

The Open Court

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER

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
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The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

VOLUME XLI

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THE RELIGIOUS FACTORS OF SCIENCE

BY JONATHAN WRIGHT

IN writing of what Dante said of the Divine Light in the pages of this journal¹ and in pursuing it back to Pythagoras and in intimating my conjectures as to how this became a familiar conception flowing from the first modern man who is credited with beginning the emergence from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance, I came to realize that there was no clue in my mind as to just where Light began to be a paraphrase for religious symbolism. Plainly it went back to Pythagoras to men more primitive in the exercise of world thought, to the sun worshippers, the fire worshippers in many parts and many ages of the primitive world. Though I had had no inconsiderable acquaintance with the ethnological literature of primitive man I could get no intimation that he had ever, except in-so-far as all things are divine to him, conceived of Light as Divine.

When, however, we came to the problem of the connection between the body and the soul, that starts from every page of the ethnology of primitive man.² It was long after men had ceased to be primitive that they began to speculate as to just how soul and body blend with one another, how one actually affects the other. There is a great deal of idle talk of each motivating the other, but it has been left to the philosophers to wrestle with the question of just how it occurs. At first it is regularly referred to the usually unnoticed blending of the conscious with the unconscious self,—to dreams and other much rarer phenomena of the normal and abnormal mind, but we scarcely gather any glimmer of information thereby, which appeals to a rational mind. It only informs us how

¹*The Open Court*, May, 1927.

²*Medical Life*, July, 1927.

in all probability man got his first dawn of the belief he has a soul at all. This became at the same time the origin of much which we now call religion and of some mental phenomena not always included under that heading and both are embraced in the wider field studied by modern psychology, but what is of especial interest to us here is to discuss some of the data upon which man has rested his thought of the soul's unison with the body. It is hardly necessary to say that the soul, the mind, consciousness, are now used in approximately the same sense. With Plato it was always the soul and Plato regarded the soul as immortal, but it is a little stretch of modern usage to speak so of the mind. The thoughts of men are written in a moving flux of language, a constant slipping of words which tends to make one age unintelligible to another age, one generation even a little misunderstood by the next. For us the mind or the soul is the most intangible, immaterial, unreal of concepts but for Plato it was the only reality, this soul of living things and men. Everything else was perishable and unreal, the mere shadow of realities. In the body of man was a Receptacle as in that of all other living things, where there was a thorough mixture of the corporeal and the incorporeal, a conception which Aristotle declared was practically inconceivable in a rational manner. It was drawn, as Professor McDougal³ agrees from Orphic theologians. McMillan. I desire to make my acknowledgment to this source for furnishing me with much of my cue in following the thread of this essay. It lies at the very root of the thought of ages and we thus find it firmly implanted in the pre-history of the Greeks.

How is it the Mind moves the body? We find it emerging in the study of the thoughts of primitive men, buried in much grossness and superstition even in the early Greek origins, but indubitably and unmistakably present. Plato of course purged the problem of much of the primitive dross and dualistic materialism with which no doubt it was obscured by the ancient hierophants. Recent analyses of the life Aristotle lived with Plato, by Jaeger and Ross,⁴ offer no support to the view that Aristotle approached the problem of psychology from a biological point of view. Later it is true that there is textual authority that Aristotle entertained the belief, that though the soul was a vital principle it perished with the body, but as to the validity of the text of the *de Anima*, at least as to this, there has

³McDougal, Professor William: *Body and Mind*, 6th ed. 1923, London,

⁴Aristoteles, *Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung*, von *H'erner Jaeger*. Berlin, Weidmann, 1923. *Aristotle*, by W. D. Ross, M. A., New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924.

always been much dispute and it still rages among classical scholars. If the works usually attributed to him are genuine and the passages not mutilated, they are self contradictory, but an extreme critic says his *Politica* is the only work we have which is surely his. Others say when he acknowledges the soul is immortal it is a relic of his platonism and when he says it dies with the body it is his own later opinion formed after Plato's death. There are those who accentuate the differences between the metaphysical thought of Plato and Aristotle and the ancients after them started the story of their antagonism, but Aristotle repeatedly, in works written after the death of Plato, calls himself a Platonist. Jaeger emphasizes the fascination and love which Aristotle had for Plato when alive and his reverence for his memory after death.

Nevertheless when Aristotle invented an *entelechy* to take the place of a soul and furnish an agent of contact between the divine and the mundane in living things, it is plain by this seemingly substitution of one mysticism by another he had constantly in view this problem of how corporeal can be moved by the incorporeal. It is in one of his biological works he plainly intimates that the soul is immortal and in the *de Anima* that it perishes, but it is a little incomprehensible to many why he made an entelechy, a purely incorporeal conception, to do what he declares the soul, as Plato conceived it, can not do,—that is, act as liason officer between the body and the divine. Let not the modern reader think the discovery of nerve and nerve cells and neurons and all the anatomical minutiae of the structure of nervous matter has banished this problem for a single moment. Neither material discoveries nor inventions of hypotheses, neither parallelisms nor epiphenomenalisms nor all the terminologies of modern philosophers, the absurdities of a jargon by which they now befog any question they touch, have brought us any closer to a solution than Aristotle's entelechies. Driesch has even adopted Aristotle's term. The human mind can not grasp it. As for Aristotle there is no space here for us to seek to know which was his earlier opinion. The significant thing for us is the evidence of the wavering of it,—at the beginning we are apt to think of for the history of our philosophical thought. It was apparently some time after Plato's death he became better acquainted with the works of Democritus, whom Plato never mentions, and the Nature Philosophers, whom he quotes but seldom, though he apparently knew their work well. Though Aristotle held

aloof, at least at the end, from a frank animism he earlier made use of it in his entelechies, which are scarcely anything else. Epicurus⁵ considered that the soul is a body of fine particles distributed throughout the whole structure and most resembling wind with a certain admixture of heat and I am not familiar with any earlier precise definition of the make up of the soul. Fire, air, we know, and perhaps other materialistic notions must have existed before him, but they are vague and not explicit.

It is not profitable, or it has not yet been proved so, to follow out the materialistic traces of the soul in its relation to the body before the Prae-Renaissance ushered in the discussion of just what Aristotle meant even or before the Renaissance, when Platonism was taken up anew where the Neo-Platonists left it. That was when new men went back to the older and better Platonism. The animosities of the conflicts of the Averrhoists, who followed one opinion of Aristotle and of the Thomists who followed another had had time to die down, more than 200 years before Pomponazzi's treatise on the immortality of the soul (1516) aroused what interest the Renaissance had in the subject, which it, must be admitted, was not much from a purely doctrinal point of view. Kepler's view is said to have been at first largely pantheistic. He followed the primitive thought in the view that all things, especially planets, possessed souls, but he ended by extruding souls entirely from his scheme of nature (McDougal) and supplanted the executive powers of the soul by those of "forces". We can accept this as symbolical. The star souls and the angels who took their places had perhaps become or had always been "forces" in the minds of ancient men, but the substitution of "forces" becomes significant in a nature philosopher nearer our times than Aristotle. It is significant at least of the avowed switching of thought from theological to scientific ways of thinking. In some form or other the "forces" of nature have always stood for the religion of the man of science. Materialist as he now often thinks himself it is Energy he has to treat as his god and frequently it is his God.

The conflict of the relationship of Mind to Body, the story of which McDougal has made into a classic in our time, is no more than an account of a later stage of the confusion into which the thought of Aristotle was thrown more than twenty centuries ago. He too, we may conjecture, as a Platonist was at first pantheistic.

⁵Epicurus, I.63.—Bailey. Oxford-Clarendon Press, 1926.

If he wrote the *de Mundo* or others of the astronomical books he like Plato put soul rather than "forces" in charge of the heavenly bodies, but like Kepler he was deeply plunged in difficulties in his physics and found mathematics thus applied impossible. Galileo profited by the turn Kepler's thought took to "forces" to which he could apply quantitative as well as qualitative faculties. Without this no definite conception of motion in space could be formed. The modern scientist then so far as he has deistic leanings must merge them with his conceptions of energy and energy he now learns is another form of matter. Plato's mixture of soul and body in the Receptacle of the living being is what the scientist under the name of energy and matter has approached again after so many centuries. This is perhaps a loose jointed way and perhaps some would say an unwarranted way of pursuing in epitome the history of thought. It may well be forcing an analogy with the thought of Plato when no such analogy exists in modern thought, but it is excusable, even if these charges lie against it unrefuted, in view of the fact that no one has ever got anywhere by pursuing it in a hypercritical fashion.

Countless pages have been written and are still written to accentuate or to reconcile the differences between materialism and vitalism and the contest is especially vivacious today, but it is not forcing an analogy at all to say it is this old difficulty furnishes the rallying point for both parties to it. Men's minds are still confused in the presence of this problem as to how mind affects matter, how matter has an influence on mind. Matter has been fused into energy, but how can mind and body fuse? How can they mix in the Receptacle and separate when the vessel is broken? That the one can be fused into the other has never been so impressively forced on the attention of metaphysicians as by the physicists of this generation. Shall we say body and soul are thus fused and separated? If any can show the analogy is a forced one it nevertheless has had a tremendous influence on modern metaphysical thought, but if it is acknowledged as legitimate, that is as having factors in common it must be confessed the conception does not yield to very satisfactory analysis as yet. Minds are confused and thought is in suspense. That the oak board of this table on which I write can be turned into a lightning bolt which will split the brother oak growing in the forest is a statement we cannot follow through all the physical steps, but that is what a scientist believes and if Energy is truly his God

his God moves by His own free will. He directs Himself. Energy directs Itself. The lightning bolts in the hands of Zeus were a part of himself. Aristotle's god was close to this conception or it was just the reverse, depending on the way we are going to be compelled to regard motion. Aristotle's god was the Unmoved Mover. What is it sets motion moving for the modern scientist? The physicist has confronted us with that which has set us in confusion and we turn to him for an answer with a question as old as antiquity itself.

It has been possible for the modern followers of Galileo, who was thought and who thought himself in revolt against the ancient astronomy and an assailant of the religious thought of his day, to make us see in their science there is still inherent belief in a subliminal spirit like unto the ancient souls and mediaeval angles trundling celestial orbs across the sky. The scientist calls it Energy, it is his God. This modern kind of animism, while accepting a pronounced form of mechanism has necessarily retained a modicum of teleology, which, thought it would not have satisfied Galen, can be put in the same class with that of Aristotle. There have been many, however, in the generation just passed who believed that animism in their time had been driven definitely from the field. As a matter of fact there were even then many fine minds, not only among pure philosophers but among distinguished workers in the field of science, who as long as twenty years ago had registered their belief, free from dogmatism, in much we must call animism. There are few modern animists, none that I know of, who cling to the original doctrine of Descartes. He looked upon all animals and plants as mere mechanical automotoms. Man alone was endowed with the attribute of consciousness and had a soul and it seems to have been a very materialistic kind of a soul. The animal spirits do not seem spiritual at all. They were really the fine granules of Epicurus' soul circulating throughout the body and passing through pores still finer and thus were intimately mixed with flesh and blood. Spinoza brought the union no closer but in vaguer terms declared "the mind and body are one, the same thing, conceived at one time under the attribute of thought and at another under that of extension". We gain nothing by dropping thus into metaphysical concepts. We want to know how a molecule of soul is grafted on a molecule of matter and how it tears itself loose. How the former directs the complex molecule as it seems best. If we must have

mechanism, we wish the mechanists to keep on talking in the language of mechanics. That is what the modern physicist seems to do. Impossible as it is for the mind to conceive it, he shows us cause to believe energy and matter are only two forms of the same thing, each affecting our bodies and our minds through the organs of sense in a way evolution has trained them for survival values.

Hobbes believed matter was all there was to it, soul or spirit was but a work of the imagination. The eighteenth century philosophy was full of dispute about it. In the nineteenth mechanism was at one time so far in the lead that the conflict all but died down. In our own century we see it again assuming activities in the wake of the marvelous revelations, which, so far as philosophy is concerned, has given the death blow to the old physics on which so much in philosophy has been based. In the early third part of the last century animism in biology may be said to have had a standing but by the latter third part of it, although some physiologists clung to the interpretation of a soul, for the majority that interpretation was regarded as the exposition of an exploded superstition. Yet teleology in all things and vitalism in biology began to arise anew in Germany before the nineteenth century was out. At the beginning of it when much of the old vitalism was still alive the young Cabanis in France, though said not to have been a materialist, spoke certainly with the tongue of one and made a public show of atheism.⁶ "Observation, experience and reasoning are sufficient for our purpose,—we require nothing more". To him we owe that most materialistic of maxims familiar to all students of medicine in the last century, even though some of them refused to acquiesce in it,—the brain excretes thought as the liver excretes bile. However he held the doctrine which still animates those whose turn of mind enables them to ignore its own more profound endeavors. "For studying the phenomena, which living bodies exhibit to our view, and for tracing their history with accuracy it is not necessary that we know the nature of the principle which animates them."

With the rise of psychology as a science it became at the latter end of the century impossible for mechanists to continue this attitude and vitalism has arisen to the surface as a consequence. We may not know yet, but the seeking to know became then a necessity. Before that however, in the mid-century it may fairly be said that

⁶*Sketch of the Revolutions of Medical Science*, by P. J. G. Cabanis, translated from the French by A. Henderson, 1806, London.

Comte and his followers in France, the positivists,—guided materialistic philosophy. She had a bad reputation for atheism and infidelity for a hundred years after the Revolution among certain classes in the countries which had had no revolution. But a change began to come over France and over French philosophy when Bergson came upon the scene, and when Spencer died materialism had already begun to wane in England. When Bergson forged to the front of the mystics animism had been everywhere at low ebb, but in France it had hardly shown strength since the strange philosophical conception of Descartes, who made a compromise between the ecclesiasticism of his day and the materialism of the rising intellectual schools of thought to whom the iatro-physicists and iatro-chemists belonged. He granted a soul only to man, who knew he was one because he thought. Frederick the Great got his materialism from Descartes, who played a great rôle in science outside his philosophy which had really no use at all for a soul. All the rest of the animal and vegetable kingdom got along without a soul as mere mechanical automatons. There is still a trend in psychology and perhaps there always has been one in physiology to regard man as essentially an automaton. In a reflex sort of way he reacts just thus and so to the same stimuli. This gets mixed up with predestination and freedom of will. God created a machine to do just so in a given environment; there is no escape from it.

