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THE OPEN COURT

A

MONTHLY MAGAZINE

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The Open Court

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the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea.

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SALUTATORY.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN THE OLD SPIRIT, but in a new garb, in the shape of a monthly instead of a weekly, *The Open Court* enters upon the eleventh anniversary of its career, and both publisher and editor hope that the change will serve to extend its circulation and carry the message which it announces to the world, farther than before.

The message of *The Open Court*, to state it briefly, is that science is a religious revelation; science is the unfoldment of the spirit, and its truths (if they be genuine scientific truths) are holy. If God ever speaks to his creatures he speaks to them in the truths that they have learned from their experience, and when truths are systematised and formulated with exactness, which is the province of science, they do not become less divine, but more divine. Therefore the application of scientific exactness to the various problems of religion is a religious *duty* which, if obeyed, may destroy some errors that have become dear to us, but will in the end unflinchingly lead to the most important religious reform.

If science is applicable anywhere it is applicable with all the rigidity of the most searching critique to the problems of the destiny of man, his origin, and his future. What would be the use of science if it were not applicable to religion? Of what profit are the various conveniences of life and the material advance of the age if our soul is to be fed on the husks of tradition, which, unless we re-transform them and make them our own, are nothing but the leavings of the religious aspirations of previous periods.

Science is the light of life; shall we not use it? Science is the bread of the spirit; he who does not partake of its soul-nourishing gifts will spiritually die of starvation.

Science should not be conceived as forming any contradictory

contrast to religion. Woe to that religion which ignores or even antagonises science! It is science that leads to new truths and reveals to us more and more of the wonders of the universe. Thus if Christ's promise of the comforter¹ is being fulfilled at all it is fulfilled in the evolution of science.

If science is the Holy Spirit, if the truths of science are religious revelations, how can religious people remain deaf to the voice of science? It is a sad fact, but it is true, that there are many Christians who look upon science as an enemy to their religion and harden their hearts against the results of scientific inquiry because it collides with their conceptions of God and of Christianity. The consequence of such a condition is the doom of degeneration. Unintellectuality (especially if it be a wilful hostility to intellectual progress) is as much a sin as immorality; error is as much a perversion of the soul as criminality. Error and stupidity are punished with no less severity, nay, with more severity, than trespasses against the Ten Commandments. Indeed, the sin against the spirit, as expressly stated in the Scriptures, cannot be forgiven, and those who persist in it will be blotted out from the pages of the book of life.

Considering the religious importance of science, we call a recognition of the stern rigidity of scientific truth and of its indispensableness in all the domains of life, in the workshop as well as in the social relations of man to man, The Religion of Science.

The Religion of Science is not a new religion, but simply a new interpretation of the old religions. Nor is it a new movement in the sense that it introduces a new motive into our religious and moral life; it is simply a revised statement of the old faith, rendering that clear which from the beginning of the religious evolution in the history of mankind lay always at the bottom of man's holiest aspirations. Therefore we claim that the Religion of Science does not come to destroy, but to fulfil.

The Religion of Science combines in a consistent system the boldest radicalism with the most deliberate conservatism. It proposes to purify religion of the dross of error, but it would not reject the gold. It would retain of the old religions all that is true and good, and would add to the old truths a new significance by throwing upon them the bright light of modern science, which allows a clearer vision and gives a deeper insight than has heretofore been possible.

The Science of Religion (that is to say, a scientific treatment

¹ "When the spirit of truth is come he will guide you into all truth." St. John, 17, 13.

of the religious problems) leads to the Religion of Science, which is briefly the trust in truth ; and the Religion of Science is a principle which, wherever recognised, will reconcile not only religion with science, but also the various religions with one another ; for on the basis of this principle a comparison is rendered possible, and this comparison will lead to a final settlement of the controversies of religions with the same necessity as the controversies between various schools of scientific theories are decided, not by any authoritative dictum, but by weight of evidence, by experiment, by argument, by proof.

* * *

The Open Court, with its message of the Religion of Science, has been criticised by representatives of both extreme parties. Dogmatists of the old school condemn science as profane, and claim that it is untrustworthy as a guide in matters of morality and religion, while the so-called freethinkers denounce our conservatism of retaining the words God, soul, and immortality as pouring new wine into old bottles. We reply to the latter, to the freethinkers, that the various terms of religion originated in response to definite needs and that their significance can be traced in the realities of life. If we abolish the traditional terms we should have to invent new terms. It will therefore be wiser to retain the old names and define their meaning with more exactness, always replacing hypothetical assumptions as much as possible by a definite description of facts. But to the former, the dogmatists, we say if Science and the Religion of Science "are the work of men, it will come to naught ; but if this council and this work be of God, ye cannot overthrow it."

In propounding the Religion of Science, *The Open Court* has never identified itself with any party within or without the various churches ; it has kept aloof from both the liberals and the conservatives, and has delivered its message independently and fearlessly, neither for the love of nor in spite of any one ; but in doing so it has gained friends in all countries of the world, among the ranks of all churches, among the unchurched, and even among the devotees of various non-christian religions.

The Open Court is, in certain respects, at variance with both the liberals and the conservatives. It is dissatisfied with the conservatives because they are not truly conservative, and with the liberals because they are not truly liberal.

If a father wishes to preserve his children, he educates them and gives them all the chances of a mental and moral growth. For

evolution is the law of life, and there is no better preservative than growth. As soon as the conservatives, for the sake of preserving certain truths or convictions or institutions, shut out progress and keep intellectual life in a stagnant condition, they cease to be truly conservative and virtually promote degeneration. Therefore he who is truly conservative is progressive; he believes in growth and is willing to learn new truths. The Religion of Science, for the sake of conserving the advances already made, must encourage progress, and, in doing so, will be more conservative than the ultra-conservatives, whose conservatism practically consists in retrogression.

The Open Court is conservative, but not stationary or reactionary; it proposes to utilise the advances made in the past for further progress, and thus combines conservatism with progressiveness.

The word "liberal" has two meanings. Firstly, when spelled with a small initial, it denotes a moral attitude. Liberal is he who shows a willingness patiently to listen to views which differ from his own and who weighs every opinion impartially and without resorting either to violence or to harsh words. Secondly, when capitalised, Liberal is used as a party-name to designate those who have cut themselves loose from authority of some kind. In this sense "Liberalism" denotes the surrender of traditions, doctrines, or old allegiances; and the more a man has given up of his beliefs, the more Liberal he is accounted. Thus Liberalism as a party name has come to stand for negativism, and liberal religion is practically used in the sense of looseness of religious conviction.

The Open Court means to be liberal in the first sense; but cannot properly be called "Liberal" in the second sense. Instead of surrendering the old religious allegiance to what in theological language is called God, it proposes to make this allegiance sterner and more earnest than ever. God is the God of truth, or he is not God at all. The various liberal movements of our age not only very frequently pursue an extremely narrow-minded policy, but they also exhibit reactionary tendencies which more than the dogmatism of the conservatives blockade the progress of mankind. This may be surprising news to many, but it is true, nevertheless, and we are ready to explain why it is true.

* * *

Liberals are negative spirits, who are characterised by a readiness to discard traditions of all kinds; they attempt to reject the errors of the past, but in the vain hope of attaining infallibility themselves, they reject also the aspiration of having definite opin-

ions. This tendency has bred the main disease of our age—agnosticism.

Agnosticism is negativism with a vengeance, for agnosticism (as defined by its two greatest representatives Professor Huxley and Mr. Spencer) is that doctrine which declares that the main problems of philosophy, the problems of the existence of God, the nature of the soul with its immortality, and the basis of ethics are insoluble; in a word, agnosticism identifies the unknown with the unknowable and makes of the most important questions on which the regulation of man's conduct in life depends, absolute mysteries. Such a philosophy is a more effectual check on religious and scientific progress than the methods employed by the Inquisition. The Inquisition had the power to put a few independent thinkers on the rack, and for a time gagged the others; but agnosticism attempts to poison the minds of whole generations: it makes people drowsy and indifferent; it makes them despair of the possibility of finding the right solution, and induces them to abandon the search for truth.

In religion, the Liberals show a strong inclination to reject the ritual and the doctrines of the past. They object to the symbolism of the Church, but also command advancing thought to halt before their negativism. Thus, the founder of the Societies for Ethical Culture dispenses with ritual of any kind, he no longer uses the word God, but he also claims that science and philosophy cannot teach ethics; indeed, he is especially severe in denouncing the endeavor of founding ethics upon science, and he loves to dwell on the mysticism of the ought, which, according to him, does not develop naturally, but comes to us from spheres transcendental. His Liberalism carried him so far that he was accused of atheism, yet he retains the philosophical error of mysticism which is the root of innumerable superstitions. When he left the synagogue there were many rabbis remaining in their old vocation who were more progressive and philosophically further advanced than he, but they being more liberal as to ceremonies, felt no compunction in preaching in the synagogues and making use of the traditional phraseology.

A strange superstition of modern Liberalism is to spell energy with a capital E and speak of it in terms of awe and reverence. What is there venerable in energy that it should take the place of God? Energy is an abstraction of a high order, it is a term of very wide but very simple circumscription. Energy is capacity for work, either by reason of position or actual motion. The falling of the

stone, the power of a cataract, the tension of a spring—all these are instances of energy, and all energy is measurable in footpounds. Energy becomes venerable only when it appears as moral purpose, that is to say, when it assumes that special form wherein it is combined with consciousness and directed by a right conception of the world. Energy is divine only when it appears as a will guided by the truth; when it is an incarnation of duty bound to fulfil its mission in life.

The same that has been said of energy applies to the deification of matter.

Less crude, but not less unphilosophical, is the deification of the First Cause, spelt with two capitals to do it reverence. While energy and matter are at least ideas possessing reality, a first cause is as much a self contradiction as a final effect. Every effect has its cause, and every cause its effect, every effect being the cause of the next following effect. By cause we understand that change in a given condition of things which introduces a new arrangement of its parts. The first cause in a longer chain of causes and effects has not the slightest higher dignity than any subsequent cause. The first cause in the creation of our solar system may, according to the Kant-Laplace theory, have been a disturbance of the distribution of nebular substance, resulting of necessity in a rotation of its mass. Yet those who use the term do not mean the first cause in the sense of the incipient motion of the evolutionary process of our world-system, but the decision of God to create the world. Granted that God, like a master mechanic, had said to himself: "Let us create the heavens," his resolution would have been the product of a previous deliberation, and certainly he must have existed before, and if he existed he must have been active, which means that there was in God's being a series of causes and effects prior to the first cause of the world's existence. There is no need of entering into further explanations of the self-contradictions of the notion of a "first cause," which originates through a confusion of the ideas "cause" and "*raison d'être*;"¹ but this much may be added, that the fallacy in question is the product of a materialistic view of causation, which regards a chain of causes and effects not as transformations, but as a series of objects following one another like the cars of a railroad train. A philosopher like David Hume, who adopted this conception of causation, is consistently driven to scepticism, or, as we now would say, agnosticism, which means a bankruptcy of philosophy and science.

¹ For details see *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 79-109; and *Primer of Philosophy*, pp. 137-172.

The phrase First Cause was first used by Liberals who sought for a convenient word which might take the place of the term God ; but nowadays the word is used even in prayer.

The Infinite, the Eternal Energy, the First Cause, are mere idols, but altars are built to them because they produce an astounding confusion in the minds of their worshippers.

Mankind judges too much from externalities. Religion to the masses is identified with the observance of days, of pulpit-slang, of dressing in special vestments. But the main thing which is the underlying conception and interpretation of all these things, the philosophy of religion, is scarcely ever alluded to ; and yet it is the soul of it, on which everything depends.

The same religion, in fact the same sectarian formulation of a religion may differ very much according as it is interpreted in the light of different philosophies. It may, under the guidance of a right interpretation, produce such noble men, martyrs, heroes, and conquerors, as were the Huguenots, who, when driven from their homes, arrived in foreign lands in abject poverty. Yet how quickly did they recover their loss ! What blessings did they spread by the example of their industry and moral earnestness ! And wherever they went they prospered and were respected and beloved by all with whom they had any dealings. But the same Calvinism, with the same confession of faith, the same sturdiness of purpose and sternness of determination, could under the sway of another philosophical interpretation (after the precedent of their leader) kindle the faggots and burn witches as well as dissenters !

Let us heed externalities only in so far as they directly and unequivocally express a definite interpretation of essentials ; otherwise, let us always go down to the significance of the doctrines. And it is strange that to discard established rituals or make innovations in the externalities of a religion is exceedingly difficult, but to introduce a new conception of both the old ceremonies and old doctrines is comparatively easy. The reason is here again that the masses being incapable of comprehending the philosophy of a religion, judge from externalities and no one would take offence at the most radical Church reform, if only the clergyman would don the same gown and preserve the old liturgy.

* * *

A prominent clergyman of the Church of England¹ declared that while the Reformation of the sixteenth century had been a moral reform, the present need of the times was above all an intel-

¹Rev. Dr. Haweis in an article published some time ago in *The Contemporary Review*.

lectual reform of the Church. This is very true, and what can the desire for an intellectual reform mean otherwise than a longing for the recognition of those principles which we define as the Religion of Science. Yet in spite of the great importance of emphasising the intellectual aspects of religion, our Liberals as a rule urge people to limit religion to practical issues to the neglect of theoretical questions. They drop theology and preach love, without being aware that love, be it ever so actively applied in practical life, without the intellectual guidance of theoretical principles, degenerates into sentimentalism. Clergymen who hold the dogma of eternal damnation in abhorrence are apt to pray with great unction. But I for one should find more edification in reading the sermon of a time-honored Presbyterian describing the horrors of Hell so vividly that we fairly smell the burning brimstone, than in listening to the prayer of such liberal pulpiteers, who sugar their theology over with the fictitious sweetness of a divine Father in Heaven. There is at least iron in the mental make-up of the old-fashioned believers. I grant the interpretation of their belief in Hell is out of date, but a new interpretation will find much truth in the dogma, for sin, if persisted in, leads irretrievably to eternal perdition, and no amount of the divinest love is able to prevent it. It is difficult to say how many Presbyterians, if there are any, still retain the literal belief in the lake of fire, as it is so drastically described in the Revelation of St. John; but who can be so blind to the facts of life as to deny that there is in life an unspeakable abyss of sin and of the curses of sin, and that the doctrine of Hell symbolises a very obvious and very important truth? How inconsistent is that kind of liberal religion which literally accepts the eternal bliss of a heaven-locality and ceases to retain its correlate symbol, the doctrine of the doom of error and sin!

* * *

At the latest Liberal Congress held in Indianapolis one of the speakers mentioned as the sources of religion "the awe of the mysterious" and "the sense of absolute dependence." If such were indeed the sources of religion, the scientist whose duty is to explain the mysterious, and the man of independent mind would be excessively irreligious. A religion that does not help us to do away with the mysteries of life and to make us more and more independent, is a false light; and it seems to me that the success of Christianity in former centuries greatly depended upon its having made an important step forward, a step away from the bondage of a religion of

ceremonies, sacrifices, and codified law toward what Luther calls "the glorious liberty of the children of God."

When Christianity made its first appearance in history, it announced itself as the solution of the problem of life, and claimed to ransom, redeem, and liberate mankind. It was Schleiermacher, one of the best liberal theologians, who first pronounced the definition of religion as "the sense of absolute dependence" (*das Gefühl schlechthinniger Abhängigkeit*); and Schopenhauer spoke of Schleiermacher as "a veil-maker."¹ Truly, if liberal theology cannot walk on the path of progress, it would be better to remain with the strict conservatives; for it would not be wise to undo the advance that has actually been made. Otherwise we might tear down with the iconoclasts the whole fabric of religion and have to start the evolution of man from savage life on over again, after the fashion of the unschooled social reformers whose panacea as a rule consists in the abolition of civilisation involving a return to some primitive state of barbarism.

* * *

While the Liberals upon the whole show an aptitude to retain the mistakes of the past, while they ignore or even antagonise the advances that have actually been made, the conservatives in their turn are beginning to imitate the faults of the Liberals. They accept the main errors of Liberalism and parade them before their congregations as a sign of their readiness to progress with the times.

Here are a few instances.

The principle of agnosticism, which was invented for the purpose of keeping the claims of dogmatism in check, is now frequently pronounced from pulpits of all descriptions. The phrase, "The finite mind cannot grasp the infinite," wrong and nonsensical though it be, is repeated *ad nauseam*. The phrase is used only by unclear thinkers, by men who may be very learned but who know nothing of exact logic and less (if that be possible) of mathematics. The infinite is by no means anything incomprehensible, indeed it is less incomprehensible than the finite, for the infinite is a simpler idea than the finite. It is true that God, the power that constitutes the order of the world and whose sway is the highest law of ethics, is infinite in his various dispensations; but for that

¹ While criticising Schleiermacher's definition of Religion, I feel urged to say that I am not blind to the many noble thoughts which he has uttered in his sermons, especially his monologues on religion.

reason the quality of infinitude is not any more divine than the limitations which give definiteness to concrete things and events.

The infinite is a quality involving an unlimited continuation or the capacity of an unchecked progress, or inexhaustible applications and potentialities; it is a condition, but never a complete and concrete thing. Of course, it is a mistake to think of the unfinished as finished, of the incomplete as complete, of that which is in a state of becoming as rigid being, of that which moves as being at rest, of that which lives and develops as absolutely stable; but those who try to conceive of the infinite as a finite object are bewildered; and in their confusion they imagine that infinitude must be something incomprehensible.

The infinite as such is not God. Man, too, is infinite, for the potentialities of every soul are unlimited and illimitable. Nay, things less sacred are infinite; space is infinite; time is infinite, or, as we commonly express it, eternal; $\frac{1}{6}$ is infinitely large; $\frac{9}{1}$ is infinitely small; and every mathematical line is infinite. Is there any mystery in infinitude? Is there any holiness in it? Is the notion of the infinite an idea of moral importance? If it were, we should write that pretzel-like emblem (∞), which is the exactest expression of the infinite, upon the altar of the church of the future and bow down and worship it.

The interpretation of the traditional doctrines has slowly and almost imperceptibly been changed, but we find that at the same time the aspiration after catholicity and orthodoxy is being abandoned. How often is the "spirit of orthodoxy" denounced on the ground that orthodoxy is wrong in principle, which in other words means that truth is unknowable.

Orthodoxy means rightness of doctrine, and catholicity means the universality of truth. What we need is not the abolition of orthodoxy, but genuine orthodoxy; not the disavowal of catholicity or a peculiar and particular kind of catholicity, an Anglican, or an Italian, or a Russian catholicity, but true catholicity. We need rightness of doctrine and a truth that is universal.

And how frequently is theology denounced,—not a special theology but theology in general. We hear sometimes voices that come from the conservative ranks clamoring for religion without theology. Theology is blamed for all the vices of heresy trials and witch-prosecution, while religion is extolled as being the sole thing needed. And yet theology is nothing but the old name for "the science of religion." It is now quite fashionable among conservative clergymen to join in the hue and cry of the liberals which is

raised against theology in favor of a mere sentimental practice of devotional religion, and which has contributed a great deal to prevent progress and to keep religious evolution upon a lower plane where the intellect is regarded with suspicion.

What we need in religion is not less theology but more theology; we need a thoroughly scientific investigation of the religious problems. We need a radical and fearless application of the scientific spirit to religion.

The Open Court does not belong to any party, but endeavors to form the third unpartisan party which shall unite the two extremes of the belligerents; and the method to accomplish this end consists, briefly, in taking religion seriously. We should neither take the traditions of the churches simply as a matter of course, nor ever surrender the hope of making headway in the comprehension of the religious problem. We should investigate boldly though reverently. We should seek the truth earnestly, assiduously, and with due discrimination, and cherish the confidence that if we seek in the right spirit with right methods we shall at last find the truth.

The cornerstone of the aspirations of the Religion of Science is a trust in truth. We believe that truth can be found and that the truth, whatever it may be, will be the best, better than the dearest illusions of our fathers or of our own making.

* * *

We should not conclude this review without at least outlining and recapitulating the solution which *The Open Court* offers in reply to the most important religious problems, the problems of duty, of the soul, of immortality, and of God.

We endeavor in religion as well as in other domains of life to dig down to the facts from which our abstractions and generalisations, direct and indirect, are derived and upon which our convictions rest. We propose in the science of religion, as well as in the various branches of natural science, to replace theories by simple statements of fact, which means we reduce our terms to the experiences which they are meant to embody.

We have sense-impressions which cause our soul to respond in various reactions. Sometimes we feel pleasure and at other times come to grief. We encounter resistance and try to overcome it. We love and we hate. We struggle, and, when the hostile forces are too powerful, we combine for a more effectual struggle. There is struggle everywhere, even within us. Our will is not one and the same always; we consist of various impulses which frequently come in conflict, and then the question arises,

Which impulse shall have its way, and which one must be suppressed? The maxim which for such situations recommends itself is our conception of duty; and the conditions which demand an implicit obedience to duty, whether or not its performance be pleasant, is that power which since times immemorial has been called God. God is not anything unknown or unknowable; his manifestations are nearer to us than our heart-beats; he is knowable, and we can with the usual methods of science investigate the character of his dispensation.

Besides the experiences in the domain of our aspirations, we face conditions that affect our sentiments. We grow old and die, and in the face of death we long for self-preservation. We become conscious of the fact that life is a fleeting phenomenon, and we seek for that which constitutes its permanence. We thirst for immortality. And here is the main problem of religion: Will our life extend beyond the grave, and, if it will, what does the life to come consist in?

In order to solve this question we must analyse our soul and trace its origin, for the origin of the soul teaches us its fate after death. Some claim that the problem of the soul is insoluble; but have we not the records of history, can we not study biology and all the other sciences that explain to us man's being? Does science teach that the soul is an ephemeral phenomenon which did not exist yesterday and will be gone to-morrow? Impossible! Here we are a living reality, and can our soul rise from nothingness simply to return again to nothingness? What is the nature of our soul? How is it produced, how does it grow, and what are the moulds in which it is shaped? These problems clamor for a solution that must be based upon a rigid and critical investigation.

The main difficulties that encounter us here are the materialistic and sensualistic tendencies, which naturally present themselves first and commend themselves to superficial inquirers. The materialistic view leads us to think that our self is the sum total of all the material particles of which we consist at a given moment, and the sensualistic view induces us to identify our soul with our feelings or with consciousness, yet both views neglect the paramount importance of form. That which constitutes our self in its peculiar idiosyncrasy is the form of our body and our sentiments. We are not vitality of a certain amount of energy, but a certain kind of vitality, a certain kind of consciousness; we are a combination of definite impulses and aspirations, and that special form which gives a special character to our peculiar constitution is the most essential

part of our existence. Our thoughts are not nerve-activity of a certain quantity, but of a certain quality. The quality of our being is our self; all the rest is of secondary importance. The matter that constitutes our body and the energy that is spent in the physiological functions of the brain are passing through our system in a rapid and constant change. They are going, always going; they become mere waste material at the very moment when they do their work, while that which is characteristic of every action is preserved as a peculiar formation or disposition which is the condition of memory. Our bodily and mental make-up consists of innumerable dispositions which are the product of functions. Our constitution, in all its parts, is memory, partly conscious, partly subconscious, partly unconscious; and the functions which we perform contribute their share in adding to or modifying the present constitution.

This analysis of the soul shows the immortality problem in a new light. While the material frame of every organism is destined to be dissolved in death, its peculiar type continues to exist; its soul reappears in new formations in a process of continuous growth. Bodily forms are transmitted to the new generations mainly by heredity, but the spirit of man has still other and higher avenues left to immortalise itself. Example and education insure the continuance of the most precious features of every life, preserving them in the same way that a thought which we have been thinking once continues to be a part of ourselves as an ever-present memory which, when not specially needed, slumbers in our subconsciousness, but can at the slightest provocation be reawakened to the full blaze of conscious activity. My soul, in its peculiar idiosyncrasy, is the present phase of a definite life-evolution; my soul not only existed before in various previous forms that contributed to shape its present incarnation, but it is ultimately conditioned in the cosmic constitution of the All which moulds its rationality and determines its ideals and moral aspirations. My soul is a more or less perfect incarnation of God. As the past generations, with all the special features that constitute their personal character, continue to exist in the present generation, in the same way the present generation will live on in the future generations, preserving the identity of all that is essential to their being. As the life-experiences of an individual man remain with him in the shape of his memory, increasing the proficiency of his work, so all the lives of the race are living stones that build up the temple of humanity and continue in it, in their personal and distinctive specificness as ever-present pres-

ences which cannot be annihilated. The body may be destroyed, but not the soul. All the representatives of a new idea, of an inconvenient truth, of an unwelcome aspiration, may be burned, but ideas, truths, aspirations, cannot be burned. Our life may be cut short, but the spirit that stirs in us is indestructible. Considered as a combination of material atoms, man is mortal; but that of man which has taken shape in his bodily system, that which constitutes his personality, his soul, is immortal.

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X The problem of the soul stands in a close connexion with the problem of God. God is the creator; God is the eternal mould which forms man's soul. God is the prototype and the norm of all those aspirations which lead to a higher and ever higher unfoldment of life. God is the reality of which truth is the picture and at the same time the standard of righteousness, for righteousness is nothing but truth applied to practical life.

The God of the Religion of Science is not a new God; it is the same God who revealed himself with more or less perfection in all the prophets and moral teachers of the world. The newness of the conception consists only in being a new definition which is more guarded and avoids the contradictions into which some of the old definitions are apt to involve us.

According to the Religion of Science, God is that authoritative presence in the All which enforces a definite moral conduct. God is that something which constitutes the harmony of the laws of nature; God is the intrinsic necessity of mathematics and logic; God above all is what experience teaches us to be the eternal lesson that leads to righteousness, justice, morality. This presence is both immanent and transcendent: it is immanent as the constituent characteristic of the law that pervades the universe; it is transcendent, for it is the condition of any possible cosmic order; and in this sense it is supercosmic and supernatural.

We do not say that God is impersonal, for the word "impersonal" implies the absence of those features which constitute personality; it implies vagueness, indefiniteness, and lack of character. God, however, as he manifests himself in the order of the universe, is very definite. He is not vague, but possesses quite marked qualities. He is such as he is and not different. His being is universal, but not indeterminable. His nature does not consist of indifferent generalities, but exhibits a distinct suchness. Indeed, all suchness in the world, in physical nature as well as in the domain of spirit, depends upon God as here defined, and what is the

personality of man but the incarnation of that cosmic logic which we call reason? God, although not an individual being, is the prototype of personality ; although not a person, thinking thoughts as we do, deliberating, weighing arguments, and coming to a decision, he is yet that which conditions personality ; he possesses all those qualities which, when reflected in animated creatures, adds unto their souls the nobility of God's image, called personality. Therefore we say that God is superpersonal.

* * *

The Religion of Science re-establishes the ideals of orthodoxy and of catholicity upon a new basis ; it introduces into religion the principle of positivism, not of the Comtean positivism, which is agnostic, but of a new positivism which grounds itself upon the rock of facts ; it embodies in its doctrine all the truth that the old religions can teach us and reads their sacred traditions in the light that a scientific world-conception affords. Above all, the Religion of Science emphasises that the doctrines of the churches as formulated in their symbolical books are symbols, and must be understood in their symbolical nature.

Symbols are not lies ; symbols contain truth. Allegories and parables are not falsehoods ; they convey information ; moreover, they can be understood by those who are not as yet prepared to receive the plain truth. Thus, when in the progress of science religious symbols are recognised and known in their symbolical nature, this knowledge will not destroy religion but will cleanse it of error and bring us face to face, more intimately than ever, with that Divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will.

The Religion of Science does not reject tradition, it only refuses to recognise tradition as an ultimate and infallible authority. We must judge the worth of doctrines, dogmas, scriptures, and practices according to their agreement with truth. We must prove all things and choose what is good. We must investigate and hold fast to the truth. In this way only can we ground our faith upon the foundation stone of the eternal logos that constitutes the irreversible law of the moral world-order.

ON TRADE AND USURY.¹

AN ADDRESS BY DOCTOR MARTIN LUTHER.

TRANSLATED BY W. H. CARRUTH.

THE HOLY GOSPEL condemns and points out all sorts of works of darkness, as Saint Paul calls them, Romans, 13, 12; for it is a bright light that shines for all the world, and teaches how evil are the works of the world, and shows the right works which one should do towards God and his neighbor. Wherefore certain among the merchants have aroused themselves and become aware that in their occupation many evil tricks and harmful practices are in use, and that there is fear, it is true here, as Solomon the preacher says, that merchants can scarcely live without sin. Yea, I believe the saying of St. Paul strikes here, I. Timothy, 6, 10:

¹ Martin Luther's address on "Trade and Usury" exhibits on the one hand his implicit faith in the Gospel, and on the other hand an unusual perspicacity and common sense. The way in which he reconciles the one with the other, where apparently they come into conflict, does honor to both his religious earnestness and his insight into the conditions and practical demands of life. Luther accepts Christ's ethics of non-resistance to evil, of lending where there is no hope of recovery, and of giving freely to those in need. These maxims, however, are practicable only in a society where all people are good Christians. If they were indiscriminately applied in this actual world of ours, which must be governed by a strong hand, the bad would soon take advantage of the pious and presume upon their patience. Luther therefore comes to the conclusion that business should be conducted strictly on cash terms with a view to reasonable profits. How little Luther would have people yield to goodnaturedness or sentimentality appears from his condemnation of going surety as a foolish self-indulgence. At the same time he calls attention to the dangers of buying and selling on time; he exposes the methods of fraudulent bankruptcy, of the artificial raising of prices by combinations, of cornering the market, and all other illegitimate business tricks which, it appears, were as common in his days as they are now.

Luther speaks with authority, because he makes himself the spokesman of the nation's conscience; and his sermon is remarkable for the loftiness of his conviction and the purity of his motive. Nevertheless, it contains some serious shortcomings which, even granting the divinity of Luther's mission, are due to the fact that the great reformer was after all a child of his age and limited by the narrow horizon of his time. In many respects he towered high above his contemporaries, but like most German clergymen of the sixteenth century he had a child-like belief in the paternalism of the government, which was expected to right all the wrongs that originated through the vices of bad people.

The pamphlet "On Trade and Usury" appeared in 1524; the same subjects in part had been

“Greed is the root of all evil;” and again, verse 9, “Those who desire to become rich, fall into temptation and the toils, and into many vain and harmful desires which sink people into destruction and damnation.”

Now, although I think that this my epistle will be almost useless, because the mischief has made such inroads and in all matters gained such headway in all lands, and since, moreover, those who understand the Gospel might themselves judge in their own conscience what is right and what is wrong in such simple and plain matters; nevertheless, I am admonished and besought to touch these practices and to bring some of them to daylight (although the mob does not desire it), so that certain of them, though but few, may be rescued from the jaws and gorge of greed. For, indeed, it must be that certain are still to be found among merchants, as well as among other men, who cleave to Christ and would rather be poor with God than rich with the Devil, as the Thirty-seventh Psalm, verse 16, says: “A little with the just is better than great goods with the godless.”

Of Foreign Luxuries.—Well then, for the sake of these we must speak. But now, this cannot be denied, that buying and selling is a necessary thing which we cannot do without, and which can be used in a Christian manner, especially in those points serving need and honor, for thus also the patriarchs sold cattle, wool, butter, milk, and other goods. They are gifts of God which he gives out of the earth and distributes among men. But foreign merchandise which brings from Calicut and India, and the like places wares such as precious silks, and jewels, and spices, which serve only love of show and no useful purpose, and drain the land and people of their money, should not be permitted if we had a government and princes. But I do not propose now to speak of these things; for I think that these things will needs be dropped of themselves finally when our money is all gone, as well as the

treated by Luther in his “Sermon von dem Wucher,” 1519, and again in the [Grosser] “Sermon von dem Wucher,” 1519, as well as in the great address “An den Adel,” 1520.

Our ancestors saw the world divided by a distinct line of demarcation into a material domain and a spiritual domain, and the dealings of the merchant still appeared to Luther to possess no aim beyond the satisfaction of bodily needs and the acquisition of wealth. Luther is not as yet conscious of the worldly importance of the duties of a clergyman and of the spiritual significance of worldly pursuits. This dualism, which began to break down on the day of Luther's marriage, was still lingering with him, being the reason why, upon the whole, the lesson which he taught in his sermon on “Trade and Usury” is still negative, why he lacks a positive appreciation of the nobility of commerce, and why he has not as yet comprehended the moral dignity of business life. Had he seen the solidarity of all human affairs, he would have recognised the spiritual significance of trade as a moral factor in the evolution of civilisation, and would therefrom have derived the positive duties of business men, the final purpose of their calling, and the part it plays in the general economy of society.—*Editor's note.*

display and gluttony ; indeed, no writing or teaching else will do any good until need and poverty force us.

God has brought us Germans to that pitch that we must needs scatter our gold and silver into foreign lands, and make all the world rich and ourselves remain beggars. England should indeed have less gold, if Germany left her her cloth ; and the king of Portugal also would have less, if we left him his spices. Reckon thou how much money is taken out of German land without need or cause in one Frankfort fair, then wilt thou wonder how it comes that there is a penny left in Germany. Frankfort is the silver-and-gold-hole through which everything that sprouts and grows among us, or is coined and stamped, runs out of German lands. If this hole were stopped, we would perchance not hear the complaint how on all hands there is naught but debts and no money, and all provinces and cities are burdened and exhausted by interest-paying.

But let it go ; it is bound to go so ; we Germans must remain Germans ; we do not stop unless we have to. We propose to speak here of the abuses and sins of merchandising in so far as it touches the conscience. How it touches the loss to the pocket, as to that we will let princes and lords have care, if perchance they may do their duty.

Of Unrighteous Prices.—In the first place, the merchants have a common rule among them, it is their motto and bottom of all their practices : I shall sell my ware as dear as I can. This they hold to be their right. But it means making room for greed, and opening the door and window for hell. What else is this than saying : I will give no heed to my neighbor, if only I may have my profit and greed full ; what do I care if it brings my neighbor ten ills at once ? So you see how this motto goes so straight and shamelessly against not only Christian love, but against natural law as well. What good could there be in merchandising ? What should there be in it but sin where such a wrong is the motto and rule ? By this token merchandising can be nothing else than stealing and plundering others of their own.

For on this ground, when the rogue's eye and the greedy-gut mark that any one must have their ware, or that the buyer is poor and needs it, they make their use and gain out of it, they look not at the worth of the ware, nor at the value of their service, nor their risk, but simply at the need and want of their neighbor,—not to help him, but to use these for their own advantage, and put up their ware which they would leave at low price if it were not for the necessity of their neighbor. And so through their greed, the

ware must have a price as much higher as the need of the neighbor is greater, so that one's neighbor's need becomes the mark and price of the ware. Tell me, is that not unchristian and inhuman action? Is not thus the poor man's need sold to him together with the ware? For since he has to pay so much the more for the ware on account of his need, it is the same as though he had to buy his own need. For not the simple ware is sold him as it is in itself, but with the addition and increase wherewith he is distressed. Behold, this and the like abominations must follow when the principle stands: I will sell my wares as dear as I can.

Of Righteous Prices.—It should not be: I will sell my wares as dear as I can or please, but thus: I will sell my wares as dear as I should, or as is right and proper. For thy selling should not be a work that is within thy power and will, without all law and limit, as though thou wert a god, bounden to no one; but because thy selling is a work that thou performest to thy neighbor it should be restrained within such law and conscience that thou mayest practise it without harm or injury to thy neighbor, but heed rather that thou do him no injury which is thy gain. Yea, but where are such merchants? How few should there be of merchants, and how should merchandising fall off, if they would correct this evil law, and put it in just, Christian fashion!

Askest thou then: Well, how dear shall I sell it, then? How shall I strike what is right and just so that I may not overreach my neighbor? Answer: That is indeed framed in no speech or writing; no one has yet undertaken to fix the price of every ware, and raise or lower it. The reason is this: wares are not all alike; one is brought farther than another, one takes more outlay than another, so that in this matter all is uncertain and must remain so, and nothing can be fixed, as little as one can fix one certain city whence they shall be brought, or a set outlay for all, since it may happen that one and the same ware, from one and the same city and brought on the same road, may cost more to-day than a year ago by reason of the road and the weather being worse, or some other chance that causes more outlay than at another time. But it is right and just that a merchant should gain so much on his wares that his outlay, his pains, work, and risk shall be made good. For even a plowboy must have keep and wages for his labor. Who can serve or work for nothing? Thus saith the Gospel: "A laborer is worthy of his hire."

A Commission to Fix Prices.—But, not to pass over the matter in silence, the best and safest way would be that worldly authority

should appoint and ordain in this matter sensible, honest people who might consider all wares and the outlay upon them and set accordingly the mete and limit of their value, so that the merchant might then add his service and get his decent living from it; as indeed in some places the price of wine, fish, bread, and the like is set. But we Germans are too busy with drinking and dancing to give heed to such control and regulation. Since, therefore, such regulation is not to be hoped for, the next best counsel is that we value the wares as the common market gives and takes, or as the custom of the country is to give and take; for in this the saw holds good: "Do as others do, and thou'lt do no folly." What is gained in this wise I hold to be honestly and well earned, especially since there is a danger here that they may lose on the wares and the outlay, and are not likely to gain too richly.

But where the price is not fixed, or where the ware is not current on the market, then must thou set a price. Verily, there is but one doctrine here, it must be laid upon thy conscience that thou examine, and overreach not thy neighbor, and seek not thy greedy gain, but only thy decent living. Certain ones have sought to set metes here, as that one might gain one half on all wares; some, that one might gain one third; and some otherwise. But none of these is safe or sure, unless it were established thus by worldly law and common right; that would be safe. Therefore must thou determine in such traffic to seek naught but a decent living, and consider accordingly outlay, pains, labor, and risk, and then thyself fix, raise, or lower the value of the ware, so that thou mayest have the reward of such pains and labor.

Prices a Matter of Conscience.—But I would not in this matter so dangerously ensnare souls, nor enmesh them so tightly as to say that one must needs set the mete so closely that there should not be a farthing's error. For that is not possible,—that thou shouldst hit so exactly how much thou hast earned by said pains and labor; it is enough that thou endeavor with good conscience to strike the limit right, though the nature of trade is to make this impossible; the saying of the wise man will probably hold true in thy case: "A merchant can scarcely deal without sin, and a tavernkeeper may scarcely keep a righteous mouth." Now, if thou take unknowing, and not intending, a bit too much, let it go into the Pater Noster, where we pray: "Forgive us our debts;" for no man's life is without sin. And besides, it may come that thou take too little for thy pains, and let that make it quit and balance for taking too much.

As, if thou hadst a trade that in the year amounted to one hundred florins, and thou shouldst take over and above the expense and due pay for thy pains, labor, and risk, one, two, or three florins a year, I call that the error in trade that one cannot well avoid, especially spread out thus over a year. Therefore burden not thou thy conscience with it, but bring it to God in the Pater Noster, like any other unavoidable sin that cleaves to us all, and leave it with Him: for to such an error drives thee the need and nature of the work, and not wilfulness and greed; for I am speaking here of goodhearted and godfearing men who would not willingly do wrong. Just as conjugal life cannot be without sin, and yet God tolerates it for the necessity of the work, since it must needs so be.

But how high thy reward is to be set, which thou art to have from such trade and labor, this canst thou not reckon and judge better than by considering the time and the greatness of the labor, and taking comparison with a common day-laborer, who does any other work, see what he earns a day; then reckon how many days thou hast spent in getting and fetching the ware, and how great labor and risk thou hast undergone, for great labor and much risk should have a greater reward. Closer and better and surer one cannot speak nor teach in this matter; let him who is not pleased with this do better. Paul says: "Who keeps the flock shall drink the milk." Who can travel at his own charge and cost? Hast thou better reasons, I am pleased.

Of Surety.—Secondly, there is another common fault which is a current custom not alone among merchants but in all the world, that one becomes surety for another. And though this seems to be no sin but rather a virtue of love, yet it commonly destroys many people, and brings them to irretrievable injury. King Solomon condemns and forbids it repeatedly in his proverbs, saying: "My son, if thou art become surety for thy neighbor and hast bound thy hand to a stranger, if thou art snared with the words of thy mouth and caught with the speech of thy mouth, then do thus, my son, and save thyself, for thou art fallen into the hands of thy neighbor: hasten, urge, and beset thy neighbor; let not thine eyes sleep nor thine eyelids slumber; save thyself as a roe from the hand of the hunter, and as a bird from the hand of the fowler." And again he says: "Take his garment from him that is surety for a stranger, and put him under pledge for the sake of the stranger." And again: "Be not one of them that bind their hands and are surety for debts." Behold how the wise king in the Holy Writ

forbids so sharply and strongly to become surety for others. And the German proverb agrees with him: "Sureties shall be throttled." As though it would say: "It serves the surety right that he is pinched and has to pay, for he acts lightly and foolishly in becoming surety." So that this is the will of Scripture, that no one shall become surety unless he has the means, and is entirely willing to be debtor himself and to pay. Now, it seems strange that such an act should be wicked and condemned. For that it is a foolish act has been felt by many who have had to sweat heaviest for it. Then what is the reason that it is condemned? Let us see.

Suretyship is an act that is too high for a man, and not fit, for it clashes presumptuously with the work of God. For, in the first place, the Scripture forbids us to trust men, and rely on them, but only on God. For human nature is false, vain, deceitful, and fickle, as Scripture says and experience teaches daily. But he who becomes surety trusts a man, and puts body and goods into danger and upon a false and fickle foundation, and hence it serves him right that he fall and fail, and through the danger perish.

Again, he is trusting to himself and making himself a God, for that on which a man relies and trusts, that is his God. But inasmuch as he is safe and certain of his life and goods no moment, still less of him for whom he has become surety, but all is in God's hand alone, whose will is that we shall not have power and control one hair's breadth in the future, or be sure and certain of it one moment, therefore he is acting unchristianly, and it serves him right, because he is pledging and promising that which is not in his power, but in God's hands alone.

Such sureties act just as though they did not need to thank God or consider whether they would be sure of their life and property to-morrow, and even act without the fear of God as if they had life and goods from themselves, and could control them as long as they pleased, which is naught but fruit of irreligion.

Four Fashions of Christian Dealing.—Sayest thou then, How then shall people deal with one another if suretyship is condemned? Many a man would needs fail who might otherwise get ahead. Answer: There are four ways in which to deal in outward Christian fashion with others.

The first is that we let our goods be taken or plundered from us, as Christ teaches: "If any man take thy cloak, let him have also thy coat, and demand it not again from him." Now, this method is despised among merchants, and indeed it has not been regarded and preached as common Christian doctrine, but only as

advice and good suggestion for clerks [clergymen] and perfectionists, who, however, observe it less than any merchant. But real Christians will observe it, for they know that their Father in Heaven has promised them to give them their daily bread each day. And if this were done, not only would numberless abuses be avoided in all bargains, but many would not become merchants, because reason and human nature flee and shun such danger and harm most diligently.

The Second Fashion.—The second fashion is to give for nothing to everybody who needs, as indeed Christ teaches. This, indeed, is a high Christian work, wherefore it is not much esteemed among people, and there would be fewer merchants and less merchandise if this were set going. For he who would do this must indeed lean upon Heaven, and look ever to God's hands and not to his own stores or goods, knowing that God would and will feed him though every cupboard-corner were empty. For he knows that it is true what God said to Joshua: "I will not desert thee nor withdraw my hand from thee." As the saying is: "God has more than He has ever given." But this takes a real Christian, the rarest beast on earth, despised of world and nature.

The Third Fashion.—The third fashion is lending or loaning, so that I give my property, and take it again in case it is brought back, and go without if it is not brought back. For Christ himself had in mind such lending when He said: "So lend, that ye hope nothing from it." That is: Lend and take the risk whether it come back or not; if it come back, take it; if it come not back, regard it as given. So that giving and lending according to the Gospel had no difference but this, that giving takes nothing back, but lending takes back if it comes, yet runs the risk of its being giving. For whoso lends, expecting to receive better or more, is an open and condemned usurer; while not even those act as Christians who lend expecting and demanding back just what they gave, instead of freely risking whether it come back or not.

And as I think, when one considers the course of the world, even this is a high, rare, and Christian work, and would, if it came into practice, powerfully reduce and hold down all sorts of merchandising. For these three methods hold masterfully to the point of not presuming upon the future, and of not relying on oneself or other men, but of clinging to God alone, and in this way everything is paid for in cash, and recalls the word: "If God will, so be it," as James says. For thus we act with people as with those who

may fail us and are uncertain, and give the goods for naught, or risk the loss of what we lend.

Here it will be asked: Who, then, can be saved? and where shall we find Christians? For in this fashion no merchandising would remain on earth; every one would find his own taken or borrowed from him, and the door would be opened to the wicked and lazy gluttons, of whom the world is full, to take everything, cheat and steal. Answer: You see it is as I said, that Christians are rare people on earth. Therefore a stern, hard, civil rule is necessary in the world, that will push and force the wicked not to take and steal, and to give back what they borrow (although a Christian should not demand it back), lest the world become wild, peace vanish, and commerce and common interests be destroyed, which would all come to pass if the world should be ruled according to the Gospel, and the wicked were not driven and forced by laws and constraint to do and permit what is right.

Therefore the highways must be kept clear, peace maintained in the cities, and law administered in the land, and the sword be drawn promptly and unhesitatingly against violators, as St. Paul teaches. For this is God's will that the heathen be checked that they do no wrong, or no wrong without punishment. No one need think that the world can be ruled without blood; the civil sword shall and must be red and bloody, for if the world will and must be wicked, the sword of God is rod and vengeance against it. But of this I have said enough in my book on Civil Authority.

Of Christian Borrowing.—Now, borrowing would be a fine thing if it were done between Christians, for every one would gladly repay what he had borrowed, and the lender would gladly go without if the borrower was unable to repay. For Christians are brothers, and one does not desert another; nor is any one so lazy and shameless as to wish to depend without work on the goods and work of another, and live in idleness on the property of another. But where there are not Christians, there civil authority should drive the borrower to pay; if it does not drive but is lax, then the Christian is to suffer the imposition, as Paul says: "Why do ye not rather suffer wrong?" But let the heathen dun and demand, and act as he will, he cares for nothing because he is a heathen and heeds not the teaching of Christ.

And then thou hast this comfort, that thou art not holden to lend, save what thou hast over and canst spare from thy needs; as Christ says of alms: "What ye have to spare, that give as alms, and all things are clean unto you." Now, if so much were to be

demande of thee that, in case it were not returned, thou must needs perish, and thy necessities could not spare it, then art thou not holden to lend; for most of all thou art holden to furnish the necessities for thy wife, child, and household, and not to take from them what is due them from thee. Therefore is this the best rule: When the borrowing seems to be too much for thee, give rather something for nothing, or lend as much as thou wouldst gladly give, and take the risk even should it be lost. For John the Baptist spake not: "Let him who hath a coat give the same away;" but: "Let him that hath two coats give one to him that hath none, and him that hath food likewise."

The Fourth Fashion.—The fourth fashion is buying and selling, and that with cash, or paying ware with ware. Now let him who would follow this fashion be prepared to depend upon nought in the future, but upon God alone, and to deal with men who err or deceive. Hence this is the best advice: that he who sells give nothing on credit, and accept no security, but take his pay in cash. But if he wishes to give credit, that it be to Christians; otherwise that he take the risk of its being lost, and give credit no further than he would otherwise give and his necessities will permit; or, where civil law and authority will not help him to his own, that he call it lost, and take care not to become surety for any one, but rather give what he can. That would indeed be a real Christian merchant whom God would not desert because he trusts Him so fairly and deals so light-heartedly with his uncertain neighbor and takes the risk.

Of Merchandising.—Now if suretyship were not in the world, and free gospel lending were in vogue, and only cash or ready wares current in trade, the greatest and most harmful dangers, errors and weaknesses were out of merchandising, and it would be easy to be a merchant, and other sinful devices could be checked the easier. For if such suretyship and guaranteed lending were not, many a one would needs remain on the level and be content with moderate living who, as it is, depends on lending and suretyship, and strives day and night to climb the height; whence also it is that everybody wishes to become a merchant and grow rich. And thence follow of necessity such swindling, wicked tricks and wiles as now are found in troops among merchants, so that I have already despaired of its ever being corrected, but it has been so overladen with wickedness and deceit, that it cannot endure long, and must fall of itself.

Hereby I wish to give to everybody a brief warning and in-

struction in this great-tangled, far-reaching business of merchandising. For if it were to be allowed to go and remain so that every one might sell his wares as dear as he could, and lending and borrowing for a consideration, and suretyship were conceded to be right, and yet we were to give counsel as to how any one is to be a Christian withal and keep a good and sound conscience, it were as much as if one would advise and teach how wrong could be right, how evil could be good, and how one could live and act according to Holy Writ and at the same time against Holy Writ. For these three errors: that one give his goods as dear as he please, and lending, and suretyship are like three springs from which all abominations, wiles, tricks, and wrongs flow so far and wide that if one would try to check the flow and yet not stop the springs his pains and labor would be lost.

The Devices of Greed.—Therefore I propose here to enumerate some of these tricks and evil devices such as I have myself observed, or have been pointed out to me by good and pious hearts, whereby it may be felt and seen that my reasons and declarations above made are supported and must stand if there is to be any help and counsel for conscience in merchandising. And also that all the other evil devices not here enumerated may be known and estimated by these; for how were it possible to number them all? since through the three aforementioned sources doors and windows are opened to greed and to wicked, tricky, selfish human nature, and room and play given, power and permission to practise freely all sorts of cunning and deceit, and daily to devise more, so that the whole business reeks of greed, yea, is soaked and sunken in greed as in a second deluge.

Of Time Sales.—In the first place, some make no bones of letting their wares go on time, and selling them thus dearer than for cash. Yea, some prefer to sell no wares for cash, but only on time, and that simply that they may make more money by it. Now, thou canst see that this performance is rudely in conflict with God's word, against reason and all justice, and from pure, unadulterated greed he sins against his neighbor, whose harm he nothing heeds, robs and steals from him his own, and seeks not his own just living, but only greed and gain. For in divine right he should not credit or sell on time dearer than for cash.

Furthermore, this, too, has been done: some sell their goods dearer than they are worth in the general market, or in prices current, and thus raise the price of their wares for no other reason than that they know that there is no more of them in the land, or

is not likely to come presently, and yet people must have them. That is the knavish eye of greed that considers only his neighbor's necessity, not to relieve it, but to profit by it, and to become rich through his neighbor's loss. Such dealers are merely public thieves, robbers, and usurers.

Of "Corners."—Furthermore, there are some who buy up altogether the goods or wares of a certain kind in a city or country, so that they alone have such goods in their power, and then fix prices, raise and sell as dear as they will or can. Now I have said above that the rule is false and unchristian that any one sell his goods as dear as he will or can; more abominable still is it that any one should buy up the goods with this intent. Which same, moreover, imperial and common law forbids and calls monopoly; that is, selfish purchases which are not to be suffered in the land and city, and princes and rulers should check and punish it if they wish to fulfil their duty. For such merchants act just as if the creatures and goods of God were created and given for them alone, and as though they might take them from others and dispose of them at their fancy.

Of Joseph.—And if any one were to cite the example of Joseph, how this holy man gathered all the grain in the land and afterwards, in the time of famine, bought therewith for the King of Egypt all the money, cattle, land, and people, which indeed seems as if it were a monopoly or piece of selfishness, the answer is this: That this purchase and bargain of Joseph's was no monopoly, but a fair bargain such as was common in the land. For he hindered no one from buying at the proper time. But it was his wisdom, given by God, that he gathered in the king's corn the seven years when harvests were good, while others were gathering nothing or little. For the text does not say that he alone gathered corn, but that he gathered it in the king's cities. If the others did not do this it is their own fault; just as the average man is apt to live without forethought, or at times has not the wherewithal to gather.

Just as we see still to-day, that unless princes or cities provide themselves with supplies for the benefit of the whole land there is no provision in the home of the common man, or very little, for he is wont to consume his yearly income from year to year. And such gathering is not selfishness and monopoly, but good Christian foresight on the part of the community for the benefit of others. For it is not as though they took everything for themselves, like these merchants, but from what the common market or the yearly harvest offers common to all, they gather the surplus,

whereas others will not or cannot gather of it, but only supply their daily needs from it. Moreover, Scripture does not report that Joseph gathered the corn in order to sell it as dear as he pleased. For the text says clearly he did it not to satisfy greed, but in order that land and people might not perish. But our merchant sells as dear as he pleases, and seeks his own profit solely, without concern whether land and people perish.

But that Joseph thereby brought all the money and cattle, all the fields and people under the king does indeed not seem to be a Christian action, since he was under obligation to give to the needy for nothing, as the Gospel and Christian love teach. But yet he did right and well, for Joseph was conducting the civil rule in the king's stead. Thus I have often read that one cannot rule the world according to the Gospel and Christian love, but by strict laws, with force and the sword, since the world is evil and accepts neither Gospel nor love, but acts and lives according to its fancy unless it is restrained by force. Otherwise, in case any one were to practise simple love they would eat and drink and live high from the goods of others, and no one would work, since every one would take from his neighbor what was his, and such a state of affairs would result that no one could live because of his neighbor. Therefore Joseph did right, because God so brought it about that by a fair bargain such as the times allowed he got control of everything and caused the people to submit to the constraint of civil law and sell themselves and all that they had. For in those lands there has always been a strict government, and the custom of selling people like other property. Besides, being a pious man, he doubtless let no poor man die of hunger, but as the text says, after he had upheld the king's civil rights and rule he gathered this corn for the use and benefit of the people and the land, and sold and disposed of it so. Therefore the example of the faithful Joseph is as far from the actions of faithless, selfish merchants as Heaven is from Hell. This much aside for this subject. But now let us return to the practices.

Of "Bears."—Another one is that when certain ones are unable to establish their monopoly and selfish purchases, because there are others on hand who have the same wares and goods, they proceed to sell these goods so cheap that the others cannot meet them, and thus force them either to stop selling or to sell as cheaply as themselves to their ruin. So they come after all to their monopoly. These people do not deserve to be called men or to live among people, nor do they deserve to be instructed or admon-

ished, since envy and greed are so coarse and shameless in this case that the man brings harm to others through his own injury merely in order that he alone may hold the field. Here civil authority would do right to take from such all that they have and drive them out of the country. It might be unnecessary to enumerate such performances, but I determined to mingle them with the others that it may be seen what great knavery there is in merchandising, and be brought to daylight for every one how it goes in the world, so that he may guard himself against such a dangerous occupation.

Of Futures.—Again, this is a knavish performance: when one sells to another in words the wares in his sack which he really has not. Thus to-wit: A strange merchant comes to me and asks whether I have such and such wares for sale. I say yes, though I really have none, and sell him such wares for ten or fourteen florins, whereas they can be bought for nine or less, and promise to deliver them in two or three days. Meanwhile I go and buy such wares where I well knew beforehand that I could buy them cheaper than I sell them to him, and deliver the wares to him and he pays me for them, and thus I deal with the money and goods of other people without any risk, pains, or labor, and become rich. That is a cunning way of living on the street by other people's goods and money without needing to travel land and sea.

Of Bearing a Market.—Again, this, too, is living on the street, when a merchant has a purse full of money and no longer wishes to undergo adventures with his goods over land and sea, but to have a sure deal; so he remains ever in a great commercial city, and when he knows of a merchant who is being pushed by his creditors so that he must have money to pay withal, having none, yet plenty of good wares, then this man procures some one to buy the wares, and offers eight florins where they are usually worth ten; if the man is unwilling then he procures another person, who offers him six or seven, so that the poor man fears the goods are about to fall, and is glad to take the eight, so that he may obtain ready money and not incur too great loss and disgrace. It even happens that merchants in such need seek out such tyrants and offer them the wares for the ready money wherewith they may pay. In this case the latter hold stiff until they get the wares cheap enough, and then sell as they please. Such financiers are called throttlers, or cut-throats, but are considered important and shrewd people.

Of Combinations.—Then again, this is another trick of selfish-

ness, that three or four merchants have one or two sorts of wares in their control which other people have not or have not for sale. Now when they note that the said wares are worth much money and are daily growing dearer because of war or as result of accident, they combine and allege to others that such wares are much sought and few have them for sale. But if there are some who have them, they put up a stranger to buy up all these wares. Then when they have the wares entirely in their hands they make a compact together in this wise: We will hold these wares at such and such a price because there are no more on hand, and if any one sells them cheaper he shall forfeit so and so much.

This performance, as I hear, is carried on most grossly and frequently by English merchants in selling English or Dutch cloths. For it is said that they have a special council for this business, like the council in a city; and all Englishmen who sell English or Dutch cloths have to belong to it under some certain penalty. And by this council it is determined how dear they shall sell their cloth and what days or hours they shall offer the goods. The chief in this council is called the courtmaster, and is held not much lower than a prince; behold in this what greed can do and dares propose.

Of Forced Sales.—Further, I must note one more performance: I sell to a certain person pepper or the like on six months' time, and know that he is obliged to sell the same immediately in order to get ready money. So I go myself, or accomplish it through others, and have the pepper bought from him again for cash, but so that what he bought from me at twelve florins on six months' time I buy from him at eight. Meanwhile the current price is ten. So I buy from him two florins cheaper than the market price, and he has bought from me at two florins dearer than the market offers. So I gain behind and before, and simply in order that he may get money and keep up his credit, lest he experience with shame that no one else would give him credit.

Of Bankrupts.—As for those who manage or have to manage such devices as is the case with those who buy more on credit than they can pay, or when one has a capital of scarcely two hundred florins and does business to the extent of five or six hundred florins, and cannot himself pay if his creditors do not pay, why here the mischief eats deeper and deeper, and one loss comes upon another the more such devices are practised, until I see that the gallows is in sight, and I must run away or sit in the tower. So I keep still and give my creditors good words, and claim that I will

pay them honestly. Meantime I go and obtain as much more on credit as I can and turn this into money, or otherwise get money on my draft, or borrow as much as I can. Then when it is most convenient, or my creditors leave me no rest, I lock my house, arise and run away, hide myself in some monastery where I am exempt, like a thief or a murderer in a churchyard. Then my creditors are glad that I have not left the country and quit me every second or third penny [half or one third] of my whole debt, and I am to pay the rest in two or three years. They give me this under seal, and I come home again and am a merchant who has gained (by his getting up and running away) two or three thousand florins, which I could not have obtained otherwise in three or four years by running or trotting.

Or where this will not work and I see that I must run away, I go to the Emperor's court or to one of his governors; there I can get for one or two hundred florins a *quinquennale*, that is, an imperial letter under seal to the effect that I may be free and do what I please two or three years for all my creditors, because according to my account I have incurred great damage; as though the *quinquennale* had a nose and could find out whether the proceeding were right and godly. Yea, this is knavery.

Of Interest.—Then another trick that is current in companies. A citizen deposits two thousand florins with a merchant for six years; therewith he is to do business, gain or lose, and pay the citizen two hundred florins interest annually, and what he makes beyond this is his own. But if he does not gain he has to pay the interest just the same. And the citizen is doing the merchant great service in this, for the merchant expects with the two thousand to gain three hundred. On the other hand the merchant does the citizen a service, for his money would otherwise lie idle and bring no profit. That this common practice is wrong, and simple usury, I have sufficiently shown in the Sermon on Usury.¹

I must tell one more thing as example of how false lending and borrowing leads to misfortune. There are some who, when they see that the buyer is shaky and does not come promptly to time get themselves paid most cunningly in this fashion: I put up a strange merchant to go to him and buy of his wares for a hundred florins or like matter, and say to him: "When you have bought all the wares, then promise him cash or refer him to a certain debtor, and when you have the wares then bring him to me

¹The "Sermon on Usury" was reprinted in the same volume with the address "On Trade and Usury."

as that debtor, and act as if you did not know that he was in debt to me ; so I am paid and give him nothing." That is financiering, and means ruining the poor man together with those to whom he may be in debt. But that is what is to be expected when unchristian lending and borrowing is carried on.

Of "Deaconing."—Then again : They have learned to put or lay goods where they will increase, as pepper, ginger, or saffron, as in damp vaults or cellars, so that they gain in weight ; so, too, to sell woolen goods, silks, marten pelts, and sable in dark stores or booths, and to exclude the air, as is the custom everywhere, so that they have a particular sort of air for every kind of goods. And there is no kind of ware with which some advantage is not taken, be it measuring, counting, with yard-stick, bushel or weight, or giving it a color which it has not by nature, or they lay the best at top and bottom and the worst in the middle. Thus there is no end of such deception, and no merchant can trust another farther than he can see or feel.

Of Robber Barons.—Now merchants are making a great outcry against noblemen or robber knights, saying that they have to trade under great danger, and are liable to be caught, beaten, ransomed and robbed. Forsooth, if they suffered this for righteousness' sake, the merchants would be saints. Although it may happen that once in a while one suffers a wrong before God, and has to pay for the company he is in, and suffer for the sins of others, yet inasmuch as such great wrongs and unchristian thievery and robbery have been brought upon the world through merchants, and are even practised among themselves, what wonder is it if God brings it about that such great properties, gained wrongfully, are again lost or plundered and they themselves cracked over the head or imprisoned ! For God must exercise justice, since he declares himself to be a just judge.

Not that I would have highway robbers and bushwhackers excused or free to carry on their robbery. It is the duty of the rulers to keep the roads free, for the benefit of the bad as well as the good. It is the business of princes to punish such unrighteous merchandising with proper power, and to check it, so that their subjects be not so shamefully skinned by the merchants. Since they do not attend to it, God uses highwaymen and robbers, and through them brings punishment upon the merchants, as though they were his devils, just as he torments Egypt and all the rest of the world with devils, or ruins by enemies. So he chastises one knave through another without wishing it understood that the

highwaymen are less robbers than the merchants, though the merchants rob the whole world daily, while a highwayman robs one or two persons once or twice in a year.

Of Combinations.—Of combinations I ought really to say much, but the matter is endless and bottomless, full of mere greed and wrong, so that nothing can be found about it that can be pursued with a good conscience. For who is so stupid as not to see that combinations are mere outright monopolies? which even heathen civil laws condemn as a plainly harmful thing in all the world—I will say nothing of divine right and Christian law. For they have all wares in their control and manage as they please, and pursue the above-mentioned practices without shame, raising and lowering prices at pleasure, oppressing and ruining smaller dealers as the pike does smaller fish in the water; just as if they were lords of God's creatures and free from all the laws and obligations of faith and love.

Thence it comes that in all the world we have to buy spices as dear as they will. To-day they raise the price of ginger, next year saffron, so that the bend always fits into the angle and they have no loss, harm, nor risk; but if ginger fails or is spoiled they make it good on saffron, so that they are sure of their profit. Which is contrary to the fashion and nature not only of merchandise but of all temporal goods, which God means to have subject to risk and uncertainty. But they have devised that through risky, uncertain, temporal wares they obtain sure, certain, and constant profit. But thereby all the world must be drained empty and all the money run into their funnel.

Of Great Fortunes.—How should it come about rightly and with God's will that one man in so short a time should become so rich that he could buy out kings and emperors? But as they have brought it about that all the world must deal with risk and loss, gain to-day and lose next year while they for ever and eternally win, or make good any loss with increased gains, what wonder is it that they gather in the goods of all the world? For a perennial certain penny is better than a temporal and uncertain florin. Yet these combinations never risk their perennial and certain florins against our temporal and uncertain pennies. How then can there be any wonder that they become kings and we beggars?

Of Great and Small Thieves.—Kings and princes should look into this, and prevent such performances by strict laws; but I hear they have hand and part in it, and it goes as Isaiah says: "Thy princes have become the companions of thieves." Meanwhile they

have thieves who have stolen one florin hung, and associate with those who rob the whole world and steal more than all the others; that the proverb may be approved: "Great thieves hang small thieves," and as the Roman senator, Cato, said: "Humble thieves lie in dungeons but public thieves go in gold and silk." But what will God say to it all at the end? He will do as He promises through Ezekiel: "Princes and merchants, one thief with the other will he melt down like lead and copper, as when a city is laid waste with fire, so that there shall remain neither princes nor merchants," which state, as I fear, is at hand. For we have no purpose to better ourselves, however great the sin and wrong, and He cannot let the wrong go unpunished.

Hence let no one ask how with good conscience he may have part in combinations. There is no other counsel than: Let it alone; only wrong can come of them. If combinations are to remain, right and honesty must go down. If right and honesty are to remain the combinations must go. The bed is too narrow, says Isaiah, one must needs fall out, and the cover is too short, it cannot cover both. I know, indeed, that my writing will please them ill, and they will haply throw it all to the wind and remain as they are. But I am unburdened, and have done my part, so that when God comes with His rod we may see how fairly we have deserved it. If only I have instructed herewith one soul, and saved it from the pit, I shall not have labored in vain, though I hope, as I said above, that it has grown so high and heavy of itself that it cannot go longer and will have to be given over. In fine, let every one look to himself. Let no one abstain from these practices for love or service of me, nor let any one adopt or keep them for spite and harm of me. Thou art to decide, not I. God illumine us, and strengthen us to do his good will, Amen!

SCIENCE IN THEOLOGY.¹

BY CARL HEINRICH CORNILL.

GENTLEMEN:—Allow me to begin with the conscientious assurance that I should have been heartily glad if I had been spared the necessity of speaking on this matter; but since the “Motion Against the Professors” has been made and opened for discussion, I may not, being the only professor of theology present,—I must not keep silence, for to do so would be, not evidence of a peaceable and conciliatory spirit, but cowardice and a denial of the station and calling in which God has placed me. Therefore I must speak, and prepare the way only by saying that as I belong to no faction or fraction of this synod, neither do I speak in the name or under commission of any fraction, but solely in my own name and that of my calling.

To be sure, when I consider the letter of the motion before us, which refers to “appointment in evangelical-theological faculties of such professors only as stand within the confession of the Church,” it might appear doubtful whether I really am called on to speak, for personally I do not feel that the letter of the motion touches me at all. Gentlemen, I stand within the Confession of the Church, this I can say unhesitatingly. For I stand firmly and

¹By the courtesy of Dr. C. H. Cornill we are favored with advance proofs of his address on the *Professorenantrag*, or Motion Against the Professors, given on the 30th of October before the sixth session of the Fourth West Prussian Provincial Synod, as prepared by him for publication in the *Danziger Zeitung*, No. 22,281. Von Puttkamer-Plauth, who advocated the motion, had preceded Dr. Cornill, and though speaking in a conciliatory tone, and denying any purpose to assail free research, had declared that the advocates of the measure distinguished between freedom of research and freedom of instruction; no one would think of restricting research, but it was a menace to the Church, and not to be permitted, that the professors of theology should forthwith teach their results, and announce to the young theologues as accepted scientific truths undemonstrated hypotheses on which the Church had not yet passed judgment. Dr. Cornill's high standing as an investigator, his position in the University of Königsberg, and the fact that he spoke as delegate of the theological faculty of Königsberg, lend interest to the views expressed. He resolutely places theology among the sciences, and denies its subordination to the Church. This address has been translated by W. H. Carruth.—[*Editor*.]

clearly upon the foundation of the Apostles' Creed,—the Apostles' Creed without higgling and haggling, without distortion and subtilising. And in case this does not suffice, and you demand a more specific sectarian confession,—well and good, as a genuine old Huguenot, in my whole church feeling and consciousness I belong to the strict Reformed¹ Confession. If there were in this synod a group of the Reformed Church, I should have felt constrained to ally myself with it, and should have done so as flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone.

But despite this, I may say without presumption or conceit that wherever the Motion Against the Professors is discussed by those who are acquainted with current theological literature, my name and person will not be among the least. For indeed, I am considered in the widest circles as an especially wicked and dangerous specimen of the species of professor against whom this motion is directed.

This is to me the clearest proof that your motion goes farther than the letter of it says, and that it is in reality directed against theological science and free investigation. This "wicked criticism" is to be stifled and driven out of the Church. Hence you must permit me to treat your motion from the point of this its ultimate aim; and I wish to show you that your motion begins with a wrong premise, that it seeks its end in a wrong way, and that, even if it is carried, it will do no good, but rather infinite harm.

* * *

Your motion starts from a wrong premise. Expressed or suppressed, it is based on the theory that science has a tendency to systematically assail and deliberately undermine church doctrine. But this premise is entirely erroneous.

✓ Science has no tendency whatever, but is solely the search for truth. To find the truth, or at least to seek it, is its only aim, and for the attainment of this sole aim it has for means and ways the approved method of scientific research. Whither this search shall lead, it never knows in advance, and is therefore not answerable for the results. A problem arises; it must be solved. If we can assure ourselves that this solution was reached by the path of strictly methodic research, we must submit to the result, and submit unconditionally, whether or not it be agreeable to us personally. And, gentlemen, this truth which science discerns, or thinks

¹The Presbyterians or Calvinists call themselves Reformed in Germany. The members of the synod are Lutherans; but both confessions, Lutherans and Presbyterians, are united in the State Church, officially known as Die Evangelische Kirche, having a common church government, under which, however, both parties enjoy a perfect freedom of worship.—[Editor.]

she discerns, it is my *solemn duty*, as a servant of science, to proclaim. I will not quote here the familiar student song about him

"Who knows the truth and hides its light,
[He is a pitiful cowardly wight]."

But this much I must say: if the commission to teach were limited by such a condition, then as an honest and—pardon the harsh word—a decent man, nothing would be left for me but to resign my professorship. To say to us: you professors may investigate as much as you will, but you must keep the results of your investigation to yourselves, that is to forbid us to teach what we have perceived to be the truth,—this amounts simply to forbidding us to lecture, if we wish to keep our self-respect. We never will and never can agree to that. It is our sacred right to announce the truth which we know, even before our students; we shall not let it be taken from us; with that we stand or fall. But if a divine power, which has for goal solely the search for truth, is to be suspected and crowded out of the Church, it looks indeed just as if the Church had reason to shun the truth, and could not endure it. But this is quite inconceivable.

Jesus Christ called himself the truth and the king of truth, born and come into the world to bear witness to the truth, and his greatest apostle writes: "We can do naught against the truth." No truth, not even scientific truth, is a menace to the Church of Jesus Christ, the King of Truth. He, in whose mouth was no guile, promised his Church that not even the gates of Hell should prevail against it. And in the face of such a promise you fear that what the gates of Hell can not achieve might be done by a few professors of theology? No, gentlemen, I think higher of the Church of Jesus Christ, and more modestly of us professors.

The Church must be able to bear every and any truth, and indeed it can. I would remind you of the time when the Copernican cosmogony was appealing ever louder and more urgently to hearts and minds. Many serious and pious Christians believed then that if Copernicus and Galileo were right, it was all over with the Scriptures and the Church for all time. But the Church has endured the Copernican cosmogony, for it is the truth, and stands to-day unmoved and unmovable.

Moreover, the way in which you propose through your motion to attain your end is not the right one. I know and recognise how delicate and questionable a proceeding it is to apply the words of Jesus to oneself and one's own circumstances, but even at the risk

of being misinterpreted I must confess that in the face of the Motion Against the Professors the saying keeps coming into my mind : " If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil, but if well, why smitest thou me? " Yes, gentlemen, if we have spoken evil, prove that it is evil. Science is a spiritual power which can be met only with spiritual weapons, and not with laws and police regulations. Science, too, is a manifestation of the spirit of which Paul the Apostle writes to the Thessalonians : " Quench not the Spirit. "

This spirit, it is true, sometimes cuts strange capers, and in science, too, there are not alone gold, silver, and precious stones, but also wood, hay, and stubble. But even if the spirit manifests itself in a way to rouse apprehension, and if you consider it harmful and dangerous, remember the parable of the wheat and the tares, " let both grow together until the harvest. " And this you can do with all confidence, for this harvest and the judgment in general do not wait until the Last Day, but are being accomplished even now. Science bears its own corrective within itself. In science, too, " the dead ride fast "—terribly fast. And precisely the extreme and unsound tendencies are the ones which experience shows to have had a particularly swift decline.

It is exactly twenty-four years since *The Old and the New Faith*, by D. F. Strauss, appeared. You will all recall the tremendous excitement which it caused at the time ; and where is it to-day, after twenty-four years? Submerged and forgotten. I think even the most innocent small-beer Philistine would be ashamed and feel antiquated in culture if he caught himself quoting or mentioning this book. And to cite a more significant and thoroughly serious scientific manifestation : Thirty-six years are fled since the death of F. C. Baur, the head of the " Tübingen School. " For a whole generation it was believed that the Tübingen School would annihilate Church and Christianity, and where is it now? Dissolved in smoke and wind, while the church of Jesus Christ remains. Not in vain, indeed, did Baur and his Tübingen School labor and investigate, but that the foundation theory of Baur was wrong, and his inferences therefore unsound, is recognised to-day frankly and unreservedly by the most critical investigators. Science has passed by him to the " order of the day. " Therefore leave science without anxiety to the ordeal of history. Without the aid of us weak men to turn the cranks, God's mills grind surely, and in this field, perhaps, more swiftly than elsewhere.

But, you will reply, until such a tendency has run its course it may do infinite harm, confuse minds and poison souls. Let me an-

swer this objection with a bit of personal experience. When I began my instruction in Königsberg ten years ago with a course of lectures on Genesis, I had among my hearers a young man, the son of a well-known clergyman. At the end of the semester the young man gave up the study of theology and turned to jurisprudence. Thereupon I was taken to task, not indeed by the father of the young man, but by the most authoritative person at that time in the East-Prussian provincial Church, as being to blame, and having by my lectures on Genesis unsettled the young man's faith and driven him away from theology. My reply was: "If this is really true, which, however, I will not believe until I have it from the young man himself, then I think I have done a service to theology and the Church; for one who is unsettled in his faith in all Christianity and the Church by the fact that Moses did not write Genesis, will be of no use to us in this fearfully serious and trying time." The ultimate development of the affair, which brought me a complete vindication, I have thought and still think it indelicate to report, because I regard it as a sacred personal secret between the young man and myself; but this much I may say, that the late General Superintendent of Prussia, after I had had a thorough understanding with him in the matter, became and remained to me until his death a truly paternal friend.

No, gentlemen, in a time of combats in all directions, such as Church and theology have to wage, we have no use for semi-invalids and cripples, but only for strong, whole, thoroughly tried men. A wavering reed that is blown hither and thither by the wind may, if God will, become anything, only not a theologian, and if we help such to a clear perception of the fact that they are not fitted to be theologians there is no harm done.

And even if you carry your motion you will not attain the end in view. Even if you succeeded in shutting out from theological professorships all scientific investigators you have not thereby stifled scientific research itself. For we shall investigate afterwards as before, and will publish the results of our researches, and is it likely that the printed word will have less effect than that spoken from the chair? Then you would needs suppress the printing of books; and consider well, even our laymen read scientific books, and, as a result of the widespread efforts at popularising science by lectures, journals, and books for the masses, laymen become acquainted with the results of scientific research.

And now suppose the case, that such a layman, interested in science, has read a book or hears a lecture, and comes to his pas-

tor and asks for instruction and explanation: "My dear pastor, how is this? I have read and heard thus and so, and in Bible history we learned quite a different story." What shall the pastor do with such a layman? Shall he simply fall back on the dogma of inspiration and answer the layman: "Friend, that doesn't concern me, and needn't concern you, for 'it is written,' " etc.? If he acted thus he would, to speak frankly, play a miserable part, and hopelessly compromise himself and the church. At every turn he finds himself face to face with modern science, and it is *a power once for all* against which the tactics of the ostrich will avail nothing.

It is wholly impossible to shield young theologues from contact with modern science; it simply cannot be done in this day and age of the world.

In the First Epistle of Peter it is said: "But be ever ready to give account to every one who demands a reason for the hope that is in you," and this apostolic admonition applies especially to the theologian, the clergyman. But in order to be ever ready to give account to every one the clergyman must know modern science, he must have assimilated it and inwardly taken position regarding it. And if this is his most sacred duty to himself and his office, if on this very account he must know science and dare not abstain from intimate acquaintance with it, well, then it is by all means best that he make this acquaintance through authorised servants and representatives, from whom he will receive the impression that the chief concern here is not frivolous mockery, not satanic delight in negation and destruction, but serious wrestling and striving for truth.

This measure, therefore, will not only do no good, but will do infinite harm. For organisations are sustained only by the powers which gave them birth.

Repeated reference has been made to-day to Luther and the reformers. Those, too, were professors; they searched in the Scriptures and the history of the Church, and when this research had led them to the conclusion that the Church of that day did not correspond to the norm of the Gospel, they did not keep this revelation to themselves because the Church of the time had not yet approved it, but they proclaimed it loudly and freely to the benefit of millions and millions of truth-seeking souls. The right of free research, limited only by God and the conscience, made the evangelical Church: to banish from it the right of free research is giving up the palladium of the Reformation, and forcing the Church back to the point from which our divinely favored reformers, by their labors as professors, happily freed it—and then rather let us simply

return to the fold of St. Peter ; for the Catholic Church knows how to get rid of science and bridle its professors : through the close-laid walls of that gigantic structure flows no breath of freedom and criticism.

Up to this point I have treated the matter altogether negatively and on the defensive ; but I cannot close without adding a positive word. For it is a necessity and a pleasure to me to speak of it : At the bottom of your endeavors there is a justifiable motive. That the Church shall exercise an influence, and that a decisive and determinative influence upon the training of its future servants is not merely a proper demand, it is a necessity. But let it be done in the right way and in the right place. Precisely as professor of theology, I feel obliged to confess that the simple academic instruction is not sufficient for the training of theologians, but that it absolutely needs a supplement which only the Church can give. It is not important whether a man knows a few Hebrew vocables more or less, or a few dates more or less in Church history, but that he can preach and minister to souls. And precisely in this most important matter academic instruction fails us. Even assuming the greatest excellence in the professor of practical theology—by two or three sermons given in the homiletic seminary, with his fellows and the critical professor for congregation, a student cannot learn to preach, and for practice in parish duties the university as such offers him no opportunity at all. There is a proper idea in the plan which formerly was in vogue at Giessen, where practical theology was excluded from the university on principle and left to the ministers' seminary in Friedberg, which every young theologian was required to attend. Here at this most important point the Church must enter the breach ; here it has a sacred duty and an inalienable right. If you would all apply the strength and energy, the activity and persistence which have been expended upon the ill-fated "Motion Against the Professors," to agitating for more ministers' seminaries, at least one for each province, and the requirement that every theologian, without exception, undergo a term, and not too short a term, as curate, then indeed you would be working in the interest and for the benefit of our beloved Evangelical Church.

And be assured that under this banner you would be followed enthusiastically by all who bear the evangelical name ; then you would find even the heretical professors shoulder to shoulder with you in the front rank. I can confidently assure you of this, not only for myself but also in the name of all my colleagues, for we, too,

wish nothing more urgently than a clear-cut and peaceful division and a co-operation based on mutual respect and recognition between science and the Church.

✓ As men of science, we must demand that to science be given what to science belongs ; but we are just as ready to give to the Church what is the Church's. You introduced your motion from highly worthy motives and as earnest Christian men forced in conscience by the motto, *Videant consules ne quid detrimenti ecclesia capiat*. But in the same spirit you in turn must permit me, without any personal consideration and purely from love for the Church, which I, too, love truly and with faithful heart, to beg this honorable synod not to make this motion its own. For with this proposal our Church would come upon an inclined plane ; but if the ball once begins to roll, it will roll in obedience to the law of gravity, irresistibly and ever swifter—*downwards*. And as the end of this inclined plane I see a condition described by the fearful phrase—Culture paired with unbelief, Christianity with barbarism ; and from that may God in mercy guard and defend His Church.

A CONTROVERSY ON BUDDHISM.

BY

RT. REV. SHAKU SOYEN, OF KAMAKURA, JAPAN.

REV. DR. JOHN H. BARROWS, OF CHICAGO, ILL.

REV. DR. F. F. ELLINWOOD, OF NEW YORK CITY.

I.

Rev. Dr. John Barrows, Chicago, Ill.

DEAR SIR :

Friends in America have sent me a number of the *Chicago Tribune*, dated Monday, January 13, 1896, which contains the report of your second Haskell lecture, delivered at the Kent Theatre in the Chicago University. The subject is "Christianity and Buddhism," and I anticipated a friendly and sympathetic treatment of Buddhism at your hands, for I do not doubt that you desire to be just in your judgment. Your utterances are of importance because they will be received as an impartial representation of our religion, since you, having been Chairman of the Religious Parliament, are commonly considered to have the best of information about those religions that were represented at this famous assemblage. I was greatly disappointed, however, seeing that you only repeat those errors which are common in the various Western books on Buddhism. You say, "The goal which made Buddha's teachings a dubious gospel, is Nirvâna, which involves the extinction of love and life, as the going out of a flame which has nothing else to feed upon." Now the word *Nirvâna* means "extinction" and it means the eradication of all evil desires, of all passions, of all egotism, so that the flame of envy, hatred, and lust will have nothing to feed upon. This is the negative side of Nirvâna. The positive side of Nirvâna consists in the recognition of truth. The destruction of evil desires, of envy, hatred, extinction of selfishness implies char-

ity, compassion with all suffering, and a love that is unbounded and infinite. Nirvâna means extinction of lust, not of love; extinction of evil, not of existence; of egotistic craving, not of life. The eradication of all that is evil in man's heart will set all his energies free for good deeds, and he is no genuine Buddhist who would not devote his life to active work, and a usefulness which would refuse neither his friends nor strangers, nor even his very enemies.

You say that "human life does not breathe, in Buddhism, the atmosphere of divine fatherhood, but groans under the dominion of inexorable and implacable laws." Now I grant that Buddha taught the irrefragability of law but this is a point in which, as in so many others, Buddha's teachings are in exact agreement with the doctrines of modern science. However, you ought to consider that while the law is irrefragable, no one but those who infringe upon it groan under it. He who understands the laws of existence and especially the moral law that underlies the development of human society, will accommodate himself to it, and thus he will not groan under it, but in the measure that he is like Buddha he will be enlightened, he will be a master of the law and not a slave. In the same way that the ignorant savage is killed by the electric shock of lightning, while an electric engineer uses it for lighting the halls and streets of our cities, the immoral man suffers from the moral law, he groans under its inexorable and implacable decree, while the moral man enjoys it, and turning it to advantage glories in its boundless blessings.

This same moral law is the source of enlightenment and its recognition constitutes Buddhahood. This same moral law we call Amitâbha-Buddha, the boundless light of Buddhahood which is eternal, omnipresent, and all-glorious. We represent it under a picture of a father, and it was incarnated not only in Gautama-Buddha, but also in all great men in a higher or lesser degree, foremost among them in Jesus Christ, and, allow me to add, in George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and other great men of your country. Allow me to add, too, that Buddha's doctrine, far from being scepticism, proclaims the doctrine that man *can* attain enlightenment and that he attains it not only through study and learning, which, as a matter of course, are indispensable, but also and mainly through *the earnest exertions of a life of purity and holiness.*

There are many more points in your lecture which I feel tempted to discuss with you, but they refer more to Christianity than to Buddhism, and may imply a misunderstanding of Christian

doctrines on my part. I am anxious to know all that is good in Christianity and the significance of your dogmas so that I may grow in a comprehension of truth, but I have not as yet been able to see that mankind can be benefited by believing that Jesus Christ performed miracles. I do not deny the miracles nor do I believe them; I only claim that they are irrelevant. The beauty and the truth of many of Christ's sayings fascinate me, but truth does not become truer by being pronounced by a man who works miracles. You say, "We can explain Buddha without the miracles which later legends ascribe to him, but that we cannot explain Christ—either his person or his influence—without granting the truth of his own claim that he did the supernatural works of his father." We may grant that Jesus Christ is the greatest master and teacher that appeared in the West after Buddha, but the picture of Jesus Christ as we find it in the Gospel is marred by the accounts of such miracles as the great draft of fishes which involves a great and useless destruction of life (for we read that the fishermen followed Jesus leaving the fish behind), and by the transformation of water into wine at the marriage-feast at Cana. Nor has Jesus Christ attained to the calmness and dignity of Buddha, for the passion of anger overtook him in the temple, when he drove out with rope in hand those that bargained in the holy place.

How different would Buddha have behaved under similar conditions in the same place. Instead of whipping the evil-doers he would have converted them, for kind words strike deeper than the whip.

I do not dare to discuss the statements you make about Christianity for fear that I may be mistaken, but I am open to conviction and willing to learn.

I hope you will not take offence at my frank remarks, but I feel that you, if any one in Christendom, ought to know the real teachings of Buddha, and we look to you as a leader who will make possible the way for a better understanding between all the religions of the world, for I do not doubt that as you unknowingly misrepresent the doctrines of the Tathagata, so we may misunderstand the significance of Christianity. We shall be much obliged to you if in justice to the religion of Buddha you will make public this humble protest of mine, so that at least the most important misconceptions and prejudices that obtain among Christians may be removed.

I remain with profound respect

Your obedient servant,

KAMAKURA, JAPAN.

SHAKU SOYEN.

II.

Rev. Shaku Soyen,

MY DEAR BROTHER :

Your interesting letter of March 1st has been sent to me from Chicago. I am to be here for the next six months. In December I go to India and I expect to spend next April in Japan, where I hope to meet you and the other friends who came to the Parliament. I send you a pamphlet giving a little sketch of my tour.

Your letter I will send to-day to a friend in America, asking him to have it printed in an important journal so that you may give American people the opportunity of your views.

I have been looking over the lecture to which you refer. Only a small part of it was printed in the *Tribune*. If you had read it all you would have found it full of appreciation both for Buddha and his ethical system. My interpretation of Nirvâna is that of some of the most friendly students of Buddhism who have gained their views from reading the Buddhist Scriptures. But if modern Japanese Buddhism teaches conscious personal life after death and believes in a personal Heavenly Father, full of love, its divergence from Christianity is not so marked as we had supposed.

What you write about Christianity would require much more time for a proper reply to it than I can possibly give it at present. I am on the point of going to Paris to deliver an address on "Religion, as the Unifier of Humanity." I think that the work that was done in Chicago shows how religion may help to draw men together.

Will you remember me very kindly to the Buddhist friends who came with you from Japan. How pleasant it would be to meet again in Paris in 1900!

Very faithfully yours,

GÖTTINGEN, GERMANY.

JOHN HENRY BARROWS.

III.

Rev. Shaku Soyen.

DEAR SIR :

I have been asked to reply publicly to a letter addressed by you to Rev. John H. Barrows, D. D., of Chicago, under date of March 1, 1896. I have not seen Dr. Barrow's answer to you, but I have consented to reply to some of the points in your letter to him.

I have been pleased with the courteous spirit of your communication no less than with your admirable use of the English language. Though firmly believing with Dr. Barrows (if I may judge from an address which I heard from his lips on the eve of his departure for India) that Christianity is the only religion that is adapted to the universal wants of mankind, and the only one that offers real salvation, yet I have long cherished and widely advocated a tolerant spirit toward other faiths, and have endeavored to give full credit to the ethical or religious truths which they inculcate. But since the close of the Parliament of Religions in Chicago I have realised more than ever the need of candid and accurate language in speaking on this subject, instead of giving way, either to hasty and ignorant denunciation, or to lavish expressions of approval for courtesy's sake which might be construed as a surrender of one's own opinions. Our American hospitality toward the representatives and the religious systems of other lands was carried to such a degree by large numbers in the Parliament, that statements soon came back to us from Japan that the delegates from that country had reported on their return that Buddhism had triumphed over Christianity on its own soil.

The *New York Independent* published a letter reporting the proceedings of a meeting held under the auspices of the Buddhist Young Men's Association of Yokohama, and which was addressed by yourself, Mr. Yatsubuchi, and others.

From one of these addresses these words are quoted: "The Parliament was called because the Western nations have come to realise the weakness and folly of Christianity, and they really wished to hear from us of our religions and to learn what the best religion is. The meeting showed the great superiority of Buddhism over Christianity, and the mere fact of calling the meetings showed that the Americans and other Western peoples had lost their faith in Christianity and were ready to accept the teachings of our superior religion."

If such were the impressions which you received from the courtesy of Dr. Barrows and others, it is not strange that you were disappointed when you read his real estimate of Buddhism in the published address to which your letter refers.

Turning to what seems to be the chief point of difference between you and Dr. Barrows,—viz., the meaning of Nirvâna as taught by Buddhist philosophy,—I may say that I should as a rule be inclined to accept every intelligent man's statement of his own belief and the belief of his countrymen, or at least of his particular

sect. But when we come to speak of a system which has undergone many and radical changes in the course of the ages, and a system which has presented important modifications in different lands even in the same age, we can hardly make any one broad assertion which shall cover the whole ground.

Buddhism is one thing in Ceylon, quite another in Thibet, and still another in China and Japan, where we find at least a dozen more or less divergent sects. Buddhism in its beginnings is generally supposed by Western scholars to have been atheistic or at least agnostic; in Nepaul it became theistic, holding, according to Hodgson's Sanskrit translations, that *Adi Buddha* is "self-existent," "the source of all existence in the three worlds," the "omnipresent who is one and sole in the universe," the "Creator of all the Buddhas." "He is the essence of all the essences." "He is the author of virtue, the destroyer of all things." Those types of Buddhism which pay divine worship to *Gautama*, or *Amitâbha*, or *Quanyin*, I should call quasi theistic or demi-theistic, while some of the Japanese sects, as described by Rev. *Bunyu Nanjio*, Oxon, seem to be pantheistic. The promised joys in *Amitâbha's Paradise*, as described in *Max Müller's* translation of a Sanskrit manuscript, part of which had been sent him from Japan, would indicate an immortal blessedness of a real soul and without further rebirth, while *Subhadra's Catechism of Buddhism*, "compiled from the sacred writings of the Southern Buddhists for the use of Europeans," declares that "Buddhism teaches the reign of perfect goodness and wisdom without a personal god, continuance of individuality without an immortal soul, eternal happiness without a local heaven," etc.

It would be difficult, therefore, to give one all embracing characterisation of Buddhism, and when one speaks of the meaning of *Nirvâna* we must first ascertain his point of view. There are as many different conceptions of *Nirvâna* as there are *Buddhisms*.

I agree with you entirely in your definition of *Nirvâna* as the "eradication of all evil desires, of all passions, of all egotism, so that the flame of envy, hatred, and lust will have nothing to feed upon." All scholars are agreed, I believe, that the word *Nirvâna* properly means an attainment to be realised in this life. I grant you also that "the positive side of *Nirvâna*," speaking from the Buddhist standpoint, "consists in the recognition of truth." *Buddha* is supposed to have attained *Nirvâna* at the time of his illumination under the *Bo-tree*, and for forty-five years thereafter he illustrated this positive side of it in his efforts for the good of men. I think

that Dr. Barrows would agree with you so far. But the real question between you lies farther on. It is this: What becomes of the possessor of Nirvâna when he dies? If Nirvâna cuts off rebirth in this world or any other, what follows the final dissolution of body and mind? And what did Buddha mean when he said to his followers: "Mendicants, that which binds the teacher to existence is cut off (he has attained Nirvâna), but his body still remains. While his body shall remain, he will be seen by gods and men; but after the termination of life, upon the dissolution of the body, neither gods nor men shall see him"?

And what, accordingly, is meant by the Pâli term *parinibbana*, or in Sanskrit *parinirvâna*? I find no other meaning for this word than total extinction. It follows the Nirvâna as a natural consequence of the cutting off of Karma and rebirth. Professor Rhys Davids expresses the distinction exactly when he says: "Death, utter death, with nothing to follow, is a result of, but is not Nirvâna." It is *parinirvâna*.

If I am asked concerning the meaning commonly given to Nirvâna in the Mahayana literatures of Northern Buddhism, I must declare my belief that it means a state of blessedness here and hereafter, but if by Buddhism is meant the system which Buddha taught and which is preserved in the earlier and canonical literature of Ceylon, then I must give a very different answer.

Professor Rhys Davids has illustrated very fully the great change which came over the Buddhism of the canonical Pitakas of the South as it was gradually developed into the "Great Vehicle" of the North. The whole emphasis of the system was changed from the ideal of Arhatship to that of Bodisatship. Even in the South, and before Buddha's death, the real logic of the Tathâgata's teachings was felt to be depressing. "Existence in the eye of Buddhism," says d'Alwis, "was nothing but misery. . . . Nothing remained then to be devised as a deliverance from this evil, but the destruction of existence itself." It was an impracticable doctrine, and Davids declares that "though laymen could attain Nirvâna, we are told of only one or two instances of their having done so: and though it was more possible for the members of the Buddhist order of Mendicants, we only hear after the time of Gautama of one or two who did so. No one now hears of such an occurrence." The more practical races of the North desired something more available and more hopeful. A Bodisat submitting to successive rebirths for the sake of service to mortals, came to be more highly appreciated than an extinct Arhat. The Northern litera-

ture came at length to even disparage Arhatship, while Bodisats like Avolokitesvara, and Amitâbha rose high in popular esteem Davids tells us that the *Lotus of the True Law*, one of the Sanskrit books of Nepal, and widely accepted in China and the North, openly disparages Arhatship and presents Bodisatship "as the goal at which every true Buddhist has to aim; and the whole exposition of this theory, so subversive of the original Buddhism, is actually placed in the mouth of Gautama himself."

Professor Davids, in alluding to the accounts given of Nirvâna by Rev. Zitsuzen Ashitzu at the Chicago Parliament, says: "It shows how astounding is the gulf on all sides between popular beliefs and the conclusion of science." (American Lectures, p. 208.) He states that two forms of Nirvâna which Ashitzu ascribes to the Southern literature cannot there be found, and that the two which he ascribes to the Mahayana school are (strangely) ascribed to the immediate disciples of Buddha. The Nichiren sect of Japan, according to Nanjio, get around this chronological difficulty by the theory that Nichiren, living far on in the Christian era, was an incarnation of an ancient Bodisat who was instructed by Buddha in a "Sky Assembly" on a certain celestial mountain.

This change from Arhatship to Bodisatship was unconsciously promoted by the introduction of fanciful Jatakas or stories of Buddha's pre-existent lives as a Bodisat. The claim that Buddha, though inconsistently with the whole drift of his teaching concerning the one supreme end,—had waived Nirvâna and submitted to rebirth hundreds of times for the salvation of all beings, changed the emphasis of his whole system. It showed from his own example that to be reborn again and again as a Bodisat was far better than to end a useful existence in Parinirvâna. The practical nations of the North espoused this new doctrine warmly, and both Beal and Edkins have described the luxuriant development of this tendency in the Mahayana School. Bodisats, past, present, and to come, were multiplied. Even before Asanga of Peshawar had introduced his ruinous compromise between Buddhism and Hindu Saktism, Hindu deities had begun to be admitted as Bodisats into the Buddhist pantheon. The bounds of the universe were enlarged to furnish an adequate field for their divine energies. At least five world systems, each with a trinity of Bodisats were recognised, each trinity embracing a Dhyana or Celestial Buddha, of whom Amitâbha seems to have been the most popular.

The old theories of a real and conscious soul for which Buddha had substituted the doctrine of an impersonal Karma, had

again crept into Buddhism with these and other Hindu elements, and with them the notion of continued and conscious existence and a changed Nirvâna or Moksha. In Nepaul a positive doctrine of absorption into Adi Buddha (following the Hindu theories) is plainly taught.

“The Buddhism of Thibet,” says Davids, “is the very reverse of the old Arhatship.” It is a form of Bodisatship which renders very substantial every-day service as a semi-political force. The practical and helpful ministry of Quanyin in China and Japan is also an illustration of Bodisatship.

But altogether the most striking departure from the original Arhat doctrines of the South is seen in the teachings of the Shin Shu sect of Japan. As described in Rev. Nanjio’s little volume, also in Max Müller’s translation above referred to, and still more clearly in a *Shin Shu* tract, a translated copy of which may be found in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Vol. XIV., Part 1, June, 1888, this sect comes nearer to the doctrines of the Apostle Paul than to those of Shakya Muni. It presents a mediator between Karma and the sinner, a salvation not by the “eightfold path,” but by faith, a righteousness not by personal merit, but by imputation, a renunciation of all trust in works as being “useless as furs worn in summer,” and, like Christianity, it enjoins a consecrated service, not as compensation but from love. The heaven promised is called “Nirvâna,” but it is something exceedingly attractive to the Buddhist masses. The tract approves of the marriage of priests and of all rational ways of living, and condemns the asceticism of the other sects as not only uncalled for but as a dismal failure in point of fact.

If, then, we are to decide upon the meaning of Nirvâna, or Parinirvâna as taught by Buddha, we must turn back from all these Northern developments to the older canonical teachings.

Burnouf maintained that the canon of Ashoka’s Council must be the final authority, just as the four Gospels must be accepted as the doctrines of Christ. If the preponderating verdict there given is not decisive, then why might we not adopt any theory concerning Buddha’s teachings which our presuppositions might require? There was indeed in Ashoka’s time an endless variety and chaos of traditions and theories. The two intervening centuries had been prolific. Tissa, a prominent member of the Council, arraigned and refuted no less than two hundred and fifty heresies. (See Rhys Davids’s American lectures.) But if after all this careful sifting the Pitakas are not authoritative then we are at sea concerning the

original doctrines of Buddhism. Moreover, these Pâli scriptures are buttressed, so to speak, by Cingalese versions which are said to have been translated from the Pâli two centuries B. C. by Mahenda, the devout son of King Ashoka. These were at a much later day retranslated into Pâli by Buddhagosha. The Pâli and Cingalese have therefore corroborated each other for centuries and rendered modification doubly difficult.

If we may believe Prince Chudhadharn of Siam, who presented a paper in the Parliament of Religions, the Siamese Buddhism (also of the Southern school) corroborates the testimonies of Ceylon. He said: "The true Buddhist does not mar the purity of his self-denial by lusting after a positive happiness which he himself shall enjoy here or hereafter. . . . What is to be hoped for is the absolute repose of Nirvâna, the extinction of our being, nothingness."

Professor Max Müller, in an article published in the *London Times* and republished in his *Science of Religion*, takes the ground with Burnouf, Bigandet, Saint Hilaire, Rhys Davids, Childers, Spence Hardy, and others, that the philosophic teaching of the Pitakas represents Nibbana or Parinibbana as equivalent to extinction. He declares that "no careful reader of the metaphysical speculations in the canon (on Nirvâna) can reach any other conclusion than that of Burnouf," though in his *Buddhist Nihilism* he seems inclined to think that the canon may have done injustice to the real teachings of Gautama. He finds inconsistencies in the statements of the canon, and he gives Buddha the benefit of the doubt. And on general principles he concludes that the great teacher could not have maintained "that Nirvâna, instead of being a bridge from the finite to the infinite, is only a trap-bridge hurling man into an abyss at the very moment when he thought he had arrived at the stronghold of the eternal." This seems to me, however, a clear case of special pleading. On the same principle we may go back of the New Testament history and build up any modified theory of the doctrine of Christ. Professor Oldenberg, an acknowledged Pâli scholar, after a careful study of the alleged dialogues of Buddha with his more thoughtful disciples, as to whether his own ego would survive after death, reaches the conclusion that he left no decisive answer on one side or the other. "The question was treated as of no practical importance to one seeking deliverance now and here." Neither the Hindu philosophers who cross-questioned him as the Pharisees questioned Christ, nor even his faithful but perplexed disciple, Mâlukya, obtained any but an evasive

answer, coupled with exhortations to gain deliverance now and here.

Personally I believe that Gautama had taught Parinirvâna in the sense of extinction (he was so understood by his followers and by the opposing Hindus, who nicknamed the Buddhists "nastakas," i. e., "believers in destruction or nihilism), but that after seeing the perplexity and depression which the doctrine produced, he became reticent and refused to commit himself. Nevertheless, his more thoughtful disciples in carrying out the general drift of his teaching to its logical conclusions, established the doctrine of Parinibbana as Burnouf, Saint Hilaire, Childers, Spence Hardy, and d'Alwis, have found it expressed in the canonical Pitakas.

But altogether the most decided position taken by any Pâli scholar in reference to Parinibbana is that of Rhys Davids, partially quoted above. He says: "Stars long ago extinct may be still visible to us by the light they emitted before they ceased to burn, but the rapidly vanishing effect of a no longer active cause will soon cease to strike upon our senses; and where the light was will be darkness. So the living, moving body of the perfect man (Arhat) is visible still, though its cause has ceased to act: but it will soon decay and die and pass away, and, as no new body will be formed, where life was will be *nothing*. Death, utter death, with no new life to follow, *is then a result of, but is not, Nirvâna*. The Buddhist heaven is not death, and it is not *on* death, but on a virtuous life here and now, that the Pitakas lavish those terms of ecstatic description which they apply to Nirvâna as the fruit of the fourth path of Arhatship."

This statement occurs in his small volume entitled *Buddhism*, and is fully corroborated in the lectures delivered in America 1894-5. Those passages in the Dharmapada which are supposed to indicate a continued and blessed existence after death, he regards as figurative expressions, applicable to the state of Nirvâna in this life, and he quotes from the Parinibbanti Anasaba this clear statement: "Some people (at death) are reborn as men: evil doers in hell; the well-conducted go to heaven, but the Arhats go out altogether." There is nothing figurative here, nothing could be plainer. He adds that in the later Sanskrit books the notices of Nirvâna "are so meagre that no conclusion can be drawn as to the views of their authors, but it is clear that they use Parinibbana in the sense of death, with no life to follow."

Aside from these opinions of the highest authorities, I think that the Buddhist metaphysics, carried out logically, militate

against any theory which supposes a continued and conscious blessedness to follow the extinction of Karma and the end of rebirth. It is difficult to see how there can be any conscious enjoyment of any kind where there is really no soul. Buddhism recognises no transition of a soul from one state of being to another. There are instead five skandas, partly physical, partly intellectual, and these produce the phenomena which others than Buddhists ascribe to an abiding, personal, conscious, and responsible soul. But according to Buddhist philosophy there is only a succession of thoughts and emotions proceeding from the interaction of the skandas, just as a flame proceeds from the combustion of the chemical elements in a candle. The flame is not the same in two consecutive moments, neither is the soul. The only permanent element remaining when the body with its skandas dies is the Karma. But if, as in the case of the Arhat, even the Karma is cut off, what can be left but extinction? Professor Oldenberg, with his metaphysical acuteness, and with a more than willingness to find something in the Buddhist philosophy less doleful than extinction, seems to suppose a sort of substrate of being which antedates this world of form and change, and therefore may survive it. He finds a passage in the Pâli scriptures, and Max Müller makes reference to the same, which reads as follows: "There is an unborn, unbecome, not created, not formed. But for this unborn, unbecome, not created, not formed, there would be no way out of the world of the born, the become, the created, the formed. . . . The wise ones who do no harm to any being, who keep their body ever bridled, they go to the eternal place. He who arrives there knows nothing of pain; but the monk, penetrated by goodness, who holds to the Buddhist doctrine, let him turn to the land of peace, where the transitory find rest." Of this passage Oldenberg says: "One who clearly and decidedly rejected an eternal future would not speak in this way." But this comes far short of a positive doctrine of conscious Nirvâna. And besides, what is that essence of being which antedates and follows conscious existence here?

The *raison d'être* of the doctrine here expressed is the supposed metaphysical necessity for some antithesis for the born, the become, etc. This can be found only in the unborn and the unbecome. Therefore the unborn and the unbecome must actually exist as the only way of getting out of the world of the born, etc. But I do not see how anything can be predicated of a state of existence only arrived at by such a process. I think it fair to Buddha to as-

sume that this fine piece of dialectics was due not to his practical mind, but to some one of his speculative followers.

In the paper which you read in the Chicago Parliament of Religions you stated that the world is governed by one universal law of cause and effect, that "there is no cause which is not an effect and no effect which has not also a cause." This theory, of course, excludes the idea of a Great First Cause. This is to Western minds unthinkable, as was illustrated in the same Parliament by Father Hewitt of the Paulist Brothers of New York in his paper on the Being of God. He used the illustration of a train of cars in which the last car is drawn by the one before it and that by another. In his view such transmitted motion would be impossible unless there could be found at the head of the train, an engine having power in itself. Your theory seemed to involve the supposition that an infinite number of cars on an infinite circular track might move without an engine. But the point which I would make just here is that your theory appears in itself to exclude the idea of a conscious and blessed Nirvâna beyond this life. It deals with such causes as we find in this world, which in your view includes all things past, present, and future; and it ought to note only such effects as are seen in this world as Buddhism conceives it. Everything must move in the circle of being if it moves at all. Men and gods are born and die and are reincarnated either on the earth or in heaven or in hell, where also they will die again: all is change; but according to the idea of Nirvâna as a changeless future existence, it is a breaking out of the circle. It belongs to the world of being, and yet it does not so belong. It is an eternal standstill, a rest, not of a soul, not of the skandas, not of Karma, but of a something which produces no longer the old effects, and which therefore does not belong to your-world of invariable causality. Perhaps you can remove my difficulty.

I shall welcome any further light which may be thrown upon this subject, and I assure you of my belief that good will come from a full and fair elucidation of all those facts and principles which belong to Buddhism or any other religious system. I have a profound respect for the searchings of earnest men of all ages in reference to the great things which concern our highest destiny.

There are two or three things in your letter in regard to which I will add a single word. Referring to the life of Christ, you speak of the miraculous draft of fishes as an indication of a lack of proper regard for animal life on his part. I do not propose to enter into a defence of Christianity, but I would only say that you seem to me

to miss the true import of the passage when you assume that Christ and his disciples went away and left the fishes to decay upon the shore. We might as well suppose that they left their boat to drift about on the waves. The true meaning is simply that three men, mentioned by name, etc., left the business of fishermen and became disciples. The narrative states that there was another boat in partnership. Even though there had been no partners or servants to look after the fish, there was never lacking a crowd in the footsteps of Jesus, to whom they could have been given. A multitude is here mentioned. A general Gospel injunction was,—sell all thou hast and give to the poor and follow me.

With regard to animal life, I know that it is often claimed that Buddha was more compassionate than Jesus. I think he was less discriminating. Jesus had a tender regard for all animal life, and taught that even the sparrows were the subjects of his Father's care; but nevertheless he believed that men were in God's sight of "more value than many sparrows." He rebuked the stiff conservatism of the Pharisees, which would have forbidden the finding of a lost sheep on the Sabbath, or the rescuing of a dumb beast from suffering. Buddhism is perhaps much more particular in avoiding the destruction of insect life than Christianity, but on that score I think Buddhism has yet to reckon with the modern science of Bacteriology, and the question whether the living germs of disease shall destroy or be destroyed, and whether it is less merciful on the whole that animals and fishes shall be food for each other and for man than that myriads of living microbes shall destroy them by the slow torture of disease. Life and death are shown by science to be so balanced that in the total of existence death is as beneficent as life. The economy of the sea is one of constant carnage and so also with the earth; but for this the sea would soon become a solid mass of suffering, living forms, and the earth would be uninhabitable by men. Christian precept is humane but it is discriminating. It would destroy the wolves and serpents of India rather than allow them every year to destroy thousands of the people, and it would allow the Esquimaux to feed on fish rather than suffer the extinction of their race.

The other reference in your letter was to Christ's anger and violence in driving men as well as oxen from the temple. Two kinds of argument are used in such a case, one is a whip or a cane, which even without actual blows is the common persuasive used with dumb beasts, and the other, adapted to men, is remonstrance; and Christ used both of these. There were probably two occasions

on which this thing occurred, and all the evangelists speak of such an incident. Only in the passage in the Gospel of John is there any reference to a whip of small cords, and in this there is no indication that the whip was designed for any but the beasts. In the New Version, translated by the most able Greek scholars in this country and Great Britain, the conjunctives, there more properly used, are "both—and,"—"And he drove them all out, both the sheep and the oxen, and poured out the changers' money and overthrew the tables, and he said unto them that sold doves, etc."

You speak of the miracles of Jesus. From a materialist this would not be surprising, but Buddhism like Christianity has opened to men the world of the spiritual and the supernatural. The greatest miracle in the New Testament is the Incarnation, but that is no greater departure from the common law of heredity than the incarnation of an old Karma in a new being wholly distinct from his predecessor.

And if we are to speak of the miraculous in Buddhism—passing in silence the marvellous legends—I should ask whether any mere human being, sitting under a tree, could without a miracle raise himself *per saltum* into intellectual omniscience,—and also into an absolute freedom from all the appetites and passions of our common humanity? That Buddha gained a victory over them I can well believe, but if you leave out the miracle—I speak of course from your standpoint—you must suppose that like the equally consecrated Paul of Tarsus, he found that when he would do good evil was present with him and that the warfare had to be waged to the end.

This accords with the universal experience of mankind, and it is the teaching of the *Shin Shu* tract which I have quoted above. I have never seen the moral disability of sinful men and their need of a Divine and therefore supernatural salvation more strongly set forth in any Christian treatise than in this tract where it speaks of those "who attempt the holy path as failing in every particular" and of their perishing need therefore of relying upon what Nanjio calls "the vicarious Power of the Original Prayer" of Amitâbha.

In closing I should like to express my appreciation of some of those high ethical teachings of Buddhism of which Rev. Dharmapâla spoke so intelligently and eloquently in the Parliament, but that my paper is already too long.

Let me add that practically the millions of Buddhists are not so helpless of the future as many have supposed, and simply for the reason that they disregard Nirvâna and look forward to a happy

transmigration, and many of them, in earth or in heaven. Even the devout pilgrim, Hioun Zsang, prayed on his death-bed that he might be born in a Buddhist heaven.

Assuring you that I aim to be an earnest student of whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, wheresoever they may be found,

I remain sincerely yours,

F. F. ELLINWOOD.

NEW YORK CITY.

NOTES AND BOOK REVIEWS.

DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS.

Every period of transition is a time of struggle, and it is natural that the leading spirits who seek to be pathfinders of new truths or perhaps also of old truths in a new light, have to pass through many errors which sometimes lead them to the very verge of despair. As an instance of such tragic experiences we may cite David Friedrich Strauss, the author of *The Life of Jesus* and *The Old and New Faith*. Finding the old faith self-contradictory and full of problems revealing the untenableness of the old interpretation of church dogmas, Strauss's life was devoted to a clarification of the writings of the New Testament, and there can be no question but the higher criticism of the present day owes more to him than perhaps to anybody else. Spinoza was the originator of Bible criticism; and after Spinoza "The Wolfenbüttler Fragments," published by Lessing, made the greatest stir in the theological world; but David Friedrich Strauss dashed the idol of literal inspiration to pieces. His work of rescission was formidable, but he was unable to put anything in its place. He was a negative spirit, and heavily was his sensitive mind weighed down by the curse that attaches to the desolation of destruction. Unhappily his family relations were very sad, and he saw himself in the name of honor and self-respect necessitated to seek a divorce from his wife. It was as if the dreariness of his religious agnosticism had intruded itself upon the sacredness of his matrimonial life, and, at the close of his career, this unusually gifted man sank into the grave almost without a comfort, for to him there seemed to be no purpose in life, and all he could say of his aspirations was that he did not know whether they had been genuine ideals or the flickerings of an *ignis fatuus*. Was there any reality in his ideal of truth to which he had devoted his life unflinchingly and against the most sacred illusions of his youth? He had sternly obeyed the call of duty, but his domestic experiences, his doubtful relation to his children, and his religious piety which had indignantly shattered the idol of his early faith, left his heart cold, and he felt as if his days had been a dream oppressed by a nightmare.

His life-experiences are condensed in a little *Sinngedicht*, whose constant refrain "I know it not" characterises the disposition of his mind. It was published not long ago by Edward Zeller in a volume containing selected letters of David Friedrich Strauss, and reads in an English translation as follows:

"I started on a journey, but I did not leave.
And whether I shall stay, I know it not.
That I am here a stranger, this is certain;
But where my home is, O, I know it not.

I thought, I had once two beloved children,
 But whether 'twas a dream, I know it not.
 A wife discarded I. If love to hatred,
 If hatred turned to love, I know it not.
 'Tis said I've written books, but whether
 'Tis truth or mockery, I know it not.
 An infidel, I'm told, the people call me;
 I'm rather pious, but I know it not.
 Of death I never was afraid, but whether
 I'm living still, truly, I know it not.'

What a terrible desolation in the soul of a man who in many respects was victor in the battles of science! He certainly conquered that old conception of traditional religion which is now abandoned even by the most reactionary representatives of dogmatism, but he did not enjoy his victory. The end of his life exhibits a terrible dissatisfaction. His strength was exhausted, and he bleeds to death from the wounds received in the battle of life. He was one of the St. Johns of the religious reformation that is now preparing itself. He was one of the Moseses who led the children of Israel out of the bondage of Egypt, but he was not permitted to see the promised land. His life's work was in the desert, and 't was in the desert, too, that he found his grave.

P. C.

Too late for the Christmas market, but not too late for those readers who are interested in the most important religious movement that has stirred mankind since the foundation of Christianity, Gustav Freytag's historical sketch of Martin Luther will be published simultaneously with the first number of the monthly *Open Court*, or at the latest two or three days after its appearance. The articles constituting the book were translated for the first time by H. E. O. Heinemann and appeared in *The Open Court* during the last year. Judging from letters received from our readers, they were greatly appreciated, and we can, without fear of contradiction, say that no better and more condensed statement of Luther's life has ever been written than that of Freytag. The Open Court Publishing Co. has published the book in handsome form, large octavo, gilt top, and bearing Luther's coat of arms in gold on the cover. A great number of choice illustrations will help to make this book popular.

Mr. Frederick A. Noble, the enterprising pastor of the Union Park Church, Ashland and Washington Boulevards, Chicago, has arranged for a series of discourses on current religious questions, to be delivered at his church on Sunday evenings instead of the traditional sermons. The value and character of these discourses may be gathered from the following list, beginning with February 14 and concluding on May 9. (1) "Philosophical Basis of Theology," by James Lewis Hobson; (2) "Evidences of a Personal God," by George B. Foster; (3) "Higher Criticism and the Pentateuch," by Edward Thompson Harper; (4) "Credibility of the Historical Books of the Old Testament," by Augustus Stiles Carrier; (5) "Prophecy: Object, Scope, and Use," by Samuel Ives Curtiss; (6) "Inspiration: How to Be Defined and Accepted," by Andrew C. Zenos; (7) "Place of Christ in Modern Thought," by Charles Joseph Little; (8) "How Far Apostolic Interpretation of Christ Is Authoritative," by Milton Spencer Terry; (9) "New Testament Interpretation as Affected by Recent Studies and Investigations," by Clyde Weber Votaw; (10) "Evolution Theories and Christian Doctrine," by William Douglas Mackenzie; (11) "Systematic Theology: Is There Still Need of It?" (12) "The Teaching of Jesus in Regard to the Hereafter," by George Holley Gilbert.

Three important works in the domain of psychology and ethics have been recently issued from the press of Félix Alcan of Paris. The first is by M. Th. Ribot, the acknowledged leader of the modern psychological school in France, and is entitled *La Psychologie des Sentiments*, which means "The Psychology of the Emotions and Passions." M. Ribot's careful psychological methods, his keen vision for facts, his horror of metaphysical theories, combined with rare lucidity and conciseness of expression, have united in making his works the most satisfactory existing compendiums of the subjects of which they treat, and the same qualities are displayed in his present work on the Psychology of the Emotions, different as opinions may be regarding the tenability of certain theories advanced in it. M. Ribot contests the doctrine that emotional states are functions of consciousness and has adopted the physiological theory agreeably to which they are primitive and autonomous, the direct expression of the vegetative life of the organism. M. Ribot's art is always most tellingly displayed in his analysis of psychological problems by the methods offered in Nature's own laboratory, namely, by the methods of degeneration and disease, and these methods he also employs with success in the present work.

The second work is *L'Education intellectuelle dès le Berceau*, by Bernard Pérez, one of the pioneers in the study of child psychology and the author of many works upon the subject. That his book should contain much of value was to have been expected, and both the professional educator and parent will find ingenious observations and wise counsels for the instruction of children in M. Pérez's work. The subjects treated are the education of the senses, of memory, attention, the logical, intellectual, and æsthetical faculties, etc.

The last work is on ethics, *Le Bien et le Mal*, by E. de Roberty, Professor in the New University of Brussels, a profound philosopher and indefatigable author. M. de Roberty's work is not light reading, except to persons thoroughly acquainted with French and philosophy, and we can do no more here than to refer to it as an able discussion of its subject and as occupying an important place in M. de Roberty's system.

μκκκ.

THE MODERN READER'S BIBLE. A Series of Works From the Sacred Scriptures Presented in Modern Literary Form. Edited, With an Introduction and Notes, by *Richard G. Moulton*, M. A. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1896. Price, each, 50 cents.

We have already referred to some of the numbers of this Series in the weekly *Open Court*, and to some also in *The Monist*, but its importance renders repeated reference to it desirable. Apart from his introductory criticism, Professor Moulton has simply sought to remodel the *outward* literary shape of the books of the Bible exactly as the Hebrew writers themselves might have remodelled them had they written their books to-day with our knowledge of literary morphology. There has been no attempt at a reconstruction of the literature of the Old Testament according to the methods of the higher critics. For example, in the historical books, consisting of Genesis, Exodus, Judges, Kings, and Chronicles, Professor Moulton has given us the history of the people of Israel exactly as it was presented by themselves; for to "appreciate the history of a great people as they themselves understand it, is an interest of universal literature," and literature here is our chief concern. The rehabilitation of the preceding historical books, therefore, has touched but three main points. What we nowadays should throw into footnotes and appendices, the Hebrew writers threw indiscriminately into the text. This material consists of gene-

alogy, statistics, documents, etc., all of which greatly bores the modern reader, and has contributed more than anything else to making the Bible a comparatively unread book. This matter Professor Moulton has distinguished by using different-sized type. The second point is that of the separation of epic narrative from historical narrative. To the former has been given, consonantly with its character, a poetical form. The third point is the adjustment of Scripture to the outer form of modern books, which has been done by division into chapters, sections, etc., so that the reader may gain at once a synoptic, analytic, and mnemonic view of the whole.

One of the most beautiful of the recent numbers is that of *Biblical Idyls*, containing the Song of Songs, Ruth, Esther, and Tobit. We should specially like to call attention to Professor Moulton's Introduction to the *Idyls*, where he has advanced certain critical and literary considerations that heighten considerably our appreciation of Solomon's Song. We refer especially to the distinction between imagery and symbolism. Such criticism quite deadens the blow to our æsthetic sense which we experience on reading much of Hebrew poetry. We cannot, in fact, quit this subject without referring to the high character and value generally of Professor Moulton's introductions, which evince not only a grasp of literature, but also a broad comprehension of philosophy and history.

The Wisdom Series, containing the ethical and philosophical tetralogy Proverbs, Ecclesiasticus, Ecclesiastes, and the Book of Job, is now complete. Besides the numbers already mentioned in this notice, Exodus and Deuteronomy in the History Series have already appeared, Judges, Kings, and Chronicles are rapidly to follow. The Prophecy Series, containing Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the minor prophets, still remains. The volumes themselves are in small 18 mo. pocket form, printed on good paper, and serviceably and tastefully bound. T. J. McC.

THE GOSPEL FOR AN AGE OF DOUBT. The Yale Lectures on Preaching, 1896. By Henry Van Dyke. New York and London: Macmillan & Co. 1896. Pages, 457. Price, \$1.75.

Dr. Van Dyke has departed in the present work from the custom which has hitherto prevailed in the preparation of the "Yale Lectures on Preaching," and waiving his privilege of instructing the Yale students of divinity in homiletics, or in the art of how to preach, has substituted for that theme a discussion of the deeper and broader question of what to preach. The word of spiritual life and power for the present age must, he contends, be a "real gospel, a word of gladness and a word of God." Traditions and dry systems of dogma are powerless. The preacher's message must come from a heavenly source, it must be fresh, vivid, and *new*, and yet be *old* and not out of touch with the past. "An altogether new religion can hardly be an altogether true religion." The solution of the apparent difficulty involved in this reconciliation of the old and the new, lies, according to the author, in a personal view of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Christianity is not a complex system of doctrine, it is a spiritual life. Christ is Christianity. "To preach Him, in the language of to-day, to the men of to-day, for the needs of to-day, is to preach a gospel as new and as old as life itself." Christianity has a *Person* at the heart of it—this is its distinctive trait wherein it differs from all other religions. Recognising this, we have no need of the confusions of the theology. "Our central message is not the gospel of a system but the gospel of a Person."

We may gather from the foregoing abstract of Dr. Van Dyke's Preface, the prevailing trend of his thought. His book is an eloquent one and breathes the buoyancy and fervor of a deeply religious mind, while his aspirations are distinctly

such as spring from an enlightened culture. Nevertheless, we cannot help thinking that in many cases his revivifications of the dogmas which he would reject for the living Christ, differ from the old only in being more suffused with ardor and sentiment, and not in being more rational. For example, it is the impassioned plea of a preacher, poet, and lover that we have in Lecture VI, in behalf of absolute personality, and in Lecture VII. in behalf of God as creator and ruler of the world—not the arguments of a philosopher. Correct though we may regard Dr. Van Dyke's conclusions to be, if not taken too literally, they are yet the imaginative fruit of associations woven in the Christian mind by the religious longings, literature, and æstheticism of centuries, and not the reasoned verifiable results of methodically conducted thought. But it has not been Dr. Van Dyke's aim to produce a bald, rational apology of Christianity. On the contrary, he has rather designedly sought to touch emotional chords. It is on this side—as a religious tonic quickening the imaginative and emotional associations of the Christian mind—that the main value of the book is to be sought, although we should be far from denying to it sterling intellectual qualities in the discussion of subsidiary points. Significant as the abrupt recent reaction from materialism to religion has been, the significance of the opposite forward movement of orthodox religion towards science has been as momentous and will bear lasting fruits. μκρκ.

L'ARITHMÉTIQUE AMUSANTE. By *Edouard Lucas*. Paris: Gauthier-Villars et fils. 1895. Pages, 266.

It is rare to meet with so entertaining a work as the present little *Arithmétique Amusante* of the late Edouard Lucas, which has been very tastefully printed by the old and famous mathematical publishing house of Gauthier-Villars et fils of Paris. Lucas was Professor of mathematics at the Lycée Saint-Louis and author of perhaps the completest series of works on mathematical recreations to be found. The present volume which has been compiled from manuscripts left unpublished at the author's death, is intended as a sort of introduction to the *Récréations*, and has the eminently practical aim of teaching young children and grown up persons the art of arithmetic by unconscious and pleasurable forms of acquisition. The book is fragmentary, yet none the less fascinating on that account. In all its features it is one of the good fruits of that practical reform in education which preceded from the founding of the *Ecole polytechnique*.

"Permit me to offer to you," says the author, "a bit of advice dictated by a "ripe experience. Develop in your child from the start a taste for drawing and "arithmetic. Children should learn to count at least as high as twenty when quite "young, to play with dominos, lotto counters, pebbles and sticks of wood, or bet- "ter, with small cubes of wood or stone of the same size; for it is imperative "above all things to develop along with writing and reading a quick facility in "mental arithmetic. In no case, however, should the scholar learn tables of ad- "dition and multiplication by rote, or any results whatever in this manner with- "out having first obtained them directly. The child should be taught to find them "himself, for his mind is a latent power on which it is merely necessary to impress "the right movement." And again upon the propriety of attaining this end by means of recreation, he says: "Instruction in science should be joyous, lively, pleasing, and full of entertainment, and not cold, majestic, or funereal. Keep your solemnities for your university festivals."

The first chapter is devoted to entertaining problems in elementary arithmetic culled from all times and nations, and interspersed with a good deal of information

on the history of arithmetic. We have instructions even as to how children should be taught to write figures.

The second chapter is devoted to the mastery of rapidity in calculation. We have first a few anecdotes of great arithmeticians and lightning calculators. There is one incident of the author's own son who had been taught, when quite a baby, to construct his own multiplication tables, and who having been forgotten continued his constructions as far as thirty times thirty and one day quite astonished his father by proposing to him a difficult sum in multiplication of two figures. His progress was so rapid that his father had soon to stop his little mathematical games lest he should become what he wittily calls a megalcephalic arithmetical machine (*une machine arithmétique à grosse tête*). The remainder of the chapter gives a number of abbreviated methods of multiplication and division which have been known to mathematicians for a long time but do not seem to have yet found a general footing in practical mental life.

Chapter III. is on the subject of arithmetical progressions, Chapter IV. on geometrical progressions. All these important subjects are inculcated by curious and entertaining examples taken from history, literature, folklore, and games of all kinds. Lucas devoted a life-time to examining and simplifying arithmetical combinations and to the invention of practical mechanical devices for automatically recording arithmetical results. He has been long an acknowledged master in this domain, and his labors in the field of mathematical recreations have not had in view intellectual entertainment alone but also the rapid and sound acquisition of elementary mathematical methods, and especially the utilising of the plays and games of children towards the attainment of solid knowledge and intellectual power. He speaks of the common methods of inculcating arithmetic as nothing less than an "interment" of the mathematical faculties. His idea is that the ways of learning science should be so far as possible ways of joyous progress and not of solemn and dismal difficulties. His simple, practical views on learning arithmetic cannot be too widely diffused.

T. J. McC.

The aim of *The Open Court* has been from the beginning the propagation of the immortality idea, as characterised in the following quotations :

"Mind, or Soul, is not a mystical something, a bodiless essence, a spiritual hobgoblin: It is the form-structure of our brain produced by our education, in the widest sense in which that term is used. This structure of form is not mere nothingness. The idiot does not possess it. The special form is here a more important part of reality than the substance that has taken the form. In the Sistine Madonna of Raphael, the form in which the colors have been distributed upon the canvas is the principal thing and not the color taken from the painter's palette. In a ball of lead that which we call the ball is as real as the lead.

"The form-structure of the human brain, the soul of man, is the result of the work and struggle of the living world on earth for millions of years. To preserve this work-of-art of nature's making, and to develop it to a higher form in the rising generation, constitutes the main duty of our life. It is the content of all morals. And the mightiest instigation to such a preservation of the soul is the conviction that we thereby again build up ourselves."

"It is of the utmost importance to retain of the belief in the immortality of the soul or the mind, and to guide into the right channels, that thereof which is true. The true belief in the immortality of the soul is the highest of the ideas that jointly constitute the soul, and the strongest factor in its struggle for existence."—*The Open Court*, Vol. III., No. 127, p. 2068.

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47.

The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

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THE CENTENARY OF THEOPHILANTHROPY.

BY DR. MONCURE D. CONWAY.

ON JANUARY 16, 1796, the Theophilanthropists held their first public meeting. It was in the chapel of an ancient hospital (St. Catharine), which stood at the corner of St. Denis and Lombard street, Paris. Early in the Revolution a part of the hospital had been assigned to penitent "Magdalens" (so miscalled), and another part to the blind. The teacher of the blind was a Catholic of Russian origin named Haüy, and it was he who made arrangements for the Theophilanthropists, whose first public meeting seems to have been addressed by Thomas Paine. There, amid the blind and the ostracised, was cradled this religion of blended love for God and Man.

After the reign of terror was passed, after the tempest, and earthquake, and fire, this still small voice made itself audible. In the two previous years there often met in a small café a little company of leading men who during the terror had tried to stem the bloodshed; they had now come from their prisons and refuges to find most of their old homes and haunts empty, their friends dead or dispersed. Like survivors from a foundered ship, stranded on some strange island, they made more intimate acquaintance, and, with whatever differences of opinion, were united by memories of a common martyrdom, and by their common love of humanity. There was the long-imprisoned Thomas Paine in close friendship with the democratic Bishop Grégoire, and the devout Bernardin St. Pierre heart to heart with the rationalist Dupuis, the socialistic nobleman De Bonneville, the poet Mercier. Their old theologic and other partition walls had crumbled under the revolution. Their common enthusiasm was now for the religion of humanity, and this was diffusing itself among many families. But meanwhile parents

were lamenting that they had no church in which their families might cultivate the higher religion. This want led to several gatherings in private houses, in September 1796, and in that month a Manual of Theophilanthropy was compiled by M. Chemin-Depontès. This was followed in the autumn by a small book of hymns and canticles. The first hymn—I must translate in prose—begins :

“O God, whose bounty and greatness the Universe proclaims,
Thou who hast given us life, receive the incense of our hearts.”

This is followed by a canticle beginning, “Descend from the Heavens, Divine Tolerance,” whose closing lines are :

“ Never hate ; for hatred is grievous,
It poisons and withers our spirit.
If the terrible tongue of an evil man
Sows thy days with thorns and vexations,
Lower not thy generous soul,
Though reason permits thy scorn.”

In an original copy before me, evidently used by one of the Society, this last line permitting scorn is cancelled by a pen, and there is written under it in French : “Show a good heart even to thy enemies.”

The third canticle invokes the “God Creator, Soul of Nature,” and a verse says :

“ While blaming error, let us plead with the offender :
Heaven alone has the right to punish him ;
With the sweetness that mingles love with instruction
Forgive, without malice :
The art of being happy is to love thy kind :
Ah, what duty is more sweet to fulfil !”

In other hymns are such expressions as “Father of the Universe, Supreme Intelligence !”—“Embrace us with thy love,” etc.

From the Manual I translate two extracts :

“Our opinions depend on so many circumstances of which we are not the masters, that the Theophilanthropists are persuaded that God, just and good, will not judge us after our opinions, nor after our different forms of worship, but from the sincerity of our hearts and from our actions.”

“What God is, what is the soul, how he rewards the good and punishes the evil, Theophilanthropists attempt not rashly to penetrate into. They feel that there is too great a distance between God and the creature that it should try to comprehend him. They are content with the knowledge, from the magnificence and order of the universe, from the testimony of every people, and of their own conscience, that there exists a God ; that they cannot conceive a deity without the idea of every perfection ; that, consequently God is good, is just, and therefore virtue will be rewarded and vice punished.”

The private houses having become too small for the numbers interested, it was resolved that Theophilanthropy should appear as a public movement, and so it happened that on January 16, 1797, this name, combining God, Love, Man, appeared on the door of St. Catharine's chapel. As a gesture in the same direction the "Philadelphians," who founded in London what is now the South Place Society (February 14, 1793), might claim precedence, but these, though bolder in negation, were not of equally wide views. While Elhanan Winchester, who founded the London "Philadelphians," was publishing his reply to the *Age of Reason*, the Theophilanthropists were welcoming the author of this temple-shaking book as an inaugurator, though they probably pruned his address of some aggressiveness. The Philadelphian "love of the brethren" was not up to the "love of man," and Theophilanthropy merits homage as the first church in Christendom to place man by the side of God,—man as man, without regard to race or creed.

As an indication of the catholicity of this movement it may be mentioned that its meetings were fixed at an hour which would not bring them in conflict with the hours of other religious assemblies.

The ancient crucifix and other symbols of St. Catharine's altar had been cleared away by the Revolution, but the altar remained,—an altar naked and desolate, the primal foundation of all temples, laid deep in the sacred longing to sacrifice something, now awaiting the next offerings. These came in the form of flowers. Every one who entered laid thereon a flower, or a bunch of flowers: these were the only sacrament. In the *Agni Purana* it is written: "The Lord of Life [Vishnu] should not be worshipped with flowers that have faded: those that grow in thine own garden are best: with the flowers must be reverence, itself a flower." This I remembered when seeing the Buddhists in Ceylon carrying flowers to their temples, and from the same garden—the human heart—came the flowers which the Theophilanthropists, also the blind and the outcast, laid on the ancient altar of St. Catharine, denuded of crucifix, Madonna, and host. And with the flowers came more spiritual roses, lessons read from Jesus, Buddha, Zoroaster, Confucius, Epictetus, Aurelius, the Psalms. The lecturer for the day wore a pure white robe while speaking. There was never any regular Minister. There was a simple form of marriage, and the birth of a child was celebrated, though without any kind of christening. In their Manual were warnings against ceremonies, and the temple must have no ornament representing the deity, nor any of his attributes, nor any

figure representing a virtue or any person. There must be no particular holiday, but celebrations harmonious with the seasons.

Above the flower-laden altar the decalogue was replaced by five inscriptions:

"1. We believe in the existence of God, and in the immortality of the soul.

"2. Worship God, cherish your kind, render yourselves useful to the country.

"3. God is everything which tends to the preservation or the perfection of Man; Evil is everything which tends to destroy or deteriorate Man.

"4. Children, honor your fathers and mothers; obey them with affection, comfort their old age. Fathers and mothers, instruct your children.

"5. Wives, regard in your husbands the chiefs of your houses. Husbands, love your wives; and both render yourselves reciprocally happy."

The Theophilanthropists were especially careful not to censure the beliefs of others; every lecture had to undergo the revision of a committee to see that it contained no such criticism. In his opening address Paine said, "The views of this society extend to public good as well as to that of the individual, and . . . its principles can have no enemies." So indeed it seemed. The expansion of the society in its first public year exceeded anything known in religious history. Several statesmen who had been apprehensive that Catholicism would reoccupy the vacancy left by its overthrow favored the new movement. The first Minister of France, Larevellière-Lepeaux, in an address on Public Instruction, extolled Theophilanthropy, though he never ventured to its meetings, and this raised the movement to national importance. Twelve parish churches were allotted to Theophilanthropy in Paris, and it spread through the provinces. It is wonderful to recall that this new religion, of which Paine was one founder, for years held possession of Notre Dame cathedral itself!

The Theophilanthropists tried to bring flowers in their season. But what was to symbolise the divine love and loveliness when winter came? During all their summer of success a priestly winter was waiting and watching to wither all their flowers of hope and humanity. Their very success proved a fatal success. A sullen priesthood was not to be conciliated by permission to conduct their tolerated functions in a country where for ages they had reigned, with right to suppress all rivals. Their authority had deep roots in popular superstition, and indeed in something deeper: the plainness of Theophilanthropist worship could not compete with beautiful images, pictures, shrines, nor nature's smile in flowers make up for the lost smile of the Heavenly Mother.

Priesthood could not yet come out in the open, but it worked in secret,—circulating leaflets accusing the Theophilanthropists of

secret orgies, of political intrigues, and an intention to make Larevellière-Lepeaux Pontiff! When Bonaparte arose, the cynical Bishop Talleyrand was made his chief Minister. Larevellière-Lepeaux tried to interest Talleyrand in Theophilanthropy, but the Minister answered, "All you have to do is to get yourself crucified and buried, and rise the third day." The creeds had long become to Talleyrand a joke, but none knew better than he the tremendous machinery at hand in the Church.

Bonaparte easily took his hints. The wily Corsican said to Dupuis, "As for myself, I do not believe that any such man as Jesus Christ ever existed, but the people are inclined to superstition, and I do not think it right to oppose them." This involved the restoration of the Church, and it could not coexist with Theophilanthropy. In the first year of this century Theophilanthropy was crushed under that spurred heel which presently tried to crush Europe. Theophilanthropy has the honor of being the only religion which the nineteenth-century war-god found it necessary to suppress. I heard Victor Hugo say that Bonaparte fell because "he troubled God"; but the God of Theophilanthropy had troubled Bonaparte with peaceful ideals before he retaliated.

The history of Theophilanthropy has never been written. The account given of its rise by Paine ("Letter to Erskine") is the best, but most of this history I have had to pick out of old French pamphlets, journals, and manuscripts.

I have not dwelt on the limitations of Theophilanthropy, the chief one being its failure to grapple with any of the great problems besetting the human mind. To Catholic definiteness it opposed indefiniteness. On this account Paine who believed clear negations essential became somewhat alienated from it, and he with Elihu Palmer inaugurated a similar but more vigorous movement in New York which but for the death of both might have come to something. After Paine's death some of his last religious writings were published in a New York magazine called *The Theophilanthropist*. Eighty years ago there seems to have been a "Society of Theophilanthropists" in Glasgow, with a good hymn-book and a doxology which strikes an ethical note:

" The man whom virtue does not bind
 No lasting pleasure knows;
 Nor e'er enjoys that peace of mind
 Which innocence bestows."

LAMARCK, AND NEO-LAMARCKIANISM.

BY PROF. A. S. PACKARD.

WHO WAS LAMARCK, and what work did he accomplish? Was he merely a compiler like Buffon or the author of the *Vestiges of Creation*? If we look for an answer in Darwin's immortal work *The Origin of Species*, we shall find that for once this otherwise invariably candid writer, so prone to give the fullest credit for aid to his contemporaries, in referring to his great French predecessor, whose eminence as a philosopher he did not at all appreciate, sets aside his theories and speaks of "the views and erroneous grounds of opinion of Lamarck" as having been largely anticipated by his grandfather Erasmus Darwin. It is questionable whether Darwin ever carefully read through Lamarck's *Zoologie Philosophique*, or the other writings of the French zoölogist. We have heard a young but distinguished English zoölogist call Lamarck's "a bad book," probably meaning that it was not sound from the Neo-Darwinian point of view. Ray Lankester writes of Lamarck in *Nature*, as if the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired habits were the sole, or at least the most characteristic, contribution Lamarck had made to the theory of descent. It is evident that these English writers have not carefully read all that Lamarck has written, while they do not give him that credit for the clearness and fulness of his views, which Haeckel and others in Germany have done. It should be here said that Lamarck's lucubrations on chemical and physical as well as physiological subjects are worthless, and his lack of caution in publishing them is deplorable. At the same time it should be said that, when a young man, in studying the clouds he was led to believe that weather forecasts could be made, and in geology he anticipated the uniformitarian views of Hutton and of Lyell.

After thirty years experience as a systematic botanist, his *Flore*

Française being the standard French work for many years, Lamarck at an age when many other men of science cease to be productive, was transferred to the new chair of invertebrate zoölogy in the *Jardin des Plantes*. The industry, toil, and productive thought of another period of thirty years, resulted in his placing the zoölogy of the lower animals in a clearer and better defined light than ever before. This zoölogical expert wrought most important changes and reforms. He separated the Crustacea from the insects. He established the class of Arachnida, separated the Annelida from other worms, and showed the distinctness of Echinoderms from polyps, thus anticipating Leuckart, who established the groups of Cœlenterata or polyps nearly half a century later. He founded the class of Infusoria. When a boy we used to arrange our shells by the Lamarckian system, which was universally used in the second quarter of the century, and great reforms in the classification of the Molluscs were wrought by him. He was called the French Linnæus, but his work was greatly in advance over that of Linnæus, being that of a skilful, profound systematist, who based his system on the facts of anatomy and structure.

As a zoölogical philosopher no one of his time approaches Lamarck, and indeed he lived fifty years ahead of his age, as the times were not ripe for the hearty and general adoption of the theory of descent. As in the animal world we have here and there prophetic types, anticipating in their generalised, synthetic nature the incoming, ages after, of more specialised types, so Lamarck anticipated by more than a half century the principles underlying the present evolutionary views, although owing to the sneers and criticisms of Cuvier and others his views were neglected and almost forgotten for a generation.

Let us compare the factors of Lamarck and of some of his contemporaries with those of Darwinism as such. The factors of Buffon who lived from 1707 to 1788 were three: climate, food, and domestication, and he insisted that there was a balance in nature. The factors of Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), in his poem entitled "Zoonomia," were the reactions of the organism to the action of external surroundings, while use and effect were vaguely insisted on. He suggested that all the forms of life originated from a single filament, but as he had little practical skill as a systematist he did not suggest or construct a phylum.

Let us now compare first the general principles insisted upon by Lamarck, and then enumerate the Lamarckian factors. He insisted on the great length of time during which life-forms had ex-

isted, the gradual, uniform action of physical and biological forces, and the absence of catastrophies, thus anticipating the uniformitarian views in geology of Hutton and Lyell. He claimed that the lower forms arose by spontaneous generation, and are being so produced at the present day. He believed in progressive development, also insisting that many forms, whole orders and classes, were the result of retrogressive development and degeneration. He explained rudimentary structures as remains of parts which had been actively used by the ancestors, but which have become atrophied by disuse. He very clearly states that development goes on from the simple to the complex, and that the animal kingdom is like a tree, with wide gaps between the branches. He fully appreciated the fact of variation, as what botanist or zoölogist does not,—and Lamarck worked over fifty years handling and examining the lower organisms. He intimated, for instance, that specific characters vary most, and that the peripheral parts, as the legs, mouth-parts, antennæ, etc., are first affected by the causes which produce variations, while he distinctly states that it required a longer time for variation to take place in the internal organs. He also recognises the great fact of adaptation to needs. Lamarck has given us the best definition of species we have been able to find. Unlike Buffon, he is never self-contradictory or ironical, and maintained his views without modifying them till the end of his life.

Lamarck's factors of organic evolution were seven, as follows :

1. Change of environment, both direct and indirect in its action on the organism ; these include change of habitat, of climate, soil, food, temperature.

2. Needs, new desires, appetites, not so much mere mental desires as the necessities of the entire organism, physical and mental, due to changes in the surroundings. Lamarck's use of the word need or necessity (*besoin*) has been greatly misunderstood and caricatured. By such changes animals are subjected to new needs. Lamarck gives as an instance the birds driven by necessity (*besoin*) to obtain their food in the water, who gradually assumed characters adapting them for swimming, wading, or for searching for food in the shallow water, as in the case of the long-necked kinds. Snakes lost their limbs in becoming adapted for gliding through brush or grass or such places. His best examples are the giraffe, kangaroo, and the ai, the lemur of Madagascar, so wonderfully adapted for an arboreal life. The acquisition of new habits or usages through necessity (*besoin*), owing to a change in surroundings, is much dwelt upon. He claims : "*Il est facile de démontrer par l'observation que*

ce sont usages qui ont donné lieu aux formes," which is another expression for Geoffroy St. Hilaire's "*C'est la fonction qui crée l'organe.*"

By many, including Wallace, Lamarck's views under this head are not fairly stated. It is evident to any one who will carefully read what he says of "*besoins*" that he does not refer so much to mental desires as to those needs thrust upon the animal by change of circumstances. Wallace in his classical essay which appeared in 1858 inaccurately states Lamarck's views when he represents Lamarck as saying that the giraffe acquired its long neck by desiring to reach the foliage of the more lofty shrubs, and constantly stretching its neck for the purpose. What Lamarck does say is that "the giraffe lives in dry, desert places, without herbage, so that it is obliged to browse on the leaves of trees, and is continually forced to reach up to them. It results from this habit, continued for a long time in all the individuals of its species, that its fore limbs have become longer than its hind ones and that its neck has become so elongated that the giraffe, without raising itself erect on its hind legs, raises its head and reaches six metres high (almost twenty feet). We submit that this mode of evolution of the giraffe is quite as reasonable as the one insisted upon by Mr. Wallace. Quatrefages has also protested against the way Lamarck's views have been caricatured, although he was not himself an evolutionist.

3. Use and disuse. While the continual use or exercise of organs develops them, as in the case of birds, giraffes, and kangaroos, the second of these principles was illustrated by the case of the mole, the spalax, the whale-bone whales, whose rudimentary teeth exist in the embryo, the ant-lion, the blind Proteus of caves, the eyeless bivalves, and the snakes, whose limbs he claimed have disappeared from disuse.

4. Lamarck frequently refers to the precautions that nature has taken to place limits to the too great increase in individuals, and consequent overcrowding of the earth. The stronger and better armed, he says, devour the weak, the large animals devour the smaller. The multiplication of the smaller species is so rapid that these smaller species render the earth inhabitable for others, but their length of life is very short, and nature always preserves them in just proportions not only for their own preservation, but also for that of other species. The larger species, however, multiply slowly, and thus is preserved the kind of equilibrium which should exist. These views are of the same general scope as Darwin's law of struggle for existence, and imply Spencer's principle of the survi-

val of the fittest. Lamarck does not, however, bring out clearly the fact of competition, a cardinal doctrine of Darwinism.

5. Lamarck's characteristic doctrine is the inheritance of characters, including those acquired during the lifetime of the individual. But this was also held by Darwin and all evolutionists until called in question by Weismann. The doctrine of heredity itself he recognised as a fundamental principle in biology.

6. The effects of crossing were considered by Lamarck, and, what has been overlooked by commentators, he clearly insists on the swamping effects of crossing, saying: "If, when any peculiarities of form or any defects whatsoever are acquired, the individuals in this case always pairing, they will reproduce the same peculiarities, and if for successive generations confined to such unions, a special and distinct race will then be found. But perpetual crosses between individuals which have not the same peculiarities of form, result in the disappearance of all the peculiarities acquired by particular circumstances." Here we have anticipated a great deal of what we find in the writings of Darwin, Romanes, and others.

7. Another principle, much insisted on by evolutionists, and especially by Wagner in 1868, is the principle of geographical isolation. It is this which underlies Gulick's principle of segregation, and Romanes's similar doctrine of physiological selection. This was anticipated by Lamarck, who at the close of the paragraph we have just quoted, and which has been overlooked by commentators, goes on to say: "Were not men separated by distances of habitation, the mixtures resulting from crossing would obliterate the general characters which distinguish different nations." (*Phil. Zool.*, p. 262.) He does not, however, specifically apply this principle to other animals than man, but the principle stated by Darwin and other writers is the same.

If we now turn to Darwin's *Origin of Species* it will be seen that the fundamental doctrine of his work is Natural Selection, based on the principle of competition. His book, however, written as it was in the fifties, and packed with facts drawn from embryology, morphology, and paleontology, those sciences having been founded and developed after Lamarck's time, accomplished the gigantic labor of convincing and converting the scientific world. Darwinism is popularly synonymous with evolution. It is, however, obvious that without the action of the Lamarckian factors, we should have had no assemblages of plants and animals to afford a field for the play of competition and natural selection. It

should be borne in mind that Darwin starts with the tendency to variation, which he assumes. It is obvious that the Lamarckian factors as a whole started the ball in motion and laid the solid foundations on which natural selection rests. Meanwhile the competitive and selective principles have been operating throughout the entire period since organisms came into existence in any number or variety. It is therefore well to insist that in discussing the origin of the doctrine of evolution, due and full credit should be given to the great French naturalist and philosopher, who a half century in advance of his time very clearly and explicitly formulated the primary laws of organic evolution.

It should also be explicitly understood that natural selection is not an active factor, or a *vera causa*. It simply expresses the results of the operation of a series of factors, those factors having been previously worked out, or at least suggested and supported by a few examples, by Lamarck.

Now to this Lamarckism, as we have represented it in its modern form, supported and broadened by the facts of modern morphology, embryology, physiology, the study of geographical distribution and the facts of variation, and more especially by the wonderful genetic series revealed by the labors of paleontologists—all of which were unknown to Lamarck—to this modern phase of Lamarckism, we have given the name of Neo-Lamarckism, since it stands for Lamarckism plus the additions to our knowledge made since the date of Lamarck's works.

One of the most important treatises on these Neo-Lamarckian lines is the recent work of Prof. E. D. Cope, *The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*.¹ In a logical way, abundant facts supporting the principles advanced, this prominent naturalist treats first of the nature of variation; second, of the causes of variation, and, in the third part, of the inheritance of variation. The whole argument and the mode of stating and illustrating it is clear, compact, and strong. It forms an admirable digest of some of the phases of the subject of organic evolution. One feature of it is the conciseness of style, being free from the verbiage which weakens much of Romanes's writings. So far as we have observed the facts are reliable, and are to be accepted as true. The force, clearness, and compactness of the style are the result of years of anatomical and systematic work plus a good deal of hard, logical thinking. It is safe to say the book and its views will never be superannuated or placed on the retired list. It may be hard reading for the layman,

¹ Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1896. 12 mo, pp. 547, cuts, 120. Price, \$2.00 net.

but the working evolutionist, the student of variations and of their causes, will find it most suggestive and indispensable.

It is written, however, from the point of view of the author's own lines of study, which have been in vertebrate paleontology. So many-sided is the theory of descent that no single book presents all sides in equal proportions. Many books on evolution are written entirely from the side of Darwinism or natural selection as such; others, like Semper's *Animal Life* and Eimer's *Organic Evolution*, as well as the works of St. George Mivart, Haeckel, Perrier, and others, are cast in a broader mould and are more eclectic.

It is evident that the most productive line of investigation in the future is a study of variation and its causes, particularly the latter. Darwinians insist that variations have been indefinite, accidental. Most Neo-Lamarckians hold on the other hand that they are not fortuitous but definite, along certain lines, the proof being that evolution has proceeded along certain definite lines, ending in this or that order or class. The problem now is to ascertain the physical causes of variation, and why, for example, evolution has followed this or that definite path, tending on the whole upwards, and ending in the eight branches of the tree of animal life, with their lesser branches and twigs, the classes, orders, families, genera, and species. These lines, as regards the vertebrates, are very clearly defined by our author. The recent carefully detailed work of Bateson, *Materials for the Study of Variations*, not only makes no attempt to discover the causes, but is simply a collection of cases of abnormal sports and variations, the author actually stating that it is "hard to see how the environmental differences can thus be in any sense the directing cause of specific differences." On the contrary we hold, with Herbert Spencer: "The direct action of the medium was the primordial factor of organic evolution." And it is vastly more broadening and informing instead of merely collecting and cataloguing sports and variations at least also to attempt to examine into the changes in temperature, climate, soil, and in the biological environment, which have in many cases clearly enough produced the variations—whether useful or not to the animal. Regarding the last subject, a great deal of tedious verbiage and wearisome discussion has been going on in the English journals, with no definite results.

Concerning the causes of variation much might have been said by our author as to the effect of changes in temperature, light, food

climate, but space hardly permitted, and Semper's work, to which he refers the reader, has adequately covered the ground.

Considerable space is given to the subject of parallelism. This section is interesting, since it restates in a detailed way the fact worked out by Von Baer, Agassiz, and Vogt, and brought by Profs. Hyatt and Cope into relation with the doctrine of evolution. Parallelism, however, appears to express a result and is not an active factor in evolution. Yet the general parallelism existing between taxonomy, ontogeny, and phylogeny is of great interest, and in this chapter the author shows admirable power of generalisation.

The causes of variations Cope divides into two classes: the physico-chemical (molecular), and the mechanical (molar). To these two types he gives the names Physiogenesis and Kinetogenesis. In this section also is discussed the principle of inheritance of characters. The portion on physiogenesis is short with but few cases mentioned compared with the many which might be brought forward, for which, however, he refers the readers to Semper's *Animal Life*.

To dynamic evolution or kinetogenesis the author devotes nearly a third of the book. And here Dr. Cope, who has given much time and thought to the subject, is at his best. Kinetogenesis is but a newly-coined word for a study of the effects of use and disuse of the different organs of the individual. A great deal has been said about structures or peculiarities in the organisation which are useless to their possessors. These parts are classified by Cope, who, with others, regards them as brought about by disuse. Such are the vestigial legs and digits of numerous lizards, the mammæ of male animals, and the vestigial structures found in many highly specialised animals, notably in man where some seventy such vestiges exist to prove his descent from the lower Primates. The existence of some of these has been explained by Darwin by the action of natural selection, through "his unwillingness to look to disuse as the cause of the conditions he describes." The instances Dr. Cope quotes in illustration of kinetogenesis are taken from American authors, and indeed in the labors of the late Prof. Ryder, Cope, Dall, Hyatt, Jackson, Osborne, and others in this country, and of Hütter, Henke, Reyher, Fick, Tornier, and others in Europe, including Herbert Spencer, who really was the first to start this kind of inquiry, we have the first attempts to explain by the effects of impacts, strains and stresses, and other movements of the muscles and other soft parts on the hard parts (as shells, the ar-

thropod crust, and the teeth and bones), the origin of joints, segmental parts, and differences in form of the parts of the skeleton. There has thus been opened up a distinct department of dynamic evolution, the study of which promises the most fruitful results. Cope's discussion of this whole matter is ingenious; his arguments appear to us to be solid and logical, and the objections of the Neo-Darwinians have been amply met.

The treatment of the principle of natural selection is fair. Its inadequacy as a primary factor or as the efficient cause of all variations, so clearly proved by Herbert Spencer and others, is here fully insisted upon.

Under this head also we have a brief, terse discussion of isolation, though it was first suggested by Lamarck, as we have already seen, and is by no means a part of the theory of natural selection, and might well have been allowed more space, since it is, though a passive agent or principle, one of universal occurrence, and of no little importance in the preservation of variations and their final elaboration into specific characters.

We have never regarded protective mimicry as a genuine active factor in the production of specific characters, and with the extreme views of Wallace, Poulton, and others we have been unable to agree, and we coincide with Cope, that to ascribe such color and form-characters to natural selection as a cause, is clearly impossible. The cases of mimicry are often due to the direct or indirect action of light, and other factors, and the supposed agency of natural selection in the matter is a fallacy. Many examples are cases of convergence. Into some cases the selective principle appears to enter, but the last word, it seems to us, has not yet been spoken on this intricate subject.

No one interested in the subject of heredity—and who is not?—can well afford to pass by the third part of this book in which the inheritance of variations is discussed in a fair and comprehensive way. Because perhaps from quite independent points of view the reviewer's opinions are in harmony with those of Cope, he is led to endorse, with little fault-finding, all that is here said in favor of the principle of the inheritance of characters acquired during the life-time of the individual, and against the extremely hypothetical views of Weismann. The very strong and apparently well-proved cases, quoted from Brewer, of the inheritance of characters due to nutrition, to use, as in the example of the evolution of the trotting horse, and particularly the inheritance of characters due to mutilation and injuries and those due to regional influences appear to be

strong proof that in these days such inheritances may at times occur, though in earlier geological times they must have been more frequent and normal. With little doubt in the near future this discussion, which, as Cope states, is "sometimes a logomachy dependent on the significance which one attaches to the term "acquired characters," will gradually close, by the abandonment by both parties in the controversy of extreme views on the subject.

The discussion under the head of "The Energy of Evolution" is suggestive, though there is a tendency to the multiplication of newly coined terms which may seem, for the sake of clearness, to be necessary, but which will repel the lay reader. Again, returning to the consideration of the dynamics of organic evolution, and to prove the inadequacy of the claims of natural selection, the author, probably quite unconsciously, follows in a general way the Lamarckian argument. Natural selection, Cope well maintains, "cannot be the cause of those alternatives from which it selects. The alternatives must be presented before the selection can commence." Darwinians imagine that here and there a useful variation or sport has been preserved or eliminated, and has been, so to speak, nursed and petted and cared for until it became a varietal and ultimately a specific character. But, as suggested by the *critique* in the *North British Review* for 1867 (attributed to Fleeming Jenkin), the objector to natural selection requires that useful variations should, in order to be preserved, arise in an enormous number of individuals "all having a little improvement in the same direction." And this is distinctly what Lamarck has said. In his case of the birds evolved by necessity into swimming or into wading forms, he does not intimate, as generally supposed by those who carelessly read him, that a single bird, by simply wishing or willing, gradually acquired webbed feet, or longer necks or longer legs, but he says, speaking of a supposed bird wishing to prevent its body from sinking in the water, "it makes every effort to extend and elongate its feet." "*Il en résulte que la longue habitude que cet oiseau et tous ceux de sa race contractent d'étendre et d'allonger continuellement leurs pieds,*" etc.; and in the next case of the bird wishing to fish without wetting its body and which "makes continual efforts to lengthen its neck, the necessity of adopting this new habit or means of obtaining its food, is not restricted to a single individual, but to all those of its race." In other words, we have here suggested that the variations were common to the species *en masse* and were induced by a change in the physical or biological environment which drove all or large numbers of the indi-

viduals of a species to the necessity of adopting new habits, and thus to transform from one species into another. It is the great weakness and inadequateness of Darwinism as such that individual or chance variation or sports, which the whole course of nature tends to wipe out by crossing or by the death of the unfit individual, are suffered to be the ancestors of species. This, it is true, may sometimes happen, but it is an exception which proves the rule.

Dr. Cope then enters into a discussion of the energy of growth and evolution as distinguished from that displayed by non-living bodies. The former he calls Anagenesis and the latter Catagenesis. His anagenetic class "tends to upward progress in the organic sense; that is, towards the increasing control of its environment by the organism, and towards the progressive development of consciousness and mind." He well criticises Herbert Spencer's definition of evolution as a process of "integration of matter and dissipation of motions," claiming, correctly, we think, and with much originality, that such a definition only applies to inorganic bodies, that in organic progressive anagenesis there is absorption of energy. "In the anagenetic energies, on the other hand, we have a process of building machines, which not only resist the action of catagenesis, but which press the catagenetic energies into their service. In the assimilation of inorganic substances they elevate them into higher, that is, more complex compounds, and raise the types of energy to their own level. In the development of molar movements they enable their organisms to escape many of the destructive effects of catagenetic energy by enabling them to change their environment, and this is especially true in so far as sensation or consciousness is present to them."

All this prepares the way for the reception of the view expressed in the final chapter, entitled "The Functions of Consciousness." Here the author steps on less certain, because metaphysical, ground, whither many will not care to follow him, and although Lamarck has attributed the movements of animals to their needs, which we interpret to mean bodily necessities as much as mental volitions, Professor Cope goes farther than the French philosopher, and attributes consciousness to all animals. "Whatever be its nature," he says, "the preliminary to any animal movement which is not automatic is an effort; hence he regards effort as the immediate source of all movement; that the control of muscular movements by consciousness is distinctly observable; that reflex acts are the product of conscious acts. He concludes, then,

that "consciousness has been essential to a rising scale of organic evolution. In the long run the most intelligent have survived ; hence he postulates a primitive consciousness which he has called Archæsthetism, which "maintains that consciousness as well as life preceded organism, and has been the *primum mobile* in the creation of organic structure."

Finally, in approaching an explanation of the phenomenon of anagenesis, our author asks : "Why should evolution be progressive in the face of universal catagenesis? No other ground seems discoverable but the presence of sensation or consciousness, which is, metaphysically speaking, the protoplasm of mind. The two sensations of hunger and sex have furnished the stimuli to internal and external activity, and memory, or experience with natural selection, have been the guides. Mind and body have thus developed contemporaneously and have reacted mutually. Without the co-operation of all these factors, anagenesis seems impossible."

This is certainly very suggestive, and will commend itself to those who, taking for granted the Darwinian view that all variation is fortuitous and indefinite, and all evolution purely material and mechanical, reject it because they suppose that evolution is purely materialistic and excludes mind from creation ; whereas it is not at all improbable nor unthinkable, even, from a scientific standpoint such as that taken by our author, that mind and consciousness are immanent in each operation of the laws underlying the evolution, not only of life on our globe, but also of the earth itself and of the universe of which it forms a part.

IS THERE MORE THAN ONE BUDDHISM?

IN REPLY TO THE REV. DR. ELLINWOOD.

BY H. DHARMAPÁLA, ANAGÁRIKA.

I HAVE READ with interest the controversy between the Rt. Rev. Shaku Soyen, Dr. Barrows, and Dr. F. F. Ellinwood in *The Open Court* of January. It is evident that Dr. Ellinwood is a student of Buddhist translated literature, judging by the quotations he has freely made in defence of the position adopted by Dr. Barrows with reference to the theory that Nirvâna is annihilation.

Dr. Ellinwood speaks of Buddhism as "a system which is one thing in Ceylon, quite another in Tibet, and still another in China and Japan." Just so, Christianity is one thing in Russia, quite another in Rome, and still another in Germany, England and America, where the Presbyterian and Universalist live side by side.

I grant that Buddhism has undergone phases of transformation. Many changes in the outward superstructure have been made according to the conditions of the countries where the Good Law was preached, yet amidst all these vicissitudes the doctrines of Buddha remained unchanged.

Here lies the wonderful vitality of the doctrine that he preached twenty-four centuries ago. Nepal is the only country where a Hinduised form of Buddhism exists, which, however, from the earliest times has been regarded as heterodox and heretical. But the Buddhism of Tibet, China, Japan, and of the countries of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula preaches fundamentally the same doctrine. By Indian Buddhist Bhikshus, says Samuel Beal, "a new literature was produced—a literature essentially Indian—and therefore Aryan. . . . The Buddhists of India brought about all this, and much more than this, for what occurred in China happened also throughout the regions beyond, and in due course Corea, Japan on

that side, and Mongolia and Tibet on the other, were converted and made obedient to *the same faith*."¹

What, then, is Buddhism? What is it that all Buddhists, if they are genuine Buddhists, hold in common?

Every Buddhist knows the four noble truths; every Buddhist knows that they have been proclaimed by the Tathâgata, and they are the foundation of his religion.

The first noble truth states that there is misery, implying the need of a religion of salvation. The second noble truth states that we must blame ourselves for our own misery, not any other man nor any demon or god: the cause of misery is desire, lust, ignorance, and hatred. The third noble truth points out that the removal of the cause of misery will lead to the removal of misery itself; and finally the fourth noble truth, pointing out the way of purity, is the logical outcome and practical application of the other three noble truths. This fourth noble truth is the essence of all Buddhism. It proclaims that not by asceticism, not by methods of the Brahmanical yoga (hypnotical trances), not by looking out for our happiness, but solely by walking on the noble eighth-fold path of righteousness can Nirvâna be obtained.

There is no genuine Buddhist who does not accept the four noble truths, and every one who does accept them is a Buddhist, whatever else he may be in addition, a philosopher, a scholar, a Christian, a Mohammedan, a Theosophist, a believer in superstitions, or what not, and any one who walks on the noble path of righteousness, leading a pure life, will in time rid himself of his impurities and errors as a silversmith, little by little, blows off the dross from the silver. (See Dhammapada, verse 239.)

Buddhism, or the Dharma, is thus defined in the *Chullavagga* (x, 5): "Of whatsoever doctrines thou shalt be conscious, Gotami, that they conduce to passion and not to peace, to pride and not to veneration, to wishing for much and not to wishing for little, to love of society and not to seclusion, to sloth and not to the exercise of zeal, to being hard to satisfy and not to content, verily mayest thou then, Gotami, bear in mind that that is not Dhamma, that that is not Vinaya, that that is not the teaching of the Master. But of whatsoever doctrines thou shalt be conscious, Gotami, that they conduce to peace and not to passion, to veneration and not to pride, to wishing for little and not to wishing for much, to seclusion and not to love of society, to the exercise of zeal and not to sloth, to content and not to querulousness, verily mayest thou then

¹Beal's *Buddhist Literature in China*.

bear in mind that that is the Dhamma, and that is Vinaya, and that the teaching of the Master." (Translation by Rhys Davids.)

Another definition of Buddhism as formulated by the great Arhat Moggaliputta Tissa, chief of the third great Asoka convocation, runs thus: "It is a Dhamma which follows all Dhammas, and yet all Dhammas descend into or follow that Dhamma."

From the earliest times of the history of Buddhism it has never been correctly understood by hostile critics. The Brahmans called it *Nāstika*, the nihilistic, because Buddhism rejects their speculations concerning the *âtma* and ignores the authority of the Vedas; the Jains called Buddha *Mâyāvadi*, the holder of the doctrine of non-reality.

Buddhism is not a creed, for it discards all belief that must be taken for granted. It is called the *Vibhajja vāda*—the religion of observation and analysis. Truth is the touchstone of Buddha's religion. All dogmatic theorising is abandoned as a "jungle, a wilderness, a puppet show, a writhing, and a fetter," and is "coupled with misery, ruin, despair, and agony, and does not tend to aversion, absence of passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and Nirvâna."

The worldly-minded, in their passions, are not in a condition to realise Nirvâna. Only the perfectly unselfish, those freed from all error and dogmatism, can attain the sinless state. None else, neither god nor man, can know the condition of the emancipated Holy Ones who have reached Nirvâna. Descriptions and explanations are of no avail; it is a state to be experienced. But one thing is sure, Nirvâna is the highest bliss attainable, and we Buddhists are confident that there is no better way to Nirvâna than the noble eightfold path taught by our Master, the Buddha.

THE TRINITY IDEA.

BY THE EDITOR.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of the trinity relation is strongly marked in the symbolism of religious doctrines, in philosophy, and in the various phenomena of nature. Three members are the necessary constituents of a syllogism. Every spot in space is naturally determined from any point of reference by three coördinates, implying that the possibility of moving in infinite directions is for measuring purposes reducible to three dimensions, and history teaches us that the progress of civilisation is effected by a reconciliation of contrasts, which appears (as Hegel puts it) in a series of (1) a thesis, (2) an antithesis, and (3) their combination.¹

In addition to the important part which the trinity idea plays in abstract reasoning, we find that it is an indispensable conception in nature. When trying to comprehend the constant flux of phenomena as manifestations of immutable laws, we distinguish (1) the eternal norms of being, viz., the laws of nature, the *Urgrund*, the βῦδος, the creative and formative power, the conditions of existence, religiously called "the Father of all life;" (2) the actualisation of existence in concrete things and living creatures, the phenomena in which the laws of nature are manifested, the avatars or incarnations of the creator, the evolution of life, the reality of the world-process, which is consummated in the sinless man, the perfectly Enlightened One, the God-man; and (3) the end and aim of life, the ideal, the aspiration of reaching a goal that animates life and gives purpose to its endeavors. These three aspects of life (1) the What, (2) the Whence, (3) the Whither; (1) *Grund*, (2) *Ursache*, (3) *Zweck*; the (1) ground or *raison d'être*, (2) the constant flux of causation, and (3) the direction or tendency of existence, are three phases of one and the same reality; they are a

¹ For particulars see *Primer of Philosophy*, pp. 100-102.

trinity which renders three aspects possible : (1) the nomological, (2) the ætiological, and (3) the ethological (i. e., the teleological or ethical).



Fig. 1. Trimurti: the Hindu Trinity.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27
28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36

Fig. 2. Saccharal Marks.

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Fig. 1. THE BRAHMAN TRIMURTI. (After Coleman.)

The trinity conception of God is offensive only to those who conceive God after the fashion of a human individual, but it commends itself to the philosopher who understands that God is not

personal, but supersonal, not a concrete individual will, but an omnipresent effectiveness, not a God, but God.

It is certainly a remarkable coincidence that several among the higher religions teach the trinity idea in one or another form. Only the Jews and Mohammedans are strict Unitarians, the Parsee faith is almost dualistic, and the religion of ancient Egypt, at least in one of its phases, exhibits the peculiar doctrine of a quadrinity. But the ancient Babylonians, the Brahmans, the Buddhists, and the old paganism of the Germanic races, as explained in the two Eddas, teach a trinity of their God.

The Edda speaks of Alfadhur as Har, the High One, Ifn-Har, the equally High One, and Thridhi or the Third One. But this trinity doctrine is not so clear as the trinity doctrines of the East, nor are we quite sure that it is not a later product which might have originated under Christian influence.

The old Babylonians worshipped the trinity of Anu, Ea, and Bel; Ea being quite analogous to the Christian God the Father, and Bel (also called Merodach) to Christ, God the Son, for he is the saviour, and the conqueror of Tiamat, the Evil One. Says Mr. Budge in his excellent booklet, *Babylonian Life and History*, p. 127 :

“The omnipresent and omnipotent Marduk (Merodach) was the god ‘who went before Ea’ and was the healer and mediator for mankind. He revealed to mankind the knowledge of Ea; in all incantations he is invoked as the god ‘mighty to save’ against evil and ill.”

Brahm, the highest God of Brahmanism, representing the All, or the abstract idea of being, is conceived as a trinity, which is called Trimûrti (Fig. 1), consisting of Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, three divine presences who in many respects bear quite a close resemblance to the Christian Trinity. The most famous ancient representation of the Trimûrti is found near Bombay in the caves of Elephanta, where three massive faces growing from one body are sculptured in the rock.

Kâlidâsa, the Shakespeare of ancient India, best known in the West as the author of *Sakuntala*, says :

“ In these three persons the one god was shown,—
Each first in place, each last,—not one alone;
Of Shiva, Vishnu, Brahma, each may be
First, second, third among the blessed Three.”

Brahma (Fig. 2) is the creator and the father of all, commonly represented with four heads; Vishnu (Fig. 6) is the divine revela-



Fig. 2. BRAHMA.
(Fragment of a car. Musée Guimet.)



Fig. 3. SHIVA-TRIMURTI
Leaning on the linga, the symbol of the
creative faculty.
(Fragment of a car. Musée Guimet.)



Fig. 4. SHIVA WITH PARVATI
On Nanda, the sacred bull (Musée Guimet).



Fig. 5. SHIVA DANCING SURROUNDED BY A HALO OF
FLAMES. (Bronze Statue. Musée Guimet.)



Fig. 6. VISHNU NARASIMHA.
(Fragment of a car. Musée Guimet.)



Fig. 7. KRISHNA
As a shepherd lad playing the flute [the flute is missing]. (Bronze statue, Musée Guimet.)




Fig. 8. JAGANNATH WITH HIS TWO COMPANIONS. (After Schlagintweit.)



Fig. 9. LAO-TSZE—BUDDHA—CONFUCIUS.

D, D, D, philosophers, and E a hero. F, the Chinese dragon, covered with the sacred tortoise shell. G, G, G, H, Gods. I, K, L, M, Demons.

After an old Chinese painting, reproduced by Kirchner, and from Kirchner by Pickart.]

tion manifesting itself in incarnations called "avatars"¹; and Shiva (Figs. 3, 4, 5) is the destroyer and regenerator, the transformer.

Vishnu in his incarnations, especially as Krishna (Figs. 8 and 11) and as Jagannâth² (Fig. 8), is dearest to the Hindu heart, for he is the God that has become flesh, and he is full of love and compassion. Brahma and Shiva, not unlike the Jehovah of the Old Testament, are gods of wrath, but the Vishnu (the Hindu Christ) is full of compassion, of meekness, and humility. This is illustrated in a crude legend which according to a story from the Bhâgavata-purâna runs as follows:³

"A dispute once arose among the sages which of the three gods was greatest. They applied to the greatest of all sages—Bhrigu—to determine the point. He undertook to put all three gods to a severe test. He went first to Brahma and omitted all obeisance. The god's anger blazed forth, but he was at length pacified. Next he went to the abode of Shiva, and omitted to return the god's salutation. The irascible god was enraged, his eyes flashed fire, and he raised his Trident weapon to destroy the sage. But the god's wife, Parvati, interceded for him. Lastly, Bhrigu went to the heaven of Vishnu, whom he found asleep. To try his forbearance, he gave the god a good kick on his breast, which awoke him. Instead of showing anger, Vishnu asked Bhrigu's pardon for not having greeted him on his first arrival. Then he declared he was highly honored by the sage's blow. It had imprinted an indelible mark of good fortune on his breast. He trusted the sage's foot was not hurt, and began to rub it gently. 'This,' said Bhrigu, 'is the mightiest god; he overpowers his enemies by the most potent of all weapons—gentleness and generosity.'"

In spite of the lack of dignity that marks this myth, it reminds one of the story of Golgatha; there, too, the wounds in the breast where the lance pierced the Crucified, became, together with the four other wounds, the symbol of the highest and divinest holiness.

Krishna is God manifesting himself as the divine hero, teacher, and saviour. The Krishna legends bear many strange resemblances

¹ Vishnu incarnates himself in ten avatars. The illustration (Fig. 6) represents him as Narasimha, or the lion-man, according to the legend that the heretical king Hiranyakasipa, ridiculing the idea of Vishnu's omnipresence, asked mockingly: "Is Vishnu in this pillar?" whereupon the pillar was rent asunder, the god came out in the shape of a lion-man and tore the scoffer to pieces.

² Jagannâth is commonly misrepresented in Christian countries, and there is much talk of the custom of people throwing themselves under the wheels of the big Car of Jagannâth. There is no truth in the tale. Says Sir Monier Monier-Williams, an enthusiastic worker in the field of Christian apologetics: "It is usual for missionaries to speak with horror of the self-immolation alleged to take place under the Car of Jagannâth (Krishna). But if deaths occur, they must be accidental, as self-destruction is wholly opposed both to the letter and spirit of the Vaishnava religion." (*Brakmanism and Hinduism*, p. 118.)

Jagannâth, the Vishnu incarnation of mercy and compassion, always appears with two companions. As to their grotesque appearance, we must consider that the Hindu tries to describe the divine by things uncommon and extraordinary.

³ See Sir M. M. Williams's *Brakmanism and Hinduism*, p. 46.



Fig. 10. THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY AFTER THE CONCEPTION OF OLD GERMAN MASTERS.
(Reproduced from Muther.)



Fig. 11. KRISHNA NURSED BY DEVAKI.
After an old and richly-colored Hindu painting. [Reproduced from Moore's Hindu Pantheon, plate 59.]



Fig. 12. QUAN-YIN.
Buddha's incarnation as a mother's love.
White Chinese Porcelain (Musée Guimet.)



Fig. 13. THE BUDDHIST TRINITY (Japanese).
The Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha.
Carved wood; Musée Guimet.



Fig. 14. THE CHRISTIAN TRINITY
From the *Iconographie Chrétienne*. [Reproduced
from Bastian's *Ethnol. Bilderbuch*, plate xvii.]



Fig. 15. MARY'S CORONATION.
By Ambrogio Fossano, called Borgognone. Formerly
in the S. Simpliciano at Milan, now at the Brera. [After
Lübke.]



Fig. 16. THE CORONATION OF MARY.

After H. F., an unknown Old German artist of Augsburg. (Reproduced from Muther.)



Fig. 17. THE TRINITY.

From Hans Schaufeleius's prayer book *Via Felicitatis*. (Reproduced from Muther.)



Fig. 18. THE HOLY TRINITY IN THE VATICAN.
After Pietro Berrettini. Reproduced from *Il Vaticano*, plate xx.

to stories in the lives of both Buddha and Christ. The most curious among them are Krishna's escape from a massacre of children, arranged by a Hindu Herod for the purpose of killing the newborn god, and his transfiguration shortly before his death. Pictures of the Krishna child at the bosom of his mother remind us very much of similar subjects in Buddhistic and Christian art (Compare Fig. 11 with Fig. 12). Well known is also the thoughtful legend that while Krishna plays the flute (Fig. 6), every one of the dancing shepherdesses believes that the swain whom she embraces is the god himself.

The Buddhist trinity (Fig. 13) is different from the trinity of the Brahmans. The Buddhists take refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, every one of them being a manifestation of the bôdhi, the enlightenment that leads to the salvation of Nirvâna. Not exactly the same, but a similar idea, is expressed in the doctrine of the three personalities of Buddha: (1) the Sambhoga-kâya, the personality of bliss, which means Buddha as the eternal law of the bôdhi; (2) the Nirmâna-kâya, the personality of transformations, or Buddha as he manifests himself in evolution; and (3) the Dharma-kâya, the personality of religious truth, which is the unfoldment of Buddha in the Buddhist doctrines.¹

In China there is a peculiar trinity of the great religious leaders, Lao-Tsze, Buddha, and Confucius (Fig. 9). Although Taoists, Buddhists, and Confucianists are not free from jealousy among themselves, the systems of the three masters are not regarded as antagonistic but rather as complementary. Their trinity appears to be accidental, and yet it, too, is an expression of the triune relation of philosophy, religion, and ethics.

