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Devoted to the Science of Religion,
the Religion of Science, and the Extension
of the Religious Parliament Idea

FOUNDED BY EDWARD C. HEGELER

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TSCHAIKOVSKY'S BLACK BEAST

The Lack of a Definite Philosophy Enhanced His Genius

BY JOHN HEINTZ

“TSCHAIKOVSKY was simply a man with intervals of neurasthenia, not a man with a philosophy of the cosmos,” wrote Ernest Newman, in his book, *A Musical Motley*. Which goes to show, I think, that a man may utter a truth without being alive to the real significance of his facts, for while Tschaiikovsky was undoubtedly a man with intervals of neurasthenia and he was also without, at least a definite, philosophy of the cosmos, it was precisely his inability to anchor himself to a rock in the shape of a religious belief or philosophic conviction that embittered his life and precipitated those crises which found their emotional outlet in musical utterance. One suspects that Mr. Newman, who does not appear to credit Tschaiikovsky's philosophical difficulties with being a source of inspiration, is a better critic of music than of human nature. His labeling of the Russian composer as a “Weary Willie of the Arts,” is the natural mental reaction of a healthy-minded individual towards that heterogeneous collection of conflicting emotions which were the bane of Tschaiikovsky's existence.

If I grasp the meaning of Mr. Newman's phrase correctly, it is that Tschaiikovsky's music can be entirely explained by his natural genius for composition plus a certain amount of nervous instability with its resultant moods. As a surface reason this is a plausible explanation, but anyone who will take the trouble to peruse that voluminous correspondence carried on by the composer which appears in his biography written by his brother, Modeste, must surely come to the conclusion that a deeper reason for some of his music grew out of those very philosophical difficulties which Mr. Newman passes over lightly.

Tschaikovsky was something else besides a neurasthenic composer. He was an educated, polished man of the world; a student of literature and philosophy. Familiar with the works of Tolstoi, Turgenieff, Schopenhauer and others, his interest in philosophy manifested itself in frequent criticisms and discussions of what he had read. His correspondence is full of his views and perplexities, particularly that which he carried on with Mme. von Meck, his friend, confidante and benefactress for a period of almost twenty years.

His letters to her give ample insight into his philosophical difficulties. On Nov. 20, 1877, he wrote her, discussing what he termed, "the skeptic's tragedy:" ". . . You may say what you please, but a faith—not that which proceeds from mere deficiency of reasoning power and is simply a matter of routine—but a faith founded on reason and able to reconcile all misconceptions and contradictions arising from intellectual criticism—such a belief is the supreme happiness. A man who has both intellect and faith (and there are many such) is clad, as it were, in a panoply of armor which can resist all the blows of fate . . . Our sufferings are the same. Your doubts are as strong as mine. We are both adrift in that limitless sea of skepticism, seeking a haven and finding none . . ."

To Tschaikovsky, the skeptic's tragedy, without the shadow of a doubt, was the dread of annihilation. Death to him was what he termed it, "a flat-nosed horror." Familiarity with the writings of the philosophers had caused him to believe, in the thirty-seventh year of his age, "that if there is a future life at all, it is only conceivable in the sense of the indestructibility of matter, in the pantheistic view of the eternity of nature . . . So I have come to the conclusion, as the result of much thinking, that there is no future life."

Had Tschaikovsky been able to rest his case there, had he been able to dismiss the subject with a phlegmatic shrug of the shoulders, it would have been better for his peace of mind, but the world would have been deprived of some of his greatest music. But such an attitude was impossible to the talented Russian's psychological mechanism and we find in his letters that he was eternally at war with the course of nature, continually depressed with the order of things as he deemed them to be. No Epicurean resignation to the inevitable marked his attitude. No Stoical indifference to his fate

characterised him. On the contrary, he was in a state of perpetual rebellion against the fact of death, not through sheer love of life like Charles Lamb, but because of an overwhelming dread of personal extinction.

This contemplation and dislike of the idea of annihilation finally became so acute that Tschaikovsky sought a way of escape from it and in 1881 after attending the funeral service of Nicholai Grigorievich, he wrote Mme. von Meck: "My brain is obscured today. How could it be otherwise in the face of those enigmas—death, the aim and meaning of life, its finality or immortality? Therefore the light of faith penetrates my soul more and more. Yes, dear friend, I feel myself increasingly drawn towards this, the one and only shield against every calamity. I am learning to love God, as formerly I did not know how to do . . . I want to believe that there is another life . . ."

However, instinct and feeling are one thing and conviction is another and we may well believe that in a keenly analytical mind like Tschaikovsky's, well read in the skepticism of his time, such a reaction to the solace of religion was but a mere grasping at straws. It is indeed true that three years later, in a letter to Mme. von Meck, he reaffirmed his belief in God as a remedy for the tragic perplexities revealed by Tolstoi in his Confessions, but not more than a month had passed before he had confessed in a letter to Anna Merckling: ". . . At the same time one ought not to fear death. In this respect I cannot boast. I am not sufficiently penetrated by religion to regard death as the beginning of a new life, nor am I sufficiently philosophical to be satisfied with the prospect of annihilation. I envy no one so much as the religious man . . ." Still three years later, writing in his diary, he regrets that he can neither fathom life or drive away those disquieting questions of destiny.

But enough has been quoted here to show that the *bete noir* of Tschaikovsky's existence was the dread of an endless death. If he ever accepted those teachings of Nihilism, advocated by Herzen and Turgenieff, as some have claimed, I found no warrant for it in his letters. The only time he refers to Nihilism at length is in a letter to Modeste, in which he denounces it severely. Nihilism denounced religion, its doctrines and its ordering of life's affairs, where Tschaikovsky envied the religious man and appreciated the

value of religion in allaying the very dreads from which he suffered even though unable, intellectually, to accept its consolations. No. The trouble with Tschaikovsky was not the acceptance of Nihilism but the fact that he was unable to accept anything. His tragedy lay in the fact that he was not made of the stern sort of stuff that his intellectual convictions called for. Philosophic beliefs often demand a tough hide. They require courage to face reality, the inevitable. But Tschaikovsky evidently was not courageous. He was thin-skinned, sensitive, over-imaginative. He was, moreover, immature in a psychological sense, inasmuch as he was constantly bewailing the fact that nature could not give to him that which he craved, and his music is the emotional expression, not of the denials of Nihilism, but of his own personal, poignant grief over his inevitable destiny, his pathetic, futile protests against fate; resignation—yes—but not that of the mature spirit, rather that of helpless, protesting despair.

Turning now to Tschaikovsky's symphonies in search of the emotional expression of his despair the opening measures of the Fourth come to mind. Analysing them in a letter to Mme. von Meck the composer said: "This is Fate, that inevitable force which checks our aspirations towards happiness ere they reach the goal . . . A force which, like the sword of Damocles, hangs perpetually over our heads and is always embittering the soul. This force is inescapable and invincible. There is no other course but to submit and lament . . ."

This explanation, however, was superfluous and unnecessary for the significance of those opening measures is clearly revealed by the music. That significance is surely Fate. No other meaning can possibly be drawn from that ominous and sinister melody. Fate, the listener unerringly recognises it to be. Not the three knocks at the door of Beethoven's masterpiece, but that ever-looming, ever-menacing finale that hides just around the corner in our lives and which inevitably overtakes us. One gets glimpses of the despairing revolt of Tschaikovsky against fate all through his music but it is in his Sixth (Pathetic) symphony that he really unburdened his troubled soul and gave free vent to his irreconcilable spirit.

Referring to this symphony in a letter to his nephew Tschai-kovsky said that it was to be "a program symphony with a pro-

gram which should be a riddle to everyone. May they break their heads over it . . . This program is penetrated by subjective sentiment . . . While composing it in my mind I frequently shed tears . . ." But to the reader of his letters the riddle no longer exists because the message of this symphony is clear and unmistakable. Whether we bring to mind the sinister opening measures for the bassoon, the noble but pathetic protest in the middle section of the first movement which follows that unforgettable melody given to the strings, or the trio in the second movement, of which Phillip Hale remarked, "Death beats the drum," the message of the composer confronts us in its stark and naked realism. As for the *Adagio Lamentoso*, who is there who can adequately describe his emotional reaction to it? To Vernon Blackburn it is the musical counterpart of Shelley's "Adonais." To James Huncker it is the cosmos draped in crepe. Words simply fail to describe the emotional power of this music which crushes even while it thrills one because words are merely guideposts to emotion. To anyone who has caught the harrowing message of those descending dirges any attempt to write down Tschaikovsky as a mere neurotic appears to be due to a temperamental incapacity for understanding. Possibly this music contains no message for those who habitually dwell upon the sunny side of life. Undoubtedly it is primarily intended for those who live on the ragged edge of existence, those "in-and-outers" whose mental lives are one eternal conflict, those heterogeneous personalities who cannot put their inner house in order.

But whatever may be the reaction of any individual to this symphony there is not the slightest question of a doubt but that the parts of it which I have referred to above are the emotional expression of Tschaikovsky's Black Beast, the eloquent musical outpourings of an agonized spirit lashed into a frenzy of despair by the ever-haunting dread of an eternity of nothingness.

Such a reaction to inexorable destiny is, of course, nothing unusual. The pages of literature teem with it. It is often the price paid to nature for the possession of a keen imagination. Wm. James is a typical example. For years he was tortured by a panicky fear over the uncertainty of life and regarded with amazement his mother, a very cheerful person, who serenely went about the business of living without giving a thought to the possibility of any impending catastrophe. Tschaikovsky's case was simply unique

because he combined the dread of the extinction of his personality by death with the capacity for expressing his grief over the fact musically, and that he has done so was as inevitable as that sparks fly upward.

It is possible, of course, to read a larger and more impersonal message into Tschaikovsky's music. His friend, Kasbkin, wrote of the *Adagio Lamentoso*: "If the last movement is intended to be predictive it is surely of things vaster and issues more fatal than are contained in a mere personal apprehension of death—it seems to set the seal of finality on all human hopes." This analysis rings true in the first place because in setting the seal of finality upon his own hopes by his music Tschaikovsky inevitably doomed the rest of humanity along with himself, and in the second place the music is all-embracing in its scope. However this may be true, it is evident, I think, that the wellspring of the *Adagio Lamentoso* was Tschaikovsky's personal, poignant grief over his own destiny. The man's mind was introspective. His own personal survival was the thing he was interested in. The stark, bleak tragedy of his life was to so ardently long for a future existence and yet to believe that he was denied it by nature. This is the burden of his song in his *Pathetic symphony*, the last movement of which, for all the critics may say with respect to its musical value, remains the most supreme lament in music.

HUMANIST TRENDS IN MODERN RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENTS

BY CURTIS W. REESE

THE study of trends has come to be regarded as a matter of major importance in the understanding of life processes. Not that there is any less interest in what has been nor in what now is. In fact the past and the present are especially significant in what they indicate to be the direction things are moving. There has perhaps never been a time when more was being done than now to find out what has really happened in the ages past. All the fields of knowledge are being re-investigated by scientific minds equipped with scientific method, technique, and apparatus. Out of the new knowledge thus made available is coming a tentative understanding of how the present has grown out of the past and what historical and current processes indicate for the future.

It would be difficult to overrate the importance of understanding trends. Many persons have wasted their lives, many movements have dissipated their energies in trying to keep alive ideas and programs which the trends of history have relegated to the realm of the "dodo." Lost causes as such may appeal to sacrificial heroism, but hardly to critical intelligence.

Not that we should summarily surrender to undesirable trends, but rather that we should seek to control trends in the direction of desired goals. The limits of control, however, are determined by the facts that give significance to the trends.

When the persons most competent in the several fields of learning begin to modify or rationalize or abandon the things most commonly believed in their fields, we are then in the presence of a condition that obviously calls for study. If these persons, however they may differ among themselves in details, move in a given direction, then a trend is established. Some people will refuse to follow.

Others will grudgingly move a few paces. Still others will pass through three stages; first, they will be in bitter opposition; second, they will say there is nothing new about the trend; and third, they will say that they have always believed in accordance with the trend. But the more courageous and far-seeing will from the very beginning move steadily and surely in the direction of the trend insofar as it appears in harmony with facts and ethical idealism.

Now in basic religious matters the usual dogmatic way of dealing with trends has been not merely to fail to understand them, not merely to ignore them, but to deny positively the very possibility of their existence. The faith "once for all delivered" has admitted of no change. But in spite of this hostile ecclesiastical atmosphere the spirit of man has refused to be subdued. The winds move in the tree tops. Indeed the very roots of the trees are being torn from their bedding in the rock and the soil.

Insofar as we are friends of what religion ought to be we will give heed both to research when it tells us what religion has been, and to prophecy when on a factual basis it tells us what religion may become.

It is my thesis that in modern religious developments there are unmistakable trends that move from *theo-centric* to *anthropo-centric religion*. Let us see how this holds in regard to various aspects of modern religious developments.

Significant trends are noted (1) in the study of religious sources, (2) in the appraisal of the dramatic religious leaders of history, (3) in the evaluation of doctrines, and (4) in the understanding of the nature of religion itself.

I

Sources

(1) In the study of religious sources we think first of all of the sacred literature of the world religions. In past ages, before the advent of the critical scientific study of documents, religious literature had a way of getting itself approved as peculiarly authoritative. This authority derived from the supernatural origin of the literature, or from the unique place held by its human author. Usually the human author merely mediated the message. When few people could read and write, and when still fewer could understand what was written, it was comparatively easy for writings to

gain credence as the very word of God, or at least, as the Modernist would say, the *norm* of religious experience.

So the Vedas and other sacred writings held sway in India; the Zendavesta, in Persia; the Tripitaka, in Buddhist lands; the Classics, in China; the Old Testament in Orthodox Judaism; the whole Bible, in Orthodox Christianity; the Book of Mormon and the Pearl of Great Price, in Mormonism; Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, in Christian Science.

