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A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELEK

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Henrik Ibsen

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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IBSEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION¹

BY GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER

TWO questions are imbedded in the depths of human nature and determine the life of the spirit. For one thing, we want to know that which is; for the other, we ask what ought to be. The former is a question of truth; the latter is a question of conscience. At times the two questions peaceably co-exist, as if they belonged to two spheres of life which had nothing in common. Then, men seek to gain their knowledge from what life offers them; they refer that which is to that which was; they thus go back ever farther, until they must call a halt, and then they think that they have explained and comprehended that which is. That is the way with the question of truth.

Along with this, however, there are manifold vital needs which men seek to satisfy; and what gives satisfaction they regard as worthful, call it good, and strive for it as the end of life. Yet between what is and what ought to be, they feel no connection, and therefore no contradiction. They consider what ought to be as supplementing, as naturally continuing, that which is.

Then a time comes when the peaceable co-existence of these two questions is seriously disturbed. That something *ought to be* seems the assault on *what is*,—an accusation that *what is* amounts to nothing, is irrational, and needs improvement. And *what is* defends itself against this indictment. It has stood the test of life; it has evinced itself as necessary, survivable; and therefore it must be rational and good; and it must be preserved and protected.

A critical time is that. The fixed becomes flux. Everything becomes problem that former generations treated as self-evident and settled. Ours is such a time as that. Problems multiply; everything in life has become problem. First of all, in the social problem, *what is* is

¹ Edited by J. V. Nash from unpublished manuscript notes left by Doctor Foster at his death.

in conflict with *what ought to be*. Socialism is nothing but the practical question, whether the real is also the rational, whether *what is* is *what ought to be*. Still socialism is the beginning, not the end of this question. Socialism knows this question only for the masses, only for their industrial life, their material requirements. But the *mass* is that which is—is it also that which ought to be, is *it* rational? Is it rational that there is *mass* in humanity? Is this mass that which ought to be?

Thus one question leads to another. Individualism is born of socialism—the query whether the things of life are rational, not only for the mass, but for the individuals of whom the mass consists.

Thus, the problem of life is *spiritualized*, and takes possession of society and law and art and science and family and education. Ultimately it turns to man himself and puts the question to him: Is thine own being rational? Art thou thyself what thou oughtest to be?

This problematic aspect of modern life, no one has so sharply seen as Ibsen. What Lessing said of *truth*, Ibsen said of *freedom*. Not its possession, but the eternal struggle for it, is the worthwhile thing. Ibsen stands on the same platform with the great modern preachers of *free personality*, with Max Stirner and Nietzsche, with Tolstoi and Kierkegaard; but he surpasses them all. He struggles with every problem which he discovers or creates, until all his struggling, creative life seems as a death from which a resurrection may be expected.

In addition, the poet must fight his way through the religious problem,—religion apprehended, not as a psychic experience, not as a question of science and world-view, but as a thing of worth or worthlessness for human personality. From this side Ibsen often touches upon the religious problem in his social dramas. The religious problem is central in two of his creations: in "Brand," and in "Emperor and Galilean."

In "Brand," it is rather the ethical side of the problem that is treated: in "Emperor and Galilean," the mystical side is treated. Brand's religion is totally a religion of the will. His God is youthful force, youthful strength, and summons strong and world-moving words in the souls of men. The God believed in by the people. The church, however, is a weak and senile God; and, impotent himself, makes terms with the weakness and feebleness of men. He himself loves half-measures, imperfections, closes his eyes when men are cowardly and weak. His task is to make life easier for men, to decrease life's burden for them. Therefore, *on this very account*, men

serve and love him *only half-heartedly*. A little earnestness and a little levity; today, a little of this, and tomorrow, a little of that; one eye turned to heaven, the other squinting at the earth.

Then comes Brand with his solution, his cry: "*All or nothing!*" The decision and resoluteness of the old Christians live anew in this northern preacher—those old Christians whose God demanded that they should be one thing or the other—cold or hot—else he would spew them out of his mouth. Brand hates any consideration which would divert the will from its path and goal. His radicalism reminds one of the radicalism of the Gospel—a man who puts his hand to the plow may not look back—the love for Christ suffers no competition from love to father and mother and wife and child; and yet, the goal of the will for Brand is different from what it was for the first Christians. Those Christians lived for the community, the Church, which filled their whole soul, their whole life; their Lord, their Christ, lived in it. They made sacrifices for the whole of which they were a part. Not the will to the whole, however, but the *will to personality*, was the goal of Brand's life. This was the voice of his God, which he perceived in his own soul, and to which he subscribed with his whole being.

No motive exists for Brand, except the effectuation of his own inner power, his inner freedom and truth. Only *that* is good, which a man does of himself, which he does voluntarily. Everything is bad, to which he is determined by external stimulation and enticement—or in which he follows the old familiar conventions, the inherited customs and usages. "One thing only I demand as my own, a place to be entirely myself in." "That thou canst not will be forgiven thee, but nevermore that thou wilt not!" That is the problem in Brand—the divine right, the divine duty of self-assertion, self-affirmation, the all-redeeming power of personality, cancelling all youth's guilt.

Thus Brand begins the great conflict with the forces which confront him along the way to his self. The will to personality is under the ban of heredity. There are the ties of blood which claim authority over the will, and summon the will to a life and death struggle. The mother is the son's first tempter, to make him unfaithful to the voice of his duty, to lure him from his chosen and sacrificial calling as a preacher to a poor and remote congregation—lure him away into a brilliant and indulgent life for which she has saved and increased tainted money for her son.

The son, however, sacrifices the mother to his uncompromising-

ness. He sacrifices her also when she supplicates the priest in her son, that he will administer the holy sacrament to her on her death bed. He *can* not, his heart rebels against it; he knows no other law for his mother than for all other people, and the mother has not fulfilled the conditions which alone could have brought her consolation in the hour of death—*all or nothing*: she has not cut loose from the god Mammon that she has served all her life.

Still the conflict proceeds, becomes more grievous. In the venture on which he stakes his life, in order to bring final comfort to a dying unhappiness, darkened by folly, the preacher wins a wife who feels herself an affinity to such strength of will; he finds a church that looks up to him, because it discovers a man in him—a man who can become to them, the weak ones, a teacher and leader through his own strong life. The woman forsakes a love which has sprung only from a fleeting, philandering frivolity; and now lives for the man who has taught her to find her self. Then comes what should be the supreme happiness to a household—a second soul, like their own, to be led along the path of life by parental love and faithfulness. And, indeed, there in that child, a new happiness does bloom for both of them. The young life is a blessing to both. Yet this happiness becomes a new conflict, a new war. The child grows ill; only a speedy departure from the country, whose cold, damp climate menaces the tender human bud, can give hope of convalescence and life to the child.

The *will to a self-chosen duty* triumphed over father's and mother's love. The child dies. The parents cannot leave the congregation to which they had dedicated their lives. Only the memory of the dead child remains; its playthings; its little garments in which it had laughed and wept, and made its parents so happy at the last Christmas festival.

Still even this memory is something foreign; it comes from without into the soul; it is a burden on the freedom of personality. It is a cult of death, not of life; and when the gipsy-woman comes to beg the child's clothes for her living babe, all that is left of the child is surrendered, though the deed cuts to the quick, in order that the soul of the mother may be untrammelled in her celestial flight for freedom. This offering costs a bitter, bloody battle of the heart, but it is made fully and freely. Thus the mother dies—the sacrifice sacrifices her—dies a happy, blissful, victorious death of loyalty. She has seen God in such triumphant freedom—and who sees God dies.

Mother, child, wife gone; the congregation still remains; the real final end of the preacher's life. Out of that congregation Brand proposes to make men in his own image and after his own likeness—pure, free, solidified, self-dependent personalities, serving only the God in their own breasts, but serving him with the whole heart. In that congregation he proposes to crush the evil demons of servility, and the real foes of humanity—levity and dullness and folly.

Added to this, the church edifice, old and musty and decayed—once adequate for father and grandfather—now is much too small. There must be a new church—wide halls, full of air and light, room for all to serve life and love. Brand considers it to be the task of his life to build this new church. Then new difficulties loom up. Influential men of the congregation will have nothing to do with such an innovation. They love the old quiet contentment. They find the parson too strict, too hard. They stand for humaneness, for compromise. They are on the side of the God who is himself so human that he keeps one eye closed—the God who loves all kinds of compromise, the God who requires nothing whole, great, resolute, decisive, of men. The entire social, phlegmatic inertia of the place combines against the man of deed and of power.

Yet Brand brings them all to time. The church is built; all opponents bow in presence of the success. Authorities bear witness to the energy of the pastor who has erected so stately a monument to ecclesiastical glory. Then comes the dedication of the church. The provost comes to dignify the occasion, to bestow reward of merit in the shape of orders and titles. Then it dawns upon the pastor that this new church, too, will be only a new fetter for the spirit. He flings the key of the church door into the sea, and summons his people to follow him into the altitudes, where there is no temple more made of hands, because the earth is God's temple, because all men are priests, and all bonds that bind are scorned.

This victory also is won. The people leave the provost and his retinue and follow their pastor, their emancipator, to the sacrificial altar—up to the desolate, bleak, icy region, where the folk saga speaks of a glacier church. But this victory is only an apparent victory—a defeat. The congregation grows weary and mutinous on the way. Finally, they demand of the pastor to tell them where the end of this journey will come, what the reward for such effort will be. Then Brand speaks the decisive word: No end—life a battle all the way through, a battle against dividedness and imperfection and weakness of the will, a battle against all idols which hold men down

in golden, shining slave-chains.

And the reward of victory? Inner freedom, inner joy, unity of the will, aspiration of faith, freedom of soul. "Deception, delusion!" cry the people. Back they go to the provost and all the men of the golden mean and the comfortable, complacent life—down they go to the lowlands. They leave the pastor and freedom; and the pastor is told in a vision that his superhuman aim can be only yearning and hope. Yet his faith fails not. His faith leads him through ridicule and scorn to God, in vision of whom Brand dies, burying his last doubt underneath the engulfing avalanche. He endures to the end, though all else fails.

Ibsen's "Brand" is the tragedy of the man who stands for all or nothing,—the man who proposes to be something whole and complete in the midst of a world which loves compromises and half-way measures and lives on what is foreign to it. Brand and his wife go the steep, hard way. Yet it is the way that brings liberation and the blessedness of the vision of God, if also of death.

It is easy to see that the poet chose the model of this pastor from his northern home, where the harsh climate and rude soil ripened religious characters like Kierkegaard and Pastor Lammer—men who came to have a seasoned courage and defiance, men who represented with iron consistency the divine right of their uncompromising thoroughness, of their peculiarity, as against the whole stagnant piety of official churchdom.

Nietzsche attacked the same problem, but, as you know, not with a pastor or theologian as model—but a mythical figure, the alien Zarathustra, the superman. Did Nietzsche think that no such men of will, of personality, were to be found among the theologians nourished in theological schools? Did he think that theological training was indeed *training*, i. e., taming of the will, developing of the memory at the expense of strength of will? Did he think that Pastor Brand spoke a language which could find no echo in the schools—that the northern atmosphere from the glacier was too cold and clear for modern school-rooms and scholastics? Best give learned and semi-learned lectures, diverting their hearers from what moves the present time—best not lay hold of the will, mold personality, launch out against all the powers which keep men from coming to themselves. State Christianity—*mass* Christianity—needs theologians, but not personalities, not whole resolute characters which will let nothing stand in the way of their aims.

Such was Nietzsche's attitude. According to him, State Chris-

tianity had adjusted religion to the instincts of the herd, the mass, the multitude; and the mass would rather that others should think and act for them than to act and think for themselves. It was a State church that had created a convenient church-calendar Christianity, in which the faith of Sunday had nothing to do with the facts of the rest of the week. That was Nietzsche's attitude to the same problem. We have not time here to tone down his extravagances and expose the residuum of justice and truth in his strictures upon the religion of his fatherland. Certainly, when a man is divided by his piety, divided between heaven and earth, his very religion hinders him from belonging entirely to life, entirely to himself, entirely to his God.

It is the merit of Ibsen to have apprehended religion from a new side, the side of *the will*, religion thus making man ever lonelier, leading man ever farther away from the great human herd, until he is all alone with himself and his God. It is quite possible, however, that this, too, is only *way*, not *goal*; a prophecy of the future, not tangible reality. Indeed, were it otherwise, Brand would be no liberator, no guide, but only a new *law*, a new inertness and accommodation. In the spirit of the poet, Brand is to be yearning and hope. Up there is the ice church, the eternal temple, not made by men's hands, ever above us; all leave us who walked with us in the lowlands of life; we mount up the way to it as Jesus went to Jerusalem and the cross; we must seek entirely alone, ultimately to find in this way our overthrow, our entrance into God.

Who goes this way knows the anxiety which overtakes one in solitude. Yet he alone also knows the power and blessedness of faith. He is disburdened of every heritage which he has brought out of the deep—heritage where there is curse for every blessing—released from the guilt which accompanies him *incognito* through life. All doubt behind him, all uncertainty of heart—faithful to himself, *faithful to his own error* even, preferably to one alien hidden truth—wholly faithful, without making allowances, without higgling and haggling, faithful unto death: this is the crown of life, which the strange pastor of the rugged northland—poet and seer—at last earned and received. This is the religion of the will.

Then after Ibsen, in "Brand," had sketched the ideal which his patriotic soul coveted for his northern countrymen—the ideal of personality, strong-willed, dying for conviction—he gave in "Peer Gynt" the obverse side of the picture, the exhibition of a weakling, living for comfort, guided by his selfish wish—a man in whom the

poet saw an embodiment of the motley mass of the people. "Brand" and "Peer Gynt"—how different! Both are national creations, born of that glowing patriotic love (which can hate, also), and of the bitter ridicule of all the powers ruining the folk soul.

Yet, for the genuine poet, each of his works has a liberating effect; it relieves a tension by which the soul is held; it broadens the vision for new and greater sides of life. To be sure, there is a universal human side in all national life, rightly understood. A living folk type transcends national boundaries and appeals to other peoples: our cause is your cause, it says. The human is international. The deeper it is apprehended, the more does it strip off the local part; it seeks for an expression embracing all the peoples, and creates in temporal and local images the mirror of the whole present life as exhibited in the great conflicts of the times, affecting all struggling spirits. Thus Ibsen broke through national limits, too. It was precisely his life in foreign parts, in Rome, in Germany, after he had overcome the melancholy and the irritation of removal from home, that paved the way to those problems which are imbedded in the eternal nature of man.

Therefore he now apprehended the religious problem, also, from another side—where there is neither Jew nor Greek. He apprehended it at a point where, to him, the history of Christianity became an expression of ideas in which he discerned the impelling power of the religious culture of humanity. Ibsen received in Rome new impressions of the power of history. The Eternal City preached a past to him, under whose spell all peoples of the new day lived, by whose force the present cultural life was everywhere pervaded. Ibsen delved into the past, studied it in one of its most important pivotal points, with the hot endeavor of a year's involuntary idleness.

For a time, however, the material at his disposal was too much for his digestive and constructive powers; therefore he went to Germany and experienced its political rebirth. The great spectacle of a people awakening from a long, death-like sleep, finding itself again, and stepping upon the stage of history a second time with rejuvenated energy, brought Ibsen to himself, too, supplied him with a living commentary on what he had been reading in the old writings of the Roman libraries. The poet came to know German thinkers, especially Hegel, the philosopher of history—Hegel who contemplated all human happening in its innermost connections, in the eternal necessity of self-unfolding Reason.