The Christian doctrine of the trinity was definitely settled at the time of the Council of Nice. In the beginning of the Christian Church there was a wavering between two conceptions, one of which may be called gnostic, the other canonical. The gnostic conception, formed after the pattern of father, mother, and child, represented the Deity as a trinity of (1) God the Creator, (2) Sophia or the Divine Wisdom, and (3) the Messiah, also called the son of David, the son of man, the son of woman, and the son of God. Some gnostic authors use the terms Sophia and Logos as perfect synonyms, but among the Christians of the third century the

¹In the Buddhist mythology of China and Japan the trinity idea is very prominent. A Chinese work of five thin volumes, kindly presented me by Mr. Jos. M. Wade of Boston, contains among its numerous illustrations of Buddhist saints and deities a great number of trinity figures. The title of the work shows four characters, signifying "Buddha-Image Table-Collection," which means "A Collection of Illustrations of Buddhist Images."

term Sophia is entirely abandoned, and the trinity of God the Father, God the Son, or Christ, as the incarnation of the Logos, and the Holy Spirit, becomes firmly established as the canonical doctrine of the Church (Figs. 10 and 14-18). Nevertheless, the gnostic conception of Sophia, the bride of God, reappears in the deification of Mary, who sometimes, although rarely, takes the place of the Holy Ghost (Fig. 17), and sometimes is represented as an additional person in the trinity (Fig. 15), which, however, in artistic representations, makes the Holy Ghost appear as the relation that obtains between God, Christ, and Mary.¹

The Brahman, the Buddhist, and the Christian trinity conceptions are in many respects very different, but the more instructive and remarkable are their agreements which teach us that the trinity idea is deeply founded in the nature of things.

¹ The old Christian Trinities (e. g., Fig. 14) bear a close resemblance to Hindu representations of the Trimûrti. The old German Masters represent God the Father as an emperor holding counsel with his son, the king, on the government of the world (e. g., Fig. 18). There are a few pictures which seem to convey the idea that God the Father, Mary, and Christ form a trinity (see Fig. 15), but the instances in which (as in Fig. 17) the Holy Ghost is entirely replaced by Mary, are rare.

THE MECHANISM OF SYMPATHY.

BY HENRY F. RULISON.

WHEN WE SEE a mother look for the last time upon the face of her dead child, when we see her tears and hear her sobs and cries, there wells up in our breasts a flood of emotion, we are filled with grief, sorrow overflows our hearts, and tears dim our eyes. We hear of the good fortune of some acquaintance and are at once filled with joy. We weep with those that weep and laugh with those that laugh.

These are familiar examples of the manifestations of sympathy. The common notion of sympathy is that it is a feeling corresponding to that which another feels, it is literally a *fellow-feeling* with others in their varied conditions of grief or joy. It is an agreement of affections or inclinations, or a sameness of natures, which makes persons pleased with one another or with the same subject of thought.

By most people sympathy is thought to be restricted to the hearts of the human family, and particularly to individuals of the same race. We hardly ever think that a bird feels sorry for its wounded mate, or that a fox that has caught a good fat hen is congratulated by his fellow-foxes. We never think, as did Pliny, that plants sympathise with one another. It is only the poet who can say that "the sympathies and affections of plants blossom into marriage; the petals of flowers are their wedding dresses, and their lovely hues and sweet odors are their gayeties and smiles and music." We never think of the ocean and the land as lovers, having that likeness of natures which makes them pleased with each other. It is only the poet that can say, as did Alexander Smith, "The sea is a bridegroom, the shore his wedded bride. In the fulness of his marriage joy he decorates her tawny brow with shells, retires a space to see how fair she looks, then proud, runs

up to kiss her." We never expect, as we enter the inorganic world, the world of coal, and iron, and rock, to see manifestations of sympathy. Yet the chemist finds here what appears to be warm sympathy and enduring affection. Many of the most pleasing experiments in chemistry and physics depend upon the apparent fact of sympathy. Dr. Mason Good says, "It exists between atom and atom, and the philosopher calls it attraction; it exists between iron and loadstone, and every one calls it magnetism." So that chemistry and physics are only a sportive, poetical way of telling the story of the human heart, its life, its intelligence, its emotions.

It is the object of this paper to show that only by the study of the so-called dead world around us can we really know what sympathy is, its exact nature, its process of action, and its development from unconscious sympathy in matter to conscious sympathy in mind. The field is an inviting one, full of surprises and pleasures, of instruction and philosophy, and to it the thoughtful attention of the reader is invited.

Let us go back to our childhood sports, to the old orchard and the old apple-tree, and see again the swing suspended from one of its branches. The mere mention of the swing sets our heart a-beating in sympathy with its motion. Did you ever carefully observe this motion and the process of swinging? A little girl sits in the swing, and a little boy stands just behind her to push. He gives a slight push and she swings away. She swings back, and he again gives a stronger push. She again swings away farther than before. And so, back and forth, she swings. Should he push before she gets fully back, he would stop the motion of the swing; should he push too slowly or too quickly, there would be an interference with the natural motion of the swing. He must push exactly at the moment the swing is ready to go away from him. In this way the swing has an even, steady motion, going away and coming back in equal intervals of time. It swings back and forth, say, thirty times a minute; the boy must therefore push fifteen times every minute. This swinging motion is called, in the language of science, a vibration.

A little way off is another swing, longer than the one just considered, and we notice that it takes longer for it to vibrate back and forth. This swing vibrates, say, twenty times a minute, and the pushes are ten a minute. Should the boy push eleven times a minute, or nine times a minute, he would stop the swinging. He must push exactly ten times a minute, no more, no less.

Anything which, when moved out of place, comes back again

to place, in equal intervals of time, vibrates. Examples of vibration are seen in the movement of the pendulum of a clock, the balance-wheel of a watch, the shuttle of a sewing-machine, the piston of a steam-engine, the waves upon the surface of water, etc.

Take a large tuning-fork and fasten it firmly by its handle to a table, so that its prongs shall stand upwards. Strike one of the prongs. See how it vibrates back and forth, so swiftly that the eye can scarcely follow its rapid motion. At the same time there is heard a musical tone of a certain pitch. Take a small piece of cork and suspend it by a fine thread. Hold the cork close to the vibrating prong. The prong pushes the cork and sends it flying away. The suspended cork is a swing, and the vibrating prong is the boy that pushes it. But the prong strikes out many times oftener than the cork can swing back and forth in a second. If the thread be shortened, that is, the swing be made shorter, a length may be found so that the vibrations of the prong and of the cork will be the same in number per second. In the case of the swing and the boy, the boy timed his pushes to agree with the vibrations of the swing; in the case of the fork and the cork, the vibrations of the cork are timed to agree with the pushes of the prong. In other words, the cork-swing is keyed up to the pitch of the fork.

Here are two tuning-forks of exactly the same pitch, that is, they vibrate the same number of times in a second. Each is fastened by means of a brass plate to the top of small boxes, open at the ends, and made of thin pieces of wood. The boxes are called sounding-boxes. When the forks are struck, they vibrate and force the top and sides of the boxes to vibrate with equal rapidity. The result is a very loud musical tone of the same pitch as the forks. Place one of the boxes on the table and hold the other in the hand. Strike the fork of the one held in the hand, and it emits a loud sound. While sounding, bring it near the silent fork attached to the box on the table, but not in contact with it. Allow them to continue in this position for a few seconds, and then stop the vibration of the fork in the hand—the tone is still heard. The fork on the table has taken up the vibrations of its neighbor and is now sounding in its turn, a faint, mellow tone. The vibrations of the fork in the hand have been transferred to the fork on the table. How is it done?

There is around us a substance capable of transmitting the motion of a tuning-fork, or of any vibrating body, to great distances with great rapidity. This substance is the atmosphere. The atmosphere is composed of very small particles placed very near

to one another, but not actually touching, so that each particle can swing back and forth with perfect freedom. Each particle is, in fact, a little swing. But they have this advantage over ordinary swings—they are not held in place by threads of different lengths, and so can vibrate just so rapidly, and no more, but are held near one another by the attractive power of the earth, and kept apart by a repulsive force which exists between them, an arrangement which permits them to swing slowly or rapidly. When the prong of the fork vibrates it strikes the particles of air next to it, which push other particles, which in turn push still other particles, and so on. Each particle swings a little ways, strikes its neighbor in front of it, springs back to be struck by the neighbor back of it, and so on. And in this way motion travels, like waves, through the air, outwards in all directions from the vibrating fork, and thus particles of air at a distance from the fork vibrate as rapidly as the prongs themselves. And when the air-waves made by the fork in the hand reach the fork on the table they strike its prongs and cause them to vibrate. "It is easy to understand this. The waves of air of the one fork can affect the other, because they are perfectly timed. A single wave causes the prongs of the silent fork to vibrate through a very small space. But just as it has completed this small vibration, another wave of air is ready to push it. Thus the small pushes add themselves together. The pushes, all delivered at the proper moment, all properly timed, give such strength to the vibrations of the fork on the table as to render it audible." One fork, then, can cause another at a distance to vibrate with the same form and speed of motion as itself has. This sameness of motion is called sympathetic vibration. Two bodies vibrate in sympathy, then, when the motion of one is similar to and as rapid as the motion of the other. Instead of a tuning-fork to set up motion among the particles of air, any vibrating body may be used, as piano-strings, harp-strings, the reeds of an organ, the tongue of a jew's-harp, a bell, etc.

All have heard of the harp of a thousand strings. Let us, in imagination, make one. Some of its strings shall be long, some short; some large, some small; some light, some heavy; some stretched tightly, some loosely; no two alike, but all capable of vibrating in different times and thus of giving out different tones, and all mounted upon a large sounding-box or sounding-board—a most wonderful musical instrument. Let us now place this harp of a thousand strings at one end of a room and place near it a young man who has good, sharp ears. At the other end of the room we

will place a piano, a violin, a flute, a cornet, a bugle, a whistle, a drum, and other instruments, each having a person to play upon it. The young lady at the piano strikes C, the young man at the harp hears C sounding in the harp. She strikes E on the piano, he hears E in the harp. She slowly plays "Home, Sweet Home," he hears "Home, Sweet Home" in the harp. And now a simple melody is played upon the flute; the young man hears the same melody in the harp. The drum is now struck, and the heavy, long strings of the harp give out the same sound. And so for the other instruments. As the strings of the piano vibrate, waves of motion pass through the air to the strings of the harp and cause some of them to vibrate. All strings of the harp so constructed and keyed-up as to vibrate the same number of times per second as those of the piano vibrate in sympathy with them, and give out the same tune as is played on the piano. Waves of air from the cornet pass over to the harp, certain strings of which vibrate in sympathy and give out the same tune as is played upon the cornet. In like manner all the musical instruments play upon the harp through this principle of sympathetic vibration. The harp is so constructed that it is in sympathy with all the instruments, and can reproduce all the tones and tunes they give forth.

This harp of ours is not altogether a creature of the imagination; England's great scientist, John Tyndall, says: "If you open a piano and sing into it a certain string will respond. Change the pitch of your voice; the first string ceases to vibrate, but another replies. Change again the pitch; the first two strings are silent, while another resounds. Now, in altering the pitch you simply change the form of the motion communicated by your vocal chords to the air, one string responding to one form and another to another."

Now, suppose this wonderful harp of ours were a conscious musical instrument, that it could feel its own tones or vibrations, and know its own tunes as they are caused in it by the other musical instruments. And suppose, further, that each of the other instruments were a conscious instrument, that it could feel its own tones or vibrations and know its own tunes, would not the harp sympathise literally with the piano, and the flute, and the cornet, and the drum?

That this wonderful harp is not wholly impossible of realisation is apparent when we come to think of the telephone. In fact, the telephone is a much more wonderful mechanism than our imaginary harp, wonderful in its simplicity and ability to respond sym-

pathetically to impressions made upon it by waves of air. The band may play, ducks may quack, dogs bark, cats mew, birds sing, and boys whistle, all at the same time, in the presence of one telephone, and the medley of sound will be transmitted miles distant, through the medium of a single small wire, to be exactly reproduced in another telephone. The two phones are constructed precisely alike, and what thrills one thrills the other in the same way, one vibrates in sympathy with the other. Now, if each phone were a conscious phone, capable of feeling and knowing its own vibrations, the feelings and emotions of each would be the same, there would be a literal sympathy between them. The joy of one would be the joy of the other, the grief of one would be the grief of the other, they would literally be "two souls with but a single thought, two hearts that beat as one."

This, then, is the philosophy of sympathy, that two objects constructed on the same plan, made of similar materials, keyed-up, so to speak, to the same degree of tension, subjected to the same forces, will vibrate in sympathy with each other. And if the two objects are conscious objects, an act of one accompanied by a feeling will arouse the like feeling and action in the other.

The sun is composed of various elements whose particles are vibrating with great rapidity. The earth has in and around it the same elements whose particles are capable of vibrating with the same rapidity. Between the sun and the earth, and filling all space, is a medium capable of transmitting waves of motion from the sun to the earth, and causing earth-particles to vibrate in sympathy with sun-particles. So that storms and other disturbances in the sun are accompanied by storms and electrical disturbances on the earth. And what is true of the sun and the earth is also true of all other heavenly bodies. Thus, as Tyndall says, "nature is not an aggregate of independent parts, but an organic whole." And thus throughout the universe there is a bond of sympathy which unites into one grand whole the myriads of worlds. It is no poet's dream that makes some lowly flower rejoice in the warmth of the sunlight, that makes the valleys laugh when kissed by the raindrops, that makes a little bird sing in some human breast when all nature smiles and is happy. Given a mechanism that can vibrate in unison with the varied motions of nature, and at the same time be conscious of these motions, and this mechanism is in literal sympathy with the thrills of the universe. And we have such a mechanism—it is a human being—man. Hear Tyndall again: "And thus is sentient man acted upon by nature, the optic, the auditory, and

other nerves of the human body being so many strings differently tuned and responsive to different forms of the universal power."

We are now prepared to study the phenomena of sympathetic vibrations accompanied by consciousness or feeling, as exemplified in ourselves and other animals.

The nervous system is the mechanism by means of which, and through which, sympathy is established between man and man, and between man and the world outside of man. It is a mechanism much more wonderful and complex than our harp of a thousand strings. The limits of this paper will not permit us to study its organisation in detail, nor to notice all the modes of its action. But enough will be presented to enable us to see that the principle of sympathetic vibration is the key which unlocks and opens up to us the apparent mystery of sympathy.

The nerves are of two kinds, nerve cells, and nerve fibres. The nerve cells are small, irregular masses of grayish color. They are so constructed that they can respond to the various motions that may come to them, as do the strings of a harp or the vibrating plate of a telephone, that is, they can vibrate in sympathy with other cells or motions. They can also originate motion, because in the process of waste and repair which accompanies their nutrition, molecular changes involve atomic and molecular vibratory motions. As each string of a piano, on account of its structure and tension, can vibrate only in one way and emit but one kind of pitch or note, so each cell, on account of its structure and quality of tissue, which it has by inheritance and education, can originate but one form of motion and vibrate to but one kind of impression. The nerve cells are connected with one another by white nerve threads or fibres. The nerve fibres do nothing but transmit motion from cell to cell. The cells may be thought of as telephones, and the fibres as wires connecting them.

There are millions of nerve-cells and millions of connecting nerve-fibres. The cells and fibres are found in every organ of the body; they are found clustered in large masses in the spinal cord and brain, which are called nerve-centres. If we think of the nerve-cells of the body as telephones, the nerve-fibres as telephonic wires, then the brain is a telephonic central office where connexions are made between the various telephones.

As one telephone vibrates in sympathy with another through the medium of the connecting wire, so the nerve-cells and centres vibrate in sympathy with one another through the medium of the connecting nerve-fibres. But unlike the sympathy between tele-

phones, there is a literal sympathy between the cells and nerve-centres of the body, for there is associated with the vibration of nerve-cells a most wonderful phenomenon, that of feeling and consciousness. The cells not only vibrate, but they know their own states of vibration. How it is that a certain mode of motion results in a certain feeling is a mystery no one has solved. But the fact is that there is a feeling, and that the feeling changes as the form of motion changes.

Motion gets into the brain from the outer world through the medium of certain special nerve-organs called the organs of sense. For example, the ear is such a special sense-organ. The cells and fibres of the internal ear are of many sizes and lengths, and many thousand in number, so that, no matter what kinds and qualities and rapidities of sound-waves may come to them, some are capable of absorbing the same motion, of vibrating in sympathy. But this motion does not end in the ear. The nerve-cells of the ear are connected with like ones in the brain. So that the motion of the fibres and cells of the ear are transmitted to the cells of the brain; and the cells of the brain vibrate in sympathy with those of the ear, and thus with the sounds in the world outside the brain. And the motion of the cells of the brain thus produced result in a state of consciousness we call a feeling, or sensation. We are conscious of noises and musical tones of different pitches, and qualities, and degrees of loudness. And this is hearing. Now, if the strings of a piano were conscious beings, if they could feel and know their own motions as they vibrate, the piano and the brain would literally sympathise with each other. Substitute for the piano a man. He feels like laughing, and he laughs. Waves of air from his vocal chords speed through the atmosphere and cause in the ear of another man corresponding vibrations. The motion goes on to the other man's brain, resulting in like vibrations in his brain, and he, too, feels like laughing, and laughs—laughs out of pure sympathy. And this sympathy is of the simplest kind; "it is a resonance, or unconscious reproduction or imitation of another's feeling."

Another example: At the back of the eye is a delicate substance called the retina. It is composed of nerve-cells and fibres in the form of rods and cones, of great complexity. The cells are of various shapes and sizes, the rods of different sizes and lengths. They are all connected by the optic nerve with the cells of the brain. Now, what is called light, or color, is thought to be only certain forms of wave-motion running through a medium called ether, which fills all space not occupied by other matter. In the

color called red as many as four hundred and thirty trillion waves of ether strike the retina every second. Violet sends out seven hundred trillion per second. The larger cells and the longer rods and cones of the retina are made to vibrate by the slower waves of light, and the smaller cells and shorter rods and cones are made to vibrate by the more rapid waves of light, just as a long swing is made to vibrate by slow pushes, and a short swing by fast pushes. Now, suppose there is placed before the eye a red rose, green grass, a yellow buttercup, the blue sky, and a modest violet. Red waves of light from the rose enter the eye and certain cells, rods, and cones of the retina are put into sympathetic vibration. Green waves from the green grass, in like manner, put other cells, rods, and cones into sympathetic vibration. In like manner other cells, rods, and cones of the retina are made to vibrate in sympathy with the waves of motion from the buttercup, the sky, and the violet. For every form of wave of light that enters the eye there is a corresponding form of motion in the retina. But the motions do not end in the retina, they are transmitted through the optic nerve to the cells of the brain, and corresponding motions are set up in them. So that the cells of the brain vibrate in sympathy with the roses, the grass, the sky, the buttercups, the violets, and with all the colors of nature. Still further, the motion of the cells of the brain are accompanied by consciousness, and there are as many forms of consciousness as there are forms of waves of light. Now, if the roses and the buttercups and the violets had feelings determined by their respective colors, we should feel as they feel, there would be a literal sympathy between us and them.

What is true of the ear and the eye as instruments for transmitting certain forms of motion to the brain and thus arousing certain feelings within us is true of the other nerves of the body. From the various organs of the body a multitude of vibrations are transmitted to the brain without intermittance, producing in us a continuous but ever-varying state of consciousness—our personality. So that our feelings of bodily comfort or pain, of hunger, thirst, muscular tension, etc., are but various forms of sympathetic vibration. So universally is this view entertained that it is common to say that the organs of the body sympathise with one another, through the medium of the sympathetic nervous system, and that our varying moods and emotions depend upon the varying conditions and actions of the bodily organs. So it is true, as said before, that the nerves of the human body are so many strings, differently tuned and responsive to different forms of motion. We thus get

feelings or ideas of odors, tastes, temperature, hardness, smoothness, colors, etc. The world close around us and the distant sun and moon and stars are continually sending into us waves of motion of different forms and qualities and degrees, causing us to tremble, to vibrate, to thrill in every nerve, producing in us an infinite number and variety of feelings; feelings as great as nature feels, full of joy if she be joyful, full of sadness if she be sad.

As we have seen, the nerve fibres from the eye are distributed to certain nerve cells of the brain, those from the ear to other cells of the brain, those from the nose to still other cells, etc., so that different receptive parts of the brain have different forms of vibration, attended by different forms of feeling. But this is not all. The various parts of the brain are themselves connected by nerve fibres. For example, the cells which vibrate under the impulses of waves of light are connected with the cells which are moved by waves of sound, so that the feelings accompanying a disturbance of the eye may be associated with feelings accompanying a disturbance of the ear. Thus, when we see a moving train of cars and hear the puffs of the engine, the two forms of feeling exist together, they are associated. In like manner other forms of feeling may be associated. Feelings produced by nerve disturbance in all parts of the body are thus made to blend into one compound feeling; it may be one we call bodily comfort, or unrest, or buoyancy of spirit. Compound feelings are the result of a blending of the vibratory motions of different nerve-cells through the medium of the connecting nerve-fibres, the form of vibration in one cell being superimposed upon that of another, as ripples upon larger waves or as overtone-vibrations of strings upon the fundamental. Another thing is made possible by this connexion of brain-cell with brain-cell. A disturbance of the cells connected with the ear may disturb the cells connected with the eye, even though the eyes themselves be not impressed. Thus, the music of a brass band will call up those feelings of sight we had when we saw the players. Though the players are out of sight, we can see them in the mind—their instruments, their dress, their orderly marching. Thus, feelings can revive other feelings with which they were once associated. A flash of lightning will revive the sound of thunder, and we seem to hear it even before it comes, that is, we anticipate the sound. And the sound of thunder leads us to think that it was preceded by lightning, though we did not see it. The first ten notes of "Old Hundred" will revive all the remaining notes, and we know the entire tune before it is sung. It is because the cells of the brain

are connected by "associative nerve-fibres, as Dalton calls them, that one idea revives another idea with which it was once associated. If an idea could not thus call up another idea, there would be no such train of ideas we call thought. Continuous, coherent thought is only possible when the cells of the brain are connected. Recollection and memory are made possible by this connexion, and impaired or destroyed by the degeneration or destruction of the connecting fibres.

" Lulled in the countless chambers of the brain,
Our thoughts are linked by many a hidden chain.
Awake but one, and lo! what myriads rise!
Each stamps its image as the other flies."

How wonderful is all this. The brain centres of the eye, the ear, and other organs of sense, at the base of the brain, are so many pipe-organs connected with the outer world, and played upon by it. Arranged on the surface of the cerebrum are the cells concerned in feeling and thinking, which are echo-organs connected with the pipe-organs below, and which are connected with one another by associative fibres. The organs at the base of the brain are played upon by pulses from the outer world, resulting in such harmonies as only the colors of the rainbow and the voices of angels can originate. The echo-organs reproduce the melodies in faint, mellow tones, with all the harmonic overtones. Even while the pipe-organs are silent, the outer world shut out, the echo-organs are sounding their sweet songs. Ideas, emotions, images, thoughts follow one another in an endless succession in the echo-organs. One melody in an echo-organ evokes another melody in another organ, one idea calls up another idea. And all so, because one part vibrates in sympathy with parts connected with it.

This view of the mechanism of associated feelings and thoughts is substantially that taught by modern psychology. Th. Ribot says: "If we take any adult person, in good health, and of average intelligence, the ordinary mechanism of his mental life will consist in a perpetual coming and going of inward events, in a marching by of sensations, feelings, ideas, and images, which associate with, or repel each other according to certain laws. Properly speaking, it is not, as frequently has been said, a chain, a series, but it is rather an irradiation in various directions, and through various strata; a mobile aggregate which is being incessantly formed, unformed, and reformed. Every one knows that this mechanism has been carefully studied in our day, and that the theory of association forms one of the solidest acquisitions of modern psychology."

But the half has not been told. The vibration of nerve cells results in a molecular decomposition of the cells themselves, accompanied by the liberation of energy. And this liberated energy manifests itself partly in heat and partly in the production of muscular contraction. Nerve-fibres, called motor nerves, run from the cells of the brain to all the muscles of the body. And the muscles are made to contract by the stimuli of this liberated energy carried to them by the motor nerves. So that every idea, every feeling, every thought is followed by some act, of some muscle, in some part of the body. All our movements and all the actions of the various organs of the body are thus produced by waves of energy which originate in, and proceed from, certain groups of cells in the brain, called motor cells. A disturbance in the motor cells of the brain is accompanied by a feeling or state of consciousness we call volition, or will. The motor cells are intimately connected with the feeling and thinking cells by nerve fibres, so that a disturbance in the feeling and thinking cells can be transmitted to the motor cells, and from thence to the muscles, causing bodily movements.

This fact of nerve structure makes it possible for us to understand how certain feelings are followed by certain definite actions; the feeling of hunger, for instance, followed by an act of eating; the feeling of pain followed by an act of crying-out; the feeling of joy followed by laughing or shouting. In every act there is not only the consciousness of the act itself, but an accompanying feeling which prompted the act. If a certain feeling finds expression in a certain action, and the feeling and the action are many times repeated, an association is established between the feeling and the motor cells, and a habit of acting in a definite way after certain feelings is formed. On the other hand, an action in another person will arouse in us the feelings that have always accompanied our acting in the same way, and having those feelings we are impelled to act as that person does. For example, we have a certain feeling and we yawn, and every time we have that feeling we yawn. We see a person yawn, and his act arouses in us the same feeling that has always accompanied our yawning, and we yawn. We unconsciously imitate that person's act because we feel as he feels—a case of the simplest form of sympathetic vibration. Again, we have a certain feeling and we weep. We hear a person weep, or see the tears flow down his cheeks, and his action and appearance arouses in us the same feeling and actions that have always accompanied our weeping, and we weep because we feel as he does, we weep out of sympathy with him.

Some amount of experience in the society of our fellow-men is needed to establish an association between the several feelings and their expression in action. But when the connexion is established a person automatically takes on the moods of hilarity, anxiety, or depression of those about him, and gives expression in acts of attitude, gesture, voice, etc. Says Sully: "A child suddenly placed in the midst of a group of merry children catches the prevailing tone of gladness. The spread of a feeling of indignation or of admiration, through a community, as a school or a nation, illustrates this tendency of a strongly manifested emotion to reflect itself in others. This fact is known as the contagion of feeling."

Contagious sympathy is well exemplified in some of the lower animals that associate in numbers. Herbert Spencer explains its mechanism in substance as follows: Members of a herd experience the attacks of an enemy. The emotion of fear aroused by the attack expresses itself in movements of escape, preceded and accompanied, it may be, by sounds of some kind. Each member of the herd sees the movements and hears the sounds of the rest of the herd, and the movements and sounds are more or less like his own movements and sounds, which are prompted by his own feelings of fear. Frequent repetition of attacks establishes an association between the feelings of fear and the signs of fear in himself and others, which signs, in time, become quite uniform as expressions of certain definite fears. After the association is established the movements and sounds cannot be perceived without there being aroused the feeling habitually joined with them when they were before perceived. Thus it is that the signs of fear may be excited in those to whom no fearful object is perceptible. And thus one member of a flock, himself alone and alarmed and making a sign of fear, seen and heard by the rest, excites in the rest the fear he is displaying, and the rest, prompted by their fear, begin to make like sounds and movements.

This explains how panics are brought about. A flock of birds towards which a man approaches will quietly watch for a while; but when one flies, those near it, excited by its movements of escape, fly also; and in a moment the rest are in the air. The same happens with sheep; when one runs, all run, and so strong is the sympathetic tendency among them that when one leaps over a stick held in his path, all leap at the same spot, though the stick be taken away. Dogs barking at night exemplify this tendency to sympathetic action. The panics in theatres, schools, and churches, upon the alarm of fire, are also examples of contagious sympathy.

By the inheritance of like body-structures and habits there must necessarily be aroused in progeny feelings and actions similar to those of progenitors, when subjected to the same environments and experiences. The association of certain feelings and corresponding actions becomes organic, and a quick, automatic, unconscious, and complete sympathy is established between the members of the same class or kind of animals. A drove of cattle, coming to a blood-stain in the road, one of their number smells it; whereupon he bellows and paws the ground. The others, seeing his actions and hearing his bellowing, begin to bellow and paw the ground. A brood of chickens under the care of the mother hen, hearing her cry of warning as some shadow flits over her head, will at once run under her protecting wings. And this they will do having never before heard the cry and being totally unconscious of danger. Having inherited a body-structure tuned in unison with the warning sound, the chickens respond as readily as does one tuning-fork to another. Says Sully: "That the child has a vague, intuitive knowledge of others' feelings seems shown by the fact that he responds to the smiles of his mother long before his own experience could have taught him to associate pleasurable feeling with this particular facial movement." The explanation of this "intuitive knowledge" seems to be that the child, having inherited the body mechanism of his mother, seeing her smile, responds in a definite action, and this action has been the action of the class to which he belongs for countless generations. Acts usually classed as instinctive find their explanation in the facts of heredity, and the possession of a mechanism which responds sympathetically to environments habitual to the race. Given a mechanism so constructed as to move in a definite way upon the application of a particular stimulus, when the appropriate stimulus comes along the mechanism responds accordingly. A windmill so constructed as to turn round a certain way when the wind blows will always turn round that same way when the wind blows.¹

But animals of unlike classes or kinds, constructed upon different plans, inheriting unlike mechanisms and experiences, are like two tuning-forks of different pitches of tone. They cannot vibrate in sympathy with each other. The acts of one cannot call out like acts in the other, either because the feelings are unlike or because like feelings have become associated with unlike acts of expression. The playing of a march will at once impel men who

¹In this connexion attention may be called to Mr. E. C. Hegeler's articles on the soul in *The Open Court*, Nos. 1, 15, and 127, which I have only seen after I had written the present article.

have marched to music to "fall in" and "keep step," but a cow will hear the same music and pass by with stolid indifference. No feelings of musical tones are invoked in her brain by the playing; her brain and the instruments do not vibrate in sympathy. The howling of a dog when he hears music clearly shows us that he and the music are in discord. The saying, "Birds of a feather flock together," is founded upon this fact of sympathetic vibration. It is only another way of saying that sympathy is found only between members of the same class or kind, because of similarity of structure.

In its well-developed form sympathy is more than a vibration in unison with the feelings of another, it is more than a resonance or imitative reproduction of manifested feeling. Says Sully: "It implies a distinct representation of another's pleasure or pain, and a disposition to make it our own, or to identify ourselves with the subject of it. It is a feeling for as well as with another." And Herbert Spencer says: "The degree and range of sympathy depends upon the clearness and extent of representation. So that there can be sympathy only in proportion as there is power of representation." Let us notice, briefly, the nature of representation upon which the higher forms of sympathy depend.

When a bell is struck it vibrates and emits a sound, and it continues to vibrate and emit a sound for some little time after the blow is struck which caused the vibration. When one looks at the sun for a few moments and then closes his eyes he still sees the sun, round and distinct. An image of the sun seems to be in his eyes. The retina continues to vibrate for some time after it is struck by the sun's waves of light. Not only is the retina set in vibration by the light of the sun, but the optic centres in the brain and the brain-cells associated with the optic centres are also made to vibrate, and the vibration of the brain-cells continues for some time after the retina ceases to vibrate. In other words, an image of the thing actually seen may be in consciousness for some time after the thing has disappeared. And multiplied experiences in seeing things, and thus causing the cells of the brain to vibrate, result in such a structural condition of the cells concerned in seeing that they acquire a habit of vibrating in a particular way. So that, though an object which has caused a vibration in the brain-cells is far distant, or utterly annihilated, the brain-cells, being now "keyed up" in unison with the motion of the annihilated object, still have the ability to vibrate as they did when under the stimulus of the object. And when they do thus vibrate, either

from molecular change in the process of nutrition or from stimuli from other cells associated with them, there is an image, more or less vivid, of the annihilated object. And this re-presentation of the image is called, in the language of psychology, representation. The brain is now able to act independently of external stimulation, having acquired a habit so to act through previous exercises under external stimulation. Beethoven was able to represent musical sounds after he had lost his hearing. Says Spencer: "A sympathetic feeling, in its higher form, is one that is not immediately excited by the natural cause of such a feeling, but one that is mediately excited by the presentation of signs habitually associated with such a feeling." Thus, though one may have nothing happening to himself to grieve about, when he sees signs of grief in another his own brain is excited, and a representation of his own grief when he manifested similar signs springs into being; he has a mental representation of another's inner experiences, he knows the other's condition of mind. And this image of another's grief may be strengthened and made vivid by the intuitions of grief he has inherited from a long line of ancestors who have had similar grief, and it may be strengthened and made vivid by the blendings of many of his own former griefs of a like form. Be that as it may, if the representation is vivid it takes firm hold on his mind, so that the suffering he witnesses is his own suffering, and he is prompted to make the same efforts to relieve the other's suffering as he would to relieve his own. He thus feels for as well as with another. And this complete identification of himself with another, this putting of himself in another's place, impels him to do toward and for that other as he would that other should do for him, similarly conditioned. "His feeling for another is a disinterested impulse which forms the foundation of a morally good and virtuous disposition of character."

Pleasure is experienced by us when we have representations of pleasure in others, and the feeling prompts us to generous actions. Pain is experienced by us when we have representations of pain in others, and the feeling prompts us to mitigate that pain.

The feeling of pity is a complex feeling experienced by us when we see in another a combination of misfortunes, as poverty coupled with helpless old age, the grief of parents over the criminal conduct of a son, an accident that cripples one for life, etc., though there exists no connexion, personal or social, with that other.

Sympathy with pain puts a check upon intentional infliction of

pain. Representations of pain and ignominy sufficiently vivid inhibits us from inflicting the penalty of death upon a convicted murderer. The corporal punishment of children is inhibited when sympathy is intense. Even the feelings of another are reluctantly wounded by unkind words when there is a high degree of representative power.

The limits of this paper will not permit an extended examination of all those altruistic sentiments having their basis and mode of manifestation in sympathy. The higher concepts and sentiments have their genesis in compound vibratory motions, the factors of which are found in the simpler forms of vibration of the brain-centres accompanied by elementary ideas and associated by connecting nerve-fibres. They may be likened (as is done by Mr. E. C. Hegeler) to the composite photographs of Galton, in which the blending of several different faces on the same photographic plate produces an ideal image which has no counterpart in actual life. The sentiments of liberty, of patriotism, of justice, and of mercy and duty, are but developed forms of these ideal images. And as intelligence and the representative power develops, the sympathetic sentiments that find their satisfaction in conduct that is regardful of others, and so conducive to harmonious co-operation, should become stronger, and the golden rule find its realisation in the actions of men. The sacredness of life, of liberty, of property, should be more vividly felt as civilisation advances. The disinterested love of right presupposes the capacity and habit of representing and realising the interests and claims of others.

IN NUBIBUS.

THE COGITATIONS OF A SMOKING PHILOSOPHER.

BY THE REV. G. J. LOW.

PIPE I.

MY READING of late has been of a very mixed character. I have gone through the Report of the Parliament of Religions held in Chicago, and I have read over again the "Symposium on the Soul and the Future Life" which appeared in the *Nineteenth Century Review* some years ago. This symposium, to which men of all kinds of belief contributed, was led off and closed by Mr. Frederick Harrison, the high-priest of Positivism in England. The result of all this study is that I am utterly perplexed, confused, bewildered in my ideas as to religion.

As a corrective, I tried a paper read by some worthy cleric at a ministerial conference, on "How to Deal with Modern Thought," but I did not get much enlightenment. "Modern Thought"—and what *is* Modern Thought? Is the daily paper its expression? Take, for instance, this Sunday issue of the *Daily Annunciator*, with its forty pages, more or less, of reading matter. What food for the mind does it afford? What is the *menu* of this Feast of Reason? The *pièces de résistance* are, as a matter of course, political articles in abundance; some grave, some frivolous, some bland, some bitter. For the rest of the banquet we have: the records of some noble deeds,—a long list of atrocious crimes,—the sermon of the revivalist,—the lecture of the freethinker,—the séance of the spiritualist medium,—the last discovery of science,—the last gigantic swindle,—the last miracle at the shrine of some saint,—the last dynamite outrage. What a witches' cauldron is the daily paper! What a chaos is Modern Thought!

Now in the midst of all this Babel, what conclusion can be reached by a man whose religious opinions are in a state of flux? Like Kant, after discussing his "antinomies," I feel like saying: "Everything sinks under us. The most perfect Being, as well as the most insignificant, floats in mid-air without support . . . to disappear without resistance."

But here is a report of the last session of "The American Congress of Liberal Religious Societies" (see *The Open Court*, p. 5139), perhaps I can find in it the $\pi\omicron\upsilon\tilde{\nu}$ $\sigma\tau\tilde{\omega}$ amid all these floating, sinking, vanishing things. At this session Mr. E. P. Powell, of Clinton, N. Y., read a paper on "The Foundations of Religion,"—that's just what I am seeking. He says these foundations are "Headship, Dependence, and the Hope of the Future."—"God in higher terms is Father, Worship in higher terms is Love, and Creed in higher terms is Immortality."

Now, all this sounds very well: we might call it Religion reduced to its lowest terms. But the problem remains as perplexing as ever; these metaphysical abstractions hardly satisfy one. "Headship"—of what or of whom? "Dependence"—on what or on whom? "The Future"—for what or for whom? "God is the Father." But I want to know, Is there a God who is the Father? Is there a necessity for worship, whether you call it love or not?

I shall just put aside all this literature. I shall for the nonce shut up my books and stow away all my pamphlets and papers, and light my pipe and think. I must begin *de novo*, and it seems to me the whole matter resolves itself into the questions: "Is there a God?" and, "Ought we to worship Him?" Now, all these authors I have been reading, who have given various answers to these two questions, may be ranged under four heads. These are:

1. Theists, who say, There is a God, somehow, somewhere; and we ought to worship him.

2. Atheists, who say, There is no God and cannot be; and all worship is frivolous and vain.

3. Agnostics, who say, We don't know if there be a God or not, and we never can know; and to worship the unknown and unknowable is foolishness.

4. Positivists, who say, We do not know if there be a God; but we must act on what we do know: and we know that worship is an instinct and necessity of our nature; therefore let us worship something, though we don't exactly know what.¹

¹ The Positivism alluded to is, be it remembered, that of August Comte, of whom Mr. Frederick Harrison is an ardent disciple; the French Positivism with its fantastic Worship and Rit-

Now, under which head do I come? Not under the first or second, because I can neither assert nor deny that there is a God. I must then be an agnostic. And yet, no. For an agnostic's creed practically amounts to this: "I don't know if there be a God, and I don't care; the unknowable is no concern of ours." Now, I *do* care. I cannot conceive of any problem of more moment to me than: "Is there a God or not?" The agnostic in physical science is not admired. Professor Proctor (*Familiar Essays on Scientific Subjects*, article "Oxygen in the Sun") speaking of the dark lines in the spectroscope, says: "A physicist of some eminence spoke of these phenomena in 1858 in a tone which *ought very seldom to be adopted* by the man of science. "The phenomena defy, as we have seen," he said, "all attempts to reduce them within empirical laws, and no complete explanation or theory of them is possible." Well, in 1859 these "inexplicable" phenomena were explained by Kirchhoff. Now, this eminent physicist of 1858 was an agnostic *in re* the dark lines, and as such incurs Professor Proctor's reproof. Why should the agnostic in any branch of philosophy be applauded? Surely, the question, "Is there a God or not?" is of at least equal importance to us as the question, "Is there oxygen in the sun or not?" No, I cannot be an agnostic; for though I don't know, still I do care. I would prefer to be classed among those of whom the Christian Scriptures speak, as "seeking after God if haply they might feel after Him and find Him."

Well then, there is nothing left but the last head, Positivism. Mr. F. Harrison and other followers of Aug. Comte argue that worship is a necessity of our nature. As Mr. Powell puts it, "dependence" prompts worship. Well, then, I will be a Positivist, and worship: but what or whom? To be sure, the masters of the school abound in suggestions:—"Worship humanity in the abstract." "Worship the Power that makes for righteousness." "Worship Sweetness and Light." "Worship the True, the Beautiful, the Good." All very nice and very pretty; but too vague for me. I can't worship mere abstractions; I can't feel overawed by mere adjectives, even when dignified with the definite article and capital letters.

I have it! I will make "worship" an intransitive verb, and "worship" just as I "think" or "breathe." The next question is,

ual. This is a very different thing from the Positivism propounded by *The Monist* and *The Open Court*. In these, Positivism means that philosophy which bases everything on positive facts and traces all things to the bottom rock of experience. Such philosophy, I am free to admit, seems to me the only possible meeting-ground for religion and modern science.

how? What mode of worship shall I adopt? What shall be my ritual?—I have it again! I see by the *Daily Annunciator* that the clergy of the diocese have lately been holding “Retreats” and “Meditations”: I will take my cue from them. My worship shall consist of certain hours of retirement in my library, during which I will cogitate on these problems while I smoke my pipe. Yes, my big meerschaum shall be my Altar of Incense. I will forbid all intrusion while I offer my burnt-offering. To quote the Christian Scriptures—for I see Mr. Harrison and the rest can do that very glibly—I will commune with my own heart, in my chamber; and while the incense ascends, I will jot down my thoughts on these subjects at each “Devotion.”

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

THE DOVE.

RETOLD AFTER THE GERMAN OF ALBERT RODERICH.¹

THERE was once upon a time a forest, and a youth was walking dreamily in the shade of its majestic trees. Suddenly he heard a wailing note, and, searching in the direction whence the sound came, he found a wood-dove caught in a snare. "Well, well," he said, "I should not wonder at all if that dove were a fairy who would grant me a wish if released."

With these thoughts, he cut the cord and let the dove go. His eyes followed her flight and he asked: "Supposing you are a fairy, shall I be allowed to make a wish?"

And really the dove was a fairy, whose delicate form hovered between the branches of the big oak tree; and she said: "Certainly I am a fairy, and I shall allow you three wishes."

"All right!" said the youth, "three wishes—such is the custom in fairy tales. But will they be fulfilled?"

"Yes," said the fairy, "they will be fulfilled."

What a delightful prospect for a young man! He thought: "First, I wish wealth; secondly, a palace to live in; and, thirdly, that I shall be granted three more wishes whenever I so desire."

"Your wishes are granted," said the fairy, and disappeared.

The youth went home, and there he saw a palace which he knew was his own. He entered and went right to the treasure-vault, for he was familiar with all the rooms of the mansion as if he had been living in it for ages. The treasure-vault contained as much money as he wanted. He spent his riches in pleasure and in charities just as he thought best. At any rate he enjoyed himself immensely until he became sick in body and in mind. While lying on his bed he thought of his chance of having new wishes granted. And he wished, first, for renewed health; secondly, wisdom, with

¹ From the *Fliegende Blätter*, Jan., 1897, by κρs.

all the learning which long years of studying would afford ; and, thirdly, another chance of three more wishes.

His wishes were again fulfilled.

When he became sick of his books he longed for a quiet home, and he wished first, for a beautiful wife, and, secondly, for well-behaved, amenable children, and, thirdly, that he could have another chance of three wishes.

Thus he continued, always asking for the fulfilment of two wishes and requesting another chance of wishes whenever he should desire it.

This kind of life was very pleasant, but he grew sick of it because he had wished for everything that he could think of, and he no longer knew what to wish for next.

One day, when he had in vain troubled himself with the invention of new wishes without being able to find one, he grew very wroth and shouted in his anger : "What pleasure can there be in obtaining anything if these confounded fairies always grant it for the mere asking ! I wish I had never wished anything."

As he uttered these words, he found himself standing at the very same spot, in the very same forest, under the very same conditions as before. The fulfilment of all his wishes was at once wiped out as though it had been a dream ; and in the boughs of the gnarly oak the liberated wood-dove cooed merrily.

A BUDDHIST PRIEST'S VIEW OF RELICS.

BY THE EDITOR.

(Containing a Communication from the Rev. Seelakkhandha.)

SINCE THE PUBLICATION of *The Gospel of Buddha* I have been in receipt of many tokens of recognition from prominent Buddhists of various countries,—from His Majesty the King of Siam, from representative leaders of Japanese sects, and from several priests of Ceylon. Among the latter, the Rev. C. A. Seelakkhandha has shown me much politeness and a kind willingness to assist me in further studying the faith of Buddhists in their old sacred literature, as well as in the living mind of the present generation. A short time ago he sent me a casket in the shape of a dagoba. The casket contains another casket, also in the shape of a dagoba, and on opening the interior casket we see a little silver lotus containing a green gem in the centre, on a golden foil. Underneath the golden foil the tiny relic, not larger in size than a pea, lies hidden.

The donation of this relic was accompanied by a correspondence as to the conception of relic-worship among the Buddhists, which may be of general interest.

When some time ago the Rev. Seelakkhandha, on sending me a number of Pâli books, offered to procure for me a Buddha statue, Buddhist pictures, relics, or Pâli manuscripts, etc., I replied with reference to relics :

"In case you can let me have relics, I shall be very grateful to you, but I do not think that I would care for relics of human bodies, bones, teeth, or anything of that kind."

The Rev. Seelakkhandha wrote back :

"We do not regard the bones, etc., of ordinary human beings. But relics of Buddha and Arhats—lasting monuments of their virtue—are more valuable to us

than any worldly possession. These are very rare, too, and are obtained from the ruins of ancient Dagobas. I have with me a relic of Buddha found in a golden casket within a Dagoba (now in ruins), built 2,000 years ago. If you are willing to have this, I shall send it to you as a token of the regard in which you hold Lord Buddha and his religion. These relics are not used by us as ornaments, but they are held most sacred. There is nothing more valuable to a Buddhist than a genuine relic."

Thinking of the collector's interest that genuine relics possess, I wrote to Rev. Seelakkhandha: "As to caskets with relics enclosed, I expect that I should like to possess one of them, because it shows the reverence in which the Ceylonese hold their master and his saints." But I regretted having accepted the offer as soon as the letter had left my hands, and I wrote another letter the next day, which reads as follows:

"I wish to add a few words to my letter of yesterday with reference to the relics. I feel that if you were to send me one of those relics which you from *your* standpoint with good reasons consider so dear to you, you would be deprived of a treasure which would be less to me than it is to you. I would value these relics for historical reasons only. They would in my eyes be an evidence of the reverence in which you hold the memory of the Buddha and his saints, but otherwise they would only be to me objects of curiosity. According to my conception of Buddhism the most sacred relics we have of the Buddha and his saints are the words which they left,—the Sutras and all those ideas which can be verified in experience as valuable truths. Words, thoughts, and ideas are not material things, they are spiritual. It is true that they are transferred by material means in books and manuscripts, and by the air vibrations of sounds, but it is not the paper of the book, or the fibres of the manuscript, or the sound-waves, that are sacred, but the ideas which are conveyed by them. Thus, all the treasures which I regard as holy are spiritual, and not material. The worship of relics, be they bones, hair, teeth, or any other substance of the body of a saint, is a mistake. They do not possess any other value than the remains of ordinary mortals. The soul of Buddha is not in his bones, but in his words, and I regard relic-worship as an incomplete stage of religious development in which devotees have not as yet attained to full philosophical clearness. Now, it certainly is of interest to me to have evidences of the religious zeal of Buddhists. The keeping sacred of relics is a *symptom of their devotion*, but that is all I see in the use of relics. And considering that these relics are more to you than to me, I feel that I should not deprive you of them. Therefore, do not send me relics except it be on the stipulated condition that you know what I think about them. Otherwise you might regret afterwards having sent them to a man in whose conception they possess no religious value.

"In the hope that you understand me and do not misconstrue my objections to relic-worship, I remain, with kind regards, etc."

Rev. Seelakkhandha once more and at greater length explained his views of relics in another letter, as follows:

"When Lord Buddha entered Nirvâna about 2,440 years ago in the Park of Opawattana of the Mallawa Kings at Kusinagara, he wished that his bones (with the exception of the bone of the forehead, the four big teeth, the two jaw-bones,

and the chief bone of the neck) be scattered away from the body and remain unharmed on its cremation. He did this in order to leave some mark of remembrance to his followers who may with their help meditate on the personal virtues of the departed Teacher, because His life on this earth was comparatively short, i. e. eighty years. It happened according to his wish, and these bones or relics were of three kinds: (1) the largest about the size of a seed of rice and golden-colored; (2) the medium about half of a pea and pearl-colored; (3) the smallest of the size of a mustard seed and of the color of jasmine. There were sixteen measures (the Magadhan measure being little less than half a peck) of these relics which were distributed equally among eight kings who built Dagebas enshrining them in their respective dominions. Among these was King Ajatasatru of Rajagaha who buried his share of relics in Dagebas with the pomp and magnificence proper to such occasions. As it had been predicted that thereafter the pious king Asoka would be a participator in the benefits derived from these relics, Ajatasatru caused the greater part of them to be buried in the city of Rajagaha itself. King Asoka (a lineal descendant of Ajatasatru) who reigned at Patna about 2,222 years ago, caused these relics to be unearthed, and he is said to have built 84,000 Dagebas in different places in India enshrining them. He was a friend of his contemporary King Devanampiya Tissa of Ceylon about this time (2203 years ago), and he sent his son Mahinda, a Buddhist monk of renown, to this island [viz., Ceylon] to introduce Buddhism, which he accomplished with the co-operation of his royal friend and convert Tissa. Relics were now necessary to build Dagebas,—the usual monuments of religious zeal.

“Sumana Bhikkhu, a grandson of Asoka who accompanied Mahinda to Ceylon, was sent to Asoka to procure some relics. He brought with him as a present from Asoka to Tissa some relics in the very alms-bowl which Buddha is said to have used in His life-time. Tissa paid the usual honors to the relics and built Dagebas for them in many places in the island,—chiefly at Anuradhapura, his capital. Most of these are now in ruins, and when the relics contained in them are consequently unearthed, the process of building Dagebas is repeated. Some of the relics thus obtained are kept in the possession of people instead of being enshrined in Dagebas.

“The relic I am sending you is one thus obtained from the ruins of a Dageba at Apura and has been kept with me with great veneration,—offering flowers, incense, etc., morn and eve. I believe this to be a genuine relic of the Buddha. We reverence Buddha's relics as a mark of gratitude to Him who showed us the way to salvation and as a token of remembrance of the many personal virtues (bhagavat, arhat samyaksambuddha) which His life illustrated; and those of His disciples (i. e., Rahats) for similar reasons, and also to keep us reminded of their noble exemplary lives as results of Lord Buddha's invaluable doctrine.

“We do not believe that by ‘worshipping’ relics we attain Nirvâna, obtain any remission of our sins, or gain even merely any worldly benefit. These advantages are effected only by persevering in the path of virtue. But having in close proximity to us any monument or relic to perpetuate the memory of one who has been a unique example of virtue and benevolence, does, I venture to say, remove many obstacles in our way and make us inclined to follow that great Teacher. But one whose life is buried in sin, however enthusiastic he may be with regard to the outward ceremonial of religion, will not attain salvation.

“An example: During a season of drought even the foul water is taken for drinking purposes after purifying the same. The purification is effected by removing the mud and filth from the water and putting a kind of gem (*osakaprasada*) into the

water. The gem will not cleanse the water if it had not been first separated from the filth. In order to purify our heart it must be first freed from sinful thoughts.

"Again, as a fan helps us to feel the refreshing breeze, and a musical instrument to feed our ears with melodious sounds, so the relics, be they of Buddha or of his holy disciples, give us courage in our attempt to alleviate our misery. The mere keeping of the fan without fanning, or the musical instrument without playing, will give us neither the breeze nor the music.

"The biographies of great men help the rising generation to follow their footsteps, but the lesson is more impressive to a person of ordinary intellect by the presence of some material object connected with them. Also, it is usual that children, on the demise of their parents, preserve some articles used by them during their life-time as a token of the regard they entertain towards their beloved, and as a mark of gratitude. When you consider what I have said above, I hope you will get rid of any erroneous impressions which 'the image and relic worship' of the Buddhists may have left in your mind."

CORRESPONDENCE.

A VINDICATION OF M. ST. CÈRE.

To the Editor of The Open Court.

I do not pause to think whether my testimony can be of any value, but I think that it is a duty whenever one hears an accusation raised which one *knows* to be false, to say so.

I have just read M. St. Cère's letter in No. 486 of *The Open Court* and cannot resist the impulse to tell your readers that I have carefully followed the lawsuit in which—on M. Max Lebaudy's death—M. St. Cère has been entangled. He was the victim of a gross calumny, and all the vile accusations that were printed against him in the reports of the press, and which were founded on *no facts* whatever, were proved to be erroneous. M. St. Cère has been declared innocent by the magistrates, and whoever reads the documents of the trial will see that the acquittal was not only due to the negative want of proofs, but to the positive certainty that the accusations were mere gossip.

M. St. Cère is no friend of mine; I know on the contrary that he is an adversary of the principles of international peace which I defend, because he is an ardent French patriot—whether his extraction be French or not—and fervently wishes to see France raised from her last defeat before she may lend her hand to universal pacification. The infamous accusation of being a *spy* is the very last that would have been believed by those who knew M. St. Cère, though it *was* raised, as it always is by a certain jingo press when the persecution spirit is let loose against some individual or other.

BARONESS BERTHA VON SUTTNER.

HERMANNSDORF, AUSTRIA.

NOTES AND BOOK REVIEWS.

Good times have been prophesied, but they do not come. Business is stagnant still, and confidence is lacking. And why? Where, as in banking, rigid watchfulness is called for, we observe careless negligence. Special favors are shown to relatives and friends against the express provisions of the law. Political nominations and appointments are made for the sake of rewarding stump orators and campaign workers. The advocates of a high-tariff policy are apparently resuming their old tinkering and bargaining with the silver senators. The spoils system is regarded as the natural condition of things, and deviations from the straight path of honesty are deemed pardonable. Such is the situation of the country! And with all that we are promised good times! But good times cannot come until honesty is recognised to be indispensable in all business affairs, in politics, and in religion.

Religion should be at the bottom of all exertions, of all business, of all politics; but religion is not church-going. Religion is honesty. Religion is not belief, religion is faithfulness. Religion is not observance of traditions, religion is taking life and its duties seriously. Do not make light of the doctrines of your church; face the problems of belief fearlessly and squarely. Dare to have a conviction, and aspire to have the right conviction which can stand criticism. Then take your conviction with you into practical life and apply it to politics and to business. You will thus within the circle of your influence contribute your share to the general prosperity of the country. Confidence is the condition of good times, and the prevalence of honesty is the condition of confidence.

C. Hermann Boppe of Milwaukee, the editor of the *Freidenker*, criticises *The Open Court* in an article on "The Belief in God and Immortality," (published in the *Freidenker-Almanach* for 1897) in which he quotes with approval Carl Heinzen, who says: "As Cortez burned the ships behind him, so radicalism burns the ships before itself—not only that fallacious boat of Charon on which those who in life are cheated out of truth and elysium, hope to attain truth and elysium after death, but also the air-ships on which man's imagination is supernaturally carried into heaven or eternity." Mr. Boppe condemns the policy of retaining the words "Religion," "God," "Soul," "Immortality," even though they may receive new contents and a definite scientific meaning. Without making any objection to the proposition that science is a revelation, he regards the solution offered in the Religion of Science as a compromise with superstition, which leads to paradoxical statements and will ultimately prove nothing but a waste of time. We have stated our answer to men of this type in our reply to Corvinus in Nos. 414 and 432 of *The Open Court*, and it seems unnecessary here to repeat our arguments. It is true that in the new

light which modern psychology sheds on the problem of the soul, we should for the sake of accuracy abolish the old modes of expression and invent new terms. But this method would lead to nothing, and would be little helpful for the progress of mankind. The new astronomy of Copernicus changed our world-conception in a similar way, and we ought to have altered a great number of phrases which are in common use, such as "sunrise" and "sunset," but the attempt to do so would simply have increased the confusion and would have availed little towards the proof of the new doctrine. In addition, these terms, in spite of being inaccurate, are quite justifiable, for to the people of a certain place the sun actually rises and sets. The facts are not changed, but the conception of the facts receives a new, a deeper, and a truer interpretation, which removes all the various insurmountable difficulties of the old interpretation.

If we had to invent new terms for every new phase in the discovery of truth, we ought to change our whole language every two or three centuries, and if we should condemn religion because it is in its beginning mixed up with superstition and its path leads through error to truth, we ought at the same time to condemn science, for science too, has to pass through phases of misconception and false theories. We might just as well abolish the universities as the churches, because the science of to-day is in many respects a combination of errors and confusion. In brief, since the facts of life remain the same in the new dispensation of the Religion of Science as they have always been, the absolute denial of the old formulations is not less erroneous than their implicit acceptance and the only way out of this dilemma is to purify the traditional notions and make religion more and more scientific. There is no need of burning our ships either before us or behind us.

Mr. Ohara of Otsu, Omi, Japan, the translator into Chinese and publisher of *The Gospel of Buddha*, writes that he will be pleased to supply copies of the Chinese edition of *The Gospel of Buddha* for seventy-five cents, and has sent us a number of copies in order to enable us to fill orders at once. We may add that the translation is in the modern Chinese-Wenli, not in the old style of the classical books of China, but in the language of to-day, of the official dispatches, of the translation of the Bible, of the Chinese newspapers, and of the commercial world in the Celestial Empire. It has received the endorsement and high praise of the Rev. Tan Tek Soon, one of the leaders among Chinese Buddhists of Singapore, who writes in a letter to H. Dharmapála: "That it is apparently translated by an educated Japanese reflects the greatest credit on that enterprising nation, and is a noble repayment of the many debts of religious instruction received by the Japanese from their neighbors. . . . It will help greatly to advance the cause of religion among my countrymen."

Mr. Rama-Chandra Sen, Ex-Inspector of Schools at Oude, has briefly outlined his philosophy in a pamphlet entitled *Monado-Mononism* which he published some time ago in India. He has in the meantime made friends in the far West, among them Dr. R. Norman Foster of Chicago, whose enthusiasm induced him to publish a new exposition of Mr. Sen's *Monado-Mononism* in the shape of a pamphlet which presents in a condensed form the world-conception of such an Eastern thinker as is Mr. Sen.

Mr. Sen believes that all existence is conscious and is radiating in a supreme focus (p. 7). Conscious unconditioned feeling is the noumenon which as unconditioned cause unconditionally conditions itself (p. 9). Time and space are mo-

nadic; motion and matter atomic (p. 13). The simplest individual is a mineral (p. 16). A plant is a cognitional organism of the simplest kind (18). A brute is an emotional organism (p. 20). Man is a reflective organism higher than brute (p. 22). A spirit is a perfect cognitional being of the highest kind (p. 27). An angel is a perfect emotional being of the highest kind (p. 30). A cherub is a perfect reflective being of the highest kind (p. 33). A seraph is a perfect super-reflective being of the highest kind (p. 35). Lastly, the self-existing, sublimest focus is the eternal, unchangeable, unchanging Monon (p. 37), which is all-absolute and omniscient (p. 38). Man's stages of progress are marked as spirit-man, angel-man, cherub-man, seraph-man, and God-man. The God-man is the end of Nature's evolution and the *summum bonum* of religion (p. 48).

While we do not agree with Mr. Sen's methods of philosophising, we have found much that is of interest in his speculations which in their naïve simplicity remind us of the lofty constructions of various European thinkers who have attained great fame. We must also add that we recognise in Mr. Sen an earnest desire to embody in his system both the results of Oriental and Western research. The Roman proverb says: "*In magnis voluisse sat est.*"

P. C.

The Biblical World of January, 1897, is, as most of its predecessors have been, full of interesting material, popular in tone, and yet scholarly. George B. Foster, speaking of "The Theological Training for the Times," says in bold honesty: "There are some things which ought to be said with the utmost freedom and frankness." And speaking of the theological student who is sorely perplexed by the dilemma of traditional faith and the results of scientific criticism, he says:

"He is divided between two feelings: perplexed on the one hand by a suspicion that in clinging to traditional orthodoxy he may be untrue to himself; and checked on the other side by a fear that in discarding it he may be casting aside ideas essential to his moral and spiritual life. At such a time a divinity school should indeed be an *Alma Mater* to him. And if its work be destructive in part, as in part today it must, it is destructive for the sake of construction, the constructiveness of Him who, though he destroyed, came not to destroy but to fulfil."

Among other material of interest we note an article by George S. Goodspeed on the "Ideal Childhood in Non-Christian Religions," in which he surveys the childhood legends of Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Lao-Tsze, Krishna, and Mohammed. From the new Egyptian discoveries made by Mr. Petrie, the tablet of Amen-Hotep the Third is reproduced from a photograph by Brugsch, the inscription of which is of special interest because it contains on the back of the tablet a mention of the people of Israel. Among the accounts of other victories, the king announces that "Israel is desolated; his grain is not (i. e., his harvests are destroyed); Palestine has become as widows for Egypt (i. e., the people of the country have become as helpless as widows before the attacks of Egypt). Not the least valuable contribution is the editorial which insists on a thorough study of the Bible. The editor asks: "Is it not legitimate from the point of view of Sunday observance to use a portion of the day for the study of the Bible, and is it not legitimate to perform such study thoroughly and with a view to permanent results, as to perform it superficially and without expectation of accomplishing anything?" The author of the article, referring to the Revised Edition, condemns those as "criminally guilty" who would conceal the "light which God in his providence has shed upon his own revelation."

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The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Editor: DR. PAUL CARUS,
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ZOROASTER

COPIED FROM A BAS-RELIEF AT PERSEPOLIS. EXAMPLES OF PERSIAN
ICONOGRAPHY IN "EARLY SASSANIAN INSCRIPTIONS," BY EDW. THOMAS, F.R.S.

(REPRODUCED FROM "THE HUNDRED GREATEST MEN," BY PERMISSION OF SAMPPSON, LOW, MARSTON & CO.)

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NO. 490

PROFESSOR TIELE ON CHRISTIANITY AND BUDDHISM.

FIFTH AND SEVENTH GIFFORD LECTURES.

REPORTED BY JOHN SANDISON.

AT THE OUTSET of his fifth Gifford Lecture Professor Tiele spoke of the religions which were entitled to be classed as ethical, and in this connexion he discussed the essential difference between Buddhism and Christianity, and the other religions in the group. The latter, he said, were all limited to a single people or nationality, and if they nevertheless spread and were accepted by other nations, that was done along with the whole civilisation to which they belonged. Christianity and Buddhism, however, did not direct themselves to a single people, but to all men, and to all in their own language. In short, Christianity and Buddhism were both universalistic in character, whereas the other ethical religions were, at least in a certain measure, still particularistic. Mohammedanism was so in the least degree. That religion also spread itself out among many peoples, but by its sacred language, its obligatory pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, and its legal prescriptions, which went down into details, it was much more particularistic than either Buddhism or Christianity, and it stood also in many other respects below them.

Professor Tiele acknowledged that there was an essential difference between Buddhism and Christianity, and the religion of Islam, because Mohammedanism had not brought forth the universalistic principle out of itself as a necessary application of its fundamental thought, but had borrowed it from Christianity, and had apprehended it more politically than religiously. In fact, this uni-

versalism of Islam was little different from, and was indeed nothing but an expansion of, the proselytism of Judaism.

Continued study of the subject and further reflexion, had led Professor Tiele to conclusions, even regarding Buddhism and Christianity, that differed in some respects from the prevailing view, and from that which had hitherto been accepted by him. Buddhism and Christianity were, each of them, rather an abstraction, than an actually existing organisation,—not a particular religion, but a group or family of religions, one in origin and in certain general principles, but otherwise often differing world wide and often standing in a hostile attitude towards each other. If we might define religions as “modes of divine worship proper to different tribes, nations, or communities, and based on the belief held in common by the members of them severally,” this definition was certainly applicable to the particular Buddhistic and Christian Churches and sects, but neither to Christianity nor Buddhism, as such, as a whole. Both fell outside of the boundary of their morphological classification. They were powerful revelations of the ethico-religious spirit, which, when spread by preaching, often conquered after long resistance the old religions with which they came into contact, so that they were permeated in more or less measure by the new higher principles, and were thereby wholly reformed. From this preaching, this conflict, and this fusion were born those related, yet, in kind and development, so sharply distinguished religions or churches, which, taken together, were called Buddhism and Christianity.

Inquiring next into the consequences of the specific origin of the ethical religions, the lecturer noted, in the first place, an important modification in the conception of revelation; and, in the second, the forming of more or less independent religious communities, which no longer coincided with the community of the State or the people, but took up over against them a certain standpoint of their own, which, to a certain extent, was independent. With ethical religion there arose the Church; for every ethical religion embodied itself necessarily in a Church. In passing, he remarked that he would not willingly give up the word “Church,”—not meaning the word in its philological sense, but the conception which was now definitely expressed by it.

All ethical religions or churches had proceeded out of small unions, of which, as a rule, one highly endowed spirit was the soul and centre, and these had thereby always a certain independence over against the community of the people and the State. The eth-

ical religions, and even some forms of the highest families of religion, viz., the Buddhistic and Christian, might also become State Churches, but they were so only as privileged Churches, exclusively recognised and supported by the State. They were no longer one with the State, but formed, even as State Churches, independent bodies, and they could only permanently prevent the rise of other independent church associations among the citizens of the State. The rising of such more or less independent Churches was an important factor in the history of the evolution of religion. Called into existence by the religious self-consciousness, they were destined and bound to maintain that consciousness in the first place. With their birth dawned the emancipation of religion. The Church had a right to sovereignty within her own sphere, the domain of the conscience, the life of the soul, religious conviction. But she forfeited that right as soon as she would move upon a domain which was not her own; as soon as, driven by ambition or self-interest, she refused to others the liberty she demanded for herself; as soon as she proceeded to domineer over the State, science, philosophy, or art, and thus disturbed the other expressions of the spiritual life of man in their development. In conclusion, Professor Tiele considered the third consequence of the specific origin of the ethical religions, viz.: that being born of individualism, they could never wholly kill it by the power of the community, and that, conversely, neither would individualism kill its power.

* * *

Continuing an inquiry into the directions of development in particular religions and in groups of closely related religions, Professor Tiele said in his seventh lecture that what held true of the great families of religion was also applicable to the individual members of which they were composed, to single religions as well as to groups of mutually related religions. After quoting examples to show that evolution was a very complicated phenomenon, that it did not proceed in a straight line, nor was perfectly harmonious, but that here the one side and there the other side of the religious thinking and life was specially cultivated, and that thus every religion, every school, every sect, every direction, furnished its own contribution to the general development, he said that that, however, they could only do, and they could only bear fruit for this end, if they did not remain isolated, nor shoot past the goal in more and more sharply marked one-sidedness. In such cases, indeed, there commonly sprang up a reaction. But this reaction was, as a rule, a violent subversion, a falling into the op-

posite extreme. The cure could only be brought about by reconciliation, whereby the equilibrium was restored, or rather by which the tendencies which, on account of their one-sidedness appeared to be antagonistic and irreconcilable, were resolved into harmonious co-operation. That co-operation, as was evident, would also be still always incomplete, just as all that was human was incomplete—at least at the beginning it would be rather a striving, an ideal, which was only slowly realised; but it would yet be a step forward and in the right direction. That which combined what was formerly separated, stood, on that account, higher, because it taught men to appreciate what was not esteemed, or was misunderstood, by one direction as well as by the other, as equally legitimate, nay, as even necessary elements of the religious thinking and life; and in so doing it let nothing be lost of the good in either direction, but made it conducive to the higher development of religion. The whole history of the Roman religion was the history of a constant and systematic reception of Greek ideas and observances into the firmly founded structure of the Roman forms of worship. In Christianity that confluence of the two great streams of development reached its completion. While Buddhism reached the extreme limit in the direction of the one-sided theanthropism, and embraced all the divine in the Enlightened One, but soon again fell away into a composite mythology and an abject superstition; and while Islam in its own almost fatalistic monotheism embraced the most one-sided form of a theocracy, and thereby to a considerable extent relapsed into the old particularism, Christianity brought the two antagonistic positions, transcendence and immanence, to unity by its ethical apprehension of the Fatherhood of God, in which both God's exaltation above man and man's affinity with God were comprehended.

X ✓ Christianity was the most many-sided of all religions and families of religion, and it possessed thereby a capacity of adaptation that had been called its elasticity which explained the great wealth of its many and multifarious forms. It was in more than one respect, and more than any other religious communion, the religion of reconciliation; and in this sense that it reconciled in itself with each other the apparently irreconcilable elements of the religious life, separately represented and one-sidedly developed in other religions and in earlier periods of shorter or longer duration. For it brought to unity, not only the antithesis referred to, of theocracy and theanthropism, but others as well. In its preaching of the kingdom of God, which was not future only nor exclusively heav-

enly, but existed here already among us, and must also be realised on earth ; in its beautiful doctrines of the communion of saints, the brotherhood of all mankind, and the equality of all before God, it strove after the most intimate union of all men, whatever be their descent, language, or color. But along with all that, it left full freedom to the individual, by proclaiming that the unity of the spirit was the only bond of this communion, and that each individual was alone responsible for his own conscience—not like Buddhism which extinguished all individuality, because it annulled personality and imposed on every confessor passive obedience to the power placed above it. Christianity did not take up a hostile attitude to the world, nor did it mix itself with it ; it neither hated nor defied it, and was therefore neither one-sidedly optimistic nor one-sidedly pessimistic. It appreciated and glorified the greatest self-denial and surrender of everything for a sacred end, but aimless self-renouncement, fasting and abstinence for their own sakes, as meritorious works it rejected. It did not assert that the reconciliation of these antinomies, the confluence of these divergent directions, was already completed in the historical Christianity. They found them still frequently side by side and in conflict with each other ; they were confronted here and now by the one, and then and there by the other religious thought cultivated with special preference, embodied in diverse churches and sects, and maintained by one-sided parties. But it was distinguished by this form from all other ethical religious communions, of which even the most universalistic really knew only one form of religious life,—that they found in the bosom of Christianity all directions, and all of them appealing with some right, to the same authority. Hence, he by no means said that the reconciliation of what hitherto divided mankind in matters of religion had already come about. It was the work which for nearly nineteen centuries had been carried on in the Christian world, partly unconsciously and partly with full consciousness, but which, although not without fruit, was still far from being completed.

✂ The whole history of religion viewed outwardly was the history of a succession of all sorts of one-sided forms of religion, in which the religious elements were variously mixed, and which in rivalry with each other arose, flourished, and perished, or at least ceased to grow. The history of Christianity was the continuation of the earlier history, but more complete, many-sided, all-embracing. What he meant was only this, that when they took the trouble to penetrate to the kernel of the Gospel in which all the varieties of

Christian life took their origin, they should find there the solution of the contradictions in germ or in principle. He did not say that from partiality for the religion which he accepted as his. If he had to give expression to his religious conviction, he should confess that in the Christ, the true religion, the religion of humanity, was revealed to man. It was the religion which constantly created new forms that were higher and higher, but because they were human, were also always still defective, and which thus developed itself more and more in and through humanity. But that was a matter of belief, and he put himself here upon a purely impartial, scientific standpoint. Yet ever upon that standpoint, and as a result of historical and philosophical investigation, he did maintain that with the appearing of Christianity a wholly new period in the evolution of religion had begun; that all the currents of the religious life of humanity previously flowed together in it; and that to develop religion was now and henceforth the same as to realise more and more the principles of that religion.

THE NEXT PAPAL CONCLAVE.¹

BY PROF. G. FIAMINGO.

ALL THIS TALK now going on in regard to the next Papal Conclave has something very strange about it, but nothing new. Pius IX. also had the same curious experience of hearing a great deal said about his approaching death and his successor, and the same thing has happened to every pope who has had a long life. Now this talk may be no reflexion upon the living pope, but surely it is not pleasant to think that one is living too long. In the election of a cardinal for the papacy his age is always considered, and he is chosen as old as possible in the hope that another Conclave may occur after a brief interval. When the election of Leo XIII. was under consideration one of the secondary arguments of the promoters of the candidacy of Pecci was precisely that of his advanced age. Cardinal Bartolini, the great supporter of Pecci, persuaded the four Spanish cardinals to oppose the candidacy of Franchi and to give their votes to Pecci on the grounds that Franchi was "*troppo giovine*," too young, and that there would be time enough for him to reach the papacy. A pope then who lives too long is, especially for the Sacred College, a great disappointment. Leo XIII. was not only advanced in age but had an apparently weak constitution, and it seemed to everybody that his powerful mind could not long remain in so weak and thin a body. Nevertheless, Leo has pronounced the holy benediction over the great majority of the cardinals who elected him. What a disappointment he has been to the Sacred College! It is this disappointment and a long restrained impatience that are signified by the numerous literary productions now appearing in regard to the next Conclave.

All these productions concerning the next Conclave may be di-

¹Translated from the manuscript of Professor Fiamingo, by I. W. Howerth, of the University of Chicago.

vided into two classes. One class treats the question in a general way, considering the qualities to be desired in the new pope, and similar topics. Sometimes writings of this class consider the present condition of Catholicism and the position of the papacy, and subject them to criticism. Each writer believes that the change of pope may result in transforming Catholicism in accordance with his own pet ideal of religion. Productions of the second class, however, try to reveal the preparatory work going on behind the scenes at the Vatican. They frequently appear in reviews, and after mentioning various cardinals proceed to discuss the question as to which one of them stands the best chance of securing the chair of St. Peter. They set before the reader a series of personalities which, far from commanding his respect for the cardinals, represent them as engaged in intrigue and more or less vulgar gossip. Banghi, Maus, and Pappalettere pointed out Pecci some years before his election as the successor of Pius IX. But in their calculations they were assisted by the merits of Pecci himself. They were assisted also by all the follies and miseries which are summed up in the badly concealed antagonism between Pecci and Cardinal Antonelli, secretary of state of Pius IX., and by the strong antipathy of Pius IX. towards Pecci, and by the friendship between Pecci and Bartolini who in the Conclave was his strong supporter. They were strengthened too by the various outbursts of discontent and protest against the politics of the Vatican in the last years of Pius IX. And yet Pecci has retained the regard and respect of those who if they were not scornful toward the papacy were certainly not enthusiastic for it, and has thus shown a character to which gossip and petty intrigue must be repugnant. Publications then which pretend to reveal the plots and schemes of the Vatican to designate a new pope while the present one is still living cannot be free from the odious character of idle gossips. When it is remembered that after all the Sacred College is composed of old men, and all that is necessary to precipitate a whole structure of ingenious speculations is the death of one of them, it is perceived how little is the importance which should be attached to this kind of talk, an importance indeed ephemeral and fictitious.

Much greater, however, is the interest aroused by those studies which make the discussion of the next Conclave an occasion for instituting an examination into the conditions of Catholicism, and which point out in their ideal of the new pope the gaps and defects which Catholicism must repair. To this kind of literary production concerning the Conclave belongs the volume which was recently

published by Le Sar Péladan, *Le prochain conclave*, and which has the pretentious and somewhat arrogant sub-title "Istruzioni ai cardinali." This sub-title, however, reflects the weakness of the whole book which is a series of severe reflexions, a revelation of the seeds of death, as Péladan himself expresses it, which are hidden in the palace of the Roman Pontiff. This criticism of the conditions of Catholicism the author completes with what in his mind constitutes the ideal of the Catholic religion, namely, humanisation, which he believes may be realised by the new pope. Péladan's book is lacking in scientific and historical precision. We read, for instance, that in the early times of Catholicism the pope was elected by Roman bishops alone. Nothing could be more erroneous. The first authentic document concerning the election of a pope is the *Epistola* written by Cornelius after being deposed by the Anti-Pope Novarius and who had again assumed the chair of St. Peter to which he is said to have been elected by sixteen bishops present at Rome. Now Péladan mistakes this special fact for a general proceeding in the election of all the popes. On the contrary, as in the early times of Christianity, and until this system was prohibited by the Council of Antioch (341 A. D.), many bishops and a few popes were nominated by their predecessors, so after the time of Constantine there concurred in the election of the pope the suffrage of the people, the presence of almost all the clergy, the vote of the assembly of the oldest priests and a concourse of men of high consideration. Of such errors in regard to fact there are in Péladan's book not a few. Italians, according to Péladan, number twenty-five million, not thirty-one million.

But in spite of all this it must be recognised that the work of Le Sar Péladan has a value and merits our consideration. Péladan is a romancer, a mystic, and a decadent besides, and is a believer in the Christian Catholic religion. It may be understood, therefore, that in his mind is established the custom of taking abstractions for reality, of taking ideas as real facts and construing them as such in order to reach a new hypothesis and new abstractions, without suspecting in the least that he must thus arrive at a point far removed from reality. From the top of an edifice of abstractions the reality of life and its institutions appears sordid and mean. And Péladan who places himself in an elevated position and is inspired by an ideal undoubtedly far removed from reality, is able to see contemporaneous Catholicism in a way not possible to ordinary individuals who think that what they observe from day to day is natural and just. The criticisms of Péladan show sometimes real gaps

and weaknesses, but they show also the religious needs of a mind of large scientific culture, that is, of an intellectual development superior to what has heretofore satisfied Catholicism. Péladan is not the only cleric who predicts for the next pope and for the Catholic Church better times than those in which the author writes. "Well or ill, Péladan has spoken some necessary words, words which have been spoken by no one else. They will irritate many minds enthusiastic over the constituted religious order. Other minds more subtle will be chilled by them."

Catholicism must be humanised. That is the sentiment which inspires Péladan's whole work. Péladan never explains comprehensively what he means by the humanisation of Catholicism. When he notes that the people of the cities are withdrawing from the Church, that persons of high culture are turning towards new religions, and that we are in the presence of the masses who are deserting, and of an *élite* who are reflecting, Péladan concludes that all that is necessary to bring back the masses and to hold the *élite* is to create some more saints and to recognise the demands of humanity. It is necessary, he thinks, to diffuse knowledge high and low in order to re-establish on the one hand the equality so dear to the masses, and on the other to construct a hierarchy. How Péladan would explain all this, it would be difficult to say. Whoever is pope, and whatever may be the character of the Sacred College, it would be difficult to create more saints in an historical epoch when no more are desired, and at the same time to humanise and idealise religion for persons of culture. One cannot understand, indeed, how it would be possible to develop Catholicism for persons of culture on the one hand, and for the masses on the other. What effect would the "saints" created by Catholicism for the masses have upon the rest of the population, that is, upon the *élite*?

Nor does Péladan explain how Catholicism is to create these saints. When has Catholicism ever created in a conscious and pre-determined manner any of the saints whom believers now adore? If Catholicism had practised such artifice, undoubtedly it would not have developed as it did seventeen or eighteen centuries ago, nor would it have that moral position which it now occupies. And yet there remains the fact established by a believer like Péladan that the population of the city is withdrawing from the Church, and cultured people are losing faith in Catholic dogmas which are found to bear a strong resemblance to those of other religions old and new. But his remedy for the decline of Catholicism set forth in a manner confused and contradictory has all the appearance of

those programs of social reform *ab imis fundamentis*, partly good but more frequently wholly impracticable and emanating from a mind unbalanced and deprived of every sense of reality, which sees everything in a form imaginary and ideal. The social program of Plato is worth just as much as that of Karl Marx. The ideal of Leo X. of the power of the Catholic religion has just as much influence on social evolution as that of Gregory VII., who proclaimed that "The Church of God ought to be independent of every temporal power. . . . The Church ought to be free; the Pope should be allowed to absolve the priests from temporal bonds. The world is lightened by two luminaries, the sun the greater, and the moon the lesser. The authority of the Apostles resembles the sun. . . . Whatever may be the resistance encountered by him who represents Christ on earth, he ought to struggle, to stand firm, to suffer as Christ suffered. Neither persecution nor violence should disturb him in the performance of his duty." A splendid program, truly; almost superhuman! But did Gregory VII. ever realise the ideal which he proclaimed as the duty of him who represents Christ on earth, or did any other pope? On the contrary, not only in the early times of Catholicism when the popes were the heirs of the haughty imperial spirit of conquering Rome, and in the Middle Ages when the military spirit was everywhere dominant, but even at the end of our century when the Sacred College united to elect a successor to Pius IX., they have been unanimous in adhering to all the demands and protests uttered by the deceased Pontiff against the occupation of the States of the Church. These ideal programs for transforming Catholicism are in fact metaphysical abstractions. Religious evolution is carried on, more even than social evolution, by the action of unconscious forces, caring nothing for those who would instil a new vitality and secure a great prosperity to the institution itself.

Paul V. completed the colossal temple in Rome dedicated to St. Peter, but upon the façade he placed enormous letters to inform the world that he belonged to the Borghese family, which is Roman. Cardinals Mertel and Caterini, in the conclave which elected Leo XIII., gave their votes to the effect that the conclave should be held in Rome because, being old, they did not wish to weary themselves by a journey. Leo XIII., in order to enjoy the sympathy of the French government, accepted as plenipotentiary to the Roman court, a man who had been excommunicated, the anti-Christian hero of *les Bouches du Rhône*, Pombelle *le crocheteur*, as he is called by the French Catholics, who are always rebelling

against the Vatican and who are now protesting in a solemn manner in the elections at Brest. These little facts, so diverse, have at bottom a nature essentially identical. They show that the Pope and the members of the Sacred College cannot banish entirely the little personal vanities and weaknesses which are found in every breast. Catholicism in the long series of centuries of its life, in its numerous successions of popes and Sacred Colleges, has been transformed by increasing more and more the power and personality of the curia and of the one who presides over it. The pope, who at first was a simple bishop, and exercised his authority, local and diocesan, just as any other bishop, and had only a little pre-eminence on account of being the successor of St. Peter, was, by and by, proclaimed the infallible representative of Christ. The whole evolution of Catholicism is in a sense directly opposed to humanising itself and to stripping itself of every personal feature, which Catholics, like Péladan, are proclaiming as the ideal of religion, an ideal never suited to new times, always neglected by the masses, and an object of criticism for the more highly cultivated. But this is to ask of the Catholic religion what it will never be able to accomplish.

The Catholic religion is impersonated in a certain number of individuals, nor can these individuals escape from the tendencies common to all men. It is a question of a new paganism, as Emile Gebhart expresses it. As exclusiveness and the spirit of supremacy are characteristics which appear in all men, so they appear in Catholicism. When Leo XIII. spoke to the dissenting Catholics of England in order to reclaim them, he could see nothing but error in their religion, and they were naturally offended and indignant. How much greater would be the spirit of supremacy in the head of the Catholic Church if he should attempt to call to his faith the followers of Buddha and Mahomet. And that would happen to-morrow if a pope like Vannutelli, or Jacobini, or Svampa should be elected.

A conclave cannot change modern Catholicism without changing the human nature of the clergy. I cannot conceive the humanisation and the universality of Catholicism asked for by Péladan as representing the *élite* of the Catholic church, to whom he speaks at length in his book. It would be the negation of evolution and of Catholicism as it has been developed and exists to-day, as well as of the hatred of innovation, which is a very great social force, and still more powerful in religion. Religions will die rather than transform themselves, and this is especially true of the Christian religion.

MAZDAISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

MAZDAISM, the belief of the ancient Persians, is perhaps the most remarkable religion of antiquity, not only on account of the purity of its ethics, but also by reason of the striking similarities which it bears to Christianity.

Ahura Mazda, the Lord Omniscient, is frequently represented (as seen in Fig. 1) upon bas-reliefs of Persian monuments and rock



Fig. 1. AHURA MAZDA.

(Conventional reproduction of the figure on the great rock inscription of Darius at Behistan.)

inscriptions. He reveals himself through "the excellent, the pure and stirring Word," also called "the creative Word which was in the beginning," which reminds one not only of the Christian idea of the Logos, $\acute{\omicron} \lambda\acute{\omicron}\gamma\omicron\varsigma \acute{\omicron}\varsigma \eta\grave{\nu} \acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\grave{\nu}$, but also of the Brahman *Vach*, word (etymologically the same as the Latin *vox*), which is glorified in the fourth hymn of the Rig Vêda, as "pervading heaven and earth, existing in all the worlds and extending to the heavens."

On the rock inscription of Elvend, which had been made by the order of King Darius, we read these lines¹:

“There is one God, omnipotent Ahura Mazda,
It is He who has created the earth here ;
It is He who has created the heaven there ;
It is He who has created mortal man.”

Lenormant characterises the God of Zoroaster as follows :

“Ahura Mazda has created *asha*, purity or rather the cosmic order ; he has created both the moral and material world constitution ; he has made the universe ; he has made the law ; he is, in a word, creator (*datar*), sovereign (*ahura*), omnis-




Fig. 2. SCULPTURES ON A ROYAL TOMB.

(Coste et Flandin, *Perse Ancienne*, at Persepolis, pl. 164. Lenormant, V., p. 23.)

cient (*mazdâo*), the god of order (*ashavan*). He corresponds exactly to Varuna, the highest god of Vedism.

“This spiritual conception of the Supreme Being is absolutely pure in the Avesta, and the expressions that Ormuzd has the sun for his eye, the heaven for his garment, the lightning for his sons, the waters for his spouses, are unequivocally allegorical. Creator of all things, Ormuzd is himself uncreated and eternal. He had no beginning and will have no end. He has accomplished his creation work by pronouncing ‘the Word,’ the ‘Ahuna-Vairyo, Honover,’ i. e., ‘the word that existed before everything else,’ reminding us of the eternal Word, the Divine Logos of the Gospel.” (*Histoire ancienne de l’Orient*, V., p. 388.)

Concerning Ahriman, Lenormant says :

“The creation came forth from the hands of Ormuzd, pure and perfect like himself. It was Ahriman who perverted it by his infamous influence, and labored

¹ Translated from Lenormant’s *Histoire ancienne de l’Orient*, Vol. V., p. 388.

continually to destroy and overthrow it, for he is the destroyer (*paourou marka*) as well as the spirit of evil. The struggle between these two principles, of good and of evil, constitutes the world's history. In Ahriman we find again the old wrathful serpent of the Indo-Iranian period, who is the personification of evil and who in Vedism, under the name of *Ahi*, is regarded as an individual being. The myth of the serpent and the legends of the Avesta are mingled in Ahriman under the name of *Aji Dahaka*, who is said to have attacked Atar, Traëtaona, and Yima, but is




Fig. 3. THE TREE OF LIFE.

Decorations on the embroidery of a royal mantle.

(British Museum. Layard, *Monuments*, 1st series, pl. 6. Lenormant, *l. l. V.*, p. 108.)

himself dethroned. It is the source of the Greek myth that Apollo slays the dragon Python. The Indo-Iranian religion knew only the struggle that was carried on in the atmosphere between the fire-god and the serpent-demon Ahrimān. And it was, according to Professor Darmesteter, the doctrine of this struggle, which, when generalised and applied to all things in the world, finally led to the establishment of dualism." (*Ibid.*, p. 392.)

The tree of life, which is known to us through the first chapter of Genesis, is an old Accadian idea, which is of immemorial origin,

dating perhaps from the days when men lived mainly upon the fruits of trees,¹ and having been handed down through the Assyrians to the Babylonians and Persians. It always remained a favorite idea among the artists of the various nations that successively held sway over the valley of Mesopotamia; and it still appears in Persian bas-reliefs, where we find it for instance in the shape of decorations in the embroidery of a royal mantle. (Fig. 3.)

The fire sacrifice of the Persians was accompanied by partaking of the haoma drink, a ceremony which reminds us, on the one hand, of the soma sacrifice of the Vedic age in India, and, on the other hand, of the Lord's Supper of the Christians. We know through the sacred scriptures of the Persians that little cakes (the *draona*) covered with small pieces of holy meat (the *myazda*) were consecrated in the name of a spiritual being, a god or angel, or of some great deceased personality, and then distributed among all the worshippers that were present. But more sacred still than the draona with the myazda is the haoma drink which was prepared from the white haoma plant,² also called gaokerena. Says Professor Darmesteter: "It is by the drinking of gaokerena that men, on the day of the resurrection, will become immortal."³

The way in which the Persian sacrament of drinking the gaokerena was still celebrated in the times of early Christianity, must have been very similar to the Christian communion, for Justinus, when speaking of the Lord's Supper among the Christians, adds "that this very same solemnity, too, the evil spirits have introduced in the mysteries of Mithra." (*Apol.* I., 86.)

The most characteristic feature of the Persian religion after the lifetime of Zoroaster consists in the teaching that a great crisis is near at hand, which will lead to the renovation of the world *frashôkereti* in the Avesta, and *frashakart* in Pahlavi. Saviours will come, born of the seed of Zoroaster, and in the end the great Saviour who will bring about the resurrection of the dead. He will be the "son of a virgin" and the "All-conquering." His name shall be the Victorious (*verethrajan*), Righteousness-incarnate (*astvat-*

¹ The tree of life may originally have been the tree of life-preserving fruits. It is noteworthy that the names of *fagus*, the beech-tree, and of *φηγός*, the oak, which are both etymologically identical with the English word *beech* and the German *Buche*, mean "eating" or "the tree with edible fruits." The word *acorn*, which is not derived from oak, but is connected with *acre*, the field, means "harvest" or "fruit," which indicates that it was eaten at the time when its name was coined. The word *acorn* has no connexion with the German *Eichel*, i. e., little oak, or oak-fruit, but it is the same as the German *Ecker*, which is the name of the beech-tree fruit.

² There is another species of the haoma which is yellow. The yellow haoma is called the earthy haoma and the king of healing plants.

³ *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. IV., p. lxxix. Compare *Bundahis*, 42, 12; 59, 4.

ereta), and the Saviour (*saoshyañt*). Then the living shall become immortal, yet their bodies will be transfigured so that they will cast no shadows, and the dead shall rise, "within their lifeless bodies incorporate life shall be restored." (Fr. 4. 3.)¹

In a similar way John the Baptist and Jesus of Nazareth announce that the Kingdom of Heaven is near at hand; and St. Paul still believed that the second advent of Christ would take place during his own life-time. The dead who sleep in the Lord will be resurrected, and the bodies of those that are still in the flesh will be transfigured and become immortal.

The Persian world-conception, like the religion of the Jews, was too abstract to favor any artistic development. Therefore we do not possess representations of either the good or evil spirits that




Fig. 4. ASSYRIAN CYLINDER.
(British Museum. Lenormant, V., p. 234.)



Fig. 5. THE GODDESS ANNA.
(Bas-relief in the British Museum. Lenormant, V., p. 259.)

are exclusively and peculiarly Persian. Even the picture of Ahura Mazda (as we find it on various bas-reliefs) is not based upon a conception that can be regarded as original. The winged form from which the bust of the god of Mazdaism rises can be traced to Assyrian emblems, and may, for all we know, be of Accadian origin. There is, for instance, a picture of the trinity of Anu, Ea, and Bel, which exhibits exactly the same figure that we find in the Persian representation of Ahura Mazda. (Fig. 4.) Other pictures of Babylonian gods which appear in the same form as the Persian representations of Ahura Mazda are quite frequent,

¹For a concise statement of the Persian religion, which in many respects foreshadows the Christian doctrines of a Saviour and of the bodily resurrection of the dead, see Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson's excellent article, "The Ancient Persian Doctrine of a Future Life," published in the *Biblical World*, August, 1896.

and we reproduce one instance in which the deity is floating in the sky. (Fig. 7.) This illustration is of interest, because it shows the sun and the idol before which the religious ceremony of worship is performed as distinct objects. Thus the deity itself is ap-



Fig. 6. AN ASSYRIAN
CAMEO. 1



Fig. 7. ASSYRIAN CYLINDER.
(Layard, *Culte de Mitra*, pl. xxx., No. 7. Lenormant, V., p. 248.)



Fig. 8. A PERSIAN
CAMEO.

parently identified with neither and is believed to be an invisible witness of the homage paid him at his statue.

The Babylonian trinity was thought to be male and female, and it is noteworthy that the female representative of the divine



Fig. 9. MERODACH DELIVERING THE MOON-GOD FROM THE EVIL SPIRITS.
(From a Babylonian cylinder. Reproduced from Smith's *Chaldean Account of Genesis*.)

father Anu, the god-mother Anna, also called Istar, was worshipped under the symbol of a dove. (Fig. 5). There is no trace of it in Mazdaism, but the dove as an emblem of most significant spirituality reappears, in a purer and nobler form, in Christianity, while

¹ Both cameos are at the Louvre in the "Cabinet des médailles." See Lenormant, *l. l.* V., pp. 448 and 493.

there is no trace of the conventional representation of Ahura Mazda.

As to the picture of Ahura Mazda, we have to add that Prof. A. V. Williams Jackson explains the ring in the hands of Ahura Mazda as "the Circle of Sovereignty,"¹ and interprets the loop with streamers in which the figure floats as a variation of the same idea, for in some of the pictures it appears as a chaplet, or waist-garland with ribbons.²

It is not possible that the loop with streamers is originally a disc representing the disc of the sun after the fashion of Egyptian temple decorations. At any rate, there are a great number of Assyrian sculptures of the same type which are unequivocally representations of the sun. A cylinder (published in Layard's *Culte de Mithra*, plate XLIX., No. 2) illustrating the myth of god Isdubar's descent to Hasisatra, shows the two scorpion-genii of the horizon watching the rise and the setting of the sun. Here the sun appears, like the figure from which Ahura Mazda rises, as a winged disc with feather-tail and streamers. In addition, we find the same picture in the deity that protects the tree of life (Fig. 3), which can only signify the benign influence of the sun on plants; and an old Babylonian cylinder representing Merodach's fight with the evil spirit that darkens the moon (Fig. 9), shows above the moon-god the sun covered with clouds in this very same conventional shape.³

Ahura Mazda is pictured as a winged disc without any head, in the style of Chaldean sun-pictures, in a cameo representing him as worshipped by two sphinxes, between whom the sacred haoma plant is seen (Fig. 6). In another cameo (Fig. 8) he appears as a human figure without wings, rising from a crescent that hovers above the sacrificial fire. Above him is a picture of the sun, and before him stands a priest or a king in an attitude of adoration.

It is noteworthy that there are a few bas-reliefs which replace, in the representation of Ahura Mazda, the circle of sovereignty by a lotos flower, which may indicate either Egyptian or Indian influence. Was the lotos flower in the hands of Ahura Mazda perhaps an emblem that was introduced since objections were vigorously made against bloody sacrifices? If that were so, we might

¹See his article on "The Circle of Sovereignty," in the *American Oriental Society's Proceedings*, May, 1889.

²See K. O. Kiash, *Ancient Persian Sculptures*; and also Rawlinson, *J. R. A. S.*, X., p. 187 Kossowicz, *Inscriptiones Palae Persicae Achaemeniorum*, p. 46, et seq.

³There is no need of enumerating other cylinders and bas-reliefs of the same kind, as they are too frequently found in Assyrian archæology. See for instance the illustrations in Lenormant, *J. J. V.*, pp. 177, 230, 247, 296, 299, etc.




Fig. 10. BAS-RELIEF OF PERSEPOLIS.

fter Coste et Flandin, *Perse Ancienne*, pl. 156. Reproduced from Lenormant, V., p. 485.)

attribute its use to the spread of a movement that in its rise was similar to the Buddhism of India.

In conclusion we state that some of the early Christians esteemed the religious wisdom of Persia almost as sacred as the dicta of the prophets of Israel, for in one of the apocryphal gospels the statement is made that the Magi of the East who saw the star of Bethlehem came in response to an ancient prophecy of the advent of the Saviour that had been made by Zoroaster.

THE ORDEAL OF CANNON-FIRE.

BY DR. F. L. OSWALD.

WHEN THE FIRST European travellers visited the island of Madagascar the form of trial known as the ordeal of poison was practised by all but the most primitive tribes of the aborigines. The supreme tribunal of the Hovas recognised its validity ; it was encouraged by officials corresponding to our justices of the peace, and was a frequent resort of individuals in the settlement of private disputes. It simplified litigation.

“ What do you agree to swallow ? ” a testy islander would ask his opponents, where our Western controversialists would offer to stake a sum of money. They had three or four different poisons : a variety of stramonium, euphorbia-leaves, and the juice of a fruit known as the tangena-cherry, that acted as an emetic, and in large doses was apt to extinguish a feebly-flickering life in a couple of hours. Vigorous patients often survived its effects, which could also be mitigated by various antidotes known only to the initiated.

As the severest test of endurance then known, it gradually superseded the milder ordeals, and appeals to that strange form of arbitration remained frequent enough to support the traffic of the antidote-mongers till the foreigners introduced arsenic and sulphuric acid.

The *défi* of desperate litigants promptly resorted to the more crucial tests, but with an unexpected result : After a few dozen court-rooms had been turned into morgues, ordeals of poison became unpopular, and Hova patriots began to take a lively interest in the European system of trial by jury.

The most conservative rulers preferred the extension of reforms, to the enlargement of cemeteries ; and similar consideration may lead to the abolishment of the ordeal of saltpetre for the settlement of international disputes.

Its first introduction seemed to have made warfare easier. First-class archers were scarce and expensive, and cavaliers, armed cap-a-pie, generally preferred to break lances in quarrels of their own; but the invention of gunpowder terminated such monopolies; a boy with a musket could defy the *Constable de Bourbon* in his double coat of Milanese chain-armor; the choice of recruiting-sergeants was no longer limited to athletes. A year's work of a few active gunsmiths enabled a city to take the field against its despoilers; a single cannon, *die faule Grethe*—Lazy Peg, as they called her on account of her unwieldiness—is said to have smashed the walls of one hundred and five different robber castles and reduced their proprietors to the alternative of flight or surrender. Battles became more frequent and yet less murderous, as they were fought at long range and under circumstances enabling the vanquished to avoid the massacres following the encounters of ill-matched combatants in the heroic age of hand-to-hand contests.

For a while it seemed as if campaigns were to be decided by manœuvres like the intricate marches and countermarches of Turenne and Montecuculi, at a great saving of human life, if not of time. Then came the inevitable reaction. The success of recklessly aggressive tactics compelled their more and more general adoption and involved a revival of close-range combats, while the mechanism of firearms was improved from year to year. Prince Eugene of Savoy advised his cuirassiers to charge at full speed and avail themselves of the fact that they could generally break infantry formations "between two volleys," i. e., after they galloped in reach of the first bullets and before their enemies had time to load again. But half a century later, and after the improvement of small arms had made sharpshooters decidedly formidable opponents, Frederick the Great issued similar instructions in the form of a peremptory order. "At the word of command," says his proclamation of June 10, 1744, "every squadron shall attack at full gallop and in close order; and his Majesty feels assured that if these instructions are implicitly followed the enemy will always be routed."

Napoleon, on his first appearance in the headquarters of the Army of Italy, proclaimed the same principle in a still more unequivocal manner. "The time for making war in a theatrical and effeminate manner," he said, "has gone by forever. I do not propose to imitate the commanders who mutually appointed a place of combat and advanced, hat in hand, to request their opponents to fire the first volley. We must cut the enemy in pieces—precipitate

ourselves like a torrent on their battalions and grind them to powder, that is, bring back war to its primitive state, and fight as Alexander and Cæsar did. Experienced generals conduct the troops opposed to us? So much the better! It is not their experience that will avail them against me. Mark my words, they will soon burn their manuals of tactics." (Headley's *Napoleon*, Vol. I., p. 64.)

That plan has since been adopted in every desperate action from the storming of the Malakoff to the battle of Spottsylvania, where Hancock's infantry charged through a storm of bullets that gnawed off an oak stump to the roots, and the three hours' rush against the batteries that bulwarked the hillside of Gravelotte with walls of corpses.

And in the meanwhile both cannons and small arms have been steadily improved. The first blunderbuss muskets had to be served by two men, and could be fired only once in five minutes, but the advance from those clumsy contrivances to the first breech-loaders is not greater than that from a Burnside rifle to the magazine guns which for the last seven years have been manufactured at the rate of nearly a thousand a day. A squad of six men can now keep up a shower of bullets approximating a hundred a minute, i. e., an average of sixteen shots each, for a minute and a half, then after a pause of ten seconds, recommence their fusillade with replenished magazines. And these bullets go five times as far as the musketballs of the Seven Years' War. At a distance of a mile and three-quarters they will penetrate a man's body; at close range they will strike through a four-inch plank of the hardest oak wood. And moreover, their alleged deficiency in "killing qualities" has been remedied by the addition of an alloy of soft, heavy metal that forces its way through the steel cap, and, by spreading like mashed wax, almost rivals the effect of an explosive shell.

Prof. W. A. Carlin describes the results of his experiments with these projectiles as beyond all his expectations, even when his victims were Rocky Mountain grizzlies—next to superstitions about the hardest things to kill. "The bear had not heard us," he says, "owing to the noise of the running stream, but evidently suspected that all was not right, for she stood up, turned slightly, and was just about to look our way when I sent a soft-nose bullet from my 30.40 Winchester into her left shoulder. She gave a bawl and turned a complete somersault, landing upright on her hind feet and rump. She turned her head towards us, and there was no mistaking the ugly expression on her face, when I

fired again, putting the second bullet diagonally through her chest and shoulder. Had I known it, the second shot was hardly needed"—nor the third, which smashed the brute's skull. "The *post mortem* inquest," he continues, "surprised us both. The first shot had smashed both shoulders to atoms, the intervening flesh resembling jelly and being filled with small splinters of bone. We had never seen such a horrible wound. The shock was evidently great, for on skinning her we found the lower part of her body badly congested, although she had not been struck further back than her shoulders. The shot in her head had crushed her skull into such small pieces that we could recover only those shown in the illustration"—with a photograph of two larger and fifteen smaller skull-fragments, while twenty years ago it was considered doubtful if a full-grown grizzly could be killed with less than a dozen bullets.

Imagine the effect of a thousand such projectiles, fired at short range into a close-formed squadron of cavalry! Yet the improvements of siege-guns and field artillery have almost equalled those of small arms. The fortifications of Gibraltar itself are considered no longer proof against dynamite bombs, and the German Government demands an additional appropriation of 175,000,000 marks to reconstruct its artillery in a manner to offset the advantages of Canét's quick-fire cannon. That invention of Col. Fr. Canét, Superintendent of the Mediterranean Coast Defences, seems to justify its description as the field-gun of the future, and to combine the advantages of the mitrailleuse with those of a Maxim gun. It is a breech-loader of a most ingeniously simple construction that can fire five shots per minute and in two minutes can be modified in a manner to adapt it to shrapnell, round balls or caissons of grape and canister. The carriage terminates in a double prong that strikes deep into the ground at the first shot, while the recoil of subsequent discharges is checked by pneumatic tubes, allowing a gradual but still limited compression of the enclosed air. A battery of such machines could almost annihilate a division of infantry attempting its capture against the range of an unobstructed fire and make cavalry charges so risky that few commanders would order them even under cover of darkness.

It is the knowledge of such risks that has preserved the peace of Western Europe for the last twenty five years and put the luxury of a man-hunt beyond the resources of second-class powers. Four hundred years ago such "autocrats of sixty faithful square leagues," as the Dukes of Parma and Modena, Brunswick, and Savoy, were fighting like catamounts upon the smallest provocation, and often,

like Cæsar Borgia, without any provocation whatever, except that of their ill humors, or, like the elder Dandolo, to stimulate a torpid liver.

The number of potentates who can afford the expenses of such tonics has steadily decreased as the number and destructiveness of gunpowder machines increased, and an invention which once threatened to close the gates of mercy on mankind may thus ultimately close the Temple of Janus.

IN NUBIBUS.

THE COGITATIONS OF A SMOKING PHILOSOPHER.

BY THE REV. G. J. LOW.

PIPE II.

I had a long talk with my old friend Professor Molecule this morning. "Professor," said I, "I have been cogitating over the old questions, "What am I? Whence came I? Whither go I?" "Then," said he, "you have been wasting your time, for those questions are settled. What are you? Why, like every other entity, a compound of matter and motion, of various atoms gathered from the four winds and operated by Force and Energy; and some of these days you will be decomposed, and the various atoms and powers will go to form other entities. Possibly the lime in your body may help, centuries hence, to form some huge rock against which may dash some vessel bearing, it may be, your remote progeny; the carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen may become sugar to fatten, or alcohol to craze, your children's children; while the brain-power you have been expending in puzzling over these questions may yet re-appear in an electric flash to carry the messages, or blast the homes, of some of your descendants."

Now, all this may be very interesting, but, oh, how horrible! How rapid, empty, foolish the whole business of life seems to be, if that is all! If my personality is like a pattern seen in a kaleidoscope for a moment, composed of little bits of glass which with a turn of the instrument are re-distributed to form other "entities," I would like to know if life is worth living! I think with Tennyson (*In Memoriam*, canto 55) that in such a case man is—

"A monster, then, a dream,

A discord. Dragons of the prime

That tare each other in their slime
Were mellow music matched with him."

But I will take a wider range. Supposing I am only a transitory combination of certain particles belonging to the world at large,—what *is* the world at large? or indeed the whole universe? How came it into being? When little Topsy, in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, was asked who made her, she answered: "Nobody made me; 'spects I growed." Wonder if the little nigger lass was right after all,—if she was an "advanced thinker"? We should call this materialist philosophy Topsyism: for when asked who made the universe (or, according to the old formula, "heaven and earth") it replies: "Nobody made it; 'spects it growed." On the other hand, the "orthodox" reply: "In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth." How grand, after all, is that opening sentence of the Book of Genesis; how majestic in its severe simplicity!

Of course, we accept the findings of science: the world no doubt "grew," so to speak, to its present condition. Even the huge rocks which our forefathers thought primitive or eternal we now know took untold time to form and were the outcome of numberless agencies. But what then? Does excessive age, or slow production, or immensity of result, lessen the necessity of an original designer? Are we not as much impressed with the genius and power of the framers of the Pyramids, as of the designer of the last new cuff-button? Does not the argument from design gather force, instead of weakening, as the thought of the immensity of the universe and its limitless age grows upon us? I believe with Darwin (see the closing words of *The Origin of Species*) that the Evolutionary Theory gives one a grander idea of the Creator—if there be one—than what I may call the mechanical theory of the creation which was held formerly. Professor Molecule says that the teleological argument breaks down, and makes fun specially of Paley's *Natural Theology*. To be sure, the details of that argument are now out of date; just as the Chemistry, Physiology, Biology of a hundred years ago are out of date now: but the main thesis seems to me to grow only stronger with the enlargement of our ideas of "Heaven and Earth." Paley opens his case thus: "In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might probably answer that for all I know to the contrary it had lain there for ever." I admit, of course, that no well-informed person would make such an answer nowadays. But the Archdeacon proceeds: "Suppose I had found a *watch* upon the ground and it should be inquired how it happened to be in that

place, I should hardly think of the answer I had given before." No, certainly not. However, a marvellous advance has been made since Paley's days, both in science and in practical mechanics. In his time there was no knowledge of the ages required to form one of the stratified rocks, while the watch was then constructed by hand at immense expenditure of time and care by the maker. Nowadays watches are made by machinery in short time, while we know the stone was the result of a much more intricate and lengthened process. I can fancy my friend Molecule and myself walking together and such a contingency happening to us. He stubs his toe against a stone; I pick up a watch. "Look here, Professor," I cry, "see this wonderful piece of mechanism! Surely, that evinces design and must have had a maker!"—"Pooh, my dear fellow," he would exclaim, "there is nothing wonderful in that watch, there are thousands like it; it was all made by machinery, by fixed rules; and once you master the details you will see nothing to wonder at. But look at this stone: your watch was made in a few hours; this stone probably took ten thousand years to make. And observe: it has some remarkable fossils in it: here is a Trilobite with a twist in his tail, and there is a very peculiar Lingula. I shall take this stone home with me and write an elaborate monograph on it, and render myself immortal: I mean I shall acquire posthumous fame."

Still, I do not see that the argument for an original designer is weakened by all this. To me it seems intensified in proportion to the immensity of the thing designed. I might put it as a "Rule of Three" sum, thus: *As* a watch, which took a few hours to put together, *is to* a stone, which took ages to put together, *so is* the designer of the watch *to* the designer of the stone, or of the process by which the stone was put together. And from the designer of this process we argue on to the designer of all the processes of the universe.

And then again: formerly a watch made by hand called forth admiration of the maker's skill and delicate manipulation, much of which is now supplanted by mechanical contrivances. Well, suppose men of genius go on inventing such mechanical appliances, until at last a machine is constructed which turns out watches entire. All one has to do is to put so much gold, silver, steel, etc., into a hopper at one end, and at the other out comes a full-blown watch,—or a bushel of them, for that matter. I can fancy Professor Molecule and myself watching the operation. "Don't you see, my dear fellow," he would say, "that it is all a matter of mechanical laws, and watches must needs come out in obedience to those

laws? Now, if the materials you put in at one end were, just for once, to come out a stew-pan instead of a watch, then indeed I should be astonished at the 'miracle,' and attribute it to some higher power."

Now, my answer to that would certainly be: "My dear sir, that's all very true, but—*who invented that machine?* I see it unerringly grinds out watches in blind obedience to fixed laws, but I repeat: Who made that machine? Let me know him that I may express my admiration of his skill and power, and 'worship' him—to use the word in its old-fashioned sense."

Now, to apply this argument to the world we live in. I see a marvellous fitness of things—a grand inter-relation of laws—matter—power—a certain *uniqueness* of the whole Universe. In short, I trace design in all—even in the stone, which in Paley's day would have excited no emotion. It is not only the mechanical adaptedness of the human eye or hand that fills me with astonishment, but also every clod of earth, every atom around me. Professor Molecule says it is all evolution. The Universe is one vast machine. Well, let it be granted. But—who made that machine?

My pipe is nearly out; the last wreaths of smoke are ascending; my 'worship' is well-nigh over. Professor Molecule may call this fetishism; Mr. Fred. Harrison may smile at my travestie of his religion. But I cannot help it. I don't know if there be a God or not. Nevertheless—with all due reverence and solemnity—I offer up my incense to—The Maker of the Machine.

PIPE III.

I met Professor Molecule again this morning and discussed my machine theory with him. I thought I would pose him with the question: "Who made the machine?" But not a bit of it. "Most likely," said he, "the machine, as you call it, made itself."—"But, Professor," I said, "that can't be, on the line of your own teaching. How can nothing produce something? Which was prior, the 'machine,' or what you call 'itself'?" How could the machine, when it was non-existent, make itself? How can non-entity make an entity? That seems to me harder to believe than any dogma of theology. That "God created the Universe" is at least thinkable, but that non-entity created all entities is to me unthinkable." He replied: "Well, what I mean is this: the various component parts of matter and power (which we must postulate to be eternal) ranged themselves into the machine. The various atoms operated by Force and Energy, and obeying chemical and

dynamical laws, in the course of innumerable ages, produced all this vast machine, this complex universe, of which you and I are infinitesimal, fleeting phenomena. What is the use of seeking further? Suppose you found out the maker of the machine,—then you must find out who made the maker of the machine, and so on *ad infinitum*.” And with that he left me. Now, is he right, I wonder? Matter and Power making the machine without a controlling mind. And then “Laws”—*why* laws, and *whose* laws? Force, and Atoms, and Laws,—Laws, and Atoms, and Force. After all that is an explanation that don't explain. It is like putting the world on an elephant, and the elephant on a tortoise, and the tortoise on no one knows what. How came those Laws, so called? Wonder did the Atoms meet in Convention and pass resolutions which became like the decrees of the Medes and Persians? Wonder if they decreed, for instance, that when so many atoms of *H* meet so many atoms of *O* under such and such conditions, they should coalesce and form a new entity called Water? Perhaps they said, Let there be water,—and there was water. By the way, what lots of resolutions they must have passed. Wonder if there was any opposition? Wonder if, when Atoms moved a resolution, Force did not sometimes move an amendment? And then, how about the different kinds of atoms or elements of which chemistry at present counts sixty or seventy? Wonder if each element was represented at the original Convention by one Atom or a billion Atoms? Now, Philosophy and Science make it their special province to search out the causes of things. Behold certain phenomena: forth steps science and tells us the causes of these phenomena. But when common sense demands, “Will you tell me the cause of those causes?” science replies, “That is not my business!”

But I understand there is a new theory now among the scientists. These scientists, by the way, ought to take out a Patent Right for manufacturing theories. None but they may theorise—or dogmatise either. This new theory is that all these sixty or seventy elements may yet be reduced to three or four, and possibly at last to one. Professor Molecule thinks that some day all our so-called elements will be resolvable into Hydrogen, and so that will be found to be the great mother-element. If that should be the case, we would then get at the great original “Indefinite, incoherent Homogeneity” of Mr. Herbert Spencer. Then, surely, science would give us a creed:—“I believe in Hydrogen.” Then I suppose we will all worship Hydrogen. We could formulate an article of religion similar to the first of the famous Thirty-nine Articles. Let

us try how the wording of it, *mutatis mutandis*, would suit our new "faith":

"There is but one living and true *Hydrogen*, everlasting, without body, parts or passions, of infinite power, wisdom and goodness, the maker and preserver of all things, both visible and invisible."

Now, let us take this up, clause by clause, as they say in Committees, and see what amendments are needed. We shall have to change the tense of the first clause as we are speaking of the beginning of things, and perhaps leave out the word "living." We will read it thus: "There was but one everlasting and true Hydrogen." That will do; first clause carried as amended.

"Without body, parts, or passions." Yes; second clause carried. "Of infinite Power." Certainly; all things were made by it; we can set no limit to its power, "potential" at first and then "kinetic." "Wisdom"—how about that? If it knew what it was doing, if it had an end in view in all its permutations and combinations, then it had "Wisdom;" but if it had no more sense than the hydrogen we fill balloons with,—then it had not, and its evolutions came out by chance, and that sounds unscientific. However, we must leave that out for the present as "not proven."—"Of infinite Goodness." Of course, if it had no "wisdom," it had no "goodness." But even if it had "wisdom," the "goodness" would be a question like "the goodness of nature," which we often hear of, but which depends altogether upon the point of view. The healthy, prosperous man will think nature very good, while the sufferer in mind, body, and estate will view it in an opposite light. The little insect, fluttering joyously among the flowers, can no doubt thank nature for its goodness; but when it gets caught in the spider's web I dare say it fails to see where the goodness comes in. No, like "wisdom," "goodness" must be left out of our Confession of Faith for the present. The last clause, "the Maker and Preserver of all things," etc., may stand, unless the word "Preserver" is objected to. But as the Indestructibility of Matter and the Conservation of Energy are established scientific facts, we may let it stay, and carry the whole clause. So our "Creed," as amended so far, would read thus: "There was but one everlasting and true Hydrogen without body, parts, or passions, of infinite power, the maker and preserver of all things, both visible and invisible."

Here at last I have an object of worship.

Now, I wonder what Hydrogen—supposing it has wisdom—thinks of the work of its hands? Wonder if it has itself absorbed some of the intelligence it has created or evolved? Wonder if it

will go on creating or evolving, until at last it produces a God, such as men have conceived of; or if—scared at its own success, at the Frankenstein it has produced—it will recall all its own constructions into itself, and resolve all things again, as at the first, into an eternal Nirvâna of Hydrogen!¹

It comes to this, it seems to me: Everybody must have some "Creed," or belief. The scientific agnostic says he don't know; but he can't help framing theories, adopting hypotheses, as to the origin of things. His "working hypothesis," until it is verified, is a "creed." Again, all parties, theists and atheists, can agree (since the universe had confessedly some beginning) in saying: I believe in a maker of heaven and earth; whether that maker be that very vague and indefinite expression, "Nature," or that definite entity, Hydrogen, or the old-fashioned term, God.

But the materialists must believe in a blind, unconscious maker, a haphazard maker, and yet a Creator; for mindless itself, it created Mind; without Intelligence, it created Intellect. It is more easy for me to believe in the priority of mind, rather than that Matter *plus* Energy evolved Mind.

There must be something Eternal, either Mind or Matter—or perhaps both. Since I must believe in some originator, I will take the most credible theory, the best "working hypothesis," of the three. I shall say with the Theist:—

I believe in God, Maker of Heaven and Earth.

¹See Clodd's *Story of Creation*, Part 1., Chapter 1., and also the summary at the close of the book. This work is an admirable epitome of the results of modern scientific research.

DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS.

BY ANTONIO LLANO.

I.

HUMAN PERFECTION, or the perfecting of mankind, has often been proposed as the object as well as the criterion of ethics. Although absolute perfection, in the sense of a state than which there is not a better, may not be readily apprehended, nor, much less, realised, yet we can form a clear conception of relative perfection, in the sense of a condition better than the present condition, or than any other condition taken as a term of comparison. And, since all ethics, whatever its particular views, deals with the means of bettering the condition of man, whether individually or collectively, or at least with the means of keeping that condition from retrograding, we may perhaps with propriety say that every system of ethics aims at the perfection of mankind ; or, in the language of moral philosophy, that perfection is the end of ethics. Nor is this all : the very word *end* implies that the relative perfection we have in view is not to be considered as a means or instrument in the prosecution of some farther object ; for in this case that farther object, not perfection, would be the end of ethics. This we express by saying that perfection, of one kind or another, is to be considered as an end in itself, to be striven after for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else ; although it is obvious that, there being no end without a means, ethics must necessarily relate to the means requisite for the attainment of the end, no less than to the end itself.

But the nature of this end is more or less definite, more or less vague, according to the view we take of perfection, i. e., according to the norm constituting our ethical guide and standard. We may, with the hedonist, make of pleasurable feeling our standard of perfection ; and the practice of morality, in this case, being di-

rected towards the enjoyment of pleasure, either by ourselves or others, we have secured our end, in every special instance, when either we or others have experienced the feelings in question; and these feelings being all we seek, we may describe them as constituting an end by itself; an end, moreover, which is perfectly definite, and whose character as an end—its finalness—is distinctly perceived. Or we may, with the ordinary intuitionist, establish a difference between the “higher” and the “lower” natures of man, including in the former all his virtuous tendencies, or the dictates of his “moral sense”; and in this case (although the distinction is by no means clear), we may still say that a given virtue, such as chastity (a favorite “virtue” with many writers, among them Mr. Lecky), is to be practised for no other reason than because it is an element of our “better nature”; because we know (or, rather, *feel*) that it is better to be pure than to be impure, irrespective of all consequences, either to ourselves or others. Here, also, as in the preceding instance, we have an end by itself, inasmuch as virtuous actions are performed, not in order to attain any remote ends, but because we conceive that by performing them we are what we “ought to be.” In both of the above cases the object in view is the satisfaction of what is, or is alleged to be, a specific feeling; and once the feeling has been satisfied, our goal, for the time, has been reached. The common characteristic of the two systems is that they both present a relatively final condition, whether pleasure or virtuousness, as the object of conduct; that they both find the ethical standard in an ideal capable of being completely realised.

The case, however, is somewhat different when we consider perfection in a dynamical instead of a statical sense; when we regard morality as a factor in the evolution of mankind, subject itself to the laws of change and adaptation, and playing no other part than that of an accelerating force impelling the human race in its uninterrupted onward and upward motion. The difference between this position and those mentioned above is, that, although the intuitionist and the evolutio-hedonist may hold, and do hold, that morality is a very powerful element in the development of the race, yet it is not a necessary consequence of their views that morality should be practised *because* of its developmental value; in other words, development is not their ethical criterion or standard. On the other hand, the doctrine now under consideration regards morality as having human progress for its main object; whence it follows that progress, in one form or another, is the ethical crite-

tion, the standard by which conduct is to be judged and measured. A system of ethics of this description may, I think, be more particularly termed an ethics of perfection. Its distinctive characteristic lies in this—that the end of every moral action, being subservient to the farther end of human progress, is only a relative end, not an end by itself; and, as such, may be more adequately described as a means, while the real end of ethics is a never-realised ideal which recedes from us in proportion as we approach it, or which constantly and continuously changes in proportion as it is partially realised. We may, however, take another view of the matter, and, by picturing to ourselves the evolution of the race as an unceasing motion, consider this motion as an end by itself, which, with respect to our actions, is attained when we are satisfied that they have been factors contributory to the preservation or acceleration of that motion.

Of all the various forms in which the ethics of perfection has appeared, there is one which, affirming to be founded exclusively on the law of cosmic evolution, as that law is understood by the foremost thinkers of the age, claims for itself, as legitimate property, the title of evolutionary ethics. Unfortunately, however, this appellation has been already appropriated by such systems as those presented in the works of Leslie Stephen and Herbert Spencer, whose doctrines, from a purely ethical point of view, are almost (not entirely) diametrically opposed to the doctrines with which I am now dealing. It becomes necessary, therefore, to make a distinction, and I think we may give the name *developmental ethics* to that system of ethics whose moral standard is development, especially mental development; in which the morality of an action is measured by its fitness to enter as a new factor in the sum total of forces impelling the human race in its upward motion.

Of this ethics Dr. Paul Carus, editor of *The Monist*, is a very strong adherent and enthusiastic advocate. It is the object of the present essay to examine the most salient points of his doctrines, as they can be gathered from his numerous writings. I shall, first, endeavor to present an outline of his views, not indeed in the literal form in which he has stated them, but as they can be logically interpreted. In following this method of exposition I am not actuated by the pretentious hope of improving upon Dr. Carus's lucid and vigorous presentation of his subject: my reasons are of a more plausible nature. In the first place, an uninterrupted series of quotations is almost always monotonous, especially when they are from a well-known writer; and, in the second place, the critic, by

presenting, as he understands them, the views he wishes to discuss, shows at once what he conceives the position of his author to be, and on what interpretation of his author's ideas he will base his criticism.

II.

Having, through the constant study of nature, acquired a scientific or positivist habit of mind, we have reversed the principles of the old systems of philosophy ; and, no longer seeking to evolve natural phenomena from the purely formal operations of our understanding, we seek in natural phenomena the materials to be combined and elaborated in those operations. However consistent our theories, however rigorous our reasonings, they will evidently remain nothing but pure forms of thought, answering to no objective realities, unless the premises have been taken from the objective world itself. But, if it is true that, in the language of Kant, pure formal thought is "empty," it is equally true that pure sensations, the data of experience, are "blind"; whence the necessity, on the one side, of looking in experience for the real content of knowledge, and, on the other side, of looking in formal thought for the meaning or interpretation of sensations. Experience furnishes the premises, but logic must give us the conclusions : without the classifications of experience in the categories of formal thought, the coherence and unification in which real knowledge consist would be impossible ; man might be a sentient being, but not a cogitative being. The laws of logic, however, are not isolated subjectivities, disconnected from the world of experience : they are conditions of thought corresponding to certain conditions of objective reality : they have been arrived at by the elimination of all the special properties of reality, except the most general property, without which no reality can be conceived, *viz.*, *form*. The laws of logic being, then, nothing but the laws of form, they must be applicable to any system of reality where form is the primary condition of existence. It follows that to that regularity and uniformity known in logic as consistency, there must correspond that regularity and uniformity in nature we describe by the term law—natural law. Hence we arrive at the conception of the universe as being not a chaos, but of necessity a cosmos, an orderly concatenation of causes and effects, where events, which are only changes of form, are invariably determined by the preceding forms of existence. Furthermore, the correspondence between the operations of formal thought and the

objective realities of nature arises from their very identity, or their oneness ; for the laws of logic are the subjective aspect of the laws of nature working in the cerebral substance ; they do not dictate or create order, but are the consciousness of the order followed by nature in the process of organisation : they are self-conscious nature, becoming aware of the conditions she has fulfilled, and *must* have fulfilled, in the course of her evolution—nature, so to speak, interpreting herself.¹

If, having established the universality of law, we ask ourselves what view we are to take of the phenomenal world in its entirety, we arrive at very important generalisations. Not only the very conception of the universe as a cosmos leads us to consider it as a unitary system of reality, but the development of all scientific knowledge points in the same direction. Knowledge is a continuous process of inclusion and harmonisation : of inclusion, in the sense that every new fact is understood when it has been referred to, or included in, a general order of facts or experiences formulated by us as a law ; of harmonisation, in the sense that the inclusion of a particular fact in a general order of facts consists in harmonising the new fact with the other known facts, in making objective the subjective requisite of consistency. In this manner we are led, by the very nature of cognition, to the theoretical conclusion that a perfect understanding of the whole world of phenomena is only possible by the reduction of all modes of existence to one single, universal law, of which particular laws are but special manifestations, or special aspects, conditioned by the special forms in which the one universal law exhibits itself. Thus the consistency of facts with one another is easily accounted for on the theory of their oneness ; a theory which is not merely the result of abstract speculation, but a legitimate induction based on the well-established truths of experimental science. All science, indeed, aims at the realisation of monism, of a continuity in nature which is the characteristic mark of its unity ; and, as said before, the solution of scientific problems consists in bringing new phenomena within the applicability of one law, or in extending the range of the law so as to make it embrace, in a synthetic whole, a greater number of phenomena. An unsolved problem is an apparent break of continuity, which disappears on the solution of the problem : so long as the break of continuity exists, the problem remains unsolved.²

¹ See chapter on "Form and Formal Thought" in Dr. Carus's *Fundamental Problems*, 2nd edit., Chicago, 1894.

² See *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 7, 20, 21, 22 ; also *The Monist*, 1., 2, p. 240. "The unitary conception of the world has become a postulate of science. Indeed, the single sciences, each one

One exception seemed for many centuries to defy all efforts directed towards including it in the one universal whole; and the philosophers of the past were, and many of our own generation are, wont to dwell, sometimes with devout satisfaction, sometimes with the pangs of despair, on the impassable chasm, impossible of being bridged, separating the realm of life and consciousness from the lower realm of dead and inert matter. To-day, however, with the progress of natural science, the chasm is becoming narrower and narrower; and if we cannot say that we have actually bridged it, we can, in some measure, see one shore from the other shore, and are not unwarranted in suggesting the means by which the intervening distance may be satisfactorily spanned. The doctrine of evolution, by tracing the most complex forms of life to the relatively simple compound known as protoplasm, has familiarised us with the truth that matter is possessed of potentialities never before dreamed of, and also with the all-important truth that two phases of the same process may appear, when taken at sufficient distance from each other, as independent, and even disparate, facts; but that, by gradual, infinitesimal changes of the one fact, we may finally arrive at the other as its necessary consequence. A gap in nature may, therefore, simply indicate, not that the gap is so in reality, but that we are unacquainted with the "connecting links." Were we ignorant of the laws of thermotics, we should, no doubt, dogmatically affirm, as an axiomatic truth, that so disparate two facts as heat and cold could never change into each other, nor one originate from the other. The thermometer, however, soon convinces us of our error; while, if we stop to reflect on the *gradual* change of a low into a high temperature, all the apparent contradiction disappears at once. A chasm between any two facts of nature is a subjective discontinuity, not an objective discontinuity; it is a discontinuous perception of a continuous reality.

Since, according to the theory of evolution, the most complex forms of consciousness have evolved from the apparently unconscious protoplasm, we must believe that the material elements constituting this protoplasm already contain, in a latent form, all the *elements* of mind; contain feeling *in potentia*, not otherwise than as molar motion contains the potentialities of heat; or, to use a very striking illustration, as darkness contains the potentialities of light.¹

in its province, have always worked out and endeavored to verify the principles of monism. Every fact which seems to contradict the principle of unity must be, and indeed it is, considered as a problem until it conforms to it. As soon as it is found to be in unison with all the other facts the problem is solved." (*Fundamental Problems*, p. 22.)

¹ *The Monist*, I., 1, pp. 85-86.

And it does not require a long stretch of imagination, nor is it illogical or unscientific to conclude, that those very potentialities exist as constituent elements of the material particles composing the protoplasm; while the transition from unorganised matter to protoplasmic matter is no more impossible (although we are as yet ignorant of the process) than the transition of mere protoplasmic matter to man. In this hypothesis the vexed question as to the origin of life disappears as unmeaning: life, in its rudiments, is a property of all matter, and, as matter, is eternal, and calls for no explanation. The problem, then, for science to solve, is not, "What is the origin of life?" but—"What is the origin of that form of matter known as protoplasm?" And the latter problem is not only scientifically intelligible, but its solution is readily conceived as both possible and probable.¹

¹ Dr. Carus's views as to the universality of life may be found in *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 110-133, 185-187, 300. His views on "The Origin of Mind" may be read in *The Monist*, I., 1, and *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 345-347. The theory of the origin of mind from what Professor Clifford called "mind-stuff," or "elements of feeling," is very clearly and forcibly stated by Dr. Carus in the following terms: "Subjectivity cannot originate out of nothing; it must be conceived as the product of a co-operation of certain elements which are present in the objective world. In other words, the elements of the subjective world are features that we must suppose to be inseparably united with the elements of the objective world which are represented in our mind as motions. This leads to the conclusion that feeling has to be considered not as a simple but as a complex phenomenon. Feelings originate through a combination of elements of feeling; and the presence of elements of feeling must be supposed to be an intrinsic property of the objective world." (*The Monist*, I., 1, p. 72.) "As light originates out of darkness, being a special mode of motion, so feeling originates out of the not-feeling. The not-feeling accordingly contains the conditions of feeling in a similar way as potential energy contains the potentiality of kinetic energy, or as molar motion contains potentially the molecular motion of heat, light, and electricity." (*Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.) I have quoted this theory at some length, for two reasons: in the first place, because it exhibits in a very plain light the scientific and naturalistic, and, therefore, deterministic view Dr. Carus takes of man as a natural phenomenon submitted ultimately to the laws of chemistry and mechanics (he repudiates this description of his views, but I think its accuracy can be substantiated, making due allowance for the meaning of words), and this is of great importance for my main purpose; and, in the second place (and although this has no direct bearing on my subject, I may be allowed to make a short digression), because, although the theory is open to serious criticisms (at least as to its form), it is, one of the most striking illustrations of the revolution worked in philosophy by the evolutionary doctrines and methods of analysis; for we no longer regard natural phenomena as mechanical *mixtures*, whose properties are identical with those of the elements mixed, but as *combinations*, whose properties, although resultants of the properties of the combining elements, are not identical with these.—The theistic argument of Locke based on the non-cogitateness of matter is well known. He argues that, if cogitateness were a property of matter, then, since matter is discontinuous (in the sense that it is not all "one being"), every particle must be cogitative, and every particle being eternal, every particle must be eternally cogitative, and, therefore (he thinks to have proved that the eternal being must be "all-knowing"), every particle must be a God. (Locke, *Of Human Understanding*, book IV., chap. x. Comp. Leibnitz, *Nouveaux Essais*, liv. IV., ch. x.) Besides a defective logic, we at once discover the error of assuming that mind is a simple, irreducible fact, not derivable from another simple and disparate fact—matter; and that mind, owing to its very simpleness, is not conceivable except in all its completeness, as we know it in man or imagine it in God. Locke never thought there could be such a thing as "elements of feeling," or elements of mind, for he took mind to be undecomposable; and it was, therefore, natural for him to suppose that if matter were cogitative at all, every particle must have a developed will, a perfect memory, and a clear understanding (although this view, when closely examined, does not tally with the theory of the *acquisition* of ideas, which is really a *formation* of mind).

III.

The foregoing doctrines as to the nature of the universe and man do away, in the first place, with that anthropomorphic view of the world which postulates an independent and arbitrary will "directing" all phenomena, either from "within" (and this is called an immanent God), or from "without," as in all popular forms of theism; and, in the second place, with that anthropocentric view which considers the will and the feelings of man as having a legitimate claim on, and absolute authority over, the processes going on outside of his conscious being. This radical change of view as to "man's place in nature" necessarily implies an equally radical change of view with regard to man's conduct—with regard to ethics. The test of all truth is no longer subjective, but objective,—not introspective, but experimental; and ethics, if it aspires to be a science at all, must take its stand on the facts of nature, considered as objective realities, and formulated into universal laws by the scientific principles and methods of research. Since our feelings and our thoughts are not self-existing or independent entities, but are dependent on, and related to, the whole order of nature, it is necessary to know what that order is, what its laws are, and how we are connected with them; and this done, we shall be enabled to enunciate in truly scientific formulas the special laws of conduct we ordinarily distinguish as ethical rules.

It may be stated at the outset, that the "authority" for ethics, the ultimate sanction and standard of conduct, can be no other than the cosmical order itself. Although the cosmos itself is neither moral nor immoral, it is the possibility for such a thing as a moral life; a possibility which, by the development of consciousness, has become an actuality. When we are convinced that all present existence is but a feature of the one eternal reality, that our consciousness has been formed and moulded by the invariable laws of the objective world, and that our actions, being special manifestations of those laws through the intermediary of feeling, are really continuations of an uninterrupted motion which comes from eternity and goes to eternity, following one, and only one, direction; then we see how idle it is to speculate on what, according to the fancies of our imagination, *ought* to be, without taking the trouble to inquire into the deeper question of what, according to the nature of things as we know them by experience, *must* be; and how liable we are to err when, leaving aside the criterion of objective

reality, we erect our feelings into a criterion of morality, by confusing those things which are logically possible with those that alone are actually possible, their possibility being no other than their very existence. The *can* is a prerequisite of the moral *ought*; but this *can*, in order to be so actually and objectively, has to be an agreement with the universal laws of nature; in which case the *can* is identical with the *must*. The universal laws of nature, then, being the necessary conditions of actual possibility, are the only justification of the moral precepts and the moral *ought*; and it is a sufficient guarantee of the morality of an action to show that it harmonises with those cosmical operations which have been revealed to us by scientific research. Nor could it be otherwise; for only that endures which, as a part, can fit the universal whole of phenomena; what does not fit must meet with inevitable ruin; and it is needless to say that what is doomed to certain failure cannot be a subject of approbation. In this sense we may say that morality "means obedience to the law," and that "human beings can be moral or immoral, according as their conduct agrees with, or does not agree with, God" (the universe).¹ Our very existence is involved in our obedience or disobedience to the supreme authority of nature; if we wish to exist, we must submit to the "cosmical conditions of existence," and such actions as conform to those conditions must be considered "good"; other actions, "bad."²

Were we unacquainted with the direction in which the world moves, with the line of progress in general, and of human progress in particular, ethics would have no meaning: in the ignorance of the causal relations between human actions and their consequences, one form of conduct could have no more justification than another; at least, no more *à priori* justification. But if there is a law of progress, a direction in which alone progress can take place, and if we know that law, then that law is our only possible norm of morality.³ This norm has been revealed to us by the doctrine of evolution, the first of whose teachings is, "that life as it is now can transcend itself; it can transform itself, and *must*, according to nature's laws, transform itself into a higher form of life."⁴ When

¹*Fundamental Problems*, pp. 315, 321. Dr. Carus constantly reverts to this position—that the objective phenomena of nature are the supreme authority and criterion of ethics. (See, e. g., *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 198, 257, 322, 328, 329; *Religion of Science*, second edition, Chicago, 1896, pp. 21, 27; *Ethical Problem*, Chicago, 1890, p. 31; *The Monist*, I., 4: "The Criterion of Ethics an Objective Reality.")

²*Ethical Problem*, p. 31.

³*Homilies of Science*, Chicago, 1892, p. 37.

⁴*Fundamental Problems*, p. 316. "Morality is that which is in concord with the law of evolution." (*The Monist*, VI., 4, p. 389.)

life is thus considered as a *necessary*, continuous upward movement, and conduct as one of the factors of this movement, the moral problem appears no longer as a mere question of *ought*, but mainly as a question of *must*: its solution consists in rationalising the *ought* by bringing it within the pale of the *must*. Shortly stated, the ethics of development may be thus formulated: Since the world moves in a certain direction, it *must* move in that direction; since it must move in that direction, we, who are but elements of the world, *must* act so as to further that movement. Hence development is at once the cause, the standard, and the authority of ethics.

Here the very natural question presents itself: What is meant by development, by progress? To this Dr. Carus answers that "the test of progress must be sought in the growth of soul." By soul, of course, he does not mean an independent and "spiritual" *ego*, but simply the mental activity of the nervous structure. For us, as conscious beings, the world is a system of interconnected phenomena more or less accurately represented, or "imaged," in the cerebral substance; and, in proportion as our experiences grow in number and complexity, the representation gains in accuracy and distinctness; which means that we interpret our feelings in a more faithful manner, or that there is a closer correspondence between the subjective states and their objective correlates. Otherwise stated, soul-progress consists in a constant approach to truth; for truth is nothing but the correct interpretation of our feelings, or a congruity of our mental states with reality.¹ Considering, then, the development of soul as, for us, the most important feature of cosmical law, we may accept it as a direct criterion of ethics, a standard of right and wrong; this standard not being different from the law of evolution in general, nor from the supreme standard of universal law, but simply a special aspect of both, or a special point of view from which we may regard them; there being, strictly speaking, only one law by which all phenomena are governed, and to which all particular laws can and must be referred.²

IV.

Such are, if I have understood them aright, the *fundamental* principles of developmental ethics. I have dispensed with minor

¹ *Homilies of Science*, pp. 41-42.

² In this sense, I think, are to be taken Dr. Carus's numerous references to the development of "soul-life" as the ethical criterion. It is man's duty, he says, to do "that which he needs most do, according to the laws of nature, to let his soul grow and expand, and to develop to ever higher and nobler aims." (*The Monist*, I., 4, p. 560.) "That which makes our souls grow and evolve is moral, that which dwarfs our souls and prevents their evolution is immoral." (*Homilies of Science*, p. 47.) Compare *Ethical Problem*, p. 42.

details, it being my main purpose to discuss the bases of the system ; but to such particulars as are of capital importance I shall advert in the course of my discussion. Although I believe that the postulates set forth by Dr. Carus as the foundations of his ethical theory are substantially correct, being identical with the generally accepted scientific doctrines of to-day, it does not appear to me that he has made a logical application of them ; that is to say, his ethical corollaries do not seem to be consistent with the general principles from which he has endeavored to derive them.

The first objection to the ethics of development is one which, demolishing, as I conceive, the very foundations, brings the whole structure to the ground ; the objection, namely, that the foregoing principles themselves are a protest against, and a nullification of, all ethical judgments ; and that, therefore, it is an incongruity to speak of morality as deriving its authority from those principles. If we are nothing but a part of nature ; if our development obeys necessary, universal laws ; in short, if we ourselves are natural phenomena, is it not a contradiction to say that we can oppose the laws of nature, and be thereby immoral ? All human passions being of natural growth, are all alike transformations of the one universal energy, as it operates in the various forms of material existence ; and passions being the springs of our voluntary actions, the action of the martyr is as natural as the action of his executioner ; they both follow the laws of their natures, that is, the laws of nature ; there is nothing in the one that makes his action more "agreeable" to the cosmical order than the action of the other ; and, judged by the supreme standard of universal law, they are equally moral, that is to say, they both act in response to the demands of nature, the only difference being that nature makes different demands upon different organisms. If, then, the laws of nature in general are to be accepted as the standard, there is really no standard, for the simple reason that there is no right or wrong ; and the everlasting objection against Spinozism remains unanswered, unless we have the courage to abide by the logical consequences of our postulates, and declare, with the philosopher, that a scoundrel is no more blamable for being a scoundrel than a horse for being a horse.¹ For Spinoza, however, the scoundrel is simply "excusable" ; but, according to that view which identifies morality with naturalness, the scoundrel must be declared to be actually moral. In fact, since everything happens, and every man acts, in absolute conformity with the laws of nature, the criterion of right is nothing but bare reality ; right-

¹ *Lettre de Spinoza à H. Oldenberg* (*Œuvres*, t. III., pp. 376-377, Saisset's trans., Paris, 1872).

ness and existence are ultimately one and the same thing ; and it were better to do away with all ethical terminology, for such terms as *moral* and *immoral*, *good* and *bad*, *right* and *wrong* lose all their significance, when one of the terms of the antithesis has disappeared.

The objection, however, may be partially met by saying, that our standard is not to be found in the laws of nature in general, but in the law of evolution in particular ; that ethics takes into consideration the difference between actions which tend to promote, and actions which tend to retard, the evolutionary movement ; and that the latter, although really as natural as the former, are by us conceived, at least relatively, as opposed to these, and may, in ordinary language, be said to be antagonistic to the general movement of the race. There seems, then, no contradiction in classifying conduct, as we classify other natural facts, into two different orders : good actions, which are conducive to development ; and bad actions, which are opposed to development. And it may be added that this distinction, when the words are sufficiently understood, and the hair-splitting of casuistry is not allowed to confuse what is plain, is entirely intelligible, and may be legitimately used as the foundation of a science of morality—of an ethics. Furthermore, it may be argued that the moral feelings from which ethical judgments arise, are simply the emotional concomitants of human progress ; that the law of society being a law of evolution, special feelings evolve, as is to be expected, in harmony with the same law ; and that thus both the physiological and the psychological aspects of morality are perfectly understandable : the physiological, in the sense that a moral person, considered as a social organ, must discharge his functions in a manner subservient to the health and vitality of the whole ; the psychological, in the sense that the actions and judgments of a moral person are accompanied by those characteristic feelings we distinguish as moral feelings.

While the logical cogency of such a reasoning as this will not be disputed, the assumptions made are open to the following objections. As regards the physiological aspect of the question, it cannot be denied that, if by ethics is meant *nothing but* the science of the objective relations and consequences of conduct, viewed from a purely descriptive and non-emotional point of view, the ethics of development, being a branch of natural science, rests on as solid a foundation as human physiology ; it may, indeed, be termed social physiology.¹ So long as we confine ourselves to tracing the con-

¹ "If by moral science," says Fouillée, "we mean the science of the necessary conditions of individual and social progress, we can understand how it was possible for Spinoza to write

sequences of murder as affecting the stability of the social group and the sense of security of its members, its effects upon industry, trade, and other pursuits of our activity, we are within the limits of descriptive science. But in this there is nothing sufficiently characteristic to make a separate science, a science of ethics; for in the above facts we have nothing but a combination of sociology, psychology, and political economy; and, if this is *all* we have to deal with, we are only disguising our surrender of ethics with the obstinate preservation of the name. Although I believe that this will finally be the only view taken of the matter—that the right-and-wrong ethics will finally disappear—I do not believe that we have reached that state, or that ethics is understood in this bare and indifferent physiological sense. For us ethics implies a special kind of feelings—moral feelings—and a special kind of judgments—moral judgments. Ethics, in its present form, deals with the relations of human conduct considered not only in their external reality as mere facts or data to be used and elaborated by reason, according to the pure laws of formal thought: it deals with those relations in so far as they affect our emotional nature—our conceptions and feelings of right and wrong. The part of science in modern ethics is to bring certain forms of conduct within the pale of the moral feelings; to show the connexion between the various forms of conduct and a recognised emotional standard. When the surgeon is asked to justify himself for amputating his patient's limb, he explains that the operation is necessary in order to save the patient's life: his science enables him to establish the morality of his conduct by showing the agreement of his action with a recognised moral judgment—that it is right to save a man's life.

Ethics, then, must take account of an emotional factor, which, being indispensable to all ethical judgments, has to be considered as a criterion; and this criterion, by its very nature, is purely subjective. To say that the amputation of a gangrened limb will save a man's life is not an ethical proposition; it is the statement of a matter of fact, not of a moral judgment. The moral judgment is passed when we say that we ought to save the man's life, or that it is our duty to save the man's life. Indeed, Dr. Carus himself, by his frequent references to the *ought*, the sense of duty, and other emotional conditions, as inseparable from morality, has virtually

a science of morality, an ethics." (A. Fouillée, *La liberté et le déterminisme*, 3me. éd., p. 52.) Here, however, the subjective element, apparently excluded, is virtually included in the term "progress." Unless progress is maintained to be a *moral* end, something that *ought to be* aimed at, the above description may apply to biology and to sociology, not to ethics.

surrendered his objective standard.¹ Although he has written an essay intended to prove that "the criterion of ethics is an objective reality,"² yet he speaks of ethics as having for its object to teach us our duty;³ and this is to recognise that the objective criterion, whatever it may be, must be ultimately subordinated to a subjective criterion; for, while the apprehension of a fact and its effects as simple relations of reality is a mental process guided by entirely objective conditions, the apprehension of the same fact *as a duty* is guided more specially by subjective, emotional conditions, which, whatever our theory as to the nature of the moral feelings, may be included under the two general terms, "moral approbation" and "moral disapprobation."

Dr. Carus may, perhaps, say that this is a misconstruction of his views; that, while he recognises the sense of duty, that sense of duty is governed by the actual facts of reality, and that it is to these facts that we must ultimately refer as being super-ordinate to all subjective states. He may say that once development has been ascertained by scientific research to be an unavoidable law, we will, as a matter of fact and of necessity, modify our sense of duty so as to make it correspond with what we necessarily must do. But to this the obvious answer is, that development is *not* a law of human nature individually considered: that some individuals neither wish to, nor do, "develop," and that their condition is as much a matter of law and of *must* as the condition of those who wish to, and do, "develop." The developmentalist must show why his line of action is "better" than theirs; he must show that his line of action is preferable or more desirable; and, in doing this, he cannot help appealing to those subjective states in which preference and desire consist. And if, with Dr. Carus, we reject the hedonistic theory, in which these states are reducible to pleasure and pain, we must accept the *ought* and the "moral feelings" of the intuitionist, although putting on them a scientific interpretation; accept them, be it understood, as *standards, guides, or criteria*; for nature presents to us two opposite roads, either of which we can, or believe we can, follow; and nothing can determine us to follow one or the other except either our desire for happiness or

¹See, e. g., *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 191, 202, where "the *ought* in our breasts," which is identified with Kant's categorical imperative, is declared to be "an undeniable fact" inseparable from "our moral consciousness"; and where it is affirmed that, without the moral *ought*, "human society could not even exist, nor could it ever have risen into existence."

²*The Monist* 1, 4, to which I have already referred.

³*Ibid.*, p. 560. Compare *Ethical Problem*, p. 7, and *Religion of Science*, p. 28.

our sense of duty (assuming, with Dr. Carus, that the two are different from each other).

Furthermore, when we come to examine this psychological characteristic of moral judgments, we find it in irreconcilable conflict with the fundamental principles of monistic philosophy. We cannot rest satisfied with the assertion that the moral feelings are the concomitant emotional states of our general development, or that they are "social instincts" which have grown together with, and as necessary elements of, social progress, being but the consciousness, on the part of every individual, of his relations to, and dependence upon, the other individuals constituting the society of which he is but a subordinate part.¹ It becomes indispensable to see if those feelings be of such a nature as will agree with our scientific doctrines, and whether the sub-criterion of development consist with the supreme criterion—the cosmical laws. It must be remembered that, according to our view of these laws, a scoundrel is as necessarily a scoundrel as a horse is a horse; and such being the case, I may appeal to consciousness, and ask: When we are convinced that the scoundrel is as much a necessary outcome of cosmical laws as the tiger or the hyena, shall we, or can we, attach to our judgment of his conduct any feeling of *moral* disapprobation? If I may, in this matter, judge of the consciousness of others by my own consciousness, I think the general answer to such question is not uncertain. And the reason, in my opinion, is, that the moral feelings are *not* only the psychical correlates of our physical and social evolution: they have been derived, among other sources and experiences, from the conception of man as a *free* agent, and from the exclusion of man from the universal realm of nature; that is, they owe their origin to, and are based on, conceptions entirely antagonistic to the conceptions of monism. To say it is a man's duty to do a certain action, or that he ought to do a certain action, is to say that we can reasonably expect him to do that action; is to suppose that he can, irrespective of his special constitution, do the action; it is, in short, to suppose that it is *possible* for *every* man to act in a certain manner; and this is obviously a lack of recognition of that law of causation that asserts that a given man *can* act in only one way, whatever that way may be; although, in our uncertainty as to his real nature, it is not unreasonable to think that he *may* act as desired.

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

¹ Such is the view taken by Dr. Carus. (See *Ethical Problem*, pp. 39, 56.)

THE RELIGION OF OUR ANCESTORS.

BY THE EDITOR.

COMPARATIVE RELIGION has made much headway ; but while the religions of Asia (Mohammedanism, Buddhism, Brahmanism, Confucianism, and Taoism), are very diligently studied, the religion of our Saxon forefathers, of the Teutons in Continental Europe, of the Norse and of the Icelanders, is much neglected. And yet it is of great importance—in some respects, perhaps, more important than the religions of the East, which at present stand in the foreground. For, while the Eastern religions are of foreign growth, the mythology of our ancestors has very largely entered into the present make-up of *our* Christianity.

It will be astonishing to many people how many ideas, customs, and aspirations of the old Northern world-conception have been embodied in Christianity and are now commonly regarded as peculiarly Christian.

When the Roman See succeeded in being recognised by the new converts of Great Britain, and when the Anglo-Saxon Winfrid converted the Germans on the Continent, making them all spiritually subject to Rome, when, finally, the Franconians adopted the Roman form of Christianity, the ecclesiastical supremacy of Rome in Western Europe was firmly established ; but the conquest of these large tracts populated by nations of Teutonic blood at the same time began gradually to change the Christianity of Rome. Innumerable dignitaries of the Roman Church, who came from the North, introduced many of their Northern views, festivals, and ideals, embodying them as much as possible in church institutions. The celebration of the birth of Christ at the time of the old Yule festival is by no means an isolated nor the most important incident of Northern influence. The most momentous innovation, which was due to the influence of the Teutonic races,

was the new spirit in which the doctrines of Christianity were received. While the old Christianity absolutely abandoned all worldly interests for the sake of salvation to be attained in a future life, the Teutons introduced their views of struggle and the ethics of struggle in this world.

The Jerusalemite Christianity had communistic tendencies and their communism practically constituted the most important feature of the new religion, so much so that those who would not submit on this point were supposed to be punished immediately by the Holy Ghost with death. The Jewish Christianity naturally went out of existence, because it attempted to realise an impossible ideal. However, before it became extinct in Jerusalem, it was transferred to Greece and found two formulations which are represented, the one in St. Paul, the other in the Fourth Gospel according to St. John. In St. Paul's Christianity the second advent of Christ still constitutes the central doctrine. The apostle expects the return of Christ during his lifetime, and admonishes everybody to be prepared for it.

From Greece, Christianity spread to Rome, where Christianity adopted the Roman forms of worship, continuing at the same time the belief in various Italian deities with a new meaning under the name of Christian saints.

In spite of many close similarities, Roman Christianity was so different from Greek Christianity that they were never united. While the West of Europe fell to Rome, Greek Christianity spread all over Russia, where it became the state religion, and the Emperor of Russia has come to be recognised as the official head of the entire Greek Church.

Although Rome incorporated in its own institutions a great number of the changes that the conversion of the Teutons wrought, the difference between Roman Christianity and Teuton Christianity became so great in the course of time that it led, in the sixteenth century, to that great schism which is known as the Reformation. The abuses and the misgovernment which prevailed in those days in the church were the cause of the Reformation, but they were by no means the sole factor that led to the final and complete split dividing the old church into two camps, the Teutonic Christianity represented by the English, the Germans, the Dutch, the Swedes, the Norwegians, and the Icelanders, and the Roman Christianity, embodying the Romance nations, and including the Celts of Ireland.

The difference between these two kinds of Christianity lies deeper than is generally supposed. The Roman Church had its



HEL, THE GODDESS OF THE NETHER WORLD. (By Johannes Gehrts.)

counter reformation, and almost all the abuses of which Luther complained were abrogated, or at least changed, so as to show no longer those features which made them objectionable; and yet the split between the two kinds of Christianity remains and will remain so long as the main differences of national character, of habits, and of ethics distinguish the adherents of both forms of religion.

In order to appreciate the difference that obtains between Teuton and Roman Christianity, we must go back to the world-conception of the ancestors of the Teutonic races, as it took shape in their religion. There we find the character of the race in simple and strong outlines. The religion of our forefathers is illustrated in its practical application in Tacitus's account of the Germans, which is the most valuable information we have on the subject.¹ Their mythology is not as artistically finished as the mythology of the Greeks, but it is superior to Greek mythology by being philosophically deeper and practically sounder.

The significance of Northern mythology consists in the recognition of the struggle that is going on everywhere in the world. Death is inevitable, but death is transfigured when it is the death of a hero who fights courageously and, if possible, victoriously. Human ideals are represented in the Asas, and the Asas are the main gods of the Teutons, but the Asas have originated, they have to fight for their lives, and will finally perish again.

The struggle for existence was perhaps nowhere severer than in the climate of Northern Europe, and the ethics of struggle were perhaps more important to the races of the cold north than to the people of the sunny south, and the Teutons learned the lesson. It is remarkable that all the Germanic races do not look upon struggle as being in itself an evil, nor do they look to victory as the main thing to be achieved. Their highest ambition is to fight the struggle nobly and squarely, not to shrink from either wounds or death, not to show cowardice of any kind, not to take advantage of a weak foeman. The most hated enemy's life was safe as soon as he was in a condition of helplessness, be it that he was without arms, that he was wounded or disabled from defending himself for some other reason. To be conquered in a duel or to be slain in battle was not regarded as a disgrace; but the use of foul means for the sake of gaining a victory was considered a crime which brought contempt and shame upon him who dared to do it.

¹ Tacitus's *Germania* is a short treatise, but it is of great historical importance. It should be a text-book in our schools, and every one who has a drop of Teutonic blood in his veins, be it Saxon, or German, or Norse, ought to have read and reread that ancient account of the habits and life of his ancestors.

As an instance of this nobility of the Teutonic ethics of struggle, we refer to an incident which is told in the *Nibelungenlied*. When Hagen, standing at the door of Atli's hall, overcomes all the Huns who try to force an entrance, he is at last met by Rüdiger, a vassal of Atli and a personal friend of Hagen. Hagen reproaches Rüdiger, not for coming to fight him, for that was Rüdiger's duty, because he had sworn allegiance to Atli, but for combating a man whose shield has suffered serious injuries in former combats. While Hagen is worn out, Rüdiger comes with fresh vigor, and since Rüdiger would be ashamed of taking advantage of the insufficient armor of his foe, he gives him the necessary equipment. Before Rüdiger proceeds to fight, he hands his own shield to Hagen and takes the dilapidated shield of his adversary in order to equalise the conditions of the fight.

It is this ethics of struggle which made the Teutonic races so strong, and if the Saxon is taking possession of the world it is not so much due to a physical superiority of the Teutonic race, but to the superior views which they hold dear as to the methods that are to be employed in fighting their adversaries.

Although infinitely superior to common mortals, the Asas, or gods, are not above error and sin. Indeed their conduct, although upon the whole quite noble and elevating, is not free from reproach. They made mistakes, and having from carelessness got into trouble, they committed the worst sin imaginable to a Teutonic mind,—they broke their faith. This is the reason why the present condition of the world is full of evil and the Asas fight bravely against the powers of evil until at last, on doomsday, which is called Ragnarok, a final battle will take place in which the gods as well as their enemies will be slain, and the whole world will be destroyed. Yet this is not the end of all, for after the destruction of the world through the fire of Muspil a new world will originate and the old gods will reappear with new chances for a better and more sinless life.

The enemies of the Asas are the giants who represent the forces of nature. Although morally and intellectually inferior to the Asas, the giants are in many respects much more powerful,—which finds expression in the tale of Skrymer, where we read how Asa-Thor drank from a drinking-horn and could not empty it. He tried to raise a cat, and could not lift it from the ground. He wrestled with a toothless old woman and could not overcome her. The drinking-horn which he could not empty was the ocean (his attempts to do so resulted in the phenomenon of the tides);

the cat which he could not lift was the Midgard serpent, the evil dragon which encompasses in its coils the whole world; and the toothless old woman whom the strongest of the gods could not throw to the ground was old age.

The literature on the religion of the Teutonic races has heretofore been almost exclusively written in German, Danish, Icelandic, Swedish, or Norwegian, and the standard works on the subject by Grimm, Simrock, Lachmann, Felix Dahn,¹ and others, are well known the world over. A few years ago, however, R. B. Anderson, professor of the Scandinavian languages in the University of Wisconsin, published a series of English-written books on Norse mythology and Viking sagas, which are a boon to the English-speaking world, especially to students of comparative religion and mythology, and we recommend them heartily to our readers. As Professor Anderson is very well versed in the traditions of his forefathers, his works are a most reliable source of information, and since they are at the same time written in a very popular style, it is hoped that they will be read and appreciated by our public and will fill a great gap in our libraries.

Professor Anderson says in his book *Norse Mythology*:²

“Greek Mythology is frivolous, the Norse is profound. The frivolous mind lives but to enjoy the passing moment; the profound mind reflects, considers the past and the future. The Greek abandoned himself wholly to this life. The Norseman accepted life as a good gift, but he knew that he was merely its transient possessor. Over every moment of life hangs a threatening sword, which may in the next moment prove fatal. Life possesses no hour of the future. And this is the peculiar characteristic of the heroic life in the North, that our ancestors were powerfully impressed with the uncertainty of life. They constantly witnessed the interchange of life and death, and this nourished in them the thought that life is not worth keeping, for no one knows how soon it may end. Life itself has no value, but the object constantly to be held in view is to die an honorable death.

“In comparing the Greek mythology with the Norse, it was stated that the Norse has a theoktonic myth, while the Greek lacks

¹*Walhall* by Felix and Therese Dahn (published by Geibel & Brockhaus, Leipsic) is a very attractive work. Not only is Felix Dahn, the famous author of *Der Kampf um Rom*, the best authority on the subject of Teutonic law, customs, and mythology, but he has found in Johannes Gehrts an illustrator of great force. We here reproduce with the permission of the publishers two pictures by Gehrts, one representing Hel, the goddess of the lower world, and the other Ragnarok or Doomsday, the last battle between the gods and the powers of evil.

²Other works by the same author are *The Younger Edda* and *Viking Tales of the North*, published by S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

the final act of the grand drama. The Greeks knew of no death of the gods; their gods were immortal. And yet, what were they but an ideal conception of the forms of life? And this life, with all its vanity, pomp, and glory, the Greek loved so dearly that he thought it must last forever. He imagined an everlasting series of changes. But what will then the final result be? Shall the thundering Zeus forever continue to thunder? Shall the faithless Aphrodite forever be unfaithful? Shall Typhon forever go on with his desolations? Shall the sinner continue to sin forever, and shall the world continue without end to foster and nourish evil? These are questions that find no satisfactory answer in the Greek mythology.

“Among the Norsemen, on the other hand, we find in their most ancient records a clearly expressed faith in the perishableness of all things; and we find this faith at every step that the Norseman has taken. The origin of this faith we seek in vain; it conceals itself beneath the waters of the primeval fountains of their thoughts and aspirations. They regarded death as but the middle of a long life. They considered it cowardice to spare a life that is to return; they thought it folly to care for a world that must necessarily perish; while they knew that their spirits would be clothed with increased vigor in the other world. Happy were they who lived beneath the polar star, for the greatest fear that man knows, the fear of death, disturbed them not. They rushed cheerfully upon the sword; they entered the battle boldly, for, like their gods, who every moment looked forward to the inevitable Ragnarok, they knew that life could be purchased by a heroic death.

“The very fact that the gods in the creation proceeded from the *giant* Ymer foreshadowed their destruction. The germ of death was in their nature from the beginning, and this germ would gradually develop as their strength gradually became wasted and consumed. That which is born must die, but that which is not born cannot grow old.

“The gradual growth of this germ of death, and corresponding waste of the strength of the gods, is profoundly sketched throughout the mythology. The gods cannot be conquered unless they make themselves weak; but such is the very nature of things that they must do this. To win the charming Gerd, Frey must give away his sword, but when the great final conflict comes he has no weapon. In order that the Fenris-wolf may be chained, Tyr must risk his right hand, and he loses it. How shall he then fight in Ragnarok? Balder could not have died had not the gods been blind and presumptuous; their thoughtlessness put weapons

into the hands of their enemy. Hoder would never have thrown the fatal mistletoe had not their own appointed game been an in-



RAGNAROK, OR DOOMSDAY OF THE TEUTONS. (By Johannes Gahrts.)

ducement to him to honor his brother. When Loke became separated from Odin the death of the gods was a foregone conclusion.

“Our old Gothic fathers, in the poetic dawn of our race, investigated the origin and beginning of nature and time. The divine

poetic and imaginative spark in them lifted them up to the Eternal, to that wonderful secret fountain which is the source of all things. They looked about them in profound meditation to find the image and reflection of that glorious harmony which their soul in its heavenly flights had found, but in all earthly things they discovered strife and warfare. When the storms bent the pine trees on the mountain tops, and when the foaming waves rolled in gigantic fury against the rocky cliffs, the Norseman saw strife. When the growl of the bear and the howl of the wolf blended with the moaning of the winds and the roaring of the waters, he heard strife. In unceasing conflict with the earth, with the beasts, and with each other, he saw men stand, conquer, and fall. If he lifted his weary eye toward the skies he saw the light struggling with the darkness and with itself. When light arose out of darkness, it was greeted with enthusiasm ; when it sank again into darkness, its rays were broken and it dissolved in glimmering colors ; and if he looked down into the heart of man, into his own breast, he found that all this conflict of opposing elements in the outward world did but faintly symbolise that terrible warfare pervading and shattering his whole being. Well might he long for peace, and can we wonder that this deep longing for rest and peace, which filled his heart in the midst of all his struggles,—can we wonder, we say, that his longing for peace found a grand expression in a final conflict through which imperishableness and harmony were attained?

“This final conflict, this dissolution of nature’s and life’s disharmony, the Edda presents to us in the death of the gods, called Ragnarok.”

NOTES AND BOOK REVIEWS.

Mr. Louis Prang's new Easter cards and booklets are as dainty as ever. They offer pictures of flowers such as Easter lilies, irises, morning-glories, violets, daffodils, wild roses, most of them being accompanied by appropriate verses, some of them new and original, others quotations from Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Longfellow, and Bryant. They glorify the beauties of spring flowers and the resurrection of Jesus, the latter being expressed exclusively in traditional forms. The immortality idea, which would be acceptable also to those outside the pale of orthodox churches, is not yet represented. The religious sentiment, however, is carried out into the temple of nature, whose blossoms also are a revelation of God, as one of the verses declares :

" Were I in churchless solitudes remaining,
Far from all voice of teachers and divines
My soul would find, in flowers of God's ordaining
Priests, sermons, shrines."

Wundt's *Outlines of Psychology* have been translated into English, and all readers may now become acquainted with the leading ideas of one of the most prominent of modern psychologists. Wundt is not easy reading for the beginner ; but his doctrines are at least presented here in a condensed form and more systematically and less technically than in his large *Elements of Physiological Psychology*. (Leipsic : W. Engelmann. New York : G. E. Stechert.)

The most recent issue of the *Old South Leaflets* is " William Penn's Plan for the Peace of Europe." These leaflets which are published at cost price by the " Directors of the Old South Work," Boston, are reprints of original documents of American history and may be recommended to students and historical clubs. (Catalogue upon application.)

An autograph portrait of the eminent English mathematician Augustus De Morgan will be found in the January number of *The American Mathematical Monthly* (Springfield, Mo.), accompanied by a biography by Dr. G. B. Halsted, from whose store of mathematical curios the portrait is probably taken.

M. P. Hoffmann, Professor at the University of Ghent, publishes a pamphlet under the title *L'Opinion publique en matière de morale* in which he investigates the moral force of public opinion, which he identifies with the public conscience. Public opinion is an evidence of the force of liberalism, which in spite of its former negativism has triumphed over the old *régime*, and is working out the new ideals of mankind. Professor Hoffmann finds that the discrepancies which obtain in public opinion, far from being injurious, are rather the main agent of their purification.

Few persons are aware that Wagner devoted himself to *belles lettres*, but he was a voluminous writer all through life, and particularly during his unsuccessful sojourn in Paris he was more than once compelled to drop his musician's wand in order to resort to the pen for sustenance. From this last period The Open Court Publishing Co. have selected as a type of his literary productions a little sketch or novelette entitled *A Pilgrimage to Beethoven*, appreciatively translated by Mr. O. W. Weyer of Elmira, New York, which is now published in board covers and on extra paper, with a handsome photogravure reproduction of a famous copyright portrait of Beethoven, which in itself makes the book a valuable possession. The sketch itself is a glorification of Beethoven; and we may add that it is obtainable in no other separate form either in English or German. It gives under the guise of a visit to Beethoven Wagner's views of musical art. (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. Price, 50 cents.)

The editors of the *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* propose a prize of five hundred marks for the best solution of the following problem:

“Nachweis der metaphysisch-animistischen Elemente in dem Satz von der Erhaltung der Energie und Vorschlag zur Ausschaltung dieser Elemente.”

The essay must be written in German, but competition is not limited to any nationality. Size should not exceed fifty or sixty pages of said magazine. Latest term, October 1. Address the editors of the *Vierteljahrsschrift*, Privatdozent Dr. Fr. Carstanjen, Zürich V Englisch Viertel 49, or Dr. O. Krebs, Zürich V Minervastrasse 46.

Instead of the author's name each essay is to be superscribed by a motto. An accompanying envelope, also superscribed by the motto, is to contain the author's real name and address. The judges will be: Prof. Dr. Ernst Mach, of Vienna Prof. Dr. Alois Riehl, of Kiel, and the two editors of the *Vierteljahrsschrift*.

The University of Pennsylvania began with January of this year the publication of a quarterly magazine entitled *Americana Germanica*, which is devoted to the comparative study of the literary, linguistic, and other cultural relations of Germany and America. The special subjects with which the quarterly will deal are German literature written or reprinted in America; American translations of German literature; influence of American literature in Germany, and German literature in America; the linguistic relations of Germany and America, including the German dialects spoken in the latter country. All other cultural relations also will be treated. The editor is Mr. Marion Dexter Learned of the University of Pennsylvania, and the contributing editors include the names of many prominent professors at American universities. Most of the contributions to the first number will have interest for specialists only. The appearance of the magazine is good but the proof-reading both of the German and the English might be improved (Yearly, \$2.00. Macmillan & Co.)

A modest little quarterly of twenty-four quarto pages, called *The Journal of Communication*, and devoted primarily to linguistic, metric, and numeric progress has been recently started by Mr. Robert Pirs of New York (320 East 14th Street) The journal is quite unique and departs in many respects from conventional typography. But it is printed in good form and edited with sense. Mr. Pirs's views of spelling-reform are tolerant and enlightened, and his little magazine will no doubt do good work in many directions which in English-speaking countries are still in need of improvement. (Yearly, \$1.00.)

Americans will be glad to learn that the Messrs. Dodd, Mead & Co. of New York have arranged for the publication of an American edition of *The Expositor*, a scholarly English theological magazine edited by Dr. W. Robertson Nicoll. The American editor is to be Dr. Charles Cuthbert Hall, recently called to the presidency of the Union Theological Seminary, New York, who will keep the Review department up to date. Besides its eminent English contributors, many foremost American theologians will write for *The Expositor*. The magazine appears monthly, and in outward form is quite tasteful. (Three dollars a year. Specimen copies on application.)

Scientific readers who followed a number of years ago the account of the first photography of flying bullets by Prof. Ernst Mach, will learn with pleasure of the resumption of these investigations by his son Dr. Ludwig Mach who recently has published the results of his researches in the Proceedings of the Vienna Academy (Sitzung vom 9. Juli 1896). Dr. Ludwig Mach assisted in the original experiments which in his present communication are exploited to the full. It is not known to many that a pretty full account of the experiments on the photography of flying bullets was published in the *Smithsonian Reports* some years ago, and may be had by applying to the Director of the Smithsonian Institute. This report, or rather article, was by Mr. Boys, who had reproduced Professor Mach's experiments in England.

The Critical Review of Theological and Philosophical Literature, edited by Dr S. D. F. Salmond, published at Edinburgh, and imported by Charles Scribner's Sons, forms in its bound annual form a remarkably complete survey and compendium of the yearly literature of its subjects. We have before us the volume for 1896. It consists entirely of Notices and Reviews, but they are all by prominent theologians of Great Britain and compose as instructive and interesting a body of reading as the majority of theological magazines that are made up wholly of independent articles. (Bound Annual Volume, \$2.00.)

Messrs. Gulab Singh Paras Pershad, bankers of Meerut, N. W. P., India, inform us that they will publish a monthly magazine in English devoted to the cause of Jainism, in which they promise to prove that Jainism "is the true and the first religion in the face of the world." Rate of subscription, with postage, \$3.00 or 12 shillings.

The story *Karma* was translated by Count Tolstoi into Russian and from the Russian into French, whence it was again translated into English and published in the *International Magazine*, whose editors did not know that it had first appeared in English. Having now seen the original, they comment in their February number on the fate of the story as follows:

"It is interesting to note the little changes that have slipped in in its journeyings through foreign tongues, principally in the spelling of names. It shows the way the translators have had to change the spelling to suit the sounds in their own alphabets. For instance, what started out 'Mahâduta' has come back to us as 'Madagoute,' 'Mallika' is changed to 'Malmek,' and so on; while the Brahmanistic terms that Mr. Carus used originally have been dropped entirely and the English now stands without them, simply giving the equivalents. *Samana* has disappeared and the word monk, which it means, has been substituted; convent is used instead of *vihara*, and many other similar changes have been made."

One of the most notable ventures of the year in theological literature is the publication, by the Chicago University, of *The American Journal of Theology*, a quarterly of enormous size and encyclopædic pretensions, embracing not less than 288 large octavo pages. It will be contributed to by a vast host of theologians from all quarters of the world, and will engage itself with the entire field of theological study, emphasising no subject unduly but maintaining in each number a balance of interest between all. It is commendable that the *Journal* is limited to no school of theological opinion, and not less so that it is bent upon the application of strictly scientific methods to theology. We have in the present initial number articles by Dr. Bruce, of Glasgow, Prof. Gregory, of Leipsic, Dr. Briggs, of New York, Dr. Menzies, of St. Andrews, Scotland, Dr. Sanday, of Oxford, England, and Dr. Strong, of Rochester, N. Y., besides an extremely comprehensive body of book reviews. *The American Journal of Theology* unites American enterprise with German learning and thoroughness,—even bids fair to outdo the latter. If matters of mind and science continue to progress in America as they have in the last decade and a half, the "modern Greeks" will soon have to look to their laurels. Germany *did* go to Canossa, and her future intellectual emperors may some day stand bowed and bare-foot before the glowering chimneys of Chicago. (Three dollars a year; single numbers, 75 cents.)

His Royal Highness Prince Prisdan Choomsai, the brother of His Majesty the King of Siam, is apparently a man of a deeply religious cast of mind. Of late, he visited Ceylon, the island so sacred to the Buddhists, and there joined the order of bhikshus. He is at present in his forty-sixth year, and has distinguished himself in his career by a punctilious fulfilment of his duties in the service of his country. He has received a good, scientific education in London and is generally spoken of as a highly cultured gentleman. As the Prince held high positions, both military and civil in the country over which his distinguished brother rules, it is but natural that many honors were showered upon him during his career by all the potentates of Europe, and he is in possession of the highest orders, Russian, German, and English. He has now deposited all the insignia of his worldly honors, and decided to devote himself henceforward exclusively to a religious life. When, in token of renouncing his former position, he broke the sword which he had carried in the service of his country for many years with honor, he addressed the congregation of priests that witnessed the ceremony, and spoke in conclusion as follows:

"May you all be guided by the same Dharma¹ which through my past and present Kusala karma² enables me to take the step I now do in your presence.

"Let us adore and praise the Lord Buddha, his Dharma, and Sangha.

"May this sword now broken in commemoration of my severance from the world of turmoil be the emblem of my resolution, and the pledge of my vow henceforward, and if in any future existence I ever were given such a weapon, may the same on being drawn against any being be turned into flowers, that I may make an offering of them to the triple gem, the true saviour of the world, as I now do with this broken sword: so help me the united Kusala karma of my own and of those who cry *Sahdu*³ and approve of my action to-day."

¹ Religious truth or law.

² Kusala means "good, excellent, meritorious," and Kusala karma is that kind of conduct which tends toward enlightenment and salvation.

³ "Good, excellent." The word *Sadhu* is used in the Buddhist ritual in exactly the same fashion as is *Amen* in Jewish and Christian services.

THE MAHA-BODHI SOCIETY APPEALS FOR HELP IN THE INDIAN FAMINE.

Harrowing tales of starvation and death are coming from all directions. The conditions of the famine-stricken people in the affected provinces are simply awful and heart-rending. The miserable wretches are dropping senseless and dead on the road side, in the jungles, in their homes, in the poorhouses are dying by thousands. Thousands of homes are full of ghastly looking skeletons, barely able to move about, famished children, unable to bear any more the pangs of hunger, crying out for a morsel of bread. These are the very words of the eye-witnesses. No sadder spectacle can be conceived. The Government of India is doing all that it can do. But the government aid falls far short of the dire necessity of the people. The Hindus, Brahmos, and Christians have assisted in giving aid to the people. That help is also inadequate in comparison to the gravity of the situation. The famine is most widespread. The present crisis is so severe and the prevailing distress is on such an extensive scale that gifts in money and grain will have to be exceptionally large. The public charity cannot reach the *middle class people*, who are pining away their miserable days without food or raiment, secretly and silently without a murmur, trying even in their abject misery, to evade public notice. After mature consultation with Babu Narendra Nath Sen, editor *Indian Mirror*, the most influential Indian paper, and the Buddhist priest Rev. N. Sadhananda, the Maha-Bodhi Society has started an Indian Famine Relief Fund, whose chief object *will be to help the middle class in their distress* as much as it can. 'To feed the hungry and clothe the naked are reckoned as higher virtues by every religion.' Mr. C. C. Bose, manager of the *Maha-Bôdhi Journal* sent telegrams to Burma and Ceylon papers and appeals also to the American people. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce made a similar appeal to America. The charity of India will be fully well organised, the donations will be publicly acknowledged, and the accounts published in the papers. Babu N. N. Sen has become the treasurer.

Mr. Bose's appeal reached the Anagârîka H. Dharmapâla, who is constantly on the wing, lecturing at Des Moines, Ia., and he made at once an appeal to the Governor of the State and to the Legislature. The Rev. Mr. Harvey of the Unitarian Church organised a relief committee, and Governor Drake took steps to collect corn for transportation to India. After his return to Chicago, Mr. Dharmapâla found the city already in a state of agitation. Hon. C. C. Bonney, President of the World's Fair Congresses and of the Religious Parliament, Judge Waterman were members of the Committee, and Mr. Gandhi, the Jain, was active in stirring the sympathy for the starving millions of India.

Mr. Dharmapâla writes from Chicago :

"Daily about four hundred are dying, and deaths will take place till the end of May next. If we start without delay to send grain and corn, we may at least save about five thousand in the month of April or May. To save one man from grim death is something; and it is a comfort to know that there is a possibility of saving at least some of them."

The American Maha-Bodhi Society, 1350 Monon Building, 324 Dearborn St., Chicago, will receive and forward contributions.

