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Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the
Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea

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
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EMILE BOUTROUX.

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THE COMMON GROUND OF LIBERALISM AND FUNDAMENTALISM.

BY C. O. WEBER.

DESPITE the issues of "fundamentalism" waged in the Baptist Church and to a lesser extent in others, there are propitious signs that we are once more to have a religion of the spirit in place of a religion of the word. Strange that the church should ever entertain the dangerous fallacy that the theological formulation of ideals in language is to realize them in fact. While for the most part the energy of the church has gone into a vain attempt to express the most sacred attitudes of life in the dialectic of theology, her spirit has found no other exercise than the rather flaccid one afforded by oyster suppers and the sale of haberdashery. The church has fallen into discredit to the extent that she has been satisfied with the role as conservator of doctrine. It cannot be denied that the church has devoted much of her interest to the development of an elaborate theology to justify the crude, mythological aspects of her faith. And it is a theology well calculated to exasperate the man of thought and to leave the mind of the average layman with the vague notion that Christianity is nothing more than some sort of "manifesto of piety" whose essence consists in its opposition to the other manifestos of Buddha and Confucius. Thus, the church has degenerated to the role of protectionism. Then, singularly enough, as though aware that all of her theological learning is as a card-board structure built on quicksand, she urges that religion must be accepted on faith, as though faith signified an intellectual suicide for the sake of some good that cannot be attained otherwise. With her cloak of infallibility torn to shreds by higher criticism, with a top-heavy theology which few understand, and which none in their hearts believe except those who are graciously predisposed to be convinced, with a rule of faith which, as someone observes, possesses the doubtful virtue of "being useful be-

cause it is incredible", the church has indeed fallen into bad straits. It has been aptly stated that it were as though a moss-grown orthodoxy, seeking compensation for its incapacity to learn, devoted itself to a grim determination not to forget. The shell of theology which religion unwittingly entered has become a prison house. Men turn from the church because they reject the three-story universe which theologians discuss so profoundly. This is the natural result of the attempt to make the Bible, which is a literature of power, into a literature of knowledge.

But it appears that another era is upon us when we again see many things "as through a glass darkly." From all directions come prophesies of "the religion of the future" and the prophets of the new do not often employ the traditional epithets. Indeed, the Christianity of today is following two tendencies, and examination will show that both of them are headed towards religious bankruptcy. On the one hand, the Catholic Pope has reaffirmed the eternal truth of catholic supernaturalism with all of its paraphrenalia of beads, censors, crosses, chasubles and holy water. Masses are still as real in their efficacy as inferno is real in its terrors; and purgatory and paradise still hold forth their promise. On the other hand, the "liberal spirits", such as Charles E. Eliot and Abbe Loisy are waxing eloquent about what they call the "new orthodoxy" and "the religion of the future." The inner content of their religion appears as a simple piety in place of the angels, devils and saints of Catholicism.

True religion, it would seem, should sanction both an object and an attitude of loyalty toward it. Yet religion threatens to break asunder with Catholicism holding blindly to the object while the liberals take possession of mere loyalty—of mere attitude without any object whatever. This development was foreshadowed by the recent furore in philosophy concerning the merits and demerits of pragmatism. Scholastic theism in general and Hegelianism in particular have sought to compel belief in the tenets of religion as a rational necessity. The pragmatists in general with William James in particular have sought to justify religion solely on the strength of its practical necessity. Thus, a faith so highly rationalized and generalized that it fails to satisfy anyone in particular, as an average coat would fail to fit any man, has been opposed to the theory that "the axes of reality run solely through the egoistic places."¹

¹ Citations from James are taken from his *Varieties of Religious Experience*.

It is instructive to note the diverse views of God that are held by these opposed views. The God of absolute idealism, whom James terms a "metaphysical monster" is replaced by a "pallid adumbration of a spiritual universe" with which we need to establish "union or harmonious relation." Then, as though realizing the thinness of this concept, James sanctions the "overbeliefs" which will give more objectivity to this too highly attenuated a bit of empiricism, which, however, "is objectively true so far as it goes."

Thus, the spiritual universe of James is only able to get content by an injection of the overbeliefs that are purely individual in their origin. He even volunteers such an overbelief of his own in which he attributes to the spiritual reality, which remains after rejecting theological trappings, *goodness* and *personality*. These overbeliefs he admits to be "somewhat of a pallid kind" as is fitting to a philosopher. Thus, the spiritual universe of James free from all overbeliefs is not one whit better than the "metaphysical monster" he condemns, since both alike are conceived to satisfy theoretical interests. It can become dynamic only by the addition of the overbeliefs and these are by hypothesis the additions of individual human beings. In this view, religion becomes *true* in more than a metaphysical sense only by becoming of practical value. This in none other than the philosophical version of the tendency of the present day prophets of whom I have already spoken. Schleiermacher's conception of religion as predominantly a volitional and moral experience with a reward all its own, is a typical exemplar of the liberal tendency.

In seeking to resolve these oppositions we may proceed in two ways. If our bias is historical, and our attitude conservative, we are inclined to declare that when religion becomes detached from such conceptions as that of God and His Divine attributes, it ceases to be religion, though it may lay claim to be an ethical system. If our bias is for individuality and progress (understood to mean *change*) we will declare against this conservatism that it is an unbecoming Chinese ancestor-worship or a stubborn nominalism which forgets meanings in its excessive devotion to conceptualism.

If, with the "fundamentalists", we seek to determine what religion is by discovering the "essence" or common element that the religions of the past have exhibited, we engage in a futile undertaking. There is no agreement among those considered competent in this task that have enabled us to say with certainty what

the content of religion is or what its true symptoms are; and Emile Boutroux has well observed that from the viewpoint of psychology the essence of religion is no other essence than ignorance. If we are to seek for the "essence" of religion, we should begin by purging the word of a certain fixed bias that lurks in it. Heretofore it has been assumed that the essence of religion consists in some *belief* that all religions hold in common. In this case, they were possibly doomed to failure at the very outset for it is conceivable that the essence of religion may not at all inhere in some rational belief; and, indeed, comparative religion presents us with an array of types—some affirming God and some denying him; some affirming an after-life, others denying it; some with well defined moral codes, others without them.

Fortunately, there is an entirely different viewpoint from which we may approach religion; and this viewpoint, I think, will end in something other than the barren results of the ordinary method of comparative research. It is clearly set forth by Emile Boutroux in the article already referred to. Of the attempt to comprehend religion in terms of a concept that will exhibit the common characteristics of all religions, Boutroux speaks as follows:

"To content oneself with this concept in deciding whether religion subsists or is to subsist, is to regard existence, pure and simple, as adequate without enquiring into its quality..... We must note that both in everyday life, and in philosophical reflection, we have constantly to deal not with concept but with idea. When we speak of the future of art and science, of democracy, and socialism, we are not thinking of them as actually given or presented, or as they would be defined in a logical generalization: we assuredly have in mind the thought of what science and democracy can and ought to be, to attain to full realization, i. e., not the concept but the idea of science or democracy."²

Let me exemplify the differences involved when we consider the issue between the liberals and the orthodox, first by the conceptual method, and then by the method proposed by Boutroux. To the orthodox in general religion involves a type of belief and conduct whose sanction is Divine; whereas to the liberals the religious life involves a type of conduct whose sanction is human well-being. To decide which of the two deserves to be called religion, we should ask, "What difference in meaning is involved by a life of loyalty to God or a life of loyalty to humanity?" This

² "The Essence of Religion", *Monist*, July 1921, pp. 337-349.

plan of campaign, however, is far from being as simple as its statement would indicate. To look for the difference in meaning that God has for the orthodox and that philanthropy has for the liberals is in the end hopeless; for though they admit of the common denominator of "dearness", this quality is notoriously incommensurable. Similarly, to look for the difference that may exist in the practical lives of the liberal and the orthodox, as pragmatism would do, is equally hopeless; for though the practical life may be measurable in a quantitative sense, they are, as quantities, without any meaning or value. This lands us in the dilemma of being unable to decide, from the conceptual view, whether the orthodox or the liberals set forth the true meaning of religion. The failure is due to the fact that it either forces us to adopt a criterion of religion to begin with (typically, the historical criterion) or else leads us to formulations without inner substance. That is, if we set out with the belief that true religion consists in the "worship of God", we ensnare ourselves in the common error that this phrase has an unvarying and unmistakable meaning; and this is precisely the issue that is raised by the liberalists.

The fact that they are in dispute is so far the only result concerning which the orthodox and the liberals can agree. Yet, there must be some more substantial agreement between them that conceptualism cannot evaluate, still less discover. There is another fact that both liberals and the orthodox have overlooked in their zeal, and that is, the dumb acknowledgement of each that *somehow their differences are not final, and that it were a blessing to all if there could be some understanding*. Have we not here already a sympathetic agreement, fundamental in the lives of men, which if brought to light by some method of magic would explain away the differences that are so insistent on the intellectual plane? It is indeed some blessing inarticulately hoped for that animates their argument. Can the intellect show them the common measure of excellence they look for in their religious lives? We have seen that it cannot. Is perhaps the intellect responsible for the fact that they have differences at all? In answer to these questions, let us consider in turn the objections each disputant has of the others religion.

The orthodox object that the liberal insistence on human welfare and its neglect of the attributes and will of God involves the contradiction that we shall find in humanity something better than human—the contradiction of mankind lifting itself by its own boot-

straps. The orthodox cannot conceive of striving except in terms of two levels, one human and the other super-human. The liberals, on the other hand, will complain that the orthodox conception only seems to provide the better things to our hopes: that the two levels of orthodoxy, the human and the Divine, fail to function after all for they are levels that are *different in kind and not in degree*. One is limited, the other unlimited: there can be no transition from the one to the other. God is perfectly good while man is only partially good; and between them there is no common measure just as there is no common measure between miles and an infinite space. How the human and the Divine can enter into the same experience is inconceivable if one occupies an absolute and the other a finite realm.

Boutroux would find in the very natures of the orthodox and liberal the "energizer" that their intellects failed to find. The intellect will always express a functional relationship in terms of levels—as a transition of stages. As a method of describing the occurrence this method may be satisfactory enough; but we are seeking to understand how it may be experienced. This view leaves us with the insoluble contradiction as to how the static realm of heaven and the dynamic realm of human affairs can articulate with each other. It is the contradiction of how perfect rest can hinder or aid human progress; of how perfection can help, still less sympathize with, imperfection; of how perfect wisdom can understand ignorance. Such contradictions are not peculiar to theology alone but arise whenever we seek to conceive dynamism of any kind in the language of conceptualism. What actually occurs in the lives of men is not an inexplicable jump from one state to another; but rather *a creative process which at once makes new levels as it arrives at them*. Needless to say this is an insoluble paradox to the intellect; but it has nevertheless a logic of its own as certain of verification as is the principle of contradiction upon which all formal logic rests.

Applying this solution to the chronic differences between the way popes and philanthropists conceive religion, we would say that popes after all are right in declaring that religion must embody more than complacent average opinion aspires to. Yet, the exponents of the "religion of humanity" are also right in demanding that worship be more than is afforded by an eternally complete God. A complete religion, as we said heretofore, must involve both an object and an attitude, a hope and at once a fulfillment, a realization which is still a resolve. But these cannot be discovered in terms

of logical externality, *for here a simultaneous identity and difference cannot exist*. It is only on the psychological level that this is possible; for it is here that we have change and yet identity, a subject who is undeniably at the same time an object. It is in subjective life that we find simultaneously the sense of something lacking and the possession of this something (in degree and not in part). In short, it is in immediate experience that the religion of the future may find the common grounds of all faiths which it has consistently failed to find when it employs dialectic.

The objection is invariably urged that immediate experience is inutterable; but the whole issue turns upon the consideration of whether in religion this is not a virtue rather than a fault. Some form of utterance it indeed has—the utterance of deeds. It finds voice, not intermittently as do arguments in a debate, but continuously in action. The intellect first gets its evidence and then believes, said Saint Anselm, but in religion we must believe first and then come to understand. So it is by living the life of Christ that we shall come to understand Christianity. Yet, it is not impossible to describe that life in words.

The fundamental fact in the lives of men everywhere is their conviction, whether articulate or inutterable, that life is essentially creative in nature. The very first verse of Scripture has therefore sounded the essential nature and mission of God in saying that God created the world. The stamp of the Divine sonship of man consists in the fact that he also can create. Theology spoiled the account by referring it to a point in time, whereas creation is omnipresent wherever there is life, and Bergson has been able to show that mental processes are inexplicable unless we suppose its presence. The creative aspect of life has always escaped science which by its very method is destined to make of all history a re-threshing of old straw, a redistribution of elements given once for all. It was in deference to a tyrannical intellectualism that made the law of conservation its cornerstone, that led religionists to the subterfuge that creation is a fact but a "miraculous" one. It is high time to give to religion the benefit of the fact that creationism is just as verified a fact in the universe as is conservationism. In social and psychological science the fact of creation is just as necessary as an hypothesis as is the law of conservation in exact science. But in the lives of ordinary men, creation is not a theory, but a responsibility—it is their natural religion. Religion is the overwhelming conviction that our powers exist and that they must be

expressed, that we must strive, however hopeless victory may seem. The true foe of religion, as Wilm observes, is not naturalism, but the mechanical absolutism of science which makes striving a deceptive appearance; or an absolute intellectualism which defeats our powers by representing all problems as solved.³ That our hopes are realizable is assurance enough for the soul not addicted to the sickness of metaphysical grubbing about the question as to whether or not the good is really predominant in the universe. Dr. McTaggart declared that the important problem for any philosophy of religion is the question, "Is the world on the whole good or bad?" Well, this may continue to be the concern of the philosophy of religion, but as for the religion of the rest of mankind the question is rather, "can the world on the whole be changed from the bad to the good?" To this question there is an answer in the heart of every person. We have the assurance that we do indeed possess such transforming powers; and if the content of religion must be a belief, surely it is this one. That life is a creative enterprise is indeed the common conviction of all mankind unless we except those who find in the very philosophy of determinism a field where their creative imaginations may expend their zeal. When we once possess and understand this idea of creationism we may wholly dispense with theology and its "levels" as the misapplication of a spatial concepts to facts of the psychological order where they can only be vicious metaphors.

Were this theme of freedom the concern of man only in his political affairs it might well continue to be the theme soley of dissertations on politics, statescraft and economics. But to the spiritual genius of mankind it is more than this. The theme of freedom is the theme of all life—it is the moving spirit of religion.

Said Boutroux, "The originality of religion lies in the fact that it proceeds not from power to duty but from duty to power; that it advances resolutely, taking for granted that the problem is solved, and that it starts from God. *"Ab actu, ab posse"*, such is its motto. "Be of good cheer", said Jesus to Pascal, "thou wouldst not seek me hadst thou not found me". God is being and principle, the overflowing spring of perfection and might. He who shares in the life of God can really transcend nature; he can create. Religion is creation, true, beautiful and benificent, in God and by God."

³ E. C. Wilm, Henri Bergson, *A Study in Radical Evolution*, p. 149.

