The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by Edward C. Hegeler

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JAPANESE BUDDHA

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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JAPANESE BUDDHISM

BY W. G. BLAIKIE MURDOCH

MANY times the writer has put to Japanese friends the question: What is the state of Buddhism today, in the Land of Sunrise? Some have answered blandly, *mada onagi des*, still same is. Others have given a sharply different reply, *shindĕ imasu*, dying is. To declare of Buddhism in Nippon, that it holds now the position, which it had say four centuries ago, is only like making an analogous statement about Christianity in the Occident. Nevertheless, to maintain of the Light of Asia, that it no longer brings comfort to the toiling myriads in the Extreme Orient, is again utterly erroneous. And, granting that the fair faith of Sakyamuni is waning, it would be almost impossible to exaggerate the refining influence, which it exerted of old in Japan. How came she to know and love the Indian creed?

In the mid sixth century A.D., there ruled over the little realm, Kudara, in Korea, a monarch who was an ardent Buddhist, and they called his name Myong. It vexed him to think of the heathen condition, as he counted it, of his neighbors the Japanese; he was eager, that the people that sat in darkness should see great light. But being well aware, that proselytising is apt to give offence, Myong took a crafty step. He sent the reigning Japanese Emperor, Kimmei, a present of umbrellas, a Buddhist sculpture being included in the parcel. This was in the year 552, Osaka being then capital of Nippon. And Kimmei was deeply interested in the letter extolling Buddhism, which the good Myong had written, to enclose with his gifts. The Japanese potentate feared, however, that if he sanctioned the preaching of the alien cult, he would incense the deities of the pristine Japanese religion, Shinto. Wherefore, he summoned a council at Osaka.

The *Kojiki*, or Records of ancient Matters, by O no Yasumaro, was completed in 712. Commonly described as the oldest history of Japan, it would be more aptly defined as the Bible of Shinto. And it need hardly be doubted that this creed, as it was in the remote days of Kimmei, was little different from what it was, when Yasumaro wrote. For it is a religion, characteristic of a simple, primitive people, which is laid bare in his pages. The *Kojiki* relates that the Mikados are divine, being themselves descendants of the gods, and having been appointed by them to rule. Several of the Shinto deities are associated with forces in nature, for instance Amaterasu the sun-goddess. The faith embodies no moral code, calls neither for good deeds, nor for mental development. And since it teaches men to pray for aid, to their own dead ancestors, also to the illustrious departed in general, in pre-Buddhist eras great care was taken, to minister to the deceased. Weapons and utensils were put in the graves, and they were frequently encircled by sculptures, to act as guardians. But these sculptures were little more than gropings at representation of the human form, and even the best of the Shinto temples were mere cottages. In short, the art of the period, like its religion, tells of a nation still essentially primitive.

At the council summoned by Kimmei, the reception of Buddhism was hotly opposed by all the speakers, with the exception of one Soga. He pointed out, that already the Indian creed had been widely espoused in Korea and China. Was the Island Empire, Japan, to betray herself slow, he asked, in offering welcome to whatsoever things were the mark, of the latest continental civilization? Nevertheless, 20 years after the coming of the gifts from Kudara, there were still very few Buddhists in the Sunrise Land. And it was clear that, would the Light of Asia spread its beneficent rays there, the faith must have an enthusiastic apostle. It should be borne in mind that, long ere the days of Myong and Kimmei, the Brahmin pantheon had been adopted by the Buddhist church. This was the cause of that church becoming a great impulse, to the fashioning of pictures and sculptures. And no doubt the keen æsthetic tastes, with the Japanese Prince Shotoku, born in 572, were among the factors which led him to prefer the Indian religion to Shinto. Himself a musician and a sculptor, in boyhood he had as tutors, a Korean and a Chinese. Perhaps they descanted to their brilliant pupil, on art being far more advanced in Korea and China, than in Nippon. And when, in 593, the Prince commenced to rule as Regent, the nominal sovereign being the Empress Suiko, he straightway

began to hurl prodigious energies into the furtherance of Buddhism. The young Regent ordained, that three of the Buddhist Scriptures should be expounded throughout Japan. He wrote essays on Buddhist philosophy, and he gave lectures on the same. But with his fine sharp mind he realized that, if the ennobling capacities of the faith which he loved were to prove efficacious, if they were to bring sweetness and light to his country, he must personally be a practical Buddhist. He must set an example, of the charity inculcated by Sakyamuni. Laboring to defend the common people against tyranny from the baronial class, seeking to heighten with the latter the sense of honor, and working to reform judicature, Shotoku wrote on this subject, a remarkable series of maxims. In connection with one of the Buddhist temples which he founded, he instituted an asylum for the poor, a hospital, and a dispensary. In the manipulation of foreign politics, he stood resolutely for pacific measures. Nevertheless, like all men of high talent, he had pride. He was the earliest Japanese ruler, who wrote to the court of China, in terms which implied that Japan was a power, no less important than her big neighbor. And on receiving the Regent's bold letter, the Chinese monarch was furious. Was he unaware, of the rapid changes which Buddhism was enacting in the Island Empire?

A long, and absorbing prëoccupation with Shotoku, was supervising the construction of the Buddhist temple, Horiuji, close to Nara, which town is near Osaka. In his enthusiasm, the princely supervisor contrived, to bring Korean artificers to help him. And consequently, in general style Horiuji is similar to the Buddhist fanes, built contemporaneously with it in Korea and China. When Shotoku died in 621, primitive art was over in Nippon. Largely through the Prince's own beautiful work, as a carver of Buddhist images, there were now Japanese Buddhist sculptors, fashioning things of high beauty. In 701 there was promulgated a new code of laws, almost a replica of a code which had been lately drawn up in China. Hitherto, it had been the custom to change the seat of rule, on the accession of each Mikado, but in 710 Nara was chosen as a permanent metropolis. Already, Buddhism had been definitely professed by a big number of people of the upper classes, and soon the faith received ardent abetting from the Nara court.

It was the Mikado Shomu, crowned in 724, who vied with the late brilliant Regent in devotion to the Indian creed. Shomu's piety was shared amply by his wife, Komyo; like Shotoku before them, these monarchs sought to carry Buddhist teaching into practice

They engaged in philanthropic schemes, for example the founding of a second dispensary. And round about Nara, the royal pair built stately Buddhist temples, in the continental mode of architecture, which had been shown forth by Horiuji. Of these fanes was Todaiji, wherein was erected the largest metal sculpture in the Orient, a bronze of Dai-nichi Nyorai, supreme god in the Buddhist pantheon. If this particular image is a very poor one, its making was accompanied by that of a wealth of fine glyptic works. In the seven-hundreds, Japanese sculpture reached almost suddenly its highest glory; the golden age in the art continued, till early in the next cycle; and the masterpieces were all Buddhist images. From the eighth century likewise dates the oldest Japanese painting extant, a study of a Buddhist goddess. The same period witnessed the invention of the *katakana*, or Japanese syllabic script, people in Japan having heretofore written, solely with the Chinese ideographs. The same era looked on the inauguration of printing in Nippon, and it was a passage from the Buddhist Scriptures, which was printed on the million leaflets then disseminated. The *Kojiki*, it has been seen, was completed in 712; in 720 was finished the *Nihongi*, or Chronicle of Japan; and in or about 748 was begun the compiling of the first anthology of Japanese poems. At this date, versification contests were the favorite pastime in the royal palace. And the mere fact that ladies took part in these competitions, illustrates well how refined was the life of the imperial circle. In brief, the advent of Buddhism resulted, in the Japanese upper classes espousing before the eighth century was far advanced, the current civilization and culture of the Asiatic mainland. But was this step, along with the profession of Buddhism among those people, indeed attended by a complete change of belief on their part? And how did the Buddhist doctrines fare, among the masses?

When, just prior to the Empress Suiko's accession, the Mikado Sushun was assassinated, Prince Shotoku contended that the violent death was retribution, for sins which the murdered king had committed in a previous existence. To the great majority, however, high besides low, the Buddhist theory that sinners will return to the world, either as lower animals or as people, was hard to reconcile with the Shinto belief, that dead ancestors have power to help their descendants still living. Determined to overcome this obstacle, the Buddhist clergy in Japan, soon after Shotoku's day, preached that transmigration does not commence till a hundred years after death. This gave Japanese the opportunity of becoming Buddhists, while

not wholly forsaking Shinto. For the crafty declaration inferred, that people might pray to parents and grandparents, if not to remote forefathers, since it was possible that these were moving about on earth in rëincarnated form. But although ministering to the dead, by surrounding the grave with sculptures, faded from custom, faith in the Shinto gods remained strong with a legion in all classes. And on the erection at Todaiji, of the colossal image of Dai-nichi Nyorai a Buddhist priest, Gyogi, delivered a sermon, designed to checkmate the Shintoists. His claim was that their sun-goddess, Amaterasu, was in actuality an avatar of the supreme Buddhist divinity, represented in the huge sculpture. In 794, the metropolis was removed from Nara to Kyoto. And soon afterwards the renowned Buddhist hierarch Kobo Daishi (774-835), preached that not Amaterasu only, but all Shinto deities, were avatars of personages in the Buddhist pantheon. The dual creed thus inaugurated, a belief simultaneously in the old religion and the new, became ere Kobo's death, almost universally the acknowledged cult. Here, then, in this absorption of the indigenous faith of Japan, lay the distinctive thing in Japanese Buddhism.

As the ninth century passed into the tenth, painting soared to splendor in Nippon. At this era the finest pictures, like the rare sculptures of earlier, were all or nearly all Buddhist works. But it is hard to say whether, on the spread of the Light of Asia, it really brought much material benefit to the masses. For written data about them, at the epoch of that event, are scarce in the extreme. In the *Nihongi*, however, it is at least told that, on Prince Shotoku's death, he was passionately mourned by the commonalty. And it is most unlikely they would have done this, unless some success had attended the Regent's lifelong efforts on their behalf. In the early days of Buddhism in Japan, people resisted stoutly the endeavor, to prevent them killing animals for food: naturally a heinous crime in the opinion of those orthodox Buddhists who, like Shotoku, believed in rëincarnation. In fact, there never came a time, when more than a fraction of Japanese refrained from such shedding of blood. But the literature of Nippon, subsequent to the union of Buddhism with Shinto, embodies many things which show that, despite this addiction to slaughter, there had come to be widely alive the feeling that the rëincarnation theory was true. Nevertheless, there was by no means renounced the idea that it was good to placate and adore progenitors. Nor did the union of the creeds destroy the Shinto tenet, that the Mikados were divine. In 1192

was founded the Shogunate, or military dictatorship; it speedily became the governing force, the crown devolving into a shadow of authority. And in 1348 the Shogunate was made an hereditary office with the Ashikaga family, who held it till 1573. But the Shoguns were always nominally subservient to the sacred Emperors.

If the assertion that the house divided against itself cannot stand, is one which may logically be supported, conversely it may well be urged that, when there goes forward the copious disparting of a religion, this tells of active thought with the religionists. And, in Nippon, with all her prolonging of Shinto beliefs, there was abundant dividing of Buddhism into *shu* or sects. It is usual to speak of the Light of Asia, as being of two main branches, Great Vehicle and Lesser Vehicle. There is sometimes classed as separate from those, the Middle Way, which, however, is a section of the Great Vehicle. It is the latter which teaches that a man must arrive at intellectual enlightenment while he is still in the corporeal state, would he pass onwards after death to Nirvana. The votaries of the Middle Way, while accepting this doctrine, add to it an intricate philosophy, whose chief point is, that on earth nothing exists, save in human imagination. And the Lesser Vehicle is the original, or primitive form of Buddhism, inculcating merely, that whoso leads an exemplary life, will not be called on to return to this vale of tears. On demise, he will be rewarded by annihilation.

It was the Great Vehicle which was known at first in Japan. But in 625 there went there a Korean priest, Ekwan, who expounded the Middle Way; and who likewise, presumably because he desired to win the masses, preached the simple gospel of the Lesser Vehicle. The outcome was the establishing of a Middle Way body, San Ron Shu, or the Sect of the Three Metaphysical Books; also of a Lesser Vehicle body, Jojitsu Ron Shu, or the Sect of the Perfection or Truth. These denominations were short-lived; by the time they passed away, other Buddhist churches had been begun; and there enrolled themselves in them the people, who had been members of the two above-named. In 654, a Japanese prelate, Dosho, instituted a Middle Way persuasion, the Hosso Shu, sometimes called the Yuishiki. Hosso Shu signifies, the Sect whose Members study the Nature of Things; Yuishiki means Idealism: and the church so entitled is extant even now. In 658 a Japanese hierarch, Chitsu, inaugurated a Lesser Vehicle sect, the Kusha or Treasure. But like its predecessor founded by Ekwan, it faded away soon, the members joining other Buddhist fraternities. Among the canonical

books of Buddhism, is the Scripture of the extensive Flower-adorning Gospel. And in 725 a Chinese priest, Dosen, started in Nippon a Great Vehicle sect, whose appellation, Kegon, is a contracted equivalent of that, of the said Scripture. For it was on this work that Dosen based his sermons, and the Kegon Shu has survived to the present day. In 754 a Chinese missionary, Kanshin, brought about the inception in Japan of a Lesser Vehicle sect, the Ritsu or Discipline, this also having survived till now. As early as the eighth century, there was talk about some of the Buddhist churchmen being corrupt, objections being raised, in particular against their being a great power in affairs of state. In 805 a Japanese priest, Dengyo, eager to bring reform, for he was a very earnest man, instituted the denomination of Tendai. And it was almost simultaneously that the Shingon church was founded by Kobo Daishi, who has been already spoken of. The name of Tendai is derived from that of a mountain in China, Tien Tai, and Shingon means New Word. Dengyo and Kobo were friends; the sects of their starting both belong to the Great Vehicle; and both are in existence yet.

The basic difference, between the Great Vehicle organizations, was from the outset comparatively small. The distinction of the Kegon was only that it laid stress, on the excellence of certain cardinal virtues, upheld in the Scripture from which the sect took its name. The Shingon, dealing far more than the Kegon and Tendai in elaborate and mysterious ritual, likewise acquired soon the reputation, of being lax in demand for morality, among its members. In centuries immediately following that, which saw the activities of Dengyo and Kobo, there grew steadily louder the outcry against the Buddhist clergy. Wealthy and luxurious, they had set up great monasteries, which were now in some cases bristling with weapons of war, the monks undergoing military drill. Out of the spirit of inquiry, which these abuses evoked, came four new churches. And as will transpire in studying them, the usual mode, of classifying Buddhist persuasions as either Great Vehicle or Lesser Vehicle, is scarcely adequate. For the new denominations were rather closer to Christianity than to Buddhism in general.

