
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The Old Colonial System

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PREFACE

In 1902 I published a sketch of "English Public Opinion after the Restoration," and it seemed natural to follow the colonising ideals of that period into a subsequent age of more self-conscious empire. I found an additional incentive in courses of lectures on the rise of Greater Britain and kindred topics, which I have given during the last few years in various parts of Lancashire and Cheshire in connection with the University Extension scheme of the Manchester University. One feature, which has characterised every audience with whom I have come in contact, is a complete misunderstanding of the old colonial system.

That system was in truth marked by many faults in theory and practice, and in the ensuing pages, it will, I trust, be seen how unfitted it was to sustain a great empire without radical amendment. Yet it is wrong to regard the policy under which Greater Britain evolved, and for which most English statesmen from Cromwell to Chatham strained every effort, as selfish fatuity, unworthy of the race. In the United States, this superficial view is no longer deemed a necessary tenet for the patriotic, and the circumstances under which the War of Independence arose have been approached in a truly scientific spirit, but in our own country, a traditional Whiggism still permeates most popular histories.

The genesis of the present volume lies in my desire to treat the question in a more impartial manner, and in my concern at the exasperating prevalence of this misconception of imperial history. Since I first studied the subject

as an undergraduate of Lincoln College, I have tried to dissociate discussion of the controversies of the past from the political partisanship of the present.

The materials which I have used are sufficiently indicated by the footnotes. I have had access to the numerous tracts and pamphlets therein referred to, in the Bodleian, in the Manchester University Library, and in the Manchester Free Reference Library. In regard to the due choice and appreciation of authorities, and to the general handling of the theme, I am greatly indebted to Professor Tout. His criticisms have made me aware how hard it is even to try to epitomise a vast subject in the compass of a single volume. I also owe thanks to Mr. J. A. Doyle of All Souls' College, Oxford, for valuable suggestions.

Manchester,
October, 1905.

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INTRODUCTION

The present work is intended to weigh the causes, character and results of Great Britain's old colonial system. It is proposed to examine the popular conception of the uses of empire during those portions of the reigns of George II. and George III., when that system reached its zenith. In this respect, the ideas which led the nation to choose its distinctive imperial policy, and to embark upon the two wars of the period will be dealt with at greater length than the actual details of any legislation or campaigns. Such details are ascertainable exactly and are familiar to the world, but on the other hand there can be infinite variety in representations of public opinion. It is however probable that this subject is characterised by unity, that the contrast between the Britain of 1756 and the Britain of 1775 is only superficial, that cleavage from America was due to no sudden accident of haphazard impolicy, and that there is nothing to dissociate the statesmanship which directed Wolfe to strike at Quebec, and Hawke at Quiberon, from that which allowed Burgoyne to drift to Saratoga, and Cornwallis to Yorktown. In each case the national aim was the maintenance of the same imperial ideal, and only the concurrence of colonial with British interests in the Seven Years' War disabled the politicians of the time from betraying that their ideal had feet of clay. At all events, the forces in English life, which made the struggle with France so popular and successful under Pitt, led obviously to the policy that culminated in the War of Independence; and for this

reason we propose to review the nature of that struggle and the character of Pitt's own statesmanship before dealing at length with the theory of colonial government, which ruled British aspirations until the American Revolution.

A topic like that which is indicated above hardly needs an apology. The growth of our dominions over sea is now deemed the chief feature in the modern history of Great Britain, and as statesmanship rarely comes by instinct, those who interest themselves in the politics of the present day are willing to study every aspect of the annals of the past. Most experiments are at least instructive, and we cannot be too well acquainted with the virtues and defects of the old colonial system, under which our country won North America and lost the United States. In this volume therefore after discussing the tendency in British political thought which animated the ardour for the Seven Years' War, and which created the colonial ideals of the time, we shall investigate more closely England's attempt to organise what she had won.

Such an investigation leads directly to a survey of the British standpoint during the conflict with the colonies over the Stamp Act, and during the Revolution itself. History should be free from passion if not from partisanship, and it is surely possible to view the theories upon which England's case rested without heat. It is suggested that those theories had a far more general acceptance in the country than has often been alleged by critics of the government then actually in office, and that they followed naturally upon the conquest of Canada. There was no cataclysm whatever in the evolution of the old colonial system.

The last portion of this work is concerned with the reaction in British imperial theory after 1783, and with

other results of the downfall of the lately triumphant school of political thought. It is possible that men hardly realise how accurately the colonial ideas of the Manchester economists were anticipated by the disputants who wrote in the morning of the "laisser faire" era. The closing chapter attempts to sketch how far their contentions embraced the true lessons of the fall of the old colonial system.

Throughout this book, the materials are derived from the immense storehouses of the writings of the day, rather than from more modern commentaries. However inadequate, the picture of Britain's conception of its mission in the world in the eighteenth century is drawn from the versions given by its own exponents. Pamphlet and tract are often as illustrative of popular beliefs as the speech of a minister or the text of a statute, and they give freshness and light to historical narrative. The chapters which describe the old colonial theory and the character of British opinion during the years 1765 to 1783, are especially based upon the voluminous polemical literature of that age of controversy. Under such circumstances, there is perhaps a danger of losing the bold outlines of the general theme under a mass of incidental detail, but it is hoped that the ensuing effort to keep the nature of the colonial scheme of the day always before the reader's eye will conquer the difficulties inherent to all subjects, which enjoy innumerable authorities.

The Old Colonial System

Canada the Indians were drawn by tactful diplomacy into a valuable alliance, which made the [1] French "coureur de bois" a master of woodcraft and an adept in forest warfare. The Jesuits mastered the Iroquois tongue in order to convince their hearers. Moreover, the Canadians were united under the despotism of their Intendants, and knew nothing of the religious and racial feuds which split Greater Britain into incongruous and weakened units. [2] Less hampered than the British colonists by economic restraints, and entirely free from the toils of party government, the hunters and trappers of French North America were able to make a bold bid for supremacy at the beginning of their last struggle against England. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said justly in 1755 that [3] "the oldest man living never saw such a scene. 'Tis a time of great thoughtfulness and anxiety."

In 1754 the French had descended upon the lands beyond the Blue Ridge held by the Six Nations and claimed as British territory by the English Ohio Company, which had been founded in 1748 to exploit over half a million acres lying chiefly to the north of that river. Its occupation had never been effective, and the invaders soon mastered the Ohio valley. Fort Duquesne was built; in July 1754 Fort Necessity fell. A year later General Braddock led an army of regulars and colonials into an ambuscade ten miles from Fort Duquesne, where two hundred of his men were killed and four hundred wounded. He himself died of wounds, and no fewer than sixty-eight of his officers fell. He had handled his men with a dis-

1 Gent. Mag. (1755), p. 436; Charlevoix' Journal of a Voyage to North America (1761), i. 123; Kalm's Travels (1772), ii. 379; Pownall's Administration of Brit. Colonies (1774), ii. 187.

2 Sensible Observations on General Commerce (1737), p. 63.

3 Harris's Hardwicke (1847), iii. 37.

astrous contempt for colonial methods of forest warfare. An attempt to take Fort Ticonderoga also failed. In May 1756 England formally declared war, but the government was inefficient and slow, and the colonies were backward with assistance. [1]"I dread to hear from America," Pitt wrote to Grenville in June 1756, and in August the French captured Oswego with a hundred guns and took sixteen hundred prisoners. In Europe Minorca was lost, and early in 1757 Byng was shot for not having saved it; but the example failed to turn the tide of the war. Notwithstanding Pitt's advent to power and the greater zeal of the new government, Loudon failed to take Louisburg in August 1757, and the fall and massacre of Fort William Henry took place in the same month. In September Cumberland was forced to conclude the convention of Closterseven.

Certain inherent defects in the state of Greater France helped to save England's colonies. Canada had not the solid basis of a successful settlement. Its inhabitants were absorbed either in missionary work among the Indians, or in the pursuit of furs and fish, [2]"leading," in Doctor Johnson's words, "a laborious and necessitous life in perpetual regret of the deliciousness and plenty of their native country." [3]Their population was a mere fraction of that of the British colonies, and infinitely less prosperous. Their capacity to settle effectually was spoilt by feudalism and religious bigotry. They had no town life at all, and were mentally and politically stagnant. Moreover, there was no force in France to neutralise such sources of weakness in America. King and nobles looked exclusively upon the Continent as the proper field for their warlike ambitions, and the colonial struggle was

[1] Grenville Papers (ed. 1852), i. 165.
[2] Introduction to the Political State of Great Britain (1774), p. 41.
[3] Charlevoix' Journal (1761), i. 113.

noticed only with a dull apathy. Since Colbert's day, Canada had been to the French nation no more than a waste of snow.

In contrast with such indifference, there were several tendencies in English public opinion at the time, which led directly to the popularity of a war for empire over sea. In the first place, social life was dominated by commercialism, and this spirit made men believe in the efficacy of wars of trade. National policy was governed by trade considerations, and in the light of contemporary economics, such considerations pointed towards colonial aggrandisement, and gave England a predisposition to meet the crisis in America in a manner worthy of a fighting race. All observers of British ideas at this time agree as to the strength of this mercantile war spirit, and to pessimists it was even a source of misgiving. They argued that the fruits of England's wars fell to the prudent not to the brave, and that to play the part of a modern Carthage was fatal. Wealth had no saving virtue on the day of battle, and the custom of entrusting a large share in national defence to alien mercenaries was thought ignobly characteristic. John Brown's "Estimate of the Manners and Principles of the Times," and John Shebbeare's "Letters on the English Nation" painted the people as sordid, avaricious and immoral. Self-interest certainly swayed the corrupt and oligarchic legislature, and politics were always discussed on a plane from which principles were banished. The excise was opposed in 1733, as being imposed upon [1]"the sweat of the laborious brows of brewers and distillers." Men fought avowedly for the most material objects only. Gold ruled the aspirations of the greatest, and India afforded many examples of its fatal

1 The Excise Anatomized, by Z. G. (1733), p. 9.

power at the time, especially during the years between 1760 and 1765. The significant trail of commercialism lay so markedly over all national thought, that even poets delighted in the growth of manufacturing towns at the expense of the country districts. Thus John Dyer, in "The Fleece," says of the aspect of ancient Carthage,

[1]". . . . So appear
Th' increasing walls of busy Manchester,
Sheffield and Birmingham, whose redd'ning fields
Rise, and enlarge their suburbs."

Fancy loved to frolic over British markets.

[2]"On Guinea's sultry strand the drap'ry light
Of Manchester and Norwich is bestowed,"

while Lancashire was said to provide

[3]"The thin shading trail for Agra's nymphs."

To optimists of course, this dominance of trade motives was something to be proud of, and certainly it showed the practical nature of English enthusiasm, as distinguished from the fever of French militarism, which drained the life blood of that country to maintain the spurious glory of Continental dominion.

Side by side with this predominance of mercantilism, was another tendency in English life, leading towards the popularity of wars for empire. The people were undergoing a wave of sensationalism. A love of excitement characterised all classes, and this trait has helped to support war policies in every age. [4]In 1741 the London mob celebrated Vernon's exploit at Carthagena by four

1 The Fleece, by J. Dyer LL.B. (1757), p. 101.
2 *ibid*, p. 129.
3 *ibid*, p. 109.
4 Paston's Little Memoirs (1901), p. 36.

nights of orgy, in which every window that was not illuminated was broken, and in which Westminster was pampered by the gift of free beer. There was a general thirst for novelty. Selwyn's impetuosity to obtain a good view of the breaking of Damiens on the wheel at Paris led the French crowd to make way for him as [1] "an Englishman and an amateur." Speculation did not end with the South Sea bubble, when the most sober of citizens [2] "never dreamt of less than three or four thousand a year." When Goldsmith studied medicine at Leyden he wrote home that [3] "the Dutch slumber, the French chatter, the English play at cards." [4] Westminster Bridge and the British Museum were largely built by means of the proceeds of lotteries. In the world of fashion, the craving for excitement was hardly satisfied by the most extravagant games of chance, while the lower orders indulged in bull and bear-baiting and cock-fights, and played football recklessly in the streets. Naval officers were the terror of seaports. [5] "Good Lord! What men!" wrote a traveller from Lausanne, who saw them rioting at Portsmouth in the reign of George II. The excitable and adventurous character of British society at the time, made it very liable to the influence of a war spirit, and a conflict for high stakes in America and in the east offered allurement to the jaded.

A third feature in the England of that day, which gave the nation a bias towards favouring a French war was the state of political life. Walpole's finance had provided the country with ample means wherewith to carry on a successful struggle, while at the same time, the parliamentary

1 H. Walpole's Memoirs (ed. 1851), ii. 97.
2 James Houstoun's Works (1753), p. 119.
3 Prior's Life of Goldsmith (1837), i. 163.
4 The Lottery Displayed (1771), p. 7.
5 Letters of de Saussure (ed. 1902), p. 360.

system of intrigue and dishonesty, which he had encouraged, made men weary of confining public events to the category of aristocratic wrangles. England now sighed for something more exhilarating. She was utterly tired of such leaders as Pelham who had no ardour, and of Henry Fox who had no principles, of Granville who had sunk into premature dotage, and of Newcastle the prototype of the politically corrupt. She was weary of their lordly cliques, of favouritism and bribery, of places and pensions. There was indeed a great opportunity for a man of genius to break away from the hated network of oligarchy, to clear the public mind from the parliamentary cant, which represented the Revolution settlement of 1689 as an ideal constitution. The nation longed for a statesman to arise from the ruck of office-hunters. For this reason, it cannot be surprising to find Englishmen keenly susceptible to the teachings of William Pitt, who emerged from this wilderness of sordid egoism to preach a new Crusade—a Crusade moreover, which appealed to the already prevailing passions of the hour. A great man fighting against the current of public opinion rarely conquers it; swimming with the stream, he is irresistible.

One secret of Pitt's success is that he was barely ahead of his age. He had his contemporaries' hatred of France; he had their love of national aggrandisement, and their belief in colonial trade restrictions. His character and statesmanship are therefore particularly worthy of study, and it is probably more important to examine his personal view of the Seven Years' War than the views of the people who gave him their support. However, in the present chapter, it is proposed to ignore the Great Commoner himself—if such a course is possible—and to deal with the people only. We have to understand the nature of English political thought while Pitt was transforming the war into scenes of British glory.

With the exception of two months in 1757 Pitt was chief minister from December 1756 to October 1761, and the successes of the remaining two years of the war were the heritage of his administration. Nominally one of the heads of the political clique formerly led by Pelham, but really welcomed for the moment by all the Whig factions, he gave the people a new interest in public affairs. The hold of the Whig nobles upon political power was more solid and lasting than his own personal influence, but the glamour of success was his, if only for a day, and the country acknowledged him the creator of its triumphs in the war. In 1758 Senegal and Goree were conquered: in the July of the same year, Louisburg, a great fort in Cape Breton Island and the key of Canada, surrendered, with a garrison of nearly six thousand men, to Amherst and Wolfe. In the same month, Abercromby was repulsed at Ticonderoga, but the enthusiasm at home was shared by army and navy, and after the fall of Louisburg, Wolfe wrote, "It is my humble opinion that the French may be rooted out," while Amherst stated that [1]"What I wish to do is to go to Quebec." In November 1758 Fort Duquesne was taken at last by General Forbes and re-named Pittsburg. In May 1759 Guadeloupe was subdued, and in August Boscawen gained a great naval victory off Cape Lagos in Portugal. In September Wolfe took Quebec. Of the actual details of his generalship there is no need to speak here, but it is worth noticing that only four days before his death and triumph, he wrote: [2]"My constitution is entirely ruined without the consolation of having done any considerable service to the state or without any prospect of it." Wolfe's work was soon followed by the

1 Chatham Correspondence (ed. 1838), i. 330.
2 *ibid*, i. 425.

conquest of Canada. In November 1759 Hawke dashed Conflans' fleet to pieces among the rocks of Quiberon Bay. In Germany, English troops had done much to win the battle of Minden in August. Before the peace of 1763 the French West Indies were reduced, while in the east, the genius of Clive had supplanted France by England as destined arbiter of India. In January 1762 war was declared against Spain, and Havannah and Manila were conquered in the autumn. By the peace of Paris of 1763 France ceded Canada, Cape Breton, St. John, Senegal, St. Vincent, Grenada, Dominica, and Tobago to England, and Louisiana to Spain, which in turn gave up Florida and the right to cut timber in Honduras to Great Britain.

Nothing gains adherents for a government more speedily than military success, and no one will wonder at the volume of enthusiasm evoked by such a roll of victories. Pitt found a large part of the nation already only waiting for some break in the continuity of England's misfortunes to become rapturous for the war, and his deft choice of good men, and good plans of campaign in 1759 created what is probably still the high-water mark in the history of the spirit of militarism in Great Britain. By that time, he had learnt the mistake of wasting resources upon unprofitable raids on the French coast, and he gave the people some substantial fruits of their eagerness for conflict. The intensity of their zeal for the colonial war was so great that even the magnitude of the armies and subsidies lavished upon the German struggle had come to pass almost uncriticised.

It would however be most unfair to attribute England's zeal during the Seven Years' War to mere intoxication with success. As we have seen above, the general tendency of the time lay in the direction of fighting trade rivals, such conflicts being considered so essential to commercial

greatness that [1]the Turkey company tried to exclude a Quaker from its councils in 1759 as professing opinions detrimental to the waging of trade wars. Long before 1756, the people had tried to interest their government in the cause of expansion. It was the trading class, who forced Walpole into the Spanish war of 1739 in spite of his love of peace and contempt for all such imperial projects as Berkeley's scheme of founding a university in Bermuda, and the pamphlets of the day attest to the eagerness of the nation at large to divert the aristocracy from its absorption in domestic cabals to the larger question of the struggle for survival in America. [2]It was urged that all England would support a war to secure colonial supremacy. [3]All our troubles were attributed to French schemes to subvert our empire. While the ministry was dallying with European diplomacy, [4]England's legs were being hamstrung across the Atlantic. No force in the world could withstand British infantry, and so the country should strike at once. The only sensible policy in view of the French depredations of 1754 was to move energetically, argued the "Cobbler's Letter" of 1756; [5]"war, my brave Britons, war."

Thus the spirit of battle awoke in England. [6]It was then the vogue to pelt foreigners in London with dead dogs and cats on Lord Mayor's day, and now the mob assuming that all foreigners were Frenchmen, hurled in addition the old epithet of [7]"French dog" at every

1 Burr's Reports, ii. 1003 (R. v. March).
2 Present State of the Revenues of France and Spain (1740), p. 45.
3 A Letter from a Cobbler to the People of England (1756), p. 9.
4 *ibid*, p. 12.
5 *ibid*, p. 29.
6 Letters of de Saussure (ed. 1902), p. 111.
7 *ibid*, p. 112; Baretti's Journey from London to Genoa (1770), i. 64.

stranger. In November 1755 [1]Garrick was attacked for employing French actors on the stage in Noverre's Chinese ballet, and it is suggestive to read that in 1760 [2]the theatres were considered to support the war feeling even more warmly than the press. In general however, the zealots of the day were as sober as they were ambitious. The war party knew what it wanted. Thus in a "Letter from a Merchant of the city of London," the writer pointed at [3]North America as the prize for which his country had then to contend. With such an end before it, parsimony was absurd. [4]If she had spent two millions instead of £200,000 in 1756 she would have won and held Crown Point and Oswego. American colonists should be made to contribute more adequately towards the cost of their own defence. All writers of this school followed Pitt in emphasising the imperial character of the war. It was being waged for the maintenance of British interests all the world over. One essayist said very correctly, [5]"If ever there was a national war, this is truly such a one." The future of the whole race was in the balance, and the quarrel with France was vital to every Briton, and not merely a dispute, personal to "the weavers of Yorkshire, Norwich or the west, the cutlers of Sheffield, or the button makers of Birmingham."

For the time, the nation forgot its old terror of a standing army. The evils of the press-gang were forgiven. It was not the people's fault if supplies for the soldiery were diverted by dastardly contractors, for money was

1 Private Correspondence of David Garrick (ed. 1831), p. xxx.
2 Grosley's Tour to London (1772), i. 97.
3 Letter from a Merchant (1757), p. 9.
4 *ibid*, p. 30.
5 Interest of Great Britain (1759), p. 20.

lavished upon their comforts, and [1] Wolfe even complained that they suffered from too much pay and too much rum. Benevolence was then a strong factor in English life, and combined with patriotism, it gave impetus to the Marine Society, founded by Fowler Walker, a barrister in 1756 for the purpose of collecting waifs and strays for the navy. The scheme was forwarded with spirit by Sir John Fielding and Jonas Hanway, the oriental traveller, and subscriptions were contributed by the corporations of London, Bristol, Leeds, York and Norwich. [2] Between 1756 and 1762, 5451 boys were drafted from the streets to the navy, and 4787 enlisted as naval volunteers. Youths flocked into both branches of the service, and [3] special performances were given by Garrick, Rich and the proprietors of Ranelagh, to raise funds for the Marine Society. In May 1756 the government waived its right to share in prize money accruing from subsequent French captures, with a view to encourage officers and seamen, while [4] the King devoted the proceeds of the sale of prizes taken before the declaration of war, amounting to over £700,000, to the national cause. [5] In 1759 the Court of Common Council subscribed £1,000 towards a voluntary London fund to bestow bounties upon recruits, to which [6] the City Companies contributed liberally. [7] The people of Newcastle raised sufficient money to furnish each recruit who joined the Royal Volunteers or the sixty-ninth regiment then quartered in the town, with a gratuity of two guineas,

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. ix.; pt. 3, 75.
2 J. Pugh's Life of Hanway (1768), p. 143.
3 *ibid*, p. 142.
4 Consideration on the Trade of this Kingdom (1766), p. 30.
5 Annual Register (1759), p. 106.
6 *ibid*, p. 115.
7 *ibid*, p. 116.

while Berwick emulated Newcastle by offering three guineas. For once England made light of the difficulty in completing her establishment, under which she laboured during the whole century. Every county encouraged its soldiery. Isaac Barré, afterwards an adherent of Shelburne and an opponent of the forward policy in America, fought under Wolfe at Rochefort, and organised the Black Musqueteers in 1761; Gibbon and his father served in the Hampshire militia for over three years. [1] In 1759 fourteen thousand militiamen did not object to remaining under arms in spite of the haymaking and harvest seasons. [2] "You may be easy as to the consequences of invasion," wrote Lord Holderness laughingly to Lord George Sackville, "as the Yorkshire militia is ready to take the field." Large sums were raised for the relief of widows and orphans. In 1762 upwards of [3] 337,000 men were employed on land and sea in the British service, of whom 57,000 were German mercenaries and 20,000 colonials. The ratio of British-born soldiery was for that age remarkably high, and their morale never better. The heroes of the war live still in song and story. An eloquent contemporary said of Boscawen that he [4] "established the British fame in remotest Asia, and made the Indies echo with his thunder"; the Marquis of Granby became a popular idol, while Hawke, when thanked for his deeds by the Houses of Parliament, answered simply, [5] "In doing my utmost, I only did the duty I owed my King and country."

It cannot be disputed that the polemical literature which supported the work of these men of action reached a

1 Bedford Correspondence (ed. 1842), ii. 393.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. ix.; pt. 3, 79.
3 Annual Register (1763), p. 50.
4 The Real Character of the Age (1757).
5 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xv. 958.

comparatively high level of good sense. If the enemy were assailed with scurrility, such abuse was not levelled against them as Frenchmen, but rather as against obstacles in the way of the national mission. Men felt very honestly on the question of America. It was thought essential to England to save her own territory, and win that of the French. Politicians had unsound views as to the true uses of a colony, but of its value as a market they had very clear perception, and this calculating statesmanship was never wholly obscured by the enthusiasm with which it was supported. Most apostles of the war policy remained cool and alert, even when Pitt himself seemed to lose his feet in the rush of triumphs.

The foundation of a firm empire was thus a genuine object of the majority of Englishmen, who little dreamed then that their choice of means was destined shortly to subvert it. [1]"Farewell imperial England," wrote Joseph Baretti, Doctor Johnson's Italian friend in 1759, a significant term in the mouth of one who knew the meaning of empire, and had seen [2]militiamen drilling at Honiton. Hundreds of poems proclaimed the virtues of England's new militant ideal. [3]"'Britannia resting on her ported spear" supplanted the complacent goddess of the days of Walpole's peace. One Jones dedicated his "Patriot Enterprize" to Pitt, and vaunted "the crimson cross of England" in 1758;

> [4]"Around the globe her dreaded flag display,
> Let ocean's utmost bounds her flag obey."

James Ogden chose the same stirring theme for his poem, called "The British Lion Roused."

1 Baretti's Journey from London to Genoa (1770), i. 3.
2 *ibid*, i. 8.
3 W. Dobson's Prussian Campaign (1759), p. 25.
4 Gent. Mag. (1758), p. 282.

[1]"Aloft the British flag defiance hurls
Her topsail lately loos'd the Frenchman furls."

Sheer exultation breathes in every line of such appeals to popular ardour, though the Annual Register of 1762 is careful to explain that the nation's self-confidence was not based on arrogance or presumption, but on [2]" a just opinion of superior courage." Patrick, a volunteer who fought at Quebec, wrote a "Poetical Essay," in which patriotism burned very brightly.

[3]"Short the dispute, for when could Gallic strength
Withstand a British arm?"

He ranged over the world-wide scenes of English conquest, including even "inmost Afric," while [4]another bard treated the flag as supreme from the sands of Africa to the snows of Nova Zembla. Patrick however, saw the practical side of the war as well, and in discussing its chief issue, he said with much truth and acumen that it was [5]"a war perhaps the most just and simple that ever nation engaged in, and entered into with uncommon spirit by King and people." In the struggle for survival among would-be world empires, each combatant has a just cause and a clear issue at stake.

Such then was the general impression, and the Great Commoner found it easy to stir men's already kindling thoughts. London, as the centre of English commerce, throbbed with the war spirit, and furnished the army with as many recruits as did the whole of Protestant Ireland; Catholics were not allowed to enlist. [6]Flags

1 Ogden's British Lion (1758), p. 13.
2 Annual Register (1762), p. 6.
3 Patrick's Quebec (1760), p. 20.
4 Annual Register (1763), p. 226.
5 Patrick's Quebec (1760), p. 2.
6 H. Walpole's Letters to Mann (ed. 1833), iii. 292.

captured at Louisburg were carried in triumph to St. Paul's, and cannon taken at Cherbourg were trailed into Hyde Park. The rich "Nabobs," who were just entering English society now that Clive's genius had for the first time opened the way to making large private fortunes in India, gave solid support to those who preached the uses of trade wars. Clive was devoted to Pitt, and when the great victory of Plassey had made him master of northern India, he presented him with a very beautiful and uncommon animal from Bengal. [1]A Cambridgeshire vicar called Wilson made the first recorded suggestion of constructing a Panama canal, calling upon the government to conquer the Isthmus. Success in Canada converted many of the Whig nobles from their early indifference. [2]"Great and most seasonable news," wrote Newcastle to Bedford after Quebec. [3]"Interesting news, and I hope to find the price of beaver hats much lowered," was Baretti's drier comment. Newcastle indeed, though remaining [4]jealous of Pitt, and pleased when he fell in 1761, realised something of the glory of the new efficiency. [5]"My heart is so full of the joyful news," he said after the taking of Louisburg, and certainly such successes were so captivating that there seemed to be need no longer of the artificial propaganda of an [6]Anti-Gallican Association, which had been called into being for the diffusion of odes to Pitt, and invectives against France. [7]The gallery and pit interrupted the Drury Lane pantomime in order to make the band play "God save great George the King." In 1759

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. vi.; pt. 1, 316.
2 Bedford Correspondence, ii. 415.
3 Baretti's Journey from London to Genoa (1770), iv. 44.
4 Nicholls' Recollections (1822), i. 9.
5 Grenville Papers, i. 259.
6 For Our Country (1757), p. 17.
7 Kilmansegg's Journey in England (ed. 1902), p. 225.

one writer treated England's various acquisitions as already her children;

> [1]"Here Senegal hold up your head;
> This tawny boy, his parents' boast,
> Shall bring us gold from Afric's coast,
> And mark these twins of Indian mien,
> This Louisburg, and this Du Quesne."

After all, it is not often that a country can claim without dispute that its chief minister is the greatest figure in the world, and such indeed was Pitt. [2]In regions as remote as Armenia and Georgia, men looked to him for deliverence from the Turkish yoke. Every Englishman who thought himself a bard sought to do him honour, from Goldsmith and Mark Akenside down to William Whitehead, the laureate himself.

However, the Judges were no less successful than the poets in exemplifying the mercantile aspect of the war. When the great Sir William Scott delivered judgment in the leading case of *The Immanuel* in 1799, he alluded deferentially to "the revered decisions" of the Court of Appeal of 1756. That Court had expressed the so-called Rule of the War of 1756 that no neutral could trade between a belligerent country and such of that country's colonies, from which neutrals had been excluded before the outbreak of hostilities. The French had opened the doors of their colonial markets under stress of the war, but the English courts deemed any Dutch or Hamburg neutrals, who availed themselves of this too opportune free trade, interlopers in a belligerent traffic, and as such incorporated into the French navigation and liable to be condemned. This is a clear instance of the manner in which the Judges

1 Annual Register (1759), p. 442.

2 Original Letters (ed. Rebecca Warner, 1817), pp. 176, 178.

have treated English customary ideas as law. The country was but a novice in International Law. Murray had composed his famous refutation of Prussian claims in the affair of the Silesian loan in 1753, simply by means of special research. The device of France in opening her colonial trade to neutrals puzzled English jurists at first, and as Anne, Princess of Orange and guardian of the young stadtholder, William V., was an English princess, [1]Pitt favoured her by releasing certain Dutch offenders in 1758. The question however soon rose again when Anne died, and Pitt changed his attitude. Jenkinson, who had already proved that the Netherlands were bound by the treaty of 1717 to give England active assistance instead of covert hostility, had already [2]searched London for Dutch authorities on International Law, there being no English book on the subject later than that of Zouch (1650), and had advised the government in 1757 that the trade complained of was illegal. By the middle of 1759 the English principle was established, largely owing to the determination of [3]Pitt and the opinions of [4]Hardwicke and Mansfield. Thenceforward, [5]few cases arise on the point, as most of the French colonies had been conquered, and trade with the remainder had become too hazardous. Two Dutch ships were condemned by the Lords of Appeal in March 1760, and two more in the following June. The judicial decisions on the question show clearly that colonies were then considered to have no independent existence apart from their Mother Country, and to have by nature what a later age has called "closed doors."

1 Chatham Correspondence, i. 357.
2 Grenville Papers, i. 270.
3 Authentic Memoirs of Chatham (1778), p. 20.
4 Grenville Papers, ii. 295.
5 Annual Register (1759), p. 5.

Of course, there were doubters, for even Pitt could not charm all Britain into unanimity. The bulk of the nation echoed his colonial ambitions, but one section stood aloof from the war policy altogether. The Leicester House clique did not disagree on the American question, but they hated the waste of men and money on Continental battle-fields. In opposition to George II.'s schemes, they had no patience for the sounding paradox, "conquering America on the plains of Germany."

[1] "Yes, he forsook the empire of the main,
With British blood dy'd every German plain."

There were however others, who objected to the whole theory of empire upon which Pitt's policy was based. They would rather have seen the French carve out what dominions they might choose to exploit in the west, than incur the long exhaustion involved by even successful warfare. Shebbeare for instance, ridiculed the scheme of American supremacy. [2] Our alarm of French attacks on our colonies was attributed to the private interest and backstairs influence of a certain Quaker. The dull [3] Lord Hillsborough, who was afterwards made Secretary of State for India before he knew the geographical whereabouts of Bengal, refused to believe that the French had encroached upon the Ohio valley at all. Grenville, a far abler man, disclaimed the prevailing habit of fighting for mere trade interests. With a dim premonition of the future problem of ways and means, that was destined to lead him to suggest the Stamp Act, he opposed the forward school in 1755, as bent on dragging England into a war for

[1] The Patriot Poet, a Satire (1764), p. 10.
[2] A Letter to the People of England on the Present Situation (1755), p. 33.
[3] Wraxall's Memoirs (ed. 1818), ii. 156.

gold, [1]"vexing your neighbours for a little muck." [2]Horace Walpole objected to endangering our own island for visionary empire on the Ohio. When the war had lasted several years, the voice of opposition became more articulate. The severe winter of 1759–60 occasioned distress, while Pitt had no mastery of finance, and critics complained that the incidence of his taxation of beer, malt and cider fell [3]"upon the most useful and laborious part of the nation." This was no idle charge, as the liquor interest procured the passing of [4]an act enabling victuallers and others to raise the price of strong beer and ale, and thereby to transfer their own burden to the consumers. In 1761 David Hume deplored [5]"this miserable war." In 1762 one writer pointed out the horrors of the protracted struggle with more than a touch of Swift, and asked whether [6]"a few wooden legs or a battered French ship" were worth the price of war. [7]Would it not be better to till the earth and throw the shuttle? Similar doubts led [8]Sir Samuel Romilly in after days to declare that all the glories of Pitt's policy and of the Seven Years' War, did not confer a moment's happiness to humanity, but merely much bloodshed and a burdensome debt.

In general however, the war party predominated, and in few British wars has a government been able to rely on so effective a majority. [9]The Senegal expedition was made

1 G. Bubb Dodington's Diary (July 21, 1755).
2 H. Walpole's Letters to Mann, iii. 326.
3 An Enquiry into the Conduct of a late Rt. Hon. Commoner (1766), p. 15; *cf.* Consideration on the Trade etc. of this kingdom (1766), p. 6.
4 2 Geo. iii. c. 14.
5 Hume's Private Correspondence (ed. 1820), p. 3.
6 Some Reasons for Serious Candor (1762), p. 7.
7 *ibid*, p. 8.
8 Romilly's Memoirs (ed. 1840), i. 402.
9 Authentic Memoirs of Chatham (1778), p. 19.

at the suggestion of Cumming, a Quaker, and every class [1] contributed towards providing the army with thousands of flannel waistcoats, woollen gloves and caps, and half-gaiters. Among the ministers of the time, Pitt, and Pitt alone, was essentially the people's choice. There is so great a volume of evidence as to England's practical unanimity in her colonial aspirations during the Seven Years' War, that one cannot help asking why so vast a power for good was frittered away in a decade. It is true that her theory of empire was as yet crude and fallacious, and that much of her zeal was undisciplined, but it is just possible that such defects could have been cured by a wise leader. The empire was young, and her children over sea, like Washington, rejoiced with her children in the home country that [2] "the French are so well drubbed." The motive power which had constructed Greater Britain, was surely capable of something more than conquest. Yet though the conquerors thus required immediate education, their master's hand shook at the crucial moment, for Pitt allowed their imperial ardour to sink into the profitless channels of Continental militarism. He did not rise above his generation to find the true science of colonial government. Great as he was, he fell just short of that consummate statesmanship, which might possibly have made the elements in English life evoked by the French war a source of perpetual union among Britons rather than seeds of separation. Be that as it may, there are few war administrations to which Englishmen can look back with more respect than that which witnessed Plassey and Quebec. The country then showed a wonderful capacity to understand and to endure a most momentous crisis.

1 Annual Register (1760), p. 67.

2 Sparks' Writings of Washington (1847), ii. 332.

Unfortunately the subsequent necessity to organise and perpetuate the empire she had created proved too great a task and Pitt's warning to Hardwicke after the capture of Quebec dipped into an actual future. [1] "Sustaining this war, arduous as it has been and still is, may not be more difficult than properly and happily closing it."

1 Harris's Hardwicke, iii. 193.

CHAPTER II.

Pitt's Influence as Minister.

Pitt's chief title to fame lies in his power to awaken enthusiasm for the cause of Greater Britain. He found dormant possibilities in English life, and he made them valuable realities. He saw tendencies, which might be utilised for the empire, and he made them do service for that purpose. His boast, "I alone can save this country," was true, and he guided the state in the Seven Years' War towards vast territorial aggrandisement. For this reason, we can be too censorious as to the crooked paths by which Pitt groped his way to power. They are really irrelevant to his place in history. Like most great statesmen, he considered that the end justified the means, and so he truckled to the prejudices of the hour until he was once supreme. Then he showed his real convictions, and after 1755, he never conceded an iota to any popular clamour, with which he did not agree. Thus as a "boy patriot," yearning for opportunities, he had denounced [1]Hanover as "a despicable electorate," and as "an execrable mill-stone hung about the neck of Great Britain." As minister, he styled it [2]"as dear to us as Hampshire," and the mill-stone became [3]"a cork jacket." In opposition, he had received in 1744 a legacy of £10,000 from the Duchess of

1 An Enquiry into the Conduct of a late Rt. Hon. Commoner (1766), p. 12; A Letter to Will Chat-em (1766), p. 19.

2 Dodington's Diary (Aug. 6, 1755).

3 A Vindication of the Conduct of the Great Commoner (1766), p. 9.

Marlborough to enable him to work [1]"unplaced and unpensioned"; in office, he was lavish in such instruments of allurement. [2]As late as November 1755, he had denounced foreign wars and subsidies; his own ministry thought of little else. Judged however, as empire-builder and colonial theorist, Pitt's past inconsistencies should not be treated too seriously. They had no bearing upon the influence which he exercised over the country during the Seven Years' War, and it is this influence that is really all-important in estimating Pitt's share in the evolution of British imperial policy. It has been suggested that possibly his change of front can be justified by the change in the character of the European conflict; German campaigns were no longer of merely Hanoverian interest.

Undoubtedly, Pitt's greatest work was to give the nation scope for its latent capacity for expansion. For many years, the potentiality of a Crusade against France had been there. Pitt made the Crusade a practical and successful undertaking. He was indifferent to finance; he was given to acting, and often lacked balance and sobriety, but no Englishman has ever attained to his power to evoke enthusiasm, or to his genius for sustaining that enthusiasm by efficiency in action. In this, he showed himself a man of the times. He was distinguished from the average citizen only by his far greater talents; he had the same national ambitions, and the same sound appreciation of how best to carry out a working project. Careless though he was of popular criticism, he was the first to learn wisdom through experience, and men recognized how directly he was the cause of their triumphs on sea and in the field. He had a genius for discovering talent, and

1 An Enquiry etc., p. 11.

2 An Examination of the Principles of a late Rt. Hon. Gentleman (1766), p. 29.

Wolfe and Boscawen, Amherst and Pocock were all objects of his own personal choice, as were the diplomatists, Louis Dutens, and Hans Stanley. Pitt was bent on making Greater Britain a permanent empire, and with that end in view, he never hesitated to stimulate the general hatred of the house of Bourbon. [1]In 1755 he urged that the government ought never to have allowed the French to establish themselves in America at all, and he clung to this principle to the last. His resignation in October 1761 was directly due to the King's aversion to declaring war on Spain, and in 1763, when it looked as if some of the fruits of his work might be lost through the shallow leniency of Bute, he declaimed against the retrocession of Manila and Havannah, and declared maritime and colonial supremacy to be essentials of British policy. Even William of Orange did not evince greater animus against France than did Pitt during the years of his power. [2]When the Duc de Nivernois remonstrated against certain acts of piracy by Englishmen, he was told that if Great Britain were only just to her neighbour, the latter's existence would not last another fifty years.