JESUS' CONCEPTION OF HIMSELF AND OF HIS MISSION ON EARTH.

BY J. O. LEATH.

FOR a while, historical criticism was centered around the life and literature of the Old Testament. Many were alarmed, lest this precious treasure would be lost to us; but the process of turning on the light of history has resulted in giving us a body of sacred literature that is more edifying for religious purposes as well as more usable. The truth will never hurt in the end.

Just now the center of historical investigation is the life and literature of the New Testament. This means that every possible light of history is being turned on the life and work of Jesus with the desire of arriving at a historical estimate of Jesus' own personal Consciousness. We must not overlook the fact that we have not Jesus' own autobiography, neither have we records of his deeds and words taken down by shorthand in his presence while he was acting and speaking. But what we do have is biographies of Jesus written from one to three generations after his death. Moreover, according to Luke's own testimony, and from an examination of his gospel, we learn that in the composition of his gospel he used written sources; and, after examining Matthew's gospel, we find that he did likewise. What we have in our gospels is different interpretations of Jesus arising from different religious and social situations.

I believe that each of Jesus' early interpreters grasped something of the significance of his life and work; at the same time we must concede the possibility that each one misunderstood him in one way or another. Each interpreted him in the light of his own religious needs and the religious needs of the time and situation in which he wrote. Hence we should not be surprised, if we find the early sources differing somewhat among themselves. In the light of mod-

ern scholarship we are surely able to understand Jesus better than were his interpreters of any age in the past, by no means excepting the first century. The fact is that, according to the representation of our gospels, Jesus was misunderstood by those of his own generation, by not only the people at large, but also those disciples who were most closely associated with him; hence we should not be surprised, if he was in a way misunderstood toward the end of the first century, when our gospels were written; in the fourth century, when our creed was formed; and in the subsequent ages prior to the days of historical criticism. The fact is that from the first to the nineteenth century men thought little of the life of the earthly Jesus, but centered their thought on the Christ of glory. Our creed, which took shape under the philosophical speculation of the fourth century and purports to be an adequate statement of Christianity, mentions only two events in the earthly life of Jesus,—that he was born of the Virgin Mary and suffered under Pontius Pilate. It says nothing of the great meaning of his words and deeds,—freedom, truth, righteousness, brotherhood, love. It would be a too hasty conclusion to say that the historical method has already solved the problems as to what was Jesus' estimate of himself and of his mission on earth, yet we feel justified in expecting valuable results from the historical process.

When Jesus was on earth, his personal followers seem to have regarded him as the Messiah in the nationalistic sense, as the one who was eventually to gather a political following and free the Jewish nation from the Roman domination. When he submitted to an ignominious death, his followers thought that God had forsaken him, hence all their hopes for him as Messiah disappeared. They at once sought safety in retreat, or in repudiating him. As soon as they attained their faith in his resurrection and exaltation to heaven, then they began the process of reconstructing their faith in him as Messiah, and this new faith took the form of belief in him as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense, that is, as the Messiah, who would come on the clouds of heaven miraculously ushering in his kingdom. They at once conceived it to be their duty to make the people ready for the coming of the Messiah, which they expected to be within their generation. Then they began the process of reconstructing their remembrance of his words and deeds in the light of their new faith, and the tendency must have been to magnify those elements in his life that had an apocalyptic significance. Some circles of early Christians seem to have made less of the

apocalyptic element than others did. This is true of the Logia source as opposed to Mark. Well, the fact is that Jesus did not during the first generation return on the clouds of heaven as the apocalyptic Messiah, nor has he returned yet. So by the end of the first century or the beginning of the second, under the influence of Greek philosophy rather than Jewish Messianism, Jesus was being interpreted not as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense who would return on the clouds of heaven to set up his kingdom on earth, but as the eternal Logos of God who would return to earth in a spiritual sense; or, if he would return in person at all, it would not be on the clouds of heaven to set up his kingdom on the earth, but rather to take his beloved followers with him to his Father's house. This is the point of view in the fourth gospel. And this is the point of view that has had the greatest influence in the later history of the Church down to the present century.

What is an adequate statement, based on an historical interpretation of sources, of Jesus' estimate of himself and of his work? Did Jesus regard himself as a prophet or as the Messiah; if the Messiah, the Messiah after what conception? Some have held the view that at the beginning of his ministry Jesus hoped to become the Messiah in the nationalistic sense. He began his career as a teacher, hoping to win the Jewish nation to his point of view and eventually to lead the people in throwing off the Roman yoke. But when the nation failed to rally to him, and when the shadows of death began to cross his pathway, he lost hope of becoming the Messiah in the nationalistic sense and began to claim that, after his death and resurrection and exaltation to heaven, he would return to earth on the clouds of heaven as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. Others have held the view that he began his career as a teacher of righteousness after the order of the Old Testament prophets, not regarding himself as the Messiah in any sense whatever. He hoped to bring about the regeneration of the Jewish nation; but failing to win the people and believing that his word would triumph in the end, he then for the first time in his career began to think of himself as the Messiah, and that in the apocalyptic sense, who after his death and exaltation to heaven would return to earth on the clouds to judge the world and set up his kingdom. Still others hold to Mark's representation of Jesus' consciousness: From the beginning of his career, Jesus was conscious of being the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. During the early days of his ministry, he purposely concealed this conscious-

ness presumably for fear that the people would misunderstand him. Toward the end of his life, he unqualifiedly asserted that he was the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense, and, after his exaltation to heaven, would within that generation return to earth on the clouds with great power and glory. Still others accept as historical the picture of Jesus as given in the fourth gospel: From the beginning of his career, he knew that he was the Messiah, neither in the apocalyptic nor in the nationalistic sense, but in an ethico-religious and metaphysical sense, as the eternal Logos of God and the divine mediator of light and life to the world. Others, finally, think that they find in Jesus no consciousness of being the Messiah in any sense whatever; but that, from the beginning to the end of his career, his purpose was merely to preach inner righteousness and sonship to God somewhat after the order of the Old Testament prophets; and that whatever Messianic language is attributed to him originated not with Jesus but with his interpreters.

I hardly feel that in the light of all our sources either of the above interpretations is an adequate historical statement of Jesus' estimate of himself. From the time of his baptism, if not earlier, he had the consciousness of being the Son of God in a unique sense of the term. The expression, Son of God, carries both an ethical and a functional connotation. He regarded himself Son of God in an ethical sense in that he believed himself loved by the Father. Yes, he regarded himself as the only begotten Son of God in that he was pre-eminently beloved in the sight of the Father. He regarded himself Son of God in a functional sense in that he believed there was committed to him by the Father a special office and responsibility. From the beginning of his career, he felt resting on him the responsibility of self-denial and the leading of others into the relation of sonship to the Father that he himself sustained. The fact that, from the beginning, altruism played so large a part in his life and message suggests that he felt a peculiar responsibility for the salvation of men from sin. So from the beginning to the end of his ministry, his purpose was to be the Savior of men from a life of sin to a life of heart righteousness and sonship to the Father. His program was to induce men to repent of sin and follow him, to live the kind of a life that he lived, to be dominated by the same principles that dominated him, to sustain the same attitude of a son toward God and of a brother toward man that he himself sustained. He was absolutely sure that he himself possessed the secret of correct living and was able to impart the

secret to others. He believed that correct living meant life, abundant life, eternal life. From beginning to end, his message was pre-eminently ethico-religious, and so sure was his conviction on the subject of correct relations toward God and man that he regarded himself as the Lord, that is, the ruler of man's life and conduct.

In the light of the ethico-religious message of Jesus, I think we can best approach the subject of his Messianic consciousness. I fail to find the evidence that Jesus at any time of his career entertained the ambition of becoming the Messiah in the political sense. His message was ethico-religious rather than political. He approached man as the Savior from sin rather than as a political reformer. Again, I find no convincing evidence of a change of purpose in Jesus' program, due to disappointment or else. Furthermore, I think that we must accept as historical the view that from the beginning to the end of his ministry Jesus did regard himself as the Messiah. It occurs to me that it would be decidedly an unhistorical procedure to deny to Jesus a Messianic consciousness of some kind since each of our early sources attributes such a consciousness to him. Moreover, it is probably true that the attitude of Jesus toward the Messianism as set forth in Mark, and taken over by Matthew and Luke, is more nearly historical than the attitude as set forth in the fourth gospel. In the synoptics, Jesus is represented as constantly putting forth the effort to conceal his Messianism and restrain any public declaration of it. Not until his arraignment before the high priest does he publicly confess it. In the fourth gospel, however, Jesus is represented as constantly engaged in efforts by word and deed to prove his Messianism and induce people to accept it. The fourth gospel seems to be an interpretation of Jesus made by some of the devout disciples of the apostle John who at the same time were thoroughly saturated with the Stoic system of philosophy. That they based their interpretation on some memoirs of the apostle John is suggested in one instance by Jno. xxi. 24. "This is the disciple which testifieth of these things, and wrote these things; *and we know that his testimony is true.*" The italics are mine. On the other hand, while we must admit that there is room for the element of interpretation in Mark's portrayal of Jesus' Messianic consciousness, an interpretation influenced by the Jewish apocalyptic thought, at the same time Mark's representation of Jesus' determined and constant effort to restrain any comment on his Messianism is more in keeping with the point of

view, which I insist is historically founded, that Jesus' message was pre-eminently ethico-religious rather than Messianic or apocalyptic.

Most of the efforts within recent years to write the life of Jesus historically have taken either Mark's point of view with regard to Jesus' Messianic consciousness, insisting that Jesus was a literalist on the question of the Messianism, or the point of view, more nearly approached in the Logia of all our primitive sources, that Jesus did not regard himself as the Messiah in any sense of the term, but merely as a teacher of righteousness. I insist that from the beginning to the end of his ministry Jesus did regard himself as the Messiah in that he regarded himself as the fulfiller of the essence of the Messianic hope. Why should one interpret Jesus as a literalist on the subject of the Messianism, while at the same time all concede that he was in no sense a literalist on the subject of observing the law of Moses and other religious institutions of Israel? The criterion of authority in conduct for him was not what the law of Moses or the tradition of the Scribes said, but rather what the welfare of humanity demanded. Relentlessly he applied this straight edge of authority to traditions and institutions hoary with age. He held no brief for any religious institution as such, but only as it ministered to the good of man. This point of view led him to repudiate entirely the Mosaic distinction between clean and unclean. It led him to lift prayer, fasting, alms-giving, and the observance of the Sabbath clear of a legalistic basis and give them a spiritual setting. So it occurs to me that it is decidedly unfair to Jesus to insist that he was a literalist on the subject of the Messianism while we grant that he was not a literalist in other respects. If he possessed spiritual force and originality in the case of the law and other religious institutions, surely he did in respect to the Messianism. Matthew is written from the point of view to prove that Jesus was the Messiah for one reason because his life in several particulars corresponds to statements made in the Old Testament, but nowhere do our earliest sources represent Jesus himself as substantiating his claims to the Messianism on the ground that he literally fulfilled the Jewish Messianic expectations.

It seems that Jesus did regard himself as the Messiah in the sense that he brought real salvation to men. Back of all the imagery connected with the Messianic hope, whether of the Messiah in the nationalistic sense or in the apocalyptic sense, was the hope that God would through a new order of things usher in good to man. Unquestionably, Jesus regarded himself as God's agent in

making this good possible. He disappointed the hope of his followers that he would be the Messiah in the nationalistic sense. Likewise he disappointed their hope that he would immediately prove himself Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. But no one has been disappointed in his ability to bring real salvation to man, to the Jew as well as to the Gentile, and thereby fulfill the spirit of the Messianic hope of Israel as well as of the whole world. Human experience has demonstrated that his program of attaching men to himself and thereby leading them into experience of sonship to the Father brings real salvation from sin. In view of this program, it is probably true that Mark's representation, that Jesus endeavored to restrain any public confession of faith in him as Messiah, is historical; for he knew that, if they believed him to be the Messiah, they would necessarily regard him as the Messiah literally in the nationalistic sense. No one had ever advanced the idea that the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense would previous to his miraculous appearance on the clouds of heaven sojourn on earth as a man. So Jesus desired that his ethico-religious message have full sway in the minds of his hearers, not being complicated by the presence of any aroused political ambitions. It is probably true that at the end of his career he did confess that he was the Messiah. To have denied it would have been wrong and misleading. He knew himself to be a greater servant of the Jewish nation and of the world than the literalist of either Messianic school hoped of their Messiah.

The synoptic gospels have interpreted Jesus as a literalist on the subject of the Messianism. The evangelists regarded him as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense and expected his return to earth on the clouds before their generation passed away. As already suggested, there is room for the possibility that much, if not all, the Messianic and apocalyptic language attributed to Jesus is due to the fact that Jesus was being reinterpreted by his followers in the light of their new faith in him as the Messiah in the apocalyptic sense. Yes, it is historically possible, if not probable, that he did not use as much apocalyptic language concerning himself as is represented in our sources. If he did use those terms, he must have employed them generally in a figurative rather than a literal sense. To conclude that he employed them in a literal sense is to some extent to discredit him. To conclude that he did not use them so freely as he is said to have used them, or that he employed them only in a figurative sense, is to interpret the earthly Jesus in this particular in keeping with the glorious fact that he was not a literalist and that his message was primarily ethico-religious.

COMFORT—GRATIFICATION—LUXURY.

BY F. W. FITZPATRICK.

THE world over there is much being written and said about Socialism, the great benefit it would be to humanity, its uplift and what not. And in many lands are there being made serious efforts to put these theories into practice. Everywhere the lodestone of socialism that attracts the masses is the idea that somehow or another the wealth of the world is to be redistributed more "equitably" and that we are all to have a fresh start on an equal footing. The lowly, the unsuccessful, the poor man, will always be ready to listen to the expounding of any scheme whereby they or he are to share the successful man's wealth, for would not that newly and so easily acquired share purchase them the comfort the gratification, the luxury they so much envy the rich man? In every clime, in every age, under every form of government, the desire for those three things, the strife to acquire them and invariably their abuse when once obtained, have been and probably always will be, striking characteristics of the human race. The "pursuit of happiness" that is supposed to be the right of all men is generally interpreted to mean the endeavor, the wish to enjoy the comfort, the gratification, the luxury, that the most luxurious in the land can possibly attain!

Until that most natural desire, that appetite, can be eliminated from man's composition methinks Socialism will have a hard row to hoe. It may be made the means of upsetting existing conditions here and there, but its permanent foothold anywhere is doubtful, it skates, so to speak, upon exceedingly thin ice, and breaking through into the old ways, republican, oligarchic, aristocratic and monarchic, is inevitable.

Luxury has always played a most important part in government. The relation of official luxury and private luxury has al-

ways been a moot question and one that legislators have ever tried to regulate. From the most remote antiquity the state has always exercised upon private life a control, a regulation that at times has been absolutely limitless. It has directed the dress, the table, the entire mode of life, of the people. It has simply always been a question of more or less regulation. Solon but used moderately a privilege, a right that Lycurgus pressed even to the point of destroying all individual liberty. Even in the philosophic view of the matter, Aristotle, the upholder of private rights, seemed to have had no greater conception of the real premises than did Plato, who preached the other extreme. And such government control is not a thing of the past. True, Louis XV was about the last monarch who imposed sumptuary laws, but nevertheless our luxuries are still to a greater or lesser degree controlled by the government today. Under some forms the people pay taxes that literally prohibit luxury, while others are merely taxed upon luxuries. A little thought given to the matter of luxuries, governmental and private, may be of some advantage to us, though it seem but pure theorizing ruminatingly.