But in recent times critical students have successfully challenged not only the verbal inspiration of sacred books but also the very idea of authoritative books as *norms* of valid modern religious experience. Back in the fifties, four young men were sent by the Brahmno Samaj, a liberal Hindu movement, to study the four vedas at Benares and report to the mother Samaj in Calcutta. The result was the abandonment by this influential Hindu body of the doctrine of vedic inerrancy. It was fitting that this example should have been set by the Brahmno Samaj, for it was the founder of that movement, Rammohun Roy, who was the father of that most helpful addition to the theological curriculum called Comparative Religion. In Christianity the smoke of the battle over higher criticism still lingers on the far horizon; but for the most part the Fundamentalists have been put to flight. Well known are the exposures of the real origin of the Book of Mormon and of Science and Health. In the various great religions critical heretics have blazed away at the scriptures, with varying results; but with the general effect that now the educated leaders of all religions look with a mingled expression of pain and patronage upon their fellows who still appeal to the authority of sacred volumes.

With the passing of the unique origin of the sacred scriptures, their unique nature ceased to have unique authority. In other words, the trend is definitely away from regarding any ancient writing as the norm for modern religious life. The effect of this is not to rob the people of religious literature, but to increase the literary material available for religious purposes. All literature, ancient and modern, that is profitable for spiritual purposes is the sacred literature of humanized religion; and the burden is upon us to produce today literature that can equal and surpass that of yesterday.

(2) It is likewise with the institutions of religion; that is, religion in its organized form. In spite of the teaching of many great religious leaders to the contrary, their followers have gen-

erally regarded organizations, institutions, and places as religious sources. At times it has been a certain line of succession, at times a particular mountain top, at times a temple or a cathedral or a shrine. These and other visible and invisible evidences that peculiar sources of religious life were possessed have resulted in streams of pilgrims to these sacred sources from the most ancient times down to the most recent occurrence in Malden, Massachusetts. It has taken a long time for even a portion of the race to learn that the spirit of religion is not bound, that all worthwhile organizations and institutions and places are holy. But the present day trend is definitely in the direction of regarding all inspirational movements and places, all experience of art and skill and wonder as sources of religious inspiration. While this may finally have a sad effect upon the institutions of organized religion, it will nevertheless have a wholesome effect upon the life of mankind. The religious institutions that would survive must do so in open competition with all other human institutions. This again gives us not fewer but more sources of religious inspiration.

(3) With the passing of scripture and institutions as final authoritative religious sources, the Modernist type of mind fell in with the traditional mystical way and declared *experience* to be the authoritative religious source. Now this had a scientific sound. It made a universal appeal. It gave great promise. But the appeal to experience is already going the way of former religious sources. In its place will come, is now coming *experimental experience*; that is, scientific method applied to the spiritual experience of man. Uncontrolled and uncriticised experience was no safer guide than the older authorities. Experiences were varied, multiple, and belonged to their setting. It is only by controlled experience, under conditions of testing, that we have good hope of using it as a dependable source. This has been pointed out by various persons these last years. Prof. Wieman of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago in an article in the *Christian Century* gave solemn warning against appealing to uncontrolled experience as authority in religious matters.

Tests are being made to find out how experience is influenced, what it means, and how it may be improved ethically; as, for example, in the character tests under the auspices of professors in Teachers' College, Columbia. Their volume on *Studies in Deceit*

is illustrative of what I mean. The work of Professor Starbuck and his associates in Iowa State University is in a similar vein.

The sum of the matter is that the study of religious sources tends definitely away from the superhuman and authoritative to the human and experimental.

II

Leaders

(1) How is it in the appraisal of the dramatic religious leaders of history? Most of the religions have been builded around the real or supposed teaching and personality of real or mythical founders. Hinduism and Shintoism are possible exceptions. The names of Zoroaster, Moses, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Mohammed, Joseph Smith, Comte, and Mary Baker Eddy are associated with the origin and history of the religions with which their names are so intimately connected.

(2) To a considerable extent the same is true of the sects. Even John the Baptist is claimed by the sect that bears his name. The name of John Calvin is linked with Presbyterianism, John Wesley with Methodism, Alexander Campbell with the Disciples, William Ellery Channing with the Unitarians, and so on. Most of the religions and sects are the lengthened shadows of dominant personalities. Great men have wrought mightily in behalf of their ideas of righteousness. They have not always been original creators but they have embodied and dramatized the emotions and ideas of the inarticulate multitudes. Some of them have even made valuable contributions to religious life.

((3) The great-man-complex once held sway throughout all social life. The shadows of the Napoleons have fallen across the face of the earth. But nothing is surer today than the fact that social theory and the democratic spirit tend to discount, even to retire, the dramatic and ofttimes irresponsible leader, and to magnify the cumulative notions of many people and the possibility of expressing the public will. Cooperative plans of social life are urged not only as wise but as unavoidable ways of life. Our very souls are socially created. The shared life is as inevitable as it is profitable.

Current theory and practice move away from the dominant personality. Many of the outstanding war-time leaders of the nations have been retired by the suffrage of their fellow citizens; and the

feelings and ideas and hopes of the peoples of the world are beginning to be heard in the councils of the nations.

(4) Nowhere is this trend away from the domination of dramatic religious leaders more forcibly set forth than in the changing attitude towards Jesus of Nazareth. Only a little while ago the Christian world regarded Jesus as nothing less than very God of very God. Then the Unitarians made him something less than very God, but more than merely man. The next generation of Unitarians made him very man of very man. Then the Modernists followed suit with a view of Jesus as man, but what a man! He was used as a depository of all modern idealism. Others, however, challenged the doctrine of the adequacy of his moral and spiritual leadership. They pointed out that he said nothing against slavery although slavery was general in his day; that he said nothing against war although war was the chief honoric profession of his day. To the argument that his general teaching implied opposition to slavery and war they replied that the highest ethical leadership is not in abstract principles nor in pious professions, but in the concrete and the specific. Meaningful words must be tipped with steel and accurately aimed.

And not regarding these changes in attitude as enough came a whole bevy of critics saying that in point of fact Jesus never lived at all, that the whole Jesus fabric is mythical. Drews in Germany, Robertson in England, Smith in America startled the Christian world with slightly different theories of the non-historicity of Jesus. Various men including Professor Shirley Jackson Case of the University of Chicago replied. But the late George B. Foster after examining the literature for and against the historicity of Jesus could only say, "Jesus is historically probable but not religiously necessary." As the battle progressed other works were written by Couchond of France, Brandes of Denmark, and Chowdhuri of India against the historicity of Jesus, and many more in behalf of his historicity or upon the assumption of it. But today it seems to me necessary to go even further than the statement by Dr. Foster, and say, Jesus is historically doubtful and not religiously helpful.

(5) In my judgment, one of the greatest services that can be rendered to religion is to free it from the grip of the historic ethnic religious leaders. Thousands of modern minded souls in the midst of the new scientific spirit and method are more competent in the

spiritual realm than were the fathers of the world religions and of the sects of Christendom.

The trend is away from one-man-religion and in the direction of a social quest to find satisfactory values for all mankind.

3

Doctrines

(1) The trend of modern religious thought in the evaluation of doctrines is also in the humanist direction; that is, away from the dogmatic and in the direction of the experimental. It is perhaps here that we find the greatest difference between the older and the newer mind in religious matters. The older mind thinks of religion as consisting largely of a set of doctrines, and of doctrines as rather definitely fixed. The newer mind thinks of religion as consisting largely of experimental quests, and of the conclusions of the quest as tentative, and, like prices, subject to change without notice.

The older mind did not hold doctrines as hypotheses but as certainties. He was concerned with finalities. He felt the need of anchoring to some rock of ages. To doubt was to be damned. But the newer mind thinks of nothing so little as of certainty. In fact he rather doubts whether any certainty exists. He feels the thrill of novelty. For him it is postulates and hypotheses, not dogmas and certainties.

(2) The more modern minded of even the conservative clergy regard such basic doctrines as God, soul, and immortality as hypotheses. They defend these hypotheses on much the same ground as the scientists do theirs, namely, as working theories to be judged by their results. Now it is a far cry from this modern attitude to the old order in religion when a Jonathan Edwards spoke with absolute certainty of the will of the Calvinistic God to the immortal souls that hung on his words. There was a dramatic situation. Heaven and Hell were as real as Northampton. Immortal souls hung in the balance. The responsibility of the preacher was beyond description. This situation accounted in large part for the great preaching of those days. It was likewise in the Hebrew tradition when prophets spoke the will of the eternal. But today it is difficult to get oratorical, much less eloquent over the tentative hypotheses that must constitute the metaphysical message of the modern preacher.

(3) But in the social realm it is different. What of a warless world? What of industry operated for the good of all? What of free peoples working out their own destiny? What of a new generation reared in the possession of the cultures of all time, and possessing the fruits of the arts today in all their richness and beauty? What of minds freed of the fears that haunt them—fear of the past that presses upon them, fear of the overarching unknown, fear of the plagues that waste the body and the mind, fear of fear itself? These are causes that will give dramatic content to effective preaching in a humanized world.

The trend is away from doctrines considered as authoritative pronouncements about the eternal, and in the direction of doctrine considered as the orderly arrangement of convictions about everyday life.

4

Religion

(1) Thus may be seen the necessity for a re-statement of the nature of religion itself. Here again the trend is away from religion understood as man's response to "the determiner of destiny," to use Professor Pratt's terms, or even as man's response to super-human sources of fortune; away from religion understood as "man's conduct facing Godward," as I was taught in my theological school days; away from the fascinating and poetic theory that religion is "the life of God in the soul of man"; away also from the notion that religion is necessarily tied up with any theistic interpretation of cosmic existence.

Rather is the trend in the way of regarding religion as a human effort to find satisfactory modes of living, in the course of which many personal, social, planetary, and cosmological theories may be postulated, tested, and abandoned; the abiding thing being the urge to newer and newer efforts to reach ever-receding goals.

It is the testimony of Professor A. Eustace Haydon of the Department of Comparative Religion in the University of Chicago that today in practically all religions there are increasing numbers who interpret religion as the shared quest for a satisfying life.

(2) The very vernacular use of the term *religion* is tending to hasten the identification of religion with the questing process. When a man commits himself to a great *cause* we say that *cause* becomes his religion. We speak of men who make their art or their business

or their social theory, their religion. Communism is said to be the religion of young Russia, as indeed it is.

Not long ago I attended an experience meeting in an orthodox Christian church where some ten or a dozen men testified. Every man of them told of his religious experience in terms of ceasing to do this and beginning to do that. Unconsciously they revealed the real nature of their religion. It was a human doing and not doing. The only trouble was that they were concerned with doing and not doing inconsequential things, such as card playing. But they identified religious experience with human behavior in a human setting.

A few years ago I had occasion to argue a matter before a commission studying a certain problem relating to theological education, of which commission the late Charles W. Eliot was a member. In the course of the discussion one of the commission, himself an overseer of Harvard, remarked that he was not interested in a type of theological education that turned out what he called "social secretaries." Whereupon, Dr. Eliot, in his characteristically direct way said, "My dear sir, if I am not badly mistaken, within the next twenty-five or thirty years our idea of the very nature of religion will undergo a great change." That change is taking place even more rapidly than President Eliot predicted. Today great religious organizations are committing themselves to concrete quests. One of the most effective examples of this is the work of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Practically all of the great religious movements, including Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, have within the last ten years issued far-reaching programs of social reconstruction.

(3) It is not likely that religion will cease to concern itself with the effort to understand man's cosmic setting, nor should it abandon such effort. It is natural that man should forever attempt to push back the veil of mystery that hangs so tantalizingly about him. Modern minds are well aware how painfully inadequate is our total knowledge; but they feel that the little knowledge man does possess is his instrument and his hope of further conquests of the dark. In controlling life situations a little factual knowledge is worth worlds of mystery.

Religion as thus understood is developing new ideals and techniques for accomplishing its purpose. Fact finding becomes more significant than wishful petition. What man really wants becomes

of more concern than what it has been said that he should want. Aesthetic expression is regarded as superior to monastic repression. Scientific apparatus ranks higher than sacred images. The free play of free minds replaces the submissive will. The buoyant thrill of physical and mental well-being are of first importance in spiritual well-being. Modern religion says to mankind, trust your capacity to understand increasingly the universe in which you live; trust your ability to order your way increasingly in harmony with the possibilities that inhere in the nature of man and the world; and so trusting, act accordingly.

In summary, the trend in modern religious developments is away from the transcendent, the authoritative, the dogmatic, and toward the human, the experimental, the tentative; away from the abnormal, the formal, the ritualistic; and toward the normal, the informal, the usual; away from the extraordinary mystic expression, the exalted mood, the otherworldly; and toward the ethical, the social and the worldly; away from religion conceived as one of man's concerns, and toward religion conceived as man's one concern.

THE PATTERNS OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT

BY CLARENCE ERICKSON

THROUGH the tremendous vogue of Spengler's *Decline of the West*, the theory that history repeats itself has again climbed to par. Whatever one may think of the validity of Spengler's attempt to reduce history to a series of recurring cycles, the method has rendered history easier to grasp, and has put some semblance of order into what once was a trackless, uncharted confusion of dates and events. Even if Spengler has substituted the concept of fatality for that of causality, as one of his critics has put it; even if he sometimes strains or even garbles the facts to make them fit his theory, he has given the mind a grappling hook with which it may easily apprehend the once chaotic panorama of history.

The history of philosophy also may be rendered more intelligible if some sort of mental tool be devised with which to classify and put into orderly array the present Babel of conflicting theories and speculations. The idea of cyclic recurrence may with equal profit be applied to the development of philosophy through the ages. It is the purpose of this paper to do for the history of philosophy, on a small scale, of course, what Spengler has done for world-history.

Philosophy is the subject that is least of all studied by the average person. Professors of economics often complain that their science is the most flagrantly neglected of all studies, so that an appalling lack of influence and understanding exists between them on the one hand and industrialists, legislators, and the general public on the other. But their claim for sympathy is feeble compared with the plight of the philosopher. Someone has said that less than one-hundred people in America have read the books of John Dewey, our foremost American philosopher, and that perhaps only about

forty-thousand Americans have ever heard of the man. It is certain that there is no subject about which the man on the street knows less than philosophy, no subject in which there is such a tremendous gulf between the initiated and the uninitiated.