Of personages in the Buddhist pantheon in Amida, venerated by every sect. It is sometimes contended that Sakyamuni himself mentioned this deity with obeisance; for he is supposed to have been originally a king, who lived in India long ages before Sakyamuni. It is held that Amida renounced his throne so that he might become a Buddha; in other words, so that he might arrive at the

intellectual enlightenment necessary for the welfare of his soul. These contentions hint, that the central idea of the Great Vehicle had been familiar in India, prior to the advent of the alleged father of Buddhism. Be that as it may, it was in 1100 that Ryonin gave inception to the Yuzu Nembutsu church. It was in 1174 that Genku inaugurated the Jodo Shu; in 1224 Shinran Shonin the Jodo Shin Shu; and in 1275 Ippen the Ji Shu. All these priests were Japanese; the sects they founded are all extant still, and each has special association with Amida.

Yuzu means circulation, and Nembutsu is a contraction of Namu Amida Butsu, or Hail to the Buddha Amida. For Ryonin taught that people ought to view this deity, as Catholics in the Occident regard the Virgin, namely as an intercessor with the Almighty, on behalf of their souls. Jodo means Pure Land (i. e., Heaven), and Genku proclaimed that Amida's renunciation of his throne had been enacted, not for that personage's own good exclusively, but for the redemption of mankind. Wherefore, it is by faith in the remote sacrificial being, and not by righteous deeds, that salvation may be won, continued the Jodo founder. And he advocated interminable utterance of the adoring phrase, Namu Amida Butsu. Jodo Shin Shu means the True Sect of the Pure Land; this church likewise accepts the doctrine of redemption through Amida; and alone among Japanese Buddhist organizations, the Jodo Shin has a married clergy. Ji Shu means Time Sect, and apart from inculcating salvation through Amida, the peculiarity of the Ji is simply this. Ippen had travelled widely, preaching; and the church of his founding has a law, that its head hierarch should practise itineracy.

It was in 1191 that a Japanese priest, Eisai, began theological expositions, which led almost instantly to the starting of yet another Great Vehicle body, the Zen Shu or Contemplation Sect, flourishing still. In addition to upholding contemplation, the Zenists attached high value to spartanism, whence their church gained support especially from the soldier class. The Scripture of the Lotus of the good Law, is of the canonical books of Buddhism; Japanese equivalents of that name are Myohorengëkyo and Hokkë; and this Scripture was extolled as supreme by the Japanese priest, Nichiren (1222-1282). His followers thus came to be known as the Hokkë Shu, being also styled sometimes, the Nirchiren Shu. But in claiming as he did that he was not the founder of a sect, Nichiren was right. For the Hokkë had long been a favorite book with the Tendai prelates; or to look further back, it was among those writings, on which

Prince Shotoku lectured. The Hokkë Shu may be described as a Great Vehicle body, of strong evangelical predilections, and it is thriving yet.

Fine Buddhist paintings continued to be wrought frequently, up till the thirteenth century. This witnessed the dawn of woodcut pictures, the art in which Nippon was to win ultimately her widest fame, and the first woodcuts were all studies of Buddhist deities. There was, too, in the thirteenth century, a revival of the glories of Buddhist sculpture, which renaissance endured, say a hundred years. Printing, from the remote day it began, by multiplying a text from the Scriptures of the Light of Asia, remained for some seven hundred years, almost wholly concerned with reduplicating Buddhist theological treatises, and books in the canon of the Indian faith. These books were in Chinese, nor was it till the twentieth century that the canon was translated into Japanese. Under the Ashikaga Shoguns, in power as has been noted from 1348 to 1573, the clergy of Sakyamuni's creed wore a triple laurel. Authors of most of the beautiful secular literature of the epoch, painters of most of its fine secular pictures, they were active in starting schools. Nevertheless, as in days soon after Kyoto had been chosen capital, so also now, the priests were very ready for fighting. If hardly anything owing to the ceaseless baronial strife, which the Shoguns were incapable of checking. And when the iron-handed soldier, Oda is known about the life of the masses before this particular period, it is only too well recorded that they suffered dire privation then. Nobunaga, tore down the Ashikaga Shogunate, he was determined that never again should the churches vie with the baronage, in being an armed peril to the Sunrise Land. If he quelled the turbulent nobles, it was the relentless blows he struck at the more menacing of the temples and monasteries, which ended wealth with the Buddhist hierarchy.

Iyeyasu, who established in 1603 the hereditary Shogunate of Tokugawa, was a member of the Jodo sect of Buddhism, and he was wont to take advice from priests on affairs of state. The second Tokugawa Shogun, Hidetada, ordained that every mature male in Japan must be on the membership roll of some Buddhist temple, likewise that every household in the land must possess a Buddhist image. The fifth Shogun of the line, Tsunayoshi, showed himself a very orthodox devotee of Buddhism, founding as he did an asylum, for aged and infirm dogs and horses. It was the extraordinary genius of Iyeasu which, finally shattering the bellicosity of the

nobles, and creating at length a strong central government, brought for the populace tolerable comfort, with considerable education. It was just after Iyeyasu's time, that the toiling myriads came to reflect that refinement of theirs, which has passed well-nigh into a proverb. Sociologists and artists have marvelled that the world-famous color-prints should have been essentially a popular art, sold as they were for a few copper coins each. And, in those early seventeen hundreds, in which this woodcut art began quickly to reach loveliness, nearly all people in Nippon had houses, with something of architectural beauty. But remember, this culture with the masses was not exactly a new thing. It was the apogee of the civilization, introduced to the Island Empire ages before, by the coming of Buddhism.

As the nineteenth century neared meridian, and there grew active an anti-Shogunal party, they used as weapon the immemorial Shinto theory, about the Mikados being divine. When the Shogunate was subverted in 1868, the legislative force, set in its place, was the revived authority of the crown. And, in consonance, Shinto was proclaimed the official religion. But the union, between that creed and the Indian one, was too firmly planted in the heart of the majority, to be lightly removed. Thus, while it is true there are today, multitudes of Japanese who call themselves Shintoists and nothing else on the other hand all or seemingly all the avowed Buddhists are faithful, to the ancient Shinto belief, in the efficacy of prayer to their own ancestors. In their houses these Buddhists have a miniature shrine, for the purpose of ancestral worship.

With the proclamation that Shinto was the national faith, the government essayed to make all shrines of the rëinstated cult, completely distinct. It endeavored to purge them of decorative items which, pertaining to Buddhist symbolism, told of the link between the indigenous and the foreign creed. In Nippon at present, there are about 70,000 temples of the Light of Asia, those of Shinto being nearly twice that number. It might be thought that exceptional popularity would lie, with the simple tenets of Buddhism of the Lesser Vehicle. But on the contrary, the solitary church of that class still extant, the Ritsu, is among the very smallest of current religious fraternities. The Zen and the Jodo Shin are the two largest persuasions, either of them being about the same size. The Shingon, with its fondness for ritual, comes third, being a good deal smaller, however, than Zen or Jodo Shin. The sole Middle Way sect still existing, the Hosso, is but a tiny affair, its fanes scarcely fifty, in

which paucity is ample significance. What shall it profit a man or woman in the hour of sorrow to hearken to the Middle Way philosophy, that nothing exists save in human imagination? It is normal that, in times of darkness, strong active people should find a little respite in the Zen advocacy of spartanism. It is normal that, in times of tribulation, people should discover consolation in the Jodo Shin doctrine, that their souls will be miraculously wafted to the Pure Land, through the sacrifice of Amida.

If these reflections are bound to rise, when studying the history of Japanese Buddhism, likewise they are bound to rise, when talking of religion to the humbler Japanese folk. "You may become a cat," was the saying to the writer, of a simple peasant woman, convinced of the truth of the rëincarnation theory. "Which deity do you principally long to see in the hereafter?" she continued, adding that her own preference was for Kwannon, the Buddhist goddess of compassion. Here was a person who did really think of the pantheon as composed of veritable beings on whom she might one day look. But of Japanese observations concerning the faith of Sakyamuni, they are the words of a city-bred woman, of the toiling multitude, which bring the sweetest perfume in the recollection: "Buddhist teaching makes the heart gentle."

KNOWLEDGE INTERPRETED AS LANGUAGE BEHAVIOR

BY LESLIE A. WHITE

MAN has spent a great deal of time thinking about himself. Piqued by voracious curiosity, he has attempted to define his station in the cosmos. The range of his speculations and conceits extends from filial kinship with a Creator, in whose name he presides over the planetary center of the Universe, to status as one of many forms of organic life, precariously and temporarily infesting an insignificant speck of dust in a universe of suns.

Out of this prolonged speculation have grown many "problems," one of which is the problem of knowledge. There has been much speculation about Intellect and Knowledge. Volumes have been written on Epistemology, in attempt to determine what knowledge is, whether or not it is possible, and how. Nowadays, we are not so much concerned with deciding questions dialectically as empirically. The tendency is to take the human being as a datum rather than a pre-conceived hypothesis; to study him objectively rather than to pit our notions of him one against the other.

This point of view makes possible a new approach to the problem of knowledge. We may dispense with such questions as whether or not knowledge is possible or "real." We may begin with the individual, examine him in any way that we can, and report our findings. Whether or not this method will reach the "ultimate nature" of knowledge, is a question that may well await upon a thorough and exhaustive examination of our datum.

Instead of metaphysics, we may begin with common sense. We have an animal that eats, sleeps, talks, laughs, wears clothes, uses tools, etc. There has been a great deal of energy dissipated in trying to determine man's place among animals. Without going into this litigation, we may cite current reputable authority to the effect

that man differs from the other animals in his use of an articulate language and material tools. (*Mind of Primitive Man*, Boas. p. 96.) We accept this tentatively, as it is the best we have at this time, but we should not hesitate to modify or discard it should further investigation make it necessary.

In our studies of animals, we have on the one hand behavior and on the other the biological organism. We may study one independently of the other, or we may attempt to correlate a datum in one cycle with a fact in the other. Thus we may examine the structure of the organism, its composition, arrangement of parts, etc., without regard for its behavior; or we may occupy our attention with the behavior of the organism without regard to its mechanical structure; or we may correlate an act of behavior with a part or structure. We thus have three distinct modes of attack, any one, or all, of which we may use. In this paper, we shall avail ourselves almost exclusively of one method, that of the study of behavior, i. e., what a person *does* where knowledge is concerned. We shall, perforce, leave the examination of the organism to further investigation and instrumental experimentation, and, necessarily, the correlation of the two cycles must wait upon this also.

The homing pigeon performs a feat which we can not explain in organic terms. Human conduct presents facts which can not be correlated with facts of the organism. But, keeping in mind the distinction made above, we see that we are justified in pursuing the facts of one cycle to the disregard of the facts of another. Our procedure here will be to deal with the facts of human behavior which have to do with knowledge, as this term is used in common sense.

As we have seen, man differs from other animals chiefly in the use of an articulate language and material tools. These are objective facts of behavior. We do not know exactly what goes on in the organism when this behavior occurs, so we say that man *has the capacity for abstraction.* Just as the homing pigeon returns to his cote when released, not knowing *how* he does it, we say that he has a *capacity*, or *instinct,* for this kind of behavior. The term "capacity" here is just another way of saying that the organism does something.

The implication of the expression "capacity for abstraction" is that man's conduct involves an object that at once bears a relationship both to himself and to some other object. Thus a stone bears a relation to a fist and at the same time to a clam; the *stone* is used by the *fist* to crush the clam; a *spear* is used as an extension of the

arm to wound a *foe; poison* is taken from a serpent's *fangs* and put on an *arrow-tip*. Thus man's conduct involves relationships between one external object and others as well as to himself. Animals, are ego-centric; for them an external object bears only one relationship, which is to them direct—they do not use tools.

A word is similar to a tool in this sense. Language may use vocal utterances, written characters or gestures. In either instance the situation is the same in this respect: Something is done or made by the body. This act possesses a degree of objectivity which bears relationships both to its author and to some other object. Thus a word itself becomes an objective datum and bears a relationship both to him who uses it and to some other object, relationship or event. A word, then, is something like a tool, that man alone of all animals uses because of "his power of abstraction."

We have now a way of studying "knowledge" in an objective, empirical way. Whether there is any knowledge that exists apart from language is a question that may be considered after we have done all we can with this method of study. The problem as it may be stated now is this: We have an animal, man, who uses words—a language. The use of language is accomplished by bodily acts—behavior; language (or thinking) is a process of the body just as truly as are respiration and digestion. We mention this fact merely to illustrate our point of view; we are not here concerned with a correlation of physiological processes with words, but we take for granted an organism with the capacity for this kind of conduct. We wish to study and interpret this conduct which consists in the use of words.

The use of language means *labelling* the universe. A word may be looked upon as a label which is attached to something else. It must be kept constantly in mind that a word has an objective existence of its own, and that it bears a relationship both to him who uses it and to that which it labels. A word may label an object, a relationship or an event. Thus, such material objects that present themselves to our senses, as rocks, clouds, trees, etc., are labelled; these labels are nouns. Events, in the sense of occurring or happening, are labelled, and we have verbs. Relationships are labelled by words classed as prepositions conjunctions, etc. We thus have the whole universe of "being" and "doing"—objects and movements—translated into a language order, conceptual rather than perceptual. But this language order is itself of an objective nature

as well as subjective, and it is the reaction of the body (biological organism) to this language order that constitutes "knowledge."

We have already seen how the universe as it presents itself is labelled with words. What then is "thinking" in such an interpretation? "Thinking" is a word that labels a physiological, bodily process that consists in the manipulation of words. (The term "thinking" may sometimes be used to designate a bodily process that does not involve the use of words, such as reverie, dreams, etc. I prefer to call these processes dreaming, and to reserve the word thinking for language processes.) Distinction must be made between words as mere vocal utterances and words as language. A parrot may vocalize a word, but he has no language: he is ego-centric and does not possess "the power of abstraction," already explained. Hereafter in this paper it shall be understood that the term "word" shall be used in the sense of language.