Pitt's influence upon the people was naturally immense, and their consequent realisation of the issues involved by the war won the struggle for England. [3]In America Dinwiddie explained the true gravity of the situation to the Virginia assembly, while Arthur Dobbs enlisted support in North Carolina in 1755, by dilating upon French depredations in Protestant Germany, and along the frontier of our American colonies. He said that Britain's object was to confine the enemy to inhospitable Canada and the hot sands of Louisiana, instead of suffering them

1 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xv. 605.

2 Soulavie, Mémoires du règne de Louis xvi. (ed. 1801), iii. 372.

3 Gent. Mag. (1755), p. 305.

to perfect their own plans of conquest, [1]"hatched in hell, and supported by the court of Rome." In England Pitt did much to encourage national self-confidence, or (as some will say) vainglory, for choice between two such terms is usually arbitrary. Pessimists, who had lamented the futility of British efforts in 1754 and 1755, and the seeming decadence of national spirit, were now attacked with vigour. [2]Brown, who had pointed with dismay at our reliance on foreign mercenaries in 1745, and [3]had questioned the efficacy of subsidies if an invader once reached Salisbury Plain, was now judged to be refuted. The army had disproved their alleged inability to do more than polish helmets, and march past correctly. [4]"Our soldiers dress better than others," wrote one of Pitt's adherents in 1757, "but sir, they also fight better. We have beau Admirals, and the prettiest gentleman of the age commands a ship of war. You infer from hence they will not fight but . . . . if an enemy takes your word, I am persuaded he will repent it bitterly. There is nothing inconsistent in valour and a clean shirt. The best dressed head may face an enemy as erect as the uncombed Charles of Sweden." This writer looked forward to England outshining Greece and Rome under Pitt's guidance. He deemed his country naturally supreme, not only in war but also in the arts of peace. It had even shown its appreciation of music by welcoming the "Messiah," and as to our chances in the struggle for America they were bright indeed. "The reverence for liberty and property is so religiously stamped on every breast that the meanest Briton (if it be possible a Briton can be mean) would wish

1 *ibid*, p. 306.
2 Brown's Estimate of the Manners of the Times (1757), p. 91.
3 *ibid*, p. 201.
4 The Real Character of the Age (1757).

to live free rather than be a Frenchman and a slave." In Scotland, Pitt's wisdom led to the raising of two Highland regiments—Montgomery's (the 77th) and Fraser's (the 78th) in 1757, a step which led to the formation of others in 1759 and 1760.

It seems to have been also largely due to Pitt, that George II. earned popularity in the last years of his reign. Previously the King had hated him for his opposition, but Court support was still most useful to a ministry, and Pitt won it by his conversion to a policy of self-assertion abroad. He assured Cumberland of his wish [1]"to efface the past." In return, he defended that unlucky general after Closterseven, and always identified the Crown with the national ambitions in the war. [2]In Parliament, the old King became universally popular. He was at last in a situation for which he had qualifications, and his candid preference for English generals like Clive over Germans like Ferdinand of Brunswick, and his liking for Hawke, whom he called "my captain," showed the new relationship between King and people. They began to appreciate his good work in keeping the army free from corrupt patronage.

However, the most important historical question which arises in reference to this time, is how far Pitt turned the enthusiasm which he so largely created to the best advantage. We must ask whether he utilised the new imperial ardour to the full, and whether he could control the flood of national feeling which he had evoked, in order to organise an empire as well as victories.

It is exceedingly difficult to surmise whether Pitt contemplated any remodelling of colonial relations as a necessary sequel to the conquest of North America. It is

1 P. Fitzgerald's Townshend (1866), p. 97.
2 Arthur Young's Autobiography (ed. 1898), p. 17.

probable that he had drifted away from his single-minded endeavours to expand the empire long before his fall in 1761. Undoubtedly, he did aim consistently at the supplanting of a French by a British world empire, but in the whirl of military triumphs, this scheme appears to have sunk into a group of other aims of far less national moment, and this modification of his policy of 1756 had very serious influence upon popular thought. Men were so subject to his personal opinions, that his subordination of colonial dreams to European policy led to absolute popular neglect of the far more vital question of how to govern America after 1763. Converted to the plan of injuring France in Europe, Pitt never taught them that the expulsion of the French from Canada necessitated a readjustment of the existing colonial system, and even in his subsequent wealth of oratory on the subject of American taxation, he never pointed out any concise scheme of reconstruction. English indifference to the need for a new imperial policy can therefore be attributed largely to Pitt's exclusive attention to conquering America on the plains of Germany. [1] That policy was abhorrent to him in 1755, but by three subsequent treaties Great Britain agreed to subsidise Frederick the Great, and men and money were sent to the Continent in profusion, for the purpose of aiding him in his struggle against France, Austria and Russia. The alliance clearly injured France; it was probably necessary at the time though Bute's reckless abandonment of Prussia in November 1762 forfeited England's claims upon her gratitude. It is doubtful however, if Pitt's famous paradox was much better than a bare excuse. It is true that France's absorption in the Continental war proved her ruin over sea, but such was the customary trend of her politics; and the same conflict

1 Harris's Hardwicke, iii. 33.

would have diverted her from America, even if Pitt had not stiffened Prussian resistance by soldiers and subsidies. The tendency in France to prefer European dominion to colonial expansion was already irresistible, and if the dust was in the eyes of the French government, it was not of Pitt's throwing.

Moreover, Pitt's interest in the German war seems to have encroached on his interest in purely colonial policy, when once the conflict had taken a decisive turn. At all events, his joy over Prussian victories was not expressed in a manner calculated to give the impression that he regarded the war as primarily maritime and colonial. [1]"Here's enough to make one giddy," he wrote delightedly after Frederick's victory at Breslau. In June 1758 he wrote to Grenville that [2]"we are all joy here," on account of the battle of Creveld. "We are sending twelve squadrons of English cavalry to this glorious school of war, and I hope to share a sprig of Germanic laurel very soon,"—words which are hard to reconcile with the idea that he had engaged in the German war as a disagreeable necessity for the sake of more English issues. After [3]"our happy victory" of Minden, he sems to have believed in the expediency of continuing to support the campaigns of [4]"our immortal Frederick" for mere glory's sake. Ferdinand of Brunswick, who led English troops in Prussian service with skill and success, was [5]rewarded by a grant of £25,000, a sword worth £1,000, a blue ribbon, and £2,500 a year secured on the Irish establishment, while English officers who were "conquering America" in

1 Chatham Correspondence, ii. 2.
2 Grenville Papers, i. 244.
3 Chatham Correspondence, ii. 7.
4 *ibid*, ii. 9.
5 Letter to Will Chat-em Esquire of Turn-about Hall (1766), p. 28.

America itself had no such favours. Nor was Hawke rewarded with a peerage until 1765.

It must indeed be admitted that [1]some Englishmen believed that no trans-Atlantic war could be waged successfully against France, without some Continental alliance. One of Pitt's supporters argued in Parliament in 1762 that [2]"the minister who goes to war with France, when that nation is in her full vigour, without a diversion on the Continent does it with a halter about his neck," and a typical Whig of 1781 ascribed our failures in the American War to its being [3]"one of those stupid wars which the Tories have always clamoured for—a naval war with France without any land war in which our men might die in German ditches." On the other hand, contemporary evidence rather points to the conclusion that Pitt was simply carried off his feet by the flood of military successes. [4]"Happy, happy day," he wrote on hearing the escape of Quebec from the pressing danger of recapture in 1760. "My joy and hurry are inexpressible." In the rush of the busy war administration, which made such hurry inevitable, he had little time to look beyond the present, and after Wolfe's triumph, he seems to have allowed public opinion to be more centred in the European war than in the prospect opened out for England in the west. He did indeed enlist sympathy for the coming maritime struggle with Spain, but he none the less looked on Germany with a gaze more rapt than discriminating. He was very sensitive to what Junius mockingly described as [5]"the guttural pomp of a German campaign," and his

[1] The Case of the British Troops serving in Germany (1761), p. 29; Reasons in support of the War in Germany (1762), p. 28.

[2] Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xv. 1226.

[3] Arthur Young's Autobiography, p. 108.

[4] Chatham Correspondence, ii. 45.

[5] Letters of Junius, ii. 186.

advocacy of the Prussian cause was so earnest that even in America itself, we find George Washington writing in 1760, [1] "We are in pain here for the King of Prussia, and wish Hanover safe, these being events in which we are much interested." In England, Pitt made Frederick a popular hero, although a few years earlier no German prince could have won even respect. [2] General Oglethorpe compared him with Henry V. and Sir Walter Raleigh. In 1790 London contained no fewer than twenty inns with the sign of the King of Prussia, and several with the sign of the Protestant Hero, all relics of the dead enthusiasm of 1756.

It must also be remembered that many Englishmen had as yet hardly felt the glow of purely colonial ambition. In 1755 a Whig politician wrote, [3] "There is not the least tittle of other public news from America, or (more important) Germany." His choice of language is significant. [4] Bedford complained of the transference of soldiery from Ireland to America, while already in 1759, the representation of the Continental war as an English necessity had provoked plenty of satire.

[5] "The Hanoverians, Hessians, Prussians,
Are paid to oppose the French and Russians,
Nor scruple they with truth to say
They are fighting for America.
No more they make a fiddle-faddle
About a Hessian horse or saddle,
No more of Continental measures,
No more of wasting British treasures,
Ten millions and a vote of credit," etc.

1 Sparks' Washington, ii. 333.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. ix.; pt. 2, 229.
3 Bedford Correspondence, ii. 164.
4 *ibid*, ii. 360.
5 Annual Register (1759), p. 440.

It looks as if the destruction of French power was a livelier motive with Pitt than the consolidation of the British empire. At least, during his ministry he had no time nor inclination to dwell on any topic but the conduct of the war. In that, he was indeed successful, notwithstanding some deviations into valueless schemes like the fatal raid on St. Malo in 1758; but he was only inspired while playing the war minister. He was so immersed in his work as such, that he had no moment to attend to finance. He could only trust in the patience of the people, and the talents of his subordinates. [1] "The Hessian demand for forage is preposterous, and would revolt all the world," he writes wearily in 1758; "I wish to God I could see my way through this mountain of expense." In 1760 the wide extension of the war from its original objects necessitated the raising of sixteen millions of revenue. In 1763 the consequent taxes on beer and cider were much disliked. When the war was over, the new problem of imperial relations afforded perhaps a fairer test for Pitt's policy, and it was then clear that he had not shaken off the fetters of the old English economics, and believed as thoroughly as ever in the virtues of restricting colonial trade. Even if he had escaped from that delusion, it is very open to question whether his influence on the people was of such a nature as to lead them in any constructive direction. It is obvious that he could inspire all that makes a war spirit effective, that he could choose excellent leaders, and turn enthusiasm to the most practical uses. Thus Lyttelton, writing to Pitt on [2] "the great and glorious news" of the capture of Quebec, and deploring Wolfe's death, pointed out how Townshend and other devoted leaders were left in Canada, all "animated by your

1 Chatham Correspondence, i. 305.

2 *ibid*, i. 442.

spirit, and by you brought forward into action." On the other hand, there is nothing to give rise to the supposition that Pitt could have guided the populace towards a policy of self-restraint and discretion. The Seven Years' War required only a judicious handling of public opinion in a course for which the people had every natural predisposition. There was no such inclination towards the imperial policy necessitated by the new conditions of the British realm.

It will be seen hereafter that Pitt's conception of the empire was limited by the traditions of his age, and that just as his delight in Clive's successes did not involve any luminous insight into the destinies of India, so his greatness during the Seven Years' War did not involve greatness as an imperial organiser in times of peace. It is however, necessary to recognize the superficial nature of his influence on England in 1756, in view of its otherwise extraordinary disappearance within a few years of reaching its highest pitch. The explanation lies rather in his personal character than in his political ideas. He seems, even at the height of his popularity, to have discouraged the sympathy which his oratory invited. He won men's hearts by appealing to those inclinations which he best understood, but he was too proud to try to hold them, or to attach himself to any political party. Occasionally he unbent, as when he wrote to Wolfe's mother in November 1759, [1] "May Heaven who assists the virtuous grant you every possible comfort under a loss which nothing can repair to you or to England," but in general he disdained the arts of politicians, and departing from the common English habit of paying homage to the mob, he kept his reverence for the state, and his flattery for the Crown.

When once in power, Pitt showed rare courage in

1 *ibid*, i. 451.

ignoring the clamour of men on whose support he relied. So great was their belief in his matchless competence to beat the French, that for the time they swallowed his contempt. They allowed him to defend Byng after his failure off Minorca, and Cumberland after the Convention of Closterseven. He feared nothing; he championed the Highlanders during the outcry against Bute and Scotland, and denounced the maladministration of the East India Company in defiance of the rich Nabobs, who had inclined to follow his leadership. He had not the patience to satisfy popular expectations and neglected to attend the coronation of George III. He lost touch with the rank and file of his adherents. Even in 1758 [1]Waldegrave foretold that he was too masterful and imperious to keep his popularity long, and consequently his ability to carry the country with him did not last when his figure was once dissociated from its original glory. At the close of the war, Pitt had a great claim to gratitude, and most men were proud of him; [2]innkeepers chose his name for their signs, and the bridge then being built at Blackfriars was called for the time Pitt's Bridge, in his honour. In 1766 [3]Burgoyne found his name a touchstone in Germany. He had no longer however, the capacity to extort support from doubters. Under the prevailing political conditions, it was essential for him to attach himself to one of the great Whig connexions like that of Rockingham, but his pride debarred him from such a course. He trusted simply in the glamour of his own name, forgetting that purely personal causes can at most be but transient. His fascination therefore ended with the war, and had he known the future effects of his isolation from every parliamentary

1 Waldegrave's Memoirs (1821), p. 16.
2 Grosley's Tour to London (1772), p. 241.
3 Chatham Correspondence, iii. 41.

party, there would have been less sincerity than there actually was in his prayer after Minden, [1] "May happy peace wind up the glorious work, and heal a bleeding world."

Such limitations to Pitt's power as a statesman contributed to weaken that empire, which his war policy had done so much to promote. Amid his many speeches and voluminous correspondence there is no trace of an attempt to create a form of colonial policy, which might perpetuate the fabric. A man of the age, he understood acquisition better than organisation. Consequently, the Seven Years' War conduced in effect to the subsequent outbreak of the War of Independence. Obviously, the removal of the standing menace of a French invasion freed the colonies from a fear which had hitherto enhanced their reliance upon Great Britain, but Pitt's influence on English public opinion led to less general causes for the coming schism. In the first place, his variation of the original aim of England's warfare had caused an expenditure of blood and treasure, far in excess of that necessarily involved in a straightforward struggle with France purely for colonial ascendency. The effect of this course was to increase the apparent burden of empire to an extent, certain to invite the fatal suggestion of direct taxation of the colonies from home.

Secondly, the brilliancy of British triumphs over sea captivated popular imagination. It diverted men's minds from the crying need of purging the parliamentary system, admitted by Pitt himself to be [2] "the rotten part of the constitution." His great war administration had thus submerged old partisan distinctions, and hence the opportunity

1 *ibid*, ii. 9.
2 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 100.

laid open to the young King George III., who had been bred in the principles of Bolingbroke, and desired nothing more than to play the patriotic despot among the ruins of parliamentary parties.

Lastly, it may justly be complained that Pitt's belief in the adequacy of the prevailing colonial theory, and his partiality towards German connexions disabled him from educating his party. He was master of British thought, but he neglected his power to teach ideas, other than those which had a natural self-commendation to the patriotic citizens of the day. Indeed, he merely acquiesced in the current beliefs as to the art of governing an empire, and failed to realise how much more was to be conquered than mere territory. Marvellous as was Pitt's capacity to inspire true patriotism, to organise victory, to point out splendid ideals, he had not that cool and calculating insight into men and affairs, which could alone perpetuate his gains. In this respect, he was inferior to Franklin, a man of far commoner clay, but of greater penetration. [1] "No man can more sincerely rejoice than I do on the reduction of Canada," wrote Franklin to Lord Kames in 1760, "and this is not merely as I am a colonist, but as I am a Briton. I have long been of opinion that the foundations of the future grandeur and stability of the British empire lie in America, and though like other foundations, they are low and little now, they are nevertheless broad and strong enough to support the greatest political structure that human wisdom ever yet erected."

1 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 399.

CHAPTER III.

The Old Colonial Theory.

Without the magic of such an influence as William Pitt's, it was impossible in 1763 to move the English people from the traditional lines of their colonial system. As no such influence was forthcoming, that system reached its natural and inevitable conclusion in open breach between Great Britain and her colonies. With its actual operation, the world has long been familiar, thanks to the historical writings of English Whigs and American patriots. The Navigation Acts had restricted colonial carrying trade to English ships ever since 1651. Many "enumerated articles" could be exported to Europe by way of England alone, to the detriment of colonial producers, but to the supposed advantage of British shipping. Such articles included tobacco, ginger, sugar and cotton in 1706, and copper and beaver skins in 1722. A concession whereby Carolina could ship rice direct to lands south of Cape Finisterre was made in 1730, and subsequently Georgia and Florida were granted similar relief; but four-fifths of that export trade continued to pass through English ports. Furthermore, several manufactures likely to compete with those of England were suppressed in what Adam Smith confessed to be [1] "a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind,"—wool and bar iron in 1719, felt hats in 1732, molasses in 1733, and steel furnaces in 1750. In view of such apparent injustice, it is clearly important to examine the theory as to the uses of colonies, and their

[1] Wealth of Nations (ed. "World Library"), p. 459.

place in the imperial system, upon which these severe and oppressive measures purported to be based. After all, it was this theory which braced England's activity in her struggle with France, and in support of its tenets, she faced the world in arms. It cannot have been wholly arbitrary and perverse.

In actual fact, the old colonial policy was based upon the very sensible ideal of a self-sufficing empire. That ideal was applied with a selfish bias by British ministers, but it was common at the time throughout Christendom, and was much encouraged by the popularity of mercantilism. Business men believed implicitly in the idea of the balance of trade, and considered English independence of all other states in every necessity of life to be a proper aim of policy. In some respects its effects were bad; [1]the high duties imposed upon yarn from Hamburg, Dantzig and Königsberg enabled the Dutch, who only imposed a duty of one per cent., to undersell British linen merchants in the West Indies and Guinea. Its political advantages were less questionable. Economic mercantilism was indeed a declining force after 1720. Walpole cleared away all export duties, and [2]Hume suggested in 1740 that Britain might even benefit from Continental prosperity. Trade, not mere bullion, came to be regarded as the chief source of a nation's wealth. Nevertheless, the old theory of a self-sufficing empire still held the field. Colonial importations enjoyed preferential rates, and large bounties were given to stimulate such colonial industries as would enable England to avoid having recourse to foreign countries for their purchase. [3]The production of indigo,

1 Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1751; ii. 291, 294).

2 Hume's Essays (ed. 1903), p. 333.

3 The Rights of Great Britain Asserted (1776), p. 14.

tobacco, hemp, flax, raw silk, iron, pipe-staves, vegetable oils, cod, whale oil, vines, olive trees, rosin, myrtle-wax, pearlash, potash, indigo, cochineal, raisins, gum, logwood, pitch, tar, and turpentine, was thus forwarded not only by the government, but also in some cases by a voluntary "Society for the Encouragement of Arts and Commerce," which was founded in 1754, and which bestowed nearly £2,800 and twelve gold medals upon colonial producers between that year and 1776. The utility of bounties is of course an open question, but those upon pitch, tar and turpentine bore good fruit as the price of a barrel had sunk [1] to ten shillings in 1766 after having been fifty shillings in the days of Swedish monopoly. Owing to bounties the [2] Irish were enabled to undersell German competitors in the West Indian linen market.

All colonial expansion had this end of self-sufficiency in view. When Oglethorpe colonised Georgia in 1732, he aimed at supplying England with wine and silk, so as to free her from seeking either abroad. It was thought possible to obtain [3] cheaper iron ore from America than from Russia, as the cost of transit down the colonial water ways was much less than the cost of transit from the Urals to St. Petersburg, but even if this was not the case, price was deemed a less material point than the place of origin. British-grown commodities were worth a somewhat higher price, if the alternative entailed buying goods from an alien market, and it was better [4] to clothe the seventy thousand slaves in Barbados with English and Irish stuff than with the cheaper goods offered by Hamburg shippers. Therefore John Dyer asks us in "The Fleece" to

[1] Morgan's Dissertation on Advantages of Union (1766), p. 14.
[2] Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1751; ii. 290).
[3] Adair's Hist. Am. Indians (1775), p. 452.
[4] Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1744; ii. 72).

[1] "Pray for the culture of the Georgia tract,
Nor slight the green savannahs and the plains
Of Carolina."

[2] Rhenish vines were planted in Pennsylvania, and one of the many tracts written to support Oglethorpe's experiment exclaimed,

[3] "Now bid thy merchants bring thy wine no more
Or from th' Italian or the Tuscan shore,
No more they need th' Hungarian vineyards drain,
And France herself may drink her best champagne;
Behold at last, and in a subject land
Nectar sufficient for thy large demand."

It was argued that [4] England would obtain as much raw silk from Georgia as she had previously bought from Piedmont for £200,000 a year. [5] She would also have a cheaper, and at the same time a British, source of supply of coffee, tea, raisins, currants, olives, almonds, cochineal and potash. It was then assumed that Georgia would fulfil such promises as might well be held out by a state [6] "in the same latitude as the promised Canaan." The sequel proved that not every Canaan flows with milk and honey, but as [7] John Wesley had wanted Georgia to be religious rather than rich, there was consolation for the pious.

With similar motives, the English empire builders of the eighteenth century gave consistent help to the silk

[1] Dyer's Fleece (1757), p. 147.
[2] John Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 81.
[3] Narrative of the Colonization of Georgia (1741), p. xii.
[4] Oglethorpe's Brief Account (1733), p. 3.
[5] Mountgomry's Discourse concerning a new Colony (1717), p. 11.
[6] *ibid*, p. 6.
[7] Narrative of the Colonization of Georgia (1741), p. 30.

industry in Carolina, Virginia and Pennsylvania, to the fisheries of Newfoundland and New York,[1] the coal mines of Cape Breton, the tobacco culture of Virginia and Maryland, the sugar, coffee, cocoa, and cotton plantations of the [2]West Indies. The production of naval stores in Newfoundland and North Carolina was designed to dispense with the timber of Sweden and the tar, pitch and turpentine of Norway, and to free England from having to pay the [3]exorbitant export duties and [4]extortionate prices of Sweden and Russia. By dint of unsparing efforts, the government succeeded in making such timber producing colonies as Massachusetts and New Hampshire of the utmost use to naval constructors. The dread of wasting British money upon imports from abroad was very strong, and was especially directed against French goods. [5]The German traveller, Keysler estimated that Englishmen spent £450,000 annually on foreign silks, but [6] £900,000 would probably have been nearer the truth. In any case it was contended that the empire ought to benefit instead by her own custom. Hence the sympathy given to thousands of journeymen silk weavers who marched in [7] procession from Spitalfields to St. James's in 1764, to represent the misery to which they were reduced by the clandestine importation of French silks, though Italy was in actual fact the chief source of supply. Accordingly, England became zealous for the growth of colonies, which might relieve her from all economic

[1] Regulations lately made concerning the Colonies (1765), p. 11.
[2] Loftt's Reports (1776), p. 661; Report on the African Slave Trade (1789) passim.
[3] An Appeal to the Justice of Great Britain (1775), p. 29.
[4] Galloway's Cool Thoughts (1780), p. 29.
[5] Keysler's Travels (1760), i. 355.
[6] Contrast between Woollen and Silk Manufactures (1782), p. 15.
[7] Annual Register (1764), p. 64.

dependence on the foreigner. [1]Raw silk should be produced more cheaply in North Carolina than in Italy, where land was two hundred times as dear, and labour far more costly. [2]Pitt himself was anxious to grow cotton in Dominica rather than import it from Dutch or French possessions, and [3]in spite of cotton requiring light, dry soil rather than the deep, rich mould and clay subsoil of the British West Indies, efforts were made to cultivate it in Nevis, Antigua, St. Vincent, and more successfully in Barbados. The chief rivals of these West Indian islands were at this time [4]the French and Spanish Indies, Demerara, Brazil and Turkey, while cotton growing in the East Indies was in a similar experimental state. The public was not yet satisfied with the outlook for empire-grown cotton. The commodity could be obtained very cheaply from shippers in France, [5]Ostend and Smyrna, while an abundant supply of cotton in the West Indies would only serve [6]to depress the more important woollen trade, and to raise the cost of freight for [7]sugar and rum. Consequently in this respect the usual policy of the Empire was not carried through with vigour, for the demand for raw cotton was never great until after the fall of the old colonial system. [8]Only four million pounds

1 Gent. Mag. (1756), pp. 161–2.

2 Chatham Correspondence, ii. 420.

3 Report of the Slave Trade (1789); evidence as to Jamaica (question 33), Nevis (q. 31), Antigua (q. 31), St. Vincent (q. 31), Barbados (q. 31), Dominica (q. 33).

4 An Important Crisis in the Calico and Muslin Manufacture explained (1788), pp. 8–9.

5 Contrast between Woollen, Linen, Cotton and Silk Manufactures (1782), p. 12; Report House of Commons Committees 1715—73 (1751; ii. 295).

6 Contrast etc., p. 14.

7 *ibid*, p. 11.

8 Quarterly Review (1861), pp. 422–3.

were imported here in 1764 and seven in 1780, as compared with thirty million pounds in 1790, fifty million in 1800, and two hundred and twenty-nine million in 1825. It is singular that the hopes of those who dreamed of imperial self-sufficiency in the reign of George III., as regards the supply of raw cotton, centred in the West Indies and not in the provinces on the American mainland. In 1770 two thousand pounds weight of cotton was exported from the latter market to England, this trivial quantity being almost the only shipment before the Revolution.

[1] Indigo was cultivated after 1742 in South Carolina and Georgia to avoid spending £200,000 a year in France. In 1731, [2] Joshua Gee published a strong plea for self-sufficiency, exposing the then state of the balance of trade in a way which [3] "struck the nation with universal panic," and [4] economists never tired of exhorting Englishmen to import hemp and flax, timber and deals from America, rather than from Norway and Riga, and [5] alkalies from New England rather than from Hungary. They should purchase their [6] isinglass from London rather than from Russia, their [7] porcelain from Worcester rather than from Dresden or Chatillon, [8] their hats from Stockport rather than from France, and should buy [9] linen from Ireland, [10] thread from Glasgow, and rely on their own colonists for [11] sugar and tobacco.

1 An Appeal to the Justice of Great Britain (1775), p. 29.
2 Gee's Trade and Navigation of Great Britain (1731).
3 Hume's Essays, p. 317.
4 Present State of Great Britain and North America (1767), p. 129.
5 Annual Register (1765), p. 115.
6 *ibid*, (1760), p. 67.
7 *ibid* (1763), p. 105.
8 Reports of the Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1752; ii. 372).
9 Ashley's Trade of Colonies (1740), p. 128.
10 Gee's Trade, etc., p. 157.
11 Dyer's Fleece (1757), p. 129.

It was disappointing to find that political artifice could not overcome natural disadvantages in respect of colonial silk and wine. In Virginia one out of every ten trees planted had to be a mulberry; ten had to be planted on every acre granted to settlers in Georgia, while all the colonies were exhorted [1] to choose sites for mulberry trees in rich, loose mould remote from marshes, woods and north and north-west winds. [2] When, however, the bounty on silk expired in 1766, the Savannah market collapsed, and though George III. dressed his Queen in New Jersey silk in 1771, the industry flickered out before the more profitable competition of other trades. Similarly the wine of Virginia was never able to emulate the cheaper vintages of Portugal and Madeira; [3] a French traveller suggested that one reason lay in the destructiveness of American blackbirds. No better fate awaited the efforts of the government to implant exotics like madder, hops and woad on American soil, to cultivate [4] indigo in South Carolina and to extend to Connecticut the struggling cotton-growing industry of the West Indies. We can only say that the ideal for which such sacrifices were made was in itself great and good.

The wish to make colonial industry as productive as possible led incidentally to the slave trade. [5] Between 1676 and 1776 three and a half millions of negroes were carried from Africa to British North America and the West Indies. One-fifth of that number died on the voyage, and a quarter of the rest perished in [6] "their

1 Samuel Pullein's Culture of Silk for the use of the American Colonies (1758), pp. 3, 4, 25.

2 See Eggleston's article in Cent. Mag., v. 431.

3 Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 212.

4 Whitney's Government of S.C. (1895), p. 56.

5 Considerations on Abolition of Slavery (1789), p. 68.

6 Benezet's Caution to Gt. Britain (1767), p. 6.

seasoning." They seem to have been worst treated in Barbados, where the penalty imposed on a master for killing a slave was but [1] a fine of fifteen pounds, yet everywhere there was at least a possibility of merciless owners, and the [2] defence that the blacks were much less to be pitied than the beggars of England is not convincing. The system is to be attributed partly to the British resolve to force the colonies to cultivate tobacco rather than to follow industries calculated to compete with home manufactures, and partly to the somewhat loftier desire to assist those branches of trade for which the southern provinces seemed to have a natural aptitude. For instance, [3] all the naval and military experts, who gave evidence before the Privy Council Committee on the slavery question in 1789—Rodney, Barrington, Parker, Hotham—considered its maintenance essential to the West Indian industries, and when the proprietors of Georgia surrendered their charter in 1752, that colony was freed, in spite of Oglethorpe's resistance, from its previous inability to import slaves, in view of the alleged requirements of its staple trades. [4] For the sake of South Carolina and Georgia, the framers of the Declaration of Independence forebore to denounce England for her furtherance of the slave trade.

This theory as to the usefulness of colonisation did not necessarily involve the friction to which it led in actual fact. But for the concurrent tendency to regard the interests of the home country as the paramount object of state interference in the normal course of trade, it might as easily have induced some popular form of imperial federation. In practice, the economic measures of

[1] Hoare's Memoirs of G. Sharp (1820), p. 79.
[2] Strictures on Slave Trade (1787), p. 37.
[3] Report on the African Slave Trade (1789), part iii.
[4] Jefferson's Memoirs (ed. 1829), i. 16.

government were confined to creating a self-sufficing empire at the cost of colonial industries, but in theory there was no such need. Englishmen desired nothing more than the development of industries upon lines not only conducive to their own political ideal, but also to colonial prosperity. Bounties and prizes stimulated the natural resources of British settlements. [1] Timber was an American product which every theorist praised. The immensity of the supply and the ease of its transport created the prosperity of the shipyards of Philadelphia and Norfolk. In 1740, [2] John Ashley argued how greatly it was to be preferred to that of the Baltic, and indeed it had fascinating possibilities in the day of "wooden walls." Every observer noticed its promise. The Swedish traveller, [3] Kalm, admired the oak, hiccory and firs of Pennsylvania. [4] Governor Pownall applauded the white pines of Virginia; [5] Bruce, the mulberry trees, live oak, pines and mahogany planks of Carolina; [6] Lord Sterling, the white pines of Massachusetts and New Hampshire; Pennington, [7] "the beautiful New England pine." Taylor, a traveller whose voyage to Philadelphia is memorable for the straits which made the crew feed on human flesh ([8] "like young pork, very sweet") remarked on the [9] prosperous saw mills around New York. [10] There were fifty saw mills on one river

1 Gee's Trade of Gt. Britain (1731), p. 104.
2 Ashley's Trade of Brit. Colonies (1740), p. 23.
3 Kalm's Travels (1772), i. 8.
4 Pownall's Administration of Brit. Colonies (1774), i. 282.
5 P. H. Bruce's Memoirs (1783), p. 522.
6 Conduct of Major-Gen. Shirley (1758), p. 2.
7 W. Pennington's Reflections on Large Commons (1759), p. 71; *cf.* Adair's Hist. Am. Indians (1775), p. 452.
8 Taylor's Voyage to N. America (1771), p. 34.
9 *ibid*, p. 147.
10 Bigelow's Franklin (1890), i. 569.

alone in North Carolina. [1] White pines made the best masts, and so, except in Massachusetts, they could not be cut down on unappropriated land without a government licence, while after the loss of the United States, [2] patriots consoled themselves with the oak of Upper Canada, and the hardwood and pine timber of Cape Breton. It is indeed clear that the British government exerted itself to develope colonial resources on these lines. The old bounty of twenty shillings per ton on masts, yards or bowsprits exported to England was extended by a statute (5 Geo. III. c. 45) to deals, planks, boards and timber. The actual success of the policy is more doubtful. From the report of a House of Commons Committee which sat in 1771, we gather that the Americans had [3] to compete with timber exporters in Hamburg, Stettin and Dantzig. The first was the depot of [4] Bohemian timber, the second of [5] Silesian, the third of [6] "Prussian deals," the local name for Baltic fir plank. Upon the whole, the navy was advised to prefer the foreign woods unless the nature and methods of the colonial market were improved. [7] Virginia's oak plank was better than that of New York, and its pitch pine was excellent, but good and bad timber was shipped indiscriminately to England in sharp contrast to the well-regulated and carefully chosen shipments from Dantzig. The [8] oak of the southern provinces was not fitted for the navy, nor was American as good as Baltic fir. Quebec oak

1 Pownall's Administration etc., i. 126; Whitney's Government of S.C. (1895), p. 21.
2 Gray's Letters from Canada (1809), pp. 19, 207.
3 Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1771; iii. 16).
4 *ibid*, iii. 22.
5 *ibid*, iii. 17.
6 *ibid*, iii. 21.
7 *ibid*, iii. 24.
8 *ibid*, iii. 22.

was probably admirable, but the contractor had failed to supply it. The proposed cedar and mahogany venture in the [1]Mosquito country had come to nothing. In short, even the highest ideal cannot be forced into practice by legislation alone.

The question of the practicability of England's dream of self-sufficiency in the eighteenth century is now of little more than academic interest, as the conditions of her empire have since been profoundly modified by the chances of time and fortune. No historian however can look without respect upon this side of the imperial theory of the day. It was one of the chief factors of the old colonial system; it was the force which made commercialism so strong an ally of the forward policy during the Seven Years' War, and so strong a foe to any economic reconstruction of the imperial system after 1763. There is no reason to doubt its intense hold upon English political thought throughout the whole period of colonial expansion. [2]Gee urged men to prefer Somerset and Dorset linen to French, and plantation rum to French brandy, and [3]Otis Little pleaded for the American iron industry as a means to avoid spending £200,000 annually in Sweden and Spain. George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, asked in the "Querist" [4]"whether if our ladies drank sage or blaum tea out of Irish ware it would be an insupportable national calamity," and protested against the general use of foreign [5]pottery, [6]tapestry, lace and linen. Nor did this ideal die with the old colonial system, for [7]John Hunter, a

1 *ibid*, iii. 17.
2 Gee's Trade, etc., p. 5.
3 Little's State of Trade in the Northern Colonies (1748), p. 39.
4 Berkeley's Querist (1751), p. 18.
5 *ibid*, p. 54.
6 *ibid*, p. 9.
7 Hunter's Historical Journal of Transactions at Port Jackson (1793), p. x.

naval captain, who, after service in North America, carried convicts to "the east coast of New Holland" in 1786, anticipated that New South Wales had a future as a [1] wine-growing and limestone country, whereby the productive capacity of the empire might become more catholic, and [2] Hugh Gray pleaded in 1806 for the diversion of England's custom from Russia to Canada in respect of hemp. Export duties [3] upon English coal were applauded as the burden of their incidence fell wholly on the foreigner, who found no Continental coal, not even that of Liège, equal to that of Sunderland and Newcastle.

The consequent leaning towards the use of artificial means to direct the channels of British activity, led Englishmen to adopt a cast of thought very alien to the ideas which were springing up at the same time in the colonies. There, people felt principally the harsher side of the ideals of the Parliament at Westminster. As they could ship tobacco, ginger, sugar, cotton, copper, beaver skins, and [4] four-fifths of their export of rice to Europe, only by way of England, they were impeded in their competition with foreign plantations. Although the prohibitive acts were [5] very loosely enforced, their wool, iron, hat, molasses and steel industries were at least hampered for the benefit of other portions of the empire, and naturally they lost pleasure in a policy, however patriotic, which led to such unfortunate manipulation of private trades by public authorities. It was exasperating to be forced by the Navigation Act of 1733 to prefer the

1 *ibid*, p. 525; Tench's Narrative of Expedition to Botany Bay (1789), p. 141.

2 H. Gray's Letters from Canada (1809), p. 206.

3 Consideration on the Trade of this Kingdom (1766), pp. 9, 10.

4 Ashley's Trade of Colonies (1740), p. 16.

5 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), iv. 49.

molasses of Jamaica to the cheaper molasses of the French West Indies. In English eyes, their best function was merely to produce such goods as Great Britain could not herself produce, and thus to obviate the need for recourse to imports from abroad. England dreaded the balance of trade going against her, and this fear induced widespread government interference. Exactly the same political view of economics prompted the preference given to Portugal over France. The Methuen Treaty was deemed a model of admirable policy, and the most common English [1] drink was stated to be port, not claret, by all foreign observers from Casanova to St. Fond.

In Pitt's time, the prejudice against foreign, and especially French, imports, gained in intensity. Patriots protested against the common use of French words, and such irritating fashionable nomenclature as [2] "the Pompadour cap," "the Orleans handkerchief," and "the Conti mantlet." [3] Shebbeare complained that for every Englishman who visited Wales, a hundred toured in Italy, and his school scorned those who [4] wasted English money abroad.

[5]"Each year how many English visit France
To learn the language, and to learn to dance.
'Twixt Dover cliffs and Calais in July,
Observe how thick the birds of passage fly,
Fair weather fops in swarms, fresh water sailors,
Cooks, mantua-makers, milliners and taylors."

There was a general wish to keep the nation's skill at home,

1 Casanova's Memoirs (ed. 1902), p. 156; St. Fond's Travels (1799), i. 58; De Saussure's Letters, p. 159.

2 Letters on the English Nation (1755), ii. 229.

3 *ibid*, ii. 33.

4 A British Philippic (1756), p. 13; J. Hope's Letters on Certain Proceedings (1772), p. 79; Tucker's Cui Bono (1781), p. 19.

5 Annual Register (1767), p. 246.

and many [1]laws were passed to punish those who enticed British artificers abroad. Alien immigration was disliked, and in 1765 [2]the peruke makers petitioned George III. to discharge foreign hairdressers, and the hatters asked for similar redress. Clearly however, the chief incentive towards both the mercantile zeal for expansion and the mercantile insistence on the state regulations of colonial industries was the jealousy of French imports. [3] In 1753 Sir John Barnard's attempt to repeal acts against the wearing and importation of cambrics and French lawn was defeated, the [4] opinion being expressed that it was better that Dresden manufacturers should draw £200,000 a year from England in this branch of trade than that Frenchmen should draw £100,000. It was hoped that [5] the cambric industry at Winchelsea would enable the country to dispense altogether with such foreign imports in the course of time. In "Trade Revived," a dialogue in verse "between Mrs. Alamode, an eminent London milliner, and Mrs. Edging, a noted Bucks lace woman," composed in 1739, the former says of the latter's English-made goods:

[6]"I can't think what you do with all your geer,
The ladies will have none but Mechlin here."

Mrs Edging answers:

"What strange, what savage notions fill their head
To give to strangers their own people's bread."

