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Outline of Historical Method



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OUTLINE
OF
Historical Method

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

WE shall have better history teaching when we have better trained teachers; and we shall have the trained teachers when the teachers themselves, and those who employ them, realize that history can be taught only by those who have been prepared for the work.

As the matter stands to-day, it is the popular belief that any intelligent person may teach a class in history without special training, or, with no other knowledge than general information, may participate in a discussion upon methods of teaching history and what the object of historical study is. It is not an uncommon thing for a college graduate, who has devoted all his time to Greek and Latin, or to science, to have a class in history assigned to him. He may not be particularly pleased with the assignment, but it does not strike him as at all incongruous. While, on the other hand, no good high school principal would assign a class in Greek to a man who had not been trained for that work. What is the reason for this distinction? It is not far to seek. As history has been taught, and is still taught, in the high school, no special training is necessary. Any bright man can read over the lesson and hear the class recite it. The large majority of history teachers never engaged in a bit of original research and

have no more idea of what constitutes history a science than has the intelligent public outside the school room.

This unscientific spirit crops out of all the discussions in teachers' associations and of most of the articles in educational papers.

The reasons so commonly given to justify the study of history can be traced to the same source. Instead of studying history for the same reason that we study botany or chemistry, that is, for its own sake, we must study it for the ethical training it gives, for its power of forming character, and so on *ad infinitum*. Now, history is not ethics, and it claims a right to an independent existence. It deals with the evolution of man in society, and no further reason need be given to justify the study of history than the necessity of knowing how that evolution has taken place. If the teachers of history can be induced to see how rational this view of their work is, one long step will have been taken toward improving the work.

But what is this training that the teacher must have, if better work is to be done and if history is to take its place by the side of Latin, Greek, mathematics, and the sciences as a disciplinary study? She must learn what the process is by which an historical narrative is constructed, and she must go through that process herself. She can no more become a satisfactory teacher of history without this training than she could become a successful teacher of chemistry without laboring with her own hands in the laboratory. It is difficult to

make the teachers realize this, but if the crusade for better history teaching is to succeed, they must realize it.

This subject of how history is written, I have treated in a general manner elsewhere; it is my intention to treat it now more in detail. But before taking up the successive steps in the construction of an historical narrative, I wish to point out the differences between the historical method and the method employed in the natural sciences.

In the natural sciences, the so-called method of direct observation is made use of. The object itself is studied directly either with the naked eye or with the microscope. Not one observation but many are made and under the most favorable circumstances. The observations thus made are recorded at once, and in exact, scientific language, the meaning of which is not ambiguous. But scientific truth is not established by the work of one man. Other scientists must make similar observations and obtain like results before these results can be accepted as fully demonstrated. It is only necessary to recall the controversy over the supposed discovery of a cure for consumption by Dr. Koch, of Berlin, to make clear how exacting the scientists are, and how difficult it is to establish a new truth beyond the possibility of doubt.

Is the historical process similar to this? Not at all. It is quite different. History deals with the past. It may be the past of this morning, of the war with Spain, or of the Persian wars

of Greek history, but it is always the past. Yet it is not with the past in an indefinite way that history has to do. It is with the past in which human society has developed and the problem with which it deals is this: How has the present complex, world-society been evolved from the primitive, disconnected beginnings of four or five thousand years ago? It is its business to reconstruct the process and to describe the successive steps. When it has done that, it has done its whole duty.

But how does it perform this duty? What is its method? It cannot be the method of direct observation, the method of the natural sciences, and the reason is very plain; the objects are not here to be observed. The past can be known to us only through its records, technically called the sources. These sources are of two kinds; material remains and traditions. The remains are all of those things that were actually part and parcel of the life of past generations; bodies of men, clothing, weapons, houses, roads, bridges, newspapers, letters, coins, etc. This subdivision of the sources will be better appreciated if a list be made of the material objects that will form the sources for the history of our own society. One of the characteristics of modern historical method is the increase in the variety of the source material. Some of our most valuable information is drawn from material that past generations never thought of putting to such a use.

The other main division of source material is tradition. It is of three kinds; oral, written,

and pictorial. Pictorial tradition has attained a great significance in our generation and a great value that it did not formerly possess. This change is due to photography. For the historian of the Napoleonic era, the great war scenes by French contemporary artists are of little value; while for the historian of our war with Spain, the snap-shots taken by the camera of a war correspondent will form the most valuable source material.

Oral tradition is the least reliable of all. It is the account of an event that has passed from lip to lip and has been handed down from one generation to another. It soon becomes utterly unreliable and worthless, although it may have been very valuable when it came from the lips of the eye witness.

The written tradition, upon which the historian chiefly relies for his knowledge of the thoughts and acts of men in the past, if it be a source, contains the record of what has been seen or heard by an eye or ear witness.

This is the material with which the historian works. He observes it directly, it is true, but what he observes is not the event, not the object, but the record of an observation made upon that object. And what an observation it often is! Made, perhaps, by an incompetent person, who, at the time, had no intention of recording it, it is onesided and incomplete, and written down so long after the event that what little value it originally had has been materially impaired, if not wholly destroyed. Add to this, the fact that it is expressed in unscientific

language, and some of the difficulties of the problem will be clear. What would be the value to the chemist of a series of experiments, if,—to borrow the illustration of a French writer,—his knowledge of them were based upon the accidental observations of the janitor of the laboratory? Not only, then, is the historian of the remote past unable to observe the events directly, “but it is very rare that the documents of which he makes use contain exact observations. He cannot, moreover, make use of the records of observations scientifically established, that, in the other sciences, may, and often do, take the place of direct observation.”

His method must be that of *indirect observation*. He starts with the record and attempts to work his way back to the fact, to see the fact as the observer saw it. The fact is the goal of his efforts, not the starting point, as in the work of the natural scientist. The documents that form the starting point for the historian are nothing more “than the traces of psychological operations.” In order to infer from the document the fact that gave rise to it, the student of history must retrace the whole series of psychological operations that lay between the fact and the written record of the observation, retracing them in the inverse order, beginning with the document.

The object of the procedure is to establish the genuineness of the document and the value of the observations. If the document is not genuine, we need not take it into account; and

an observation is practically useless until it has been localized, that is, until we know *when* it was made, *where* it was made, and by *whom* it was made.

From this crucible of criticism, the contents of a document come forth separated into single affirmations, each affirmation bearing the mark of its value. This is the foundation work that places in the hands of the historian observations similar to those possessed by the scientist, but seldom, if ever, as exact or as valuable. The work of historical criticism is *extremely difficult, but absolutely necessary*.

It is, however, the portion of method to which the least attention is paid in our colleges, although it is the best developed part of method. The natural credulity of the human mind leads the student and the historian, too, for that matter, to accept with the faith of a child the evidence that comes to them, and to utilize observations without having first localized them. Here is where the reform must begin. The student must be taught that "historical work is critical work *par excellence*," and that he is sure to fail if he undertakes it without having been previously put on his guard against his natural instinct to accept without examination anonymous information and to utilize good, bad, and indifferent documents without distinction. This work should be done in the colleges; it is very seldom that it is done there.

In future papers I shall give a more detailed

treatment of criticism. My purpose at this time is to bring out the characteristic feature of historical method, namely, that of *indirect observation* and to distinguish it from the *direct observation* of the natural sciences.

As the material with which the historian deals consists largely of "the traces of psychological operations," it is perfectly clear that the student of history must have at least a working knowledge of psychology. Much good history, it might be said, was written before such a science as psychology existed. True, but it was written by men who through introspection knew much about the workings of their own minds, and through experience much about the workings of their fellows' minds. They applied this to their work, sometimes consciously, more often unconsciously. To-day, in addition to his own introspective study and his experience, the student of history has at his disposal scientific treatises upon the operations of the human mind, and is taught to apply this knowledge consciously in his work. Without such a training, he is unable to trace the mental process by which an observation is made, and thus determine its value; without such a training, he is unable to control his own mental operations when he attempts to imagine the event described by the witness. The more conscious these processes become, the more likely are they to become exact and scientific.

The teacher of history, then, should be a constant student of herself, observing carefully every mental process that has any relation to

historical method; through reading and travel, she should enlarge her experience, and, finally, she should systematize her psychological knowledge by the careful study of some good work on psychology.

Psychology is as likely to throw as much light upon the problems of history teaching as it has already thrown upon those of historical method. It teaches the student of history that "the eye sees in an object what the eye brings power of seeing," and the student of history, become the teacher of history, knows that the boys and girls in her classes can acquire a knowledge of past society from the sources just so far as their knowledge of present society has given the eye power to see, and no further. We know that this mass of knowledge has been acquired unconsciously and to a very large extent has been used unconsciously. One of the innovations of the future in history teaching will be the care for the systematic acquisition through direct observation of such knowledge of existing society as will enable the young student to understand the past. This work must be done in the early years and lay the foundation for the study of ancient society. It has long been a question as to whether history study should begin with ancient history or with the history of the locality in which the child lives. Psychology would seem to have answered this question once for all. It says the child can begin in but one way, and that is by the direct observation of the society in which it lives. When through this direct observation

the eye has acquired the "power of seeing," the attention may then be turned to the societies of the past that may be studied only indirectly and by the light of the knowledge that has been acquired. Some excellent suggestions for this direct observation of society will be found in one of the chapters of Professor Mace's book on Method. It is, to my mind, the most important chapter in the book.

If this chapter, and those that follow, accomplish what I hope they may accomplish, the teacher that reads them and needs their help will not accept on trust the statements that I have made, but will proceed to test them, and by so doing make the truths they contain her own property. Let her satisfy herself by dealing with source material (accounts of the battle of Manila by eye witnesses—August *Century*) that the method of the historian must be that of *indirect observation*; let her see, at the same time, how necessary to her work a *knowledge of psychology* is, and if she has not already done so, let her take up the study of the subject; and last of all let her convince herself of the need of a *systematic study of existing society* by her young pupils, and learn from the examination of the life of the village or city in which she lives what fascinating material for direct observation lies unused around her. Such effort will give her a new insight into the nature of historical work, and will enable her to become a valued helper in the crusade for the better teaching of history.

CHAPTER II.

SOURCES, BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND AUXILIARY SCIENCES.

IN the preceding chapter, I emphasized the fact that to teach history successfully one must know how to study history scientifically. It is then with the subject of Historical Method—the method of *studying* and *not* the method of *teaching* history—that this and the following chapters will have to do.

There has always been more or less method in the way in which history has been studied and written, but for a long time this method was largely unconscious. This is established by the fact that only in our generation has a literature of any size, containing treatises upon method of considerable length, come into existence. But one work has come down to us from the Greeks, Lucian's "How Should History be Written," and this treatise deals, for the most part, with the artistic form of the historical narrative. Rome and the Middle Ages contributed practically nothing to method. In fact, the period of the Middle Ages represented a reaction in historical writing. A new era began with the Renaissance.

The awakening of interest in the past, that was one of the characteristics of the Renaissance, contributed largely to the development of historical method. Men must gather material and experiment with it for generations

before the data for a work on method can be gathered. Now the first modern treatises on method were preceded by many generations of practical work; by the publication of great collections of sources, with critical notes and aids of various kinds. Then appeared the first attempt to describe the method by which the work was done. But before our day the works were few; they appeared at long intervals and were incomplete in their treatment of method. Each work, however, contributed something, and every time the attempt to formulate the rules of historical science was renewed, there was a broader base to build upon, as each man studied the work of his predecessors before doing his own.

Of the works produced in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, there are a few that stand out from among the rest: those of the Frenchman Bodin, "*Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem*" (1566); of the German Voss, "*Ars historica*" (1623); of the Frenchman Mabillon, "*De re diplomatica*" (1681); of the Frenchman Du Fresnoy, "*Méthode pour étudier l'histoire*" (1713); of the Italian Vico, "*Principi della scienza nuova*" (1725).

In our century, the quality of work has increased and the quality improved. The Germans were the leaders, and the most important works are those of Wachsmuth, "*Entwurf einer Theorie der Geschichte*" (1820); of Droysen "*Grundriss der Historik*" (1867)—published in this country in a translation by Andrews;

Gervinus, "Grundzüge der Historik" (1837); Lorenz "Die Geschichtswissenschaft" (1886, 1891); of Dolci, the Italian, "Sintesi di scienza storica" (1887); and of the Englishman Freeman, "The Methods of Historical Study" (1886).

Up to 1889, these were the most important treatises that had appeared on method. They dealt with the subject in a summary way—many of the works being only pamphlets—and often treated only parts of method instead of the whole. There was need of a work that should gather up these partial results, combine them, and attempt to present them in a systematic and detailed manner. Such a work was published by Bernheim in 1889. The title is "Lehrbuch der historischen Methode." It contains six hundred pages and describes in detail all the steps in the construction of an historical narrative. The book marks an epoch. For the first time a real text-book on method had been produced. In 1897 a more popular work was published in France by Langlois and Seignobos, entitled, "Introduction aux études historiques." Although the work does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatise like that of Bernheim, yet certain divisions of the subject are dealt with in a much more satisfactory manner and really supplement the work of Bernheim.

Besides these two hand-books treating of the whole subject, many monographs, or partial studies, have been published, so that the literature upon method has become one of quite respectable size, and can not be neglected by any serious student of history.

But what is the result of all this study by so many centuries of historians?

A conscious operation in the treatment of historical material, an understanding of what has already been accomplished, and a pretty fair appreciation of what remains to be done. As yet, the form in which the results are presented has not been fixed by tradition; but there is a quite general agreement as to the subject matter and order of arrangement, although there is some disagreement as to the nomenclature to be employed.

Bernheim, after an introduction dealing with such questions as the definition of history, the relation of history to other sciences, and the possibility of attaining scientific certainty in historical study, divides his work into four parts: (1) *Quellenkunde*, treating of bibliography, source collections, and the auxiliary sciences; (2) *Kritik*, treating of the genuineness of the sources, their origin and value, of the establishment of historical fact, and the arrangement of the facts established; (3) *Auffassung*, dealing with the interpretation and grouping of facts, with their physical, psychical, and social environment, and with the philosophy of history; (4) *Darstellung*, or the formulation of the results obtained in the preceding investigation.

The grouping of Langlois and Seignobos is somewhat simpler. Their work is divided into three parts: (1) *Les connaissances préalables*, or preliminary knowledge, equivalent to Bernheim's *Quellenkunde*; (2) *Opérations analyt-*

iques, embracing criticism, interpretation, and establishment of the facts; (3) *Opérations synthétiques*, or combination of the facts and constructive reasoning together with the presentation of results.

There is one important difference between the arrangement of Bernheim and that of Langlois and Seignobos; in the first, interpretation follows the establishment of the fact; in the last, it precedes it. With that exception, there is substantial agreement in the arrangement of the two works.

It would be safe to say then, that, whatever title may be given to the parts, a work on method naturally falls into three or four parts; four, if the narrative, or presentation of the results, forms an independent division.

A moment's thought will show that all this is nothing more than a careful description of the procedure of the student of history from the time that he selects his subject for investigation until he commits the results of this investigation to paper. It is my intention in this chapter and the following to sketch rapidly the successive steps in this procedure as they are described in the works just referred to. I hope that it may be helpful to teachers that have not access to these works or who would be unable to read them. If they would draw the greatest benefit from this study, let them follow the process step by step, investigating some historical topic in accordance with the method described. Let them repeat the process again and again, and careful scientific work will soon become second nature.