Thinking, then, is a bodily process of manipulation of words *in a certain way*, for it is obvious that mere mouthing of words in a haphazard way does not constitute thinking. We must analyze and define this special *way* of manipulation of words. A baby is born with a greater or lesser number of pattern reactions, such as sneezing, but most of his behavior is learned. It requires some time for an infant to accomplish the eye-hand coordination, and it requires still further time and training for him to use an instrument or tool to do something to something else, e. g., to eat with a spoon. It is in the same way that language habits are built up, from the behavior standpoint, disregarding the physiological processes correlated with these acts of behavior. Just as the baby learns to make the eye-hand-spoon-food-mouth combination, he learns to make the various combinations in the manipulation of words. The baby makes use of certain things in his environment in eating, bringing into the process such things and in such a combination as are necessary to accomplish his purpose or end—eating. Language is a part of one's environment as truly as spoons and food are, and it is in a similar way that it is employed in effecting changes and accomplishing ends. Language, then, in its simplest forms, is simply a manipulation of words, in certain combinations, with reference to the things which the words stand for, and with reference to the purpose or end to be accomplished.

What then is "knowledge" in terms of language behavior? What do we mean when we say that one "knows something"? A micro-organism avoids contact with some chemical; is this knowledge? A

dog will not come into the house because he "knows" someone will kick him: is this knowledge? A small boy "knows" that two times two are four, and that Tokyo is the capital of Japan: is this knowledge? Regardless of terminology, there is an essential difference between the first two instances and the third. We prefer to reserve the term "knowledge" to apply to the last mentioned example. It is in this instance that we have manifested that "capacity for abstraction" which differentiates man from brute. The "knowledge" of the boy who knows that Tokyo is the capital of Japan and that there are whales in the sea, is based upon the use of words which at once bear a relationship to him and to some other facts which they represent. The first two examples cited are cases of ego-centrism solely.

The *meaning* of a word is simply the recognition of its dual relationship—to the user and to that which it represents. This recognition is accomplished by the physiological organism in a way that can not as yet be explained in physiological terms. No more can we explain the "homing instinct" of the homing pigeon in physiological terms. We have these physiological capacities given, and in studying behavior, we take them for granted The meaning of a word is the same as the meaning of a tool. A savage uses a spear or a hammer. These have meaning to him; they supplement his physiological equipment and effect changes in his environment. A tool has meaning both to the user and to the material upon which it is used. A word has meaning to that which it represents just as truly as it does to him who uses it. We do not know why an ape, who has the physiological structure to use tools and language does not do so; we only know that he does not use them, and that man does.

An idea is a word combination. It is not a haphazard collection of words, but an arrangement in such a fashion as to accomplish a purpose or to achieve an end. This is not to be thought of in any metaphysical teleological sense, but in a common sense way. Just as one would lay a log across a stream in order to cross it without wetting his feet, or use a needle to pick a thorn out of the flesh, so an idea, or word combination, is an arrangement of such words as will accomplish some purpose or end, such as description, command or inquiry. The criterion of an idea is the correlation of the words and combination used with the objects, events and relationships which they represent, and also with the purpose of the user. The same is true with tools. In the two instances given above, one could not interchange the needle and the log and accomplish the desired

ends. We may have idea combinations as well as word combinations.

Knowledge consists, then, in the acquisition of language habits—word combinations. (The use of the term "language habits" must not be confused with Watson's language habits. There may or may not be similarities, but our use of the expression in this paper is entirely independent of the definitions and theories of Watson.) It is true that one learns something by discovery, such as radium, bacteria, etc., but this does not become knowledge until it has been translated into the language order. We may now view knowledge, or bodies of knowledge, such as History, Literature, Mathematics, etc., in the light of our interpretation, as consisting of congeries of word or idea combinations, that have meaning to us and to objects, events or relationships for which they stand.

How is learning to be interpreted in terms of language behavior? It is said that one learns "by experience." We also learn by studying. We do learn by experience, as the dog learned to avoid kicks by staying out of the house. We learn in laboratories by dissecting frogs, mixing chemicals, etc. But we also learn by reading and listening to lectures. We learn of the past in History, of foreign countries, of the heavenly bodies, etc. But this, too, is a form of experience, experience in which we are subjected to a discipline of word and idea combinations instead of to those things which they represent, so that the distinction between learning by experience and by study disappears since both are experience. Furthermore, what we learn by dissecting frogs is not knowledge in the human sense any more than a dog who turns a roasting spit has knowledge, until it has been translated into the language order of behavior.

How are we to interpret "abstract thought" in light of our theory? We have seen that we may have word combinations (ideas) and also idea combinations. We also know that these word-idea combinations may be labelled. Thus, instead of having some other object, event or relationship which words represent, they may stand for other word-idea combinations. This is abstract thought. Take "justice" for example. First we have simple words which label the objects (or persons) involved, and we have words which label *what* these objects *do*, *how* and *upon what* they *act*. We make various word-idea combinations which correspond to these various data. These are ideas; (word) reflections upon the phenomena. (Reflections in the sense that they are *reflected* by the data and phenomena themselves.) Then we label these idea combinations with *a* word

which then *stands for* a word-idea combination, or a series of word-idea combinations. Thus "expansion" is a word which labels a group of word-idea combinations, which represents certain objects and events. Likewise do "justice" and "liberty" stand for word-idea combinations. The manipulation and use of these labels constitutes "abstract thought." Abstract thought differs from concrete thought in that instead of having other objects and events as a correlative it has word-idea combinations as its correlative.

Invention and Discovery. What is an "original idea"? How is "creative thought" to be interpreted? Let us begin with random movements and pointless manipulation, and with material objects instead of words. Random movements and manipulation will result in successive combinations in arrangement of environment and operator, just as successive throwing of pennies will result in different combinations of heads and tails. The manipulation may be pointless and without plan, but should a certain permutation or combination come about that strikes the operator as being of value, useful or desirable, he may seize upon it and try to repeat and preserve it. It is in some such way as this, we believe, that the wheel was discovered, and no doubt the bow and arrow. Here we have an object-combination. Now suppose we have several of these object-combinations, the inclined plane, the screw, the wheel, the lever, etc. These object-combinations are then subjected to various manipulations in the course of the activities of their users. In the course of this manipulation these object-combinations come into contiguity and a combination is made of object-combinations, e. g., the wheel, lever, screw, etc., may be combined into a machine. In this way inventions are made. The steamboat was simply a combination of the steam engine and the boat, both of which had previously existed for many years. An invention, then, is the combination of one object-combination with another object or object-combination.

The same is true of words and ideas. In the process of manipulation, one word-idea combination is brought into contact with another word-idea combination, forming a new combination. Should there prove to be any advantage to or desire of the operator to preserve this combination, he does so, just as the object-combinations were preserved in tools and machines. Thus Darwin got certain ideas from Linnaeus, some from Malthus, others elsewhere. Manipulation of these ideas led to a combination—an hypothesis. "If X be true and Y be true, then Z must also be true." This represents the process of bringing together two discrete facts or ideas, and conclu-

sion which is drawn in the combination formed. Hypotheses, theories and laws are thus results of combinations of idea-combinations.

Education and Knowledge. Education consists very largely in a discipline of and practice in the language order. Working with actual material such as in the laboratories, in clinics, and in field surveys has an important place in education. But to a greater extent, one works with the word order that *represents* these primary data. Thus one learns and "knows" about the circulation of the blood, the customs of African tribes, the orbits of the planets, the life of Bismarck, the climate of Egypt, the British Labor movement, the endocrine glands, etc., without ever coming into primary contact with the original data themselves. The subject-matter of the student is very largely a secondary order—a language order—which *takes the place of the primary order—the original data.* Thus the subject-matter of the student of economics is the *writings* (and lectures) of men on economics. The point is that education consists to a very great degree of a discipline of word-idea combinations rather than the original data themselves. Of course, this has to be so to a great extent, but it might be maintained that it is carried too far. Thus many students and scholars instead of dealing with the primary data, concern themselves almost exclusively with what Aristotle, Adam Smith, Darwin, Comte, Wundt, Spencer, Boas, James or Dewey *said* about them. This tendency to attend to the secondary word-order rather than to the primary data order has resulted in the accumulation of a great cumbrous mass of "knowledge" which consists of what one man said about what another scholar wrote about what some predecessor of his thought about something else, etc., etc., and education consists largely in preserving the past by subjecting students to its discipline rather than directing attention to primary-fact data.

Summary. We wish to interpret "knowledge" in terms of behavior which can be studied empirically, objectively. We take for granted man's "capacity for abstraction," which means the use of language and tools. Knowledge, from our viewpoint is language behavior. This consists in the use of words, which bear at once a relationship to some object, event or relationship and to him who uses the word as well. The meaning of a word is this dual relationship, just as the meaning of a tool is a dual relationship to the user and to the material upon which it is used. Ideas are word-combinations for a purpose, as object-tool combinations are in the material culture. Hypotheses, theories and laws are idea-combina-

tions. Idea combinations are labelled with words which are called abstract words, such as "liberty," "cohesion," "justice," "relativity," "expansion," etc. Original ideas and creative thought are new combinations made between one idea combination and another idea or idea-combination. This is accomplished by the historical process of manipulation in the same way that inventions (new combinations between object-combinations and other objects or object-combinations) are made, or grow, in the material culture. Knowledge consists in systems of these idea-combinations which are embodied in an objective language order, which may be analyzed into primary, or idea systems which represent objects and events, or secondary, which consists of idea-combinations which represent other idea-combinations. Education consists largely in dealing with this secondary order; attention is directed to word-orders which represent data, rather than to the data themselves.

UTOPIA REDISCOVERED

BY WILLIAM LOFTUS HARE

I. The Spiritual Utopia

THE Utopias that have found literary expression at all times and in many countries fall generally into three classes:

I. *Utopia Spirituale,* whose chief characteristic is conceived to be a divine outpouring of spiritual energy and a human response thereto. The Golden Age will come—so say its prophets—when Heaven intervenes in the affairs of the world and by wisdom "ordereth all things graciously."

II. *Utopia Judiciale,* whose chief characteristic is conceived to be the exercise of power in accordance with the most just statute law and the universal obedience to it. The Golden Age will come when men, as the result of the sufferings they have endured, fall back upon the recognition of justice as the principle of order and harmony.

III. *Utopia Occonomica,* whose chief characteristic is conceived to be the operation of economic forces in the best or inevitable direction. Here the Golden Age will come from the recognition of the extent to which men may react for good or evil, in thought and deed, from their external environment and from the means they adopt for the satisfaction of their needs.

* * * * *

1. *A Word and Its Meaning.* "Utopia" is a mediaeval scholarly word derived from the Greek. *Ou* = no, *topos* = place. The Latin equivalent is *Nusquam* = nowhere. We may here take some comfort from Professor Patrick Geddes' habit of spelling the word "Eutopia," deriving it from *Eu* = good, *topos* = place, thus presenting us with the idea of Utopia as a good place. But we are left

with the subtle, if unpleasant thought that the "good place" is "nowhere."

So much for Utopia in relation to the element of Space. As to Time some think of it as a Golden Age that has passed and some as a Millenium to come. The former view is taken by the backward-gazing Asiatics like the Chinese and Indians, while the Semitics and the Europeans may be classed together as forward gazers. As a matter of contemplative edification it makes little difference as to whether the Golden Age has passed or is to come; for in either case it is as part of a criticism upon contemporary conditions that it is depicted. I will quote the Chinese writer Chwang-Tze by way of illustration: he is looking backward to the men of perfect virtue:

"The people had their regular and constant nature; they wove and made themselves clothes; they tilled the ground and got food. This was their common faculty. They were all one in this and did not form themselves into separate classes; so were they constituted and left to their natural tendencies. Therefore, in the age of perfect virtue men walked along with slow and grave step, and with their looks steadily directed forwards. At that time, on the hills there were no footpaths, nor excavated passages; on the lakes there were no boats nor dams; all creatures lived in companies; and the places of their settlement were made close to one another. Birds and beasts multiplied to flocks and herds; the grass and trees grew luxuriant and long. In this condition the birds and beasts might be led about without feeling the constraint; the nest of the magpie might be climbed to, and peeped into. Yes, in the age of perfect virtue, men lived in common with birds and beasts, and were on terms of equality with all creatures, as forming one family. How could they know among themselves the distinctions of "superior man" and "small men"? Equally without knowledge, they did not leave the path of their natural virtue; equally free from desires, they were in the state of pure simplicity. In that state of pure simplicity, the nature of that people was what it ought to be."—(*Chwang-Tze*, IX, II, ii, 2.)

"In the age of perfect virtue they attached no value to wisdom, nor employed men of ability. Superiors were but as the higher branches of a tree; and the people were like the deer of the wild. They were upright and correct, without knowing that to be so was 'Righteousness'; they loved one another, without knowing that to be so was 'Benevolence'; they were honest and leal-hearted, without knowing that it was 'Loyalty'; they fulfilled their engagements, without knowing that to do so was 'Good Faith'; in their simple movements they employed the services of one another, without thinking that they were conferring or receiving any gift. Therefore their actions left no trace, and there was no record of their affairs."—(XII, II, v, 13.)

There is a singular profundity in the closing observation: for history is mainly the record of the aberrations from the normal: when some one does something specially bad and another reacts by doing something specially good—we hear about it. Otherwise the normal course of life goes unrecorded, because it is not remarkable and is soon forgotten. But here we detect the twinkle in old Chwang-Tze's eye.

2. *The Hebrew Prophets.* The Jews were the inventors of the Utopia which lies in the future, for reasons which are as clear as they are interesting. For them, history began with an act of disobedience, was continued with an act of murder and its consequences, and went from bad to worse until, out of great suffering, their propnets cried in songs of lamentation so poignant that, as a mode of relief, they soared in spirit above the world as it was to the world as they felt it ought to be. There was no room in their vision of the past for a Golden Age and the germinal idea of Eden was not sufficient to look back to. The Utopia of the Jews was to come about through religious conversion: it was a restoration of Israel to more than all they had lost in the years of their affliction: and as prophet succeeds prophet the details of the new social order that is to come vary, but the general characteristic is the same. I will quote a few of the illustrative passages which, from their sheer familiarity, have hardly been recognized as the formulation of the Utopian idea.

"And I will give them an heart to know me that I am the Lord: and they shall be my people and I will be their God, for they shall return unto me with their whole heart."—(*Jer.* xxxiv., 7.)

The cycle of events is briefly this: suffering, repentance, forgiveness, restoration, Utopia—the motive power of the change from a divine source. More beautiful and precise is another passage:

"But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days: I will put my law in their inward parts, and in their heart will I write it: and I will be their God and they shall be my people: . . . for they shall all know Me from the least of them unto the greatest of them. For I will forgive their iniquity and their sin will I remember no more."—(*Jer.* xxxi., 33-34.)

The prophets were not slow in witnessing to the radiation of the Utopian atmosphere from its central nucleus in a restored Israel to other nations of the world.