It is to be hoped that her scorn stung the conscience of "the modish," for they did not usually accept such

1 5 Geo. i. c. 27; 23 Geo. ii. c. 13.
2 Annual Register (1765), p. 64.
3 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xv. 163
4 *ibid*, xv. 181.
5 Annual Register (1763), p. 100.
6 Trade Revived (1739), p. 4.

arguments, and it was already the vogue for English play-actors and singers to pose as aliens. When [1] Mark Moore turned from the navy to the stage, he became Moreo, and when his wife sang "Eileen Aroon" in Irish, the fashionable took it for Italian, and cheered. The middle classes were more susceptible to the patriotic plea. Lord Clare however, encouraged the demand for British manufactures at Court by presenting Queen Charlotte in 1775 with some Irish goods and his poems, and in Beawes's time (1787) Dunstable and Luton straw hats and bone lace were [2] "worn by multitudes of the principal ladies of England." The drinking of [3] rum was encouraged as its consumption enriched West Indian planters, and much resentment was felt because [4] the cosmopolitan population of New York bought Dutch rather than Lancashire checked and striped linens, which cost more than the foreign-made goods owing to the dearness of yarn in England.

The effect of this political sentiment upon the old colonial system was therefore twofold. It led first, to an ardent desire to expand British territory, as that would involve an expansion of the empire's productive capacity, and secondly, to a strong leaning to regulate colonial enterprise in accordance with the English conception of imperial economics.

Colonial policy was affected with identical results by the Navigation Acts of 1651, 1660 and 1663. These also aimed at a patriotic ideal, the expansion of the British carrying trade, and like the creed of self-sufficiency, they met with considerable success in this direction. At the same time, like that creed, they contributed to confirm the

1 Moore's Memoirs (1795), pp. 115—7.

2 W. Beawes's Lex Mercatoria (ed. 1813), ii. 6.

3 Massie's State of Brit. Sugar Colonies' Trade (1759), p. 75.

4 Reports of House of Commons Committees 1715—73 (1751); ii. 291–2).

extravagant use of state interference in American activities. With regard therefore to both the economic and maritime aspects of the theory of empire in the eighteenth century, it may be said that while each helped Pitt to inspire national enthusiasm for the Seven Years' War, each helped George III. to alienate America.

The Navigation Acts were prompted directly by English ambitions for sea power and trade supremacy. [1] That of 1660 laid down, so far as the colonies were concerned, that no ships could carry their goods to England (and indirectly to Europe at all) unless truly owned by British subjects, manned by a crew of whom three-quarters at least were Britons, and navigated by a British captain. [2] That of 1663 insisted upon the additional proviso that ships so plying should be English-built. The effect was that colonial commodities could only be exported in the vessels of owners, who could fix their own arbitrary freights in the absence of foreign competition. This policy would have ruined the colonists if thoroughly carried out, and as it was, it crippled them. On the other hand, it was thought by men of every school that England benefited by such a system, and it was for this reason that [3] John Ashley in 1740 deemed the colonies the chief source of our wealth and naval strength. In many respects his opinion was probably true, for while the carrying trade with America was always lucrative, its fisheries were also ideal nurseries of seamanship. The Navigation Acts were symptoms of the general wish to force national character into a maritime groove. [4] In 1734 it was suggested that every British herring buss should carry four charity boys as

[1] 11 Car. ii. c. 18.
[2] 14 Car. ii. c. 11.
[3] Ashley's Trade of Brit. Colonies (1740), p. 11.
[4] The British Fishery recommended to Parl. (1734), p. 42.

apprentices, and the youth of the nation were attracted to the hard life off the dreary Newfoundland banks, as men were sure to grow lusty and skilful among the [1] everlasting fogs of that sodden clime. In 1756 the "British Philippic" ascribed our superiority over [2] "the starveling Gaul" to the prowess on sea, which the possession of our colonies involved. The patriotic opera of "Eliza," performed in Drury Lane during the war fever of 1757, and set to music by Arne, had maritime greatness as its leading topic. The navy was always more popular than the army, and war at sea than war on land, and one writer argued ingeniously that an alliance with Austria must be inherently unnatural, as the English people could have no feelings in common with a nation possessing [3] "scarce a cockboat." It is also important to observe that the colonies shared the advantages offered to sailors by the British government, and Franklin himself could not but recognize that in some ways the Navigation Act then in force was to their advantage. In 1754 the four New England provinces employed [4] six thousand men in the cod, mackerel and whale fisheries; [5] by 1774 Marblehead alone had four thousand fishermen, and Gloucester three hundred schooners, the seamanship of [6] New York and Rhode Island being also particularly good. In 1780 the number of Americans engaged in the fisheries had risen [7] to thirty-five thousand. The people of [8] Bermuda were

1 Cassini's Voyage to Newfoundland (1778), pp. 115—23.
2 The British Philippic (1756), p. 17.
3 Pasquin and Marforio (1783), p. 81.
4 Ramsay's Hist. Amer. Rev. (1793), i. 161.
5 Friendly Address to Reasonable Americans (1774), p. 40.
6 Little's State of Trade etc. (1743), p. 30; Pownall's Administration etc. (1774), p. 251.
7 Cool Thoughts (1780), p. 25.
8 Bruce's Memoirs (1783), p. 510.

said to be the best fishermen in the world, while the shipbuilding of Philadelphia and Boston repaid the fostering care of the legislature.

The Navigation Act however was no doubt designed primarily for the good of England, for besides closing British trade with foreign states to neutral carriers, it confined colonial exports and imports in effect to British ships, as colonial shipping was in its infancy, and was only able to transport about one-eighth of the tobacco despatched to Europe from the Chesapeake. The Act was considered essential to English maritime greatness. To Josiah Child in 1692, it was "our Charta Maritima." [1] Gee in 1731 considered that to allow any direct trade between British colonies and foreign countries would be inviting ruin. To [2] Decker in 1766 the Act seemed "that most glorious bulwark of our trade;" to [3] Grenville in 1771, and also to [4] Gibbon, it seemed "the palladium of British commerce." [5] Pitt himself believed in its excellence, and even [6] Adam Smith thought that its political advantages outweighed its theoretic failings. Lord Sheffield in 1783 called it [7] "the guardian of the prosperity of Britain," and [8] Beawes in 1787 deemed it the basis of our pre-eminence in shipping and seamanship. In a modified form it survived until 1849, and it was adopted as a model by the American Congress itself after independence had been won.

1 Gee's Trade, etc. (1731), p. 49.
2 Decker's High Duties (1766), p. 21.
3 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 101.
4 Gibbon's Autobiography (ed. 1896), p. 334.
5 A Vindication of the Conduct of the Great Commoner (1766), p. 22.
6 Wealth of Nations (ed. World Library), p. 361.
7 Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the American States (1783), p. 1.
8 Beawes's Lex Mercatoria, i. 54, 55, 98.

In a scientific light the merits of this policy have often been questioned in England, although it has since been at least partially adopted by most civilised states. It fostered commerce within the empire, but unduly discouraged foreign trade, a defect according to [1] Adam Smith, a merit according to Pownall, who thought that Americans were safer customers than Germans. From the American and Irish points of view, it had several ill-effects. The British West Indians were ousted from neutral Spanish markets by the French, who were freed from the necessity of employing their mother country as an intermediate depot, while Ireland suffered from its forced inability to trade directly with France and America. The chief grievance, however, was the restriction of all exports to England. Virginia and Maryland shipped [2] 90,000 hogsheads of tobacco a year to British ports, of which [3] 60,000 were re-shipped here with a rebate. [4] Nearly all the Maryland or Oronoko tobacco was re-exported. Although the government connived at a general evasion of the law in this respect, the nominal disabilities of the colonies were objected to in Virginia as early as 1671 by Sir William Berkeley, but they never decreased. The locking up of capital and waste of energy and time, which resulted from this policy of "a roundabout trade" was regretted by competent judges like [5] Pownall, who suggested the establishment of British factories on the Elbe or Weser, whither colonial goods might be allowed to travel direct without a halt and trans-shipment in England. [6] France,

1 Pownall's Letter to A. Smith (1776), p. 46; Wealth of Nations, p. 471.

2 J. Carver's Travels through N. America in 1766–8 (1779), p. 21; Morgan's Advantages of a Perpetual Union (1766), p. 40.

3 Dulaney's Considerations on the Propriety of imposing Taxes (1766), p. 75.

4 Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1733; i. 637).

5 Pownall's Letter to Adam Smith (1776), p. 26.

6 Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 379.

which might well have bought British colonial rice under a free system of commerce, procured it instead from Egypt and the Levant. Incidentally, the Navigation Act was the cause of the vast extent [1] of smuggling, and of the consequent embitterment of feeling between government officials and collectors and the colonists, as soon the three surveyors-general of the customs in America were directed by Grenville to enforce the operation of the Act. This ill-effect of the policy was its most important influence on the conditions of the time, especially as the Dutch were eager accomplices of the colonial smugglers, but the [2] difficulties met with in English custom houses and the degeneration of [3] the Isle of Man into a sanctuary of thieves and smugglers were also minor sources of trouble. In England itself the constant running of forbidden cargoes gave French seamen an accurate knowledge of the stretch of coast between Plymouth and Land's End, and even, according to one writer, a fatal familiarity with the British shore as far north as [4] Yorkshire. On the other hand, [5] Rodney complained of similar effects produced by the opening of free ports in Jamaica and Dominica in 1766 on French knowledge of their coasts, so that according to partisans of both schools of economics, either policy would place our shores at the mercy of foreign spies.

Seriously however, this aspect of the old colonial system, while conducive to such enthusiasm as that which won victory for England in the struggle for survival in America against the Dutch in the seventeenth century,

[1] An Appeal to Landowners (1733), p. 31; Grosley's Tour to London (1772), i. 119.

[2] Casanova's Memoirs, ii. 137; Baretti's Journey, ii. 65; Grosley, i. 8.

[3] Consid. of the Trade of this Kingdom (1766), p. 55; Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xv.; pt. 1, 176.

[4] History of the loyal Town of Ripon (1733), p. 44.

[5] Mundy's Life and Correspondence of Rodney (1830), i. 136—8.

and against the French in the eighteenth, led ultimately to the loss of her earliest settlements. Its framers showed a want of proportion in thus neglecting all interests but that of the Mother Country. It was indeed tyrannical to force Britons over sea to pay [1] twenty-five per cent. more for the wine, oil and fruit which they procured from Spain and Portugal than they need have paid if not forced to import by way of England alone. It was unjust to force colonists to buy hats from a market 3,000 miles off at treble their intrinsic cost. They would be infinitely more prosperous if enjoying merely normal freedom in their trade, and the home country would only benefit by such prosperity. Washington argued that money would still [2] "centre in Great Britain as the needle will settle to the pole." Moreover this side of the current colonial policy was so dear to British people that it could not expand under the new conditions, which governed national affairs after the expulsion of foreign powers from North America, though even at home some thinkers questioned the utility of bolstering decayed West Indian industries at the expense of [3] New England, just as [4] colonial consumers complained that the Jamaican planters were the only persons benefited by the duty on foreign molasses.

Another characteristic of the country's theory of empire in Pitt's day also tended indirectly towards separation. One of the chief uses of colonisation is its provision for the surplus population of a state, for there is always a margin of efficient inhabitants above the contemporary level of the demand of the labour market. Now during the first half of the eighteenth century, this margin was very small, for

1 Gent. Mag. (1775), p. 476.
2 Sparks' Washington, iii. 345.
3 Dickens' Late Regulations (1765), p. 11.
4 The Controversy between Gt. Brit. and Colonies (1769), p. 40.

the land was prosperous, and population almost stationary. Consequently, the character of British emigration did not tend to bind Britain and her colonies any more closely to each other, for a large proportion of the emigrants were miserable and shiftless, and not fit apostles of unity. They carried with them to America little love for England, and the avowed desire of the home government to "dump" the derelicts of society upon the soil of thrifty and religious colonies was by no means calculated to please. The "Brief Account of the Establishment of Georgia" contemplated the creation of a haven for people, [1] "who would otherwise starve and burden England." As a field for the deportation of idle rogues, America offered many attractions. As early as 1619 Virginia was treated as a fitting bourne for "dissolute persons," and by [2] a statute of Charles II.'s reign, Judges were empowered to ship Cumberland and Northumberland moss-troopers to the plantations. During the seventeenth century a succession of lost causes—Royalist, Irish, Covenanter—furnished their quotas of involuntary emigrants for the colonies, which were described by [3] Child in 1692 as sites for our superfluous malefactors—and Quakers. In 1732 [4] South Carolina appealed for carpenters, vine planters, husbandmen, or labourers from the Swiss Protestant cantons, with three or four good shirts apiece, in place of pauper wastrels from England, and in 1742 [5] Georgia asked for good English or Welsh servants. Otherwise the provinces would naturally prefer industrious foreigners like the [6] Crefeld weavers who founded Germanstown in Pennsylvania.

1 Oglethorpe's Brief Account (1733), p. 5.
2 18 Car. ii. c. 3.
3 Child's Discourse concerning Plantations (1692), p. 35.
4 Description of S. Carolina (1732), p. 14.
5 State of the Province of Georgia (1742), p. 13.
6 Holcomb's Pennsylvania Boroughs (1886), p. 24.

In conflict with such desires, the British people deemed America simply a land of hope for those whom fortune had treated unkindly at home, and so [1]humanity supported expediency in teaching that no better method than transportation could be devised for the reform of criminals. Estimates differ very widely, but after 1719, several hundred convicts were shipped annually to [2]Virginia, by virtue of [3]two statutes of George I. and under indentures made between the government at home and masters in the provinces, though a [4] large number of these convicts managed to return to England. They were assigned for various terms of years to their contractors, and sent off sometimes in weekly batches from Newgate. For them [5]the change from the pestilential English gaols could only be for the better. [6] "Last week, as the convicts were passing to the waterside in order to be shipped for America with fifes playing before them 'Thro' the wood, laddie,' a gentleman observed to another that they were very joyous; to which a droll convict replied, 'Joyous? Aye, so we are, master; and if you will but go along with us, you will be quite transported.'" When America had been lost, the same considerations led to the Order in Council of 1786, authorising convict settlements in [7] Australia, a scheme more humane, after all, than the [8] counter proposal of using felons to exploit Gambia and the Gold Coast, and one thought likely to promote trade

1 Gee's Trade etc., p. 62.
2 Letters on the English Nation (1755), i. 142.
3 4 Geo. i. c. 2; 6 Geo. i. c. 23.
4 Observations on the Causes of Dissoluteness (1772), p. 39.
5 Reasons for Establishing Georgia (1733), p. 18.
6 Annual Register (1766), p. 85.
7 Tench's Narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay (1789), p. 138.
8 Short Review of Present State of Gt. Britain (1797), p. 80; 16 Geo. iii. c. 43.

with China. [1] The Newgate prisoners petitioned for leave to go to Botany Bay, that spot being thought so preferable to the hulks that [2] Judges sentenced felons to periods of imprisonment longer than seven years from motives of mercy to ensure transportation. Such a source of emigration tended to fill the colonies with restless and violent inhabitants, whose influence was bound to demoralise both the British and native peoples among whom they came to settle. As Churchill wrote in 1764, when the tide of convict influx into America was high:

[3] "Happy, thrice happy now the savage race
Since Europe took their gold, and gave them grace!
And on sure grounds the gospel pile to rear
Sends missionary felons once a year."

[4] There was also an unfortunate tendency to regard all "indented" servants, whether voluntary or convict, as their masters' property, service becoming a status rather than a contract.

There was however a far brighter side to the old colonial system. If public opinion did wander into many impolitic deviations from what our far longer and wider experience has shown to be the best type of a colonial policy, it had at the same time a very thorough appreciation of some of the national advantages accruing from the possession of an empire. It was this understanding which gave the Seven Years' War its great hold upon British feeling, and which made the country withstand the forces of disintegration with much constancy and patience during the War of Independence.

1 Dibdin's Musical Tour (1788), p. 235
2 Atkinson's Bentham (1905), p. 39.
3 Annual Register (1764), p. 235.
4 See J. C. Ballagh's White Servitude in Virginia (1895).

In clear contrast to France, England thought that colonies were prizes, for which she ought to strive hard. In America were wide domains, where Britons could make easier livelihoods than at home without sacrificing their nationality, and it must not be imagined that the most common type of emigrant was the one pilloried by Churchill. Every traveller told the same tale of wealth to be won in the colonies, and so appealed to the ambitious and the able. In 1768 a Sheffield man, called Taylor, heard the praises of America from merchants at a [1] Whitehaven inn, and tested their accuracy by a tour over sea. He reported the prosperity of colonial towns where English life was reflected, the wealth of New York, the culture of Boston. Philadelphia boasted a bull-ring and horse races [2] after Newmarket rules, as well as ironworks and shipyards. The productive capacity of the colonies was generally rightly estimated, although [3] the climate of South Carolina proved bad for potters' work. [4] In Georgia a labourer was expected to earn six times the amount of wages he could obtain in London, and [5] the South Carolina government offered Wedgwood's workmen three and a half times the wages they earned in Staffordshire. Land was so boundless across the Atlantic that England needed no other territory; over-population was an absurdity. One acre in Jamaica or Barbados was said by [6] Penn to be worth three British acres. [7] In 1765 it was argued that a poor settler with ten acres of land became at once happier than an English labourer, and with but thirty acres, he

1 Taylor's Voyage to N. America (1771), p. 1.
2 *ibid*, p. 175.
3 Wedgwood's Address to Workmen in the Pottery (1783), p. 5.
4 Narrative of the Colonization of Georgia (1741), p. xi.
5 Wedgwood's Address, pp. 7, 11.
6 Penn's Benefit of Colonies or Plantations, p. 27.
7 Regulations lately made concerning the Colonies (1765), p. 29.

was as prosperous as an English farmer. Sometimes these promises ended in [1] ruin and despair, but in the main they were well kept. Here then was the panacea for sufferings at home. [2] One writer alleged that the policy of expansion would clear the last beggar and stroller from English streets. A tract industriously circulated by the authorities of South Carolina to the effect that even tailors and shoemakers rode their own horses in that ideal province drew hundreds of Germans and Swiss to settle at Purrysburg. If there was little luxury in America, there was [3]no squalor. In [4]1763, [5]1773 and [6]1779 acute observers remarked on the fascination exercised by the prospect of riches in the new continent upon the Irish people. Between 1740 and 1745 South Carolina gave a cow and calf to each group of five emigrants settling in a frontier township, while tools and free conveyance were always offered to settlers, who were chiefly German, Huguenot, Scotch and Welsh. [7]Grants of land were made liberally to retired soldiers in 1765, and America was always thought to hold out to the young and uninfluential the possibility of careers denied to them at home. Illiberal landlords drove the ambitious from British soil to act as pioneers of civilisation in the backwoods of America. William Grant, a future English Master of the Rolls, but then only a newly-called barrister, emigrated to Canada in 1774 to become Attorney-General there in 1776, at the age

1 Wedgwood's Address, pp. 7, 8.
2 Letter from a French Refugee in America (1774), p. 114.
3 Lauzun's Memoirs (ed. 1896) ii. 271; Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 71.
4 Annual Register (1763), p. 79.
5 Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1773; iii. 109).
6 Bigelow's Franklin (1890) ii. 476.
7 Annual Register (1763), p. 21.

of 23. [1] Burke thought of going to America in 1754, and [2] Arthur Young in 1779. [3] In 1782 Jefferson said that he had never yet seen a native American begging in the streets or highways. Nor was this an idle boast, for even during the Revolution [4] Englishmen were amazed at the absence of beggars in New York.

The zeal for empire was heightened by the prospect of an illimitable market, which lay behind the obvious benefit of colonisation to individuals. Emigrants from England were not lost to her, for they became purchasers of her goods in a market from which foreign competition was excluded. Hence the general indifference to the fear of depopulation, which might otherwise have troubled a nation of mercantilists, and which made the King of Prussia hang [5] "newlanders, or those who seduced his subjects to emigrate." Thus many districts like [6] the Highlands of Scotland lost a large number of their inhabitants. Trade and empire were deemed to outweigh the evils incidental to rural decay, and resulting from their persuasiveness to English villagers

[7] "To traverse climes beyond the western main;
Where wild Oswego spreads her swamps around,
And Niagara stuns with thundering sound."

Perhaps some of the best blood in England thus left her for ever, for [8] Child thought that the most active thinkers

1 Burke's Correspondence (ed. 1844), i. 32.
2 A Young's Autobiography, p. 83.
3 Jefferson's Notes on Virginia (1782), p. 242.
4 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xv.; pt. 6, 365.
5 Candidus' Plain Truth (1776), p. 17.
6 Johnson's Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland (1773); Hanway's Defects of Police (1775), pp. 199, 291.
7 Goldsmith's Traveller (1764).
8 Child's Discourse (1692), p. 33.

are a nation's first emigrants; but British merchants were compensated by their possession of an empire of customers, confined to English goods by the closed doors of the old colonial system.

Hence the zest with which emigration was furthered. General Oglethorpe carried Protestant refugees from the Palatinate to Georgia, and his philanthropy was approved by men of business. In 1764 the London crowd demonstrated in favour of German Protestants, who were moved from their camp at Whitechapel to the river side, and [1]"were carried in lighters to the ships lying at Blackwall, singing hymns all the way," outward bound for South Carolina, refugees to-day, customers to-morrow. Manufacturers needed markets of this nature. [2]"Great Britain," wrote a pamphleteer of 1767, "wants nothing more than people, which the narrow and limited bounds of her possessions at home cannot maintain." Moreover the Salzburgers proved themselves the best road makers in America, a useful capacity at a [3]time when roads were few and bad. The tendency to rely too much on the American trade was clearly bad, but during the years of dependence it brought much wealth to England, creating the prosperity of Manchester and Liverpool, Kendal, Lancaster and Bristol, of the leather industry of Glasgow, and the export trade in stuffs from the West Riding. Even when the colonists began to make their own clothes, they came to England for higher class goods, their own being [4]inferior to our best drabs, while the need to clothe slaves in cotton resulted in [5]Manchester exporting half a million pounds worth of

1 Annual Register (1764), p. 147.
2 Present State of Gt. Britain and N. America (1767), p. viii.
3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv.; pt. 10, 52.
4 Taylor's Voyage to N. America (1771), p. 145.
5 Report on the Slave Trade (1789), part iv. no. 3.

cotton goods a year to the West Indies and Africa. [1] Unfashionable articles could be safely shipped to American markets, which were barred to foreign competitors, and where the current exigencies of London fashion were unknown. [2] The retention of Canada in 1763 was only insisted on under the belief that the colonists in America would derive so much benefit by its acquisition as to have a greater purchasing power, and so furnish [3] "a demand of our manufactures as large as all the working hands of Great Britain could possibly supply." The devout were drawn to support the same cause by the idea of doing good among the Indians, and the dissenting ministers of London hailed the glories of the Seven Years' War as giving an opportunity [4] "for imparting even to the most uncultivated of our species the happiness of Britons." Behind such edifying philanthropy lurked [5] the knowledge that even the Red Indian brave, when on the point of death, desired to meet his fate in a white shirt and Stroud blanket.

Thus the old colonial system was prompted by a curious compound of great ideals and petty prejudices. Behind the clumsy fabric of shameless restrictions and liberal bounties lay plenty of patriotism. The empire-builders of the age did not mind making sacrifices for the sake of the expansion, which was to excel that of Rome. When the French traveller, [6] Grosley asked an Englishman sarcastically in Drury Lane, whether he considered bread at threepence a pound, and beer at threepence halfpenny a pot brilliant trophies of the struggle that closed in 1763,

1 Gee's Trade etc. p. 102.
2 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 402.
3 Annual Register (1762), p. 60.
4 *ibid* (1763), p. 204.
5 Adair's Hist. Am. Indians (1775), p. 331.
6 Grosley's Tour to London (1772), i. 98.

he was answered, that it did not matter; "We have got Canada and beaver." [1]The skins of the beaver, deer, racoon, otter, bear and martin were for some years the solitary exports of Canada, [2]some thirty to forty thousand beaver skins being annually required for the hat trade. Pitt imposed taxes deliberately upon the working classes, who had made themselves responsible for the war by their clamours against France, but who asked for little in return. The colonial charters were nearly all drafted by Americans, and indeed apart from industrial matters, Great Britain gave her colonies absolute self-government, and tolerated slavery as necessary to the welfare of the south long after it was considered unlawful here, and was [3]"an abomination to the middle and northern colonies." The constitutions of all the provinces were democratic, each possessing one elective assembly, and Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut electing their upper houses as well. Rhode Island and Connecticut chose their own governors, and along with Maryland, could enact laws without the Crown's approval. It must also be remembered that some of the commercial restrictions were designed to assist other parts of the Empire. [4]By Act of Parliament, Great Britain denied herself the cultivation of tobacco. The restraint on the making of molasses in America and on its importation from non-British sources aimed at helping West Indians, and the unpopular tea duty of 1773 was itself contrived so as to relieve the East India Company and actually to benefit the American colonists at the same time. Its incidence would have fallen most lightly on the consumer, in view

1 Hugh Gray's Letters from Canada (1809), p. 383.
2 Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1752; ii. 377).
3 Controversy between Gt. Britain and Colonies (1769), p. 95.
4 22 Car. ii. c. 26.

of the privilege given to dispense with the intermediate landing of tea in England. Moreover, [1] the governors who abetted the policy of coercion had in many cases high ideals of duty to their provinces. Hutchinson himself was a thoroughly patriotic New Englander, and Bernard's chief fault was want of sympathy with colonial thought, not want of principle.

On the other hand, in the new preacher of empire there was much of the old Adam. The policy of shackling the commercial energy of fellow citizens across the seas was ignoble to a degree. [2] Franklin remarked on the ceaseless hum of the English press against a colonist's free use of his faculties, notwithstanding the existing repressive laws, and the impossibility of any real colonial competition at that time. British manufacturers need not have prohibited the woollen industry in America where labour was dear, and native-grown wool scarce. Nor was it reasonable for Birmingham traders to have petitioned the government in 1773 to refuse to relax its regulations against the making of steel and of tilt hammers in the colonies. Yet even Pitt acquiesced in the policy of curbing their industry at every turn. Great as the British theory of empire was in certain aspects, this side of the old colonial system was fatally bad. The country wanted some leader with genius to point out the necessity for adapting its modes of government to new phases of dominion, but Pitt's role was only that of the enthusiast, and he did not combine Franklin's saneness with his own fire. Though he was not the actual promoter of the measures which led to Lexington and Bunker Hill, he was an adherent of that restrictive colonial theory, which was the deeper cause of separation.

1 See Prof. Hosmer's Samuel Adams (1884), pp. 29, 30.

2 Bigelow's Franklin, 1. 569.

He believed in a policy which was shaped by the mercantilist creed of the age, and which made men haggle for legal rights instead of judging policies on principle. Such a narrow vision was not by any means peculiar to English statesmen; they but shared it with their European contemporaries. Nevertheless, it cost us America, for as Burke said, [1] "magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go ill together."

1 Burke's Select Works (ed. Payne), i. 233.

CHAPTER IV.

Dialectics on the Question of Taxation.

Grenville succeeded Bute as Prime Minister in April 1763, and in March 1765, he passed the Stamp Act, which levied duties upon deeds, cards, dice, pamphlets, advertisements, licenses, newspapers and legal proceedings within the American colonies. At the same time he tried to enforce the Navigation Acts, and to suppress the importation of smuggled molasses from the French West Indies. Both projects evoked indignation in America. Grenville resigned in 1765, and was succeeded by Rockingham, who repealed the Stamp Act early in 1766, but the repeal was accompanied by a declaration affirming the soundness of the principle upon which the Act had been based, in that the colonies were alleged "to be subordinate unto and dependent upon the imperial crown and Parliament of Great Britain." Rockingham failed to secure the co-operation of Pitt, whose distaste for all party connections remained unabated, and he retired from office in the summer of the same year. A new ministry was formed under Pitt, who accepted the earldom of Chatham at the same time, but he was too ill to be more than a nominal leader. Grafton acted as his deputy, and finance was left in the hands of Charles Townshend. Like Grenville, Townshend misunderstood the character of American resistance, and possibly he even entertained the idea of subverting the existing colonial constitutions. At all events, he introduced a Revenue Act, which became law in June 1767, and provided for the imposition of duties upon tea, paper, glass and painters'

colours in the colonies. As in the case of the preceding measure, the product of the duties was much less than the cost of collection. The new regulations were however enforced by an army of revenue officers, backed by a few thousand regular troops. The outcry in the colonies, and the open sympathy of many Whigs with the policy of evasion and resistance during Grafton's ministry (1768–70) led to the repeal of all the duties except that on tea in 1770. This was insisted on by Lord North, who had just become Prime Minister, and who thought concession would be imputed as surrender. The Boston tea riot in December, 1773 was punished by the closing of the port of Boston and by the nullification of the charter of Massachusetts. Government coercion was met by colonial violence, and the Continental Congress of September 1774 declared definitely for the cause of resistance to all taxation for raising a revenue from American subjects without their consent. The first shot of the War of Independence was fired at Lexington in April 1775.

Thus the question of direct taxation was the immediate cause of the struggle for independence, and for this reason that struggle has often been attributed to the personal work of George III. and of his Tory adherents. This however is an entirely wrong view. No doubt that impolitic king was largely responsible for the actual incidents leading to rebellion. American resistance was to him as much an obstacle to his own monarchical ideal as to British public policy. No doubt also the Tories would be more disposed than the Whigs to treat the colonial opposition as a national menace rather than as the assertion of a constitutional theory, internal to the empire. On the other hand, the King's friends formed but a small clique; the Bedford and Grenville factions, which supported him, were thoroughly Whig, and the government policy was a

far more logical outcome of the accepted colonial system than any conciliation could have been. Indeed, it is impossible to dissociate the insistence on direct taxation from the general spirit of the current theory of empire. To understand the English side of the dialectics, which spurred the controversy of the time, it is necessary to imbibe for the moment the spirit of the old colonial system. Imagine that expansion is essential to the mother country, and that colonies exist primarily to further its material welfare. Then recall the vast exertions of the Seven Years' War, in which England had safeguarded the future of her colonists by fighting all over the globe. [1] Nothing could be more natural than the inference that America should contribute its share towards sustaining the burden of empire.

Questions like that involved by Grenville and North's policy of taxing colonies directly from Westminster are now old enough to be judged without passion. It is not for an historian to declaim on their justice or injustice. Concerned as he is with causes for which great masses of men honestly contended, it is more his province to explain why they appealed so successfully to so many minds than to balance their ethics and moralities. At all events, it is palpably unfair to assume that righteousness was on the side of the victors in the American War, and even if this be assumed, it does not follow that an average follower of that side had better reasons for his partnership than a sincere opponent. Certainly the abuse so often lavished upon George III. and his ministers has been unwarranted. Politically, their minds were opaque where clear vision was essential, but as typical men of the day they could not have been properly expected to see beyond their fellows,

1 Conduct of the late Administration (1767), p. 12.

for figs do not grow on thistles. Living in the atmosphere of the old colonial system, it would have been unnatural had such men of small talent more than but partially conceived the true uses of an empire. Polemics must be ephemeral, and therefore the nature of English arguments on the question of taxation cannot but appear reasonable, if we place ourselves in the position of their exponents, and accept the truth of premises, which have only been discarded as false in the light of later and larger experience. Their policy may well appear now to have been indefensible as statesmanship, but it was none the less a very natural outcome of the contemporary theory of empire.

The Seven Years' War had involved [1] brisk trade for the time, especially during its last years, and the taxes to the amount of twenty-five millions, which it entailed, were not severely felt. It added however nearly seventy-five millions to the National Debt, and it left war's usual legacy of distress behind it. There was some suffering in England as soon as she began to feel the exhaustion incident to all such gigantic efforts, while [2] commercial panics in Berlin, Hamburg and Holland lessened the demand for British goods in those markets. Men wondered then why they had ever enabled Pitt, the quondam champion of peace and isolation, to [3] "conquer America in Germany at the cost of eighty millions." Here and there, the return of soldiery to civil occupations overstocked the labour market; a great storm broke over England in December 1763, and harvests were bad for some years. [4] Dundee and Edinburgh had thriven on the transient

1 A. Smith's Wealth of Nations, p. 343.

2 Consideration of the Trade of this Kingdom (1766), p. 6.

3 An Enquiry into the Conduct of a late Rt. Hon. Commoner (1766), p. 14.

4 Reports of House of Commons Committees, 1715—73 (1773; iii. 101, 105, 109).

demand for shirtings for the army; they drooped after the war. The Irish had benefited while the struggle had disabled Germans from competing with their linen industry; they lost the whole trade when the Continent was free to try again, with its cheaper yarn and underpaid labour. The prospect of maintaining a considerable army in the newly ceded territories was therefore not pleasing, although no less than ten thousand troops had been left in North America and the West Indies in 1763. [1] It was estimated that the annual Ordnance charge after the war was on an average sixty thousand pounds more than before its outbreak, and that [2] the cost of the American establishment was about one hundred and sixty thousand pounds a year.

Under these circumstances, there is no reason to wonder why Grenville should have proposed to exact direct contributions towards the cost of empire-building from the colonies themselves. [3] Three millions sterling were being spent every year upon imperial defence, towards which sum the Americans, though constituting one-fifth of the British population, paid nothing whatever. Any Englishman who had learnt the doctrines of the system under which the colonies had been brought into being, would naturally fall in with such a clear application of those doctrines. In 1757 it was suggested that the Pennsylvanians should [4] "pay those who fought their battles." In 1761 a judicial decision enabled the government to repress American smuggling more effectually by means of writs of assistance, enabling collectors of customs to command the help of sheriffs and constables in searching for smuggled goods,

1 Consideration of the Trade of this Kingdom (1766), p. 28.

2 *ibid*, p. 70.

3 *ibid*, p. 73.

4 A Letter from a Merchant of London to Rt. Hon. W. Pitt (1757), p. 33.

and a writer in the "Annual Register" of 1763, who was almost certainly a Whig, for that publication was conducted by Burke himself, said of the garrison in Canada: [1]"For the present these troops are maintained by Great Britain. When a more calm and settled season comes on, they are to be paid, as is reasonable, by the colonies they are intended to protect." Early in 1764 Governor Bernard sent certain definite proposals on this point to the government, and in March the House of Commons passed a resolution that it was proper to charge certain stamp duties in the colonies. Such a view was surely characteristic of the utilitarian, and by no means altruistic side of the war spirit of Pitt's time. Grenville himself described his aim as being the establishment of [2]"settled, moderate and frugal government" by the choice of such methods of taxation as would fall least heavily upon the taxpayer. He did not anticipate resistance in America. The colonists had gained enormously by the war, and if they had submitted in the past to the many restrictive measures of the old imperial system without demur, it seemed probable that they would accept state interference in a new form for a necessary purpose. [3]In the winter of 1763 he had interviewed the agents of various colonies in order to be advised as to the names of tax collectors likely to be acceptable to the inhabitants. It was palpable that the alternative method of making direct and distinct requisitions for proportionate contributions to each of the colonial assemblies would fail utterly.

The English disputants laid great stress afterwards on the claim of Great Britain to colonial gratitude arising from the general neglect of the colonists in British North

1 Annual Register (1763), p. 21.
2 Bedford Correspondence, iii. 397.
3 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 464.

America to provide for their own defence. The ministry believed that the whole brunt of the late war had been borne by soldiers and sailors from home. In actual fact, numerous colonial levies had fought with the same gallantry and skill which had won Louisburg from the French in 1745, but upon the evidence actually coming to English ears, the prevailing partial misconception of facts was not unnatural. Certainly it added to the popularity of the claim to tax America. During the Seven Years' War, the many extreme sectaries in the colonies had vented their theories of unpractical quietism with foolish ostentation. The Dutch of [1] Albany had shown themselves avaricious and disloyal, while [2] Pennsylvania in particular, ignored the danger of French and Indian forays with fatal composure. In 1754 its people refused to supply Braddock with [3] waggons, and [4] complained that the British army was depriving provincials of their indented servants. Indeed, their attitude goes far to justify that general's refusal to rely on colonial military advice. One infatuated enthusiast preached to the Quakers: [5] "If the potsherds of the earth clash together, what is that to us?" Such men considered English troops [6] "poisonous," and Maryland contributed practically nothing to the cost of their maintenance. Both [7] these provinces were still proprietary, and their efforts to escape expense were no more edifying than the similar attempts of their narrow-minded proprietors. Lord Baltimore refused to pay anything by way of taxation

1 Kalm's Travels (1772), i. 100.
2 *ibid*, i. 36.
3 Brief View of the Conduct of Pennsylvania (1755), p. 31.
4 An Answer to an Invidious Pamphlet etc. (1755), p. 11.
5 Brief View etc., p. 23.
6 J. Dickinson's Speech at Philadelphia (1764), p. 29.
7 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 146; Black's Maryland's Attitude in the Struggle for Canada (1892), pp. 19, 25, 55.

while the French were ravaging the borders. In many colonies the danger of French invasion was thought remote, and the peace-loving population left defence to others, the Quakers in some cases [1] excommunicating active resisters to invasion. Washington described provincial recruits in 1754 as being chiefly [2] "loose, idle persons, quite destitute of hearth and home, and I may truly say, many of them of clothes." The wealthier were often incorrigibly selfish, and with a singular apathy towards the welfare of the empire, [3] New England traders plied their business under fictitious flags of truce on the Mississippi and Mobile throughout the war. [4] Bossu saw these disloyal pedlars chaffering at New Orleans, while Wolfe was struggling to win Quebec, and similar indifference was shown in the next war, when the revolutionary army were starved in consequence of local "corners" in food-stuffs. Washington then said: [5] "Shall a few designing men for their own aggrandisement, and to gratify their own avarice, overset the goodly fabric we have been rearing at the expense of so much time, blood and treasure?" These causes of complaint were foreshadowed repeatedly in America during the Seven Years' War; [6] General Forbes was compelled to take 300 soldiers at Forts Cumberland and Frederick into his own pay in 1758, as Maryland would not save them from starvation, and we cannot wonder that such incidents weighed more with English politicians than facts which reflected the better side of American thought. They deserve considerable weight, even when we recognize that

1 Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 350.
2 Sparks' Washington, ii. 2.
3 Gent. Mag. (1759), p. 629.
4 Bossu's Travels through Louisiana (1771), i. 237.
5 Sparks' Washington, vi. 211.
6 Black's Maryland (1892), p. 64.

in 1740 [1] 15,000 New England seamen were willing to fight Spain, that [2] Franklin did as much to stimulate the war spirit in America in 1756 as Pitt did in England, and that altogether the colonies sent [3] 23,800 men and 400 privateers to do battle for the race in the Seven Years' War. The lion's share in the fighting was borne by British troops, even if the future revolutionary leaders, Washington, Lee, Prescott, Putnam, Montgomery and Gates all fought against the French.

Therefore, in the war of words between Great Britain and her colonies, which began in 1764, the British controversialists found their most effective argument in the plea that every portion of the empire should bear its quota of the common burden. To sustain this contention most successfully, they did not admit that America had herself made great sacrifices in the French struggle. Whatever might be alleged against England's choice of means, her end was deemed just in this respect. As one writer said, [4] "If the Americans enjoy the privileges, let them participate, in some degree, of the burthens of their fellow subjects." Taking America's economic disabilities as matters of course and irrelevant, English disputants pointed out how much the Mother Country had done for her children. The very able author of "The Rights of Great Britain Asserted" showed that the old colonial system had provided the colonies with nearly two and a half millions sterling in bounties between 1706 and 1774. In the Seven Years' War England had done much for them. [5] In 1756 £115,000 were sent us "a free gift" to

1 Present State of France and Spain (1740), p. 41.
2 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 278.
3 Ramsay's Hist. Amer. Rev. (1793), i. 40.
4 Conduct of the late Administration (1767), p. 153.
5 The Rights of Great Britain Asserted (1776), pp. 12–3.