The rest of this chapter will be devoted to what Bernheim calls *Quellenkunde* and Langlois and Seignobos, *Connaissance préalable*.

Sources were defined in the preceding chapter, and Bernheim's classification of them under remains and tradition was given. It is clear that, if there are no sources, no history can be written. If a student is desirous of investigating a subject, he asks himself the questions: "Are there any sources? What are they? Where are they?" If there are no sources, the subject, however interesting, can not, of course, be investigated. Great masses of source material are being destroyed in various ways every day. On a recent tour of investigation in France, I learned in two places, at St. Martin, on the Ile de Ré, and at Saintes, on the neighboring mainland, that valuable archives, containing sources for which I was seeking, had recently been destroyed by fire. It is a common thing in the course of an investigation to run across traces of sources that once existed and perhaps exist to-day, but can not be found. Often sources are known to be hidden in private archives, to which access is denied.

But even when the student knows that sources exist and where they exist, his work is often rendered difficult by the fact that his sources are scattered and a use of them would oblige him to make long journeys. His work will be lightened if a government has acquired all of this material and placed it in a central depot. It will be lightened even more if this manu-

script material has been published and he can study it comfortably by his own fireside. While the study of written tradition may thus be made easy, there are certain kinds of source material that can be studied only upon the spot. An exact copy of a manuscript may be studied even more satisfactorily than the manuscript itself, but neither photographs of an historical spot, nor descriptions of it, nor both, will do for the student what direct observation will do.

But whether he can only study at home or can also go abroad, it behooves the student of history to make the acquaintance of the great source collections that have been published by governments, associations, and individuals. The contemporary histories of Greece and Rome have been carefully edited in the original Greek or Latin, and also translated into English. The Greek and Roman inscriptions have been gathered up from every side, carefully restored and published. Hundreds of specialists are engaged in making public the Latin sources of the Middle Ages, and the sources of the later periods composed in the language of the various peoples. Some periods have been thoroughly worked, while others are still almost virgin soil. So difficult is much of this work, so nice and varied the skill required of the worker, that many men do nothing but this: they simply prepare the sources that others may make use of them. Historical work is becoming every year more differentiated, and to make it successful the heartiest co-operation must exist among the workers.

The source collections of which I have been writing are made up of complete documents, narratives, etc. There are other source collections of a more elementary character, composed of short typical documents and of extracts from narrative sources. These are for the use of beginners. The new method of history work has called into existence a large amount of this material. From Harvard University have come extracts and documents on United States History; from the University of Pennsylvania, "Original Sources of European History;" from the University of Michigan, sources of English History; from the University of Indiana, sources of European History; and from the University of Nebraska, sources of European and American History.

But suppose that there are sources and that they are accessible, how does the student learn what they are and where they are? It is the work of bibliography to tell him this.

After the subject for investigation has been selected, his first step is to seek for a book that will answer these two questions for him. Such a work is not always to be found. Bibliography is not in an advanced stage of development. The larger number of works upon which the student must depend are out of date and others are thoroughly unscientific. In many of them, no distinction is made between sources and narratives based upon the sources, and, for the most part, when the sources are enumerated there is nothing to indicate their contents nor the value of the contents. The

most of this work the advanced student is obliged to do for himself. Historical study will be much easier when good bibliographies have been prepared.

Although he may have learned what the sources are that he needs, the student is often in ignorance of the whereabouts of his sources, especially if they consist of rare printed books or manuscripts. Here bibliography might help him, but it seldom does. The large and wealthy libraries *ought* to have the books and certain archives *should* contain the manuscripts. But books and manuscripts are not always where they should be, and even when they are they are very often not catalogued.

Yet however incomplete these bibliographical aids are, they are all we have and are improving rapidly each day. The student that does not know how to make use of them will find himself badly handicapped. A most helpful little book upon historical bibliography was recently published in Paris. The author is Langlois and the title *Manuel de bibliographie historique*.

When the student, through the use of bibliography, has succeeded in reaching the sources, he finds that his work can not go on without the use of one or more auxiliary sciences. It may be a manuscript that he has before him, and it may be incumbent upon him to determine its genuineness before using it. The performance of such a task would call for a knowledge of *palaeography*, or the science of writing, of *diplomatics*, or the science of documents, and

perhaps several others. If it is known that the document is genuine, the student must at least have a knowledge of the language in which it is written in order to interpret it. For some periods, such a knowledge is not easy to acquire. The investigator in the fields of Grecian, Roman, or Mediaeval History must have a knowledge of *philology*, or the science of language. He must be acquainted with all the changes that take place in the meaning of a word in order to understand how it is used at a particular time. When the student comes to criticise his sources, and to determine their value, he finds that a knowledge of *psychology* is necessary; in arranging his facts, he must make use of *chronology*; in combining them, of *logic*; in forming the background, he is aided by *geography*, *ethnology*, *economics*, and *sociology*; and in searching for the deeper meanings of historical development, by *philosophy*. These are the most important of the auxiliary sciences. There are, of course, many others, determined by the peculiar nature of the subject investigated.

It would appear, then, that historical investigation is neither easy nor simple. And why should it be? It has to do with the most difficult and complex of subjects—the evolution of man in society. We are just coming to a realization of the magnitude of the task to be accomplished in correctly tracing this evolution, and of the only way in which it may be accomplished. The uninitiated are accustomed to sneer at the specialist in history who con-

fines himself to a limited field and works it thoroughly. But it is the sneer of ignorance. Such specialization in the natural sciences is taken as a matter of course. We must learn that the same reasons make specialization imperative in historical sciences. Without specialization, we can not advance.

Special study and comprehensive views of history are not irreconcilable things. Every scientific investigator will not only know first hand the results obtained in his own part of the field, but he will know second hand the results obtained in other parts of the field. Specialization can be dangerous only when the specialist fails to keep in touch with the greater whole of which his work is only a part.

If the student, supplied with the necessary knowledge of the auxiliary sciences, has been able, through the aid of bibliography, to find the sources that he seeks, his next step will be to decide how much of these sources can be admitted as evidence on the subject under investigation. To settle that question is the province of Criticism or Kritik.

CHAPTER III.

EXTERNAL CRITICISM; GENUINENESS OF THE SOURCE.

BERNHEIM'S KRITIK, the second division of Method, covers practically the same ground as Langlois, and Seignobos' *Opérations analytiques*. The subdivisions of the former are External Criticism, Internal Criticism, and Critical Arrangement of the Material; of the latter, External Criticism and Internal Criticism.

External Criticism, Bernheim subdivides into: Testing the Genuineness, Localization of the Source, and Editing; Langlois and Seignobos, into Criticism of Restoration, Criticism of Origin, Critical Classification of the Sources, and Criticism of Erudition and the Erudites.

The ground covered in both works is practically the same, Bernheim being, of course, more technical and detailed, while Langlois and Seignobos, in their interesting chapter on "La critique d'érudition et les érudits," deal with a subject not treated by Bernheim, or, rather, treat it from a different point of view.

In this chapter, I shall consider the first subdivision of External Criticism, the Testing of the Genuineness of the Source.

The first question that the historian puts to the sources that he has brought together is "Are they genuine? Or, subdividing the question, he asks, "Are they what they appear

to be?" (forgery), and "Are they what I think they are?" (self-deception). In the first case, the trouble lies with the source; in the second case, with the historian. A lack of criticism in the first case would lead us to use material that should not be used; a lack of criticism in the second case, or it may be hypercriticism, would cause us to reject material that should be used. The historian should guard against these two errors.

Man is naturally credulous. It is much easier to believe what we hear than to sift the evidence in order to find out the truth. This last process is so unnatural that few men will undertake it unless it is absolutely necessary. Criticism is often a thankless task, for its results are frequently negative, forcing the historian to throw aside as worthless what he has gathered with so much difficulty.

The critical attitude toward the sources has been a product of time. Although it has reached its fullest development in our day, there were historians among the Greeks whose attitude was in some respects strikingly modern. Speaking of the credulous spirit, Thucydides said (I., 20): "For men receive alike without examination from each other the reports of past events, even though they may have happened in their own country. * * * With so little pains is the investigation of truth pursued by most men; and they rather turn to views already formed." Referring to his own methods of investigation, he wrote (I., 22): "But with regard to the facts of what was done in this

war, I do not presume to state them on hearsay from any chance informant, nor as I thought probable myself, but those at which I was personally present, and, when informed by others, only after investigating them accurately in every particular, as far as was possible."

Many passages from the histories of Polybius (I., 14; XII., 17-22) show that his attitude toward the sources was decidedly critical.

But I recall nothing that would indicate that either of these writers carried their skepticism so far as to doubt the genuineness of the material that fell into their hands. They dealt more with what we call to-day Internal Criticism. Even here Thucydides was not consistent, but attempted to make a rational narrative out of the myths of the Iliad, gravely discussed the reasons for Agamemnon's leadership in the Trojan War, and knew the contents of the sealed letter sent by Pausanias to the Persian king, Xerxes. In a word, the critical method was not thoroughly conscious and scientific.

The Greeks left us nothing in the writing of history but the work of Lucian, referred to in the preceding chapter. The Romans did not accomplish as much as the Greeks, and the man of the Middle Ages was incapable of doing critical work. With the Renaissance, the forward movement began again and from rational criticism the scholars of the following period passed rapidly to hypercriticism. In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the Jesuit Harduin, disturbed by the large amount of forged material that he encountered, went so far as "to deny

the entire foundation of our historical knowledge, and to reject as forged a long series of historical works and documents: Pindar, Thucydides, Dionysius, Diodorus, Strabo, Josephus, Varro, Livy, Terence, Virgil, Horace, Eusebius, Cassiodorus, etc."

A reaction naturally set in against this extreme view, leading to the present rational attitude of carefully testing all material and "holding fast that which is good." This is the solid foundation of External Criticism, upon which modern historical science is built.

But it is not surprising that the man of the Renaissance were led into hypercriticism. The highways and byways of history are strewn with forgeries. Every kind of source material can point to its famous examples. Some of these cases are well known to others than the special student of history.

A long list of forgeries could be made under the head of Remains. This practice of fabricating relics of the past and, for various reasons, passing them off as genuine has been continued down to our own day. Two of the most famous of those perpetrated in the nineteenth century are described by Bernheim; the first was the Moabite pottery, the second the Sardinian literature, or "Parchments of Arborea."

After the discovery, in 1866, of the Mesa stone with its invaluable inscription, in the land of Moab, there appeared for sale by a dealer in antiquities at Jerusalem certain old Hebrew inscriptions similar to that on the Mesa stone. In the spring of the year 1872, there appeared

at the same place certain pieces of pottery and later in the year vases, urns, etc., with inscriptions and drawings, 2,000 pieces in all. The articles were brought to Jerusalem by an Arab, Selim, who had been in the employ of European excavators. The dealer in Jerusalem was charged with fraud, and, in company with those interested, went to the place indicated by Selim and found other articles of the same nature. Although criticism was not silenced, many of the articles were bought, at the advice of German savants, for the Berlin Museum. Careful criticism has shown that the articles are counterfeits and that the work was probably done by the Arab Selim.

The Sardinian forgery is even more interesting. In 1863-65, there was published in Italy a series of letters, biographies, poems, and other literary fragments, supposed to have been composed in the island of Sardinia in the period from the eighth to the fifteenth centuries. The original manuscripts were of parchment and paper. The find created a great sensation, for it was not known that such a state of culture had ever existed in Sardinia. The originals, after publication, were deposited in the library at Cagliari. As a heated discussion had arisen in Italy over the genuineness of the material, some of the originals were submitted to the Academy of Sciences at Berlin for criticism. Jaffé investigated the material of the manuscripts and the handwriting; Tobler, the language and literature; Dove, the historical contents. They established, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the material was forged.

The Forged Decretals, the Gift of Constantine, the poems of Ossian and Chatterton are forgeries known to every school boy.

Marie Antoinette suffered much at the hands of the forger. The historian of the French Revolution who attempts to write the life of this unfortunate woman is confronted at the very threshold of his work with the question, "How many of the letters attributed to her were really written by her?" The famous collections of her letters by Feuillet de Conches and Count d' Hunolstein contain a great mass of forgeries. A glance at the introduction to the first volume of the collection by La Rocheterie and DeBeaucourt (Paris, 1895) will give some idea of what a Herculean labor the determination of the genuineness of the material may become.

In 1895 a work entitled, "The Journal of a Spy in Paris during the Reign of Terror," purporting to have been written in 1794 by one Raoul Hesdin, was printed in London by the reputable firm of John Murray. The editor did not give his name, did not state where the manuscript was found, nor where it could be seen by the skeptical.

The work received little attention on this side of the Atlantic. The American Historical Review (July, 1896) remarked that "the unsatisfactory point about *The Journal* is that no evidence is given of its authenticity," but no attempt was made to prove by a study of its contents that the work was a forgery. This was successfully undertaken by the English Historical Review in the July number of 1896. It is a good example

for the student of history to study. The work was shown to be a forgery.

This case is the more interesting as the anonymous editor attempted to defend himself by anonymous letters written to the Athenaeum. Although the work is a forgery, it is a clever forgery, and it would be well worth the while of the historical student to give it some study. The absence of the manuscript rendered, of course, the work of detection much more difficult than it otherwise would have been.

The question of the authenticity of the so-called "Casket Letters" of Mary Queen of Scots is still an unsettled question. The appearance of the *Mémoires* of Talleyrand a few years ago raised a discussion upon their genuineness that lasted for more than a year. The manuscript of Talleyrand was not to be found; it had probably been destroyed. The existing manuscript was a copy made by Bacourt. This gentleman had formerly edited the correspondence between Mirabeau and De Lamarck, and had taken great liberties with it. This rendered the critics suspicious, and they were naturally desirous to know why the original manuscript had been destroyed and how much of the *Mémoires* was the work of Talleyrand and how much the work of Bacourt. They will probably never know.

In 1897, the *English Historical Review* and the German *Historische Zeitschrift* contained interesting critical articles on a series of secret reports on the French Revolution published in the *Dropmore Papers*.

The *Mémoires de Weber* on the French Revolution is largely the work of Lolly-Tollendal, and it is claimed that the Comte de Ségur wrote the *Mémoires de Besenval*. And so the list might be continued indefinitely. Besides the injury done by treating forged material as if it were genuine, as great an injury may be done by treating genuine material as if it were forged. Bernheim gives a number of interesting illustrations of this kind of error. The mistake is due to ignorance. During the first half of this century, quite a number of mediaeval sources were set aside as forgeries, but have since been recognized as genuine.

Enough has been written, I take it, to make clear the necessity of testing the genuineness of sources before using them. It is now in order to say a word about how this is done.

Apart from the genius that characterizes the most successful criticism, the indispensable preparation for this work is the acquisition of a fund of detailed knowledge concerning the source material of the period in which the forgery is supposed to have originated. Such a fund is not the property of the novice, and only the veteran knows how difficult of acquisition it is, how much time and patience and skill are expended in securing it.

The investigation of the genuineness of a source is little more than a series of comparisons systematically conducted. The suspected source forms a part of the remains that have come down to us from some previous age. If it be genuine it will be in harmony with all the

other sources of that period and bear the marks common to all the culture products of that age. A simple statement of this fact will make clear that as difficult as it may be to detect a forgery, it is even more difficult for a forgery to escape detection if the critic possesses an adequate knowledge of the period concerned.