If Descartes had consistently developed his philosophy the church in his day had sufficient power and the will to crucify him. Cartesian philosophy thus extended besides abasing man to the level of beasts would have left ecclesiasticism nothing to do and the ecclesiastics were quite sure God had not so constructed a world, in which for so long they had played so large a part. But the Church was crumbling and no compromise of Descartes with animism in one hand for man and mechanism in the other for beasts could long save it. By the time France was ready for revolt Voltaire and de la Mettrie and Holbach had long flouted it with impunity. They ridiculed the arguments of the parsons and they denied the existence of a soul in man and were neither crucified nor burned. They sharpened the edge of the guillotine for the parsons. These men and their ideas however were the sinister excrescences of the philosophical conflicts of previous centuries as to the relation of the mind to the body. These flaneurs of thought to whom the politicians flock in every age for their principles, or rather their bases of action,

came to the flippant conclusion that because so many sages had disagreed as to how the soul moved the body, how the incorporeal influenced the corporeal, there was no soul. Hobbes was a writer on politics as well as philosophy and he had the art of securing the protection of politicians for his alleged and essential atheism. He and Descartes found protection beneath the long tailed coats of courtiers and the skirts of pedantic queens, but they and their like prepared the way for that materialism which has marvelously endowed the nineteenth century with materialistic blessings and made mighty with material progress, and too, "the rapid progress of the physical sciences in the early decades of the nineteenth century seemed to bring much nearer the realization of the possibility of complete physical and chemical explanation of the processes of living bodies".

This however has never been realized. Materialists have never been able to shake themselves clear of animistic assistance in physiology or, what amounts to the same thing, the confession that the knowledge which at the moment is at their disposal, is not sufficient entirely to explain the processes of living beings. There was always in science some one among those who knew, like Johannes Müller in physiology or even Claude Bernard and Cabanis, to confess that there was something behind it all, which eluded them. Though his followers rapidly guided their students into the mechanistic paths of the middle of the last century, while Müller was alive animistic philosophy was not entirely devoid of physiological support. His influence furnished a bond, however fragile, between spiritually minded men and men of science. That had been true of Wallace, of Crookes, of Lodge. While for the parallelist there was a neurosis with every psychosis, as Huxley expressed it, the universality of the application has never been established. It is perhaps not too much to say, for psychoses at least, it has never been established in the majority of cases. Huxley with the instincts of an orator often made sweeping assertions more suited to the lecture dias than to the laboratory or the dissecting table. It has been said that materialism has never had cosmic affairs so much favor its rule as at the opening of the nineteenth century. That was the time, it was said, that philosophers and men of science came closer together than they ever were before Comte or have been since Spencer. Perhaps they were never so wide apart as at its close. Nearly every philosopher

was a mechanist. In the first quarter of the new century there has been a great change.

No religion has long endured or profoundly affected the minds and actions of men, in which there was not inherent something inexplicable, something mysterious, something mystical, something which thought can not grasp, something which emotion must reveal. It is out of such stuff as this that the divine is fashioned in the understandings and emotions of men. Physicists long ago found in many manifestations of energy that which still seems inexplicable. Gravitation, many electrical phenomena, the nature of electricity itself, lastly the mystery of the conversion of matter into energy and the movements of its forms in space and space and time themselves,—there are no deeper nor more enduring mysteries than these. The Eleusynian and the Orphic Mysteries were not so deep, the tenets of the faith of Christ and of Buddha have not been so enduring nor less incomprehensible. Energy has every right to be the God of science, except it lacks the attributes of humanity. It is not anthropomorphic. No religion can go far or penetrate deep into the hearts of men, which in addition to the mysterious offers nothing at all of this. It can do nothing or but little psychical to help the social and political organizations of men. In the past every civilization has arisen by availing itself of the restraints imposed on man by some appeal to his love or fear or reverence for something divine, something he does not understand, doubtless, but something he hopes will help him in this life or something he fears will harm him in another. Those who, like Sir Oliver Lodge, think they can endow Energy with that on which other civilizations have founded their organization entertain sentiments not vouchsafed to all men of science.

"THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN"¹

BY J. V. NASH

THIS is an age of specialization. The fact is especially true in science. During the last twenty-five years advances have been made in every field of science greater than the progress in all previous history. The diameter of the stars has been measured, the amazing properties of radium have been analyzed, and the atom has been broken up and its almost incredible interior structure discovered, revealing to us the existence of solar systems in the realm of the infinitesimal. In chemistry, physics, geology, biology, bacteriology, palentology, anthropology, ethnology, zoölogy, and psychology, a mass of new knowledge has been accumulated that is, to the layman, utterly bewildering. So vast are the new fields which have been opened up to exploration that a man might spend his entire time specializing in one branch of science, or even in a minor sub-branch.

Never was the need so great for a comprehensive synthesis of science, such as Herbert Spencer achieved in the nineteenth century. While a specialist may by intensive labor become a master of some particular branch or sub-branch of science, he is apt to be deeply ignorant in other fields. He places so much emphasis upon his own specialty that his point of view becomes distorted. On the other hand if he tries to reach out into other fields, he is likely to get only a smattering of knowledge, which may be of little real value. In any event, he fails to get a true perspective of science as a whole, and of the relations of different branches to one another.

More important still is an understanding of the place of man in the order of Nature, and of the relation of the individual to the world in which he lives.

¹Edited by H. H. Newman, University of Chicago Press, XXIV, 566 pp. Price \$4.00.

The trouble has been that in the past there has been a lack of books designed to present that broad general survey of the entire field of modern science. What is needed is a work that is neither too superficial, through excessive popularization, nor too abstruse and technical; in short, a book that is both interesting and sufficiently thorough to give the reader a firm grasp of the fundamentals of every branch of modern science as worked out in the laboratory and to enable him to perceive the relationships of the parts to one another and to the great whole.

That want is now at last being filled. A noteworthy contribution in this direction will be found in the volume issued last year by the University of Chicago Press, entitled *The Nature of the World and of Man*, edited by Professor H. H. Newman. It consists of a series of brief yet vital surveys worked out by sixteen members of the University of Chicago faculties, each contributor being an outstanding authority in some special branch of science, with all the parts brought into significant relationship.

The purpose of the book is well stated in the *Preface* by the Editor . . . "to present an outline of our knowledge of the physical and the biological world, and to show the position of man in the universe in which he lives. Or, in more precise terms, it aims to assist the individual in the very important problem of forming well-defined conceptions of the cosmos and of his relation to it."

One of the most valuable aspects of the book is the human way in which so many difficult scientific subjects have been treated. The humanization of science is one of the greatest needs of the day. "The authors of this book," we are told, "have not treated science as something cold and austere and apart from human life. On the contrary, it glows with the burning enthusiasm of those who have cultivated it; it is severe only in the standards of truth that it maintains; and it has aesthetic aspects as well as practical. There has been no hesitation in pointing out the present great value of science to mankind and the hopes for better things that it promises for the future."

It is impossible to try to summarize in a brief paper the contents of a book that covers such an immense field. Suffice it to say that the drama of Evolution which it presents, beginning with the birth of the solar system, and going on through the gradual transformation of the earth into the state in which we find it to-day, and then taking up the history of life, both plant and animal, on the

planet, and the emergence of man as the highest form of life, is more thrilling than any novel or romance.

Some parts of the book, such as the chapters on energy, radiation, and atomic structure; on the nature of chemical processes; on the world of bacteria revealed by the microscope; and on the facts of human heredity, present a picture that is utterly amazing in its complexity, yet the broad outlines of which are readily grasped by the reader.

The last chapter, entitled "Mind in Evolution," brings the book to an impressive climax. Here we have a brief discussion of such topics as "The unique characteristics of man," "Man as a part of the evolutionary series," "The evolution of intelligence," "Civilization as a product of intelligence," "Tools as evidence of complex cerebral processes," "Language as the chief product of social intelligence," "Writing," "The contrast between man and animals," and so on.

One who gives this book a careful reading will not only acquire a valuable and significant synthesis of the whole vast range of modern scientific discovery, but will also gain a new sense of the values inherent in human life and character. For the book leaves us with a picture of man as a rational and civilized being the culmination of all the long history of the world's evolution. We perceive that, wonderful as organic Nature and all non-human forms of life may be, the human mind is the most marvellous of all Nature's achievements. In the words of the closing sentence: "In every normal human being there is an inner world of ideas and of recognition of values, for which inner world of rational thought there is no counterpart in the world studied by the physicist or in life below the human level."

Such a book as *The Nature of the World and of Man* is an important and far-reaching step in bringing together "the Science of Religion" and "the Religion of Science," for the redemption of the world.

THE IDEA OF GOD

BY EDWARD BRUCE HILL

“AND God said let us make man in our own image”. Scholars tell us that the word “Elohim” which is in this passage translated “God”, though plural in form, is always used as if of the singular number. We can hardly help thinking that the form is a relic of a time when the Hebrews were not yet monotheists and that grammatical accuracy was, later, sacrificed to religious scruple. We seem to see a people of gods creating a people of men, like themselves except in immortality and divinity. But whether the original idea was of gods or of God, the passage shows the conception which men, at a date certainly far earlier than that of the Book of Genesis, ancient though that is, had formed of God.

This is the really significant part of the passage quoted. If given by inspiration, it justifies men in forming their idea of God upon the basis of their own natures. If not accepted as revealed truth it shows, at any rate, that men of the most ancient times conceived God or the gods as, in general, like men. It is anthromorphism either revealed as a truth or shown as a fact of men's ideas. The mind of man had made God in his own image, whether justified in so doing or not.

This was then, and is to-day and must always be, inevitable. God must be conceived as having personality, will, intelligence, a moral nature, power and purpose. These things we see in men, some of them in animals, and savages have even seen most, if not all, of them in some inanimate things. But in man we see them actually in the highest form in which they ever met, potentially in a higher form than man ever displays. If God is so different from anything which we know that nothing can give us any idea of Him, then we are unable to think, talk or reason about Him. But this men have always been compelled, by their natures, to do, and so they have necessarily

assimilated their idea of God to the highest being whom they knew possessing such characteristics as they conceive Him to possess. This inevitable process brought with it the equally inevitable result that the necessary assimilation of God to man, in thought, was taken to come from and to be justified by a resemblance in fact. Men could not think otherwise.

The idea of God held by the early Jews did not involve so much supernal goodness as supernal power. God was to them a sort of sublimation of the sheik, chief or king who ruled them, and nothing more. Of course he was immensely wiser and stronger than the earthly ruler, but morally their simple anthropomorphism did not raise him to a different class. Of course like the earthly ruler, he prescribed laws and rules, often punished wrong conduct, rewarded right conduct and showed mercy, but he was also at times angry (sometimes without apparent cause) revengeful, jealous and fierce. His laws were largely of a ceremonial rather than an ethical character. He was particularly severe upon any neglect of due respect to Himself and particularly rewarded zeal in His service. In such cases He was comparatively indifferent to moral character. He was a "man of war", and His wars were conducted in the merciless way characteristic of the time. He adopted one nation and favored them beyond all others, but He also punished them with cruel severity when He judged them not sufficiently assiduous in their devotion to Him. At other times His attitude toward them was paternal, such as might be expected of a benevolent patriarchal sheik.

But with the New Testament we find a totally new idea of God in the Gospels. The notion of a king is nearly gone. This God is consistently and constantly assimilated to a father and that is the word most frequently used to designate Him. This God is not angry nor jealous. He is quite indifferent to outer marks of respect and cares nothing for formal observances. He is preëminently a moral God, and His service consists solely in ethical conduct. Such conduct alone does he reward, and unethical conduct alone does He punish. He is loving and protecting, not to the men of one race, but to all men. His power to punish is put in the background. The emphasis is laid upon his paternal affection and care for men. This is the burden of the Gospel teaching upon that point.

But this conception was at once too high and not sufficiently imposing to last. Fathers all men knew, and they could readily comprehend what was meant by God as a Father, but this did not satis-

fy them. That He should be a father to each was well, but He must be something higher and more. A Father may love and care for His children, but a God must have a higher dignity and His power and glory must be manifest. The noble conception of the Fatherhood of God did not satisfy and seemed inadequate. God must be modelled upon the glory and greatness of the Emperor.

So by the old inevitable process the idea of God taught by Jesus faded before a renewal of the old ideal, that of the king. Not now as a petty monarch of the East, but as the mighty Roman Emperor did the idea take shape, and that promptly. Compare the idea of God shown by the Book of Revelation with that shown by the Gospels. It would seem as if two different religions were concerned.

When Christianity had become the State religion the situation was what it had been among the Hebrews centuries before, and as then, inevitably, men had formed their idea of God upon the kings to whom they were accustomed, so now the Roman Emperor would have become necessarily the model, even had he not already been so. Since he was so already, the idea of God as a greater Emperor became so definitely crystallized that it has never been lost. The idea of the Empire was more enduring than the institution itself. It lasted through the Middle Ages and beyond, and the idea of God as Emperor is that of most minds to-day.

The doctrine of the Trinity has only served to intensify this conception by removing God farther from man. When the Council of Nicea formulated the dogma of the divinity of Christ it created, besides the one God previously accepted, two subordinate gods, Christ and the Holy Ghost. That they were subordinate, secondary, derivative, was recognized as it is, indeed, stated in the Nicene creed. The real question which concerned the council was whether Christ was *created* or *begotten* by God. If *created* (as the Arians contended) then he had no other divinity than any other of God's creations whom he might inspire. If *begotten*, then he must be of the same substance as his Father, and so really divine by his nature. The Holy Ghost was a matter of less importance. He was always secondary and the later doctrine of the double procession, afterward so important, derived all its seriousness, not from anything concerning the nature and functions of the Holy Ghost, but those of Christ. The double procession placed the Son more nearly on an equality with the God who had begotten him, and made him part of the source

whence the Holy Ghost had come. Important as the subject was, from a theological standpoint, it concerned, really, only Christ.

