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Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.

Workers of the World. Unite!

L. Trotsky.

TROTSKIY

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OUR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AND OUR FRONTS.

Report read at the 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets of
Workers, Peasants, Red Army and Labour Cossacks
Deputies on the 7th of December 1919.

(A Verbatim Report).

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Our Military Construction and Our Fronts.

The Principles of the Construction of the Red Army.

Comrades, the Red Army was legally established by a decree of the Central Executive Committee on the 22nd of April of last year and later by a resolution of the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the 10th July of last year. In the decree and resolution referred to the general lines upon which the Soviet Government and the Commissariat for War in particular undertook to build the Red Army and the armed forces of the Soviet Government were defined. These resolutions prescribed all home-made and amateur methods in a task to which more than anything else amateur methods are inapplicable. It followed therefore that it was necessary to construct the army on correct scientific and regular lines. This was stated quite clearly and distinctly. It was necessary therefore to attract to the work of construction former officers of the Tzarist Army, men better acquainted with military affairs than at that time and even now are the workers representatives. At that time foundations of the Red Army were laid down which characterized our constructive work as a whole. This is not a people's army, or a national army, not a «democratic», army not an army of the Constituent Assembly,—it is an army of the working class, which is fighting for the reconstruction of the whole social system. Consequently we introduced class criteria in the army. In spite of protests which many will remember, we excluded exploiting, parasitic, bourgeois and landlord elements. The army must reflect

that regime, which we are constructing in social and political life. The regime was distinguished by political domination of the working class relying on the broad masses of peasants and labouring peasantry. The leading role of the working class in the army was strengthened by the institution of commissaries who were selected from the most experienced, reliable, and most self-reliant representatives of the working class.

In material organisation, the overcoming of guerillism implied for us the establishment of military administration on a proper basis: first of all the establishment of war industry within the necessary limits, to take stock of all supplies necessary for war purposes, to establish their proper distribution and to establish control over consumption. These were the postulates laid down by the 5th Congress of Soviets and served as a guide to our work in military construction. After the 5th Congress we more and more successfully continued in the work of organising and regularising our armed forces.

First of all we laid down the foundations of the army by a proper mobilisation of the working class. We did not do this all at once. In order to carry out mobilisation, in order not to leave the defence of the country merely to revolutionary enthusiasm it was necessary to have an apparatus suitable for mobilisation, an apparatus in the form of local military institutions. In the first period a supreme war council was established with the Commissariat for War whose task in the history of our military affairs was, with the necessary energy and consistency, to organise military areas: government «uyezd» and even volost War Commissariats. Only after the creation of this apparatus was it possible for us to take a census of the population and actually to draw the people into the ranks of our military detachments. This work was carried out all the time under the colossal pressure of the war. In distinction from all other countries who before their war, had a long period of so-called armed peace during which they constructed and armed their armies, we were compelled to construct our workers' and peasants' army, the first in the world.

under the direct pressure of military demands, with the knife of the world imperialist bandits at our throat. We created the apparatus, and with its aid we at the same time constructed our army and in working on this army we improved our apparatus.

At the present time our country is divided into eight military areas. In these areas there are forty four government and three hundred and forty four uyezd war Commissariats. This number is growing rather rapidly. Demands are coming from the South front for experienced military commissaries for the Ukrainian governments, candidates are required for Kharkoff, Poltava and above all for Kieff.

The First Mobilisations.

The first mobilisation was a very serious test for our military apparatus and in a certain sense for the whole of our Soviet system. We did not lightly resolve to carry out our first mobilisation in Moscow, which during the summer and winter of last year covered ten thousand workers. It is not an easy task, comrades, for a new Soviet system to create an apparatus which could secure the registration of those liable to military service and which would be sufficiently authoritative to those who are called up to appear to be drafted to their various detachments. The first mobilisation of the town workers in Moscow, those more politically trained naturally was easiest of all. That went off quite successfully and enabled us to gradually repeat this experiment over the whole country. During the course of last year from the last sixth Congress of Soviets to the present one, we have mobilised many men. Of course, I have no right to tell you the exact figure, but it is no secret for anybody that we have mobilised tens of thousands in a month, and these tens of thousands have gathered into hundreds of thousands, and these hundreds of thousands into millions during the years of our civil war (*Applause*).

Comrades—these figures have a double significance.

Millions of workers and peasants have been torn from industry and been placed into difficult, abnormal conditions in the combattant army, but the fact that the young government of the revolutionary class has been able to place millions of citizens of the country under arms proves that this government is a strong and powerful mainstay of the labouring masses. Our army is composed of workers and peasants, the workers hardly compose 15—18%, but in our workers' and peasants' army the workers retain a leading position, as they do in the whole of our Soviet country in all spheres of life and labour. This privilege is acquired by them as a result of their greater class conscience, their closer unity and their finer revolutionary temper.

Our Enemies' Armies.

You know, comrades, that even our chief enemies, Denikin and Koltchak started with irregular detachments. They, of course, approached it from a different angle than we did. At the time we were sending Red Army detachments, composed of Peterburg and Moscow workers throughout the country to spread the sphere of the proletarian revolution, Denikin and Koltchak were creating storm battalions of officers, yunkers and students. Following in our footsteps they later changed to the mobilisation of peasant and working class sections of the masses. At first it seemed to them that after the break up of the old Tzarist army and the collapse of all the psychological ties, the collapse of those elements of discipline—outside of which they know nothing, that mobilisation was impossible. But when they saw that we, a party, which in their view had grown out of complete anarchy and disorder proved capable of mobilising tens of thousands and millions, they decided to attempt to do the same on their own account. They made considerable experiments in the East and at first seemed to have achieved good results. This was first put to test by Koltchak's army which with the aid of his mobilised army achieved great victories. But further recrui-

ting by fire and sword gave varying results, both in our army and in the army of Koltchak. As long as Dutoff, Koltchak and Denikin possessed detachments of irregulars, composed of the most steeled officer and younker elements they developed considerable fighting forces in comparison with their numbers, because, I repeat, these elements have considerable experience and high military skill. But when our great masses, organised into regiments, brigades, divisions armies compelled them to mobilise the peasantry, so that masses opposed masses, then the laws of the class war manifested themselves. Then mobilisation with them was converted into internal disorganisation and aroused forces of internal destruction. Only our hammer blows at them were required to expose this and make it evident.

However pleasing it is for us to appreciate the direct fighting force of the Red Army it is yet more important and valuable for us to understand and to define the social class basis of our victories. We have a regular army,—so have they a regular army. We have mobilised the masses, so have they mobilised the masses; our army is chiefly composed of peasants,—their army is chiefly composed of peasants; our army is led by workers, by the most class conscious revolutionary communists—their army is led by officers and students,—the most conscious representatives of bourgeois interests—but the difference lies here; the progress of the struggle unites and tempers our army, whilst with them it results in disorganisation and collapse. (*Applause*). That is the basis for the whole thing.

The Communist Party and the Red Army.