Some theologians and many philosophers would have us believe that all men were born equal, absolutely so and that the earth and all it produced belonged to all men equally and that the acquisition of more property by some than by others was a false condition, a species of usurpation, brought about by and a part of government, forgetting that if the products of the land, wealth, are to remain equally divided, some power, some authority must limit each man to the enjoyment of only that which is physically absolutely necessary. Beyond that, there would immediately be some who expended more than others and others who acquired more than the first and the inequality would again be established. Government could alone do this and while some have attempted it, it has never been accomplished. Each form of government contending for its superiority claims that the greatest luxury and abuse exists under the other form. Yet it is doubtful if anyone has any real reason to feel superior to any other. Generally at the inception of each there have been moderation and sane living that have little by little given way to riotousness, if not debauch, that again generally have but shortly preceded the overthrow of that form and the establishment of a new one upon a saner basis.

Let us glance at what has been done in that connection and it may convince us that as long as men are men the same conditions

are bound to obtain, though it may be natural and perhaps praiseworthy to ever and anon engage in the pursuit of the unattainable.

There is perhaps no form of government under which luxury has shown itself in a garb of greater splendor and has been of more pernicious effect than in monarchies, to the point even of having destroyed them. Naturally the very apotheosis of luxury has been under autocracies, despotic monarchies. There it generally assumes the form of disordered phantasies, the realization of the most extravagant dreams by a power great enough to attempt anything, all-powerful and against which no opposition could stand. The very disproportion there is between the undertakings of an ambition that acknowledges no restraint and the limits that it encounters in our very nature makes us understand the unquiet character of despotic luxury, it explains its unmeasured tentatives, its colossal enterprises and its unclean caprices. History gives us enough portraits of such types, a collection of monsters, and does it in so prosaic a manner withal that these monstrous and criminal mountebanks seemed to have yielded to peculiarities, comprehensible eccentricities. Look at Caligula, for instance, who dearly loved the cruel sports of the arena. One day there seemed to be a dearth of criminals to be fed to the animals, but the spectacle must go on, therefore he simply ordered that some of the spectators be seized and thrown into the pit. In the name of luxury, Claudius perpetuated as great atrocities and so did Nero, who varied the order, however, by picking out Senators and officers for sacrifice instead of the haphazard spectator, and Domitian, Commodus and Galerius were equally shining examples of what despots could do in the name of luxury who, satiated with the ordinary, sought the inconceivable. And Rome was not alone in this. Everywhere despotism was alike in its disordered fatuousness, only the accessories, the frills were varied. In China, the Emperor Cheou-sin, 1,100 years before the Christian era, built a temple to debauchery, where even his wife passed days and nights in devising the super-refinements of luxury, in the guise of infamous, voluptuousness and atrocious sufferings of sacrificed victims. Under a later dynasty Yeow-wang and his worthy spouse, Pao-sse, continued in like manner until the invasion of the Tartars gave them something else to think about. And what Roman Emperor ever paralleled the career of the terrible "reformer" Hoang-ti? He first corrected many grave abuses, destroyed his predecessors' despotic rule, and lived in Spartan simplicity until the craze for luxury seized him, too, and

we read of the ten thousand horses in his stables and the ten thousand concubines in his harem. His funeral carried out as he directed, was a fitting sequel to his life. Three thousand men were immolated upon his tomb that their fat might serve to keep the funereal torches alight thereabout for the requisite number of months' mourning. Indeed, history, I firmly believe, has underestimated, rather than exaggerated the part that luxury and cupidity have played in the crimes of despotism.

A peculiarity of all this is that one would think that despotic luxury would have the very contrary effect upon people than that which it had. Instead of being disgusted with the results of and what was seen of this luxury, the people sought to emulate it from afar.

Under other than despotic forms of monarchy, there has always been fostered a nobility, an aristocracy that has kept but a step behind, if it has not gone ahead of the monarch himself, in the matter of luxury. An hereditary hierarchy surrounds, supports and to a certain extent contains the monarchy, while a despotism is nothing but one master over a nation of equals. Under monarchies generally, until comparatively recent times, the excesses and extravagances of the ruler have been masked, the sting taken from them, as it were, by the prodigal feasts and fetes and spectacles given by the monarch to the people. All that sort of thing has kept the proletariat in good humor and the same tactics were followed by the courtiers and barons and the lesser lights who all gave largesse to their retainers and serfs and vassals.

In all of this it is interesting to follow the influence that woman has had upon luxury. Her influence has been more far-reaching and baneful under so-called Christian and Occidental rulers than in the Oriental and other forms of despotic monarchies. In the latter woman has been part of the luxury, but as a servant, as a slave. True in polygamous countries where women were sold and fattened for the market, the maintenance of courtly harems was a most costly luxury, but nowhere has a woman played the important part in court affairs, has been so costly a luxury to the nation as well as the kings as were the favorites of some of the kings in Western Europe. Someone may say that despots have been known to raise certain of their concubines to even the throne itself, but, with rare exceptions, those women have never really reigned. Their example has never spread the contagion of luxury, they seldom exercised any influence whatever in politics. The court

favorites particularly of France, propagated and corrupted luxury by the influence of their courts upon the cities, they usurped governmental privileges, their secret intrigues, their deals made a very traffic of public affairs, affected the whole political situation and indeed were the causes, (oftentimes, but the mere caprice of some enchantress), of war and terrible international upheavals.

Luxury has tainted everything social and economic, our arts, all. Decadent absolute monarchies have given us marvelous specimens of architecture and other arts, colossal temples and monuments and generally tainted with the same spirit that luxury instilled in everything else, in that the art was simply riotously resplendent, garishly decorative, a mere display of wealth, always at the cost of good taste. Constitutional and other monarchies in their earlier stages have given us splendid and robust memorials of those times but as they grew more luxurious so their arts became effeminized, extravagant, and another period of decadence is marked. An overthrow, a return to virile, sturdy manliness, governmental and private, the infusion of new blood or the incursion of so-called barbarian peoples, then more ease and comfort, then luxury, then decay!

Strange, too, what a part religion has had to play in this. After each revolution or the reform of any people the habits of life have been severe, hard even, and in accord therewith the beliefs of such periods generally reverted to more primitive forms of religion; life was reduced to the essentials. Public monuments were few, and those plain in character. The temple only was made beautiful. Then the ceremonial robes of the priests became more gorgeous and the people clothed themselves in finer raiment upon church-going occasions, and, little by little, the habit of luxury was formed and grew. Feudal aristocracy gave vent to its luxurious inclinations by its large number of retainers and servants, a sturdy, but almost exaggerated hospitality, its hunts and its races, the pomp of its military retinues, its tourneys. That was feudal aristocracy. Its successor of today also entertains lavishly and but replaces the tourneys and joustings with brilliant balls and operas and lucullian banquets. England secures the continued enjoyment of luxury to its select by its law of entail by which the nobility insures the perpetuation of its wealth and exclusiveness and station and privileges by entailing them all to their heirs.

Commercial aristocracies have differed in their luxury from the landed aristocracies in that in all their extravagance there is a

species of economy. As a rule, the wealth has been acquired through severe toil, and habits of mind have been formed that make for their expended wealth. The habits of the merchant act as a corrective upon the tastes that would otherwise be merely luxurious. It is not in their nature to remain idle. Much as the warriors of old they have either to keep on winning victories, or become the vanquished, the losers. If they stop acquiring wealth they are ruined. Venice was one of the best examples of a commercial aristocracy and these points I have just enumerated obtained there in marked degree. But in course of time, a generation or two, such an aristocracy soon gets upon the same plane as the old-fashioned court nobility, where there was more vanity than real pride. The value of money is forgotten, mere prodigality rules and it is just as fashionable to be in debt as it is to gamble and they all do that.

Even in our democracies luxury plays an important role. In the church the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience are taken by its votaries; in the republics of old and even in the more modern ones, the vows of equality, fraternity and liberty were and are theoretically made but are never kept. True, the abolition of titles, crown-lands and special privileges that exaggerated luxury has tended to moderate it. With slavery has disappeared one of the most poisonous sources of abusive luxury. Free and responsible labor has its own correctives and has always held in repugnance the tendency to excessive luxury on the part of the employers. But we have seen a new form of luxury grow up that, in the abstract, is not better than the monarchial and aristocrat ones and that in all likelihood, will eventually lead to the same decadence and ruin that we have noted in the others. Twenty-five years ago we looked upon certain writers as croakers and false prophets because they told us of dangers they foresaw; the great concentration of wealth, all-powerful "captains of industry" holding the labor in a species of bondage, exploiting it without mercy and preventing it from tasting the slightest particle of luxury. It was said then that the birth of such a class was impossible; that never again would the excesses of the ancient aristocracies be equalled and that we were assured a continued diffusion of capital and a spreading of national wealth so that all would have comfort and but few would be justified in indulging in extravagance (the latter assertion all too true!) Industry and democracy were to go hand in hand. Each demanded liberty and light, and each had for its object the benefiting of the

great mass of humanity. The development of industry was to have created a vast amount of business with all the people and benefiting them all. Industry was to become the rival of art and art was to find expression in industry.

That was as it was supposed to be. What have we actually? To what excess of luxury have the democracies of our own time reached? As a matter of fact in a democracy where all men are supposed to be equal, is not the temptation to strain toward the attainment of luxury greater even than under any other form of government? In most others, the plain people are born so and seem quite content to remain so. With us, no limit is placed to our attainments and we have seen to what point some men have reached through their own unaided efforts and it is most natural that we should all endeavor to attain that same point, even if to do so we realize that we must scramble over our brothers, our equals! In practice, equality signifies the desire to rise. Who cares about equality in poverty, in obscurity? Our eyes are not turned in that direction. The equality we desire is that of being with—our superiors. We have no ancient monopolies, no privileged classes, no concentration of civil and military employment, no favoritism in the commercial lines as “special makers to the king” and what not, all that is well enough. But wealth still exists. Wealth may be acquired. One man has more ability to acquire it than the other and there lies the root of the prime cause of inequality, in the very nature of man itself.

Perhaps by education we may convince our people, two or three generations hence, that true happiness is not necessarily found in wealth, in the enjoyment of great luxury, that there is a higher plane of life, that service to one's fellows is nobler far and conduces more to one's own beatitude than any mere gratification of one's animal appetites. All that is possible. But to me it seems a good deal like rainbow chasing, and certainly an attainment of the far-distant future. Socialism is of benefit and far be it from me to do anything to detract from its laudable aspirations, but, and without feeling at all pessimistically inclined, it seems to me that Liberty, Equality and Fraternity have been perverted, twisted and turned until they are made to read Comfort, Gratification, Luxury, to which History has always added Deterioration, Degeneracy and Extinction, then a Renaissance and another run over the same gamut, an orderely and continued turning of the Wheel of Life—Mayhap that Wheel while turning on its center, is likewise moving ahead, progressing in the true sense of EVOLUTION.

COLOR NAMES. CONFUSING AND ARBITRARY.

BY WILLIAM GRUBY-WILYEMS.

IT is largely the household novelist of the gentler persuasion who revels in the sunset's colors of crysolite, nacre and carmine. Four men in every hundred are color-blind, in two hundred women only a single one. This must explain why men give so little heed to hues. With half-a-dozen syllabic tags they dispose of all the two thousand shades educed by the chrysanthemum society.

Refinement on the theme doubtless began with the other sex; the question is: What force do color-titles carry? Milady of the pen dipped in glory may be sanguine enough as to her power to convey to the reader's inner eye ideas reflecting not only the glamor but the true glint of her nomenclatural jewelry; yet any comparison of the various senses and absence of sense attaching to some of the commonest poetic colorifics gives rise to doubt. If this essay gets anywhere it should shortly disclose that the poetess's raptures about yon heliotrope west, yonder rhododactylous east, with flowers of carmine, scarlet, purple and so forth, bring home as little to the averagely attentive imagination as a draft on the mathematical calculus.

Sixes-and-Sevens—Let us begin with the familiar *livid*, properly meaning ember-colored, from Latin *lix*, ashes. "Livid with passion" seems almost the only phrase in which the word remains popularly current, and then as a synonym of purple. Borrow, who appears to have possessed some abnormality of vision, sets down the hue of the Jew as "livid."

How many who use the word know that *lurid* is defined in the dictionary as "pale yellow?" An ancient classification of human races describes the Mongolian as *luridus*—a "lurid" Chinaman! Or

who among those using the word recall that *sallow* (now implying pale greenish yellow) may with some lexical authority be used as equivalent to swarthy? The recruiting officer's over-employment of it for all shades of complexion save florid, freckled and dark, and especially for yellowish white, seems to have been born of a confusion with the noun *sallow* signifying a species of willow—hence *sallow*, willow-color.

Ovid called the Britons *virides* (green), where others have depicted them in a free and easy undress of blue woad. Homer makes the hair of Hector, as the beard of Ulysses, *kuaneos*, dark blue. Lucian in his Dialogs dubs Athena, *glaukōpis*, literally green-eyed, without any connotation of either envy or rusticity; she is always elsewhere portrayed as keen-eyed, martial. Purple was a term which the classic authors deemed applicable to any bright color.

Vermilion, at first glance, might strike one as the most locatable of all color epithets, for it comes from *vermis*, and is therefore designed to convey simply worm-color. Unfortunately there are many kinds of worms, but the ruddy earthworm is so widespread that little risk can exist of any other being invoked to explain the meaning of this epithet. The mnemonic "worm-color," then, is very fair as mnemonics go.

To Prove Black Is White—Etymologically, if not by logical mood and figure. For (to follow Euclid) if black be a shade or color and be not white it must be some other shade or color. Now, there is an English adjective "bleak;" this formerly meant colorless, or loosely, white; the *bleakfish*, from whose scales artificial pearls are produced, is also called whitebait, or on the Continent *Weiss-fisch*, French *able*, from Latin *albula*, that is little white fish. "Bleak" was pronounced in Anglo-Saxon *blaak*, so that "black" signifying at first ink, then the color associated with ink as anciently made, and "blaak" meaning pale, wan or colorless differed at most in the length of that vowel, a gap easily bridged by dialectal variations.

A century-old novel describes a damsel's lips as being of a beautiful purple, where many a modern might fall back on our colloquial allusion to the "pink of condition." But color-discrimination must have been very weak in the Middle Ages if, as some French grammarians hold, the word *bleu* (blue) is to be affiliated to the Latin *flavus* (yellow).

Prevalence of color-blindness is explained by the fact that only the center of the retina is sensitive to color, while light and

shade affect its whole surface. It may be in consequence of this that races such as the Tatars, who, some have credited, can see the major moons of Jupiter with the unarmed eye, possess only half-a-dozen terms for color in their language.

