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# The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the  
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER.



A TEMPLE OF ATHENA.

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THE PARTHENON IN ITS PRESENT STATE.

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## THE PRESENT PROSPECT OF CHINA.

BY GILBERT REID.

THERE are two policies in dealing with the affairs of China which are mutually antagonistic, the one known as the "open door" policy or that of equal opportunity, and the other that of domination and ultimate possession by some one outside power. Somewhere between, but more akin to the latter, is the policy of combination on the part of several, to retard the advance of others and to gain the control of China. In the political combination, to China's ruin, some one power will be supreme, all others will be pawns.

The policy of the open door has been professed by many powers, even by those who have been keen for more. To advocate such broad, fair, considerate and soothing conduct on the part of outside nations is good diplomacy. To consider one's own national interests is practical politics. In the former, China is always consulted; in the latter, never. In the former, one or more foreign nations leave it to China to work out her own salvation, agreeing to present no hindrances. In the latter, they take it upon themselves to preserve the peace, or the integrity, or the independence of China, and look to China for profuse expressions of gratitude.

These antagonistic conceptions as to the way China should be treated did not really come into being till after China was defeated by Japan in 1895. China's defeat opened the eyes of the world as to her comparative weakness. She lost in prestige and also in money. She began to borrow money, first to carry on the war and then to pay an indemnity to Japan. Ever since, China has become more and more hampered and throttled, while Japan has become strong like a giant and free like the birds of the air.

Hardly had the China-Japan war come to an end, when Chinese officialdom, the older as well as the younger men, confessed the need of reform. At first nearly every outside nation watched the pulsations of life with a degree of sympathy and admiration. China's failure to accomplish at once all that she professed or desired soon aroused contempt on the part of the strong, and with this came the open declaration that internal reform could come only by outside interposition. Spheres of influence, or spheres of interest, were the talk of the day on the part of Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany. Japan was silent; she was abiding her time. Some, like Lord Charles Beresford, after being fêted by the Chinese, spoke of the break-up of China. A mild, if not drastic, dismemberment of China was freely discussed in Europe, without thinking of the probable effect on Chinese susceptibilities.

From experiences which the writer enjoyed during a part of the years 1897 and 1898 in Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany and Russia, he must acknowledge that while the general sentiment was on the side of spheres of influence in China and possible dismemberment, there was an open mind to the reasonableness of the opposite theory, namely that China's sovereignty should be maintained and that she should be helped or advised in reforms which she herself should decide to initiate.

In 1899 Mr. John Hay, being transferred from the ambassadorship at St. James's court to the position of secretary of state at Washington, proposed to all the governments having relations with China common support of the policy of equal opportunity with maintenance of China's independence. No government dissented. In 1900 and after, this policy was reiterated by the government at Washington and received stronger confirmation by all the great powers. The Boxer cataclysm had shown the futility of all dismemberment theories.

In the very midst of the siege of the legations, on July 3, 1900, Mr. Hay urged the powers to "seek a solution which might bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve its territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law, and safeguard to the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire." Mr. Hay's high politics have been called the politics of the Golden Rule.

For these fourteen years but little has been heard of spheres of influence, and no nation desirous of influence has been so imprudent as to talk any longer of the break-up of China. The most

that has been done has been to insinuate that some one else was plotting this break-up.

The United States has continued to advocate the Hay doctrine with no diminution of sentiment. To use force for the carrying out of the doctrine—practical politics—has been contrary to the spirit of our people and is also inconsistent with the very idea of equal opportunity for helpfulness to China. Thus if China is going to have her integrity preserved America alone cannot be relied upon to see that it is done. *All the powers on an equal basis and in an equal spirit must work for its consummation.* The present war has knocked this beautiful idea in the head.

Equality of opportunity, equality of influence and equality of helpfulness have no meaning when any one outside nation is dominant or even predominant. *The only predominant influence in China should be China.*

Up to the present the predominant influence in China, at least among outside nations, has been Great Britain. Even when theorizing in her most persuasive tones for fair play and equality to all, she has unconsciously affected the predominant attitude. This war has brought much into the light of day. Woe to the man who thinks differently from an Englishman, whether such a one lives in "merry England" or out here in foreign communities of the Far East! Down with the nation that is a rival of Old England!

An Englishman, writing from Bristol to the New York *Evening Post* as far back as August 29, used these words:

"Our London papers contained report yesterday that 'Ninety-ninths of Americans were on our side' in this great European war. Britons are deeply grateful for such warm sympathy and encouragement on the part of our American cousins. Once we have swept the Germans from the seas, our navy will command the vast expanse of the ocean, and our great mercantile fleet, augmented by captured ships, will do the carrying trade of the world. Our merchants and manufacturers will control the markets of Africa, South America, China, India, Japan and Russia. Britain should be permitted to reimburse your government to the amount of one-half of the cost of that magnificent work, the Panama Canal, and unite with you in protecting and keeping open this great waterway."

How stands Britannia in China? Has any German, any American, yea, any Japanese or Russian or Frenchman, in days gone by, been so impudent as to claim first place? From descent my prepossessions are for Britain, but I also study the facts. No sooner did the war, like electricity, come flashing into our midst, than war was

made not only on German militarism but on German trade, German culture, German character. Some of the shot fell into the American camp, unless speedy escape was made into the loving embrace of the temporarily loving allies.

But Britain's predominance in China, it is said, is hers by right, as it is o'er all the waves. The claim has been sound. In 1842 and 1860, whatever the name of the wars, whether called "opium war" or some better name, England (as she was called in those days) took the lead. Long before Prussia became Germany, Hongkong was made English with no thought of restoration to China. Not even now is there such a thought. After Prussia became Germany and leased Kiaochow, England, not to be left behind, leased not only Weihaiwei but Kowloon Extension opposite Hongkong, 400 square miles or more.

The British business houses in China have never relished a competitor worthy the name. They made no tirade against such interlopers till the war gave them a chance. German competition has been taken meekly, all the more when German firms were pushing English goods. Still the shoulder has been shrugged and considerable thinking has been done. The American competitor, and the Japanese too when real enterprise began to be shown, affected badly the easy flow of the stream of fortune which the English had opened up. Still, so long as German merchants spoke English and sold English goods, and American houses had English agents, and Japan was an ally, there was nothing as yet to fear, Great Britain was still predominant. So long as no one disputed this, she was friendly to all. In certain lines of goods (opium) the British, if India and Bagdad may be included, have succeeded by rare persistency and with ever-growing favor to hold their own. Thus in some things the British are actually dominant.

Even in educational matters German technical schools have caused some worry. Lord William Cecil, to consummate his Oxford University scheme at Hankow, has had to stimulate latent English generosity by pointing out the greater energy of Americans and Germans in China. Latterly both English and American missionaries have taken fright at a German scheme, suddenly disclosed, for uniting commercialism and missions, in a mistaken conception of the modern American policy. Such things only show that British influence has heretofore been first, and for it to become second anywhere is intolerable if not unthinkable.

Life in any treaty port in China has been predominantly British. Every one of course speaks English. The American at least tries

to do so, "with variations." The variation will always prove an impediment to *entrée* into good society. For an American to speak either French or German is merely an accomplishment. To know Russian is to be an exceptional linguist. This being the case, it is axiomatic that the English people as well as language are predominant. The newspapers too were English until a piece of impertinence was perpetrated by an American, and the *China Press*, published in Shanghai, entered on its weary existence. The Shanghai Club, the Race Club, the Country Club, the three popular clubs of Shanghai life, all breathe English atmosphere. Other clubs are permitted, but they are looked upon as subsidiary or insignificant. Other ports are less favored with such large popular clubs for the élite. In those places language, etiquette, ideas, religion, are also all determined by the predominating English factor.

The average American in the treaty port, who wants to come in with the band wagon, is more English than American. To go with the current is for the American to speak, feel, think, hope, believe and pray as does his first cousin of Anglo-Saxon stock. To agree with the Anglo-Saxon's second cousin, the Teuton, is in time of emergency an impossibility, unless reasons to substantiate are irrefutable. The average American coming to China, be he merchant or missionary, instinctively lines up with the British portion of the community. The prepossession is nothing if not for Britain. In times of crisis as the present, when Britain's predominance throughout the world is put to the test, to venture an opinion other than that to which the predominant element has given its stamp, is anathema, marenatha. A good word for the Germans, even as they are in China, deserves martial law. Not to speak the good word for the English and their part in the drama does not merit martial law; a social boycott is sufficient.

In all this we have only spoken of Britain's purpose to be predominant. She has hardly dared to demand from China or other powers the lofty position of dominance. Other aspirants to the predominant place have come forward both in the political and commercial life of China, and more than once have they appeared too threatening. Outside of Manchuria the greatest menace has come of late from Germany. Thus the war has proved a veritable God-send to Great Britain; the chance has come and been eagerly seized to crush the dangerous rival.

As for China the eradication of this German rival is not viewed altogether as a blessing. Germany was a kind of check on too great onesidedness on the part of other powers. Now by the

elimination of Germany China finds herself in the hands of the five allies, the new political combination composed of Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan and Belgium. Anything that a neutral nation like America can do to help China is realized as almost futile in the face of this combination. China thus views the future with feelings of trepidation. Both one-sided domination and dismemberment have heretofore been warded off by the presence of a strong and active competitor like Germany. For the future the question is, whether the old policy of the open door can be maintained, with America's pious blessing, or whether the five remaining powers will again advocate between them China's dismemberment, or whether Japan will succeed in becoming dominant as well as predominant and treat big China as she has treated little Korea.

In any case the *predominance of Britain in China is gone* as is that of Germany; it now passes to another, and that other the reader will surmise is Japan.

## AN ANSWER TO THE "EUROPEAN WAR."<sup>1</sup>

BY M. JOURDAIN.

ONE of the leading characteristics of *The Open Court* is that it is really open to discussion, and it is in keeping with the very liberal views of Dr. Paul Carus, a German by birth and sympathies, that I am allowed to discuss and dissent from his views upon the European war published in the October number of *The Open Court*, and with other articles in the same number. Dr. Carus's article (pp. 596-646) deals by sections with questions that have arisen in connection with the war; and following his arrangement, I propose to summarize his arguments and, so far as they seem to me misleading, to question them. The first section is:

### PANSLAVISM.

After a summary of the characteristics of the Slav races and the well-known disunion of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the Editor turns to the incident of the assassination of the heir-apparent to the throne of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, on June 23, 1914. There was, he says, no public sympathy throughout Europe for the crime; and yet we read: "No crime has ever aroused deeper or more general horror throughout Europe; none has ever been less justified. Sympathy for Austria was universal. Both the governments and the public opinion of Europe were ready to support her in many measures, however severe, which she might think it necessary to take for the punishment of the murderer and his accomplices."<sup>2</sup>

The opinion of the Russian, French, and German governments

<sup>1</sup> We publish this article from England as the most comprehensive reply to the editorial position that we have received.—ED.

<sup>2</sup> Throughout this article I have used for convenience's sake the cheap reprint of the English White Paper (which also includes Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3, and other matter) entitled *Great Britain and the European Crisis*, London, 1914. I shall refer to this as *G. B. and the E. C.* Here the reference is to the introductory narrative of events, p. iii.

was that the Servian government was not to blame for the crime, but that Serbia must investigate and put an end to the propaganda which had apparently led to it. Sir Edward Grey advised Serbia to show herself moderate and conciliatory.<sup>3</sup> Unless it were proved that the Servian government had connived at or incited to the crime; or unless the Servian government were to conduct an investigation in such a way as to screen the conspiracy, there was no reason for declaration of war, or a punitive expedition against Serbia. A declaration of war on Austria's part on the ground that she "did not trust the Servians to be impartial"<sup>4</sup> is absurd.

The first open step on Austria's part was an ultimatum delivered at Belgrade, requiring an answer in forty-eight hours. The ten demands involved the suppression of anti-Austrian newspapers, literature and propaganda, the suppression of nationalist societies such as the Narodna Odbrana; the dismissal of officers and functionaries "guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian government reserve to themselves the right of communicating to the royal government" (of Serbia), participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia, the arrest of two individuals compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo; the prevention of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier, an explanation of anti-Austrian utterances by high Servian officials, and finally the immediate notification of the enforcement of these measures. In addition, a prescribed statement was to be published by the Servian government in the official journal, condemning anti-Austrian propaganda and regretting the participation of Servian officers and functionaries therein.<sup>5</sup> A summary of the secret trial at Sarajevo was annexed to the ultimatum, giving the bare findings, with no corroborative evidence.

As Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir Maurice de Bunsen,<sup>6</sup> he had "never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character." The demand for the participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceedings in Serbia was "hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with the right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Serbia."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. iv.

<sup>4</sup> *Open Court* for October, 1914, p. 599. In future the letters *O. C.* will denote that issue of *The Open Court*.

<sup>5</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, pp. 3-9.

<sup>6</sup> British ambassador at Vienna.

The Editor admits that this "sounds very fair."<sup>7</sup> It is, in fact, unanswerable; and no other line of action would be possible even in the imaginary case he adduces, "if the Prince of Wales had been assassinated and some little nationality on the moral level of Servia were for good reasons suspected of having helped in the deed, plotting renewals of the crime so as to endanger the British government and its royal family." I do not think that an Englishman would have his sense of justice warped by national considerations.

Before the expiration of the time-limit of the ultimatum, Servia returned to Austria a reply amounting to an acceptance of all the demands,<sup>8</sup> subject on certain points to the delays necessary for passing new laws and amending her constitution, and subject to Austria-Hungary's explanation as to her wishes with regard to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in Servian judicial proceedings. "The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon their territory, but they declare they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principles of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."<sup>9</sup>

This reply went beyond anything which any power—Germany not excepted—thought probable.<sup>10</sup> This was the more remarkable as the time-limit of the ultimatum was as unnecessary as insolent. The impression left upon the mind of Sir Maurice de Bunsen was that the note was "so drawn up as to make war inevitable." "This country," he writes, "has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Servia and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment."<sup>11</sup> In this temporary blindness of a people, the Austrian ministers were borne along on a wave of violent enthusiasm, in which they said themselves that they would be dislodged from power if they did not accede to the popular demand for the punishment of Servia.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>7</sup> *O. C.*, p. 599.