I have referred to the fact, and this is the leading idea in my report, that our army bears the impress and is the reflection of the whole of our social system. It is based on the political domination of the working class relying on the peasantry. The leading role in the working class is played by the Communist Party, the leading Soviet Party. For that reason,

although giving my report as Commissary for War and not as a representative of a party I cannot avoid mentioning, however, the part played by communists in the ranks of our army. In the overwhelming majority of cases the responsible posts of commissaries are occupied by members of the communist party. In every regiment, in every battalion you will find communist groups. Our rules lay it down that communists in the army have no rights, only obligations. Naturally it would be too optimistic to assert that all communists without exception execute their duty irreproachably. We do not speak of small isolated groups but of the very large number of communists. I will not state an exact figure, but I will say that they run into six figures and consequently are not less than a hundred thousand men. (*Applause*). As a matter of fact they are considerably more, and in confirmation of this I base myself on the statement of our military specialists and commanding staff, largely non-party men, and I consider myself justified in repeating that without this communist leaven, without this unexampled self-sacrifice and without this unexampled courage of the best representatives of the working class, our army would fall to pieces. When things are not going very favourable at one or another sectors of the front, sector commanders, army commanders and even Commanders in Chief appeal to the revolutionary War Council, either directly or through the responsible department, to send communists to these sectors. (*Applause*). It is understood, comrades, that we also very highly value the fact that even other parties who consider themselves the opposition and in fact are such, have recently mobilised a certain number of their members for work in the army. They are all accepted in the army as brothers. But I must at once, without entering into a long discussion observe an instructive and pregnant fact. During an inspection which I made in Karkoff the officers of one of the regiments were presented to me, about a quarter of the number of whom were mensheviks. I interested myself in their further fate. They were attested to be superior, most self-sacrificing fighters who had risen to great heights during

the difficult situation in which the Ukrainian army found itself at that time. But I must add, that when any hitch or dissatisfaction arose, in the regiments—and in the Ukraine such things easily lead to difficult complications, these menshevik commanders approached the regimental commissaries and demanded that communist agitators and communist literature be speedily sent to the regiment. (*Applause*). They were good soldiers, they wanted victory, and they knew that they could not do much by distributing Martoff's declaration. (*Laughter and applause*).

Comrades, in this great struggle about which poets one day will write great things we are making tremendous sacrifices. Communist soldiers, communist commanders, communist commissaries are being sacrificed without numbers. For a communist there is and there can be no such thing as being taken prisoner. A communist who falls into the hands of the enemy never returns. There was a case where one of the most prominent Moscow communists comrade Baryshnikoff, an excellent militant comrade did not manage to shoot himself when he fell into the clutches of Mamontoff's cavalry; Baryshnikoff was hanged. Those whom you select from your midst and with great loss to the local work you send to the front, not as rankers not as conscripted soldiers, but as spiritual leaders, as men who go to fight and teach others to fight, who fight and die, all those know that for them there is no possibility of being taken prisoner. How many first class fighters, commissaries, commanders have put the last bullet through their own heads when nothing remained but shameful captivity! Comrades, during my two years traveling along the various fronts. I have observed the development of a new psychology, or to speak more truly I have observed how the former old, human psychology is acquiring a finer temper. At one time we were interested in the Samurai caste who did not shrink from death in the service of their nation. I must say that in our commissaries, our most advanced warriors we have a new communist order of Samurai who without the privileges of caste know how

to die and to teach others to die for the cause of the working class. (*Applause*).

Political Work in the Red Army.

The welding together of the commissaries, the advanced members of the communist party, and the remaining sections of the combattant detachments is achieved principally with the aid of the political work which is being carried on to an extent that has not been known in any other army. This political work has developed very widely during last year as a result of the stream of workers, and of literature. It is sufficient to say that in January of this year there was not a single school in the army, there are now three thousand eight hundred. Up to the first of January there were thirty two clubs, now there are 1315. Up to the 1st of January we did not have a single travelling library, now we have 2,392. We spend hundreds of millions of roubles in one year—it is true at the present deplorable value—on cultural and educational work in the army. This work will send back to the villages, to the factories, to the workshops, men who will be heads above those who came from them into the army. (*Applause*).

The Commanding Staff.

The question of officers creates tremendous difficulties for us. This question during all critical periods, during all changing revolutionary periods of history, always represents a tremendous difficulty for the government. How much more so with us where things from the point of view of class and the form of government are entirely new. I remember on the 23rd of April of last year I submitted to the Central Executive Committee a report on the organisation of the Red Army and insisted then on the necessity of attracting military specialists and instituting commissaries into the army. I would ask the representatives of the opposition to remember this

fact, not for the purpose of polemics, but in order to enable us to learn from each other, that is if we really desire to work on a basis of a Soviet regime,—I would ask them to remember that we were told at that time, I remember that very well without referring to the minutes—that we would never create an army, that the project is a farce, that we are placing these commissaries over the counter-revolutionary officers like guardian angels. More than a year and a half has elapsed since then. You know how difficult that period has been in relation to the war and particularly in regard to the internal construction of our army. We have frequently cases of treachery, frequently cases of officers going over to the enemy's camp. Take the history of the most brilliant army in the world, the army of the Great French Revolution. This was formed by means of amalgamating what was then called the old Royal Battalions of the line. Out of 15,000 royalist officers nearly a half fled to the counter-revolutionaries and foreign enemies. The remaining half together with the new officers remained in the service of the revolutionary France. Take the American Civil War in the sixties of last century; there also the same division among the officers was to be observed. The higher ranks were divided. The greater number went over to the South, to the slave owners and helped the South to secure the advantage in the first months and years of the Civil War until the revolutionary army of the North formed the necessary cadres of officers with the aid of which it formed an army. The ebb and flow produced in our army also a natural and artificial selection in which many factors entered, the chief of which were the progress of military operations, successes and failures and our international position. The co-operation between our commissaries and commanders had a tremendous influence. I again emphasise here that the fact that our horny-handed Moscow and Petersburg workers, know ten times more about politics and world affairs than these educated military specialists, produced a tremendous impression upon the late ex-generals and colonels. (*Applause*).

These ex-officers gradually learned to respect their com-

missary-colleagues. They observed from day to day that as commissaries, these representatives of the governing party, delegated by the centre for responsible work give themselves up whole-heartedly to it, do not demand any privileges for themselves, but on the contrary, are first to be found where danger most threatens. This moral influence of the commissaries could not but attract the better elements of the officers to that class and to that regime which has thousands and tens of thousands of workers like these.

Thus our army not only automatically attracted tens of thousands of ex-officers—literally tens of thousands—but many thousands of those were organically absorbed into the army, psychologically and morally reformed, and became subjected to the same spirit that reigned in the army not out of compulsion but conscientiously.

Training Courses for Commanders.

Parallel with this, comrades, our resolutions arranged for a considerable number of officers' courses for the most militant and class conscious peasants of the old army as well as of our Red Army. I will not quote any figures, for well understood reasons, I will say that we have some dozens of these schools. The number of courses have doubled during the last year, the number of students have doubled, so that the lower ranks of our officers in our army are supplemented by workers, coming directly from the factories and villages who passed through a short term officers' training courses. Later after acquiring the necessary practical training in our best fighting detachments the more able pass through a higher military school and become commanders of regiments and brigades. Finally the most able pass through the general staff academy of the Red Army and through the artillery and engineering academies.

Proletarian Commanders.

