

The Open Court

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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELE

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
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Rudolf Eucken

Frontispiece to The Open Court.

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RUDOLPH EUCKEN¹

BY GIOVANNI PAPINI

[Note: The following paper is from Papini's 24 *Cervelli* ("Four and Twenty Minds"), published in 1912, before the author's conversion to Catholicism. It is one of the papers not included in Professor Wilkins' book of Papini translations.]

WHEN, a short while ago, a swarm of news dispatches announced among the list of Nobel prize-wimmers, a name deformed by German syllables, followed by the word Jena, certain Italian newspapers, better versed in matters of crime than in the history of philosophy, at once leaped to the conclusion that the fortunate recipient-to-be of one of these annual cheques was none other than the celebrated Ernest Haeckel, who also resided in Jena. However, better informed journals and more intelligent persons understood at once that the savant in question was not the evolutionistic pope.

It is possible also that down there in Jena they would have been better satisfied if the prize had been awarded to Haeckel instead of to Eucken. The contemporary history of the little university town is well known but interesting. Behind its walls dwelt three great men. The first, Haeckel, is the patron saint of the city. There is a *Haeckelstrasse*, and the tobacco shops carry cigar boxes displaying a large bearded face, with the energetically satisfied inscription, *Unser Haeckel!* beneath it. The second, Eucken, is known after a fashion, and while he has many friends and acquaintances, it might be said that his good fortune had made him known for the first time to a number of his fellow townsmen. The third, Frege, is absolutely unknown, in Jena and out, although he is, perhaps, the most original of the three. He is a modest mathematician, inventor of a logical symbolism, and, in many respects, worthy of a place beside our own Peano. There are not ten persons in Europe, possibly, who have

¹ Translated from the Italian by Samuel Putnam.

read and understood his works, but that detracts nothing from his glory. Now, however, the great European public knows that there exists a philosopher by the name of Eucken, and everybody wants to know what sort of man he is. The life of Eucken has in it nothing of the extraordinary. It is the life of a diligent professor, of a laborious writer, and of the faithful father of a family.

Rudolph Christian Eucken was born in Aurich, East Frisia, January 5, 1846. He studied at the university of Goettingen from 1863 to 1867; from 1867 to 1871, he taught in a gymnasium. In 1871, he received a call as professor ordinarius of philosophy at Basilea, and there he found himself in the company of Buckhardt and Nietzsche. These latter, however, as the celebrated editor, Diedrichs, another of Jena's glories, assures me, did not attach much importance to the young professor and took no notice of him, possibly for the reason that he did not possess, in their eyes, sufficient *persönlichkeit*. From 1874, he taught at Jena, and from then on he never moved from that place.

When it is added that Eucken has a wife who is a great admirer of her husband, that he has several sons and many friends, practically all the necessary information about his life has been given.

The philosophic life of Eucken, on the other hand, has been quite an adventurous one. As a youth, through his masters, Trendelenburg and Reuter, he underwent the influence of Hegel, an influence which was never effaced. A little later, however, his own true masters were Plato and Fichte, and to them he owes that vivid sense of the reality of the spirit which fills his eloquent pages.

He began, as so many others have done, with history, with certain studies in the method of Aristotle, with certain thorough researches in philosophic terminology, with certain acute observations on images and tests in philosophy, and with a series of studies on the old German philosophers. His leading work, the *Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*, is a species of philosophic history from Plato to Nietzsche, the whole viewed through the medium of his own novel idealism.

But Eucken, with the soul of an apostle and a moralist, could not remain in the field of history, even though it was history made to his order, and for twenty-three years he continued to expound, in books large and small, a group of ideas on life and the world and, above all, his conception of an independent spiritual life, towards the development of which he believed mankind must tend and labor.

He began, in 1878 with his *Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart* (Fun-

damental Concepts of the Present Time), which then became the *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart* (The Spiritual Currents of the Present Time), in which, already, the central motives of his ideology were recognizable; and in a few days, the *Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens* (Introduction to a Philosophy of the Spiritual Life) appeared, in which the same motives are to be found again, with certain variations imposed by time. His most famous work, *Life Visions of Great Thinkers*, is not the one best suited to convey an idea of Eucken's genius. In it he is too critical, too preoccupied with the idea of showing the contradictions between other philosophers, and, to tell the truth, a little tedious, though the spirit of Eucken is naturally an enthusiastic, optimistic, and spontaneous one.

Eucken has written a great many books, but it is not to be assumed, for this reason, that he has put forth a large number of ideas. Some of his books are revisions of his earlier ones; others are repetitions, developments, amplifications and sometimes, it is to be regretted, dilutions of ideas which have been put forth by him ten and a hundred times before. He is fond of eloquence; he exhibits a tendency to moral sermonizing; and he draws out his thoughts a little as if they were symphonic themes. For this reason, in reading his works, one has an impression; if not of distasteful obscurity, certainly of prolixity; and perhaps, one who has read one of his books may be said to know Eucken as well as one who has read them all.

There should be no need, on the other hand, of drawing the unkind conclusion that this extensive literary output of Eucken is the result of an inordinate desire for money or fame; he has in himself a need to expand, to communicate his thought, to make known and accepted that which he believes to be true; and for this reason, he seems never to have been able to repeat any one idea often enough or to expound it with sufficient lucidity.

His philosophy, on account of this oratorical, poetic, propagandistic character, is not easily summed up. That with which Eucken is most preoccupied is life—with the manner in which we ought to live. Spiritual divisions grieve him, and he believes that metaphysical as well as moral salvation lies in unity. This unity is not to be found in the philosophers, who are perpetually in contradiction to one another; it is not to be found in the various conceptions of life which have been given us from time to time. It can only be realized in a deeper and fuller spiritual life.

One of the most important ideas of Eucken is that man, from a purely natural being, tends always to become a spiritual being, and that we have the right to speak of an *autonomous* spiritual life, one independent, that is to say, of the other vital and social functions, and one which ought ever to extend its dominion more and more. But we are not to be content with hoping that this spiritual life will be extended and deepened. We must coöperate more and more in the coming of its kingdom. We must *act* in order to aid it, and not content ourselves merely with contemplation. "This life in its orderly development," he says in one of his most recent books, "receives its coloring and its special tone by putting forth, above all, the fact that we do not belong by simple right of birth to a reasonable world, capable of being primarily reduced to contemplation and pleasure, but that it is necessary for us to hurl ourselves forth with energy against this world, and that for this reason there must be a revolution of present conditions." (*Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, Leipzig, Veit, 1907, p. 210.)

The philosopher, then, must not merely *know* the world; he must *change* it, as well. For this reason, he has ultimately given to his philosophy the name of *activism*, and for the same reason, that philosophy has been connected with the famous pragmatism, which has created so great a stir in America and in Europe in recent years. But Eucken holds us to an accurate distinction between his activism and pragmatism, and he has a right to do so, since he is more akin to the two masters of French spiritualism, Ravaisson and Boutroux, than he is to either James or Schiller.

To Boutroux he bears a special resemblance on account of the great importance which he attaches to religious questions. Many of his volumes treat of religion, and not everybody knows, perhaps, that in Germany he is one of those who have followed with the most intelligent attention the Franco-Italian modernistic movement.

With respect, however, to the religions of the past, as with respect to their philosophies, he preserves the attitude of a critic. No church truly can call him her follower, as no philosophy can call him its disciple. He is constantly in search of something which shall be at one and the same time a perfect religion and a perfect state of knowledge, of action and of contemplation. He has in himself the "torment for unity," and yet, he is constrained to recognize the dualism which is in all thought and the fact that thought must continually triumph. And so the contradictions which he finds in others are to be found also in himself. For Eucken, the great philosophers

are those seekers who have glimpsed little by little something of the truth; the great revealers of religion are the experimenters who prepare the way for the unknown God to come. But is there not something of this in Eucken himself? He also, a modern and therefore a dolorously contradictory spirit, finds himself caught in a dilemma from which all his beautiful phrases on the spiritual life are powerless to extricate him. He, as a religious soul, aspires to a union with God; as a prophet of the kingdom of the spirit, he believes in the coming of the Man-God; and for this reason, if he were consistent, he ought not to philosophize at all, he ought not to write books, but ought rather to live and to assist others to live in a manner progressively more noble. If the spirit is activity, as Eucken is always repeating, metaphysics has no further cause for being. The great problem is to know what to do, and philosophy is thus reduced to a moral issue. Eucken, often as he has combatted intellectualism, has not had the courage to lay aside the pursuit of knowledge; and so, in all his works, a contrast is to be perceived between a mystic spirit, tending to pure interior action, and an old-style philosophic mind, which cannot detach itself entirely from intellectualistic predilections. With a philosophic predication, he attempts to dissipate the contrast, but it is not possible. And for this reason, Eucken, while he is today a valuable worker in the field of spiritual education, will not be found among those who have given to humanity a new and decisive word.

SOME ASPECTS OF CHINESE POETRY

BY FREDERICK W. DUPEE

THE westerner who approaches with sympathy and understanding the fascinating yet little-explored field of Chinese poetry cannot fail to be impressed, first of all, with the tremendous age of the Oriental culture which forms its background. Before Shakespeare, before Horace, before Homer, before our Occidental civilization had even begun to take root, the Chinese people were singing their delicate lyrics of human longing, of valiant deeds, of unfulfilled love, and of nature's placid beauty. And with one's appreciation of the spirit of Chinese poetry there comes a realization how little man's fundamental nature is changed, after all, by time and place; how closely akin we are to these Oriental singers; how like our own their sorrows and pleasures, their aspirations and their failures.

While in our modern western world the poet is a highly specialized literary craftsman, and poets are consequently few in proportion to the population, in China during the classic age of Chinese culture every man was a poet and therefore the poet expressed not the ideas of the exceptional but of the ordinary man. And so it is that these ideas seem so like those of the common folk of today. They are expressive of human experience, unaffected by the limitations of time and geographical boundaries.

The educated Chinese, indeed, has always expressed himself almost as commonly and naturally in poetry as in prose. Training in poetical expression has been an essential part of his education. If he takes the examinations for a civil office, he must be prepared to exhibit his skill in verse construction. If he wants to write a letter or send an invitation, he is as likely to do it in poetry as in prose. In the days of the empire, if he heard a royal proclamation read he was chiefly impressed by its poetical qualities. He praised the cleverness of the verse or else he concluded that His Majesty was a poor

poet. If one can imagine President Coolidge delivering his recent message to Congress in the form of a Whitmanesque poem, one can appreciate somewhat the place which poetry held in the official life of China. It is said that a great emperor of the Sui dynasty once ordered a subject executed whose poetry, he feared, rivaled his own. Perhaps it is well that we Occidentals take literature a little less seriously. At any rate, European and American potentates are not as a rule over-jealous of their literary reputations. Frederick the Great, it is true, nourished poetical aspirations, but his relations with his illustrious temporary subject, Voltaire, so entertainingly described by Macaulay, led to ludicrous rather than tragic results.

The very antiquity of poetry in China explains, in a measure, the depth to which it has taken root in the Chinese mind. Scholars disagree considerably as to the date of its beginnings, but it is safe to say that the Chinese were writing verse as early as 1700 B.C. In the time of Confucius, three hundred lyrics, or odes, as they are called, were collected and polished up, and are extant today. These odes were remarkably naive pieces of work, written with the same unconscious art which characterizes the old English ballads, with something of the same element of tragedy in their content.

It was not, however, until the coming of the Han dynasty, in 200 B.C., that poets began to realize that they were poets, and that poetry began to be considered a serious art. The period of the Han dynasty, like the pseudo-classical age which followed the early era of poetry in England, began to show an elaborateness and artificiality, evident in technique as well as in subject matter. There was a stereotyped way of saying things, and only conventional things could be said.

When the Han family died out in 200 A. D., several minor dynasties occupied the throne of China for the next four hundred years. During this period, poetry experienced a distinct growth and began to react the influences of Taoism or the philosophy of inaction—"Do nothing and everything will be done." Poetic dreamers revelled in indolence. Like a subtle yet far-reaching perfume, this spirit pervaded all the works of the age, and went far on into the Tang period, giving everything a touch of its characteristic scent.

The Tang period was the ripe, abundant age of Chinese literature, the glorious age of fertile genius. Men like Li Po, Tu Fu, and Po Chu-i, produced a vast amount of unequalled poetry, and thrived under the adoring patronage of the emperors and the idealization of the people. Fully as colorful as the Romantic period in

England, the Tang era had its Keatses and Shelleys and Wordsworths, to whom poetry was more than art and more than religion. It was the age of natural idealists who saw life as it was, not all bitter nor all exultant, but an exhilarating mixture of the two.

A very definite verse form came to be adopted, more rigorous than our sonnet in its limitations, and made vivid by an element known as "tone." Somewhat like the difference between our stressed and unstressed syllables, all Chinese vocables have a difference of tone, the first being known as the flat, and the second as the deflected tone. Waley, in his introduction to *One Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems*, explains the method by which they are used: "In the first (the flat tone) the voice neither rises nor sinks. In the second (the deflected tone) it (1) rises, (2) sinks, (3) is abruptly arrested." These tones are arranged in the line in somewhat the same manner as our stressed syllables are arranged to form a metrical line.

Rhyme in Chinese verse was standardized in the eighth century on the basis of a likeness of vowel sounds, and although some of these, through changes in the language, have ceased to be rhymes, they are still used in good verse just as they were in the time of the Tang dynasty.

Real verse writing, however, included something more than the mechanics, which were difficult enough; it included a certain concentration of ideas, so that brevity, the great desideratum, could be achieved. We put no limits on our poets, but in China they are forced ordinarily to keep within eight, twelve, sixteen, twenty, or twenty-four lines. There are, in fact, very few longer poems in the language.

The four-line stop-short is a very popular although epigrammatic mode of poetical expression and calls for a great deal of skill in construction. The third line is supposed to lead up cleverly to the fourth, which expresses a surprise, or a "denouement," as Giles terms it. The following stop-short translated by him is illustrative:

"The bright moon shining overhead,
The stream beneath the breezes touch
Are rare and perfect joys indeed
But few are they who think them such."

The element of brevity is especially important to the Chinese, because they do not read poetry with the idea of having an emotion or story fully described or told to them, but only to receive a sug-

gestion which will stimulate their imagination. The stage is set for them, there is a whispered hint, and then the words stop; but, as the notes of a bell continue to vibrate in the air after the ringing has ceased, so the thread of thought continues to unwind long after the poem has ended. This quality, when it is employed with clarity and simplicity, gives the verse a very appealing slenderness and subtlety, as well as a certain rather gripping charm.

A writer in the London *Times* very aptly expresses this aspect of Chinese poetry by saying: "The Chinese seem to play on a penny whistle, and then suddenly, with a shy smile, to draw the most wonderful thin music out of you." Another writer remarks that this quality has made Chinese poetry "the well and source of the diaphanous in literature."

Two poems of Li Po's, the first translated by Cranmer-Bing and the second by Shigeyoshi Obata, best illustrate this suggestive quality:

"The yellow duck winds round the city wall;
 The crows are drawn to nest,
 Silently down the west
 They hasten home and from the branches call.
 A woman sits and weaves with fingers deft
 Her story of the flower-lit stream,
 Threading the jasper gauze in dream,
 Till like faint smoke it dies; and she, bereft,
 Recalls the parting words that died
 Under the casement some far eventide,
 And stays the disappointed loom,
 While from the little lonely room
 Into the lonely night she peers,
 And like the rain, unheeded fall her tears."

* * * * *

"Blue water and a clear moon. . . .
 In the moonlight the white herons are flying.
 Listen! Do you hear the girls who gather water-chestnuts?
 They are going home in the night singing."

The latter, in its cameo-like beauty and transparent clearness, might have been penned by the great poet-seer of modern India, Rabindranath Tagore.