Thus originated the great work, "Emperor and Galilean," an his-

torical play, we are wont to call it; in fact, a present-age play, a play of human faith and yearning, of human seeking and wandering. The center of the double tragedy is held by Julian—dubbed by Church historians, *the Apostate*—Roman Emperor. Already Christianity had three hundred and fifty years of history behind it. What some choose to call the proletariat, assembled around Messiah, had demonstrated their spiritual and moral superiority over a decaying and hostile world. The deep feeling of weakness which trembled in the heart of the upper classes, the intimation of monstrous moral decline, of a condition of life which human nature could not long endure—all this had made once hostile spirits receptive for the messianic expectation of the poor and the disinherited. The philosophy of the time had developed more and more that supramundane character, that hankering for the mysterious and the mystical which had drawn the whole educated world nearer and nearer to the fundamental thoughts of Christianity. Thus, under cover of the sharp opposition between Roman and Christian society, breaking out into bloody persecutions, the catastrophe was prepared for, which lifted up the cross to imperial symbol under Constantine, and made the God of the Christians the God of the State.

And in this way the Christian's Kingdom of the Future, so long hoped for and expected, appeared—different, indeed, from the dreams of Christians; and Ibsen begins with depicting Christianity emerging in triumph over Roman culture. The faith of the Galilean has exchanged peasant garb for robes of the court and it is now known by its costly raiment and courtly manners. The confessors of Christ have built a high wall against everything that can remind them of the glory and splendor of pagan times, and that can convince spirits of the greatness and significance of this pagan culture. Greek philosophers are persecuted and banished. Visitors to their lecture rooms are earnestly and persuasively warned. Youth is forbidden to partake of their poisonous food. And those are the worst zealots against Greek culture, who have themselves drunk from that fountain. They feel their own weakness as compared with the gigantic forces of life which once helped them to create a great spiritual culture. Therefore, they blaspheme the gods which they formerly worshipped; they flee the Academies in which once the thirst for truth gathered seekers together; they hate the beauty whose pictures once charmed them. Every means seems justified to them, every intrigue and violence, that will sever and save Christian believers from contact with the bearers of the ancient culture.

In essence, the new world remains the old world, only under a new, a Christian, name. It becomes worse than the old, for it has a glittering, pious galvanism and gloss which *hide vices*, while all rottenness and dissolution were open as the day in the old world.

Julian seeks a pure woman and he thinks that he has found her in the person of Helena, a pious kinswoman of the Emperor, and a Christian fanatic. Yet this saint of the new faith is a monster of ambition and lust. Perfidy, adultery, murderous assault upon the Emperor's brother—this is what fills her pious Christian soul. And the Emperor, head of the Galileans, hypocritical, suspicious, hesitates at nothing. It is a sorry cloak which conceals, superficially enough, this pious court society with its processions and its church-building.

This is the atmosphere in which Julian lives and from which he has sprung. In this atmosphere no healthy plants grow. An inner contradiction preys upon his young soul. He has imbibed so much of the faith of the Christians that he finds his dearest friends among them—honored teachers and friends of his youth whom he loves. He would like indeed to support the preaching of poverty and self-abnegation, to dedicate his service to Christ, to overcome his foes with the weapons of that spirit which issued from Christ. Yet, deep in his soul, throbs a hot yearning for life—life that the Christians condemn, the life of beauty and of freedom, the kingdom of this world and its glory.

And when he seeks rest of soul in faith, doubt arises as to where this faith—where Christianity at all—is to be sought. Christians themselves rave against each other; they anathematize each other over the question of the Son of God, creation out of nothing, over the Trinity and its nature. They preach turning away from the world and yet are lustful of the stolen sweets of the world. And when these doubts overmaster him, books are given him as answer, as of old in the Greek schools, when he asked—what is truth? He betook himself to the books, only to find that they could not satisfy a hungry soul. And the cry for life grew mightier in him; it became a cry for a new revelation, for an experience of something new, for something not written down in any book!

Then he comes to a magician and exorcist who promises the seeker to induct him into the most hidden mysteries of life, and to give him new revelation, answer to all the enigmatic questions of his soul. Offending Christian friends, disregarding their admonitions, he follows the magician, who leads him through supra-terrestrial regions. In visionary rapture, Julian experiences the two-fold predic-

tion of a coming, a third, Kingdom, which he will found through the way of freedom which is also the way of necessity, and which the guilty ones of humanity, Cain and Judas Iscariot, united with the tree of knowledge and the Cross of Golgotha. Julian applies the prediction to himself. He feels himself called to dissolve the Kingdom of the Christ; for the God-Man had no freedom in his Kingdom and no necessity. He proclaimed his eternal "Thou shalt" to man—his commands remain *outside* of man. Julian remembers his Christian virtue, which has been a constant offense in the presence of an alien will, in the presence of the Emperor, in the presence of the Christ. The human has become something disallowed, since the Seer of Galilee seized the helm of the world! With him, to live is to die. Our normal innermost soul rebels against this—and yet we ought to will precisely against our own will!

Julian becomes Emperor, contrary to all probabilities which seem to obstruct his way to the throne. And now Destiny, the world-will, expresses itself apparently in the sense of that visionary prediction, and the Byzantine Ruler proceeds to found a Kingdom of Freedom. He proclaims—he proclaims the free play of the forces in his kingdom; the old gods whom the Christ has dethroned are reinstated. Everyone shall live according to his faith, serve God as he pleases. And since the freedom which the Emperor accords the least of his subjects he reserves for himself also, he decides for the old gods and announces his faith to the people.

Now the imperial nimbus begins to work; what the emperor believes, others will believe also. His example is effective for all who hope for corroboration and advantage from the throne. Hosts of apostates come and flatter the Emperor. Fallen away from their Christ-God, they make the Emperor their God. But the Emperor-God is only a man, subject to the influences of his environment which uses the spectacular worship of the Emperor as a means of enmeshing him in its net. The memory of the time when the ruler was also Pontifex Maximus awakens. Julian feels himself to be priest, then supreme philosopher also. He works on a book to refute the folly of the Galilean at a single stroke. The multitude increases to whom word of Emperor is word of God; harsher becomes the contrast to "render unto God the things that are God's."

The reign beginning with the declared freedom of faith, is now ending with the repression of the Christ faith. The Christ faith is persecuted; but the persecution purifies the Christ faith. The apostates are the half-way, vacillating Christians, seekers of the Galilean

for their own advantage. To the remnant, their faith is everything—faith in the strength of which *one man* is strong enough to withstand an Emperor. The spirit of the old heroes and martyrs is in the remnant. Then it begins to dawn upon the Emperor that the Galilean who is crucified is not dead, and a new, greater doubt comes over the Emperor; "There is no comparison between me and the Galilean," he says. "Who will possess the Kingdom, Emperor *or* Galilean?" The old necromancer gives the final meaning: Both have their day, both will yield to another their kingdom; they will go down but not pass away. As the child passes into the youth, the youth into the man, thus the first kingdom and the second will grow into the third: *the kingdom of free humanity, of wisdom and beauty*, will be united with the kingdom of necessity, which preaches suffering and death—when, no seer can tell! Given this vision of the future, Julian hesitates; he wants to be third himself. With this self-deception, he goes down in conflict with the Persian Empire; and the solution of the riddle is announced over his corpse: *will is must will*.

Thus, the tragedy of Emperor Julian is Ibsen's confession of faith, a prophetic glance into the history of the development of humanity. Church and State, these two rival, warring powers, determining the cultural history of Christian peoples by their rivalry and warfare, are here seen in their inner connection; one cannot be without the other; one creates and conditions the other. Rome and Byzantium—these are the gates of that history whose tide still bears us on today.

In Rome, God is all, Emperor nothing; in Byzantium, Emperor is all, God is nothing. This opposition is Scylla and Charybdis for Christian peoples. Free from Rome! this was the watchword of the Reformation, and this cry seemed to signify liberation from an oppressive necessity, this return of a kingdom of humanity and of freedom. Yet, when the people became free from Rome, they took the road that leads to Byzantium, where they hoped to have found freedom, but only fell into a new dependence. It is significant that Ibsen lets the tragedy of Rome play itself out in the background, and delineates the tragedy of Byzantium with all the poetic power of his constructive imagination.

Many weaklings have fallen victim to this cult of Byzantium. They have changed their disposition and their religion, as they have changed their clothes; and the living Gods they have preached to the world were yet only idols, which were outlived. It was reactionariness, an effort to check growth, to call a halt to the development

which they had undertaken.

Ibsen, however, wants to transcend this dualism: this is the problem to which he dedicates the drama. He himself is, of course, the mystical seer, who gives the Emperor a look into the hidden deep of life, and finally sees how the Emperor, who does not understand his times or himself, fulfills his destiny through his lack of understanding. Precisely this apostasy from what offers the soul its stay in Christianity, produces self-examination among those who cannot and will not take the road to Byzantium. They purify themselves and their faith from the dross which has made it a hissing and a by-word to all serious, forward-looking spirits. Once again, there are *great individuals*, where formerly there were only members of a herd. They find in themselves a strength which makes them leaders of others into the light.

Thus what speaks here to us in a great world-historical spectacle is also the history of each man's own soul. The division which consumes the heart of Christian peoples is repeated in the life of individuals, and demands its solution from each one—State and Church, Emperor and God: this is the contradiction *in* man, between free, sovereign man and the eternal necessity which rules over him. Will man declare for the Emperor, will he himself *be* Emperor, self-ruler in the Kingdom of Spirit and of Will—only to be dashed against the limitation of eternal necessity which holds him? Then he hears the cry, "Render to God the things that are God's." Will he subscribe to the other kingdom, the kingdom of divine necessity? Then the ruler-man mounts up in him, the man who imperiously demands his right, his freedom.

Now the mystic releases himself from this division. He has intimation of a third kingdom, in which the law of freedom and the law of necessity, of life and of death, are become inwardly one,—in which the will has become conscious of its eternity. In this third kingdom, the Christ has ceased to be an external mandatory power, an historical authority: he is entirely inward, entirely man in man. And the ruler-man does not look back to idols to which he once sacrificed: he looks forward—he has himself become messianic, and gives all his freedom, all the wealth of his life and his spirit, a living sacrifice to man, that men, too, may become ruler-men, messianic men. To build this third kingdom, this is the task of all free spirits: it is a secret, hidden kingdom, a kingdom in man, in which Emperor and Galilean look beyond themselves into the great, glad future which shall fulfill all necessity with freedom.

PATRIOTISM: WITH SOME ASPECTS ON THE STATE

BY L. A. SHATTUCK

That she, the goddess, teaches men to be
Eager with arméd valor to defend
Their motherland, and ready to stand forth,
The guard and glory of their parents' years.
A tale, however beautifully wrought,
That's wide of reason by a long remove.
—*Lucretius.*

PATRIOTISM is the categorical imperative of the State's metaphysics. Which, being dynastically moral, one must accept in the manner usual with phenomena which are examined closely only in inverse ratio to their importance. Its supreme emotional appeal, due to being sunk deeply in a savage or barbarian psychology and perhaps even laminated beneath religious superstitions, deters one phase of criticism. Another, kept in the dark for the benefit of the common man by the State's baptismal and protecting arm, has been tampered with but seldom. Resting itself on an economic fallacy it falls into the same class with those things which Macauley had in mind when he said that if the law of gravitation had anything to do with economics there would be droves of arguments to prove its falsity. Hence, the few phases of patriotism which have been oriented into the light can be clearly seen only by a vigorous somersaulting from first principles of national philosophy.

Which, in democracies formed of undiscerning electorates, is as it should be.

A State, like its common divisor, the common man, follows biological law, viz: the survival of the fittest. Consequently in following this law every function pertaining to its national persistence must be egoistic; must be, if one is morally color-blind, positively immoral. It must educate the common man along lines that least threaten contradiction of its dogmas; nay, along lines which will even make these dogmas more inflexible; see that the common man does its work; that he engages in a productive toil, even an indif-

ferent laziness being a form of vice; that he does not animadvert on its beneficence, which is, to say the least, *lese majeste*; that, in short, all common men under its ægis be coördinated into a composite whole: think as it thinks, hate where it hates, lay logic, labor, and life, if need be, at its service.

Thus, while political theory has it (excepting a few anomalies like Japan) that States and all their attendant machinery are for the benefit of the common man, the reverse is the fact. Due to the State's very belief in its own permanence and its knowledge of the mortality of its common men, its interests are entirely dissociable from those of common men both within its borders and those the world over. True, within its borders there are a few individuals with whom it has interests in common as I shall later point out but they are assuredly not common men. Thus while the State is more or less of an abstraction, society itself beyond the individual being a philosophical myth, this abstraction becomes fetich, hence blameless, soul-less, and beyond criticism. It is an organism, disparate to any other, whose well-being evolves along a path utterly opposed to any other organism. Free, too, from that gregariousness of man which abates in some degree his natural predatory instincts, that gives a semblance of altruism to even the worst of us, the State pursues its way true to biological law. Only when it indulges in that phenomenon called "*international comity*" does it seem to relieve itself of its feral nature, its *anima bruta*. Yet even while the State believes in international comities in principal, submerged under the principal is the fact that it believes essentially as Tacitus did in speaking of the German barbarians: "Above sixty thousand barbarians were destroyed, not by the Roman arms, but in our sight and for our entertainment. May the nations, enemies of Rome, ever preserve this enmity to each other! We . . . have nothing left to demand of fortune, except the discord of the barbarians." As the State holds to such general tenets as this in its international relationships there is nothing strange about its intra-national in that it uses the common man, molds him to satisfy whatever are the national intentions of the moment.

And though it may be said that the efficacy of thus using the common man was high in the Middle Ages with its inter-relating systems of power, priests, castes, etc., it is still higher today with our facilities of press and propaganda. True, we are liable to overstretch the value of these due to a fallacy, e. g., our belief in psychological freedom. We fail to observe that man is apperceptive to

propaganda not alone because of any intrinsic weight in the propaganda itself but because the ideas advanced in such drop into psychological grooves which have been worn frictionless by use and wont. (In general, not scientific, ideas. The latter, once they become popular, are never questioned; if not popular are too heady, hence they are never desiderata of the common man's mental equipment.) We see the effects of propaganda upon the common man and the way it makes him act. We do not see the causes which make him accept such propaganda as the truth. Nor do we see that each one of these causes is the effect of another cause, that cause the effect of still another, and so on until an original fact is reached.

Though it is true of course that the propaganda served up to the common man is seldom as intellectually indigestible as the foregoing still we can't deny that even the common man's thinking may travel in the grooves of determinism. However, waiving such arguments aside in view that man labors under the apprehension that his present acts are intelligent and not dependent upon a sequelae of original causes, we can advance the fact that nearly all propaganda appeals to the common man's basest instincts (if the propagandist knows his business); that it preys upon him only through those things which are harmful and beneficial to him; that, briefly (to use a most appropriate slang phrase), "it hits him where his house is." But as this all comes under the heading of what is known as "education," it should be conspicuously posted on the credit side of the ledger, naïve bookkeeping though it is, and let it go at that.