This situation is very unfortunate, to say the least. The complete lack of philosophical training or knowledge on the part of more than 99 per cent of the population allows all sorts of false and ridiculous ideas and superstitions to pass muster. Witness the credulous avidity with which the public swallows the philosophical speculations of automobile manufacturers and business men. The critical training given the mind even by the smallest smattering of philosophic knowledge would be a vaccine against these infections of the popular mind with superstition and buncombe.

The chief reason for the widespread neglect of philosophy is the apparently hopeless difficulty of the subject. The field of philosophy seems, and there is a measure of justification for the belief, a bedlam of conflicting speculations and theories. It has been said that all the philosophers in the world could not fill a single page of a note-book with the truths on which they are universally agreed. Thus, it would appear, that the study of a given philosopher does not lead to a permanent addition to our knowledge, because the next philosopher we study will, in all probability, shatter everything we have learned from the former. Add to this the proverbial obscurity and difficulty of understanding philosophy, and we see why philosophy has been so neglected by the average reader.

As a matter of fact, the chaos and confusion reigning in the field of philosophy can be reduced to simplicity and order, by means of a little analysis and probing beneath the surface of the many apparently conflicting systems. The multiplicity of systems of philosophy can be reduced to a few persisting, easily understood types, which have retained a remarkable intactness throughout the centuries. Equipped with the knowledge of these simple, persistent pigeon-holes of philosophy, all the thoughts and speculations of the many philosophers can be placed with ease into one or another of the several compartments. There is no reason why the man of limited leisure cannot read philosophy with understanding, provided he learns the few simple molds into which all philosophic thought from Thales to John Dewey has been cast.

The conception of the ninety-two elements in the science of chemistry has proved a wonderful aid to man's grasp and control of what once seemed a baffling variety of substances. Any substance, no matter how complex, can now be analyzed into two, three, or four simple chemical elements. Simplicity can likewise be introduced into what appears to be the chaotic, disorderly confusion of philosophic thought. With a little practice, the cursory reader should be enabled to take any philosophic idea or speculation, and subsume it under one of the permanent elemental patterns.

What are these persistent patterns, these chemical elements as it were, which are the building blocks out of which the most baffling and involved metaphysical systems are constructed? These patterns are five fundamental world-views, or interpretations of the whole of reality. They are Materialism, Spiritualism (Idealism), Dualism, Monism, and Phenomenalism. Any given philosophical system can be reduced to one of these elemental patterns, or else demonstrated to be a compound of two or more of them. If the reader of philosophy knows these five fundamental patterns, and recognizes them beneath their raiment of philosophical verbiage, the task of understanding philosophy is immeasurably simplified, and is rendered a positive delight. We shall consider each one of them in order.

We shall begin with Materialism, not because of any prejudice in favor of it, but because it is the easiest system to understand. Our line of attack will always be from the easy to the more difficult.

The universe, according to Materialism, consists of nothing but matter and its motions. The All, or matter, is generally conceived of as being distributed through space in the form of tiny indivisible particles, or atoms. Every phenomenon, whether physical, chemical, biological, or psychological, can ultimately be resolved into a change of position of material particles or atoms, on this hypothesis.

The first consistent system of atomic Materialism was put forward by Democritus, the Greek philosopher who was the immediate forerunner of Plato and Aristotle. He got his atomism from a still earlier Greek philosopher, Leukippus. It will be seen, then, that the atomic theory of modern physics and chemistry goes back to the sixth century B. C.

The atomistic Materialism of Democritus was adopted by the

well-known and much maligned ethical philosopher, Epicurus, of the fourth century B. C. The celebrated ethical principles of Epicurus, that happiness (as distinguished from sensual pleasure) is the chief object of life, and that enlightened self-interest is the guide to moral conduct, have been a potent influence in all later philosophy. Moral law is social or human law, ethical conduct is that conduct which enables men to live together with the maximum of harmony and happiness. The Utilitarianism of the last two centuries of English moral philosophy, and the Humanism of which we hear so much today, are modern versions of the Epicurean ethic.

Lucretius, the Roman poet flourishing immediately before the beginning of the Christian era, is the next important name in the history of the Materialist tradition. His wonderful poem, *De Rerum Natura* (The Nature of Things), presents a philosophy so modern, except for a few poetic licenses and exaggerations, that much of it might pass for the work of a modern popularizer of science. Evolution, natural selection, the nebular hypothesis as to the origin of the earth and the stars, and many other conceptions generally supposed to be peculiarly modern are to be found in this extraordinary philosophic epic.

Coming down to more modern times, we find a partial acceptance of the Materialistic tradition in the great scientific and philosophic contemporary of Shakespeare, Francis Bacon, who many critics contend was the real Shakespeare. Bacon expressed his preference for Democritus over the more spiritual Plato and Aristotle, and held that knowledge must emancipate itself from the Aristotelian tradition and return to the sounder principles of Democritus.

Thomas Hobbes, the next English philosopher of note, was a simon-pure Materialist. Even God was a material body with him. This inclusion of a Deity in a system purporting to be a thoroughgoing Materialism is an inconsistency. If reality consists of nothing but the action and reaction of material particles upon one another, there can be no God, unless of course one maintains that matter is God. This is purely a question of words, however. If matter is all that there is and we choose to call it God, we are expressing a purely verbal proposition. The problem of consciousness Hobbes disposed of by saying that thought consists in the movement of the particles or atoms making up the brain.

John Locke, the famous author of the *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* and one of the founders of modern philosophy, although generally a Dualist, in one passage advanced the speculation that it was not impossible that God may have added to matter the faculty for thinking. The French Materialists and Voltaire derived one of their fundamental principles from this passage in Locke's *Essay*.

Up to this time the Materialist philosophers had never adequately realized the difficulty, if not utter impossibility, of accounting for the phenomenon of consciousness under the assumption that material atoms are the sole reality. Furthermore, the problem of knowledge, which in materialist terms amounts to the question, how does matter become conscious of itself? had never been faced, or even asked. It remained for the Idealist philosopher Berkeley, whose influential work, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, appeared in 1710, to render the older forms of Materialism absurd and untenable. Berkeley demonstrated, with a line of argument that never has been successfully refuted, that all we can know or experience is of the nature of sensations, perceptions, and mental states, and that matter has only an inferential existence. He held that this inference was a faulty one, and that matter, as distinct from our own states of consciousness, did not exist. Thereafter, matter has led a very precarious existence among philosophers. The very name Materialism is no longer in good standing in strict philosophic usage. The mind-body problem, the puzzle of consciousness, the critical analyses of Berkeley and his successor Hume, have rendered the old-fashioned Materialism of Democritus, Hobbes, and Holbach obsolete. The modern representatives of the Materialistic tradition now call themselves Naturalists. Still, practically speaking, Naturalism amounts to much the same thing as Materialism, in that the essential thing involved is the denial of a supernatural or spiritual order existing above the natural or material order.

Naturalism to-day recognizes the impossibility of accounting for the appearance of consciousness out of a collection of dead atoms. The atoms, electrons, or whatever the ultimate unit of matter may be, is given the attribute of mind, or sensation, in a rudimentary form by modern Naturalists, such as Haeckel and Lester

Ward. Another form of Naturalism conceives of matter and energy as being the dual manifestation of an Unknowable Power or Force. Mind is considered a form of energy. (Herbert Spencer.) Still another type of Naturalism regards experience, or the actual perceptual flux that is immediately known, as the stuff out of which reality is made. Matter and mind are but mental tools or conceptions abstracted from reality for the purpose of better apprehending and controlling the flux of "pure experience." (John Dewey.)

The evolution of the Materialistic attitude shows that the lines of thought of the various philosophers are not completely out of touch with one another, as is commonly supposed. We have seen how Materialism, through the influence of Spiritualism, has been forced to alter some of its basic conceptions. In truth, every philosophic system, every individual philosopher, influences every other system, sometimes profoundly, broadening its viewpoint. There is an unmistakable convergence of the once sharply severed, antagonistic rival philosophies. Perhaps the day will come when one philosophy will gain complete control of the field, after having enriched and expanded itself from all the converging philosophies of which it will be the synthesis.

We shall next consider Spiritualism, as it is the direct antithesis to Materialism. *Idealism* rather than *Spiritualism* is the term more generally applied to this philosophy, but *Spiritualism* is to be preferred, because of the popular confusion that exists between philosophic and ethical idealism. But there is danger in the term *Spiritualism* also, as it is liable to be confused with the popular superstition of that name, which pretends to hold communicatoin with the spirits of the dead. One of the greatest tribulations of the philosopher is the fact that many of the terms he uses are also used popularly in an entirely different sense from the philosophic sense.

Spiritualism contends that reality consists of nothing but spirit, or spiritual substance, in flat contradiction of Materialism, which asserts that reality consists of nothing but matter, or material substance. But do we directly sense and experience matter every moment of our lives? we may ask. Matter is but an illusion, the external appearance of that which is really spiritual, answers the Spiritualist. The appearance of things are the symbols by which they are known to us. The fundamental principle of Spiritualism

is thus seen to be essentially the same as the contention of the Christian Scientists, that matter and body are delusions, and that only spirit and soul are real. Christian Science indeed is a variety of Spiritualistic philosophy, but a corrupt variety in which there are many misunderstandings and inconsistencies.

The philosophical basis of Hindu Brahmanism, as presented in the Upanishads, is the most ancient prototype of Spiritualism. Reality is the dream of the Absolute Mind, Brahma, who creates the universe by thinking or dreaming it. All appearances, the material world, our own personalities, are but illusions, the sole reality being Brahma, the Eternal God. Needless to say, this is not the Brahmanism of the masses of Hindu people; it is the doctrine of the Hindu philosophers and scholars. The popular Brahmanism is a gross, polytheistic superstition, holding several hundred-million people in the densest ignorance.

There is no exact prototype of Spiritualism among the Greek philosophers. Plato is generally spoken of as a Spiritualist, but he was, more properly speaking, a Dualist, in that he acknowledged the existence of two fundamental principles, Spirit or Idea and Void or matter. Spirit, according to Plato, exists in the shape of the famous Platonic "Ideas," which are abstract virtues, such as goodness, temperance, wisdom, and courage, given a substantial existence. The Ideas also consist of perfect divine models of all things, of which earthly realities are more or less imperfect copies. The Ideas realize themselves in our world of sense through the refractory, coarse medium of matter. The grossness of matter renders it impossible for the Ideas to realize themselves perfectly; hence the imperfection and evil of the world of existence. Above this disappointing world of sense exists the supernal, spiritual world of Ideas, the haven of the philosopher, and the solace offered by reason to the soul jaded by the cares and evils of the material world.

The first pure form of Spiritualism in European philosophy was the philosophy of the German mathematician and scientist Leibnitz, a contemporary of Isaac Newton. According to Leibnitz, reality consists of a large number of spiritual, spaceless, centres of force, which he called Monads. Matter is an aggregate of Monads of the lowest order, having a confused perception and no reason. The souls of animals are Monads having a somewhat

more clear perception. The soul of man is a Monad having clear perception and the faculty of reason. God is the supreme Monad, having perfect perception and perfect reason. Each Monad mirrors the whole of reality more or less clearly according to its status as matter, animal soul, or the soul of man. All our perceptions are internal, proceeding from this mirroring of the universe by the Monad which is our soul. The realities and the perceptions are made to occur simultaneously by means of a principle of pre-established harmony.

This fanciful doctrine, one of the favorite objects of ridicule of the vitriolic Voltaire, had little influence on future philosophy, and it remained for Berkeley, the Irish bishop of the early eighteenth century, to present the first influential system of Spiritualism in European philosophy. The external world, and the thing we call matter, consist only of our own sensations of space, location, hardness, weight, pressure, color, sound, touch, etc. But each of these sensations is a state of consciousness, not a property of something external to our mind. Hence our knowledge consists only of mental states, and matter cannot be known to us. Indeed, said Berkeley, matter is a superfluous entity, since we derive it from a faulty inference, namely, that we really experience something outside our own states of consciousness. Therefore matter does not exist as a substance, and mind or spirit alone is real. The external world consists only of sensations and perceptions given us directly by God. The only reality is spiritual substance, in which the sensations and ideas making up the world inhere. Myself, otherselves, and God are the three spiritual realities making up all of existence in Berkeley's system.

This triumph of the Spiritualists over the Materialists was short-lived, for soon after Berkeley had undermined Materialism by destroying matter, David Hume, the Scotch skeptical philosopher did to Spiritualism what Berkeley had done to Materialism. He cut the ground from under Spiritualism by showing that spiritual substance is as much a faulty inference as material substance. Berkeley had pushed matter out of existence by saying that it is only the sum of its properties, i. e., hardness, extension in space, resistance, etc., and that there is no substance underneath in which these properties reside. Hume, using the same line of argument,

said that neither could we find a "spiritual substance" underlying the sensations, ideas, volitions, and memories making up spirit or mind. Both matter *and* spirit then are faulty constructions of human thought. Sensations are the sole reality! A material body is a complex of sensations having a more or less persisting identity, to which we have given a name. Similarly, an ego or soul is but a complex of sensations, ideas, and memories also having a more or less persisting identity. Hume's doctrine is known as Phenomenalism or Sensationalism. We shall consider it in greater detail later.

Modern Spiritualism has evolved out of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the great German thinker whose work was largely an attempt to refute Hume's uncanny Sensationalism. Kant held that the raw sensations are worked into perceptions and conceptions, and that these conceptions are in turn organized and synthesized into knowledge, the various sciences, and complete systems of thought. There must be something that performs this transforming work. This something Kant called the "transcendental ego of apperception." For our purpose it is sufficient to know that this formidable phrase represents Kant's resuscitation of the ego and spiritual substance, which Hume had so cruelly slain.