Li Po seems to be accepted as the foremost Chinese poet, although he shares his honors to some extent with Tu Fu, his contemporary

and close friend, and with Po Chu-i, who lived nearly a century later. The lives of all these poets appear to have followed a rather similar pattern. All were literary prodigies in their childhood; all went to the capital as young men and became favorites of the emperor or attempted to fill official positions. Then there came disgust with the artificialities of court life and a longing to get away again to the hills and fields. Inevitably there was flight or exile due to political intrigue, some years of wandering, and finally a settling down with a group of congenial companions, who drank a great deal of wine and who wrote melancholy verse to their hearts' content.

The familiar strain of grief and sadness runs like an obligato through all Chinese verse. The poet is ever yearning for the home he has left, for the friend he has lost, or for the happiness of other days. He sees an old pile of ruins and they recall to him the glories of a departed age. Frequently he chants in minor key the woe of a woman whose love has been unfulfilled. Times without number he pens poems of parting, inscribing them on trees or pillars, or presenting them on a piece of parchment to the friend from whom he is about to separate. Then there are the poems in praise of the emperor, of good wine, and of the beauties of nature.

Like Swinburne, the Chinese poets gloried in the sensuous imagery of nature, without attempting to attach any moral significance to it. Nature was their mistress and they threw themselves recklessly into her arms, giving themselves up to the gratifying of the senses, without any stirring of the intellect. These lines by Po Chu-i are aesthetic enough to be worthy of Keats and accurate enough to be Rossetti's own:

“ . . . At last

Slow yielding to their prayers the stranger came,
 Hiding her burning face behind her lute;
 And twice her hands essayed the strings, and twice
 She faltered in her task; then tenderly,
 As for an old sad tale of hopeless years,
 With drooping head and fingers deft she poured
 Her soul forth into melodies. Now slow
 The plectrum led to prayer the cloistered chords,
 Now loudly with the crash of falling rain,
 Now soft as the leaf whispering of words,
 Now loud and soft together as the long
 Patter of pearls and seed pearls on a dish
 Of marble; liquid now as from the bush

Warbles the mango bird ; meandering
 Now as the streamlet seaward ; voiceless now
 As the wild ice torrent in the strangling arms
 Of her ice lover, lying motionless,
 Lulled in a passion far too deep for sound.
 Then as the water from the broken vase
 Gushes, or on the mailed horseman falls
 The anvil din of steel, as on the silk
 The slash of rending, so upon the strings
 Her plectrum fell. . . ."

This is from the "Lute Girl," perhaps the longest poem in the language and one of the few which tells a complete story. The story is a tragic one, but there is no moral to it and not a murmur of complaint or discontent ruffles its complacency. There is merely an acceptance of things as they are, without any attempt to alter them or to seek an explanation for them. And that is, after all, the primary expression of Chinese philosophy.

One who delves into the poetry of the Chinese is certain to be rewarded by an insight into the life of the people and a feeling for their philosophy. One experiences the same sensations as a traveler on shipboard who awakes in the morning to find himself anchored in a strange harbor, where the wind off-shore brings him his first whiff of the new land. He quaffs it, he breathes it in, he feels it taking hold of him, entering his blood, spreading through his system and although he is not a part of the busy life going on before his eyes, nevertheless by some mysterious process an understanding of that life and a certain sympathy with it, which perhaps he cannot fully explain, stirs within his being.

And in brooding over this rich field of poetry, one senses clearly the Chinese outlook on life, which is distinctly pagan, and contains much that is suggestive of the Roman Epicureans and of Omar Khayyam. "Carpe diem," and "eat, drink, and be merry"—there is something of them both in the Chinese philosophy. Life is short and unutterably sad. The poet weeps as easily as he laughs, and even his sincerest laughter with some pain is fraught. Here is the essence of the Chinese idea expressed in two lines :

"Oh, ruthless fate ; oh, cruel boon !
 To meet so late, to part so soon !"

This is as far as the poets of China ever go in lamenting the sadness of life ; the nearest they ever come to a protest against it. They feel little resentment toward the ills of mortal existence ; they would

change but little. They are quite well satisfied with things as they are and they find their solace in the external pleasures of the world. They immerse themselves unreservedly in nature, though they may dream at times of other and better worlds—the dream worlds of fantasy and imagination. Then, too, they have their friends, and an important part of Chinese philosophy is the glorification of friendship. To the Chinese philosophers, as to the Greeks and to some of the poets of the Renaissance, friendship between men partakes of a higher nature than love between the sexes. Women are apt to be looked upon with contempt, as a temptation to folly, and their pursuit regarded as degrading.

But perhaps a greater solace to the poet than nature, his dreams, or his friendships, is his wine cup. He loves to lie in the sunlight and drink himself into such a stupor that no tremor of conscious thought disturbs his inward peace. His jug, like Omar's, is always close at hand, and he has few other cares. After all, he wants very little from life:

“Tell me now, what should a man want
 But to sit alone, sipping his wine cup?
 I should like to have visitors come and discuss philosophy.
 And not to have the tax collectors coming to collect taxes.
 My three sons married into good families,
 And my five daughters married to steady husbands.
 Then I could jog on through a happy five-score years
 And, at the end, need no Paradise.”¹

Although life seems to him an experience shot through with sadness, we find the poet clinging tenaciously to it with both hands, and exhibiting an almost childlike dread of the inevitability of death. He does not try to comfort himself with the thought of immortality and a Deity; he is blind to all that and sees only the darkness and oblivion which lie beyond life. He is altogether a fatalist and cares little whence he came or whither he is bound. Life is a voyage on a rudderless ship; man must let the wind and tide bear him whither they will, though there may be sunken reefs along the course and he knows not the port toward which he is headed—if indeed there be any port at all. In the words of Li Po:

“In vain we cleave the torrent's thread with steel,
 In vain we drink to drown the grief we feel;
 When man's desire with fate doth war thus, this avails alone—
 To hoist the sail and let the gale and waters bear us on.”²

¹ Arthur Waley: *One Hundred and Seventy Chinese Poems.*

² Cranmer-Byng: *A Lute of Jade.*

THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LUDWIG STEIN¹

BY HARRY ELMER BARNES

I. GENERAL NATURE OF HIS SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

1. *His Leading Works.*

ONE of the most important sociologists who uses the German language as a medium for expressing his ideas, and yet one who has been but little known to English and American readers, is Ludwig Stein (b. 1859), long professor of philosophy in the University of Berne, Switzerland, and since 1910 in Berlin. Stein is particularly distinguished for his work on the history of philosophy and sociology. The second part of Stein's major work, *Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie, Vorlesungen Über Sozialphilosophie und ihre Geschichte* (1897, revised and enlarged edition, 1923), is as much the best history of the development of social philosophy since the earliest Greek writers as Paul Barth's work, *Die Philosophie der Geschichte als Soziologie*, which appeared in the same year (2nd enlarged edition, 1915), is the most comprehensive and satisfactory treatment of the development of modern sociology since the time of Comte. Stein's other important works, aside from special philosophical monographs, are *Wesen und Aufgabe der Soziologie: Eine Kritik der organischen Methode in der Soziologie* (1898); *Der soziale Optimismus* (1905); *Die Anfänge der menschlichen Kultur* (1906); *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart* (1908); and *Einführung in die Soziologie* (1921), a valuable collection of his sociological essays and a handy summary of his social philosophy. Professor Stein's lectures delivered in the United States in 1923-24 are to be printed in a volume entitled, *Evolutionary Optimism*.

¹ I am indebted to Professor Stein for a critical reading of the manuscript.

2. *The Nature of Sociology.*

As might naturally be expected from a professor of philosophy interested in sociology, Stein holds that sociology is really a unifying philosophy of the special social sciences, in the same way that general philosophy is the unifying element in all science. "Sociology is social philosophy, a department of the whole philosophy which systematizes and brings into the most complete formulæ the unity of the different kinds of relations of men which are investigated separately by the respective specialisms."² This is essentially the view of Professors Schaeffle, Barth, and Ratzenhofer in Germany, and of Professor Small in America; it is sharply opposed by Professor Giddings and his followers and, in general, by the statistical school of sociologists.

The three main tasks of sociology, according to Stein, are: (1) the investigation of the history of social institutions; (2) the tracing of the development of social theories, and (3) the formulation of rules and ideals for guiding the social development of the future.³ This outline of what he believes to be the proper scope of a system of sociology is strictly adhered to in his most important work, *Die soziale Frage im Lichte der Philosophie*.⁴

3. *Nature and Scope of His Social Philosophy.*

The fundamental principles of Stein's social philosophy are those of causality, teleology, and continuity.⁵ Social causality is manifested in the universal tendency of the various social institutions to change with alterations in the fundamental economic and psychological foundations of society. A good illustration of this principle of causality in society is to be seen in the vast changes in political and social institutions which have taken place since the economic foundations of society have been entirely transformed by the Commercial and Industrial Revolutions. The principle of tele-

² *Sociological Papers*, 1904, p. 247. Cf. also *Wesen und Aufgabe der Soziologie*, p. 6, and *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart*, Chap. xiii; Jacobs, *German Sociology*, pp. 39-41, briefly summarizes Stein's notions regarding the scope and nature of sociology. For his latest views, see his *Einführung*, pp. 11-19.

³ *Sociological Papers*, 1904, p. 247.

⁴ The citations from this work unless otherwise indicated, are based upon the French edition entitled *La Question sociale*, Paris, 1900. Though I have had available for revision of the manuscript the new German edition of the *Soziale Frage*, a comparison with the French edition and a conference with Professor Stein failed to reveal any essential changes of doctrine. Hence, I have retained the references to and quotations from the French edition because of the superior ease with which American readers can handle the French.

⁵ *La Question sociale*, pp. 39ff.

ology in society is to be discovered in the changes which have been effected in laws and institutions by the conscious action of society—in other words, the attempt of society to improve its own condition. Finally, the element of continuity is to be discerned in the mutual interrelationship of different stages of social evolution, the principle of gradual development, and the almost invariable failure of every attempt suddenly to change the nature of the fundamental institutions of society by revolutions or direct legislation.⁶

The basic principle of Stein's interpretation of the phenomenon of association is the old Aristotelian dictum of the instinctive basis of social groupings. Stein's rather peculiar and arbitrary definition of *society*, however, precludes the possibility of his regarding it as an instinctive product. Like Ferdinand Tönnies, he distinguishes sharply between "community" and "society." Community life is an instinctive product.⁷ The period of community in social existence is found in the primitive social groups of the family and horde. Here the bonds are consanguinity, contiguity, the sexual instinct, common intellectual interests. The economic and intellectual bonds prepare the way for the development of society out of the previous stage of community.⁸ Society, according to Stein, is a more advanced form of grouping than community. It presupposes, besides contiguity and association, the additional element of conscious coöperative activities. Human groupings do not reach the stage of society until they become purposive organizations.⁹ This distinction is, of course, very similar to the differentiation made by Professor Giddings between component and constituent societies, or, again, between instinctive and rational societies, and that maintained by Durkheim between segmentary and functional types of society.

In harmony with his view of the proper scope of sociology, Stein makes a sociological study of the evolution of the family, property, society, the state, language, law, and religion. He next presents his famous history of social philosophy, and concludes his work with an exposition of his program for the solution of the outstanding

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 40-51; 350-54.

⁷ "La communauté représente cette trame sociale primitive où l'homme, dépourvu de conventions extérieures ou même de sanction légale, rend des services à son semblable, le protège et l'aide grâce à un instinct naturel." *Ibid.*, p. 63. Cf. p. 192.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 63-8.

⁹ "Par 'société' je comprends un mode de coopération constitué par les individus et réglant leurs rapports réciproques. . . . Pour qu'il y ait société, il faut non seulement que les individus vivent les uns à côté des autres, mais encore une *coopération* de ceux-ci fut-elle instinctive, est nécessaire." *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15. Cf. Jacobs, *German Sociology*, pp. 33-5. Cf. R. M. Maciver, *Community, A Sociological Study*.

social problems of the present. Stein is an optimist and believes that civilization is improving and is capable of a high degree of further development through the conscious self-direction of society guided by the laws reached inductively by sociology. His erudition is unquestionable, particularly in the field of philosophical literature, though he is also familiar with the chief works in the field of anthropology and systematic sociology. His original work of 1897 dealing with the problems of social evolution, while well abreast of the average sociological treatments of these subjects, is now antiquated, as it is based upon the generalizations of the classical anthropologists such as Lubbock, Spencer, Tylor, Post, Max Müller, Letourneau, and Grosse. When the volume was printed, however, twenty years ago, these writers were *the* authorities upon the subject of historical sociology, and to question their conclusions was considered to be almost a sacrilege. It is a sad commentary upon the lack of scientific alertness on the part of sociologists that these very works are still quoted in most contemporary sociological writings with the same degree of reverential credulity which was accorded them a quarter of a century ago.¹⁰ In his last work, the *Einführung in die Soziologie*, and the revised edition of *Die Soziale Frage*, Stein shows decent familiarity with recent anthropological literature.

II. SPECIFIC DOCTRINES REGARDING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

1. *Fundamental Concepts and Definitions.*

It has already been shown that Stein considers sociology to be the general unifying philosophy of the special social sciences. Therefore, political science is regarded by Stein as one of those subordinate specialisms, the results of which are used by sociology as the basis of its final and unitary survey and arrangement of social data.¹¹ Stein analyzes in detail the essential relations and differences between society and the state. Society may be regarded as the organization

¹⁰ As a proof of the hopeless anachronism of current historical sociology compare the prevailing doctrines with the excellent synthesis of the newer point of view in R. H. Lowie's, *Primitive Society*, A. A. Goldenweiser's *Early Civilization*, and A. L. Kroeber's *Anthropology*. See my paper on "The Development of Historical Sociology," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1921.

¹¹ *La Question sociale*, pp. 14ff.; *Sociological Papers*, 1904, pp. 245-7; *Wesen und Aufgabe der Soziologie*, pp. 6-7.

of the coöperative activities of individuals for the purpose of regulating their reciprocal relations. The state is a social institution designed to secure the protection of the persons and property of its citizens. Society is thus an earlier and more fundamental organization of humanity which prepared the way for the later development of the state.¹² Though society is prior to the state, it is not, in the opinion of Stein, the most elementary type of association. Society grows up gradually from the more primitive and basic stage of "community." Community, tribal society, the territorial state, and modern international society are the chronological stages in social evolution.¹³ Looked at from another point of view, society is voluntary though conscious in character, and is the chief agency in promoting the interests of the individual. The state is a coercive organ which is mainly concerned with the interests of the community as a whole.¹⁴ Again, society is a much more all-inclusive organization of individuals and is much more flexible and plastic than the state.¹⁵ After viewing the problem from these various standpoints Stein formulates his final definition of the state as follows: "We may behold in the State, especially in the modern civilized State, the substantial organization of the inevitable subordination and superposition of the individuals and associated groups within it, with the aim of establishing an equilibrium of interests between the legitimate personal necessities of individuals and the interests of the nation and

¹² "Par 'société' (*societas*) je comprends avec Morgan un mode de coopération constitué par les individus et réglant leurs rapports réciproques; j'entends au contraire par 'état' (*civitas*) une institution ayant pour but d'assurer la possession de la terre, de la protection de la vie et de la propriété à l'intérieur comme à l'extérieur. En s'appuyant sur cette définition, il n'est pas douteux que la 'société' ne soit la première forme qui précède l'Etat et prépare sa venue." *La Question sociale*, p. 114. See also *Einführung*, pp. 286ff. This is directly contrary to the rather anachronistic views set forth by Henry Jones Ford in his *Natural History of the State*.

¹³ "Société et Etat ne coïncident jamais et nulle part. La société préétatique (*gens*) est le prius passager, la société actuelle le postérius de l'Etat. La *gens* s'est intégrée dans l'Etat. la société actuelle est une différenciation de l'Etat." *La Question sociale*, pp. 115-220.