<sup>8</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, pp. 22-27.

<sup>9</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 25. Servia concluded by proposing, in case the Austro-Hungarian government were not satisfied with the reply, "to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the international tribunal of the Hague, or to the great powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian government on March 31, 1909."

<sup>10</sup> "German secretary of state has himself said that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia could hardly be expected to accept." *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 29.

<sup>11</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. vii.

As Servia consented to dismiss and prosecute those officers who could be clearly proved to be guilty and had already arrested the officer referred to in the Austro-Hungarian note, it is not correct to speak of "Russia's protection of assassins."<sup>13</sup>

Equally incorrect is the statement by the Editor: "That England rushed at once to the support of the methods of Panslavism is incomprehensible except on the assumption that England favored the plan of a most stupendous war in which Germany's prosperity, her manhood, her civilization, would be buried under the armies of the invading Russ."<sup>14</sup>

The British government's attitude was that she had no interest in the Balkans except the consolidation and progressive government of the Balkan states. Sir Edward Grey's concern in the Austro-Hungarian note and the reply of Servia was "simply and solely from the point of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of His Majesty's government."<sup>15</sup> Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed (on July 24) that "direct British interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion."<sup>16</sup> British intervention in the European crisis only followed Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality on August 3. As the Austro-Hungarian note was presented to Servia on July 23, and war was declared by England on Germany on August 4, England's intervention cannot be described as hurried or determined by the action of Russia.

The Editor proceeds to praise the German emperor as the prince of peace. "The Kaiser," he writes, "is a peaceful man. If any one deserves the Nobel peace prize it is he. Since his ascent to the throne he has preserved the peace of Europe, often under the most difficult conditions. The bellicose party of Germany has often been disgusted with the Kaiser's policy and called him William the Pacific."<sup>17</sup> It is perhaps premature to assume that the German emperor is the sole cause of Germany's attitude;<sup>18</sup> but turning to his acts and utterances, *is* it peace that he proclaimed so loudly in the days before the war? Was the author of those won-

<sup>13</sup> *O. C.*, p. 599.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>17</sup> *O. C.*, p. 600.

<sup>18</sup> In December 1910 he sent his portrait to the minister of education with the significant motto, *Si volo, sic jubeo*. The words of the minister completed the quotation. On May 4, 1891, at a Rhenish banquet, he said: "There is but one master in the country; it is I, and I will bear no other." In a speech at Königsberg, May 25, 1910, he wrote: "Considering myself as the instrument of the Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of the day I go my way"—an attitude which might lead to breaches of the peace.

derful Wardour Street phrases of "the mailed fist" and "shining armour" so pacific? In a speech of his delivered on March 1, 1900, on the completion of a fort, he said: "I christen thee Fort Haeseler. Thou wilt be called upon to defend the *conquests* of Germany over the western foes." Seven months later, in celebrating Moltke's birthday, he expressed a desire that "thy staff may lead Germany to further victories." The man who could proclaim that "nothing must be settled in this world without the intervention of Germany and the German emperor" cannot be the most pacific of European sovereigns. That the English people had some just cause for uneasiness in the past may be seen from a very courageous and temperate article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 29, 1911: "We shall be obliged to admit that the distrust on the other side of the English Channel is not altogether unfounded. If we had to listen to such utterances from the mouth of a foreign sovereign, we too would become restive and take thought for the strengthening of our line of defense. At present we can only ask England not to take so seriously the utterances in question, since we have long ago had the experience that great words are not followed by great deeds. We know that the Kruger telegram, the challenge to the yellow races, the speech at Damascus, the trip to Tangier, the sending of the "Panther," and so on, were only outward gestures which remained without any corresponding consequences. This is one of the weakest points of our foreign policy. We say to England again and again: 'The German nation is absolutely peaceably-minded, and wishes to live on terms of peace and friendship with England just as much as with all other nations.' This makes no impression on them, since they answer us: 'We are glad to believe that the German nation is peaceably-minded, but the German nation does not make German policy. Her policy is made in a quarter which is absolute, irresponsible, and incalculable; and for that reason we attach merely a Platonic, and never a practical, value to the national professions of peace.' What answer are we to make to that?"

"Who can believe," writes the Editor,<sup>19</sup> "that Germany wanted a war of such dimensions, that she provoked it or ventured into it for lust of fame or with an expectation of conquest? What can she gain?" The answer to this is twofold. Firstly, there has existed an aggressive war literature in Germany which has no parallel in any other country. Von Treitschke condemns perpetual peace as the "dream of weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages," while Bern-

<sup>19</sup> O. C., p. 600.

hardi, echoing Treitschke, speaks of war as "an indispensable factor of culture, in which a truly civilized nation finds the highest experience." In the latter author's works war with France and Russia simultaneously is hopefully anticipated, for "in one way or another we must square our account with France. . . . This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy. . . . France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path. A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp which no serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keep the possibility of war with England before our eyes and arrange our political and military plans accordingly." As Bernhardi (who died in 1913) was a prominent German general, high up in the general staff, his aspirations have a certain degree of authority. And apart from militarist writers, every traveler in Germany has come face to face with what Sir Walter Raleigh aptly calls "the cheerful brutality of their political talk."<sup>20</sup> "I remember meeting," he adds, "with a Prussian nobleman, a well-bred and pleasant man, who was fond of expounding the Prussian creed. He was said to be a political agent, but he certainly learned nothing in conversation. . . . The error of the Germans, we were told, was always that they are too humane; their dislike of cruelty amounts to a weakness in them. They let France escape with a paltry fine, next time France must be beaten to the dust. Always with a pleasant outward courtesy, he passed on to England. England was decadent and powerless, her rule must pass to the Germans. 'But we shall treat England rather less severely than France,' said this bland apostle of Prussian culture. . . . The grossness of the whole thing was in curious contrast with the polite and quiet voice with which he uttered his insolences." It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that war with Russia and France was expected, one might say desired, by an influential party in Germany. That she did not desire a "war of such dimensions" is quite evident from the bids for English neutrality.<sup>21</sup> Yet she inevitably drew England into the war by her violation of the neutrality of Belgium; and both Austria and Germany were quite aware of the fact that the note to Servia might lead to a European war. The German White Book informs us that the Austrian government informed the German government of their "conception" of the situation and asked their opinion. The White Book comments as follows:

"With all our heart we were able to agree with our ally's esti-

<sup>20</sup> *Might is Right*. Oxford pamphlets, 1914, p. 12.

<sup>21</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 45.

mate of the situation, and assure him that any action considered necessary to end the movement in Servia directed against the conservation of monarchy would meet with our approval.

"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might, therefore, involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies."<sup>22</sup>

In the second place, Germany showed no wish to work for peace when the key of the situation lay with Berlin. While Russia, France and England initiated and supported peaceful measures, the German chancellor claimed that none should intervene between Austria and Servia.<sup>23</sup>

The remaining arguments of the Editor that the causes of the war are "the French lust for revenge"<sup>24</sup> and "England's determination not to allow Germany to appear on the field of commerce as her rival,"<sup>25</sup> and "the anti-German policy of the British government"<sup>26</sup> are more conveniently treated of under the sections on the "Foes of Germany" and the "English Point of View." The statement that "Germany has been cut off from the rest of the world" is hardly correct, as the German official wireless is sent out and is published daily in the English newspapers, while German newspapers can be easily obtained.

#### A BREACH OF NEUTRALITY.

The Editor claims that on the part of England Germany's breach of neutrality on Belgium was only an official pretext for the war, "not the real and ultimate motive." This certainly does not represent the attitude of England towards the neutrality of Belgium or Holland. Their independence had been for centuries considered as one of the strongest means for securing peace in Europe, as their position and conformation rendered them the natural battlefield of Northern Europe; of this their troublous history is sufficient proof.

"If it was made impossible for great powers to invade them war would become increasingly difficult and dangerous. With the growth of the idea of a fixed system of international law founded on treaties the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a permanent safeguard to this end. As such it had been consecrated by two international treaties signed by all the powers, and recognized by two generations of statesmen."<sup>27</sup> As Sir Walter Raleigh says, it

<sup>22</sup> German White Book, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> *O. C.*, p. 600.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. viii.

was a matter of common knowledge in England that one event would make it impossible for England to remain a spectator in a European war,—that event being the violation of the neutrality of Holland or Belgium.<sup>28</sup> There was never any secret about this and it was well known to many people who took no special interest in foreign politics. The stress laid upon the importance of Belgian neutrality in speeches by Lord Granville in the House of Lords (August 8, 1870) and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons (August 10, 1870) is emphasized again in Sir Edward Grey's speech in the House of Commons on August 3 last.<sup>29</sup>

The wrong done by Germany has no parallel in the instances of earlier breaches of neutrality quoted by the Editor.<sup>30</sup> The only recent instance quoted is the landing of British troops in Delagoa Bay at the beginning of the Boer war. Portugal is an old ally of England, and conceded permission to the British consul at Lorenzo Marques to search for contraband of way among goods imported there, and accorded free passage to an armed force under General Carington from Beira through Portuguese territory to Rhodesia.

"The Portuguese government exposed itself to no international difficulty through allowing a belligerent, whose final victory was certain and of necessity entailed total suppression of the conquered belligerent, to cross its colonial territory,"<sup>31</sup> and this incident cannot be compared with Germany, one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality, invading Belgium when that country, conscious of its duty, was "firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means."

The earlier instances of breaches of neutrality instanced are the seizure of Capetown and the annexation of Dutch colonies. The Dutch colony of New Netherland was seized by England in time of peace, in 1664;—a discreditable action, but this and other political measures of the seventeenth century are no precedents for us to-day. Late in the eighteenth century, when the organization of the united Netherlands was abolished, and they were transformed into the Batavian republic, in close alliance with France, the Dutch participation in the wars of the Revolution naturally brought with it the enmity of England, and the seizure of all the Dutch colonies by the English.

Further, the Editor writes that there is no use discussing the atrocity of a breach of neutrality "because it is an acknowledged principle that in case of war the natural law of self-preservation

<sup>28</sup> *Might is Right*. Oxford pamphlets, 1914, p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 93.

<sup>30</sup> *O. C.*, p. 601.

<sup>31</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 11th ed., Vol. XIX, s. v. "Neutrality," p. 477.

demands of every power the completion of the war that has arisen or is about to arise, with the utmost dispatch and by the easiest method. In the present case the Germans have carried the war through Luxembourg and Belgium because that was to them the straightest and safest way of attack."<sup>22</sup> It is significant to recall here that von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German imperial chancellor, in his speech to the Reichstag on August 4, while laying stress on Germany's "state of necessity," confesses openly that the invasion of Luxembourg and Belgium is "contrary to the dictates of international law," a wrong committed.

"It is true that the French government," he said, "has declared at Brussels that France is willing to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as her opponent respects it. We knew, however, that France stood ready for the invasion. France could wait, but we could not wait. A French movement upon our flank upon the Lower Rhine might have been disastrous. So we were compelled to override the just protests of the Luxembourg and Belgian governments. The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can have only one thought—how he is to hack his way through."

The Imperial Chancellor, was, we see, unaware of this "acknowledged principle" of the Editor's. As Mr. Lloyd George has said, "treaties are the currency of international statesmanship," and it is obviously to the interest of each country to see that such international treaties are valid not only in peace (when nobody proposes to break them) but also in war. An apology advanced by the Editor is that Prussia and Germany had signed the neutrality treaty of Belgium, the present German empire not then existing, and Germany need not respect the treaty "under conditions so obviously changed." Prince Bismarck in 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, "confirming his verbal assurance gave in writing a declaration which he said *was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence*—that the German confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium." Bismarck here speaks not of Prussia but of the German confederation, representing the German empire of to-day. The present conditions appear closely parallel to those of 1870, and it was for such an event as a Franco-German war that the neutrality of Belgium had been devised as a safeguard. The Editor considers an important

<sup>22</sup> O. C., pp. 601-2.

change in the conditions was created by "the suspicion,"<sup>33</sup> the "probability" of a Franco-Belgian *entente*. "Suspicion" in the German mind is not sufficient to justify such a breach of international law. No serious evidence is advanced of a Franco-Belgian *entente*, while, on the other hand, we have the French government's assurance that it would respect the neutrality of Belgium in answer to Sir Edward Grey's inquiry:

"The French government is resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality, that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. The president of the republic spoke of it to the king of the Belgians, and the French minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian minister of foreign affairs to-day."<sup>34</sup> France could have no object in alienating the sympathies of England by violating Belgian neutrality, and Belgium on her side (August 1) intended to maintain her neutrality to the utmost of her power.<sup>35</sup> On August 3<sup>36</sup> she even refused the five French army corps offered her through the French military attaché for protecting her neutrality against the Germans, and did not "propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers."

In face of these facts we must discount unsupported stories such as that French officers were present prior to the declaration of war, in Liège, that "Lord Kitchener was in Belgium two weeks before the war began,"<sup>37</sup> if the letter of the staff correspondent of the *New York Evening Post* in London is to be accepted. The presence of English and French officers in Belgium before the Germans invaded that country has been officially denied by the Belgian government. Assuming that England and France planned how they would act if Germany did precisely what she has done, "to say that it was a violation of neutrality for England and France to plan an advance how, if necessary, they would perform the duties put upon them by the treaty establishing Belgian neutrality is to insult the intelligence."<sup>38</sup> A German plan of campaign against the United States of America has recently been published, which has not yet caused that country to attack Germany on suspicion of hostile intentions.

<sup>33</sup> "We do not know all the secret occurrences of European politics, but the *probability* is that the Belgians had agreed to allow the French to march through Belgium. . . . *Mere suspicion* of a Franco-Belgian *entente* is sufficient to attack France through the Belgian frontier." *O. C.*, p. 602. The italics here used for emphasis were not in the original.

<sup>34</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 75.

<sup>37</sup> *O. C.*, pp. 602 and 603.

<sup>38</sup> *The Nation* (New York), October 29, 1914.