Furthermore, according to Kant, the mind or ego renders the sensations, which Hume had said make up the world, intelligible by means of the "forms" of space and time. These forms are not from the sensational world, but are tools of the ego, which enable it to grasp the sensations. The chaos of the sensational world is further reduced to order by means of the "categories," that is, the ideas of cause and effect, sequence, totality, modality, etc. Like the forms of space and time, the categories are also "intuitive." By intuitive is meant beyond experience, not derived from the senses, but inherent in the mind. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume made up what is known as the "empirical" school, in that they held that all knowledge was ultimately derived from sense experience. Kant was a "rationalist," in that he maintained that some knowledge is not derived from experience, but is intuitively known to the reason. The forms, the categories, and truths of mathematics are intuitive truths.

Kant thus rehabilitated spirit. Furthermore, he also rehabilitated matter by his doctrine of "things-in-themselves" or *nouomena*,

the realities giving rise to our sensations or *phenomena*. These noumena, or things-in-themselves, are beyond our experience and unknowable. Kant was, then, strictly speaking, a Dualist, since both matter and spirit were admitted in his system. But because of his profound influence on later Spiritualist philosophers he is commonly called a Spiritualist or an Idealist. His entire system is known as Transcendental Idealism.

Kant's German successors, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, dropped Kant's notion that there are things-in-themselves. This was somewhat of a return to Berkeley in denying the substantial existence of matter. Spiritualism now became a pantheism, strikingly like the Hindu Brahmanist philosophy. Reality is one self, Absolute Idea, all including mind, of which our finite minds are partial expressions. The Absolute Idea creates reality by thinking it. The evolution of reality is the unfolding of a logical reasoning process on the part of the Absolute. Hegel reduced reality to logic, which ever advanced by means of his famous "triads." A triad is a series of three steps; *thesis*, *antithesis*, and *synthesis*. Something is asserted by the divine logic, that is, comes into being, and then is contradicted. These two steps are thesis and antithesis respectively. A higher union of the two contradictories then takes place, and this constitutes the third step of the logical and evolutionary process, synthesis. Reality is a logical evolution progressing by means of these triads, said Hegel. For example, the Russian Revolution swept away capitalism (thesis) and set up pure communism (antithesis). With the passing of time, the Russian State has been obliged to make concessions to capitalism. The result is a synthesis of capitalism and communism. Everything that exists is a blend or synthesis of two opposites, the resolution of previous contradiction.

Another representative of Spiritualistic philosophy is Schopenhauer. With this celebrated pessimist reality is the expression of a blind, unconscious Will to Live. Schopenhauer differed from Hegel in that he substituted a voluntaristic for and intellectualistic conception of reality. Reality is thought or intellect, said Hegel. Reality is Will, and intellect is but a product derived from the Will, said Schopenhauer.

A word as to the famous pessimism of Schopenhauer. Since Will is the basic reality, the fundamental fact of existence is a

constant striving to satisfy some desire. But desire is a condition of want and dissatisfaction. Existence leads to misery because of the constant pain of desire which the Will seeks to satisfy. But assuming that every desire is finally satisfied, then a still greater unhappiness befalls the Will, the misery of inactivity and boredom. Therefore the Will, in its effort to conquer the pain of desire only succeeds in achieving a still greater pain. All existence, then is a stark tragedy, according to Schopenhauer. But the greatest tragedy of all was when the Will became fully conscious of itself and its futility in man.

The philosophy of Hegel, or Absolute Idealism as it is called, is still a live doctrine. Indeed, until about twenty-five years ago Absolute Idealism had most of the philosophers in its camp.

One of the principal causes for the present reaction away from Absolute Idealism, is that philosophy's inability to find a satisfactory explanation for the existence of error and evil in the world. If reality consists of nothing but an all-including mind or God, of which our personal, finite minds are partial expressions, where does error come from? No fact is more obvious than the tremendous amount of error and illusion in the world. And worse still, we know that the world is full of evil, which we are constantly striving to overcome. But according to Absolute Idealism, this evil must be a part of the divine plan, must proceed from the source of all being, the Absolute. It becomes almost impossible to build a satisfactory ethical theory out of such a philosophy. The house of ill-fame, the gambling hell, are as much parts of the divine plan as the music-dramas of Wagner, the statues of Praxiteles.

We have somewhat anticipated our discussion of Dualism in our previous discussion of Spiritualism. The truth is that the development of each of the fundamental philosophies carries with it implications influencing all the other philosophies. We have seen how Materialism has been profoundly influenced by developments in the Spiritualistic type of philosophy. The Dualists, Plato and Kant, have left their impress on all later philosophy, regardless of its type. Therefore, it was impossible for us to outline the growth of Materialism and of Spiritualism without bringing in something of Dualism.

Dualism, as its name implies, holds that reality is made of two

independent substances. Matter cannot be reduced to spirit, and spirit cannot be reduced to matter, says the Dualist. The mind is not a mere aggregate of material atoms, but the manifestation of a spiritual principle, the soul. Neither is the material body an illusion of the soul. Both soul and body exist in their own right in Dualistic philosophy.

The most common example of Dualism is ordinary Christian theology, of course. Of late some of the more intellectual Protestant clergymen have accepted the Hegelian Absolute Idealism, but the rank and file of the Christian clergy, both Catholic and Protestant, still cling to the Dualistic interpretation of reality.

(To Be Continued)

EL DORADO
BY LLOYD MORRIS

THE hour that was to usher me through an unobtrusive door three hundred feet in the air, passed up the street on a windy flaw in failing pulses of chiming sound; and the clock, its signal completed, moved a warning finger of gold one space forward on the black dial registering in terms of Man, the incomputable. Yet I lingered in the throbbing ways below, where all that was purposeful in human life jostled with accomplishment.

I thought as I faltered in my going that the minatory tongue beneath the crocketed spire, bidding men from the marts of stridency to appointed quietudes of prayer, was not greatly dissimilar in harsh utterance from the street car's horatory clangor addressed alike to those who trafficked, and him who loitered in this lane of marque and merchandise. And I wondered if for me this sounding hour of noon knelled something cherished, now to receive meed and gesture of farewell; or was the bright clarion of an emergence richer in fancy and fruition than that of the dreams and wakings which had attended all the earnest days that had been my life's idyll.

History was about me, shuffled into obscure byways by avid years; its outworn braveries cared for by reverent hands. Plumed with futurity, the present, imperious and oppressive, shouldered arrogantly upwards; its terraced loftiness of steel and stone four-square about a House of God that crouched small and weather-stained, in its own iron-gated garden planted all-a-row with seed of perishability.

A few score lives of men and this History will have become touched with the mellowing tones of tradition; and this present taken on the wistful charm of a faded chronicle; but the fevered hope and curse of futurity plumes for ever trodden street and beetling facade.

Here but yesterday the insolence of power was rebuked, and from the declaration of a people free by the redemption of blood, came to hardy nativity a nation ripened now to stature exceeding any ever set down in annaled time. From here but a longbow shot away, some wandering Indian in yet recent day did stand at gaze where there was much mariners' noise, with heave and ho; and wave-scarred argosies limped in to their landfall; or, yielding proudly from the river's sheltering banks, passed with stately carriage of summer clouds, beneath the circle of the sea. And in retired *bouwerij*, a brief promenade onward from where now I stayed, moccasined runner had panted tidings from outfall and foray consummated no distant leagues in space, yet already old in time.

Here, today, in titanesque impressiveness the coffered wealth of nations reposes; obedient in Pactolian flow to pens whose slightest tracteries diminish antique epics of graven stele to pleasing simplicities of quiet story. Here at this high noon in a second's space of time, whispering wires tell of devastation from earth and sky butchering pygmy mankind, and toppling fair cities and gracious landscape to wholesale catastrophe beyond the world's rim where night is still on the land; while from the air tongueless voices call a pentacostal medley of grievous announcings, far-supplifications of perilled and lonely men, and manifold divertisments.

To this place on this autumn morning I had come from pursuit of lettered Art and simple sylvan joys; once again in a rough but honored mart to dice with fortune for stake of gold against my very self in future thrall; and on a winning hazard, set cherished hostages free from jeopardy of economic circumstance; and myself turn anew to where a scorned road of little ease goes marvelously on with noble company of knights and dames riding there in gallant mien to El Dorado.

Often beside the smiling Pacific as the declining sun mantled the darkening Sierras with silken gold and purple, opulent hours of friendship took on grace and fragrance of immortality from the frank shy confidences of eager minds exploring the extremities of life and love; but beneath bubble of wit and sober presentment of russet sense, the careful mind of one friend to me brooded over my material occasions and moved to avert my regard from phantasms of ideality, wherein spiritualization was accepted the essence of endeavor, to the display of life's adventure as a deferential obeisance to sociological inexorabilities; to which in duty and wis-

dom I should address myself. For I in youth had duffed the world aside to join those riders to El Dorado; and now the first rime of age touched me to winter of years with small store of economic substance garnered; while on receding horizons in planes of shifting light gleamed and wavered the still uncaptured, still unscaled shining streets and bannered roofs of towered El Dorado.

I do suppose that once to each of us all in some one moment, some one hour comes a great Wonder of enlightenment; which none may tell if it be a perturbation of Divine disquietude, or thing remembered from dead celestial years, or aura of epileptoid significance. That is El Dorado; shining, elusive El Dorado.

It is a fashion of Man that some in their certain day should doubt, extinguish or deny this thin flame of inner visitation which motions the laborer, as seems, to till the barren, reap the stubble, and bring to harvest at life's ending only the unsubstantial husbandry of dreams. To others the manner is to follow secretly, intermitently, in furtive shamefastnesses, or with obsequious expedience of deference to the authorized and customary. A few follow wholly; consistently pursuing a conviction of ideality to its logical extremities of conduct. And once or twice or thrice in our human story comes one that transcends the vision.

The fruits of negation are apples of Sodom plucked in fields of Asphodel; but every human aspiration, every intrepid endeavor is El Dorado. In youth and the prides of life it is the vision of the eye, the sounds in the ear, and all the gay and variant pleasantries of the physical world that rioting in our blood inform our exaltations; till the very linaments of ecstasy seem to lie in the whorl of the flesh, and slumber in the essence of beauty on all the flowing symmetry of unveiled loveliness. But when adolescence is done the fairest image takes on stain of mortality; and our unsophisticated candidness withers and is gone; when it is seen that the ultimate frankness of nature is not beyond question, and indeed utterly is suspect of perpetuating its economy by shallow deceits offered before the human race which so pathetically is eager to be deceived. Romeo and Juliet exchanging vows in the perfumed dusk beneath a heaven painted with bright gold are purely selfish, and in no degree concerned with the continued existence of the *genus homo*. Yet, all their aureate rapture is but the sugared comfit of a prelude whose passion is decreed to an obstetric end: for the concerto of life's orchestration—its most tenderly muted motif of wood-wind; its

triumphancies of polyphonic brass—has for its secret sardonic theme the dignification of the continuity of the human race.

With Isis unveiled and deflowered, the Hegelian Absolute must needs put forth fresh artifice and lure disillusioned mortals anew with philoprogenitiveness, and the pomps and circumstance of corporate life draping our sordid individual ephemerality. But tinsel and tapestry alike wear thin; the very bones of Being grin outwardly through the cunningest fabric; and we turn as in avoidance of a charnel house, away from ideals of the flesh, to where in shifting confusion of splendour, El Dorado reappears in the beautiful austerities of philosophical abstraction.

In calm contemplation of our cold new god, we reflect in contemptuous tranquility on those derogatory days when the delusive snares of the sensory world seemed to have form of loveliness or hold shape and truth of beauty. There is no god but intellect, we cry; and philosophy is its prophet. Nothing to us in our fervor of new servitude is it, except evidence of our present rightness, that to our paens be joined in jangled discordancy, the sorrows of Rachel weeping for her children in hospitals; with crooked backs and crumbling skeletons; or griped with hunger, wolfing through city thoroughfares; or staring up to the sky on sodden battlefields—their emptied skulls pillowed on the soft pudding of their own spilled brains—Nothing, till in the tears of a universe our El Dorado of ethic or metaphysic; esthetic or corporeal perfection—our very categorical imperative crumbles, and totters down through the shallows of utilitarianism into annihilation beneath obliterating tides of sentiment.

To us poor mariners adrift on this perilous sea, every sail on the horizon wafts a galleon more utterly desirable than our own poor hulk; till we board it and find the glittering allurements were only the gold of sunset lacquering the weathered poop of a billow-raked old hull newly come from battling desperate seas in its passage to some homely anchorage; and from its deck the barque we abandoned seems now to have the similitude of a fine tall ship pendent on the mirror of the sea; and bound with jocund company for El Dorado.

It is then the cry goes up from the deeps of human character: "Where is El Dorado that with lance in rest, beaver up and gonfalon blazoned on the streaming wind, we set out to seek and to follow?—What is El Dorado? Is it but many things to many people; and to each a kaleidoscope of idealities shaken into and shaken out of

variant pattern by the sums and differences of psychological states; which have their fervid consciousness at the functional dictate of physiological being?"

