

# The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER

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LORD BYRON

*Frontispiece to The Open Court*

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## THE DREAM OF MATERIALISM

BY WALTER B. LYDENBERG

“I BELIEVE that we shall sooner or later arrive at a mechanical equivalent of consciousness, just as we have arrived at a mechanical equivalent of heat.” In these words, Professor Huxley gave utterance to what is perhaps the ultimate confession of materialism with regard to its hopes and ambitions. Although Huxley died without seeing his dream come true, and indeed probably without expecting to, yet that he was justified in his expectation is not easily disputed. His hope was based on a condition which exists—namely, that there is a relation, possibly an indissoluble connection, between a conscious, spiritual, immaterial, or imperceptible order of things on the one hand and an unconscious, concrete, material or perceptible order of things on the other. Even as spiritual a one as the Psalmist would not disdain to give due credit to the rôle of the material in life, as he sang, “As for man, his days are as grass; as a flower of the field so he flourisheth. For the wind passeth over it, and it is gone; and the place thereof shall know it no more.” This is the materialistic view of things; it is a view upon which the eyes can not be closed; it is entirely logical; and there is no reason why one should rebel at it. It is something forced upon us. It is the expression of a truth. It is that which is seen—the perceptible. Nor is it peculiarly a modern view; it is perhaps as old as man. The savage who staked his life on his trusty spear was, that far, a thoroughgoing materialist. The Hebrew who conceded vision to the eye and intellect to the heart was, that far, a materialist. Coming down to recent times we meet with the discovery of the intellectual function of the brain. As early as Shakespeare’s time the rôle of the brain in intellectual activity was common knowledge: how much earlier than that is not so apparent, but it is clear that with the Greeks and the Hebrews a man thought in his *heart*. We are not a bit astonished to find late writers, as Cabanis, contending that the

brain "secretes thought"; or as Voltaire, that "I am body, and I think"; or as Schopenhauer, that "if matter can fall to the ground, then it can also think"; or as Moleschott, that "without phosphorus, no thought." What did Emerson mean when he said, "Man carries the world in his head"? So certain was Ernst Haeckel of the legitimacy of this view that he did not hesitate to confide that "all phenomena, from the most material to the most spiritual, can be accounted for in terms of motion and matter."

But the dirge of the Psalmist's had hardly subsided when he touched his harp again and sang, this time another song, "But the lovingkindness of Jehovah is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him." How can that be? Man dies. Can that eternal love be for mortal man? No; though man is mortal, there is that which is immortal. Clearly the Psalmist was not satisfied with his materialistic view of things. And how also about the savage? It was not indeed alone on his trusty spear that he staked his life, but in dance and song he invoked a power unseen, without which his spear was but a broken twig. So, too, with the Hebrew, although vision may rest within the eye, there is in man vastly more than vision, for "the eyes of man are never satisfied." Although Hamlet's mother was satisfied that the visions of her storm-tossed son were but the "coinage" of his "brain," the son himself was not so well satisfied with this materialistic view of things, as where his mother found a brain, he found a conscience which "makes cowards of us all." Though Voltaire was content to say of himself, "I am body, and I think," he could not view the surpassing achievements of Newton as the product of some surpassing body, but rather as the product of "a mighty genius received from heaven." Schopenhauer, who reached the conclusion that matter can think, laid infinitely greater stress on the reversal of the process in that it is "will and idea" that is matter. And so, too, an examination of the trains of thought of the most dogmatic materialists readily elicits evidence that their stands are taken with hesitancy; as Huxley also concluded, "Legitimate materialism . . . is neither more nor less than a sort of shorthand idealism."

Here we find a confusion and contradiction which, on its face, discountenances philosophy. Here is evidence of a conflict in the reasoning of man starting with the dawn of history and still waging. It is a battle not alone for the scientist and the philosopher and the theologian, but a battle also for the man in every-day life, the business man, the schoolboy, the housewife, the pleasure-seeker. In the factory there are not simply buildings and machinery and finished

product and bank-account ; there are anticipated recreation and freedom, recognition, honor, the approving smiles of loved ones. That the schoolboy's pastimes and the wedding guest's love-dreams and all the joys and sorrows and hopes and poetry and prayers of our daily life are after all nothing else than matter in motion is what materialism teaches. If it is so, let us not deceive ourselves. Let us have the truth, and not be afraid of it. "The truth shall make you free."

The essential doctrine of materialism is "All is material." Logically, this is impossible, as a whole can not be equal to a part. Clearly all can not be material, as, for one thing, the immaterial can not be material. To reach a stable footing the doctrine assumes the form "there is no immaterial"; and in this is involved a psychological dictum that the immaterial is a mental illusion. The task of materialism is to prove this psychological dictum.

In attempting this proof, materialism must by its hypothesis eliminate as authentic data all but matter, inasmuch as in the hypothesis there exists no such thing as the immaterial. Materialism has formulated no definition of matter, and our only recourse in an effort to obtain a definition of matter is an acceptance of the common understanding of what matter is, namely, that it is anything which is perceived, seen, felt, apprehended—in other words, anything which we may touch or see. The task of materialism is then to show how matter (the perceptible) can produce the mental illusion of the immaterial. Materialism has adopted no definition of illusion, and our only recourse here also is the acceptance of the common understanding of what an illusion is, namely, that it is a supposed knowledge of that which is not. The task of materialism thus narrows itself to the construction of a psychology out of perceived things, eliminating all psychology of imperceptible things; the distinction here is that between physiological psychology and empirical psychology (the psychology of experience—thought, reason, imagination, feeling, willing, as such). The data of physiological psychology are accepted by materialism (the brain, nerves, etc.) ; the data of empirical psychology (the immaterial things thought, feeling, willing, etc., as such) are rejected. There are perceived brain, perceived nerves, perceived organs of touch and sight ; and these, in their activity, are all that knowledge and all the other data of empirical psychology are. There is no such thing as mind, as such ; but instead there is the acting brain. There is no such thing as intellect, as such ; no such thing as knowing, as such ; nor as feeling, as such ; nor as willing, as such ; nor as thinking, as such ; nor as hoping, as such ; nor as sorrowing, as

such; nor as being joyful, as such; nor as devotion, as such; nor as having an illusion, as such (the illusion of the belief in the immaterial is simply that phase of brain activity which in empirical psychology is called an "illusion"). This is the doctrine of materialism narrowed to a point, although an accepted proof of this doctrine has not yet been produced and the psychology of experience still as far outweighs the psychology of the brain and nerves as the meal on the table outweighs the dreams of the starving man.

The field of physiological psychology is a broad one, and it has been well though not exhaustively explored. Possibly the task of materialism is completed when it defines the data of empirical psychology in terms of data of physiological psychology. Before this task can be undertaken the general conclusions with regard to the function of the brain must be clearly in mind.

Broadly speaking, the cerebrum may be described as an aggregation of nerve-cells in more or less intimate contact one with another through the agency of structural elongations, nerve-fibers. The number of these cells in the cerebrum has been estimated as 1,600,000,000; their average length in thousandths of an inch. It is not known whether they are in immediate contact one with another. With regard to the body as a whole, the cerebrum is that portion of the nervous system midway between the terminals in the periphery of the body (the end-organs of sense) and the terminals in the muscular and glandular systems of the body. External conditions operating on the end-organs of sense are, through the medium of the nervous system, known to be definite causes of muscular activity, in the case of reflex action. The control of the muscular system is definitely known to be centered in the brain, and the only observable prime physiological function of the brain is the control of muscular activity, an adjustment of the body to its environment; or, as Professor Wundt put it, "Everything that we call will and intelligence resolves itself, as soon as it is traced back to its physiological elements, into nothing but sentient impressions transforming themselves into movements." In other words, the only visible expression of cerebral activity is resulting muscular movements; that is to say, the mental activity of a man is apparent only in his movements, his speech, his writing, and other physical expressions.

It is not certain, however, that Professor Wundt was justified in attributing the source of all cerebral activity to sentient impressions, if by this is meant impressions arising in the end-organs of sense. The evidence is clear that a single nerve cell, even one of the minutest and one wholly buried within the brain substance, may be affected

by impressions developed within the cerebrum. The evidence is also clear that all sentient impressions are not invariably transformed into movements; rather the vast majority of sentient impressions appear to be wholly absorbed and possibly entirely diffused within the central nervous system. In other words, the function of the brain is comparable to the function of a sponge. Furthermore, the possibility of strictly intercerebral stimuli must not be overlooked, such possibly as blood pressure and blood movement, chemical activities in the structure of the cerebrum, latent cellular processes, and some indefinite biological phenomenon which might be defined as the stream of life; definite knowledge of these factors is, however, lacking. And there is the possibility also that cerebral nerve-cells may be affected by forces reaching these cells not through the medium of the end-organs of sense, but directly through the cortex of the cerebrum, such as electrical forces, radio forces, or other telepathic forces of kinds wholly unknown.

Whatever the source of cerebral activity, its visible expression, as we have stated, is muscular movement or impulse to muscular movement. The intensity of muscular movement is in a way susceptible to measurement, as is possibly also, in a measure, the intensity of impulse to muscular movement. The difficulty of determining a minimum limit to the intensity of impulse to movement would seem to be unbounded, so that the range of the intensity of impulse may be from a maximum of a definitely measurable horse-power to a minus infinity horse-power; that is to say, there may be impulses to movement so delicate as to defy all means of measurement.

It is to the action of this, physiologically speaking, absorbing and controlling organ, the cerebrum, that materialism turns for proof of the illusory character of the knowledge of the immaterial.

It distinguishes between knowledge of the material and knowledge of the immaterial; the former is certain, the latter illusory; the former is gained through the end-organs of sense, the latter through other sources.

What are these other sources? For the present they are hypothetical. We have hinted that they may be intercerebral stimuli, intercerebrally generated either by an ever-present "stream of life" or by telepathic forces received directly through the cerebral cortex. It is certain, however, that, from the essential uniformity of character of nerve-structure within the external end-organs of sense (the eye, the skin, the ear, etc.) and nerve-structure within the cerebrum, it is possible that there may be one or more organs of sense wholly within the cerebrum, necessarily and forever unknown to us through

visual or tactful perception, receptive on the one hand of external stimuli constantly being gathered in by the external end-organs of sense, and receptive on the other hand, and simultaneously and directly, of stimuli engendered in the nerve-matter of the functioning brain itself. In other words, physiologically there is no reason why sensation should be limited to the external end-organs of sense and not be a function also of intercerebral organs.

The presence of an intercerebral organ of sense, sensible only to cerebral activity, might be considered as a physiological explanation of the empirical phenomenon of self-consciousness. The nerve-complex of the cerebrum may be considered to be under incessant bombardment by stimuli from all sides, checking these stimuli, absorbing them, and transforming them not into incessant muscular activity, but into an incessant impulse to action. Simultaneous with this incessant intercerebral impulse, new stimuli are constantly being added to the fire by the external end-organs of sense. From the blending of this complex of extra-cerebral and inter-cerebral stimuli, a single momentarily predominating cerebral impulse must result, expressing in some manner the fact of the conflict of an external world with an internal world, the differentiation of these two worlds, the differentiation of the self from the environment, the differentiation of the self from the non-self, the phenomenon of self-consciousness. In other words, self-consciousness may be defined physiologically as the impulse to the adjustment of the body to conditions imposed by the blending of simultaneous and conflicting functionings of the end-organs of sense and an inter-cerebral organ of sense—the simultaneous sensing of the self and the non-self.

It is conceded that self-consciousness is at the basis of the psychology of experience, empirical psychology; what sees, thinks, knows, feels, wills is the self—nothing else. So in physiological psychology it would become this sensed nervous system functioning, as distinguished from the sensed external world functioning, that is the self. The empirical phenomena of knowing, thinking, perceiving, imagining, feeling, willing could therefore be defined as follows in terms of physiological psychology. Knowing is a cerebrally contained impulse to an adjustment either to an extra cerebral condition or an inter-cerebral condition. Feeling is a cerebrally contained impulse to an adjustment to a condition of the body as a whole. Willing is a cerebrally contained, cerebrally originating impulse to an activity. Thinking is a cerebrally contained impulse to an adjustment to a condition of receptivity of a continuance of cerebrally contained adjustments to conditions. Perceiving is a cerebrally contained

impulse to an adjustment to extra-corporeal conditions effective upon the end-organs of sense. Imagining is a cerebrally contained impulse to an adjustment to conditions not effective upon the end-organs of sense. Remembering is a cerebrally contained adjustment to a condition which does not exist but which did exist and which has been cerebrally retained. The sensed functioning of any one of these cerebrally contained impulses is the self-consciousness of empirical psychology.

So we might go on, defining the phenomena of empirical psychology in terms of cerebrally contained impulses to adjustments to conditions, but the end-results would be as unsatisfactory as trying to read an unfamiliar language. Tyndall declared that "the chasm between these physical processes and the facts of consciousness remains as intellectually impassable, as in prescientific ages." Notwithstanding this, materialism must bridge the chasm. To this task it is spurred on by the doctrine of evolution, in that the biological and physiological data relative to the development of the human nervous system appear to be not without meaning. Biologically and physiologically considered, the simplest form of a functioning nervous system may perhaps be illustrated in the reflex action of the simplest forms of animal life; it may be denoted the *mouth* stage, in which excitation of food touching the periphery of the animal is followed immediately by the opening of the mouth to absorb the food. A higher, and second, stage may perhaps be illustrated in the reflex action of more complex forms of animal life; it may be denoted the *eye-mouth* stage, in which only certain excitations from light, such as a particular color, will result in the opening of the mouth, thus developing a function of selection in the reception of food. A third stage may perhaps be denoted the *eye-foot-mouth* stage, in which certain kinds of vision react upon locomotive muscles resulting in the propelling of the organism into conjunction with food. A fourth stage may perhaps be denoted the *stomach-eye-foot-mouth* stage, in which conditions within the organs of digestion control activity of the eye, foot, and mouth. Here, perhaps may be imagined the presence of a central nervous system, coördinating and controlling after fixed laws the activities of the organism in conformity with both internal and external conditions of a simple nature. A fifth stage may perhaps be denoted the *mate* stage, in which phenomena of so-called instinct enter, involving sexual selection, and a higher development of the central nervous system. A sixth stage may perhaps be denoted the *offspring* stage, a step still higher in the play of instinct, in which the offspring is fed under controlled laws

approaching in a measure intelligence. A seventh stage may perhaps be denoted the *fellowship* stage, in which colony-instincts play their part. An eighth stage appears to follow closely upon the fellowship stage, which may be denoted the *self-consciousness* stage, for it is clear that in fellowship selection of any complexity is involved also the selection of that which is not a fellow, i. e., the self. Little as we can know of the self-consciousness of the dog, we are unable to understand how it can select and care for its maimed brother except in so far as in some measure it is conscious of the soundness of itself as distinguished from the maimed condition of the brother. Here we must imagine the presence of a highly developed central nervous system, in which slumbers a latent impulse ready at a moment's notice, upon the slightest provocation, to create an adjustment of the body to conditions irrespective of digestive, sexual, or maternal conditions—a love of fellows, playing an important rôle in the preservation of the species. A final, indefinite, broadly inclusive stage may be imagined in a practically complete control of all incoming and outgoing nerve-impressions by a central nervous system; a dominating cerebrum; a storehouse of inhibited nerve-impressions, latent but always potent; an ability to retain and repeat an impulse over a lifetime (memory); a state of cerebral activity accompanied by long periods of muscular inactivity (thought); an ability to sense and respond to inter-cerebral functions (self-consciousness); the control of action on the basis of received sounds vocally made (speech); the control of action on the basis of received visions of pictures, signs, or words tactually made (writing).