The argument that it was "preferable to the Germans to anticipate the French move and take Belgium first" errs like the German manifesto "To the Civilized World" in assuming an unproved and improbable French violation of Belgian neutrality. But even granted that this contention were true, what does it amount to? That Germany hurried to violate a law before some one else could do so; and "if anybody was going to murder Belgian neutrality she was going to be first at the job."

"A stray notice in the *North German Gazette*," "later reports," "a newspaper clipping" from a German paper, cannot be considered serious evidence. Information supplied from these doubtful sources is on its face doubtful. The statement<sup>39</sup> that large deposits of ammunition were stored by England in the fortress of Maubeuge before the continental war, is officially denied. The giving of wide publicity to absurd stories such as the "later reports" that "some Russian officers had adopted the custom of carrying on their persons the fingers of their slain enemies, both male and female" is to be deprecated. Stories of atrocities are circulated by all the combatant nations without exception; and it is impossible to accept any without a careful preliminary investigation.

The Editor quotes from the *Independent* (September 21, 1914): "On August 1 the British Ambassador was asked a second time whether England would remain neutral in case Germany respected the integrity of France and also her colonies. Here England again said she must be free to act." This correctly summarizes Sir Edward Grey's earlier communication (July 30) in which a similar proposal<sup>40</sup> is declared unacceptable. "For France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy."<sup>41</sup>

It is difficult to see where the Editor has gained "psychological insight into the manner in which the Russian minister induced Sir Edward Grey to join the French-Russian alliance. The English had supported Serbia in diplomacy, and the Russians hinted that after all the English would not be credited with making good by joining the fight,<sup>42</sup> and it seems that the Russian suggestion helped to bring the English into line."<sup>43</sup> The suggestion that England

<sup>39</sup> Published in *Gil Blas*, February 25, 1913.

<sup>40</sup> Except that in this case the French colonies were not safeguarded.

<sup>41</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 55.

<sup>42</sup> For the discussion of England's attitude during the Schleswig-Holstein complication (*O. C.*, p. 604) see below section on the "Foes of Germany."

<sup>43</sup> *O. C.*, p. 604.

acted from mere pique is naive and unsupported. The facts are that on July 24 and 25 M. Sazonoff, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, pressed Great Britain to make a declaration of solidarity with Russia and France, adding that "unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count on your neutrality." On July 29, Sir Edward Grey outlined to Sir F. Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, a conversation with the French ambassador in London, in which he says clearly in what circumstances England would not intervene,<sup>44</sup> i. e., not in a dispute between Austria and Servia, nor in a dispute between Russia, Servia and Austria. Even if "Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider."<sup>45</sup> We see Sir Edward Grey moved by English interests and obligations.

#### THE ENGLISH POINT OF VIEW.

There has been a commercial conflict between England and Germany,<sup>46</sup> two great manufacturing countries; just as there has been a struggle for markets between England and America. But the latter struggle has not led to war, and the relations between the two countries have never been better. Commercial rivalry is not, therefore, the only cause of our recent alienation from Germany; but, as the Editor rightly points out, "propaganda." But while he draws attention to the anti-German propaganda in England (relatively small) he omits to refer to the enormous and influential anti-English propaganda in Germany. The Editor points to an article in the *Saturday Review*, September 11, 1897,<sup>47</sup> as the first expression of anti-German policy in England, but the violently anti-English utterances of Treitschke date as early as 1874. Later, the German professor Karl Lamprecht seized upon the Boer war to demonstrate to Holland that England is the enemy; and Bernhardt is also anti-English. Now while in Germany the feeling against England has raised in the past a crop of aggressive professors, lectures and books, in England the feeling against Germany did not lead to dreams of conquest but to fear of invasion; of the "German peril." Instead of *Germany and the Next War*, we had *The Englishman's Home*. Even to-day, in the midst of war, the English press references to Germany are temperate when compared with German references to England.

<sup>44</sup> *G. B., and the E. C.*, pp. 9, 16.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>46</sup> *O. C.*, p. 607.

<sup>47</sup> Reprinted in *O. C.*, pp. 577-579. There is, however, no reason to suppose with the Editor that the article was "inspired by the British government" (*O. C.*, p. 607).

A third factor in the creation of national hostility was the matter of armaments, especially the navy. The English case for a predominant navy is England's insular position, which renders her liable to starvation directly she loses command of the sea; the immensely larger size of her mercantile marine, which needs protection; her colonies, and the fact that she maintains but a small army. In the competition in armaments it is worth noting that on the eve of the Hague conference of 1888, Mr. Goschen announced that if the other naval powers should be prepared to diminish their programs of ship-building, we should be prepared on our side to meet such a procedure by modifying ours; the German government replied, by Colonel von Schwarzhoff, their delegate at the conference, with a scornful speech. At the second Hague conference in 1907, the British proposal to consider a concerted arrest of armaments was politely shelved, the German delegate, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein refusing to discuss it. The question of total disarmament has not been raised, and we cannot tell whether she would "abolish her militarism if her neighbors, the French and the Russians, would disarm, and if the English would sell their navy as old iron,"<sup>48</sup> but she has certainly refused on several occasions the invitation to slacken competition in armaments.

#### THE GERMAN CAUSE.

There is very little to discuss in this section, in which patriotic poems are quoted. In the concluding paragraph, however, a list is given of indefensible and partly-defensible English wars,<sup>49</sup> such as the Opium war in China, and the Boer war of the Transvaal.<sup>50</sup> All nations, unfortunately, have some blots in their accounts, but especially Prussia, from the day of Frederick the Great's brazen theft of Silesia to the cold-blooded quarrel with Austria in 1866 and the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 which was contrived by Bismarck down to its precipitation by the falsified Ems telegram.<sup>51</sup>

#### THE FOES OF GERMANY.

An accusation is made against England of stirring others to

<sup>48</sup> *O. C.*, p. 608.

<sup>49</sup> *O. C.*, pp. 612-613.

<sup>50</sup> "Was the Boer War undertaken for the protection of English homes and English liberty?" asks the Editor (p. 613). Certainly it was, though the English liberty and English homes were in the Transvaal. The fact that it was a foreign government that interfered with their rights did not minimize the responsibility of England.

<sup>51</sup> In October, 1892, Bismarck said to Harden: "It is so easy for one who has some practice, without falsification merely by omissions, to change the sense. As the Editor of the Ems despatch. . . I should know. The King sent

war and keeping out of it herself,<sup>52</sup> "making other nations carry on wars intended for her benefit."<sup>53</sup> As an illustration of the first policy the attitude of England during the Schleswig-Holstein complication is quoted as follows:

"In 1864 England encouraged Denmark to resist Prussia and Austria on account of Schleswig-Holstein, and the Danes relying on English assurances, refused any compromise, the result being that they lost their duchies. A Danish friend of mine expressed himself very vigorously in condemning British statecraft, saying that the warfare of Prussia was square and honest, but the attitude of England was unpardonable."

Though some of England's diplomacy in the past has been both weak and blundering, her action in this affair compares favorably with Germany's. The succession to the duchies received international sanction by the protocol of London (May 8, 1852), signed by the five great powers and Norway and Sweden. In 1863, Frederick, Duke of Augustenburg, son of the prince who in 1852 had renounced the succession to the duchies, next claimed his right on the ground that he had no share in the renunciation, and assumed the government under the style of Duke Frederick VIII. With "this folly," as Bismarck termed it, Austria and Prussia would have nothing to do. It was clear that they, as signatories to the 1852 protocol must uphold the succession as fixed by it, and that any action they might take in consequence of the violation of that compact by Denmark must be so "correct" as to deprive Europe of all excuse for interference. "From the beginning," Bismarck admitted later, "I kept annexation steadily before my eyes."<sup>54</sup> On December 28, a motion was introduced in the Diet by Austria and Prussia calling on the confederation to occupy Schleswig as a pledge for the observance by Denmark of the compacts of 1852. This was rejected by the Diet, and Austria and Prussia thereon decided to act in the matter as independent European powers (January, 1864). "Had<sup>55</sup> the Danes yielded to the necessities of the situation, and withdrawn from Schleswig under protest, the European powers would probably have restored Schleswig to the Danish crown, and Austria and Prussia as European powers would

it me with the order to publish it either completely, or in part. After I had summarized it by deletions, Moltke who was with me exclaimed: "*Vorhin was eine Chamade jetzt ist eine Fanfare.*" *Zukunft*, October 29, 1892, p. 204; and December 3, 1892, p. 435.

<sup>52</sup> *O. C.*, p. 604.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 613.

<sup>54</sup> *Reflections*, Vol. II., p. 10.

<sup>55</sup> I quote here the resumé of the question in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, "Schleswig-Holstein Question," 11th edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 329.

have no choice but to prevent any attempt upon it by the Duke of Holstein. To prevent this possibility, Bismarck made the Copenhagen government believe that Great Britain had threatened Prussia with intervention should hostilities be opened, though (he admitted) as a matter of fact England did nothing of the kind. The cynical strategem succeeded; Denmark remained defiant, and the Prussian and Austrian forces crossed the Eider." This explains the fact that Denmark is in favor of England to-day, and anti-German in its sympathies.

There is no evidence that England used Japan for the purpose of humiliating Russia.<sup>56</sup> The talk of inveterate enmity between England and Russia is by no means justified. The *entente* with Russia is an indication that English and Russian policies were not irreconcilable. As to national sympathies, England is quick to appreciate the qualities of that "profound and humane people."

The Editor describes the French as theatrical and vain, unsteady and lacking "the serious insistency of their Teutonic neighbors,"<sup>57</sup> and dominated by the idea of "revenge." "The French are blinded by their vanity, their vaingloriousness, their narrow-minded hope for revenge. Like big children they became an easy prey to the British king who ensnared them to fight the battles of Albion." The Editor's French type reminds one of the comic Frenchman of fiction. But how are we to explain the fact that the German army has moved backward from the Marne, and has vainly attempted to break through the lines of their vain, decadent and vainglorious enemy? The French idea of revenge is circulated by Germany, but little has been heard of it in France in recent years. There is evidence that French statesmen looked on war with Germany as one of the greatest evils that could befall a nation, and the events of 1905 and 1911 are a proof that she was prepared to pay a price to avert the ill-will of Germany. As French statesmen speak of the launching of five threats of war against them by Germany since 1870—the first in 1875 when Moltke wished to bleed France white, the fifth in 1911—it is hardly to be expected that the French should have adopted the point of view that "the real interest of France would naturally lie in an alliance with Germany. . . . this has often been recognized by Germans, but the French are blinded by vanity and their narrow-minded hope for revenge."<sup>58</sup>

The war has come; the French who know their history no doubt remember the war of 1870-71. Of this war in which Napoleon III was a mere puppet in Bismarck's hands, the Editor writes,

<sup>56</sup> *O. C.*, p. 613.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 613-615.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 616.

“Was not the cause of the war the unjustifiable demand that the king of Prussia should humiliate himself before the French emperor? He should beg pardon for a Hohenzollern prince of an entirely different line because the Spaniards had offered to the latter the crown of Spain.”<sup>59</sup> Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was advised by Bismarck to “abandon all scruples and accept the candidature in the interests of Germany,” and as “a red rag to the Gallic bull.” Prince Bismarck worked the German press to inflame opinions against France. On the evening of July 8, the French ambassador Benedetti reached Ems under instructions to ask King Wilhelm to secure the withdrawal of Prince Leopold. The King wrote privately to Sigmaringen; on the 10th, Prince Karl Anton, father of Prince Leopold, said it was too late to draw back, but on the 12th, Prince Leopold actually withdrew, and the news was published in the *Kölnische Zeitung*. Benedetti received orders to demand an undertaking from King Wilhelm that the candidature would never be renewed. The old king refused but added that he had no hidden designs, and had reason to hope the question was closed. The German ambassador in Paris sent to Ems for approval a draft note stating that the king of Prussia had meant no offense to France. Though irritated, the king sent an aide-de-camp to Benedetti to report that he had received the official withdrawal from Sigmaringen and approved of it. The aide-de-camp added that Benedetti might come to the station at Ems to salute His Majesty on his departure for Coblenz. As Benedetti bore witness at Ems “there was neither insulter nor insulted.” Bismarck, as is well known, falsified the telegram summarizing the conversation with Benedetti; and this “news” made public rendered the continuance of peace impossible. This was not an affair in which French diplomacy shone, but what of the Prussian?

With regard to the conditions of peace after the French defeat, the Editor writes that the surrender of Alsace and a small piece of Lorraine was demanded for rounding off the lines of Germany’s defense, and “incidentally it was remembered that the people of Alsace were Germans, that Alsace had belonged to the German empire, and its people even in the year 1871 were still speaking German,”<sup>60</sup> therefore the French should not resent this settlement.

This account avoids the cruelty of the annexation of these provinces by Germany. Though largely German in speech and race their inhabitants were for the most part passionately attached to France. In accordance with the Treaty of Frankfort the in-

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 615.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 616.

habitants were allowed to choose between French and German nationality, but all who chose the former had to leave their country. Some 50,000 did so before October 1872 and settled in France. Even after this exodus, when in 1874 the provinces were enabled to elect members for the Reichstag, they sent fifteen deputies who delivered a formal protest against the annexation and retired from the House, they formed no party and took little part in the proceedings except on important occasions to vote against the government. Gortchakoff gave warning that the annexation would leave a wound that would long be a menace to Europe, while Bismarck is reported to have said "one does not mutilate with impunity. To take Metz and a part of Lorraine was the worst of political blunders." It will be seen from this account of the feelings of the two provinces, that the cases imagined by the Editor, of England clamoring for revenge because the United States were once English colonies, and Spain clamoring to regain Gibraltar, are not parallel.

It is difficult to see why the English alliance with Japan (which has for some time been recognized by the powers as a civilized power), is condemned<sup>61</sup> by the Editor, while Germany's alliance with the oriental and unspeakable Turk is welcomed with enthusiasm at Berlin. To the German mind Japanese intervention is cowardly, the Turkish glorious.