The appearance and triumph of Augustinian trinitarianism, though it so completely expelled from theology the Nicene trinitarianism that most persons now are ignorant that they totally differed, produced no real effect upon the current idea of God. This is natural because it is impossible for the mind to form a definite conception of "three persons in one God." Therefore the Augustinian expression has remained without effect upon actual belief except in one respect; that it did raise the Son and the Holy Ghost to equal nominal rank with God the Father. The equality of the Persons of the Trinity was the sole point in his statement which was intelligible. The subordination of the Son, which St. Athanasius and the other Nicene Fathers had considered a part of their system, was no longer a part of orthodox theology but became an heresy. Henceforth the three Persons must be spoken of as of equal rank.

Nevertheless the effect of all this theology upon the popular idea of God was, after all, practically *nil*. Always the original God, now called God the Father, remained in his place, and it was of him that men thought when they said "God". The Holy Ghost has never had any reality as a person. But with the second Person of the Trinity the case was different and it can hardly be doubted that His rise in importance was due to action and reaction between the conception of Him and that of the First Person.

The Emperor was an awful being. Few of his subjects ever saw him, fewer still might approach him. To them he was remote, inaccessible, the source of power, the embodiment of splendor and greatness, but too remote and too high above the mass of the people for any of them to hope to attract his notice or benefit by his care. If anything needed his mighty interposition a go-between, an intermediary, an intercessor, must be employed; someone whom the humbler suitor might venture to approach and might hope to interest. The nearer to the Emperor this intercessor, the better for the petitioner. but often the petition must pass through several hands. At any rate, without some such help nothing could be expected.

God having been conceived as an infinitely greater Emperor was, accordingly, infinitely more remote and inaccessible. A Mediator was even more imperatively demanded in His case than in that of the earthly ruler. He, certainly, might not be directly approached. But, fortunately, a Mediator was at hand, and in the one who had

been a man and had lived with men, Christ, who was, moreover, the Only Begotten Son of God. To Him, therefore, men's minds turned. Many, indeed, then and now, dared not or thought it useless to look so high as the Son, and sought to propitiate Him through some saint, that he in turn might propitiate God. This served to remove the awful God still further from men. But in any case men were led to turn solely to Christ and to regard God as beyond their reach.

Nor did they ever reach any idea of identity between God and Christ. They could, in the nature of things, go no further than the Nicene affirmation. Christ remained, and is to-day in the general conception, as distinct from God the Father as if St. Augustine had never spoken. That Christ is divine men could accept and have accepted. That He can answer prayer and forgive sins they can and do accept. But that He is not an entirely distinct being from God the Father and that there is not above and behind Him a remote, awful figure which was God before Him and from whom His powers, even if unlimited, are derived, they have never been able to accept. The Governor may be able to do all that the Emperor could do, but he is not the Emperor.

Accordingly when men say "God", they mean, not Christ, not the Holy Ghost, not a composite of these with the Father, but simply and solely "God the Father." "Father" in this designation has quite lost the sense in which Christ used it. In His mouth it meant that God was as a Father to all men; in describing the First Person of the Trinity it means only the Father of Christ, the Only Begotten Son, and by this use of the word it forms another barrier between men and God instead of a link between them: No doubt in various liturgies the old formula is used which would, of itself, imply the old thought, but the Imperial and Royal conception is so strong that this remains a mere formula.

It is, in fact, upon this view that all Christian theology is based. Christ's theory of a family relation in which all men are brothers with God their common Father, hardly survived His death. The sovereignty of God is the foundation of the whole fabric of Christian theology, and men are regarded as the subjects of the Great King and existing wholly for Him. Out of this have grown, at different times, extraordinary theories, some heretical, some accepted as orthodox, but all based on this idea of God's nature and relation to man, all involving views which one who had read only

the Gospels could not understand. It is this conception of God which is largely responsible for the dogmas of modern theology.

It is a truism to say that no definition of God can be adequate. Man being finite and God infinite, it must always be impossible for man to search out and express God. All that can be done, and perhaps all that need be done, is to find some formula which shall express so much as will indicate to man how he is to bear himself toward God and how he may expect God to deal with him. If we may find such a formula we need not be concerned with the fact that it does not express all. It cannot; but if it give us enough for our general guidance will suffice.

But there is caution to be used in the manner in which we deal with our formula when we have it, and it is a failure to observe this caution which has led so many able men and so many churches to the statement of dogmas which have caused difference and discord.

When once we have found a formula we must always bear in mind that it cannot be complete and cannot express the whole truth. We are not, therefore, at liberty to proceed by logical deduction from it, to erect a whole system of theology. The sovereignty of God has been generally adopted by all churches, as best expressing the relation of God to man. There is, no doubt, truth in the statement itself. Perhaps it may be the best formula. But theologians have proceeded to expand and develop it by processes of deduction until they have spun out of it complete theological systems, differing from each other, but all of them containing some statements repugnant to our reason, and which amount to *reductio ad absurdum*. Yet it was always known that, even if true, even if the best formula which we could have, the conception of God as a sovereign was not and could not be complete, and it was also known that God is beyond the reach of man. But the theologians proceeded as if the formula were complete and as if men could, by mere deduction from it, perfectly know God, His nature, His will and His purposes. They have treated Him as if He were completely within their grasp, and could be dissected and known like a molusk. The error seems obvious, yet it has never been avoided.

We must bear in mind too, that, as has been said already, whatever formula we adopt must be anthropomorphic. It is a common criticism of any particular idea of God that it is anthropomorphic, but the criticism is unfounded because this is the necessary result of a limitation which we cannot escape. It may be true that God

has not personality in the sense in which we understand the word, but personality is necessary to our idea of Him. Without it we cannot conceive Him with will, power, moral purpose, or many other attributes which are so inseparably connected with what the word "God" means to us as to deprive it of all meaning were they eliminated. A God who is by essence, a divine aura or ether surrounding or permeating the universe may be, from some points of view, a correcter conception (though no man has a right to say so) but such an idea would leave us wholly adrift. The reporter who expressed to Dr. Lyman Abbott his idea of God as "a big man up in the sky who runs things" was quite right. Dr. Abbott repudiated the description but, passing by its unconventional phraseology, the definition roughly represents what men have always understood by the word.

We are but men and finite. We only know qualities (other than physical qualities) as expressed in men. If we may not attribute to God a personality similar to that of men without wholly misconceiving Him, we cannot conceive Him at all. But we must conceive Him and must consider Him a person, and this means that our conception must be anthropomorphic. That it will be but a partial and inadequate conception we know, but it is all that we can do and we must hope that, so far as it goes, it will suffice for us. The teachings of all great religious teachers encourage us to think so.

We need not dwell on the pantheistic idea. It is a philosophical speculation which has never been a living reality to anyone. Some forms of religion have been called pantheistic and in a sense perhaps all religions are so, but always one or more personalities are found. For our purpose anthropomorphism is all that we can attain.

There are really but two ways in which we can regard God; as our Father or as our King. The two ways are really exclusive. While recognizing Him primarily as a Father we may admit that he might be called a King; while regarding Him as a King we may admit that He might be called a Father. But the two terms imply such a radical difference in His relation to men and in their relation to Him that to use both would result in a contradiction. One of the two must be chosen.

There can be no question of Jesus's choice. The Gospels are explicit. In His teaching God is a Father, not only His Father, but the Father of all mankind, all men are brothers and all service of Him consists in service to them. The relation between God and man

is direct, personal and immediate. Each man is the object of His loving care, each may approach Him with loving confidence. He cares nothing for ceremonial observances, nothing for formal marks of respect. In short He is the earthly Father, only better, wiser, more loving, more tender, more full of mercy. He is a King, no doubt, but the idea of Him will best show Him to men and best guide them in their conduct toward Him as that of a Father.

The choice of historical Christianity is equally clear. To every branch of the Church God is a King first of all. We are not so much His children as we are His subjects. He is not so much our Father as He is our ruler. He delights in ceremonial observance. Churches, services, Sunday observances, public prayer and praise please Him and He enjoins them. He will punish a failure to observe them. Of course He is a moral God and enjoins also right conduct, but He requires the ceremonial observances as well. We may approach Him directly, and indeed should do so, but in all humility and not with confidence or merely filial respect. There is especial virtue in having a priest, minister or bishop. These He hears with more satisfaction. He is stern and cold, and except Christ had died for us would have sent us all to hell. Mere mercy is not in His composition. He will weigh our conduct without allowance or consideration for our weaknesses and He will condemn us at once unless we have expressed our belief in the Sacrifice of the Cross and its power to save. In that case He will pardon us, though not otherwise.

In short, He is a stern, hard, pure, unsympathizing monarch, who must be propitiated, appeased and treated with the humblest servility. In all ages men have trembled before Him as before a tyrant, fear has driven out love and the love has been centred upon Christ who, by offering Himself as a sacrifice for us, has satisfied justice and made our salvation possible.

If God be, as Christ represents Him, a loving Father to men, it is sad to see Him represented as a stern, even if just, monarch. If He loves them, as Christ says, His justice will never exclude mercy. The name "Father" is a mockery as applied by men to the King whom Christianity sets before us. Not only does it not describe Him but, if He be such as Christianity says, it would mislead us in every way as to His attitude toward and relationship with us. If God be what theology represents certainly He does not love us. At worst He dislikes us (Jonathan Edwards says that He "hates" us);

at best He regards us with an icy indifference, calmly weighing us and with unfeeling impartiality dealing out our fate, save as the death of His Son may have satisfied Him.

But the Church made its choice long ago and has not changed. The idea of God upon which it insists is that of a King. The idea of Jesus is long since lost.

AUSTRALIA'S CAPITAL A SINGLE TAX CITY

BY WILLIAM EVERETT HICKS

IN 1861 an Australian girl married in California a young American printer, Henry George. Sixty-six years later the Commonwealth of Australia established its national capital, Canberra, on the principles of the Single Tax which Henry George had brought to the attention of the world in his book, "*Progress and Poverty*".

The chief object of that book was to prove the injustice of private ownership of land and the duty of every community to appropriate the rental value of land in lieu of all other forms of taxation. Two great reforms, George argued, would be achieved by this change in taxation. One would be the paying of all governmental expenses by a tax that would not fall upon labor or the products of labor, and the other would be the extinguishment of what he called the curse of idle land through the elimination of land speculation.

On May 9, 1927, the formal opening of the new government building at Canberra took place, and thus was launched the greatest experiment in the Single Tax philosophy yet attempted. Canberra (pronounced with the accent either on the first or the second syllable) is admirably suited to this test as it is a new city built for the government along the lines of Washington, the American capital. It is laid out on a virgin site and the government of Australia plans to make it the most beautiful city on the globe.

The new capital is situated about 80 miles from the coast in New South Wales between Melbourne, Victoria, the capital of the Commonwealth up to this year, and Sydney, the metropolis of New South Wales and the largest city in Australia. The city being constructed virtually out of raw bush land, the government was not confronted by the question of paying huge sums to the landowners for the acreage of the site. The act empowering the

building of the city provided that the Federal territory there should cover 900 miles as against the 100 miles of the site of Washington. The greater part of the 900 square miles was crown land and was taken over by the Commonwealth without cost. The small percentage of land in this area which was in private hands was sold to the government at a price fixed by statute to provide against the inflation of price by private owners as soon as the location was determined on. By this precautionary measure against "boom" prices the government was able to acquire this property at the small price of \$15 an acre. The tremendous increase given to the value of land by the building of the new city is shown by the fact that although the city may be said to be still in an embryonic condition the government is receiving rents amounting to \$4,000 an acre annually for some of this land purchased for \$15 an acre.

The exploitation of the government by land speculators in acquiring the site having been prevented, it was decided to checkmate any efforts that might be made to introduce the element of speculation in land with the growth of the city. To accomplish this object it was voted to put into operation the Single Tax principle of having the increase in land values accrue wholly to the government through the Federal Capital Commission as trustees of the nation. Parliament has decreed that none of the land may be transferred to private ownership.

The primary object of the Single Tax theory of Henry George is to release land held in private ownership in such a way that it will practically revert through taxation to the people. However, in Canberra a different situation exists from that obtaining in countries whose chief cities are already established. Thus, instead of basing the rental values upon prices obtained by private owners through years of buying and selling, the government disposed of sites for building purposes by auctioning off parcels of the land and basing the annual rental values upon the auction prices. All land is turned over for individual use only through leases and these leases are expected to return to the government 5 per cent. of the unimproved value of the land.

Leases for as long a period as 99 years may be obtained and such leaseholders will not have their rents increased during the first 20 years, but after that length of time there will be rental revaluations every ten years. If these revaluations are not frequent enough the people always have the power to change them. Laws also have

been passed to prevent speculation in leases. The idea of leasing instead of selling outright obtains equally in the open country outside the city proper. There farms and grazing terrain are disposed of through leases with all increasing values going to the government.

As far as the development of the city is concerned two objects, it is hoped by the government, will be accomplished by this plan. One will be the consistent expansion of the city along the original lines and the other will be the prevention of arrested growth through high speculative rents. The study by the Australian officials of the effect of private ownership upon the growth of Washington has shown them the danger of subjecting the city to the caprice and moods of land speculation. The commission in charge of Canberra will see to it that no part develops at the expense of another part and that the spreading out of the city takes place in accordance with the original plan.

Only a restricted acreage is thrown open to development at a time and thus the growth of the city is under the absolute control of the authorities entirely uninfluenced by those sectional appeals which are so often made in cities of the United States where speculation in land runs riot. Transit facilities are often given to one part of an American city, not because that district is more in need of them, but because the landed interests there can bring greater pressure to bear in favor of their locality.

As one studies the method by which Australia is setting about the building of its capital city, one is tempted to draw a contrast with the American system of throwing open public lands for settlement as in the cases of the Indian reservations. Under the American plan the Australians would either have sold their Canberra land to private buyers or would have thrown the tract open on a certain day to be seized and staked out as private property by the speediest or the most unscrupulous. But, evidently enlightened by the lamentable results of such clumsy, primitive methods of colonization, the Australian government has adopted this Single Tax system.