For the eye never ceases to look differently upon its local world nor reflection to be of a different temper. Day by day ancient songs tell other tales than those we read into them yesterday. Day by day the Art of forgotten days takes on changing significances and the piled up wisdom of eras yields stranger and simpler conclusions. In the morning of our life we laugh softly to ourselves and say, Thus, will we do, and Thus. At life's heyday we dispose ourselves to conclaves of solemn discourse and grave intents to mould and elevate mankind. In the evening of our days when our importunities, our curses, our ineffective defiance and nugatory efforts are done, we remember the thoughts that we thought in youth; when in the ways of human life appeared no harshness, and our ambition clad itself in shining mail and hewed at Beauty's foes, or with stout lance thrust at enchantments and bore its affection to dazzling palaces forlorn in fantasy. We remember how our stammering tongue could never confess nor our lively eye convey the fulness of our lover's passion, nor exhaust our friendship for a friend. We recall the hour when our exquisite idylls of innocence became pierced by protusion into human affairs of inhuman potentialities; and existence no more appeared a gentle thing of physical delights to our irresponsible young animalities, but presented aspects that appalled; and experience gave such meaning to what before had been mere words of academic definition, that we had perforce to dream stronger dreams of the envy of men and love of women; of being a solid man in the city; a leader of politics; an author of many editions; a painter with a picture well hung on the line; a nice fat balance in the bank, a man of property and perhaps great possessions. In the twilight of life's little day when the physiological timepiece ticks low, and the assured Reason recoiling from pursuit of that which is fugitive to the understanding, is stricken from its heroic complacency, we think on the time when our human spirit entered upon a strong endeavor to discover a corrective to the enigmas that troubled it. We clashed ethic of the Dust with ethics of the Stars; we looked down into the manure that gave delicacy to the hue of the blossoms waving above it; and up to the subtility that weaved the stars in patterns; we searched among the shadows in the eyes of the friend who clasped our hand, and we thought to

read more plainly there when the light of life had been stifled out; we pondered upon the imponderable to part the greater from the less, to grasp faiths and establish theories; we heard the voice of the Absolute in Archangelic Trump and the regurgitatory murmurs of hyperchlorhydria; we hunted the Final Reason from oviduct to a warp in space, and thought to catch and cage it in apparatus and formulae and in temples that we builded and hung with blue and with silver. At nightfall, sitting in the shadow of the Infinite we wonder supinely if any of those hard-won and tremulously cherished beliefs we evolved cloaked Truth, and if they and all that we fabricated and followed were only idols and salve for our offended Ego; and if El Dorado itself is nothing but a cowardly escape, or perchance a pragmatic carrot dangled from the Infinite before our asses' nose. We wonder if the Absolute is pragmatic; if the Pragmatic is absolute; if in the shadows lying beyond human understanding, unnegated by definition, a Celestial Observer looking upon the dissensions comprising human effort sees them each and all of one value and no one of greater delusion than another; and if it be not well for Mankind that there is ever a residuum which evades research and renders the pageant of life a glory of growth that justifies; and not a dirge of decay whose accents are nothing but despair.

El Dorado is nothing till it has ceased to be El Dorado; nothing till it has ceased to be something; nothing but a city of dreams which none shall ever find; though into it all shall ride at last from over the hills and far away; nothing but a great weariness of the flesh till we shall have beheld windmills become whirligigs and Barataria a plain hoax; and seeing have ceased to be offended; and passing through egoism to the Ego are convicted with the positive conviction that the pragmatic cannot endure, and the end of all rationalization is irrational.

Our pursuit of the real has its recalcitrant hours in which we wantonly lubricate our egotisms with the unctuous oil of pragmatism; or are so straitly compelled to palter with Nominalist exiguosness that Inspiration, taking alarm, clutches for defence at the ludicrous; by reducing to cynical paraphrase of catchpenny philosophy the short but vulgar aphorisms of the poor; who question with leery knowingness if it be possible to worship God with cold feet; if it were not well for him who has his head in the clouds to keep his feet in a bun-shop; if spiritual equilibrium is only feasible

on a gold basis, and the path to life's superlatives, a devious motion of planetary economics.

Such insurgence of speculative dubieties held me immobilized now in the vortex of the world's traffic; and the cheating devices of caricature were of no present avail to repel the starkly pervasive reflection that whereas in time previous I had extended but small salute of dalliance or *devoir* to the world and yet had it seemed failed to achieve the ineffable; might it not be that here in the booths of the money-changers was not merely all the eye desired and the heart hoped, but that Ideality itself waited to yield happily captive to him who never came.

Here in this Broadhighway no magic casements looked down from cloud-capped towers; yet perhaps Romance was twenty-five floors up in a frowning office building over against the House of God—for did Romance always take the air gorgeously in sumptuous gown and never tread plain ways in hodden gray? The pallid-faced men of immobile mien and snapping diction who had their waking being in dollar frenzies within that vibrant congeries of offices: was that what they visioned of the future forty years since; when chin on knees they embraced their shins and started into the sunbright surface of the "ol' swimmin' hole?" When with the long, long thoughts of youth they stared abroad their little world to kingdoms beyond—was the face that came between their inner eye and the outer heaven, that of the peevish blonde or atrabilious brunette who bears their name? The youth and age of femininity, also, going about their economic business in that economic pen; what thoughts are theirs as they battle age and strain with cosmetics? Was this the El Dorado that glowed in their girlhood's golden dreams? Was the gentle knight who carcolled over their fancy's plain; or the troubadour who luted his *rondelet* in the secret chambers of their heart, the husband over whom the turf is green; the husband absconded to parts unknown; or the loose-lipped wastrel for whom they must leave their day's drugery to drudge anew at night?

Yet, because there is measurability to our knowledge, not alone of ourselves, but of those with whom we have been life-long trencherman and bedfellow in the jog-trot of human association; may it not be that some other insight than the critical faculties could discern within the lives of these lords and conscripts of industry here—and of all who live move and have their being in the common-

place—heroisms of simple duties simply done, sacrifices silently, ungrudgingly, lovingly made, and cherished ambitions denied that have lit for the doers a splendour exceeding any that seemed to them a sacred lamp in the morning of their life? May it not be that in very deed and sober fact there is for us all an ivory gate three hundred feet up or down or at street level; behind which all our rich imaginings, and the wild errantries of our questing souls are caught and held without end in despised beatitudes of drab occupation: and that we have only to put forth our hand and the wicket will roll back on its valves, and our wandering feet from garden of rue, and fields of asphodel shall tread the streets of El Dorado.

Be that as it would; here in this street at this moment of time, decision was to be made whether I followed still the prompting I had ever cherished as El Dorado, and whose effulgencies had been the lure and compensation of laborious years; or whether El Dorado, timed for noon, lay behind an ivory gate no larger round than the tip of my thumb, and Pegasus being foundered, I must ride thither in the express—twenty-fifth floor only—click! click! slam!

In childhood days, old wives tales overheard in chimney nooks when winter's storms fouled all the ways, bound me with spells of fearful delight. I listened to stories of men who, coming victoriously from grim and sudden contest with death by flood and field; had declared life as they had lived it from its earliest recollections even unto that strangling moment, flashed before their eyes glazing upon the verge of dissolution. In later years I came by ways more philosophic to surmise that for all poor souls upon whom are come the ends of Fate the shuttle of Time is reversed; and, even as the physiological embryo epitomises in its foetal history the evolutionary story of the genus; so, at the point between quickness and death there is a process of psychological devolution correspondent to physical disintegration, during which consummated individual existence retraces in swiftest panorama to puling infancy; and the ego crying aloud at the portal of this second threshold of the unknown often ejaculates a parental call; and even seeks mystical passage through the very umbilical cord into the womb that was the earliest shelter of its fleshed Odyssey.

I have seen many men die, and of some roystering metropolitan blades might bear witness that "a babbled o' green fields;" and that some as their last timeous act did from adopted tongues and secular

fields of thought revert to their native Aramic. And not alone, it would seem, is this recessional phenomenon peculiar to crises of Mortality; but those episodic occasions when the conduct of life comes up for sharp settlement, are, also, under its governance to the extent that under present mental and emotional stresses there is a tendency to escape or solve them by retreat to some anterior plan of reference.

Myself in Ultima Thule had both infancy and youth. Age was about my growing years. As preceptors to adolescence there attended me, Romance—in withdrawing rooms fragrant with roseleaf; in paneled halls and oriel-litten galleries hung with panoplies of chivalry; in quiet churchyards; in ancient chantries commemorative of the dust and themselves epitaphic memorials of men's desire so to register himself in the book of life, that later travellers might read and know that here, too, had passed before them, one like unto themselves along the road to El Dorado. Upon me, too, the transcendental laid its impress; when of nightfall the vesper bell ringing across the meres filled my bedchamber with a golden wistfulness of sound. While as the shadows drew out and ruffling winds complained through casement and corridor, and whooped among twisted chimney stacks; I lay, a wisp of human consciousness in my high and carved and curtained bed, and hearing the great bell in the neighbouring church tower strike out its loud curfew, thought of the world that lay beyond the sound of bells, where no king's writ ran and the tongue of episcopacy spake not; and of the time when I should adventure it.

So now under the press of decision in the pulsing heart of modernity, life flashed for me to youth; and at the sound of the bell striking out its harsh monition here where no king's writ ran; I thought on the world that lay beyond the sound of bells where the tongue of episcopacy spake not; and of the time when I should adventure it. . . . and turning aside I went through the iron gate and sat among the rude emblems of mortality.

THE DEVIL, THE WORLD AND THE FLESH

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

THE *Devil, the world and the flesh* are linked together in the phraseology of the baptismal formula. The world, as well as the flesh, is thus definitely associated with the Devil in the Christian religion. Although not explicitly stated in the creed of any sect, Protestants as well as Catholics consider the material world, in contrast with the spiritual realm, a diabolical work. The fact is that the Devil is commonly credited with the creation of the cosmos.

There is much significance in this often mentioned saying, which is well worth historical analysis. As a rule, popular phrases have a good deal of meaning for the investigator. Under the guise of a figure of speech there is psychological value, regardless of whether or not serious belief is given to such conceptions, inasmuch as this is a discussion in terminology rather than theology.

THE DEVIL AS MASTER OF MATTER

The belief in the world as a diabolical work can be traced back to Iranian-Persian teachings. In the Zend-Avesta we find that the Devil created the evil part of the world in contradistinction to the good part fashioned by the Deity. The Jews, who obtained their notion of the Devil from the Persians, rejected the theory of a dual creation. In the Old Testament the Lord is represented as the maker of the material as well as of the spiritual world, of darkness as well as of light. In the New Testament, however, the Devil's power over this world is strongly emphasized. He is not named the creator of this world, but is called "the prince of the world" (John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11; cf. Eph. ii. 2; vi. 12) even "the god of this world" (2 Cor. iv. 4). The belief in the temporal world as the work of the Devil, however, soon took root in Chris-

tianity. First appeared the Gnostics with their teachings that the world was created and is ruled by the Devil. In the Valentinian Gnosis, this material world is the work of a fallen æon, and in the writings of the Gnostic Saturninus, dark matter as the domain of the Devil is placed in opposition to the light-realm of the Deity. The Manicheans, who drew the logical conclusions from the syncretic speculations of their Gnostic predecessors, taught that all matter, good as well as evil, had its origin in the kingdom of darkness. The creation of man, as of the material world in general, is, according to Manichean teachings, the work of the Devil, who wished to imprison and finally to destroy the souls emanating from the god of light in the diabolically created bodies, to which they must cling.

Although Manicheism was considered a heresy, the Church nevertheless could not wholly combat its concepts. Manicheism took deep root in Christianity and could not be extirpated.¹ Throughout the history of the Church, the belief in the creation of the world by the Devil appears again and again in various forms and in various parts of Christendom. This belief formed the essential element of the system of the heretical sects and is still held by the Yesidis, a sect of devil-worshippers in Asia Minor.² The Church itself adopted this belief, at least in part. If it did not consider the Devil the creator of the world, it regarded him as the master of all matter, and looked upon all nature as the domain of the Devil. This conception, prevalent in the Church, will account for the idea of the inherent wickedness of all matter and for the belief that evils of every kind spring from our material bodies. Our forebears held that all diseases were caused by demons and that relief from all ailments consisted in the exorcism of the demons—the diabolical ancestors of our modern germs—from the human body.

Many modern writers also share the belief in the creation of the world by the Devil. Goethe, in his youth, looked upon Lucifer as the author of all creation. William Blake stated unequivocally: "Nature is the work of the Devil. The Devil is in us as far as we are Nature." Byron, in *Cain* (1821), represents Lucifer as co-creator of the world. In Immermann's *Merlin* (1832), Satan is

¹ See G. Messina's article, "la dottrina Manichea e le origini del Cristianesimo," *Biblica*, X (1930), No. 3.

² On the various sects who held the belief in the Devil as the creator of the world, see the present writer's essay, "Des Teufels Schöpferrolle bei Goethe und Hebbel," *Ncophilologus*, VI (1918-9), 319-22.

the demiurge, the creator of the earth in Gnostic and Platonic philosophy. The Spanish lyric poet, José de Espronceda, in his fragmentary *El Diablo Mundo* (1841), also identifies the Devil with the world. Leconte de Lisle expresses his belief that the world is the work of the Evil Spirit, and that it will exist only as long as Evil exists on earth. In his poem, "la Tristesse du Diable" (1866), this pessimistic poet affirms that the result of the six days' labor will be abolished on that day when, from the bottom of limitless spaces, the oppressed races of the earth hear a voice crying, "Satan is dead!" Anatole France, in his work, *le Jardin d'Épicure* (1895), speaking of the Devil, affirms that "he has created at least one half of the world . . ." In an earlier work, however, this latter-day diabolist expresses the belief that the Demon has created all the world (*la Rôtisserie de la Reine Pédauque*, 1893).

Alfred de Vigny also believed in the infernal essence of Nature. This "enigmatical divinity," with its inflexible and inexorable laws, was, in the opinion of this pessimistic poet, silent and indolent, cold and cruel, disdainful and unmerciful to the ephemeral creature, man. Nature, hymned by mortals as the beneficent mother of men, was to Vigny only their living tomb. In Baudelaire's eyes, Nature, though not created by the Devil, was nevertheless inherently defiled and, according to his own expression, Satanical. In the opinion of this Catholic and diabolic poet, original sin had indelibly stained all Nature.

Even if we do not hold the belief that the Devil created the cosmos, we may agree that it is he at least who makes the world go round. Satan is putatively a very potent power for evil on this planet. His kingdom is in the human mind, through which he directs the affairs of this earth. It is not without reason, therefore, that the Demon was popularly regarded in the Middle Ages, and even for many centuries afterwards, as the governor of this globe.