#### JAPAN.

The action of Japan has been so correct that no reasonable American paper shows a trace of Mr. Randolph William Hearst's notorious scare on this subject<sup>62</sup> in the *Chicago American*. The conclusion is so grotesque that it needs no comment or refutation. "The attitude of Japan and her procedure against Germany is a warning. Might we (i. e., America) not overnight have a war on hand on account of the secret treaties between Japan, England and Russia in which Mexico and the South American republics would join just for the fun?"

#### ANTI-MACCHIAVELLI.

The Editor quotes a few clauses from the testament of Peter the Great, who ruled from 1689 to 1725, "to show our readers what it means to support Russia and how little any one can rely on Russian faith."<sup>63</sup> The dates alone make this contention pre-

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 618.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 618-619.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 620.

carious; one could as soon attribute to M. Poincaré the ruling ideas of Louis XIV, or to King George V the methods and aims of James II. To counterbalance Peter the Great's "testament" the Editor draws attention to Frederick the Great's *Anti-Macchiavelli*,<sup>64</sup> issued by Voltaire at the Hague in 1740, and containing not Frederick's own ideas but a reflection of the generous French philosophy of the eighteenth century respecting the duty of sovereigns, which may be summed up in the sentence: "The prince is not the absolute master but only the first servant of the people." It is however worthy of note that the great Frederick who joined in the partition of Poland was no believer in honesty in politics. Of statecraft popularly called Macchiavellian I have found the most remarkable expressions in German authors such as Bernhardt, who in speaking of Germany's future<sup>65</sup> war with France, says "As soon as we are ready to fight, our statesmen must so shuffle the cards that France shall appear to be the aggressor,"<sup>66</sup>—a sentence that might have been written by the ingenious author of *Il Principe*.

#### MODERN WARFARE.

This section attempts the defense of the German army by stating: (1) that German "atrocities" in Belgium did not take place; (2) that the Belgians committed atrocities against Germans. With regard to the first contention it may be pointed out that the only official inquiry, the Belgian, produces a vast mass of evidence from sufferers and eye-witnesses; while the round robin of the five American reporters<sup>67</sup> only comes to this, that these five gentlemen, after spending two weeks with, and accompanying the troops upward of one hundred miles, were "unable to report a single instance unprovoked." This is quite possible with regard to the districts seen by them, but obviously does not cover the whole country of Belgium. The German official statement that "the only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with unrelenting severity, and to create examples which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole country" seems by its wording to allow for atrocious treatment of the civil population.

The destruction of Louvain, whether the civil population fired upon the Germans or no, has shocked all neutral countries. The Editor gives the German official report<sup>68</sup> (published in Berlin,

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 621.

<sup>65</sup> *Germany and the Next War*, published in 1911.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 280.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted in O. C., p. 620.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 632-633.

August 20), as disposing of "all the Belgian fables," while he describes the Belgian account as improbable and lacking verification.<sup>69</sup> The utmost that could be said is that the two accounts are inconsistent; and neither side gives "verification." It cannot be said that the German version disposes of the Belgian, any more than that the Belgian disposes of the German, as far as evidence is concerned, though one may have a clear idea as to which story is the more probable. It is not correct to say that "to reproach the Germans for burning Louvain is the more unfair as under the same circumstances every other army would have done the same";<sup>70</sup> as the English, French and Italian press has repudiated such measures. The execution of a certain number of Indian rebels as a definite punishment of the guilty cannot be compared with the German treatment of Louvain, Termonde and Aerschot, in which many innocent civilians, women and children perished. In the suggestion that Belgians have been guilty of "the most heinous crimes of battle-hyenas," and that many people have been captured who found a pastime in torturing German soldiers,<sup>71</sup> no proof is adduced; and as far as the evidence of hospitals is available the *Vorwärts*, investigating this question, found there was absolutely no foundation for these imaginary "atrocities."

The final "atrocities" charge made by the German emperor<sup>72</sup> to President Wilson, is that French and English troops make use of dum-dum bullets. Such accusations are easy to make, and no verification is attempted on the German side; that is, the German emperor merely states that "after the capture of the French fort of Longwy my troops found in that place thousands of dum-dum bullets which had been manufactured in special works by the French government. Such bullets were found not only on French killed and wounded soldiers but also on English troops." The German case was that the government supplied large quantities of these bullets, and the German legation in Berne invited all and sundry to go and see the dum-dum bullets in their possession which had, it was said, been taken from French and British soldiers. The *Journal de Genève* sent Herr Meyer von Stadelhofen, the well-known Swiss rifle champion, who also carefully scrutinized these bullets in the German legation. He reported:

"I noticed first that the transformation had been effected with the help of rudimentary tools, such as a file, a saw, or a

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628. The Belgian account was issued to the British press on September 15 by the Press Bureau.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 628.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 634.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 634.

puncheon; secondly, that of these five bullets no two were cut in the same place, the mark of the instrument having been sometimes made nearer and sometimes farther from the nose of the bullet; thirdly, that the scooping-out was not done in the middle of the bullet; fourthly, that the metal had been recently worked, for the lead was still very bright."

His conclusions, therefore, are that obviously these bullets were not altered by mechanical means, and that they were not altered at the time or under the conditions referred to in the German note handed to him. To put it plainly, the statements of this note are not borne out by the examination of the bullets with which it was accompanied, while, to put it still more plainly, the famous dumdum bullets were made in Germany, or, at any rate turned into dumdum bullets there. Herr Meyer von Stadelhofen then asked whether the secretary of the Berlin foreign office had sent the German legation in Berne any medical evidence testifying to the use of dumdum ammunition, to which the answer was "No," an explanation being added, about which an army surgeon's opinion would be highly interesting, that "German doctors consider that it is virtually almost impossible to know whether a wound is or is not due to a dumdum bullet, owing to the fact that modern bullets have such a rotary movement that they often cause wounds similar to those produced by dumdum bullets, especially when they do not strike quite direct, as is frequently the case."<sup>73</sup>

Corroborative testimony directly controverting the use of dumdum bullets by the allies is that of Dr. Häberlin, a member of the Zürich medical association, who acted as a volunteer surgeon in various military hospitals in Arlen (Grand Duchy of Baden) and Ludwigsburg, and reported he never heard anything of a dumdum bullet wound. I have given prominence to these reports of neutrals, but the memorandum issued from the War Office, dated October 7, denies the use of dumdum bullets by English troops. There is, the report runs, clear evidence that Germany has not confined herself solely to the use of unobjectionable ammunition. Her troops both in Togoland and in France have been proved to have used bullets with a soft core and hard thin envelope, not entirely covering the core, which type of bullet is expanding and therefore expressly prohibited by The Hague Convention. Such bullets of no less than three types were found on the bodies of dead native soldiers serving with the German armed forces against British troops in Togoland in August, and on the persons of German European

<sup>73</sup> Quoted in the *Morning Post*, October 30, 1914.

and native armed troops captured by us in that colony. All the British wounded treated in the British hospitals during the operations in Togoland were wounded by soft-nosed bullets of large calibre, and the injuries which these projectiles inflicted, in marked contrast to those treated by the British medical staff amongst the German wounded, were extremely severe, bones being shattered and the tissue so extensively damaged that amputation had to be performed. The use of those bullets was the object of a written protest by the general officer commanding the British troops in Nigeria to the German acting governor of Togoland. Again, at Gundelu, in France, on September 19, 1914, soft-nosed bullets (i. e., those in which the lead core is exposed and protrudes at the nose) were found on the dead bodies of German soldiers of the *Landwehr*, and on the persons of soldiers of the *Landwehr* made prisoners of war by the British troops.

One of these bullets has reached the War Office. It is undoubtedly expanding, and directly prohibited by the Hague Convention.

#### MILITARISM.

In this section the Editor makes a useful distinction between two uses of the word militarism.<sup>74</sup> With the training of a large proportion of the citizens of military age for military service, which is the practice of nearly every country in Europe, few English critics find fault; though hitherto England, standing outside the European system, has contented herself with a small professional army. The French are also "the French nation in arms."<sup>75</sup> The militarism that is condemned by England and France is not only "the disease of militarism contracted by some members of the officers' corps at Zabern,"<sup>76</sup> but the political condition characterized by the predominance of the military class and its armed doctrine. It was against this subordination to armed doctrine that Theodor Mommsen warned his constituents at Halle: "Have a care, gentlemen, lest in this state which has been at once a power in arms and

<sup>74</sup> *O. C.*, p. 636. Militarism, according to the *New English Dictionary*, is "the spirit and tendencies characteristic of the professional soldier, . . . the political condition characterized by the predominance of the military class in government and administration; the tendency to regard military efficiency as the paramount interest of the state."

<sup>75</sup> Before the war the French army, with 84 per cent of competent men called up, was even more "a nation in arms" than the German army with only 53 per cent of such men called up.

<sup>76</sup> *O. C.*, p. 636. It is hardly correct that militarism in this sense "has never been worse in Germany than in other countries."

a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish, and nothing but the pure military state should remain."

#### GROWING MILITARISM.

Whether a peace party will make an end of armaments<sup>77</sup> in the future or whether militarists, the men who believe with Moltke that universal peace is "a dream and not a pleasant dream," is an academic question suitable for a debating society, and from its nature insoluble at the present moment. Other contentions in this section are that Germany has been converted from a friendly to an inimical nation, which has been dealt with already, and that in Germany warfare has developed into a science.<sup>78</sup> "The German army is a school in which German youths are training to be good soldiers and the German staff is also a school in which officers are instructed in strategy. There is not a Moltke to lead them, but Moltke's spirit guides them all. Should one of them die to-day, even if he occupy the highest rank, there are dozens who can take up his work." Strategy is not the monopoly of the German general staff; and the German operations on both fronts have hitherto shown small signs of serious strategy. In the west there was the occupation of Belgium and, while the way to Calais and Dunkirk lay open, the rush to Paris. Then the retreat from Paris, a defeat on the Marne; and—Calais is now the objective! In the east, an advance toward Warsaw and a strategic retreat with heavy losses. Some of the army's defects in war were foreseen by a critic of the manœuvres in 1911 when the military expert of the *Times*<sup>79</sup> gave warning that "the German army has seen less of modern war than any other which stands in the front rank. The contempt which it displays for the effects of modern fire, and professes to hold for armies of naval states with which it may come in conflict can only be set down to ignorance." But the end tries all, and it is not wise, as the Editor points out, to discredit the enemy.<sup>80</sup>

#### ILLUSTRATIONS.

At the close of my examination of the Editor's statement of

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 639-640.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 642.

<sup>79</sup> "There is nothing in the higher leading at the manœuvres of a distinguished character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of the command. . . . The German army, apart from its numbers, confidence in itself and high state of organization, does not present any signs of superiority over the best foreign models and in some ways does not rise above the second rate." *Times*, October 28, 1911.

<sup>80</sup> The cheerful brutality of Mr. Winston Churchill's speech at a recruiting meeting at Liverpool in which he used the following words: "If the German

Germany's case I wish to draw attention to some of the illustrations in the October number of *The Open Court*. As a pendant to the serious damage to Rheims cathedral the Editor gives a photograph of the Castle of Heidelberg, and the same juxtaposition of the two buildings has occurred to German purveyors of picture postcards. No one defends the ravage of the Palatinate in 1688, but as I have pointed out we do not draw our precedents from the reign of Louis XIV. With reference to the three views of Nuremberg, the Editor writes: "It is almost forgotten that according to newspaper reports, the first bombs were not dropped over Antwerp or France or England, but from French aeroplanes on this city of old German art." "Newspaper reports" (exclusively in German papers, by the way) are not sufficient evidence for this statement. It is inconsistent with the attitude of the French government, which withdrew the French army six miles from the frontier to prevent a collision before the outbreak of war<sup>81</sup> and later protested against German bomb-dropping upon and bombardment of unfortified towns.

#### ENGLAND'S BLOOD-GUILT IN THE WORLD WAR.

The Editor's contribution to the discussion of Germany's case is by far the largest and most considerable of the papers in the October number. But there remain two papers to be considered. That by Professor Burgess<sup>82</sup> reproduced from the *Springfield Republican* brings forward no point of importance, and its value may be gathered from the fact that he gives up a whole page to an account of a dinner at Wilhelmshöhe with the Emperor, including a list of the guests. Haeckel's contribution, "England's Blood Guilt in the World War," like the German appeal "To the Civilized World," is interesting as showing that German savants have not realized that assertion is not proof. We read:

"The parliament and press of the hostile Triple Entente, the English, French and Russian newspapers are endeavoring. . . to throw the whole blame upon Germany. . . . Emperor William II has, in the twenty-six years of his reign, done everything within his power to preserve for the German people the blessings of peace. . . . Similarly, the other two members of the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary and Italy, have ever endeavored to preserve the precious

navy does not come out and fight, they will be brought out like rats in a hole" (Quoted in *O. C.*, p. 641) is also to be deprecated.

<sup>81</sup> "The French troops have orders not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of 10 kilometers, so as to avoid any grounds for accusations of provocation to Germany." *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 69.

<sup>82</sup> *O. C.*, pp. 587-595.

blessing of peace and avoid European complications. *Rather does the whole responsibility for the outbreak of this world war fall on that mighty triple coalition the entente cordiale. . . .*

"In the splendid speech from the throne with which Emperor William II opened the German Reichstag on August 4 he *showed* the real causes that drove the enemies of our German empire to their insidious attack, envy of the prosperity of the dear fatherland," etc.<sup>83</sup>

The method is that of a Free Kirk minister dealing with the difficulties of belief in the existence of John the Baptist: He began: "Some people say John the Baptist did not exist. (Very solemnly) He *did!* Having disposed of that difficulty. . . ."

It is the spirit of the German appeal to the civilized world<sup>84</sup> with its many national trumpet-peals, each beginning "It is not true," sheer denial with no attempt at adducing evidence for the denial. The appeal might have originated in the Wolff bureau, not in the minds of savants. As the *Nation*<sup>85</sup> points out, "Nowhere is there any evidence of a desire to undertake an unbiased investigation of facts, logic is thrown to the winds, and we are treated to a flood of rhetoric and of unsupported statements. . . . It really seems as if some of the professors who have rushed into print to defend Germany's cause are doing it quite as much harm as the enemy." The appeal to the cultured world has destroyed the myth of German culture.