New England. In 1757 £50,000 were sent for "the use and relief" of North and South Carolina and Virginia; in 1758 £41,000 were given to Massachusetts and Connecticut. The vaunted Louisburg expedition of 1745 had been financed by the home government, and between 1759 and 1763 £870,000 were paid to the colonies for the maintenance of the army in America. Townshend said with some force that the colonists were only asked to give their mite towards a common fund. Their contribution would be expended in America itself. Adam Smith, while [1] condemning the monopolist tendencies of the old colonial system in 1776, argued that the Americans had no just ground for exemption from helping to bear the cost of a war waged as well for their, as for English interests, and that there was no good in [2] "the splendid and showy equipage of empire," if England had to bear the whole burden of its maintenance.

Of course, the most efficient weapon in the armoury of colonial dialectics was the argument against England's choice of means to effect her end. It was however considered necessary to combat the justice of that end as well. The American case on this point rested on three pleas. In the first place, it was argued that there was no necessity at all to quarter an army among the colonists. [3] They could hold their own against any French or Indian incursion, and desired no protection. The troops, for whom they were asked to pay were garrisoned in Canada, and would therefore only benefit that province by their expenditure. [4] If England herself disliked a standing

1 Wealth of Nations (ed. "World Library"), p. 485.

2 *ibid*, p. 760.

3 Considerations on behalf of the Colonists (1765), p. 11.

4 An Appeal to the World (1769), p. 27; Adair's Hist. Am. Indians (1775), p. 463.

army, she should not force one on her colonies, and risk creating another Ireland. Secondly, Franklin urged that America had made equal sacrifices with England in the French war. She had put nearly 25,000 men in the field, and in the later Indian war 1,000 men out of the British force of 1,300 were colonial. The payments made to the colonies were far less than their disbursements for the purposes of the war. Pennsylvania spent £440,000 more than she received. So willing was America to fight for any English interest that she had sent 3,000 men to the Carthagena expedition in 1739, and would help the Mother Country even in the event of a purely European conflict. Thirdly, the country was said to be [1] too poor in gold and silver to pay the duties demanded.

None of these pleas however were conclusive, and the colonial controversialists directed their opposition rather against England's choice of means. Though there was no precedent to favour imposing duties directly upon colonies, British policy had been exercised again and again in controlling the economics of Greater Britain for the benefit of vested interests at home. The American provinces had entire self-government in internal affairs, and Massachusetts was [2] admittedly a genuine democracy; but they had always been regarded as subject to the paramount exigencies of the imperial system. Hence the natural drift of the government to the policy of the Stamp Act, which obviated the difficulties of separate appeals to a dozen different unwilling legislatures. It was said very truly that direct taxation from home was [3] "to the great ease of the Mother

1 Present State of Gt. Britain and N. America, p. 285; Late Regulations respecting Brit. Colonies, p. 23; Bigelow's Franklin, i. 468. See however J. Adams' Twenty-one Letters (ed. 1789), p. 41.

2 Bernard and Gage's Letters to Hillsborough (1769), p. 43.

3 Two Papers on Taxing the British Colonies in America (1767), p. 14.

State, and without the trouble of applying to the several assemblies in so many distinct and independent provinces."

The question of legality played a great part in the dialectics of the day. The colonial lawyers were then almost [1]notorious for their fine verbal distinctions, and their genius for evasion and chicane. They claimed to discriminate between the previous indirect taxation from home as external, and the new taxation as internal. With regard to the latter, they claimed to have been always exempt from the jurisdiction of the English Houses of Parliament. [2]"We owe them no more subjection than the Divan of Constantinople." [3]Washington seems to have deemed the Stamp Act simple robbery and "a direful attack upon our liberties," and [4]John Adams thought that there was no more justice in Britain than in hell. More learned and precise critics like James Otis sought controversial weapons in the past history of English freedom, to prove the unlawfulness of direct taxation of the colonies from Westminster, and though Mansfield deemed his views [5]"full of wildness," he found plenty of matter in the writings of Locke and other political philosophers [6]to support the plea of no taxation without representation. [7]Writing upon paper made at Boston in support of the proposal to import no English goods, Otis asked [8]why America should be governed by the electors of Old Sarum, and the occupants of Cornish barns and alehouses. [9]The

1 See Douglas' Reports (1781), p. 647; Bernard and Gage's Letters to Hillsborough (1769), p. 39.
2 Conduct of the late Administration (1767), p. 91.
3 Sparks' Washington, ii. 543; iii. 394.
4 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 308.
5 Holliday's Life of Mansfield (1797), p. 248.
6 Rights of Parliament Vindicated (1766), p. 8.
7 Tudor's Life of Otis (1823), p. 35.
8 *ibid*, p. 191.
9 *ibid*, p. 165.

injury to the colonists arising from their forced inability to accept molasses from the French West Indies in return for fish was the work of the Sugar Act of 1733 and was already intolerable. On the other hand, like John Dickenson and other moderate reformers, Otis abandoned the plea as the alleged difference between external and internal taxation. That plea is indeed difficult to maintain, and if to-day we can agree that it was fallacious, it is clear that apart from the deterrent effects of long disuse the government might have been legally entitled to extend its admitted right to regulate the affairs of the colonies without consulting them, in order to cover the claim to levy taxes. This is the view of the best American authorities, such as [1] Professor Woodburn, and in any case, we should hesitate to term illegal a course considered constitutional by a lawyer as profound as Mansfield, and an historian as great as Gibbon. It is especially difficult to accept the American contention as correct if we believe in the juristic rather than in the political conception of sovereignty. A philosopher might hold that all the power of a government is derived from and delegated by the people, but the custom of the British constitution has discarded such an abstract proposition and made Parliament absolute. By accepting the trade restrictions imposed upon them by those in authority at Westminster, the colonies had habitually admitted in effect their illimitable sovereignty. Justice and expediency should no doubt temper the exercise of legal rights, but they do not themselves alter or abridge such rights, and the declaration of Parliament in 1766 (6 Geo. III. c. 12) that it had full power "to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies and people of America in all cases whatever" is not technically open to objection.

[1] Woodburn's Causes of the Am. Rev. (1892), p. 51.

The disputation of that day is far more suggestive in the spirit than the letter. Arguments "ad hoc" may have no lasting value, but the general tone of this controversy is most suggestive, as the best American writers made amends in the early years of the struggle for any legal flaws in their political case. Otis said: [1] "God forbid (that) these colonies should ever prove undutiful to their Mother Country," but he brushed aside the sophistry of forensic quibbles, realising that there are occasions when political principles must outweigh bare legal rights. Englishmen were arguing that many districts at home paid taxes without returning members to Parliament, but it was madness to extend such an anomaly. A trained disputant —witness his admirable argument against the legality of writs of assistance as being general not special, perpetual not returnable,—he appealed to English Whigs to sympathise with men struggling for [2] "the laws, customs and usages of our ancestors, bravely supported and defended with the monarchy, and from age to age handed down." He argued that the economic restrictions were in effect America's taxes, and that further interference would be tyranny. [3] Richard Bland of Virginia pointed out how even the system of bounties was really devised for the sake of Britain.

Such contentions enabled the opposition at home to evade treating the question as a national issue, while at the same time its appeal to abstract principles opened the way to a repudiation of England's repressive colonial theory altogether. When once the "locus standi" of the old colonial system was disputed it was but a step to the avowed republicanism of Paine. Franklin held out long

1 James Otis' Vindication of the British Colonies (1769), p. 22.
2 *ibid*, p. 47.
3 Bland's Enquiry into the Rights of British Colonies, p. 19.

for peace, but in time he saw that Britain would never give way, and he was then willing to avail himself of this opportunity. He perceived that when once the colonies could be persuaded that their previous subjection to British mercantilism was but arbitrary and terminable, there would be an open road to a new career of freedom, unimpeded by British interests, wars and debts. Such a dream animated the heated abstractions of Paine's "Common Sense and Plain Truth," where alleged "natural rights" are preferred to the old political ties. [1] "In England the King hath little more to do than to make war and give away places, which, in plain terms, is to impoverish the nation and set it together by the ears. . . . Of more worth is one honest man to society and in the sight of God than all the crowned ruffians that ever lived." When we read such language we cannot but feel in a new atmosphere, where history and tradition are treated with contempt, and where the formal pleading of old world constitutional lawyers sounds like a dead tongue. [2] Blackstone was quoted to support the since exploded doctrine that human laws which conflict with those of nature are invalid. The admission of alleged eternal "laws" into the category of legal arguments and Paine's rancorous invective against [3] "the royal brute of Great Britain," [4] "Mr. Guelph," were clear steps towards the unhistorical rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence. They marked a distinct departure from the earlier and far more closely reasoned appeals to juristic principles; and revolutionaries of the saner sort like [5] John Adams deplored Paine's "Newgate" epithets, and the

1 Common Sense (1776), p. 23.
2 The Farmer Refuted (1775), p. 6.
3 Common Sense (1776), p. 40.
4 22 State Trials, p. 406.
5 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 507–9.

coarse abuse, which alienated many moderate reformers. Indeed the years between 1765 and 1775 witnessed a steady growth of this new republicanism under the influence of hot-headed zealots of the type of Warren and Samuel Adams. [1] The burning of effigies on the liberty tree at Boston, the [2] cruelty and violence of "the Sons of Liberty" towards the Tories, the innumerable libels on loyalty, the practice of tarring and feathering opponents, were all novel applications of the notion of man's natural rights. Temperate patriots like Benjamin Thompson, afterwards celebrated as Count Rumford, were thus driven unwillingly into the loyalist camp. Men said that if all American fancies were true, [3] "we are as abject slaves as France and Poland can show in wooden shoes and with uncombed hair," and they listened willingly to the passionate eloquence of Jefferson, whose hatred of the British people was intense, and whose [4] expurgated passages in the Declaration of Independence ring with sonorous and trenchant denunciations.

English arguments were cast in an utterly different mould. The generation of Adam Smith and Josiah Tucker hated fanciful abstractions; they wanted facts alone, and judged policies from business experience, not from commentaries on Locke or Filmer. They clung probably too closely to the assertion of legal rights without considering the larger question of expediency. John Wesley said that no charter had ever given an American colony [5] "the illegal privilege of being exempt from parliamentary

1 Bernard's Letters (1765), p. 13.

2 What think ye of Congress Now? (1775), p. 12.

3 Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (1768), p. 25.

4 See the fine passage beginning with "the road to happiness" etc., in Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 21.

5 Wesley's Journal (ed. 1902), p. 405.

taxation," and thought this defect conclusive. His cast of thought was not characterised by particularly elevated philosophy, but it was eminently logical. No pamphleteer of the age, who wrote in support of the British government, ever approached the burning hatred of Paine, who had become even more bitter than native-born Americans. In fact, the dominant note of the tracts which vindicated the policy of Lord North was the simplicity of their practical self-interest. Samuel Johnson's violence was only in expression. With massive bigotry, he said in 1769 that the malcontents were [1] "a race of convicts, and ought to be thankful for anything we allow them short of hanging," and that if they had their deserts, [2] "we should have at once razed their towns, and let them enjoy their forests." Those who recognize the habitual dogmatism of the writer, will see in such words merely a keen dislike to speculative theorists and mob orators. In "Taxation no Tyranny," he compared the constitutional functions of the colonial assemblies to those of parish vestries in England, and refused to see in their pretensions to a greater province anything more than pretexts to avoid taxation. He did not admit that the cry of liberty among colonists was genuine at all. If they believed in it they would have freed their own slaves first. As a defence in the present case the plea of freedom was a mere excuse. Johnson's school of thought always inculcated resignation to fate, and acquiescence in established forms of government. The fact that eight-ninths of our own population were unrepresented in Parliament was thought to prove that the principle, "no taxation without representation" was inadmissible, and existing laws, whether as to the franchise here or taxation in America, needed no reform, living as

1 Boswell's Johnson (ed. 1896), iii. 163.

2 R. Napier's Johnsoniana (1884), p. 273.

we did, [1] "in Britain not Utopia." [2] No one could say that hop or cider growers had willingly "consented" to the hop or cider tax in England, and yet such taxes were binding on them. A minority's grievance did not justify a revolution of the existing constitution. England was proud of not applying "the rule of three" to representation, and [3] Tucker explained that a town had no right to additional members by virtue of having become, like London, "swollen and bloated." What would become of the constitution if the theory of "no taxation without representation" were applied to the [4] "thousands of poor journeymen day labourers and low ignorant mechanics residing in Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds and Halifax?" [5] "O Liberty! O my Country!" exclaimed the Tory dean. Johnson, with a similar distaste for democratic dreams, shuddered at the idea that the rebels would increase in numbers at the rate of progression suggested by Franklin. [6] "When the Whigs of America are thus multiplied, let the princes of the earth tremble in their palaces."

This indifference to all arguments except those derived from actual constitutional law was eminently characteristic of the partisans of England's old colonial theory. John Wesley's addresses at the time are admirable examples of clear and moderate statement, but they all assume that the existing conception of empire is adequate for every purpose. [7] "Do you not sit without restraint, every man under his own vine?" he writes in his "Calm Address to our American Colonists," as if personal freedom necessarily

1 An Answer at large to Mr. Pitt's Speech (1766), p. 12.
2 Controversy between Gt. Britain and Colonies (1769), p. 87.
3 Tucker's Four Letters (ed. 1783), p. 59.
4 *ibid*, p. 117.
5 *ibid*, p. 61.
6 Boswell's Johnson (ed. 1896), iii. 166.
7 Calm Address (1775), p. 15.

atoned for economic repression. To men of his school of thought all political agitation seemed worthless, so long as he who ploughed the field was allowed to reap it in peace, and he who built a house remained master of the door. So long as person and property were safe, it was wrong to disturb a state on behalf of immaterial doctrines. [1]Adam Smith admitted that any representation of America in England was impracticable, and it was thought absurd to allow this difficulty to present the enforcement of a just demand. Politicians so different from one another as Grenville and Junius considered that colonial resistance was based on the most sordid motives, and even [2]Wilkes was opposed to American claims until won over by a flattering address from Boston.

A similar vein of thought ran through the contemporary loyalist literature of America, which assumed [3]that the rebellious colonists wanted England to draw water and hew wood for America without reward. It will indeed be seen later how Joseph Galloway, sometime Speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly, conceived [4]a plan of union between Great Britain and her colonies, but [5]it is clear that he saw in the pioneers of the United States only frantic zealots, [6]when he pointed out that if the colonists desired, they need not buy any tea at all, but that they were only hurting themselves by such abstinence. [7]They had implored help from England in 1754, and now dared to incite the British army to attack them. The able tracts of Samuel Seabury and the sermons of Jonathan Boucher

1 Wealth of Nations, p. 494.
2 Stephens' Memoirs of J. H. Tooke (1813), i., 178.
3 Galloway's Reflections on the Rise of the Am. Rebellion (1780), p. 23.
4 Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims etc. (1775), p. 53.
5 *ibid*, p. 47.
6 A Friendly Address to all Reasonable Americans (1774), p. 7.
7 *ibid*, p. 27.

exposed the legal fallacies of the American disputants, showing [1]the inconsistency of their tenets with their charters, and [2]the humble reality of their subordination to Parliament, contrasted the justice of England with [3]the violent methods of colonial mob law, and showed how hardly the non-importation policy would weigh on [4]the poor farmer. The Hutchinson letters breathe horror of the wild sentiments of the [5]"Boston Gazette," and are themselves written with coolness and composure. Temperance alone, however, cannot win battles, and the loyalists thought it hopeless to attempt to organise resistance to the rise of the demagogues. Their dry contempt for the firebrands of the coming Revolution faithfully reflected the tone prevailing in Great Britain.

The truest deduction therefore, that we can draw from the dialectics of the day on the question of taxation, is that each side adopted an attitude inevitable during the sway of the old colonial theory. Both indeed drifted into spheres of thought, not necessarily following from that theory. The forward party in America became immersed in a new ideal of republicanism, while in England the chance influence of domestic politics gave to the government policy a partisan character wholly alien to its origin. The energetic effort of George III. to reverse the work of two centuries of political development complicated the colonial issue by partially identifying the national theory of empire with his own personal greed for power. If however we hold the opinion that the English people were already committed to the policy of

1 A View of the Contest (1774), p. 14.
2 *ibid*, pp. 15, 35.
3 Free Thoughts by a Farmer (1774), p. 16.
4 *ibid*, p. 17.
5 Hutchinson Letters (1773), p. 25.

direct interference in America, by their deep convictions as to the adequacy of the prevailing colonial system, there is no reason to paint George III. as the sole author of the war. [1] John Adams himself alleged that the roots of the Revolution lay in the aspiration after a free trade with all the world, in place of subjection to a mean monopoly. Under the same circumstances and conditions, it is probable that the American colonies would have tried to sever themselves from Great Britain, had she been a republic instead of a monarchy, and George III. been a cypher instead of a despot.

[1] Adams' Twenty-one Letters (ed. 1789), p. 9.

CHAPTER V.

English Feeling Towards America in 1775.

When Braddock's army marched to its ruin in the woods near Fort Duquesne, its contempt for colonial allies earned it deserved unpopularity. [1] Franklin was always stung by the common British opinion that colonists were "Yahoos." For example, an essay on the Militia in 1757 referred scornfully to the fact that [2] "every Indian incursion alarms the American militia." [3] Wolfe described the Americans in 1758 as "in general the dirtiest, most contemptible cowardly dogs that you can conceive." [4] In 1765 a provincial writer complained that the colonies were spoken of as the property of Englishmen at home by "every gazeteer from the environs of Grub Street to the purlieus of St. James's," and English officials themselves deplored the provoking insolence of British garrisons towards the American populace. Already in 1769 Washington spoke bitterly of [5] "our lordly masters." In 1774 a member of Parliament called Van, described by [6] Governor Hutchinson as "a plain, blunt man," styled Boston [7] "a nest of locusts," which ought to be destroyed, and in 1775 one [8] Colonel Grant alleged in the House of Commons that the colonists

1 Bigelow's Franklin, iii. 284.
2 An Essay on the Expediency of a National Militia (1757), p. 15.
3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. ix.; pt. 3, 76.
4 Considerations on behalf of the Colonists (1765), p. 14.
5 Sparks' Washington, iii. 351.
6 Hutchinson's Diary (ed. 1883), i. 319.
7 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xvii. 1178.
8 Gent. Mag. (1775), p. 63.

would never face any army in the field, while Lord Sandwich, a responsible minister, declared in the House of Lords that the Americans were [1] "raw, undisciplined, cowardly men," a taunt which [2] rankled long. A much greater Englishman, Rodney wrote to his wife from Paris in 1778 of three captains of American warships then in that city: [3] "They talk, I hear, much of fighting, for which reason I believe they are cowards." In 1776 Aaron Burr said that the British officers [4] "hold us in the utmost contempt, talk of forcing our lines without firing a gun," for the war was well advanced before the army admitted that the colonists had the same courage as themselves, [5] "though their hair may not be so well powdered." We can see the glimmering of a truer view in the vivid account of Bunker Hill by the commander of the Light Infantry in that action. [6] "The rebels were very numerous and behaved far beyond any idea I could have formed of them. . . . . We have paid for our victory, lost a great number of our officers—I am told about eighty killed and wounded—a great smash by such miscreants." Yet Lady Sarah Bunbury wrote of Howe in 1775, that she hoped he [7] "will not be employed long in so vile and fruitless a service, where he may be killed and cannot get any honour." Even loyalists like [8] Joseph Galloway and Samuel Curwen resented the attitude adopted towards their fellow countrymen by [9] "these conceited islanders."

1 Russell's Life of Fox (1859), i. 83.
2 Sparks' Washington, iii. 407.
3 Mundy's Rodney, i. 170.
4 M. L. Davis' Memoirs of Aaron Burr (1838), i. 97.
5 Lord Stair's Facts and their Consequences (1782), p. 31.
6 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 381.
7 Life and Letters of Lady S. Lennox (ed. 1902), i. 235.
8 Considerations upon the Am. Enquiry (1779), p. 7.
9 Curwen's Journal and Letters (ed. 1842), p. 90.

Such examples of English feeling display the common want of that political sentimentality, with which we now associate our conception of the British empire. The idea of racial brotherhood, now so popular with all classes, made no appeal to men of that day. It was an unimaginative age in England, and much of the efficiency of the government during the war for America had been derived from the severely practical nature of England's colonial ambitions. The war benefited the colonies, but its aim was rather to expand our imperial market, and its popularity owed nothing to the modern fancy that it was waged to rescue brothers beyond the sea from oppression by the French. In that respect, the age of chivalry had gone, for even the best and most disinterested side of national activity was then eminently unemotional. Religion had thus sunk into creedless benevolence. Charity was as yet as soberly administered, that the idea that every citizen had a right to outdoor relief and to state help in maintaining his family was only a delusion of the next generation; but philanthropy was practised with visible effect and with better results. In the same simple spirit, the uses of the empire were estimated by its material fruits alone, and a colonist was weighed critically in the balance as a customer, without being privileged by his fellow citizenship in the same imperial community. Men saw no advantages in territory *per se*, and never appreciated the sentimental aspect of a British North America.

A number of active minds among the colonists approached far more nearly than the thinkers of the Mother Country to the modern idealism. When the New Englanders captured Louisburg, [1] "the Dunkirk of

[1] Letter from a French Refugee in America (1774), p. 13.

America," in 1745, they exulted over "the sixpence-a-day" regulars, in having proved the efficiency of untrained Anglo-Saxons in furthering the common cause. [1]"What is it that Britons cannot do?" wrote one of them to James Houstoun, thus identifying himself with the Englishman at home. In 1755 Dinwiddie appealed to the Virginians to atone for the sluggishness of some of the other colonists by [2]"distinguishing yourselves the sons of Britons." In the Seven Years' War the relations between the English regulars and the colonial levies improved with experience of each others' worth. Thomas Pownall, once Governor of Massachusetts, attempted to infuse a wider and more lasting geniality into the attitude of Great Britain and America towards each other. Like Franklin, he saw the need to impress upon each the lesson that unity should mean more than mere business relationship. [3]He wrote that the colonies were as much part of the home country as the Palatine counties, that they were constituents of [4]the same empire as England herself, and it will be seen how he [5] recommended colonial representation at Westminster, a scheme which ignored the prevailing conditions of Parliament. That haughty oligarchy would never understand the reasoning, whereby rugged backwoodsmen and austere New England traders were to intrude upon an assembly, which had treated representation as only a legal fiction for generations. The colonists in this respect were far more modern in their view of political systems, and Dulaney claimed that they

1 James Houstoun's Works (1753), p. 366.

2 Gent. Mag. (1755), p. 305.

3 Pownall's Administration of British Colonies (1774), i. x.

4 *ibid*, i. 10.

5 *ibid*, ii. 82.

should be treated as [1] "other Englishmen." Great Britain was often called [2] "by the tender endearing appellation of 'home'" in these days before the Revolution. [3] "They may be looked on as foreigners," wrote Franklin of his compatriots, "but they do not consider themselves as such." They thought that an empire was more than a mere commercial appendage to a Mother Country, and had plenty of sentiment for the [4] "Old England men." Whatever were the true feelings of the Congress of [5] 1765 and of that of [6] 1774, each expressed lip loyalty to the Crown, and it is to be observed that [7] the much abused Germans and Quakers of Pennsylvania were among those most disinclined to resist English claims.

Hence the surprised character of much of the colonial dialectics, when the British government treated the American provinces as negligible factors in formulating the public policy of the empire. It was said that Englishmen only lost their votes by leaving Britain for a foreign country, not by migrating from Yorkshire to London, and it was argued that migration to British America was on the same footing as the latter. The colonists were "fellow-subjects" with Britons at home, and not "their subjects." The Congress of Pennsylvania

1 Dulaney's Considerations on the Propriety of imposing Taxes (1766), p. 39.

2 Dissertations on the Advantages of Perpetual Union (1766), p. 97.

3 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 495–6.

4 *ibid*, i. 476.

5 Authentic Account of the Proceedings of the Congress at N.Y. (1765), p. 25.

6 Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress at Philadelphia (1774), pp. 25, 65.

7 Galloway's Reflections on the Rise of the Am. Rebellion (1780), p. 115.

said that they were only acting [1] "like the descendants of Britons." In 1748 [2] Otis Little wrote that there were no people on earth more loyal than the colonists. [3] In 1764 an advocate of the colonies protested that nothing was further from their nature, their interest, their thoughts, than revolt, and in 1765 the Massachusetts assembly considered dependence on the Mother Country "a great blessing." [4] Philadelphia was Tory to the last, and [5] the Anglican, Lutheran, Quaker, Calvinist and German elements among the American people largely inclined towards the British cause throughout the Revolution. Numbers of loyalist corps served valiantly in the war, such as the Corps of Pioneers, De Lancey's Regiment, the Florida Grenadiers, the Loyal Refugees of West Florida, the King's American Dragoons and Orange Rangers, the Loyal American Regiment, the Maryland Loyalists, the Volunteers of New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Nova Scotia, the Pennsylvania Loyalists and Royal Fencible American Regiment. These represented the class who invented the phrase "United Empire."

In England itself there was far less feeling of sentimental affinity. Its people had always been willing to fight for a colonial cause, but they looked for some reward, more immediate and material than airy gratitude and unsubstantial protestations. They realised how useful British protection had been to the colonies, and how liberal the colonial policy was with regard to internal self-government, in comparison with that of Spain or Holland. It was therefore the general belief that England

1 Gent. Mag. (1775), p. 496.
2 State of the Northern Colonies (1748), p. 15.
3 The Administration of the Colonies (1764), p. 25
4 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 437.
5 Galloway's Rise of the Am. Rebell. (1780), p. 115.

deserved in return every solid advantage that could possibly accrue from the possession of dependencies. [1] It was thought that a desire for separation could not be produced by such a policy, in view of England's mild laws and generous defence in war. [2] The want of fellow feeling between the Puritans of New England, the Anglicans of Virginia, the Quakers of Pennsylvania, the Germans of Georgia, the Catholics of Maryland, and the Dutch of New York, was deemed to make a colonial league against Britain an impossibility, and it should not be forgotten that far better informed judges like Otis and Franklin were surprised by the strength of American unity in 1765.

Moreover, although some enlightened colonists might proclaim the unity of all Britons in the common empire, emigration across the Atlantic did mean in actual fact a real drift away from the contemporary evolution of European thought and character, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The Puritans who had fled to Massachusetts in the reign of Charles I., did not bequeath to their descendants of 1775 anything analogous to the spirit of Hanoverian England. The Americans were still eminently Cromwellian in their conception of life and duty; the Bostonians, who listened to Samuel Adams at their town meetings, were wholly Puritan, and New England was still swayed by theologians; she delighted in sermons, and [3] celebrated every 5th of November by burning the Pope in effigy, and burlesquing Catholic rites. Such colonies had little of the Englishman's sober callousness to political anomalies. So far from having been planted by our care, as Townshend alleged in 1767,

1 Reasons for Establishing Georgia (1733), p. 15.
2 Interest of Great Britain considered (1759), p. 39
3 Tudor's Otis (1823), p. 25.

they were largely the products of government intolerance, and naturally the Puritan element feared episcopacy, hated any possible extension of royal prerogative, and was devoted to pulpit oratory. The Mother Country possessed nothing analogous to the way men lived in [1]Philadelphia, where an austere theology had for many years condemned fencing, dancing and play-acting as diabolical, and the use of wall-papers, carpets, tombstones and tooth-brushes as equally vain and unseemly, and where such small sums as the Assembly could be induced to grant for local defence were raised as "tokens of respect" to the Crown, and not for their true purpose. These provinces in fact, were so far removed from British thought that the community of faith and sentiment, which so largely supports the sense of imperial brotherhood to-day, was genuinely absent from the empire of the eighteenth century. There is no doubt also that while the opinions of emigrants to America remained almost unchanged, their actual natures had been modified under the quick influence of a new clime. The distance between England and America could only be spanned in a month, and the citizen at home rarely visited his compatriot over sea. Otis justly said, [2]"We are little more known than the savages of California." National character is probably but a patriotic myth, for history proves that it can rarely resist physical influences, and [3]the drinking and gaming slave owners of the West Indies had little of their original ancestors; [4]John Adams said that their nerves had been relaxed by the great heat. [5]A traveller described the

1 A. C. Applegarth's Quakers in Pennsylvania (1892), pp. 13, 15, 24, 42.

2 Otis's Vindication of the British Colonies, p. 25.

3 J. Atkins' Voyage to Guinea etc. (1757), p. 206.

4 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 174.

5 Atkins, p. 208.

women of beautiful Barbados in 1757, as nearly all Scotch or Irish, "very homely and great swearers." In America itself, the colonial type had already diverged slowly from the English, changing every characteristic, from the inflection of the voice to the form of the face and frame itself. "Yankee" was a distinctive term applied to the New Englander early in the eighteenth century, and the phrase, [1]"an Americanism," which has suggestive analogues in the Spanish and Portuguese languages, was already current at the time of the Revolution. In the *Pennsylvania Chronicle* of 1768 we find the un-English but American expression, [2]"this fall," and the un-English but American name, [3]"Silas Yerkes." [4] Paine was particularly eager to dissociate the colonies from British traditions, alleging that two-thirds of their inhabitants were of foreign descent, and that their motherland was Europe not England. [5]John Adams, afterwards President of the United States, said that no relation for whom he cared a farthing had been in England for one hundred and fifty years, and that he himself was purely American.

Under these circumstances English feeling towards America in 1774 was naturally wanting in the sentiment which normally flows from a people's realisation of the tie of kinship. The armies which fought for England in the War of Independence treated loyalist allies with ill-advised neglect. The average Briton knew little of the colonies beyond their exigencies in time of war, and their utility as markets. It is curious to read in George Veal's "Musical Travels through England," that [6] while strolling

1 Ramsay's Hist. Amer. Rev. (1793), i., v.
2 Pennsylvania Chronicle (1768), p. 410.
3 *ibid*, p. 275.
4 Common Sense (1776), pp. 28–9.
5 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), iii. 392.
6 Collier's Musical Travels (1775), p. 89.

on the banks of the Severn at Worcester in 1775, he heard a boy whistling "Yankee Doodle," a song "very popular in America," as the tune appears never to have been printed before 1784, and the words are certainly not older than 1755. In general, England's acquaintance with the customs of her colonies was dim and uninquisitive. Their political experiments aroused no interest. [1]Johnson, for instance, said in 1762, "In America there is little to be observed except natural curiosities."

Another reason for British coolness towards the Americans was a firm belief in their ingratitude. Convinced that the many sacrifices of the long French and Spanish wars had been largely occasioned by colonial interests, the Englishman could not understand American unwillingness to make England any repayment. As we have seen above, he did not admit that the colonies had contributed any assistance in those wars, nor did he tolerate theoretic objections to direct taxation. He had no appreciation of the irritating incidence of the old colonial system upon a sensitive and ambitious commercial people. Consequently he could only consider travellers' commentaries upon the American attitude towards England as revelations of extraordinary thanklessness. In spite of the British sentiment of many colonial traders, there was already no want of possible centres for disaffection, as the origin of so many colonies had simply been government oppression at home. The restrictions on trade stung such communities, and as early as 1703 [2]the Abbé Dubos predicted separation within ten years, as the colonists were not of the same long-suffering mould as those of Spain. The presence of the French Catholic power in Canada did what sentiment alone could not have done,

1 Boswell's Johnson, ii. 38.

2 Grosley's Tour to London (1772), i. 133–9.

in keeping American loyalty alive, but in 1731 Gee referred to [1]"the uncommon stiffness" of New England towards Britons at home, due no doubt to its earliest traditions as to the character of an England, very different to the England of George III. In 1748 a Swede, named Peter Kalm, visited North America, and in the course of a bright narrative of his travels, [2]he predicted that the colonies would seek independence within thirty or fifty years, but for the then fear of the French. The same tendency was noticed among the common people by [3]another traveller in 1774. Such, indeed, was the general opinion when once the terror of the Canadian scalping knife had been removed. [4]The unanimity of the north in resisting the Boston Port Act was a striking and novel sign of the universal scepticism as to the value of the British connection.

England was also aware of the presence of elements in American society, prejudicial to the continuance of community in thought between the two portions of the empire. The strong Congregationalist body in Massachusetts was avowedly hostile to monarchical institutions, and their chief minister, [5]Mayhew, of Boston, was both an exponent of the absurdity of celebrating Charles I's memory on the 30th of January, and one of the earliest promoters of a colonial congress. For some years before the Revolution, [6]Irishmen used to celebrate St. Patrick's Day by drinking to the cause of separation in the City Tavern at Philadelphia. The outlying frontier settlements west of the Blue Ridge were peopled

1 Gee's Trade and Navigation of Gt. Britain (1731), p. 72.
2 Kalm's Travels (1772), i. 207.
3 Thoughts of a Traveller upon our American Disputes (1774), p. 7.
4 Joseph Priestley's Memoirs (1806), pp. 90, 451.
5 Memorial History of Boston (1881), iii. 20, 119.
6 Remarks on the Travels of Chastellux (1787), p. 79.

notoriously by Irish and Scottish Presbyterian malcontents. The words [1] "Irish rogue" were used as a common term of abuse among the Seneca Indians. Such men hated the connection with England, and public opinion was generally with Dulaney, when he said of the colonies that [2] "for food, thank God, they do not, and for raiment they need not, depend upon Great Britain." At home also, men distrusted the numerous foreign settlers among the British colonists, especially in the western provinces,—Swedes, German Lutherans, Dutch, Jews, Frenchmen, Camisards, Swiss, Italians—and in some cases their distrust was well founded, for New York, where the cosmopolitan element was strongest, took the lead in the policy of non-importation.

For these reasons English feeling in 1774 was not marked by any widespread misgiving as to the justice of the cause of the government. In consequence of the existing order of events, there seemed nothing unnatural in forcing the old colonial policy upon fellow citizens in America at the point of the sword. Pitt, now Earl of Chatham, Burke, and several of the Whig nobles, excluded from office by the recent diplomacy of George III., tried from varying motives to prove the struggle unnatural, but in view of the actual conditions of the accepted imperial system of the day, we cannot wonder at their unsuccess. Franklin, who had once described England as [3] "this happy island," and looked forward [4] "as a Briton" to "awing the world with a British North America," who had sought with delight the home of his ancestors, and styled the victors of 1763

1 Taylor's Voyage to N. America (1771), p. 94.

2 Considerations on the Propriety of imposing Taxes (1766), p. 65.

3 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 432.

4 *ibid*, i. 399.

[1] "that brave army of veterans," had long since despaired of awaking the Mother Country from her fatal oblivion to the new necessities of her dominions over sea. With the exception of Chatham, and a few enlightened but uninfluential Whigs, he found every English official exasperating, from the time that he begged [2] Braddock to listen to colonial experts in 1755, to the days when he tried to teach Clare and Hillsborough the needs of the empire. The profit of the existing colonial policy was great and obvious in England, and its modification naturally appeared to be but a needless concession to selfish demagogues. Franklin's sarcastic "Rules for reducing a Great Empire to a Small one" dealt with the opinion prevailing throughout England, and were not in the least personal to the Crown or ministry. A nation, which had raised wild demonstrations in honour of "Wilkes and liberty," was not so spiritless as to drift into a long war simply at the will of a king. The prospect of stopping trade by insisting on the Stamp Act of 1765 had aroused genuine resistance in the manufacturing districts affected, but on the larger question of abandoning the economic pretensions of the old colonial theory, Burke himself admitted that the superficial advantages of coercion retained the sympathies of the majority of the nation. Men of the world were with the government, and [3] Dean Tucker provoked little criticism, by suggesting an appeal to the negroes and Red Indians in the colonies, to join in the comon cause of humbling the Americans. The real flaw in British imperial theory was its failure to appreciate the idea of a common membership in the same national community. In this the American

[1] *ibid*, i. 435.
[2] *ibid*, i. 316.
[3] Tucker's Tract v. (1775), p. v.

revolutionaries were happier, as when George Washington declared in 1776 that [1] "I have laboured to discourage all kinds of local attachments and distinctions of country, denominating the whole by the greatest name of America." The founders of the federal constitution of the United States, notably Hamilton and Washington, fought strenuously against [2] the tendency to prefer local prejudices to the welfare of the whole community, realising that insistence on the special advantages of individual states can only lead to disintegration. Englishmen had no analogous conception of the British empire in the days before the Revolution. As yet, they were merely groping towards the only safe imperialism. They still looked exclusively at purely English interests, and their particularism was the curse of the old colonial system.

1 Washington's Official Correspondence (1795), i. 352.

2 Sparks' Washington, viii. 443.

CHAPTER VI.

Chatham and Burke.

While the old colonial system was breaking down, it was natural to look for guidance to the statesman, who had caused its greatest triumphs. Pitt's contempt for the ministers in office at the time of the Stamp Act, his disbelief in the legality of direct taxation, his dread of the re-assertion of French power in the world, and his great solicitude for the colonies, which he prized so much, all led him to denounce a policy, which might throw Greater Britain into an alliance with Louis XVI. Such an attitude on his part earned him the affection of later day Whigs, in spite of his refusal to co-operate effectually with the opposition of his own time, and it won him also a pathetic fame in America, in spite of his adherence to the economic principles, which really made the Revolution inevitable.

In actual fact, however, the latter years of the Great Commoner did nothing to increase his reputation as a leader of men. An excessive pride made him widen the gulf which flowed between himself and the people. It is indeed a sign of high moral character to follow the right, disdaining the criticisms of the time-serving, but there is no virtue in flouting the most cherished ideals of one's own partisans. Pitt indeed maintained them against Bute, and though so [1] "excessively ill" as to be unable to stand, he spoke for three hours against the too lenient treaty of 1763. Yet his attitude towards Tories and Whigs,

[1] Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xv. 1263.

"King's friends" and Wilkes's allies, remained equally scornful and cold. While he treated Grenville and Edgcumbe, Conway and Richmond with an easy insolence, he also estranged many of his less aristocratic Whig supporters by accepting an annuity of £3,000 a year for the lives of himself, his wife and eldest son, and a title for his wife in 1761. His refusal to help Rockingham's ministry, and his own elevation to the earldom of Chatham in 1766 disentitled him to be considered a party leader at all, and gave the lie to his earlier democratic creed. The excuse that this step was due to ill-health and was a natural sequence to his acceptance of the office of Lord Privy Seal, did not prevent the mob from twisting his name into [1] "Cheat 'em," and from [2] burning him in effigy in his own former stronghold of London. A great war minister who scorns all party connections, cannot possess lasting magnetism in a country subject to aristocratic government, and where interest in politics is not widely diffused; and the nation's response to [3] Chatham's reckless desire to fight Spain on the question of the Falkland Islands in 1771, was but an echo of its earlier enthusiasm.

