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SEPTEMBER, 1929

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VOLUME XLIII NUMBER 880

Price 20 Cents

The Open Court Publishing Company

Wieboldt Hall, 339 East Chicago Avenue
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LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

Lancaster, Pa.

55 Fifth Avenue, New York

Single Numbers \$1.00 (5s.)

Per Annum \$5.00 (25s.)

THE OPEN COURT

Volume XL'II (No. 9)

SEPTEMBER, 1929

Number 880

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Published monthly by
THE OPEN COURT PUBLISHING COMPANY
337 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago, Illinois

Subscription rates: \$2.00 a year; 20c a copy. Remittances may be made by personal checks, drafts, post-office or express money orders, payable to the Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

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Address all correspondence to the Open Court Publishing Company, 337 East Chicago Ave., Chicago.

Entered as Second-Class matter March 26, 1897, at the Post Office at Chicago, Illinois, under Act of March 3, 1879.

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


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


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
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A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and
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Volume XLIII (No. 9) SEPTEMBER, 1929

Number 880

AMERICA AND MEDIAEVAL EUROPE

BY LEWIS SPENCE

EVEN the most conservative historians now agree that the records relating to the Norse discoveries and settlements on the North American continent during the tenth century bear the stamp of authentic and acceptable narrative. But alert as our generation may be in research, it seems either to have lost sight of, or fails to appreciate at its proper value, the later mass of evidence which leads to the amazing conclusion that the descendants of these early settlers maintained a connection with Europe until the middle of the fourteenth century, that the Crusades were actually preached to them on American soil by missionaries sent thither for that purpose by European prelates, and that Peter's Pence were contributed for the upkeep of the armies of the Cross by the people of at least one Norse-American colony in 1282 and 1325. These tithes duly found their way across the Atlantic to certain Italian banking-houses, as documents in the Vatican definitely bear witness.

Nor does it seem to be generally understood, even in knowledgeable circles, that it was from personal examination of records referring to these lost lands in an Icelandic library that Columbus first received corroboration of the existence of a Western Continent. Indeed the clue to the American connection had never been altogether lost, and it seems now quite apparent that the great discoverer gained his information concerning America from certain Papal officials aware of its existence through the records of the bishoprics which the Norse had established there and which had been preserved in the Vatican. It is now scarcely open to question that he received a strong suggestion from official circles in Rome that, were he to betake himself to Iceland, he would certainly discover there definite evidence of the existence of land in the Atlantic.

Before justifying these rather startling statements it will be necessary to relate briefly the story of Norse discovery in the American Continent, a story so seemingly incredible that it has received the recognition of cautious authorities only after the most rigorous examination of its bona fides. The first mention of Greenland, whence sailed the Norse discoverers of America, is in the *Description of the Northern Islands* of Adam of Bremen, written about 1070, in which he accounts for its name by saying that its inhabitants derive their blueish-green colour "from the salt water," and that they had adopted Christianity. But "the best informed man in Iceland" Ari Frode, or "the Wise, born in 1067, tells us that Greenland was discovered and colonized from Iceland by the Norseman Erik the Red about 985 or 986. Ari received this information from his uncle Thorkell Gellison, who in his youth had been personally acquainted with at least one man who had accompanied Erik to Greenland.

The history of the Norse colony in Greenland is that of a white people, few in numbers, isolated in a dreary and remote region, yet keeping in contact with its parent Iceland, building at least one monastery and producing the beginnings of a literature. But it is not with the Greenlanders we have to do, interesting as is the saga of their courageous struggle against overwhelming conditions and their ultimate and absolute disappearance in a continent of ice. It is rather with their exploration of the American coast, their settlements on its shores, and the contact of these with European civilization with which we are here concerned.

It is in the *Book of Hauk Erlendsson*, an Icelander, that we find the earliest authentic notice of the explorations of the Norse Greenlanders in America. This document was probably written about 1305. The facts as Hauk knew them, are contained in his Book, part of which is written in his own hand, and in another MS. of the fifteenth century, No. 557 of the Copenhagen collection of Arne Magnusson, generally known as *The Saga of Erik the Red*. Portions of this latter document can readily enough be referred, so far as its materials are concerned, to the eleventh century, and the spirit of the work is archaic to a degree. It will be found in its entirety in Mr. A. M. Reeves' *The Finding of Wineland the Good*, published so long ago as 1890. It is obviously a transcript of a much older MS. and contains a number of copyist's errors.

These documents briefly outline the discovery of the North American regions known as "Helluland," "Markland" and "Wonderstrand" by Thorfinn Karlsefni in 1020. Within a six day's sail from Greenland, we are told, these northerly countries were found, but tempests drove the enterprising voyagers far to the south, to "Vinland," where they dwelt for a year, trouble with the Skraelings, or natives, at last forcing them to withdraw. Another manuscript also in the Arne Magnusson collection, generally attributed to Nicholas, Abbot of Thingeyri, who died in 1159, seems to corroborate this information, and states that "Southward from Greenland is Helluland, then comes Markland: thence it is not far to Vinland the Good which some men think is connected with Africa. . . . It is said that Thorfinn Karlsefni hewed a timber house and then went to seek Vinland, and came to where they believed this land to be." The topography of these accounts agrees with that of the actual coastline of North America as observed sailing southward from Greenland—first a desolate stony region, next forest-country, and lastly the warmer lands to the south—and seems to point to a voyage past the coasts of Labrador, Newfoundland and the more fertile region of Massachusetts.

In the later *Eyrbyggja Saga*, written in 1250-1260, the *Islendingabok* or *Book of Iceland*, written by Ari Thorgilsson and the *Grettisaga*, dating from 1290, the story of the Norse discoveries in America is detailed at greater length, and is now recognized as agreeing in substance with the earlier accounts so entirely as to leave little dubiety that its details were drawn from common and authentic sources. It may be summarized as follows:

It was in the year 1002 that Leif Eriksson, son of Erik the Red, sailing from Greenland to Norway, was thrown out of his course by a great tempest, on a coast where he found cornfields and wild vines flourishing and where he wintered. On his return to Greenland, he did not fail to give his adventure every publicity, and in 1020 an expedition was fitted out under the leadership of Thorfinn Karlsefni to search for this land of plenty. It consisted, like the flotilla of Columbus, of three vessels, and was manned by 140 men.

Some days after setting sail from Vestribygdh in Greenland, Karlsefni's ships came in sight of Helluland, or the Land of Rocks, which is now thought to answer to the coast of Laborador. There they found nothing to detain them, so, sailing southward, they ar-

rived in a couple of days at the country of Markland, or the Wooded Land, a region covered with forests and frequented by numbers of wild animals. Pushing south-westwards, they came in turn to Kjalarnes, or the Cape of the Keel, then to Furdhurstrandhir, or Wonder Strand, so called "because it was so wondrous long," where they anchored. Here they sent out two Scottish slaves, male and female, called Haki and Hakia, to forage. These explorers returned to the coast laden with wild corn and grapes.

Once more taking to the sea, the Norsemen sailed onward to a place they called Straumsfjord, or the Bay of Currents, where they discovered an island to which they gave the name of Straumey. Here they resolved to winter, and shortly afterwards came in touch with the natives, to whom they gave the rather contemptuous designation of Skraelings or "chips," because of their small stature. These Skraelings were dark and ill-favoured and were probably of Indian race. Karlsefni had brought his wife Gudrid with him on the voyage, and a son Snorri was born to him at Straumsfjord during the first autumn, "and he was three winters old when they left." Snorri was the first European to be born on American soil.

A feud arose with the Skraelings, and because of the swarming numbers of these people, the Norsemen were compelled to evacuate their winter quarters and set sail again. Passing Markland they found five Skraelings there, and seized two of their children, whom they took to Greenland and taught the Norse Language. This concludes the account as given in the *Saga of Erik the Red* and elsewhere. But in a manuscript known as the *Book of Flatey*, supplementary details are given relating to even earlier Norse discoveries in America. We are told that Björn, the son of Herjulf, an Icelander, when sailing to Greenland in 985 or 986, was cast by a tempest on the coast of a strange land, and discovered regions known as Helluland, Markland and Vinland. Voyaging to Norway in 994, he gave an account of his discovery to Jarl Erik of that country, and to Leif, who afterwards reconnoitred the coast. The account given of the regions discovered by Leif is similar to that in the *Saga of Erik the Red*.

But Leif's voyage led to a second expedition, that of Leif's brother, Thorwald Erikson. Setting out with one ship and 30 men in 1004, he found without difficulty the place where Leif had wintered, and thence he pressed southward, coming upon a land well-

wooded and fertile. At Kjalarnes, he and his company fell foul of the Skraelings, and several were slain, Thorwald himself being killed by an arrow. He and his dead followers were buried at a place called Krossness and the rest of the expedition returned to Greenland.

That the Norse people of Greenland at this time or later actually founded a colony in an American locality known as Vinland is now a matter of history. Grapes grew in Vinland, we are told, so that it must have been situated in a comparatively warm climate. Professor Hovgaard has even suggested that there may have been two Vinlands, that of Leif being much farther south than that of Karlsefni.

But Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy has argued very convincingly that the country in which Karlsefni wintered and where Snorri was born was actually the Hudson River end of Long Island. Long Island is of interest to naturalists as a meeting place for equatorial and arctic species of birds, and was formerly the centre of a whaling industry,¹ which accounts for the Peter's Pence of whalebone which, as we shall see, the Vinland colony paid as a tithe to the exchequer of the Crusades. But if Mr. Gathorne-Hardy credits the discovery of Vinland, he appears to be of the impression that no colony was ever settled thereon. This, however, can be proved by existing documentary evidence.

At the close of the thirteenth century, the influence of the Scandinavian race extended from Palestine to America. Its devout pilgrims were numerous in the Holy Land, and the Church, realizing the zeal of the northern nations, made efforts to enlist their hardy sons in the ranks of the Crusaders by preaching the holy war in Norway, Iceland and Greenland. Nor was its propaganda limited to these countries, for the missionaries dispatched thither actually travelled in furtherance of their labours to that Vinland discovered in America by Leif and Karlsefni some centuries earlier.

Abundant evidence exists that this isolated American colony of the Norsemen was not only well-known to the Europe of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, but that it was familiar to the Vatican through missionary effort and correspondence. Pope Gregory X, as Archdeacon of Liege, had accompanied the Frisian Crusaders to Palestine in 1270, and was well acquainted with the geography and seafaring conditions of the north. In 1273 he con-

¹ *The Norse Discoverers of America*, 1921.

voked at Lyons an œcumenical council, the purpose of which was to organize crusading effort in western and northern Christendom, and to Sighorte, Canon of Trondhjem, and Arne, Bishop of Skalholt, in Iceland, he entrusted the task of propaganda throughout the Scandinavian realms. Bertrand Amaury, Canon of Rheims, was moreover dispatched as papal legate to these dominions and was instructed to extend operations to those outlying Norse colonies to which crusading endeavour had not as yet penetrated. Lapland, Finland, the Orkneys and Hebrides were embraced in the scheme, and their settlers, impressed by the necessity for liberating the Sepulchre, contributed generously according to their means. In Iceland Arne Thorlaksson preached the Cross with a fervour unsurpassed by Peter the Hermit himself and its clergy willingly agreed to resign a tithe of their substance to the crusading war-chest, while its manpower, with equal readiness, enlisted under the banner of the Church militant.

King Hakon of Norway had dispatched Olaf, as Bishop of Gardar to Greenland in 1261, with instructions to keep the Norse colonies both there and in America more closely in touch with the motherland. Olaf made further good use of his time while in Greenland by preaching the Crusade. For some years prior to this a republican or separatist spirit had appeared in the colony at Greenland, precisely as some centuries later it was to do in the British transatlantic settlements and, perhaps, for similar reasons. But equilibrium had been restored. In 1276 the Pope authorized the Archbishop of Trondhjem, Jon the Red, A Scot, to dispatch a commission to Greenland to assist Olaf in his crusading efforts, and to insure that the edicts of the Council of Lyons were being carried into effect. In 1279, seizing the opportunity of a vessel sailing to America, Jon sent "a grave and discreet person" thereon to preach the Holy War and to recover the tithes due from the colonists. The name of this American Peter the Hermit we do not know, but his commission was confirmed by Pope Nicholas III, in a letter dated from Rome, January 31, 1279, conferring on him full powers to further the crusading movement by every lawful means. Three years later this emissary returned to Norway with a cargo of sealskins, walrus-tusks, and whalebone, the offerings of the American colony of Vinland to the soldiers of the Sepulchre. Archbishop Jon, embarrassed by the strange nature of the tithe, which he could not

dispatch to Italy, communicated with the Vatican as to the best method of disposing of it, and in March 1282 Pope Martin IV replied, authorizing him to sell it in the best market. This was done, and the sum realized was sent to Italy, to the banking houses of Squarccialupi and Giudiccioni. The correspondence relative to these missions and payments still exists in the archives of the Vatican and in the national records of Iceland and Norway.²

After the Council of Vienna in 1312, we find Arne, Bishop of Gardar, acting as agent and collector of Peter's Pence for that council in respect of the American colonies. It would seem that the zeal displayed in these far outposts of the Scandinavian world had lapsed somewhat since 1276, and that efforts were once more made to awaken it. In the same year Laurence Kalfsson and a certain Björn ardently preached the Crusade in Iceland, whose hardy sons were greatly in request in the ranks of the Cross. That emissaries were once more dispatched to Vinland in America at this time is undoubted and is, indeed, proved by the results, but who they may have been, and what were their adventures, we have no means of discovering. In the event a Vinland ship arrived at Greenland in 1325, bearing the tithes of the colony, consisting of 127 lispounder of walrus tusks, which were duly sold to Jean du Pré, a Flemish merchant, for 12 livres, 50 sous of Tour.³

This shows that Vinland must have existed as a dependency of the Norse Crown until 1325. If Vinland was of sufficient importance to be the object of a special crusading mission, it must have had at least several thousands of a population. What was the fate of the Vinlanders? Probably they were overwhelmed by the invading Red Men, who would speedily destroy all traces of their occupation. Perhaps they mingled with them, as did the Norsemen of Greenland with the Eskimo. Charles Godfrey Leland, in his *Algonquin Legends of New England* showed how Norse influence has penetrated Indian mythology. He believed that the Norse tale of Balder is to be found as an Indian legend, and indicated that the name of the Scandinavian evil spirit Loki, is connected with it. Moreover he reproduced ancient Indian drawings showing Norsemen pursued by Indians.

Now there can be no doubt that documents relative to the exist-

² Riant, *Expéditions et pèlerinages Scandinaviens*, p. 364; Torfæus, *Hist. Gron.* p. 25; Malte Brun, *Lib.* 18, tom. 1, p. 289.