Prof. Luigi Cojazzi has translated Hermann Gruber's book on Positivism into Italian, the third edition of which lies now before us. The original work, which is written in German, was reviewed at some length in a back number of *The Monist*. The present Italian translation is revised and much enlarged. It devotes more

attention to American Positivism, without, however, bringing out the differences that obtain between the French school of Comte and the monism of *The Monist*. Gruber has added brief expositions of Ingersoll's Agnosticism, of the aspirations of the societies for ethical culture, and of the Positivism of the Open Court Publishing Co. Considering the radical difference of view held by the author, who is a Jesuit, we must recognise his impartiality and honest endeavor to be fair to views that are antagonistic to his own. He sets in this respect a noble example to others. His work certainly belies the common notion of Jesuitic ethics.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE SENSATIONS. By *Dr. Ernst Mach*.
Translated by C. M. Williams. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.
1897. Cuts, 37. Pages, 208. Price, \$1.25.

The translator, Mr. Williams, finely characterises the value of Professor Mach's book when he says: "The matter contained in a book is by no means proportioned to its size. If this were so, the following treatise, rich as it is in suggestions bearing on some of the fundamental problems of scientific and philosophical theory must be a bulky one." And this is a fact. There are few works of the same size that can boast of having contributed so much to thought and science as Professor Mach's *Analysis of the Sensations*. Its range is a broad one, covering indeed the whole foundation of science, which it examines mainly from the side of biology. The relation between feeling and its physiological counterpart is investigated in the light of the important principle that as many processes in the nerves are to be posited as there are distinguishable qualities of sensation; and it is a delightful task to follow the author's fruitful application of this principle to our varied sensations of space, time, and sound, all of which he has wonderfully illuminated. There are few finer pieces of research to be found than these chapters, which are admirably succinct and acute. In this connexion it is to be remarked that we are dealing here not with a *text-book* on psychology, but with a work of purely original research, which makes considerable demand at places on the attention of unprofessional readers, but unfailingly compensates such effort by a heightened stimulus. The Introduction and concluding chapter are purely philosophical in character, and treat of the foundations of knowledge and of the theory of scientific research. Much new matter, both in notes and appendices, has been added to the English edition, the value of which has also been increased by an analytical index. *t.*

While going to press, we received Abbé Victor Charbonnel's book, *Congrès universel des religions en 1900. Histoire d'une idée*. He explains in 300 pages small octavo, the origin of the plan and the difficulties which it had, and still has to encounter. In the conclusion he sums up the objections, and insists on the advisability of holding a Congress. (Armand Colin, 5 Rue de Mézières, Paris.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

SCIENCE AND UNIVERSALISM.

To the Editor of the Open Court.

SIR:—As a minister and missionary of the Universalist denomination, I am moved to offer a few words relative to the Salutatory in *The Open Court* for January.

I emphatically endorse your view that Agnosticism *is* the main disease of the age. I see its damaging effects every day, and find it most difficult to stay.

I also approve of your comments and criticisms upon both Conservatives and Liberals. This is the sort of talk the people need, particularly the Liberals.

It appears to me that the unavoidable inference of your words, whether you are aware of it or not, is that the Universalist Church occupies the right and true religio-philosophical ground. But let me note some contras.

You say: "The sin against the spirit, as expressly stated in the Scriptures, cannot be forgiven, and those who persist in it will be blotted from the pages of the book of life" (p. 2).

Our Universalist view is this:

1. *The sin against the Holy Spirit* is difficult to determine; has not been satisfactorily settled by representative churchmen. Your view that it is a sin against the intellect would identify the holy *spirit* with the *intellect*. But by common and Biblical usage there is a difference. However, your view is far more helpful than that of the churchmen.

2. That the "shall" and "shall not" of Matt. xii. is a Hebraism indicating, not actual negation or impossibility, but exceeding difficulty. That the "never forgiveness" of Mark iii. should be "*not* forgiveness," and that the "*eternal* damnation" in the same connexion refers to the well-known "age-lasting or quality (*αἰών*) damnation," not to endless (*ἀτελεύτητος*) damnation.

On page 8, you say: "How inconsistent . . . , which accepts the eternal bliss of a heaven locality and ceases to retain its correlative symbol . . . doom of error and sin."

I suppose by "doom of error and sin" is meant doom of sinners either by annihilation or a place of endless woe. (I believe in the destruction of the Devil and all his angels.)

Universalism once tried to teach the doctrine of eternal bliss immediately after death in a heavenly place or state, but it caused a schism. We now believe the future state to be one of moral and spiritual environment, similar to the present. But it is a state of progressive growth, including, when necessary, retributive and severe punishment. Each receiving just recompense for the deeds done in the flesh, but none, owing to God's nature, can merit annihilation or endless woe.

I believe that in Biblical usage "immortality" (*ἀθάνατος*) is applied *only* to the being of God and to glorified *bodies* of the dead, not to their souls or spirits (see Cox, XV). Universalism does not teach a physical resurrection, as we know physical bodies. It teaches that the life or body which here clothes our personality is *changed* to a different and a spiritual garment.

The "symbolism of hell" teaches that punishment is purifying for three reasons. Universalism worships "God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," who is "the way, the truth, the life." Truly, "no man cometh to the Father but by him."

I believe as a Universalist that it is science to say that immortality is a fact, in that it is demonstrable in the influences of our lives after we are gone,—in the lives of those who come after us. I believe also that there is a higher view which is as yet perhaps only indicated by Christian philosophy and shadowed by its science viz., that of a self-conscious personal immortality. This latter might be indicated certainly not denied, by the former view which sees and proves immortality as influential in the lives of posterity.—I have no faith in spiritism.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. F. GILLISPIE.

MANCHESTER, Iowa, January 30, 1897.

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47.

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VOL. XI. (NO. 4) APRIL, 1897. NO. 491

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NO. 491

CHICAGO AND ITS ADMINISTRATION.¹

BY THE HON. LYMAN J. GAGE.

THE characteristic element in the common notion of a city is an aggregation of dwellings, either in actual contact each with each or separated only by such little space as convenience of light and ventilation requires,—a cluster of compacted habitations such as was anciently surrounded by a common wall. And perhaps we may, without any violent stretch of imagination, regard these habitations, even in a great city like our own, as but the multitudinous apartments of one vast house, and all the citizens as members of one household.

“A palace,” says Dr. Johnson, “must have passages”; and our great house has no lack of extensive and spacious corridors, 1,183½ miles of paved streets, enough to make a continuous road from St. Louis to Boston, some of it admirable, a good deal barely tolerable, not a little intolerably bad.

And as our house is not yet completed, but is all the time enlarging,—6,444 new apartments were added in 1896 at a cost of nearly \$22,730,615, and the work has not stopped yet,—so there are yet other main passages which might naturally be expected to have, and do have, a rough and unfinished appearance, 1,494½ miles of unpaved roadway, most of it provided with sidewalks, of which we have in all 4,863⅓ miles of various degrees of excellence. And as a great house, besides its stately halls and galleries, has also its back stairways and dark passages, with many a

¹Lack of time preventing the Hon. Lyman J. Gage from personally preparing for publication the MS. and proofs of this article, he authorised the editor of *The Open Court* to have the statistical figures revised and a few lines added concerning the latest reform movement. The latter was done by Mr. Ela, the former by Mr. Charles A. Lane, whose courteous assistance is hereby acknowledged.—EDITOR.

nook and corner handy to conceal the delinquencies of the slovenly housekeeper or unconscientious servant, who is prone, like Shakespeare's Puck, "to sweep the dust behind the door"; so we have abundant counterparts to these in our 1,340 miles of alleys, of which only 108½ miles are paved, so that it may safely be affirmed that that portion to the condition of which we can "point with pride" is very small.

The halls and corridors of this house of ours are lighted with more or less regularity and constancy, by 54,203 lamps, of which over 42,180 burn gas and over 10,000 gasoline, while 1,765 shine with electric light. Our total expenditure last year for keeping our lamps trimmed and burning was \$1,058,496.88. Our electric light plant is valued at nearly \$750,000.

Our municipal house has, of course, the modern improvements, being supplied daily with 254,208,509 gallons of water (including a good deal of solid ground, as any one may see by letting some of it stand a little while), by means of an apparatus valued at \$25,369,215.21, including nearly 1,692 miles of pipe, to which great additions will (evidently) have to be made before our vast stretch of unpaved streets is fully supplied. The same is equally true of the not quite 1,306 miles of sewers with which our house stood equipped last New Year's day; they included more than 57 miles laid during 1896; they have doubtless been largely added to during the current year, and will need still greater additions in the years to come.

Indeed, these modern improvements of ours, stupendous as their extent is, fall a good deal short of the magnificent proportions of the mansion which they undertake to supply; and its inhabitants have opportunity now and then,—some of them pretty much all the time,—to draw the lessons of patience which, in a single dwelling, prompted Henry Ward Beecher's essay on "Brown Stone Fronts as a Means of Grace."

The family that inhabits our municipal house has gathered itself "out of all nations and kindreds and peoples and tongues." According to the last school census there were then more than a million and a half—to be exact, 1,616,635—of us. The school census reports not quite two-thirds of our family as Americans. According to the proportion disclosed by the census of 1890, nearly two-thirds of these are children of foreign-born parents, so that only about 320,000 are of native American parentage, including nearly 25,000 of African descent.

The number of those whose tone of thought and habits of life

are in general harmony with our national institutions and traditions is, we may reasonably apprehend, considerably short of the greater number, and let us hope a good deal more than the 320,000.

The school census reports 121,436 Irish, an element which certainly shows a remarkable aptitude for making itself at home in our political institutions, surprising in view of the very generally accepted assertion that it is impossible for Ireland to get along with Saxon laws and methods. The number of these is increased to 226,636 by counting those of foreign or mixed parentage. The same estimate shows 187,000 Scandinavians, for the most part very hopeful material for American citizens, 20,184 of the same blood and training as the founders of New Amsterdam, and 427,527 Germans, among whom may be found many of our best citizens and comparatively very few of our worst.

More strange to American ways are (for the most part) the Bohemians and Poles, who collectively number 85,620 according to the school census, and 81,844 more than that American-born are reported of foreign-born parentage.

The school census also gives a total of about 30,000 Russians, a term applicable to races more diverse than the most unlike of those whom we have been considering; a Russian may be by race and education, German, Scandinavian, Finn, Slav, Tartar, or Esquimaux. Then, too, there are 22,340 Italians. And to make up an assortment, there are among us about 1000 Chinamen, over 700 Greeks, together with a liberal sprinkling of Arabs, Persians, Japanese—people, indeed, from all four corners of the earth, aggregating in the unclassified columns of the school census over 15,000 souls. Our sister republic, Mexico, has a surprisingly select representation, 100 plus 2. Perhaps she still remembers that in earlier days her elder sister has been somewhat over-bearing and grasping.

Of the 380,245 voters who registered for the presidential election of 1896, nearly one-half, were foreign born. And of the men of 21 years of age and upwards, the census of 1890 represents only a little over 127,000 as native Americans, nearly 198,000 (more than 60 per cent. of the whole) having been born in foreign countries.

On the whole, however, we may infer that if the principles of Christian civilisation on which this nation was founded do not prevail in Chicago, it is not because of any necessity of heredity, other than the common heredity of original sin.

Closely connected with the question what are we, is that other (if indeed it is another), what are we doing?

The sites of great cities are generally determined by their convenience as distributing points. This is pre-eminently the case with Chicago. The safe landing-place which the mouth of the Chicago river, afforded at the western extremity of the chain of lakes; then the convenient communication with the Mississippi through the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and later still the converging of multitudinous railroads, are the triple source of the greatness of Chicago. And as she was created for distribution, so that has been her predominant employment ever since. Manufacturers too have been attracted by the convenience of the place for collecting their material and sending out their products; but still the decided majority are engaged in the work of distribution either directly, or by supplying the means of distribution or ministering to the wants of those who distribute. These two latter classes include many who may be disposed to assert for themselves the title of producers, and may feel a certain superiority over those whom they call "middlemen." But if they are only furthering the business or serving the personal wants of the distributor, then his work is all that theirs ultimately amounts to; and judged by what it accomplishes, their work can have no greater merit or dignity than his. If we do not judge by the result accomplished, then the distinction between producer and distributor becomes altogether idle; and we are thrown back upon the truth that the dignity and merit of a man's work consist not in what is accomplished by it, but in the intelligence and conscience which prompt and direct it. More than that, one who accomplishes nothing at all, who can only lie still and suffer, may rank in moral worth and dignity immeasurably above one who works out the most useful results simply because he does not see how else he can so conveniently get a living, and who would drop his work almost as suddenly as lightning, and quite as recklessly, the moment he saw how he could live comfortably in idleness.

Some idea of the extent of our commerce and (indirectly and not very accurately) of our consumption of food may be derived from the fact that in 1893 (these figures chance to be at hand) there were received 4,664,000 barrels of flour, while 4,105,117 were shipped, a difference of 558,883. Of wheat 35,355,101 bushels were received and 24,715,738 shipped, a difference of 10,639,363 bushels. Of Indian corn the receipts were 91,255,154 bushels, and the shipments 78,919,781 bushels, a difference of 12,335,373. The

receipts of butter were 150,742,418 pounds, and the shipments 145,700,000 pounds, a difference of 5,042,418 pounds. The receipts of cheese were 59,000,000 pounds, and the shipments 51,000,000.

The receipts of lumber were 1,600,000,000 feet, and the shipments 733,000,000 feet. The enormous amount of 925,000,000 feet is said to have been used in the city during the year.

The United States census of 1890, which attributed to Chicago a population of about 1,100,000, enumerates not quite 10,000 manufacturing establishments, employing about 191,000 workmen, not including clerks, superintendents, proprietors, or officers of corporations. Of these workmen about 12,000 were employed building or repairing railroad cars and engines, the only object of which is obviously to provide means of distribution. Between 10,000 and 11,000 were employed in printing and publishing establishments. So far as their work did not tend merely to the wasting of ink to spoil paper—which as every one's observation may teach him, is just what a very large proportion of printing amounts to—it is simply the distribution of thought.

There were also (in round numbers) 5600 carpenters, 6000 masons and 2200 plumbers, a great proportion of whose work was necessarily applied to provide dwellings, offices, and warehouses for those who were engaged in distribution or in ministering to the wants of those so engaged. The workmen thus particularised amount to more than 36,000, and there are still other deductions, each by itself comparatively small, but all together very considerable, to be made from the 153,000 remaining. And of the work of that remainder a great part, the extent of which can hardly be ascertained with exactness, is merely subsidiary to distribution in the way which has already been pointed out.

A census for the year preceding that of the World's Fair, taken by the City Department of Health, does not distinguish between manufacturers and wholesale dealers, nor between the clerks and the workmen in any manufacturing establishment. It shows a total number of 572,000 persons employed in all branches of business, of whom over 72,000 were engaged, directly or indirectly, in some kind of transportation service, besides 10,400 bridge and car builders, 6326 pavers, 5000 persons, manufacturers, or wholesale dealers in bicycles and baby wagons, 2684 in vehicles of a larger growth, 574 harness makers or wholesale dealers, and 427 ship chandlers, a total of over 26,000 whose work is evidently altogether subsidiary to transportation. There were over 32,000 others engaged in wholesale trade, besides many more who, as I have already

said, cannot in the returns be distinguished from manufacturers. Banking, insurance, commercial agencies of various kinds, real estate and abstract-making employed between 11,000 and 12,000 more. There were also 120,000 persons engaged in various retail trades, a considerable number of them doubtless at handicraft of one kind or another, but again a very large portion of these serving the wants of the distributors. Of those who, as distinguished from distributors, would be classed as producers, the various building trades occupied nearly 64,000, and printing and publishing 20,000. On the relations of these to the municipal family I have already remarked in connexion with the United States census.

The statistics of retail trade show 1403 dry goods stores, 730 drug stores, 7000 of those places which by a disgusting euphemism have come to be called saloons so universally that it is useless to protest against it, 1056 bakeries—not so great an improvement as might be wished on Falstaff's proportion of "one half-pennyworth of bread to this intolerable deal of sack"; 2200 butcher shops, 1228 milk depots and 3336 groceries, 1,550,000 barrels of flour, 3,000,000 barrels of beer.

The statistics of the Health Department do not include physicians or lawyers. According to the directories for the current year, we have a little over 3000 of the latter and not quite 2500 physicians and surgeons of various degrees of regularity.

There are those in every city, who, instead of being regarded as members of the household, deserve no better analogy than that of the vermin, the rats, and mice, and cockroaches, and those blood-thirsty insects which it is hardly in good taste to mention to ears polite but which will occasionally start up to disgust and horrify the most careful and diligent housekeeper, and which seldom fail to overrun that habitation where negligent and indolent householders tolerate and set example to dishonest and lazy servants. So in too many a city do those who live by, and for, beggary, fraud, mischief, and lawless violence, those whose business it is to cultivate and develop the vicious propensities of mankind, to tempt the susceptible to their ruin and entrap the unwary,—these pernicious vermin of the municipal house not only creep in through unfrequented lanes and lift up their heads here and there in obscure nooks, but plant themselves in the most conspicuous locations, swarm in the chief thoroughfares and thrive sometimes in partnership with those whose sworn duty it is to exterminate them. Citizenship implies the sacred duties of the guardian as well as the ward's accruing benefits; but a culpable indifference too often

characterises citizens of large municipalities. We become too indolent or too busy to attend to our public duty or too listless to discriminate between the faithful and the unfaithful public servant. To keep the municipal house clean and orderly we select men on account of the color of their hair or the cut of their whiskers, or the opinions which they profess on predestination, or the historic episcopate, or the canals of Mars, or the tariff, or the currency, or anything else wholly irrelevant to the business they have to do.

When the servants and the stewards who are to oversee public functions are thus appointed and retained or dismissed for considerations as remote as possible from the duty they are to perform, is it any wonder that that duty should occupy a very low place in their thoughts, and that regard for it should not be strong enough to prevent them from following up various channels of a very different kind of usefulness?

Fortunately these considerations now apply chiefly to the servants of the county and of the various townships included in our municipality. In the spring of 1895 the city adopted a civil service law, and thereafter inaugurated a system of municipal house-keeping which puts our public service upon a rational basis. This law applies the merit system to appointments and removals in every department of the city government, and while—so far as appointments are concerned—it applied gradually, as vacancies occur, it is being put in thorough operation, and its effects are already plainly perceptible in the increased effectiveness of the entire service. The extension of this system to the county and town officials and employees within the city will give our municipal *menage* a domestic service as nearly perfect as such things ever get to be.

It is not absolutely impossible, however, that our municipal vermin may by suitable reformatory agencies be converted into useful and acceptable members of the household. That their young may be so converted, if seasonably taken in hand, there is every reason to hope.

And there is no neglect more cruel to the subjects of it, or more dangerous to the future of our city, than that which leaves multitudes of children to grow up in haunts of vice and uncleanness, or swarm in the streets, acquiring a precocious smartness which only aggravates the want of any respect for law or faith in virtue. And of all our inadequate public charities none call more urgently for re-inforcement than those which pick up children destitute of any genuine parental care, and bring them under the discipline of a virtuous home.

Every one who has not altogether got rid of old-fashioned ideas would think family life not altogether complete without family religion, manifested by occasional gatherings for worship and instruction in faith and morals, and by some indication of those instructions and of a regard to the object of worship in the daily conduct of the members. How perfectly that conduct should exhibit and embody that regard and those instructions, is a question as to which the majority have perhaps rather vague notions, and some have notions which to some others would seem fanatical. But something of that nature almost every one will admit to be highly desirable and commendable.

And this element is conspicuously recognised in our municipal habitation, which, like the stately mansions of old time, has among its multitudinous apartments not a few chapels and oratories.

The City Directory shows in all about 780 places of public worship of every kind, some of them only small mission stations, a few which most people would regard only as rendezvous of cranks, but the vast majority of them centers of useful instruction and wholesome moral influence. The bulk of them may be grouped as follows: Baptist, 78; Presbyterian of all schools and Congregationalist, 159; Episcopalian, 54; Lutheran, 124; Methodist, 138, and Roman Catholic, 106; leaving 121 unclassified.

All the places thus grouped, and a large proportion of those which have not been classified, are devoted to the inculcation of everything which Protestants generally would consider essential to Christianity, the Roman Catholics differing from the rest only by adding some doctrines which they deem essential but which most Protestants regard as pernicious. But the computation roughly indicates that of those who have any conviction in matters of religion which they are interested in maintaining, the immense majority adheres to the essentials of what is commonly known as evangelical Christianity.

If then the principles of that religion have not their legitimate practical application in the public life of Chicago, if vice and atheism often successfully arrogate to themselves the right of way, it is worth considering whether it is not because those whose duty it is to exert a contrary influence, are not enough in earnest in the principles they profess to co-operate with one another in the practical assertion of them. Such practical assertion would, of course, not consist in attempting the impossibility of compulsory religion, but in insisting on the eradication of haunts of vice, the suppression of brutal or indecent exhibitions and advertisements, and in the recog-

dition and teaching of piety and virtue (without forcing upon any doctrines to which they have conscientious objections) in our public schools.

A recent issue of the Chicago Congregational Directory states the number of communicants of Protestant churches, other than Unitarian and Universalists, at 98,147. The numbers for the Baptist, Congregational, Presbyterian, and Methodist churches are precise, the others estimates merely. That for the Protestant Episcopal churches appears from the full statistics given in the Journal of the Diocesan Convocation to be less than half the actual number. Correcting this error, the whole number would be 104,531, but it is very probable that the numbers of the Lutherans also are underestimated.

In Protestant Churches there is almost uniformly a considerable number of customary attendants and supporters of the church who are not communicants, of whom no account is generally taken in published statistics. The Protestant Episcopal statistics before referred to show that the number of parishioners of all ages is considerably more than twice the number of communicants. For the other denominations I have made a calculation based on a comparison of the membership roll of one Congregational church with a directory of the actual congregation for the same year, adding to the numbers shown by the latter 44 per cent., for children under 14, being a fraction less than the proportion shown by the School Census. We thus arrive at a total 76 per cent. greater than the membership roll. Adding 75 per cent. to the number of communicants of churches other than the Protestant Episcopal, and combining that result with the Diocesan reports before mentioned, we have, at a very moderate estimate, a total Protestant evangelical population (in round numbers) of 190,000. To this should be added about 7000 for Unitarians and Universalists. Adding the estimated Roman Catholic population of 495,000, we have a total of 692,000 for what might be called the Christian population of Chicago, a minority by 183,000.

This unfavorable showing is probably due in great measure to the fact which has been very generally remarked, and the cause of which has been a good deal debated, that great numbers of people who might naturally be expected to be Protestants, stand aloof from the churches. The statistics of the Sunday schools, however, would indicate that a large proportion of these people are not unwilling to have their children brought under religious influences.

And there is thence reason to hope that another generation may show a smaller proportion of "Nothingarians."

In 660 Protestant Sunday-schools there are 140,000 members, twelve Unitarian and Universalist churches not being included in the enumeration. Of Roman Catholic Sunday-schools I have no figures; but the total Roman Catholic population is estimated at 495,000; (the Catholic Directory for 1896 places the number at 600,000 for the Diocese of Chicago;) and since our whole number between the ages of five and fourteen is a fraction more than a seventh of the whole, we may infer that there are something over 70,000 persons between those ages who are in Roman Catholic Sunday-schools or receive Roman Catholic religious instruction in some way. We have then about 211,000 persons of the common school age who are being to a greater or less extent instructed in the most essential doctrines of the Christian religion, leaving about 18,000, or not quite 8 per cent. of the whole, most of whom, it is to be feared, are without any religious instruction at all, while that of too many of the other 92 per cent. is too probably fragmentary, irregular and inadequate to a thorough grounding in the principles of virtue.

Government is essential to the normal constitution of a family; indeed there is strong reason for regarding the family as the archetype and source of all political organisation. And the multitudinous family that inhabits our municipal house is not scantily provided for in that respect. In fact, as was pointed out on a recent occasion, Chicago has eight or nine governments, leaving out of account the higher powers of the State, to which this, like every other family, is subordinate. But much the most important of these local governments is that which, it is to be hoped, will ultimately draw to itself the powers and functions of all the others.

While there may be those who do not accord much weight to the authority of Scripture, no one will dispute that of Abraham Lincoln; so that we may assume it as a truth universally accepted that "a house divided against itself cannot stand." And here, though the division of functions and powers is far from being equal, the city government having much the greatest share, and though the harmonising control of the State exercised through its courts, is always at hand to preserve the peace; yet the elements of conflict and disintegration inherent in several overlapping jurisdictions have already given proof of their mischievous and distracting effect.

The drainage canal is a public work transcending both in loca-

tion and effect the largest limits which could reasonably be allowed to the municipal authority of Chicago; and therefore it has seemed wise that the extraordinary powers necessary to its location and construction should, during its progress, be lodged in a distinct organisation, if the salutary principles of local control over the proceeds of money raised by special local taxation are to be preserved.

But there is no reason—I might say, indeed, no excuse—for not applying to Chicago the ancient rule for English cities, exemplified not only in the case of London, but also in Bristol and even York, Chester, and Gloucester, and familiar in our own country in the city of New York, thus making Chicago a county of itself, with the administration of all its municipal affairs entrusted to the Mayor and City Council.

Any one learning for the first time of our curious entanglement of city and township boundaries would not know how to ascribe it to anything but oversight or forgetfulness by which, when the city territory was enlarged, the township boundaries were not rectified so as to coincide with those of the city. Nor have I ever heard it suggested that there were any functions of a township government which could not be just as well performed—indeed, most of them are now performed—by that of the city.

It is not impossible that the existence of an additional number of official positions by which diligence in the service of some party or some party dictator may be incited and rewarded, has a great deal to do with the continuance of this anomaly.

One dangerous absurdity incident to the separate town governments is the election from time to time by direct popular vote, of great numbers of constables. I am conscious of making a large demand on the faith of any one who did not actually see the ballot or the election notice when I say that at the last ordinary election for Mayor there were elected in the town of West Chicago, on a single ballot, *sixty-four* constables. When we consider the amount of mischief and annoyance which an unscrupulous constable can inflict, and when we consider that hardly anybody knows sixty-four men, or half that number, who are both competent for the office and willing to undertake it, we may well wonder that the results of this blind election have not been more conspicuously mischievous.

The principal function of the town governments in Chicago, the valuation of property for purposes of taxation, is exercised in a way which provokes general complaint and condemnation. But its faults, so far as they are chargeable to a law in force throughout the whole state, are chargeable to the citizens themselves, who

elect to the assessorship, with what in matters outside of the sphere of politics we should not hesitate to call sottish stupidity, one or the other of the men who may be prescribed by two assemblies of politicians, and who have very seldom given any evidence whatever of fitness for an office demanding no little financial skill, extensive acquaintance with the business and property of the community and invulnerable integrity.

The most important function of the county government, the care of the poor, is very inadequately performed by the county commissioners, and is in great measure thrown upon the city police, which last year gave free lodging to destitute persons in over 176,980 instances, and also to some extent fed them—to what extent does not appear from the report, which blends in one item the nearly 141,000 meals furnished to prisoners and lodgers.

These figures report the work to December 31 only. The noble service of the Police Department during the early part of the current year affords a memorable instance of municipal philanthropy, manifested in such zealous and intelligent methods as to have challenged the admiration of the world.

In one important respect the analogy of municipal to family government does not hold: the family administration and expenditure are generally regulated by that member who has to furnish the money; whereas our civic governors provide but an infinitesimal proportion of the money they spend, so that an irreverent journalist a good many years ago styled them tax-eaters in contradistinction from tax-payers. Perhaps this fact has something to do with the frequent complaints from those in places of municipal authority, of the niggardly limitation imposed by State law on city expenditure, and the inadequate valuations of property for purposes of taxation; whereas there is some room for question whether a rigorous business manager, regulating all employment and all expenditure strictly by the needs of the municipal business, would not contrive to make both ends meet without stretching the statutory limitation or begging the State Board of Equalisation, which is not generally deemed to need any prompting in that direction, to shift a still larger proportion of burden from the rest of the State to the shoulders of his fellow citizens.

Looking at the city government proper, its actual constitution is to a remarkable and beneficent extent free from those divisions of power and responsibility which have wrought such mischievous results in other cities. Virtually all its powers are vested in a mayor and aldermen, elected by the citizens for terms of two years.

Upon the City Council, in which the mayor has a casting vote when the aldermen are equally divided, and over which he has a veto not to be overridden without a two-thirds vote, the State statute which constitutes our municipal chart has conferred more than ninety enumerated powers, a number from which one would naturally infer that the State has been liberal in putting the powers of government over us into the hands of our own representatives.

These powers thus conferred may be generally described as the making of rules for the conduct of the executive officers of the city government so far as it is practicable to regulate it by general rules laid down beforehand, and also for the conduct of individual citizens in their relations to each other, whether in business or recreation, in matters where State law does not interfere, and regulation of which by public authority becomes necessary or expedient from that closeness of contact or neighborhood in men's habitations and outdoor movements which is the characteristic feature of city life, and the occasions thence arising on which it becomes necessary or convenient to rely on the honesty or competency of persons with whom it is impossible to have had much previous acquaintance. To this latter class belong among other things, the supervision by license, of auctioneers and carriers of passengers or goods for hire ; to the former the regulation of street traffic so as to prevent us from running over each other or getting unnecessarily in each other's way ; of occupations capable of becoming dangerous or annoying to persons in whose neighborhood they are carried on ; of the erection, preservation, and management of buildings, in the interest of safety and public convenience ; provision for remedying unsanitary local conditions and preventing the sickness or untidiness of individuals from imperilling the health of their neighbors.

These powers of the City Council also extend to providing against certain common dangers, such as fire, and to some extent supplying certain individual wants to which all are subject, such as water, roads, and lights.

It needs but a very moderate degree of observation and reflexion to convince any one how necessary is the exercise of these powers and others such as these, to make life in a city tolerably safe or comfortable, and how easy it is to exercise them in such a way that people not absolutely insane may be driven to think it would be far better to have no regulation at all.

If citizens who wish to live quiet, peaceable, and honest lives would seriously consider what powers over the life, liberty, and

happiness of themselves and their fellow citizens are conferred in the annual elections of aldermen, would they not take more pains than they do now, not merely to register and vote, but to combine their votes, whatever action primaries or conventions, Republican or Democratic may have taken, for men in some measure worthy of being intrusted with such powers.

The executive powers of the city government are virtually concentrated in the mayor.

In this respect our system is immeasurably superior to those divisions of executive power among divers boards and commissions, created in divers ways, and of alternating membership, so that thorough concert of action is practically impossible, bad administration eludes responsibility among the windings of the official labyrinth, each department laying the blame of its shortcomings on the refusal of some other to co-operate; and even if a discontented people succeed at last in locating the fault, it cannot be dislodged until several terms of office, one after the other, have expired; and so through the public weariness or forgetfulness, the mischief very likely escapes expulsion after all.

The evil last referred to does to some extent exist in regard to our board of aldermen, in which each ward is represented by two members, elected one each year, to serve for two years, so that only one-half of the board can be changed at any one election.

This arrangement was doubtless designed, like analogous provisions in our own and other State constitutions, to afford some check to the too hasty fluctuations of popular opinion and favor. And we may admit that democratic power, like monarchical, would be the better for some salutary restraining influence on its extravagancies. But great danger of mischief and scanty hope of benefit lies in putting the restraining power in the hands of democracy's own creatures; when they rebel against their creator it is much more likely to be for worse than for better.

And moreover, this restraining power should be obstructive merely and not active, a power to prevent changes and serve as barrier against corrupt schemes, not a power to make changes and promote schemes according to its own pleasure, in defiance of its constituents.

We may well question therefore whether there is any good reason for not permitting the people of any ward when dissatisfied with their aldermen to remove them both instead of one only.

Do the people "love to have it so"?

Much evidence could be adduced in support of the proposition

but it should be remembered that passivity, indifference, inertia are not true evidences of active approval.

While all the dwellers in our municipal house, acting together, are mighty—even irresistible, the individual atom as related to the vast executive machine, is weak, if not powerless. His voice of protest is not heard, and his outcry at executive maladministration is lost, amid the political clamor at City Hall. There are signs, however, gratifying signs, that the growing evils of municipal misrule are to be met in a more effective way. The people will not much longer be tricked by the ingenious devices of low ringsters who play the game of politics for the sake of official plunder. The instinct of danger to our civic life is aroused. Agencies are in the process of evolution through which the lovers of good government can unite to correct many of the evils from which we have so long suffered. At least 80 per cent. of our people desire peace, good order, decency, honesty in administrative functions, a pure ballot, and an honest count.

Indeed, the civil service and other municipal reforms which have lately been so encouragingly prosecuted are eliminating many of the evils against which the moral sense of the people has hitherto vainly protested.

Although, as I have said, it very seldom happens that a city council has refused to confirm the mayor's appointments, yet it is quite possible that this apparent harmony between the two branches of the city government is based upon a tacit understanding that the recommendations of the confirming aldermen shall have weight in appointments to subordinate positions in the several executive departments, so that there is an unseen influence at work in the selection of those who are to carry out in detail the duties of the city administration, which impairs the mayor's control over the service for which he is responsible, and (it is to be feared) has an unfavorable effect on the quality of that service.

While no mayor has any right to be a party to any understanding by which he is to barter away the powers which the municipal constitution has lodged with him in trust, and while his having done so aggravates rather than extenuates his blameworthiness for the bad administration which naturally results, yet it would seem that the mayor who seeks to do his duty would have an obstacle which (while we do not tolerate the suggestion that it is insuperable) we must admit to be serious, removed out of his way, if he were enabled to make his appointments and removals independently of the City Council; or at least that the power of appointment

should be, like that of removal, subject only to the veto of a number equal to two-thirds of a full council.

The worst hindrance to the efficiency of a government is a deadlock ; and very little better is a corrupt compromise by which a deadlock is avoided. We should insure against both of these by making the mayor's power over the administration of his own department practically independent of the City Council.

Of course there is danger that unlimited power may be abused, but to paralyze or cripple its efficiency for good is hardly a satisfactory safeguard. To say nothing of the criminal proceedings which are available against outrageous misconduct, the short term of office, involving the necessity of speedily giving account to the people, who will hold him fully responsible for the full power entrusted to him, and from whom he will naturally be desirous of some further honor, if not of a renewal of this, besides the honorable ambition of acquitting himself well of his present trust, which must be strong in every man worthy to be thought of as Mayor of Chicago ; all these constitute a safeguard against misuse of power, to which the power of a board of aldermen to clog and shackle can add very little, and from which it detracts a great deal.

A conscientious use of executive power is more likely to be promoted by leaving it in the hands of one who knows that he will be held to full accountability for the exercise of it, and that a right and judicious use of it will insure him high honor available for his future career than by making him share it with a numerous body, each one of whom need have little concern about his undivided seventieth of the responsibility and can have little to hope from his fraction of the honor ; while his proportionate share of the spoils will be something quite appreciable.

A good safeguard and an additional help to good administration would be afforded by making all subordinate positions obtainable only upon a thorough test of qualifications and tenable during good behavior, all removals to be only for cause stated, with the privilege of a public investigation of all the alleged causes if the person removed desires it.

As a general rule, the head of each department appoints, with the consent of the mayor, the chiefs of the several bureaus in that department, each chief of bureau appointing and removing his own subordinates with the consent of the head of the department. These chiefs of bureaus are in some instances entrusted with highly important duties, particularly in the Department of Public Works, where there is a city engineer having the care of our vast system of

water works and those extensions of it which are almost continually being made, a superintendent of the water office, who sees to the collecting of the rates which we pay for the use of the water; a superintendent of sewers; a superintendent of streets, who has charge of the work of grading, paving, lighting, and keeping in order and repair our 2570 miles of street,—a work closely related both to that of the city engineer and that of the superintendent of sewers, both of whom may have frequent occasion in repairing, renewing or modifying their several systems of underground conduits to disturb the pavements, and whose structures may be favorably or unfavorably affected by the kind and quantity of the material piled above them; as in New York, some years ago, the water mains in one of the streets were found to have been crushed by the weight of broken rock which had been laid over them to make a road bed. Hence is apparent the importance of having all these bureaus under the control of one head, who can, in case of need, decide their disputes and make them work in harmony together.

A part of the work of the bureau of streets has recently been transferred to a superintendent of street cleaning, a change which has not as yet justified itself by any conspicuous results. Now as heretofore, so many of our streets as are well paved and well drained and are sometimes clean, namely just after a heavy and prolonged shower. At other times they are dirty in varying degrees, so that a bright and breezy day which otherwise would come with health and refreshing in its wings, comes to Chicago as a calamity; for, undesirable as it is to have the street filth plastered on our footgear and the borders of our garments, it is immeasurably worse desiccated and pulverised and showered into eyes, nose, and mouth.

Closely connected with the cleaning of the streets is the removal of the garbage, ashes, and other rubbish which accumulates in every house, and which it would be oppressive to require the average householder to remove for himself. Till recently this work was under the charge of the Department of Health.

In 1893 the supervision of the work was transferred to the newly created Street Cleaning Bureau, which has an inspector in every ward to see that the contractor does his duty. The terms of the contract are stringent, making the Superintendent that final judge of the question whether the contractor lives up to his undertakings or not, and making the contractor and his sureties liable for all additional expense which the city may incur by reason of having to relet the contract or to do the work through its own em-

ployees. Nevertheless, it is notorious that the work which the contractors undertake to do, is not done. And it is difficult to detect any cause for this failure in the system or anywhere else than in the men who administer the system.

The ordinances on this subject might be improved, so as to provide for a more complete service less burdensome to the householder; but the want of such improvements is no excuse for failure to do what little is provided for.

The Department of Health, perhaps beyond any other, is empowered to interfere with personal liberty, and it is hardly too much to say, to demand the sacrifice of the individual life to the necessities or supposed necessities of public safety.

The fundamental statute in sweeping terms gives the City Council power "to do all acts and make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease;" and the Council in declaring the powers of the Commissioner of Health have gone to the full extent of the statute. He may not only draw a quarantine cordon around the city, but may in his discretion remove any person whom he decides to be suffering from infectious disease from his home to a pest house, or may leave the patient at home and shut off the house from all communication with the outside world. And lest this should not be enough, it is his duty (in the words of the City Ordinance) "in case of pestilence or epidemic disease, or of danger from anticipating or impending pestilence or epidemic disease, or in case the sanitary condition of the city should be of such a character as to warrant it, to take such measures, and to do and order and cause to be done such acts, for the preservation of the public health (though not herein or elsewhere or otherwise authorised) as he may in good faith declare the public safety and health to demand."

If we are not kept in good health, it certainly is not for want of plenary authority in the Commissioner.

How serious a matter for the patient, removal from his home to the pest house may be, will appear from a report made by Dr. Cazier at a recent medical conference, of the result of his own observation at the small-pox hospital. "The building," he says, "offers inadequate protection from storm and rain, is wholly without fire protection and in imminent peril of fire. The heat is irregular; the patients near the stove are overheated, while the remote ones freeze; and thus the elements wage a ceaseless war,

making the efforts of doctor and nurse alike futile; pneumonia claims convalescents, and lives by the score are sacrificed."

Inasmuch as the protective power of vaccination has made small-pox the least to be dreaded of all the more virulent class of diseases, it would seem as if these human sacrifices to the god of health were hardly necessary.

On the other hand, that efficient and sometimes even stringent sanitary control is necessary appears from the statistics of mortality. In 1896 there were in Chicago 2076 deaths from zymotic disease, including 751 from typhoid fever and 956 from diphtheria. But it may be questioned whether the great—not of course the only—source of danger is not miasmatic poison rather than personal contagion.

And perhaps it would not impair the efficiency of the Department of Health if its power to take heroic measures at the sacrifice of personal liberty and life were made dependent upon the advice of a consulting board composed of practising physicians and non-medical men commanding the public confidence for good judgment.

Another side of the protective work of the inspectors of this Department appears from the fact that in 1896 they condemned as unwholesome 125,000 pounds of meat on South Water Street and in Fulton Street Market, and about 2,000,000 pounds at the Stock Yards.

Our municipal family contains its proportion of bad children—of those, indeed, who do not deserve to be deemed its children at all—besides many more who occasionally stand in need of some restraint, so that no department of our municipal government is more essential than the police. We had at the beginning of this year 3398 policemen, not including clerks, lock-up keepers, etc. During 1896 they made 96,847 arrests; but of these prisoners not quite half, more than 47,000, were discharged in the police courts. What proportion of these were improperly arrested, and what proportion improperly discharged, is a question which any one who has observed the proceedings of our police courts, would be unwilling to answer off-hand.

Of the arrests 29 were for murder, 6 for manslaughter, and 607 for assault with intent to kill. The mortality reports of the Health Department show 69 homicides, of which one third are classed as murders and the balance as manslaughter, whence we may infer that the number of arrests does not quite equal that of the actual crimes of this class.

There were, in 1896, 1947 arrests for burglary, 1083 for robbery, and 149 for assault with intent to rob, 6780 for larceny, including 459 for larceny of property which had been intrusted to the accused, 401 for receiving stolen property, and 651 for obtaining goods or money under false pretenses. There were 241 arrests for keeping houses of ill fame, and 5547 of inmates of such houses, 310 for keeping gaming houses, and 1000 lacking 4 were of inmates of such houses.

There were 40 arrests for riot, 602 for malicious mischief, 1988 for vagrancy, and, to come down to a petty nuisance very inadequately dealt with, 194 for lounging on street corners.

So far as the police are aware, only 19 drunkards and 21 minors succeeded in finding any one to sell them intoxicating drink during the year 1896.

There were some arrests of Aldermen, for what offences does not appear.

There is a more genial side to the work of this department. During the same year it restored over 3318 lost children to their parents, assisted 6164 persons sick or hurt, rescued 42 persons from drowning, and extinguished 321 incipient fires, besides giving 3395 fire alarms. There were also, as has already been stated, 176,980 instances in which homeless persons were furnished with lodging.

These figures emphasise the importance of this department and show also that it must be credited with a very considerable degree of efficiency.

The system might however be improved by making the mayor's power of appointment and removal independent of the City Council, and by providing that no patrolman shall be appointed or promoted until his qualifications have been tested by a thorough examination; that no reduction or removal shall be made except for cause stated, and that the person reduced or removed shall be entitled (if he demand it) to an investigation by a board analogous to a court martial and to re-instatement if the charges are adjudged to be unfounded.

Any splitting up of the control, and consequent dissipation of the responsibility by means of a non-partisan (that is, doubly partisan) commission, can only tend to introduce alternations of wrangles and corrupt compromises where unity and integrity are essential.

Close by the Department of Police is another with organisation almost exactly parallel, the Fire Department, having at its

head a fire marshal with powers similar to those of the superintendent of police. Under him is a force of 1135 men of all ranks, including 93 clerks, telegraphers, machinists, etc. The fire-fighting force is divided into 109 companies, operating (among other apparatus) 78 steam fire-engines and 4 fire boats. The fire apparatus is valued at \$855,000, and that belonging to the alarm and telegraph system at \$643,000.

During 1896 there were 4414 fires, causing a total loss of \$1,979,355. In less than half of these was the loss over \$10, and in only 161 cases did it exceed \$1000. The number causing a loss of \$30,000 or over was 4. Two firemen were fatally and 16 others seriously injured in the discharge of duty. The firemen rescued 71 persons from imminent peril of death.

This department appears to do its work with practically no complaint either as to efficiency or honesty. But a guaranty of permanence in its good condition might be afforded by modifications such as have just been suggested for the Police Department.

It would seem on the whole, that if the city government of Chicago does not work as it ought to, the cause is to a very slight degree in the system and practically altogether in the men who administer it. And these men are much more effectually under the control of the citizens than if more of them were elected by direct popular vote. It would be impossible to make good government easier of attainment than it is now, depending as it does solely on the election of an upright and capable mayor, and of two upright and capable aldermen in each of a majority of the wards. If anything is wrong in the city government, it is because (as we said of another city centuries ago) the "people love to have it so."

Nor is there any reason to hope that if the people of Chicago have not virtue and capacity enough to get good government for themselves, they can get any help from the people of the rest of the State, who are not so very much more virtuous or wise, and who have immeasurably less at stake. Any change in that direction would be simply removing the cause of the evil from where we can get at it to where we cannot.

SCHILLER AS A PROPHET.

BY THE EDITOR.

ALL TRUE POETS are prophets both in the original sense of the word and in its commonly accepted significance. A prophet (or *προφήτης*) is a preacher, one who propounds the law of the higher life, of the ideal. A prophet is, as the Hebrew call him, "a *nâbî*," a revealer of truth, a messenger who speaks in behalf of the moral world-order, expounding the duties which it involves. Prophets are confronted with the same reality as their fellow creatures, but while other mortals see merely what is, prophets have the vision of what ought to be; and by comprehending the law of being, they actually can foresee the future.

When Amos, the shepherd of Tekoah, witnessed the tyranny of the powerful, the oppressiveness of the rich, and the debaucheries in which the whole people indulged at their national festivals, he saw at once the doom which this lack of discipline foreboded; and he raised a cry of alarm among the revellers at Bethel, prophesying the desolation that would follow in the wake of their feasts. He whose mind's eye is undimmed by passion can always see the curse that accompanies sin and self-indulgence.

Schiller was the prophet of the ideal, the revealer of the ought; and at the same time his sensitive nature made him understand the signs of the time, so as to render his poetry predictions of the nearest future. The barometer does not better predict the weather than did Schiller's dramas the great historical events of the age; and what is most remarkable is the exactness with which the German poet anticipated every change in the fate of the world in regular succession. Thus Schiller wrote *Die Räuber* (the robbers) in 1780-1781, and the French revolution ensued, an outburst of the same spirit which pervaded this drama. In 1783 Schiller dramatised the story of the bold adventurer Fiesco, who took possession of the



SCHILLER

REPRODUCED FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF A PAINTING BY C. JAEGER, 1872

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throne of Genoa, and Napoleon soon afterwards seized the government of France and placed the imperial crown upon his head. In 1791 Schiller wrote his famous trilogy *Wallenstein*, and the succeeding years became a period of warfare which were paralleled in the history of Europe only in the campaigns of the great Duke of Friedland. Further on, in 1801 Schiller wrote the *Jungfrau von Orleans*, describing a foreign invasion and the heroic struggle for liberty, foreshadowing Napoleon's conquests and the national rebirth of Germany which ended in the final expulsion of the Corsican invader. *Wilhelm Tell*, Schiller's last work, written in 1804, is a noble prophecy of the eventual union of the German tribes which took place in much the same way as the Swiss formed their confederacy; for united Germany also was the result of a self-defence against the external danger of a common foe.

Schiller's anticipations of coming events must be startling to those who do not understand that the poet's nature by his very vision of the ideal will necessarily and naturally presage the future. And there was no one among all the prophets of the world who had a clearer and more philosophical grasp of the significance of the ideal in its relation to the real than Schiller; and thus Schiller has become a religious prophet announcing a deeper conception of God as based upon the matured thought of the philosophy of his time.

Plato was the inventor of the conception of the ideal from which Philo (20 B. C.—40 A. D.) developed the doctrine of Words or *λόγοι* which manifest themselves as virtues in the spiritual leaders of the world.¹ Philo's logos doctrine contains the Christian view as expressed in the Fourth Gospel. It is a Platonic view that the logos is, as Philo says, "the archetypal model, the idea of ideas," but it is already a genuine Christian thought, when he speaks of "the word of the Supreme Being" as "the second Deity," and as "the image (*εικών*) of God, by whom all the world has been framed." The Greek conception of the ideal found another expression in the philosophical writings of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, who distinguishes two things, the material (*ὕλικόν*) and the formal (*αἰτιῶδες*), the latter being that which is the determinant in causation, meaning literally "the cause-like" or simply "the causal."

While the conception of the ideal is represented by Plato with a tinge of corporeality as if the ideas were beings or things who

¹ Thus Abraham is the educational virtue *διδασκαλικὴ ἀρετή*; Isaac the ingrained or natural virtue, *φυσικὴ ἀρετή*; Jacob the practice-virtue, *ἀσκητικὴ ἀρετή*; Joseph, political virtue, as leading a life of political usefulness (*βίος πολιτικός*), and Moses is the pattern of all virtues, he is the model and a unique manifestation of the word (*ὁ λόγος*), as the totality of all the words (*λόγοι*).

existed somewhere in an unspatial space and an untemporal time, and while to Philo the logoi are forces performing work as we might think of light and electricity, or tools employed by the great architect of the world in his work of creation, Schiller conceives of the ideal realm as forms with the same scientific clearness that is possessed only by the trained mathematician. The realm of the ideal is not anything material, nor is it dynamical; it is purely formal. Yet the formal is the most essential part of this material reality which is the world in which we live and move and have our being. The purely formal is not an idle illusion; it is the recognition of the eternal, the immutable, the absolute, the laws of which pervade the whole universe and determine the destiny of stars as well as molecules, of nations and of every single individual not less than of mankind as a whole. Thus James Sime, compiler of the meagre sketch of Schiller's life in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, is right in his terse characterisation of the poet when he says:

“Schiller had a passionate faith in an eternal ideal world to which the human mind has access; and the contrast between ideals and what is called reality, he presents in many different forms.”

This side of Schiller's poetry is little known among the English-speaking nations. Goethe's philosophy has become accessible through the excellent translations of several ingenious translators, men like Bayard Taylor and others. It appears that it is even more difficult to translate Schiller than Goethe. Schiller's verses sound like music; yet is their language simple, and a native German needs no effort to understand their meaning at once. It seems almost impossible to reproduce their elegant diction adequately. The best translations of Schiller's poems are not entirely free from the grossest blunders, which prove that the translators were unable even to parse the original sentences, let alone to grasp their significance.

The most important poem that sets forth Schiller's confession of faith in its philosophical foundation is his anthem on “the Ideal and Life,” the most significant verses of which are as follows¹:

“Smooth, and ever clear, and crystal-bright,
Flows existence zephyr-light,
In Olympus where the blest recline.
Moons revolve and ages pass away
Changelessly, 'mid ever-rife decay,
Bloom the roses of their youth divine.

¹Edgar Bowring's translation is the best that could be had. The first verse, which is very good, remains here unaltered. The other verses are more or less changed for reasons which comparison with the original will explain.

Man has but a sad choice left him now,
Sensual joy and soul-repose between ;
But upon the great Celestial's brow,
Wedded is their splendor seen.

" Wouldst thou here be like a deity,
In the realm of death be free,
Never seek to pluck its gardens fruit
On its beauty thou may'st feed thine eye ;
Soon the impulse of desire will fly
And enjoyment's transient bliss polute.
E'en the Styx that nine times flows around
Ceres' child's return could not delay ;
But she grasped the apple—and was bound
Evermore by Orcus' sway.

" Yonder power whose tyranny we bemoan,
On our bodies has a claim alone.
Form is never bound by time's design.
She the gods' companion,¹ blessed and bright
Liveth in eternal realms of light
'Mongst the deities, herself divine.
Wouldst thou on her pinions soar on high,
Throw away the earthly and its woe !
To the ideal realm for refuge fly
From this narrow life below.

This same idea of the ideal realm of pure forms is further emphasised in the thirteenth verse, beginning with the lines :

" In den heiteren Regionen,
Wo die reinen Formen wohnen."

Which may be translated as follows :

" In yon region of pure forms,
Sunny land e'er free from storms,
Misery and sorrow cease to rave,
There our sufferings no more pierce the soul,
Tears of anguish there no longer roll.
Nought remains but mind's resistance brave.
Beauteous as the rainbow's colored hue,
Painted on the canvas of the cloud,
E'en on melancholy's mournful shroud
Rest reigns in empyrean blue."

Schiller, utilising to some extent Greek mythology, contrasts pure form with reality. Peace of soul exists alone in the realm of pure form ; there no suffering exists ;² for what is painful struggle

¹ *Die Gespielin seeliger Naturen*, means the companion of the blessed ones, i. e., the gods, and not (as Mr. Bowring has it) "blissful Nature's playmate."

² Schiller's description of the region of pure forms reminds us of St. John's revelation, where we read : "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes ; and there shall be no more death,

in real life, appears in the domain of the ideal merely as beautiful contrast. Pure form is divine, while its bodily realisation is mingled with that element that is of the earth earthy. Therefore the poet exhorts us, in the second stanza, not to lust after the fruit of sensuality; once bound by its spell, we are caught in the maelstrom of desire, leading to disgust, and the desire itself will leave us, which reminds one of Schopenhauer who declares that life is an oscillation between wants and *ennui*. But that is not all. Schiller adds that enjoyment involves us in the doom of death,—an idea in which Greek views are strangely mixed with the resignation of the Buddhist. So long as we are able to discard all earthly sorrow, and seek refuge in the realm of the ideal, we need not fear death. Death is the fate of Eve who tasted the forbidden fruit of sensual desire, but death has no power over Proserpine, Ceres's daughter, the goddess of spring, whose return to life from the domain of OrCUS, Styx cannot prevent.

And what is the ethics to which Schiller's philosophy of pure form leads? Schiller says :

“ Man before the law feels base,
Humbled and in deep disgrace.
Guilt e'en to the holy ones draws nigh.
Virtue pales before the rays of truth.
From the ideal every deed, forsooth,
Must in shame and in confusion fly.
None created e'er surmounted this,
Neither a bridge's span can bear,
Nor a boat o'er that abyss,
And no anchor catches there.

“ But by flying from the sense-confined
To the freedom of the mind,
Every dream of fear thou'lt find thence flown,
And the endless depth itself will fill.
If thou tak'st the Godhead in thy will,
It no longer sits upon its throne.¹
Servile minds alone will feel its sway
When of the law they scorn the rod,
For with man's resistance dies away
E'en the sovereignty of God.”

neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain : for the former things are passed away.”

¹ Schiller's expressions that “God descends from his throne” and “abdicates his sovereignty,” have been misunderstood by Mr. Bowring. He translates :

(The Godhead)

“ Will soar upwards from its earthly throne.”

This is an ethics both of modesty and of moral endeavor. Since the ideal can never be attained in its purity, even the holy man is not free from guilt, and absolute perfection can never be realised. Nevertheless, the ideal is not a beyond; it is an immanent presence which can find its incarnation in man. And the ideal ceases to appear as an implacable condemnation of our shortcomings as soon as it dominates our entire being. He whose will is determined by the ideal, can say of God, "I and the Father are one." God is no longer above, but within him. Says Schiller:

" Nehmt die Gottheit auf in euren Willen,
Und sie steigt von ihrem Weltenthron."

This looks like outspoken atheism, but it is the same atheism for which Socrates drank the hemlock. It is the same blasphemy for which Christ was crucified. It is an expression of that moral endeavor which renders man divine and gives rise to the ideal of the God-man.

In the same sense that permeates these lines of his poem "The Ideals and Life," Schiller expresses himself in his "Words of Faith," which contain Schiller's poetical formulation of Kant's postulates of Freedom, Virtue, and God. Schiller says:

" These words I proclaim, important and rare,
Let from mouth to mouth them fly ever.
The heart to their truth will witness bear,
Through the senses you'll prove them never.¹
Man will no longer his worth retain,
Unless these words of faith remain.

" For LIBERTY man is created; he's free,
Though fetters around him be clinking.
Let the cry of the mob never terrify thee,
Nor the scorn of the dullard unthinking!
Beware of the slave when he breaks from his chain,²
But fear not the free who their freedom maintain.

" And VIRTUE is more than an empty sound,
It can in life be made real.
Man often may stumble, before it be found,
Still, he can obtain this ideal.
And that which the learned in their learning ne'er knew,
Can be done by the mind that is childlike and true.

¹ Schiller has here in mind the contrast made by Kant between sensation rising from the outside and thought, having its roots in the pure forms of our mind. Schiller means to say that the three ideas, "freedom (i. e., moral responsibility) virtue, and God," are not sense-given.

² While Schiller says, "the slave must be feared when he frees himself, not the free man," Bowring translates, "Fear not the bold slave, nor the free man."

“ And a God, too, there is, a purpose sublime,
 Though frail may be human endeavor.
 High over the regions of space and of time
 One idea supreme rules forever.
 While all things are shifting and tempest pressed,
 Yet the spirit pervading the change is at rest.

“ Preserve these three words, important and rare,
 Let from mouth to mouth them fly ever,
 The heart to their truth will witness bear,
 Through the senses you'll prove them never,
 Man will forever his worth retain,
 While these three words of faith remain.”

When Schiller speaks of God as “a purpose sublime”; literally, “a holy will,” “*ein heiliger Wille*,” and as “the idea supreme,” “*der höchste Gedanke*,” and when he contrasts God with the restlessness of the world, stating that “a spirit of rest pervades all change,” *Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist*, we do not believe that these expressions were framed under strain of versification. They must, in our opinion, be regarded as carefully worded definitions which are the matured product of the poet's thought, and considering their deep significance, we make bold to claim Schiller (not less than Goethe)¹ as one of the most clear-sighted prophets of the Religion of Science.

Schiller's religion was not limited to any sect, and indeed he avoided giving allegiance to any particular creed, because his religious faith, although very definite, was broader and more deeply rooted than any one of those confessions of faith which the Christian dogmatism of his time could offer him. He took the religious problem too seriously to accept any set of formulas without making them his own and transforming them into a religion that was tenable before the tribunal of both his philosophy and his conscience. This apparent lack of religion was an evidence of his extraordinary religious seriousness, which he expressed in the famous distich :

“ What my religion? I'll tell you! There is none among all you may mention
 Which I embrace.—And the cause? Truly, religion it is!

¹ Goethe says :

“ Und alles Drängen, alles Ringen
 Ist ewige Ruh' in Gott dem Herrn.”

LUTHER'S FABLE OF THE LION AND THE ASS.¹

TRANSLATED BY W. H. CARRUTH.

THE OLD LION fell ill and summoned all the animals to attend his last diet and to make his heir, the young lion, king in his stead. The animals came obediently and accepted the old lion's last will. But after the old lion was dead and buried with splendor befitting a king, there came forward certain false and faithless counsellors of the king, who had received many favors at his hands and been helped by him to great honors. These now sought to lead a lawless life and to rule in the kingdom after their own pleasure, and wished therefore no lion for king, saying: "*Nolumus hunc regnare super nos*" (We do not wish this one to reign over us). They pointed out what a cruel sway the lions had held hitherto, how they had torn and eaten innocent animals, so that no one could feel secure from them. Thus it is wont to be: that of those in authority all the good is suppressed and only the evil is reported.

From these remarks a great murmur arose among all the estates of the kingdom; some wished to keep the young lion, but the great part were even fain to try another. At last they were called together that they might choose according to the word of the

¹Luther had serious misgivings when he established among the Protestants the principle of making the sovereign of each country *summus episcopus*, or head of the church, but in those disturbed times he saw no other way of arranging the matter. Since his policy has become one of the strongest foundation-stones of secular church government he is generally believed to have upheld the idea of a monarchical government "by God's grace." However, the fable of the "Lion and the Ass," which is scarcely ever mentioned, let alone read in the religious curriculum of the Lutheran schools of Germany, proves that Luther had very radical views on questions of politics and government.

This fable was printed, according to the best authorities, in 1528, two years before Luther applied himself to the editing of the old collection known as *Æsop's Fables*, and bore the title "A New Fable of *Æsop*, recently found in German."

greater number and quiet the matter. Thereupon the false, faithless counsellors made the fox their speaker, who should say their word before the estates of the kingdom, and gave him cunning instructions and directions how he should nominate the ass. At first, indeed, it seemed laughable even to the fox that an ass should be king; but when he heard their considerations: how independent they could be under the rule of the ass and could sway him as they would, the knave liked the prospect and helped faithfully, pondering how he should present the matter cleverly.

The fox appeared before the estates of the kingdom, cleared his throat, and, calling for silence, began to speak of the dangers and difficulties of the kingdom, and implied by his whole speech that it was all the king's fault, and he ran down the lion family so that the populace quite fell away from them. But when a great doubt arose as to which animal should be chosen, he again called for silence and attention and proposed the ass family, and spent a good hour praising the ass, saying that the ass was neither proud nor tyrannical, did much work, was patient and humble, admitted the consequence of other animals, was not hard to keep, neither was he cruel and did not devour other animals, and was satisfied with little homage and low taxes.

Now when the fox observed that this tickled the populace and pleased them well, he capped the climax by saying: "Besides, gentlemen, we have to consider that he is, perchance, appointed and created by God for this office; this may be seen in the fact that he bears forever the cross upon his back."

When the fox referred to the cross all the estates of the kingdom were astonished, and shouted with loud acclaim: "Now we have found our proper king, who can manage both civil and ecclesiastical matters." Then each commended something in the ass; one said that he had fine long ears which would be good for hearing confession; another said that he had a good voice which would be fit for preaching and singing in church. Indeed there was nothing about the ass that did not seem worthy of royal and papal honors. But above all other virtues shone the cross on his back. So the ass was chosen king among the animals.

An outcast orphan, the poor young lion went forth from his ancestral realm wretched and sorrowful, until certain faithful and devoted old counsellors, who were offended by the affair, took pity on him, and agreed that it was an abominable shame to let the young king be expelled in such a disgraceful way; his father had deserved better of them. They decided, too, that it must not go in

the kingdom as the fox and his fellows willed, seeking only their own pleasure and not the honor of the kingdom. They encouraged one another and called the estates together, saying they had some necessary business to propose. Then the eldest, an old dog, a faithful counsellor of the old lion, came forward and declared in a beautiful speech that the election of the ass had been too sudden and hasty, and that a great wrong had been done the lion, adding that all is not gold that glitters.

The dog argued: "The ass, although he has the cross on his back, may be a fraud with nothing behind it, as indeed all the world is deceived by glitter and fine appearances. The lion has proven his many virtues by deeds, but the ass has never shown any deed. Look well to it, therefore, that you do not choose a king who is only a graven image, which also can bear a cross. And if a war should arise, you do not know what good the mere cross will do if there is nothing to back it."

This serious, brave speech from the dog affected Master Omnes. The fox and the faithless counsellors grew uneasy, and declared that what was once done in the kingdom should stand; but nevertheless the masses were influenced by the consideration that the ass had never shown forth any deed, and that the cross might indeed have deceived them, and yet they could not cancel the election.

As the dog insisted so strongly on the deed and the fraud of the cross, a proposition was agreed to that the ass should fight with the lion for the kingdom, the one that conquered to be king; there was no other way to manage, since the election had already taken place. At this the young lion again took heart, and all his devoted subjects were full of hope. But the fox and his fellows hung their tails, for they did not expect much knightly combat from their new king, unless the contest were in thistle-chewing. The day of combat was set, and all the animals came to the place. The fox supported the ass; the dog, the lion.

The ass let the lion choose the contest. The lion said, "Well, let it be: whichever jumps over this brook, without wetting a foot, shall be the winner. Now it was a broad brook. The lion took a start and sprang over as a bird might fly across. The ass and the fox thought: "Well, we were not kings before, daring wins, daring loses"; he had to jump, and jumped with a splash into the middle of the brook, as a block would fall in. The lion jumped about on the bank and cried out: "I guess his foot is wet." But now behold what luck and cunning can do. While under the water

a little fish had become entangled and caught in the ass's ear ; so when the ass crept out of the brook and the animals had had a good laugh at his jump, the fox sees the ass shake the fish out of his ear, and begins and speaks : "Be still and harken :

"Where now are those who despise the cross, saying that it can show no deed? My lord, King Ass, says he might also have undertaken to spring across the brook, but that would have been a poor device in his eyes to prove the virtue of his cross ; but seeing on his jump a fish in the brook, he sprang after it, and that the miraculous power of his cross should be the greater, he undertook to catch it with his ear instead of with his mouth or his paw. Let the lion do as much, and then he may be king. But I think with his mouth and all four claws he could not catch a fish, not even if he went after it, to say nothing of catching it on the jump."

With such babble the fox again created confusion, and the cross was on the point of winning. The dog was vexed with his ill luck, but still more with the fact that the treacherous fox, with his foxy ways, had so befooled the multitude, and he began to believe that it had come about thus by chance, and was no miracle.

But lest a riot should ensue from the snarling and snapping of the fox and the dog, it was considered well that the lion and the ass should go alone to some place and have their contest there.

They proceeded to a wood within the peace and safe-conduct of the kingdom. "The test shall be," said the lion, "which one can catch the swiftest animal." And he ran into the wood and chased until he caught a hare. The lazy ass, however, thought : the kingdom is going to cost me too much pains ; I am to have no peace if things go in this fashion. So he lay down in the sun where he was, and let his tongue hang out for the great heat. A raven comes that way, and, thinking it is a carrion, alights upon his lips and is about to eat, whereupon the ass snaps his jaws to and catches the raven. Now when the lion comes running joyfully with his hare, he finds the raven in the ass's mouth, and is dismayed. In short, the game was lost, and he himself began to have a dread of the ass's cross.

The lion, however, did not like to give up his kingdom, and said : "Dear Ass, one more test for the sake of good fellowship ; they say all good things go by threes." Half from fear because he was alone with him, the ass accepted the proposal.

The lion said : "On the other side of this mountain stands a mill ; whichever gets there first shall be winner ; will you go around the foot or over the top of the mountain?" The ass said : "You

go over the mountain." As in his last struggle, the lion ran with all his might and main. But the ass stood where he was, and thought: if I run I shall only be laughed at, and wear my legs out besides; I see the lion is not willing to concede me the honor, and I do not care to labor in vain.

When the lion reached the other side of the mountain he saw another ass standing before the mill. "Aha!" says he, "has the devil already gotten you here?" and he shouted: "Very good; back once more to the starting point!"


Having crossed the mountain, once more he saw the ass still standing there. "A third time, then," he cried, "back to the mill!" There he saw the ass standing a third time, and had to confess him victor and admit that there is no jesting with the cross.

So the ass remained king, and to this day his family reigns with a strong hand among the beasts of the world.

IS THE CHURCH RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INQUISITION?

BY THE EDITOR.

THE QUESTION has often been raised whether or not the Church is responsible for the crimes of heresy trials, witch prosecutions and the Inquisition, and the answer depends entirely




THE BANNER OF THE SPANISH INQUISITION.

THE BANNER OF THE INQUISITION OF GOA.¹

upon our definition of the Church. If we understand by Church the ideal bond that ties all religious souls together in their common aspirations for holiness and righteousness, or the communion of saints, we do not hesitate to say that we must distinguish between

¹The illustrations on pages 226-232 are reproduced from Packard.



THE CHAMBER OF THE INQUISITION.



VARIOUS MANNERS OF CROSS-EXAMINING THE DEFENDANTS.

the ideal and its representatives; but if we understand by Church the organisation as it actually existed at the time, there is no escape from holding the Church responsible for everything good and evil done by her plenipotentiaries and authorised leaders. Now, it is strange that while many Roman Catholics do not hesitate to concede that many grievous mistakes have been made by the Church, and that the Church has considerably changed not only its policy but its principles, there are others who would insist on defending the most atrocious measures of the Church, be it on the strength of



A MAN AND A WOMAN CONVICTED OF HERESY WHO HAVE PLEADED GUILTY BEFORE BEING CONDEMNED TO DEATH.

their belief that the Church is the divinely guided organ of God's revelation, or on some other doctrinal ground.

We will illustrate the contrast of views that obtains at present by quoting a few sentences from Roman Catholic authors. The reviewer of Gustav Freytag's *Martin Luther*, in the *Providence Journal*, after a column's discussion of Luther, of whom he says that "even Rome owes a debt to Luther," continues:

"Freytag's attitude is well expressed in his opening words: 'All Christian denominations,' he says, 'have good reason to be grateful to Luther, for to him they owe a purified faith which satisfies the heart and soul and enriches their lives. The heretic of Wittenberg is a reformer for the Catholic quite as much as for the Protestant.' That in the struggle with Luther Catholicism was forced to purify itself, to outgrow mere scholasticism, to make its sacraments true means of grace.




HERETICS CONDEMNED TO BE BURNED.



Tom II. A. 32

A MAN AND A WOMAN CONDEMNED TO BE BURNED BUT PARDONED ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR CONFESSION.

may freely be admitted. But Catholics, at least, can hardly be blamed for holding also that in some respects the loss outweighed the gain, and that irreparable harm was done to Christianity by a movement which, despite its original purity of intention, developed rapidly into the sectarianism which Protestants themselves deplore. Where Luther was certainly right, however, was in his first decided protest against the sale of indulgences and other abuses, and in his strong upright defiance of authority which led him to the Diet at Worms. It is not necessary to agree with his later theology in order to see this. Nor can Catholicism set Luther down as a mere reckless disturber of the peace in the light of those unimpeachable authentic documents which show how thoroughly justified his revolt was. The English monasteries, for example, were probably no worse—they may have been better—than



THE INQUISITION IN SESSION ON THE MARKET SQUARE AT MADRID.

A. King and Queen.

B. Grand Inquisitor.

C. Counsellors.

D. Nobility.

E. The defendants and their families.

F. Two cages in which the criminals were placed when their sentence was read.

G. Altar for saying mass.

H. H. Escutcheon of the Inquisition.

J. The preacher's pulpit.

K. K. Stands for those who read the

sentences.

L. Effigies of those who died in prison.

those on the Continent. Yet we know what Morton, Cardinal Archbishop of Canterbury, thought it necessary to say about the Abbot of St. Alban's when Pope Innocent VIII. commissioned him to correct and reform the religious houses. Queen Mary's agents endeavored to destroy the records of the visitation under Henry VIII.; but there is evidence enough in the papers in the Cotton Library and in the Rolls House, to say nothing of evidence from private persons; and if we had nothing else, the Acts of Parliament would be sufficient. It is idle in the face of all this to say that the Reformation was not needed or might have been averted. The men really responsible for Luther's revolt were they who refused to heed his complaints. One great Churchman, Erasmus, saw this clearly. He urged reform upon deaf ears, having himself borne witness to the imperative demand for it. 'The stupid



PROCESSION OF THE INQUISITION OF GOA.

A. The Banner.

B. Dominican friars.

C. Criminals condemned to be burned alive.


D. Criminals who, having pleaded guilty, were pardoned.

E. Crucifix turning its back upon those that are condemned to be burned.

F. Criminals condemned to be burned.


G. Effigies of those who escape the fagots by having died in prison.

H. Grand Inquisitor.



THE LAST SERMON PREACHED TO THE CONDEMNED.

monks,' he writes, 'say mass as a cobbler makes a shoe; they come to the altar reeking from their filthy pleasures. Confession with the monks is a cloak to steal the people's money, to rob girls of their virtue, and commit other crimes too horrible to name.' Nor was he less emphatic in writing to the Pope himself. 'Let each man amend first his own wicked life,' he urges. 'When he has done that, and will amend his neighbor, let him put on Christian charity, which is severe enough when severity is needed. If your Holiness give power to men who neither believe in Christ nor care for you, but think only of their own appetites, I fear there will be danger. We can trust your Holiness, but there are evil men who will use your virtues as a cloak for their own malice.' The weight of the testimony is indisputable."



THE HERETICS' DEATH ON THE FAGOTS.


Another weighty expression of the enlightened spirit that manifests itself in certain quarters of the Roman Catholic Church comes from the lips of DeConaty, the new rector of the Catholic University at Washington, who on the occasion of his inauguration inculcated the principles of the religion of science, saying :

"Let the watchword of the Catholic university be, 'Revelation and science, religion and patriotism, God and our country.' . . .

"Truth is one as God is one, whether it be sought for in the moral or scientific order. There is no secret in nature which can offer danger to truth. The Church has always blessed true science and blesses it every day."

We could easily increase such quotations as these, which are symptoms of a healthy spirit and show that there are men bold

enough to be impartial, just, and progressive. There is, however, a reverse to the medal, for narrowness and bigotry, too, find ex-



POPE URBAN V. PROCLAIMING THE BULL *In Coena Domini*. A. D. 1367, CONDEMNING HERETICS.

pression and like to parade before the public as the genuine expressions of the true Church. There are, for instance, many Roman

Catholic historians who still defend the inquisition and even witch-prosecution as justifiable,¹ and even here in America a man rises in defence of this barbarous and irreligious institution. Mr. James A. Conway in the *Catholic Mirror* (we find it reprinted in the *Dominion Review*) characterises the blessed times of the Spanish inquisition in these words:

"The State made enactments and laws for government of its citizens; the Church inspired and seasoned them with justice and wisdom. All the laws, then, had a tinge of Catholicity, and they were carried out in a manner savoring of the principles of that universal religion. Consequently, it is evident that one who was a heretic then, was by that very fact in opposition to the spirit of the laws and customs of his country—in other words, a disturber of the public peace, and an underminer of civil society. And so it was that in the year 1184, when Lucius III. sat upon the throne of Peter, the Roman Inquisition was formally established to bring to trial the Cathari (the Albigenses). And at the same time bishops established special tribunals in different places to examine into the charges against other persons who were suspected or known to be heretics. . . .

"There were three classes of heretics, and three were the kinds of punishment meted out to them. The first class were the Jews, who were punished very lightly; the second class were the ordinary heretics, who were condemned to banishment or else imprisoned; the third class, however, those heretics who were at the same time open disturbers of the peace and enemies to society, were punished to the full extent of the law. The Church could suffer the pagans to worship, because they erred from ignorance; she could tolerate the Jews, because they were the living and most singular witnesses to the truth; but never could she countenance or encourage a formal heretic, a foe to civilisation, a barrier in the way to salvation, to scatter his poisons unmolested. But aside from the question of civil society, was the Church justified in punishing heretics for that reason alone? *Most assuredly.* The Church is the divinely appointed guardian of the revelations of Jesus Christ, and consequently has the right to rebuke those who, in any way, attack the purity of that faith."

Mr. Conway waxes warm when he considers the blessings of the Inquisition. He says:

"Again, they say that the Inquisition, during the time it existed, hung over Spain like a dark, heavy cloud, enslaving the spirit, robbing the poor country of the free manifestation of all that is dear to natural life. The truth is that, during the flourishing period of the Inquisition and shortly after, in the arts, the sciences, in knowledge and grandeur, in empire and dominion, Spain was the envy of the civilised world. No nation was more enlightened, more powerful, more extensive. In those days her sceptre swayed princes and potentates, and the muses seem to have deserted the rest of the earth and nestled only on her soil. Under their enlightened guidance, the illustrious Lope de Vega, the writer, employed his talents to delight all Christendom with his beautiful works; and the renowned Cervantes, the father of novel-writers, brought into the world his famous *Don Quixote*. Up rose the

¹ See *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. XIII., p. 95. "And now again from 1875 to this day a crowd of defenders has risen up: Father Wieser and the Innsbruck Jesuits in their journal (1877) yearn for its re-establishment, Orbi y Lara in Spain, the Benedictine Gams in Germany, and C. Poullct in Belgium take the same tone," etc.


great Himenez, the statesman and orator ; and the heroic Columbus braved the unknown seas and opened up to the world a new-found continent. In the midst of the Inquisition was born the conqueror Cortez and the explorer De Soto. And scarcely had it ceased to exist when the church was enriched with Ignatius Loyola, Francis Borgia, Francis Xavier, and the great St. Theresa, the greatest warriors for the faith which Spain has begotten.



THE FIRST PAGE OF THE *Dialogus Miraculorum* BY CÆSARIUS HEISTERBACH, which spread the belief in witchcraft and other superstitions.¹

"O Spain, beautiful, smiling Spain, loaded with calumny, held down beneath the scorn of thy sister nations, struggling and struggling, yet in vain, to regain thy long-lost grandeur; fair mother of saints, warriors, heroes, discoverers, explorers,

¹The original, which is preserved in the Royal Library at Düsseldorf, is artistically colored in red. The piety that appears in the initial is genuine and should not be put down as hypocrisy. The superstitions of witch prosecution and heresy trials would never have reached their terrible dimensions had they not been carried on in a deeply religious, albeit misguided, spirit.



THE TOOL-ROOM AT NUREMBERG. After C. Rau. Reproduced from R. E. Kohn's

land of chivalry and conquest ; who could but admire and extol thy greatness and fame ? ”

There is no need of refuting the arguments of Mr. Conway, but we may state that his opinion will scarcely be endorsed to day by the Roman Catholic Church, as such. At any rate, the number



AGNES BERNAUER DROWNED AS A WITCH AT THE REQUEST OF ERNEST, DUKE OF BAVARIA.

(Wood cut by G. Dietrich. Reproduced from B. E. König.)

Shows how the unscrupulous availed themselves of the extraordinary power of witch tribunals

of those Roman Catholics who would protest against a justification of the Inquisition in any form will not be small. The Inquisition may be excused through the ignorance of the times, but it can never be defended. We can learn to understand how it was possible that such outrageous mistakes could be made, but there is no

point of view from which we can justify its proceedings or suppress the condemnation which later ages have pronounced upon it.

What is, in spite of the famed unity of the Roman Catholic Church, the reason of this contrast of opinions? It is not far to seek. The Church is a unity by dint of its hierarchical discipline, as an ecclesiastico-political body, not in its spiritual evolution. There is, to be sure, a unity of doctrine, but this unity of doctrine is more in words than in the meaning of words, and it is very loose considering the liberty that is afforded to its members to interpret



WITCHES CONJURING A HAIL-STORM.
(After an old German print.)



THE DEVIL OF CONCEIT SEEN BY A CLERGYMAN
ON THE DRESS OF A FASHIONABLE LADY.

the dogmas as best they can. The Church as such interferes officially with the interpretation of dogmas only when the peace of the Church is disturbed and the infallibility of the Pope, which is relative and not absolute, serves as a means to prevent a schism. The truth is that Roman Catholics, in spite of the unity of their church government, are very different all the world over, and the Roman Catholics of the United States and of England may be regarded as the leaven in the dough which in the long run will make its influence felt even in the haunts of the darkest mediævalism of continental Romanism.



THE WITCHES' SABBATH. (After Packard.)

The key to all problems of the authority of churches, of the respective merits and demerits of tradition, of crimes committed in good faith through the prevalence of errors and superstitions, must



THE MATERIALISTIC SOUL-CONCEPTION PREVALENT AMONG THE UNEDUCATED EARLY CHRISTIANS. (From ancient MSS.1)

be sought in evolution. All organised life, including spiritual and religious life, develops in a progressive unfoldment and passes through successive phases. Ideas are not solely the thoughts of individuals;



BALTHASAR BEKKER.²

A clergyman of the Reformed Church and author of *De betoverde Weerelde*. (Reproduced from an old wood cut.)

they partake of a superindividual life migrating from individual to individual, from generation to generation, and waging a struggle with other hostile ideas which is finally decided according to the law of the survival of the fittest. The Christian idea of the immortality of the soul, contains a great truth, but ideas originate and pass in their development through a state of infancy and are subject to measles, chicken-pox, and other children's diseases. The truth that the soul is as different from the body as thoughts are different from

the ink with which they are written, led to a dualistic interpretation of life which represented the soul materialistically as a sep-

¹ See Bastian's *Verbleibs-Orte der Seele*, Plate 1. Reproduced from *Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde*, Vol. II., Plate XVII., 5 and 7.

² Born 1634 as the son of a clergyman in Western Frisia, became pastor of a Reformed Church at Amsterdam. His famous work, *The Enchanted World*, was the first bold attack on the superstition of magic and witchcraft. He died 1698.

arate being consisting of a mystical soul-substance. Dualism leads to the belief in magic and witchcraft, implying at the same time the ethics of asceticism. Evil is conceived to be a personal being who can make contracts with people and assist them with demoniacal power. This notion naturally leads to witchcraft prosecutions which were begun in a spirit of piety, but became quickly



FRIEDRICH SPEE VON LANGENFELD.¹

The Jesuit author of *Cantio Criminalis*. Ardent abolitionist of witch prosecution.
(After an old oil painting.)

the means of unscrupulous men who used the verdict of witch tribunals as a convenient instrument to satisfy their passions of hatred and revenge. It is true that the Roman Catholic Church inaugu-

¹ Born 1591 or 1595, and died 1635; he joined the Jesuits 1610 or 1615, was professor of philosophy and morals at Cologne, and wrote his *Cantio Criminalis* in Franconia when his pastoral duties brought him in frequent contact with wizards and witches whom he had to prepare for death. He takes high rank as a poet of Church hymns which appeared under the title *Trutznachtigall*.



Christianus Thomaeus

CHRISTIAN THOMASIVS, (Born 1655, died 1728.)
Professor of Law at the University of Halle, who succeeded in the abolition of witch prosecution. (After an old oil painting.)

rated and continued the prosecution of heretics, wizards, and witches officially through its popes, but it is also true that the Protestants did not hesitate to follow their example¹, and the arm of the worldly powers was ready to serve as an instrument of religious fanaticism. Even our own country witnessed scenes which now make us blush to think what crimes our ancestors committed in the superstitious conviction of increasing the glory of God. Nor must we forget that among the abolitionists of heresy trials and witch prosecutions there were clergymen like Bekker, a Presbyterian, and Spee, a Jesuit, who took a prominent part.

We become lenient judges if we learn to understand the spirit of the past and trace its superstitions to their various causes, as a physician would describe the development of the successive phases of a disease. But while we thus may recognise the subjective sincerity of such characters as Torquemada, the old Grand Inquisitor of Spain, we must not blind ourselves to the terrible dangers of errors if they take hold of the guiding spirit of an age, be they the authorities of church and state or the masses of the people in republican countries.

Error is the poison of our spiritual life; and there is no royal road to truth. Religious revelation is not given us in an easy way, either in the Bible or through the authorities of the Church. In all things we have to make efforts ourselves to shun error and find the truth. We commit a sorry mistake, nay, more than a mistake, a grievous sin, if we accept any belief unthinkingly and blindly on authority. One of the highest religious duties consists in the courageous search for truth. Says Marcus Aurelius :

“δοκεῖ σοι ἔλασσον ἰσχύειν τὸ διεψευσμένον, ἢ τὸ χόλιον τῷ ἰκτεριῶντι, καὶ ὁ ἰὸς τῷ λυσσοδῆμτῳ;”

“Dost thou think that to be in error has less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog?”

The lesson of this chapter in history is that the confidence in science has already become a religious conviction with the leading nations of the world, although the fact is not as yet definitely and openly acknowledged; and any sectarian faith that endeavors to set forth its claim to recognition does it and can do it only on the ground that it is one with scientific truth. For there is nothing that can be declared to be universally true, nothing that is truly catholic, nothing genuinely orthodox, except such truths as are demonstrated by science.

¹ Be it said to the honor of Luther that he is a noteworthy exception.

MISCELLANEOUS.

CHICAGO SEVENTY-SIX YEARS AGO.

AS IT APPEARED TO A UNITED STATES SENATOR.¹

Preparations for starting: One cloth coat for best, two cloth coats for ordinary wear, one Marseilles coat, two pairs cloth trousers, two pairs Nankin trousers, six linen shirts, four cambric shirts, four linen handkerchiefs, eight cambric handkerchiefs.

Aug. 10 to Sept. 22, 1821.

We left Fort Wayne at one o'clock, with one guide, in company with Captain H's five police-at-arms. Our general course was northwest by west, four miles across a high, rich, level country. The timber was oak, beech, sugar-tree, hickory, ash, as far as the waters of the Wabash, which was the commencement of the prairie or barrens, which continued for four miles to a handsome creek, a branch of Eel River. Then came again a gradually rolling and heavily timbered country, walnut and poplar appearing in addition to the already mentioned trees which we had seen when first starting out.

We encamped at Blue Grass Creek, clearing away the haw, dogwood, and pawpaws.

From Fort Wayne to Eel River was ten miles and eight additional miles to the Blue Grass Creek. The second day we crossed rolling, sandy, and gravelly barrens which rise abruptly above small lakes (four or five of beautifully clear water) more than one mile long and one-fourth of a mile broad. We stopped to rest about fourteen miles north of a flat village called Chicago, after various meanderings, making in all one hundred and sixty-five miles from Fort Wayne.

The town consists of about . . . houses and . . . inhabitants. It is built round a basin, in the rear of which a bluff rises abruptly to the height of . . . feet, on the summit or declivity of which has been repaired and is now occupied, Fort Mitchel. Machenau (Macenaw), built by the enemy during the late war. From this summit we can get a prospect of the whole island. The surface is limestone and gravel, with a small proportion of light, rich soil, which is regularly moistened during the summer by copious dews, producing the finest of potatoes onions, turnips, parsnips, beets, etc. Corn, wheat, and rye grow, but do not succeed so well. They begin to plough and sow seed about the last of May and 1st of June, and the crops mature in August and are gathered and stored in October. The roots and vegeta-

¹ Taken from the diary of Col. Wm. H. Trimble, of Hillsboro, Ohio, in possession of Mrs. E. J. Thompson, his niece, Hillsboro, Ohio.

bles are kept in houses constructed for the purpose, partly underground and covered with sod. Currants and cherries succeed well; their apples are not good.

Chicago is nothing but a small Indian village. The whitefish are said first to appear in going down the lake.

Officers of the Government and some of the citizens waited on us. Mr. Robert Stuart gave us a horseback ride over the country.

The Indians assembled in council about one o'clock. Governor Cass told them that they had been invited to assemble at this place to receive a message from their Great Father, the President of the United States, which message would be delivered to them to-morrow; that Mr. Sibley had been associated with him, and that I was a member of their father's council. The next day they assembled and the commissioners delivered their message: that their Great Father desired to purchase the St. Joseph country, for which he would give them in goods which would be worth more to them than all the lands and game. One of the war chiefs, Mitia, answered for them that they had sold to their Great Father the greater part of their lands and that they had reserved little upon which to lay the bones of their fathers, and that it was necessary to support their chiefs, women and children, and that they did not expect their Great Father would have asked them to sell.

After this we took quarters with Mr. Ramsey and A. D. Stuart, Esq., the collector.

GEORGE JULIAN HARNEY.

During the month of February England honored a man who is one of the noblest and most courageous heroes of progress and liberty—George Julian Harney, the sole survivor of the delegates of the great Chartist Convention of 1839, who during the month of February celebrated the eightieth birthday of his eventful career.

Mr. Harney's birthday was not celebrated officially, no degree of any kind, no knighthood was conferred upon him, but the people, represented by men of all factions, the Tory, the Whig, and the Labor Party, expressed their sympathy with his life's endeavor and presented him with a purse that had been collected for the octogenarian among his friends and admirers. It honors the English nation that they recognise honesty and love of liberty in a man who fought for the rights of the laborer and suffered in dungeons as a martyr of his conviction. The speeches held on this occasion are memorable, for they are concessions on both sides. The representative of Toryism has a wider heart than the labor leader would anticipate, and the old labor leader has discovered that the troubles of the poor have many causes, some of which must be located in other quarters than he had sought them. We want liberty, but we need also the right education to prove ourselves worthy of liberty. Progress is slow, and we must be patient, but for that reason we should not despair. Mankind is after all advancing, and will further advance if we are ensouled with the right aspirations.

We here reproduce a brief report of the most noteworthy sayings uttered on that memorable occasion.

Mr. Joseph Cowen speaks of the olden times in which Mr. Harney labored and suffered for freedom, as follows:¹

"When I first met Mr. Harney, he was in the prime of manhood—sanguine, intrepid, open-hearted, and confiding. It was a period of intense political ferment,

¹Quoted from a letter to H. Wonfor, Esq., published in *The Newcastle Chronicle*, of Feb. 18, 1897.

With patriotic exuberance he was endeavoring to arouse an apathetic people in the name of freedom and the rights of man, and his aspirations, energy, and fervor were illimitable.

"Fortune denied Mr. Harney the gifts of ease and opulence. He is self-made and self-reliant. He has been the slave of no patron, the drudge of no party,—neither a time-server nor a tuft-hunter. He formed his political opinions without regard for, and has acted upon them with disregard of, personal emolument and social distinction. He writes and speaks with epigrammatic terseness in plain, broad, down-right English. 'Age has not withered, nor custom staled,' his force of thought or fluent aptness of expression.

"To-day while we gather round us the memories and warnings of experience truth compels me to confess that our anticipations of a better time coming were overwrought. Political machinery has been improved, yet man thereby has little altered. Mr. Harney has not lost faith in human progress, but his hopes have been chastened. The world can never retrograde to the darkness and bondage from which it has been freed, but wider knowledge has taught him to expect less and forgive more."

Mr. Stroud, an old Tory, who had been chosen to present the birthday present of £200, collected by Mr. Harney's friends, to the octogenarian said:

"It is a little odd that it should fall as it has fallen to me—who, during all my manhood, have been and am a Tory—to make this presentation to an old Radical and Chartist. But in truth a Tory of Disraeli's school cannot choose but be in close sympathy with that genuine big Englander, which the old Radical and Chartist nearly always was, and which you, Mr. Harney, were and are in so eminent a degree. People often forget or never knew that Chartism, once regarded as a dream and sometimes advocated by hare-brained adventurers, has practically been placed on the statute book. Property qualification of members was abolished long ago, vote by ballot had long been law. Disraeli effected what nearly approaches to manhood suffrage, and our present close approximation to equal electoral districts is due in a very great measure to her Majesty's present Prime Minister. But we meet here not as politicians to greet a politician. We meet to do what little in us lies to honor an honest man and a consistent worker for Old England."

Mr. Alderman Lucas of Gateshead said: "We are not here either to criticise or defend the principles for which the Chartists contended—of which body you were one of the most able and distinguished leaders—it is only common justice to you, as the oldest, if not the sole survivor of the leaders of that popular rising, to say that another generation has arisen, who can look with more impartiality and judge with less prejudice or party bigotry the efforts made and the work accomplished by that league. It cannot but be a great satisfaction to you to know that many of the changes you so ardently advocated in your youth are now endorsed by the electors of this kingdom and have been enacted by Imperial Parliament. It is quite safe to say it would be difficult to find a single member of the House of Commons who would dare to advocate the abolition of any of the statutes which so largely embody the opinions of yourself and others, who so firmly stood in their support. It has been most truly said that a reformer is never properly or justly appreciated in his own generation. Like the sun, he is too often obscured by the mists of envy and the fogs of selfishness for his worth to be recognised. You have amid much difficulty not only striven but suffered for what you believed to be the truth. You lived in days when you were neither understood nor appreciated by great numbers, whom you were endeavoring to benefit. Your only wages were

pains and penalties, and, if you did not flee from your own country for refuge, you were driven from one city to another to seek security and a place to preach your political doctrines. You have had, however, during your times of persecution the only real and abiding satisfaction an honest public man can possess, the approval of your own conscience of the enterprise you were engaged in, the knowledge that you had no sordid objects whatever to accomplish, that you had no emoluments or office to obtain, but—actuated by a high and noble sense of public duty in times of danger to advocates of liberty—you gave your time, your body, your brains, your all to assist, according to your judgment, your fellow-men to a higher and better condition of life. You have not attained to riches or high social standing, but you have accomplished something ten thousand times more important. You have, by your example, given to the future a magnificent lesson in self-sacrifice, and you may rest safe and sure in the belief that your life and work will be a great incentive to effort in the cause of humanity in the years to come. In the literary work of various kinds, in which you have for so many years been engaged, we cannot but recognise all the indications of a mind well versed in all branches of human knowledge, in addition to great observation and large experience. In your writings you have clearly shown that a public speaker and leader of men, to live in the memory of others, must be a scholar if he desires to escape the fate of the demagogue, who lives only for the hour and seeks only the applause of the unthinking. You may rest assured that your memory will linger in many a humble dwelling and many an honest heart for generations to come."

Mr. Harney's reply is noteworthy in more than one respect. After a humorous apology for having been born in the dull month of February, Mr. Harney expressed his thanks for the gift, which was dearer to him because he knew that a great part of it consisted of small amounts coming from donors to whom 2s. 6d. were a sacrifice. He concluded his remarks as follows:

"Now that we have entered 1897, we are in the year of Queen Victoria's greater jubilee. But it is also the greater jubilee of the People's Charter, which was completed and promulgated by Lovett in 1837. We are not likely to see any jubilation over the Charter, but the chronological fact cannot be obliterated from English minds. The men who subscribed that Charter—six members of Parliament and six workingmen—are all dead, most of them many years ago.

"I have noticed some cavilling at the designation applied to me of being 'the last of the Chartists.' Well, I did not claim that designation. The term 'last' has often been and will again be applied incorrectly. We have heard many times about the last of heroes who fought under Nelson at Trafalgar and again under Wellington at Waterloo. And we are near the time—if not already in it—when we shall hear of the last of the heroes who charged at Balaclava. So when I am dead and gone, there will still be some last Chartists named, like 'more last words of Mr. Baxter.' But that cannot go on long. In one sense, however, 'the last of the Chartists' is applicable to myself, inasmuch as I am the sole survivor of the delegates who constituted the first Chartist Convention, which met on the 4th of February, 1839, at the British Coffee House, Cockspur Street—now disappeared—and subsequently at the Dr. Johnson Tavern, Bolt Court, Fleet Street.

"Of the members of the Convention I will only recall a few. First in honor comes William Lovett, the prime author of the People's Charter, and with him I couple Collins, of Birmingham. With these I put Cleave and Henry Hetherington, who led in the Warfare of the unstamped for the freedom of the press previous to the birth of Chartism. I next name James Watson and Richard Moore, Feargus

O'Connor, and Bronteric O'Brien, Dr. Taylor and Dr. McDougall, Moir of Glasgow and Marsden of Preston. These were all famous men, all dead long ago. Subsequently other leaders came to the front—James Leach, of Manchester, and John West, of Macclesfield—one embodying the strong common sense of the Saxon race, the other representing the wit and the humor of the Irish race. Two greater names must also be mentioned—Thomas Cooper and Ernest Jones, who both suffered cruelly for the cause. It seems nowadays almost incredible how these men were treated.

“I should add yet another name, that of a man who stood rather outside the Chartist movement, but aiming at higher things—the principles of Milton combined with the aspirations of Mazzini. Of course, I refer to Mr. W. J. Linton, essayist, poet, unapproachable wood engraver, and remembered at least by some of us as the chivalrous, self-sacrificing propagandist of republican principles. Mr. Linton if still living, self-exiled to the States, but, though four years my senior, is strong intellectually and physically, and happily is not obliged, as I am, to claim kinship with the Queen of Spain.

“Most of the men I have named suffered in bonds for freedom's sake, thus realising Byron's sonnet on Chillon, in which he says :

“Eternal spirit of the chainless mind,
Brightest in dungeon's liberty thou art,
For there thy habitation is the heart,—
The heart which love of thee alone can bind.
And when thy sons to fetters are consigned,
To fetters and the damp vault's dayless gloom,
Their country conquers with their martyrdom.
And freedom's fame finds wings on every mind.”

“Something was said in Mr Stroud's address and in that of Alderman Lucas of what has been accomplished, indirectly and since their time, through the influence of the Chartist agitation. I know we are in the way of being congratulated on having obtained most of the points of the Charter. Well, we have vote by ballot, no property qualification, an approximation to equal electoral districts, and a very wide extension of the suffrage. Whether we have an equally wide extension of intelligence to make a right use of the vote, is a matter I will not now discuss. Whether the present Parliament, elected on a democratic basis, is much superior to or even compares favorably with, Parliaments elected on a restricted suffrage—Parliaments that contained such men as Buller, Molesworth, Roebuck, Leader, Wakley, Duncombe, Sadler, and Lord Ashley—is doubtful. Indeed, Parliaments seems to me to have fallen into discredit. In our case we have a mob of seven hundred gentlemen, most of whom are of no earthly use, except to vote as they are directed by party leaders.

“One feature of the people's charter would have been very valuable. The country was to be divided into three hundred equal electoral districts, each returning one member. That would have given us a Parliament of three hundred members, a much more useful body, I think, than seven hundred can possibly be. There is a feeling abroad not only in this country but in others—France, Germany, Italy, the United States, and our Colonies—that Parliaments are played out, and that some better legislative machinery will have to be devised. I shall not live to see it, but that question will have to be seriously entertained by political philosophers and practical politicians.

“If, then, Parliaments are at a discount, it may be said that the Chartist agitation—which had for its object the reform of Parliaments—was so much energy

wasted. I think not. The Chartist influence extended beyond the six points, and to it we largely owe the extirpation of innumerable, some of them abominable, abuses, and a great widening of the bounds of freedom. We have not now so much to seek freedom as to conserve it, to make a good use of it, to guard against faddists, who would bring us under new restrictions as bad or perhaps worse than the old.

"I do not attach supreme importance to any form of Government. All forms have had their uses and merits at particular times. But all have failed to bring us even near to that perfectibility of man, which was the beautiful dream of so many good men and so many eloquent writers a little over a hundred years ago. To conclude, my philosophy of government is to be summed up in two lines of Byron, which I trust true friends of genuine liberty will never forget :

" I wish men to be free,
As much from mobs as kings, from you as me."

COMMERCIAL MORALITY.

Few things more valuable or more relevant to the ethical needs of the day have appeared anywhere than the articles in *The Open Court* on the " Doctrines of Buddha." There is newness in the wholesome ethics of *Karma* nobler than the familiar Christian teaching, which seems second-hand, egotistical and stale by the side of it. The late Lord Derby said: " The greatest British interest is peace." Should we not rather say the greatest interest of mankind is morality? and commercial morality constitutes a greater part of the life and glory of a nation.

Some information as to how we in England stand in this respect will be relevant, and possibly interesting to *Open Court* readers.

We have an Ethical Society which gives lectures at Essex Hall, Strand, in the city of London. I lately heard one there, lured by the name of Augustine Birrell, a member of Parliament, who is always original, with flashes of humor and wit, and is wisely entertaining. But I on this occasion found him surprising—in what he did not say. Discussion was permitted, but no information was supplied whether it was expected or merely tolerated; whether it was regarded as a right or an interruption. No information was given to the audience upon the subject, or I should have asked the lecturer for the expression of some additional opinion beyond what he vouchsafed.

The lecturer began by remarks upon the Sermon upon the Mount, which he told us contained precepts the common sense of mankind regarded as absurd and impracticable. I should like to have asked whether Mr. Birrell did not think it a great misfortune that one who was regarded as a divine teacher should have brought morality into contempt by putting forth precepts which the world must ignore if society is to exist. Bishop Magee had said this in a famous speech, and subsequently defended his representation. At the conclusion of his lecture Mr. Birrell extolled Christ as the flawless, unsurpassed, transcendent moral teacher of mankind; but as so many other speakers in pulpit and on platform do this, it did not strike me as strange, nor yet did I think it ethical.

My surprise came in later. Mr. Birrell's subject was " City Morality." As I had never heard of it, I was very desirous of learning in what it consisted. He said that the morality of the city accepted the principle that in commerce it is justifiable in the seller to withhold any information which the buyer could find out for himself. How can the ordinary buyer find out whether food, or drugs, or garments are adulterated; whether there is shoddy in his coat or pasteboard under the soles

of his boots, or whether colors will fade, and a thousand things from which nothing but honesty and candor in the seller can save the purchaser. The motto of the city, Mr. Birrell said, was, "Let the buyer beware of the seller." This seemed to me to be the motto of knaves, and I told the International Co-operative Congress in Paris the other day that this motto implied that behind every counter there probably stood a knave. The tradesman may be an honest man, and often is, who would not cheat by his speech, but he may by his silence. This is competitive morality. Mr. Birrell did not seem to be aware that there was a large commercial house in the city, a branch of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, whose business transactions amount now to nearly a million a month, whose principle it is to make known to the purchaser anything known to the vendor which the purchaser ought to know. This rule is in the laws of all British co-operative stores. Why should the morality of city gentlemen be lower than that of workingmen co-operators?

Afterwards I took an opportunity of asking Mr. Birrell whether I rightly understood him as saying "that the morality of the city accepted the principle that in commerce it is justifiable to withhold any information which the customer or buyer could find out for himself." Though Quain professor of law in the London University, with parliamentary and other duties, he courteously made time or found time to tell me that :

"The rule *caveat emptor*, when it is applicable, covers *silence*. A vendor, if he opens his mouth, must not *lie* (as distinguished from mere puffing), but he may hold his peace unless indeed the *defect* is a concealed one. The rule also applies in favor of the buyer. Suppose an estate is put up for sale with a valuable mine underneath it, of the existence of which the purchaser is, and the vendor is not, cognisant ; a contract for the sale and purchase of the estate would be binding. Mr. Justice Story states the law thus : 'The general rule, both of law and equity, in respect to concealment, is that mere silence with regard to a material fact which there is not legal obligation to divulge, will not avoid a contract though it operate as an injury to the party from whom it is concealed.'

"In a well known case the late Mr. Justice Blackburn says : 'A mere abstinence from disabuse to the purchaser of an inaccurate impression is not fraud or deceit, for whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there is no legal obligation in the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake *not induced by the act of the vendor*.'

"In certain cases there is an obligation to disclose : (1) Where a fiduciary relationship exists (*agent* and *principal*, *solicitor* and *client*, *trustee* and *beneficiary*)

"(2) Certain contracts are from their character considered as Marine Insurance Partnerships. In these cases full disclosure must be made of all material facts. In other words, in these cases the law adopts the *moral* view up to the hilt ; but in the other cases it takes the view that people must look out for themselves and that though it is illegal to cheat people, there is no harm in allowing people to cheat themselves."

These were the legal grounds which Mr. Birrell explained to his audience as the law of city morality by which we were all instructed. But my surprise was that he uttered no word against the commercial morality of fraud by silence. Is it not the very business of an ethical lecture, given in the name of an ethical society, to show us not only what *is* but what *ought* to be ? If an ethical lecturer does not do this, who is likely to do it, and to whom are we to look for the lessons which shall impart honesty to commerce and raise it above the level of war or fraud ?

G. J. HOLYOAKE.

RATZEL'S HISTORY OF MANKIND.

The interest in the study of mankind is constantly increasing, and in response to the extraordinary demand for reliable information, Macmillan & Co. are now making accessible to the English reading public a standard work on anthropology, the *Völkerkunde* of Prof. Friedrich Ratzel. However excellent the works of Profs. Waitz and Tylor are, they are far surpassed by Ratzel's *Völkerkunde* in the point of numerous and carefully selected illustrations, which, after all, in this science, are quite indispensable. Considering the cost of both the colored and uncolored illustrations, which are executed in a highly artistic style, the price of the English translation (which is \$4.00 for the first volume) is remarkably cheap, and will no doubt contribute much to make the book popular. We must also mention that the English edition promises to be an improvement on the German edition. A comparison of the first volume, which is now before us, with the original German edition, proves that the condensations have been made with great care and without omitting anything that even a specialist would miss.

Anthropological exhibitions have done much to popularise the youngest sister of the sciences. The Paris exhibition of 1889 set the first example of this kind by exhibiting villages of various French dependencies, of Algiers as well as of other countries, and presented in a series of buildings a systematic history of human dwellings; the Chicago World's Fair surpassed the French anthropological exhibits and established regular scientific departments under the supervision of specialists, even holding an anthropological congress, the proceedings of which were edited by Mr. C. Staniland Wake. The examples set by Paris and Chicago were imitated in Europe, where Bremen distinguished itself by a most valuable anthropological exhibition, which proved of such an extraordinary interest that the city decided to provide the necessary funds for establishing a permanent museum.

While the facts of anthropology come more and more within the reach of the people, there naturally rises the demand for a better comprehension of their significance, and this has been nowhere better met than in Ratzel's *Völkerkunde*. The average philistine meandering through an anthropological museum is apt to smile at the half-naked savages and their crude instruments, but when he learns more of their condition and considers what he himself would be without the advantages of modern civilisation he will begin to cherish a high opinion of the courage and skill of the South Sea Islander, who in his boat boldly ventures on voyages of hundreds of miles and more without a compass, steering through seas where the smallness of the islands makes it possible for even a European vessel, if missing her goal by only a few miles, to easily pass it by. Ratzel says:

"The taking of proper bearings is of double importance in this ocean, in which the individual islands are often so far apart and so low-lying that one is astonished that they were ever found. Many islands in the Pacific were discovered for the first time in the present century. The islanders are keen observers of the stars, and have names for a good list of them. They distinguish eight quarters of the heavens and winds to match. In their conception of the world the ocean is imagined as being everywhere full of islands, which helps to explain their daring voyages. They even inscribe their geographical knowledge upon maps, but while on these the bearings are to some extent correct, the distances are given very inaccurately. In the Ralick group the preparation of maps from small straight and bent sticks, representing routes, currents, and islands, is a secret art among the chiefs. The Marshall Islanders also possess a map of their own, made up of little sticks

and stones, showing the whole group. On their greater enterprises they go to sea in a thoroughly systematic way; the longer voyages of from 500 to 1,000 nautical miles are undertaken only in squadrons comprising at least fifteen canoes, commanded by a chief who has one or more pilots to advise him. Without compass, chart, or lead, and with but limited knowledge of the stars, these men contrive to make their distant point. On their voyages they steadily observe the angle made by the canoe with the run of the sea caused by the trade wind, which, north of the equator, blows steadily from the northeast. The use of this run, which remains constant even with shifting winds, has been brought by the native pilots to great refinement. The ocean currents are also no less well known to them by experience, so that they are able to take this also into consideration in laying their course. As a general rule, in order to get the largest possible field of view, the squadron proceeds in line in which the individual canoes are so widely separated that they can only communicate by signal. By this progress on a wide front they avoid the danger of sailing past the island they are looking for. During the night the squadron closes in. This whole style of navigation contradicts the supposition that before the invention of the compass only coasting voyages were undertaken."

We have spoken of the South Sea Islanders' skill in seafaring as a striking instance of the ingenuity of our brethren on a lower stage of civilisation, upon whom we look down as savages; we ought to know, however, that we shall discover interesting symptoms of genius also in other occupations and among other nations. We must not forget that our civilisation is but the perfection of the aspirations of our savage ancestors. Their inventions of the wheel, the needle, the boat, are the indispensable basis upon which our modern Edisons and Teslas take their stand. Their thoughts and happy guesses are still living in the brains of the generation of to-day, and will remain immortal presences as long as mankind is destined to exist.

Religion is perhaps the most important chapter of anthropology, and Professor Ratzel has not neglected it. We would, nevertheless, have preferred a more elaborate and systematic treatment of this subject by classifying myths and rendering their comparison easy. There are two chapters devoted to religion (pp. 38-65 and 300-330). Ratzel recognises that religion is everywhere connected with man's craving for causality and is ever on the lookout for the cause or the causes of everything that comes to pass. No race is devoid of religion, and even those of whom missionaries have reported that their minds are a *tabula rasa* in religious matters are found to be in possession of appellations for God, the Devil, spirits, and souls. There are no people on earth, be they ever so savage, who have not crude ideas of a spiritual world. The savage's ideas of the origin of the world, of a deluge, of stealing the fire against the will of the God, of a fall from a prior state of undisturbed happiness and immortality, hero-worship, etc., reappear in forms that show striking resemblances among nations of distant continents, and we cannot help thinking that most of these legends originated independently.

While among the lowest savages the gods are little better, both in power and in morality, than they themselves, the idea of one God and Creator unfailingly looms up in the minds of more advanced people. We are sometimes struck by an unexpected profundity of thought. But, says Professor Ratzel:

"The profundity of the thought must not be measured by the imperfection of the expression. In considering a mythology like the Polynesian, it must not be overlooked that this multiform weft of legend is often less like clear speech than like the prattle of a child, and that one has more often to attend to the What? than to the How? Often a similarity of sound, an echo, suffices the sport-

ive fancy of these people as an attachment for far-reaching threads. The same aspect of a supra-sensual relation looks far more impressive on the parchment of some manuscript of a Greek poet than in the oral tradition of a Polynesian or African priest or sorcerer. But if we try to extract the more intelligible sentences in the prattle of the savage we get a picture which is in its essence not far inferior to the more adorned poetical expression. Let us compare a Hawaiian legend of the under-world with its parallels in Greek mythology. A certain chief, inconsolable for the loss of his wife, obtained from his priest, in answer to his prayers, the company of the chieftain's god as his guide into the kingdom of Milu. They journeyed to the end of the world, where they found a tree which was split; on this they slid down to the lower regions. The god hid himself behind a rock, and after smearing the chief with an ill-smelling oil, sent him forward by himself. On reaching Milu's palace he found the court filled with a crowd of spirits (*Akua*), who were so engrossed in their game that he was able to join them unobserved. When they did notice him they took him for a newly-arrived soul, and jeered at him for a stinking ghost who had stayed too long by his putrefying body. After all kinds of games had been played, they had to think of another, and the chief suggested that they should all pluck out their eyes and throw them together in a heap. No sooner said than done; but the chief took care to observe which way Milu's eyes went. He caught them in the air and hid them in his coco-nut cup. As they were now all blind, he succeeded in escaping to the kingdom of Wakea, where Milu's hosts might not set foot. After long negotiations with the chief, now under the protection of Wakea, Milu got his eyes back, on condition of releasing the soul of the chief's wife. It returned to earth and was reunited to its body."

Among the Gods of the South Sea Islanders there is one who is closely connected with cosmogony; "this is Tangaroa, who is revered even in remoter islands as *Taaroa* and *Kanaloa*. A Raiatean legend gives a grand picture of his all-pervading power; how at first, concealed in an egg-shaped shell, he hovered around in the dark space of air, until weary of the monotonous movement, he stretched forth his hands and rose upright, and all became light around him. He looked down to the sand on the seashore and said: 'Come up hither.' The sand replied: 'I cannot fly to thee in the sky.' Then he said to the rocks: 'Come up hither to me.' They answered: 'We are rooted in the ground, and cannot leap on high to thee.' So the god came down to them, flung off his shell, and added it to the mass of the earth, which became greater thereby. From the sherds of the shell were made the islands. Then he formed men out of his back, and turned himself into a boat. As he rowed in the storm, space was filled with his blood, which gave its color to the sea, and, spreading from the sea to the air, made the morning and evening glows. At last his skeleton, as it lay on the ground with the backbone uppermost, became an abode for all gods, and at the same time the model for the temple; and Tangaroa became the sky."

Tangaroa (or Taaroa) is worshipped under different forms among the various islands; sometimes his main character seems to be that of a Sea God and then again as the Sun God; but everywhere he is regarded with special reverence (even where he changes into an evil deity, as in Hawaii), and called the Uncreated and the Survivor of the age of night. A hymn praising Taaroa's omnipresence is one of those flashes of profundity that are apt to astonish the thinker of a more advanced civilisation. It reads as follows:

" Taaroa like the seed ground,
Taaroa, rock's foundation,

Taaroa, like the sea-sand,
 Taaroa, widest spreading,
 Taaroa, light forth-breaking,
 Taaroa rules within us,
 Taaroa all around us,
 Taaroa down beneath us,
 Taaroa, lord of wisdom."

NOTES AND BOOK REVIEWS.

THE LAW OF CIVILISATION AND DECAY. An Essay on History. By *Brooks Adams*,
 New York: The Macmillan Co. 1896. Price, \$2.00.

In this attractive essay Mr. Adams has attempted to give a running sketch of the causes which have concurred in the building up of the chief ancient and modern civilisations, and assisted in their eventual decay. He makes the rather broad claim that the theories of his book are the effect and not the cause of the way in which the facts have unfolded themselves. He has been the mere rational mirror, so to speak, in which the facts have been gathered to a logical focus. Opponents of the conclusion which he has reached will possibly be of the opposite opinion.

It cannot be gainsaid but his book is a very interesting one, nor disputed that he has clearly traced the red thread of development which it has been his desire to emphasise. The politics, commerce, religion, and partly also the literature of the various ages of the world are made to pass before our minds in succinct, rapid succession with their chief characteristics distinctly marked, and all these features are skilfully made to illuminate the central theme which the author seeks to establish. He upholds such themes as that commerce is antagonistic to the imagination, as witnessed by the universal decay of architecture in Europe after the great commercial expansion of the thirteenth century; that the centralisation of power generally, expressing itself in accumulated wealth, and the subsequent contraction of money, is conducive to moral and political decline, and that it is pre-eminently the growth of the money lender and his type which has brought on the ruin of all the civilised nations. There is a law, the author claims, governing history, comparable to the physical law of energy. Concentration follows expansion; economic competition dissipates the energy amassed by war; and decline, with a possible renovation by new races, follows.

The conclusions to which the book points smack distinctly of the free-silver movement (although apparently this is a side issue), and economic agitators of the latter type will find much plausible material here in support of their tenets. Upon the whole the book has marks of scholarship, and its subject is facilely presented. *μ.*

DIE LEBENSANSCHAUNGEN DER GROSSEN DENKER. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Lebensproblems der Menschheit von Plato bis zur Gegenwart. Von *Rudolf Eucken*. Zweite, umgearbeitete Auflage. Leipzig: Veit & Co. 1897. Pages, 492. Price, 10 M.

Professor Eucken's works are throughout characterised by profound historical scholarship and by a distinct sense for the practical problems of philosophy. His writings upon terminology and upon the ideas that dominate modern thought,—his book (recently reviewed in *The Monist*) upon the modern struggle for a fitting spiritual groundwork of existence, are not alone mere hives of erudition but give evidence of a signal individual bent for applying the results of research to the needs of practical intellectual life, quite refreshing in an age where the shibboleth of research

for the sake of research has still so many upholders. Hand in hand with this runs an unflinching insistence upon the religious and ideal bearing of philosophy, to which Professor Eucken has borne fresh and splendid witness in the present volume.

The second edition of the *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker* is practically a new work. Thoroughly revised and remodelled, it is at once an introduction and a supplement to existing methodical histories of philosophy, without making any pretense of supplanting them. It appeals to all cultured readers, welding the world with which they are familiar with the thought by which the great masters have sought to compass it. A specimen of the manner in which Professor Eucken has treated his materials may be approximately gained, barring the force and naturalness of his original style, from his appreciation of Hegel in the latest number of *The Monist*. So, and at times more richly, more feelingly, and more fully, he runs the gamut of the great thinkers from Plato to the moderns, not omitting the religious teachers, Jesus, Luther, and the rest, and even going beyond his path to consider the influence of a few eminent scientists. If every man who has the destiny of a nation, a city, or a home to shape, could bear some such record as this in his breast, how much more easily the problems of the world and life would lend themselves to solution!¹

μκρκ.

There are a number of new labor papers in the field, advocating various social theories for the purpose of curing all the evils that ail us. □ An English monthly, *The Social Democrat*, advocates socialism as expounded by Marx, Engels, and Hyndman, but is not free from the slang of demagogism. A new German anarchist paper, *Ohne Staat*, is published in Budapest. Another paper, *The Labor Exchange*, edited by De Bernardi, propounds a new monetary system called "labor exchange," which, if adopted, will speedily right the wrongs which exist in society, for money is said to be the root of all evil.

In consideration of the great importance of the problem of money, would it not be advisable to spread even in schools a sound knowledge of the elementary laws that underlie the use of money; and this must be done in times of a relative political rest. Should there be another campaign which would divide our parties on the test question of the monetary problem, it might be too late to infuse the necessary knowledge into the masses of the people. We cannot afford to neglect the crank notions which grow up in the minds of the people. We cannot silence them and ought not to treat them with contempt. We have to educate the people and furnish them the knowledge of financial laws in an accurate but popular and simple form. The worst about it is that wrong ideas concerning the nature of money are spread among the most influential political and even financial leaders, and the crisis which has come upon us in the last campaign is mostly due to the mistakes of previous legislation. Nor can it be said that the errors are no longer continued. The discrimination which has again been made of late between two kinds of promises to pay—the promise to pay in gold and the promise to pay in legal tender—is one of the evidences that our financial system is not as yet based upon the right principle. It is a very expensive system and would have made many another country bankrupt. The appointment of Mr. Lyman J. Gage, President of the First National Bank of Chicago, however, is a very promising symptom that we shall see better days, and that the government of the United States will endeavor to rid the nation of the ambiguity that is attached to its currency. But the educational methods

¹See the Preface to one of the volumes of Professor Jodl's *Geschichte der Ethik*, as to the latent unused power which the literature of every nation contains for its salvation.

should not be neglected ; and it might be advisable to offer a prize for the soundest treatise on money written in the simplest language. We must always bear in mind that a popular government can only be maintained on the supposition that the masses of the people are sufficiently intelligent to understand the main principles of political economy, and one of the most important questions has always been and always will remain, the question of money.

The Swâmi Vivekânanda has recently published a book on the *Yoga Philosophy* (Lectures delivered in New York, Longmans) which will be warmly greeted by delvers in Indian lore as well as by Christian scientists generally. It is devoted to the exposition of the Râja Yoga or royal Yoga, which signifies the royal method of conquering our internal nature and so of liberating the soul through perfection, and is based on the Sâmkhya philosophy, the chief expression of which are the Sûtras (aphorisms) of Patanjali, published as an appendix to this same work. Mingled with many acute, thoughtful, and noble maxims for the attainment of spiritual and hygienic discipline, there is much in the Yoga practise and theory which appears to us Western people naïve nonsense. We can understand the effect which correct breathing and posture have upon the mind, can even stomach, allegorically speaking, the "coiled-up energy" of the triangular lotus Kuṇḍalinī, which lies at the base of Susumnâ, the hollow canal in the spinal cord ; but the pithecanthropic mummery, colloquially called monkey-business, connected with closing one nostril and breathing through the other and then of closing both till the compressed columnar air-current is imagined to bump against the triangular fundament of Kuṇḍalinī, thus ultimately arousing the latter gentleman and freeing the canal Susumnâ, whence issueth serenity and wisdom—all this we say is quite beyond the Western reach. Not having practised these exercises, we are of course subject to error in our judgment upon them. But even granting they reach their desired end, we think their efficacy is covered by the simple truth that *all* discipline and self-control lead to enlightenment. Personally we prefer to turn to the beautiful sentiments on religion and on life, with which the Râja Yoga is full, and to which Mr. Vivekânanda seems to have imparted new lustre and profundity. On this score we can cordially commend the book. μ.

The *Hansei Kwaï* is a Japanese Buddhist society devoted to the promotion of morality, charity, reform, upon the basis of scientific investigation and mission work. They have their headquarters in Kyoto, with six branch societies, and claim 21,000 members. Their official organ, the *Hansei Zasshi* is now in its twelfth volume, and will, for the sake of reaching the Western world, be published forthwith in English and Russian. The first number of the twelfth volume opens with an editorial setting forth the programme of the *Hansei Kwaï*, a brief statistical article on the Buddhist sects of Japan and an article on the source of Japanese art. The frontispiece, representing cranes in the forest, is a photogravure of a dainty Japanese painting. Terms of subscription, 3 yens (about \$1.50); Address H. Hara, 10 Nishikata-Machi, Tokyo, Japan.

The article "Chicago and Its Administration" in this number is to be read at the Woman's South Side Study Club of Chicago, whose president is Mrs. Edward Roby. Its distinguished author would have read it personally had he not been called to Washington to serve as Secretary of the Treasury.

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Editor: DR. PAUL CARUS,
Assistant Editor: T. J. McCORMACK.

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
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Elisabet Ney, Sculpt.

Frankfurt a. M. d. 2. Dec.
1859.
Arthur Schopenhauer

The signature is from Elisabet Ney's autograph copy of Schopenhauer's works.

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THE PROPHET OF PESSIMISM.

BY THE EDITOR.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER was born at Dantzig, Feb. 22, 1788, the son of a well-to-do merchant. His father had destined him for a business career, and placed him in the office of a Dantzig broker. The youth, however, had higher ambitions. After his father's death he began the serious study of philosophy, which he pursued at the universities of Göttingen, Jena, and Berlin. He took his degree, in 1813, with a dissertation on causality in which he distinguished four kinds of causes, which he called *principium rationis sufficientis*, (1) *fiendi*, (2) *cognoscendi*, (3) *essendi*, and (4) *agendi*; i. e., the principle of a sufficient reason for (1) becoming, (2) for comprehending, (3) for being, and (4) for acting. His main work *The World as Will and Representation* was completed in 1818, in the same year the fundamental work of his great rival Hegel was given to the public. Schopenhauer settled in Berlin as a *Privatdocent* of the university, but failing both in attracting disciples and in obtaining a professorship, he withdrew from university circles and led from 1831 on, a retired life in Frankfort on the Main, where he wrote his second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, in the form of additions to the various chapters of the first volume, and several other books among which the best known are *On the Will in Nature* (1836), *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics* (1841), and *Parerga and Paralipomena*, a collection of popular articles on realism and idealism, religion, university philosophers, the vanity of existence, the indestructibility of our being, women, worldly wisdom, etc., etc., all of them full of bitterness and disdain of the world and everything in general, especially the philosophy professors of the German universities, Hegel at their head, in particular.

Hegel was the man of the day during Schopenhauer's life-time,

and when Hegel's fame began to wane Schopenhauer's came to the front. His influence increased until he became the most popular philosopher in Germany, and it is only of late that his philosophy begins to lose its hold on the people in the Fatherland. But his star is now rising among the English speaking races, and his works are being made accessible to the public in good translations.

Schopenhauer's merit consists in having called attention to the main problem of philosophy, "Is life worth living?" And he will perhaps for all time to come remain the classical representative of that philosophy which answers this question in the negative. There can be no doubt about it that Schopenhauer exercises upon immature minds a baneful influence, but we must at the same time recognise that he raised a problem which demands a solution. It is the great religious problem, it is the *Œdipus* question as to the purpose of man's life.

* * *

Schopenhauer's philosophy is characterised by two words, Idealism and Pessimism. The objective reality of the world is will, which appears in the stone as gravity, in the chemical elements as affinity, in man as a desire to be, manifesting itself in his various intentions and actions. The reverse of the medal is the realm of subjective existence, which is the world as we intuit it, as we picture it in representations or ideas. It is, in appearance, extending outside of us in space; this world, such as it lives in our conception, Schopenhauer calls the world as it is represented, *die Welt als Vorstellung*, and it is mere representation, not reality. Space is a function of the conceiving mind, and with it the whole material universe is nothing but thought, idea, imagination, a heavy dream. The sole difference between objective existence and dreams consists, according to Schopenhauer, in the continuity of the former and the discontinuity of the latter.

We do not intend here to criticise the weak points in Schopenhauer's system; they become more apparent to those who are not personally interested in his peculiar dislikes and can therefore judge his denunciations with impartiality. The notion that causation has a fourfold root is on the very face erroneous, for there is only one kind of causation, which is the law of change, and every change is a transformation that produces a new arrangement, leaving in the whole system the same amount of matter and energy as before. While there are not several causes, there is a difference between the *cause* which is the *primum movens* in a process of transformation, and the *reason why* this cause takes effect. The cause

is one definite fact, an event, an act that happens; the reason why it happens is a natural law, a description and explanation concerning the interconnexion of things. The reason why, is not a single fact but a universal truth. Further, while there are not several roots of causation, there are several kinds or species, according to the various reasons that condition the effectiveness of the cause. In mechanics the cause takes effect according to mechanical laws, in chemistry according to the affinity of the elements, in the lower domain of physiology, in plants, and in unconscious animal movements according to the nature of a physiological irritation, and in psychology according to the significance of representative signs, according to ideas and the meaning that ensouls words. These kinds of causation, however, are not comparable to so many roots but to branches.

The popularity of Schopenhauer is certainly not due to his idealism which is quite unintelligible to average readers, who constitute his most zealous disciples. It is based upon unproved declamations as to the non-existence of space and time and of the whole material universe in their objective reality, which are declared to be mere representations. This proposition is mixed with a belief in the genuineness of various phenomena of mysticism, such as telepathy, second sight, magic, etc.; for Schopenhauer's Will is, like the Creator, omnipotent and omnipresent; the Will can at pleasure produce worlds out of nothing; it can produce effects at the most distant places, and its vision is not veiled by the illusion of time. In spite of the spiritualistic tendencies of this view, Schopenhauer advocates an almost crude materialism which regards matter as the thing-in-itself, the bearer of the metaphysical will, and the source of all life. It is quite natural that a philosopher who himself lacks all system and consistency should exhibit a sovereign contempt for everybody who tries to treat philosophical problems in a methodical way. Yet, with all his faults, Schopenhauer is great in his incidental remarks, and even in his worst and most undignified aberrations when he rails like an old scold at the school-philosophers, impugning their honesty, he remains fascinating and becomes sometimes even refreshing.

By far of greater importance than his theoretical philosophy is Schopenhauer's pessimism which draws its power from the misery of life, such as it actually exists, pointing out that its presence is an intrinsic and unavoidable feature of existence. What a fund of truth, one-sided though it may be, lies in the following description of human fate (*Die W. a. W. u. V.*, Vol. II., Chap. 46):

“Having awakened to life from the night of unconsciousness, the will finds itself as an individual in an endless and boundless world among innumerable individuals, all striving, suffering, erring; and as though passing through an ominous, uneasy dream, it hurries back to the old unconsciousness. Until then, however, its desires are boundless, its claims inexhaustible, and every satisfied wish begets a new one. No satisfaction possible in the world could suffice to still its longings, put a final end to its cravings, and fill the bottomless abyss of its heart. Consider, too, what gratifications of every kind man generally receives: they are usually nothing more than the meagre preservation of this existence itself, daily gained by incessant toil and constant care, in battle against want, with death forever in the van. Everything in life indicates that earthly happiness is destined to be frustrated or to be recognised as an illusion. The conditions of this lie deep in the nature of things. Accordingly, the life of most of us proves sad and short. The comparatively happy are usually only apparently so, or are, like long-lived persons rare exceptions—left as a bait for the rest.

“Life proves a continued deception, in great as well as in small matters. If it makes a promise, it does not keep it, unless to show that the coveted object was little desirable. Thus sometimes hope, sometimes the fulfilment of hope, deludes us. Whenever it gives, it is but to take away. The fascination of distance presents a paradise, vanishing like an optic illusion when we have allowed ourselves to be enticed thither. Happiness accordingly lies always in the future or in the past; and the present is to be compared to a small dark cloud which the wind drives over a sunny plain. Before it and behind it all is bright, it alone casts a shadow. The present therefore is forever unsatisfactory; the future uncertain; the past irrecoverable. Life with its hourly, daily weekly, and yearly small, greater, and great adversities, with its disappointed hopes and mishaps foiling all calculation, bears so plainly the character of something we should become disgusted with, that it is difficult to comprehend how any one could have mistaken this and been persuaded that life was to be thankfully enjoyed, and man was destined to be happy. On the contrary the everlasting delusion and disappointment as well as the constitution of life throughout, appear as though they were intended and calculated to awaken the conviction that nothing whatever is worthy of our striving, driving, and wrestling, that all goods are naught, the world bankrupt at all ends, and life a business that does not pay expenses,—so that our will may turn away from it.

“The manner in which this vanity of all the aims and objects of the will reveals itself, is, in the first place, time. Time is the form by means of which the vanity of things appears as transitoriness; since through time all our enjoyments and pleasures come to naught; and we afterward ask in astonishment what has become of them. Accordingly our life resembles a payment which we receive in copper pence, and which at last we must receipt. The pence are the days, death the receipt. For at last, time proclaims the sentence of nature’s judgment upon the worth of all beings by destroying them.

‘And justly so; for all things from the void
Called forth, deserve to be destroyed.
‘Twere better, then, were naught created.’—*Goethe*.

“Age and death, to which every life necessarily hurries, are the sentence of condemnation upon the will to live, passed by nature herself, which declares that this will is a striving that must frustrate itself. ‘What thou hast willed,’ it says, ‘ends thus; will something better!’

“The lessons which each one learns from life consist, on the whole, in this, that the objects of his wishes constantly delude, shake, and fall; consequently



SCHOPENHAUER IN 1852.

From two daguerreotypes, highly prized by Schopenhauer, now in the possession of Elisabet Ney. They represent the sitting when Schopenhauer drank the historical bottle of wine to remove his wonted lugubrious and pessimistic cast of countenance.



From two photographs in the possession of Dr. Lindorme, of Chicago. Date unknown.

they bring more torment than pleasure, until at length even the whole ground upon which they all stand gives way, inasmuch as life itself is annihilated. Thus he receives the last confirmation that all his striving and willing were a blunder and an error.

'Then old age and experience, hand in hand,
Lead him to death, and make him understand,
After a search so painful and so long
That all his life he has been in the wrong.'

"Whatever may be said to the contrary, the happiest moment of the happiest mortal is still the moment he falls asleep, as the unhappiest moment of the unhappiest mortal the moment he awakens. Lord Byron says :

'Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free,
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better not to be.'"

"It is indeed incredible how stale and empty are the fates of most people, how dull and heedless are all their feelings and thoughts. Their lives consist of flabby longing, and pining, of dreamy reeling through the seven ages to death, and this is accompanied with a number of trivial thoughts. They are like clocks wound up to go and do not know why. Each time when a man is born the clock is wound up again to play off the same hackneyed tune, bar for bar, measure for measure, with unimportant variations." (*Ibid.*, *Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. I., p. 379.)

Or, take the following on the misery of life :

"Nobody is exactly to be envied, but those who are to be pitied are innumerable. . . . Animals are more satisfied in their mere existence than we; the plant is quite satisfied; but man only in the degree of his obtuseness. . . . A happy life is impossible; the highest that a man can attain to is the fate of a hero."

Schopenhauer the idealist will be forgotten, but Schopenhauer the pessimist will survive for all time to come. The misery of life has never before found a more eloquent prophet, and here he finds himself in touch with the two great religions of the world, Buddhism and Christianity. Schopenhauer is an enemy of religion. His article on religion is perhaps the severest and keenest criticism that has ever been made. He hates priests and hierarchical institutions as much as, if not more than, womankind. And yet when he comes to speak of Buddhism and Christianity he does not conceal his profound admiration for the spirit that pervades these two creeds. He regards Buddhism as the purer faith of the two, but Christianity, too, ranges according to his philosophy high above the noblest humanity of the Greek civilisation. The Greeks, he says, were mere children when compared to the age that revealed the truths of Christianity whose symbol is the cross, an instrument of torture and ignominy, employed by the ancients only for putting to death the most contemptible criminals and slaves. Schopenhauer says of Christianity :

"The centre and core of Christianity is the doctrine of the fall of man, of original sin, of the perdition of our natural state, and the corruption of the natural

man, which is connected with the vicarious atonement through the Saviour which is gained by faith. But this characterises Christianity as pessimism. It is therefore opposed to the optimism of the Jewish religion and to Islam, the oldest child of Judaism; but kin to Brahmanism and Buddhism.

"That all have sinned and are condemned in Adam, and that all have been saved in the Saviour, expresses the truth that the real being of man and the root of his existence does not lie in the individual but in the species which as the Platonic idea of man is laid out in its temporal appearance in individuals."—*Parerga and Paralipomena*, Vol. II., § 181.

"Human existence, far from being a boon, is like a debt which we have contracted . . . our life is the payment of the interest of this debt, the payment of the sum itself is made in death. . . . That Christianity regards life in the same light appears from a passage of Luther's comments on the Epistle to the Galatians. 'We all are however in our bodies and possessions subject to the Devil, and are guests only in the world whose lord and god he is. Thus the bread which we eat, the drink which we drink, the garments which we wear, even the air and everything on which we live in the flesh, is under his government.' So far Luther. People complain about the dreariness of my philosophy. The reason is this: instead of proclaiming a future hell as the result of sin, I claim that in this world here, wherever there is guilt, there must be something like hell."—*Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. II., pp. 665-666.

Schopenhauer is one of the most notable characters among the philosophers of the world. His faults are gross and obvious; his vanity (it is most obtrusively displayed in his letters) is ridiculous; his practical hedonism forms a strong contrast to his theoretical contempt of pleasure. Nonetheless, he is great and deserves fully the attention which he receives. His sentiments are deep, and he has experienced in his own bosom the shallowness of joy in every form. Read Schopenhauer, and you will no longer be able to adhere to the traditional optimism which found its best representative in no less a man than Leibnitz. If pleasure is the purpose of life, the goal that must be striven for, then indeed the world is a failure, and life is not worth living.

Schopenhauer appreciates Buddhism and Christianity, because these religions recognise the existence of misery and the need of salvation; but Schopenhauer, the pessimist, has opened his eyes to the first part of the truth only proclaimed by the Buddha and the Christ; he overlooks the other and more important part. Schopenhauer agrees with Buddha that there is misery in the world, and that there is a cause for misery, which is our thirst for individualisation, our desire, our lust. These are the first and second of the four noble truths. But he blinds himself to the third and the fourth, which proclaims there is salvation from misery and that the eightfold noble path of righteousness unfailingly leads to the attainment of salvation. Schopenhauer believes in the cross

only as a symbol of martyrdom, not as the token in which sin is conquered and death trodden under foot; he knows nothing of the higher life that is gained by him who surrenders the vanity fair of the world and all selfishness, for the sake of laying up spiritual treasures that are incorruptible and not subject to decay. There is a glimpse of this realm of the higher life in his discussion of art and Platonic ideas, but he fails to recognise in it the consummation of life and the aim of evolution. There is no evolution, according to Schopenhauer; Lamarck and Darwin are in his opinion two queer ignoramuses, and everything that is great or noble is, if we abide by Schopenhauer's verdict, abnormal and out of place. Genius and virtue are not qualities that adorn man with some special and rare perfections, but render him unfit for life and change him into a lunatic who deserves both admiration and pity. The world, according to Schopenhauer, is a place for brutal people, for fools, and knaves; it leaves no room for beauty, wisdom, and morality.

* * *

In fine: we do not agree with Schopenhauer, but we appreciate the importance of his philosophy. A study of his works is the best cure for the old optimism so common among large masses of the unthinking who go through life without ever reflecting upon the significance of the duties that it imposes, believing that pleasure is the highest good, and that ethics is nothing but a calculation of how to secure for the greatest number the maximum amount of happiness. We reject optimism, but for that reason we do not accept pessimism. Pessimism is right only in the face of optimism. If life's purpose be the realisation of pleasure, then life is a failure. But for that reason, it is still wrong to proclaim that life is not worth living. Meliorism denies the premise of both optimism and pessimism, that the purpose of life is pleasure. Meliorism looks upon life as an opportunity for realising the higher spiritual life of moral ideals, of scientific aspirations, of the attainment of art. What is all the misery of life in comparison to that bliss which is perceived by those who are instruments in the actualisation of the good, the true, the beautiful, a bliss unattainable to those who brutelike cling to their particular egoity, and become at last the spoil of death.

Pessimism is deeper than optimism, it is a higher and more advanced stage in the recognition of truth. But Pessimism is only a state of transition which opens our eyes to a better, a truer, and nobler conception of life: it leads to meliorism.

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JEWS SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM BABYLON.

BY THE REV. BERNHARD PICK, PH. D., D. D.

WITH THE RETURN from Babylon, the history of Israel becomes the history of the Jews. "The name Jew," as Josephus observes, "was born on the day when they came out from Babylon," and their history thenceforth is the history not of Israel but of Judaism.

After the overthrow of the Babylonian Empire by the Persians, Cyrus permitted the Jews (536 B. C.) to return to their own land and to rebuild Jerusalem and the temple. About 42,000 exiles returned under the guidance of Zerubbabel and Joshua the high priest. A second colony followed under Ezra (458 B. C.), who with Nehemiah restored the law and transformed the theocracy into a nomocracy, which finally degenerated into that scribism which reached its climax in the Talmud and similar works. In the twelfth year of his administration, Nehemiah returned to the Persian court (433 B. C.). During his absence of many years affairs fell into disorder; but on his return, after a long residence in Persia, Nehemiah reformed all these disorders and even expelled a grandson of the high priest Eliashib on account of his unlawful marriage with the daughter of Sanballat (Neh. xiii, 28). This expelled priest, undoubtedly one and the same person with Manasseh, withdrew to Samaria and built a rival temple on the mountain of Gerizim.

Palestine was ruled as Syrian satrapy by the then high priest, but afterwards became subject to the Macedonian rule. On the death of Alexander, Judea came into the possession of Laomedon. After the defeat of Laomedon (B. C. 320) Ptolemy, king of Egypt, attempted to seize the whole of Syria. He advanced against Jerusalem on the Sabbath, and carried a great many Jews away as captives, whom he settled in Egypt, Cyrene, and Libya. Under the

Ptolemies the Jews enjoyed great liberties and prosperity. In the time of Antioch the Great (223-187) Palestine was again the seat of war between Syria and Egypt, till at last, under Seleucus IV. (187-175), it came under Syrian sway.


The plan of Alexander to imbue the nations of the East with Greek culture was continued under his successors, and by degrees Grecian influence was felt in Palestine. Thus Antigonus of Socho, one of the earlier scribes, the first who has a Grecian name, is said to have been a student of Greek literature. In opposition to these Hellenists, whose Judaism was of a very lax nature, there devel-



THE GREAT TALITH.
The mantle worn by Jews at prayer.

oped in a quiet manner, the party of the pious or Hasidim, which rigidly adhered to the laws of the fathers and afterwards openly declared itself in the struggle of the Maccabees. Under Seleucus, IV., as has been said, the Jews had come under the Syrian sway. The people were governed by the high priest, and thus their condition was tolerable. When, however, the effort was made to hasten the process of Hellenising the people and destroy altogether the Jewish nationality, new troubles began, which resulted in the rise of the Maccabees. Seleucus was succeeded by Antiochus IV. Epiphanes (175-164 B. C.). When he ascended the throne there


were at Jerusalem two parties,—a national one, adhering to the laws of the fathers, and the Greek, which endeavored to introduce Greek manners, vices, and idolatry. At the head of the national party stood the high priest Onias III., afterwards supplanted by his brother Jason, who offered four hundred and forty talents (or about five hundred and thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty dollars) annually as tribute to Antiochus, besides a hundred and fifty more for permission to build a gymnasium. Jason was dislodged by Menelaus, who offered a higher tribute to Antiochus (172 B. C.). While the latter was absent on his second expedition against Egypt (170 B. C.) Jason took possession of Jerusalem for a time. Antiochus, who looked upon this act as rebellion, after his return from Egypt took fearful vengeance on the Jews and the temple (1 Macc.



THE SMALL TALITH.
Worn continually by the orthodox Jew.


1, 16–28; 2 Macc. 15, 11–23; comp. Dan. 11, 28). In the year 168 a royal edict was issued, according to which the exercise of the Jewish religion and circumcision was interdicted, and a statue of Jupiter Olympus was erected in the temple (1 Macc. 1, 43 et seq.; 2 Macc. 6, 1 et seq.; Dan. 11, 30). At last the patience of the people was exhausted, and the Maccabean struggle arose, which ended in the independence of Judea. The Maccabean successors of Judas, the son of Mattathias, united in their own persons the offices of king and high priest (1 Macc. 14, 28 et seq.); but though they proved valiant defenders of the country against foreign enemies, they could not prevent Palestine from being torn by internal factions. At that time the two religious factions known as Pharisees and Sadducees opposed each other. Hitherto the Maccabees had

sided with the Pharisees, the successors of the Hasidim. But the third successor of Judas Maccabæus, named John Hyrcanus (135-106), being offended by the Pharisees, went over to the Sadducees; thus making the Pharisees his opponents. His eldest son's reign (Aristobulus) was short; but when his second son (Alexander Janæus) ascended the throne, in 104 B. C., he was so annoyed by the popular party of the Pharisees that, before his death, he felt obliged to advise his wife, Alexandra, to join the Pharisees and abandon the Sadducees entirely. Through this policy peace was restored, and Hyrcanus II. was made high priest while Alexandra occupied the throne. After the latter's death (70 B. C.) a deadly strife began between the two sons, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, for the sovereignty. In the course of this struggle both parties ap-



SMALL PHYLACTERY FOR THE HEAD.

Used by ordinary Jews.



LARGE PHYLACTERY FOR THE HEAD.

Used by the Pharisaic Jews.

The phylactery was a memorial amulet consisting of a strip or strips of parchment inscribed with certain texts from the Old Testament and enclosed within a small leather case, which was either fastened on the forehead or on the left arm (see the upper part of the cut which follows).

pealed to Pompey, who at once invaded Palestine, and after having taken Jerusalem and its temple, appointed Hyrcanus high priest, limiting his dominion, however, to Judea alone, and taking his brother, Aristobulus, with his two sons, as captives to Rome. Alexander, one of the sons of Aristobulus, managed to escape (57 B. C.) and tried to raise the standard of revolt against Hyrcanus, but with no success. He was put down by Gabinius, the Roman proconsul, who divided Judea into five districts. Hyrcanus was recognised as high priest by Cæsar, who also permitted the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem; and Antipater, for services rendered to Cæsar, was appointed procurator over Judea (47 B. C.), who again made his son, Phasaël, governor of Jerusalem, while he placed his son Herod over Galilee. The latter soon succeeded, by


the help of the Romans, in becoming king of the Jews (39 B. C.). Under him Aristobulus, the last of the Maccabeans, acted as high priest, but he was put to death (35 B. C.).

Herod was followed by his son, Archelaus, who, after a few years' reign, was deposed by the Emperor Augustus (A. D. 6), and Judea became part of a Roman province with Syria, but with its own procurator residing at Cæsarea. When Quirinius took the census he succeeded in quelling a general revolt; but the fiercer spirits found a leader in Judas, the Galilean, who, fighting for the theocratic principle (according to the notions of the Pharisees) against the Roman yoke, kindled a fire in the people which, though often quenched, was not extinguished.

The high priests followed in quick succession with the exception of Caiaphas, who retained his office during the long reign of Pontius Pilate (28-36). The principle of interfering as little as possible with the religious liberty of the Jews was rudely assailed by the Emperor Caligula, who gave orders to have his image set up in the temple of Jerusalem. It was entirely through the courage and tact of the Syrian governor, Petronius, that the execution of these orders was temporarily postponed until the emperor was induced by Herod

Agrippa I. to withdraw them. Caligula soon afterwards died, and under the rule of Agrippa (41-44), to whom the government of the entire kingdom of his grandfather, Herod, was committed by Claudius, the Jews enjoyed much prosperity. In every respect the king was all they could wish. At the time of his death his son, Agrippa, being too young, Judea was again ruled by Roman governors, viz., Cuspius Fadus (44-46, under whom Theudas [Acts 5, 36] played his part); Tiberius Alexander (46-48, nephew of Philo of Alexandria); Ventidius Cumanus (48-52), and Felix (52-60), magnificent in his profligacy and despotic as a ruler (Acts, xxiii, 24). He was followed by Porcius Festus (60-62), a well-meaning man. With his successor, Albinus (62-64), everything became venal; and, bad as his government was, yet it was by far preferred to that of Gessius Florus

PHYLACTERIES.



For the arm.

For the head.

Showing straps with which they are fastened.

(64-66), the last but also worst procurator, who made an ostentatious display of his oppressions. Disturbances in the streets of Jerusalem and Cæsarea were now of frequent occurrence, and massacre followed upon massacre. All attempts at peace-making on the part of Agrippa I. and of the peace party were in vain. The patience of the people had been taxed too much, and Judea was at open war with the Emperor Nero, who sent his first general of the

empire, Vespasian, to subjugate Palestine. Under Titus, Vespasian's general, fortress after fortress surrendered until at last Jerusalem was taken and the temple burned to the ground, August 10, 70 A. D.

Judea was now a waste, Jerusalem a heap of ruins, and there was no Jeremiah to sing the funeral dirge of the city of David and Solomon. Directly after the triumph of Titus the Sanhedrin met at Jamnia or Jabneh, and in the hands of this council the work of transforming and adapting Judaism to the altered political circumstances, proved a task of little difficulty. Jamnia had only to be substituted for Jerusalem, a few ordinances to be discontinued or slightly altered, and certain prayers or good works to be substituted for the sacrifices, and the change was effected without leaving any trace




POLISH JEW AT PRAYER IN THE SYNAGOGUE.

Showing the manner in which the tallith and the phylacteries for head and arm are worn.

of violent revolution. The spiritual head of the Jamnian commonwealth was Gamaliel II.¹ National fanaticism, indeed, was not yet extinguished; but it burnt itself completely out in the vigorous insurrection led by Bar-Cocheba, the pseudo-messiah, in which nearly six million Jews lost their lives, together with the

¹See McClintock and Strong's *Cyclopaedia*. We are largely indebted to this work for the details of the present article. All readers desirous of pursuing the subject further should use it for constant reference.

famous Rabbi Akiba, one of the pseudo-messiah's most ardent adherents (135 A. D.). Titus, to annihilate forever all hopes of the restoration of the Jewish kingdom, accomplished his plan by establishing a new city on the site of Jerusalem, which he called *Ælia Capitolina*. An edict prohibited any Jew from entering the new city on pain of death. More effectually to keep them away, the image of a swine was placed over the gate leading to Bethlehem. The seat of the spiritual head, or patriarch, also called *nasi*, was now transferred from Jamnia to Tiberias, where Judah the Holy completed in A. D. 190 the collection of all the oral or traditional laws, called the *Mishna*. When in the fifth century (429) Palestine ceased to be the centre of Judaism, Babylonia took her place. From the period of the exile a numerous and coherent body of Jews had continued to subsist there. The Parthians and Sassanides granted them self-government. At their head was a native




MEZUZA, OR SIGN UPON THE DOOR-POST.

A cylinder containing a piece of parchment inscribed on one side with certain words from Deuteronomy, and on the other with the name of the "Almighty" so placed as to be visible through an opening covered by glass. The cylinder is affixed to the right-hand door-post in Jewish houses; the mezuza is believed to have the virtue of an amulet and is saluted by pious Jews both on entering and leaving the house.

prince, the *Resh Galutha*, i. e., prince of the captivity, who, when the Palestinian patriarchate came to an end, was left without a rival. The schools there at Pumbeditha, Sora, and Nahardea prospered greatly, developed rabbinism, vied with those of Palestine, and continued to exist after the cessation of the latter, when the patriarchate became extinct; thus they had the last word in the settlement of doctrine, which was embodied in the celebrated Babylonian Talmud, compiled about the year 500. When the schools at Pumbeditha and Sora were closed Jewish learning was transferred to Spain.

Returning to the Jews in the Roman Empire, we find that after the reign of Vespasian and Hadrian the condition of the Jews was not only tolerable, but in many respects prosperous. But the complete reverse took place after the conversion of Constantine. The Jews, who formerly had taken a great share in the persecution of the Christians by pagan Rome, now became a condemned and

persecuted sect. With the triumph of Christianity over paganism began the period of cruel oppression of the Jews in the Roman Empire. A gleam of hope shone upon them in the days of Julian the Apostate, but they were more illy-treated under his Christian successors. Till the reign of Theodosius, in the fourth century, however, their position in the empire was tolerable. Different, however, it was in the fifth century. The Roman Empire had, from the year 395, been divided into the Eastern or Greek Empire, of which Constantinople was the capital, and the Western Empire, of which Rome and Italy still formed the centre. In both these divisions the position and treatment of the Jews became worse and worse. In the west, even under Honorius, its first emperor, oppressive laws began to be enacted against the Jews.




MODERN JEWISH SYNAGOGUE.

In the east, i. e., in the eastern part of the Roman Empire, soon after called the Empire of Greece, or Byzantium, the position of the Jews became particularly unfavorable. The government of the Emperor Justin, and the code of Justinian, soon permanently fixed the social relations of the Jews in the Byzantine Empire. Justin (A. D. 523) excluded all non-Christians from holding any office or dignity in the state. In the reign of Justinian the enactments

against the Jews were made more onerous. No wonder that during his reign many rebellions broke out among the Jews. From the reign of Justinian the position of the Jews in the Greek Empire became such as to prevent their possessing any vestige of political importance. True, they carried on theological studies in the country of their fathers, especially at Tiberias. But even here the last surviving gleam of their ancient glory was soon extinguished. The dignity of the patriarch had ceased to exist with the year 429, and the link connecting the different synagogues of the Eastern Empire was broken. Many Jews quitted Palestine and the Byzantine Empire to seek refuge in Persia and Babylonia, where they were more favored. When, in 1455, Constantinople was taken by the Turks,

some of the Jewish exiles from Spain and Portugal took refuge in the ancient capital of the Eastern Empire, where the number of their descendants is now considerable.

In the peninsula of Arabia the Jews had dwelt from time immemorial. Before the time of Mohammed the Jews were very prosperous there, and even a Jewish kingdom under Jewish kings is said to have existed there. When the prophet of Mecca made his appearance he found the Jews in general favorably disposed toward him. Several of the Jewish tribes became even his open parti-



THE FEAST OF DEDICATION AS CELEBRATED IN AN ENGLISH SYNAGOGUE.

sans. But when his principles and plans became more thoroughly known and the Jews rejected him, Mohammed at once commenced a war of extermination against them. His first attack was against the clan of the Beni-Kinouka, who dwelt in Media, and was overcome by the warrior-prophet. The same fate awaited the other tribes, one after the other. From the moment that the Jews declared themselves against Mohammed they became the special object of his hatred, and since that time a feeling of enmity has ever existed between the Musselman and the Jew. Crescent and cross shared equally in their contempt and hatred of the Jews, and, as

in Christian Europe, so in Mohammedan Asia and Africa the Jew was compelled to bear a distinctive mark in his garments—*here* the yellow hat, *there* the black turban.

Beyond the boundaries of either the old Roman or the Byzantine Empire Jews have, in early times, been met with, both in the most remote parts of the interior of Asia and upon the coast of Malabar. In the latter place they probably arrived in the fifth century in consequence of a persecution raised in Persia. In the sev-



THE HIGH PRIEST, IN LINEN VESTMENTS.
Sprinkling the blood in the holy of holies.

enth century a Jewish colony was met with in China. When the Jews emigrated there is difficult to ascertain.

But to return to the West. It has already been stated that with the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity evil days came upon the Jews. In the Western Empire this unfavorable change commenced in the days of Honorius, and would have continued so; but the storm that burst over Rome toward the end of the fifth century changed in a degree the condition of the Jews. The northern nations, as long as they professed Arianism in preference to the Catholic faith, showed themselves merciful to their Jewish subjects.

This was especially the case with the Goths. When the dominion of the Ostrogoths, under their king Theodoric, succeeded that of Odoacer and the Heruli in Italy and the west, the Jews had every reason to be satisfied with their new sovereign. The consequence was that the Goths in the west, like the Persians in the east, found faithful allies in the Jews of that period. When Justinian, by his general, Narses, conquered Italy from the Ostrogoths (A. D. 555), the Jews, especially those at Naples, assisted him, only to be heavily punished afterwards.

The Visigoths also, in their defence of Arles, in Provence, against the Franks, under Clovis, were assisted by the Jews. In Spain the kings of the Visigoths treated them with favor till about the year 600, their king, Reccared, having embraced the Catholic

faith, inaugurated that peculiar system of conduct toward the Jews which finally resulted in their total expulsion from the peninsula.

The Franks were at first less merciful to the Jews than the Goths. The Merovingian line treated them with peculiar rigor. Thus in 540 King Childebert forbade the Jews to appear in the streets of Paris during the Easter week. Clotaire I. deprived them of the power of holding office. King Dagobert (629) compelled them either to receive baptism or to leave the country.

Under the Carolingians in France the Jews of the eighth and ninth centuries enjoyed so great a degree of prosperity, that the



THE FAST OF JERUSALEM IN JERUSALEM.

Romish bishops took alarm. Under Pépin le Bref, son of Charles Martel, they enjoyed many privileges, and so likewise under his son Charlemagne and under his successor and son, Louis le Débonnaire. The latter even freed them from the grinding taxes imposed upon them, and confirmed them in their immunities in 830. And all exertions of the priesthood, especially of Ogobard, bishop of Lyons, to injure the Jews, were futile.

The position of the Jews underwent an entire change at the downfall of the Carolingian dynasty, which began to decay after the death of Louis le Débonnaire. The invasion of the Normans

was partly the cause and partly the signal for a complete change of kings in Europe. An age of barbarism spread over the whole face of Christianity, the feudal system developed itself in every way injurious to the Jews. But one of the greatest evils which they were compelled to endure was the prevalence of the crusading spirit. During the first crusade (1096-1099) Treves, Speyer, Worms, Mayence, Cologne, and Ratisbon were the seat of oppression, murders, and bodily tortures, inflicted upon the Jews. During the second



JEW OF BAGDAD.

crusade (1147-1149), Rudolph, a fanatical monk, travelling through central Europe, stirred up the populace to take vengeance on all unbelievers. The cry, "Hep! Hep!" was sufficient to bring terror to the heart of every Jew. But King Conrad III. and such men as Bernard of Clairvaux protected them, and thus the sufferings of the Jews were less, compared with the intemperate zeal of Rudolph. During the Middle Ages the Jews were not only persecuted, but, where they were tolerated, they became also the Pariahs of the west. But to resume the thread of events.

In France, formerly so signally patronised by the Carlovingians, the Jews experienced a different treatment after the extinction of that dynasty. Toward the end of the eleventh century they were banished and afterward recalled by Philip I. In 1182 they were at first banished by Philip Augustus, but readmitted upon certain conditions, one of which was the obligation to wear a little wheel upon their dress as a mark. Louis VII. (A. D. 1223) treated them as his serfs, and with one stroke of his pen remitted to his Christian subjects all their debts to Jews. Louis IX. (St. Louis), being anxious to convert them, commanded that the Talmud be destroyed by fire, and twenty-four cartfuls of the Talmud

were publicly burned in Paris (1244). Philip the Fair, after robbing them repeatedly, expelled the Jews from France in 1306. Under Louis X. they were treated unfavorably, while Philip V., the Long, favored and protected them. In 1341 the usual accusations of treason, poisoning of the wells, etc., were brought against them, and many were burned, massacred, banished, or condemned to heavy fines. Under John I. they enjoyed a little rest, and so also under Charles V. But in 1370 they were again banished, but soon recalled under Charles VI. In spite of the many vicissitudes, Jewish learning flourished in France, especially in the south. Men like David Kimchi and Rashi have become household names in Jewish as well as in Christian theology.

In England the Jews date their first residence from the time of the Heptarchy. In the twelfth century, under Henry II. and his son, the cruel treatment and plundering of the Jews reached its height. On the coronation day of King Richard I. (1189), when they came to pay their homage, the population plundered and murdered them a whole day and night in London. This bad example of London was followed at Stamford, Norwich, and more especially at York. Under King John (1199) all kinds of liberties and priv-


ileges were granted to the Jews, but he soon showed he cared more for their money than for their persons. Henry III. (1217-1272) followed the same policy, and when the Jews petitioned the king to allow them to leave the country their request was not granted. Under Edward I. they were banished in 1290, and only in 1635 Cromwell permitted them again to settle in England.

In Germany, Jews were found as early as the fourth century, especially at Cologne, where they soon became numerous and prosperous. But the commencement of the Middle Ages in Germany, as elsewhere, put an end to their favorable position. It is true that



JERUSALEM JEWS.

the Emperor of Germany regarded the Jews as his *Kammerknechte*, or "servants of the imperial chamber," and as such they enjoyed the emperor's protection, but the scores of violent deeds, which are recorded, show that even the protection of the emperor could not prevent the popular rage from breaking out and marking its course by bloodshed and desolation. The least cause was sufficient to massacre the Jews. When in 1348 an epidemic malady, known as the *black death*, visited half of Europe, the Jews were blamed for it because they were said to have poisoned the wells and rivers. A general massacre took place, in spite of the remon-



NEW YEAR'S DAY IN TIBERIAS AND SAFET..

stances of princes, magistrates, bishops, and the Pope himself. In the south of Germany and in Switzerland the persecution raged with most violence. From Switzerland to Silesia the land was drenched with innocent blood, and in some places their residence was forbidden.

In the Netherlands the history of the Jews during the Middle Ages was much like that of Germany and the north of France. In Flanders they were already living at the time of the Crusaders. In the twelfth century they were driven out, but were found there again in the fourteenth. In 1370 they were accused of having

pierced the holy wafer, an accusation which brought many to the stake. In Utrecht the Jews resided till the year 1444. In Holland, Zealand, and Friesland many Jews had sought refuge after their banishment from France by Philip the Fair.

Before the end of the tenth century Jews were already found at Prague. Boleslaus I. favored them and permitted them to build a synagogue. In Poland they existed very early. Under Boleslaus V., Duke of Poland (1264), they enjoyed many privileges. His great-grandson, King Casimir, showed them still greater favor, out



THE BLOWING OF THE TRUMPET ON NEW YEAR'S DAY.

of love, it is said, for Esther, a beautiful Jewess. Synagogues, academies, and rabbinical schools have always abounded in Poland.

In Italy, where Jews have resided from early times in their ghettos, the popes generally appeared kindly toward them. Gregory I., the Great, in the seventh century, proved himself the friend of the Jews, but Gregory VII., in the tenth century, was their enemy. In other great towns in Italy the position of the Jews varied. At Leghorn and Venice they met with favor, and so also in a less degree at Florence, but in Genoa they were looked upon with enmity. In the Kingdom of Naples, where they settled about the year 1200, persecutions took place from time to time.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

DEVELOPMENTAL ETHICS.¹

BY ANTONIO LLANO.

[CONCLUDED.]

V.

IF, passing from the general principles of the doctrine to its practical applications, we endeavor to harmonise our ordinary moral judgments (whose validity is accepted by Dr. Carus, as by every one else) with that law of evolution (whether of "soul" or other) from which alone all ethical conceptions can derive their authority and legitimacy, we again find ourselves in a labyrinth of perplexities, escape from which can only be secured by surrendering all morality. The evolution of man is not a simple process, a simple motion governed by one single force: it is a very complex process, a motion whose propelling force is the resultant of many different, although concurrent, forces, some acting in one direction, some in another, and many of them opposed to one another. From such combination human development in general, and "soul development" in particular, arise; nor could mankind move as it does if the combination were not what it is, or if any of the constituent components of the resultant force were lacking. Of these components some present themselves in the form of human actions accompanied by consciousness; and, since they all have their share in the general movement, they must all be regarded as necessary factors of development; i. e., all human actions must, whatever their nature, be considered, according to the developmental standard of goodness, morally good. And to this it will be no scientific or logical answer to say, that development would take place faster and follow a better path (whatever may be meant by "better"), if some modes of conduct were omitted, and replaced by opposite modes of conduct; for this is to abandon the position that evolu-

¹For the first part of Mr. Llano's article see *The Open Court* for March 1897.

tion, at every moment, can take place only in one direction and at one rate of speed, and that it must so take place; and to frame an imaginary, subjective standard of what *ought* to be, instead of preserving the scientific and objective standard of what *is* and *must* be. We cannot escape from the logical consequences of universal determinism: in whatever direction we turn, the austere and implacable monster of Necessity rises before us, proclaiming, with his very silence, that he is the eternal and, therefore, the irrevocable. He cannot be moved, for he has no heart; nor convinced, for he has no brain; he is an automaton made of inflexible material; and if we recognise him as our master, we must be satisfied to watch in submissive resignation the everlasting motions of the wonderful and awful mechanism.

The process of evolution itself presupposes the conflict between antagonistic forces and tendencies. In the moral world, as in the physical world, there is a struggle for existence, if not among individuals, at least among what have been termed moral ideals. The higher ideals have not been realised except through, and by the agency of, the lower ideals; the lower ideals are, therefore, indispensable, if there is to be any development at all. But by this I do not mean to repeat the truism that what was morally good yesterday is to-day morally bad: the idea I intend to convey is, that, *at any given period*, the morally good (I now use the word in its ordinary sense) cannot usually become better, that is, progress (either by gaining in intensity, or by being propagated), unless helped in its course by the morally bad; the consequence being that the morally bad, viewed now as a necessary factor of the morally good, ceases to be really bad: our judgment must be reversed, and we must say that in such cases every action is morally good. An illustration will, I hope, make my position perfectly clear.

The teachings of Jesus of Nazareth are by many, Dr. Carus among them, considered as the starting point and the root of all modern morality. After the legendary element has been strained in the capacious filter of "Christian scholarship," and the moral residue treated with the powerful chemicals of "interpretation," the New Testament is found to contain the highest truths and principles of ethics; and thus the revolution worked by Jesus in the whole life of mankind is likened, both for its legitimacy and its importance, to the astronomical revolution of Copernicus. But it is, I believe, allowed by all students of Christian morals that the bare precepts of Jesus would have made little impression upon the old Romans and their barbarian conquerors, had they not been accom-

panied by those narratives appealing to the imaginal and emotional parts of our nature,—the stories of his struggling life and his patiently borne passion, crowned by his awful death. The best credential of his moral code was the seal of martyrdom stamped upon it by the heroic sacrifice of Calvary; and had this tragedy never been related to the Western World, the precepts of Jesus might to-day be slumbering among the utopic vagaries of what the greatest of Roman historians described as a superstitious people, who distinguished themselves by the odious characteristic of being the enemies of human kind.

What judgment, then, are we to pass upon the persecutors, the betrayers, and the executioners of Jesus? He was not an independent, self-existing, extra-cosmical personality: but for his surroundings and the state of the world at the time of his advent, his work would have been impossible. His work was not a simple nor an isolated event: it was, scientifically considered, a complex phenomenon, of which his moral teachings were only a factor, some of the other factors being the actions of his enemies, his denunciators, and his crucifiers. From a naturalistic point of view, Pontius Pilate, and Judas Iscariot himself, were component elements of the great compound whole, which, operating upon the minds of men, was to revolutionise the moral world; their actions were really not *theirs*: they were, so to speak, the instruments of nature, even as Jesus himself was the instrument of nature; and in those actions we must see, not the acts of free and independent wills, but the necessary operations of the eternal laws of the cosmos, which, for the carrying on of the evolutionary process, *must* make use of the martyr and the assassin alike, each being as indispensable as the other; they both conform to the laws of the cosmos,—they are the laws of the cosmos themselves; they both further the evolution of the race,—they are but terms of the sum total of progress; given the actual constitution of the universe, progress would be as impossible without the one or the other, as the existence of a whole without its parts. Judged, then, by the standard of development, are they not both equally moral, both equally good? It will, perhaps, be argued that Jesus himself had reached a higher stage of development, while his enemies were yet in a state of relative undevelopment. But in this case the question is only one of degree; Jesus, we may grant, was *better*, but they also were *good*. By what criterion can we trace the line of demarcation between the good and the bad? Nor can the question be evaded by taking into consideration the feelings, the *intentions* of the actors that took part in the momentous

tragedy ; for, apart from the fact that the persecutors of Jesus were probably acting in good faith and in obedience to the dictates of their "categorical imperative," it must be remembered that our criterion is entirely objective ; or, if we take account of the subjective element, it must be from an objective point of view ; from the point of view, namely, of what the consequences of that subjective element must be upon the development of the race. Nor, again, can it be said that the objectiveness of our criterion consists, not in judging actions by their consequences, but in taking in the objective world the necessary data for the direction of *our* conduct ; for this would be an ethics of egoism, not of development : the ethics of development is an "ethics of eternity," embracing the past, the present, and the future of the race.¹ The immediate causes of voluntary human actions are human feelings ; and feelings from which the evolution of the race results cannot, according to the "ethics of eternity," be declared bad or immoral. The feelings of Judas Iscariot, from which resulted the sacrifice of Calvary, from which resulted the adoption of Christianity, from which resulted the elevation of mankind, have to be accepted as necessary antecedents of the alleged redemption, i. e., as necessary factors of moral evolution ; or, to place the subject on its true bearings, as necessary factors of cosmical evolution in general ; and, as such, those feelings must be declared good.

It may, perhaps, be thought that the foregoing remarks are too far-fetched, and that they come from a misapprehension, or even a perversion, of the theory I am criticising ; for it is repeatedly stated by Dr. Carus that the elevation of the soul is the test of progress, and he says very distinctly that the "nature of moral goodness" "must be sought in the quality of our ideas and motives."² I shall, therefore, endeavor to present with all candor the reply that can be made, from his point of view, to the objections I have just adduced.

Human conduct, it will be said, consists in voluntary movements made in response to impressions received, directly or indirectly, from the outer world, and aiming at an adaptation of the organism to his environment, especially the social environment. The interpretation of those impressions and of the necessary conditions of adaptation are forms of consciousness we term judgments. Judgments, then, are the subjective regulators of conduct ; and it is therefore obvious that our actions will be better adapted to their ends in proportion as our judgments are more correct, or, as Dr. Carus

¹ *Ethical Problem*, p. 42.

² *The Monist*, 1., 4, p. 564.

says, in proportion as we approach nearer to truth. It follows that the first condition, for a scientific direction of conduct is knowledge of the objective laws of nature ; and the first thing to be inquired into, when a line of conduct is proposed, is, how it will tally with those laws, or what its consequences will be, according to those laws, as they have been revealed to us by the attentive examination of natural phenomena. In this sense, then, it may be said that the standard of ethics must be objective : it must be, and cannot but be, found in the immutable order of the outer world. The law of evolution being a well ascertained fact, we may take it as an ethical guide : of conduct which is moulded so as to conform to that law, we may say that it is moral ; and of the man whose motives correspond with that law, we may say that he is good. By doing this we have not exchanged our objective criterion for a subjective criterion ; for, although we judge a man by his motives, those motives themselves are judged by the higher standard—the law of evolution, which, when applied to man, and viewed on its “spiritual” side, may with propriety be called the moral law. The consideration of motives is an indispensable element of moral judgments, for the simple reason that morality is only predicable of thinking beings, the causes of whose actions are motives : were we to judge merely by consequences, we should have to speak of brutes, trees, and stones, as of moral creatures. Nor is it sufficient that a man’s motive should be what is ordinarily called a “good intention” ; for herein comes our objective criterion to inquire whether that intention, when carried out, will further the evolution of the race ; and, unless his intention comply with this condition, it cannot be called good. Such examples, then, as that of Jesus’s persecutors, cannot be justified ; for, although these men may have acted in good faith, they were ignorant of the true course of human development ; they were immoral through their ignorance, or at least they were not good men ; they may be excusable, but this does not make them moral. Furthermore, it has to be admitted that we ourselves are liable to form erroneous judgments as to the laws of nature, and that some of our actions may be viewed by our descendants as we now view the proceedings of the Inquisitors ; but this is a necessary, although unfortunate, consequence of the limitations of human knowledge : all we can say is that, *for us*, those actions are morally good to which we are prompted by motives that, according to the facts known to us, and to the interpretation we can give them, we believe to be faithful responses to the requirements of the law of human progress.

The main objection to this reasoning is the same general objection I conceive to be applicable to the whole system—inconsistency. Development is here presented as the end, the ideal, of ethics; as an object whose realisation must be the purpose of moral conduct. It must, then, be accepted as the most desirable condition, or, in the language of other moralists, the *summum bonum*. If we ask why this is a desirable good, we are answered that “we *have to* be pleased with the development of our race according to the laws of nature,” and that “those who are displeased might just as well commit suicide at once, for they will go to the wall, they will disappear from the stage of life. Those alone will survive who are pleased with what the laws of nature demand.” Ethics, it is added, formulates general rules, based on facts, to “assist us in doing what we shall after all *have to* do.”¹

Leaving aside the hedonistic spirit of these statements, we find them inadequate to explain what they are intended to explain; for, while it is true that science teaches us what we “*have to*” do under certain circumstances, this “*have to*” refers to an end determined in advance; it is what we “*have to*” do *in order to attain an object in view*. The ethical *ought* is a conditional *must*; the *if* is the *sine qua non* of ethics, and for this reason all ethical structures have to be erected on an assumption of some kind—on an *if*. The foregoing propositions, therefore, are to be understood in the sense that we must adapt our means to human development, considered *beforehand* as a desirable end: *beforehand*, for experience teaches us that we can follow a different line, whether we “go to the wall” or not; and, consequently, we *have to* follow the line of development *if* we have accepted the idea of development as our guide. As the choice between the two apparently possible modes of conduct is a subjective operation—a matter of desire—our objective criterion only applies, as I have said above, *in the hypothesis that we have already chosen one form of conduct or the other*. This criterion, then, does not tell us why one conduct is more desirable than the other; for, although it assures us that by following the wrong line we shall “go to the wall,” this is simply the statement of a possible fact, which leaves us in absolute ignorance as to what is meant by “going to the wall,” seeing that in many cases the immoral man attains *his* end. As to the highly praised and so oft repeated criterion of facts and laws of nature and the development of the soul in the direction of truth, it may be said that it amounts to but a useful and necessary tool, as use-

¹ *The Monist*, I., 4, pp. 553, 554, and VI., 4, p. 589.

ful to the malefactor as to the saint—indeed, more useful to the malefactor.

Development, then, is to be accepted as an end in and by itself, to be striven after for its own sake, and for its sake alone. Its desirability cannot be established (even if this were logical) by an absolute *must*, for experience shows that we can, and often do, move counter to development; nor justified by reference to any other end or standard, for, in this case, that other end would be *the* standard. Such efforts at justification as that immoral conduct “will lead to certain ruin,”¹ and the like, are either a begging of the question or a surrender of the criterion. We arrive thus at an ultimate postulate, which must be assumed as a fact not susceptible of demonstration; the postulate, namely, that development is the most desirable object, and, as such, the *summum bonum*. And here we are confronted by a notorious contradiction; for, while Dr. Carus declares that “ethics should not start from any assumptions,”² his system cannot be built except on the assumption (assumption, as being a matter of subjectivity) that development is desirable in and by itself. To say that development consists in agreement with facts, or in an approximation to truth, may be a definition of what development is, but its desirability remains an ultimate postulate—an ultimate assumption. Even the reduction of progress to “soul-development” is an implicit substitution of subjectivism for objectivism, an unconscious return to the judging of nature by the standard of our feelings.

Admitting, then, that development is desirable in and by itself, and that, besides being desirable, it is actually desired, I shall leave other difficulties aside, and pass to the immediate consequences of the developmental theory, as thus understood (I almost said *mis*-understood). I shall endeavor to show how the objective sub-standard and the ideal standard can be combined, and what the results of the combination must be.

The first condition of our ideal of development is that it should be conceived as something possible or capable, of being realised by a due application of the laws of nature with which we are acquainted; and when, on the application of these laws, we find that our end is not attained, we must at once recognise that our ideal was such only in the popular sense of the word—that it was a dream; or, scientifically expressed, that we were in error, and that the object of our pursuit was only a logical possibility, conceived by us

¹ *Fundamental Problems*, p. 198; *Ethical Problem*, pp. 31-32.

² *The Monist*. 1., 4, p. 555.

as such through ignorance of some unexpected circumstances which make the realisation of the desired end an actual impossibility; in other words, we have to remodel our ideal so as to make it conform to the actual facts of reality, thus constantly modifying our subjective standard by our objective sub-standard, the former being mostly formal, the latter experimental. A consequence of this is that we cannot judge actions or individuals by their motives; at least, that we are not justified in passing any judgment of moral disapprobation. For, motives being themselves a part of our ideal, we may conceive and desire a special form of development where certain motives exist; but if, by actual observation, we discover that those motives do not exist, or that the contrary motives exist, and that, furthermore, these are not capable of being changed by any means at our disposal, we must conclude that we were reckoning without the host; that development does *not*, as a matter of actual fact, take account of our supposed motives; and, as we "*have to be pleased*" with what really exists, we cannot disapprove of any existing motives, whatever they may be. The only feeling we can consistently experience is one of disappointment at the erroneousness of our judgments and the frustration of our expectations; but all verdict of immorality is out of the question, as the form of development with which we finally "*have to be pleased*" is that form which actually takes place, not the form we have in our minds.¹ We may, no doubt, cling to our definition, and say that a moral man is one whose motives correspond to our ideal of development; but this definition is nothing but the statement of a logically possible fact, and, being stripped of all feeling of praise and blame, entirely loses its ethical importance. And it is further evident that, with regard to the realisation of our ideal, although we think that the ideal can (that is, *may*) be realised in a certain manner, yet if the event—the actual fact—prove that the ideal is realised in a different manner, we must again confess that our conception of the means was inadequate, that the means that nature has employed are the *only* possible means, and that, unless we give up the realisation of the ideal, those means must be regarded with approba-

¹The words of Antoninus the Philosopher (quoted by Dr. Carus himself) are a very clear statement of the monistic and determinist views (although the Stoics were not determinists in the modern sense of the term): "All is suitable to me, O Cosmos, that is suitable to thee! Nothing that for thee is in due time is for me too early or too late." And again: "There is hardly anything foreign to any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form one and the same cosmos." Remember also the words of Epictetus: "If any one go to the bath too early, say not that he does wrong, but that he bathes before time. If any one drinks too much wine, say not that he does wrong to drink, but that he drinks too much. For, before thou knowest what moves him to act, how knowest thou whether he do wrong?"

tion, or, at least, not with disapprobation. Thus I do not believe I have been illogical in my application of the developmental principles (even in the above distorted form) to the actions and men connected with the life and death of Jesus. To say that we can further or retard the progress of mankind are metaphorical expressions,¹ and, if literally taken, they betray an absolute ignorance of the difference between the logically possible, based on *assumptions*, and the actually possible, based on reality. There is only one process of evolution, only one direction and one speed of progress, all predetermined from eternity, i. e., contained in the universe as potentialities that are actualised at definite times and in definite places. This is scientific and philosophical fatalism, but not practical fatalism; for we are never *absolutely* certain of what will take place, and, in that uncertainty, we act as if to accomplish what we believe may happen; but, should the event disappoint our expectation, all we can say is that the event could not be what we believed it would be.

Before closing this part of my discussion, I would call attention to some features of the law of development, which, I think, will farther strengthen my position.

The universe, mechanically considered, is an immense (probably infinite) system, the fundamental law of whose operations is the law of action and reaction. Whatever our ideas of force may be, every phenomenon can be described as a reaction, in the sense that it is the response of a mode of existence to the action of another mode of existence. This law, also known as the law of causation, operates with equal rigidity (at least we believe so) in the region of the intellect and of the emotions,—in the world of knowledge and in the world of morality; and, just as in the physical world it would be unreasonable, nay irrational, to expect an effect where the cause was wanting, it would be in the same degree unreasonable and irrational to expect, in the moral world, the rise of higher conditions, which can only originate as reactions on lower conditions, without the existence of those lower conditions. The features of our civilisation of which we so often boast as our glorious achievements have originated in the antagonism between opposite social forces, opposite tendencies and ideals: liberty has been born in oppression, toleration in political and religious despotism; and, while we may deplore that such should be the law of

¹ Thus Dr. Carus says that, although the soul-development of the race "is of a spontaneous nature, man can, to a great extent, make or mar his own fate and that of his race." (*Ethical Problem*, p. 41.) Such expressions, however, coming from so strong a necessitarian as Dr. Carus, must be taken in a figurative sense.

nature, we must either "be pleased" with it, or blame nature for being what it is. Are we, then, to brand the Russian autocrat as a perverse fiend, the enemy of his subjects and of mankind? Leaving aside the fact that his actions *are* the immutable laws of the cosmos, we must remember that from his tyranny the freedom of the Russians will probably be the inevitable consequence, and that, without the action of despotism, the reaction of liberty could not take effect. And, should it be said that he would be a better man if he, of his own free will, granted more rights and gave more security to his subjects, and that freedom may exist without previous oppression, the answer simply is, that this could *not* be so, for the all-convincing and unanswerable reason that it *is not* so; and that, as said before, we must not confuse in our judgments the logically possible with the actually possible, the actually possible being what exists, and what does not exist being impossible.¹

VI.