This is the mind-machine of materialism's. It is nerve-force functioning in nerve-matter and expressing itself in bodily impulses, movements, signs, and sounds, largely through the agency of the muscles. It is a force contemporaneous and coextensive with the phenomenon life. Through it arises the illusion of the immaterial; and here we encounter the outstanding problem of materialism, namely, to show, materialistically, how this illusion of the immaterial arises.

With regard to this, the following deductions appear to follow from the materialistic data presented. The mind-machine, like all machines, is necessarily, with respect to the laws which govern it, *infallible*. Nerve-force, like all forces, is essentially positive, not negative. There can be no impulse to an adjustment, except it is an impulse to an adjustment to a condition, as there can be no effect except it is caused. Perception and its modifications, with respect

to the laws which govern them, are necessarily *infallible*. Physiologically, there is no such thing as an illusion; all is inevitable, necessary, mechanical. Physiologically, every so-called illusion is, empirically considered, in itself an illusion, as physiologically there is no illusion. The problem of the illusion is returned by physiological psychology, to empirical psychology. Physiologically, every so-called illusion is no more than a contradiction; that is to say, conditions may not be now as they were; but it can not be said that, physiologically, conditions were not as they were. Contradiction, not illusion, is physiologically possible,—an impulse to the adjustment to a condition preceded by but still coexistent with an impulse to the adjustment to an essentially contradictory condition. What I saw, I saw; what I now see, I see. If I am impelled to adjust to the condition of the house falling down over my head, it means that the *nerve-conditions* attending the falling of the house were existent; if the house did not fall, I may adjust differently later. If I am impelled to adjust to the condition of my body's being transported toward the clouds, it means that the *nerve-conditions* attending such a possibility are present. Whether the event occurred, whether it was possible, are different matters; the fact is, there was the physiological nerve-adjustment,—a positive activity. My companion may adjust or believe otherwise; but, physiologically, what has his nervous system to do with mine? or mine with his? If I adjust to the condition of life after death, what has that to do with past conditions or with future conditions? How I may adjust in the future will depend on me in the future. Thus imagination; and if imagination, belief; and if belief, faith, are, like perception, like digestion, physiological phenomena, effects of causes, phases of "matter in motion," factors in muscular control, materially inevitable, materially infallible. My belief, my adjustment, is the predominant physiological fact, the external world to the contrary notwithstanding. "As he thinketh within himself, so is he," is as true physiologically as empirically. In the psychology of the poet,

"Unfading Hope! when life's last embers burn,  
When soul to soul, and dust to dust return!  
Heaven to thy charge resigns the awful hour!"

Has materialism any basis for sustaining a charge of fraud against spiritualism? None that it can produce from materialistic data.

On the other hand, has it grounds on which to support its own proper claims irrespective of the contradictory claims of spirit-

ualism? How far is it justified in its dogma? On that point, it is evident that, physiologically considered, the extent of response of nerve-force to external conditions is limited by its own nature. The body can adjust nervously only to conditions to which nerve-force is sensitive. Perception, the criterion of the material is therefore also limited to perception. That far, it is an incomplete criterion, and metaphysically an insufficient criterion. That which is perceived is the perceptible, not the imperceptible. The cause, the origin, the life-principle of this nerve-force—that which precedes it and conditions it—being necessarily different from it, can certainly have no part in it other than its cause. There is no more fundamental axiom in materialism than that every effect has a cause. It may be true that nerve-force is nothing else than the play of electrons and protons which constitutes also electrical force; but if so, nervous impulses are limited to the range of this play, are dependent upon the cause of it, and can not function except as such. You can no more expect to find a nervous impulse existing under conditions other than those of its own physical laws, than you can expect to produce an electrical current with a single element of your storage battery.

Nor are physiologically defined limits any less evident in the empirical phenomenon of knowledge. Confucius is credited long ago with having discovered that "there are things above the power of human comprehension, beyond the grasp of human intelligence." Similarly, we find that faithful historian of materialism, Lange, reaching the conclusion that "the whole cause of materialism is forever lost by the admission of the inexplicableness of all natural occurrences."

## BYRON—AFTER ONE HUNDRED YEARS

BY J. V. NASH

THE opening years of the nineteenth century in England were illumined by the work of five poets of rare genius—all apostles of the Romantic revival. They were, in the order of their age, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats. By a strange coincidence—if it be philosophical to speak of *coincidences*—these five men were destined to die in the reverse order of their birth. Keats was to go first, in 1821, followed by Shelley in 1822, Byron in 1824, Coleridge in 1834, and Wordsworth—full of years and honors—last of all, in 1850, a date within the lifetime of many now living, though at the time of his birth Voltaire still had eight years to live.

While all five of these poets were heralds of the new age ushered in by the French Revolution, Byron alone was a man of action as well as of song. Writing impassioned poems about Freedom and hymning the praise of Nature were in the end unsatisfying; he longed for some taste of the heroic life—to be in the thick of the fray where Liberty waged warfare with Autocracy and sword clashed upon sword. And yet, exalted ideals were in Byron strangely mixed with egotism, vanity, love of excitement, and an inherently theatrical attitude toward life, which exposed both himself and his work to suspicions of insincerity.

It is safe to say that there is no other poet in the whole history of English literature whose life affords such a fascinating study to the psychologist as that of Byron. His was the tragedy of a dissociated personality, a soul torn by conflicting emotions and impulses. The cause of the inharmonious mental states which were a source of constant torture to the poet and cast a pall of futility over all that he undertook, will be made clear by an examination of the abnormal and in many ways deplorable heredity and environment by which his personality was molded.

To most people today the name Byron calls up vague images of a voluptuous poet and fiery radical of the early nineteenth century. But this tumultuous incendiary of popular imagination was a Peer of England by right of blood, who claimed and actually occupied a seat in the House of Lords, at that time the very citadel of aristocracy and privilege.

The Byrons were an ancient noble family of England, the founder of the line having been a Norman by the name of de Burun who came over with William the Conqueror. In the reign of Henry II (1155-1189) the name was modified to Byron, the form which it has since retained.

It was the fourth Lord Byron (1669-1736) who seems to have started the strain of eccentricity and passionate violence for which the family during the next one hundred years acquired an unenviable reputation.

As his third wife, he married Frances, daughter of Lord Berkeley and it was from this union that the wild and erratic race which culminated in the poet sprang.

The fifth lord, who was born in 1722, entered the Navy, narrowly escaped death by shipwreck when his vessel, the *Victory*, was lost on the rocks of Alderney; subsequently he took to a life of fox-hunting and gambling. In a sordid quarrel following a card game he ran through with his sword and killed his neighbor and kinsman, a Mr. Chaworth. This was in 1765, the year famous for the passage of the American stamp act. Byron was committed to the Tower and tried on a charge of murder. The trial, which was held in Westminster Hall, was one of the *causes célèbres* of the day. It is said that the interest which it aroused was so great that tickets of admission sold for six guineas apiece. A verdict of manslaughter was returned, but Byron, by pleading his privileges as a Peer and paying costs, regained his liberty.

The slayer was, however, thenceforth shunned by his former friends. He became haunted as if by spectres, and shut himself up in his ancestral home, Newstead Abbey, going abroad from time to time by stealth and under assumed names, and at other times being locked up like a wild beast behind the thick walls of the ancient pile. Many sinister stories began to circulate regarding him. It was said that he shot a coachman and flung his body into the carriage beside his wife, whom on another occasion it was alleged that he tried to drown. Finally his wife was forced to flee, in mortal dread for her life.

It was rumored that "the wicked lord," as he became known, was in league with Satan himself, and was waited upon in his castle by imps of his Sooty Majesty. The poet himself tells how, after his wife left him, "the wicked lord's" only companions were a troop of tame crickets, which he had trained to crawl over his body and which he used to punish with blows of a tiny straw when they misbehaved. After their master's death, the story was told how these insects solemnly marched out of the castle, in military procession, and disappeared from view.

"The wicked lord" survived his three sons, his brother, and his only grandson, killed in Corsica in 1794. Consequently, on his death in 1798, his estates and title passed to George Gordon Byron, then a boy of ten, who was the grandson of the fourth lord's second son, John. The latter had led an adventurous life in the British Navy, in the course of which he was shipwrecked in the straits of Magellan, and reached England again only after two years of the most extraordinary adventures in the wilds of South America, including a period of captivity in the hands of the Spaniards in Chile. Several years later he circumnavigated the globe, taking possession of the Falkland Islands in the name of England, which has held them to this day.

The eldest son of this sailor adventurer, born in 1751, was the father of the poet. He was educated at Westminster School and became a captain in the guards. Fundamentally unprincipled, he developed a degree of blackguardism that alienated him from his family. "Mad Jack" he was known in the circles which he frequented.

In the year 1778, in circumstances of peculiar shamelessness, "Mad Jack" seduced the wife of the Marquis of Carmarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds. The affair was discovered by the marquis through Byron's financial demands upon the lady. In reverse of the usual relations in such cases, he was constantly clamoring for money from his innamorata.

The pair then eloped to the continent of Europe, and when the marquis obtained a divorce in 1779 they were regularly married. The life of one who had sacrificed her honor at his behest he proceeded to make so miserable that in five years she died. Two daughters had been born to the pair, of which one survived. This was Augusta, half-sister to the poet and destined to become a constructive influence in his checkered life.

John Byron was not long a widower. He succeeded in bagging a second wife in the person of Miss Catherine Gordon of Gight,

whose extensive estates in Aberdeenshire attracted the needy and greedy adventurer. "The property of the Scotch heiress," says Nicol, "was squandered with impetuous rapidity by the English rake."

It was on January 22, 1788, in Holles Street, London, that Mrs. Byron No. 2 gave birth to her only child, George Gordon, the sixth lord and the stormy petrel of literary England in the days when the nineteenth century was young.

Soon after the birth of his son, the father, being pressed by importunate creditors, abandoned wife and child and fled again to France. The mother took her young son to Scotland, where she found shelter at Aberdeen. The father, meanwhile, having spent his last shilling in dissipation, decided to return to his wife. They lived together in humble lodgings until their incompatible tempers compelled a separation. For a time, they occupied separate apartments at opposite ends of the same street, within visiting distance. But even this arrangement was destined not to last. His creditors found him out. He extracted sufficient money from his wife to pay his passage once more to France, and left the country, never to return. The curtain fell on his wretched career at Valenciennes, in August, 1791, just as the French Revolution was breaking.

One would suppose that to the wife who had found it impossible to live with him, and whose fortune he had dissipated, his demise would have been in the nature of a relief. Yet when news of Byron's death reached the lady, it is said that her piercing shrieks disturbed the repose of the quiet neighborhood.

As to the character of the poet's mother, we are told that she was not only proud, impulsive, and wayward, but hysterical, that her affection and anger were alike demonstrative, her temper never for an hour secure. "She half worshipped, half hated," says Nicol, "the blackguard to whom she was married, and took no steps to protect her property. Her son she alternately petted and abused."

Such were the jarring, neurotic and tainted psychical streams which united in the poet. Though a handsome lad, he was afflicted with a deformity of one foot which, while it did not seriously interfere with walking, was a source of extraordinary mental suffering—"a lame brat," his mother in her brutal moods used to dub him.

But our limited space bids us hurry on. We cannot linger over Byron's school life, except to note that he was deficient in technical scholarship, low in his class, and apparently without ambition to rank high, but that he eagerly devoured history and romance and reveled in the Arabian nights. Like many another poet, he is reported as

disliking mathematics, and he was an indifferent penman. Yet he was fond of declaiming, and "noted by masters and mates as of quick temper, eager for adventures, prone to sports, always more ready to give a blow than to take one, affectionate, though resentful, and romantically devoted to his friends. The story is told how on one occasion he offered to take half the thrashing a bully was giving to a lad who later was known as Robert Peel.

Such was the little boy who, when the ogre at Newstead Abbey died in 1798, became the sixth Lord Byron. The news came to him at School, and when at the morning roll-call, his name was called, prefixed by the Latin "Dominus," he was so overcome with emotion that he was unable to answer and burst into tears.

It was at Harrow School, too, that he experienced his first love affair—an intense attachment for his cousin and senior in year, Mary Ann Chaworth, daughter of the victim of "the wicked lord." The lady soon married, leaving the future poet disconsolate, and it appears that he never quite forgot her.

From Harrow, Byron went in October, 1805, to Trinity College, Cambridge, as a nobleman scholar. We learn that he took full advantage of his privileges as a lord, quickly got into debt notwithstanding an allowance of 500 pounds (\$2,500) a year—a handsome sum in those days, indulged in gambling, hobnobbed with prize-fighters, won fame as a swimmer, traveled about in great style, and after terrible quarrels with his redoubtable mother successfully asserted his claim to independence.

Apparently Byron had little affection for his Alma Mater. Speaking of Cambridge, "the place," he said, "is the devil." "Cambridge did him no good," adds Ernest Coleridge. It is hard to think of Byron as an M.A.; yet it is a fact that he received the degree of Master of Arts, by special privilege as a peer, in 1808.

Byron was now twenty. Already, nearly two years before, he had published a little volume of verse, entitled *Fugitive Pieces*, subsequently destroying all but two or three copies on account of a clergyman friend having criticized one poem as "too free." Practically all of the material, however, was included in *Poems on Various Occasions*, which came out early in 1807.

Shortly afterwards he published another edition with some revisions, under the title, *Hours of Idleness*. This appeared in an altered second edition in March, 1808. Two months earlier his youthful poetic efforts had been torn to pieces in a criticism by Brougham appearing in the famous *Edinburgh Review*. The *Edinburgh*, however, soon felt the mettle of the young poet when Byron

brought out his scathing satire, *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers*, in March, 1809. Within two years it passed through five editions. Even today it repays reading. Its play of wit and its poetical technique recalled the days of Pope.

It was the scorn which the *Edinburgh Review* had heaped on Byron's youthful verses that stung him into a fixed resolve to prove himself a real poet. Had this criticism never appeared, the name of Byron might be unknown today in English literature.