One may imagine what would have happened if in any of the big Indian reservation openings in the Western states of America the Canberra principle had been put into operation. Instead of the frenzied rushes of frantic land-grabbers seeking to best their neighbors to desirable locations, the land would have been auctioned off and let only on leaseholds. Then there would have been none of the orgies of cupidity and greed which have made these Indian

land openings the scenes of murder, robbery and scoundrelism of every description. With nothing to gain by the increase in the value of land there would have been no incentives to those deeds of low cunning and fraud which made those "settlements" disgraces to civilization.

Often in those land rushes a man would seize upon a tract and stake it out and before the sun went down would be offered thousands and thousands of dollars for the site because it had been decided that the county court house would be built near it. None of this value having been created by the man who had been able to obtain possession of that site, under the Canberra, or Single Tax, principal the value of which the man put into his pocket would have accrued to the state and thus to all its citizens.

One may understand the difference between the American and the Australian plan of opening land to use by contrasting this Canberra system with what would happen if Central Park, New York City, were opened for residential and business purposes the way the land of the Indian reservations has been thrown open. An announcement from the mayor would give notice that at 12 noon of a certain day a gun would be fired at a certain entrance to the park as a signal for location of site grabbers to make a rush into the park. To keep out those who might try to "beat the gun", the park would probably be surrounded by police or National Guardsmen. Of course there would be restrictions as to how much a man might grab but this limitation would be easily circumvented by the hiring of men as "dummies" to seize sites and turn them over to others. In a few minutes the land of Central Park worth hundreds of millions would be in possession of a few speculators; few, that is, compared with the millions of citizens who previously had owned it as public property.

Not only would the huge values of the park land fall into the laps of the land grabbers, but all the tremendous increase in values which the succeeding years would bring would also accrue to the grabbers of the opening day or their successors. Nothing of the kind could happen under the operation of the Canberra system. The land of Central Park by that method would be auctioned off and held only on leases, the annual tax absorbing the rental value of the land. Thus nobody would profit by being a mere landlord or landholder. None would profit from a location except by putting it to use and obtaining an income from the improvements upon the land.

Through all the years to come the people of New York would still under the lease system own the land formerly used for Central Park and all the augmentation in value would be turned back into the city treasury.

It may well be that the Australians in adopting the Single Tax principle were moved to do so by the experience of Chicago which threw away millions in land values by parting with public lands at a small price. In accordance with the policy of the United States government to foster public education some Western states decades ago received grants of the sixteenth and thirty-sixth square miles of the thirty-six square miles making up a township for the support of the common schools. Now it happened that the sixteenth or school section of the old town of Chicago lay between State, Madison, Halsted and Twelfth streets, a square mile in the heart of the second largest city of America. One might liken it in its locational value to a mile in New York City with Forty-second street and Broadway as the center or in the down town district with the City Hall as the center. Naturally the land values could not fail to be enormous.

The Federal government made that grant of land to supply the municipality with a revenue for the perpetual support of the public schools. Yet with a blindness that one would hardly believe possible in the case of hard-thinking, close-bargaining Western pioneers the city of Chicago sold 138 of the 142 blocks which made up this tract in 1833 for the pitiful sum of \$38, 619. Of the four blocks that were saved from the sale two were retained, not as investments but as sites for school buildings. These school buildings have retired to quieter and cheaper neighborhoods to make way for business buildings yielding a revenue to the school fund.

One of these blocks became one of the most valuable in the city, lying between Dearborn, State, Madison and Monroe streets—the very heart of the “loop” district. On a valuation assessed every ten years the ground rent, at six per cent, 40 years ago was paying the school fund \$82,369. Thus that amount of school revenue was provided without taxation.

In that year (1887) the 138 blocks sold in 1833 were worth \$50,000,000, the additional value having been created by the whole city of Chicago, by the growth and development of that metropolis. Then the revenue from that tract amounted to \$3,000,000 a year, but none of it went to the school fund. It was taken by the heirs of

those who purchased those 138 blocks in 1833, while all the city got out of the original sales price was the interest on \$38,619. The cost in 1887 of the school system of Chicago was about \$1,200,000 and the total cost of the city government about four millions.

If the 138 blocks had not been sold by Chicago but disposed of on the Canberra plan, the revenue in the shape of annual rent would have paid the total cost of the schools nearly three times over and would not have fallen far short of supporting the entire city government without resort to taxation of any kind. But the community-made value of the 138 blocks was taken by private owners while the city had to tax its citizens for the support of the schools.

The state of Nebraska affords another illustration. The Federal government gave to it 2,838,123 acres of land for the support of the schools. Instead of retaining state ownership in the land as the Australians are doing with the 900 square miles making up the Canberra district, from year to year Nebraska sold hundreds of thousands of these acres, thus permitting private owners to profit by the increase in the value of the land caused by the development of the state. Singularly enough the state law prohibited Nebraska from selling any of this land at less than \$7 an acre, but after the value passed that figure the state was allowed to sell. Nobody has ever satisfactorily explained why the state retained the land when it was worth \$7 an acre and why individuals were permitted to buy it after its value passed that sum.

Had Nebraska handled its great gift from the national government in the spirit in which the government of Australia is now controlling Canberra, the original 2,838,124 acres would be returning to the state so large a revenue in annual rentals that the state taxation would be reduced to a minimum. Just as Australia has profited by the experience of American states and cities in relinquishing ownership in public lands, so now communities in the United States may take advantage of the Canberra experiment in the future disposal of great public tracts.

There has been begun in the Everglades district of Florida a reclamation project for draining that huge area, as large as several of the smaller states of the Union. When the work is finished at an estimated expense of more than \$100,000,000 and the land is ready for settlement, it is safe to say that the government will permit the land to be sold outright to settlers or speculators with the land allotted or will permit an opening day rush like that marking the

settlement of an Indian reservation. Either of these methods would fall far short of the Canberra plan in assuring the rights of the people in the land.

When the Everglades project is finished the people of Florida will have the example of Canberra to go by. They cannot say: "Yes, your plan is very good in theory, but the trouble is there is no practical illustration, no actual application of it to guide us. Consequently we shall have to fall back upon the old plan of selling the land, giving up possession of that vast tract forever."

In reply the answer would be conclusive: "There is no reason why the system upon which the Australians' capital city has been laid out cannot be applied to the Everglades. All you have to do is to appoint a body of experts like the Australian Federal Tax Commission, which shall supervise the leasing of the Everglades land to prospective settlers. None of this land should be sold. It should always be held as state property to be cultivated as farm land or used otherwise by the lessee as long as he is willing to pay the value of the land in annual rent. Whatever increase comes to the value of the land will go to the state. In a few years the entire cost of this reclamation project will have been paid for by the rental of the land and afterwards millions will be turned in annually to the state treasury effecting a huge reduction in state taxation."

The matter of speculating in leases can be easily taken care of by a subsidiary law, once the main principle of the state's appropriation of the annual rental value of the reclaimed land is put into the laws. If in the light of the Canberra system the people of Florida sell the reclaimed Everglades land they will display an even greater lack of vision than did the officials of Chicago when in 1833 they sold their birthright for a mes of pottage in disposing of the 138 blocks in the richest part of Chicago.

It has been proposed that the city of New York fill up the East River to provide more land for the growth of the city. If this were done there can be little doubt that the reclaimed terrain would be disposed of in the old way, by sale to private persons. In that case the new land would become the object of the same speculative movements as have marked the development of the metropolis in the years gone by. Every improvement that would be made in the city would enhance the value of the reclaimed land, but, instead of the people of New York sharing in that value as the people of Australia share in the increased value of the land in the Canberra

district, the great value that would attach to the new land on account of the growth of the city would fall into the pockets of the owners of the land, and in the long run the inhabitants of the city, with the exception of the few landholders, would gain nothing by the filling up of the East River. When and if that proposal comes before the city fathers or other authorities for practical action it should be made clear that the law authorizing that filling should carry a provision like that obtaining in Canberra which will prevent the new land from passing into private ownership.

It must not be understood that Australia as a whole is operating under the principle of the Single Tax merely because of the Canberra incident. The government still believes in tariff taxes and taxes on improvements. Until all taxes are wiped out except the tax on ground rent, no state can be regarded as under the operation of the principles laid down by Henry George. But the system applied to the building of Canberra is distinctly the Single Tax in that the increase in land values that will inevitably follow the growth of the city is to be taken by the government.

This experiment is expected by many Australians to demonstrate the practicability and the justice of preventing the unearned increment in land values from falling into private hands, and may suggest to the Australians the importance of applying the principle of land value taxation to all the land of Australia in place of the present cumbersome method that now obtains in the raising of the revenues of the Commonwealth.

MORAL ORIGINS AND THE NUB OF ETHICS

BY BRUCE W. BROTHERSTON

I

IT has often appeared to the present writer that the moral philosophers have dealt too cavalierly with the materials of early human life. Of course none are so well aware as they that the difference between tribal or national standards is a relative matter. They would not, as less well-informed men might, think of basing upon this difference the charge that another people lacked moral consciousness. Yet the suspicion may be justified that the extreme difference between our own ways and the ways of uncivilized men is largely the basis of the doctrine that moral consciousness is absent or merely "in germ" among them. This error, if it exists, is hidden in a well-conceived method. The method presents the nub of ethics as it appears "to the enlightened moral consciousness", and takes this as a criterion in the study of moral origins. The presence or absence of moral consciousness or the degree of its force is measured by the presence or absence or the degree of force in early life of this nub of ethics.¹

It is notorious that the views of moralists differ widely. But as to this nub of ethics there is general agreement. As psychologists and sociologists, moral philosophers may have different ways of accounting for volition and responsibility. But all agree that voluntariness is what gives conduct its ethical quality. And volition is of course individual volition. Hence courses of action for which individuals are responsible are the subject-matter of ethics. But even the casual reader of the customs and beliefs of early men re-

¹Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*, Vol. I, p. 202; Chaps VIII-X, esp. p. 524 f. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Vol II, pp. 135 f, 137, note. McDougal, *Society Psychology*, p. 238 f.

members that any notion of individual responsibility played a very small part among them and he is prepared to hear that moral consciousness is absent or vaguely 'in germ'.

But if he be one who has yielded to the fascination of strange customs and has read farther, he will remember cases of passionate loyalty among savage peoples; of the Greek Menoikeus immolating himself to save his city;² of Oedipus wishing to be exiled to remove the "uncleanness" from Thebes; or of an Indian brave who accepts a forlorn hope to save a contingent of his tribe. One reads the *Libation Bearers* of Aeschylus and finds himself at once in the atmosphere of Central Africa or Polynesia and at the same time in an intense life of moral praise and blame. One wonders whether Aeschylus, immersed as he was in the Chthonic religion of Greek peasants, as nearly primitive as is Central Africa today, has read all this intense moral feeling into the tradition, and has not truly interpreted for us—no doubt omitting many external things that were confused in it—the inwardness of early life. Greek tradition descends from the period of barbarism. Yet the dramatic power of Euripides is achieved while presenting these traditions just as they are, bringing out their human relations in full force of passionate good and evil, passionate praise and blame.

When one is told by the moralists that custom, which is the ethics of early man, was wholly external; as though it were obeyed without any force of inward approval, merely from superstitious and wholly unfounded fear, one feels that something has been overlooked; that there is something at fault in the usual method of studying moral origins. But on the contrary, it may be the case that the Greek dramatists are true interpreters of the traditions of their early ancestors. Doubtless they made analyses of human situations not made by their fathers, as they were not made by the masses of their contemporaries. But their powerful handling of the materials of tradition merely served to bring out the force present in those traditions and in the experience of their creators.

The thesis of this paper is that the materials of early human life have been in this regard wholly misread, because a too radical individualism has misled moral philosophers as to the nub of ethics. It will begin with a study of primitive man's world-view in which it will attempt to make appear the genuine moral consciousness in-

²Cox, *The Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, p. 415. Euripides, *The Phoenician Virgins*, 990 ff.

volved in social or group responsibility; to show why the notion of individual responsibility did not at first enter; and to suggest the part it later played. Next by tracing the development of the concept of moral evil in Greek thought, we will make clear the inextricable relation of individual responsibility to social or group responsibility. Finally by a very brief outline of the development of the concept of the good in Hebrew experience, traced from the primitive world-view to the teachings of Jesus, we will make appear how the religious motive, really the motive of social responsibility, maintained itself as the ground of ethics, carrying individual responsibility with it as an implication, at first obscure and at last fully clear. Hence we will maintain that individual responsibility is not the nub of ethics; that while it is inevitably involved in social responsibility, it can never be clearly and distinctly separated from it. But even while, as in the primitive world-view, it lies within it in a wholly confused way, group responsibility manifests still a genuine and full-powered moral consciousness.