The rest of Haeckel's paper is notable only for a few mis-statements—such as that "Russia in the beginning of August declared war on Germany and Austria,"<sup>86</sup> whereas Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia on July 31,<sup>87</sup> at a time when negotiations were still proceeding between Russia and Austria,<sup>88</sup> and that England aims at a world empire, "the annihilation of the independent German empire, the destruction of German life and works, the subjection of the German people to British domination,"<sup>89</sup> a dream worthy of a German mind. The conclusion has a very unlucky prophecy, also

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 581.

<sup>84</sup> This appeal was published by ninety-three German savants and artists. Among the signatures are Eucken, Haeckel, Freda, Humperdinck, Sudermann, Hauptmann, Lamprecht, Kaulbach, Dörpfeld.

<sup>85</sup> *The Nation* (New York), October 29, 1914.

<sup>86</sup> *O. C.*, p. 584.

<sup>87</sup> *G. B. and the E. C.*, p. 66.

<sup>88</sup> On July 31, "the Austro-Hungarian ambassador declared the readiness of his government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia." *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>89</sup> *O. C.*, p. 585.

an outcome of German subjectivity, that Germany would find powerful allies among the nations that already bear England's unbearable yoke—Canada, India, Australia, Egypt and South Africa. Prophecy is of all controversial weapons the most dangerous.

#### TWELVE POINTS ASSURED.

The only important controversial points in the Editor's December article, "Lessons of the War," are summed up in the section "Twelve Points Assured," pp. 758-760. The Editor regards certain points as assured. Could he give any evidence that Russia "officially" supports a policy of assassination in Serbia (p. 758)? In the fourth paragraph he assumes that the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is the result of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. We now know, thanks to Signor Giolitti's revelations to the Italian parliament, that the murder of the archduke and the indictment of Serbia's complicity, which figured so largely in the Austrian ultimatum, had little to do with the settled purpose of Austrian policy. In the middle of 1913 Signor Giolitti, then Italian prime minister, was informed by the Austro-Hungarian government that it contemplated immediate action against Serbia and reckoned on the support of Italy under the terms of the Triple Alliance. The Italian government replied that it could not regard the action indicated as constituting a *casus foederis*, which would never arise out of an aggressive act. This reply induced Austria-Hungary to postpone action. As the Austro-Hungarian policy was already set in 1913, it is absurd to speak of it as conditioned by the Sarajevo assassination in 1914. I have already dealt with further points such as the Belgian neutrality and Russian mobilization. In the case of Germany's "positive evidence that the Belgians had broken neutrality long before a German soldier set foot on Belgian soil," the English case is strengthened by Herr Dernburg's publication of the military convention between England and Belgium. The proposed help from England, it is definitely stated in this document, was only to be given *after Belgian neutrality had been violated*.

## ENGLAND AND GERMANY IN THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR.

BY CHARLES H. CHASE.

I HAVE read the last three numbers of *The Open Court* with a good deal of interest and disappointment as well. I cannot understand how men as high intellectually, and, as I believe, morally, as the editor of *The Open Court*, Professor Münsterberg, and others of German descent can defend the German emperor in the present great struggle in Europe. To me it is incomprehensible how men can take such a position. My ancestors, mostly English, have lived in this country since 1631, but on both sides of my ancestral tree I have a large admixture of Dutch and German blood. I say this to indicate to all who read this article that I am in a position to be unbiased by near descent from any of the belligerents.

I wish to state what I believe to be deep-seated influences which have actuated both English and Germans in the present struggle. The English and Germans are the same people, of the same Teutonic blood, divergent only by the varying environment of the last fifteen hundred years. In England there has been a continuous struggle for liberty during all that period. To go into the causes which have made England the cradle of Anglican liberty, the highest and best in all the world, that which guarantees to every individual the right to do any and everything which will not interfere with the equal rights of his fellow,—to go into details respecting these causes, would require a volume. I can only say that Anglican liberty has been a development which has affected favorably every country where the English language is spoken, as well as every land over which the English flag floats. India and Ireland are only just coming into their rights; but the time is not far distant when they, too, will enjoy the same measure of Anglican liberty as is now enjoyed by the Scotch, the Welsh, the citizens of the United States, Canada, and the Boers of South Africa. Within

the few short years of English government these latest inheritors of Anglican liberty are, with few exceptions, well pleased with English suzerainty, which gives them greater liberty than they ever before enjoyed. England, too, has been a robber state; but the fangs of her absolutism have been drawn in the course of an age-long struggle. In her insular position what might have become Cæsarism, has through the ages grown beautifully less.

Cæsarism (or militarism as generally designated) has been the dominating influence of continental countries, age-long in France, Austria, Spain, Italy, Germany and Russia. In France, Italy, and other Romance countries there has been a gradual breaking away from Cæsarism; but in Russia, Turkey, Austria, and Germany we have Cæsarism in its unadulterated form, where the individual has no rights, no freedom in any proper acceptation of the term. The appeal to force in the duel is a fair indication of their ideas of honor. Here a soldier can run a civilian through with his saber, with impunity; the latter has no rights as against the former. In these countries every man is a slave to some one who is his overlord; except that the Kaiser, the Czar, the Sultan, the Emperor acknowledges no master but God, of whom he is vicegerent.

That the Kaiser and the Austrian emperor wanted this war, planned for it, there can be no kind of doubt for one who has investigated the ante-bellum conditions. The proof is to be found in a thousand documents and volumes. When the Kaiser applied to the bankers for a war loan a few years ago, they protested that they could not float it; they were not ready. The Kaiser enjoined them with: "The next time I call I want you to be ready." Prussia's national egoism and egotism has been growing ever since she humbled Austria in 1866. These two great robbers joined three years before in wresting Schleswig and Holstein from Denmark. It was inevitable that they should fall out; for honor among thieves is ephemeral. The seven weeks of war in 1866 was provoked by Prussia, to take from Austria her share of the plundered territory. Prussia with her needle-gun was victorious. Then she sought a quarrel with her ancient enemy, France. The all too willing usurper emperor, Louis Napoleon, influenced by his empress, was equally anxious for the fray. France was humbled, and emperors in France became anathema. In 1874, Prussia was again possessed with the itch for war with France, too rapidly rising out of her valley of humiliation. But England and Russia warned Prussia; and the recently united Germany was not ready for a struggle with England and Russia. But for several years the most popular toast in the German mili-

tary ranks has been "To the hour," the hour when the wished-for struggle should come with her now inveterate enemy, England. England, mistress of the seas, England whose flag floated over one-fifth of the earth's surface, whose commercial trade was with every land and people, was a standing menace to Germany's advancement. She it was whom Germany must crush, in order to carry out the ideas of world empire by which Germany is to impress her culture upon the rest of the world.

In 1831 Hegel, the last of the great school of German idealists who dominated and led the thought of Germany, passed away. From idealism and the moral code taught by the great school of Kant, Fichte and their followers, Germany has degenerated into the crass materialism of Haeckel and the neo-Darwinians. The materialistic philosophies have dominated German thought for more than half a century. Might is the only right of her universities; and her ethics may be properly denominated "hog ethics,"—take what you want when you can, and don't be particular how you get it.

The teachings of her historian Treitschke, her philosopher Nietzsche, and her materialistic philosophers and scientists, led by Haeckel, are bearing their legitimate fruit. Germany has appealed to the sword, and she (at least her autocratic government) will perish by the sword.

Prussia and Austria have been properly criticized for their autocratic and arbitrary governments, which deny to the ordinary citizen any rights as such, his whole duty being to obey the powers that be in the state. Their people are intelligent, progressive, peace-loving, and liberty-loving; but the only force in these countries that makes for liberty is the socialist party. This party might have been successful in pushing forward the struggle for liberty, but for the crisis which enabled the militarists to bring on a general European war, the only thing which could put off the fall of Cæsarism, and that only in the event of German success. The defeat of Germany in the present struggle means the rapid decline and fall of Cæsarism, imperialism, militarism and autocratic government, by whatever name called.

The boasted culture of Germany has degenerated from the idealism of a hundred years ago to mere materialistic industrialism; her ethics from the intuitional axioms of right and wrong to a base system of energetics, which makes force, energy, the only criterion of human action. In the adoption of Darwinism most German philosophers out-Darwin Darwin. Darwin recognized at least three

factors of evolution, in his later writings more; but the neo-Darwinians recognize but the one negative factor which selects the stronger by the destruction of the weaker. The inevitable result of such a philosophy is to abolish all moral principles and to paraphrase the beatitudes, so well stated by Professor Cramb, as follows:

“Ye have heard how in old times it was said, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth; but I say unto you, Blessed are the valiant, for they shall make the earth their throne. And ye have heard men say, Blessed are the poor in the spirit; but I say unto you, Blessed are the great in soul and free in spirit, for they shall enter into Valhalla. And ye have heard men say, Blessed are the peacemakers; but I say unto you, Blessed are the war-makers, for they shall be called, if not the children of Jahve, the children of Odin, who is greater than Jahve.”

I am driven to the conclusion that the most potent cause of the present war is the shift of Germany from idealism to materialistic mechanicalism (energetics) and industrialism. The common people of Germany are still untainted by this philosophic poison, and in them lies her hope. Both Austria and Russia are priest-ridden, and their condition is about that of England in the time of Henry the Eighth or earlier. Later claimants to absolute power in that country were either beheaded or driven from the realm. That is the course which events must take, rapidly or slowly, in Russia, Turkey, Austria, and Germany; and it is to be hoped that the present great struggle may bring about this greatly to be desired end.

## FATE AND THE WAR.

BY THE EDITOR.

IT almost appears as if Friedrich von Bernhardi had made the present war. No books of his have appeared until recently, and he was little known as an author before his death in 1913. One of his books, "On the Customs of War," was published in 1902, but it was merely an official statement of the German General Staff for public information. His main work, entitled "Germany and the Next War," which appeared in 1912 in the midst of peace, now sounds like a prophecy, and the contents of this book have been popularized in a still more recent book (published in 1913) entitled "Our Future—A Word of Warning to the German Nation." General Bernhardi was apparently an able general, and also a keen diplomat who had studied the history of nations, their wars, their rise and decline and ever-shifting positions in the world, to such an extent as to make him a most able judge of national development in the history of mankind. That he, a German general, should have proved to be a true German patriot is surely deserving only of commendation; that he was a good writer must likewise be counted in his favor; but if we are to consider him as a prophet, his rôle has truly been a terrible one, for his prophecy seems to have been almost fatalistic in its consequences. But I will add here that, as Herr Dernburg claims, Bernhardi's pessimistic utterances and his assistance in the movement for increased armaments were not approved by the German government, and caused his discharge.

In spite of his high rank in the army and his position in the General Staff, Friedrich von Bernhardi was little known in Germany. His warning, though in some places obviously directed against the peace policy of the Kaiser, was not specially heeded by the German people, and as an author he remained unknown to fame. Unfortunately, however, his second book was translated into English, the work being done by J. Ellis Barker who did not hesitate to change its title, "Our Future—A Word of Warning to

the German Nation," into the more alarming words, *Britain as Germany's Vassal*. This change is not just to the author, for there is not a word in Bernhardi's book which suggests the idea of making Britain a vassal of Germany. On the contrary it is a book, as Bernhardi himself says, of "warning to the Germans," and he claims that Germany stands at that point of her development where she has to decide for herself whether she will remain a continental power of secondary importance or whether she will continue her course of expansion and become a world-power possessing colonies, like England and the United States.

General Bernhardi recently undertook a journey round the world to gather impressions, and he passed through the United States; but though he had then finished his literary career, he was unknown. His presence here did not create even a ripple of excitement, and there are few who saw his name mentioned in the papers. He became famous only since the translation of his books created a stir in England; and an Englishman can well shudder with fear as he contemplates the need of Germany's expansion and the native vigor of her teeming millions demanding also their share of space on this globe. On the other hand, Bernhardi points out England's established policy of refusing to tolerate the growth of another naval power and of antagonizing whichever state happens to be the most powerful in continental Europe.

England and Germany have formerly been united by the closest ties of national relationship and the personal kinship of their rulers. For several centuries the English royal family has hailed from Germany, and has been related to the houses of Hanover, Saxony, Coburg and Prussia. The present King of England and the Kaiser are cousins. Queen Victoria was the grandmother of both, and if the laws of succession were slightly modified or some of the Queen's descendants had unexpectedly died, or had not been born, both thrones might be held by the same man.

The English language, a daughter of Anglo-Saxon speech, is practically a Low German dialect, and the Low Germans of the northern part of the fatherland constitute the dominant and, in military matters, the most efficient portion of northern Germany. The English people come from the territory where formerly Saxon or Low German was spoken, and the Lowland Scots are of the same race. The Saxons conquered the Celtic portions of Britain, and also Ireland, and though they form only about one-third of the population of Great Britain they have impressed upon the remainder their language and national character.

At present the inhabitants of Great Britain are about 45,000,000, but with a very far-sighted and practical policy they have succeeded in acquiring the most important inhabitable portions of the globe, such as southern Africa, Australia, Canada and India, and at the same time have possessed themselves of all important naval bases, chief among them being the Suez Canal together with Aden at the end of the Red Sea, and Malta, and Gibraltar.

England's position is practically that of ruler of the ocean, and with great foresight the English have always insisted on having the strongest navy in the world. In modern politics England has always opposed any nation likely to develop a powerful navy, and so it was perhaps inevitable that Great Britain should be arrayed against Germany notwithstanding her old blood-ties with that country, the kinship of their royal families, and all their common historical interests, and should side with her old enemy, France, and even with Russia, so dangerous to England everywhere in Asia. She has allied herself with these for the sole purpose of checking the more systematic and therefore more formidable advance of Germany.

The German danger was pointed out by an anonymous pen in two articles which appeared in the *London Saturday Review*<sup>1</sup> and which must be mentioned here because their underlying principles have guided English politics; they have led to the establishment of the Triple Entente, and they explain the plan of an English invasion of France through Belgium and the determination to have Germany crushed between France and Russia while England destroyed Germany's trade and starved the whole country into submission, a plan which it was expected would be very easy and one whose execution was urged while it was still feasible.