In the meantime, Byron had managed to borrow money enough to repair to some extent his ancestral estate—Newstead Abbey. There he now settled, "if," as one biographer remarks, "such a word may be used of his riotous occupation of his domain." Although much of the place was falling into ruin, Newstead Abbey was a magnificent inheritance. Byron fitted up two suites of apartments, one for himself and the other for his mother.

The vista from the Abbey was enchanting. In the large adjoining park there sparkled a chain of lovely lakes, and from the casement of his chamber the poet enjoyed a view of a cascade falling from the lakes.

Here Byron held high revel with boon companions, the members of his house parties sleeping until one in the afternoon, then spending hours at the chase, followed by a long night of festivity in which wine was quaffed from a human skull and the merrymakers "buffooned about the house" in monkish garments.

On attaining his majority, in 1809, Byron laid claim to his rights as a Peer of the Realm by taking his seat in the House of Lords.

A few months later, accompanied by his friend Hobhouse and a small retinue, he left England for a tour of Southern Europe. The Napoleonic wars were at their height and the trip promised an abundance of thrills. Landing at Lisbon, he visited Cintra and other points of interest, passing thence into Spain, and on to Seville and Cadiz. The "Peninsula Campaign," in which Britain was seeking to drive the French out of Spain, was in full swing, the battle of Talavera being fought and won during Byron's sojourn in the country. "Being against the government," Ernest Coleridge tells us, "he is against the war." Seemingly he is fascinated by Napoleon's genius and believes that nothing can withstand "the scourge of the world."

Leaving Gibraltar on August 16, Byron stopped long enough at Malta to enter into a love affair with a lady who figures as "Fair Florence" in his poem, *Childe Harold*.

In the Fall, we find him wandering on horseback through the wild and then almost unknown interior of Albania, entertained by

Moslem magnates. One of the most notable Turkish leaders, Ali Pasha, conceived a great admiration for the dashing young Englishman. "He told me," Byron wrote home to his mother, "to consider him as a father whilst I was in Turkey, and said he looked on me as his son. Indeed, he treated me like a child, sending me almonds, fruit, and sweetmeats twenty times a day."

Byron was greatly disillusioned shortly afterwards to find that the fatherly old gentleman was a notorious poisoner and assassin.

Late in November he reached Missolonghi, the fateful spot which fifteen years later was to be the scene of his own death.

In December, by a land journey from Larnaki, he came to Athens. It was at about Christmas time that, from the ruins of Phyle, he caught his first glimpse of "the city of the violet crown." The view inspired the following well-known lines:

"Ancient of days, august Athena! where,  
Where are thy men of might? thy grand in soul?  
Gone, glimmering through the dreams of things that were.  
First in the race that led to glory's goal,  
They won, and pass'd away: is this the whole—  
A schoolboy's tale, the wonder of an hour?"

Then he points his favorite moral:

"Men come and go; but the hills, and waves, and skies, and stars endure."

"Apollo still thy long, long summer gilds;  
Still in his beam Mendeli's marbles glare;  
Art, glory, freedom fail—but nature still is fair."

Thence the poet journeyed on to Constantinople and Asia Minor, where he rambled among the reputed ruins of Troy. It was at this time, too, that, while detained at the Dardanelles by unfavorable winds, Byron performed the feat of which he never tired thereafter of boasting—he swam the Hellespont, from Sestos to Abydos. It was what we should call nowadays a publicity stunt, valuable because of the opportunity which it would give him for classical allusions in his writings.

Byron's behavior during this tour was bizarre in the extreme. He affected an exotic costume of scarlet and gold, and his attitude was a strange mingling of democracy and hauteur. At the court of the Sultan we find this fiery radical engaged in a disgraceful squabble with the English Ambassador over a point of social precedence.

During two years he wandered again and again through the Grecian peninsula and among the islands of the Archipelago, conversing with all sorts and conditions of men among the motley assemblage of races which then as now peopled the Levant—shepherds, farmers, villagers, sailors, monks and priests, chieftains, brigands, and pirates. He noted having crossed the isthmus of Corinth no less than eight times on his way from Attica to the Morea. He fell ill, and was nearly killed by native quacks, but his servants got him away from the doctors in time to allow Nature to cure him.

Byron next planned an expedition to Egypt, but his remittances from England ceased and his creditors at home became threatening. He would fain remain indefinitely by the shores of the Archipelago, looking out over “the wine-dark sea,” and “the bright, bright track of the sun,” still unchanged since the days of the ancient Greek poets. “Where one is well off, there is one’s country,” expressed his philosophy, and besides, he felt himself now a citizen of the world.

Still, his affairs in England were getting desperate and he must needs return. “In short,” he wrote, “I am sick and sorry; and when I have a little repaired my irreparable affairs, away I shall march, either to campaign in Spain, or back again to the East, where I can at least have cloudless skies and a cessation from impertinence. . . . Howbeit, I have written some 4,000 lines, of one kind or another, on my travels.”

Returning at last to England, he gave to the press the first two cantos of *Childe Harold* (1812), a work which was received with acclaim and at once placed him among the greatest poets of his day. Seven editions of the book were called for in four weeks.

The next two years witnessed the publication of *The Giaour*, *The Bride of Abydos*, *The Corsair*, and *Lara*.

Shortly before Byron's return home, his mother had died. She expired in a fit of rage superinduced by reading an upholsterer's bill. The poet now resumed his seat in the House of Lords, as a Liberal, making speeches on a number of bills in which he was interested. On April 21, 1812, we find him speaking in behalf of Catholic emancipation. Yet despite all his protests of Liberalism, Byron makes us aware that while he is *for* the people, he is *not of* them, nor does he wish to be.

Seeking escape from the harassed life which he was now leading, Byron decided to marry, in the frame of mind in which one might decide to hire a cook. “A wife,” he impersonally observed in his journal, “would be my salvation.”

The lady of his choice was a Miss Milbanke, daughter of Sir Ralph. He led her to the altar on January 2, 1815. "Byron," Nicol tells us, "was married like one walking in his sleep. He trembled like a leaf, made the wrong responses, and almost from the first seems to have been conscious of his irrevocable mistake. . . . In handing his bride into the carriage, he said: 'Miss Milbanke, are you ready?'—a mistake said to be of evil omen."

As Macaulay remarked anent Voltaire and Frederick the Great, it was easy to foresee the end of a relationship which had such a beginning. In fact, to quote again from Nicol: "Byron never really loved his wife; and though he has been absurdly accused of marrying for revenge, we must suspect that he married in part for a settlement. On the other hand, it is not unfair to say that she was fascinated by a name, and inspired by the philanthropic zeal of reforming a literary Corsair. Both were disappointed. Miss Milbanke's fortune was mainly settled on herself; and Byron, in spite of plentiful resolutions, gave little sign of reformation."

The ill-assorted union lasted only a year. Shortly after the birth of their only child, the little daughter Ada, Lady Byron left her husband forever. Neither Byron nor his wife would divulge the actual cause of the break, and in the thick fog of gossip and slander which sprang up around the affair, no gleam of truth can be discerned.

The next year Byron took his final departure from England. His popularity had suddenly changed into extreme unpopularity. "I was accused," he wrote, "of every monstrous vice of public rumor and private rancor. . . . My name, which has been a knightly or a noble one since my fathers helped to conquer the kingdom for William the Norman, was tainted. I felt that if what was whispered and muttered and murmured was true. I was unfit for England; if false, England was unfit for me. I withdrew."

In short, "the fashionable world was tired of its spoilt child, and he of it. Hunted out of the country, bankrupt in purse and heart, he left it, never to return; but he left it to find fresh inspiration by the 'rushing of the arrowy Rhone,' and under Italian skies to write the works which have immortalized his name."

A long chapter was now closed and Byron's life entered upon its last phase, stretching over a period of eight years. With the advent of this period, and the poet's emancipation from all the hateful conditions by which he was pursued in England, a fresh access of power came into his literary work.

After quitting England, Byron spent some time at Geneva under the stimulating influence of Shelley. At last he found a congenial

refuge by the waves of the Adriatic, "like the stag at bay who betakes himself to the waters."

He now turned out a large amount of poetry, including the remaining cantos of *Child Harold*, *Cain*, *Manfred*, and *Don Juan*. Then he seemed to weary of writing. He lacked the capacity for sustained effort at anything. Poetry he decided was not his vocation. He longed for action, and a field for heroic adventure opened immediately to his view.

The Greeks were struggling to throw off the Turkish yoke. In 1823, Byron chartered a ship at Genoa and set sail for the theatre of war. The Greeks welcomed their distinguished volunteer with great acclaim. With his usual inconsistency, Byron showed little real respect for these Greeks whose cause he was now enthusiastically advancing. Yet he brought with him to Missolonghi 4,000 pounds (\$20,000) of his own personal loan. "The people in the streets," wrote Stanhope, "are looking forward to his lordship's arrival as they would to the coming of a Messiah." He was received with salvoes of musketry and triumphal music, and was given the freedom of the city. He strove manfully to end the internal dissensions in Greece, in order that the leaders might present a united front to the Turks.

Finally, it was arranged that Byron should assume the post of commander-in-chief of an expedition against Lepanto. But the hand of death was already upon him. On his thirty-sixth birthday, while still at Missolonghi, he wrote:

"If thou regret'st thy youth, why live?  
The land of honorable death  
Is here . . .  
Then look around, and choose thy ground  
And take thy rest."

Stricken with illness before he could get into action, in his delirium he fancied he was leading his troops on to the charge at Lepanto. "Forward, forward!" he called to his phantom legions. Then the fire of life slowly flickered out, like the flame in a dying coal. "Now I shall go to sleep," he murmured to a faithful attendant. These were his final words.

The tides of literary reputation ebb and flow like those of the ocean. The tremendous impact of Byron's fame in the flood tide of his literary popularity is difficult for us to realize, now that the tide has been ebbing so long.<sup>1</sup> To his own generation, Byron was

<sup>1</sup> Byron's literary reputation is still very high on the Continent.

an inspired spokesman. In masculine and, though declamatory, none the less powerful speech he voiced the chaotic yearnings and strivings of his day—its passion for liberty, its despairs, its doubts and questionings, its blind gropings toward new ideals and new values. All the strength and all the weakness of his generation are found in Byron.

And it is just because his was the voice of his generation that it lacked the quality which transcends time, and echoes so faintly in the ears of a generation busied with other problems. Byron was not a Shakespeare, but he was supremely himself, in all his virtues and all his vices. His work, dashing, brilliant, effective, and rich in content as it is, is marred by faults of technique and displays marked inequalities in merit. His thoughts welled out faster than he could put them down, and if he paused he could not recapture the fleeting mood. And so he is careless of form, of finish, of detail, and at times even of grammar.

'He is the poet of the mountain-peak, the sea, and the tempest. A contempt for his fellow-men mingles curiously with his love of nature and her solitudes. Unlike Wordsworth, he does not efface himself in her presence, but finds a congenial spirit in her moods of fierceness and of power.'

The tumult of his own life and emotions is mirrored in his verse, which he made "the memorial of his imperious and colossal egotism." His heroes follow the same general type and are born of his own personality. They are not chastened by suffering. "They stand solitary in the midst of the sufferings of the world, in their own woes, sullen and defiant until the last."

Byron's ideal of freedom was not the freedom dreamed of by philosophers and by the political leaders of oppressed peoples. It was largely a concept of personal license. "I have simplified my politics," Byron confided, "into an utter detestation of all existing governments."

It was Byron's lack of any constructive social faith, any vision of a redeemed and uplifted humanity such as inspired Shelley, that makes his reputation a tarnished thing today. But the striking force and beauty of many a passage in his writings will give enjoyment to lovers of literature as long as English is a living tongue.

## AN INTERPRETER OF DESTINY

EDWIN MILLER WHEELOCK AND THE WAR BETWEEN  
THE STATES

BY CHARLES KASSEL

THE corridors of time resound with the clangor of the battle between those schools of philosophy and religion which proclaim the utter freedom of men and movements on the stage of history and those schools which view the experiences of peoples and races as a mighty drama, cast by some supernal intelligence, and whose course and climax are fixed by inevitable law. The surge of the conflict, back and forth, as the one system or the other rose to the ascendant, has left an ineffaceable impress upon thought and character, and the annals of the past sufficiently reveal how subtly each belief works up into individual life and conduct.

Scientifically, the question is insoluble. It reaches farther back into the history of being than science penetrates. In religion, it occupies a region where faith and not reason is the arbiter and where each sect guides its groping way by the word of some inspired page or prophet. It is in the realm of philosophy alone, upon this overshadowing problem, that the eager mind finds measurable scope for exercise.

Back of the whole world-story, with its magnificent panorama of evolution, this question may lie. The last two decades have widened incalculably our thought of the evolutionary process. The revelations of the spectroscope, the latest triumphs of the chemical and physical laboratories, and, above all, the apocalyptic splendor of radio-activity, have disclosed to us a vision of growth and becoming which embraces not only the animate creation as we have hitherto known it but the very metals and crystals and even the atoms of the material fabric about and beneath us.

The scientist today sees with larger eyes than in the days gone by. He thinks of all matter as the outflowering, in all likelihood, of one primordial substance, and he even wonders whether all life as well may not reach back to a mother-element in the cosmic prime. Peering within the atom, until recently deemed simple and indivisible, he finds the electron sweeping with incredible swiftness its orbit about the nucleus in the infinitesimal system, forming as it does a miniature of the solar scheme, and the imposing thought drives in upon him that the atomic order may be the type and symbol of the cosmos itself, with suns and planets as units of galaxies, and these of larger clusters still. Upon this theory the whole visible universe, with others trillions of miles distant, may form a grand system, rolling, through inconceivable ranges of time, about some sublime center.

That the bewildering profusion of worlds may be thus a slow blossoming in space and time, through measureless ages, of a pre-existing Idea, with a principle of growth, unfoldment and decay ingemed and fixed, is neither new nor unwelcome to the philosophic mind, but heretofore we have rebelled against the thought of such a process in the evolution of the animate creation and in the history of man. If we assume, however, that the starry hosts are a harmonious whole, wrought forth in the loom of creation according to a set pattern and to be unravelled and rewoven when some huge cycle is done, we shall find it hard to deny that the course of life and history itself may have been foreshadowed in outline from the beginning, leaving only the details to the play of secondary causes, including the volition of man.

It is just here we encounter the seemingly hopeless conflict between the idea of necessity and the idea of free will. To solve the difficulty will require a deeper knowledge, and perhaps a higher order of mind, than the race possesses as yet. It may well be, however, that we have made too much, in our philosophic thinking, of free will and moral responsibility. Libertarian in every direction, political, religious and social alike, and disposed to exalt the principle of freedom in all merely human relations, our dislike for the doctrines of the necessitarians may spring from our bias and not from our reason.

In reality, the will to good may be the synonym of the highest freedom, and the will or proneness to evil, where it exists, the badge and measure of its absence. If, because of an invincible revulsion, we are definitely incapable of a heinous act, our moral responsibility may be less, but our freedom, in spite of the seeming paradox, may be greater. For a solution of such questions, fundamental though they are, we must await an illumination beyond us at present. As

with the conceptions of infinity in space and eternity in time, the mind thus far is without the material, and perhaps without the machinery, for reaching a conclusion.