Yet even if these things are true of present-day systems of propaganda it is nevertheless doubtful if they have the force commonly ascribed to them. That they have wider scope for influencing the human mind than did the systems prevailing in the Middle Ages is no doubt true but that such influence is intensified is extremely questionable. And especially is this true in a State where many racial habits and traits are at variance. The point almost commonly lost sight of by the State is that the propagandist is himself surrounded by hosts of instincts, hates, fears, and superstitions which fail to strike responsive chords in large masses of common men. And inasmuch as such masses can be moved by certain stimuli and no others, other things being equal, the State has only two courses open to it. In the one case it is possible for the State to choose as henchmen, as its propagandists and political bullies (if one would make invidious distinctions) those who cover the widest of ethnic ranges. But while it is possible for the State to do this, it is, except under

remarkable circumstances, improbable that it will for the almost obvious reason that the State itself is essentially national in its instincts, having the hates, fears, and superstitions almost common to one type of man. It but seldom sheds itself of such chrysalises even when to do so will prove to be of inestimable value to it. It reacts to the same stimuli as its common men, by rote eventually accepting its own falsehoods as truth. Whence follows the well-known principle that a State's moral sense of justice is on a par with all but the lowest of its common men. In the other case, of course, when the State's systems of making opinion prove unavailing, there is one final, unailing element at its disposal: Force. Yet even force, used indiscriminately, has certain drawbacks. It may be used only according as the principles involved are minor or major to the national existence. Its constant use may be costly to the State in the matter of its international relationships. If the State inject force into its proselyting of its subject people at the wrong time or without sufficient justification, such offending State may become morally odious to other States, subject, of course, to the world's temper at the moment. As for instance (though the case is not strictly parallel) France's sympathy with the colonists during the American Revolution. Also as was the case during the World War. No instance is recorded that I know of in which any of opposing States reproached any allied State for using force when milder persuasions failed, though all of the opposing States involved were free enough with their reproaches for each and every State opposed to them. The thousand and one cases of flagrant injustice (not even yet all amended in the United States) later reported in the American and continental press made but few of us blink an eyelash. But this by the way. The aim of the State Jesuitically hallows the means. And whether we believe in determinism, or that propaganda have all the insidious appeal as is said, or whether it be necessary to throw force behind it to make it really effective: if none of these things have a vestige of truth to them there is little difference in the final result. For in the face of the hords of instincts and habits of thought which have been cajoled and attuned to the national interests (interests which may be called moral, or immoral, equivalents to the natural egoism of the common man) to ask the common man to adopt an ironic scepticism, to reason in a manner different from those in the schools, classes, and sub-classes to which he is accustomed is to ask for the millenium out of hand. Only a confirmed idealist would have the temerity, or an utter idiot the effrontery, to do so.

But let us push such irrelevancies aside. I stated a short time ago that the feudal lord had hardly more influence over his vassals than the modern State has over its common men. Even allowing all the foregoing argument bearing upon propaganda as making such a statement invalid there are still other considerations to be laid down, viz: First, it is almost common knowledge that the key-stone of the early State was the desire for mutual protection. But as this desire with relation to the common man in the large modern State is either non-existent or is figurative, it will have to be thrown out as being contradictory to the premise. Second, that under even the greater feudal States the common man was in a position to lose life, or goods, or both, a position which in no wise confronts him today. In but few of the great, modern States does he possess goods, and his life, under more civilized (sic!) conditions of warfare, is safer: provided of course that he be a non-combatant. Third, that if mutual protection, and not the dependence upon a plutocracy, were the motive for cohesion in the modern State, anarchy would reign in all but a few of them within a week. In this respect, the plutocrat has merely changed places with the feudal lord, the former standing in the same position to the common man today as the money lender stood to the latter upon the breaking up of the feudal system in western Europe. Fourth, and finally, the thin slap of difference existing between the position of the common man under the older regime and that of today is barely discernible to the naked eye. He occupies, if anything, rather a less enviable position in that while the vassal had a tenure of a type for which it was to his interest to aid his lord, since there was always the usufruct, the common man of today gets out of his services to the State whatever subserviency usually gets from impersonal gods. And as the State, well entrenched behind the justice of its territorial phase ("aut Caesar aut nullus," as Sir Henry Maine has it), goes on encroaching farther and farther into the domain of the common man, e. g., controls his opinions, this subserviency will keep on increasing. One can't say to a State, an entity which depends for its very existence on human brawn and brain, that its most worth-while individuals are untrue to a type. True in a chemical experiment such organisms are considered the most interesting of phenomena, but in social chemistry men who prove untrue to type, or what the State obscurely imagines to be a type, and whose amalgamation in the herd always remains incomplete, become apostates, anarchists, subverters of all principles

of national autonomy. From Socrates down through the ages such men have always paid the penalty of freemen.

Yet who can advance arguments versus the State on this score? Since the State is composed of individuals and as it is but seldom that the individual is rhadamanthine in his sense of justice, is he any the more subject to a careful exercising of it when the unit becomes a thousand or a million fold? When the very natural propensities, and the thousand possibilities of the single mind to err are increased to infinity? Hardly. For as the individual germinates into the mass, that is, the social mass, he becomes a more powerful, a more emotional, a less mental organism, and hence he has grown the body, the nerves, and the mind of a nascent tyranny. Thus we bring back the argument to its original starting-point: That conditional upon average individual judgments on both sides being in balance a more equitable justice will be awarded by the individual than by man in the mass. The whole theory that a juridical tribunal maintains justice on a higher mental plane than does an individual I believe to be false. Since laws have been written and collated by individuals all their authoritative strength is actually vested in an individual opinion. Their strength—except from a standpoint of force—does not vest in society just because society has come to adopt them as true. For if it be conformable to fact that no opinion as handed down from the dawn of history by an individual (I except such debatable things as mathematics and the inductive sciences generally) has proved indubitably true, how much more so has this been proved of the opinions of society! And what has proved true of opinions as a whole has proved true of laws. For to assume because a consensus of opinion is that one point of law is more just or more reasonable than another is no reason for saying that such an opinion is the opinion of the mass. It simply means that the mass agrees to, or concurs with, the opinion as finally laid down by, one. For, in the last analysis, to increase the adjudicating powers, that is, numerically, merely adumbrates and does not clear the issue. The greater such powers the more highly tempered and complicated are the emotions and the more easily are the vestigial instincts of the primitive man set oscillating.

The foregoing being true of the judgments of men in the mass, to charge the State with immorality for doing away with those of its citizens who fail to accord its dogmas and its gods the degrees of sanctity to which they are no doubt entitled or because it uses the common man whenever it can is as fatuous as to believe that

biology itself is immoral. Since its dogmas have, assumptively, been bruited even in the farthest corners of the State and its gods apotheosized by its political pontiffs, ignorance of their sanctity avails one nothing in extenuation. And if one is not ignorant of the sanctity with which they are invested the very power of their sponsor is enough to make a sane man pause. Yet that stupid quality in man which is termed reticence, that gross-headed obstinacy in him whereby he goes to the torture chamber without opening his lips, has painted the whole history in lurid flame. As Nietzsche has pointed out an apology from Socrates would have saved his life. His persistence, contumacy, fanaticism, what you will, were his real executioners. As the popular opinion is ever ephemeral and as only a difference of opinion existed between him and the Greek senate that condemned him to death, he should have genuflected, smiled like a gentleman and no bigot, and apologized—as did Galileo, Roger Bacon and Voltaire—then gone on unheedingly in the way his particular gods directed him. Yet who can say that he didn't? To say that men go to torture or to death under the impulse of a free-will is pure sophistry. Unless under the constraint of acting at the *fiat* of some unknown nexus of ideas, a latent, imperious urge, or a Satanic afflatus, no one short of an imbecile would do so. Nor, on the other hand, whether Socrates was so urged or not, would one expect a State, even a comparatively small city-state, to suffer a changement of opinion for the sake of one individual.

Yet the State itself is not entirely free to act always in relation to its own self-interests. Occasionally it may be bound to a narrower sphere of influence by the collective opinion of its citizens with respect to its internal policies; in its external it is not alone prescribed by the military power of neighboring States, but by the opinions of those States as well. While philosophically the individual man will be free under a theoretic anarchy, factually, however, he will never be free under anarchy since there will always be the possibility of others combining against him and thus restricting his scope of freedom. In the same manner as this is the State circumscribed with restrictions. Except under a condition of world dominion as of Rome under the Antonines, the State is always subject to chastisement by other States once it becomes too "free." Thus its imperialistic measures are curbed sheerly by the same "moral" considerations as those which restrain a sound man from striking a cripple who offends him: there are bystanders present. Justice in such cases is usually a negative, and not a positive, reflex; the

State considers the force alone which can be brought to bear. An impending and temporarily withheld force thus restricts the State to a modified, one might say a more decent, policy of imperialism. Cases are numerous enough on this head; offers to mediate by third parties between States when, usually, the third party would lose were the two offending States to indulge in war-like enterprise. Thus the offer of Argentine, Brazil, and Chili, to mediate between the United States and Mexico in 1914; the acceptance of the latter for no other reason than to save its "moral" face at the time; the offer of A, B, and C, conditioned sheerly as a matter of self-defense; to have Mexico as an intervening *cheval-de-frise* between them and United States; while the United States later went into the doldrums called "watchful waiting" by which it no doubt meant that its gun was at its shoulder and it was ready to march.

All of which comes under the head of freedom. And whether it applies to the State or individual makes no difference. There is no freedom where there is no power to exercise it. For, by the same token, a freedom that is dead, that emanates from the fetid breath of a political edict is no freedom. Man is free in direct proportion only as the restraints surrounding him are few in number whether such restraints are said to be good for civilization or not. Every new law behind which the State stands in a contradiction of liberty. Even laws affirming a general liberty as are now promulgated by some few republics are a negation of liberty since the really free man does not court allowances. He is free only so far as he owes nothing and morally he feels bounden to the State when a right to which he is innately entitled is conferred upon him as an afterthought, as a further right to his consideration. To paraphrase Napoleon, not only God, but Freedom, is on the side of the strongest battalions. As to the Freedom of the State, Lord North is authority enough. "Oh! . . . miserable and undone country! not to know that right signifieth nothing without might; that the right without the power of enforcing it is nugatory and idle in the copyhold of rival States or immense bodies!"

It is organic of man, as of tropisms, that he wants to move in the line of least resistance. Let it pass that this statement may prove objectionable to Puritans. However, let us say that the individual wants to be free or wants to have the idea of being free in respect to whether, in the first case, he is exceptional to the species, or, in the second, he is common to it. The exceptional man wants the substance of freedom for the same reason in principle that makes the

wolf hunt alone rather than with the pack. Not because he doesn't realize that such a freedom will always be unattainable; he is nearly fully aware that even in primitive times he was engulfed by the gens, house, or family, as he is aware today that the future holds out for him nothing but being engulfed by larger and larger units as time goes on. Nor is it that he is less social than the other because in the long run he is more so. He sees that the future of the race depends more or less upon a practical initiative of the individual, a reasonable amount of *laissez-faire*, just as in economics a reasonable competition will tend towards balancing costs. That he is not less brave than the common man almost goes without saying if bravery means to try new paths and have moments when habits go-by-the-board as his brother-in-kin did back in the dark ages on sunshiny days when he temporarily forgot his fear of the elements. He is willing to take a chance in any political world barely short of an absolute anarchy. Hence, while his ideal is anarchy, his practicality points out that anarchy is a *pons asinorum* as a means to happiness. But he rebels against anything else; it is his heritage to hate the feel of harness, the click of the whip along his back. Not so, however, the common man. While the proclivities of his ancestors remain with him he can't restrain his fears. He wants something to which he may pay homage, something that will take out of his hands the initiative that he himself should exercise so that he may be left free to perform his ordinary duties of obtaining food, breeding and getting a shelter. In the past he left nearly all questions beyond these things to a god, a totem, a patriarch, a tyrant, a lord, a king. But whereas he trusted his fate to these in the past, because he attributed to them an all-powerful divinity, he has almost nothing today in which he can trust except what one may call a proxy. And proxies are not divine. Hence, when the common man sees initiative in others, he is incensed to the extent of seeing the need to limit it. He knows that though at present it may not even be remotely directed against himself, some day it may. Hence the need of whatever action he is capable to control it.

There are two ways in which the common man can do this. He can join the larger of two or more factions with which he may have interests in common or he may have recourse to the law, in either case vitiating by force the power of any real or imaginary attempts against his well-being. The very nature of the common man, his hates, his fears, his jealousies, his ever-quavering need for self-protection, are thus the nuclei of numberless laws and prohibitions

which will restrain the initiative of all individuals whose interests are opposed to his. And especially is this so in the democratic State. It is almost an open forum where thousands of insignificant grievances may unwhirl themselves out of stupid brains; where by the simple expedient of gaining a few cackling votaries almost any imbecile can become his own Justinian, having his own pandects eventually incorporated in the statute books. Everything he fears and can't abide (either because he can't or has no desire to indulge them) lie ready at hand to add to the discordant din of the legal charivari.

This is one of the reasons that a democracy will seldom function as efficiently as an aristocracy. Whereas the laws in the latter are usually fundamental and few in number they can be rigidly enforced, those in the former are almost purely adventitious and numerous and their enforcement entails thousands of courts and depends on fortuitous factors. The aristocrat is wary of unlimited legislation for the simple reason that it will in time rebound upon himself, while the common man is constantly skipping from legal panacea to legal panacea, now distrusting legislation, now a fanatic about its powers to cure. Thus the State instead of remedying things by paternalistic laws which are supposedly to cure common men of their diseases is unconsciously impoverishing itself. For instance, the Drug and Prohibition Acts in the United States. None but the blind has failed to see how impotent the government is to enforce them. Still somehow we do manage to go lumberingly towards the millennium, whatever it will be, increasing laws, taxes, police forces, not to mention intolerance which is the primary cause for dissolution of the State as polarity within the atom is primary cause for dissolution.

The common man is, of course, satisfied with all this as indeed we all must be. The legalistic horizons to which he has so long been habituated, the innumerable "Keep Off the Grass!" signs which since the days of Hammurabi keep augmenting hour on hour and which fimbriate every highway and alley of modern life, have no terrors for him. He is satisfied not because he is interested in the State *as* State. He is interested in it sheerly because he believes that if the State engrafts upon itself a number of prohibitions gross enough he will be surrounded by an impenetrable armour, protecting him always, perhaps even saving him from thought. He will again have his totem. There is nothing paradoxical to him in the verity that when these prohibitions have reached a point where they

become intolerable to a large mass of men his armour will dissolve into a filament where he'll be compelled to meet his fellow man almost utterly devoid of self-reliance. Just as the State, in attempting to cure all the common man's ills by law, weakens itself, so does the common man with his supra-tendencies towards sociality, his allowing the State to preempt more and more the prerogatives which he himself should assume, weaken himself. There is a balancing point between tolerance and intolerance which should never be passed. Whenever it has been passed onto the side of the latter the common man will have no State left to protect him nor will the State have common men enough to uphold it.

As the rights of the democratic State persist only by the sufferance of the majority of its citizens, whose toes are respected, and hence who believe collectively in the sanctity of the State, it is to the majority the State looks to validate its behests. It is therefore the majority who have what are called "rights," which means in essence that what the State can't help acceding to it, the State accedes. Practically, as I have shown, there are no "rights" except those residing in force. The minority therefore have no rights. They are merely the by-products of a heterogeneous society. And as by-products they supposedly add nothing to the value of the State it may be economy to treat them negatively. Yet in this, too, I think the State errs. That is, of course, the democratic State.

Men in society, I presume, may be divided into three groups: the apathetic, the idealistic, and the realistic. Politically, we call them conservatives and reactionaries, progressives and liberals, radicals, etc. The first two of these may be said to belong to the apathetics if we open the term to every one indifferent to, or opposed to, political evolution. The third, fourth, and fifth, are about evenly divided between the idealistic and realistic groups. Though it is true, of course, that no austere classification such as this can be made where individuals are involved, it is a biological truism that almost in direct proportion as the number of individuals examined become greater the more will they reflect characteristics in common. Thus when a few "apathetics" are examined many slight differences of opinion will be found among them. Where many are examined these differences will pare off by insensible gradations, the general agreement of their opinions rising predominantly above them. More, I think it will be found that the larger the group whose ideas fall into definite categories the more indifferent to those ideas will the group be. One Athanasius or one Luther has more feeling for his particu-

lar creed than ten thousand converts. Only exceptionally small groups of G. B. Shaws, Anatole Frances, H. G. Wellses, or say, Bertrand Russells and Jacques Loebes could ever be formed. Hence we may say in general that the "apathetics" will be found largely among the majority, the idealists and realists the minority. Though all trickle in and out of these two groups I think the hypothesis approaches fact. It is almost banal to point to history to show that almost everything has come from the minority, nothing from the majority. And by majority I mean, of course, those who are "for" the dominant thoughts of the community or State, the general level of its ideas and tenets, and by minority those who are against them. In the United States, for instance, the majority believes in Protestantism and industrialism; the minority does not. And while the United States *as* State recognizes heterodoxy in religious matters, in principle, officially it is Protestant. As witness its refusal to interfere with the persecution of Catholics by the Klu Klux Klan in the South. As I shall show in the next paragraph it is such stupidities on the part of the State which breed anarchy.