¹⁴ "La 'société' est surtout la gardienne du choix individuel, l'Etat, le rempart des intérêts communs." *Ibid.*, p. 222. "L'essence de la société consiste donc en une action combinée librement choisie, celle de l'Etat dans une action combinée exigible des individus unis en une société, ou en un Etat." *Ibid.*, pp. 226-7.

¹⁵ "Les limites de l'Etat se trouvent ainsi plus étroites que celles de la société; avec ce rétrécissement d'horizon il possède en même temps une structure incomparablement plus ferme. La société est de par sa nature incertaine et fluide, l'Etat est au contraire stable et solide. Le lien de la société est le tact, celui de l'Etat est la loi. Les membres de la société sont retenus entre eux par les moeurs, ceux de l'Etat par le droit." *Ibid.*, p. 227.

humanity as a whole which are frequently in conflict with individual interests."¹⁶

In contrast with his lengthy discussion of the distinctions between the state and society, Stein devotes little attention to the equally important matter of the differences between the state, the government, and the nation. The term state is employed by him both in the strict usage of political science and in the popular sense as synonymous with government. At the same time he makes the state include the attributes which are usually assigned to the nation.¹⁷ The state is "un système d'action réciproque des intérêts intellectuels et esthétiques, moraux et religieux des hommes."¹⁸ Such a conception of the state is very similar to the usual definition of a nation. There can be little doubt that Stein's failure to differentiate carefully between the the state and the government, and his subordination of nationality to the state, are a result of his Swiss political environment, where, in a majority of the cantons, the state and the government are practically identical and where a common nationality does not exist, the state being the only unifying agency. In his *Einführung in die Soziologie* his differentiations are much clearer and he accepts the scientific distinction between the state and the nation.¹⁹

2. *The Origin of Political Institutions.*

Stein's theory of the origin of the state is a combination of Morgan's theory of social evolution with a moderate version of Gumpowicz's doctrine of the conflict of social groups. The first stage of social evolution was the period of community, which was based on the bond of practically unorganized or undifferentiated blood-relationship. In this period the only types of social organization were the extremely crude forms of the primitive family and the horde. In his theory of the evolution of the family Stein follows the scheme of development postulated by Morgan which is now thoroughly discredited.²⁰

The next stage of human evolution, or the period of the beginnings of social relations, according to Stein's use of the term "social" came with the development of the gentle organization of society.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 230; cf. *Einführung*, pp. 334ff.

¹⁷ *La Question sociale*, pp. 222, 227, 230, 265ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 253ff.

²⁰ *La Question sociale*, pp. 57ff., 82-3, 115ff. It should be kept in mind, however, that Stein was writing in 1900, when the newer anthropology had not been adequately formulated. In the *Einführung*, pp. 62-77, he modifies his earlier version in the light of the more recent anthropological research.

While this stage brought a system of regulation of social relations which was, on the whole, adequate to the demands of the time, gentile society was a period of idyllic democracy as compared to the present.²¹ Stein's representation of the Iroquois as free from the burden of conventionality and custom which oppresses the modern man strongly resembles the Rousseauian variety of anthropology when viewed in the light of the later researches of Hewitt, Parker, and Goldenweiser. The alleged universality of the gentile organization of primitive society has been disproved by critical ethnologists, and even in those places where it did exist it could hardly be deemed the most primitive type of society, unless one accepts Stein's arbitrary definition of society.

Though the *gens* marked the origin of society, the series of changes which brought in the state began with the development of agriculture. Like many writers from Rousseau to Loria and Oppenheimer, Stein holds that private property in land broke up the primitive felicity and paved the way for the immediate development of the state.²² Agriculture created a need for slave labor, and the ensuing raids upon neighboring bands to secure slaves produced the earliest wars and brought about the origin of the warrior class. The dangers of attacks from others led to a differentiation of the population of each group into two fundamental classes of warriors or protectors and laborers or producers.²³ Either offensive or defensive warfare, if successful, required an effective centralization of power, and when the *gens* conferred upon the leader the power to compel the group to bow to his will the essence of the state had appeared. Democratic communism was then well on its way to a transformation into absolute monarchy. The increased wealth of the chief made it possible for him to render his power more secure and enabled him to assume new functions. As industry and social relations developed, conflicting interests appeared within society, particularly between the servile class and its masters. The state was able to extend its influence here by adjusting the differences between these contending parties which threatened the integrity of society.²⁴

This period of conquest and the integration of groups was an essential stage in the development of political institutions. Tribal communities and small nations have always been doomed to perpetual warfare and arrested development. Only by means of large-

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 119, 124.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120-122.

scale warfare could a sufficient degree of integration be effected so that a compact and powerful state could be formed. Paradoxical as it may seem, centuries of warfare were required as a preparation for the final cessation of war.²⁵ Besides this, war provided a valuable discipline for the race.²⁶

War being thus an essential agent in the integration of states and the discipline of society and the human mind, the more vigorous the warfare the more rapidly this bloody but necessary stage in social evolution could be completed.²⁷ Therefore, the great conquerors of history while morally little more than assassins on a large and picturesque scale, really rendered a great service to the progress of civilization without being aware of the fact.²⁸

While Stein thus practically agrees with Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer and Ward in regard to the process by which the State originated, he does not hold with Gumplowicz that progress must always be a result of the conflict of groups. The formation of the large and compact state by war is but the necessary preparatory period to the gradual cessation of war and the achievement of progress through the development of coöperative activities, the division of labor and legislation based upon the sound principles of sociology.²⁹ In this respect the doctrine of Stein greatly resembles the position taken by Lester F. Ward. Both emphasize the teleological nature of future progress.³⁰ The national territorial state is not, however, the last stage in social evolution. Already modern society, international in most of its interests and activities, has become more powerful and important than the national state. Man's voluntary activities, which are separate from the activities of the state, are

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-2, 457, 461.

²⁶ "Un bon maintien du corps, la sobriété et la persévérance opiniâtre, l'éducation d'hommes vigoureux, une discipline absolue, la joie du sacrifice, les liens de la camaraderie, sont la propriété exclusive des peuples exercés par l'esprit militaire." *Ibid.*, p. 461.

²⁷ "Un massacre en masse conduisant à une intégration immédiate de l'Etat est préférable à l'hypocrisie des guérillas perpétuelles entre petites tribus et petites nations." *Ibid.*, p. 123.

²⁸ "Ces assassins grandioses donnent à la civilisation une poussée puissante égale à celle de plusieurs siècles. . . . Ils ont plus fait pour la civilisation réelle que toute une armée de sentimentaux douillets." *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4, 352f., 450ff.

³⁰ Gumplowicz is criticized for his exaggerations, *op. cit.*, p. 119, note. Cf. *Einführung*, pp. 161ff., 226ff.

now preponderant.³¹ The national state will be followed by the socialized state and a society of states.

3. *Sovereignty and the Principle of Authority in Human Society.*

In an interesting article entitled, "Die Träger der Autorität."³² Stein analyzes the nature and value of the principle of authority in society and traces the changes in the nature, sources, and organs of authority throughout history. The principle of authority is as important for the maintenance of the race as the principle of self-preservation is for the individual.³³ Those who wield authority in society are the instrumentality for the education and discipline of the social will.³⁴ Stein finds that the organs of social authority have been successively: "1. die elterliche, 2. die göttliche, 3. die priesterliche, 4. die königliche, 5. die staatlich-militärische, 6. die rechtliche, 7. die Schulautorität, 8. die Wissenschaftsautorität."³⁵ Stein further maintains that in the course of the historic changes in the sources and organs of social authority, institutions have displaced persons as the bearers of authority in society; that, whereas originally authority was imposed by individuals upon the community, now the group imposes its authority upon individuals; and, finally, that, while in the past authority was wielded for the selfish interest of the individuals in power, at present it is consciously employed by the community for the purpose of securing social discipline and progressive improvement of the welfare of the group.³⁶ The changes in the nature, sources, organs, and conceptions of social authority have been correlated with successive stages of social development and different types of civilization.³⁷

While Stein in no place analyzes in detail the nature and importance of sovereignty, considered in the technical or conventional con-

³¹ Les rapports et traditions de famille, les états professionnels dans toutes leurs ramifications, les communautés d'intérêts dans des complications et des déplacements sans nombre, les associations libres, professionnelles, sportives, religieuses, artistiques, pédagogiques, scientifiques, de compagnonage, etc., associations en partie internationales, dans leurs nuances à peine perceptibles; voilà ce que présente la 'société' moderne. . . . Aucun Etat avancé ne peut longtemps résister à l'ordre suprême de la 'société.'" *La Question sociale*, p. 220; cf. *Einführung*, pp. 253-86, 441-54.

³² Published in the *Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie*, Oct., 1907, pp. 44-65; cf. also *Einführung*, pp. 388ff.

³³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 44.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 54, 55, 56.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49. This notion harmonizes with Professor Giddings' view of the social foundations and the evolution of sovereignty; see *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XXI, No. 1.

notation of political science, he devotes a very considerable space to the treatment of the principle of authority as manifested in society. As a part of this general analysis he touches by implication upon the more specific problem of sovereignty. His treatment of the subject is to be found in the article on "Die Träger der Autorität," mentioned above, and another entitled, "Autorität, ihr Ursprung, ihre Begründung und ihre Grenzen."³⁸

Authority, Stein holds, is the basis of order in the social organism corresponding to the dominance of law in the mechanism of nature.³⁹ The development of authoritative control in society was the indispensable prerequisite for the passage from unorganized communal life to the stage of organized society.⁴⁰ This development of authoritative control in society goes back to the groups of animals where it has its origin in force and the imitative instinct.⁴¹ Among men, authority begins in the power of the heads of families and the leaders in war.⁴² Authority was the force which domesticated man and made him fit for society.⁴³ Civilization has never developed except as a result of the previous establishment of the principle of authority in society.⁴⁴

The type of social authority which is to be found in any particular group depends upon the stage of civilization and the character of the composition of the group.⁴⁵ The more fierce and uncivilized the group the more severe must be the type of authority.⁴⁶ Force was thus the first basis of authority. Faith and credulity are the foundation of the second type of authority. Ancient and medieval priests and emperors exercised their control because the masses believed them superior and actually vested with the powers which they claimed. Beginning with the French Revolution there has developed a higher form of authority—that based upon intelligence.⁴⁷

³⁸ Published in Schmoller's *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Volkswirtschaft im deutschen Reich*, 1902, drittes heft, p. 1-30. These two articles are revised and reprinted in the *Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart*, chap. xv; cf. also *Einführung*, pp. 388-452.

³⁹ "Autorität," loc. cit., p. 3.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 14-15, 22. "Und so möchten wir den als oberste Formel der Begründung aller Autorität den Satz aufstellen: Keine Kulture ohne Autorität." *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5, 15, 20. "Jedes Volk hat die Autoritäten, die es vermöge seines Civilisationsgrades braucht und verdient." *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴⁶ "An der Schwelle der Kultur stehen durchweg blutdürftige Tyrannen. Wilde Bestien zu bändigen, giebt es nur ein Mittel: die Furcht." *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-7.

Though authority is indispensable in the evolution and functioning of society, it should not exceed its legitimate scope. When it has reached the point where it obstructs and restrains cultural development instead of advancing it, authority is to that extent an undesirable evil.⁴⁸ Egypt in antiquity, the Byzantine Empire in the middle ages, and Spain in modern times have been "horrible examples" of how an excess of authority can obstruct progress.⁴⁹ Reviving the Hegelian myth Stein maintains that the Germans have solved for future civilizations the age-long problem of the reconciliation of liberty and authority.⁵⁰ "Vernünftige Einsicht und öffentliches Wohl" has been the formula followed by them in making this notable contribution, and it is truly enlightening to learn that the main personal agent in grounding the Germans in this principle was no other than Frederick the Great.⁵¹

4. *Liberty and Authority.*

Stein, in his treatment of the abstract question of liberty and authority, takes the sensible view that liberty can be secured only through the protection of the interests of the individual by the state.⁵² The anarchistic ideal of absolute liberty is a pure chimera.⁵³ Liberty, while important, is not the sole goal of social effort or evolution. Equal in importance are a just reward for labor, the intellectual development of the race, and the raising of the standard of life of all strata of society.⁵⁴ As a substitute for that liberty which is the ideal of the individualists, Stein offers that of the "socialization of law" (*droit*). By this, he says, "We mean the juridical protection of the economically weak; the conscious subordination of individual interests to those of the State, but ultimately and fundamentally to those of mankind as a whole."⁵⁵ For a writer who is so favorably

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 22ff. "In dem Augenblicke aber, da die Autorität solche Dimensionen annimmt, das sie nicht mehr kulturfördernd, sondern geradezu kulturhemmend wirkt, verliert sie ihr logisches Daseinsrecht. In solchen Fällen wird eben mit Goethe zu sprechen 'Vernunft Unsinn, Wohl'that Plage.'" *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 23ff.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7. "An der hand der Germanischen Völker, welche mit der Wahrung des Autoritätenprinzips ein hohes Ausmass individueller Freiheit zu verbinden wissen, soll jetzt der positive Beweis erbracht werden, dass in der Germanischen Versöhnung von Autorität und Freiheit die Lösung des probleme liege." *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30. In his *Einführung*, pp. 449ff., Stein argues for the establishment of an international authority and a League of Nations.

⁵² *La Question sociale*, p. 125; cf. *Einführung*, pp. 320ff.

⁵³ *La Question sociale*, pp. 296-7.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 402-3.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 304. See also *Der Soziale Optimismus*, chap. vii. Cf. Roscoe Pound. "A Theory of Social Interests," in *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1920.

inclined towards the socialization of the activity of the state the abstract question of individual liberty could only be regarded as a minor consideration as compared with the benefits which might accrue from reform legislation. Stein agrees with Priestley and Bentham that "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" is about as satisfactory a formula for the guidance of the social reformer as has ever been devised, in spite of the difficulties involved in its metaphysical interpretation and its practical application.⁵⁶

5. *The Forms of the State and the Government.*

Stein makes no attempt at a comprehensive treatment of the different forms of the state and government. He merely touches upon the subject in dealing with other topics. In a republic and a constitutional monarchy sovereignty is vested in the whole body of the people, while in a despotism the ruler possesses sovereign power.⁵⁷ While he has great confidence in the Swiss democracy, Stein has no patience with the view that all men are created equal. He maintains that it is one of the primary principles of sociology that men are of unequal ability. While the state may adjust itself to these inequalities, it cannot hope to eliminate them.⁵⁸ Equality before the law is the only sense in which men can be held to be equal.⁵⁹ Democracy is founded on an aristocracy of ability just as much as a monarchy.⁶⁰ At the same time, the masses in a democracy are not entirely devoid of reason, as Le Bon would have us believe. Democracy does not necessarily mean mob rule.⁶¹ In general, while Stein seems to regard the Swiss democracy as the most advanced type of modern government, he has a very high degree of admiration for the efficient German bureaucracy. This original veneration of the German polity, evident in Stein's writings, was somewhat stimulated by his German residence and the recent world war. His most recent work, the *Einführung in die Soziologie*, however, is notable for the moderation of tone, the absence of chauvinism, and the frank recognition of the inadequacy of the modern national state system.

⁵⁶ *La Question sociale*, pp. 288ff.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 282. "Autorität," *loc. cit.*, pp. 4-6, 23.

⁵⁸ *La Question sociale*, pp. 231, 297.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-2.

⁶⁰ "Autorität," *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

⁶¹ "Si LeBon, aveuglé par son horreur pour la démocratie, s'était donné seulement la peine d'aller habiter dans une commune rurale suisse, au lieu de prendre pour modèles des gamins et des camelots parisiens, il aurait trouvé en pleine activité cette 'raison' qu'il refuse catégoriquement à la masse." *La Question sociale*, p. 215.