Finally, comrades, we have a certain number of responsible commanders who have neither passed through the old schools or through our new courses and academies. These very often

are communists whom we have sent to the front to acquaint themselves with military affairs and to carry political consciousness into the ranks of the Red Army. These, thanks for their own personal qualities and the demands of the moment, acquired a skill which enabled them to occupy the most responsible commanding posts. You heard the representative of the Turkestan front comrade Frunze speak here. All his previous military training consisted in having shot, if I am not mistaken, at a local chief of police who shot at workers. (*Laughter and applause*). I am not sure whether he hit the chief of police or not, but he was sent to the front as one who had worked as a military commissary under arms. At the present moment he commands an army and according to the despatches from the chief of staff he is a successful commander. The N-army, one of the best, is commanded by comrade Sokolnikoff whom we knew as a member of the executive of the party, as an excellent journalist, but entirely a civilian. Now he commands an army, and again according to dispatches of the commander in chief—he is an excellent commander. We have also a brilliant commander in the person of comrade Turkhatchevsky, who was something between a first and second lieutenant, who has conducted a number of brilliant operations in the decisive battles against Koltchak. (*Applause*). We find still greater varieties in the divisions. There we will find a number of late non-commissioned officers, who are now what formerly would have been called generals of divisions. Small armies are commanded by a late non-commissioned officer who had a very good peace time occupation—he was a barber. In this sphere, comrades, we do not draw any hard and fast line, we do not work upon any «principle», we seek good, loyal commanders wherever they are to be found and if, in neighbouring detachments of a division one is being commanded by an ex-general and the other by an ex-metal worker, a former non-commissioned officer, and if these are emulating in the exposition of military arts — no harm at all is done to the workers and peasants revolution. (*Applause*). It is true that treachery con-

tinues even up to the present moment. Quite recently the most glaring instance of treachery was witnessed in Petrograd, where the leader of the conspiracy was a colonel in the general staff—Lundequist. But, comrades, side by side with traitors and treachery, side by side with agents of foreign imperialism and Lundenquists—the cadres of officers in the Red Army have their heroes and martyrs, like general Stankevitch, Nikolaeff and others, whose names have not yet been inscribed either on monuments or on paper. Brave general Nikolaeff was hanged by Balakhovitch and we solemnly buried him in Petrograd. Not long ago we buried general Stankevitch beneath the walls of the Kremlin, on the Red Square. General Stankevitch was an old man sixty two years of age. He was vice-commander of the 13th army and during a retreat was taken prisoner. The enemy demanded of him to come over to their side, but he refused. The star of the Red Army was branded on his breast with red hot irons, army comrades who are now in Moscow have seen it. This old general thrust the hangmen away from his side and placed the noose round his neck himself and died bravely for the cause of the workers and peasants revolution. (*Applause*).

Naturally cases of treachery rouse suspicion and necessitate strict control which affects our friends and comrades in the army who have come from the Tzarist Army. Many of us have observed this difficult position, but I think that the time has come when a way out of this situation is gradually shaping itself. The Red Army and Soviet regime have shown their strength even to those strata of officers who were wavering and hesitating and sought to be on the stronger side;—these strata are diminishing. The process of selection which is going on in the higher ranks of officers in the Red Army is not a party selection, but one in which Soviet ideology must find frank expression, must create such a firm view, such a Soviet atmosphere among the former officers which would annihilate all those who stand with their feet in both camps, in order that every officer may know that this is not a damp

rary mercenary service, but a high duty, demanding loyalty of body and soul. We must create such an atmosphere, that there shall be no room for him who harbours evil intentions, who walks with a dagger concealed behind his back, for him, who looks to the South front with hope; we must diffuse this conviction among those former officers, who are now honourably serving the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and who are defending its independence and its future on all fronts.

New Perspectives.

In any case, comrades, we have overcome these difficulties in this sphere as we have in others. New perspectives and possibilities are opening up before us. The reform of the psychology of the old officers, the creation of large cadres of officers from workers and peasants, the appearance of numbers of self-trained commanders from among our party comrades, the appearance of prominent commanders like Budenny,—a former non-commissioned officer of the old army, who now successfully commands very large cavalry unities,—this creation of an organised Red Commanding Staff assures us of the possibility of gradually going over to a single command. Certainly, a combination of a commander and one or two commissaries, a combination at which the opposition has sneered, is not an ideal and permanent combination in military affairs. On the contrary—military affairs demand that the commanders be the only military political commissaries. The more we obtain reliable, firm, moral and moral authority. The more we shall create, in conscious, self-reliant officers, the single command, the grounds for the introduction of apparatus for the political work in all its importance. This is one of the tasks to the solution of which we must devote ourselves in the immediate future.

Red Army Supply.

The question of supply is one which creates for us tremendous difficulties. Our Soviet apparatus in this sphere has been

put to the severest tests and has withstood them. There was a time when our factories did not produce a single cartridge, not a single machine-gun, not a single gun,—a period in which the old apparatus had collapsed and we had not yet commenced to build a new one. When we established our war industry production during the first two months was very modest. Not being able to quote any definite figures I can say however, that production during the last few months is 10 to 15 times greater than when we started work. Our exhausted country is compelled to work for the war. But we are compelled to fight. If we are compelled to fight—we must be armed and well armed at that; and in this direction we have achieved the required results. Our apparatus has proved itself capable of establishing a war industry. In this connection at the present moment we stand with both feet firmly on the ground. The fear that we may be defeated owing to a lack of cartridges, rifles, machine-guns and guns,—a danger which threatened us 8—10 months ago—no longer exists. (*Applause*). This fact—I say in passing—proves that the apparatus which in a few months had proved itself capable of establishing a war industry will also prove itself capable of establishing general industry when we shall open up the sources of the Don Coal, of Caucasus petroleum for our industry, as we have opened up the sources for Turkestan cotton. Consequently the test of our military apparatus is the test of our regime as a whole.

Military supplies are concentrated in all stages, production, distribution and accounting. A few months ago comrade Rykoff was placed at the head of military supplies with wide powers. This fact (the concentration of affairs of paramount importance in one hand) with the active co-operation of the trade unions and other labour organisations, as I have already said, has given us tremendous results in productivity. In the sphere of account-keeping we have also achieved considerable successes. We know exactly what we have, what we had, what we lack, we know how many pairs of boots and how many great coats we shall have in the next few months.

I confess that it was not quite so simple in the beginning to calculate the extent of our property, to take an inventory, to learn how to manoeuvre it in conformity with the demands and the operations of the troops. Now our troops generally are booted, clothed and fed, at least in the most accessible fronts. Correct lines of co-operation have been established between the Supreme Council of National Economy on the one hand and the Commissariat for Food and the Commissariat for Communications on the other, which gives us further possibilities of continuing our work without interruption. The business of military supplies is carried on under difficult conditions, because the whole of our country lacks supplies. The peasants and the workers have neither boots, nor under-clothing, nor great-coats. For this reason here and there a leakage takes place through which military supplies find their way into the hands of the civil population, most often through the soldiers themselves. One can explain this, but one must under no circumstances permit it, because the army must be clothed in the first instance. I do not speak here of the fact that equipment which trickles out of the ranks of the army very often become objects of criminal speculation on a large scale in many markets and concealed stores. We are taking measures now against illegal trading in military equipment. I call your attention to this prosaic question because it has a colossal importance, for at this rate we shall not be able to clothe our army. In the struggle against the criminal wastage we are taking two sets of measures; first a complete stock taking not only from above but throughout all departments in every military detachment, company or regimental stores an exact account of issues of arms and ammunitions are kept. Every soldier has a service book in which everything he receives is exactly noted. The other is not departmental. It is necessary to mobilise the public opinion of the advanced workers and class conscious peasants, commencing from the district Executive Committees and factory committees, against illegal trading in military equipment, in order that it may be clear to everyone that boots and

great coats are indispensable means of fighting against our enemies. Only under these conditions will our central military supply department, which at the present moment is working incomparably better than it was a few months ago, be able to clothe our Red Army without interruption.