Meanwhile, none the less, the thought is an admissible one that, if such things as Fate and Destiny exist, exceptional natures may not be without the faculty for catching their secret whispers. We can not say that we have sounded to its depths the mystery of mind. Sealed away in the hidden places of the subconscious may lie unexplored chambers, filled with treasures richer than any Pharaoh's, and whose full opening awaits some unknown hour in the history of man.

Even the sober scientist in these latter days, seeing all things in a new and magic light, is ready to believe that in the realm of mind may lie as many marvels as the new century has unveiled in the domain of matter. It was a startling suggestion of John Burroughs, in his "Sheaf of Nature Notes," published in the *North American Review for September*, 1920, shortly before his death, that the mysterious instincts in the insect and lesser animal world may be in reality senses of a psychic order, "and that in what we call telepathy we get hints of the same thing among ourselves." Nor is it without significance that the great naturalist should have reserved for so late an hour the utterance of a thought which must have been long in his mind.

"It seems certain," says J. Arthur Thomson, in his *Introduction to Science* (Home University Library, p. 230), "that in many fields there are men with a remarkable power of intuition, born not made, of whose methods even self-analysis can give no account." Such a pronouncement would not have been possible to a distinguished scientist of the earlier day and it is a striking commentary upon the mystical tinge in modern scientific thinking that this statement should have come from the same hand which, in the recently-published *Outline of Science*, has given to the world a work unique and unrivalled in its field—an authoritative exposition of all the sciences with their interrelations, told in language of majestic simplicity and beauty.

In the issues of the present magazine for September, 1920, February and July, 1922, and March, August and December, 1923, we saw that Edwin Miller Wheelock was not only a writer of remarkable gifts, and a courageous champion of intellectual freedom, but that he belonged to an order of men who look clearly into the future where measures and movements are concerned which make a supreme appeal to their natures. Von Holst, as we found, had, by

a quotation in his "Constitutional History of the United States," paid an impressive tribute to the seer-like character of the young minister's utterances upon the execution of John Brown, and it was indeed a notable thing that from the fact of the raid at Harper's Ferry, and the tragic fate of its leader, he could construct so faithful a picture of the strange events to come, and could so accurately fix their date. No less remarkable were the deliverances which in the early years of the war came from his pulpit at Dover, New Hampshire, proclaiming the higher meaning of the struggle as it proceeded, and emphasizing with eloquent reiteration its fated course and character.

Liberal Unitarian as he was, and disciple of the arch-heretic Theodore Parker, he presented the spectacle of a mind freed from the trammels of the old religious sanctions yet oppressed with an overwhelming sense of the providential in human life and history, and his discourses between the outbreak of the war and the end of the year that followed, as dealt with in the issue of this magazine for March, 1924, are an ample testimony to his penetrating insight and the breadth of his forevision. That the prophetic passages quoted in the last installment of this biography ring out so clear and full, and, above all, that they should have been spoken when the Northern cause was at its darkest stage, and facing what seemed almost certain military defeat, is only an added token of the calmness of his faith in the destined outcome of the crisis.

As the war progressed the North found itself increasingly surrounded with difficulties. The world had held its judgment in suspense and awaited the decisive battle which should determine whether the strife would be brief or prolonged. The battle of Bull Run demonstrated that the struggle was a war, and not a petty rebellion, and instantly sentiment abroad crystallized and nations inquired of the Union what it was seeking to accomplish.

Three days after the election of Lincoln, an editorial had appeared in the *New York Tribune*, written evidently by the hand of Greeley himself, recognizing the right of the Southern states to secede, if they desired, and recommending that they be permitted to depart in peace. Such, indeed, had been the feeling of the abolitionists, and a peaceful separation was advocated at the North far more widely, as James Ford Rhodes tells us, than Northern historians now like to admit. Lincoln, on the other hand, while he had set his face sternly against secession, as an impossible thing under the constitution, disclaimed all desire to interfere with slavery in the South.

The state of feeling at the North upon the subject of the South's distinctive institution admits of but one construction. So widely prevalent was the belief in the responsibility of the abolitionists for the tension between North and South that an anti-slavery convention held at Tremont Temple in Boston to commemorate the anniversary of John Brown's execution was broken up by a mob, and the mob was largely composed, according to rumors at the time, of Beacon Street aristocrats.

For the Republicans at the North Lincoln had spoken a word as unequivocal as the action of the mob itself. "Do the people of the South," he said in a letter to Alexander H. Stephens, "really entertain fear that a Republican administration would, directly or indirectly, interfere with their slaves or with them about their slaves? If they do, I wish to assure you there is no cause for such fear."

Congress itself, indeed, on the day of the battle of Bull Run, adopted a resolution, introduced two days previously, which gave the most solemn expression to the same sentiment. The war was not waged for conquest or subjugation, the resolution declared, or to overthrow or interfere with the rights or established institutions of the Southern states, but only to maintain the supremacy of the constitution and to preserve the Union.

That the war must necessarily end in the freedom of the slaves was not appreciated at the North, though at the South Jefferson Davis foresaw from the beginning that the defeat of the Southern Confederacy would mean the end of slavery. The abolitionists were still a small body with limited influence and their program was distinctly distasteful to the politically powerful classes. There was every inclination among Northern men to leave slavery untouched where it was already rooted and established and the Republicans accentuated in every way their cordial dislike of the abolitionist reformers. The emancipation of the slaves was beyond the power of the federal government under the Constitution and the successful party made it very clear they would not war upon the South for the supremacy of the Constitution and at the same time strain or break its provisions in the anti-slavery cause.

Whatever the feeling of the Republican leaders, however, as to the problem of slavery, however clearly they may have realized that emancipation was beyond the power of the federal government under the Constitution, emancipation was inevitable in the progress of events, and the student of the times wonders that this truth was so little appreciated. With the historic panorama unfolded before the mind's eye, and from the vantage-ground of present knowledge,

the fatuity of any hope of compromise is apparent. The war for the conquest of the South could not be fought over a range of years without forfeiting wholly the sympathy of the world. A great moral issue was necessary about which a lofty sentiment could center, alike in the North and throughout the world at large, and in the institution of slavery that moral issue lay ready-made. The triumph of the abolitionists was predestined. A war to subjugate the rebellious states the world might tolerate, if the war were short and successful, but a protracted war, or one of doubtful fortunes, would be certain ultimately to bring recognition of Southern independence in its train and possibly foreign intervention. A war, however, fought to rid the soil of America from the stain of chattel slavery was one which in its very nature made recognition difficult and intervention impossible without doing violence to the sentiment of mankind.

That the war must take on ultimately the character of a crusade against slavery was clearly foreseen by our minister. The prophetic ken which had stood him in good stead through the preceding years did not forsake him now and the sermons coming from the pulpit at Dover betray an insight into events that were passing and a sureness of feeling as to the outcome which lend peculiar impressiveness to the manuscripts of those years. In an early sermon of this period, he said:

"We are now reaping that which we have sown. Our mouths are filled with the fruit of our own devices and that despotism whose chain we so complacently fastened round the ankle of the unoffending slave is now seeking to twist its bloody links around our own necks. Let the land now undergoing the agonies of dismemberment testify to the depth of our sin and the need for reform. The nation has stood for five long months meekly parrying the deadly thrusts of treason and returning none of them in the temper in which they were delivered. We lost the battle of Manassas because we chose to go the half-witted way to work. There were four millions of Americans intensely and irrevocably loyal in our enemy's rear. There wanted but a move and a word and the whole rear of the foe was our own. But it was thought better to fight with one arm tied up and the result was suitable. We gave up our brethren to the slaughter, we sullied our banner, we buried our friends and our good name—but we saved slavery. Thus stands the case today. The war is simply and solely one for the defense of our national unity and life. We are fighting as a nation from the same instinct which would prompt each of us, as an individual, to defend himself if an attempt were made to cut his body into three and thirty pieces."

"But we are in a revolution and revolutions never go backward and only seem to stand still. The ball of revolution, once fairly in motion, is beyond human control. So it has always been. Luther did not mean to split the Roman church—only to reform it. Hampden and Cromwell did not mean to destroy the English monarchy—only to curb its prerogative. Wesley did not mean to sever himself from the national church—only to shake it out of its sleep. The Continental Congress did not mean independence—only redress of grievances. But when the hand of God has struck the hour and turned the stream of history, men are like reeds in the blast and whole nations are swept before the motions of his will.

"The signs are plain to all eyes that the system which has caused the carnage of all these battlefields and made oaths the most solemn brittle as straw and taught lying and stealing as cardinal virtues shall die amid the convulsions it has raised. In the loyal slave states, if any such can be found, insurrection will be suppressed, the institution left to its own chances. But wherever slavery is used to help the work of treason on it will fall the blow of the federal arm till, from sunrise to sunset, the eye of day does not rest on a solitary slave. To this end the internal spirit of this national uprising is clearly tending. On this sublime height the nation is planting itself. It will deal with the slave power as with one found guilty of treason against the majesty of the republic. It will liberate the loyal men in the Southern states from the reign of terror that there prevails, and then, in concert with them, prepare a New South, reconstruct its now degraded state sovereignties, prevent that beautiful land from becoming the desperate haunt of brigandage and piracy and forever end the ownership of man in man. On treason's head this just retribution is impending.

"The cause of the war is simple. This is a slave-holders revolt. It has no other parentage. Slavery alone has split a happy people into two warring parts and wrecked the foremost government of the world. Believe it not, my friends, when you are told that the army of the republic must cleave its way from the Potomac to the Gulf at the cost of the best blood of the nation and leave the cause and the sole cause of all this carnage protected and powerful for future mischief. This is utterly impossible.

"Peace can only come by burying the cause of the war so deep that no trump of resurrection shall ever reach it. Only thus can our lost stars be recalled to their orbits in the federal sky. The hour is at hand, its dawn already whitens dome and spire and hilltop, when

the dullest will see that there is no alternative between emancipation and national dismemberment.

"There are not many orphans and widows and bereaved brothers and fathers without sons as yet, but wait until Southern treason has hung crepe on thousands of our homes, then there comes an uprising compared to which this present excitement will be as frost to fire; the slave power and the war will both die on the same day, smitten through and through with the trenchant blade of complete, unanimous abolition!"

Again, in a later sermon of about the same time:

"This monstrous thing stands in the midst of the republic like a pyramid as of skulls and serpents, of cruelties cabled into law, reminding us of the sight that once, in a South American forest, nearly froze Humboldt's steady soul with horror—the spectacle of a pyramidal column of living, knotted snakes, interfolding, intertwined in one body.

"The next step in the divine plan for the progress of this great nation is the destruction of slavery. That is God's purpose in this war. It is as plain as the hand writing on the wall and needs no interpreter. Every star on our banner, every stripe on its folds, is now singing the hymn of emancipation and eternal union. It is the harvest-time and the tares are to be burned. What the North always failed to do for itself even He who causes the wrath of man to praise Him is accomplishing through the blind madness of the South. Their armed and desperate revolt is as though a decayed tooth should pull itself out—as though a cancer should drop away or a gangrened limb amputate itself, when the nervous fevers of the patient would not suffer the operation to be performed otherwise.

"The time has been when this ferocious sin that now convulses a continent and wraps our republic in flames might have silently and gradually disappeared—the slow and kindly action of moral and economic forces acting upon it as the April sun upon our winter snows. This method for thirty years the free states have pressed on the slave-power in vain. It is too late now. The moments for fulfilling higher duties are always transient. Noiselessly as apparitions they come; they are here—they are there—they are gone. The lips of argument now are silenced; reason pleads no more and arms must settle this high debate.

"The slave system, armed, desperate, maddened, is at our door. It has thrust us into the red path of war; it has attacked the republic at its heart and one of the two must go to the wall, crushed and forever destroyed. The struggle is no light one—it is for life and

death. One of the two forces must go down. Either liberty must perish or slavery die. Our very life as a nation is at stake.

"Let no one think that a victory at Vicksburg or on the Rappahannock, the blockade of the Southern ports, the retaking of a few fortresses, will vindicate our insulted honor and end the war; and then that we can peacefully arrange for a general settlement and division, they forming one confederacy and we another. Not so. If this union is broken asunder it will be broken into atoms and we become as a herd of Mexican states.

"The Lord has made us *One Nation* and we can not become two or three or four. We are one people or we are nothing. The day that sees our recognition of a slave empire on our soil will see our national annihilation. Every cause of warfare would still remain, stung into tenfold rage; the very first question in dispute would have to be decided on the battlefield; each meeting by land or sea would be a hostile collision; the intervals of truce would be but as brief breathing-spaces for a new struggle and the interminable war would swiftly drag us down the steep of disorganization and anarchy to the lower deep of European dictation and control.

"But some will say, O you can not conquer the South. You can not subjugate eight millions of people. I know it. We do not wish to conquer the South. The slave power is not the South any more than Boston is Massachusetts. It is the slave power—the eternal foe of free government—that, first silencing every loyal voice at home and refusing to submit its traitorous work to the popular vote, now grasps at the nation's heart. That power we can destroy in a single campaign and we must destroy it or be ourselves destroyed.

"When God calls upon us to execute his decrees, like Jonah of old we may close our ears to his call but in our blind disobedience we shall only stumble upon a worse fate and after many stripes turn back to our work at last."

The summer of 1862, as we have seen, beheld the North farther than ever, to all seeming, from a successful end of the contest. Dis-  
couragement was in every Northern heart. Of the mercenaries with which the Union armies were filled toward the close of the struggle there were few as yet—the fighting forces were composed of the rarest blood of the North and East, consecrated to the cause by an impassioned feeling of its utter rightfulness; but the god of battles, for the time, was with the South.

The great struggle, nonetheless, was approaching now the psychological hour when the choice must be made from which the whole North had shrunk. With the possibility of foreign intervention, and

the certainty of foreign aid, the triumph of the Southern cause was perilously near, and with its triumph would come the blight of a divided empire on the American continent, with bloody contests in the future. The intuitive mind of Lincoln felt the approach of a supreme crisis and already he was preparing to take a bold and decisive step, and one which should fill the soul of our minister with an unmixed joy; but the preparations for this step rested as yet in the consciousness of the patient executive at Washington, unknown to any save his most intimate counselors, and in the meanwhile the Dover pulpit continued to echo with the prophetic utterances of the young preacher. Said he in July, 1862:

"We can not make crises—God makes them and offers them to our hands to use. We cannot control events; they will flow on in His providence—He gives them to us to work with. Twelve months have passed since the first great federal defeat—twelve months filled with meaning louder than words or than cannon—events so significant as to make eloquence tame and vapid. The American people were called from their farms and workshops, where they labored with faces turned earthward, with brains, arms and hands intent on the conquest of material nature, and were whelmed in a sea of untold disgraces and sacrifices.