Hitherto I have shown that every State (with exceptions noted) was constrained in its acting upon other smaller States by the temporarily withheld force of other large States. When the power of any State is aggrandizing too swiftly, other States, sensing a threatening of their own autonomy, will check it by combination or counter-combination, sheering strength from the too powerful State, disposing it if the result will warrant, upon weaker States from which they have nothing to fear. It is the only check against a free imperialism and sometimes a most effective one. Within the community, however, we have no such checks. Where one faction in it is weak and the other strong the last will dominate over the first and intolerance will set in. Where neither is the strongest there will be no attempt at coercion for where their force is co-equal their one or several differences of opinion will be passive. The democracy, therefore, that maintains its various factions, its minority and majority groups, in equilibrium will most nearly approach the ideal democracy. It will be strengthened because all men will be for it. That is, as much as all men can ever be for a godhead.

Democracies ever fail to see this. They recognize creeds to the denial of everything contrary to them. They perpetually heave up prohibitions and legal restraints against natural humours which erect factions that lead the common man into mazes from which he can only extricate himself by adopting a devout nihilism.

It is true that the police and military forces of the democratic State may at all times seem omnipotent but they are not things apart. For the common man to assume that they will always be ready to protect him against all of the State's mistakes is an egregious error. They, too, are common men who take their part in the day's doings, who join their factions, and who, when these are to be put down by law, will either not bear arms against them or will take arms with them if there be the slightest chance of success. Every common man is, therefore, wherever factions exist, a potential force which may be brought to bear against the State. And factions, as I have already shown, are indirectly the children of innumerable laws.

Thus it is that the tendencies of the democratic State towards the creation of numberless prohibitions and the multiplication of intolerance is not combated by the common man. They are combated by the rare individual whose scalpel goes far beneath the surface respectabilities leaving the raw, naked stupidities exposed. It is the rare individual only who has the capabilities and the perseverance to be not alone his own surgeon but the State's. He stands in the same relationship to the State as a great critic stands to the novelist. He chastens—not because he loves the State first—but because he loves it at all. He sees in the integration of laws the gradual disintegration of his individuality and he also sees that in that integration there is a greasing of ways towards launching another mightier State which will cause still further disintegration. He would rather take present evils than those . . . etc. Call him conservative if you will, yet from the standpoint of the State with the interests of its subject people at heart, he is the only constructive influence such a State has. One Spencer is worth a thousand Cecils. England up until the early decades of the Nineteenth Century, perhaps the "freest" nation in modern history, was made so by its free-thinkers, its liberals, and radicals to whom the increasing powers of the courts were anathema. It was they who kept the legalistic restraints down to a norm compatible with a reasonable amount of individual liberty because that and that only meant the greatest sum of collective happiness. It was as these bars against the increase in laws weakened, as a few leaders of opinion became less febrile in their denunciations, that England became less and less an ideal State for the individual and therefore for every citizen in it. But while it is true that England is still far from approaching the United States in its insidious penchant for multiple law making, its committees, its governmental

bodies of this and that, it is fast riding the current which will lead it into Socialism—or worse.

I have before me a Socialist pamphlet that says: "The tendency of social evolution always was and forever will continue to be towards a state of ever-increasing restraint of the individual by society, and that this will continue till a state of existence will be attained in which the individual will be constrained by society." This passage, except for the absoluteness of "forever will continue," seems to accord with the facts. Constantly as civilization reaches farther and farther out, and as the nomadic, pastoral, and agricultural habits of men are slowly broken down, it becomes increasingly harder for him to live without its limits. His tendency is ever towards adhesion to larger and larger groups. He follows specifically Spencer's doctrine of evolution: from incoherent homogeneity to coherent heterogeneity: from individual to family, family to clan, clan to tribe, tribe to nation. And as the indispensable condition to living in these is conformity to their laws and customs, he comes up through them each in turn singeing from him some of his individuality. He becomes in the end merely the unknown "X" in an indeterminate equation. He may have one special value or he may have a dozen. He may still retain some individuality or he may retain nothing except values common to his kind. And in a democracy, the present end of social evolution, such values are bound to be common.

So it is that if evolution (if one may call it evolution) of the State is to go on it is in some manner in which the common man will play more of a supposititious part. The signs are fairly intelligible that such evolution will be towards a stultifying democratization of values. The State slowly but surely gives way before the common man: all but him are being swallowed in its ever-widening maw. We have Utopians, Socialists, Communists, Bolsheviki, all tending to eliminate physical competition and take out of the common man's hands the initiative that has so long irked him. Socialism, Communism, and Bolshevism are all for feeding the common man assuming that thereby all individualism would be drugged into a profound coma. Yet doing this would rouse long dormant psychological possibilities in the common man which would start another type of individualism all over again. Haven't the Utopians forgotten the restlessness of man, even of the bovine type, except that he be restrained by a rigid dictatorship? Graze the common man on the vastest of meadows and he'll want any fences that surround him taken down,

that done and he'll want someone to do his grazing for him; do that and he'll reach out for things still farther fetched. If the inherent traits of common men are hardly much higher than the Neanderthal man, if a physical Utopia could be created tomorrow, he wouldn't appreciate it any more than Adam appreciated Eden, which, contrary to the orthodox doctrine of original sin, may just as well be interpreted to be a parable on man's discontent; even with the most perfect world known to man.

Any world in which man is to be happy will be one that comes through slow, transitional stages of growth. Even the common man will rebel at the regimentation of the current interpretation of what socialism means. His whole underlying psychology will have to be trained in new habits, new ways of thinking before any such millennium can come to pass. Ah! but then, says the Utopian, the common man will become a real part of the State, an owner; he will become blessed with a transcendental spirit of mutual aid, brotherly love, civic honor, etc. A place will be found for the halt, the maimed, the blind, the stupid; all will be the State! And I ask where, except for a very thin tincture, is there the spirit of mutual aid as would be necessary under socialism or communism? Where, except that exhibited by some very rare individuals and that voiced in stupid mandlinism, is there the brotherly love? As for civic honor, 999 times out of 1,000, if delved deeply enough into, it is found to be actuated by self-interest. No would-be socialist can be trained in these things by empty words. He can't get the spirit of them by studying economic history. Except to make him aesthetically unhappy with the present world, dangling socialism constantly before his eyes gives him nothing. He may dream that tomorrow morning he may wake up and find himself in a new world. True, dreams can only come true by first dreaming them. But dreams, as Freud has pointed out, are inhibited desires and as man has probably dreamed for millions of years, one can doubt whether the perfect Utopia will ever arrive. His desires will ever keep in front of him like the tortoise in front of Achilles. Yet Liberals of one kind or another are attempting and will probably go on attempting to make the common man suddenly into something that he is not; mayhap in time they will succeed. They have done it since the Middle Ages: from Martin Luther attempting to convert every common man into being his own metaphysician down to Jean Jacques Rousseau and other super-democrats making every man his own politician. Yet metaphysics has now become a horror and as a politician the com-

mon man is a wanderer in a gloomy wilderness. Yet that the world will ultimately shoulder some such thing as socialism or bolshevism there is little doubt. As the whole world has a democratic bias and as such means the exfoliation of power from the hands of the few into the hands of the many (even though such power is really fictitious) some equivalent of socialism is bound in time to come. Exactly as the democratic State increasingly wades into labyrinthine mazes of government ownership pulling many common men, by the golden threads of democratic doctrine, after it, so does it increasingly give itself over to a large petty officialdom, a bureaucracy whose disposition is more and more towards socialism, creating sinecures to keep alive that sense of superiority of rank which under the most perfect of democracies is so necessary to the common man. If a vicarious egoism has glitter to him—what matter? And he gets this vicarious egoism out of being an official whether in a civil or a governmental organization. Shut off from a lack of the general qualifications necessary to a business success "on his own" in the one case and a decent respect for his own dignity and powers in the other, is it any wonder that he takes it out in a putative ownership and lords it over those whose interests are most in accord with his own? As he but seldom views things subjectively how can one blame him? If you make ethical comparisons anent whether things are to be judged foolish or wise, or good or bad, then maybe the common man is foolish. But then whatever is, is, and by playing the hobble-de-hoy mentor to him you don't make him any the wiser. And as the democratic State retains its power through his lack of wisdom one should be loathe to criticize. To appreciate this one has only to know that to give the common man a shilling different in wages or to clothe him with a purely fictitious inequality of office and he will be like a god where the difference between him and his kind will be greater than that between a peacock and some cull of the barnyard. Each will direct him next below him in rank with the pomposity of a strutting idiot.

Thus, the State with its orders, stars, garters, medailles d'honneur, jobs, "Toys," as Napoleon called them, temporarily strengthens its power yet each such acquisition of power by the democratic State, where a new political sinecure is made available, is a nail in its own coffin. For each gainer there must be a loser and for each non-productive sinecurist there must be one or more productive common men and each new sinecurist makes the onus all the heavier on the remaining common men. True the common man who is proclaimed

a hero pinning a tin medal on his chest is hardly liable to detest the State nor is the common man who is fed at the public crib nor indeed is any man who is infantile over pacifiers. Since a large bureaucracy quiets a large number of common men via the reason that they are within the sanctum, are "in the know," and as even a post-office clerk is in the same macrocosmic world as a Prime Minister, his uniform, by ascription to himself at least, covers the same great virtues, the same great secrets of State. Yet while satisfying the common man's thirst for purely egocentric indulgence other common men must pay in ever-stiffening sums as time goes on.

Am I assuming that an aristocracy would be free of such absurdities? I point to history and that hackneyed line about the beggar on horseback. *Magistratus indicat virum*. True it is that all aristocracies have not been composed of Solons but the castes out of which aristocracies have sprung have nearly all sent with them daimiosian (to coin an adjective) codes of honor from which few true aristocrats have deviated. The promiscuousness of the common man, his practical inability to realize any codes of honor except those inspired by fear, the venal habits of his kind to "get it while the getting's good," his supine dependence upon surface expedients, are all against any form of self-discipline. "There is," says Mr. H. G. Wells in his "First and Last Things," a base democracy just as there is a base aristocracy, the swaggering aggressive disposition of the vulgar soul that admits neither of superior or leaders. . . . It resents rules and refinements. . . . It dreams that its leaders are its delegates. It takes refuge from all superiority, all special knowledge, in a phantom ideal, the People, the sublime and wonderful People. 'You can fool some of the people all the time and all the people some of the time, but you can't fool all the people all the time,' expresses, I think, this mystical faith, this faith in which men take refuge from the demand for order, discipline and conscious light. . . . The community is regarded as a consultative committee of profoundly wise, alert and well-informed Common Men. Since the common man is, as Gustav Le Bon has pointed out, a gregarious animal, collectively rather like sheep, emotional, hasty, and shallow, the practical outcome of political democracy in all large communities under modern conditions is to put power into the hands of rich newspaper proprietors, advertising producers and the energetic wealthy generally who are best able to flood the collective mind freely with the suggestions on which it acts." And, as de Tocqueville says: "*Presque tous les peuples qui ont agi fortement sur le monde, ceur*

qui concu, suicij and execute grand desseins, depuis Romains jusq- aux Anglais etaient dirigé par un aristocratic, et comment s'en etonner?" But, of course, by aristocracy I do not mean alone those who are so conditioned by fortuitous circumstances, wealth, birth, etc., but those who have risen from the primordial ooze of slothful ignorance and unreasoning worship of ancient gods. It is, however, a melancholy paradox that our most militant cohorts of democracy are our most unreasoning—not aristocrats—but autocrats when it comes to "business as usual."

And why not? No business can be successfully run by other principles. To speak of absolutely democratic co-operation is to speak of chaos. And so too is to speak of government from a standpoint of efficiency. Democracy is expensive, wasteful. No single man with the most extravagant of retinues could ever be as costly to the common man as modern democracy. No Heliogabalus, Nero, Commodus, Louis's with a hundred de Maintenons and Du Barrys have been. The sooner we realize that, to make government cheap and efficient, which it ever should be, that democracy is a poor way towards its attainment. Precisely as a business run on a theory of democracy with a thousand directing heads would eventually put the richest corporation in the world in the hands of the receiver so in time will the whole theory of democratic government have to be scrapped no matter to what point it eventually reaches. A policy of accumulating numerous hangers-on who add nothing to the value of the State, whose constructive value to it is inversely co-extensive to the depths they have their arms into the public treasury, eventually will drain that treasury dry, even though, like the United States, its resources for taxing the common man seem inexhaustible. No matter what theories are, facts are worth ten thousand of them that are found wanting. And from viewing history we know that no policy within the State, if we want cheap and efficient government, except that of stiffening and centralizing the powers, will work for long. No policy of indifferentism as to how many men are engaged in running the government will. Thus (without justifying anything) Germany was before the boon of democracy overtook it, an example of what a policy, which was rigorously adhered to by its political masters, could show in the way of national efficiency. True, Germany has been pointed out by social biologists as a society in a lupine State of evolution and hence may, at this date, be an invidious comparison due to its late questionable barbarisms. Yet whether this be so or not, the fact remains that where the centralization of

power is most effected: where a few fundamental laws are most rigorously enforced; where a rigid, national credo, a political fundamentalism, is unwaveringly adhered to, there, from the nationalist's point of view, will the great State stand. Whatever odium that attaches to a hundred men who advocated the great State through the instrumentality of the mailed fist, have we not come to see that from the promontory of national truth they were right? Caesar, Machiavelli, Frederick the Great, Bismarck, Treitschke, Metternicht, William the Third, Roosevelt, not to mention less boisterous types such as Mazzini and Cavour, all go to show that a national efficiency as well as an exalted patriotism flourishes best when cultured by the hands of fanatical autocrats.

Patriotism rests on just such considerations. But as it depends on who imparts it and how harshly it is imparted no appeal to the common man's tribal instincts by a lackadaisical high-priest will do. Patriots are not born in political Laodiceas. But while he must have his civil heroes, those who engender in him a proprietary interest in the welfare of his country and make him see this interest through a wide-meshed veil of religiosity, he must as well have his military heroes: the eternal Homeric ode that lives in man's instinct to deify those who have vanquished their enemies. Who could resist the incandescent spangle and glitter of military genius of a Nelson or a Napoleon? Under whom was patriotism at its flood here in the United States? Under Wilson with his peace policy or under Roosevelt with his swash-buckling jingle and clatter of the sword? Had the latter the influence he accumulated just after the Spanish War one million men and perhaps five would have shouldered arms overnight just as our optimistic sooth-sayers of patriotism said they would. That they didn't is because Roosevelt had lost power; democracies are notoriously forgetful; their heroes are those of the moment.

But while having national heroes is a consideration towards breeding patriotism, there are still deeper lying instincts which must be accounted for.

There are two: first, the herdal instinct of self-protection, the long-buried assumption from a bye-gone day that national war means the extermination of a whole race and not that, at most, of a very small sub-division of a race; second, the psychological heritage from the tribal ages that every national aggression in some way means loot. Since in the first case the common man has an inherent feeling of superiority over all those not of his own kind, which by some

turbid ethnological reasoning are supposedly differentiated by national boundary lines; and since he fears the unknown, of being amidst the beliefs and superstitions other than those to which he has been used, he assumes that his patriotism acts as a buffer against whatever the vicissitudes of life may bring him in the way of such things: that in the herd, labeled and tagged with definitive tribal names, French, English, American, etc., he will be game for any crowd heroism; that without it he will waver with uncertainty, lurk in the darkness of loose quandary.

All of these assumptions are fallacious.