If I were to summarise all that I have said about the construction of the army. I would say that there are no grounds at all for changing our method or our line of action in the work. We have to develop and improve our methods.

Training of Commanding Staff.

In connection with the training of our new officers we are confronted with the task of increasing the number of our military students and to adapt the methods of teaching to the new conditions and forms of our war. There is too much routine and antiquated and superfluous theorising in our present new methods. Our workers and peasants students demand more practical methods, demand methods that would be more applicable to the present circumstances. The complaints from the front in this connection have been responded to at the centre and changes are being carried through and will be carried through to the end.

Care of the Families of the Red Soldiers.

It is necessary, comrades, to improve the care of the families of the Red Army men in the localities. This question is of tremendous importance and is reflected in the morale of the army. One of the delegates reminded me of this at the presidium. This question is of tremendous importance and the local Soviets are not doing all they can in this connection.

Further, we must devote more care and more attention to the sick and the wounded Red Army men. Facts are observed in this connection which are quite intolerable and shameful for a workers' and peasants' Government. Too often with us, as a result of general poverty and ignorance a disregard to

suffering is observed. Too often warriors have been wounded and fall out of the ranks, completely disappear from the battle field, and the medical personell and nurses do not by far devote their attention to them that they should. I say frankly that the bourgeoisie could surround their wounded, of course, principally officers, with more care and love than that with which our wounded and sick Red Army men are surrounded. I ask you, when you return to your districts to raise this great question, at your local Soviets. It is necessary to mobilise all public initiative, workers and peasants, men and women for the assistance of the official military medical departments. The experience of Petrograd and Moscow have shown that it is possible to achieve considerable results in this connection.

ii Military Transport.

On the question of transport I have mentioned that we have established proper organised relations with the communications department. The People's Commissary for Ways and Communications, and the Assistant Commissary by an order of the Council of People's Commissaries have been placed on the Revolutionary War Council of the Republic; but co-operation at the top is not sufficient. Most of the means and forces of the railways, owing to the conditions of our civil war, are given over to military transport. The closest co-operation which the Council of People's Commissaries has ordered should be carried out in the localities over the whole stretch of our front. There are many representatives of the army and the fronts here, and I would call their attention to this most supreme question.

At the present moment everything depends upon transport. I say frankly that on the hastern front there is more than one division which after the rout of Koltchak could be thrown to the South front and settle Denikin in a short time. Where does the difficulty lie? The difficulty lies in transport. Of course, we will overcome this difficulty. In the elevators and stores of the food departments there are large quantities of

provisions. Where does the difficulty lie? The difficulty lies in transport, and the chief difficulty in transport is fuel. Out of these, two tasks confront the army: in the first place to devote the most careful attention, control and vigilance over the uses to which the means of transport are put to at the front. At the present moment waggons are unnecessarily detained. I do not speak of locomotives. To detain a single waggon unnecessarily is a crime committed against the interests of the workers and peasants, and you, comrade delegates, from the fronts and the armies, should infuse the consciousness of this into all workers in all the military departments and establish such a state of affairs that whoever does not work in this sense should feel the responsibility for his conduct; he should be brought to trial for hindering the supply of food and other requirements of the working masses.

At the same time nobody can assist, or is so well able at the present moment to come to the assistance of the railways in connection with fuel, than the military departments. These have wide powers and means, and particularly in the war areas, have a large number of excellent Soviet workers. If there is a scarcity of fuel in Moscow it is not because of the «bureaucracy», as the opposition says, but because that three quarters of the best workers of Moscow have been sent to all the fronts; but these workers relying on the power and means of the military departments may in the first place supply the railways in the war area with the necessary quantity of wood fuel. This is being done now and must be done with increased energy in the future.

The Forthcoming Demobilisation.

These are the practical conclusions, comrades. The question of the future of our Red Army is looming up on the horizon. When it will have conducted its fight to a finish, and we conclude peace, then the question of demobilisation will confront us. This question may seem rather too problematical at the moment for the purpose of calling the attention of

the Supreme Legislative Organ of our Soviet country to it. I limit myself only to essentials. The question of demobilisation is a very complicated and responsible question demanding considerable preparation. We have started on this work and everybody will admit the propitiousness of this in view of the undoubted change in our international situation which has been confirmed at this Congress.

The Militia System.

When we speak, however, of the conclusion of peace within the next few months, we must not call this a permanent peace. As long as a class government remain, as long as the hearths of Imperialism remain in the Far East, in Europe and in America, the possibility is not excluded of the peace for which we hope to conclude in the near future not being a genuine peace, but a pause before a new attack upon us by predatory Imperialists from the West or the East. Consequently, it is not a question of disarming, but of changing the form of the armed forces of the State. We have to send the workers back to the factories, the peasants back to the villages to establish industry, to raise agriculture, the art of war must be brought nearer to the workers, to adapt the regiments to the factories, to the villages. Consequently we must adopt the militia system, as the armed forces of the Soviet Republic. Even among the most conservative sections of our military specialists objection to the militia system is continually decreasing. In fact the world war has in this connection taught something to the most hardened pedants. All the first class militarist countries entered the world war with armies insignificant as compared with the total of the armed forces they threw into the war at the highest stage of its development. Thus, for instance, Russia, on the eve of the war had 1.320.000 soldiers, which during the war rose to 6.860.000; France had—630.000 which was increased to 4.500.000; Germany had 770.000 which was increased to 5.490.000; Austria Hungary had 390.000 which was increased to 3.500.000 and

the United States had 252.000 and put into the field 1.790.000.

In other words the number of troops which fought in the Imperialist war was 5—7 and 9 times greater than the number of troops comprising the permanent peace time armies. This means that the army was made up of permanent troops and later practically a national army of millions was improvised based upon the narrow foundation of the standing regular army. One national army may have been better than another, but at any rate it was not the armies which the military theorists and general staffs of all countries which fought in the war had in view. The attempt to settle the war by lightning strokes failed. It was found necessary to resort to the deepest resources of the respective nations.

The socialist parties of the II International stood for the creation of a militia in peace time. Jaures urged this idea with all the power of his genius in the form of a legislative act, in his book on the army. He, with his democratic utopism imagined that the transfer to the new army will be made gradually, unnoticeably by means of partial reforms just as the transfer to socialism should in his opinion be brought about by gradual democratisation. But Jaures was deeply mistaken in this connection, history has dictated quite another path to humanity; a path of savage bloody battles, Imperialist world war, and later on civil war. But the idea of a militia, that is the conversion of the army into an armed nation, bringing the army close to the land and the factory, the creation of regimental, brigade and divisional territorial areas where there are officers corps engaged in training the workers and peasants in the art of war, in which every worker and peasant, according to his age category belongs to a definite territory and consequently is included in a definite regiment, which can be immediately raised and placed under arms,—this idea confronts us now as the only possible form of our armed forces in peace time. This work is being undertaken by the administrative department «vseobutch» (universal military training), which has a tremendous work in front of it.

The Position at the Fronts.