As for the creation of man, even if we do not favor the belief that man is the Devil's handiwork, orthodoxy contends that he was created through the instrumentality of Satan. For his existence on this earth, man is at least indirectly indebted to the Devil. It should be remembered that man was created solely as successor to Satan in the celestial choir-stalls. If the beautiful archangel had not rebelled, no vacancy would have occurred in heaven; and with no vacancy in heaven, there would have been no need for man's crea-

tion. It is thus proved, to the satisfaction of believers, that man's creation is at least indirectly the work of the Devil.³

THE DEVIL AS PRINCE OF THIS WORLD

Furthermore, it is to Diabolus that man is indebted for all human accomplishments and achievements. Inasmuch as the Spirit of Evil was in the eyes of the Church the master of all terrestrial matter, he was considered the incarnation of all human endeavor which was based on mundane interests. The Church was concerned with things spiritual and of the other world, consigning to the Devil the possessions and deeds of this world. This ecclesiastical antithesis between heavenliness and earthliness amounted in the end to this fact that whatever did not directly contribute to the glory of God, in other words, did not profit the Holy Roman Catholic and Apostolic Church, was denounced as diabolical. In fact, whatever was displeasing to Rome in any field of human thought or activity was regarded as the Devil's work.

SATAN AS SPONSOR OF REASON

It is a matter of historical record that the priests placed all mundane pursuits, professions and pleasures of man under the protection of the Powers of the Pit.⁴ The learned pursuits in particular were believed to be under the inspiration of demons. The priests preached at all times, but especially in the Middle Ages, what André Gide calls "the evangelical depreciation of reason." Satan was regarded by the Church as the incarnation of human reason in contrast to the Saviour, who represented faith. The Spanish reactionary, Cortes Doñoso, less than a century ago, denounced reason as a gift of Gehenna. Heinrich Heine, in *Die Elementargeister* (1834), explains the Catholic condemnation of human reason in the following words:

"The Devil is not only the representative of the supremacy of earthly interests, of sensual delights, and of the flesh; but he is also the exponent of human reason, simply because reason vindicates all the rights of matter. In this respect, Diabolus is the antithesis of Christ, who sets forth

³ On the Devil's partnership with the Deity in the creation of the world, see also the chapter "Diabolus Simia Dei" in the present work.

⁴ Baudelaire's dictum that commerce was in its essence Satanic should certainly meet with the hearty approval of the socialists.

not only the spirit, the ascetic abnegation of the senses, and heavenly salvation, but also faith. The Devil does not *believe*, he does not accept blindly the authority of other persons, he rather relies on independent thought; he uses reason. This method is of course dangerous and terrible; and the Roman Catholic Church has logically condemned independent individual thought as devilish, and declared that the Devil, as the representative of reason, is the Father of Lies."

It is for this reason that, in the eyes of the Church, thinking was equivalent to blaspheming, and that it imprisoned, tortured, hanged or burned every person who dared to think for himself.

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Modern writers, in conformity with Catholic teaching, regard Satan as a luminous genius of reason. Gœthe conceived the Evil Spirit not only as the subtlest of all the beasts of the field, but also as the subtlest of all the intellects of men. In the opinion of Anatole France, it was thought that led the beautiful archangel to revolt (*le Puits de Sainte-Claire*, 1895). Rapisardi's Lucifer is the exponent of Reason, which will finally conquer dogma and do away with superstition and unsupported tradition.

The Devil has a reputation for wisdom. He appears to possess a great amount of brains between the two horns on his head. Anton Chekhov, in "The Shoemaker and the Devil" (1883), maintains that Old Nick, notwithstanding his hoofs and tail, has more brains than many a (Russian) student. Max Beerbohm, in "Enoch Soames" (1916), affirms that the Devil is well informed in all things.

SATAN AS SCHOLAR

Satan, it is generally agreed among modern writers, is a learned scholar and a profound thinker. He has all philosophy and theology, ancient learning and modern science at the tip of his tongue. Anatole France, in his previously quoted work, *le Jardin d'Épicure*, calls the Devil "a great *savant*." This French writer credits Diabolus with a philosophical mind, and Friedrich Hebbel goes so far as to hail Satan as the first philosopher. Heinrich Heine, in the previously quoted *Elementargeister*, represents the Devil as a master in metaphysics, and Edgar Allan Poe, in "Bon-Bon" (1835),

reveals the Devil as a practised metaphysician. Maxim Gorky, in "The Devil" (1899), maintains that Satan is a master ironist, who will, however, not apply "the scalpel of his irony" to the majestic fact of his own existence. Heinrich Heine, in the work just mentioned again, tells us that Satan is a logician. Anatole France says likewise, "The Devil claims that he is a logician" ("le Scepticisme," 1888). Paul Verlaine calls Satan "the old logician." Heinrich Heine assures us further that Diabolus possesses clear, luminous logic,—in fact the greatest ability in argument. According to this German poet, Satan is famed for sophistry and fine-spun syllogisms. Gœthe, in *Faust*, has, to a great extent, availed himself of this characteristic of sophistry on the part of the Evil Spirit. Satan, it should be remembered, is a good dialectician, an incomparable casuist, and a controversialist. The Demon is very fond of disputing when driving a bargain with men for their souls. "The Devil," says Anatole France, in the essay just mentioned, "definitely remains the only doctor who has not yet been refuted." Huysmans warns us with regard to the Devil, "You must not discuss with him; however good a reasoner you may be, you will be worsted, for he is a most tricky dialectician" (*En route*, 1895). Mrs. Browning, in *A Drama of Exile* (1845), portrays Lucifer as an argumentative, introspective spirit, well read in modern poetry and well versed in modern thought. In Molnar's *The Devil* (1907), the protagonist is a masterful ironist and casuist, who demolishes all the stock arguments for goodness, which have been advanced by mortals throughout the ages.

The Devil is no less a theologian than a philosopher. Anatole France testified that the Tempter is a great theologian, and is thus necessarily well versed in the Sacred Scriptures. Martin Luther affirmed that the Devil can quote Holy Writ as fluently as any minister, and can twist and torture texts to any meaning that will suit his evil ends.

SATAN AS SYMBOL OF SCIENCE

By mediæval man the Devil was believed to hold the key to all knowledge. This belief has scriptural sanction, inasmuch as mastery over the world through the intellect was one of the lures held out to Christ by the Tempter. The Serpent in the Garden of Eden also tempted our ancestors to eat of the forbidden fruit of the Tree

of Knowledge. The reward which the Evil Spirit offered his victim for his soul in the Faust legend was likewise power through knowledge. For this reason, all worldly learning was taboo to the theologians.

To the dominion of the Devil the Church handed over philosophy, science and secular learning in general. Philosophy was regarded by the Church as the forbidden fruit of human reason. Ever since the day when the mob of Nitrian monks, in the month of March of the year 415, murdered Hypatia, the last of the Greek philosophers, Catholicism has considered philosophical speculation the work of Satan.

Especially was the study of science invested by the medieval Church with a diabolical taint. Satan has always been considered the symbol of science. In Flaubert's *la Tentation de Saint-Antoine* (1874), the father of the anchorites sees Satan as the personification of science. The Protestant clergy holds the Catholic view on this point. A speaker at an assembly of Lutheran pastors held at Berlin in the month of September, 1877, identified modern science and culture with Belial. All inquiry into the mysteries of nature was regarded by the Church as black magic. The practical investigation of natural laws was denounced as the work of the Evil One. A certain poet of a generation ago referred very seriously to the laboratory as Satan's smithy.

DIABOLICAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERIES

Every discovery of science, every invention of material benefit to man, was believed, during the Middle Ages, and in Catholic countries for long centuries afterwards, to have been secured with the Devil's help. The Marquis de Mirville, author of the treatise, *Des esprits et de leurs manifestations fluidiques dans la science moderne* (1858), also refers all scientific discoveries to the demons of hell. Speaking from the Roman Catholic viewpoint, Jules Michelet exclaims: "Name me one science that has not been a rebel! Every new one," continues this French liberal thinker, "has been Satan." Accordingly, the Vicomte Joseph de Bonald, a religious reactionary living in the beginning of the past century, long before our own fundamentalists, perceived the idea of evolution to be born of the Evil Spirit.

According to the contention of the theologians, it was Satan

who in all ages inspired the philosophers and scientists. Every man who was distinguished from the masses by his learning was suspected of having signed the Satanic pact. Any extraordinary power of intellect was sufficient for our credulous forefathers to credit its possessor with a knowledge of the Black Arts or dealings with the Devil. The human mind was not considered capable of accomplishing anything outstanding without the aid of Satan. "In the popular belief," says Professor Ward, "pre-eminent success in any of the paths which human ambition follows, especially if achieved with extraordinary rapidity or in the teeth of unusual difficulties, was associated with the possession of supernatural powers."⁵

Scholars were especially regarded as servants of Satan. "You scholars carry on dealings with the Devil," says a character in Alexandre Dumas' *la Tulipe noire* (1850). It is common knowledge that men of great learning, like Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon, figured in the eyes of our ancestors as magicians. Giordano Bruno, Servetus and Galileo, it was believed, owed their scientific theories to the inspiration of the demons below.

In all ages the Devil has received the laurels for the labors of the learned. The discovery of the art of printing—the right hand of our civilization—was ascribed to Diabolus. Heinrich Heine, writing of the invention of printing, also said that an art which gave science the victory over faith, an art, moreover, which plunged us into doubts and revolutions, finally delivered us into the hands of the Devil. Johannes Fust or Faust, a promoter of Gutenberg's invention of the art of printing, was considered by his contemporaries a servant of Satan and a magician. The black slave, whom Aldus Manutius, the great Venetian printer, employed in his printing shop toward the end of the fifteenth century, was popularly said to be an imp of hell. This belief accounts for the term "Printer's Devil." The invention of paper money was attributed to the Devil by Gérard de Nerval in *l'Imagier de Harlem ou la Découverte de l'imprimerie* (1851).

Among all scientific pursuits, chemistry was especially considered black magic and identified with alchemy. The chemist's crucible, and the fumes and vapors emanating therefrom, assumed the dimensions of the alchemist's cauldron. Sulphur and phosphorus, in particular, were regarded as articles of purely diabolical equipment. A character in Balzac's *la Peau de chagrin* (1831) also calls

⁵ Cf. A. W. Ward: *Old English Drama*. 4th ed., Oxford, 1901.

chemistry "that science of a devil." This idea survived so long that, in the eighteenth century, Friedrich Hoffmann, a professor at the University of Halle, and a prolific writer on chemical and medical subjects, was believed to have discovered carbonic acid gas with the aid of the Devil.

The German Franciscan monk, Berthold Schwarz, who invented gunpowder about 1350, was believed to be a servant of Satan. A plate in Johannes Brantzius' *les Artifices de feu* (1604) shows the Devil instructing Schwarz in the art of making gunpowder. Chapelain, in *la Pucelle* (1656), represents the Devil as the inventor of gunpowder and owner of a cannon factory. Milton, in *Paradise Lost* (1667-74), also credits the Devil with the invention of the cannon. Tammuz, the Syrian god of vegetation, who, together with all other pagan gods, was converted into a demon by Christianity, is said to be a rival inventor of artillery. P. J. Stahl, in *le Diable à Paris* (1842), similarly attributes the invention of fire-arms to Satan. This writer also terms the silkworm the Devil's worker.

The clergy also counted steam-power among the illusions of the Devil. Pope Gregory XVI called steam an invention of Satan. The priests found no difficulty in spreading this distrust in scientific discoveries among the masses of poor and ignorant country-folk. The peasants of Provence also considered steam an emanation of hell (Alphonse Daudet: "le Secret de Maître Cornille," 1869). The construction of the first steamboat was attributed to the Devil. "Fulton," said one of the characters in Victor Hugo's *les Travailleurs de la Mer* (1866), "was a variation of Lucifer." The locomotive passed originally for Satan's chariot. The school board of the town of Lancaster, Ohio, in 1828, declared the railroad a device of the Devil. In the eyes of the Old Order branch of the Church of the Brethren in America, the automobile is a "devil-machine." The Polish peasants call the radio the "devil-box." The possessor of a radio was recently murdered by Polish peasants in his vicinity, who, in justification, asserted that it killed their crops. Even sanitary appliances were attributed to the Devil. Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, living in the twelfth century, beheld Lucifer lurking in lavatories. The Russians, down to the seventeenth century, regarded purgings and clysters as infernal inventions.⁶

⁶ The telephone is considered by many Europeans, on grounds other than religious, as a diabolic invention, inasmuch as it implies a negation of per-

THE ARTS SPONSORED BY SATAN

But more than anything else, it was art that Catholicism counted among the works of Satan. The Church has at all times affirmed the diabolical origin of all artistic beauty. "Inasmuch as the Evil Spirit," says M. André Thérive, "was the most beautiful of angels, it stands to reason that he will tempt mortals, not by denying art, but through art and under the mask of beauty."⁷ According to the Church fathers, the Devil lurks behind all beauty. St. Cyprian saw the Fiend in a flower. The Protestants were not behind the Catholics in their anathema against all art. The Church of England believed the Muses to be daughters of the Devil. The English poet and preacher, John Donne, in a sermon delivered before Oliver Cromwell at Whitehall, affirmed that the Muses were damned spirits of demons. By the Puritans the seven arts were counted among the works of Satan. Thomas Carlisle reported that his pious friend wished that "the Devil would fly away with the fine arts."

Strangely enough, this belief in the diabolical origin of art is sincerely shared by many moderns. André Gide, the contemporary French diabolist, affirms, "There is no true work of art without the collaboration of the Devil." James Huneker says similarly, "Without the Devil there would be no art." If art has always been diabolical in its essence, it has assuredly become increasingly so in modern times. Charles Baudelaire, a profound and penetrating thinker as well as poet, saw correctly when he said, "Modern art, in particular, has an essentially devilish tendency." This trend results from the fact that, more keenly than their predecessors, the moderns are interested in the demoniac element of human nature.

THE DEVIL AS ARTIST

The popular belief, which credits the Devil with a mastery of all arts, is also shared by many modern thinkers. Anatole France ap-
personal liberty by forcing man's attention at all hours of the day and the night. Read the editorial printed on the occasion of the death of Graham Bell, the inventor of the telephone, in the Paris daily, *le Temps*, of August 3, 1922. The reader who is interested in the war between the monastery and laboratory is referred to Andrew D. White's classical work on the subject, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*. 2 vols., New York, 1898.