The English apprehension of the German danger was the real cause of the war; the Servian quarrel was only the occasion on which Russian eagerness to assert its Pan-Slavic ambition with the help of the Triple Entente grew bold enough to start the trouble, and the German breach of Belgian neutrality furnished England a pretext to join in the general fray.

In former articles I have defended Germany for standing by Austria in her determination to have the conspiracy of the regicide fully investigated, and I have also maintained that, in view of the fact that she was threatened with an invasion through Belgium, Germany was justified in attempting a passage through this no longer neutral territory. There is no need of re-opening the dis-

<sup>1</sup> See *The Open Court* for October, 1914, p. 577, and December, 1914, p. 719.

cussion on this problem. Since we know that England herself had intended to break into Germany through Belgium, Germany's action is perfectly justified. I assume that every one who wishes to investigate the situation with impartiality will familiarize himself with the documents discovered at Brussels, which do not admit of any other interpretation than that Belgium had joined with England and France in the project of an attack on Rhenish Germany. In connection with this we refer to the letter of Baron Greindl, at that time Belgian ambassador at Berlin, who warns his government against the danger to which such a step would expose them. England saw no wrong in breaking Belgian neutrality with Belgium's consent, but she angrily denounces Germany for breaking it without that consent.

Baron Greindl was a Belgian patriot. He did not want to have the Germans admitted to Belgian soil; he wanted to preserve the independence of his country. For this reason he deemed it dangerous to hand the Belgian fortresses and defenses over to the British and French who were more easily invited than disposed of when no longer needed. His warnings remained unheeded and now comprise a document testifying to anti-German intrigue. Another letter of a similar purport was written July 30, 1914, by M. de l'Escaille, the Belgian ambassador at St. Petersburg. This was also found by the Germans in Brussels and was published in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung*. M. de l'Escaille recognizes that the war has been unavoidable from the time that the war party at St. Petersburg gained the upper hand, and he concludes thus:

"The army, which feels itself strong, is full of enthusiasm and relies on great hopes based on the enormous progress that has been achieved since the Japanese war. The navy is so far from having realized the program of its reconstruction and its reorganization that it can scarcely enter into the matter of reckoning. It is probably there that the motive lies which gives such great importance to the assurance of England's support."

This expectation was expressed before the Germans entered Belgium. It is clear that England wanted to throw her full weight into the balance with France and Russia. The Germans asked twice whether England would remain neutral if Belgium were left alone or if Germany promised not to attack France by sea, or, if not, what conditions would satisfy her; but Sir Edward Grey refused to commit himself and so Germany could run no risk of a hostile attack through Belgium and saw no other chance to forestall her enemies. Even then she would have guaranteed

Belgian independence if Belgium had been willing to allow her passage through Belgian territory. It was the duty of Germany to protect first of all her own citizens and so she reluctantly decided to open the war by taking Belgium, otherwise the British and French trenches might now lie round Aix-la-Chapelle or Cologne.

The English make light of the discoveries of the *Conventions anglo-belges* at Brussels, and speak of them as "an academic discussion" relating only to "the event of Belgian neutrality being infringed upon by one of its neighbors," but to a reader of these documents there is no doubt that Belgium joined England and France with definite promises and made common cause with them. The documents prove a plan to attack Germany; they mention the possibility of an attempted march of German troops through Belgium only as one eventuality, not as the condition of the whole proposition.

The question that remains is simply a problem of the future. It is this: Will Germany continue to expand, or will England's dominating power crush it before its navy is large enough to rival her own on the seas? In other words, we stand before a crisis in history. The crisis is here. But the question is, were the diplomats of England wise in having it decided by war?—for no one who has studied the diplomatic events of the last days of July, 1914, doubts that England brought about the war. Can England much longer, either by war or peace, maintain her dominant position in the world? The truth is that, apart from her forty-five millions at home, she counts not more than twenty millions of whites in her colonies—Canada, Australia, South Africa and India—to defend her vast empire, and she has not even enough sailors to man her navy—which is not surprising when we consider the constant drain there must be to keep up to the two-power standard. England is a comparatively small country, her people are not as prolific as the Germans, and her hold on her tremendous colonial possessions is more or less precarious. Ought she not, under these circumstances, to have allied herself with some virile country such as Germany, and would not both countries have benefitted thereby?

The question has been proposed, whether England, Germany and the United States could agree to stand together for a peaceful development, and have questions of right or wrong decided by mutual agreement. Of course the basic question of mutual recognition of their respective spheres should be settled at the start. This would have been the ideal solution, and it is the one we have always advocated; but it seems that the distrust between the nations

has grown too strong to permit any friendly understanding between them, for English policy has recently been very determined to put a check upon any possible aggrandizement of German colonies or colonial life. The English have also been very much opposed to the increase of Germany's navy, and, on the other hand, the Germans have been just as determined not to allow any interference with the development of their military or naval power.

Germany would have preferred to continue a peaceful competition with England like that which prevailed before the war, and from her own standpoint this would have been the better course. Germany was noticeably gaining, and England seemed either unwilling to exert herself to outdo German trade and commerce, or unable to outdo it. War finally appeared to the British government to be the only chance of suppressing the German danger.

If two nations are actually unwilling to allow each other free development the result must be war, and in this sense we speak of the war as having been unavoidable. It is not a question of right, it is a question of might.

In studying the facts closely, and in trying to understand what the English and the sponsors of their policy mean by the "aggressiveness" of Germany, we conclude that it is Germany's unwelcome advance in population, in trade, in power, in influence, in wealth, etc., by which it may rival England. No wonder they deem it intolerable. The question is only whether it is wise to check their intolerable aggressiveness by war. I believe it would have been wiser to compete with Germany by adopting German methods and striving to outdo the Germans in their peaceful accomplishments, by imitating their schools, by fostering science and teaching the growing generation to apply themselves in a severer attention to the duties of life.

Another feature of modern Germany which the English find unpleasant is her militarism. They would much prefer to see her helpless. But this very institution of universal military service is the strength of Germany, and it is this that renders her invincible. It is Germany's backbone. If England wants to continue this war she will have to adopt universal military service, and she could not do better than imitate the much denounced German militarism as speedily as possible.

England has chosen the war, not Germany! England was unprepared for the war for she thought it would be an easy game. Her former wars have been easy, and this war too seemed as sure; and it was a matter of course to crush any power that threatened

to grow stronger and richer than herself. In the Triple Entente with all its secret implications and corollaries, they believed, lay their weapon for the isolation and strangulation of Germany. From the English point of view, however, I do not condemn them for the course they have pursued, for they certainly have ample cause for apprehension; and from the old standpoint of Macchiavellian statecraft there is no right or wrong in diplomacy. But even from their point of view their diplomacy has been grossly deceived; the Triple Entente will not accomplish what they hoped for; and the disaster which they have planned for Germany will recoil on their own heads.

The present situation appears like the work of fate. Similar conditions have repeated themselves in history. And is it to be wondered at that the Kaiser, though he did his utmost to preserve peace, should finally be forced into this conflict against his will? It is as if the German people had been compelled to come forth in all their might to show themselves worthy of becoming a world-power.

The Germans are naturally a peaceful people. Their much denounced militarism is positively a peaceful institution, for it means that every father, son and brother must fight the battles of his country. If England possessed this system the English people would have been considerably less vociferous in their clamors for war.

Germany has accepted the challenge, not for the sake of gaining a new and larger position in the world, but simply to maintain her old hold and to ward off the invaders to the west and the east. Here, however, appears a new factor in history. England has become the main enemy of Germany, and it will be very difficult, if possible at all, to eradicate the intense hatred which has suddenly arisen in Germany against their cousins beyond the channel.

A university professor whose only son and all of whose sons-in-law are in the field writes: "We pity the French and are sorry that the Belgians were so misguided; we regret that our men have to pit their lives against the Cossacks. But we feel a positive hostility toward the English. They have become the arch-enemy of Germany and we know that peace, an honorable peace, will be possible only if we succeed in humbling Albion. We shall probably fight against France and Russia only until we can establish ourselves on foreign soil in a secure defensive position, and then we will concentrate all our forces against England."

Another friend of mine, also a university professor, a scholar

highly respected also in English-speaking countries, writes as follows:

"Our losses on the battlefield, especially in the west, are terrible, but how is it with the enemy? We have to fight hard for every foot of territory we gain, but even if the struggle is slow no one doubts here but we shall win in the end; for there is but one enemy, and that is England. She is not only our enemy, but the enemy of mankind.

"You have not the slightest idea of the intense hatred against England which moves all Germany. Since documents have been found in Brussels proving a compact made between Belgium and England, a plan according to which Belgium would allow English troops to march through Belgian territory into the Rhenish provinces of Germany, indignation, wrath and contempt for British hypocrisy knows no limits among us. And yet the English government could take Germany's breach of Belgium's neutrality as a reason for declaring war, whereas the English and French had broken it long before.

"England is the instigator of the whole war and of all the unspeakable misery which has been brought not only upon innocent Germany, but also upon the allies themselves, the Belgians and the French. The most simple-minded man in the *Landwehr* and every peasant knows this to be the case, so that for centuries the deadliest hatred against England will remain the most sacred inheritance in every German family, to be handed down from father to son.

"And what will be the harvest of this terrible crop of hatred? Even if peace could be obtained now, this hatred will remain, and the thought of England as the cause of all this horror will not be blotted out in future generations. It will produce new seeds for future wars, and the representatives of the German people will always be ready to grant any number of millions needed for preparing attacks upon England. Our armies see the need of conquering the Russians in the east and the French in the west, but all their ambition burns for a humiliation of England, and *they will succeed!* Nothing is more apparent than the degeneration of that ruthless nation, and careful observers have noticed the several symptoms which show the lowering of their national conscience, of which every day brings new evidences."

The hatred of England which has suddenly developed in Germany is explicable only through England's sudden and unexpected declaration of war, an act which showed conclusively that Eng-

land had definitely determined that Germany's commercial and naval development should receive a crushing blow. Previous to the summer of 1914, there was not the slightest animosity towards England among the great majority of Germans. The report that the most popular toast in certain circles in Germany since the time of Edward VII has been *Der Tag* or *Die Stunde* (referring to the day or hour when Germany should finally settle accounts with England) is absolutely unknown to me, although I have been in Germany repeatedly and should certainly have seen something of this bellicose attitude had it existed. In certain quarters in Germany, it is true, there has always been an antagonism to England, but the idea of a war with that country has never been prevalent in military circles. Possibly such a toast may have been offered in the German navy, as might just as easily be the case in any other navy since England is practically the only possible opponent on the seas; but it certainly could not have been in general use in the army. Some one may possibly have witnessed such a toast in some corner, but, if so, it was certainly an exception and does not represent the general spirit before August, 1914.

Whatever my English friends have said in their accusations of Germany has only confirmed my conviction that Germany is right in being what she is to-day, and that the steps she has taken in self-defense are justified. One of my friendly critics ends his private letter with the following postscript: "When Germany shall have lost all her navy, all her colonies, all Polish Prussia, she will be greater than ever spiritually—greater in the things which made her great in 1813—and 1870 also."

I grant that Germany was great in the beginning of the nineteenth century; it was the Germany of Goethe, Schiller, Mozart, Beethoven, etc. Napoleon's armies were garrisoned in the country, and the people were impoverished by unendurable war-taxes; yet Germany was great, and accomplished things that will be immortal. It is this state of Germany that the English would like to restore, helpless but noble, poor but ideal, downtrodden by her invaders but famous for poetry and science. Such is the idea of my friend, Mr. Poultney Bigelow. Perhaps the historian of the future will declare that Germany in her greatest distress in 1806-1813 was greater than in her military glory and in the restoration of the empire in 1871; but, after all, I can not blame the Germans for taking steps to prevent the return of this humiliating state of purely ideal greatness. The Triple Entente was concluded to check Germany's growth, and the question now is not whether the Serbs

should or should not be allowed to assassinate the heirs to the throne of Austria, or whether the Belgians have or have not the right to allow the English and forbid the Germans to march through Belgium. The question is whether the Triple Entente can crush Germany, and I say they will not succeed.

As best, from the English standpoint, the war will fizzle out in a drawn state of hostility without reaching a definite decision. The hope in which the war was undertaken and which seemed so easy of realization—the hope that Germany could be crushed between the French and the Russians—will scarcely be fulfilled and becomes more and more improbable. On the other hand it becomes more and more apparent that Germany suffers less through her isolation than England, whose trade is also crippled through the war. On the one hand the Germans adapt themselves more easily to new conditions which really are not worse than a prohibitive tariff (so highly praised by protectionists in this country), and, on the other hand, England suffers as much, perhaps more, through this patriotic destruction of trade and in addition runs greater risks. Her domination in India, South Africa and Egypt seems pretty well established, but it may be shaken at any time, and if so, it will probably collapse. The war is a test of Germany, but it will prove equally a test of those who are responsible for the war, and above all of England. And it seems to me very doubtful whether England will stand the test. It is strange that my English friends do not see the question from this point of view.

Wars are not made by kings or emperors, nor are they made by the people. They come upon mankind like fate. They seem predestined. When they first break upon us they have a stultifying effect and all manner of insane hates are engendered; but as time passes on the wounds heal—though sometimes slowly, as for instance after the Thirty Years' War—new times and conditions arise, new generations come on, and, forgetful of the past, the development of mankind progresses along fresh channels. If mankind stood on a higher plane, if the leaders in European politics had commanded a broader vision, the war might have been avoided, but, as conditions were, it was inevitable. We inhabitants of the United States can only regret this struggle, for we are closely allied to both England and Germany, and we feel keenly the terrible losses on both sides. And for the outcome,—*nous verrons ce que nous verrons!*

## THE LIFE OF SOCRATES.<sup>1</sup>

BY WILLIAM ELLERY LEONARD.