6. *The Scope of Desirable State-Activity.*

In regard to the question of the proper scope of state activity, Stein lays down the preliminary proposition that the range of legitimate action on the part of the state must necessarily vary with the degree of civilization. The higher the development of the group the greater the number of interests which it is the duty of the state to protect and harmonize.⁶²

It is the prime duty of the state to preserve and protect the equilibrium of interests which are represented by its citizens. The state alone is able to harmonize the interests of the individual and the race, which achievement is the real goal of social evolution.⁶³

After these few preliminary observations, Stein sketches what he believes to be desirable activities to be undertaken by the State. He states at the outset that he intends only to suggest the general outlines and will leave the details to be worked out by specialists.⁶⁴ While he denies that he can correctly be designated as a Socialist, Stein proposes a field of state activity which very nearly coincides with the program of state socialism, and he certainly is nearer to the views of the socialistic group than to the doctrine of extreme individualists, such as Herbert Spencer.⁶⁵ He says that his theory of state activity is a combination of the programs of the socialists and the individualists "qui nous assure les avantages d'un mode de production collectiviste, sans abandonner l'émail incomparable de ce qui est intimement personnel, le parfum enchanteur de l'individualité."⁶⁶ Stein makes the very pertinent observation that the amount of successful state activity which is possible depends upon the *morale* and efficiency of the existing governments.⁶⁷

Stein enumerates a considerable list of activities and industries which should be taken over by the state. This list includes the postal service, the telegraph and telephone service, the railroads, distilleries, mines, the salt, match and tobacco industries, and all dangerous occupations.⁶⁸ Further, the state should assume all insurance business within its boundaries.⁶⁹ The state must guarantee to its citizens the right to live, which under normal circumstances, means the right to work. If the industries above mentioned are not

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 231; cf. *Einführung*, pp. 275-306.

⁶⁴ *La Question sociale*, p. 290.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 232-4 and p. 232 note.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 267; cf. p. 278.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 271-2.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 269*ff.*, 281.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 286.

sufficient to employ all who cannot secure employment in private, it is the duty of the state to enter into other lines of industrial activity for which it is specially adapted, so that it may furnish the necessary opportunity for employment.⁷⁰ Moreover, the state should protect the interests of its prospective citizens who are yet unborn through "the taking over by the State of all the underground natural resources which have not been discovered, of all water power which the technology of the future will exploit for industrial purposes, as well as the exploitation by the State of the most important inventions of the future."⁷¹ Stein holds that the state should control all the important inventions made by its citizens and should reward the inventors by salaries and official honors which would make the incentive to invention much greater than it is at present.⁷² He believes that when the state shall have taken up the rôle of the enterpriser to the extent that he has indicated, it will be able to fix and equalize prices and will be strong enough to make private capital follow its lead.⁷³

Aside from this direct participation in industry, Stein believes that the state should develop departments to adjust or eliminate the struggles between capital and labor and to prevent the exploitation of the citizens by monopolistic combinations.⁷⁴ As to the practical application of his program for the extension of state activities, Stein points with a considerable amount of justifiable pride to the fact that Switzerland may serve as a school of social reform for the rest of Europe.⁷⁵ Stein contrasts his program with that of the socialists in the following paragraph:

The social democrats demand the extinction of the modern capitalistic State; we demand its conscious perfection; they desire a fraternal and international alliance of the proletariat of the world; we desire, first of all, a fraternal national alliance of all classes and of producers of all levels; they demand the elimination of all private property and the private ownership of the means of production, and the abolition of all wage employment; we demand the maintenance of an economy of private property under a socialized form, a mixed type of industry divided in control by the State and private enterprise, which would not entirely extinguish labor for wages, but would soften its repulsive harshness; they demand at once a social State, or, in fact, a "society," in order that they may build from within it a polity; we demand, on the contrary, first of all, a socialized law and polity from which there will naturally proceed, like ripened fruit, the socialized State.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 270, 314-16.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 283

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 284-5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 275ff., 291.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-7, 280.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 262-3

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

7. *The State and Social Progress.*

Stein maintains that the evolution of political and judicial institutions must keep pace with general social evolution. If the political and legal machinery is not adjusted to the needs of the time it must submit to a radical reform in order to make it competent to deal with the present situation.⁷⁷ It is to be desired that political evolution move along gradually and peacefully, so that a revolution may be avoided. It was to escape the necessity for a political and legal revolution in the future that Stein formulated his program for the socialization of law.⁷⁸ Like Ward, Stein holds that the progress of the future should be primarily teleological. Legislation must be based upon the accepted doctrines of sociology.⁷⁹ The state will not disappear in the future, but, reformed and socialized, it will become an increasingly important organ in achieving social progress. It is folly to expect that the course of evolution will be reversed and that society will return to primitive anarchy and communism.⁸⁰ Stein, then, stands with Comte, Ward, Dealey and Hobhouse, as an exponent of social teleosis."

8. *The State and International Relations.*

In regard to the question of international relations, Stein in 1900 took the position of the majority of sociologists, namely, that whereas war has in the past made important contributions to the advance of civilization, its mission has been fulfilled and it should give way to economic and psychic modes of competition. He believed that an alliance of European states would be accomplished in the near future and that international disputes would tend more and more to be settled by arbitration.⁸¹ Quite in contrast with the views of Novicow and Tarde, he maintained that the desire of France for revenge was the chief menace to the future peace of Europe.⁸² Europe cannot, however, afford to disarm even after the consummation of an international alliance or after it has agreed to settle its disputes by arbi-

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 232; cf. F. J. Goodnow, *Social Reform and the Constitution*.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 313.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 232ff., 352f.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 495. "Ce n'est donc pas dans le dépérissement, mais dans la construction complète et l'organisation basée sur l'égalité économique, de nos Etats nationaux que nous voyons le salut social de l'avenir. Sans Etats nationaux, solidement construits, avec des législations nettement a'truistes, l'humanité civilisée ne peut pas atteindre son but suprême; la constitution d'un type humain supérieur." *Ibid.*, p. 495. Cf. *Einführung*, pp. 286-89, 334-387.

⁸¹ *La Question sociale*, pp. 459, 461ff.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 458-9; cf. A. L. Fisher, *Studies in History and Politics*, pp. 146ff.

tration. The danger of an Oriental invasion will render it necessary to keep large standing armies, but this expense will find compensation in the moral and cultural value of military discipline.⁸³ While Stein believed that war will ultimately be banished from Europe, he expressed the fear, which later events have proved to be well founded, namely, that war would not be eliminated in Europe until after a last great conflict.⁸⁴ But though there may ultimately be a cessation of war between states, a continuation of the conflict of interests within the state is inevitable and desirable. Competition within certain reasonable bounds is indispensable to progress.⁸⁵

In his most recent work, the *Einführung in die Soziologie*, Stein develops still further his theories on the subject of war and international relations, particularly as they have been formulated as a result of the recent World War. His doctrine is a peculiar combination of the Marxian and Hegelian types of determinism. He takes the position that the wars of today are caused primarily by economic factors—by the struggles for raw materials. "The contemporary pattern of wars is the following: the parceling out of the earth according to the distribution of raw materials. As man earlier fought for pasture lands, so today he struggles for ore, coal, potash and petroleum."⁸⁷ Yet, ultimate world-peace, internationalism, and the league of nations are inevitably to be produced by the "immanent logic of history" in the service of the *Weltgeist*.⁸⁸ At the same time, this manifestation of the will of the *Weltgeist*—internationalism and the league of nations—can be secured in practice only through erecting an international organization with power to control and equalize the economic resources of the earth.⁸⁹ The following section best summarizes Stein's latest views on international relations and the league of nations:

⁸³ *La Question sociale*, pp. 459-62.

⁸⁴ "Malheureusement, le sociologue qui embrasse d'un coup d'oeil tous les facteurs, ne peut pas se débarrasser de la crainte que le type guerrier de l'Europe ne chante encore dans une dernière bataille décisive son chant d'adieu aux accents lugubres, avant de céder définitivement le pas au type industriel." *Ibid.*, p. 458.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 453, 461, 465f., 470. "Mais si le combat sous forme de guerre doit un jour se rétrécir et devenir insignifiant ou même entièrement disparaître, la cessation complète de la lutte sociale n'est ni souhaitable ni désirable. Religion et morale, science et art, langue et religion, tempérament et mœurs, commerce et industrie pourvoieront abondamment à ce qu'il ne manque jamais de matière pour une lutte généreuse, pour une incessante excitation au plus haut déploiement des forces individuelles. Si donc en ce qui concerne les relations politiques des peuples la solution est la paix éternelle, le mot de la concurrence sociale des individus est, au contraire; lutte éternelle, avec des armes loyales!" *Ibid.*, p. 470; cf. *Einführung*, pp. 226ff.

⁸⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 108-9, 449ff.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 449-50.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 450-52.

The political and social struggles of the human race can be ended only through a league of nations, of which we have now the first groping manifestations. If authority means essentially and primarily a focus of power, the league of nations will represent just as much authority as it has power. By power, I mean not merely an international army, such as was proposed two decades ago by von Vollenhoven but, above all, economic power—a tribunal of economic authorities for the purpose of settling the world-wide battle between capital and labor. Let us not deceive ourselves about this: The political wars are in their ultimate causes economic wars, and the longer they last the more pronounced this economic aspect becomes. The battle for fuel, for coal and petroleum, especially the struggle between capital and labor, dominated the present war far more thoroughly than was the case in the earlier religious wars or the dynastic wars of succession. A purely political league of nations, without the economic foundations for the purpose of regulating the economic intercourse of the world, will be futile. A rump league of nations without the United States of America, Germany and Russia is a torso.

The alliances and ententes, which characterized the political situation before the war, have furthered the idea of settling by jury such differences as do not involve vital issues between nations. The two conferences at the Hague, the Red Cross, the fourteen points of Wilson, the embryonic Institute of the League of Nations in Geneva, Harding's Conference in Washington in November, 1921, are plain evidences that the idea of the league of nations, as proclaimed by the Prophets of the old covenant and the *stoa*, has made more progress in the last three centuries than in the preceding three thousand years of history. One would have deliberately to close one's eyes to these impressive facts not to recognize that they reveal an inner logic of history. One need only review these symptoms to convince even those who are opposed to this idea on principle that the logic of social evolution tends to the final goal of a peaceful adjustment among the civilized nations, and that it does this according to immanent laws, tenaciously and unswervingly, even if only slowly and seemingly by circuitous routes.

It is for the sociologist to interpret this immanent logic of the historical process. Statesmen make history, sociologists explain it. Great men, says Hegel, are the instruments of the *Weltgeist*, which avails itself of all the human passions as motive power in order to accomplish the goal of human improvement all the more easily and swiftly. The statesmen believe they are pushing, but in reality they are forced by the immanent logic of history to steer a course that the *Weltgeist* needs.

There was originally opposition to obligatory trial by jury, yet how gladly was it recognized by 1908 that there was the Hague Tribunal as a permanent institution, and that in 1913 it had a fixed home. For history is not the crazy dream of a sleeping Deity but it reveals in large outlines purpose and plan, and reason and con-

tinuity. This continuity was first sensed in the stories and fairy tales, the legends and mythologies of our prehistoric ancestors in a kind of proto-philosophy, as Wundt has termed it. The religious myths are in fact a low kind of metaphysics, that is, metaphysics in a popular edition, in the phrase of Schopenhauer. The philosophic metaphysics, on the other hand, is meant for the intellectual élite of the human race: it is, so to speak, a dialectical pocket edition of the old mythologies, in the form of logical conceptual processes. After that come the augurs, seers and visionaries, the star-gazers and astrologers, and they proclaim the future of humanity. All science, says Comte, has this tendency: *voir, pour prévoir*, to understand, in order to predict. And thus arises the task for the sociologist, to interpret the evident processes of history. The theory of social articulation and institutions developed in these pages, is no mere abstraction of the study room, no speculation in the sense of Hegel, whose Triadic rhythm has been wittily parodied by Fortlage in remarking that it suffered from articular disease. But my sociology keeps closely in touch with the actual course of history. I use the facts of history only in order to explain its causes, in the words of Bacon: *V'cre scira est per causa scire*. For that reason I see in cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, the historical stepping-stone to the idea of nationality, and, on the other hand, also the stepping-stone to the league of nations. Nationalism is the antithesis of cosmopolitanism, internationalism is the synthesis of cosmopolitanism and nationalism on a higher plane of consciousness. Internationalism realizes that section of the mutual interests of all civilized and nationally united people which demands a uniform regulation of their common interests and, therefore, accomplishes it by means of a conscious international convention. This regulation of the economy of the world by means of a kind of economic clearing-house is the basic function of the league of nations. Cosmopolitanism is the longing for, nationalism the limitation upon, and the league of nations of the future the fulfillment of, the idea of unity within the scope of what it is historically possible to realize. Cosmopolitanism is the dream stage of the idea of humanity, nationalism the waking stage of the idea of national unity, and internationalism, finally, as it is to be embodied in the league of nations, is the waking stage of the idea of international unity, inasmuch as it deliberately, i. e., by contract, puts together the common interests of all civilized nations.

Wherever, among civilized nations, there exist, in addition to vital national interests, which must be preserved first of all and most certainly, common interests and compromises of interests, international treaties will have to be made. The radically changed international intercourse, which brings to the fore the problem of a world economy, has smashed the dogma of the isolated national state. The goal of history is the league of nations, in accordance with the words of the New Testament: "peace on earth and good will toward men."⁹⁰

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 449-52.

9. *Extra-legal Phases of Political Control.*

Stein offers some pertinent observations regarding the extra-legal aspects of social control. Man, he says, is in modern society the slave of custom and convention.⁸⁶ A society of the modern type can hardly be said to exist where there is not a well-developed public opinion. In the highly developed states of modern times, society, in its most general sense, is more powerful than the state. Laws are not valid or enforceable unless they are supported by public opinion and, conversely, the state cannot successfully refuse legislation which is persistently demanded by the organized opinion of the group. The organ through which public opinion is moulded and society is enabled to exercise its control is the press, taken in its most comprehensive sense.⁹¹

10. *Political Theory and the Social Environment.*

Stein devotes about a third of his major work to a discussion of the history of social and political theories and the manner in which they reflect their contemporary environment.⁹² Stein's own social and political doctrines in many ways reflect his Swiss environment. In the matter of abstract political theory, his identification of the state and the government, and his emphasis upon the state rather than upon the nation as the most important political concept, are tendencies which might well be natural to a teacher in the Swiss republic. His ideal of the socialization of law and the extension of state activities are in full accord with Swiss practice. He invites the attention of LeBon to the success of democracy in Switzerland, and holds that Switzerland might well serve for the model for Europe, both in regard to advanced social legislation and with respect to the formation of a successful and lasting alliance between the European nations.⁹³ Likewise his emphasis on the socio-political function of authority and the assertion that the Germans alone have succeeded in reconciling it with liberty, reflect Stein's German birth, education and affiliations.

While significant as a social and political theorist, it must be admitted that Stein excels as a critical expositor and historian of sociological and philosophical doctrine.

⁸⁶ *La Question sociale*, pp. 117, 125, 128. "L'Européen civilisé qui vit sous la domination du cérémonial en est l'esclave perpétuel. Seulement nous n'entendons pas le bruit de nos chaînes; nous y sommes habitués dès l'enfance; il est aussi imperceptible pour nous que les coups de marteau pour l'oreille d'un forgeron. Et pourtant, en réalité, nous ne sommes jamais délivrés du cérémonial, nous n'arrivons pas même à nous en défaire dans le coin le plus retiré de notre appartement." *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 220-21; cf. *Einführung*, pp. 51ff.

⁹² *Die Sociale Frage*, pp. 145-385.

⁹³ *La Question sociale*, pp. 215, 292, 459.