Having presented and discussed what I conceive to be the most salient inconsistencies of the ethics of development, I shall now attempt to trace them to their main psychological sources; sources from which, as will be apparent, all ethical systems have sprung, and from which they draw their very life.

The first source is to be found in the law of conflict between feeling and judgment. The nature of this law will be readily seen by an illustration. A nervous woman may take the five cartridges out of the five chambers of a pistol, count them and hold them in her hand; and yet, if the weapon be pointed at her, she will scream with fright, and not improbably faint away. Her judgment, it is evident, tells her, beyond all doubt, that it is impossible that any harm should come to her from the unloaded weapon; but her deeply rooted feelings, organised by heredity, or by association, or both, unavoidably impel her to act in opposition to her correct judgment. This is a very simple, and, I think, a very plain instance of the law of conflict. In the higher and more complicated forms of conduct a similar phenomenon takes place, which, although of a more complex character, is yet of the same identical nature. Through the combined agencies of heredity and educa-

¹ This view of the possible and impossible was very strongly held by Wyckliffe. According to him "that only is possible which is actual, though men may conceive of many things as possible which in fact are not possible." "Whatever is possible is actual," and therefore God's power and God's action are identical. This doctrine, as can be easily seen, logically leads, as in fact it led Wyckliffe, to absolute fatalism and predestination. (See Neander's *History of the Church*, Vol. V., pp. 166-8, Torrey's translation, Boston, 1871.)

tion we find ourselves possessed of certain feelings (what the original source of those feelings was matters not for our present purpose), which, invariably aroused whenever certain circumstances concur, prompt us to follow, or at least approve, certain lines of conduct, and to shun, or at least disapprove, certain other lines of conduct. When, however, we endeavor to rationalise our conduct, to give a reason for our actions, one of two things will happen :— either we take our feelings as our starting-point and criterion, in which case our theory may finally come in conflict with ascertained truths or other accepted theories, but not, if logically developed, with the given feelings themselves ; or we may start from other phenomena, both objective and subjective, and in this case it may happen that the logical consequences of our theory will come in conflict with the feelings in question, by establishing facts which, according to our experience, must give rise to opposite feelings. In the latter case we find ourselves involved in the perplexities of contradiction ; for, while it was our purpose to give a reason for our conduct, which we take for granted is reasonable (not being able, owing to the complexity of the case, to detect our error as easily as in the example of the woman given above), we arrive at the opposite conduct, or at the opposite feeling, as the only one that is really reasonable, or rational ; and as we still persist in believing that our habitual feelings are defensible on rational grounds, simply because we cannot help feeling and obeying them, we undertake to frame a theory of reconciliation, which cannot fail to be characterised by its inconsistency,

This, I should venture to say, accounts for the lack of logic discoverable in naturalistic systems of ethics. For, so long as the so-called moral ideals are adhered to, and the feelings of moral approbation and disapprobation are held to be justifiable on scientific principles, the determinist element of monism, and of naturalism generally, must be partially surrendered ; the necessary result being a crippled and vulnerable system, easily accessible through the breaches made by the admissions of its own advocates. There is only one logic consistent with determinism—the inflexible and implacable logic of Spinoza ;¹ and the only conclusion that that logic warrants is, that there are no such things as right and wrong ; or, if the word right be permissible, that everything is right. The antagonism between this conclusion and our inherited feelings ac-

¹ I am not, however, ignorant of the fact that in Spinoza himself we may often detect serious inconsistencies, traceable, I think, to the general source of error in these matters—the law of conflict. But, as a rule, he accepts the consequences of his thoroughgoing necessitarianism.

counts, as I have said, for the conciliatory theory of ethics I have been analysing in the course of this essay. The antagonism is so great, and even so shocking, that we recoil in horror when confronted by the bare corollaries of our fundamental propositions; we naturally and unconsciously distort the rules of logic, and finally convince ourselves that there is no such antagonism, but that, on the contrary, the postulates of determinism are the most solid foundation on which the current, subjective morality can rest. Of our feelings, which are only one part of our general interests, it may be said what Bentham says of personal interest in general: they do not "attack men's integrity in front, but undermine it," by strongly directing attention to whatever conforms to them, and diverting it from whatever conflicts with them. They form an unconscious bias (unconscious, as it is not apprehended as such) which it is difficult to eradicate.¹

The second source of error is of kindred nature with the first, and consists in the habit (due, no doubt, to the limitations of the human understanding) of conceiving phenomena as related to their *immediate* causes only; whereby we disconnect these causes from their necessary accompaniments and antecedents, and regard them, in a certain measure, as independent facts and first causes, instead of secondary and component causes, in themselves dependent upon other causes and determinant circumstances. This mode of conception is indeed valid, under certain limitations, and even unavoidable for practical purposes, provided we do not fall into the error of extending it beyond its proper boundaries. Thus Spinoza says that we may with propriety speak of some things as depending upon man's pleasure, although man's will is not free; because, in the first place, man is a part of nature, and whatever he does is done by nature *through* him; and, in the second place, because "we must define and explain things by their immediate causes."² In the impossibility of embracing in consciousness, by an intellectual act, the infinite series of causes and effects constituting cosmical existence, we are compelled to abstract the subjects of our inquiry from the total integral of which they are but differential

¹Bentham, *Deontology*, Vol. II., Chap. iii., p. 139 (Bowring's edit., 1834). It is a well-known fact that, as Mr. Lecky remarks, we always gravitate towards that intellectual system which is more in accordance with our emotional nature. "Every moral disposition brings with it an intellectual bias which exercises a great and often a controlling influence upon the most earnest inquirer." (*European Morals*, Vol. II., Chap. iv., p. 192, Appleton, 1889). I may, perhaps, be allowed to refer to an essay in *The Philosophical Review* (V., 4, July, 1896), where I have discussed this subject at somewhat greater length.

²Spinoza, *Traité théologico-politique*, Chap. vi, (in *Œuvres*, translated by Saisset, t. II., pp. 71-72).

terms ; and by thus breaking the continuity of nature, or rather, by thus studying nature in a discontinuous manner (what we inevitably have to do), we are liable to commit the error, unfortunately so common, of objectifying our subjective states, and believing that discontinuity exists not in our conceptions only, but in nature as well. Moreover, where the connexion between one of the secondary or immediate causes with which we have to deal and the rest of natural phenomena is not easily or accurately discoverable, the tendency to make of the disconnexion an objective reality grows in proportion, and this again engenders the belief (we might say the *feeling*) that those immediate causes are independent causes, which may either agree or disagree with the rest of reality we designate by the name of nature. For obvious reasons, this erroneous habit is particularly exhibited in our judgments relating to human conduct, whose springs are to us generally unknown (an ignorance lying, as showed by Spinoza, at the root of the illusory belief in the freedom and autonomy of the will) ; and, although we may correct our judgments and plainly recognise our error, the error, having been organised as a habit, continues, as in the case of the moral feelings, to be our unconscious guide, and to vitiate our arguments ; it makes us forget, in our usual ratiocinations, that we have changed our premises, our fundamental principles, and leads us into the belief that the old conclusions and ideas are still legitimate. It is, indeed, a curious fact to notice that, as a general rule, it does not occur to our philosophers that, the whole foundation of philosophy having been relaid, all human conceptions must be radically changed : they prefer to accept the current conceptions, accusing our predecessors of having been poor logicians, who had the most wonderful gift of deriving right conclusions from wrong premises.

A very striking illustration of the habit referred to in the preceding paragraph is presented by the writings of Dr. Carus. I have already called attention (indeed, attention has been called to this for several hundred years) to the inconsistency and incongruity in saying that we are natural phenomena, and affirming, at the same time, that we can, or may, oppose or follow, disagree with or conform to, natural phenomena. Expressions of this kind may, no doubt, be used metaphorically ; but Dr. Carus seems to take them in a literal sense, and make of such propositions the very foundations of his ethics. One of the most important definitions with which he sets forth ; one which he constantly reasserts, in one form or another, is, as I have had occasion to notice, that "individuals

are moral in so far as they conform with the cosmos, in so far as they *become* one with the All," and immoral in so far "as their conduct does *not* agree" with the laws of the universe.¹ And, in order to exculpate his "God" (i. e., the "cosmos") from the everlasting accusation of being responsible for the evil existing in the world, Dr. Carus (although he might have given an irrefutable answer by saying that an unconscious cosmos can be neither responsible nor irresponsible) says: "The constitution of the universe is such that we reap as we have sown. When we say 'we' it is understood that it means not our present individualised existence only, but our entire Karma, past, present, and future. It includes all the causes of our being. . . . Thus it becomes apparent that not God is guilty of the evil conditions of our state of being, but we ourselves."²

I need not insist on the contradictory nature of such statements, when compared with the first principles of the monistic philosophy; on the presentation of man as different from nature, or, in the words of Spinoza, as an empire within another empire. The contradiction itself is, I think, sufficiently obvious; while the cause of it, its psychological source, I hope to have made clear. I cannot, however, abstain from referring to the candid answer given to the embarrassing question of the origin of evil by one of the greatest exponents of monism—Spinoza himself.

Good and evil, perfection and imperfection, he says, are not external conditions inhering in the objects of nature: they are modes of thought, abstractions used for the purpose of comparison. Of a work of human art we say it is more or less perfect according as it is more or less adapted to the purposes for which it was *designed* by man. Through our repeated experiences we arrive at the conception of certain conditions that must be fulfilled in order to accomplish a proposed end in the best possible manner; and this end, as represented in consciousness before it is realised, is an ideal to which the object to be attained must conform, and a deviation from which we consider an imperfection. This, however, always presupposes an *end* in view, a purpose; but of an object which is made for no end or purpose we cannot say that it is either perfect or imperfect, there being no term of comparison. Once, therefore, we have discarded the idea that there is an intelligent design in universal phenomena, the problem of whether things be perfect or imperfect, in their relations to the whole cosmos, becomes entirely unmeaning; and our endeavors to give it a meaning are based

¹ *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 208, 315, 321. The italics are mine.

² *The Monist*, Vol. IV., 3, p. 413: "Ethics and Cosmic Order."

“rather on a prejudice than on a true knowledge of nature”; on the prejudice, namely, that nature aims at the attainment of special ends.¹ As to the origin of good and evil, they have, no doubt, as all else, their source, their cause, in the very essence of God; they are, however, subjective states existing only in our minds, but which, considered in relation to God, have no significance, in the sense of antagonistic realities. Right and wrong are equally indifferent to God, since they represent emotional conditions of joy and grief, of which God is not capable; and it is only in a figurative sense that we can say we disagree with God or sin against God.²

Among the causes to which the inconsistency of developmental ethics is traceable might also be mentioned the belief in the freedom of the will, which, although rejected in principle, has left profound marks even in the minds of the most thorough-going determinists. This important subject, however, would compel me to extend this article beyond the space at my command. The reader, I think, will have no difficulty in applying the principles of the last paragraphs to the unconscious survival of the free-will philosophy.

¹ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Pt. IV., Introduction; also, *Lettre à Blyenbergh* (in *Œuvres*, t. III., pp. 402-404).

² *Lettre à Blyenbergh* (in *Œuvres*, t. III., pp. 395-397).

IS ETHICS POSSIBLE?

IN REPLY TO MR. ANTONIO LLANO.

BY THE EDITOR.

ANTONIO LLANO, a philosopher of very outspoken views, has made his mark both as an author and an editor. His monthly magazine, *El Pensamiento Contemporáneo*, which was devoted to philosophy, history, and science, contained Spanish translations of articles by the most noted men of our time, Tyndall, Maudsley, Huxley, Sayce, Wallace, G. J. Romanes, Spencer, Crispi, Andrew D. White, John Stallo, F. Max Müller, Mivart, Prince Kropotkin, Ingersoll, and others; and Mr. Llano's own books deal with philosophical, ethical, and religio-philosophical problems.¹ I am glad that a man of Mr. Llano's calibre takes an interest in the philosophy of *The Open Court* and *The Monist*, but regret to see that in his attempts at being consistent, he becomes one-sided, and that through following his one-sided line of thought he is not aware of the inconsistencies to which his aspiration of being rigidly logical leads him.

Mr. Llano claims to be a consistent Spinozist, and his Spinozism is more Spinozistic than that of Spinoza himself. He believes in absolute determinism which, in his opinion, is identical with fatalism, involving a surrender of both the freedom of will and of morality. In his philosophy there is no room for "the possible." Logical possibility is based upon assumptions and actual possibility is limited to reality. Everything not real is impossible, for the course of the world's evolution is predetermined in its minutest details. Ethics is therefore built upon a fallacy: the *ought* presupposes the *can*, but there is only the *must*. "A scoundrel is as necessarily a scoundrel as a horse is a horse." From

¹ *El Cristianismo ante La Filosofía, La Moral y La Historia.*

this standpoint, which is a most rigid fatalism, Mr. Llano charges me with inconsistency, which, as he declares, is due to a conflict between feeling and judgment. If I were not biassed by heredity and tradition, I should see that there are no such things as right and wrong and that my system of ethics is built upon an assumption. In reply I shall briefly state my reasons for believing in ethics and in the reality of the moral ought.

Let us first recapitulate the problem of free will, for here the root of our difference lies.

Freedom of will is a condition in which a man can do as he pleases, and it is a matter of course that in such a case he will necessarily act according to his character. Is that incompatible with determinism? Not at all! If the wills of certain people are free, an honest man will unhesitatingly resist temptation, while a thief under the very same conditions will steal. All actions, which result from the specific character of a man, are actions of his own and of his free will; and yet they are performed with necessity according to the irrefragable law of cause and effect.

It may be that Mr. Llano will object to this definition of free will, because he defines free will as a will that is not determined at all. To which objection I reply that I, too, reject that kind of free will; but I submit that a will which is not determined at all, not even by its own nature, is not a free will, but pure haphazard. Such a conception of free will is nonsensical; and, in addition, such a kind of free will, if it existed, far from being an indispensable condition of ethics, would make all ethics futile. What would be the use of trying to influence men by preaching ethics and by building up character if a man's decisions were not determined by his character?

Mr. Llano has the right to propose for his own philosophy any definition of free will he likes; but if he wishes to understand me, he must at least for the time being accept my definition, which regards that will as free which enjoys the liberty of acting according to its own nature.

If this definition of free will be granted, it will be readily seen that freedom permeates nature in all its domains. When zinc is dissolved in hydrochloric acid (HCl), the acid is decomposed, its chlorine unites with the zinc, forming chloride of zinc (ZnCl₂), whilst its hydrogen escapes in a gaseous form. The elements act in strict agreement with their nature, but not because there is a power that forces them to combine and separate. If the zinc were endowed with consciousness and speech, it would say, "I like

to join the chlorine"; and the chlorine would avow, "Zinc is preferable to hydrogen." It is possible that the hydrogen would feel the smart of a jilted lover; but, then, it mixes with the air and is quickly comforted, for it will soon find another consort.

While it is a stretch of imagination to impute human sentiments to the chemical elements, there are, nevertheless, certain analogies between psychical and non-psychical phenomena, and the most obvious resemblance consists in the difference of primary and secondary movements. Primary movements have their ground in a quality of the moving thing, as the falling stone and the combination of oxygen with carbon into carbonic acid in the flame, etc. Secondary movements are due to push or pull, which is an external influence or impulse, as the stone thrown up and the cart drawn by a horse. Primary movements are acts of liberty, secondary movements are acts performed under constraint against the nature of the moving bodies. The needle of a magnet points toward the north spontaneously, for it is the nature of magnetised iron to adjust its position in conformity to the magnetic currents of the earth; but if the needle be pushed aside and is turned toward the south it suffers violence; and if it could feel its condition and express it in words, it would complain of compulsion.

So long as the character of a thing remains the same its primary motions will be the same under the same conditions; and if the character be changed, as for instance by magnetising a piece of iron, its behavior will change accordingly.

Mr. Llano is apparently under the illusion, which is very common among philosophers, that the laws of nature are metaphysical entities, and he believes that to them is given dominion over all things in heaven and on earth. Thus the cosmic order which is constituted by their harmony does not appear to him grand and beautiful, but awful and oppressive. He says:

"In whatever direction we turn, the austere and implacable monster of Necessity rises before us, proclaiming, by his very silence, that he is the eternal and, therefore, the irrevocable. He cannot be moved, for he has no heart; nor convinced, for he has no brain; he is an automaton made of inflexible material; and if we recognise him as our master, we must be satisfied to watch in submissive resignation the everlasting motions of the wonderful and awful mechanism."

Natural laws are not tyrants; they are not powers which dominate over things and creatures; the laws of nature are formulas which describe the actions of objects according to their nature so as to make it possible to foredetermine the results of given conditions. Determinism does not mean that the various things are com-

pelled by an external force ; it means that there is stability and regularity in nature. Thus the law of gravitation is only a comprehensive statement of the actions of gravitating bodies. The stone does not fall to the ground at the bidding of Newton's formula, but on account of its own gravity.

Mr. Llano's monster of Necessity is the child of an antiquated metaphysicism ; it is bred in the close air of the philosopher's study, and will never be believed by those who feel the thrill of real life in their hearts. But suppose he could infuse this idea into the artist, the inventor, the poet, the man who dares to do and to achieve, would it not quench the fire of their youth? Would they not turn away in submissive resignation from their own aspirations at the thought that whatever happens takes place according to irrevocable laws : that Moloch Necessity is everything ; we are nothing but tools in his hands ?

Necessity has two meanings : (1) inevitableness or determinableness, meaning that which unfailingly will be,¹ and (2) compulsion, a condition by which something is forced or compelled to act in a certain way by some external power. If necessity is to be identified with compulsion we had better abandon determinism as a superstition which is as untrue in theory as it is baneful in practical life, and speak simply of the describability of the course of future events in the measure of our knowledge of the nature of things.

That every single particle of the world is ensouled with freedom, that it acts differently under different conditions, but always according to its nature, is an important truth which we should never lose sight of ; but its true significance increases with the unfoldment of organised life. With the appearance of consciousness the powers of nature reach a higher stage of freedom having new potentialities ; and, choice having been made possible, right and wrong, goodness and badness, virtue and vice are introduced. That indifference of all actions of which Mr. Llano speaks does not exist in the world of conscious life. With cognition, necessarily the possibility of error originates, and thus when the blind impulses of inorganic nature rise into the realm of conscious aspiration we have sin and righteousness.

Mr. Llano is under a radical misapprehension of facts when he claims that between the action of Jesus and Judas Iscariot there is no difference of kind but "only of degree," because the immoral is

¹ The word is composed of *ne*, the negation, and of a derivative from *cedere*, to go away, signifying that which will not disappear, that which will stay.

in his opinion merely "a state of relative undevelopment." We might as well say that there is no error in the world, for error is merely a state of less developed truth; that there is no missing an aim, for missing is simply a state of not yet having reached a place. Failures and mistakes, however, do not originate by mere differences of degree; they are instances of following a wrong direction. Evil, error, vice, sin, are not merely negative quantities; they are positive factors as much as virtues, knowledge, and noble achievements. If I say $2+2=5$ and act accordingly, it is not merely a not-yet-completed but a wrong computation.

While it is quite true that a criminal is the product of conditions and can to that extent as little help being a criminal as a horse can help being a horse, it is not true that for that reason the distinction between badness and goodness ceases. A diamond can help being a diamond as little as glass can help being glass, but for that reason a piece of glass is not of the same value as a diamond.

To understand how a criminal has become a criminal will no doubt make those who judge his deeds considerate and compassionate, but it will be no argument for looking upon him as a saint or letting his crimes go unrebuked. On the other hand, a genius has no reason for boasting. He, too, is the product of conditions. The doctrine that we are by God's grace what we are has acquired a new sense in the light of scientific considerations.¹

The scientific view taken of crime and virtue is the beginning of a new era in mankind, which was anticipated in the East by Buddha and in the West by Christ. Our judiciary is not as yet administered from the Buddhist-Christian point of view, but follows the principle of retaliation. Instead of treating crime as a disease, we punish crime. Instead of educating the criminal and creating conditions under which the disease of immorality will be cured we torture him, well knowing that this method has the tendency of ruining him altogether. The times, however, are changing now. Our penal code is slowly being adapted to the new world-conception, and the criminal condemned to die is no longer tortured as in former centuries, but executed with as little pain as possible.

¹Buddhism speaks of the time of grace in somewhat the same sense as Christianity. When we receive instruction that is beneficial and leads us on the path of salvation to Nirvāna it is no merit of ours, but a grace that is offered us, as we read in the Jataka tales:

"If in this present time of Grace
You fail to reach the happy state,
Long will you suffer deep remorse."

—Trans. by T. W. Rhys Davids, p. 157.

It is true, as Mr. Llano says, that "we are natural phenomena"; but we are not blind or unconscious things; we are sentient beings. Sentiency and corporeal objectivity are two abstractions representing different qualities of the same reality. As such they are radically distinct but not separate. Every subjective feeling is the psychical aspect of a cerebral commotion; and as every cerebral commotion possesses a definite form, so every feeling is distinct in kind. The objectivity of the world can thus, according to the varying forms of objects, be impressed upon the subjectivity of sentient organisms, and a sight-sensation of a definite form grows by repetition to represent the object that causes it. The subjectivity of the human soul is practically a comprehensive inventory of the surrounding world and its relations, serving as a guide through life or as a means of adaptation to conditions. In other words, the form of subjectivity is the product of objective influences.

The things of the inorganic world act according to their nature and so do living animal organisms. But the nature of living animal organisms does not consist of purely mechanical or chemical properties; they exhibit a new feature, which is called mentality or the representative value of feelings. The animal mind is determined in its actions by ideas and not by pull or push or chemical affinity.

Now it is the appearance of consciousness in the cosmic evolution which renders ethics possible. A thinking being is not like a stone; it does not follow the first impulse; a thinking being deliberates before it acts, and comes at last to a decision which is executed. This is a higher phase of freedom, for it adds the possibility of choice, and man, the animal of abstract thought, can form ideals of a state of things, not as it is, but as it ought to be.

Mr. Llano will make an objection here. He will say that in the realm of the soul the same determinism obtains that rules in the domain of purely physical phenomena. Now I grant that psychical phenomena are as much determined as physical phenomena; but here as there we are confronted with freedom. There is only this difference, that that which determines the decision of a man is his character. Ideas are the factors and the responsiveness of ideas consists of other qualities than mechanical push and chemical affinity. It is true that the strongest idea will prevail over weaker ideas, but the strength of ideas cannot be measured in foot-pounds. The strength of ideas depends upon various other factors, among which the conviction of their truth is perhaps the most important one.

The appearance of the soul is not a break in nature, but the

product of a natural evolution. That the continuity from the formation of crystals to the aspirations of human beings is uninterrupted is not an evidence of man's degradation, but on the contrary it proves that the world as a whole is more than a haphazard conglomeration of matter in motion. There is a teleoarchy¹ of some kind—a cosmic order which prompts aspirations in a definite direction. This teleoarchy works blindly in the lower spheres of nature and acquires consciousness in man. Man is himself a natural phenomenon; but he is a phenomenon in which the eternal conditions of being can be reflected. Thus the transient can become a mirror that pictures the immutable; the particular can comprehend the universal; that which is conditional can grasp its own conditions and trace them back to the unconditioned order of existence.

The old supernaturalism which assumes that some extramundane personality, power, or entity enters into the natural world by a break of the cosmic order, has become untenable; but for that reason we need not deny the existence of the moral tendencies that manifest themselves in the world-process. We propose a new supernaturalism, which believes that the potentialities of a *sursum*, of an aspiration to rise higher, are contained in the natural. Man forms a higher empire in nature which is above the physical. It is true that obedience to the law that conditions man's evolution constitutes morality, but the highest morality imaginable is a state of mind in which man's sentiments have become an incarnation of the world-order. The man who is obedient to the laws of morality still feels himself the subject or slave of a power which he apprehends to be stronger than himself. But he can so love justice, righteousness, kindness, charity, that his whole nature is determined by these qualities. He can become an incarnation of these aspirations, so as to be identified with them. That is the state of heart which characterised the Buddha ideal of the Buddhists, and that is the gist of the ethics preached by Christ. There is no longer any need of requesting obedience to the moral law of a man whose sentiments are aglow with it and whose will is bent on realising it.

According to Mr. Llano, every man is the product of conditions, and we are what we are by necessity; therefore, the must governs us, and there is no sense in speaking of the ought. The premise is true, the conclusion is wrong. Mr. Llano forgets that

¹The old teleology, whose workings are extraneous, is wrong; the world has not been designed like a watch; there is not a demiurge who in the fashion of a human artifex constructed the universe. But there is an intrinsic teleoarchy, an orderly arrangement of the actions that take place in the world, the nature of which is most obviously apparent in the harmony of mathematics.

the ought, the ideal, by which a man allows himself to be guided, is also a factor and, indeed, a most important factor among the determining causes. One of the conditions that make a man is his own thought. A man who cherishes the idea of his responsibility will act differently from the man who imagines that he is irresponsible. The idea that we are unfree, that we are products of chance and helplessly doomed to be determined by conditions, is oppressive (as Mr. Llano's case proves), while the thought of our responsibility gives strength and rouses us to vigorous action. The man inspired with the idea of responsibility will investigate and try to learn, the man who thinks he is unfree will be indifferent and passive. Considering the importance of ideas, as the determining factors of man's actions, is it not necessary to devote a special study to the subject for the sake of distinguishing between wholesome and injurious ideas?

In ethics we ask which ideas are wholesome and which injurious, and the answer in brief is that the truth is wholesome and untruth injurious. There is no need here of entering into details, for the question has been discussed repeatedly, and we shall emphasise the fact only that truth does not mean mere correctness of knowledge but also and mainly truthfulness of heart.

Ethics would be futile if man's action did not depend upon his beliefs and habits. Since his beliefs and habits are the main determinant factors of his fate for his own personal good as well as that of the whole race, ethics is as necessary for human conduct in general as mechanics is indispensable for mechanical engineering. Indeed, ethics belongs to the necessities of life, it is the bread of life, and a wrong ethics is not less injurious than poison that is used for food.

Mr. Llano declares that "the ethical ought is erected on an assumption of some kind,—on an *if*." Ethics has sense only for him who desires to attain the aim and end of ethical aspirations, not for him who has other ends, or no end at all.

This same objection was made to ethics as a science years ago from another standpoint. Mr. Salter in defence of intuitionist ethics granted that a scientific inquiry into facts may teach morality to him who longs for truth and for a life of truth, "but," says he, "the fact is that we may desire other things."

My answer to Mr. Llano is the same as it was to Mr. Salter. "The ultimate question of ethics is not, what *we desire* but what *is desired of us*."

When we want to have truth, we must drop our personal likes

and dislikes. Exact science eliminates the subjective and aims at a purely objective statement of facts. He who wants to think correctly must leave aside the *I*'s and the *me*'s. It is no exaggeration to say that the intrusion of self is always the main source of error.

While it is wise to drop all *I*'s and *me*'s, we grant that the world is full of them, and we must take their presence into consideration. And who can deny that the thwarted endeavors of self-willed men teach us a most impressive lesson?

The man who desires pleasures and does not stop to think what is desired of him, may have, for a time at least, pleasures; but then he must take all the consequences of his actions. The man who delights in crime may actually commit crime, but the evils that result from crime will come not only upon those against whom he trespasses, but finally upon himself also. A truly scientific ethics knows of no assumptions; it gives information as to the consequences of deeds; and the sufferings of life, including the final dissolution of ourselves in death, set us to thinking how we can escape evil. Here the answers may be many, but there is one only which I deem to be right, it is the answer of Buddha and of Christ, both being practically the same, and these injunctions are substantially the same that are taught by the ethics of science. According to Buddha it is the eightfold noble path of righteousness that leads to salvation, implying an extermination of all selfishness, hatred, and passion, which are the three roots of all evil. And Christ says:

"A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another" (John, 13, 34), and, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you" (Matth., 5, 44, and Luke, 6, 35).

There is a time in the cosmic evolution when consciousness originates; and there is again a time when the idea of self in its full contrast to the not-self dawns upon consciousness. But then again comes a time when the relation of the self to the whole begins to be understood. That is the origin of ethics, and that is the meaning when people become anxious about themselves, about their soul, about their fate and the destiny of their lifework after death. Then such questions are asked, What shall I do to enter life eternal? These aspirations are a transition which lead from the question, "What do I desire?" to the other question, "What is desired of me?" There is no assumption whatever in scientific ethics. He who does not ask the question, "What is desired of me?" will remain stagnant at a certain phase of his evolution and will reap the consequences of his thoughtlessness. He is comparable to the anthropoid who does not want to become man. He will

either remain what he is, if that be possible, or share the fate of the unprogressive anthropoid: his name will be blotted out from the book of life.

There is this peculiarity about ethics, that there are many roads leading to it. The man who longs for happiness will find that there is no absolute happiness possible, and the best thing he can do is to drop altogether his hankering after pleasures and lead a moral life. On this basis a hedonistic ethics is possible. A man who is egotistic and ambitious will find that there is no success in life possible except he surrender his vanity. And on this basis an ethics of egotism can be erected. All these different methods, insufficient though they may be, lead practically to the same conclusion, pointing beyond the self of man and teaching him to seek a purpose higher than his limited life and individuality.

The new solution of the problem of self (which in detail has been explained elsewhere) brings about a radical change of attitude, for upon the proper solution of the psychological problem all other problems of philosophy, religion, and ethics depend. The new conception of self destroys the illusion of the limitedness and narrowness of self as held by the psychologists of the old school, and shows us the human soul as the divine incarnation of the eternal prototype of rationality and moral endeavor, revealing both its whence in the past and its whither in the future.

The self in the old sense is destroyed and with it the vanity of all selfishness. But there is a new self which takes the place of the old limited self; and the new self is infinite in its potentiality, for the new self identifies itself with the eternal conditions of existence. Our eyes are opened, and we discern those subtle influences which build up the structure of our soul and are as invisible to the uninitiated as for instance the geometrical proportions of the barn or the meadow are nonentities to the sheep.

If it is true, as Master Eckhart says, that man is what he loveth, the new self is truth incarnate, for it loveth truth above everything, and consists in the endeavor of living out the truth, realising it more and more in comprehension as well as in practical application. The old Adam must go, and the new Adam is a higher man, no longer a particular ego but divinity incarnate, no longer an isolated individual but the universal realised, the ideal that has become flesh.

The main ideas underlying the ethics of Christianity are true, but the commonly accepted church-dogmas and their interpretations are wrong. As useful inventions generally precede scientific

comprehension, so the precepts of practical morality were discovered long before our sages could explain the psychological basis of these apparent paradoxes. The Religion of Science is needed because science is sufficiently advanced to-day to catch up with religion. Religion (practically applied religion, as taught by Lao-Tsze, the Buddha, the Prophets, and Christ) was in advance of science by more than two millenniums, and it is the science of religion or theology that is unprogressive. Not that theology is wrong in principle, but it is slow in accomplishing its task. Not that we must have less theology or science in religion, but more. Not that we must abolish science in religion, but we must perfect it. For science (i. e., genuine science, not the one-sided productions of the average sciolist) is the comforter that illumines the world and brings about the fulfilment, the *πληρωσις*, so dearly longed for by St. John and the early Christians.

* * *

Mr. Llano discovers the source of what he is pleased to call the inconsistencies of Developmental Ethics in "the law of the conflict between feeling and judgment." He says:

"The nature of this law will be readily seen by an illustration. A nervous woman may take the five cartridges out of the five chambers of a pistol, count them and hold them in her hand; and yet, if the weapon be pointed at her, she will scream with fright, and not improbably faint away. Her judgment, it is evident, tells her, beyond all doubt, that it is impossible that any harm should come to her from the unloaded weapon; but her deeply rooted feelings, organised by heredity or by association, or both, unavoidably impel her to act in opposition to her correct judgment."

Mr. Llano forgets that sentiments are very important factors in the makeup of man's soul. To disregard our feelings for the sake of some logical argument would be as wrong as to be swayed by feelings alone without subjecting them to a careful analysis and revision. Man's sentiments are the sediment of an immeasurably long chain of experiences, partly inherited, partly personal, and are of too great importance to be neglected or to be regarded as utterly without foundation. Our sentiments are sometimes more reliable than our logical deductions in which we are too apt to omit an important factor. Thus, for instance, in the illustration which Mr. Llano proposes, we should decidedly object to a behavior such as he mentions, and far from blaming the woman who screams when an unloaded revolver is pointed at her, we blame the man who handles the revolver carelessly. Almost all the accidents that happen are due to toying with weapons which were supposed not

to be loaded. I know of a case in which two brothers, who have great experience with guns, had unloaded a revolver the construction of which they investigated, and one pointed it at the other, when all of a sudden the revolver went off, and the ball went right through the head of the other boy, entering near the nose and coming out near the ear. The young man, an officer of the militia, assured me that he could conscientiously declare on oath that to his knowledge there could not have been a shot in the revolver. He added, "It was a lesson that I shall never forget." Fortunately, the bullet did not kill his brother, and after several weeks of suffering he recovered without any serious injury, leaving only a small mark on his face. But not all cases end so happily, and it is advisable for every one to mind sentiments, because they sometimes represent the influence of factors overlooked in so-called scientific expositions which are seemingly faultless, and, so far as pure logic is concerned, unquestionably correct.

* * *

And now in conclusion I may be allowed to discuss briefly a point not mentioned by Mr. Llano, which, however, is closely connected with the subject.

We understand that ethics as a science is the product of a continuous evolution; we know that the religious leaders in the world have found the right solution instinctively. As a genius makes an important invention, or as a poet finds by inspiration the word that thrills thousands of hearts, so the moral teachers of mankind taught lessons of highest morality at a time when their truth was so far from being scientifically comprehensible that it appeared paradoxical—naturally so, for it is paradoxical from the old standpoint.

The great unknown inventor of the wheel was not familiar with the science of applied mechanics as it is developed in our time, but he is one of those that laid the basis of it, and his invention is still the corner-stone in that grand edifice. The same is true in ethics of him who first proclaimed the law of love and charity. The souls of these men are with us to-day, constituting the kingdom that is within us. We are the continuance of aspirations that began long before we were born.

Considering the close connexion of the present with the past, we prefer reform to rescission and deem a purification of the traditional religious conceptions better than abandoning them. It is true that the words God, soul, immortality, and religion have become new; they have become more definite, more exact and less mythological, but that is exactly what must be expected. History

is a change and a growth. He that sat upon the throne said: ". . . . But behold, I make all things new!"

I know that at present both the conservatives and the liberals look with suspicion upon this method of pouring new wine into old bottles, but the time will come when they will understand it. The situation may be briefly explained by a simile. There were in former times people who believed in mathematics as if it consisted of lines and circles and other figures that were living in heaven and came down from time to time upon earth in a miraculous way for the sake of helping poor mortal man, calculating distances, erecting buildings, constructing bridges, tunnelling mountains, and other feats of engineering. But a schism arose: there were men who declared that mathematics did not exist at all and that every belief in mathematics was a superstition. There was one among them who said that mathematical truths (if they deserve the name at all), so far from being true, are actually wrong; they are "purely mental" and refer to "purely imaginary objects." He claimed "there exist no points without magnitudes; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right." Believing that "the points, lines, circles, and squares" which the mathematician "has in his mind are simple copies of the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience," he claimed that the science of mathematics consists of "assumptions" which are not only faulty but even "inconceivable." This view was actually defended by Mr. John Stuart Mill,¹ and it characterises most drastically and consistently the attitude of all negativism, drawing the ultimate conclusions of the main tenets of the nominalistic philosophy.

Such is also the contrast between the parties of the conservatives and freethinkers. The conservatives believe that God is a being; some freethinkers declare that God does not exist at all. There is on the one hand a literal belief in a traditional mythology, and on the other hand a flat denial of the truths of religion. Now I take the liberty to differ from Mr. John Stuart Mill. I believe in mathematics, and I believe that the definitions of and theorems concerning mathematical lines designate truths which are not only real but super-real. I do not believe that they are beings of any kind who lead a life of bliss somewhere in heaven; they are not corporeal, nor do they possess astral bodies; still less can they be said to be metaphysical entities. Nevertheless they are not non-existent, for they are the eternal relations that apply to any possi-

¹ See John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, 8th edition, Chapter V., pp. 168, et seq.

ble world ; they are absolute truths whose being is indestructible and whose existence is the law that conditions the formation of every particular existence.

The same is true of God. The believer in the letter of his mythology looks upon the views editorially upheld in *The Open Court*, as atheistic ; and the freethinker criticises them for making compromises with superstition. Nevertheless, we are serious in saying that the average atheist is wrong in flatly denying the existence of God, while the old-fashioned believer is a pagan—that is to say, a man who believes in the letter of a myth and has no idea of its significance ; he surrenders the substance for the vessel in which it is contained ; he loses the reality by holding on to its shadow.

This position is a reconciliation of two contrasts, but it is not a compromise. It gives to science what belongs to science, and to ethics what belongs to ethics. By making ethics a science applied to practical life, it shows us the truth of the old religious ideals in a new light ; it renders it possible for us to grasp with scientific comprehension what our fathers were feeling after, groping in the dark for. And this is what we call The Religion of Science.

MISCELLANEOUS.

ELISABET NEY.

We publish in this number, as our frontispiece, a photogravure of Schopenhauer's bust made by Elisabet Ney, a disciple of Rauch, and one of our most prominent American artists, who, before she came to the United States, acquired an enviable European fame. She has modelled from life the busts of many famous men of science, among whom were Humboldt, Jacob Grimm, and Liebig; of statesmen and heroes, among them Bismarck and Garibaldi; of artists, among these Kaulbach and Joachim; of kings, among these George of Hanover, and a statue of Ludwig II. of Bavaria, now at the celebrated castle of Linderhoff, etc., etc. While she lived at Frankfort in 1859, Schopenhauer had not yet attained to the fame of his later years, but Elisabet Ney was interested in the great prophet of pessimism. She was well acquainted with his works, and foresaw the influence which the grumbling misanthrope would wield over all generations to come. She knew very well that he was a woman hater who thought that women could never accomplish anything either in science or in the arts. But this only made her find it the more attractive and humorous to converse with him and prove to him what women could do. Schopenhauer was very much impressed with the young sculptress, and confessed to friends of his, as seen in many of his printed letters, that she was an exception to the rule. While he was sitting to have his bust taken, he was as a rule animated and full of interesting gossip, mostly of a philosophical nature. In a copy of his works presented to Elisabet Ney he wrote: "To my most talented and amiable young friend, Miss Elisabet Ney, I donate this copy of a profound and serious work." The signature which he attached to these words has been photographically reproduced, and appears under the frontispiece to this number of *The Open Court*. The great pessimist was more vain than might be suspected in such an old grumbler, and he did not care to appear before posterity with a sullen countenance. Once when a photographer took his picture, it seemed to him a failure on account of its grim expression. This might have been very appropriate for a man who proclaimed the philosophy of the miserableness of all life, but he objected to going down to posterity in that shape. He at once called for a bottle of wine and drank it all before having his picture taken a second time. Elisabet Ney is still in possession of both these photographs, which are in the shape of daguerreotypes. They have faded and are on the verge of disappearing, but Mr. Copelin, and the Franklin Engraving Company of Chicago, have, by enlarging and retouching them, succeeded in restoring the original forms, from which they have been reduced again to their original size. They appear on page 261.

The two other pictures on page 261 are taken from photographs in the possession of Dr. Lindorme, of Chicago.

Schopenhauer writes to Assessor von Doss, Munich, March 1, 1860;

"The sculptress, Elisabet Ney, a grand-niece of Marshal Ney, arrived here from Berlin during October, in order to make my bust. She is twenty-four years old, very beautiful, and indescribably amiable. She works by herself in a room that belongs to my present residence, which is much larger and prettier than the old one. Almost every day for several weeks she had her dinner ordered from a restaurant which is situated in my house, and joined me in the afternoon at my coffee when I returned home. Several times she has gone with me on a walk along the Main. We harmonise wonderfully. My bust has been exhibited for fourteen days, and everybody thinks that it is extremely like me and beautifully chiselled. It is intended to be taken to Berlin, where copies of it are to be made and sold. At Christmas Miss Ney intended to be in Berlin, whither she goes *via* Hanover, where she is engaged to make the king's bust in marble. My bust has been ordered sent to her, and I have heard nothing of it since. She has been seen in Münster, where her father lives. The bust will probably be heard of."

Schopenhauer frequently mentions Elisabet Ney's name in his correspondence, and, in a letter to Dr. Ernst Otto Lindner, of Berlin, dated November 21, 1859, he says:

"Are you acquainted with the artist Miss Ney? If not, you have lost much. I did not believe that such an amiable girl could exist."

Elisabet Ney is now living in Austin, Texas, where she has a beautiful studio at Hyde Park. She is president of the Texas Art Academy, and has been repeatedly engaged by the State of Texas to model busts and statues of Texas governors.

PROF. EDWARD DRINKER COPE.—DIED APRIL 12, 1897.

It is with profound regret that we record the death of Prof. E. D. Cope of Philadelphia. In him we not only mourn with the world at large the loss of an accomplished scientist from whom great and valuable achievements were yet expected, but we also experience the personal bereavement of a valued contributor who has from the first greatly aided in the promotion of the work of *The Open Court* and *The Monist*. Prof. Edward Drinker Cope was born in Philadelphia, July 28, 1840, and received his education at the University of Pennsylvania, the Smithsonian Institute, and in Europe. He held the chair of Natural Sciences at Haverford College from 1864-1867, and subsequently became paleontologist to the United States Geological Survey. He was for many years Professor of Zoölogy and Comparative Anatomy in the University of Pennsylvania, a post which he occupied with signal success to the day of his death. Professor Cope was an indefatigable worker; he was the editor-in-chief of the *American Naturalist*, to which he constantly contributed, and a prolific writer in the other scientific journals. His chief work was in the paleontology of the United States, with which his name as an organiser and original investigator is indissolubly associated. Besides his systematic treatises, he is the author of not less than three hundred and fifty memoirs and scientific papers on zoölogy, anatomy, and paleontology. At the time of his death he was President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Professor Cope's contributions to *The Open Court* began early and were extremely varied, showing him to be a man who was interested not only in the special problems of science, but in their application to the graver questions of philosophy and life. His article on "Evolution and Idealism" in Volume I. of *The Open Court*, his later articles on "What is Mind," and on "Ethical Evolution," his discussions of vexed social questions, such as marriage and divorce, the negro-question, strikes, etc., and the instance which is perhaps freshest in the minds of recent readers, his discussion of the Monroe Doctrine during the late Venezuelan troubles, prove his breadth of interest. He was determined in his convictions and bold and impulsive in their expression, qualities which gave vigor and cogency to his expositions and which rarely failed to involve him in controversies which displayed to the best his polemical abilities. His articles in *The Monist* as well as his book on *The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*, which we recently published, show, for a special scientist, unusual philosophical endowment and are of permanent value. The work on *Organic Evolution* is an extremely concise yet lucid and complete exposition of the theory of development as drawn from the evidence of paleontology and based on the Lamarckian factors, and is designed to supply the *lacuna* which the failure to consider the *causes* of variations had left in the theories of Darwin and Weismann. Professor Cope has gathered in this book the results of all his own researches and those of the American Neo-Lamarckian school generally on the subject of evolution, and has raised points which will stimulate not only evolutionists but psychologists and philosophers for some time to come. His work is on a level with that of the foremost European inquirers, and his name is a brilliant refutation of the idea which is quite current in some circles that America cannot produce scientists of the first rank.

COUNT HOENBROECHT.

In a recently published pamphlet Count Hoenbroecht states his reasons for severing his connexion with the Jesuit order, in whose service he had been for seventeen years, defending its position and policy and wielding a pen that was not without great influence within the circles for which he wrote.

Count Hoenbroecht's statements have excited a great sensation in Germany, and sixteen or more editions of the pamphlet were quickly exhausted. Yet the person who expects to find in it revelations of slander that would throw discredit on the order or support popular prejudices of a lower kind, will be greatly disappointed. In fact, the self-vindications of Count Hoenbroecht, which reveal him to be a man of upright character and earnest Christian endeavor, are in some respects a vindication of the Jesuit order.

Count Hoenbroecht exhibits in his very complaints, which are mainly directed against the suppression of personality, a peculiar respect for the moral earnestness of the order which we cannot help thinking is in many respects nothing but the principle of Catholic Christianity carried to its extreme. He still stands upon the ground of his Roman Catholic faith. He regards confession, in all the rigor in which it is maintained by strict Catholics, as a divine institution, but he resents the slavery to which the Jesuitic mode of confession reduces its members, without at the same time imposing upon the father-confessor the restrictions of inviolable privacy which the Church imposes upon him. At the same time his liberty-loving mind rebels against the straitjacket of Jesuitic education, which, far from fos-

tering an independent spirit, impresses upon every one of its members the peculiar type of Ignatius Loyola's piety, showing an unconcealed contempt for other forms of religious devotion, such as find expression in other Roman Catholic orders. According to the side-lights which incidentally his expressions throw upon the order, the main tendency of Jesuitic institutions is to prevent by well-calculated methods that which American institutions wish to favor most—character-building and self-reliance.

We believe that the ethical maxims of the order, especially of its liberty-destroying tendency, are radically wrong, but at the same time we cannot join in the denunciations which are so commonly held as to be accepted by many as gospel truth. The movement which was inaugurated by Ignatius Loyola may be briefly characterised as a counter-reformation. Its tendency is, as a matter of principle, directed against the spirit of independence that pervaded the Reformation and found expression in the civilisation of the Protestant nations, especially Germany, England, and North America. But while Ignatius Loyola's counter-reformation sets itself against all free development of character that would venture outside or beyond the narrow lines prescribed by Roman Catholic Christianity, it is pure in its motive, honest in its aim, ascetically rigid in its ethics. In a word, the Jesuit system is wrong, but it is not dishonest.

AN EVENING PRAYER.

We received a poem from one of our readers entitled "An Evening Prayer" which is accompanied by a letter expressing the sentiment through which it originated. Our correspondent (who is otherwise unknown to us) writes :

"All the world is looking for a short creed that shall yet contain all essentials and I think that "Trust in Truth" is the best, perhaps the only, formula to satisfy the demand.

"The harmony between Science and Religion will become apparent to the world through the lives and teachings of those who have first reconciled scientific thinking with religious feeling in their own personal experience, and I rejoice as the number of such increases.

"But I also sympathise with those who feel the inevitable pangs of transition from one mode of religious thought to another, for I have suffered them all.

"There are many who doubt that the Religion of Science can be truly a religion at all, and afford consolation in trial; I can testify that it not only satisfies my reason but it has given me—in the words of a Christian hymn—'peace I never knew before.'

"I enclose some lines which record a recent experience of the comfort derived from trusting in truth.

"I send them, not as deserving your attention for poetic merit, but as a tribute to the devotional side of the Religion of Science.

"I hardly suppose you would care to publish them, still you are at liberty to do so if you think they might be of any help to others."

The enclosed evening prayer reads as follows :

"Thou Highest Good confessed,
I hail thee, blessed Truth!
The while my heart oppressed
Doth healing crave and ruth.

" Oh ! may I clearly see,
As day by day I strive,
What laws must honored be,
Would I at joy arrive.

" Why need I sadly miss
The blessings close at hand,
Unsharing others' bliss,
Exiled in native land ?

" *Three guides*, already mine,
I'll trust to lead me on
Where sun of peace doth shine,
A cloudless benizon.

" And one is Faith—that trust
In Nature's tireless power,
That can in darkness thrust
A seed—then wait its flower.

" And next there doth abide
Sweet Hope—of Life the twin.
It cannot be denied ;
It dwells the heart within.

" The trio is complete
With Love—the force divine
That melts our dross with heat,
Till hearts like gold are fine.

" O good and loyal guides !
My wayward footsteps turn.
Where'er the path divides,
Let me the right discern.

• • • • •
" Behold ! my prayer hath wings
To lift my soul from pain.
Self-answering, joy it brings.
None worship Truth in vain."

EMILIE H. DARROW.

ANIMAL SYMBOLISM IN ECCLESIASTICAL ARCHITECTURE. By *E. P. Evans*. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1896. Pages, xii, 315, Price, \$2.00.

Students of the architecture of the Middle Ages are often puzzled to know the meaning of the sculptural figures which are found in such profusion in almost all the ecclesiastical structures of that period. The angels which hover about the altar, the saints peering out from the corners, the Apostles ranged about the arched doorway, the figure of the crucified Christ held aloft,—all these are comprehensible. But what shall be said of the "Execution of the Cat" which is pictured on a column of the cathedral of Tarragona, Spain, or of the "Burial of the Fox" as delineated in the choir of the Strassburg Minster, or of the "Lay of Aristotle" depicted in the church of Saint-Jean in Lyons ?

The present volume, entitled *Animal Symbolism in Ecclesiastical Architecture*, is an attempt to explain some of these apparent absurdities. Indeed, its scope is much larger, for it extends to the work of the missal painter and even to that of the theologian. It is the work of an American long resident in Europe, where he

has had the best of opportunities for studying the subject. As a contribution to American scholarship it will take high rank; and for most Americans it will be an introduction to a new field of study and thought. Heretofore knowledge of this subject must be sought in many a ponderous tome difficult to find and even more difficult to understand. This handsome volume, amply illustrated, will save much wearisome research, and will add materially to the interest already felt in the sculptural figures adorning the cathedrals.

The key to the whole matter lies in the fact that, according to the patristic conception, the visible world was the image or symbol of the invisible world. This applied especially to the animal creation. In the words of Origen, "As God made man in His own image and after His own likeness, so He created the lower animals after the likeness of heavenly prototypes." It is natural, therefore, to find ecclesiastical structures adorned with the figures of those animals to which some spiritual significance was attached. The oldest, most systematic, and most complete treatise on the spiritual significance of the animal and vegetable world is the *Physiologus*. This was probably the work of an Alexandrian Greek, and embodies much of the priestly lore of ancient Egypt. Its popularity led to its translation into many tongues, and there is evidence of the existence of versions of it in Latin, Ethiopic, Arabic, Armenian, Syriac, Icelandic, German, Saxon, Spanish, and Provençal. "Perhaps no book, except the Bible," says Professor Evans, "has ever been so widely diffused among so many peoples and for so many centuries as the *Physiologus*." It served as a convenient manual of instruction in zoölogy and botany, but in the hands of Christian teachers it became merely a treatise on theology interspersed with pious exhortation. At an early period in the history of the Church, the book fell into disfavor and was condemned as heretical; but it was not long until it found a powerful patron in Gregory the Great, who used it freely in expounding the Scriptures. From the seventh century to the twelfth it was highly esteemed as an orthodox compendium of natural history, and it was during this period that most of the translations of it were made. The invention of printing diffused it even more widely, and its translation into the vulgar tongues embodied it in the general literature of Christendom, where it has become the source of many quaint and striking, though often forced, figures of speech. Its scientific value as well as the pious use to which it was put by the theologians are well illustrated by the account which it gives of the lion. "First, when he perceives that the hunters "are pursuing him, he erases his foot-prints with his tail, so that he cannot be traced "to his lair. In like manner, our Saviour, the lion of the tribe of Judah, concealed "all traces of His Godhead, when he descended to the earth and entered into the "womb of the Virgin Mary. Secondly, the lion always sleeps with his eyes open; "so our Lord slept with His body on the Cross, but awoke at the right hand of His "Father. Thirdly, the lioness brings forth her whelps dead and watches over them "until, after three days, the lion comes and howls over them and vivifies them by "his breath; so the Almighty Father recalled to life His only begotten Son, our "Lord Jesus Christ, who on the third day was thus raised from the dead, and will "likewise raise us all up to eternal life."

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries animal symbolism was carried to excess, and the opposition of many ecclesiastics was aroused. About the year 1125 St. Bernard of Clairvaux wrote a letter to William, Abbot of St. Thierry, sharply censuring the practice. "What business," he says, "have those ridiculous monstrosities, those creatures of wonderfully deformed beauty and beautiful deformity before the eyes of studious friars in the courts of cloisters? . . . O God! if one is not

ashamed of these puerilities, why does not one at least spare the expense?" His protest was unavailing. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the transfer of building operations from the hands of the monks to secular companies of masons led to the introduction of a new element. Beast-symbolism was replaced by beast-satire, and as the spirit which resulted in the Reformation grew more aggressive, this satirical tendency increased. A good example of this sort of ornamentation is found in a wood-carving in Ely Cathedral which represents a fox arrayed in a bishop's vestments, preaching to an audience of geese from the text, "God is my witness how I long for you all in my bowels." In the next scene he exemplifies his text by throwing off his holy vestments and hurrying away with a goose. The obscenity of many of these delineations was the natural and inevitable result of the obscenity of the subjects which they satirised.

The final chapter of this work, entitled *Whimseys of Ecclesiology and Symbology*, throws much light upon mediæval ideas and modes of thought. At the same time the extracts from the paper on *Vestiges of the Blessed Trinity in the Material Creation*, published by the Rev. John S. Vaughn in the *Dublin Review* for January, 1893, suggest that we are not yet entirely out of the woods. When it is sought to maintain the truth of a dogma, because every object has three dimensions; because every plant consists of seed, stalk, and flower; because life is "vegetative, sensitive, and rational;" because matter is solid, fluid, and gaseous, and time is past, present, and future;—when all this is seriously attempted by a learned ecclesiastic, it may be questioned whether some of our thinking is not as mediæval as that which lay back of Tertullian's famous criterion, *Credo quia absurdum*.

The value of this volume is much enhanced by the illustrations which accompany the text, and by the appended bibliography which will serve as a guide for those who wish to pursue the subject further.

CARL EVANS BOYD.

HEGEL AS EDUCATOR. By *Frederic Ludlow Luqueer, Ph. D.* Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy, Psychology, and Education. New York: Macmillan & Co. May, 1896. Pages, 185. Price, \$1.00.

The Hegelian cult is steadily on the increase in this and other countries proportionately to its wane in Germany. The fascination which circles about Hegel's indefinite and dazzling profundity, and the wideness of interpretation which may be placed upon his thoughts, are destined to insure his popularity and power even more than the nucleus of truth which resides in his works. In one of the most eloquent passages of the present work, we have a brilliant testimony of the spell which he has cast:

"It needs but little faith to believe that, in the parts [of his thought] not as yet understood, riches are hidden which will repay search. The parts comprehended are but messengers telling of the sleeping princess that lies within, waiting for the kiss of him who loves and dares aright. The strange words and break-brain passages are but the thorny hedge and rough entrance-ways to the beauty, which here as elsewhere answers but to the brave."

And from the experience of one of the students closest to Hegel, the young Russian Baron Boris d'Yxkull, we joyfully learn that Hegel was as difficult to understand when alive as he is now when dead. The Baron writes:

"After the Professor's lecture, I went to the nearest book store, bought all the works of Hegel that had been printed, and in the evening settled myself comfortably in my sofa-corner to read them. But the more I read, and the more attention I tried to fasten on the reading, the less I understood of it; so that after

"struggling for two hours with a proposition without nearing its comprehension, I laid aside the book. But out of curiosity I kept on attending the lectures. I must confess, however, *that I did not understand my own notes, and that I was lacking in needed prefatory knowledge for this science.*"

Having acquired this prefatory knowledge the Baron mastered the great philosopher, and never afterwards travelled without a copy of his *Logic* in his pocket.

And again, we have the following vivid description of Hegel's oral delivery from the pen of Hotho:

"He began haltingly, struggled on, began once more, paused, spoke, reflected —the fitting word seemed ever lacking, but in a moment was given unerringly; it seemed too common, but was inimitably adequate. . . . Now one had seized the clear meaning of a proposition, and hoped for a further step—in vain. The thought, instead of proceeding, circled with similar wording about the same point. But if the attention strayed for a moment and was then duteously turned back, it was punished by seeing that it had lost the connexion. For imperceptibly almost, proceeding by apparently insignificant steps, the full thought had been shown to be limited, to be one-sided; its differences had been developed into contradictions, the victorious solution of which was seen only in the final re-unitement [reconciliation on nobler terms] of what before had been opposed. And so, ever carefully taking up the preceding, in order to unfold its implicate antitheses and then to blend them in richer harmony, the wonderful thought-stream pressed and fought its way along, now dividing, now uniting, hesitating sometimes, then leaping on, and always advancing. But he who could follow with complete understanding, without swerving right or left, felt himself thrilled with adventurous excitement. To what depths were his thoughts taken—ever at the point of losing all that had been won, the toil all in vain, the utmost might of the intellect forced to halt. But in just these depths that powerful spirit moved and worked with calm confidence. Then only did the voice raise itself, the eye sent a gleam over what had been gathered together, and glowed with the still fire of assurance, while with never-lacking words he touched all the heights and depths of the soul. His speech in these moments was so clear and full, so simply truthful, that every one who could grasp it felt as if he himself had been discovering the thought it unfolded."

Throughout the whole of the book of Luqueer, we obtain such delightful glimpses into Hegel's life. The first part of the work is in fact a biography, quite sufficient for the general reader's purpose, although giving an eulogistic as distinguished from a critical, sketch of Hegel's career, and mainly seeking to portray the interests of his life not identified with his philosophy. As its title indicates, it studies Hegel as a student and teacher. The second part contains the thoughts of Hegel on Education systematically arranged. This part is mainly a translation from Thaulow.

μκρκ.

LA TEORIA SOCIOLOGICA DEI PARTITI POLITICI. Reprinted from the *Rassegna di Scienza Sociali e Politici*. By Lorenzo Ratto. Florence, 1893. Pages, 31.

RAFFORTO TRA I PARTITI POLITICI E LA RAPPRESENTANZA. Reprinted from *Antologia Giuridica*. By Lorenzo Ratto. Catania, 1894. Pages, 24.

LA RESPONSABILITÀ DEI PADRONI PER GLI INFORTUNI DEL LAVORO, Reprinted from *Legge*, 1896, Vol. II., p. 603. By Lorenzo Ratto. Rome. Pages, 30.

In these pamphlets we have an illustration of what is going on over the whole field of the social sciences, namely, the examination of old questions from the so-

biological point of view. Much light has thus been shed upon a great variety of subjects, among which are those usually treated under political science and constitutional law. Such a subject is that of political parties, their origin, development, function, etc., and its sociological discussion by the eminent Italian, Dr. Ratto, affords a successful example of this method of treatment.

According to Dr. Ratto neither political science nor constitutional law is able to give us a true theory of the nature, genesis and functions of political parties. This is a task, he thinks, which belongs essentially to sociology (p. 3). He proceeds, therefore, to develop and establish a sociological theory which may be briefly indicated as follows: Modern parties are quite different from parties in ancient times. Then there was a struggle for equality, but now, the typical constitutional state being based upon juridico-political equality, the struggle is for the determination of the social will. Then the conflict was between superior and inferior classes, now it is between conservatives and progressionists, between order and progress, between *natura fatta* and *natura si fa*. Again, parties are not a social manifestation of the struggle which is going on in all the fields of individual activity; they are a sociological phenomenon. The theory of Gumplowicz and others that the struggle for power is the fundamental law of social life is, therefore, denied. The social group has its own laws which neutralise the action of biological laws to which the individuals were originally subject (p. 11). Finally, and as a result of the preceding, we have the proposition that government ought never to be in the hands of political parties (p. 8). They represent public sentiment only in part. They are to assist in the determination of the social will; its execution should be left to an independent authority above them.

Having expounded his theory of political parties, Dr. Ratto considers their relation to representation, or, rather, the relation of representation to government on the one hand and to parties on the other. The representative, he maintains, is neither the agent of a single party nor a counsellor of the government, but a person chosen to represent public opinion and to assist in synthesising its various currents into practical programmes. He represents not a party, but the nation. The legislative body, therefore, is not the field on which should be fought out the battles of the parties, but the council chamber in which the ideas contended for by the various parties outside should be combined into the best possible scheme of action. As to the relation of representation to the government, it has already been indicated. Government, which should never be actuated by party spirit, should receive from the hands of the representatives the programmes which it is to carry out for the well-being of all.

It is obvious that this theory of political parties and their relation to representation is not fully illustrated in any modern state. Germany, Dr. Ratto thinks, approaches most nearly the sociological ideal (second pamphlet, p. 23). Here there is a strong government distinct from representation, a cabinet which does not attempt to realise the desires of a single party, but which is supported by all those who are favorable to its programme. This condition of things, it is maintained (p. 24), better than any other existing example, corresponds to the sociocratic ideal, because the government, being above parties, is transformed in accordance with the exigencies of the state, and is spontaneously inclined to regard all the movements of public opinion and all the aspirations of the country.

It is to be feared that this selected illustration of Dr. Ratto's theory will militate against its acceptance. Many are indisposed to look to Germany for ideals in regard to government, and this is especially true in America. We in this country

are firmly convinced that we are at least on the right track, and we cannot agree with Dr. Ratto that the kingdom is the most excellent form of government in the constitutional state (p. 14). Although we must admit that there is a measure of truth in his characterisation of American government as personal and very corrupt, and of our citizens as animated solely by the mercantile spirit, it does not follow that our condition would be bettered by the rule of a sovereign whose programmes would more likely be drawn from his own consciousness than accepted from the hands of the legislative body. We cannot see that more is to be hoped for from government by a wilful emperor than by a president who takes his cue from the party representing the majority.

Although we cannot agree with some of his conclusions, we take pleasure in acknowledging the ability and learning with which Dr. Ratto has carried on his investigation. It would be difficult to find in any language a better short treatment of the subject considered.

In the third pamphlet mentioned above Dr. Ratto considers the question whether an action for damages against an employer engaged in trade has a commercial character, and also the question whether the obligation of compensation for damages due to misfortunes are contractual or legal. In discussing these important questions he brings to bear an apparently wide knowledge of Italian jurisprudence, but his conclusions are of local rather than general interest.

I. W. HOWERTH.

A NOTE ON THE ANCIENT GEOGRAPHY OF ASIA. Compiled from Valmiki-Ramayana. With Map and Index. By *Nobin Chandra Das*, M. A. Price, 1 rupee. Buddhist Text Society of India. 1896. Pages, 68.

Sir Nobin Chandra Das, of Chittagong, Bengal, a prominent Sanskrit scholar, and brother of Sarat Chandra Das, of Darjeeling, is the only traveller who has been in the interior of Tibet. Many Europeans and Hindoos have been in little Tibet, which is the Western Tibet, and not Tibet proper, but none except Sarat Chandra Das was admitted to the inaccessible Eastern Tibet, which is the real Tibet, the country of Lamanistic Buddhism.

The Tibetans object to the intrusion of any foreign influence, and are more secluded than the Chinese ever have been, but no objection was raised against Mr. Das because he is a Buddhist and his fame as a pandit has spread over Tibet.

The present pamphlet and map are an important contribution to the literature of the Ramayana, the ancient epic of the Aryan Hindus. Mr. Das has located all the geographical sites, and thus renders it possible for us to have a better comprehension of Rama's wanderings in search of his faithful wife, Sita, who has been captured by the island king Ravana.

We need not call attention to the importance of the Ramayana, which to the Hindu, even to-day, is scarcely less than the Iliad and the Odyssey were to the Greek, or the Nibelungen saga and Gudrun to the Teutons. Says Mr. Das: "The names of Rama and his faithful Sita are still bywords for the model king and the model wife, the two most important factors in the social and domestic life of a nation throughout the length and breadth of this country." (Preface, vii.)

Mr. Das accepts (against Professor Weber¹) Signor Gorresio's opinion that the Ramayana is based upon historical facts; and he may be right, for there are reasons to believe that both the Greek and Teutonic sagas, too, are based upon real events which once took place in prehistoric times. But the more remarkable are

¹ See Weber, *Ueber das Ramayanam*. 1870.

the similarities among the ancient legends of the three nations. Sita, (Like Gudrun) is abducted, and Rama (like Herasig) pursues the robber and regains his faithful wife. In his search Rama (like Odysseus) wanders about and visits almost all the places of the earth known to the poet. Like Helena, Sita is well treated by her abductor while Rama wages war for her recovery. The allies of Rama are enumerated as minutely in the Ramayana as the allies of Menelaus in Homer; and there are several other noteworthy similarities which caused Professor Weber to think that Valmiki, the author of the best version of the Ramayana, must have been familiar with the epics of Homer—a view which is not very probable. The problem of these coincidences has not as yet found its solution, but we believe that the epics of all the nations are a mixture of myth and history. There are events which actually happen again and again. An Indian chief sent the same reply to the President of the United States that Aristovus sent to Cæsar. Both declared, "If I want something of you, I will go to you, but as you want something of me, you may please come to me!" Must we conclude that the American Indian had read Cæsar? In an early stage of civilisation the abduction of wives was probably an event that happened in the north, in Greece and in India, and the search for a lost wife was probably compared to the wanderings of the sun over the whole earth by more than one poet.

But we cannot discuss the subject in a book review and conclude our remarks by mentioning that Nobin Chandra Das endeavors to explain the mythological elements of the story, the *vânar* or monkey chiefs, "the dwellers of the forest," who assist Rama in his warfare as the aboriginal non-Aryan tribes, whom the Aryans call *vâ-nara* (*vâ*-like; and *nara*-man), i. e., those creatures who are only similar to, but not of, the kind and race of the real men or Aryans. P. C.

Mr. H. Dharmapála, the Buddhist monk now traveling and lecturing in America, writes us from Cambridge that the anniversary of the Buddha's birth will fall on the 16th of May, the day of the full moon. In the *Maha-Bodhi Journal* for March will be found an article on the discovery of the birthplace of Prince Siddhartha Buddha Gautama. The discovery was made by Dr. Führer and its details first announced by the distinguished Vienna scholar, Dr. G. Bühler. In the place that now bears the name of Konagamma is a monument called Buddha's Nirvâna stupa, which is supposed to mark the place where Buddha died. About fifteen miles northeast of Konagamma the archæologists discovered another stupa. Here they found fourteen feet deep in the ground an inscription which, as is stated, declares itself to be made by Emperor Ashoka in the twentieth year of his reign (that is to say, in the year 229 B. C.). It declares that the Emperor had been in the garden of Lumbini to do homage to the Buddha, and that, having erected various other stupas, he built also this stupa for the purpose of honoring the birthplace of Buddha. About eighteen miles northwest of this stupa, marking the site of the garden of Lumbini, are ruins of monasteries and other buildings, which are now densely covered with forest trees. They must have been an important centre of religious life, for they form quite a large city, extending over about five miles in length between the villages Amuli and Tilaura Kot. They are supposed to be the site of Kapilavastu, the capital of the Shakyas, which is at present in the same neglected condition in which the pilgrims Fa-Hian and Hinen-T'sang found it when they visited India between the years 629-645 A. D. The excavations are continued and great results are expected, which will either corroborate or correct the tradition of the sacred literature of the Buddhists; and we have good reasons to

hope that we shall within one or two years know much more about the history of early Buddhism.

Readers of *The Monist* and *The Open Court* will remember the Triangular Debate on Christian Missions, which took place in the fall of 1894 before the Nineteenth Century Club of New York, under the chairmanship of its President, who, at the time, was Walter H. Page, the former editor of the New York *Forum*.

The Rt. Rev. J. M. Thoburn, missionary bishop to India and Malaysia, on that occasion was challenged by Mr. Gandhi's bitter denunciation of Christian missions for inventing a story of the prevalence of infanticide in India. The latter even denied that the criminal law of India contained a prohibition against throwing babies into the Ganges, while the Bishop contended for its truth. Bishop Thoburn announces in a letter to the *Christian Advocate* that Dr. K. S. McDonald, a missionary of the Free Church of Scotland, has taken up the question and published a statement in the Indian *Evangelical Review* in which he offers overwhelming proof to justify Bishop Thoburn's statement. In his letter to the *Christian Advocate* Bishop Thoburn quotes enough of it to leave no doubt about it. While it is true that infanticide from religious motives does not prevail now in India, it evidently existed in the years 1798-1820, and Brahmans of higher education—such men as the Pundit Hara Prasad Shastri—rejoice at the abolition of this terrible superstition, saying: "This cruel custom (of vowing to cast the first born child into the Ganges) was a frightful source of infanticide among the Hindus, and Lord Wellesley put a stop to it." No one will deny that there is in India, and always has been, a Brahmanism of philosophical depth and moral purity, but at the same time it must be conceded by the most ardent admirer of Indian wisdom that there are many various forms of idolatry prevalent in India, and it would be strange if here alone a custom which was all but universal all over the whole world should never have existed.

MODERN FRENCH LITERATURE. By *Benjamin W. Wells*, Ph. D. (Harvard University.) Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1896. Pp., xii, 510.

This book is more fully up to date than the present notice. Ten of the thirteen chapters are given to the nineteenth century; two of the ten pay well deserved honor and with due discrimination, to Victor Hugo; Taine, Renan, Sardou, Zola, and Daudet are criticised at some length; and mention is made of many recent writers not yet generally known, for instance of Verlaine, Barrès, and Margueritte. Dr. Wells shows intimate personal acquaintance with the authors taken up, and his work may be very useful to those who wish to know what to choose, either among famous old books, or among very new ones. He can at least do his readers the good service of proving that there really are French poets. There is no truth any longer, if there ever was any, in Emerson's line about

"France, where poet never grew."

F. M. H

The German edition of Professor Mach's *Popular Scientific Lectures*, which was not published until after the American edition, and which appeared only in last January, is now in its second edition. A third edition of the *Mechanics* is also announced. The success with which Professor Mach's ideas are meeting in Germany is encouraging for the philosophy of science.

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PYTHAGORAS.

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NO. 493

THE LIFE OF PYTHAGORAS.¹

BY MORITZ CANTOR.

RESEARCHES in primitive history have shed a flood of light on the genesis of human knowledge. Not only has it been shown that rudiments of art and science which ordinarily are ascribed to later epochs may be traced back to dimmest antiquity, but more important still the origin of many inventions has been proved to be far less simple and sudden than tradition would have us believe. Particularly is this so of mathematics, which in its theoretical no less than in its applied forms, sprang up in widely different localities, making it upon the whole exceedingly difficult to determine whether its results are of independent contemporaneous origin, or were handed over from nation to nation.

That the latter happened is scarcely open to doubt in the case of a man who sojourned long years at many of these cradles of primitive culture and who tarried there largely with the express purpose of acquiring the knowledge they offered. It is not chance if the substance of what he acquired abroad was embodied in his system; on the contrary, we have reason to believe that it was design and necessity. And it would be inexplicable were the experiences so acquired to skirt without impression his mind, or the flood of new ideas which inundated his admiring soul to have passed away without leaving behind them some fertile deposit.

Men of such stamp—men who scatter everywhither the culture which they have absorbed by founding at all points schools and by leaving upon all whom they meet the impression of their genius,

¹ Translated from Cantor's *Mathematische Beiträge zum Kulturleben der Völker*, by T. J. McCormack. Inasmuch as the present article was written a long time ago, a few alterations and omissions have been made at the suggestion of the author, so as to keep the treatment of the subject up to date.

not unlike, though the reverse in their effects, to a travelling bale of cotton which spreads epidemics—such men, forming the intellectual vinculum of races and nations, have existed in all ages. There has never been a time but some man or other, awearied of the constrained quarters of his study and forsaking the crouching attitude at his desk, has donned his “sandal-shoon and scallop-shell,” to seek in the wide world fresh sceneries and new knowledge. As journeys of this character gradually became more frequent, the novel prizes awaiting the searcher grew less and less, and so, as the means of communication increased in magnitude, the personal influence of the individual traveller waned.

Pythagoras, if not the first to travel for study and information, was yet one of the earliest, and certain it is that he extended his tours farther than any one before him. I will attempt to portray the life of this intrepid man whose character was distinguished not less by thirst for knowledge and readiness for self-sacrifice than by eminent talents, reflecting his picture as it lives in the traditions of Grecian authors, whether true or not.¹

Pythagoras's birthplace was the Island of Samos, where his parents, who were held in high esteem, resided at the time the elder despot Polycrates was gathering into his hands the reins of government. His father, Mnesarchus, came originally from the Island of Lemnos, but having succored the Samians during a famine with supplies of grain, had been made the recipient by the latter of the rights of citizenship, and henceforward led in his adopted country a life principally devoted to the furthering of art, but frequently interrupted by commercial voyages to all the harbors of the then known world, on which journeys his wife Pythais was his constant companion, as is the custom to-day among the inhabitants of the Greek Mediterranean isles. On one of these voyages, in the year 569, B. C., at Tyre, Pythagoras was born; and on subsequent voyages to Southern Italy, the boy himself is mentioned as companion of his father. Thus his mind was early nourished by impressions of roving, which foreshadowed the bent of his entire subsequent career. It is not surprising, therefore, that in his eighteenth year and while scarcely more than a school-boy, Pythagoras should have formed the resolve to seek abroad that higher education which had now become the paramount interest of his life.

But the execution of the resolve was not so simple as its conception. Tyrants are ever suspicious, and even then it was sought to prevent the departure of young men from important families, by

¹ See Eduard Röth, *Geschichte unserer abendländischen Philosophie*.

associating with such attempts rumors of treason, and it was only by clandestine flight at night that Pythagoras in 551 was able to reach in safety the shores of Lesbos, where he met with a hospitable reception at the house of his uncle Zoilos.

He also found in Lesbos Pherecydes, the youngest but not the least of the teachers of the day, who shared with the two Milesians Anaximander and Thales, the world's fame for philosophic wisdom. And yet Pherecydes, so far as appears from the writings transmitted to posterity, was not an original thinker. He was merely the interpreter of Egyptian science, which he had acquired in Egypt itself, as before him his intellectual superior, Thales, had done.

The scientific journeys to Egypt, which at this juncture and by a rather sudden turn in affairs were becoming the vogue with Grecian scholars, are explained by the political situation of the latter country. Psammetichus, having overthrown the Dodecarchs, had consolidated his power by the assistance of Ionic auxiliaries, and as a token of a gratitude to his old allies had granted them many privileges. He even went so far, in fact, after 630 B. C., as to cede to them permanent places of settlement in Egypt, whereby this country, formerly so hostile to foreigners, was opened up to traffic and commerce, a circumstance which before long was turned to the profit of science, when individuals who had gone thither for mercantile purposes began to study the superior learning and civilisation of Egypt.

Pythagoras enjoyed the personal instruction of Pherecydes for two years, during which time he applied himself more particularly to the latter's religious doctrines. Afterwards, in 549 B. C., he betook himself to Miletus in quest of Anaximander and Thales. The fact that the latter sage, now a nonagenarian, admitted the young student to his confidence, is striking proof of the promise which Pythagoras gave of future greatness and of the excellent soil upon which the seeds of exact science fell, as hitherto cultivated by Anaximander and Thales.

We are concerned here with the beginnings of cosmical physics. Whilst Thales conceived the earth as a sphere floating in an immense body of water which was forced up in the form of oceans by the pressure between the walls of the earth and the vaults of heaven, Anaximander, in developing Thales's doctrine, reverted in a measure to the ancient Grecian view which conceived the earth as a flat disc. According to Anaximander's conception, the earth was a short, broad cylinder, the upper transverse section of which was

inhabited by living beings. On the other hand, Anaximander took a decided step forward in enunciating the doctrine that the earth hung suspended and at rest in the centre of the celestial sphere, because there was no reason why a body situated in the centre of a hollow ball should move towards either one side or the other.

Further, history has associated certain astronomical and mathematical theorems with the names of these two sages. It is known that Thales brought from Egypt the knowledge of the solar year, that he predicted eclipses of the sun and moon, that he calculated the heights of pyramids by the length of their shadows, and finally that he enunciated geometrical theorems of wide theoretical import, such as that of angles in semi-circles being right-angles, and of the equality of the angles at the base of equilateral triangles. It is related of Anaximander that he was the first to construct celestial globes and to draw upon them great circles for determining celestial phenomena, that he was acquainted with the properties of the gnomon, which is not of Egyptian but of Babylonian origin, that he employed the same for determining the altitude of the sun, that he even made use of it as a sun-dial for subdividing time, that he was the first to teach geography as a science, and the first to draw on metal geographical maps.

Of general interest, further, is the fact that Anaximander was the first prose writer. Prior to his time the custom was universal among the Greeks, as it was among the Indians, of writing scientific works in verse. Even Thales conformed to this onerous practice in composing his didactic poem upon the solstices and equinoxes.

The subjects of instruction which Pythagoras naturally enjoyed in Miletus, therefore, were astronomical and physical in character, supplemented by other, more purely philosophical and theological studies, for which he had been amply prepared by Pherecydes. Before long Thales directed the eyes of the aspiring young genius towards Egypt, and the sage's advice was eagerly acted upon. The Phœnician sacerdotal academy at Sidon was chosen as a fitting place for the young philosopher's sojourn of transition, and Pythagoras accordingly repaired thither in 548. He passed an entire year at Sidon, engaged in studying the sacred rites of the priestcraft, and not until he had fully mastered these, and so was fittingly prepared, did he place foot in 547 on Egyptian soil, probably at the port of Naucratis.

The political attitude of Egypt at this time was, as regards foreigners, scarcely different from what it had been toward the

close of the reign of Psammetichus, when Thales was visiting this country. Psammetichus had been followed by Necho, the circumnavigator of Africa (616-601), by Psammis (600-595), and Apries (594-570), and during the reigns of these monarchs Egyptian civilisation had reached the acme of its grandeur, although outwardly the power of the country, shattered by Nebuchadnezzar's defeat of Necho, was on a swift decline. Finally, an unfortunate campaign conducted by Apries against Cyrene gave rise to an insurrection which cost the king his life and placed Amasis, a man of plebeian extraction, upon the throne. Necessity compelled the upstart—it was the second time the thing happened in Egyptian history—to secure his unlawful dominion by foreign arms and alliances. He filled his capital, Memphis, with Ionic mercenaries, concluded by the seal of marriage a peace with Cyrene, and entered the sacred relation of hospitality with Polycrates of Samos.

It lay in the immediate interest of Pythagoras, therefore, to seek a reconciliation with the ruler of his native isle. And it appears that the reputation of the young man, now only in his twenty-second year, had, since his sojourn in Miletus and Sidon, already risen to such a pitch that the political scruples aroused by his early flight vanished before his scientific fame. Polycrates recommended the young scholar to King Amasis in an autograph epistle. Even with his powerful support, however, trying obstacles were to be overcome before Pythagoras could accomplish his aim of being admitted among the esoteric students of the Egyptian sacerdotal philosophy. For he was not satisfied, as his teachers Pherecydes and Thales had been, with the superficial knowledge of Egyptian civilisation that came from polite intercourse and the occasional communications of the priesthood. He already knew this in great part. What he longed for was to be admitted as a foreigner, as a person unclean, into the innermost, profoundest secrets of sacerdotal science, to conquer the prejudices of a caste which in all ages was the most jealous defender of its privileges, and which concealed its sanctities even from the born Egyptian when not of its tribe.

To this end the mightiest engines had to be set in motion, and King Amasis himself was obliged to present the stranger as a candidate for priestly honors. The application was made at the ecclesiastical college in Heliopolis. To reject outright an applicant bearing a mandate from the King would have been impossible; so recourse was had to a subterfuge, which seems to have been as widely practised then as now. A plea of insufficient jurisdiction was made, and the suitor was referred to a more ancient college at

Memphis. Here the same trick was again resorted to, and Pythagoras was obliged to repair to Thebes, where a still older college existed. Further reference being impossible, it was decided out of regard to the mandate of the King to allow the aspirant conditional admittance to the order. But extremely trying conditions were imposed upon the knowledge-seeking youth,—conditions that would have intimidated any ordinary mortal. Ablutions, shaving of the entire body, and particularly an operation practised by all Oriental nations, including the Jews, which is as painful as it was regarded indecent by Hellenic peoples.

And yet Pythagoras submitted to all these indignities. His courage and perseverance triumphed over the narrow exclusiveness of the Egyptian priests, and his instruction began under the direction of the arch-prophet Sonchis. It appears his powerful intellect soon mastered the difficulties of the curriculum, and the sacerdotal caste speedily came to esteem him as highly as before it had contemned him. His sojourn in Egypt was, as a result of these successes, prolonged from year to year, and it is possible his great knowledge might have been lost forever to Europe had not opportune political events intervened which were in every respect significant for his career.

During the twenty-one years that Amasis ruled subsequently to the arrival of our philosopher, Pythagoras assimilated not only all of Egyptian science, but he had by his assiduity wrested from the sacerdotal class its highest honors and was now counted among its high priests. In 527 Amasis died, and his son Psammenitus ascended the throne, only to lose it with his life shortly thereafter. Cambyses in 526 threw his conquering hosts into Egypt, completely subjugated the country, and vented with truculent sagacity the full weight of his wrath upon the priesthood from whose powerful caste he expected the stubbornest resistance. Nearly all the members of the priesthood were transported to remote regions of Asia, and the report goes that Pythagoras also now suddenly found himself a prisoner in the walls of Babylon.

Sorrowful as was this change of affairs for the philosopher personally, thus wrested from the serenity and contemplativeness of priestly life, it was yet of incalculable advantage to science, for Pythagoras was now virtually compelled to master the knowledge of the Chaldeans. That there was sufficient material there needs no special emphasis. Babylon had long since been the centre of a world-wide traffic, the common mart of Bactrians, Indians, and Chinese. And it quite accords with these facts that Pythagoras

met at Babylon, Jews, Brahmans, and Calatians, and became acquainted with priests of the Persian religion Mazdaism.

The sceptic may justly doubt whether Pythagoras, as a prisoner of war, could ever have had the opportunity of occupying himself with Chaldean science. We have only to think of the mural sculptures and terra cotta paintings which have been unearthed from the wondrous rubbish-heaps of Nineveh and Babylon, to appreciate the force of such a scruple. We see on these the wretched prisoners of war dragging, under the goading whips of native masters, stones, statues, and building material of all kinds, which can hardly be described as occupations of an intellectual character. But it is questionable whether the *priestly* prisoners were forced to perform such menial tasks, especially in a country which itself possessed a mystic ritual. In such a country the priestly order has always great influence and is always held in great esteem—distinctions which in a certain measure are transferred to the priestly representatives of other religions. These either die as martyrs of their religion, or they are highly venerated. Furthermore, the captivity of Pythagoras was of long duration, and it is scarcely possible that his mighty genius should not have risen from any position however low. Of his twelve years' compulsory sojourn in Babylon we know next to nothing, and we are only told of the romantic manner in which in the year 513 he regained his liberty.

At the court of Darius, who came to the Persian throne in 521 after the brief interregnum of the Pretender Smerdes, the successor of Cambyses, there lived a physician, a native of Croton, by the name of Demokedes, who, himself originally a captive, had by his art not only risen to the post of body-physician to the king, but had so insinuated himself into the confidence of Darius that the latter, upon a promise to return, had placed him at the head of a reconnoitering expedition to Greece. In violation of his pledge, Demokedes bent his course for the Southern coasts of Italy, where he landed at Tarentum and placed himself under the protection of its ruler. The Persians were compelled to depart without their leader, suffered shipwreck, and, having been taken captive, became the property of a certain Gillos of Tarentum, who restored them to Darius on certain conditions, among which one of the most important was the liberation of Pythagoras. And now, at the age of fifty-six, and for the first time since boyhood, the exiled philosopher revisits his native land, arriving just in time, during a brief sojourn in Delos, to close the eyes of his old teacher, Pherecydes. But he was far from desiring to enjoy his well-earned rest. On

the contrary, he at once set out on a six months' tour through Greece, whose estranged religious, scientific, and political conditions he was desirous of restudying before making his appearance as an independent teacher.

We here reach the turning-point in Pythagoras's life, for from here on the hero of romantic adventures disappears and the philosopher, the lover of wisdom, as he modestly yet proudly was wont to style himself, steps into the foreground.

The beginning of this second period of his life was far from encouraging. At Samos, where he made his first attempt at instruction, his efforts were so unsuccessful that, for fear of being utterly deserted, he was obliged to resort to bribery to win the attendance of the only scholar left him after his first lectures, a cousin and namesake, Pythagoras, son of Eratocles. Such a trying existence, compared with which the lot of a young lecturer in elective branches at German universities is an enviable one, was unendurable to Pythagoras. It is no cause for wonder, therefore, that he forsook his ungrateful paternal city and in 510 set out in search of a new home in the highly cultivated municipalities of Magna Græcia or Southern Italy.

He betook himself to Croton, and the choice he made was an exceptionally happy one. For he found in this city a state which had already passed the tyrannic stage of government, a state in which neither the despotism of a single ruler nor the tyranny of the mob impeded intellectual advancement and in which neither wealth nor luxury had as yet exerted their baneful and enervating influence, as had been so markedly exemplified in the case of the neighboring town of Sybaris. Not only were the inhabitants of Croton physically sound and athletic, but a healthy scientific activity prevailed in the place. The frequent victories which the Crotonites won at the Olympian games were proof of this, as was also its far-famed academy of physicians, who had gathered about the selfsame Demokedes with whom Pythagoras had become acquainted during his Persian captivity and who had so strangely assisted in his liberation.

The year in which Pythagoras took up his abode in Croton, the year 510 B. C., was a year of revolutions. Almost on the same day Tarquin fled from Rome and Hippias was driven from Athens, whilst in Sybaris unsuccessful insurrections were on foot aiming at the overthrow of the tyrant Telys, who, as was the wont in Southern Italian states, based his power on the plebeians. The contemplation of contemporary history, which alone discloses the

right points of view in such matters, everywhere betrays symptoms of the same movement which at this time was universally affecting Italo-Grecian civilisation. Even localities whose political stability admitted of no possible disturbance of the governmental fabric, were set intellectually agog, and the impulse so given could not help making strongly for ideal ends, and may even have directly tended to the religious mysticism which was politically in store for them. At any rate, the trend of affairs was such that pure science was not likely to appeal to the ruling minds, and Pythagoras, if he desired to gain a hearing, was perforce obliged to adopt methods harmonising with either one of the tendencies mentioned.

In the light of these facts his conduct during the first weeks succeeding his arrival in Croton becomes intelligible. He apparently waives the realisation of his real object, the founding of a rigorous scientific school, in order the more surely to accomplish it. His very first appearance is a public oration to the young men of the city, in which he expounded so gravely and attractively the duties of youth that the fathers of the city besought him to deliver an address to them. And when in his second oration he emphasised obedience to law and purity of morals as the solid foundations of state and family, and when, as the consequence of his persistent exhortations, the senate resolved to abolish the growing evil of concubinage, his goal was virtually won, and the two following orations to the boys, and lastly to the women, only served to complete his triumph. His oration to the boys treated pretty much the same theme as that which he had sought to instil in the youth, but was clothed in a form which made it more readily intelligible to juvenile minds. His address to the women is less perfectly preserved, "perhaps," as Röth says, "from being less coherently remembered, as might have been expected from women." Yet we know the outcome of it, for thousands and thousands of costly garments were donated to the Temple of Here because no woman longer ventured to be seen in ornate attire. Even from the meagre relation of the results of his addresses as here recorded one can comprehend the lightning-like power with which he blasted long-standing prejudices and frivolous vice. Stupendous as the sudden reform in morals was, no less universal was the enthusiasm. There was no longer the weary hunting for disciples; a flood of listeners of all ranks and capacities streamed to his lectures. Besides the youths who listened all day to his teachings, nearly six hundred of the most prominent men of the city and many matrons and girls attended his evening

lectures, and among the latter was the young, beautiful, and intellectual Theano, who had the good fortune to become Pythagoras's bride.

The natural result was as already indicated a division of the listeners into *scholars proper*, forming a narrower esoteric school, and into simple *hearers* (the *Acoustici*), forming a less exclusive exoteric school. The first mentioned, the *mathematicians* as they were called, consisted of those students to whom the doctrines of Pythagoras were taught in all their formal rigor as a rounded scientific whole and in their systematic logical connexion from the most elementary mathematics to the subtler speculations of philosophy and theology. At the same time they were taught that only a knowledge of the whole is productive of fruits, that fragmentary knowledge, on the contrary, owing to the miscomprehensions it gives rise to, is frequently dangerous, nay, even fatal; and hence the secrecy and extreme reserve which the *Pythagoricians* as they were styled in later times manifested towards the public at large, and which they so jealously preserved that their writings were unknown even to antiquity until the time of the Ptolemies. The *Acoustici*, or simple hearers, from whom the *Pythagoreans* afterwards proceeded, are to be sharply distinguished from the *Mathematici*, or mathematicians. The former attended only the popular evening lectures where *exact* science was not considered. Carefully selected themes from ethics, morals, the doctrine of immortality and the transmigration of the soul constituted the principal content of these lectures, and the listeners took with them to their homes, mingled and confounded with the information which they had derived elsewhere on the same subjects, such knowledge as their several capacities enabled them to assimilate. The majority belonged to the school of physicians above mentioned, and the enigma of the confounded character of their doctrines and conceptions, which are quite dissimilar and plainly have their origin in contradictory spheres of thought, can only be explained on some such hypothesis.

But the political agitation which we mentioned above had not yet passed away. Its undulations still swept the petty States of Southern Italy, and they carried Pythagoras and his school to the loftiest pinnacle of glory. In Sybaris, as we have already learned, the aristocracy had been crushingly defeated by Telys and his supporters. The fugitive and exiled nobles repaired forthwith to Croton, where they were hospitably received, and negotiations in their behalf set on foot. But when the Crotonian ambassadors to Sybaris were treacherously murdered by the Sybarites, what was at first

mere sympathy on the part of the hosts was immediately converted into active espousal of the defeated party's cause. War was declared, and the army sent against the mighty Sybarites was victorious. The hostile city was completely destroyed, 509, and in the allotment of the confiscated territory, a piece of property fell to the share of Pythagoras, whither he retreated with his esoteric school of mathematicians.

It is difficult for persons who have played a conspicuous part in the whirl of politics suddenly to sever themselves absolutely from public life without giving rise to this or that conjecture which is speedily transformed into a suspicion. Such was to be the fate of Pythagoras, and it cannot be gainsaid that appearances were against him. Röth may be right in denying that no scientific doctrine militating against existing political constitutions formed the ultimate keystone and secret of his powerful school; nevertheless, the sharply-marked aristocratic division of his scholars into classes, the monarchical ascendancy of their teacher, combined with the haughty reserve of the entire school towards the uninitiated, were all that was needed to foster the development of such a political doctrine, and it was but a necessary result that in the lapse of time contempt of existing institutions should become the prevailing attitude of the school and suspicion of the future the dominant state of mind of the citizens. As yet the crisis was not reached, for, as subsequently to all times of ferment and revolution, so here too there followed a period of quiet and inaction which was not disturbed until the appearance of a new factor of unrest from the East.

In 493 began the formidable onslaughts of the Persian kings on Athens and the allied States of the Grecian peninsula, and the shock spread with irresistible momentum. Sicily and Carthage felt it, and were implicated in the struggle. Nor could the States of Southern Italy escape its influence. Not being drawn immediately into the maelstrom of the war, they vented their agitated feelings in embittered internecine and civil strife. So it was in Croton when Hippasos, who had been ejected from the school as an unworthy aspirant to its honors, placed himself in 490 at the head of the democratic party and appeared with a public and formal accusation against his former associates. The school was dispersed, Pythagoras was exiled, his property confiscated, and he himself again compelled to grasp the wandering scholar's staff. He passed the succeeding sixteen years in comparative quiet at Tarentum, although still the object of persecution. But here, too, in 474, the

populace overthrew the reigning aristocracy, and Pythagoras now in his ninety-fifth year, chose as his last haven of refuge, Metapontum, where he still managed to eke out for four years a miserable existence. When in 471 democracy also gained the upper hand in Metapontum, the house in which the meetings of the school were held was surrounded, set on fire, and most of its inmates burned. Pythagoras himself escaped the flames, but died shortly afterwards in his ninety-ninth year.

Such were the life and fortunes of one of the greatest men of all times, as they have been preserved in the memory of his countrymen. That they are in the main fabulous is contended by many. Nevertheless, two facts remain unshaken—Pythagoras's sojourn in Egypt and his activity as a teacher in Southern Italy. At the same time we must bear in mind that the beliefs of the ancients, whether in themselves correct or not, are also facts. While it is true that Hercules never lived, the ideal of Hercules was an important reality in the mental evolution of Greece. In the same way, the life of Pythagoras, as remembered by his disciples, is intimately associated with his philosophy, and it will, therefore, even though a pure fiction, remain forever an essential part of history.

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLICE AS A MEANS OF DISTRIBUTING CHARITY.

BY A. F. CAMPBELL, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF POLICE.

THE CITY OF CHICAGO has taken the initiative steps in a work of relief that undoubtedly will be followed by other cities, and I wish to give briefly an account of the work done during the cold spell of last winter.

The relief of the poor of the city has for many years past been handled by the county; but, as the appropriation for this year was small, it was impossible to cover the ground thoroughly; so when our extreme cold spell came on in January, his Honor, Mayor Swift, realised that something must be done, and at once. He felt satisfied that the citizens would gladly respond to his request for cash contributions, if they were assured that the contributions would be properly used. He therefore called the heads of the Police Department together on Monday, January 25, and a hurried consultation was held and plans made for quick service. It was decided that the Department should be utilised for ascertaining information of destitute cases, and for the immediate relief of all such cases.

It was further decided that the Mayor should issue a proclamation asking the citizens for contributions to be sent to him. This proclamation was published in the afternoon papers, and the morning papers of the next day, and immediately cash commenced to flow in to him, until we had a bank account of over \$61,000 to draw on.

The plan of action adopted was that an immediate order should be sent to all police stations notifying all officers to investigate along their posts, and wherever a case of actual destitution was found to telephone the particulars at once to the nearest police station. On receipt of the report at the station the commanding

officer was to load up in the patrol wagon sufficient supplies to provide for a week's sustenance for a family, and have it delivered at once.

By ten o'clock on Monday, January 25, I had started out to order the goods for the relief. We decided to give to each family of four or less, five pounds of fresh beef, five pounds of corn meal, five pounds of beans, five pounds of peas, one loaf of bread for each member of the family, and two hundred pounds of coal; and double that amount for a large family. I visited the best wholesale houses, and was able to secure a very low price on all goods that we would want, and I ordered large quantities of the above articles sent to each police station; so that by the evening of the first day the stations were all equipped with enough supplies to last them twenty-four hours.

During the first week we were not very particular in investigating the cases reported. We simply wanted to know that the persons were in destitute circumstances, and that they were without means to provide sustenance and fuel. The cold weather continued all through that week; the mercury going as low as twenty degrees below zero, and never higher than zero, and during that time there was not a case reported to our department that did not receive relief within one hour after the report was received; and I am well satisfied that only for our prompt action there would have been a great many persons either starved or frozen to death.

After the first week we were able to investigate all cases, and wherever we found a deserving family, they were given a relief card which entitled them to the amount of provisions named above every five days, and arrangements were made for delivering the coal in half-ton lots direct from the coal yards. We continued this work until the 20th of February, when the amount of money deposited to our credit in the bank was exhausted.

During the time we were engaged in this work, our supplies cost \$61,855.81. Our meat amounted to 546,232 pounds at an average cost of 4.22 cents per pound, making a total of \$23,084.76. Our orders for bread amounted to 470,736 pounds, a total of \$13,296.90, an average price of 2.82 cents per pound. Our orders for meal, beans, and peas amounted to \$9,750.48, an average cost of about 1 cent per pound. Our coal orders amounted to 6,004 $\frac{1}{5}$ tons, or an average of \$2.28 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ton, costing \$13,720.72.

We furnished food and coal to 65,557 families; an average of 2,731 $\frac{1}{2}$ families a day, or a total of 304,802 persons; being an average of 12,700 persons a day.

Every cent that was contributed to this fund was used in the purchase of supplies. There was not one cent paid out for clerk-hire, rent, extra time, or other expenses. In addition to the above purchases by our department, there were a great many thousand dollars' worth of goods donated in the way of coal, clothing, coffee, meat, fish, bread, blankets, shoes, and other goods, all of which was disbursed by this department.

The officers of the department entered into the work with a zeal and devotion that will be long remembered by those who were familiar with the work; and in addition to performing the duty of distributing the food, a voluntary subscription of \$1,600 was subscribed by the men of the department and added to the Mayor's fund.

One notable fact that will be of interest to persons interested in the study of crime was the great reduction in the number of crimes committed while the relief work was going on. The records of the department will bear me out in this statement that the crimes of robbery, larceny, and "hold-ups" fell off fully 33 per cent. I draw an inference from this, that if our people are provided with work, so that no one would be idle who is willing to work, that crimes of the above nature would fall to a very low figure, as there is no doubt a great amount of stealing done during the winter by persons who are forced to it simply to secure means to sustain life.

In the poorer districts of the city our officers now are held with a great deal more respect than they were ever before. Thousands of people who heretofore have looked on a patrolman on the beat as an enemy, now salute the same officer as a friend. We found a large number of families who were actually destitute, who had never in their lives received charitable contributions, some of them would have suffered long in silence, and probably starved to death rather than ask for assistance, and a few cases we found of persons who had not a bit of fuel or provision in the house and no money to procure any with, but who, when told that their provisions would be brought in a patrol wagon, exhibited a degree of modesty that was surprising, and refused to be helped. Where a case of that kind was found, we arranged to supply them by sending the goods with an officer in citizen's clothing, and while we afforded them bodily relief, we also refrained from hurting their sensitive natures.

As in almost all other work, there was a humorous side to this. I remember an instance of a portly colored woman who was sup-

plied at a station with a large basket containing five pounds of fresh beef, four loaves of bread, and other articles to fill her basket, and who walked from the station to headquarters, a distance of about two miles, and complained that she had not been given food enough. She expected to be supplied with fish and jelly cake.

Among the contributions received at one of our stations was a pair of chromos, called "Wide Awake and Fast Asleep," which some of your older readers will remember as having been offered years ago as a premium with a certain religious paper; the donor no doubt thinking that they would be of great benefit to some suffering family.

I submit the above facts for the benefit of those who make a study of charity, that they may see what can be done in a short space of time, by using a thorough organisation that is familiar with all parts of the city and the location of the poor.


HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JEWS SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM BABYLON.

BY THE REV. BERNHARD PICK, PH. D., D. D.

[CONCLUDED.]

IN SPAIN the Jews must have settled at a very early time, for the Council of Elvira, assembled in 305, made enactments against them, which proves that they had already become numerous there. Under Reccared, the first Catholic sovereign of the Gothic race, the long-continued and relentless work of persecution began. His successor, Sisebut (612-617), ordered all his Jewish subjects to renounce their faith or quit his dominions. Under Sisenard the fourth council of Toledo, in the year 631, mitigated these measures of compulsion without rescinding any of the penalties which had been previously enacted. Chintilla, in 638, exiled the Jews, but they still remained in great numbers under Wamba (672). In 698 Erwig persecuted them, while Egiza banished them upon the accusation of having entered into league with the Saracens of Africa. Witzia (in 710) recalled them. Under his successor, Rodrigo, the Saracens invaded Spain after the famous battle of Xeres de la Frontera in 711. The Jews greeted the Arabs as their deliverers, who again treated them kindly. In the reign of Abderahman III. (912-961) Cordova became eminent for industry and learning, and the Jews shared largely in the splendor and prosperity of the Arabs. Less peaceful times, however, the Jews enjoyed in the Christian states of the peninsula.

From the southern part of Spain the Jews had emigrated to Castile in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, where they soon became very prosperous. Their synagogues and schools increased, and, as formerly in the east by the *resh galutha* or head of the captivity, so were they now governed by the rabbino mayor, a Jew, usually in favor at court, and appointed by the king. Every kind



CEREMONY OF TASHLICH OR CONFESSION AT THE RIVERSIDE ON NEW YEAR'S DAY.

of office was open to them, and they often served in the army. But soon the populace, stirred up by the inferior clergy, gave vent to their envy, which manifested itself first by the usual accusations of sacrilege and the murder of Christian children, but soon broke out into open rage and acts of violence. Amid the general prosperity of the Jewish nation a massacre took place at Toledo in 1212, and in 1213 the Council of Zamora, in Leon, vehemently demanded the revival and enforcement of the ancient laws against the Jews. In general, we may say that the kings of Castile and Aragon, with very few exceptions, stoutly befriended the Jews during the four




THE MASTER OF THE HOUSE DIVIDING THE APPLE ON THE NEW YEAR.

centuries which elapsed between the reign of Ferdinand I. and the Catholic sovereigns Ferdinand and Isabella. Ferdinand I. was almost the only one who showed enmity to the Jews. Alfonso VI. (who conquered Toledo from the Saracens) granted many valuable privileges to the Jews. Alphonso IX. of Castile (1158-1196) showed them still greater favor because of his love for the fair Jewess Rachel. The prosperity of the Jews in Castile and their influence reached the greatest height in the reigns of Alphonso XI. (1312-1350) and his son, Peter the Cruel (1350-1369). All this grandeur and these privileges were, nevertheless, not infrequently accompanied by violent acts on the part of the populace, and complaints

and protestations from the councils and the Cortes, which had little or no effect upon the king.

More perilous times, however, commenced for the Jews of Castile and the rest of Spain under John I. (1379-1380). This king found occasion to deprive them of the immunities they had hitherto possessed. Under Henry III. tumults took place at Seville in 1390 and 1391, and the Jewish quarter was attacked and burned to ashes. This fearful example spread, as by contagion, to Cordova, Madrid, Toledo, over the whole of Catalonia, and over the



FEAST OF PENTECOST IN PRUSSIA.

isle of Majorca. In the first years of the reign of John II. a royal mandate, dated Valladolid, 1412, was issued, which contained the most oppressive measures that had ever been promulgated against the Jews since the time of the later Visigothic kings. Among other enactments, they were ordered to wear a peculiar dress. In consequence of these severe enactments, many joined the church, who were styled *Conversos*, or "New Christians."

The glorious period during which Isabella, the sister of Henry IV., with her husband, Don Ferdinand of Aragon, governed Castile, brought a complete change over the whole face of the coun-

try, and became to the Jews and also to the New Christians the time of a most striking crisis.

But before speaking of this period, let us glance at some of the most famous literary men of the Jews during their residence in that country, before the close of the Middle Ages. We mention Menahem ben Saruk (d. 970), author of a biblical dictionary; Jehuda ibn Chajug (in Arabic Abulwalid), the chief of Hebrew



READING IN THE SUCCAH OR BOOK ON THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES.

grammarians (about 1050); Ibn Ganath (d. 1050), the grammarian; Ibn Gabirol (the Avicbron among the schoolmen), philosopher, grammarian, commentator and poet (d. 1070); Ibn Pakuda the moralist (1050-1100); Ibn Giath, cosmographer, astronomer, and philosopher; Ibn Gikatilla, the grammarian (1070-1100); Ibn Balaam, commentator and philosopher (d. 1100); Moses ibn Ezra, the hymnist (d. 1139); Jehuda ha-Levi, the philosopher and poet (d. 1141); Abraham ibn Ezra, commentator, philosopher, and

poet (d. 1167); Jehuda al-Charizi, the Horace of Jewish poetry in Spain (d. 1230); Benjamin of Tudela, the traveler; Jehuda Tibbon, the prince of translators (d. 1190); Isaac Alfasi, (d. 1089); Moses Maimonides, the greatest of all mediæval rabbis (d. 1204); Moses Gerundensis or Nachmanides (d. 1270); Abraham Abulafia, the cabbalist (d. 1292); Moses ben Shem-Tob de Leon, the author of the Sohar (d. 1305); Jedaja Bedarshi or Penini (d. 1340); Abner of Burgos, better known by his Christian name, Alfonso Burgensis de Valladolid (d. 1340); Jacob ben Asheri; Ibn Caspi (d. 1340); Gersonides or Ralbag, among the Jews




PALM PROCESSION ON THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES.

famous as a philosopher and commentator (d. 1345); Solomon Levi, of Burgos, better known by his Christian name, Paulus Burgensis, or de Santa Maria, bishop of Burgos (d. 1435); Joseph Albo, (d. 1444); Simeon Duran, the polemic (d. 1444); Ibn Verga, the historian, who died in the dungeon of the Inquisition; Abarbanel, the theologian and commentator, who was exiled with his co-religionists from Spain (d. 1515).

The great prosperity of the Jews in Spain proved their ruin. The ignorant populace, instigated by the priests, could not brook the happy condition of the Jews, and wherever they were to be found they were from time to time pounced upon; numbers of


them were slain, while others, to save their lives, submitted to baptism. Thus the Spanish Church contained, besides a body of real Jewish converts, whose names are known by their excellent writings, a large number of nominal Christians who, by sentiment, remained Jews. Soon popular suspicion was aroused against these latter, the so-called New Christians, and at last the Inquisition was set in motion to find out those who, while outwardly conforming to the Church, secretly lived according to the rules of the synagogue. Horrible are the details of what the Inquisition wrought at that time in Spain; but, curiously enough, all to no purpose. Cruel as was the old Inquisition, it was to be surpassed by the new, established by Ferdinand and Isabella, and which cast so dark a shadow



PROCESSION WITH THE SCROLLS ON THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES.

over their reign. While the old Inquisition was of a limited power, and its influence of little importance, the powers of the "New Inquisition," or "Holy Tribunal," were enlarged and extended; and under Torquemada, the first inquisitor-general, it became one of the most formidable engines of destruction which ever existed. Isabella at first felt great repugnance to the establishment of this institution, and some of the most eminent men opposed it. But the Dominicans had set their heart upon it and were determined to obtain it. What finally determined the queen to adopt it was a vow she had made when a young infanta in the presence of Thomas of Torquemada, then her confessor, that if ever she came to the throne she would maintain the Catholic faith with all her power

and extirpate heresy to the very root; and thus it was that she became instrumental in the perpetration of the most horrible cruelties that blacken and deform the history of man. The New Inquisition reached its climax in the year 1492, when an edict was published ordering all Jews who would not embrace Christianity to leave the country within four months. The news of the edict came upon the Jews like a thunder-clap. Every appeal to the compassion of the king and queen was defeated by the opposition of Torquemada. The Jews offered immense sums of money as a price for remaining in a country where they had already been established




SMITING OF THE DESK ON THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES.

for centuries. But the merciless Torquemada presented himself before the king with a crucifix in his hand, and asked for how many pieces of silver more than Judas he would sell his Saviour to the Jews? Over 300,000 Jews left Spain and emigrated to Africa, Italy, and Turkey. Most of them went to Portugal, where they enjoyed a few years of rest. In 1497, however, they were again given the choice either to receive baptism or leave the country forever. Many abandoned forever the soil of Portugal; others, not few in number, embraced or feigned to embrace the Roman Catholic faith. Under Don Emanuel and his son, John III.,

the New Christians enjoyed the protection of the state in every way in Portugal.

Following the Spanish exiles, a short time after the edicts of 1492 and 1497 Jews and New Christians were to be met with in the newly-discovered territories of America and in Brazil. In Africa, Asia, and the Turkish Empire their families and synagogues have been established and have continued to this day. In great numbers the exiled Jews settled in the western parts of Africa, especially in the states of Morocco. At Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, Oran,



THE READING OF THE LAW ON THE FEAST OF TABERNACLES.

and Fez, Jews soon felt themselves at home. In the Turkish Empire, soon after the taking of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453, the Jews became a prominent part of the population, and when the Spanish exiles came there they found numerous synagogues and schools of learning. And although they belonged to one nation, yet they kept distinct from their co-religionists, preserving not only their own liturgy, but also their language, and were distinguished here, as everywhere, from the others, by the name of *Sephardim*, or Spaniards. In Italy, also, they were welcomed, with the exception of Naples, where they were not allowed to remain. In

the ecclesiastical states, especially at Rome, the exiles were but little persecuted, and the New Christians lived in far greater security in the papal states than in Spain and Portugal. The Jews established printing establishments in Italy. The most celebrated was that at Ferrara, where the famous Spanish version of the Old Testament was printed. Italy was also the home of such learned



DESCENDANTS OF AARON THE PRIEST BLESSING THE PEOPLE IN A SYNAGOGUE IN ENGLAND.

Jews as Nathan ben-Jechiel, author of the famous lexicon entitled *Aruch*; Solomon Parchon, another lexicographer; Immanuel of Rome (1320), a famous poet; Moses Rieti (1388), the Jewish Dante; Messer Leon (1480), philosopher and grammarian; Isaac Nathan, author of a Hebrew concordance, etc.

Shortly after the passing of the edicts in 1492 and 1497 many

Jewish emigrants sought refuge on the northern side of the Pyrenees, where they enjoyed many privileges. Early in the seventeenth century Portuguese Jews were settled and flourishing in the Danish states. At Hamburg, which was soon honored with the appellation of "Little Jerusalem," the Jews enjoyed a very great social prosperity. The country, however, which has shown the greatest favor and afforded the warmest hospitality to the exiled Spanish Jews, since the close of the sixteenth century, was the low countries of the Netherlands. When the first Jews, or New Christians from Spain, made their appearance in the low countries



SACRIFICE OF THE COCK ON THE EVE OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT IN RUSSIA AND POLAND.

there was not a vestige of those French and German Jews whose troubles we have before related. The first indication of the re-establishment of the Jews in the southern part of the United Provinces is found in the year 1516. At that time some refugees from Spain petitioned Charles V. to be allowed to reside in his dominions. Their appeal was unheeded, and severe edicts entirely excluded New Christians from Holland. And yet, notwithstanding these edicts, many Jews were to be found in these provinces before and after their separation from Spain. Their religion had long ceased to be tolerated, but they practised it with the greatest se-

crecy and lived and prospered under Spanish names. At Antwerp, also, the concealed Jews were very numerous, and had established academies for the study of Hebrew and Spanish literature. Most of these Spanish and Portuguese Jewish families established themselves shortly afterward in the Protestant low countries, to seek there complete freedom for the exercise of their religion. Their first settlement at Amsterdam was made on the side of East Friesland. It was from Embden that, in the year 1594, ten individuals of the Portuguese families of Lopes, Homen, and Pereira,



THE EVE OF THE SABBATH. LIGHTING THE SABBATH LAMP IN A FRENCH-JEWISH FAMILY.

came to Amsterdam, where they soon resumed their original Jewish name of Abendana, and in the year 1596 the day of atonement was celebrated by a small community of Portuguese Jews at Amsterdam. In 1598 the first synagogue was built in that capital, and in 1618 the third. In 1639 the three were united to form, from that time onward, one single and inseparable community of Spanish and Portuguese Jews, and in 1675 a handsome synagogue was built by them. In the meantime the German and Polish Jews had also established their synagogues at Amsterdam, which, like Hamburg, was a "Little Jerusalem."

Of the authors and learned men brought up in the synagogues of Holland, we mention Manasseh ben Israel (1604-1657), who pleaded the cause of his brethren before Oliver Cromwell; Uriel Acosta (1594-1640); Baruch, or Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), a. o. At the Hague, too, the Portuguese Jews enjoyed great prosperity and esteem, and their synagogue is situated in one of the finest quarters of the town.

Almost immediately after the discovery of the New World, the Jews from the Peninsula established themselves in America. The first Jewish colony was established in Brazil, in 1624, when



PREPARING FOR THE BURIAL, IN BELGIUM.

the Dutch took possession of the country. The nucleus formed by the Jewish settlers from Holland was greatly strengthened by the progress of the Dutch in Brazil, under William of Nassau, about 1640, when some 600 Jews sailed from Amsterdam to Brazil in 1641, but were obliged to leave again in consequence of the downfall of the Dutch rule in Brazil in 1654. In the meantime, the settlement founded in French Guiana increased at a rapid rate, the Jews enjoying special privileges here. During the wars between France and England in the reign of Louis XIV., the Jews in Eastern Guiana suffered severely, in consequence of which they

settled at Surinam. Their privileges were confirmed under King Charles II., by Lord Willoughby (1662) and the Dutch and West Indian Company. Of those parts of the West Indies where Jewish settlements are to be found, the British colony of Jamaica deserves



A JEWISH WEDDING IN POLAND.

special mention. Here a large Hebrew congregation has been in existence since the middle of the seventeenth century. As regards the Jews in the United States and North America at large, the late Professor Cassel disposes of those in North America in the following pithy words: "To the Jews emigrated to America, especially

“to the United States, that continent represents the land of the independence the settler obtains by the very fact of setting his foot on its shore. The Jews of North America have no history of their own; theirs is the history of the freedom of that continent. American Jews there are none, but only Jews from all parts of Europe who emigrated there, formed congregations and were free and independent. In the seventeenth century, Jews went to North and South America with the English and Portuguese; in the eighteenth century they joined in the struggle of the American colonies for their independence; and in the nineteenth America is the great commonwealth, where the Jewish portion of the population of Europe, being sick of Europe—some impelled by the spirit of adventure, others by rank despair—seek and find a harbor of refuge.”¹

In England, as we have seen, Manasseh ben Israel, of Amsterdam, pleaded the cause of his co-religionists before Cromwell. Although this effort was then in vain, yet in 1666, under Charles II., permission to reside and practise their religion was granted to the Jews. Since that time Jews have become very numerous in England, which was and is to them a real home.

The Reformation opened a new and better era to the Jews. Not that the reformers personally were much more tolerant to them than the Romish hierarchy, but the very fact that the boasted unity of the Church had received a serious blow, made people more inclined to toleration. Besides, since the invention of the printing machine, the Jews had been engaged in publishing beautiful copies of the Hebrew Bible and of the Talmud. This brought their learning into prominence, and some of the leaders of public opinion were more friendly to them. Reuchlin, for instance, stood manfully up for the preservation of the Talmud. Luther, too, owed much to the Jews; for it was chiefly with the help of a Latin commentary to the Old Testament made by Nicolas de Lyra, which embodied the sober-spirited and ingenious explanation of Rashi, that he was enabled better to understand and translate the Old Testament from the original Hebrew, hence the couplet of the Reformer's enemies:

“Si Lyra non lyrasset,
Lutherus non saltasset.”

If Lyra had not harped on profanation,
Luther would not have planned the Reformation.

The fury of persecution formerly directed against the Jews, was now directed against heretics in the bosom of Christianity

1 Art. “Juden” in *Ersch und Gruber's Allgemeine Encyclopädie*, 1853.

itself, and while the Jews were left alone, yet the anathema of public contempt, humiliation, and exclusion from every public or private connexion still lay heavily upon them. Thus the period of two hundred and seventy years, which intervened between the Reformation and the French Revolution, was of a monotonous character to the Jews, with the exception of a few instances, which attracted public attention. Thus in 1677 the pseudo-Messiah, Sabbathai Zevi (born at Smyrna in



JEWESS OF BAGDAD.

1625), died at Belgrade as a Mohammedan. Notwithstanding the apostasy of this pretender, there were some who upheld his claims even after his death, and asserted that he was still the true Messiah, and that he was translated to heaven. Some even of his most inveterate foes, while living, espoused his cause after his death. A few years later this heresy appeared under a new form, and under the guidance of two Polish rabbis, who travelled extensively to propagate Sabbathatism, which had its followers from Smyrna to Amsterdam, and even in Poland. In 1722 the whole sect was solemnly excommunicated in all the synagogues of Europe. In 1750, Jacob Frank, a native of Poland, appeared, who caused a schism in the synagogues of his native country, and founded the sect of the Frankists.

The most extraordinary movement which occurred among the Jews in the eighteenth century was that of the sect termed the *Chassidim*, or hyper-orthodox Jews. In 1740 a certain Rabbi Israel, surnamed *Baal-Shem*, i. e., Possessor of the Name, i. e., the mysterious name of God, appeared at the head of a small party of men, first at Hussti; and afterward at Medziboze in Podolia, who called themselves Chassidim or Saints. Rabbi Israel was most probably a man of devotional and enthusiastic spirit, who felt the

insufficiency and lifelessness of Rabbinism, and thought he had discovered the essence of true piety in the mysticism of the cabalistic system. His fame soon spread, in spite of the opposition of the rabbis; and in a short time his followers were numbered by tens of thousands. As long as he lived, the sect formed one great whole, of which he was the head. After his death, which took place in 1760, it was divided into separate congregations, each of which had its own rabbi or Tsaddik or Saint, unreserved devotion to whom



THE JEWS' QUARTER IN CRACOW.

is the most important of all the principles of the sect. In a word, before Pius IX. was declared infallible, the Chassidim had already their infallible popes, whose number is still very large in Poland, Wallachia, Moldavia, Galicia, and Palestine. Of these popes of the Chassidim, a modern Jewish writer, the late D. Cassel says: "To the disgrace of Judaism and modern culture the Tsaddikim still go on with their disgraceful business, and are thus the most essential hindrances to the dissemination of literary progress in Galicia and Russia. There are still thousands who behold in the Tsaddik the

worker of miracles, the prophet, one who is in close communion with God and angels, and who present him with rich gifts, and promulgate the wonders which they have seen. Covetousness on the one hand and spiritual narrowness on the other are the channels through which the evil is fed anew."

Contemporary with the rise and progress of the sect of the Chassidim, there lived in Germany the famous Moses Mendelssohn, born in 1729 at Dessau, a man whose remarkable talents and writings constituted an era in the history of the modern Jews. The



JEW BARGAINING IN THE MARKET-PLACE OF CRACOW.

influence produced by the writings of Mendelssohn was to destroy all respect for the Talmud and the Rabbinical writings among the Jews who approved his opinions, and thus rendered them dissatisfied with their religion, and drove them, on the one hand either to the adoption of total infidelity, or of Christianity on the other, as is the case of his own children.

Mendelssohn died in 1786. Six years before Joseph II. ascended the throne of Austria, and issued in 1782 his edict of toleration, which marked for the Jews the beginning of a new era in the German Empire, as well as in other Austrian countries. In Austria

proper, from the first establishment of the duchy in 1267, the Jews were regarded as belonging to the sovereign of the country. In 1420 and 1460 persecutions broke out against them in Vienna. In 1553, Ferdinand I. had granted them the right to reside in the Austrian capital, but at a little later date expelled them. Maximilian II. recalled them, and Ferdinand II. permitted them, about the year 1620, to erect a synagogue in Vienna. In 1688 an edict appeared signifying the wish that they leave Vienna and the Duchy of Austria entirely; but in 1697 we find that the Jews had gradually returned in large numbers. After the accession of the Empress Maria Theresa their condition improved, and under Joseph II. they enjoyed equal rights and privileges with other subjects. They enjoyed these advantages until after the death of Joseph II. The reactionary spirit then prevailed in Austria, and many privileges were withdrawn.

As in Catholic Austria, so in Protestant Prussia an amendment in the condition of the Jews began to appear and develop itself as early as the eighteenth century. Under the Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William (1640-1688), the Jews had again an asylum and a safe abode in Prussia. During the reign of King Frederick I. the synagogue at Berlin was built. Frederick William, the father of Frederick the Great, was equally favorable to the Jews, although Frederick the Great is thought not to have looked favorably upon them. He did not persecute them, but, on the whole, they were treated as inferior to the other inhabitants of the country, and the whole community was considered responsible for the crimes of its individual members. The successor of Frederick the Great endeavored by new laws to effect a salutary change for the Jews; the result was, that some of them attained to considerable wealth, but the majority of them retained a degraded and



A WEALTHY JEWESS OF WARSAW.

dependent position, which continued till toward the close of the eighteenth century. Mendelssohn, it is true, tried to elevate his people, and to bring about this task he was assisted by such men as Hartwig Wessely (1725-1805), Isaac Euchel (1716-1804), David Friedländer (1750-1834) and others. But the effect produced by his writings was precisely the same as that occasioned by the writings of Maimonides six centuries earlier—to render the Jews dissatisfied with their religion, as has already been stated above.

The French Revolution marked a new era in the history of the Jews. Not only the Jews, but also the Christians, or, more properly speaking, the civilised world, had become intoxicated with the idea of reforming everything. Several writers, as Dohm and Grégoire, advocated the regeneration of the Jews, and the French revolution furnished an opportunity of realising some of their ideas. The Jews had been much neglected or cruelly oppressed, but now a new system of legislation commenced. On September 27, 1791, the French National Assembly declared them citizens of France. On September 2, 1796, a similar decree was passed in Holland.

Napoleon, when in the zenith of his power, perceiving the spirit that was stirring in the Jewish mind, conceived the idea of turning it to his own advantage. He thought that the Jews, existing in considerable numbers in most parts of the world, understanding all languages, possessing great wealth and endowed with talents, might prove useful allies in his plan of universal empire. He undertook the vast project of giving these scattered fragments a centre of unity in their long lost, but never forgotten, national council—the Sanhedrim. His idea was that all Jews in the world would obey the Sanhedrim, and that this body, with its seat at Paris and appointed by himself, would be governed by him. He clearly saw that with the old-fashioned Jews he could effect nothing. The land of their love was Palestine, their hope the Messiah, and God their legislator. He knew that to them their religion was everything, and his decorations of the Legion of Honor worse than nothing, yea, an abomination. To make use of the Jews it was necessary to reform them, and he perceived in the nation a large party, ready and willing, though upon different principles, to be the agents in effecting this reform. And though Napoleon's intention was to make the decisions of the Sanhedrim the religious law of all the Jews in the world, yet he felt the indecency of legislating for a religious body to which he did not belong. He therefore thought it necessary, at least to preserve an appearance of permitting this

body to reform itself. On July 28, 1806 (on a Sabbath-day), the French Sanhedrim began to sit, and nominated as president Abraham Furtado, a distinguished Portuguese of Bordeaux. After the meetings were fully constituted, and were prepared for the transaction of business, Napoleon appointed the commissioners—Molé, Portalis, and Pasquier—to wait upon them, and to present to them twelve questions, to answer which was to be the first and principal occupation of the Sanhedrim. The answers given by this body were satisfactory to Napoleon, who convened another great Sanhedrim, February 9, 1807. To this assembly the rabbis from various other countries, especially from Holland, were invited, in order that the principles promulgated by the body might acquire general authority among the Jews.

The Jews throughout France were at first highly pleased at the interest taken by the Emperor in their affairs. But their joy was soon afterward diminished by an edict which he issued in the provinces bordering on the Rhine, and which restricted the Jews in their commercial affairs. Nevertheless, in Westphalia, Napoleon exerted a favorable influence by supporting the reformatory endeavors of Israel Jacobson (1768–1823) who devoted himself to the diffusion of education among his brethren by establishing schools and a seminary for the proper instruction of teachers among them. The same Jacobson also undertook a reform in the public worship. The temple which he built at his own expense at Seesen, he furnished with an organ, a choir of school children, and commenced regular preaching in German. This was the first instance since the destruction of the Temple that instrumental music was introduced into Jewish worship. The Rabbinic Jews



A JEWESS OF TANGIER.

regarded the playing upon instruments as a labor, and therefore a desecration of the Sabbath. But the reformed Jews cared little for rabbinic principles, and hailed this change with enthusiasm. Subsequently temples were built at Berlin, Hamburg, Leipsic, and other places.

Beyond the borders of France, the principles set forth by the Sanhedrim found but a faint echo, and soon met with positive opposition, especially in Germany and Holland. It is true, that the French armies at their invasion of the Netherlands in 1795 were successful in effecting by degrees a complete emancipation of the Jews. Yet, strange as it may appear, the emancipation was received and estimated very differently by the Jews of Holland than by those of France. With a few exceptions, the Jews from Spain and Portugal who were lovers of monarchy and aristocracy upon principle, and devotedly attached to the House of Orange, cared nothing for the so-called emancipation, which accorded little with their political attachments and their religious opinions. Even the Jews of the German and Polish synagogues of Holland, the so-called Ashkenazim in opposition to the Sephardim, were little disposed to exchange their ancient Israelitish nationality, for the new political character offered to them by the Revolution. Only a small number, following the spirit of the age, formed a kind of political association under the name of Felix Libertate, which gave rise to a schism in the synagogue, that lasted till the reign of William I. From this association the Felix Libertate, which had founded an independent synagogue, named Adath Jeshurun, three deputies were sent to the Sanhedrim at Paris.

In the new Batavian Republic, founded in 1795, the opinions concerning the political equality of the Jews were divided. There were many admirers of the Revolution of 1789 in France, and that of 1795 in Holland, yet they were restrained by scruples of conscience from wishing for a complete naturalisation of the Jews. Finally, however, the contrary opinion prevailed, and the change was made. Under the government, first of Louis Napoleon, and then of the House of Orange, the Jews of Holland became reconciled by degrees to their new political rights. After the restoration of the House of Orange to the government of Holland, the principle of absolute equality among all the inhabitants also remained unaltered.

In Belgium, also, the Jews enjoyed equality in the sight of the law. In spite of the new political position of the Jews in Europe, constituting as it does a new epoch in history, the ancient barriers

between the Jews and Christians could not be broken down. In Germany, for instance, the entire emancipation of the Jews, which in France had been established, as it were, in a moment, had to struggle for more than thirty years longer. Already before the Revolution of 1789, in the principal states of Germany measures were taken to secure to the Jews some rights and to amend their condition. The French Revolution and the influence of the French Imperial Government considerably aided the cause of the Jews throughout a great part of Germany, especially in Westphalia and Prussia. The reign of King Frederick William III. assured to the



AN OLD JEW OF TANGIER.

A YOUNG JEW OF TANGIER ON THE SABBATH.

Jews by the edict published March 11, 1812, the right and title of Prussian citizens, with some restrictions and conditions.

When the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, settled the affairs of Europe, the sixteenth article imposed upon the Diet an obligation to take the necessary measures for advancing the social improvement of the Jews, and to obtain for, and to secure to, them the enjoyment of all civil rights, on condition of their fulfilling the duties connected with them. This proposal met with intense opposition from many quarters. The prejudices against the Jews seemed to be intense, varying in their nature and degree according to the different circumstances of the thirty-eight states into which the Germanic body was divided. In the end the Congress decided to

leave the decision of the matter to the legislation of the respective states representing the confederation. When this subject came up subsequently for discussion in the legislative bodies of the several states, it was found that three distinct parties existed, who might be termed the Conservative, the Historical, and the Revolutionary. The conservative party wished to leave things *in statu quo*, the historical appealed to history and insisted upon making progress and improvement in harmony with the necessities of the age. The revolutionary party, caring for neither history nor religion, insisted upon an entire revolution of things, in which, amid the cry of universal equality, liberty, and fraternity, the Jew should secure his rights. The most famous of the revolutionary party was Bruno Bauer who openly declared he did not wish for the emancipation of the Jews, but for their entire extinction and destruction in a new race of pantheistical humanity. The king of Prussia, Frederick William IV., in the spirit of the historical party, published an edict, July 23, 1847, according to which equality of rights and duties was secured to the Jews, with some exceptions. The year 1848, with its revolutionary principles, effected the full emancipation of the Jews in Germany, and ever since they are found in parliament as well as in universities, schools, etc. Of late a reaction has taken place against the Jews of Prussia, the so-called "Anti-Semitic Movement," the end of which cannot be foreseen.

In England, Parliament passed in 1753 a bill for the naturalisation of the Jews, but in the following year the bill was rescinded. After many fruitless attempts for the political emancipation of the Jews, the question was finally settled in 1858, and in that year Lionel Rothschild took his seat for the city of London as the first Jewish member of the House of Commons.

In the Scandinavian countries the Jews enjoy many liberties, but not their absolute emancipation. In Russia the Jewish population has experienced at different times various kinds of treatment, and it seems as if the last emperor of Russia was bent upon their extinction.

As in Russia, the Jews experienced a diversified fate in the territories of the pope, varying according to the peculiar disposition and prejudices of the successive popes. Under Pius VII. (1816-1825) they enjoyed ample protection and equal franchises; different, however, it was under Leo XII. who reinforced old and obsolete bulls. Under Pius IX. the Ghetto of the Jews at Rome was solemnly and publicly opened, and thus the wall of distinction and separation between Jews and Christians was removed. The Pope's

example was followed by Charles Albert of Sardinia, in 1848, who proclaimed perfect equality of political rights to the Jews.

In Mohammedan countries—Asiatic and African—the relation between the Jews on the one hand and the government and people on the other has progressed in exact proportion to the influence that Christianity and the growth of civilisation have exercised on those countries. Still great, however, is the contempt in which Jews and Christians, and more particularly the former, are held by the Mohammedan population. But on the part of the government of the Viceroy of Egypt and of the Sultan of Constantinople, a gradually increasing favor has been exhibited to the Jews. At one time only, in 1840, an accusation was levelled against the Jews in Syria, for having assassinated Father Thomas who for thirty years had practised medicine at Damascus, and who, as had been reported, was last seen in the Jewish quarters. A persecution against the Jews took place, scenes of barbarity occurred, till at last the representatives of the European governments made an end to the cruelties.

The number of Jews scattered all over the world may be estimated at a little over seven millions, and is distributed as follows :

EUROPE.		ASIA.	
Belgium	5,000	Afghanistan	14,000
Bulgaria.....	24,000	British India.....	26,000
Denmark.....	4,000	Persia.....	19,000
Germany.....	579,000	Russian Asia.....	40,000
France.....	80,000	Turkey in Asia.....	195,000
Greece.....	6,000	Total for Asia.....	294,000
Great Britain.....	60,000		
Italy.....	45,800	AFRICA.	
Luxemburg.....	850	Abyssinia.....	200,000
Netherlands.....	90,000	Egypt.....	8,000
Austria.....	1,005,000	Algiers.....	48,500
Hungary.....	641,000	Morocco.....	200,000
Bosnia.....	6,000	Tripoli.....	6,000
Portugal.....	300	Tunis.....	45,000
Rumania.....	400,000	Total for Africa.....	507,500
Russia.....	3,236,009		
Sweden.....	3,800	AMERICA.	
Switzerland.....	8,800	British N. America.....	2,500
Servia.....	4,400	Dutch Possessions.....	2,700
Spain.....	6,900	Central and S. America.....	50,000
Turkey in Europe.....	94,600	United States ¹	230,000
Total for Europe.....	6,301,450	Total for America.....	285,200
	Australia has 13,500, and New Zealand 2,500.		

¹ According to the *New York Independent* of January 7, 1897, only 139,500.

This makes a grand total of 7,404,150 Jews on the whole globe, which figures are doubtless the most complete and accurate.

The Jews who use the Arabic dialect are called Moghrabim, numbering about 160,000 souls, and are found in Northern Africa and Palestine. Those who still retain their Spanish dialect are styled Sephardim, now scarcely numbering more than 300,000,



ENGLISH JEW, WITH TALITH AND PHYLACTERIES. A PRAYING JEW OF GALICIA, WITH TALITH.

and are found chiefly in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Palestine, North Africa, but also scattered in small communions in France, Holland, Germany, and England. The Ashkenazim, numbering more than 6,000,000 souls, have their chief seats in Germany, Austria, Russia, and Poland, but are found scattered also in the Orient, Italy, France, Holland, Scandinavia, England, and North America. They constitute the bulk of the Jewish nation, speak the "jargon" or

Jewish German, to which in Russia and Poland Slavonic elements are added.

All three classes of Jews, as far as their members belong to the old faith, follow the rabbinical law as laid down in the Talmud, and afterwards codified by Moses Maimonides in his Mishna Thora, who also is the author of the Jewish creed, which the orthodox Jew repeats every morning. More minutely Talmudic Judaism is expounded in the Shulchan Aruch or the arranged table, composed and compiled by Rabbi Jacob Karo.

In religious belief, however, there are Jews of the old faith and Jews of the new faith. When towards the close of the eighteenth century the Jews began in great numbers to take active part in the development of modern civilisation, those concerned in the movement could not fail to recognise that the rabbinical law contained much which is superstitious or inhumane, not compatible with the ethical standards of modern culture ; that the divine service needed reorganisation, especially by the introduction of sermons in the language of the country : that the youth ought to have a fuller instruction in the Bible and the elements of doctrine and ethics ; and acting on this conviction the natural result was that there arose a distinction between the Jews living in Central and Western Europe or in the United States, and the Jews settled in or coming from Eastern Europe. The latter retained Judaism in its old mediæval petrified form, the former entered upon a development demanded by the times.

Among the neo-Judaic party there arose two classes, the so-called Orthodox and the Reformed. The former retain the old Rabbinical standards, though purged from their extravagancies ; they still use the Hebrew language in their services, but from time to time permit sermons in the language of the country ; they also hope, on the basis of prophetic promises, for the return of Israel to Palestine, together with the establishment of an earthly Messianic kingdom of which Jerusalem shall be the capital and which will embrace the whole world. The Reformed Jews without having virtually broken with the past, take an absolutely independent standpoint toward the Mosaic law ; they employ throughout the language of the land in their public worship ; they consider themselves genuine citizens of the State to which they belong. But most of them have given up the faith in a divine revelation ; they idealise and rationalise Jewish thought and see in the acknowledgment and acceptance of this thought by all men the religious

golden age of the future. Some of them have lost all religious conviction, and become absorbed in mere materialism.

Within the old orthodox branch of Israel two groups have been developed, the Perushim or Mithnaggedim, i. e., adherents to the Talmud, and the Chassidim or adherents to the younger form of the Kabbala, i. e., the mysticism and theosophy of Judaism. They revere pious men, whom they believe can, on account of their intimate connexion with the upper world, assist their devotees with infallible counsel and heavenly blessing. Their Tsaddik or Saint is as infallible as the pope.

There is violent war between the different Jewish religious classes. The traditionalists condemn the worship of the moderns as semi-heathenish. The moderns despise the ignorance and the superstition of the traditionalists. Both, however, agree in the rejection of Jesus as *the* Christ.

In Europe the synagogue has produced a number of learned men, who have enriched oriental literature and other sciences. In America, the land of the free, the Jews have been less productive. Those who have distinguished themselves were and are foreigners. More is to be expected in the future, since the American Jews have established schools of learning, which supply the synagogue with teachers and preachers.

IN THE DISSECTING-ROOM.

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN AN OLD PHYSICIAN AND HIS SON,
A STUDENT OF MEDICINE.

BY PETER ROSEGGER.

LONG BEFORE the vacation began, he came home. His boots spattered to the very tops with mud, his hat soaked by rain even to the very lining, and an eye flashing nervously and angrily as he stood before his father.

“Who is this, then?” asked the latter, grasping the tip of his long beard and rubbing his old eyes with it. “Can this be my Adalbert?”

“Father, that’s who it is. I’m sorry to say it is, father.”

“Then the university is burned out,” said the old man.

“No, the university still stands. It is I that am burned out.”

The old man grasped the youth firmly by both shoulders as though to shake him. But as the young man scarcely moved at all, he said: “This is not ashes. Not at all. This is one who has a solid framework in his body. Perhaps it is in your pocket that things have gone wrong?”

The youth had thrown his soaked hat into a corner, and himself upon the sofa.

“You may have a calf butchered, papa; I come as a prodigal son. That is,—no, have me butchered. I am a prodigal son. I shall be one and shall remain one. There is no repentance in me. Let the calf live; but let me have a drink, I am thirsty.”

The old man went up to him and laid his hand upon his brow: “Is it possible that anything is out of tune here?”

“It is out of tune *here*,” said the young man, pointing to his heart.

“O yes, I see,—in love,” laughed the old man. “And for that the long trip in this beastly weather? Good, my son, that you value so highly the blessing of your old father.”

“The blessing will grow stale before I find a sweetheart.”

“Not that, then? An Adonis of twenty, and not in love? For shame! A healthy medical student, and not in love?—Boy, you’re studying anatomy, aren’t you?”

No, father. That is just it. I am no medical student. I am not studying anatomy. And that is why I am here destroying your pet ambition, poor, dear father!”

The old man filled his pipe; it had a stem so long that he handed the match to his son: “Be so good as to start the fire.” When he had taken several whiffs, and the blue rings were wavering about his grey head, he said: “So not a medical student! Well, why not, please?”

“To make it short: I can’t stand the infernal dissecting-room.”

“You can’t stand the in—”

“—fernal dissecting-room. It sickens me.”

“O, you dear baby you, that passes off in a few days.”

“For four weeks I attended. Then again for four weeks. The last day was even worse than the first.”

“Do you expect me to believe that?” asked the old man imperturbably. “Why, you have often helped me bravely with surgical operations at home. No dread of blood, no blood poisoning. Why, a cadaver is nothing in comparison.”

“God forbid that a cadaver should sicken me,” cried the youth, springing up from the sofa. “It is the infernal *frivolity* that sickens me. Say, father, am I sentimental? Was I ever?”

“Like a golden russet in September! That is about my idea of your heart. Sentimental? Not that I know of.”

“Or am I a scoundrel?” snorted the young man, pacing up and down the room. “And if everything that goes on in the world is done or is said to be done for the sake of mankind,—every calling, every science,—or isn’t it so?—what sort of a physician is that that has no respect for mankind! If I am to respect the human being in myself and in others, I cannot be entirely irreverent toward a dead body. God knows, I cannot! And if I despise the dead body like a—like a—I don’t know what, then the living body is—mere dough! Yes, father, yes! Then I renounce medicine and shall become a soldier, or a hermit, or any arabesque in society.”

The old man took a deep pull at his pipe and looked at his son

with a smile. He even nodded his head a little. "Now I really begin to see clearly, Adalbert, that you were born for a physician."

"I can't scream louder," replied the youth, "if you don't understand me now — —"

"Ah, how well I do understand you, my son! They write to a hospital: Request for three bodies, female if possible, at six florins. Good. The boxes come and are opened. The servant loads the stiff naked body upon his shoulder as a butcher carries a dead hog. On to the ice with it! The extremities upon the dissecting-table for the first-year students, the trunk for—"

"Please don't, father, it is horrible."

"It certainly is not poetical, my child. But it is necessary. Are young people to study anatomy on manikins? Or is this science really unnecessary? Does it only serve to satisfy idle curiosity, or at best the perfection of knowledge, and practically has the physician, who of course cannot take his patient apart like a clock, no use for anatomy? Is it possible that you have been taken by such silly phrases as these?"

"Indeed, I have not! The most thorough study of the human body, not in books, but in practice, is the first requisite for a physician. Certainly, that is clear."

"Well, then, young gentleman, what do you want?"

"Another profession."

"Since you are so delightfully inspired for the dignity of humanity,—what profession do you mean, which is so entirely filled with respect for others? Politics, perhaps? Or stock-broking? Name a calling, please, which demands greater sacrifices on behalf of mankind than that of medicine. One of these sacrifices, for instance, is so great that my young medical student is about to desert his colors because of it. Because out of respect for human kind he is repelled by the thought of making examinations of human bodies. Moreover, my boy," added the old man, laying his pipe on the table, "I had precisely the same experience thirty-five years ago that you are having to-day. My feeling the first time I entered the dissecting-room was one of rebellion. The brutality of the performance, and besides many a jest of thoughtless boys with the bodies, and the vulgarity of it all! Mere butchery! And these 'subjects,'—were they not human beings who a few days before had been living and suffering like ourselves, animated like us by the same ideals, spurred by the same 'demons'! This dead man to whom I am applying the knife mechanically,—is not some mother-heart weeping for him? Or some inconsolable widow, or a deserted or-

phan? How faithfully this body may have been nursed, how modestly veiled and guarded! And now!—On every highway the hurrying crowds bare their heads for a moment when a funeral passes along; the cemetery is a sacred place in all the world, even when all that rest in it are strangers to us. Everywhere the dead are respected, but not in the dissecting-room. A joyful ‘ah!’ runs through the ranks of physicians and students, if the cadaver reveals an abnormality from which a human being had suffered untold misery and finally perished! And when I saw how they burrowed into the vitals,—Adalbert, I felt their knives in my own breast. And I felt for the outstretched dead, thinking: If that were my father, or my brother, or my son! So it came about one day that they carried me out of the hall in a swoon — —”

“And yet you went back?” the youth exclaimed.

“And yet I went back,” replied the old man calmly. “I thought: Consider, if you think that there is too little reverence in the dissecting-room, you must simply carry some into it. At least for your own personal use. Many a calling is sadly vulgar, yet man can consecrate it. For coarseness in general, abominable, despicable coarseness, you will never be able to banish from the world. There are vulgar creatures everywhere, even in the temple of knowledge; and men of refinement, even in workshops and mines. The right man consecrates his calling and his work himself. Even if the work is only for money and property, for worldly vanities, man can by a good thought give it a noble meaning. The miner, as he goes down into the earth, says: A happy return! The peasant who sets plough to the sod, says: In God’s name! The sailor puts out to sea with an appeal to Mary! So they all have their phrases and their prayers with which they refresh their hearts lest they perish and turn to stone. The young physician, of all persons, must not let his heart perish and turn to stone; he needs it too much for the suffering brothers and sisters to whose welfare he has consecrated himself. And so I, too, devised me a phrase, a prayer, for the dissecting-room. It did me good service.”

“May I know it?” asked the son.

“You shall know it, Adalbert; you should have hit upon it yourself. You can interrupt your promenades through the room a moment and listen to me quietly. It is a very short lesson. Listen. When I entered the room, and before me on the table lay the form with the dull, yellow, waxy gleam, stark naked, cold as clay, clean shaven, the sunken eye fixed, the features expressionless, robbed of all humanity,—then I thought: “Thou dear, fortunate dead man!

While the most of thy kind must be given over to the earth straightway, thou art chosen to be useful to men even in death! Through thy remains, before they turn to ashes, the flames of knowledge and intelligence will be kindled, of power and performance for the common weal, so that from thee, thou dead body, new life shall pass into the limbs of the sick. Thou art chosen to contribute to the welfare of humanity. I honor thee!"—Behold, my son, this thought made me strong. Protected by this thought, my heart escaped the danger of growing brutal in the dissecting-room, and thus protected, I think I saved for the sick-room what little idealism I had."

"That sounds different," said the student. "Perhaps I will change my mind after all. But why doesn't the professor from his desk talk of these matters?"

"Why, there has to be something left for the father to say."

THE IMMORALITY OF THE ANTI-VIVISECTION MOVEMENT.

BY THE EDITOR.

COMPASSION with the suffering is a virtue ; indeed it is that virtue which in itself constitutes humaneness and which, wherever absent, changes a man into a brute, a wild beast of prey. Let us therefore by all means foster this gentlest of all virtues, which is the main jewel in the crowns of the two greatest religious leaders of the world—Jesus the Nazarene, and Gautama the Shâkyamuni. But compassion should not be allowed to grow rank ; compassion is a sentiment, and he who yields to sentiments without subjecting their exercise to criticism and discrimination, ceases to be a man of moral responsibility and degenerates into a creature of instinct. Compassion as a blind instinct is unquestionably a nobler fault than wrath, but as a passion it is a fault, it is sentimentalism, and its influence can become the more baneful the less its deficiencies are anticipated. Thus an untruth in the mouth of the erring who honestly believe it to be a truth may be more dangerous than an ethical falsehood pronounced by a liar.

The anti-vivisection movement, as it is carried on, is in this sense guilty of immorality, and we deem it our duty to state our views of the subject openly and frankly. We do not doubt that the anti-vivisectionists are noble men and women ensouled with the noblest of all virtues, compassion for the suffering, but they lack upon the whole the most essential of all virtues, which is thought, discrimination, discretion, consideration of consequences, a surveying of the situation and a weighing of the implications of the question as well as the results to which it leads.

Not to be misunderstood, the writer of this article states at once that he sanctions all those aspirations which tend to alleviate suffering of all kinds, in man and in animals, not excluding even

the insects and the vermin which molest our life. He would condemn all contrivances and traps which involve unnecessary pain or produce suffering; but for that reason he would not demand that we should not resist those creatures, be they small or great, that are pestiferous and obnoxious. There is no merit in sparing the life either of a tiger or a louse; but it is a vice to take delight in torturing a wild beast caught, and also in prolonging the death-struggle of a fly. It is our moral duty to resist evil, but we should not resist evil with evil. Let us combat evil and all the creatures representing evil in an honest and square fight, but having conquered them, let us not delight in their destruction, for even the meanest and most wretched creatures deserve our compassion; they are the products of circumstances and cannot help being such as they are. Being evil, they deserve destruction, but he who finds pleasure in serving as their executioner becomes vicious in exactly the same degree that he yields to the passion of hatred and vindictiveness.

Mark well that whenever a murderer is condemned to die, that the law must condemn him and not the judge. The judge only pronounces the judgment, and the executioner is an instrument of the law, not a murderer. A judge who hates the criminal is in his heart guilty of an offence similar to that for which the criminal is condemned. A true judge has a sorrowful heart, and great is his responsibility.

The two greatest religious leaders of mankind, Buddha and Christ, have taught us to have compassion, but neither the one nor the other prescribed to avoid once and for all the infliction of any suffering. On the contrary, they taught that suffering is unavoidable. Buddha did not say that salvation is obtained by yielding unreservedly to the sentiment of compassion; he taught salvation by enlightenment. The bodhi, or enlightenment, is higher even than compassion which implies that the compassion which we must exercise towards all suffering beings is subject to the discrimination afforded by the light of the bodhi. And Christ's mission is mainly a lesson of sacrifice which means that salvation is obtained through suffering. There is no sentimentalism in either case.

Among the Buddhist Jataka tales is the story of the sacrifice which the Bodhisat accomplishes in his incarnation as a hare for the sake of keeping by his flesh a starving Brahman alive who was engaged in religious contemplations. The story illustrates that it is the higher life which must be enhanced, not life in general. Life in itself is not sacred; it becomes sacred only when devoted to the

acquisition of a nobler, fuller, better phase of life. We therefore demur when in another Jataka tale we are informed that a Brahman gave himself up for food to a starving tiger.¹

Morality consists, religiously speaking, in doing the will of God ; or simply, in performing the duties of life ; that is to say, in achieving that which according to the nature of the universe in which we live raises us higher, renders us nobler, and extends the sphere of our power.

The word "we," in this connexion, does not mean our corporeal individuality ; it means that spiritual part of ourselves which constitutes our personal character as it lives and grows in the evolution of mankind. It means that peculiar form of endeavor in us which we have received from the past, both by inheritance and acquisition ; that part of ourselves which does not die at the dissolution of our body but continues after us,—in a word, it means our soul, and morality is what promotes growth of soul. Thus the characteristic and most essential feature of morality is not the increase of the happiness of our fleeting individuality, of our self, the temporary abode of our soul ; but it is the extension of our good will to all that is good, based upon the acquisition of a clearer and ever clearer insight—a heartfelt insight—into the nature of the interrelations of all things, especially of all living beings.

If we call the conditions of being to which we must accommodate ourselves, in other words the ultimate authority of conduct (of whatever nature it may be) "God," and if we define the recognition of these conditions of existence as the essence of religious "truth," (which are two popular terms that can easily be understood), then we say that morality is an endeavor to find the truth and live according to its behests, or briefly, it is conformity to God.

Immorality is all that which antagonises morality, and there can be no question about it that self-indulgence is the main,—nay, the sole cause of going astray. Self-indulgence is yielding to passions, and passions are sentiments of high tension.

Self-indulgence may either be from ignorance, in which case it appears excusable without, however, escaping thereby its evil con-

¹ There is, however, a possible interpretation of this Jataka tale, which would justify its moral. First, we must recognise that the tigress, according to the story, is starving with her cubs ; and the Brahman sees in her the mother sacrificing herself for her children. Secondly, the Jatakas are written in the spirit and style of fables. As the lion represents a king, and not a beast of prey, so the tigress must be regarded as the widow of a noble Kshatrya family. When the Brahman gives himself up for food, the meaning is simply that he sacrifices himself for her ; he assists her and keeps her starving progeny alive by means that are ruinous to himself, and this is expressed in the usual fable style. If we take fables literally, we will find them all nonsensical and ridiculous.

sequences, or it may be consciously willed. All the wild beasts and creatures lower than man suffer from ignorance by blindly following their appetites, and wherever they exhibit moral qualities, they rather happen to strike the right than choose it deliberately. Man alone possesses the prerogative of either being a consciously-willed evil-doer or becoming a truly ethical man—a morally enlightened being.

Now we ought to bear in mind that the moral man should never yield without previous deliberation to a sentiment or passion of any kind, not even to the gentlest and noblest, such as charity, compassion, love. Be full of charity, compassion, and love, but do not yield at once to every gentle motion of your heart, for your charity may be misplaced and your love may do more harm than good.

A noble zeal for truth was the original motive that begot the Inquisition ; and a genuinely charitable spirit has pampered pauperism in Italy and other good Christian countries.

Therefore we must beware of yielding to sentiment, for every kind of yielding to sentiment is self-indulgence and will be productive of good by haphazard only in the same way that an animal may perform a moral deed if his disposition at a certain moment happens to be excited in the right way.

The anti-vivisection movement we cannot help regarding as such thoughtless yielding to sentiment. The sentiment is noble and evinces a gentle disposition of the heart, but whether it is moral, whether it is right, whether it leads mankind upward is another question ; and it appears to us that it cannot stand a careful weighing of all the pros and cons. Before the tribunal of ethics it stands condemned as much as all those other sentimental aspirations, indiscriminate alms-giving, the burning of the bodies of heretics for the sake of saving their souls, and showing mercy to the tiger because he ought to have a chance of reforming and might learn to eat cabbage and grass like a lamb.

This life is a struggle and only the courageous will conquer. Courageous is he who does not fear to leave his body on the battlefield in order that his aspirations, his cause, his soul may be victorious. But shall we be courageous only so far as our own individuality is concerned ; must not the leader in battle have courage for the whole army. Indeed, he must. Victory is gained only by sacrifices, by the wounds of the gallant, by the death of the brave.

Count Moltke had his own sons in the ranks of the German army, and he was a man of the gentlest disposition, kind, compas-

sionate, and taking pity even upon the sufferings of a dog. Yet for a great purpose he was determined to make any sacrifice that was necessary to achieve it, and he said that "a whole regiment of soldiers had fulfilled its purpose if at a critical moment they were all slaughtered for the sake of delaying the enemy ten minutes."

Where the fate of a nation is at stake, the individual must be ready to lay down his life, and it is the duty of those who are appointed to watch over the weal of the nation to stake the lives of the present generation for the sake of a nobler and higher unfoldment of the future.

As to vivisection, we all know that it is not a pleasant duty of the physiologist, but it is an indispensable task that must be done for the sake of investigation. It falls within the same category with all sacrifices. Should science neglect to search for light in this most important domain, the domain of life, its representatives would be guilty of a gross neglect of duty. They would be like generals who would retreat before the enemy, because the enemy's bullets endanger the lives of their soldiers. They would be like an officer in the fire department who, inspired by the idea of not causing pain to anybody, would recall his men from the burning building when they ought to rescue its inmates, because the firemen might blister their hands.

Vivisection may truly have, and frequently will have, the tendency of blunting the sentiments of the vivisector; but so does dissection. Shall we surrender dissection as an obligatory part of medical instruction lest the moral sense of the student be shocked? There are a few quack schools of medicine in this country which undertake to educate physicians, but their degrees should not be recognised, for they leave their graduates ignorant on one, perhaps on several, most important subjects. It is true enough that the human body in its wretched nakedness is subjected on the dissection-table to most undignified treatment, which is liable to make the student vulgar and rude; but for that reason we cannot abandon dissection. The right thing to do is to teach the student the moral aspect of dissection and put him on his guard against the demoralising influence of the dissection table. Do not cut him off from one of the best sources of information, but strengthen his moral nerve that he can bear the view of the Medusa without having his heart petrified by the sight of her terribly ugly features.

The present number of *The Open Court* contains an article by Peter Rosegger on the subject which ought to be read by every medical student in the country. Peter Rosegger proposes as an

antidote for the demoralising influence of the dissecting-room the following prayer, to be spoken by the dissector whenever he begins the ghastly work—so indispensable in the study of medicine :

“Thou dear, fortunate dead man! While the most of thy kind must be given over to the earth straightway, thou art chosen to be useful to men even in death! Through thy remains, before they turn to ashes, the flames of knowledge and intelligence will be kindled, of power and performance for the common weal, so that from thee, thou dead body, new life shall pass into the limbs of the sick. Thou art chosen to contribute to the welfare of humanity. I honor thee!”

The anti-vivisection movement might be excusable if there were any valid arguments to prove that vivisection is useless. But the very opposite is the case. Innumerable discoveries of the most beneficent kind have been made through experiments on animals.

An anti-vivisectionist writes that he would rather die than purchase the prolongation of his life with the sacrifice of an innocent animal. That sentiment seems noble and generous. But should we not be ready to kill a million rabbits if we can thereby save the life of one child attacked with diphtheria? Now the question is not one child against a million rabbits; but many millions of children of all the generations to come against a few hundred rabbits; and consider that not man alone but the whole animal creation, too, is the gainer by every progress of science.

It is not our intention to enter here into a detailed discussion of the anti-vivisection movement, but suffice it to say that many publications of the anti-vivisectionists are guilty of gross exaggerations as to the number of the victims of vivisection and the cruelties to which the dissected animals are exposed. The truth is that all the great scientists who are famous as clever vivisectors are as considerate as possible and avoid all unnecessary suffering. It is of course not exactly impossible that there are among the minor lights of science men ruthless enough to delight in the cruelty of their work, but it is very improbable. I believe that it is painful to vivisectors to be reminded of the fact that their subject is a living being; but whenever they think of it, they cannot help being touched by a sentiment of compassion.

Every compassion is a pain. While the anti-vivisectionist weakly indulges in his sentiment and thoughtlessly yields to the impulse of removing it, the investigator knows that the victim is sacrificed for a great purpose, and he can say to the rabbit on the table before him: “Blessed art thou, poor creature; thou art distinguished among thy comrades and glorious is the destiny for which thou hast been chosen. While most other animals die of direful

diseases, frequently under terrible pains, thou shalt give thy life for science ; for the sake of revealing the mysteries of existence and for the purpose of giving us instruction as to how some of the ills that flesh is heir to may be cured. Blessed art thou ; for thy death helps to build up life, and the preservation of lives of many noble men and women will in part be due to thee. In them and with them thou wilt gain an immortality of a noble kind, which in the same way is otherwise not granted to the brute creation."

There is a great field for the humane societies¹ and they can do a noble work by elevating mankind and refining its sentiments, and also by protecting the dumb creation against the cruelty of savage masters. We are with them in all these worthy endeavors with heart and soul. In addition they may set their face against any kind of vivisection performed by those not called upon, but when they begin to meddle with science and forbid the physiologist to investigate life in the living animal, it is time to pronounce the *quousque*.

Vivisection, *if strictly kept within the limits of its important purpose*, is a moral obligation ; and he who would hinder the physiologist in the performance of his duties makes himself guilty of immoral conduct ; but any cruelty to animals, viz., every lack of respect for life, every thoughtless or wilful infliction of pain, every delight taken in torturing, injuring, or destroying sentient beings, is a crime that should be denounced and reprimanded and, if necessary, checked by the power of law.

¹ We Americans are greatly plagued with flies in summer and most houses are protected by fly-paper. It would be a good work if the humane societies, taking pity on the poor little captives whose feet are caught in the tanglefoot glue, would provide us with other means to dispose of these small, but troublesome and disease-spreading enemies.

There is a fly-trap used in Germany which is made of glass and looks very much like a broad water caraffe, with neck and stopper, standing on three short legs. Its bottom is open at the middle, and the walls of the orifice rise so as to form a circular basin, which is filled with alcohol. A little granulated sugar is placed underneath to attract the flies who never fail to come, and as they always fly upwards after having partaken of their sweet repast, they pass at once into the glass trap above where they are slowly but pleasantly affected by the smell of alcohol until in a state of perfect intoxication they lose control of their limbs and fall into the liquid at the bottom in which they drown without struggle. The only objection to this innovation would be the indignation of our temperance societies when they see that we lend our help to make our fellow creatures drunk.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MAZDAISM OR ZOROASTRIANISM.

To the Editor of the Open Court :

I am very much pleased to read the very interesting article on "Mazdaism" in *The Open Court* (March, 1897), and hope that you will kindly permit me to make some friendly remarks thereon.

"Ahura Mazda, the Lord Omniscient," has no form or representation in Zoroastrianism, except, perhaps, the sun, which is the visible symbol of the Invisible One. The representation given at the beginning of the article, which is often without the body, and is sometimes called *Scarahæus*, represented since antiquity, and it still represents, *Fravashi* or *Ferouer*. De Mirville, author of *Mémoires à l'Académie*, says: "Here we have the two heroes of the Old Testament, the Verbum (?) or the *second* Jehovah, and his *face* ('Presence,' as the Protestants translate) forming both but one, and yet being two, a mystery which seemed to us unsolvable before we have studied the doctrine of the Mazdean Ferouers, and learned that the Ferouer was the spiritual potency at once *image, face*, and the *guardian* of the soul, which finally assimilates the Ferouer." (Vol. V., p. 516.) It is the inner immortal man or true Ego which existed before its physical body, and survives all such bodies it happens to be clothed in. It is the impersonal and true essence of Deity. On account of its oneness with Ahura Mazda, there is a probability of taking its representation as that of Ahura Mazda.

Now about Ahriman. It is generally understood by strangers that Ahriman is the adversary of Ahura Mazda, which is not true. There is no duality in Ahura and the charge often laid against Zoroastrianism as dualism is the result of a lack of understanding about the true essence of that religion. Ahriman is the corrupted or modified form of Angremainyus, the adversary of Spentamainyus, the former evil and the latter good powers in nature, on the plane of relativity, where duality begins in nature. The idea of Ahriman is not peculiar to Zoroastrianism only. Compare the struggle of Zoroaster with Ahriman in his efforts for union with Ahura Mazda (*Vendidad*, Farg. 19); with Gautama's struggle with Mara (*Light of Asia*, Book the Sixth); also the struggle of Jesus with the Tempter (St. Matthew, 4; St. Luke, 4); and again of Nachiketu's with Yama (*Upanishad*), and there one will find perhaps some clue to the problem of this misapprehension. Ahura Mazda has no adversary. This hint will be sufficient for your grasping the correct idea on this head.

The sacred but mystic tree referred to in the article is not a botanical plant as it is often supposed to be, although certain drinks are consecrated and drunk in the

Hindu and Zoroastrian ceremonies bearing the same name. The mystic tree is the *man* himself,—it is the tree of life. One who drinks the juice of that tree—the knowledge divine—can become immortal; it is by practically knowing the divine nature of man that man becomes immortal, and not by drinking potions of any botanical plant, however marvellous that plant may be. The Avesta literature of the Parsis is allegorical and mystic, and before it could be deciphered in its true light one must become pure like its authors. An article on this mystic tree, which is also found in almost all great religious and mystic schools, will be found (contributed by me) in *Lucifer*, Vol. XV., p. 491.

In the ceremony which is performed in connexion with this idea, certain cakes (*draona*) are consecrated, it is true; but not "covered with small pieces of holy (!) meat (the *myazda*)." The last word means fruit, but our people having gradually become meat-eaters, the prejudice against meat-eating disappeared in course of time, and the "fruit" was transformed into "meat" by the later translators of the Avestâ. Religion proper will never grant such an abomination; the whole of the *Yasna* enjoins every Zoroastrian to protect *goshpands* (kine, goat, sheep, horses, etc.). Hâ 32, paragraph 12, strictly forbids slaughter of, or injury to, animals, even in joke. Here it is one with Buddhism.

The bird represents a cycle, an eternity, a *manvantara*; it also represents the human soul.

If Mazdaism is similar to any religion, it is certainly not Christianity, nor Judaism, nor Mohammedanism, its own offspring, but the religion of the Vedas, as will be seen from the similarity of their languages, their worship, their philosophy, their national characteristics, and their one common ethnological source, the Aryan. It will take time, perhaps, before we shall be able to decipher correctly the symbolic inscriptions and to know the true rationale of religious rituals.

The portrait of Zoroaster which appeared in your March number is entirely new to the followers of that most holy Master. NASARVANJI F. BILIMORIA.

BOMBAY, April 10, 1897.

"IN NUBIBUS."

To the Editor of The Open Court :

In the March number of *The Open Court* is an article entitled "In Nubibus," in which there is the following statement :

"Again, all parties, theists and atheists, can agree (since the universe had confessedly some beginning—) in saying: I believe in a maker of heaven and earth."

Who confesses that the universe had a beginning? No one whose thinking is not dominated by the statement, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth."

So far from there being agreement that the universe had a beginning, it is not possible for an intelligent man of this generation to conceive of a period when the universe was not.

Let any one try to imagine it as springing out of nothing; or of thought, intelligence, or intellect as existing entirely disassociated from matter.

We may, indeed, conceive of evolution as moving in a circle; from nebula to man and from man to nebula, but not of the creation of fire mist out of nothing.

Imagine a period remote as a quadrillion quadrillion centuries ere our earth took globular form: we are then no nearer a beginning than now, and are forced

to admit that even then the universe had existed for more than a decillion decillion æons.

Nor are we able to conceive of a time when law was not.

Endeavor to think of an age when there was no law of gravitation, when one mass did not attract another, when the laws of nature did not exist or were variant from what they are at this time.

As to generals, there has been no beginning; the universe, matter, mind, motion, law, evolution have always been. As to particulars, myriads come into being each instant, there are countless new flowers, songs, birds, and sins; facts innumerable created every hour.

Men build houses, and gods may make men and earths. Of what has happened in the illimitable past we know very little; we find ourselves unable to dream of a condition when there had not elapsed sufficient time for the evolution from star dust of creatures equal to ourselves.

All philosophy postulated upon a beginning of the universe or its laws is baseless.

A. N. WATERMAN.

CHICAGO, ILL.

To the Editor of The Open Court.

In the February number of *The Open Court* I find that the Rev. G. J. Low, writing "In Nubibus," misunderstands the position and work of Mr. Frederic Harrison as the leading Positivist in England. Mr. Harrison is President of the English Positivist Committee, and, I am sure, would repudiate the title and functions of "high priest."

The February number of *The Positivist Review* contains an address by Mr. Frederic Harrison, entitled "Theological Reaction." On page 59 he says: "We repudiate the name of 'Comtists,' and we have never pretended to be bound by the language of Comte, bound to believe anything on his authority, and to practise whatever he chose to preach or to recommend. . . . But whatever may be the truth about the vast religious and social organisation which the genius of Auguste Comte inaugurated for the future, we have never presumed to the folly of trying to set up a working model of it in this place, and we shall never do so. Nor has any such thing been done in Paris by Pierre Laffitte, the successor of Auguste Comte in France. From time to time both he and we have tried to put in force, humbly and tentatively, some illustration or type of what we feel to be involved in a real religion of humanity. But the future must decide the ultimate form and features in which it must be cast. All this to me is a matter subordinate and capable of different solutions and issues. The religion of human duty must, in its own good time, evolve such practices, institutions, and expression as will satisfy the reason, the imagination, and the emotions."

In the same review you will also find an article by Professor Beesly, its editor, entitled "Positivism and Comte." Of course the Rev. G. J. Low had no opportunity of reading either of these articles before writing to the February number of *The Open Court*. But on many previous occasions both Mr. Harrison and Professor Beesly have clearly expressed themselves to a similar effect in regard to Comte, his doctrines, and proposals.

I hope there is considerable sympathy between the "positivists in England," who accept as their leaders Mr. Frederic Harrison, Professor Beesly, and Dr. Bridges and the "new positivists," who adopt "the Religion of Science" as presented by you. Both adopt the scientific basis. But "Comtean positivism" is

anthropocentric—all the powers of feeling, thought, and action being devoted to the progressive good of man, and natural laws being studied as conditions of improvement. The "new positivism" is monistic, and regards the progressive good of man as the product of the operations of a divine power immanent in man and in his environment, and whose modes of working are described in laws which are irrefragable.

Comte's system is indicated in his formula—"love, for principle" (or motive); "order, for basis"; and "progress, for end." And this same formula seems to me almost equally applicable to your system. Both forms of positivism may be regarded as differing rather in range than in their basis; for the foundation of each is science. Both are forms of a religion of love and truth and duty, and their respective adherents should therefore be on sympathetic terms.

Though the "new positivism" is the more satisfactory to me, I must honor those whose whole religion is "devotion to humanity," and I much regret the misapprehension into which the Rev. G. J. Low has fallen regarding "positivism in England" as represented by Mr. Frederic Harrison.

JAMES ODGERS.

Knutsford, England.

MISCELLANEOUS.

SOME RECENT FRENCH WORKS IN PHILOSOPHY.

Recent statistics have given the literary output of France to be more than twice that of the United States, including the American duplication of English works. This enormous production is almost wholly confined to Paris, and it reflects not a little credit upon the intellectual activity of the French capital, besides refuting a widespread popular impression to the contrary, that a relatively large percentage of French publications is devoted to philosophy, science, and practical education. Especially in the last two departments a high standard has always been maintained, and French text-books and expositions have for nearly a century served as models of lucidity, conciseness, and pedagogical tact. In philosophy, of late years, while nothing startling nor epoch-making has been produced, there has been considerable activity, particularly in metaphysics, and a fair level of originality, as distinguished from the re-elaboration of old thought, has been sustained. We have briefly to note here several of these works which have appeared within the last two months or so, and which come from the press of Félix Alcan,¹ perhaps the largest philosophical publishing house in the world.

M. G. TARDE, jurist and sociologist, now the head of the statistical department of the French government, has achieved an enviable reputation by his recent writings. He has successfully developed and applied the theory of *Imitation*, which explains so many social and psychological phenomena, has written several penological works, in which he has combated the theories of Lombroso, and also given to the world an interesting collection of *Sociological Essays*. His latest work, of which we now speak, *L'Opposition universelle, essai d'une théorie des contraires* (price 7 fr. 50), forms the complement of his book on *Imitation*. There he considered the things of the world and life as they were spontaneously reproduced, mimicked, and multiplied; here he views them under the aspect of their antithesis,

¹ Address: 108 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris.

opposition, and antagonism, seeking to reconcile the "Manichean, Satanic, and infernal" features of the universe with the kindness, love, and fraternity that issue therefrom. In fine, the book is an attempt to place the two evolutionary factors of strife and love, considered in their whole cosmical and social import, in the right scientific light.

An important and profound subject is treated by PROF. VICTOR BROCARD in his work *De l'Erreur* (second edition, 5 francs), originally presented as a thesis for the doctorate. After discussing the theories of Plato, Descartes, and Spinoza, he examines the nature, psychological causes, and logical conditions of error, showing that it is as natural as truth, that if it cannot be avoided it can be corrected, and that it springs from intellectual freedom in which it also finds its ultimate annihilation.

Somewhat related in subject but more metaphysical and rigid in character, and less easy of perusal, is the book of M. LÉON BRUNSCHVIG, professor of philosophy at the Lyceum of Rouen, entitled *La modalité du jugement* (price, 5 francs). Professor Brunshvig sees in "modality of judgment" the central problem of philosophy and in elucidating its scope attacks some pretty knotty problems. His is certainly not a book for "babes and sucklings," but the heavy-weight philosopher, skilled in the tossing of metaphysical dumb-bells, will enjoy its reading and draw from it considerable profit.

M. EMILE FERRIÈRE is the author of many works which draw upon the facts of science for resolving the problems of philosophy, and notably of a trilogy of books on *Matter and Energy*, on *Life and the Soul*, and on *The First Cause*,¹ which aim at demonstrating the substantial identity of energy and matter, the unity of animal and vegetable life (the soul is held to be a function of the brain!), and the existence of an immanent first cause,—a very thin, spectral, and Platonic first cause which need give the opponents of metaphysics little alarm, as it has been shorn of all its noxious attributes. M. Ferrière has given good *résumés* of some of the main results of mechanics, physics, physiology, and phylogeny, and has some excellent remarks on method, taken from Claude Bernard. We learn for the first time from his book that Lavoisier was guillotined not because he was an ex-farmer general, but because he refuted the theory of phlogiston of which the truculent Marat was a devoted partisan.

We have a curious plea in behalf of mystical intuition in the *Essai sur les fondements de la connaissance mystique* (5 francs) by DR. E. RÉCÉJAC, who would rescue the "heart" from the obloquy into which it has fallen as an engine of knowledge, and reinstate it in its rights along with the intellect. Those who have read the argument of Prof. Knight for the existence of God as expounded in his beautiful *Aspects of Theism*, will understand the principles which M. Récéjac has sought to justify philosophically.

The impending publication of the great edition of Descartes's works by M. Charles Adam has been the innocent cause of a booklet called *Je pense, donc je suis* (price, fr. 2.50), by C. Paul Viallet, which is intended as an introduction to the Cartesian method. Descartes's own *Discourse on Method* should be read by every educated person and may be had in many cheap editions. Its simplicity, we think, does away with the necessity of commentaries, but as M. Viallet has attempted nothing original, his book will not be a serious impediment to its understanding.

¹ This is the most recent of the three and bears in French the title *La première cause, d'après les données expérimentales*. Price, fr. 3.50.

We have, finally, in the didactic and expository line a critical study by ANDRÉ CRESSON, Professor at the Lyceum of Alençon, on *La morale de Kant* (price, fr. 2.50), which was crowned by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and which simply seeks to facilitate the difficult reading of Kant's ethical work; and further, a more necessary treatise on a subject which is certainly not less difficult, *La logique de Hegel*, by GEORGES NOËL, Professor of Philosophy in the Lyceum Lakanal.

μρκκ.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

DIE GOTTESOFFENBARUNG IN JESU CHRISTO NACH WESEN, INHALT UND GRENZEN, unter dem geschichtlichen, psychologischen und dogmatischen Gesichtspunkte prinzipiell untersucht von Dr. Paul Schwartzkopff, Professor in Wernigerode. Giessen: S. Ricker'sche Buchhandlung. 1896.

This booklet, *God's Revelation in Jesus Christ*, is the fourth and last part of a series of pamphlets which will ultimately lead to nothing less than a reformation of Christian dogmatology upon the basis of exact philosophy. Professor Schwartzkopff is a Christian who clings with all his heart to the religion that finds its realisation in the personality of Jesus Christ, but he is at the same time a methodical thinker who can probe the problems presented to him by his sentiments, and solves them as a chemist determines the nature of an element, by discriminating the essential from the accidental and fixing the limits that separate them. This he did in a booklet of his, "Could Jesus Err?" The problem is, of course, no problem to unbelievers; but Paul Schwartzkopff is not an unbeliever. To him it is a problem, and by answering the question in the affirmative he is led to distinguish between sinlessness and errorlessness. Christ was without sin; that is essential if ever the Christian belief can be upheld that Christ is truly God revealed in the flesh. But being at the same time truly a man, he was subject to disease, to pain, to death, as well as to error, and Christians must learn to know in what respects Jesus could err, and in what other respects it was impossible for him to err. This methodical treatment of the Christian problem lays the foundation of a new Christology that will quickly recommend itself to Christian scholars.

We are glad to learn that the importance of Paul Schwartzkopff's investigations is appreciated in England. The treatise on the *Weissagungen Jesu* has been published in an English edition by T. and T. Clark of Edinburgh, but we have not as yet seen the translation.

P. C.

Many students will find in the *Concise History of Religion* of Mr. F. J. GOULD a manual which they have long been wanting. The third volume has just appeared and deals with the history of Christian origins and of Jewish and Christian literature to the end of the second century. Although issued for the Rationalist Press Committee, the author claims to have preserved due impartiality, to have suppressed his personal beliefs, and "accorded equal respect to Pagans and Christians and Jews and Gnostics." "I leave Irenaeus to rail against heresies," he says; "my only aim has been to marshal facts." (London: Watts & Co. Pages, 280. Price, 5 shillings.)

PROFESSOR CHRISTIANSEN'S *Elements of Theoretical Physics* has earned a deserved reputation in Europe. It has been translated from the original Danish into German and is extensively used as a text-book in Germany. Now an English ver-

sion, made by Prof. W. F. Magie and Mrs. W. F. Magie of Princeton University, has appeared. The book is predominantly mathematical and can be used by no one who is not familiar with the Calculus; the treatment is concise, formal, and rigorous, and for a person sensible to such things, not without its æsthetic qualities. The rendering has been excellently done, while the typography and letter press of the book also merit great commendation. (Macmillan: New York. Pages, 333. Price, \$3.25.)

The Lowell Lectures *On Habit and Instinct*, which the distinguished English biologist PROF. C. LLOYD MORGAN delivered in Boston and in other places in the United States last year, have been handsomely published by Edward Arnold, London and New York (pp., 350). All Professor Morgan's works are characterised by sound thought and perfection of expression, while at the same time they possess the merit, which most works on science lack, of being interesting. The present researches *On Habit and Instinct* are among the most important that have been made in recent years, and touch upon a subject that appeals to the experience of every one.

MR. T. BAILEY SAUNDERS has rendered a genuine service to English readers by his translation of Schopenhauer's essays. The last of the series are the papers on *Human Nature*, which are taken from the "Ethics and Politics" of Schopenhauer's *Parerga* and have been faithfully and pleasantly rendered. (New York: Macmillan. Price, 90 cents.) If a new translation of Schopenhauer's main work should ever be undertaken, and in the opinion of some critics this is highly desirable, Mr. Saunders should be entrusted with the task.

The University Tutorial Series, issued by the University Correspondence College Press of London (American agents, Hines & Noble, 4 Cooper Institute, New York), is a useful series of books for self-instruction. They are designed to aid students in preparing for the London University examinations and present the elements of the subjects of which they treat in a clear and simple manner. We have recently received two of the books of this series: (1) *The Tutorial Statics*, by William Briggs and G. H. Bryan (price, \$1.00); and (2) *The Tutorial Chemistry*, Part I., Non-Metals, by G. H. Bailey and William Briggs (price \$1.00). Little demand is made upon the preparatory knowledge of the student in these volumes, elementary geometry and trigonometry being all that is required in the case of the former and elementary physics in the case of the latter. We can recommend both books to the autodidactic seeker of knowledge, who will find in them as much as he will in the average manual.

MR. GOLDWIN SMITH'S *Guesses at the Riddle of Existence* has provoked considerable discussion in orthodox religious circles, where his attempt is regarded with some suspicion. Mr. Smith is a publicist and scholar of renown, he wields a facile pen, and has clothed the arguments against mysticism, miracles, etc., in a form which will appeal to people. His philosophy is mild and never wades into deep water. But there is common-sense in the book, and the author has a clear and direct way of putting things which while never harsh leaves no doubt as to his meaning. (Macmillan: New York. Price, \$1.50.)

In *Rays of Light*, a little Buddhist periodical published in Ceylon, one of the contributors compares Buddhism to Christianity in the following quotations, the

former culled from the Buddhist canon, the latter from the New Testament. Buddha said :

"In a corrupt world be a lotus without spot."