"But not one of our sufferings could be spared and our defeats will prove more gainful than victories. The experience of the last sixteen months of faction and anarchy is fast producing in the nation the conviction that the rebellion and its cause must sink together into a common grave.

"A small party at the North—continually growing smaller—still cower before the power that stirred up the rebellion and talk of putting down the revolt while respecting and protecting its mainspring and cause.

"The war really began not with the siege of Sumpter but in the fall of 1855 on the plains of Kansas. Every slave state save Maryland and Delaware had an army on the plains of Kansas that liberty might be killed, but a handful of Northern men with a few rifles said to slavery, you have brought this upon us and you shall cease to exist in Kansas. They also said to those whose shackles they struck off, seize arms and fight for freedom with us. Thus Kansas was saved and thus will the Union be saved, if at all.

"There are those who have been hoping for the reconstruction of the 'Union as it was.' That delusion is now dispelled. The slave power stands forth unchangeably and implacably disunion. It has ceased to palaver. It has discarded forever the stars and stripes.

Henceforth it will have empire or the grave. You can not soothe it. You can not conciliate it. No depth of abasement on our part will lure it back. It will not negotiate—it will not capitulate—it will conquer or die; and its success means the subjection of the working classes of the North to the auction block.

"Let those, great and small, who have whelmed the republic in this wanton war pay for it with their goods and lands and chattels and lives. Now is the time to settle our long account with eternal justice for the working classes of the South. Have we not been brayed long enough in the mortar of a slave rebellion to have our negro folly depart from us? This is no time for quackery, sentimentalism or tenderness to the rebels. We have poured out treasure enough to buy up half a continent. We have lavished streams of the most precious blood. The bones of our brothers lie bleaching on the soil of every rebel state. It is the second year of the war and we have but touched its borders in the cotton states. It yet remains a question whether free institutions shall endure or be crushed into ruin. We must do speedily the one thing we have too long forbore. We must speak the one word that has died on our tongues.

"The cotton states contain three millions of people devotedly loyal and true. They will not wait for either bounty or draft. They are already drilled—drilled by a hundred years of bitterest oppression—every drop of their blood is earnest—covered by God with black faces so that you may know them at a distance and always to be trusted. Call them to your aid! Give the rebellion into their hands during the sickly months of summer and the autumn will witness the close of the war. The President promises to do this if necessity compels, but so will the rebels if driven to the wall and the danger is that we shall be too slow and too late.

"The hand of destiny is moving fast on the dial-plate of time. It is a race between Lincoln and Davis which will reach emancipation first and whichever does will succeed in the end. When our army draws near to final success the South is already pledged to write emancipation on her banners, identify those waiting millions with her cause and welcome the protectorate of a European power. They like ourselves will throw everything overboard before they will submit to defeat. We then would not conquer her if we could and we could not if we would—the sympathy of the world will be with her and the contempt of the world upon us.

"But—but," says some friend, who has not yet emerged from the chrysalis, 'you are advocating John Brownism and abolitionism.'

It does look like it, certainly, but if your sensibilities are very delicate and the rose smells any sweeter by another name call it military necessity. Battle is a swift educator. We are all abolitionists now or will be after a third retreat from Richmond, while the main difference between Wendell Phillips and Abraham Lincoln seems to be that what the one calls abolition the other terms abolition.

"John Brown's crime was that he saw this day a little sooner than we saw it and his democracy was just three years in advance of ours. The lesson for which he set the text five hundred thousand men are writing in characters visible from Harper's Ferry to New Orleans. His soul, multiplied by half a million, filling the heavens with flame and the earth with thunder, is 'marching on.'

"Our past union was one of diplomacy, not of ideas; of law, not of love; states married, not matched; chained together, not welded into one. It was a union of 'two snarling hounds leashed together,' but out of this war will come a better, a homogeneous union, lasting as the granite that underlies the continent."

Almost on the very day these last words were spoken, President Lincoln imparted to his cabinet the project of decreeing the emancipation of the slaves by executive order as a war measure, although the actual promulgation of the proclamation would await a Union victory. It was on July 22nd, 1862, that the draft of the preliminary proclamation was read to the cabinet but it is a striking commentary on the doubts which infested even the mind of Lincoln upon the subject that on August 22nd, a month later, he should have written to Greeley the oft-quoted letter giving it as his primary purpose to save the Union, whether with or without slavery.

Clearly as our own minister may have foreseen the certainty of emancipation, we cannot marvel that Lincoln hesitated. He was above all a practical statesman. He hoped, perhaps he knew, that somehow the issue of the struggle would bring with it the end of slavery in America, but he could not be sure that emancipation was even yet expedient.

Sentiment abroad was distinctly unfavorable to the Northern cause. The English historian Grote, who had many fine words for democracy in Greece, felt no sympathy with the Union. Carlyle was without real feeling against slavery in America. Even Gladstone, up to July, 1863, was hostile. The chief newspapers of England were frankly Southern in sympathy, as were the leading English statesmen. Great Britain, indeed, and France as well, was secretly opposed to the Northern cause, and among the nations of the world, Russia alone was consistently the friend of the Union. In

English harbors vessels were building, over the protest of American ambassadors, which were meant in the fullness of time to break the Southern blockade. With the exception of D'Israeli, who was always opposed to intervention in American affairs, and of Bright, whose fine nature was sensitive to struggles for freedom, little came from the British shores to give encouragement to Lincoln.

It is one of the touching episodes of the time, however, that while British statesmen and British press were following the promptings of British interests, which dictated the opening of the Southern cotton ports, British workingmen, suffering unemployment and extreme privation from the stoppage of cotton supplies for English mills, clung stubbornly in sympathy to the Northern cause, recognizing instinctively that chattel slavery in whatever form and wherever practiced held a menace for the working classes. They were still without the ballot, as they had been without the ballot in the days of the American Revolution, and their feelings were not reflected in the action of the English Parliaments and ministries, but they could make their voice articulate in other ways and the note of sympathy for the North which came from all meetings of English factory workers seemed a happy omen in the midst of so much discouragement.

# THE ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IDEAS OF JESUS

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

SEVERAL noteworthy books have lately been written on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth—their essential significance, their originality, and their relation to the time, place and circumstances which gave them birth. Some of the questions raised and treated in these works are of greater importance, historically and scientifically, than the average man who considers himself religious and devout, and who is not averse to candid, searching discussion of everything connected with the life and mission of Jesus, appears to realize. But as superstition, credulity and unthinking acceptance of traditions give way to critical and rational discussion of theological and metaphysical subjects, the study and interpretation of Jesus and his doctrines is bound to assume an increasingly objective and detached character. The elements of permanent value in the Christian faith have nothing to fear from the most rigorous use of the analytical and scientific method; the accidental, ephemeral and superficial elements of that faith will, and should be, placed in the right light and traced to their sources.

Two questions naturally suggest themselves to the earnest and independent student of the New Testament, and these claim a good deal of attention in the new books to which reference has just been made. The answers given are not quite satisfactory, perhaps, but they indicate an advance on previous views and enable the unprejudiced truth-seeking inquirer to make further progress.

The first and obviously important question is this: To what extent, if any, was Jesus consciously and unconsciously influenced in reaching and promulgating his doctrines by the belief that the end of the world was imminent? The second question, old yet ever new, is—Just *what* does Jesus teach and preach in connection with vital and grave problems of human conduct under such conditions as obtain today?

Let it be frankly recognized that opinions may and do diverge widely with reference to the first of these questions. Dogmatism or overconfidence on the point would be as arrogant as it would be vain and foolish. The best we can do is to apply common sense to the injunctions, aphorisms and words of Jesus and determine whether they were intended to apply to normal and stable society or only to a society whose days were numbered and whose dissolution and complete rebirth were inevitable.

Of the many utterances, direct and indirect, which may be cited from the Gospels concerning the impending destruction of the world, the following must suffice:

"Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."

"This generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled."

"Watch, therefore, for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come."

"Therefore, be ye also ready: for in such an hour as ye think not the Son of Man cometh."

"The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye and believe in the gospel."

"Watch ye, therefore. . . . I say unto ye, Watch."

It is impossible to read these and similar sayings in their contexts without recognizing that Jesus believed he was preaching to a doomed world, a world in which *the supreme duty and supreme opportunity was repentance, spiritual preparation for a new heaven and a new earth*. Let sophists assert what they will; simple honesty requires us to give the words of Jesus their natural meaning. We know that he often spoke in parables and freely used symbols, like a true Oriental. But we also know that he could be blunt, down-right caustic and laconic. We cannot doubt that, had he known that the world he was seeking to save would last for hundreds of thousands of years; had he conceived his, and its, problem in a modern, scientific, evolutional spirit, his manner and form and "approach," though not his essential matter, would have been radically different from what they were. He would not have stressed the need of *repentance*; he would have emphasized the necessity and wisdom of conduct conducive to harmony, happiness and peace under normal conditions.

I may add that those who are disposed to doubt the foregoing inference would do well to consider the style, manner and form of those of our own contemporaries in Europe and America who claim to be, and indeed are generally admitted to be, the true, sincere, consistent, frank followers of Jesus. Do these men and women dwell

on repentance, of watching and praying for the coming of the Lord, on the wonders, miracles and calamities that shall attend the end of the world, on angels coming forth to sever the wicked from the just? No; they do nothing of the sort. *They* dwell on the application of the teachings of Jesus to concrete problems, to industrial, social and political relations. They think and speak in terms of service, solidarity, love, positive beneficence. The conclusion is inescapable, then, that if Jesus had not believed in the inevitable, catastrophic end of the world, he would not have painted the gloomy pictures he did paint, would not have spoken of "days of vengeance," of distress and wrath, of signs in the sun, moon, stars. He would have urged and illustrated his gospel with reference to normal, every-day life and its perplexities. He undoubtedly shared some of the notions and superstitions of his time and his race, a fact, by the way, which makes his genius and profound insight all the more extraordinary.

We now come to the second question—namely, what Jesus thought and taught with regard to the proper human way of life generally, and what his doctrines should mean to us and future generations—generations living in a world that is *not* running down like a clock, in a world still evolving and advancing with the aid of science and the better side of our nature.

Of course, candid persons must admit that there are ambiguities, evasions and even flat contradictions in the saying attributed to Jesus. Many books have been written on the "essential" message of Jesus, and each interpreter finds quotations in the new testament to support his particular view. Was Jesus opposed to war? Was Jesus a communist? Did Jesus justify punishment of wrongdoing? Such questions as these have been argued exhaustively, and with little prospect of agreement. But, after all, if we clear our minds of cant and bias, there is no *serious* difficulty in determining what Jesus is said to have said on the cardinal issues with which so-called Christian society is still wrestling. Let us consult the text and give words their reasonable and proper meaning, and, where we find inconsistencies, let us note them and call logic and reason to our aid in order to decide which statement was deliberate and which casual and accidental.

First, as to *war*. Is war compatible with the teachings of Jesus? We are told that it is, because, forsooth, Jesus was very angry with the money changers, drove them out of the temple and called them thieves; and, further, because he denounced hypocrites and lawyers; spoke harshly of the rich, despised the well-fed, complacent and

greedy, and did not hesitate to array set against set, class against class, group against group. We are reminded by professed Christians that Jesus said:

"Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay, but rather division."—(Luke.)

Or, according to another version:

"I came not to send peace, but a sword."

"And a man's foes shall be they of his own household."—(Matthew.)

And, on the strength of these expressions, chiefly, we are asked to believe that Jesus was *not* opposed to war as a means of settling international disputes and differences!

The suggestion must strike one as absurd. True, Jesus did not directly condemn war. True, he did not even discuss it. But, whatever the explanation of these omissions may be, it is idle and perverse to maintain that opposition to war, to brute physical force, to wholesale slaughter, is not implied in all of his teachings and doctrines.

It is not to be wondered at that, at last, self-respecting churchmen and devout laymen, theological students and other serious-minded young men and women are beginning to protest vehemently against the encouragement, sanction and support of war by the so-called Christian denominations! There are limits to human ingenuity, to human self-deception and to human inconsistency. Consider the following absolutely quint-essential sayings of Jesus:

"But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

"And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.

". . . Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you."

Can any decently honest Christian pretend that the foregoing injunctions can be reconciled with justification of war? The answer is plain, and no doubt or cavil is possible.

Some writers, indeed, have affirmed that Jesus, in the foregoing injunctions, had in mind only one's neighbors and fellow-nationals, and that his ethical views were not meant to apply to relations between states or between subjects of one state and those of another. To fortify this contention, we are referred to the episode of the tribute money—the penny—and to Jesus' supposedly adroit avoidance of a dilemma by distinguishing between the things that are

Caesar's and the things that are God's. Diplomacy, foreign affairs, war-and-peace issues between states are declared to be affairs of state, Caesar's concerns, and hence, when the subject or citizen is ordered to fight an enemy of Caesar's, he may do so without disobeying the commandments of God or of Jesus.

The answer to this line of argument is two-fold. In the first place, Jesus would hardly have failed to make the momentous distinction between state ethics and individual and personal ethics clear and emphatic had he intended it. The matter is far too grave to leave to far-fetched inference and guesswork. In the second place, there is no theoretical or practical difference between an order of Caesar—that is, a state or government—that relates to domestic, national matters and an order that has to do with foreign policy. A law is a law, and its sanction is always the same. If the individual is not responsible for the state's foreign policies, he is not responsible for its domestic policies. If he may and must obey treaties and laws growing out of international affairs, he is also bound to obey laws covering relations between neighbors and fellow-citizens. Jesus never said, "*Resist not evil, unless ordered to do so by the state*"; "*Love your enemies, unless the state orders otherwise.*" To argue that this is what he meant is to make a mockery of Christian teaching, to indulge in paradox-mongering and sophistry.

No; Jesus evidently meant what he said, and if he be followed and obeyed, war is out of the question. If his words do not forbid physical force, resort to the duel and arbitrament of the sword, on any and all occasions, they simply mean nothing, and it is idle to talk of a new testament, of fulfilling and bettering the old law, of a kingdom within one's spirit, of a totally revolutionary world-philosophy properly to be called Christian. So far as the so-called Christian nations' theory and practice of war is concerned, they are, and never have been, Christians. That is all!

As to property, communism and the whole complex of economic relations, the writer is satisfied that Jesus' teachings cannot possibly be applied to modern conditions in a literal sense or even in sense approximating the literal. Jesus preached to a primitive and simple community, and to a primitive and simple world. He preached to tillers of the soil, fishermen, journeymen, petty merchants, and to the few aristocrats, landlords, rulers and scholars who lived on the fruits of the toil of the common people. His doctrines, moreover, one must note again, would not have been conveyed in the form in which he did couch them had he not expected an early

destruction of the world and the advent of the kingdom of God. Let us candidly consider these injunctions:

"Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth."

"Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on."

"Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself."