“MORD” LINCOLN, THE WOMAN-HATER

BY WILLIAM E. BARTON

THE lumbering stage that jolted its way across the rutted prairie from Carthage to Macomb, stopped for the exchange of mails at the little old village of Fountain Green, and a passenger descended. He was unusually tall, dark and lank, and wore a long, seedy black coat and a tall hat in need of brushing, and carried a cotton umbrella tied about the middle with a string. He also carried an old-fashioned carpet bag. Several of the men who were lounging about the store, waiting for the stage, identified him, for they had been at Carthage on the preceding day and had heard him speak. Carthage was the county-seat of Hancock County, a county that lay along the Mississippi River opposite the Keokuk Rapids. Boats ascending the river to Keokuk, or the Illinois shore opposite, often had to discharge their cargoes and take a new start. It had been these rapids that made a head of navigation in the early days, and that was what began the settlement of Fountain Green. That was a place, some miles in from the river, where the rank prairie grass gave way for grass of finer texture, growing around a many-mouthed spring. In this same county, but above the rapids, was the town of Nauvoo, where the Mormons settled. Joseph Smith had been taken from

¹ This article has interest as a story, and that interest is increased by the close relationship of its principal character to Abraham Lincoln. But it is not as a narrative, though evidently a truthful one, that the article has its chief value. It is the first attempt, so far as we are aware, to answer the question, To what extent was Abraham Lincoln a Lincoln? Did his personal traits and moods come to him chiefly through his mother, or were there important elements in his mind and character which he inherited through his father? It is known that Abraham Lincoln saw practically nothing during his life-time of his father's relatives; this article mentions his isolation from his own family. In some respects he was quite unlike his father, Thomas Lincoln, who was a man of medium height, solidly built, while Abraham Lincoln was very tall and loose-jointed. Mentally, they had some traits in common. Doctor Barton has now conducted an investigation among the Lincolns most closely related to Abraham. The President left no surviving brother or sister, and his father died before he did. But there were first cousins in Illinois, and this article tells the story of this family, with some very suggestive facts concerning their mental traits, and especially those of one cousin, whose life story as here told cannot fail of interest.—THE EDITOR.

there, and was in the jail at Carthage when the mob captured the jail and killed him. The old jail at Carthage is now a shrine for the Mormons who visit it from other places. Joseph Smith was killed June 27, 1844. The events which this story describes occurred fourteen years later.

There was a political meeting in Carthage on September 11, 1858. Stephen A. Douglas, then a candidate for re-election to the United States Senate, spoke before a great crowd. A tablet set in the wall of the court house commemorates the event. Eleven days later, on Wednesday, September 22, Abraham Lincoln spoke there. You will find a massive up-standing boulder in the court house yard telling you where he stood. And that boulder tells us the date of the stage ride, for Abraham Lincoln journeyed eastward from Carthage after his speech in that town, and stopped at Fountain Green. The joint debates between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas were seven in number, beginning at Ottawa on Saturday, August 21, and closing at Alton, October 15, 1858. The days intervening between the joint discussions were filled by the two candidates separately. Douglas said that in the 100 days, exclusive of Sundays, between July 9 and August 2, he spoke just 130 times. Lincoln spoke not so often but almost always once a day, on certain days he spoke twice. Douglas traveled from place to place in a special car, often on a special train with a flat car bearing a cannon to announce his arrival and to echo the applause with which his speeches were received. Abraham Lincoln rode in the day coach, or in the stage. Four of the seven joint debates had been held when Lincoln spoke at Carthage.

Why did he stop at Fountain Green?

He stopped to visit his cousin Mordecai Lincoln. When the two men met in front of the little store at Fountain Green, it was easy to see that they were close akin. Their eyes and hair and gait were all alike. Abraham was taller than Mordecai, but Mordecai was a tall man, and his two brothers, Abraham, who died in 1852, and James, who died in 1837, were also tall men of the Lincoln type.

So far as I am aware, this meeting of Abraham Lincoln and his cousin Mordecai, is the only meeting that ever occurred in the life of the President between him and a first cousin of the name of Lincoln.

The isolation of Abraham Lincoln from his relatives of the Lincoln name was life-long and pathetic. His father, left an orphan at a tender age, became, as his distinguished son said, "a wandering

laboring boy," who from the time he left home saw almost nothing of his father's people. When Abraham was born, two of his mother's aunts were near at hand, and another was not very far away, and he grew up among the Hankses. In Kentucky, Indiana and Illinois, the Hankses were with the family of Thomas Lincoln; but there were no Lincolns near. To be sure, the aged mother of Thomas Lincoln, Bathsehba by name, remembered by her grand-children as "Granny Basheby," lived in the same county in which Abraham Lincoln was born, but so far away that if she ever saw him in the cradle we do not know it, and if he ever saw her he appears not to have remembered it. It is said, though not on very good authority, that John Hanks was invited to Abraham Lincoln's wedding; perhaps so, but no Lincoln was there. And when Abraham Lincoln lay dead in the White House, and three weeks later was buried in Springfield, there was no Lincoln present on either occasion, except the President's widow and her two sons. Nicolay and Hay comment upon the fact that even the great fame and conspicuousness of the President did not call forth his kin of the Lincoln name. We do not know that he ever met any of his first cousins named Lincoln, except on that day in Fountain Green, and there was only one of them left.

I wish greatly that I could produce a kodak picture of Abraham and Mordecai Lincoln sitting together on that occasion, and that I might give a short-hand account of their conversation. I do not have it. But I have something almost as good, and in some respects better. I have a package of old letters and other documents of Mordecai, and some of the writings of his closest kindred.

They could all write. The Hankses could not write, except Dennis and a few others. But I have yet to learn of a wholly illiterate Lincoln. Even Thomas Lincoln, the President's father, could "bunglingly sign his own name" as the President said, and also could read his Bible. Most of them could do more, and Mordecai had the pen of a ready writer. So had his two brothers, while they lived. Both were Justices of the Peace. Abraham Lincoln, the President, knew very well that there was an Abraham Lincoln, Justice of the Peace, in Hancock County; he was familiar with certain documents prepared by him. He also knew of certain land records signed by James B. Lincoln. Both these men were his cousins, sons of his father's oldest brother, Mordecai. But both were dead in 1858, and the only one remaining was Mordecai, the youngest of the three sons of old Mordecai.

In the very year, 1830, in which Thomas Lincoln moved with his family into Macon County, Illinois, two of his cousins who in the year 1829 had removed from Kentucky, came into Hancock County, and there made their home. There lies before me a letter of the younger Mordecai, dated Leitchfield, Kentucky, January 19, 1831, in answer to one which he had just received from James B. Lincoln, dated November 4, 1830. The letter had been between two and three months on the way. At the time of writing, these two brothers, James and Abraham, and a brother-in-law, Ben Mudd, were living in "State of Illinois, Hancock County, the head of the rapids," as the address reads. The letter of Mordecai was really addressed to all three families, and also to his father, the older Mordecai, who had ridden through on horseback to visit his Illinois children, and see about making a home there. But that was the "winter of the deep snow." The older Mordecai was out on horseback on the day when the snow began to come down, not in flakes but by bucketsful, if the old settlers are to be believed. He had taken a good deal of liquor to keep out the cold, and the cold and the liquor together were too much for him. His sons Abraham and James, both carpenters and good ones, hewed a coffin out of puncheons, and as soon as the storm permitted they buried their father in a grave which cannot now be identified. He had been dead more than six weeks when the younger Mordecai wrote, but the news of his death had not reached Kentucky.

Before very long, Mary Mudd Lincoln, the widow of the older Mordecai, removed from Kentucky, and came to live with her Illinois children. She brought with her two unmarried daughters, Mary Rowena and Martha, both of whom found husbands in Illinois.

In 1836, the younger Mordecai left Grayson County, Kentucky, and thereafter lived in Illinois. He made his home with his mother, who was an aged woman at the time of Abraham Lincoln's visit, and died the following year. Mordecai lived until June 15, 1867, and voted twice for his cousin, Abraham. So far as is known, no Hanks ever voted for him except old John Hanks, who was transformed into a republican by the episode of the fence rails at the Decatur convention in 1860. Dennis Hanks, Lincoln's boyhood bed-fellow, voted against him both in 1860 and in 1864. Some of the Hancock County Lincolns, also, were democrats, but not Mordecai. He voted for his cousin Abraham.

The two cousins had a good visit. Abraham Lincoln was interested in his own family history. When he was in Congress in 1848

he made inquiry concerning relatives who were descended from his father's Uncle Isaac. He did not know very much about his ancestry but the extent of his interest is suggested in the rather full account which he gave of the Lincolns, as compared with the very meager data he gave concerning the Hankses, in the two biographical sketches he prepared.

This story, which is getting under way more slowly than I could wish, yet which needs this background of accurate information, relates to the younger Mordecai, the one cousin whom Abraham Lincoln is known to have visited.

Like most of the Lincolns, Mordecai was skilled in the use of tools. Some mechanical aptitude characterized nearly all members of this family. Several of them were carpenters. They were good joiners, and could do mortising and beveling and mitering and dovetailing. I have seen specimens of their work, and it is good. Mordecai kept books. I have one of his account books now before me. He charged six dollars for a coffin, full size, and three dollars for a coffin for a child.

Mordecai was a shoemaker and also a tailor and a carpenter. He worked for high wages as they were then esteemed. Two dollars a day was what he reckoned his time to be worth. He was adept at the turning lathe. Two dollars paid him for making a large spinning wheel, and four dollars rewarded him for a set of six chairs. He made doors and windows, fitting the sash together and glazing them. Twenty-five cents paid him for turning out two large spools. He made a lathe for \$4.50.

Mordecai Lincoln was a woman-hater. Every one said so.

He left Kentucky because a girl there was determined to marry him, and he was determined not to be married. Her name was Patsy, and we know, but need not here record, her other name. I have a letter from her father, written from Kentucky, January 29, 1837, to James Lincoln, and one still earlier, dated September 4, 1836, to Abraham Lincoln, the other brother of Mordecai. He tells of "the painful circumstances of Mordecai's departure," and the effect which that departure has had on Patsy. "What makes it the more strange," he says, "is that I cannot learn that anything happened, nor can I conjecture anything, without it was a little pecuniary embarrassment that he could have got through in six months had he stuck to the noble resolution he took six or seven months previous." Like his father, and like most men of the period, Mordecai sometimes drank rather too much, and I have a letter of his about

that. But he had made a "noble resolution" not to do so, and his financial embarrassments would not have been of long standing had he kept that resolution and married Patsy and remained in Kentucky, or taken her with him to Illinois.

He visited Patsy one night, as these letters show, and she never saw him again. That was the night of his "elopement" as his expectant father-in-law calls it.

These are dignified letters, from a man of standing and official position, and they disclose a father's sorrow for a daughter's disappointment. Why did Mordecai run away when he was to be married?

Some first-hand information exists concerning the younger Mordecai during his life in Leitchfield, Grayson County, Kentucky. Rev. John W. Cunningham, who was born in that town in 1824, and lived there until he was nearly fifteen years of age, was a lad between twelve and thirteen when Mordecai left, and he remembered the details with distinctness when at the age of seventy-nine, he wrote some of his reminiscences for the *Elizabethtown (Kentucky) News*, in September, 1903. Insofar as his recollections related to the Lincoln family, they were chiefly located in Hardin County, where Abraham Lincoln was born, and where Mr. Cunningham later preached. He related, however, that in his home in Leitchfield, there lived a Lincoln family, children of a brother of Abraham Lincoln's father. He wrote:

"I am not sure of the first name of Thomas Lincoln's brother in my native town. . . . (It was Mordecai, the older). He had a married daughter and a bachelor son in our village. The daughter's husband was George Washington Neighbors, who was for several years the acting sheriff of the county. . . . Mrs. Neighbor's brother was Mordecai Lincoln, first cousin of Abraham. He was commonly known as 'Old Mord,' though I did not think of him as an old man. He was the village shoemaker, and occupied a house of his own, with an upper story, where he slept, a lower room, that he used for his shoe shop. All of the little boys liked him because of the bits of thread and wax that he gave them. The house, I presume, is standing, and is one of the oldest in the village. Mordecai was a fiddler, and he had a fiddle that had been made by a Revolutionary soldier from pieces of sugar-tree wood with a shoe-knife as his only implement for making it. Of pleasant nights he would sit on an upper or lower porch to the house, and make sweet music for the town, and would sometimes call forth responsive wild-wolf howls in a neighboring wood.

"Some time after I left home for Elizabethtown, Mordecai went away to Illinois, leaving everything behind him. There were claims on his possessions which the law disposed of. On one of my visits home I found Mord's fiddle there and took it home to Elizabethtown with me. There, for two or three years, I scraped the strings of Old Mord's Revolutionary fiddle, but I never equaled the performances of the clever village shoemaker. I finally gave the fiddle to my brother, from whom it was stolen by a wandering clock-peddler. . . . I have heard Theodore Thomas' forty fiddlers, and many others of note in concerts, but the memory of Old Mord's long-meter fiddling is sweeter to me than any of them."

Mr. Cunningham contributed a later article to the *Louisville Times*, March 29, 1909, in which he gave some added details:

"Mordecai was a charming fiddler. In cold weather, he made music for his own entertainment in his own bedroom or shoe shop. In summer weather he made music for all who could hear his performance as he sat on the second floor of his two story front porch. He ate his meals wherever he made arrangements for them. All the small boys were his friends, and older people were kindly disposed to him. I remember him as a man not more than forty-five years old, but he was commonly called 'Old Mord.' One night he left his home, his possessions and the town, and went away to Indiana and never returned. There was no complaint of wrong-doing against him."

These two articles by a competent and truthful man assure us that Mordecai had no known occasion to leave Leitchfield and Kentucky, and it is but fair to say that nothing in the letters from Patsy's father, and nothing that has been learned from any other source, indicates that he had betrayed Patsy's confidence. Evidently the people of Leitchfield did not know that he had run away to get rid of Patsy and the prospect of matrimony. But he left from her home, and in the night, not returning to his house to take away his precious fiddle.

And he never owned a fiddle afterward, though he often visited at homes where there were violins, and when he did so, would take up the fiddle, tune it, and walk the floor playing it, the tears coursing down his cheeks. When he ran away from Patsy, he ran away from his fiddle.

All of Mordecai's near relatives wished he would marry. His mother was glad to have a son for whom to keep house, but Mordecai was not always a comfort to his mother. Mary Mudd Lincoln

was a devout Catholic, and she made Catholics, not all of them very devout ones, of that branch of the Lincoln family. But some of them revolted. Mordecai was almost violent in his opposition to his mother's religion. He uttered some harsh words about it while he was yet in Kentucky, and on the Sunday following one of these diatribes he heard the priest quote his words, and say that no man who uttered such words could prosper in this life or the next. Mordecai said that after that, and after some things which he said about the priest, the priest would never look him in the eye, either on the street or in the pulpit.

One of Mordecai's sisters went to a convent for a year. He tells the story in a manuscript before me. He says that when she went to the convent, it was promised that she should be educated; but she was not taught but was kept at hard work, weaving, and forgot much of what she had known before she went to the convent, and, moreover, came home weakened by the hard labor. He said that a new ecclesiastical name was given her, and the priest "slapped a veil on her." Mordecai tells how he went to the convent and brought her away. She later married, but did not live very long, and he said that her convent experience shortened her life.

We have no way of checking up these bitter affirmations. But we see that Mordecai had a passion for writing out his convictions. And all this denunciation of the nuns and the priests and the people of the church must have been hard for Mary Mudd Lincoln to hear.

His mother made efforts to change his mind concerning these matters, and she persuaded her other children; but Mordecai wrote a letter to "The Widow Lincoln and Her Family" declaring his independence.

But except for these matters, Mordecai Lincoln was a good son, and his mother loved him. And she saw that he did not care for women, and knew that she was likely to have him as her support as long as she lived.