"Sin comes back upon the sinner like dust thrown against the wind."

"The taint worse than all others is ignorance."

"The way of salvation is through the practice of the virtues."

"When the just man goes from this world to another, his good deeds receive him as friend greets friend."

"Proclaim it freely to everybody,—my law is a law of mercy for all."

"Forsake all evil, bring forth good, practice self-control, such is Buddha's path to end all suffering."

"Not even a god could change into defeat the conquest of oneself."

"Of all the lamps lighted in Buddha's honor, only one, brought by a poor woman, lasted through the night."

"The four castes are equal, and the path is open for women as well as for men."

In the New Testament we read :

"But I say unto you resist not evil ; but return good for evil."

"Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you. Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect."

"Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you do ye even so to them."

"Now abideth faith, hope, charity—these three, but the greatest of all is charity."

"God is love, and His tender mercies are over all His works."

"Have we not all one Father? Are we not all brethren? We are all the offspring of God."

"In my father's house are many mansions."

The number of such quotations can be greatly increased on both sides.

Dr. Arthur Pfungst of Frankfort on-the-Main is a German poet who takes a great interest in Oriental subjects and especially Buddhism. He has translated various Buddhist scriptures, such as the *Sutta Nipata*, into German, thus making accessible to those Germans who are unable to read the English translations of the Buddhist sacred books. He is also the author of a long poem entitled *Laskaris* of which the third volume has just now been published. The theme of this epic is the problem whether life is worth living. The answer which he gives will, in spite of its beautiful poetic solution, not be acceptable to the majority of mankind, as it is not in the affirmative. Pfungst believes that life is not worth living. The poem touches also incidentally on other philosophical problems, such as determinism, ethics, etc. The whole is pervaded by a burning desire for understanding the truth which is expressed in the name of the hero of the third part, Philathes. The pessimism which pervades Dr. Pfungst's solution of the world-problem should not discourage those who do not agree with him from studying his works.

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
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BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

Introductory Observations.—Land and People.—Race Migrations of the Orient in Ancient Times.

THE HISTORY of the people of Israel is the subject to which I desire to call the reader's attention. But am I justified in calling attention to the subject at all? What do we care for the people of Israel? Where is there interest or profit for us in knowing what took place in Palestine in the long period of time from 1500 before Christ to 70 after? Such questions and objections must be anticipated by one who undertakes to present the history of Israel to a general public; and those who make such objections probably regard themselves as upon the very pinnacle of modern impartiality and freedom from bias. But this boasted impartiality is a strange thing: it is too often only a product of ignorance, of entire absence of insight into the situation.

A certain familiarity with the history of Greece and Rome will always be required as a necessary element of general culture. And why? Because our whole civilisation has its roots in Hellas and Latium. Our science and our art would simply be incomprehensible without Plato and Aristotle, without Homer, Sophocles, and Phidias. It is true, the Hellenes themselves were heirs of the primitive civilisation of the Orient, and their intellectual achievements would have been utterly impossible but for Egypt, Babylo-

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nia, India, and Phœnicia. The Phœnicians in their colonising and commercial activity, which embraced the whole known world, brought to the nations of Europe not only gold and cotton (the Greek word for gold is Phœnician, and our current "cotton" is also a Phœnician word), but also the intellectual possessions of the Orient, and, most important of all, transmitted to the European world perhaps the greatest and most important invention of the Orient, the alphabet, which rendered genuine civilisation and real intellectual life possible for the first time.

But the Hellenes acquired this inheritance of the ancient Orient in order to possess it; from the divinely endowed genius of their race they gave it a re-birth as something specifically new and specifically Greek. We, too, know the civilisation of the ancient Orient directly only in the form which it received among the Greeks and at their hands. We must know the history of a race to which we owe our whole intellectual life on the profane side. And inasmuch as the inheritance of the Greek mind has reached us through the Romans, whose whole function in the development of civilisation consisted in transmitting Greek culture to the nations conquered by them, we must know the history of this race also, the intellectual connecting link between us and Hellas, because only he who knows this can understand his own people and his own present.

Beside Hellas and Rome, third in the group of races to which the arbiter of history assigned an exceptional mission in the world, stands Israel. True, Israel played no important part in universal history in the accepted sense of the word, nor did it ever lead in the march of civilisation. In learning and the plastic arts it achieved nothing; it produced no Plato or Aristotle, no Phidias or Praxiteles, no Homer or Sophocles,—but it gave the world Moses and the prophets, and from it alone could be born after the manner of the flesh Jesus of Nazareth. Just as on the profane side our whole intellectual life is rooted in Hellas and Latium, so on the religious side it is rooted in Israel: Israel gave the world the true God and the true religion.

For all times the truth is established that was uttered by the founder of Christianity himself to the woman of Samaria in the talk by Jacob's Well at Sychar, "Salvation is of the Jews," and which his greatest apostle wrote in an epistle to the Christian community of Rome, that Abraham is the father of us all in the faith. And this applies also to the many millions of Mohammedans, for the prophet of Islam himself wished only to restore in its

primitive purity the "faith of Abraham," which Jews and Christians alike had corrupted, as he thought, and disguised under all sorts of strange additions. And can we be indifferent to the history of a race to which we owe our best and noblest possessions? Can we be without interest in such a race?

But, you might reply, we do know it, we have all learned it in school under the title of "Bible History." Very well and good, and that brings me directly to a point which is in urgent need of explanation at the very start. I must simply beg you to forget here all recollections of "Bible History." Not on the ground that everything is untrue that is told in the Bible of the history of Israel. But in the Biblical accounts the material has all gone through the medium of popular tradition, and then again this popular tradition has been treated and presented from special points of view by later compilers. The Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament do not claim to be history, but books of devotion. It is very characteristic that the Jewish canon itself does not know the designation "historical books," but includes the writings which we are accustomed to call the historical books of the Old Testament among the prophetic, with a correct perception that we have not in this case historiography but prophecy. That the historian, who is concerned with these books only as historical materials, looks at them with different eyes from the Bible reader, who is seeking in them only edification, is a matter of course and cannot be otherwise, and accordingly the historian will often be obliged to draw a different picture of the matters reported in them from that made for devotional purposes by the Biblical writers themselves.

There is one misfortune in the limitations of this work: I can only portray and not demonstrate; if I were to undertake to support my delineation by reference to the sources, I should need at least sixfold the space at my disposal, and I could scarcely hope to awaken interest for such details and investigations, and might not after all convince any one. I must therefore incur the appearance of putting forth in the following work only undemonstrated propositions, and of deviating without evident reason from the current views derived from Bible history. But I earnestly beg my reader to believe that every deviation from the traditional picture is based on careful reflexion, and on reasons which my scientific conscience regards as imperative. And I trust it will be felt that everything essential is left, even if certain details disappear.

For I hold the firm and well-grounded conviction that the traditions of the people of Israel itself regarding its earliest history

are thoroughly historical in all essential points, and can sustain the keenest and most searching criticism. Poetic legends have, indeed, woven about those ancient traditions a misty magic veil which charms the eye and captivates the heart, and in which lies the spell that those traditions cast over every unbiased mind. Not with rude Vandal hand should we tear away this veil, but with loving care resolve it into its single threads and remove it with considerate hand, so that the original image may stand forth in its unadorned simplicity and naked chastity, and then we shall see that it is really a noble human figure, and not a mere creature of the imagination, that was concealed beneath the protecting cover of this veil. For science there is no veiled image of Sais, and the road to scientific truth does not go through guilt, not even where scientific truth in sacred things is concerned.

If the question is raised: what sources are at our command for the investigation of the scientific truth in connexion with the history of Israel, we have first to confirm a fact which for the historian, indeed, is extremely grievous and discouraging, but all the more valuable and significant for the student of race-psychology. Israel is the poorest in history and monuments of all the races that we know. I will not refer to the Egyptians and Mesopotamians, who covered every spot of free space with inscriptions and pictorial representations which recall to us vividly to-day a life that was lived five thousand years ago. Even among the nearest relatives and neighbors of the Israelites the conditions are entirely different. The thousands and thousands of inscriptions which the Phœnicians set up wherever they went are a familiar fact; from the next kinsmen of the Israelites, the Moabites, we have at least the triumphal column of their king Mesha, and from the nature of this monument we may conclude that it was not the only one. Even the wandering Bedouins of the Arabian and Syrian deserts transmitted their memory to future generations by numerous inscriptions. From Israel we have nothing of the sort, no monument, no inscription, no tomb. It might be thought that this was to be explained from outward circumstances. Since the second millennium before Christ Palestine has been the battlefield of the Orient, and all that has visited this land would make the destruction of its ancient monuments quite comprehensible. But not even the earth has brought anything of the sort to light, despite most careful and painstaking search; and in view of all that has actually been preserved from ancient times, we have a right to expect that somewhere at least a letter or a written fragment would appear. One

sole exception but confirms the rule. In the year 1880 the first and thus far the last ancient Hebrew inscription was found,—but where? In the tunnel of the conduit of the Siloah canal, where a human eye could see it only by accident, as indeed it was discovered by pure chance on the occasion of the cleaning of the canal.

No, the reason lies deeper, and we shall scarcely find anything of importance, even if the search is continued. This is shown by the very character of the literature of Israel that has been preserved. The composer of the Book of Kings had before him the official annals of the ancient kings of Israel and Judah, or at least extracts from them. This work, which if preserved would be for us a historical source of incomparable value, and which we would gladly make great sacrifices to regain, was allowed to perish; it has vanished and left no trace, because it was not appreciated. And yet this work contained everything in the whole matter that would interest us as historians.

We meet an entirely analogous case in the history of David. David was the greatest king and warrior that Israel ever had, and we are more exactly informed about the time of his life and reign than about any other period of ancient Israelitish history; but these very detailed reports speak so incidentally and superficially of David's wars and victories that it is quite impossible for us to obtain a picture of his warlike achievements that shall be clear in all respects. What interested Israel in this its greatest hero, and endeared him to it, was not the warrior and the victor, but the man and the king. It seems as though ancient Israel had no eye for those things, as though it felt itself clearly enough that its function in history and its mission to mankind were not of this world and did not consist in earthly achievements. This undeniable fact has always been to me the strongest proof of a really transcendent spiritual endowment of Israel.

Accordingly we have no monuments of any sort at hand for the history of the people of Israel, but our only sources are the written traditions of this absolutely unhistorical people itself, which are and profess to be not histories but books of devotion, and after these the direct and indirect reports of alien nations—in fact a scanty and unreliable body of material in dealing with which the greatest caution and self-control are urgently demanded. To present what can be learned from these unpromising materials is the object of these pages.

And first we must endeavor to get a tolerably clear idea of the scene of our history. It will appear that as the people that lived

there in historical times was unique in its kind, so is also the land the features of which could not but exercise a great influence upon the nature and character of its inhabitants.

The land in which the chief part of the history of Israel was played, and which this people regarded as its own, is called by us with a Græco-Roman designation, Palestine, that is, the Land of the Philistines. The Greeks entered the country by way of the coast, and gave to it the name of the tribe that dwelt there, a phenomenon that we shall observe frequently. The inhabitants themselves called it Kenáan. As this name means etymologically "lowland," it must originally have been applied only to the Philisto-Phœnician coast strip. The land occupied by the Israelites, on the contrary, is altogether mountainous and has a considerable lowland only in the plain of Jezreel. This fact is in accord with the report of the Phœnicians that they descended from a tribal progenitor, Chnâ, in which name we recognise immediately the stem of Kenáan. In Israelitish times, however, only the portion of the land situated west of the Jordan is known as Kenáan; the land east of the Jordan has the separate name Gilead. What we now call Palestine, the land on both sides of the Jordan, is a comparatively small bit of earth, only about eight thousand five hundred square miles in extent, that is, a little more than the area of Massachusetts, or of Wales and Herefordshire.

Hydrographically the land is very scantily endowed. Of rivers it has the Jordan alone, with its tributaries, the most important of which, however, are all on the east side: the Yarmuk, the Jabbok, and the Arnon, which latter empties not into the Jordan proper, but into the Dead Sea. The land west of the Jordan can boast really of no rivers save the Kishon in the plain of Jezreel; but in the hottest part of the season this is a slight rivulet and begins to be a considerable river only a few miles above its entrance into the Mediterranean Sea at Haifa.

The fertility of Palestine is dependent exclusively on the rain, which falls in winter, and on the dew of summer, wherefore it is more clearly and more perceptibly than in other lands a blessing from above, a gift of heaven, so that the eye of man was here directed upward, toward heaven, by nature herself. The Jordan, the sole river of Palestine, called to-day "esch Scherîat el Kebîre," the Great River, has not its like on earth; instead of uniting the adjacent lands and shores, like other rivers, the Jordan separates them as an almost impassable barrier, since its extraordinary fall and its winding and twisting course make navigation on it impossi-

ble. Of moderately convenient and always available fords it has only three between the Lake of Gennesaret and the Dead Sea. Thus it comes about that we are obliged to consider the land east of the Jordan and that west of the Jordan as two really distinct lands without connexion with each other.

The Jordan plain, called to-day "el Ghôr," is almost entirely uninhabitable, in summer on account of the tropical heat, in winter on account of the floods: it was and is still a notorious resort and hiding-place for all possible beasts. The southern part of the country, too, the region about the Dead Sea and the so-called mountains or wilderness of Judah are sparsely populated and capable of sustaining only a scant population. In ancient times, as well, it must have been much as it is to-day, since natural conditions have not changed. The country east of the Jordan is but a narrow strip of tillable land wedged in between the valley of the Jordan and the vast Syro-Arabian desert. Only in its middle and northern portions is the land really fertile and adequate for a considerable population, and this especially on the slope toward the Mediterranean coast, the lowlands of Sharon and Sephela, which Israel never succeeded in occupying.

But upon this narrow and limited soil our astonished eyes meet an infinite variety and diversity of details. Palestine deserves the name of the land of contrasts; here is found gathered together everything between a sub-tropical climate and the region of eternal snow. The mighty mountain peak of Hermon, which forms the northern boundary of the country, is covered with perpetual snow and rises to an altitude of over nine thousand feet, some three thousand feet more than Mt. Washington, or more than twice the height of Ben Nevis. There we have Alpine landscape and Alpine flora. The mountain region of Galilee, the most healthy portion of Palestine, has the most moderate climate, the southern portions, especially the plain of Jezreel and the seacoast have a warm climate, and in the valley of the Jordan and about the Dead Sea it is actually sub-tropical. In Ghôr a temperature of 109 F. has been observed in the shade in the month of May, and along the Dead Sea, even after sunset, when in other southern lands a sudden coolness usually sets in, the thermometer has recorded 95 F.

And accordingly the vegetation here is sub-tropical: the balsam used to thrive here and the palm still does, wherefore Jericho was formerly called the City of Palms. On account of these great climatic extremes the flora of Palestine in general is exceedingly rich: some two thousand species of flowers have been noted. It is

easy to understand how this natural wealth of nature about him must arouse and inspire the mind and soul of man.

But as a whole, also, Palestine is a land of contrasts, and this in a manner that must be regarded as providential. In the first place, the land is almost entirely shut off from the world outside. On the east and south it is bordered by the desert, like a perfect insulating medium, and on the west by the surging Mediterranean, offering no good harbor on the whole coast of Palestine (to this day a calamity for travellers to the Holy Land), besides being almost unnavigable by the ships of the ancients because of the strong blasts of the trade-winds. Only on the north is the land accessible, though one cannot say open, for here the two great parallel Alpine chains of Lebanon and Anti-Libanus reach across like a natural bar. This same reserve which the land shows outwardly, is manifest within as well. Almost everywhere are mountains with deep, abrupt gorges, which constitute a great obstacle to intercourse and make travel extremely wearisome and slow.

This is providential. For this isolation guaranteed to the inhabitants the undisturbed development of their individuality; they were exempt from the influences of the great leveller, commerce.

Mountaineers are everywhere men of strongly developed individuality. But there is another side to the matter. It is true that the genuine mountaineer is vigorous and upright, but he is also clumsy and stubborn, revolving complacently about his own axis and distrustful and inhospitable toward all influences from without. From this danger Israel was preserved. For while the land is insulated, at the same time it is a bridge and highway of world-commerce without a parallel. All the ancient highways of commerce went through Palestine. For instance, that primitive one from the Nile to the Euphrates, which runs through Palestine in its entire length, and after crossing the Jordan touches first at Damascus; and likewise the no less important one from Tyre to the Arabian Gulf, which brought to the Phœnicians the products of Arabia, East Africa, Persia, and India. And so, if I may venture to use the figure, Israel was constantly fanned and refreshed by the wings of world-wide commerce and thus kept from growing hard and sour, while its individuality ran no risk of being dissolved in a characterless, nebulous cosmopolitanism.

And in still another way this providential tendency to extremes is seen. The land was favored in many ways, but on the other hand it was full of pests. In early times wild beasts, such as the lion and the bear, the wolf and the panther, the jackal and the

hyena must have lived there in great numbers, and even to this day serpents are a great pest, Palestine having more than twenty species, among them five very dangerous and poisonous ones.

Furthermore, the land is fertile : wheat of all varieties, grapes, figs, olives, and pomegranates thrive abundantly, but not without labor and care. Of Palestine especially the old Bible sentence is true : "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." These contrasts also are very important. There was no chance for the relaxing and enervating effect that comes when man receives from nature without exertion all that he needs ; he was spurred and forced to the full exertion of his powers. But this application was not discouraged by the prospective fruitlessness of his exertions, a condition which makes man as stupid and indifferent as when everything falls into his lap of itself ; but prosperity was the reward of toil. He knew that it paid to exert his powers. A land, therefore, which seemed as if made to produce a physically and mentally sound race, that brought thither the capacity to fulfil the mission assigned it by God. The Roman historian, Tacitus, also, in his famous description of the Jewish people, dwells especially on the exceptional health, strength, and endurance of this race. And accordingly the Israelite has always clung to his country with sincere gratitude and loving loyalty ; it was to him the paragon of countries, and he recognised the gracious dispensation of his God especially in the fact that this precious land had been assigned and promised to him without any merit and desert of his own.

The limitations of our subject are self-evident. Properly speaking, there is no history of the people of Israel until the exodus from Egypt ; not until this event did Israel become a people, only then does its history begin. It ends with the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans. Since that time there have been plenty of Jews ; but there has been no Jewish nation since the year 70 after Christ. To be exact, therefore, we must begin with the exodus from Egypt. But, as is well known, the recollections of the Israelitish people reach much further back, and we must extend our examination into their history as far back as we can possibly go. This will constitute the primitive or archaic history. A subject of vast importance ! For, as with the individual the child is father of the man, so in the life of a nation the primeval history has a decisive influence on the whole following development. But at this point we must get a clear idea of the character of those earliest recollections of the people of Israel.

We find no history or historical literature in Israel until the

period of the kings. Of literary monuments reaching further back than this we have some songs and fragments of poetry, most notably the splendid Song of Deborah. But until the beginning of the monarchy all the historical recollections of Israel were handed down by word of mouth alone. Now there are centuries between the oldest authentic reports and the things reported. Therefore the criticism of the sources is especially needed here, and at the same time especially difficult. We must regard this whole body of oldest traditions as popular legends. Popular legend does not invent its subjects, it makes nothing out of nothing, but it handles its subjects very freely and treats them with all the sovereign authority of a divinely inspired poet to whom the subject is only the raw material which he endows with soul, form, content, and life. Accordingly we must endeavor everywhere to get at the historical germ, the substratum of reality in these legends; it is this that is historically valuable, and may be regarded as an authentic source.

To penetrate into times that antedate history we have a still more reliable guide: this is language and philology. Let us try to make Israel's language speak, and put it on the stand as a witness regarding the earliest fortunes of the people. Israel itself calls the language which we know as Hebrew "the language of Canaan"; there is no recollection that the Israelites themselves or their fathers ever spoke any other. Now this designation "the language of Canaan" is true in a literal sense: it can be proven on philological grounds that this language can have developed in no other country than Canaan.

The Hebrew language calls the west *jam*, "ocean" or "sea-coast": in fact, the Mediterranean Sea constitutes the west boundary, and Canaan is the only race speaking a Semitic tongue which has directly and solely the sea on the west. The south is in Hebrew *negeb*, literally "the dry-land," "the drought-land"; *negeb* is the proper name of the desert into which the mountains of Juda abruptly descend to the south, which is called in the oldest Egyptian records *pa-nagbu* (the very same word, with the Egyptian article). Here again, this peculiar etymology could have grown up in no other Semitic-speaking land save Canaan. And the creators of the Hebrew language were already tillers of the soil, and no longer nomads. While the Arab, a thorough nomad, uses for all figurative applications of "dwelling" the word *ahl*, "tent" (calling, for instance, a man's family his tent), the Hebrew uses regularly the word *bajith*, "house"; only to a people that had long ceased to be

nomadic could it occur to say *scháar*, "gate," for "city" or "dwelling." Most decisive, perhaps, is the word *lechem*, which appears as second element in the name Bethlehem. This word means in Hebrew "bread," while in Arabic the corresponding form of the same stem, *lachim*, means "meat." How is this to be explained? Originally, of course, the word has neither of these meanings, but only the general sense of "nourishment," "food." To the nomad, meat is the absolute equivalent of food; if the Hebrew language understands by it "bread," then those who formed this language as a vehicle for their thoughts and ideas must of necessity have been tillers of the soil.

On these grounds, then, we should conclude that the people of Israel had always dwelt in Canaan and that they had always been agricultural people. But against both assumptions Hebrew tradition raises loud and vigorous protest. No element of this tradition is more permanent than that the ancestors of the people were not born in the land of Canaan, but immigrated thither, and that they were nomads, wandering shepherds, who adopted agriculture and settled abodes only in historical times and in this very land of Canaan. These two points cannot be invention, for the first is very inconvenient for Hebrew tradition, which is thus compelled to make extraordinary efforts to prove or at least to found its claim to the possession of Canaan. Therefore, unless it had had a very distinct recollection of this fact, it would never in the world have invented it. Moreover, traditions have preserved a recollection of the original home; with one accord they report that the patriarchs were Aramæans, and came to Canaan as emigrant Aramæans. In historical times Aram was the hereditary enemy of Israel, which waged a life and death struggle against its assaults. Here, too, it is a psychological impossibility that this Aramæan origin should be an invention of legend, particularly when we consider that the Aramæans speak a language wholly different from the Hebrew. The Germans might as easily get the idea that they were descended from the French, or *vice versa*.

For ancient Israel, Aram is a term of wide extent; but recollection located the primitive home more definitely, though not always in precisely the same place. A tradition, in other respects very good and bearing the marks of antiquity, makes "Laban the Aramæan," the father-in-law of Jacob, dwell not far from Damascus, which the Israelites regarded as a part of Aram. Another and indeed older tradition finds the initial point of the migration of the patriarchs to Canaan in Haran, a place in northwestern Mesopo-

tamia, well known under the Græco-Roman form of the name as Carrhæ, and tells also of a connexion with the ancient marvellous city of Ur in the extreme southeast of Babylonia, the modern Mukajjar (Mugheir), whose ruins inform us of a primitive civilisation in that region, which we can trace back into the third millennium before Christ, and which is surely much older than that. How should Israelitish tradition have happened upon these names and localities, which it is not probable that any Israelite ever set eyes on in historical times?

These are no airy creations of the imagination, but even the keenest criticism must recognise here a foundation of reliable tradition. All accounts agree that the ancestors of the people of Israel were conducted from Haran to Canaan by Abraham. The recollection of an occurrence of such importance could not fail to be preserved, and even the name of the person who was the motive power and manager of the whole could not be lost to posterity. I consider Abraham a historical personage in just as strict a sense as Opheltas and Peripoltas who, according to the tradition of the Bœotians, led this people from Arne in the valley of the Peneus in Thessaly to Chæronea in the land afterwards occupied by them. Such particulars and such names are not invented by tradition out of nothing. Let us see whether it is possible to fit these facts into the course of the history of the Orient as known to us from other sources.

In Mesopotamia, where the oldest tradition places the primitive home of Israel, our historical knowledge reaches back almost to the year 4000 before Christ. According to the reports of the Babylonians themselves, the two earliest kings of whom they have any recollection, Sargon of Agade and his son Naram-Sin, ruled about the year 3800 before Christ; of Sargon it is already reported that he made expeditions as far as the Mediterranean Sea. These two rulers are absolutely historical personages, since we possess to-day authentic monuments of them with full identification of their names.

And even then the land already had a long and eventful history behind it. Sargon of Agade already bears a genuinely Semitic name. But there can be no doubt that the primitive Babylonian civilisation, which has given even to the present day the names of the seven planets, and of the corresponding days of the week, the division of the circle into 360 degrees, the division of the year into 12 months, the week into 7 days, the day into 24 hours, and the hour into 60 minutes, is older than the year 4000, and derived from

a non-Semitic people. This people called themselves Sumerians, and by their language belonged to the Finnish-Turkish-Tartar race, the so-called Turanians.

This highly civilised but unwarlike people was overwhelmed by a great Semitic migration, and with the Semitising of the Sumerians our knowledge of the history of Mesopotamia begins. We can follow this process step by step. The more energetic and powerful Semitic race succeeded in the course of centuries in completely absorbing the Sumerians, and adopted, without adding anything of their own, their primitive civilisation, especially the cuneiform writing invented by the Sumerians and long in use among them. They organised city principalities and district kingdoms whose rulers we can name and identify in great numbers from their own inscriptions and the accounts of the Babylonians. Especially interesting for us among these is Gudea of Zergulla, about 2800 before Christ, from whom we have a considerable number of sculptures and inscriptions. These sculptures show already a high degree of skill; in the inscriptions he mentions expressly cedars from the Amanus mountains and from Lebanon, so that the connexion with the Mediterranean was still maintained. Furthermore, it is as good as certain that there existed already a lively and uninterrupted intercourse with Egypt; in these very sculptures of Gudea Egyptian influences are said to be manifest. We must assume about the year 3000 a high degree of civilisation and some international commerce in southwestern Asia. We see, therefore, at the beginning how the course which Israelitish tradition assigns to the patriarchs had been travelled for a thousand years or more.

About the year 2300 B. C. these Mesopotamian Semites are assailed by a new enemy who seems about to deal out to them the same fate which they had before dealt to the Sumerians. The Elamites, the non-Semitic inhabitants of the mountain region east of the lower course of the Tigris, invade Babylonia and conquer the land. Their king, Kudur-Mabuk, must have ruled over a mighty realm reaching even to the Mediterranean, and of this Elamite kingdom we have left a trace in the king Chedorlaomer of Elam, who according to the account in Genesis, Chapter 14, ruled over Palestine and waged wars there. But their dominion was to be of short duration. About 2250 the great city-king, Hammurabi of Babel, led a victorious attack of the Semites against the Elamites, destroyed their power and became the founder of a greater Babylonian empire, combining under his sceptre all that was later known as Babylon.

This greater Babylonian Empire founded by Hammurabi seems to have continued over five hundred years peaceful and unassailed. In the eighteenth century before Christ, it is true, the Assyrian power began to develop to the north of it, but for some time this did not threaten Babylonia. It was a more serious matter when in 1550 a new conquest came upon the country. The Cossæans, or Kassites, a mountain people related to the Elamites and dwelling northeast of Mesopotamia, invaded the country under the lead of their king, Agu kak-rimi, whose very name shows that he was no Semite. They succeeded in completely subduing the north part of it and in establishing a Cossæic dynasty which ruled for several hundred years, the members of which called themselves, after the name of Middle and North Babylonia, "Kings of Kardunjash." The Semitic part of the people and their rulers were forced southward, where they continued to live an inactive life, and suffered severely from the attacks of the Bedouins of the Arabian Desert.

By this time another enemy had appeared on the scene. About the year 2000 Egypt had been invaded by foreign conquerors—Hyksos, the Egyptian historian Manetho calls them—who settled permanently in Lower Egypt which they subdued to their sway. The origin of these Hyksos is disputed; according to the report of the Egyptians themselves we can see in them only hordes of Asiatic Bedouins, who, however, soon became acclimated and adopted Egyptian civilisation to a certain degree. After the reign of the Hyksos had lasted a considerable time, Pharaoh Ahmes, the vigorous founder of the Eighteenth Dynasty, succeeded in breaking their power and taking from them their last support in Egypt, the border fortress of Abaris.

The Hyksos went back to Asia, but the Egyptians followed their track, and now themselves advanced into Asia as conquerors. Thotmes II., the great-grandson of Ahmes, overran all southwest Asia even to the further side of the Euphrates, which he descended with his army in ships, and hunted lions and the still numerous elephants in Mesopotamia. Even the king of the rising Assyrian Empire sought the favor of the powerful Egyptian and several times sent him valuable presents. Even though this Egyptian rule was only nominal in the lands along the Euphrates, it established itself firmly in Palestine and on the Mediterranean coast. At this period Palestine was a regular Egyptian province, ruled by subject kings and Egyptian governors. And so the Cossæic kings of Kardunjash sought the friendship of the Egyptian Pharaohs, and maintained with them the relations of friend and neighbor.

Here again I must mention one of the most remarkable and valuable discoveries given to the world in recent years. The last Pharaoh of the powerful and mighty Eighteenth Dynasty was King Amenhotep IV., the so-called Heretic King. This remarkable man wished to reform the Egyptian religion and put in place of the old and confused polytheism a solar monotheism in which the sun was to be worshipped as the sole god, under the name of Aten. The king especially disapproved of the ancient imperial god, Amon, whose name he ordered erased everywhere, and changed his own name from Amenhotep to Chu-en-aten, "Glory of the Sun." And so too, the old metropolis of Thebes, the very city of Amon, had become distasteful to him, and he moved his capital to Middle Egypt, to the modern Tel-el-Amarna. It is no wonder that the reformation was a failure, and that the King, who was besides so unfortunate as to leave no son but only daughters, died amidst the curses of his subjects, and pursued by the fanatical hatred of later generations. Hence the place where he had dwelt was regarded as plague-ridden and haunted by evil demons.

And as a result of this belief it happened that the complete royal archives, his own and his father's diplomatic correspondence, were preserved at Tel-el-Amarna; they were found in the fall of 1887. This highly interesting correspondence covers the whole of Palestine and the Phœnician coast, Mesopotamia and Babylonia, and even the Cossæic kings are represented. And this correspondence is in the Assyrio-Babylonian language and written in Babylonian cuneiform characters. If even the proud Egyptians, who so thoroughly despised everything foreign, condescended to this and had their subjects and vassals write to the king in a foreign language which the Egyptians themselves had first to learn with much pains, this is the clearest evidence of the great power and dominant influence exercised by Babylonian culture on southwest Asia; it explains also very naturally how precisely the oldest Hebrew tradition shows the most remarkable kinship with the Babylonian.

This, then, is the historical picture shown us by southwest Asia at the time of the migration of the ancestors of the people of Israel. Babylonia shaken to its foundations by the Cossæic conquest, Egypt in uncontested possession of southwest Asia and recognised even by the rulers of Mesopotamia as chief power of the age. Let us try to fix the time a little more closely. The Exodus of Israel from Egypt must have occurred, according to Egyptian chronology, about 1300 before Christ; the residence of Israel in

Egypt lasted, according to the oldest tradition, three generations, or in round numbers a hundred years. This would make the migration to Egypt about 1400 B. C. If we estimate the events between the immigration of Abraham to Canaan and the further migration to Egypt at about one hundred years also, or perhaps somewhat more, we would arrive at the time for the immigration of Abraham to Canaan as between 1550 and 1500.

Now if the unquestionably Semitic inhabitants of Mesopotamia whom Abraham led leave Mesopotamia at exactly the same time when the Cossæic conquest was suppressing and expelling the Semitic element from Mesopotamia; if these Semitic emigrants follow a long familiar highway of international commerce into a land where they will be under the potent protection of Egypt; if later they go from the recognised Egyptian province to Egypt itself,—not a migration from one country to another, but only a migration from one part of a land to another—well, am I saying too much when I declare that the substance and the historical pith of the oldest traditions of Israel fit most perfectly into the picture of the general history of the time and are completely confirmed by it? What in fact the primitive history of Israel was, we shall examine in the next article.

ESCHATOLOGY IN CHRISTIAN ART.

BY THE EDITOR.

ESCHATOLOGY, or the doctrine of the last things, commands no longer the same important position in the Christian churches as it did at the beginning of the Christian era. The imagination of the early Christians was full of the subject. The Apostles, the Church Fathers, and other Christian writers of legends and martyr-stories speak constantly of the resurrection of the dead, the day of judgment, the torments of hell, of eternal life in heaven ; and it is even difficult for the Christians of to-day to realise the extraordinary strain which in past times these ideas exercised upon the minds of the people. Nevertheless, the extraordinary fear of the day of judgment, as the end of the world, was natural enough at an age in which astronomy and kindred sciences that reveal to us the nature, origin, and future fate of our planet were still in their swaddling clothes. Indeed we must be blind not to recognise the fact that the throes which attended the birth of early Christianity consisted mainly of the fears of the fires of hell and the anxiety to escape the universal doom of mankind that was supposed to be near at hand. The key-note of the sentiment among the first congregations is expressed in St. Paul's second epistle to the Thessalonians, where he says :

"Now we beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by our gathering together unto him,

"That ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter as from us, as that the day of Christ is at hand."

St. Paul's belief "that the day of Christ is at hand" is based upon Christ's own utterances. We read in Mark ix, 1 :

"And he (Jesus) said unto them : ' Verily I say unto you that there be some of them that stand here which shall not taste of death till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power.' "

That in this passage the second advent of Christ is referred to

there can be no doubt, especially as there are parallel passages which are written in the same spirit. In Matthew x, 23, Christ declares that his disciples preaching the Gospel in Palestine and fleeing from one city to another when persecuted for his name's sake, "shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come."

St. Paul confidently expected that he himself would see the day of the Lord, and in consideration of its nearness he deemed all worldly care unnecessary. Having explained in his first epistle to the Corinthians the significance of the events in Jewish history and the punishments of sinners, he adds :

"Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples. and they are written for our admonition upon whom the ends of the world are come."¹ (1 Cor. x, ii).

When some of the Thessalonian Christians died, he comforted them by declaring that those who sleep will be resurrected and taken together up to heaven with those who survive. And the words of Paul expressly implied that he himself, together with the Thessalonians whom he addresses, will remain, of which fact he is so sure as to pronounce his opinion as being "the word of the Lord." He says :

"But I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not, even as others which have no hope.

"For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him.

"For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord shall not prevent them which are asleep.

"For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God : and the dead in Christ shall rise first.

"Then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air : and so shall we ever be with the Lord.

"Wherefore comfort one another with these words."

When the early disciples became more and more disappointed at the non-appearance of the Lord in the clouds of heaven, a prominent leader of the Christian Church wrote an epistle to revive their faith, which was apt to suffer by the ridicule of those who did not share this belief. We read in the second epistle of St. Peter :

"This second epistle, beloved, I now write unto you ; in both which I stir up your pure minds by way of remembrance :

"That ye may be mindful of the words which were spoken before by the holy prophets, and of the commandment of us the apostles of the Lord and Savior :

¹ τὰ τέλη τῶν αἰώνων. See also Hebr. ix, 26, where the appearance of Christ is said to have taken place at the consummation of the time (ἐπὶ συντελείᾳ τῶν αἰώνων).

“Knowing this first, that there shall come in the last days scoffers, walking after their own lusts,

“And saying, ‘Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.’

“ . . . The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness; but is longsuffering to us-ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance.

“But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up.

“Seeing then that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness,

“Looking for and hasting unto the coming of the day of God, wherein the heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat?

“Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.”

The newly discovered fourth book of Daniel¹ contains the sad story of a certain man, holding the office of president (*προεστῶς*) in a Christian congregation of Syria, who “persuaded many of the “brethren, with their wives and children, to go out into the wilderness to meet the Christ, and they went wandering in the “mountains and wastes, there losing their way; and the end was “that all but a few were apprehended as robbers and would have “been executed by the mayor of the city (*ἡγεμῶν*) had it not been “that his wife was a believer and that in response to her entreaties “he put a stop to the proceedings to prevent a persecution arising “because of them.”

Cases of this kind happened frequently. We read of another Christian officer (also a *προεστῶς*) in Pontus that he also preached the approaching day of judgment. “He brought the brethren to “such a pitch of fear and trembling that they abandoned their “lands and fields, letting them become waste, and sold, the most of “them, their possessions.”

The belief in the imminent approach of the day of judgment waned during the third century, but was revived in the year 1000, which was commonly believed to be the end of the millennium prophesied by St. John the Divine in the Revelation. The disorder and misery which resulted from the foolish acts that people committed in anticipation of the approaching day of judgment all over Christendom are beyond description. Some squandered their property in order to enjoy the last days of their lives, some sold all they had and gave to the poor; some invested all their posses-

¹ Edited by Dr. Ed. Bratke, Bonn, 1891.

sions in masses and church donations, and thus almost all who were filled with the belief in the coming of the Lord fell a prey to the most wretched poverty and distress.

The hope of eternal bliss in heaven is among most of the Christian fathers strongly mixed with the expectation of the endless sufferings of their enemies. Heaven and hell are conceived as inverting the present order of things. Dives is not punished for his



DIVES IN HELL. From a German Picture-Bible.

sins and Lazarus is not rewarded for good deeds, their future fate is the result of an equalisation, as we read in Luke xvi, 25 :

“But Abraham said, ‘Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedest thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things : but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented.’”

The bliss of heaven appears partly to consist in witnessing the torments of hell. St. John the Divine simply follows the style of previous writers of prophecies and revelations when indulging with great delight in the anticipations of the plagues that will come over this world and of the punishment that will be meted out to Rome,



WAR IN HEAVEN.

After the Revelation of St. John. (By Albrecht Dürer.)

the new Babylon, the woman of abomination. This anticipation of plagues is an inheritance that Christianity had received from the



THE WOMAN OF ABOMINATION.
After the Revelation of St. John. (By Albrecht Dürer.)

Jews, who had suffered badly at the hands of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Syrians, and Romans. It is un-Christian for any one to indulge in such hopes of divine wrath inflicted upon his

religious adversaries ; and happily the main prophecy of the Jewish Christian author of the revelation was not fulfilled. By a strange irony of fate Judaic Christianity disappeared from the face of the



THE FOUR RIDERS OF THE APOCALYPSE. Wall-painting on the Campo Santo, Berlin. (By P. Von Cornelius.)

earth, while Rome became the centre of the Gentile Christianity, in which capacity she rose almost to more glorious power than pagan Rome ever possessed through her political superiority. Christianity was thoroughly Romanised and remained under the

sway of Rome until the Reformation split the Church in twain and opened new possibilities for a progressive development of Christianity, no longer subject to the dictates of a conclave of Italian cardinals and a Roman pope.



THE LAMB OPENS THE SEVEN SEALS.
The Christian world-dispensation according to the Revelation of St. John. (By Schnorr von Carolsfeld.)

Eschatological views at the time of Luther were still in many respects similar to the belief in Christ's second advent during early Christianity. Luther thought that the world would scarcely abide longer than a few decades, and, not unlike St. Paul, deemed it quite natural that he himself might still witness in the body the coming of the Lord.

Since Luther's times eschatological views have changed considerably. The Christian belief in resurrection has been spiritualised and there is a tendency among the most advanced and earnest theologians of to-day to interpret the old eschatological doctrines in the spirit of science. Since we know definitely what the nature of the earth is like, since we understand its origin and have better ideas as to its probable fate in the future, it has become an impossibility to remain under the influence of the crude beliefs of former




THE DOOM OF THE DAMNED. (After Luca Signorelli.)

centuries. But while the literal belief of the mythology in which the ideas of the end of man and of this world has been surrendered, the religious leaders of to-day are endeavoring the more earnestly to preserve their moral significance; and in this respect the eschatological conceptions have not lost their paramount importance in religion, although their influence, like that of antiseptics, appears to be purely negative.

Religion, if it has any right to existence at all, must be able to comfort man, to render him strong in the face of his own death

as well as in the contemplation of the discontinuance of all life on our planet. There is a deep truth in the prophecies of the end of the world, and we must learn to understand that while all things,



THE LAST JUDGMENT. After Michelangelo. (Sistine Chapel.)

great as well as small, the most insignificant mote as well as entire universes, will be dissolved into their elements, that there are yet things which will never decay. Justice, righteousness, and truth are immortal. The world changes, but the laws of the world remain the

same forever and aye. All material combinations will be broken up into their parts. But the eternal types of existence, the ideas, as Plato calls them, the Logoi and the entirety of the logoi, i. e., the Logos, or the cosmic order in its immutable harmony, will remain forever and aye.

These things are not non-entities, they are the most real features of reality. Although immaterial, they shape the evolution of all material objects ; although not concrete but absolute, they condition the nature of all concrete existences ; although superphysical (or, if you please, supernatural), they are the *raison d'être* of all physics.

These things are what philosophers call the purely formal. They are universal, for they are not here nor there, but everywhere. They are immutable, for they cannot be different from what they are ; they are intrinsically necessary. They are eternal, for they do not exist to-day only with the possibility of being no longer applicable to-morrow. They are above time and space. They are supercosmic, for they shape not only the present world, but are the conditions of all possible cosmic evolution.

These things are not, as is the material world, an immense heap of single atoms ; they constitute one grand concord, a divine harmony, an eternal unison in which truth, righteousness, and beauty are aspects only of one and the same actuality. Their unity is in religious terminology expressed in the word God.

These things, in brief, are the uncreated, which, when reflected in living creatures, appear as reason ; they are the spiritual or the formative feature of existence, which, when developing in sentient beings, becomes mind, they are the ultimate measure of what is right, the standard and norm of goodness, which, when dominating the motives of man, manifests itself in moral aspiration.

That man who by his life-actions gives evidence that God, the uncreated, eternal, and universal order of existence, animates his soul, will fearlessly contemplate the dissolution of his own body as well as of the whole world-system to which he in his bodily existence belongs, for he knows that what is essential in him is immortal, the ideas that ensoul him are indestructible. His spirit is rooted in the immortal, and the end of his life, although a dissolution of the body, is not a dissolution of the divinity which has begotten him, which constitutes the characteristic and main features of his being and dominates all the impulses of his soul.

CATHOLICISM IN ITALY.¹

BY G. FIAMINGO.

WE FREQUENTLY HEAR the expression of Voltaire that "no man is great in the eyes of his valet." This observation corresponds very closely to the truth, but Voltaire was not the author of it. Jesus Christ himself recognised that a prophet is not without honor except in his own country, and Voltaire only paraphrased this expression of Christ.

What is true of men is true also of an institution like the Catholic Church. This Church, which has its seat in Rome, must naturally present itself to Italians, and that independently of other factors, in a manner quite different from that in which it appears to other Catholic populations. These other populations, distant from Italy, and especially from Rome, see in Catholicism its less real phases. All the functions and life which are manifested in St. Peter's, and in the Vatican, reach them through general ideas which, like all other things at a distance, exaggerate their ideal and mystical character; and all the lesser and meaner things of the papacy and the curacy of Rome do not reach them at all.

To the Catholics living at a distance from Rome and Italy, their religion necessarily appears in an ideal form, and among them the mystical features of Christianity prevail. Roman historical tradition has little by little impersonated the Catholic religion in a pope who not only represents, but almost personifies, God himself, as is shown by proclaiming his infallibility at the end of a century which has criticised everything, and has found error everywhere, and also by the fact that St. Peter's has become the great temple of this Roman Catholic Christian religion. On account of this view of the Pope and of St. Peter's the Gospel has been forgotten, or,

¹Translated from the manuscript of G. Fiamingo by I. W. Howerth of the University of Chicago.

at least, neglected. But while this is obvious to the Catholics of Rome and Italy, almost in contact with the Pope and with St. Peter's, it is not so to those who have never seen either, and who know them only from tradition, and from the stories of pilgrims who have gone for a few days to Rome, urged by their extreme mysticism. Consequently, to these distant Catholics the Pope and St. Peter's must present themselves in an ideal and semi-mystical form, as two grand institutions like the religion which they serve to symbolise.

Even to-day the Catholic who is not Italian and who goes to Rome and has sufficient intelligence to form a clear idea of things as they are, gets a very different impression of the papacy, the Vatican, and St. Peter's from that which he had formed at a distance. Le Sar Peladan, a sincere Catholic, had to make that confession; even he had to recognise the profound difference which exists between these great institutions of Catholicism as they are idealised in the minds of the people at a distance, and as they are in reality. As a matter of fact, they badly conceal the narrow-mindedness, the faults and vulgarities common to men, and are represented by men far from exempt from human weaknesses. And all this narrowmindedness and weakness, all these intrigues and vulgarities which are not wanting in the neighborhood of the Vatican, and in the election of a Pope, and which are not visible for the most part to distant populations, constitute a great part of Italian life and activity. How much moral and mystical authority, for instance, could have inspired Bartholomew of Naples, Archbishop of Bari, elected Pope under the name of Urban VI.? He succeeded Gregory XI., who died in 1378. At the death of this Pope the clergy, and especially the common people of Rome, collected in great numbers under the windows of the cardinals, and made a demonstration beseeching them, for the welfare of the Roman Church, and for the glory of the Christian name, to choose for Pope, especially for those troublous times, an illustrious Italian personage. They were afraid that if the choice should fall upon a Frenchman he would remove the court to France, thus entailing enormous damages upon Rome, and upon the whole of Italy. In fact during the absence of the pontiff, they had seen the control of the Church fall into the hands of tyrants, Rome and Italy afflicted by continuous evils, and the churches of Rome abandoned and for the most part ruined.

Concerning this, Berthelet says: "The Holy See being seen
"to be thus reduced, the convents and sacred places having be-

“come the lair of wild beasts, religious zeal which had formerly brought great masses to Rome was chilled, and none came any more to visit the tombs of the martyrs. It is necessary, therefore, that the Pope should reside in the city which St. Peter had chosen for his dwelling-place, and that he should guard and preserve the patrimony of St. Peter’s which had expanded itself into Tuscany, Sabina, Campania, Umbria, Marchés, and Romagna, and which during the absence of the Popes had been conquered by various tyrants.” Very few cardinals ever lived at Rome, and in the absence of the pontifical court the economic evils which afflict the city are terrible; especially among the common people, the misery is very great. The remedy for all these evils was the election of an Italian Pope. This is why the Romans wished the Pope to be an Italian. Religious sentiment had nothing to do with it.

Impressed by these circumstances, the cardinals replied that they would elect a worthy man, who, without making individual or national distinctions, would govern the Church according to the example of the Saviour, and attract to Rome the affluence of the faithful and thus better its conditions. The clergy and the people were thus pacified, believing that nothing would be done by the cardinals that was not for the honor of God, and for the welfare of the Roman Church and Christianity.

But, as a matter of fact, something very different happened. The conclave had assembled in St. Peter’s, and the doors of the Vatican were closely guarded by a great number of soldiers ready to put down any uprising of the people which might interfere in the election of the Pope. But when they began to count the votes, a serious contest arose among the cardinals on account of the fact that there were thirteen French cardinals who wished one of their number chosen, and four Italians, one of whom, Orsini, hoped to be elected. At the same time a still more bitter contest arose among the French cardinals, who were divided into two parties each of which wished the Pope to be selected from itself.

This contest, this personal struggle for the See of St. Peter’s, was carried on with an unparalleled audacity and shamelessness, and without any possible reconciliation, until the sacred clergy were forced to nominate for the papacy a prelate who was absent, and who, moreover, was not a member of the college, Bartholomew of Naples (or, as some say, of Pisa), Archbishop of Bari.¹ The rabble crowding around the Vatican was already shouting, “A Ro-

¹G. Berthelet, *Si le pape doit être italien*, Rome, 1894, p. 18.

man! We wish a Roman, or, at least, an Italian!" When Bartholomew Prignano, Archbishop of Bari, by fifteen votes out of sixteen was elected, it was necessary, before announcing the new pontiff to the crowd, to know whether he was acceptable to it. A cardinal called to the people from a window to go to St. Peter's to hear the proclamation, but the crowd understood that the cardinal of St. Peter's, Tibaldeschi, was elected Pope, and ran, as is the custom, to his house (*a saccheggiane la casa*). In vain others were told that the Archbishop of Bari was elected. They understood de Bar, John de Bar, whom they did not like. That part of the crowd which had already surrounded St. Peter's was about to invade the conclave. Then the cardinals, against his wish, took old Tibaldeschi and forced him to sit down in the pontifical seat. They put upon him the mitre, and the stole, and sang the *Te Deum*. Tibaldeschi protested, but Cardinal de Marmontiers forced him to remain in the pontifical seat, holding him down by the shoulders, and his own grandson, Tibaldeschi, helped to keep him there with his fists. This disgraceful scene lasted for some time. Six days afterwards, however, all the cardinals of this strange conclave assisted at the coronation of Prignano, who took the name of Urban VI.

Urban VI., being a violent, insulting, and intolerably cruel man, aroused the indignation of the cardinals who, remembering the extraordinary and far from liberal conditions under which he had been elected to the papacy, soon re-assembled in the castle of Anagni, not far from Rome, and with a vote of twelve cardinals out of thirteen who participated in this second conclave, elected to the papacy Robert of Geneva, who took the name of Clement VII. Tibaldeschi, who was too old to leave Rome, remained with Urban. The king of France proclaimed the second election valid, that is, that of Clement VII. It is pretty sure that the Holy Ghost did not inspire either of these two conclaves.¹

It is such things as those which have just been described which caused the people of Rome to see in the Pope not a representative of a supernatural God, mystical and impersonal, but simply a useful economical institution. They demand an Italian pope, even a Roman, not that he may take care of their individual souls, for that is not even distantly thought of, but in order that he may satisfy Roman and Italian economic interests. And this people witness and even participate in the most vulgar intrigues and loudest demonstrations, lest the See of St. Peter's be assumed by one per-

¹Le Sar Peladan, *Le Prochain Conclave*. Paris, 1896. Page 68.

son rather than another. How much moral authority, much less mystical, can an individual have in the eyes of his people, who has obtained the Holy See only because he has outdone the other cardinals in audacity and cunning, or by illegal and violent means, or by a combination of all these circumstances?

Machiavelli, like his contemporaries who saw the Chair of St. Peter successively assumed by Sixtus IV., Innocent VIII., Alexander VI., Julius II., and Leo X., was compelled to say that "it is Rome which has taken away our faith;" while Vettori, who lived at Rome, the secretary of a cardinal, wrote of Leo X.: "It being seen that the Pope broke his oaths and made a constitution one day which he violated the next, he began to lose the very name of Good, and while he made many prayers and fasted often, he was no longer believed in. It is certainly a great task to undertake to be at the same time a temporal lord and a religious man, because whoever considers the evangelical laws will see that the pontiffs, while taking the name of the Vicar of Christ, have really created a new religion which possesses only the name of Christ; for they command poverty and wish for themselves wealth; they urge humility and themselves follow pride; they demand obedience and will suffer themselves to be commanded by no one." A modern critic could not have put the matter better than Vettori, who lived in the midst of the Roman life of the sixteenth century, and who was unable, therefore, to see all defects.

But this sixteenth century, which took the name of the century of Julius II. and Leo X., of those two Popes who were the negation of any truly mystical spirit, and who represented a God who is the negation of all that is described in the Gospel, these Popes, I say, and the century in which they lived do not stand alone. The whole history of the papacy after the early centuries is a chronology of popes who, with a few exceptions, are similar to Julius and Leo, without, indeed, having their genial qualities; and the other centuries of the Vatican differ from the sixteenth only because they lack its artistic splendor. All the popes, with a few exceptions, as well as not a few centuries of the history of the Roman Catholic Church, are alike in the complete want of a genuine sentiment of Christian and mystical faith. And the whole people who lived in contact with the Church of Rome, not only those who lived in immediate contact with it, like the Romans, but all Italians, necessarily lack these mystical and religious characteristics.

Moreover, the Italian mind from a purely psychological point

of view and as a result partially of the natural environment in which it has been developed, is powerfully fascinated by the beauty of the external world. So true is this that in Sicily where the beauty of nature and the abundance of the tropical flora are still more beautiful than in the remainder of Italy, the Sicilian is almost overwhelmed by the superiority of nature, and in presence of it recognises his own inferiority. In the character of the Sicilians there is therefore developed a taciturnity and a contemplativeness which is generally found only among the people of northern Europe where the population is affected by the imposing grandeur of its natural environment, although it is quite different from that of Sicily. Therefore, in the Sicilian, as in all Italians, there is developed a tendency to enjoy and to reproduce the beauty of nature. In fact, among Italians there is a strong and general inclination to enjoy and to portray the beauty of the physical world, hence the tendency to prefer an outdoor and active life to the indoor and thoughtful one; to follow the practical instinct in its manifestations, sometimes artistic and poetical, sometimes scientific or civil; and, as a consequence, the Italians are wanting in the energy and force necessary to penetrate deeply into an abstract subject, and have an almost absolute lack of originality and of systematic philosophic doctrines. Concerning this, Ferri a few years ago pointed out that the Italian mind, on account of being warmly attached to the objective world, seemed never to have approached metaphysical speculation, except to restrain it with an eclectic sense and an instinct of measure, which illustrates on the one side its artistic tendency, and on the other its constant adhesion to classic tradition, but with this distinction, that our nature, allied in origin to the Greek and Roman stocks, has not inherited to the same degree the faculty of ideal synthesis of the one, and the organising power in politics of the other.

There has always been wanting in Italy, especially since the Reformation, a lively interest in things of the conscience, as well as all spirit of discussion and examination in matters of religion; and this has been one of the causes which, with the violent restraint of all speculative liberty following the Council of Trent, has brought it about that philosophy has always had a very small place, and a value subordinate to that of all other disciplines, in our literature. Philosophy as rational comment in the examination of the religious conscience, and as bold, speculative integration of religious ideals, as is the philosophy of the German type, even among the most independent thinkers, has never been able to take root in

Italy as a permanent product of national thought. The way in which it has sometimes entered into the researches of the moral world has never been that insinuating way, a sort of continuous compromise between the two extremes of absolute and open liberty and of respect for tradition, which Bacon, Locke, Hume, even Mill, the greatest English thinkers, have always followed. The Italian mind, drawn as it is by its own instinct toward all that has distinctness of form, and that does not lose itself in vagueness, even in matters superior to sense has either accepted wholly the content of religion as tradition has handed it down, or has rested with the scholastics, and then with Rosmini and Gisberti and their followers, or, if it has not acquiesced in them, has gone into open rebellion, like the philosophers of the Renaissance, and has overturned altars and priests in whom it no longer believed, and cursed the God which it had formerly worshipped in silence.

The great preoccupation, the fixed idea of the Italian mind, the one to which it holds most passionately, has always been a political and social idea entirely of Roman and Latin origin and tradition, an idea of internal adjustment and of the independence of the State and the Nation. The love, the anger, the implacable hatred aroused in numerous civil discords, although they have many times grown out of motives and sentiments religious in their nature, have never had these as their sole and determining cause. The tumults, the bloody revolts in which the newly-formed Italian communes of the second half of the eleventh century engaged, and in which the clergy were usually mixed up, like that, for instance, of Patarini, although they took their name and occasion from heresies, were chiefly civil and political in their nature and were waged over municipal interests and disputes. And this is noteworthy, that the Italian mind has never of itself produced a single heresy out of the pure spirit of controversy about a dogma, or, at least, none of historical importance. All those which have put foot in Italy, like the heresy of Catari,—and note that they have been usually imported and almost entirely into that part of Italy where there is the largest infusion of foreign blood,—came from abroad, or have in every way an origin not Italian, and have scarcely appeared upon our soil before they were changed from theological and doctrinal, which they were originally, into political. An example is furnished by the followers of Arnaldo da Brescia, a disciple of Abelard, who, like all our great independent thinkers, was opposed to the Church of Rome and its doctrines, who really revolted against the temporal power of the papacy, corrupt itself and the

corrupter of Christianity. To wish to "bring back the Church to its own principles" has always signified to the Italians from Pier delle Vigne, from Dante and San Francesco to Machiavelli, and even to our time, to wish to reform the "rich poverty of the Gospel" (*ricca povertà del vangelo*). On the other hand that which has given to the temporal power of the Church such an important place in our civil history has been a combination of motives and moral causes which grew out of the Church and operated upon the religious character of the entire nation. The people, it is true, have felt and have said by their greatest representatives that they owe to the papacy and the priests the fact of their having become irreligious. While there has always remained in the Church from the inheritance of Roman tradition a portion of its great spirit, it has only served to stamp upon the papacy an imprint of worldliness and a political tendency never inseparable from its history.¹

The papacy has thus slowly but surely rendered to the Italian spirit all that was purely and classically Italian and Roman in what it received from it with the tradition of the empire which it has continued. The faith which Machiavelli claims is destroyed in our minds I would say has been changed in great part by the faults of the Church, and has been made little by little more exterior and secular, withdrawing itself from the mystical spirituality and faith of the early Christian communities, and has become what it has always been to the Italians and which perhaps it was in Etruria and certainly at Rome, the most solemn among the functions of public life, as well as the most dignified and, therefore, the most needful of show and of magnificence and ritual pomp. The old Roman conceived morality as an agreement of conduct with social laws, and superficially placed it above everything in that external dignity by which virtue presents itself to the administrator of the public conscience. The observance of religion, which was the first of all laws and social obligations, stood for him, therefore, above everything else in respect and in the public fulfilment of rights and usages of his native land. It was in substance only a custom of sacred legality. And this is what religion has been, as it has been understood and practised by the majority of the Italians in every age, especially among the common people. It has always been chiefly a *ritual observance*, the legality of which was constituted by the code of precepts of the Roman Church. It has given and gives, therefore, in fact, if not in maxim and in theory, more value, as

¹ Giacomo Barzelotti, *Italia mystica ed Italia pagana*, in *Nuova Antologia*, Rome 1890, p. 266 et seq.

measured in credit and in sanctification, to *works* and to their performance *in public* through the ministry of the priests than to the intimate personal inspiration of faith which speaks from the heart, and is sufficient unto itself. This has always been, and is to-day, the *fact* concerning the faith of the great majority of Italians.¹

An impartial judge who should observe attentively the most significant manifestations of Italian piety and Christianity could not express a judgment different from that of Barzelotti. As far back as 1860 Taine, in his letters to the *Revue des deux Mondes* upon Italy and Italian life, remarked: "In the matter of religion "the Italian imagination grasps only the ceremonies. The celestial powers, like the civil powers, are to it dangerous personages "to be feared, and whose wrath is to be appeased by genuflections "and offerings, and by nothing else. On passing before a crucifix, "these people make the sign of the cross, and mutter a prayer. "Twenty steps away, when they think Christ no longer sees them, "they begin to swear."

The character of the Italians, disinclined as it is to profound meditation, and strongly attracted toward the contemplation of natural beauty, and animated by a strong desire to reproduce this beauty, is marked in consequence by a profound artistic sentiment, which has always flourished in Italy, even in the darkest centuries of the Middle Ages. The Italians accepted, it is true, for a brief period the theories of the Gospel, which at the time constituted a reaction against the social evils which Cæsarism had produced. And at that time Christianity responded to a true social need, and was diffused without any fomentation produced by active propaganda. So that historically it is well known that in Rome the new religion was diffused before any of the apostles had come there to preach it, a thing which happened in a few regions of northern Africa. But as soon as it was born and began to develop, the Italians adopted only its external and ritual manifestations, and did not perceive the social importance of the new religion. They found in Christianity only a subject for artistic manifestation, and they made this religion almost an object of artistic worship, and went to the temples to refresh their spirit eager for artistic beauty. The religious sentiment was overpowered, or rather it did not exist, annulled as it was by a lively desire for contemplating externality.

The Church of Rome has shown a great ability in making use of and in satisfying this artistico-religious need of the Italians. And by satisfying this pseudo-religious sentiment, it has been able

¹G. Barzelotti, *Art. cit.*, p. 29.

to do without mysticism and true religious sentiment, and to give itself to worldliness and to the cultivation of physical force for the conquest of political power and temporal splendor. The Catholic Church thus continues the traditions of imperial Rome, although at the beginning it arose by supplanting it. In other words, the Catholic Church is perfectly adapted to the religious needs of the Italian population, a need, however, *sui generis*, which does not go beyond the image painted more or less skilfully, and the statue roughly or artistically modelled, and remains satisfied with religious ceremonies more or less grotesquely performed. The infamies committed by many popes, the unbridled corruption which infests the Vatican, do not strike them, do not offend their religious sentiment, because this sentiment lacks every characteristic of mysticism and true piety. But, instead of being offended at these infamies and corruptions, it is offended by some spirit who happens to possess the true religious sentiment, like Catharine of Sienna, for instance, who said "God demands that justice be done toward these iniquities which are committed by those who feed and pasture in the garden of the Church, while proclaiming that the animal nature ought not to be nourished (*non si debba nutrire del cibo degli uomini*) . . . you may obtain peace by casting out the perverse edile pomp of the world, preserving only the honor of God and the duties of his Church."

The Church of Rome has occupied itself neither with souls nor the future life, nor with precepts mystical or truly religious. St. Thomas Aquinas or Egidius Colonna, who were among the clearest thinkers of the Guelph school, never occupied themselves with these questions. On the contrary, they maintained that everything ought to be subject to the Church and to its priests, to whom both the authorities and the laity ought to be obedient, and upon whom they should depend. What man can do in this world is of no value if it does not in some way prepare him for the future life (of which they say nothing except what may serve as a kind of scarecrow for giving force to the wishes of the Church), of which the history and the secret are confided to the Church. History, like nature, is a work of God, whose hand guides and conducts the people to triumph or to ruin, and without whom the will of man cannot arrest or change the predestined course of events. What the body is to the soul, what matter is to spirit, the temporal power is to the spiritual. In substance, the two swords which symbolise the two different powers ought to be wielded by the vicar of Christ, whose authority comes directly from God, and to whom even the

emperor, who is the representative of law and of purely terrestrial force, ought to be subject. The authorities, they say, are like the moon, which has no light of its own, but receives its light from the sun, which may be compared to the Pope. And in all the writers of the Middle Ages you may find this singular comparison repeated and given the force of a valid argument or a rigorous demonstration.¹

But, if this curious comparison is no longer found in the writers of the Church of Rome, they maintain the same principles and come to the same conclusions. Leo the XIII., well versed in modern studies, soon after he assumed the chair of St. Peter, issued an encyclical in which he recommended the study of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the purest Thomism inspires his speeches and all his encyclicals. Taking up at random one of his later encyclicals, this fact is amply illustrated. Having fixed upon the unity of the Church as a point of departure, he advances from this idea to all the other conclusions. He begins by saying that the unity of the Church, like that of Christ, is of a double nature, corporeal and spiritual, and this unity is eternal, as Christ wished it and established it; and he excludes the plurality of communions because even in the physical body without unity there is no life. If there is not a unity of faith, there is not sufficient to establish a church. There must still be a unity of interpretation of doctrine, of which the Church is the guardian; and hence, its paternal authority, etc. In fine, St. Thomas himself could not have better interpreted his writings and his logic than Leo the XIII. has done. And as mediæval Cæsarism rules in the Vatican, so the blindest obedience is rendered to the wishes of the great pontiff. Mgr. Talamo, one of the most cultured men of the curacy of Rome, simply because he wished to reconstruct Thomism in accordance with the progress of modern science, fell into disgrace at the Vatican. Confronted by this attitude of the Vatican, the Italian philosophers, who, reflect, however, the insignificance which has always been attached to philosophy in Italy, and which indicates one of the chief characteristics of the mental attitude of this people, either continue to repeat monotonously the dogmas of the metaphysics of St. Thomas, or by reaction fall, like some of the writers of the Renaissance, into the opposite excess and become naturalistic and materialistic, and deny all function to the spirit and to religion which they ridicule or neglect altogether. These, quite numerous, too, are all followers of Darwin and Spencer. Even the laity are almost without exception

¹P. Villari, *Nicolo Machiavelli*. Milan 1895, Vol. 2, p. 239.

led to such extreme materialistic consequences by the influence which their ideas undergo from the struggle carried on between the State and the Vatican. No new spirit animates the Vatican. The Catholic religion remains even in its greatest representatives perfectly consonant with the traditions of the spirit of the Italian people, always averse to profound, meditative and abstract thought, and only eager for and satisfied by external manifestations, however fallacious, of a religion which has no truly religious content. The Pope and the Vatican continue to struggle for a temporal power which they hope is only temporarily lost, and seek to attach the people to themselves more and more in order to have their support in reconquering that show of power which a few square kilometres are able to give to the Church of Rome, while the Italian people are absolutely uninterested in the *Thomistic* theories which the fathers of the Church continue to preach without understanding them. And yet these people continue to carry about their necks a little crucifix and salute more or less respectfully the holy images which are frequently found painted on the walls of the streets, and go to hear the mass, of which, however, they do not understand the meaning. But this people, I repeat, is entirely wanting in all religious sentiment. It continues its religious practices, and finds in its images and in its religious functions a satisfaction of its artistic sentiment, and worships God, the saints, the Church, and is respectful toward them, because they are imposed upon it by tradition, because they are afraid of the Church's power, of its hell, and of the evil fortune which it may bring upon them. Modern Italians pray to God and to the saints, just as their pagan ancestors did two centuries ago. There is no new spirit whatever in the modern Catholic religion of the Italians and of the Vatican.

IN NUBIBUS.

THE COGITATIONS OF A SMOKING PHILOSOPHER.

BY THE REV. G. J. LOW.

[CONCLUDED.]

PIPE IV.

“I believe in God, maker of Heaven and Earth.”

But what is He like? Is He pure Mind, or Mind and Matter combined? If the latter, then He is after all only like one of ourselves, a living being of a “genus” or “order” still higher than that of Man. If so, He is a further development; He would be at the end of the chain instead of at the beginning. Instead of Creator, He would be the ultimate creation: so that won't do. Then is He Mind alone? But how can mind exist without matter? It does seem curious that Thought should be the result of perturbations in the brain,—or that without phosphorus there can be no thought,—or that the brain should secrete thought just as the liver secretes bile,—and yet these are dogmas of science. It seems odd to think that the locomotive or the electric light came into being simply because certain atoms of grey matter were dancing a quadrille within the skull of a Stevenson or an Edison. And yet, on the other hand, it would be quite as absurd to imagine that those inventions would have been made by those men if the said grey matter had been first scooped out of those skulls. In fact, mind and matter, with us mortals at any rate, are so inextricably mixed, that I do not see how we can separate them.¹ But the Maker of the Machine—what of Him? He must not be confounded with His machine: He must be considered, surely, apart from the machine itself. I was watching a locomotive in the station-yard to-day. Really, it was like a thing of life. It ate and drank: it devoured

¹ See the first part of the late G. J. Romanes's work on *Monism*.

huge quantities of coal and water. It panted, and puffed, and squealed, and roared. The steam was its blood, the cylinders its muscles, the pistons its tendons. It went forward, or backward, or stopped still, or yelled, just as its brain dictated: for the engineer in the cab was its brain. The machine was so perfect, so grand, so life-like. Yet it does not follow that the maker of that machine was composed of boiler-iron, and brass, and coal. It is evident to me that all our knowledge of the constituents of a machine does not help us to form any idea of the constituents, so to speak, of its maker: so in the case of the Universe, it seems to me, we cannot argue from the known to the unknown; we cannot tell what the Maker of the Machine of the Universe is like from any study of the machine itself.

What, then, is the theist's conception of God? The Bible says, "God is a Spirit." What do Christians mean by "Spirit"? Tennyson makes Nature say:

"The Spirit does but mean the breath,"

and the word is used of air, wind, gas, and alcohol. There are those, too, who believe in Spirits or Ghosts of men, certain filmy, shadowy substances, which they can see through, and poke a stick through, and which can at pleasure "materialise," as they call it, and render themselves visible to mortals, and then vanish away. Well, these mysterious beings are very scarce, and I for one find it very hard to believe in them: certainly, I cannot think of such a vaporous existence as being superior to my present one of flesh and blood. And then again, why should these spirits or ghosts have precisely the same shape and appearance as they had when inhabiting bodily forms, and even appear in their mundane habiliments? Cæsar's ghost appears in his toga, the spirit of Hamlet's father in his armour, and so on. Have old clothes their ghosts too? If so, there is no end to the spirits, and tables and chairs would have ghosts, to say nothing of deceased animals. Indeed, ghosts of cats have been seen, if we may credit "reliable authorities." The spiritualists of the day would give us not only the ghosts of our friends, but ghostly flowers, tambourines, guitars, and what not. If animals have spirits, I wonder where they stow away the ghosts of all the defunct rats and mice? Unless, indeed, we accept the doctrines of the ancient philosophers and modern Buddhists, and suppose these ghosts are utilised to animate other bodies. And the trees, too, they must have their "spirits." How odd it would be to imagine the ghost of a pine tree—its Dryad—hovering around a saw-mill, and ruefully watching its own members being remorselessly

dragged into it to be cut up,—and vowing vengeance against the owner of the saw-mill as soon as he himself enters the ghostly state! Why, the fate of Clarence in his dreams (Shakespeare, “Richard III.”) would be nothing compared to the fate of that unfortunate lumberman. Now, for my part I cannot believe all this sort of thing: I cannot believe that everything, tables, chairs, musical instruments, and old clothes, have their ghosts.

Now, if God is a spirit, and that table there, or my meerschaum pipe has its spirit too, I don't see what we have gained by our inquiry. It is simply relegating the whole Universe to the shades; and this actual life is far more substantial than the ghostly or shady one. If theists can give us no better idea of God than this, I don't see what good it is. But I should not say theists, but Christians; it is they who describe their deity by this term. After all, what is a Theist? Cannot Mr. Herbert Spencer be included in this term? In his thesis on the probable outcome of religion, entitled “Religion, a Retrospect and a Prospect,” he says (at the close): Man “is ever in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed.” There is Mr. Spencer's conclusion of the whole matter. “Ever in the presence”—ah! then, that Energy is Omnipresent—“of an Infinite and Eternal Energy.” Just so; and suppose we call this Infinite, Eternal, Omnipresent, Omnipotent Energy by the old-fashioned term—God? It is easier than always using that circumlocution, or Mr. Spencer's other expressions, such as, “The Power that is manifest in the Universe” (*First Principles*), or “The Power that is manifested throughout Evolution” (*Data of Ethics*, Chapter IX.). To be sure, Mr. Spencer does not call this Power a “Spirit.” I must ask the Rector when I meet him, what is the Christian idea of “spirit.” By the way, this definition which Mr. H. Spencer gives us of the Maker of the Machine, i. e., “the Infinite, Eternal Energy from which all things proceed,” does not say a word about Who made the Maker of the Machine, the question that Professor Molecule bothered me with. Well, if Mr. Spencer and Professor Molecule—and, for that matter, every other thinker I have met with—must needs postulate something eternal,—surely, so may I. But Mr. Spencer adds, “from which all things proceed.” That sounds awfully “scriptural,” somehow. Now, Mr. Powell says (see “Pipe I.”) that “God in higher sense is Father.” So this Infinite, Eternal Energy from which all things proceed may be equivalent to the theist's “God the Father.” But then, how about that Everlasting Hydrogen? Is that, then, the mother element? Oh, dear! I am getting things mixed again!

My pipe is just out. I must ask the Rector to-morrow what he means by spirit. In the meantime I think even Mr. H. Spencer cannot find fault with my belief, if I say in company with the Christians :

“I believe in one God the Father, Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth and of all things visible and invisible.”

PIPE V.

I met the Rector this morning and drew him into conversation. I thought to pose him with the question: “What is spirit?” But it was like my attempt to pose Professor Molecule with the question: “Who made the machine?” I did not get much satisfaction. “You speak of God as a Spirit,” I said to the Rector, “will you kindly describe to me what sort of thing ‘spirit’ is?”—“My dear sir,” he replied, “I have not the least idea.” This staggered me somewhat, but I returned to the charge, saying: “Then you use a term, as predicate of your deity, which you don’t understand and can’t explain?”—“Certainly,” said he in a most matter-of-fact way, “I can form no conception whatever of the nature or property of what we term spirit as applied to the Deity or to any immaterial being.” I answered him: “Your very expression—‘immaterial being’—sounds to us a contradiction in terms; it is equivalent to a Nothing-Something.”—“Precisely,” said he, “it *is* a Nothing-Something. It is a Something, because it is a Being, an Entity—and yet a Nothing; that is, nothing of which we can form any proper conception; there is nothing of our known substances or phenomena to which we can compare it.” I replied: “Then by spirit, as applied to your concept of God, you do not mean anything like air or vapor or gas?”—“Certainly not,” said he, “we know perfectly well that air, gas, vapor, and even the luminiferous ether, which it is supposed pervades all space, are matter just as much as wood and stone; and we do not conceive of God as bearing the likeness of anything that is in the heavens above or in the earth beneath.”

I asked him: “Is there not danger of confusion of thought is using such an ambiguous word as ‘spirit,’ which conventionally means one thing and theologically another?”

The Rector replied: “Not only is there danger of it, but I am free to confess there *is* much confusion of thought among divines to-day in regard to these matters; and it is not to be wondered at. Our present theories of heat, light, air, etc., are, you must remem-

ber, very modern. The theologians of former times knew no more of the component parts of atmospheric air, or of the doctrine of the correlation of forces, than did the philosophers of those days; and all alike spoke of heat, light, air, etc., as "immaterial" entities. The trouble is, that while physical science has advanced with such strides that, in order to express her new ideas, she has to coin some new term almost every day, said term being generally some barbaric compound of the old Greek words, theology all the while sticks to her old terms: and to those theologians whose scientific knowledge has not kept pace with modern philosophy these old terms undoubtedly connote the old ideas."

"Then," said I, "you Christian theologians have different ideas on these subjects?"

He replied: "Yes; there are as many theologies as there have been philosophies. Indeed we may say there are idealist, empiricist, utilitarian, necessitarian, and even hedonistic theologies. In fact, theology has always been necessarily colored by the dominant philosophy of the day. In these days Evolution is beginning—for it is only just beginning—to dominate popular thought; and in due time theology will follow suit; the advanced guards, so to speak, among the theologians, are doing so now."

"But if the Church," I said, "is such a chameleon-like, protean thing as to change the color and form of her doctrines in conformity with the philosophy of the day, what is the good of it? What can the Church give us which science cannot?"

"My dear sir," said the Rector, "you must not confound the Church with theology: they are two different things. The Church was founded to announce certain objective facts relating to God's dealings with men. If those facts are true, they will be ultimately found to be reconcilable with science. If they are false, then the Church's occupation is gone, and the sooner she disbands the better. But while the Church's business is to deliver her message, the business of theology is to philosophise on that message and adapt it to the knowledge of the day. In doing this she must levy contributions on all the sciences and bring their latest findings to bear on her conclusions. Therefore, like all other sciences, theology is capable of development. But the Church's original message remains one and the same: it was once for all delivered to the saints."

"I confess," said I, "that I do not follow you in all this: for I do not see the difference between what you call the message of

the Church and what I suppose you consider the *rationale* of that message."

"I am not surprised at that," said the Rector, "I could not expect you with your present views, to appreciate the distinction which I draw. We may, possibly, discuss it later on; but in the meantime you have first to decide for yourself whether there is a God or not."

"At all events," said I, parrying his last remark, "You admit the truth of Professor Huxley's dictum, that 'extinguished theologians lie around the cradle of science like the strangled snakes around that of the youthful Hercules.'"

"Yes," said he, "but extinguished theologians no more lie around that cradle than extinguished scientists and extinguished philosophers. From the dawn of philosophy to our own times, the endeavor of every philosopher has been to 'extinguish' his predecessor, and every new discovery of science has 'extinguished' the pale and ineffectual light that went before."

"That may be," I retorted, "but your Christian theologians proceed to dogmatic definitions and descriptions of your God that seem absurd to us."

The Rector said; "Ah yes; so Mr. Huxley argued in his address to the British Association in Belfast in 1874. In defending himself from the charge of 'fatalism, materialism, and atheism,' he was pleased to say: 'Of all the senseless babbles I have ever had occasion to read, the demonstrations of those philosophers who undertake to tell us all about the nature of God would be the worst, if they were not surpassed by the still greater absurdities of the philosophers who try to prove that there is no God.' Now, with regard to this passage, let me say, first, we thank Mr. Huxley for his assurance that those who try to prove that there is no God are the biggest fools of all; it agrees with what our Scriptures tell us: 'The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.' But, secondly, respecting the 'senseless babble,' of those 'demonstrations' of certain theists, of course I cannot say to whom he alludes; it cannot be Christian theists, for the first axiom of Christian theology is that God is incomprehensible: the very attributes we ascribe to Him all 'transcend the forms of distinct thought,' to adopt Mr. Herbert Spencer's phrase. The Book of Job, the oldest, perhaps, of all the books of the Bible, says (Chap. XI., 7, 8): 'Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection? It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou know?' And the Gospel of St.

John, which is the latest of all the books says: 'No man hath seen God at any time.' Surely he would not call such statements senseless babble?"

I answered: "Certainly not; but probably Mr. Huxley was referring to such 'demonstrations' as are contained in the Athanasian Creed and other formularies. Can you give any rational explanation of them?"

But the Rector evaded the question by saying: "My dear sir, we must leave that discussion, too, for some other time. We must first decide, as I said before, whether there is a God or not, before we discuss whatever may have been predicated of Him."

"That brings me back," said I, "to my first question: why should you say 'God is a spirit?' Granting that the old-fashioned theologians, of whom you speak, stick to the old-fashioned terms, why should the more advanced (amongst whom you would no doubt range yourself) still use a word which men ordinarily connect with Ghosts, vapors, and so forth?"

"Because," said he, "we can't help ourselves. Your own scientific researches have informed you that the Brain or Mind—put it which way you will—cannot create, that all its ideas must be based on impressions already received. Hence we can form no conception of anything we don't know, save by comparing it to something we do know. So when we speak of God, whose nature we cannot possibly comprehend, we must make use of terms—or 'symbols,' as Herbert Spencer says—and of ideas of which we are already cognisant. The word 'spirit' was, no doubt, primarily identical with 'Breath.' It is so, most markedly, in Hebrew and Greek. 'Pneumatology' has a very different sense from 'pneumatics'; yet they are both derived from the same Greek word. And this is easily understood. The breath seemed to the ancients so mysterious an agent, so identified with life, yet so intangible, invisible, that when death occurred, the expressions—'The breath has left the body'—'the spirit has left the body'—'life has left the body'—seemed equivalents. Now we all feel there must be a First Cause—or, if you please, a Great Originator. The very idea of Evolution postulates something from which to be evolved. With us The Great Evolver or Originator is God. But as to His nature we can predicate nothing whatever; we have no data to go upon. So we call Him a spirit—not meaning thereby the conventional Ghost—but because that is the nearest approach we can make to that Nothing-Something which scandalises you so much."

So far for my conversation with the Rector. Now sitting at

home over my pipe and recalling his remarks, I notice especially two things. The first is that by "spirit" Christians do not necessarily mean a misty, vague, vaporous form like the "Ghosts" of the Spiritualists, or the "shades" of the classics. They simply use the term to connote an existence of which they can predicate nothing; an existence "transcending the forms of distinct thought," as Herbert Spencer says. In that sense I can accept it too. The Christians' God—and I may say my God—is equal to Mr. Spencer's Infinite, Eternal Energy *plus* self-consciousness or Omniscience. Really this last seems to go without saying. An Eternal, Omnipresent, Creative Energy, possessing every infinite attribute *except* consciousness, is to me unthinkable.

Another thing I was pleased to hear the Rector remark was that the Brain or Mind cannot create; at the most it can but combine impressions already received. Scientific works (such as Bain's *Mind and Body*, Clifford's *Seeing and Thinking*, and many others) of course maintain this position, but it was good to hear a theologian admit it. And how true it is! Look at the "creations," so called, of the poets and artists: what are they but combinations?—startling, pleasing, repulsive, grotesque, as the case may be—look at the idols of the East, or the winged lions and bulls of Assyria, or the sphynxes of Egypt, or the centaurs, satyrs, mermaids of the classics, or the dragons, griffins, etc., what are they but certain jumbings of various parts of creatures already well known? So when the mind tries to conceive of a being of higher order than man, it cannot create an original design. The highest stretch of imagination can only think—for example—of an evil spirit as an ugly man *plus* horns and hoofs and tail—or of a good spirit or angel as a comely man *plus* a pair of swan's wings. Professor Helmholtz (in his lecture on *The Origin of the Planetary System*) fancies that organic life will go on evolving on this earth until, ages hence, the denizens of our globe of the then highest order will pick up the bones or mummies of us poor humans, and examine them with pitiful scorn and think what miserable creatures we must have been. Yet he fails to give us any clear idea of what these future highly-developed beings will be like. Possibly the highest type, after all, is man *plus* wings. Helmholtz, Haeckel, and the rest can show us how man developed from the protozoön; they can infer that this process of evolution will go on *ad infinitum*, or at least until the world cools down; but they cannot describe the outcome. They might state their ratio thus:

As The Protozoön : Man :: Man :

but they can't work out the sum. At all events this will furnish us with a formula whereby to symbolise the creature of the Coming Race; for we may characterise him as M^2/P , taking M for Man and P for Protozoön.

It is clear there is a limit to human understanding, as to most other things. Here is my pipe, for instance; it holds, say, a cubic half-inch of tobacco. By smoking it I make the tobacco pervade the whole room, perhaps a space ten times as large: still there is a limit. But air—the luminiferous ether—is there no limit to it? The infinite eternal energy—no limit to it? Infinite! eternal!—what a thought! Who can comprehend it?

Well, there is a limit to my smoke, sure enough! My pipe is out.

PIPE VI.

I have been reading lately a good deal about insect life, in the writings of Sir John Lubbock, Grant Allen, and others. Among these I was particularly struck with a charming little essay in a book by W. Mattieu Williams (*Science in Short Chapters*) entitled, "Another World Down Here." And what a wonderful world, totally unlike our own, must that be in which these small creatures live and move and have their being! It is surely a world within a world, for their sights and sounds are what we see not and hear not. All these minute creatures can see, hear, feel, taste, smell, as well as we; indeed far better, for they have appliances which we lack. They have "antennæ," "ocelli," or "stemmata," which furnish them with some sixth sense, the nature and properties of which we cannot fully appreciate. And yet there is room—so Mr. Williams argues—for such a supernumerary sense, or even for more than one. We can form some notion of the sphere of use for such sense or senses, though to do so, he says, "we must travel beyond the strict limits of scientific induction and enter the fairy land of scientific imagination." This we may safely do, "provided we . . . keep a true course guided by the compass-needle of demonstrable facts." And his theory is this:

Our various organs of sight, hearing, etc., respond to certain molecular vibrations of matter. "The limits of audible tremors (in the case of man's ears) is three to four thousand per second, but the smallest number of tremors that we can perceive as heat is between three and four millions of millions per second." So that "the world of possible sensations lying between" these extreme

limits "is of enormous width." "In such a world of intermediate activities the insect probably lives."

So what these little creatures perceive by their senses—be they five or more—constitute "another world down here," as Mr. Williams says, a world within our own world. The objects which they see are invisible to the human naked eye, the sounds they hear are inaudible to us, being caused by vibrations too rapid to affect our auditory apparatus. Indeed we cannot estimate how many sounds there may be unheard by us, because they are either too rapid and shrill or too loud and deep; any more than we can reach the limit of minuteness on the one hand or of space on the other. Possibly there may be no limit to the gamut of sound in nature. The finest and highest note which the human ear can detect is said to be the "Chee Chee" of the mosquito; well, very likely that little aphid on my rose-bush is just now hearing a grand orchestra of sounds inaudible to me, but in which the mosquito's hum would form the diapason. I take my cat on my lap some frosty night and rub her fur the wrong way. I can just faintly see the sparks and hear the crackling sounds; but while I am doing so doubtless the fleas, or whatever parasites there may be on the cat's back, are scared at what they conceive to be an awful thunder-storm: while the great reports that terrify and nearly deafen us don't distress the fleas; such sounds are too big to enter their little ears. Who knows but this earth of ours, rolling through space, produces waves of sound in the luminiferous ether which are altogether too immense for our acoustic faculties? And so of all the planets, and suns to boot. If one could only be transported, for instance, to Alcýone, or whatever star is the centre of our system (for I don't see why I should not enter with Mr. Williams, "the fairy-land of scientific imagination") and have ears adapted to hear that immense orchestra! There is no doubt truth as well as poetry in the expression, "The Music of the Spheres."

So sounds that terrify or nearly deafen us are beyond the reach of these ants, fleas, and midges that surround us; the sounds which we must strain our ears to catch are terrible roars or explosions to them; while they are charmed with fairy music that is altogether too fine for our hearing machines. And so again with sight. Look at that little housefly roaming about the room,—aimlessly, one would think. There, he's getting tired; he settles down on the window-sash and scratches and rubs himself all over. One would think he had nothing to do but just to amuse himself—to kill time. But far from killing time, he is killing things that might kill us, big

creatures as we are. Some French savant, I forget his name, has taken the trouble to investigate one of these house-flies under a powerful microscope. He finds that after one of his airy flights the little fellow comes back to his resting-place with the minute hairs of his body covered with still more minute particles of what we call dust; these he sets to work to scrape off, roll up into a little pellet, and swallow. "Dust," I said: but if I could only borrow for a while the four thousand eyes of that fly I should see that pellet of "dust" is in reality a mass of living organisms—bacteria, bacteria, microbes, spores, germs, and what not—all prejudicial to humanity, but forming luscious food for the fly. The fact is, while roaming around the room he was hunting his prey; and enjoying his sport, no doubt, as keenly as any fisherman on the lake or hunter in the woods. If we could only borrow those multitudinous, microscopic eyes, we should see the whole air peopled with hideous monsters. I wish I could be a fly for a little while, and investigate this world within a world. But perhaps it is better not. I remember as a boy how shocked I was on seeing a drop of water magnified and viewing the hideous creatures within it. I could not, for many a day afterwards, drink any water without making a wry face: and perhaps if some power would give me the gift of seeing the air as that little fly, "with his little eye," sees it, I should forswear drawing a breath. But there the little fellow sits on the window-sash, surrounded with more awful and grotesque forms than ever was the good Saint Anthony: but, unlike him, he does not "keep his eyes so sternly fixed on his old Black Book": rather, like St. George, of Cappadocia, he goes forth to slay the dragons.

And not only are the faculties of these insects so acute, but the intelligence of at least some of them is marvellous. Darwin says (*Descent of Man*) that the brain of an ant, which is proportionately larger than that of any other insect, although itself scarcely as large as the quarter of a small pin's head, "is one of the most marvellous atoms of matter in the world, perhaps more so than the brain of a man." According to Lubbock, Huber, etc., bees, wasps, and ants, in their own little world, seem to have arrived at a stage of absolute perfection, not only organically but sociologically. They form commonwealths which apparently fulfil the ideals of all social reformers, from Plato's *Republic* to Bellamy's *Looking Backward*. They seem to have no discontent, no revolutions or riots, no boycotting, no strikes, no "sweated" workers, no wrecked lives, no "submerged tenth," no filthy slums, in their communities. And

yet they have ranks and degrees and divisions of labor : they have rulers, warriors, artisans, nurses, hospitals, crèches, storehouses ; and everything runs smoothly in the "state." The Hebrew proverb says : "Go to the ant, thou sluggard." We might add : "Go to the ant, ye Platos and Bellamys." And certainly ants can talk to one another in their own way. I have often watched them as they waived their antennæ at one another, and I am sure, as Mr. Williams suggests, they were making signals which were perfectly intelligible to themselves. Indeed they must have some method of communication to engage in concerted actions as they constantly do.

And they have even the vices of humanity. They can get very drunk on occasion. Dr. Lawson Tait shocked the teetotallers of England not long since by stating this. He said that bees and wasps would crowd round a partially rotten plum or other fruit where alcoholic fermentation had set in, and struggle for the best place ; and the more "fortunate" in securing a good spot would suck away until they became very tipsy, and then fall on the ground and lie there till they had slept off their debauch. And I have my own suspicions about the ants also ; they, too, like a "drop." I have seen them go for decaying fruit. And then we are told that they have advanced so far in civilisation as to keep "cows," in the persons of the aphides. I have often watched them on the twigs and tendrils of my Virginia creeper, tickling the aphides to make them exude a drop of—milk, shall I say? I believe it is liquor, and that the ant, who may be poetically said to be "quaffing metheglin," is, in "the vulgar tongue," literally "taking a nip" from, not his "cow," but his "tapster." I wish some savant would analyse that "wee drap." I am pretty sure, from some rough and crude tests, that what the ant swallows is not a lacteal but an alcoholic extract. If so, it becomes a question how much the alcohol which bees, wasps, and ants consume has helped to stimulate—or develop—their wonderful brain-power.

After all, it would be a grand thing if one could have the power, for a while, to become, like *Alice in Wonderland*, very little or very big at pleasure : if, for instance, one could transform himself into a midge or fly, and view the worlds invisible to us :—and then, *per contra*, transport oneself to the centre of our stellar system, and view with eyes proportionate the worlds and suns innumerable, and hear them hum as they roll through space. By the way, perhaps Professor Helmholtz's Coming Race may be able to do something like this. Perhaps M^2/p will provide themselves

with adjustable eyes and ears: perhaps they will evolve another lens or two and be able to shove their eyes in and out—like snails—and make them microscopes or telescopes at pleasure. And so with their ears, may be they will be able to make them megacoustic or micracoustic (why should not I coin terms as well as the savants?) at will. And then this sixth sense, which would make us master further mysteries; why should we not evolve that too, in time? Oh, yes, the Coming Race will have antennæ.

And who knows—for we are still in “the fairy-land of scientific imagination”—but that the denizens of some of the other planets, either of our own sun or of some other stars, have already realised Professor Helmholtz’s ideal? The inhabitants of Mars, for instance, have been supposed by some to be signalling to us: perhaps they have been waving their antennæ at us and wondering that we don’t respond.

What a lot there must be in the universe to know, if we could only see everything and hear everything, the infinitely minute as well as the infinitely great! Is there an All-seeing Eye, an All-hearing Ear? Aye, surely. The Maker of the Machine must know every sight, every sound in it. That book of the Christians, whether “inspired” or not, contains many a shrewd saying. “He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? Or He that made the eye, shall He not see?” Aye, exactly. He that designed the whole Machine, shall He not know every detail of it, vast as it is? “Whither shall I go then from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee then from thy presence?”

MISCELLANEOUS.

THE REV. J. M. GOEZE AND LESSING.

The Rev. R. G. Baumann, pastor of the Lutheran churches at Mount Palatine and Peru, Illinois, delivered a lecture on "Johann Melchior Goeze and Lessing" at La Salle recently, which was of more than ordinary interest by reason of the famous literary feud waged by these two champions of Christianity and Liberalism. Lessing having published *The Fragments of Wolfenbüttel*, a manuscript that contained a keen criticism of the Gospels and the Christian dogmas, was fiercely attacked and denounced by Christians, and he selected from among over ninety critics of his the head pastor of Hamburg, Johann Melchior Goeze, as the man against whom to direct his defence. Goeze was the most conspicuous of Lessing's adversaries, and Lessing attacked him in the most formidable manner. There is no room here to expatiate on the subject, nor is there any need of it, for the facts of this famous dispute are sufficiently known; suffice it only to say that in Lessing's time the head pastor of Hamburg, being a well-known man, perhaps the most famous clergyman of Germany and the incumbent of a rich living, enjoyed great advantages over Lessing, the poor *littérateur*, who eked out a meagre sustenance as a librarian. The liberals were scantier in Lessing's days than they are now, and Goeze was sure of finding applause in all religious circles. The tables, however, were quickly turned. Clergymen pose before the public during lifetime, but their fame fades before the light of their successors, while the author's reputation (if his works are going to stay) rather increases after his death. In a similar way the actor gains glory quicker and more easily than the poet, but the poet's fame is eternal while the actor is soon forgotten. At any rate, while Goeze seemed to have the best of it during Lessing's lifetime, the head pastor's renown quickly waned in later generations, and to-day he and his cause have become almost the laughing-stock of the world. The fact is that everybody is familiar with Lessing's side of the controversy, and no one (orthodox Christians not excepted) has read what Goeze had to say. Thus public opinion has become one-sided in favor of Lessing, and it seems a very bold undertaking to take up the doomed cause of the vanquished pietist. Pastor Baumann has dared to do so. He has gone over the documents again and places himself squarely on the side of the defender of Christianity so much ridiculed by liberals and scorned even by dogmatic Christians who are in the habit of emphasising that he was not the proper man to defend the cause of the Church. Pastor Baumann's defence of Goeze's position comes very timely, and although we cannot adopt Goeze's religious conviction, which is satisfied with traditional Christianity, we can neither accept Lessing's views, which are nothing but a bare agnos-

ticism. We find that both sides are justifiable as one-sided standpoints, but the solution of the problem about which they fight is not contained either in Goeze's or in Lessing's propositions.

It is a decided merit of Pastor Baumann's lecture to have called attention to the noble spirit of Goeze's attitude in the controversy, which becomes apparent in a letter written to Lessing, which reads as follows :

"MY DEAR SIR¹ :—Be not vexed if on this occasion I speak a word in another tone than the one which you have forced from me. God knows that I love you heartily. I do not overlook the beautiful talents which God has given you, nor your exquisite learning and comprehension which you have acquired by their right use in several departments of *belles-lettres*. I forgive you from the bottom of my heart that you employ all your strength to degrade me in the eyes of the Church, of the learned world, and of my own congregation, as an unscientific and stupid fool, and *that* I should be if seven like me could not hold their own against the seventh part of your *Fragments*. But this very love, this regard, urges me to take, in a quiet hour, the following thoughts into consideration : you declare, and my whole heart quakes at the declaration, that for the sake of having published the *Fragments* and what you have done in connexion with them, you would not fear in your hour of death. For the sake of God, consider what you have written. Consider the responsibility which you owe on Judgment Day to the Lord, whose honor you have criminally attacked and blasphemed through the *Fragments*, whose word you have rated much lower than miserable human writings. Bear in mind that on that day not one but hundreds will rise against you and say, 'O Lord! we have heard 'that your disciples, upon whom we looked as tools of the Holy Spirit, were 'frauds, that they had stolen a dead body, that they were rascals. Thus we could 'not help regarding thy resurrection as anything else than a mischievous fable 'through which the world was duped. We began to be ashamed of it and mock at 'it. We offended others and made them like us, and the writings of these men, as 'well as the holy religion taught by them, became ridiculous and absurd.'

"Well, my dear sir, are you indeed certain that this scene will not happen, and that, should it happen, your similes and witty suggestions will be sufficient to justify your demeanor?"

These lines, written after an acrimonious controversy, in which Lessing had shown no compassion for his adversary, exhibit a noble spirit, and we cannot help thinking that Lessing, after the receipt of this letter, regretted much what he had said. But the main thing in question is not the character of the combatants, but the cause for which they fought, and we find that the one, Goeze, believed in the absolute reliability of a tradition as genuine and indubitable truth, while the other one, Lessing, regarded the attainment of truth as impossible. Lessing said :

"If God in his right hand held all the truth, and in his left hand solely every living aspiration after the truth, yet with the condition of eternal error, and if he gave me the choice I would with humility choose the left hand and say : 'Father, give me this ; the pure truth after all is for Thee alone.'"

Lessing apparently overestimates the aspiration for truth, and undervalues the possession of truth. It is true that truth, if uttered from insincere motives, ceases to be truth. It acquires an admixture of most venomous falsity. But for that reason error, if held with the conviction of being truth, remains a dangerous condition, and will exercise an injurious influence, be the man who is blinded by such

¹Literally, My Dear Mr. Counsellor, or *Hofrath*, which was Lessing's official title, given him by the Duke of Brunswick.

illusions ever so sincere and faithful. We may excuse the man who errs, we may think better of him who in honesty and with modesty defends an untruth than of his antagonist who stands up for the truth in haughtiness and for the sake of his own interests. Supposing mankind were really condemned to search for the truth without ever finding it, would not life be like the cruel fate of Tantalus? Our hunger for truth would be a punishment rather than a blessing, and science, instead of being the bread of life, would be a stone.

We cannot say that Goeze's position is right; we are not satisfied with the traditional belief of any one of the churches, and find in none of the Christian sects the realisation of the ideal religion. There is a need of reform and criticism in the indispensable means of discovering the sore spots which must be cured. But when we concede that we are not in possession of pure truth, we need not despair of truth itself. We are at least in a partial possession of truth; for truth reveals itself in degrees, and we can progress from an incomplete to more and ever more complete comprehension of truth. Truth is not a thing, not an object which we either have in its entirety or have not at all; truth is a matter of spiritual growth; it develops, and the development of truth on earth is nothing else than the progress of the human race.

Lessing's position is not only untenable, but also dreary and disconsolate, and it seems that Lessing assumed his attitude for the same reason that our modern agnostics adopt agnosticism, viz., for mere spite of gnosticism. The self-complacency of the gnostics provokes the antagonism of unbelievers, and they attack the principle of the gnosis itself, without noticing their own inconsistency. If agnosticism is right, science has lost all authority; and all opinions, whether scientific or superstitious, come down to the same level. Lessing perceived that his adversaries, who claimed to be in possession of truth, were wrong, but he himself had not as yet discovered a way out of it. In fact, he preferred the traditional dogmatism to the shallow liberalism of his time. He wrote to his brother during February of 1774:

"What is our new fangled theology but dung-suds as compared with impure water? With our old-fashioned orthodoxy we were pretty nearly through. A division had been made between its doctrines and philosophy, and each one proceeded on its own way without hindering the other. But what do they do now? They tear down this division, and under the pretext of changing us into rational Christians they make of us irrational philosophers. Do not please consider so much that which our new theologians reject as that which they propose in its place. We are pretty well agreed that our old religious system is wrong, but I would not grant you that it is a botch of bunglers and half-philosophers. I know of nothing in the world on which human acumen has shown itself and practised itself more than here. A botch of bunglers and half-philosophers is the religious system by which they now try to replace the old one, and they arrogate to themselves much more influence upon reason and philosophy than was done formerly. In the face of these facts you are dissatisfied with me that I defend the old one."

This attitude seems to suggest that the proper way of attaining to the truth is investigation, and that we should proceed in a conservative spirit, to keep the good we had and not to discard everything if we discover a flaw somewhere. There is no need of casting out the child together with the bath because the water has become dirty. The eagerness of the combat alone can have led Lessing to adopt the doctrine now so prevalent all over the world, that the search for truth is based on a vain hope, and this notion must have proved very oppressive to him.

One of his friends, Jacobi, visited Lessing in Wolfenbüttel in 1780 and ex-

pressed in a letter to Elise Reimarus, of May 15, 1781, written soon after Lessing's death, his opinion concerning his state of mind as follows :

"I should like to know how much secret grief may have contributed to his [Lessing's] death. A profound melancholy lay upon him, and I shall never forget that morning which on my return I passed in his company. He gave me some remote hints that his late wife had blamed him on her death-bed for having infected her with his sorry view. That was frightful and forbade him to think of marriage, children, and love."

The object of the Religion of Science is to lead us out of the narrowness of the old views represented by Goeze into a broader, a truer, a scientifically more correct, and a nobler religious conception without committing us to Lessing's desolate position of a disbelief in the attainableness of truth. The hope of future progress does not lie in blind faith, nor in infidelity, but in exact and bold inquiry; and there is comfort neither in a submission to unbelievable dogmas nor in the acceptance of agnosticism, but in the final discovery of truth. The fact that every new discovery leads to new problems, thus exhibiting the inexhaustibleness of the universe, does not prove that there is no truth; nor is it a system of the worthlessness of partial glimpses of the truth. We had new glimpses of truth which show us the old truths in a new light. Shall we therefore despair and say there is no truth at all?

It is the aim of *The Open Court* to stimulate research and to point out that the methods of science are also applicable to the problems of religion. Religion is not a domain that is exempt, and the light that science throws on it will only preserve the old ideals and render them in their purified forms more useful and practicable.

P. C.

DETERMINISM AND MONISM *versus* MORALITY.

To the Editor of The Open Court :

The following brief notes refer to an article written by Dr. Carus in the May number of this magazine, in which he answers some of the present writer's criticisms of the ethical views advocated by *The Open Court* and *The Monist*. It were fruitless to re-state the arguments advanced; and, as I do not believe that Dr. Carus has answered them in a satisfactory manner, I see no necessity for explaining or strengthening them. There are, however, some points in his reply that are of special interest, and to which I would call particular attention.

Dr. Carus properly says that the whole matter turns on the freewill problem, and he presents and elaborates a definition of freedom that, according to him, reconciles morality and determinism. To dispute about words is, indeed, a most fruitless task; and I shall, therefore, overlook his definition as such, and consider simply the *facts* implied.

Dr. Carus's conception of a free agent is identical with Spinoza's and is to the effect that a thing (whether sentient or not) is free when it acts according to its own nature, and not constrained by another thing, that is, by a cause outside of itself. Free actions he describes as "primary movements" having "their ground in a quality of the moving thing"; while actions that are not free are "secondary movements," due to push or pull, which is an *external* influence."¹

Is it necessary for me to repeat that this mode of reasoning is founded on the anti-monistic illusion that effects are due to their *immediate* causes only; that there are separate and independent things in nature, and that everything is an aggregate

¹ Italics mine.

of properties existing and acting by themselves? In a universe in which every phenomenon is but a phase of one eternal energy, in which every body is but a part of an infinite whole, what is meant by *internal* and *external*, by the properties of an object independent of the properties and actions of other objects? Furthermore, every action being a reaction, what matters it whether John acts constrained by the immediate action of a whip or by the "push or pull" to which the molecules of his brain were submitted when they formed part of the gaseous nebula from which our solar system originated? The question is simply one of time: in one case energy transforms itself rapidly, and, so to speak, before our eyes; in the other case the transformation is gradual and the intermediate steps many in number and complex in nature; but the final action is as much constrained in one case as in the other. It seems evident that all distinction in this respect is anti-monistic and may be traced to what, in my essay, I have called the second source of error.

Dr. Carus makes a nice distinction between necessity, in the sense of inevitableness, and necessity, in the sense of compulsion; and he says that an object is compelled when it is acted upon "by some external power." In this, it will be well to notice, he differs from Spinoza, who, if I remember well, identifies necessity with compulsion. An illustration will show whether the distinction is admissible. Suppose that John and Peter are walking down a hill, and that suddenly a boulder rolls down and strikes John in the back, forcing him to run down the hill. This is a case of compulsion. Suppose, also, that Peter, in seeing his friend forced down the hill by the blow, runs to his assistance. This Dr. Carus would call a free action, it being necessary simply in the sense that, given Peter's character, he could not act otherwise under the circumstances. Now I should like to ask if Peter was not as much struck by the *sight* of his friend's condition as the latter was by the stone; and if it is logical to say that one man was "compelled" because he came in contact with a massive body that affected him *molarly*; while the other man was not compelled, because, although he received a shock that was transmitted to his brain and therefrom propagated, yet was not at first affected molarly, but *molecularly*? The explanation may seem somewhat ridiculous; but, in strict logic, that is what Dr. Carus's distinction amounts to. For him, freedom exists where the determinat causes are invisible; compulsion, where they are visible. I must again refer the reader to my "second source of error."

He also identifies morality with the pursuit and love of truth. But this is certainly a very elastic doctrine; for trueness may be predicated of bad actions as well as of good actions. I confess that, although truthfulness may be a good quality, I do not conceive how truth in general can be made the foundation of ethics.

There is another view taken by Dr. Carus, which, I should submit, is one more illustration of metaphysical survival. He speaks of ideas and convictions as very powerful factors in human actions. Expressions like these are often used, and I should raise no objection to them were it not that Dr. Carus takes them in a literal sense, whereas, according to the materialistic principles of monism, such expressions are only metaphorical.¹ An idea, as such, is not the cause of anything; it appears in consciousness as the effect of a neural state; this neural state (which, theoretically at least, *could* be expressed in foot-pounds) gives rise to another neural state, to which corresponds another idea, etc. etc. But an idea is not, as Dr. Carus seems to imply, a metaphysical entity capable of determining or dictating

¹Since Dr. Carus seems to have a pronounced abhorrence of the term *materialism*, I must say that here the term is employed to denote all systems holding that mind is inseparable from matter, or that matter possesses mentality.

human actions. A human action is an organic change, whether molar or molecular, and such change can be due only to the immediately preceding *physical* condition of the organism. These considerations I submit, be it understood, *from the monistic point of view*, my contention being merely for *consistency*.

Finally, Dr. Carus charges me with forgetting "that sentiments are very important factors in the make-up of man's soul;" and this he does immediately after quoting a passage in which I emphatically insist on the controlling influence of feeling, and on the fact that the power of feelings is so strong that they often prompt us to act in opposition to our correct judgments. But his contention seems to be that, because the influence of feeling is so strong, it should not be opposed. I agree with Dr. Carus in that a strongly organised feeling should not be *violently* opposed: the nervous woman will be more injured than benefited if we try to change her feelings by frightening her. But this is not the point at issue. The question is whether her feelings are defensible on rational grounds, and, above all *whether we can consistently maintain that her way of acting is to be taken as a universal guide.*

ANTONIO LLANO.

EDITORIAL REPLY.

Being the editor of this magazine, I treat my contributors as guests and am therefore anxious to let my critics have the last word in controversies. Accordingly I should have published Mr. Llano's rejoinder without any editorial comment, had he not challenged me to answer a question, which, if avoided, might give the impression of involving an unsurmountable difficulty. It is a question which is fully answered in my reply published in the May number of *The Open Court*. That Mr. Llano proposes the question, proves that he has not appreciated my definition of freedom (which in his opinion is a mere verbal quibble) and he can therefore not be expected to see the point why morality is not a mere illusion but an all-important feature in man's make-up.

If John, struck by a boulder, rolls down hill, he is not active but passive. He does not act, but is acted upon. His fall is not a deed that evinces a quality of John's character. But Peter, when following John for the sake of assisting him, is active, not passive.

It is true that Peter is acted upon by the idea of his companion's misfortune; and the idea originates in him by a sense-impression which in its physiological aspect is as much an impact as is the push of a rolling boulder. But here is the difference: The sense-impression gives rise to an idea, and the idea results in an action which characterises Peter's nature, his mental make-up, his very soul. The chain of causation is, in John's case, in all its causative factors purely mechanical, while, in Peter's case, it passes through the sphere of his mental and emotional life so as to make the reaction that ensues characteristic of the peculiarities of his soul. John's fall characterises a quality of John's body; it proves that John's body is as much possessed of gravity and subject to the laws of mechanics as any other mass of atoms. It is a purely mechanical result of the boulder's impact upon John's body. Peter's reaction upon a sense-impact characterises the mental and moral nature of Peter. His hastening down hill is an uninterrupted chain of mechanical motions beginning with the molecular motions which are the physiological side of his thoughts that prompt his muscles to action. But in addition to the mechanical aspect of the event, we have the psychical aspect. Peter's motions are not mere movements, they are a deed.

Man does not consist of matter alone, but also of sentiments and thoughts; and sentiments and thoughts, are as real as concrete objects and mechanical pressures. Mr. Llano's faithfulness to "the materialistic principles of monism" (as he calls it) leads him to disregard the import of the psychical facts of existence.

Among the molecular motions of Peter's brain, there is one which in its peculiar form is the physiological aspect of an idea of peculiar significance; this idea rouses other ideas of a sympathetic significance, embodied in brain-structures of an analogous form; and the nature of these ideas determines the character of Peter, as it finds expression in deeds, which, if done without compulsion, are rightly called his own deeds.

Whether a man be moral or not depends upon the significance of his motive ideas.

Ethics is the science that investigates the nature of motive ideas and searches for a norm or standard by which their commendability may be judged.

I refrain from further comments, because, aside from answering a direct question, there is no need of my repeating old arguments. Mr. Llano, too, feels as though he in his turn ought to repeat his arguments. And naturally so, because I have failed to convince him that he is one-sided, and he has failed to convince me that I am inconsistent when I take ideas as something more than morally indifferent molecular brain-motions.

Thus, so far as we two are concerned, we have wasted our powder in vain. But the case is different with our readers; and this is the main advantage of controversies. Our readers can go over the whole field again and reconsider the arguments offered on both sides; they may be benefited by the ventilation of these questions.

I conclude with the prayer that our readers may choose the truth on whatever side the truth may be. For controversies are not waged that one or the other may enjoy the satisfaction of a victory or that two wranglers may show their skill, but simply and solely that the truth may come out.

P. C.

THE JEYPORE PORTFOLIO OF ARCHITECTURAL DETAILS.

His Highness, the Maharaja Sawai Madhu Singh of Jeypore, has published in six portfolios, containing almost four hundred plates, illustrations of the carvings found in the ancient buildings of his State. Col. S. S. Jacobs, engineer of the Jeypore State, undertook the work first at his own expense, but as the collection increased the expenditure became greater than his means allowed and he was only enabled to continue his labors by the liberality of His Highness, the Maharaja, and, considering the transiency of all things, and especially of those finer ornaments of Indian architecture, the publication of these ancient forms is practically an act of rescuing them from perdition. To some extent photography has done much to make us acquainted with the general character and grandeur of India's ancient architecture, and Ferguson, in his *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, has given us a systematic account of it. Here, however, we find representations of the fine detail work whose wealth of form is almost more wonderful than the imposing magnificence of the structures themselves; and these designs could be introduced into modern architecture to-day, and would thus revive among Western people the spirit of ancient Indian art.

In the Preface to the work, Col. Jacobs states "few men in India have the time or opportunity to make for themselves a collection of architectural studies. Nor is it likely that the opportunity will again occur of erecting any buildings so

grand as those we see around us ; noble specimens, it is true, but designed to meet the requirements of an age that is past. Still there is no reason why the details which everywhere meet the eye, so full of vigor, so graceful and true in outline, and so rich in design should not be made use of in modern buildings."

No cost has been spared to make the plates themselves worthy of the subjects which they represent. They are of large size and are drawn with the greatest skill, which does credit to the Jeypore School of Art, to its Principal the late Surgeon-Major F. W. A. de Fabeck, to Lala Ram Bakhsh, head draftsman and drawing teacher of the Art School, to Mr. A. Cousens of the Archæological Department of Western India, and all the others who assisted in completing the work. It will contribute much to strengthen the respect which every educated man cherishes for India ; and the great pecuniary sacrifice with which these portfolios have been brought out is a good evidence of the ideal spirit that is still found in India to-day.

The six volumes that have so far appeared have been given free of charge, as a present from the Maharaja, to various schools, institutes, or individuals interested in work of this kind, on the sole condition that they would pay the express charges from India. The edition is limited and therefore the copies are rare.

We need not say that the possession of a work of this kind would be of great value in every school of art and every technological institute. Every architect or wood-carver would be glad to profit by a study of these delicate designs.

We herewith publicly tender the Maharaja our sincerest thanks for the beautiful present he has made to The Open Court Publishing Company.

NARCISSUS.¹

Narcissus, poor deluded boy, thy fate
 Has brought to many a lip a smile
 And word of cold contempt ;
 But few who scornfully thy tale relate,
 If tried as he they now revile,
 Would be themselves exempt.

Thou didst the love of rustic maidens scorn
 The while the tenuous bow was strung
 And timid stag pursued.
 And tho' poor Echo strove from earliest morn,
 And tho' thy latest words were sung,
 Alas ! she was not wooed.

And thou hadst never loved on earth, I ween,
 Hadst chased away the trembling deer
 And sought thy rustic play,
 Hadst thou thine own fair image never seen
 In forest lakelet burnished, clear,
 On Fate's appointed day.

Thou wast consumed by love of self, 'tis said.
 What folly not to know thy face
 Reflected true to life !

¹ Narcissus, a Greek youth who refused the love of Echo and the other nymphs, fell in love with his own face, reflected in a forest pool. He pined away and died of unrequited love, and his beautiful body was changed into the Narcissus flower.

Yet many a man, to earth's ambition wed,
Has staked his all in life's short race
On prize less worthy strife.

The miser grim who hoards his counted gold
All heedless of a world of woe
That mutely asks for aid,
Narcissus-like, in each coin doth behold
His own reflexion. Does he know
What fate for him is laid ?

That boy, enamored of his own fair form,
But sacrificed it to itself,
While he, in years more wise,
And moulded by life's sunshine and its storm,
Resigns his soul for greedy pelf
And o'er his treasure dies.

And he who lends his brain to perfect wrong,
Though for another be it wrought
Or at ambition's call,
Will find, reflected in the world, ere long
The image of his bosom's thought ;
And though he conquer all,

His soul grows stultified by deeds unjust,
And, lost each impulse, lofty, true,
His better self descends,
Till, all consumed by selfish lust,
He gloats o'er the appalling view,
And in confusion ends.

And he who strives the world to lift and save
By deeds of sweet self-sacrifice
And noble Christian love,
Will find, e'en though he seek an early grave,
His image, pure as morning skies,
Reflected there above.

Aye, truly what we are is what we find
Reflected in each phase of life,
And what we love we are.
Yea, though the glare of sin would mortals blind,
Would fill the soul with damning strife
And all its beauty mar,

The sparks of life divine within us burn
With constant, though oft clouded ray ;
And from our griefs and woes,
That fain would bury hope in Death's last urn,
See, bursting from the mortal clay,
A flower of beauty grows.

EMILY S. HUTCHINGS.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

The Philosophy of Plotinos. (Philadelphia: Dunlap Printing Co., 1306 Filbert Street). This pamphlet is very unassuming in its appearance. No price is stated, and it is doubtful whether it is obtainable in the book market. The author seems to be MR. KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE, of Philadelphia, 1203 North Forty-first Street, and the pamphlet belongs to that class of books which the reviewer is apt to lay aside without further notice. By glancing over its contents, however, we find that it is a very concise and scholarly statement of the doctrines of Plotinos in connexion with the preceding Greek philosophy. The author is apparently an admirer of Neo-Platonism, and that is the main criticism we have to make of the book. He says on page 21; "As Neo-Platonism is the last phase of Greek philosophy, we may look upon his (that is, Plotinos's) system as that which represents the philosophy of Greece in its noblest and most perfect proportions." Plotinos really represents Platonism run to seed. The height of Greek philosophy is, according to the orthodox conception, the period of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, which degenerated under the influence of mystic tendencies into the orientalised Platonism of Ammonius Sakkas, Porphyry, Philo and others. Philo happened to be the Jewish interpreter of Platonism, and was as such best known to the early Christians. Thus Philo became the channel through whom Platonic ideas, among which the conception of the Logos was the most important one, were instilled into Christianity. Plotinos was not a Christian, but represented a reaction against the Philonic conception of Platonism, and was in his day, in spite of the great similarities that obtain between his system and the doctrines of Christianity, a representative author of the noblest pagan thought. The Christian authors, among them Augustine, are greatly indebted to Plotinos for suggestions and philosophical ideas.

From the Upanishads. By CHARLES JOHNSTON. The author has just published a dainty booklet *From the Upanishads* which comes from the press of Thomas B. Mosher, of Portland, Maine. It contains the three most famous Upanishads: (1) "In the House of Death" (*Cathaa Upanishad*); (2) "A Vedic Master" (*Prashme Upanishad*); (3) "That Thou Art" (*Chhandogya Upanishad No. 6*). As Mr. Johnston is possessed of literary taste, we have no doubt that these three Upanishads will be very welcome, as being more readable than the heavy translations in the *Sacred Books of the East*.

Ferdinand Lassalle and Helene von Dönniges. A Modern Tragedy. By ELIZABETH E. EVANS. (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.) Ferdinand Lassalle, one of the most prominent leaders of the social democratic party of Germany, ended his life in a duel which originated in his relations to Helene von Dönniges, and Mrs. Evans has devoted the present booklet to an exposition of this tragedy, so important in the evolution of the labor movement in Germany. Lassalle, born in 1825 of Jewish parents, was very ambitious, and perhaps at the same time careless in his relations to the fair sex. Helene von Dönniges (a bright girl who at one time was greatly influenced by the desire of emancipation from the traditional bonds of society), was very sympathetic to him in character, and it seems natural that when they met they should feel strongly attracted to one another. The details of the tragedy need not be enumerated now. It proved fatal to Lassalle, who, although he was a very good shot, was killed by his adversary, Herr von Racowitza, to the great regret of the social democrats of Germany, who lost in him a leader who has not been replaced since.

Mr. C. LEVIAS has recently published *A Grammar of the Aramaic Idiom Contained in the Babylonian Talmud* (Cincinnati, The Block Publishing Co., 1896). The literature on the grammar of the idiom of the Babylonian Talmud, which is written partly in Hebrew and partly in Aramaic, is very scanty, and the author of this little treatise has sought to supply some of its defects. The long and eventful history of the Aramaic language, one dialect of which was spoken by Christ, and which was still a living language in the tenth century, is very interesting. Mr. Levias's booklet, however, is designed, not for the general reader, but for the specialist.

Mr. Charles Johnston has translated the *Atmabodha* by Shankara from the Sanskrit into English, and published it in attractive form. Copies are obtainable from the author, 144 Madison Avenue, New York. Mr. Johnston has translated the term *Atmabodha* by "awakening to the self," which, although not literal, may be quite appropriate. It treats the old Delphic problem of the *γνώθι σεαυτόν*, or self-cognition, answering the question as to the nature of self in the spirit of the philosophy of the Upanishads, which hypostatizes the self as an independent being separate from the body and the senses as well as from the mind and the soul. This self is supposed to be the Lord of all the faculties of man and is nothing but a metaphysical dream, which, although distinguished from the soul and all the functions of the psychic life, is identified with consciousness and ultimately declared to be the Brahm, or the eternal deity that is omnipresent in the whole world. The *Atmabodha* is a very brief essay, or rather a string of aphorisms, and contains beautiful gems of thought side by side with purely metaphysical assumptions. We grant however, that an interpretation is possible that would conciliate Shankara, the representative thinker of Brahmanism, with Buddha who denied the existence of a self as an independent entity in man.

The whole philosophy of Shankara, the Hindu sage, may be summed up in the following verses of Mr. Johnston's translation :

"Through the power of varying disguises, race, name, and rank are accredited to the Self, as difference of taste and color to water."

"Through unwisdom, the doings of its disguise, emotion, are referred to the Self; as the motion of the waves to the moon reflected in water."

"Desire and longing, pleasure and pain, move in the soul when it is manifested; but in dreamlessness there is none of them, when the soul sinks to rest: therefore they are of the soul, not of the Self."

"The causal disguise comes into being through the beginningless, ineffable error of separateness. Let him apprehend the Self as other than these three disguises."

"By union with these veils and vestures, the pure Self appears to share their nature; as a crystal seems blue beside a vesture of blue."

"Let him diligently discern the pure inner Self from the veils that cling to it; as rice from chaff and straw by winnowing."

"Distinct from the body, powers, emotion, soul, which are of the world, let him find the Self, who, king-like, beholds all the doings of these."

"Without quality or action, everlasting, without doubt or stain, changeless formless, ever free, am I, the spotless Self."

"Putting away all disguises, according to the saying: 'It is not this! It is not this!' let him see the oneness of the personal self in life and the Supreme Self, according to the mighty precept."

The *Viveka Chintamani* is a periodical edited by C. V. Swaminathaiyer, in the vernacular of the language spoken at Madras. It is devoted to the diffusion of knowledge among the native inhabitants of India, and it publishes articles and books of Western civilisation for the enlightenment of the Hindus. While the standard of the publication is kept at a high level, it is nevertheless popular enough to be of practical use to the average educated native, and it is naturally recommended by a great number of prominent men, both English and native. It is a matter of course that an institution like this has a hard road to travel; for any publication which is not for amusement, but endeavors to diffuse knowledge, is not liable to pay its way. It ought to be supported somehow for the same reason that our universities are. Who would try to run a university on a paying basis? We need not add that this kind of work belongs to the class of missionary work. It is not the missionary work of any of the sects, but it is missionary work of an unsectarian, or rather supersectarian kind. It is the propagation of the scientific spirit of the age, which, if it spreads among the Hindus will prove to be the lever by which the national life can be raised to a higher plane.

President William F. Warren delivered an impressive oration in Tremont Temple, Boston, on convocation day, on one of the Buddhist ordination questions, "Art thou a human being?" It is well known that before being admitted to the Buddhist order an aspirant must take the ten vows, such as not to destroy life, not to take anything not given, to be chaste, not to speak falsely, not to drink intoxicating liquors, etc. At the same time they answer questions, one of which is, "Art thou a human being?" the meaning of which is commonly explained by the story that once a naga or a serpent had become a monk and assumed his serpent-form at certain times. It is on this question that President Warren delivered a splendid discourse, impressing his audience with the dignity of manhood. At the conclusion of his speech he reminded his auditors of Terrence's slave, who was greeted with applause when he said on the stage: "I am a man." "But," adds President Warren, "no man can be completely human until the human is complete. The slave and his wild applauders might better have paused, and, with the great Christian poet of our day, exclaimed: "Man is not man as yet."

The Liberal Congress of Religion will hold its annual meeting on the Exposition grounds in Nashville, October 19th to 24th. The program will consist of two sessions a day, one in the forenoon and one in the evening, with informal query meetings in the afternoon. The whole will close with popular meetings to be held on Sunday the 24th in the city. There will be sessions devoted to the discussion of the Bible in the Light of Modern Thought, comparative religion, the sociological problems and duties which now confront the churches, the Parliament of Religions, its work in the past and its influence on the future, the influence of religion on morals, etc., etc. Special rates will be arranged for on railroads and at hotels. The prospect of a grand success is well assured and the only thing still missing is money, for there are great expenses connected with the preliminary preparations. Any one who is desirous of helping the cause of the Liberal Congress is invited to join and send his annual assessment fee of \$5.00, or life membership of \$25.00. Special subscriptions of larger sums are respectfully solicited and will be gratefully received by the General Secretary, Dr. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, 3939 Langley Avenue, Chicago, Ill.

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THE RELIGION OF ISLAM.¹

BY PÈRE HYACINTHE LOYSON.

A VERY LARGE NUMBER of Frenchmen—perhaps I should say the majority of Frenchmen—have more or less completely broken with the Christian faith. Nevertheless, the bulk of them have not yet parted with the prejudices and antipathies which were its mediæval accompaniments. These prejudices and antipathies are quite unamenable to reason, on the contrary they dominate it when they do not absolutely hinder its action. They are bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh by a force of atavism, and, if I may be permitted the metaphor, they oscillate fatally in the electric piles of the most liberal brains.

During all the Middle Ages, and even since, Mohammed has been regarded as the Anti-Christ, or at least as his precursor. The empire of the Caliphs, and later the Ottoman empire, were always in the eyes of our theologians the empire of Anti-Christ, the social incarnation of the power of evil, and the kingdom of Satan on earth. "Repent," said the disciples of Saint Francis of Assisi who were massacred in the thirteenth century in Morocco, to the inhabitants of that country, "repent or ye will be cast into hell, as was Mohammed your false prophet before you." And to-day even, a goodly number of Catholic and Protestant missionaries do not speak or at least do not think differently.

In one of the most enlightened and freest countries of Europe, a writer of some note published in 1829 two large volumes to prove "that Mohammed was the little horn of the ram that figures in the eighth chapter of Daniel, and that the Pope was the big horn."²

¹ From *Christianisme et Islamisme*. (Paris: E. Dentu.) Translated, with the author's permission, by T. J. McCormack.

² *Mohammedanism Unveiled*. By Charles Foster.

From this premise the English author deduced a complete philosophy of history, according to which the corruption of Christianity was due in the East to Mohammed and in the West to the Pope.

Nor is the case different with the Mussulmans as regards us. It is true, they revere Jesus as much as the Christians detest Mohammed, but they regard us as unfaithful disciples, and, to speak plainly, as idolators. "They are infidels who say 'Verily God is 'the Messiah, the Son of Mary,' for the Messiah himself hath 'said: 'O children of Israel, worship God my Lord and your 'Lord.' Verily to him who associates other gods with God, God 'hath forbidden paradise and his resort will be the fire. The un-'just will have none to help them.'" (Koran, V., 76.)

And Mohammed also preached a holy war in behalf of God, not only against idolators, but also against "those among the men having the Scriptures who do not profess the religion of the truth" (Koran, IX., 29), that is to say against the Jews and the Christians. "God sent from heaven iron. In iron is great violence, but also much advantage for man. He has given it to you "that he may know who among you is willing to help him and his "apostle with sincerity. Verily God is strong and mighty." (Koran, LVII., 25.)

Oceans of blood flowed from these utterances. The crusades of the Christians were the answer to the holy wars of the Mussulmans, and it would be a dangerous error to believe that the spirit which engendered them is yet extinct.

I maintain, nevertheless, that if we closely examine these two hostile religions—that of Mohammed and that of Jesus—we shall find no valid grounds for their antagonism. We shall discover, in fact, a marked family resemblance between them which almost justifies us in regarding them as sister faiths.

I shall now establish my contention by successively considering the origin, character, and fruits of Islamism.

* * *

What was the origin of Islam? Without doubt it was the personal creation of Mohammed. Mohammed was an extremely original and very powerful genius, and from his brain and heart issued the religion which his adversaries have often designated by his name—Mohammedanism. But, be a man ever so great, he is yet the expression of his country, the creation of his epoch, and it is in no sense a disparagement of the prophet of Arabia of the seventh century if we apply to him this law of universal history. The applica-

tion is the more in place, too, from the fact that his work, and to his great glory be it said, was not a revolution, but an evolution.

Arabia had long been stirred by the need of a religious transformation, which the best of its representatives conceived as a return to the past. Among the gross superstitions of an idolatrous creed bordering almost on fetishism, it had yet preserved something of that faith in a single God by which its ancestry could be traced to its great progenitor, Abraham. Not the desert is monotheistic, but the posterity of Abraham. The influence of the Jews and the Christians, more faithful disciples of the patriarch, had penetrated deeper and deeper into the peninsula, and was accelerating there this silent, mysterious movement which only needed for its start an inspired mouthpiece. At the period in which Mohammed appeared, the sectaries of the ancient monotheism were known by the name of Hanifs. M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire has recounted their history in his excellent work on Mohammed and the Koran. They were not numerous, but they were the élite of the thoughtful minds of Arabia, and the attention of their compatriots, respectful even when hostile, was inevitably drawn to them. From their ranks came forth the touching figure of Zaid, son of Amr, whom the world has justly styled the John the Baptist of Islamism.

Zaid was in the habit of visiting the sanctuary which it is said Abraham himself had built, and which to-day annually attracts hosts of pilgrims from all parts of the world. With his back resting against the Caaba, he reproaches the Arabs for the idolatry with which they had sullied the sanctuary, and then cries out, "O Allah! if I but knew what form of worship was most pleasing to thee, I should adopt it. But I know it not."

A shining example this, bequeathed by a barbarian to us civilised men! How many are there among us in France and in Europe who can no longer enter their temples because they know there are idols in them! For all idols are not made of wood, stone, or metal, and the worst of all are those which clothe the forms of mind. May all such persons escape the fatal mesh of blasphemy, or what is perhaps more sinful still, and certainly more disastrous, the fate of indifference! May they, too, lean with sorrowful and tender reverence against the walls of the edifice which sheltered their childhood, and in their hard bereavement of the church of the present, invoke, like Zaid, that of the future!

Pressed by Omar to pray for the soul of Zaid after his death¹

¹The Mussulmans like ourselves rightly pray for the dead.

Mohammed replied: "I shall pray for him, but in the day of the resurrection, Zaid will form by himself a church entire."

The voice which did not reply to Zaid was heard by Mohammed. It was heard during his retirement at Mt. Hira near Mecca, after long prayers and long austerities which in these burning wastes are so conducive to ecstasy. He had fallen asleep and during his slumber he saw and heard for the first time the angel Gabriel. "Dreams," he has said himself, "are the revelations of the prophet." On waking he felt, and it is he who still speaks, as if a book had been written upon his heart.

Frightened, and believing himself possessed of evil spirits, he confided his adventure to the woman whom alone he loved in her life-time, and who was at once mother and wife to him, although fifteen years his senior. Her name was Khadija, and the Mussulmans have named her "the great."¹ In a sense Islamism was the creation of her soul. She was the first to assure the prophet, as well as to believe in his word. She believed in it before the prophet did himself and her act is the most beautiful apology that could be found of this man, whom she knew better than any one both in his faults and excellences. "God is my support," she said to him; "He will not suffer *thee* to be a seer in whom none will have confidence, not thee to be possessed of the Djins. Thou always speakest the truth. Thou art never wanting in thy word. Our kinsmen know this as well as I. He who holds the life of Khadija between his hands is my witness that thou shalt be the prophet of this nation. Assure thyself and banish trouble from thy mind."

But Khadija had not yet wholly banished disquietude from her own mind. She in her turn sought counsel, to reassure herself against her own doubts. For faith begins with doubt, deep, genuine adamantine faith which is not merely a habit of childhood but a personal conviction. She addresses herself to her cousin Varaka, a venerable old man and a convert to Christianity. Zaid has been compared to John the Baptist; Varaka reminds us of Peter. "If what thou hast told me be true," answered Varaka, "thy husband has been visited by the great law which descended of yore upon Moses. He will be the prophet of his people. Announce it to him and let him be pacified."

Several days after, the old man met the husband of Kadija near the Caaba. He addressed to him affectionate and consoling

¹ Khadija-ul-Kiupra. Mohammed himself ranked Khadija among the four perfect women. The three others were the Virgin Mary, the converted woman of Pharaoh who persecuted the Israelites, and Fatima the only daughter of Mohammed and the wife of Ali.

words and kissed him upon the forehead. It was the kiss of ancient oriental Christianity still a stranger to the subtleties and superstitions of Byzantium, which recognised in growing Islam its legitimate son, or, if you please, its younger brother.

“They will treat you as an impostor,” cried Varaka, “they will persecute you, they will hunt you, violently oppose you. O, that I might live until that hour to assist you in your struggle!”

Twenty years after, in 630, the persecuted man reentered the Holy City as conqueror. The sword had been justified by the sword; the apostle had become soldier. Mounted upon his camel he solemnly made the rounds of the sanctuary of the God of Abraham and of Ishmael, which had become the temple of all the idols of the desert tribes. There were three hundred and sixty of them crowning the eaves of the great edifice. Before each of them the prophet raised his curved staff pronouncing the words: “The Truth has come. Whoso belies it shall disappear.” And the overthrown idol was dashed into fragments at his feet.

To find anything as beautiful in religious history we have to go back to the legislator of Israel and of the human race. Moses descends from the tempestuous tops of Mt. Sinai bringing to his people the decalogue written primarily for them but destined to be the law of all upright hearts and the code of all civilised peoples. What are those sounds that rise to his ears? They are the chants of an idolatrous and wanton gathering who are conducting their shameful dances about the golden calf—stiff-necked people with uncircumcised hearts who rebel in advance against the law which they had not yet received! The indignant prophet dashes to the earth the sacred tables of which Israel is not worthy. Moses at the foot of Mt. Sinai is monotheism growing in a terrible struggle against the unwilling revolts of man; Mohammed before the Caaba is the same monotheism grown great, still combated but now conqueror.

The last word has not yet been said. It will be said when at some future time, which we cannot fix, the three great religions of the unity of God, Judaism, Christianity, and Islamism shall form but one grand faith—the religion of Abraham, the father of all believers, the religion of Adam, the father of all men.

That illustrious Emir, who, from having once been the embittered enemy of France is now its faithful friend, Abd-el-Kader, has written these words: “If the Mussulmans and the Christians would “lend me their ears I could put an end to their differences and “they would become as brothers, both outwardly and inwardly; but

“they will not listen to me because it is pre-established in the science of God that they will not unite in the same thought—the Messiah alone will put an end to their antagonism when he shall descend again.”¹

With Abd-el-Kader and all Musselmans, I believe in the coming again of Jesus Christ. It is written in the Apostle’s creed of the Christians: *Et iterum venturus est cum gloriâ*. But we know neither when nor how Jesus Christ will return. It is not necessary that he should return in person. It is sufficient if his spirit be poured out upon men with an abundance and power which it has not yet shown. It is the spirit of faith, but it is also the spirit of science. It is the spirit of the highest religious spirituality and of the most perfect intellectual liberty. “Where the spirit of the word is, there is freedom; the letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth.” It is the spirit of the fraternity of all men under the pater-
nity of the same God.

The Apostle St. Peter repeated after the Prophet Joel, on the day of the first Pentecost (Joel ii., 28). “And it shall come to pass,” saith the Eternal, “that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh. I shall pour it out even upon the servants and upon the handmaids in those days.”

* * *

Of what nature is the religion of Islam? This is the second question which I have set myself. My answer is brief. Islam is one of the three great forms of monotheism and at the same time one of the oriental branches of Christianity.

Mohammed, as we have already seen, issued historically from Judaism and Christianity. He had not read our sacred works,—it has often been asserted that he did not know how to read, much less to write, which is far more difficult for an Arab, owing to the complicated character of his alphabet,—but he was familiar with the substance of our Biblical teachings. Through his numerous voyages he had held intercourse with the disciples of Moses and of Jesus and had been subjected to the influence of the Christian school at Edessa. “The books which have gone before the Koran,” he declares, “are the sources of the Koran.”

Another source, more living than the first, was his own soul. I find no difficulty in admitting that God spoke to Mohammed; he spoke to him in a language which he could understand, yet which even in that lowly form he was not always able to understand. The unconscious errors which men almost inevitably mingle with divine

¹*Rappel à l'intelligent, Avis à l'indifférent*, par l'émir Abd-el-Kader, Paris, 1858.

inspirations in no wise impair their fundamental truth. Mohammed was the prophet of the Arabs, as Moses and David were the prophets of the Hebrews.

“God,” as St. Paul said, “is not far from every one of us, for in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts, xvii, 28). To every son of man, who is likewise by nature a son of God,—“for,” as the same Apostle has said, “we are His offspring”—God hath revealed Himself in the depths of the intellect and the conscience, two organs at once natural and supernatural, the one the instrument of truth, the other of goodness. Yet when He is impelled to send forth a prophet, he speaks to him not more directly but in a more palpable and in a more stirring way. He shakes his imagination by powerful symbolical images. He stirs and rouses his heart by enthusiastic sentiments. After having been the food of long and solitary meditations, these visions of the mind and inspirations of the soul become the object of public promulgation. *Unde pascor, inde pasco*, said a Father of the Church.

Jesus himself, the greatest of prophets and their master, never spoke but in parables, and often He was not understood. It took Christian theologians and thinkers a long time to extract from the sacred rinds the hidden fruit of his doctrine. Jesus followed this practice to the last days of his life, when He said to His followers: “The hour cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in parables, but shall tell you plainly of the Father” (John, xvi, 25), and He strove to make them understand a religion that was above all symbols, and which He announced to the Samaritan in the words, “God is spirit, and they that worship Him must worship in spirit and in truth” (John, iv, 24).

Inferior though it be to Christianity, the religion of Mohammed has yet realised pure intellectual worship in one of its simplest and most living forms.

A religious savant of the eighteenth century, the Italian Maracci, who both translated and refuted the Koran, made a just remark which is all the more striking as coming from an adversary, when he said that Mohammed had conserved what was most plausible and probable in Christianity as well as everything which seemed conformable to the law and light of nature. Islamism is in fact a simple and lofty form of primitive monotheism.

It has been asserted that it is lacking in originality and that it is at bottom nothing but natural religion. This is exactly what constitutes its merit in my eyes, for, discarding all complications, subtleties, and superfluities, it has put within the reach of all, in

the poetical and palpable language of revelation, the necessary and sufficient virtues of religious life. "Without faith," says the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh of God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him." (Heb., xi, 6.) The living God, the immortal soul, and for the joining of these in this world and the next, true faith, good works, repentance,—such is natural religion in the high sense of the word, the religion to which the two natures which it ought to unite, that of man and that of God, both appeal.

Yet let us be on our guard against confounding natural religion and the religion of Islam with deism. Nothing could be more dead than deism, nothing more living than Islam. When M. Guizot wrote, "Christians alone possess the living God," he did not think of the Mussulmans.

Deism is dead because it suppresses providence in the Creator and prayer in the created,—acts which bring the two together and join them in unity. The Creator is rather the servant of the laws of the world than their author. In any event they envelop his face in a thick veil and do not suffer him to see minutely the particular beings over whom he rules. We may apply to this mental idol who is not the true God the forceful words of the psalm: "He has eyes and sees not." He hears no more than he sees, and what rises to his ears is neither the cry nor the groans of souls but simply the vague and whirring harmony of things. Deaf and dumb as this singular God is, the soul never speaks to him in prayer; and even when prayer survives it is naught but soliloquy; the soul never hears the inarticulate but expressive murmurs of the supreme inward voice, the organ of the purest and sweetest of revelations.¹

Such a God cannot love such a soul, nor such a soul such a God, but in this system which Bossuet rightly termed disguised atheism,² all communication between heaven and earth is impossible. An impassable abyss separates creator from created.

Deism is not a religion. It is only a philosophy, and a detestable philosophy at that; one which makes an orphan of man, and of God a sort of honorless, compassionless father who has no care for his children subsequently to the caprice which gave them birth.

¹ "Blessed are the ears that gladly receive the pulses of the Divine whisper. . . . Blessed are those ears which listen not after the voice which is sounding without but for the truth teaching within." *Imitation of Christ*, Book III., Ch. I.

² Schelling has called it "dastard atheism."

And even if it had other claims to being a religion, deism could never become such, because it rejects from principle the remotest possibility of revelation. Every religion is essentially revealed, and natural religion in the lofty sense in which we conceive it can have no power over men except it come through the medium of an inspired prophet, of an apostle sent by God. It must receive a palpable form and must pass through some outer and visible gate. "Every nation has its prophet," says the Koran (X, 48). "Every people has its guide." "For every age there is a holy book." (*Ibid.*, XIII, 8 and 38.)

In Islam everything hangs upon revelation, the revelation which was proclaimed by Mohammed, who was called "the seal of the prophets," as well as upon that which previously to him was proclaimed by Jesus, by Moses, by Abraham and even by Adam himself, so that we can say of this religion, which like ours is universal in its aspirations, that it is "the beginning of all things."

We may say this in a certain sense more correctly of Islam than of Christianity, because it is less developed, more rudimentary, nearer its origins, and this was why its founder was wont to say that if people become Jews or Christians they are born Mussulmans. "Mussulman" means "he who is subject to God."

I have just mentioned the Jews and the Christians. From the point of view of a universal and living monotheism, the Mussulmans are in my opinion superior to the former but inferior to the latter. They are superior to the Jews in the clear and powerful affirmation which the Koran makes of a future life which is quite foreign to the old sacred books of Israel or is at least conceived there under the oppressive simile of a prolonged slumber terminating in a more or less distant resurrection. For the Mussulman death is without horrors, I was almost going to say without sadness, and although their religion is a religion of the world, like that of the Jews,—and for this I should be very far from censuring either,—yet that of the Mussulmans is pre-eminently a religion of the world to come. It is more complete.

The superiority of Islam appears to me additionally established by its universal character, so different from the rigidly national character which Israel has always striven to preserve in spite of Jesus and Paul. Israel is a people, a race: the race of Abraham and Jacob, mixed no doubt with numerous proselytes, yet having amalgamated them in its racial mill; the people of Palestine, so intimately wedded to Jerusalem that everywhere else it is in exile, and that its very cult has become impossible without that unique

and ruined temple. The Mussulmans, on the other hand, are like the Christians, humanity in all its potencies. Mecca, without doubt, is still their religious centre, but their circumference is in all places, and within this enormous circle move fraternally Turks and Arabs, Chinese and Hindus, negroes and whites, all repeating, to whatever blood they belong and whatever country they inhabit, from the bottom of their hearts: "God is God, and Mohammed is his prophet."

I add, that though superior to Judaism in the sense that I have explained, Islam is inferior to Christianity, though of course not to corrupted Christianity, such as we only too frequently find it among both Protestants and Catholics: *optimi cujusque pessima corruptio*. But above all the churches that have disfigured it and are disfiguring it, the spirit of the gospel possesses a sublimity, purity, and tenderness to which nothing in the Koran approaches. Jesus Christ did not found a church, nor did he formulate dogmas. The Gospel is an evident and abundant proof of this to him who knows how to read it. The Church is the work of St. Paul and of his disciples. The dogmas are the work of the great councils. These two creations are legitimate and necessary, but they did not come from Jesus Christ. What Jesus Christ gave to the world, in the absence of a single line written by his hand or at his dictation, is the spirit which quickeneth those whom the letter killeth, the new spirit which comes from him at the same time that it does from God and which has produced in the world of souls and in the world of societies that marvellous development which has not its peer and which is far from having uttered its last word. "He that believeth in me," Jesus himself has said, "the works that I do shall he do also; and greater works than this shall he do." (John xiv, 12.)

Inferior to genuine Christianity in its dogmas, its ethics, and especially its spirit, Islam is yet not opposed to it as Judaism is which crucified Jesus Christ and cast off St. Paul. Far from being foreign or opposed to Christianity, Islam, I make bold to say, is in reality a branch of it, as much so as are some of the doctrines within Christianity itself, which without being orthodox have produced undeniable fruits, and in a certain measure excellent fruits, such as those of Arius and of Nestorius, and in our days of Channing.¹

"Do you believe in Jesus?" asked of one of our Algerian

¹ To speak only of the Goths, who were zealous Arians, they surpassed the orthodox French in light and in morality. It may even be regretted, with Herder, that the reorganisation of our West was not the work of the great Theodoric instead of Charlemagne.

Arabs an English missionary, one of that class who are making such touching but vain struggles to convert the Algerians to their Christianity. "I believe in him more than you do," retorted the Arab.

They certainly believe in him much more strongly and more sincerely than many indifferent or sceptical Christians with whom the missionaries should first occupy themselves.

Repelled by the Byzantian subtleties, and we must also say by the paganism of the supposedly Christian masses, the prophet of Islam rejected the title Son of God which Jesus had bestowed upon himself and which according to Jesus is a real attribute of us all¹ though less so than in his case, but which our theologians and preachers have so strangely perverted.

Mohammed calls Jesus "the soul of God." He says that Jesus was miraculously brought forth by the Virgin Mary: "One day the angels said to Mary God gives thee tidings of his Word; his name shall be the Messiah, Jesus the son of Mary, illustrious in this world and in the next, and of those whose place is nigh to God." (Koran, III., 40.) According to the Koran Jesus performed the most astonishing miracles besides revealing the purest doctrine. "There shall be no one of those who have faith in the holy book but shall believe in him before his death." (Koran, IV., 157.) In not separating the mother from the son the Arab prophet conformed to the traditions of the Oriental Christians as laid down in the Gospels of Infancy, so popular at that period. Perhaps he was also making a touching application of the verse written by him in the Koran: "Paradise is at the feet of mothers."

Be that as it may, Aissa, as they called Jesus, is to descend to earth again at the end of time, and will exterminate all the enemies of God and will cause goodness and virtue to reign upon earth.

Am I right in saying that the Arabs are Christians after their fashion and that the Koran is related to the Gospel?

* * *

We should now study Islamism in its results. But the space at my command compels me to be brief. It is in accordance with the spirit of our age, however, to value a religious or social system by the facts in which it has realised itself rather than by the ideas which are its programme, and in doing so, our age simply returns to the method proclaimed by Jesus Christ: "A good tree

¹"Go to my brethren," says Jesus to Magdalene, "and say unto them, I ascend to my Father and your Father, and to my God and your God."

cannot produce bad fruits, nor a bad tree good fruits. Ye shall judge them by their fruits."

The fruits of Islamism are of two kinds, those which it has produced for itself and those which it has produced for others.

And first for itself. Closed as it is against all foreign propagandism, the Mussulman world is nourished wholly from its own substance, and whatever superficial or interested observers may say of it, it is still far from perishing. I would even say it has more vitality, not than Christianity proper, but more than the existing forms of Christianity, whether Protestant or Catholic.

A descendant of the crusaders, Prince Polignac, recently wrote me on the subject of Islam: "This powerful discipline of souls does not count a single rebel among its adherents,—not a single atheist. . . . No such result could be realised without intrinsic greatness." And he added *viva voce* the bold words to which I subscribe: "The Arabs are better Christians than we and it is through the God of Islam that we shall return to the gospels. We have at present need of this intermediary between Jesus and ourselves."

The Hegira is now in its fourteenth century, and as I am now speaking, more than 200,000,000 men date their chronology from it. We have, it is true, also our 200,000,000 Catholics and make much ado about the fact, but among these Catholics how many are there who are not Christians, how many who are not even theists!¹

Islam does not only conserve its faith, but it also propagates it, and its propaganda is now of a peaceful character. "Two things constitute the religion of the world," wrote Abd-el-Kader, "the sword and the pen; but the sword is below the pen." And the word is above the pen if it were only that it can address those who cannot read. And this is the plight of the innumerable black hordes of Africa among whom the missionaries of Islam are making so many proselytes. These hordes are plunged in the black night of the grossest fetishism. Islam lifts them directly to the most absolute monotheism, giving the lie to the chimerical law of Auguste

¹ To speak only of my own country, nothing is more incorrect than to assert, as is asserted every day, that Catholicism is the religion of the majority of the French people. "Thirty-six million Catholics is an easy thing to write on the official rolls, but the preacher who knows his congregation knows what value is to be placed upon such statistics, falsified like all the rest. Of these 36,000,000 it would be rashness not to cut out 25,000,000. . . . There are in our country 25,000,000 baptised Christians who care nothing for the clergy considered as the representatives of God, as the dispensers of the truth, of grace, and the sacraments, brought into this world by Jesus Christ." (*L'Esprit nouveau dans l'action morale et religieuse*, by the Abbé J. Crestey, p. 96, Paris, Guillaumin, 1895.)

Comte which makes polytheism the indispensable link between these two forms of religion.

It is truly a grand and precious result, the bringing of these negroes from the adoration of physical objects to that of the invisible and supreme spirit; but with the same stroke the apostle of the Koran suppresses for them a great vice, the abuse of strong liquors, and a great crime, cannibalism.

Finally, may I be permitted to say that Islam is called to give a necessary lesson to the many degenerate Christians who scoff at it. For they, of all, have the most need to profit by its example. These Christians, and they are numerous, have lost the living God of which they say that they alone possess him. Some have made of him an idol; others have reduced him to a nullity.

Twenty-six years ago, during that dreadful war of which we have as yet neither repaired the losses nor fully comprehended the lessons, Madame de Bismarck wrote to the Iron Chancellor: "I shall send you shortly the Book of Psalms that you may read the prophecy against the French. I tell you a people without God must disappear from the face of the earth."

Several years later a distinguished thinker, the heir of Auguste Comte and to-day professor in the Collège de France, pronounced the following words which, if they are true, give a show of justice to the Prussian puritanism: "Is there a city in the world that can compare with Paris, that ever living heart of the Revolution whence have gone forth the thousand voices of philosophy in the grand struggle against God—Paris, which after Rome became the leader of the West and will become the leader of the world?"¹

France slanders herself more than she is slandered by those who look down upon her and seek her destruction. France is no more atheistic than it is idolatrous, but her official science and religion would often lead one to believe that it is both at once.

Two years ago or more I was on the frontiers of the empire of Morocco at Tlemcen. It was Friday, that day which is to the Mussulmans what Sunday is to us, or at least was to our fathers. By an exceptional favor, my wife and I were permitted to attend public prayers in the grand mosque. We should judge of the Arab genius, not by its present decadence, but by its ancient splendor. This temple which we entered is one of the most beautiful that the art and faith of men have erected to God. There were none of those superfluous ornaments, too often superstitious when not idolatrous, that wound in our Christian temples the sentiment of the

¹M. Pierre Lafitte. *Les Grands Types de l'Humanité*.

beautiful and true as well as the more august and more rigid sentiment of religion itself. The mosque was more full of faith than the cathedral. The commandment of Sinai was not broken here: "I am thy God the eternal. Thou shalt have no other gods but me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath or that is in the water under the earth. Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them nor serve them."

Devoid of images, the temple was full of worshippers. In our churches we ordinarily see only women, as if the worship they render there were not a virile religion but were framed only for them and for their sons prior to the adult age. There were no women here—these pray in the neighboring oratories—but there were men, two thousand men, I had almost said two thousand warriors. They had the bearing of warriors and they prayed as they would have fought. They were all mingled together without distinction of rank or place. The red burnous of the chiefs touch the white burnous of common individuals and the tattered garments of the poor. For in this theocratic society, which is at the same time a democracy, the most absolute equality unites and binds believers together.

The voice of the Iman was lifted from the other extremity of the mosque. He was no priest, for in this religion, so vigorous, so enthusiastic and with such a mastery over souls, which is now in the thirteen hundred and fifteenth¹ year of its existence, there is no clergy: its believers are its priests. The Iman is a believer specially charged with the direction of the worship.

His assembled brothers responded to his appeal. Now prostrated upon the earth, now with their backs turned towards the heavens but always with a sort of ecstasy, these children of the desert and of the Koran, these Arabs, half monks and half soldiers, cry with one voice and with one heart: "Allah is Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet." Their cry shook the mosque as it had anciently shaken the world. Who knows but it will shake it again?

At any rate a divine thrill coursed through my whole being. I joined, despite myself, in the prayer which was not mine and which was still mine, and I repeated from the bottom of my heart: "Yes, God is God!" Woe to the men who think themselves civilised and free and who know no better than to blaspheme His mighty name or to suppress it! And woe to the men who think themselves Christians and who profane the incommunicable name of

¹ According to the Mohammedan chronology, which reckons time by purely lunar years.

Him who abides eternally in what is born and dies in time, by making what is infinite in him finite, and by associating with this God, justly jealous of his glory, with this sole and supreme Creator, any creature howsoever perfect.

Aye, God is God and Mohammed is his prophet! I do not know how he was so, by dint of what virtues and what ecstasies, despite what errors and what weaknesses. But I know that he was so. Without being a prophet and a great prophet too, one cannot incarnate God so profoundly in the soul, with such great power, such great passion, such holy passion, and cause him to be adored by so many races of men in all languages, in all continents, and through fourteen centuries.

Yes, God is God, and Mohammed is his prophet! And I added without fear of contradiction from those who were praying in the mosque: "Jesus is the Messiah." He is "The soul of God" who will come among us because we have neither loved nor known him; because we have all of us crucified him, some of us in the flesh, and what is more sinful still, the rest of us in the spirit. He will come to judge, to punish, but also to pardon. "Forgive them, O my Father, for they know not what they do!"

That day is approaching, for we can no longer live in the religious and moral anarchy into which we have fallen nor in the cruel antagonism which is its consequence and which is dragging the world to the depths of barbarism.

On that day the final religion will be founded. True Christianity, that of Jesus, that of God, which has never yet been aught but a prophecy will be a reality. The human race reconciled, brought back to unity without losing its diversity, joined to heaven without being severed from earth, the human race will then form but one family of brothers under the paternity of God. Jesus has said: "There shall be but one fold and one shepherd."

And I make bold to say that for those who can forestall the future that state has already come.

THE AVATARS.

BY THE EDITOR.

CHRISTIANITY has gathered into one focus the light of the religious evolution of the various civilisations. Like a great river, it has not one source, but originates from the conflux of several streams. It has inherited the theology of the Jews with its stern monotheism, the philosophy of the Greeks in the form of Philo's Neo-Platonism, and the incarnation idea of the Hindus. The conception of a God-man as the Son of God was a blasphemous idea to the pious Jew, and we find no trace of it in the Old Testament; but it was a natural idea among the pagans, which, however, had to be purified and chastened before it could be received as one of the most important factors in the religious movement of the Christian era.

* * *

India, the primitive home of religion and philosophy, exhibits as strong a tendency for monism as the Persian nation has shown for dualism. But the ancient monism of India is apt to lose itself in Pantism,¹—a theory of the All according to which the absolute alone is possessed of reality, while all concrete existences are a mere sham, an illusion, a dream. The polytheism of the popular Hinduism is practically a pantheism in which the discrimination between good and evil is entirely lost sight of. Thus the struggle between good and evil is contemplated as a process of repeated God-incarnations made necessary, according to the idea of the Brâhmins, by the appearance of tyranny and injustice, lack of reverence for the priests, encroachments of the warrior caste on the supremacy of the Brâhmins, or some other disorder. While the enemies of the gods—giants, demons, and other monsters—are not

¹ Pantism, the theory of the All (from $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, root Π ANT), is different from Pantheism, the theory which identifies the All ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$) with God ($\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$).

radically bad, and cannot be regarded as devils in the sense of the Christian Satan, the Brâhman gods in their turn are by no means the representatives of pure goodness. Not only do they frequently assume shapes that to the taste of Western nations would be exceedingly ugly and diabolical, but the same deities who in one aspect are beneficent powers of life, are in another respect demons of destruction.

Brahm, the highest god of Brâhmanism, represents the All, or the abstract idea of being. He is conceived as a trinity which is called Trimûrti, consisting of Brahmâ, Vishṇu, and Śiva.

Brahmâ, the first-originated of all beings, the lord of all creatures, the father of all the universes, is the divine mind who is the beginning of all. He is called *Aja*, the not-born, because he has originated, but was not begotten.

Brahmâ originated from *tat*, i. e., undifferentiated being, in which he existed from eternity in an embryonic form.

Brahmâ's consort, Sarasvatî, also called Brahmi or Brahmini, is the goddess of poetry, learning, and music.

Brahmâ is the creator of man. We are told in the Yajurveda that the god produced from himself the soul, which is accordingly a part of his own being, and clothed it with a body—a process which is reported in the reverse order in the Hebrew Genesis, where Elohim creates first the body and then breathes the life into the body, which makes of man a living soul.

Brahmâ is pictured with four heads and four hands, in which he holds a spoon, a sacrificial basin, a rosary, and the Vedas. One of the four hands is frequently represented as empty. He sits on a lotus which grows from Vishṇu's navel, representing the spirit that broods over the waters.

Brahmâ keeps the first place in the speculations of philosophers, where he is identified with the life-breath of the world, the Âtman or self that appears in man's soul, but he has not exercised a great influence on the people. The gods of the people must be less abstract, more concrete and more human. Thus it is natural that Vishṇu, the second person of the trinity, the deity of




BRAHMA AND SURASWATI.
(Reproduced from Coleman.)

avatars or incarnations, is, for all practical purposes, by far more important than Brahmâ.

Vishṇu appears in ten incarnations, which are as follows :¹

In the first incarnation, called the Matsya-Avatar, Vishṇu assumes the form of a fish in order to recover the Vedas stolen by evil demons and hidden in the floods of a deluge that covered the whole earth. This incarnation is of interest because we read in the *Pistis Sophia* (one of the most important gnostic books) that the books of Ieou, which were dictated by God to Enoch in para-



VISHNU, LAKSHMI, AND BRAHMA.

[Vishnu reclines on a flower, supported by the serpent Ananta (a symbol of eternity), floating on the primeval waters of the undifferentiated world-substance.] After a native illustration, reproduced from Coleman.


dise, were preserved by Kalapataurôth from destruction in the deluge.²

In order to enable the gods to procure the immortality-giving drink, amṛita, Vishṇu appeared as an immense tortoise in the kûrm-avtar, his second incarnation. He lifted on his back the world-pillar, the mountain Mandaras; and the world-serpent, Vâsuki (or Anantas, i. e., infinite), was wound about it like a rope. The gods

¹Since it is our intention to be brief, we do not enter in this exposition of the ten avatars into any details that could be omitted and neglect to mention the variants of the myths.

²MS., p. 354, English translation from Schwartz's latest translation by G. R. S. Meade, p. 354.

seized the tail, the demons (daityas) the head, and they began to churn the ocean, which produced Vishṇu's gem, Kaustubha; Varunânî, the goddess of the sea; the Apsaras, lovely sprites, corresponding to the Greek nymphs; Indra's horse, with seven heads; Kâmadhenu, the cow of plenty; Airâvata, Indra's elephant; the tree of abundance; Chandra, the god of the moon; Surâ, the goddess of wine; and, finally, Dhanvantari, the Indian Æsculapius, who is in possession of the water of life. The serpent began now to spit venom, which blinded the demons, while the gods drank the amṛita.



THE MATSYA AVATAR OR FISH INCARNATION.



THE KURM AVATAR OR TORTOISE INCARNATION.¹

The third incarnation is the Varâha-avatar, in which Vishṇu, in the shape of a wild boar, kills, with his tusks, the demon Hiraṇyâksha, who threatened to destroy the world.

Hiraṇyâksha's brother, Hiraṇya-Kaśipu, had a son by the name of Prahlâda, who was a pious devotee of Vishṇu. The unnatural father tried to kill his son, but the latter escaped all danger because he did not cease to pray to Vishṇu. When Hiraṇya-Kaśipu expressed a doubt of Vishṇu's omnipresence, mockingly declaring that he could not possibly be in a column to which he

¹ All the Avatar pictures are from Pickart.

pointed, the wrathful god decided to punish the scoffer. The column rent in twain, and Vishṇu, proceeding from its interior in the shape of a monster half man half lion, tore Hiraṇya Kaśipu to pieces. This fourth incarnation is called the Narasiṅha-avataṛ. Its moral is to impress upon the people the sad fate of those who do not believe in Vishṇu.

Prahlaḍa's grandson, Balis, was a pious king, but on that very account dangerous to the gods, for he was just about to complete the hundredth grand sacrifice, by which he would have acquired



THE VARĀHA AVATAR OR WILD BOAR
INCARNATION.




THE NARASIṂHA AVATAR OR MAN-LION
INCARNATION.

sufficient power to dethrone Indra. Vishṇu came to the assistance of the god of heaven and appeared before Balis as a dwarf in the guise of a Brāhman mendicant. Balis honored him with presents and promised to fulfil his desire, whereupon the dwarf requested three paces of ground. This was gladly granted under a severe oath that would be binding on gods and men. Then the dwarf assumed a huge shape and stepped with the first pace over the whole earth, with the second over the atmosphere, with the third into the infinity of the heavens. This is the reason why Vishṇu is called Tripādas, or Trivikramas, the three-paced god. Thus Balis was prevented completing the hundredth sacrifice, and Indra was again

safe on his throne. This dwarf incarnation is called the Vâmana avatar.

The sixth incarnation, called the Parashura avatar, is historical in its character, for it reflects the struggles between the warrior-caste and the Brâhmans for supremacy. It is said that Jamadagni, a pious Brâhman, had received from the gods the miraculous cow, Kâmadughâ (or Surabhî), which provided him, his wife, Renukâ, and their son, Râma, with every luxury. Kârttavîrya, a king of the warrior-caste, visits him, and seeing the




THE VÂMANA AVATAR OR DWARF
INCARNATION.



THE PARASHURA AVATAR OR BATTLE-AX
INCARNATION.

wealth of the Brâhman, tries to take the cow from him, but the cow kills all who dare to approach her, and rises into heaven, whereupon Kârttavîrya in his wrath slays the pious Jamadagni. Râma, the son of the murdered Brâhman, invokes Vishnu's help for the punishment of the wicked king, and the god not only presents him with a bow and a battle-ax, which latter is called in Sanskrit *paracus*, the Greek *πέλεκυς* (hence the name of this avatar), but also incarnates himself in Râma. Kârttavîrya is described to be in possession of a thousand arms, wielding a thousand weapons, but Râma, endowed with the divine powers of Vishnu, conquers him after a decisive struggle.

The Râma Chandra avatar has taken a firm hold on the Indian mind, and is described in the Râmâyana, an epic which is the



HANUMÂN, THE MONKEY KING, BUILDING THE BRIDGE OVER THE STRAIT BETWEEN INDIA AND LANKA. (Reproduced from Coleman.)

Hindu Odyssey, to the narrative of which the legend of Râma bears a great resemblance.


Râma Chandra lived with his wife Sîtâ (frequently regarded as an incarnation of Lakshmî) and with his half-brother Lakshmaṇa in the wilderness of the south, where he had withdrawn in order to obey his father, who had unjustly banished him and appointed Bharata, another son of his, as heir to the throne. The demon-king, Râvaṇa, waged war against Râma, and carried off Sîtâ while he and his brother were hunting. It is impossible to relate here Râma's adventures in detail on the island of Ceylon, how



THE MONKEY KING SUGRIVA FIGHTING. (Reproduced from Coleman.)

he fought with giants and demons, how the monkey kings, Lughriva and Hanumân, became his allies, how Hanumân jumped over to

Lanka, the island of Ceylon, to reconnoitre the enemy's country, how the monkeys built a bridge over the strait by throwing stones into the water, how Râma pursued Râvaṇa to Lanka, and finally how he vanquished Râvaṇa and recovered his faithful wife Sîtâ.



VISHNU AND SHRI-LAKSHMI AS RAMA CHANDRA AND SITA AFTER THEIR HAPPY REUNION (Reproduced from Coleman.)

Like the sixth avatar, the Râma Chandra avatar also probably contains historical reminiscences. It resembles both the Trojan War and the Gudrun Saga, the epics of Western nations that relate the story of an abducted wife. The mythical part of all these

stories describes the wanderings of the sun god in search of his consort, the moon.



HANUMÂN RECITING HIS ADVENTURES TO
RAMA CHANDRA AND SITA.
(Reproduced from Coleman.)

after his birth, comforted his mother, and gave directions to his father, Vasudeva, how to save him. Vasudeva carried the infant, pro-

In his eighth incarnation, the Krishṇa avatar, Vishṇu has reached the ideal man-god of the Hindus. Kaṇṣa, called Kalânkura (i. e., crane), the tyrant of Mathurâ, prophesies that the eighth son of his sister, Devakî, will take his throne. He therefore decides to kill all the children of his sister. Her eighth son, Kṛishṇa, however, was an incarnation of Vishṇu, who spoke at once



THE RÂMA CHANDRA AVATAR.

Vishnu and his incarnation in Rama Chandra, assisted by the Monkey King Hanumân, vanquish Ravana.



THE KRISHNA AVATAR.

Vishnu is born as Krishna and miraculously saved from the prosecutions of the tyrant of Mathurâ.

tected by the serpent king, over the river Jamunâ, and exchanged him in Gokula for a girl which Yasuda had just borne to the cow-


herd, Nanda. Kāṣa seized at once the girl baby, but before he could kill her she raised herself into the air, explained to the wrathful king that Kṛishṇa had been saved, and disappeared in the form of lightning. Kāṣa now decided to have all the babies in his empire killed, but Kṛishṇa escaped again. A demon nurse was sent to poison him with her venomous milk, but he bit and killed her, while his stepfather decided to remove to a more distant country in order to escape the continued hostilities of the king. Kṛishṇa slew the huge serpent, Kali-naga, overcame the giant Shishoo-polu, killed the monster bird that tried to peck out his eyes, and also a malignant wild ass. He burnt the entrails of the alligator-shaped



KRISHNA, THE FAVORITE OF THE COUNTRY LASSES OF GOKULA.
(Reproduced from Coleman.)

Peck-Assoort who had devoured him, and choked Aghi-Assoor, the dragon who attempted to swallow him. When Kṛishṇa had grown to youth he became the favorite of the lasses of Gokula. When he played the flute every one of the dancing girls believed that the swain whom she embraced was Kṛishṇa himself. He fell in love with the country girl Râdhâ, the story of which is sung in the Jagadeva's poem, Gîtâgovinda. He protected the cowherds against storm and fire, and finally marched against Kāṣa, killed him and took possession of his throne.

Kṛishṇa plays also a prominent part in the Mahâbhârata, the Iliad of the Hindus, which describes the war between the Kurus and the Pândus,¹ both descendants of Bharata and both grand-



KRISHNA'S ADVENTURES. (Reproduced from Coleman.)

children of Vyâsa. Dhṛitarâshtra, the father of the Kurus, was king of Hastinâpur, but being blind, Bhîshma, his uncle, reigned in his stead. After a test of the faculties of the young princes, in

¹The Pândus are also called Pândavas, and the Kurus Kamavas.

which the Pându Arjuna, the skilled bowman and the Hindu Tell, showed himself superior to all the others, the oldest Pându-prince, Yudhisht̥hira, was installed as heir apparent. The Kurus, however, who managed to remain in power, tried to burn the Pându, but they escaped and lived for some time in the disguise of mendicant Brâhmans. Having allied themselves, by marriage with Draupadî,¹ the daughter of Drupada, king of Pançhâla, with a powerful monarch, the Pându reappeared at Hastinâpur and induced Dhṛitarâsh̥tra to divide the kingdom between his sons, the Kurus, and his nephews, the Pându; but at a festival, held at



THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE KURUS AND PANDUS ON THE FIELD OF KURUKSHETRA
(Reproduced from Wilkins.)

Hastinâpur, Yudhisht̥hira, the chief of the Pându, staked in a game of dice his kingdom, all his possessions, and Draupadî herself, and lost everything. The Kurus granted their cousins to recover their share of the kingdom, after thirteen years, if they would live twelve years with Draupadî in the forest and remain another year in exile; but when this period had elapsed, the Kurus refused to give up the country or any part of it, and thus the war became unavoidable. Then Duryodhana, the Kuru prince, and Arjuna,

¹That the five Pându held Draupadî in common as their wife, proves the high antiquity of the story. Polyandry was apparently a practice not uncommon in ancient times. It prevails still to-day among the less cultured hill tribes. But being at variance with the Aryan customs of the age in which the Mahâbhârata was versified, Vyâsa (the Homer or "arranger" of the poem, and its supposed author) tries to explain it allegorically, Draupadî being Lakshmi, and the five Pându brothers representing five different forms of one and the same Indra.

the main hero of the Pâṇḍus, called on Kṛishṇa for securing his assistance. Kṛishṇa decided not to take an active part in the fight himself, but left to Arjuna, whom he had seen first, the choice between his (Kṛishṇa's) company as a mere adviser or his (Kṛishṇa's) army of a hundred million warriors. Arjuna chose Kṛishṇa himself, and left the hundred million warriors to his rivals, the Kurus. The two armies met on the field of Kurukshetra, near Delhi. During the battle, as we read in the Bhagavadgîtâ, Kṛishṇa accompanies Arjuna as his charioteer and explains to him the depth and breadth of the religious philosophy of the Hindus. The Pâṇḍus conquer the Kurus, and Yudhishtira becomes king of Hastinâpur. After sundry additional adventures the Pâṇḍus go to heaven, where they find that rest and happiness which is unattainable on earth.

The Mahâbhârata, like the Wars of the Roses, shows neither party in a favorable light; but the epic is written from the standpoint of the Pâṇḍus, whose demeanor is always extolled, while the Kurus are throughout characterised as extremely unworthy and mean.

Kṛishṇa is the Hindu Apollo, Orpheus, and Hercules in one person, and there is no god in the Hindu Pantheon who is dearer to the Brâhman heart than he. Many of his adventures, such as his escape from the Hindu Herod, the massacre of babes, his transfiguration, etc., reappear in a modified form in Buddhist legends and bear some resemblance to the events told of Christ in the New Testament.

In his ninth incarnation Vishṇu appears as Buddha, the enlightened one, to be a teacher of morals, of purity, charity, and compassionate love toward all beings. It is difficult to state the differences between the Buddha avatar of the Brâhmins and the Buddha of the Buddhists. The latter, there can be no doubt, was a historical personality, by the name of Gautama, the son of Shuddhâdana of the warrior caste, while the former is a mere ideal figure of ethical perfection. Burnouf¹ proposes to regard both as quite distinct, and he is right, but we need not for that reason deny that, on the one hand, the ideal of a Buddha avatar was a prominent factor in the formation of Buddhism, while on the other hand Gautama's teachings have, since the rise of Buddhism, powerfully affected and considerably modified the Buddha ideal of the Brâhmins. Whatever may be the historical relation between the Hindu Buddha and the Buddha of the Buddhists, this much is

¹*Histoire du Bouddhisme*, I., 338.

sure: the Buddha has been received by the Brâhmans as one of the members of the Hindu Pantheon.

The Hindu deity that is nearest in spirit to the Buddha avatar is Jagannâth, the god of love and mercy.

The tenth avatar has not yet been completed. Vishṇu is expected to appear on a winged white horse to reward the virtuous, convert the sinners, and destroy all evil.

The horse has one foot raised, and when it places its foot down, the time of the incarnation will find its fulfilment.



THE BUDDHA AVATAR OR VISHNU'S INCARNATION AS THE ENLIGHTENED TEACHER OF MANKIND.




THE KALKI AVATAR OR THE WHITE HORSE INCARNATION.

The third person of the Indian trinity is Śiva, the Auspicious One, representing the end of the world and its regeneration. He is commonly represented by the *linga* as a symbol of the creative faculty and by the all-devouring fire, the tongued flame of which is pictured in a triangle turning its point upwards \triangle .

Sir Monier Monier Williams (in *Brahmanism and Hinduism*, p. 68) says of this deity, which is "more mystical and less human than the incarnated Vishṇu," that his symbol, the *linga*, is "never in the mind of a Saiva (or Śiva-worshipper) connected with indecent ideas, nor with sexual love." The *linga*, or, as the Romans called it, the phallus, the male organ of generation, be-




SIVA AND PARVATI. (Reproduced from Coleman.)



SIVA WORSHIP. (Reproduced from Pickart.)

comes at the first dawn of civilisation, almost among all the nations of the world, an object of great awe and reverence. As the symbol of the creative principle it is regarded as the most essential attribute of both the God-Creator himself and all those who hold authority in his name. The *linga* develops in the hand of the med-



KALI-DURGA IN THE HINDU PANTHEON. (Reproduced from Wilkins.)

icine man into a wand, in the hand of the priest into a staff, and in the hand of the king into a sceptre. The *yoni*, or female organ, is regarded as the symbol of *Śiva's* consort, *Pârvatî*, and is worshipped in connexion with the *linga* by the sect of the *Sactis*. Perforated rocks are considered as emblems of the *yoni*, through which pilgrims pass for the purpose of being regenerated, a ceremony in



KAMA.
(Reproduced from Wollheim da
Fonceka.)



SIVA SLAYING A DEMON.
(Reproduced from Wilkins.)



AGNI. (Reproduced from Coleman.)



GANESA. (Reproduced from Coleman.)

which Hindus place great faith for its sin-expelling significance. (See Charles Coleman, *The Mythology of the Hindus*, 1832, p. 175.)

Śiva's consort, Kâlî, is one of the greatest divinities of India. She is the goddess of a hundred names, representing not only the power of nature, but also the ruthless cruelty of nature's laws. She is called Pârvatî, the blessed mother, and Durgâ, which means "hard to go through," symbolising war and all kinds of danger. She is in the pantheon of modern Hinduism the central figure; and in spite of the universality of Brahmâ in philosophical speculations, in spite of the omnipresence of Vishṇu and his constant incarnations as told in ancient myths and legends, in spite of the omnipotence of Śiva, and the high place given him in Hindu dogmatology, she is the main recipient of Hindu worship all over the country. As Kâlî she is identified with time, the all-devourer, and is pictured as enjoying destruction, perdition, and murder in any form, trampling under foot even her own husband. There is scarcely a village without a temple devoted to her, and her images can be seen in thousands of forms. Her appearance is pleasant only as Pâvartî; in all other shapes she is frightful, and it is difficult to understand the reverence which the pious Hindu cherishes for this most diabolical deity, who among the Buddhists of Thibet is changed into a devilish demon under the name of mKha'sGrôma.

The Pantheism which lies at the bottom of the whole Hindu mythology finds expression in the worship of HariHara, who is a combination of Vishṇu and Śiva. In the Mâhâtmya, or collection of temple legends of the HariHara shrine at HariHara, a town in the province of Mysore, Iśvara says:¹

"There are heretics amongst men who reject the Vedas and the Shâstras, who live without purificatory ceremonies and established rules of conduct, and are filled with hatred of Vishṇu: so also there are heretical followers of Vishṇu, who are similarly filled with hatred of Shiva. All these wicked men shall go to hell so long as this world endures. I will not receive worship from any man who makes a distinction between Vasudeva and my own divinity: I will divide every such man in two with my saw. For I have assumed the form of HariHara in order to destroy the teaching that there is a difference between us: and he who knows within himself that HariHara is the god of gods, shall inherit the highest heaven."

There are in Hindu mythology innumerable other deities, among whom Indra, the thunder-god, is the greatest, as the hero among the gods of secondary rank, reminding us of the Thor of the Norsemen; but Varuṇa, the Hindu Kronos, Agni the god of fire, have also at times been very prominent.

¹The legends of the Shrine of HariHara, translated from the Sanskrit by Rev. Thomas Foulkes.

There are in addition gods of third degree, such as Kâma, the Hindu Amor, Gaṇeśa, the elephant-headed god of wisdom¹, and Kârttikeya,² the leader of the good demons, on the peacock, both sons of Śiva, and others. In addition, we have a great number of devas, sprites, and goblins. Some of them are good, as the Gandharvas, others at least not naturally ill-intentioned, as for instance the Apsaras, (a kind of Hindu elves), but most of them are dangerous and demoniacal. Such are the general mischief-makers, the Âsuras, the Pretas, or ghosts, the Bhûtas, or spook-spirits, the baby-killing Grahas, the Râkshasas, who are either giants or vampires, not to mention all the other demons of less power and importance.

¹ Ganesa, which means the lord (*isa*) of hosts (*gana*), is originally Siva himself, and he was invoked under that name by writers of books to drive away evil demons.

² Kârttikeya is also called Subrahmanya and Skanda.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

II. Israel Prior to the Origin of the National Kingdom.

HAVING SATISFIED OURSELVES that Israel's oldest traditions fit very easily into the course of the ancient history of the Orient as known to us from other sources, our task will now be to translate these oldest traditions out of the language of legend into that of history, or in other words, to ascertain their historical content. To this end we must first of all have a clear idea of the point of view that is to be our guide in the process.

With most earnest conviction I have already recognised Abraham as a strictly historical personage, and it might be thought that what is true of the father should hold for the son and grandchildren. But this conclusion would be premature. Greek tradition ascribes to Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta, two sons: Eunomos and Eukosmos, i. e., Law and Order. No reasonable person will doubt that Lycurgus was a historical personage, but that he actually had two sons named "Law" and "Order" will scarcely be believed. The tradition will be understood to mean that by his whole public activity he became the father of law and order for Sparta.