³ Paul Riant, *Expédition et Pèlerinages Scandinaviens*.

ence of a Norse colony on American soil are to be found in the Library of the Vatican. More than one of the Catholic writers who have evidently had access to them allude to such sources. The Rev. Wm. F. Clark S. J. of St. Joseph's Church, Philadelphia, a Catholic priest, mentioned them in his centennial discourse, delivered on July 4, 1876, and Mrs. Marie A. Shipley, a Protestant American lady, in her "English Re-discovery of America" (1890) writes:⁴ "I have obtained a mass of corroborative testimony from Roman Catholic sources proving the statement in my book *The Icelandic Discoverers of America* that in the Vatican and other monastic libraries of Europe are the records and documents that will fully establish the fact . . . that Norse colonies existed there for several centuries." A memorial submitted to the Congress of the United States in 1888, asking for research on the subject and signed by over a thousand persons of influence states that: "there is a vast amount of evidence in the shape of documents, records and manuscripts of all descriptions that has been buried for centuries in the libraries at Rome—in fact the Church annals of six centuries, containing the minute details of the ecclesiastical work and establishments, the succession of bishops for 263 years, etc., etc., in the colonies of Greenland and Vinland. . . . These it is the right of the American nation to incorporate in its archives."

That the mother of the first European born in America actually went later in life on pilgrimage to Rome and gave the Papal officials there an account of her transatlantic adventures is a fact sufficiently historical. That Gudrid who was wife of Thorfinn Karlsefni, and who had accompanied him to America, "went abroad," says the Book of Flatey, "and made a pilgrimage to Rome." Later she became a nun at Glaumbæjar in Iceland. At Rome she was well received and her accounts of the new countries beyond the seas were listened to with attention by her spiritual advisers as relating to a new field for the preaching of the gospel.⁵

Only 152 years elapsed between the last known attempt of the Greenlanders to reach Vinland and the visit of Christopher Columbus in a Bristol ship to Iceland in 1477. That the discoverer visited Iceland with the definite object of collecting information relative to the existence of lands west of Greenland is not now open to question. Indeed he himself recorded the fact, and the letter in which

⁴ P. 62.

⁵ Shipley, *The English Re-discovery of America*, pp. 110-111; C. Gravier, *Discovery of America by the Northmen*.

he did so was published by Diego Columbus, his son, in the first, and perhaps the best biography of the world's greatest adventurer. "In the year 1477, in February," he says, "I navigated 100 leagues beyond Thule, the southern part of which is 73 degrees distant from the equator, and not 63 as some pretend; neither is it situated within the line which includes the west of Ptolemy, but is much more westerly. The English, principally those of Bristol, go with their merchandise to this island, which is as large as England. When I was there the sea was not frozen, and the tides were so great as to rise and fall 26 fathoms."

It is certainly strange that more attention has not been directed to the circumstances of this extraordinary visit, for if it proves anything, it shows conclusively how indefatigable was the discoverer in his researches concerning the character of that part of the globe he proposed to navigate in his search for an uninterrupted sea-passage to India and China. That he voyaged hundreds of sea-leagues from Spain to Britain, and from Britain to Iceland for the purpose of verifying statements in certain Norse sagas relating to a north-western land lying in the Atlantic from the lips of the authority best qualified to enlighten him, is now well authenticated.

It is also recognized that while in Italy and perhaps at Rome, Columbus had heard or read of the Book of Flatey, that beautiful manuscript volume, in which the saga of Thorfinn Karlsefni is incorporated. At that period its manuscript was still in Iceland, though now housed at Copenhagen. Fin Magnusen, the learned Icelandic scholar, makes it abundantly clear that in the year of Columbus's visit to his island, Magnus Eiolfson, Bishop of Skalholt, then the greatest living authority on Icelandic literature, met and conferred with the discoverer. Since 1470 Magnus had been abbot of the monastery of Helgafell, where many venerable documents relating to the discovery of Greenland, Markland, Vinland, and the other parts of the American continent settled by the Norsemen of Iceland were carefully preserved. It was, indeed, from this very district that the most distinguished of these early pioneers had gone forth. The contents of these documents were familiar to Bishop Magnus, as indeed they were to most Icelanders of that period, and it is therefore in the highest degree improbable that Columbus should have omitted to seek for and receive information respecting them, primed as he was with the clues to their existence which he appears to have collected at Rome.

He arrived at the port of Hvalfjardareyri, on the south coast of Iceland, at the season when that harbour was most frequented, and it has been found that Bishop Magnus visited the neighboring churches during the winter or spring of 1477, the year of his arrival.⁶ From the records at Helgafell Columbus must have learned how the coasts of Vinland, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland were first sighted by the Icelfander Bjarni Herjulfson in 983, and how Leif and Thorwald, sons of Erik the Red, the colonizer of Greenland, made an exploration both of the coast and the interior.

In the archives of Iceland is to be found authentic corroboration of the circumstances of Columbus's visit. In the letter quoted by his son the discoverer states that the sea at the time of his arrival was free from ice, and this is confirmed by the public records of Iceland, which refer to the unusual circumstances of the port of Hvalfjardareyri being ice-free during the months of February and March in the year 1477. It may have been merely by chance that Bishop Magnus happened to be visiting the port in question, which was situated in his diocese, at the very time when Columbus arrived in the haven, but it seems more probable that the bishop had been apprised of his coming beforehand through ecclesiastical channels. In any case they met and conversed in Latin, and it is on record that Columbus questioned Magnus "concerning the western lands."⁷ What precise information he actually received from the bishop we cannot tell, as record is silent on this point. But that he obtained what he came so far to seek can scarcely be doubted.

Sailing to Iceland from Bristol, Columbus must have heard many traditions of land in the western Atlantic from the mariners of that port, who, from 1491 to 1498, according to Pedro de Ayala, the Spanish Ambassador to England, had annually dispatched three or four caravels "in search of the isle of Brazil and the Seven Cities." Through their long commercial associations with Iceland the Bristol traders could scarcely have failed to hear the many traditions of the former existence of the Norse colonies in America, and to have picked up clues to the probable sea routes thither.

But if Columbus received while in Iceland information so authentic concerning the existence of a western continent, why did he not take steps later to verify this by sailing towards the latitude

⁶ O. Moosmüller, *Europeans in America before Columbus*.

⁷ Rafn., *Antiquitates Americanae*, p. xxiv, note 1.

indicated by Bishop Magnus instead of steering almost due west from Palos, as he did 15 years later on his first voyage of discovery? The fact that he did not make for Vinland is a powerful vindication of the theory that his intention was not so much to discover a new continent as to find a new sea route to India and the Orient. The very knowledge that the north-western Atlantic was occupied by land would naturally militate against his acceptance of it as a feasible route to the rich Indies of his dreams.

This evidence notwithstanding, it is strange that not a single trace of the Norse occupation of North America exists to-day. Fairly abundant ruins and recognizable sites of the presence of Norse colonies are to be found in Greenland, but despite the quests of archaeologists in more southern American latitudes, no authentic relics of Norse colonization have as yet been encountered there.

Yet many antiquaries have endeavoured to prove that vestiges of Norse buildings and inscriptions are to be found on the American Coast. Perhaps the most remarkable of the latter is the Dighton Rock inscription on the River Taunton in the State of Massachusetts, which Rafn believed to be Runic, attesting the presence of Thorfinn Karlsefni. But Sir Daniel Wilson doubted these conclusions. At last an Indian Chief, Shingwauk, assured Schoolcraft, an authority on Indian customs, that the inscription was the work of Wabenaki Indians and was pictographic in origin.

On the Island of Monhegan, on the coast of Maine, was found another inscription which seemed much more akin to the Runic, but this also Wilson disallowed as a genuine piece of Norse antiquity, attributing it to the agency of ice. Still more romantic is the Tower of Newport, Rhode Island, on which Longfellow wrote a striking threnody. Rafn hailed this also as a relic of Norse occupation. But it was found that Governor Arnold, ancestor of the notorious American traitor, had built it after the model of Inigo Jones's mill, which still stands at Chesterton in Arnold's native Warwickshire.

More recently, 1890, Mr. E. N. Horsford startled American antiquarian circles by announcing his discovery of the ancient Norse city of Norumbega in New England. But this site was proved to have been discovered previously by Verazzano and others, including Sir John Hawkins, who visited it in 1569, and it was certainly an Indian town.

To account for this surprising absence of the remains of the

Norse Occupation of American soil is indeed difficult. In all probability the colonies or settlements—and Vinland seems the only one among them the existence of which has been authenticated—were small and not very thickly populated. If, then, we take it that a colony actually flourished in the vicinity of Long Island, as the evidence goes to prove, it must not only have occupied a most isolated position, but have had little power of resistance because of its inability to draw to any great extent upon the population and resources of the parent colony in Greenland. Yet it is evident that bishops and missionaries were dispatched thither with some regularity. In 1059, Bishop Jon of Iceland went to Vinland, and fell a martyr beneath the arrows of the Skraelings whom he was endeavouring to convert to the Christian faith.⁸ He had been especially consecrated for work in the North by Adalbert, Archbishop of Bremen-Hamburg. In 1121 Erik, Bishop of Gardar in Greenland, travelled to Vinland, and seems also to have been assassinated there.⁹ Pope Nicholas V mentions in a letter written in 1448 that the Greenland colonists had then been Christians for six hundred years, and the last Bishop of Gardar in Greenland, Vincent, was consecrated so late as 1537, forty-five years after the discovery of America by Columbus, and nearly five hundred years after the erection of the see.

Mr. J. C. Shea in his *History of the Catholic Missions Among the Indian Tribes of America* states that Bishop Erik led a body of clergy and colonists to Vinland in 1121. The incident is indeed, alluded to in the Icelandic annals under that date, and is also referred to by a late Danish writer, Lyskander, in 1609. The Icelandic annals also tell us that in 1347 a Greenland ship arrived in Iceland which had been to Markland in America, but had been driven out of her course on her return.

The above facts seem to indicate actual contact between the American colonies and Europe in the years 1059, 1121, 1282, 1325 and 1347, and it seems almost incredible that, if communication were feasible during periods so widespread, it was not also available between these occasions. It is indeed most unlikely that, had no connection been maintained between Iceland and America from 1121 to 1282, missionaries would actually have been sent from Iceland

⁸ Mallet, *Introduction a l'histoire de Danmermarc*, t. i. p. 254; *Islendnamabok*, p. 396; Torfæus, *Historia Vinlandiæ, Antiqua*, p. 71.

⁹ Rafn, *Antiquitates Americanæ*, p. 261.

to America in the latter year, and the very fact that they were then dispatched goes far to prove the probability of the statement in the Icelandic annals with reference to Bishop Erik's colonial enterprise in 1121.

But we must wait patiently for the results of research in the archives of the Vatican, where the original records of episcopal and missionary effort in Vinland would appear to await discovery. Is not the quest peculiarly one for the generous and enthusiastic spirit of American scholarship?

PHILOSOPHY VINDICATED

BY CLARENCE ERICKSON

IT has become the custom of late years to liken philosophy to the search in a pitch-dark room for a black cat that, after all, does not really exist. Philosophy is often considered a curious species of Solitaire, in which such terms as "substance," "mode," "percept," "concept," "matter," and "spirit" are manipulated about to beguile the excess leisure of a muscle-bound intellect, rendered unfit to participate on the battle-ground of the world of action by too great subtlety and over-sensitivity.

Philosophy, say its detractors, is a now abandoned method of searching for truth, by means of speculation and ingenious spinning out of words, which has been supplanted by science, which gets at, and observes the "facts." Like religion, philosophy is held to represent an immature stage in the evolution of human intelligence, and to be now well-nigh obsolete among enlightened people. But old superstitions die hard; millions of people still belong to the churches, and a few living fossils of academic erudition still cultivate philosophy.

Such is the attitude of a certain superior class of persons toward philosophy: a class that has just been emancipated from the mediæval superstitions of Fundamentalism, and, like a delighted child, is trying out its newly acquired wings of intellectual freedom in flights of polite heresy; a class that has been newly converted from the Babbitry of Dr. Frank Crane to the Babbitry of H. L. Mencken; a class that rejects the fallacious creed of the ignorant majority only to embrace the liberal dogma of the enlightened minority that reads the *American Mercury*. H. L. Mencken in an editorial of his makes some caustic jibes at philosophy, and forever afterwards the *American Mercury* reading public, the class that has been freed from intellectual dictatorship and now does its own thinking, goes about

repeating parrot-like the gospel of our lord, H. L. Mencken.

The chief reason for this widespread disdain of philosophy is the popular acceptance of materialism, which is commonly supposed to be identical with science, and to have rendered philosophy no longer necessary. But in reality, materialism, far from being science itself, is only a philosophical inference drawn from some of the results of science. Far from having supplanted philosophy, materialism is itself a philosophy.

Materialism had a large following in learned circles during the latter half of last century. Its votaries were principally men of science, with no genuine philosophical training, suddenly turned into philosophers through whim. The works of these amateur philosophers are full of crudities and self-contradictions, but they are comparatively easy to read and fascinating in their naive simplicity, which accounts for their vogue among the uninitiated. Like all doctrines that have had to fight their way into favor, materialism is only now winning a popular acceptance, long after it has been left behind in philosophical circles.

Materialism is based on the unwarranted assumption that there is only one science of nature, the science of mechanics. All the other sciences, such as chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, are considered more complicated phases of mechanics. The ideal towards which materialism strives is the ultimate explanation of all phenomena, whether chemical, biological, or psychical, in terms of motions of indivisible unit particles of matter. Nothing is said to exist but matter in the form of atoms, and the motions of these atoms. If the position of every particle in the universe together with the direction and the velocity of its motion were known, it would be possible to reconstruct the past history and to predict the future of the universe down to the smallest detail. A hypothetical all-knowing mind, from the positions and velocities of the particles of the primeval nebula from which the solar system evolved, could have deduced, by mathematical calculation, the future history of the earth down to every word of Homer, every chord of Beethoven, every formula of Einstein, every nuance of Fritz Kreisler. This is the logical corollary of materialism. Such is the miracle the skeptics so piously believe.

This exaltation of mechanics into the one master science is the outcome of the magnificent results the physics of Kepler, Galileo, and Newton yielded in reducing the motions of the planets to infal-

lible law and order. At one time geometry was considered the fundamental science, and Plato had the motto, "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here," placed over the entrance to his academy. The present enthusiasm for mechanics is a mere fad, which will pass like the former enthusiasm for geometry.

As a matter of fact, there are at least five fundamental sciences of reality; Physics (Mechanics), Chemistry, Biology, Psychology, and Sociology, each succeeding science treating of a new and higher order of reality, which could not be treated by the preceding sciences. The simplest fact of chemistry cannot be explained in terms of mechanics. When two atoms of hydrogen combine with one atom of oxygen, the product, water, has qualities and properties which could not have been predicted from our knowledge of the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. Or, carrying the example out to its ideal limits, if every electron and proton, their positions, velocities, and masses were known in the reaction, if we had no previous experience of water, we should be unable to predict the result of the reaction.

If the mechanistic hypothesis is inadequate to account for the simplest chemical reaction, how much more far-fetched is the attempt to reduce the phenomena of biology, or even psychology, to mechanics.