⁷ André Thérive: "M. André Gide et le Diable," *l'Opinion*, August 17, 1923.

plies to Diabolus the singular epithets of "great artist" (*le Jardin d'Épicure*, 1895) and "wonderful artist" (*Thais*, 1890).

The Devil is credited in the popular mind with great skill in the technical arts: skill which he inherited, be it parenthetically remarked, from the giants of the old North. The Fiend, in fact, is famed as an architect. The many devil-bridges in Germany and other countries speak for his talents, and the cathedrals even show some of his handiwork as a great builder.

The Devil was always ready to aid artisans who found that they could not complete the work they had undertaken. For, in earthly pursuits, the Devil is man's best friend, ready to lend a hand whenever man is at the end of his natural capacities. "I am one," says Old Nick to Steenie Steenson in Walter Scott's "Wandering Willie's Tale" (1824), "that, though I have been sair misca'd in the world, am the only hand for helping my freends." The Devil never shrank from performing the most arduous tasks, and never even recoiled from carving intricate church-pillars for architects who found that unaided they could not carry out their plans. Solomon found no difficulty in recruiting demons to help him build his temple at Jerusalem. They quarried and cut stones for that edifice, which was erected to the glory of their Great Enemy.

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In Jewish mythology it was the fallen angels who instructed men in all the arts and sciences. Samsaweel taught men the signs of the sun, Seriel, the signs of the moon, and Arakiel, the signs of the earth. Kawkabel was, according to Jewish belief, the demon who taught men astrology, just as Set or Seth, in Egyptian mythology, is the originator of astronomy and many other arts, especially agriculture.⁸ Barakel instructed men in the art of divination from the stars, and Ezekeel taught them augury from the clouds. Armaros showed men how to break spells, and Shemhazai taught them exorcism and how to cut roots. The inventor of the finery and ornaments with which women attract men is Azazel. This demon showed the daughters of Eve "armlets and all sorts of

⁸ Cf. Moncure Daniel Conway: *Demonology and Devil-Lore* (London, 1879; 3rd ed., New York, 1889), II, 279.

trinkets, taught them the use of rouge, and showed them how to beautify their eyelids and how to ornament themselves with the rarest and most precious jewels and with all sorts of paint."⁹ This demon also showed the different metals to men and taught them "how to make slaughtering knives, arms and shields and coats of mail."¹⁰ In European folklore, Bel, a prince of fire, is said to have made possible those technical arts of man which cannot be produced without the aid of fire.

⁹ Cf. Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1909-25), I, 125.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

(To Be Continued)

THE LAW OF REGRESSION IN RELIGION AND MORALS

BY VICTOR S. YARROS

ONE of the principles definitely established in biology is that known as "the law of filial regression." A better formula is, "the tendency to mediocrity." Sir Francis Galton, a pioneer in the statistical study of inheritance, demonstrated that extreme or exceptional peculiarities in parents became less and less exceptional in their offspring. In the words of Galton, "the stature of adult offspring must on the whole be more mediocre than the stature of their parents—that is to say, more near to the mean or mid of the general population." Intellectually and morally, Galton was convinced, as other biologists have been and are, we fare no better. In Galton's words, again, "the more bountifully a parent is gifted by nature, the more rare will be his good fortune if he begets a son who is as richly endowed as himself." The tendency throughout nature, indeed, *is to revert to the mean and to eliminate the abnormal or super-normal.*

These facts are clearly quite as important to sociology and to scientific or philosophical reform movements as they are to biology. If there is a tendency to mediocrity in nature, social and moral relations can not escape the same fate. Society is not an organism in the strict sense of the term, but it is an organic entity nevertheless for all essential social purposes. Great seers and leaders, founders of religions, schools, parties, systems of government have spiritual offspring—disciples, interpreters, enthusiastic propagandists. The law of filial regression seems to apply to the spiritual sons and daughters of genius or of truly remarkable ability.

History, we shall see, is full of illustration of this tendency to revert to the mean and the ordinary. Some of the illustrations seem tragic, and therefore strained, improbable explanations of them have been advanced by minds otherwise acute and powerful. Ah, what progress humanity would have made had it been able to preserve and even improve upon the exceptional moral and spiritual

gifts of its prophets, its supermen, its heroes and martyrs! But, alas, the rare exceptions and the peculiarities, no matter how valuable and beneficent they may be, are obliterated by the universal tendency to mediocrity. The children of the moral giant are "shorter" than the spiritual parent, and their children are apt to be still shorter. The noble and lofty teachings and examples of the parent are either forgotten, or misinterpreted, or honored only by lip service. Practice and conduct undergo little change, or else the change that does take place under the inspiring, influential leadership of the genius, like a revivalist's conversion of a multitude, gradually fades and melts into conduct hardly ditinguishable from that of the pre-conversion period.

But the thoughtful and open-minded student of history and of social psychology is not at all astonished, or disheartened, by these facts. They are seen to be natural and inevitable. Only, not even reflective students always draw the right moral from them.

Mr. H. G. Wells, for example, in his extraordinarily vivid and fascinating *Outline of History*, in discussing the early corruption and misconception of Buddhism, says:

"There seems to be no limit to the lies that honest but stupid disciples will tell for the glory of their master and for what they regard as the success of their propaganda. Men who would scorn to tell a lie in everyday life will become unscrupulous cheats and liars when they have given themselves up to propagandist works; it is one of the perplexing absurdities of our human nature."

Here we have a most sweeping generalization—namely, that religious and ethical systems tend to corruption because the zeal of the propagandists who flock to the master's standard leads them, or many of them, to invent lies and vulgar marvels for the purpose of arousing the interest and gripping the imagination of the indifferent, the unintelligent and the superstitious. To this generalization two objections may be raised. In the first place, few of the mendacious disciple-propagandists lie *deliberately and consciously*. They undoubtedly half believe their own inventions. They exaggerate spontaneously, they "romance," as children do, or even adults when carried away by any cause whatever, personal, class or social; and subsequently they are humanly ashamed to retract the half true or extravagant statements impulsively made by them. The capacity for self-deception, for self-exculpation, is known to psychologists and common-sense observers of human behavior, and these are not as

ready as Mr. Wells to call enthusiasts and rhetoricians "cheats and liars." Care and precision, literal and rigorous truth in human speech, and especially in eager, excited speech, are rare and difficult virtues, seldom achieved even by men of science, especially in their ordinary conversations and their offhand, unguarded utterances.

The second objection to Mr. Wells' severe indictment of human nature in disciples and apostles is more important even than the first. Grant for the sake of the argument that the disciples too willingly become "cheats and liars" for the glory of their revered master, whose message they are so anxious to disseminate that they lose consciousness of their own initial violation of its spirit and even of its letter. What does this fact prove? That the disciples, who are of the people and intimately acquainted with their proclivities and mental habits, find it necessary to cheat and lie *in order to render the master's message acceptable*. The disciples seek to make converts, and do not hesitate, by the hypothesis, to stoop to conquer. Otherwise, their voices would be voices crying in a wilderness. The process of popularization, of corruption, of attenuation, of sugar-coating, which the disciples set in motion, even in the lifetime of the master, continues afterward with ever increasing momentum. In the course of a comparatively short period the master's original and revolutionary teachings become conventionalized, hardly distinguishable from the old, unsound creed they were intended to discredit and overthrow. Can we complain that the disciples lack the faith, the courage, the vision, the single-mindedness of the master? This would be irrational and futile. To repeat, moral genius, like intellectual, is rare. It is foredoomed to misconstruction and perversion. It is foredoomed by the law of regression or the tendency to the mean.

Let us go to history for some striking illustrations of this tendency. The rise, growth and decline of great religious systems might be expected, a priori, to supply them, and in fact they do.

Take Buddhism first. Mr. H. G. Wells, in his "Outline"—a compilation based on standard works and authorities—writes as follows concerning the fundamental teaching of Gautama:

"All the miseries and discontents of life he traces to insatiable selfishness. Suffering, he teaches, is due to the craving individuality, to the torment of greedy desire. Until a man has overcome every sort of personal craving his life is trouble and his end sorrow. There are three principal forms the craving of life takes, and all

are evil. The first is the desire to gratify the senses, sensuousness. The second is the desire for personal immortality. The third is the desire for prosperity, worldliness. All these must be overcome—that is to say, a man must no longer be living for himself—before life can become serene. But when they are indeed overcome and no longer rule a man's life, when the first personal pronoun has vanished from his private thoughts, then he has reached the higher wisdom, Nirvana, serenity of soul."

Gautama's Rule of Life, or Eightfold Path to wisdom and serenity, is this: right views; right aspirations; right speech; right conduct; right livelihood; right effort; right mindfulness; right rapture.

Gautama's religion, Mr. Wells truly observes, was primarily a religion of conduct, not a religion of observances and sacrifices. It had no temples, no priestly order, no sacrifices, and no theology. The gods worshipped in India in Gautama's time were completely ignored—passed by.

What happened to Gautama's teaching, to primitive Buddhism? Let Mr. Wells answer:

"It was early the fate of Gautama . . . to be made into a wonder by his less intelligent disciples in their efforts to impress the outer world. We have already noted how one devout follower could not but believe that the moment of the master's mental irradiation must necessarily have been marked by an epileptic fit of the elements. This is one small sample of the vast accumulation of vulgar marvels that presently sprang up about the memory of Buddha. . . .

"Honest souls, for most of them were indubitably honest, were presently telling their hearers of the miracles that attended the Buddha's birth—of his youthful feats of strength, of the marvels of his everyday life, winding up with a sort of illumination of his body at the moment of death. Of course it was impossible to believe that Buddha was the son of a mortal father. He was miraculously conceived through his mother dreaming of a beautiful white elephant. . .

"Moreover, a theology grew up about Buddha. He was discovered to be a god. He was one of a series of divine beings, the Buddhas. 'Under the overpowering influence of these sickly imaginations the moral teachings of Gautama have been almost hid from view. The theories grew and flourished; each new step, each new hypothesis, demanded another, until the whole sky was filled with forgeries of the brain, and the nobler and simpler lessons of the

founder of the religion were smothered beneath the glittering mass of metaphysical subtleties' (Rhys Davids' "Buddhism")."

Many of the disciples, misconceiving the idea of renunciation, lapsed into monasticism, a lapse particularly easy in the climate of India. Then Buddhism gained wealth and power; simple huts were giving place to substantial structures, decorated and adorned. Early Buddhist art was strongly Greek in character, and the cult and doctrine of Gautama soon gathered corruptions and variations from Brahminism and Hellenism alike.

The fate of primitive Buddhism is not exceptional but typical. Whatever one may think of Mr. Wells' own religious views, no serious student of history will take exception to the following general observations regarding primitive Christianity:

"The story of the early beginnings of Christianity is the story of the struggle between the real teachings and spirit of Jesus of Nazareth and the limitations, amplifications and misunderstandings of the very inferior men who had loved and followed him to Gallilee and who were now the bearers and custodians of his message to mankind."

Nor is it possible to dissent from the statement that Paul, who had never seen Jesus, built the ethical and spiritual doctrines of the Nazarine into a subtle theological system, or converted a way of living into a doctrine of belief, the beginning of a creed.

Islam, again, has been corrupted by zealous but credulous and limited disciples. "It was full of the spirit of kindness, generosity and brotherhood"—writes Mr. Wells—"and it was a simple and understandable religion; it was instinct with the chivalrous sentiment of the desert; and it made its appeal straight to the commonest instincts in the composition of ordinary men."

But—"the splendid opening of the story of Islam collapses suddenly into squalid dispute and bickering of heirs and widows." The history of Islam degenerates, to quote Mr. Wells again, "into the normal crimes and intrigues of an Oriental dynasty." Why? Chiefly because Islam, as it spread and stereotyped itself, had to work on a less and less congenial basis—had to grow on soil that distorted and perverted it, answers Mr. Wells. Countless converts were converts only in name; they missed the spirit and essence of the faith they thought they were embracing.

Thus, without multiplying words, one may conclude with Mr. Wells that all great unifying religions "present the same history of

a rapid spreading, like a little water poured over a great area, and then of superficiality and corruption."

Is the history of great political, social and economic movements, of the explosions we call revolutions, different from that of religious reformations? The answer is that it is not. In the words of Mr. R. S. Tawney, in his admirable little book, "The Acquisitive Society," painful experience shows that revolutions take their color and tone from the very system or order they undertake to overthrow.

Take the great French Revolution. Its principles were noble and inspiring. Its leaders were sincere and earnest men. They were ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause of human liberty, equality and fraternity. They were tolerant and humane at the start. But how soon the movement so auspiciously and so thrillingly begun degenerated into the worst form of tyranny, into incredible cruelty and savagery! Leaders of groups and factions were sent to the guillotine for political, ethical or religious opinions which the men temporarily in supreme power deemed heterodox and dangerous. Freedom of speech and publication was suppressed. The tyranny of the liberators and humanitarians became worse than that they had thundered against and overthrown! No wonder the people of France were ready after years of disorder, or bloodshed, of insensate fanaticism and revolting injustice to submit even to Napoleon Bonaparte and his imperial regime!

In our day we have the object lessons of the Russian "social revolution" under the Bolshevik clique of dogmatists and pedants. This "real" or economic revolution was embarked upon for the purpose of completing the task of the political revolution of March, 1917. Lenin, Trotzky and their colleagues, as disciples of Marx, hoped and sought to destroy once and for all the capitalist-bourgeois order in Russia and in the world at large. They thought they had a rare historic opportunity and that it was their sacred mission and privilege to improve it. They had, they claimed, a more advanced type of democracy, a more genuine kind of liberty, to offer to mankind. They were evolutionists *in theory*, and they had written and spoken most earnestly against Utopian or sentimental radicalism that imagined the course of history could be changed, a process of development shortened, by mere willing or sighing or even terrorizing and fighting. But when the temptation seemed to present itself, they yielded. They forgot their science, their stern historical logic, their determinism. Russia was backward, primitive, ignorant, il-

literate, barbarous; yet, after all, perhaps it *was* her lot to lead the West, to set an example of thoroughgoing revolution, to start the world-conflagration. Europe might follow. America was a formidable stumbling block, but she too might follow. The risk might be taken—nay, must be taken.