I have purposely chosen the example of Lycurgus because here the names themselves speak plainly. It is the same with Hebrew tradition. The names which it gives us in connexion with Abraham are all names of races and tribes, and accordingly we are beyond question in the realm of personification; for races never

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

adopt the names of individuals, but the patronymic tribal ancestor is first and ever a composite, a personification of the people. When the Hellenes derive themselves from a patriarch Hellen, who has two sons, Æolus and Dorus, and two grandsons, Achæus and Ion, no one will dream of looking for historical individuals here, but will immediately recognise in them the entire race of the Hellenes and the tribes into which it was divided. Or when in the well-known list of races in Genesis Shem has the five sons, Elam, Asshur, Arpachshad, Lud, and Aram, every one will see in this directly a very evident way of representing that those five peoples were regarded as branches of the great Semitic race and language group to which Israel itself belonged.

And thus also must the primitive history of Israel be regarded. However plastic and distinct the individualities of Ishmael and Edom, Israel and Joseph may seem to us, they are all only personifications and representations of the races or tribes whose names they bear. A glimmer of this truth is seen quite clearly in Hebrew tradition itself. When Rebekah, before the birth of the twins whose mother she is to become, receives the divine annunciation :

"Two nations are in thy womb,
And two peoples shall be separated even from thy bowels :
And the one people shall be stronger than the other people ;
And the elder shall serve the younger,"

it is said with all directness that we are dealing here not with single individuals, but with races. And when Jacob and Laban together set up a boundary-stone upon Mount Gilead and make a solemn and sworn covenant that neither of them henceforth will pass this boundary with evil intent, it is perfectly plain that this is not a private agreement between father-in-law and son-in-law, but a legal regulation of tribal boundary rights between Israel and Aram, which according to the Hebrew manner of speaking reaches unto southward of Damascus and to the mountain of Gilead.

What is historically significant in this tradition is the purely genealogical element, the relations of age and kinship between the various personages. To return once more to the Greek illustration cited, just as we must conclude when Æolus and Dorus appear as sons, and Achæus and Ion as grandsons of the patriarch Hellen, that the Æolians and Dorians are older tribal organisations and entered history earlier than the Achaians and Ionians, so it is in the case of Hebrew tradition : those tribes which were consolidated earlier in a political and national way are regarded as older, and the genealogical kinship corresponds to the ethnographic relation-

ship. When Moab and Ammon appear as sons of the nephew of the patriarch, and Edom and Israel on the contrary as his twin grandsons, this means: Moab and Ammon are closely related to each other, and Israel too recognises its kinship with them, but only as cousins, not as close kin, while with Edom it feels very closely related, in a kinship as of brothers, even of twin brothers. And when of these twin brothers Edom is the elder, this signifies: Edom was earlier consolidated into a political body, a nation, became a people in the historical sense earlier than Israel. And when Israel is represented as the son of the patriarch by a concubine, this means: Israel recognises a race relationship even with the Bedouins of the Syro-Arabian desert, which borders on Palestine, but regards this relationship as a very remote one. Having thus established the correct point of view for an historical understanding of the oldest traditions of Israel, let us now proceed to loose their tongue and hear their testimony as historical witnesses.

As we have seen, about 1500 B. C. a party of emigrants from Mesopotamia set out for Palestine under the lead of Abraham, and among them must have been, along with the ancestors of Israel, those of Moab, Ammon, and Edom as well. That these races so closely related to Israel are also not natives of the lands occupied by them in historical times, but are immigrants, is declared quite expressly, and certainly not without reason, by Hebrew tradition. The new arrivals were nomads, wandering shepherds, going about the country peacefully and seeking pasture for their flocks. It is therefore only natural if they turned to the portions of the land best suited to grazing. One branch soon crossed over the Jordan and settled in the luxuriant pastures of the country east of the Jordan; and here where the Egyptian dominion did not reach they succeeded in a comparatively short time in forming a political and national organisation as Moab and Ammon. Separated from the others by the Jordan, these tribes thenceforth went their own way.

West of the Jordan the march went mainly toward the south. The more thinly populated south with the abundant growth of grass in the mountains of Judah seemed made for such nomadic shepherds, and it is therefore not accidental, but rests on sound historical tradition, when the legend locates Abraham as well as Isaac in the south. In Canaan they adopt the language of Canaan: this important process, too, must have taken place in the pre-Egyptian time, and at the same time and in the same way among all the related tribes; for the Moabites, too, speak a language differing from the Hebrew only in unimportant dialectic respects.

But we have to examine another important element of the tradition. It represents Abraham as a religious leader and hero, and I find myself compelled to regard this feature also as historical. The appearance and achievements of Moses would be entirely inexplicable unless the people already had an almost distinctive religious character: for it is "the God of the Fathers" whom Moses proposes to bring and proclaim to Israel. The details of this matter are of course beyond inquiry and recognition, but we must maintain the fact unqualifiedly.

The next occurrence of historical importance is a further division within the portion of the Abrahamitic expedition that remained in Palestine. Not too soon after the settlement in Canaan,—Edom and Israel are lateborn grandsons, not sons, of Abraham,—the chief part turned further toward the south, where on Mount Seir dwelt the evidently uncivilised tribe of the Horites, and where the very nature of the land was a guarantee that the dominion of Egypt was but nominal. They succeeded in overcoming the Horites and in forming a political and national unity as Edom. More than a thousand years they remained in undisputed possession of this territory. About the time when these events must have taken place, the Egyptian prefect in Jerusalem, Abdichiba, writes to the Pharaoh Amenhotep, in the before-mentioned correspondence of Tell-el-Amarna, of Chabiri tribes that were making him much trouble and against whom he urgently begs the Pharaoh for support. There has been an attempt to find the Hebrews in these Chabiri, and the identification is possible from a linguistic point of view; but it is too much out of harmony with the whole character of Israelitish tradition itself for us to adopt it. Yet we may learn from this letter that southern Palestine was at that time in ferment and turmoil, and thus we have even here the appropriate historical background.

Of course, the Abrahamitic expedition was much reduced by the separation of Moab, Ammon, and Edom, and perhaps it would have been unable to maintain its identity if help had not come from the original home in Mesopotamia. This is Jacob, whose name means "reinforcement," "straggler." Jacob appears as father of twelve sons: these are the tribes into which Israel was divided in historical times. Legend has these sons, with the exception of Benjamin, born in Haran and the patriarch brought thence by them to Palestine: this is significant and shows that we are dealing here with fresh additions from without. Among these twelve sons the genealogical relationship is especially important. They fall into four groups, personified by the legend in four mothers:

two wives and two concubines of the patriarch. We have four groups: a Leah group, a Rachel group, a Bilhah group, and a Zilpah group. The oldest and most important of these groups is the Leah group, and next to it the Zilpah group; but not less in power and nobility was the Rachel group, with which the Bilhah group was more closely connected.

In the origin and formation of the tribes we have one of the obscurest points in the primitive history of Israel; but weighty reasons confirm us in thinking that we must place the beginnings of tribal formation in the pre-Egyptian period. In order to avoid false conceptions, we must endeavor to get a clear idea of what a tribe is according to oriental views. We are inclined to conceive of a tribe as something great and important; but that would be a great mistake. The Turkish Bureau of Statistics publishes a list of the Bedouin tribes that wander in Dscholan, the region east of the Sea of Galilee; there are 29 enumerated and their number given by tents, the tents being estimated at an average of five persons. Of these 29 "tribes" two consist of 4 tents, two of 6, five of 8, and the most numerous of 300. This, then, would make for the largest in round numbers 1500 souls, while groups of only 20 souls are reckoned as separate tribes. On an average each of these 29 tribes has 40 tents, or in round numbers 200 souls. Such are the ideas of size with which we have to deal in treating the earliest tribal history of Israel. Even in historical times the tribe of Dan is estimated at 600 fighting men, and all Israel at 40,000.

It is not to be assumed that the Abrahamitic expedition had no connexion with the formation of the tribes, and there has been a disposition to see in the Leah group, which is generally regarded as the oldest and comprising the firstborn sons, the portions of the Abrahamitic expedition that remained in Canaan, and in the Rachel group the reinforcements from Haran, so that Jacob and Joseph would at bottom be terms of the same size historically. At any rate we must distinguish two expeditions; the second we shall call the Jacobitic. This one united with the portions of the Abrahamitic expedition that remained in Canaan—the legend has Jacob also settle in the southern part of the land—and now becomes the representative of the historical development. And the two expeditions were united not outwardly alone, but spiritually as well: the faith of Abraham was transmitted to Jacob and was perpetuated in him as the noblest inheritance from his ancestors.

The next feature reported by tradition is the internal strifes among the tribes. Presuming upon his power and upon being the

representative of the national history, Joseph, from whom Benjamin had probably not yet separated, laid claim to the hegemony, but had to give up in the face of a coalition of the other tribes, and went to Egypt, whose fertile and grassy borderlands on the side of Asia, on the isthmus of Suez, had been from early times the scene of strife among Semitic nomads.

With Joseph the Bilhah group had lost its chief support. Now the Leah group attempted to gain control of it, and the firstborn of the Leah group, Reuben, seems to have planned to achieve this by violence; but the tough and doughty tribes of Dan and Naphthali maintained their independence, and Reuben retired from the contest so reduced that he lost forever his birthright, i. e., his former power and standing. The only case in which the tribe of Reuben, or members of it, play a historical part is the insurrection of the Reubenites, Dathan and Abiram, against the Levite Moses, to whom they deny the leadership,—another contest for the hegemony. Legend has personified these occurrences in a crime on the part of Reuben with Bilhah, his father's wife, on account of which he is cursed and deprived of his birthright.

But soon conditions must have arisen which forced all the tribes to migrate. They followed the path of Joseph, and the latter now took noble revenge; forgetting the cause of offence and mindful only of the old kinship, he hospitably opened to his distressed brethren the territory occupied by himself.

Thus all the sons of Jacob had come to Egypt. At first the Egyptian government, to which such settlements of Semitic nomads in the borderlands was a very common affair, seems to have met the strangers with kindly neutrality; but soon there was a very keen change in their situation, and the reason for this is to be found in a change of the historical and political conditions. Even in the Tell-el-Amarna correspondence, Ribaddi, the Egyptian prefect of Gebal (the Greek Byblos), complains of the Chatti who are advancing threateningly against northern Palestine. This people, the Hittites of the Old Testament, did in fact at this time, during a temporary decline of the Egyptian power, set up a great kingdom between the Euphrates and Lebanon. Judging by the names of their rulers on the numerous monuments left by them, they were not Semites, and the attempt has been made to identify them with the Armenians, and even to designate their language as Ancient Armenian.

When under Seti I. the Egyptian power began to revive, it undertook immediately the recovery of the former dominion in

Asia; but Seti was diverted toward the West and had to devote his chief attention to the Lybians. His son, Rameses II., however, equipped a great expedition against the kingdom of the Cheta and claims to have subdued them completely. But the end of the long contest was a treaty which proves the very opposite: the two opponents, who had apparently recognised themselves as well matched, concluded a perpetual peace, the letter of which is preserved to us as the oldest political treaty in history. When this treaty, the Egyptian version, it should be added, in which alone it is preserved, begins with the words: "Chetasar, the great king of Cheta, enters into treaty from this day on with Ramessu, the great prince of Egypt," one sees directly that this is not the style in which the vanquished deals with the victor. Evidently the kingdom of the Cheta remained unreduced and embraced all northern Palestine, while only southern Palestine returned into the former subjection to Egypt.

That this perpetual peace was not a finality was probably clear to both the contracting parties, and at least it was a heavily armed peace. Therefore we can understand why Rameses regarded distrustfully the alien elements on his eastern border facing Asia; besides, for his great architectural undertakings,—he was unquestionably the greatest builder of ancient Egypt,—he needed laborers, and so he resorted to the measure of impressing as public slaves the Semitic settlers on the isthmus of Suez and forced them to do heavy labor under strong military guard. It is claimed that there is a direct reference to the Israelites in a papyrus of the time of Rameses II. which speaks of "Apurin" who drag stone for the constructions of King Rameses. These Apurin, who are also mentioned elsewhere, are not, indeed, the Hebrews, but the papyrus is incontestable evidence that under Rameses II. alien settlers were really treated as the Israelites were treated by him according to their traditions. In the very Land of Goshen there have been discovered numerous structures of bricks made of Nile mud and chopped straw and bearing the arms of Rameses II.

And so from free nomads the Israelites had become Egyptian serfs. It will be easily understood that of all people Bedouins, in whom the proud spirit of independence is most characteristic, could not endure such treatment; among them especially it was inevitable that nature should rebel against the outrageous constraint which struck and wounded mortally the very heart of their being. As long as Rameses ruled, indeed, all resistance and all attempts at escape seemed vain. But under his son and successor, Meren-

ptah, an entire change in affairs took place. In the fifth year of Merenptah there poured over Egypt an invasion of several distinct foreign races, which brought the government to the verge of ruin. Merenptah claims, indeed, to have beaten and completely overcome the enemy, but it remains true that the Egyptian power received in these occurrences a blow from which it was long in recovering.

These enemies from without seem to have come simultaneously with all sorts of domestic troubles and distresses, and thus the hour of freedom for Israel had struck. Moses, a Hebrew of the tribe of Levi, had by favorable providence had access to the learning and civilisation of Egypt,—even his name, Mesu, is genuinely and specifically Egyptian. But his heart inclined him to his people; he preferred to be a brother of these despised slaves rather than to live in the enjoyment of Egyptian glory and Egyptian splendor. One single thought dominated him: how to become the rescuer and liberator of his people. With keen insight he perceived that the only possibility of rescuing them from the iron clutch of the Egyptian border fortresses and garrisons was a desperate course: through the sea to the desert. He gathers more detailed information about places and conditions, enters into connexions with the related Bedouins of the Arabian Desert, and when he thinks the proper moment come they start with wife and child, with flocks and belongings. By skilful zigzag marches he succeeds in eluding the Egyptian border-guards, and already the strait of Suez lies before them when they are overtaken by a troop of Egyptian scouts. Before them the breakers, behind them the pursuers thirsting for vengeance,—a moment of extreme distress! But where need is greatest there God is nearest. A mighty north-east wind lays dry the shallow strait and they go through on the bottom of the sea, into the desert, into freedom. The pursuing Egyptians are surprised by the returning waters; Israel is saved. Then, as Exodus says briefly, but with magnificent effect, “then the people feared the Lord and they believed in God and in his servant Moses.” This overwhelming moment created the people of Israel; they never forgot it: here they recognised the God of their fathers, who with strong hand and outstretched arm had saved his people and brought them out of the house of bondage, out of Egypt.

Under Merenptah, as we know from documentary evidence, southern Palestine and the sea-coast was still in uncontested Egyptian possession, and the neighboring kingdom of the Cheta was

obliged according to the treaty referred to, to deliver Egyptian deserters and fugitives; therefore Moses led the liberated people into the gorges of Sinai, whither a troop of wandering nomads could indeed make its way, but never an army of any size. Israel remained for some time in Sinai, and here in this mighty highland scenery tradition locates the capital achievement of Moses, his religious reorganisation of the people. It is one of the most remarkable moments in the history of mankind, the birth-hour of the religion of the spirit. In the thunder-storms of Sinai the God of revelation himself comes down upon the earth: here we have the dawn of the day which was to break upon the whole human race, and among the greatest mortals who ever walked this earth Moses will always remain one of the greatest.

But Sinai was only a station, not the goal of the expedition. Soon the people, strengthened by the rest and compacted by discipline, wandered on as far as Kadesh Barnea in the desert south of Canaan, very probably the modern Ain Kadès on the southwest slope of the plateau of Azazimeh. This place, sufficient as a settlement for simple shepherds, was out of reach of the Egyptian arms, and yet at the gate of the land of the fathers. Here for a time they could quietly await the development of affairs, and from all we can judge the stay in Kadesh must have been a tolerably long one. Probably here too occurred the death of Moses. That he personally did not enter the Promised Land, nor any one else of those who left Egypt, is an important feature of the tradition, the more essential when one remembers that the distance involved is one that can be covered easily under normal conditions in two weeks.

After the death of Merenptah Egypt fell into a condition of wild anarchy which made any interference in the affairs of Palestine impossible. His grandson, Setnecht, finally succeeded in restoring order; but then there came a new danger. In the eighth year of his successor, Rameses III., a general race migration swept in upon northern Syria and Palestine. We are told of a whole series of races who came bringing with them their wives and children to seek new dwellings. Rameses was obliged to take measures against the impending danger. With a great army and a strong fleet he set out for Palestine, and the experienced military art of Egypt was successful in defeating the undisciplined hordes. The danger to Egypt was removed and the glory of the Egyptian name in Palestine was revived—but it was a final flickering before extinction. After this we hear no more of the deeds of the Egyp-

tians in Canaan ; indeed when the first great Assyrian conqueror, Tiglathpileser, advanced to the Mediterranean, the Pharaoh hastened to send him presents.

This race-migration in the time of Rameses III. had two great results. It evidently destroyed the kingdom of the Cheta, of whom no more is heard, and it brought the Philistines to Palestine. In the army of these hordes Rameses repeatedly gives prominent mention to the "Pursta." As the Egyptian script regularly represents the "l" in foreign words by "r" and makes no distinction in the sounds, we may also read the name "Pulsta," and have probably to recognise in them the Philistines, who were of course also immigrants, and whose alien race character was especially felt. In nature and customs they were entirely different from all the other races of Palestine, and are therefore justly to be regarded as the remnant of that migration which remained in Palestine.

But we have almost lost sight of Israel, and shall now return to it. It was in all probability the consequences of the just-mentioned disturbances which brought Israel to the end of its wanderings. Driven in turn, perhaps, by the Philistines who were settling in their country, the Canaanites, led by their king, Sihon, made an advance into the country east of the Jordan, expelling the Moabites and the Ammonites from the most fertile parts of their territory and founding a new kingdom with Heshbon for its capital. At this point the conquered bethought themselves of their kinsmen in the desert of Kadesh. Perhaps called to aid by Moab and Ammon themselves, in any case they were welcome allies, and the fresh and unexhausted vigor of Israel accomplished the work. King Sihon was defeated at Jahaz and his kingdom destroyed, but Israel took up its dwelling in the bountiful land and kept for itself the reward of the contest and the victory. Soon, however, the fertile valleys and fields ceased to suffice for the constantly increasing men and flocks: it was necessary to seek homes west of the Jordan. Judah led the advance. He crossed the Jordan and turned southward toward the mountains and fertile lowlands which afterwards bore his name. Here Judah succeeded, indeed, in establishing himself, but only after heavy losses. Many mixtures with alien races took place, but after long and persistent struggles the intruder finally overcame the native; at the time of David, when Judah enters the clear light of history, the Israelitish part of the population is in unquestioned control of the land and it is recognised as distinctly Israelitish.

A second and entirely unsuccessful attempt was made by Si-

meon and Levi. Through treachery they got possession of the Canaanite city of Shechem which is the key to the mountain region of Ephraim ; but Israel recoiled in horror from the disgraceful deed, and the transgressing tribes fell victims to the vengeance of the Canaanites. Levi was obliterated as a tribe, to reappear by a most remarkable metamorphosis as a sacerdotal tribe ; the remnants of Simeon took refuge with their nearest kinsmen, the tribe of Judah, and were absorbed by it.

The third and most successful invasion was conducted by the house of Joseph. Only Reuben and Gad remained behind in the country east of the Jordan ; the other seven tribes united under the lead of the Ephraimite Joshua for a combined expedition against middle Palestine. They took advantage of unusually low water in the Jordan to make a sudden assault upon Jericho, which they captured and destroyed ; they also succeeded in taking Ai and Bethel.

Only now did the Canaanites, who were evidently enervated by luxury, and no match in respect of bravery for the impetuous sons of the desert, rouse themselves to united resistance ; but Joshua defeated them at Gibeon, and so Israel was firmly established in middle Palestine. But this does not mean that Israel was in full possession of the land : by far the best and most fertile portions of it, and especially the majority of the cities, whose strong fortifications made them impregnable to the primitive military skill of the Israelites, remained in possession of the Canaanites ; it was chiefly the woody mountain-chains of northern and middle Palestine that had come into the power of Israel, and the Canaanites had partly to be subdued by force and partly to be peacefully absorbed—a long and difficult task.

That Israel had the ability to carry on this centuries-long struggle deliberately and with final success, is due entirely to Moses and his work. Moses had given the people a nationality and in this an inalienable palladium which, purified and strengthened by the power of religion, could not be destroyed, but of itself led on to victory. Thus it came about that Israel in Canaan did not become Canaanitish, but on the contrary the Canaanites became Israelitish.

But this outcome of the contest of the nationalities was by no means certain to human foresight. In Canaan Israel adopted from the Canaanites agriculture and all the arts of domiciliated life. How easily this might have led to a change in national character, a loss of national individuality, so that Israel would have been conquered and subdued spiritually by the Canaanites !

Besides, quite apart from the superior numbers and civilisation of the Canaanites, Israel had within itself the worst of enemies and a germ of destruction. This was the proud sense of independence and the strongly-developed family feeling of the nomad, which did not immediately vanish from the national character with the surrender of the nomadic fashion of life. After the united effort under Joshua had but barely laid the foundation, the people again broke up into tribes and clans, which now aimlessly and each on its own account and unmindful of its neighbor sought new places of settlement.

Judah had been entirely lost sight of by the other tribes. Zebulun and Naphtali went into the extreme north where under the leadership of a certain Barak of Kedesh-naphtali they succeeded in defeating King Jabin of Hazor and thus secured their tribal territory in the North. A part of the tribe of Manasseh, the families of Jair and Machir, crossed the Jordan and conquered the land east of the Sea of Galilee: an event of much importance, since thus was established the permanent connexion between the country east of the Jordan and that west of it. The tribe of Dan tried first to establish permanent homes in the fertile plain sloping toward the Mediterranean; but in spite of all its bravery it did not succeed in conquering territory from the powerful and warlike Philistines: the poetic, one might almost say romantic, expression of this fruitless struggle between the tribe and the Philistines is preserved in the story of Samson. They finally left this region and in the utmost north conquered the city of Laish on the slope of Mount Hermon, giving it their own name of Dan. The division of Benjamin from Joseph and its continuance as a separate tribe must also be dated from this time. Shamir in the mountains of Ephraim was occupied by the family of Tolah of the tribe of Issachar, Pirathon in the same region by the family of Abdon, Aijalon by the family of Elon from the tribe of Zebulun. Only an extreme danger could bring about union among these, and not even this a complete or permanent union.

After the time of Joshua the Canaanites seem to have made only one more effort, by gathering and exerting all their forces, to overcome the intruders. Under the leadership of a certain Sisera of Harosett-haggiojim a powerful coalition of Canaanitish kings was formed, which undertook the war of extermination against Israel. And it seemed about to succeed: the Israelites were already withdrawing into the hiding-places of their woods and mountains when aid came from heaven. Deborah, a divinely inspired woman,

rekindled the spirits of the discouraged troops. Under the lead of Barak of the tribe of Issachar the fighting-men of seven tribes assembled upon the venerable and sacred Mount Tabor, and the Canaanites gave way before the impetuous attack of these troops fighting for God and their existence. At Taanach by the river Kishon they were beaten and scattered; Sisera himself was slain on his flight by a woman. After this battle we hear no more of any resistance on the part of the Canaanites: it settled the destiny of Palestine for good in favor of Israel.

While Israel had thus obtained relief from the Canaanites, it was now threatened by another enemy. The races related to Israel looked enviously upon its success, and now wanted a share of the Canaanite booty. Moab advanced across the Jordan, and its king, Eglon, received at Jericho homage and tribute from the tribe of Benjamin, but the Benjaminite Ehud stabbed him and freed his people from the foreign yoke. Ammon, too, advanced to the Jordan, and the hard-pressed tribe of Gad was saved only by the bravery of Jephthah, whose victory is made especially memorable by the tragic circumstances connected with it,—the hero was forced by a too hasty vow to sacrifice upon the altar his only child, a beloved daughter. Jephthah had also to wage domestic war. The tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh regarded with jealous and anxious eyes the rising power of the tribe of Gad which lay between them, and tried to extend their own territory by an act of aggression against Gad; but they were repulsed by the Gaddites under Jephthah and suffered a fearful defeat.

If Israel was so lacking in inner harmony, it is no wonder that its enemies had free play. Even the marauding Bedouins of the desert made plundering incursions into the land which was exposed to them as a defenceless prey. Such a band of Midianites advanced even to Mount Tabor in the extreme north of the country not far from the Sea of Galilee. But this very expedition was to bear far-reaching consequences. In pure wantonness the Midianites had slaughtered on Tabor some captured members of the noble family of Abiezer of the tribe of Manasseh. Thereupon Gideon, or Jerubbaal, the head of the family, took up the sword to avenge the blood of his murdered brethren. He summoned the members and dependants of his family, three hundred men all told, and with these pursued the retreating Midianites. Far beyond the Jordan, on the very border of the desert, he overtook them; he succeeded in dispersing the enemy and in taking captive their two kings, Zebah and Zalmunna, whom he himself struck down in ex-

piation for his murdered brethren, after his eldest son, Jether, had refused to do it. On his return he chastised the inhabitants of Succoth and Penuel, who had scornfully refused to aid him in his pursuit of vengeance. After this victory Gideon must have established a regular tribal kingdom: in his ancestral city of Ophrah he erected a great ephod, or idol, from the gold of the Midianitish booty, and maintained there a regular court and numerous wives.

Thus the first attempt at political concentration, the establishment of a tribal kingdom, had originated with the house of Joseph, and from this tribal kingdom might have grown a national kingdom, but the time for it had not yet come. During his life Gideon was in undisputed possession of the sway over Joseph; but after his death harem-politics, the curse of all oriental royal houses, overthrew his family. Abimelech, the son of a noble from the still purely Canaanitish city of Shechem, with the aid of kinsmen in this city, appropriated the inheritance of his father. He attacked Ophrah and slew there upon one stone all his brothers, seventy in number according to the legend; only the youngest escaped. Of course, this was not the way to establish the kingdom in the hearts of the Israelitish people. Abimelech enjoyed the usurped throne only three years. At the end of this period he fell into a quarrel with the Shechemites. Toward them, too, he acted the Israelitish king, and the proud Canaanitish nobles would not endure this of their creature. An open insurrection against him took place in consequence of which he sacked and utterly destroyed Shechem. But before the Canaanitish city of Thebez, which he was threatening with the same fate, destiny overtook him. As he was on the point of setting fire to the tower in which the inhabitants of Thebez had taken refuge, a woman threw a millstone down upon him from the battlements of the tower and killed him.

Thus the first attempt at an Israelitish kingdom ended in blood and murder. But it failed not on its own account, but because of the manner of its execution. Conditions called for a repetition of the attempt: only it must be no tribal kingdom, but a national one. It was an absolute necessity. Only through the union in one strong hand of all the divided and therefore impotent forces could the way be paved for order, and race and nationality be maintained. True, it required first a great danger to overcome all the centrifugal forces in Israel, and a gigantic danger really came; but in the fire of this extreme distress Israel was welded together into a united and strong nation.

The truculent people of the Philistines, well trained in war,

took advantage of the weakness of Israel and advanced toward the mountain region of Ephraim into the fertile plain of Jezreel. The first clash at Eben-ezer resulted unfortunately for Israel. Thereupon they fetched from the temple at Shiloh the old military shrine of the house of Joseph, the ark of the covenant, in order to make sure of the help of God. But as though God had wished to give his people an impressive lesson on the folly of such reliance upon outward things, this second battle ended with a more terrible and complete defeat: thirty thousand Israelites covered the field of battle; the sacred ark itself was captured by the heathen victor. With this the power of Joseph was broken. The Philistines burned and destroyed the temple at Shiloh, carried the captured sacred ark to the temple of their chief god, Dagon, and subjected the land even to the Jordan: the people were disarmed and held in check by Philistine prefects and strongholds. And from all evidence this Philistine domination must have lasted a considerable time. Israel seemed paralysed, and submitted, though with gnashing of teeth. After all it was no disgrace to have succumbed to the lion. But when in addition the ass came to give a kick to the powerless people, the measure was full. The Ammonites renewed the attempt which Jephthah had checked, and spread out as conquerors on the east bank of the Jordan. They laid siege to the city of Jabesh-gilead; the inhabitants, recognising the impossibility of resistance, offered to capitulate. But the Ammonite king, Nahash, answered them: "On this condition will I accept a capitulation from you, that I may thrust out all your right eyes, and lay it for a reproach upon all Israel." The inhabitants of Jabesh beg for seven days time, during which they propose to call on all Israel for help. Scornfully the Ammonite grants them the respite and calmly permits the messengers to leave the beleagured city. But he was destined to have erred in his reckoning. The God of Sinai had not forgotten his people; he who had freed it from the bondage of the Egyptians delivered it now from the Philistine subjection. Already his spirit had touched the heart of the hero whom he had chosen as the liberator of his people; this liberator is still following the plow in the field inherited from his fathers, but humbly yet confidently he bides his time. Then when the call for help from Jabesh reaches his ear, there is no delay; the districts of Israel are stirred as by a spring tempest: the liberator, the king has come.

THE EVOLUTION OF EVOLUTION.

BY DR. MONCURE D. CONWAY.

MR. EDWARD CLODD'S history of the great generalisation now called Evolution, which has recently appeared, is not only a substantial work in itself, and the most comprehensive yet written on its subject, but it possesses the excellent quality of suggestiveness. He has necessarily drawn lines of delimitation on his frontiers, and adhered pretty closely to the scientific lineage of evolution, but the volume convinces me that many of the most important facts lie beyond those frontiers. Lucretius is generally credited with being the first evolutionary philosopher, though tendencies of the like kind are to be found in Democritus, Empedocles, Aristotle, and Epicurus; and it is evident from many thoughts of Marcus Aurelius that this had become a mental attitude of moral and meditative writers. He speaks of their being only "one substance"; out of "the universal substance, as if it were wax, the universal nature moulds" all organised forms; "all things are implicated with one another;" "one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of the active movement and mutual conspiracy and the unity of the substance." But ideas of this kind, when thus assumed without argument, are themselves the result of long processes of evolution, and I believe that if careful search were made it would be found that among all great races of antiquity there existed an evolutionary conception of nature, and that this underlay the quasi-mythological and symbolical belief in transmigration, avatars (from the tortoise to primitive man) the succession of the Buddhas, and (in Genesis) the development, under a maternal brooding of the life-spirit, from chaos to man. In *The Gospel of Buddha* (Carus, XCIX.) the Buddhist doctrine that "reason came forth in the struggle for life," corresponds with the teaching of the Zoroastrian Avesta of the interaction of the living

and not-living by which visible nature was fashioned. Genesis begins "In a beginning," and I doubt if there be any ancient cosmology wherein the universe is declared to be created out of nothing. The relationship between man and the animals underlies all moralising fables, from Pilpay, the Buddhagoshā parables, and Æsop, to "Uncle Remus,"—some of whose stories are traceable to aboriginal Africa. Some eminent scholars think that among the three thousand parables of Solomon were fables about "beasts, birds, creeping things, fishes" (I. Kings, iv, 32, 33).

The striking fact about these ancient intimations of evolution is that they are generally perceptions of the religious or of the moral sentiment. And when we come to the speculative theories of later philosophers and scientists the same religious association of the germinating principle is noticeable. I will mention two that I have observed and which I have not seen mentioned in this connexion in any published work,—both from the seventeenth century. Spinoza, in his work *De Deo et Homine*, argues against the existence of a Devil that "from the perfection of a thing proceeds its power of continuance." The existence of a Devil would be the survival of a being through its unfitness. Newton, after he had published his *Principia* (1687), appears to have felt increasingly a divine presence in nature while doubting that the deity was not at work in organic nature in a dynamic way. Twenty years after the original publication he added, in a note: "Perhaps the whole "frame of nature may be nothing but various contextures of some "certain ethereal spirits or vapors, condensed, as it were, by precipitation . . . and after condensation wrought into various forms "at first by the immediate hand of the creator, and ever after by "the power of nature."

Goethe in Germany, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire in France, and Erasmus Darwin (grandfather of Charles) in England, all three came simultaneously (1794–95) to the conclusion that species were physically connected, but before either of them John Hunter had placed a little footnote in one of his publications which recognised the connexion between embryonic development and the geological progression of forms. And there it lay unnoted by any eye until Ralph Waldo Emerson saw a new religion in it. And here I may relate an adventure of my own. Soon after Emerson's death I was requested to give a lecture on his life and works at the Royal Institution, London, and in preparing the lecture (which was given February 9, 1883) I was desirous of making some statement concerning an early reference by him to Hunter as having announced

a theory of "progressive and arrested development." I consulted Huxley, Tyndall, and Sir William Flower (then Hunterian lecturer) as to the statement of Hunter, but neither could tell me where the passage might be found. They had never supposed that Hunter had any such idea. But by reading steadily through the first volume of Hunter (Palmer's edition) I found on page 265 this footnote: "If we were capable of following the progress of increase of number of parts of the most perfect animal, as they formed in succession, from the very first to its state of full perfection, we should probably be able to compare it to some of the incomplete animals themselves of every order of animals in the creation, being at no stage different from some of those inferior orders; or, in other words, if we were to take a series of animals, from the more imperfect to the perfect, we should probably find an imperfect animal corresponding with some stage of the most perfect." The fact that each animal in the course of its embryonic development passes through stages comparable to those of adult animals of lower organisation is now explained by evolution. John Hunter died in 1793; his great anatomical collection is the basis of the Hunterian Museum, where now the visitor begins with the lowest animal forms on the floor and ascends by galleries which represent the strata of the earth, as to their ascending forms, up to the skeletons of all races; yet his little footnote, recognising the organic world in an egg, lay as the merest dry bone for a hundred years until the religious breath of Emerson gave it meaning. It had been impressed on me in my youth by my beloved teacher himself. I had undertaken to write a little essay on "The Natural History of the Devil," and was finding it rather difficult to deal with the problem of moral evil. But I happened to mention my task and its difficulties to Emerson, who said: "What is moral evil but arrested development?" Thus it was that many years later I was able to quote to the scientific men at the Royal Institution the footnote of John Hunter and Emerson's interpretation of it, which he had written many years before Darwin's *Origin of Species* was published.

* * *

Evolution was Emerson's religion for a quarter of a century before its specific physical method was discovered and announced by Darwin. His son, Edward Emerson, showed me in manuscript his father's very first public lecture after he had abandoned the ministerial profession and entered on his real ministry. The lec-

ture was given in Boston in the winter of 1833-34, and entitled "The Relation of Man to the Globe." In this manuscript there is a significant blank. After tracing the progression of forms through "a thousand thousand ages" preceding man, he says: "Man was "not made sooner because his house was not ready had "wrought such changes on the surface of the globe as to make the "earth habitable for a finer and more complex creation." Who had wrought? What "had wrought"? Apparently no word or name had yet been born into the new thinker's mind adequate to fit the new fact. The blank space remains unfilled. One of his striking sentences is: "The brother of man's hand is even now cleaving the "Arctic Sea in the fin of the whale, and innumerable ages since "was pawing the marsh in the flipper of the saurus."

In 1836, the year in which Charles Darwin left college for the voyage which discovered a new world, Emerson published his first book, *Nature*, which always impresses me as the Vedas of the new scientific age, in which instead of man's ancient worship of dawn, sun, cloud, star, these glorious objects unite in the adoration of man. His anthem of unity swelled on, and evolution was his key to every mystery. Among the Emersonian students at Harvard College, of which I was one, evolution was an enthusiastic religious faith and vision in the fifties, and when in 1859 Darwin's great book appeared it seemed to us, in our various regions, as if the very dove of wisdom had alighted on the head of our dear master, who had so long seen this truth by inner vision. In that year I was present at a conversation between Emerson and Agassiz,—in whom, great as he was, the paternal Swiss pastor survived, and who, when the new star appeared, was, like the ancient shepherds, "sore afraid." He regarded this theory of Darwin's as atheistic. Emerson, who loved Agassiz, was greatly disappointed at his rejection of the discovery, and recalled to his mind his (Agassiz's) early lectures, which had made so much of Goethe's *Metamorphoses of plants*, and Oken's ideas, and the generalisation of Buffon, who said: "There is but one animal." Agassiz answered, "Yes, I have always believed in the ideal progression of forms, the gradation from lowest to highest, but to this materialistic development of one into another I cannot agree." Emerson was going on to maintain that the material and the ideal were essentially one, but Agassiz became excited and troubled, and said, "There we must differ." Thereon, with his usual tact, Emerson changed the subject. As the two men sat there, the greatest men in America, parting on the subject nearest to both,—one seeing

atheism where the other saw a new gospel,—I, who listened silently, beheld a marvellous illustration of “progressive and arrested development.” But I cannot help recognising at this distance of time that the hereditary theistic instinct of Agassiz told true, in one sense, and the particular idea of deity in which he had been educated has not survived in the post-Darwinian world. A new religious statement has become necessary to adjust evolution to the spiritual consciousness, and that statement will also have to be evolved.

THE MAN IN THE WELL.

A PARABLE. TRANSLATED FROM A CHINESE SUTRA.

BY D. HAYASHI.

THUS I HAVE HEARD. Once upon a time Buddha was residing in the garden of Anāpīṇḍada at Jetavana in Srāvastī, with a great number of bhikṣus. Among them there was the great Emperor Shōkō, and Buddha addressed him :

“There is a parable which I will tell you, and you bethink deeply its meaning.

“In olden times a man was travelling through a wild prairie-land where he met a ferocious elephant. In his fear he ran away but the elephant pursued him hotly. On the way there was a deep well at the root of a tree, on which he climbed down to escape the danger ; but O horror ! he saw two rats, one white, the other black, gnawing at the root alternately ; and snakes on the four sides of the well threatened to bite the poor man with their poisonous fangs, while at the bottom of the well a large dragon was waiting to kill the suspended man with his sharp claws. And there was a hive in the root of the tree from which he sucked five drops of honey, and then the bees stung him. After this, the tree was burned by a fire which came from the prairie.”

When the Emperor heard this dreadful story, he asked the Buddha : “Why did that man undergo so much suffering, and how could he suck honey notwithstanding the evil consequences ?” Then the Buddha replied : “Great Emperor, this parable illustrates the fate of man. The wild prairie is our ignorance ; the man represents the condition of all living beings ; the elephant is the transiency of the world ; the well is the birth and death of man ; the tree root is life ; the white and the black rats are day and night ; their gnawing is the slow lapse of time ; the snakes on the four sides are the four

elements [viz., earth, water, fire, and air]; the honey-drops are the five sensual desires [rising from visible form, sound, smell, taste, and touch]; the bee is sin; the fire is disease and old age; and the dragon is death.

“The parable teaches men to be afraid of the causes of misery of birth, old age, disease, and death.”

When the Emperor Shoko had heard the Buddha's sermon, he was full of awe over the causes of misery. And then the Emperor Shoko worshipped the Buddha and said to him: “Now I received your merciful instruction, and I will in the future practise the law.”

“Good and great Emperor,” replied the Buddha, “you practise the law according to my words, and persevere in unshaken endurance on the path of salvation.”

When the Buddha had concluded the words of instruction concerning salvation, Emperor Shoko and the multitude of Buddha's disciples were full of exceeding joy.

THE MIGRATION OF A FABLE.

EDITORIAL COMMENT.

The Reverend D. Hayashi of Toyotsu Mura, Japan, informs us that the Chinese original from which he translated the parable of “The Man in the Well,” is a translation from the Sanskrit which was imported into China by the Buddhist pilgrim Gi-jô about twelve hundred years ago. When Buddhism was introduced into Japan, this Sutra also found its way to the Flowery Kingdom and is there well known. The special interest of this parable consists of the fact that it is known also in Europe where it was imported in the famous collection of Bidpai's Fables. We here reproduce a reduced fac-simile of an old German print, published in the year 1483 in Ulm by L. Halle.

En sollicher mensch würdt recht gegleicht ain man
 der sich einen lewen der yn iagt / vnd kam zu ainem
 dieffen brünnen vñ ließ sich dar ein vnd hüß sich mit
 seinen henden an zway claine reiflen. So bei ende des galbrün
 nen gewachsen warend / vnd sein fuß satz er auff ain walzen

den stain/vnd sach vor ym her gan vier tiere die mit geduckten haubten vnd yn begertn züuerschlinden/vnd da er sein gesicht von ynen zü tal köte da sach er ainen greuselichen trachen mit auff getanem münd vnder ym in gründe des brünnen/berait yn in seinen giel zü enpfachen/vnd nam war das bei den zwai en reisen daran er sich hüß ain schwarze vnd ain weisse mauß waren die ab zenagen nach irem vermügen. Dieser mensch da er in so grossen engsten stünd vnd nit west wann sein end was da ersach er neben ym zwüschen zwaien stainen ein wenig hönigsams/dauon leckt er mit seiner züngen/vnd durch entpfung der clainen süßigkeit vergaß er ym selber für zü sehen wy er von seiner angst geledigt werden möcht bisß das er viele vnd verdarb. Ich gleich den brünnen diser welt/die vier tiere die vier element von den alle menschen züm tod gefordert werden/die zwai reiß das leben des menschen/die weiß mauß den tag/die schwarz mauß die nacht die sterz das leben des menschen ab nagend/durch den trachen das grab des menschen das sein alle stund wartet das wenig hönigsam der zergenglich wollust dieser welt durch den sich manig mensch in ewige vnruw versenckt.

A picture illustrating the story accompanies the German text, which reads in English as follows :

“Such a man (viz., a worldly man living for pleasure) should be compared to a man who has fled before a lion that is chasing him, and has come to a deep well and laid himself down and clung with his hands to two little twigs on the edge of the well. Here, resting his feet upon a round stone, he saw before him four animals with lowered heads, eager to devour him. And when he turned his face away from them and looked down he saw a horrible dragon with gaping mouth under him at the bottom of the well, ready to receive him in his jaws, and he perceived that at the twigs to which he clung there were two mice one black and one white who gnawed at them with all their might. As he stood in such great fear not knowing when his end



As he stood in such great fear not knowing when his end

would come, he saw near him between two stones a little honey which he licked with his tongue, and in the sensation of that little sweetness he forgot to give heed as to how he might be released before he should fall and perish. I liken the well to this world: the four animals to the four elements who have a claim on all men until death. The two twigs are the life of man. The white mouse is day and the black mouse is night, who are constantly gnawing at man's life. The dragon is the grave of man that all the while is awaiting him. The little honey is the lust of this world through which many a man sinks into eternal unrest."

The points in which the two forms of the parable differ are very trivial in comparison with their similarities.¹

¹For the history of Bidpai's Fables, the migration of which has been closely traced, see Dr. Ernst Kuhn's essay in the *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (1893); also Joseph Jacob's *Bidpai's Fables* and *Barlaam and Josaphat*.

MISCELLANEOUS.

PÈRE HYACINTHE LOYSON.

Père Hyacinthe Loyson, whose portrait we publish as the frontispiece of the present number of *The Open Court* to accompany his article on "The Religion of Islam," was born in Orléans, France, in 1827. Educated in the bosom of the Roman Catholic Church, he was for a long time one of the ablest scientific expounders of its doctrines, and had in fact reached the maturity of manhood before he began in Paris, with his lectures at Notre Dame, the career of criticism which made him famous and which, as his ideas broadened, finally led to his breach with the Church. His utterances as a Roman Catholic *savant* involved him in many lively controversies, and in 1869, on the meeting of the Council of the Vatican, he sent to the general of his order a ringing protest denouncing "the intrigues of the one all-powerful party at Rome," and refusing henceforward to preach "a doctrine falsified by words of command, or mutilated by reservations." As the result of his bold protest he was excommunicated from the Church, and several months later visited the United States. He was in London during the Franco-Prussian war, and pleaded there the cause of France. In 1871 he visited Italy and afterwards repaired to the Congress of "Old Catholics" at Munich, where he delivered several stirring addresses against the infallibility of the Pope. In 1872 he returned to Paris and sealed his separation from the Church by marrying Miss Meriman, an American lady, whom he had converted to Catholicism and who has since loyally aided him in his labors of reform.

His marriage was the beginning of a new period in his career. In 1877 he returned to Paris, and after eight years of silence again appeared before the people in the rôle of a religious preacher. His reappearance created an enormous stir, his lectures at the Cirque d'Hiver being extraordinarily successful. After a sojourn of five years in Switzerland, which he devoted to the cause of Catholic reform in that country, Père Hyacinthe founded the first Gallican Catholic Church in Paris in 1879. With this bold act he reached the acme of his reformatory career, which may be epitomised in the remark that he is the renovator of the ancient Gallican Catholicism which, while recognising the primacy of the Bishop of Rome, rejected his infallibility in religious, and his authority in political, matters. The doctrines of the ancient national church found in Père Hyacinthe a staunch defender.

But the significance of his labors is not only that of a return to the vigorous and independent ideas of the past; his glance is also directed to the future. Christianity must be regenerated on a broader basis, and on one conforming absolutely with modern science. It is useless to struggle against the spirit of modern science;

we must march with progress, not against it. And it is his contention that in order to meet fully the needs of present and future humanity, Roman Catholicism must not only be reformed but transformed. "What is false in it must perish, what is true must be made more true, more full of life, more comprehensive." Let us read his own words, which he has written especially for *The Open Court* in answer to our query, "What is your position?"

"I am not a philosopher nor a writer. I am a humble preacher, moved by God, as I firmly believe, to utter in an enslaved church the cry of deliverance. In regaining for myself the sacred rights of thought, conscience, and of heart, I have claimed them for all.

"Like the Shepherd of Horeb, I have heard the voice which speaks in the desert and in the fire. It proclaims the absolute God, yet withal a personal and living God. It says, as of old, 'I am He who is.' I have put off my shoes from my feet, for the ground on which we walk is holy; I have hidden my countenance, for I dare not look the Eternal in the face.

"And the voice which affirmed the sovereignty of the Absolute Being now proclaims the liberty of created existences: Thou shalt say unto the children of Israel: 'He that is hath sent me to you.'

"And the Eternal said to me further: 'I have seen the affliction of my people who are in bondage, in the Catholic Church, and I have heard the cries which their taskmasters have caused them to utter. Come now, therefore, I will send thee unto Pharaoh, who sitteth in the Vatican, that thou mayest bring forth my people, the children of Israel, out of Egypt.'

"But the children of Israel did not hearken unto me. They have not only ceased to believe in Christ and the Church, but also in the living God and in the immortal soul. They have found in the depths of their moral being naught but the response of death. They have preferred the fleshpots of Egypt with bondage to labor and sacrifice with liberty. Let them continue, then, to prostrate themselves before the idols in which they no longer believe: I and my house shall serve the Eternal."

"One has only to read," says a writer in the *Profils Contemporains*, from whom we have taken most of the data of this sketch, *Mon Testament* and the *Codicille à mon Testament*, to appreciate that the regenerator of the Gallican Church is not pursuing a chimerical task, and that sooner or later the most absolute zealots of Catholicism will be compelled to recognise in Hyacinthe Loyson the most illustrious forerunner of the New Catholicism which will emerge perforce from the struggle between science and ultramontaniam."

As the reader will see from Père Hyacinthe's utterances in the article in the present number, his thought and character are marked by a strong filial fidelity to traditional Christianity and by a broad liberalism which aspires after the greatest possible progress. His theism is of the old virile Christian type, unadulterated by speculative thought. He encloses in a recent letter to us the following brief statement written with his own pen: "God is not only thought, but he thinks. He is thought by man, he thinks himself. The definition of the Indians of America is a fitting one: 'He is the Great Spirit.'"

It is significant of the width and thoroughness of Père Hyacinthe's labors that he has been accused of sometimes mingling politics with religion. And the belief is characteristic of the man that one's religion should penetrate into all the walks of life. No one has insisted more emphatically or eloquently than he on the part which religion should play in the great social struggle.

Ardent and combative, yet with all the gentleness of the classical Christian character, Père Hyacinthe has been endowed by nature with a gift of surpassing eloquence, which has been much enhanced by the culture of art, and has gained for him an international fame. But behind the orator is the deep sincerity of the religious reformer, which has led to his being called the new Lamennais. Finally, Père Hyacinthe asks us to say for him that he is a devoted champion of the Parliament of Religions and of its organisation as a permanent institution. We do not take leave here of his interesting and charming personality for good, but hope to publish in a future number additional sentiments from his pen on the problems of religious life and thought which will give a deeper insight into his soul. μκρκ.

M. BRUNETIÈRE ON EDUCATION.

M. Ferdinand Brunetière is in the habit of printing now and then in pamphlet form a lecture or article which advocates some one of his pet theories, contains a truth that he would spread or combats an error, as he thinks, which he would exterminate. He has issued quite a collection of this sort in which you will often find more of the real Brunetière than in his more pretentious volumes.

One of these modest pamphlets—*Education et Instruction*—develops M. Brunetière's views on the whole subject of education. What should be its real aim? he asks. To form men, he answers. But there are so many kinds of men! Should the effort of our schools be, for instance, to turn out trained athletes or polished men of the world? So at the very threshold of the subject, we must decide what kind of men we wish to produce. As, according to M. Brunetière, the permanent interests of the nation and of society should regulate the matter of public instruction, the aim of education and educators should be to subordinate, in the rising generations, something of themselves and their natural rights to the interests of the community and to substitute in every man the aggressive power of social motives for the natural impulse of individual motives.

M. Brunetière does not at all believe in pedagogic chairs. He holds that the true professor finds in the sentiment of the dignity of the profession that pedagogy which is the art of not only awakening the mind but of forming character. The apparatus with which educators embarrass themselves appears to him to be useless.

Athletics, foot-ball, rowing, etc., which are rapidly making their way in the French college world, awaken no enthusiasm in M. Brunetière. He believes that exacting and supernourished senses are less easily dominated than more sluggish and spiritualised ones. He thinks, therefore, that gymnastics offer more inconveniences than advantages, that physical vigor has nothing in common with intellectual force. It is only the base not the measure, he says. At the bottom of this false reasoning lies the vague hope that by this means the quality of the race may be improved. Vigorous children, they say, will become robust men and robust men will engender vigorous children. Here bodily strength is associated with patriotic and national interests, for France wishes, above all things, to preserve her political existence.

That part of education which consists in polite forms, elegance of manner, and which goes to the making up of the well-bred man *par excellence* is the same at bottom, as athletic education. A well-bred man is one who puts himself to inconve-

nience for others. He is taught to repress every thought and act which could wound his fellows. The interest of the general is recognised as superior to that of the individual and imposes the subordination thereto of one's own nature. Here, as everywhere throughout Brunetière's writings, the principle is inculcated of the effacement of the individual before the general good. There is no country, no society, no army without this.

M. Brunetière declares that instruction and morality have not made equal progress, that the increase of learning has not been followed by a decrease of crime. Neither diplomas nor parchments prevent one from succumbing to the most vulgar temptations. You may be a very honorable man without knowing how to spell. This is a mild protest on the part of Brunetière against what some consider the excessive impulse given to popular education under the third Republic.

The grand affair, M. Brunetière tells us in summing up, is to regulate the relations between instruction and education, which terms, by the way, were almost synonymous in old French as they are in English to-day, and which M. Brunetière regrets is not the case in modern French. The aim of the first is no longer, he tells us, as formerly, disinterested culture, but only the ability which is found in it. One studies now for an immediate, effective, and practical end, in order to utilise, as a help towards success, the knowledge acquired. Instruction, so understood, is opposed to education, for it develops the spirit of individualism and puts first considerations of getting on in the world. To consider oneself the centre of the universe and one's chief aim the strengthening of all the powers of one's being,—this view of modern instruction Brunetière cannot approve. He regrets that the selfish culture of the ego should be the first and last words of our methods, that the curricula of studies seek only to arm each individual as completely as possible for the struggle for existence. All this, M. Brunetière tells us, is contrary to the true purpose of education, which should be the substitution of the interests of society for those of the individual, and he points out the danger of having so organised public instruction that man's passage through life is a perpetual combat of each one of us against all the rest.

It will thus be seen that when M. Brunetière sailed for the United States last March on a lecture tour among some of our seats of learning, he had already thought and written maturely on the whole subject of education and had arrived at some very decided conclusions, many of which are quite contrary to the ones prevailing on both sides of the Atlantic.

THEODORE STANTON.

LECTURES ON THE STUDY OF THE BHAGAVAT GITA. Being a help to students of its philosophy. By *T. Subba Row, B. A., B. L., F. T. S.* Printed for the Bombay Theosophical Publication Fund. By *Tookaram Tatyā, F. T. S.* 1897. Pages, 216. Price, 14 Annas.

The author of these lectures, the late Mr. T. Subba Row, was a native of high culture who held the position of a pleader at the Madras High Court and was well versed in the sacred scriptures of the Hindus as well as in Western science. The lectures were delivered at the request of the Bombay Theosophists and present his interpretation of this greatest book of Brahmanism, which he looks upon as "a discourse addressed by a Guru to a Chela who has fully determined upon the renunciation of all worldly desires and aspirations but yet feels a certain despondency caused by the apparent blankness of his existence." Krishna, who represents the divine teacher, is to Subba Row the "Logos," while the Atma, viz., the eternal self

of the Deity, is identified with God. The lectures are interesting as the exposition of the Hindu Song of Songs by one of their most prominent modern thinkers, and the tendency of broadening Brahmanism is apparent on every page.

VERGLEICHENDE UEBERSICHT DER VIER EVANGELIEN. By *S. E. Verus*. Leipsic: P. van Dyk. 1897.

This synopsis of the four Gospels, which is very handy for comparison as well as for critical study of the various Gospel passages, is apparently written by a theologian who has made a thorough and professional study of the subject. He hides his name under the pseudonym of *S. E. Verus*, and publishes his book under the motto of an old orthodox theologian, the Rev. Ch. K. I. Bunsen, who admonished clergymen to "tell to the congregation the full truth and indeed in such a way that the people could fall back on the original sources themselves." *Verus* has tried to live up to this principle, and the result is the present book, which is not only useful to people who hunt for contradictions among the four Gospels, but also to clergymen who make a thorough study of the text. The critical notes are as brief as possible and contain the most important references. It is strange that the book, which is quite scholarly and creditable, is anonymous. The author apparently fears removal from his position as a clergyman or as a teacher; and we interpret it as a sign of the times in Germany where a tidal wave of reaction seems to be sweeping over the country.

BAB-ED-DIN, THE DOOR OF TRUE RELIGION. By *Ibrahim G. Kheiralla, D. D.* Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co. 1897. Price, 25 cents.

The author, a resident of Chicago, is a disciple of Abd-el-Karim Effendi Taharani of Cairo. He teaches a religion which accepts the doctrines of Jesus as well as of Moses, but rejects the dogmas of the Church. The pamphlet contains two parts, the first explains the author's views of the individuality of God who is an omnipresent person and must neither be identified with the universe nor conceived as a law or principle. The second part is a most vigorous criticism of the dogma of vicarious atonement.

A "civic and philanthropic conference" will be held at Battle Creek, Michigan, October 12-17, to discuss the methods for the betterment of municipal politics, public sanitation, pauperism and crime, emergency relief, social settlements, and public hygiene. People interested in the movement may address S. Sherin Secretary, Sanitarium, Battle Creek, Michigan.

With regard to the correspondence of the Rev. C. A. Seelakkhandha, of Ceylon, on "Buddhist Relics," in No. 489 of *The Open Court* (pp. 125-5), we have, at his request, to state that the largest relics are "half the size of a kidney-bean (*Phaseolus mungo*)," and the second largest are "half the size of a seed of rice."

The Japanese monthly *Hansei Zasshi* aspires more and more since it is published in English to become an interpreter of Japanese thought to the English speaking world. It publishes articles on Japanese art, religion, history, and antiquities, including also a number of notes on current events. It is illustrated and will be welcome to all lovers of the country of the rising sun. It contains sometimes materials that are of general interest. We take pleasure in reproducing from

the latest number the text and translation of an ancient Chinese inscription which has been discovered at Buddha Gaya. It is the record of a Buddhist pilgrim from China who visited the sacred spot in about 950 A. D. The inscription reads:

THE TEXT.

大漢國僧志義先發願。勸三十萬人修上生行施三十萬卷上生經。自誦三十萬卷。如上功德迴迥同生內院。今至摩竭國毘金剛座。伏過唯識座。主歸寶與諸大德等。同發願往生內院。三十萬人中歸寶爲第一人。志義第二。廣峰第三。下依烈功第。惠嵩○○○○。童達^{トウダ}全^{セン}遵^{ジュン}緣^{エン}其義日進。惠秀智永奉昇清蘊等。並願親奉弥勒慈尊。今結良緣。成此七佛。已爲〔記念〕。

THE TRANSLATION.

"Chi-i, a priest of the country of the great Han, made a vow, some time ago, that he should persuade 300,000 men to perform the (religious) practices (required) for being born above; that he should distribute 300,000 copies of the sūtra of (Maitreya's) ascension to heaven; that he himself should recite it 300,000 times; that having performed the religious merit, such as above, all together should be born in the Innermost Hall (of the Tushita). Now he is come to the country of Moch'üeh (Magadha) and gazed upon the 'Diamond Seat' (vajra-âsana) and humbly passed the Seat of 'Only knowledge' (vidyâmâtra). The master, Kuei-pao, together with several men of great virtue (Bhadantas) vowed to go to be born in the Innermost Hall (of the Tushita). Of the 300,000 men, Kuei-pao is the foremost [man], Chi-i the second, and Kuang-fung the third. After these, in order of success, Hui-yen - - - ? ? ? ? their intelligence improved day by day. Hui-sien, Chi-yung, Fung-shing, Ts'ing-yun, and others together wished themselves to revere Mi-lö (Maitreya), the compassionate and honored one. They have now gained a favorable opportunity (for that purpose). They have made (the figures of) these seven Buddhas thereby to leave [a souvenir].

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47.

The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Editor: DR. PAUL CARUS,
Assistant Editor: T. J. McCORMACK.

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
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(1799-1888.)

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SEPTEMBER, 1897.

NO. 496

THE CANONISATION OF TWO NEW SAINTS.¹

BY PROF. G. M. FIAMINGO.

THE UNCOMPROMISING among the Italian faithful, those who do not know how to accommodate themselves to a state of things resulting from the absence of the temporal power of the Papacy, and who even to-day are speaking and writing in favor of restoring the rule of the Vatican, urge as among their strongest arguments that the Vatican is wanting in the necessary liberty for completely performing all its religious and spiritual functions.

Now, if anything is true it is this : that if the presence of the Italian Government at Rome has really put a stop to the feasts and religious processions in the streets, and has therefore operated as a moderating influence upon religious ceremonies, nothing has been more beneficial to Catholicism itself than that very fact.

The religion of Jesus Christ, which grew up slowly in the spirit of the Semitic race even before Christ came into the world, was in the nature of a reaction against the voluptuous worship of Syria, and was characterised by a great simplicity of ceremony, by the complete absence of temples, etc.

It is quite certain that Jesus Christ had no knowledge of the worship and the pompous and corrupt civilisation of the Greeks and Romans. But his religion being a spiritual movement of protest and reaction against the corruption and fanaticism of Judea, even if it was not called forth by them, was in striking contrast with the magnificence and the worldly, aristocratic, and imperial splendor of the Greek and Roman civilisation. And it is due to this contrast between the pietistic and simple nature of the religion of Christ and the barbaric and vainglorious spirit of that civilisa-

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. G. Fiamingo by I. W. Howerth of the University of Chicago.

tion, that the new religion on being brought into contact with it disseminated itself with great alacrity; it responded to the conscious need of those who felt and suffered the influences of that brutal civilisation.

Unfortunately, however, the religion of Christ on being brought to Rome, instead of reacting and correcting the evils of that unscrupulous, corrupt and voluptuous civilisation was little by little embodied in it, and when the Empire of the Cæsars fell the Church, already established at Rome, received its moral and intellectual legacy. Consequently the history of the Church of Rome during the Middle Ages is just as odious as that of the Roman Empire. The Christian religion lost that purity and simplicity which it had received from Mount Sinai, and took upon itself all the formality, all the ridiculous rites and superstitions, and all the pompousness which had belonged to Paganism.

This sickening excess of the external manifestations of worship and religious ceremonies was refined somewhat it is true by the progress of the arts and the artistic sentiments, but in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it became especially complicated and tended to become more and more pompous and even entirely theatrical. Gregory XV., like Pius IV. before him, felt the need of restraining and limiting the pompous and burdening system followed in the funerals of the Popes. He declared that during the nine days from the funeral of a Pope to the opening of the conclave the expenses ought not to exceed the sum of nine thousand ducats, which reduced to the value of money to-day would correspond to about ninety or one hundred thousand francs. Alexander VIII. in 1690 fixed these expenses at the sum of ten thousand *scudi*, which to-day would be equivalent to fifty-three thousand francs. And not only this, but he thought proper in his prohibition to descend to particulars, and fixed the maximum expense of a Catafalque at two thousand *scudi*. He even wished to be more economical by providing one for permanent use. These good intentions of Pius IV., of Gregory XV., and of Alexander VIII., did not always have the approval of the other Popes who followed them and consequently they were not often carried out.

Christianity brought into Italy and Rome lost little by little all its simplicity, and came to be powerfully affected, even misled, by the influence exercised upon it by a people quite different from those who had seen it brought forth. In one of the journeys of Jesus Christ from Jerusalem into Galilee, he stopped at Bir-Ga Koub where the women of Sychar came to draw water. Jesus

asked one of them for a drink. The demand made a strong impression upon the woman, for the Israelites ordinarily avoided all relations with the Samaritans. The woman attracted by the conversation of Jesus recognised in him a prophet and said to him: "Sir, our fathers worshipped in this mountain; and ye say, that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship." Jesus said unto her: "Woman, believe me the hour cometh when ye shall neither in this mountain nor yet at Jerusalem worship the Father, but the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." Now this sublime parable is the solid foundation of external religion, of pure worship. Without regard to country, without temples, without specific times is the worship of elevated souls, of all who truly feel the spirit of worship. But one will seek in vain in the religion of Christ after it was transplanted in Rome for a trace of religious principles so wonderfully humane and pure. For many centuries Rome had no other goddess than that of brutal force. The most ferocious military spirit dominated all the Romans even when they had become weak and disorganised. The sentiment of enmity, of hatred toward those who were not Roman, as well as the struggle among the social classes had waxed almost into paroxysm. And also, before the Republic and after the Empire, the worship of the artistically grand, of worldly splendor was developed in the continuous rendering of honor to victorious military leaders, and to the gods who must always be propitiated.

The religion of Jesus Christ as it arose and developed in Galilee responded to the need of the spirit of that population, which had none of the characteristics of the Romans. In Judea Christianity was a movement of the soul entirely spontaneous, hence it had no written or dogmatic formulæ. He was a Christian who looking forward to the Kingdom of Heaven adhered simply to Christ. The perfect idealism of Jesus was the highest rule of a disinterested and virtuous life. He created, as Renan says, the Heaven of the pure soul where is found that which is sought for in vain on the earth, the perfect nobility of the sons of God, the absolute purity, the total abstraction of the filthiness of the world, the liberty which modern society excludes as an impossibility and which can have an application only in the domain of thought. It was impossible that this religion, so pure and so humane, could be transplanted into the pompous and coarse environment of Rome, refined, as it was apparently, by the cultivation of art.

After the third century when it was recognised by Constantine as the official religion, the religion of Christ underwent at Rome a

profound perversion, and hence became through all the successive centuries an ally of the Government in holding in subjection and poverty the mass of the population. Meanwhile in the fourth century the Doctors of the Greek Church entangled Christianity in the most subtle dogmatic and metaphysical disquisitions, thus anticipating the scholastics of the Middle Ages. And all this in spite of the fact that Jesus Christ carefully refrained from uttering any dogma.

At Rome the Christian religion ceased to be pure "Ebionism," that is, the doctrine that the poor alone will be saved, and although its adherents continually declare that the kingdom of the poor must come, they do nothing to hasten its advent. For the pure and mystical worship of Christianity is substituted the admiration and worship of artistic religious productions, and pompous ceremonies performed with the greatest display.

When in 1870 the Italian Government had taken possession of Rome, the Pope, at first Pius IX. and then Leo XIII., proclaimed himself a prisoner of the Italian Government, paralysed in every action, and prohibited festivals in St. Peter's, that greatest temple of Catholicism. Pius IX. even wished that none of the furnishings of the Vatican should be renewed, and preferred to let everything go to rack and ruin in order to make it appear that the Vatican was suffering from the loss of power. Leo XIII., however, had ideas quite opposed to those of Pius IX. He wished to have all the furnishings of the Vatican renewed in accordance with what was suitable to the Royal Palace, and had all the magnificent Borghian apartments restored in a magnificent manner. He badly concealed his worldly sentiments. In other times he would have been a great patron of artists.

Thus we see that while with Pius IX. the presence of the Italian Government at Rome put a powerful check on the grandeur of religious ceremonies, even in St. Peter's with doors closed, Leo XIII., little by little, urged on by his worldly sentiments and by the traditions of the Roman Church, had these showy religious ceremonies performed, and brought back to the Roman people the magnificent festivities in St. Peter's just as they had been before 1870. If there is anything in these modern festivities different from those celebrated in St. Peter's before 1870,¹ it is perhaps

¹The only particular, and that is of no liturgical importance, is the absence of the religious processions through the streets of the city. This was prohibited after 1870. Especially important was that of the *Corpus Domini*. In the feasts of the Canonisation the procession with the Pope went out from one gate of St. Peter's, passed through the archway of the Piazza, and returned through the other gate. But this ceremony has been suppressed in the recent Canonisations.

their greater expense and luxury. The new times, the new social conscience, appear to have exercised no influence whatever.

The first Canonisation of Saints was in the eighth or ninth century. Mngr. Rocca, pontifical sacristan, in his Commentary *De Canonizzazione Sanctorum*, and other authors with him, assert that the first Canonisation was that of St. Sivitberto, celebrated in Verdun in 803 by Leo III. at the instance of the Emperor Charlemagne. Others maintain that the first Canonisation was that of St. Ulric, Bishop of Arduin, celebrated in the Hall of the Lateran Council, by John XV. in 993.


Few Canonisations are recorded outside of Rome, and there are few which were not celebrated in St. Peter's. That the Canonisation must be made at Rome and in St. Peter's was indeed explicitly decreed by Alexander VII. Benedict XIV. in his Bull of December 23, 1741, *Ad sepulcra Apostolorum*, solemnly confirmed what had been already established by his predecessors, and then, as if the first Bull were not sufficient, issued another, *Ad honorandam*, dated March 27, 1752. The constitution of Benedict XIV. is still followed in the procedure which has been instituted by the Congregation of Ceremonies in the Beatification of the Servants of God and in the Canonisation of the Beatified as well as in the ceremonial of Canonisation itself.

Up to to-day there have been registered one hundred and ninety-four Canonisations.

Pius IX., predecessor of the present Pope, although he held the Pontificate longer than it had ever been held in the history of the Popes, participated in only two Canonisations. These were in 1862 and in 1867. The latter was celebrated in St. Peter's on the 29th of June, falling on the centenary of the death of St. Peter, and on this occasion twenty-five saints were proclaimed. Among these was that famous Peter D'Arbues, whom Ferdinand Gregorovius in his *Diari Romani* called "infamous." Perhaps in this accusation Gregorovius exaggerated a little, and yet Gregorovius was undoubtedly a conscientious historian. In 1867 twenty-four Cardinals, six Patriarchs, two Primates, ninety-eight Archbishops, three hundred and fifty-seven Bishops, innumerable Prelates and Priests, came to Rome from every part of the world for the express purpose of participating in the function. The festival was celebrated with great pomp.

There was nothing extraordinary in the two Canonisations celebrated by the present Pontiff in 1882 and in 1888 respectively. These were not held in the Basilica Vatican, but in the so-called

Hall of the Benediction, reduced now to the Hall of the Beatification and Canonisation, situated above the Atrium of the Basilica



INTERIOR OF THE BASILICA OF ST. PETER'S AT ROME, AS DECORATED FOR THE RECENT CANONISATION.
From an actual photograph.

Vatican. It seems, then, that the Basilica Vatican, in spite of the Bull of Benedict XIV., had lost the privilege of Beatification of Saints when Leo XIII., caring little for the presence of the Italian

government at Rome and offering as a reason his desire to have as large a number as possible present at the ceremonies, wished that




THE PAPAL PROCESSION IN THE BASILICA, DURING THE CEREMONY OF CANONISATION. From an actual photograph.

the Sanctification of the Blessed Zaccaria and Fourier should be held in Saint Peter's.

For the festival of the 27th of last May the furnishings of St.

Peter's were very showy. The excessive adornment was a continuation of the artistic traditions of the sixteenth and seventeenth



THE PAPAL PROCESSION IN THE BASILICA.
Drawn from the preceding photograph by E. Limmer for the *Illustrirte Zeitung*.

centuries, and at first glance they produced an extraordinary and indescribable effect. The Catholic journals were pleased to report

the figures representing the outlay: eight kilometres (in round numbers, five miles) of material were used to adorn the archways and the columns of St. Peter's, eighteen thousand candles burned during the ceremony, and other figures were in similar proportions. But the mass of the people are not satisfied with delicate artistic works which they do not understand. They are struck with pompous display, and this the Church of Rome has always aimed at in the construction of its great temples, such as St. Peter's, furnishing them as it did St. Peter's on the 27th of last May. All that ungraceful but extraordinarily abundant adornment was like the *mise en scene* for a spectacular show. Of the thirty or forty thousand persons (fifty thousand according to some) who were present at that ceremony there were very few of the true believers. All that great crowd had gone to St. Peter's to enjoy a very great display which is repeated only at long intervals and which takes place in an environment absolutely unique. Many people from all parts of the world come to Bayreuth to enjoy Wagnerian music. But the so-called song of the angels, which angels are a hundred or more eunuchs collected under the dome of St. Peter's, the blast of the silver trumpets which accompanies the entrance of the Pope, the uncertain light of twenty thousand candles which reflect a reddish glow from the walls furnished so profusely, this artistic combination is so extraordinarily grand that the spectacle of Bayreuth is not in the least worthy of a comparison. At the show in St. Peter's were collected all kinds of people who could in any way secure tickets. Ministers of the Italian Government and men of every religious sect were there. It is said that the Guards of the Pope who took up the tickets were instructed to prevent the Grand Master of Italian Masonry, Signor Nathan, from attending the ceremony. This festival cost the Vatican at least three hundred thousand francs, while the whole expense for the funeral of Pius IX. and for the conclave which elected Leo XIII. scarcely reached the sum of sixty thousand francs. Very few of the displays in St. Peter's have been so pompous and showy as this last one.

* * *

Now, in all this religious ceremony there is nothing at all mystical. To be sure, a part of the procession which preceded the entrance of the Pope was majestic and imposing. The clergy in sacred vestments, the Prelate Commander of *Sancto Spirito*, the Bishops, Archbishops, Primates, Patriarchs, Cardinals, etc., all the personages who assist the Pope, and finally Leo XIII. under the Canopy held up by different dignitaries and surrounded by

others, all this part of the procession was imposing, and majestic ; and a feeling of awe took possession of that vast multitude as it witnessed the passage of the Pope, who with an effort waved them his benediction. But while the procession of the regular clergy, secular clergy, etc., was passing by the people showed little interest. Many ate the provisions which they had been careful to bring with them, others were tired and yawning, while still others were evidently impatient at being kept from their dinners. A gentleman was heard to say : " I see passing before my eyes as in a vision a plate of macaroni." The people around him laughed.

This pompous display in which was wanting any mystic element, where everything dazzled but awakened no intellectual sentiment, continued through the whole celebration of the Canonisation. Even around the altar in the Basilican Vatican where the Cardinals, the Bishops, the Patriarchs, etc., took their places near the Pope, one could see by the movements of heads that they were speaking and laughing, wearied and confused by the spectacle. Cardinal Mazzella, who they say is a very brilliant and witty man, now and then whispered to the Pope, and succeeded in making him laugh. At the celebration of the Mass, which followed the Canonisation, there was a special ceremony which consisted in the offering of wax, bread, wine, water, doves, pigeons, and other birds. All these objects are supposed to symbolise the virtues of the " Blessed Ones " who are sanctified. Thus the Pagan character of the ceremony is accentuated still more. When they brought all these little birds to the Pope, he said " Poor little things we shall soon give them their liberty."

All those who were present at the late religious ceremony of the Canonisation of Saints Zaccaria and Fourier, after having remained for five or six hours in St. Peter's, in that warm season chosen purposely in order that the delicate health of Leo XIII. might not be exposed to changes of temperature, went out bewildered and almost stupified, scarcely able to synthesise the multi-form and extraordinary spectacle which they had seen. Certainly it did not minister to their religious sentiments.

Zaccaria of Cremona was the founder of the order of Barnabites and died a natural death at thirty-seven. Fourier, a Frenchman, was a parish priest and reformed a little congregation of Canons. Could two such obscure servants of God be raised to the rank of saints by such a theatrical ceremony, a ceremony which contained nothing mystical whatever? It is such a proceeding as

this that weakens the religious sentiments. Certainly it does not strengthen them.

Le Sar Peladan a little while ago remarked that we are living in an epoch in which the intellectual classes no longer believe in saints. But this observation is such a commonplace that Le Sar Peladan deserves no merit for uttering it. Now, it is certainly not by creating new saints with a display so theatrically grotesque as that which took place in St. Peter's on the 27th of last May that the faith in saints is reinforced.

In the procession of the Sanctification there were two enormous



ANTONIO MARIA ZACCARIA, OF CREMONA.
Founder of the Order of Barnabites. Canonised at St. Peter's, May 27, 1897.



PIERRE FOURIER.
Reformer of a Congregation of Canons. Canonised at St. Peter's, May 27, 1897.

banners, one for each saint. On these two banners were painted the figures representing the miracles performed by them. There were figures of persons instantaneously cured of incurable diseases by the intercession of the young priests, at that time Maria Zaccaria or Fourier. Now to-day no one believes in miracles, because none of us has seen one, and science denies that a single case of miracles can be verified. Science explains these pretended miracles as phenomena of hallucination or of illusion, much more likely to happen in past centuries when the masses were profoundly ignorant. What prestige could the new saints Zaccaria and Fourier,

to whom were attributed miraculous deeds to-day considered impossible, acquire in the eyes of the mass of believers, at least of the more intelligent among them? The whole ceremony of Sanctification, whether it be considered with regard to the idea which inspired it, or whether it is regarded merely as a pompous, worldly display, is in conflict with the intellectual progress of the people. Catholicism which seeks to find in a perfect observance of religious traditions and of its Liturgy, the principal source of its moral and mystical force, has failed to adapt itself to the new social environment which has undoubtedly developed even in old Europe. While in certain religious ceremonies it is in perfect harmony with the spirit of former centuries, it is to-day losing faith in itself and falling into ridicule. This fact was illustrated in the Canonisation of the new saints.

THE AGRAPHA.

BY THE REV. BERNHARD PICK, PH. D., D. D.

AGRAPHA is the name of the traditional sayings of Jesus reported by authors who did not derive them from the Gospels but from oral tradition.

The term "agrapha" was first used by Körner in his *De sermonibus Christi ἀγράφοις*, Lipsiæ, 1776, in which he gives sixteen such agrapha. Since that time collections of agrapha have been made by several writers, and the material reached its climax in the work published by Alfred Resch, *Agrapha: Ausserkanonische Evangelien-Fragmente in möglichster Vollständigkeit zusammengestellt und quellenkritisch untersucht*, Leipzig, 1889 (forming part of the fifth volume of *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur*, edited by Gebhardt and Harnack). Before Resch, Hofmann in his *Leben Jesu nach den Apokryphen* (Leipzig, 1851); Westcott in his *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels* (London, 1860, Boston, 1867); Schaff, *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. I., (New York, 1882), had published lists of agrapha. Following Resch, Nestle published a list of agrapha in his *Novi Testamenti Graeci Supplementum* (Lipsiæ, 1896),¹ and in the same year Ropes *Die Sprüche Jesu, eine kritische Bearbeitung des von A. Resch gesammelten Materials*² (forming part of Vol. XIV. of the texts published by Gebhardt and Harnack). This list does not exhaust the literature. In the following, references are only made to Hofmann, Westcott, Schaff, Nestle, and Ropes. According to the latter, the traditional sayings may be divided as follows: (1) Sayings which tradition has not conceived of as agrapha; (2) passages erroneously quoted as sayings of the Lord; (3) worthless agrapha; (4) eventually valuable agrapha; (5) valuable agrapha. To the latter class may be

¹The preface is dated Ulm, July 1896.

²The preface is dated Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A., June, 1896.

reckoned fourteen sayings, including 1 Thess. iv. 15-17; Revel. xvi. 15; John vii. 53-viii. 2 (the pericope of the woman taken in adultery), and a saying contained in the Talmud (not mentioned by Resch). According to Ropes there are only *ten* agrapha. Nestle mentions twenty-seven; Hofmann, twenty-three; Schaff mentions twenty-three, and Westcott thirty-two (twenty-one being traditional sayings in the proper sense of the term, and eleven variations of evangelic words).¹ There are altogether sixty-one agrapha, or, counting also the agrapha found of late, sixty-seven. They are as follows:²

1. And to remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he himself said: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Acts xx. 35. Not mentioned by Nestle. In the *Teaching of the Apostles*, I. 5, these words appear as "happy is he that giveth according to the commandment." In the *Constit. Apost.* iv. 3, this saying occurs as: "since even the Lord says 'The giver was happier than the receiver.'" In Clem. Rom. I. 2 we find it under the form "more gladly giving than receiving." Schaff describes our saying as "pregnant with rich meaning, and shining out like a lone star all the more brilliantly."

2. Our Lord Jesus Christ said: "In whatsoever I may find you, in this will I also judge you."

Justin Martyr, *Dialog.*, ch. 47; comp. also Clem. Alex., *Quis Dives*, § 40; Cyprian, *De mortalitate*, ch. 17. Somewhat different Nilus: "such as I may find thee, I will judge thee, saith the Lord."

3. Jesus said to his disciples "ask great things, and the small shall be added unto you; and ask heavenly things and the earthly shall be added unto you."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, I. 24; Origen, *De orat. libell.*, § 2; comp. also Ambrose, *Epist.*, xxxvi. 3.

4. Rightly, therefore, the Scripture in its desire to make us such dialecticians, exhorts us: "Be ye skilful money-changers," rejecting some things, but retaining what is good.

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, I. 28. This is the most commonly

¹ It will be understood why we quote in the present collection what Westcott terms variations, since there exists a difference of opinion. The few other quotations which we made from Ropes's work find their explanation in the remarks to the respective sayings.

² The translation here given is that published in the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, published by the Christian Literature Co., New York; quotations not found here have been translated by the present writer.

quoted of all traditional sayings. Resch gives sixty-nine passages. According to Delitzsch (*Ein Tag in Kapernaum*, p. 136) the meaning is: "exchange the less valuable for the most valuable, esteem sacred coin higher than common coin, and highest of all the one precious pearl of the gospel." Rénan (*Vie de Jésus*, ch. xi. p. 180, fifth ed.) regards this saying as an advice of voluntary poverty. Westcott explains "put your talents to good use" (*Introd.*, fourth ed., 1872, p. 459), but this explanation Ropes regards as unhappy, who believes that the meaning is: we should distinguish between good and bad coin. This is also Schaff's opinion, who in quoting the saying adds "i. e., expert in distinguishing the genuine coin from the counterfeit."

5. In the Gospel according to the Hebrews, which the Nazarenes used to read, it belongs to the gravest offences when "one has afflicted the spirit of his brother."

Hieron., *In Ezech.*, 18. 7; not quoted by Nestle, Hofmann Schaff, Westcott.

6. As we also read in the Hebrew Gospel: "The Lord said unto his disciples: 'Never be joyful, except when ye have seen your brother in love.'"

Hieron., *In Ephes.*, 5. 3. 4; not quoted by Nestle.

7. For the Lord saith: "Ye shall be as lambs in the midst of the wolves." And Peter answered and said unto him, "What, then, if the wolves shall tear in pieces the lambs?" Jesus said unto Peter, "The lambs have no cause after they are dead to fear the wolves. And do you fear not those who kill you and can do nothing to you; but fear him who after you are dead hath power over soul and body, to cast them into hell-fire."

Clem. Rom. II. 5; not quoted by Nestle, Schaff; Westcott regards it as a variation.

8. "I will choose to myself the good; those good ones whom my Father in heaven has given me."

Eusebius, *Theophania*, IV. 13; not quoted by Hofmann.

9. It is written in a certain gospel which is called "according to the Hebrews," if any please to receive it, not as an authority, but as an illustration of the subject before us: Another rich man said to him, Master, what good thing shall I do to live? He said to Him, 'man, fulfil the law and the prophets.' He answered Him, I have fulfilled them. He

said to him: 'go, sell all that thou hast, and distribute to the poor, and come, and follow me.' but the rich man began to scratch his head, and it did not please him. And the Lord said to him: 'How sayest thou I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, since it is written in the law thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself; and lo! many of thy brethren, sons of Abraham, are clothed in filth, dying of hunger; and thy house is full of many goods, and nothing at all goes out of it to them?' And he turned and said to Simon His disciple, who was sitting by them: 'Simon, son of Joannes, it is easier for a camel to enter the eye of a needle than for a rich man (to enter) into the kingdom of heaven.'

Origen (Latin comm.), *In Matt.*, tom. xv. § 14; not quoted by Nestle, Schaff, Westcott, Hofmann.

10. "But ye seek to increase from little, and from greater to less. When ye go and are bidden to dinner, sit not down in the highest place, lest a more honorable man than thou come, and he that bade thee come and say to thee, Take a lower seat, and you be ashamed. But when thou sittest down in a lower seat, and a less honorable man than thou come, then he that bade thee will say unto thee, Go up higher; and this will be profitable to thee."

Codex Bezae (D) at the end of Matt. xx. 28; not quoted by Nestle; Schaff and Westcott only mention the first clause. The Christian poet Juvencus of the fourth century has incorporated our saying in his poetic *Hist. Evang.*, III. 613 et seq.

To these sayings Ropes adds the following, not mentioned by the others:

11. "Behold, I come as a thief. Blessed is he that watcheth, and keepeth his garments, lest he walk naked, and they see his shame."

Apocal. xvi. 15.

12. John vii. 53-58, 11, based upon the Gospel according to the Hebrews according to Papias is said to have contained also a history of "a woman who was accused of many sins before the Lord."

Euseb., *Hist. Eccles.*, III. 39.

13. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we, that are alive, that are left unto the coming of the Lord, shall in no wise precede them that are fallen asleep. "For

the Lord himself shall descend from heaven, with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God, and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we that are alive, that are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air"; and so shall we ever be with the Lord.

1 Thess. iv. 15-17.

14. Rabbi Eliezer was seized on the charge of being a Christian. The judge said to him: Thou, an aged man, busy thyself with such idle matters! He replied: I admit the faithful reproof of the judge. The latter, thinking that he referred to him, whereas he really meant God, said: Since you trust me you are discharged. He went home deeply distressed, and would receive no consolation from his disciples. Rabbi! cried Aqiba, allow me to say something, which I have learned from thee. Say it, was the reply. Hast thou not had a dispute with a Christian, and by approving what he said, got thyself into trouble? Aqiba! said he, thou just remindest me of a certain incident. Once upon a time I was walking in the upper street of Sepphoris, when I met one [of the disciples of Jesus of Nazareth], whose name was Jacob, a man of Kefr Sekanja,¹ who said to me: it is written in your law "thou shalt not bring the hire of a whore into the house of the Lord thy God" (Deut. xxiii. 18). May a water-closet be made with it for the high-priest? This question I could not answer. Whereupon he said to me: Jesus of Nazareth taught me thus on the subject. It is written, He gathered it of the hire of an harlot (Micah i. 7); that is, it came from an impure source, and it may be applied to an impure use. When I heard this explanation I was pleased with it, and on this account I was accused of heresy, because I trespassed against the word: "remove thy way far from her" (Prov. v. 8); "from her," i. e., from heresy.

Talmud, *Aboda Zara*, fol. 17, col. 1-2; comp. also *Midrash Koheleth*, I. 8. Ropes quotes this narrative on account of the traditional saying of Jews, which he regards as genuine. The veracity of the narrative is defended by the late Jewish scholar Derenbourg in *Essai sur l'histoire et la géographie de la Palestine*, p. 357-360. Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, II. 307 (Leipsic, 1886) and his review of Töttermann, *R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanos sive de vi qua*

¹ The late Jewish historian Graetz, in his *Gnosticism and Judaism*, p. 25, note 22, identifies this Jacob with the Apostle James.

doctrina Christiana primis seculis illustrissimos quosdam Judaeorum attraxit, Lipsiae, 1877 (in *Theol. Literaturzeitung*, 1877, 687-689), regards the whole as a legend. The late Dr. Edersheim, *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, I. 537, in referring to this narrative remarks: "it need scarcely be said, that the whole story is a fabrication; indeed, the supposed Christian interpretation is not even fit to be reproduced; and we only mention the circumstance as indicating the contrast between what the Talmud would have delighted in hearing from its Messiah, and what Jesus spoke." We admit that the object spoken of in this narrative is rather of a trifling character; but since conversations between Christians and Jews are mentioned in the Talmud, we do not see why this one should be rejected and others accepted. The Eliezer of our narrative flourished between 90-130 A. D., when intercourse between Christians and Jews was of a frequent occurrence.

15. On the same day, having seen one working on the Sabbath, He said to him: "O man! if indeed thou knowest what thou doest, thou art blessed; but if thou knowest not, thou art cursed, and art a transgressor of the law."

Codex Bezae (D) to Luke, 6. 4. Westcott says: "it is evident that the saying rests on some real incident." Plumptre who regards the narrative as authentic, remarks that "it brings out with a marvellous force the distinction between the conscious transgression of a law recognised as still binding, and the assertion of a higher law as superseding the lower." Ropes thinks that the saying might possibly be authentic. Farrar (*Life of Christ*, I. p. 439) thinks "the story too striking, too intrinsically probable, to be at once rejected as unauthentic." Edersheim (*loc. cit.*, II. p. 59) regards the words as a spurious addition.

16. The Lord says in the Gospel: "If ye kept not that which is small, who will give you that which is great? For I say unto you, that he that is faithful in very little is faithful also in much."

Clem. Rom., II. 8; comp. also Irenaeus, II. 34. 3. Ropes regards this saying as a parallel to Luke xvi. 10, 12.

17. And Jesus says: "For those that are weak, I was weak; and for those that hunger, I suffered hunger; and for those that thirst, I suffered thirst."

Orig., *In Matt.*, tom. 13, 2. Ropes and Westcott think this saying to be only an adaptation of Matt. xxv. 35, 36.

18. As the Son of God says: "Let us resist all iniquity, and hold it in hatred."

Barnabas, iv. Schaff thinks that the words "as the Son of God says" (*sicut dicit filius Dei*) ought to read *sicut decet filiis Dei*, i. e., "as becometh the sons of God," as is evident from the Greek original.—It is not quoted by Nestle, and Ropes remarks that it owes its quotation as agraphon to a clerical error.

19. Thus he (Christ) saith, "They who wish to see me and to lay hold on my kingdom must receive me by affliction and suffering."

Barnabas, vii. Schaff remarks: "It is doubtful whether the words are meant as a quotation or rather as a conclusion of the former remarks and a general reminiscence of several passages." Ropes regards the saying as a "conclusion."

20. Therefore says Peter that the Lord said to the apostles: "If any one of Israel, then, wishes to repent, and by my name to believe in God, his sins shall be forgiven him. After twelve years go forth into the world, that no one may say, we have not heard."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, VI. 5 from the "Preaching of Peter." Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.*, V. 18, mentions that Apollonius refers to the tradition that our Lord commanded His apostles not to leave Jerusalem for twelve years after His ascension.—The translation "his sins shall be forgiven him after twelve years," as found in the edition of the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. II. p. 490, is nonsense. This saying is only mentioned by Hofmann. Ropes thinks that it evidently means to represent the transition of Christianity from the Jews to the Gentiles as intended by Christ. Westcott regards it as a variation.

21. For this reason, if we should do such things, saith the Lord: "Even though ye were gathered together with me in my bosom, yet if ye were not to keep my commandments I would cast you off, and say unto you, Depart from me; I know you not whence you are, ye workers of iniquity."

Clem. Rom. II. 4; quoted by Hofmann, Westcott regards it as a variation of Matt. vii. 21-23.

22. The Lord says: "Keep the flesh holy and the seal undefiled, that ye may receive eternal life."

Clem. Rom. II. 8, quoted by Hofmann, Nestle, Schaff, West-

cott. Ropes thinks that this is merely an explanation and application of the one mentioned already (see above, 16). Schaff, too, thinks this to be an explanation, not a separate quotation.

23. As the elders who saw John, the disciple of the Lord, related that they had heard from him how the Lord used to teach in regard to these times, and say : "The days will come in which vines shall grow, each having ten thousand branches, and in each branch ten thousand twigs, and in each twig ten thousand shoots, and in each one of the shoots ten thousand clusters, and on every one of the clusters ten thousand grapes, and every grape when pressed will give five and twenty metretres of wine. And when any one of the saints shall lay hold of a cluster, another shall cry out, 'I am a better cluster, take me; bless the Lord through me.' In like manner (the Lord declared) that a grain of wheat would produce ten thousand ears, and that every ear should have ten thousand grains, and every grain would yield ten pounds of clear, pure, fine flour; and that all other fruit-bearing trees, and seeds and grass, would produce in similar proportions; and that all animals feeding on the productions of the earth, should become peaceful and harmonious among each other, and be in perfect subjection to man." To this description Papias adds : "These things are credible to believers. And when Judas the traitor believed not and asked : 'how shall such products come from the Lord?' The Lord said : 'They shall see who come to these times.'"

Westcott, Hofmann. Westcott thinks that it is certainly based on a real discourse. Schaff regards it as fabulous, and borrowed from the Apocalypse of Baruch which has a similar passage. Ropes admits that Westcott's view cannot very well be refuted, although it is difficult to perceive at present the genuine matter.

24. For the Lord has said in a mystery : "Unless ye make the right as the left, the left as the right, the top as the bottom, and the front as the backward, ye shall not know the kingdom of God."

Pseudo-Linus, *Martyrium Petri* (Lipsius and Bonnet, *Acta apost. apocr.*, I. 1891, p. 17), quoted by Hofmann. Ropes who quotes this saying with those which he regards as of no historical value, thinks it to be a parallel to the following :

25. For the Lord said unto me : "If you do not make your low

things high and your crooked things straight, ye shall not enter into my kingdom.”

Acta Philippi, ch. 34 (Tirchendorf, *Acta apost. apocr.*, p. 90), quoted by Schaff.

26. As it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews :
“He that wonders shall reign, and he that has reigned shall rest.”

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, II. 9 ; quoted by Hofmann, Westcott, Schaff. Ropes too is inclined to regard this saying as authentic. The same idea we find in the following : “He who seeks will not stop till he find ; and having found, he will wonder ; and wondering, he will reign ; and reigning, he will rest.”

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, V. 14.

27. “Look with wonder at the things that are before thee.”

Loc. cit., II. 9 ; quoted by Schaff and Westcott. Concerning this and the foregoing (26) saying, Plumptre, as Schaff remarks, finely says : the Alexandrian divine intends to show “that in the teaching of Christ, as in that of Plato, wonder is at once the beginning and the end of knowledge.”

28. “I came to abolish sacrifices, and unless ye cease from sacrificing, the wrath (of God) will not cease from you.”

Epiph., *Haeres.*, XXX. 16, from the Gospel of the Ebionites, quoted by Hofmann, Schaff, Westcott. Ropes regards this saying as of no account ; its thoughts belonging to the principles of the Ebionites.

29. The Saviour says : “He who is near me is near the fire ; he who is far from me is far from the kingdom.”

Didymus in Ps. lxxxviii. 8 ; Origen, *Hom. (Latin) in Jerem.*, XX.

3. Quoted by Nestle, Schaff, Westcott. Ropes ascribes to this saying some historical value. A like thought occurs in Ignatius (*ad. Smyrn.* 4) : “to be near the sword is to be near God.”

30. The Lord Himself being asked by one when His kingdom would come, replied : “When two shall be one, that which is without as that which is within, and the male with the female, neither male nor female.”

Clem. Rom. II. 12, quoted by Hofmann, Nestle, Schaff, Westcott. With this saying the following from the Gospel of the Egyptians, as quoted by Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, III. 6, 9, 13, may be compared. To the question of Salome : “How long shall death reign ?” the Lord answered : “As long as ye women give birth.

For I came to make an end to the works of the woman." Then Salome said to him, then have I done well that I have not given birth. To this the Lord replied: "Eat of every herb, but the bitter one eat not." When Salome asked, when it shall be known what she asked, the Lord said: "When you tread under foot the covering of shame, and when out of Two is made One, and the male with the female, neither male nor female." Hofmann quotes this saying from the *Stromata* with the exception of the last clause, as a separate one. Like Schaff he takes this clause as parallel to the saying (30) itself.

31. When the Lord came to Peter and the apostles (after his resurrection), he said to them: "Lay hold, handle me, and see that I am not an incorporeal spirit." And immediately they touched him, and believed, being both convinced by his flesh and spirit.

Ignat., *ad Smyrn.*, III.; quoted by Schaff, Westcott. Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.*, III. 36) remarks that he knows not whence these words are taken. Origen (*De princip. prooem.*, c. 8) speaks of a passage in that book which is called the "Doctrine of Peter," and where the Saviour said to the disciples: "I am not an incorporeal demon." Jerome, in his preface to the eighteenth book of Isaiah and in *De viris illustr.*, c. 16, remarks that according to the Gospel which the Nazarenes call that of the Hebrews, the Apostles believed Jesus to be "an incorporeal demon."

32. The prophet of truth has said: "Good must needs come, and blessed, said he, is he by whom it comes; in like manner evil must needs come, but woe to him through whom it comes."

Clem. Hom., xii. 29; quoted by Westcott, Nestle, Schaff. Ropes regards the whole as a variation of Matt. xviii. 7, Luke xvii. 1.

33. It was not through unwillingness to impart his blessings that the Lord announced in some gospel, "My mystery is for me and for the sons of my house."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, V. 10; quoted by Nestle, Schaff, Westcott, Hoffman. The same saying we find as follows: "We remember that our Lord and Teacher commanding us, said: 'Keep my mysteries for me and for the sons of my house.'" Clem. Hom., xix. 20.

34. (The Sabellians refer in favor of their doctrine to a saying

of Christ recalled unto his disciples): "The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one and the same."

Epiph., *Haeres.*, LXII. 2; quoted by Hofmann.

35. In the same volume (i. e., the Gospel according to the Hebrews): "When thy brother has sinned against thee with a word, and has satisfied thee, thou shalt receive him again seven times in a day." Said to Him Peter his disciple: "seven times in a day?" The Lord answered and said to him: "but I say unto thee also seventy times seven times." Hieron., *adv. Pelag.*, III. 2; quoted by Hofmann.

36. If any one should lend credence to the Gospel according to the Hebrews where the Saviour Himself says: "My mother, the Holy Spirit, took me just now by one of my hairs and carried me off to the great Mount Tabor."

Origen, *In Joann.*, II. 6; *In Jerem.*, XV. 4; Jerome, *In Mich.*, VII. 6; *In Isa.* XL. 12. quoted by Hofmann. Ropes rejects this agraphon. Westcott calls it a "very singular saying," and quotes it among the variations. Jerome, *In Isa.* XL. 12, remarks that no one should be offended, because in the Hebrew the word "spirit" is of feminine gender, and in our language it is masculine, and in the Greek neuter; for in the godhead there is no gender. Ropes is inclined to think that the reference is not to the transfiguration, but to the temptation of Jesus, since tradition mentions in both instances the Mount Tabor.

37. Being especially mindful of the words of the Lord Jesus which He spake, teaching us meekness and longsuffering. For thus He spake: "Be ye merciful, that ye may obtain mercy; forgive, that it may be forgiven to you; as ye do, so shall it be done unto you; as ye judge, so shall ye be judged; as ye are kind, so shall kindness be shown to you; with what measure ye mete, with the same it shall be measured to you."

Clem. Rom., I. 13; quoted by Nestle. Ropes regards the whole as a variation of Luke vi. 36-38. Comp. also Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, II. 18, where the last clause, however, reads: "with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again."

38. Where He said: "Father, let their temple be made desolate."

Hippolyt., *Demonstr. adv. Judæos*, VII.; quoted by Nestle. Ropes thinks this to be an exposition of Ps. lxxix. 25.

39. The teacher of Sergius the Reformer of the Paulicians (died 835) quotes as words of Jesus: "My friend, I do thee no wrong; thou hast received thine own in thy lifetime, take now what is thine and depart."

Quoted by Nestle from Zahn, *Kanon*, II. 455. (not mentioned by Ropes).

40. On which the Saviour said: "The Son of Man, coming to-day, has found that which was lost."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, IV. 35; quoted by Nestle.

41. Therefore the Lord says: "Save thyself and thy soul."

Excerpta Theodoti apud Clem. Alex., § 2; quoted by Nestle.

Ropes thinks that this might be an enlargement of Luke xvii. 28-33.

42. Since even the Lord says: "The giver was happier than the receiver." For it is again said by Him: "woe to those that have, and receive in hypocrisy; or who are able to support themselves, yet will receive of others: for both of them shall give an account to the Lord God in the day of Judgment."

Const. Apost., IV. 3; quoted by Nestle. (For the first part of this saying see above No. 1.)

43. For it is written: "Cleave to the saints, for those that cleave to them, shall be made holy."

Clem. Rom. I, 46. quoted by Nestle; Ropes thinks this to be an Old Testament interpolation. Comp. also Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, V. 8.

44. But hear the word of the Lord: "take care of faith and hope, through which comes the God-loving and kindly love, which brings life everlasting."

Macarius, *Hom.* XXXVII.; quoted by Nestle. Ropes does not regard this as a saying of the Lord.

45. Moreover said the Lord to them: "What do you admire the signs; I give you a great inheritance which the whole world has not."

Macarius, *Hom.* XII. 17; quoted by Nestle. Ropes regards this as a paraphrase of certain passages.

46. The Lord admonishes and says: "Grieve not the Holy Spirit which is in you, and do not extinguish the light which shines in you."

Pseudo-Cyprian, *De aleatoribus*, c. 3; quoted by Nestle. Ropes thinks that this is only a variation of Ephes. iv. 30; 1 Thess. v. 19.

47. The Lord Himself instructs and admonishes us in the epistle of his disciple John to the people: "You see me thus in yourselves as one of you sees himself in the water or in a mirror."

Pseudo-Cyprian, *De duobus montibus*, c. 13; quoted by Nestle. Ropes thinks that the author used here the image of a mirror and John xiv. 20.

48. For the Lord saith: "love covers a multitude of sins."

Didasc., II. 3; quoted by Nestle. Comp. also Clem. Rom. I. 49; II, 16; Clem. Alex., *Paedag.*, III. 12. Ropes thinks this saying to be unauthentic.

49. The Lord says: "Behold I make the last like the first."

Barnabas, VI. ; quoted by Nestle. Ropes thinks it difficult to say whether it refers directly or indirectly to Ezek. xxxvi. 11, or to Matt. xix. 30, or to Revel. xxi. 5.

50. "Thou seest," he says, "thy brother, thou seest thy God."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, I. 19; quoted by Nestle. Comp. *Stromata* II. 15; Tertullian., *De orat.*, c. 26. Ropes does not regard this as a saying of the Lord.

51. Therefore I said to you once: "You shall sit upon your thrones in my kingdom to my right and to my left, and reign with me."

Pistis Sophia, p. 230 et seq.; regarded by Harnack as an agraphon, according to Ropes.

52. And to those who suppose that God tempts, as the Scriptures say, He said: "The tempter is the wicked one."

Hom. Clem., III. 55. Ropes says that there can be no doubt that the author meant here to introduce a word of the Lord by "he said," nevertheless Ropes puts this saying among those which are erroneously quoted as agrapha.

53. Accordingly in the "Preaching of Peter" the Lord says to the disciples after the resurrection: "I have chosen you twelve disciples, judging you worthy of me."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, VI. 486, quoted by Westcott among the variations. Ropes leaves it undecided whether the author of the "Preaching" regarded this as a word of Jesus or not.

54. For the Logos again says to us: "If any one kiss a second time because it has given him pleasure (he sins)," adding: "therefore the kiss, or rather the salutation, should be given with the greatest care, since, if there be mixed with it the least defilement of thought, it excludes us from eternal life."

Athenagoras, *Legatio* 32, quoted by Westcott among the variations. Ropes regards this as a rule of decency only.

55. For He said: "Many shall come in my name, clothed outwardly in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves." And, "there shall be schisms and heresies."

Justin Mart., *Dialog.*, c. 35, quoted by Westcott as a variation, having been formed from the sense of our Lord's words and the form of 1 Cor. xi. 18, 19. Ropes is of opinion that Justin read this in his manuscript of the Gospels, and doubts not that the Didascalia had the saying as a traditional word of the Lord. The latter (vi. 5) reads: as also our Lord and Saviour said: "that there shall be heresies and schisms."

56. (It is said) in Scripture: "The just shall fall seven times, and shall rise again."

Hipp., *adv. Haer.* (Naass.), V., quoted by Westcott among the variations.

57. It is said in the Gospel according to Luke: "He to whom more is forgiven loves more; and he to whom less is forgiven loves little."

Cyprian, *Test.*, III. 116, quoted by Westcott among the variations, cp. Luke vii. 47.

58. (Christ said) "I often desired to hear one of these words, and had not one to tell me."

Iren., I. 20. 2, quoted by Westcott among the variations.

59. According to some who alter¹ the Gospels (Christ says): "Blessed are they who have been persecuted through righteousness, for they shall be perfect; and blessed are they who have been persecuted for my sake, for they shall have a place where they shall not be persecuted."

Clem. Alex., *Stromata*, IV. ch. 6, quoted by Westcott among the variations.

60. "The Lord revealed to me what the soul ought to say when

¹This is Westcott's translation; in the *Ante-Nicene Fathers* the word is translated "transpose."

she mounts to heaven, and what answer she should give to each of the higher powers: 'I have known myself, and gathered myself together, and begotten no children for the Archon of this world, but have torn up his roots, and gathered the scattered members, and I know thee, and who thou art. For I also am descended from the upper world. By speaking in this manner, she is dismissed. But if she is found to have begotten a son, she is kept below, until she is able to take up her children and to draw them to herself.'"

Epiphani., *Haeres.*, XXVI. 16, from the Gospel of Philip, quoted by Hofmann.

61. The same Epiphanius quotes also the following from the Gospel of Eve, which also betrays a pantheistic tendency: "I am thou, and thou art I, and where thou art there am I also; and in all things I am scattered. And from whence-soever thou gatherest me, in gathering me thou gatherest thyself."

Haeres., XXVI. 3; quoted by Hofmann.

After having finished my manuscript, the literary world was startled by the news of a new find of Logia, or sayings of Jesus, discovered on a papyrus manuscript from Egypt of about 200 A.D. For the benefit of the reader we give both the Greek text and translation as found in the New York *Independent*, July 15, 22, 29, 1897:

1. . . . και τότε διαβλέψεις ἐκβαλεῖν τὸ κάρφος τὸ ἐν τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ σου.

2. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς: Ἐὰν μὴ νηστεύσῃτε τὸν κόσμον οὐ μὴ εἰρήτε τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ θεοῦ· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ σαββατίσῃτε τὸν σάββατον οὐκ ὄψεσθε τὸν Πατέρα.

3. Λέγει Ἰη[σ]οῦς: Ἐστῆν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ ὤφθην αὐτοῖς, καὶ εἶρον πάντας μεθύοντας, καὶ οὐδένα εἶρον διψῶντα ἐν αὐτοῖς· καὶ πονεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐπὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τυφλοὶ εἰσιν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτῶ[ν]. . . .

4. . . . τὴν πτωχείαν.¹


1. . . . "and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote that is in thy brother's eye." (= Matt. vii. 5; Luke vi. 42.)

2. "Jesus saith, Except ye fast to the world, ye shall in no wise find the kingdom of God; and except ye keep the Sabbath, ye shall not see the Father."

3. "Jesus saith, I stood in the midst of the world, and in the flesh was I seen of them, and I found all men drunken, and none found I athirst among them; and my soul grieveth over the sons of men because they are blind in their heart."

4. . . . the beggary.

¹ Several letters about the gaps in the fourth logion are not quite certain.



FAC-SIMILE OF THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED EGYPTIAN PAPYRUS CONTAINING THE
 NEW LOGIA OF JESUS. From the New York *Independent*.

5. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς· Ὅπου ἐὰν ὦσιν [. . .] ε [. . .] . . θεοὶ καὶ τῶ [. . .] σο . ε [. . .] ἔστιν μόνος [. . .] τῶ ἐγὼ εἰμι μετ' αὐτ[οῦ]. Ἐγει[ρ]ον τὸν λίθον, κάκει ἐνρήσεις με· σχίσον τὸ ξύλον, κα' γὰρ ἐκεῖ εἰμί.

6. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς· Ὅτις ἐστὶν δεκτὸς προφήτης ἐν τῇ πατρίδι αὐτ[οῦ], οὐδὲ ἰατρὸς ποιεῖ θεραπείας εἰς τοὺς γινώσκοντας αὐτόν.

7. Λέγει Ἰησοῦς· Πόλις οἰκοδομημένη ἐπ' ἄκρον [ὄ]ρους ὑψηλοῦ καὶ ἐστηριγμένη, οὔτε πε[σ]εῖν δύναται οὔτε κρυβῆναι.

5. "Jesus saith, Wherever there are . . . [the Gods and to the] . . ., and there is one . . . alone, I am with him. Raise the stone, and there thou shalt find me. Cleave the wood, and there am I."

6. "Jesus saith, A prophet is not acceptable in his own country, neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him." (In part = Luke iv, 24; Matt. xiii. 57; Mark vi. 4; John iv. 44.)

7. "Jesus saith, A city built upon the top of a high hill and stablished can neither fall nor be hid." (Similar to Matt. v. 14.)

Altogether there are eight logia which Messrs. Grenfeld and Hunt discovered on a small leaf $5\frac{3}{4}$ by $3\frac{3}{4}$ inches; but this number is practically reduced to six, for the eighth is undecipherable, and of the fourth only one word remains, "beggary." As this was not used by Christ in any Gospel, the logion is considered to have been new. The fifth, which is a gnostic, almost pantheistic, suggestion, contains also lamentable gaps.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

III. The National Kingdom.—Saul and David.

WE HAVE SEEN the messengers of the hard-pressed city of Jabesh go out through all Israel; will they bring help? King Nahash thinks not, otherwise he would not have let them go, and very likely they themselves have little hope of it; but only a few weeks before, in an obscure and quiet corner of the mountain region of Ephraim, had occurred an event which was to give a wholly new turn to the destinies of Israel.

At Ramah in the hill country of Ephraim, in the district of Zuph—not to be confused with the better-known Ramah of the tribe of Benjamin near Jerusalem—dwells a seer already high in years, Samuel by name, highly esteemed among his own people, but otherwise little known in Israel. He feels Israel's degradation more bitterly and more keenly than the rest of the people, who had already submitted with dumb indifference to what seemed inevitable. To his illumined eye the causes of the national misfortune are evident: the lamentable division alone, in spite of all the personal bravery of individuals, has made the people the almost defenceless prey of its neighbors. If the people is not to succumb utterly and be absorbed gradually by its oppressors the only remedy is the union of the divided and undisciplined forces in one strong hand,—in other words, the national kingdom. Among the enemies of Israel it is precisely and solely this organisation and centralisa-

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

tion due to the kingdom which guarantees to them their superiority in the field. But whence shall come the king who with strong hand will shake off the yoke of foreign rule and lead the people to victory and freedom? Full of pious trust, Samuel lays the question before the faithful God who has always hitherto sent the right man at the right time.

In this crisis there appears before him one day a distinguished Benjaminite seeking Samuel's prophetic gift for an event of daily life: Saul the son of Kish, from Gibeah of the tribe of Benjamin. In this Gibeah a Philistine prefect held his court. This is significant. With this visible evidence of the bondage of his people constantly before his eyes, Saul could not but feel with especial keenness the humiliation of his people. Doubtless he bore the yoke of the uncircumcised with gnashing of teeth, and probably looked often in silent grief for a rescuer out of this distress. But with the childlike guilelessness of a generous and unspoiled heart he seems to have no presentiment of the powers that slumber within him. That he himself might be destined to become this ardently longed-for rescuer from distress is a thought that does not enter his head. Thus unconscious of his own worth, in the noble adornment of modesty, he appears before Samuel. The seer is struck with the chivalrous bearing and the majestic appearance of this Benjaminite who towers above the rest of the people by a head; when he catches sight of him an inner voice calls to him: This is the man for whom thou waitest; God Himself sends him to thee. By mysterious remarks he cunningly rouses in Saul's heart thoughts and feelings that till now had slumbered within him. A sacrifice, combined with a festal meal, to which Samuel takes the Benjaminite, serves to give to the developing thoughts of Saul a religious consecration, and the honorable distinction with which Samuel treats him, a stranger, at this solemn ceremony, arouses within him the presentiment of great things that await him.

When after this Samuel takes the stranger to his own house as a guest, where a familiar conversation loosens his tongue and reveals the innermost thoughts of his heart, Samuel grows ever more certain that he has found the one whom God has chosen for the liberation of his people. When Saul takes leave of his host the following morning the seer anoints his head with oil, reveals to him for what high things he is destined, and bids him bide his time and then do what his hand may find to do, for God will be with him.

Saul returns to his home, and his people notice that a change

has come over him—as our account says briefly and significantly, God had changed him into another man ; but quietly as before he tills his field, awaiting the moment when the spirit of God shall come upon him. Now the messengers from Jabesh make their appearance also in Gibeah. Everywhere they have found tearful sympathy, but no hand is lifted to help. And in Gibeah also it seemed to be the same. When Saul drives home his yoke of oxen from the field he finds the whole city in tears. In reply to his question he learns of the insolent mockery of the Ammonite. He flames out in sacred wrath, cuts his oxen in pieces and sends the bloody portions all about with the message : “ Whosoever cometh not forth after Saul, so shall it be done unto his oxen.” His enthusiasm has its effect ; a considerable troop gathers around the brave leader, the enemy are surprised in the gray of morn and utterly routed ; the hard-pressed city of Jabesh is saved.

Now the scales seem to fall from their eyes : they have found the right man and they propose to keep him. Rejoicing in the first victory after long subjugation and humiliation the people bring to Gilgal in triumph the one to whom they owe the fresh victory, to deck him in this ancient sacred city with the royal diadem. Now Israel too has a king, like all the nations round about. Will the new king accomplish what they expect of him and what he needs must accomplish ? Or was the ceremony at Gilgal perhaps too hasty, a mocking air-phantom of the overflowing enthusiasm of the moment ?

The defeat of that troupe of Ammonite skirmishers was after all no great affair. The real test of power for the new kingdom was rather whether it would succeed in breaking the domination of the Philistines. It was possible, indeed, that a peaceful settlement would be attempted with the national enemy. Perhaps the Philistines would have recognised Saul as a feudal king or Philistine vassal if he had submitted to their authority as had been done before. But this was an impossibility for the popular king who had just been raised to the throne. Only the sword could arbitrate now. Therefore Saul keeps about him three thousand men selected from the exultant concourse at Gilgal, waiting to see what attitude the Philistines would assume in view of the new turn of affairs. But the whole situation demanded a settlement ; both sides needed a decided clearing away of uncertainties. In order to bring Israel face to face with an accomplished fact which should shut out all retreat, Jonathan, Saul's first-born son, the most ideal and purely heroic figure of the Old Testament, does a bold deed and slays the

Philistine prefect at Gibeah, and Saul has the trumpet sounded throughout all Israel and the fighting men summoned to join him at Gibeah.

To meet this open outbreak the Philistines march into the rebellious district with a strong force, and so great is Israel's fear of her longstanding oppressors, so great the dread of this victory-wonted enemy that the people about Saul flee, all save six hundred men, at the approach of the Philistine army. Again it is Jonathan who takes the lead in manful action. By a movement executed with unparalleled audacity he carries disorder into the Philistine camp; Saul takes advantage of this disorder to make an attack, and after a hot struggle the victory is his. But in the ardor of pursuit of the fleeing enemy he issues an imprudent order which makes it impossible to secure the full benefit of the victory. His glorious son Jonathan, the real hero of this memorable day, came near falling a victim to his father's indiscretion,—and thus in this very first deed of liberation there is a faint shadow which settles upon the new kingdom as an omen portentous of misfortune.

We do not know much more of Saul's reign. Saul's first measure was to put the military forces of the people upon a war footing; for he had enemies all about, first of all, the Philistines. That first victory at Michmas was only a transient achievement which had scarcely destroyed the Philistine tyranny; the struggle with this ancestral enemy, conducted with fluctuating fortunes, constitutes the chief part of Saul's reign and his life. He owed the crown to his sword and had to maintain it by the sword; his whole reign was an incessant warfare. In such a condition of affairs the need of a standing army became evident; it would not do to be forced in every separate case to summon the militia of Israel. And so Saul kept those three thousand men about his person and strove to increase the number and their efficiency: wherever he saw a brave and capable man, he attached him to himself, he himself and his son Jonathan at their head, a genuine leader of his men and supported by the enthusiastic love of his people. So much the more puzzling and incomprehensible seems the tragic turn of events which soon ensued. The oldest account gives no explanation for it but simply says: "An evil spirit from the Lord troubled him." Plainly we have to do here with severe derangements of mind and soul, an incurable melancholy which at times gave way to fits of madness. And if we examine more closely, we shall easily find the psychological reasons for this.

It had really been a hasty proceeding when they put the crown

upon Saul's head in Gilgal. Saul was not equal to the inner difficulties of the situation. If he had been introduced into settled conditions, reared upon the throne in possession of an inherited and established power he would have been, with his noble and chivalrous nature, one of the best kings of Israel; but here everything had first to be created, and Saul was not equal to this task: he was a nobleman and cavalier, but here was needed a ruler and king. His whole character has a cast which I would almost call rude and provincial; the original and sunny, the winning and all-compelling personality that sways men by moral conquest, this he lacked. And this is just what he needed; for the office did not carry the man, but the man had first to create the office.

It was no easy thing for the Israelites who were accustomed to perfect freedom and local independence to renounce these congenial and familiar conditions and subordinate themselves to a single will. When there was combat with the national enemy involving the struggle for existence, they followed him willingly and gladly; but to feel themselves members of a commonwealth even in times of peace and to abandon perhaps well-founded personal claims in the interest of the state and public order, was more than could be expected of them, and the people had to be accustomed to it slowly and gradually. In fact, it was achieved only when they had a sense of doing whatever came hard to them as a personal favor to the king, somewhat as a child on first going to school can be accustomed and reared to the discipline of the school only when he does all that is asked of him with the joyous feeling of showing the teacher a personal kindness. And to awaken this feeling in Israel Saul was not the man. Of decidedly choleric temperament, bold and energetic, but at the same time abrupt and inconsiderate, it was not natural for him to sue for love; indeed, he had no compunctions about offending Israel in its most sacred feelings when state policy, as we would express it to-day, seemed to call for it.

Israel had a solemn league and covenant with the Gibeonites, a Canaanitish alliance of four cities. We can understand that Saul felt it as a severe restraint to have an enclave of alien people dwelling a few miles from the gates of his capital. In his zeal for Israel, as the report says, he attacked the Gibeonites and undertook to defeat them. Furthermore, it became a necessity to reduce the predatory and dangerous people of the desert, the Amalekites. The solemn curse was pronounced against them, and Saul marched against them and conquered them, but considered it more expedi-

ent not to execute the curse, and spared the captive king and the best part of the booty. This could not but seem a great sin to the religious consciousness of that time, being a breach of promise and perjury toward God himself, and robbery or at least embezzlement of God's property. So even Samuel lost faith in the man of his choice, and in deep grief abandoned him to whom, as king, law and right ought to have been inviolable and sacred.

When we realise further that even in the war with the Philistines there were no great and decisive victories, and that the enthusiastic uprising finally ended in a spiritless and wearisome guerrilla warfare, we can understand the change in public sentiment and understand, too, how Saul himself was forced to recognise that he was not equal to his position and was not accomplishing what was expected of him and what he ought to accomplish. Now, for a noble man striving only for the best with honest purpose and consecrated zeal there is no more terrible spiritual torment than the consciousness of his own insufficiency; Saul's strong and yet sensitive nature succumbed to this infernal assault, and darkness settled upon his great soul.

When I contemplate this picture that so moves the depths of the heart, I am always impressed with the parallel in the figure of that most unfortunate of rulers on the Prussian throne, personally perhaps the most gifted of all, the son and counterfeit of an incomparable mother, and richly endowed with all advantages of mind and soul, who was welcomed at the beginning of his reign with rejoicings and enthusiasm beyond what any Hohenzoller had ever received, and yet ended at last alone and forsaken in the night of insanity, because a pitiless destiny had placed him in a position and before tasks to which his empyreal nature was not equal.¹

It is a touching proof of the genuine and grateful love bestowed upon Saul that Israel remained faithful to him in his misfortunes, and that no one undertook to remove him from the throne, not even after he had actually become a danger to his people. On the contrary, they did everything possible to subdue the evil spirit. The magic power of music was invoked to dispel the melancholy of the unhappy king. Some one in Saul's retinue knows a man especially talented in singing, and at the same time of tried valor, knight and troubadour in one, the Judean David of Bethlehem. David is summoned to court and obeys the summons. Thus enters upon the scene the man who after Moses is the greatest personage

¹Frederick William IV., son of Queen Louise, and brother of Emperor William I.

of ancient Israel, and for whom it was reserved to complete the work of Moses.

David is one of those divinely favored, sunny natures whom all hearts acknowledge, the born ruler whom all willingly and gladly acknowledge and serve. Distinguished by all the advantages of mind and body, radiant with youth, beauty and power, compelling all hearts to love by his fascinating amiability, thus he appears before the king. At first all went well. Even Saul could not withstand the charm of this personality; he made the young man who soon became indispensable to him his armor-bearer, what we would call his personal adjutant. The chivalrous Jonathan recognises in the chivalrous Judean an affinity, and the two hearts are united in a most devoted, fraternal league of pure and generous friendship, while the king's daughter Michal also is inflamed with ardent love for her brother's bosom friend and her father's favorite, and Saul, for whom it was a matter of great concern to keep such a hero near him, gives him his daughter to wife.

But soon the evil spirit began its fiendish work even here. It is not clear what aroused the wrath of the suspicious king. According to one account it was jealousy of David's warlike deeds and success. True, it was necessary in those days that the king should be at the same time the chief in bravery, but there was his glorious son Jonathan, who at least equalled David in military fame. According to another account he sees in David a pretendant to the crown, a possible rival in the dominion over Israel. This account owes its origin wholly to the fact that David actually did become his successor; but it is wholly improbable that at that time anybody, even David himself, should have thought of such a thing; when Saul resigned the crown it would simply descend to Jonathan, and the most that David could have expected would be to become perhaps grand-vizier of his friend and brother-in-law. On the other hand the oldest account offers us what seems to be the first credible and plausible clue: here Saul suspects that David had entered into a conspiracy against him with Jonathan, a plan to depose him and put Jonathan in his place.

David cannot have failed to see that such a change of rulers would be a real blessing for Israel in the condition of the people at that time, and many a good patriot may have thought the same. Whether David some time uttered an incautious expression to this effect, or whether the suspicious king imagined this thought in the heart of his son-in-law,—at all events, in an attack of his malady he threw a spear at him, and David fled. The priests at Nob, who

had innocently aided the fugitive, were overtaken by a fearful judgment: they were summoned before the king's tribunal and executed as traitors, and their city and sanctuary destroyed; only one, Ebiathar by name, escaped and fled to David.

Meanwhile David had fled to his home in Judah and had there gathered about him a band of desperate men, four hundred rash and reckless fellows, whose leader he became. He is often represented as a regular robber chief, before whom no man was sure of his life, no woman of her honor; and there is some support for such a view in the familiar story of David's relations with the rich Nabal and his prudent wife, the fair Abigail. But such stories must be judged from the oriental point of view. To this day any Arab would shoot down on the spot like a mad dog a man refusing his hospitality in such an insolent and offensive way as Nabal does David's. No, we have rather to picture him to ourselves like the knight-errants who go out seeking adventures and are always ready to draw their swords where there is need. For instance, David is informed that the city of Keilah is hard beset by the Philistines; his people remonstrate with him, saying: "We are scarcely sure of our lives in Judah, and shall we now begin a feud with the Philistines?" But David undertakes the foray and rescues the city. On this occasion, however, and in general we see that the members of his tribe are rather in sympathy with Saul and regard David and his band with evident distrust.

Despite the critical condition of his kingdom, Saul did not shrink from civil war, but led his standing army against David and his men. David succeeded, indeed, in evading him, but finally the soil of Judah became too warm for him and there remained nothing for him but to take refuge with the enemy: he became the vassal of the Philistine king, Achish of Gath, who received him with open arms and gave him the city of Ziklag as residence. Even here he was helpful to his people and fought their enemies while pretending to Achish that he was fighting with Judah and Israel, and that he was taking no prisoners in order to keep the matter secret. Achish, too, was completely fascinated by him and trusted him blindly.

When David had dwelt a year and four months in Ziklag, destiny overtook Saul. The Philistines prepared for a decisive campaign against Israel, and David was expected to join the army of Achish. How David would have acted if the Philistines had insisted on the fulfilment of his feudal obligations we cannot say, but the other Philistine kings did not trust David and protested against

such an ally. David probably never thanked his God more ardently than when he was thus sent home. Saul with his troops was stationed on Mount Gilboa, and the battle ended in his total defeat. When he saw all lost and his three sons fallen, in despair he fell upon his own sword. The Philistines cut off the head of the corpse and sent it together with the armor of the fallen king to the temple of Astarte; the headless body and the corpses of his three sons they hung upon the walls of Beth-shan, the nearest considerable city. But now the men of Jabesh, which Saul had once rescued from utmost need, remembered their debt; they took down the bodies from the walls by night and took them across the Jordan to Jabesh, where they gave them honorable burial and mourned them for seven days.

Saul is one of the most tragic figures in history. A great and nobly endowed nature, heroic and chivalrous, inspired with fiery zeal, he finally accomplished nothing; the dream of Gilgal proved a cruel illusion; the man of the people, whose very name signifies "the desired" and in whom the longing of Israel seemed embodied, had been a will-o'-the-wisp. At his death the situation was again just what it had been at his coronation: Israel prostrate, the power of the Philistines greater and firmer than ever before. He had not shown himself equal to the task which destiny and circumstances had set for him.

And I would call attention to one more point: he lacked appreciation of the true character of Israel; in this regard tradition has given a wholly correct picture of him. He was exclusively a soldier, and was in a fair way to change Israel into a secular military state and thus divert it from its religious function in universal history. Saul may claim our deepest compassion and our heartiest sympathy, but the fall of his power was a blessing for Israel. We have no direct information as to the length of his reign; from such sources as we can command it did not last long. Five years is the least that we are obliged to estimate, but ten is the utmost possible. According to the most probable estimate of dates, based on the very accurate Assyrian chronology, Saul's death would fall in the year 1017; this will not deviate more than a few years at the utmost from the actual date.

But Saul's blood was not to flow on Mount Gilboa unavenged; an avenger and the real finisher of his life-work arose in the Judean whom he had fought and persecuted. For a while, it is true, David had to remain inactive. It would have been madness to begin the contest against the Philistines with his six hundred men;

he took care first to save what he could, and was anointed tribal king of Judah under Philistine suzerainty, and took up his residence as such at Hebron. It seems that Saul had left a single, minor son, named Ish-bosheth (or Eshbaal); Abner, Saul's cousin and commander-in-chief, took up his cause and established for him out of the ruins of Saul's dominion a kingdom at Mahanaim in the country east of the Jordan, in all probability under Philistine suzerainty also, while the whole territory west of the Jordan reverted to the Philistines. We know scarcely anything about the period immediately following: it is evident that they did not like to recall it in later times. When Abner had in some measure established himself, he attempted to subject David and Judah also to the dominion of Ish-bosheth: a battle was fought at Gibeon, but the Judeans under the lead of David's nephew and general, Joab, won a complete victory, and Abner fled with the remnants of his army across the Jordan.

Soon, however, dissension arose between Abner and Ish-bosheth. Saul had left a concubine named Rizpah, and Abner took her. Ish-bosheth could see in this nothing but a design against his dominion, and called Abner passionately to account, whereupon the latter renounced allegiance to his ward and went over to David. He had probably recognised for some time that there was no prospect under existing circumstances that Ish-bosheth's reign could last long. David then demanded back Saul's daughter, Michal, whom after David's flight Saul had given in marriage to a noble of the tribe of Benjamin. Abner himself brought her to Hebron and was splendidly entertained by David. He went away with a promise to win all Israel over to David. Thereupon Joab hastens after him and stabs him on the pretext of revenge for blood.

Joab is the most remarkable figure among David's followers,—the man to whom he owes most. He has something terrible but at the same time grand about him, and reminds me vividly of one of the most characteristic personages of our German legends, the fierce Hagen of Tronje. Like Hagen, Joab is dominated and impelled by one single feeling, that of absolute fidelity to his master. Whatever is for the interest of his master he does, even if it should be a crime; for the crime he himself takes the responsibility in order that his master may reap the benefit. Abner was in fact, a questionable friend who was liable to become inconvenient and even dangerous, and his death was a desirable thing for David, although the latter denied, and very justly, all responsibility for

the deed; that he knew about it, or instigated it, is wholly out of the question, for that would have been, to use the familiar and shocking *mot* of Talleyrand, more than a crime, it would have been a blunder.

Soon after, Ish-bosheth, too, fell a victim to blood vengeance: he was assassinated by two Gibeonites. The murderers cut off his head and brought it to David thinking to win a reward; but David had them cut down by his guards and the head of Ish-bosheth deposited in Abner's tomb. Thus ended the son of Saul after a reign of seven and a half years.

There were still left two sons of Saul by the concubine Rizpah, but no one thought of them. The situation was such that experiments could not be risked, and David was the only one who could be regarded as equal to it. And so the voice of the people called him to the throne: the elders of the districts hitherto ruled by Ish-bosheth came to Hebron to offer the crown to David, and the terms of his regency were accepted by him with a solemn oath. Now the Philistines began to suspect their late vassal, and they attempted to destroy the kingdom of David in the bud. But the undertaking on which Saul had made shipwreck was accomplished by David and accomplished to last. In what were evidently long continued and bitter contests, from which tradition gives us a number of exciting episodes and individual deeds of heroism, he succeeded in breaking forever the Philistine dominion. He destroyed all their relish for returning to the attack in his realm, but disturbed them no more in their own. He did not take from them a single foot of their land or a stone of their fortresses, and thus by his wise moderation paved the way for a peaceable footing of arbitration between the two countries, which fortunately for Judah remained permanent.

While David thus had his hands full with the Philistine wars, the Moabites appear to have fallen upon his rear; they, too, are beaten and severely chastised, and joined to the kingdom of Israel as a tributary province. During the Philistine wars, perhaps, or in any event directly after the close of them, David took a step which gives shining evidence of his statesmanship. As king of all Israel he could not continue to reside at Hebron in the extreme south of the country. Only about six miles north of his native place Bethlehem, lies Jerusalem, at that time still in possession of the Canaanite tribe of the Jebusites. The almost impregnable location of this city could not fail to strike a man of David's military insight; he selected it for the capital of his new kingdom; he con-

quered it but did the Jebusites no harm, and thus made sure from the start of an element of grateful and devoted citizens. Jerusalem is situated pretty near the central point of the entire country, and belonging to none of the tribes it stood on neutral ground above them and their rivalries. When it is called the City of David this is no mere phrase, for Jerusalem is altogether the creation of David; and when we consider what Jerusalem was to the people of Israel, and through the people of Israel to all mankind, we shall recognise in the foundation of this City of David an event of world-wide importance.

In characteristic contrast to this, Saul, even when he was king, continued to reside quietly in his native village. And another characteristic contrast between the two kings forces itself here upon our attention. David immediately set about securing for this kingdom in the political centre an ideal centre of interest. The ancient popular shrine, the ark of the covenant, had once been captured by the Philistines and then given back; Saul had let it run down without concerning himself about it. David made it one of his first concerns to bring it from the out-of-the-way country town to which it had been taken, to his new national capital. In a great popular celebration in which the king himself officiated as a leading performer, the shrine was brought to Jerusalem, and thus the God of Israel himself made his entrance. If anything in the Psalms was really composed by David, it is the words of the twenty-fourth Psalm, which may very well have been sung on the occasion of that great celebration:

"Lift up your heads, O ye gates,
And be ye lifted up, ye everlasting doors,
And the king of glory shall come in.
Who is this king of glory?
The Lord strong and mighty,
The Lord mighty in battle,"

That the Lord was mighty in battle David was soon to experience. Nahash, the king of the Ammonites, Saul's old opponent, died, and David sent an embassy of condolence to his son and successor Hanun. But Hanun took the messengers for spies and sent them back to their master covered with insults. Hereupon the Ammonites united with the Aramæans, Israel's neighbors on the north border, who probably were also somewhat uneasy at the sight of Israel's ambitious growth. At the Ammonite capital a battle was fought: while Abishai, Joab's brother, held the Ammonites in check, Joab beat the Aramæans in a decisive combat

and the campaign was won. But now the Aramæans called other allies into the field. David took the command himself, and there was a decisive battle fought at a place called Helam, the location of which we do not know; the Aramæans received a still more crushing defeat, and the hostile leader was among the slain. David captured rich booty, and the region about Damascus was added to his realm as a tributary province. And thus, too, the northern border was made secure.

But while David was thus occupied in the extreme north the Edomites invaded the land from the south. Joab proceeded against them in forced marches, and beside the Dead Sea they were beaten and fearfully punished; their land too became a tributary province. After a long siege the capital of the Ammonites fell also; but in this case David exercised leniency and only required certain public labors of them, indeed he even seems to have permitted the native dynasty to continue, of course as vassals of Israel.

Thus under the lead of David, Israel had become in a few years the dominant race, the most important nation between the Euphrates and the Nile, and it deserves to be once more emphatically pointed out in closing this part of the subject that it cannot be proved or even claimed with plausibility that David began a single one of these wars: only to ward off unwarranted attacks and for the defence of the most vital interests of his people did David draw the sword, but when he did, it was with might and as in a war of God. The close of his life might have been full of light and of peaceful enjoyment of the power he had acquired, but at the height of his renown and his career David incurred a heavy guilt and this guilt went on bearing evil deeds; thus a series of trials was prepared for him which plunged him into the depths of woe.

While his troops were in the field against the Ammonites he was smitten with a sinful passion for Bath-sheba, the wife of one of his officers; he had the officer put out of the way and took the woman. If we look into the whole wretched affair without prejudice we must come to the conclusion that the blame was just as great on the woman's part, if not greater. Few kings, indeed, would have made such frank confession of the sin as David did, and we get the impression that of all his numerous wives this demoniac woman was the only one whom he really and deeply loved.

Thus David had sinned against the sanctity of the family, and the heaviest retribution was to come upon him from his own family. His eldest son, Amnon, is enamored of his fair step-sister, Tamar, and accomplishes his shameful purpose by cunning and

force. Very likely he thought : If my father has done such things I need not restrain myself. In fact David does not venture, probably in view of his own guilt, to punish his wicked son ; but two years after Amnon is murdered by Absalom, the full brother of the ravished Tamar. Now Absalom has to flee, but the king longs for this son, who after the death of Amnon was the successor to the throne, and who had slain in Amnon rather the crown prince than the violator of his sister. Joab sees through the situation and manages to procure for Absalom permission to return ; but he is still banished from his father's presence and is not allowed to come to court. This was extremely unwise, and could not but embitter the son. Two years passed thus, and again Joab acted as intercessor and Absalom was restored to favor and now appeared as officially recognised crown-prince.

But Absalom's ambition was not satisfied with this. It is easy to imagine that many elements, and these not the worst, were dissatisfied with the new conditions and saw with deep regret the former simplicity and informality giving way before the pomp and splendor of the new monarchy. Absalom took advantage of this sentiment and even cultivated it. The description of the malcontent crown-prince and the way in which he wins popularity and steals the hearts of his father's people is nothing less than classic. When he thought the time had come he procured leave of absence to go to Hebron, and there the insurrection broke out ; Absalom was proclaimed king and marched with his Judean supporters directly upon Jerusalem.

That the insurrection broke out in David's first capital, Hebron, and in his own tribe of Judah, is significant and highly complimentary to David : the Judeans evidently felt offended and slighted because David did not favor them, and because as king of all Israel he no longer would or could be tribal king of Judah. David was taken so completely by surprise that he barely managed to escape ; he fled across the Jordan, but did not neglect to provide for representation of his interests in Jerusalem. And the cunning Hushai actually succeeded in detaining Absalom from an immediate pursuit of his father and in persuading him to a fatal delay. The militia of all Israel was first summoned and then Absalom crossed the Jordan.

Meanwhile David had found time to gather about him his old and tried guards ; under the leadership of Joab these easily scattered Absalom's rabble hosts and Absalom himself, contrary to David's express command, was slain by Joab's own hand. The scene

that follows, David breaking out into bitter lamentations over the death of his still loved son and taking no pleasure in his victory, is familiar to all ; Joab is obliged to remind him by a frank admonition of his duty as king, but the king takes the death of his son so to heart that he dismisses Joab and puts in his place Absalom's general, Amasa. Now there was nothing to interfere with his return to Jerusalem, but in the spiritual anguish of these days and weeks he had lost his old discretion and wisdom. It may well have cut him deeply that his Judeans had been the first to desert him, and accordingly he persuaded them now to come alone and fetch him back to Jerusalem. This was done. But when the forces of the northern tribes came to the Jordan and saw how things stood, dissension and strife arose, which finally became so bitter that a Benjaminite named Sheba blew the trumpet and cried : We have no portion in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. To thy tents, Israel ! And all Israel actually followed Sheba, and David was left alone with his Judeans. He immediately gave orders to his newly appointed general, Amasa, to get the army ready to march ; but when Amasa proved unable to execute the order he turned again to the tried and trusty Joab, and as though nothing had happened meanwhile, Joab did his duty with inflexible fidelity. He cut down his incapable successor, and the old and invincible warriors gathered enthusiastically about his standard. The rebels were promptly dispersed and driven into the extreme north of the country ; Sheba took refuge in the city of Abel Beth-maacah, and as Joab was preparing to besiege the city the inhabitants threw out the head of the rebel to him over the wall.

With this achievement David's kingdom was saved, and the evening of his life seems to have been passed in undisturbed repose. He reigned forty years in all : seven and a half years as tribal king of Judah at Hebron and thirty-three years as national king of Israel in Jerusalem. When he reached the age of seventy the infirmities of age made themselves felt ; he seems to have become quite torpid, a plaything without will in the hands of his followers, particularly of Bath-sheba, who entirely controlled him. Adonijah, the eldest son after the death of Absalom, was generally regarded as the successor to the throne, and David's old companions, Joab and Abiathar, were on his side, while Bath-sheba, supported by certain ambitious men who hoped thus to open a future for themselves, tried to divert the succession to her son Solomon, the youngest of David's sons.

Be it that Adonijah could not wait for the death of his father, or that he merely incurred the appearance of so doing,—under pressure of the report that Adonijah had caused himself to be proclaimed king and homage to be paid him, Bath-sheba managed to have Solomon formally recognised by the dying king and introduced to the people as his successor. As Benaiah, the captain of the guard, who wished to succeed Joab as general and actually did succeed him, was for Solomon and Bath-sheba and they thus had the whole military force at their disposal, all resistance was in vain and the outwitted opponents were constrained to make their peace with the newly appointed youthful king. Adonijah and Joab did not long survive the defeat of their hopes and died by the hand of the executioner; the priest Abiathar was merely deposed and banished.

David must have died soon after this settlement of the succession. He is the most luminous figure and the most gifted personage in Israelitish history, surpassed in ethical greatness and general historical importance only by Moses, the man of God. It is not possible to overestimate what David did for Israel: Israel as a people, as a representative of political life, as a concrete quantity in the development of universal history, as a nation in the fullest sense of the word, is exclusively his work. With this he completed what Moses had begun in quiet and inconspicuous labors on Sinai and at Kadesh. And all of this David created as it were out of nothing, under the most difficult conditions conceivable, with no other means than his own talents and his own all-inspiring and all-compelling personality.

However far I let my gaze wander among the ranks of the great figures of history, I find no parallel among them for so completely a "self-made man." He is one of those phenomenal men such as Providence gives but once to a people, in whom a whole nation and its history reaches once for all its climax. David created Israel and at the same time raised it to its highest eminence; what Israel was under and through David it never again became. And so we can easily understand how the eyes of Israel rested in grateful reverence upon this figure, and how a second David became the dream of Israel's future.

True, the picture of David does not lack the traits of human frailty, which Israelitish tradition with a truly admirable sincerity has neither suppressed nor palliated, but the charm which this personality exercised over all contemporaries without exception has not yet faded for us of a later day; whoever devotes himself

without prejudice to the contemplation of David's history and character cannot fail to like him. A saint and psalm-singer, as later tradition has represented him, he certainly was not ; but we find in him a truly noble human figure, which, in spite of all, preserved the tenderest and most fragrant bloom of its nature, perfect directness and simplicity ; nowhere any posing, nothing theatrical, such as is always found in sham greatness ; he always acts out what he is, but his unspoiled nature, noble at heart, generally comes very near to the right and good. At the same time the whole personality is touched with a breath of genuine piety and childlike trust in God, so that we can wholly comprehend how he appears to tradition as the ideal ruler, the king after God's own heart.

This king, who did more for the worldly greatness and earthly power of Israel than any one else, was a genuine Israelite in that he appreciated also Israel's religious destiny : he was no soldier-king, no conqueror and warrior of common stamp, no ruler like any one of a hundred others, but he is the truest incorporation of the unique character of Israel, a unique personality in the history of the world, and we understand how he could become the impersonation of an idea,—how the highest and holiest that Israel hoped for and longed for, appears as the Son of David.

SHANKARA, TEACHER OF INDIA.

BY CHARLES JOHNSTON.

A SHORT TIME AGO, an esteemed friend of mine who has devoted much study to Buddhism in writing of Indian philosophy, drew a comparison between Shakya Muni and Shankara, saying that while the Saint of the Gotamas might well be compared to the founder of the Christian religion, Shankara could only rank with philosophers, like Kant and Schopenhauer.

Now, it seems to me that, while this comparison does justice to one side of the great Vedantin's character, as his lucid insight and cogent reasoning may be equalled, but are certainly not surpassed, by the greatest minds of our own or classical times, it quite fails to take into account another side of Shankara's life, which is of the greatest interest, though too generally ignored by the writers on Indian philosophy.

I shall try to outline this side of the teacher's work, using materials gathered, for the most part, in Southern India, among living followers of the master of Advaita philosophy. It has been noted, in passing, by several writers that during his short lifetime Shankara, besides writing his famous Commentaries, founded three Monasteries, or Colleges, the chief of which was at Shringeri in the northern part of the province of Mysore. But I do not remember to have seen it clearly stated that the great organisation of which Shringeri was the centre, is full of life and vigor at the present day and has influential branches, not only throughout the Deccan, Madras, and Bombay, but even in Northern India, Benares, and Lower Bengal. To this organisation belong all the best and most influential students of the Advaita doctrine; and chiefs or overseers are appointed for each province, whom we might well call bishops and doctors in philosophy.

The life of the central organisation at Shringeri has been preserved in a wonderful and peculiarly Oriental way. Just as Shan-

kara himself during his lifetime chose pupils whom he initiated into the deepest mysteries of his esoteric doctrine, so each chief of the Shringeri College chooses his successor, generally selecting a youth or even a boy of quite tender years; and this elect pupil is trained during the life of his superior in all the wisdom which comes down from the first great head of the College, who himself was but the follower of earlier sages, stretching back in unbroken line to the dim dawn of the Vedic age. There is thus what we may well call an apostolic succession, with the single difference that the chief is in each case selected, not by a college of dignitaries or royal mandate, but by his immediate predecessor, who chose him, as I have said, at an early age, and watched over the gradual growth of his mind, character, and learning. Each chief of Shringeri is spoken of as the Shankaracharya; the name of the founder having become a title of honor; and the present Shankaracharya is a man of the highest character, a magnetic personality, a fine Sanskrit scholar, and a perfect master of all the intricacies of the Vendanta philosophy, familiar with the works of his great predecessors. A discourse of his, delivered during one of his periodical visits to the outlying organisations which are under the control of the Shringeri College, was recently published; and it bears, in thought and language, the clearest resemblance to the works of the great Shankara, such as the *Tattva Bodha*, or the *Atma-Anatma-Viveka*.

To such an apostolic succession as that established by Shankara at Shringeri the Indian schools of philosophy give the name of *Guru-parampara*,—the same term, it will be noted, which Shankara himself uses in his Commentaries on the *Chhandagya* and *Brhadaryaka Upanishads*, where he speaks of the teaching of Rebirth, or Reincarnation, having been handed down as a secret esoteric doctrine, by the line of teachers, or *Guru-parampara*, of the Rajput race, before being revealed to the Brahmans. The *Upanishads* themselves contain lists of very ancient lines of teachers, which go back to mythological ages and invariably lead up to the deity, as their first founder; and, within historical times, we find constant traces of the same institution, as, for instance, in the case of Shankara himself, who was the pupil of Govinda Guru, the pupil of Gaudapada.

There is a tradition in Southern India, among the followers of Shankara's school, that this Gaudapada, who is known to us as the author of a poem expanding the ideas of the *Mandukya Upanishad*, is the same person as Patanjali, the author of the *Yoga Sutras*. If this tradition represents a historical fact, it will be necessary for us

to date Shankara not more than two generations later than Patanjali, or some time in the second century before the Christian era; and I have been assured by many Brahmans connected with Shringeri, that the lists of Gurus, still preserved in the archives of the College there, fully bear out this date for the great Vedantin teacher; notwithstanding that the accepted opinion among European scholars is that the first Shankaracharya lived in the eighth century of our era. Up to the present, however, I have not been able to obtain a satisfactory copy of this list of Gurus; several which have been published being imperfect or incomplete, so that it seems best to leave the matter open, merely recording the fact that this tradition exists and is widely accepted by the followers of Shankara themselves. I have further seen it stated that the lists in the minor Colleges founded by Shankara also fully bear out the same date; but further evidence is necessary before we can come to any definite conclusion.

It will at once be seen that the Shringeri College and the organisation of which it is the head are perfectly analogous to the Lamaic system of Tibet, and we may very well compare the Chief of Shringeri with the Teshu Lama. I believe I am right in saying that the Chief of the Mysore College is invariably a celibate, like the first Shankaracharya, while his deputies in the various provinces are married men, following the old Brahmanical laws for households. It is interesting to note that Mysore State, in the northern part of which the College of Shringeri is situated, still largely conforms, even in its temporal government, to the Brahmanical ideals, the dominant powers being strictly orthodox, and thus furnishing our best analogy to the political conditions of Buddha's day when the Brahmans practically ruled even in affairs of state, as ministers and diplomatists, not less than as teachers and priests.

The great organisation founded by Shankara has withstood unshaken the conquering armies of the Prophet; and when we consider the great learning and high philosophical training of its living followers, we may be confident that this closely knit association of Advaita schools will in no way be weakened or changed by contact with Western thought, which has too often been but another name for the most ignorant materialism, especially when coming into contact with Eastern faiths.

It will thus be evident that the comparison with Kant and Schopenhauer by no means does justice to this side of Shankara's work. If we can imagine that Paul, instead of Peter, had founded the hierarchy of the Christian Church, to perpetuate and preserve

the mystical teachings which we find in his Letters to Colossi, Galatia, and Corinth, we shall have a much truer parallel. Or if we could conceive a practical reformer, such as tradition tells us Pythagoras was, leaving writings like the Platonic dialogues, we shall again approach to a truer conception of Shankara's work. If we had an apostolic succession of masters in Greek philosophy, each bearing the name and inheriting the thought of the greatest pupil of Socrates, lasting through the centuries, supplying an inner, philosophic side to the successive phases of popular religion; and conserving, as the heart of a widely extended and powerful organisation, the highest ideals of Plato's best thought, we should be more in a position to understand in what relation Shankara the Teacher stands, not only to Indian philosophy but also to Indian life.

Many of the finest scholars and most influential men among the followers of Shankara affiliated with the Shringeri College are also graduates of the English universities in India, and are prominent as lawyers or administrators under the present government; their position as such in no way interfering with their relations to the great Vedanta College, just as their studies in European science or history in no way clash with their earlier allegiance to Advaita idealism, since their intellectual training has thoroughly fitted them to find a just and harmonious relation between our physical knowledge and their own metaphysical theories.

We are not in a position to judge how far the numerous traditions of Shankara's life, preserved in the popular histories, are faithful records handed down from contemporary sources; and I am far from holding that the element of the so-called supernatural, which often tinges them, justifies us in rejecting the pictures they give us of the great Vedantia's personality. But what we know of Shankara's practical work, as embodied in the great and powerful organisation I have described in outline, is quite sufficient to show that the Advaita teacher must have been a man of rare power of character, endowed with a commanding will, as well as with a penetrating intellect; for no man of less magnetic force could have persuaded his contemporaries to found and support such colleges completely devoted to his ideals, especially when we remember that his work lay almost wholly among the Brahmans, whose class had long grown old in privilege and power; and, with these, as we know from Buddha's life, had inherited a profoundly conservative suspicion of change.

That this powerful body should have continued to cherish, and should cherish to-day, an ideal of the highest and most abstract

philosophy, with a vast body of learning continually added to, though already of great compass at Shankara's death, is the liveliest testimony to his genius and power, as a ruler of men, not less than as an illuminer of minds.

The very reasons which make the excellence of the schools founded by Shankara—the facts that they deal with the loftiest and most abstract regions of philosophy, and appeal almost wholly to intellectual and cultivated minds—have been the causes that we have not, for Shankara, as for Buddha, a mass of legends full of popular feeling and emotions, such as sway the minds of the masses, appealing rather to the ignorant than the learned.

Shankara is thus a figure for whom it would be difficult to find a parallel; as, indeed, to furnish comparisons, we have been compelled to resort to imagination; a philosopher of the highest rank, who, not content with the world of abstract thought, went forth into the world of men; seeking, and finding pupils who should accept and carry out his teachings, and impressing his will on their minds with such imperious power that his best ideals are perpetuated and preserved, by a hierarchy of philosophers, to the present day.

A word in conclusion as to Shankara's teaching. Briefly stated, it is this: The cause of the sorrow and suffering of mankind is a belief in the reality and isolated existence of the personal life. But the personality, with the fate of which each one of us identifies himself, has no real existence; it is nothing but an image of the body in the mind, and its sufferings are imaginary. Its original cause is the "beginningless, ineffable unwisdom" of separation; and this illusion of isolated being is dispelled by an insight, which we may well call illumination, or inspiration. When the false self is dispelled, Shankara tells us, the real Self rises in the heart, as the sun shines out when the clouds are dispersed. The real Self is the self of all beings; hence the revelation of it brings an end of egotism, of the sense of separate life. The real Self is, further, the reality underlying all outward things; hence its possession makes an end of all lust and desire for outward things. Thus the realisation of the selfless Self, destroying all egotism and lust, makes an end of the sorrow of the world. But this illumination, which is perfect freedom, must be led up to by right understanding; for the errors of the mind are the true cause of bondage. Hence the necessity for a sane and broad philosophy, and for schools and teachers to preserve and perpetuate this philosophy. To supply this necessity, was the aim of Shankara's life-work.

PHILOSOPHICAL PARTIES AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE AS FACTORS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT.

BY THE EDITOR.

THERE IS a natural contrast in philosophy between rationalists and empiricists, between the theory-party and the fact-party, between deductionists and inductionists, between the advocates of pure reason and the advocates of experience, between the believers in the universal and the sticklers for particulars, and these parties are as natural in philosophy as the Whigs and Tories, the Republicans and Democrats in politics, the anarchists and socialists in social affairs, and the Pharisees and Sadducees in religion. Both parties work in harmony toward a common aim, which is the discovery of truth, representing two principles, the former looking out for the unity of all things, the latter for exactness in detail. Both parties are needed in philosophy as much as we need in politics the Republicans for union, order, centralisation, and the Democrats for independence, liberty, and non-interference in local and private affairs.¹ The Tories are the English Republicans and the Whigs the English Democrats. The socialists are social Tories, or the party of social organisation and union; the anarchists are the social Whigs, the party of liberty and independence. Thus the theorists in philosophy, the advocates of pure reason, are the Tories of thought and the particularists or advocates of pure experience are the Whigs of thought.

The same holds good in religion, where the Pharisees insist on definiteness in dogma and on authority in church government,

¹ This general characterisation of our parties refers merely to the traditional principles, leaving out of sight the fact that the silverites have of late taken possession of the Democratic party-machine and switched it off on the side-track of populism.

while the Sadducees demand culture, even though it may come from the Gentiles, and freedom from dogma.

In addition to these two parties there is another party which in American politics has received the name of Populist, and in Germany the collective name of the *die Wilden*, the wild ones, or savages. They are the irregulars who follow either no principle whatever or raise some side issue, thus giving a universal significance to some unimportant question. They are innovators on general principles; they propose a change on account of their dissatisfaction with the world. As a rule they rise from the ranks of those who not having the public ear try to gain it by creating a sensation of some kind. They are in this respect very much like those personages in politics who are hopelessly out of power and anxious to come into power by any means, just criticism of existing evils and otherwise—mostly otherwise. But whether or not their complaints are right or wrong, they are generally disregarded and poohpoohed.

The Populists in politics and the irregulars in philosophy play a very important part in history. They represent the spirit that denies, and when by a division of power both parties have become corrupt and anti-progressive, the irregulars grow in prominence and shake them from their stupor. Some of the greatest movements have been launched by this party of wild issues; but we must add that a wild issue raised on account of some sore need that was neglected by the Pharisees and Sadducees of the time, always sobers down when it grows to power. The Nazarene movement of Palestine is a religious populism which culminated in Christ's preaching the Gospel to the poor, leading finally to the establishment of the Christian Church, in which to-day we have the same division of parties, the dogmatists, or so-called orthodox, and the liberals, both being nothing but a reincarnation of the Pharisees and Sadducees of the times of Christ.

The Pharisees and Sadducees are as severely and indiscriminately arraigned in the New Testament as are the Republicans and Democrats by the Populists of to-day; and this lack of discrimination is natural. Both parties had remained heedless of the religious demands of the large classes of the poor and the uncultured. Both looked down with contempt upon the irregular preachers and self-appointed prophets of the Essenes and Nazarenes, who (like John the Baptist) lived, in food and dress, like Buddhist monks, introduced new rites, such as baptism, preached in the streets, and represented in this way the voice crying in the wilderness. We know from Josephus that both the Pharisees and the Saddu-

cees were by no means such contemptible persons as they are commonly supposed to have been. With all their faults, they were, taken as a class, earnest and upright men who tried to do what was right according to their best knowledge and obeying the dictates of their conscience. The Pharisees were stern in their faith in Jehovah and adhered with strictness to the covenant; and the Sadducees, seeing the narrowness of traditional Judaism, endeavored to broaden the religion of their fathers. We may assume that there were hypocrites among them, but the Pharisees' hopes and the Sadducees' aspirations were as honest as was any religious faith in the world. Their main fault was narrowness, not rascality and blindness, not knavery and ignorance, not ill-will. Considering the tragic fate of the people of Israel, we feel compassion for them, we pity them, but cannot look upon them as rogues. And what holds good of the old Pharisees and Sadducees is true of the modern Pharisees and Sadducees. There are hypocrites among them, but for that reason we need not call them a generation of vipers.

The Populists form a third party, but it would be wrong to imagine that the irregulars, the innovators, the representatives of prevalent dissatisfaction, are all that is left. There is not only the large mass of indifferent people who allow themselves to drift with the currents that originate in the conflict of both parties, following upon the whole either the will o' the wisp of private hopes or yielding thoughtlessly to their sentiments, which are allured by catching party-cries. There are also a number of independent men who would not swear by any one party-principle, and who sometimes do not care for consistency of party-principles, but would leave such questions alone and select what for some reason or other they feel there is a moral need of. They are called in politics the independents, in philosophy eclectics.

Independents and eclectics rise frequently into great prominence in times of need. They recruit themselves from the middle classes, who for practical ends and for the sake of peace, demand a *status vivendi* which would temporarily settle a problem by compromise. The independents appear on the scene of local government as "citizens' parties" and under similar names. Their work, however, is sporadic. They make a clean sweep, but as soon as the pressing cause of indignation that called the movement into existence has been removed, the enthusiasm abates on account of the general indifference, and the citizens' party changes into a regular political machine with spoils' system and all other faults. The eclectics in philosophy are similar; they are the seeds of thought

that grow on stony places ; forthwith they spring up because they have no depth of soil ; but when the sun rises they are scorched, and because they have not root, they wither away."

There is a great difference between the independents, the eclectics or citizens' party, and the Populists or irregulars. The former are practical and demand the settlement of practical questions. If they enter into matters of principle they are fain to appeal to two or more contradictory principles in one breath. They have no root, and are lacking in depth. The latter, however, are, upon the whole, wild theorists ; they sometimes fight principles as a matter of principle. They endeavor in their way to be thorough, but their schemes are wild and their theories crude.

The Populists can start new movements, but they are forever unable to run them. As soon as a new movement has become an established fact, the two parties of universalists or unionists and the particularists will under new names naturally and spontaneously reappear. The old names become sometimes odious and are for that reason dropped, but the new party divisions will in all essentials be on the lines of the old principles.

The reason of the constant reappearance of the same contrasts lies in the fact that they are both legitimate. They are contrasts but not contradictions. Both principles are right, and the history of the world is mankind's endeavor to adjust itself to both. Zealous partisans would abolish either principle and expect the realisation of a millennium on earth as soon as the principle which they have happened to embrace will have sole sway. Thus the ideals of both anarchism and socialism will be actualised in every social progress, not in the way that demagogues preach, but as society develops, according to the laws of social growth. Every new adjustment of the needs of society, every new institution in which it takes shape, will create better chances for individuals to make a fair living and through a choice of new possibilities widen their sphere of independence. Every definite comprehension of the true significance of a religious doctrine will show the old dogmas in a new light,—not, to be sure, in the light of narrow traditionalism, but after all as a fulfilment of the ideal which the dogmatists were groping after.

In the history of modern philosophy it is sometimes difficult to class philosophers, because they do not go to the polls to vote either way on party issues, and cannot therefore be divided as the goats and the sheep will be on the day of judgment. As there are no republicans who would not occasionally advocate democratic

measures, and *vice versa*, so there are no theorists who do not gladly avail themselves of the material of the empiricists; and there is no one who as a matter of principle rests his confidence on experience alone, who would not form a theory as soon as he believes he has found the general feature in a number of single facts. Nevertheless, we can say generally that among modern thinkers Kant, the philosopher of Pure Reason, represents the deductionist, the theorist, the believer in universality, the upholder of the *a priori*; John Stuart Mill, the advocate of pure experience, the inductionist, the believer in particulars, the upholder of the *a posteriori* as the sole source of knowledge; and Herbert Spencer, the eclectic. Without solving any one of the fundamental principles, Spencer accepts the main results of the science of his day and thus satisfies that large class of people who are in search of a solution that will serve their most urgent philosophical needs. As a typical populist in philosophy, one of the irregulars, who proposes to be original by principle, is Nietzsche, rampant and incoherent, but interesting; betraying even in his clearest works the incipient insanity to which he finally fell a prey, but suggestive; ridiculously grandiloquent, but ingenious, and brilliant.

The constant reappearance of the two main parties in philosophy, as indicated by Plato and Aristotle, the realists and the nominalists, the Kantians and the experience-philosophers, has led to the belief that the issue between these opposed principles is ultimately based upon the idiosyncrasy of the philosopher and can therefore never be decided but must forever remain a matter of personal preference. We beg to differ. As society is the product of two factors, the needs of the whole community and the wants of the individual, so the scientific instinct seeks a comprehension of the unity that pervades all the particulars and collects the particulars for the purpose of gathering them up into unities. If the realists imagine that the unities in nature, the types or ideas, the noumena, exist as independent entities or essences within, above, and beyond the things in which they have become incarnate, they are mistaken; and if the nominalists imagine that they are purely subjective notions to which there is no correspondent reality in the objective world, they, too, are mistaken. The types of being are not metaphysical essences but pure forms, and being pure forms they are, although not material, yet real or actual.

The issue between both parties can be decided only by a clear and definite conception of the nature of form. The form of a statue and the form of musical sounds consist neither of matter nor

of motion; and yet the forms of things are their most essential qualities. Things are such as they are because they possess certain forms. Form is the essential problem everywhere. We have reasons to believe that even the chemical elements are different groupings of the same world-substance, and that thus their difference will eventually be explicable as a difference of form.

All science is ultimately a tracing of form; hence the paramount importance of counting and measuring in all exact investigations. But we must remember that counting and measuring are only quantitative determinations of form, and that qualitative differences must be defined by subtler methods of purely formal thought.

The philosophy of form is the philosophy of science; it starts from experience, systematises the facts of experience, and then studies the method of systematisation which contains the key to the order that prevails throughout the cosmos. The system that characterises the functions of all the purely formal sciences (which as a totality characteristic of the human mind is called Reason) is analogous to the formal aspect of the objective world; or, in other words, the intrinsic harmony of mathematical constructions and the immanent order of the laws of nature (which at first sight appear to us as the studied design of a creator) are the results of the same conditions in different fields: they are products of the same determinedness of formal laws, implying intrinsic necessity as well as universality.

Now, we claim that while forms are not gods, nor metaphysical essences, nor entities of any kind, that they are nevertheless (as the realists claim) not only present in the things, but exist also independently of them as "pure forms." There are no things in themselves, but there are "forms in themselves." This is the solution of the old quarrel between the mediæval schools of realism and nominalism, and this is also the answer which we present to the fundamental questions of Kant's transcendentalism. It is wrong to seek for an x behind the things; that which constitutes the thing is its form; and if a concrete thing is destroyed it can be reconstructed by an exact restitution of its form.

There is one important peculiarity of form, viz., the intrinsic necessity of its laws. This, reduced to its simplest expression, is formulated as the law of identity, which declares that that same is the same. The same purely formal operation will give the same results wherever, whenever, and howsoever it may be done. One plus one equals two, whether counted in apples or planets, or any

imaginary objects, and $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$, whatever a and b may stand for.

The sciences of pure form are not (as the nominalists claim) purely subjective inventions; they are not mere conceits of the mind; they possess objective validity. The fundamental notions of form are abstractions from experience, and in this sense they are *a posteriori*, but given the fundamental notions of pure form every thinking being can, *a priori*, construct forms which, if they are consistently built up, will generally be applicable to objective reality, for the same process will lead to the same results whether performed with purely mental figures or with concrete objects of any kind. The applicability of mathematics to the most distant stars on which we can never set foot demolishes the principle of nominalism that we know particulars only and have no right to formulate any universal law until we have collected all its single instances in actual experience.

Both the nominalists and the realists were right in their main aspirations. There is (as the realists claim) a unity in the world, and this unity is a real presence in the universe. On the other hand, the nominalists are right in saying that the world consists of particulars and there is no other way to a comprehension of the world than by a study of these particulars. Universals are first mere names, the verification of which as actualities in the objective world can only be determined by a verification of their applicableness to the concrete world of particulars.

The world of form, being throughout definite and determined, is a world of order. It is the condition of science and the condition of ethics. Science is everywhere the tracing of some change of form; and its principle is negatively expressed in the physicist's law of the conservation of matter and energy, and positively in the law of causation. Both laws declare that in all changes there is a certain something which remains the same. Qualitative changes involve no quantitative changes; which means that all causation is ultimately a transformation, a new arrangement, a new distribution of parts.

The philosophy of form is not a temporary compromise between realism and nominalism, between Kantian apriorism and John Stuart Mill's empiricism, but a definite settlement of its issues.¹ It neither overlooks nor abolishes the contrasts that nat-

¹For further details as to the nature of cognition, reason, the *a priori* in its relation to the *a posteriori* and further inferences in the domains of religion and ethics, see the writer's *Primer of Philosophy*.

urally obtain between them, but on the contrary justifies the principles on which they are based and limits them to their proper spheres. Thus the faults of onesidedness can be avoided and science has come in close touch with philosophy.

The philosophy of form is a new positivism in so far as it derives the fundamental notions of forms from the positive facts of experience; it is a new monism in so far as the formal aspect of the world constitutes its unity and verifies the assumption of the oneness of all existence as well as the unison of all truth. It is the philosophy of science in so far as it analyses and explains the methods of science; it can serve as a propædeutic to scientific methodology and justifies the scientist's ideal, which assumes that truth is attainable.

MISCELLANEOUS.

AMOS BRONSON ALCOTT.

AMOS BRONSON ALCOTT (see Frontispiece to this *Open Court*) was born in the little town of Wolcott, Conn., Nov. 29, 1799. He died at Boston, March 4, 1888.

He first became known as a teacher, and his school in Boston excited much attention by the originality of his ideas and methods. Both Margaret Fuller and Elizabeth P. Peabody assisted him at times in his work. He published a *Record of a School* which gives an account of this work and also *Conversations of the Gospels*. These conversations were held by his young scholars, and they are much prized by educators for their revelations of the minds of childhood.

He took a brave part in the anti-slavery and other reforms of the day, and had many original ideas and plans of his own.

He was one of the leading minds among the famous transcendentalists, and his *Orphic Sayings* attracted much attention. He tried a practical experiment in associated life at Fruitlands, but it did not prove successful.

Mr. Alcott married Miss Abby May, a sister of the well-beloved Samuel Joseph May of Syracuse. She was a woman of high intellectual power and great strength of character, and all her daughters inherited much of their parents' rare gifts. Louisa, the author of *Little Women*, became famous and has made all her family so by her stories.

Mr. Alcott lived very quietly at Concord for some years in intimate friendship with Emerson, Thoreau, and the other famous men of that town. Previously, while living mostly in Boston, he had classes for conversation which were well attended by highly cultivated men and women and which were of great interest.

About 1854 he first went West to give lectures, and later in 1873 and succeeding years he made several trips to the West and was quite successful in drawing around him a circle of sympathetic friends.

He was the original projector of "the Concord School of Philosophy" which opened at Concord in 1879, and as long as his health permitted he took part in all its exercises as lecturer or as listener. When about eighty he first appeared in public as a poet, publishing a volume of sonnets.

Full particulars of Mr. Alcott's life and philosophy may be found in the *Memoirs of Bronson Alcott*, by Sanborn and Harris, published by Roberts Brothers. Boston.

The bas-relief forming the frontispiece to the present *Open Court*, which is here published for the first time, was made from life, in 1852, by Seth W. Cheney of Boston.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

DE INCARNATIONE VERBI DEI. By the Rev. Alan S. Hawkesworth. Pp., 116
Albany, N. Y.: Riggs Publishing Co.

We have the assurance of the Very Rev. E. A. Hoffman, Dean of the General Theological Seminary, that the present work "gives a very admirable and comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of the Incarnation in all its bearings and consequences; that it could well be used as the basis of a series of theological lectures, "or as the framework of an exhaustive treatise"; and as to the doctrinal worth of the treatise certainly such high commendation is sufficient. The philosophical point of view of the author is that of the Platonic concept of Ideas with its subsequent development into the *Λόγος* and *λόγοι* of the Neo-Platonists and of St. John. If we understand the mechanism by which the archetypal Ideas of Plato are reified, how the Logos is logified into the logoi, the step is easy and logical to seeing how the primordial Logos-God of Christian Neo-Platonic philosophy is incarnated in the lesser logos-man of the Christian Church. The idea is the very core and essence of a powerful and cogent system of philosophy, appealing to the liveliest side of our spiritual nature, and hence no one can fail at least to appreciate the author's position that "the Incarnation in man of the Logos of God [rightly understood] is the crown and necessary complement of all natural truths," and hence historically may be, although it is therefore not naturally and necessarily such, "the living and vivifying heart of Christianity."

If Aristotle had been more studied by the Alexandrian Fathers, the "living and vivifying heart of Christianity" might conceivably have been different. As it was, their very occupation with philosophy led in self-defence to dogma, with its thousand fantastic and rococo ramifications. And it is our only criticism of the theological part of this work that our author lends his erudite powers to the literal justification of these indifferent dogmatic excrescences rather than to the simple statement of the philosophical truth which lies at their heart. The latter is not untouched but the preponderance of emphasis is laid upon the former. The grand Neo-Platonic, philosophical idea of the Logos-incarnation is one thing, and the "dual character of the Eucharistic elements" conceived as the Unifying Body and the Atoning Blood is, with all due reverence, another.

Appended to the work proper are three philosophical essays. We have only to say that the author's mode of procedure here is not the scientific mode of philosophical procedure. To us it is no refutation of the Dualistic theory of mind and matter to prove that "Dualism is based upon a shallow and erroneous conception of *Sin*," or that it is "opposed to all Religious and Philosophical *axioms*." This is looking at philosophical problems through a theological lens, of which method we have a further example in the statement of the author's own "Christian-theory" of spirit and matter—*videlicet* that they are to be regarded as "two stages, or two aspects of the one creative act of God, by which He is ever giving *existence* to His world," understanding by *ex*-istence the manifestation of God's primordial *sub*-sistence (which by the way is a specimen of the philological mode of philosophical procedure). Remarkably enough the "Christian theory" corresponds in substance with the current psychological theory which should have been mentioned separately in Mr. Hawkesworth's classification, and which beginning with Spinoza was per-

haps most distinctly pronounced by Fechner, who compared matter and mind to the two aspects, convex and concave, of a curve, which while constituting the same existence were yet different. (See, e. g., Lloyd Morgan's *Comp. Psych.*, and for *pro* and *contra* modifications the discussion between Dr. P. Carus and Prof. Ernst Mach, page 393 et seq. of Vol. I. of *The Monist*, also and particularly the latter's *Analysis of the Sensations*, Appendix I. and the "Introduction.") Into the further figurative theological extensions of this theory we cannot go, but must take leave of the book here, commending its honesty and sincerity of tone and its profound Christian scholarship.

T. J. McC.

CRIME AND CRIMINALS. By *J. Sanderson Christison, M. D.* Chicago: The W. T. Keener Company. 1897. Price, \$1.00.

This little book of only 117 pages treats of the problems of Crime and Criminals in a practical way as can be done by an expert only. The author distinguishes three classes of criminals: (1) the insane, (2) the moral paretic, and (3) the selfish or criminal proper. The first class must be limited to those who cannot be held responsible; their action is chiefly the product of subconscious reasoning which is dominated by a delusion of some kind, sometimes by hallucination. The moral paretic is the man that lacks self-control, suffering from an abnormal weakness of the will owing to a diseased condition of the inhibitory powers of the brain, chiefly caused by self-indulgence. The criminal proper is fully conscious of the results of his crime, but is void of moral principles and exhibits little or no consideration for the sufferings of his fellow-beings.

Dr. Christison exemplifies his views by twenty-three cases which he analyses with good discretion and scientific exactness, among them Prendergast and other instances of Chicago criminals. He finds the cause of crime in heredity, environment, and a wrongly directed purpose in life. "It is no misfortune to be born poor, but it is a great misfortune to be born badly and reared unwisely. . . ." "Man's education begins in the cradle. . . ." "Nursery lies and fictitious rhymes engender fear, distrust, and, later on, deception, with false pride, the mother of most crime. From this springs much of the prevailing egotism of the present day, which would induce most men to steal rather than beg. And just as in midlife tumors arise from embryonic flaws, so the unforeseen crime of manhood may have been thoughtlessly coached in the infant's cradle."

It is noteworthy that in two-thirds of all cases criminals lost either both or one of their parents early in life, and it seems "that the care of even an indifferent parent is better than none at all. If a parent, especially a father, is not a total wreck, he will usually try to have his child do better than himself."

Dr. Christopher opposes the present system of treating criminals; he says: "The whole treatment of prisoners, guilty or innocent, from the time of arrest to the time of trial, which is sometimes many months, is nothing short of being a barbarous disgrace to a civilised State." He goes so far as to add that it "is the greatest cause of crime which is brought to public notice."

Therefore Dr. Christopher proposes the utter abolition of punishment, saying: "As a preventive of crime punishment is simply a notorious failure. It reforms neither child nor man, if they are in need of reform, though it is often an incident along the line, and if they are not in need of reform they can atone for their acts in a rational way. He who is incapable of reform is simply an irresponsible being."

The practical application of his theory he expresses as follows: "While society must have laws to secure order, it should exclude the delinquent only to correct and restore them. The severest and only just penalty that can be inflicted on any criminal is a full realisation of the nature of his crime, which involves a reform of his character. This can only be secured by education—an education for moral light, right relationship, first principles. In other words, it is a religious question, view it as you may. A satisfying final purpose must be found in order to insure right character and a desire for the proper conduct."

The cause of the new woman has found an enthusiastic champion in M. JULES BOIS, who has recently published a very readable book on the subject, *L'Eve nouvelle*. (Paris: Léon Chailley, 41 Rue de Richelieu. Pp., 381. Price, fr. 3.50.) M. Bois is unstinted in his praise and admiration for the inexhaustible potencies of the fair sex, and reviews their anthropology, or rather, if we may use the word in its literal sense, their gynæcology, less with the eye of the scientist than with the aim of the passionate special pleader. With many sound and common sense claims he has mingled a few very doubtful sociological theories, evidently at second hand. He proclaims the judgment day of social anthropocentrism, the overthrow of the *femme-poupée*, the *femme-reflet*, the *femme-victime*, above all of that *monstrum ingens* the *femme-homme*, and hails the advent of the *femme-femme*. "Woman, before being a wife, a sweetheart, or a mother, is and should be first a *woman*. Her full freedom must be conserved." This new woman is not a new creation, moreover, but existed in the old woman, who was her undeveloped Platonic archetype. All the sides of her life M. Bois considers in brief, outspoken terms and shows great knowledge of her condition in all countries. We Americans have not so much need to take his admonitions to heart as Continental Europeans, seeing that captious critics are prone to regard us as suffering rather from gynocentrism than anthropocentrism. Be that as it may, and sticking still to the geometrical metaphor, what we have both to look forward to in the new dawning millennium is an anthropic, gynecic bi-focism, preferably of curves with vanishing ellipticity; when which consummation has been reached, the eternal problem will be solved

μκρκ.

KARL PEARSON, Professor of Applied Mathematics in University College, London, the editor of Clifford's posthumous works, and the author of a book entitled *A Grammar of Science* which created considerable discussion in philosophical and scientific quarters, has now given to the public a handsome work in two volumes entitled *The Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution*. The lectures and essays constituting the two volumes have been written in the last six years and are on the most varied subjects. We append the titles of the first volume: "The Chances of Death," "The Scientific Aspect of Monte Carlo Roulette," "Reproductive Selection," "Socialism and Natural Selection," "Politics and Science," "Reaction! A Criticism of Mr. Balfour's Attack on Rationalism," "Woman and Labor," "Variation in Man and Woman." The treatment in all is predominantly exact, with a mathematical bias. Despite the heterogeneity of their titles, the author believes there will be found a unity in his essays which will be interesting at least to the psychologist, if not to the general reader, for the works of every man mirror the unity of the same mind, however diverse may be the problems which it attacks. In all of them he believes the sympathetic reader will find the

fundamental note of their author's thought, namely, "the endeavor to see all phenomena, physical and social, as a connected growth, and describe them as such in the briefest formula possible." There are some fine studies in statistical method in the book, as well as a display of independent insight into the general problems of life. Of numerous illustrations, the most notable are those of the death dances taken from the old German painters, and notably a frontispiece embodying Mr. Pearson's own conception of the bridge of life. We hope to return to this work more at length in *The Monist*. (Edwin Arnold: London and New York. Price, \$8.00.)

One of the most praiseworthy recent attempts at combining classical literary form with choice typography, and inexpensiveness, is the *Bibelot Series* of Mr. Thomas B. Mosher, of 45 Exchange St., Portland, Maine. This series is published monthly in petite form, tastefully bound in paper, averaging thirty-two pages, and costing but five cents each. In the original Foreword—all such series which in taste, matter, and terminology affect the past, have "forwards" and not "prefaces"—the author tells us it is the simple plan of the *Bibelot* "to bring together the posies of other men bound by a thread of one's own choosing." Things which do not find a way to wider reading, but are yet "the things which perish never," such as the lyrics of Blake, the ballades of Villon, time-honored Latin student songs, etc., are to be reprinted here in a form which will render them accessible and pleasing to all readers. We find, for example in Volume I., besides those above mentioned, the following pieces: "A Discourse of Marcus Aurelius," "Fragments from Sappho," "Sonnets on English Dramatic Poets," "The Pathos of the Rose in Poetry," etc.; in Volume II. "A Flower of Laurium," "Songs of Dead Florentines," "Certain Songs and Sonnets from Astrophel and Stella," "The Death of Darnley—from Bothwell, a Tragedy"; and in the present current volume "Idyls from Theocritus, Bion, and Moscus," translated by such men as Andrew Lang, Leigh Hunt, Matthew Arnold, and John Addington Symonds, "Selections from Dr. John Donne," "Letters of Marque, Selections from a Suppressed Book by Rudyard Kipling," and "Father Damien" by Robert Louis Stevenson—from which last two it will be seen that modern authors are not lacking. Such rare gems, which usually lie hidden and scattered in many huge and dusty tomes, are in this Series laid at the disposal of the whole world. There are few who would not be better both in literary and moral tone for the companionship of any one of them.

We record with pleasure the publication of Major J. G. R. FORLONG's *Short Studies of the Science of Comparative Religions*. The wide and long experience of the author, combined with the practical points of view which he has adopted, is certainly destined to bear fruit in the field of comparative mythology and religious belief. The present volume, which consists of amplifications of certain encyclopædia articles on religious terms, rites, and symbolisms is virtually an epitome of religions, particularly those of Asia. It is intended for the general reader rather than the specialist, the former of whom will find here good representative extracts from the religious literature of the Asiatic nations, and a brief digest of their main tenets and beliefs. A number of illustrations and several excellent maps that are invaluable in such studies accompany the text. (London: Bernard Quaritch 1897. Pages, 663. Royal 8vo. Price, 28s.)

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
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MUNICIPAL LIFE IN NEW ZEALAND.

BY THE HON. SIR ROBERT STOUT, K. C. M. G.