This, comrades, is all that I can say at the moment about the construction of the Red Army. Permit me now to deal with the work of the Red Army on our fronts. (*Applause*). Maps have been distributed to you which have been prepared by our Field Staff under the guidance of its chief, P. P. Lebedeff. On these maps you will find the line of our fronts as they were on the 27th November. You will have an opportunity of examining them later on. The ideas which I will put forward will be quite clear to you without having the map in front of you. For the whole of the period from November 27 however, much of our military situation has been changed; in one connection it remained unchanged, that is, we have been completely surrounded. We have a North front, a West front, a South and a East front, the latter being divided into an Eastern front proper and a Turkestan front. Our successes on the Eastern front opened a road for us to the heart of the continent of Asia. So far this process has not given us all the results that we are expecting from it, but we shall get them.

We still remain surrounded, however. We hold central positions on all our fronts. This gives a tremendous military advantage, and allows us to throw all our reserves from less important fronts to more important fronts. This advantage, however, imposes a considerable strain upon our means of transport and this again is reflected upon the whole economic state of our country. Only a complete victory on the South can bring an end to this state of affairs.

The North Front.

We will commence, comrades, with a review of the most mobile and least dramatic of our fronts—the Northern front. This front was formed after the seizure of Archangel by the English, by a landing and principally by an air raid. If we recall our first regiments which fled from Archangel without a fight when the English air squadrons appeared, and compare

it with the army which we have now, that army which is fighting at and defended Petrograd, we may say that during this period we have made a considerable advance. After the fall of Archangel the Northern front moved very little. This is explained by the fact that this front was never a decisive front for us. Operations are conducted there on a very limited territory, that is to say a territory stretching over a tremendous space, but direct military operations are conducted in a defile along the railway and rivers. There are three most important sectors on this front,—Murmansk, the Archangel railway and the Northern Dvina. Although it will be seen from our communique that no great military events have been registered there, I, however, take this opportunity to give credit to the exceptionally heroic work of our soldiers, commanders and commissaries on those fronts. The most difficult climatic conditions prevail there. In the winter there is severe cold and deep snows. Very often it has been necessary to transport guns on sledges when the snow has been breast high. In the spring and in the autumn and even in the summer there is deep mud and bad sanitary conditions. More than this, the Red troops generally are not accustomed to remain inactive, they must advance or else after a long period of inactivity they become demoralised. Our red troops under such difficult conditions have produced such detachments, which, in spite of the immobility of the front have distinguished themselves by extraordinary stubbornness. The North front has also given us not a few excellent regiments, particularly for Petrograd; it has given us a number of excellent commanders and workers. It is sufficient to refer to the present commander of the Western front, comrade Gittis, and the present commander of the N—army, comrade Samoilo.

The task of our Northern army is clear and simple,—to clear our North. There is no doubt that the hour is approaching—and it is not far off—when the N-army will be given a broom sufficiently long to sweep the white guard bands from the White Sea and Murman Coast.

At the present moment we are firmly convinced that the

Northern N-army will not allow the White guards to come to the South, to Petrograd, to Vologda and to sever our Northern Railways. In the Northern army we have, in difficult and unfavourable conditions, an honourable and loyal guardian of the Soviet Republic. (*Applause*).

The Eastern Front.

Our Eastern front represented a very important and at certain periods one of the most decisive fronts of the Soviet Republic. Allow me to acquaint you with some of the figures which are illustrative of the results of our battles. These figures are a good gauge of our victories on the Eastern front.

The result of our fighting for the last year was that our troops have regained for the Soviet Republic 1,194,000 square versts with a population of 15,1880,000 people; this includes neither the territory nor the population of Turkestan, with regard to which even approximate information cannot at the present time be given. Out of this number the Eastern front alone regained for the Soviet Republic up to the 27th November 1,300,000 square versts with a population of 13,213,000 people, — this may be said to be the lion's share of all the gains of the Red Army. Even these figures are out of date by this time, as during the last few days our army has made considerable progress. As you know the chief leadership in all the operations on the Eastern front belong to the present commander-in-Chief, S. S. Kamenev, who is here present before the 7th Congress of Soviets. (*Prolonged applause, all stand up*).

On the Eastern front we began the establishment of our first regular armies near Kazan and Simbirsk in August of last year. Our first important success was crowned with the capture of Orenburg, Uralsk and Ufa, and when we advanced with small intervals until the beginning of the present year, when Kolchak reinforced his army with fresh reserves dealing us a heavy blow, as a result of which our armies had to retreat. Those critical weeks of March and April are well re-

membered; at that time Kolchak's troops reached the middle of the Volga, and were at a distance of 70—80 versts from Kazan and of 30 versts from Spassk on the Volga. The world Stock Exchange recognised Kolchak as the crowned head of a vanquished country. At this time the first great effort was made by the Soviet Government. The party and labour organisations were mobilised in a short time; fresh detachments were established, equipped and trained in record time; the Eastern army was re-inforced by thousands of communists. Generally speaking at that time the construction of our army went on with new energy; administrations for the formation of the army were established at the fronts and were to supplement the work of the All-Russian Chief Headquarters which is carried on under the guidance of O. Rattel. Our work in connection with the political education of the army was doubled and even trebled. Experienced leadership made the results of this apparent at the end of April. In April we began an offensive at Buzuluk, Bugulma and Belebey which during the months of May, June, July and August extended further and further. We soon crossed the Urals, crossed the river Tobol and threw the enemy back to Ishim. In the beginning of October Kolchak made his final effort hurled his last reserves against us. We took up a new position about one to two hundred versts back of the river Tobol and entrenched here firmly. Our troops were soon brought into order again, reinforced and led to a new attack, dealing on this occasion a final blow to Kolchak. All the facts and information received are witness to this. Here is the last communique sent by I. Smirnoff, one of the most prominent workers of our Siberian Armies, the president of the Siberian Revolutionary committee; it is the following effect: «The government of Altai has been siezed by the insurgents. We have sent there a revolutionary committee. The Tomsk and the Yenissey goubernias are in revolt. The insurgents are striking hard at Kolchak. The Army and the Siberian Revolutionary Committee are faced with work of organisation. The watch-word for this winter should be creative work».

Thus, Siberia to a considerable extent is being transferred from the hands of the army into that of Soviet Institutions, party and trade union organisations with a view to cultural Soviet Construction. (*Applause*).

The Turkestan Front.

Our successes at the front have led to the necessity of splitting the Eastern front and of forming the Turkestan front. With capture and retention of Orenburg — and in that district we smashed Kolchak's South Army when 45,000 surrendered to us — we may say that we neared the gate, or better still, the opening of the gate to Turkestan was drawn nearer. The final union of the troops of the Turkestan Front, that is to say of that part of our front which is facing Turkestan, with those troops which were actually stationed in Turkestan, came about, if I am not mistaken, in the middle of September in the district of st. Emba on the Orenburg—Tashkent Railway which is in working order along the whole track. From a technical point of view this line is in working condition; it carried the first trains of cotton and on this line were despatched trainloads of troops to Turkestan. The difficulty here, as everywhere else, is in the absence of fuel; but hope is entertained by the commander of the Turkestan front that this difficulty will be removed by local means.

The Turkestan front has opened before us inexhaustible possibilities.

Our success in the East and the reunion of Turkestan with Soviet Russia has raised the authority of the Soviet Government along the whole oppressed and slave-driven continent of Asia. The first Asiatic ambassador was the Afghanistan Extraordinary Embassy. At the present moment Turkestan is the object of the greatest attention of all the class conscious element of Asia. There, in Turkestan all the leading elements of Asia—of Afghanistan, Belutchistan, Persia, India, China and Corea, all these countries which have suffered and are suffering under the treatment meted out to all colonial and

semi-colonial countries, — will find new means for their national freedom and their social emancipation.