While thus losing popularity, Chatham adopted an attitude of Elizabethan deference towards royalty. His singular exaltation of George III., even while opposing him in Parliament, was always an obstacle in the way of any true union between him and the Whig nobles. [4] "The least peep into that closet intoxicates him, and will to the end of his life," Burke wrote to Rockingham

1 Bedford Correspondence, iii. 51.
2 *ibid*, iii. 54.
3 Nicholls' Recollections (1822), ii. 129.
4 Burke's Correspondence, i. 506.

in 1774. Both these men thoroughly [1] distrusted him; the destroyer of party politics could hardly claim esteem from the author of "Thoughts on the Present Discontents." Physical weakness, repeated attacks of gout, constant lethargy, all made him an utterly unreliable force in English politics after 1763. [2] The loyalist Galloway said scornfully that Chatham no longer lived; he merely protracted a wearisome existence. He refused to join with any of the Whig cliques, and when he accepted office in 1766 his dislike to party caused him to select colleagues who had nothing in common with one another. He was too ill ever to act the part of leader; his position as Lord Privy Seal was a sinecure, and after living in complete seclusion for over a year, he resigned in 1768. There was a ferment of popular indignation against his delinquencies in the matter of consistency. [3] Hume said in 1766 that Lord Chatham was as much detested as Mr. Pitt was ever adored, and even his intimate associate and brother-in-law, [4] Temple, turned against him. Innumerable tracts satirised "Will Cheat-'em Esquire, of Turn-about Hall." One critic, in a pamphlet called "The Right Honourable Annuitant Vindicated," said of his pension, [5] "if you take it beforehand it is a bribe; if you take it afterwards it is a gratification." To Whig zealots it seemed deplorable that the only man in England with sufficient genius to stay the drift towards despotism at home and rebellion in the colonies, should have preferred to stand aloof from all party ties. Partisans like Richmond and Granby, Camden and Rockingham could not understand his contempt for

[1] *ibid*, ii. 63.
[2] Considerations upon the American Enquiry (1779), p. 9.
[3] Hume's Private Correspondence (ed. 1820), p. 211.
[4] Grosley's Tour to London (1772), ii. 243.
[5] p. 19.

their political traditions, failing to recognise that his splendid war ministry would have been impossible had he worked in the groove of party. Yet their failure was natural and their suspicion powerful.

[1] "Mourn, Albion, mourn, the wretched chance deplore;
In Chatham buried, William Pitt's no more,"

wrote one of the hack-writers employed by these Whig aristocrats, and [2]Blackfriars Bridge regained its old name in place of the recent appellation of Pitt's Bridge.

The wide breach between Chatham and the Whigs after 1766 attests to the independence of his judgment on the American question, for he was as careless of their favour as he was of the suspicions of the Court party. For this reason it might be surmised that his previous views on imperial government had developed into broader statesmanship, as he showed much of his old vehemence in withstanding the growing tendency to alienate the colonies by insistence on direct taxation. Gravely distrusting the King's avowed aim to become despotic in England upon the ruins of the party system, Chatham deemed the proposed extension of the established colonial policy but another step towards the destruction of parliamentary government. He considered the mediocre Tory ministers of the day as oblivious to the national necessity of maintaining the good feeling between the British peoples, and hence such criticisms of them as [3] "government butchers," which come amiss from one so great. They only typify his constitutional impatience of little minds and special pleading, and not an acquiescence in the suggestion of dismembering the empire. When Chatham

[1] An Enquiry into the Conduct of a late Rt. Hon. Commoner (1766), p. 70.

[2] Grosley's Tour to London, i. 30; ii. 241, 245.

[3] Chatham Correspondence, iv. 403.

rejoiced that America had resisted, he did not contemplate the evolution of a protest for freedom into a war for absolute cleavage from Great Britain. It should not be forgotten that he attacked Rockingham's proposal to acknowledge American independence in 1778, and that his dying speech was directed against the Whig separatism of the Duke of Richmond. Such divergence from the extremists among the opposition testifies to the honesty of his sympathy with colonial opposition to arbitrary measures, though we cannot but doubt the goodness of the precedent he set in refusing, from political scruples, to allow his son to serve in the army during the early years of the war.

In the controversy evoked by the projects of taxation Chatham strained every effort to avert a scheme which he saw would weaken the sentimental bonds of empire. [1] In 1766 he pointed out the absurdity of Parliament purporting "to grant" taxes on behalf of unrepresented Americans. By nature, taxes were voluntary gifts, not compulsory exactions, and Parliament had therefore no right under heaven to enforce them. [2] The colonists were the sons, not the bastards of England, and as such were entitled to all our ancient liberties. The argument as to taxation being applied to many unrepresented districts in Great Britain, he held futile and foolish. [3] "The rotten part of the constitution" deserved to be amputated, not extended. On the purely legal side of the dispute, however, Chatham was really a less qualified spokesman of opposition than many less famous controversialists. He was a [4] thorough believer in the sovereignty and supremacy

[1] Fox's Memoirs (ed. 1853), i. 109.

[2] Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 99.

[3] *ibid*, xvi. 100; A Short View of the Life of the late Rt. Hon. Commoner (1766), p. 53.

[4] Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 46.

of Parliament over the colonies, and consequently he could only escape the conclusion that whatever it commanded was legal, by pleading the alleged difference between external and internal taxation, and by holding that to give or grant supplies was not a function of government or legislation. In fact, his admission of the validity of parliamentary claims to rule the empire upon the principles of the old colonial system, put the burden of proof in the present case upon his own side. We can hardly be surprised that the Whigs resented such difficult inconsistency, and that Lord Hardwicke, as a government partisan, thought his doctrines [1] "absurd and pernicious."

Chatham's views are therefore far less assailable as expositions of the great lesson that expediency rather than a false notion of dignity should govern a nation's policy. It was idle to tell a man, who saw to what the drift of ministerial coercion might lead the empire, that the tea duty was considered legal by the same class, who had justified ship money under Charles I. and dispensations under Charles II. He had never any taste for law or constitutional history. A rather dim idea of Magna Charta, and a very clear intuition as to the meaning of liberty provided him with a sufficient political philosophy. He had nothing whatever of Otis' or Dickenson's legal acumen; his speeches appealed to the emotions more than to intellect, and were characterised by a grasp of large principles rather than by accuracy or precision. Such a man was bound to display an almost dramatic scorn for academics, at a moment when the country wanted statesmanship, not pedantry. Of America he said:

[2] "Be to her faults a little blind,
Be to her virtues very kind."

[1] Albemarle's Rockingham (1852), i. 290; *cf.* Hutchinson's Diary (ed. 1883), ii. 171.

[2] Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 109; A Short View (1766), p. 64.

He was of opinion that coercion would entail the loss of freedom at home as well as over sea, and might further lead to the wreck of that empire, which had just been acclaimed. [1]"The fate of Old England is at stake," he wrote to Shelburne in March 1774, and to save her he advocated yielding to every colonial demand except that of separation. In May 1774 he drew an eloquent picture of what the future of Britain might be if she chose gentler means for retaining her hold over her rising empire. [2]"Length of days be in her right hand, and in her left hand riches and honour; may her ways be ways of pleasantness, and all her paths be peace!" It is easy to realise the awe, which was inspired by Chatham's fierce declamation, and the English public, who knew little in those days of the politicians who purported to represent it, was singularly familiar with his dominating aspect from the hawk-like eyes down to the ebony crutch and [3] black velvet boots.

Chatham's attitude has endeared his memory to generations of Americans, and his despair at the prospect of "pouring the riches of America into the lap of the House of Bourbon" has given a splendid pathos to his last days. France and the rebels concluded a formal alliance in February 1778, and he died three months later in despair. No one however, who realises the inevitable trend of the old colonial system, will allow that Chatham's policy after 1764 marked any real advance from his earlier ideas on imperial government, or that it could have ever secured the permanence of the union between England and America. Assuming even that he had had the tact to keep the nation at his back, he had not that detachment from

1 Chatham Correspondence, iv. 336.
2 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvii. 1356
3 H. Walpole's Last Journal (ed. 1859), i. 369.

the spirit of the age which could alone have pointed out the way of escape from ultimate separation. We have seen above that his influence on popular thought never touched the old colonial system with the precious gift of adaptability, so necessary in view of the new conditions of the time. Chatham never wavered in his belief in the virtues of state interference and of those economic restrictions, which were in fact the chief disintegrating factors in imperial policy. He hated the fiscal aspect of Amerian resistance. When New York opposed Grenville's attempt to enforce the Navigation Act he ascribed such opposition to a [1] "spirit of infatuation." The colonial contentions against economic restraints were, in his opinion, [2] "grossly fallacious." The demagogues of 1767 were [3] "irritable and umbrageous." The Boston tea riot in December 1773 was [4] "criminal violence," and [5] any relaxation of the old repressive policy would destroy England. Long before the Revolution he had threatened America with the full weight of the government's power to punish, if she manufactured a single horse-shoe, and [6] he never contested the right of the ministry to quarter troops in the colonies. Moreover, [7] his opposition to the Quebec Act of 1774 was characterised by intense prejudice against that policy of allowing a conquered people to retain its own established religion and laws, which has since proved sound statesmanship.

These considerations point to the conclusion that even if Chatham had retained his hold upon the nation, he was not

1 Chatham Correspondence, iii. 188.
2 *ibid*, iii. 189.
3 *ibid*, iii. 193.
4 *ibid*, iv. 336.
5 *ibid*, iv. 338.
6 Russell's Life of Fox (1859), i. 187.
7 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvii. 1403.

endowed with sufficient insight into political science to save the Greater Britain of that day from ruin. [1] "I can only say God's will be done, with the simplicity of a poor American," he wrote on the eve of the Revolution, but even then he was still a believer in the old colonial system. If it never had another exponent so liberal as Chatham, it could claim him none the less as a follower, and his heartiest eulogist must admit that if there was much in his theory of empire to admire, there was also much to criticise.

Edmund Burke approached modern theory more nearly than Chatham, in that he was an advocate of Free Trade, and would have been satisfied by ties of merely the Hellenic type between England and her colonies. On the purely legal question at issue his arguments also were only general and historical, and in fact he admitted the bare legality of direct taxation. As to the principle however, which was involved by insistence on the exercise of that prerogative of Parliament, he opposed the short-sighted policy of Lord North's government with brilliant vigour. [2] He argued that the imperial character of Parliament entailed the imposition of strict checks upon its use of theoretic powers. Morally, it had no claim to intrude into the place of its subordinate sister legislatures. Plainly it was for the latter to "grant" supplies, and yet the government affected to "grant" and not to "impose" taxes payable in America. No man appreciated the uses of colonisation more than Burke, and he pointed out the folly of dissipating the work of past years. [3] He compared the Boston rioters to Hampden, and [4] argued that the

1 Chatham Correspondence, iv. 387.
2 Burke's Select Works, i. 156–7.
3 *ibid*, i. 105.
4 *ibid*, i. 121.

adoption of a commercial monopoly in America marked the abandonment of the alternative right of taxation. [1]To prove the popular notion that dignity would suffer by concession to be thoroughly bad, he showed that the risks, involved by coercion, were far more vital than any possible advantages. [2] Chesterfield said that it was absurd to risk trade amounting to two million pounds a year for a tax which might bring in one hundred thousand, and similarly Burke held that England should be guided by national expediency, not by the latter of the law. He reversed Gibbon's method absolutely, by preferring imperial needs to legal argument, while the latter voted with the government in favour of [3]"the rights, though not perhaps the interests of the Mother Country." When he advised the amiable but lukewarm Rockingham to introduce the bill declaring the right of Parliament to tax America, Burke was clearly leaving the academics of coercion to pass unrefuted. He saw the larger necessity for immediate concession, and he recognised that to give way only after defeat in the field was an impossible course, for [4] "if we are beat, America is gone irrevocably." It was far better to associate the idea of the British empire with the rights which the colonists enjoyed, than with the claims which they disputed.

His most remarkable speeches on the colonial question are those of the 19th April, 1774, and the 22nd March, 1775, but the tone of all his utterances at the time is clear and consistent. Assuming the truth of the current parallel of England's relationship with her colonies to that between a parent and children, was England to give them a stone

1 *ibid*, i. 106.
2 Chatham Correspondence, ii. 361.
3 Gibbon's Autobiography (ed. 1896), p. 310
4 Burke's Correspondence, ii. 38.

if they asked for bread? He pointed out the immense worth of the possession of a British empire. The whole export trade of England in 1704 was not much in excess of her exports to her colonies alone in 1772. He asked old men to go back to the days of their boyhood, and imagine what their feeling would have been had some angel then opened to their vision the future glories of Britain's realm across the sea. [1] "Young man, there is America, which at this day serves for little more than to amuse with stories of savage men and uncouth manners; yet shall before you taste of death show itself equal to the whole of that commerce which now attracts the envy of the world." He asked whether all the glory and progress of a century was to be sacrificed to the litigious obstinacy of self-willed ministers. In his opinion, the danger of losing America made concession the more profitable as well as the more magnanimous policy.

The force and beauty of Burke's language made him a welcome ally to the Whig nobles, but under the conditions of the time, he had no more power than Chatham to stay the downfall of the British empire in America. It may well be doubted if he grasped what the American cause really involved, for he never felt the touch of the new Radicalism, then slowly coming to birth in England, and no glimmer of the dawning faith in democracy emancipated his mind from the general British devotion to the established order of things in Church and State. He acquiesced in the slave trade, and unlike Chatham, he opposed the tendency for Parliament to curb the East India Company's maladministration. He was quite willing to fight for the cause of a wider theory of empire in the ranks of an aristocracy, which had nothing of his idealism,

1 Burke's Select Works, i. 173.

and his later attitude towards the French Revolution shows how little understanding he had of the forces in society which made America rebel. [1]In 1773 he told Priestley that the hope of England lay in increasing the power of the great Whig families. This was hardly a creed to inspire a people just emerging from a century of oligarchy. Burke's quasi-imperialism offered to the country no prospect of direct gain nor of any realisation of its alleged legal rights over dependencies. No wonder his schemes were thought visionary and extravagant. If his mind was slightly more balanced than Chatham's it had far less captivating power, for to the last Chatham was a name to inspire awe and to command attention, while Burke seemed but a follower and an ex-secretary of Rockingham, not a master of men. Such certainly was his estimation by the House of Commons in 1775. As he said himself, [2]only angels or devils could stand aloof from the ties of existing parties, and so he stooped to serve the most hopeful among the groups in the House of Commons, realising that no plebeian could possibly have governed that corporate aristocracy. Burke catered to its moderate interest in territorial expansion, and his ideal of an empire was that of several communities federated by the loosest of material ties, and destitute of Chatham's passionate centralisation. [3]He reached the height of his influence in 1779, when he led the Rockingham Whigs in the House of Commons, and frustrated their proposed union with the group of more original thinkers, who gathered round Shelburne and Dunning. Soon afterwards he found that his leadership had passed to Fox, whose habits and temper were more congenial to the party. It is plain that

[1] Joseph Priestley's Memoirs (1806), p. 455.
[2] Burke's Select Works, i. 90.
[3] Nicholl's Recollections, i. 39—41.

Burke's methods were often unattractive, and though he delighted his hearers by his wit and strength, his long, vague and elaborate speeches were not of a nature to convince phlegmatic opponents. [1]Parliament had already lost its likeness to an open debating society, and it listened with settled convictions to partisan oratory, never expected to persuade. [2]Horace Walpole said that rhetoric was invented before the days of places and commissions. To such an audience [3]Burke's many mannerisms seemed grating, his emotionalism repellant, and his eloquence rather won the admiration of Americans like [4]Curwen, whose models were very different from those of the ordinary Englishman. Even Tories like Johnson recognized Burke's consummate genius, but they considered him a mere theorist in politics, and his friend Goldsmith admitted the natural difficulty that prevented the House of Commons from appreciating one,

[5] "Who too deep for his hearers still went on refining,
And thought of convincing while they thought of dining,
Though equal to all things, for all things unfit,
Too nice for a statesman, too proud for a wit."

In spite of his renown, Burke never won a place in any cabinet. Indeed, both these great English politicians, Chatham and Burke, by widely different means, appealed to an imagination too high for contemporary politics, without possessing quite enough genius to raise their world from its existing level. For this reason Chatham passed as [6]"wholly mad," and Burke as an unpractical enthusiast.

1 Lord Teignmouth's Memoirs of Sir Wm. Jones (1806), i. 294.
2 Letters of H. Walpole to Mann (1833), iii. 117.
3 Fox's Memoirs, i. 163.
4 Curwen's Journal and Letters (ed. 1842), p. 311.
5 Goldsmith's Retaliation.
6 Hume's Private Correspondence (ed. 1820), p. 243.

CHAPTER VII.

"United Empire" Loyalty.

It will be clear from the foregoing pages that Great Britain in 1775 was destitute of constructive imperialism. None of her politicians devised any scheme whereby strong executive government for the whole empire could be reconciled with the particularist tendencies then at work on both sides of the Atlantic. Every great federation has to face some such problem, and even to-day the present relationship between the Mother Country and her colonies appears to be so transient that no one would dare to prophesy the ultimate evolution of Greater Britain. Consequently singular interest must attach to the only proposals made in George III.'s time to solve the perplexities of empire by giving real freedom to every partner in the British community, and by subordinating each at the same time to the general interests of that community. In view of the contemporary selfishness of English colonial ideas, and of the concurrent American perception of an easier road than that of constitutional compromise to economic independence, it was a bold step to frame a scheme for unity among all British peoples. Those who took the risk spoke to deaf ears. The work and even the names of Thomas Pownall and Joseph Galloway may be said to have perished with them, for their ideals were less practicable than those of Hamilton and Washington, whose feat of binding together the United States was less perfect in conception than an Anglo-Saxon federation but was in the light of that age,

the only feasible compromise of the warfare between the larger and smaller political units.

As England's devotion to the old colonial system made the needs of the whole empire irreconcilable with the individualism of its component parts, the more practical colonial thinkers abandoned British for American patriotism, and organised trans-Atlantic rather than Anglo-Saxon unity. Nevertheless, the courage and ingenuity of the constitutional theorists in the colonies, who refused to despair of the wider union, and who parted company with Franklin upon reaching the point where their common patriotism forced them to choose between plain rebellion and pure Toryism, deserve much respect. The Falklands and Colepepers of 1775 are to be distinguished from the blinder partisans of what was called the cause of the "United Empire." Not that the latter class do not merit British gratitude, for even such pro-American zealots as Burke and Shelburne recognized their devotion to the Crown, but it was natural that most of them should merely acquiesce in the English view of the issue then at stake, and should ask for no amendment of the existing imperial system. Their position was simply that of honest citizens, who hated [1] "Oliverian" fanatics, who distrusted radical changes in society, loved old English traditions, and loathed the forensic and pulpit bluster of the fiercer revolutionaries. This "Church and King" type is familiar to all, and its scornful bravery in conflict is not rare. Jonathan Boucher, a clerical refugee from Maryland, told proudly of the loyalty of the cloth. [2] "We did not bow the knee to Baal." Such attachment however is not often intellectual. The loyalists, who experimented in constitutional science, who wished to

1 An Alarm to New York (1775), p. 88.

2 Boucher's Causes and Consequences of the Am. Rev. (1797), p. xlix.

purge colonial policy of its particularism, are those in whom modern participants in imperial politics have most reason to be interested.

Such men had all shared the earlier aim of consolidating the British brotherhood, which had led Franklin to propose the formation of a confederate council at the Albany Congress of 1754 to deal with such questions as [1] trade, taxation, defences and Indian policy. Many of them had been his intimates, but unlike that more sceptical and calculating statesman, they did not discard that brotherhood while the approach of rebellion was fast making it an empty dream. When one realises their unsentimental surroundings, the attitude of these writers seems precociously pan-Britannic. The whole race, said Pownall, once Lieutenant Governor of New Jersey, should form [2] "a grand marine dominion . . . . united in one empire in a one centre." It should be knit, said Galloway, the leading lawyer at Philadelphia and sometime Speaker of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, [3] "in one grand and illustrious empire." The colonies, said Dr. Chandler, should feel themselves [4] "a part of the great British community." Dreading the break-up of the empire, such thinkers aimed in the first place at displaying to both England and America the value of the imperial connection. They tried to refute the common British opinion that colonies, which withstood the claims of taxation, were not worth having, and the more widespread colonial belief that the tie which linked the two peoples was an impediment to American development. The first task was best attempted by Galloway, the second by Samuel Seabury, afterwards Bishop of Connecticut.

1 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 37, 52.

2 Pownall's Administration Brit. Cols. (5th ed. 1774), p. 10.

3 Galloway's Reply to an Address etc. (1775), p. 7.

4 The American Querist (1774), p. 6.

Upon the facts of the day Galloway's was the easier work, and he succeeded in showing that expediency as well as justice required a modification of the colonial system in view of the immense worth to England of her American possessions. Galloway was so far from being an unthinking adherent of the existing order as to have acquiesced in the non-importation policy of the first Congress of 1774, and his loyalty was the more magnanimous. He tried to reveal the fallacy of the doctrine that the ingratitude of colonies proved the futility of colonisation. The race wanted the readjustment of her imperial system, not its disruption. [1] He ridiculed the complacency with which Dean Tucker was willing that Britain should lose a vast territory and three million citizens. [2] The trade with the American colonies more than doubled every ten years, and British exports thither had risen in volume from £830,000 in 1748 to nearly £4,600,000 in 1771. [3] Such exports were many times as great as exports to the West Indies, and amounted to nearly half the volume of British exports to all foreign countries, representing at the same time a safer and more profitable trade. Moreover, if England were to lose her American provinces by her obstinacy she would also lose [4] the West Indies in the course of years, those islands being as natural appanages of North America as the Isle of Man and the Orkneys were of Great Britain. Surely so great an empire was worth the trouble of reorganisation; without it the home country would dwindle into a second-rate power, and its flag [5] "would be no more respected than

1 Cool Thoughts (1780), p. 11.
2 *ibid*, p. 15.
3 *ibid*, p. 14.
4 *ibid*, p. 26.
5 *ibid*, p. 34.

the lug sail of an oyster boat." This line of argument has an echo of that of Burke, but Galloway was not a political partisan. He was a far clearer advocate of expansion than Burke, and he crowned his reasoning by propounding a definite plan of imperial federation.

A different note was required to sustain Seabury's appeal to Americans to consider the advantages of the British connection. It was essential that the loyalist drafts of remodelled constitutions should be backed by evidence of their desirability, and yet it was hard to show that their adoption would provide as adequately for national development as the gaudy dreams of the republicans. The argument that the colonies required protection against foreign states was now untenable, although apparently [1] unquestioned as late as 1766. Under these circumstances we cannot but wonder at the skill with which Seabury argued that the young states of North America were only benefited by dependence. The tracts which he published under the pseudonym of A. W. Farmer are singularly clever; if he attempted the impossible, he attempted it very well. First he showed the far-reaching harm of the proposed non-importation of British and West Indian goods. Without molasses [2] American distilleries would come to a standstill, as maple juice and honey were poor and insufficient substitutes. The one hundred thousand colonial dram-drinkers would suffer. Similarly [3] the farmer would be crippled by having to discard British clothing for the coarse and expensive manufactures of New England, and the agricultural and seafaring elements—the best part of the population—

1 Dissertations upon the Advantages of Perpetual Union (1766), pp. 20, 98.

2 Friendly Address to Reasonable Americans (1774), p. 38.

3 A View of the Controversy (1774), p. 25; Free Thoughts on Proceedings of Congress (1774), p. 17.

would be exploited to enrich the commercial Puritans. Again, independence would hurt the people at every turn. The Newfoundland fisheries would be barred to Americans, and [1] thousands of sailors, shipbuilders, carmen, smiths, boatmen, iron workers and pilots would lose their means of livelihood. Even the West Indies would buy all their goods from England, and not from the mainland, and [2] their timber from Canada or Hamburg. It was foolish for the various provinces to sacrifice themselves for the sake of a few oppressed persons at Boston, which could surely relieve its own sufferers without appealing to every colony from Nova Scotia to Georgia. [3] "Have you no poor of your own to relieve?" Britain's cause was just, for no sovereign's charter could discharge inferior bodies politic from parliamentary authority, and the colonies [4] "as parts of the body must be subject to the general laws of the body;" but even if it were unjust, it was far better to remain part of an empire able to protect every member from foreign aggression than to break away into a number of discordant and segregated units, for it was impossible that states as hostile to each other as [5] New York and New Jersey would ever unite. A similar spirit governed Daniel Leonard's arguments against John Adams in the *Massachusetts Gazette*.

Assuming therefore the general necessity of preserving the empire, the more capable loyalists sketched various plans whereby the colonial system might be revivified, and the prejudices then aflame respected. Thomas Pownall was a recognized authority on American

1 Friendly Address, p. 39.
2 *ibid*, p. 43.
3 Congress Canvassed (1775), p. 33.
4 Candid Examination (1775), p. 21.
5 Congress Canvassed, p. 25.

questions, who after acting as Governor of Massachusetts between 1757 and 1760, and afterwards as Lieutenant-Governor of New Jersey and Governor of South Carolina, sat between 1768 and 1780 in the British House of Commons. A convinced reformer but a thorough loyalist, he advocated the direct representation of America at Westminster. [1]He abhorred the idea of using force instead of diplomacy, and following a policy which had in its early days received the sanction of some random remarks of Franklin, he never ceased proclaiming this course to be [2] the only alternative to separation. [3]The centre of the empire would still be in England, and she need not fear its transference to America, a move [4] which would only be justified upon the shifting of the real heart of the British nation to the new world. Distance was no obstacle; it only necessitated [5] the lengthening of the periods for the issue and return of writs. [6]The national debts of the Mother Country and her colonies might be readily adjusted upon principles similar to those adopted in the Anglo-Scottish union of 1707. England need not fear that the American members would form [7] a compact phalanx, nor [8] need America fear that her representatives would be corrupted or overawed by British influences. If the oppressive economic restrictions upon the colonies had to continue they might be much softened by opening English trade depots on the Continent whither American goods could be shipped direct.

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 339.
2 Admin. Brit. Cols. (5th ed. 1774), ii. 82.
3 *ibid*, i. 35.
4 *ibid*, i. 171.
5 *ibid*, i. 174.
6 *ibid*, i. 170.
7 *ibid*, i. 173.
8 *ibid*, i. 172.

The "Administration of the British Colonies," in which these contentions were advanced, appeared in 1764, and ran through six editions in thirteen years without ever really obtaining a hold on public opinion. Neither side cared for Pownall's scheme. [1]George III. could not tolerate so moderate a partisan; Governor Hutchinson said his proposal was [2]"above my capacity;" [3]Franklin and his friends had passed Pownall's stage of thought long since, and scouted the idea of coming to Westminster. In fact, the Americans could not possibly be satisfied by the right of sending a few members to a distant assembly, which would only look on them as strange and uncultivated intruders. [4]A plan of representation, brought forward in 1766, allowed for four members from Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Virginia respectively, "or a smaller number at their option." Nothing in such a suggestion could attract Americans. The last two words in the cry of "no taxation without representation" could well have been dispensed with, as the rising school of colonial patriots did not dream of sinking their self-importance in the back benches of the English House of Commons, and [5]John Adams, for instance, ridiculed the legal fiction by which Massachusetts was to be deemed part of the English soil. The spirit of Pownall's plan is better than its details.

Galloway's scheme of imperial reorganisation was far wiser and more original, and in some respects it offers useful suggestions to modern searchers after racial federa-

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 440.

2 Hutchinson's Diary (ed. 1883), i. 355.

3 *ibid*, i. 183; Galloway's Rise and Progress of the Am. Rebellion (1780), p. 102; The Controversy between Gt. Brit. and her Colonies (1769), p. 91.

4 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. pt. 10, 51.

5 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 191.

tion. Himself a member of the Congress of 1774, and for long an opponent of the government, he entirely discarded the old folly of commercial restraint, and advocated the removal of every colonial disability. His means, however, were far removed from the aims of the revolutionaries, as he intended such reform to be but a step to a more perfect British union. He wished to see the erection of an American branch of the imperial assembly, [1] "incorporated with Parliament for the purpose of taxation and general regulations,"—coinage, defence, boundary disputes. Each province would retain its own legislature for local affairs, but the formation of one central federal body would end the silly distinction between the Briton at home and the Briton over sea, and kill the grievance of taxation without representation. [2] The American branch of Parliament was to be a Grand Council sitting in one of the colonies, elected every three years, and presided over by a President-General appointed by the King, and holding office during his good pleasure. The Council was to sit at least once a year, and to enjoy privileges and rights analogous to those of the House of Commons. Every act relating to matters of general concern had to be transmitted by the House of Commons to the Grand Council and *vice versâ*, for their respective approval, as the consent of each house was required in imperial legislation. The one exception was in the case of aids granted in time of war, when the government need not wait for the consent of the sister body over sea. In theory, the scheme would have [3] identified all the King's subjects in one common citizenship, making it [4] immaterial

1 Galloway's Rise and Progress of the Am. Reb. (1780), p. 81.
2 What think ye of Congress Now? (1775), pp. 71–3.
3 Rise of the Am. Rebellion (1780), p. 128.
4 Reply to an Address etc. (1775), p. 8.

to Britain whether a man acquired riches in London or on the Ohio.

In the light of after events, it is difficult to see how Galloway's constitution could have survived the many changes in politics and society, which came within the ensuing fifty years. The growth of the cabinet at the expense of the legislature would have either excluded Americans from all imperial business requiring secrecy and despatch, or else drawn the best colonial politicians away from the assembly of which they were the chosen leaders and to which they were responsible. However, Galloway's failure to convince his contemporaries was not due to any such defect in political speculation, but rather to the unwillingness of both Great Britain and her colonies to recognize the necessity for concession. No scheme which provided for the abandonment of the economic ideals of the old colonial system, and which gave Americans an equal voice in public policy with the richer and more numerous population at home, could have appealed successfully to Englishmen before the War of Independence, and in America the prospect of British parliamentary control was far less alluring than the vision of complete independence. The revolutionary party practically drove Galloway to join the English in 1776, and as late as [1] 1847, its admirers could find no other epithet than "notorious" for this admirable theorist.

Nevertheless the efforts of the loyalists to rationalise the imperialism of England deserve a separate chapter in any review of the old colonial system. They groped for truth amid the darkness of revolution, and refused to acquiesce in the alleged necessity of perpetual misunderstanding. It is however easy to see why they failed to make

[1] Sparks' Washington, v. 522.

any impression upon British thought, which was not of such a nature as would respond to obscure provincial appeals for moderation and reform when a response would have entailed the reversal of cherished economic ideals. Though it is just as clear why America ignored their doubts and scruples, we cannot but feel some surprise at the insignificance of their successes, and at the small space they filled in American public life between 1765 and 1775, for these loyal constitution framers were among the first men of the colonies, while the cultivated society in which they moved enjoyed great social influence. Hutchinson was a great great-grandson of the famous Anne Hutchinson, and in spite of his disastrous relations with the men whom he had to govern after 1771, he was admittedly the leading authority on the history of Massachusetts. Sewall was Attorney-General of that colony; the De Lanceys were among the richest and most influential families in New York, and some of the best names in Boston figured in the list of refugees, who formed the loyal [1] New England Club in London in 1776.

The explanation seems to lie in the weakness inherent in conservatism in times of national uprising and passion. The allegiance contemplated by Galloway's constitution was based on sentiment alone, and against such sentiment was the armed enthusiasm of zealots as well as the clear material advantage of the majority of the people. Passive half measures are of little avail in the face of the fierce proselytism of an ardent and interested minority, and the academics, which were to have saved the empire, were brushed away by the fierce rhetoric of the bar and the dissenting ministers, to whom George III. seemed diabolic, and the timorous [2] Gage an Alva. More particularly was

[1] Memorial History of Boston (1881), iii. 175.

[2] John Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ix. 351.

the failure of the Tory reform movement due to the work of debtors who wished to rid themselves of the crushing burden of indebtedness to England, and of the Congregationalists, whom Galloway considered the authors of the Revolution. The first class owed a sum variously estimated from [1] three to [2] six millions sterling to British merchants in 1775, and their dependence would in no way be relieved by mere constitutional readjustment. The second class realised that any strengthening of the ties of union would but enhance the claims of the Anglican Church, suspicion of which lay at the bottom of New England animosity. They resented [3] the general choice of government officials from the ranks of the established Church alone, and prophesied in the words of Ezra Stiles, President of Yale, that [4] there would be a Runnymede in America. [5] In 1764 a Presbyterian synod at Philadelphia led the way to repudiation of the empire, and from 1766 onwards the [6] Congregationalist ministers of Boston, under the influence of Dr. Jonathan Mayhew, preached open resistance. Their anti-monarchical bias was profound. Only one minister of their sect in Boston remained loyal to the Crown in 1775. [7] Seabury adverted on their former practice of reading the words, "Civil Magistrate" in the Bible in place of the word "King," and of substituting for "the kingdom of Heaven" the phrase "the Parliament of Heaven." These no doubt were obsolete vagaries, but the old spirit lived still, and the temper of the Ironsides was the making of the United States.

1 Boucher's Causes and Consequences of the Am. Rev. (1797), p. xl.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. pt. 10, 29.
3 Kingsley's Life of Stiles (1847), p. 23.
4 *ibid*, p. 48.
5 Galloway's Rise of the Am. Reb. (1780), p. 53.
6 *ibid*, p. 67; Memorial History of Boston (1881), iii. 20, 126; Hutchinson's Diary (ed. 1883), i. 169.
7 Friendly Address (1774), pp. 29, 30.

Thus the men of thought, who strove for true imperialism, became but part of the flotsam of loyal America, cast upon the shores of Great Britain and her remaining colonies during the hard years of the Revolution. [1] Galloway left property to the value of forty thousand pounds behind him, while Seabury was not only [2] neglected by English churchmen, but never even won credit for his tracts, as [3] they were published under the name of a Farmer and were attributed to another. These men fell back into the ruck. Their cause nevertheless was great, and their ready sacrifices for the enlightened ideal of a "United Empire" should keep their memories green.

1 Considerations upon the Am. Enquiry (1779), p. 44.
2 Hoare's Memoirs of Sharp (1820), p. 213.
3 Boucher's Causes and Consequences (1797), p. 557.

CHAPTER VIII.

The War Spirit in England, 1775—1783.

Few governments have been more unpopular than that which was in office in England on the eve of the War of Independence. The growth of royal power, the rise of "the King's friends," the decline of party politics, the foolish resistance to the claims of John Wilkes, all contributed to lower the dignity of the ministry in British eyes. Even if the proposal to coerce America was considered just, its expediency was questioned by many powerful interests. Until the actual outbreak of war, the trading centres and also [1] the Irish were clearly in favour of concession. Trouble in America affected their material welfare by stopping commerce, and their political welfare by encouraging the pretensions of the Crown. [2] For many years after 1765 there was continuous distress in London, Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham, Lancaster, Leeds, Hull and Glasgow owing to the colonial policy of non-importation, and each of these places took an active part in obtaining the repeal of the Stamp Act. [3] Even the unpolitical mind of Boswell deprecated coercion in view of trade depression. As late as 1775, [4] many merchants and most Dissenters were ardent for peace. Yet, when once the idea of separation had been mooted, and it was

1 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 37.

2 Annual Register (1766), p. 35; Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xiv. pt. 10; 28, 44—47; *ibid*, Rep. xv. pt. 1; 220.

3 Burke's Correspondence, ii. 209.

4 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 47, 240; Chatham Correspondence, iv. 401.

clear that the whole system of governing the empire was being called in question, the bulk of the nation rallied round the ministry. Incidents like Franklin's publication of the private letters of Governor Hutchinson, which he had obtained by surreptitious means, and the burning of the revenue schooner Gaspee by American patriots in 1772 had embittered their feelings. That England was dragged into the war by George III. is simply a Whig legend. His fatuity indeed was responsible for many administrative follies, but in the American War the British case was based on far wider principles than royal desire. The cause for which the country fought was identical with that which had triumphed in the Seven Years' War. The old colonial system was dear to the heart of the British people. It was rudely challenged in 1775, and naturally this development of what had once been regarded as a mere incident in the growing conflict between George III. and popular liberties, entirely altered the national outlook. In view of the actual character of English popular thought during the War of Independence, it is absurd to continue to regard that war as the effect of only a legal or constitutional controversy. Of course, it suited George to treat the struggle as a "King's war," because success would lead to his own exaltation. Similarly, it was to the advantage of the Whig oligarchy to treat it as but a royal entanglement, for its failure would liberate their political world from the danger of a new despotism. However, the mass of Englishmen had no such bias, and they showed the true nature of public opinion by their distinctive acceptance of the belief that their own imperial theory was the genuine cause of war.

Surely this is a more reasonable conclusion than the inference so often drawn by writers bred in Whig traditions, that the peers who led the opposition retained the

heart of England, in spite of the country allowing itself to drift into nine years of conflict. Surely there was a more national issue at stake than the King's conception of his own dignity. Burke was clearly no lover of the war party, and so his picture of British opinion in 1775 is worth more than that of later day partisans. [1]He described the people as curiously languid on the great question of the time, without the fire and jealousy of 1756. In the main however, they were out of touch with the Whig politicians, who tried to treat the attack on the old colonial system as only an incident in the struggle with the Crown. All the opposition could do was [2]"to clog" the war, a phrase hardly characteristic of an ascendent party. [3]He said that the business class was pacified by war contracts, and that the ill effects of a stoppage in the American trade were obscured by a passing boom in trade with the north of Europe, and by the demand for freights and clothing for English and Canadian troops. That demand was only enhanced in 1776, when Paul Jones captured ten thousand uniforms in a vessel outward bound from Liverpool. The old Whigs of the commercial districts were being lured towards the government policy by [4]"the cadaverous 'haut goût' of lucrative war." After all, the system then fundamentally assailed by America, was the creation of Whig economists, and the type of Whig ambitions. The Duke of Richmond, most ardent pioneer of the new Radical school, [5]admitted that merchants would not support the opposition unless they felt the pinch of bad trade. The early interference of foreign powers gave

1 Burke's Correspondence, ii. 48.
2 *ibid*, ii. 55.
3 *ibid*, ii. 49.
4 *ibid*, ii. 50.
5 Albemarle's Rockingham (1852), ii. 290.

additional impetus to the process of nationalising the struggle. With France and Spain in the field, it was impossible to ignore the difference between the state of the colonial question in 1766 and its state in 1778. The new French theory "free ships free goods" ran counter to England's maritime code. The adherence of France, Spain, Holland, Prussia, Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Austria in 1780 to that theory, and to such doctrines as that which condemned "paper blockades" as null, and that which limited the definition of contraband to sulphur and munitions of war, placed the British version of International Law upon its defence. English successes increased the popularity of the war; English failures increased the determination with which it was waged. Under such circumstances, we cannot wonder that such enlightened Whig leaders as Temple and Cornwallis tried to strengthen the hands of the government, although they had had nothing to do with the steps which led to the Revolution, and disapproved of the royal conduct which had hastened its outbreak. They joined in the defence of a doomed cause, the success of which would not have contributed towards the world's happiness, but none the less we cannot speak too highly of their attitude, for very few statesmen have the courage to bury partisanship in patriotism. When Chatham deplored the policy which had made [1]"poor England" fall upon her own sword, Temple answered, [2]"I am no party to the war, nor am I to the causes of it, which I think my greatest happiness; but engaged as we are in, I think, a most just cause, I cannot but wish victory to dear, dear England."

Thus men who had doubted the government's policy originally, acquiesced in their management of the war,

1 Grenville Papers, iv. 573.
2 *ibid*, iv. 575.

when conflict became inevitable. North's tardy abandonment of the right to tax the colonies in 1778 by the statute 18 Geo. III. c. 12, attracted other elements of earlier opposition to the national camp. If we have given a faithful picture of the old colonial system in the chapter above, the adherence of most Englishmen to the cause of its maintenance cannot excite surprise. Their fatal blindness to its narrowness and impolicy was more foolish than dishonest. [1] Camden, the Whig Lord Chancellor of 1766 and a keen foe to the ministry, admitted that the landed interest was on their side. Among the gentry, the war spirit had something of the fire of earlier days. By means of their voluntary offers to facilitate army manœuvres upon their lands, [2] army cadets were enabled to encamp on Banstead Downs in 1773 and 1774, and on Wimbledon Common in 1775 and 1776. Rural sportsmen were exhorted in 1780 to

> [3] Leave fields of pleasure for the fields of fame,
> The foes of Britain are the noblest game."