Air is colorless apart from its content of dust, to which is due the blue of the sky; artificial skies can be made by the chemist to test this point, the sky matter and with it the tint of cerulean being added and subtracted at will. The self color of water is true blue. In view of the apparent blueness or greenness of ocean depths, the wave's whitening into foam at the immixture of a little air may afford a legitimate subject for wonder.

It might be a great saving of thought to re-name or number all colors according to their position in a scale such as that of the solar spectrum; the systematic reformer could call black *nil* or *o* and attach to white the highest number, to signify that it is the all-inclusive color. Some color terms not self-explanatory to the run of folks but in frequent use are: *beige*, the natural color of wool; *paille*, straw color (to be distinguished from *faille*, meaning throw-out, that is, reject silk, which has no gloss); *azure* is named for the mines of Lajwurd mentioned by Marco Polo: lapis lazuli was the light-blue stone quarried there—Old French *l'azur* in mistake for *le lazur* being the connecting line; scarlet meant primarily Eastern broadcloth, which was usually of the loudest of hues; *crimson* meant the color of the insect called *kermes* used in dyeing; turquois conveyed to the French the notion of Turkish (or light) blue; *invisible green*: a very dark shade of green, approaching black and liable to be mistaken for it; *matt* is German for dull; *cardinal*, the color of a cardinal's robe, a species of red; *buff*, "a saddened yellowish orange,"—Webster (the color of buffalo skin, with a velvety or fuzzy finish); *visual purple* and *visual yellow* denote parts of the contents of the retina of the eye; *purple* was so named from the shellfish purpur, from whose blood the people of the Levant prepared a bright dye, a blend of red and blue. In Spanish *colored*, literally *colored*, is used only for red. The English adjective *blank* formerly had the sense of white (*blanc*), while in German the word means polished. *Calomel* is now the title of a white powder, yet its two roots make it express simply "beautiful black."

Dappled may mean dabbed with or dipped in color; *piebald* is equivalent to "bald in spots" (Latin *pica* a spot); *skewbald* means marked in a skew (that is, irregular) manner; *emerald* is the greenish color of the stone dubbed by the Greeks *smaragdos*, of which

name *emerald* is a corruption. *Lake* means the color of the gum lac, a variety of crimson; "crimson lake", then, seems an idle emphasis. *Taupe* means mole-color (Latin *talpa*, mole). *Moire*, *moiré*, applied to the undulating or watered appearance in silk, is the same word as *mohair*. To remain true to its ancient intention *puce* should denote nothing more nor less than flea-color. *Pink* has its provenance from the flower called a pink, while in the case of *carnation* the flower affording the color term is itself named from a resemblance to human flesh, the carneous tissue, unless as some suspect it has been corrupted from "coronation." *Sorrel* once indicated the reddish-brown complexion of a sere leaf. *Mauve* still means, to all who understand French, of the color of mallow-flowers. *Roan* stands for a mixed color having a shade of red; it probably is unconnected with the rowan or mountain ashtree. *Maroon* means chestnut color, a brownish crimson; some recent writer speaks of a lady blushing maroon. *Hoary* alludes naturally to hoarfrost. *Grizzled* comes from French, *gris*, gray. *Café* (coffee) is the regular word in Spanish for brown. *Rose* in French means pink. It is said that no blue rose has ever been cultivated—a fatality like that of the invariable she-ness of tortoiseshell cats.

Red at present is applied to tints as diverse as the "ginger" (probably a metaphor for hot, fire-color) variety of hair that one could almost "redd" the dinner on and that quite different grog-blossom embellishing a toper's nose. "Carrot" hair may mean like that of Judas which was also called *Iscariot*.

A common expression is *violet* color, yet the violet is found of as many colors as the coat of Joseph. *Ochre* originally denoted yellow, but it is quite as usual nowatimes to speak of red ochre. *Jaundice* derives from French *jaunisse*, yellowness, yet there is a custom of speaking about yellow jaundice, which seems to suggest that several other colors may not be barred from competition. Froude writes of "the black colors in which Philip the Beautiful painted the Templars." Black is not properly a color, and how many black colors could there be, apart from degrees of admixture with white? Many of these color notions and emblazoned figures of speech appear as wide of the mark as the schoolboy's opinion that *scarlatina* might be the feminine of *scarlet fever*.

Although yellow and blue mixed by the artist produce green, yet because of interference with each other's rays a blue glass slide held over a yellow one results in the obscuration known as black. The red in "Red Indian" may have referred to warpaint, but this

is unlikely in view of the early loose use of color names. Green, said of fruit, is often used hastily for unripe, without any allusion to color, and one may compare metaphorical idioms such as "green geese," "a green wound." The root means still-growing. Blue blood probably alludes to the color of the veins in a Caucasian race as distinguished from the Moors and others. Verdigris (oxide of copper) may be translated offhand green of gray (*vert de gris*). Olive is the name of another green, the yellowish-green of the olive tree; "oil" itself is derived from the same word in its Latin form of *oliva*, and *oliva* descends possibly from the root of "elastic," referring to the quality of the expressed sap.

The blue gumtree seems to be christened from the color of its bark, while the title red-gum may refer to the tint either of the resin or of the hewn timber.

ROMANTICISM AND GOVERNMENT.

BY HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND.

OCCASIONALLY as our attention turns to and from the varying vicissitudes of Modern Romanticism we find that one of the striking points of interest, if not one of the most decisive features, is that of its relation to government administration and especially that phase of practice adjudged by romantic morality. Here and now, in an age of greed, extravagance, graft, superficial propaganda, wage-cuts, strikes and industrial strife, political stratagems and industrial jockeying for economic control, it might be said that we have a daily review of the whole situation. But at the less raucous entrance of romantic morality we find the general atmosphere tempered somewhat, whence it gradually becomes more fit for clear-seeing and free breathing, suitable for amiable tournament rather than for the deceptive cunning of stratagems and spoils. It is then that we meet our adversaries face to face in the arena of individual virtue and public morality. Romanticism implies and requires a certain compound of individual freedom, courage and aspiration while Government implies and requires a certain degree of discipline, respect for authority, and allegiance to the group-psychology of social institutions. True Romanticism does not recognize or sanction free-love, risque literature, ugly art or jazz music; neither does a just Government recognize or encourage such things as free-lunch, partiality in industrial disputes, franked campaign propaganda, mercenary tariff discriminations, or plutocratic preferment.

Still, as we know, there are faults on both sides. Administrations are too multiple-minded, too clumsy and top-heavy, to be agile in action, balanced in judgment or uniform in legislative opinion. Likewise also the common character of public amiability is often imposed upon to the extent that the romanticist seeks to

dodge the difficulties of life; he renounces the "wise strenuousness" which Aristotle and Roosevelt prescribed, and takes refuge in the walled city of his dreams. Of course, this departure is not begrudged him if it is not made at the expense of some cunning exploit or public mischief. Indeed, his humble retirement is considered right and exemplary at times, as when we discover that in an ivory-tower sort of existence above the mediocre haunts of common men the bright visions and noble aspirations of a Kierkegaard, a Grieg, Father Tabb, Thorwaldsen or Leoncavello come only when one lives well apart from the clamor and vice, the selfishness and petty cavillings of a sordid world. But then, the times are not always so auspicious, for, as with the double-jointed entrenchments of Rousseau's acrobatic policy, the sordid world comes crashing in and with its ruthless vandal power wrecks the beautiful house of dreams, upsets the dreamer in his easy chair and scatters the papers on his writing desk. Cracks and spots readily show on the peculiar ideal blue of Sèvres ware, and the rich lavender of Kismet easily fades.

No wonder he would then advocate a sensitive morality, knowing both by intuitive anticipation and by an actual misfortune of experience that such an event was possible, even more often than not, a probable incident in this imperfect and blind-striving world. And anyway, such a romantic individual, being only an Aeolian harp played on by all the various winds of Nature and empirical contingency, should expect now and then to have a string broken by less tender fingers. Carducci, the anagogic poet and philosophical critic of premodernist Italy, considered that a *soft* sort of Romanticism and hence not an adequate or worthy mold in which to cast either one's life or one's literary creations. In his famous work on the erotic poets of the 18th Century he repudiates such romanticism altogether and champions a sort of *religio grammatici* return to the classical paganism of old.

I. PHILOSOPHICAL GROUNDS.

The philosophical ground of all this seems to be that Natural Law is quite attractive so long as we conform our conduct to it, but absolutely ruthless and inexorable when we try to fool with it or oppose its stern decisions; while our finite Human Law is apparently harsh but easy to get around and wheedle into favorable readings whenever we think such an arbitrary course is expedient. And it is a similar opposition which exists today between Romanti-

cism and Cultural Education. Romanticism is too often inclined to hazy thinking; it likes to grope along in the ecstasy of the weird, and usually jams in the dry parts of its own mechanism. But Culture, if it is of the real sort which leads on to spiritual development and finds expression politically in a system of socially just Government, is always inclined to be clear and rational, seeking explicit conceptions of things and events, and is certainly always sufficiently lubricated to be in fairly efficient working order. The main trouble with the policy that is advocated by the romantic moralist is that he tries to teach us to be exceptional, superior-to-others, superficially naive, and does not begin to realize that he is preaching a dangerous doctrine until his idols are cast down by a world which seeks only the normal experiences of a rationally balanced life.

Romantic ideas are invariably so much mysticism; its metonymy and magic doors mark them out as mysterious and yet traditional as the yellow-beak birds and Bedouin coffee-pot designs on genuine Saraband rugs. Scientific romanticists, too, are ambitious to gain the Prix Pierre Gusman, but their essays are as abstruse and unpopular as a quantum theorist's technical lucubrations on the future possibilities of a worldling age which learns to harness atomic energy. They are playing for the delight of the elect, so they think, and never ask themselves what lay interest is popularly shown in astrophysics or cosmic phase-orders of existence, nor who, besides certain of their abstract speculator-companions, cares whether there are kinks in time or gaps in space. Less astute minds which are perhaps more honestly Nature-loving know that the plain homogeneous possibilities of motion and duration (Euclidean space and time) do not have to depend upon the exotic fancies and acrobatic rationalizing of intellectual moon-calves for an opportunity to become actual realities.

But howsoever this condition may seem to react against the periodical rebirths of idealism, Civilization will not fall; it will become estranged from simple living and high thought by the seductions of extravagance and pride, it will even be badly broken in the numerous political, industrial, economic and cultural upheavals it is bound to pass through, but it serves one of our favorite hopes to trust that Civilization will survive both the destructive science and the plutocratic government policies of today, that it will survive the hazardous struggle against a pseudo-romantic naturalism and be faithfully with us when we reach our final goal.

It is only in this bare negative sense that romantic morality is at all constructive and vitally functional as an actual accessory to our cultural progress. Nor yet can anyone deny that it has managed to supply us with many magnificent treasures of artistic literature and has given us exemplary models of what a grand achievement its realized ambition would make. This determinable quality is its one redeeming credential. It allows us to go through with all its vague ramifications of imagery and burlesque, and still come out at the magic door of plastic interpretation with a fairly close guess at the strange meaning of it all. The ultimate significance, however, of the experience is to show us that the highest value that may be attached to romantic morality is its heuristic service to cultural education and just governmental administration. It points out with unmistakable accuracy some of the things we should pursue or avoid for the sake of progress and the regeneration of man's travailing spirit.

Quite possibly there have been exceptions here and there in the general chronicle of humanity's vague aspirations. There is no racial uniformity of emotion just as there is no nationalistic hegemony of control over the means of making romantic pilgrimages to King Oberon's court. While the French romanticists of the older school were alert to almost every form of art and inspiration, their German contemporaries plodded on in perspiration toward their fixed ideal of perfection, and the English joined the Italians in the aspiration to be reasonable about both Nature and Art as they related to human life. But we of today are threatened, by a too loose valuumism in understanding human needs and natures, with losing both our romantic and our cultural heritages in the maelstrom of monopoly, in the narrow nationalism of a moribund mediocrity, and in the weird seductions of would-be "practical" government concessionaries and committee-legislation. Every group of petty libationers drinks to the toast that "Our interests must be served *first*",—economic turmoil and industrial sedition notwithstanding. This is the only morbid Kulturkampf that must be guarded against. And strange to say, it was only that aspect of it which was anticipated as soon to be in conflict with neoclassic traditions that lead M. Francis Eccles, in his recent lectures on "La Liquidation du Romanticism" (1919, London), to deplore its break with the 19th Century *coup d'état* trend of French nationalism, naming it "une déviation de l'esprit français." But, for all we know or care, Romanticism has been the invariable deviation

from every other nation's habitual esprit, especially in those nations whose leaders become patriotic only when bond-issues are discounted and the tariff is revised (upward usually). An international rather than a nationalist perspective of culture and government policy is all that can or ever will be able to accurately and hence adequately liquidate the not-always financial obligations of modern Romanticism.

However much we are forced to attend to the worldly interests of obtaining a livelihood by more or less sordid contact with the grimy wheels of "essential industries", the fact still remains that the evenings and the Sabbath (if not an occasional holiday or vacation-period) are our own to dispose of as we will. There is a great majority of people who put in an admirable day of industrial efficiency and alert devotion to the tasks and duties of the business on hand, but seems to utterly relax at sunset and fritter away the time that is their own in idle pleasure, love of sleep, plots for revenge, or futile dreams of lazy luxury. They try to live on bread alone, and in the last communion expect viaticums to heaven. But it is not likely that they will have anything but the cruel recollection of vain exploits, lots of work, and indigestion. On the other hand, we have that scattered minority who devote their private moments to aspiring thoughts, to those refined feelings which delight the inward frame, and to those exalted motives which demand a nobler vision of the over-world. They are the courageous hearts and creative minds of this poor old mediocre nether-orb. They are perhaps the less conspicuous of the two classes as we observe them at the daily economic grind. "But in the evening is the difference seen", as Elbert Hubbard would have said, and on the Sabbath are their relative values as *men* revealed and verified. You do not have to wait ten years to see what will be the result of their public occupations and the legacy of their private avocations.

Such then, has been the great perennial antithesis, the vital either-or, ever since the world began: whether to seek out the spring of spontaneity and lay our humble festive board beneath the shady trees of a romantic life, swearing allegiance to nought but moral necessity and congenial spirits, or to leave our individual fate in the hands of careless contingency, hoping to balance our own weary days against the bare assumptive control of others' conduct. A certain rhetorical partiality here shows my private choice, but very often I find myself, not idly wondering or superficially contrasting, but actually philosophizing as to which is the more in-

dispensable portion of community's citizenry—its workers or its dreamers, its martyrs to ephemeral industry or its torch-bearers in the eternal procession of culture and religion.