All this, however, is still a question of the future. Our immediate military task in Turkestan is completely to unite this country with Soviet Russia, with the Soviet Republic by a unity of organisation and by a united army; the first piece of business to transact is to organise the partisan detachments and to subject them to one single command. This is a question with which I will deal when I have concluded my report of the fronts.

The Western Front.

It was generally observed that the fate of the Western front was closely connected with the fate of the Soviet Republic. This front — a legacy we inherited from the old Imperialist war — soon after the cessation of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations became most unfavourable to us. After the collapse of German militarism our army represented by the Esthonian, Lithuanian and Lettish White-Russian detachments took the offensive which in the month of March reached its highest stage of development; a considerable part of Esthonia and the greater part of Lettland, Lithuania and White Russia become subject to the government of the working class. These countries formed their own armies. At this moment however the Entente proved capable of arming and throwing against us bourgeois profiteering peasant elements, morally and materially under their influence; a body of people which was formed on the whole of the Western territory of the former Tzarist Empire. In April these white guard elements made an offensive against us. This coincided with Kolchak's offensive in the East and with sharp fighting that took place in the South. We were not in a position to withstand with sufficient success the attacking white armies of Poland, Lettland, Lithuania and Esthonia. In this direction the Labour Government was forced gradually to retreat to the west, surrendering one point after another, including such important centres as Vilna and Riga. It was only with the beginning of September that

this retreat along the whole line on the Western Dwina, from Polotsk to Dwina, and later on along the line of Berezina to Prepiat was stopped. This is where our troops stand at the present moment.

This Western front, which since September remains stationary from the town of Pskov to the South gives us in its northern sector a dramatic picture of cruel fighting which was mentioned by various speakers in connection with various matters. There the question was of Petrograd and its fate, over which the world bourgeoisie gambled. The 7th Army united with the 15th Army at the western front and with the heroic support of the Petrograd workers twice resisted severe attacks upon Petrograd. You have presented them with the Order of the Red Banner (*Applause*). Heavy fighting went on there and the vanguard of the working class profusely expended its heroism, its self-sacrifice, and its life under the most difficult conditions of the cold days of our early winter. The battle field before Petrograd was a real battlefield, and many of our noblest and bravest fighters remained there forever. Our Armies defended Petrograd. At one moment Petrograd was in the gravest danger,—that was the moment when the question of Finland was most acute. How did we act at that time? I could read a few secret army orders and parts of orders which are no longer secret because events with which they are concerned are matters of the past. Of these orders I will mention that given to the 7th Army regarding the Karelia border.

The words of the speaker from the Menshevist group were intended as a warning to the effect that we should not attack small states on the Western front but leave it to their internal powers to decide their own destiny. In reply to this I may say that we never in the least degree intended nor do we intend now to provoke directly or indirectly any of the states which were justly called vassals of the Entente, — and this even in spite of the fact that they provoked us more than once. At the time, comrades, when we stood fighting for the fate of Petrograd on the Pulkoff Heights the Finnish whiteguards subjected our troops to a curtain fire not only from machine

guns but from cannons, in addition to which their armies bombed our territory with dynamite. From the point of view of the so called International law this is a sufficient pretext for a direct declaration of war or even direct attack from our side. After the first period of difficulties had passed, in the second half of September we concentrated in Petrograd and before Petrograd sufficient forces to resist the attacks in the Korelia direction. What was our conduct then? I am here to say and can substantiate my words by official documents, that our order to the Commanfer of the 7th Army with regard to Finland was to the following effect: In spite of the provocation, in spite of the artillery fire, in spite of the numerous single instances of criminal behaviour of the enemy along the whole frontier, the order is to avoid at all cost any counter activity on our side which may give ground for interpretation as a desire or an attempt to attack Finland. Of course, simultaneously with this, measures were taken to make it clear to the Finnish workers that we had no desire to fight Finland, that we were ready at a short distance from Petrograd, to suffer a bourgeois Finland—under the condition that, on its part the Finnish bourgeoisie understands exactly that an independent autonomous Finland can exist at a score of versts from Petrograd only—on the condition that it will never throw its troops into the balance whenever the fate of Petrograd is at stake. I repeat, during the second half of our struggle we were strong enough to make a counter offensive. But we gave orders to the local command saying: «No notice is to be taken of provocation; but should Finland interfere in spite of this, should she cross the borders, should she make an attempt to strike at Petrograd, you are not to limit yourselves to mere resistance, but you are to enter on a counter offensive and follow it up to the end». The army was given an order to make responsible for the attack on Petrograd not only the Finnish bourgeoisie as a whole but every Finnish bourgeois at Vibourg and Helsingfors individually and to treat them as bandits making an attempt upon the Petrograd proletariat.

Our Baltic Fleet covered itself with glory in the battles

at Petrograd in which as comrade Baranoff, himself a seaman and a member of the Revolutionary War Council, said, it not only did all it could and all it should have done, on the water, in its own element, but in a critical moment threw thousands of seaman on to the land who were dispatched to the most dangerous places. (*Applause*).

If we were to summarise our operation on the West front we will say that in spite of the retreat to the line which I indicated, we have increased the territory of the Soviet Republic by 50,800 square versts with a population of more than two millions.

I want to add just a word or two on the Judenitch adventure. His routed army, as it is known has crossed the Esthonian frontier. Our troops are standing almost in a line with Narva which until any possible changes arising from the peace negotiations take place, we regard as the frontier between the Soviet Russian Republic and Esthonia. At this point I want to return to what the representative of the Mensheviks said on this'tribune, who advised us not to attack Esthonia or Finland, a policy which quite falls in with our own. I call his attention to the fact that the Esthonian Government which together with Judenitch attacked us and fought on our territory without any cause includes Esthonian mensheviks. (*Cries of shame*).

Our fight with Judenitch is of instructive interest for Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. We said frankly that from a strategic point of view the Western front is not for us a front of first rate importance, because it is not our strongest front, but we have shown during the Judenitch adventure, that immediately any danger threatens the vital centre of our country from this front our transport apparatus improves sufficiently strong and elastic for the purpose of throwing in the necessary time the necessary number of fighting divisions to the necessary place. However alluring this or that sector of our front may be to our enemies our operations against Judenitch will remain fixed in their memories. They will always remember and keep in view that we can

always find in the centre of the country and on the various fronts a sufficient number of reserves to resist all enemies who attempt to attack Moscow, Petrograd or Tula from whatever point they may threaten, either from Narva, from the Western Dvina, or the Beresina (*Applause*).

The South Front.

Our most decisive and most important front is the South front. In the South, in the Don and Kuban we have our Vendee. The war in the South is the oldest Civil War. It was begun by cossack forces before the Czekho-Slovaks and Kolchak were created as the champions of the Constituent Assembly. In the South at the beginning of this year we delivered a severe, almost fatal blow to the Don cossacks of Krassnoff. Our successes on the South front continued during January, February April and the middle of May. In the middle of May we received a severe blow and began to roll back. This blow was delivered not only by the Don Army. The Denikin volunteer armies of the Northern Caucasus, Kuban and Ukraine joined with it. Only the co-operation of the Kuban and Don volunteer army gave the counter-revolutionaries the balance of power over our troops who in the course of the first four months of this year delivered a severe and fatal blow to the forces of Krassnof and approached to within forty versts of Novocherkassk.