Since there are no hard and fast boundary lines, either anatomical or ideological, where races begin or end, all, in the first class, imperceptibly moving downward until we have reached a common stock; and, in the second class, there are but few superstitions or rites which are absolutely indigenious to one soil, all being more or less evolved from a few general ideas, it would take but a short time for the common man to adapt himself to new national beliefs. This, of course, in the event of the nearly total extermination of a nation. Which, as I have said before, is very remote under modern conditions where no resistance is offered to an enemy nation. Conquering nations no longer enslave the conquered. And while I do not believe in the transcendental benefits that, say, Mr. Bertrand Russell, attributes to non-resistance, because militarists are seldom if ever as civilized as he, still, if all militant patriotism were to be subtracted from the vast sum which make up the inhumanities, few nations could be spiritually conquered; as, for instance, India and China have not.

I come now to the second instinct, the more iniquitous of the two; the tribal instinct for loot without which no imperialism can come into being.

If we go back to the age of the gens we find that wealth was more or less communal; that every man within it knew every other's possession as more or less his own: that every goods inequality was more fictitious than real. This was, too, more or less the case when the gens had grown into the tribe. As the tribe was nothing more or less than a greater gens, formed for the purpose of mutual protection, all property which had belonged to the various gentes became *de jure* the property of the tribe and hence communal. Thus every addition to the common stock of the tribe was conducive to the welfare of the individual; and, conversely, every lessening of the common stock, or every tribute paid marauding chiefs or loss made

through inter-tribal warfare had to be paid for by the individual. As the tribal goods ebbed and flowed through the channel of the individual, it was he who had to pay in every instance. It is almost needless to say further that it was but seldom that there were additions made to the common stock except those gained through warfare. As the smaller and less war-like tribes but seldom kept a surplus of stock, it was to the tribes in the middle status, to those constantly oscillating between warfare and such domestic arts as might engage them, that the larger tribes looked to replenishing or augmenting their goods. But as the smallest tribes were most constrained to follow pursuits of a peaceful nature it was to them that all others looked to gain through warfare those things which they were too lazy to gain through industry. They were ever the prey to all and as such were eventually parceled out as slaves when the tribute became too small to further warrant their freedom.

As it is very doubtful, however, that slaves would be held by the tribe in common, because no organization had been perfected whereby they could be made to work collectively for the group well-being, it is a natural assumption that they became the property of the dominant members of the tribe to whose lot they fell: who, usually, were chiefs, petty chiefs, etc., those who, by a prescriptive right to war-like distinction, were looked upon with no little awe by the rest of the tribe. There would, of course, be distinctions: such as the more attractive women falling to the chiefs, the less attractive women and perhaps men apportioned to lesser members, according as the prescriptive right to supremacy did not intervene. Where it did of course, there was plenty of room for club law or whatever other species of equity prevailed.

The question was: what was to be done with such property? In the nature of things the women slaves alone had value. In most cases it was found cheaper to knock the men on the head; in others it was found that he could be made to perform menial tasks; he could even, on occasion, be pressed into service as a warrior such as his older brother does without the slightest compunction. But be that as it may, the male slave's value was more or less negative, may hap he was tolerated as a hanger-on out of a nascent, egocentric pity, a pity that has since grown, under modern government, into an indefeasible right. Eventually, however, as the tribe's depredations grew apace, as fewer tribes were left to conquer, and as the tribal goods kept running lower and lower, it became a necessity to put such male slaves into a service whereby the community would

be benefitted. Such opening appeared in agriculture, fishing and other domestic arts. It was satisfactory to his kingship, his headship. As long as the common stock grew, war became unnecessary. His kingship had no labor to perform; he was happy. "But uneasy lies the head that wears a crown" and because at least one crowned head was uneasy, the idea of private property was born.

Ideas thrive where there is mental and physical leisure. And since the king or Old Man or whatever he was called, was, in the ancient tribe as well as in modern society, the one to whom the most leisure was allotted, he it was who first saw the idea of private property clearly once he had begun to realize the value of slaves. Just as they later had a value to the emperor under the Roman *fiscus caesaris* so did they have a value to him. They were more conducive to leisure than war, hence it followed because of the increased stock, the more slaves the less war. What if he were to own all the slaves? Make a pronouncement, say, that all slaves taken henceforth in combat were to be the property of his kingship?

It might be worth while to pursue this further but as I intend to refer to it again with more definite material at hand at present it would be useless. Nevertheless, I believe it to be true that in some such manner as this slavery was the hub around which the status of property held in severalty moved to private ownership.

Yet paradoxical as it may seem to the foregoing argument, it was this very idea of private property which made the tribe more war-like than ever.

We have seen that in nearly every case of the tribe's taking to war in order to replenish its stock there was never the interest of one separate individual involved. It was as the stock of the tribe ran low, as famine, perhaps, or the fear of famine, came to inoculate all its members with the desire to ward off the evils incident to these things that the collective mind was badgered into a war-like ecstasy. To seek an augmentation of their stock without a dire need would be absolutely contrary to what we know of primitive psychology. Since the tribesman lives without forethought of the morrow it may be doubted that there was ever in prehistory a tribal gloating over excess of stock. Just as long as the collective goods lasted each member was welcome; when it ran out there was nothing for the tribe to do but what it did do: engage in rapine upon neighboring tribes or starve.

From this it will be seen that there was always a collective interest at work. The individual was ever subject to checks and balances.

When his ambitions roved and settled upon considerations which could not be satisfied out of the common stock the tribe pow-wowed and a decision made whether such considerations were of sufficient community interest to vindicate the concerted effort involved. If they were not the individual could suck his thumbs in silence. Thus the individual whose desires for gain eclipsed his desires for safety would have to go it "on his own," which meant his banishment, and, unless he were adopted into a neighboring tribe, his death. Only within the tribe lay comparative safety and sustenance.

This was probably true of the individual for a long while, even after private property in slaves came into being. Since power had vested in the head of the tribe, once the community interests depended more or less on the labor of his slaves, the individual was suffered to remain in the tribe only on condition of his sacrificing his interests to the head's will. Whereas before the individual did have some chance of having his selfish extra-tribal ambitions satisfied through the community "aye!" now he had none. The head of the tribe had become not alone the leader in war-like enterprise but the arbiter of the individual's fate. Law, sagacity, dignity, and divinity were exhumed out of purely aeriform considerations and were mantled about his pontifical shoulders. Though his headship had not changed in reality, the glamour of his property, like "the lamplight streaming o'er," surrounded him with a halo of purity, verity, valour and justice. He was the fountain-head from whence all blessings flow.

And such things have tranquilizing values to those who go in for that sort of thing. Whether they be created out of the fictions of history, legends, mythology or out of the more realistic and impressionable clay deities and fanciful folk-lore of the moment but few men can withstand their lure entirely. Whether they be rare excerpts out of the annals of the State, such as carefully colored pictures of William Tells, Rolands, Cids, Bayards, Cromwells, Martels and Grants, some of whom never existed except as universal legends common to all peoples, or if they be merely canons plentifully fertilized with what passes currently as truth: if such things are coped about (to go low in the scale of royalty) a mere headship and whose sole claim to distinction is being, comparatively, a Barney Barnato for wealth, the result is the same as if he were an Aristotle, a Charles the Hammer, a Louis the 14th, a Lycurgus, and a Beau Brummel all welded into one piece. He becomes a shaman and a Holy of Holies who spills wisdom and emanates courage from

every pore. His spirit fills every quarter of the realm; he breathes a divine breath; his shadow fills every darkened forest, dell, cave. All of which is meant in no ironical spirit. Things as they were and are, were and are. To say that they had and have fictions of prior ages hanging to them is no cure. Nor is it any reason to abuse them.

However, we'll assume now that the headship was about to die. After seeing the glittering effect that wealth had upon the rest of the tribe the most natural thing for him to do would be for him to leave it to those of his posterity who could do the most with it; namely, those who had the most becoming dignity and the strongest arm. Thus to cut the tale to less than professorial prolixity, his favorite club went to his eldest male; his stone axe to his grandchild, his quartz necklace to his warrior brother, etc. Thus in some such way as this chattels personal or the theory of them came into being. Private property, in its less invidious aspects, was now in *status quo*.

We come now to the effect that private property had upon the individual ambitions of those members of the tribe to whom this property descended.

The headship, we'll say, had fallen to the lot of the eldest son. Now we'll further assume that such things as constituted the common stock, such as eatables, utensils, stone pots, etc., were still in the same status as heretofore. The younger brother of the headship had still the use of this common stock; he could use anything in this way that he could before but—there was something else he craved: his uncle had a quartz necklace and he had seen such a necklace on the neck of a warrior of a neighboring tribe some weeks before. It is but a short step from a craving to the desire to satisfy it. He would see his brother, the headship, and since his word was law now it might be possible to get that necklace. The headship loving, or perhaps fearing, his brother acceded; the tribe put on its war gear; and the coveted yellow pebbles slipped easily over one headless neck and fell upon the brawny chest of the brother of the headship.

But it did not end here.

The uncle of the headship had once seen in the hands of a neighboring tribesman a club just like his nephew's. He wanted it and as he was a brave warrior and had many friends among the tribe (and his nephew knew it) he got it.

Such cases were, in essence, the impelling deliriums which started the tribe out upon new crusades of extermination. What we may now term the royal family became the sole shepherd of its warlike flock; concomitantly with every augmentation of its wealth its power over it grew. But while most of this crusading spirit of the tribe was induced out of, mostly, royal considerations of gain, it needs but little probing to ascertain that the tribal common man as well had not been slack "in getting his." While royalty was engaged in getting its club or necklace there was loot for the common man. Since war-like enterprises presupposes derelictions from peacetime moralities, royalty was blind to what the common man got: the club was the thing. But always for centuries following centuries the common man got something. Thus he was, for all purposes of tribal ambition, though in a less modern sense, a patriot. His tribe now possessed a thousand axes and necklaces. His heart glowed with a sturdy and proud manliness.

We need not nurse this idea farther since for all purposes of argument we have the basis upon which the patriotism of the common man in the modern State is founded. We have seen a coercive force come into being out of pure obliquities; and we have seen that that coercive force was wealth. And since no other consideration but to protect or to obtain wealth has been the stimulus that formed the modern State, it is no far-fetched corrolary to say that wealth and wealth alone controls its policies. It is a corporation which legally never dying, has fallen heir to all the prerogatives, rights, customs and laws of the ancient tribe, which have been amended at the will of the State's masters as time or the case warranted. As being in the nature of a corporation it is controlled by and through those who hold a majority of its stock, who are, and by no consideration could be other than, its propertied class. Since minority stockholders cannot control civil corporations they cannot control the policies of the State as a corporation irrespective of whether the voting power within the State be co-equal or not. As the majority stockholders have coercive powers it is they who will control the votes where any measure is important enough to extenuate it. They can throw out subversive opinion, buy up demagogues, hire political machines, indoctrinate the common man with lies, call upon thugs, vote-breakers, political bullies. Thus where the propertied class is collectively in agreement the common man has a chance in a thousand. Disagreement among it alone adds weight to the common man's opinion. It thus follows that the greater the number of the

propertied class (in proportion to the population) the more gain will there be for the common man. In the tribe it was jealousy that distracted royalty from taking thorough cognizance of the common man during its raids; it is dissentient opinions and jealousies among the propertied classes that lightens his saddle today. "When thieves fall out honest men get their dues" may sum it up though it is an entirely unjust comparison. Thus the proprietors of the latifundia of Rome, having nothing left to squabble for when those great estates had all been taken up, went in for *lex talionis* and the common man came in for his own. Obversely, the power of the United States resides in its industrialists who guide the native genius in the way it is most willing to go. True, its heart is not with industrialism but its stomach is and as long as there is conflict between the two it will never be happy. This evidenced by its appalling inefficiency as a State. Yet the extravagant benefits of industrialism will probably be believed in by a majority of its people for many a long moon to come. The graph of the public opinion concerning it shows but few undulating lines upon its surface.

The common man is, however, usually a most willing subscriber to such doctrines. Since in the tribe the headship and his various relatives took on numerous attributes of virtue, benevolence, illustriousness, heroism, dignity, etc., the difference existing between them and their counterparts of today is of little moment. The analogy existing between the putative virtue of the tribe possessing a few billion dollars or francs is surely close enough. The same considerations that made the common man a patriot within the tribe make an obedient patriot out of him today. He worships his tribal goods.

Of course, there are some differences. The axes and necklaces have become more complex in their nature and are more in harmony with contemporaneous philosophy. And since philosophy, once undeniably true to the common man, should be undeniably true to every body else, one should not heckle its advocates. Thus industry is true to the common man because it is a direct means to a closer worship of God if it is not to hold a direct communion with Him. Thus the extent of the tribal domain, having no value to the common man of an earlier day, now comes in for his proud boasting. So does the past and present glory of the State; after military victories or a diplomatic group coup d'etat patriotism receives a new impetus. So does the industrial efficiency of his State over that of foreign States: the canny ability to "put one over" on his neighbors. From every

tax upon their goods he is in some obfusate manner to "get his." Every addition his congeners make upon foreign territory in the way of rights, concessions, etc., is, in some queer manner, to be divided unto him and is cause for his rejoicing exactly as he rejoiced when he came in for his modicum of the spoils during tribal days. Or when, as in the medieval "scolae" he got his "fred" or "feeding" for protecting his wealthier neighbors from marauding bands.

Such things all go to make up the sum total of the national egoism. Only lately we had the spectacle in the United States of a severe agitation for a merchant marine. "American goods, carried by American bottoms, manned by American seamen," was the hardly appetizing bait thrown out to the American common man. "Keep the American flag on the High Seas" was the slogan that beset one on every side. Yet inane as it sounds in what manner the common man was to gain or that it made any difference to him whether goods were carried by American or Phoenician vessels would be beyond a horoscopist to say. Since not one per cent of the American population had any more interest under what flag goods were carried than they had in organized prostitution they might just as well been taxed upon the latter as upon the former. Except to those who liked that kind of thing because they drew down dividends or fat salaries for running the vessels nobody short of an idiot could fail to see through the blarney of the benefits which the common man was to accrue. That he is still paying for the upkeep of a merchant marine even though the Subsidy Bill did fall through is well or ill as you regard such things. As long as the common man likes the ring in his nose and likes to be lead whithersoever those who lead him like to lead him so much the worse for him. If most of us suffer with him perhaps we can the easier afford it and thus treat it as high comedy.

Further than this, no one with even an elementary knowledge of economics can fail to see what pleasures the common man takes out of a protective tariff. As the importer pays this (sic!) those interested have all the phraseology necessary at their finger tips, infant industry, protection for revenue, protection to American, French and Italian workingmen, etc. Which in the common man's obtuse thinking is not alone a gain to him but is a positive injury to foreigners and as such comes in for his risible enough commendation. Except to raise the price of domestic articles of a similar nature which is therefore a direct tax upon the common man it is nothing but part of the State's generosity to those most privileged

to be accorded favors. Yet in some manner, out and beyond even a metaphysical logic to unravel, the common man is "getting his" from the tariff which is enough to make all others keep their mouths shut.

Of course, patriotism, though eventually resting on such considerations as these, must be first quickened into life by another consideration, if it is ultimately to culminate in its real purpose—warlike enterprise. When the tribal man subjugated himself to the power of a ruler he quelled all feelings of a sense of equality beneath a becoming servility. He did not dream that the headship or his relatives breathed the same air as himself. His ego was, in other words, suppressed. Only on warring expeditions did any dormant belief in himself come out in shrieks and yells of co-equality with royalty. In peace times he was humble squatter by the family fire, lord perhaps within that circle, but not without it. Not so the common man of today. His ego is inextricably linked with that of the national egoism by perfectly invisible ganglia. So it is that it is only when he has been told that the national egoism has been wounded, the national pride humbled, the national honor insulted, he is beset with the fighting spirit of his ancestors. Much as he reveres his rich countrymen, at heart he hates them. But when their goods are threatened or when some foreigner has "skinned" them a bit in international chicanery or business deal (if it calls for strong measures of reprisal) he is told that the national honor or pride has been sullied and there is much show of diplomatic crimination and recrimination: there is a great to do about the reprehensible conduct, "National Honor Dragged in the Dust" read the headlines, and the genial and good-natured common man is dragged out upon a punitive expedition, as if national pride, once having fallen, could be placed again on its pedestal by such a method.