Since Codrington presented the Melanesian conception of *mana* in 1891, there has issued among scholars a tendency to believe in the existence of a preanimistic world-view. The following interpretation of this primitive *Weltanschauung* is offered as that which best synthesises the entire field of facts. It is usually supposed that what seemed most real to early man was the distinct and solid particular thing—human body or natural object. This body or object, through experience of dreams or visions, had come to be “doubled” by an anima or soul. But this view is a preconception on the part of modern students rather than a result of the study of the facts. Such a study shows rather that the thing most real to early man is something he cannot see. It is a reality inward to the world in general as a man’s psychical nature is inward to his body. Indeed it is universal in primitive man’s little world. But however universal, this reality has not been conceived by the abstracting intelligence. It is the immediate issue of his own psychical organization and it has the vivid and persistent reality of spontaneous impulse. It would never occur to early man to doubt its presence in the ritual observances of his people, the awful power of natural storms, or the dread passion of social upheavals. We have here perhaps a fact of foundational significance in the study of human nature. The common sense view of reality has not always been the common sense view of later ages when social atomism has prevailed. It did not

always fasten upon the unit of sense perception. It has always been ingenuous enough, but man's first sense of reality followed the lines of inner rather than of outer perception; and it issued in the conception of a vital, psychic, dynamic reality felt with varying potency through the flow of his life. It found its "substance" not in solidity, nor in individual distinctness, but in so tenuous a matter that it could flow through all solidities like ions. It is the solidary, inward reality of kin, clan, tribe, and natural environment, holding all things together in the real world of his experience. The labored conception of a unity, presupposed in human experience, which issued in modern philosophy to correct the subjectivity of Berkeleyan idealism, was native, though in absolute naivete, in the world-view of primitive man.³

But this immediate reference of man's experience to the universal did not take the arrangement and management of his world out of man's hand. Man's ability to affect his own world and life was conceived to lie in his ability to operate this power through the discovery of systems of interconnections which it followed and a manipulation of these. This brings us at once into the realm of religious and "magic" ritual. It was customary thirty years ago to explain magic as primitive science. Apparently the "power" that operated in magic was taken to be the force of causal relationship or of logical implication. This force was thought to have been felt in a wholly vague way by the primitive mind and to have been confused therefore with the more obvious psychological associations of similarity and continuity. But it becomes evident upon study of the sources that man's power to adapt himself to physical forces and physical things by observation of their causes and implications played no dominant part. It was not that early man was deficient in this power. Its prosaic progress was retarded, and greatly retarded, as was also his sense of individual responsibility, not by logical or moral incapacity, but by his systematic and persistent attempts to operate this more profound and elemental force. This force was primitive man's reality sense. It was the total force of his psychological organization, the impulsive objectification of his own nature. It was still without analysis and hence it was conceived as being both matter and force unbounded. It flashed in with concentrated power upon

³For another view, see Hopkins, *History of Religion*, p 18. But Hopkins takes the view-point that the savage thinks "concretely". He has not sufficiently felt the force of the shape-shifting nature of the savage world, whose constant realities are general solidarities.

any avenue of relationship that might more or less strikingly present itself to a wholly inexperienced intelligence. It presents strong evidence, as against the usual theory of the instincts, of an innate organization of man's total psychical equipment, which shows itself, amidst the confusion of objective events, in a want, of all wants the most specifically human, and one just as persistent and definite as hunger or sex,—the prophetic restlessness, the ethical penchant for social integration, the philosophical desire for universal integration, for unity, the religious want for God. This deepest force in primitive human life was "the Presence" in earliest religious apprehension. It was nearer than breathing and closer than hands or feet. It itself was immediately known. Its consequences alone were occult. It was a wind blowing where it listed. It focussed like storm forced at different times and places, and common men could not tell whence it came or whither it went. So was every one born of this spirit and every place where it focussed its power. But such a man became potent with esoteric knowledge and power to bless or ban. Similar were sacred spots where it was concentrated and localized. It was thus that the later animism and theism were derived from this earlier religion. The plenitude of this theoplasm, concentrated in sacred places, constitutes the vague aniconic deities of pre-theistic times, and that in persons, the semi-divine heroes. It is likely through an interplay of these two that personal gods are conceived.

Hence it is not the case that magic was an early science. It was not the case that the loose associational connections were confused with the more binding relations whose tracing constitutes science. The world-view of early man is not to be apprehended by any such comparison with the modern mind. It is to be apprehended only in the apprehension of their sense of a ubiquitous reality, holding all in unity, ready to strike across any relation however insignificant. Indeed for primitive man to discover any relation whatever,—to have any connection in thought or things become a distinct matter of interest, was to discover a natural avenue of this potency, this real identity under difference. Any sort of similarity, any sort of contiguity is sufficient to become an evidence of reality,—of identity in difference,—lines upon which potent operations of the unseen reality may run. Thus while this is ubiquitous, universal, it is present in all sorts of changing qualities and degrees,—a changing pattern of utmost intricacy, as it follows the lines of these connections

which intrench upon each other because vaguely observed and carried beyond their proper scope.

Now the significant matter in primitive man's world-view is just this continuity of the real. At every turn of the data one is struck with early man's feeling of solidarity. There is evidence on every side of a sense of real connections binding apparently distinct things and events. The contagion of "uncleanness" and of sacredness, closely connected, the inner bond of kinship acquired by birth or by partaking of the blood of the kin, or even of common food, these connections,—these undercurrents of reality all referring to the same underlying theoplasm, dominate the life of early man. They are the inner power for which custom merely fixes the lines of operation. Jevons pointed out long ago that the contagion of taboo is not conceived through an error but is an *a priori* principle.⁴ Equally so is the bond of kinship and the force of curses and blessings. They are all forms of the same thing. They are the sanctions of custom and the source of its authority and they give it its *a priori* aspect.

This obsession of solidarity, which found real connections in every chance relation, militated against any proper conception of the relations of individuals and particulars. It is exceedingly important to notice this obverse side of early man's world-view. The world of particulars is a world of lesser reality capable of all kinds of metamorphoses. Its changes proceed upon connections inwardly felt. Hence all sorts of real relationships and all sorts of merging are possible. A man and a crow may perfectly well be of the same kin, and the rain and the hail may perfectly well be in the same class as the crow and the man.⁵ Particular things and persons may shape-shift indefinitely—from old woman to beautiful maiden, or to serpent, or to werewolf. The identity of such forms is an inward matter discovered on traditional lines. The individual is merged in his kin and in his environment. There is a continuity in which each individual and each particular has significance according as he or it is the locus of a greater or lesser concentration of the continuous reality of the universe. Always submerging the individual and the particular and constituting all that is real in any person or thing is a superrealm from which the tribal custom gets its whole force and the lines of whose operation it marks. It is a cosmic power. To call it a transhuman reality were to make a distinction between humanity

⁴Introduction to the *History of Religion*, p. 88.

⁵See Durkheim. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, p. 141 ff.

and the world which early man never made. It is a hyperrealm, including all particulars and constituting a cosmic unity solidary with the central current of human impulse and emotion. A fluidity of perception following lines of a continuity not conceived intellectually but arrived at upon the basis of impulse and emotion characterized the world-view of early man. The universal is the real. The particular is appearance.

We are now in a position to understand primitive man's conception of good and evil. They had one source together in the same reality and the same cosmic power. The difference between them belongs to the realm of relations among individual and particular persons and things. The theoplasm focusses in advantageous and in disadvantageous combinations of particular things. It may follow lines of beneficence to the kin, or it may break out in disaster. But this real Presence is one. It is beyond good and evil, which lie in the connections it finds to take, connections which man himself may determine. *Sacer* means both sacred and polluted, and $\alpha\gamma$ is the root from which derive both $\alpha\gamma\omega\varsigma$ pollution and $\alpha\gamma\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$ holy. The same power operates for blessing or for cursing, for good or for evil according to outer forms that may be manipulated by enemy or friend.

From the beginning men believed that if the group strictly followed the customs, particularly observing the rites and offsetting the magic of enemies, reality would operate in all beneficence. If not, any evil might fall. The lines men open or leave open toward good or toward evil are the lines the hidden force takes. It lies with men—with all men in following the customs—but especially with the directors of the ritual, to open good or evil ways for sacred power. Because the Tao of man in China does not implicitly imitate the Tao of heaven, the forces of the universe operate for evil to mankind. The Rita in India is at once the ritual and the order of nature and it is some breach in the former that brings disturbance in the latter. In Greek life the Real Presence has early been divided up into a pantheon of distinctly personal gods and thus particularity and evil with it had been carried back into the realm of the real. The early thinkers were baffled by this escapeless fusion of good and evil among the gods. The philosophers repudiated the gods altogether, excluded impulse and emotion in which the gods had their origin, and made the quest for reality a noetic pursuit. The dramatists were unwilling to go so far. It remained a baffling

problem to them. It was perhaps with this problem that the Bacchae of Euripides was intended to deal. It presents the real presence of deity as, on the one hand, poetic inspiration and noble social passion and, on the other, as mad intoxication and the frenzy of social chaos. Both issue from deity, but according to the current of man's life. Upon the action of Pentheus, the locus of social authority, depends which shall prevail. Repeatedly he is adjured,—by the priest, Teresius, by Cadman, and finally by the God, himself: "All may yet be well". Euripides seems here to reflect the idea that good and evil issue from one reality which takes different direction and quality according to the trend men give the social relations they control. If so he has returned with clear concepts to what is essentially the attitude of the earliest human traditions.

The first traceable human situation had its passion for good and against evil, its criterion for judging them and its methods for escaping the one and achieving the other. In total confusion of particular and individual relations a normal moral consciousness was working. As we have suggested, it was very force of moral consciousness which prevented an earlier analysis of relations between particulars in both the moral and the natural realms.

Let us see what was the extent of this confusion in the moral sphere. In that "uncleanness" which arises out of sinister focussings, sinister courses of the common reality all the different aspects of evil are present without distinction. We can separate its several elements. First, natural evils which fall upon men out of unforeseen operations of natural laws. Second, evils which men enact but without intent, which if intended would be genuine moral evil such as the "sin" of Oedipus. Third, there are evils which the immediate agent could not avoid but which common sense persists in calling moral evil—deeds wrought under passion that came upon the agent out of larger circles of evil in which he was involved. Fourth, the moral evil of the Aristotelian—what the individual could have avoided. These distinct matters are mingled together in utmost confusion. Guilt and punishment, accident and design, sin and misfortune lie undistinguished in a common ground of evil, to which primitive man referred the whole force of his moral consciousness. Profound moral loathing attached to any of its focussings,—to the inner thought or to the outer object or act alike. Indians performing their purificatory rites, must refrain from thoughts of strife. The inner thought is "unclean" in precisely the same way as the outer

deed. There is no lack of inwardness, but a failure to distinguish inward and outward. Again the individual's voluntary misdeed is "unclean" just as the passionate or accidental evil in which he is involved. There is no absence nor weakness of moral consciousness; but rather the solidarity of the whole field of evil as of good is so powerfully felt that moral feelings rightly attached only to certain aspects of evil are indistinguishably attached to all.

With this in mind it is not difficult to understand why scholars have thought that among early men there has been no conception of moral evil at all, or one only "implicit" or "in germ", and that custom which prescribes the individual's conduct was a matter of merely external rules sanctioned by superstitious fears. It is because the individual plays so slight a part in the world-view of early men, whereas modern ethical thought is centered in the individual. The enlightened moral consciousness lays all emphasis upon the immediate *agent* and thereby does him vast injustice. The savage mind was intent only on discovering the *locus* upon which a generalized moral evil had centered its baneful force. This is the point: it is the locus of a superparticular evil they are intent upon, rather than the agent of a particular deed. The agent is passed over except in case he is also the locus. Upon that locus the guilt, the sin, has fallen with its fluid power that can flow on any connection infecting a whole city and causing flood and earthquake and war. It can even pass its contagion by the relations of time, making days unclean. It is this which renders resentment at real agents strangely slight in savage life. Resentment of a violent color fastens rather on particular loci of evil. A man to whom an accident occurs may be loathed, or a stone, or a beast. It is not the agent but the locus of moral evil that is important to early man.

Here is the key to the understanding of primitive ethics. Early man was concerned with the control of evil conceived as a social and indeed as a cosmic unity and is not concerned with the individual as such. The social and cosmic falling of evil prevent him from perceiving the true relation of the individual to evil. The control of evil is a restoration of balance in the hyperrealm, making negative sacredness to flow again in positive channels. The sinister focus must be localized. The centre of danger must be dealt with. Whether the locus of the loathed evil be another or oneself it must be removed. It is significant that the agent of evil first reprobated *as agent* is the magician who for private ends can disturb the balance

of the hyperrealm and centre its forces for ill on man or group. He is the first agent of moral evil. Every other sinner is merely a locus. And the man of social praise is the man who can manipulate the theoplasm for social good. The early priest is usually also chief. A strong moral life is seen here in progress but in utmost confusion of its elements.

To be sure the feeling of the significance of agency enters very early under the motive of justice to the individual, while yet the all-important control of superindividual evil in society is kept secure. Agency often seems to be taken as a sign that the individual thing or person is truly the locus of a superindividual evil and of how profound an evil. In English law, for instance, a cart or other object was "deodand", given to God, if it fell on a man when it was said "*movere ad mortem*", but not if the man fell upon it.⁶ The Hebrew law established cities of refuge for the accidental slayer. It is not that he is not a locus of the evil, nor that he ceases to be if he reach his refuge. He must remain there, an exile until the death of the high priest, when a new regime renders him no longer danger-central. A sense of justice to the individual is here in process of excluding adventitious elements from the primitive view of the social control of evil. And this process is not by any means complete. Men who are very largely mere loci of vast social evils and only slightly agents, having been born into involvement in these evils, are sacrificed to justice, still conceived by the "legal mind" as an occult force to be balanced or deity to be appeased. Yet today the proved agent of a crime, especially if he be a minor, is recognized to be the locus of superindividual evil, as well as the agent of particular deeds, and is sentenced to social training rather than to a balancing retribution.

In a second part of this paper, the inextricable relation of individual responsibility to social or group responsibility will be clearly illustrated by tracing the development of the concept of moral evil in Greek thought. Then by tracing, in Hebrew history, the development of the opposite conception—that of the good—it will be made to appear how, from the primitive world-view to Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God, the religious motive—really the motive of social responsibility—maintained itself as the ground of ethics, carrying individual responsibility with it as an implication, at first obscurely, at last quite clearly.

⁶Westermarck, *Op. Cit.*, Vol. I, p. 264.

THE LATER MINISTRY OF SAKYAMUNI

BY HOWARD W. OUTERBRIDGE

HERE are a large number of events in the life of Sakyamuni, which are related in the canonical works and other places, which we must consider, briefly at least. We cannot concern ourselves with the large amount of material which tells of the Rules of the Order, and the various teachings on different subjects, given by the Master, for these would take us too far afield. The purpose of this chapter is rather to outline the principle types of experience which were more or less common to the forty-five years of his active work. These may be summarized under three heads, (1) Living Conditions, and Difficulties. (2) Journeys. (3) The relationship of the Teacher with his Disciples.