Even a primitive community could not follow such advice as is contained in the foregoing sentences and live, for there would be no plowing, no planting, no gathering of crops, no building, no sewing, no shoemaking, no trading, no productive labor of any kind. How would mortal men and women subsist under such a regime? The answer is life would soon come to an end. Jesus could not intend race suicide, and such suicide would have been sinful and criminal in any case. Of course, he could provide food miraculously, as he did on certain specified occasions; but he made no such promise to his followers, and his reference to the lilies of the field further precludes the theory of miraculous supplies of all the necessities of life at his express command. The unavoidable conclusion, then, is that he did not use the words quoted in a literal or semi-literal sense. How, then, are they to be interpreted?

Suppose we seek light from other utterances and episodes. Jesus told the young man who had great possessions that, if he would be "perfect," he must sell all he had, give it to the poor, and thus lay up treasures in heaven. But, clearly, this advice could not be meant for everybody, for if everybody followed it, there would be no market and no buyers for the goods and no possible use for them. All would be poor and destitute, and all would have to depend on miracles for food and raiment. Of course, Jesus' disciples, whom he charged with spreading his gospel, could be perfect in the sense of the words addressed to the young man, for they were to be fed and clothed by their converts; indeed, they were instructed to carry "neither purse, nor scrip, nor shoes." But Jesus knew that he would have but few such self-sacrificing and faithful followers. He said the harvest was great and the laborers few, since they were to be lambs among the wolves. Communism might be highly desirable for small bands of itinerant preachers and prophets; it does not follow that whole communities and societies, with institutions to maintain children to bring up, wealth to conserve, can rationally be expected to seek perfection in communism and a life of asceticism and prayer.

In short, there is nothing in Jesus' teachings, explicit or implicit, to require his modern followers to adopt communism, socialism, the

single-tax, or any other particular "ism." All that the spirit of his teachings enjoins is generous treatment of one's fellowmen in all relations of life—love and beneficence on a foundation of equality and justice. Opinions may well differ among sincere Christians as to the kind and type of institutions, adjustments, relations—economic and social—which best embody justice, generosity, and love of one's fellowmen. It is even possible to argue that capitalism, freed from abuses and perversions, is more likely to promote human happiness than any form of socialism! An appeal to Jesus' doctrines could not settle a question of that sort; it is purely scientific, and must be settled in accordance with experience, knowledge of individual and social psychology, and the operation of economic laws. Intellectual honesty, sympathy, forebearance and good will Jesus unquestionably demands; the rest is "mere opinion," as Carlyle would say.

Finally, about punishment of crime, or of anti-social conduct when it passes certain limits. Jesus manifestly did not believe in punishment, although he believed in stern reprobation of wrong-doing. In other words, he believed in moral resistance to evil, but not in physical. The driving of the money-changers from the temple cannot be called punishment, but it was not non-resistance, either. It was and always is a form of very effective resistance, for we know that, as a matter of fact, many anti-social acts and habits are repressed or prevented by moral censure alone—by criticism and social ostracism, by scorn, ridicule and contempt.

The true follower of Jesus cannot vote to hang or electrocute or poison the worst of our criminals. He cannot vote to imprison anyone, or to degrade him—save, again, by moral means—or to flog him. On these points Jesus' teaching is emphatic and uncompromising. Punishment is anti-Christian, just as war is anti-Christian. There is no escaping from this conclusion. It is mockery and hypocrisy to kill criminals and ask God to forgive them. Jesus did not recommend so cynical a policy as this. He demanded that *men* should forgive trespassers and criminals; that *men* should return good for evil; that *men* should love even their enemies and translate their sentiments into appropriate deeds.

To say that society and civilization are impossible without jails, executions, and the like, is to say that Jesus' positive teachings are impracticable and incompatible with civilized existence—to say that Jesus did not show a Way of Life, but uttered hollow and meaningless sayings. The religion which does not point to a way of life is no religion worthy of the name. Either Jesus must be accredited

or he must be rejected as to all injunctions and mandates which he patently intended to be taken literally and which reason tells us *can* be so taken. The Christian is bound to try Christianity where such a course is possible. If he refuses to do this, he simply disavows and repudiates Jesus' basic teachings. This, of course, he is privileged to do, but he is *not* privileged to pretend to believe and embrace doctrines which he has no intention of living up to and fearlessly applying.

It should be frankly admitted, however, that those Christian pacifists, lay and clerical alike, who are now condemning all war and bitterly denouncing those who justify national defense and defensive warfare as hypocrites or faint-hearted weaklings are strangely inconsistent themselves. Why, they should be asked, does not their zeal and fervor attack the penal code and the vindictive treatment of crime first? Why their sudden passion for rigorous Christianity in foreign relations and their continued indifference to capital punishment, to solitary confinement, to stripes, lock-steps, floggings, filthy cells, and all the rest of it? Far stronger would their position on war-and-peace issues be today if they had initiated, to begin with, a crusade against punishment, vengeance and judicial killing *at home!*

The back-to-Jesus movement is heartening. The interest in the ethical and social ideas of Jesus is significant and welcome. But the first and last condition of any enduring prosperity for these tendencies is intellectual honesty. It requires courage to clear one's mind of cant and face truth, but without such courage crusades and reforms are short-lived and foredoomed to deserved failure.

## DEMOCRATIZING HUMAN NATURE

BY C. W. REESE

THE age-old faith that human nature can and should be changed is being justified by scientific fact. The expectation of the religions of the world is being fulfilled. While the great religions of the world have spoken ill of original human nature, they have never doubted its possibilities. With the exception of Brahmanism, no great religion has excluded any one from the highest religious attainment. Religion has not been wholly successful in remaking human nature, but its achievements have been such that no doubts have been able successfully to assail its faith. Recent positive achievements have verified the age-long faith in the possibilities of human nature; and one positive achievement overthrows all negative experience. It is now evident that human nature not only can be changed but is being changed constantly. The process of organizing and correlating impulses, of changing human nature, is going on with startling rapidity.

While most living things constantly fit their environment to themselves, man can reshape himself also—and is now reshaping himself on a gigantic scale. Lower forms of life see only the need for change in their outside facts; man sees the need for change in himself also. Other forms of life have some part in their growth and development; but man seems to be the only living thing that consciously examines himself with serious intent to change his nature in accord with an end in view.

### I

Original human nature is a bundle of unorganized impulses. We know no man in the unaffected natural state. There are no solitary human infants. With the first social exchange the original self is overlaid; and this early experience becomes the basis of perfectly

normal dispositions later. Hence our idea of original human nature must be the result of abstraction. We have to postulate units. And "an instinct is such an hypothetical unit." Instincts may be thought of as the channels down which the current of life runs, but the channels are not fixed and permanent but are being changed constantly.

The higher range of instincts tends toward the intellectual mastery of problems; but this is a rather late development. Human nature has become what it is by a gradual process of organization around the will to responsible living.

## II

The democratization of human nature consists in the gradual organization of instincts or impulses or original tendencies in harmony with the growing conception of individual and social worth, i. e., in harmony with community of interest.

As the human race progresses its conception of individual worth grows apace. The sacredness of the individual becomes an established premise. The violation of personality becomes the gravest crime. No man may be sacrificed on the altar of another's ambition. The individual in and of himself is sacred and his personality must be regarded as inviolable.

Society, too, becomes a sacred thing. That indefinable something that we call society,—that system of psychical relations, that net-work of interdependence, that human brotherhood,—has come to be regarded with reverence and devotion. The rights of the whole have come to be regarded as inviolable as the rights of the individual.

So we must organize our fear, our hunger, our pugnacity, and our love around the will to responsible living, i. e., the will to selfhood in harmony with the selfhood of our fellowmen and the interdependence of all. This is not reversal but development of primitive tendencies on impulses. Such is the process of civilization. The instincts as well as the individuals and species worthy of survival are the federalists and not the anarchists.

## III

The principal agent in the remaking of a human being is his own will. By coercion a man may be made to do this or that but such is not to change his wants, and unless his wants are changed, his

instincts reached, he is not a remade man. And in final analysis a man's own will must determine what he wants to be or do.

Coercion long continued may change human nature, but if so it is because a degree of consent has been developed. Unless coercion, even with a child, is so managed as to develop the consent and approval of the will, it is ethically worthless.

While there is continuous interplay between a man's will and the reaction of society, and while every man is what he is in part because of what somebody else is, or has been; yet within very wide margins a man may become largely what he wills to be. That is to say, a man may consciously remake himself and society may deliberately assist in the remaking. In this lies the hope of democracy.

Human nature is the most plastic part of the living world. Within very large margins human beings may not only do what they will but also *become what they will*.

In man, of all animals, heredity counts for least and conscious building for most. Man's infancy is longest, "his instincts least fixed, his brain most unfinished at birth, his powers of habit-making and habit-changing most marked, his susceptibility to social impressions keenest."<sup>1</sup> That is to say, man of all animals is the most unfinished at birth.

There are few national or racial or Utopian demands so contrary to nature that they could not be put into operation. The question, then, becomes *not what is possible but what is desirable*. Once we know what we want to make of human nature, that we can make it.

#### IV

The original unorganized impulses or tendencies are very general in their nature. For instance, the impulse to flee from danger: Some years ago a cry that sounded like "fire" was heard from the balcony of a theater in the south. The impulse to flee was immediately operative, and many people leaped from the building and landed on the pavement below or piled on top of each other and became heaps of dead. The impulse to flee from danger was not correlated with the higher impulse to think of an end and how to reach it. That is, the general impulse to flee from danger should be particularized and correlated and so become the specific impulse to reach the means of escape. The intellect, that is the idea of an end—in this case safely to reach the ground by means of the fire

<sup>1</sup> Hocking.

escape—must particularize the general impulse to flee.

Consider the food-getting impulse. The impulse to eat may lead to sudden death from the eating of poisonous matter, or which is more usual, to indigestion from eating too much. The impulse to eat must be organized in line with the responsible policy of eating wholesome food and not too much of that, in order to an end, viz., health and long life.

The impulse to sociability, the gregarious instinct, must be particularized to the point of desiring to be with people of worth and to make people worthy of association. The general impulse to be with a crowd must be particularized to the point of desiring to be with a worthy crowd. And so on through the range of impulses.

Original human nature is neither depraved nor divine: it is simply unorganized and undirected. Its remaking, its regeneration if you prefer, consists in organization and direction toward worthy ends. And this is the work of intelligence and will.

## V

To this task of democratizing human nature the church must set itself with apostolic fervor. Now that we know how to change human nature, what the change means, and why human nature should be changed, we should increase our efforts and so multiply results.

The achievements of religion in the remaking of human nature have not been what they should. And the reason for this is two-fold: Neglect of basic inside facts, and misapprehension of the relation between inside and outside facts.

The function of the will in the remaking process has not been sufficiently recognized, nor has the will been developed adequately. Religion has called on men unconditionally to surrender the will to outside and supernatural forces. "Breaking the stubborn will" is evangelical language. Worldly powers have coerced the will of subjects; and parents have broken the will of children. The will is the central agent in remaking and should be neither broken nor surrendered to God or man. Let the will be developed, let it be directed into safe channels, but never broken or surrendered. If the church would once turn its attention toward developing the will and directing it into safe channels, it could render a most useful service to

humanity. The church must be the champion of the inviolable rights of the human will.

The importance of outside facts in the development of the will and in the remaking of human nature has not been understood by the church. Arctic zones and torrid regions tend to stultify human nature. But worse is the stultifying effect of an evil social environment. The temperate zones tend to development. Likewise the zones of temperate living—of neither too much nor too little—are socially healthful. A democratic environment and a democratic nature are interactive and mutually necessary.

We may become what we will to be. The door to the future swings wide open. The eternal urge moves within us. The laws of nature sustain us. Swords shall yet be beaten into ploughshares. Ours shall be the social order that follows tireless toil and noble purpose. But to attain this goal we must reaffirm our faith in the possibilities of human nature, and dedicate ourselves to the task of organizing human nature on the basis of world-wide community of interest.

## THE SECRET CULTS OF ISLAM

BY DUDLEY WRIGHT

SECRET societies and monastic orders, some would have us believe, are unknown in Islam. Certainly among a certain section of Moslems there has always been a strong disinclination to encourage membership of any society or association demanding a vow of secrecy from its members and, in some quarters, even membership of the Masonic order has been forbidden or deprecated because of its supposed opposition to some of the precepts of the Qur-an. That such idea is fallacious is proved by the fact that in India there are Masonic lodges composed entirely of orthodox Moslems, while in England there are Islamic members of lodges who are assiduous equally in the carrying out of their religious duties as they are of their Masonic obligations. In practice, however, almost every Moslem who takes his religion seriously (and that number is legion—greater in proportion to the faithful in any other religion) is a member of some secret religious order or confraternity and performs daily the *Zikr*, or act of devotion peculiar to such association. There is no doubt that monasticism was forbidden by Mohammed. It is stated in the *Traditions* that Usman ibn Mazun came to the Prophet with the request that he might retire from society and become a monk, to which the Prophet made reply: "The retirement which becomes my people is to sit in the corner of a mosque and wait for the time of prayer." According also to the Qur-an (lvii. 27) the Prophet said: "We gave them the gospel and we put into the hearts of those who follow him kindness and compassion; but as to the monastic life, they invented it themselves," thus crediting Christianity with the invention of monasticism, which is an error, it being a pre-Christian institution.

Although the Islamic faith knows nothing of the doctrine of sacrifice, in the general meaning of that term, and has, therefore, no priesthood, the organization of religious orders or societies, demand-

ing a novitiate from aspirants to membership, along with the taking of vows and obligations of secrecy, following a regular ceremony of initiation, has been an established fact right from the days of Mohammed, in whose lifetime one, at least of the twelve original societies was founded. Many have been formed since then; many are in existence in full vigor at the present day. They are, as it were, independent states within the body politic, with constitutions, differing from each other only in trivial points of practice and costume, and may be compared with the orders, congregations, friarhoods, and societies of the Roman Church and, like those bodies, consistently orthodox (at any rate, so far as the majority are concerned) with respect to the articles of their faith and practice. In a few orders, however, beyond the fundamental belief that "There is no God but Allah"—which, by the way, is not maintained in one order—there is the utmost divergence in belief. Even the second portion of the credal sentence: "And Mohammed is His Prophet," finds exception in, at least, two. The Qur-an, the basis of the Islamic faith, has, in circumstances somewhat similar to the Christian Scriptures, been subject to various interpretations and dialectical comments, sometimes genuinely made, but sometimes also, inspired by self-interest, hatred, or ambition. The result in Islam, as in Christianity, has been spiritual chaos, and while, on the one hand, the various religious orders in Islam have played a very active part in the propagation of the faith, they have also played an equally or, perhaps, more important part, not only in politics, but also in the holy wars against Christian nations. Very frequently, too, they have proved hostile to modern civilization and European influence.