The critic deals first with the form of the document, with the writing, language, style, and composition. Palaeography and philology have obtained such a development that he would indeed be the prince of forgers who could successfully imitate the language and writing of past ages and deceive the critics. To reproduce successfully the style of a certain man of a certain age, would be even more difficult were it not for the fact that this part of criticism has been but little developed. The success of this sort of thing is due to the ignorance of the critic rather than to the skill of the forger. A growth of knowledge and of method will reverse these relations.

After dealing with the form of the source, the critic turns to the contents. (1) Do they agree with what we have learned from other genuine sources of the same age and place? (2) Is the writer ignorant of things that a writer of that day would have mentioned? (3) Is he acquainted with events of which he could not have known at the date of writing? Of these three questions, the second is the most difficult to answer. If a forger passed unscathed the ordeal of one and three, it would be rather difficult to convict him under two. It is the so-

called argument from silence, and is often used in a most unscientific manner. It is almost impossible for a forger to escape the test of three. Every man is a child of his own time, and it is practically impossible, in dealing with an earlier period, to conceal his personality. It was through his knowledge of later events that the forger of "The Journal of a Spy" fell a victim to the critics.

If the source passes the tests of outward form and of content, the critic then asks if the information drawn from the source fits naturally into the chain of historical evolution as we know it. A successful answer to this question can be given, of course, only by a master of the period.

Besides these main tests, there are others that may not be decisive in themselves, but that supply us with cumulative evidence. Such tests are found in the peculiar conditions under which the source was discovered, the use, by the forger, of documents or other records that could not have been known to him at the time when the record was supposed to have been made, and the detection of certain prejudices in the source that might explain the object of the forgery.

From what has been said, it ought to be clear that clever cases of forgery can be detected only by experienced critics.

If the source material stands the test and is clearly genuine, the historian takes the next step in External Criticism by attempting to localize the source, that is, to tell *when* the account was written, *where* it was written, and *who* the author was.

CHAPTER IV.

EXTERNAL CRITICISM: LOCALIZATION OF THE SOURCE.

HAVING decided that the material is genuine, the historian has to deal with the further question, "Shall it be admitted as evidence?" A reply to this question is possible only when the material has been localized. Now sources are the results of human activity, either destined originally to serve as proofs of historical events or fitted to serve as such proof because of their origin and existence. The first class of sources constitutes tradition; the second the historian styles remains. If, then, the events are to be restored by means of the remains and traditions, it is perfectly clear that the historian must know with certainty to what events the remains belong, and that the traditions actually come down to us from individuals who were themselves participants in the events or at least eye-witnesses. "It would be absurd to seek information upon an event in the writings of one who knew nothing about it and was not able to know anything about it." The historian must know, then, *when* the source originated, *where* it originated, and *who* the author was. "A document whose author, date, and place of origin are totally unknowable is good for nothing." When these questions have been answered, the source has been localized, and the historian knows whether it may be admitted as evidence or not. The further ques-

tion as to what this evidence is worth is dealt with by Internal Criticism.

It is evident that the work of localizing the source is closely connected with that of determining its genuineness. A source might claim to be the work of a Frenchman, living in Paris in the year 1794; in proving it to be a forgery, we show that it is the work of an Englishman, living in London, in the year 1895. It is the object of the investigation that marks the difference between the two processes. In the first, we wish to know if we are dealing with a genuine document; in the second, if the document, through its origin, could contain the evidence that we seek. A false document, claiming to contain evidence, would, when localized, be of no value; a genuine, but unlocalized, source, might, when localized, prove to be of no value for our investigation.

If the document is genuine, and the name of the author, the time and place of writing are all given, there is no need of an investigation. A distinction should, however, be made between the time of writing, and the time of printing; the place of writing and the place of printing, the author of the title page and the real author. If these two sets of facts always agreed, the work of investigation would be rendered much easier. Setting aside, for the present, these latter problems, let us consider the more difficult ones; how is the origin of a source—written tradition, for example—ascertained when there is no title page indicating the author and the time and place of writing?

The determination of the date of a source is often a very difficult matter. It is especially difficult when it must be determined by the contents of the document controlled by general information. In the first place, we endeavor to locate the source in a general way by a study of form, language, style, and contents. In this way, we place it in a certain century or even generation. Here palaeography and philology are of use to us. If our source is in the form of a manuscript, palaeography tells us it was written in such or such a century. Even the school-boy knows how writing changes from generation to generation. Men of thirty-five, living to-day, have had experience of three generations of penmanship; the style of their fathers, the so-called Spencerian style, and the lately introduced upright style. Modifications of a similar nature characterize the whole history of writing; a knowledge of this history enables the palaeographers to locate the manuscript approximately.

The history of language lends its aid, and this may be employed with printed sources. Words and expressions are born and die. The philologist tells us that a certain word appeared for the first time in a language in a certain century. If the word appears in the given source, it must have been written after that century. He tells us, also, that a certain word disappeared from a certain language in a given century. If the word appears in the source, the record must have been made before the disappearance of the word.

But often neither palaeography nor philology, nor even style can do more than locate the source in the first or second half of a century. How can the date be fixed more definitely?

Here we must depend largely upon the contents of the source. References to events, known to us from other sources, prove that the record was made after the events took place or that it arose at the time of the events. That is shown by the manner in which the events are referred to. Writing upon the events of July, 1789, Bailly said, "If M. Barrère had been listened to, many things accomplished by time and accident would not have happened, the revolution would have been less complete; but we should have been saved from the anarchy to which the constitution has been exposed and is still exposed (Today, 23d of February, 1792)." Although the work is printed in the form of a diary, kept from day to day in 1789, it is evident, from remarks like the above, that it was written several years later.

Brissot's *Mémoires* offer an excellent opportunity for a study upon the date of writing. Even in the first volume, dealing with his early life, there are repeated references to events that took place in the last years of his life. On one page he refers to "my pamphlet of the month of October, written against the factions of Marat and Robespierre," and to "the choices made by the sections of Paris for the National Convention."

So every record made by an eye-witness, but made some time after the events, is likely to

supply some such clue, as the above, to the date of writing. The use of such expressions as "up to the present time," "at the date of writing," or references to the results of certain acts that are being described, are helpful to the historian.

The failure to mention events that the witness undoubtedly would have mentioned had he known of them is also helpful. This is the so-called argument from silence. There are great dangers connected with its use. The reasoning is, "Because the witness does not mention this event, the event never took place." For this reasoning to be valid, it is clear that all of the events must have been recorded and the records preserved. If the witness did not record all the facts, or if any of the records have been lost, the reasoning would be false. It would seem to be evident, then, that this argument can be employed only in certain clearly defined cases, namely, when (1) the "witness desired to note systematically all the facts of a certain kind and was acquainted with them all; and (2) when the fact, if it had existed, would have made such an impression upon the mind of the witness that he would have been forced to record it."

Sometimes a single reference is sufficient to fix the date; often the procedure is more difficult, and the historian must determine the limits within which the record was made. The one limit is called the *terminus post quem*, or the limit after which the source must have originated; the other limit is the *terminus ante*

quem, or the date before which the record must have been made. The following excellent illustration is given by Bernheim of the search for these two limits: One of the annals describing the period of Charlemagne and his predecessors, and written contemporaneously, treats the years from 741-791. It is seen at once that it was not written year by year, because frequent references are made to later events. Assuming that they were not put in at a later date, we may make use of them to fix the *terminus post quem*. The latest event mentioned that may be used in this way happened in the year 1781. In speaking of the Duke of Bavaria, Tassilo, who had been conquered and had promised submission, the annalist writes, "But the promises that he had made he did not keep long (Sed non diu promissiones quas fecerat conservavit). It is evident the writer knew of the subsequent revolt of Tassilo in 1788. This is the *terminus post quem*."

There is but one reference that gives assistance in establishing the *terminus ante quem*. In 785 the annalist writes: "And then all Saxony was subdued" (et tunc tota Saxonia subjugata est). He would hardly have written like this had he known of the breaking away of all Saxony from the rule of Charlemagne in 793. This, then, is the *terminus ante quem*. The work was written, if this reasoning be sound, between 788 and 793.

The determination of the place of origin is often more difficult than the fixing of the date of a source. The place where the record was

found, and the imprint, may or may not help us in the investigation. A manuscript written on the island of St. Helena may be discovered in the United States, and the place given on the title page may have been intended to mislead the censor, when a censorship of the press existed. In dealing with French works printed before the Revolution, it is never safe to accept without investigation the place of publication given on the title page. The writing, if it be a manuscript, or the language may aid us, in case that we have the original language.

The subject matter furnishes the most valuable evidence. How this material may be used will be best shown by another example from Bernheim. In the early part of this century, there was discovered in the monastery of St. Michael at Lüneburg a few sheets of parchment manuscript containing annals for the years 1057-1130. Neither the name of the author, nor time and place of writing, were given. The part from 1100 on was clearly the work of a contemporary. Where was it written? The handwriting was of the twelfth century, but showed no local characteristics. The same was true of the language, that was the Latin of the twelfth century. The place of discovery might point to Lower Saxony as the place of origin, but not without further proof.

An examination of the contents showed that the part from 1100 on bore the stamp of unity. Saxon events are treated in great detail, while events taking place in the rest of Germany, even when important, are simply

mentioned or not referred to at all. Changes in the bishops of different bishoprics occupy much space, and the writer is especially interested in the bishoprics of Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, and Merseburg (Saxon bishoprics). The most of the princes, whose deaths are mentioned, are Saxon, and the writer assumes that when he refers simply to the "Markgraf Rudolf" or the "Graf Friedrich," the reader will understand him.

The deaths in the family of the Count of Stade are given regularly, and the writer assumes that his readers are acquainted with even these relatively unimportant lords. "Udo comes" (Count Udo) is the regular form of reference. So great is the interest in this family that in the midst of the account of the struggle between Henry IV. and his sons, the annalist breaks off his narrative to note that "Count Linderus, with the surname of Udo, was taken sick, was brought to the cloister of Rosenfeld, and died there." The mention of this cloister in connection with the Count of Stade is an important clue. Investigation shows that the cloister of Rosenfeld is located in the land of the Count of Stade, that it was founded by the Counts of Stade. Who, then, would be so much interested in the Counts of Stade as a monk in the cloister of Rosenfeld, and who wrote his annals for the circle of readers about him? And a notice from the year 1136 points unmistakably to the cloister of Rosenfeld as the place where the annals originated. "Cono abbas obiit" (the

abbot Kuno died) runs the record. Only in the monastery where the annals were written could a reference like that—a reference that did not give name of the monastery over which Kuno presided—be understood. From other sources, we learn that Kuno was the abbot at the head of the cloister until 1130. This was clearly the place where the annals were written.

The determination of the authorship of a source is of the greatest importance. Not that we may simply know the name of the author, do we seek this information, but that we may know what kind of a person he is and what his position in society is. Only in this way can we determine what his testimony is worth. This information might be made use of even when we did not know the writer's name.

The most common means of determining the authorship of a source is to compare it with other sources. Here the knowledge of time and place of origin is of value, as it enables us to limit the body of sources with which we work.

If we have a manuscript and know it is genuine, we may compare it with other manuscripts of the same period. In modern history, where distinguished men have left large quantities of manuscript material behind them, their hand-writing is well known, and it is easy to locate a newly discovered manuscript. In the Middle Ages, the work is more difficult, for there is less individuality in the hand-writing and less material for comparison.

To determine the authorship of a source by a comparison of its style with that of other contemporary works is a difficult undertaking. All the world is acquainted with the attempt to prove in this way that Bacon wrote Shakespeare's plays. But this sort of thing is generally unscientific in two ways. In the first place, the investigators forget that all the writers of a given generation will have much in common, and when we prove that an anonymous work has, in the matter of style, much in common with the work of a known writer, it may be possible to establish further that these common things are found in the works of all other writers of that period. In the second place, the investigators have lost sight of the fact that an author's style changes; it changes as he grows older, as he treats different subjects, as he addresses different classes of readers. Much time has been wasted in purposeless work of this kind, and although some progress has been made, this part of method is in a very unsatisfactory condition.

It often happens, when handwriting and style fail to give definite results, that the authorship may be settled in other ways. Frequently references made by the writer to himself, to his interests, occupations, position in life, and persons with whom he is associated point clearly to some known persons whose surroundings correspond to those indicated in the sources. Such a piece of work could, of course, be successfully carried out only by a historian possessing a large fund of information on the

period of history to which the source belonged.

Sometimes we are aided in determining the authorship of a work by references to it in other works, where the reference is coupled with the author's name. At times these works give exact quotations that are found literally in the anonymous work.

As was pointed out above, the important thing in the determination of the authorship of a source is not simply to learn the author's name, but the author's personality. To know that the writer of a certain source was an unknown A or B, and to know nothing else, would profit us little. If the source furnishes us abundant information upon the personality of the writer, it is of no value to know his name, unless the person be well known, and a knowledge of this name will enable us to obtain elsewhere further information about him.

An example from Bernheim will illustrate the methods by which the authorship of anonymous sources may be determined.

One of the most important sources for the close of the ninth century in Germany is the chronicle of Regino, the Abbott of Prüm. This is continued from 907-967 by an unknown writer. He evidently worked in the sixties, making use, at first, of other annals and, later, writing more independently and treating the subject more in detail. From the interest that he betrays for the cloister of St. Maximin at Trier, it is evident that he belongs to this cloister; the events enumerated are such as only a resident would be likely to take note of.

Now the resident of a cloister engaged in literary work, could have been none other than a monk. This first inference gains support from the fact that the first part of the chronicle was written in St. Maximin where Regino took refuge after being expelled from Prüm.

Among the few persons of the cloister named by the writer of the chronicle, one, Adalbert by name, is especially prominent. In 961 it is stated, that at the instigation of the Archbishop of Mainz, "of whom Adalbert might have expected something better," the monk was sent as a wandering preacher to Russia. He was fitted out for the journey by the king. In 962, he returned from his bootless mission, passing through great dangers and receiving a most hearty welcome at home. The writer is so well informed upon the adventures of Adalbert and speaks of them with so much feeling that he must have been on intimate terms with him, or he must have been Adalbert himself. For this last presumption there is considerable evidence drawn from what we know about Adalbert from other sources. In 966, he was made Abbot at Weissenburg, and in 968 became Archbishop of Magdeburg. From his career, it is evident that he was an educated man. The writer of the chronicle shows by his language and the character of his narrative that he possessed a culture not common in that day. The chronicle mentions the transfer of Adalbert to Weissenburg and breaks off with the year 968, the year when he was raised to the archbishopric. It may be said, then, "with the greatest prob-

ability, if not with certainty, that Adalbert was the writer of the continuation of Regino's chronicle."

Such are the problems to be solved in the localization of a source, and such are some of the methods of solving them.

CHAPTER V.

EXTERNAL CRITICISM: ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCE AND RESTORATION OF THE TEXT.

THE work of External Criticism is not completed when the source has been shown to be genuine and has been localized. It still remains for the student of history to analyze his sources and, in some cases, even to endeavor to restore the printed or written text, corrupted by copyists.

The need of text analysis is self-evident. In the first place, all of the events recorded by a witness have not, as a rule, been directly observed by him. Not all parts of his record are equally valuable and the first-hand evidence can be separated from the derived only by analysis. In the second place, as we shall see later, historical facts are established by the agreement among *independent* witnesses. It is of the first importance, then, that the independence of the witnesses should be established, and this is done by studying the relation of one source to another. I shall consider, then, (1) the analysis of a single source; and (2) the analysis of the relationship existing among several sources.