(1) *Living Conditions and Difficulties.* While extreme asceticism as such was definitely renounced as a way of life by Sakyamuni before his enlightenment, the adoption of the mendicant garb and the begging bowl was at least a partial recognition of its value. The Bhikkus definitely accepted a life of celibacy and seclusion from ordinary society and its interests. It does not appear that the Order suffered greatly from under-nourishment or starvation. They were frequently invited to feasts, and seem to have been well received by those to whom they appealed for food. They were looked upon as "holy men" but not as ascetics in the stricter sense.¹ On the other hand strict rules were drawn up against immorality, and any Bhikku who had intercourse with a woman was expelled from the Order. On one occasion we are told, Sakyamuni was offered a young woman by her father, but he at once rejects the offer in most contemptuous terms.

The general living conditions of the Order were improved grad-

¹*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 172.

²*Sacred Books of the East*, X (ii), 158-62.

ually year by year. The place of abode was frequently changed to suit the varying needs of the Indian climate, and the exigencies of the work of preaching. Regulation in regard to food, dress, sanitation, medicines, and a large variety of other subjects related to ordinary daily life, are given in the Mahavagga and the Kullavagga, and constitute quite a proportion of the available literature of the Canon. These accounts make it possible for us to picture the rapid growth of the band of disciples, making necessary the adaptation of certain general principles of life in their growing and diversified needs. Not infrequently a rule is given, and almost immediately withdrawn. The general purpose however seems to be to maintain an order of life, which on the one hand, does not concentrate thought on the flesh by an attempt to mortify it, and on the other does not encourage the development of desire by self-indulgence.

We must not gather, however, that the life of the Order was entirely one of comfortable ease and harmony. Not a few difficulties were encountered. Some were from without; others arose within. Criticism of the Order from those outside was not infrequent. Celibacy was criticized as causing fathers to beget no sons, and wives to become widows, and families to become extinct.³ The somewhat crude manners of the disciples also came in for criticism. They were said to be improperly dressed, and to be indecent and even gluttonous in their manner of requesting and eating food.⁴ Among the Bhikkus themselves frequent disharmonies arose. On one occasion, when the quarrelling grew too intense and out of hand, the Blessed One moved and "dwelt in Parikeyakka, in the Rakkhita Grove, at the foot of the Bhaddasala tree", where he thus meditates to himself. "Formerly I did not live at ease, being troubled by these litigious, contentious disputations Bhikkus of Kosambi, the constant raisers of questions before the Samgha. But now, being alone and without a companion, I live pleasantly and at ease, remote from these litigious, contentions, quarrelsome, disputations Bhikkus of Kosambi, the constant raisers of questions before the Samgha."⁵ This period of solitude did not last for long; but the conditions which made it necessary for the ever-patient Sakya to leave his company of Bhikkus for a period of rest, must have been acute indeed. It is evident that some of the dissensions were very deep-

³*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 150.

⁴*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 152, also XX, 250.

⁵*Sacred Books of the East*, 312, also XX, 238, XIII, 349.

seated indeed. Even before his death, a Judas appears, as we shall see later. Almost immediately after, there is a schism among his followers, resulting in the breaking up of the Order into groups, united only by their common loyalty to the great Founder. The attitude which Sakyamuni shows to these increasing discords is one of unchanging patience. Only on this one occasion does he find it necessary to leave his little company of disciples, for a breathing space alone.

On several occasions Sakyamuni was exposed to very real personal danger, due to the treachery of his cousin Devadatta, who from youth had been his evil genius. Toward the close of the Buddha's life, Devadatta made definite plans to kill him, and take from him the control of the Order. These stories are told not only in the extra-canonical works⁶ but in the *Kullavagga* as well⁷ and may therefore be considered as having at least some basis in history. Devadatta, who is not only his cousin, but the son of another Rajah, was even in childhood a rival and competitor of the young Prince, as we have seen. He later joins the Order, and by an apparent change of heart, merits the good will of a large number of people, and the praises of the Blessed One himself.⁸ Toward the close of Sakyamuni's life, Devadatta seeks to displace him. First, he tries guile, suggesting that the Blessed One is old and had better retire in his favor. Later when this method is unsuccessful, he conspires with another Prince, the son of King Bimbimsara,—Agatasattu, by name,—to kill him. The agreement is that Agatasattu is to kill his own father with a dagger, while Devadatta is to kill the Buddha. Later they will join forces, Agatasattu as King, and Devadatta as head of the Buddhist Order. Agatasattu is caught red-handed and confesses it is Devadatta that has led him to do the act. His father, King Bimbisara, then retires in favor of his son, and allows him to become King. Devadatta appears again, requesting the services of sixteen of Agatasattu's men, who are to be stationed on the four paths which the Buddha may possibly travel,—four on each path,—in order to kill him. These men are converted however on the appearance of the Blessed One, and the plot is rendered futile. Devadatta, finding his efforts balked again, climbs to the top of the mountain beneath which the Buddha is resting, and hurls down a

⁶Fo Sho, *Sacred Books of the East*, XIX, 246-9; also King Milinda, *Sacred Books of the East*, XXXV, 290-300.

⁷*Sacred Books of the East*, XX, 238-65.

⁸*Ibid.*, XX, 240.

rock to crush him. But again he is saved; two mountain peaks coming together stop the descent of the rock, only a splinter of which strikes his foot and causes it to bleed. Still another attempt is made by Devadatta, who arranges with the keepers of a fierce elephant to loosen him as the Samana (Sakyamuni) is coming down the carriage road. The result is that while the Bhikkus are terrified and run away, Sakya, with wonderful self-control is able to quiet the rage of the elephant. "Touch not, O elephant, the elephant of men; for sad, O elephant is such attack; for no bliss is there, O elephant, when he has passed from hence, for him who strikes the elephant of men." The elephant is "touched by his sense of love" and with his trunk takes up the dust from the feet of the Blessed One, and sprinkles it upon his head; he thereafter becomes tame, thus greatly increasing the good reputation of the Samana, while that of Devadatta suffers proportionately.⁹ Devadatta later leaves the Order, taking with him the five hundred Bhikkus of Vesali, and endeavours to found a rival Order. Two of Buddha's chief supporters however go with them, and await an opportunity to make a counter-stroke. Later in the evening, when Devadatta is tired, one of them preaches to the five-hundred, so effectively that they repent of their schism, and return to their former Master.

(2) *The Journeys.* It is a most difficult task to try to follow the travels of the great Teacher and his Bhikkus during the 45 years between the enlightenment and his death. Accounts are meagre, and there is no attempt whatever at chronology. Sometimes the transition is made from one place to another without any mention of a journey, which must have intervened. At other times the fact of his being in one place is stated several times, leaving the reader uncertain whether it is the same or different occasions that is meant. A perusal of the Mahavagga and Kullavagga will give one a fair idea of the general method of itinerary which he followed. There seem to be two distinct periods which we can notice, one coming before and the second after the adoption of a regular retirement during the rainy season.

The enlightenment took place at Uruvela, on the banks of the Nerangara¹⁰ river. The place of meditation is changed from one tree to another, several times. It is scarcely likely that these changes

⁹These stories of the mountain and the elephant, while impossible if understood literally, illustrate the traditional belief in the power of the Buddha over nature and wild animals.

¹⁰The modern Phalgu.

represent any very extensive journey. The first real change of place is when he goes to the city of Benares, where he preaches his famous sermon. This city, which was about 100 miles from his native town of Kapilavastu, is the destination of many of his later journeys. The Deer Park of this city seems to have been the headquarters for his disciples whenever they visited Benares.

The next journey undertaken by the growing band is back again to Uruvela, where a series of wonders takes place. A short stay at Gayasisa, and the little company go on to Ragagaha, about 100 miles S. W. of Benares, and a place which figures very conspicuously in the later history of Buddhism. Just how long they remained here it is difficult to tell, though the stay was apparently a protracted one. The place is frequently revisited during later years, though probably not for so long. On this first visit they remain through the rainy season, and probably for at least one year,—possibly longer.¹¹ At times he and his band lived up on one of the mountains near-by known as the Vulture's Peak, and here some of the important scenes of his later life took place.¹² At other times, and probably most frequently they made their place of refuge a park below the mountain.

When this somewhat extended period is completed, he goes to his home town of Kapilavastu, and thence to Savatthi, where he lived in the Anathapindikā Grove. Another journey to Ragagaha, then to Kēdanavattu and back again to Ragagaha completes the journeyings,—more or less haphazard,—of this earlier period. During this last stay in Ragagaha the question of a residence during the rainy season becomes a real problem. The desirability is expressed of retreating during this trying period, rather than continuing to travel throughout the whole year. The reasons given are not entirely conclusive perhaps. The story is that "the people" were angry because the Bhikkus in their journeys during the rainy season crushed the green herbs, and destroyed many forms of animal life.¹³ It may not have been entirely from such altruistic motives that the decision was reached, though solicitude for animal life was quite to be expected. At any rate they decided to retire, and one of the upasaka, or lay disciples build for them a vihāra, in the city of Savatthi, in which they might take refuge.

¹¹*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 298.

¹²This is also the place where the late Mahayana scriptures are supposed to have been taught.

¹³*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 298.

From this time on, the return to Savatthi is frequently mentioned. We cannot be sure whether each mention of a journey thither represents one of the consecutive rainy seasons or not. It is altogether possible that some years are not mentioned. Again, in several instances, Savatthi is mentioned several times, with no story of journeys elsewhere intervening. Do these represent the same stay, or events of several visits? We cannot tell. If we take each mention of Savatthi after journeys to other places, as indicating a retreat during the rainy season, and at the same time understand that when mentioned several times together the same sojourn, during one season is intended, we will have a period of eleven years covered, as follows:

1. Savatthi, Ragagaha, Benares, Rhaddiya.
2. Savatthi, Ragagaha,
3. Savatthi, Ragagaha, Benares, Andhakaomda, Ragagaha, Pat-aligama, Kotogama, Natika, Vesali, Apana, Kusinara, Atuma,
4. Savatthi, Ragagaha, Bhakkina giri, Vesali, Benares,
5. Savatthi, Kampa, Kosambi, Balaka, Eastern Bambu Park, Parileyyaka,
6. Savatti, Kosomba,
7. Savatthi, (mentioned four times) Ragagaha (twice) Vesali, Bhagga,
8. Savatthi, Ragagaha, Vesali.
9. Savatthi, Avali, Ragagaha, Anupiya, Kosambi, Ragagaha.
10. Savatthi, (mentioned twice) Kapilavastu, Vesali,
11. Savatthi, end of Kullavagga record.

This list at best covers only a period of from eleven to fifteen years, however. What of the journeys of the other twenty or thirty years? There are three possibilities of explaining away the problem. First, we may think of the adoption of the retreat for the rainy season as coming later in his life, spreading the early part of the Mahavagga over a long period. Second, we might think of the Kullavagga record as ending a long time before his death,¹⁴— and no account of the intervening period, between the end of Book X of the Kullavagga and the beginning of the Parinibbana Sutta. Third, it is possible that none of the records cover at all completely the periods with which they deal; we must then imagine the list which

¹⁴This is not the end of the Kullavagga however. Books 11 and 12 give the accounts of the Council's after Sakyamuni's death.

we have drawn up as covering a much longer period than it suggests, with probably many journeys entirely dropped out.

The one fact which is evident from the records is that we cannot be dogmatic concerning dates. We have no attempt at a chronological scheme for these years, in any of the records. The subject was of no interest to them whatever. As Rhys Davids says, "The dwellers in the valley of the Ganges for many generations after Gotama's death were a happy people, who had no need of dates."¹⁵ Their life was a very free one. A robe or two, a begging bowl and perhaps a staff was all the baggage they needed. Except for the rainy season, a park or grove was a sufficient shelter. If a storm arose there were friendly caves and sheds where they might take refuge. And while there is evidence that the band lived in comfortable quarters for part of the year, probably a good deal of their time was spent out of doors in some park, or by the roadside as many do in India today.

(3) *His relations with his Disciples.* There is place for only a very casual treatment of this question, but there are a few outstanding facts which ought to be mentioned.

(a) Requirements for admission into the Samgha or Order were at first quite loose, but were made more stringent as time went on. The whole of the first Khandhaka of the Mahavagga, covering 165 pages in the English translation is devoted to the question of "Admission to the Order of Bhikkus"¹⁶ Some of the more important elements we have considered in a previous chapter. The best summary of the rules for admission as they later took form, is probably that found in the Sabhīyasutta, where a probation of four months and certain other formalities are required.¹⁷ (b) The admission of women as Bhikkuni or nuns was a conclusion arrived at only after some hesitancy, and at the earnest request of Ananda, his favorite disciple.¹⁸ Even then the concession was granted on account of the pitiful appeal of Gotami, his foster-mother. She stood outside the porch, with swollen feet, dust covered and weeping. The heart of Ananda is moved and he is finally able to persuade the Blessed One that she should be admitted.¹⁹ The permission granted her was gradually extended to others. The tenth Khandhaka of the Kūla-

¹⁵*Sacred Books of the East*, page xlv, Introduction.

¹⁶*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 73-238.

¹⁷*Sacred Books of the East*, X (ii) 94; XI, 109; XIII, 188.

¹⁸They had been admitted as lay disciples before. See Ch. VIII

¹⁹*Sacred Books of the East*, XX, 320.

vagga is concerned particularly with the problems which grew out of this situation, and a code of special regulations were drawn up for them.²⁰ Buddhaghosha reminds us that the Bhikkuni or women disciples were allowed to live only in villages, and that some of the modifications of discipline were due to that fact.²¹

(c) *The Position of Disciples.* Sakyamuni seems to have tried to invest the position of the disciple with as much reverence and honor as possible. The Sangha or Order was and has always been one of the three great Buddhist treasures. Doubt or lack of faith in the Sangha is a sign of spiritual barrenness,²² but faith is the possession of the mirror of truth.²³

During his lifetime Sakya seems to have exercised a rather imperious and arbitrary authority over his disciples. Later non-canonical scriptures describe him as having a parental relationship to the Order, and an authority over it.²⁴ On the other hand however he foretold for them an independent authority after his death. Each man must work out his own salvation for himself. For even the Buddha is not the source of their dependence.²⁵ Each is to be independent, even to the extent of abolishing all the lesser and minor precepts, if they saw fit.²⁶

(d) Ananda, the beloved disciple of Sakyamuni deserves special mention. He is one of those characters of history who find their chief happiness in being present with and serving a great master. He was not one of the first to join, but came in with a group of Sakvans, including Upali the barber²⁷ and Devadatta,—the cousin of Sakyamuni, and his evil genius.²⁸ It was not long however before Ananda came to have a very special relationship with his master. He is frequently pictured as the spokesman of the disciples in their interviews with the Blessed One,²⁹ and is addressed by him as the representative of the group.³⁰ It is he who intercedes for the Bhikkuni, and who is the constant attendant upon his master during

²⁰*Ibid.*, 343, 352.