One thing sure, the workers need a thorough education in solidarity, in how to forego personal interests in favor of those more social and justicial; an education in fact which emphasizes brotherly co-operation instead of mere radical agitation to violence. But they must think for themselves the while such enlightenment is in process of taking effect, else much effort be lost to larger and nobler causes. One of Art Young's cartoons shows one of our economic despots carrying away a bushel of corn labeled "Fat of the Land", leaving the husks to the worker whom he advises: "Don't think. Stay on the job." Just that is too much the trouble already. Spoliators and knaves do most all the thinking, and they codify their selfish processes of thought into laws which protect their schemes of ravinage and exploit. For any other sort of people it is nowadays fast becoming a crime to even think (for anyone who thinks cannot help but have the courage betimes to express what he thinks, even though it means trouble); witness the case of the Kansas editor, Wm. Allen White, against the rulings of the Industrial Court. Thought has all too significantly become the anarchy of fools just as thoroughly as words are the counters of wise men.

The majority of people today do not seem to have the time, talent nor inclination to contemplate for long any certain problem or phase of their multifarious existence. That is, they do not devote that longevity or sincerity of Thought to any one particular subject which will render it clear and ethically applicable to the almost insatiable requirements of life in a vulgar, selfish world. Thus comes the custom of shallowness and its consequent notion that anything which resembles Thought shall be taboo if not directly libeled and discountenanced with the various epithets of illegitimacy and anarchy. It is really good cause for alarm, and I am beginning to feel that it is a part—and a major part too—of the general debauchery of our public mind and private heart that the modern world is fast losing all honest capacity for effective meditation, and is blindly letting its philosophic functions deteriorate while it is so feverishly occupied with the putrid exploits of avarice, finite interests, unscrupulous adventure, folly and extravagance.

It is now popularly considered a sociological if not a physiological defect if anyone is so unfortunate as to have a brow any

more developed than that of an ape. It is almost impossible to go into an up-to-date bookstore and find anything in black-and-white that is not classifiable as "the latest fiction" or advanced as "a best seller that is different." An oldtimy work of sincerity in science, reverence in religion, profundity in philosophy, or true artistry in poetry is only to be had in the basement or balcony of some back-street store which handles an honorable but unpopular trade in "good though slightly soiled bindings." How could they remain in anything but good conditions, not having been used for years, and then probably by those only who treated them with tender care and choice selection here and there amongst the deckled pages? Even the modern historical, economic, educational and sociological works are inoculated to the very marrow with the specious virus of propoganda and misinformation. And those who read anything nowadays without first taking a generous dose of antitoxin to preserve their normal sanity are bound to become affected and perhaps fatally afflicted with some form of this insidious epidemic.

Thoughtfulness, like Romanticism in a vulgarian age or just government administration in post-war periods, being the habitual application to life of the power to meditate on the deliverances of consciousness and subconscious existence, is accordingly a rare attribute in the human makeup, at least as it is constituted and presented to us today. The exercise of any effectual degree of thinking capacity is as rare and discontinuous as lightning in foggy weather. The loose structure and the arbitrary functioning of our modern mind however should be expected, as they are foregone conclusions in this age of external perfection and internal chaos, smear-culture and spiritual decay, somatic sophistication and soul-atrophy. So it is found to be a sort of vicious circle we are chasing ourselves around in. We are unable to think because we are wage-slaves to sin and folly, and we are ignorant fools because we prove by our mode of living that Thought is one of the lost arts.

The honest exercise of an adequate philosophy of life has provisioned far less houses with happiness than have been mortgaged to meet the demands of creditors. But it is not the philosophy which butters no bread and keeps the proportion in such hopeless minority. It is the sophist folly of people who think (feeble process) that they can gamble on the promises of youth and pay their debts with an early demise or with the inane sloth and in-

cessant regrets of a miserable old age. The history of ten thousand years has many times reiterated the proof that it cannot be done successfully, although for a time we may appear to survive the flood. In the first place, paying attention to what is venal, low-aiming, and ephemeral is not philosophy; it is a morbid pursuit of folly and usually works out as a most fallacious and mischievous occupation. In the second place, anyone who honestly knows how to think will actually study the processes of Thought and Life; he will entertain considerate opinions as to the philosophic measures supporting honest knowledge and just government, and will endeavor seriously to bring his more or less romantic vision of truth down to the bosoms of men that they may live more nobly and with less enfeebling notions about immediate selfish gain.

II. MORALISM, SCIENCE AND RELIGION.

The cerated moralism of hero-worship, with none but ivory apes and peacocks to exemplify the Good, is of little help or inspiration; it is grounded in a fallacy subtle and yet futile as the "horns" of old Carneades. Our age seems wholly mad with lucre-lust and the tarantism of intellectual jazz—our morbid mental stupor and inordinate desire to let others pay the piper while we dance seem quite incurable even by using the so-called appropriate medicinal music of Trotsky's tarantella. Governments are now taking a third dimension of their legislative function. Air routes and rights of way are listed in the new regulations of aerial traffic. Likewise with the recent realization of the necessity for unifying our various means of communicating information and experience we come across Chief Signal Officer (Major-General) Squier's valuable advice on how to so unify and supervise the practical uses of radio, telegraph and multiple telephony as to render them both efficient and unmercenary to criminal purposes. Also there is the new application of screen-art in cinematographic interpretations of scientific theories and discoveries; one somewhat extreme example being the recent filming in Germany of motions and signals demonstrating more or less effectively to laymen the extra-mundane and supra-empirical principles (or at least ideas postulated as principles) in Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity. One scientific fallacy, however, which I suppose the usual lay audience overlooks or which may be merely used through the necessity of material backgrounds to supply balance and familiarity to naive sensory experience, is this: that the hypothetical detached observer requires

no earthly landscape of assumed immobility from which to compare two or more motions or rather the relative course of a third motion of an object passing from one to the other of two diverse moving origins or "grounds." This fallacy is particularly in evidence in the filmed experiments such as that of the light signals from one end to the other of a moving train on a bridge with a mountain gorge for background, or in the imaginary extra-terrestrial view of a ball falling from the top of a tower which of course moves with the rotation of the earth. The ball's real path of motion is parabolic, although an observer anywhere sharing the earth's motion would view it as a straight-line fall.

This is a good example of scientific romanticism which is seeking some proportion of control or influence over the way we think about natural phenomena. By virtue of this aim it is in the same category with that phase of didactic moralism which is just now so anxiously concerned in love, sex, divorce, etc. Ethics as a rational science of man's natural affections and relations should take good care in turning over to romantic moralism the social welfare of people not yet able to cope successfully with the problem of evil in a vulgar, selfish and shallow-thinking world. The great furor set up a few years ago over the ascetic attitude toward marriage (which was considered "not a duty but a sin") in one of Tolstoy's last books, *The Sex Problem*, left the present generation no more enlightened on how to spiritualize such intimate relations as puppy love, pornographic courtship, common-law marriages, soul-mate triangles, love-nest scandals, et al. Beyond a sophist mess of specious arguments aiming to medicate and minimize the actual pejorism of the situation, nothing appears to have been really done in the direction of giving spiritual sanction and support to sex experience. Even the fairly representative symposium of Elinor Glyn in the *Photoplay* magazine or that right now (July) being carried on in the Hearst papers simply reflects a practical balance of opinion between variously famous of our contemporary worthies on just what is at the bottom of the human mind and heart when undergoing the equally named ecstasy and complex emotional experience of sex-urge or love, marriage or celibacy, gutter-grief or idealism. The very relevant question of continence or control is apparently overlooked altogether.

All that we can conclude from this is that the sincere initiates of Mrs. Eddy's or Madam Blavatsky's inner circle may possibly be able, with the assistance of compulsory circumstances, to satis-

factorily (or what the New-Thoughters hold is the same as actually) apply their esoteric scheme of asceticism to private life, but not likely the lay dilettanti who still remain absorbed in fleshly vanities and worldly interests on the outside. Monogamy and totemism, problem-plays and phallic worship, risqué literature and pornographic art are by no means as yet purified of a degenerate appeal to the more physical appetites of a vulgar morbid patronage. Romantic morality should have none of such, but saints and sages often have to start reactionary combat before the sluggish government machinery can be properly oiled and fueled for ameliorative legislation. Mormonism is no less culpable of polygamous vices than the Lesbian eclipse of polyandry; the erotic hysteria of gynophily is no more innocent of sex perversion than the naked neurosis of the Rathayatra feast. But we still find them very well to the fore both as subjects of public interest and as items lending zest to our modern love-science. No wonder then that Achmed Abdulla has such little faith in modern continence and chastity as to define them as 'but the narrow ribbons on love's chemise.' The occasional rechauffes of Agapemonite theory and practice cannot help but vitiate an atmosphere into which nobler souls and more ascetic-minded men try to breathe a sterner discipline. So many men are not seeking *women* for their life-mates, but mere females; so many women are seeking mere males instead of *men*, that the social fabric is becoming faded and ugly and tattered and torn. The bathos as well as the pathos and irony of life is that they usually get what they seek, so that this is the source of much of the world's misery and discontent, although it is clearly a resultant retribution for folly and vice.

Dostoievsky is a peculiar example of the dualistic romanticism of the Slav nature; his religious paradoxes are grounded in the Gadarean compound of angel and beast, Greek Orthodoxy and Tartar bloodlust. His sociology could not have become exalted except on condition that his anthropology and historicism be conceived as the creed and chronicle of an utter depravity; such an expensive mental process does not appreciate the thrift of Puritan ethics nor the stern economics of a just government. Russia is the scene of perennial carnage, the never-decisive conflict between Romanticism and Government. It was only by dint of heroic courage and the endurance of imminent exile that practically all her best literature has been written. The revolutionary realism of Pushkin, Gogol and Turgenev simply passed the flickering torch of half-

infernal enlightenment on. I believe the world was fortunate beyond measure to find it held aloft by those two great devotees of mystic naturalism, Tolstoi and Dostoievsky, even after twenty years of hounding by both Czarists and narodniki.

Religion and Romanticism are most successful while they are mystic and theoretical; so soon as they begin to cast about for proselytes and practical applications of doctrine they begin to grow vulgarized, secular, commonplace and corrupt. Witness how the Quaker-like Sadhus have become demoralized so far as to follow their leader, Sundar Singh, in his violent revolt against any native Indian procedure of self-determination free from Anglican supervision. Witness how thoroughly the first fine brew of Democracy has recently turned to the vinegar of a crass vandalism, a morbid mediocrity of individualism and rhyomistic monopolies. Witness how the absorbing interest of theologians fifteen years ago in Delitzsch's plan to unite the world's three great monotheistic religions is now shifting over to the converse question whether or not the administration of the world's religious faith should be decentralized and given back its supposed freedom of spontaneous expression. During this interval people have found that religious imperialism has been delayed and thwarted more by racial differences and nationalist programs than by interchurch schisms, ritual objections, or lay petitions of secessional criticism. Any external irenic aiming at a possible unification of *all* religions whether pagan or puritan, pantheistic or personal, polytheistic or monotheistic, is a remote vision; its promises have little probability of realization so long as we have all those distinct forms of ritual and reverence, differences of attitude and practice, even their clumsy nominal classification as this or that sectarian group variously styling itself Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, Shintoism, Zoroastrianism, and so forth on down the list.

Mere uniformity of scriptural sense and textual interpretation is not enough: in fact it is useless to lay store on paper unity and agreement so long as a disparity of viewpoints regarding international equality, economic justice, industrial exploitation, co-operative spiritual effort and aid remain to make antagonisms and seditions between the various constituent leaders and devotees. Inspirations of text and ceremony are little more than the lip-service of a vicarious ecstasy; they are seldom deeply spiritual, like true reverence and mystic exaltation, to the degree that they have scope

for social or industrial applications, much less for international aids or interracial brotherhood. The pure and actual application of religious faith and love is seldom sufficiently thorough or innate to endure in new garments, work efficiently in avaricious armor, or take confident action upon those conflicting elements which concern its growth upon exotic shores. Much of every religion's original purity and power of spiritual expression is lost in the maze of subsequent public interpretation and private practice. The simplicity of the Christ ideal is lost in the complex motivation of an apologetic hypocrisy; the direct counsel of Dharmapada is brushed aside by the more ambiguous Vitanda of the Tripitaka and eristic Hinyana; the progressive ethics of the Wu-I or man's five social relations are sidetracked and polluted by the *squeeze* of a corrupt ceremonial practice in China; the *Arsha* revelations of the Koran are smothered under the idolatrous carpet of Kaaba lore; the Torah of Moses (like the original Hebrew and Greek texts trying to survive a half dozen Vulgate translations) is swamped with the vulgar half-vernacular tide of Talmud and Cabala; the Way of the Gods is murky with the smoke clouds of sentimental Zenist pachak; and Zoroaster's Zend of the ancient Kshatragathas in the Avesta is now vulgarized by forced passage through the hundred exegetical gates of Sadda commentary.

The living flame of ancient wisdom illumines the dark paths of the modern world with an occasional flash of inspiration for truth and virtue, and shows its devotees how to know and practice the best in life. But the superficial anecdotes, parallogisms, dogmatics, economic sops and external statutes of priest and potentate are soon lost to the inexorable erosion of time. They are largely the illegible modern scribblings of fools in the endless chronicle of man's transfiguration anyway, so why should they be treasured or mourned over. They emphasize and seek the profits (not the prophets, Upton Sinclair shrewdly tells us) of the world's pristine religious faith, knowing but never informing others that even the supposititious divinity and parthenogenesis of Christ are but subsequent refinements of linguistic fancy staking largely on substitutions or mistranslations of ancient texts. A false note of delusion gave the vital lie to their pseudo-romanticism and there was no superior critical faculty from which to render judgment or law covering the assumptive situation.

III. THE PROPER BUSINESS OF GOVERNMENT.

Turning to the more recent marplots of contemporary events I cannot help but see that much of the current criticism ridiculing and opposing government interference in the operations of Big Business is but so much economic evasion and political flapdoodle. If the would-be innocent bourgeoning of capitalism and financial prestige into a mature octopus clutching at industrial and economic control were to be justly and resolutely restrained, the business world would not come to an abrupt end nor dash into the chaos which alarmist sopthrowers so excitedly prophesy. It would simply *divide up* the vast unearned surplus, the multiple turnover of what its meekened press-agents like to call half-of-one-per cent. Steel magnets, 100 percenters, Wall Street patrioteers, and other plutocratic despots would not be able to shut down their profitless (?) industries in prospect of turning their investments elsewhere under an efficient and justly administered government. No, for the same restraints on excess profits and corrupt political practices would be effective elsewhere also; there would be no Hooversque commission to review tearfully the situation and put an extra margin on the lump-load price of coal.

Generally speaking, however, the political reformers of today are too much given to the *static aspect* of government policy and its title to state sovereignty. They attach too great an importance to the immovable type of political power, and this becomes the persistent ideal of all their aims and efforts. But we, in taking a few philosophical observations around and beyond their finite position, can readily see how far they fall short of framing any adequate plan with or by which to replace the present form of government so popularly in force in practically every nation throughout the world. To be sure they rightly attack our fallacious system of governing peoples by the fast and loose manipulation of industrial and economic power; but what other means can reach everyone who lives on a physical plane of existence? We are not trying to administer government in the astral world. And why is the present system found fallacious, if not because there is physical misery, material injustice, and worldly *nerf-ferure*? Why then are practically all our reformative measures so sadly inadequate, so culpably inapplicable and inert, if not because we seek to change the plan of life by talking to the workmen instead of going to the architect and the boss of the job? Like all the other processes of

livelihood and experience, government policies are (or should be, if not autocratic and tyrannous) motive and plastic; there is no static absolutist element in them except as we read it there and fall into doubt and disaffection over its possible solution.