Failure to analyze their sources and to distinguish between what the witness knows first hand and what he has derived from others is one of the characteristics of the uncritical historian. Having decided that the work as a whole

is genuine, and that it was written by a contemporary who lived in the midst of the events described, the general inference is made that all the evidence contained in the record must be source material. This is, of course, as a rule, a false inference, but it is surprising how long it has taken historical science to get beyond it.

Thucydides wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war. The work is preceded by an introduction in which he deals with the history of Greece up to his own day. It is self-evident that Thucydides could have witnessed but a small part of the events that he recorded; for the events of his own day, he obtained his information largely from eye witnesses, while for the past he was dependent upon written and oral tradition. It is necessary (1) to analyze the work and, if possible, to separate Thucydides' personal knowledge from his information derived from other sources; and (2) to learn, if possible, what the other sources were.

Neither of these operations can be successfully carried out. For although Thucydides, in referring to his methods of work, states (I., 22) that he gave "the facts of what was done in the war.....only after investigating them accurately in every particular, as far as possible," he seldom, if ever, gives his source of information. The necessity of proof was not realized in his day. Incidentally he tells us that he suffered from the plague (II., 48), commanded in Thrace (IV., 104) and was exiled (V., 26); but these statements are not made for the purpose of showing us where he obtained his information.

It ought to be clear by this time that the fact that Thucydides wrote the "History of the Peloponnesian War" does not justify the historian in accepting the whole work as the result of his observations. It is evidently composed of material of unequal value. How unscientifically much of the work has been done in the past will be realized when it is stated that the question as to whether the Boeotians migrated from Thessaly to Boeotia in early times has been often settled in the past by a quotation from Thucydides (I., 12). When it is remembered that if there ever was such a migration, it must have taken place several hundred years before his day and that the event must have been without a written record for many generations, it will be easy to comprehend the desperate straits in which the historian finds himself who cites Thucydides on such a point and really believes that he has proved anything by the citation.

A vast amount of time and labor have been expended on the analysis of the Greek and Roman historians. After a careful examination of all the attempts to analyze the sources of Roman history, Dr. Carl Peter (*Zur Kritik der Quellen der älteren Römischen Geschichte*, Halle, 1879) concludes that, for the most part, such work can lead to nothing definite (page 166). The same remark would apply to the larger part of the written traditions on the history of Greece. Some of the possibilities, however, are shown in Kirchhoff's "Thukydides und sein Urkundenmaterial, Berlin,

1895," especially in the study of the truce between Athens and Sparta (IV., 118, 119). What our sources are for early Roman history may be learned from Pelham (Outlines of Roman History, N. Y., 1893, page 3), namely, the tradition as established in the time of Livy and Dionysius (about first century, B. C.). Under these circumstances, one would be justified in saying that we know practically nothing about the first few centuries of Roman history. It is source analysis that has led to these results. They are negative, it is true, but the acceptance of negative results in the place of unscientific and impossible constructions represents a distinct step in advance.

"Most historians," says Seignobos, "refrain from rejecting a legend till its falsity has been proved, and if by chance no document has been preserved to contradict it, they adopt it provisionally. This is how the first five centuries of Rome are dealt with. This method, unfortunately still too general, helps to prevent history from being established as a science."

But more satisfactory results are obtained in the study of periods nearer our own time. The period of the French Revolution is a veritable *Tummelplatz* for untrained historians. . . . No-where does the neglect of source analysis lead to more disastrous results. For the events of 1789 the *Moniteur* and the *Archives parlementaires* are commonly referred to as sources. There are copies of the *Moniteur* dealing with the events from May 5, 1789, but the publication of the paper did not begin until Novem-

ber of that year. Several years later the desire to make the file complete for the revolution led the editors to publish the back numbers from May 5 until the real publication began. This portion of the paper can, in no sense, be called a source; it is a second-hand compilation. An analysis of the material contained in it shows that other newspapers (Mirabeau's *Courrier de Provence*), mémoires (Bailly), and contemporary histories (*Histoire de la révolution par deux amis de la liberté*) were made use of it. Ranke has an interesting study on the *Moniteur* in his "Revolution-skrieger." He there points out that the compilation for the year 1789 is composed of two parts; the second part, dealing with the events happening outside the Assembly, is taken almost bodily from the history by "Two Friends of Liberty," referred to above. It is clear, then, that, instead of using the *Moniteur*, we should go back to the source used by the compilers of the *Moniteur*. Even here the need of source analysis will still be felt, for Flammermont tells us, in his work, "*La journée du 14 juillet, 1789*, Paris, 1892," that for this great event the work has "no original value." The authors utilized the most of the accounts by eye witnesses that had been published when they composed their history, but as we have the same works at our disposal we pass on to them, and begin anew the task of analysis. This one example ought to be sufficient to establish the necessity of source analysis.

The state of the *Archives parlementaires* is

even worse than that of the *Moniteur*. The portion of the work devoted to 1789 was compiled about thirty years ago and the chief source was the *Moniteur*! The work was done at the expense of the French government. It is now being done over again by M. Brette. That is a good example of the loss of time and money resulting from unscientific work. More than that, the work has been often read by those who did not know its character and the generalizations based upon it are often unsound. A good criticism is found in Brette, "*Les Constituantes*, Paris, 1897," page 33.

While examining a letter written by Mirabeau in 1788 to a friend in Germany, I was struck by the familiar appearance of a large part of it, but was unable to explain it. Shortly after that, I had occasion to make use of a pamphlet written in 1788—one that I had already examined—and I found the solution of the problem. Mirabeau had copied whole paragraphs from this work and sent them out as his own. This was one of Mirabeau's great failings, and, if we accepted without reserve the opinions of some of the men that co-operated with him, we should believe that all his plumage was borrowed. Source analysis is no easy task, but it is clearly indispensable.

I have dealt thus with the analysis of the single source and the attempt to determine its composition; I shall now consider the relationship among sources. The importance of this investigation has already been pointed out; it is the indispensable foundation for historical cer-

tainty. The testimony of two or more eye witnesses is sufficient to establish a fact, but on the condition that the witnesses are independent of each other. The failure to meet this condition is a common occurrence. Students appear to think that a fact is established by the number of references in support of it, the question of independence being entirely overlooked. They do not stop to consider the fact that if five references to an event are found and four of these five draw their information from the fifth, it is sufficient to give the one reference; it does not strengthen the case to add the remaining four references. Certain events happening on the 14th of July, 1789, are reported in the *Moniteur*, in the history by "*Deux amis de la liberte*," and in the "*Proces-verbal*" of the city government of Paris. A careless investigator would think that he had three independent witnesses. We know that he has but one, the "*Proces-verbal*."

When we have before us two or three records dealing with the same events, how is their relationship determined? The question is often settled by the localization of the sources. From this process we may learn that only one could have had direct knowledge of the event; the others have only indirect information. When the question can not be settled thus readily, it is necessary to compare the different texts. The procedure rests on two psychological axioms: (1) when two individuals perceive the same event they neither seize upon the same details nor report them in the same way; (2) when two individuals give expression to inde-

pendent conceptions, they never make use of exactly the same form. From these axioms, we draw the inference that if two or more sources report the same facts in the same or nearly the same form, these accounts have not been independently conceived. This axiom dealing with expression does not, of course, include those fixed forms, found in every language, representing neither independent thought-conception nor thought-expression.


Even when the language is different, if the details are complex, and their arrangement the same, it is sufficient to establish dependence. But if the event is a simple one, it might not be possible to establish the relationship between the sources when similarity in expression is lacking.

In considering the relationship of two sources known to be related, the problem may be solved in various ways. If we find in one source a misunderstanding of an expression correctly used in the other, then the last is clearly the original. When the style of one source is flowing, smooth, and well arranged, while that of the other is awkward, disconnected, and poorly arranged, the latter is clearly the original. When the two sources are the work of writers with different prejudices and party affiliations, the attempt to arrange and modify the facts taken from one source to make them harmonize with the point of view in the other often betrays the copyist. Additions and omissions frequently furnish the


most satisfactory material for the study of relationship.

When three or more sources must be analyzed the problems become more complex. Here two of the sources may have drawn from the third or one may have drawn from the other two.

In the first case, we should have possible combinations like these:



In the second case the combination would be:



There is no space here, were it desirable, to work out these combinations and show how the problems are solved. It is sufficient to know that they do arise, that they must be solved, and that specialists develop a marvelous skill in solving them.

The analysis of the sources not only enables the historian to determine the relationship between sources, but even to restore lost sources. The Germans have furnished some remarkable examples of this kind of work. Giesebrecht, in studying certain mediaeval chronicles, discovered that they had all copied from a lost chronicle of the eleventh century. Gathering up the extracts embedded in these

later works, he restored the lost source. In 1867, the lost annals were discovered, and it was found that the main results of Giesebrecht's work were correct. Scheffer-Boichorst's restoration of the *Annales Patherbrunnenses* is another remarkable example.

When the source is known to be genuine, has been localized and analyzed, it only remains to restore the original text of the document, and to prepare it for publication, if it be a manuscript. This completes the work of External Criticism.

The necessity of a carefully restored text is self-evident in the case of classical and mediaeval manuscripts; it is not so evident for later documents. And yet the fairly attentive newspaper reader sees every day corrupt texts, that is, printed pages that have not faithfully reproduced the written page. When he attempts to correct the text by putting the misplaced words or lines in their proper places, to substitute a word that makes sense for one that makes nonsense, he is doing on a small scale, and in a simple way, what the text restorer does on a large scale and in a more complex way.

How unreliable some of the texts are that are based on old manuscripts, only the investigator can fully appreciate. A rapid examination of the foot-notes in the Bohn translation of Thucydides, coupled with an observation of the questionable passages—possibly later additions—enclosed in brackets in the text, will give some idea of the uncertainty of the results attained.

The explanation of all this is not hard to find. The originals of these old manuscripts—especially Greek and Latin—have been lost. The manuscripts that we possess are only copies of copies, and sometimes worse. The great mass of the classical manuscripts are not older than the fifteenth century.

What possibilities of error lay in this repeated copying! True even for intelligent copyists, this becomes doubly true of the ignorant workmen employed—under competent direction, it is true—at the close of the Middle Ages. Hear what a contemporary says of these corrupt texts (Von Reumont: *Lorenzo de Medici*, London, 1876, I., page 436): “I can not express,” says the Florentine chancellor once, “how repulsive the universal corruption that has crept into books is to me. We scarcely find one manuscript of Petrarca’s and Boccaccio’s works which does not deviate from the original. They are not texts, but coarse caricatures of texts. . . . In Dante’s book this calamity is the greatest, as the uninitiated are often unable to follow those who are at all acquainted with the poet.”

The restoration of a text can be done successfully only by a trained specialist. It calls for a great mass of technical knowledge and long years of practice.

Langlois divides the possible problems in text restoration into three classes: (1) Where the original exists, (2) where but a single copy exists, and (3) where several copies exist.

In the first case the process is comparatively

simple. The correctness of the printed text is determined by comparing it with the manuscript. It is surprising how often the most careful scholars make some slight mistakes in copying. I had occasion to collate a letter published in the work of a distinguished historian with the original in the archives at Paris. The letter had, presumably, been reproduced literally for the purpose of showing the lack of culture in the writer. The document was a mere note, and occupied only thirteen lines in the printed text. I found that the copyist had made eighteen (18) errors!

Langlois gives an example of one remarkable restoration where the original was missing and the investigator was obliged to work with a single copy; the text was the Letters of Seneca; the restorer, Madvig. The passage was "Philosophia unde dicta sit, apparet, ipso enim nomine fatetur. Quidam et sapientiam ita quidam finierunt, etc." This did not make sense. Madvig knew, from his study of palaeography, that the original was written in capitals, with nothing to indicate the separation of words or sentences, thus: FATETURQUIDAMETSAPIENTIAM. Putting the lines into capitals, he quickly discovered the true reading. It was: "ipso enim nomine fatetur quid amet. Sapientiam ita quidam finierunt." There have been many other remarkable restorations from single copies.

In the third case, where more than one copy exists, it is necessary, first of all, to study the

relationship of the copies, to learn, if possible, how many are independent. Having learned this, by a comparison of the independent texts, an effort is made to remove the errors that have crept in and to obtain, if possible, a better text than is found in any one of the manuscripts.

When the original text is restored, the work of External Criticism is finished and we are ready for Internal Criticism. In other words, we have decided what material shall be admitted as evidence; it now remains to be seen what that evidence is worth and by means of it to establish the historical facts.

CHAPTER VI.

INTERNAL CRITICISM: INTERPRETATION OF THE SOURCES AND VALUE OF THE SOURCES.

I N Bernheim's *Lehrbuch* as well as in Langlois and Seignobos' *Introduction*, Criticism is divided into two parts, and the second part is called Internal Criticism. The agreement does not, however, extend to the subdivisions. As I pointed out in a previous chapter, Seignobos makes Interpretation the first head under Internal Criticism, while Bernheim makes Interpretation the first subdivision under his third main division, *Auffassung*.

The authors do not disagree as to what the business of Internal Criticism is. According to Seignobos it "is destined to discern in the document that which may be accepted as true" (p. 117); according to Bernheim, its business is to "determine the reality of the events" (p. 355, edition of 1894).

Why, then, should Interpretation form a part of Criticism in the one work and not in the other? Is it because they disagree upon the meaning of Interpretation? Apparently not. Bernheim, it is true, deals with both remains and traditions, while Seignobos has traditions chiefly in mind—for his purpose, clearly a wise limitation; but in dealing with written traditions, both authors agree that the mission of Interpretation is to discover the thoughts that the writer expressed in the text. It is true

that Bernheim states that the work of Interpretation is to understand the testimony of the source in its significance for the connection of the facts, but when he works this idea out he gives us nothing more than Seignobos does. Bernheim's idea, as I understand it, is this: the isolated facts have been *determined* through Criticism, by a comparison of the sources that have been tested; under *Auffassung*, the student should *interpret* these facts—find out what they mean and then combine them. But is it possible to complete the work of Internal Criticism, to determine what facts are established by the sources without having first interpreted the sources? Clearly not.

Yet, on the other hand, why not introduce Interpretation earlier even than Seignobos has done, and make it a part of External Criticism? To test the genuineness of a source, to localize it, to analyze it, we are obliged to interpret it, to get at the thoughts that the writer wished to express, and that is interpretation. The work of interpretation may begin at the very outset of the work of the historian. As Bernheim states, the moment that he recognizes certain material as historical sources, he is interpreting it.

Interpretation thus forming a part of so many of the divisions of method, it is not an easy matter to decide just where it shall be treated. After taking everything into consideration, it has seemed wisest to me to make a compromise and treat the following topics under Internal Criticism: (1) Determination of

the Value of the Source; (2) Interpretation of the Source; and (3) Establishment of the Facts. I think that good reasons may be given for such an arrangement.

Although each fact must be examined by itself to determine its value, it is necessary first of all to form a general estimate of the value of the work from the character of the source and from the individuality of the writer. It is just as legitimate to do that work before taking up the formal interpretation of the source as it is to deal with the problems of External Criticism before the source has been carefully interpreted.