The term materialist, or mechanist, is sometimes improperly applied to those scientists who would reduce biology and the higher sciences to organic chemistry. Much has been done in the field of Bio-chemistry, as it is called, but the knowledge of the chemistry of living organisms by no means exhausts the science of biology. Bio-chemistry and biology represent two different viewpoints from which the same set of phenomena may be studied, and each uses a different set of concepts. Bio-chemistry is based on the concepts of atomic and molecular proportions, transformations of chemical energy, etc.; biology is grounded on the concepts of life, growth, development, and evolution. The latter set of concepts cannot be reduced to the former; they are supplementary, not higher or lower terms of the same thing.

The phenomena of life involve complicated chemical processes it is true, but new qualities, biological qualities, *emerge* from the aggregate of chemical qualities which a knowledge of the latter alone would never reveal. In the same way, in our previous example of the chemistry of water, new qualities, of the chemical order, emerge from the aggregate of physical qualities of hydrogen and oxygen.

This doctrine of emergence is one of the most generally accepted of the philosophical tendencies of the present day. It may be abstractly stated thus: Aggregates have properties which are more than, and cannot be predicted from, the sum of their constituent parts.

Each succeeding science in the hierarchy of fundamental sciences, physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, deals with a higher order of emergent qualities than the science immediately preceding it. The realm of inert, dead, mechanical law emerges from "events" in the space-time manifold. The chemical order of reality emerges from the mechanical order. When the phenomena of chemistry become sufficiently complex a new order of reality, called life, emerges. Mind emerges from life, and the phenomena of society emerge from aggregates of minds.

It is thus seen that the fundamental axiom of materialism, that all phenomena can ultimately be explained in terms of mechanics, or in terms of physics and chemistry, is a mistaken dogma, as fallacious as the dogmas of mediaeval theology.

Materialism also meets insuperable difficulties in its treatment of the mind and body problem. In keeping with its fundamental postulate, that the one reality is matter, materialism attempts to reduce mind to body. Mind is explained as the functioning of matter of especially complex organization, namely, brain and nerve tissue. Consciousness is an accidental something accompanying these complex material phenomena in the brain, much the same as an accidental humming sound accompanies the operation of complex machinery. Consciousness is without utility of any sort, a mere epiphenomenon accompanying brain and nerve processes.

If this view is correct, the plays of Shakespeare, the music-dramas of Wagner, the paintings of Michaelangelo, might equally well have been produced and appreciated by a race of unconscious automatons, since consciousness has no effect on our conduct and is a mere accidental spectator enjoying (or lamenting) the mechanically determined operations of our body-machines.

Recent developments in the physical sciences, which formerly were the chief prop of materialism, have tended to discredit materialism. The materiality of the once dreaded "matter"—that object of the invectives of theologians and the spiritually inclined—has been impeached by recent researches into the nature of the electron. The electron, the ultimate unit of matter, has been reduced

to a mere centre of reference, from which radiations emanate at certain intervals, and since the electrons are known to us only through these intermittent radiations we are unjustified in attributing to them the properties of "matter" as common-sense conceives that term. From a strictly empirical stand-point, all that can be said of a piece of matter is that it consists of a series of "events" in the space-time manifold, having a more or less persisting identity. The definition which defines matter as "nothing in motion" is more than a witticism. Physical science is becoming more and more ghostly and spiritual, and the former hard, impenetrable ultimate particles of matter are now immaterial centres of force. There is no longer any absurdity in supposing these centres of force to be psychical in nature, the expression, mayhap, of nescient will or intelligence. While psychology, under the influence of behaviorism, is becoming materialistic, physics is fast approaching panpsychism!

Materialism being thus archaic and inadequate, the problems of philosophy are not mere hallucinations, and philosophy is as real and valid a discipline as ever.

But despite the fact that materialism is dead among philosophers, it is gaining multitudes of converts, especially among the younger generation. The reasons for this growth of materialism are its attractive extremism; its appealing, but specious, simplicity; the gradual extinction of Christianity; its ethical indifference, which condones an empty life of frivolous pleasure seeking; and above all, the appalling and almost universal ignorance of philosophy.

The Fundamentalist Christianity of the older generation is losing ground rapidly, and after a few more pyrrhic victories, such as that of the Tennessee evolution trial, will be well nigh extinct. Modernism has not been able to repair the breach in the dam of faith left by Fundamentalism crumbling before the debacle of modern enlightenment. Supernaturalism, with good old-fashioned miracles and hell-fire, is the very life and blood of popular religion, and for that reason Modernism makes little appeal. The unenlightened person wants a religion of the old brand, with a heaven to reward the virtuous and downtrodden, and a hell to punish the sinful and prosperous, or else he had rather not bother with religion at all. The person with sufficient intelligence to get along without a future heaven and hell is not attracted by pale, anemic Modernism, which appears to him to be nothing but words, cleverly juggled so as to

reconcile science and theology. The widespread ignorance of philosophy leaves no alternative but materialism, in either case. Hence it is not surprising that materialism is succeeding decaying fundamentalism.

The passing of the old religions will leave the world as dogmatic as ever. The dogmatism of materialism will have become substituted for the dogmatism of Christianity, and new philosophical ideas will meet the same hostile reception as of old. The only solution of the difficulty lies in a more widespread study of philosophy.

One of the chief enemies with which philosophy has to contend is a complete and almost universal misapprehension of the problems, scope, and field of philosophy, and its relations to the other branches of human knowledge.

It is popularly and erroneously believed that science—that is, observation and experiment—has superseded and put into discard philosophy—that is, loose, unverified speculation. A certain superior class of hack writers, who style themselves “scientific,” because they have read and half-understood a few unauthoritative, popular books on science, are fond of alluding to the misguided efforts of certain medieval, theological philosophers, and placing a stigma upon all philosophical activity in consequence.

The question of how many teeth a horse has become a subject of debate at some time during the Middle Ages, and a group of worthy Schoolmen wasted an astonishing amount of brain tissue, ink and paper, breath, and ill temper without arriving at an agreement. It never occurred to these Scholastics to get a real, living specimen of a horse, open his mouth, and count his teeth. The pseudo-scientific writers mentioned above regale the magazine-reading public with this delectable story, and then, fearing that the point will be missed, proceed to give the reader a good dose of moral, in the shape of the conclusion that philosophy is obsolete, and has been superseded by science.

There are several errors in this specious moral. In the first place, the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages were theologians rather than philosophers, and all their so-called philosophizing was obliged to arrive at pre-ordained conclusions fixed by the authority of the Church militant. Scholastic reasoning was the process of finding new proofs for old “truths,” fixed by authority, not the process of arriving at new truths. In the second place, the mistakes of indi-

vidual philosophers do not invalidate philosophy as a whole. Scientists also have often made mistakes, but no one outside of Billy Sunday or John Roach Straton would hold that these acknowledged errors constitute a refutation of science.

A misapprehension of what philosophy really is lies at the bottom of these attempts to ridicule philosophy.

We shall now attempt to arrive at a more exact idea of what philosophy really is. The successful defining of philosophy constitutes perhaps the most difficult problem of philosophy. A fair sized volume could be filled with various definitions which have been tried and found inadequate during the history of philosophic thought.

The reason for the difficulty, nay, impossibility, of defining philosophy has been aptly summed up by Hegel, who said that philosophy cannot be defined since it defines all else. A definition of philosophy in one sentence must be given up as an impossible undertaking, so we shall attempt to define philosophy by pointing out a few of its more salient tasks.

The principal aim of philosophy is to arrive at a unified conception of the universe, a *Weltanschauung*, or world-view, through a critical and synthetic examination of all the humanly possible ways of knowing reality.

These modes of knowing are Common Sense, Religion, Art, and Science, each of which represents a distinct and peculiar view-point, in accordance with which the multiplicity of phenomena is interpreted. Common sense looks at things from the undisciplined point of view of the man on the street. Religion attempts to formulate the individual's emotional relationship, and moral responsibility to the Invisible Power behind the universe. Art interprets reality in terms of beauty, and hence is more or less subjective and capable of an infinite variety of forms. Science describes the universe in terms of mechanism, and lays bare the mechanical means through which the cosmic purposes are realized. In other words, science studies the technique of the Composer of the cosmic symphony.

The function of metaphysics, the central discipline of philosophy, is to construct a dispassionate, composite view of reality, from all that it finds valid in the claims of common sense, religion, art, and science. Such a broad, unprejudiced, synthetic attitude toward the cosmos constitutes one's *Weltanschauung*.

It frequently happens that conflicts occur between common

sense, religion, art, and science. But such clashes are due to ignorance of the proper sphere of each of these apparently contending points of view; in other words, an ignorance of philosophy.

Take science and religion for example. Religion has often attempted to do the work that legitimately belongs to science, as in the Book of Genesis in the Bible, where a would-be scientific explanation of the origin of things is given. Because of such encroachments of religion upon the domain of science, incessant warfare has been waged between these two rivals since the beginning of human thought, and continues to-day in the invectives of theologians against evolution. The so-called conflict between science and religion is in reality a conflict between the three thousand year old science of Moses and modern science.

Now there could be no conflict between a rational religion, based upon a study of philosophy, not spurious revelation, and science. Each represents a different "universe of discourse." Science can no more invalidate the religion of a philosopher than a knowledge of the number of words, the kind of type, or the grade of paper used in the printing of Hamlet can invalidate the lofty strength, truth, and beauty of Shakespeare's immortal lines.

In this connection, there is an interesting story on record of a certain natural mathematician, who could do unheard of problems, such as cube roots and adding whole pages of figures, mentally. Once out of curiosity, a group of this extraordinary man's friends took him to see a performance of Hamlet, to see what his reaction would be. The looked for reaction was most curious; the mental mathematician stated the exact number of syllables, words, and speeches in the play, but was totally unable to recount the story, meaning, philosophy, or any of the aesthetic qualities of Hamlet.

Here we have a splendid example of the study of the identical subject-matter from more than one view-point, each of which belongs to a different universe of discourse, and hence does not in the least impinge upon, or invalidate, the other view-points. The mathematician studied Hamlet from a mathematical point of view, and arrived at purely quantitative results. A literary student, seeing the same production of Hamlet, might have gained a comprehensive view of Shakespeare's philosophy of life. Still another auditor might have studied the play from the viewpoint of grammar, and compared the grammar of Shakespeare with the grammar of to-day.

These three methods of studying Hamlet give us three sets of results not at all like one another. But no one would say that these different results contradict one another. The number of words in Hamlet has no bearing upon Shakespeare's grammatical usages, or upon the ethical implications of Hamlet's soliloquy.

Similarly, the universe may be studied from the viewpoints of common sense, art, religion, science, and philosophy without any contradiction ensuing, because the results of these various viewpoints are incommensurable with one another and belong to different universes of discourse.

Hence, the world-views given us by common sense, art, religion, science, and philosophy are equally valid, provided that they do not mistake their proper places, and do not encroach upon territory properly belonging to the others, as has so often happened in the past, through ignorance of philosophy. But it is to the world-view of philosophy that the greatest credence must be given, since, as we have seen, philosophy is a synthesis based upon an examination of all means of attaining knowledge.

It is sometimes erroneously held by the philosophically illiterate enemies of philosophy that philosophy is in conflict with science. Such cannot be the case, for philosophy draws part of its data from the results of science. There may indeed be conflict between materialism and other schools of philosophy, but, as we have seen, materialism is not science itself, but merely one of the possible philosophical interpretations of science.

Philosophy supplements, does not contradict science. One is philosophical after one has been scientific. Herbert Spencer said, "Knowledge of the lowest kind is *un-unified knowledge*; Science is *partially-unified knowledge*; Philosophy is *completely-unified knowledge*." (First Principles, page 119.) That is, common sense knowledge consists of scattered, isolated maxims and rules not yet reduced to a system by classification under general principles. Scientific knowledge consists of general theories and principles unifying one particular science, for example, as the atomic theory unifies chemistry, or the evolution theory, biology. According to Spencer, a philosophical generalization is one that involves the complete body of science as a whole. We should prefer, however, to give the term "philosophical" a broader application, and extend it to cover all possible knowledge, not merely scientific knowledge.

Properly speaking, that branch of philosophy which deals with

the results of science, is Natural Philosophy. The tasks of philosophy in connection with science consist in the analysis of the axioms and unanalyzed fundamental concepts of the special sciences; the examination and possible improvement of the methods and procedures of science; and the extension of broad, general scientific theories, such as the evolution theory, to all departments of human knowledge.

Each of the empirical sciences is based upon certain basic concepts, in terms of which the subject-matter of the particular science is described. The physical sciences, for example, are built upon the concepts of *matter*, *energy*, *space*, *time*, and *motion*. These terms are taken for granted, and physics makes no attempt to tell us what they really are.

It is through the identification of these terms with the significance common sense has attached to them that mistaken philosophical interpretations arise. For example, the *matter* of physics is confused with the hard, enduring, impenetrable matter of our daily experience. In reality, the term *matter* as used in science is a mere abstraction, a short-hand expression by which we express the idea that certain groups of sensible properties of our experience always occur together and maintain a persisting identity. This confusion of the scientific and common sense meanings of the word "matter" is one of the root fallacies of materialism.

Similarly, the phenomena of biology are described in terms of *life*, *structure*, *function*, *development*, *evolution*, etc. The subject-matter of psychology is reduced to the fundamental concepts of *sensation*, *perception*, *cognition*, *affection*, *volition*, etc., or, in the psychology of John B. Watson and the behaviorists, merely *stimulus* and *response*.

It is one of the tasks of natural philosophy to define and analyze these elementary concepts, such as *matter*, *energy*, *evolution*, *perception*. If philosophy were more widely studied there would be fewer faulty interpretations of the axioms of science, and less credence given to the ridiculous philosophizings of scientific specialists suddenly turned philosophers for the sake of publicity.

One of the chief tasks of natural philosophy is the application of certain far-reaching scientific to the entire body of human knowledge. The theory of evolution is such a theory. Every art, every science, literature, practically every pursuit of man, no matter how far removed from the field of biology, has been profoundly affected

by this revolutionizing and epoch-making conception. It is obvious that no one of the special sciences is general enough in its scope to undertake the task of tracing all the manifold implications of the theory of evolution. Hence this work must be undertaken by philosophy.

Another task which falls to the philosopher is the unifying of the results of the separate special sciences into an organic whole. This is an age of extreme specialization, and the workers in the different fields of scientific research are getting more and more out of touch with one another, so that were it not for the synthesizing activity of philosophy, chaos would inevitably result and science would degenerate into an unorganized, unconnected congeries of random facts and details.

It has been protested that this labor of unifying the sciences is no longer practicable for the philosopher. It is said that the results of the various sciences now form a body so inconceivably vast that no one man could hope to master it all in a lifetime.