WE ARE APT to overlook the fact that municipal government is more important than what is called general government. The social life of the people is more deeply influenced by the government of the township and the city than even by a federal constitution. The New England town meeting has probably more deeply affected the New England life than the form of the State or Federal Government. If we are to know a people we must know not only their external constitution but their internal government. And if all government is on its trial—if no one admits that the ideally perfect government has yet been discovered—comparisons of municipal life in other countries may not be uninteresting to American citizens. I read with profound interest the sketch of "Chicago and Its Administration" by the Hon. Lyman J. Gage, appearing in *The Open Court* of April this year, and I thought it might be worth while detailing to the readers of that journal how municipal affairs are managed in far-away New Zealand.

A few general remarks about New Zealand's population may not be out of place. At the census taken in April, 1896, there were 703,360 people in New Zealand, mainly Europeans or of European descent, and 39,854 Maoris or aboriginals. The colored people included in the 703,360 people were 3,719 Chinese, 124 negroes, and 15 Japanese, and perhaps 100 others of all kinds. Our population is therefore mainly white. There were 441,661 born in New Zealand, 118,689 in England and Wales, 50,435 in Scotland, 46,037 in Ireland, 21,681 in the Australian colonies, 1,749 in the United States, 1,412 in Canada, 4,595 in Germany, 4,900 in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, 881 in Austria-Hungary, 698 in France, and a few hundreds each for other European countries. Those born in

New Zealand are descended mainly from the people of the United Kingdom. This will be seen if the census of 1867 be taken. In 1867 the number of the population was, exclusive of Maories, 218,668, and their birthplaces were: New Zealand, 64,052; England and Wales, 66,933; Scotland, 34,826; Ireland, 27,955; Australian colonies, 11,313; foreign countries, 271; unspecified, 769. We are sprung then from a people long used to self-government.

We have three kinds of local government—the borough and city, the road district, and the county. The borough and city system is for centres of population; the county for country districts, and road districts are part of counties, and only in force in some special districts. For practical purposes we may look at the former alone, as the road district is only a branch of the county system. There are two main statutes dealing with the borough and city system and county system, both passed in 1886. They were consolidating statutes which put under one act multiform laws that were on the statute book regulating local government.

There are ninety-six boroughs in all; six of these are called cities. The name city is a mere name, for except in the name there is no difference in management between an ordinary borough and a city. Each borough may be divided into wards. The lowest number of wards in a borough, where a borough is divided into wards, is two, and the highest number six. There are eighty-one counties, and each county may be divided into ridings. The number of ridings may vary from two to nine. The population of the four chief cities is as follows: Auckland, 31,424; Wellington, 37,441; Christchurch, 16,964; Dunedin, 22,815. There are, however, suburban boroughs adjoining the chief cities, and if the population of these be added, and they should be added to get an accurate idea of the urban population at the four centres, then the figures will be as follows: Auckland, 57,616; Wellington, 41,758; Christchurch, 51,330; Dunedin, 47,280.

If the parts of Christchurch and Dunedin within a radius of eight miles be added then the population would be: Christchurch, 55,288, and Dunedin 49,181. Before leaving the question of population; one may judge of the kinds of people we have by the religions we profess and trace our descent through our creeds. They are:

Church of England (Episcopalians).....	282,809	Wesleyan Methodists (non-Episcopal).....	73,367
Presbyterians.....	159,952	Small sects, Freethinkers, etc..	37,351
Roman Catholics.....	98,804	Object to state.....	15,967

Congregational Independents...	6,777	Hebrews	1,549
Baptists	5,538	Unitarians	375
Buddhists and Confucians (Chinese).....	3,391	Society of Friends.....	321
		Unspecified.....	1,122

The "freethinkers," so-called, and "no denominations" are 7,487; "agnostics," 562; "no-religion," 1,490; atheists, 117. The Presbyterians have the largest church accommodation and the largest number attending church. In Southern New Zealand the Scotch Presbyterians predominate.

I now come to the way in which our cities are managed. The franchise is uniform throughout all the boroughs and cities. All occupiers of land or houses are, if they are owners, and if tenants, if their tenancy is at least a six months tenancy, entitled to be enrolled as burgesses or citizens, and they alone of the inhabitants have the right to vote. Every borough, and hereafter I include in a borough the cities, has a council consisting of a mayor and councillors. The number of councillors varies from six to eighteen.

When the borough is divided into wards, three councillors sit for each ward. The term of office is three years, one-third of the council retiring each year, one from every ward. The mayor is elected annually by the entire borough at a general vote of the burgesses, each burgess having one vote only. In the election of councillors, however, plural voting is permitted and is thus regulated:

One vote up to £50 yearly value of holding, two votes if over £50 and under £100, three votes if over £100 and under £150, four votes if over £150 and under £350, five votes if over £350.

A person who has not paid his rates is not entitled to be enrolled; women have the same right to vote as men.

The duties a borough has to perform are the following: (1) Construction of roads and streets, (2) lighting the streets, (3) providing water for the people, (4) general municipal improvements (including sewage, etc., sanitary arrangements), (5) management of recreation and other reserves, (6) fire brigades. Neither the boroughs nor counties have any control of the police. They are under the central, general, or colonial government. Education also is not under the boroughs or counties. It is managed by boards and committees. There are thirteen education boards, and almost every district in which there is a public school has a committee. The maintenance of hospitals and the dispensing of aid to the poor are under separate boards. The boroughs and counties have, however, to pay part of the expenditures of these hospital

and charitable aid boards, and the councils of the boroughs and counties have the right to elect a certain number of members to such boards. Harbors are also controlled by separate boards. Counties have, however, the control of irrigation, and in the dry region of Canterbury in the South Island one county has thousands of miles of water races.

The revenues of the boroughs are first rates. A borough may levy a general rate not exceeding one shilling in the pound on the annual value per annum. It may levy a small special rate for hospitals and charitable aid, and rates called special rates to pay interest and sinking fund on loans, which have been borrowed either with the express sanction of the colonial legislature or by the vote of the people at a poll. The rule as to borrowing is that a borough council can borrow if a vote of the burgesses is polled and a majority in number vote for the loan, provided that the majority must be at least one-half in number of the votes which can be exercised by the whole number of burgesses.

The ratable value of property means the value at which any property would be let from year to year, deducting therefrom twenty per cent. in cases of houses and buildings and other perishable property, and ten per cent. in case of land and hereditaments, but shall in no case be less than five per centum of the value of the fee simple thereof. A small subsidy is paid by the colonial government to the boroughs. License fees are also part of their revenues. The license fees are obtained from the licensing of hotels or public houses and other places licensed to sell alcohol, the licensing of public conveyances, the licensing or permits for building, etc., etc. Some boroughs have considerable revenue from the rents of reserves owned by them. Then some boroughs own gasworks and make a profit in selling gas to the citizens. Others own the waterworks that supply the borough with water, and for that supply a special rate is charged. The boroughs own the cemeteries and there is a profit made out of the sale of burial lots.

To show the practical outcome of the local government system we may take two of the cities—Dunedin and Wellington—and state what they do.

Dunedin has an area of 1,420 acres, and is bounded on three sides by a reserve called the "Town Belt," 500 acres in extent, and which is set apart for recreation purposes. The city is divided into four wards, and its council therefore consists of a mayor and twelve councillors. It is well endowed, and its rent roll from its reserves that are let is £9,600 per year. The capital value of the reserves

is at least twenty years' purchase of the rents. It has forty miles of finished streets with asphalted footpaths, all supplied with drainage, underground and surface, with gas and water. It has 525 gas lamps to light the city, the cost of which is £3 each per annum. The lighting, extinguishing, and cleaning cost £821.10s. more. The total cost of lighting is therefore £2,396.10s. The city is well lit. The ordinary general rates are about £12,000 a year. The only other rates are the water rates. Its general rates cover lighting, hospital, and charitable aid and interest on loans. The water rates—which include rates for the use of water—are about £13,000 per annum. The total revenue annually in the general account is about £42,000, in the water account £20,000, gas account £27,000. There are other separate accounts kept, such as cemeteries, recreation reserves, abattoirs, etc. The debt of the city is £611,125, but £157,637 sinking fund has accrued, so the net debt is £453,488. There are assets against that of reserves worth close on £200,000—gas-works, £100,000; water-works and credits, £246,000, and there are town hall, fire brigade buildings, plant, etc., etc. The rates including all rates but water rates generally average $\frac{1}{3}$ in the pound on the annual value. The water rates are charged by a percentage on houses and about one $\frac{1}{3}$ on the rates on land. The total rates are 2 : 8 $\frac{1}{2}$ on the rateable annual value.

In Wellington the rates are higher, but the rents from reserves are lower, and Wellington has not gas-works. The profits from gas in Dunedin are about £3,000 a year. The rate per 1,000 cubic feet to consumers is about 7s. In Wellington the rates were, general and special, 2 : 5 $\frac{1}{4}$, and water 9 $\frac{3}{4}$ d. Wellington has water-works, public library, public baths, recreation grounds, etc. The general rates, rents from endowments, licenses, etc., amounted to about £37,000 annually. In addition there are water rates, about £20,000, special rates for interest on loans, charitable aid, and library £19,000. The total gross debt of Wellington is £620,000. Against this there is a small sinking fund. Wellington is lighted by electricity. There are two large arc lamps and 630 lamps of twenty-candle power. The cost of lighting is £4.10s per year for each twenty-candle power lamp. There are forty-eight miles of streets properly formed and metalled, and ninety miles of made footpaths. A sewerage and drainage scheme costing about £185,000 is nearly completed. The sewerage will be taken right out to sea. Forty-five and one-half miles of sewers have already been laid, and about 4,000 houses connected with the public sewers.

The boroughs are managed as I have said by a mayor and councillors. At the beginning of each year committees are appointed, such as finance, reserves, fire brigades, library, building, etc., and these committees meet weekly, the council generally meeting every fortnight. The mayor is paid. In Dunedin the mayor gets £400 a year, in Wellington £200, but none of the councillors are paid. The officers of the borough are appointed by the borough, and though removable at the pleasure of the council are never disturbed in their offices so long as they remain efficient. Some of them have been in office for twenty years. The total salaries of officers in Dunedin are: General department, £2,450; water, £342; gas, £1,106—in all, £3,898.

It may be asked, What is the citizen's life? The colony is exceedingly healthy. The death rate for 1896 was only 8.6 per 1,000 people. I doubt if any place can show a lower death rate. The cities are healthy. In Wellington in 1896 there were only four deaths from typhoid fever. Typhus, smallpox, and cholera have never yet found a lodgment in New Zealand. The death rate of cities and suburbs was, including deaths in the hospitals, about ten per thousand. The mildness, and equableness of the climate no doubt have their effect on the death rate. In Wellington, for example, frost is unknown. The heliotrope blooms in winter, and in summer there is no extreme heat, the thermometer rarely registering in the shade 80°. Nights are always cool.

The intellectual life is cared for. Dunedin is the seat of a university. It has an art faculty, a medical school, and a mining school. There is a museum, an art gallery, and a large and valuable reference library connected with the university. It has also a high school for girls and a high school for boys, and six large public primary schools and a training college for teachers. There are also church and private schools besides. There is a public athenæum and mechanics institute having large reading-rooms and a lending library. There are many literary societies, an Otago institute dealing with science. Musical societies, art clubs, camera club, etc. The games of football, cricket, lawn tennis, have numerous societies and clubs for their votaries. Rowing, yachting, cycling, bowling, chess, draughts, etc., etc., all have their societies. The colonists are noted for their fondness of athletic and out-of-door amusements. There is no lack of church accommodation. In Dunedin proper the Presbyterians have five large churches, the Episcopalians have three, the Roman Catholics one, Congregational Independents two, Baptists three, Wesleyan Methodists and Primitive

Methodists three. There is one Jewish synagogue and there are also meeting places of other smaller sects.

In Dunedin there is one theatre and several halls that are used for concerts and plays. In Wellington there are two theatres and several small halls. Both have substantial municipal buildings.

As to literature, we have not only in our libraries and in our book shops the books and magazines that are published in the United Kingdom, but American literature is common with us. We read the *North American Review*, the *Atlantic*, the *Forum*, the *Arena*, *Harper's*, *McClure's*, *Cosmopolitan*, the *Century*, *Scribner's*, *The Monist*, *The Open Court*, etc., etc. And the literary men of the States are perhaps as well known to us as to the residents in the States. We have read Lowell, James, Hay, Clemens, Holmes, Craddock, Howells, etc., etc., not to mention the older writers, Longfellow, Prescott, Emerson, Theodore Parker, Hawthorne, etc., etc. And will not reading the same literature do much to weld us together in sympathy as partakers of the same high destiny?

As has been said, there are eighty-one counties in the colony. Every borough is distinct in government from a county, though geographically it may appear within its area. Counties are divided into ridings, not exceeding nine. There must be at least six councillors, but there must not be more than nine. The council annually elects its own chairman from out of the councillors. The councillors hold office for three years, and the electors are the rate-payers of the county. There is plural voting as in boroughs, the votes being from one to five. In counties the rates are levied on the capital values—that is, the selling value free from incumbrances, and the rates cannot exceed six farthings in the pound on the capital value. Counties cannot borrow beyond four times the amount of a year's general rates, and then only after a poll and by a majority, as in a borough.

The duties of counties are mainly confined to road construction, drainage, and water races. As a centre or village gets populous it becomes a borough and ceases to belong to a county.

This short sketch will show that we have a system of local government in New Zealand, and this can be said that hitherto it has not been the scene of party conflicts and there has never been charged against any of the local bodies or any of their members any corruption. Whether this has been because of the smallness of the revenues, the control of the rate-payers, or the restricted franchise, will be answered no doubt in accordance with the view

of those who venture to give an opinion. The fact that separate bodies control education, harbors, hospitals, and charitable aid, rivers, etc., may, by the very specialisation of functions, have promoted both efficiency and purity of administration. Like our brothers and sisters in race and language in Europe and America and Australia, we too, in our humble way, are playing our part in the world, and who knows but that they may even learn of us as well as we of them?

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

IV. Solomon.—The Division of the Kingdom.—The Early Years of the Divided Kingdoms.

TO BE THE SUCCESSOR of David was a great inheritance, but a much greater responsibility. Will Solomon, upon whose youthful shoulders the dying father laid the heavy burden, be equal to it? There is perhaps no other personage of Israelitish history of whose true character and its historical significance it is so difficult to get a clear conception and give a correct picture, as Solomon; for what we know of him is scant and self-contradictory. It is possible to represent him as an oriental despot of the most common stamp and support every trait of the picture thus drawn with Bible references, and to take credit into the bargain for one's objectivity and freedom from prejudice. But such a judgment would be absolutely unhistorical: Solomon cannot have been an ordinary and insignificant man,—on this point history speaks loud and clear.

He was the acknowledged favorite of his father. This may have been due solely to the fact that he was a late offspring, considerably younger than David's other sons, and born in his father's old age. Now it is deeply rooted in the nature of a man that his desire for children and his fondness for them grows with advancing age. A grandson is usually loved more fondly than a son, and Solomon might have been David's grandson as far as years were

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

concerned. But this is not the whole explanation of their relation. Solomon was plainly made of different clay from his brothers. The elder sons of David, so far as we know them, were mere caricatures of their father, rude, wild fellows, who had inherited their father's strength and beauty indeed, but not his lofty mind and noble spirit.

Moreover, in estimating Solomon, his mother is a factor to be considered. Bathsheba, this demoniac creature, must have been a quite unusual and extraordinary woman ; for to attach to herself such a man as David not merely in the fleeting intoxication of a criminal passion but permanently, and to be indispensable to his heart for twenty years, required more than simply a beautiful face, especially when one considers how quickly physical charms decay in oriental women. From this extraordinary mother also Solomon had received a rich endowment for his career. Thus we can easily comprehend how the aged king took into his heart of hearts this highly gifted, clever and animated boy who played about him, growing under his very eyes into the image of his fondly cherished mother, and how he came to the honest conviction that this son was the fittest and worthiest to sit upon the throne after himself. And in diverting the succession to him he committed no wrong according to Israelitish ideas. In ancient times custom seems really to have conceded to the father unrestricted disposal of the right of primogeniture : the Hebrew language devised a regular formal expression for the transference of the right of primogeniture to a son who was not the first born, and this right was expressly taken from the father only with the giving of the Second Law (Deuteronomy). Solomon was eighteen years old when he ascended the throne, at least no older than this. The fact that in spite of this he maintained his dominion for forty years under the most trying conditions is of itself sufficient evidence of his great qualities, and that his father had not been deceived in him.

The new king's tasks were given in his conditions. David himself had really not been a conqueror. To extend the realm further would have been folly ; rather could the loss of provinces be endured if only domestic conditions were strengthened and consolidated. The kingdom of David was the creation of enthusiasm, an achievement of a mighty national tendency which his masterful personality had released and guided : if this creation was to be permanent it was necessary that institutions should take the place of persons.

David had in the main left domestic conditions unaltered. He

was satisfied if Israel always responded to his summons, and the tribute of conquered peoples sufficed to meet the expenses of the still comparatively simple court. True, David does seem to have contemplated some measures of taxation—the great census of which we are told can have had no other end in view—but when a severe pestilence broke out he saw in it a divine hint and gave the matter up. What united the Israelites under David was free obedience and voluntary subjection ; it was not forgotten, and he himself did not deny that his rule was the outcome of popular choice. In comparison with the neighboring peoples having long-established monarchical forms of government, conditions in Israel were still thoroughly patriarchal and primitive, and David was only a sheikh on a large scale. Now it was Solomon's accomplishment and merit to have rid the Israelites of the last trace of their Bedouin character, and to have trained them in a severe and even harsh school into national citizenship. Tradition sees in him pre-eminently the judge and the ruler who establishes everywhere solid order and strictest discipline. And in this respect his activity was unquestionably beneficent and laid the foundation for all after time. If David created an Israelitish nation, Solomon created an Israelitish state.

But,—and now we come to the reverse of the medallion—Solomon was thoroughly imbued with the sentiment : *L'état c'est moi*. His government has a decidedly personal character, and all that he did was done not for the benefit of his people, but for his own glorification. Love of splendor and desire for display are the most prominent traits of his picture. He looked for the essence of dominion in outward show : extensive buildings, an extravagant court with innumerable servants and concubines,—that was his taste. But for this he needed most of all money, and so his whole reign has a marked financial character. This necessity grew more imperative in so much as the tributes from foreign peoples soon ceased.

Right at the beginning of his reign Edom secured its independence. Hadad, a descendant of the Edomite royal family, had escaped the catastrophe that came upon Edom at the hands of Joab and David by fleeing to Egypt and had there formed an alliance of marriage with the Pharaoh. When he heard that David and Joab were dead Hadad returned to his country. He despised Israel and became king in Edom, as the Book of Kings briefly and dryly reports. The commercial highway by way of the Arabah valley to the Red Sea must, indeed, have remained in Solomon's

possession, otherwise he would not have been able to make his famous trips to Ophir; but Hadad evidently ruled without molestation in the Edomite mountain-land proper.

Moab, too, seems to have shaken off the Israelitish yoke. At any rate, it was necessary soon after to subdue it anew. But a matter of much more moment was that Solomon did not, or could not, prevent the secession from Israel of the Aramæans whom David had conquered. They established a new kingdom with Damascus as centre, which was destined to become the mortal enemy of Israel.

Thus the conquests of David were quickly lost, and Solomon was left dependent on the resources of his own land and people alone. He divided the land into twelve districts for fiscal purposes, each of which had to meet the expenses of the court for one month. In conjunction with the Phœnicians he undertook from his seaport of Eziongeber expeditions to South Arabia and East Africa, which brought him abundant profit. From the caravans which crossed his territory he collected high tolls, and monopolised the Egyptian horse trade with Asia. And when these resources failed he borrowed of his friend and neighbor, Hiram of Tyre. The Tyrian loan had finally reached the amount of 12,000 pounds of gold: that is, according to current value of the metal, about \$2,880,000, but taking into consideration the purchasing power of money at that time it would in fact correspond to \$48,000,000; and as Solomon could not pay back this immense sum he had to cede to Hiram a border district with twenty towns.

But Solomon's chief need was workers. To supply it he robbed the Canaanites who still dwelt among the Israelites of all their rights and liberties, making them state slaves, just as Pharaoh Rameses II. had done to the Israelites in Goshen in his day. This was not exactly commendable, but it was an enormous advance in the centralisation of the state. Saul had planned something of the sort, but had not been able to carry it out. But this was still insufficient, and accordingly Solomon had levies made of 30,000 Israelite citizens, who were compelled to work in sections of 10,000 every fourth month.

Among the buildings of Solomon none became of such importance to succeeding generations as the Temple. Yet the Temple was originally planned merely as a chapel—only a part, and by no means the largest and most important, of Solomon's palace. The royal residence of David had long ceased to satisfy the increased

requirements. Solomon worked for thirteen years on his palace at Jerusalem.

Solomon's activity in building and his development in splendor were doubtless increased by the fact that he had won for a wife the daughter of his powerful neighbor, Pharaoh Pasheban II., and had to supply her in some measure with what she was used to at home, as indeed he did build her a palace for herself with quite exceptional splendor. The Pharaoh had furnished Egyptian troops to conquer the ancient Canaanite city of Gezer which was evidently indisposed to submit to forced annexation by Solomon, and surrendered it to Solomon as dowry for his daughter.

This is a symptom of great military weakness or at least of indolence, and it is in keeping with the fact that Solomon's buildings were chiefly of the nature of fortifications. He endeavored to protect by fortresses all the strategic or otherwise important points of his country, and especially to make his capital of Jerusalem impregnable. We see that Solomon places himself wholly on the defensive and desires only to put his country into condition to maintain and defend itself within his own borders. Here the difference from David becomes most conspicuous, but here also the question may be asked whether Solomon's policy was not the more correct and suited to the situation. If he succeeded in securing his own country against attack and strengthening it within, that was enough.

That these new conditions seemed very strange to the Israelites, who were accustomed to the most unrestricted freedom, and were very distasteful to them, we can easily imagine. So much the more significant is the fact that there was only one revolt against Solomon's authority, and that easily suppressed. A young Ephraimite named Jeroboam had attracted Solomon's attention and Solomon had made him overseer of the laborers of the house of Joseph, who were working on the fortifications of Jerusalem. Jeroboam induced those who were under him to rebel, though they probably followed unwillingly, but was obliged to flee to Egypt. There the throne was no longer occupied by Solomon's father-in-law, but a new dynasty had arisen, the founder of which, Sheshenk I. (Shishack), of course received with open arms the enemy of his neighbor who was allied to the previous dynasty.

Otherwise Solomon's reign seems to have passed off altogether peacefully and without disturbance within the country itself. And in one respect it bore the most important results for

Israel. Solomon was what one might almost call a cosmopolitan nature: he extended immensely the intellectual horizon of Israel, and opened his country in all directions to intercourse with the world. He placed Israel in the ranks of the great nations. Not only gold and ivory, sandalwood and peacocks came to Jerusalem; but also the art of the Phœnicians and Egyptians, the wisdom and the fairy-lore of the East found their way into Israel, giving everywhere the most powerful impulses, and rousing to new life.

Solomon was just as striking and winning a person as his father David, only in a different way: what is told of his wisdom and his wit, his artistic and scientific tastes and interests is certainly to be regarded as historical. The epigram has come down to us which he uttered on the occasion of the dedication of the Temple, and it is among the most profound and original in all Israelite literature. It runs:

" God hath set the sun in the tent of heaven,
But He Himself hath chosen to dwell in the thick darkness.
And yet I have dared to build Thee an house
As habitation and a dwelling-place for ever."

It is quite conceivable that about the person of just such a ruler a whole circle of legends and anecdotes was woven, and his portrait was especially ornamented by poetry. Judah never had occasion to regret that it remained faithful to its son and preserved the solid structure of the state founded by Solomon.

After a reign of forty years Solomon died and thereupon a serious crisis came upon his realm. The imposing personality of Solomon had restrained opposing forces; now they were determined to bear the heavy burdens no longer. In Jerusalem, it is true, Rehoboam, the oldest son of the deceased king, was promptly recognised; but in northern Israel they had not forgotten that David was not a member of their tribes, but that the house of Joseph had submitted to him as an electoral king and on the terms of a solemn electoral compact.

And so all Israel gathered at Shechem to set terms for the new king: "Make thou the heavy yoke which thy father put upon us lighter, and we will serve thee," so ran their demand. Rehoboam was clearly disposed to consent, but his advisers succeeded in changing his purpose. Legally considered, the men assembled at Shechem were rebels; he was urged to make no concessions to the revolution, but to suppress it by an appearance of energetic firmness. When on the third day the people came to get the royal re-

sponse Rehoboam answered: "My father did lade you with a heavy yoke, but I will add to your yoke; my father hath chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions."

After these fateful words the rebellion was openly declared. The terrified king sent Solomon's overseer, Adoniram, to negotiate, but he could not have chosen a less acceptable negotiator; the people stoned the odious officer to death before the eyes of the king, and the latter hastily sought his chariot and barely escaped to Jerusalem. But those who were at Shechem proclaimed Jeroboam, who meanwhile had returned from Egypt, king over Israel.

And thus the work of David was destroyed; what he had united through the pains and labors of a beneficent life was divided forever by the imprudence of his grandson. Of course the might of the nation was broken by this division, and it is a real wonder and an astonishing evidence of its toughness and vitality that it maintained itself, divided as it was, for centuries.

We have very scanty information regarding the next two centuries. The Hebrew sources themselves run low, and we receive nothing worth speaking of from without. Even the kings of this period are known to us by little more than their names. Only a few, here and there, are for us concrete figures with individual features.

In the beginning the two hostile brothers made war upon each other for life and death. At first the advantage seems to have been upon the side of Judah, where Rehoboam had at his disposal the well-filled arsenals and garnered treasures of his father, and lived amid established conditions, while Jeroboam had to create everything from the beginning. Thus Jeroboam considered it advisable to transfer his residence from Shechem, where he had at first dwelt, to Penuel on the east bank of the Jordan.

But at this point a severe storm broke over Rehoboam. The Egyptian Pharaoh, Shishak (Sheshenk), marched against his country and plundered Jerusalem, carrying off all the treasures accumulated by Solomon. As Shishak is the former host and protector of Jeroboam one might be led by the account of the Old Testament to suspect that Jeroboam had called him in to relieve him of his neighbor and enemy; but from the report of his victory made by Shishak himself in the great temple of Ammon at Karnak we learn that he conquered and plundered north Israelitish cities also, and accordingly that his expedition was directed against both kingdoms alike. So we see that it was just an ordinary marauding ex-

pedition on which Shishak expected to secure easy booty and cheap laurels, and succeeded.

This is all that is told us of the seventeen years reign of Rehoboam,—this and the fact that there was constant war between him and Jeroboam. It is the same with Rehoboam's son and successor Abijah, though it appears that he entered into alliance with the kingdom of Damascus, in order, of course, to make with it common cause against Israel. Abijah reigned but three years; he was followed by his son Asa, of whom we learn that he was obliged to take measures against his own mother, because she had devoted herself to the worship of an unclean idol.

Meanwhile Jeroboam had died after a reign of twenty-two years, having transferred his residence back to the west side of the Jordan at Tirzah. He was followed by his son Nadab. But the latter was murdered in the second year of his reign. While engaged in the siege of the Philistine border fortress of Gibbethon—for we learn thus that war had again broken out between the people of northern Israel and the Philistines—he was slain by a certain Baasha and the whole house of Jeroboam destroyed.

This performance is typical of the whole history of the northern kingdom. Israel had rebelled against the heavy yoke of Solomon, and now it was never rid of revolutions and anarchy; the throne was regarded as derelict, and every bold robber took possession of it only to be dispossessed by the next more lucky comer. Baasha who was perhaps Nadab's general (the usurpers are generally officers and the revolutions military revolutions), and who must have been an efficient soldier, turned his whole force against Asa of Judah. At Ramah, about six miles north of Jerusalem, on the border of his country, he established a close blockade, and as the Book of Kings says, "suffered no one to go out or come in to Asa, king of Judah." Asa was thus brought into such straits that he gave all his remaining gold and silver to purchase the aid of the king of Damascus. The latter immediately invaded and devastated the whole north of Israel, whereupon Baasha was obliged to hasten to the aid of his hard-pressed north-border. Now Asa summoned all Judah to arms, had the fortifications at Ramah taken down and the material transported across the border where with Baasha's stone and timber he strongly fortified Geba and Mizpah on his own territory. The Book of Kings also attributes to him the fortification of other cities.

Baasha ruled for twenty-four years. But fate overtook his son Elah. Once more the Israelites were in the field against the Philis-

tines and besieging Gibbethon ; but the king, as it is said, lay drunken at Tirzah in the house of his minister, Arza. Here a cavalry officer named Zimri murdered him and exterminated the whole house of Baasha and all his relatives and friends. But the glory of Zimri was to last but seven days. Scarcely had the army which lay encamped before Gibbethon, learned of the palace-revolution when it proclaimed its tried leader Omri as king. In forced marches Omri moved against Tirzah ; Zimri realised that all resistance was in vain, but was resolved at least to die like a king : he set fire to the palace and perished in the flames. Omri, however, was not destined to receive general recognition ; a certain Tibni was set up as opposition king. But after several years of civil war Omri succeeded in overcoming his rival ; Tibni fell, and now Omri was the undisputed monarch.

Omri's very first deed after attaining the sole rule bears testimony to his statesmanship. Zimri had burned the palace at Tirzah, and there was need of building another. Omri may himself have learned with dismay what an easy game the capture of the capital had been ; therefore he moved the royal residence to another place and founded Samaria. The very name, which we may translate with watch tower (*Wartburg*), is significant enough. Proud and free the hill of Samaria rises from the surrounding valley, sloping gently only to the east, but falling off steeply on the other sides. A gigantic circle of higher mountains surrounds it with a protecting sweep. Moreover this particular region is extraordinarily fertile and comparatively well watered. From a strategic point of view especially the choice of the site is a strikingly fortunate one ; that the kingdom of Israel survived for a century and a half the lamentable times that soon came upon it is due first of all to its almost impregnable capital, which resisted even the Assyrians for three years. Through the foundation of Samaria Omri became the real founder of the kingdom of Israel, and it has its good reason that the Assyrians always designated the kingdom of Israel as Omri-land.

Further than this we know only a few facts regarding Omri's reign, and these only indirectly. He made successful war against Moab, colonised the northern parts of Moab with Israelites, and made the king Kemosgad pay tribute. On the other hand, he was not successful against Damascus: he had to cede several border districts and acknowledge a sort of feudal overlordship. Therefore he sought the support of his powerful neighbor on the west, and married his son Ahab to Jezebel, the daughter of the Tyrian king

Etlibaal. With Judah, where king Asa still reigned, he seems to have maintained peace and to have taken steps toward closer relations with the brother kingdom. On the other hand, the first conflict with Assyria occurs in his reign.

Under Assurnasirapal, who ascended the Assyrian throne in 884 B. C., the power of Assur experienced a mighty revival after a long period of decrepitude; Assurnasirapal is the first of the great conquerors who lived wholly in war and by war and carried the terror of the Assyrian arms everywhere. In the year 876 he marched as far as the Mediterranean and Mount Libanon, and Omri among others hastened to lay his offering at the feet of the mighty monarch; but Assurnasirapal never came again.

Omri was succeeded by his son Ahab. We know relatively the most of him, because the great prophet Elijah was his contemporary, and his career throws also important light on the king. True, this light is not favorable for Ahab, and his conflict with Elijah was fateful for him. He is one of the most ill reputed personages in Israelitish history. But if we examine carefully and with the searching eye of criticism the reports preserved regarding him, the result is a materially different picture. His religious conflict with Elijah, as reported in the Book of Kings, is pure legend; the historical residue turns out to be quite innocent, leaving no occasion for any just reproach to Ahab, and the only actual crime that is laid to his door, the judicial murder of the Israelite Naboth, was the work of Jezebel, which he simply did not interfere with; when Elijah openly and frankly reproached him with the wretched deed, he bitterly repented it and did heavy public penance for it.

What remains of the reports concerning Ahab shows him to have been a worthy son of Omri and one of the best kings and most powerful rulers that Israel ever had. The situation of his kingdom was very critical, and to this were added exterior misfortunes, crop-failure, and shortage, famine and drouth, so as to shake the state to its foundations. But Ahab was equal to the situation, and managed to win the respect and admiration of friend and foe. First of all, he took steps for a peaceful and friendly relation with Judah. Under him we find again for the first time Israel and Judah fighting shoulder to shoulder; the old feud is forgotten, and to seal their friendship the two reigning houses ally themselves by marriage: Jehoshaphat of Judah, who meanwhile had succeeded his father Asa, married his heir, Jehoram, to Athaliah, the daughter of Ahab.

It is notable, although Jehoshaphat reigned twenty-five years,

and is praised by the Book of Kings as one of the best kings of Judah, that we really know nothing about him save his relations to the ruling family of Israel. When we find express mention that under him there was no king in Edom, but that a governor from Judah ruled the land, we may indeed infer that Jehoshaphat again subdued the land and deposed the dynasty of Hadad, but the conclusion is not inevitable. He attempted to resume the Ophir expeditions of Solomon from Ezion-geber, but characteristically refused to let his Israelitish friend and neighbor take part in them. However, he did not in the end carry out his purpose, for the ships, though constructed with much pains, were wrecked, probably because they were not managed by the skilled seafarers of Phœnicia, who in Solomon's undertakings had been the leaders.

The most important matter in the reign of Ahab is his wars with the kingdom of Damascus. Omri had been obliged to recognise its overlordship in a certain fashion, and evidently Ahab did the same for some time; but he could not suffer this state of things to continue. After he had increased the power of resistance of his country by fortifying the most important cities, he made an attempt to secure his independence. At first fortune did not favor him, and Ahab found himself shut up in Samaria. King Ben-hadad sends word to him: "Thy gold and thy silver are mine." And with truly royal mind Ahab does not hesitate to take upon himself the misfortune of his people, and consents.

Now Ben-hadad, who had evidently not expected such prompt yielding, demands further that his people shall also plunder Samaria. But Ahab cannot consent to this; he says: "All that thou didst send for of thy servant at the first I will do; but this thing I may not do." Then Ben-hadad answers: "The dust of Samaria will not suffice for handfuls for all the people that follow me;" and to this brutal boast Ahab replies with dignity and decision: "Let not him that girdeth on his armor boast himself as he that putteth it off." While Ben-hadad and his officers lie in their drunken mid-day sleep Ahab makes a desperate sortie with the seven thousand two hundred and twenty-three men whom he had in Samaria; the Syrians are taken wholly by surprise and defeated, and hasten back to Damascus in confusion with additional heavy losses on the way.

The following day they again measure strength in open battle at Aphek, and again, despite greatly inferior numbers, Ahab wins a complete victory; the army of Damascus is destroyed, and Ben-hadad himself, with the remnants of his forces, shut up in Aphek.

But Ahab nobly and magnanimously spares his defenceless opponent, and makes peace and friendship with him on condition of the surrender of all the territories that had been taken from Israel.

This performance on the part of Ahab is only explained by a very surprising piece of information which we receive from the Assyrians. Salmanasar II., son and successor of Assurnasirapal, takes up his father's plans, and in 854 leads all the forces of his empire against Cölesyria. At Karkar on the river Crontes there is a battle. Here Salmanasar meets a coalition of many kings and tribes, at the head of which Ben-hadad of Syria and Ahab of Israel are fighting shoulder to shoulder. True, the Assyrian king claims a complete victory, but this victory results in his beginning a very hasty retreat, and it is five years before he attempts to come again.

If Ahab had been a king of common mould he would certainly have used the opportunity to fall upon the rear of this his mortal foe of many years' standing and the natural enemy of his people; but he looked further and recognised the greater danger; and as he had put an end to the fraternal dissension with Judah, it was plainly his intention here by conciliation and magnanimity to put an end to the quarrel with Damascus and conquer his opponent by moral force; and he steadily and faithfully carried out this noble and magnificent policy.

But Ahab had made the mistake of judging others by himself, and in his nobility and large-heartedness overlooked a factor with which the practical statesman unfortunately must deal, and that is human meanness. When the danger was past Ben-hadad never dreamed of keeping his plighted word, and Ahab is compelled to demand the rightful possessions of his people at the point of the sword.

One year after the battle at Karkar the allies of that occasion are facing each other in open battle. Ahab was supported by Jehoshaphat of Judah; for the first time since the days of David we see all Israel united against a foreign foe. The campaign is to secure the important border fortress of Ramoth in Gilead. How high Ben-hadad rated his opponent may be learned from the order he gave his captains: "Fight neither with small nor great, save only with the king of Israel."

Ahab may have known or suspected this; he does not wear his usual armor in the battle, but his fate was sealed. By chance a man shot an arrow into a joint of his breastplate which was to put a premature end to his precious life. But Ahab proposed to

die as he had lived, a king and a hero. Although he immediately recognised the wound as mortal he held himself by gigantic efforts upright in his chariot until evening, in order not to discourage his troops; then his strength gives way and he falls down dead. At this dreadful tidings a wild panic seizes the Israelite ranks; they think only of saving the king's body; battle and campaign are lost. This is the historical Ahab of Israel.

The consequences of the death of Ahab are seen forthwith. Now that his strong hand was cold, the Moabites again became aggressive. Their king, Mesha, reconquered the parts of his country that had been taken by Omri, and massacred the Israelites that had settled there without respect to age or sex, "as a delight for the eyes in Kemosh and Moab," as he himself says. There was no opposition, for Ahab's eldest son and successor, Ahaziah, seems to have been an incapable and insignificant man. Fortunately for Israel, one is inclined to say, he died in the second year of his reign in consequence of a fall from the window of his palace, and as he had no children he was succeeded by his much abler brother Jehoram. The latter immediately undertook a campaign of revenge against Moab. In conjunction with Jehoshaphat of Judah they advanced from the south by way of Edom into that country and wasted it terribly; but Mesha succeeded in holding his own in the fortress of Kir-hareseth, and the allied kings were obliged to depart finally with their purpose unaccomplished.

Soon after this Jehoshaphat died and was succeeded by his son Jehoram, husband of Athaliah. The Book of Kings reports from his eight years' reign nothing but these two misfortunes: the Edomites freed themselves from their subjection to Judah, while an attempt on the part of Jehoram to subject them again failed utterly, and the king himself barely escaped; furthermore the city of Libhah revolted from Judah and allied itself with the Philistines. Jehoram was followed by his son Ahaziah who reigned but one year, for then a terrible catastrophe broke upon the royal houses of both kingdoms.

In the years 849, 848, and 845 Salmanassar was again in Cölesyria, and thus we can understand how Jehoram of Israel succeeded in recovering from the power of Damascus the city of Ramoth, before the walls of which his father Ahab had fallen. Besides there had been a violent change of dynasty in Damascus, Ben-hadad having been murdered by one of his courtiers, Hazael, who himself mounted the throne. Jehoram was wounded and withdrew to

Jezreel to be healed of his wound. And then the calamity which had long been creeping in the darkness suddenly burst forth.

The great prophet Elijah had died; his pure and sacred work was carried on in a very impure and unholy spirit. The impression grew up that the whole house of Ahab must be exterminated root and branch for the honor of God. And now the favorable moment seemed to have come. Elisha sent into the camp at Ramoth a disciple of the prophets to anoint as king the man whom he had selected to execute the judgment against the house of Ahab. This was Jehu, a dashing cavalry officer, as we would describe him: no match for him in madness rode horse in Israel.

Jehu had been an eye-witness of the memorable scene when Elijah, after that judicial murder executed against Naboth, had denounced upon Ahab the divine judgment which would demand of him and his children the blood of Naboth and his children. Ambitious and full of restless energy, he seemed to be the most suitable instrument. The anointing takes place, and his comrades do homage to him. Jehu immediately forbids any one to leave the camp, and himself with a troop of cavalry takes the road for Jezreel where lay the wounded king, and where meanwhile Ahaziah of Judah had arrived to visit his sick uncle. The guard sees a troop of cavalry approaching; after two messengers sent out to meet them fail to return, the two kings themselves mount their chariots and ride out to meet this mysterious troop. Jehoram recognises Jehu and calls out to him: "Is it peace, Jehu?" and Jehu answered: "What peace, so long as the whoredoms of thy mother Jezebel are so many?" Then Jehoram turned his chariot and cried: "There is treachery, Ahaziah!" But with fatal accuracy Jehu shoots an arrow into his back, piercing his heart; the body of the king he orders thrown into Naboth's vineyard. Ahaziah had fled, but is pursued by Jehu's command and likewise fatally wounded; he dies in Megiddo, not far away, and his servants bring the corpse to Jerusalem.

Meanwhile the red-handed murderer has reached the royal palace in Jezreel. The aged Jezebel is minded at least to die like a queen: in full royal attire she looks from the window and receives the ruthless Jehu with the haughty greeting: "Goes all well, Zimri, thou murderer of thy master?" Jehu has her thrown out of the window, her blood spattering his horse. Then he coolly rides over the quivering corpse, leaving it lying on the street, and enters the palace to proceed to a royal meal; when he is through

he says: "See now to this cursed woman and bury her; for she is a king's daughter."

But there were still many royal princes in the capital Samaria. Therefore Jehu writes to the chief officials there: "Ye have arsenals and fenced cities; look ye out the best and meetest of your master's sons, and set him on his father's throne and fight for him!" For reply the intimidated people ask his orders. Thereupon he wrote: "If ye be on my side, take ye the heads of your master's sons and bring them to me to Jezreel." The horrible order is executed, seventy royal princes are murdered, and their severed heads packed in baskets and sent to Jezreel. There Jehu has them piled in two pyramids beside the city gate and feasts his eyes on the terrible sight, casting to the people that stood about a cynical witticism.

Now he starts for the capital of the kingdom, having first caused all the friends, supporters and officials of the overthrown dynasty remaining in Jezreel to be slain. On the way there is more bloody work. At Beth-ekeb he meets a party of forty-two persons of distinction. They profess themselves royal princes from Jerusalem, coming to visit Ahaziah and Jehoram in Jezreel. Jehu has them seized, and the forty-two princes of the house of David follow the seventy of the house of Omri. Thus he enters Samaria.

A supposedly religious movement had brought him to the throne; he now paid in his own fashion those who had elevated him. He makes proclamation: "Ahab served Baal a little; but Jehu shall serve him much." He makes pretence as though he would offer his coronation-sacrifice in the temple of Baal erected by Ahab, and summons thither on pain of death all worshippers of Baal. When they were all in the trap, he had them cut down by the guards and desecrated the temple in the most brutal manner. Of course, the boards were now swept clean in Samaria also, and all the relatives, friends, supporters, and officials of the exterminated royal house were slaughtered. The peace of the grave dwelt in Samaria.

The fanatical prophets could not have chosen for the execution of their purpose a more unholy instrument than this bloodhound; even a century later, almost, Israel still stands aghast at the memory of this horror, and the prophet Hosea sees in the bloody deeds of Jehu an unatoned guilt which rests upon the kingdom and its royal house, and can be atoned for only by the destruction of both. And if ever in history God himself has clearly spoken and pronounced condemnation upon human delusions, it

was here: by the fall of the house of Omri Israel itself was brought to the brink of destruction, and the reign of Jehu and of his son, Jehoahaz, is the most miserable period that Israel ever experienced.

It is one of the most remarkable ironies of fate that these murders which were alleged to have been done to the honor of God, and which actually did completely root out the worship of Baal in Samaria, led in Jerusalem to exactly the opposite result. King Ahaziah and forty-two princes of the royal house had succumbed to the murderous steel of Jehu; how will the future of Judah fare? A wholly unexpected turn of affairs ensues. When the queen-mother, Athaliah, learns that her son is dead, she proceeds to finish Jehu's work, and has the whole royal family put to death. Only one little grandson, Ahaziah's one-year-old son, Joash, escaped her frenzy; a sister of Ahaziah, Jehosheba, who was married to the priest Jehoiada, saved her little nephew and concealed him in the temple from his grandmother.

Athaliah now assumes the reigns of government as sovereign queen. She seems to have met no opposition; Judah submitted with just as much resignation to Athaliah and her wickedness as had Israel to Jehu and his monstrous deeds. Athaliah now erected at Jerusalem a temple of Baal, and, if we may credit the report which even gives us the name of the priest appointed by her, celebrated the worship of Baal officially. It is asked, What can have moved Athaliah to turn thus sadly against her own flesh and blood? How is it possible that a grandmother would have her own grandchildren exterminated? On this very point an explanation is not far to seek. Conditions in the Orient are such that the first lady of the land is not the wife but the mother of the king; she is the only person to whom the king himself, the sovereign lord of all, shows reverence and even submission—whom he recognises as superior to himself; he goes to meet her, does obeisance to her, seats her at his right hand. So we see that the position of the queen-mother was actually a court office, and the highest of all; King Asa formally deposed his wicked mother from this dignity. The moment her grandson ascended the throne Athaliah would have been compelled to vacate this first position in the kingdom in favor of her daughter-in-law, and her proud heart could not bear this. Lust of power and the gift for ruling,—generally, alas! combined,—must have impelled her and made a fury of her; it is possible also that the thought arose that the ruling house in the little land of Judah should not fare better than that in her own mighty

Israel,—if she could have had her way the house of David would have perished from the earth. But God held his hand over it; He cared too much for it to let the family be destroyed by an inhuman woman.

The destruction of the house of Omri and the catastrophe in the house of David constitute a milestone in the history of the people of Israel at which we may tarry and turn away overcome. Unspeakable horrors at Samaria, unspeakable horrors at Jerusalem, and the curtain falls on blood and corpses. Is this terrible picture an omen for the future? Yes, and no. In the next chapter we shall see both kingdoms fall, but their fall is not a blood-curdling melodrama, rather a genuine tragedy; they fall like heroes, after a manful struggle with destiny, and there is a mitigating feature: they fall, indeed, but they do not perish: new life will spring from the ruins.

THE MISSION RUINS OF CALIFORNIA.

BY J. M. SCANLAND.

THE MISSION church buildings of California, the crumbling monuments of a mistaken policy, are picturesque in their decay. In a few years all will have disappeared, as will, also, the last of the aboriginal tribes found here by the missionary padres. At the end of the first quarter of the present century, when the twenty-one missions of California were in the height of prosperity, the friars estimated the number of Indians to be about 100,000, of which about 25,000 were mission Indians—that is, under the subjection of the Church. The others were styled “Gentiles.”

The coast line of the territory comprising California extended from San Francisco to San Diego—at least, that was as far north as the missions extended—a distance of 600 miles.

The jurisdiction of each mission extended half the distance to the other, each way, and thus they controlled the entire coast line. Their jurisdiction inland extended only about twenty miles—beyond were the mountains and the savage Indians.

These deserted buildings now serve as a reminder of the enslavement of a people who may have become civilised had the priests pursued a different policy and not degenerated from spiritual advisers to managers of vast estates. The spiritual welfare of the Indian was neglected in the enslavement of his body.

About the beginning of the eighteenth century the Jesuits planted a chain of fifteen missions in Lower California. Spain had, about that time, lost considerable of her territory, and shrewdly adopted the plan of invading and colonising the Californias through her mission policy and under the cloak of Christianity. The prime motive was to acquire territory—which is the underlying principle of all governments, just as the acquisition of property is inherent in mankind. With the extension of her do-

minions, the power was to civilise the Indians, make of them good citizens, and award to them a due proportion of the lands they already occupied, which ownership Spain never denied, and so recognised in the laws of the Indies.

The Jesuits were eager to extend their scheme of salvation to this western wilderness, and their services were accepted by the government. Donations were made by wealthy Spaniards for the cause of the "Holy Faith," the Government furnished the friars with a half-dozen or dozen soldiers as a guard for each of the missions as they were established, also giving to each church ornaments, vestments, etc. Unfortunately, the soldiers were placed under the command of the priests, and thus they had full temporal authority, and looked only to the prosperity of their mission property.

It may be argued that the friars were actuated only by the best of motives. True, no doubt; but, after an experiment of seventy years, only about one-fourth of the 50,000 Indians in Lower California had been "reduced to the missions," as they termed it. None of them had been educated, and the Spanish Government concluded that either they or the system were at fault. Some of these friars deserve great credit for their self-sacrifice in spending a lifetime in such a barren country; while some, very likely, preferred to rule in a savage land than to serve in civilisation. However, the interference of the order with political matters in France and Spain at this time, resulted in their expulsion from those countries and their provinces. The missions in California were transferred to the care of the Franciscan friars, who after having landed at La Paz and taken possession of them, found that the property, together with the "Pious Fund," did not exceed in value \$100,000.

Spain now began to pursue a "vigorous foreign policy," and her energetic rulers decided to colonise "Alta" or Upper California, which Cabrillo had discovered in 1540, and Viscaïno had "rediscovered" in 1602, and which had remained undiscovered for more than one hundred and fifty years afterwards. Accordingly, the Franciscans were given permission to accompany the colonising expeditions of 1769, and from that time dates the "mission era" of the present California.

The Franciscans were anxious to leave Lower California, as they soon found that it was a very uninviting field—for worldly prosperity, and besides, the Dominicans, or Black Friars, had asked for a division of the field of labor, and spoils, perhaps.

Spain did not change the policy in reference to the powers of

the friars, but, as before, allowed to each mission a number of soldiers, who were under the command of the priest in charge, who thus became commander, priest, law-maker, executive officer. He could punish a crime in any manner that he chose, and could prescribe what constituted a crime.

Spain considered that this territory north of the Peninsula of Lower California was a portion of that peninsula, and that as it was inhabited by the same class of people, it was called Upper California, though according to an ancient Latin publication, dated 1579, it was called Quivera.

By the aid of the confiscated "Pious Fund" of the Jesuits, the Franciscans were soon established in their new field, and dotted the coast line of Alta (upper) California with missions. The friars selected the most fertile spots in the watered valleys, the missions being located on the sea coast. Their jurisdiction extended only a few miles into the interior, or to the foothills, where the wild or "Gentile" Indians held sway.

Spain never intended that the Indians should be dispossessed of their lands, or that the Church should own any lands other than necessary for buildings, gardens, etc. The expressed policy of the Government was that each mission should be converted into a pueblo (town) after it had been in existence for ten years, believing that period was sufficient for the civilisation and Christianising of the Indian. But, the Franciscan Friars, following the policy of the Jesuits whom they had succeeded, ignored these instructions, and settled down into the possession of the country.

The friars seemed to believe that it was necessary to separate themselves and their "children" from the world in order to be successful. They reasoned that civilisation came from within and not from without.

Had it not been for this mistaken policy the deserted mission church buildings of to-day would not be in ruins, and the 100,000 Indians the friars found here would not have decreased to the remnant of five per cent., who are neither civilised nor savage, having the vices of both with the virtues of neither.

For sixty years the missionaries had absolute control of California—temporal and spiritual. Had they sought to educate the Indian he would have become an industrious citizen. But, when the missions were abandoned, he became a vagabond.

The priests set themselves up in defiance of the expressed will of the Government in claiming the lands for their order, which they well knew to be the property of the Indians, and held to be

so by Spain. The priests argued that the Indians were "children," and constituted themselves as the guardians of the neophytes. Each mission in time became a feudal principality; the priest was lord of all he surveyed, and he surveyed everything to the line of the next mission. They had possession of the entire country, and united to exclude settlers, fearing for their absolute power.

In those early days it would seem that the settlers would have been welcomed, and they would have been under any other system than this, which perhaps is the main cause of Spain eventually losing this territory. When a settler made application to the Government for land, it was granted to him provided the grant did "not interfere with the existing rights of others." As the chain of missions claimed the entire coast line of six hundred miles, the coveted grant did "interfere" with the "existing rights" of some one of the missions. This was the report generally made by the priests, to whom the petitions were usually referred. As the settlers could not well locate lands in the mountain districts, which were occupied by hostile Indians, the country was practically withheld from settlement, or colonisation, by the priests for more than half a century. The few people who did settle in the country when it was ruled by the friars, held their lands subject to the Church, receiving their titles from the priests, who took upon themselves the high-handed authority of deeding away the lands of the country.

Under a genial climate, and with the advantages of a highly productive soil, the missionaries cultivated the vine, the olive and the fig, and enjoyed all the conveniences and luxuries that slave labor could produce. Stock multiplied with amazing rapidity on the virgin pastures and rich valleys, and the exports of hides, tallow, and wine and other produce, swelled the coffers of the missions, for nothing was paid for labor—the Indian received only food and the coarsest of raiment. As an illustration, the Mission of San Gabriel, one of the wealthiest, made from five hundred to six hundred barrels of wine yearly, and the others were not far behind in this product. Each mission averaged from 50,000 to 75,000 head of cattle, about the same relative number of sheep, and from 2,000 to 3,000 head of horses. And yet an Indian was not permitted to ride on horseback, unless first getting permission from the priest, and when he slaughtered cattle he was given a small allowance, the friars holding that too much food tended to make them rebellious.

As the missions waxed rich, they abandoned the Indians in the interior to their fate, and made no effort whatever to reclaim them to civilisation or Christianity. They made no effort at any time to explore the interior, so far as the establishment of missions was concerned. But, as the neophytes became lessened in numbers in consequence of the remarkable number of deaths, incursions were made to capture the Gentile or hostile Indians, as much for laborers as for Christianising purposes. They were hunted down by soldiers with lances and *reatas*, and were lassoed as animals, brought to the missions, flogged into subjection, and then baptised. As evidence of this inactivity of the friars, no mission was established north of San Francisco, the territory inhabited by wild Indians, until after the independence of Mexico. The friars never visited the interior to ascertain whether the Indian inhabitants were worthy or willing to be civilised.

The beginning of the present century saw California missions wealthy and prosperous to an enormous degree. For about twenty-five years the priests experienced the most halcyon days of a system which seemed to prosper the greatest only as they succeeded in benumbing the intellect of their spirit-broken subjects. They lived in patriarchal state, with almost royal revenues, and with no one to account to. But they neglected the mind of the untutored Indian, looked after their flocks, herds, produce, and lands, and beyond their routine religious offices they had degenerated from priests into managers of vast estates. Had they devoted their time to the education of the Indian, an empire and civilisation unexcelled awaited them, but they would not release their grasp upon the Indian's body, and they lost, perhaps, the grandest opportunity ever offered a religious order.

Settlers made numerous complaints to the "Supreme Government" at Madrid of the cruelty to the Indians at the missions and of the opposition of the priests to the settlement of the country. This led to the secularisation act of 1813, but its execution was delayed by the Mexican revolution against Spain. Very soon after the independence of Mexico, that country changed the colonisation system which had not colonised California. Under a general law, grants of land were given to colonists, and the secularisation act of Spain was re-enacted. The "Pious Fund," which now amounted to about a half-million dollars, was confiscated to the treasury of the republic.

The act was not enforced until several years after its passage, but the mission system began gradually to decay, and it was found

that it was a miserable failure, in that the Indians were not fitted for citizenship, and were too much broken in spirit to again become savages. They had been taught to depend upon the priests for everything, and when liberated, they were like the slaves of the South at the close of the Civil War, unfit for freedom. The Indians were permitted to remain upon the mission lands which they had so long cultivated, but the friars, having been devastated of their authority and revenues, refused to remain as mere parish curates, which shows that they had in view their own self aggrandisement above the welfare of the neophytes. Shorn of their temporal power, the friars left the Indians to their fate, rather than to labor in a depleted vineyard, merely to save savage souls.

Finally, seeing that the mission policy was a failure, and as many of the priests were royalists and refused to take the oath of allegiance, the Mexican government abolished the missions entirely, and gave the priests their passports. The majority of them left the country, and most of these did not leave empty handed. The vessels that carried them also carried leathern sacks of tallow and barrels of olives, ostensibly. These sacks and casks were filled with silver and gold, the contents of each mission treasure-room. The shipments had been going on from the time the friars read the "handwriting on the wall," and it is stated on good authority that a very energetic friar at San Louis Obispo succeeded in shipping out of the country about \$100,000, and when the administrators took possession they found no gold to tempt their cupidity. This money, sent to—no one knows where—was the result of the Indians' labor. They had toiled for more than half a century, and not only their lands, but the accumulations of their labor, was taken from them.

Under the secularisation act, however, the Indians were entitled to one half of the accumulations of the missions, including seeds, vines, trees, orchards, etc., and half of the lands. They were made to believe that all had been taken from them, and, in some instances, the vineyards were torn up, fruit trees cut down, flowers uprooted, horses and cattle turned loose to stray into the mountains, and all of the available cattle were slaughtered at the command of the priests, who at once exported the hides and tallow. If this vandalism of the vineyards and orchards was not instigated by the revengeful priests, it was not prevented by them, and could not have been done without their knowledge.


A great deal has been written about the robbery of the missions by the *mayor-domos* and administrators in charge, but justice

should be done even at this late day to these Mexican officials. The missions were but skeletons when they took charge. True, the administrators wasted considerable of the remaining property, and dispossessed the Indians of the lands, which were theirs by right of occupancy, long before the missionaries came. But, had the priests remained in charge as curates, there would have been no despoliation. Instead, the priests set the example, and what they left behind the officials appropriated or wasted, and the Government received only a pittance for the buildings.

Seeing at last that the Indians were becoming even more degraded by the mission system, which had deprived them of the instincts that nature had implanted, and left them no independence but the will of the priests, the Mexican Government decided to change its policy of colonisation. Or rather, it decided to carry out the liberal policy of Spain, which granted to the Indians lands for cultivation and lots in the pueblos for homes. Much of the land on which San Francisco, Monterey, Los Angeles, and other pueblos and presidios, now stand, was granted to partly civilised Indians by the Spanish Government, but they were dispossessed by either Mexican or American settlers.

In 1834 Mexico inaugurated her new colonisation system. About three hundred colonists arrived from the City of Mexico in the brigs *Moreles* and *Natalia*, the latter being one of the vessels in which Napoleon and his battalion escaped from Elba. This should have been the policy from the beginning, but the friars strived to prevent colonisation even now, and when the first band of settlers arrived they were not permitted to settle in this immense country as a colony. The Church party held that they would in time become too powerful. In consequence the colony disbanded and the emigrants, after drifting around for several months, settled at various points, the majority of them at Los Angeles. The Governor, who was one of the Church party, actually refused the emigrants the necessary food when their supply became exhausted, and exiled the leaders from the country. As an evidence of the priestly opposition, the *Natalia* was scuttled one "dark, stormy night" at Monterey, by which the emigrants lost most of their household effects. This was charged to the Church party. It was certainly done by persons inimical to the colonists, who had become unpopular in consequence of the stories set afloat that they had come to take possession of the mission property.

The missions were secularised, or confiscated, by the Mexican Government in 1835, and in a few years all of the property of the



SAN JUAN CAGISTRANO MISSION.


vast estates was wasted by the administrators. The Government received little or nothing.

Then followed a series of revolutions: A Governor who attempted to enforce the degree of secularisation was deposed, and a "Church Governor" installed, to be in turn deposed. No sooner would a Governor arrive from Mexico than he found a revolution on foot to depose him. The "year of revolutions," 1836, witnessed five such changes in the gubernatorial office. The friars, who were loyal to Spain, and refused to take the oath of allegiance to Mexico, sided with the revolutionists when they happened to be "pronouncing" against an enemy of the Church. Finally, the priests were sent out of the country, and the decay of the missions, which had outlived their doubtful usefulness, soon sank into that decay and ruin which overtakes all institutions founded upon ignorance and slavery.

Prior to the arrival of this colony there were not more than about 7,000 settlers in California—about one-third of that number being Spanish and Mexican, exclusive of the soldiers, who were mainly convicts sent into exile and servitude. Within five years after the secularisation of the missions the population had increased about 100 per cent. Had Spain adopted this policy of colonisation half a century earlier, or before the Mexican revolution, she would no doubt have reared a magnificent and rich empire in the west. But her statesmen made the mistake when they permitted the friars to accompany the first colonising expedition under Portalla in 1769. Even had the expressed policy of Spain been carried out, which was that each settler should have lands, that the inherent rights of the Indians should not be disturbed, and that the missions should be reduced to towns after ten years' existence, the country would have become thickly populated within a comparatively short time, and might be now the home of Spanish-speaking people.

Gold and silver was found in the dry beds of streams and in the foothills as early as 1836, but the friars warned the people against digging for the precious metal, telling the simple-minded Mexicans that adventurers would flock into the country and dispossess them of both gold and their lands. This is exactly what did happen a decade later.

There are left only about 5,000 Indians now. They live on their ranches, in brush huts, near the missions, having been dispossessed of their lands. A small number cultivate crops, but the




PALA MISSION, UPPER SAN LUIS REY VALLEY. Photographed by Turner and Judd.

majority move from place to place, working on the farms of the paleface.

There are several schools for Indians in this State, Government and private, and the Indian pupils show a remarkable aptitude in study and a high degree of intelligence, capable of further development.

In order to defend their own conduct in holding the Indians in slavery for so many years the priests have misrepresented the physical and mental condition of the aborigines. They uniformly report that the California Indians, when the missions were established, were the lowest in the scale of humanity—inferior to the Australian Bushmen. Because the California Indian eats herbs and wild fruits, which his native land furnished in abundance, it does not follow that he was irredeemably sunk in sloth and idleness. He built huts of tules, because the mild climate did not demand anything more substantial, and he wore very little clothing because it was the fashion of his race, and furthermore the climate permitted it. Life was not with him a continual struggle for existence, and with no hopes or ambition, he got along with the least amount of work possible, just as the Spaniard and Mexican who took his lands did when they came, and just as they do to-day. The California Indian was not continually at war with neighboring tribes, as were other Indians, and for this reason they are stigmatised as cowardly. Living mainly upon farinaceous food, these Indians were less warlike than any other tribes in the West, but they were not cowardly, as their frequent rebellions and uprisings against mission authority attests. When the *conquistadores* came early in the seventeenth century they did not find weapons of warfare among the California Indians, and no indications have been found among the numerous relics excavated to show that they were a warlike people. Circumstances indicate that they were half-civilised when the missionaries arrived, and their complete civilisation could have undoubtedly been brought about just as our European ancestors were civilised. But education should have preceded the attempt to Christianise. The Indian should have been advanced to that mental condition by which he could be made to understand why it was better to adore the cross than his fetish. The friars reasoned with the lash, the dungeon, and when subjected physically he was baptised without knowing whether it was intended for a religious ceremony or for personal cleanliness.

No country in the world was so well supplied by nature with the wants of man as was California in the aboriginal days. The



OLD SAN DIEGO MISSION, FOUNDED 1769. Elite Studio.


hills, *mesas*, valleys, and streams were filled with abundance of game and fish, and the forests were full of trees, plants, and vines, bearing seeds, nuts, and berries that grew in profusion and luxuriance in this tropical clime. Being a child of nature, the Indian enjoyed the fruits of this ideal world of his in the most natural manner. He was not lazy, for it was his work that built the massive mission buildings and created the wealth of the missions. He was not so stupid as the friars paint him to be, for he became expert in mechanics, readily learned to till the soil, cultivate fruits, construct irrigating ditches, manufacture cloth, and even to make wine for the priests. Minds capable of receiving such instruction were not "incapable of being instructed," and all of their handiwork goes to prove that the California Indian was capable of civilisation, at least in two generations. They constructed irrigating ditches, the remains of some of which are still in existence, and they were skilful in the manufacture of various articles. True, they did this under instruction, but a mind susceptible of being so instructed is also capable of being educated to a point of civilisation.

These Indians had a religion and worshipped a supreme being. Their priests wore long robes of human hair, but these the missionaries burned, and finally drove their rivals out of the field. Their finely wrought ornaments of gold and silver showed that they were artisans and possessed inventive skill not excelled by the subsequent teachings of the missionaries who enslaved them.


The fact that they navigated the ocean for some distance in canoes, rudely constructed of bark (according to the statements of the Spanish conquerors) is proof that they were skilful and enterprising.

Navigators and scientists from France, Russia, the United States and other foreign countries who visited this coast in the early part of this century, all unite in stating that the Indians were held in bondage mental as well as physical, and that the methods used by the priests in obtaining converts was "little better than kidnapping," and that their treatment was worse than that accorded to the serfs of Russia, or the negroes of the Southern States.

Ethnologists and philologists who have made an exhaustive study of the Hindu, Chinese, and Japanese races, have discovered convincing testimony that the Indians found in Mexico and the Californias are descended from the Mongolian. Protius holds that the Peruvians are descended from the Chinese, and states that



SAN LUIS REY MISSION. Photographed by Judd.



MISSION SAN LUIS REY DE FRANCIA AS IT APPEARED IN 1837.
After a model by Mr. and Mrs. A. F. Coronel. Copyrighted. Reproduced with the permission of the modelers.

the "Spaniards found wrecks of Chinese vessels in the Straits of Magellan."

The customs of the aborigines go toward proving their Asiatic origin. They had no written language, but kept their records by means of bundles of strings with knots of various colors, as did the Chinese many centuries ago. Their system of notation, calculation of time, and ornaments are similar.

The Chinese now in California bear a striking resemblance to the California aborigines, where the type is found in its purity. And there is a similarity in their language, both in gesture and intonation.

Had not the Spanish priests destroyed all of the records at the conquest of Peru, and later of the Californias, there would have been more evidence, and of a conclusive nature, as to the origin of the native races. But enough is known, however, to establish the fact that the native Californians were a people susceptible of civilization, even if they were not already partly civilised and educated.

The large stone houses, or *casa grandes*, found in New Mexico, Arizona, and California have their counterpart in Thibet, and they were built by Mongolians. History states that many of the Tartar invaders of this country were of the Christian faith. That much is certain, that the conquering Spaniards found the cross in Peru and among the aborigines in California.

The California aborigines did not offer human sacrifice, and were not savages. They were a peaceful and agricultural people, and had the missionaries educated them, Christianity would have followed. They had a grand opportunity, but failed to grasp it.

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PÈRE HYACINTHE LOYSON
AND THE EDITOR OF THE OPEN COURT.

NEUILLY PRÈS PARIS, 22 July, 1894.

Dr. Paul Carus.

MY DEAR SIR:— The parts of your *Primer of Philosophy* which I have had translated for my perusal have struck me very forcibly by reason of the emphasis with which you have expounded the necessity of the great philosophical principles which should be established in the human soul as the basis of all certitude and all religion, and which no revelation coming from without, however excellent it may be, can supplant.

I do not know to what degree you are a Christian. As for myself, I worship the Word which is incarnate in Jesus Christ. But I do not forget that before having been manifested in a man and in having thus opened up a new epoch in the history of mankind, the Word was eternal and universal, and, according to the beautiful words of the Evangelist, “the true light which lighteth every man which cometh into the world.”

In their manner of understanding the religion of the incarnate Word, Christians too often miscomprehend the Eternal Word, the uncreated reason which proceeded from the Father before all time and from which proceedeth in time the reason and the conscience of men.

Believe me, dear sir, sincerely yours,

HYACINTHE LOYSON.

20 April, 1895.

MY DEAR SIR:—My slight knowledge of English has hitherto enabled me to grasp only very imperfectly your philosophical point of view, but I now comprehend it, thanks to the French transla-

tions of your works, *L'Idée de Dieu* and *Conscience du Moi*. I have found in these two works many good and beautiful things worthy of a philosopher and a man. But on one fundamental point I differ radically from you.

Not only as a Christian but as a thinker I believe absolutely in God, living and personal,—though not necessarily anthropomorphic,—and in the like personal immortality of the human ego. I say with Maine de Biran, “Science has two poles: infinite personality, which is God, and finite personality, which is the ego.”

I could not live, I should be overwhelmed with intellectual and moral asphyxia, if I were to lose this double and profound conviction.

Truth is not for me an abstract ideal without a living support. It is the direct, unmediated radiation of the divine reason in human reason, and, as the fourth gospel excellently has it, “the light of the Word which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.”

I remain, dear sir, sincerely yours,

H. L.

The Rev. Hyacinthe Loyson.

DEAR SIR:—Thanks for your letter. I am sorry that on the two most important points, the problems of God and the soul, you find yourself in disagreement with my position; but I am always delighted to meet an adversary of your type, a man of warm convictions and unusual intellectual ability, for you are not loath to give your reasons, and I am sure that they are worthy of consideration. If you point out to me my errors I shall be glad to change my views. I should be glad to have from your pen for publication in either *The Monist* or *The Open Court* an exposition of your standpoint, and if possible a refutation of that view which we, the editors of *The Monist*, call the Religion of Science.

You write that you absolutely believe in a personal God and in a personal immortality of the human ego. These two ideas are to you as they were to Maine de Biran, the two poles of science, and you would be struck with intellectual and moral asphyxia if you ever lost this conviction; and as you understand by personal immortality the continuance of a human ego, so by personal God, you understand plainly an individual being, an ego personality, a concrete though spiritual existence. I can feel with you and I can sympathise with you, for I have been in the same predicament as you. But I cannot follow you. Nor can I approve of the fervor

with which you emphasise your belief as the sole condition for the welfare of your soul. For in doing so you endanger the future of those whom you impress with your powerful personality.

When I was young I was taught as you believe. I was taught that there was no God unless God was a personal God, and a personal God means a God who is possessed of an ego; God was characterised as a self, endowed with a consciousness of self. At the same time I was taught that immortality must be the ensured continuance of our personal consciousness in its idiosyncrasy with all individual recollections and relations. Many struggles would have been spared me if my parents and teachers had not written on the guide-post that leads to a higher and purer religion the words "atheism and nihilism." Thus I was prevented for a long time from attaining a scientifically tenable conception of God and soul. But man cannot help growing, and I had, nevertheless, to march onward, though I could not avoid passing through atheism and nihilism, losing both my God and my soul; for after a most careful examination of these two problems, which, however, at bottom are one and the same problem in two applications, I came, against my own inclination, to the conclusion that there was no God and there no soul. Science has as little room for the huge world-ego of a God-individual as for the puny ego-entity of man, supposed to exist in addition to the psychic elements of which the human soul in the course of a long evolution has been built up. We might as well assume the existence of a metaphysical watch-essence as a distinct entity residing in the watch and representing the unity of its motions. I would gladly have believed in a personal God and in the reality of an ego soul, if I had not plainly recognised the desolate superfluity of these two postulates. It is possible indeed that the world might have been built by a rational being according to a rational plan. But who, in that case, made the rationality of the Creator? Is not reason, which you will readily recognise as intrinsically necessary, eternal, and universal, superior to any individual God-being? Thus Reason would be an authority above God: it would be the God of God.

Here is the problem in a nutshell:

Take the simplest mathematical theorems, such as $2 \times 2 = 4$, or $(a + b)^2 = a^2 + 2ab + b^2$. There are two possibilities for the anthropotheistic theologian: either these theorems have been shaped by God to hold good in the plan of his creation, or God has cleverly adjusted his creation according to the laws of arithmetic and geometry. If God shaped these laws, they could not be independent

of Him; but they *are* independent of Him, of an individual God, for we cannot help recognising them to be true whether we believe in the existence of God or not. These rules, as all other rules of mathematics, arithmetic and logic, have not been created; they are intrinsically necessary, unconditionally true, absolute, universal, and eternal. Thus the second possibility remains only. God must have adjusted his creation to the laws of pure Reason, viz., to the eternal conditions of the cosmic order. And if God adjusted His creation to these eternal conditions of the cosmic order they are superior to Him, as being a power to which He must conform. Such, indeed, is Plato's conception of God. Plato, when speaking of "the absolutely necessary," calls it "a necessity against which God himself is unable to contend."¹

In reply to Plato's God-conception, which places necessity above God, we say that a God who is subject to a higher power does not deserve the name of God. Call him a divine spirit, an archangel, the demiurge, the world-fashioner, but not God; for God, as I conceive him, is the highest authority, the ultimate *raison d'être* of existence, and the final standard of truth and righteousness.

On moral grounds the belief in an individual God is not less untenable. An anthropomorphic view of God would inevitably make the Creator responsible for all the untold misery in the world. If we accept traditional Christianity, no compensation is promised to the brute animal world, and for the majority of mankind misery is perpetuated in the sufferings of eternal damnation. And is it not sad that here the human heart that knows nothing of the sternness of scientific proof can take shelter only in agnosticism (the very enemy of any gnosis, scientific as well as religious,) by assuming that we can never comprehend the truth and had better trust in God's mysterious dispensation?

Only after a period of deep despair in which I felt myself forsaken by God and struck with a moral asphyxia such as you prophesy for yourself, did I regain my mental equilibrium.

Now let me tell you that when, after the bankruptcy of my belief in God, I began to calm down; I opened my eyes again and was astonished that I could still see. I applied my mental abilities, and lo! I could still think. I had not lost my moral aspirations; and though I had utterly surrendered my self, such as it appeared to me in my personality, I had not abandoned my ideals, my appreciation of nobility of character, my admiration for beauty

¹Laws, 818. Cf. Laws, 741, and Protag., 345.

in conduct as well as in art, and above all my love of truth. God had died to me, and I myself had become as dead. The world was so empty that death appeared rather as a redemption than an annihilation. But while I continued to live, I soon felt that the wellsprings of my religious life had not dried up; the realities of life remained as they had been before, and these functions of my soul that, according to the traditional terminology, I had accustomed myself to call a belief in God, continued to operate. I learned through experience that that which in the traditions of Christianity is called God symbolises actual facts. If God, as science unmistakably teaches, is not an individual being, He is after all a living presence, and if the soul is not an immortal ego, we cannot deny the actuality of the soul's pursuits, such as the treasures of science and art and the grand aims of moral endeavor. The main argument that refutes the existence of an individual God-entity affords incontrovertible proof of the omnipresence of an intangible God who, being the rationality of reason, the life of the living, and the ultimate norm of moral aspirations, is alone the true God. Therefore I should not say that the laws of mathematics are superior to God, I should say that they are part and parcel of Him, viz., of the superpersonal God. They are the most important features of His nature. God cannot alter them, because He cannot alter Himself. But if God were an individual being, a person such a one as we are, a deliberating, thinking ego-consciousness, only infinitely greater, wiser, and better than we, the laws of mathematics and all other formal laws of logic and arithmetic would indeed be superior to Him; for mathematical and logical truths are intrinsically necessary and eternal, and a God-individual would have to conform to them in order to be wise and good and great.

The problem of the ego, both in God and in man, commands a wider interest among both professional thinkers and people in the practical walks of life, and justly so, for here lies the root of all difficulties. Man's personality is the most important fact of life. Says Goethe:

“ Fürst und Volk und Ueberwinder,
 Sie gestehen zu jeder Zeit,
 Höchstes Glück der Menschenkinder
 Ist doch die Persönlichkeit.”

[Prince and people, and those who conquer,
 Mankind in totality,
 All agree, the bliss they hanker
 For is 'personality.']

Personality asserts itself in conscious aspiration, in endeavor, in purposed action. Hence the importance of consciousness and of design. Both together constitute the functions of the soul. There would be no sense in life unless there were personality changing indifferent nature into a field of planned activity. The highest we can think of is that which creates and conditions personality. That is God; and the question is only whether or not God is a personality himself.

Our answer is, that the conditions of human personality are the same eternal laws, or necessary relations, or universal verities, or whatever you may call them, which constitute the entire cosmic order, for man's personality is nothing but a concentrated reflexion of the cosmic order, a kind of quintessence of the divinity that is omnipresent in nature. These conditions are not an indifferent anything, but possess a definite character. Nor are they scattered, isolated facts; they constitute a harmonious unity. Considering their unity, we call them in their religious significance in one word "God." The characteristic feature of personality is rational will, consisting in the realisation of purpose; and purpose is design pursued with consciousness.

The cosmic order which reveals itself in the rationality of man, being inalterable and intrinsically necessary, does not only govern this actual world of ours, but, as an investigation of the nature of pure reason teaches, holds good universally for any possible kind of world, and may, therefore, very appropriately be called "supernatural." It is the purely relational, not the material; it is the formal, not the substantial; it comprises not the physical properties of nature, but the hyperphysical order of things which is applicable to any kind of world. It is what St. John calls the Logos that was in the beginning, not as a first-created being, but as part and parcel of God himself. Being the rationality of our thought and the endeavor in our noblest actions, God is nearer to us than any ego-God who is a distinct individuality can be, for God constitutes the very essence of our being.

We may call this conception of God Nomothetism.¹ The order of the universe, the irrefragable law that permeates nature, conditioning the tiny molecular crystallisation of metals as well as the grand course of planets, and appearing in its highest manifestations as the rational will of man where it shows itself as moral endeavor, is God Himself. The uncreated and immutable laws of nature are themselves parts and parcels of God; they are features

¹ From νόμος law.

of His being; they are the characteristic aspects of His nature. They are the God whom science teaches. In their oneness we may call them the logic of facts, the world-reason, or Logos. Science teaches that the Logos is uncreated; the Logos is the divinity of God.

Now, God (as I understand him to be), if he be God at all, is not conscious design, but, being the condition of organised unity of any kind, of law and cosmic order, he is also the condition of design, of man's rationality, of purposive action. As such God is also the condition of consciousness, for consciousness is organised sentiency; it is the irritability that prevails among the lower forms of nature, raised to the high level of self-apprehension. Having originated through organisation, consciousness is the product of the order-producing cosmic laws that are intrinsically necessary and eternal.

But should we not admit the hypothesis of a God-consciousness, by conceiving the universe as a great organised unity, as an ego, endowed with the quality of self-apprehension, as a huge being in which the planets play a part analogous to the blood-corpuses of the human brain? We reject this view of the universe as pantheistic, for it will be difficult for us to believe that the planetary motions are accompanied with consciousness; nor do we see any need of this assumption, as our God-idea is complete without it.

Mr. W. E. A. Wilkinson, of Rasra, a reader of *The Open Court* and one of my friendly critics in far-away India, objects to this superpersonal conception of God as follows:

"Evolution is an infinite process and consciousness is manifest at both ends of it. God is a conscious being whose purpose is to develop out of Himself a number of smaller beings like Himself. The process of their development is evolution. The process is somewhat analogous to the birth of a child from its parents. The parent as a whole is a conscious being. The parts of it by themselves are not conscious. There is no consciousness in a man's big toe, as such, but there is consciousness in a perfect child born from the man and containing all the elements that are in him. So also, as you say, there is no consciousness in the planets as such. But there is a consciousness in the whole universe; and there is consciousness in that complete reproduction of the parent called man.

"I maintain that my conception of God as a loving and all-wise father is far more satisfying than yours; that it is warranted by human aspirations, and that it is not inconsistent with any known scientific facts.

"I require something more than *definite character* in this whole universe; I require consciousness. I believe that there is a consciousness in the whole universe as such. Otherwise I do not see how it can be manifested in the limited parts of the universe called human individuals. There cannot be any 'conditions of sen-

tiency' without sentiency. It is absurd. Consciousness either is, or is not. *We cannot conceive of any elementary state from which it can be evolved.*"

In reply to Mr. Wilkinson's objections I would grant the possibility of the animation of the universe with an ego-consciousness, such as is assumed in his proposition, and I would for argument's sake also grant that man's soul is a part of this world-soul, developing from elements of the world-soul into an independent being like unto its parent soul. But if this were so, would not the God, whom science reveals, that superpersonal presence of law, be still superior to this world-soul?

If Mr. Wilkinson's God existed, I should not call him God, but Brahma, or world-soul, or the great spirit of the universe, and he would be subject to God no less than I am myself or any other person is. If you, however, insist on calling such a being with a world-wide consciousness, God, I would insist that there is something higher than God, and I would deem the belief in God a matter of small concern.

God (*viz.*, the God of science) is truly like a father, but he is not a father. If we speak of him as a father, it is a mere allegory. Take the allegory in its literal sense, as does Mr. Wilkinson, and you change God into a creature such as we are. A child develops from a part of his parents and grows into a being like them; there is no constitutional difference between parent and child, except that if the parent be faithful in the fulfilment of his duties, the son should become superior to his father in mental and moral equipment and start life under better conditions and with wider possibilities than did his ancestors.

While I reject the letter of the belief that God is a loving father, I gladly accept the significance of the allegory, and I would go so far as to recommend belief in the letter of the allegory where its meaning cannot as yet be understood. In a certain phase of human development the belief in the letter is natural for the broad masses of the people who are not yet matured in philosophical thought and will not be able to realise the fact that God is much nearer and dearer to us than any human father can be to his child; if they believe that there is a benevolent father in heaven who guides their lives and watches over them with loving care, they have a truer conception of the world than if they say, "There is no God, let us eat and drink and be merry, for to-morrow we shall be no more."

The allegory of a loving father in heaven is true enough in its significance. The order of cosmic laws, which prescribes the

paths of the planets and arranges the wonderful combinations of atoms into molecules, is not only sternly just but also most beneficent and dear. It not only begets us; it also cherishes us and surrounds us with unceasing blessings, infinitely greater not only in amount and proportion but also in kind, than any father or mother could bestow on their children.

If God were an individual being, even though he were conceived to be eternal and infinitely great, he would after all be one of us; he would be the first of all beings, the most powerful of living things, the monarch of creatures, the demiurge or world-builder, the progenitor of life, the father of all, but he would be in the same predicament as other beings are.

The father of a family is as much an individual and a mortal as are his children. Therefore God is comparable to a father, but he is not our father. He is infinitely dearer to us than a father. God's relation to his creatures is incomparably more intimate and at the same time more authoritative than the relation of a father is to his children.

Nor is God's relation to the world that of a king. We may compare him to a king; but God's majesty is radically different from any ruler or monarch of any description. God is not a legislator, not an individual being that issues ukases, he is not a deity who creates laws, but he is the eternal order of all natural laws itself.

Supposing there were a God-individual who rules the world after the fashion of a king, he might surpass all other beings as much as a noble-minded sovereign, a King Arthur, or a Charlemagne, is greater than the beggars in the streets of his capital; but after all he would not be their absolute superior. For he would not be the ultimate standard of truth and morality.

According to the letter of the law in monarchical institutions, the sovereign of a country is above the law; but that is nominal and means simply that he should not be judged in court for any offense he may give; practically he is as much a subject to the law as are all his subjects. He is the first citizen of the country but not the measure of justice. The law is practically above him, and, if he be wise, he knows it and will act accordingly.

A God-individual would not condition the cosmic order but would only conform to it. The eternal norms of reason, of rightness, and of righteousness would be as absolutely above him as they are above us. In a word, being a particular being, he would

not possess the marks of Godhood, intrinsic necessity, intrinsic eternity, intrinsic universality, intrinsic omnipresence.

Man naturally fashions his views of God after the pattern of his own personality, because he regards God as the mould from which his manhood has been shaped. But we must learn to understand what is the divine and what the human in man's personality. The divinity of man does not consist in his being an individual; for every crystal, every plant, every brute, is also an individual; the divinity of man consists in that feature which raises individuality into the higher domain of personality, and the distinctive feature of personality is the faculty of rational thought and rational action. In rational beings, feelings develop into self-consciousness, and self-consciousness finds expression in the notion of egoity.

The egoity of man is a very important feature, but it is not that feature which constitutes his divinity. Man's reason is divine, his conscience is divine, his comprehension of the truth is divine, but his ego-consciousness is simply the psychical expression of his selfhood, it is the awareness of his being a distinct individual, and this distinct individual can become divine only when its sentiments are guided by reason, conscience, and truth.

Our ego-consciousness is like a flickering flame now rising to bright clearness, now sinking into sleep's darkness, finally to be extinguished in death.

What is consciousness?

Consciousness is a function, and the peculiar nature of each conscious state, of every sentiment, every sensation, every idea, every word we think, every volition we have, depends upon the form of the nervous structure that is in commotion. The function of consciousness is a process of oxydation; it constantly feeds on new material and discards the old waste products. Thus the consciousness of every moment in life is a new consciousness. Nevertheless, there is an uninterrupted continuity, and, according to the laws of organised life, the form is preserved in the metabolism of the tissue by a constant renewal of the material used. The renewal is an assimilation, that is to say, it preserves the form of the wasted structure. The preservation of the form of nervous tissue is the condition of the continuity of consciousness, rendering the main bulk of our past experiences accessible in the shape of memories.

Memory, accordingly, is the salient feature of man's personality.

I have come to the conclusion that Maine de Biran's compari-

son is in a certain sense both forcible and true: God and the ego are indeed like unto the north and the south poles of our starry heavens. They are the direction of astronomical lines, but if we were to go out in search of them among the stars, we should not be able to discover them. They are useful for certain practical purposes of astronomy from a terrestrial standpoint, and represent, as such, real and indeed very important relations of the earth to the surrounding universe; but they are no entities, no things in themselves, no tangible or concrete objects, no individual things.

I am not a Pantheist. I do not identify God and the universe, for God and nature are different. God is the omnipresent law, and not the sum total of all existences. Nor is the term God (as I use it) an empty abstraction, but a word of intensest significance, for indeed God is that which gives significance to the world.

I do not say that God is impersonal, for God is not a vague generality but possesses a distinct suchness. He is not indefinite, but exceedingly definite in character. We can positively say what God is and what God is not, as we can distinguish between truth and untruth, between right and wrong, between good and evil. If you understand by personality definiteness of character, God is personal; but God's is not a human personality, his is a divine personality. His personality is not confined to the limits of individual concreteness; that is, His will is not a particular aspiration, but the eternal rightness that constitutes the condition of the cosmic order, the physical aspect of which can be stated in a body of formulas,¹ called laws of nature.

While in one sense God is personal, being possessed of a definite character, we must insist on the truth that in another sense God is not personal. God is not personal in the sense that an individual being is called personal. God is not an individual being; he is not a particular existence; he is not a concrete ego-self; in a word, he is not a creature; but if he is God, he is truly God, i. e., He is that which is omnipresent, absolute, intrinsically necessary, universal, eternal, the reality of all truth, and the norm of all righteousness. Being the condition of everything conditioned, he determines the suchness of all creatures and is especially also the condition of all personality in rational beings. For what is personality but individuality developed into the domain of rationality and

¹The unity of a system of truths is frequently compared to an organised body, and it is in this sense that Buddhists speak of the three bodies or Kāyas of Buddha, the Nirmāna Kāya or body of transformation, Sambhōga Kāya, the body of bliss and eternal rest, and Dharma Kāya, the body of the law or the revelation of the truth as developing in the evolution of the Buddhist religion.

endowed with moral aspiration. Being the condition of personality, God is superpersonal.

Since I understand that God is superpersonal, I cannot help looking upon the belief in a God who is a concrete and individual being, endowed with an ego-consciousness, as a pagan notion. It is a belief that takes an allegory literally. Paganism, in my opinion, is nothing but a literal acceptance of a symbol or a myth, where we ought to seek for the truth that is conveyed to us in the form of a parable.

The superpersonal God as I conceive him is neither vague nor illusory, but definite and actual. As Newton's formula of gravitation is not an unmeaning phrase but a description of actualities, so the word God (in the sense in which I use the term) defines a reality of omnipresent effectiveness. The reality is not material but incorporeal; not bodily but spiritual,¹ not individual or concrete, but universal, yet at the same time definite.

This conception of God, far from being atheistical, obviates the objections of atheism and shows the old truths of religion in a new light; it is in harmony with the most stringent critique, and is not only tenable on scientific grounds, but will be recognised as the sole philosophical basis of science formulated as a religious term.

The God of science, it is true, is not an individual being, but he is after all a reality as much as the law of gravitation; He is not an ego-entity with a limited range of consciousness, but is for that reason not a nondescript generality; he is definite in character and his qualifications are unmistakable. When we take the attributes of God—eternality, omnipresence—seriously, we shall understand that God cannot be personal, but for all that He is superpersonal. He is the condition of all personality, the prototype of man's reason, the norm of all moral purpose, the inspiration of ideals. He is the determinedness of the universe and the intrinsic necessity of the cosmic order itself. God cannot be an individual; He is not a man, He is God; He is not *a* God, but God.

God's thoughts are not acts of thinking, they are verities such as mathematical laws. God does not think in syllogisms as we do; His ideas are not a chain of arguments; he does not deliberate, ar-

¹ But please do not interpret "spiritual" in the sense that spiritualists represent ghosts. It is here used in the sense of the Platonic term *αιτιώδης*, i. e., the causal, viz., that which is the determinative in causation; frequently translated by "formal," because form is the feature that gives character to a thing and is the decisive element in the processes of transformation.

iving finally at a conclusion and coming to a decision. In Him the problem and its solution are one. His thoughts are not representations of the conditions of being, but the laws of pure being themselves.

Man's thoughts are representations. God's thoughts are eternal verities.

When we find a proposition that is intrinsically necessary and universal, a law that is uncreated and uncreatable, we must know that it is a thought of God. While thinking it, our thoughts are on holy ground, they are face to face with the Eternal.

It seems that glimpses of this higher God-conception are not foreign to the Gospel-writers. According to St. John, Christ did not say God is a spirit; he said *πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός* (God is spirit). And again he did not say God is a loving personality, but "God is love." And when He was asked, "Where is thy father?" He replied, "I and the Father are one." The two poles of science which you seek, viz., God and man, are not special spots in the universe. The two poles of science are a direction which is laid down in one line of "definite direction," in the God man, Christ, the Logos incarnate; here, if anywhere in our aspiring hearts, must we seek for God.

Here I agree with you that the Logos doctrine contains a great truth. The Logos, or World-Reason, takes shape in him who is perfect, in the God-man, the realised ideal of manhood, the paragon of mankind.

The Logos is incarnated not only in Christ, but in every rational being. The perfection of the Logos is not mere rationality, but moral endeavor, purity, holiness, charity, love; and the incarnate Logos is in its perfection as much divine as the eternal world order, God the Father. Nor is it less divine in the various ideals of mankind as they appear to-day in the advance of civilisation, in science, art, invention, and social progress, all of which in a word may be comprised under the name of the spirit manifesting itself—the holy spirit of the New Testament.

Allow me to add here that the trinity doctrine of the Church and the conception of the Logos or World reason as an aspect of God Himself is quite tenable upon philosophical grounds, provided we do not believe in the letter of the dogma but comprehend its sense. There are not three God-individuals who are one, but there is a superpersonal God who has three aspects which are allegorised in three personalities. As soon as the personality of God is construed to mean an individual God-being, the trinity doc-

trine becomes absurd. Hence the various rationalistic¹ reactions against this most fundamental dogma of traditional Christianity, and hence probably your own deep-felt sympathy with the deistic teachings of Islam.

Our reason, our life, and our moral ideas are not human inventions; they are intrinsically necessary and cannot in their fundamental nature be other than they are according to the unalterable conditions of existence. The cosmic prototype of our existence, that something through the agency of which we have become intelligent and morally aspiring beings, is what I call God, and, thus, I recognise God as the ultimate norm of reason, the all-quickenning wellspring of life and the obedience-enforcing authority of moral conduct, acting with the never-failing certainty of natural law.

The immortality of the soul remains a mystery so long as we still believe in an ego-entity, for we fail to understand the possibility of a continuance of our ego-personality, but when we learn that our thoughts and aspirations are our soul, that *they* constitute our personality, we see at once that we shall continue beyond our grave. Our thoughts will be thought again. The examples we set will be imitated, and our life will remain a factor in the evolution of mankind, not otherwise than every act of ours remains during our entire life with us as a living presence shaping our fate for good or evil. When we are gathered to our fathers, we shall remain active realities in the spirit-life of our race; we are and remain citizens of the Kingdom of God which is not beyond the clouds but in the hearts of men.

Although the whole combination of a man, his bodily frame, and the energy that manifested itself in the discharges of his nervous activity breaks utterly down in death, all the personal features of his soul remain according to the actions which he performed during life. Man's life is transient, but his deeds are immortal, and deeds are soul-activity; deeds constitute the soul, indeed, they are the most characteristic features of personality. Our deeds are not extraneous or foreign to us, they are we ourselves; and our deeds continue according to the law of causation, for the same reason that every event which takes place continues in its effects and that every thought of ours lingers with us as a memory. Effects may be modified and offset by other effects, but they can

¹ "Rationalistic," not "rational." By "rationalistic" I understand the theories of the rationalistic school. Such rationalists are Arius, Pelagius, Mohammed, the Deists, the Unitarians, etc.

never be annihilated; they remain for ever and aye modifying the universe in exact proportion to the range and nature of their causes.

Here again we must understand that the soul is spiritual, not material, nor kinematic. The soul does not consist of substance, nor is it an energy or a force; the soul is the significant form of life, and thus it constitutes the essential and determinative feature of a being.

Here is an illustration: A poet writes a verse to a friend, and it so happens that in the course of time the ink fades and the paper crumbles into dust. Is the verse itself thereby destroyed? No, not at all. The verse (that is to say, that peculiar sentiment expressed in definite words) cannot be destroyed, for it is not of the earth earthy; it is spiritual. Previous to the destruction of the writing the verse was received and read; it was copied and printed; and its sentiments are now repeated by hundreds and thousands of people. The copy which the poet wrote is transient, but the life of the verse is not limited to the single copy. By being read it impresses itself upon other minds and thus acquires the faculty of resurrection. It will reappear, according to the power of its intrinsic worth in combination with external conditions that may favor or obliterate its reappearance. But be it ever so neglected, it will remain forever and aye an indelible modification of the constitution of the universe.

The immortality of the soul is of the same kind. It is spiritual, not corporeal. But it is real, and among all the realities of the world, it is the most important, the most essential, the most vital reality; and the recognition of this reality is the most paramount religious truth. Thus it appears that the pantheistic notion of the soul as being dissolved in death into the All is from this standpoint a gross error. First, because the soul is not a fluid that could be absorbed by or resolved into a large reservoir of a kindred fluid, as a river loses its identity in the ocean; and, secondly, because the deeds of a man, that is to say, his spiritual existence, or his soul, retain all their peculiar and characteristic features, just as the verses of the poet preserve their identity throughout all the time to come even after the destruction of the original copy.

We may compare man's life to the writing and type-setting of a book. Life is labor, and death is the consummation of our labor. While the bookmaker toils there is life in his efforts. After the distribution of the type his labors cease, but his book does not cease to exist; it enters a higher career of existence. Thus, if a

man of science passes out of this life, the truth he has found is not lost; when a mother sinks into the grave, the fruits of her maternal care and of the example she gave to her children are not buried with her; when a hero dies for a great cause, his ideal remains with us. The body dies, but the soul lives; and the soul is purely spiritual, not an essence, not a sense-function, not a force. It is the significance of man's life-work in all its definiteness and in all its personal identity.

Thus death is not a curse, nor is it an annihilation, but merely a going to rest. It is the consummation of life's labor, but not an end of its usefulness and its significance. The dead are blessed, for "they rest from their labors," but their works do not cease; they continue to be a living influence in the world.

I sum up: Traditional religion is based upon belief, and I do not deny that a belief in what children are told to believe, a trust in their spiritual fathers, is, within certain limits, beneficial, but let me add, belief is not as essential to religion as is commonly thought. Belief characterises a stage of religious immaturity. The highest religion is a trust in truth. The facts of life, of our own experience in addition to that of the human race, are, if they are carefully weighed and rightly interpreted, the safest basis to build upon. They are a divine revelation which teaches us the solidarity of all existence, demanding of us to suppress passions and to seek comfort for affliction in charity and good will. Such a religion (a religion based on facts) is possible, and as it is purified in the furnace of scientific criticism it may be called "the religion of science."

Science and religion will both gain by their alliance. Science is not profane (as many think): science and its sternness in searching for the truth is holy. And religion is neither irrational nor anti-scientific; religion is nothing but obedience to the truth; it is man's enthusiasm to be one with truth and to lead a life of truth.

I conclude my already too long letter:

Try to understand the position which I have laid down before you and show me its errors. Years ago I thought as you do but have been compelled to surrender my position. Can you persuade me to return to yours? The question does not concern you and me alone, but mankind; for there are thousands who share your views but are beset with doubts, and I venture to say that there are not a few (un-churched people as well as members of various denominations and religions) who have progressed on the same road with me. If the new path of the religion of science is the narrow path

of life, as I trust that it is, this conception of religion will become in time the religion of mankind.

If we would understand that growth is the plan of life, we would see that intellectual, moral, and religious growth is as necessary as the progress of science and invention; we would comprehend that God's revelation is not as yet a closed book, and that we are here to decipher its writings. And the duty of the hour is to make scientifically definite what has come down to us in the shape of prophetic symbols.

With kind regards and profound respects

I remain, dear sir, yours very truly,

PAUL CARUS.

MY DEAR SIR:—I have read with deep attention the remarkable letter which you have been so kind as to write me on the doctrinal points wherein we two differ. Nevertheless, it has not convinced me.

At the present moment I have absolutely no time at my disposal for discussing your arguments with the thoroughness which they deserve, but I hope to be able to do so later.

For the present, therefore, I shall restrict myself to saying that your reasoning simply proves, so far as I can see, the profound and infinite difference there is between the personality of God and that of man or of any creature whatsoever. With this understanding I am quite willing to say with you, that God is not personal but superpersonal.

I admit also that in the future life, or at least in the definitive state of the future life, the only one which we can call eternal, our personality, without ever being of the same nature with that of God, will yet be so stripped of its present infirmities that it will exhibit a character far superior to that which it possesses now. Nothing will be destroyed. All will be transformed. "Man shall end where God commences."

What I affirm is that the immortality of the personal ego of the intelligent, moral, and religious agent is not a purely ideal and abstract thing but a living and real one. "Because I live, ye shall live also," saith the God of Christians.

As to your statement that the laws of mathematics and ethics are not dependent on the *free will* of God, I have always believed that they were. But it does not follow from this that they are a power superior to him and of the nature of an impersonal God set above and dominating over the personal God. These laws depend

on the very constitution of the eternal and necessary being of God, and as that being is conscious and intelligent he sees them eternally and necessarily in his own proper bosom. It is what the Christian theologian, who perfected the doctrine which he inherited from Plato, admirably says: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was God . . . and the Word was the Light."

I must beg your pardon for these hurriedly written lines, but if you believe them of any value you may publish them in your magazine with my preceding letter and the answer which you made to it.

If later I can send you a more complete discussion of the subject, I shall do so with pleasure. But to-day I am just on the eve of starting for a tour through Constantinople, Cairo, and Jerusalem.

With sympathetic regards, I remain,

Very truly yours,

HYACINTHE LOYSON.

MISCELLANEOUS.

JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE.

Goethe the Darwinist before Darwin, the positivist before August Comte, the naturalist among bards, and the bard among naturalists, is perhaps the clearest of all the prophets of the Religion of Science. There may be others as great as he in other fields, as in the natural sciences, in special philosophy, in the practical arts, or in sociology, but there is certainly none greater than he as a poet and a sage. His religion is as broad as the whole cosmos, not excluding Christianity, but including it and all other religions, accepting their truths from a higher plane, from the cosmopolitan standpoint of the scientific inquirer. The narrow pulpitist looked upon Goethe as an infidel and a negative spirit, but Goethe replied that he had a faith too. He said :

"Ye faithful, do not claim that your confession
Be truth alone : for we have faith like you.
Science can't be deprived of the possession
Belonging to the world, and to me too."

[Ihr Gläubigen! rühmt nur nicht euern Glauben
Als einzigen: wir glauben auch wie ihr;
Der Forscher lässt sich keineswegs berauben
Des Erbtheils, aller Welt gegönnt—und mir.]

Goethe's *Faust* with all its shortcomings is one of the grandest poems of mankind, not inferior to the Mahabharata, Hesiod, Homer, or the *Divina Comedia*. And it is as much religious poetry as the book of Job. It teaches a lesson, pointing out the way of salvation, which is not obtained by a belief in the word, not by the theories of thought, not by reliance on a power, but solely by courageous, self-done deeds. In translating the New Testament *Faust* says :

"'Tis written: 'In the Beginning was the *Word*.'
Here am I balked: who, now, can help afford?
The *Word*?—impossible so high to rate it;
And otherwise must I translate it,
If by the Spirit I am truly taught.
Then thus: 'In the Beginning was the *Thought*.
The first line let me weigh completely,
Lest my impatient pen proceed too fleetly.
Is it the *Thought* which works, creates, indeed?
'In the Beginning was the *Power*,' I read.
Yet, as I write, a warning is suggested,
That I the sense may not have fairly tested.

The Spirit aids me : now I see the light !
 ' In the Beginning was the *Deed*, ' I write."

—*Trans. by Bayard Taylor.*

Goethe's God, it is true, is not the God of the masses, he is not an individual, but more than any possible individual, however great. Goethe said in reply to those who accused him of pantheism :

" Why do you scoff and scout,
 About the All and One.
 The professor 's a person, no doubt,
 God is none."

[Was soll mir euer Hohn
 Ueber das All und Eine?
 Der Professor ist eine Person,
 Gott ist keine.]

Goethe's God is the eternal rest of law in the unrest of the eternal changes of the world's life ; the sameness in the apparent irregularity, the necessity in haphazard happenings, the cosmic order of the universal in the evolution of infinite particulars. He says :

" When in the infinite appeareth
 The same eternal repetition,
 When in harmonious coalition
 A mighty dome its structure reareth ;
 A rapture thrills through all existence
 All stars, or great or small, are blessed,
 Yet all the strife and all resistance
 In God, the Lord's eternal rest."

[Wenn im Unendlichen dasselbe
 Sich wiederholend ewig fiesst,
 Das tausendfältige Gewölbe
 Sich kräftig in einander schliesst,
 Strömt Lebenslust aus allen Dingen,
 Dem kleinsten wie dem grössten Stern,
 Und alles Drängen, alles Ringen
 Ist ewige Ruh in Gott dem Herrn.]

Goethe's psychology, which anticipates all the main practical results of modern investigation, has been the subject of a special article,¹ and we need only add that Goethe while denying the ego-soul, recognised the importance of immortality both as a factor in the world which explains the evolution of life as the product of treasured up souls and as an ideal whose influence upon practical ethics is paramount. Life is transient, but it is our duty to overcome the transiency of life. He says :

" Drop all transiency
 What'er be its claim.
 Ourselves to immortalise,
 That is our aim."

[Nichts vom Vergänglichen.
 Wie's auch geschah !
 Uns zu verewigen
 Sind wir ja da.]

Goethe was one of those rare exceptions on whom fate had bestowed almost all the blessings that ever fall to the lot of mortals. He walked on the heights of life

¹" Goethe a Buddhist," *The Open Court*, No. 445.

and yet saw enough of its tribulations and anxieties to prevent him from falling a prey to shallowness. He was as great as he was happy, and as gifted as successful. He added treasures to the spiritual heirloom of our ancestors that will remain valuable possessions of mankind for all time to come.

P. C.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

GRAINS OF SENSE. By *V. Welby*. London: J. M. Dent & Co. 1897. Pp. 146.

The distinguished authoress of this pretty little volume has devoted much thought to that department of philosophy which deals with the significance of words, and been instrumental in many ways in the furthering of research designed to lead to the clarification of language. The students of correct expression will welcome therefore the appearance of the booklet, which we may say contains in a popular but exact form the philosophical confession of faith of Lady Welby. The great spiritual and practical need of the times, according to the authoress, is to develop immensely the power of significant communication between mind and mind, as distinguished from the physical mechanisms of communication. 'We encourage geographical explorers; let us extend the conception and encourage explorers of the expression-world, sending out well-equipped expeditions into the polar regions of meaning. Let us have laboratories of experimental language. We have already shorthand; let us have short-tongue and short-mind—a larger proportion of meaning to expression, more economy in words, more fulness of thought. To this end, the further application of the principle of the alphabet is suggested, the aid of indicative symbols, typographic or pen gesture on the analogy of mouth-gesture, symbolic art-words composed of art-letters, etc., etc. The enormous time which we spend on learning the spelling of the English language is contrasted with the little time or no time which we spend on acquiring the meanings of the language and in giving precision to these meanings. The way to a rational spelling-reform is pointed out and the potency of the English language as a world-speech after appropriate modification is emphasised. *Apropos* of the wranglings of purists and cranks over reforms in orthography we have the following sense-laden words: "So rigid about the letter and so lax about the spirit: so careful of the petty points of fashion, so careless of the greater points of import: so jealous for the sanctities of convention, so tolerant of the desecration of the inner shrines of speech: so fastidious on what signifies less, and so indifferent on what most of all signifies,—Significance."

We agree perfectly with the general opinions advanced by the authoress. Surely the present development of civilised language is "arbitrary in the bad sense, and capricious, casual, incoherent, chaotic," but considering the invention of printing, the advantages of popular education, and the tremendous increase in the speaking and writing population of modern times, it is hardly more so than it was in the past. The authoress is too hard on "bulls." All living language is built on the corpses of dead bulls. The bulls of the past are the classic expressions of the present. It is not likely that the rustic clowns of ages gone by, from whose speech the creators of literary language must have drawn their material, were less prolific in the delivery of bulls than the unthinking and superficially educated public of to-day. That colossal bull of the French language, the double negative,

which doubtless originated in a loose grammatical solecism similar to a very common slip among vulgar English-speaking people to-day, illogical as it may appear on the face of it, is still absolutely harmless in its present usage, never gives rise to obscurity, and is even cited by logicians as a piece of natural testimony that a double negative is not necessarily an affirmative. Bulls should not be permitted to make language, but the fact is, if we can judge from present data, that language was as much bovine in its origin as it is in its more conscious making to-day.

Most of that which Lady Welby has to say upon this subject, and some of the examples which she gives, are pertinent and should be heeded. But some of them are strained and we cannot regard the criticism of the title of "The Descent of Man" as anything else than a piece of quibbling. The word "descent" is not a metaphor but the description of an actual fact, and should not be contrasted with "ascent," which has a moral and teleological connotation quite foreign to the objective spirit and purpose of Darwin's inquiry. Much that Lady Welby suggests would lead to the gradual banishing of analogy and metaphor altogether from language, a consummation which, seeing that mathematical abstraction and that concise description without analogy which science demands as its ideal is beyond the reach of the ordinary mind, can be considered as scarcely less than chimerical. "Invisible light" may be paradoxical, but to the child studying physics, far from being confusing, it is luminously suggestive and instructive. It is far easier to extend and correct or contradict an old view than to manufacture a new one, valuable as the last process may be for perfected science. It is contradictory to speak of a flattened sphere, yet it is the method of knowledge and conveys far more to the mind of a child than the correct mathematical expression. The method of scientific discovery is the method of *continuity*, consisting in the adaptation of old concepts to new needs, and it is not until perfect familiarity with a given province of thought has been gained that we can invest it with that high abstract and mathematical form which is the ideal of the Universal Real Character that philosophers so ardently long for.

The book of Lady Welby is full of sententious and aphoristic utterances which fully justify its title *Grains of Sense*. We can recommend it unqualifiedly as containing matter which every thinking person should heed, and in view of the present state of linguistic anarchy in our own country, where all expression is running riot and the popular language achieves developments in a decade that formerly would have required centuries, Lady Welby's advice and admonitions are very timely and will afford parmaceti to many an inward linguistic bruise. T. J. McC.

The *Psychologie des Saints* is the interesting theme to which HENRI JOLY has devoted one of the volumes of the novel series *Les Saints*, of which he is the editor. This unique series is published by Victor Lecoffre, Rue Bonaparte, 90, Paris, and already comprises in small, neat, 12mo. volumes, at the low price of two francs each, the following subjects: *Saint Augustin*, by Ad. Hatzfeld; *Sainte Clotilde*, by G. Kurth; *St. Augustin de Cantorbéry et ses compagnons*, by R. P. Brou, S. J.; and *Le Bienheureux Bernardin de Feltre*, by M. E. Flornoy. The remaining volumes are to be written by other well-known Catholic professors and scholars of France; the spirit of their composition is to be that of loving admiration and faith both for their subject and for the truth. M. Joly himself has already studied the psychology of Lower Organisms, of Genius and Crime, so that he brings to his task considerable training. He is opposed to the view which

reduces all the manifestations of the human mind, the lowest as well as the highest, to the action of aimless and determined forces, and which sees in crime only a disease and in genius and sainthood only marked and erratic expressions of the spiritual organisation. He believes that we are all made of the same clay, that we all have our places on different rungs of the same ladder, which issues from the same fundamental nature and rises ever nearer to God. It will be seen that his *Psychology of the Saints* is not a study in pathological psychology as the same would be treated by many of his French contemporaries. He rejects the current definitions of mysticism as being the inverted pole of rationalism, despair at achieving anything like reason, and defines it as the pure love of God. This mysticism is the first step to sainthood. While the book contains much good analysis, the real *Psychology of the Saints* still remains to be written.

We and many of the readers of *The Open Court* owe our deep sympathy to Mr. G. J. Harney, who is now lying extremely ill at his home at Richmond-on-Thames, England. Mr. Harney is the last surviving leader of the great Chartist movement and was a warm personal friend of the late Gen. M. M. Trumbull. A man of sterling character and exceptional intellectual ability, he has through a long lifetime been the champion of liberty and progress, and much that has been done in this direction in England during the last half century, has been due to his and his co-workers' labors. Mr. Harney has always been a friend and great admirer of *The Open Court*, and in his brilliant and witty reviews in the *Newcastle Chronicle* has frequently commented on its work with appreciation and interest. He contributed some time ago a fascinating article to *The Open Court* on Abbé Lammenais the Roman Catholic clergyman who was bold enough to take Christianity seriously. We have not failed to urge Mr. Harney to write again for *The Open Court*, but his health failing, he was unable to accede to our solicitations. We print the following extract from a letter from Mrs. Marie Harney, which tells of her husband's sad condition :

"Mr. Harney bids me thank you for your kind sympathy for him. As you are aware, he has been, and still is, very ill. He was slowly getting better; a sudden relapse occurred from which, however, he seemed recovering when another set-back from which he is now suffering, reduced him to the verge of the grave. For the past ten days he has been in great pain, living simply on liquid food, in small quantities. The doctors seem unable to do him any good. If able to take solid food, there is good hope of recovery; if unable, he bids me tell you his days are numbered. He furthermore desires me to add, that he wishes he could live in order to show his gratitude to his kind friends. He regrets also that he can do nothing now for *The Monist* and *The Open Court*. If spared he will make amends for his silence at present."

Mr. Harney has a great number of friends on both sides of the Atlantic, and if good wishes could cure his disease he certainly would most speedily recover and rise from his bed to a life of renewed activity and usefulness.

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The Open Court

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
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Editor: DR. PAUL CARUS,
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NO. 498

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.¹

BY THE LATE JUSTICE ALBERT HERMANN POST.

ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE, the most recent branch of the science of law, so richly elaborated by every method of research, has still to battle for its existence. Wide circles in the world of juridical learning utterly ignore it, or assume a hostile and at best sceptical attitude towards it. Neither the history of law nor the philosophy of jurisprudence has accorded it scientific recognition, and even the tenability of the principles upon which it is based has been characterised as highly questionable.

It is universally true that every new departure in science at first meets with opposition, and that it cannot aspire to recognition until it is in a position to present results that are incontrovertible. Only by presenting such results can it acquire recognised standing in the roll of the sciences, and only by the elaboration of these results can it repel definitively the attacks directed against it. But this process may be expedited by giving in the clearest and most explicit terms possible a sketch of its underlying principles, and so in the present case, while ethnological jurisprudence is still in the initial stages of its development, it will not be amiss, in the interests of our study, to attempt a substantiation of its scientific pretensions. We shall, by so doing, at least throw obstacles in the way of superficial criticism from the traditional standpoint.

Ethnological jurisprudence stands in marked contrast with the tendencies that at present dominate the science of law. Its method of procedure is fundamentally inductive, and has for its starting-

¹ Translated from the German by Thomas J. McCormack

point the customs and jural¹ concepts of all the nations of the earth. Its method furthermore is specifically comparative-ethnological; that is to say, it is on the one hand socio-psychological and on the other hand comparative in the sense that it proceeds by comparison even where the historical connexion between the facts of the jural life is lacking.

It is thus opposed to—

1. Every philosophy of jurisprudence which is essentially deductive in its methods.
2. Every system of jurisprudence founded upon the law of a single nation or a single group of nations.
3. Every system of jurisprudence which is individuo-psychological in its origin.
4. All investigations of historical jurisprudence which on principle do not quit the ground of historical connexion in the treatment of the facts of jural life.

These innovations have given to ethnological jurisprudence its peculiar impress, and it is this peculiarity that demands scientific vindication.

The first point of view that presents itself for the examination of the jural order is unquestionably the individuo-psychological. For the domain of jural life comprehends the action of the forces that emanate from individuals, and the law finds its most immediate expression in the jural sense of the individual. It is daily born anew in the depths of the human soul. Here it appears in the form of passion and desire, so soon as a misdeed is committed, and urges to vengeance and expiation. The written law of statute-books and the courts, however, is but the mediate expression of the jural life.

The first point of view presenting itself is therefore the following: to regard all jural order as the product of the differences and coincidences of the jural sense of human individuals, and to endeavor to explain the same from the nature of man, that is, from the nature of the individual.

This idea still rules supreme in modern jurisprudence. We meet on all sides with arguments explanatory of state and law, which are derived from the nature of the human individual. And seeing that the individuo-psychological method of investigation derives its materials directly from the living source of life, while

¹ "By the adjective *jural* we shall denote that which has reference to the doctrine of rights and obligations; as by the adjective "moral" we denote that which has reference to the doctrine of duties."—*Whewell*. (Quoted by *Translator*.)

the socio-psychological starts from the jural phenomena of the life of all nations, deriving thence its inductions as to the causes which underlie the same, certainly, if it were possible to explain jural life adequately from the nature of the human individual, the individuo-psychological method would have the preference.

But this latter method does not lead far towards the understanding of jural life. The sequence of causes soon vanishes in so inaccessible a sphere as the personality of the individual, and true scientific inquiry is displaced by ingenuity and sophistry.

Viewed from the individuo-psychological standpoint, the facts of jural life are partly matter of our subjective and partly matter of our objective experience.

Matter of subjective experience is merely our own individual jural sense, that is our individual consciousness as bearing upon right and wrong. This individual jural sense is made up of a sum-total of psychical activities, of which we become conscious when from inward or outward excitation we are confronted with the question as to whether something is right or wrong. These psychical activities are partly feelings and desires, and partly judgments, the former tending towards action and the latter tending towards expression by word or sign. Jural feelings are principally feelings of indignation as when an injustice is experienced by an individual, a feeling of fear as when the individual is affected by an inclination to do wrong, a feeling of penitence as when the individual has committed a wrong. With the feeling of indignation is joined a desire for vengeance, with the feeling of penitence a desire of atonement, the former tending towards an act of vengeance and the latter towards an act of expiation. The jural judgments of individuals are not complete judgments; they are based upon an undefined sense of right and wrong. In the consciousness of the individual there exists no standard of right and wrong under which every single circumstance giving rise to the formation of a jural judgment can be subsumed. A simple instinct impels the individual to declare an action right or wrong.

It thus becomes evident that the individuo-psychological analysis of the individual jural sense, in so far as it rests upon subjective experience, can afford only meagre results. All psychical phenomena of the jural sense are, so far as regards our subjective experience, ready-made products. The psychological development of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, is not accessible to our inner experience. The psychological processes whereby we be-

come conscious of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, lie without the reach of consciousness.

Further, subjective observation of the psychical processes from which the jural sense springs, bears the same character as subjective observation of psychical processes generally. Systematic self-observation is impossible, inasmuch as the observing subject and the observed object are one and the same, and the very act of observing thus modifies the object observed.¹ It is likewise impossible to evoke, arbitrarily or artificially, a jural desire or an instinctive jural judgment; they always appear instantaneously and unbidden in consciousness. As material for observation, accordingly, there remains only the recollection of such occurrences in the mind of the individual.

Still another drawback to the employment of subjective observation for scientific inquiry is the fact, that it is almost utterly impossible to distinguish in general between jural feelings, desires, and judgments, and moral feelings, desires, and judgments.

Scientific inquiry attains more favorable results when it adopts as the subject of investigation the expressions of the individual jural conscience in the external world of sense—that is, the phenomena of the individual jural sense as appearing in acts on the one hand and in words and signs on the other. Here self-observation discovers facts which are represented as events in the outward world of sense, and which are consequently subject to external observation. True, the observation of the outward expressions of the individual jural conscience in acts, words, and signs affords scarcely more material for the psychological analysis of the individual jural sense than the direct inward observation of the same. The material for observation increases, however, if the observer, not confining himself to the expressions of his own jural sense, compares with these the expressions of the jural sense of other people, or even compares the expressions of the jural sense of other people with each other.

From this method dissimilarities in the phenomena of the jural consciousness appear at once, and these are in a high degree adapted to throw light upon its nature. In the first place it is possible to distinguish differences in the jural sense of individuals according to their ages. It is possible to follow the jural sense of children in its development. We are also able to fix degrees of jural sense in youth and manhood, perhaps too in old age.

¹ Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, abridged by Rig; German translation by Kirchmann, 1883, I. p. 13 ff. Wundt, *Logik*, 1883, II., p. 482.

It will be possible, furthermore, to point out variations of jural sense between the male and female sexes. Then further, there are to be noted marked irregularities of jural sense resulting from derangement; which derangement may rest on biological as well as sociological causes. Mental diseases, affecting the whole consciousness of the individual, affect the jural sense also. Besides these, there are a great number of persons whose jural sense, though not disturbed by any psychical disarrangement, is far below the normal state; namely, criminals. Such persons, endowed with a jural sense of a socio-pathological kind, furnish the material for a separate branch of psychology; viz., criminal psychology. Marked irregularities in the individual jural sense may be further distinguished according to the social circle in which the individual moves. Even in a single nation these irregularities are quite considerable; according to caste, culture, occupation, politics, religion, and the like. Yet the most considerable deviations are to be found between the jural consciences of different peoples, and they are more considerable according as the difference in civilisation is greater, or as the development of the same has been more unique.

In all these ways it would be possible to observe the expressions of the individual jural sense and by a process of individual-psychological comparison to arrive at scientific results. It is evident, though, that it would be difficult to collect the material for observation, and that the observations of individuals themselves to this end would be subject to innumerable sources of error.

These observations could not acquire scientific value unless made upon the most extensive plan, and with persons of different ages, different sex, different intellectual ability, different social standing, and different nationality; and unless the material accumulated were so considerable that all the sources of error in individual observation could be eliminated. To limit the observations to a narrow field, would necessarily yield incorrect results; for it is now beyond question that the jural sense of individuals is subject to the most varied differentiations. The most distorted presentation of all, however, is produced when the inquirer confines himself mainly to his own individual jural sense, and persuades himself that this should determine the conduct of humanity. He has here merely systematised his own jural consciousness; manifestly a doleful scientific result.

How is it possible to observe the manifestations of the individual jural sense, which appear only instinctively and occasion-

ally, exhaustively enough to obtain really valuable scientific material for a causal analysis of the jural order? It is unquestionably hopeless.

And even were it possible to proceed thus, we should be far from exhausting in this way the *data* of jural life. Jural life, as a social province, is by no means made up of immediate expressions of the individual jural sense only; there are also mediate and indirect expressions of the same in it. The positive laws of nations with their statutes and provisions, have, it is true, their first origin in the expressions of the jural sense of individuals. But after these have become positive laws they are no longer the immediate expressions of the individual jural sense, but the objective products of the jural sense of whole spheres of social development, of countless individuals with variously formed jural consciences—individuals of existing generations as well as individuals that have long passed away.

It would be a manifestly precarious attempt to seek the explanation of these phenomena in the nature of the human individual itself. Unlimited scope would be given to caprice and imagination.

And yet, in the face of all, this method of studying the Science of Jurisprudence is still greatly in vogue, and meets with unqualified approval from contemporary students. They endow the human individual with certain instincts, the social instinct and the instinct of self-preservation: or they will have it pursue different ends according to its constitutional bent, happiness, liberty, etc., and upon these phantasms they build their structure as becomes the kindly heart and academic culture of the philosopher. These artistic productions are often charming reading, often teem with clever conceits, and give us a pretty picture of how blissful all would be, were it not so different in the world. If these works did not claim to be more than light and entertaining reading, we might joyfully welcome them. But they pretend to be more; they assert that they are scientific, and would actually influence the practical mechanism of the jural order. Herein is their danger. Ethnological Jurisprudence, in my opinion, must stand aloof from all attempts to define State and Law on the basis of individual psychology. And now to the discussion and proof.

* * *

It is not only in the province of Jurisprudence that we find attempts to explain the phenomena of social life on the basis of individual psychology. This method is common to all the other so-

cial sciences. It rests upon a broad and fundamental psychological principle, which at the present day shows signs of instability and will sooner or later be completely overthrown.

All human science takes on a different form, according to whether we assume that the nature of man can be determined from his *ego* alone, or that the soul and *ego* of man are not identical but that man is conscious of a portion only of his psychical activity. In the first instance, the psychology of the individual is the irreversible basis of human science; in the second, we have to look about us for broader foundations. Ethnology, and likewise ethnological jurisprudence, is founded upon the second view. It assumes that, in the individual consciousness, only a small portion of his psychical activity is manifest to the individual and that the greater part is lost to his consciousness. It regards individual psychology, therefore, as no proper basis of science.

That which we call our consciousness is in any case but an infinitesimally small portion of the totality of psychic life active within us. It hovers like a tenuous and shimmering cloud above an unfathomable ocean. All manner of images rise from the depths of our soul, yet few assume such sharpness of contour as to be recognised. By far the greater portion of our spiritual life remains unknown to us. By far the greatest portion of the spiritual life of which we are conscious, is known to us only as the resultant product of unconscious psychical processes, and not as something in process of production. We remain totally unconscious of those spiritual activities which touch most nearly the vital centre of our being, the activities which create on the one side an *ego* and on the other a world. At the instant a child first becomes conscious of itself, the *ego* and the world are already existent: their birth is concomitant with the act of consciousness. The unconscious activities of the soul have shaped them, until, appearing as ready-formed products, they give rise to that radical contrariety by which man becomes conscious of himself and a world. We remain utterly unconscious, too, of those psychical workings which give to the world its sensible character and to the *ego* its spiritual. Our world, in every phase in which it is accessible to us, is virtually a product of psychical activities acting unconsciously within us. Light, heat, color, sound, taste, smell, pressure, weight, even space and time, do not belong to the world as such: on the contrary they are creations of mental activities, corresponding to the psychological activities of our sensory and central organs, and project without a world created within.

Rokitansky¹ expresses himself upon this subject as follows :

“ We see the world that surrounds us by means of light ; but it is now known that light does not exist as such apart from us ; on the contrary it is vibrations of ether, which we transpose into light, and recognise as such, by means of mechanisms of specific irritability located beyond the sensory organs proper. Thus we ourselves illuminate space and come to know things therein through their relation to light ; we acquire knowledge not only as to their surface and outlines, but also as to their inner constitution. It is likewise the vibrations of sounding bodies of different magnitude and velocity, taken up and communicated to us by the air, that we convert into sound and tone. And so, too, the things which we perceive through impressions upon the other senses, are, apart from our conception of them, quite different, and undoubtedly consist of the molecular or molar motions of matter. It must strike every impartial person as strange that we recognise as external objects things of which the conception is really formed within us. How does this come ? There is undoubtedly a subjective organic activity present here.

“ This much is known : that the impelling power in obedience to which we project objects conceived, outside the subject conceiving them, must lie in the inward organisation of the mind ; that the conception of things in space is a function of the organs of our cognitive faculty which even in dreams creates in our imagination an external world.

“ The perceptible world about us is essentially a creation of our personality ; it is by the functioning of inner organs that objects appear as things outside of us, as things of definite quality and form, of definite size and greatness. Further, when we behold in the genesis of things and in their different stages and mutations a succession and a connexion, we say that the succession takes place in *time* and that the connexion between the changes is a *causal* one. But when we ask ourselves how we arrive at these conclusions, it turns out that we do so by virtue of subjective forms which must lie in our organisation and by means of which we are in fact enabled to apprehend successions and connexions.”

Even the world that remains after we remove the mantle of sensible phenomena, the world of ether and matter vibrations, is still not the world proper ; it is the world only as it appears to human cognitive activity.

¹ *Der selbst. Werth des Wissens*, 1869, p. 6, et seq.

The psychical operations, too, that create our ego are totally hidden from us.

And even the greater part of those psychical operations of which we *are* conscious, are presented to consciousness as finished products, the genesis of which took place in unconsciousness. Ratiocination alone is effected wholly in consciousness. Feelings and desires come to consciousness as results only, and many judgments are not logical judgments, but incompleted ones, lying, with the principle upon which they were formed, in the province of the unconscious.

If all this be correct, it is evident that our consciousness is in no wise fitted for the thorough comprehension of human nature ; for only an insignificant portion of our spiritual life ever becomes immediately conscious. What we are able to fathom by self-contemplation is soon exhausted. Yet unlimited is the province of knowledge that opens before us, if to the inward observation of self we add outward observation by the senses ; in other words, if, from the phenomena of unconscious psychic life as expressed in the outward world of sense, we draw inferences as to the unconscious activities at work within us.

To this end the whole sensible world presents itself. Our sensible world is not the real world-in-itself. It is merely a world-image, made by man, created by human psychical activities. From this, therefore, we shall be able to gather a great part of our unconscious psychical life, and thus come infinitely nearer the essence of our being than would be possible through the introspective observation of our own psychical activities.

In this way we arrive, not at the psychology of the past, which attempted to unfold the nature of man from the ego, but at a psychology which will endeavor to disclose the same from the world-image created by man.

* * *

Among the phenomena of our sensible world which admit of inferences as to unconscious psychical activities, the phenomena of social life assume a prominent place.

And social life, though made up of the activities of individuals, supposably in possession of free will, is also essentially instinctive, resting upon the more or less unconscious impulses of the individual. Whosoever has had to do with the more intricate problems of ethnology, will entertain no doubt whatever of this fact.

Turn where we will in the domain of social life, we shall every-

where see fixed social laws at work, everywhere meet with a tendency of development, which leading through centuries and centuries, makes towards some definite end, and of whose aims the individuals comprehended in the movement have no idea. Contemplate the history of the growth of language, the development of forms of divinity, of art, of legal institutions, even of fashions and utensils; they come, grow, and go, like things of life. There is but little here that is the product of individual reflexion; almost everything is of organic growth. The individual follows blind impulses and coercive social conditions; the individual most frequently intends the very opposite of what he produces by his work, and all that he does accomplish, unless fitting in with the course of organic development, will soon come to naught.

That the individual in social life acts for the most part instinctively, we may ascertain by self-observation and by the observation of other individuals. A man, in speaking to another, employs the words he needs quite instinctively; they come to him, as a rule, without further reflexion. He need not know anything of the grammar of the language he speaks, and yet may employ the language with the greatest ease. A man who is confronted with the question whether he is acting advantageously or not, whether he is committing an act of justice or injustice, generally decides from pure instinct, occasionally from feeling, but seldom through clear reasoning, and then always liable to the danger of mistake. A poem, a melody, a picture, a statue, arises before the mind's eye of an artist: something comes to him. Not until something comes to him, can he elaborate it further by thought. Creations that are not unconsciously born in the artist are not works of art, although every artifice of æsthetic manipulation have been employed. Every original and powerful idea in science is born of unconsciousness like a stroke of lightning.

We need but glance at every-day life to become convinced of how instinctive in its workings the whole mechanism of human existence is. Take the habits and customs of ordinary social life. When do we ever hear of reasons for acting in this manner or in that. We act so because things are not otherwise than they are, because we must, because others do so. We all know how impossible it is to convince a person who can advance no reasons for his conduct, that his way of thinking is wrong. If there were a possible prospect of being able to do this in the case of a man, it would certainly fail with a woman, whose springs of life are pre-eminently more instinctive than man's. In fact, a man who does not act and

live instinctively is ridiculed and despised : he is no longer capable of inspiration and enthusiasm for any cause.

The deposits, therefore, of the unconscious workings of the human mind in the customs and conceptions of nations, are a source of incalculable importance to the understanding of the human soul ; and the history of social activity furnishes an infinitely more copious material to this end than could be obtained by introspection and observation of the psychical life of a single human individual. An important part of our psychical life, which for the most part does not directly appear in consciousness, can thus be gathered from the customs and conceptions of the peoples of the earth.

Our statements as to consciousness in general are likewise true of the jural sense. The jural sense by no means exhausts the totality of psychical processes which constitute the jural life of a man. More properly, the majority of these processes come into the jural consciousness as results, as feelings and desires, or as instinctive jural judgments ; while the genesis of these psychical formations are hidden in unconsciousness. But in the jural institutions and conceptions of nations a great deal of jural life comes to light that remains unknown to the individual, and so it is possible to penetrate much farther by this method into the cognition of the human mind in its jural aspects than was possible by the observation of one's own jural sense or by observing the expressions of the jural sense of single individuals.

But apart from this broad psychological standpoint, the very nature of Law itself indicates that the individuo-psychological method can lead to nothing, and that only the socio-psychological method can produce satisfactory results. It will appear on closer observation that the individual jural sense is not the creator of the jural order, but on the contrary, that the individual jural sense is a product of law as a sphere of social life. Only in so far as the jural sense is *consciousness per se* are we concerned with a biological basis ; in so far, however, as it is a *jural* consciousness, the foundation is sociological. The human consciousness has a physical basis in the central organs of the body, but we should search in vain in the human body for an organ that is the seat of the moral or jural sense. A human being, reared in a state of perfect isolation, would think because he possessed a brain and had to use it in the struggle with nature. But we should find no trace of a moral sense or a jural sense in such a person. They are both the exclusive product of life in human society. They first arise through

adaptation to the social relations in which men live, and not until this adaptation is perfected does human consciousness acquire, among innumerable other notions, conceptions of right and wrong, of rights and obligations.

The jural order, therefore, is not to be explained from the nature of the human individual, but from the nature of the social bodies in which it has been evolved. And it is only from this source that the individual jural sense also becomes intelligible.

Although the jural sense acts purely from instinct within us, it is nevertheless the creation of social and not of individual factors. This will appear from the fact that it acts in opposition to individual inclination. How are we to find one biological basis for the two psychical forces that come into conflict when the individual becomes possessed of an inclination to commit a crime and his jural sense restrains him from it? And if there be no biological basis, then the psychological theory that a person can control his sensuous inclinations by the innate rational faculty rests upon imagination. In reality the controlling element here is not a biological or an individuo-psychological factor, it is a socio-psychological one.

The most telling proof that the individual jural sense is not a biological but a sociological product is found in the circumstance that, apart from the changes it suffers as consciousness proper (through age, insanity, etc.), its content is determined by the character of the social community in which the individual lives or has grown up. Were this not the case the jural sense of Frenchmen, Germans, Russians, and Chinese, who had attained the same degree of intellectual culture, would be one and the same. But this is obviously not the case. Identity of jural sense means identity of social organisation.

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The individuo-psychological standpoint, accordingly, is inadequate for the explanation of the facts of jural life and we must expect really valuable scientific results only from a socio-psychological analysis of jural phenomena.

The socio-psychological method proceeds, in its investigation of the causes of jural life, not from the human individual, but from the forms which Law assumes in society, from jural customs, jural conceptions, and jural institutions as they are met with in the life of nations themselves. All these forms arose originally from expressions of the individual jural sense, and these expressions are in their turn founded upon social instincts developed by life in hu-

man society. By frequent repetition and the elimination of concrete notions, these expressions gradually lose their individual character. They become expressions of the corporate jural sense of a concrete sphere of social development. In this way a nation acquires a set of jural customs and jural conceptions, which regulate its acts and judgments, and whose conservation is entrusted to the government of the social sphere in which they were evolved. In this so-called positive law, the organic law of a nation assumes an objective form. It is a precipitate, in a social shape, of the jural sense, just as religious rites, forms of divinity, and doctrinal faith are the precipitates of the religious sense, or human language of human thought. In the positive law of a definite epoch lies, essentially, the normal jural sense of the totality of individuals embraced within a single sphere of social development, as founded upon the jural order transmitted from previous generations.

These positive laws constitute the combined data of the socio-psychological investigations of jural life; and they are full of promise. In the evolution of positive laws the creative national genius has instinctively accomplished a scientific work, such as could only be obtained by thoroughly analysing the utterances of the jural sense of all the individuals that now live or ever have lived within the social sphere governed by the positive law in question.

The study of the individual jural sense is thus in reality unnecessary, and the science of jurisprudence may begin at once with the analysis of positive laws.

The question now arises as to what method of conducting the analysis of jural life, as a field of social activity, will be most productive of results. And this question we shall answer in our second and concluding article.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERUSALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

V. To the Destruction of Jerusalem by the Chaldeans.

OUR MINDS still bear the fresh impression of the terrible events in Samaria and Jerusalem. What will be the fate of the blood-stained usurper of the throne?

It was but six years until righteous retribution overtook Athaliah. Jehoiada the priest, who had taken his nephew, the crown-prince Joash, into the temple for safety and there kept him hidden, established relations with the captains of the royal body-guard and managed to win them for his plan. We learn in this connexion that the whole royal body-guard did duty in the temple on the Sabbath, and that only one-third of them returned to the palace for service there, while two-thirds remained in the temple as a sort of guard of honor. One Sabbath when there was a numerous concourse in the temple Jehoiada detained the whole body-guard in the temple, so that the royal palace was without any military protection whatever and Athaliah had no troops of any kind at her command. Now Jehoiada brings the seven-year-old crown-prince to what we would call the royal box in the temple, and there anoints and crowns him, whereupon a thundering "Hurrah" from the guards and the whole people greets the legitimate ruler. At the sound Athaliah goes to the temple to learn the cause of it; at the command of Jehoiada she is seized and taken out and slain at the entrance to the temple; the temple she had erected to Baal is destroyed and the priest appointed by her likewise slain.

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

From the forty years' reign of Joash only one occurrence is reported in detail, which however throws a peculiar and glaring light upon the conditions of the time. As a matter of course the priest Johoiada at first conducted the government as guardian for his nephew, and the authority and influence of the priesthood was greatly increased by this relationship; but unfortunately the priesthood made a very material use of this. In the twenty-third year of Joash there was a sharp accounting between him and his uncle the priest. The priests were in the habit of receiving from the people voluntary offerings for the service and the temple, but were evidently allowing these gifts to find their way to their private cofers; therefore the king deprived them of this office of trust, and a contribution-box was placed in the temple, into which thereafter all offerings were to be put. When this "chest with a hole in the lid," as the Bible account briefly but clearly describes it, was full, royal officials came and emptied it, and carried the money away; and this arrangement became permanent, being expressly mentioned as late as the time of King Josiah.

Jehu died without having been molested, and bequeathed the usurped throne to his descendants even to the fourth generation; but then an even more fearful fate than in the case of Athaliah overtook the ruler.

From this point on, Assyria is the determining factor, and the whole history of Israel is intelligible only when we know the history of Assyria. This may also be maintained in a certain sense for earlier times. The pan-Israelitish kingdom of David would not have been possible save for the fact that Assyria, which had already prepared under Tiglath-pileser I., 1110, to establish itself in Coele-syria, was in David's time in such a condition of weakness and impotence that we do not even know the names of its kings for a century and a half.

From the time of Salmanasar II. on, Assyrian and Hebrew history are, as it were, two connected vessels, where the height of the water in the one is always governed by that in the other: if Assyria was powerful, Israel was prosperous; but if the power of Assyria was declining, Israel suffered accordingly.

In the year 842, probably the date of the two violent usurpations in Samaria and Jerusalem, Salmanasar marched for the fifth time against Damascus. This time he succeeded in inflicting upon King Hazael a decisive defeat. He besieged him in his capital, but could not take Damascus. Under the circumstances it was a correct and reasonable policy, humanly considered, for Jehu to throw

himself into the arms of the Assyrians, the mighty enemies of his hostile neighbor: he sent a considerable tribute to Salmanasar, which the latter caused to be depicted among other things upon his famous black obelisk.

And yet, Jehu had reckoned without his host, as the saying goes. Salmanasar came again, indeed, in 839; but then there followed a period of thirty-eight years in which no Assyrian made his appearance in that region. Now the people of Damascus threw themselves with all the force of hatred and revenge upon Israel,—with what result we will let the Book of Kings tell: “In the days of Jehu the Lord began to cut Israel short, and Hazael smote them in all the coasts of Israel.” He seems to have taken from Israel the whole of the territory east of the Jordan, and he carried his warlike and victorious incursions even to the country of the Philistines: he took and destroyed Gath, and Joash of Judah was enabled to ransom Jerusalem from siege only by the delivery of all the treasures in temple and palace.

While the situation under Jehu was sad, it became absolutely hopeless under his son and successor, Jehoahaz.” “At that time,” says the Book of Kings, “the anger of the Lord was kindled “against Israel, and He delivered them into the hand of Hazael “king of Aram (Syria) and into the hand of Ben-hadad, the son of “Hazael, continually. He left to Jehoahaz but ten chariots and “fifty horsemen and ten thousand foot soldiers, for the king of “Aram (Syria) had destroyed them and ground them to dust.”

By the most probable assumption, Jehoahaz is the unnamed king in whose reign occurred the siege of Samaria reported in the story of the prophet Elisha, when famine raged so frightfully that mothers slew and devoured their own children, and when one of these wretched women appealed to the king because she had shared her son the day before with another woman and the latter now refused to reciprocate in kind. But this siege was suddenly raised because Ben Hadad received tidings that his own land was threatened by an invading foe. This foe must have been the Assyrians.

In fact the Assyrians are again found in Coelesyria in the years 805, 804, and 803, and strange to say it is a woman who begins the mighty advance of the Assyrian arms. The nominal ruler in Nineveh was King Rammannirari III., but being yet a boy, his mother, the Babylonian princess Sammuamat, wielded the sceptre for him, and with a strong hand: she resumed the policy of her father-in-law, Salmanasar, and sent out her generals and troops

into all quarters of the world to announce to astonished humanity that a woman was preparing to renew the glory of Assur.

There can be no doubt that we must recognise in this vigorous and energetic Babylonian princess and Assyrian queen-mother the Semiramis of the Greeks. And among other places she sent her troops three years in succession into Coelesyria, and thus Israel had a breathing spell; Joash, the brave and vigorous successor of Jehoahaz, succeeded in defeating Ben-hadad three times decisively, and in giving Israel relief from this tormentor. But Joash must needs turn his victorious arms against Judah also. There King Joash, after a reign of forty years, had been murdered by two high officials and succeeded by his son Amaziah, who avenged the death of his father upon the murderers, but had only the murderers executed and not their families. He also succeeded in defeating the Edomites and in again subjecting this old province.

What follows must be told in the very language of the Bible account: "Then Amaziah sent messengers to Jehoash (Joash) 'king of Israel, saying: 'Come, let us look one another in the 'face!' And Jehoash answered Amaziah, saying: 'The thistle 'that was in Lebanon sent to the cedar that was in Lebanon, saying: 'Give thy daughter to my son to wife.'" And there passed "by a wild beast that was in Lebanon, and trode down the thistle. "Thou hast indeed smitten Edom, and thy heart hath lifted thee "up; glory thereof, and abide at home; for why shouldst thou "fall to thy hurt and Judah with thee?" But Amaziah would not "hear. And so they looked one another in the face at Beth-she- "mesh. And Judah was put to the worse before Israel; and they "fled every man to his tent. And Jehoash took Amaziah prisoner "at Beth-shemesh, and brought him to Jerusalem, and brake down "the wall of Jerusalem a space of four hundred cubits, and took "away all the gold and silver in the temple and in the palace, and "hostages also, and returned to Samaria." Indeed the conjecture has been put forth, and the attempt made to support it, that Jehoash put a complete end to the kingdom of Judah for the time being and formally incorporated it with the kingdom of Israel.

Amaziah came to a like end with his father Joash. The people grew weary of the rule of the indiscreet and thoughtless monarch and murdered him. They took his sixteen-year-old son, Azariah or Uzziah—he has both names—and seated him upon his father's throne. Uzziah was evidently not the eldest son and heir-apparent, but this time the popular choice had hit upon the right man. His reign of fifty-two years must have been powerful and prosper-

ous and a period of new progress for Judah, although we know surely from this whole long time only the one fact that Uzziah reconquered the Edomite seaport Elath and fortified it. But the descriptions by the prophet Isaiah, who was consecrated prophet in the year of Uzziah's death, declare loudly and clearly that outward conditions in Judah at that time were prosperous and even flourishing.

But we must now return to Israel. In the year 797 the Assyrians had finally taken Damascus, though they did not immediately dethrone King Mari, son of Ben-hadad, but allowed the country to continue its existence. But in the following fifty years they returned five times, so that a lasting restoration of the kingdom was impossible. Thus Israel was left free, and the son of Jehoash, Jereboam II., succeeded not only in regaining the former possessions, but in taking from Damascus a part of its territory and subduing all Moab, and thus in restoring the kingdom of Israel to the same compass as in the time of David. He ruled over the whole country from Edom to Damascus, and seems to have been on friendly terms with Uzziah of Judah; at least we hear of no dissension between them.

Unfortunately we know no details of the forty-one years' reign of Jeroboam II. But the light which Jeroboam caused once more to illumine Israel was only the glow of evening, a last flickering of the dying taper. Under Jeroboam's son, Zachariah, Nemesis overtook the house of Jehu: after a rule of six months he was murdered by a certain Shallum, who in his turn was overthrown after one month by Menahem and slain in a war waged with barbarous cruelty. And now destiny came upon Israel with giant strides.

In the year 745 a usurper named Pul had mounted the Assyrian throne, and as a sort of declaration of his purposes he adopted the name of the first great Assyrian conqueror, Tiglath-pileser. And he carried out his programme with brilliant success. As early as 745 he had begun systematically to conquer Coelesyria. Menahem took pains to purchase his friendship and protection by means of a tribute of a thousand talents of silver. This tribute was raised by a poll tax, and Menahem demanded of every man of means in Israel fifty shekels of silver. This is an interesting item for the student of national economy, as it proves that there were at that time in Israel 60,000 men of means. And Menahem did manage to die a peaceful death and was able to bequeath the kingdom to his son Pekahiah, who, however, was soon slain by an adjutant

named Pekah, who mounted the throne destined to be the next to the last king of Samaria.

And now begins an almost incredible spectacle. The doves over which the hawk is already hovering ready for his mortal swoop, begin pecking and fighting one another. In Jerusalem the crown had just been assumed by Ahaz, the grandson of Azariah, evidently still very young and of very youthful character. Israel and Damascus profit by his weak and unpopular rule. They combine against Judah in order to drive the house of David from the throne and make the king a vassal dependent on them. First they expel the Judeans from Elath, which they give back to the Edomites, and invade Judah itself, bringing it into direst distress. The capital, Jerusalem, was besieged and hard beset, and this situation probably brought about that resort to the last remedy of despair, reported of Ahaz by the Book of Kings: he sacrificed his own son, just as King Mesha of Moab in extreme distress made a burnt offering upon the walls of his beleaguered city of the son who was to succeed him as king.

Finally Ahaz knew no other way out of the difficulty but to send a message to Tiglath-pileser, saying: "I am thy servant and thy son; come up and save me out of the hand of the king of Syria (Aram) and of the king of Israel." That this petition was supported by jingling arguments is a matter of course. Under the circumstances Tiglath-pileser would perhaps have interfered of his own accord; at any rate he did not wait for a second invitation, but came straightway. Damascus was besieged and a part of the army sent against Israel. Pekah's life was ended by the murderous steel of a certain Hoshea, who was recognised as an Assyrian vassal but was compelled to resign the country east of the Jordan and the entire North to Assyria. After a siege of three years Damascus was taken, King Rezin was executed, and his country appropriated as an Assyrian province.

Thus the kingdom of Damascus had vanished and Judah and the decimated remainder of Israel had become dependencies of Assyria. Ahaz understood the situation, and was shrewd enough to keep quiet, but in Israel the old, defiant spirit of independence flashed forth mightily.

In the year 727 the powerful Tiglath-pileser had died, and at about the same time Egypt had received an energetic and enterprising ruler in the forceful Ethiopian prince Shabakah (also Sabe, Sebech, Sewe), the Biblical So. For Egypt it was a vital matter that the Assyrians should not establish themselves on her border; self-

preservation compelled her to interpose. Therefore Shabakah entered into negotiations with the rulers in Palestine, and Hoshea allowed himself to be deluded by the voice of the siren, and broke his allegiance to the Assyrians. Forthwith the son of Tiglath-pileser, Shalmaneser IV., marched against him. Hoshea indeed surrendered and was imprisoned; but Samaria itself, even without a king, made desperate resistance; only after three years did the Assyrians succeed in overcoming the creation of Omri. It was taken in the year 722, while the Egyptians and Ethiopians never lifted a hand for its relief.

This is the end of the Kingdom of Israel. The Assyrians seized the country as a province and put it under the immediate rule of Assyria. But they did not destroy Samaria itself. On the contrary it became the seat of the Assyrian prefect, after 27,280 persons, that is, certainly the whole population which had survived the siege, had been carried away from it into exile.

The opinion is very prevalent that the whole population of Israel was carried away to Assyria, but this is decidedly an error. On the other hand, the Assyrians flooded the land with foreign colonists, thus entirely destroying its nationality; in Judea it soon became the custom to regard the Samaritans as half heathen. The fact that the race, surrounded by powerful enemies and in the midst of domestic anarchy and constant revolutions, nevertheless maintained itself with honor for over two hundred years and finally perished honorably, is a shining proof of its inherent worth and of its indestructible vitality. Yet even after its destruction the kingdom of Israel was pursued by misfortune: an undeserved reproach clings to its memory.

Later Judean historiography, which fixed the picture of Israelitish history for all following times, and whose views have entered into our very flesh and blood as Bible history, sees in the House of David the legitimate and divinely appointed dynasty for all Israel, and in the Temple of Solomon the only legitimate sanctuary for all Israel, and accordingly regards the ten tribes as rebels and heretics, who have renounced through wicked arrogance and sinful defiance the legitimate dynasty and the true religion. The final consequence of this view appears in the latest historical book of the Bible, the Book of Chronicles, to which only Judah is Israel, and which consequently ignores entirely the kingdom of the ten tribes and tells after the division in the kingdom only of the kingdom of Judah. Indeed, some have gone so far as to regard the claim of the kingdom of the ten tribes to the name of the Promise, the name

Israel, as boundless presumption and an utterly unjustified pretension. But this whole point of view is unhistorical. The centre of gravity of the race, materially as well as intellectually, was in fact with the kingdom of the ten tribes: it was really the people of Israel, beside which Judah can only be regarded as a part which had separated from the whole body. That the kingdom of Judah was only an appendix to the more powerful neighbor kingdom until after the destruction of Samaria is shown as plainly as possible by the accounts of the Book of Kings itself.

The religious judgment of later times has been influenced by the bull-cult, which was practised officially in the kingdom of the ten tribes. But in this connexion the fact is highly noteworthy, and yet is not generally given a clear explanation, that we do not hear a single word of rebuke on this subject from the prophet Elijah. When he denounces Baal in Samaria and Israel, he is simply advocating the "calves of Dan and Bethel" as the only customary form of worship in the kingdom of Israel, which he himself did not attack. The view that this whole species of worship was pure heathenism, and the worship of God in an image folly and absurdity, is first found in the prophet Hosea, and is an outgrowth of literary prophecy.

In the pre-prophetic times according to the express testimony of the Book of Kings itself, religious conditions in Judah were not a whit better than in Israel, indeed we have documentary evidence of the worst distortions and perversions only in Judah. And especially let us not forget that the greatest spiritual power that ever arose in Israel, prophecy, is, if I may use the expression, an exclusive growth of North Israel, which bloomed and developed on the soil of the kingdom of the ten tribes: Joseph, and not Judah, gave this divine blessing to mankind. Samuel, Elijah, and Hosea were North Israelites, and even the native Judean Amos worked exclusively in and for Israel.

With the loss of national and political independence this relation changes immediately: Samaria is thenceforth only an Assyrian province, and Judah receives the inheritance. After 722 Judah really became Israel, and the spiritual life too is centred in Jerusalem: the prophet Nahum, for instance, although a native of Galilee, regards himself altogether as a Judean, and does not even connect with the destruction of the universal empire of Assyria the hope of a restoration of the kingdom of the ten tribes.

True, Judah was also an Assyrian dependency, and remained so a whole century; but if it dispatched its annual tribute duti-

fully and conscientiously to Nineveh, that was all the Assyrian government cared for. In domestic affairs it was still wholly its own master, and could develop unchecked and unhindered; indeed, the question may fairly be raised whether the dependency on Assyria was not actually a blessing for its interior development, inasmuch as it guaranteed a positive security and permanence of conditions and relieved it of the necessity of cultivating international politics, for which the petty state of Judah, about the size of the English county of Kent, or half again as large as Rhode Island, had neither the power nor the means, and in which it would inevitably have worn itself out. Hence we can fully comprehend how a man like the prophet Isaiah, who was certainly a genuine patriot and did not underestimate the destiny of his people, could actually regard it as the object of his life to keep Judah in peaceful subjection to Assyria and preserve it from unwise adventures. >

The conquest of Samaria was not achieved under Shalmaneser IV., but belongs to the beginning of the reign of Sargon. This Assyrian ruler, perhaps the mightiest of all, was, as it seems, a descendant of the old Assyrian royal family overthrown by Tiglath-pileser. He was obliged to continue warfare in Palestine. In the year 720 there occurred a general revolt of the countries from Hamath to the Egyptian border, which had but shortly before been subjected by Assyria.

And now Shabakah finally prepared for armed intervention. But the whole coalition was dispersed by Sargon, the Egyptians were defeated at Raphiah southward from Gaza, and when, five years later, Sargon returned to these regions the Egyptians hastened to lay tribute at his feet,—the decadent empire of the Pharaohs was no match for the rising power of Assyria, and the time was past for Egypt to pursue an international policy. Its only resort was to plot and instigate in order if possible to derive some questionable advantage from the dissensions of others. These conditions were characterised most drastically by Isaiah in the names he applies to Egypt, “blusterer and laggard,” that is, making a mighty clanking with the sword and finally when matters become serious refusing to draw.

In the year 715 King Ahaz died and was followed by his son Hezekiah. Ahaz had persisted steadfastly until the end in his voluntary subordination to Assyria, and thus secured for his country twenty years of unbroken peace. Hezekiah was differently constituted. Even from the descriptions of the tradition which greatly favors and glorifies him we derive the impression that he was an un-

decided, vacillating character, easily influenced and partial to great plans, but just as easily discouraged and dispirited. Under him the national party again came to the surface regarding the dependency upon Assyria as a disgrace and disposed to use the first opportunity to regain their former independence. The danger became so great that Isaiah went about for three years in the humiliating garb of a military captive, as a standing warning that such would be the fate of all enemies of Assyria.

In the year 711 especially the situation became critical. In Ashdod a certain Yaman had expelled the Assyrian vassal king, Achimiz, and raised the standard of rebellion; according to the report of Sargon he had entered into the plots with Judah, Edom, and Moab. But the Assyrian army made a swift end of this war of liberation. When he recognised that his cause was lost Yaman fled to Egypt, but was delivered to Sargon in chains by the Pharaoh,—with this disgraceful act Egypt with her own hand effaced her name from the list of first-class powers.

During the life of Sargon we hear no more of disturbances in Palestine. But in 705 the great king died suddenly a violent death, murdered, it appears, by his son and successor, Sennacherib. This was the signal for revolt and rebellion in the whole extent of the great empire, for it was not to be expected that a second Sargon would follow the murdered king, and fear and submission had been due alone to the person of Sargon. The threads of conspiracy run from Babylon to the Nile. The Book of Kings informs us that there came to Hezekiah an embassy from the Babylonian king, Merodach-baladan, to whom Hezekiah showed all his armories and treasures: this embassy must have come in the first year of the reign of Sennacherib (704), in order to win Hezekiah as an ally, for in the very beginning of the year 703 Sennacherib threw himself with all his might upon Babylon and expelled Merodach-baladan.

Furthermore Isaiah gives us a vivid description of an embassy of tall, bronzed Ethiopians, who also came to Jerusalem with the evident purpose of forming an alliance against Assyria. In the year 704 the young and vigorous Tirhakah had become king of the Ethiopians and had succeeded in carrying Egypt with him. Now with two such great powers as support there was no stopping the movement. All the Phœnician and Philistine rulers, Edom, Moab, Ammon, and Judah were in outspoken rebellion. King Padi of Ekron, who remained loyal to the Assyrians, was taken prisoner by his own people and brought in chains to Hezekiah at Jerusa-

lem, in order that the latter might hold him in safe keeping. This shows how general was the confidence in the impregnable position of Jerusalem.

In one of his most powerful and most stirring appeals Isaiah describes half in fierce mockery, half with bleeding heart, the delirium of heroism and warlike enthusiasm that seized upon Judah on this occasion: he sees these holiday troops already dispersed and scattered to the winds, captured without the firing of an arrow. And all too soon it became manifest how justly Isaiah had judged his people.

In the year 701 Sennacherib moved with the whole force of his kingdom against the rebels, and the petty kingdoms sank one after the other like barley blades before the sickle. The very beginning of the attack brought the whole coast of Phœnicia and Philistia to terms. Then Hezekiah too lost courage. "And Hezekiah," so the Book of Kings reports, "sent to the king of Assyria to Lachish, saying: I have offended! Return from me; that which thou puttest on me will I bear. And the king of Assyria appointed unto Hezekiah three hundred talents of silver and thirty talents of gold. And Hezekiah gave him all the silver that was found in the house of the Lord and in the treasures of the king's house. And he even had all the gold stripped from the doors and pillars of the temple, and gave it to the king of Assyria."

Further King Sennacherib informs us that Hezekiah set free King Padi of Ekron, whom he held captive, and delivered over to him his daughters and the women of his household. Gladly we would doubt this statement. But it is not possible; we are really obliged to believe that Hezekiah made a contribution of his own flesh and blood to the harem of the mighty Assyrian monarch. It was not possible to humble himself more deeply before Sennacherib. But the situation soon changed. The combined Ethiopian and Egyptian forces actually began to advance, and now it appeared to Sennacherib hazardous to leave in his rear an unreliable vassal like Hezekiah in such an important strategic position as Jerusalem. Therefore he now demanded the surrender of the capital and the acceptance of an Assyrian garrison.

But now Hezekiah remained firm: he could not consent to this. According to the account of the Book of Kings it was chiefly the prophet Isaiah who urged him to hold out, promising him most positively that the Assyrian would not send a single arrow into Jerusalem, but would return again the way he had come. And contrary to all expectation this bold prophecy was fulfilled.

The immediate results of Hezekiah's refusal were indeed terrible for the land. The Assyrian captured forty-six walled cities, and countless fortresses and smaller places, devastated the land systematically, and took two hundred thousand one hundred and fifty persons and all the cattle as booty to Assyria. He himself reports that he at least undertook the siege of Jerusalem, and there is no reason to doubt this. But he did not accomplish his object. The final result of this undertaking is veiled in obscurity.

At El Tekeh on the border between Judah and Philistia Sennacherib came upon the combined Egyptian and Ethiopian armies, and defeated them completely. Several Egyptian princes and a considerable number of the enemy's highest officers were made captives by the Assyrians. Sennacherib pursued the retreating hosts and had doubtless already determined upon an advance into Egypt, but was compelled to turn back on the Egyptian border. Herodotus was told by the Egyptians that an army of mice attacked the Assyrian army in the night, destroying all the leather of their equipment and weapons, thus disabling the army of Sennacherib.

The Bible account also tells of a great catastrophe that befell Sennacherib: "The angel of the Lord went forth in the night and smote in the camp of the Assyrians an hundred four-score and five thousand." At any rate the great expedition came to naught. It is possible that a threatening turn of affairs in Babylon urgently demanded Sennacherib's presence at home and hastened his return. Before going he assigned all the cities of Judah to his loyal Philistine vassals and returned to Nineveh. He never saw Palestine again. Jerusalem was indeed saved, but in what a condition? The prophet Isaiah shall tell us:

"Your country is desolate;
 Your cities are burned with fire;
 Your land,—strangers devour it in your presence,
 And the daughter of Zion is left as a booth in a vineyard,
 As a lodge in a garden of cucumbers,
 As a besieged city.
 Except the Lord of Hosts had left unto us a very small remnant,
 We should have been as Sodom,
 We should have been like unto Gomorrah."

Of the next hundred years we know almost nothing. For the history of Israelitish religion, it is true, scarcely any other period is so significant and important as this very seventh century: yet concerning the secular history we know but little. The Book of

Kings goes on to tell that Hezekiah drove the Philistines beyond Gaza : so he evidently succeeded in regaining those portions of his territory which had been separated from Judah by Sennacherib and promised to the neighboring Philistine kings. But we are obliged to infer that he returned to his former dependence upon Assyria and sent his yearly tribute to Nineveh afterwards as before, for his son and successor, Manasseh, appears always and everywhere in the ranks of the tributary vassals of Assyria.

Of Manasseh we know only that he was twelve years old when he ascended the throne, that he ruled fifty-five years, that he persecuted the prophets with fire and sword, and filled Jerusalem with the blood of the innocent. His son and successor, Amon, was murdered in the second year of his reign by a conspiracy in his own household, but the people slew the conspirators and placed upon the throne Josiah, the eight-year-old son of the murdered king. And here a ray of light falls upon the history of Israel : Josiah, from all that we know of him, must have been a good and noble character, who took his duties as regent seriously, ruled with justice and mildness, and was a father to his subjects. His contemporary, the prophet Jeremiah, bears the best of testimony for him, and the Book of Kings praises him as a second David ; but unfortunately we have no details regarding his reign.

The ninety years which we have just hastily covered include the greatest splendor and the greatest power of the Assyrian Empire as well as its sudden end. The wild and barbarous Sennacherib was murdered, 681, by two of his sons, who thus avenged his act of parricide, but the throne was not their reward. Another son, Esarhaddon, who had evidently been selected by Sennacherib for the succession, marched against his brothers and was generally recognised as king. He was destined to attain the utmost goal of Assyrian ambition and conquer Egypt.

Tirhakah still kept up his interference in Palestine in order to stir up revolts. Therefore Esarhaddon determined to put an end to the matter : he entered Egypt in 670, defeated Tirhakah completely and subdued the whole country, and Tirhakah withdrew into his native Ethiopia. Thus Egypt also became an Assyrian province, and remained so a considerable length of time. Under Assurbanipal, who ascended the Assyrian throne, 668, came the turning-point. Outwardly, indeed, the empire is more brilliant and more powerful than before, but within are seen already unequivocal signs of dissolution. Assurbanipal continued, indeed, to wage wars, more cruel and bloody than any of his predecessors ; but he

himself no longer appears in the field. On the contrary he has the captive enemies and rebels brought to Nineveh, there to feast his eyes upon their torture and death, pursuing in the intervals the pleasures of the chase and the harem—he is the Sardanapalus of the Greeks—and incidentally showing an active interest in art and science. In his palace he founds an immense library, into which he gathers all that could be found of Babylonian and Assyrian literature.

It deserves attention, and is the evidence of a very unusual personality, that no one throughout his reign of forty-two years ventured to contest the throne with this unwarlike monarch. Nevertheless the beginning of the end was at hand. Egypt seems to have freed itself soon from Assyrian domination, and enters upon a new period of political and national progress in the long and prosperous reign of Psammeticus I. In the Aryan mountaineers, the Medes, a dangerous enemy arises in the rear of Nineveh, and at the same time another fearful storm sweeps over all Asia. From the north, the countries about the Black Sea, hordes of predatory horsemen, similar in nature to the later Huns and Mongolians, invade the civilised countries of Asia, marching through and plundering them for about thirty years: Herodotus calls them Cimmerians. As a matter of course all political ties were loosened by this, and the Assyrian Empire was shaken to its foundation.

Now Phraortes, king of the Medes, considered the time come to venture an attack upon Nineveh; but he was utterly defeated and met his own death in the undertaking. His son, Cyaxares, proposed to avenge his father, and already had assailed and besieged Nineveh when an invasion of the Cimmerians into his own country recalled him and relieved Nineveh. But this was only a stay of execution. About fifteen years later Cyaxares united with Nabopolassar, king of Babylon, for a final blow at the Assyrian Empire, of whose last two kings we do not even know the exact names. After a siege of three years Nineveh was taken and razed to the ground, and the whole nation obliterated. This took place 606, just twenty years after the death of the mighty Assurbanipal.

The whole history of the world shows no catastrophe equal to the destruction of the Assyrian Empire; no nation was ever so completely destroyed as the Assyrian,—a just retribution for the abominations which it had perpetrated for centuries. The two victors divided the spoil, the lion's share falling to Media.

But meanwhile a third rival had arisen. In Egypt Necho, son

of Psammeticus, had ascended the throne of the Pharaohs in 610. This enterprising and restless monarch also wanted to secure his share of the Assyrian spoil, and set out for the Euphrates with a mighty army in 608. King Josiah of Judah tried to arrest him but was utterly defeated at Megiddo and himself mortally wounded. The people, who knew well what they had to expect of the crown-prince Jehoiakim, made Jehoahaz, the younger son of the deceased, king in his father's stead. But only three months had passed when Necho summoned the young man before his tribunal at Riblah and sent him in bonds to Egypt. He punished the people for their arbitrary action by a heavy tax, and put Jehoiakim upon the throne at Jerusalem as an Egyptian vassal.

But the Egyptian glory was not to last long; a year after the destruction of Nineveh the Babylonian crown prince, Nebuchadnezzar, met the Egyptians at Carchemish on the Euphrates, and Necho was so completely defeated that he sought safety in wild flight. Nebuchadnezzar followed closely after him, but was overtaken by the news of the death of his father, Nabopolassar, so that his presence at home became absolutely necessary. Accordingly he made peace with Necho, who ceded to Babylon all his conquests in Asia as far as the Egyptian border in consideration of being allowed to return to his country unmolested.

Thus Jehoiakim of Judah had been transformed from an Egyptian vassal into a Babylonian. His policy was prescribed by his circumstances: unconditioned submission to Babylon. But he would none of this, and rebelled against his feudal lord. At first Nebuchadnezzar did not consider it worth the while to go himself, but stirred up the neighboring peoples against the unhappy land. In the midst of this situation Jehoiakim died. His eighteen-year-old son, Jehoiachin, entered upon an evil inheritance, and had to atone for his father's sins. After a reign of three months he was forced to capitulate and surrender to the Chaldeans without conditions. Nebuchadnezzar took the treasures of the temple and the palace with him and led the young king and ten thousand of the best inhabitants, the whole aristocracy of birth and intellect, into exile in Babylon, where Jehoiachin himself was kept in close confinement. But Nebuchadnezzar made one more attempt with a native ruler and placed Zedekiah, the full brother of Jehoahaz, who had formerly been chosen by the people, and an uncle of the captive Jehoiachin, upon the throne in Jerusalem as a Babylonian vassal prince. This took place in 597. Before four years of Zedekiah's reign had passed Jerusalem was again filled with discon-

tent, and there were plots which however finally came to nothing. Of course the matter could not remain concealed from the Babylonian government, and the seriously compromised Zedekiah went in person to Babylon, but came off cheap and conducted himself discreetly for the next five years. Then misfortune brought it about that the restless and aggressive Nahabrah (Apries) ascended the throne of the Pharaohs and immediately resumed the policy of his grandfather, Necho. So all eyes were turned longingly toward the Nile, whence the liberator from Babylonian subjection was expected. Nahabrah promised assistance, and Zedekiah could no longer resist the pressure: he actually rebelled, and thus the fate of Judah and Jerusalem was sealed.

On the 10th of January, 587, the Chaldeans began to besiege Jerusalem; but Nahabrah kept his word, and a mighty Egyptian army started for Palestine and the Chaldeans withdrew. The rejoicing in Jerusalem knew no bounds. But the prophets of evil were justified: the Chaldeans returned, and after a resistance conducted with the heroism of despair, when the most terrible famine was already raging in Jerusalem, such that women were devouring their own children, the city fell into the hands of the Chaldeans, on the 9th of July, 586. In the first confusion Zedekiah escaped with a few attendants, but was overtaken and brought before the tribunal of Nebuchadnezzar at Riblah. But now Nebuchadnezzar knew no such word as mercy. All the captive nobles were executed and Zedekiah's children were all butchered before the eyes of the wretched father. That was the last thing he was ever to see, for he himself was blinded and taken to Babylon in chains, where he declined and perished miserably in prison. Thus ended the last descendant of David that had ruled in Jerusalem.

The city itself was looted and then given over to the flames; the whole people that had escaped the executioner and the sword was led into exile at Babylon. "Only of the poorest of the land did they leave some in Judah as vinedressers and husbandmen." Over this miserable remnant was set a certain Gedaliah as Babylonian prefect; but when Gedaliah perished soon after by the hand of a murderer, those who had remained in Judah fled to Egypt from fear of the vengeance of the Chaldeans, and there they vanished and left no trace. Edomites and other neighbors spread over the unclaimed land—Judah had ceased to be.

If Israel had been merely a race like others it would never have survived this fearful catastrophe and would have disappeared in the Babylonian exile. But Israel was the bearer of an idea; this

was not to be annihilated with the state, and its eternal destiny was not closed with its political life. On the contrary. It seems as though only now, when the body was dashed to pieces, was the spirit really able to develop unhampered. The death that Judah died was a death suffused with dawn. While its sun seemed set in eternal night, already in the east a new day was breaking, destined in the fulness of time to illumine the whole world with its light. Israel went down to the grave with the hope of early resurrection, and this hope was not disappointed. Forty-nine years after Nebuzaradan, the Babylonian captain of the guard, set fire to city and temple, a burnt offering from those who had returned to the fatherland was again smoking to the God of Israel on the spot where the brazen altar of Solomon had stood. The flame that had consumed Jerusalem was for Judah a purifying fire ; from the seed-field of the exile sown in tears was to spring up a precious and immortal harvest.

THE RELIGION OF SCIENCE: THE WORSHIP OF BENEFICENCE.

BY JAMES ODGERS.

AUGUSTE COMTE wrote his *Positive Philosophy* and *Positive Polity* before the doctrine of Evolution had been presented in systematic form. In his time a general idea of development was entertained by many thinkers and a "nebular" hypothesis to account for the formation of the solar system had been worked out. But before Darwin and Wallace had contributed the results of their observations and thought upon the "Origin of Species," a correct general view of evolution was unattainable. Hence, although Comte actually used the term "evolution" to indicate the course of human development, it remained for Mr. Herbert Spencer to formulate the law of evolution.

But Comte's philosophic grasp of the history of civilisation enabled him to give to the world a brilliant illustration of the law which Mr. Spencer afterwards enunciated. He showed that the process of theological evolution was a progress from what he termed fetishism to monotheism: it was a progressive integration of beings and differentiation of functions—confusion giving place to coherence of thought.

Primitive men deemed themselves the slaves of a multitude of supra-human powers actuated by passions like their own. Their religious ideas, if we may call them religious, represented a superstitious and confused perception of the powers of their ancestors and of nature: a confusion of ancestor-worship and nature-worship. But they regarded these powers with fear rather than with reverence, being in constant terror of superior force—the awe-inspiring and terrific in nature, the fierce and cruel in man.

In the struggles between families and tribes the inferior, with their beliefs, were overthrown and sometimes exterminated; with

the result that the fetishes of the conquering tribes were held in supreme regard by increasing numbers. The objects of superstitious regard were gradually reduced in number. Instead of each natural operation being referred to a separate power, phenomena were gradually grouped, and each department of nature was regarded as under the presidency of a distinct being. In this way, and by the survival of those tribes whose beliefs and conduct were best adjusted to conditions within the tribe and outside it, the original incoherent superstition gave place to polytheism. Whilst the Asiatic and Egyptian polytheisms were coercive, that of Rome—tolerant of the gods of conquered peoples—promoted order and permitted progress; and Greek polytheism, accompanying a large amount of independence, developed a worship of freedom, strength and beauty. With the growth of a free exercise of intelligence, differences of power amongst the traditional gods were recognised. The inferior were disregarded, and in course of time all others were subordinated to a supreme One. But Greek development was arrested by the Roman conquest. Some of the gods of Greece had already been appropriated by the Romans, who, in their political and social decay, increasingly subordinated ethics to pleasure.

In the meantime the Hebrew god of battles came to be regarded as a righteous judge, and later, by Jesus of Nazareth, was revealed as a god of love, the father of all men.

Some of the disciples of Jesus visited Rome, whose people were perishing for want of a new ethical inspiration, and introduced Christianity, which subordinated the present life and happiness of each worshipper to a future and greater happiness.

Christianity was gradually established amidst the ruins of the Roman Empire. It exercised a restraining and purifying influence, and even aspired to international authority. It was most effective for good when it exerted least direct political power, and when it appealed most exclusively to the hearts and consciences of its worshippers. But its doctrines, brought together from different sources in prescientific times, were confused and incapable of retaining intellectual authority in the presence of free criticism and the advance of knowledge. Group after group of earnest religious people protested against dogmas which, from time to time, had become untenable. Sect after sect arose with a modified form of religious belief: and many a sect, whose difference from others was not of permanent value, disappeared.

Until within recent times the religious evolution had not proceeded beyond an imperfect monotheism; a stage of belief in

which all good was referred to the action of a good spirit, God, all pain and misery were referred to the action of an evil spirit, the Devil, and in which nature was regarded as the arena for the exercise of the powers of God and the Devil and their subordinates. But with the growth of a more scientific habit of thought, an increasing number of people now perceive that pain and misery are unavoidable consequences of certain modes of natural operation ; that ignorance and selfishness account for a great deal ; and that to personify evil is no more logical than to personify color or sound. Hence few people (who think) now believe in a personal devil.

Although people are apt, for a time, to rest satisfied with the step in advance made by the displacement of a belief in a personal devil, yet "the logical necessities of the understanding" require us to treat in identical ways the causes of both good and evil. We soon learn that good also is a result of perfectly regular modes of operation of natural forces within us and without. "The Reign of Law," one of the chief discoveries of modern observation and thought, accounts for the production of love, truth, and duty, as well as of hate, superstition, and crime. Hence, under the light of modern scientific philosophy, the imperfect monotheism of the past—in which God, Nature, and the Devil were regarded as three distinct beings—gives place to "Monism," or a faith in "one existence of which all phenomena are modes."¹

By a scientific use of the imagination we are able to form a clear general idea of the evolution of the world and man : we are led to regard the whole process—the cooling and rotation of the nebula, its shrinkage and the detachment of its revolving rings, their break-up and concentration into rotating globes revolving around the centre of the system, the cooling of our globe, the precipitation of the heavier matters from its gaseous envelope, the crumpling of the crust and subsidence of the waters into the hollows, the beginnings of life, the growth of vegetal and animal organisms, their differentiation, struggles, and survival of the fittest, and the whole course of human development—as the varied workings of one power possessing within itself the potency and motive of all that has been or shall be.

Professor Fiske, in his address on the "Destiny of Man," has shown that although strength and courage enabled brutes to conquer, yet in the course of evolution intelligence and loyalty became increasingly important : that eventually mental characteristics counted for more in the battle of life than physical force. Though

¹ The terms in which the late Charles Bradlaugh summarily defined his philosophic belief.

practical efficiency has always conquered, this efficiency has been, to an increasing extent, the result of loyalty to the whole community, guided by a progressively clearer appreciation of relevant facts. War and industry, conflict and competition, are always weeding out the incapable; and it is found, in the long run, that good-will, regard for facts, and loyalty survive.

Auguste Comte looked forward to a time when the dominant human motive will be love, and when the chief practical purpose will be human welfare.

Both Spencer and Comte, in their philosophical writings, show that war is being displaced more and more by industry, and that sympathy expands with peaceful intercourse. The ideal of "Peace on earth, good will to men," is not a mere dream, but a prevision justified by observation of the course of human development. We may hasten the advent of this noble future by working systematically for it; or we may retard it by subordinating the public good to our own ease and pleasure; but if the world lasts only a small part of the time we may reasonably hope it will, we cannot prevent this consummation.

Though we have to refer not only all good but also all evil to the operations of the one power whose modes of working are described in scientific laws, we cannot regard this power as non-ethical even if we continue to judge the world-process from an anthropocentric point of view. But as soon as we conceive of Nature as a unity, man's pleasure and the contingencies of his evolution can no longer be the final ethical standard. If the universe be one, then universal good—whatever that may be—must be regarded as superior to man's good; and man must be resigned to find his welfare in conforming to the conditions of universal good.

Sir Edwin Arnold, in his *Light of Asia*, presents the Buddhist idea that:

" Before beginning, and without an end,
As space eternal and as surety sure,
Is fixed a power divine which moves to good,
Only its laws endure."

If we find, and we do find, in the world-process, that pain and evil, though always with us, are subordinate to a growing fulness of life; that not only strength and beauty, but love, truth, and duty are surely though slowly rising in the scale of efficiency; and that the reign of peace and good-will is a certainty for our successors though not for us; then we are justified in attributing a character of general beneficence to the universal power. And this quality of beneficence, which means so much to us, has undergone

noteworthy changes of meaning corresponding to the stages of human development. A god of battles was worshipped because he gave to his people the victory : success in battle being, in the opinion of a fighting people, the greatest good. The Olympian gods of freedom, strength, beauty, and enjoyment were worshipped because these qualities seemed to the Greeks most desirable. The Christian God of Love, who offered joy unspeakable in a future life in exchange for faithfulness for a few years on earth, was worshipped by people oppressed by tyrants and without escape from trouble in this world. Men have always worshipped beneficence, though they have meant different things by it.

Comte, the first to propose a scientific religion, offered as an object of worship "The Great Being" (chiefly humanity), which, in his *Positive Polity*, he defined as "the whole constituted by the beings, past, future, and present, which co-operate willingly in perfecting the order of the world." Here he distinguishes beneficence, chiefly beneficent human lives, from conduct which has impeded or opposed human development. The beneficent results of natural activity are as clearly distinguishable from those to which, for the time being, we cannot ascribe this character, as are the beneficent results of selected human activity ; and if the Great Being, or Humanity, be a proper object of worship, still more worthy is the character of the power represented by the evolution of all natural usefulness and beauty and all human excellence.

The new positivism of *The Open Court*, or the Religion of Science, presents to us the idea of one universal power whose character is represented by the modes of its working, which are definable in scientific laws : and which Dr. Carus regards as a plexus of laws with ethical consequences. Avoiding the mistake made by Comte, who, in eliminating the idea of God from scientific religion, broke away from the past ; and avoiding also the error of Mr. Herbert Spencer in regarding the "Unknowable" as the basis of religion ; Dr. Carus maintains the religious continuity by regarding God as our conception of the everlasting and universal power whose modes of working, around us and within, condition the whole life of man and are the final ethical authority. God, in this sense, is the representation in feeling and thought of the only reality, and with the growth of knowledge and increased loyalty to a scientific and progressive ethical standard, the god-idea approximates more and more to this reality.