### I.


THE Athenian of whom I speak was born, according to tradition, a half-hour's walk from the walls of the city, in the deme, or precinct, Alopeke, birthplace too of Thucydides and of Aristides. Here amid olive- and fruit-trees, vegetable gardens and wayside plants, in view of Mount Hymettus, was the house of Sophroniscus, the artisan stone-cutter, and of his practical helpmeet Phaenarete, a midwife. Thus the parents were plain people, both earning their own bread at old racial occupations that combined cleverness of head and of hand; thus, also, it was the folk-stock, it was the common womb of humanity, out of which have issued so many of the powerful ones of the earth, that furnished the bone and brain of Socrates. The father seems to have lived only long enough to lead the child to the public sacrifices; the mother married again, and we hear of a half-brother in the household.

Great men tend to lose their human nature in the aftertimes. They become symbols of forces and ideals, being absorbed into a train of thought on historic cause and effect—as factors in our judgments rather than as faces for our imaginations. But we need the touch of the hand and the sound of the voice. The great man must walk by our side if we are to walk well. The affair can be managed; it is not a question of the dissevering years altogether—a contemporary is not a matter of time, except etymologically: it depends upon us. That Socrates was born at Athens in 469 may be a line of print, a point of departure for a lecture in philosophy, or a vision of life.

But after standing for one preeminent moment by the infant's

<sup>1</sup>This partial sketch of the life of Socrates follows Dr. Leonard's introductory paragraphs published in the January issue. The illustrations which should have accompanied his description of the city of Athens were crowded out of that number and will be found here and in later instalments somewhat apart from their context.—ED.

cradle and getting our bearings with reference to its issues of immortality, we must wander for a number of years in the outer world of conjecture. Legend itself has left us little. Around the boyhood of Socrates have gathered none of the tales or myths that have



ATHENS.  
Southeastern part taken from the east end of the Acropolis. Reproduced  
from Weller's *Athens and Its Monuments*.

unconsciously symbolized the genius and unfoldment of so many of the illustrious.

We surmise he had the customary education in gymnastic and in music, which included besides singing and dancing, the mem-

orizing of much Homer and Hesiod. At eighteen he would become a citizen and take his turn in the militia on the Attic frontier, a service we can conceive him as performing in a more rollicking vein than Coleridge or any other philosopher ever condemned to the barracks. The tradition that he made a beginning at his father's profession is presumably reliable; but his reputed statue of the three Graces on the Acropolis has yet to be unearthed. It is plausible, too, that by the time he had passed his majority, he met and learned from the philosophers, a number of whom are represented



ACROPOLIS FROM MUSEUM HILL.

either by ingenuous hearsay or dramatic propriety as having been formally or casually his teachers: Parmenides, the Eleatic; Zeno, the dialectician; Anaxagoras and Archelaus, the physicists; Protagoras, first of the sophists. These men were doubtless in Athens during the younger manhood of Socrates, and the air was full of talk on the physical sciences, just beginning to be differentiated, as well as on metaphysics, already split up into the two opposing world-views of the absolute and of the relative. It is to the sophists, however, with whom he is in point of view and activity closest allied; and with the sophists he presumably most frequently asso-



THE PATRON GODDESS OF ATHENS.

The identification of the statue as the Lemnian Athena is disputed. The replicas from which this restoration was made are two torsos in the Museum of Dresden and a head in the Museum of Bologna. Reproduced from Weller's *Athens and Its Monuments*.

ciated (as Jesus with the rabbis), before his years of maturest self-dependence.

## II.

A chronological account of his career is impossible. We have a few dated events in the military and civil history of Athens, in which Socrates played a part; we have the performance of the *Clouds* in 423, and hints of his primary activity as teacher early and late, the most circumstantial, however, only when he was already an elderly man, surrounded by the Socratic circle.

He appears first in history at about the age of thirty-seven. But he is not at Athens; he is not teaching. Armed with the heavy shield and spear of a hoplite, a citizen-warrior in the early days of the Peloponnesian war, he is far northward in Chalcidice at the siege of Potidaea (432). The pictures given by Alcibiades in the *Symposium* of Plato are brilliant and well-known, moreover characteristic and significant in several ways. We see here for the first time the shabby mantle and the unsandalled feet. One scene is winter. The snow flakes gather in the folds of his single garment; the ice is under the bare heels. He goes his rounds; the other privates in the ranks bear it ill: "This fellow is airing his hardihood to shame us." Another scene is amid the confusion of battle. He is stalking toward us with a wounded soldier in his arms. It is Alcibiades, who a little time before in Athens seems to have attached himself to the philosopher, like Critias, to learn merely for selfish ambitions, not for truth. Had Socrates left him to die on the field, it would have been better for Athens. And thinking of how Alcibiades's subsequent conduct was to be urged against Socrates at the crisis, I was about to add—better for Socrates. But no; cowardice is never better—never better for the man himself, never for his usefulness to us after his death. It is worth knowing that Socrates was brave as well as wise. The third scene changes to the Chalcidicean summer. Socrates stands somewhat apart from the tents in morning meditation. Nobody pays much attention; he is doubtless already notorious for queer ways both on the streets of Athens and here in camp. But noon comes; he is still there. And twilight—still there. This is a new thing. Word is passed around. The soldiers take their bedding out and lie down to watch him. The stars rise and set—who is this that his thought should be more than food and drink and sleep? At last he salutes the golden sun and goes his way. This celebrated anecdote, making perhaps some allowance for exaggeration, we may well credit. It

is too public in its setting to have been invented out of whole cloth during the very lifetime of many veterans of the northern campaign; at least too unique in its portrayal of character to have been foisted upon any man whose nature would have rendered such extraordinary demeanor unlikely. We cannot but accept it as one of several illustrations of Plato's skill in utilizing for art the facts of life.

Socrates was twice again under arms, and at a time of life when not alone the philosophers prefer their own firesides: at Delium in 424, where his calm and resourceful conduct during retreat earned him the commendations of Alcibiades and the general Laches (in Plato); and at Amphipolis, in 422, where no one was present whose report has come down to us.

A number of years later, now an old man, we hear of him for the first time in civic affairs. Xenophon gives the facts in a paragraph of simple narration, and Plato in the Dialogues represents his Socrates as playfully referring to them by the way. Matters so public we readily separate from literary fiction. The most circumstantial account, however, is in Plato's *Apology* (20) where I am ready to believe we can hear in the homely grandeur of the utterance not only the dramatic tribute of the disciple, but some echoes of the great voice itself.

"The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of senator; the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency [Socrates himself being president for the day] at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginusae [406, toward the close of the Peloponnesian war]; and you proposed to try them in a body, contrary to the law, as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytanes who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you. [Socrates refused to put the matter to vote]; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and you called and shouted, I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law and justice with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death. This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power [404], they sent for me [Socrates being a well-known citizen] and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon the Salaminian from Salamis, as they wanted to put him to death. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; and then I showed, not in word only but in deed, that,

if I may be allowed to use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my great and only care was lest I should do an unrighteous or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. And many will witness to my words."

If there need be comment, let a Roman speak:


"Justum et tenacem propositi virum  
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,  
Non vultus instantis tyranni  
Mente quatit solida"....

### III.

Such data from military and civil chronicle nobly expand our conception of the versatile energies of Socrates, and by easily intelligible and concrete illustration bind him for our imagination close to the city of his birth and death. Yet they are but supplementary to the activities of the indefatigable intellect and tongue which for over a generation puzzled, amused, inspired, or irritated his fellow-citizens by services far different and altogether unparalleled. The distinctive chapter in his biography must report on the gad-fly of the Athenians.

"Socrates ever lived in the public eye; at early morning he was to be seen betaking himself to one of the promenades, or wrestling grounds; at noon he would appear with the gathering crowds in the market-place; and as day declined, wherever the largest throng might be encountered, talking for the most part, while any one who chose might stop and listen." So Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, I, 1). "Talking"—and, we may add on good grounds, asking various odd and new questions about the old familiar things.

Just when Socrates laid down his chisel to become the cross-questioner of mankind is uncertain. According to Plato's *Apology* the whole impulse came from the Delphic oracle. Socrates's friend Chaerephon had inquired who was the wisest of men, and had received there the answer we all know. Socrates was puzzled, and began questioning around among the masters of trades and arts only to find them as ignorant of the meaning of their own business as they were wise in their own conceit. Socrates then reflected, "The oracle must have named me the wisest, because I am wise enough to know myself as knowing nothing." This old story is of some symbolic truth; as sober biography it is absurd. Its symbolism,



PLATO.

Bust in the Berlin Museum.

whether intended or not, lies chiefly in the facts that Socrates understood, as no other Greek, the motto on the portal of the Delphic temple, "Know Thyself," and that Socrates was preeminently the priest dedicated to Apollo, god of light. Its absurdity lies partly in the arch naïveté of its actors; but more especially in its self-contradiction, as it implies that Socrates was already famous for the peculiar quality and activity which, however, the oracular word is here accredited with having first awakened.

I have already suggested that the friendship with Alcibiades at Potidaea points to a discipleship before that time at Athens; nor would such a clever and well-to-do young aspirant of the gentility have allied himself to any teacher, least of all when he hoped to get training serviceable for his own career among men, unless that teacher were already a recognized authority. Critias, too, must have been in the master's company as a youth, many years before his open hostility to Socrates as leader of the Thirty. Plato is presumably nearer the historic situation in those dialogues representing him as a fairly young man in the analytic conversation of a trained thinker and teacher with wise heads who we know died long before Socrates. Moreover, the *daimonion*, Socrates's warning voice, which is so intimately related to his teaching and his thought as to call for particular examination in a later chapter, is said to have manifested itself in his early years. But he was still in his intellectual and moral prime at seventy, eagerly attended by younger spirits, such as Xenophon, Antisthenes, Aristippus, Euclides, and Plato, of the Socratic circle, who were all destined in one way or another to perpetuate his influence. We may safely assume that his most vital work began in the period of the Peloponnesian wars somewhat after the death of Pericles; and this, to recall some items of section II of the present chapter, lends peculiar unselfishness and dignity to the military service of a middle-aged man naturally so devoted to the quiet ways of wisdom.

A credible report represents him as acquainted with all sorts of people: philosophers, military leaders, the gilded or callow youth, free beauties, artists, artisans, and tradesfolk and shopkeepers, teaching or learning from all. Nor did he always wait for them to appear in the public places; he would look in at a shop to chat with some poor cobbler, or knock at the door of some wealthy friend who, he had just heard, was entertaining some good talker from abroad. Plato and Xenophon are here surely true at least to the democratic spirit of his conduct and the diverse classes to whom he was welcome.

His mode of life and personal appearance have been proverbial from the first. The bare feet and sordid mantle of Potidaea are



PERICLES.

here, as nonchalantly mocking the bright painted marbles of the Acropolis and all the golden spoils of the doomed imperial city, as

they had mocked the simple soldiery of the northern campaign. The broad mouth with its thick lips swallows over the shaggy beard the humblest fare, having more important work on hand than the chewing of dainties. The bulging eyes that see so far aslant envy no man his chariots or merchandise. The wide nostrils of that broad nose never twitch with anxious suspense for the fate of argosies overdue. The ungainly arms that picked up the wounded comrade are never extended for pay. Antiphon, the sophist, advises him to dub himself professor of the art of wretchedness (Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, 6). Aristophanes in the *Birds* has his fling at this "unwashed guide of souls." Alcibiades, in that wonderful eulogy in Plato's *Symposium* calls him Silenus-face, working out the analogy into a spiritual loveliness. And the Socrates of Xenophon's *Symposium* subjects his own physiognomy to ironic examination which leads to the conclusion that, if beauty be in adaptation to ends, then his own capacious mouth and nose and eyes render him the most beautiful of mankind. Without some such genial reflection as this, it must remain an outstanding paradox of Greek life that the race which so identified goodness and beauty as to fuse the very words into a single noun should have furnished the most glorious example of the quite comfortable existence of the one in separation from the other.


His habit of going barefoot is said to have been imitated by his younger followers, Aristodemus and Chaerephon. Who it was that chiselled the kindly bust, familiar in the modern school-rooms of all the lands, we do not know, but the artist seems to have wrought honestly and well.

Socrates, however, could enjoy the creature comforts when they came in the beaten way of friendship, and, if the banquet of Plato's brush betrays indeed the wine and wisdom of the artist's own imaginings and the philosopher's own intuitions, its interest lies also in what it suggests of a very possible reality—for, as Emerson put it, to the bewilderment of a village audience, Plato was in the habit of grinding his friends into paint. At such times surely they such clusters had as made them nobly wild not mad, and yet as surely each word

"of thine

Outdid the meat, outdid the frolic wine."

In his own little dwelling outside of the town, things did not always go so merrily. Socrates's domestic affliction is one of the jests of time, and Xanthippe is a proverb. The sage took her shrew-



SOCRATES.

ish temper like a sage; and, if she flung the dirty water on his head, that was, he remarked, but the rain which must follow the thunder; and he would whisper to his friends that he had married her as a matter of self-discipline. She must, however, have come late into his life, since Aristophanes, who would scarcely have lost such an opportunity for burlesque, makes no mention of her and since she is represented as visiting her condemned husband in the prison, accompanied by two children only half-grown. But though the hopelessly unromantic case of the tempestuous and screaming Xanthippe certainly bears not the stamp of poetic legend, it suggests precisely that kind of contrast which makes capital anecdote for literature; and may well be an exaggeration of the uncomfortable, but not necessarily grotesque, circumstance, where a wife and mother finds her humble convenience too often unconsidered and her unreflecting patience tried by an abstracted companion supporting the home out of a small inheritance from his father and gifts from his friends, spending his rich leisure in the market-place, or bringing his philosophic cronies unexpectedly in to dinner.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]

## MISCELLANEOUS.

### IN ANSWER TO CRITICS.

In the current issue I have taken pleasure in publishing a number of articles which take the opposite ground to my own, but I do not feel like resuming the controversy and restating my arguments. In most cases my critics simply offer anti-German testimony from any source available, but their arguments do not carry conviction, and I have seen no reason for changing my position. The enemies of Germany harp continually on the same string. Over and over again they repeat the charge of atrocities, and Sir A. Conan Doyle speaks of this war as nothing but murder. I recommend, however, the perusal of the open letter by Mr. James O'Donnell Bennett, the well-known American journalist, in answer to Sir Conan Doyle, which was published in the *Chicago Tribune* of January 17, 1915. In his letter Mr. Bennett expresses his astonishment that a man of Sir Conan Doyle's intelligence can lend his pen to the propagation of such untruths. Mr. Bennett is a man whose honesty is beyond question, and, although an eye-witness of German manoeuvres in Belgium and France, he was nowhere able to discover a foundation for these stories. On the contrary, he has observed many highly humane features both among the German soldiers and among the civilians; and the wounded and prisoners from the enemy's ranks—English, French and Belgians—are the appreciative recipients of many kindnesses at their hands.