Ukrainian Front.

The South front naturally joined with the Ukrainian front, but by origin the Ukrainian front is not so much connected with the South front as with the West. The Ukrainian front was a heritage from German Imperialism. The existence of the powerful German militarism meant placing our Ukrainian front in a dynamic state. We moved from North to South from Kursk. Our successes here were astonishing. We swept the whole of Ukraine in a short time with insignificant forces.

cooperating with irregulars under the general leadership of comrade Antonoff-Avseyenko. In May we captured the Crimea and in June the Black Sea Coast. The liberation of South Ukraine coincided with the union of the Denikin forces with those of Krasnoff. Our failures on the South front, on the Don and in the Tzaritzin district determined our future failures on the Ukrainian front. In both places the enemy was united. The exceptionally rapid failures in the Ukraine is explained by the same reason for the rapidity of our successes, namely the instability of the Ukraine. The numerous changes of the regime in the Ukraine shattered all social relationship and psychology and converted the vast masses of the peasantry for a prolonged period into more human material for whom it was difficult to crystallise into some form of social whole. This also refers to the non-classconscious sections of the workers. There have been quite ten various regimes in the Ukraine which have changed in the course of two years and the only class that stood firmly on its feet during this period was the Ukrainian «kulaks» who got the best out of all the regimes. Regimes come and regimes go but the kulak remains master of the village. This «kulak» armed himself for he is yet more determined than the middle class peasant and certainly more so than the poor peasants. The Ukrainian «kulak» armed to the teeth and who has outlived all regimes represents an element of anarchy and destruction in all spheres of human society. We can say with conviction that no regime will be able to exist or remain firmly on its feet until the Ukrainian «kulak» will be disarmed. This will be the first task of the troops which enter Ukraine. At the present moment the Ukrainian front merges completely with our South front because the enemy is the same in both places. This enemy is Denikin whom the Ukrainian peasantry have assisted to acquire the Ukraine. We have now a general command and regular detachments of the Red Army. Perhaps there will not be a triumphant march of revolt through the country, because orders have been given to the Ukrainian troops not to occupy a single town or ueszd without suffi-

cient forces for the purpose of securing the position of the local Ukrainian Soviet authorities and to prevent all access to individual, irresponsible bands. (*Applause*). We will move forward according to plan. I say we, because on the strength of an agreement arrived at between the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in June of this year the Ukrainian army and ours is united and the Ukrainian command is united with our command. This will remain in force until the Soviet authorities of the Ukraine will tell us that they are severing this connection. We are convinced that this will never be. We are moving into the Ukraine systematically, firmly and consistently, and the fate of the Ukraine will be decided simultaneously as the fate of the Don Region, after which the fate of Northern Caucasus will also be decided.

Our offensive at the present moment is proceeding altogether quite satisfactorily. Of course, we have not yet covered the same amount of territory which we have covered in the East where our troops in the furthest direction have advanced 1750 versts as the crow flies. In the South we have advanced up to the present 250 versts as the crow flies reckoning from the point which the front occupied at the time when Denikin was North of Orel. The latter offensive developed in the second half of October. We advanced at all points after most savage battles. In the South-Eastern sector of the South front we had success in the first period. After this a slight set back occurred which our high command had good reasons for regarding as temporary. At present we are advancing mostly in the centre and on the right flank, but this arises from the temporary distribution of our and the enemies forces—to strategic combinations of the fronts. At the present moment the balance of forces is on our side, the initiative is in our hands, we have reserves, we have supplies, we have a firm command, in a word we are assured of the complete victory over Denikin and the Southern counter-revolution. (*Applause*).

Comrades, as we are advancing on all fronts with considerable rapidity the picture which I have drawn to a consi-

derable degree refers to the past. I referred to the 27th November and now it is the 6th of December, During this period we have taken the following towns: Oster, Kosoletz, Lebedin, Akhtyrka, Priluki, Lokhvina, Cadiatçh, Graivoron, Pavlovsk, Novo-Oskol, Chotmizhsk and according to information which, however, has not yet been officially confirmed we have taken Bogodukhoff, so that we are now 40 versts from Połtava and the same distance from Kharkoff. (*Applause*). During the interval between the facts I have spoken about today on the South-Eastern front we have taken the following towns: Kalatçh, the station of Novaja Kriusha, the stanitza Bukanovskaya; on the Turkestan front we have taken the fortified position of Uilskaya; on the Eastern front Atbassar, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Pavlodar, Slavgorod and Kainsk.

Denikin and Kolchak.

Denikin, undoubtedly was much more dangerous for us than Koltchak. The more Koltchak was successful and the more he moved to the West, the further he was removed from his base,—from Japan and America and clung to that fine thread of the Siberian Railway. The more Denikin was successful, the nearer he approached to his base England, to the Black Sea ports and to the West fronts, where he tried to establish land connection with the rich sources of supplies—England and France.

The White and the Red Cavalries.

Besides this Denikin was and remains even now rich in a form of arms which is most difficult to create—cavalry. During the Imperialist war of positions, cavalry, however much their work may be valued as an auxiliary arm, in our «light» war; light in the rapidity of advance and retreat, but not in the number of victims which it causes. In our war of manoeuvres cavalry plays a tremendous and often a decisive role. Cavalry cannot be improvised in a short time, it

requires specialised human material, trained horses and a suitable staff of officers. Cavalry officers are usually aristocrats, namely from noble families or from the Don and the Kuban—the home country of cavalry. In every country and almost in every period cavalry has always been the conservative and governmental weapon. In civil war it was always difficult for the revolutionary class to secure cavalry. The army of the great French revolution did not find it easy to secure it. The more so with us. If we take the number of commanders, who fled from the ranks of the Red Army to the White we shall find that a very large percentage of these were cavalry officers; the preponderance of cavalry in the first period of the war rendered great service to Denikin and gave him the possibility of delivering very heavy blows against us. But the Soviet Republic said to the proletariat: «You must get on horseback». It ordered metallists, textile workers, bakers to become cavalry men, and they fulfilled their duty to the Soviet Republic. Side by side with the Red cossacks of whom comrade Poluyan, himself a red Kuban cossack, spoke with just pride, we have cavalry men from the Moscow, Petrograd and Ivano-Vosnessensk and other proletarians. The proletariat fulfilled the order of the Soviet Republic and mounted horses. Our undoubted success in the creation of cavalry proves that the path which has been destined for us, the path of a regular, methodical construction on the basis of military art, which is not casual, which cannot be changed at because it is the reflection of a general technical and other development of humanity in its positive and negative features, has justified itself. Only the combination of revolutionary enthusiasm and correct and methodical organisation will assure the independence and inviolability of our Soviet Republic.

On Partisanship.

Comrades, in connection with this there is a problem, which we shall meet in those territories which the strength

of the Red Army has restored and will restore to the family of the Federative Soviet Republic. I speak of the Ukraine, of the North Caucasus, of Turkestan and Siberia. In all these territories there are large numbers of armed rebels, workers and peasants who are fighting against their own or foreign counter-revolution, and with whom we are coming more and more into direct contact. In the Ukraine we have already come to direct contact with the rebels. In Siberia whole oblasts and governments are being restored to the Soviet Republic as a result of the efforts of these rebels. The same will happen when our South-Eastern front will have—and this will happen soon—delivered a decisive blow to the right flank of Denikin's army. Coming into contact with these rebels we must clearly define our policy towards them, and in this connection, comrades, we have already learned something. Guerilla warfare has its spheres, has its definite line of development. The nucleus of guerilla bands must often spring from the most self-relying, sacrificing elements, workers and revolutionary peasants. Later on other elements gather round, in proportion to their successes. Finally, when these successes become clear and undoubted adventures, bandits and seekers after easy gain, attach themselves to them. Therefore in guerilla warfare we meet with heroism and anarchy, banditism and self-sacrifice and all forms of moral savagery. The longer guerilla warfare continues, the more it becomes confirmed in its irregular state, the more these bands become something like Balkan brigades who fight among each other for the booty of the plundered peasant.