"And it shall come to pass in the latter days that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills: and all nation shall flow unto it.

And many peoples shall go and say: 'Come ye and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord . . . and He will teach us His ways and we will walk in His paths.' . . . And He shall judge between the nations and reprove many peoples, and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, nor shall they learn war any more. —(*Isaiah* ii., 2-4.)

The psychological change was to be so potent as to affect the behavior of the animal world:

"And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb. . . . They shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy mountain."—(*Isaiah* xi., 6-9.)

Nor is there any doubt as to the location of the "good place."

"And they shall be a peculiar treasure unto Me . . . in the days that I prepare . . . and all nations shall call you happy; for ye shall dwell in a delightsome land."—(*Mal.* iii., 17and 12.)

The broad universalism of the post-exilic prophets widens the scope and adds beauties to the scene of the Messianic Utopia, but retains the chief characteristic: it is the work of a compassionate God who wishes all former troubles to be forgotten:

"For behold I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be remembered nor come into mind."

3. *Utopia Delayed.* The second phase in the evolution of the Jewish Utopia was reached about the beginning of the second century B. C., and was due primarily to the non-realization of the earlier prophetical hopes. The series of apocalypses beginning with one attributed to Enoch, put off to a more distant future the coming of the happy kingdom, and some of them removed it from earth to Heaven. Moreover, a fixed tradition, with occasional modifications, established itself right down to the first Christian century and familiarized the pious with the machinery and the process by which the spiritual Utopia should be ushered in. There was to be a *Parousia* or appearance of the Messiah or the Son of Man; then a great Judgment, followed by a first Resurrection and a general Resurrection. After that was to come a final consummation of the Righteous. I will now quote from the widely circulated and influential *Book of Enoch I*, the Utopian passages in their true chronological order.

"For the elect there will be light and joy and peace, and they will inherit the earth. . . . And they will not be punished all the days of their life, nor will they die of plagues or visitations of wrath, but they will complete the full number of the days of their life;

and their lives will grow old in peace, and the years of their joy will be many, in eternal happiness and peace all the days of their life."—(x., 7-9.)

"Destroy all oppression from the face of the earth and let every evil work come to an end; and let the plant of righteousness and uprightness appear. Labour will prove a blessing; righteousness and uprightness will be established in joy for evermore. And then will all the righteous escape and will live till they beget a thousand children, and all the days of their youth and their Sabbath will they complete in peace. And in these days all the whole earth will be tilled in righteousness and will be planted with trees and be full of blessing. And all desirable trees will be planted on it, and vines will be planted on it; the vine which is planted on it will yield wine in abundance, and of all the seed which is sown thereon will each measure bear ten thousand, and each measure of olives will yield ten presse of oil. . . . And all the children of men shall become righteous, and all nations shall offer the adoration and praise, and all will worship Me. And the earth will be cleansed from all corruption, and from all sin, and from all punishment and torment, and I will never again send them upon it, from generation to generation for ever."—(x., 16-22.)

"And in those days I will open the store chambers of blessing which are in heaven, so as to send them down upon the earth over the work and labour of the children of men. Peace and justice will be wedded throughout all the days of the world and throughout all generations of the world."—(xi., 1-2.)

Thus the human, the animal and vegetable kingdoms are all to be touched by the Divine Hand. The next two passages, however, remove Utopia from Earth, which is to be destroyed, to the Heavenly world.

"And the righteous one will arise from sleep, will arise and walk in the path of righteousness, and all his path and conversation will be in eternal goodness and grace. He will be gracious to the righteous, and will give him eternal uprightness, and will give him power, and he will live in goodness and righteousness, and will walk in eternal light. And sin will perish in darkness for ever, and will no more be seen from day for evermore."—(xciii., 4-5.)

The next group of writings indicate a return to earth from which the wicked will have been removed and the righteous planted in security. I quote one specimen:

"And on that day will I cause Mine Elect One to dwell among them, and I will transform the heaven and make it an eternal blessing and light. And I will transform the earth and make it a blessing and cause Mine elect ones to dwell upon it: but sinners and evildoers will not set foot thereon."—(xlv., 4-5.)

Parallel to *Enoch* are the *Sibylline Oracles*, in which are found many Utopian passages. As these are unfamiliar to modern readers and very beautiful, I will quote a few words. They belong to the Jewish Dispersion in Egypt and Rome, rather than to Palestine, where the *Enoch* literature was produced, and the hope they express in their solemn prophecies are characteristic of a later period and a people more widely informed in world politics.

"But all the sons of the High God shall dwell peacefully round the temple, rejoicing in that which the Creator, the righteous Sovereign and Judge, shall give them. For He shall stand by them as a shelter in His greatness, as though He walled them in with a wall of flaming fire; they shall be at peace in their cities and lands. No hand of evil war shall stir against them. . . . Then shall all the isles and cities say 'How greatly the immortal God loves those men'." (*Sibylline Oracles*, III, 703.)

The passage ends by a description of a great burning of warlike arms for seven years, "for wood shall not be cut from the thicket for burning in the fire." That bonfire is not yet!

"But when this destined day is fully come a great rule and judgment shall come upon men. For the fertile earth shall yield her best fruit and corn and wine and oil . . . it shall gush out in fountains of white milk: the cities shall be full of good things, and the fields with fatness; no sword shall come against the land, nor shout of war; nor shall the earth again be shaken, deeply groaning; no war nor drought shall afflict the land, no dearth nor hail to spoil the crops, but deep peace over all the earth; king shall live as friend to king to the bound of the age, and the Immortal shall establish in the starry heaven one law for men over all the face of the earth for all the doings of hapless mortals." (743-759.)

"All the paths of the plain, and the rough places of the hills, and the lofty mountains, and the wild waves of the sea shall be made easy for traveller and sailor in those days: for perfect peace and plenty cometh on the earth: and the prophets of the high God shall take away the sword; and well-gotten wealth shall abound among men: for this is the judgment of the great God and his rule." (777-784.)

The Utopia placed on Earth and the Utopia placed in Heaven are followed in the first Christian Apocalypse (or the *Revelations of St. John*) by a third and very significant variety—the Utopia which *comes down* from Heaven to Earth. Of this the seer gives a picture. The scene is the new world the new heaven and the new earth in the midst of which is the new Jerusalem. The ideal Kingdom of God becomes actual. The city needs no light and no temple:

its citizens dwell in perfect fellowship with God and consequently with each other. Jew and Gentile, bond and free, are all among the redeemed. The life of the world is a perpetual Sabbath. There shall be no more tears, nor death; no mourning, nor pain—"the first things are passed away."

Unhappily, this spiritual Utopia, which held the fascinated gaze of Jews and Christians for hundreds of years, seemed to recede across the horizon rather than to advance; nevertheless it still constitutes the ideal of the faithful who, even in modern days construct their longed-for social order upon its attractive principles. They are glad thus to believe themselves chosen instruments for the fulfilments of ancient prophecies, the non-realization of which has thrown discredit upon their God and their faith in Him.

II. The Legal Utopia

The aim of the Greek political philosophers was to conceive, and of philosophic statesmen to create and maintain, a constitution founded on laws and the respect for them. The history of the many Greek states from the earliest times shows a series of changes, sometimes alternating from monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, dictatorship, democracy and tyranny; none of them were satisfying for long; each represented in fact, though not always in theory, the government of all by one class or section, in its own interests. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, each in his own peculiar way, sought to found a *politeia*, a polity or constitution, which should exhibit the rule of the State by itself; yet although there were many excellencies in the actual constitutions of Athens and the other Greek states their weaknesses and imperfections were so marked that the ideal *politeia* was never realized. It is this fact which, apart from its many beauties, gives to Plato's *Republic* a special interest, for therein is found his Utopia.

1. *Plato's Republic.* Yet we must be careful to avoid thinking of the *Republic* as simply a *proposal* for the order of society; it was at the same time less than that, and more. It was a deeply critical and historical analysis of private and public life. The object of the work is to exhibit the misery of Man let loose from Law; it draws

in the eighth and ninth books a picture of the changes of society, and paints in minutest detail a picture of a licentious democracy which, as everyone knew, was true of the lawless and violent state of Athens of his day; he passes on to the frightful prophecy of the tyranny that would inevitably follow. He then throws out a general plan for making Man subject again to Law and follows the wind of his poetic freedom whithersoever it will blow, disregarding the difficulties and "impossibilities," as Aristotle truly said. Plato endeavors "thoroughly to investigate the real nature of Justice and Injustice, first in their character in cities and afterwards applying the same inquiry to the individual, looking for the counterpart in the greater as it existed in the form of the less."

The two leading principles on which Plato's moral system reposes are: (a) that no one is willingly evil; and (b) that everyone is endowed with the power of producing moral changes in his own character. Consequently, *dikaiosune*, "justice"—or more properly "righteousness"—becomes the chief object of search in this great work. It is found in man himself as a psychological element, and by constructive artifices Plato enlarges and extends it until his new State has become a *Politeia*, a *Respublica*, a Commonwealth rooted in righteousness.

Utopian ideals had been sketched before his time and laughed at by the comic poets. The Spartan system of personal bodily culture and obedience to the State was well known. Compulsory marriage and State ownership of children were features of the system. Athens recalled the legislation of Draco and Solon regarding property. The attempts of Pythagoras to found religio-political communities in Italy were not forgotten—and upon all these materials Plato drew freely. The *Republic* is not a *corpus juris* for a given state, but a vision of how men have lived and still live when they practise injustice and how they might live if they would not practise justice *as they can do*. Incidentally, it is worth noticing how few are the proposed Utopian elements in the *Republic* compared with the discussion of past and present conditions. Yet such as they are, they deserve mention.

Plato begins modestly by saying—through Socrates—that he will tell a fable "of what has often taken place heretofore, but which has not happened in our times nor do I know whether it is likely to happen—to persuade one of which requires great suasive power." It is the myth of the Earthborn Men; which tells how, out of the womb of the earth, came men of gold, silver, and brass and iron—

in a word, that men are by Nature unequal. The golden men, who may appear in all classes of the state, should hold its guardianship—that is how the Utopia of Plato begins, quite casually and apparently without intention. But men of gold must possess no gold!

"They should have a good education. . . . In addition to this training, their houses and all other effects ought to be so contrived as neither to impede the guardians in bearing the very best possible, nor to excite them to the injury of other citizens. . . . First let none possess any private property unless it be absolutely necessary: next, let none have any dwelling, or store house, into which any one that pleases may not enter: then, as for necessaries, let them be such as both temperate and brave champions in war may require; making for themselves this law, not to receive such a reward of their guardianship from the other citizens as to have either surplus or deficiency at the year's end. Let them also frequent public meals, as in camps, and live in common; and since they have that which is gold and silver in their souls they have no need of that which is human—no need of private lands and houses and money." (Bk. III, ch. xxii.)

"We are not establishing our state with an eye to making any one tribe or class in it remarkably happy, but that the whole State might be so to the fullest extent." (Bk. IV, ch. i.)

The problem which faces the modern town-planner arose in Plato's mind: the size of the city. It was solved by a useful formula:

"So long as the city, as it increases, continues to be one, but no more . . .to take care by all means that the city shall be neither small nor great but of moderate extent, and one only."

It is agreed that men and women are to enjoy a civic equality, but since their nature differs they cannot perform identical functions. The great difficulty of the status of women and children had at length to be faced, and was settled by enacting their community.

"That these women be all common to these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children be likewise in common." (Bk. V., ch. vii.)

The arguments supporting this law are very long and profound and embrace questions which have since been brought together as the science of eugenics or "good birth." It is to be noticed, however, that the ultimate reason justifying the enactment is to establish the unity of the State, to avoid factions, to abolish the distinction betwixt *mine and thine*, in regard to person, property, pleasure or pain. All are to enjoy and suffer in common: that is the test.

Plato's *Republic* involved a League of Hellenic Nations and a Washington Conference, naturally. He then seems to grow weary of enacting details and comes to what he realizes as the crux of his polity. It has a ring of truth sounding through its deep pessimism:

"Unless either philosophers govern in state or those who are at present called kings and governors philosophise genuinely and sufficiently and both political power and philosophy unite in one, there will be no end to the miseries of states, nor yet, methinks, to those of the human race; nor till then will that government which we have described in our reasonings ever spring up to a positive existence, and behold the light of the sun." (Bk. V., ch. xviii.)

Thereafter the great dialogue turns on an exposition of the system of education from the "three R's" to the highest metaphysic, upon which Plato rested his only hope, to which he devoted the labor of his life. If there be those who cavil and carp at the "impossibilities" of Plato's great construction they must be told in the first place that they probably lack the fine sense of serious humor by which alone the *Republic* can be appreciated; and, secondly, that if they want "proposals" for the concrete problems that troubled the Greek States in Plato's time they had better read his closing work, *The Laws*.

2. *More's Utopia.* Aristotle's practical mind was quick to perceive the weakness and incompleteness of the *Republic* which Plato had begun to found, half in ironic jest and half in earnest. He took Plato's "proposals" one by one and criticized them severely in his *Politics*, and began a new cycle of scientific thought as opposed to Utopian idealism in relation to political life. It is probably due to his criticisms that Plato's notions were, some centuries after his time, represented more as profound allegories than as serious proposals, and no one ever seriously suggested that a city should be established on Platonic lines until the time of Plotinus (205 A. D.-271) when the reigning Emperor of Rome offered that philosopher a site upon which to build "Platonopolis." Happily, the venture was never undertaken. Nevertheless the fundamental ideals—of Plato that a state might be rooted in *righteousness*, and of Christ that human society might be founded on *love*—caught the imagination of European peoples for centuries, and many communities were established temporarily in the bosom of the Christian world. Dante, by his splendid poem and his less known political writings, gave fresh impetus to the hope of an ideal Commonwealth, but no literary Utopia was produced until Sir Thomas More issued his in 1516

A. D. He referred to it in correspondence as "my Nusquama"— my Nowhere—which settles the meaning of its title. It appeared in 1551 in English.

The book professes to be the report of the travels of one Raphael Hythlaeus (Gr.: *Huthlos*=Nonsense) who had seen the lands of the Archorii (Wretched) and the Macarensii (Happy), had visited the city of Amaurotus (Unknown) and who when returned to Europe, imparts his traveller's tale to his friends.

More was a practical statesman who lived in times less violent than Plato's but perhaps more dangerous for a zealous reformer. While the Greek critizes the democracy from the viewpoint of philosophic detachment, the Englishman attacks the rich on behalf of the poor. He sees "a certain conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the title of the Commonwealth" and he seeks to devise "a system in which the poor shall not perish for lack, nor the rich be idle through excuse of their riches: in which everyone is equally of the Commonwealth, and in which the Commonwealth possesses only a common wealth."