The value of the material in a source is determined by three things: (1) The Character of the Source; (2) the Individuality of the Writer; and (3) the Influence of Time and Place. Following the classification given under *Quellenkunde*, Bernheim considers the manner in which the facts are influenced by the form of the source. Language, newspapers, political pamphlets, speeches, proclamations, diplomatic correspondence, chronicles, genealogies, memoirs, biographies, ballads, pictures, etc., are passed in review and the characteristic features of each brought out. Newspapers express the views of a party, but as a record of events may be worthless; a political pamphlet may be accepted as containing the views of an individual; it is well known that the speeches in the writings of the Greek and Roman historians are, for the most part, simply rhetorical exercises; war bulletins, party proclamations,

etc., are notoriously unreliable; diplomatic correspondence is the "chosen region of lies;" the comedies of Aristophanes hardly contain reliable evidence touching the men and events of Athenian history; ballads are sources, but their testimony will help us little in our effort to establish the facts of history; contemporary pictures are often distorted by ignorance, prejudice, and passion.

But it is to tradition, both written and oral, that Bernheim devotes the most of his space. He traces the process by which the written tradition is formed, and indicates the deforming influences to which it is subjected. It is the business of Internal Criticism to free the tradition, as far as possible, from all these influences. In this connection, it is necessary to know when the record was made, where, and by whom. This information was supplied us by External Criticism. The necessity of knowing all that we can about the writer takes us to the second division of Value; Value as Determined by the Individuality of the Writer.

But before passing to this division, a word should be said concerning the value of oral tradition. When it comes to us directly from the witness it may have considerable value, but when it has been handed on for a generation or more without being recorded, it assumes a mythical form and it is generally impossible to separate fact from fiction. The rule is that when a student perceives that he has to do with a myth or a sage, instead of attempting to discover the nucleus around which the work of the

imagination has gathered, he shall discard the myth *in toto*. Of course, I do not mean to say that the material of this character may not be of great value in showing us what views a people—Greek or Roman—held concerning its own past; this material simply does not help us to discover what that past really was.

This is heroic practice and all students of history have not been strong enough to follow it. Grote understood the problem and simply narrated the myths as the Greeks knew them. "Two courses, and two only, are open," he wrote; "either to pass over the myths altogether * * * , or else to give an account of them as myths; to recognize and respect their specific nature, and to abstain from confounding them with ordinary and certifiable history" (Vol. I., Part I., Chap. XVIII).

With this method, Curtius was not content. He believed "that a wealth of reminiscences survives in the myths, whose very essence consists in expressing a people's consciousness of the beginnings of its history" (Vol. I., Bk. I., Chap. II). Working on this theory, he attempted to separate fact from fiction, and to reconstruct early Greek history by the use of the myths. His chapters based on this kind of material should be studied by the young historian as an example of how history should not be written.

Returning, now, to the second division of Value, as Determined by the Individuality of the Writer, let us consider its place in Internal Criticism.

It is clear that the individuality of the writer is the most important factor to be taken into account in judging the value of written tradition. For written tradition is nothing more than the record of some person's conception of an event. The value of the conception depends, very clearly, upon the personality of the witness. The information that the historian requires concerning the witness is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Was he able to observe exactly and to describe correctly what he saw? Was he desirous of seeing the truth and of telling the truth?

It is not an easy task to answer both of these questions in a satisfactory manner. Sometimes the larger part of our information must be drawn incidentally from the author's own works. How little we know about the Greek and Roman historians! Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Plutarch, Arrian, Livy, Sallust, and Tacitus are comparatively unknown men although their histories are world-famous. What we know about Thucydides could be put into a few lines. It is not known when nor where his history was written (I mean exactly, of course); we do not know how old he was, nor when he began to write.

But what is it, in particular, that the historian needs to know? He must know what the birth and education of his witness was; in what class of society he moved; what his powers of mind were; what his occupations had been; what special training he had had that fitted him to observe these particular facts and what opportu-

nities he had for observation. These would be the intellectual requirements touching his ability to tell the truth. There are other requirements that are partly intellectual and partly moral. Were his prejudices and passions so strong that he would be unable to see the truth or that he would unconsciously misrepresent what he saw?

In connection with his moral fitness, the historian would know whether the witness is an honest man or not; whether he was filled with a desire to know the truth, and when he knew it, whether he would consider it his sacred duty to tell it. Among the few poorly established data that we have concerning the life of Salust, there is a statement that, while governing Numidia, he plundered it and escaped punishment only by bribery. Whether these statements are correct or not is of little importance here, but if they are correct, what influence will they have in shaping our opinion of the value of evidence coming from such a man?

Seignobos formulates two series of questions to be used in determining the accuracy and good faith of a writer. "The reasons for doubting good faith are: (1) the author's interest; (2) the force of circumstances, official reports; (3) sympathy and antipathy; (4) vanity; (5) deference to public opinion; (6) literary distinction. The reasons for doubting accuracy are: (1) the author a bad observer, hallucinations, illusions, prejudices; (2) the author not well situated for observing; (3) neg-

ligence and indifference; (4) fact not of a nature to be directly observed.”¹

Bernheim makes a third subdivision under Value, namely, Value as Influenced by Time and Place. It is easy to see how important this point might be. What source can be rightly understood if we fail to consider the age in which it was written? To what extent was the knowledge of a witness hampered by lack of means of communication—railroad, telegraph, and post—as in the Middle Ages? How was the value of his work affected by a low standard of truth, by an unscientific public opinion, by a lack of aids to research, and by defective methods? Was the record that we have before us typical of the best or of the poorest work of the age? And as to the influence of place, what was the nationality of the writer? Who could understand the value of Tacitus' Germany, if he did not constantly remember that it is a work written by a Roman, who from the point of view of Roman civilization described the manners and customs of the primitive Germans for Roman readers? The value of Caesar's description of the Germans is limited by the fact that he observed only the people on the border.

Such are the leading questions to be answered in the effort to form a general estimate of the value of the source as determined by the Character of the Source, the Individuality of the Writer, and the Influence of Time and Place.

¹This analysis is taken from the Contents of a recent translation of Langlois and Seignobos by Mr. G. G. Berry. The work is published by Henry Holt & Co. The title is "Introduction to the Study of History." This book should be in the library of every student and teacher of history.

Young's Travels in France furnish one of the best examples of satisfactory written tradition. The work itself is a journal, where, as a rule, the events of each day were recorded on the evening of that day and the journal was published practically as it was written. From the point of view of the character of the source, little more could be desired.

Young was an ideal witness. He had literally been trained to make just such a journal. He early became interested in agriculture, and, being of a good family, with considerable wealth, he was able to experiment and to travel for the purpose of studying the condition of agriculture, industry, and commerce in England and Ireland. He published the results of his observations and became famous. Through his work he made the acquaintance of distinguished Frenchmen before he had traveled in that country. He was a born student, a keen observer, and as honest as the day. When he went to France in 1787, to do for that country what he had done for England and Ireland, he was equipped as few men ever have been for such word. He made three journeys through the kingdom, and every facility was given him to find out what he wanted to know.

Although he looks at every thing from the point of view of the eighteenth century Englishman, he is so frank in his statements and so desirous of being exact, that no Frenchman could have been fairer to France than Arthur Young was.

Having formed a general estimate of the Value of the Source, the historian proceeds to interpret it. Interpretation has already been defined. Bernheim treats of the interpretation of remains and traditions and, like Seignobos, devotes the most of his space to the consideration of the interpretation of tradition. Under this subdivision, the points considered are Interpretation of the Writing; Interpretation of the Language; Interpretation from the Character of the Source, the Time and Place of Origin, and the Individuality of the Writer.

A historian must be able to interpret the writing of the documents employed. This does not mean simply ability to read the letters, but to interpret abbreviations correctly and to understand all the peculiarities of the record. Langlois says "Scholars who have received no regular paleographical initiation can almost always be recognized by the gross errors which they commit from time to time in deciphering, errors which are sometimes enough to completely ruin the subsequent operations of criticism and interpretation."

Some interpretation of abbreviations is often called for in printed sources. In French works of the latter part of the sixteenth century, it is the regular thing to omit the *n* or *m* after a vowel and to indicate the omission by a mark over the vowel: *gentil-home*, *quad*, *no*. The colonial records of our country present some interesting problems in the interpretation of writing.

The interpretation of the language of a source

demands: (1) a knowledge of the meaning of the words of a language used at a given time, (2) in a given country, (3) by a given writer, and (4) an understanding from the context of the different ways in which the same author uses the same words in different places. The important thing, as Seignobos points out, is to discover just what the author did say. Too many historians scan their sources for the purpose of finding something and read into the text the meaning they are searching for. It is not an uncommon thing to discover that the references given to support a statement have quite a different meaning when studied in their context from what they have when isolated. How much is demanded of the historian can be seen from the four points on interpretation given above.

In dealing with a Latin text of the Middle Ages, a knowledge of classical Latin is not sufficient. Nor is a general knowledge of Medieval Latin sufficient. The historian must know how certain words were used in a particular century, in a particular part of Europe, and by a particular writer.

Sufficient training combined with knowledge and study will enable the student to get at the literal sense of his source. A second examination may be necessary to discover hidden meanings, to interpret the real meaning underlying irony, sarcasm, and allegory.

Just as the search for the value of the source is helped by a knowledge of the character of the source, so is the interpretation aided in the

same way. The comedies of Aristophanes, the dialogues of Plato, the writings of the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance can be interpreted correctly only when we keep in mind the character of the sources. Aristophanes wrote to amuse the Athenians; Plato used Socrates as a mouthpiece to express Plato's ideas; the Letters of Obscure Men were written to satirize the monks.

To interpret a source correctly, the historian must so reconstruct the conditions of time and place that the document will appeal to him as it appealed to a contemporary. To interpret the source from the individuality of the writer, he must not only be familiar with the writer's style, but with his conceptions, his philosophy of life, the circle of his relations and interests, his fund of information. In a word, the historian must endeavor to put himself in the place of the writer.

Few, if any, historians accomplish all this. And yet, this is the ideal that the conscientious historian must set before himself and toward which he must direct his efforts.

The writing of history is not the easy task that many believe it. So exacting is it that the man who does his work thoroughly can do but a small bit of research work. This, however, should be no cause for discouragement. A vast army is at work, and if co-operation is carried far enough great results may be obtained.

Having determined the value of the sources

and interpreted them, the next step is to make use of the statements contained in the sources for the purpose of establishing the facts of history.

CHAPTER VII.

INTERNAL CRITICISM: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS.

THE end that historical criticism has ever in view is the establishment of the historical facts. The determination of the genuineness of the sources in hand, their localization and analysis are of value to the historian only so far as they enable him to decide whether this material shall be admitted as evidence; the determination of the value of the sources as a whole and their interpretation simply make clear to him the general reliability of his witnesses and furnish him with their conceptions and affirmations concerning the subject under investigation. But what is the relation of these conceptions and affirmations of witnesses to what actually occurred? To answer that question is the last work of Internal Criticism.

The material drawn from the sources is divided by Seignobos into two natural groups, conceptions and affirmations. The first are easily disposed of; the last not so easily.

The testimony of a single source is sufficient to establish the existence and character of a conception. Luther's ninety-five theses contain the views that he held at the time of their publication. Whether they are true or not does not concern the historian; their existence and nature are established by one genuine copy of the theses. Plato's Republic, Machiavelli's Prince, Rousseau's Social Contract, and other

works of a similar nature may, when known to be genuine, be held to contain the conceptions of these men concerning government. Conceptions of this nature furnish the material for histories of doctrines and dogmas. The history of painting, of architecture, and of science may be written in the same way from remains of the work of artists and the architects, or from the writings of scientists.

Closely related to conceptions is another class of material, employed, for the most part, unconsciously in the works of the imagination. While the imagination may construct wholes that are not real, the elements with which the poet or novelist works are drawn from experience. It is possible, then, for the historian to sift out these elements and make use of them. This procedure is psychologically sound, and its value may be easily tested. Examine any modern novel dealing with familiar life and it will be readily seen that the elements with which the novelist works are all real. I do not refer, of course, to historical novels where the elements are consciously acquired and consciously introduced into the picture.

What is true of the literature of this century is even truer of literature of past centuries. It is for this reason that the Homeric poems may be used as historical material. The old bards knew little about the siege of Troy, but they could not construct their imaginary pictures of the earlier society without making use of the elements found in the society of which they formed a part. Battles and sieges, swords, spears, shields, helmets, chariots, war-

riors, and horses; palaces and huts; kings, princes, freemen, and slaves; fields, crops, oxen, ploughs, were things that formed a part of their daily lives, and out of these they wrought their epics.

There was no Agamemnon, but there were great kings; there was no Achilles, but there were great warriors.

In using this material, however, it is necessary to keep constantly in mind Seignobos' limitation. In the first place, there should be a clear understanding of the meaning of the term "elements." Elements are irreducible. They deal with "matter, form, color, and number." Thus the historian may take from the poem, "objects, their destination, and common acts." The poet might speak of "golden doors." That is not an element. The elements are "gold," and "doors." Furthermore, these elements, drawn from literature, are not localized: we know nothing of their frequency, and, if they are drawn from a single poem, nothing can justify us in making generalizations upon them concerning the morality and artistic ideals of a whole people. Yet with even these limitations the results obtained from the study of such material are not insignificant. Without them, we should be unable to construct one of the most interesting chapters in Greek history.

With the establishment of the facts from affirmations the case is quite different. "The affirmation of a *single* source concerning an external fact is never sufficient to establish that fact." The chances of error and falsehood are

too numerous, and the conditions under which the observations were made are so little known to us that we are unable to determine whether the witness escaped all these chances or not. Criticism of tradition is negative work; it simply lays the affirmations before us with an indication of their value, but does not establish any fact.¹

These affirmations are only probable or improbable. To reach a definitive result another operation is necessary; the affirmations found in different sources upon the same point must be compared. The mechanical preparation for this operation consists in gathering together upon the same or different slips of paper affirmations bearing upon the same event. The cases that generally arise in the study of affirmations may be grouped under three heads: (1) When the affirmations agree; (2) when there is but one affirmation; and (3) when the affirmations disagree.

The problems under the first head naturally present fewer difficulties than those arising un-

¹ The reader will recall that in the treatment of Interpretation of the Sources I noted that "Bernheim * * * deals with both remains and traditions, while Seignobos has traditions chiefly in mind—for his purpose, clearly a wise limitation." I did not state, at the time, what his purpose was. The failure to treat remains has been criticized by Bernheim in a review of the book found in the January number of the *Vierteljahrschrift* for 199. This omission is excusable. The book was founded on lectures delivered at the Sorbonne for the benefit of the young students of history. Now it is very doubtful whether it is desirable to teach a beginner all that is known about a subject. The college undergraduate deals in his historical work almost wholly with written tradition, and a book serving as an "Introduction to Historical Study" might with good reason do a thing that a complete treatise on historical method could not do, that is, emphasize tradition and neglect remains.

der the other heads. If the sources have been tested and been found to be genuine; if they have been localized and analyzed; if their value has also stood the test, then their agreement upon certain facts establishes these facts beyond the possibility of a doubt. This kind of proof has been expressed in the form of an axiom by Rhomberg (*Die Erhebung der Geschichte zum Range einer Wissenschaft* Wien, 1883, page 21): "When two or more contemporary (eye or ear) witnesses report *independently of one another*, the same fact, with many like details, that do not have a necessary or usual, but rather a casual connection with the fact, then the accounts, so far as they agree, must be true, *if the fact and its details were so clearly perceptible that no self-deception could have been possible.*"

For the axiom to be valid all the conditions must be fulfilled. In the first place the witnesses must be independent of one another. This point is commonly overlooked by the untrained student. The slovenly manner in which evidence is frequently handled is well illustrated by Freeman's comment on the method of Thierry, the author of the "History of the Norman Conquest." "He would kill a man by one name in one page," writes Freeman (*Methods of Historical Study*; page 280), "and bring him to life by another name in a later page, each time with a perfectly good reference; he simply had not learned the art of probing and weighing his references and finding out either what they meant or what they were worth."