[4] One Tory politician said wittily that on the question of the day, the country gentlemen were "for their country"; many of them, like [5] Lord Harrington and [6] Lord Sheffield, raised regiments of light dragoons, or like Lord Kenmure and Sir Boyle Roche, beat up recruits for the infantry by dint of bounties and persuasion. It was clear that [7] the land tax, which had been reduced by Townshend from four to three shillings in 1767, in view of the Revenue Act of

1 Chatham Correspondence, iv. 401.
2 Lewis Lochée's Essay on Military Education (1776), p. 70.
3 September, a Rural Poem (1780), p. 9.
4 Malmesbury's Letters (ed. 1870), i. 327.
5 Cowper's Letters (ed. R.T.S.), p. 207.
6 Adeane's Girlhood of M. J. Holroyd (1896), p. 15.
7 Stephens' Memoirs of J. H. Tooke (1813), i. 433.

that year, would remain at the lower figure if the policy of that Act could be enforced against the colonies. Old adherents of the Jacobite cause had long since drifted into the Tory ranks. Scotland was on [1] the side of the government, while the English Church was heartily loyal. The Anglican attitude cannot cause wonder, in view of American resistance to the proposed extension of Church work in the colonies and to the suggested establishment of a colonial bishopric.

The popularity of the British cause was indeed far wider than that of a mere party cry. The towns were as zealous as the Tory centres in their support of that colonial policy, on which their trade with America had been built up. In London the corporation was hostile to the ministry and refused to vote bounties for recruits, but [2] £20,000 were collected by voluntary subscriptions for the raising of troops, and Burke himself admits the [3] "wild tumult of joy," aroused in the capital on the arrival one Sunday morning in November 1777 of the news of the capture of Philadelphia. Birmingham, which had welcomed the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766, was now heartily with the war party, whether or no we care to accept [4] Horace Walpole's explanation that this was due to its being the emporium of the swords and muskets of the British army. The growth of the town between 1770 and 1790 was [5] generally attributed to its profits during the American Revolution. [6] Its annual output of gun barrels amounted to sixty thousand. As early as September 1775 the ex-Jacobites of Manchester presented George III. with a

1 A Second Appeal to the Justice of Gt. Britain (1775), p. 55.
2 Annual Register (1778), p. 85.
3 Burke's Correspondence, ii. 199.
4 Seeley's H. Walpole and his World, p. 152.
5 St. Fond's Travels (1799), i. 341.
6 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xv. pt. 1, 180.

loyal address, [1] "which really gives me pleasure," wrote the King, "as it comes unsolicited." This town was thoroughly Tory in its sympathies, and [2] as late as 1777 it celebrated the royal oak day of Charles II. It is therefore not surprising to read that it raised a regiment of a thousand men for service in America. The feeling in [3] Liverpool, where a similar force was raised voluntarily, is really more significant, as its inhabitants were not only more Whig but had also everything to gain by reconciliation. In spite of the disastrous effects of the cessation of colonial trade upon Liverpool shipping, [4] Burke told Fox that its inhabitants "loved" the war, and [5] Gilbert Wakefield's congregation objected to his omission of what he called "unchristian words against the Americans" from the special prayer ordered to be used in churches during the war. [6] Bristol, though also affected by the depression in colonial trade, voted the freedom of the city to Lords Sandwich and Suffolk in 1777, although two most eager advocates of coercion. [7] Both Edinburgh and Glasgow raised regiments at their own expense. In fact, as [8] Gibbon, a very dispassionate observer, remarked, the people in general regarded the war as their favourite incident in politics, and as late as March 1781, we find Horace Walpole writing, [9] "the nation is more besotted and the ministry more popular than ever." Beyond the narrow if brilliant circle of Whig debaters, and the small group of Whig

1 Correspondence of Geo. III. with North (ed. 1867), i. 267.
2 Curwen's Journal (ed. 1842), p. 137.
3 Correspondence of Geo. iii., ii. 100.
4 Russell's Life of Fox, p. 155.
5 Wakefield's Memoirs (1804), i. 198.
6 Russell's Life of Fox, p. 155.
7 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. on Amer. MSS., vol. i. 187.
8 Gibbon's Autobiography, i. 324; *cf.* Hutchinson's Diary, i. 506.
9 Some Unpublished Letters of H. Walpole (1902), p. 49.

philosophers, whose Radical bent made them dissent altogether from the prevailing faith in colonisation, few notable Englishmen objected to the war policy. William Scott, afterwards the great Lord Stowell, but then not even called to the bar, wrote to his relations at Newcastle in 1777 that he and his brothers and sister in London had lamented [1]"the fate of the great Burgoyne. We mingled our tears for two days together, being English folks of the old stamp, and retaining in spite of modern 'patriotism,' some affection and reverence for the name of England." He added that if the government wanted common sense, its foes wanted common honesty. His younger brother, [2]John Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, wrote in 1775 that the American contentions were bad in law, and that England had to decide between conquest and separation. Neither of these men had anything whatever to gain by such opinions. Lawyers like Mansfield, whose judgment in the leading case of [3]Campbell *v.* Hall is a model of sound constitutional law, and Thurlow, whose opinions were always shrewd, had come unhesitatingly to the same conclusion, and on the bare legal aspect of the question they [4]far outclassed the shallower Lord Camden. Even [5]Jeremy Bentham for once favoured the contentions of the government.

It is clear that the support given to the war could only increase when the colonial issue had been complicated by foreign intervention. It was then too late to gain by concession, and a substantial number of moderate Whigs dissociated themselves from leaders, who seemed mere

[1] Townshend's Lives of the Judges (1846), ii. 291.
[2] H. Twiss's Life of Eldon (1844), i. 98.
[3] Lofft's Reports, p. 655.
[4] Nicholl's Recollections (1822), ii. 128.
[5] C. M. Atkinson's Bentham (1905), p. 23.

anti-English extremists. Thus Chatham himself allowed his son to serve at Gibraltar after the outbreak of war with France. [1]Arthur Young, who had nothing of Toryism, warmly supported Lord Bristol's proposal to purchase a 74-gun ship by public subscription as a gift to the nation, and [2] Lady Sarah Bunbury, once the object of the King's admiration but a thorough Whig, wrote that in spite of all her sympathies with America, she could only wish the English soldiers success in the field. It is indeed palpable that this was the true type of public opinion. In the heart of the country, men felt just as they had done fifteen years earlier. For once the placid monotony of [3]Cowper's letters from his Olney hermitage was broken by the joy attendant on the capture of Charleston in 1780. [4]The strains of regimental music charmed even this recluse, while busier men appreciated the more practical issues of the struggle, and in 1776 Adam Smith closed "The Wealth of Nations" with the advice that "if any of the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of supporting any of their civil or military establishments in time of peace." Although a strong Whig in politics, Smith was so far satisfied with the American policy of Lord North as to accept the office of Commissioner of Customs in Scotland at his hands in 1777. Indeed most thinkers of the contemporary political school believed that the only alternative to the policy of the government was absolute separa-

[1] A. Young's Autobiography (ed. 1898), p. 102.
[2] Life and Letters of Lady S. Lennox, i. 235, 275.
[3] Cowper's Letters, p. 129.
[4] *ibid*, p. 208.

tion, and therefore all who held that colonies were useful sided with the Crown. [1]"I am more and more convinced," wrote Gibbon to Holroyd in January 1775, "that we have both the right and the power on our side, and that we are now arrived at the decisive moment of preserving or of losing for ever both our trade and our empire." [2]He doubted in fact whether Lord North would be firm enough, and was agreeably surprised by the willingness of the trading interests to embark on the war.

Indeed, indirect evidence of the spirit with which most Englishmen were ready to fight for the colonial system lies in the shortness of the interval between 1763 and 1775. If the national character in the first year was calculated to sustain a war for empire, there was no reason why it should have altered by the second, in spite of the evolution of domestic politics in the interim. [3]The army itself was Tory, and its belief in trade wars had not declined. A few Whig soldiers may perhaps have feared the new influence of the "Nabobs," and distrusted the commercialism of imperial theory. Draper, the conqueror of Manila, for instance, had no idea of the greatness of Clive's work in India, thought Grenville's preference for the latter [4]"very mortifying," and complained that the only way to gain success was now to be "a most dirty dog, rob and pillage whenever I can." [5]Burgoyne had a similar dislike for Clive and had been one of his least scrupulous assailants. However, among the people no such alienation from the policy of trade wars is discover-

1 Gibbon's Autobiography, i. 248.
2 *ibid*, i. 250.
3 H. Walpole's Last Journal, ii. 242.
4 Bedford Correspondence, iii. 261–2.
5 H. Walpole's Last Journal, i. 207.

able. On the contrary, the ardour of 1756 reappeared in a modified form.

[1] "Our fame shall spread in every distant shore,
And in new climes the British lion roar,"

is a characteristic couplet from verses of 1776, while [2] the more prosaic press revelled in the news of victories. In Scotland, regiments of a thousand men each were raised by the Gordons and Macdonalds, and several companies were raised by public-spirited partisans in Wales.

Rodney represented the best type of the simple and straightforward Englishman of his day, and though personally a Tory, there was nothing distinctively partisan in his thought or character. He was clear indeed as to the national nature of England's war. In his opinion, party jealousy lost us America. [3] "What is it that party and faction cannot do?" Like all his fellows, he saw only the minor sources of the war and the less vital reasons of its failure, but the vigour and gaiety of his fighting spirit throw a glow of fancy that we should not like to miss, upon the cause for which the country fought. Brightness of touch and genuine love of country serve to redeem much bad political science. In 1780 Rodney's little daughter wrote to him from London, [4] "There are a great number of songs going about the streets, the chorus always being, 'Brave Rodney for ever.' Such rhymes I never saw, and if they were not about you, I am sure I should not have the patience to read them." [5] Rodney told her in return, after his victory over Grasse, that he had captured four admirals within the last two years, two Spanish, one French, and one Dutch.

1 T. Maurice's Hagley (1776), p. 41.
2 Cowper's Letters, p. 212.
3 Mundy's Rodney (1830), ii. 329.
4 *ibid*, i. 263.
5 *ibid*, ii. 225.

It is noteworthy that [1]the Dissenters were from the first, lukewarm in their support of the opposition. They had little in common with the great Whig families, beyond a distrust of the Crown. It is true that [2]the impolicy, which drove six Methodists from St. Edmund Hall at Oxford in 1768 was not likely to attract their co-religionists towards Lords North's party, and in Priestley and Price, Franklin found two learned allies of considerable weight. The former was then minister of Mill Hill Chapel, Leeds, and [3] his appeal to Dissenters to oppose the government met with some success. On the other hand, they were strongest in number in those trading districts where prosperity was most affected by the methods of reprisal adopted in America. The threatened stoppage of colonial traffic naturally estranged them from the revolutionary doctrines. Hence their readiness to believe in the then orthodox theory of empire, expounded by John Wesley. This great man's exposition of the English view of the war deserves a far wider fame than it now enjoys. If we really want to understand the British standpoint, and to see how naturally and inevitably the war spirit of 1775 evolved from the current colonial system, we have only to read [4]Wesley's eloquent tracts. [5]The Dartmouth papers, disclosed by the Historical Manuscripts Commission, reveal that he had at one time inclined to favour the Americans. In June 1775 he wrote passionately to Lord Dartmouth to abstain from the use of force and to remember Philip II and Charles I. However as "an High Churchman and the son of an High Churchman, bred up

1 Russell's Life of Fox, i. 156.

2 Boswell's Johnson (ed. 1896), iii. 44; Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xv. pt. 1; 187.

3 Priestley's Memoirs (1806), pp. 149, 457.

4 See Malmesbury's Letters, i. 328.

5 Hist. MSS. Comm. Report xi.; part v., 379.

from my childhood in the highest notions of passive obedience and non-resistance," he soon came back to the orthodox fold, and in his "Calm Address to the American Colonies," he explained that emigration had modified the original rights of British settlers, by reducing them to [1]the innumerable multitude that have no votes." There was no hardship in that; every colonist was suffered to live undisturbed. The question of representation was dealt with in "Observations on Liberty," which defended existing constitutional anomalies. The "Calm Address to the Inhabitants of England," was a far warmer appeal to the country to avenge [2]the burning and devastation by the enemy of loyalists' property and lands in America. Wesley spoke particularly to those [3]"who are vulgarly called Methodists," and asked for a continuance of such prayer and fasting, as had just effected the expulsion of the rebels from New York and Rhode Island. "I believe Americans cannot fight, for the hand of God is upon them." His subsequent "Serious Address" is a protest against pessimism. His arguments, and those of his friend Fletcher in "The Bible and Sword" were probably more effective than the "Constitutional Answer" of Caleb Evans, and the "Second Answer of W.D." in winning over Whig Dissenters. Many of them had always believed in the commercial ideas of the government. The more extreme Whigs, who disliked Wesley as [4]"a declared enemy of civil and religious liberty," found solace in abuse. In the scurrilous satire of "The Saints," he was described as

[5]"Beating his drum for murderers to enlist,"

1 Calm Address, p. 8.
2 Calm Address to the Inhabitants etc., p. 21.
3 *ibid*, p. 13.
4 Constitutional Answer to Wesley's Calm Address (1775), p. 3.
5 The Saints (1778), p. 23.

and he was said to "inflame intestine broils,"

[1] "And spread destruction in his Saviour's name."

In prose he figured as [2] "a low and puny tadpole in divinity," and in caricature he was quaintly pictured as an old fox dressed in clerical attire and tarred and feathered, but he won the day nevertheless against his more republican co-religionists, and made Methodism a conservative force in British politics. He made the lower middle class adherents of the established order in political life, and left them no spark of sympathy with the fiery theorists who were leading New England to rebellion.

Thus until the war reached a stage of absolute hopelessness, the country supported the ministry, and the frequent superiority of the opposition in Parliament, both in wit and intellect, does not attest to any such ascendency outside Westminster. The general belief in the perfection of the old colonial system was so great that any other national outlook at this crisis would have been extraordinary and unnatural. The country hated the rebels, and despised the French, and when [3] Noailles, the French ambassador passed through the streets of Canterbury with his wife on their homeward journey in 1778, the mob pelted them both, conduct which Gibbon coolly describes as [4] "some slight expressions of ill humour from John Bull." In America, there had been an impression that the Whig nobles were powerful enough to raise a rebellion in the event of royal policy causing a breach with the colonies, but men who had no sympathy with that policy soon realised the absurdity of this illusion. Samuel Curwen, an American judge of admiralty, whose moderate politics led him to

1 *ibid*, p. 24.

2 An Old Fox Tarred etc., by an Hanoverian (1775).

3 H. Walpole's Last Journal, ii. 243

4 Gibbon's Autobiography, i. 333.

live in England in 1775, [1] described the manufacturers as being so busy that they had no regret at the stoppage of orders from the colonies.

These considerations point to the conclusion that George III's personal influence on the war has been often exaggerated. This reasoning applies most to events after the skirmish at Lexington, as undoubtedly the steps actually leading to the outbreak of the Revolution owed much of their disastrous sting to the King's own hand. All that can be said is that his personal desires hastened an inevitable tendency, and made the chance of a temporary armistice between two incompatible theories impossible. He had none of the scruples which troubled sensitive Britons, and said he would [2]"as lief fight the Bostonians as the French." He wrote to Lord Dartmouth, the Secretary of the Colonial Department in 1775, that [3]"as the rebels have got Indians to their assistance, we must make use of the same desperate weapons." He had a genuine belief in the virtue of the war; his love of his soldiery was remarkably sincere, and he waived the contemporary dignity of kingship when [4]he took off his hat to the Guards paraded on Wimbledon Common in 1776. When he said, "the die is cast; the colonies must either triumph or submit," he expressed a joy, which was not less patriotic because it happened to be utterly misguided. He could see no honesty in the opposition to the war. [5]"Thank God," he wrote of Chatham to Lord North, "the nation does not see the unhappy contest through his mirour" (*sic*). Similarly, [6]Anthony Storer, one of his

1 Curwen's Journal and Letters (ed. 1842), i. 35.
2 H. Walpole's Last Journal, i. 366.
3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 440.
4 Walpole's Last Journal, ii. 3.
5 Correspondence of Geo. III. with North, ii. 70.
6 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xv.; pt. 6, 317–8.

cleverest supporters, wrote of Fox, "I stayed tête à tête with Charles till four. His ideas, if they are his real ones, almost make me think that he is mad. I must have perfectly lost the use of my eyes before I could be made to fancy things as he represents them." In the narrower mind of George III. such criticisms tended to become wild fanaticism. He played [1]a pitiful part when he said that he deemed the country's demonstrations of regret on Chatham's death "offensive measures to me personally." Nevertheless in his meanest, as well as in his bravest moments, he was convinced both of the justice and the necessity of his war. In view of the [2]opinion of such a competent judge as Hutchinson upon the perfection of the King's knowledge of American affairs, it is idle to treat his attitude as blind and thoughtless. However much we may deprecate his obstinacy we cannot question the earnestness with which he faced the problem of the day. He had always wished to develope the colonies, and in 1763 he gave personal instructions to Governor Murray to lay out townships for possible English emigrants to Canada, who were to be provided with clergy and schoolmasters. As an enthusiast in his own narrow but fervid creed of imperialism, he did not flinch after Saratoga, and thought those who wished to relax the national efforts were [3] "lost to all ideas of self-importance." [4]It was said that the Court resounded with "delenda est Carthago" after that reverse. When the ill news of Yorktown was brought from Falmouth to Pall Mall [5] "on Sunday the 25th November (1781) about noon," even the cool and patient

[1] Russell's Life of Fox, p. 190.
[2] Hutchinson's Diary (ed. 1883), i. 159.
[3] Correspondence of Geo. III. with North, ii. 310.
[4] Curwen's Journal, p. 160.
[5] Wraxall's Memoirs (1818), ii. 433.

North lost his balance. He took the news, says [1] Wraxall, "like a ball in his breast," and gave way to the inevitable at last. "Oh God, it is all over!" George III. was made of different metal. Three days later, we find him writing to his pliant Prime Minister, [2]"Many men chuse rather to despond on difficulties than see how to get out of them. A good end may yet be made of the war." It was then so evident that the old colonial system could never be re-asserted, that perhaps George's optimism does little credit to his head, but on the other hand, his point of view is quite characteristic of the British people, and is one of which it has often been proud. He and his followers hoped to see England emerge victorious from the dark days of blunder and defeat. They had no notion that America was fighting for any principle beyond that of a selfish immunity from imperial obligations, and were oblivious to the moral issues which the colonists believed to be involved. A Scotchman is said to have pointed to some American prisoners and remarked to a Frenchman, [3]"You fought for your master, I for mine; but for whom were these men fighting?"

It is possible also that some high-minded men may have been attracted towards the royal policy by the frequent lapses of the colonists from their high ideal of freedom. Paine and Jefferson were pioneers of the tendency to make war upon all law-abiding society, and side by side with the true patriots of the Revolution were to be found many of those bad men, who are always thrown to the surface by great national uprisings. These persons were principally responsible for the dreadful treatment of the loyalists, and their views on persecution infected even Washington.

[1] *ibid*, ii. 435.

[2] Correspondence of Geo. III. with North, ii. 392.

[3] Lauzun's Memoirs (1896), ii. 216.

Their attitude towards the French Catholics of Canada makes it also impossible in practice to identify the colonial cause with the toleration it purported to embrace. The New Englanders, whose Puritanism was still the unquenchable bigotry of 1629, hated the British policy of winning the loyalty of a conquered race by the gift of liberty to retain an established religion and law. [1]"Since they have the Catholic religion established among them, and are even allowed a Popish bishop in the British dominions with the French language and customs, we cannot suppose that they will ever become Englishmen or true subjects of Britain," was the complaint of an American pamphleteer, who probably felt the additional local grievance of the annexation to Quebec of the undeveloped lands north-west of the Ohio. With less genuine fear, English Whigs like Chatham, Burke, Camden, Savile, Horace Walpole, and Barré, opposed the tolerant Quebec Act of 1774, which simply carried out a pledge given in article 4 of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, and which was amply justified by North as being [2]"thought better calculated to secure the happiness of the Canadians." The Act secured Canadian loyalty to England for half a century, and though its details were very open to criticism, its spirit was certainly more liberal than that of the policy advocated by the usual preachers of freedom. To describe it as [3]"calculated for tyrannical purposes" was unjust. In the heat of the war, Richard Price, the Whig philosopher, abused the government for availing themselves of the services of [4]"French Papists from Canada," but their loyalty at the time of Montgomery and Arnold's

1 Present State of Great Britain and N. America, p. 326.
2 Debates of the House of Commons in 1774 (ed. Wright, 1839), p. 11.
3 Considerations on the Provisional Treaty with America (1783), p. 36.
4 Price's Observations on Civil Liberty (1776), p. 94.

invasion must surely have given most Englishmen of the day a far different and more exhilarating impression. The best side of the old colonial system is brought out by [1]the difficulty experienced by Washington's French Canadian friends to raise more than a handful of troops for the American cause in spite of [2]his attempt to conciliate them by forbidding his army to burn the Pope's effigy on Guy Fawkes' day, 1775. [3]The parish priests and the seigneurs had been won for Britain by the Quebec Act.

So far as ardent Whigs were concerned, the war must have raised in many cases the difficult and much contested question as to the rival claims of country and conscience. Allowing for the prejudices of bitter partisanship, there must still have been a large element in the Whig ranks who hated the blunders that culminated in conflict, and [4]the tendency of the Crown to use national enthusiasm for its own despotic purposes. In these instances, condemnation of the war can only have been whole-hearted and sincere. The moral sense of mankind has hardly determined even yet whether "my country, right or wrong," is a proper principle for the guidance of such thinkers, or whether it were better to run counter to the dearest wishes of the majority of our compatriots for the sake of what appears right. The problem was then as painful as ever, and the interference of France with the avowed object of avenging her losses of 1763 complicated its difficulty. A certain number of the Whigs whom it perplexed then rallied to the government, but the majority preferred to follow the example of Chatham and Burke, and to make no terms with the government. Probably

[1] Washington's Official Correspondence (1795), i. 12.
[2] Sparks Washington, iii. 144.
[3] Canadian Freeholder (1777), i. 14.
[4] J. Burgh's Political Disquisitions (1774), ii. 276.

many of the Whig nobles and a small element in the great towns honestly dreaded both the moral and the commercial effects of alienating [1] "the brave Americans," and fancied that the war would destroy [2] one-third of the country's trade. Furthermore, the conduct of George III. had done much to give the war a partisan colour, which was not its natural guise, but which was none the less effective in enabling the Whigs to disclaim the slur arising from lack of patriotism. They alleged that [3] just as Chatham had conquered America in Germany, so the government was now trying to conquer Great Britain in America. The political conditions of England were then most unfavourable to more disinterested action, and the chiefs of the opposition happened to be aristocrats, whose lives had never come in touch with the aspirations upon which wars of trade were built, and colonial restrictions founded. It was satisfactory to them to treat the revolt against the existing English theory of empire as a rising against royal tyranny and Tory incompetence. They were cheerfully indifferent to its effects on Greater Britain. Thus Horace Walpole looked forward complacently to the country's mouldering again [4] "into our insignificant islandhood," and indeed, [5] but for the fierce rivalry between the opposition faction under Rockingham, Burke and Fox, and that under Shelburne, the ministry could hardly have survived so long.

The peace party contained all the ablest parliamentary speakers of the day except Mansfield, Thurlow and

1 A Full Examination of Wesley's Address by a Friend to the People (1775), pp. 3, 15.

2 Price's Observations on Civil Liberty (1776), p. 85.

3 Essay on Patriotism (1768), p. 11.

4 Seeley's H. Walpole and his World, p. 154.

5 Nicholls' Recollections, i. 296.

Wedderburn, and the war spirit rarely shone brightly in debate. We cannot be surprised that Tories who disliked abstract rhetoric on constitutional government, found the speeches of Burke and Barré [1] "immoderately long," and [2] alleged that the former's diffuse and emotional oratory reminded them of Drury Lane. The Whig advocates of peace at any price grew stronger as the struggle became more and more exhausting, and as the drain upon the country's resources began to lead to undiscriminating and disastrous outdoor relief; ultimately they wore down the voting strength of the ministry as well as its power of argument. It must however be admitted that in many cases their policy was coloured by unscrupulous opportunism, and had nothing of the sincerity or idealism of Burke. Wedderburn may have been a selfish time-server himself, but assuredly he spoke the truth when he said of the Whigs after Cornwallis' surrender, [3] "It is strange they should never have learnt that to show exultation in a public calamity makes them odious, and aids those they are attacking." In the darkest hours of the war, Fox never ceased to denounce the cause for which Great Britain was contending, and we cannot easily respect an English statesman, who said [4] he heard the news of Saratoga and Yorktown with delight. His hate was so great that every British success dismayed him in the same way as an unfortunate division in the House. [5] "Whatever happens," he wrote after the American disasters of June 1776, "let us all resolve to stick by them as handsomely (or more so) in their adversity as we have done in their glory," and he

1 Malmesbury's Letters, i. 327.
2 *ibid*, i. 321, 396.
3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xv.; pt. 6, 539.
4 Gibbon's Autobiography, ii. 320 (note).
5 Fox's Memoirs, i. 143.

alluded to the tidings of Howe's victory in Long Island as [1]"terrible news." [2]Shelburne affected to consider the numerous voluntary gifts of a military nature, which were made to the government, dangerous and unconstitutional, and was quite willing that [3]the sun of Britain should set for ever in the west.

We have seen above that the country in general sided with the war policy, but the violence of these Whig politicians was reflected in the conduct of their supporters, and there are few English struggles in which the peace party have made a greater show of opposition. It had such distinguished models as Chatham and Burke, Camden and Fox, while the ministry included unpopular leaders of doubtful worth like Germain and Sandwich. Lord Pitt, Chatham's eldest son, had been serving as aide-de-camp to Carleton in Canada since 1773, but [4]he was made by his father to stand idle from 1776 to 1778, an example followed by Lord Effingham, by Watson and Wilson (two members of the Irish Parliament) and by a handful of other enthusiasts. Granville Sharp, the high-minded apostle of slave emancipation, [5]threw up his post in the Ordnance Office. In 1776 Horne Tooke, an extreme Whig much disliked by Doctor Johnson, collected £100 at a meeting of the Constitutional Society in the King's Arms Tavern, Cornhill, for [6]"the relief of the widows, orphans, and aged parents of our beloved American subjects, inhumanly murdered by the King's troops at or near Lexington and

1 *ibid*, i. 145.

2 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne (1875), iii. 13.

3 Considerations upon the Am. Enquiry (1779), p. 53.

4 Soulavie, Mémoires (ed. 1801) iii. 390; Chatham Correspondence iv. 292, 420.

5 Hoare's Memoirs of G. Sharp (1820), p. 126.

6 Henry Cowper's Reports, ii. 672.

Concord in the province of Massachusetts." [1] He was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a fine of £200. Such extraordinary animus against the ministerial policy was the common characteristic of all who remained on the side of the opposition, and who were wittily described as [2] "the Americans in our house." Sir William Jones could only refer to the struggle as [3] "this abominable war." Party hack writers like "Malcolm Macgregor" asked America sarcastically to

> [4] "Toast peace and plenty to their mother nation,
> Give three huzzas to George and to taxation,
> And beg, to make their loyal hearts the lighter,
> He'll send them o'er Dean Tucker with a mitre."

It will be seen later why Tucker was thus pilloried.

The vigour of the minority was a great injury to government efficiency. Horne Tooke, Priestley, Price and Hartley were almost more American than the Americans, while the Whig corporation of London conferred the freedom of the city upon Price for his "Observations on Civil Liberty," of which sixty thousand copies were sold in 1776. [5] Behind the dialectics of tracts such as these "Observations" and the "Facts" of Price and Horne Tooke, was the cold and clever master mind of Shelburne. The ministry on the other hand had few capable organisers on whom to rely, and Lord George Germain, though [6] an able man with sound views on [7] tactics, had too bad a reputation to act successfully as Secretary of the Colonial Depart-

1 *ibid*, ii. 681.
2 Malmesbury's Letters, i. 328.
3 Teignmouth's Memoirs of Sir Wm. Jones (1806), i. 416.
4 Epistle to Dr. Shebbeare (1777), p. 10.
5 Stephens' Memoirs of J. H. Tooke (1813), ii. 24.
6 Nicholls' Recollections, i. 35.
7 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. ix.; pt. 3, 83.

ment of the Board of Trade. [1] "The ghost of Minden" hung for ever on his shoulders. Consequently plans of campaign were always impeded. In 1778 a wrangle between the Whig Admiral Keppel and the Tory Vice-Admiral Palliser developed into a heated counter-agitation at home, and paralysed naval warfare for months. The opposition leaders were resolved to reverse the government policy completely as soon as fortune smiled upon them, and thus Rodney was rewarded for his glorious victory over Grasse in April 1782 by being displaced by Pigot, a Whig Lord of Admiralty. The French writer, [2] Soulavie justly attributed the government's difficulty in raising troops to such pernicious party feeling, and John Wesley's remark that colonial resistance was helped by Whig sympathy in England was accepted as true by admirers of the politicians, whom he attacked. Just as Napoleon and in a later age the Boers looked hopefully to the British Opposition to defeat the policy of the government in office, so some of the acutest intellects in Europe and America expected co-operation with a large party in this country, and saw in the Gordon Riots a [3] symptom of sympathetic revolution. Indeed the whole character of British politics during the War of Independence illustrates the unfortunate influence of faction upon a country's activity. The old colonial system proved no rallying point for the nation. One of its worst faults was a complete want of that idealism, which alone can unite a whole people in the hour of need, and before which party jealousies roll away like mists before sunshine. It failed wholly to inspire a national conviction that justice was on the side of the British arms.

1 *ibid*, Rep. xv.; pt. 6, 311.

2 Soulavie, Mémoires, iii. 360–1.

3 Paston's Little Memoirs (1901), p. 93.

CHAPTER IX.

Britain's Conduct of the War.

In view of of the militant character of the old colonial system, the inadequate nature of the forces intended to maintain it is remarkable. A policy, which aimed at monopoly and expansion, could only be carried into effect by the sword, and yet the defences of the empire were puny and precarious in time of peace, and quite insufficient in time of war. This defect in the practical side of England's commercial militarism was largely due to the old dread of a standing army, which had been perpetuated by Tory policy under Anne, and Whig policy under Walpole, and had even outlived the victories of the Seven Years' War.

[1]In 1733 it was asked whether an excise or an army was the worse abuse, while in 1742 [2]David Hume considered a standing army as "a mortal distemper in the British government," and "Opposition not Faction," a tract of 1743, described it as [3]"dreadful and dangerous." Walpole preferred that creed to one which might sacrifice economy, and his Tory opponent, Shippen denounced the army yearly in what he called his [4]"anniversary oration." [5]A Whig bishop described a standing force in 1763 as a

1 Appeal to Landowners (1733), p. 15.
2 Hume's Essays (ed. 1903), p. 513.
3 Opposition not Faction (1743), p. 61.
4 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xi. 250.
5 Butler's Serious Consultations (1763), pp. 15, 16, 20.

prop of royal despotism and a haven for Scottish adventurers, and in 1770 when England possessed only 20,000 soldiers and 30,000 militia, [1]Lord Chesterfield regretted the existence of the latter force as being "full as dangerous to the constitution" as the former. In 1774 a writer called Burgh told [2]how soldiers had destroyed freedom in Holland, Sweden and Turkey, and quoted [3]Carteret and Chesterfield in support of the inference that the country needed no other defenders than the militia. In 1775 [4]a Whig pamphleteer protested against increasing the resources of the Crown by transforming labourers out of work into soldiers and sailors. In 1784 Stevens' popular lecture on "heads" styled the army the [5]"caterpillars of the nation," and in 1786 Thomas Seddon, minister of Stretford, warned his readers against its [6]"duellists and macaronis." Such fears were perhaps not wholly groundless at a time when the rights of the executive had not yet been fully reconciled with parliamentary sovereignity by the growth of the cabinet system.

Consequently, the army was always neglected, even when a passing wave of imperial sentiment did something for [7]the sister service. It was debated in [8]1748 whether 15,000 or 18,800, and in [9]1752 whether 16,000 or 20,000 would be its most proper size. Even in 1759 its numbers were kept down in order to encourage the more [10]"constitutional

1 Chesterfield's Letters to Faulkner etc. (1777), p. 17.
2 Burgh's Political Disquisitions (1774), ii. 370.
3 *ibid*, ii. 448, 451.
4 Short Tour in the Midland Counties (1775), p. 33.
5 Stevens' Lecture (1784), p. 26.
6 Seddon's Letters to an Officer in the Army (1786), pp. 225, 227.
7 The Politics on Both Sides (1734), p. 71.
8 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xiv. 1087.
9 A Treatise concerning the Militia (1752), p. 11.
10 Gibbon's Autobiography, i. 181–2.

force," the militia. In spite of the systematic use of the press, recruiting was extraordinarily difficult. The limitation of recruiting to Protestants made [1] Ireland a most barren field for the recruiting sergeant, while in the summer of 1775, only four hundred men enlisted in England. Though soldiers were [2] better paid than in France, the vocations just opened by the industrial revolution were far more lucrative, and already the factory system was drawing recruits from the country districts, which might have sent thousands to the army. Arkwright's mill had been built at Cromford near Derby in 1770, and within twenty years, one hundred and fifty cotton spinning factories were established in the neighbourhood of Manchester. Mining industries were progressing with equal rapidity, and in 1777 Bray described the road between Wakefield and Leeds as running [3] "through a country black with coal pits." The increase of trade within the decade preceding 1776 was said by [4] Wesley to have been unparalleled, and wages rose proportionately, to the detriment of the service. The government was therefore driven to extraordinary shifts, and in 1778 [5] the gaols were cleared of all felons who could possibly be made to handle a weapon, physique and morale being considered negligible qualities. Of 150 recruits from London and Dublin, despatched from Chatham in 1779 to fill gaps in the ranks of the Royal Highland regiment, 16 died on the voyage, and 75 were sent to the hospital immediately on disembarkation. The 2372 recruits, drafted to join Cornwallis

1 Bedford Correspondence, ii. 387.

2 Chantreau, Voyage dans les Trois Royaumes (1792), p. 296.

3 Wm. Bray's Sketch of a Tour in Derbyshire and Yorkshire (ed. 1783), p. 260.

4 Wesley's Journal (ed. 1902), p. 407.

5 Cochrane's Thoughts concerning the Brit. Navy and Army (1791), pp. 13–4.

in South Carolina in 1780, were reported to have been [1] "very sickly and spread contagion through the army." By that time, volunteers for the navy had become as scarce, and when it was proposed to subscribe for a warship in 1781 to present to the government, [2] Keppel asked what was the good of ships without sailors to man them.

Moreover, there was no encouragement to join the army. Its punishments were horribly cruel. In 1757 when a grenadier was shot at Chatham for desertion, [3] another deserter was made to attend his execution, but had "only" to receive 500 lashes by way of caution. [4] That number represented the standard penalty for drunkenness. [5] In 1788 a deserter of eighteen died under a sentence of 650 lashes, and in 1801 [6] three seamen were flogged and ran the gauntlet till they died. It was also [7] unfortunate that the exclusive spirit of the corporations, and the arbitrary Statute of Apprentices gave the ex-soldier little chance of a career after seeing service, while the custom of enlisting for life was often a cause of hardship. The army was aristocratic, and except in a few cases like that of Colonel Preston, who rose from being a kettledrummer to lead the Scots Grey Dragoons at Minden, valour was rarely more than its own reward. [8] Officers had no means of learning military science at home, and had to be content with [9] "dancing, fencing and a smattering of French," unless

1 Cornwallis Correspondence (ed. 1859); schedule.
2 A. Young's Autobiography, p. 108.
3 Gent. Mag. (1757), p. 478; *cf.* the horrible details in R. v. Wall, 28 S.T. at p. 56.
4 J. Long's Voyages of an Indian Interpreter (1791), p. 164.
5 Dibdin's Musical Tour (1788), p. 233.
6 Romilly's Memoirs (1840), ii. 133.
7 A. Smith's Wealth of Nations, p. 116.
8 Brown's Estimate of the Manners of the Times (1757), p. 80.
9 The Polite Philosopher (1750), p. 26.

they went abroad. It was not unusual for subalterns to be attached to schools of instruction in French fortresses like [1]Metz; Eliott learnt the art of war at the French college of la Fère, and [2]Cornwallis, when an ensign, was sent to Turin in the charge of a Prussian captain, for England herself gave no such facilities. The pay of captains and subalterns forced them to [3]"genteel beggary," and their murmurs against "starving in embroidery" remind one of "the splendid misery" of later day German officers. [4] Wolfe made Shelburne devote his pay to a fund for distressed officers, when he heard that the latter's private income was considerable, but the defects in the system were ineradicable; they outlived the century itself, and survived even their later masterly exposure in Cobbett's Political Register. Cumberland, although beloved by the Guards as [5]"the hero of Culloden," had not the brains to throw new life into the bad system of his day. His mistake was to treat the army [6]"more like Germans than Englishmen," and his favourite officers were the slow Loudon, and the inept Braddock. Everything conduced to starve initiative. Braddock had despised the help of [7]"George Croghan our Indian interpreter with one hundred Indian scouts," and had preferred to advance in line firing at random and in close order formation, against picked marksmen fighting under cover. He explained to Franklin that [8]"these savages may be a formidable enemy to your own American militia, but upon the King's regular and

1 Hume's Private Correspondence (1820), p. 283.
2 Cornwallis Correspondence (ed. 1859), p. 4.
3 Observations upon the Pay of Subaltern Officers (1773), p. 39.
4 Fitzmaurice's Shelburne, i. 93.
5 Letter to Wm. Pitt Esq. (1746), p. 28; Harris's Hardwicke, ii. 228.
6 Waldegrave's Memoirs, p. 22.
7 Bigelow's Franklin, i. 324.
8 *ibid*, i. 325.

disciplined troops, sir, it is impossible they should make any impression." In a few hours, he had lost 63 of his 86 officers, and 714 of his 1,200 men, the rest naturally breaking away [1] "with more cowardice," said Washington, "than it is possible to conceive," instead of fighting under cover like their ally, [2] "the uncorrupted American." "Who would have thought it?" were the dying words of Braddock's aide-de-camp, Colonel Orme. [3] It was said that no man with brains would ever have sent such a general against such a foe, but the pompous and prolix Burgoyne was certainly as incompetent in the next war. In 1742 Pitt had expressed the wish that the army could appear [4] "more like soldiers and less like beaus," but he had not enough time to transform the zest for brilliancy in equipment into zest for efficiency in action, and no other minister possessed his genius to single out the best men to lead the forces of Great Britain.

We cannot therefore wonder why recruiting was difficult, and why the government had recourse to foreign mercenaries. [5] "Conquering America without foreign troops is entirely impossible," wrote Storer, one of the "King's friends" in 1775. During the Jacobite rising of 1745 [6] General Wade had five Dutch regiments and three battalions of Swiss under his command, and [7] 6000 Hessians were shipped to Edinburgh from Antwerp. Pitt bought such troops all over Europe in the Seven Years'

1 Sparks' Washington, ii. 87.
2 A Letter to the People of England (1755), p. 48.
3 *ibid*, p. 27.
4 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xi. 1432.
5 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xv.; pt. 6, 315.
6 Cumberland's Memoirs (1767), pp. 298, 325; Harris's Hardwicke, ii. 199, 221; H. Walpole's Memoirs (ed. 1851), i. 462.
7 H. Walpole's Memoirs, i. 465.