3. *Criticism.*—The book falls into two parts, the first of which is devoted to criticism of the conditions prevailing in England, presumably, in his time.

The country, says More, suffers from partial judgments and the laws are not made according to equity. Idleness is the mother of thieves, landlords are rent-racking and poor ex-service men are unemployed. Idle servants of the rich develop into thieves and too many soldiers are hardly distinguishable from thieves. There is a danger of keeping continual garrisons. The rich make an excessive display of apparel; they act as profiteers and forestallers; there are too many taverns and alehouses and the education of the youth is corrupt. He goes into economic questions thoroughly, attacking the wool growers who sacrifice husbandry and throw thousands of laborers out of work—"sheep are the devourers of men." The consequences are beggary, or shortness of foodstuffs, a concentration and actual dearth of wool and cattle. Housekeeping is decaying, food is adulterated, currency is enhanced and debased. Poverty is the mother of strife and the decay of the realm.

4. *The Island.*—Then follows a description of the unknown land discovered by Signor Nonsense. Here, of course, we discern the author's proposals to make England a Eutopia by imitating the manners and customs of Utopia.

"War or battle as a thing very beastly they do detest and abhor and they count nothing so inglorious as the glory gotten in war." This is a good beginning, but has to be qualified by saying that the Utopians were not mild non-resistants by any means, nor anti-Versaillian defeatists either; as witness the following:

"But when the battle is finished and ended they put their friends to never a penny cost of all the charges that they were at, but lay it upon their necks that be conquered. Then they burden with the whole charge of their expenses which they demand of them partly in money and partly in lands of great revenues to be paid unto them yearly for ever."

But this was before the discoveries of Mr. Norman Angell and the Union of Democratic Control.

More's Second Book contains all that is essential to the understanding of his Utopian ideas. After describing the "Ilande of Utopia" he passes to the social organization in families with their several officers and representatives. The sound economic principle of sowing more corn than they consume, and breeding more cattle than they require for personal use is described in the first chapter; they do not *import* such food but export it "among the borderers." Exchange of food for manufactured goods or raw material from abroad was the true basis of their commerce. The magistrates are elected, their chief being "Princeps," not exactly a Prince. Their crafts and occupations are based on husbandry, of course, and every one does his part, there being no idlers and no over-burdened slaves—there is a six-hour day in Utopia. The chapter on "their loving and mutual conversation together" describes the equalitarian life desired by More for his contemporaries. The closing section deals with Religion.

Jerome Busleyden's letter to More gives the key to the efforts of the author of "Utopia," if that were needed. He says in conclusion:

"Meanwhile farewell. Go on and prosper, ever devising, carrying out and perfecting something, the bestowal of which on your country may give it long continuance and yourself immortality. Farewell, learned and courteous More, glory of your island, and ornament of this world of ours."

5. *More's Successors.*—Plato in the Classics and More in the Renaissance produced, between them, a fine crop of imaginative Utopians of different sorts. Hobbes exalted the State to the position of an omnipotent Leviathan, subordinating the individual man

to Nature and Authority. Bacon produced his *New Atlantis* and his *Novum Organum.* Simultaneously Tommasso Campanella, an Italian of the Dominican Order, published his *Civitas Solis* in 1623, and James Harrington his *Oceana* in 1656. Fénelon followed with Télémaque in 1699 and Rousseau enjoyed his career as a moralist and reformer in the eighteenth century. Then followed the French Revolution which, in our way of thinking, may be said to have closed the cycle of the *Utopia Judiciale,* except for two slight efforts by Etienne Cabet (*Voyage en Icarie* 1840) and Theodore Hertzka (born 1845) who placed his Utopia in Central Africa, which in those days was "nowhere." Bulwer Lytton's *The Coming Race* (1871) belongs to the period but hardly to the class.

III. The Economic Utopia

A close study of all the Utopias of the middle group reveals the fact that their composers believed that man had the power of perceiving in Nature certain general laws and of elaborating upon them certain Social Customs in the form of Statutes; that he had the intelligence and volition to subject himself and his fellows to their natural and artificial ordinances; and by doing so could renovate the state of mankind.

But it is also clear that in the most important of these Utopian constructions there is a condition precedent to this generally desired obedience to the discipline of law. It is the satisfaction of the material needs of life. From Plato to Rousseau, Law reigns supreme, but within Law there is a germinal thought which becomes fundamental and primal for the *Utopia Oeconomica.* It places economic order first and deduces moral order from it. It changes the Aristotelian sequence of Ethics, Economics, Politics, to one of Economics, Politics, Ethics; and breaking with the past, establishes a new political philosophy.

As we are dealing here with Utopias only we place our finger at once on the most notable which sprang into being at the close of the nineteenth century. Butler's *Erehwon* (1872), Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888), Morris' *News from Nowhere* (1890), Wells' *Anticipations* (1901), *A Modern Utopia* (1905), *New Worlds for Old* (1908), and all the others he is going to write! It is significant

that both Bulter and Morris repeated More's old joke and founded their states *nowhere*. Of late, we are given to understand, men have ceased to compose Utopian romances and have objectified the thing itself in Russia, where it can be seen in perfect working order.

2. *America First.*—Skipping over Butler's *Erehwon*, which he "discovered" in 1872 and "revisited" in 1901, we discern the principles of *Utopia Oeconomica* clearly set forth in Bellamy's work. Within a hundred years the structure of Society has changed without bloodshed by the simple method of industrial evolution. Production became focussed into the hands of the few that it was easy to pass it on to Society, which then became a Socialist State. Thereafter remained Law, the State and Property, but in very different forms to those of Capitalist Society. Law is the regulation of the individual and economic processes which lie at the basis of State life. The State is the whole body of citizens, equal in rights though not in ability or appreciation. "All men who do their best do the same" is the wisdom distilled from the experiences of Bellamy's Bostonians of 2000 A. D. Property is of two kinds: the tree belongs to the Stare while its fruit is distributed to and appropriated by the citizens. Labor is fundamentally compulsory but nevertheless light. After conscripted service all work is voluntary; vocations are chosen; money is abolished, wages are paid in kind, drawn from the stores by the power of the citizen's credit card. The arts are universal for the same reasons as formerly, but not exclusive. Music is "broadcasted" from the finest performers. There is absent from this Utopia all the physical and mental suffering which formerly depended upon uncertainty of livelihood, competition and defeat. The "four nations"—rich, poor, educated and ignorant—have become one nation by the simple economic expedient described. This Utopia however is not nowhere, but *everywhere*. America led the way and Europe followed and all the great nations became federated economically, each doing its best and thus "all the same." All the beneficent changes are traceable to the one great change in the status of industry, which is no longer a field to be exploited for personal profit but a necessary duty for social service. There has been no "change in human nature" such as was desiderated by the opponents of Socialism a generation ago. Human Nature is the same but is placed in better circumstances and consequently reacts better.

3. *Morris and Wells.*—William Morris the artist-craftsman and scholar, who had already written *The Earthly Paradise*, moved from that delightfully romantic world of myth to the equally delightful

world of the near future. His *News from Nowhere* is a representation of Bellamy's theme; more subtle and profound, more attractive, and above all, more English. According to Morris, there must be a violent revolution of sorts culminating in a battle in Trafalgar Square. The book, which is charmingly written, is, like More's *Utopia*, a terrible criticism of our modern life in all its aspects—economic, political, moral. It describes the passage through revolution to State Socialism and finally to Anarchist Communism, in the chapters, "How the Change Came" and "The Beginning of the New Life." There is no "government" and no "politics"—but of course matters are arranged in some way. Morris goes back to his beloved Moot Hall where neighbors settle everything nicely. The chief change responsible for all others, is the abolition of commercialism and manufacture for the world market. The moral excellencies of the people of Hammersmith and Runnymede are thus accounted for and thus maintained.

The original meaning of all the attractive pictures painted by Economic Utopians is simple enough. "We cannot," they say, "practice your exalted morality or obey your wise laws—much less your bad ones--while the economic conditions of our existence press so heavily upon our will, which is necessarily and entirely devoted to a struggle for existence."

All other Utopias of modern construction rest on the same basis, with occasional lapses. The prolific Wells invents and describes, describes and invents, adding detail to detail and going far into the future or side-slipping into one of Einstein's adjacent universes. But it is always the same economic basis that supports the Utopia. William Stanley wrote in 1903 *A Political Utopia* to be realized in 1950, which enters into such details as the feeding and cooking of lobsters and oysters by a reformed method visualized under hypnotic trance. The time is at hand!

IV. Anarchism

Some of the latest, as distinct from the earlier Utopias, differ from both the *Utopia Judiciale* and the *Utopia Oeconomica* by the fact that they dispense with Law, the State and Property. In doing this they pass out of the conditions which make possible either the

Capitalist State or the Socialist State and enter the realm of Anarchism.

By an accident of our language the word Anarchy has now come to mean extreme disorder appearing in a sphere where formerly a certain order reigned. Scientifically, however, it means what its history shows: *Arche*=the first, *Archon*=the chief magistrate of Athens; *anarchia* signifies the absence of any such rule or government. Anarchism is the philosophy of anarchy, or human society rid entirely of government. Obviously, therefore, it belongs to the general family of the Utopias, whatever the anarchists may say to the contrary: for it looks forward to the realization of its aims by various means to a condition of society which, by anticipation, it values and desires.

In order to understand Anarchism generally or any anarchist philosopher in particular, we have to use three touch stones and observe the resultant behavior of the system in question; they are Law, The State and Property, as recognized in pre-anarchistic society. They may be defined as follows:

(a) Law is the body of legal norms, or ideas of correct procedure, based on the fact that men have the will to see a certain procedure generally observed within a circle which includes themselves.

(b) The State is a legal relation—determined by ideas of correct procedure—of persons to whom procedure is prescribed, with each other, for whose sake it is prescribed, by virtue of which relation a supreme authority exists in a certain territory.

(c) Property is a legal relation, by virtue of which some one has, within a certain group of men, the exclusive right of appropriating and disposing of a certain thing.

Taking the writings of seven typical anarchists, Eltzbacher analyzes them in respect to Law, The State and Property. Godwin, Stirner and Tolstoy rejected all three entirely. Prudhom rejects all present laws, the State and Property. Bakounine and Kropotkine reject enacted law and private property after which the State will disappear. Tucker, the American, approves Law and Property but rejects the State unconditionally.

But while this takes their constructions out of the *Utopia Judiciale*, it does not and cannot abolish economic relations between men. Consequently it is the precise form of that relationship that gives Anarchism its characteristic. The economy of Anarchism used to be called Communism as distinguished from Socialism, which still adheres to the State; but since, in our own day, the Bolsheviks, wish-

ing to alienate other Socialists, publicly stole the word "Communism" to define their kaleidoscopic system, anarchists will have to find a new term for their economic process.

The realization of the Anarchist Utopia is to follow the establishment of Equality, or Justice, or Self-interest, or Evolution, or Revolution or Universal Love—according to the different exponents. The means of motivation are equally diverse and contradictory. The aim, however, is to achieve a state of Society in which the needs of men are met by their perfectly free co-operation in productive and distributive processes, devoid of the coercive power of Government

V. A Synthetic Utopia

The perusal of the four foregoing sections will have prepared the reader to find for himself some kind of conclusion on the whole matter.

(a) Three types of propositions lie before us. That a spiritual change will overtake mankind as the result of which the mistakes and imperfections of human society will be easily removed and we shall realize the Earthly Paradise once more. The Age of Perfect Virtue will return. Even H. G. Wells, the prophet of modernism was once smitten with this idea. *In the Days of the Comet* tells how, as the Earth passed quietly through the Comet's tail, its inhabitants breathed a certain gas—was it το πνευμα το άγιον?—and immediately began to behave normally and kindly to each other. The impulse of egoism was inhibited or reduced to reasonable proportions and people did naturally for others what they would wish to be done for themselves, without any sense of virtue or difficulty. Utopia was simply inevitable. In Bucke's *Cosmic Consciousness,* a scientific view is presented of the evolutionary process by which human nature is to change—and is changing—so that the whole scheme of values attains a new equilibrium. This consciousness, denied hitherto to the animal and the self-conscious man, is to appear in children and reappear in adults more strikingly, making the man into a new creature. The modern romantic and scientific prophecies thus take up the old religious theme of Jewish faith, described in my first section, confirmed by the religious and moral fervour of many, though rela-

tively few, saints and sages of all time. Good men will do good deeds: such is the conclusion of the *Utopia Spirituale.*

(b) But the world is not entirely or mainly inhabited by "good men" nor ruled by them. In the absence of the power to behave spontaneously well, some expedient for an imperfect world has to be devised. This is Law, which supplies norms of conduct which even imperfect men have the power to obey. There is nothing unreasonable in this and though it has never worked to the full it has succeeded in bringing a relative order into a general potential chaos. The theory of *Utopia Judiciale* is that obedience to laws becomes habitual, customary and natural. The essential is that the laws be wise and just, that the people consent to their enactment and that the Executive Government maintain them impartially. If such a process of gradual obedience to good laws should blend with the process of gradual illumination of the consciousness, the result would be a richer Utopia than either speculator has imagined.

(c) But thirdly: what, in the main, is the subject-matter of all laws to which obedience is demanded? Apart from the fixed customs of our slowly-changing culture, almost all laws deal with material things and our various rights to appropriate them. Consequently it may be said that the system of Property, its production and distribution, whether written or unwritten, is the fundamental Law that governs all Societies. The system by which we satisfy or fail to satisfy the claims of our need—psychologically, our egoism—must affect our whole conduct. Our reactions are really our actions: such is the theory of the *Utopia Oeconomica.* And here, too, we see that were the present Capitalistic system of production and appropriation replaced by one of Socialist economy it would likewise need a certain body of laws to which our adhesion would be asked. Meanwhile the silent operation of spiritual processes would continue unopposed—the Earth would pass through the tail of the Comet—and the Utopia realized would be a Synthetic Utopia, spiritual, legal and economic.

The French Revolution was accompanied by the well-known triple cry: Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité. Great interest lies in observing that the three Utopias above discussed may be differentiated by the sequence in which they use those words. When placed in the order: Fraternity, Equality and Liberty, they indicate, first, a marked advance in morals, then as a consequence a just arrangement of economics, and finally a free condition of politics—this is the slogan of *Utopia Spirituale.* Alternatively, let us have Liberty first, we will

next establish Equality and lead on to Fraternity: such was the theory of the French Revolution, the lineal descendant of the inventors of *Utopia Judiciale*. But Economic Equality must precede Political Liberty and pass on to Moral Fraternity—so says the late school of *Utopia Oeconomica*.