²¹*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 256 note.

²²*Sacred Books of the East*, XI, 224, 228.

²³*Ibid.*, 26.

²⁴*Sacred Books of the East*, XXXV, 150; XXXVI, 51-56.

²⁵*Sacred Books of the East*, XI, 36-9.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 112

²⁷This is evidently a different Upali from the child who cried at daybreak, as related above; though he was also a Sakyan.

²⁸*Sacred Books of the East*, XX, 228-33, also XIX, 226. The story of how he was chosen for his position is told in the Teragatha CCLX.

²⁹*Sacred Books of the East*, XIII, 202-6; XVII, 87; XX, 299.

³⁰XVII, 36, 41, 43, 69, 118, 191, etc., etc.

his last hours.³¹ Though he is not an Arhat at the time of his master's death, he is chosen as one of the representatives at the first Council of Ragagaha, and is thereupon given Arhatship.³²

The later non-canonical scriptures further glorify Ananda. He is represented as the only one who remains at the side of the Buddha when he is attacked by the elephant.³³ He remembers his own previous births, and the Buddhas of the past.³⁴ He is taught by the Buddha concerning the western Paradise and the great vow of Amida.³⁵ These fictitious legends add nothing however to the real glory which he attained, as being one of the greatest historical examples of loyalty and devotion and the chief confidant and support of one of the world's greatest men.

³¹*Sacred Books of the East*, XI, Mahaparinibbana Sutta. See next chapter.

³²*Sacred Books of the East*, XX, 373-9.

³³*Sacred Books of the East*, XIX, 247; XXXV, 297-300.

³⁴XXXV, 122.

³⁵XLIX, (ii) 168-201.

THE BURIAL OF JESUS

BY WM. WEBER

TRADITION claims John, the disciple whom Jesus loved, as author of the Fourth Gospel. That is in all probability true, but does not guarantee the genuineness of every statement found in the present text. The original memoirs of John may have been enlarged by later additions, derived from post-apostolic sources. At the same time, important parts of the Johannine booklet may have been lost before the present Gospel was composed.

The account of the burial of Jesus, John xix. 31-37, begins: *The Jews . . . asked of Pilate that their legs be broken, and that they might be taken away. The soldiers therefore came and broke their legs. . . .* The statement is short and offers apparently no difficulty. *The Jews* who call upon the Roman governor are evidently the mortal enemies of Jesus who had brought about his ignominious death. But we have to bear in mind that their number was very small. Our Gospel calls them in other places: *The chief priests and The Pharisees*. The First Gospel speaks of *The chief priests and the elders of the people*, Mark and Luke of *the chief priests and the scribes*. The meaning is the same in all three cases. The chief priests were a small group of priests, entitled by birth to fill the position of high priest. The Pharisees, scribes, or elders of the people were the famous rabbis who, few in number, interpreted the law of Moses in the temple.

While that is perfectly clear, it is difficult or rather impossible to understand why they should be called *the Jews*. The supposed author was a Jew himself, just as Jesus and all his followers. His friends outnumbered indeed by far his enemies. But the latter, not the Jewish people, met the ear of Pilate. Under these circumstances, John could never have called the few men who brought about the death of Jesus *the Jews*. He would have employed the

term *the chief Priests and the Pharisees* just as does John vii. 32, 45 and xi 47, 57.

We cannot suppose John to have renounced in his later life his Jewish nationality and religion. For Jesus had instructed all his personal disciples, including John:

"Go not in any way of the Gentiles and enter not into any city of the Samaritans; but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel!" (Matthew x. 5 f, comp. vii. 6 and Galatians ii. 12 ff.)

The word *Jews* in our passage points clearly to a Gentile Christian writer who, ignorant of the true history of Jesus, had come to regard with all his contemporaries the entire Jewish nation as directly responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. That is still the popular idea. For even to-day, one may hear a Jew called *Christ killer*. Therefore, we have to replace the word *Jews* by the original Johannine expression *the chief priests and the Pharisees*. The change was made probably after the year 150 to judge by Justin Martyr's Dialogue with Trypho.

There are two more statements in verse 31 which owe their uncalled for presence in the text to ignorant Gentile commentators. They attempted to explain why the bodies of the men on the cross were taken down before nightfall, something the Romans never did outside of Palestine. The first clause reads: *because it was the preparation, that the bodies should not remain on the cross upon the Sabbath*. But no Jewish law forbids bodies of evildoers to hang upon the cross during the Sabbath. That means the Jews would not have become excited if the Romans had crucified a criminal on that day. The second commentator must have been aware of that fact. He added therefore: *for the day of that Sabbath was a high day*. According to him, a few Sabbath-days, including that of the Passover week, were too holy to permit criminals to be executed on them:

The true solution of the difficulty is offered by the law found in Deuteronomy xxi. 22 f:

And if a man have committed a sin worthy of death, and he be put to death and thou hang him on a tree; *his body shall not remain all night on the tree; but thou shalt surely bury him the same day*. For he that is hanged is accursed of God. That thou defile not the land which Jahveh thy God giveth thee for an inheritance.

This law is illustrated in Joshua viii 29, x. 26 f, etc. There

we learn how Joshua treated the king of Ai and, later on, the kings of Jerusalem, Hebron, Jarmuth, Lachish, and Eglon. The Israelites did not crucify living persons, but hanged only corpses of evildoers on a cross. That was done to render them accursed of God. But the bodies had to be taken down and interred the same day before the sun set. Otherwise the land of Israel would have been defiled.

The Romans crucified only living people, but left their bodies on the cross until nothing but the bones remained. These dropped by and by to the ground at the foot of the cross and produced in course of time a calvary, or golgotha.

These facts render it clear why the chief priests and rabbis, accompanied in all probability by an orator, that is an interpreter, (cp. Acts xxiv. 1) went in the afternoon to Pilate with the request, or petition of having the legs of the crucified men broken and their bodies removed. That implied of course, a burial similar to that of the five kings of Josh. x. 27. As executions at Jerusalem were of frequent occurrence, there was very likely in the immediate neighborhood of Golgotha some kind of underground charnel-house into which the crushed bodies were thrown.

The Roman governors of Palestine modified apparently in times of peace the Roman way of crucifying so as to have it agree as much as possible with the ancient law of the Jews. But they seem to have insisted on being asked each time by the religious representatives of the Jewish nation. The breaking of the legs and interring of the remains was always a special favor. Whenever the Roman governors were dissatisfied with the behavior of the Jews, the corpses remained on the cross just as in any other imperial province.

Therefore, when the chief priests and the rabbis asked Pilate to break the legs and remove the bodies of the crucified men, they did not suggest a new way of handling such criminals but referred simply to a long established practice.

Every Palestinian reader of the short account of John understood what was done with the body of Jesus. Both that centurion and the four soldiers who had charge of the execution, knew what to do when they received the order of Pilate. Nor would they change in any way their regular procedure. Whether the men on the cross were dead or still living, the soldiers would crush their legs before they threw the remains into the charnel-house.

German scholars (Preuschen, *Handwörterbuch zum Neuen*

Testament) translate the Greek verb at the end of verse 31 *to take down*, namely from the cross. The American Revised Version, however, renders it *to take away*. That is without doubt the proper translation. For the original meaning of the Greek verb is *to take up, to raise, to lift* and then *to lift and take away, to remove*. (Liddell & Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*). That refers, of course, to the removal of the crushed bodies.

The *taking down from the cross* had to precede as a matter of fact the breaking of the legs. The cross and especially the cross-bar, or patibulum did not offer resistance enough to permit the breaking of the bones, while the corpses were still hanging there. The soldiers had first to loosen the hands and, when necessary the feet, so that the body would drop to the ground. Then they would hit the legs and thighs with heavy hammers until they were beaten into pulp. The idea was not only to make sure of the death of the criminals, but also to disfigure them as much as possible. Even in Hades or Sheol their shades should announce them as accursed of God.

Thus the original Johannine text is very short and reads: *The chief priests and the Pharisees asked of Pilate that their legs might be broken and that they might be taken away. The soldiers therefore came and brake their legs and took them away.* Modern readers may consider that as too short. But it is without doubt all a Jewish eye-witness had to tell his own people; and even Gentiles, at least such as had been in Palestine, understood perfectly the meaning of those words.

The Romans believed in a reign of terror and even in times of peace transgressors of the law were nailed to the cross everywhere in large numbers. "In Judae the punishment was frequently used. Thus Varo crucifid 2000 rioters after the death of Herod the Great. Under Claudius and Nero various governors, Tiberius Alexander, Quadratus, Felix, Florus, crucified robbers and rioters of political and religious character, including two sons of Judas Galilaeus, and even respectable citizens and Roman knights. Titus crucified so many after the destruction of Jerusalem that there was neither wood for the crosses nor place to set them up. Especially under Tiberius, who held that simple death was escape, was this method of punishment frequent." (*Dict. of the Bible*, Vol. I, p. 528.)

The term "the Jews" at the beginning of John xix. 31 has been shown to belong to a Gentile Christian. He must have changed

the original text at a comparatively late date. For as long as Jewish Christians were connected with the Gentile churches as seems to have been the rule at least with the converts of Paul, they would have protested against the wanton change. The same man has added also verse 32b-37. His intention was to remove what, according to Paul, the Gentiles regarded as *the foolishness* of the death of Jesus. (1 Cor. i. 33.) They could not think of any religious leader, except as a God. But a God could not be crucified or harmed by men. We are fortunately enabled to determine at what date that spurious passage was joined to the writings of John.

Verse 32b-37, beginning *of the first and of the second that was crucified with him* presents an entirely new account of the burial of Jesus. The soldiers, instead of following their routine, pierce only the side of Jesus with a spear and that so carefully as not to break a single bone. They did not act as hardened soldiers, but like men in a trance, forced by some supernatural power to fulfill, against their will and without their knowledge, certain false Old Testament prophecies concerning the Messiah.

These are quoted in verse 36 and 37 respectively. The first reads: *A bone of him shall not be broken.* The Bible does not contain such a prophecy. Our writer has invented it, borrowing the words from Numbers ix. 12. There we read: *They shall leave none of it until the morning nor break a bone thereof.* The noun to which *of it* and *thereof* refer is the Passover lamb. Exodus xii. 46 presents a parallel reading. *In one house shall it be eaten. Thou shalt not carry forth ought of the flesh abroad out of the house; neither shall ye break a bone thereof.*

In the first place, each of these two statements is nothing more nor less than a commandment. Besides, the breaking of the bones is forbidden, not when the lamb was killed, but after it had been eaten. The lambs were prepared at the temple during the afternoon of the 14th of Nisan. They were eaten the next night on the 15th of Nisan. The explanation of the commandment Num. ix. 12 and Ex. xii. 46 is easily given. The Jews just like other people were used to break the bones in order to get the marrow when they had meat. But that was expressly forbidden when they ate the Passover lamb. For that was a religious, not an every day meal. It was only the absolute ignorance of the religious customs of the Jews among the Gentiles which permitted the Gentile author of John xix. 32b ff.

to offer a spurious prophecy and story of what the Roman soldiers did with the dead body of Jesus.

That is the case also with the second prophecy, taken from Zechariah xii. 10. Verse 37 quotes the words: *They shall look on him they pierced* and refers to verse 34: *One of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side.*

H. G. Mitchell, author of an excellent commentary on Zechariah, published in *Scribner's International Critical Commentary*, informs us, page 330: *To pierce is generally to put to death.* That is to say, to pierce does not mean Zech. xii 10 to pierce one's side with a spear. It denotes in the Old Testament *to inflict mortal wound with any kind of weapon.*

But what was even more important, Prof. Mitchell states, also in agreement with all Old Testament scholars: *The act of piercing the nameless victim belongs to the past. This means that the one pierced is not the Messiah, whose advent, as all will agree, was still future when these words were written, but someone who had at the time already suffered martyrdom.* Since Zechariah xii. 10 does not mention the Messiah but refers to a past happening, the author of John xix 32b-37 is here again guilty of offering a fictitious account of what he tells has happened to the corps of Jesus during the interval between his death and interment.

That, of course, rejects likewise as unhistorical the attempt of representing the crucified Jesus as *the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world.* No Jew could ever have conceived that idea. The Passover lamb was not the symbol of the wrath of God, but of His boundless love of his chosen people. The *scapegoat* that was driven into the desert on the day of Atonement, was supposed to take away the sin of the nation.

To the Jews of the age of Christ, God was not a blood-thirsty monster, but their loving and forgiving Father. They had, of course, to obey, serve, and trust in Him if they desired to be sure of His love. Jesus ended the work of the prophets and offered to his people the final revelation of what was really demanded of them.

The Gentiles were not ripe enough in religious experience to understand the revelation of Jesus. They were and are looking for an easy way into heaven. The mere belief into the saving power of the blood shed by Jesus with out any moral effect and progress on their part, was their idea of what they called redemption.

There remains of John 32b-37 the statement: *And straightway,*

there came out blood and water. The question is not whether blood and water will flow from the body of a man two hours after his death. For we are dealing with a miracle or rather the mystic symbol of the bloody atonement for the sin of the entire human race and of the origin of the water of baptism. T. Cotterhill has given us in his version of the Rock of Ages the shortest and clearest explanation of it when he says:

Lest the water and the blood,
From Thy wounded side which flowed,
Be of sin the double cure.
Save from wrath and make me pure.