Yet, says Sir Edwin Pears, in his *Life of Abdul Hamid*, "the real simple life and spiritual life of Islam is to be found in Turkey among various sects of Dervishes, such as the Mehlevis and the Bektashees. Englishmen generally are unaware how highly developed is their spiritual life. . . . The influence of these two great communities has been a humanizing one on the Moslems of Turkey and it is largely due to the wide dispersion of their members that the spread of Pan-Islamism of an objectionable character entirely failed in the Turkish Empire. The only Pan-Islamic movement which has existed is a purely religious one. The great missionary efforts that Mohammedanism has made in Africa and Asia are not due to a political Pan-Islamism, but to the leaven of the sects mentioned, who understand that if missionary efforts are to succeed they must be made by spiritual and not by temporal forces."

So also G. Bonet-Maury in *L'Islamisme et le Christianisme en Afrique* tells us that it is amongst the Berbers, superficially Islamic, that we see born and developed the societies of Dervishes, or religious brotherhoods, whose distinctive traits are monasticism, voluntary poverty, solitary or conventional life passed in prayer, certain mortifications, and missionary zeal. However, like the ancient military orders, they believed themselves authorized to take up arms to defend their cause.

Whence arose these religious orders and secret societies of Islam? In the opinion of Depont and Coppolani (*Les Confréries Religieuses Musulmanes*) one of the faults eminently prejudicial to the work of Mohammed was undoubtedly the neglect to establish an order of succession in the Caliphate which would have prevented civil dissension, such as was produced in the bosom of some of his most fervent disciples while it might, perhaps, have founded an imperishable monarchy. This, however, is purely hypothetical, because in religion, as in politics, it is very difficult to alter customs, particularly laws, or to suppress the national spirit, and the Islamic edifice, although erected with much care, was not in foundation sufficiently solid to prevent discord from penetrating into the structure.

The official creed of Islam, though brief, is rigid and stationary, and this rigidity is held to be an outstanding virtue. In official Islam there is no place for the visionary, the egoist, who, while holding to the fundamentals of the faith and its practices, would, at the same time, strike out on side lines of his own invention. There is no opportunity for an Islamic Francis, Dominic, or Bernard. Even the Arabic language has preserved its original character and the new words which enriched it as the outcome of the philosophic movement of the Middle Ages have no meaning for the great masses of the people and remain in the lexicon merely as souvenirs of a vanished past.

In his lifetime the great personality of Mohammed dominated the great majority of his followers, and there seems to be no reason for regarding as exaggerated in any way the story of the scene described as taking place on the day he passed away. His death undoubtedly left a void in Islam which it was practically impossible to fill without causing dissension. Some of the believers sought to fill the gap by appointing mediators whose intercession would ensure the granting of their petitions by Allah. What more natural, therefore, than that they should turn to the friends of the Prophet, whom they believed to be possessed of this power, and to whom they gave the name of Walis. They were the first saints of Islam and, true to

the doctrine of development, it was not long before they were accredited with the power of performing miracles. The word *Wali* means "one who is very near," and *Al-Wali*, "the Helper," is one of the ninety-nine attributes of Allah.

It is only a short step from obedience to a living authority to post-mortem adoration, and thus the reverence shown to a Wali when living was continued by way of invocations after his death, and the tombs of the saints became the objects of pilgrimage, generally on the anniversaries of the saints' death. Today the invocation of Walis is generally regarded as a religious duty wherever Oriental Moslems congregate, reminding one of the practices of Catholic hagiolatry, although there are some differences to note:

1. The Wali is not canonized by an ecclesiastical authority, not even by the Shaikh-ul-Islam, but by the voice or vote of the people;
2. He is not venerated in the mosques, which are reserved for the worship of Allah, but in the privacy of the tomb, or in a building erected at the place of interment;
3. No picture, sculpture, or painting is made of the Wali, consequently there is no nimbus or halo to adorn any representation before which Moslems prostrate in prayer.

The form of government is practically alike in all the Islamic orders. At the head of each is the Shaikh, a word which means "Master," "Doctor," "Senior," "Director," or "Guide of the Spiritual Life," and his position may be said to correspond to that of a Grand Master of a Masonic jurisdiction, although the Shaikh has powers far greater than any possessed by any Masonic functionary. The title "Shaikh" is not the sole property of Islam, nor did it originate within that body. It was borne by the chiefs of the pre-Islamic tribes, and it was given to Aus-Begr, the first Caliph. It is a stately qualification and highly prized by all who have the privilege and honor to bear it. The position of a Shaikh is analogous to that of a Pope. He is the spiritual and temporal director of the Order, the spiritual descendant and heir of the founder, thus establishing an apostolic succession. He is regarded by his disciples as being almost omnipotent and omniscient, favored by Allah, the Clement and Merciful. Who has granted to him a portion of His Almighty Power, and made him His intermediary with human beings. In some orders the Shaikh is the direct lineal descendant of the founder and, so far as the members are concerned, he has practically unlimited power. Moreover, he is generally a man of considerable diplomatic skill and so able to exert an influence outside the confines of his order. Often he is regarded as the synthesis of all the virtues and of all

knowledge and even as possessing the power of performing miracles. He recognizes no earthly power, only that of Allah. He is accredited with a perfect knowledge of the Sacred Law and he claims the absolute unquestioning obedience of every member of the brotherhood of which he is the head.

Among his subordinate officers the principal is the Khalifa, whose standing may best be compared with that of a District or Provincial Masonic Grand Master. The Khalifa is the lieutenant of the Shaikh in any country in which the Brotherhood has been established and, as his delegate, is invested with plenipotentiary powers.

Next in order comes the Moqaddim, who, to continue the simile, stands in the position of the Master of a Masonic lodge. The literal meaning of the term is superintendent, front-rank man, prior, or curator. He must exercise faithfully all the instructions sent to him by his Shaikh, whether orally or by letter, for he is his chief's delegate to the rank and file, and to him is entrusted the power of initiating candidates into the order. Each zawiyyah, or monastery, is placed in charge of a Moqaddim, and the members are enjoined in the diploma which is handed them on their admission into the order to yield implicit obedience to the Moqaddim and not to enter upon any enterprise without his consent. To the principal brethren in each monastery are assigned certain offices of varying rank. One, the Wasil, is the treasurer, who has charge of the funds and property of the zawiyyah. Another, the Raggal, is the bearer of despatches and part of his duty is to summon the members to the various meetings of the order. To another is assigned the office of Guardian of the Threshold, whose care it is to see that none but the regularly initiated gain admission. Other offices are those of precentor, standard bearer, and water carriers, but all offices are eagerly sought after as great honors, and the duties are always performed with the utmost punctiliousness. The rank and file are known by varying names in the different orders, the most common being Okhwan, "Brother"; Ashab, "Companion," and Mureed, "Disciple."

In all Islamic societies the degrees are numerous and, consequently, there are varying degrees of dignity. The Shaikh decides whether and when advancement shall take place. There is no fixed rule for promotion.

It has been thought by some that Freemasonry existed among the Moslems of Constantinople under another name, and, consequently, in other parts of the East. With regard to this, John P. Brown, in his work on *The Dervishes*, published in 1868, says:

"This I do not find to be the case, though, like in most secret fraternities, there may be points of resemblance accidentally. I have had an indirect intercourse with a Mussulman, who asserted that Freemasonry does exist there, and he gave me a list of places in various parts of the Empire in which lodges were held, adding that the Grand Lodge existed on the Lake of Tiberias, in Palestine, whither it had been taken after the destruction of Jerusalem. It must, therefore, have existed and does still exist among the Jews. I regret to have to state that, notwithstanding all my researches to verify this declaration, I have not found any trace of the fact on which I could rely. My opportunities of inquiring here (Constantinople) have been numerous, and my desire to meet with brethren among Mussulmans led me to use all proper zeal in the pursuit of this desirable object. Others may, perhaps, meet with more success. The title by which it is said Mussulman Freemasons are known is Melameeyson."

In certain orders the officers and disciples all live within the walls of the zawiyyah, in which case there is a further rank, known as Associates, or lay brothers, who are regularly initiated, but live outside, attending all the meetings of the order, and are in possession of the secret signs and passwords, by means of which they can claim the protection of any brethren of the order.

At least once in every year the heads of all the monasteries assemble in conference under the presidency of the Kalifa, who examines the financial condition of each zawiyyah, reads any communication or passes on any instruction received from the Shaikh. Sometimes the Shaikh himself presides, when he blesses numbers of charms or amulets, which are after sold to the disciples. On returning home each Moqaddim calls a meeting or synod of his zawiyyah, this synod being known as Jalal, when he entertains the brethren at a feast and relates to them all that has taken place.

## PROPHETS AND PROFITEERING

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND

IT IS not a religious activity to seek happiness through some magic formula, some stroke of good fortune, some worldly prestige or material acquisition. These do not often really contribute to our happiness, but usually prove to be obstacles thwarting our hopes and wishes. Taking both religion and happiness as genuine functional achievements in the emotional life of man, we find that they are or should be mutually inclusive and complementary; mystic perhaps in spiritual aim and exaltation, but still sharing the same functional power and possibility, the same value and destiny in the conduct of human life. Both aim at spiritual development, moral discrimination, intelligent and devout appreciation of all that is beautiful, good and true. Both have content and utility, as well as function and significance, if we but take proper care and valid methods in seeking to realize them. The true mystic and the sincere religionist share the same ascetic relations and restraints, the same social feelings and attitudes toward life, for neither can dispense with tolerance, honor, courage, justice, self-control, faith, largesse, forgiveness, heroic sacrifice and spiritual aspiration without ceasing to be loyal to the highest ideals of their loving trust in both Divinity and Humanity. The happiness one seeks, like the heaven of the other, is not a worldly goal of luxury and ease; it is a genuine condition where goodwill and creative capacity give realization to their aims.

No one, I hope, denies that the divine part of man's nature must be developed and the worldly part discouraged and repudiated. But the intellectual war, the perennial conflict of ideals and never-ending debate of issues, is over the question how this development is to be realized and this repudiation brought about. The point I am driving at is that a fallacious scheme of approach and solution is forever being advanced for merely mercenary motives; that we are, it seems eternally corrupt, ready for rewards, and have more con-

cern for the profits than for the prophets of religion; that we are constantly being urged to join some ambitious congregation, church, lodge, club, society or what-not, and all under argument of what we will get out of it, or else be hounded by the vociferous reformers and revivalists who storm and threaten with eternal damnation, fire and torment if we don't subscribe to their particular form of gas attack.. Everything is so much thyomism and vanity; the rhyomist first makes an epispastic flourish of amiable generosity and fellowship, but if these tactics fail he immediately returns to nature and threatens all sorts of rancor and revenge, as if hell and high water could clinch an argument when soft bribery and peremptory persuasion failed. It is a good thing that some of us are still sane, sufficiently sensible and sincere and attentive to our future welfare to keep ever before our mind's eye one simple scientific fact, and that is that *human nature was here first*, long before any artificial scheme of salvation, any clumsy legal machinery, any top-heavy institution. Church and State, religion and politics, folly and philosophy, art and science are all subsequent developments, comparatively recent expressions of man's enigmatic genius; and nearly all these group-moods of aspiration are intended to *cover up*, if not able to transfigure, the common defects, deformity, depravity or at least the finitude of human nature. Long before the first family altar or public policy was established, men were on earth with passions and pastimes, heartaches and consolations, dreams and aspirations, and the fact that we must remember is that the sincerity and urgency of these private visions, faiths, hopes, loves and sacrifices are all that still animate our religious frames and give us courage or genius to cope successfully with the many problems and temptations of life. They make up the original stock of human nature and only recently have they been somewhat artificially forced into cold corporate bodies, institutions such as Church, State, Nation, art, science, religion and philosophy. Let us hope that man's soul will not be lost in total obscuration by the trampling march of unconscious carnal interests.

However, it seems impossible to get away from the obsession we have for big things, mere quantitative values in thought and action, appreciation and creative taste. Our attention too readily flits from prophets to institutions, from mystics of meekened meditation to mechanical processes of power and plenty, and in the fickle flitting we usually "lose the spirit in our mad anxiety to save the soul."—(John Burroughs.) We seek increase of everything instead of an honest refinement of the few essential things. Authority is

transferred from natural law (God) to human lawyers, from righteousness to "rights," and everyone feels that his neighbor will bear watching. We set aside those pristine prophecies of old and take up modern twaddle about psychology, success and personal salvation; we seek to realize our own corrupt malicious wills by the establishment of churches, schools, legislatures, judiciary, penal codes and foreign policies: we worship nothing but rewards and punishments, and our neighbors feel insecure. We seek profit for ourselves and control over others, plotting ease for ourselves and hell for those who stand athwart our path, even taking umbrage and condemning whatever they unwittingly do which is not contributory to our own pet scheme of livelihood, lazy luxury, lucre-lust, love, success or salvation. I cannot too strongly emphasize the Unitarian position that human needs and natures are more important than any institution; that the proper birth, education, discipline and employment of the individual is the only reason we have organized our forces and established institutions; that all our institutions were set up in the first place only to make easier, better and more efficient ministry to our needs and natures. Why should we now reverse the proper situation and let them become Frankensteins and destroy those sturdy qualities of soul which gave them birth and sustenance? It is unconscionable to predict any such disaster, but it is already impending and with a few more decades the demoralization will be complete. No one can say with precision just how long we can stay dead without decomposition setting in, but it is safe to say that a certain ill odor begins to arise almost immediately. Decadence always strikes the vulgar first, but it soon corrupts the elect, and the genius, hero, lover, saint, philosopher or those of nobler mold are soon reduced to the necessity of choosing in an all-too-vital *either-or*, join the jazzarimbo jubilee or go hang, and very few will deliberately choose to hang before their time.

Neither man, beast, tree or stone can be truly lost, condemned or annihilated in the cosmic scheme of things; neither God, Devil nor Universe can be wholly cast out of the life of man, for he is part of them and they are part of him. Everything is Nature, and God's laws as well as the petty spites and poseury of theologians are still just so many items of the cosmic composition. The fact of life that is most persistent and indestructible is the fact of spirit, with its various functioning as faith, hope, charity, courage, justice, loyalty and forgiveness. Without these neither human nature nor the Universe would be here, nor would they have any destiny or survival value in the true eschatology of cosmic law. But with

them in open action and devout intent our lives can dispense with much of the artificial accomplishment, casuist power, arbitrary authority and hypocritical pietism so often affected by the willing dupes (?) to institutional religion. The divine in man created all the gods and bibles extant in the world today, in the same way that the malice in man has created all the devils and deviltry in the world. But mere projection of will and idea does not give them external validity as really existent beings or things. Man is a dual composition of divinity and depravity. The divinity in man has often been in almost supreme potential and has been called Christ, Buddha, Brahma, Shang-Ti, Ormuzd, Allah; and has tried to express itself in an eternal procession of Testaments, Vedas, Srutis, Canons, Avestas, Kaaba carpets and muezzin calls. The great need of modern religious theory and practice is not power or profit, but just the recognition and understanding of this simple fact of life as being largely a spiritual activity, part noble and heroic, part vulgar and wicked. The proper business of education is not to make a specious blend of this duality nor to minimize the many meannesses of those selfishly inclined; but to guide, counsel, enlighten and inspire, helping men to discover themselves, to know and rightly value their spiritual powers and develop the divine possibilities lying dormant in their souls, to have good reason to realize that they are not wholly depraved, lost or subject to eternal damnation, but are (if they but make the necessary will and effort) quite capable of intelligent thoughts, heroic deeds, good works, noble faiths and loyal leadership.