This danger confronts us again in the Ukraine and to a lesser degree in the Northern Caucasus, Siberia and Turkestan. We must right from the start approach this subject armed with all our past experience.

Ukraine must and will be an independent country, the possession of the Ukrainian worker and peasant. (*Applause*). But individual groups of rebels do not represent the personification of the embodiment of the Ukrainian workers and peasants. The Ukrainian proletarian workers and peasants

will express their will in their Soviet government, in their economic and cultural creativeness, and to the extent that this creativeness will develop in the form of an Ukrainian, national culture in the Ukrainian language, it is understood that no one of us will ever attempt, to place any obstacles in the path of the free development of Soviet Ukraine. More than that, for the very reason that the Ukrainian people have been an oppressed people, oppressed by the Imperialist Russifiers, there will yet be for a long time a sensitiveness among them to any thing that might suggest itself as an attack on the Ukrainian language, the Ukrainian school and culture. It would be opposed both to our principles and our present policy either directly or indirectly to touch these susceptibilities. On the contrary as comrade Rakovsky expressed himself, it is necessary to devote all efforts to securing that the Ukrainian language should become the language of communist education of the Ukrainian labour schools. But we must not confuse this question with the question of guerilla fighting. Ukrainian comrades, the question of guerilla fighting is not a question of national culture or language, it is a question of military expediency. There is no difference for us between guerilla warfare in the Ukraine, in Siberian or in Northern Causasus. If we allow the Ukrainian people to retain the hope that they will be able to create any from their irregular bands we shall again encompass the ruin of Soviet Ukraine from which she will not be able to emerge for a long time. How will it be? We have said that there are various elements in the guerilla detachments and of varying importance. The guerilla detachments having reached our main front should now go to the rear for the purpose of undergoing a thorough internal reformation. All the bad elements should be weeded out, and the best elements must be subjected to the necessary training and discipline. We have given direct orders to the army to the effect that when they come into contact with irregulars not to accept a single detachment or a single volunteer in the active sections of the army without having undergone a preliminary train-

ing in the reserves at the rear. If a genuine volunteer, an honest worker or peasant desires to fight for the cause of the working class, he will make the sacrifice and agree to go into a reserve batallion in order to receive within a month the drilling, the tactical and political training which is given to the Red Army. If he does not agree to do this, than it proves that in the guise of volunteer we have a bandit whose only object to get into the army is to plunder, to violate and to ruin the Ukrainian peasant. For these there can be no place in our ranks. I have no doubt that with the complete approval and support of all that is class-conscious and honest in Ukraine, of all the advanced workers and peasants, we will by means of our organised military power conduct a firm and undeviating policy with regard to guerilla war. Makhno of course represents a danger for Denikin to the extent that Denikin dominates the Ukrain, but at the same time he has betrayed the Ukraine to Denikin. On the morrow of the liberation of the Ukraine Makhno will become a mortal danger to the worker and peasant government. Comrades Makhnoism is not a production of Ukrainian national culture. No, it is a Ukrainian national ulcer which must be pierced once for ever. (*Applause*).

Conclusion.

These, comrades, are the considerations which I can submit to you in connection with our military constructive work in the rear and in connection with the work of our Red Regiments of the front. All this allows us to believe that the genuine preparative work that is being conducted assures us not a chance, passing victory, but is the pledge of a complete and final victory on all fronts and directly on our most dangerous front, the South front.

Consequently we are justified in arriving at the conclusion that the Soviet regime has created an Army after its own kind and that this army has learned to conquer. This, comrades allows us to estimate all our work in the past and all our

constructive work in the future. Every one of us knows that an army is not something that is outside of society, but reflects all the strength and weaknesses of its organisation. Why do the working classes hate militarism? Because under the bourgeois and aristocratic system the Army is the crowning evidence of their domination, because the domination of the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy in the military sphere assumes a particularly outstanding, sharp and difficult form. The economic dependence of the peasant and the workers on his master is in the army converted into subordination of the worker and peasant soldier to the bourgeois and aristocratic officer. This subordination is not only military but also social and class. The exterior form and democratic framework of the French Republic deceives the masses, and in the army democratic phrases are developed for the purpose the more surely to enslave the French workers in uniform in the interests of the French stock Exchange. Everywhere, no matter in what country, the army reflects the social relations existing there, no matter what they may be. It translates the main features of the social and governmental regime into the clear and sharp language of its general staff. Consequently it is historically true that war is terrible, but is true also that war is a genuine test of the strength of a given social organism. Of course, it is possible that a healthy organism will be destroyed in a war if larger material forces are brought against it. But it is impossible, comrades, for a decaying, dying organism ever to create a strong, fighting army. This is a conclusion at which we arrive.

I again recall our discussions of the 22 nd April of last year at our Central Executive Committee and to-day's declaration of the opposition parties and compare these two in mind. We were told on the 22 nd April by Martoff «you will not create an army, because the foundation is rotten», but we created an army. To-day Martoff says we have shown our strength in the military and diplomatic spheres, in which we have shown that we are up to our tasks». I assure you that I speak without any ulterior motive, without the shadow of irony

when I say that I had a feeling of joy when Martoff said of our army—and of our international struggles «we» because by that he added a certain amount of intellectual and political strength to our work; and strength is what we need. But in his declaration he said: «despotism, anarchy, collapse, dying Soviet institutions and dying constitution». I ask every one of you how can a regime such as is described in Martoff's declaration a regime of despotism, of anarchy and of dying Soviet institutions, succeed in creating an army which according to Martoff's own confession is efficient, an army against which there are not «fourteen» enemies as Churchill said—I attempted to count these, by nationality, and found there were twenty one,—but as a matter of fact there is only one—the International Counter-revolution and world bourgeoisie. In the struggle against this our Red army has proved itself powerful and efficient. This is recognized by those opponents who a year and a half ago said: «You will not create an army». How is it possible not to say so, when this army on a length of 9—10 thousands versts, defeats an enemy, mobilised and armed by world capitalism. Yes, we created this army, and who are we? The workers and peasants, the bearers of the Soviet system. They created it. Consequently, that system which gave birth to the army, which supported and sustains it—is a strong and healthy system. There are deficiencies, shortcomings and fissures in the system. It is easy to point a finger at it. The Soviet mechanism and its Constitution is not working locally because the best forces of the Moscow Soviet and Petrograd Soviet and all the Soviets of Russia are fighting and dying at the front. We confess that in dying they violate this or that paragraph of the constitution, but we console ourselves with the fact that they are saving the Soviet Republic and the Revolution. The army which you have created is flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone. This is our living and armed Soviet Constitution, because our soldiers are fighting and dying under the battle-cry of «Long Live Soviet Russia. Long Live the World-wide Labour Republic». (*Continued Applause*).



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