Nowadays, and especially since the skeptical and materialistic times of Hobbes and Locke, Comte and Malebranche, modern society has become bafflingly complex as well as quite self-determinate and insubordinate to any feasible control by the old tattered codes of our predecessors; it is too high-g geared for slow-coach travel. Hence the consequent difficulties of readily analyzing and interpreting any particular phase or problem of its present condition render any prospect of an adequate solution exceedingly but not hopelessly distant of realization. As T. V. Smith shows in the *Open Court* for June, experimental criteria cannot readily get at systems which rely on an absolute and infallible authority; I wonder then how the authority of scientific control can replace that of either the individualist or the group (State) without ceasing to be purely peirastic and assuming even *that* measure of infallibility. No sufficient assurance seems to be given that those in the directors' private chambers will continue to be honest scientific seekers or experimenters and not soon degenerate into mere puppets of some more ruthless source of authority and control. I can readily recognize the necessity of departing from the individual kingship as well as the representative (?) group-rule sort of government, but cannot find the courage and nobility in human nature that is today necessary to even set up, much less maintain, a strictly experimental democracy which could secure equality of opportunity to all, industrial peace, economic justice, virtuous coal barons or honest oil promoters.

In any plan of scientific control over our social or political affairs we would have, first, the numerous vagaries and anomalies of individual temperament to deal with, seeing as we do that it is practically useless to try to draw up any set code of rules or static series of criteria as to what *is* good government procedure, when no two critics or advisors or cabinet members can agree on what constitutes the best legislative policy, the surest (if not most just) control, the true social welfare, or the most roundly efficient administrative mechanism. Second, there is the perennial obstacle of false valuation in every politically organized society which appears most often in the Orphean mask of selfishness and involves human turpitude all the way from insatiable greed up to maniacal

illusions of personal freedom and utopian destiny. And third, we have to spend time, so otherwise precious, accounting for and trying to dissolve the ethical gall-stones of domestic strife, poverty, commercialism, class-wars, plutocratic prestige, industrial or economic monopoly, and the thousand other variations of anarchy and social malevolence.

Although these are largely negative relations of fact, still they achieve telling results in their active opposition to whatever possible political philosophy we try to establish. We must take up positive weapons against all wickedness and folly, because negative attacks only give us "the feeling of security without the security itself, and at the same time cause us, in the enjoyment of the feeling, to neglect the attainment of genuine security in the only way possible, through intelligent and far-sighted control." (Smith, *ibid.* page 343). We know also that any political philosophy that is worthy of the name will aim and attempt to set up a reasonably practical code of control which not only guides present social conduct aright, but shall romantically qualify the temper of restraint so as not to too harshly discipline the creative works of true genius on the one hand, and shall so safeguard our justicial methods of control that no legal loophole will be allowed through which anyone viciously disposed can discount or evade the penalties provided in the code. Stated simply then, the true business of Government is properly that of supplying its subjects with a good and fair standard by which to live, an honorable and equitable means by which to preserve that standard from subversion or corruption, and an ideal in the bosom of which they will be glad, not coerced, to respect and help maintain the law and order thus established. Sumptuary and punitive measures are always in season to restrain the extravagant and segregate the wicked; but they should not unfairly be made to apply only when the transgressor is poor or friendless, else the only romantic element in public justice be rendered sterile, cast out and wholly alienated from the hearts of men.

According to this simplicity of conceiving it, the proper business of Government appears largely to be a masterly handling of the moral forces and an impartially scientific control of the economic, industrial, social and educational handicaps obtaining within the domain of its jurisdiction. Dealing with relations external to this proper domain should not be a government function at all, being as it invariably is, nothing but a postponement and evasion

(if not a traitorous controversion) of the immediate responsibility. Because most all our international intercourse and diplomacy (usually called statesmanship) is practically a rhetorical pastime for those in high and honorary but non-essential offices, such efforts have little directly to do with the domestic business of control.

It is easy then, to see what becomes of a government's political sovereignty when it seeks to base its operations or administrative functions on any but primarily moral grounds, on ethically just measures of control. The oldtime systems of governing by divine right, dynastic inheritance, religious imperialism, hand-me-down authority, minority-prestige, class-privilege, and kept-press tactics have been seen to fail time and again. And we are right now witnessing the failure of various more or less sincere attempts at arbitrating strikes, adjudicating wage revisions to meet (?) a far more buoyant cost-of-living, financing a soldier's bonus with *any* but a direct and confiscatory tax on unreasonably excess war-profits, and a myriad other schemes all in the mood of governing the nation according to the fallacious political philosophy of industrial hegemony, financial prestige, and mandatory economics. What about that old maxim about "pride goeth before a fall?"

If the political code is biased one way or the other, or even when only thrown out as a sop to the demands of any self-seeking clique which happens to have a powerful voice in making or breaking that code, then how can we expect the public, the subjects under that code really, to see in it any right to claim patriotic allegiance or consent to any other form of political sovereignty? But if the political philosophy adopted and enforced by a government provides honorable means of livelihood and adequate protection over all useful and worthy activities, enjoining those which overstep the ethical limits of personal liberty, and so interpreting and administering the just aids toward preserving the common weal, then and only then will it have any honest claim to sovereign power. The people will respect it and endeavor to live up to its secure and noble patterns, knowing that it guarantees to carry on its proper functions in full recognition of moral right and ethical justice, having confidence in and devotion to that decalogue of principles which can never be abrogated with impunity.

One of the world's worst fallacies in governmental theory is giving itself specious reasons and ill-founded hopes in the very face of the numerous hazards and presumptions of paternalism, whether nationalistic or agendic, industrial or educational. It is pseudo-nationalistic paternalism which is now leading Premier Nitti to

sublimate and medicate the feeble results of the Genoa Economic Conference; the same thing which led Giolitti (formerly premier and the Iago-Macchiavelli-Caillaux of Italian politics who renewed Italy's membership in the Triple Alliance) to become a dramatic deceiver with a perfect art of vicious casuistry and an ambiguous assumption of power. Likewise it was a fallacious turn of internationalist paternalism which caused both the Allies and the Central Powers to fail to preserve the integrity and economic rights of smaller nations, just as they failed both during and since the war to adhere to the given principle that "all government should be carried on only with the consent of the governed"—a principle good enough for all but vicious and refractory groups. However, Bernard Shaw and the Fabian Society struck a few conciliatory points for international government relations when they gave secondary notice to the patriotic pride of nationalism, but sanctioned the priority of properly using combined international force to compel the equitable decision of justicial issues, and suggested that some rational form of cosmopolitan culture and understanding might well be used as a guide-book to our social evolution.

Here were some anticipations of Randolph Bourne's heuristic suggestions of an impending twilight of idols, a stern irenic for terminating the numerous intellectual conflicts relating to the decisions of war in the particularly American assumption that they should be, primarily if not ultimately, carried on for the sake of international freedom and democracy. But the only *Demos* that has survived is that of a sophisticated vulgarity, a popular corruption of morals which holds us in a bog of mediocrity and pot-boiling, in a perennial mood of mercenary motive and ambitious monopoly. The supreme American fallacy in governmental theory is the assumption of an absolute, even incomparable, fund of administrative ability whereby even the pluralistic functions and relations of international co-ordination are considered to be in dire need of the would-be benevolence of a self-appointed guardianship and a reciprocally calculated but ill-balanced formula of economically sustained political hegemony. Surely anyone with half an eye can see in much of this the same old \$incere Octopus\$ reaching out his slimy tentacles to grasp and stifle the world. Else why do our profiteering potentates (so well exemplified by their predecessors, the war-lords, speculators in food-stuffs, and other so-called dollar-a-year men) reveal such an utter and lead-menacing fear of their very lives when anyone mentions Bolsheviki, I. W. W., Farm

Bloc, Non-Partisan League, Social Equity, etc.? Great concern is entertained for ship subsidies, compensation for broken ship-building contracts, railroad financing, guarantees of various industrial dividends, but they have used their Congressional puppets to recently show with conclusive certainty that they do not relish the idea of relinquishing the smallest part of their share in another great American fallacy (§service) even to the extent of financing a tax-free and discount-free soldier's bonus out of their astounding hoard of war-profits, not to say out of the equally greedy post-war "velvet" overlaying an economically well-trimmed world.

It is the business of honest and socially efficient government to disapprove and forestall any such national and international thievery, such direct and unscrupulous ethical anarchy, for such culpable conduct by either individuals or corporations or corrupt politicians is always preventable or controllable if in some just and adequate way they are held accountable to those who make and directly administer the laws. Even the most divergent contingencies of a nation's life may be effectively controlled by means of reactionary publicity and resort to popular moral action, if not by the more positive agencies of prosecution, imprisonment, segregation or exile of all who controvert our highest ideals, all who would corrupt the goods of life. One of the worst things that can befall a nation's administrative government is for it to function unfairly, giving ease of protection and luxury of ready exploit to *big* thieves and using its punitive powers only to hound the poor or improvident, the misfit or unemployed. Thus is bred the spirit of revolt, not against the laws or personnel of government particularly, but against the injustice, tyranny, special privilege and protected exploitation of the caste-wise malffeasance. Witness Ireland, Egypt, India, Russia, post-war Germany and the Fascisti-phase of the recent Italian economic transition toward a social democracy. Even in our own ribald, high-gearred, loud-labelled (but really mediocre, muddied-eyed) America we have far too much newspaper democracy, and not enough of the real, actual, pulsating people's government, of, by, and for themselves, not as selfish individuals who use their government as a cloak, but as a nation nobly organized for the best welfare of all and faithfully living up to the full requirements of its program.

However, the workaday business of government must be supplemented very often by the heroic efforts and courageous sacrifices of a few unselfish men. Like Lowell once said, the safety and en-

lightenment of the many always depends upon the courage and talents of the few. Like the ideal supplied in Royce's philosophy of loyalty, it means that one of the richest services a man can render his country is to make his intellect and capacity for moral distinction bring searching and constructive criticism to bear on the bettering of its customs, laws, ambitions, industries and other social institutions of national development. Every country or community is always in need of men with true and high ideals of life, men who also have the courage and the talents necessary to push their ability to the front so as to realize their worthy ideals in the affairs of both the smaller world about them and the larger world of international brotherhood and cosmic destiny. One of the encouraging facts is that any man who really has such ideals on the threshold of his ethical vision will do all in his power to amplify his neighbor's viewpoint of life, his contemporaries' ways of thinking, and exalt their worthier aims toward political reformation and true sovereignty.

In this sense, governmental reform is a far more gradual process than that of other less secular affairs, romantic morality, art, or religion, for example. Even while largely an inert mass of officialdom performing perfunctory duties, the cycle of political growth, flourishing and decay is usually pretty well marked off if we recognize its two perennial conditions; one holding that the static appearance of economic, industrial, financial, or judicio-social codes of government is really the fixed label of motive functions making up the so-called progressive character or purpose of our modern political system; and the other or dynamic aspect (field of active causal principles, the structure of both theory and practice) of those ethical action-patterns which give us any government at all holding that this field is really an everchanging expression of what is or should be morally static and ethically structural, the very soul of every just organization, free communion and uniform social improvement. This amounts to a rational, rather than a merely romanticizing, conception of the purposes and functions of good government.

Thus it must be said and, even in contradiction to the position adopted by many of our contemporary reformers, proved that taking it at any point of historical time human society can honestly be called organized only when the motives of organization and the functions of its self-preservation are morally good, when the activities of such life and ambition as it may show are vitally con-

structive rather than destructive, ethically co-operative rather than selfishly conflicting. We know that political power is proverbially changeable and arbitrary, lucre-loving and corrupt; but any government by moral hegemony and any just administration of adequate and inexorable laws are the only kinds that can give *all* the people security, for they stand ever ready to assist the fallen, they are accountable and responsible for what they do, they are enduring and conservative of the national welfare, both public and private probity being the featured virtue. It is, then, the proper business of governments to see that they have this hegemony, that they administer just and effective laws, that they guarantee equality and security to all, that their most durable value is constructive of social good, and that their conduct is always accountable and responsible to the people who acknowledge their guidance and benefit by their protection. Bare reliance on the integrity of personal conscience is not enough, and the motto of *pas trop gouverneur* resounding through Waldo R. Browne's political symposium ("Man or the State", Huebsch, 1920) should have been somewhat more stringent and historically accurate.

IV. CONCLUSIONS.

Therefore, there are many facts and fancies, truths and lies, to be met with in those two hemispheres of human conduct and control. A certain tonic effect is to be had from looking things squarely in the face, even though such disillusion to the clever camouflage makes us oftentimes pessimists and skeptics. In a fairly close survey of both Romanticism and Government I find that we live in a world of masqueraders, in an age of artifice and delusion, in a group-mood of mediocre mimicry and inert hero-worship. There is loud argument as to destiny and tradition, but any supposititious sense of effective discipline or co-operative interest is given an inaudibly small voice. Destiny is but the soft lining of tradition's coat; it is the raised nap of a dirty rug that has been sent to the cleaners. Traditions start, so Froude tells us, in the miracles of saints and the heroic exploits of supermen. But when once these have passed into the blear retrospect of ages less visionary, mediocre minds then read into our future a destiny commonly open to all humanity. The unique genius of those more talented and heroic is assumed as animating those still ignorant and cowardly. The survival of tradition, then, requires a certain respect for things venerable but irrelevant; the survival of man (i. e. the destiny-ideas of

such a future) requires a certain susceptibility of mind to visions of personal preferment, affective prestige, possessional merit if not also that peculiarly human appetite which craves *more life, more love, more pleasure, more luxurious ease, more everything*. Were so many of us not set on the vain career of realizing a fickle and illusory success in life we would not be prematurely grasping after destiny, the imaginary rewards hereafter; instead of this there would be far less error and misery, and far more progress and happiness in the world. Man's happiness philosophy is all askew with false ambitions and his life is grown corrupt; his ethics seem to have only a possessive case and his neighbors feel insecure.

The vulgar seek happiness in fads and cults, in wealth and luxury, in the specious prestige and egotism of a consciously directed influence over others. This is a vain and vacillating procedure; it is neither sure of its aim nor secure in its acquisitions. It is the worldling's faith in material perfection and argues a rhyomistic philosophy on the bourse of life. Such fools invariably miss the proper discipline of experience—nay, they also miss the joy of true living by controverting the normal interests of life into base means for self-assertion and self-service. They murmur in self-pity but know no sweet relief; they lead pinched lives, making no public sacrifice and seeing no lesson of justice in their private suffering. It is not always an adverse environment, not altogether an external defect, which can be marked down as the cause of wasted lives. It is rather the growing despond of spirit too innately feeble to wage a successful struggle; it is rather the emptiness of heart giving expressionless concessions to caducité; it is the sickening thud of souls falling into perdition. Mad purchases of murky pleasure, raucous pursuits of risque delight, are the functions of decaying souls; they are the inevitable symptoms of a gradually degenerating moral issue.