Even writers who do not blunder as Thierry did do not realize the necessity of proving the independence of their witnesses. They appear to believe that facts are established by a cloud of witnesses who may or may not be so many independent observers. The analysis of the source, the only protection against "repeaters," is trying work, consumes much time, and often leaves the historian in uncertainty. Yet upon the doing of this thing, and, above all, upon the way in which it is done, depends the value of the facts established by the evidence.

The interdependence of witnesses is often of a subtle kind that eludes the analysis of the uninitiated. Members of the same party regarding events from the same point of view, they are not, in reality, independent of each other, and their agreement upon certain points may prove nothing more than that they heard, believed, and repeated a common report. Dubois-Crancé's *Analyse de la révolution française* is apparently independent of the *Souvenirs* of Thibaudeau. Neither could have seen the work of the other, for they had been dead many years before the works were made public. Both men were members of the assembly of 1789. On the 20th of June the Commons, excluded from their hall, assembled in the Tennis Court and took the famous oath never to separate. On the 22d they would have met again in the same place, but, report says, the Comte d'Artois had engaged the court for tennis and the deputies were obliged to go elsewhere. Is this true? Both Dubois-Crancé (page 22) and

Thibaudeau (page 35) state the fact in these terms. They were contemporaries, members of the excluded Commons, and independent witnesses. Hence it must be true. But *were* they independent? When did they write their accounts of these events? Dubois-Crancé, ten years later; Thibaudeau, fourteen years later. I shall show further on that their sole source of information was probably nothing more than a common report that originated among the enemies of the nobility and that in time passed unchallenged as a historical fact. This one example should be sufficient to convince the most skeptical of the necessity of critical study of the sources.

According to Seignobos, the only observations that are certainly independent are "contained in different documents, coming from different writers, belonging to different groups, and working under different conditions. That is to say, cases of agreement that are fully conclusive are rare, save in modern history."

But the witnesses may be independent and yet self-deceived. The much-discussed case of the miracles of Bernhard of Clairvaux offers a good illustration. The account of these miracles is found in the "liber miraculorum S. Bernhardi," a contemporary record by reliable eye witnesses. The men were certainly "self-deceived."

The existence of the devil—to use an illustration from Seignobos—is better established by independent eye witnesses than the existence of the tyrant Pisistratus. Not a single contem-

porary testifies to having seen Pisistratus; "thousands of 'eye witnesses' declare that they have seen the devil. There are few historical facts established by an equal number of independent witnesses. Yet we do not hesitate to reject the devil and to admit Pisistratus. It is because the existence of the devil would be irreconcilable with all the constituted sciences."

If we are certain that our witnesses are independent and are not self-deceived, we are ready to compare their affirmations and see if they agree. The concordance to be looked for is not exact agreement in form and content; that, as was shown in another place, is proof of dependence. Scientific agreement is agreement, upon certain points, of divergent affirmations. The points where the affirmations cross are the points scientifically established. Here are two independent accounts written on the spot, of the employment of troops at the Royal session of June 23, 1789.

The first is by the Englishman, Arthur Young; the second by the Frenchman, Gaultier de Biauzat, a member of the assembly. Young says (*Travels*, 1892, page 175): "The important day is over; in the morning Versailles seemed filled with troops; the streets, about 10 o'clock, were lined with the French guards, and some Swiss regiments, etc.; the hall of the states was surrounded, and sentinels fixed in all passages, and at the doors; and none but deputies were admitted."

Gaultier writes (*Sa vie et sa correspondance*, II., page 136): "The deputies were obliged to traverse a body of troops in order to betake themselves to the hall of the Estates, without having even the liberty of making choice among the three avenues that lead there and which have been open to the public until to-day."

The two accounts prove that at least one street was lined with troops. Gaultier's statement that only one avenue was open to the hall seems to agree with Young's statement that soldiers were posted about the hall and were to be found in other streets for the purpose of closing all avenues but one to the deputies.

The second group under the Establishment of the Fact deals with cases of single affirmations. "In such cases, all other sciences," writes Seignobos, "follow an invariable rule; an isolated observation does not become a part of the science; it is cited (with the name of the observer), but no inference is drawn from it. Historians have no allowable motive for proceeding otherwise. When they have been able to establish a fact only by the affirmation of a single man, however honest he may be, they ought not to assert the fact, but simply do as the naturalists do, mention the information (Thucydides affirms, Caesar says that): it is all that they have a right to assert. As a matter of fact, all have continued the practice, as in the Middle Ages, of asserting a thing on the *authority* of Thucydides or of Caesar; many push their naiveté so far as to say it in so many words. Thus given over without scientific control to

their natural credulity, historians go to the point of admitting upon the insufficient presumption of a single source every affirmation that is not contradicted by another source. Hence the absurd consequence that history is more affirmative and seems better constituted for almost unknown periods, from which but a single record has been preserved, than for facts known to us by thousands of contradictory documents. The Persian Wars, known solely through Herodotus, the adventures of Fredegonda, narrated solely by Gregory of Tours, are less subject to discussion than the events of the Revolution described by hundreds of contemporaries." He may well add, "To draw history from this shameful condition, a revolution in the minds of historians is a necessity."

I have quoted Seignobos at length, because the point is of the utmost importance and because the case could hardly be stated more clearly and energetically than he has stated it. However, the turning point has been reached and the attitude of the best men is expressed by Holm in the preface to his *Griechische Geschichte* (I., page xi. 1886): "My history of Greece ought in the text to give an image of the existing material (sources), in that I express myself with certainty only when the sources permit, while, on the contrary, I express myself doubtfully when all or much is uncertain. Such is not the general practice to-day. But a historian of the first rank (Droysen) declared at the end of his life that he no longer recognized as correct the method, so favorable

to beautiful and powerful narration, that presented the results of investigation simply as historical facts.”

In historical writing, a readable narrative is not the all-important thing to which all else is sacrificed. The truth is the thing, and it is the sacred duty of the historian to follow the method of Holm and others and to make his text reflect the condition of his sources. When the narrative rests simply on the statements of a single man, the reader should know it, should know who the witness was, and should understand that such a state of things yields only probability and not certainty. How common the contrary practice is can easily be learned by rapidly examining standard histories of Greece and Rome. As a rule, facts stated with the utmost certainty are supported by a reference to a single source—and often this is only a *derived source*.

The third group, that dealing with cases of contradictory affirmations, alone remains to be considered. In such cases the contradictions are only apparent, and may be reconciled by a careful study. Such cases I shall pass over, and turn to the problems that deal with genuine contradictions.

The independence of the witnesses must be determined first of all. This study may dispose of the case, by proving the witnesses on the one side were not independent, as in the case cited above. But it may be necessary, before a conclusion can be reached, to submit all the witnesses to all the tests of external and in-

ternal criticism. The witnesses may be independent, but not equally well informed nor equally honest. In the case cited above, dealing with the Tennis Court, it is possible to set against these writers, making their records ten or more years after the event, writers favorable to the Commons, and making their records on the spot or a year or two afterward. Not only do they know nothing about the legend of the action of the Comte d'Artois, but they also give most satisfactory explanations for the change of meeting place on the 22d. The truth is the Tennis Court was not a fit place for an assembly. It was simply a bare hall—as bare as it is to-day—and, in addition to that, on the morning of the 22d was half filled with a curious public. In spite of all this, every standard history of the Revolution repeats this legend as if it were a historical fact.

If the evidence on either side is equally reliable, there is, as a rule, but one thing to be done: the historian must suspend judgment and announce that he can reach no definite results.

It is in this way that the suppositions and affirmations derived from the earlier work of criticism are compared and the facts established. With this process, the critical or analytical operations are brought to an end. The second or synthetic stage has been reached. The historian is ready for the constructive work or the *Auffassung*, as Bernheim calls it.

CHAPTER VIII.

SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS: IMAGINING THE FACTS, GROUPING THE FACTS, AND CONSTRUCTIVE REASONING.

THE divisions of method treated in the preceding chapters embrace the major part of "the rules and artifices" that, arranged systematically, constitute history a science. Heuristic (Quellenkunde or Preliminary Knowledge) and Criticism (External and Internal) forming, as they do, the first steps in method, and dealing with the least complex parts of the historical process, have received the most attention, have taken scientific shape, and are thus out of the field of dilettanteism. But this is not true of the later operations. While there is a general agreement as to what the work of criticism is and how this work can best be accomplished, the field of historical synthesis is largely unexplored territory. Historians do not agree as to the end, nor the means of reaching the end. Under these conditions, it is no cause for wonder that men, laying no claim to historical training, write so-called historical narratives, and that these narratives find acceptance on account of their literary, but not on account of their scientific, qualities.

The portion of Bernheim's *Lehrbuch* devoted to historical construction is the most unsatisfactory part of the whole book. Bernheim might, perhaps, justify himself by replying that his

purpose was simply to put into systematic form the results that have thus far been obtained. Seignobos, however, does more. This part of the *Introduction* is a real contribution to method.

It seems desirable, at this point, to again compare the arrangements of the two books and to outline the topics to be treated in this and the following chapters.

The third and fourth divisions in Bernheim, *Auffassung* and *Darstellung*, correspond fairly well to the *Opérations synthétiques* of Seignobos, but there are some points of difference that shou'd not be overlooked. Bernheim subdivides *Auffassung* into Interpretation, Kombination, Reproduktion und Phantasie, *Auffassung der allgemeinen Bedingungen* (conception of the *milieu*), *Geschichtsphilosophie* (Philosophy of History), and *Wesen der Auffassung* (Nature of *Auffassung*). *Darstellung* (Exposition) is not subdivided in the table of contents.

Seignobos subdivides *Opérations synthétiques* into *Conditions générales de la construction historique*, *Groupement des faits* (Grouping of the Facts), *Raisonnement constructif*, *Construction des formules générales*, *Exposition*.

I have shown in a previous chapter that while Bernheim treats Interpretation under *Auffassung*, Seignobos deals with it under Criticism. Grouping of the Facts, in Seignobos, corresponds to *Kritische Ordnung des Materials* (Critical Arrangement of the Material)—Bernheim's last division under Criticism—and to a part of *Kombination*; *Reproduktion und Phantasie*,

Seignobos deals with in his chapter on General Conditions of Historical Construction, but does not devote a whole chapter to it; a portion of the chapter on *Kombination* corresponds to *Raisonnement constructif*; Seignobos does not deal with the *Allgemeine Bedingungen* nor with *Geschichtsphilosophie*; Bernheim's *Darstellung* treats the same topic that Seignobos deals with in *Construction des formules generales* and in *Exposition*. If Seignobos' table of contents were complete, he would have a chapter on "Imagining the Facts."

Combining the topics treated in the two works, I shall consider in this and the remaining chapters the following subjects under the general head of Synthetic Operations: Imagining the Facts, Grouping the Facts, Constructive Reasoning, Environment, the Philosophy of History, Exposition.

The first three subjects form a natural group. The facts imagined and grouped and the gaps in the evidence filled by constructive reasoning—as far as possible—we have completed the narrower work of historical construction. It is this group that I shall deal with in the present chapter.

Criticism supplies us with isolated facts, but isolated facts do not constitute history. The facts must be organized and this organization must depend upon the character of the material. What is this material? A heterogeneous mass of simple statements, differing in generality, in certainty, and limited to a definite time and place.

This is the kind of material supplied by Criticism, and from it the historian must construct

his fabric. But how? He can not adopt the method of the natural sciences, for the student of nature can observe his facts directly, while the method of the historian—as was shown in the introductory chapter—must be that of indirect observation. The work of imagining and grouping the facts calls the fancy into play. It is the scientific fancy with which we have to do and not the poetic fancy.

The poet is free to create the material with which he works; the historian has his material given him and is limited by it, while he is free to combine it under the subjective categories of his mind. The uncontrolled imagination is a dangerous thing in history, and leads to false conceptions and combinations.

Before the facts can be combined, the historian must endeavor to see the isolated facts as the witness saw them. He must *imagine* the facts. Yet how *imagine* facts that will be real? The thing is possible only on the assumption of the identity of human nature.

If humanity in all ages did not have much in common, it would be impossible to reconstruct the past. For the material with which the historian works is not simply the heterogeneous facts drawn from the sources; he works also with the categories of his own brain. It is only through his own experience, analogous to the experience of men in the past, that he is able to picture to himself the events of the past.

But the past is not exactly like the present; in fact, it is the business of the historian to show that successive ages are unlike and to make

clear how they differ. The first image, then, that is aroused in his mind is generally incorrect and must be modified. The difficulty of imagining the facts obtained from the sources is largely due to the circumstance that they are psychical facts and described in inexact language. What is a "warrior," a "combat," a "king," or a "tribe"?

To picture to ourselves facts that we have not seen described in such unscientific language is a disheartening task, and yet this is what the historian must undertake to do. Moreover, all of the elements of the image can not be drawn from the sources. Attempt to picture to yourself one of the battles of Greek or Roman history making use only of source material? It is impossible. In imagining the event the historian makes a complete picture of it by drawing from his own experience: but he must never forget to distinguish between these two classes of material, and must base his later construction only upon the source elements.

Having imagined the facts, the next step is to group them. Here, again, the fancy plays an important part. In fact, while much of method may be taught, the great historian is the man who possesses in addition to technical training the genius that enables him to combine the facts. "I am an historian," said Niebuhr, "because I am able to construct a complete picture from the fragments that have been preserved." This is a power that few possess, but without it no lasting results are possible.

The simplest method of grouping the facts,

and the earliest employed, is to group chronologically facts of all kinds happening in the same place. It is the method followed for the most part by the old historians of Greece and Rome. The later and more scientific method is to base the construction upon the nature of the subject matter, to select and group together facts of the same kind. This has given us histories of law, religion, art, literature, etc. In order to treat the whole social fabric in this way, it is necessary to construct a set of questions or *questionnaire général*, as Seignobos calls it, "founded on the nature of the conditions and of the manifestations of activity." This *questionnaire* contains the following groups: I., Material Conditions; II., Intellectual Habits (not obligatory); III., Material Customs (not obligatory); IV., Economic Customs; V., Social Institutions; VI., Public Institutions (obligatory).

This method of grouping facts according to their nature may be combined with the first method of chronological and geographical grouping. Thus we might have the history of Greek art in the time of Pericles.

But a scheme that disposes of the facts common to many men and persisting through one or more centuries does not dispose of all the facts. There still remain the acts and words peculiar to certain individuals. What shall be done with them? What is the part that the individual plays in historical development? Is the life of society controlled by fixed laws and is the individual a helpless atom? These are

questions that divide the historians of the continent to-day, and in Germany they wage a war that is anything but merry. It is the old question of necessity and free will.

But, as Seignobos says, one may not take sides here. Both general and particular facts must be taken into account. History is explanatory of the real, and the real happens but once. There is but one evolution of society. In this evolution "the facts that succeed one another have been the product not of abstract laws, but of the conjuncture, at each moment, of many facts of different kinds. This conjuncture, sometimes called chance, has produced a series of accidents which have determined the particular march of the evolution. The evolution is intelligible only by the study of these accidents; history is here on the same footing with geology and palaeontology."