But it is not necessary to know every particular fact in all the sciences to build up a philosophy of science. A knowledge of the principles, general laws, methods, and basic concepts is all that is requisite, the mass of details being irrelevant. The mastering of the fundamental principles of the sciences surely is not the work of a lifetime. Hence, Spencer's conception of philosophy as a completely unified universal science is still valid, except that he should have used the more restrictive term, "natural philosophy."

In addition to metaphysics and natural philosophy, which we have already examined, philosophy includes several other disciplines. The most important of these are Epistemology, Aesthetics, and Ethics. Lack of space obliges us to dismiss each of these with a word. Epistemology investigates the conditions, possibility, and validity of human knowledge. Aesthetics treats of the problems of beauty, taste, and artistic norms. Ethics studies the principles underlying moral conduct.

It is evident that these subjects are not capable of being subjected to exact scientific treatment. Hence, philosophy is necessary for their study, if for no other reason.

Philosophy is sometimes impugned on the ground that the only certain knowledge is the knowledge given us by the sciences, and that philosophy is the work of fancy and unbridled imagination in a sphere where the truth is not vouchsafed to human intelligence.

This attitude is known as *positivism* and is not to be confused with materialism. Materialism dogmatically asserts that there is no other reality than mass particles in motion. Positivism does not deny the possible existence of an underlying reality of which the world of mass particles in motion is only a manifestation. It merely says that knowledge of this underlying reality is impossible to human minds, and that our efforts should be confined to the less pretentious, but practical field of science.

Positivism is usually associated with the name of Auguste Comte, the French philosopher of the first half of the eighteenth century, who called his system the *Philosophie Positive*. Comte banished metaphysics from his philosophy and concerned himself entirely with the "positive" results of the empirical sciences. Within the field of science itself, Comte recommended complete reliance upon observation, and the exclusion of all speculation that might be of a metaphysical nature.

The result of this dread of the bogey of metaphysics was that Comte relegated so many problems of science and philosophy to the category of the "unknowable" that, had men of science followed his teachings, science would have stopped in its progress then and there and advanced no further. The nature of light, the chemical composition of the sun and the stars, the ultimate nature of matter, said Comte, were to be given up by science as problems incapable of solution by human intelligence, and scientists who dealt with them were wasting their time pursuing metaphysical will-o'-the-wisps.

Fortunately, men of science pursued these "will-o'-the-wisps" despite the warnings of the positivists, and every High School child now knows, or should know, that light consists of inconceivably rapid vibrations of what was once called the ether, that matter is composed of electrons and protons, and that the chemical element Helium was discovered in the sun even before it was found on the earth.

It will be readily seen that an over-emphasis upon mere observation to the exclusion of speculation, or imagination, in science is as fatal to progress as pure, unverified speculation. Scientific discoveries are made, not by the application of hard and fast rules of experimental procedure, but by employing the imagination in framing ingenious hypotheses, which are tried out in actual experience to see if they will work. Imagination, trial and error, even "metaphysical" speculation, are indispensable in giving the scientist his

first guesses and crude hypotheses, to be refined later, through successive modifications and verifications, into accurate laws and theories rich in practical results to mankind.

Speculation, in other words philosophy, is an indispensable part of scientific method. Pure observation and experiment, or *empiricism*, is as useless as pure, untested speculation, or *rationalism*. Throughout the ages, these two motives, the rationalistic and the empirical, have existed side by side, apparently incompatible with each other. The reason why science and philosophy were so slow in arriving at lasting and substantial results is that a happy balance between the two irreconcilables, rationalism and empiricism, had not been attained.

For the scientific method is really nothing less, nothing more, than the harnessing of the two incompatible steeds to a common purpose. Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, and Descartes (not Bacon as is commonly supposed) developed the characteristic, wonderfully productive scientific method, and each of the three was even more a philosopher than a scientist. Galileo in his writings mentions that he had studied philosophy as many years as he had studied months of science and mathematics, and this statement is significant. For the devising of the methods of science is a task involving deep thought and philosophy. Fortunately, Leonardo and Galileo tested the efficiency of their methods by actual observation, and modern science was born.

Science is rational-empiricism. Science is the base metal, found by empiricism, transmuted by the touchstone of rationalism into pure gold.

The atomic theory of Dalton, which put chemistry upon a solid foundation; the evolution theory of Lamarck and Darwin, which has enriched not only biology, but the whole of human thought; what are they but philosophical theories, verified by their magnificent results? For who has seen, or ever will see, an atom? Who has ever seen one species turn into another? These two theories are the work of speculation, rationalism, philosophy, and not observation.

Philosophy thus plays an indispensable part in science itself. Without "metaphysical" speculation the progress of science would immediately cease. Without philosophy, the methods of science would never have come into being.

Far from philosophy having no place in science, science, whether it acknowledge it or not, assumes a metaphysical attitude in every

formula, every law, every generalization. This metaphysical attitude amounts to a matter of faith, and is the very apostle's creed of science, without which science would be as helpless as the Fundamentalist who had just lost his faith.

Science assumes as a working hypothesis, as a sacred article of faith, that the same cause must always be followed by the same effect. But from a purely empirical-skeptical standpoint there is no compulsion in causal relationships. All that can be predicated of the recurrence of phenomena is *probability*, not certainty, that the same effect will follow the same cause. Scientific laws and formulae are but "short-hand descriptions" (Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*) of certain regularities and uniformities in the flux of perceptual experience.

The practical applications of science, control of the forces of nature, the application of mechanical laws to machines, *assume* that the same effect *must* follow the same cause.

When George Babbit steps on the starter of his Ford, he has faith that a sequence of phenomena of electricity, dynamics, mechanics, compression and expansion of gases, and centrifugal force will occur that will enable to get to his destination on time. When a lady driver stops suddenly in front of him, he trusts that the mathematical and mechanical laws under which his brakes operate will hold good in this particular instance as they have in all observed instances in the past, provided the mechanism is in working order.

The sun has been observed to rise (apparently) in the east and set in the west in all recorded instances in the past; hence it is extremely probable that it will rise in the east and set in the west to-morrow. But the proposition that the sun must inevitably rise in the east and set in the west to-morrow is incapable of logical proof. All that we can say with the authority of logic is that it is very likely that no exception to the rule will occur to-morrow.

There is no compulsion in the passing of one phenomenon into another, a cause into its effect. All reference to a causal force or agency that brings about the effect, that makes the cause a cause, is a matter for metaphysics, not for science. We assume as a working hypothesis, "same cause, same effect." Scientists are willing to stake everything on this creed, and it constitutes their gospel.

If a metaphysical assumption, an article of faith, is necessary for science, the pursuit of life even more urgently demands a working hypothesis, a philosophy, some sort of creed. Indeed, the most

practical benefit of philosophy, the point of contact between philosophy and average human being, lies in its supplying the individual, and the age in which he lives, with an attitude toward life and the universe that will serve as the basis of his conduct.

It may be true that such an attitude toward things involves beliefs incapable of proof, faith, and a measure of dogmatism. But a certain degree of dogmatic self-assurance is necessary for successful living. Hamlet is a classic example of a man so undogmatic, so open-minded, that all action is suspended in favor of self-scrutiny, and the neutralizing influence of conflicting arguments. Hesitation, indecision, impotence, and suspended animation are the results of a too thorough-going open-mindedness.

We may concede, then, the need for a modicum of dogmatism, or faith, in a philosophy of life that is to carry conviction and which is to be capable of functioning.

Even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that the cause and purpose of existence is unknowable to human intelligence, still our minds demand that we adopt some attitude, some sort of faith, toward things, to supply a background, a justification of our behavior. Even the most unphilosophical, the most unlettered, or the most skeptical person has some sort of philosophy, conscious or unconscious, whether he admits it or not. In his conduct out in the world of life and action he acts a philosophy, though he may disdain to acknowledge it. The most self-questioning scientist belies his intellectual creed of accepting nothing without proof the moment he forgets his studies, the moment he leaves his laboratory and goes forth as a human being.

There are some individuals who prefer to have their philosophy expressed in articulate, communicable form, rather than leave it unconscious, vague, and unverballed. Such are we poor, misguided individuals, who waste our time poring over books of philosophy, who reach out for the unattainable, who seek to render ever more complete, emotionally and intellectually satisfying, our *Weltanschauung*.

We revel in the fierce, exhilarating joy of the chase, though our quarry ever eludes us, is ever a step beyond us. What hunter pursues his prey for the mere business of filling his larder, and prefers the disappointing satisfaction of capture to the wild, innervating ecstasy of pursuit?

Malebranche said, "If I held Truth captive in my hand, I should

open my hand and let it fly, in order that I might again pursue and capture it." Philosophic Truth offers joy without end, is the one pleasure which will not allow us to become blase, because of its very unattainable nature.

As has already been hinted, science makes no claim to absolute knowledge. It seeks theories, hypotheses, laws, and formulae such that will enable us to predict and control phenomena, so that we may alter and reconstruct our experience and environment, making this world a better place in which to live. From the scientific stand-point, the value of an item of knowledge lies in its fruits, and the criterion of truth is usefulness. That which is true from this pragmatic stand-point is that which enables us to attain a fuller and more abundant living. Old truths are constantly giving way to new and more adequate truths, which better fulfill that purpose in experience.

Let us carry the pragmatic motive into the field of the life of an individual. A philosophy, or a religion, is useful, or necessary, for an individual to attain that abundant living, adjustment with his environment, that harmonious functioning of all his capacities, which are the aim of the individual's life. Hence, though we cannot attain an ultimately true philosophy, we can shape and acquire a practical and intellectually satisfying attitude toward life, that will give us those ideals that determine our character and our actions.

We have dire need to-day for some such attitude toward life. John Dewey has written well in this connection. "Where is the moral progress that corresponds to our economic accomplishments? The latter is the direct fruit of the revolution that has been wrought in physical science. But where is there a corresponding human science and art? Not only has the improvement in the method of knowing remained so far mainly limited to technical and economic matters, but this progress has brought with it serious new moral disturbances. It need only cite the late war, the problem of capital and labor, the relation of economic classes, the fact that while the new science has achieved wonders in medicine and surgery, it has also produced and spread occasions for diseases and weaknesses. These considerations indicate to us how undeveloped are our politics, how crude and primitive our education, how passive and inert our morals. *The causes remain which brought philosophy into existence as an attempt to find an intelligent substitute for blind custom and*

blind impulse as guides to life and conduct." (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 123. Italics mine.)

Science, unallied with a program of ethical idealism, threatens to wipe out civilization, through its perfecting of the efficiency of instruments and destruction. We hear rumors of scientists at work, in every world power, at the problems of chemical and even bacteriological warfare. Explosives have been developed of late that make the explosives used in the last war seem like children's firecrackers. The next war will be fought from the air, and will be directed against the civilian populations as well as against the armed forces at the battle-front. With modern electrical, chemical, and bacteriological methods of destruction civilization itself will be jeopardized if another world-war occurs. Perhaps the human race will render itself extinct through its useful slave, science, rising up and slaying its master.

Would it not be better, for themselves and society, for these men of science, devoting their energies to the means of destroying mankind's painfully, slowly, and laboriously acquired civilization, to hold some religious, philosophical, or ethical view that would restrain them from that diabolical work, even if that view could not be empirically proved, than to be free from all dictates of conscience whatever through an ethically indifference agnosticism? Even a false theory that furnishes a basis for ethically responsible conduct is certainly more conducive to the welfare of society than the lack of any guiding theory whatever.

True science, as distinguished from the pseudo-science of certain commercial scribblers, makes no claim that its results represent absolute truth. A scientific "truth" is merely a concept abstracted from the perceptual flux, to be used as an instrument in the control of our environment. When a more efficient instrument is found, the old "truth" is either discarded or revised. The results of science, like the programs of a certain vaudeville theatre that I was once dragged into by a friend, well-meaning, but in need of philosophy, are "subject to change without notice."

If then the results of science are useful to us even if they do not represent absolute truth, we can say the same of a philosophy of life. If a scientific theory is "true" because of its useful applications, we may say with equal justification that a particular philosophy of life is "true" because of its useful applications in the conduct

of life. The argument that absolute truth is unknowable does not invalidate philosophy anymore than it invalidates science. Philosophy, when approached and studied in the right spirit, is as practical as science.

Decriers of philosophy are fond of alluding to the clash between rival schools of philosophy. It is declared that the points on which all philosophers are agreed would not fill a page of a pocket notebook.

As to the matter of disagreement among philosophers, the very nature of the problems investigated by philosophy precludes unanimous results. Furthermore, philosophy does the pioneer work in fields which are not yet ready for the exact methods of the special sciences. A great part of the work of philosophy consists of such pre-scientific work. As soon as a field of research has reached the point where scientific exactness is possible, that field automatically ceases to be philosophy and becomes science. Thus science claims credit for a great deal of accomplishment that really belong to philosophy.

Again, scientists are not as universally agreed upon their results as is commonly supposed. Take the theory of evolution for example. While practically all scientists now accept the bare fact of evolution, we find at least five conflicting theories of the *modus operandi* of evolution. Lamarck, Darwin, Weismann, Eimer, and De Vries have each given us a distinct theory of descent. The theory of natural selection unaided by the inheritance of acquired characters, of Weismann, has been losing ground of late before a revival of Lamarckianism. Thus certain questions within the field of science are as far from final solution as the questions of philosophy.

While there is no complete agreement among philosophers, still, tendencies originated by certain philosophers persist and reappear in the works of all later philosophers, often many centuries later. Thus the Heraclitan idea of the harmony of opposites has played its part in the philosophy of Hegel, twenty-two centuries later. Even today a new philosophical tendency-movement, called the New Heraclitanism, is under way.

Although, let us say Plato's philosophy as a whole is no longer adequate, many of his views continue to play a role in modern thought. Plato believed in a supernal, perfect, eternal world of Ideas, divine models of things from which earthly things derive their imperfect, material existence. While we no longer believe in

the actual existence of the Ideas, the conception of them is still useful to us, as ideals towards which we may direct our efforts.

Anaximander and Empedocles, the Ancient Greek philosophers, had evolution theories. Anaximander taught that all things had their origin in a fiery vapor, the *apeiron*; that living creatures came from the slime; and that man evolved from water creatures. We have here the modern naturalistic view of the world.

Empedocles taught a doctrine amazingly like the theory of natural selection. According to this fertile imagination, four simple elements, air, water, earth, and fire, through the operation of two fundamental forces, love and hate, were sufficient to explain the eternal flux of integration and disintegration. A vast number of combinations of the simple elements were formed in the past, but only the more stable ones, those that could successfully survive the conditions of the environment, remained. Such monstrosities as headless men, lions with woman's heads, had come into existence from time to time, only to perish in the struggle for life. We have here a very fanciful, but unmistakable statement of the theory of natural selection.

The idea of evolution thus was not an innovation of Lamarck, or Goethe, or Darwin, but had been floating as a seed through the ages, finally to land on the favorable soil of the nineteenth century. Some of the philosophical speculations of twenty-five centuries ago thus still appear in our science and philosophy, though with a new significance. The statement that nothing is ever accomplished in philosophy is obviously false.