Resurgent souls, on the other hand, are more sternly set on righteousness and truth, more clearly conscious of Man's nobler pilgrimage toward the shrine of beauty and reality. But it is not a procedure wholly romantic, nor yet wholly ascetic and restricted; neither is it exactly patterned after our historical evolution, for that (as Huxley says) would be too "unutterably saddening." Progress is spiritual growth if anything; it is that specific ennoblement, enlightenment and advance which guards against both atavism and false culture, which secures us in a world neither brute-selfish nor foppishly ignorant. The element of rebirth in souls which populate

a good world precludes all base illusions of private gain, all fear of material loss, all barren toil and futile grief, all vengeful malice and undeserved rewards. The wicked are invariably conservative in their creed of vice, the spoliator is an inveterate toastmaster to his own debauchery. But saints and sages see the true romantic cycle of progress, the meliorism of bare human deeds and dispositions; for all of fact or fancy in our human world is always subject to either debasement or ennoblement, whichever we choose to put into effect. We would do well to be generous and good instead of stingy and degenerate, were it for no nobler purpose than that of our own ultimate welfare. We should make practical interpretation of the affective power of art, such for example as that wizardry possessed by the second century Chinese painter Liu Pao whose *North Wind* made people feel cool, whose *Milky Way* made them feel hot, and whose *Ravens* were like the 24 Filials of antiquity. We should appreciate Milton's advice in the sonnet and be like Cyriack Skinner's grandsire "on the royal bench of British Themis" pronouncing laws of writ and wrath, the while he let no solid good pass by nor cheerful hour disdained. We should so live as to honestly read into Southey's *Scholar* our own biography of friendly converse "with the mighty minds of old", gaining humble instruction from partaking their moral either-or. Thus could we derive substantial government and a valid political philosophy from our realistic romanticism and Nature-love. Thus also would we know why Shelley said that "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world."

True artistic temperaments are more mute than voluble except in viewing things deformed, unjust or vile. The esthete, like the connoisseur of the exquisite and romantic experiences of life, is in perennial ecstasy and rapture through his sense of beauty, good and truth. He is the genuine apostle of the poetic imagination, but can yet speak strongly in terms of emphatic vernacular when the violence of vandal power or the folly of fickle postichees come crashing in upon him. Any honest devotee of art dislikes to have anything—empirical or contingent, affective or industrial—disrupt the serenity of his refuge. And yet he lives no peacock life, his treasures are of the humble, they are not housed precariously aloft in the ivory tower of an exclusive existence. His very genuineness of heart and talent keeps his life exemplary and tangible to others; his very heroism of soul and livelihood keeps his enthusiasm social and his firewood dry. No proud company of the world's elect can

claim priority to his membership, for he was already a genius and a creator of good taste when the tribal instinct first took root in man. Benevolence, justice, integrity and cordial deeds of daily expression are constant companions to the soul of romantic art as well as to the intellect and moral tools of a good government. No hate or grudge, no spoils or umbrage is held against or taken from what others do, because artistic genius is in nowise narrow or provincial. A certain darkened outlook on life is necessary for umbrage to be either given or taken, and romantic souls are too clear seeing to be vexed with trifles and imaginary wrongs. Dull sorrow and care may drag the common folk down and sadden their days, but in the sanctuary of romantic art the sunshine of happiness, remembered joys, and the ideal contact with relics of past glory are ever the vigilant sacristans of the shrine set up in governments of Beauty, Nature, Faith and Love.

TWO ANSWERS TO THE CHALLENGE OF JESUS.

BY WILLIAM WEBER.

(Concluded)

The words of Caiaphas breathe the same spirit in which the ruling classes of all nations and ages up to the present day have identified their own privileges with the welfare of their whole nation and even of the entire world. There is no need of looking for a higher truth hidden in them as the author of verse 51-52 does. "Now this he said not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation: and not for the nation only, but that he also might gather together into one the children of God that are scattered abroad," was not written by the author of verse 47-50, but was added by the compiler or a later reader. The statement belongs to an age when the death of Jesus was considered no longer as an event of human history, but of divine economy. As a matter of fact, the high priests were not endowed by virtue of their office with the divine spirit. Priesthood and prophecy were two separate things. The one was an hereditary position with strictly defined duties and emoluments, the other an individual gift of God that fell to the lot only of such as deserved it. A man of the type of Caiaphas was absolutely unworthy of divine inspiration. Thus no allegorical interpretation can be permitted to obscure the plain meaning of a proposition which breathes nothing but a selfishness that shrank not even from murder. That the resolution, offered by Caiaphas was adopted without a dissenting vote goes without saying. Before dismissing this subject, we have to consider the question how a disciple of Jesus could have learned what he relates about the council that decreed the death of Jesus. The general public cannot have known anything about that conspiracy. The account in Luke comes apparently from one of the Twelve. It does not contain anything but what an intelligent outsider could know and deduct from

what happened. The author of the Johannine version is, up to a certain limit, much better informed. He must have possessed special information which came to him from the camp of the enemy, unless we should have to conclude that his pen was guided by a vivid imagination. But such a conspiracy was bound to become known to quite a number of people. The chief priests had to take their whole entourage into their confidence and persuade them of the necessity of doing away with Jesus. They needed the co-operation of the temple servants for arresting him. We may therefore assume the meeting of verse 47-50 to have been of a semi-public character as far as the personnel of the temple was concerned. That some or the other of the subordinate priests and the Levites who were present at that occasion became afterwards believers in Jesus, is not impossible. In any case, the words ascribed to Caiaphas seem to have been addressed to the gallery.

The Johannine and the Synoptic accounts under discussion are independent of each other. The more important is the agreement of the Luke version with that of the Fourth Gospel. According to both, the chief priests and their allies want to put Jesus to death; and in both the hold which Jesus had upon the people is the cause of their murderous hatred. No details as to how that should be accomplished are discussed, whereas in the first two Gospels the emphasis is laid upon the means by which the end was to be attained. The reports of Luke and John are in that respect historical. For the execution of a plan of that kind is left quite naturally to an executive committee that is better qualified to act with decision and promptness than a deliberative body.

We are now in a position to state definitely what the first answer to the challenge of Jesus was. The chief priests and the scribes took up the gauntlet and replied: Thou shalt die!

Looking for the continuation of the source from which Jn. xi, 47-50 has been taken, Jn. xi, 54-57, and xii, 1-11, have to be put aside. The first passage is clearly unhistorical. For, according to it, Jesus, after having challenged the chief priests and incurred their deadly hatred, sought safety in flight and remained in hiding at a place called Ephraim for a whole year. For in verse 55 f. it is said that the people looked for Jesus at the next passover and wondered whether he would come to the feast. There are two unanswerable objections. In the first place, Jesus could not run away and hide himself after he had cleansed the temple without losing the confi-

dence of the people. Whatever else the Messiah might be, he could not be a coward. In the second place, Ephraim is identified with a fort only fourteen miles from Jerusalem. Jesus and his disciples could not tarry there for a whole year without being recognized and reported to the chief priests, especially as the enemies of Jesus had given commandment that the whereabouts of Jesus should be made known to them because they wanted to arrest him.

The Anointing at Bethany (Jn. xii, 1-8) has parallels in Mt. xxvi, 6-13, and Mk. xiv, 3-9. It is not a genuine Johannine pericope but a rather late compilation, most of whose features have been borrowed from not less than five different sources. These are, besides the just mentioned Matthew and Mark stories, Lk. vii, 37-39, Lk. x, 38 ff., and Jn. xi, 1-46. The name of the place where Jesus was anointed is derived from the first two Gospels as well as from Jn. xi. While the name of the host is not given, the names of Lazarus, one of the guests, and of Martha and Mary come from Jn. xi. But the statement "and Martha served," in verse 2, is based upon Lk. x, 40, where we read: "but Martha was cumbered about much serving." Mary anoints the feet of Jesus and wipes them with her hair. That feature is copied from Lk. vii, 38. The criticism of Mary by Judas Iscariot and her defense by Jesus is based on the Matthew account, not that of Mark; only there the disciples, instead of Judas Iscariot, find fault with the woman.

The party who put together Jn. xii, 1-8, out of odds and ends was an indifferent writer. The second half of verse 1 reads according to the Greek text: "where was Lazarus whom raised from dead Jesus." One might say perhaps that the first subject is placed after the verb for the sake of emphasis, but no reason can be found why Jesus should stand at the end of the second clause. That name indeed is entirely uncalled for, because the sentence to which that relative clause belongs begins: "Jesus came to Bethany." The reference to the raising of Lazarus from the dead is superfluous. For it has just been related at great length in the foregoing chapter. Neither the missing article before "dead" recommends our author. "But Lazarus was one of them that sat at meal with him" (verse 2) is rather suspicious. One should think Jesus could not have been the guest of anybody else at Bethany than of his friend Lazarus. The compiler must have felt that, too. For he omits the name of the host, who, according to Matthew and Mark, was Simon the Leper. The nameless woman of Matthew and Mark anoints the head of Jesus, whereas Mary anoints his feet and wipes them with

her hair. But in taking over these features from the Third Gospel, our writer failed to grasp their true significance. The woman of Luke is called a great sinner. When she stood with her cruse of ointment behind Jesus at his feet, her emotions overcame her, and her tears fell on his feet. That unforeseen accident forced her to dry the wet feet with her hair. Thereupon she kissed the feet and anointed them. As a rule friends kissed each other on the mouth, and the head was anointed with oil, as we learn from Lk. vii, 45 f. (comp. Ps. xxiii, 5). But the woman for obvious reasons did not dare to treat Jesus as a social equal. At Bethany, as is proved by the Matthew and Mark account, there was no reason why Mary should have abased herself. Moreover, the woman in Luke does not use her hair to anoint but to dry the feet of Jesus in order that she might anoint them. Mary in John simply rubs off the ointment with her hair and thus anoints rather her own head than the feet of Jesus.

The only original feature in John is that not the disciples in general, or some bystanders, or the host, but Judas Iscariot criticizes Mary, and that he is called a thief. In view of the other shortcomings of the pericope, no weight can be attached to these statements. Our compiler did not have first hand information. He lived at a time when Christians unconsciously drew the picture of the traitor in ever darker colors and crowned the faithful apostles with a halo. The answer of Jesus: "Suffer her to keep it against the day of my burying," indicates likewise the age of the compilation. It belongs to a time when the Christians believed the body of Jesus had been anointed when it was committed to the ground. But Mk. xiv, 8, and Mt. xxvi, 12, Jesus says: "She hath anointed my body beforehand for the burying," and "In that she poured this ointment upon my body, she did it to prepare me for burial." That was written while the Christians still knew that the corpse of Jesus had not been anointed. Therefore Jn. xii, 7, has to be regarded as an intended emendation of the older text. But since the nard had been applied to the feet of Jesus, it could no longer be sold nor kept against the day of the burial of Jesus. Thus the emended text of verse 7 is contradicted by its own context. Final proof of the dependence of our pericope upon the Synoptic Gospels is the expression *Judas Iscariot*. That is a strictly synoptic term and is used two times in each Synoptic Gospel. The Fourth Gospel calls the traitor three times *Judas the son of Simon Iscariot*, which therefore has to be considered as characteristic of John.

Jn. xii, 9-11, is closely connected with and dependent upon the story of the Anointing at Bethany. Since the latter is spurious, the former cannot be genuine. Both stand and fall together.

The Triumphal Entry of Jesus into Jerusalem (Jn. xii, 12-15) takes up the thread of the narrative which broke off Jn. xi, 50. The opening phrase, "on the morrow," places in the present condition of the text the occurrence on the fifth day before the passover. But that is an impossible date. The chief priests and the Pharisees could not afford to wait six days before they struck their victim. Their revenge, in order to be sure, had to be swift. The Jews remained for eight days at the temple; including the journey to and from Jerusalem, the Galileans spent about two weeks for the passover. For that reason alone, they would not congregate in any large numbers at the temple until the last day before the feast. The compiler of our section was aware of that fact. He undertook to account for the early presence of the multitude by stating in Jn. xi, 55: "Now the passover of the Jews was at hand: and many went up to Jerusalem out of the country before the passover to purify themselves." Still "many" and "a great multitude" are not the same thing. Besides, special purifications were not required before the passover. The law said: "If any man of you or your generations shall be unclean by reason of a dead body, or be on a journey afar off, yet he shall keep the passover unto Jahweh" (Nu. ix, 10). Moreover, Jn. xi, 55, could not explain the early arrival of Jesus. He foresaw the fate that awaited him; he had made up his mind to bear the cross; but he would hardly anticipate the fatal moment. The right time for striking effectively at the chief priests was when the pilgrims had arrived, that is to say, the afternoon of the last day before the paschal lamb had to be prepared. Of course, as soon as the true character of Jn. xi, 51-xii, 11, has been established, both the phrase "on the morrow" and the expression "a great multitude" of Jn. xii, 12, are quite correct. Jesus arrived and cleansed the temple during the afternoon of the thirteenth of Nisan. The chief priests and the Pharisees decided the same evening to put him to death. The next morning a great multitude went forth to conduct their champion in triumph to the temple.

The idea of going out to meet Jesus on the road and escort him into the city and temple was conceived and executed by the people. Neither Jesus nor his disciples suggested or arranged that triumphal entry. They played throughout the whole affair a strictly

passive part. It is necessary to call attention to that fact because the Synoptic Gospels tell a different story.

The Johannine multitude went forth to salute Jesus as victor. That is shown by the palm branches with which they were provided. The fronds of palm trees were the symbol of victory. They are mentioned only in John. Likewise the definite article is not to be overlooked. We read: "They took *the* branches of the palm trees and went forth to meet him." The taking of the palm branches was evidently a deliberate act, not a mere accident. Palm trees are not found in the neighborhood of Jerusalem. The altitude is too high for them. They do not thrive at an elevation of more than 1,000 feet above sea-level. They grow in the seacoast plain of Palestine and were raised in antiquity also in the Jordan valley near Jericho. (Ant. xvii, 13, 1) The palm fronds could therefore not have been picked up by the roadside. They must have been taken along from the temple. We know from Lev. xxiii, 40, that the Jews used palm branches at the feast of Tabernacles. But it is very probable that this custom was extended also to the Passover as well as Pentecost. One of the ancient rabbis, at least, writes: "With the palm branches in your hand, ye Israelites appear before the Eternal One as victors." Also Plummer (Internat. Crit. Commentary, St. Luke, p. 498) assures us: "The waving of palm branches was not confined to the feast of Tabernacles." The palm branches, and especially the definite article, are such an intimate feature that no later writer, interpolator or commentator could have added it to the narrative.

Since the palm branches were taken along purposely, the great multitude of pilgrims that sallied forth to meet Jesus must have intended to greet him as victor. But a victory implies a preceding fight. In what fight, had Jesus been victorious? We know of no other attack he made upon anyone except that upon the chief priests and the scribes when he cleansed the temple. In that encounter he held the field while the chief priests and their partners had to withdraw in discomfiture. The pilgrims who had sided with Jesus had prevented the chief priests from inflicting any harm upon him, mistook that initial advantage for the final victory. They argued, very likely, "As long as Jesus is in our midst, nobody shall lay hands upon him."