Montesquieu said that patriotism flourished best under democracies. If it be true that a worship of material things is most exuberant under democracies then it is no doubt true. The reason for which may be that the possessions of the few are nearly always, at least impliedly, the possessions of the many. In the modern State, it goes something like this: The goods of my nearest neighbor have always more value to me than those of one remote. Where my neighbor is poor in goods, I, comparatively as poor, am all the poorer by his not being rich. Hence when he is threatened with loss of his goods by an invasion of a public enemy I cannot see greater loss of goods than my own, which, if I am poor, are hardly worth while giving my life for. However, when my neighbor is rich in goods I

visualize wealth which I may some day attain going to an alien from whom I may never wrest a particle. So my wealthy neighbor is one whom (with the help of all my poor neighbors) I should protect. As he but holds a feoff on goods I may one day hold everything in my power should be done that he should keep his feodary right until I am able to take as much of his goods as I can get as a vested right.

Which may be pure sophistry or a reasonable theory. And if it be reasonable it is nearly impossible of cure. As long as the common man is an out-and-out materialist he will be an out-and-out patriot. The terms are, as one sees it, more or less synonymous.

True, patriotism as an appellation has the ring of an old and virtuous coin and may be for all one really knows one of the great and laudable and sacrificial virtues. Yet even here a little thought will disclose an underlying self-interest. The common man still fights for Holy Grails but less and less as time goes on. -

I am not assuming, of course, that the common man does any such psychological diving as the foregoing when his patriotic emotions are awash. I simply mean that the opinions as given may be pertinent to a study of the basic psyche of patriotism. That the common man's intra- or extra-analyses of the things he is taught seldom get beyond the foetal stage because he seldom frees himself from the chains of his environment and the habits of thought which gyve him to that environment is surely well known enough. And as long as patriotism is one of those habits any such thing as outlawing war will be an impossibility. As long as the common man is actually a patriot, potentially he is in the way of being a warrior. Which, being of benefit to those who are interested enough in such virtues, is surely warrant enough for perpetuating patriotism—as long as we do not want to “revalue our values.”

THE BHAGAVAD GITA, OR SONG OF THE BLESSED ONE

BY FRANKLIN EDGERTON .

CHAPTER VI

THE NATURE OF GOD

WE HAVE spoken of the metaphysics of the *Gītā* as dualistic, as recognizing two fundamental principles, the soul and the non-soul (body, or material nature). But it is impossible to read far in the *Gītā* without finding that this description does not fully represent its author's metaphysics, at least in his most typical mood. It leaves out of account his idea of God, which is as it were superimposed upon the dualistic system outlined in the last chapter.

How does God fit into this system? Is He a sort of third principle, higher than the other two and distinct from them? So we are told at times, perhaps most clearly in the following passage: "There are two *souls*⁷¹ here in the world, a perishable and an imperishable one. The perishable (i. e., material nature) is all beings. The imperishable (i. e., the soul, spirit) is called the Uniform (unchangeable). But there is another, a supreme Soul, called the Highest Spirit (Par-amātman), the Eternal Lord who enters into the three worlds and supports them."⁷² Here the Supreme Soul, God, is definitely set off against the individual soul and matter, as a third principle. Somewhat similarly in another passage, we first have a statement of the ordinary dualism: "This body is called the Field; him who knows it (the soul) those who know the truth call the Field-knower"—which is immediately followed by this: "Know that I (God) am the Field-knower in all Fields."⁷³

⁷¹ The word used is *purusha*, which elsewhere means strictly "soul" and is not applied to the body or material nature; yet here the "perishable soul" can obviously mean nothing but *prakṛiti*, material nature. This is an example of the loose language which not infrequently confuses the expression of the *Gītā*'s thoughts, and reminds us that we are reading a mystic poem, not a logical treatise on metaphysics.

⁷² 15. 16, 17.

⁷³ 13. 1, 2.

But even in these very passages let it be noted that God, though in a sense something other than either material nature or the individual souls of men, is at the same time regarded as immanent in them. "Whoso sees Me in all and all in Me, for him I am not lost, and he is not lost for Me. Whoso, attaining to (the concept of) oneness, reveres Me as located in all beings, he, the disciplined, though he may abide everywhere (i. e., anywhere), abides in Me."⁷⁴ "Attaining to (the concept of) *oneness!*" Thus through its idea of God the Gītā seems after all to arrive at an ultimate monism. The essential part, the fundamental element, in every thing, is after all One—is God. "There is nothing else that is outside of Me; on Me this All is strung like necklaces of pearls on a string."⁷⁵ "Also the seed of all beings, that am I. There is no being, moving or motionless, that is without Me."⁷⁶ "I am the moisture in the waters, the light in the moon and sun, the sacred syllable Om in all the Vedas, sound in the ether, manliness in men. The goodly odor in the earth am I, and the brilliance in the fire; I am the soul in all beings, and the austerity in ascetics. Know Me as the eternal seed of all creatures. I am the intelligence of the intelligent, the glory of the glorious."⁷⁷ God is the animating principle in everything; it is He that "makes the wheels" of the universe "go 'round," that acts in all natural activities and processes: "The Lord resides in the heart of all beings and makes all beings go around by His mysterious power (*māyā*), as if they were fixed on a revolving machine."⁷⁸ "The splendor of the sun that illumines the whole world and the splendor that is in the moon and in fire, know that to be My splendor. Entering into the earth I support (all) beings by My power; becoming the juicy soma I make all plants to grow. Becoming fire (as the principle of digestion, regarded by the Hindus as a "cooking" by bodily heat) I enter into the bodies of animate creatures, and, joining with the upper and nether breaths, I digest their food of all four sorts. I have entered into the heart of every man; from Me come memory, knowledge, and negation (in reasoning). I alone am the object of the (sacred) knowledge of all the Vedas; I am the author of the Vedānta (summation of the esoteric doctrines of the Vedas), and I too am the sole knower of the Veda."⁷⁹ So, of course, God is repeatedly declared to be the Creator, Supporter, Ruler of all that is; the origin and dissolution of the universe,⁸⁰ "both death that

⁷⁴ 6.30, 31.

⁷⁵ 7.7.

⁷⁶ 10.39.

⁷⁷ 7.8-10.

⁷⁸ 18.61

⁷⁹ 15.12-15.

⁸⁰ 7.6.

seizes all and the origin of creatures that are to be,"⁸¹ "both immortality and death, both the existent and the non-existent,"⁸² "the beginning and the middle and the end of beings."⁸³

Such thoughts lead to the question of the existence of evil and how to reconcile it with the concept of an all-embracing God. Every theistic religion has its difficulties with the problem of evil. In describing the manifestations of God in the universe, the *Gītā*, quite naturally, tends to emphasize the good side of things; but at times it does not shrink from including the evil also. Since *all* comes from God, it seems impossible to deny that origin to anything. "Whatever beings (or, states of being) there are, be they of the nature of purity, activity, or dullness (the three *gunas* or qualities of matter, as set forth in the last chapter), know that all of them come from Me alone."⁸⁴ In another passage, God is declared to be the source of all mental states and experiences, *good and bad alike*, though the good predominates in the list: "Intelligence, knowledge, freedom from delusion, patience, truth, self-control, peace, pleasure, *pain*, existence (or, presence; or, coming-into-being), lack (non-being, or deficiency), *fear*, and fearlessness too; harmlessness, equanimity, satisfaction, penance, alms, fame, and *disrepute*—the states of creatures, of all various sorts, come from Me alone."⁸⁵ More definite recognition of the origin even of evil in God is found in this: "I am the gambling of gamblers, the majesty of the majestic; I am conquest, I am adventure (of conquerors and adventurers); I am the courage of the courageous. . . . I am the violence of conquerors, I am the statecraft of ambitious princes; I too am the silence of the taciturn (or, of silent ascetics), I am the knowledge of the learned."⁸⁶

If even in these passages we seem to find a tendency to slur over the evil of the world and its necessary relation to a quasi-pantheistic God, in other places the *Gītā* feels it necessary to qualify its semi-pantheism by definitely ruling out evil from God's nature. Thus to a passage in the seventh chapter which is strongly suggestive of pantheism, and which I quoted on the preceding page—"I am the moisture in the waters, etc.; I am the intelligence of the intelligent, the glory of the glorious"—there is added this significant verse: "I am the strength of the strong, *free from lust and passion*; I am desire in (all) beings (but) *not* (such desire as is) *opposed to right-*

⁸¹ 10.34.

⁸² 9.19.

⁸³ 10.20, 10.32.

⁸⁴ 7.12.

⁸⁵ 10.4.5.

⁸⁶ 10.36, 38.

cousness."⁸⁷ Thus the Gītā strengthens its appeal to the natural man, or to "common sense," at the expense of logic and consistency.

This stricture (if it be considered a stricture) seems to me not unfair, even though I doubt whether it can be said that the Gītā ever commits itself to absolute pantheism. It undoubtedly comes very close to it, as in some of the passages I have quoted. That God is *in* all, or all in God, it frequently says; and hence we may fairly ask whether God is also in that which is evil (or it in Him). But this is not exactly saying that God *is* all, that God is identical with all and all with God, there being no remainder on either side. Such a definitely pantheistic statement is not, I think, to be found in the Gītā. Certainly we find many expressions which seem to deny it. And that in two ways. In the first place, God's nature may be limited by the exclusion of certain parts of the universe or forms of existence. And secondly, God is thought of as extending beyond the universe, as including more than "allbeings."

As to the first point, the word "limited" as applied to God's nature is my own, and would undoubtedly have been strenuously repudiated by the author of the Gītā. He would have said—indeed he does say again and again, in many different ways—that God is limitless, that He includes *all* forms. Yet we have seen that at times he feels compelled to deny that God manifests Himself in certain forms of existence which are felt as morally evil; although at other times he swallows even this dose. Whatever terminology one uses, the fact remains that the Gītā repeatedly manifests a tendency to find God only in the best or highest forms of existence. The worse and lower forms are at least implicitly left out. This tendency is so natural as to be almost inevitable in a writer who is, after all, pervaded by a spirit of ardent, personal theism—however tinged with quasi-pantheism. Philosophically, the doctrine that God is *in* all leaves a loophole which can be stretched to admit a good deal. God is the soul, the essential part of everything; this may be interpreted as meaning the highest or noblest part of everything. Now lay the emphasis on the word *part*, and the trick is turned. Any entity may be regarded as a part of some larger whole, just as any entity (except perhaps, for the time being at least, the modern electron) may be treated as a compound whole and analyzed into parts. By choosing your "whole" and making it sufficiently inclusive, God can be found in some "part" of every "whole," and yet excused from responsibility for anything that would seem unworthy of Him. I do not accuse the author of the Gītā of deliberately practising such

⁸⁷ 7.11.

sophistry. Of course, his mind did not work in that way consciously. But unconsciously I think something like this must have gone on in his thoughts. Otherwise it seems impossible to account for such passages as the long series of verses found in the tenth chapter,⁸⁸ in which God is identified with (*only!*) the first, highest, or best, of every conceivable class of beings: "Of lights I am the sun . . . of stars the moon, of Vedas the Sāma Veda, of gods Indra (the king of the old Vedic gods), of sense-organs the mind . . . of mountains Mount Meru," and so forth indefinitely.

On the other hand, the Gītā's theism differs from pantheism also in that it regards God as *more* than the universe. "Whatsoever creature possesses majesty or glory or greatness, know thou that every such creature springs from a *fraction* of My glory. . . . With *one* part of Myself I remain the support of this entire universe."⁸⁹ "I am not in them (all beings); they are in Me."⁹⁰ "By Me all this world is permeated, by Me whose form is unmanifest. All beings rest in Me; and I do not rest in them."⁹¹ In the next verse after this last, the author retracts even this statement; it is too much to say even that the world is in God: "And (yet) beings do not rest in Me; behold My divine mystery! My nature is the support of beings, and does not rest in beings; it is the cause of being of beings."⁹² This idea that the First Principle is more than all existing things, that the universe is only a *part* thereof, is at least as old as the "Purusha" hymn of the Rig Veda,⁹³ in which the entire universe is derived from only one-quarter of the cosmic Purusha or "Person."

This is by no means the only point in which the Gītā's conception of God shows relationships with older ideas of the First Principle. While, as we have seen, the older speculations, so far as we know them, tend to impersonal and non-theistic formulations of the One, still many of the expressions which they use in describing that One can quite well be applied to a personal God; and they and similar expressions are so applied in the Gītā. Many of the Gītā's descriptions of God sound as if they were taken bodily from the Upanishads. Thus: "Thou art the Supreme Brahman, the Supreme Light, the Supreme Purifier; the eternal Purusha ("Person"), the divine, the Primal God, the Unborn Lord."⁹⁴ "The eternal Seer, the Governor, finer than an atom . . . the Establisher of all, whose

⁸⁸ 10.21-37.⁹¹ 9.4⁹⁴ 10.12⁸⁹ 10.41, 42.⁹² 9.5⁹⁰ 7.12.⁹³ R. V., 10.90.

form is unthinkable, the Sun-colored, who is beyond darkness.”⁹⁵ “I am the father of this world, the mother, the creator, the ancestor. . . . The goal, supporter, lord, overseer, dwelling-place, refuge, friend; the beginning, end, abiding-place, treasure-store, the eternal seed (of all).”⁹⁶ The term Brahman, favorite expression in the Upanishads for the Absolute, is frequently found in the Gītā; and often it is hard to say whether the author means to identify Brahman with God or not. The fact doubtless is that, as set forth in Chapter IV, the Upanishadic Brahman has contributed largely to the Gītā’s concept of God, which has absorbed it along with other, more theistic elements. As a rule, no clear distinction is made between them. But in one or two places the Gītā shows a realization of a possible difference of opinion as to whether the Supreme is personal or impersonal. And, most interestingly, it definitely recognizes *both* beliefs as leading to salvation,—that is, as in some sense or other true, or at any rate not wholly false; although it prefers the personal theory. “Arjuna said: ‘Those devotees who thus with constant devotion revere Thee, and those who revere the Imperishable, the Unmanifest (i. e., the impersonal Brahman), which of these are the best knowers of discipline?’ The Blessed One replied: ‘Those who fix their minds upon Me and revere Me with constant devotion, pervaded with supreme faith, them I consider the best-disciplined. But those who revere the Imperishable, Indescribable, Unmanifest, Omnipresent, and Unthinkable, the Immovable, Unchangeable, Immutable,—restraining completely all their senses, and keeping their minds indifferent in all circumstances, devoted to the welfare of all creatures,—they too reach Me after all. Greater is the toil for those who fix their minds on the Unmanifest. For the unmanifest path is hard for embodied creatures to attain’.”⁹⁷ Could we ask for any clearer proof of the thesis set forth in Chapter IV? The abstract, impersonal Absolute of the Upanishads was more than the mind of the average man could grasp. The Gītā represents a sort of compromise between that speculative religion and popular theology. It provides an “easier way” to salvation, without denying the possibility of salvation to those hardier intellects which chose the more laborious, abstract path. We shall see later that in other ways, too, the Gītā tries to save men the trouble of mental exertion. It is quite characteristic of it to regard intellectual meth-

⁹⁵ 8.9.

⁹⁶ 9.17, 18.

⁹⁷ 12.1-5.

ods as difficult and unnecessary. It is "easier" for the ordinary man to worship a personal, anthropomorphic Deity than to fix his attention on an impersonal Absolute. So the Gītā, while allowing man to choose, recommends the belief in a personal God.