Man in his early attempts at philosophizing is naive, and sees greater simplicity and order in Nature than there really is. As philosophy advances, the simple, unqualified formulae of the pioneers become antiquated and displaced by more subtle and elaborate interpretations. Greater and greater becomes the range of phenomena, the extent of the known universe, the discordant elements to be resolved to a more and more embracing formula. As science and human observation, aided by increasingly effective instrumental apparatus, expand, more and more things undreamt of in philosophy—that is, the current philosophy—arise, and philosophy must expand to take account of the new factors.

Philosophy, like science, is thus constantly correcting and revising itself, so that the lack of permanent achievement in philosophy is more apparent than real.

The quest of truth is like Achilles' pursuit of the tortoise in the celebrated paradox of Eleatic Zeno; strive as we may, the ultimate truth can never be attained, for like the tortoise, it is more and more nearly reached, but never over-taken.

The world-view, or *Weltanschauung*, of any particular age may be likened unto a musical chord with discordant elements included, a chord of the seventh or the ninth, as it were. With further progress of philosophy these discordant elements resolve into a consonance, but in the meanwhile new discordant elements have entered, through the discovery of new problems, to be resolved in the next step forward. Thus the progression of chords never comes to a final concord, but is rather a sequence of discords, such as the sequences of chords of the seventh or the ninth which we often hear in music, each chord ever resolving into the chord following.

The end of the sequence, the final philosophy, would be the contemplation of the perfect, concluding tonic chord of the cosmic symphony, the evolution of the cosmos brought to its final, infinitely distant ideal; the world process regarded *sub specie aeternitatis*, past, present, and future blended into one glorious, diaphanous, everlasting present moment, in the consciousness of some all-knowing mind.

CONFUCIUS AND CONFUCIANISM

BY H. G. CREEL

THE most famous exponent of Sinism was K'ung Fu Tse, or, as his name is latinized, Confucius (551-479 B. C.).¹⁸³ The son of an obscure military officer in the state of Lu, he was orphaned early. The *Analects* tell us that he had no teacher, but studied the ancient books and traditions for himself. This seems probable. He worked his way up in the government of Lu until he became one of the chief ministers of the state. As a protest against the improper actions of the Marquis who employed him he resigned, as the code of his class required, at the height of his career. He went thereafter from one state to another seeking employment, but was unable to find a permanent post. Later, he settled down with a circle of disciples about him to teach and to write. He edited the *Shu King* and the *Shi King*, but his original compositions include only the *Ch'un Ch'iu*¹⁸⁴ and, probably, one of the appendices to the *Yi King*.

Confucius has been greatly misunderstood and greatly misinterpreted to the West. Beyond doubt this is due to the fact that the teaching which bears his name formed the strongest bulwark against the entrance of Christianity into the country. In requital, such scholars as Wieger have, perhaps not deliberately, but thoroughly, misrepresented him.

In the Occident he is believed, at least popularly, to have originated Sinism. This has already been shown to be untrue. On the basis of the *Analects* (our most reliable source of information

¹⁸³ Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 123.

¹⁸⁴ This book is a brief, laconic, and unembellished record of events. Several commentaries have been written on it, and numerous commentaries have been written on these commentaries. The book is supposed to have accorded praise or blame to the persons mentioned, by means of extremely delicate niceties of phrasing. It was probably written with this intent. See Legge's preface to the book in the *Chinese Classics*.

concerning the Sage) it may be seen that he was conspicuously unoriginal as compared with his famous contemporary, Lao Tse, and as compared with the outstanding Chinese thinkers of the centuries which followed him. His teachings are almost entirely a setting forth and elaboration of the philosophy stated in the *Shu* and the *Shi*; many of his statements in the *Analects* are taken verbatim from these sources. Confucius did not pretend to be original.

On the other hand, he has been represented as having been, personally, almost entirely negative, an inhuman, formal, stiff, timid prig. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The Confucius who is revealed by an unprejudiced reading of the *Analects* is modest, kindly, earnest, sincere, above all "human." It is, in my opinion, his greatness of character, not exceeded by any figure in world-history, rather than his intellect, which makes him significant for the history of Chinese thought. Confucius lived in a time when all of the old standards were being thrown over, due to the breakdown of the Chow dynasty. The system of thought which we have been sketching had been in existence long before his time, and had been expounded by many men before him. But Confucius, by the force of his personal greatness, was able to catch the imagination of men, and eventually, through his disciples, to reinstate the old philosophy, to some extent, for another two thousand five hundred years.

Part of the injustice done to Confucius derives from the error of considering him the originator of Sinism. To be sure, he insists on formalism, but in this he only attempts to better the ordering of human affairs in the way which had been prescribed from antiquity. In so far as he allows his personal preferences to intrude, he figures as a rationalizer and *humanizer* of the old formulas.

The Master said, "The linen cap is that which is prescribed by the rules of ceremony, but now a silk one is worn. It is economical, and I follow the common practice.

The rules of ceremony prescribe the bowing below *the hall*, but now the practice is to bow *only* after ascending it. That is arrogant. I continue to bow below the hall, though I oppose the common practice."¹⁸⁵

In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there should be deep sorrow than a minute attention to observances.¹⁸⁶

The Master said, "'It is *li*,'¹⁸⁷ they say 'It is *li*,' they say.

¹⁸⁵ *Analects*, 9,3.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 3,4,3.

¹⁸⁷ *I. e.*, "It is according to the rules of propriety."

Are gems and silk all that is meant by *li*? 'It is music,'¹⁸⁸ they say. 'It is music,' they say. Are bells and drums all that is meant by music?¹⁸⁹

The Master said, "High station filled without indulgent generosity; ceremonies performed without reverence; mourning conducted without sorrow;—wherewith should I contemplate such ways?"¹⁹⁰

The Master said, "Though a man have abilities as admirable as those of the Duke of Chow, yet if he be proud and niggardly, those other things are not really worth being looked at."¹⁹¹

Confucius' way of following the *tao*, which was the way prescribed in the *Shu* and the *Shi*, was to study carefully the methods of the successful emperors and dynasties of the past, and then to apply them.

The Master said, "Follow the seasons of Hsia.

"Ride in the state carriage of Yin.

"Wear the ceremonial cap of Chow.

"Let the music be the Shao (the music of Shun) with its pantomimes."¹⁹²

The Master said, "Without knowing the ordinances of Heaven, it is impossible to be a superior man.

"Without knowing *li* (the rules of propriety), it is impossible for the character to be established."¹⁹³

Confucius puts great emphasis, therefore, on learning and study.¹⁹⁴ He does not, however, allow himself to become entangled in the philosopher's error of mistaking words for things,¹⁹⁵ nor does he, in setting up the past as criterion, leave no room for growth.¹⁹⁶

The picture of Confucius the man can be painted most accurately by a few quotations from the *Analects*. A disciple said of him:

There were four things from which the Master was entirely free. He had no foregone conclusions, no arbitrary predeterminations, no obstinacy, no egoism.¹⁹⁷

He himself said:

To conceal resentment against a person, and appear friend-

¹⁸⁸ Chinese music of this period had deep moral and ceremonial significance.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 17,11.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3,26.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 6,11.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 15,10.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 20,3.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2,16; 8,12; 11,24.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 15,40.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3,14; Cf. also *Li Ki* (in *C.C.*), p. 390.

¹⁹⁷ *An.* 9,4.

ly with him;—Tso Ch'ü-ming was ashamed of such conduct. I also am ashamed of it.¹⁹⁸

The Master angled, but he did not use a net. He shot, but not at birds perching.¹⁹⁹

The Master said, "In letters, I am perhaps equal to other men, but *the character of the superior man*, in carrying out in his conduct what he professes, is what I have not yet attained to."²⁰⁰

The Master said, "A youth is to be regarded with respect. How do we know that his future will not be equal to our present?"²⁰¹

When any of his [Confucius'] friends died, if he had no relations who could be depended upon for the necessary offices, he would say, "I will bury him."²⁰²

Actual incidents related of the Sage show him as unusually kindly and considerate.^{202a} It must be remembered, also, that the things which are said of him are not of the sort of myth with which the disciples of every great man seek to glorify him. Legends about Confucius abound, but we are not dealing here with those. Most of the material in the *Anallects* rings true. If the reader doubt, let him take two or three hours to read through the book himself.

There is little of the dilettante or the pedant about Confucius. He is tremendously in earnest.

Though a man may be able to recite the three hundred odes, yet if, entrusted with a governmental charge, he knows not how to act, or if, when sent to any quarter on a mission, he can not give his replies unassisted, notwithstanding the extent of *his learning*, of what practical use is it?²⁰³

Such a question would have been sacrilege to a Confucianist of a later day, when the *Classics* had become sacrosanct and their knowledge a badge of caste.

Confucius has been interpreted by various schools of thought, in East and West, to accord with their systems. Especially has there been an effort, under rationalistic influence, to make him a mere ethical teacher, without any system of metaphysics. Enough has been said, I trust, to discredit this position. To be sure, Confucius believed in the force of teaching and example, but he also

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5,24.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 7,26.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 7,32.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 9,22.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 10,15.

^{202a} *Ibid.*, 5,1; 15,41.

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 13,5.

believed that the same ends might be achieved without them if the transcendent harmony of the universe were brought about by the emperor, treading in the *tao*. He has been thought likewise to have been a sceptic on the subject of the existence of "spirits," the *kwei* 鬼 and the *shên* 神. Perhaps he was, but our materials do not warrant the assumption.

Fan Ch'i asked what constituted wisdom. The Master said, "To give one's self earnestly to the duties due to men, and, while respecting the *kwei* and *shên*, to keep aloof from them."²⁰⁴

The rule of Confucius in regard to these beings, as in regard to all others, is to treat with them no more and no less than *li* prescribes, and in the manner which it prescribes.

The Master said, "For a man to sacrifice to a *kwei* which does not belong to him [is not of his family] is flattery."²⁰⁵

For this philosophy, as for any anthropocentric cosmology, the great problem is, of course, that of evil. If all which exists is properly part of the great harmony, and if at one time that harmony was in existence, how could it ever have ceased? This problem, Confucius never deals with. His practical emphasis did not admit of it. We must, however, consider his doctrine of human nature, since that has been called into question by Dubs.²⁰⁶ Dubs makes the flat statement that Confucius did not teach that human nature was originally either good or evil.²⁰⁷ He is mistaken, as the following quotations from the *Analects* will show.

The Master said, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness, and yet live, his escape *from death* is the effect of mere good fortune."²⁰⁸

The Master said, "By nature, men are nearly alike; by practise, they come to be wide apart."²⁰⁹

Nothing could be more explicit than these two statements. And it will be seen that this is the only position which is really consistent with pure Sinism. For *properly* and *naturally* all things were good, and it was only by perversion that they became evil. And likewise, all things properly worked out for the good, and evil was surely punished and virtue surely rewarded. It was a noble faith—too

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 5,20.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 2,24,1.

²⁰⁶ H. H. Dubs, *Hsüntze, The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism*.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 78-79.

²⁰⁸ *An.* 6,17.

²⁰⁹ *An.* 17,2.

noble to maintain itself intact in the evil times upon which China had come.

Yet we have not answered the question as to the origin of evil in this once perfect universe. Nor does Confucius answer it, in the *Analects* at least. One passage indicates that he would trace it to a gradual deviation from the original path of rectitude.

The Master said, "Extravagance leads to insubordination, and parsimony to meanness. It is better to be mean²¹⁰ than to be insubordinate."²¹¹

It must be remembered, of course, that our record of Confucius' teachings is partial at best. But it is not probable that Confucius ever did meet this problem directly, for his interest was in practical statesmanship and social engineering, and he refused, like Gautama, to spin logical spider-webs. Such an emphasis was thoroughly compatible with his belief in the efficacy of certain techniques which we should call magical. To the man who uses magical technique, it is as much a valid and common-sense means of achievement as our magical category, "Science!", is to us.

The error of thinking Confucius a sceptic regarding the existence of superusual beings, which had its origin in this practical emphasis, has been touched on. His pragmatic attitude has been still further misinterpreted by Wieger to be "opportunism," action with a view to getting results without much reference to principle or means.²¹² It is not without whimsicality that Wieger, himself a Jesuit scholar, should libel Confucius with the very accusation of "Jesuitical" tactics which has followed his own order. What are the facts?

The Master said, "The superior man, in the world, does not set his mind either for anything or against anything; what is right he will follow."²¹³

"What is *right* he will follow." The character used here is *i*, but *tao* or *li* might be substituted equally well. If there exists in the world a more exacting code of principles than this one, I do not know it. Confucius means simply that a man is not to follow his own whims and personal opinions as over against the cosmically grounded principles of right action—a fundamental principle of Fr. Wieger's own Church. The learned Jesuit makes the mistake of believing

²¹⁰ *I.e.*, at all costs, *order* must be preserved.

²¹¹ *An.* 7,35.

²¹² Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 133.

²¹³ *An.* 4,10.

that lack of Christianity means, *ipso facto*, lack of any body of settled principle.

Unsparring of himself, Confucius demanded that others, and especially those of his own class, the scholars in government service, should be equally selfless in working for the prevalence of the *tao*. Again and again he tells us that the man of complete virtue will give up his life if need be rather than violate it. No matter how ancient an agreement may be, it must be kept. One who calls himself a scholar, and yet who devotes himself to truth so little that he can be ashamed of bad food and bad clothes, is not worth talking to. He is especially scornful of the mercenary scholar.

The Master said, "With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow;—I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors, acquired by unrighteousness, are to me as a floating cloud."²¹⁴

Is there any asceticism in Confucius' teaching? He does, to be sure, declare that it is not the part of the superior man to take undue enjoyment in fine food and ornamentation of his dwelling. He stigmatizes some music as "licentious," and he left the employ of the Marquis of Lu, at the height of his own career, because the Marquis was devoting his time to dancing girls. Yet the objection in the latter case was chiefly, at least, that the Marquis was neglecting his governmental duties; in other cases, too, devotion to pleasure was disapproved because it made devotion to duties impossible. In each situation, *li* was the guide, and *li* was the code of good manners made sacred. Obviously, few ascetic practices could have been tolerated within it; even a slight deviation in dress was sacrilege. Mutilation of the body (although practised by the government as punishment) was a serious breach of filial piety if performed by the individual, since it destroyed part of what was given by one's parents. A good Chinese had too many duties, within the order of Sinism, to have time for much asceticism.

Confucius was by no means a foe to happiness. The bringing of universal happiness was, in fact, his great ideal, and he approves the enjoyment of life, in conformity with *li*, wherever he finds it. On one occasion he asked several of his disciples to name their wishes. Three named more or less grandiose ambitions, to govern states well, and the like. Confucius turned to the fourth, who said:

²¹⁴ *An.* 6,15.