War, especially Germans and Swiss. In 1755, [1] 166,000 foreign troops were in England's pay. [2]It was alleged that every alien employed meant the gain of one man's industry to the country, as our population was thus enabled to stay at home instead of being "dragged from the plough and the loom." The force of 2,000 men, which won Manila under Draper's leadership in 1762, [3] included Sepoys, Kaffirs, Lascars, Topasees, and French and German deserters. There was therefore nothing at all novel in the purchase of German hirelings in the War of Independence. This incident has sometimes been allowed to throw a sinister shadow upon England's conduct of the war, but the conditions of the age entirely negative the idea that it was immoral according to contemporary ethics. Those who recognized that to hire German troops to fight against Britons in America was a repulsive system stood ahead of their age.

The practice was then universal in Europe, to whom it has bequeathed the proverb, "point d'argent point de suisse." [4] In 1756 the French army included 15,400 Swiss, 12,201 Germans, 2,976 Irish, 1,114 Italians, 992 Scots, and 1,056 foreign cavalry. In 1754 the French actually enlisted recruits in [5]Scotland in spite of the imminence of the war with Great Britain, and their prisoners confined at Winchester in 1759 [6] included men of every nation, from Turkey to Ireland. One Wiltshire militiaman found his own brother among them. [7]The Irish regiment in the

1 A Second Letter to the People of England (1755), p. 34.
2 Reasons in Support of the War in Germany (1762), pp. 1–2.
3 Annual Register (1764), p. 140.
4 Conway's Military Arguments (1758), pp. 14–5.
5 Prior's Life of Goldsmith (1837), i. 160.
6 Grenville Papers, i. 315.
7 Ségur's Memoirs (1825), p. 238.

service of Louis XV. was dressed in scarlet, and was mistaken for an English corps by our garrison in St. Eustacius, when surprised by Bouillé. The Dutch employed several Scotch regiments, while in 1760 [1] Spain had no less than 3,600 Irish soldiers, 3,600 Italians and Walloons, and 9,600 Swiss. [2] The officers of the Irish corps had to be of British blood. The King of Prussia bought a dragoon regiment from the Elector of Saxony for [3] "forty blue and white metal jars." [4] Many Swiss and German officers served in Turkey.

In view therefore of the inadequacy of the British theory of empire on the point of imperial defence, the use of mercenary troops offered three great advantages without in the least offending the current canons of European taste. In the first place, it avoided the necessity of taking the wives and children of the soldiery to the campaign. The English armies were notoriously liable to be hampered by such useless impediments; such at all events was [5] Marbot's opinion delivered only thirty years afterwards, and it is corroborated by the letters of General von Riedesel and his wife, who showed her good sense by taking [6] "only a small summer wardrobe" with her on the Saratoga campaign. [7] Of the 16,445 men, who returned from service in Germany in 1763, 1666 had taken their wives with them to the war. Secondly, the system [8] obviated the necessity of granting pensions and half-pay, which legacies of war are always unwelcome to a thrifty

1 Annual Register (1760), p. 76.
2 Baretti's Journey from London to Genoa (1770), iv. 45.
3 H. Walpole's Last Journal, i. 404 (note).
4 Memoirs of the Bashaw Count Bonneval (1750), p. 190.
5 Marbot's Memoirs (ed. 1894), p. 281.
6 Riedesel Briefe und Berichte (ed. 1851), pp. 146–7.
7 Annual Register (1763), p. 52.
8 Correspondence of Geo. III. with North, ii. 45.

people. Thirdly, the Hessians were bought "ready made," [1] to be delivered at Hamburg or Rotterdam, and therefore required none of the lengthy and expensive impressing and drilling, needed by British recruits, who were usually ignorant as to the use of arms before enlistment—a grave defect in view of the urgent want of soldiers in America. [2]New levies were sent out almost as quickly as they were enrolled, after a hurried and sometimes merely perfunctory medical examination. Thus shortness of time necessitated teaching Scottish recruits the handling of firelocks by candle-light at Glasgow before embarking in April 1776.

A further reason to have recourse to Germany was that [3]the Swiss cantons would not allow their subjects to serve across the Atlantic, and [4]Russia refused to hire out the 20,000 troops applied for in 1775, whereas the German princes had no such scruples. Moreover their country had the reputation of being the best centre of military skill. Assuming that the old colonial system was so wholly unsentimental as to treat a colonist as a compulsory customer rather than as a brother and an equal, it followed that no scruples would deter a government from using as many soldiers as it could buy in Hesse Cassel or Brunswick. [5]All Germans were then deemed born soldiers. [6]Their discipline was the model of Europe, and Pyrch, a Prussian major, taught the French army its drill. Frederick the Great was the ideal general of the day, and [7] travellers

1 *ibid*, i. 266.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. on Amer. MSS., vol. i. 253.
3 Chatham's Speeches (ed. 1853), p. 168.
4 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 395; *ibid* on Amer. MSS. vol. i. 7.
5 Annual Register (1759), p. 6.
6 Ségur's Memoirs, p. 121.
7 Sherlock's Letters from an English Traveller (1780), p. 9.

delighted to watch him manœuvre his glittering army in the parade ground of Potsdam. Every nation copied the Prussians, and the famous order given to the defenders of Bunker Hill to withhold their fire until they could see their enemies' eyes, was [1] borrowed deliberately from the Prussian orders at the battle of Jägerndorf in 1745. [2] The French accepted the Germans' habit of inflicting corporal punishment; the English imitated their custom of firing by divisions and platoons, and their formations of columns and squares. The use of light cavalry and of the bayonet were both perfected by Frederick. [3] The Prussians alone could fire as quickly as four times per minute, and all armies tried to imitate such despatch. [4] "As ready as a Prussian soldier," was a current phrase of 1756, and the British army tried to vie with his mechanical precision. They were so far successful in that their neat woollen cloth breeches, their spatter dashes, and their uniformity even to their shoe buckles left nothing to be desired, though [5] the Spanish snuff, which was allowed to spoil Frederick's own simple blue coat and red and yellow waistcoat, might have taught the larger lesson that a soldier's equipment is less essential than his efficiency. Indeed, all England looked for guidance to Prussia. Military teachers like [6] Lochée of the Little Chelsea academy and [7] J. O. Vandeleur of the school of field artillery, used her methods, and the standard model for entrenched camps was that constructed by Frederick in 1761 at Buntzelwitz near Breslau.

1 Memorial History of Boston (1881), iii. 85.
2 Ségur's Memoirs, p. 120.
3 Gibbon's Autobiography, i. 229.
4 Grenville Papers, i. 189.
5 Sherlock's Letters, p. 17.
6 Lochée's Essay on Military Education (1776), p. 72.
7 Vandeleur's Duty of Officers (1801), p. 65.

For the present purpose however, it is only necessary to realise that England's recourse to Germany for troops to serve against her colonies was then in the natural order of things. The policy in fact illustrates the peculiarly unsentimental nature of the imperial theory, upon which Greater Britain had been erected. It does not do more than this; in itself it was neither strange nor immoral. The Briton felt no nearer in spirit to the Yankee than to the Hessian, and when the garrison of Yorktown marched out with the honours of war, it was stipulated that the drums might beat [1]"a British or a German march." The cupidity of the princes who sold their subjects may well seem disgraceful, but unless we are ready to judge all past policies by present codes of ethics, we cannot pass a similar judgment on the ministers who bought them. As statesmanship, their action was possibly bad, but it was a most natural result of the political conditions of the age. The Americans welcomed every foreign adherent—Lafayette, Rochambeau, Steuben, Kosciuszko, Kowatch, Pulaski, Bosen —and England found her alien troops of similar service. In June 1777 she had no less than [2]14,749 Germans in the field. Their green coats made them bad targets for the enemy's fire, and there were many [3]gamekeepers and other good shots among the Jäger corps. Riedesel, on arriving in Canada in 1776, insisted on the uses of taking cover, and taught his men to move in snow shoes. Galloway, while severely criticising the operations of 1780, praised Kniphausen almost alone as [4]"a truly gallant and great officer." [5]Burgoyne was unappreciative,

1 Cornwallis's Answer to Clinton (1783), p. 221.
2 Sparks' Washington, v. 542.
3 E. J. Lowell's Hessians in the Revolutionary War (1884), p. 108.
4 Letter to a Nobleman on the Conduct of the War (1780), p. 73.
5 Riedesel Briefe und Berichte (ed. 1851), p. 301.

and [1]complaints were made in 1777 that Waldeck was selling raw and undeveloped boys instead of men, but Cornwallis referred to [2]"the discipline, alacrity and courage" of the Hessians and Anspachers in 1781, when Bose and Buy helped to put the American militia to flight in the woods near Guildford Court House. Gibbon welcomed the idea of purchasing troops even from barbarian Russia.

The same oblivion to the claims of brotherhood led the government to employ Indian auxiliaries. No one will justify this unnatural alliance, but on the other hand, the time has passed when such policy could be treated as a sign of the depravity of British statesmanship under George III. and of a general hideousness in the national standard of morals. Assuming that the recognition of close kindred ties between the belligerents was utterly dim, the men of the time could scarcely have set up a different code for the American War than for the late campaigns against the French. The chief opponents of Indian alliances in 1776 had been their chief promoters twenty years earlier. Just as Chatham's denunciation of the hiring of 20,000 [3]"boors and cut-throats" from Germany was inconsistent with [4]his own policy of 1757, so his indignation upon the news of the league with the barbarians against the rebels was inconsistent with his earlier tenets. In 1755 he had exhorted the House of Commons to join with [5]"our Indian allies" against the French. [6]His excuse that their enlistment had never received his official sanction is far from

1 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. on Amer. MSS., vol. i. 121.
2 Cornwallis' Answer to Clinton, p. 141.
3 Gent. Mag. (1777), p. 251.
4 Harsh Truths (1757), p. 11.
5 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xv. 604.
6 Chatham's Speeches, p. 165.

convincing. The Iroquois were old friends of the British government. In 1759 [1]Delawares tried to induce Twightwee Indians to help England against France. Certainly French allegations as to the horrible nature of England's Indian policy under Lord North are very hollow, for the influence of France had always been directed towards the furtherance of savage raids upon the frontiers of British colonies. In [2]1749 a mixed horde of 2,500 French and Indians ravaged our settlements on the Bay of Fundy, a measure repeated in [3]1754. In 1755 the Canadian government stirred up the Shawnees and Delawares against English settlers. It was [4]an old complaint that French Jesuits were at the bottom of every Indian depredation, a tendency [5]supposed to be heightened by the similiarity of their superstitions. Ogden referred in 1762 to the union of [6] "the fierce Indian and perfidious Gaul," and said of France,

> "Yet baffled in her schemes she seeks again
> To spirit up the Cherokees in vain,"

while Patrick described the enemy in 1759 as

> [7] "Leagued with savages, more savage made,
> By Gallic perfidy and gilded lies."

In 1754 Waldegrave ascribed French success to their influence over the natives. The defeats of that year were said to be due to the adherence of the Norridgwalk Indians and some of the Five Nations to the French, while

1 Gent. Mag. (1759), p. 109.
2 Mundy's Rodney, i. 47.
3 Patrick's Quebec, p. 26.
4 Interest of Gt. Britain Considered (1759), p. 5.
5 *ibid*, p. 5.
6 Ogden's British Lion Roused, p. 204.
7 Patrick's Quebec, p. 3.

[1]Pownall pointed very truly to the assimilation of Canadians to the Indian type. Nor was this tendency to [2]"spirit the Indians up to massacre and scalp the English" denied by candid Frenchmen. Bossu, a captain of French marines, has left us a narrative of travels in Louisiana between 1750 and 1757, in which [3]he urged that the Choctaws should be persuaded to make a foray into Georgia and Carolina, and to burn as many crops as possible during the absence of the local militia in the Louisburg expedition. [4]He wanted to attract the Chicsaws, dwelling between the Mississippi and the Apalachian mountains, to a French alliance. With such ideas in the air in 1775, we can hardly wonder that the British ministry was very willing to avail itself of such powerful allies in arduous forest warfare, for which regular troops were little fitted. The inhuman aspect of the alliance could not readily strike men educated in the unsentimental colonial system of the day, and the savages who followed Burgoyne [5]shouting "war, war" were treated as useful friends. It must also be remembered that the American forces included many men of colour, red and black. Even [6]their earliest levies included negroes, and in time few volunteers were rejected. [7]Impartial Americans now admit that the Massachusetts Congress of 1775 gathered Red Indian adherents before a shot had been fired, notably Mohawks and the Christian converts at Stockbridge, and that their army was never averse to using such savage auxiliaries.

1 Pownall's Adminstration of Brit. Colonies (1774), ii. 187; Kalm's Travels, ii. 379.

2 Letter addressed to Two Great Men (1760), p. 14.

3 Bossu's Travels through Louisiana (1771), i. 293.

4 *ibid*, i. 310.

5 Riedesel Briefe und Berichte (ed. 1851), p. 151.

6 Washington's Official Correspondence, i. 7.

7 Sparks' Washington, iii. 495.

Washington, for instance, described them in 1778 as being [1]"of excellent use as scouts and light troops mixed with our own parties," and even [2]missionaries were employed to bring in Cherokee and Oneida recruits. In 1780 [3]the Richmond smiths were busy making axes and tomahawks for Gates. Lauzun tells us of [4] his Indian allies' horrid habit of eating British prisoners, and writes of Washington's army, [5]"There are whole squads of negroes, and the outposts of black men with white shirts such as they wear in this country, look exactly like the negro harlequins on the stage."

In view of this not unnatural, but still odious reliance upon foreign and barbarian troops, we cannot hold a high opinion of the old colonial system's provision for imperial defence. Men appear to have expected to maintain a great empire without any adequate safeguards. A tradition which dated from the time when Cromwell's Ironsides were the terror of Britain, but which was strengthened by the new fear of royal despotism, prevented the army acquiring either size or efficiency. In spite of the long struggle to win America, England hoped to keep it by a peace establishment, of which economy was the only virtue. A sound belief in the excellence of the navy and in the fighting capacity of a very small army, made the nation self-confident on every imperial question. War was hardly considered as a science, and high commands were entrusted to parliamentary soldiers like Howe and Burgoyne. The difficulties in the way of success in the War of Independence were immense, but no struggle was

1 *ibid*, v. 273.
2 *ibid*, v. 274.
3 Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 176.
4 Lauzun's Memoirs (ed. 1896), ii. 208.
5 *ibid*, ii. 204.

entered into with greater lightness of heart. The effects of the colonial theory of the time had been to obscure the true character of British colonies, and also the arduous character of a great war, when undertaken by an empire divided within itself.

The disadvantages under which Great Britain laboured cannot be over-estimated. In the first place, the nature of the ground upon which military operations were conducted was quite unsuited to the prevailing practice of British manœuvres. Wolfe and Amherst had only overcome this obstacle by dint of patience and expert advice, but few of their successors in the next war had their talent or forbearance. Hence the heroic frontal attack on Bunker Hill, where close lines of troops, burdened by a load of three days' provisions and a heavy knapsack apiece, were sent across open country against entrenched marksmen on a hill top. It is true that they [1]"trod the rugged path where glory led" with brilliant courage and ultimate success, but their losses were enormous—1,054 casualties in a force of 2,200. [2]In one company every man was either killed or wounded. Such methods of attack were not repeated, but the improvement in British tactics was not accompanied by improvement in strategy. Our generals failed signally to develope a definite and continuous scheme of warfare. They alternated between a policy of mere raids and descents, and one of penetrating invasion. The first course made thorough conquest an impossibility; the second was largely nullified by the absence of an enemy's capital, the fall of which might end the war. It entailed also long lines of communication, which were liable to interception and involved considerable dispersion of strength. More than eighty years later, in

1 Gent. Mag. (1775), p. 396.

2 Memorial History of Boston (1881), iii. 89.

an era of railways and turnpike roads, armies found the wildernesses of Virginia and the south extraordinary obstacles to penetrate. The soldiers of George III. had to co-operate in the heart of this hostile country under even greater difficulties. As early as the retreat from Lexington they realised the uses of [1]"flying parties from behind stone walls along the road," and even in the New York district they found the country [2]"incredibly strong." Some officers indeed rose to the occasion. Major Ferguson, who was killed at the decisive battle of King's Mountain in 1780, was the most capable British tactician in wild terrain. The best shot in the army, he taught his corps of marksmen the wisdom of firing, [3]"lying upon the back or belly," and [4]Lord Rawdon, who had been among the first to scale the redoubt at Bunker Hill, utilised his musicians and drummers as riflemen; but many regulars never relished such departures from the orthodox Prussian school. Certainly nothing could be more galling than the colonial practice of harassing outposts at night, and we cannot wonder at the soldiers' complaint that they were [5]"fired upon by a skulking peasantry, whom no laws or usage of European war could justify." [6]Their own plans of campaign were singularly wanting in the silence and secrecy, which are essential to success. Thus men, who were irresistible in the open, came to be entangled in rugged country, and baffled by far less dashing militiamen, a fact clearly understood by topical verses of the day like the ballad of [7]"the Sick Queen." It is really surprising

1 Gibbon's Autobiography, i. 258.
2 *ibid*, i. 299.
3 Annual Register (1781), p. 52.
4 Tarleton's History of the Campaigns (1787), p. 462.
5 Remarks on the Travels of Chastellux (1787), p. 11.
6 Riedesel Briefe und Berichte, p. 147.
7 The Sick Queen (1784), p. 10.

that the light cavalry, which acted as a screen for Cornwallis' movements during the campaigns of 1780 and 1781 should have for several months so triumphed over [1]the difficulties of fighting in the hot regions of Georgia and South Carolina, where the theatre of war was made almost impassable by swamps and forests, and where such staple wants as bread and salt were alike unobtainable. [2]Nathaniel Greene himself said that the greater part of that country was a wilderness, and partisans like Thomas Sumter and Francis Marion availed themselves of its features in order to baffle the strategy of Cornwallis and the tactics of Rawdon and Tarleton. The royal armies having to fight at great distances from their base, had to rely on precarious lines of communication, and these were constantly troubled by raids from the western backwoods, which were peopled principally by Scottish and Ulster Presbyterians, uncompromising rebels and direct ancestors of the unconquerable "valley army" of Stonewall Jackson. Pownall had justly described the Americans as [3]"the best of any forces in the world" for such irregular warfare, and in view of their alliance with great maritime powers like France and Holland, they were really far more powerful antagonists to the small British forces of the time than the Boers were to the infinitely stronger England of 1899.

Another ill effect of the nature of the country was the impossibility of feeding an army, without carrying with it a very large transport. The resources of many districts were entirely insufficient to sustain an invading force. In 1778 Clinton's baggage train was twelve miles long. The distress of the soldiery when at a distance from their base,

1 Tarleton's History of the Campaigns, pp. 16, 113, 155, 225, 507; Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. on Amer. MSS., vol. i. 473–4.

2 *ibid*, pp. 314–5.

3 Pownall's Administration etc. (1774), ii. 232.

was consequently frequent and acute. The troops under Cornwallis, who won the battle at Guildford Court House in March 1781, had no bread for two days afterwards. [1]Tarleton fed his legion on wild cattle and on potatoes, gathered under fire. The heat in Florida prostrated the garrison of Pensacola; in Virginia it was little less desolating, and half the army which surrendered at Yorktown was too ill to bear arms. All the gallantry in the world cannot save a force from physical exhaustion.

Another reason for England's failure to maintain her old colonial system by force of arms lay of course in the incapacity of her generals, who wholly failed to appreciate the advantages of their unusual freedom from civilian control. It is easy to imagine how differently a Wellington would have acted in their place, for the American Tories were numerous, and nine-tenths of the colonial population distrusted Congress. Washington's army was often disunited and depressed in spirit; a Salamanca or Vittoria would have dissolved it. Again and again, vigour might have saved the existing government, at all events for a period, but initiative was left to the enemy by Gage and Howe, and Burgoyne was quite as incompetent. On the eve of his capitulation at Saratoga, the last-named commander, in the words of an eye-witness, [2]"spent half the night singing and drinking, and amused himself with the wife of a commissary who was his mistress, and who (like him) loved champagne." In 1777 when the American forces numbered barely 18,000 men and Howe had 40,000, the latter neglected the campaign, and allowed his forces to ill-treat their own supporters. His feebleness and lethargy contrasted badly with the dash of Arnold and

1 Tarleton's History of the Campaigns, pp. 507, 511.
2 Riedesel Briefe und Berichte, p. 158.

Greene. In 1778 he wasted opportunities by frittering time and money upon regattas and festivals at Philadelphia, his officers taking part in a long tourney before [1]"seven of the principal young ladies of the city, dressed in Turkish habits and wearing favours." [2]It was a great pity, said Galloway, that such a general was paid by the day and not by the job. Burgoyne's pompous description of himself as [3]"dictating" terms at Saratoga was characteristic of the man, and it is amazing to find [4]that his "surrender value" was that of 1,040 privates. Only Cornwallis and Carleton displayed any aptitude for strategy; [5]the former was also a tactician and raised sensible objections to the practice of volley-firing.

It would seem however more in keeping with the philosophic spirit in history to attribute the loss of America not so much to the blunders of a few individuals, as to the breakdown of a great theory. It is quite questionable whether Clive and Wolfe together could have preserved the empire. Great Britain's failure was by no means primarily due to want of military efficiency, for the men and indeed [6]a large proportion of the subordinate officers were good enough. In the open, they were generally victorious, and even at Yorktown their gallant sortie, four days before the surrender, fully upheld the old traditions of the country. Twenty years later, [7]an adversary described the British army as the best scouts and the best marksmen in Europe, and within so short an interval there had been

1 Annual Register (1778), p. 266 *cf.* Letter to Rt. Hon. Lord Howe (1781), p. 13.

2 Galloway's Considerations upon the Am. Enquiry (1779), p. 18.

3 Fox's Memoirs, i. 164.

4 Sparks' Washington, viii. 15.

5 Windham's Diary (ed. 1866), p. 362.

6 Stair's Facts and their Consequences (1782), pp. 29—31.

7 Marbot's Memoirs (ed. 1894), p. 423.

no revolution in the military system. In the American War our soldiers fought through many years of most trying warfare with consistent spirit. On the famous day at Lexington, when the whole countryside was panting for rebellion, and the minute guns were steadily beating up the most skilful shots in the world for attack, the light-hearted English troops, in the words of Captain Gould, an eye-witness, [1]"rushed on shouting and huzzaing "to meet the embattled farmers first at Lexington green, and afterwards on the bridge at Concord. [2]During 1776 they took nearly 5,000 American prisoners. Indeed success is not the touchstone of valour, and the men who stormed Bunker Hill in 1775 and defended the Ebenezer redoubt at Savannah in 1779 were worthy of the purest cause. When the dragoons broke at the battle of Cowpens in 1780, [3]the artillerymen refused to leave their guns, and all died at their posts. Victories like those of Guildford and Camden were often as brilliant as they were barren.

We should therefore find the chief cause of the break-down of the empire not in the passing inefficiency of commanders, but in the permanent defects of the old colonial theory itself. Its intense commercial selfishness alienated the colonies, and hence the Revolution. Its pugnacity embittered all Europe, and hence the alliance between France, Spain and Holland with America, and hence also the armed neutrality of the northern powers. Later experience has taught that a comparatively "open door" is the only way to reconcile one state to another's expansion. The empire of George III. had no such key to the art of reconciliation.

1 Gent. Mag. (1775), p. 294; Cowper's Reports, ii. 677–8.
2 Sparks' Washington, iv. 549.
3 Tarleton's History of the Campaigns, p. 218.

France burned to avenge the losses of the Seven Years' War. Other nations longed to efface from International Law the stringent rules, devised by England to strengthen her supremacy in maritime warfare. Treating the law of nations as but a question of expediency and opinion, exponents of the British colonial system refused to admit the rebels' claim to recognition as belligerents, and availed themselves of such maxims as "enemy ship, enemy goods," and "free ships do not make free goods," in order to keep all foreigners aloof from her intestine conflicts. The whole tenor of English political science was one of exclusiveness towards other states, and of monopoly at home. Hence Franklin's appeal to France to admit the natural rights of Americans and neutrals under a more liberal version of International Law, won first sympathy, and then actual intervention. John Adams was similarly successful in persuading the Dutch that the interest of America was also the interest of Europe.

No one can doubt the immense value of European help to the struggling republic. In 1775 [1]Franklin asked Dumas to send him two good engineers from Holland, and in 1776 [2]he procured 200 brass field pieces and 15,000 firelocks from France. [3]Lafayette was valued by Washington above all his foreign subordinates, but most of them were useful. Rochambeau, for instance, did great work with French contingents, and Lauzun has left us a pretty sketch of the advent of the brilliant French soldiers among the quiet Quakers of Rhode Island. The rose-colour facings and white feathers of the Soissons brigade were alluring to the ladies of Philadelphia, while its own patrician officers fell victims to the charms of

1 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 352.
2 *ibid*, ii. 371.
3 Sparks' Washington, vi. 14.

Polly Layton, the Quaker belle of Newport, whom Ségur calls [1]"that angel" and the Prince de Broglie, [2]"Minerva in person, a masterpiece of nature." Such cavaliers were efficient in the field, while on sea the French alliance was extremely valuable, and prevented Cornwallis' escape from Yorktown in 1781. Nor have the United States forgotten the services of other European haters of the British policy of monopoly and repression, such as Kosciuszko, who came to help them in 1776, and the Prussian Steuben who came in 1777, or such guerilla leaders as the Pole Pulaski who was killed by a swivel-shot before Savannah in 1779, and the Bavarian de Kalbe who was mortally wounded in the rout at Camden in 1780. The rebel cause attracted [3]plenty of British deserters whose zeal was heightened by their knowledge that they were fighting with halters about their necks, and probably no less than [4]5,000 of the German hirelings. Indeed the popularity of the American cause in Europe and the successive loans raised in France, Holland and Spain in its support attest to the universal detestation of the British imperial theory. There was nothing accidental in the tendency to connive at obvious breaches of neutrality by subjects of neutral states. The French playwright, Beaumarchais made a fortune by unlawful shipments of military stores to America from Bordeaux, as did the firm of Penet and Pliarne by similar shipments from Nantes.

Thus American success has often been ascribed in a large measure to [5]foreign help, and under the exasperating

1 Ségur's Memoirs (1825), pp. 358–9.

2 Lauzun's Memoirs, ii. 214.

3 Sparks' Washington, viii. 384.

4 Lowell's Hessians in the Revolutionary War (1884) p. 300; Washington's Official Correspondence, i. 146; ii. 293; Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. on Amer. MSS., vol. i. 199, 250.

5 Remarks on the Travels of Chastellux (1787), p. 2.

old colonial system, such help was inevitable. It was by nature simply part and parcel of the Revolution itself. Apart from merely accidental causes of war like Lord North's specific fiscal policy, George III.'s ambition to be despot, the coercive measures against Massachusetts and the special grievances of Boston, the real creative force of the Revolution was the feeling against the whole imperial system of Great Britain. Franklin realised that France and Spain felt the same irritating influence of the British world empire as the Americans, though in a different way, and from the first, he laboured to draw these countries towards an alliance by proving the identity of their interests with those of the colonists. In 1775 he sent to Holland for a copy of Vattel, and he says himself, [1] "it came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations." The new learning enabled the Americans to assert that the acceptance of cartels for the exchange of prisoners implied a British recognition of themselves as belligerents, and to justify the enlistment of allies abroad. Stationing himself at Passy, an object of ecstatic homage to the French in spite of his ignorance of their fashions, his long grey locks and uncouth fur hat, Franklin conducted American maritime policy in a manner calculated to identify the spirit of their resistance with that of the Continental opposition to English doctrines in prize law. Thus in 1780 [2] he wrote from Passy that the American government should not condemn any British goods other than contraband when shipped in Dutch vessels, as all the neutral states in Europe considered the old International Law modified in that respect. In December 1781

1 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 349.
2 *ibid*, ii. 506–7.

International Law [1]"according to the general usages of Europe" was declared to be part of American law.

Thus the exclusive claim put forward by British political theorists with regard to the wide dominions added to the empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, made renewed war with France as inevitable as colonial opposition. A time was bound to come when the Briton over sea would object to having his land exploited for the benefit of monopolists at home, and then the adherence to his cause of the excluded and supplanted foreigner was equally certain. The Emperor Joseph II. said, [2]"My business is to be a royalist," and gave no countenance to the Americans, but all other European princes were zealous for their cause, and allowed their subjects to commit obvious breaches of neutrality for their sake. Yet apart from their hatred of the English colonial theory and their desire for revenge, there could be no real sympathy between these despots and the young democracy. What had Marie Antoinette in common with the men, whom she described as [3]"the good Americans, our dear republicans"? What had the ladies of the French Court, who wore head-dresses [4]"aux Insurgens," or the French priests, who stamped their sacramental bread with the word "Liberté," in common with the sceptical and sober Franklin? The French soldier Ségur was asked by Polly Layton why France fought for America. [5]"The English have done thee no harm, and as for our liberty, what concern is it of thine? It is always wrong to interfere in other people's concerns except to make peace, and prevent

1 Kent's Commentaries, p. 1.
2 Lauzun's Memoirs (ed. 1896), ii. 144.
3 *ibid*, ii. 191.
4 *ibid*, ii. 142.
5 *ibid*, ii. 215.

bloodshed." The genuine explanation lay in the general desire to retaliate for the former triumphs of the British colonial system. The very patriotism of that system had injured its efficiency by leading to the sacrifice of colonial interests for an ideal of self-sufficiency, which no American appreciated, and by leading at the same time to the alienation of every European state. Hence the energy and spirit with which first France (after the surrender at Saratoga in 1777) and afterwards other Continental powers embarked upon war with Great Britain during the latter's struggle with her revolted colonies. France spent over fifty millions sterling on the war. England's usual superiority over her foes at sea, and the dissensions among the rebels themselves, enabled her to hold out for several years against all comers. Charleston, with a garrison of over 5,600 soldiers and nearly 1,000 seamen, was captured in 1780. However, the French won the upper hand for the moment on the ocean, and so assisted materially in bringing about the surrender of Cornwallis with 8,000 men at Yorktown in 1781. Rodney won back maritime ascendency after [1]"a long day of obstinate fight over the seas of Martinico" in April 1782, when Grasse was captured with eight warships. [2]Lauzun called this battle "a fearful blow to our navy"; [3]Rodney himself, writing to Lord George Germain, described it as "the most important victory I believe ever gained against our perfidious enemies the French." Yet on land ultimate success was clearly impossible, notwithstanding England's financial superiority, and the peace of 1783 was an admission that the moral influence of our old colonial system was fatal to the successful conduct of any war, in which men of British

1 Bigelow's Franklin, iii. 60.

2 Lauzun's Memoirs, ii. 253.

3 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. ix.; pt. 3, 116.

blood were driven to co-operate with the ancient enemies of the empire.

The political ideals, for which Great Britain fought in the American War, were not by any means sinister, notwithstanding the use of mercenaries, but they were lamentably lacking in the sense of brotherhood, which we now connect with our conception of colonial relations. To the English troops, the struggle never seemed a civil war, and the Americans' indignant anxiety to show that their courage was no less than that of British-born soldiery proves the power of that English delusion. Thus Washington exulted in the news of Lexington as showing Sandwich [1]"how Americans will fight for their liberties and property," and Henry Dearborn, a captain who served in the ill-fated army, which struggled under Montgomery and Arnold through the wilderness then barring the way to Quebec, wrote in his Journal a passage that illustrates the same feeling. He is describing the attack on Quebec in the grey dawn of New Year's Eve 1775 when the snow was falling heavily, and the storming parties were being everywhere repelled. He was suddenly challenged by a picquet. [2]"I answered a friend. He asked me who I was a friend to. I answered 'to liberty.' He then replied 'God damn you,'" and Dearborn, whose gun would not go off, had to surrender to the English [3]"and their brothers the savages." He adds characteristically, [4]"But we had something more at stake than fighting for sixpence a day. We have convinced the British butchers that the cowardly Yankees can, and when there is a call for it, will fight." In wars between men of the same blood one would expect

1 Sparks' Washington, iii. 406.
2 Dearborn's Journal (ed. 1886), i. 20.
3 *ibid*, ii. 4.
4 *ibid*, ii. 7.

combatants to treat each other with more mutual respect. Joseph Warren, who was killed at the very moment when his men broke at Bunker Hill, said of the British, "These fellows say we won't fight; by heaven I hope I shall die up to my knees in blood."

The actual conduct of the war was not indeed marked by unusual inhumanity on England's part. As America was the scene of hostilities, she naturally suffered most, and sometimes the recollection of the horrors of conflict has led to many charges against British methods of warfare. It must indeed be admitted that the entire absence of racial sentiment from the old colonial theory led to the encouragement of ravages, which all must condemn. To loyalists like Bishop Inglis, the forays which took place during the last years of the struggle were [1]useful descents, deserving of support, but in actual fact they left a disastrous effect upon American thought. [2]The depredations of Governor Tryon and of Arnold in the southern states, and of John Butler in Wyoming, and [3]the misconduct of British troops in New York in 1777, wiped out much of the Anglo-Saxon sentimentality which had previously been far stronger in America than England. Since then, the warmth of that feeling has been chiefly on the British side of the Atlantic.

On the other hand, apart from these lapses from good policy, the British armies seem to have been [4]humane. Washington admitted that General Carleton treated American prisoners in Canada [5]"with kindness and

1 M. L. Davis' Memoirs of Aaron Burr, ii. 30.

2 Ramsay's Hist. Am. Rev., ii. 104, 141.

3 Letters to a Nobleman on the Conduct of the War (1780), p. 43.

4 Tarleton's History of the Campaigns, p. 110, but see Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 428.

5 Sparks' Washington, iii. 264.

humanity." [1]"We were carried to the guard house," says Dearborn in his Journal, "where we had a good dinner, and a plenty of several sorts of wine." [2]Richard Montgomery, the rebel general who fell along with his two aides-de-camp in the attack on Quebec, was buried with full military honours. When [3] Ségur was captured by Nelson, then a young captain of 24, he was generously treated. In view of the customary embezzlement of prisoners' supplies by fraudulent intermediaries, [4] charitable people in Liverpool took precautions for their welfare. Upon the capture of Mark Moore, captain of an American privateer by the Eurydice in the channel, the commander of that vessel was chivalry itself. [5]"He treated me very genteely," says Moore, "and ordered me to mess with the officers in the gunroom."

In discussing such questions as that of clemency in this war, it must always be remembered that the contemporary standard of ethics was, on this point, extremely low. [6]Prisoners were often treated with scandalous neglect. In action, humanity was exceptional. [7]The French had used broken nails and slugs as bullets in defending Ticonderoga in 1759, so that every soldier, wounded in the attempt to storm it, was hurt incurably. In 1764 General Draper alleged that [8]"it is a known and universal rule of war amongst the most civilized nations that places taken by storm without any capitulation are subject to all the miseries that the conquerors may chuse to inflict," a canon

1 Dearborn's Journal (ed. 1886), i. 22.
2 Remarks on Travels of Chastellux (1787), p. 46.
3 Ségur's Memoirs (1825), p. 427.
4 Wakefield's Memoirs (1804), i. 190.
5 Moore's Memoirs (1795), p. 179.
6 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 404–5.
7 Annual Register (1759), p. 77.
8 *ibid* (1764), p. 139.

followed by the Russians on storming the Turkish fortress of Ismail in 1790. The French behaved with [1]"indescribable kindness" to Cornwallis on his surrender, but their treatment of captured crews during the American War was not always exemplary. Lauzun says, [2]"a horrible scene of pillage, and men even fought with each other," when mentioning the capture of an English herring ship in 1780. The French had left the bodies of Braddock's army to lie unburied from 1754 to 1759, when the Ohio valley was reconquered. The same implacable spirit entered into the more legitimate province of traps and ruses. [3]Bossu hoisted British colours in 1757 to entrap an English ship, and [4]Lauzun sailed to conquer Senegal in 1778 under the Union Jack, while in one case, [5] a French frigate availed herself of Venetian colours in chasing a neutral snow bound for London. Spying was very common, and one American, who had once served in the royal navy, had no scruples in using Flemish colours and an Austrian passport in order to watch the English coast, and to anchor even [6]"in Brighthelmstone Bay, at a time when the London comedians were there." The identity of the language of both armies, and apparently [7]their similarity in dress made spying easy.

Impartial critics will therefore be slow to condemn the conduct of those who fought on behalf of the imperial theory of George III.'s reign. Perhaps it was less exceptionable than that of the colonists themselves, whose

1 Cornwallis' Answer to Clinton, p. 212.
2 Lauzun's Memoirs, ii. 198.
3 Bossu's Travels through Louisiana, ii. 13.
4 Lauzun's Memoirs, ii. 165.
5 Douglas' Reports, p. 576.
6 Moore's Memoirs, p. 175.
7 1 Dallas Rep. 33; Tarleton's History, p. 265.

persecutions of loyalists were often appalling, and whose attitude towards the Indians, though not without some justification, nevertheless reveals the wide gulf between colonial and British feeling. To the Englishmen at home, they were regarded as brothers in theory and as partisans in practice, and [1]the government had always protected them against the rapacity of civilisation's pioneers. One Iroquois told Burgoyne in 1778 of his tribe's readiness to serve against the Bostonians, [2]"at the voice of our great father beyond the great lake." The Americans, on the other hand, had far more knowledge of Red Indian barbarity, and never spared the savage. During the War of Independence, the rebels punished the Six Nations and the Creeks for their adherence to the Crown by [3]general slaughter. Washington wrote coolly of Sullivan's warfare in 1779, [4]"He had by my last advice burned between fifteen and twenty towns, destroyed all their crops, and was advancing to their exterior villages, the Indians, men women and children, flying before him to Niagara in the utmost consternation, distress and confusion." [5]Colonial violence was often bitter, and Washington and Gage interchanged recriminations as to their respective treatment of prisoners. Burgoyne's army was badly treated in captivity, and Governor Hamilton, a leader of British and Red Indian irregulars, was put in irons when captured. The guerilla troops on both sides fought with a touch of ferocity during the campaign in the southern colonies, and grave charges were made against the victors at King's Mountain in 1780, Cornwallis remonstrating against

1 Annual Register (1763), pp. 32, 212.
2 Gent. Mag. (1778), p. 123.
3 Ramsay's Hist. Am. Rev., ii. 147; Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 209.
4 Spark's Washington, vi. 356.
5 Remarks on Travels of Chastellux, pp. 18, 22–3.

Gates's [1] "scarcely credible inhumanity." The cases of André and Asgill do not need citation, nor does the counter-case of Nathan Hale. The only point, in fact, of recalling these long-forgotten grievances on either side, is to show that Great Britain's conduct of the War of Independence was not below the customary standard of the day. The old colonial system was of the earth earthy, but if its champions rarely rose from worldliness, they need not be accused on the other hand of having acted like devils. David Hartley, for instance, who was the Whig member for Hull, alleged that the army was waging war on [2] "defenceless women and children." Such polemics are best buried. They, and the wars by which they were inspired, have passed into history long ago, symbolising the fate of a great scheme of colonial government, and leaving it to us to draw the moral. It is a far better task to give judgment on a policy, than to draw an indictment against men long since forgiven.