Elsewhere the impersonal Brahman is more or less distinctly subordinated to the personal God. Thus the following description is quite Upanishadic, except for the single phrase in which the Brahman is described as "consisting of Me": "The object of knowledge I will now set forth, knowing which one gains immortality; the beginningless Brahman, *that consists of Me*;⁹⁸ it is declared to be neither existent nor non-existent. It has hands and feet on all sides, eyes, heads, and faces on all sides, ears on all sides, in the world; it permanently covers everything. It has the semblance of all the qualities and senses (of material nature), but is free from all the senses; it is unattached, and yet it bears all; it has no qualities, yet it is the enjoyer of the qualities (of material nature). Both without and within all beings; immovable and yet moving; because of its subtility it cannot be known; it is both afar off and near. Both undivided and as it were divided, it resides in (all) beings, and it is to be known as the supporter of beings, causing their destruction and also their creation. It, too, is called the light of lights, that is beyond darkness; knowledge, and the object of knowledge, that is to be reached by knowledge; it is fixed variously in the heart of everyone."⁹⁹ The impersonal Brahman is nominally granted all the dignity which the Upanishads claim for it—and yet it depends on the personal God. "For I am the foundation of Brahman!"¹⁰⁰ Other passages in which the Brahman is spoken of as the Supreme Soul, the One that is in all creatures, or the "Possessor-of-the-Field," leave us more or less uncertain as to just how the author would have formulated his thought if hard pressed. "When one perceives that the various estates of creatures are all fixed in One, and that it is just from that One that they spread out, then he attains Brahman. Because it is without beginning and without qualities, this eternal supreme Soul (*ātman*), even though it resides in the body, does not act, nor is it stained (affected, by actions). As the omnipresent ether, because of its subtility, is not stained, so the Soul, residing in every body, is not stained. As the one sun illumines this whole

⁹⁸ Literally, "having Me as the chief (element?)"; it is hard to determine the precise *nuance* of the phrase, but it seems to me to imply some subordination of the Brahman to "Me" (God).

⁹⁹ 13. 12-17.

¹⁰⁰ 14. 27.

world, so the Possessor-of-the-Field illumines the whole Field (material body)."¹⁰¹ Is this impersonal, Upanishadic monism? Or is the One implicitly thought of under a personal, theistic guise? Or, as in the foregoing, is God the "foundation" of It? In a preceding verse¹⁰² we were told that "I (God) am the Field-knower in all Fields"; this suggests that the "Possessor-of-the-Field" is conceived as the personal God. Again: "But higher than this (world of perishable beings) is another, eternal being . . . which perishes not when all beings perish. It is called the unmanifest, the eternal; they call it the final goal, which having attained they do not return; *it is My supreme station* (or, *light*). This supreme soul (*purusha*) is to be attained by single devotion; within it all beings rest; by it this universe is pervaded."¹⁰³ Again, we might think that we were reading a non-theistic Upanishad, but for the little phrase, "it is My supreme station (or, light)." Does this mean something else than that "Brahman is God"? Let the mystic answer. The fact seems to be that the author subconsciously avoids careful definition of these terms. Or, to put it otherwise, he does not feel able to get rid of the Upanishadic Absolute, but he strives, doubtless unconsciously, to color it with his personal theism.

Elsewhere the idea of man as a dualism, a combination of "soul" and "body" or "material nature," leads to a macrocosmic dualism in which God, the Soul of the Universe, is set over against the cosmic or universal Prakriti, "Material Nature" as a whole, which is then thought of as *God's body*, as it were—God's material nature. So God too is dualistic; He has a double nature, a "lower" or material, and a "higher" or spiritual. "Earth, waters, fire, wind, ether, mind, will, and self-consciousness: thus is divided My material nature, eight-fold. This is (My) lower (nature). But know My other nature, higher than that. It is the Soul by which this world is sustained."¹⁰⁴ And just as the material nature of man confuses and deceives him, so that he thinks that what is really matter is himself (his soul), so he confuses God's body—manifest material nature—with God's unmanifest Self. "Deluded by these conditions of existence, that consist of the Three Qualities (*gunas*, of material nature), this whole world fails to know Me, who am superior to them and eternal. For this is My divine illusion (*māyā*, trick, piece of jugglery), consisting of the (three) qualities, hard to overcome. Those who devote themselves solely to Me escape this illusion."¹⁰⁵ "Fool-

¹⁰¹ 13.30-33.

¹⁰² 13.2.

¹⁰³ 8.20-22.

¹⁰⁴ 7.4, 5.

¹⁰⁵ 7.13, 14.

ish men think of Me, the Unmanifest, as having become manifest. They do not know My higher nature, everlasting and supreme."¹⁰⁶

The adherents of the Vedānta philosophy interpret such passages as meaning that material nature is "illusion" (*māyā*) in the sense that it does not really exist. I believe they are wrong. The *Gītā* only means that the Soul—universal Soul or God as well as individual soul—is utterly distinct from material nature or body; the "illusion" consists in the apparent blending of the two. The wise man should realize the distinction; but this does not imply the non-existence of either. In my opinion the word *māyā* did not acquire its Vedāntic sense of "world-mirage" until long after the *Gītā*'s time. The reality of material nature is clearly indicated in many passages in the *Gītā*. Thus it accepts the doctrine of evolution and devolution of all nature at the beginning and end of successive world-eons, a theory which is familiar in Hindu cosmogonic speculations, and makes God the "overseer" of the process, and *His* material nature the world-stuff out of which all material creatures evolve and into which they devolve. "All beings go to My material nature at the end of an eon, and again at the beginning of (the next) eon I send them forth again. Resorting to My material nature, I send forth again and again this whole number of beings, involuntarily (that is, by a natural law, not by special interference), by the power of (My) material nature. . . . With Me as overseer, material nature creates the world of moving and unmoving beings. This is the cause by which the world revolves."¹⁰⁷ This same process of successive creations in successive eons is alluded to elsewhere¹⁰⁸ and is there treated as wholly material, not even as supervised by the Supreme Soul, which however is mentioned in the following verses¹⁰⁹ as "higher than all that"; He does not perish when all beings perish at the end of an eon. But there is no suggestion in any of these passages that material nature is in any sense unreal.

In another very curious and interesting passage this creative activity is conceived as a sexual relation between God, as the Supreme Soul (the male principle), and the female principle of inert or receptive matter. Instead of an evolution of beings out of matter independently of the Supreme Soul, or with Him merely as "overseer" of the process, the Supreme Soul or God "plants the germ" in the womb of nature, and from this union all beings evolve. But here—most curiously—the cosmic matter is not called by the

¹⁰⁶ 7. 24.¹⁰⁷ 9. 7, 8, 10.¹⁰⁸ 8. 18, 19.¹⁰⁹ 8. 20-22.

usual name of Prakriti, material nature, as we should expect¹¹⁰ (although this term would be peculiarly appropriate to such a connection, since the word *prakriti* is grammatically of the feminine gender), but instead is called *Brahman*, which has neuter gender! "My womb is the great Brahman; in it I plant the germ. Thence comes the generation of all creatures. Whatsoever forms are generated in all wombs, of them Brahman is the great womb (mother); I am the father that furnishes the seed."¹¹¹ Brahman is used as an equivalent for Prakriti, material nature, in another passage also: "Whoso lays his actions upon Brahman and does his acts while avoiding attachment (or interest in the results; compare Chapter VII), to him evil does not cling, as water clings not to a lotus-leaf."¹¹² The context shows unmistakably that Brahman here can only mean "material nature," the "non-soul," which is, as we have already seen, solely responsible for all actions. In these passages a strange fate has overtaken the Upanishadic Brahman. Originally the Soul of the universe, it has been so far degraded as to be definitely deprived of all spirituality, and identified with the inert cosmic Matter, which is precisely all that is *not* Soul. No more significant indication could be found of the Gītā's personal theism. For nothing could be clearer than the reason for this dethronement of the Brahman. It was impersonal; and so, logically, it must either make way for, or be absorbed by, the personal God of the Gītā. Of these two alternatives, the Gītā, with the catholicity of the true mystic, chooses both, and neither. As we have seen in this chapter, Brahman (1) is absorbed into God, who assumes all its characteristics; (2) is differentiated from God and placed in some sort of subordinate position to Him, or made a lower manifestation of Him; and (3) still at times retains its ancient prestige as the Absolute, the One-in-All. All these positions appear side by side in the Gītā. Often its references to the Brahman are so vague as to leave us in doubt as to just how the author was thinking of it for the moment.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ And, be it noted, as later speculations call it; for this same sexual figure is used in later philosophy.

¹¹¹ 14, 3, 4.

¹¹² 5, 10.

¹¹³ There is no clear indication that the Gītā knew the concept of the Trimūrti, the supreme triad consisting of Brahmā (as a masculine deity, the Creator-God), Vishnu, and Shiva, which is familiar in later Hinduism. Only once does the word Brahman in the Gītā have masculine gender unmistakably; in some of its occurrences the forms are ambiguous and could be either masculine or neuter, but when unambiguous it is always neuter except in a single instance. In that one occurrence the god Brahmā is mentioned merely as one of the numerous beings that appear mystically manifested in the vision of the Deity's supreme form as revealed to Arjuna, in the eleventh chapter.

The whole material universe is, then, in some sense God's manifest form or material nature. But of far greater practical importance, for the development of the religion taught by the Gītā, is this further fact, that God, by the exercise of his *māyā* or "mysterious power," can and does take on empiric, personal existence as an individual being in the world of beings. "Though I am unborn and everlasting in nature, though I am the Lord of Beings, I enter into my own material nature and take on (empiric) being, by my own mysterious power."¹¹⁴ This is of course a cardinal doctrine of the Gītā. Krishna, the principal speaker in the dialog, is himself such an incarnation of the Deity. He is not the only one; God appears upon earth again and again, to accomplish His purposes. And His purposes are expressed in the following famous verses: "For whenever religion languishes, and irreligion shows its head, then I create Myself. To save the righteous, to destroy the wicked, to establish religion, I come into being from age to age."¹¹⁵ God condescends to become man Himself, for the benefit of mankind. This is the beginning of the famous system of *avatārs* or incarnations of God, which became so characteristic of later Vishnuism and a prime source of its strength. No Christian community needs to be told how such a doctrine of a loving God who is born upon earth to save the world can conquer the hearts of men.

Of course, God appears in such an incarnation not in His true, supernal form. That form is not only invisible to the eye of man, or even of the (popular) "gods," but also unknowable to their minds. "I know all beings that have been, that are, and that shall be; but no one knows Me."¹¹⁶ "The companies of the gods know not My origin, nor the great seers (*rishis*); for I am the origin of the gods and the great seers altogether."¹¹⁷ None but God Himself knows Himself, says Arjuna: "All this I hold to be true, that Thou tellest me; for neither gods nor demons know Thy manifestation, O Blessed One. Thou Thyself alone knowest Thyself by Thyself, O Supreme Spirit, Animator of Creatures, Lord of Creatures, God of Gods, Lord of the World."¹¹⁸ But as a special act of grace, granted to the few whom God elects, and who serve Him with pure devotion, He may reveal His Supreme form. This He does to Arjuna, in the famous eleventh chapter of the Gītā, the climax of the poem—after

¹¹⁴ 4. 6.¹¹⁵ 4. 7, 8.¹¹⁶ 7. 26.¹¹⁷ 10. 2.¹¹⁸ 10. 14, 15.

first giving him a supernatural power of sight, since his natural eye could not behold the marvel.¹¹⁹ The mystic vision is revealed by a pure act of God's grace. No amount of pious rites and performances can win it; it is granted only to the chosen of God, and, we are told, to Arjuna first of all mankind. "I in My grace have shown thee, Arjuna, this supreme form of Mine, by My own mysterious power; this majestic, universal, endless, beginningless form, which has not been seen before by any other than thee. Not by Vedic sacrifices and study, nor by almsgiving or rites or severe penance, can I be seen in this form by any other than thee in the world of men."¹²⁰ As to what Arjuna saw—of course, words fail utterly to describe it. It is the mystic's direct vision of God. The greater part of the eleventh chapter of the *Gītā* is devoted to the confessedly vain attempt to describe this indescribable. The ecstatic language of the description is hard to transfer to another tongue. Even in externals the passage differs from its surroundings; instead of the sober meter of most of the poem, it breaks forth into more elaborate lyric measures, which Sir Edwin Arnold imitates in his English version. The vision is described as "made up of all marvels."¹²¹ "If the light of a thousand suns should suddenly burst forth in the sky, such would be His glory."¹²² "Arjuna beheld the whole world there united, and yet infinitely divided, in the form of the God of Gods."¹²³ Therein were contained all creatures, the gods (*Brahmā*¹²⁴ and the rest), all the seers, the supernatural race of serpents, and all other beings;¹²⁵ there was neither beginning nor middle nor end to His form;¹²⁶ the sun and moon are His eyes, His face is flaming fire, He illumines the whole world with His radiance.¹²⁷ And so on. We recognize the type of ecstasy which so many mystics of all times and lands have told of, and which, they all agree, can only be realized at first hand, not described in terms comprehensible to another unless the other be a brother-mystic who has himself enjoyed the experience.

¹¹⁹ 11. 8.

¹²⁰ 11. 47, 48.

¹²¹ 11. 11.

¹²² 11. 12.

¹²³ 11. 13.

¹²⁴ Here occurs the only unmistakable reference to the masculine God *Brahmā* that is found in the *Gītā*.

¹²⁵ 11. 15.

¹²⁶ 11. 16.

¹²⁷ 11. 19.

THE NEW LIBERALISM

BY CURTIS W. REESE

HISTORICALLY, the basic content of religious liberalism is spiritual freedom. Out of this basic content has come the conviction of the supremacy of reason, of the primary worth of character, and of the immediate success of man to spiritual sources. Always religious liberalism has tended to replace alleged divine revelation and commands with human opinions and judgments; to develop the individual attitude in religion; and to identify righteousness with life. The method of religious liberalism has always been that of reflection, not that of authority. Liberalism has insisted on the essentially natural character of religion.

Believing that religion is best promoted in the presence of live issues, and that every age must achieve its own faith, liberalism has been willing to hazard its affirmations in an open field where the contestants strive for only the greatest service possible. And this experience has led liberalism not only to free religion from extraneous accretions, but also to think of religion primarily as conscious committal and loyalty to worthwhile causes and goals. Formerly, liberalism emphasized chiefly emancipation and freedom; now it emphasizes also committal and loyalty.

Liberalism has had to face, even more than have other forms of religion, the age-old philosophical question, "why"? That is, to what purpose—to what end—do we live? In answer to this question liberalism proclaims as the end and aim of religion, and of life, free and positive personality, loyally and intelligently associated, and cosmically related.

If liberalism can be reduced to a single statement, I think this is it: Conscious committal and loyalty to worthwhile causes and goals in order that free and positive personality may be developed, intelligently associated, and cosmically related.

Let us see where this leads.

I

The liberal is not satisfied with a religious experience acquired chiefly through confession, repentance and divine communion, and terminating in a heaven of subject existence. He is not willing to accept the promise of a distant estate of doubtful character and location in lieu of concrete worths and measurable values here and now. He believes that whatever the future may be or hold for him is essentially the outcome of his own spiritual achievements. Hence, he demands that his personality be free and self-directive.

The liberal is not satisfied with purely material ends. In his swing away from mystic union with entities of doubtful existence he does not plunge into the abyss of gross material satisfactions. He may go from one of these extremes to the other, but if so, it is only for a while. In the long run, he hangs tenaciously to the conviction that fundamentally his nature is spiritual—that a spiritual self adjusts and guides and controls.

The liberal is not satisfied with freedom alone. Emancipated from superstition and prejudice, he may lead a care-free and easy existence for a while, but soon the essentially positive nature of personality becomes assertive, and the liberal knows that positive committals and loyalty are essential to the full expression of himself.