In *this*, the last month of spring, with the dress of the season all complete, along with five or six young men who have assumed the cap, and six or seven boys, I would wash in the *I*, enjoy the breeze among the rain-altars, and return home singing." The Master heaved a sigh and said, "I give my approval to Teen."²¹⁵

Incidentally, this approval of participation in an ancient and homely rite by one of his disciples does not show Confucius as the rationalistic sceptic he has sometimes been made out.

Confucius' devotion to duty was intensified by a sense of mission such as most great men have had. He feels very definitely that he has been appointed by Heaven to further the *tao*, and that so long as this mission is yet to be fulfilled he can not be harmed.²¹⁶ This was in part responsible for the very great personal courage which he displayed on several occasions. The corollary of this position, at which Confucius merely hints in moments of despair, is that Heaven is also responsible for his lack of success. Here again the problem of evil raises its head. Like his successors, Confucius seems to have been given to a degree of fatalism.²¹⁷ Neither of these problems was recognized squarely until the time of Wang Ch'ung (the first century A. D.).

Sinism had as one of its integral parts, it will be remembered, the arrangement of society, as well as of authority, in a system of graded ramifications from the center, which might be compared to an arterial system. All were bound to the center, *i.e.*, the emperor, but by a graded series, which extended from individuals to the head of the family, thence to the petty feudal lord, to the greater lord, and so on up to the imperial throne. It has been said that the theory of the empire was a magnification of the theory of the village. The village was a family, or a group of families; the empire was also conceived on the pattern of a great family. The centrality of the family concept in Confucius teaching was therefore thoroughly consistent. One of the very corner-stones of Sinism was the "five relations," that of father and son, of elder brother and younger brother, of husband and wife, of elders and juniors, and of ruler and minister. It will be seen that three of these are specifically within the family. These five relationships are mentioned in the *Classics*, from the earliest to the latest, as being of paramount im-

²¹⁵ *An.* 11,25,7.

²¹⁶ *An.* 7,22; 9,5; 14,37-38.

²¹⁷ *An.* 12,5,3.

portance. The family was, in fact, the most important Chinese institution, as it remains today. Religion and philosophy, which always rationalize the status quo, were inevitably built around this center. When Mo Tse treated family loyalties as of relatively little importance he was rightly accused of heresy from the ancient point of view. Confucius, in this as in most other matters, followed the ancient way.

The Duke of Shê informed Confucius, saying, "Among us here there are those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father have stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact."

Confucius said, "Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this."²¹⁸

This does not mean, however, what has sometimes been attributed to Confucius, an attitude of indifference toward all but one's kin. He was a persistent preacher of altruism, which he also practised, and he advocated practical charity. It was only to the evil-doer who was not of one's kin that he denied the claim of help. Although, when asked to define benevolence, he replied, "It is to love men," he also said, "Recompense injury with justice, and kindness with kindness."

One of the chief reasons for which Confucius is important for sinology is the fact that he edited the *Shi* and the *Shu*. A vital problem, which will probably never be solved, concerns the extent to which he altered the materials which came to his hand. The matter has been referred to before, and little can be added here. The general opinion is that, while he eliminated much of what he found, he altered the remainder but little if at all. Confucius, in so far as we can see him, is a traditionalist, not an innovator. The true traditionalist may easily select those materials which harmonize with each other and with his own views, but his reverence for the past will probably interdict any great amount of tampering with those records which he believes correct and therefore sacred. We know that in at least one instance, that of the songs of Ch'ing in the *Shi*, Confucius included materials of which he violently disapproved.²¹⁹

²¹⁸ *An.* 13,18.

²¹⁹ *Analects*, 15,10,6. Cf. Legge's note, in *Chinese Classics*, v.I, p. 162.

It is Confucius who gives us the first, the most complete, and the most faithful picture of the orthodox Sinism which had flourished up to his time. After him, and starting in his own day, we enter the period of criticism and of philosophical embellishment of the old system. As we have seen, there is little of this in Confucius, and the lack makes him invaluable. Had he been more original, he would be less important for this study.

In treating next of Mencius, we take up the most important successor of the Master, often called the Second Sage, and credited with having given its wide vogue to the teaching of Confucius. We skip a hundred years, to which we must return later to deal with those trends of thought which differed more from the way of the ancients.

Mencius is the latinization of Meng Tse. The philosopher, who lived from 372 to 289 B. C.,²²⁰ was born in Confucius' native state of Lu. He received his training, it is recorded, from the sole grandson of Confucius, who is generally agreed to be the author of the *Chung Yung* or *Doctrine of the Mean*, which is the third of the *Four Books*. The book of Mencius, entitled simply by his name, is the fourth and last of these documents, which might together be called the "New Testament" of the Confucian school. Mencius' book is said to have been written by himself, but there is reason to believe that it was probably composed after his death by a disciple. This was the more usual procedure.

Mencius, like Confucius, travelled widely, but the object of his travels was very different. Confucius sought, above all, an opportunity to put his principles into practice; Mencius, although he occasionally held office, relinquished it easily, and sometimes for reasons which seem to be mere petulance. On one occasion he complains that a king who had employed him did not really want him, else he would have kept a representative perpetually beside the philosopher to compliment him and assure him of the great esteem in which the king held his services, and of how sorry the king would be to lose him!²²¹

The fact is that Mencius was a philosopher and a teacher, while Confucius before him was primarily a man desperately concerned to save the empire. Mencius really cares far more that his own brilliance shall be recognized, and that his dignity shall be un-

²²⁰ Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 226.

²²¹ *Mencius* 2(2), 11.

impaired, than for the prevalence of that hazy thing called the *tao*, which is so far away and which Heaven itself does not yet wish to prevail. The rôle of harsh and unbending critic, which he filled to perfection, suited him far better than did that of practical reformer. In originality, and in intellectual penetration, he far outshone Confucius; in personal greatness he is not to be compared with him. For some incomprehensible reason, the opposite view seems to have gained currency in the West.

Mencius is conspicuously lacking in that uniform courtesy and kindness which was perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the great Master.²²² He considered himself so eminent that it was the place of kings to approach him for advice, rather than for him to go to them (one can hear, and enjoy, the stinging rebuke which Confucius must have uttered from the tomb for this arrogant breach of *li*.)²²³ Time after time he dodges the issue when questioned, saving his reputation for omniscience by a bit of cleverness.²²⁴ On one occasion, when asked by the ruler of Ts'e if the state of Yen might properly be attacked, he answered "It may." But when, after the attack had been made, he was accused of having countenanced an unjust aggression, he denied the charge. He had only been asked, he declared, if the State might be attacked, nothing had been said of *who* might properly conquer it. Oh, by no means, he had not advised the attack!²²⁵ Confucius despised such slyness.

On the other hand, the good qualities of Mencius were not a few. His loyalty to the memory of Confucius is implicit. He does not hesitate to decline large sums of money offered him, though he accepts gifts when in need. And his very arrogance compels our admiration when he carries it, as he often did, to the point of telling a king to his face that he ought to be put to death if he does not govern his kingdom well.²²⁶ And it is Mencius who has given us our most inspiring statement of the ancient Chinese ideal of character.

To dwell in the wide house of the world, to fill his correct place in the world, and to walk in the great *tao* of the world; when he obtains his desire *for office*, to practise his principles for the good of the people; and when that desire is disappointed, to practise them alone; to be above

²²² *Men.* 2(2), 11, etc.

²²³ *Men.* 2(2), 2, 7.

²²⁴ *Men.* 6(2), 1; etc.

²²⁵ *Men.* 2(2), 8.

²²⁶ *Men.* 1(2), 8, 2; 5(2), 9, 1.

the power of riches and honors to make dissipated, of poverty and mean condition to make swerve from principle, and of power and force to make bend:—such is the man who may be called truly great and courageous.²²⁷

After Confucius, the integrity of the old Sinism, as a metaphysical system, began gradually to disintegrate, but the enfeeblement in Mencius is very slight. Mencius still insists that to follow the *tao* absolutely is the way to bring about felicity, and declares that a king who fails to do so is responsible for the death of his subjects as surely as if he put them to the sword.²²⁸ The power of virtue is so great that the untrained peasants of a state which practises righteousness, though they be armed but with sticks, will utterly rout the mail-clad soldiers of a state which has forsaken the *tao*. Likewise, there will be no famine if only agriculture, fishing, etc., be carried on in the proper and prescribed manner. On the other hand, if the people are not given the benefit of the Confucian teaching, but are led astray by the perverse doctrines of Yang Chu and Mo Tse, they will forsake the *tao* so far that the harmony of the world-order will be shattered, and beasts will be led on to eat men—more, men will take to eating each other.²²⁹ All of this is in strict conformity with Confucius.

But Mencius says other things which Confucius would never have said. These aberrations are due, not so much to a genuine difference in philosophy, as to an inability clearly to hold in mind, at the same time, all of the various elements of the Sinistic system. Mencius was incisive and analytical, but neither he nor any of the other later philosophers of the period had the mellowness, the breadth of wisdom, and the firm intellectual grasp of the old philosophy which Confucius had. This may have been due in part to the fact that Confucius taught himself, and did not receive a “pre-digested” system from a master.

When asked by a king what was necessary in order to attain the imperial sway, Mencius replied, “The love and protection of the people; with this there is no other power which can prevent the ruler from attaining it.”²³⁰ Again, he approves the appointment, as minister, of a scholar who is neither vigorous, wise, nor well informed, but whose sole qualification is that he loves what is good.

²²⁷ *Mcn.* 3(2),2,3.

²²⁸ *Mcn.* 1(1),2,2; 1(1),4,3.

²²⁹ *Mcn.* 3(2),9,9.

²³⁰ *Mcn.* 1(1),7,3.

Questioned on the point, Mencius declares that "The love of what is good is more than a sufficient qualification for the government of the empire."²³¹ Now, this is scandal from the ancient point of view. To be sure, motivation must be correct, but in addition a man had to know *li* (Confucius stresses learning more than piety) and he had actually to follow the *tao*, properly performing the necessary rites and duties. Were Mencius here, his ubiquitous cleverness would provide the answer that of course, if a man really loved what was good, this action would follow as a matter of course. But we must over-rule the objection. Unwittingly, he was helping in the gradual corruption of the old philosophy. His stand on tradition represents another divergence, for he tells us that

"It would be better to be without the *Book of History* [the *Shu*] than to believe all of it."

Confucius was not a book-worshipper, but he would have asked which were better, to have a book with a few errors, or to lack the *tao* entirely?

Concerning the nature of man Mencius is, however, in essential agreement with Confucius, though Dubs has denied this. As is well known, Mencius teaches that men are naturally good, and this is, as has been shown, in conformity with Sinism. He shows great ingenuity in defending this position against attacks. It is, apparently, their understanding of the *tao* which distinguishes men from the beasts.

"Men possess the *tao*; but if they are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged, without being taught at the same time, they become almost like beasts."²³²

"That whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small. The mass of people cast it away, while superior men preserve it."²³³

Mencius further says that the man who knows his own nature thoroughly knows Heaven. This would seem to be based on the organic unity and harmony which pervade the cosmos. Another reminder of the natural philosophy is the fact that men, like other objects, differ among themselves not in substance but in *action*. Any man may be like Yao or Shun, if his conduct be so.²³⁴

But still we ask why, starting equal, men become so widely

²³¹ *Men.* 6(2),13.

²³² *Men.* 3(1),4,8.

²³³ *Men.* 4(2),19,1.

²³⁴ *Men.* 4(2), 28; 4(2),32.

different? The only clear answer which Mencius gives refers us to environment. He uses the figure of a field of barley, sown with the same seed, but giving an unequal yield in different sections: this is due, he says, to inequalities of soil, rain, and dew, and to unequal cultivation of the various portions. He rejects all hereditary differences. Another time, when hard pressed, he answers:

“The senses of hearing and seeing do not think, and are obscured by objects. When one thing comes into contact with another, as a matter of course it leads it away. To the mind belongs the office of thinking. By thinking, one attains *the truth*; by neglecting to think he fails to do so.”²³⁵

But he has not yet told us why it is that one man thinks, and another fails to, although he pretended to answer that very question. This throws him back on the first portion of his statement, which is much like contemporary deterministic behaviorism. In fact, Mencius is much inclined to fatalism. He declares that Heaven does not yet wish the right to triumph, and proclaims a doctrine familiar to the West, that Heaven sends calamities in order to strengthen men. Although cheerfully ascribing some of his own failures to destiny, he adds that the man who properly understands the decrees of Heaven will not stand beneath a precipitous wall.

Mencius could afford to be a fatalist. The plight of the Empire was not a matter of burning personal distress to him. His most biting criticisms only exalted his fame and his self-esteem, and in any case his needs were well taken care of. He was received with the greatest respect, even kings quailed before him—he was having a very good time. “It is fate”—well, why not?

Mencius' chief claim to intellectual distinction lies, probably, in his social psychology. He declares that all possess the capacity of natural sympathy.

“If men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will all without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. *They will feel so* not as a ground on which they may gain the favor of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbors and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of *having been unmoved* by such a thing.”²³⁶

From this point he builds, in outline, an entire system of ethics, which, being so firmly grounded, is not without force today. His criticism of the ethic of “enlightened self-interest” is penetrating.

²³⁵ *Men.* 6(1),15. ²³⁶ *Men.* 2(1),6,3.

It is impossible, on this basis, to build a genuinely cooperative society, he asserts, because at the end one still has no more than a group of self-seeking individuals, whose reactions in crises may not be depended upon to be social.²³⁷

In next considering Hsün Tse, we come to a philosopher who is, in the history of Chinese thought, a figure of paradoxes. Dubs calls him "the moulder of ancient Confucianism," and he is one of the most important Confucianists in history; as a matter of fact, he is the destroyer of the principles of Confucius, for he utterly and explicitly denied and rejected the heart and soul of Sinism. Lao Tse and his teachings are considered the arch-opponents of Confucius, and Hsün Tse is considered a disciple of the latter. Yet, as compared with Hsün Tse, Confucius and Lao Tse stand solidly together on the basis of Sinism, which Hsün Tse discarded.

It is evident that the technique by which Hsün Tse nullified the teachings of Confucius must have been subtle. It was. And yet it is the simplest and most usual technique imaginable. Hsün Tse simply "modernized" and "interpreted" Confucius. The procedure is that which has been used numberless times, and is still used, to substitute some more favored philosophy for the teachings of Gautama, Zoroaster, Mohammed, Jesus, or another, while at the same time preserving for the substituted system the prestige of the famous teacher. In most cases, the persons who make the change are quite sincere, and innocent of any intent to deceive. This was true, I believe, of Hsün Tse.

The life of Hsün Tse is little known. Dubs dates him as having lived approximately from 320 to 235 B. C. Hsün Tse strikes one as a man more interested in his task than in himself. He lived toward the end of the period of the "Warring Kingdoms." The time was one of constant bloodshed and ruin. The fifty-five states, which had been, were now consolidated to ten, but the struggle went on more fiercely than ever between these. A student of Hsün Tse, Han Fei Tse, was counselor to the T'sin emperor who finally did consolidate China, but this was after the time of Hsün. His day was one of slaughter, licence, and sophistry. From this came his very low estimate of human nature, cardinal in his philosophy. He saw that while the idealism of Confucius might have worked in the ancient "Age of Peace," something sterner was needed for his own "Age of Trouble." He did not attain fame until middle

²³⁷ *Men.* 6(2),4.

age, and it is probable that he had already worked out his own ideas, at least in outline, before he came in direct contact with the Confucian tradition.