It was a hard task which Mary Mudd undertook when, marrying the older Mordecai Lincoln, she endeavored to make good Catholics out of a stock that for generations had been Baptist. The measure of her success should have rewarded her in part for her difficulties. While none of the Lincolns who married Catholic wives became very ardent Catholics, and some of the younger generations revolted, there remains a strong Catholic strain in this branch of the family, and Mary Mudd introduced it.

But she had a hard time with her son Mordecai. He sat by the

fire and wrote long treatises against the Jesuits, and at times he burst forth into violent invective. Some things that he wrote would not look well in this article. And yet, Mordecai had a strain of reverence, and once, not having acknowledged any other religion, and being pressed for a definition of his own position, he said that judged by his own standards, and not by those of the priests whom he hated, he was still a Catholic. It would have gladdened Mary Mudd to know that after all the evil things he said about her religion, he would be buried, as he was, beside her, in consecrated ground. There is a forlorn little old cemetery, a half mile back through fields, where the little Catholic church once stood. Not one stone now stands erect. But in that cemetery Mary Mudd Lincoln and her vehemently protesting son Mordecai lie side by side.

Mordecai was a man of moods. So were nearly all the Lincolns. After the death of his mother, he lived like a hermit. He had a dog and a cat and his books—all the Lincolns managed to have some books, and Mordecai, if not a diligent reader, was a student. He had a great memory. A neighbor loaned him Victor Hugo's great story, and he read it so intently that the characters all became real to him, and he could relate the story almost verbatim.

At times, Mordecai worked with great industry, but he was a Lincoln in the matter of hard work. He was strong, and capable of working, and at times he showed steady industry. But his moods as to labor varied. He did not enjoy labor for its own sake, and there were days when he forsook his work and loafed and told stories, or engaged in acrimonious controversy. His cousin Abraham had a dangerous gift of sarcasm, and at times used it mercilessly; but he learned how to curb it. Mordecai never learned, and he was always ready to stop work and say harsh things about the people and institutions he hated. He liked his lathe, and did his work well. He made wagons and coffins and clothes presses and many other articles. But at times he stopped work and brooded, or went to the woods and was gone for a whole day, hardly speaking to any one he met, but returning in his normal frame of mind.

By fits and starts he visited his neighbors. No one knew when or why he was coming and seldom knew just why he had come. Sometimes he sat and talked politics or religion or neighborhood news. Sometimes he came to curse a neighbor or a relative or to tell his opinion of the priests. Sometimes he would enter a house and take up the violin, and play it, walking the floor, with tears streaming down his cheeks.

Crazy? Not at all. All the Lincolns were odd. No one of them ever went insane. But there ran through the entire family an unstable equilibrium of intellectuality and emotion.

Mordecai Lincoln cultivated flowers, and in that regard was most unlike his cousin Abraham, who said that in such matters, something appeared to have been left out of his nature. Hancock County still has its "Uncle Mord roses" which he propagated. He was fond of fruit, and the Lincoln farms have excellent fruit trees to this day. He had a trick which he liked to play at the Joe Duncan school. He would go there with a bag of big red apples, open the door, and roll an apple to every boy and every girl, carefully saving the biggest and reddest one for the teacher.

With all his cantankerousness, he was a likable man, and had many traits that endeared him to people. And, spite of all his crabbedness toward his mother on account of her religion, he was a good son.

In some of his dark moods, he drank so heavily that his friends were troubled about him. Some of them came to him and advised him to stop drinking. I have a letter written by him August 16, 1853, and it is rather more than possible that it was written to a Protestant minister, but the name is not given. In it Mordecai says:

"As for your hopes or wishes with regard to me, they don't interrupt my mind at all. I clame it as my rite to drink anything I please to drink and by the same rule I clame it as my wright if I think it best for my self to let it alone."

It will be noted that his spelling sometimes was erratic, but this was true of most letters of the period, and his handwriting was good.

Although he drank, and sometimes drank too much, he was not as heavy a drinker as his father, and was not accounted a drunkard.

The exact age of Mordecai I do not have. His parents were married in 1792, and his two older brothers appear to have been born before 1800. They both, and his sister Elizabeth, who married her cousin Ben Mudd, were married before they left Kentucky in 1829, but his two younger sisters were young and unmarried at that time. He was of age, and capable of attending to legal business in 1830, but probably was not much past 21 in that year in which Abraham Lincoln, the future President, came of age. Practically, he was of the age of the President, and in many respects much like him in his mental make-up.

All the Lincolns in Hancock County were men of ability, and their abilities were of the same general kind as those of Abraham

Lincoln. They were capable of close thought and sound logic. They were men given to wit, and like Abraham, had a merciless gift of satire, which he possessed but learned to control. They were men of moods, all of them, the men more than the women, though the women were not free from them.

It is in the matter of these moods we are especially interested. Abraham Lincoln had them. He went from boisterous merriment to depths of gloom, and often without any reason which his associates could assign.

Sentimental writers have no difficulty in accounting for these moods. Lincoln loved Ann Rutledge, so they say, and he almost went insane when she died. After that, he was a changed man. There is good reason to believe that Abraham Lincoln did indeed display great sorrow on the death of Ann Rutledge; but have we any reason to suppose that his grief on her account was the first outbreak of his melancholy? William H. Herndon affirmed that Lincoln was a sad man because he was unhappy in his domestic relations. That Abraham and Mary Lincoln sometimes made each other unhappy is undeniable, but is there any reason to believe that each would not have been more unhappy without the other?

Suppose we undertake to do what no one yet has undertaken, to discover whether Abraham Lincoln was a Lincoln in his mental equipment, and whether these moods were such as other members of his family had? We shall not discover the answer without some labor, but we shall find that not Mordecai only but others of Abraham Lincoln's first cousins and close kin had similar moods. The Mudd family, that by intermarriage descended from Ben Mudd and Elizabeth Lincoln, daughter of the older Mordecai, had "the Lincoln horrors" and called them by that name. "The Lincoln hypo" was a term well understood in the family and by the neighbors. We shall find, if we explore far enough, that we do not need either Ann Rutledge or Mary Todd to account for Lincoln's gloom. Many of the pioneers had it, in greater or less degree, but the Lincoln family as a family were peculiarly addicted to it.

Did Abraham Lincoln know this?

I doubt it. So far as I am aware, Thomas Lincoln was not particularly subject to these fits of depression. Abraham Lincoln was accustomed to think of himself as inheriting more, intellectually, from his mother than his father. He had his father's gray eyes and coarse dark hair, and his father's love of stories and other well-marked traits. But he and Thomas were not wholly alike in their

mental characteristics and he can hardly have been expected to realize how much or little he inherited from the Lincoln side, for practically, he saw no Lincolns. As for the Hankses, he lived among them the entire first half of his life; and his mother seemed to him, as he remembered her dimly from his tenth year, to have been nobly superior to other members of her family, it is little wonder he told Herndon, in 1850, that from her he inherited his ability to think and reason. Would Lincoln have been quite so sure of this if he had known more Lincolns? Would he have said it after he had spent a night with Mord Lincoln, and found in him the keen wit, the capacity for satire, the love of argument, the power of reason, which he found in himself?

That Abraham Lincoln was mentally and physically a Lincoln only those have denied who did not know the Lincolns. John Hay lived not far from them, but did not know them. After the Civil War, Hay retired for a time to his old home in Illinois, and went from it to be Secretary of the Legation at Vienna. He left his home in Warsaw, and he made this record in his diary:

"Rode to Carthage in the same seat with Robert Lincoln, a second cousin of the late President. He is forty-one years old, looks much older. The same eyes and hair the President had—the same tall stature and shambling gait, less exaggerated. Drinks hard, chews ravenously. A rather rough, farmer-looking man. He says the family is about run out. 'We are not a very marrying set.' He is dying of consumption, he said very coolly. There was something startling in the resemblance of the straight thicket of hair, and the grey, cavernous eyes framed in black brows and lashes, to the features of the great dead man."

This Robert was a son of Abraham Lincoln's first cousin, Abraham. He died in Carthage, September 5, 1868, after making a campaign speech for General Grant. He did resemble the great dead man, and so did his brother Hezekiah, and a number of other cousins.

"We are not a very marrying set," said Robert Lincoln to John Hay. He spoke truly. The Lincolns, the men especially, were not highly matrimonial. A very considerable fraction of them did not marry.

"What kind of men were the unmarried Lincolns?" I asked different members of the family and their neighbors. "Were they dissolute men?"

No, they were not dissolute.

"Where they woman-haters?"

"No, except for Uncle Mord. He hated women. The others did not. Indeed, it seemed as if it was because they cared so much for women they were overwhelmed with the thought of marriage."

"That does not sound like a very good reason."

"It may not have been a good reason, but it is more nearly the reason of the Lincolns than any disinclination to marry or any lack of appreciation of the charm of women. They were great admirers of women, but they stopped short of matrimony. But Uncle Mord did not care for women."

"It was no physical disability that kept them from marriage?"

"Not at all. Those who married were generally happy in their married life. There was not a single divorce among them. Most of them had good-sized families. But they had some strange feeling of the solemnity of marriage that held them back."

I have too many friends in Springfield, Illinois, to raise at this point the question whether Abraham Lincoln and Mary Todd set more than one date for their wedding, and whether Abraham Lincoln ran away from his own wedding. But Abraham Lincoln, who, as I believe, sincerely loved and greatly admired Mary Todd, and had loved several women before he met her, shrank from marriage. There was no physical disability in his case. His first son was born within a year, and after that there was a new baby once in two years until there were four children. Why did the Lincoln men shrink from marriage?

I think the disabilities were wholly mental. They grew out of the caution, the contemplative nature, the moodiness of the family, concerning which I have collected a good deal of information, all of it new to students.

This study opens doors for a number of interesting inquiries. For the first time we are in position to make a study of the mind of Abraham Lincoln as a Lincoln. We have some material, a good deal of it, indeed, toward a comparative analysis of Lincoln's temperament in the light of his inheritance. And some one, possibly the present writer, will go further toward such a study. It will stop a vast quantity of cheap sentimentality which has no scientific basis, and some alleged scientific study which is futile and misleading because we have not had the facts.

But now I must tell you a secret, and I do it under seal of confidence. This is the secret:

Mordecai Lincoln was not a woman-hater

I think he really cared for Patsy, the girl in Kentucky whom he kissed good-bye one night and never saw again, but he was afraid of marriage. He was never afraid of anything else, man, woman, pope or devil—he defied them all: but he was afraid of marriage. And from that time on they said he was a woman-hater. Read this:

"My Favorite Girl, Elizabeth:

"I can call you by no other name in my heart but My Favorite Girl. The first time I ever saw you in my life, my mind was filled with the site of your person, but such was the circumstances in my life that I thought it better for me never to see you or any other girl that there was any likelihood of my becoming so greatly attached too. But by that means I have added fuel to the flame that is burning in my bosom. . . . I believe that I now see a fairer prospect before me than I have beheld for 7 or 8 years; and if you could be as willing to risk me as I am to undertake, the time would not be far ahead till a great portion of all my time in business would be employed in trying to render you as happy as possible in this life. Elizabeth, I naturally hone for your company here with me, but when I look around you are not here. All that I can do is to nourish and cherish my strongest wishes for the welfare and happiness of the object of my affections.

"Affectionately yours,

"MORDECAI LINCOLN."

He went to Nauvoo or Carthage and bought tinted paper for this letter. It must have been a rarity: the shade is robin's egg blue. He wrote out his love in this fashion.

And he lost courage, and did not send the letter.

He continued to be known as Mord Lincoln, the woman-hater.

The years passed by. His mother died, and he was alone in the house with his dog and cat and books and lathe and his paper and ink. He was more than fifty years of age, a sour, moody and at times very angry man, and a confirmed woman-hater. So they all said. But on November 2, 1862, he wrote a letter which began "Dear Catherine." She was a school teacher, and had been slandered, and Mord had risen to defend her good name. He did it, if his letter is to be trusted, like a knight rushing in to smite down the hand that would be lifted to stain the name of a lady. And when he had done all this, he offered her his hand.

He was not sure that she would accept him. He wanted her "the worst of anything" and he made one small request. If she could

not accept him, let her think now and then of him; for he thought always of her.

Apparently he mailed this letter, giving it to his niece, Emily Lincoln, to take to the post office at Fountain Green, and what I have is his penciled first copy. Doubtless he copied it in ink.

This is where the story stops, and you may supply the rest of it as you like. I find no answering letter from Catherine, nor any record that indicates that she returned his love.

No wonder. By that time he was counted an old man, and was crotchety and moody and his habits were planted and grown. Catherine was a school teacher, and could do better, and probably did. But this old letter serves to show that even Mord Lincoln, the Woman Hater, was not as consistent in that hatred as some people thought him to be. It is easy to be a woman-hater, but few men are able to do it consistently. Mordecai Lincoln was thought to be one of the few; and you know more about it now than did his neighbors. Most men, it may be believed, at some period in life, have renounced women and all their works; but this world is not so constituted as to make it easy for a man to maintain that attitude forever. With a procession of attractive women forever passing down the pike, it is hard for a man to live very long in this world and maintain a steady and unswerving hatred for women.

I was not born when Abraham and Mordecai Lincoln had their one visit at Fountain Green, and therefore was not present. I greatly regret this delinquency on my own part, for I should like to tell what these men said to each other about women. Although I was not there, I have some ideas with regard to the matter, and I give them for whatever they are worth.

Both Abraham and Mordecai were reticent men. They did not talk lightly of the things that were closest to their hearts. But they were interested in each other, and in each other's affairs, and in their common heritage as representative of the Lincoln family. They told each other, I think, about the migration of the Lincoln family from Virginia to Kentucky, and Abraham was eager to learn what Mordecai had heard from his father, who was a lad of fifteen at the time while Abraham's father Thomas was only six. They rehearsed the story of the murder of their grandfather, Abraham Lincoln, by an Indian, and how Mordecai's father, Mordecai, took deliberate aim through one of the cracks in the cabin wall and shot the Indian dead. They talked of their cousins, the children of Josiah, who had removed to Indiana, and of the children of their

aunts, some of them in Kentucky and others in Missouri. And they surely talked a little about their own family life. Abraham was married and the father of four sons, three of them living and dearly beloved by him. Mordecai was, as we know, a bachelor, with no prospect of being anything else.

I wonder if Abraham asked Mordecai why he had lived his lonely life unmarried, and whether Mordecai told him that he had once come near to marrying a girl in Kentucky, but when the time approached his courage failed. And I wonder if Abraham said, "I, too, experienced a strange and unreasonable timidity as I saw my wedding-day approaching. I did not marry until I was thirty-three, and sometimes think it was almost a miracle that I married when I did."

I wonder if Mordecai, with his habit of doing the unexpected, said to Abraham, "But don't you find it a constant annoyance? Women are such unreasonable creatures; is it not a bother to have to live with one of them?"

And Abraham might have answered, "Women have their weak points, Cousin, and so have we men. Mary and I have our ups and downs, and our occasional disagreements. She has a hot temper, and I am an awkward fellow and often do things that are annoying. Still, we love each other, and we have our common hopes and ambitions, and we have our boys. I am glad I found courage to get married, though for a long time it was matter of profound wonder to me that it ever could have happened."

Some such conversation as this might have happened between the two men, and I do not think anyone can prove that words like these were not actually spoken by these two cousins to each other.

Abraham Lincoln went on his way, speaking practically every day, and meeting his three remaining appointments for joint discussion with Douglas. Mordecai went back to his bench, and made his spinning wheels and coffins. But as he worked, I wonder if he did not say to himself:

"My cousin Abraham and I are much alike in many respects. We look alike: we think and write and speak alike. And both of us admire women, and each of us had his strange shrinking from marriage. But Abraham found courage to go forward, and now he has something to live for, a wife and three boys; and I am lonely Mord Lincoln with no one to care. I wish I had married Patsy and not made such a fool of myself. For, in spite of what the neighbors think of me, I am a very unsuccessful woman-hater."