The history of Roman institutions would be unintelligible without a knowledge of the battle of Pharsalus.

"History is thus obliged to combine the study of general facts with the study of certain particular facts." This mixed character—half science, half narrative of adventures—has often given rise to the question, "Is history a science or an art?"

There are two kinds of facts, then, to be grouped: general facts and particular facts. I shall treat them in order.

In dealing with the general facts that treat of habits, manners, and customs, institutions, language, religion, etc., after deciding what habit

we shall study, it is necessary, first of all, to determine the group to which the habit belongs. The natural tendency is to assume that a group is made up of like units. Because a group of people talk the same language we are apt to think that the members of the group have everything else in common. A minute's reflection would make clear the falsity of this inference, "for no real group, not even a centralized society, is a homogeneous entity. What is the group of people that talk Greek, the Christian group, the group of modern science? The English nation consists of Gauls, Scots, and Irish; the Catholic church consists of the faithful scattered throughout the entire world and differing in everything except religion." The Swiss are united in government, but are divided in language (French, German, Italian) and in religion (Catholic and Protestant). Think of the bewildering way in which the groups, made up of individuals with one or more habits in common, overlap in the United States!

We must know, then, what people compose the group; by what bonds they are united; what activities they have in common, and in what they differ. This study will show us for what a group may serve. For the study of language, religion, etc., we would not select a national group.

But even when a group has some habit in common, the group is not homogeneous; there are subdivisions. Language is divided into dialects and religion into sects. It is necessary to determine the subdivision of each group.

When all the habits of a society have been studied, the society as a whole must be examined in its relation to other societies of the same time. "This is the study of international institutions, intellectual, economic, and political (diplomacy and the usages in war). * * * To all this it would be necessary to add the study of habits common to many societies and relations that do not take on an official form."

All this gives us nothing more than a description of society in repose. History, however, treats of society in motion, evolving. It is necessary to trace the manner in which these institutions change. The steps in this process are: (1) The choice of the fact whose evolution is to be traced; (2) the period of the evolution; (3) the successive steps; and (4) the means by which the evolution has been brought about.

The particular facts, the accidents of history, still remain to be treated. They are "the facts that have acted upon the evolution of each of the habits of humanity." All of these facts taken together, classed by order of time and country, would bind together the special histories of the institutions and give a picture of the "ensemble of historic evolution." But *all* of the facts can not be described. Which shall be chosen? Those without which the evolution can not be described. The fact in itself may have been small; the effect produced may have been decisive, and the effect is the all-important thing.

Both in special histories (the study of habits) and in general histories (the study of decisive

accidents) it is necessary to mark the stages in the evolution, to divide it into periods. This is done by means of events. For the special history, an event that has produced the formation or the change of a habit becomes the commencement or end of a period. Here the event is generally of the same species as those that form the object of the study, while in general history the periods embrace the evolution of several kinds of facts.

The Migrations, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the French Revolution were all-embracing in their effect on society.

The periods thus formed are of unequal length. For evolution is not regular and a period of slow uneventful evolution is often followed by an age of rapid, dramatic transformation.

This rapid, fragmentary presentation of the grouping of the facts is necessarily unsatisfactory. The most exhaustive treatise would leave but abstract conceptions in the mind of the reader when unaccompanied by the study of typical cases. If we would learn how to group material, we must not only try our own hands at it, but we must study the works of successful historians. Seignobos' "*Histoire politique de l'Europe contemporaine*,"* is an excellent example, because it enables us to see how well he applies his own theory. The preface contains a discussion of the kinds of classification—log-

* The work is being translated and will be published by Henry Holt & Co.

ical, chronological, and geographical—and the advantages of each.

In the work, the three kinds of classifications are combined. In the first part, the geographical order is followed and the interior history of each state is studied separately and successively; in the second part, the logical order is employed and the political phenomena common to the different European societies are grouped together; in the third part, the chronological order is used, and the exterior relations of the states considered. The volume deserves a careful study as a successful attempt at scientific grouping.

The picture formed by grouping the facts would be much less complete, if we had only the material that criticism furnished us. In this material, there are many gaps. These gaps become noticeable during the work of grouping the facts, and the historian endeavors to meet this difficulty by constructive reasoning. "We set out from the facts made known to us by the sources, in order to infer new facts. If the reasoning is correct, this method of obtaining knowledge is legitimate."

It is, however, a dangerous method, if not employed with the greatest care. Seignobos makes the following valuable suggestions concerning the control of the method:

(1) Never mix up reasoning with the analysis of a source; (2) never confound the facts drawn directly from the sources with facts obtained by reasoning; (3) never reason unconsciously, but put the argument into logical form

and the fallacy is easily detected; (4) if there is the least doubt about the soundness of the reasoning, draw no conclusions; (5) never attempt to turn a conjecture (No. 4) into a certainty by dwelling upon it. Too long reflection upon a few sources renders the conjecture familiar and at last plausible. The chances are that the first impression is correct.

There are two ways of employing constructive reasoning: negative and positive. Negative reasoning, or the "argument from silence," has already been dealt with. Positive reasoning starts with a fact found in the sources and infers a fact not found there. A good illustration is given by Bernheim; we find in a certain document, dated May 10, that the Bishop of Wormes signs himself, "Wormatiensiselectus;" a document, dated May 16, bears the signature, "Wormatiensis episcopus." From these facts we infer the additional facts, that between the 10th and 16th the bishop elect was consecrated. We infer more. We know that it was customary for such a ceremony to fall on Sunday or a festival day; computation shows that the 12th was Sunday, and we infer that the bishop was confirmed May 12.

That this positive reasoning may be exact, it is necessary: (1) that the general proposition should be exact, that is, "the two facts that it assumes to be bound together ought to be of such a nature that the first is never found without the second;" of this we may be certain only when we operate with detailed propositions; (2) "That the general proposition may be detailed, the particular historical fact must itself

be known in detail." The conditions of reliable positive construction are rarely realized. "We know too little about the laws of social life and too rarely the precise details of an historical fact."

These are the steps in the synthetic operations that are included in the group to which this chapter is devoted. Having treated the Imagining of the Facts, the Grouping of the Facts, and Constructive Reasoning, I shall consider in the next chapter the Environment and the Philosophy of History.

CHAPTER IX.

SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS: ENVIRONMENT AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

THERE was a time, and that not long ago, when a work on method would have been complete without the treatment of such questions as Environment and the Philosophy of History. But that day is past. The historian of to-day realizes that it is not only necessary to consider each event as a link in a chain of events—if he would understand the particular event—but that he must also possess a knowledge of the physical, psychical, and social conditions that form the environment of the events. But the sciences dealing with these conditions are in a formative state and can furnish only scanty assistance. Anthropogeography, anthropology, ethnology, individual and social psychology, and sociology will transform historical work when they themselves have reached a more advanced stage of development. Under the influence of these sciences, synthetic historical work will, in the future, become scientific in its turn, and another important field will be rescued from dilettanteism.

The influence of geography upon the development of society is recognized by historians and, as a rule, every history of a people is prefaced by a chapter upon the geography of the country. But this a rather poor makeshift. It is almost equivalent to the presenta-

tion of crude material to be worked over by the readers. The question that interests the student of history is "What influence did the geography of the country have upon the history of its people?" That question can not be answered by a simple description of the natural features of the country; it can not be answered once for all by an introductory chapter. The study of the relation of man to his geographical environment must go hand in hand with the description of the acts that were conditioned by that environment.

In dealing with this subject, it must never be forgotten (1) that the historic races did not originate in the environment in which we find them, and (2) that man is not passive clay to be moulded by his physical surroundings.

No attempt should be made to explain the brilliant history of the Greeks from the geography of Greece alone. There is no way of determining how long the Greeks had been in Greece previous to the recorded beginnings of their history. It is very certain, however, that when they migrated to this country the people bore with them tribal characteristics, inherited from ancestors, who had been for thousands of years subject to natural influences in other places. How much, then, that we find in Greek character is due to the environment in Greece and how much to the earlier environment of the ancestors of the Greeks, we shall never be able to determine. Suppose, for an instant, that the records that made it possible to explain the presence of the negroes in our south-

ern states were lost. What success would the historian have that attempted to explain the characteristics of these people from the environment in which they find themselves to-day?

Human beings, moreover, are not like chemical atoms; the same external causes, acting on different human aggregates produce unlike effects. To one people, a sea would be a barrier; to another, it is the threshold to a new world. The character of a people must, then, be always counted with. Certain natural conditions are capable of producing such and such effects if the right people is brought into contact with them. This power of reaction differs not only from people to people but in the same people from time to time. How unwise it is to attribute too great an influence to natural environment is nowhere better illustrated than in the history of Greece. The same sea and sky, the same mountains and transparent atmosphere, but how different the results to-day! If the physical environment of the Greek has not changed, the social environment certainly has.

One of the common fallacies encountered in the consideration of this matter of the relation of geography to the evolution of man in society is the belief that man emancipates himself by degrees from the influence of his physical environment. According to this theory, the barbarian is more dependent upon nature than the man of civilization. This statement of the case does not make clear the true situation. The savage is bound to nature by few and slender bonds; the civilized man by many and

strong bonds. The latter makes more use of nature than the former. He has a greater variety of resources; when one fails him the others serve him. The farmer who plants but a single crop and sees it perish from lack of moisture is no less dependent upon nature than the savage, who, living from the natural rice of the swamp, is driven to the verge of starvation by the first wind that strips the plants.

These two limitations made, it is certain that geographical environment plays a vastly important role in human history. It affects both the conditions and the acts of men. It affects their bodies through climate and their minds through startling natural phenomena. It impels men of the North to the warm lands of the South and controls the direction of the movement by river valleys (natural highways) or checks it by high mountains. It makes impossible the development of a high civilization upon islands of the ocean (lack of space); it enriches and develops science by the struggle with nature, dictates man's clothing and even his social organization (social and political division of the inhabitants of a desert). All of these things are not history, but they make history intelligible. For however great the psychical development of man may be in the future, it will always rest upon a physical foundation, and this physical side must inevitably link him to his geographical environment.

But if the historian turns on the one side to the geographer for aid, he turns on the other to the psychologist. Historical acts are noth-

ing else than the "expression of human feeling, conceiving and willing, the activities of that psychophysical unit that we call the soul or the mind." Simmel (*Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Berlin, 1892, p. 33) calls psychology the "apriori of historical science." It is clearly important, then, that the historian should understand something about the psychical conditions under which the individual or society—in part or in whole—act. Not that such general knowledge will enable him to determine what particular psychological fact happened at a given time and place, but that he will be able to tell what psychological facts could *not* have taken place under given conditions and he will be helped in the interpretation of the facts.

The common use of collective terms such as the state, the church, society, culture, corporations has tended to obscure the fact that all historical acts are the result of the feeling, conceiving, and willing, of individuals. However important social psychology may be it should never lead us to undervalue the importance for the historian of a knowledge of the psychology of the individual.

Such knowledge has always been possessed and applied, in some degree, by historians. It was, however, "an instinctive knowledge of the universal identity of human feeling, thinking, and willing," that the ordinary man makes use of in his attempts to understand the acts of others; and furthermore an empirical knowledge of their own mental life, combined with

the empirical knowledge of the soul life of others drawn from reading and experience.

This knowledge was employed, for the most part, in supplying motives for acts when these motives were not given by tradition. Such work is most difficult. Its successful accomplishment depends upon the ability to put one's self in the place of the historical personage and to feel and think as he felt and thought. The fact that like outward acts are often due to different inward motives renders the attempt to infer these motives a very delicate operation. Robespierre favored the Hebertists and they attached themselves to him. An Italian nobleman had his enemies in his power and instead of destroying them he dismissed them with gifts; they felt insulted and planned to take his life.

But the empirical knowledge of psychological conditions should be widened and deepened by the scientific study of the mind, and not by the study of the sound mind only, but also of the diseased mind. The whole attitude toward certain classes of phenomena, such as religious exaltation and hallucinations, has been changed by psychical research. All the historical processes of interpretation, combination, and reproduction are conditioned by mental laws and the study of these processes can never lead to the best results if the laws are not taken into account.

It has been shown in a previous chapter that the work of interpretation and combination not only calls for a knowledge of the individual

psychical, but also of the social-psychical conditions, or the conditions of mind having their roots in the relations of men with one another. Whether we look upon these conditions as the manifestations of a social mind (*Volksgeist*) matters little; the important thing is that the living together of men in society produces results that are not simply the mechanical total of individual sensations and thoughts; there is an additional something characteristic of the whole. No better illustration can be given than the language of a people. It is a product of the social spirit. All have contributed to its growth, some consciously, others unconsciously, but of all it may be said "Was er webt, das weiss kein Weber" (The weaver knows not what he weaves.) The national consciousness, although it exists only in the sensations and conceptions of individuals, yet constitutes a peculiar whole and exercises a peculiar influence. The consciousness that the same general conception of the fatherland lives in the minds of millions of other men and women preserves and even increases the patriotism of the individual. Since, then, social relations call forth peculiar psychical effects, these effects may reasonably constitute matter for investigation and the field may be set aside under the head of social psychology.

Although the science has been born it is still an infant. So little has been accomplished that the historian is obliged to do for himself the work that will be done in the future by an auxiliary science. Through his own investiga-

tions, he must win for himself the necessary knowledge of the social-psychical conditions. He must appreciate the distinctions of time and locality when dealing with the past. Difficult as it is to appreciate justly the social-psychical conditions of contemporaries who may be directly observed—like the French, Germans, and Italians—it becomes infinitely more difficult to deal successfully with past ages that can be studied only indirectly through the sources.

Only through a knowledge of the social-psychical conditions can the historian determine what is peculiar to the individual and what the common property of the age in which he lived. Who would undertake to speak with authority of the work of a great artist without having first acquainted himself with the condition of that particular art in the age in which the artist lived? There is no commandment of good historical work that is more frequently violated than the commandment that the writer shall acquaint himself with the spirit of the age in which the events that he would narrate took place. And what wonder? The man who undertakes to familiarize himself with the social-psychical conditions before describing the events that were conditioned by them often finds that life is too short for the completion of his task.

A knowledge of the geographical, the individual-psychical and social-psychical conditions is not all that constitutes an acquaintance with man's environment. Every individual born into an advanced society finds himself surrounded

by the vast accumulations inherited from past ages. Probably the great superiority of the civilized man over the savage is due in a very large degree to this fact. Imagine the child of cultured parents transferred immediately after birth to the care of African negroes and reared in their midst. A little reflection will show that the wide chasm between his real life and the life that he might have led was due to the absence of culture accumulations among the Africans. How great a blunder Buckle committed in failing to take into account the culture conditions can be readily seen. While it is true that the culture products are the results of historical events, they should, nevertheless, be treated as independent factors in all historical problems, because no historical development has ever taken place that has not been influenced by some existing culture conditions.

These culture conditions act, for the most part, almost like geographical conditions, since they are not subject to important changes through the arbitrary acts of individuals or of particular generations. Some, it is true, are more changeable than others. The constitution of a state is more easily changed than the language of the people. The culture conditions, moreover, do not influence all alike. "The sun shines equally upon the just and the unjust, the educated and the ignorant, the rich and the poor;" the literature of a people exerts a powerful influence upon a few, a slight influence upon many. Then again the influence of all the culture products is not the same.

The form of the state affects all in much the same manner, while the influence of language, art, and science differs from individual to individual and from group to group.