It is to the door of false education that we are to lay the blame for much of our modern meanness and mischief. It seems as though our pragmatic religions, arts and philosophies are futile instruments against all the irreverence, evil, folly, misery and disease in the world. No wonder Nietzsche and Nordau decided that they have a narcotic rather than a therapeutic value in the scheme of life. Death alone was invented to terminate these mortal things, but we devise all sorts of artificial creeds and measures, pragmatic values and viewpoints, to mitigate and medicate the issues. Obscuration serves in place of understanding and our humility is reduced to an expression of cautious sophistry while our piety becomes a pose of dignified discretion. I do not know what manner of theological efficiency gave rise to the notion of exploiting God, but when we try to add religion to our herd of milch cows, *she balks*. It is as much a blasphemy to spoliate mans' chastity by reducing Art, Science, Education and Philosophy to base creeds of utility, as it is to con-

ceive vengeful whimsical gods and try to put religion to work on the vicary of our own mischief and cupidity. The commercialism of universal exploitation seems to be part of the original theological blunder which lost man his title to Paradise. It is shrewd enough on austral defects and decretals, but utterly delinquent and quite desperate when it comes to showing genuine devotion, sacrifice or honest aspiration.

In ancient India, the laws of Manu advised men of the inexorable cosmic vengeance, the divine wrath of Siva which will inevitably descend upon them in consequence of unrestraint, ill-nature, lust, deceit and wickedness. No one living a life of shame, sham or chivalrous villainy could expect to escape the nether world of calamity and corruption. But both the Brahman Moksha and the Buddhist Nirvana offered unusual persuasion to perspective devotees who would consider the vows of poverty, chastity, renunciation of the world, and the resolute desire to transfigure or exalt all one's natural instincts, thoughts, aims and habits of life. Today these venerable destinies have been pruned of their abstract predication and promises, they comprise more definite notions presenting more concrete situations; the Brahman svarga or the Mahayana sukharati both consist in a sliding scale offering various degrees of heavenly bliss to the wise and righteous, while naraka offers various degrees of hell with unimaginable misery and torture for the wicked and corrupt. Even the lukewarm spirits of the manas or merely human, halfwise, half-infernal natures meet their true deserts in a return to kamaloka or rupaloka, in a reincarnation in either the animal or physical world.

There have been all sorts of prophets and profiteering in the world, and some of the most calloused cases have been masque plays under the name and formulism of religion. The chronicle is full to overflowing with rishis and rascals, rogues and reverend gentlemen, saints and augurs, soothsayers and scoundrels who tried and often succeeded in putting religion on a paying basis. The highly respectable Magi had the idea that a lofty sense of justice would carry the soul above all earthly seductions, but they allowed the corrupt practice of caste survival in the spiritual relations of the next world; so what would naturally become of the justicial issues under such conditions? The later Parsees and Zoroastrians considered that this was an artificial arrangement and would terminate when the apparently finite struggle was over between good and evil, light and darkness, intelligence and delusion; but they still held to the notion that the bridge Chinevat between this and the future world

was the point of justicial decision, which was an equally artificial arrangement seeing as we do that right here and now is the really decisive period. The soothsaying business in Rome found its most prosperous days under the Caesars as when the Paphlagonian Alexander furnished up gorgeous apartments and catered to the rich patricians who had ambition but lacked foresight. And money was not the only fee ever exacted, for many an overt oracle would not speak favorably on delivery of whole patrimonies, jewels, young girls, beautiful wives, or title to political office. Cicero's client Vatinius did not hesitate to sacrifice his four children when anxious to persuade the gods to favor his political ambitions. Thirteen centuries ago the monophysites or ubiquitarians who flourished under Emperor Justinian were condemned for confounding the two (spiritual and physical) natures of Christ in the Eucharist, but the specious unification is once more being made, and not for the sake of mere theory either. We are living in a mercenary vulgarian age of commercialism and spoliation, so no wonder our modern Eucharist is so accommodating when it offers extreme unction, last rites and viaticums to heaven no matter what one's life has been. This is religion operating under pragmatic sanction.

A somewhat different task was attempted by the Rosicrucians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with their alchemy, nature lore and Cabalistic clairvoyance. Numerical codes and analogic ciphers were applied to the Scriptures and no end of chimerical reading were possible—and profitable too if we can take Eschenmayers' word for fact. They did not, however, enjoy the venerable dignity of the Druids whose doctrines are said to have dated back to Zamolais, a freed slave of Pythagoras. The oak forests and grassy grottoes of ancient Gaul resounded with the chanted hymns, judicial courts, and oracular rites of these hoary Bards and Vates. But the actual Druid who was in on the esoteric scheme was the priest who alone had authority to offer human sacrifices, who alone possessed the power or knack of divination, foresight and magic. Prayer was a common possession of Bard, Prophet and Priest alike, and even to this day of modern Eistedfods, everything is esoteric and class-conscious except prayer, and its efficacy is claimed to depend more upon social (ritual) sanction than upon individual piety. Merlin prophesied right when he read the Druid traditions behind the Nature lore and Christian heroism which inspired the poor shepherdess of Domremy to become the liberator of France in its most glorious hour of trial. These same traditions in the old Gallic Trouvéres, the moralism of the Fabliaux, Bards and Celtic heroes make a saddening com-

mentary on the actual purpose of the Crusades, for they were both prophet-wise and profit-rich to the esoteric few who were clever enough to exploit them quietly behind a sanctimonious camouflage. Modern rites and rechauffes are just the same old tactics disguised in modern styles of popular apparel, but you couldn't get an honest confession out of a modern priest any more than Socrates or Diogenes could get one out of the Delphic Oracle.

There was a growing ambition in New England 85 years ago "to make Christianity a religion of political power and intimidating persuasion" which led Emerson to resign from the Second Church and render his immortal challenge in the Divinity School address at Harvard in 1838 and again later in the address before the Free Religious Association; and led Channing, Alcott, Margaret Fuller and others to espouse the transcendental doctrines of Nature-love, the Over-soul, Pre-existence, Universalism, Divine Reason and Grace, melioristic versus categorical morality, etc., even to rationalist interpretation of the Messianic Miracles. It is quite apparent in Emerson's Poems, Essays, Addresses and the ten volumes of his Journal, that he broke with historical Christianity because of its long weary kyielle of signs and wonders, ambitious authority, intimidating tactics, emotional bribery and insatiable grasping after secular power, all within the hypocritical sovereignty of vicarious atonement and the inert traditions of copyist vicary in all one's religious experience. Such officious goodness may well take shape and pay homage under our ancestral traditions, but it is a sham virtue and befouls one's intellectual honor as well as one's spiritual integrity. In fact it is taking advantage of ancestral reverence in a way quite similar to that of Ghengis Khan when he invaded Shensi, China; their basic filial piety prevented the Chinese from attacking him because he placed their aged parents in his vanguard as he advanced from town to town. Any morbid search or concern for signs and wonders, hidden meanings and imaginary hermeneutics always weakens the moral fibre anyway; one's attention is turned away from discipline and given to discerning the delicacies of ambiguity and casuist evasion. Much of our modern emphasis on consecration and sacramental power is really an emphasis on magic and the efficiency of sorcery, taboo and voodoo; there is no actual power inherent in bread and wine except as nourishment and stimulant to body and mind, all else is auto-suggestion and works with a hap-hazard efficiency. True consecration to a life of wisdom and virtue, even when only a mystic emotional response rather than a well-

thought-out intellectual decision, is always a spiritual function or expression, never an institutional patronage of gregarian instinct.

Prof. J. N. Caird's criticism of our futile modern attempts to translate Christianity into theology shows up the fallacy of our perennial assumption that intellectual processes, ideas, views and reflective judgments are fundamental features of a good Christian life. All these are added contents, they are of adjectival not substantive significance, and are of value to a correct understanding only rather than an emotional, volitional and active emulation of that life. Intellectual conception of a thing's value or content is far different from an active life sympathetically and spiritually patterned after it. One is perhaps coldly scientific, philosophical and idealistic, but the other is warm, congenial, aspiring and realistic. A different set of viewpoints, values, meanings, skill-limits and affections are experienced, and we should not confound what is conceptual with what is emotional, what is ideal with what is eventual and real. The blind philosopher, Duhring, says the vital antithesis of Christianity as well as of Philosophy is that perennially existing between the brute factual and the divine actual, the vulgar finite and the spiritual infinite; in his "Emphatic Philosophy of Reality," which was exceedingly anti-mystic, anti-religionistic and anti-obscurantist in attitude and tone, he adopted the Hegelian principle of sufficient reason as a *law of our thought* rather than of reality, and sought for a "substitute for religion" in the ethical sentiments and cultural aspirations which are a part of human evolution. Caird, on the other hand, takes a different view of the Neo-Hegelian theology and claimed that from the fact that "religion exists and must exist as a noble life enriched by the discipline of experience before it can be made the object of reflective thought and understanding, we may conclude that no mere ideas, no bare intellectual process or reflective interpretation can be called the fundamental element in Christianity, nor in any other religion that is actually lived rather than simply argued about." Such a vital realism brings the religious problem to a head even more forcefully than Huxley's classical lecture on Descartes or his argument from design in "Darwiniana."

However, it is well to have a certain amount of character analysis and moral exhortation for the benefit of those not yet able to stand erect in spontaneous piety and self-reliant faith. Thus in Lecky's inspiring volume on "The Map of Life" there are no anecdotal delights nor soft empirical suggestions, but a carefully laid philosophical understanding and a lucid presentation of consecration, piety, faith and exaltation as they affect our moral laws and obligations.

If we are to decide that Christianity is only "taught" and never *lived*, then Lecky's system is far more inspiring and to the point in its description of the various religious experiences than is the case with a cold, theological scheme such as the one hinging on the Westminster Catechism or the Code and Symbols of Hodge and Shedd, with all their intellectual precision, textual cross-references and artificial sanctity. Authority cannot be deliberately assumed from outside the actual sources and spiritual functions of authority, else it be nothing but the shadow play of false predication and presumption. The creed of Calvin in all its Presbyterian pomp and ambidextrous dignity is no more truly fundamental as signifying *vital* Christianity than the Baptist formulation of tactful resurrection and liberal eucharism in the blasé irresponsibilities of a vicarious atonement. Both are sectarian and secular expressions of pragmatic power, they advocate religions proposing spiritual profit, the reward of all casuists who will help exploit the prophets.

Professor Pfleiderer's forty years' work in the philosophy of religion took two courses of action in direct contra-distinction to the "actual life" theory of Duhring and the vital realism of Caird. These were the scientific approach supplied in the psychological analysis of religious consciousness and experience, and the historicoevolutionary approach supplied in the critical comparison of the different religions of the world. But both of Pfleiderer's viewpoints had one basic assumption from the very start—and this is where he diverged from his two equally famous contemporaries—that the religious life can be made the object of scientific investigation, that it can be interpreted and understood, presented and emulated the same as any other form of human interest and activity in art, literature, drama, history, science, politics or jurisprudence. One of the chief advantages of this religious philosophy is that anyone making this assumption and seeking this dual understanding will not center his attention dogmatically on Christianity as "the only religion," but will be open-minded, tolerant and considerate of all forms, creeds, aims and services in the religious life and ceremonies of all mankind. According to science, it is not so much the possible miracle of divine revelation as it is the actual human aspiration and effort toward reverent spiritual expression, which should be taken as the proper source of religious truth and authority. In other words religion originates in the soul of man and takes all its nourishment there, not in some institution's exploitation of the "law and prophets" from effete antiquity.

Kant found the majority of our motives in ceremonial practice to be grounded in irrational conceptions and purely emotional thrills and stimuli, whence those of us more philosophically inclined try to find intellectual sanction and moral support for the motives of our own religious faith and aspiration. The first sort of people bank largely on external (i. e., institutional) authority and leadership, while the latter rely more on our inward sense of right, reverence and restraint. His famous colleague, Schleiermacher, in seeking the ground for the philosophical viewpoint, tempered Kant's dualistic humanism of the pure and practical reason by adding the Spinozan security in eternal ideas, the Platonic Laws of State and Cosmos which rested on righteousness and reason, justice and integrity, virtue and utility, obligation and responsibility. But Hegel gave the whole action a popular turn by establishing a "dynamic relation between the Absolute Reality and our finite human ideality," trying thereby to show that this was a relation of identity, an ideal type or *iurphanon* of the Divine. It all resulted in a thinly veneered anthropomorphism, and its devotees have been determined on pragmatic readings and profitable redemptions ever since. The best we have is a more or less discriminating eclecticism of all past theories and interpretations ; it is at least *willing* to be scientific and open-minded. Take the notion of infallibility for instance : After allowing that both religious and scientific infallibility are mistaken assumptions, we still find that the former has been buffeted around so much during the last seven decades that the Church is now just about ready to confess that some of the arguments of modern scientific psychological inquiry *do apply* to the origin and expression of humanity's vast heritage of heartache, our religious traditions, hopes, ambitions and anxieties. That some of these ideas and aspirations, rather than being prophetic by divine immediacy or inspiring through miraculous revelation and mythical resurrection, are often mere pathological symptoms of a serious emotional or intellectual disturbance (if not ultimately some social or political disorder). All religions and all the sacred writings of the world's history have had champions and apologists who claimed the same specious prestige and infallibility for their particular faith, but have since been found in the same category along with the over-emphasized dogmas of Christian inspiration, Dervish ecstasy and Sruti cipher-codes. But while we can see the cynical point of old Makkhali Gosali's criticism that religions were founded for the purpose of governing people more easily through shrewd imposition on their feelings and folly, we still have to acknowledge that the religious mind and reverent soul have

motives nobler than those of the ignorant and vulgar, that they are not mean and mercenary like the fickle Philistines, and that they are therefore entitled to some codicil of faith, some common abiding expression of the basic truths and spiritual purposes under which their lives are housed. They sanction no hypocrisy and cultivate no casuist equivocation. They live the pious life for they know by actual experience that true religious living inspires the highest morality and encourages the harmonious adjustment and welfare of all our social relations. But they also know (in controversion of Mrs. Eddy's pseudo-science) that religion does not *make* this morality, it does not *create* the rectitude of these relations; it only gives them the necessary sanction and support for our favor and faith, for our acceptance of them in a life of normal intelligence and balanced activity. Religion accommodates all our interests, but it seeks to qualify and ennable them through the introduction of discipline and the application of restraint.

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