We may be permitted to believe that the final word is with the Synthetic Utopia, where the three cries are heard resounding simultaneously.

THE EARLIEST GOSPEL WRITINGS AS POLITICAL DOCUMENTS

BY WILLIAM WALLACE MARTIN

THE investigations of Abbott and Rushbrook (1884) under the title "The Common Traditions of the Gospels" gave a new view to what is now referred to as the "Triple Tradition." The Ammonian sections were separated by Ammonius of Alexandria in the third century, and are preserved for us in the "canons" of Eusebius of Caesarea in the fourth century out of which may be constructea the Triple Tradition, the Dual Tradition, and Single Tradition. Scholars of the last century placed these several traditions as antecedent to our gospels and used by each synoptic writer in the composition of his work. It is accepted today that Mark is the earliest gospel and that Matthew and Luke wrote independently of him.

Criticism has assumed that the fundamental traditions upon which our gospels rest were gathered together for the general information of early Christians in regard to the works and the words of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ of the churches. The astonishment is that Jesus cured so many and that of all the cures only the merest few are recorded. And these lack detail such as would deeply interest the churches. The wonderment is that the Nazarene should cast out so many devils and only the Gadarene incident be given with anything like completeness. It would be unbelievable that the Galilean should command the tempest and walk on the sea and feed with a few loaves of bread and several fishes thousands of people, and that a few of his neighbors would be strong enough or even dare to kill him. It must be admitted that Jesus of Nazareth was a master teacher, a rabbi that commanded attention, especially in Galilee. His popularity must have been immense. But his work could have been nothing but what man had wrought before. His words were notable but not revolutionary to Rome, or to the Herod who was

ruler of Galilee when Jesus spoke and did philanthropic healings in his realm. John the baptist was public example of what reproof to civil rulers incurred in those days and the numerous crucifixions by procurators of patriotic Pharises, who longed for the restoration of the Jewish kingdom and for release from Roman domination, were cogent warnings to all Jews who would influence the public mind.

Scientific criticism concerns itself with facts. The synoptic gospels in its view are records of the deeds and words of Jesus of Nazareth, a physician and a religious teacher. The recitative portions of these gospels are strikingly alike, whereas the narratives have marked and outstanding differences. Matthew's gospel is about one-fourth narrative, Mark's gospel about one-half, and Luke's about one-third. There are not more than twenty-four verses in Mark to which parallels may not be found in Matthew and Luke. Scholars have pointed out these facts. It is now generally accepted that these synoptic gospels are writings not dependent upon each other and that all appeared before the destruction of the temple by Titus. A study of the "tripple tradition" has led to the general acceptance of a view that there was a collection embodying the works of Jesus and another containing his words. Scholars differ as to whether these collections represent recollections and so were oral traditions afterwards written down, or whether from the first they were not set down in writings by disciples and used by the synoptic writers. In either event it is assumed by scholars that these memories were gathered together for the benefit of believers in Jesus as the Christ.

Our thesis is that these two earliest collections, one of the deeds of Jesus up to his death and resurrection, the other of the words of Jesus, were written ıeports made to the legate of Syria, in order that Rome or the legate might have accurate knowledge of the popular religious movement, which Jesus initiated and his followers carried on. The earlier was a report upon the works of Jesus, probably made during the reign of Caligula. It was not irony which led Pontius Pilate to write a title and put it on the cross. "And the writing was JESUS OF NAZARETH THE KING OF THE JEWS." It was not irony, but the blunt way of a Roman procurator to tell all who passed by and saw the crucified Jesus, that such reward, a crucifixion, awaited every pretender to kingship of the Jews, a people who could have no king unless Caesar gave one to them. It was in line with the policy of Rome and indeed it was one of the neces-

sities, which a Roman legate was under, to know accurately the extent of a movement, whose originator emphasized the near approach of a Kingdom of God and whose followers were expectant of the near coming of that kingdom.

The Roman legate was thorough in investigations of this character. He began where danger was most imminent. The Pharisees looked for a king of the house of David and these Pharisees showed their valuation of this advocate of a kingdom of God, this Nazarene, by demanding his crucifixion. Vitellius, the legate of Syria, sent (35 A. D.) Pontius Pilate to Rome that he might answer for the shedding of innocent blood. The legate himself came the next year to Jerusalem and conciliated the Jews by removing the taxes on fruit and restoring the high priest's vestments, which had been kept in the tower of Antonia since the first Herod. Vitellius was in Jerusalm in 37 and administered to the Jews the oath of allegiance to Caligula. The chief religious and most recent agitation among the high priests and the Pharisees had risen from the preaching of John the baptist and Jesus of Nazareth, both of whom were put to death. Jesus in Vitellius' time, had a considerable following; and there were then living in Jerusalem or Judea eleven of his disciples, who were his closest associates. The legate, while in Jerusalem less than a guinguenium from the day of the crucifixion, must have learned much of this sect, who averred the injustice of the crucifixion, laying the blame on the Jews, a sect who proclaimed that Jesus arose from the dead, appeared to his followers, ascended into heaven, promising just before his departure his coming again. Vitellius with his Romanlike vigilance must have determined to investigate this whole matter and learn, whether there was peril for Rome in a sect, which looked for the "kingdom of God," looked for the return of Jesus of Nazareth, of whom a Roman procurator had sanctioned the crucifixion, placing on his cross the writing, "KING OF THE JEWS," thus warning all of the fate awaiting every one making such pretentions. The high priests and Pharisees would encourage the Roman legate to make thorough investigations of these matters.

Vitellius was not concerned at first about the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. The works, the remarkable cures, his popular following, were the chief matters of inquiry. Jesus passed most of his public ministry in Galilee. The legate would of course get reports from his own investigators, that he might know impartially the facts. It was very important also to have accurate reports, since a Herod was ruler in the regions where Jesus did most of his work. Per-

haps this Herod was planning independence of Rome and would use this movement to push on his purpose. There were three centers, Tiberias and the region surrounding, Caesarea Philippi and its neighboring towns, Caesarea on the coast and the adjacent parts. These investigators began the search some four years after the occurrences and obtained the facts from the people of these places, not from disciples.

These official reports contained the cause of Christian popular gatherings, the dominant thought controlling the assemblage, the territorial extent of the movement; it left all inference with the legate. There came from the three regions, widely separate, a uniform statement that Jesus of Nazareth healed a great number of persons of their diseases, that he made remarkable cures in each region, that outstanding cases were the healing of the daughter of a Syrophoenician woman, the healing of a leper in Capernaum. A deaf man was healed somewhere in the district of Decapolis, and a lunatic in Gadera was restored to his right mind, a paralytic was healed in Capernaum. The unusual method of healing and curing was noted in these reports. Another cause of the popularity of Jesus of Nazareth was that he fed with a few loaves of bread and a few fishes a multitude of several thousand, that he commanded the winds and waves of the lake to be calm and they obeyed, that he walked on the lake, and even raised the dead. The facts, striking features of each incident, the locality and the popular impression were recorded in these reports. All reports confirmed the teaching everywhere of the Coming of the Kingdom of God, of the errors of Pharisees and scribes, of the need of a life in each one, that would please the Father, the God of each one, a life every way approvable amid the whirl of the surrounding life which abounded in Jewish, Hellenistic, and Roman customs and manners.

A digest of these several reports was made. As the incidents were narrated by the common people, telling what they remembered, there would be found words that were in the vulgar tongue, and which elegant and educated people would not use. Aramaic expressions would be used and their translation placed after them, making them intelligible to the Roman legate. This interpretative characteristic has given us in these accounts, what has been cleverly characterized as "duality of phrase." An example of this duality is "And at even, when the sun was set." The Greek in these reports is rude and vulgar. In the account of the healing of Jairus's daughter "eschatos echei (at the point of death) is the *canaille* use. The

word chrab batos (bed) would be an offense to the cultivated. Instances are many of this characteristic feature, which is ever present because the account of the incidents are gathered from the people. Jairus was ruler of a synagogue, but he was a Hellenist and the language of his household was Hellenistic Greek. These reports had such expressions as the following: "The whole city was gathered at the door." "He could no longer openly enter into the city." "So many came and went, he could not even eat." "They from all the cities ran together on foot." "Wherever he went, into villages of cities or country, they placed their sick before him." This was of course popular exaggeration, evidencing the hold Jesus of Nazareth had upon the people. The only order in this digest of reports, which went to Vitellius, would be an arrangement which would indicate the deeds of Jesus when he was around the Lake of Tiberias or when he went into the coasts of Sidon and Tyre, or when he went into the villages round about Caesarea Philippi. The order of events in each region was only approximate. The principle aim was to show the man Jesus of Nazareth whom they found to be a popular teacher and one who gathered numbers in many places who came to be healed. These crowds also listened to his teaching. The legates comment seems to have been, that the followers of Jesus were an asset to good government and not a menace, that they served as a balance to the Pharisaical Jews, who then wished the removal of procurators and the restoration of the Jewish kingdom, that the coming Kingdom of God had no peril for the sovereignty of Rome. The age of Caligula saw persecution of the Jews: and these Jews persecuted the followers of Jesus, although the Jews in Palestine saw them worship at the temple, use the ancient Jewish scriptures, gather in houses to rehearse the words of Jesus and encourage each other to look for the coming of their Lord.

Caligula was assassinated in 41 and Claudius became emperor. He restored civic rights to the Alexandrian Jew and set Agrippa I upon the throne, giving him all the territories which Herod the Great had governed. Agrippa observed the tradition of the Pharisees and protected the Jewish religion. He put to death James the brother of John: he began to make Jerusalem safer by building walls, he summoned five vassal kings of the empire to conference at Tiberias. The Roman legate prohibited the conference and the construction of the wall. Agrippa died suddenly at Caesarea by the sea. Claudius thereafter governed this whole Jewish kingdom in Palestine by procurators. Cuspius Fadus was the first. He seized Thaddeus, a

prophet and a religious agitator, beheaded him and brought the head to Jerusalem. It was probably under this procurator that the teachings of Jesus was gathered and a detailed statement of the last days of Jesus of Nazareth in Jerusalem and especially the trial and crucifixion of this Nazarene. Fadus probably directed this last enquiry to be made among the scattered followers of Jesus, principally it would seem through Peter. If we remove from the Gospel of Mark the narratives of the works of Jesus, leaving the recitative matter, we will have probably the collection generally referred to as "the Logia of Jesus." The Roman investigators would not seek to obtain the discourses of Jesus, such as are now represented to us in the so-called Sermon on the Mount. These ethico-religious teachings influenced the private life and the conduct of Christians. The investigators sought to obtain the words of Jesus, which made him the object of the wrath of the Pharisees, so that the legate might know and so the emperor, whether the breach between the Pharisees and these assemblies, now under the directive control of the disciples of Jesus could be done away with. These Roman investigators were desirous of knowing more fully the teachings, which bound together Christians, teachings that looked for the establishment of the kingdom of God and the coming again of Jesus. Fadus certainly felt little was to be feared from a sect which was awaiting a time of awful trial for all, wars and rumors of wars; of a sect whose founder commanded them in these days to flee from one city to another, and to look in these terrible days for the "coming of the son of man in his glory."

The view which regards the earliest records of Jesus of Nazareth as reports of Roman investigators to the Roman procurator or legate and so to the Palace at Rome, makes these two documents, one telling of the Works of Jesus and the other of his Words, documents of purely human origin, the only inspiration in them being to make them accurate reports and so avoid censure of the Roman legate. Rome found in the widespread movement of Christians a counterpoise to Judaism, ever plotting for independence of Rome, although it was Rome that had saved the Jew from annihilation by the Ptolemaic and Seleucidian kings. The Christ-movement undermined the supremacy of the ever-present religious legalism among the people, and so Phariseeism undertook its extermination. It was the policy of Rome to weaken Phariseeism and so the procurator would encourage Christians. The hatred of the Greek for the Jew would make him a natural ally on the side of the Christian. Hence came

a double encouragement to the followers of Jesus and their authoritive leaders, the college of the disciples. Paul at this time was in Antioch or else in the regions north, where Jews from the Mesopotamian valley had been settled by the Seleucidian kings in order to bring into the region of Babylon Greek colonists to put in awe the Semitic natives. Paul carried to these deported Semites as a rabbi the hopeful message of Jesus and the worth of a religious life apart from the fetters of Pharasaic legalism. He proclaimed also the comfort in the near coming again of the risen and ascended Jesus to reward his followers. Paul was a Roman citizen and so Roman governors would encourage his teaching, at least insofar as not to let it be prohibited. A little more than a decade from the date of Fadus the Jew Paul became an apostle of the Lord Jesus Christ and travelled through Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Greece, heralding to Jew and Gentile alike "the unsearchable riches" of Christ. Paul then wrote letters to "churches." It is remarkable, that in these epistles scarcely any references are made to the works of Christ Jesus and only very few to his words. The "risen Lord" was uppermost in his thought and the superiority of the gospel of the "crucified Christ" was everywhere published. Faith in Jesus Christ displaced belief in and the practise of Judaism. It is not credible that the words and works of Jesus of Nazareth were unknown to the churches. There must have been collections of these words and works among the churches, so that the public ministry of Jesus was from the first well known. Our theory of public documents containing these words and works, compiled for the information of Roman procurators and legates, would make it not difficult for this general knowledge of Jesus to be in the possession of the churches. It would be to the interest of Rome to have spread abroad these facts about Jesus among his followers. Such collections would not be forbidden if the compilation had their source in Roman authority. They would also have very great authority in the churches themselves. Probably the collection of the works of Jesus had the first and more general circulation. Later, perhaps some fifteen years, Mark combined both documents in the gospel which we now know as St. Mark's.