The consideration of the culture conditions has been neglected in the past together with the other elements of the environment. In certain epochs their influence has been so great that the historian could not fail to count with them. But the treatment of economic conditions in connection with the French Revolution, of art in the Age of Pericles, of literature in the period of the Renaissance and of religion in the period of the Reformation does not satisfy the just demands of this element in the environment. The ideal of the historian—perhaps an impossible ideal—must be to consider the culture conditions as acting continuously and regularly, not spasmodically, upon the historical evolution, and to trace their influence not only upon the events but their mutual influence on each other.

Such are the elements of the environment in which the historical events take place. With this environment the historian must acquaint himself and under the influence of it his narrative must be written. The labor of the great historians can be appreciated only by those who realize how much time must be given to the simple effort to reach a point of vantage from which the event may be seen in its true light.

From the historical environment the step is but a short one to the philosophy of history.

It should be noted first of all that there is a distinct difference between *philosophical history*—a narrative with philosophical reflections—and the *philosophy of history*. The first may contain a sweeping, comprehensive view of universal history, but so long as it retains its descriptive character it falls short of the philosophy of history. For the philosophy of history deals not with the description of historical events, but with the consideration of the universal and fundamental conditions and processes upon which the historical development rests. If the historical events are introduced at all, it should be simply as illustrative material.

The content of the philosophy of history consists of a distinct group of problems, and these problems must evidently have to do with history or the evolution of man in society. But what are these problems? An examination of the history of the philosophy of history from Augustine to Lotze makes clear that all the problems that have presented themselves may be grouped under two main heads: (1) How is the historical evolution brought about? and (2) What are the results and what the significance of the historical evolution? In other words, it is the business of the philosophy of history to investigate the factors of historical evolution and the value of the results of the evolution.

The analysis of the factors leads to the three groups of general conditions that have already been treated. The relation of these factors to one another and to the historical evolution must, if possible, be determined. In the fur-

ther analysis of the factors, a new set of problems presents itself. Is this psychical being, the individual of history, a free being? Can any freedom of the will exist in a society where evolution is controlled by natural law? Is this belief in the freedom of the will simply self deception and is the individual absolutely dependent upon external powers or forces? And here we rise to the problem of problems. What is the motive force in all history? Is it the struggle between good and evil that has been going on since the fall of man and will continue until the last judgment? (So thought the philosophers of the Middle Ages.) Is it the hand of a personal God, who by rewards and punishment leads man on to ever higher destinies? Or is it the divine idea that has been placed in the germ in the soul of man, to be developed organically in history? Is it the manifestation of the God idea itself? Is history simply the unfolding of the immanent world-spirit? Are the natural laws only the form in which the inner, spontaneous will impulses outwardly realize themselves? Do natural laws alone control history? Or is it all accident?

These problems concerning the factors of evolution lead naturally to the problems dealing with the value of the results of evolution. Can we prove that one of the results has been the perfecting of man and the improving of his condition? If so, has this progress been regular and universal? Have all the social elements been equally active and equally developed, or has the evolution been onesided?

Are all the elements capable of participating in progress, the moral and artistic equally with the intellectual? Are all peoples called to take part in this progress or are there a chosen few? Can we even say that only certain classes in certain peoples are the sharers of this culture? Finally, what is the measure of progress or of regress?

The problems of the factors and values stated above have been answered again and again but no satisfactory solution, no solution that does justice to all the conditions of the problem, has yet been presented. Many of the failures, up to the present time, have been due to bad method. The most of the work has been done by men defective in historical training, who have not hesitated to do violence to the facts in order to justify their theories. The philosophy of history in the future must rest on the science of history and grow out of it. It will develop as our knowledge of history develops and its aim will be to comprehend historical facts as regarded from the most universal point of view, that of general human evolution, that of humanity itself.

CHAPTER X.

SYNTHETIC OPERATIONS: EXPOSITION.

IN the preceding chapters, I have described the process by which an historian discovers the source material related to his subject and obtains the use of it; I have explained the critical examination to which the material, when found, must be submitted to determine its genuineness, to localize, and to analyze it; I have indicated the method for determining the value of the sources admitted as evidence and for establishing the facts contained in the sources; finally, I have shown how the facts must be imagined and grouped, the gaps in the evidence filled in by constructive reasoning, the physical, psychical, and social environment constructed and the factors and processes of historical development (philosophy of history) be understood.

It remains for the historian to communicate to others the results of his research. This last topic is treated by Bernheim under the head *Darstellung* and by Seignobos in the two chapters entitled *Construction des formules générales* and *Exposition*. In his two chapters, Seignobos really treats more topics than are embraced in Bernheim's *Darstellung*. The first chapter deals with the subject matter of *Darstellung* and adds a few words on the philosophy of history; the chapter on *Exposition* is devoted

to the question of scientific form in the narrative and is not treated by Bernheim.

The problem of *Exposition* or *Darstellung* is by no means simply a question of style, although, as Seignobos says, "il n'y a pas d'historien complet sans une 'bonne langue," and the reason is that "pour atteindre des faits aussi fuyants que les faits sociaux, une langue ferme et précise est un instrument indispensable." But the need of a good command of language, of a power to use exact, scientific expressions in dealing with facts as elusive as social facts, is not the topic to be emphasized in this chapter; we have to do here with a question of a more difficult nature, namely, how may the results of the investigation be communicated, *in as correct a manner as possible*, to others?

Not all the results can be communicated. However limited the topic of investigation, not all the results of that investigation can possibly be presented in all their fullness of detail. An historian who attempted to communicate all the facts that he had found concerning the life of Napoleon would never find readers. It is a practical question. Obligated to choose between "being complete and unknowable or of being knowable and incomplete," historical synthesis naturally decided in favor of the latter.

If not all the results of the investigation can be communicated, it follows that there must be condensation and this condensation must be performed in such a manner that the narrative will, as far as possible, correspond to the re-

ality as it appeared to the investigator. The relation of the narrative to the mass of conceptions contained in the views of the man who has seen the evidence first-hand has been compared by Bernheim to the relation of the piano arrangement of a great orchestral work to the work itself. The idea is easily grasped; the execution of the idea is unusually difficult. To condense, to omit unimportant details, to retain the right proportions in the condensed material, is a thing calling for an infinite amount of skill.

The selection of the material must depend upon the theme. Details omitted from a universal history would find place in the history of a state, of a province, or of an individual. In a church history, one kind of material would be emphasized, in an industrial history another. A good historian may learn much in the matter of composition from the artist, for the good historical narrative is characterized by boldness of execution and subordination of details.

The most helpful thing that has yet been written on condensation is Seignobos' excellent chapter entitled *Construction des formules générales*. "History," he writes, "to become a science, must elaborate the raw material found in the facts. It should condense the facts into descriptive formulae, both qualitative and quantitative. It should search for the relations between the facts, relations that form the last conclusion of every veritable science." Historical facts, human facts can not be reduced to a few simple formulae like chemical formulae, but

“history, as well as all sciences of life, has need of descriptive formulæ to express the character of the different phenomena.” The formula should be short that it may be manageable; precise, that it may give an exact idea of the fact. Yet brevity and precision conflict. To obtain brevity, we must eliminate details, while characteristic details alone give precise knowledge of human events. A compromise is necessary; all that is not strictly necessary must be suppressed, but the work of suppression must cease when it leads to the sacrifice of characteristic traits. If the demands of precision are lost sight of, “all history is reduced to a mass of vague generalities, uniform for all time, with the exception of some proper names and dates.”

In constructing these formulæ one would do well to “employ as often as possible concrete and descriptive terms; their meaning is always clear.” That is to say, “collective groups should be described by collective names and not by abstract substantives (as monarchy, state, democracy, reformation, revolution).” When a word or a group of words constituting a formula is employed, there should be no uncertainty as to the meaning that attaches to them. What different meanings attach to the word monarch when applied to Clovis, Louis XI., Louis XIV., Louis XVI., and Louis Philip! This misunderstanding may be avoided by a description of the term when first used. Such a device may mar the artistic unity of the narrative, but the historian is primarily a scien-

tist and only secondarily an artist. Belloc's "Danton" (1899) is a good illustration of the compulsion that the historian feels to make his general terms convey a precise meaning. Tacitus would have won the eternal gratitude of students of the Middle Ages had he but indicated the meaning that attached to abstract Latin substantives when used to describe primitive German life.

After dividing his formulae into two classes, qualitative and quantitative, Seignobos subdivides his qualitative formulae into (1) those descriptive of general facts (habits and evolutions) and (2) unique facts (events).

"General facts consist of acts often repeated and common to many men. Their *character*, *extent*, and *duration* must be determined."

To determine the character, the common traits of a usage or institution are drawn from many individual cases and expressed in a formula; the individual variations are neglected. Serfdom in a certain period of the Middle Ages, the city life of a like period, might be treated in this way. If the usage is that of language, laws, regulations, etc., it should never be forgotten that formulae of this kind express only superficial facts; "in language the written words, not the pronunciation; in religion, the dogmas and official rites, not the real beliefs of the mass of the people. * * * In all of these cases the knowledge of conventional formulae should be supplemented some day by a study of the real habits."

To determine the extent of a habit, one de-

termines the area of its distribution and the point where it is most practiced; for its duration, the time of its first and last appearance and the epoch of its greatest activity must be noted.

In the case of unique facts many can not be united under the same formula, and it is necessary to decide what facts shall be sacrificed. Personal taste should not determine the choice of facts to be retained. There is but one standard that may be employed, and that is the role played by the fact in human affairs. "Persons and events that have clearly influenced the march of evolution must be preserved. The mark by which one recognizes them is that the evolution could not be described without making mention of them."

In constructing the formula for an individual we must draw our traits from his biography and habits; from his biography we learn the physiological, educational, and social influences under which he lived; from his habits we form an idea of his conception of life, his dominant tastes, his habitual actions, and his rules of conduct. From all these details, we form a portrait or formula of the individual.

To construct the formula for an event, we must fix its character and extent. The character consists of the traits that distinguish this event from all others. The formula should contain the following points: one or more individuals, impelled by certain motives, working in the midst of certain material conditions (lo-

cality, instruments), performed certain acts, and the acts produced a certain modification of society. The extent of the event should show the region where it occurred and that affected by it, together with the moment when the action began and that when it was finished.

The formulae of quality should be supplemented by those of quantity. The five methods employed in formulating quantity as given by Seignobos are (1) measurement (psychological facts can not be measured), (2) enumeration, (3) evaluation, (4) sampling, (5) generalization. They decrease in exactness from the first to the last.

There are certain dangers to be guarded against in the employment of each method.

In the second, it should be noted that the method of statistics applies to facts that have in common a definite character of which use is made that the facts may be counted. These facts, however, are not homogeneous and may have but one thing in common (crimes, suicides, workmen, strikes). The danger is that the statistician may believe that he has described the facts with scientific precision, when he has only counted them.

Evaluation is an enumeration covering a portion of the field and based upon the assumption that the same proportion holds good in the rest of the field of investigation. The results are unreliable if it is not known that the portion examined is exactly similar to the other portions of the field.

“Sampling,” that consists in making an enumeration of units taken from different portions of the field of investigation, is of value when the samples are representative of the whole. They should be taken from very different points and from groups living under very different conditions, that the exceptions may balance one another.

“Generalization is only an instinctive method of simplification.” It is unconsciously applied in dealing with all complex human events. It is an unconscious “sampling.” It may be rendered correct by submitting it to the conditions of “sampling.” To generalize correctly one must (1) indicate the field of generalization (country, group, class, epoch); (2) be sure that all the facts generalized upon are similar in all the points concerned; (3) be certain that the cases selected are types, and (4) take care that the cases considered are more numerous as the points of resemblance are less numerous.

The descriptive formulae, qualitative and quantitative, do not represent the last stage of the synthetic operations: Still larger groups, more general formulae must be constructed. In forming groups more and more general, the procedure is the same as that described above. At each step in advance some of the characteristics of the smaller groups are dropped until at last only universal human characteristics remain. In this manner, the formulae for a language, a religion, a society, or an event are constructed. When this condensation can be carried no farther, the attempt may be made to

classify the groups by comparison. The two methods of classification suggested by Seignobos are (1) comparison of similar categories of special facts, such as languages, religions, and arts, and (2) comparison of "real groups of real individuals." The first is "an abstract classification that isolates one species of facts from all others;" the second is "a concrete classification similar to the classifications in zoology, when not the functions but the animal forms are classified." The difficulty with this last classification is due to the disagreement as to the characters that should constitute the basis of resemblance: shall they be political, economic, intellectual, or religious? Upon this point no agreement has been reached.

The problem of problems still remains unsolved: How to classify all of the groups or formulae and thus construct a grand ensemble embracing all human society. Some historians say that it is impossible, but it continues to be an ideal worth striving for. It is clear that these groups are not isolated in reality and that a change in one brings about a change in the others. If there is unity (*Zusammenhang*), it will be possible in time to construct the formula for this unity.

Having formulated the results of the investigation it simply remains for the historian to commit these formulae to paper. Here we touch one of the weak points in historical work. The fact that the writing of history has so often been left to men with no scientific training, men whose main purpose was to write

to entertain, and who repeatedly sacrificed the truth in their effort to please—sacrificed the truth because it was commonplace and unattractive—this fact has made it difficult for the historical narrative to take on a scientific form. It has been said too often that a historical work should be a work of art. The thing may be absolutely impossible. The completeness and attractiveness of the work depend upon the quantity of the sources and the character of the sources. Both of these things are beyond the control of the investigator. The first demand made upon the historian is to tell the truth, to tell us exactly what he knows and what he does not know. If there are any gaps in the evidence, it is his business to point them out. We should remember that he is not an infallible authority speaking from inspiration, but just a plain fallible man who should be required to prove every statement that he makes.

The demand for proof is not made by the general public; it must be made by the body of historical students. What right have untrained men, who have not mastered the subject of which they speak, what moral right have these men to publish histories for the education of the multitude? None whatever. It is simply a business proposition. These popular histories in four or five large volumes are the dime novels of historical literature. It should be the business of teachers and writers of history to put an end to the existence of such works by creating a taste for something better. This work may be done in two ways: (1) by prepar-

ing histories that are at the same time popular and sound (Adams' Civilization of the Middle Ages), (2) by training in historical study in the schools. The teachers of history must be students of history, and the boys and girls must be taught what proof is in history just as they are taught what proof is in mathematics and the other sciences. Having learned what historical proof is they must be trained to give it themselves and to demand it of others.

The historical narrative must, then, take on a scientific form when it is written for students. The sources of information must be indicated and evidence exactly cited in support of general statements. The writer must do his work in such a way that the reader may be able to control his every statement. Less time will be wasted when this rule is rigorously followed. What would we think of an investigator in chemistry who gave only results, made no mention of the processes by which results were reached, and carefully destroyed all traces of his methods as soon as his work was accomplished? We should hardly credit him with common sense. And yet that is just the course that many historians have pursued in the past, and that many are pursuing to-day. Many of the instructors in our colleges by their irrational methods of instruction are cultivating that sort of thing with their students, and until these teachers develop a scientific conscience this state of things is likely to continue.

The task that I set myself in the opening

chapter has been accomplished. I then stated my belief that there would never be better teaching of history until there are more students of history among the teachers. It was that conviction that led to this attempt to present in a brief outline the substance of the method of historical research as found in the works of Bernheim and of Langlois and Seignobos. If it opens the eyes of any teacher to the necessity of this training and leads them on to study the works that I have so constantly cited, I shall have done all that I hoped to do.

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