No Jewish disciple of Jesus could ever have arrived at such a conclusion. Only a Gentile Christian, absolutely ignorant of the aims of Jesus and the conditions under which he lived, labored, and died could invent such a story which appealed to the Gentiles and spread like wild-fire over the whole Roman world. The tidal wave of superstition swallowed even the Jewish Christians of Palestine so as to leave no trace of them. That was, under the banner inscribed *Ignatius*, the tragic fulfillment of the warning of Jesus.

Give not that which is holy unto the dogs,
Neither cast your pearls before the swine,
Lest haply they trample them under their feet,
And turn and rend you!—(Matthew vii. 6.)

THE VOICE OF A CHILD

BY MABEL G. JACKSON

BLACK clouds scudded furiously across the sky and the waves of the leaden sea ran high as hilltops. The sound of one striking against the ship's bottom suggested more the impact with a rock than with a liquid, shifting mass. Hardened travellers made brave attempts to look unconcerned, but only to those tormented by qualms of discomfort did the mere physical danger appear a matter of minor importance.

As the German shore came within sight I left the stuffy, overcrowded saloon that was noisy with the breaking of dishes and the groans of miserable humankind. My spirit cried aloud for purity of air and strained at the leash of the material. But an ascent of the steep stair to the out-of-doors and tempest brought me upon a scene of greater wretchedness than that witnessed below. A hundred small forms were huddled on the open deck in abject misery, and the planks were slippery not only from dashing spray and driving rain, but from frequent testimonials to rough weather and ill ease.

I stood aghast, clinging to the glistening, dripping rail. Then open-eyed with wonder I watched the little act set on the impromptu stage. From out of the thronging masses of childhood a woman's form stood forth, bravely, energetically, cheerfully. Enveloped in a rain-sodden ulster, with a shabby cap atop hair from which not all the clinging moisture could extract the life and curl, she moved continually here and there, relieving as best she could the needs of her small charges and attempting by force of example to hold them to a presentable standard of endurance.

"The least discouraged person I've met today", thought I, and marvelled at the optimism of that young female thing to whose

hands and head and heart more than three score child beings had been entrusted.

"Now then," she called in a loud, clear voice, "all together! So you will avoid colds. Arms out,—so! Arms up,—so!"—suiting the gesture to the word. "Now, one, two, three, jump!"

The surging, swaying crowd of children did their utmost to follow her lead in calisthenics and self-control, bumping one against the other, sliding on the slippery deck, straining small bodies and weak wills to commendable effort. Some even laughed. But the laugh seemed but the ghost of the spontaneity usually connected with childhood. It was a faint, wraith-like thing that twisted the pale lips, contorted the white faces, and played like a shadow around the deep-set, sorrowful eyes. The restraint of those faces, the questioning of those eyes, were hard to meet.

"War children!" whispered a steward with pity over all his features and a haunting memory in his grey eyes, "little ones born under the cloud of war, little ones whose infancy was dragged through the mire of it. Been in Sweden, they have, for the summer, to escape starvation, to seek for health. Bless the Swedes, I say," he muttered, dashing one hand across twitching eyelids and unsteady lips.

To welcoming ears came the whistles' glad signal of arrival. There ensued the customary grating and bumping against a waiting pierhead, the merciful stillness of the element beneath us, the stentorian shouting of orders and the shriller shouting of greeting, the distant shriek of a railway train, the thud of a gangway and the tramp of hurrying feet. I joined the jostling throng, the burden of my luggage in my hands, a heavier burden in my heart.

The train was bitterly cold and strangely bare, denuded of all ornamentation and brass. Even the window curtains had disappeared. To find a compartment to myself had become an ambition since witnessing that painful scene on the slippery deck. But I searched in vain. Evidently thrift or poverty had dictated the smallest number of carriages compatible with actual necessity.

Effort at last succeeded in discovering one with but a single occupant, a woman. At first, at all events, I thought she was alone. But soon it became evident that to her belonged the small boy who was running in the passage of the train like some wild creature just loosed, inspecting the view from every window, examining every compartment, trying the opening and closing powers of every door.

And it seemed that for the time being he was new to her, forgetful of her past sway, mindful only of freshly-acquired habits and customs, an unfamiliar sprite accustomed to the wide limits of the out-of-doors and nature, one of those children who had come from Sweden, one of those shivering, jumping, laughing little beings on the slippery deck, one of the number saved from starvation, or,— I glanced with question at the lithe, straight limbs,—or from worse. Had there been some dread danger working for the ruin of that youthful body, for the handicapping of the human soul, the divine possibilities of the intrepid spirit? I began to understand the sadness of the young mother draped in black, the pathetic anxiety of the pale, set face, the tension, the melancholy, that enveloped her. As my thoughts directed my gaze toward the slender, sternly upright figure, I started. There was a distinctly hostile gleam in the dark and hopeless eyes looking into mine. I began to feel as if a word were blazoned on my clothes and stamped upon my brow, the short word "enemy". And every one of its five letters scorched me, searing my heart and soul.

"The boat was late," I murmured helplessly.

She hesitated, then answered with curt decision.

"Very. I had been waiting two and a half hours."

Did she feel resentment, as if in some latent way I had been responsible even for the delay in the child's coming? Having spoken she removed both glance and attention, leaving me in an almost tangible isolation. Her thoughts, her words, were occupied with the restlessness and obstinacy of the child who was still exploring the train corridor, oblivious of being an obstruction to passengers and luggage.

But when the train started, slowly and laboriously as if feeling in every bolt and beam the age and ruin outwardly visible, the boy seated himself reluctantly between his parent and the window. The independence to which he had become accustomed during months of absence was most apparent, and the mother's attempts to re-establish the old, familiar footing were pathetic to witness. He edged shyly away from her caresses and vouchsafed no response to her affectionate words or glances. His surroundings, however, he eyed with curiosity, and finally bent upon me such a cool, relentless gaze that I felt like a caricature of myself, like the result of the artistic efforts of a child, two rude, round holes for eyes, ob-

long, bulbous figure of a nose, uneven, unlippped semblance of a mouth.

In vain did his mother seek to divert his attention toward objects along the line of travel. Apparently he desired to fathom a strange something in the face and figure of his vis-a-vis, perhaps he even felt a kind of kinship on account of his recent foreign experience.

But at last he was either satisfied or weary of examination. Turning impulsively to the woman who had waited with subdued patience, he began to talk,—rapidly, unceasingly, restless in his speech as in his actions,—and framing all his words in Swedish. Evidently she did not understand and in low tones made an appeal for the language they possessed in common. He paid no attention, eseming not to perceive in the rapid fire of childish description that his words were unintelligible to the eagerly listening ears. All manner of questions were those she asked, hungry as she was to become familiar with her son's immediate past in which there had been no part or presence of herself. He understood and answered readily and in detail, but always in the foreign tongue that was as Greek to her. A pained expression stole over the sad face, the hopeless look in her dark eyes deepened.

I could endure no longer the little tragedy. When a particularly urgent question brought only an incomprehensible response, I leaned forward.

"Your son," I said gently, "says he had one or two good playmates and that as a rule they came to him at the farm."

A swift glance of gratitude met the translation. It seemed as if the mantle of aloofness and enmity had slipped a trifle.

Then began a torrent of question, answer, and interpretation. The child's speech was vivid, his observation had been keen. Of necessity I was made a party to intimate scenes of family life and affection. Events of farm life, strange customs, homely or civic celebrations, were all pictures. Every word and gesture glowed with the color of enthusiasm. And little by little the mother's face assumed a look of content. Once again she was able to measure her step to that of the boy, once again to enter the details of his daily life.

At last the young narrator showed definite signs of weariness. Indeed to me it had long been apparent that his restlessness, his super-activity, were in reality but the result of the fatigue and ner-

vous strain of an unusual experience. His day had begun early and had been crammed with hardship and adventure. Now his head drooped, his figure slouched in the yawning arms of the slippery seat. But true to his inborn instinct of vivacity he pulled himself upright and protested with a little jerk the demand of sleep.

I watched his manly struggle and pity dimmed my eyes. The mother would have pillowed his head upon her arm, but the youthful farmer, the experienced traveller, spurned the blandishment of such comfort. The dusk had gathered. A light in the roof of the compartment flared to meet its challenge, but after a little sputtered and died away, leaving a dark place of spaced black shapes shrunk with chill and discomfort. The sky flaunted a last, faint streamer of sunset red. One by one the stars appeared like spikes in the crevices of a deep cavern.

The boy nestled close against his mother. The darkness had recalled his discarded childhood. Again she sought to provide a comfortable resting place for his restless head. She suggested knee or arm, but instantly his dignity rose on the defensive and he withdrew to the corner of the hard seat. Instinctively he searched for the comfort of a cushion, moving impatiently back and forth.

The mother gazed hopelessly about her. Aware of her longing and quandary I impetuously extended my great fur muff.

"Oh no," she gasped, "no, it would be ruined."

"And if so," I answered with a laugh to re-assure her, "if so, it would be in a good cause. But you underestimate its powers of endurance."

"Thank you, thank you," she breathed, and in her low voice I heard the emotion I could not see for the darkness.

Impressed with the novelty of such a cushion, the child slipped down to the level of his mother's knee. For a time silence reigned except for the chug-chugging of the train and the sound of voices rising at intervals above it. I thought the boy had succumbed to the weariness caused by the long day, by the travel, by the soporific influence of the darkness. But then I heard him speaking in low, dreamy tones as if his voice were trailing over memories of the past. And the words were of his native speech, the speech shared by his mother. The stillness, the gloom, the warmth and comfort of his improvised bed had made him the little child of the days before the long journey northward, before the experiences in a new land, in a strange family circle. He dwelt among reminiscences of his

own home, of the friends of his infancy, he recalled the kiss of joy, the sting of sorrow. He touched upon the little festal gatherings, the glamour of the Christmas season, the light of the birthday candles.

And then came silence. The train rattled on. The great stars glimmered through the bared windows.

Suddenly the child's voice rang out in agonized poignancy. Was he dreaming, had unconsciousness brought him to the brink of his soul?

"Mother, mother, I want my father!"

The black, still figure that was his mother sat motionless.

"Hush, dear, hush," she murmured.

But the child cried out again.

"Mother, mother, shan't I see my father any more? Not even at Christmas time?"

And again the low, tense voice made answer, "Hush, dear one, hush!"

The boy, however, went on as if awakening had brought self-control, yet rambling still between impulse and fact, between fancy and knowledge.

"Oh mother, see the big stars! Is my father up there among the stars? Oh, why did my father have to die? Mother, you know how good my father always was, to you, to me, to everybody. Why did the dear God take him away? Why can't he come back to us, if only for a little while, if only for Christmas time? Oh, mother, if I am very good, if I ask the dear God very sweetly, very kindly, won't He send my father down to me, down, down, on the light of one of His shining stars? Mother, dear, dear mother, I want my father!"

I could not see for the darkness. But had the carriage been flooded with light perhaps I had not seen for the veil of tears before my eyes. As I heard the sound of a dry, a choking sob, I felt instinctively that nevermore would memory be able to free itself from such a note of anguish. The dark figure of the woman was bent above the child and I knew he was being gathered close in a straining hold. A low murmur of voices followed and presently silence. Evidently the child was asleep. Somehow, as the train jugged steadily on, the motionless of the tense form opposite made a pitiful appeal for companionship and sympathy. In sudden response I leaned forward. It needed tact and the evidence of a communicative spirit to win the confidence of one so enwrapped in

constraint. What had laid such a cloak about her? I could not tell. No word of hers had betrayed the clue to her great and overwhelming sadness.

I spoke of many things, I spoke long and eagerly; of trivial incidents, of life in many countries, of literature and art. And continually I was conscious of the cloak of enmity that hid her soul from me. Then I spoke of the sorrows of others, of sorrows that had no end, but tangled as they were with query and with problem knew no solution; of griefs that paced beside one like solemn sentinels clogging the footsteps, restraining the spirit. And reluctantly I laid bare the wound in my own soul. Through the darkness I heard a gasp. It was followed by words of sympathy in soft and heard a gasp. It was followed by words of sympathy in soft and unfamiliar tones. I parried commiseration.

"Have you never thought," I asked, "that sorrow not only takes, but gives? With the burden that is laid upon one, with the weight of shackles, there is something else, the wisdom of a head that can understand, the warmth of a heart that can feel. Is it not worth the pain, to know the world, to love the world, in spite of all failure, all error, all injustice? Why should a chasm yawn between God's peoples? Why should they look with abhorrence, with hatred, across the depths of bitter enmity? Is there nothing to bridge that cleft of their own wilful making? Is suffering then of no avail? Can it not unseal the lips and hearts? Will it not open wide the arms?"

I closed my eyes as though I would shut out the picture I had conjured. And suddenly it seemed as if an angel wrestled with an ugly spirit brooding in the darkness. The child stirred and a voice rang through the carriage, a voice buoyant and joyful, youthful, yet strangely mature and confident.

"Oh mother, mother, such a dream, such a wonderful dream! My father came to me. The dark sky opened and the light of a star made a splendid, shining pathway. And down that pathway came my father, straight to me. I saw him, mother, and his face was shining. He spoke to me, mother dear, he spoke. 'Be happy, son,' he said, 'and tell your mother to be happy too.' And then,—oh mother, he said '*forgive*'. What made him say that, mother dear? Can you tell me? And then he went away again. But somehow, mother, I am not unhappy any more. My heart feels all bright, mother dear, as if my father had left some of the light of his beauti-

ful star. But what made my father say '*forgive*'? I don't hate anyone. Once at the farm Anders and I had a fight, a horrid fight. But when it was over we shook hands. Both of us had been fighting, and somehow, mother,"—the clear, childish voice dragged and stumbled a little over the confession he was making—"somehow I knew when his hand touched mine that I too had been at fault. Not only Anders, mother, not only Anders. Do you think that feeling was forgiving?"

The mother bent over her child, and in the darkness an ugly, evil shape arose and fled.

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