Another favorite theme resorted to by those bent on proving the injustice of the German cause is the German breach of Belgian neutrality; and this is reiterated again and again in spite of the well-known discovery in Brussels of documents proving that an arrangement had long before been concluded between England and Belgium for the purpose of invading Rhenish Germany. In these papers all the details are specified, the harbors at which the English troops should be landed, the provision of interpreters and also of capable spies for the German provinces. Such a contract cannot be interpreted as a mere provision for defense, and when a neutral country enters into such a compact it forfeits its protection under international treaties.

I might add that the contents of these Brussels documents have been published in convenient pamphlet form, with facsimiles of the original French and a rather precarious English translation, under the title "The Case of Belgium," and is procurable from *The International Monthly, Inc.*, of New York City, and also doubtless through German consulates. *The Continental Times* (Berlin W. 50, Augsburgstr., 38), in its issue of November 25, 1914, has likewise reprinted the substance of the documents and is no doubt procurable through German consulates. \_\_\_\_\_

### THE OLDER GERMANY AND GERMAN GENIUS.

*To the Editor of The Open Court:*

Apollonius of Tyana owed his greatness to the fact that he was not compelled to travel with a costly retinue; Diogenes would have been lost to us

had he lived on a Rockefeller pension in upper Fifth Avenue; there would have been no Ben Franklin had college education been forced upon our greatest of practical (if not pragmatic) sages. And so to me America was richest when our land was known to the world by our inventors, our painters, our poets, our historians and our unpaid but liberty-loving statesmen. Can any one for a moment prefer the age of Jay Gould and Vanderbilt to that which produced Prescott and Washington Irving? Will the Muse of History glory in the palaces of Astor and Carnegie more than in the cottages that gave light to Abraham Lincoln, Edgar Allen Poe and Hawthorne? Do the hordes of hollow-eyed factory children to-day make us feel great because they swell our ill-smelling census of big cities?

And so with my Germany! I think of Prussia in her sorest straits during the Napoleonic occupation—when the court spent less in a whole year than now in a day—when the Berlin University was founded at a time when all the world looked upon such a feat as impossible. During those days arose great men—as in New England at about the same time and largely for analogous reasons. The land was poor but the discipline severe. Those were the days of Arndt and Jahn; of Boyen and Blücher; of Humboldt and Grimm; of Hardenberg and Stein; of Körner and Uhland; of Beethoven, of Goethe, of Schiller. But why continue? It is the Germany of my youth and of my dreams—the Germany of *Kultur* and constructive statesmanship.

The poisonous doctrines of protectionism, territorial conquest, colonization, naval supremacy—all these are morbid symptoms of a miasmatic modernity that despises the lessons of age and experience but hurries feverishly toward new things that excite their cupidity. America has wasted and will continue to waste her millions in mad colonial experiments and meddlesome interference that will find a check only when a great power shall have challenged our so-called Monroe Doctrine and mopped up every safe deposit storehouse and cash-box between Boston and the Golden Gate. We shall be the better for such treatment as Prussia was the better for the Napoleonic doses between 1806 and 1813. Germany and America are rich in great thinkers to-day—but they need the wholesome spur of national necessity to make their forces tell.

To-day nearly all the avenues that lead to eminence in literature, science and art are obstructed by the salaried servants of great financial institutions who would stone to death any who ventured to preach a doctrine varying from that of their bank cashier. We have but to recall the tragic fate of Henry George and add to that a few less notable who have been quietly crucified by trustees of American colleges, orthodox medical societies or Roman Catholic monsignori—no American but can mention a few!

Pardon me, dear Doctor Carus, I am abusing your editorial generosity—for I merely started out to say that when Germany shall have been divested of all her superfluous baggage she will be no poorer than when she was richest in the mind of

Yours faithfully,

POULTNEY BIGELOW.

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#### THE PARTHENON.


Our frontispiece represents the ruins of the Parthenon, the state sanctuary of the most representative city of Greek antiquity. It was built by Pericles who although not the nominal ruler of Athens controlled her destiny before the time of Socrates. The work of construction was completed in B. C. 483.

The "temple of the Holy Virgin," as we may translate the word *parthenon* into the later language of Christian expression, was the indication of Athenian glory and represents the Greek spirit. The love of Greek antiquity was so strong that early Christian iconoclasm could not utterly destroy the temple. During the middle ages it was converted into a church dedicated to the Virgin Mary and then into a mosque and remained in good preservation until 1687. In that year the Venetian fleet under Count Donnersmarck bombarded Athens and the Parthenon was blown up by a bomb which fell in the center of the building where the Turks had stored their powder magazines. The ruins, however, met with greater mutilation at the hands of Lord Elgin who spoiled the artistic beauty of the friezes and pediments by having them taken down by unskilled workmen and removed to England where he sold them to the British Museum after considerable bickering about the price.

#### POLIENOV'S MASTERPIECE.

Thorwald Siegfried, Attorney-at-Law, of Seattle, Washington, so admires Polienov's picture of the *Adulteress Before Christ* that he has undertaken to popularize it by publishing reproductions in three sizes, all of them large enough for framing.

A reproduction of Polienov's picture appeared as a frontispiece in *The Open Court*, October 1912, and for some editorial comments on the artist see the same number, pages 634 and 636. It was this frontispiece which aroused Mr. Siegfried's interest in the Russian masterpiece, and by persistent efforts, in



THE ADULTRESS BEFORE CHRIST.

which he was aided by Mr. Louis N. Wilson, librarian of Clark University. he succeeded in obtaining an excellent negative of the picture. The original painting was completed in 1888 and now hangs in the Alexander Museum in Petrograd.

We here repeat the picture in a smaller size, and will add that Mr. Siegfried's reproductions can be obtained by addressing him at Second Avenue and Madison Street, Leary Building, Seattle, Washington.

## PROFESSOR RUDWIN ON THE "BOS ET ASINUS."

To the Editor of *The Open Court*:

In the January number of *The Open Court* appears a brief paper by Professor Rudwin which is likely to cause astonishment to students of Biblical archeology. The writer traces the legend of the "Bos et Asinus" to the Itala version of the Bible, where the reading "in medio duorum animalium" is attributed to the Prophet Habakkuk. As he does not find it in the Hebrew or the Latin Vulgate, he concludes that it is due to "wilful corruption or ignorance."

As a matter of fact the reading is found in the Septuagint version which antedates the Itala by some five hundred years. It is undoubtedly erroneous; but there is no reason to blame either St. Jerome or the compilers of the Breviary. The Jewish rabbis who made the Septuagint version were by no means ignorant or wilful corrupters of the Hebrew text. They probably remembered the prophecy of Isaiah (i. 3) and were quite sincere in bringing the unpointed text into harmony with the Messianic allusion: "The ox and the ass know the crib of their master, but Israel etc." The "Bos et Asinus" is certainly five centuries older than Dr. Rudwin supposes.

The medieval mystery playwright knew both the Hebrew rendering from their reading of the Vulgate and also the Septuagint rendering from the homilies of the Greek fathers, which were then, as now, read in the churches east and west.

H. J. HEUSER.

OVERBROOK SEMINARY.

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 BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD AS A FIELD FOR SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY. By *Bertrand Russell*. Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company. Pp. 242. Cloth, \$2.00.

These eight "Lowell Lectures," delivered at Boston, Mass., in March and April, 1914, attempt to show by means of examples, the nature, capacity and limitations of the logico-analytical method in philosophy, which in the author's opinion yields whatever scientific knowledge it is possible to obtain in philosophy. "The central problem," says the author, "by which I have sought to illustrate method, is the problem of the relation between the crude data of sense and the space, time and matter of mathematical physics." Many of the difficulties between the views advocated here and those of *The Problems of Philosophy* are due to Dr. A. N. Whitehead; and much of these lectures is a rough and preliminary statement of what Dr. Whitehead will say in the fourth volume of *Principia Mathematica*. The author's chief debts are to G. Frege, on logic, and G. Cantor, on the mathematical infinite.

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ELEMENTI DI ETICA. Di *Giovanni Vidari*. Milan: Hoepli, 1911. Pp. 379. Price 3l.

This is the third edition, revised and enlarged, of Professor Vidari's compendium on ethics. Part I treats of the sociological bases of ethics from the historical and psychological point of view, while Part II discusses ethical ideals and their application to the life of the individual and of society. In his list of bibliographical references he gives credit to Wundt, Spencer, Durkheim,

Levy-Bruhl, Simmel, Eucken, Lecky, Lubbock, Jodl, Royce and a number of other German, French and English thinkers besides the best standard works of Italy.

George Ashton Black, of New York City, publishes a pamphlet of twenty-four pages in which a mathematical definition of science is made to lead to a mathematical well-ordered curriculum of the sciences. The formulation of the title reads

Problem | Science = Analysis ||

Formula | Indeterminate | Science = Analysis | Determinate.

The fundamental definition is that science (being cognition necessary and sufficient to resolve all cases of a general problem)=analysis. Mr. Black regards the sign of equivalence (=), meaning a fact or thing done, as the prototype not merely of mathematical science but of any science whatever, and believes that the simplest practical application of the scientific method is the actual production of this equivalence by degrees. (See a remark of his in *The Monist*, XXIII, p. 612). Mr. Black inserts a series of tables by which the whole of possible science as universal analysis is differentiated.

The international magazine *Scientia* (*Rivista di Scienza*) has completed its sixteenth volume, and the January number of the current year contains a new and unexpected feature. In the present terrible European war, *Scientia*, true to its scientific and international character, has decided to emerge from its "ivory tower of abstract synthesis" and to invite "the most eminent philosophers, historians, sociologists, economists and jurists" to treat thoroughly the question of the present war and its causes. These authorities have been chosen from both of the opposing camps and also from neutral countries, and have either already sent their studies to *Scientia* or will soon do so. The object of this research is to be an objective and calm inquiry into the causes and sociological factors of the war; and not only will it be of great scientific interest but also of a supreme and vital practical importance, for from this analysis we shall be able to conclude if and in what way the present war can, for the greater good of humanity and civilization, preserve us forever from other wars. Thus, with the next volume *Scientia* will—for the present at least—appear every month and as usual there will be a supplement containing French translations of the English, German, and Italian articles.  $\Phi$

We are in receipt of a small pamphlet, entitled "The Catechism of Balaam, Jr., by an Irish-American," which consists in a contemplation of the war issues in questions and answers between the old false prophet and the ass in defense of Old England in the present war as well as in her treatment of other nations in India, Africa and especially Ireland. England is mainly excused, but the sarcastic tone is so obvious that we may regard the catechism as the expression of one of the severest critics of the British cause.

The author is in dead earnest, for the publication of his catechism means a pecuniary sacrifice to him, as is indicated by the prefatory remark on the cover which reads thus: "Sixty thousand copies have been printed, mailed and distributed at my own personal expense for the good of the cause, but I now find the demand for this pamphlet so great that I am obliged to ask the cost price of same from those who desire large quantities and wish to help me in

this work, namely: one cent per copy. Small quantities will be gladly sent gratis, as heretofore upon application to *Hugh H. Masterson, 170 Chambers Street, New York.*"

The name of the author is withheld until after the war.

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We have received the first number of *School and Society*, a weekly educational journal which begins publication with the new year under the editorship of Dr. J. McKeen Cattell, professor of psychology in Columbia University and the Teachers College, editor of *Science*, *The Popular Science Monthly* and *The American Naturalist*. It is announced that the journal will follow the general lines that have made *Science* of service in the sciences, cooperating with publications in special fields, aiming to become the professional journal for those engaged in the work of our lower and higher schools, and to be of interest to the wider public for whom education is of vital concern. It will emphasize the relations of education to the social order, scientific research in education and its applications, freedom of discussion, and reports and news of events of educational interest. The first number opens with an article by Dr. Charles W. Eliot, president emeritus of Harvard University, entitled "Educational Evolution" in which he has long been the leader in this country. Dr. G. Stanley Hall discusses the teaching of the war in our schools, and President W. T. Foster of Reed College commends the state-wide campus of the modern university. There are departments devoted to discussion and correspondence, quotations, books and literature, educational research and statistics, societies and meetings, educational events, and educational notes and news.

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J. G. Cotta (Stuttgart and Berlin) has published a neat little volume of ninety-nine pages under the title, *Die deutsche Erhebung von 1914*, being a series of essays and lectures by Friedrich Meinecke, professor of modern history at the University of Berlin, in which the spirit of the German conception of the current war is pretty well represented by a professional historian. Most of the essays were published during the early months of the war; one of them, however, was written in the month preceding the outbreak of hostilities, and one of the lectures was delivered on the memorable fourth of August. They treat of the German rise against Napoleon in 1813 and its continued movement in 1848, 1870, and down to the present time, showing that the whole history is one uninterrupted development. He disusses what Germany is fighting for in the present war and (page 64) he denounces the misrepresentations which German thought has to encounter, mainly in the English papers.

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In *The China Press* of November 19, 1914, Dr. Gilbert Reid enumerates the treaties made between Japan and China or by Japan with reference to China and Korea with the approval of Russia and Great Britain and shows how they have been ignored by Japan. Korea has been annexed by Japan in absolute disregard of Japan's assertion of contrary intention and Great Britain has not entered into war with Japan for the violation of these treaties. They have been completely overlooked, and China is helpless, lacking, as it does, a system of militarism. Dr. Reid is in close sympathy with China and deplores her present helpless condition at the mercy of the European powers that have not adhered to the letter or spirit of their agreement.

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