The center of spiritual gravity is shifted from objective and supernatural forms to individual man. This is not the denial of the existence of significant and objective worths, but only the removal of the seat of authority from an indefinite something somewhere, to a definite self known to be native to human existence. This is not a hasty conclusion reached by the liberal. It is the plainly observable trend of history. The lesson of long experience of the race is that of the primary importance of human initiative and self-direction. Whatever contribution may be made by authority and coercion—of one person over another, of society over the individual, or of cosmic processes over personal experience—the greatest contribution of authority and coercion is to make themselves unnecessary.

The outstanding characteristic of modern liberalism, and indeed of all modern thinking, is the evaluation of personality as the thing of supreme worth. Hence, liberalism now affirms in terms unmistakable that institutions are only the tentative and temporary expressions of personality, that they are frequently outgrown and must, like the hull of the chrysalis, be burst asunder and left only to mark an epoch past. Institutions—religious, capitalistic, socialistic, or

what not—must now stand or fall as they are able or unable to serve effectively and efficiently in the building of free and positive human souls.

Let us now turn to another phase of the content of present-day religious liberalism.

II

Present-day liberals see the essentially interdependent nature of human beings; that the fulfillment of the individual self requires orderly, purposeful association with other selves. This thought finds expression in various terms: Brotherhood, solidarity, mutuality, reciprocity, fraternity, community. For a long time, prophets, poets and statesmen have proclaimed the ambition of the race to be linked together for mutual service; and now biology and social science agree that there is and can be no complete self-realization aside from co-operation with other selves.

Ideally this is the heart of Christianity. The organic unity of the race is found in the teachings of Christianity. Jesus, at his best, thought and spoke in world-terms. Human solidarity is the heart of the labor movement. This finds expression in the motto: "An injury to one is an injury to all." The red flag is meant to be symbolic of the blood of the race. The latest and best type of statesmanship thinks in world terms. We are now becoming accustomed to world issues, programs and achievements.

Religious liberalism constantly aims to promote the widest possible human comradeship and the closest possible human fellowship. And this aim is underwritten by the knowledge that co-operation and not competition is the dominant factor in the growth of the race.

In the most intimate of human relationships, the home, we know no complete satisfaction apart from the good of those whom we love. Notions of the exact character of this relationship, laws defining its social responsibilities may and do and should change with changing time; but always the race finds deep and abiding satisfaction in the solidarity of what we call the home. We now know that the positive sentiments and other hard facts of the solidarity of the home belong essentially to other social relationships. In industry we are trying as never before, and with a measure of success, to reorganize on the basis of community of interest. So with other relationships. The old notion that the individual experiencing good can be an isolated individual has gone forever.

The legacy from the best prophets of the past is a conception of

a united world. The coming order is a world order. And any religion that hesitates to proclaim this gospel is neither an heir of the prophets of the past nor the parent of the achievement of the future.

The cohesive principle in the achievement of this human world order is radical good-will. This leads to the new competition, competition in the rendering of the greatest service. The pride of the old professions—law, medicine, ministry—is in the rendering of the greatest service. The spirit of the old professions must be fused into the social order from bottom to top—from the corner grocery to the League of Nations.

Liberals think of democracy not only as freedom and equality of opportunity but also as mutual assistance in the use of freedom and opportunity. To take one class off the shoulder of another class is not enough. All people must work shoulder to shoulder.

Radical good-will alone does not satisfy modern liberalism. Now comes the demand on good-will, to develop a technique for making itself effective in the world of hard facts. Social science is still in its infancy. There is room for and need of creative statesmanship in the reorganization of human relationships. How to secure food, shelter, and clothes without losing one's soul is a pressing problem. At last humanity has rebelled against a state of affairs that requires the forfeiture of the soul in order to acquire a rag, a shack, and a loaf of bread. In the solution of the problems involved in the rescue of the soul from the clutch of mammon are causes worthy of committal and loyalty. Liberalism declares that the church needs to understand the economic expression of brotherhood, and that everybody needs to understand the spiritual significance of economic co-operation. The next step in world progress is the proper co-ordination of economic forces with intellectual, moral, and spiritual forces.

III

In the past, the basic content of most religions has been that of the submission of persons to supernatural agencies, and the consequent appropriation of worths. In these systems of religion man was worthwhile because he participated in or was possessed by supernatural agencies. In virtue of this relation man received a supply of finished goods. In these systems men got their rights, powers, and goods by servile tenure. This monarchic view of religion rose to its noblest height in the expression, "Thy will be done."

The realm of the divine is now subject to investigation. Here, as elsewhere, the scientific method is being applied. Here regulated

observation and experiment may result in new theological discoveries, and so liberalism must remain undogmatic in regard to God. The theology of Augustine and that of Channing, the theology of Billy Sunday, and that of H. G. Wells, might all be found utterly inadequate without consequent injury to the religion of the liberal. Liberalism is building a religion that would not be shaken even if the thought of God were outgrown.

Nevertheless, the liberal recognizes and zealously proclaims the fact that purposive and powerful cosmic processes are operative, and that increasingly man is able to co-operate with them and in a measure control them. What these processes be styled is of but little importance. Some call them cosmic processes, others call them God. In life there is wisdom beyond our present power fully to comprehend. This is seen in the amoeba as it adjusts its structure for the attainment of the ends desired; in the living protoplasmic cells on the ends of the rootlets of bean and of wheat, both apparently identical, the one refusing the flint, the other receiving it; in the co-operative colony of the sponge and the daisy, the bee and the wolf; in the marvellous neural arrangement of man.

To the ancients the contemplation of cosmic events led to the theory of direct supernatural operation or to that of the use of natural forces by supernatural agencies. But to an increasing number of serious thinkers and to an innumerable host of liberals everywhere the contemplation of cosmic events has given way to regulated observation of and experiment with cosmic processes; and this has led to conscious co-operation with and partial control of cosmic processes. The ancients bowed before the unknown; the modern man attempts to understand the unknown. Supernatural agencies and laws are giving way to natural modes and processes. With this must go much of the nomenclature and many of the forms of worship of the religions of the world; and in their place liberalism must institute a liturgy lyrical and modern, inspirational and creative, reverential and socially useful.

Liberalism understands spirituality to be man at his best, sane in mind, healthy in body, dynamic in personality; honestly facing the hardest facts, conquering and not fleeing from his gravest troubles; committed to the most worthwhile causes, loyal to the best ideals; ever hoping, striving, and achieving. To know one's self as inherently worthwhile, actually to find fullest self-expression in the widest human service and consciously to become a co-worker with cosmic processes is spiritual experience deep and abiding.

THE CHINESE STATE RELIGION

BY JULIUS J. PRICE

THE Chinese language, peculiar as it may seem, has like the Hebrew tongue, no generic term for the word religion. The word "*keaou*," which has the meaning of "to teach," or, better still, "the things taught," "doctrine," or "instruction," is very often applied by the Chinese to the religious sects of Taou and Buddah, as well as to the ethical sect of Confucius.

The same word is also used by the Chinese to denote the Christian as well as the Mohammedan religion. The Chinese, however, do not apply this term to the State religion. Inasmuch as it only consists of rights and ceremonies, rather than something to be taught, learned or believed. The State religion has been practiced from time immemorial by the court at Peking as well as by the other provincial governments. The *Ta Tsing Hwayteen* and the *Ta Tsing Leuh-le* contain the code of laws dealing with the State religion of China. From a careful perusal of the above two works, we can safely conclude: (a) as to the persons or things to whom the sacrifices are presented, or the objects of governmental worship; (b) the ministers or priests who are to offer the sacrifices, and the minute preparation required of them for the performance of this grave religious service; (c) the sacrifices and offerings, the specified times of presenting them as well as the necessary and peculiar ceremonies that must accompany them, and (d) the penalties for informality or the neglect to perform the prescribed ceremonies as directed in the above works.

Let us first consider the necessary objects of worship or the things natural to which sacrifices must be offered. It was customary to divide the state sacrifices into the following three classes: (a) The *Ta sze*, or great sacrifices; (b) the *chung sze*, or intermediary sacrifices; or (c) the *seaou sze*, or the minor sacrifices. The

Chinese priests also designated the last as *kiun sze*, or heard sacrifices. The word *kcun*, "a flock of sheep," was used as a simple noun to denote multitude. In the following list which we quote below, the first, second, third and fourth are the specified objects or classes of objects to which the great sacrifices were to be offered; while, on the other hand, from the fifth to the thirteenth are those to which the intermediary sacrifices were offered; while those from the fourteenth to the end are offered to the minor sacrifices.

- (1) *Tcen*, which is used as a designation by the Chinese for "sky" or "heaven." This word is also sometimes translated by the "azure heavens"; while *hwang kung yu* is used to designate the "imperial expanse."
- (2) *Te*, the earth.
- (3) The *meaou*, which is used as a designation for "the great temple of ancestors." By this designation, the Chinese mean all the tablets on which are inscribed prayers to the manes or shades of the deceased emperors of the last dynasty. In as much as rank or dignity is always denoted by the height of the title which a Chinese emperor or nobleman has after his name, and in as much as the lines or columns of Chinese characters are always read from top to bottom, the Chinese were always careful when inscribing prayers to the deceased emperors or to their manes in placing all titles of equal size in height.
- (4) *Shay tseih*, by which the Chinese mean the "Gods of land and grain."
- (5) *Jeih*, the "sun"; called also *ta ming*, the "great light."
- (6) *Yue*, the "moon"; called also *yay ming*, the "night light."
- (7) *Tseen tae te wang*, the "manes" of the emperors and kings of former ages.
- (8) *Seen sze Kung sze*, the "ancient master," Confucius.
- (9) *Seen tsan*, the "ancient patron" of the manufacture of silk.
- (10) *Seen wang*, the "ancient patron" of agriculture.
- (11) *Teen Shin*, the "gods of heaven."
- (12) *Te ke*, the "gods of the earth."
- (13) *Tae suy*, the "god of the passing year."
- (14) *Seenc*, was regarded the "ancient patron" of the healing art.
- (15) *Choo jin kwe che tse*, designated the "innumerable ghosts of deceased philanthropists, statesmen, scholars and martyrs."
- (16) *Sing shin*, the "stars," are sometimes placed next after the sun and moon.

- (17) *Yun*, the "clouds."
- (18) *Yu*, the "rain."
- (19) *Fung*, the "wind."
- (20) *Luy*, the "thunder."

These atmospheric divinities are usually placed in one column.

- (21) *Woo yo*, the "five great mountains of China."
- (22) *Sze hae*, the "four seas"; i. e., "all the waters of the ocean."
- (23) *Sze tuh*, the "four rivers."
- (24) *Ming shan*, "famous hills."
- (25) *Ta chuen*, "great streams of water."
- (26) *Ke tuh*, military "flags" and "banners."
- (27) *Taou-loo-che Shin*, the "god of the Road," where an army must pass.
- (28) *Ho-paou che Sin*, the "god of Cannon."
- (29) *Mun Shin*, the "gods of the gate."
- (30) *Howjtooché Shin*, the "queen goddess of the Ground."
- (31) *Pih keih*, the "north pole."

From the above, we may safely conclude that the Chinese State religion chiefly consisted in the worship of the material universe and in subordination to it, the celestial as well as terrestrial God, infernal ghosts, and the work of their own hands, such as flags, banners and destructive cannon. We can also strengthen the above contention that the material universe was the object of worship from other sources than those quoted. The imperial high priest was compelled to wear robes of azure color which was to correspond to the color of the sky when he worshipped the heavens. He, however, wore robes of yellow material representing the clay of this earthly clod when he worshipped the earth. When he worshipped the sun he wore red robes and when he deified the moon, he wore pale white robes. The kings, nobles and centenary of the official hierophants, however, were accustomed to wear their usual court dresses. The altar on which the sacrifices to heaven were performed, was round, so as to represent heaven, so to speak, while the altar on which the sacrifices to earth were performed was square. No reason was given for the use of either type of altar.

The "prayer boards" or *chuhpan* are of the same color as the emperor's robes. In the worship of heaven, an azure ground with vermilion letters was used; while in the worship of earth, the yellow ground was used with black characters; for the worship of ancestors, a white ground was required with black characters; for the sun, a

carnation with vermilion characters; while for the moon, a white ground with black characters.

In this, the second part of our paper, we shall consider the sacred persons who performed the rights of sacrifice. The priests of the Chinese State religion are the emperor, the kings, the nobles, the statesmen and the civil and military officers who are known as *pi kwan*. The emperor fills the position of high priest, the "*pontifex maximus*"; the lower dignitaries are subordinates to him. The civil and sacred functions are usurped by the *joo keou*, or "sect philosophers." Women and priests are forbidden entrance at the grand state worship of nature; the empress and the several grades of imperial concubines only take part in the sacrifice to the patroness of silk manufacturers, which takes place by itself.

The Chinese hierophants had to meet two requirements: they were to be freed from any recent legal crime, and were not to be in mourning for the dead. In order to perform the first order of sacrifices, they are required to prepare themselves as the priests amongst the Hebrews did, during the time when the Jewish temple stood in Jerusalem, namely, by ablution, a change of garment, a vow in the fast of three days. During this time, they must occupy a clean chamber and abstain from (a) judging criminals; (b) being present at feasts; (c) listening to music; (d) cohabitation with wives or concubines; (e) inquiries about the sick; (f) mourning for the dead; (g) drinking wine; (h) eating garlic. The above were carefully to be fulfilled in as much as sickness and death were believed to defile, while banqueting and feasting dissipate the mind and make it unfit to commune with Him who holds sway over this great earth.

The third division of this paper deals with the victims sacrificed and the things offered. The animals or bloody sacrifices that were made use of for sacrifices of heaven and earth were divided into four classes:

- (a) A heifer, or *new tsze*.
- (b) A bullock, or *new fco*.
- (c) Oxen generally.
- (d) *Sheeo*, or pigs.

The things that were offered were chiefly silk, about which we shall speak elsewhere. The first essential in sacrifice was that the victims should be whole and sound, while an azure black colored animal was much preferred. The victims were to be purified nine decades or cleansed ninety days for the grand sacrifices; three decades for the

intermediary class, or only one decade or ten days for the herd or flock of sacrifices. These seemed to be no ceremony connected with the killing of the animals. Contrary to the Greek custom of decorating with wreaths and garlands and the Jewish custom of sprinkling the blood, the Chinese sacrifice seemed to be simply slaughtered the day before they are to be offered and dressed. After being laid on the altar, they were ready to be distributed among the *tse fuh jou*, "the sacrificial blessed flesh," which the civil and military priesthood no doubt relished after a three-days' fast. The sacrifices are offered at specified times; on the day of the winter's solstice, those to the earth, and at regularly appointed times the others were offered.

The following ceremonies characterize the grand worship of nature: bowing, kneeling and knocking the head against the ground, or, as it is termed in Chinese, *pac kwei kow*. The emperor when he officiates in *propria persona* at certain sacrifices, bows in the place knocking his head against the ground. The emperor makes three kneelings and nine bows, instead of three kneelings and nine knockings of the head against the ground. The knocking or bowing, or, as it is known in Chinese, the *kow* or the *pac*, seems to effect a material or rather a feeling difference in the estimation of his majesty.

Our last topic deals with the penalty of informality. The forfeiture of a month's salary or a specified number of blows with the bamboo stick, which very often was avoided by the payment of a trifling sum of money, instead of the lawful punishment for the neglect of due preparations, imperfect victims, etc., etc. The displeasure of the things or beings worshipped is not considered; man's wrath is only to be appeased by a forfeiture or a fine. The number of blows adjudged to the delinquent determines the amount of fines. But while such easy penalties are reserved for the delinquents, for the hierophants and philosophical legislatures; the common people who presume to arrogate the rights of worship, being heaven and earth, announcing their affairs thereto, or of lighting lamps to the seventh stars of *ursa major*, are punished bonafide with eighty blows of strangulation. The State religion is in reality a worship regarded proper for monarchs and philosophers, and one that is not to be desecrated by the worship of the vulgar plebian. Such, then, do we find to be the worship of the Chinese State religion prior to the nineteenth century, before the Occident got a firmer hold on Oriental China.

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