The Religion of Science cannot admit any confusion of quantity and quality : cannot sanction the worship of mere power as

such. Of absolute perfection and almightiness science knows nothing ; but beneficence is a demonstrable quality, though when regarded from the point of view of human welfare it does not appear to be coextensive with all natural activity. But we are obliged to abandon the anthropocentric point of view ; and yet to satisfy "the ethical demands of the soul as well as the logical necessities of the understanding" we seek a coherent idea of existence as a unity. As our powers of observation and reasoning enlarge, we have increasing ground for faith in the evolution of peace and goodwill in human affairs, in the continuous growth of love and understanding and righteousness. And we have increasing justification for the belief that a large amount of pain and unhappiness is a consequence of partial development, and that it will be progressively reduced as knowledge and social sympathy increase. Thus we have growing evidence of the beneficence of the One Existence of which all phenomena are modes ; and towards this beneficence worship is the inevitable emotional attitude. Combining the ideas of continuity, unity, and ethical value, we may conceive of God as *everlasting power working for universal good.*

The Religion of Science and the worship of beneficence are the logical and ethical aspects of religion as modified by modern knowledge and criticism. The religious revelation must be read in natural law, especially in the evolution of society and morals ; and it is the business of religion so to use the history of the past as to throw a clear light upon the paths of human improvement.

Comte taught that the evolution of humanity depends on the extension of sympathy, the adoption of a demonstrable faith, and the substitution of peaceful industry for war. He proposed the concert of the West for the preservation of peace, for the suppression of war and aggression, and for the development of all the powers of humanity. He trusted in the main to moral improvement, and initiated an ethical organisation to promote it.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has shown that, to a large extent, human development has depended on a progressive political incorporation : on the compounding and recompounding of groups in more stable and more effective political and industrial organisation.

Dr. Fiske, foreseeing the consequences of the progressive political incorporation and growth of sympathy, and relying on the law of evolution, prophesies the final union of all states in one world-wide federation and "the parliament of man."

It seems inevitable that, sooner or later,—sooner, if we under-

stand the laws of human development and systematically work for it,—humanity will be one complex organisation animated by one aim, working under the impulse of love or good-will and the guidance of science for the greatest good of all.

As all existence is one, though working in the various ways described in scientific laws, each one of us, being a part of this existence, should express in his life the character which gives ethical value to science. Nature, or God, works by regular methods towards beneficence; hence the final character of force is beneficent. It is difficult, perhaps beyond our power, to discover to what extent each natural movement conduces to good. But we know that our surviving needs and ideals which, except in degree of development, are the same now as they have been throughout historic time, are certain guides to the welfare of the race. Each one of us, in his own life, should consider himself a function of the everlasting power that impels man towards organised efficiency, beauty, love, truth, and duty. No one of us is without the potential beneficence, which is the most general ethical characteristic of universal power. Beneficence, therefore, should be our watchword and our standard of conduct. This character is needed in every walk of life: not mere ignorant sentimentalism—which often weakly does harm with the best intentions—but well-considered helpfulness which looks beyond immediate results to future consequences. The preservation of peace, the suppression of war, the promotion of international concert for progressive purposes, the cultivation of sympathy, truth, and duty, the appreciation of worth and scorn of wrong-doing and greed; all these enter into the character of beneficence, which each one of us should strive to exemplify. The Religion of Science implies that as there is only one existence, of which all phenomena are modes, so there should be only one character—Beneficence—dominating all activity.

DEATH IN RELIGIOUS ART.

BY THE EDITOR.

DEATH appears to the imagination of mankind as the climax of all the evils in the world; for death is feared as annihilation, and death seems to destroy our entire life-work as well as ourselves.

Death is the main problem of life. If there were no death, there would be no need of religion, for religion originates as a so-



THANATOS AND HYPNOS LAYING A WARRIOR TO REST.
From an Attic vase. (After Hermann Göll.)

lution of the problem of death. Every religion proposes its own peculiar solution than which there is nothing more characteristic in its doctrines and moral teachings. Salvation means an escape from death and the attainment of life everlasting. If we want to comprehend the spirit of a religion, we must learn what, according to its teachings, is the significance of death.

Death in Pre-Christian Art.

Demonolatry, the religion of savages, is based on the fear of death. Death is supposed to be a monster-deity that is thirsty for blood and takes delight in sufferings. For the sake of escaping



RELIEF ON A SARCOPHAGUS, REPRESENTING THE BATTLE WITH THE AMAZONS.
(After Hermann Göll.)

his wrath, savage tribes feed him with such sacrifices, both animal and human, as are expected to pacify him.

Death in Brahmanism is not an annihilation of the soul but a mere transmigration. The soul which is conceived to be a being or an entity that can move about without a body, is supposed to assume a new shape and to reappear in a new incarnation. The



OKNOS AND THE DAUGHTERS OF DANAOS IN HADES (After Hermann Göll.)

religious Hindu, therefore, exhibits a strange indifference to his worldly fate and submits unflinchingly even to death.

In Buddhism, Mâra, the Evil One, is the demon of death (the word *mdio* meaning "slayer"). Buddha enjoins his followers to surrender to death what belongs to death, and to live in the realm of moral aspirations; for the body is subject to decay, but deeds

do not die. Mara, the Evil One, presides over that which is transient, the realm of birth and death. He is both sensuality and the perdition which all flesh is heir to, and this world is a world of death.

It appears that to the ancient Hebrews death was the end of life, for there is no mention of any kind of immortality in the canonical books of the Old Testament. This is the more strange as both the Assyrians and the Egyptians who have powerfully influenced the religious development of Israel, clearly taught that




RELIEF ON A SARCOPHAGUS, REPRESENTING THE DEATH OF HIPPLYTUS.
(After Hermann Göll.)

man's soul does not die but survives death and enters other regions, either for being rewarded or punished in the life to come, according to his deeds. They believed that evil-doers have reason to fear death, while the righteous may face it courageously, as the innocent man need not tremble before a judge who is absolutely just.

The Greeks are strongly influenced by their artistic sense. Homer¹ speaks of Death as the twin-brother of Sleep, and Pausa-

¹*Iliad*, XVI. 682.



ORESTES PURSUED BY THE FURIES.


From an ancient vase. (After Hermann Göll.)



A SPHINX CARRYING OFF A VICTIM.

Terra Cotta relief from Melos. (After Hermann Göll.)

nias¹ describes a box of cedar wood in the temple of Juno at Elis on which Death and Sleep are represented as two boys resting in the arms of Night. Both have their legs crossed, as sleepers naturally would lie, and there is this difference only between the twin



SISYPHUS, IXION, AND TANTALUS IN HADES. Relief on a Sarcophagus.

brothers, that Death is black while Sleep is white. The box described by Pausanias is lost of course, but there are a great number of artistic representations of Death as the twin-brother of sleep. There is, for instance, an Attic vase which depicts Thanatos and Hypnos, Death and Sleep, laying a warrior to rest.

The Greek sarcophagi represent scenes of Greek mythology such as the battle with the Amazons, the Death of Hippolytus, and similar subjects.

There is a tendency prevalent among the artists of ancient Greece to hide everything that is ugly, or, if it could not be hidden, to transfigure it with beauty. In this way the pangs of a bad conscience, represented in the furies, the Harpies and Sphinxes



THE COFFIN OF THE SON OF VALERIUS. (From Lessing.)


representing fatal diseases, the petrifying dread depicted in Medusa's face, and even the torments of Hell have assumed quite an æsthetical appearance in Greek art. It is in accord with the whole Hellenic world-conception that the Greeks covered their graves with flowers in order to conceal the terrors of death, which were

Paus. Eliac, cap. XVIII p. 422.



HEGESO'S TOMBSTONE. In the ancient cemetery on the Dypylon in Athens.

felt as a disturbance in the enjoyment of life. The æsthetic sense of Greek artists shrunk from picturing death in its ugly features, and death is depicted on the tombstone of an Athenian cemetery as a parting.



THE TOMBSTONE OF AMEMPTUS, A FREEDMAN.

According to Lessing's interpretation probably a musician. (From Lessing.)



DEATH AS A GENIUS HOLDING AN URN AND TURNING DOWN THE TORCH.

The soul is represented as a butterfly. (After an ancient gem, reproduced from Lessing.)



THE TOMBSTONE OF CAECILIUS FEROX.

Representing Death as a youth standing with crossed legs and down-turned torch. (From Lessing.)



DEATH AS A GENIUS WITH A WREATH, BUTTERFLY, AND DOWN-TURNED TORCH. (From Lessing.)

Lessing¹ has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that the ancient Greek artist did not represent death as a skeleton, but that they always followed the Homeric idea of death as the twin brother of sleep. He proved his case by reproducing and explain-

¹Lessing (*Wie die Alten den Tod personificirten*), written in reply to a criticism of Herr Klotz.

ing a number of antique works of art, mostly tombstones and sarcophagi, on which a youth with down-turned torch can represent nothing else but Death. At the same time he showed that the few skeletons that are actually antique, must be *larvæ*, i. e., the departed souls of the wicked who are described by Seneca as consisting of bare bones.¹

Schiller, who is himself one of the foremost representatives of classical taste, criticises the Greek habit of shrinking from that which is unpleasant in the following Xenion :

" Beautiful, truly, is he, the youth with his torch turning downward ;
But 'tis apparent that Death lacks this æsthetical charm."

The idea of immortality was not missing in Hellas ; but the notions of a beyond were very indefinite. The hope of an after-life was indicated by the butterfly which is frequently found on tombstones and sarcophagi. The hope of a reawakening to new life found a symbolical expression in the Eleusinian mysteries as ears of wheat which were handed to the neophytes and worn in crowns by the initiated.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

¹Nemo tam puer est, ut Cerberum timeat, et tenebras, et Larvarum habitum nudis coherentium ossibus. *Ep.* XXIV.

VIVISECTION FROM AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW.

THE EVILS OF VIVISECTION.

From personal experience and a near relationship with hospitals, schools, biological laboratories, and experimental work-rooms, I know that I am right in believing that my scientific brethren ought to be supervised, cautioned, and restrained by a firm hand. Alas, I know full well, as myself a worker, that our work called Science, as now pursued, is not an end in itself, fails as yet to point out the solution of all life, and in the case of many of its votaries has produced a narrowing scholastic result. So thought in large degree, so lived in the inspiration of his research, so often taught by his action, my departed friend Professor Cope. To my mind the enthusiastic advocates of humanity and mercy, often weak of mind, hardly ever logical, are after all in the deepest sense right, because of no self-indulgent weakness have some of us encouraged them as far as reason permits, in the attempt to restrain and supervise the whole thing. Let them take it out of the hands of the conceited doctor, or the smart biological assistant. You know what I mean. With us your voice should speak. To shrink from cruelty, from the sight of torture as we shrink from a vile smell, from the ravages of disease, or an act of barbarism, as a thing to shudder at, as a thing that runs through you, and changes the heart-beat whether or no. This, to my mind, is an unfolding of the deeper meaning of that struggle to which you allude. How shall science solve it without the heart's help?

HENRY C. MERCER.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

THE ETHICS OF ANTI-VIVISECTION.—A REPLY TO DR. CARUS.

“There are scientists, and among them some of great name and fame, who after a life-time of long and laborious study did not arrive at the ethical truths that the moral commands will preserve, and that they do preserve, both the individual who keeps them and the society to which that individual belongs.

*Dr. Paul Carus.*¹

The unique position occupied by Dr. Carus as the ardent and principal exponent of the “Science of Religion and the Religion of Science” and his distinction in the regions of culture and ethics entitle his speculations to the gravest considerations of those who think and aspire. Dr. Carus often writes with a positive conscience but never with papal assumption, and it needs no apology in the pages of

¹ *Homilies of Science*, p. 53.

The Open Court to question his conclusions when controversial. Probably many of his admirers read with concern the definite denunciation of "The Immorality of the Anti-Vivisection Movement" in the June issue of this magazine. I venture to submit some reasons to Dr. Carus for reversing that denunciation. Precisely because (as he is aware) I greet him as a protagonist of the higher ethics and the harvester for this wistful modern age of all that was eternally and beautifully true in the God-ward guesses of every religion,—so in proportion I confess some sorrow for his vindication of the identical and unscrupulous materialism in science which is opposed to his noblest teaching.

Dr. Carus affirms that while the anti-vivisectionists are "ensouled with the noblest of all virtues, compassion for the suffering . . . they lack upon the whole the most essential of all virtues, which are thought, discrimination, discretion, consideration of consequences, a surveying of the situation, and a weighing of the implications of the question as well as the results to which it leads." If all the counts on this indictment were true, it would undoubtedly discount the currency of opposition to, but would not affect in the least the final appeal against, scientific torture.

"Consideration of consequences,"—who are the sinners? Take we that text for awhile. Listen we first to another accent of the same voice:—"Morality is "not the increase of the happiness of our fleeting individuality, of our self, the "temporary abode of our soul; but it is the extension of our good will to all that "is good, based upon the acquisition of a clearer and ever clearer insight—a heart-felt insight—into the nature of the interrelations of all things, especially of all "living beings." True,—most true. Proceed we now to the "consideration of consequences."

Dr. W. B. Carpenter once asked Canon Wilberforce "whether he would not vivisect a dog to save the life of his wife?" The Canon ironically answered, "Vivisect a *dog*? Why, Dr. Carpenter, I would vivisect *you!*" In like manner Dr. Carus queries: "But should we not be ready to kill a million rabbits if we can thereby save the life of one child attacked with diphtheria?" But here is a subtle distinction. Torture and slaughter are two different things. The first is totally indefensible,—the second is inevitable. The tortures of the Spanish Inquisition and the modern system of capital punishment convey no association of ideas. The brutal maltreatment of animals by the depraved or violent obtains no precedent from the killing of animals for human food or the necessary extinction of what is obnoxious or dangerous to human life. If it were conceivable that the mere slaughter of a million rabbits would save the life of a beloved child, probably few parents would hesitate. Affection—like hunger—would plead expediency. But if it be meant that the scientific torture of rabbits precede sacrifice,—then we pause. I will not disfigure these pages with the ghastly details of physiological research but simply refer Dr. Carus to Professor Mantegazza's experiments with his "Tormentatore,"—an ingenious device for creating the most intense pain, yet keeping the animal motionless in an attitude that shall not interfere with respiration. "Thus," says Mantegazza in the pride of his invention, "I can take an ear, a paw, or a piece of skin of the animal, and by turning the handle squeeze it beneath the teeth of the pincers; I can lift the animal by the suffering part, I can tear it or crush it in all sorts of ways." "These my experiments were conducted with much delight and extreme patience for the space of a year."¹

Dr. Carus alleges of vivisection that "we all know it is not a pleasant duty of

¹ *Fisiologia del Dolore.*

the physiologist." Mantegazza thought differently. So did Cyon:—"The true vivisector must approach a difficult vivisection with the same joyful ardor and the same delight wherewith a surgeon undertakes a difficult operation from which he expects extraordinary consequences. He who shrinks from cutting into a living animal, he who approaches vivisection as a disagreeable necessity, may very likely be able to repeat one or two vivisections, but will never become an artist in vivisection. The sensations of a physiologist, when from a gruesome wound, full of blood and mangled tissue, he draws forth some delicate nerve-branch . . . has much in common with that which inspires a sculptor."¹ And Claude Bernard wrote in similar terms.

"Consideration of consequences!"—Let it ever be remembered that the consequences of vivisection are not limited to the pain inflicted. Vivisection means not merely agony and mutilation,—it involves the deliberate suppression of intelligence,—the determined concentration of accumulated ingenuities against affectionate but intellectually inferior organisations,—and the effect more evil than physical curiosity is to murder mind. The subject *was* joyous, frolicsome, sensitive, and faithful,—it *shall* be terrified, palsied, blinded and shorn of the perceptions and volitions that linked it to our own humanity in the love of life, the faith of gratitude, and the unconquerable fear of death.

"Give us this day our daily bread!—which is a vivisection!" was Carl Vogt's revision of the human cry of Jesus.

Do the opponents of vivisection neglect "consideration of consequences?" Surely not. Not any "who consider pleasure and pain . . . from the higher standpoint of ethics, where the individual as such disappears . . . where life is valued not according to the pleasures it affords, but according as it contains more or less of those treasures that 'neither moth nor rust doth corrupt.'"² Not any who remember that while the individual vivisector may disappear to find pleasure in pain and only to value life "according as it contains more or less of those treasures" of organic intricacies for living dissection,—yet must emerge into the world to share again its influences for good or evil. For if within the walls of his laboratory the vivisector violates the principal sanctions on which the security and well-being of society depends, it must follow as the night the day that however conventional his conduct in the outer world, he does but mask a dangerous revolt against the supreme contract of the social order. That contract insists that powerful aggression shall not plead "expediency" against the liberties, the lives, and the rights of the most defenceless if involuntary assentors to that contract. Given a starving mass and a minority of prosperous people in any community a revolution against the eighth commandment does not establish stealing as moral. Given a single millionaire and a starving mass. Undoubtedly the mass would temporarily benefit through the murder of the millionaire and the appropriation of his wealth. But murder in alliance with theft could not be affirmed after the tempest of passion was over as other than rebellion against the infinite conscience of humanity. The plea for vivisection is precisely analogous and apart from the scientific fiction would equally justify rape and cannibalism. Those of us who oppose the torture chambers of the Inquisition of Science do consider consequences, for we know that every thought, and word, and action of good and evil are impulses that extend in widening circles throughout the universe for everlasting time.

Dr. Carus alleges that "innumerable discoveries of the most beneficent kind have been made through experiments on animals." It would be more effective to

¹ *Methodik*, p. 15.

² *Homilies of Science*, p. 219.

describe say, three, which have so benefited mankind and for which experiments on animals were unavoidable. When it is further alleged that "many publications of the anti-vivisectionists are guilty of gross exaggerations as to the number of the victims of vivisection and the cruelties to which the dissected animals are exposed," it need only be said that—at least so far as England is concerned—the details are invariably quoted from the official confessions of experimenting physiologists. Here we meet on ground which needs no word of argument. These details are accepted from physiologists—who scarcely exaggerate except in condemning or contradicting each other—and alleged against themselves in propaganda. These details are true or false. If false, the case against vivisection collapses; if true, the appeal is to the tribunal of conscience which admits no plea of "expediency" for experiments that blunder through swamps of mangled tissue into deliberate crime. To-day it is the outrage on animals, to-morrow it may be the surrender to exultant researches of the pauper and the criminal. Why not? With ten-fold force that curious apostrophe of Peter Rosegger to the "dear fortunate dead man!" in the dissecting-room would apply to any dear fortunate living man "chosen to contribute to the welfare of humanity."

"The pedigree of two-thirds of our virtues is far longer than the human race," as Professor Woods Hutchinson finely wrote. "They are backed by the inheritance, not merely of our whole human lineage, but by that of our infinitely longer pre-human ancestry. Their strength is drawn from the life of all the ages."¹

These words are worthy of Dr. Carus himself who upholds the banner of spiritual evolution and pleads like a prophet against the tendencies of modern materialism. Shall we descend into the gulf of materialism and with scientific ferocity and sleepless ingenuity rend without remorse whatever is helpless?—apply the gas-engines of the physiologist to the fainting heart of nature and probe with fierce impatience through her bleeding organs for secrets she only whispers into the souls of guiltless investigators? The marsh-lights of materialism are alluring procuresses to the "Lords of Hell." But the star of conscience, however tremulous when feet may falter or purpose tremble in times of temptation, is the guide of the individual to a grander immortality than dreams ever fabled or dogmas ever foreshadowed.

NOTTINGHAM, ENG.

AMOS WATERS.

VIVISECTION AND MORALITY.

The Open Court is a journal devoted to the Religion of Science. In its June issue is a thoughtful article devoted to the cause of vivisection, for which it endeavours to establish a valid plea. Now although vivisection is as yet a matter in which the thinking world takes but little interest, it is, in its cause, course, and consequence, one of the most serious problems that can confront the thinker and the legislator. Religion, morality, and philosophy, are as deeply involved as science in this question of vivisection. Some even think that if we could have a religion and a philosophy founded upon vivisection, humanity itself would be doomed. And certainly we may assert that if the Religion of Science is about to ally itself with vivisection as an indispensable element of its ritual and ceremonial, then will that religion be confronted by the execration of mankind, speedily and righteously.

The Open Court may draw the line as carefully and as tenderly as it will between cruelty and the necessary infliction of the least possible pain, the enthusiastic vivisectionists, young and old, bad and good, will not be much moved by such gentle admonitions.

¹ *The Monist*, July, 1896.

There is no question as to man's duty to learn the truth, especially the highest truths, those which show his relation to God and his fellows. But there is a question as to the methods by which he may seek to learn. There is a question also as to the truths which he ought *first* to seek. He may not justify any means whatsoever of acquiring knowledge. One can acquire knowledge by torturing his neighbor, or his own wife or child, but he is not at liberty morally so to do.

Freedom of inquiry may be of great value, but this too has its limits. Freedom of religious action founded the Inquisition of the Catholic Church. Freedom of scientific inquiry founded vivisection, the inquisition of the Religion of Science. One has the same ground as the other. Both are alike revolting and diabolical. It was accounted "immoral" to oppose the Inquisition. It is now becoming immoral to resist the progress of vivisection.

Happily for them, the majority of mankind know nothing about the horrors of vivisection. I do not believe that the writer in *The Open Court* knows anything about them or he could never have written such a statement as this:

"The truth is that all the great scientists who are famous as clever vivisectioners are as considerate as possible and avoid all unnecessary suffering."

Only by attaching a curious meaning to the word "unnecessary" in that sentence can it be comprehended at all by one who knows what the actual history of vivisection has been.

When a man constructs an oven with a glass window in it, imprisons a living animal therein, and then bakes it, roasts it slowly to death that he may, in its behavior, behold the effects of increasing high temperature on the animal organism, is that suffering "necessary"? Has the knowledge so acquired been of even the smallest service to any living creature, human or less than human?

When this man's successors and students repeated the experiment, and varied it, and verified it, and learned from it how to make further and more searching experiments, was it "necessary"?

When at Alfort now for many years several poor horses, worn out in the service of man, are to be found, any hour of all these years, subjected to the same disheartening, dreadful round of operations—sixty and more operations to each horse—is this frightful atrocity "necessary" for the knowledge of truth that shall be of service to mankind? These horses survive six days the awful ordeal. I dare not detail to your readers what they suffer. Let it be enough to say that the hoofs are dissected off from the feet, the eyes cut to pieces, the ears carefully dissected, the brain laid bare and pierced, and burned, and shocked with electricity, the spinal canal opened and the spinal cord tortured to exhibit "motor reaction to sensory impressions"; the intestines, the lungs, the heart, the kidneys, every part without exception, is tortured by laceration, cutting, bruising, burning, until at the end of about six days the quivering mass, still alive, is dragged to the bone-yard to breathe its last without further torture. How many readers of *The Open Court* could sleep well to-night after a half-hour's thinking on such unspeakable cruelty? Is this not "unnecessary suffering"? How can we justify the torture of one animal in this manner and not justify equally the torture of others in the same way? First experiments are crude and tentative and the results unsatisfactory. Men must be trained by repeated experience and careful study to be enabled to elicit the profoundest verities from such sources. In this, as in all other departments of research, a little knowledge only creates a thirst for more; therefore we must have more torture, more exhaustive, more vivid, more crucial. Otherwise we intrench

upon the domain of free inquiry, freedom of research, freedom of thought, besides leaving our work unfinished.

Does the editor of *The Open Court* mean to say that this poor and feeble detail is a "gross exaggeration" of the cruelty of vivisection? We mean to say that it is not one drop in the bucket of the indisputable truth that is known perfectly by every man who has fairly studied the subject, "Gross exaggeration," indeed! Why? What need is there of any exaggeration whatever? Thousands of horses have been dissected alive as described, by thousands of medical students, at Alfort and in Paris, where the work has been systematically pursued for many years. Let us say that ten thousand horses only have been subjected to this torture. Let us not flinch from the figures, but say that forty thousand living hoofs have been cut alive, piecemeal, from as many mangled feet, and then ask if this is necessary or "unnecessary suffering." Not one syllable of useful truth has thereby been wrung from the helpless and agonised animal. Not a single hoof has been saved as a result. All that is useful to know in the matter can be learned from dissections of the dead foot. If a tithe of the energy that has been wasted in this shocking and fruitless work had been spent in studying the hygiene of the foot in the living horse, some good results would assuredly have been achieved. As a matter of fact, all the useful knowledge that we now possess on that subject has been acquired in this natural, humane, and divine way of studying the subject. The same remark applies with equal or greater force to the entire field of vivisection. There is a right way and there is a wrong way of searching after the truths of physiology; there is a moral way, and there is an immoral way; and the right way is the only way of attaining real truth and right results. The very instinct of humanity revolts at the idea that the way to health is through the horrible torture-house at Alfort and through others of its kind established all over the civilised world. On the other hand all hearts rejoice at the thought that nature, in her most perfect and in her least perfect forms, freely offers herself as a study, pure, sane, and natural, full of beauty, charm, and beneficence. Why should we teach our young men, pardonably ambitious for knowledge, to desert these methods and opportunities for the unnatural, violent, and most cruel revelations of vivisection? For we cannot follow both methods. The time spent in one is lost to the other.

This awful method of eliciting truth has even been applied to psychology, and I have heard one of the foremost teachers of America announcing to a vast audience of children and teachers certain educational principles which had been drawn from the laboratory of the vivisectionist. Fortunately hardly one of his hearers, much less the happy children, knew anything of the hideous background of his information.

If a man wishes to make a special and profound study of psychology, why not go at once to the divine psychology which is presented in its purest forms in the world's great literature? Here is mind communicating itself to mind as such, in the most perfect and natural way; and every intelligence is lighted up anew at every touch, and has received a new revelation of real mind. Every moment spent in converse with intelligent men and women, is a revelation of mind to mind. And this is psychological growth of a beautiful and legitimate character. One hour's converse with Shakespeare, Paul, or Plato, reveals more of the true nature of mind than could be ascertained by all the world in a century by slicing off the feet of a million living horses, or putting to perpetual torture the whole animal kingdom. In fact, this latter process obscures psychology. All that we get by such torture is a series of motor reactions frightfully expressive of the agonies possible to a sentient

creature—the groan of a horse for a lucid utterance of Plato! No wonder the psychologists assure us that it will take a thousand years of such study, lengthened, deepened, broadened, intensified, in order to enable them to say what mind is.

Furthermore there is such a thing as perverting and destroying any faculty. Every desire, appetite, and passion of man is good and necessary in right relation and in proper exercise. And every one may be perverted, abused, and destroyed by unnatural exercise. The desire for knowledge is a spiritual desire that exalts man at one bound above all animality, and is the means for his continuous spiritual development—that is, for creating him as man. Nevertheless this faculty, like the lower desires, is capable of abuse. It may become morbid by being wrongly directed or governed by inferior motives; or it may seek its gratification without due respect to moral, social, physical, or religious principles, in alliance with which only can it be normally developed. There is a whole science of sociology in the inter-relation of the faculties. Finally the desire for knowledge may be unnaturally excited and exercised, and may so be rendered first erratic, then reckless, then morbid, and so may pass, step by step, into states of incurable disease, which finally end in intellectual blindness, disgust, and misery. The end of this unnatural exercise is intellectual impotency. If there is a possibility of creating in man a depraved desire for unnatural knowledge, as he may acquire a depraved taste for unnatural and destructive food or drink, then must we scrutinise most closely this matter of our intellectual hygiene. We must not prescribe recklessly all kinds of diet, and all kinds of intellectual indulgence, not even on the plea of the necessity of liberty. And if there is possible an unwholesome regimen for human thought, in the scientific realm, that possibility is fully realised in vivisection. Of course we cheerfully admit that actual and historical vivisection is not the vivisection which *The Open Court* advocates. But on the other hand it must be affirmed that the kind of vivisection suggested by *The Open Court* is not the kind which the anti-vivisectionists have been “immorally” opposing. These latter have been in determined antagonism to the vivisection that was, is, and will be (so long as there is any), not to the vivisection that might be—say in some quite different world.

The Open Court advocates a vivisection which makes “innumerable discoveries of the most beneficent kind,” and which, by sacrificing “a few hundred rabbits,” saves “many millions of children.” The opponents of the practice object to the continual torture for centuries of thousands of creatures of many kinds for no good purpose whatever, and with no good results. Where are the results to be found anywhere in hygiene or medicine—where has a single life been saved or benefited by the cruel experiments made at Alfort, above described?

Magendie starved, mutilated, and otherwise destroyed several thousand dogs in the course of his physiological experiments, and where has been saved a single human life as a consequence? In all our text-books of hygiene and therapeutics no reference of practical value is ever made to them. The results and theories of one year are contradicted by those of the next year, and clearly nothing has been learned. Meanwhile something might have been learned by a rational and humane study of the subject in other ways. Dr. Edward Berdoe, M. R. C. S., says: “I have been trying for many years to find out what the blessings are which vivisection has conferred upon the race, but I have not succeeded.”

Prof. Lawson Tait, F. R. C. S. E., a man known the world over for his unexampled skill in surgery, says: “In the art of surgery, vivisection has done nothing but wrong.”

Prof. Henry J. Bigelow, M. D., late professor of surgery in Harvard Univer-

sity, says: "How few facts of immediate considerable value have of late years been extorted from the dreadful sufferings of dumb animals, the cold-blooded cruelties now more and more practised under the authority of science."

Dr. Charles Bell Taylor, F. R. C. S., says: "No good ever came out of vivisection since the world began: and, in my humble opinion, no good ever can. . . . If there are any discoveries either made or to be made, for which vivisection was indispensable, I must candidly confess I do not know them."

Sir Charles Bell says: "The opening of living animals has done more to perpetuate error than to confirm the just views taken from anatomy and the natural motions."

Volumes of such testimony, which is valuable because it is the testimony of men who have seen, and known, and studied, and practised, and know just the exact value of vivisection to the physician, can be furnished if desired.

But lest these men should be deemed prejudiced or incompetent witnesses, let us turn to those whose competency and freedom from prejudice cannot be questioned. And first we will call Dr. L. Hermann, professor of physiology, Zurich, and he says;

"The advancement of our knowledge, and not utility to medicine, is the true and straightforward object of all vivisection. No true investigator in his researches thinks of their practical utilisation. Science can afford to despise this justification with which vivisection has been defended in England."

And Professor Charles Richet, M. D., professor of physiology, Paris, says: "I do not believe that a single experimenter says to himself when he gives curare 'to a rabbit or cuts the spinal cord of a dog, 'Here is an experiment which will relieve or cure the disease of some men.' No, he does not think of that. He says to himself, 'I will clear up an obscure point; I will seek out a new fact.'"

Prof. E. E. Slosson, of the University of Wyoming, says: "A human life is nothing compared with a new fact in science. The most curious misapprehension is that the Humane Society seems to think that the aim of science is the cure of disease, the saving of human life. Quite the contrary, the aim of science is the advancement of human knowledge at any sacrifice of human life." "If cats and guinea pigs can be put to any higher use than to advance science, we do not know what it is."

This ought to be enough for the present. Does *The Open Court* still believe that vivisection and vivisectionists, the real kind, are moral, and that those who oppose them are immoral?

What vivisectionists are in themselves we cannot say, and have not the right to judge; but that their theory and practice and results are utterly unscientific, unspeakably cruel, wholly irreligious, and morally damnable, we do not hesitate to declare.

R. N. FOSTER.

THE BRUTALITY OF VIVISECTORS.

I see you claim we anti-vivisectionists call too hard names, and, generally, overdo the thing. May I respectfully ask, is *any* epithet too severe to apply to a set of men who inflict, without a pang, upon sentient (ofttimes affectionate) creatures, torments before the contemplation of which, the human mind stands aghast! I have been fighting vivisection about twenty-five years, and I positively assure you that a humane vivisector is a *rara avis*.

The same cause which operated, in England, to frame and pass the measure which made butchers ineligible as jurors, rapidly obliterates the last traces of hu-

mane sentiment from the vivisector's heart; then they but see in the animal, in their power, so much "material" (the term they, themselves, invented and employ for this purpose). Neither has vivisection made great discoveries in medicine or surgery. I brand all such claims as absolutely false, and, if you will accord me space, I engage to disprove any and every such claim which may be advanced. "Come one, come all!"

ELLIOTT PRESTON, M. D.

Vice-President "New England Anti-vivisection Society."

FURTHER PROTESTS AGAINST VIVISECTION.

From other replies lately received from the defenders of the anti-vivisection movement we extract the following quotations:

Captain C. Pfoundes of Kobe, Japan, writes:

"The main point contended for is this: the vulgarising of the practices of the dissecting-room, and the vivisection laboratory, by the admission of junior students and candidates, indiscriminately, tends to harden and injure the character and to numb the finer sensibilities, weakening the ability to succeed in the art of healing, and vitiate the judgement so necessary in all cases. There are also other obvious considerations."

And Mrs. Fairchild-Allen, editor of *Anti-vivisection*, protests against the term "immorality of the anti-vivisection movement." Having quoted Webster's definition of immorality she adds that the writer of the article "can scarcely assume to apply such terms as these to the very long and eminent list of anti-vivisectionists embracing in its leadership such names as those of Anthony Ashley Cooper, seventh Earl of Shaftesbury; Lord Coleridge, the Lord Chief Justice of England; Basil Wilberforce, Canon of Westminster; Lord Alfred Tennyson, the late Poet-Laureate of England; the Bishops of Bath and Manchester; Robert Browning and a very large company of others who were the confrères of Miss Frances Power Cobbe in the early history of the movement the sentiments of which remain unchanged—except to grow stronger—from its first inception. From the modest beginning of a solitary society, in 1874, for the total suppression of vivisection there has now arisen ninety-four societies, all working to the same end, and these societies comprise a host of adherents whom the world delights to honor."

EDITORIAL REJOINER.

Having perused with great care a number of replies to my article on anti-vivisection, some of which are published in full here, I find that the main point at issue has not been touched by any one of my critics. When I wrote against anti-vivisection I did not attempt to sing the praise of vivisection, for indeed I hate vivisection as much as any one of my critics. Only I cannot join the anti-vivisectionists, and seeing the dangers of their propaganda I deemed it appropriate to point out the difference between stern morality and weak-hearted sentimentalism. I do not use the word "hate" frequently, but I can say that I truly hate vivisection. I hate it as much as war, as operations, amputations, and other cures that remove evils. Although fully conscious of all the horrors of war, I would not recommend a policy of peace-at-any-price. There are causes for which we have to go to war and I understand that war, although an evil, is a necessity in the world. The patient who would not allow the physician to cut into the living flesh of his body if thereby his life might be saved, is not a man of high moral sentiment, but a weakling. And the surgeon who decides in favor of the operation is not a hard-hearted rascal,

but a man who attends to his duty. And bear in mind that the lower nerve-centres of the human body range as high in physiological psychology as frogs and other animals upon whom vivisectors experiment.

It is not my intention to go over the whole field; nor do I wish to repeat myself. Therefore I shall in reply to my critics proffer one consideration only which characterises the issue:

We are surrounded in life by forces which in themselves are neither hostile nor friendly. They now promote our welfare, now impede and even destroy it. Frequently we become the victims of diseases the causes of which are unknown. Under these circumstances our sole salvation consists in comprehending nature and directing the course of events instead of remaining at the mercy of chance. This can be done only by inquiry which must be conducted fearlessly and with utmost circumspection. Truth is needed, for truth is more than life; truth is the condition of the comprehension of life; and as the soldier in battle gladly gives up his life for the sake of victory, so the true scientist gladly devotes his life to the search for truth, and would be willing even to die for truth if truth could be had at that price only.

Now the fact is that the inquiry into truth demands sacrifices. How many noble heroes have died, for instance, in the attempt at reaching the North Pole and collecting facts concerning the nature of the arctic regions. How many animals, especially dogs, have died with them! How many soldiers must be sent into a sure death so that the liberty and honor of a country may be preserved! And truth is more even than liberty.

Life is not the highest good, neither is pleasure, nor the absence of pain. And if progress and truth can be bought only with human lives, by the surrender of human pleasures, by undergoing hardships and suffering, we must unhesitatingly pursue the narrow and thorny path. The animal sacrifices that become necessary for the sake of solving various important physiological problems are only a trivial part of the sufferings that all life has to undergo in its struggle for maintaining itself and advancing to nobler heights of being.

Suppose that scientists had been prevented from making systematic inquiries on lower animals into the nature and cure of diseases, such as the small-pox, cholera, diphtheria, the plague, etc., what would have been the result? We should at present still be at the mercy of the terrible epidemics that sometimes swept over the world and devastated whole countries. If our scientists do not make the experiments, nature will make them for us; but while scientists can make them on lower forms of life and on a small scale with well-calculated economy, nature makes them in wholesale slaughters, on the highest forms of life with an appalling wastefulness, and even then it is doubtful whether she reveals the true cause of the disaster.

There is no need of entering into the details of the question, for we mean to limit ourselves to its moral aspect only. Tenderness of heart showing itself in compassion with the suffering is a noble sentiment, but unflinching courage in a well directed pursuit of truth is the greater virtue. And mind you, tenderness of heart must be well distinguished from that sentimental softness which shrinks from using the knife when needed. I do not deny that there are abuses of vivisection, but I do deny that all vivisectors are unfeeling and blood-thirsty scoundrels. There are men among them who are more considerate than all the members of the anti-vivisection societies together. It is nothing uncommon for the rude butcher-boy to faint at the sight of blood, while the tender-hearted sister of mercy with apparent indifference to the pain she cannot help causing, dresses the wound firmly and safely.

As for our own person we avoid all unnecessary pain, so it is every one's duty to avoid causing any unnecessary pain to others, even to the lowest creatures possessed of sentience; nay, it is wrong to inflict some ruthless harm even on shrubs and plants. But as it would be cowardice to shirk pain where, for some reason or other, duty demands of us to suffer it, so it would be flabby sentimentality if for fear of causing pain to a frog or a rabbit, we should abandon the investigation of important truths that are indispensable for the comprehension of life.

Happily, the terrors of vivisection are grossly exaggerated by the advocates of anti-vivisection and the invention of new anæsthetics will more and more reduce the pain of the victims of science.

EDITOR.

MISCELLANEOUS.

LEONHARD EULER.

Leonhard Euler, one of the greatest and most prolific mathematicians that ever graced the annals of science, was born at Basle, Switzerland, on the 15th of April, 1707. His life fell thus in the period just succeeding the invention of the Calculus by Newton and Leibnitz, the period of the greatest glory of mathematics, which was destined through his hands to be pushed to an unparalleled pitch of perfection. Perhaps the life of no man offers an example of such long and unremitting creative production, nor any science so great a single legacy as that bequeathed by this God-graced inquirer. He fell short of his great compeer and successor Lagrange in the elegance, generality, and high abstractedness of his results, but certainly not in the magnificent plenitude of his achievements.

Euler showed early his mathematical bent. He received in his youth at Basle the instruction of the greatest living mathematician of Europe, John Bernoulli, and at nineteen competed for a prize offered by the French Academy on the masting of ships, which was taken by the veteran hydrographer M. Bouguer, Euler receiving second honors. In 1733, when twenty-six years old, he succeeded his great friend Daniel Bernoulli as professor of mathematics at the Academy of St. Petersburg. His productiveness was astounding, and in a few years his reputation was one of the highest in Europe. There was no branch of existing mathematics that he left unaugmented, and few branches of analysis that arose in the years succeeding his death that he did not partly lay the foundations of. Mechanics, astronomy, music, navigation, gunnery, optics received his attention equally with the purely theoretical parts of arithmetic, algebra, analytical geometry, the Integral Calculus, the Isoperimetrical Problems, etc. He labored incessantly. His very recreations were mathematical, and to them we owe the origin and solution of many important problems. Here fall, for instance, the knight's move in chess and the problem of the crossing of the Königsberg bridges, which gave rise to the "geometry of situation." In consequence of his unceasing application he lost in 1735 the sight of his right eye, and in 1766 that of his left. Thereafter he was compelled to use an amanuensis, but his productivity continued unabated. By virtue of his tenacious memory he was able to carry on the most complicated calculations in his head, and it is related of him that he once formed a table of the first six powers of all numbers from 1 to 100 and recollected them ever afterward with perfect accuracy. He could repeat the *Æneid* from beginning to end and remember the place of every line on every page.

In 1741 he was called to Berlin by Frederick the Great, but returned in 1766

to St. Petersburg where he worked till his death. He left enough posthumous MSS. to supply memoirs for the *Acta Petropolitana* for twenty years after his death, and it is said his complete works would fill from sixty to eighty quarto volumes.

But Euler was not only an investigator; he was also an unusually gifted expositor and teacher, such as few great inquirers have been. Even his works of discovery were frequently systematic didactic treatises, as witness his "Introduction to the Infinitesimal Calculus" wherein he incorporated researches revolutionising analytical mathematics and which in its first part, as recently published in a German translation by Springer of Berlin, can be read with profit and satisfaction today. Mention must also be made of his *Introduction to Algebra*—the only instance of an elementary text-book, if we except the lectures of his successors Lagrange and Laplace, ever written by a mathematician of really first creative rank. It is clear, simple, and copious in style, so much so that it can be used by beginners without the least aid from a teacher; its occasional shortcomings¹ being plain and self-apparent to the intelligent reader. This book, the translation of which is rare in English, can be had in the original, perspicuous German for a mere pittance (Reclam: Leipzig), and might profitably be used in the teaching of scientific German in our colleges as an easy and familiar introduction to the language of German mathematics.

Euler's signal fault in thought and exposition was his diffuseness which formed so marked a contrast to the elegant conciseness of Lagrange. It is said that this was due to the same elements which created in him his theological bias. His father was a preacher. He was himself pious, and a rigid Calvinist, often battling manfully for his faith. With Newton, with Pascal, and so many others of the inquirers of the century preceding him, he offers a most conspicuous example of the two warring elements of religion and science standing side by side in one and the same head unreconciled, each triumphant and victorious in its field. He busied himself much with religious and philosophical problems, as his famous *Letters to a German Princess* (1760-1762) show, wrestling with the problems of evil and prayer, foreknowledge and freedom, preferring "the divine truth to the reveries of men" and the pride of unyielding philosophers. We give but one example, his apology for prayer. He says:

"I remark, first, that when God established the course of the universe, and "arranged all the events which must come to pass in it, he paid attention to all the "circumstances which should accompany each event; and particularly to the dis- "positions, to the desires, and prayers of every intelligent being; and that the "arrangement of all events was disposed in perfect harmony with all these circum- "stances. When, therefore, a man addresses to God a prayer worthy of being "heard, it must not be imagined that such a prayer came not to the knowledge of "God till the moment it was formed. That prayer was already heard from all "eternity; and if the Father of Mercies deemed it worthy of being answered, he "arranged the world expressly in favor of that prayer, so that the accomplishment "should be a consequence of the natural course of events. It is thus that God "answers the prayers of men without working a miracle."

The philosopher here unconsciously employs the atheistic weapon of Deism in support of his Christian faith, and gives proof that if he could not escape his an-

¹For instance, in the elementary treatment of infinite series, where it is said that $\frac{1}{2} = 1 - 1 + 1 - 1 + 1$ etc. *ad infinit.*, because since we are not allowed to stop at any member neither 1 nor 0 can be the result, but something between these two, which is $\frac{1}{2}$!

cestral theologic bias, he could also not resist the spirit of the age, which had imperceptibly infiltrated his religious thought.

Euler was gentle, simple, and unaffected in character, and distinguished by an exemplary love for his numerous family. His single and unselfish devotion to the truth, his joy at the discoveries of science, which was as sincere when these discoveries were made by others as by himself, is beautifully evidenced in his letter to the youthful Lagrange when the latter generalised the branch afterwards known as the Calculus of Variations: "Your analytical solution of the isoperimetrical "problem," he writes, "leaves nothing to be desired in this department of inquiry, "and I am delighted beyond measure that it has been your lot to carry to the "highest pitch of perfection a theory which I have been almost the only one to "cultivate since its inception."

Euler died in St. Petersburg in 1783 crowned with the emoluments and distinctions of a princely scientific career which he never forsook for the allurements of the world. In the Academy of the city which had witnessed most of his silent triumphs was placed an allegorical picture representing Geometry standing upon a basement covered with mathematical calculations—the formulæ of his theory of lunar motions.

T. J. McCORMACK.

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE BUDDHISTS.

AN OPEN LETTER TO THE KING OF SIAM.

SIRE: In the spring of 1896, I learnt from the *Journal of the American Oriental Society* that you had presented forty copies of the Buddhist Scriptures in Pâli to the libraries of the United States. A list of the favored libraries was given, and I found that two copies were in the city where I reside. Though I have been a librarian since 1881, and was in the habit of using both these libraries, I was not aware that they had received so royal a present; for our newspapers, which recorded the fact, contain daily more than any one could read in a week; so that it is not astonishing when we miss information therein. As I was already a student of Pâli, and had spent much money in buying Pâli Texts in Roman letters, I was anxious to make use of your edition, because I knew it contained books which are not to be had in Roman letters, and which have never been printed before in the history of the world, except in translations by that nation who invented printing some eight hundred years before we did—I mean your neighbors the Chinese. But your volumes were in the canonical Pâli, an Aryan language closely allied to Sanskrit, and containing words like *pità*, father, and *mâtâ*, mother, which we recognise at once to belong to our own European family. I was also pleased at Your Majesty's critical ability in omitting from your edition of the Scriptures those ancient fairy-tales called Birth-Stories, which we know were disputed at the Second Council of the Order in the fourth century before Christ. These books are therefore on the same footing with certain books in the New Testament, which we Christians call *Antilegomena*, that is, disputed by the ancients, such as the Second Epistle of Peter, together with six others.

Upon my asking at the library, the thirty-nine volumes, bound in yellow, the ancient color of the Buddhist robe, were placed before me. The first thing I had to do was to master the Siamese alphabet, for I had only read Pâli in Roman letters. I therefore borrowed a volume from the library, and, by the aid of your valuable and necessary table of transliteration at the beginning, I soon learnt to read

and write the simple and elegant characters which your scholars have devised. Our own letters are barbarous in comparison, and this for the reason that we have borrowed those of the Romans, without adding to them such newly invented ones as are absolutely necessary to express our greater number of sounds. You Asiatics have a much more scientific idea of constructing an alphabet than we have, and therefore you take care to have one letter for every sound, that there be no confusion. The Armenians invented their alphabet on this rational principle in the fourth century, and it is evident that you have done the same in Siam when adapting Siamese letters to Páli. You had not enough in your Siamese alphabet; so you invented new ones,—all very elegant and shapely,—until you had enough for every sound in Páli. If the English and the Americans would only do the same, "our commercial and conquering tongue," as Emerson calls it, would be a still greater conqueror. As it is, its absurd orthography acts as a barrier to foreigners, second only in difficulty to the ideographic systems of the Chinese and the ancient Babylonians and Egyptians.

I have since derived much spiritual profit and intellectual enjoyment from the use of your gift, especially from Vol. 25. This is because the Dhammapada and the Sutta Nipáta are out of print in the Roman letters, and are not to be had by an ordinary student. I have copied out many pages from these grand old books, turning your characters into Roman letters as I do so. Not only so, but I know many verses in both these collections by heart, and their rich music rings through my head day and night. I have read portions of Homer, Virgil, and Horace in the originals, but neither hexameter, Sapphic, nor alcaic is one whit the richer in musical effect than the varied measures of these ancient poems. The softness of the language rivals Italian; and when one begins the Dhammapada, one launches upon a sea of melody:

"Mano pubbaṃgamá dhammá,
[Character has its mainspring in the mind.]

Of the fifty ways in which we may translate these immortal words, none can ever have the music of the Páli.

Christian as I am, and believing that the Lord Jesus was the Deity in person, I can yet admire what is true, and therefore Divine, in your religion. The great fact which Gotama has taught us is that our present personality is not worth preserving. It is a husk, a scaffolding, whose beginning is in the world of sense and flesh, and which, after forming a basis for a higher development in realms unknown, is fit only for extinction. "Blessed shall be the cessation thereof." Though this doctrine finds full expression in our own New Testament, yet it is in the rapture of Hebrew gnomes; while in your Three Baskets, especially in the Second, it is elucidated with an intellectual clearness which we cannot find in the concentrated utterances of our Divine Master. Your generosity has given our nation the opportunity of learning all this from the fountain-head.

I now come to the real object of my letter: to thank Your Majesty for the treat you have given me. You have already received the thanks of universities, of libraries, and of famous scholars. I wish you now to accept the thanks of an obscure and unknown student, that you may feel assured of having done a benefit beyond what you have already been thanked for.

I therefore subscribe myself,

Gratefully yours,

ALBERT J. EDMUNDS.

HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PENNSYLVANIA, May 27, 1897.

BRIEF NOTES ON SOME RECENT FRENCH PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS.

We may fitly preface our remarks on the main philosophical works which have appeared in France during the last year with a mention of the *Année Philosophique*¹ which is published under the able editorship of M. F. Pillon and has for its task the review of everything in French philosophy for the year 1896. The *Année* is now in its seventh year, and its possession is indispensable for those who would survey within a brief compass the annual course of Gallic thought. The original articles are contributed by M. Renouvier who writes on "The Categories of Reason and the Metaphysics of the Absolute," F. Pillon who discusses "The Evolution of Idealism in the Eighteenth Century," and L. Dauriac who offers a criticism of the doctrines and methods of Lachelier. Particularly the essay of M. Renouvier is distinguished for the clearness with which it treats a difficult subject, while that of M. Pillon is remarkable for the philosophic culture which it discovers. The bibliography also is the work of M. Pillon, who was the editor of the old *Critique Philosophique*, a philosophical magazine of high worth and standing.

We have a very useful treatise in M. PAUL RENAUD'S *Précis de logique évolutionniste. L'entendement dans ses rapports avec le langage*,² which aims to present the elements of natural logic in a concise and simple form, by the use of the material and data which the modern science of language offers. M. Regnaud, who is Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Grammar in the University of Lyons, and is hence eminently fitted for such a task, regards language as the living record of the development of thought in the past and consequently as the principal document to be studied in treating the evolutionary psychology of the race. His readers will find his reflexions simple and suggestive.

We have in *Le Psychisme Social*³ of M. E. DE ROBERTY a work of a different type. M. de Roberty is Professor in the new University of Brussels, which by its high and liberal aims and its recently broadened plan of instruction is one of the most exemplary educational institutions in the world. He is the author of a systematic series of philosophical works which when completed will cover the whole ground of philosophic inquiry, and which began with his *Sociology*, was continued with one or two historical works, with formal discussions of the reigning movements in philosophy, and is now engaged with the subject of ethics. Ethics will be treated in three volumes of which the present is the second. Ethics, according to M. de Roberty, is explained by the bio-sociological development, which is predominantly intellectual in character and significance. He regards social life as beginning with ideation and constituting thus an absolutely new power in the universe; hence the name *social psychism*. M. Roberty is a hard and profound thinker, and for a foreigner his works are not all easy reading.

Under the pseudonym of Jules Rig, M. ÉMILE RIGOLAGE embarked as early as 1876 upon the praiseworthy task of epitomising Comte's *Course of Positive Philosophy*. The work met with some favor and was translated into various languages. It was well done and could be relied upon, and M. Rigolage had made it possible for one to get the gist of Comte's philosophy without reading everything he had written. He now publishes the second volume of his *résumé* in a second edition, under the title of *La sociologie*,⁴ which, inasmuch as the first part was the *résumé*

¹ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 5.

² Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 2.50.

³ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 2.50.

⁴ Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 7.50.

of Comte's survey of the state of science in his time and is now of course antiquated, really gives his philosophy proper. M. Rigolage has added a valuable preface to his book, where he treats of the application of the positive philosophy to education which had not been considered by Comte.

In the "Historical Collection of the Great Philosophers" which Alcan is publishing in Paris and which now contains excellent translations of Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc., besides large critical works on Socrates, Plato, Marcus Aurelius, Malebranche, Maine de Biran, etc., M. Victor Basch has now given us a ponderous work of 622 large octavo pages entitled *Essai critique sur l'esthétique de Kant*.¹ The work is certainly exhaustive, and M. Basch has subjected the Kantian æsthetics to a microscopic and severe examination in the light of contemporary psychology, endeavoring to draw profit from it for modern uses. He reviews Kant's method, his theories of feeling, of logical and æsthetical reflective judgment, of the æsthetic sense itself, etc., etc. He proposes to study in a sequel to this work the æsthetic of Kant in its historical development, origins, and results. As, judging from its scope, that volume is likely to be larger than the present one, M. Basch will certainly have said much upon this subject. We gladly call attention to this series of works, as the translations and criticisms have been made and written by men of the stamp of Barthélemy Saint Hilaire, M. Fouillet, and M. Paul Janet.

The most recent of the sociological works of ÉMILE DURKHEIM, Professor of Sociology in the University of Bordeaux, is his treatise on *Suicide*,² which he studies as a social phenomenon, observing that every nation has a penchant for suicide of a definite intensity measured by the ratio between the annual number of cases and the population, which the author calls the social rate of suicidal mortality. To seek the conditions which cause this rate to vary is the object of his work. He also considers the means by which the enormous increase in the number of suicides in all large European countries can be retarded. The work is accompanied with numerous charts and tables of statistics.

In *Les origines du socialisme d'état en Allemagne* M. CHARLES ANDLER, Lecturer at the École normale, reviews the causes which have led to the establishment in Germany of a socialistic monarchy, one of the most significant and curious developments of modern government and society. He finds that this development has its cause in the intellectual ferment which was brought about by the great and powerful philosophical works of Hegel, Savigny, Ferdinand Lassalle, and Rodbertus. A noteworthy feature of the book is the author's insistence on the power of ideas over facts. He studies the fundamental conditions of the ownership of property, of the production and distribution of wealth, of the organisation of social labor, the question of revenue and wages generally. He lays much weight upon the influence exerted by the early German philosophers, and shows that they were more concerned with the relations which the individual holds to the state than the relations which individuals hold to each other. Thence proceeded the ideas which led in Germany to state socialism,

We have further to refer to a book on *Nature et moralité*¹ by Charles Chabot, wherein the author discusses the question of free-will, the content of morality, etc., while we must also not omit to mention a work in two volumes by M. J. Strada which has the same title as that of the task to which *The Open Court* is devoted, namely *The Religion of Science*.⁴ M. Strada understands by "religion of science"

¹Fel can, publisher. Price, fr. 10.
³F can, publisher. Price, fr. 5.

²Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, fr. 7.50.
⁴Two volumes. Alcan. Price, 7 fr. each.

something similar to the meaning given to it by *The Open Court*, insisting upon an impersonal criterion of truth which he finds in the Fact, identifying the basis of religion with science, etc. We may have occasion to return to this work independently later. It is difficult reading and extremely rugged in style.

Mention should finally be made of the excellent work which *La Revue Philosophique*¹ under the editorship of M. Ribot, and the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*,² under that of M. Xavier Léon, are doing. The former review is devoted mainly to psychology and to the related philosophical questions, while the review of M. Léon is concerned with the more formal problems which compose the science of metaphysics in its best sense. Its contributors are eminent thinkers in all departments. Science is especially considered, and in every number a certain amount of space is devoted to the consideration of practical questions, it being a theory of the editor that the power of philosophy also belongs to life. T. J. McC.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

AN OUTLINE INTRODUCTORY TO KANT'S "CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON." By R. M. Wenley, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1897.

Prof. R. M. Wenley of the University of Michigan with his publishers, Messrs. Henry Holt & Co. of New York, have made a laudable experiment in the publication of this *Outline Introductory to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. The little book, which is only ninety-five pages in length, is written in a concise, lively style and gives a very adequate digest of Kant's monumental and epoch-making work. Professor Wenley has supplied an able introduction on the genesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* showing its connexion with the preceding development of philosophy, and he has evinced throughout the whole of his opusculum a clear grasp of the main trend and significance of Kant's thought. The little book might be read before or collaterally with the Prolegomena, a study of which should always be made introductory to that of the Critique itself. If the present work is favorably received by teachers and students, it is the intention of the author and publisher to issue a series of works of like character, giving digests of the other leading philosophical masterpieces, to which end the services of prominent teachers in America and Great Britain are to be enlisted. Such a general conspectus as Professor Wenley has given is in Kant's case perhaps more necessary than in that of any other philosopher. But the outcome of each attempt must be judged upon its own merits. We can cordially recommend the present little book and would certainly encourage the author and publisher to continue their plan. T. J. McC.

A MATHEMATICAL SOLUTION BOOK CONTAINING SYSTEMATIC SOLUTIONS TO MANY OF THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEMS. With Notes and Explanations. By B. F. Finkel. Kibler, Cokely & Co.: Kidder, Mo. Pages, 352.

Prof. B. F. Finkel has supplied a useful work in his *Mathematical Solution Book*. His purpose has been to give systematic as opposed to routine solutions of the commonest difficult problems of elementary mathematics, and he has searched all the leading works and periodical literature on the subject for the material which he has offered, not omitting the contributions which he has himself made to the art of solving mathematical problems. All the operations of elementary arithmetic

¹Felix Alcan, publisher. Price, 33 fr. per annum.

²Armand Colin & Cie., publisher. Price, 15 fr. a year.

are considered, the processes explained, and a large number of exercises added. Fully half of the work is devoted to mensuration, and in this part not only the common surfaces and solids are treated, but a large number of unusual figures, rarely used in practical thought, are dealt with. For the latter purposes the calculus is employed, the results and rules only being intelligible to the elementary student. The book is rich in definitions, graphical illustrations, and in information which cannot be obtained in the ordinary school-books. A human interest has been infused into the work by the addition of the biographies of three mathematical teachers, but we cannot help thinking that the praise which is accorded to their achievements has been slightly overdrawn. We have two remarks to make, regarding the operations of subtraction and multiplication which might be incorporated in elementary books.

Since adding is a simpler operation than subtracting, it follows that if the latter process can be reduced to the first, the subtraction of large sums from one another can be greatly facilitated. One knows intuitively the complement of every number with respect to 10 and with respect to 9, and consequently to convert any given example of subtraction into addition we have simply to take the complement of the last right hand number of the subtrahend with respect to ten and add that complement to the corresponding number of the minuend, and then take the complements of all the following numbers of the subtrahend with respect to 9 and add these to the minuend, carrying if necessary and rejecting 10 at the close of the process. The reason of the operation is apparent. Its facilitation lies in the fact that it does entirely away with borrowing, and in long subtractions it is almost impossible to commit an error through this source. For example, in the subjoined subtraction,

$$\begin{array}{r} 83452 \\ 35616 \\ \hline 47836 \end{array}$$

instead of following the common method we may say: 4 (the complement of 6 with respect to 10) plus 2 gives 6—write down 6; 8, the complement of 1 to 9, plus 5 gives 13—write down 3 and carry 1; 3, complement of 6 to 9, plus 5 (because of the one carried) gives 8—write down 8; 4, complement of 5 to 9, plus 3 gives 7—write down 7; 6, complement of 3 to 9, plus 8 gives 14—write down 4, and since the operation is completed, reject the 10 which represents the 100,000 originally borrowed. For what we have virtually done is to add 100,000 to the subtrahend and subtracted the minuend from the whole total.

Further, Professor Finkel says that it is more convenient in multiplying to begin at the right. Since the most important numbers of the result are usually the numbers to the left, it would seem logical that we should attempt to reach these first, rejecting, if it suits our purpose, the numbers to the right. In the multiplication of large decimal fractions this is nearly always desirable, and it is one of the great advantages of the use of logarithms. It can be done in the following manner, where we have to multiply 437.25 by 27.34:

$$\begin{array}{r} 437.25 \\ 27.34 \\ \hline 87450 \\ 306075 \\ 131175 \\ 174900 \\ \hline 119544150 \end{array}$$

We have put here the units' place of the multiplier under the last number of

the multiplicand and we begin multiplying with the last number of the multiplier to the left, going successively through the multiplicand from the right, and placing the first number of the product underneath the number of the multiplier. We continue in this way always placing the first number of each partial product under the number we multiply by. The decimal point will, in the partial products as well as in the total product, always be exactly where it is in the multiplicand, as the vertical line purposely placed in the example shows. Evidently, in any large example, we can neglect as many decimal places as we see fit.

The above is due to Lagrange. Oughtred (1574-1660) suggested the reversing of the order of the digits of the multiplier, but the same result can also be accomplished by writing the first left-hand digit of the multiplier under the last right-hand digit of the multiplicand, in both cases allowing the partial products their proper inverse order of places. Where the multiplier is put to the left under the multiplicand, of course it is absurd and inconvenient to attempt to imitate the common method.

T. J. McCORMACK.

The Messrs. Ginn & Co. of Boston have just issued a translation, made by Professors Beman and Smith, of Prof. Felix Klein's *Vorträge über ausgewählte Fragen der Elementargeometrie*. The English title is *Famous Problems of Elementary Geometry*, being those of the Duplication of the Cube, the Trisection of an Angle, the Quadrature of the Circle. It will be seen that the contents do not exactly justify the title. They are rather an attempt of the well-known Göttingen geometer to show the applicability of the more refined and more generalised methods of modern mathematics to elementary geometry, and to indicate the improved and broader points of view so obtainable. The little book (80 pages) deals therefore with the possibilities of elementary geometric construction generally, with the nature of transcendental numbers, and with the transcendence of e and π . The expositions are lucid and interspersed with valuable historical and bibliographical references. Though, as the translators say, the Calculus is nowhere employed, and the whole is intended to bring certain higher, abstruse results of modern mathematics within the reach of the ordinary mathematical devotee, still a good knowledge of the theory of equations, series, etc., is absolutely necessary to the understanding of the book. Both translators and publishers deserve the thanks of students for the reproduction of this delightful little book in English. The translation is good (might not *potency* for *Mächtigkeit* be better than *power*, on page 51?). By a strange blunder the bookbinder has put the names of the translators instead of that of Professor Klein, the author, on the cover. (Price, 55 cents.)

μκκκ.

DR. HENRY F. OSBORNE, Professor of Biology in Columbia University, and Curator of the Museum of Natural History of New York City, has contributed to the November *Century* an admirable appreciation of the late Prof. Edward D. Cope, the most distinguished of American Naturalists. Cope has not been rated by the non-scientific world at his just merits, and it is well that his importance is now so strongly emphasised. The article following Professor Osborne's is devoted to the gigantic and curious monsters of palæontologic times, with handsome illustrations by Knight, based on the material of Cope. The *Century*, in all such occasional articles, is doing good work for science, if only by softening the minds of the people to a moment's attentive consideration of the claims of research.

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
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NO. 499

ANIMAL WORSHIP.¹

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ETHNIC PSYCHOLOGY.

BY DR. TH. ACHELIS.

IN ORDER to understand the important part played by the worship of animals in the lower stages of religious development,—and some survivals remain even in a higher stage,—it is necessary, as in so many studies in ethnology, to rid oneself entirely of all current prejudices and assumptions with reference to the history of civilisation. Our feelings are still dominated by the cheap disdain with which Christian Wolff, in the eighteenth century, regarded such discussions, saying: “The question whether animals “have souls or not is of no particular value; wherefore it would “be great folly to quarrel much about it; as far as I am concerned “it may be disputed or not, I leave every one to his own views.” Whenever this comfortable repose is disturbed by any disagreeable problems, appeal is made to all-powerful instinct, and thus everything is easily settled: men and animals are separated by a yawning and impassable gulf.² But this is by no means the case with uncivilised races; even the lower stages of civilised society often deviate considerably from this position in their estimate and views of the animal world. To them animals, being endowed plainly enough with souls,—in the strictest sense of the word the primitive man knows nothing inorganic and lifeless,—are just as much persons as are men, with sensual perceptions and intellectual pow-

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Dr. Th. Achelis by W. H. Carruth, of the University of Kansas.

² The fact that a school of natural science dominated by a one-sided Darwinian influence goes to the other extreme and endeavors to obliterate this distinction as far as possible, and, in a fashion quite perilous for psychology, to judge animals entirely from the human point of view (cf. Wundt, *Essays*, p. 182 ff) does not affect the average standpoint, of course.

ers, including speech,¹ only that no ordinary mortal, but the medicine-man alone, understands it. A distinguished ethnographer and traveller remarks that we must conceive the boundaries between man and beast as wholly obliterated. A given animal may be wiser or stupider, stronger or weaker than the Indian, it may have entirely different habits, but in his eyes it is a person just as he himself is; animals, like men, are united into families and tribes, they have various languages like the human tribes, but man, jaguar, deer, bird, fish, they are all only persons of various aspect and qualities. One only need be a medicine-man, who is omnipotent, and he can change himself from one person into another, and understand all the languages that are spoken in wood, air, and water.

The deeper basis of this conception lies in the fact that mankind at this stage is not yet ethical; goodness and badness exist only in the crude sense of doing to others what is agreeable or disagreeable, but the moral consciousness, and the ideal initiative, influenced neither by prospect of reward nor fear of punishment, are entirely lacking. Under these conditions how should the assumption arise of an impassable chasm between man and beast? The outward observation of the life-habits of animals, to which the Indian is restricted, can at most result in assigning man the position of *primus inter pares*. Furthermore, the Indian lacks our delimitation of species, in so far as they do not cross. This distinction, which is easily taught by experience, is entirely wiped out for the Indian because he lacks the knowledge of the hindrance based with us on knowledge of anatomy. If the Indian can explain anything by the crossing of various species of animals with each other, or of man and beast, nothing prevents his asserting it; on the contrary he sees it proven, and concludes at most that such things no longer happen when it is no longer necessary. To-day, our scholars tell us, there is no longer any *generatio æquivoca*, but once there surely was such a thing (V. d. Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasiliens*, p. 351; cf. my *Moderne Völkerkunde*, Stuttgart, 1896, p. 373 ff).

If we go back to these rudiments of primitive psychology, we shall not be surprised when we are informed that the savages talk with their horses, that the Indians beg pardon of the bear when they are preparing to hunt him, or in the case of the rattlesnake—

¹ Even as late as the *Märchen*—as instance bird-language—this conception remained, and accordingly is not solely a product of the imagination, as has been supposed, but rests upon the deeper foundation of primitive animism.

which, as we shall see later, is considered a peculiarly sacred animal—offer sacrifices to it and sprinkle a pinch of tobacco on its head (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, third American Edition, I., 467). Neither can it be surprising if animals are regarded as incarnations of the souls of the departed.

Ancestor-worship, this primary factor of primitive religion, demanded equally by filial duty and social considerations, continued to thrive upon this fertile soil. After their physical death powerful chiefs continue to live and act in the form of animals. Here, too, the psychological train of thought which led to this idea is plain and unmistakable, for as primitive man was impressed by the mysterious speed and the irresistible strength of certain animals, the same respectful awe necessarily led him to keep the spirit of the departed favorable to himself by appropriate worship. It is also notable that this worship is directed especially to large and dangerous animals, probably with the deliberate intention of preventing their depredations. True, in a higher stage of religious development this utilitarian consideration vanishes, as we shall presently see, and is succeeded by what one may almost call an abstract thought. In this case, a given species of animal is regarded as the dwelling of the ancestor, the tribal deity, for one is merged imperceptibly into the other, and the whole tribe takes the name of this heraldic animal, which thus at the same time gains social importance as being a member of the tribal family.

This is the significance of totemism, which is so widespread in Africa, Australia, and America.¹ The mythical tribal ancestor is worshipped in the form of some animal in which his soul has taken up its abode, so that thenceforth the flesh of this animal may not be eaten, or at least the eating must be preceded by all sorts of conciliatory ceremonies. This belief in a common origin from such a tribal ancestor very strikingly illustrates the inviolability of the social bond guaranteed by blood relationship. Among some races (for instance, many Indian tribes, some Malays and Polynesians) this relation is still more emphasised by the belief that the dead are changed into their totem-animal, and thus united with their mythical ancestor. It will be readily seen that in this way there occurred frequent confusions of identity which are of the utmost importance in the development of the *Märchen*,² as we shall see later, and, further, that we are here meeting the first elements of

¹ For details cf. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, I., 117 ff, where the legal consequences (property rights, blood-revenge, etc.) are discussed.

² Cf. J. Kohler, *Ursprung der Melusinsage*, Leipzig, 1895, especially p. 39 ff.

the doctrine, later so philosophically refined, of the transmigration of souls (cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, I., 469 ff).

But while in totemism legal and religious interests are mingled, and while it is often only a matter of an especial guardian-spirit, whether of an individual or of a tribe, the worship of a divinity in an animal symbol shows a purely animistic religious character which sometimes reveals a profoundly philosophical conception of the universe. This transition, hitherto generally overlooked, is to be seen in the Egyptian deification of animals, which has been misunderstood so frequently from the days of the Greek philosophers down to the present. Here, too, at first, we find the universal disposition to fetishism manifested in the care and consideration for certain species of animals widely different in different sections, so, for instance, that one "nomos" or district, used as food the animal worshipped in a neighboring district (cf. A. Wiedmann, *Religion der alten Aegypter*, München, 1890, p. 99). Just as, in a very striking scene described by Bastian, the negroes cudgel a fetish unmercifully to make it thoroughly submissive (*San Salvador*, Bremen, 1859, p. 61), so, too, the ancient Egyptians did not hesitate to resort at times to such brutal means, which, moreover, are even now employed in the case of obstinate and inefficient images of saints in some remote mountain villages of Tyrol and Bavaria.

From such a beginning the speculative priesthood developed the myth into a grand, half-pantheistic idea: the bull was the corporeal representative of Osiris, who was constantly renewed in him, just as, for instance, Buddha is renewed in the individual Dalai-Lamas in Lhassa. The very same process can be traced among the Hindoos, where the modern Brahmans worship in the sacred cow the direct incorporation of divine power, which for this very reason is imperishable and undergoes ever new incarnations. To cite a remote parallel, one might compare the great hare¹ Michabo of the Algonquins in North America, the powerful and kind creator, the discoverer of medicine and of all the arts that lead to civilisation (Brinton, *The Myths of the New World*, third edition, Philadelphia, 1896, p. 194 ff, and his *American Hero-Myths*, Philadelphia, 1882, p. 37 ff). In the same way the god of the Aztecs, Quetzalcoatl, or Huitzilopochtli, worshipped in the form of a hum-

¹The god is worshipped also as a rabbit, which fact Brinton explains from a confusion of the word *wabos* (rabbit) with *waban* (daylight), for Michabo is the light-bringer, and the native American idea of god is contained in this meaning (cf. *Hero-Myths*, p. 41 ff). We shall return to this point.

ming-bird or a serpent, rose far above this connexion with fetishism to the rank of a pure symbol of divine power; he, too, was a god of light, who issues victorious from a contest with his father, Tezcatlipoca, the god of night and darkness (cf. Brinton, *Hero-Myths*, p. 68 ff). Indeed, even Christianity was not able to rid itself entirely of this primitive characteristic, as is sufficiently proven by the representation of the Holy Ghost as a dove, by the familiar symbolic beasts of the apostles, and the various animals connected with the saints, which were borrowed from German heathendom, and, despite the zealous exertions of the missionaries, only slightly altered. The saints on horseback, those primitive figures of Middle Age Catholicism, are simply inconceivable apart from the deeper connexion with the fetish-idea associated with the dragons and serpents which these Christian heroes combat (cf. Lippert, *Christenthum, Volksglaube u. Volksbrauch*, p. 499).

The attempt has sometimes been made to find in the religious ideas of savage races an ethical dualism, such as is familiar to us in the Christian conception of the contest between God and the Devil, or as it is expressed in the conflict between Ormuzd and Ahriman in the Zend Avesta.¹

It requires but little reflexion to see that it is contrary to all psychological probability to assume, as early as this, such speculative ideas, which presume a certain maturity of moral perception. But since, on the other hand, the mythological religion of primitive races is a direct reflexion of their mode of thought and their conception of the universe, it would be strange if the common experiences of joyful or of painful nature had found no corresponding expression in their projection in mythology. Such an expression may be most keenly felt in the familiar answer of a Bushman to the question of a missionary as to what good and bad were: "Good is when I take away my neighbor's cow; bad when he steals her back." Then there is the further consideration that the savage in his helplessness and inexperience sees himself everywhere threatened with hostile attacks and surprises, wherefore it was an organic necessity that the thought and conviction of the fatal activity of evil spirits should reach a rank development in his superstitious imagination. Therefore it is by no means an accident, but rests on a mythological necessity, that the religious precepts of lower races have relatively a gloomy, demonological character, and

¹ So, too, in the myths of the Quichas, we are told of a battle between the gods of the upper and of the lower world which led the Spanish priests into a fatal error.

that most prayers deal with the prevention of impending misfortunes and protection from malicious powers of evil.¹

Even animals are drawn by the irresistible momentum of animism into this unhappy sphere, and so we find arising from these conceptions those terrible creatures of popular belief: werewolves and man-tigers. That certain exceptionally fierce wolves or tigers are man-eaters, says Tylor, is explained by the belief that the souls of depraved men enter the bodies of wild animals at night in order to prey upon their fellow-men. These are the man-tigers or werewolves, that is, man-wolves, whose existence is still believed in by the superstitious people in India and Russia.

The circumstance of a person's growing pale, bloodless, and haggard is explained in Slavic legends by the belief in the existence of blood-sucking spirits, who haunt the patient at night, and whose terrible visits enter his consciousness during sleep. These creatures are declared to be demon-souls, living in corpses, whose veins still flow with blood for a long time after death. These are the so-called vampires (Tylor, *Anthropology*, German edition, Braunschweig, 1883, p. 429; cf. Lippert, *Religion der europäischen Culturvölker*, Berlin, 1881, p. 45 ff; *Christenthum*, etc., p. 410 ff). The essential point is again the original fetishistic idea of an object *possessed* by some divine power,—both the English and the German languages still show the persistence of this thought in the words *possession* and *Besessenheit*. The particular animal varies, of course, according to location; for the Germanic and Slavonic wolf the African substitutes the hyena or leopard.

We cannot here enter into the details of the cult, of the means used for warding off evil, and of the horrible psychological ideas of the people. It must suffice to establish here, too, the early connexion of psychic life in men and animals. Neither can we take up the peculiar variations of the idea of transmigration. In accordance with the original presumption which we expounded earlier, we shall not be surprised if in certain conditions such exchange takes place, for is it not between beings of essentially the same nature? But in a higher stage of philosophical development there occurs imperceptibly a change in favor of man. The incarnation in an animal's body is regarded as a direct punishment for sins committed in this life; or a tyrannical priesthood, as the Brahmans in India, set such impassable barriers between the various classes that the man of

¹ Characteristic in this connexion is the remark of an African, that their God, Niankupong, was too far from them and dwelt too high for a prayer to reach him; they were satisfied with the house-spirit, who cares for the common needs of life. (Cf. Bastian, *Controversen in der Ethnologie*, Berlin, 1893, III., 2.)

lower caste simply had nothing to be born into but an animal, while on the other hand the soul of the pious, by way of ever-recurring rebirths rises to the height of divine nature and perfection (cf. Lippert, *Culturgeschichte*, II., 418).

After such general explanations, which are intended to prepare for the understanding of these problems, already vague to the majority of living men, and misapprehended by them, it now becomes our task to illustrate this outline of the theory by certain concrete examples. It would, indeed, be a hopeless undertaking to try to exhaust the abundance of ethnological material. We can only present a few definite and especially characteristic examples, animals which have attained a typical significance for large race-groups, perhaps even for a considerable fraction of the human race, in a certain stage of religio-mythical development.

This is the case above all with the serpent, and next with the bull and the eagle. Before ethnology opened up the correct perspective, the worship of the serpent was often interpreted in a purely fanciful way, and confused in arbitrary speculation with alleged philosophical doctrines and druidistic priestly lore. Here, too, the initiative influences are evident: on the one hand the totemistic idea of ancestor-worship, on the other a series of material observations on the nature and habits of these animals. These are summed up by Lubbock as follows: The serpent occupies first rank among the animals worshipped; not only is it a maleficent and mysterious creature, but by its outwardly insignificant yet fatal bite, it produces the most dreadful effects in an inconceivably short time with means seemingly so inadequate, and forces the savage almost irresistibly to the assumption that he is dealing with what he regards as a divine being; there are some other less important, yet no less direct influences which have aided in a marked degree the development of this cult; the serpent is long-lived and easily kept in captivity, and thus the same individual can be preserved for a considerable period and shown to the multitude again and again at certain intervals (cf. *Origin of Civilisation*, p. 221). To these points we may add: Its rapid speed without the aid of feet, its dwelling in clefts and caves (the first burial-places), its brilliant, shimmering color, its peculiar sloughing of its skin, its sudden disappearance in subterranean depths, and again its frequenting of human dwellings, especially of that important place, the hearth-stone.

We find serpent worship, therefore, in almost every stage of social development in which mythologic ideas are manifested with

any degree of power : in Central Africa and among the reflectively inclined East Indians, among the red-skins of America¹ as well as among our own ancestors² and among the Semitic races.

Now while we can trace among primitive peoples at least the germs of the idea of eternal life through rejuvenation (as in the legend of the phœnix and in the later version of the Scandinavian midgard-serpent) they know nothing of the serpent as a symbol of evil, as it is familiar to us and particularly to the Iranians of Zoroaster's time. The only connexion with this idea to be assumed here is a slight one. The word serpent among the Dakotas, for instance, signifies the supernatural, just as in Arabic and Hebrew the corresponding word is associated with synonyms for spirit and demon (cf. Brinton, *Myths*, p. 132). Here, too, as Brinton justly suspects (*ib.*, p. 143), the ignorance and the religious bigotry of Christian missionaries have to be taken into account, as is so often the case. Wherever they found images of this animal they fancied they saw the work of the Devil, representations of the principle of evil, which of course was not their purport in any such degree.

Not so universal, yet diffused throughout extended regions of the earth, is the worship of the bull. It seems to be limited to certain fields of civilisation, as India, Irania, and Egypt. Lippert says that the bull must once have served extensively as a fetish animal in the early stage of civilisation in Asia, and among the occidental races related in culture to Asia. It is preserved to us in this capacity for the Assyrio-Babylonian Empire by later sculptures, and in Parseeism by the easily comprehended myth that the primal bull, Kajomort, was also the first man, the progenitor of their kings and the primitive ancestor of the whole human race. In India the bull Nandi was associated with Çiva. On the other hand, the origin of the sacred character of the sacerdotal cow is somewhat different. Throughout Egypt the cow, in connexion with Hathor and other divinities, was treated as a fetish, and was therefore not butchered. But among bulls it was only an individual with certain peculiar markings which received worship at Memphis as the living image of Ptah Sokari (*Culturgeschichte*, II., 408). It is well known that the Egyptian people, who were strictly trained in religion from beggar up to king, were profuse in all imaginable tokens of honor to the visible god to whom King Psammeticus built the splendid court in the Ptah temple at Memphis. His ora-

¹ Cf. Brinton, *Myths*, etc., p. 129, ff., who correctly emphasises the significant symbolism of rejuvenation in the sloughing of the serpent's skin.

² Cf. Schwartz, *Der Ursprung der Mythologie, dargelegt an griechischer u. deutscher Sage*, Berlin, 1860, who expounds especially the significance of the storm-dragon, p. 26 ff.

cles commanded the utmost regard, and later monarchs, such as Alexander the Great and Emperor Titus, paid homage to him. (Cf. Wiedemann, *Religion der alten Aegypter*, p. 100 ff.)

Finally, among birds the chief place was given to the eagle because of his strength and swiftness and his soaring flight. Birds in general are representatives of storm and tempest,¹ and most of the Algonquins on the northwest coast of America tell of a gigantic bird the flap of whose wings produces the thunder, and the flash of his eyes the lightning. (Cf. Brinton, *Myths*, p. 126.) It is presumed to be familiar to all that among Germans and Greeks the highest god was accompanied by an eagle.

It happens, moreover, that the birds that live on the flesh of serpents are regarded as the enemies of the serpent-gods, who attack and generally overcome them, as in the Indian legend. Moreover in this point also there are variations of the original fetishistic principle of soul-transference and possession in the various mythologies, multiplied in the case of the individual animals. Thus we find in the first Christian community the dove, among the Polynesians the soul-transferring moa-birds² (cf. Bastian, *Heilige Sage der Polynesier*, Leipzig, 1881, p. 149), among the Mexicans the humming-bird, half serpent and half bird, of the god Huitzilopochtli, and among the East Indians the hawk, Garuda, representative of Vishnu.

For lack of space we must pass over other animals, such as the elephant, so revered by Buddhism, the rabbit among the Algonquins, the dog among the Persians; neither can we discuss in detail the various forms of the cult, which, of course, differed considerably in the different stages of the people's development. Whether it is a simple child of nature, who sees in some animal his guardian spirit, and seeks to propitiate it by every possible gift, or whether it is an Egyptian priest bringing a sacrifice to the Apis-bull, which represents the divinity in bodily form, the psychological connexion is the same in both cases, even though in the latter case knowledge has advanced so far that the physical form is regarded as an unessential feature compared with spiritual power and efficiency.

And yet we must throw more light upon a point hitherto fre-

¹Cf. Schwartz, *Ursprung*. p. 180 ff; Odhin also changes according to the Edda into an eagle.

²They proclaim the arrival after a great, all-devouring flood of a king, Wakea, who should come to their coast from foreign parts; they are the seat of the highest god, Tangaloa, or Tangaroa, who in this form often approaches his temples. (Cf. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, II., 191.)

quently slighted; this is the significance of animal worship as it appears in the *Märchen* and the animal fable.

Owing to insufficient investigation, there has been a disposition, prompted by illustrations from classical antiquity and certain Middle-Age subjects, to find in the fable a direct moralising value, a didactic tendency, to which it is supposed to owe its origin, whereas ethnology has proven beyond all controversy that the real soil from which sprung this fanciful growth was the primitive relation and intimacy of man with his neighbor animals—an intimacy now wholly lost to civilised man.

The astonishment expressed one day at Oxford by Prof. F. Max Müller, when he found among the Zulu tales the very same ones that we know in such abundance in our *Märchen*, is very significant. In this case, according to the assertion of the best judges, such as the missionary and linguist Bleek, no outward connexion was possible; and yet, with slight local alterations befitting the changed scene, there appeared the same type and the same elements of treatment,—another proof of the psycho-social endowment of the genus *homo sapiens*, whose mental capacity, as Peschel justly observed, is uniform even to its most curious caprices and vagaries. (*Völkerkunde*, p. 27.)

Not until later, when the simple consciousness, the unreservedly animistic conception of the world, had given way to a critical philosophical reflexion, do we meet the familiar parables which are concentrated into the phrase, *Haec fabula docet*. Traces of this rationalising treatment may be recognised, as Tylor has correctly shown, even in the rich wreath of legends that twines about the person of the North American god, Manabodzho. (*Primitive Culture*, I., 409.)¹

The social background of the *Märchen*, which our historians of literature, filled with dumb admiration of poetic power, have too much neglected, is emphasised by Kohler in connexion with the legend of Melusina. He says: In the interpretation of this, as of other myths, the relations of the *Märchen* to the ethnological phenomena of national life have been too much overlooked. The *Märchen* is of mythological origin, but it is the myth incorporating itself in national life which comes to light in highly poetic reminiscences in the legend. It will not suffice to try to explain the *Mär-*

¹The resemblance here is undeniable to the Polynesian god, Maui, the civilising hero of the Polynesians, who, however, like Til Eulenspiegel, is full of cunning schemes and burlesque tricks. (Cf. Bastian, *Zur Kenntniss Hawaiis*, p. 73.) But on the other hand it is certainly possible, as Brinton suspects, that in this case there have been later changes and corruptions of the original character. (Cf. *Myths*, p. 194 ff.)

chen by natural phenomena alone ; it must be explained by the manner in which the natural phenomena are reflected in the spirit of the people, and this manner is characterised by the fact that the people feel themselves to be wholly identified with nature. Therefore modernised interpretations, like those of Max Müller, in which *Puruvavas* is interpreted as the sun, and *Urvaci* as the dawn which flees at the sight of the unveiled sun, are to be rejected to begin with, however much they may appeal to our sentiments.

The origin of the Melusina legend leads us back into the remotest antiquity. It dates back to the period when mankind still clung to totemism. A totem is, as generally known, the sign of a family, usually taken from some animal ; and the clans, ranked in the main according to the matriarchal system, wore such a family sign, and were thereby distinguished from one another. Moreover, this animal sign has a deeper significance : the family wearing it bears a mystic relation to the animal ; it must not kill such an animal or harm it, often not even touch it. The animal is the spirit of the family ; even more, the animal is regarded as the family ancestor,—the family sprang from the animal. (*Ursprung der Melusinensage*, p. 37.)

Only on this assumption of an essential identity can the many variations of the *Märchen* and the fable be explained. Although in a more mature civilisation the world-wide gap between men and animals is undeniable, and manifests itself with a peculiarly tragic effect in the Melusina legend just referred to, yet to the childish simplicity of the Bushmen (those rare virtuosi in animal-fables!) the world of animals is the direct and faithful copy of human life and deeds. (Cf. Ratzel, *Völkerkunde*, I., 690 ff). The discord which so often with harsh clash disturbs this harmonious fellowship of men and animals is especially heard when the higher being which for a time had assumed human form and appearance is recognised, or its origin recognised ; then it is obliged to go away, while jealousy and curiosity play a fateful part, perhaps also the irresistible longing for the old supernatural life that was not restricted to the narrow limits of human existence.

Sometimes, but by no means always, there follows a reunion of the parted pair in the other world, and as a result we have the romantic wanderings across mysterious waters, to sun and moon, or to the dark under-world, in order to find the lost loved one. All these traits and variations of this prolific theme are simply inexplicable without the deeper totemistic background. And so Kohler is quite right in concluding thus: The Melusina theme is a *Mär-*

chen theme that was later attached to historical persons and families, and thus became a legend. The conclusion of the *Märchen* is mythical, but it is not a nature-myth in the sense of a cosmic philosophy which constitutes the various factors of nature's activity into specific divinities, but a myth in the sense of an animism filling the universe with vague spiritual activity, and the myth has its roots in the animistic conception of social relations which, as totemism and Manitou-worship, dominates the childhood of nations.

The mythical element, therefore, has a closer relationship than was formerly thought to the whole social conception of life, for the social fabric is permeated with the spirit of animism, and the belief in animism is most intimately related to social as well as to individual life and its manifestations. And it is very true that the physiological and pathological phenomena of dreams, hallucinations, and nightmare have contributed much to the origin of myths, no less than the phenomena of the outer world reflected upon the imagination of races.

But it is also true that the social manifestations of the collective life-instinct, with its loving, hating, and fearing, and the strong centripetal instincts have influenced the formation of myths. And especially is it true that the love and the aversion particularly strong in man in a state of nature with regard to certain animate beings, certain animals and plants,—feelings which were intensified to the point of a sense of kinship, of passionate desire to persecute, or again, of dumb worship,—appear in popular myths. These social and ante-social manifestations of the human *psyche* must not be lost sight of in the study of myths and their transition into the charming form of *Märchen*. (*Ib.*, p. 63.)¹

If we recall in closing the outline of our investigation, the conclusion is irresistible that the close connexion of men and animals was, to the simple mind of the primitive man, a fact established beyond all question. Hence any further religio-mythical exposition had inevitably to begin at this point, and, apply to this its theory of the soul, which of course had been obtained already as the result of another process. Social forces, especially primitive ancestor-worship enjoined by filial respect, added their influence to make this connexion still closer and firmer, and make it a moral obligation. Not until much later did a metaphysical priesthood take hold of this fruitful subject, expanding it in all directions, but with-

¹As the Melusina legend shows the primitive animistic features very plainly, Kohler prefers it to the Lohengrin type, in which the original force is already relaxed (*loc. cit.*, p. 61).

out destroying in the minds of the common people, at least, the primitive conception of a mystic, fetishistic incarnation, as seen in Egypt and India. This dualism may be traced among primitive peoples, according to Brinton, as in the peculiar myth of the great rabbit of the Algonquins. Michabo, who is worshipped in the form of this animal by the red-skins as supreme god, creator of heaven and earth, and giver of all the blessings of civilisation, has etymologically another meaning, that of "white," and from it are derived the words for east, dawn, light, day, and morning. (*Myths*, p. 198.) To the simple, natural sense the animals are themselves divinities, or at least their direct and authoritative representatives, and the savage believes in their genuineness and power just as firmly as the sincere Christian in the miracles of the New Testament.

It is, therefore, a false standpoint, resulting only from our critical reflexion, to hold to the current assumption of conscious anthropomorphising in the *Märchen*. These animals of the fable are just as much real creatures, endowed with psychic impulses and instincts, as the animals in the constellations, whose real substances have, to be sure, faded in the course of time into the symbolic and shadowy signs of the zodiac. (V. d. Steinen, *Unter den Naturvölkern Central-Brasiliens*, p. 351 ff.) Only a purer interpretation, further removed from the sensual concept, and striving for a deeper understanding, departs from this almost unintelligible, mythological realism, and, piercing through the glittering show of the outer veil to the essence and reality of the phenomenon, endeavors to add to the manifestation the moral element hitherto wholly lacking. A fine illustration of the invincible power of truth in the human mind is given by Brinton in his account of the Inca, Yupangui, who prohibited in his realm all image-worship of the supreme god, Viracocha, declaring it to be wrong to worship the almighty creator of all things in the former manner by means of sacrifices and presents, since only spiritual service was befitting the highest of all gods. (*Hero-Myths*, p. 236.) But in the presence of this lofty and luminous conception of the universe, which reminds us of Christian ideas, we must not, in attempting to secure a socio-psychologic perspective, lose sight of the humbler stages of development, in which the chief part is played on the one hand by inorganic nature, with its mighty elemental forces, and on the other by animals like man in their nature and bound to him by multifarious mystic ties.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.¹

BY THE LATE JUSTICE ALBERT HERMANN POST.

[CONCLUDED.]

WE NOW COME to the task of analysing the jural order of society, as that was indicated in our last article (*The Open Court*, for November). It is obvious that in the first place the jural customs and jural notions of all the nations of the earth must be carefully collated and accurately described. For only the aggregate of all the expressions of the jural sense of mankind can afford material warranting inferences as to the nature of the human jural sense in general.

And since the mass of jural customs and jural notions necessary to this task lies scattered among very many different peoples, it follows that the natural classification of the material will be according to the nationalities in which the notions in question prevail.

Such a collection of the jural customs and notions of all mankind arranged according to nations, would afford a highly useful basis for juridical research. It would be possible to carry out, within this framework, a uniform and systematic arrangement of the material. There are numerous customs and conceptions which repeat themselves among different peoples, and these would serve as the leading divisions of the systematised arrangement we have in mind. The following, for instance, might properly be regarded as divisions: the relations of kinship as derived from mother-right, father-right, and parental rights generally, with the stages of transition between the same, the subsequent development of the bonds of consanguinity (clan-fraternity, milk-tie, foster-tie, etc.), endogamy and exogamy, wedlock in its various phases (restrained and

¹ Translated from the German by Thomas J. McCormack.

unrestrained promiscuity, wedlock by groups, polyandrous, polygynous and monogamous wedlock, leviratical marriages) the capture of wives, the acquisition of the bride by service, the purchase of brides, betrothal-rights, obligation of abstinence before and after marriage, suitors, disqualifications to wedlock, forms of marrying, divorce, second marriage, mourning-time, the status of women and children, age of arming, age of majority, child-bed of the husband, the status of the old and the sick, forbiddance of intercourse between persons near of kin, guardianship, federal and monarchic forms of organisation, community of house and farms, systems of joint responsibility and solidarity, blood-feud, rights of refuge, ordeals, forms of oaths, *et cetera*. This list might be continued for pages. In this material are to be found legal conceptions and customs of the most widely different nations of the earth which partly agree and partly vary. We could arrange all customs and conceptions under these headings, and the classification so reached would be a preparatory work of great value for the causal analysis of legal customs and conceptions generally. It would then appear in how far given legal customs and conceptions varied among themselves and among different peoples.

One foundation for such a causal analysis is afforded by the historical connexion between the legal customs and conceptions of different periods within the same social organisation. But this analysis is only possible where traditions are at hand relating to corresponding legal customs and conceptions taken from the different periods of the same people's development. As a rule this is only the case with peoples having a history. With peoples having no history these traditions are wanting, unless perchance observations relating to their law be made during different epochs by travellers from civilised nations.

The historical method, therefore, in so far as it presents the history of the development of a given legal custom or conception in a given society, is restricted to provinces comparatively limited. So far, we only know of a history of Roman and Germanic law with the beginnings of the history of Slavonic, Celtic, Indian, Mosaic, and Islamitic law. The history of all the other systems of the earth has not been treated, or at least what has been accomplished is confined to the beginnings. Here and there historical treatment would be possible. But with the majority of the peoples of the earth material for such a treatment is wanting altogether, and will, in all probability, never be accessible.

The question arises now whether a really causal analysis of le-

gal customs and conceptions is still everywhere possible. The only aid at the disposal of science here is, as with every such analysis, the method of comparison. But this is possible only when there is an external similarity between legal customs and conceptions. The use of a chronological connexion is here altogether out of the question. Can such a comparison yield scientific results of any value whatever, or are we here at the end of our science? That is the question, the answer to which will determine whether Ethnological Jurisprudence is a science at all, or whether it is a will-o'-the-wisp the pursuit of which is to be given up as soon as possible.

The question cannot be answered *a priori*: it depends entirely upon our successfulness in arriving at definite results. If we are successful, the method is warranted; if not, the attempt goes for naught. The scientific possibility of a purely comparative method depends upon facts, the existence or non-existence of which can only be determined by the application of the method itself. The question is whether in the development of human law definite legal customs and conceptions exist and regularly occur even among unrelated peoples, or whether the law of every people, at least of every kindred group of peoples, is an isolated product standing in no relation whatever to the law of other peoples. If there be rules of legal conduct which recur everywhere on the globe and which pass through a stated course of development, the method by comparison is applicable: to explain a given legal custom of one nation we may avail ourselves of the corresponding legal customs of another. If such be not the case, a purely comparative method is a scientific chimera.

For instance, if a table of the legal customs of all the nations of the earth were to present such a picture as the languages of all the nations of the earth (e. g. in Franz Müller's *Grundriss der Sprachwissenschaft*), a purely comparative method such as I have employed in my works upon ethnological jurisprudence, would be out of the question. A comparison of non-cognate tongues is impossible, for these are isolated formations. It may be that certain results for the general evolution of human thought could be obtained only from a conspectus of all the languages of the earth; but generally languages are isolated products of certain ethnic groups. With other creations of social life this is not the case. The evolution of the religious sense affords phenomena of manifold similarities, which extend far beyond the boundaries of philological races; and so the jural life of mankind affords a succession of phenomena which are not the especial creations of certain peoples or

of a certain congeries of peoples, but which recur on the contrary in wide domains, among unrelated nations, and extend over such broad fields that they may be regarded as the common and universal property of the whole race.

When such analogous legal customs and conceptions are discovered among unrelated peoples of the earth, it then becomes a question whether they owe their origin to analogous causes; for phenomena of jural life which are outwardly alike may rest upon quite dissimilar causes. Yet we may attempt to explain one by the other, and whether this is possible, we shall soon discover. When we meet with the same or a similar legal custom among many peoples, we usually find a sphere of ideas which readily explains it. Whilst certain legal customs and conceptions occur only within extremely limited domains, and do not lend themselves at all to the comparative method, on the other hand we meet with such as recur among all possible peoples and races in infinite variations, and the divergences are such that we are often unavoidably led to assume that these isolated customs represent different stages in the development of a jural institution which in its fundamental features is everywhere uniform. This can be shown only by illustrations, and it remains for me to explain what I mean by a definite example.

Thus under the rubric of *leviratical marriages* we may include a group of phenomena regarding which we possess accounts from the most diverse peoples of the earth, varying greatly in compass and credibility. Such accounts are for instance the following :

1. *North American Indians.*

Among the Kolushes the brother or sister's son receives the widow of the deceased in marriage. Among the Ojibways and the Omahas the widow became the wife of her brother-in-law after the mourning period was over, and the latter had to care for the children of his deceased brother.

2. *Aztec and Toltec Nations.*

In the States of Anahuac a man was only allowed to marry the widow of his deceased brother when children were still living whose education had to be cared for.

3. *South American Indians.*

Among the Arawaks a second marriage is not left to the will of the widow, for the nearest relative of the deceased husband has

the right to marry her, and the latter may thereby often become the second or third wife unless sold to a third party. If she marry any one without the consent of the lawful heir, the deadliest feuds may result. Among the Calchaquis in the interior of Brazil, the brother marries the widow of his brother, to beget descendants for the deceased. According to Von Martius, it is a custom rigorously practised among all Brazilian Indians, that upon the death of a husband the eldest brother, or in case there be none, the nearest male relative of the deceased marries the widow, and the widow's brother marries her daughter; which is the case with the Mundrucús, Uainumas, Juris, Mauhés, Passés, and Coërunas.

4. *Oceanic Peoples.*

In Australia when the husband or affianced dies, his brother on his mother's side inherits his wife and children; the widow repairs to him with her children after the interval of three days. In Western Australia the brother of the deceased has a right to the widow, and, if he choose, may take her for himself. On the Flinders Islands, near Australia, if the husband die his brother marries his wife.

Among the Polynesians the brother of the deceased is regarded as the husband of the widow and the father of the deceased's children.

5. *Semitic and Cognate Peoples.*

Among the Bedouins, if a young husband leave a widow, his brother as a rule offers to marry her; but it is not in his power to force her to marry him. With the Beni Amer, if the brothers of a deceased husband do not wish to marry his widow, she can, after the expiration of the mourning period, marry at her own will, and she may not be forced into marriage by the brother of her deceased husband. With the Barea and Kunama, if a man die, his widow is married without further ado by his brother of the same mother, or ultimately by the son of the deceased's man's sister. With several Berber tribes of the Atlas region, the male relative who after the death of her first spouse first throws his shawl (Haik) over the widow, becomes her husband and has to care for her children and manage her property. Among the Bogos, when a married man dies, his sons by a previous marriage, his brothers or next of kin, succeed to his wife, that is, marry her, without further consultation with her father. Among the Hebrews leviratical marriages occur in the following form: If brethren live together and one of them

die and have no child, the wife of the deceased shall not marry without unto a stranger: her husband's brother shall go in unto her and take her to him to wife. And it shall be that the first born which she beareth shall succeed in the name of his brother which is dead, that his name shall be not put out of Israel. With the Galla, the brother must marry the widow of his deceased brother. With the Somali, the widow may marry again only with one of her husband's nearest relatives, who has to pay her half of her first dowry; if the latter die too, his wife is married to one of the same family for a compensation of one-fourth of the first sum. If the wife die, the husband has the right to demand in marriage an unmarried sister of his dead wife for one-half of the marriage dowry.

6. *Negro and Congo Peoples.*

In the interior of western equatorial Africa, the nephew marries the relicts of his maternal uncle, and with the Bakalai the son marries the widows of his father, with the exception of his own mother. With the Bechuana the son succeeds to all his father's wives, and if an older brother die, the younger brother comes by his wives.

7. *Indo-Germanic Peoples.*

With the Afghans the brother is bound to marry the widow of a deceased brother if she wish it. In the laws of Manu, leviratical marriage occurs only in case a virgin widow be left. In the latter case, the same custom prevails among the Ideyars in South India, among the Jat families in the Punjab, and with some of the Rajput classes of Central India. It occurred in the old German law, that the heir to whom the guardianship of the widow came with the inheritance, particularly the brother of the deceased or indeed her own stepson, took the widow to himself as though part of the inheritance.

* * *

From such a collection of ethnological facts, embracing the whole earth and including the customs of nations in no ways related, no one, unless starting from a prejudiced point of view, could entertain the supposition that it were possible for such strange phenomena, agreeing in so many particulars, to rest everywhere upon causes different in character and place. There can be no doubt that broader foundations to these exist; they must repose upon universal forms of social organisation,—forms which in individual instances find diversified expression only.

These universal forms of organisation are not to be discovered directly from the facts themselves: to determine them a person must possess a knowledge of the general jural status of the nations in question, and this knowledge can be obtained only from accounts of the legal customs of the said peoples. With the aid of information thus obtained, no doubt can be entertained that all the above mentioned customs belong to a form of organisation which extends over the whole earth, and which is exhibited exclusively among peoples living in a state of nature—viz., the clan. Thence arises characteristic conceptions of law which are repeated in all the customs above mentioned. It is a universal principle of the clan-system that women are not independent subjects of jural relations, that they are, so to speak, pieces of property belonging to the clan. They stand under the guardianship of the clan, which disposes of them at will, but which likewise provides for their maintenance. These rights and duties of guardianship are lodged by preference in the hands of a definite person, the head of the family, and after the latter's decease fall to the person who succeeds him. And so the women of the family chief pass to the new family-chief by way of inheritance, and the same rights and duties that the former chief possessed, arise in the person of his successor. With the gradual disintegration of the clan-system women acquire more and more recognised legal status, while the right and duty of guardianship becomes more and more invalidated.

This is the fundamental principle upon which all the above-mentioned customs rest. If the guardian of a woman die, the latter passes by inheritance to the person to whom the guardianship now falls. According to the strict interpretation of tribal institutions, there lies in the idea of guardianship the right of absolute disposal on the one hand, and on the other the obligation to provide for the woman in question.

A great number of other conceptions of clan-law might be adduced in explanation of the customs mentioned.

1. First, two systems of relationship exist in the clan: the system of mother-right, agreeably to which relationship is determined solely through the female line, and the system of father-right agreeably to which relationship is determined solely through the male line. Descent and guardianship conform to these systems. The third system that occurs, the system of parent-right generally whereby the relationship is determined through the male as well as the female line, first appears after the dissolution of the clan-system.

It appears from the instances cited, that leviratical marriages and inheritance of women occur as well under the system of mother-right as under that of father-right. Under mother-right, women are transferred among the North American Indians, Australians, Barea, Kunama, and among the tribes of equatorial Africa, according to the systems respectively prevailing among these peoples. Under father-right, women are transferred among the peoples of the Malay peninsula, the Himalaya and Caucasus districts, among the Mongolic-Tartaric, most of the Semitic, most of the Negro, Congo, and Indo-Germanic peoples, according to the systems respectively prevailing among them. Here and there the accounts fail in establishing whether inheritance takes place according to mother-right or father-right, and since both systems often exist side by side, these instances demand more detailed investigation. With the Brazilian tribes mentioned a complication of father and mother-right is found. The widow is married by the nearest relative according to the patriarchal system, while the daughter is married by her mother's brother on the maternal side according to the matriarchal system.

With the Dyaks, who live according to parent-right, leviratical marriages are in a state of total decadence. The widow may be freed from marriage with the nearest relative of her husband by surrendering her property to the family of such relative.

2. In strict conformity to clan-law, the nearest male-relation of the deceased husband is empowered and obligated to take the widow in marriage, while the consent of the widow is not asked. After the dissolution of the clan the heir generally continues to enjoy the right of marrying the widow, although no longer obliged to do so; on the other hand, he is still obliged to provide for her, although he may become absolved from this duty by giving her in marriage to another person—a procedure empowered by his guardian-right of disposition. The widow acquires the privilege of no longer being forced to marry without her consent the person that inherits her; but on the other hand she is not allowed to enter into another marriage without his approval. If a third person should marry her without the consent of the heir, he would be guilty of an infraction of the heir's guardian rights, and according to clan-law this leads to blood-feud.

Here belong the customs of the Arawaks, the Australians, the Malayans, and most of the others mentioned.

3. All male relatives are entitled to such inheritance who, according to the system of kinship prevailing, are next of kin.

Thus the sister's son or mother's brother, according to mother-right, and according to father-right the son or the brother on the father's side, inherit the wives as well as the property and enter into marriage with the former by inheritance. The brothers of the deceased figure in almost all the customs mentioned. The sister's son figures as heir, for example, among the Kolushes, the Barea, and Kunamas, in equatorial Africa; the son, among the Tunguses, the Bakalai, the Bechuana, the Kaffirs. The only exception to the inheritance of the son is his natural mother, who falls to a brother of the father.

In accordance with the notion that the right of guardianship resides in the whole clan, all members thereof are in a mediate way supposed to be entitled to the inheritance, as is the case among the Alfurs.

4. A legal custom prevailing among all clan-organisations is the purchase of the bride. The family of the female, or its clan-head, sells the future wife for a certain sum to the family of the future husband, or to the latter in person. By this sale the family of the female either renounces all claims to the wife, or certain defined rights still remain with them. When the wife is transferred by marriage to the family of her husband, she remains there even after his death. The family of her husband has to dispose of and care for her: she stands under the guardianship of her husband's family. Without the consent of the latter she is not allowed to enter into marriage with a third person, and in case of such a marriage her deceased husband's family receives the amount paid for her as bride.

If a kinsman of the deceased husband marry the widow, no bridal price is paid the family of the female, provided all rights have passed to the family of the husband through the original bridal purchase. Otherwise, a smaller payment is made at remarriage.

If the guardian-rights of the female's family are not totally abolished by the bridal purchase, the relations between the family of the female and the family of the husband may take various shapes.

Thus among the Benget-Igorrots the wife belongs to the family of the deceased husband, and among the Papuas of Geelvink Bay and on the Aru islands the family of the husband gets the bridal sum for the widow who enters into an alien marriage. No bridal sum is paid among the Alfures of Buru and on the Aru

islands in case of leviratical marriages. The law of the Somali is also to be compared here.

The rights of the wife's family still appear in the custom of pre-emption, which is mentioned among the Usbeks, in the law of Timor, where the next of kin to the deceased can absolve himself from the obligation of providing for the widow by the payment of a certain sum to her family.

5. To the clan-guardianship already noticed, belongs the custom of the Karo-Karo according to which, if there be no near relative of the deceased to take the widow, the family chief assigns the latter a spouse from the Marga of the deceased husband. And similarly among the Circassians, the widow and her children pass to another member of the clan. The provision here is quite characteristic that the clan has no obligations in this line if the widow be too old for marriage. With the Bechuana also the whole kindred determines which among the kinsmen has to marry the widow.

6. The provisions of the Batak-law of Angola and Sipirong are to be taken into consideration here according to which the widow of the elder brother always falls to the younger brother, while the marriage of the elder brother with the widow of the younger is regarded as incest. On the other hand, with the Alfures of Buru the eldest brother of the deceased inherits the widow of the deceased, whereas a brother younger than the deceased husband may not marry the latter's widow. This last provision appears to owe its existence to entirely specific causes. With the Malagasy the brother next succeeding marries the widow. With the Khatties the widow of the elder brother falls to the younger, while the widow of the younger brother may do as she pleases. It thus appears that also in this instance the elder brother can make no claim to the widow of the younger. With the Chassaks the women pass from one brother to another in the line of succession, apparently thus: the widow of the elder brother, always to the next younger. With the Bechuana also the younger brother succeeds to the widow of the elder. And so it appears to be the rule in general, that the next younger brother is in every case authorised and obligated to contract leviratical marriages.

7. A peculiar group is formed by the leviratical marriages of the Calchaquis in the interior of Brazil, of the Malagasy, and of the Hebrews. In these instances the object of leviratical marriage is to perpetuate the family of the deceased—an object which is aimed at by many other features of the clan system. Children begotten in leviratical marriage are considered the children of the de-

ceased husband. The law of the Malagasy recognise all children as such; that of the Hebrews only the first son. With the Ossetes the same thing reappears as with the Malagasy: only in this instance the widow's children which are subsequently born out of wedlock, also pass for the children of the deceased husband, just as among the Kaffirs natural children of widows pass as the children of the deceased husband and consequently fall to the latter's heirs.

8. To the decadence of the clan-system belong those customs according to which the obligation to marry the widow is only a duty of propriety, and according to which the woman must consent to the marriage; in the first place, however, the provision of the law of Anahuac whereby a leviratical marriage is permissible only when the education of the deceased brother's children has to be provided for.

9. To an entirely different group belongs the custom of Ponnapi, according to which, upon the death of a wife, the widower marries her sister. This custom is also found among the North American Indians, the Knistineaux and the Selish, and in many other districts besides. It is found among the Somali together with the customs above noticed. There may be a close relation between this and the legal principle so widely diffused that the wife's family stands security to the man in bridal purchase that he shall keep his wife, and that if she die, a new one shall be substituted. Yet the matter might be considered from other points of view, and more thorough investigation is demanded for an adequate explanation of this phenomenon.

Numerous groups of facts similar to those just discussed may be discovered in the jural life of the peoples of the earth, and this being the case, it will no longer be possible to deny that the purely comparative method is allowable in the province of jurisprudence; and this holds true, whatever individual opinions may be as to the value of the facts reported and the inferences drawn from them.

That the inferences are unsafe, is at once evident. This comes from the fact that sufficient material is not yet at hand and has not yet been properly assorted. But it is just as perfectly evident that inferences have to be drawn and will have to be drawn still. The material would never be procured, if it could not be shown from such inferences that a collection of facts in the direction indicated would lead to solid scientific results. Furthermore it is only through inferences of this sort that points of view can be won from

which further work may be directed with intelligence. For all material is certainly not of equal value to science, and the tendency to delve into irrelevant details is widely prevalent in learned circles, and especially in Germany. On the other hand, one must be on one's guard against pronouncing a discovered fact irrelevant because we do not happen to know at the time of any analogous phenomenon. It is impossible to prescribe a detailed method of procedure for the field of ethnological jurisprudence. Such a method must first result from the very material to which it is applied.

At present we can offer but a few general points for consideration :

1. Although the collection of material must take place with separate races and nations (and the most detailed observations are here of the highest value), nevertheless in the causal analysis of the jural customs of a single nation, it is highly expedient always to adduce the corresponding jural facts of cognate as well as of non-cognate peoples : for we may thus avoid such false conclusions as easily arise from insufficient material in treating of a definite custom of a given people. This is but the extension of a view which has already asserted itself in the investigation of the history of law.

An exposition of what is stipulated in the law of a single European municipality would be much more exhaustive if expounded from other sources beside its own and if the laws of kindred municipalities were adduced in explanation. In wider fields, the recent study of Indian Law has aided considerably in perfecting the expositions of Germanic, Roman, Grecian, and Celtic customary law. If legal customs exist which are more universal and which prevail throughout extended ethnic fields, it is certain that an understanding of these is of proportionately more value if the explanation of such a custom in a single nation is under consideration. We do not wish to say by this that no attempt should be made to expound the legal custom first from the more limited sphere in which it appears. On the contrary, this endeavor should be aided as much as possible, and historical investigation in particular should be pushed as far as practicable in the separate provinces. But in any single province of law, historical investigation will always reach a point where original material no longer warrants conclusions of demonstrable certainty. Vagrant hypotheses necessarily arise, where the admission of facts from more extended regions might lead to safe conclusions. It is quite obvious that in considering the laws of peoples having no history, a comprehensive

understanding of the laws of all other peoples of the earth possesses incomparably higher value than in the case of peoples that do possess a history; indeed it is indispensable in the first instance if false conclusions are to be avoided. It must therefore be recommended to those who intend to labor scientifically in the field of ethnological jurisprudence, first to acquire at least a tolerable knowledge of every existing legal system before entering upon more limited fields of research: otherwise they will always be liable to partial judgments. Even for the mere collection of legal customs, this will be expedient, for an investigator with European opinions of law might very easily receive a wrong impression from a legal custom discovered among a people living in a state of nature. The causal analysis will be the more correct, in proportion as the investigator's knowledge of all existing systems of law is the more comprehensive.

2. The history of law deals with historical data in their chronological succession. Ethnology in so far as it treats of peoples having no history does not recognise such a connexion; it has no chronology. Ethnology takes no cognizance of decades or centuries: it has to do with periods and strata only, somewhat like geology. In any epoch you choose ethnology meets with all manner of legal customs, from the lowest and crudest to those of the highest development, existing near each other and among all nations of the earth. The materials whereon it can found its conclusions are like or analogous data, and such data among the different peoples of the earth are separated from one another not by decades but by hundreds and thousands of years. Legal customs which are practised to-day among one people, belong to the most primitive periods of another. The chronology of ethnological jurisprudence is not a computation of years from a point of time arbitrarily adopted. It is the graduated scale of development which any characteristic legal custom or conception has passed through among the different peoples with whom it is found.

This idea can be transferred to historic nations also and with important results. Every living historic nation still rests in its undermost strata upon the primitive society whence it has arisen, and upon this foundation strata upon strata of culture and civilisation are piled. All these strata still lie one above the other in the positive law of a people of any period. Even in the most recent of modern codifications there is an abundance of heirlooms from primitive times, and we may trace in the current law of to-day the history of its development as easily as we can trace in the structure

of the human body the history of the human race. This point, too, may often become of great importance in explaining any single legal custom; for it is often impossible to explain such customs from the times in which they occur, it being necessary to recur to periods long since past.

3. Hitherto, the science of jurisprudence has believed that it possessed the most valuable material for research in the laws of nations which had reached the highest plane of civilisation, and that it could dispense altogether with the study of civil life among the ruder and more uncivilised peoples. It is exactly upon this point that ethnological jurisprudence must lay the greatest emphasis, for only in the laws of uncivilised peoples are the germinal conditions of law to be discovered, and for a universal history of the development of law a knowledge of the latter conditions is indispensable. As the science of physiology is based upon the physiology of the cell, so will the future science of jurisprudence be founded upon the germinal element of civil society—the primitive gens. And this primitive gens as an elementary form is to be found at present only among purely aboriginal peoples.

4. Social customs and conceptions, as we find them among the nations of the earth, are regarded by the ethnologist as organic products. The fact of their existence can no more be subjected to criticism than the fact of the existence of individual plant or animal species, than the fact of the existence of a solar system or of the universe at large. They are regarded as natural growths, and merely the causes that have produced them are made the subject of ethnological research. In the same manner the *legal* customs and conceptions of the various nations of the earth, are regarded by ethnological jurisprudence as irreversible facts. They too are not to be subjected to æsthetical or ethical criticism from the individual standpoint. They are to be investigated objectively in reference to their causes, just as we examine a plant or an animal in search of the laws of its growth and the conditions of its life.

In ethnology, therefore, and particularly in ethnological jurisprudence, the question never arises as to whether a thing be good or bad, right or wrong, true or untrue, beautiful or ugly. The sole question is whether a certain custom or conception really exists in the life of the nations; and if it exist, why? and if not, why? No importance can be attached here to the judgments of individuals regarding such a custom or conception; and if ethnology and ethnological jurisprudence are to acquire a strictly scientific character, this purely objective standpoint is to be rigorously adhered to.

Individual estimation is an extremely inconstant factor, and its recognition would utterly invalidate a strict and scientific treatment of ethnological subjects. An exhibition of indignation on the part of an ethnologist at relatively immoral practices, adds nothing to the solution of ethnological problems. It matters not whether a people live without the institution of marriage, practice cannibalism, offer human sacrifices, impale its wrong-doers or burn its witches and sorcerers; for the sentimental disapproval of such practices, in investigation, tends to disarrange that equipoise of judgment which is requisite to determining the causal relation existing between ethnological phenomena. The ethnologist is called upon to seek this causal relation with the cold indifference of the anatomist. A person who speaks of senseless customs and senseless institutions, is not fitted to engage in ethnological research.

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The above are the principal points of view which at present admit of establishment for ethnological jurisprudence. Others may suggest themselves as the science is further developed.

HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF ISRAEL.¹

FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE DESTRUCTION OF JERU^s
SALEM.

BY PROF. C. H. CORNILL.

*VI. From the Return out of the Babylonian Captivity to the Outbreak
of the Rebellion of the Maccabees.*

THE HISTORY of the people of Israel begins with the migration of Abraham from the Euphrates to the Jordan ; it closes, one may say in a certain sense, with the compulsory migration of the exiles from the Jordan back to the Euphrates. The Babylonian exile constitutes the crisis in the history of the people of Israel from both the political and the religious standpoint. Politically and nationally the Babylonian captivity put an end for ever to the people of Israel. Even when, three hundred and fifty years later, there was once more a Jewish state, those who formed it were not the people of Israel, not even the Jewish nation, but that portion which remained in the mother country of a great religious organisation scattered over all Asia and Egypt. It would on this account be technically correct to entitle the second part of our theme, which is to occupy us in the last five chapters, simply Jewish history, or history of the Jewish people. Yet the change is still more tremendous which the Babylonian exile produced in the religious life of Israel, though indeed the two are most intimately and inherently connected. The very overthrow of the Judean state and the destruction of the national life had the effect of entirely reconstructing the religion of Israel. Even in the last periods of Judean independence there had been evolving a movement which had for its aim to spiritualise religion as much as possible. In order to guard

¹ Translated from the manuscript of Prof. C. H. Cornill, by W. H. Carruth of the University of Kansas.

it against growing worldly and to avoid with all care the danger of sullyng its purity, they had aimed at separating religion from its foundation in nature and referring it absolutely to itself and the spirit.

This was a dispensation of Providence; for thus it became possible for the religion of Israel to survive the fall of the state and the destruction of the nation, and yet to preserve them both by reconstructing them. If the destruction of the body had freed the spirit and given it an unhampered career, this spirit must needs shape for itself a new body. And Israel could constitute this new body only if it developed in accordance with the demands of this spirit. No one felt this more clearly and no one expressed it more distinctly than the Great Unknown of the last years of the Babylonian exile, whom we are accustomed to call Deutero-Isaiah because his writings are transmitted to us as the second portion of the book of Isaiah. This Deutero-Isaiah announced the universal mission of the religion of Israel more grandly than any one else: Israel is set for a light of the heathen; it is called to carry the revelation of God to the whole world even to the ultimate islands, the house of the God of Israel shall become a house of prayer for all nations; but in order to be able to fulfil this mission God must first make of Israel itself a covenant. Israel must become a covenant nation; that is, after Israel had broken the covenant and therefore perished as a nation, it must become a new people which will identify itself with the covenant, or league with God, and which is resurrected and remains alive only for and through it. Quite literally the ground had been snatched from beneath the feet of the nation, and it was therefore obliged to seek another ground and foundation, and this was necessarily religious. Thus religion became one with this nationality which completely subordinated itself to religion and proposed to be nothing but its body and mouthpiece.

With correct instinct, guided by the prophet Ezekiel, the religious genius of Israel laid its universal mission upon God for the time being, and took up the immediately more urgent task of getting the mastery in its own house, of driving ineradicable roots in Israel itself. And accordingly there is accomplished in the Babylonian exile, and as a consequence of it, that remarkable transformation which makes of the Judean state a Jewish church, of the Israelitish people a Jewish religious congregation. For the history of religion there is perhaps no other period in the history of the people of Israel of equal importance and significance with the half century of the Babylonian exile, from 586 to 537.

But from the standpoint of secular history we know nothing of Israel in this period : its destinies are those of the Babylonian Empire. This empire with such a brilliant beginning was not destined to enjoy length of days. It depended on the person of its founder, Nebuchadnezzar. When this mighty monarch died, on the 27th of March, 561, after a reign of forty-three years, the star of Babylon set. The empire maintained itself only twenty-three years longer, under four short-reigned kings, two of whom died by the hands of assassins, and then the Persian king, Cyrus, put a sudden end to it.

After the overthrow of Assyria, the most extensive empire remaining was the Median, to which indeed the lion's share of the spoils of Assyria had fallen. True, the two allies against Assyria had connected themselves by marriage, Nebuchadnezzar marrying Amytis, the daughter of Cyaxares. Nevertheless, Nebuchadnezzar recognised clearly the danger that impended from this neighbor, and the immense fortifications of his capital and of his whole country, constructed by Nebuchadnezzar, could have no other purpose than to protect his empire against Media, as indeed they were called "the Median wall." And when in the year 585 he made every effort to mediate between his father-in-law and Alyattes of Lydia, and thus to maintain the Lydian kingdom, he was guided by the desire not to let Media become too powerful.

But destiny had already provided that the Median tree should not reach the skies. Nebuchadnezzar's brother-in-law, Astyages, who succeeded his father Cyaxares in 584, was not the man to give his realm added glory ; after he had ruled thirty-four years, Cyrus, the Median vassal king of the powerful and vigorous race of the Persians, made himself independent, defeated the Median army and captured the capital, Ecbatana, in the year 550.

In Babylon they probably rejoiced at first over the downfall of Media, but they were to learn only too soon what a bad exchange they had made.

As general, king, and man, Cyrus is the greatest personality and the noblest figure in the ancient history of the Orient. In but twelve years, with his handful of Persians, he destroyed forever three great empires, conquered all Asia, and secured to his race for two centuries the dominion of the world : with him the hegemony over Asia passes from the Semites to the Indo-Germanic races.

The formidableness of the new rival was soon recognised, and in the year 547 a great coalition was formed between Lydia, Baby-

lonia, and Egypt, which was also joined by Sparta, for the purpose of stifling in its beginnings the ambitious and growing empire of Cyrus. Cræsus of Lydia began operations in the spring of 546 and made a hostile demonstration toward Persia ; but Cyrus fell upon him at the first approach, followed on his heels as he retreated, and captured Sardis, the Lydian capital, in the autumn of the same year and took Cræsus captive : the kingdom of Lydia had ceased to be.

Why Babylon was then given a respite of eight years, and how the quarrel finally broke forth, we do not know ; but on the 3rd of November, 538, Cyrus held his triumphal entry into Babylon, and therewith the empire of Nebuchadnezzar also had ceased to be.

With what enthusiasm the Jewish exiles greeted the victorious Persian king as avenger and liberator the contemporary Hebrew literature gives the clearest evidence. And in fact, it was one of the first official acts of the new ruler in Babylon to give the Jewish exiles permission to return to their home, and to encourage in every way the restoration of the Jewish commonwealth.

Cyrus could have had in this only political motives. A clash with Egypt was inevitable, and so it was to the interest of the Persians to have on the Egyptian border a commonwealth that was bound to their ruling family by the strongest ties of gratitude, and upon the fidelity of which they could absolutely rely.

In the spring of 537, forty-nine years after the destruction of Jerusalem, the exiles set out, about fifty thousand souls all told. And evidently members of all the families and groups participated in the migration. They felt that they were representatives of all Israel, as is shown by the fact that the returning emigrants were under the authority of a council of twelve responsible men, the repeatedly mentioned "elders of the Jews," a number which can have been chosen only with reference to the number of the tribes in the nation. This council evidently had the whole internal control and the guidance of the affairs of the community, for which the Persian government did not concern itself. First among the twelve are named Zerubbabel, grandson of King Jehoiachin, and Jeshua, grandson of Seraiah, the last priest of Solomon's temple, who had been executed by Nebuchadnezzar. Sheshbazzar, who is repeatedly mentioned as Persian Governor-General of Judæa, was, by the likeliest supposition, a son of King Jehoiachin born in Babylonia, and hence most probably the oldest, to whom the Persians, as was their custom, entrusted the vicereignty of his people.

On the site of the great brazen altar in Solomon's temple

they forthwith set up a new altar, and had it ready to celebrate the feast of tabernacles in 537 with an offering to the God of Israel. Voluntary gifts were also received for the expenses of the religious service and for proper clothing of the priests, but according to the express testimony of contemporary accounts the restoration of the temple was not immediately undertaken. They had indeed enough to do to make the desolate land habitable again and to restore Jerusalem as far as necessity commanded. About one-tenth of the returned immigrants settled in Jerusalem, the remainder in the immediate vicinity of Jerusalem,—the report that the whole territory of the former Kingdom of Judah was occupied at the very beginning, is in itself improbable to a high degree, and is entirely contradictory to the impression made upon us by accredited tradition.

The returned exiles held themselves strictly and haughtily aloof from the remnants of the former population that had remained in the country; we read frequently of the value that was put upon pedigrees and the proof of pure stock.

Of the next seventeen years we have no positive knowledge, but must conclude that important events occurred within the priesthood in this period. For in the year 520 there appears all at once a "high priest" in the person of the before-mentioned Jeshua. Even Ezekiel knows absolutely nothing of a high priest; now on a sudden, he is present and very soon becomes the first personage among the people, crowding into the background even the house of David. We know beyond all doubt that certain things did happen within the priestly class during these years: several families which could not prove their pedigrees were excluded from the priesthood for the time being, and yet we find the descendants of these families mentioned as in important positions in the priesthood eighty years later, whence it appears that they must have secured admission after all. This gives us a significant hint. According to the regulations of Ezekiel only the descendants of Zadok, members of the family of the priests of the temple in Jerusalem, were to have priestly rights after the restoration of the commonwealth and to exercise priestly functions; but it was not possible to carry this out. The very number of the immigrant priests, four thousand two hundred and eighty-nine, that is, one out of every ten free men, puzzles us. These cannot all have been of the family of Zadok, or even in the main so. Whence it appears that they had been obliged to establish the new priesthood on a broader foundation: not the sons of Zadok, but the sons of Aaron are its

representatives, and in order to satisfy the claims of the house of Zadok it is probable that the high priesthood was established and reserved exclusively to this house.

Finally in the year 520 the construction of the temple was begun. Harvest failures and famine burdened the country: the prophet Haggai declared this to be a punishment from God because the people were dwelling in ceiled houses while the house of God lay in ruins. He was supported by another prophet, the priest Zechariah, who worked in the same spirit. So the work was actually begun on the 24th of September, 520, and on the 24th of December the corner-stone was laid with due solemnities,—laid by the Davidite Zerubbabel, who had succeeded his deceased uncle Sheshbazzar as governor. This was an assumption of privilege on the part of the congregation: but the Persian authority was at the time on a weak footing; almost the whole empire was in revolt against the new king, Darius. The satrap Tattenai, who was Zerubbabel's superior, saw the structure while on a tour of inspection, and demanded an explanation. He reported the circumstance to Darius, but Darius sent reply that the building was really supported by a permit from Cyrus, and that he was therefore desirous to see the work aided in every way. And in fact it was possible on the 3d of March, 515, after four and a half years' work, to celebrate the completion of the temple and solemnly dedicate the new house of God.

We know nothing about the next fifty-seven years. Only from the descriptions of the book of Malachi we can infer that conditions took a very critical turn. Lukewarmness and indifference, and even frivolous mockery, had taken the place of earnest enthusiasm: a painful disappointment had taken possession of men's minds, and they tried to make life as comfortable and agreeable as possible for themselves and to compromise with their religious duties in the easiest and cheapest way. There was, indeed, a little band of the genuinely pious, who labored only the more seriously for their own and the people's spiritual salvation; but they could accomplish nothing. At this crisis aid came to them from Babylon.

The closest connexion and the most lively intercourse was maintained between the exiles who had returned to Jerusalem and those who remained in Babylon, so that these received reliable information regarding all occurrences in the old home. The development had proceeded differently in Babylon: the Jews there, without anxiety for their existence and not compelled to wage a severe struggle for sustenance, had devoted themselves with all zeal

and undivided interest to the religious problem; and they, who still lived in a heathen land, were called upon to keep their identity as Jews, and to cultivate consciously and to manifest their Judaism.

Thus there had developed in Babylon of all places a regular theological school, which pursued the study of the law and showed also a marked literary activity: the expansion and completion of the law was the work of these circles. One of the most prominent among them was Ezra, likewise a descendant of Zadok and a near relative of the high priest's family in Jerusalem. He determined to take an active interest in this portentous crisis. He succeeded, how we do not know, in interesting King Artaxerxes Longhand in his plans and in securing an autocratic firman which named him as royal commissioner with unlimited authority to reform conditions in Jerusalem.

On the 1st of April, 458, the caravan assembled: there were seven hundred and seventy-two men, the number of women and children not being given. Ezra had refused a Persian escort. After preparing themselves by fasting and prayer, the train set out on the 12th of April and arrived safely in Jerusalem on the 1st of August. There they celebrated a great thank-offering to God for the happily completed journey.

Ezra proceeded immediately to his work. The most important point was that of the mixed marriages already contracted. In the revival of religion and nationality these presented a great difficulty: if the national identity was dimmed or entirely blotted out the religion also would inevitably perish; then indeed Israel would be swallowed up by the heathen. Therefore it was necessary to apply the knife right here, and to show the most merciless energy. According to what Ezra was told conditions were much more discouraging than he had imagined: even the priests and the Levites turned out to be involved in the abuse and deeply compromised.

And now a scene is played which has been compared not unfairly with the so-called "revivals" of the English Methodists: a deep religious excitement is aroused, and under the pressure of this temporary excitement the participants are led into resolutions which otherwise they would have refused to make. Ezra rends his garments, tears his hair and beard, and as though paralysed by what he has heard, sits stiff and silent until evening. A great circle of people gathers about him, and finally toward evening he arises, throws himself upon his knees, and speaks in tears a long,

loud confession which paints the corruption of the people in the blackest colors.

An even greater circle of men, women, and children gathers about him, who all break out into loud weeping. At this point one of Ezra's sympathisers speaks in the name of the assembly: "Yea, we have all sinned grievously! Let us make a solemn vow "to put away all our foreign wives and their offspring! Ezra, take "thou the matter in hand; we will be with thee." Ezra strikes the iron while it is hot, and puts all those present under a solemn oath straightway. But this did not settle the matter: only when they began to enforce the plan did the whole difficulty of it appear. It is true, every man had by the law the right to put away his wife, and we must take great care not to judge these occurrences from our point of view. But in the case of a marriage prompted by love and blessed with fondly cherished children, it could not but be regarded as a monstrous proposal to put away wife and children absolutely and without condition. And the most serious obstacle was found in the most respected circles of the community. These had formed many alliances with the neighboring aristocracy and with the Persian officials, and to send back to such fathers-in-law their daughters and their children was not to be thought of without hesitation.

And so it is almost five months after that prayer-meeting before there is summoned to Jerusalem, on the 20th of December, 458, a popular assembly at which every male member of the families returned from the captivity was ordered to appear under penalty of excommunication. There sat the whole assembly in the open square before the temple, trembling with excitement, cold, and rain, and when Ezra repeated his demand the matter was treated in dilatory fashion; they said it was too important and weighty a matter to be settled in haste, and asked that a commission under the leadership of Ezra should first ascertain the exact condition of affairs and then deal with the offenders individually. Four adherents of Ezra protested, it is true, against this delay, but the proposal was accepted: the assembly goes home, and Ezra is left to see what he can accomplish with his commission.

Any one who has had the questionable fortune to be chairman of a commission or of a directory can easily imagine himself in Ezra's place. The commission is organised on the 1st of January, 457, and in three months has so far accomplished its task as to have ascertained and officially identified all the men who are living in mixed marriage. At this point our report breaks off suddenly

and we have no direct account of the next thirteen years, until April, 444. Of course the reports of the period were intentionally suppressed because they were too sad and too humiliating. Plainly Ezra accomplished nothing, and an attempt to strengthen his position was a woful failure.

In April, 444, we suddenly learn that the walls of Jerusalem are torn down and its gates burned with fire. Ezra had probably recognised that he must first of all be master in his own house before he could take any energetic measures. Jerusalem was an exposed and thinly populated city, defenceless against any sudden attack, open to any surprise. Relying, therefore, upon his royal authority, Ezra had proceeded to build city walls and fortify the place.

The neighbors, suspicious and offended most deeply by the recent occurrences in Jerusalem, now publicly denounced this last proceeding to the Persian Government, attributing to Ezra's action a political motive.

We must recall that Egypt had shortly before freed itself from Persian rule. True it had been again subjected, but not by any means pacified; there are still commotions in Egypt as late as 449 and 443. Accordingly the Persians were naturally very anxious regarding the neighboring countries, and therefore a command actually arrived from Artaxerxes to desist forthwith from the building of the wall. The enemies of the Jews translated this royal command into action and destroyed the work that had been begun. This probably happened in the year 445.

But just at the moment when Ezra's cause seemed hopelessly lost there came to him unexpected assistance. A Babylonian Jew named Nehemiah had won the favor of King Artaxerxes and his wife, Damaspia, and had become royal cup-bearer. He heard of the depressing occurrences in Jerusalem and could not conceal his distress. The king whom he was serving at the time made sympathetic inquiries, and when Nehemiah is directed to ask a royal favor he applies for and receives the position of governor in Jerusalem, which was evidently vacant at the time. The king gave him leave of absence for twelve years and actually appointed him Persian governor in Judea.

Well provided with royal privileges and credentials, he sets out in order to assume his new office forthwith. Now the civil arm is at the disposal of the work of reform, and Nehemiah is the man to make use with all energy of the authority given him.

In Nehemiah we have one of the most characteristic and at-

tractive figures in the whole of Israelitish history. He owes his success above all things to the moral nobility of his personality. Entirely unselfish, inspired only by consecrated zeal for the cause, he has the power of carrying all along with him, of encouraging the timid and unenthusiastic by his own belief and confidence, and of lifting plodding and lukewarm souls out of and above themselves by his own idealism and enthusiasm. He is at the same time the soul and the arm of the whole work, taking hold everywhere himself and leading. But he proceeds in this openly and honorably, scorning all petty means and evasions: friends and foes alike know where to find him. Even where he uses force he does not cloak his purpose, but meets his man with lifted visor, everywhere throwing his whole personality into the undertaking. And since his energy was coupled with practical force and equally great shrewdness and knowledge of the world—he had not gone through the school of diplomacy at the Persian court for nothing—he was the man of destiny for this difficult task, which demanded a peculiar combination of religious enthusiasm and worldly wisdom, and he accomplished it. What Ezra attempted, Nehemiah achieved; the establishment and consolidation of the Jewish community is essentially his work and his merit.

The new governor had been but three days in Jerusalem when he undertook, with but a few companions, a night ride about the ruined walls in order to get by the pale light of the moon a complete survey of the damage. He had not proceeded far when his animal was checked by rubbish and ruins, and he was obliged to turn back.

Now he called together the whole people and the priests and elders, painted for them in vivid words the shameful condition of Jerusalem, and presented to them the authority and the privileges which he had received from the king. They proceed to work forthwith and the task is apportioned in an extremely practical way. To each family was assigned a certain part of the wall, which it was to construct, and thus the whole wall rose from the ground at once.

The whole time Nehemiah did not have his clothes off. Day and night he was on the ground, taking hold everywhere himself like the commonest laborer, supervising all and carrying great and small with him by his example and pattern.

The enemies of the Jews, among whom Sanballat the Horonite, Tobiah the Ammonite, and Geshem the Arabian are especially mentioned, behold with wrath and dismay what is going on in Jerusalem, and try in every way to hinder the work. When their

ridicule and mockery prove of no avail they try to use force ; but Nehemiah makes his arrangements so that the work need not be interrupted, and yet the whole force is at any moment ready for defence. Now the enemy try cunning : they undertake to lure Nehemiah away from the work under pretext of a conference ; but Nehemiah, who immediately sees through the clumsy plan, answers with delicate irony that he unfortunately could not leave Jerusalem at the moment, being occupied with an important task which urgently demanded his personal presence.

Then the enemy hit upon the plan of causing him difficulty in his own camp. There were certainly many who had but half a heart in the matter, and to whom any pretext for withdrawing in good order was welcome. And now Nehemiah's enemies hire the pitiful remnants of the prophetic class in Jerusalem, who actually sell themselves for money and work against Nehemiah by means of alleged prophetic oracles, and try to mislead and alienate the people ; but Nehemiah overcomes these difficulties also.

But now he is met by the most dangerous obstacle. By reason of the work upon the wall the common man has been deprived of the opportunity to follow his regular business ; moreover the taxes have to be collected afterwards as before, and there seem to have been in addition crop failures and dearth. Thus the poor had become deeply in debt: they had been obliged to mortgage their fields, vineyards, and houses, and even in some cases sell their children into serfdom. Now they bring their complaints before the governor, who forthwith calls a general assembly and with all the pathos of virtuous indignation rebukes the rich usurers for their unfraternal behavior. By referring to his own unselfishness in resigning all the income that belonged to the office of governor, in order not to oppress the people, but instead paying for everything out of his own pocket and besides keeping open table daily for a hundred and fifty persons, he brings such a moral pressure to bear upon the rich that they swear solemnly to cancel all their claims and return all property held in pledge.

Now the work advances with giant strides : on the 25th of September, 444, after fifty-two days' labor, the wall was finished and the gates set in place. A solemn procession which marched about with psalm-singing and music upon the top of the newly erected wall, expressed thanks to God for the success of the work and proclaimed to all the world its completion.

Thus protected against interference from without, they now proceed to the greater and more important task which Ezra had

been obliged to drop. For the very next 1st of October, 444, the whole people is summoned to Jerusalem. From the midst of the assembly itself comes the proposal that Ezra shall read from the book of the law of Moses. Ezra mounts a pulpit already erected for this purpose ; on either side of it stand seven of the most prominent men, and a number of Levites are on hand to explain to the people what Ezra has read. Again the people break out into loud weeping ; but Ezra says they are not to weep, but sit down to a joyous meal and give a share to those who have brought nothing, for this day is a sacred jubilee for Israel.

The following day Ezra continues the reading of the law, but only to the heads of families. Then the feast of tabernacles is celebrated on the 15th of October according to the directions of the law, and on the 24th of October a great and general day of repentance and prayer is held, and there the whole people takes a solemn oath to support the book of the law as read by Ezra ; the heads of families sign and seal this obligation with due solemnity : strict observation of the Sabbath, absolute prohibition of mixed marriages, observance of the sabbatical year and the remission of debts, and above all faithful payment of the dues to the temple, are the most important single points of this compact.

The 24th of October is the real birthday of Judaism, one of the most important days in the history of humanity. At last the religion of revelation had succeeded in getting a home of its own, if I may use the expression ; it had created for itself a body in and through which it could act and fulfil its lofty mission to the world.

True, not all was accomplished by this one popular assembly. Many had allowed themselves to be carried away by the mass, to whom it now came hard when obligations there assumed were taken in bitter earnest. And the very ones upon whom Nehemiah should have been able to depend, and who were the born tutors and guardians of his people, the priests, stood aside resentful or at least lukewarm. They had by this time developed into a sort of temple nobility, who were now concerned only for the privileges of their position, who fraternised with the civil nobility, but who were not disposed to accept into the bargain heavy obligations. So long as Nehemiah was governor, indeed, he was able with iron hand to suppress all opposition ; but at the end of twelve years his leave expired, and in 432 he was obliged to return to the Persian court. But with a true perception of the needs of the sit-

uation he managed to secure the governorship anew and was permitted soon to return to Jerusalem.

How far the whole work depended on him personally became evident immediately. Even this brief absence had sufficed to let everything get at odds and ends. The Sabbath was desecrated boldly, the temple tribute was not paid, mixed marriages began to recur. But the most serious offence had been committed by the high priest, Eliashib. He had given a chamber in the temple to his kinsman, Tobiah the Ammonite, whom we know as an enemy of Nehemiah, and his grandson, Manasseh, had even married Nicaso, the daughter of Sanballat, Nehemiah's chief adversary.

And now Nehemiah adopted rigorous measures. He went about the whole country to hunt out mixed marriages and appeal to the consciences of the guilty parties; he punished severely violations of the command of Sabbath rest; he had the gates of Jerusalem closed on Friday evening and kept closed the whole Sabbath, and when heathen traders tried to set up their market without the walls of Jerusalem on the Sabbath, he had them warned and threatened with violent punishment. The temple tithes, likewise, were systematised carefully and provision made for their correct payment. But Nehemiah took the most energetic measures against Eliashib, the high priest. If he might defy his authority with impunity, it would amount to nothing. Without ceremony Nehemiah had Tobiah's household stuff cast out of the chamber in the temple and had the chamber itself reconsecrated; and when Manasseh refused to put away Nicaso, he expelled him from the people and the congregation.

We have a vague hint that a considerable number of priests, who were dissatisfied with the new conditions, joined Manasseh and left Jerusalem. Manasseh went to the home of his father-in-law, Sanballat, and founded there an Israelitish worship according to the old style, which was adopted by all who were dissatisfied with the reforms. This became the religious community of the Samaritans.

This secession was a decided advantage for the reform in Jerusalem: all the hesitating elements withdrew from the city and only those remained who had firm convictions. Now the Jewish community became an harmonious and homogeneous society in which the strict tendency of the reform party prevailed; whoever was dissatisfied had simply to join the Samaritans. Thus there was a clean division on one side as well as on the other, which however was not accomplished amicably, but planted on both sides a rap-

idly growing harvest of passionate hatred. For the further history of the development of religion the Samaritans are without consequence; for a second time, and now for all times, Judah had become Israel, Israel was limited to Judah.

Regarding the length of Nehemiah's second term as governor and his further destinies we know nothing; but the after time shows plainly that he accomplished the work of his life. He impressed the stamp of his spirit upon Judaism for all time and forced it to follow the course he had marked out.

It is one of the greatest ironies of fate known to universal history, or, to speak more correctly, it is one of the most striking evidences of the wonderful ways which divine Providence takes for the attainment of its most important and most significant ends, that the final completion and the permanent consolidation of the exclusive Judaism, which sealed itself hermetically against everything non-Jewish and rejected sternly everything heathen, was accomplished and made possible only under the protection and by the aid of a heathen government, that the reformation of Ezra and Nehemiah, to use a modern phrase, hung on the sword-belt of the Persian *gens d'armes*. And yet the work was of God, and only thus could the religion of revelation be preserved. But for the energy of Nehemiah the whole history of humanity would have run an entirely different course. And therefore we too must look up to this man with gratitude and reverence to this day.

For the next two hundred and fifty years only a few scattered dates are transmitted to us. For universal history they are the most important and portentous of all—I need only name the one name, Alexander the Great. Let us examine what we know of this period and sketch the events of the history of the world only in roughest outline, so far as they are indispensable to the understanding of the history of the people of Israel.

Johanan, the grandson of the high priest Eliashib whom we know, had a brother Joshua, who was a friend of Bagoses, the Persian governor. Bagoses wanted to secure the high priesthood for Joshua; Johanan learns this and murders his brother in the temple during the service. At the news of the crime Bagoses hastens to the temple; when they beg him not to pollute the temple by his presence he answers scornfully: "Do I, perchance, pollute the temple more than the corpse of the slain man?" So he goes in, and for atonement fifty silver shekels have to be paid him for every lamb sacrificed throughout a period of seven years,—at least he made a fine stroke of business out of the death of his friend.

Further, we have the wholly disconnected remark that King Ochus destroyed Jericho and deported a great number of Jews to Hyrcania. In the reign of Ochus it is a fact that all Egypt, Phœnicia, and Coelesyria was in rebellion against the Persians: it is possible that some scattered Jews took part in this, and so there is at least every inner probability for this report.

But the days of the Persian dominion were numbered. Alexander the Great began his marvellous career of victory in 334, and the battle of Issos delivered all Syria and Egypt into his hands. Alexander hastens immediately thither in order to make sure of these countries. What Josephus tells of a visit of Alexander in Jerusalem and his meeting with the high priest Jadduah is pure legend; on the other hand it is quite probable that Alexander, who showed all possible consideration for the religious views of the people whom he subdued, may have granted the Jews exemption from tribute in the sabbatical year and permitted to those going with him to war the observance of their own religious customs. When the Samaritans rebelled against him he added a part of Samaria to Judea.

And so the Jews had been transferred from the Persian rule to that of the Greeks.

We pass over the events and confusion of the succeeding years, remembering only that the battle of Ipsus, in the year 301, put an end to the contentions of the immediate successors of Alexander: Palestine and Coelesyria fell to Ptolemy of Egypt, and until 198 Judea remained an Egyptian province.

This century is the happiest period that Judea experienced after the loss of her independence. The very first Ptolemy favored the Jews in every way. Not only was the Egyptian administration in Judea exceedingly mild and kindly disposed, but Ptolemy endeavored also to persuade the Jews to settle in Egypt proper. It is even reported that Alexander colonised Jews in his newly founded city of Alexandria. Ptolemy pursued this policy with all energy, because, as Josephus informs us, the Jews were the only ones among all his subjects upon whose oath he could absolutely depend; therefore he preferred to appoint Jews to positions of trust, and granted them in Alexandria complete equality with the Macedonians themselves, "isopolity," as it was called. As the immediate successors of Ptolemy favored the Jews in the same way, Alexandria soon became the second Jewish city in the world, and in Egypt they were numbered by millions.

That this favoring of the Jews by the Ptolemies was based

largely on policy, and that the endeavor to attach to themselves and their family the population of an important and exposed boundary province, is evident from the very fact that Seleucas Nicator, ruler of Syria, the neighbor and rival of Egypt, hastened to grant them in his country and his cities the same privileges : he, too, gave them "isopolity" with Macedonians and Greeks. In the new capital founded by him, Antiochia, this right of citizenship even paid something : there were allowances of oil connected with it ; but since the Jews would not accept this heathen oil, as being polluted, Seleucas issued an order that it should be made up to them in money at the prevailing market price.

As Palestine belongs geographically to Asia, nature herself had assigned it to Syria ; so long as this province was in possession of Egypt, and the Egyptian boundary was thus advanced to the very gates of the capital, Antiochia, the Seleucidæ could not rest nor regard their realm as rounded out and complete. And so, as the result of the inner momentum of circumstances, there soon began the struggles of the Seleucidæ with the Ptolemies in order to take from them this province which was indispensable to Syria.

It is not our office to pursue these fluctuant events in detail. At first the advantage was decidedly on the side of Egypt. There a series of excellent and highly gifted rulers ruled, while the first Seleucidæ after the mighty Seleucas Nicator present a mournful and lamentable picture.

But soon the leaf is turned. The fourth Ptolemy, a Louis XV. on the Egyptian throne, wholly degenerated in the most shameless excesses, allowed everything to decay and rot, while at the same time in Antiochus III., incorrectly called the Great, the throne of the Seleucidæ had received at least an enterprising and energetic ruler. True, the first attack of Antiochus upon Egypt was repelled ; but when in 204 Ptolemy IV. suddenly died and the kingdom was left to his five-year-old son, the confusion in Egypt was great. Now Antiochus took swift measures. In their helplessness the Egyptian regents offered the guardianship of their youthful king to the Romans ; but the Romans were still occupied with Hannibal, and soon after had Phillip V. of Macedon to look after, and accordingly could not at the time give any attention to their Egyptian ward.

After various chances of war Antiochus succeeded in defeating decisively the Egyptian general, Scopas, at Paneas, and in forcing him to capitulate in Sidon, whither he had retreated with

his troops. Thus in the year 198 Palestine and Coelesyria became a Syrian province.

The Jews who had felt the change in condition of the Egyptian state, and who could have no sympathy for such a man as that fourth Ptolemy, received the Syrians with open arms and gave them active support in expelling the Egyptian garrisons, and Antiochus showed his appreciation of their willingness: the whole service in the temple in Jerusalem was put upon the charge of the state treasury, exemption from taxation was granted to everything intended for the temple as well as to the priesthood and all *attachés* of the temple, the entrance into the temple was forbidden to every non-Jew as well as the introduction of unclean animals into Jerusalem, under heavy fines to be paid to the priests of the temple, and all Jews were secured in unconditional religious freedom. Those who had fallen into military captivity and slavery were to be released forthwith. To the population of Jerusalem, and to all who should settle in Jerusalem within a certain period, complete freedom from taxation for three years was granted and after that exemption of one-third.

We see, the new government spares no pains to win the hearts of its Jewish subjects, and these probably looked forward to the future with joyous confidence. But how soon the picture was to be changed! When thirty years had passed over the country Judea was engaged in a desperate struggle with Syria for life and death; and with this we are once more at a turning point in the history of the Jewish people.

SOCIALISM AND BIRTHS.

BY AUSTIN BIERBOWER.

THOSE proposing social remedies commonly ignore one factor which threatens to defeat all their measures, and that is the law of births. The labor question is not merely how the poor may be made more comfortable, and the rich required to divide their possessions, but how the people may be maintained in their new equality when attained. If all were rendered comfortable in some socialistic community, and none had to provide for the future of self or family, there would be a thoughtless propagation of human beings which would soon overthrow the community. People are now restrained from the maximum increase by the question of support. Were that removed, the less considerate would win in a race of reproduction. The worthless generally reproduce fastest. The low and idle, being most given to licentiousness, and having least restraint, would, if not controlled by considerations of support, soon crowd out the more intellectual and moral classes. There would be too many children if all could produce them without individual responsibility, and over-population would destroy the prosperity of the community. In improving the condition of the poor, we should consider why there are so many poor, and how far the relief of the poor tends to multiply the poor. The improvement of their condition should go along with expedients to prevent their undue multiplication. The lower classes ought not to disproportionately populate the earth. The better element should perpetuate itself instead of the worst. And while the poor are often morally and physically better than the rich, a large proportion are poor through indolence, drunkenness, or crime, and these do more than their share in reproduction. The question of bettering the condition of the people must, therefore, be considered in connexion with the increase of the people. Removing the present

obstacles to over-population would not permanently benefit the people. To relieve the poor, and by the same measure multiply the poor—to make it easier to get support for their families and to raise still larger families—is not to permanently solve the labor problem. Were all provided for, the most reckless would have the advantage and soon throw the system out of proportion again. One with twenty children would have no more work to support them than one with two; and in a world with too many people it is not a policy of relief to confer on the most worthless the greatest power of increase. Were our country newer, and greater numbers needed to till the soil, the greatest producer of children might be the greatest benefactor; but when laborers are complaining of excessive competition, large families become a burden on the community.

The question is, What shall we do about the production of human beings? Shall the negro, the pauper, the immigrant, the ignorant, and the morally low be permitted to put upon society as many of their kind as they can? And will society undertake to care for them all? Men believe themselves intended for something else than to support other people's children as fast as they can be produced, and they do not like to toil for the benefit of the worthless.

Men get rich, and keep rich, by moderating their desires, and were all equal in children they would be more equal in wealth. But to have one class produce the wealth, and another the consumers of wealth, is to make a condition of necessary conflict.


The question, then, for labor reformers is, What shall be done to regulate the population when all are provided for? A better distribution of wealth would not remedy general poverty, since the number of those who have much is small, and their possessions, however distributed, would not make all comfortable. The poor embrace nearly all the population; and the more people there are, the poorer must be the average. To be well-to-do, men must be few. In some countries, as China, the soil cannot support the entire population. As we learn to live more easily, more come into the world to live, the supply being according to the facility of birth and support, and not according to demand. Men are increasing too fast, and the supply throws our social and business system out of order. The regulation of men is as important as the regulation of any other interest.

THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTION OF DEATH.

BY THE EDITOR.

IN CHRISTIANITY the names Death and Devil are as closely coupled together as in Buddhism. Death is the wages of sin, and it was Satan who brought Death into the world from which the Saviour is expected to rescue mankind.

Christianity of the first and second century was a spiritualistic movement, but the conception of spirit among the early Christians was rather materialistic.



THE LAST MOMENT OF LIFE.
(Representing early Christian views. From ancient manuscripts.¹)




STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL.

However, we must here, as in many other respects, distinguish between Christ and the Christians. According to the synoptic gospels Jesus did not enter into a discussion of any philosophical problem; his religion was practical, not theoretical. Yet the Jesus of St. John, in agreement with the doctrine of the Logos, identifies the life of the soul with language and defines spirit as the words which he speaks. He says: "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." (John vi. 63.) If the nature of

¹ See Bastian's *Verbleibs-Ort der Seele*, Plate 1. Reproduced from *Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde*, Vol. II., Plate XVII., 5 and 7.

spirit had been understood in this sense, the Church would not have passed in its evolution through a number of grievous errors; it would have avoided the materialism which characterises both its psychology and its dogma of the life to come.


St. Paul taught that Christ had bodily risen from the dead, and he regards Christ's bodily resurrection as a guarantee of the bodily resurrection of all those who believe in Christ. He believed that the bodies of the dead would on their resurrection at the great day of the Lord be transfigured, and the Church formulated the doctrine in the Apostle's Creed in the terse but unmistakable formula of "the resurrection of the flesh."



THE EARLY CHRISTIANS' IDEA OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD. (13th century.)
From the Cathedral of Rheims, France.


Many frescoes and bas-reliefs in the Christian cathedrals prove how very intent the Church at all times has been on the doctrine of a resurrection of the flesh. The most popular hymn of the German Reformed Churches, both Lutheran and Calvinist, which has only of late been altered by a few liberal congregations, enumerates details and emphasises that on the day of resurrection "we shall be covered by this very same skin; these very same eyes shall behold God,¹ and in this very same flesh we shall see Jesus."

¹ "Dann wird eben diese Haut
Mich umgeben wie ich gläube.
Gott wird werden angeschaut
Dann von mir in diesem Leibe.
Und in diesem Fleisch werd' ich
Jesus sehen ewiglich."



CHRISTIAN REPRESENTATION OF THE LAST JUDGMENT.

Sculptures on the main entrance of the Cathedral at Bourges, France. Fourteenth century. (Reproduced from *Klassischer Skulpturenschatz*.)



CHRISTIAN REPRESENTATION OF HELL.

Sculptures on the main entrance of the Cathedral at Bourges, France. Fourteenth century. (Reproduced from *Klassischer Skulpturenschatz*.)

The belief in a bodily resurrection was, in spite of its materialism, the dearest hope of the early Christians; and their materialistic view of immortality is only of late giving way to a nobler, purer, and more spiritual conception.

Christian art naturally originated with the decoration of graves. The Catacombs, where the dead bodies of the early Christians and their martyrs lay became places of worship, and it was customary to celebrate the sacrament over the very tombs of the dead. The sanctity attached to dead bodies is especially apparent in the custom of burying some saint, if possible the patron saint of the church, underneath the altar itself, a practice which now begins to be neglected, but is sometimes still adhered to in the Roman churches even in the United States.




CHRIST AS ORPHEUS.

A painting in the Catacombs. (After F. X. Kraus.)



PERISTERA.

A dove of gilt silver for receiving the Eucharist. From the Catacombs. (After F. X. Kraus.)



LAMP FROM THE CATACOMBS.

Showing the anagram of Christ, (XP) and the Ω .


The custom of having a grave underneath the altar gave rise to the establishment of the crypt, which is never missing in any Roman Catholic cathedral of the Middle Ages.

The earliest products of Christian art, such as we find in the Catacombs, are mere imitations of classical *motifs*. Dr. Francis Xavier Kraus, when speaking of early Christian painting, says:

"The ornamental system is, upon the whole, the same as in the contemporaneous pagan paintings. We find wreaths, cornucopias, vines, birds and other animals. In addition we find the seasons represented as youthful virgins and also genii. Even the dolphins and tritons of profane art are not missing. All these things were as natural and conventional in Greco-Roman ornamentation as the letters of the alphabet and the words of the language. Thus, we can understand that Christian artists applied the implements of paganism without hesitation, and no one thought of their pagan religious significance."

The transition from pagan to Christian art is gradual. In the Catacombs, for instance, Christ is represented as Orpheus with the

lyre, or as the good shepherd carrying a sheep after the fashion of a calf-bearing Hermes. The virgin with the child finds its prototypes in various maternal deities, such as the Egyptian Isis, nursing Horus, and the Greek Mother Earth, Gaea Kurotrophos. An independent spirit of Christian art develops first in peculiarly Christian symbols, among which the favorite subjects are the lamb, the fish,¹ and the dove. In addition we find the chrisma, the monogram of Christ, a combination of *XP*, the two first letters of the word *Χριστός* and the *A* and *Ω*, symbolising God as the Beginning




THE CALF-BEARING HERMES.

(From *Denkmäler des klassischen Alterthums*.)

and End of all things. When gradually the better classes of Roman society began to join the Church, the Christian sarcophagi almost rivalled in elegance and beauty of design their ancient classical prototypes. But the further north we come, the rarer are ornamented stone coffins. The sole instance in Germany is the sarcophagus of Treves, representing Noah in the ark. The artist's work is almost crude, but it shows a pious spirit and possesses the charm of naïveté.

¹ The word "fish" (ΙΧΘΥΣ) was anagrammatically interpreted to mean *Ἰησοῦς Χριστός Θεοῦ Υἱός Σωτῆς*, "Jesus Christ, God's Son, the Saviour."

The most famous piece of art of this kind is perhaps the sarcophagus of Junius Bassus, who died in 359 at Rome. Here pagan subjects are replaced by illustrations of Biblical events, such as Daniel among the lions, Jesus preaching, the Saviour's entry into Jerusalem on an ass, etc. The technique is quite pure in style and as rich in execution as the best pagan work. It shows warmth of sentiment in the disciples and earnestness in the attitude of those



CEILING OF SANTA LUCINA. (After Rossi. Reproduced from F. X. Kraus.)

who teach. But (says Dr. F. X. Kraus, quoting from Schnasse¹) it lacks individuality and strength. The faces of all the apostles are made after the same pattern and the expression of the various persons is monotonous.


The tombstone of Eutropus is of special interest because we learn from the picture that he was a sarcophagus-maker by trade. He is represented at work assisted by his apprentice. The inscrip-

¹ *Geschichte der Ital. Kunst*, I., 58. See Kraus, I. c., p. 117.

tion,¹ which speaks of him as “saintly² and fearing God,” as well as the dove with the olive branch, indicates that he was a Christian. The man standing behind the artist is perhaps his son. According



THE TREVES SARCOPHAGUS REPRESENTING NOAH IN THE ARK. (After F. X. Kraus.)



THE SARCOPHAGUS OF JUNIUS BASSUS, Rome. (After F. X. Kraus.)

to Fabretti the vial in his son's hand would indicate that Eutropus died a martyr's death.

¹ The inscription reads: ΑΓΙΟΣ, etc. See Kraus.

² The term *ἅγιος*, “saint or saintly,” is a synonym of Christian. It is a term by which the members of Christian congregations frequently called themselves.

During the Middle Ages people were anxious to have their bodies rest in holy ground where they would be protected until



THE DYING MAN'S TEMPTATION.

(From *Ars Moriendi*; first temptation. Devils try to induce him to seek assistance from false gods, after the manner of the pagans, or to escape suffering by committing suicide.)

doomsday against the evil influence of the Devil. Thus the dead were buried underneath the pavement of the churches or in their

immediate vicinity. And here, too, the materialism of the early Christianity is retained, for almost all the mediæval tombstones identify the deceased person with his remains that lie in the grave. The most common style of their inscriptions reads *Ci-git*, or *Here lies*, or *Hier ruht*, etc., and if it is ornamented with sculpture, the



TOMBSTONE OF SIEGFRIED VON EPPSTEIN.
(Henne am Rhyu.)

stone frequently represents the man as lying in the coffin. It is rather an exception that Siegfried of Eppstein, archbishop of Mayence, is represented as crowning two kings of Germany, Henry Raspe and William of Holland. Apparently these two actions were regarded as the most glorious events of his life. But even here the traditional style is adhered to, for the artist only indicated the coronation scenes, and adapted this idea to the conventional form of tombstones. The archbishop lies in the coffin and the two kings upon whose heads he places the crown, are lying at each side.

The Christian faith has done much to give comfort to mankind in the tribulations of life, but when its purer aspirations were dimmed by a literal interpretation of its doctrines, when the pagan-like symbol was accepted as truth itself, Christianity did its utmost to

bring all the terrors of hell to bear upon every man when on his death-bed. The hour of death was supposed to be the decisive moment which would determine man's fate for all eternity. Therefore the early Christians anointed the dying and prayed over them. The breviary of Cardinal Grimani, now at the St. Marcus Library in Venice, contains a picture by Hans Memling (an artist of May-

ence who lived about 1450-1495) which characterises this conception of the hour of death. The patient is surrounded by praying



DEATH, THE SLAYER. Woodcut of the sixteenth century. (By H. Burckmair.)

monks with candles and crucifix and sees in his imagination the powers of both good and evil hover above him, both anxious to



THE HOUR OF DEATH.

After Hans Memling's picture in the breviary of Cardinal Grimani, at the Library of Venice. (Henne am Rhyn.)

snatch away his soul as soon as it would depart from the body.¹ The sacrament is prepared on an improvised altar. In the background, to the right, the physician stands helpless, while to the left a notary is busy drawing up the last will and testament.

Where there is a great strain, there follows, as a rule, a relaxation. The facts that make up a tragedy will naturally offer sufficient material for a comedy; and thus the seriousness of hell is contrasted by the grim humor with which this gloomy subject is frequently treated. The picture of hell in the *Tragico Comedia* by



HELL ACCORDING TO DIONYSIUS KLEIN'S TRAGICO-COMEDIA.
(Reproduced from Bastian's *Die Denkschöpfung*.)

Dionysius Klein (published in 1622) is an instance that illustrates this truth. And when we consider that in the days of Klein heretics were still burned, we must admire the courage of the author who dared to show the comical side of the traditional conception of eternal perdition. The moral significance is greater still when, judging from the text of the book, we have reason to assume that the author was not a scoffer but actually believed in the reality of the tortures of hell.

¹ There are even to-day some zealous ministers who have not as yet outgrown the mediæval barbarism of saving the souls of the dying. In a German soldiers' hospital during the Franco-Prussian war, a prominent Protestant clergyman who used to come to pray with the patients had at last to be refused admittance because there was a regular increase of the death rate immediately following his pastoral visits.

MISCELLANEOUS.

JOSEPH LOUIS LAGRANGE.

A great part of the progress of formal human thought, where not hampered by outward causes, has been due to the invention of what we may call *stenophrenic* or *short-mind*, symbols. These, of which all language and scientific notations are examples, dispense the mind from the consideration of ponderous and circuitous mechanical operations and economize its energies for the performance of the new and unaccomplished tasks of thought. And the advancement of those sciences has been most notable which have made the most extensive use of these short-mind symbols. Here mathematics and chemistry stand pre-eminent. The ancient Greeks, with all their mathematical endowment as a race, and even admitting that their powers were more visualistic than analytic, were yet so impeded by their lack of short-mind symbols as to have made scarcely any progress whatever in analysis. Their arithmetic was a species of geometry. They did not possess the sign for zero, and also did not make use of position as an indicator of value. Even later, when the germs of the indeterminate analysis were adumbrated by Diophantus, progress ceased at the birth of the science, doubtless from this very cause. The historical calculations of Archimedes, his approximation to the value of π , etc., owing to this lack of appropriate arithmetical and algebraical symbols, entailed enormous and incredible labors, which, if saved, would, with his genius, indubitably have led to great discoveries.

Subsequently, at the close of the Middle Ages, when the so-called Arabic figures became established throughout Europe with the symbol 0 and the positional principle, immediate progress was made in the art of reckoning. The problems which arose gave rise to questions of increasing complexity and led up to the general solutions of equations of the third and fourth degree by the Italian mathematicians of the sixteenth century. Yet even these discoveries were made in somewhat the same manner as problems in mental arithmetic are now solved in common schools; for the present signs of plus, minus, and equality, the radical and exponential signs, and especially the systematic use of letters for denoting general quantities in algebra, had not yet become at all universal. The last step was due to the French mathematician Vieta (1540-1603), and the mighty advancement of analysis resulting therefrom can scarcely be measured or imagined. The trammels were here removed from algebraic thought, and it ever afterwards pursued its way unincumbered in development as if impelled by some intrinsic and irresistible potency. Then followed the introduction of exponents by Descartes, the representing of geometrical magnitudes by algebraical signs, the extension of the theory of

exponents to fractional and negative numbers by Wallis (1616-1703), and other symbolic artifices, which rendered the language of analysis as economic, unequivocal, and appropriate as the needs of the science seemed to demand. In the famous dispute regarding the invention of the infinitesimal calculus, while not denying and even granting for the nonce the priority of Newton in the matter, some writers go so far as to regard Leibnitz's introduction of the integral symbol \int as alone a sufficient substantiation of his claims to originality and independence, so far as the progress of the new science was concerned.

For the *development* of science all such short-mind symbols are of paramount importance, and seem to carry within themselves the germ of a perpetual mental motion which needs no outward power for its unfoldment. Euler's well-known saying that his pencil seemed to surpass him in intelligence finds its explanation here, and will be understood by all who have experienced the uncanny feeling attending the rapid development of algebraical formulæ, where the urned thought of centuries, so to speak, rolls from one's fingers' ends.

But it should never be forgotten that the mighty stenophrenic engine of which we here speak, like all machinery, affords us rather a mastery over nature than an insight into it; and for some, unfortunately, the higher symbols of mathematics are merely brambles that hide the living springs of reality. Many of the greatest discoveries of science,—for example, those of Galileo, Huygens, and Newton,—were made without the mechanism which afterwards becomes so indispensable for their development and applications. Galileo's reasoning anent the summation of the impulses imparted to a falling stone is virtual integration; and Newton's physical discoveries were made by the man who invented, but evidently did not use to that end, the doctrine of fluxions.

We have been following here, briefly and roughly, a line of progressive abstraction and generalisation which even in its beginning was, psychologically speaking, at an exalted height, but in the course of centuries had been carried to points of literally ethereal refinement and altitude. In that long succession of inquirers by whom this result was effected, the process reached, we may say, its culmination and purest expression in JOSEPH LOUIS LAGRANGE, born in Turin, Italy, the 30th of January, 1736, died in Paris, April 10, 1813. Lagrange's power over symbols has, perhaps, never been paralleled either before his day or since. It is amusing to hear his biographers relate that in his early life he evinced no aptitude for mathematics, but seemed to have abandoned himself entirely to the pursuits of pure literature; for at fifteen we find him teaching mathematics in an artillery school in Turin, and at nineteen he had made the greatest discovery in mathematical science since that of the infinitesimal calculus, namely, the creation of the algorism and method of the Calculus of Variations, which drew forth the admiration of the great Euler, and which the latter did not deem it beneath his dignity to write a treatise upon, supplementary to his own researches upon the subject. The exact nature of a variation even Euler did not grasp, and even as late as 1810 in the English treatise of Woodhouse on this subject we read regarding a certain new sign introduced, that M. Lagrange's "power over symbols is so unbounded that the possession of it seems to have made him capricious." Lagrange himself was conscious of his wonderful capabilities in this direction. His was a time when geometry, as he himself phrased it, had become a dead language, the abstractions of analysis were being pushed to their highest pitch, and he felt that with his achievements its possibilities within certain limits were being rapidly exhausted. The saying is attributed to him that chairs of mathematics, so far as creation was concerned, and unless new

fields were opened up, would soon be as rare at universities as chairs of Arabic. In both research and exposition, he totally reversed the methods of his predecessors. They had proceeded in their exposition from special cases by a species of induction; his eye was always directed to the highest and most general points of view; and it was by his suppression of details and neglect of minor, unimportant considerations that he swept the whole field of analysis with a generality of insight and power never excelled, while to his originality and profundity he united a conciseness, elegance, and lucidity which have made him the model of mathematical writers.

Lagrange came of an old French family of Touraine, France, said to have been allied to that of Descartes. At the age of twenty-six he found himself at the zenith of European fame. But his reputation had been purchased at a terrible cost. Although of ordinary height and well proportioned, he had by his ecstatic devotion to study,—periods always accompanied by an irregular pulse and high febrile excitation,—almost totally ruined his health. At this age, accordingly, he was seized with a hypochondriacal affection and with bilious disorders, which attended him throughout his life, and which were only allayed by his great abstemiousness and careful regimen. He was bled twenty-nine times in his life, which would, one would think, have affected the most robust constitution. Through his great care for his health he gave much attention to medicine. He was, in fact, conversant with all the sciences, although knowing his *forte* he rarely expressed an opinion on anything unconnected with mathematics.

When Euler left Berlin for St. Petersburg in 1766 he and D'Alembert induced Frederick the Great to make Lagrange president of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin. Lagrange accepted and lived in Berlin twenty years, where he wrote and published some of his greatest works. He was a great favorite of the Berlin people, and enjoyed the profoundest respect of Frederick the Great, although the latter seems to have preferred the noisy reputation of Maupertuis, Lamettrie, and Voltaire to the unobtrusive fame and personality of the man whose achievements were destined to shed more lasting light on his reign than those of any of his more strident literary predecessors: Lagrange was, as he himself said, *philosophe sans crier*.

The climate of Prussia agreed with the mathematician, as did also the national life of the Germans. He refused the most seductive offers of foreign courts and princes, and it was not until the death of Frederick and the intellectual reaction of the Prussian court that he returned to Paris, where his career broke forth in renewed splendor. He published in 1788 his great *Mécanique analytique*, that "scientific poem" of Sir William Rowan Hamilton, which gave the quietus to mechanics as then conceived, and having been made during the Revolution Professor of Mathematics at the new *Ecole Normale* and the *Ecole Polytechnique*, he entered with Laplace and Monge upon the activity which made these schools for generations to come exemplars of practical scientific education, and by his lectures there, systematised in definitive form the science of mathematical analysis of which he had developed the extremest capacities. Lagrange's activity at Paris was interrupted only once by a brief period of melancholy aversion for mathematics, a lull which he devoted to the adolescent science of chemistry and to philosophical studies; but he afterwards resumed his old love with increased ardor and assiduity. His significance for thought generally is far beyond what we have space here to insist upon. With him, not least of all, theology was forever divorced from a legitimate influence on science.

The honors of the world sat ill upon him ; *la magnificence le gênait*, he said ; but he lived at a time when proffered things were usually accepted, not refused. He was loaded with personal favors and official distinctions by Napoleon, who called him *la haute pyramide des sciences mathématiques*, was made a Senator, a Count of the Empire, a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honor, and, just before his death, received the grand cross of the Order of Reunion. He never feared death, which he termed *une dernière fonction, ni faible ni désagréable*, much less the disapproval of the great. He remained in Paris during the Revolution when *savants* were decidedly at a discount, but was suspected of aspiring to no throne but that of mathematics. When Lavoisier was executed he said : " It took them but a moment to lay low that head, yet a hundred years will not suffice perhaps to produce its like again." Lagrange would never allow his portrait to be painted, maintaining that a man's works and not his personality deserved preservation. The accompanying frontispiece to *The Open Court* is from a steel engraving supposedly based on the sketch obtained by stealth at a meeting of the Institute. His genius was excelled only by the purity and nobleness of his character, in which the world never even sought to find a blot, and by the exalted Pythagorean simplicity of his life. He was twice married, and by his wonderful care of his person lived to the high age of seventy-seven years, not one of which had been misspent. His life was the veriest incarnation of the scientific spirit ; he lived for nothing else. He left his weak body, which retained its intellectual powers to the very last, as an offering upon the altar of science,—happily made when his work had been done. A desiccated liver, a tumored kidney (see the delectable *post mortem* of Monsieur Potel), long since dust, were the sole defects he gave to the grave, but to the world he bequeathed his "ever-living" thoughts now resurgent in a new and monumental edition (Gauthier-Villars, Paris). *Ma vie est là!* he said, pointing to his brain the day before his death.

THOMAS J. McCORMACK.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL CHEMISTRY. A Graded Course of One Hundred Lectures. By *Gustavus Dettlef Hinrichs*, M. D., LL.D. With an Atlas of Eighty Plates. Pages, 400. Price, \$4.00. St. Louis, Mo., U. S. Carl Gustav Hinrichs, Publisher.

Since the invention of the kindergarten, education is undergoing a radical reformation which in the end will make teaching more difficult and learning more easy. Instruction, which in former days consisted in mechanical cramming, has of late become an art employing a definite method of presenting the lesson, not to the mind alone, but first to all the senses and then to the mind. Professor Hinrichs's *Introduction to General Chemistry* is a guide for teachers and pupils according to the modern requirements. The book is full of illustrations and diagrams. It opens with pictures of the most famous chemists, Berzelius, Liebig, Bunsen, Faraday, Berthelot, and others. It contains illustrations of coal and gold mining, the process of quarrying salt, plates explaining crystallisation, a table of spectrum analysis (the latter, however, is not colored as it ought to be) ; parabolæ of fusing and boiling points, etc.

The book contains a great deal of information, but it is not a text-book ; it is, as the title indicates, an introduction into the science. It will therefore be welcome to the man of broad culture as well as to the student of chemistry. In the hands of a pupil for the use of home reading it will be a valuable help to the professor's lessons. It is sufficiently elementary to be attractive even to a beginner.

Professor Hinrichs as a scientist has not found the recognition to which his discoveries seem to entitle him. He claims, e. g., to have discovered the Mendeljeff law before Mendeljeff, and proves his priority by communications and statements the dates of which are unequivocal. No doubt he suffered under the disadvantage of living at a distance from the European universities. The recognition, withheld from him by his German colleagues, was, however, freely given him by French chemists, one of whom, M. Friedel, has been honored by the author with the dedication of the present book. Whatever we may think of Hinrichs the scientist, there can be no doubt that Hinrichs the teacher ranks high in both originality of method and in the *Anschaulichkeit* of his lessons. These virtues appear plainly in his *Introduction to General Chemistry*" and render the book a valuable aid to teachers.

There are two points, however, which may be regarded as drawbacks. First, an index is missing, and secondly the book, although its general make-up is good, has been partly printed in the display type which we are accustomed to find in advertisements. It is a fault (if a break of fashion may be called a fault) which is unessential, yet such unessential faults, because they are mere externalities, do sometimes more harm than essential shortcomings, which on account of their being internal are not easily discovered.

We heartily wish the author a genuine success with this book, which appears to contain the quintessence of his life's experiences as a professor of chemistry. P. C.

The flowers of summer are rapidly fading away in the cold December winds, but with the regularity of the seasons our artists offer us a new and indeed a rich harvest of the most delicate blossoms in the form of Christmas cards. Messrs. L. Prang & Co., the leading art publishers of this continent, publish again a choice selection of holiday greetings, all of which show exquisite taste and a rare perfection of technique. The style of art at present quite fashionable, which indulges in a method of outline drawing that is sometimes wrongly regarded as an imitation of the Japanese, appears to advantage in "The Dream Roses Calendar," a series of pictures representing dream-lost maidens surrounded by roses. The extravagance that is habitual in this style of painting has been happily avoided, and thus it appears that the very moderation of the artist has enabled him to transfigure the art *à la mode* and add beauty to fashion. Among other novelties of Messrs. Prang & Co. we notice a large picture by J. L. G. Ferris, "Washington and Sally Fairfax," and the second series of "The Masters of Music."

The Open Court Publishing Company has just received from Japan the new and first Japanese-English edition of Dr. Carus's *Nirvāna: A Story of Buddhist Psychology*. The delicate illustrations, which were made by Mr. Suzuki, one of the most famous artists of Japan, well reproduce the spirit of the tale and afford some fine specimens of Japanese art in its purest form, as unadulterated by foreign extravagances. The book is considerably larger than the *Karma* of Dr. Carus, with which our readers are familiar. The English type is good, the paper a soft, flexible crêpe. (Price, \$1.00.) An exquisite colored *Nirvāna* poster has also been designed for The Open Court Publishing Co. by Mr. Suzuki, and in our judgment far surpasses the examples of this style of art which were recently so much in vogue in European countries. (Price, 25 cents.)

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