What Hsün Tse does is to retain the outward forms of Confucian ethics and politics, while discarding the cosmic sanctions and metaphysical guarantees which were central for Confucius. For Hsün Tse, Heaven is merely the active principle, invisible and impalpable, which pervades all beings in the whole world. It is wrong to say that good and bad fortune come from Heaven. Drouths, floods, etc., are merely the natural activities of the cosmos, which may injure men but do not do so intentionally; it is for man to use his intelligence and industry to provide against these things, and so to make himself independent of Heaven and earth.²³⁸ Ancient tradition should be followed in government *because it is, after all, that which has proved useful in experience*, but it is to be used experimentally, and modified and adapted to suit new conditions. Confucius and his disciples were wrong in considering it an absolute standard, to be applied as found in the *Classics*.²³⁹ The right of revolution is affirmed, but Hsün Tse declares that Heaven has nothing to do with the tenure of kings. The "Decree of Heaven" is "what one meets at the moment." "The supernatural sanction is entirely gone."²⁴⁰ Hsün Tse agrees with Confucius and Mencius in deploring war, which disrupts society and causes misery, and like them he declares that righteousness is worth more than a standing army. But they believed that this was true because Heaven prospered the man who followed the *tao*, and the whole universe was with him. Hsün Tse's argument is that all the people would love a good ruler so much that it would be impossible to get an army to oppose him.²⁴¹ Again, he says:

If a man's deportment is respectful, his heart loyal and faithful, his methods according to the rules of proper conduct and justice, and his ruling passions love and benevolence, were he to rule over the empire, although he were harassed by the four barbarian tribes, the people would not fail to honor him.²⁴²

But Confucius would have declared that such a ruler could not possibly have been harassed by anything or anybody, else the very structure of the universe must have been altered.

²³⁸ Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 277. ²³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

²⁴⁰ Dubs, *op. cit.*, p. 260. Cf. also p. 54. ²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 268-69.

²⁴² *Ibid.* p. 258.

How could Hsün Tse pass such teachings as true Confucianism? In the first place, he attributed his own contempt of human nature to Confucius. He declared that Confucius realized that the men of his time did not wish to see the real truth. For this reason Confucius gave them the ancient axioms, to be accepted as a matter of faith. Common men believe, and wait foolishly for Heaven to help them. But the sages, Hsün Tse assures us, use their own wits and ability to solve their problems, and worry little or not at all about Heaven. The sages know that the speaking of the ancestors through the tortoise and the milfoil, the bringing of rain by prayers and offerings, etc., are only ways of explaining obscure natural phenomena to the unintelligent people.²⁴³

This is the old doctrine of the "symbolic scriptures" and the "esoteric tradition." That Hsün Tse should have used it is natural, but that he should have succeeded in imposing the unconscious fraud, not only upon a large portion of subsequent Chinese Confucianism, but on a large portion of modern Western scholarship, is astounding. Yet it is Hsün Tse's Confucius that many of us are given today—a rationalistic sceptic, looking down on, but tolerating for pragmatic reasons, the silly superstitions of people and princes. Dubs says of Hsün Tse, "His logical mind grasped the Confucian philosophy in systematic form, and he set to work to express and defend the Confucian teaching in its wholeness as none before him had done." On this point, either Dr. Dubs has misunderstood Confucius, or I have. Let those who are competent judge.

First of all, it is beyond question that the *Classics* are saturated with the metaphysical relation existing between Heaven, men, and all things. This is that universal harmony which composes the *tao*. But did Confucius, as Hsün Tse declared, have his tongue in his cheek when he pretended to take this seriously? To answer this question it is necessary to live with the *Analects* for a time, and to come to know Confucius well. No mere citation of passages can settle the point; we must, however, be content with that here. No one who has read the *Analects* will doubt that Confucius mentions the sacrifices very often. But did he believe in their efficacy?

Some one asked the meaning of the great sacrifice. The Master said, "I do not know. He who knew its meaning would find it as easy to govern the empire as to look on this;"—pointing to his palm.²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Wieger, *Histoire des Croyanccs*, pp. 277-79. ²⁴⁴ *An.* 3,11.

It has already been shown that Confucius felt a very definite personal relation with Heaven.

He [Confucius] said, "After the death of king Wan, was not the cause of truth lodged here *in me*? If Heaven had wished to let this cause of truth²⁴⁵ perish, then I, a future mortal, should not have got such a relation to that cause. While Heaven does not let the cause of truth perish, what can the people of K'wang do to me?"²⁴⁶
I do not murmur against Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven;—that knows me!²⁴⁷

Hsün tells us that the sages were far above the belief in divination, omens, etc., which the foolish people clung to. Why, then, does Confucius declare that his decay is extreme merely because for a long time he has not seen the Duke of Chow (whom he considered his preceptor) in his dreams? Why is the low point of the *Analects* the passage in which Confucius declares that all is over with him, because no phoenix has been seen, and the river has given forth no map?²⁴⁸ All of these are traditional omens of political good fortune.

According to Hsün Tse, law (*fa* 法), propriety (*li* 禮), and righteousness (*i* 義), are not natural, but are artificial restraints devised by the sages to make a sort of straight-jacket in which to confine evil-natured humanity. Thus, the *tao* was empirically established, and is from time to time revised and amplified.²⁴⁹ Is this experimental, piecemeal, non-cosmic ethics the true spirit of Confucius' teaching? Emphatically, no!

The Master said, "Ts'ze, you think, I suppose, that I am one who learns many things and keeps them in memory?" Ts'ze-kung replied, "Yes,—but perhaps it is not so?" "No," was the answer; "I *seek* an all-pervading unity."²⁵⁰ The Master said, "Sin, my *tao* is one pervading principle."²⁵¹

Confucius declares, "Heaven produced the virtue that is in me,"²⁵² and asserts that if it be so ordered that his *tao* is to advance,

²⁴⁵ I am aware of the difficulty of this translation, but I believe this rendering is substantially accurate.

²⁴⁶ *An.* 9,5.

²⁴⁷ *An.* 14,37,2.

²⁴⁸ *An.* 7,5; 9,8.

²⁴⁹ Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, p. 276.

²⁵⁰ *An.* 15,2.

²⁵¹ *An.* 4,15.

²⁵² *An.* 7,22.

no mere mortal can prevent it.²⁵³ Confucius was one of the most firm believers in metaphysics who ever lived, as Hsün Tse was one of the most thorough-going naturalists of ancient times.

Among certain of the American Indians there are medicine-men, who heal disease by magical ceremonies in which the sweat-bath figures as a part. Certain scientific medical practitioners also use the sweat-bath in healing. May we say, because their technique coincides in this case, that their theory of healing is the same? If their technique coincided in a hundred instances, we would still not infer that their philosophies were alike, nor that they would approach new problems in an identical manner. The analogy applies to Confucius and Hsün Tse. On empirical grounds Hsün Tse took over many of the moral axioms, etc., of Confucius. Hsün Tse thought they had worked, because the history, written by men pervaded with Sinism, showed that they always had worked. But Hsün Tse's theory was far different; on his principles, if these axioms failed to work in the future, they must logically have been discarded. According to Confucius, on the other hand, the only remedy for the failure of Sinism was "more Sinism."

Since he refused to accept truth as an absolute datum, cosmically established, Hsün Tse needed a theory of knowledge. It was very much the theory we have today, simply that truth is that which we arrive at when we do the best thinking of which we are capable. He carefully laid down the conditions for thought, with especial reference to lack of bias and disturbance of any sort. For this reason he has sometimes been said to have borrowed the "meditation" of Laoism, but this seems improbable. His dependence on that school of thought has probably been exaggerated, although it probably did influence him. Hsün Tse's distrust of human beings in general made him unwilling to leave thinking to the tender mercies even of the scholars, and led him to set up his theory of authoritarianism.

The doctrine that human nature is evil, and that man's goodness "is only acquired training," is Hsün Tse's most famous teaching, and caused him to be declared unorthodox. He "showed that according to Mencius' statement that virtue was just the development of innate impulses, there would be no use for the Sage-Kings or for any standards of conduct at all, such as those embodied in the concepts of *li* and *i* (proper conduct and justice). Here he

²⁵³ *An.* 14,38,2.

made a criticism," Dubs comments, "that must have cut very deep."²⁵⁴ On the contrary, the objection is easily met. Dubs, like Hsün Tse, fails to recognize the central dogma of Sinism, that goodness (*i.e.*, harmonious cooperation) is the natural, normal, proper state of all things. In the "Golden Age" men were born good, kings were sages, animals did not eat men, men were kind to each other and to animals, men followed *li* without the necessity of punishment and kings were good without admonishment from their ministers, all as a part of the naturally ordained scheme of things. It is evil (*i.e.*, disharmony) which is unnatural, abnormal, and transient. As Confucius said, "Man is born for uprightness. If a man lose his uprightness and yet live, his escape *from death* is the effect of mere good fortune."²⁵⁵ It is the existence and persistence of evil, not of good, which should provoke astonishment.

As we have seen Hsün Tse so far, he is the freest thinker and the most modern spirit we have encountered. Given his empirical and experimental method of attaining and amplifying ethics and politics, we might expect that China would have made unprecedented strides of social and political amelioration. But here we encounter the final paradox of this remarkable man. As he was, in his opinions, the least traditionally-minded of his fellows, he was, in his theory of education, the most rigid authoritarian. He distrusted men, and was unwilling to allow them to think *ad libitum*. The thought of what may have been lost, by that lack of faith, is staggering. There is no other knowledge, he asserted, than the knowledge of the ancients. To acquire that knowledge it is necessary, not to think, but to listen to one's teacher. The student's studies are finished when he has so thoroughly learned the teachings of his master, and especially the *Li Ki*, that he is able to become the echo of his teacher for a new generation.²⁵⁶ This rigid authoritarianism was fixed upon the Confucian school from his time.

But his rationalistic basis of ethics, and his related doctrine of the viciousness of human nature, were too heterodox and too heroic for most of the members of the Confucian school. And it is for this reason that Sinism survived, past the time of Hsün Tse, as something more than an external shell of precepts without a living heart.

²⁵⁴ Dubs, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

²⁵⁵ *An.* 6,17.

²⁵⁶ Wieger, *Histoire des Croyances*, 282.

JOURNEYS TO HELL

BY MAXIMILIAN RUDWIN

AMONG the travellers' tales which delighted our wonder-loving ancestors, the greatest popularity was enjoyed by reports of journeys to the realms of the dead. Visions too numerous to tell were invented for their delectation and edification. It would, indeed, be too great a task to follow the mythical stream of a Beyond flowing out of and into the hearts and imaginations of men. It is found in Indian, Iranian, Greek, Roman, Jewish and Christian mythology, and its sources reach far back, to a time whereof "the memory of man runneth not to the contrary."

Many have been the visits of the living to the dead. Some went in the body and others out of the body. Some travelled by night and others in the light of the day. The first record of a journey to the World of the Spirits is found in Plato. The Greek philosopher recorded the testimony of Er the Arminian to the effect that he had been admitted to witness the distribution of rewards and punishments to the souls of the departed and had been permitted to return to earth and tell his story (*Rep.* x. 614ff.). Homer described the descent of Ulysses to Hades to consult Tiresias (*Odyss.* xi). From the Greek poet, the idea descended to Virgil, Seneca, Ovid, Lucian, Statius, and other Greek and Roman writers. It also entered Jewish-Christian thought, the Church fathers elaborating it into a doctrinal system. The New Testament furnished the starting-point with its visions of the Beyond. The Book of Revelations offers many glimpses of the Unseen World, and in the Epistles we learn that St. Paul was caught up to the third heaven (2 Cor. xii. 2). Details of this journey are suppressed by the biblical writer as "unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter" (*ibid.*, 4), but are given in the apocryphal Vision of St. Paul (4th cent.). Other biblical passages (Acts ii. 31; Eph. iv. 8-10; Rom. x. 7 and

especially 1 Peter iii. 19-20) were interpreted to mean that Christ after his burial descended to hell for the purpose of redeeming from infernal pain the patriarchs and prophets of the Old Dispensation. This idea was elaborated in the apocryphal *Descensus Christi ad Inferos*, which is the second part of the *Evangelium Nicodemi* (3rd cent.). It also forms part of the Apostolic formula of the Christian creed.

But while Christ visited hell after his death, others journeyed thither during their life-time. Zoroaster is said to have made mid-night journeys to heaven and hell; and, according to Jewish tradition, Moses also visited the upper and lower worlds in his body.¹ The Holy Virgin and the Great Apostle likewise wandered, according to tradition, through hell and witnessed the torments inflicted upon the wicked. It would seem, in fact, that when the ancient world of spirits was divided by Christianity into two realms, an upper and a lower, the majority of travellers preferred to go in the downward direction. The idea of hell seemed to have had a great fascination for the Christian mind. What wonder that hell is writ large on the manuscripts of the medieval monks and missionaries! Many, indeed, were the visions of hell in medieval times. What we call the Dark Ages were, in fact, a perpetual spiritualistic *séance* with lights lowered. We need but refer to Beda Venerabilis, St. Brandan, Tundalus, Albericus, Wettin and Hildegard. Prominent among the medieval pilgrims to the Pit is Owaine the Knight His descent into St. Patrick's Purgatory, as told by Henry of Sal-trey, took place in 1153.² The most distinguished visitor, however, that Satan ever received at his court was Dante Alighieri, the first and greatest of the poets of Italy.

Dante, to be sure, visited all the three realms, to which the Catholic Church assigned the dead. His journey included hell, purgatory and heaven. It would seem, however, that our poet was most impressed by hell. Of his trilogy, the "Inferno" undoubtedly commends itself most to our imagination. The "Inferno" is the most powerful poem in the *Divina Commedia*. Next in importance is the "Purgatorio." The "Paradiso" comes last. "If Dante's great poem," says Francis Grierson, "had been a description of heaven, no one would read it. The interest centers in hell and purgatory."

¹ Cf. Louis Ginzberg: *The Legends of the Jews* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1908-25), I, 309 ff.

² See *St. Patrick's Purgatory*; an essay on the Legends of Purgatory, Hell, and Paradise, current during the Middle Ages. London, 1844.