Scientific historical criticism makes it clear, that the excellence of any teaching and the worthiness and suffering of any leader whether in religion or politics, in no way decides its survival. More Jews suffered crucifixion for their religion in the first three-fourths of the first century than Christians. Adaptation to environment or

a conqueror's sword determines converts. Adaptation to environment does not mean accommodation to the vices of a people in the case of Jesus of Nazareth. His message as by a tempest carried away vices from the individual, who followed him. The environment in the day of Jesus was a loose assemblage of national units under the sway of a dominant power, which stood for a peaceful empire and tribute paying subjects. Woe to the disturbers of peace, equal woe to him who refused tribute. The proletariat were the sufferers. Ceaseless toilers and no benefit from labor; sleep came to them from weariness, not from restful repose. They were hopeless. The environment was slavery or its equivalent. The adaptation would be to give this proletariat outlook. The message of Jesus of Nazareth wrought this miracle. It was not to be accomplished by revolution. It was to be done by a reformation of each individual so that his body became a temple of God, sin not dwelling therein; he was not to labor less in the struggle for a living, but more because he must look to helping his neighbor carry his burden. The assemblies of the followers of Jesus were inspired with encouragement to produce wholesome and helpful human lives. They were not revolutionary gathering. All this new endeavor amid the crushing burdens of the proletariat's conditions was actuated by the faith that in this way they pleased God.

The Roman legate or procurator would analyze the report upon the Works of Jesus on this wise. If this crucified teacher commanded the tempest or walked on the sea, so few saw it that it would generally be regarded as an idle tale. If he fed thousands with a few loaves and fishes it was cheaper than agrarian laws, but the Roman governors would hardly credit the occurrence. They would regard it as most philanthropic, that a great physician should heal without fee large numbers in widely separated regions and would readily concede, that the teachings of Jesus would therefore receive hearing. These governors would learn that individuals from the proletariat were leaders in this sect, the most prominent of whom were fishermen, that these followers of Jesus believed in his resurrection and ascension and his return. And so, the kingdom of God in their view had no peril for Rome. It was after the death of Agrippa, king of the Jews, and so after the second undertaking to rule the Jews by procurators, that agitation for independence became acute among the Jews and events began to move fast toward revolution. The Roman governors therefore looked with encouraging tolerance upon the growing assemblies of Christians. Judaism sought

to obliterate the schism made in its body politic by the Christ movement, which threatened its hold through its legalism and its synagogues upon the people. The Jews would emphasize before the Roman governors the fact that Jesus was crucified because he did not deny that he was king of the Jews, that his followers were members of a kingdom, styled the Kingdom of God But the procurator Fadus who had investigated the reports made to him upon the saying of Jesus and the last days of Jesus, found no reason for exterminating the Christian assemblies. Saul and Barnabas at this time were Christians (meaning followers of Jesus) but not apostolic teachers of the faith; they had not been "separated for this work." But at this time (if we accept the theory that the earliest writings among the Christians were political documents, put together for the information of the legate and the procurator of Rome), the Christian assemblies, mostly Jews, had furnished to them copies of these writings and so Christians were well acquainted with the events and the teaching connected with Jesus of Nazareth. Later there was no need of Paul referring to the works and teachings of Jesus, for they were well known. Other gospels, which were written later, would of course have as a large element in them these earlier political documents.

THE GREEK IDEA OF SIN

BY ALEXANDER KADISON

IT IS not one of the least tragic consequences of theology that its distinctive marks are often left upon those who are supposed to have become emancipated from its influence. Among other of its concomitants, the myth-making tendency is seldom entirely absent as a factor in militant Rationalism. And one of the myths of popular Freethought—a myth which scholarly Freethinkers might well disdain to use as a weapon against Christianity—is embodied in the naive belief that the idea of sin was virtually non-existent in ancient Greece. To me, for one, it comes as something of a mental shock to find so able and eminent a critic as William Archer giving currency to this piece of mythology, which, in point of historical accuracy, is about on a par with, say, the ecclesiastical version of the part played by Freethinkers in the French Revolution.

There was recently published, in the London *Literary Guide*, an article by Mr. Archer, entitled, "The Superstition of 'Sin'." In this article, after quoting another writer's assertion that, "For Christianity the origin and seat of moral evil lies in the will, whereas for the Greek it lay in the intellect," and then somebody else's assertion that, "The very word for sin meant originally 'a missing of the mark'," Mr. Archer goes on to say:

> "Oh, what a wise people the Greeks were! And what a reversion to barbarism is the whole Judæo-Christian ethic! One may wonder, indeed, whether the words quoted do not slightly flatter the Greeks—whether some tinge of the irrational, theological conception of wrong-doing did not now and then creep into their thinking. In the main, however, there is no doubt that the superstition of 'sin' which has darkened the minds of men for twenty centuries, and fatally impeded the evolution of a sane morality, is of Hebraic origin." [1]

[1] *Literary Guide* (London), April, 1924.

The suggestion that possibly "some tinge" of the irrational idea of sin may "now and then" have "crept" into the thinking of the Greeks, is what, in our colorful American slang, would be termed "rich." Anybody who is familiar with the history of religion ought to know that the idea of sin was neither of Hebraic nor of Hellenic origin, but was common to all ancient religions, just as it is common to all religions today. And anybody who is versed in ancient Greek literature knows that, so far from having been free from the "superstition of "sin," the Greeks were as much dominated and obsessed by it as any other people of antiquity, barring none. Though we have inherited some romantic notions about "the glory that was Greece," it was precisely in that much-lauded land that the sin-idea prevailed in its cruelest, most barbarous, and least rational form. For the Greeks, generally speaking, did *not* regard the intellect as the origin and seat of moral evil; for them the seat of moral evil lay in the proscribed act itself, and the origin of moral evil lay in the ineluctable decrees of the capricious gods.

Turn to Homer, Hesiod, or Sophocles, to Pindar, Aeschylus, or Solon, and it will almost instantly become evident that the conception of sin pervaded the Greek consciousness—and not in the sense of a mere "missing of the mark," but in the more oppressive sense of any conduct (whether of omission or of commission) that was offensive to the deathless gods. Furthermore, whereas in Judæo-Christianity sinful behavior—actual sin, as distinguished from innate depravity, *i. e.*, original sin—is conceived of as conscious and voluntary, the Greeks believed that sin could be committed not only knowingly and wilfully, but even involuntarily and unconsciously. Indeed, whenever any person was the victim of signal misfortune, it was inferred that he must have sinned grievously against the suprahuman powers; and whenever any dire calamity befell a city or a state, it was taken for granted that some citizen must have been guilty of a monstrous sin crying to a wrathful heaven for expiation.

Since a national literature mirrors the thought, the temper, and the superstitions of a people, it is not without significance that the most poignant of the immortal Greek tragedies revolves wholly about the idea of sin—sin unwittingly committed, yet most cruelly atoned for. In the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles, King Oedipus sins against the gods entirely without his knowledge. His conduct, in fact, is but the fulfillment of divine prophecies made before his birth. Nevertheless, his sins must be expiated just as completely as if they had been conscious and deliberate. So Oedipus, brought after years

of ignorance to a realization of the enormity of his wickedness, is crushed beneath the weight of the soothsayer's revelation. He loses his beloved Jocasta and, in the frenzy of his grief, puts out his eyes. Then, after a heartrending farewell to his children, the blinded, utterly humbled ruler—viewed as a plague-spot which has to be eradicated—is driven from his polluted kingdom.

Need we consider in detail the *Ajax* of Sophocles? Or the *Hippolytus* of Euripides? Or his *Iphigenia at Aulis?* Need we refer to the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle? But why go on? Even the most cursory inspection of Greek literature makes it all-too-clear that the nightmare of sin lay like an incubus upon ancient Greek religion no less than upon the religion of Judæa or upon Christianity.

"Oh," exclaims Mr. Archer in the passage that I have quoted, "what a wise people the Greeks were!" But Athens was the pearl and pride of Greece; yet was it not by a jury of enlightened Athenians that Socrates—a Theist with pronounced Agnostic leanings—was found guilty of Atheism and condemned to drink the hemlock? Had Mr. Archer and I been fellow-citizens of Socrates, we too—Agnostics both—should have had to quench our thirst for truth with that fatal beverage.

In our zeal for the propagation of Freethought, it behooves those of us who call ourselves Rationalists to examine our evidence very critically and, as far as possible, to avoid the intellectual sin of overstating our case. While we carry on the good fight against the old religions with their myths and their dogmas, let us take care not to evolve a new religion with an inverted dogmatism and a mythology of its own.

MOREL

BY B. U. BURKE

ENGLAND has lost, in Mr. E. D. Morel, a public servant whom posterity, with the tardy justice commonly accorded the morally great, is likely to set high among her men of character and ability. But, since the war, the smoke screen of calumny has been so effectually drawn across his career and achievements that the great majority have no realization of this, or, at best, think of a man whom they could not but have honored had they known the truth, as a misguided fanatic.

Mr. Morel leaves as public legacies by which he will be judged, the completed emancipation of the Congo, and the living, growing organization of the Union of Democratic Control, of which he was admittedly the heart and brains, ably as he was abetted in this work by the small group of radical thinkers who, with him, were responsible for its foundation. He lived to see it with branches in many lands, focal centers for the harassed minorities of the democratically minded, and lived, too, to receive a measure of appreciation due him in the ardent support of his labor constituents in Dundee.

There seems little doubt that the treatment accorded Mr. Morel while he was imprisoned during the war brought on, or at all events greatly accelerated, the heart disease which has troubled him since, and to which his sudden death is attributed. Fifty years, even though they were, as Mr. Nevinson writes in *The Labour Leader*, "crammed from the earliest age with human endeavor," was a pitifully short span for so active and needed a fighter in the lists of truth; and so vital was his personality that it is hard to realize, even after reading of the memorial service in his honor at St. Martin's-in-the-Fields, that his voice is silenced and that we shall have no more of those vigorous editorials in which he alternately exposed injustice and logically pointed the wiser way.

To his French origin, on his father's side, would seem to belong this insatiable habit of unearthing and combating great wrongs in

season and out of season, not in any spirit of perversity, but to mitigate, or where possible rectify, the harm done by their perpetration. On the day of his death he wrote (I quote again from *The Labor Leader*):

"I have no use for, and no place in, public life if I am compelled being in it, to act in a way which I know to be morally wrong and destructive of my own self respect. I did not risk everything by insisting upon the lie of the sole culpability of Germany for the War because I like it, but because I was constitutionally incapable of acting in any other way."

His mother, an Englishwoman, de Horne by name, was descended from a Flemish family who migrated to escape the persecution of Alva, and who early became members of The Society of Friends and suffered for their belief, hence perhaps unflinching tenacity.

Born in Paris in 1873, his baptismal name was Georges Edmond Morel-de-Ville, though he later shortened it to the more convenient form of Edmund Dene Morel. When he was only a few years old, his father died of an illness contracted while serving on the Paris ramparts during the Franco-Prussian war, and although his mother had him educated in England, she continued to live in France until he was seventeen, when he became a clerk in a Liverpool firm dealing with West Africa. To eke out what was at first a meagre salary, he took to journalism and wrote largely of West African affairs on which he soon made himself an authority.

It was this early interest, inculcated and fed at first by close contact with West African ships and cargoes, and later by frequent visits to Antwerp and Brussels on behalf of the firm for whom he continued to work for ten years, which led in time to his knowledge of conditions in the Congo and gradual realization of the abuses being carried on there under King Leopold's regime. Thenceforth in articles, pamphlets and books he hammered the matter home to the British public, till in 1904 he was enabled to form the Congo Reform Association, with which he continued to work with unabated energy until the necessary reforms were achieved in 1913.

So great had been the interests in opposition, that the successful conclusion of this work brought Mr. Morel a world-wide mead of praise for his humanitarian endeavors, and most eulogistic tributes from all sections alike of the British public and press. His championship of native rights had not been confined to the Congo, for his books deal with conditions throughout tropical Africa, and when visiting Nigeria in 1910, he experienced what must have been a

yet keener reward for his efforts in the gratitude of the natives and their realization of all that "the white man with the straight eye" as they named him, had been able to do for them.

But African affairs had by no means monopolized Mr. Morel's attention, great as was the part he played in them. Bi-lingual, and well acquainted with the intricacies of French public life and politics, he had from the first written for French journals as well as English, and had, through the critical years that comprised the Fashoda incident especially, striven hard to bring about and cement an understanding friendship between the two peoples. His chosen work having given him an unusually deep insight into the secret diplomatic workings of the Powers, he published in 1912, in the hope of averting the war he felt to be imminent, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, a searching analysis of the fatal policies pursued by the principal European governments through the decade leading up to the crisis of 1911. But public interest being at that time still asleep as to the importance of foreign affairs and their close connection with national welfare, the warning fell unheeded and the averted catastrophe was but deferred to a later day.

The formation of the Union of Democratic Control followed almost immediately on the outbreak of war. It was no defeatist organization as it was generally misrepresented to be. The hope of its founders was to prepare the way for a future parliamentary control of foreign policy, that should preclude any recurrence of blind ministerial commitments such as had secretly bound Great Britain to France, and through France to Imperialist Russia, before the war. Its principal aim was to insure that when peace came it should, contrary to those concluding previous wars, be of a just and lasting character, and it therefore sought to build up while there was time an enlightened public opinion as to the policies which would be necessary to this end. This it attempted through the publication of many pamphlets of real historical value and its organ *The U. D. C.*, since grown into *Foreign Affairs*, a monthly covering its subject so widely that there is no longer excuse for public ignorance on matters of international interest.

For this same end, as well as in common fairness, Mr. Morel combatted, more especially in his book *Truth and the War*, the historically untenable but popularly held idea that Germany was exclusively to blame for the war, since this belief could but engender a peace of conquest which would inevitably lead to further conflicts. When a man, particularly in war time, stands apart from his fellows

by reason of clearly pronounced unorthodox opinions, no matter how just and expedient they may be, he is at once liable to be misjudged and misrepresented beyond recognition. The general vilification of his character and aims in the press, paved the way for Mr. Morel's imprisonment on a technical charge of having, through an intermediary, sent pamphlets to M. Romain Rolland in a neutral country, the fact being that he had supposed him to be still in France, in which case the offence was nil. The treatment accorded him was, however, of a severity compatible with the war fever which prompted his incarceration rather than the slightness of the charge. It was shortly after his release that he became a member of the Independent Labor Party.

Invaluable as Mr. Morel's contributions to such subjects of world wide importance as free trade, peace, and international relationships have been, there are those of us who must always regret that his masterly gift of clear, vigorous prose was never embodied in some work of purely literary value. But whenever there were wrongs to be righted—and when are there not—then was the time, and so thorough was his work in anything he undertook, that there can have been but little margin left over. We may perhaps look forward to the printing of his unpublished reminiscences, from which such interesting quotations are given in Mr. Seymour Cock's book, *E. D. Morel, the Man and His Work*, or at least their fuller incorporation in the biography Mr. Nevinson has promised to undertake. The public may then be allowed to know more of his unusually happy family life and peaceful pursuits such as his great love of gardening, and also of that brave helpmate, his wife, who steadfastly aided and encouraged his endeavors through all vicissitudes.