From that point of view, the clause "when they heard that Jesus was coming to Jerusalem" cannot refer to the first arrival for the feast. His coming to the temple on the morning after the

cleansing must be meant. The Greek text reads "into Jerusalem." That may be significant. Jesus and his disciples as well as the great majority of pilgrims camped during the week of the feast outside of the city, from where they came daily to attend the religious exercises at the temple. Some enthusiastic admirers of Jesus must have learned from the disciples where he was staying over night and by what road he came to the city. That knowledge enabled them to arrange the royal reception they gave him. The original text, however, may have been changed slightly by the compiler. That man, as I presume, supposed the triumphal entry to have taken place on the very day when Jesus arrived from Ephraim. That would follow from Jn. xi. 55, and agree with the Synoptic tradition, with which the compiler was familiar.

The great multitude went forth, according to verse 13, with their palm branches to salute and honor Jesus not only as victor but also as the Messiah. For they hailed him:

"Hosanna!

Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord,
Even the king of Israel!"

What could have prompted the people to acclaim thus in public the Messianic mission of Jesus? His teaching alone could not have caused them to do so. For thereby he had demonstrated only that he was a great prophet. The Messiah indeed was expected to possess the spirit of prophecy and know the will of God even better than the greatest prophets of old. But that spiritual gift alone could not prove his Messiahship. Neither could the miracles ascribed to Jesus establish any royal claims. For prophets of past ages like Elijah had performed similar deeds. Moreover, the signs of the Fourth Gospel do not belong to the oldest Johannine source which relates only the passion of Jesus. All references to those signs belong to the compiler. The Messiah, besides being a great prophet, was expected in the first place to do Messianic deeds. The Fourth Gospel reports only one such deed. That is the Cleansing of the Temple. An ordinary mortal would never have dared to do that. It presupposed the consciousness of royal, Messianic authority which surpassed that of the priests. Anybody might have criticized the chief priests most severely, but nobody would have dared to interfere actually with their business in the temple and with the sale of victims that were devoted to God. The people recognized that instantly. They understood at once what Jesus meant with his question about the baptism of John.

The royal reception which the pilgrims gave to Jesus was their answer to the Challenge of the Chief Priests and the Pharisees. Jesus, as the Messiah, had called them to repentance and urged them to renounce their selfish greed. The people saw that as clearly as they themselves did; but while the latter decided to kill him, the former ranged themselves with unbounded enthusiasm at his side. He was the long-expected Savior. They went forth to give expression to their conviction in an unmistakable manner for the purpose not only of honoring Jesus but also of bringing to bear the pressure of public opinion upon his opponents.

While Jesus was being escorted into the city, there happened an incident of little importance in itself. Jesus and his disciples were, of course, walking afoot when the multitude met them. Getting ready to march back with Jesus in their midst, the thought occurred to them how little it became Jesus to enter the holy city like any other poor pilgrim. Looking around, they found a little ass whose owner consented to put it at the disposal of Jesus. Neither Jesus and his disciples nor the multitude paid any special attention to that occurrence at the time being. Only later on they remembered a saying of the prophet Zechariah which had been fulfilled literally. Jn. xii, 14-16, says: "Jesus, having found a young ass, sat thereon; as it is written,

Fear not, daughter of Zion:
Behold, thy king cometh,
Sitting on an ass's colt.

These things understood not his disciples at the first: but when Jesus was glorified, then remembered they that these things were written of him, and that they had done these things unto him."

The words quoted show that neither Jesus nor his disciples were responsible for the episode of the ass. "They," that is to say, the multitude or the leaders of the multitude took the initiative.

The Synoptic version of the Triumphal Entry is very different from the Johannine account. It is found Mt. xxi, 1-11—15-16; Mk. xi, 1-11, and Lk. xix, 29-40. It does not follow the cleansing of the temple but precedes that event. The very first sentence with which the narrative begins in the first two Gospels shows very distinctly that the triumph was celebrated right at the arrival of Jesus for the Passover before he had been in the city and temple. Mt. xxi, 1, reads: "And when they drew nigh unto Jerusalem."

In the preceding paragraph (Mt. xx, 29-34) Jesus passes through Jericho on his way to Jerusalem.

Also the place whence Jesus started his ostentatious procession is named. Matthew tells us: "and came unto Bethphage unto the Mount of Olives"; Mark: "unto Bethphage and Bethany at the Mount of Olives," and Luke: "when he drew nigh unto Bethphage and Bethany at the so-called Mount of Olives." Why the First Gospel has omitted the second village is not difficult to see. The Greek translator employed by mistake a wrong preposition for rendering the preposition of the Semitic text. He wrote "came into Bethphage." As a person can enter not more than one village at the same time, he felt constrained to omit "and Bethany." But the Hebrew preposition here in question means as a rule with verbs of motion like go and come "to" or "towards." That is confirmed also by verse 2, where Jesus directs two of his disciples: "Go into the village that is over against you." Jesus had not entered Bethphage nor intended to do so. Therefore Jesus may have stopped in the neighborhood of two villages before he rode into Jerusalem.

All three Gospels have Jesus order two of his disciples to fetch him an ass from Bethphage. He wanted to fulfill literally an old prophecy (Zech. ix, 9). We are told so Mt. xxi, 4 f. That passage is indeed a gloss, because it is not supported by Mark and Luke. But even if it is dropped, the fact remains Jesus in all three Gospels makes deliberate preparations for going into Jerusalem just as the prophet had described it. The very act of riding on the back of an ass proclaimed Jesus to all who knew him as the Messiah.

The translator of the Matthew version committed another linguistic error when he translated the just-mentioned prophecy into Greek. He discovered therein two different animals, an ass and a colt of an ass. He was not acquainted with the characteristic peculiarity of Hebrew poetry to repeat a statement in other words, called parallelism of members. The prophet had written:

"riding on an ass,
even upon a colt,
the foal of an ass."

That means the king rode upon a young donkey. But our interpreter made the disciples bring an ass and a colt. They not only put their garments upon both, but even made Jesus ride upon both at the same time, as if he had been an equestrian performer. The

translators of the Mark and Luke text did not make that mistake. There the disciples obtain but one animal.

As soon as Jesus had identified himself in that manner with the Messiah of Zechariah, the disciples started an ovation, designed to call the attention of the pilgrims to what was going on and enlighten them as to its true import. They spread their garments on the way and saluted Jesus as "the king that cometh in the name of the Lord." (Lk. xix, 37 and 39). The second Gospel reports the same thing. Only one addition is made. Besides the garments, leaves, cut from the fields, were strewed upon the road for Jesus to ride over. The disciples are not mentioned expressly; but as no other subject is introduced, the "many" and "others" of Mk. xi, 8, must belong to the same group of people as the "they" of verse 7. Of course, the term "disciples" embraces under those circumstances all the adherents of Jesus that were present. That is indicated perhaps also by the expression "the whole multitude of the disciples" of Lk. xix, 37. According to Matthew, the disciples, that is to say, the Twelve, only secured the ass for Jesus and put their garments upon him; everything else is done by "the multitudes." As they are thus distinguished from the disciples, the term must denote the pilgrims that happened to be traveling along with Jesus and his twelve companions. It reads: "The most part of the multitude spread their garments in the way; and others cut branches from the trees and spread them in the way; and the multitudes that went before him and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna," etc. (Mt. xxi, 8 f.) When, at last, they had marched into the temple, and the grown people had become quiet, the children still continued to shout: "Hosanna to the Son of David!" (verse 15). The three Synoptic accounts form a climax. The ascent from Luke through Mark to Matthew is quite conspicuous. One is tempted to consider "the whole multitude" of Lk. xix, 37, as a later addition to the text, suggested by Matthew. According to Luke, only garments were placed in the road like rugs for Jesus to ride over. Mark adds leaves cut from the fields. The Greek noun rendered in the American Revised Version "branches" (Mk. xi, 8) means a bed of straw, rushes, or leaves whether spread loose or stuffed into a mattress. The first Gospel has: "Others cut branches from the trees." (Mt. xxi, 8) That is doubtless unhistorical. Branches would not have made the road any smoother. Besides, nobody would have thought of depriving in the vicinity of Jerusalem trees of their branches, be-

cause trees are rare in that region. Thus the most simple account, that of Luke, seems to be the most original of the three.

But even the Luke account, though superior to that of Mark and Matthew, contains highly improbable statements. Jesus tells the disciples, who were to fetch the ass for him, they would find in Bethphage "a colt tied whereon no man ever sat." He also instructs them as to what they should say if anybody should try to prevent them from taking the animal along. Neither Jesus nor his disciples were acquainted with the owners of the ass. Jesus therefore must have possessed the gift of the second sight, and the owners must have been influenced by supernatural means to hold their colt in readiness for two men who were to claim it in the name of the Lord.

It would be silly to reject anything related about Jesus simply because it looks like a miracle. Still supernatural things do not exactly lighten the task of the exegete. But any explanation of the Synoptic pericope of the Triumphal Entry presents unsurmountable difficulties as soon as it is placed side by side with the Johannine account of the same event. The Synoptic Gospels date the Entry before, the Fourth Gospel after the Cleansing of the Temple. The former makes Jesus the arranger of the whole demonstration, and Luke confines it to the disciples; the latter describes the triumph as arranged exclusively by the people without previous knowledge and consent of Jesus and his disciples. The donkey which plays so prominent a part in the Synoptic Gospels is merely an accident in the Fourth Gospel. As the two versions are directly opposed to each other in their principal details, only one of them can be genuine.

The Johannine account presents not a single objectionable feature. Jesus acts as he acted before. He does not violate any of his well-known principles. He did not make a bid for the applause of the people; he simply accepted it when it was offered to him unsought although by doing so he sealed his fate. The Synoptic Jesus acts in an altogether different way. He proclaims his divine mission to the multitude of pilgrims who ascended to Jerusalem with him. It was quite a theatrical performance. Still up to that moment, he had concealed his identity most carefully and had even forbidden his disciples to tell the people who he was. He wanted the people to recognize him as the Messiah themselves. Jesus can never have renounced that principle and advertised himself like a charlatan. Thus the Fourth Gospel alone has preserved the authentic account

of The Triumphal Entry. The parallel tale of the oldest synoptic source was lost by some accident. But the compiler of the first synoptic memoirs possessed a legendary version of that event, inserting it, however, in the wrong place. That apocryphal version may even have induced him to omit the original story of his best source because, in his opinion, it was too plain and too short. Consequently, we have to insist with the Johannine account that the Triumphal Entry of Jesus, as arranged and managed by the people on their own responsibility, is the answer of the people to the challenge of the chief priests by Jesus.

That answer proved disastrous for Jesus. His mortal enemies needed the active co-operation of Pontius Pilate unless they wanted to employ hired assassins. A public crucifixion by order of the Roman governor was, of course, more desirable and safer than secret murder. It would look like a swift judgment of God because Jesus had rebelled against the priests. But Pilate would only proceed against Jesus if he had become convinced of the dangerous character of the man from Nazareth as an enemy of the Pax Romana.

Under these circumstances, nothing could be more welcome to the priests and scribes than the enthusiastic demonstration of the people in favor of Jesus. They passed the Antonia when entering the temple, and that citadel must have been the Praetorium of Matthew, Mark and John. Many scholars indeed regard the palace of Herod as the official residence of the governor. They do so because he occupied the palace of Herod at Caesarea. (Act. xxiii, 35) But there is a great difference between Jerusalem and Caesarea. Within the walls of the latter, the Roman governor was absolutely safe and would inhabit as a matter of course the most pretentious building. At Jerusalem, where he was only during the great festivals, he was in a hostile camp. His task was to prevent or to suppress any outbreak against the Roman authority. Not personal comfort and splendor but exclusively military considerations prescribed his place of business. He was compelled to be at the strategic point. As the temple was the only place where a revolt might start, the Antonia, a strong fort at the northwest angle of the temple, which commanded the entire temple area, was the Praetorium at Jerusalem. It offered ample room for a large garrison, was safe from attack from without, and gave "immediate access to the flat courts and to the inner Temple." Thus Pilate, his officers and soldiers always knew what was going on in the temple. In the

given instance, the guards, many of whom were recruited in Syria and Palestine, would report that a man riding on an ass was acclaimed by a large multitude as the Son of David, the king of the Jews. Pontius Pilate himself would in all probability come out to watch the scene. In any case, he would send at once to the high priest for information and advice. That worthy dignitary had only to confirm the suspicions of the governor and promise to have the pretender arrested during the next night so that he could be crucified in the morning without the knowledge of his adherents.

The high priest was not even compelled to resort to lies. All he had to do was to assure the Roman of his undying loyalty and devotion and complain of the attack made by the Galilean upon himself the day before. His wrong consisted simply in not telling the whole truth. But truthfulness is not to be expected from men of his caliber. For the whole truth would have indicted himself and his colleagues. They had abused their sacerdotal office to further their own unsavory ends. They were guilty of atheism and robbery and were ready to crown their misdeeds, unpardonable for men in their position, with the judicial murder of him who had dared to warn them.

CREED.

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID.

Consenting not, consulted not, I came,
What then am I? A simple pawn of fate
That accident of birth alone might claim
For prince or pauper, saint or profligate.
With knowledge of my whence to me denied,
With mystery my pathway shrouding o'er,
How then shall I my whither's hope decide?
Or seek beyond this sphere in thought to soar?
The Force that formed the mammoth in his time,
The cuttle-fish, the sponge, the coral reef,
The chambered molusk in his home of slime,
The smallest germ, the crystal, and the leaf,
No revelation yet hath vouchsafed man,
Though book and legend would proclaim it so;
But, loving good, I trust, nor fear to span
The final breach, presuming naught to know.

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The practice of eating a god in the form of first-fruits or of a divine animal originated in ancient times, and attained an extraordinary development in the Mystery Religions of the Greeks, in the cults of Attis, of Adonis, of Osiris, of Dionysus, of Demeter, and of other Saviour Gods. From these cults the idea was borrowed by Paul and, against opposition of the Jewish Christians, fastened on the church. The history of the dogma, after the first centuries of our era, has been the story of attempts to explain it. Transubstantiation and the doctrine of the sacrifice of the mass were not, as commonly by Protestants and rationalists they are said to be, the inept inventions of a barbarous age, but were the first endeavors to reason about and philosophically to elucidate beliefs formerly accepted with naïve simplicity. The hardest battles over the dogma came in the Reformation period, which accordingly bulks large in the present work. While Luther, Calvin, and other prominent Reformers believed in a real presence, but tried to give its mode new explanations, other more advanced spirits, Honius, Carlstadt, Swingli, Tyndale, and their fellows, adopted the view, now prevalent in Protestant communions, that the eucharistic bread and wine were mere symbols. After the heat of the sixteenth-century controversies, Zwinglian or rationalist views were quietly adopted by most Christians, though here and there high sacramentalism survived or was revived.

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