DOUBT, PRESUMPTION AND THE OPEN MIND

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

IT IS always in order to defend "philosophic doubt," or the right to criticize and re-examine accepted views and theories. We too often assume that settled questions stay settled; that, for example, the battle, or campaign, in behalf of toleration and free inquiry was won long ago and need never be renewed, and that, therefore, bigotry and obscurantism, though rife at times, constitute no serious menace to liberalism and civilization. Alas, the situation is not nearly so satisfactory. The Klu-Klux-Klan, the not wholly unsuccessful assaults of the self-styled fundamentalists and Bryanites on the doctrine of evolution (which they misconceive, by the way) and like symptoms bid us beware of an excessive optimism. No; science and philosophic doubt are not as safe as they are supposed to be; eternal vigilance is the price of intellectual as of civil liberty. Any reasoned plea, therefore, for philosophic doubt is still useful, relevant and educational.

But it is the fashion nowadays to preach and boast of the right of doubt in another than the philosophical sense. A new periodical has recently been started to uphold the general right to doubt and question everything. It is explained that the editors of this review are not "radicals" in politics or economics; they are, however, great, unterrified doubters. They are free from superstition; they take nothing for granted; they stand for the open mind; they have no respect for mere authority. They demand proof, facts, demonstrations in support of any and all theories and doctrines, whether new or old.

Curiously enough, there are hosts of shallow persons who applaud this supposedly bold, courageous, independent position. Is it not, we are asked, eminently rational, scientific, noble? Does not every real *savant* carefully verify his theories and conscientiously

examine all new facts presented to him? Why, then, should politics, ethics, sociology and economics frown on the gospel of doubt?

Those who ask such questions as these have little comprehension of the methods and procedure of science or philosophy.

Let us take some illustrations. We have today a new theory regarding the structure and composition of the atom. This theory may or may not withstand criticism and further research. We accept it, of course, provisionally. No one challenges our right to question the theory, to offer objections thereto, if we have any. But the handling of material things is not affected by our freedom to doubt. We don't say, "Stop all activity because we are not certain our theory as to the atom is true." We should regard that person as feeble-minded who should argue that we cannot cross bridges, live in houses, ride in trains or motor cars, because, forsooth, the atom is not a solid bit of matter, but a "center of force," a miniature solar system!

Again, Professor Einstein's relativity theory, which is so revolutionary in an intellectual sense, may or may not be finally established by adequate observations and tests. Meantime, Doctor Einstein himself assures the practical man that to him the ultimate fate of relativity will "make no difference." Practice, in short, is not affected by scientific doubts concerning relativity. If it were, Doctor Einstein would be the first to demand adherence to accepted ideas pending production of conclusive proof.

Finally, there is the old biological controversy regarding the transmissibility of "acquired characters." The majority of contemporary biologists affirm that "heredity is everything" and the influence of environment is comparatively slight. There is no substantial evidence, we are told, in favor of the view that acquired characters, physical or mental, are inherited. Are we, therefore, asked to abandon all efforts to *improve* the environment? Are we exhorted to pin our faith to eugenics alone, and proceed to develop a finer and better race? By no means. No level-headed biologist or sociologist lightly dismisses the factors of environment, education, social discipline, tradition.

In the absence of certainty, conclusive proof, what does the wise man do? He acts upon probability, upon presumption, upon empirical knowledge and common sense. He knows that dogma is dogma; theory, theory, and probability just probability. But life cannot be arrested and activity suspended while we await the establishment of truth in any given sphere.

Now, the superficial defenders of the right to doubt and challenge everything accepted and recognized tacitly assume, if they not definitely assert, that *to entertain a doubt is to acquire the privilege of rejecting any law, rule, arrangement concerning which the doubt is raised by them.* The freedom of inquiry, discussion, criticism is identified with the freedom of action in ways that civilized society with virtual unanimity regards as immoral and injurious.

For example, let us consider the apologies for Bolshevik tyranny and Bolshevik persecution of all opponents which many of our Liberals and Radicals have been solemnly making. Democracy, we are told, is breaking down and parliamentary government is a snare and a mockery. The world is turning to dictatorships—look at Italy under Mussolini, at Spain under the military regime of Primo-Rivera, at France under Poincaré. The party system is giving way to the group and bloc system; thoughtful persons are advocating the abolition of political parties and the substitution for them of temporary, limited, loose "leagues" for the promotion of definite objects. In these circumstances why make a fuss when the Russian communists destroy the "bourgeois" fabric of civil liberty, due process of law, representative institutions, universal suffrage, and free speech? The soviet regime, with its despotic features, *may* prove to be superior to the obsolescent systems cherished by the "doctrinaire" individualists or moderate Laborites and Socialists of the type now in control of the British empire. Why not give the Russian experiment a fair trial? Why not observe it with an open mind? Why not be objective, tolerant and lenient toward the Bolshevik departures from tradition and habit?

Of course, this line of argument is childishly fallacious, yet it is adopted in all seriousness by self-styled exponents of the gospel of political doubt and skepticism!

Political and social science is still in its infancy, and, of course, experiments in government are not only legitimate but necessary. Let the soviet system be tried fairly; let even communism receive fair play; but fair play does not require any honest, sincere, intelligent liberal or radical to condone or justify Bolshevik savagery, terror, and ruthless suppression of every vestige of liberty and democracy! When the communist dictators, with their bloodthirsty checka, were guilty of excesses worse than those of absolute autocracy; when they imprisoned, exiled and executed men and women who had fought czarism and other evils for years, it became the duty and right of every true, consistent lover of justice and liberty to

denounce them as usurpers and traitors. No amount of "open-mindedness" of the right sort can possibly lead any one to apologize for flagrant and monstrous injustice or to overlook glaring, riotous repudiation of first principles. Open-mindedness is not empty-mindedness, or total want of consistency and good faith.

Here is another illustration: The institution of private property has evolved and is still evolving. The conception of private property is not—and never has been—a rigid one. Do these facts warrant theft or embezzlement on the part of "open-minded" persons? Does any rational thinker entertain a plea of doubt or open-mindedness in regard to private property when advanced by a willful thief? What the future will do with private property may be a matter of doubt; for the time being we expect—all of us, not excepting sane communists—respect for private property, as for public property, from all members of society. Even revolutionary governments sternly forbid and punish "private expropriation," that is, looting, which is attempted sometimes in the name of some professed doctrine or relief.

We may say the same thing about other social, economic and political institutions. We may believe that the family is bound to undergo important changes, but this would not justify any rational person in disregarding present obligations toward his wife, or children, and throwing his burdens upon the community or his neighbors and friends. We may believe that education is very inadequate, but this would not warrant total neglect or abandonment of existing educational and research agencies. We may believe that the wage system will be supplanted in the course of some centuries by a more satisfactory and more equalitarian and libertarian system; meantime, as reasonable beings, we expect employers, managers, superintendents, foremen, workers and workers' spokesmen to consult reason and common sense in disposing of the hundred and one issues that constantly arise within the sphere of industrial relations.

But, it may be asked, what of the right insisted upon by Thoreau and other earnest and high-minded radicals—the right of "civil disobedience?" Is not the superior individual, whose reason and conscience are offended or outraged by accepted laws and standards, entitled to break such laws, trample upon such standards? Have not heroic and self-sacrificing men and women always defied and violated law in obedience to a higher moral conception? What of the Hampdens, the John Browns, the religious martyrs, the political and social heretics we now honor and revere? And is not the

example of such pioneers, leaders, rebels inspiring and compelling—one of the important factors, indeed, of progress? How can we preach to the young men and women of today blind, unreasoning obedience to law and convention because of alleged presumptions and probabilities in favor of such law and convention when history tells them that revolt by individuals and small groups of advanced thought and exceptional moral independence has made for reform and evolution in the past?

These queries are pertinent and important, and one must answer them candidly. Certainly the law may lag behind the moral sentiment and enlightened opinion of a nation, or section of a nation—witness the American conflict over the extension of slavery and the rigid enforcement of anti-fugitive slave laws. Certainly taxation may be oppressive, confiscatory, unfair, and government may become corrupt, tyrannical and imbecile. In such circumstances there is a duty of civil disobedience and there is a right to revolt. Nay, in a free state there is no escaping the conclusion that when conscience and moral duty clash with formal law, the latter must yield to the former. The statute books are full, and always have been, of so-called dead-letter laws which are honored in the breach rather than in the observance—which public opinion has outgrown and forgotten, and which no rational government would attempt to revive and enforce for a day. Laws are often annulled or repealed by custom and general evasion and violation. The so-called general property tax laws of our American states may be cited as one current and striking illustration of this truth. Everywhere intangible personal property escapes taxation, and everywhere governors, legislatures, assessors and prosecutors bow to the inevitable and treat the law as a dead letter.

But one must be perfectly sure that a law is unjust, obsolete, unreasonable, unwise and unenforceable before one decides to ignore or break it. The appeal to reason and conscience in such a case must be sincere, real, frank. The trouble with many social insurgents is that they mistake personal prejudices for convictions, inconveniences selfishly resented for high moral sentiments outraged, and that self-indulgence is mistaken for devotion to principle. In the name of philosophic doubt unstable and unscrupulous men demand the privilege of disregarding restraints imposed by moral decency, by the consensus of reasonable opinion, by respect for human dignity and social solidarity.

The true man of science is never dogmatic. He may frame

working theories, but he does not mistake them for established truth. He will adhere to his theory only so long as the facts sustain it. If new facts or new interpretations of known facts, throw doubt upon his theory, he will thenceforth treat it as doubtful and seek further light. He will welcome, instead of resenting, additional evidence, whether it tends to support or to undermine his theory.

There is, of course, no reason why economic, political, social and ethical questions should be dealt with in any other than the humble, tentative, scientific way. But science is not at war with common sense. It does not require us to be gullible, patient with manifest absurdity, willing to abandon positions taken after profound study and reflection and lightly swallow cock-and-bull stories. Prof. T. H. Huxley, for example, refused to devote time to the psychical research of his day on the ground that "inherent probability" militated against the worth or value of familiar "proofs" of spirit communication with the living—table rappings, medium trances, and the like. His mind, he protested, was not closed to real evidence; but he did not propose to waste his energy and valuable time on futile investigations. To engage in such investigations on slight pretexts is not to exhibit open-mindedness and tolerance, but rather to write one's self down as weakly amiable and wanting in discrimination. There is a time for inquiry, a time for suspending judgment, a time for revising a view, and a time for holding fast to that which has been tested and demonstrated to be true.

If science and philosophy must beware of undue conservatism, of pride of opinion, of arrogance, it must also beware of flabbiness, of superficiality, of excessive generosity to quacks and fools.

The proper study of mankind is perhaps man; but the indispensable preliminary study or discipline is logic and the correct use of words to express real ideas instead of pseud-ideas. The besetting sin of our age is loose thinking and loose writing. Persons who revolt against everything accepted in ethics, economics and sociology should be reminded of their inconsistency in not doubting their doubts, in not cultivating an open mind in respect of the results of earnest labor and reflection in the past, and of the teachings of vital experience. In their sweeping rejections they forget such principles as probability, presumption, preponderance of evidence, legitimate inference, and the like. Nothing is more futile, and nothing more impossible, *au fond*, to the rational human mind than universal skepticism. No science was ever born of or advanced by such an attitude toward the world.

MYSTICISM AND MAGIC

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND

TODAY, just as it was in Balzac's or Nietzsche's day, the world is full of mediocre Christianity and gregarious Christians, religionists seeking the niches of saints through the tactics of vulgarians and philistines. If their religious spirit was not weak and worldly their flesh would not be so willing to join in the ribald jubilee of jazz triumphant; nor would they find it necessary to develop that herd instinct which is used to replace a higher faculty's development—mystic exaltation and spiritual communion. The modern age is seemingly set on that specious spiritualization of sensuality and commercialism which stops at nothing too sacred for spoliation, nothing too noble for debasement, and nothing too pure for adulteration or ravagement. This fake anagogy, this sham social uplift and phoney religious hypothecation, in practically every modern effort toward valid theological hypotheses, is the very antithesis and ultimate nemesis of both spirit and spiritual religion. It makes much over the delinquent delicacies of decadent art, the popularity of problem-plays, sex literature, Sadist love-science and matrimonial bliss, but wholly lacks the mystic faculty, energy and ambition which alone can secure us in an actual spiritual triumph and a consequent moral hegemony over the world's physical despotism and materialistic slavery.

There is no coward's valor, no sophist irenic, no philosophy by magic nor fiat science wherewith to obscure the issue, for we do not intend to be seduced by the rewards nor frightened by the punishments held imminently over our heads by a lot of sacerdotal soothsayers. Our one chief conviction and confessional finds the only valid source of spiritual security now and hereafter in the simple fact that man was meant to stand erect by his own volition and effort, not meant to be eternally propped up like a straw man with

external threats and penalties, seductions and rewards. It is no sign of virtue or spiritual achievement to always require the bolstering of outside discipline and dispensations, for these are cold institutional measures and do not function as direct congenial aspirations toward divine communion and enlightenment. True mysticism is spiritual exaltation and is not gotten like material acquisitions by addition from the outside world, but by inward effort, integrity and expression of soul. It has no magic formula for realizing spiritual truth or benediction, but rests its final goal on the merit of industry, the courage of faith, the innocence of piety and the *con amore* desire to live the life of Nature and know by direct contact and willing submission the laws of God and Cosmos.

Christianity is too often a negative religion; it is more often a vague and indeterminate renunciation of this world's duties and devotions than an intentional and whole-hearted embracing of whatever life awaits us in the next. It is also negative of humanity's best achievements because of its seeking to preserve the weak, helpless, afflicted, ignorant and foolish; in fact, it is really negative of the best possibilities of human life when it insists on limiting the genius and energy of exceptional personalities in order to maintain its mediocre ideal of a commonwealth of creed-foolish gregarians. It would set up a soft sort of artificial polity to replace the hard genuine provisions of Nature, and this negation of Nature is what will eventually prove its failure as a durable religion making perennial and priceless contributions to the world's future progress. It already effects but little persuasion on men of other mood or caliber than those of imbeciles and prebendary saints. Mystics, on the other hand, are neither conceited nor stupid, neither dogmatic nor negative in matters religious; they have no weak mercy nor maudlin sympathy for things worldly nor for delinquent people, for if these are corrupt they are to be shunned, while if they are malicious they are to be rendered harmless. Mystics have no sham ethics to hold them in emotional leash, and certainly no magic social hypothesis to give them a neurotic sense of freedom and happiness. Whenever they read the Old or New Testament they keep a good clear discrimination between the two gospels, appreciating the former for its patterns of human justice and the latter for its vicarious promise of Divine Mercy; but they read no external combination of Grace and Vicary into the Scripture that is now printed and published in a single binding—this being as ambiguous and misrepresentative of the original chroniclers' intentions as the Pocket Bibles which Cromwell

distributed amongst his soldiers, the so-called Murderers' Bible, or the Sunna exegesis of Zoroaster's creed.