I cannot close more fitly than by quoting a few sentences from the very beautiful appreciation of E. D. Morel by M. Romain Rolland printed in the December number of *Foreign Affairs.*

. . . "He was the representative of humanity without respect of race or creed. No evil but found him ready for the struggle, no people downtrodden but saw him spring to their defence. . . . Truly an heroic figure. We of today cannot measure his stature. He will tower above his age as the years pass. . . . As a Frenchman, I am proud that my race can claim its share in this great Englishman. He combines in himself the greatest attributes of both peoples; the clear-sighted idealism, which never wavers, and the fearless execution, which does not know defeat."

THE ORGANIZED RELIGION OF CHURCHES AND SOCIAL WORK: WHEREIN DO THEY DIFFER?

BY JUNE P. GUILD

THE religion of churches too often concerns itself with *one* phase *only* of human existence, to-wit: the spiritual, particularly in reference to the life hereafter. However important this may be, it is for organized religion to accept a broader philosophy if it shall continue its vitality amid the complexities of modern life. The social worker is deeply concerned also with spiritual or moral values but not alone with these. The social worker stresses the *complexity* of causes for motives and acts, the intricate interplay of heredity in contact with physical and moral environment. The social worker knows that nothing *just happens.* The social worker realizes, therefore, that if changes are to be brought about in life conscious changes must be made in the makeup of personalities, delicate adjustments made between personalities and environment, and definite changes in the social environment itself achieved through individual effort and mass action.

Religion should be the controlling element in *every activity* of human life. How earnestly has the religion of churches worked to decrease child labor, improve prison conditions, outlaw war, bring about law enforcement, or increase wages? The church has too long remained set apart, a thing of pulpits and prayers for an hour on Sunday instead of admitting active responsibility in every problem of mankind. It is reasonable perhaps that personal redemption should be the first concern of churches, why should they not, however, add a second and equally important concern; the redemption of man's entire life, political, industrial, and physical?

Is not the bringing about of a Kingdom of God on earth as essentially Christian as the delivering of orations on the Kingdom of God in Heaven?

The social worker accepts everything as possible of accomplishment, if not today by individual case methods, tomorrow by fundamental economic and social reforms, or by advancement in science. The social worker will not believe Christ intended to say that because certain of the poor of His time would outlive Him, that we too must inevitably have other poor with us always.

The social worker believes in intensive self-criticism of the methods of its social organization and a continual revaluation in its technical processes. The social worker does not believe that God has ceased to work for improvements in man, and that God regarded His work for man closed aeons ago on the seventh day. The church has not developed to meet the changed and changing social problems of today. It should weigh its accomplishments in the community today in the light of modern social conditions. It should frankly evaluate its own efforts day by day if it would live. There is a certain smugness about religion of the church, it rarely admits its own weakness and failure; it is suspicious of experiments, it will not seek out new methods.

The social worker does not believe in trusting the sense judgments only or in acting on surface conditions alone. The social worker wants to know all the pertinent facts before arriving at conclusions; the social worker regards all facts as pertinent. If the church would seek out all facts before attempting to act, its acts would be more fruitful. The social worker believes in a social case study or a social survey to determine needs. The church launches forth on drives to clean up this or drive out that without knowing its facts, without seeking trained leadership, without co-operating intimately with others who may also be interested.

The social worker believes constructive thinking is more helpful than abundant alms; it has learned that it is not enough to feed a tramp. It is quite as necessary to learn the causes of vagabondage and if possible remove the conditions which produce it.

The social worker believes that if a man is to deal successfully with the problems of another, that the one who attempts to help must not only be kind, but be *trained* in kindness. Good intentions —unsupported by knowledge of how to put desires into deeds effectively and graciously—do not solve questions. When life in the world was simple, good neighborliness was perhaps enough. Now in the day of complex individual problems, legal entanglements, frequent scientific discoveries, situations are increasingly difficult

to analyze and adjust. Only through trained and directed effort will success repay hopes.

The church too often is sporadic in its efforts, driven by emotional impulse only. The social worker must be prepared for a year-around program of helpfulness; a dinner on Thanksgiving or Christmas for the hungry is insufficient.

Social workers tap every source of co-operation and aid. They believe in working with every agency in the community, physical, moral, industrial, legal, social, religious. They see relatives and friends and teachers and lawyers and doctors and landlords and employers and committees and clubs and clearing houses. The church too often works alone, ignorant of other effective resources for human reconstruction.

Social workers are believers in specialization. They train special probation officers for delinquent children, special child placers and home finders for dependent children, legal aid workers for legal problems, welfare workers for industry, family case workers for general family rehabilitation, medical and psychiatric workers for health and mental cases. The church too frequently believes that any well intentioned person can deal successfully with any intricate human problem.

Social workers believe in finding out first what is needed and in giving just that. They do not believe in giving money or material aid only. They believe material help tends to degrade and should be given as sparingly as possible. While the church could profitably realize that men will be more interested in saving their souls if they have food in their stomachs, the church's first business of saving souls will gradually pass on if it tries to purchase interest in souls by giving food. By a system of dispensing material relief or by the opening of a church pool room, the church subordinates and weakens its own spirituality and drives elsewhere those who honestly seek soul satisfaction.

Social work emphasizes the scientific approach, which merely means that approach which is truly kind because it is seeking for the truth open-mindedly. Social work insists on regularity of effort and on trained understanding. Social work would bring about good will on earth by using every human and divine resource. Social work cannot work without religion. How can religion in the churches be Christian until it is socialized?

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MANAISM

BY GEORGE P. CONGER

I

IN COMMON with every branch of inquiry, the history of religions has been subjected during recent years to notable attempts at revision, and, as often the case in other inquiries, the larger consequences of the revisions have not yet been fully considered. This seems to me to be peculiarly the case in that revision of views which, under the influence of Marett[1] and Levy-Bruhl,[2] traces the roots of religion not to animism but to manaism.

A generation ago the English anthropologists had apparently succeeded in establishing the view that animism, in the sense of belief in spiritual beings,[3] marked the most rudimentary form of religion. The notion that belief in personal spiritual beings could have come originally from primitive men's experiences with shadows, echoes, dreams, sleep, and death was not welcome to the conservatives of that day; but after all, if religion was to be studied at all in evolutionary perspectives, there were a good many points in common between animism and theism. The theist from his advanced position and with his refined doctrines could look across the ages at the primitive animist and regard him as a kindred spirit, a younger brother groping for light. It was the presupposition of animism that primitive mentality was essentially like our own.

More recently other workers, relying upon numerous investigations of primitive peoples and upon a few systematic interpretations

[1] R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion* (1914); article, "Mana," in *Here*, Vol. III (1916).

[2] Levy-Bruhl, *Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (1912); *Primitive Mentality*, translated by L. A. Clare (1923).

[3] E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, 2 volumes (1913). Vol. I, p. 425.

of them, have detected and developed another view, with the presupposition that primitive mentality was different from ours. According to Levy-Bruhl this primitive mentality is predominantly a social or group affair rather than an individual affair; it is pre-perceptual, and characterized by an unbroken transition between what we have subsequently learned to distinguish as subject and object; it is a matter of attitudes and actions rather than of elaborate explanations: and it has not yet brought into focus the sharp distinction which generations of logicians have registered in the law of contradiction. It is in a matrix such as this that primitive men develop the practices and later the beliefs with reference to the mysterious power referred to by the term "mana" and cognate terms.

II

What is the possible significance of such manaism for present-day philosophy? There are at least three points to be settled before the question can be answered with any definiteness. In the first place, there is the objection that the characteristics attributed by Levy-Bruhl to primitive mentality are hard to make clear and difficult to accept; but this very point, according to the sponsors of the manaistic theories, only goes to show that primitive mentality is different from ours. The difficulty can be said to inhere in the very nature of the argument.

There is in the second place the fact that the manaistic interpretation of the data has not convinced some investigators and interpreters. If one finds, with Codrington,[4] that mana "essentially belongs to personal beings to originate," or concludes, with Miss Campbell,[5] that mana is essentially a personal power, one has, for our present purposes, only called animism by another name. If manaism has any peculiar significance for constructive thinking, one must proceed according to the view of Marett, and say that in manaism the conceptions of personal and non-personal powers are still

[4] R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians—Studies in Their Anthropology and Folk-Lore* (1891), p. 119n.

[5] I. G. Campbell, "Manaism: A Study in the Psychology of Religion," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 29, p. 1 (1918). Valuable bibliography appended.

in solution[6] and not yet precipitated; that where manaism exhibits animistic notions the latter are later accretions rather than primary features;[7] and moreover that it is of no great concern for primitive mentality if practices implying both personal and impersonal powers are carried on in the same group or at the same level.[8]

The third difficulty is found in the method, more common a few years ago than at present, which explains institutions and beliefs solely in terms of their origins. Any one who seeks to read a philosophy of religion in manaism must bear in mind that manaism at its best represents only an almost vanishingly primitive stage of religion.

III

If these preliminary questions can be adjusted provisionally in some such manner as I have indicated, I think the possible significance of manaism can be summed up under four heads. The first may be called methodological. A part of the value of manaism certainly lies in the facility it affords for interpreting other data in the history of religions, particularly that of magic and tabu. This point has been covered by Marett[9] and needs no further development.

Manaism has a second kind of significance which I would call epistemological. In order for the point to be entertained, manaism must perhaps be taken more seriously than it has sometimes been taken; but if it is taken seriously, it offers a kind of prehistoric protest against John Locke and his successors who have worked so hard for mind's own sake to isolate mind from the world. Locke's assumption that the mind does not know the world, but knows only its sensations of the world, created a gap between mind and world which the Kantians have ever since sought to capitalize, and which the Hegelians and the realists in different ways have tried to close. The history of modern philosophy until recently has been predominantly a series of debates about epistemology and its supposed consequences. The debate is still going on, somewhat diminished in intensity because the problems of the natural sciences and of industry

[6] R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, p. 119.

[7] Same, article, "Mana," *Here*, Vol. III, p. 377.

[8] Same, p. 378f.

[9] Same, p. 378f.

alike demand more direct action upon the environment. Manaism indicates that for primitive men there was no great gulf between mind and world; the senses were, so to speak, transparent, and action was overt. Manaism here, as elsewhere, affords only the barest of answers; but at least it may serve to help pose the question whether the reflective theories of knowledge are not over-reflective, and whether they do not distort our situation rather than clarify it.

When one begins to discredit reflective theories because they are reflective, one gravitates rather naturally towards intuitionism. The kinship between Levy-Bruhl's pre-logical mentality and Bergson's intuitionism is noticeable, particularly in the matter of the reconciliation of contradictories.[10] But if manaism points toward intuitionism at all, I think it should be made clear that it points toward important modifications in Bergson's doctrine. Bergson's intuitionism is individualistic and non-practical; manaism represents attitudes toward the environment assumed by groups, and first for practical rather than for theoretical or ideal interests.

Perhaps, in the third place, one may discern in manaism a hint for dealing with present-day psychological problems. Everyone has to reckon, in one way or another, with extreme behaviorism and its reduction of mentality to physiology, and with the emergent theory of mind and its derivation of mental functions from bodily processes. The hint which manaism affords here is hard to state in words which will not be misleading; perhaps it can be phrased thus: We are to find out about the world around us, not merely through avenues of psychology and epistemology (as ordinarily treated) but also of physiology. Knowledge involves not merely mentality, but also vitality. Irving King has called manaism a biological attitude;[11] and on the other hand, Patrick has called attention to the fact that the old lines on which the mind-body problem was argued are being obliterated by the newer investigations in physiology and psychology.[12] Manaism is of course rudimentary and hopelessly crude; but at least it is the attitude of men who do not live by taking thought alone. It is neither wholly practical nor wholly speculative; this is perhaps the reason why it appeals to neither of two prominent current and rather divisive philosophies. But, like an organ-

[10] See L. Levy-Bruhl, *Primitive Mentality*, pp. 60, 93, 443. Compare also H. Bergson, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, translated by T. E. Hulma (1912) p. 39f.

[11] I. King, *The Development of Religion* (1910), p. 149.

[12] G. T. W. Patrick, "The Emergent Theory of Mind," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 19, p. 706 (1922).

ism which is neither animal nor plant, it still possesses a modicum of vitality and exhibits an astonishing persistence.

Most important, I think, is the possible metaphysical bearing of manaism. Let us suppose, in accordance with views sketched above, that thinking, although it represents a high level of development, is nevertheless a late development and on the whole is secondary and derivative. Clear thinking develops in a matrix or a medium which is not clear. I think that we may extend the principle, and say that theism, with its thought-out doctrines of God although it represents a high level of development, is secondary and derivative, and *when it develops, leaves something of value behind.* A great difficulty with the historic doctrines of theism seems to be that they are too finely-drawn. Like certain medieval paintings of men's souls, their very clearness for us defeats their purpose. This was of course the case with our oft-mentioned childhood ideas of God as "a Big Man up in the sky," but the difficulty nowadays is more ominous. We are now facing the possibility that it may apply also to our elaborate and sophisticated doctrines of God as a Big Mind up in the sky, or as a Cosmic or Super-Cosmic Mind. Most naturalists agree with this statement, but without recognizing the fact to which manaism bears witness—namely, that what is left behind as theism develops may be both vital and persistent.

If this is the suggestion of manaism, certainly it would give new point to the familiar preachment that "religion is a life." It would further, reinforce widespread current tendencies to regard traditional distinctions between matter and spirit as overdrawn. And it would give a world-wide aboriginal basis for the view which, perhaps after long eclipse, is beginning to loom up again with imposing grandeur upon the horizons of religion—the view, namely, that the true object of religion is the stupendous universe around us. The suggestion of manaism might be that even though theism is secondary and derivative, atheism in any narrow sense is equally secondary and derivative: both alike crystallize out from an original solution. Nor is the original solution properly describable as pantheism: to call it pantheism, or to call it anything else, is more like attempting to recover the original solution by placing one hard crystal beside the other and weighing the two together. Properly speaking, religion should never be defined or described; but only religious men should attempt to define or describe other things.

Finally, manaism, more than anything else since developed, reflects a certain paganism residual and latent in all the religions, a paganism which theism by its very loftiness has overshadowed, or else by its definiteness has relegated to the realm of esthetics. Manaism does not afford a philosophy of religion, any more than a cry affords a language or a horde a civilization. But it may serve to set the problem of a philosophy of religion in more inclusive terms, and to remind us of once unbroken relations between religion, the universe, and the life and mind of man.

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