The great Italian poet was most successful in his description of the domain of the damned. Chateaubriand has aptly remarked that it is easier to conceive of eternal unhappiness than of endless happiness (*le Génie du Christianisme*, II. iv. 14). We can, indeed, grasp hell and even purgatory but not heaven. "Our imagination," says Anatole France, "is made up of memories." We can easily form a hell out of the material taken from earth, but we lack on our planet the stuff with which to construct a heaven. Dante had no difficulty in assembling the material for his description of moral sufferings and physical pains. "I have found," said the poet of "Inferno," "the original of my hell in the world which we inhabit." It was hell and not heaven which, according to the testimony of his contemporaries, had left the deep marks on Dante's face. It is hell and not heaven which is the most real in the consciousness of man. We all know what hell is, but when questioned in regard to heaven, we feel embarrassed to answer. The information is so scanty, as a brilliant French woman once remarked to Sainte-Beuve. "There may be heaven, there must be hell," is the conclusion reached at the end of Browning's poem, "Time's Revenges" (1845). A further illustration of this idea is the legend of the three monks of Mesopotamia, who set out one day on a journey to the dwelling of the departed and who found hell and purgatory, but not heaven.

Dante's conception of hell is not original but universal. Many of his ideas were current in his days. The "Inferno" is but a highly poetical elaboration of medieval notions. The flaming and frigid divisions of hell point to the two mythical currents, the Christian and the classical, which meet in Dante's vision of the inferno. Following the lead of all Roman writers, our poet shows, in his description of the Christian Underworld, a love of horrors and a delight in terrors for their own sakes. This predilection for bloodshed and corruption is especially typical of the art of the Etruscans.

The Devil in Dante's "Inferno" is an incarnation of ugliness, foulness and corruption. As he stands half sunk into the frozen fastness of his pit, in all his pervading brutality and cruelty, malignity and monstrosity, he is an appalling rather than an appealing sight. We cannot enter into his psychology. The action of his mind or will is closed to us. We do not even know whether it is sorrow over his departed glory or impotent fury which brings the tears flowing over his three chins. "The imagination of Dante," says Chateaubriand, in his work already mentioned, "exhausted by

nine circles of torment, has made simply an atrocious monster of Satan, locked up in the center of the earth" (II. iv. 11). What wonder that the Devil in G. Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* (1905) is discontented with this description of himself!

*

* *

Dante had many imitators who also ventured to visit the Lower World. Emmanuel Swedenborg, in the eighteenth century, is said to have journeyed to heaven and hell. Perhaps the most prominent guest that Satan welcomed in modern times was the popular French poet Jean-Pierre de Béranger (1780-1857). In his ribald song, "la Descente aux Enfers" (1812), impiously named after the Descensus Christ ad Inferos, our ballad-maker tells how he descended to the domain of the Devil on a broomstick in company with a modern witch, a young and beautiful woman. As the imps of hell by no means lack appreciation of beauty, they came in swarms to kiss the naked feet of his companion. The nether world, according to the testimony of this modern visitor to Satan, is different from the description given by the priests, who employ the fear of hell as a means of driving men into the church. From the report of this traveller, we would say that the underworld resembles more a voluptuous Turkish harem than a vaporous Turkish bath. The court of the Kind-Devil cannot be surpassed in luxury by that of any earthly ruler. Our visitor to the infernal regions found no traces of kettles or cauldrons and heard there no howling or gnashing of teeth. On the contrary, he found the floor strewn with oyster shells and empty bottles. The souls who are fortunate enough to go to hell eat and drink and make merry. Nothing is less frightful than the sight of Satan. The infernal monarch is a devil of a good fellow *chez lui*. He issues his severest decrees to the clinking of glasses and the playing of reed-pipes. Satan is a very genial host and entertains his guests most royally. His Infernal Majesty is surrounded at the banquet table by a crowd of red-faced drinkers, for whom he keeps pouring bourgogne and champagne. There is not much decorum in the halls of hell. Ixion is sleeping on the shoulder of Tantalus, who is dead drunk, and Epicurus is making love to Ninon de Lenclos.

"After reading this poem, one is inclined to exclaim with St. Paul: O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?" (1 Cor. xv. 55). The author draws the following lesson from his description of the Devil's domain:

“Si, d’après ce qu’on rapporte,
 On bâille au céleste lieu,
 Que le diable nous emporte,
 Et nous rendrons grâce à Dieu.”

*
 * *

No man who descended to hell after his death is known to have returned to earth to tell others what he has seen in that dread and dismal darkness. But letters purporting to come from the inhabitants of hell appeared on several occasions during the past century.³

A very interesting visit to the infernal world has been paid some time ago by our own cartoonist, “Art” Young, who introduced himself to “Sate” as a newspaperman from Chicago and who reported that “Hell is now run on the broad American plan.”⁴ “Captain” Charon, who began his career with a little tub of a “rowboat,” is now running big steamers on the Styx, “the only navigable river in hell.” Judge Minos sits in court, and an Irish policeman introduces the poor wretches one by one. The lawyers are condemned to be gagged, and their objections are overruled by Satan. The inventor of the barbwire fence is seated naked on a barbwire fence; tramps are washed; policemen are clubbed until they see stars; quack doctors are cured according to their own methods; poker fiends, board of trade gamblers, and fish-story tellers are treated according to their deserts; monopolists are baked like popcorn; editors are thrown into their waste-baskets, and clergymen are condemned to listen to their own sermons, which have been faithfully recorded on phonographs.

This goes to show how much truth there is in the words of the old Gæthe that

“Culture, which the whole world licks,
 Also unto the Devil sticks.”

³ Ferdinand Gregorovius: *Konrad Siebenhorns Höllenbriefe an seine lieben Freunde in Deutschland*. Hrsg. von Ferdinand Fuchsmund. Königsberg, 1843.

Letters from Hell. Translated from the Danish by Julie Sutter. With a Preface by George MacDonald. London, 1886. 2nd ed., New York, 1911.

B. Piscator started a series of *Modern Letters from Hell* (*Moderne Höllenbriefe*) with his book *Psychologische Studien der Hölle* (*Psychological Studies of Hell*). Berlin, 1907. Rachel Hayward published a novel with the title of *Letters from Là-Bas*, named after J. K. Huysmans' novel *Là-Bas* (1891).

On letters from heaven and hell see W. Höhler's article “Zu den Himmels—und Höllenbriefen” in the *Hessische Blätter für Volkskunde*, vol. I (1902), pp. 143-9.

⁴ Art Young: *Hell Up to Date*. Chicago, 1892. Wilhelm Waiblinger has written a report of his subterranean sojourn under the title *Drei Tage in der Unterwelt*.

SPINOZA AND THE CARTESIAN PHYSICS

BY BIRGER R. HEADSTROM

THOUGH Spinoza was deeply indebted to the philosophical conceptions of Descartes, it was rather on the physical side that he felt the latter's power more fully; and this is to be expected for it was through his physical teachings that Spinoza first made his acquaintance. Such being the case, it would be reasonable to assume that the Cartesian physics played no small part in defining his philosophical development; and that this is so can be seen not only by the appearance in *Deo et Homine*, and by traces in the *Ethica*, of Descartes' account of motion, but equally as well by the bearing of the Cartesian theory of dynamics on Spinoza's conception of the material world. Yet, exactly to what extent this influence extended can only be shown by a comparison of various passages in his writings with the second part of Descartes' *Principia Philosophiae*, a work from which Spinoza derived most of his physical ideas.

In several places, Spinoza speaks of "certain things immediately produced by God," in explanation of which he offers the following passage in his essay on *God and Man*: "As pertaining to *Natura naturata* in general, that is, the modes or creatures which immediately depend on God or are created by him, of such we know two and only two, namely, motions in matter, and understanding in the thinking thing. Of these we say that they have been from all eternity, and to all eternity shall remain immutable, a work certainly as great as befits the greatness of the master-worker (part i, cap. 9)."¹ In another passage, he says that extended bodies differ only in "proportion of rest and motion;" and that a body is impelled to motion by the impact of another body possessing motion greater than its rest (*Deo et Homine*, part ii, note ad init. and cap. 19);²

¹ *Vide Eth.* 1. propp. 21, 23, 28, schol.; Ep. 66, No. 8.

² *Cf. Ethica*, 4, 39.

while in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (c.vii. No. 27) we read of *res maxime universales et toti naturae communes, videlicet motum et quietem, eorumque leges et regulas*. And in a letter of 1675, he gives motion and rest as examples of those "things immediately produced by God." For Spinoza, then, motion and rest were not relative terms but real things.

According to Descartes, matter, or any body considered generally, consists only in extension in three dimensions, and not in hardness, weight or any other such quality; and that all matter is ultimately homogeneous (*in toto universo una et eadem existit*); while the variations in its properties are determined by differences of motion (*omnis materiae variatio, sive omnium eius formarum diversitas, pendet a motu*), the relative nature of which is shown by *nullum esse permanentem ullius rei locum, nisi quatenus a cogitatione nostra determinatur*. Furthermore, he tells us, the quantity of motion in the universe is constant, a proposition which he demonstrates a priori from the perfection of God; and from which we are to assume that God not only maintains a rigid immutability in his operations but that in the beginning he created a certain quantity of motion and rest which he preserves unchanged: *materiam simul cum motu et quiete in principio creavit, iamque per solum suum concursum ordinarium tantundem motus et quietis in ea toto, quantum tunc posuit, conservat*. Rest, however, is not a real thing, and though Descartes did not probably look upon it in that sense, he yet appears to be somewhat confused on this point for he says somewhat later that motion is contrary to rest, and that speed is contrary to slowness "inasmuch as such slowness shares the nature of rest." And though Spinoza speaks of finite existence as "de nihilo participans, "partaking of nullity (*cogit. Met. pt. ii.c. 3. No. 1*), it is clear that he did not view nothing as a real thing. In any case, he accepted without question the conservation of motion as prescribed by Descartes, which principle, though not true, indicates at least that Descartes was not far from a definite truth, only he lacked the patience to carry his speculations to their logical conclusion.

By the term "quantity of motion" Descartes understood what is now known as momentum, a quantity which has direction as well as magnitude, though he failed to take this into consideration for he assumed that the sum of indiscriminately directed quantities was constant, a proposition not only erroneous but incomprehensible as

no method is given by which velocity can be determined. To him, motion is separate from its direction, "the determination of motion towards this or that part;" and further asserts that the total quantity of motion is not only the same after as before a collision of two bodies but remains the same even though the direction is reversed. And though he avers that such two bodies must be viewed as an independent system (*a reliquis omnibus sic divisia ut eorum motus a nullis aliis circumiacentibus impedirentur nec invarerentur*), he mentions cases in which one of them is at rest, as well as of cases in which they move with different velocities. That his results were wrong is beside the point; what is more interesting is that Spinoza accepted all his rules except one.³

What Descartes was after was a principle which would enable him to treat the material universe as a machine self-acting and self-contained; and by postulating an original creative act which furnished the matter of the universe with its fixed "quantity of motion," he was able to effectively meet theological criticism, at that time a no small matter; while Spinoza, fully convinced of the perfect unity of the divine nature and its manifestations, found in his system scientific evidence in proof of that unity and uniformity which speculation had already led him to anticipate in the physical world.

In naming *motus et quies* as being those things not only infinite in their kind but necessary to the existence of finite things of the same kind, looking upon water as merely figured extension, Spinoza's views of motion and rest, though derived from the most confused part of the Cartesian physics, become, in a sense, intelligible. For by substituting energy of motion and energy of position a rather happy result is attained. Beside being the most fundamental property of the physical world, energy is continually passing, in all natural phenomena, from one portion of matter to another; while equally as well the sum of kinetic energy and potential energy is constant. From which it follows, that if energy is taken as this sum, it becomes that which is infinite and immutable.

Spinoza, besides being indebted to Descartes for his physical ideas, derived from him, as well, his starting-point for human psychology and ethics. According to Descartes (*Princ. Phil.* 2.c. 37), "everything, in so far as it is simple and undivided, remains in the same condition and undergoes no change unless from external causes," a proposition which is repeated by Spinoza in much

³ Epistle 15, No. 10.

the same words of his "Principles of Cartesian Philosophy:" *Unaquaeque res, quatenus simplex et indivisa est, et in se sola consideratur, quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseverat*, though the demonstration he offers is couched in such language as to indicate that to him it was something more than merely physical:⁴ while in the *Cogitata Metaphysica* appears the idea of the self-preserving effort of things, "conatus quo res in statu suo perseverare conatur," this effort being merely the thing itself, in illustration of which Spinoza gives the first law of motion: "Motion has the power of persisting in its actual condition. Now this power is nothing but the motion itself, that is, the fact that such is the nature of motion."⁵ While furthermore, *Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur*, (Everything, so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being)⁶ and *Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam*, (The endeavour wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing else than the actual essence of the thing itself)⁷ expressed in physical terms simply means that no change can take place in a system without work being done.

Yet, despite all he owed to the physical conceptions of Descartes, Spinoza, towards the end of his life, became deeply dissatisfied with them, as can be seen from his letters to Tschirnhausen in 1676. Asked how we would prove a priori the existence of bodies figured and in motion,⁸ Spinoza answers that "From extension as conceived by Descartes, i. e. an inert mass (*molem quiescentem*) it is difficult if not impossible to prove the existence of bodies. For matter at rest will, so far as in it lies, persist in its rest, and, as well, will not be impelled to motion unless by a more powerful external cause; for this reason, I did not hesitate to affirm long ago that the Cartesian principles of natural philosophy are useless, if not absurd." According to Tschirnhausen, Descartes, as he supposed motion to have been given to matter by a creative act, did not view the material universe as a product of inert matter; to which Spinoza replied somewhat as follows: "As to your question if the

⁴ To Descartes it was the most general law of physical action *Princ. Phil.* 2. c. 43.

⁵ *Cogit. Met.* pt. i. c. 6. No. 9.

⁶ *Ethica* iii. 6.

⁷ *Ethica* iii. 7.

⁸ *Epistle* 69.

diversity of things can be proved a priori from the conception of extension, I believe I have already sufficiently shown that it is impossible; and that, therefore, matter is ill-defined by Descartes as identical with extension (*materiam a Cartesio male defini per extensionem*), but must rather be explained by an attribute which expresses an eternal and infinite nature." And though he hoped to be able to make himself clearer on this point, the opportunity never came. But what is clear at least is that Spinoza did not accept, in his last days, the Cartesian conception of material substance as consisting purely in extension.

THE COMET

BY CHARLES SLOAN REID

Celestial migrant, taught of endless force
The wanderlust of an untold desire,
Eternal urge that fills a wanderer's course
With trailing flames of friction-lighted fire,

Your journeyings command so wide a sweep,
Man's sense of distance finds no unit clear
To mind's instruction—trails ethereal keep
The secret of your passage far and near!

What grand extremes your visitations know,
Your tropic and your frigid zones of space!
What meteor tides upon your sky-ways flow!
What planets flag your strange, erratic race!

Projectile sun, or weird celestial toy,
A boomerang from some exploded sphere
That force may sunder yet cannot destroy,
While atoms find ethereal media clear,

Grand spectacle of Earth's unclouded night,
You held man's gaze in undivided awe,
When, marvelling upon your giddy flight,
He sensed the strangeness of celestial law.

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Published at the beginning of JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, OCTOBER

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