Many people are forever seeking some magic solution to their problems, some easy exit out of the struggle for a worthwhile life. They pursue a morbid patronage of mediums, fortune-tellers, soothsayers and other Nature-fakers who loudly advertise their claims to superhuman faculty, but little actual foresight or sincere advice is ever derived from this lazy pseudolatry. From the narrow wicket and cramped casement of their rhyomistic resort it is no wonder that they see only an increasing measure of misery, toil and trouble in the growing complexity of civilization, in the anxiety of modern restlessness and industrial revolts, in the very seductions contained in the new barbarism of liberty and its vulgar bed-fellow, sexual unrestraint and promiscuity, easy marriage and easy divorce. There are only two castes in the modern world, mystics and vulgarians; everyone is either a God-seeker or a world-seeker, either devout and saintly, wise and just, or else cunning and corrupt, ignorant and selfish. It is the business of moralists and social workers to distinguish them and try to give the spiritually poor something besides part of the rich man's pelf. The common instincts of religion do not sense this difference but mystics have the necessary clarity of vision, sympathy of feeling and chastity of judgment to understand why the vulgarians are interested in freedom more than in discipline, in recreation more than in restraint, and yet not be a companion to their debauchery nor be seduced by their fallacious bribe-tactics. Perhaps the most surprising feature of the whole vulgarian program is that your foolish worldling follows daily this looseness of moral fibre and still expects to avoid ultimate disaster; he spends his life gaming and expects to always win the last trick with extreme unction and viaticums to heaven. Whatever moral or religious distinctions he does happen to offer in an argument or other expression of his mental outlook are invariably based on values derived from *below*, from the downtrodden, the poor, the weak, the helpless derelicts of society. The fabric of the vulgarian's philosophy is coarse and shows many broken stitches, many faded and often ugly splotches on the design. Too much freedom and self-determination will prevent anyone from being humble, devout, sensible of spiritual things or mindful of the mystic phases of life and livelihood. The vulgarian always thinks some sort of magic formula is at the bottom of his success or failure, but the mystic knows that life's only art and magic consists in a conscientious attention to duty, a courageous

approach toward all problems and situations, a clear and readily applicable sense of beauty, virtue, wisdom, justice and generosity.

There is no magic door into any of the good things of life; no clever ruse ever fooled Nature into giving up her secrets or dropping her blessings promiscuously among the good and bad. We cannot find anywhere an effective sesame with whose power to charm we can pass instantly into either vocational success or a virtuous life, nor can we find that secret elixir which can in a twinkling give us strength of soul and purity of heart and with these, courage to love and intelligence to learn the truth. These are, true enough, the constant aims and aspirations of mystics the same as they are the ever-present test conditions demanded by philosophers in any life claiming to be religious and devout. With the sophist vulgarian, on the other hand, they are valued automorphically and judged to be merely the shrewd counters against the crass catchwords of finite interests, worldliness and their less innocent propaganda. If some of us didn't give endless voice in preachment of the good and by our own example show the proper sort of emotional response to the inspiration of heroism, justice, courage, beauty and genius, the world in no time would become a veritable hogwallow, if not a desolate vale of ravaging knaves and gullible fools. It is the exemplary function of mysticism to forestall the ignorant superstition that a good life is won by magic or that spiritual rehabilitation may be realized by miracle or mimicry. A certain amount of honest effort, persistence and idealism is necessary, but without some degree of noble spirituelle and kindly disposition to start with, little and but slow progress upward can be made.

In those classical anticipations of pragmatism which felt no anxieties over ideas, opinions and value-judgments so long as these continued to give men happy moods or share with them some mysterious power over life and progress we can read no little measure of shrewd ethical device, for their principal function was the more or less direct ordering of men into social relations with each other. No one seemed to object to false notions or self-sought religions so long as these were useful, well-argued or preservative of past tradition; but they did object strongly whenever anyone attempted to challenge their vital lies and fallacies. Some such a similar condition is necessary for any sort of pragmatic religion to take root and flourish; there must be a general tenor of cupidity among the people, a popular approval of whatever is foolish, ephemeral, promiscuous and illusory. It is fashionable to be low-aiming and mercenary,

trusting to luck and placing faith in whatever magic formula happens to be the most loudly advertised. Just now we are passing through an age of irresponsible rhyomism, everyone appears to be hellbent on some pet fallacy of will, some private perquisite of power, some personal adventure patterned after the wild opportunism of Fortunatus. No wonder there are so many pragmatic sponsors of religion, so many clever manipulators of rewards and retributions. But the situation is not unique; there have been a thousand previous vulgarian ages at certain intervals in the world's past history, and nearly every one of them has been a dismal repetition of its predecessor.

The situation that is unique is revealed when we think of the occasional flourish of philosophy, how the world manages to forget its mad folly long enough to now and then produce an age rich in righteousness and reflection, an age of justice, honor, sincerity, courage and reverence. Then it is that we find a fair number of saints, sages, heroes and geniuses who know how to think with clear vision and free faculty, who have intelligent faith and soon grow impatient with the crude fallacies of creed and deed which surround them. They have no manufactured pedigree because their true ancestry is all the struggles, hopes, thoughts, dreams and disappointments of humanity's past experience. They have no artificial pose to strike, no magic formula to apply, for their ambition is sincere and they play fair tourney in winning life and livelihood from the world. This is one good reason why they are often misunderstood by the multitude which confuses them with those no higher souled than their own vulgarian companions or with those no more exalted or devout than the average rabble-ranter. The general mass of people never come in contact with anyone but fools and fakers, knaves and nincompoops, so we shouldn't wonder at them when they look on philosophers and saints also as so many Cagliostroes and spiritual rat-catchers.

I feel quite fertile whenever a discussion is raised as to the relationship, even the dependence, of a man's religion to his interest in such subjects as Art, History, Science, Mvsticism, Government, Philosophy and Social Efficiency. I believe that whatever religious faith a man professes as well as the one he actually practices is vitally influenced if not almost wholly determined, by the amount of study or the degree of understanding he has of the principles and purposes of these great domains of human achievement. They are items in our cultural progress, our spiritual enlightenment and exaltation, so

why should they not be among the principal interests of anyone desiring to be religious and intelligent himself, or at least have a tolerant understanding of reverence and wisdom in others? Not being accomplished in *either* of these talents he is certainly a dunce and makes an unprofitable mate as well as a boorish companion.

True genius does not resort to things fantastical, false, mythical, uncertain or extreme in his attempt to work out a valid symbolism of life and art. It is the function of genius, the same as it is the purpose of art, to disprove and repudiate these very things, to certify the beautifully good and true in such a way as to inspire and teach others. It is only cynics like Nietzsche or La Rochefoucauld who regard art and religion as subtle narcotics to make us forget our cares and woes. *Some* consolation against this view may be had in remembering that other narcotic addicts like De Quincey, Coleridge and Poe have found more honorable security in art and religion than in the petty umbrage of a cynic philosophy. This phase of the question concerning magic and artifice in one's religious outlook cannot be ignored and evaded with empty cavilling or catch-worded ridicule. It is *live* enough to demand our attention and interesting enough to delight us with the advantage of understanding what it means. The mystic philosopher is no free-lance postichee, he works no magic tricks on his fellows, he is never the cheap miracle-monger who is forever spoliating the temple and obtaining an easy livelihood through his clever but fallacious manipulations. Instead of this he is a genius of genuine capacity, his unique nature is of noble origin and his loyal affections last through a lifetime. It is not because of fear, laziness or egotism that he often retires to a quiet refuge from the world, but because his superior spiritual powers reveal the utter vanity of worldly effort, the utter futility of all ephemeral aims and conflicts. His life then bears no petty spite or spoil, it does not exist for base utility or ease, but for the nobler cause of spiritual refinement, mystic exaltation and philosophic reverie. He understands the true purpose of individuality, that it is the door to destiny, that its value is symbolic and its function is constructive, that its ultimate aim is to realize progressive transfiguration and its only justification is its power for happiness, for a wholesome life redeemed from meanness, folly, sin, mediocrity and the semi-animal poverty of our souls. The whole procedure is bound by a sense of piety and justice, feeling always responsible for what is done as well as accountable for what is not done. It is this piety perhaps which is the only really religious teaching which can be derived from mysti-

cism, but without it Christianity itself would be in need of salvation.

Religion may be of the Medici, the Grammatici, Physici or Mystici, but it is as Prof. Gilbert Murray so charmingly shows, a poor *religio* if it does not "free us from imprisonment in the rancor and wreck of the external present." Its aim is spiritual salvage and its method is heroic sacrifice, renunciation and intelligent self-control. The general attitude is one of reverence and responsibility, aspiration and sympathy with Nature, God and the Cosmic Consciousness. Pure religion is essentially a lifetime search for some means of establishing communication between man's mind, nature and experience with those divine existences which we call Nature, God, the Universe. It was the clear vision of this possibility and ideal achievement which inspired all the great saints and mystic philosophers of antiquity; it encouraged their speculations on divine things and ennobled their dealings with their fellow-men. It was a recognized fact which gave both foundation and validation to the mystic realism of Plato's ideal types and Spinoza's eternal forms; it is the constant cementing element giving coherence and inter-functional relation to Doctor Wallace's hierarchy of demi-gods and angels, cell-souls and exalted spiritual agencies. Many and various religions throughout the world's past history have found unity at least on this one feature of cosmic emotion, reverence and mystic exaltation. Among them may be mentioned those esoteric cults of theurgy and theosophy, Mithraic magic and Kaaba lore, mystic ecstasy and Neoplatonism, doctrines of creation and redemption such as Chaldean cosmogony and Logos-power, Gnostic Demiurgos and Byzantine Eucharist, oriental meditations and occidental industry.

The actual trend of religious progress and enlightenment has been away from miracles and magic toward normal experience and honest achievement. It has been a slow and laborious culture of man's soul, his mind and heart; not a sudden mysterious transfiguration or wheedler's promise of vicarious merit. It has been a natural process of time and effort, not a mythical emprise after imaginary golden fleeces. One of the first impulses toward religious feeling and aspiration was when some shaggy anthropoid began to wonder what made the stars shine or why the sun made him feel warm; then, after untold ages of vague observations, weird wonderings, superstitions and fetich-worship, the ancient peoples became self-conscious and adopted a veneration of heroes, tribal leaders and medicine men which soon gave rise to philosophies of man-made postulates and automorphic predications, to social theories of class, occu-

pation, government, customs and creeds. Two examples of what was perhaps the world's most unique program of mysticism are to be found existing contemporaneously in India and Greece during the days of ancient glory. Without making any close sectarian distinctions we find that there was a general practice and ritual built up in ancient India on the religious significance of a meditative asceticism which renounced all physical activity whether good or bad and which was supposed to give one power over the natural law of Karma which meant that one was enabled to evade the pernicious cycle of fate and all attachment to the seductions of sentient existence. Not only did the Hindus aim to free themselves from the vain exigencies of the external present, but they even went so far as to propose repudiation of the whole process and procurement of worldly life. In contemporary Greece we find the Eleusinian Mysteries offering their astonished devotees, who were usually erratic of mind if not erotic in emotion, a more or less enigmatic program of intellectual mystification under which (the flesh being willing and the spirit weak) was also given a teasing taste of emotional persuasion. The ultimate creed aimed at was a shrewd device of oracular manipulation whose only spirit and courage for good found expression in a specious ambiguity of advice which aimed to secure political power at a time when several states were jockeying for leadership in Greek sovereignty. In reality they were the feminine cults centering around the worship of Persephone and derived from the Egyptian cults of Isis; thus acting as correlatives to the masculine cults (Dionysaic Mysteries) centering around the Bacchanalian hedonism which Orpheus brought over from the Egyptian devotees to Horus. Very few of their rites were either religiously devout in the strict sense or sensually pure in the latitudinarian sense, and we should not reveal our own corrupt persuasion by considering them less devoted to cheap magic than to a hard-won sincerity in spiritual purity and mystic exaltation. Greek talent was more worldly than that of the ascetic Hindus.

Is it not a strange coincidence and commentary on our modern situation to find that among those who seek to minimize and extenuate religious fallacy and hypocrisy are reverend gentlemen hiding behind sackcloth frocks and rosaries de Cluny? How can a confessed casuist like Hastings Rashdall admit that the plain truth is not always the highest propriety and yet claim to be devout and loyal to a creed which frowns on all mischief and mendacity? Non-committal assent to a falsehood will sooner or later prove to be culp-

able of greater wrong whether at the time found formal and literal or active and intentional. Neither casuist nor formulist can work up an eclectic relish for all that is good in even the major religions of the world, and still have such high respect for his petty "reservations" that he practically repudiates his cumulative credo. Twenty years ago an Anglican majority refused to change the Rubric, and although admitting a vast moral chaos in their own ranks, still decided to continue groping about their cavern of hypocrisy until such time as Divine Guidance chose to succor them.

A really welcome relief is to be had in the revival of Doctor Browne's practical interpretation in his *Religio Medici*. This revival appears in Canning Schiller's acceptance of Christianity as "an essentially human product like any other social phenomenon; it is a thoroughly pragmatic religion in which faith and reason perform mutually serviceable functions showing us that we must hold fast to the principle that the truest religion is the one which issues in and fosters the noblest life." Schiller's great friend and mentor, Wm. James, was another who looked at religion through similar spectacles and saw a similar sort of spiritual utility as its only valid excuse for taking up so much of our time and attention. In many ways like that famous neo-Spinozan who subscribed neither to casuist hypocrisy nor to formulist fantacism (Haeckel), James loved Nature and Nature's code, whence he affected no artificial theology because he had natural talent and a lovable character, and where these are neither artifice nor theology can long endure. There was nothing tender-minded about James' scientific temperament; he advocated a *tough* sort of mystic attitude which was able to doubt miraculous traditions and champion the possibility of plural religious situations at a time when literal theology and personal idealism were dividing the specious honors of a mutually eristic controversy.

Professors Royce was another protégé of William James. In "a constructive approach to the philosophy of religion" in his two great series of Gifford Lectures entitled, "The World and the Individual," he seeks to interpret Reality and Divine Being in a way that will solve the dilemma set forth in Bradley's "Appearance and Reality." Life is essentially the struggle to establish some sort of external validity for our spiritual outlook, our ideas and our talents, our wills and aspirations. That for the first or intellectual group is proven by the success or advantage of scientific discovery and invention, engineering projects and material achievements; that for the second or religio-moral group is proven by the *balance* of edu-

cation, social service, altruistic welfare, personal integrity and spiritual exaltation. Honesty in either mystic or pragmatic religion means that the motive or purpose behind our conduct qualifies the moral product of our activity as being acceptable to social justice and welfare, in the same way that the meaning or significance behind ideas validates them to take part in the intellectual content and philosophical tendency of our thoughts and plans. These also are the ultimate grounds on which to decide the good or evil of an action as well as the truth or fallacy of an idea. Religion and morality, science and philosophy, start with these first principles and erect their common barriers against man's mischief, folly, debauchery and delusion. Intelligent and purposive action, like discerning and teleological thought, is capable of realizing its aim only when and because it is grounded in reality and keeps company with truth and goodness. Both, in order to be whole and wholesome, to be of advantage to the individual and of benefit to society, must consider the three essential aspects of life; the supreme Sovereignty of God, the unity of the Universe or natural world, and the integrity of human personality. As Lotze once said, there is no universal integrity if we look on everything as separated or as lost from God. Religion is the emotional response while philosophy is the intellectual content to be found in our experience of these three orders of reality. While the laws and loves of the natural world share the same justice and inexorableness as those of the divine, we often find that the human spiritual world is plastic and appreciable enough to allow for a variety of interpretations, novel situations, spontaneity and initiative, numerous delicate variations and expressions of that piety and virtue which responds to law, that love and heroism which looks on beauty, truth and goodness with all the devout emotion of religious faith. Contrast and identity, plurality and unity, strife and harmony, sin and sobriety, iniquity and integrity—these are but different aspects of the ever-present conflict and antithesis between the ephemeral and the eternal, the finite and the infinite, the artificial and the real, the false and the true. And when we err in placing our confidence in the illusory rewards instead of the actual principles and duties of life, we cannot fail to be also wicked, miserable, ignorant, selfish and corrupt. And with these as sources to our further failure and unhappiness we are mad and vengeful because our petty purposes have been thwarted and overcome by others more ruthless or more diabolically determined. The whole finite scheme of falsehood, ignorance, pettiness, rhyomism and revenge must be

cast aside, and a more noble spiritual attitude assumed, a more devout piety, a more discerning disposition toward the good developed before one's life can be associated with the mystic nobility or even aspire to be divine.

As I said before, the proper conduct of life may be any of several sorts of mysticism, but there is no philosophy by magic nor any fiat science wherewith to solve the problems which so often stump us, thwarting our best efforts and ambitions.

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