1 Cornwallis Correspondence, i. 144; *cf. ibid*, i. 67, 75.
2 Hartley's Letters on the American War (1779), p. 25.

CHAPTER X.

Colonial Theory in 1783.

The loss of America caused an intense reaction in British colonial theory. For two centuries, the country had fought for supremacy in America. She had struggled long and arduously with Spain, Holland and France in turn. She had buried thousands of her bravest sons and much capital across the Atlantic. Yet at the acme of the imperial system for which she had made such exertions, her own colonists had revolted, and justified Turgot's oft-quoted dictum as to the likeness of daughter states to fruit which drops from the tree when ripe. In the face of such seeming ingratitude, men threw off their old belief in the utility of expansion, and acquired the new faith of "laisser faire." A customer was a customer still, even if he traded under another flag, and most Britons accepted [1]Adam Smith's view that colonies which admitted no obligations towards the Mother Country, were worse than useless. [2]The nation regretted the increase of the national debt far more than its loss of territory.

It is to be observed also that the state of the colonies still retained by Great Britain was in no way conducive to optimism. Even at the height of the imperial enthusiasm of Chatham's day, Canada had been regarded as of doubtful value; [3]the colonies which rebelled had been

1 Wealth of Nations, p. 760.

2 Remarks on the Travels of Chastellux, p. 63; Tucker's Life of Jefferson (1837), p. 220.

3 Candid Examination (1775), p. 44.

twenty times as populated and a hundred times as wealthy. Its future development was not dreamed of by the wisest. It was thought to have been [1]"only a place of arms for the French, or a factory for the fur trade." [2]The only post in the whole country was that between Montreal and Quebec, and its exports to England in 1787 amounted to [3]but $^1/_{119}$ of the sum of the exports to England from the United States. [4]The reports as to Liverpool shipping show that British ships of 21,870 tonnage plied between that port and the United States in 1785, but ships of only 2,948 tonnage between it and British North America. It was therefore most natural for Englishmen to suggest its abandonment in view of the probability that the great expense of its maintenance would be followed by ultimate separation. In 1784 James Allen, a typical pamphleteer of the new school, [5]alleged that British trade with Canada must needs be profitless, that her wheat and lumber were of inferior quality, and that her population only consisted of [6] 100,000 backward Frenchmen. The sprinkling of British settlers and loyalist refugees was too insignificant to necessitate the maintenance of so useless a possession. Unlike Lafayette, [7]who held a high opinion of the value of Halifax, [8]Turgot thought that it was even to the interest of France that Great Britain should retain her possessions, and great weight was attached to his views in England. John Nicholls, a Whig member of Parliament who has

1 Present State of Gt. Britain and N. America (1767), pp. 171, 308.
2 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 138.
3 Beawes' Lex Mercatoria (ed. 1813), ii. 91, 104.
4 Report on Slave Trade (1789), Part iv.
5 Allen's Considerations on the Present State of Intercourse between Sugar Colonies and U.S.A. (1784), p. 26.
6 *ibid*, p. 30.
7 Sparks' Washington, vii. 480.
8 Soulavie, Mémoires, iii. 99.

left us Recollections, [1] argued that the fur trade alone was not a sufficient source of wealth to justify the retention of Canada, and that it was absurd to prefer its timber to the cheaper and better timber of Norway. In case of war too, we might hire Norwegian sailors quite as profitably as Canadian.

Nova Scotia and Newfoundland were then equally unremunerative dependencies. [2] One vessel used to make two voyages a year to the former colony from England; otherwise it enjoyed no communication with Europe, and though praised by [3] Little in 1748, it was yet in its infancy. [4] It had no ships of its own, and only [5] 16,000 inhabitants of whom [6] four-fifths were immigrant loyalists, and the remaining fifth was hostile to England and addicted to "rum and idle habits." Halifax had been founded in 1749 but was not allowed self-government. [7] Newfoundland did not possess a single coast road, and its fishermen were wretchedly poor. [8] "All government is alike to them" runs a government report of 1775, "when they have bread, pork and peas sufficient." Hence many patriotic Britons wanted nothing more than to be free again from such unproductive possessions. Colonies had been tested and found wanting, and the repudiation of the recent policy of expansion was immediate and sincere. The office of Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the Council of Trade and Plantations were alike abolished in 1782, and after certain makeshifts the concerns of Greater Britain were handed over to the

1 Nicholls' Recollections (1822), ii. 87–8.
2 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 355.
3 Little's State of Trade in the Northern Colonies, p. 36.
4 Allen's Considerations, p. 31.
5 Beawes' Lex Mercatoria, ii. 102.
6 Cornwallis Correspondence, i. 279.
7 Cobbett's Parl. Hist. xvi. 138.
8 Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. xi.; pt. 5, 384.

keeping of the Secretary of State for War in 1801. The debates in Parliament in 1783 were marked rather by relief than regret. [1]Viscount Howe said that the greatness of England did not lie on the sands of America, and [2]Onslow alleged that the colonies had always hung like a dead weight on the neck of Great Britain. Shelburne had been at enmity with Burke and the Rockingham branch of the Whig party for many years, and though he had acted as colonial minister from 1766 to 1768, he did not feel a pang at the severance of the imperial tie. He found his most congenial allies in the philosophic circle of Price and Priestley, and from the first, he had inclined strongly in the direction of free trade and British insularity. Thus he was quite consistent in [3]minimising the advantages accruing from the ownership of the lost dependencies of Florida and Tobago. [4] Most Whigs indeed prided themselves upon having asserted the futility of the late scheme of empire from the first moment of colonial resistance, and [5] argued that emigration and imperial wars alike impoverish a mother country. The government with singular irony entrusted the peace negotiations to David Hartley, a hater of militarism and empire, and an intimate of Franklin and Price. He was hardly the man to hold out for British claims to the unappropriated lands lying north and west of the seceded states.

The only misgiving that accompanied English complacency on the loss of her colonies was that the nation's lucrative trade with America might be stopped. As yet however, the resources of the United States were so un-

1 Gent. Mag. (1783), p. 6.
2 *ibid*, p. 21.
3 *ibid*, p. 300.
4 Bigelow's Franklin, iii. 86.
5 Consolatory Thoughts on American Independence (1782), pp. 3, 11.

developed that the danger was thought remote, and the fear that commerce only followed the flag was ably combated by numbers of economists. Thus a clever writer of this school, Alexander Brown, [1]argued that Great Britain was never personally benefited by the welfare of a colony merely because it was a colony. Newfoundlanders catch fish for themselves, not for us. There is no need to spend twice as much on our timber as we need do, simply because the more expensive market happens to be a British province. [2]Free trade was better for the consumer at home. It would be wrong to prefer colonial importers to the former American producers, who probably would sell more cheaply. [3]The wish to relieve the West Indies did not warrant the doubling of the price of sugar. He asked with persuasive eloquence, [4]"How much more are we enriched by the wealth of a man who lives in Nova Scotia, than of one who lives in Massachusetts? Does the corn of Canada produce us a greater revenue than that of Pennsylvania?" We are thus brought very near to the unsentimental economics of the Manchester school; the contrast to the prevailing theory of but twenty years earlier is most striking. Brown proved that the effect of regulating trade within the empire was simply [5]"mutual oppression."

The new doctrine was calculated to win over a people just emerging from a burdensome war for empire. While French doctrinaires were teaching that the Greek plan of colonisation, with its loose ties of [6]"reason and good offices," was alone effective, Englishmen like Lord Stair

1 A. C. Brown's Colony Commerce, p. 19.
2 *ibid*, p. 31.
3 *ibid*, p. 74.
4 *ibid*, p. 83.
5 *ibid*, p. 74.
6 Grosley's Tour to London, i. 133.

considered [1] every penny ever spent on colonial wars as squandered. Lord Sheffield's tracts tried to show that loss of sovereignty could not lead to loss of markets, and won considerable popularity. [2] "Some great Frenchman," writes his daughter Maria Josepha Holroyd, "talking of Papa's work, said if he should live to see a French nobleman write thus on commerce he should be quite content and satisfied." Sheffield argued that [3] the United States would still have to depend on Great Britain for wool, porcelain, earthenware, glass, shoes, buttons and hats. No foreign rival could compete with us as yet; [4] Manchester goods were twenty per cent. cheaper than those of Rouen, and [5] English shipping merchants gave longer credits to customers than did the French. Like Washington and [6] John Adams, Sheffield thought that the new republic would never be anything but an agricultural community, [7] that emigrants would never be anything but farmers, and [8] that therefore the demand for British manufactures in America would continue for ever to expand. [9] Seabury had said in 1774 that it would need a conjuror to convert the American sailor or shipwright into a spinner or weaver. According to this view, the States now burdened by a national debt mainly bearing interest at 5 per cent., and destitute also of capital and technical skill, would sadly miss the £370,000 previously expended annually therein

1 Stair's Facts and their Consequences (1782), p. 4.
2 Adeane's Girlhood of M. J. Holroyd (1896), p. 11.
3 Sheffield's Observations on the Commerce of the American States (1783), pp. 7, 12, 19.
4 *ibid*, p. 20.
5 Consolatory Thoughts on American Independence (1782), p. 16.
6 Adams' Twenty-one Letters (1789), p. 60.
7 Sheffield's Observations, p. 105.
8 *ibid*, p. 101.
9 A. W. Farmer's View of the Contest (1774), p. 25.

by the British military establishment, and the loss accruing from separation would be all on the colonial side. The dependence of Lancashire upon the American cotton supply was a thing of the future, as only [1] one twenty-fifth of the world's cotton was produced in the United States in 1791. To-day they provide the bulk of that supply and export yearly to Great Britain nearly forty million pounds worth, but in the light of earlier days we can well understand why both Washington and Henry Laurens feared the effect of these derogatory tenets upon American thought; certainly in England, they helped to strengthen the new idea that a colony was never more than [2] "a millstone lying about the neck of this country." The repeal of all prohibitory acts made English ports again the principal European depots for American produce, while the Americans on the other hand experienced [3] the disadvantages of being outside the empire by being excluded from trade with the British West Indies until the year 1793, [4] and by having to face a prohibitive duty on the importation of those Boston oils, which had in previous years illuminated the streets of London.

Even Tories acquiesced in the opinion that empire entailed more sacrifices than benefits. Josiah Tucker, dean of Gloucester, an old antagonist of Franklin and persistent depreciator of the revolutionaries, was an able exponent of this view, and though his claim to have [5] "demolished" Locke was not convincing, he gave adequate expression to the country's disgust with the apparently inevitable fruits of empire-building. Entirely

1 Quarterly Review (1861), pp. 422–3.

2 Tucker's Four Letters on Important National Subjects (1783), p. 7.

3 Nelson's Dispatches, i. 9; Ann. Register (1776), p. 205; Cornwallis Correspondence, i. 280.

4 Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 352.

5 Teignmouth's Life of Sir Wm. Jones (1806), i. 330.

distrusting the monopolist tendency of the old colonial system, and believing in the new creed of "laisser faire," he was almost the first Englishman to infer that all colonies would show the same spirit as America, when they reached a certain stage of development. Tucker was a thinker of great independence; he had favoured the Jew Act of 1753 in spite of much clerical bigotry around him, and a peace policy in 1756 in spite of the prevailing belief in wars of trade. In sympathy with the opinions of Turgot, who appreciated him, he held that England only spent millions on her colonies with the future prospect of being abandoned by them. [1]The tobacco of Virginia and Maryland would still come first to England as their best market. Possessions were only entanglements. [2]Gibraltar was useless and [3]America had been valueless. Its loss was therefore [4]"one of the happiest events" in disguise, and we should properly have cut the bond which bound her to us ourselves; the war had simply been waged on behalf of "cormorants and contractors here." It was remarkable that the rebels had been forced to buy English goods even during the struggle, in spite of their being forty per cent. above normal price, and with such eager customers awaiting us, [5]Tucker regarded the prolongation of the war as Quixotic insanity.

The consequent apathy of the government towards colonial interests, and towards any idea of expansion was great and long-lived. In the negotiations of 1783, the claims of the Newfoundland fishermen were disregarded as irrelevant to England's purpose of obtaining peace, and

1 Tucker's Cui Bono (1781), p. 76.
2 *ibid*, p. 137.
3 *ibid*, p. 127.
4 Tucker's Four Letters (1783), pp. 7–8.
5 Cui Bono, pp. 41, 87.

a private undertaking not to annoy the French fishermen by competing with them on the French shore led to a century of friction. At the same time, [1] Minorca was abandoned as useless, and [2] Gibraltar was nearly ceded to Spain. After 1793 United States traders were allowed to compete on equal terms with British Americans in the West India trade. Firmly believing with [3] Paine in the uselessness of every possession from Halifax to Gibraltar, ministers acted consistently upon that assumption and became entirely engrossed in the new political and social reforms at home. For fifty years, British North America was [4] decried as a field for emigration, and settlers were encouraged to drift in thousands to the United States, where they became aliens. In Queen Victoria's reign this tendency was strengthened for some years by the want of a direct line of steamers to Canada, and the absence of an emigration agency. Everywhere the government floundered between such irreconcilable motives as philanthropy and self-interest, expediency and altruism, ultimate advantage and immediate economy. Australia was considered to be simply suitable for convicts; New Zealand all but fell into the hands of France; South Africa was treated with habitual inconsistency and weakness. Canada's boundaries were permitted to be whittled down by the surrenders to her southern neighbours, known in diplomacy as the Ashburton Treaty of 1842 and the Oregon Treaty of 1846. In every part of the world, Great Britain pursued a negligent policy of non-intervention in questions involved by expansion. The empire, which was

1 Considerations on the Provisional Treaty with America (1783), p. 10.
2 *ibid*, p. 18; Pasquin and Marforio (1783), p. 31.
3 Paine's Letter to Raynal (1782), pp. 69–71.
4 J. Knight's Extracts from Letters written by Englishmen in the U.S.A. (1818), p. 25.

predicted in 1763 [1]to vie one day with that of Russia or China in extent, and that of Rome in glory, had proved itself, in Franklin's phrase, but a [2]"fine and noble China vase," which broke at the first emergency. We cannot wonder that in the first moments of disillusion, men reversed their opinions as completely as did their ancestors when they found the rule of the saints impracticable in 1660. The step to the absolute insularity of early Victorian politics was easy and short, and the doctrines of Cobden and Bright hark back to those of 1783. The one great redeeming feature of the "laisser faire" system was its free gift to the colonies of the boon of self-government, which earned for Britain a loyalty impossible in her day of self-conscious empire; so the extravagance of the "laisser faire" policy in its early phase worked at last its own cure.

It is clear too that the older belief in the virtues of a Greater Britain never entirely died out. In 1783 one writer of "Political Memoirs with regard to French Policy" deprecated the current [3]"zeal for a peace on any terms," and [4]the government eventually helped loyalist refugees to settle in Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, and gave them three million pounds to compensate for their sufferings. [5]Some four hundred free negro loyalists were planted in Sierra Leone. The Napoleonic wars were breasted with a courage, much recruited by a sense of the value of England's remaining possessions. Napoleon fully realised that a maritime and colonial empire was worth more than what was suggested by Turgot,

1 Annual Register (1763), p. 15.
2 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 364; Priestley's Memoirs (1806), p. 450.
3 Political Memoirs (1783), p. xl.
4 Sheffield's Observations on Commerce (1783), p. 97.
5 Hoare's Memoirs of G. Sharp (1820), p. 274.

and accepted by the "laisser faire" school. In the opinion of many Britons, the individualist illusion had to be tempered by Napoleon's epigrams. "The east is worth a turban and a pair of trousers." "Egypt once in possession of the French, farewell India to the British." "There are only two nations, the French and English; the rest are nothing." The great Emperor fought avowedly to recover supremacy at sea and in the east, and his ambitions thus forced England into a new struggle for dominion. The value of the West Indies was indeed almost over-estimated, while the East India Company was induced by Wellesley to pursue a forward policy in Hindustan. We can therefore trace the roots of the imperialist revival in our own times to a very early date in the history of the preceding school of political thought. [1]Hugh Gray's "Letters from Canada," written in 1806, 1807 and 1808 proved that even if it were not a colony's interest to remain within the empire, there was no doubt that such was England's interest. Better preserve a smaller market than further the rise of a foreign nation, which could always vex the country with threats of trade embargoes and boundary quarrels. In January 1800 the laureate Pye, heralding what he considered to be the opening of a new century, had predicted that [2]"The realms which God has joined shall never man divide," a conceit somewhat liable to the Gladstonian criticism that man cannot join realms which God has divided by oceans. It attests nevertheless to the rise of a tendency to identify an active foreign policy with renewed colonial aspirations, which tendency grew in strength as Napoleon was slowly defeated. Open as their domestic policy was to criticism, the governments of Pitt and Castlereagh and Liverpool at all events handed on some-

1 Gray's Letters from Canada (1809), pp. 76, 370.
2 H. J. Pye's Carmen Seculare (1800).

thing of the old tradition of the uses of empire to practical pioneers of expansion like Lord Durham and Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and finally, almost in our days, a new imperial theory came into being, which revived what was most valuable in the old colonial system, while retaining all that was best in the "laisser faire" reaction of 1783.

CHAPTER XI.

"Hands across the Sea."

The fall of the old colonial system had little influence upon British feelings towards America. Sentiment had never animated imperial policy before the Revolution, and consequently in England, there had been little brotherly love to destroy. When the next generation sprang up, believing in the new principle of nationality, and accustomed in a measure at least to the liberal ideal of cosmopolitanism, the heat of the American war was soon forgotten. Two causes helped to create a novel affection for the revolted colonists. In the first place, trade increased between the two peoples to an extent amazing to former adherents of the older economic school, and for several years after the beginning of the nineteenth century British exports to the United States were [1]twice or thrice as valuable as United States exports to Great Britain. The Americans found England [2]a cheaper and better market than France, and were [3]excellent customers for half a century. [4]The export of woollen goods rose with a bound after 1783 while [5]our cotton trade became for the first time a wonder to the world. [6]The scarcity of labour still made the cost of production in the States comparatively

1 Hugh Gray's Letters from Canada (1809), pp. 380–1.
2 Speeches of Mr. Smith of S. Carolina (1794), pp. 31–2; Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 65–6.
3 Beawes' Lex Mercatoria, ii. 88.
4 Question of Wool truly Stated (1788), p. 3.
5 Crisis in Calico and Muslin Manufacture Explained (1788), p. 5.
6 Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 367.

high. Indeed [1]it was suggested that the economic independence of America had lost them the former bounties, without enabling them to manufacture for themselves, and that the 4th of July should be treated as a [2]"day of repentence." Of course, such doubts soon passed away along with American free trade; even as early as [3]1788 the progress of the States gave rise to a disavowal of Lord Sheffield's optimism, but its prevalence at the time made Britons more inclined to forget the past bloodshed.

Secondly, the close connection between the Whig party and the American revolutionaries had had at all events one abiding advantage. It had lessened the impression that the struggle was international. It had preserved to some extent the idea of racial affinity between leaders of thought on both sides of the Atlantic. At the time of his victory at Saratoga, [4]Gates sent a message of friendship to an English Whig. Franklin was devoted to [5]"our dear good friend, Doctor Price," and while hating the government, he never wavered in his sympathy with its opponents. [6]"But to be serious my dear old friend," he wrote to Joseph Priestley in 1782, "I love you as much as ever, and I love all the honest souls that meet at the London Coffee-House. . . . I long to see them and you once more, and I labor for peace with more earnestness that I may again be happy in your sweet society." [7]Granville Sharp received honorary degrees from no less than three American universities in 1787. For several generations, the Whigs looked on the States as an ideal republic where the poor man

1 Ramsay's Hist. Am. Rev., ii. 339.
2 Isaac Weld's Travels in N. America (1799), p. 156.
3 Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. xi.
4 Chatham Correspondence, iv. 489.
5 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 347.
6 *ibid*, iii. 61.
7 Hoare's Memoirs of G. Sharp (1820), p. 253.

could live in happiness and plenty, unhampered by peers and prelates.

Hence in England, large classes of men were free from the resentment so often lingering after a great war. They had not tasted of the bitter fruit of campaigns upon their own countryside, and they sank old jealousies in reviving brisk trade with America and in facing the entirely fresh problems presented by the French Revolution. [1]Burke and [2]Romilly both expected to see the natural alliance between England and the United States succeed the unnatural connection between the latter and France. In 1793 [3]Talleyrand expressed the same opinion. [4] An English writer pointed out that such an alliance would be founded on the highest principles, for if old foes like England and France could join in the commercial treaty of 1787 [5] "shall America retain the resentment of a day?" Moreover the new colonial theory of 1783 was of so pacific a nature, that the birth of the idea of nationality and of race in politics might well have stimulated both peoples to friendship. [6]Many Englishmen seem to have been proud of Washington as a compatriot, while [7] Thomas Erskine in his defence of Paine on his trial for seditious libel in 1792 dared to call the Revolution glorious, just and happy.

Some Americans responded to the changed spirit of British imperial policy, like John Jay, who said he [8]"should prefer a connexion with her to a league

1 Burke's Correspondence, iv. 509.
2 Romilly's Memoirs, i. 183.
3 Holland's Foreign Reminiscences (1850), p. 39.
4 Remarks on Travels of Chastellux (1787), p. 73.
5 *ibid*, p. 75.
6 Sparks' Washington, xi. 210; Correspondence of H. Walpole and Mann, ii. 222.
7 22 State Trials, p. 428.
8 Life of John Jay by his Son (1833), ii. 23.

with any powers on earth," and who looked with something of the new sentimentality on [1] "Old England, which afforded my ancestors an asylum from persecution." He negotiated a treaty between the two countries in 1794, which was ratified by the senate in 1795 in spite of much opposition in the States; while the excesses of the French Revolution gave Britain a new opportunity. The sober and commercial elements of the American people had a profound dread of Jefferson's radical propaganda, and were drawn back to conservative sentiment by the prospect of attacks on property. A very large number of New Englanders, successors of the Federalist party of 1783, deprecated the War of 1812 as between [2]men who ought to feel and love like brethren," and borrowing for the occasion the constitutional theories of their opponents, denied that they were under any legal liability to help the central government in a war of which they disapproved.

Unfortunately, the old colonial system had so dominated the relations between Great Britain and America for two centuries, that its iron had entered into the soul of the United States. Many years had to pass before new conditions could obliterate the recollection of the past. In dealing therefore, with such a subject as British colonial policy in the reigns of George II. and George III., it is quite relevant to examine the legacy which it bequeathed directly to international thought. Policy is judged by its fruits, and the system under which England won North America ended not merely in the loss of thirteen colonies, but in a long period of ill feeling among the people whom she had endeavoured to suppress. The extraordinary bitterness, which prevailed in the United States for some genera-

1 *ibid*, ii. 24.

2 M. Carey's Olive Branch (1815), pp. 255, 313–15, 320–3.

tions after the War of Independence, attests to the total failure of the old colonial system to engender any of the true imperial spirit, that is to say, the appreciation of a common brotherhood among men of the same race all over the world. The Wars of the Roses were forgotten in half a century, and the Cromwellian struggles passed into mere history in 1688, because in each case, conflict had not been preceded by any sense of radical alienation between the great masses of combatants on either side. In the American War, the revolutionaries had a far more personal cause. The old colonial system affected every hearth and home in the colonies, and consequently its downfall in 1783 did not involve an immediate end to the sense of feud in the United States, as it did in Great Britain. For this reason, just as we deem colonial co-operation with the home country in 1899 a test of the newer school of imperial policy, so we are forced to consider the American attitude towards England after 1783 as a factor to be dealt with in estimating the worth of its less fortunate fore-runner.

Throughout the War of Independence, the actual presence of warfare on their own soil, and the feeling that the struggle involved the personal welfare of every individual partisan, inspired Americans with a deeper animosity than that which prevailed in England. With them, the causes of the war and the issues at stake were alike far nearer to the personality of every citizen. Great Britain fought for empire, but America fought for the Americans. Its ardour was more thorough, its hate deeper, its intolerance more bitter. [1]"A Tory has been properly defined to be a traitor in thought but not in deed," wrote Jefferson, and the revolutionaries persecuted the loyalists with relentless zeal. In New York they were stigmatised as enslavers of their

[1] Jefferson's Notes on Virginia (1782), p. 285.

own country, guilty of [1]"felony, murder, and every other act of high treason." Such intemperance struck old believers in the imperial creed of Chatham's wars with amazement. [2]"Good God!" exclaimed an American writer in 1774, "Can we look forward to the ruin of the whole British empire without one relenting thought?" Was the new republican ideal to be built upon fanaticism and mob law? [3]"O rare American freedom!" Many moderate colonists shrank from the burning zeal of the enthusiasts, who alleged that Toryism was [4]"grievous to all honest men," and they feared that "these delectable provinces" would fall [5]"under the harrow of oppressive demagogues." The Irish element in the States had too fresh a recollection of the bad English government in Ireland to abstain from fanning the fire. The earnest recommendation of Congress to the several provincial legislatures at the end of the war to show mercy towards the loyalists was consistently ignored.

Thus the general feeling against Britain in the United States proved that the steps actually leading to the outbreak of the Revolution, had been but of an incidental nature, and that the old colonial system would have led in any event to separation and hate. Franklin was the coolest of men, but his belief in the inherent tyranny of that system made him deny that the two nations would ever feel again the glow of kinship. [6]Priestley tells a story that on the day when Wedderburn insulted Franklin before the Privy Council in 1773 as having stolen

1 Gent. Mag. (1783), p. 884.
2 A Farmer's Free Thoughts on the Proceedings of Congress (1774), p. 6.
3 *ibid*, p. 36.
4 Tyranny Unmasked (1775), p. 5.
5 Candidus' Plain Truth (1776), p. 38.
6 Priestley's Memoirs, p. 454.

Hutchinson's letters, Franklin put aside his suit of spotted Manchester velvet, and never wore it again until the day when American independence was acknowledged. The incident is not without its moral. Franklin would not accept Hartley's suggestion that Great Britain would be for ever [1]"the home" of the Americans, and said that they would never forget [2]"your bloody and insatiable malice and wickedness," words which contrast strikingly with the cheerful optimism of British amity in 1783. When the anniversary of the French alliance was celebrated by Washington's army in the February of that year, the passwords of the day were [3]"America and France," and "United for ever," mottoes little calculated to further England's hold upon American sentiment, and which, in the opinion of [4] Frenchmen, ought to have been followed by an abandonment of Jamaica rum for French brandy. [5] Otis left one of his daughters but five shillings under his will, to punish her for marrying a British officer, while no greater bitterness was ever displayed than that which Samuel Quincey's family expressed when he espoused the loyalist cause. Jefferson and the democratic party, burning with the anti-monarchical fanaticism engendered by the French Revolution, tried to make hatred of England a cardinal tenet of American patriotism, and delighted to vex [6]"the proudest nation on earth."

Three causes contributed to strengthen this lamentable legacy of the abandoned colonial theory. In the first place, the actual presence of war made it harder for

1 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 412.
2 *ibid*, ii. 499.
3 Sparks' Washington, viii. 381.
4 Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 398.
5 Tudor's Otis (1823), p. 483.
6 Jefferson's Memoirs (1829), i. 153.

Americans to forget. [1]Paine said that the sight of smoking homesteads and schools would live for ever in the memories of the youngest. When General von Riedesel's wife asked an American woman for food, she was scolded in return, [2]"Why have you come from your own land to kill us and drive us out of hearth and home?" John Adams always said that a nation fighting, like his own, [3]"for her altars and firesides," could never be wholly conquered, and that such a struggle was of necessity impressed for ever upon her imagination.

Secondly, the history of the United States must necessarily start with the dramatic annals of the War of Independence, and therefore those annals must always loom more largely upon the thought of the young republic than upon that of Great Britain. To Englishmen the war would never be more than an incident in a long history; to Americans it would be never less than a national epic. The consequent tendency to emphasise the country's wrongs, to exalt the "patriot" heroes, to depict the constitutions and declarations of the revolutionary period as monuments of creative genius, and to darken the offences, of which the British government was guilty, would necessarily be great. Paine justly argued that the children of that generation in America would be England's foes for all time under the instruction that they would inevitably receive. [4]Washington hated the idea of sending children to Europe for their education, and thus prevented the softening influence of more tolerant schools. One-sided books like Paine's "Common Sense" had [5]prodigious

1 Paine's Letter to Raynal (1782), p. 63.
2 Riedesel Briefe und Berichte , p. 189.
3 Adams' Twenty-one Letters, pp. 19, 31.
4 Sparks' Washington, xii. 3.
5 Bigelow's Franklin, iii. 374.

effects upon American thought. The absence of any real wish in England to inflict injustice upon her colonies was always ignored. It was assumed that acts which seemed oppressive raised necessarily the imputation of a "mens rea," and fallacies in British theory were treated as crimes in fact.

The third motive power in stimulating this hostility among Americans was derived from the effect produced by the contemptuous disregard for their capacity under the old colonial system. In Great Britain the delusion that the Yankees were cowards had been the folly of a day. In America it was taken bitterly to heart, and national vanity prompted much of the self-assertion, which has since hampered the hopes of the enlightened to join "hands across the sea." So large a number of the vaunts of that day justified themselves afterwards by passing into sober fact, that this trait even now needs mitigation. While [1]Raynal, in view of the extreme depression in American finance at the close of the war expressed the doubt whether ten millions of people could ever find subsistence in the United States, Americans already boasted of the future glories of their republic, and looked forward to constituting an immense agricultural community. [2]Otis had predicted that in a century, its population would be greater than that of the British Isles; [3] Chauncey thought that this event would come to pass in twenty-five years. [4] Burgh and [5]Jefferson held that its population would double every twenty years; [6]Franklin every twenty-five. The Americans

1 Raynal's Revolution in America (1781), p. 179.
2 Otis' Vindication of the Brit. Colonies, p. 20.
3 J. Adams' Works (ed. 1850), ii. 305.
4 Burgh's Political Disquisitions (1774), ii. 287.
5 Tucker's Jefferson (1837), i. 229.
6 Cobbett's Parl. Hist., xvi. 141.

married more generally and at a younger age than Britons at home, and [1]possibly lived longer. Truly, as [2]Washington told Lauzun, the rising generation in the colonies formed an unconquerable army. [3] Franklin said that they would one day rule the whole of North America, and [4] Galloway, though a loyalist, anticipated their sway over Mexico and Brazil, Chili and Peru. The French traveller Brissot de Warville flattered such dreamers by prophesying [5]the construction of a Nicaragua canal, and the rise of a great pastoral state untainted by the lures of commerce. [6] "America," he said, "will never have enormous cities like London and Paris." These hopes made many Americans affect to treat every pretension of other countries as a slur on their own national merits, and Sir Samuel Romilly, himself a great believer in their future, had to reflect upon [7] "the American mania of pretending to philosophize upon everything, and to treat all nations but his own with contempt." The Americans were too prone to Franklin's habit of being unable to exalt [8]"our rising country" except at the expense of "this old rotten state" of England. Their morbid sensitiveness to any conduct, which might conceivably be due to want of appreciation of American greatness, can be reasonably attributed to the tendency under the old colonial system to regard colonists as but a conquered race, and of inferior metal. This

1 Bossu's Travels (1771), p. 406; Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 302; but see Kalm Travels (1772), i. 81, Robin and Paw.

2 Lauzun's Memoirs, ii. 224.

3 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 449.

4 Cool Thoughts on the Consequences of Am. Independence (1780), p. 13.

5 Brissot's Travels in U.S.A. in 1788 (1794), p. 407.

6 *ibid*, p. 415.

7 Romilly's Memoirs, ii. 37-8.

8 Bigelow's Franklin, ii. 250.

delusion irritated the revolutionaries above all other charges, and made Washington insist upon the necessity of keeping [1]"an American character," independent of the favour of any European state.

Upon such grounds therefore as have been here set forth, we are obliged to condemn the old colonial system as a working policy. It is true that some of its principles can still be cherished, and that it inspired sufficient interest and ambition in the minds of Englishmen to win North America for Great Britain, and to give the nation that gift of expansion, upon which the future of the Anglo-Saxon race depends. To that extent it was indeed a fruitful factor in our history, but it had no further potentialities, and its downfall led to a long estrangement, which was a worse result than loss of mere territory. Consolation (if any) can only lie in the lessons taught by its disastrous end.

[1] Sparks' Washington, xi. 83; xii. 392.

CHAPTER XII.

Lessons of the American Revolution.

During the last century, the lessons taught by the downfall of the old colonial system have been stated in various manners according to the imperial theory of the hour. To one generation the chief inference to be deduced from the loss of our first American colonies was the intrinsic futility of our empire; to another, it has been the immense importance of preserving it. One age has regarded "laisser faire" as the best agent to effect separation; another as the best agent of unity. The modern liability to be excluded forcibly by tariffs from commerce with foreign possessions has led recently to an appreciation by all the great powers of the virtues of the national flag as a safeguard of trade, and this has combined with political influences at work in England since Disraeli's accession to power in 1874 to foster the imperialist theory at the expense of quietism. The experiences of Australia and New Zealand have refuted the fallacy that democracy is incompatible with empire, while the great work which Britons have accomplished throughout the world in furthering the prosperity and contentment of subject peoples has made the nation realise the vast moral advantages arising from the exercise of the governing faculty. Meanwhile it is clear that the intense commercial jealousy and monopolist greed, which so alienated colonies under the old system, have quite disappeared from modern British policy, except perhaps in India, which is no colony at all. The tendency is rather in the direction

of giving them advantages out of proportion to their natural weight and to the scanty sacrifices they make for the support of the common empire. A most painstaking observer has laid down that the drift of the empire is to-day towards alliance not [1]federation, towards a phase of friendly contract not towards the status of the old-time loyalty. So far then, one obvious lesson of the American Revolution has been taken to heart. Since Lord North's Act of 1778 it has been illegal to impose direct taxation upon the colonies from Westminster, and few statesmen would dream of meddling in their internal affairs. In this sense, the suggested interference of Australian and of some English politicians with the internal policy of the executive government in the Transvaal colony would be pure reaction. With regard to the self-governing colonies, the tendency is to make their independence merely nominal. Her experiences in 1871 and 1903 are not calculated to induce Canada to follow any future projects of arbitration that emanate from Downing Street, and this idea of limiting British interference to the Crown's power of appointing governors, and to the unimpressive and [2]unpopular power of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to hear appeals from colonial courts in certain cases, can be clearly traced to the general perception of one of the morals of the War of Independence. Its wisdom is as palpable as that of the larger lesson that love of freedom is the greatest moral force in political life.

Is there nothing more to be learnt than such now commonplace characteristics of practical politics? Those who aim at making history a science aspire to dazzle the world with brilliant deductions from any group of correlative facts, and it might well be thought disappointing

1 R. Jebb's Studies in Colonial Nationalism (1905), p. viii.
2 *ibid*, pp. 80–1, 302–3.

to have to content ourselves with such a plain and currently accepted idea as that of colonial internal independence; or are historical lessons of a wider sort like legal maxims, mere 'minims' in practice, often misleading and never conclusive?

In reality, history is very far from being an exact science, and no one who sifts its evidence judiciously will deem postulates of greater weight than actual phenomena. Admitting however, the many special circumstances of the case of the American War of Independence, it does seem possible to construct some narrower doctrine than the general principle that it is wrong to shackle fellow citizens over sea, from the facts attendant to the downfall of the eighteenth century theory of colonial government. Its failure was primarily due to the absence of any community of interests between the Mother Country and her colonies. There were still some sentimental ties between them in 1763, and men like Franklin and Pownall were devoted to the imperial ideal. The former said that the colonies could be led by a mere thread, and both made proposals to establish a closer union. Certainly in America, there was a true sense of affinity to Great Britain. It was nevertheless too weak to maintain the love of the common empire when the conquest of Canada broke the only bond of positive advantage which knit the colonists to England. Kindred blood and common ideas can bind two peoples together as strongly as links of iron, but each must feel that its material privileges are associated with the union. Such was not the case under our old colonial system, and hence its failure. By ignoring the lesson of its unsuccess, Spain lost her trans-Atlantic possessions, and Portugal, Brazil. We have now to show that membership of the British empire conduces to the material good of Canada and Australia, and requires from each a consideration

more tangible than an airy claim to loyalty. Really strong material ties of union accrue to-day from the influence of the British connection in lightening the incidence of the burden of self-defence, in providing security against foreign aggression, and in enabling a colony to obtain the loan of capital at more moderate rates of interest than independent countries of the same standing. But for such advantages, no such loose aggregation of states as our own could outlive the disintegrating influences of climate and distance. If compact federation is impossible, we can secure at all events a working partnership between sympathetic and independent peoples. "Civis Romanus sum" becomes an empty catchword when citizenship is barren. Man will not live politically on the principle of nationality alone.

In a secondary degree, we can also infer that community of feeling is essential to the maintenance of an empire. Alone, it will not secure its continuance, but it is still a vital ingredient. Belief in the higher character of British ideals and the natural antagonism of United States patriotism keep Canada *prima facie* loyal, and without such national sentiment union may become a mere question of calculating self-interest. The idea of racial unity was undiscovered in the eighteenth century, when Germany and Italy were still but geographical expressions. Pitt's most eager partisans never used the phrase "Anglo-Saxon," and we have seen how the Americans were treated habitually as an absolutely alien people. We have learnt now that the tie of blood, however delusive historically, is the most powerful political fiction in the world. In the chief movements of later-day history, it has been treated as a rallying point, and this alleged natural bond has proved a stronger keystone of empire than all the artifices of diplomacy. Modern science has aided its capacity to join people who

are divided by seas, by facilitating inter-communication, and every step towards closer intimacy is good. It is easy to imagine how Chatham would have delighted in Rhodes's dream of grafting the memories of Oxford upon the youth of the colonies, and of emphasising the historical identity of the "island race." It is clearly necessary that the settler in lands beyond the sea must be able to glory in the name of Briton in common with his brothers in the Mother Country, and in a far wider and more generous manner than did George III. British statesmanship has to respect the sensibilities as well as the material interests of outlying portions of the empire, and if the necessary unity of ideals be thus encouraged, imperial defence will rest ultimately upon a sounder basis than the system which broke down in the American Revolution.

It is not within the historian's province to apply these two principles to later-day controversy. Academics end and pure politics begin when we raise the practical questions of the hour. The use of history is simply to furnish the records of past experience for present use, and in that capacity its value is genuine though limited. One who understands the growth of the empire, and who comes also in contact with the practical side of life, is in the position of an expert witness in political controversy; he has materials analogous to the latter's information, even if he has perhaps something of his bias. Yet some historical lessons like those indicated above stand beyond the sphere of partisanship. For instance, the current fiscal dispute raises the issue whether or no the existing relations between Great Britain and her colonies provide sufficient community of interest and sentiment to enable the empire to endure the stress of conflicting aims and principles without the additional tie of preferential tariffs, but as a nation of optimists we may perhaps be justified in assuming

that the best adherents of both the affirmative and negative answers have accepted the lesson of 1783, as to the urgent necessity of such a community. So long as Parliament and Press are not drowned by parochialism, not overwhelmed by the growing pressure of domestic problems, the British people will not drop back into mid-Victorian indifference. For a day at least, it has passed out of the "laisser faire" delusion into a clearer appreciation of the uses of colonisation. Thus the old colonial system was not wholly planned in vain, for it bequeathed a great racial objective to later-day British politics. The deeds of our empire-builders were no mere essays in powers, and the rise of Greater Britain has been part of God's "increasing purpose."

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