But when Europe, profiting to some extent by the bitter experience of the Russian victims of premature and non-evolutionary revolution, refused to follow Lenin, what did the Bolshevik pedants do? Acknowledge their blunder and make peace with the intelligent and constructive Russian radicals and literals? No. They persisted in their fatal error, and decline and degeneration set in. Espionage, terror, tyranny, ruthless suppression of the most moderate criticisms, wholesale arrests and executions were—and still are—the means adopted by the Bolshevist dictatorship to retain power and postpone the inevitable—surrender to irresistible forces, to the logic of facts and conditions. The followers and disciples of Lenin and his few associates surpassed their masters in violence, arrogance, impotent rage and ferocity. The great social revolution that was to liberate Russia at one stroke, thrill the world and establish the purest and truest form of democracy has assumed the revolting, abhorrent form of a depotism worse than that of the most reactionary of the czars. Criminals, knaves, hypocrites, bullies, thieves, placemen flocked to the Bolshevik banner. The eventual liquidation of the whole fantastic and stupid experiment became inevitable. “The greatest failure in all history,” Mr. John Spargo calls Bolshevism. *One* of the greatest failures it certainly is, and it dramatically reinforces the many lessons of history that illustrate the law of regression and of the reversion to the mean.

“The Great Man” theory of progress is utterly unsound and fallacious. Humanity is not lifted up and carried forward by heroes, or demi-gods, or super-men. The seers and prophets are those who interpret tendencies rightly, who see things as they are, who forecast the future because they realize all the implications and necessary effects of the present. We cannot appeal to the non-existent. We cannot create something out of nothing. The prophets and leaders, as Mr. Wells says, do but call forth elements that are latent in mind and conscience of hosts of ordinary men and women. We are all strange bundles of contradictions, mixed motives, conflicting instincts and impulses. We are all to a certain extent “educable” and plastic. We respond to the good, and we succumb

to the bad in us. The great leaders make their appeal to the latent good, and for a time they may succeed, perhaps even beyond expectations. But the struggle recommences, the less creditable motives and desires reassert themselves, the old habits insidiously resume control. The reaction that results is not necessarily equal to the action; if it were, no progress would be possible. *Something remains of the new faith*, the conquest over the lower self. The general moral tone in society is higher because of the generous enthusiasm, the infectious zeal, the conversions, the new evangel, the precept and example of the master. We revert to the mean, but the mean is found, in the moral and spiritual realm, to be somewhat or distinctly better than before the change. We say, if we lapse, that we had not really understood ourselves, and that we had not sufficiently identified ourselves, consciously, with our higher qualities. The master had energized, mobilized, organized and made effective the latent and potential forcés.

But we must not fold our hand and wait for the genius, the master, to push us forward and place us on a higher plane. Genius is rare and unforeseen. It is not true—to quote Lord James Bryce, in substance—that the occasion *always* brings the man, or that demand for leadership *always* produces the supply. History flatly contradicts the too optimistic generalization which asserts the contrary. When the master “happens”—and no one can tell beforehand *where* a genius will be thrown up by nature—human advance may be facilitated. But to neglect all the other means of facilitating progress in a moral, spiritual and social direction is to sacrifice the certain, the permanent, for the occasional and accidental. The main effort of high-minded and humanitarian thinkers should be to elevate the mean, the average, by unceasing education and by honest agitation of the problems that challenge attention and enjoin solution under penalties—penalties in the form of misery, friction, ill will, catastrophe. One may not agree with Mr. Wells that history up to date has been “a race between education and catastrophe” in which the latter has generally won, for, if this were true, mankind would not be where it is today intellectually and morally. Progress is a *fact* to the sober-minded student of man and society; not merely a dogma or hope. Education has won many a race in history, but it can win more frequently and more decisively if, instead of depending on exceptional genius, we emphasize constantly the need and ample possibilities of patient, sustained, modest educational work

on democratic lines. The alternative to progress by education is progress by fits and starts, by convulsions—often unfortunate and futile convulsions—with subsequent reversion to the mean. It is unscientific and foolish to underestimate the intelligence of the average body of men and women who suffer by reason of unjust survivals and of maladjustments. If the grievances they are supposed to have are real, and not imaginary, their problems can be stated, formulated and explained to most of them, and so can the proposed solutions. *If humanity cannot be educated, it cannot be reformed.* There are Bourbons in every class that learn nothing and forget nothing, but they are in the minority. What is reasonable in reform makes its appeal to reason. What is just in reform—no matter how radical it may seem at first—strikes a responsive chord in conscience, in the sense of right and honor, and makes the still small voice imperative and compelling. Modern democratic societies, says Bryce, are *what their leaders make them.* This is largely true, though an overstatement of the case. But leadership in a modern society need not be the privilege of the few. It can become the privilege of thousands of thoughtful, sincere men and women in their respective spheres of influence. Newspapers, periodicals, popular books, pamphlets, trade union meetings, civic and cultural clubs—all these, and many other agencies, have it within their power to carry on systematic education of the masses, provided they first fit themselves for the task by earnest study and reflection, and thus gradually elevate the mean.

OPPOSITION VERSUS INDIFFERENCE

BY HAROLD BERMAN

A MAN should never be afraid of opponents, but mortally afraid of those who are neither opponents nor the exponents of his ideal or outlook, nor for that matter, the exponents or opponents of any outlook or philosophy in particular. An opponent is he who has given the particular philosophy or outlook cherished by you some earnest and more or less consistent consideration, and is ready to do so again if new facts and added information are presented to him, but who sincerely finds himself at present unable to concur in your views or to accept your methods or cure as the panacea for the particular ill or ills it proposes to cure. Enlightened opposition implies by its very term a readiness to learn, a willingness to accept something new and different from the philosophy and outlook that one has espoused all along provided that the new prove more acceptable to his rationalizing facilities or mystical and intuitional needs and inspirations than the old system, in which case one is quite ready to accept it and make it his only guide in life and quite irrespective of the destruction that it brings in its train to one's inherited notions, his preconceived and cherished ideals and the number of one's hallowed idols that it will inevitably lay in the dust.

An opposition of this dynamic and enlightened nature not only is legitimate but becomes a positive incentive, and, on occasion, even an inspiration to the thinker and the creator, serving as it does to spur him on in his search of new knowledge, of new truths with which to impregnate his own opinions and outlooks, to broaden his field of vision as well as to clarify all disputed points and formulas. And being that the missionary spirit is exceedingly strong in all of us, and no sooner is a belief or *Anschauung* recognized by ourselves as *the truth*, and, hence, as possessing the essence of salvation, physical, mental or spiritual, in it than we itch

to preach it and make it known to our fellow-men, so that it becomes the medium of their salvation as well, we usually do go a step further afield and seek not only to defend our own assailed position but exert ourselves at the same time to convert our opponents, and occasionally do succeed in doing it, our own opponents presumably being open to conviction as all men engaged in the search of truth invariably are. It is in this manner that all philosophies and 'ologies make their headway in life, and from their beginning as the treasured possession of one or more favored discoverers or originators become the property of the many, though they inevitably become considerably diluted in the process of popularization and acceptance by the large masses of the people who could not possibly be expected to grasp all their postulated intricacies as well as their abstruse points. Its raging and torrential whirlpools have to be drawn off into the shallow wading pools fordable by the man of low stature, as otherwise they would either refuse to enter the stream altogether, or, having entered it, would be overwhelmed by its strong currents and swept away to their destruction. A thesis must be "watered down" considerably in order to make it acceptable to the weak stomach of the average man, but the essence of its principle cannot, and must not, be abrogated. These constitute the very soul, the life-breath of the thesis, and by tampering with the soul of a living organism we are destroying the body that it dwells in as well, and then we should have nothing whatever left of the entire cherished object.

But that, however, applies only to the indiscriminating mass of the people, and does not at all apply to the chosen, reasoning few who are, above all else, anxious to get at the truth and nothing but the truth. In the case of these superior men one should, on the contrary, take care that the idea be presented to them in its pristine purity, clarity and perfection, as these men do boast the stomach for strong meat; and, furthermore, they are of the seed of the martyrs who might sooner or later become the apostles to carry the divine Gospel, so strenuously opposed by them now, to the very ends of the earth in days to come. They will disseminate it, that is, after they have become converted from opponents into adherents, when they will become as zealous in your cause as they had been formally in its antithetical counterpart.

This g enre of man, the kind that does his own thinking and is truly anxious for light and leading, is the very one into whose

keeping the fate of your ideal may be safely entrusted. Of necessity, *he had to* be your opponent, even an active and sincere opponent, as the more active and sincere his opposition the more zealous and devoted will his adherence be after his conversion. Your Saul of Tarsus, persecutor of truth and its exponents, becomes the Saint Paul after he had beheld the vision of truth on the road to persecute its preachers. But no Pauls are ever bred out of the great masses of indifferent or jeering artisans and petty tradesmen to whom the welfare of their craft or trade is of far greater concern than all the systems of salvation and all the 'ologies in the universe. From these only lackeys and footmen of an idea are made, the "yea" shouters and the coach-followers of the great procession *after* it has become the mass demonstration. They, also, will be found on the band wagon when the proper time arrives, feebly mouthing words that they little understand and care less for.

The preacher of a new religious or social faith should *seek* with all his might to provide himself with opponents of such mettlesome calibre, who in the long run will prove even greater importance to him in his final hour of triumph than the facilely-acquired adherents of a certain, inconsequential, sort. Such an opponent, it is quite true, may prove a Calvin or a Torquemada and burn your body at the stake ere your idea has had the chance to convert him or others. But he is worth taking a chance with if you are truly earnest in your faith, inspired by its truth and ready to assume serious risks and hazards on its behalf. You will then either save his soul while preserving its shell, the body, or he will save your soul at the expense of your body, which is of little moment to you after all when the well-being and the salvation of your own and others' immortal souls is concerned.

Your idea or *Anschauung* has need of an opponent even as your body has need of nutrition and pure air as means for keeping life within it. And the trouble with us men of the present generation is that we have no opponents worthy of the name. Outside of the realm of economics-applied economics, of course—there seems to be no division of opinion among men. People have grown complacent and tamely acquiescent, tolerant to the point of absurdity. Fighting over abstract ideas and principles has become ungentlemanly, needless and a sore waste of time. Tolerate the other fellow and his vagaries and errors so that he in turn will tolerate you and your vagaries and errors and all will be as peaceful and as har-

monious as a graveyard, where all is decorum and peace because the occupants of the various graves had long since settled their accounts with their God and men, even as they did with life itself, living blood no longer courses in their veins while the worms have nibbled away again and again at their brains. The peace and harmony that we now enjoy in the realm of religion and abstract reasoning generally, far from importing to us the arrival of the long prayed-for millenium, really betokens *the twilight age*, the age of expiring lights and the oncoming of darkness, or at least of the lesser and dimmer lights of the night by which only the coarser and more material objects are clearly seen, while the finer ones are barely discerned and as if through a haze or fog. No one is certain about them; no one cares, or is able, to discern their true being and composition—and of what practical difference is it to us after all? Such seem to be man's thoughts, his perhaps unconscious and unanalyzed reactions to these abstruse matters, and, hence, his easy going and good natured behavior towards his so-called opponents and the supposed controversialists who have long since abandoned all controversy.

Far different is, however, man's behavior in things material and concrete, whether these affect his immediate well-being or at some possible more or less remote time. Man will not only haggle, and haggle mightily, about his day's wage or the price of a bushel of corn, but also about the possible coming changes in the system of production and distribution of wealth, which change may most likely not affect his own well-being at all and perhaps not even that of his immediate successors in life. But these matters indubitably *are concrete* in the sense that they affect his day's wage and, hence, his standard of physical comfort, the amount of money he is to have in his pocket in return for that bushel of corn, while the changes in our economic system, should they come today or tomorrow or next year, also are bound to affect them in the same way, and mayhap, even to a larger degree. But ideas, outlooks and philosophies languish, and will continue to languish, with us for lack of any serious, well defined and obstinate opposition.

Just as long as men will refuse to crack even metaphorical skulls over religious, moral or esthetic views, as they now do crack *physical* and *actual heads* over the question of Unionism, the tariff, foreign markets, Imperialism and the like material questions, it will profit the preacher but little to go on preaching his ideals and exert

himself in the thankless task to have them become the lighthouse radiating light and leading to erring man.

Where there is no friction the needle cannot become magnetized, and hence, remains incapable of acting in turn on the inert lump of iron. Similarly, where there is no friction of ideas, no serious clash between life-philosophies and outlooks but all is peacefully indifferent and indolently drab, serene and matter-of-fact, the dull and lifeless metal of life cannot be magnetized by any new ideas, but is doomed to remain inert; and the one who seeks to awaken it is simply indulging in useless effort and wasted motion. The old, long established systems, outlooks and philosophies will persist, despite the repetitive monotony and lukewarm dullness of their preachers and exponents because of man's mechanized, routine habits and his constitutional mental inertia which urges him on the path of least physical or mental resistance. But new systems and values have as much chance to survive, spread and propagate their kind as has the proverbial snow-ball in the eternally hot nether regions in an atmosphere wherein touch and sight are the only two of man's senses to survive and function in their full force, while the other and more delicate senses have become merely rudimentary or vestigial in their action.

LEAN CATTLE

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID

Lean cattle, ranged against the rim
Of sunset's cloud-smudged glow,
Sharp-hipped, with scrawniness of limb,
Knee-deep in drifted snow ;
Forlorn of eye, and shivering,
They stand in mute appeal
To Whom, or what, of God, or thing,
No longing may reveal.

Thin silhouettes of weird design,
Bespeaking patience dumb,
In shrunken jaw and brisket line,
Stand rigid, stark, and numb.
As night befalls the evening's wane,
And Man his rest may find,
Lean cattle, motionless, in vain
Await the tempered wind.

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