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OUTLINES OF GENERAL PHILOLOGY

LONDON : PRINTED BY  
SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE  
AND PARLIAMENT STREET

OUTLINES  
OF  
GENERAL OR DEVELOPMENTAL  
PHILOLOGY

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*INFLECTION*

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BY

R. G. LATHAM, M.A., M.D.

LATE FELLOW OF KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; AND LATE PROFESSOR OF  
ENGLISH, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON

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## P R E F A C E.

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THE present work is the 'Outline' rather than the full exposition of the subject upon which it treats. And it is an outline of the *Method* of investigation rather than a collection of any specific results. Moreover, it is a work on General, or Developmental, rather than upon Comparative, Philology. In the latter branch of study there is no want of valuable works, and a fair amount of well authenticated and generally recognised details. In respect to the growth, development, and *à fortiori*, the origin and general character of Language, there are fewer works, fewer recognised facts, fewer trustworthy principles of criticism, and, not unnaturally, much more speculation.

The two principles which, in the present treatise, have carried the writer farthest are—(1.) That of beginning with the languages of the present time, and arguing from them backwards, *i.e.*, from the more familiar to the unfamiliar, from the more certain to the less uncertain. Theoretically, then, the best languages to begin with are those in the most advanced state of development; inasmuch as they have the longest history, and, as a rule, the greatest amount of material

for its investigation. The language, however, which everyone best understands is his own, whatever it may be: and this is really the starting-point in every philological investigation, either actual or possible. To an Englishman, the difference fortunately is unimportant, because his language is both the one which he knows best, and the one that belongs to the most advanced stage of development. It is, always, it may be said safer to argue in this way, *i.e.*, from the known to the unknown rather than *vice versâ*: and there is no doubt but that such is the case. There are degrees, however, in the danger or difficulty of reversing the process: and if there is one subject of human knowledge which is more dangerous and difficult to investigate *à priori* than another, that subject is the growth and origin of language.

(2.) The second point is the necessity of looking more closely to the idea than to the expression of it. The former is the thought itself, the latter the sounds by which it is communicated to the person spoken to. The thought is the same throughout all languages and in every stage of each. The manner, however, in which it clothes itself in words or syllables differs with the conditions of time and place. In a word like ‘*γέγραφα*’ and a combination like ‘*I have written*,’ the expression is different both in the form and the principle of its formation. But the idea is the same, *viz.*, that of a certain action done in time past, but continued in its actual or possible operation up to the time of speaking, or time present. In like manner the differences be-

tween one and more than one; between male and female; between time past, time present, and time future; between certainty and contingency; between being an agent and being an object in an action, are universal. Of the combinations of sounds that express them the name is Legion. With the idea, then, so far as we have a clear conception of its nature, we have a certainty and a unity; with the guise it may take in language we have any amount of variety.

In the familiar terms *Person, Voice, Number, Case, Tense, Gender* and *Mood*, we have these mental conceptions not only recognised as such, but classified, named, and defined, converted, so to say, into categories. The signs of them are their Inflections. What those are taken by themselves, is taught as Etymology; how they stand to one another, we learn from Syntax. Of these two divisions it is only the former that deals in single words. In Etymology, moreover, it is the chief questions which are connected with the Inflections. There are other details in this division besides these; but Inflection gives us the most important of them: and to see our way to the origin and structure of this is to get an adequate conception of the most difficult problem in Language, save and except the mysterious one of its earliest infancy and origin—and even this, when the general character of its later history is known, is no illegitimate subject of speculation.

That the vast majority of Inflections originated as separate and independent words, first combined as compounds, and subsequently modified in form, in import,

or in both, may safely be assumed as the dominant opinion ; so that the extent to which they are reducible to elements of this kind is the leading question in the present investigation. These elements we are bound to seek, though we may fail to find them. Nor are our *data* wholly inadequate. There are three stages in the development of Language which are generally recognised, and for which we have three (perhaps four) current names—the *Analytic and Synthetic* represented, in different degrees of progress, by the languages of the Indo-European class, the *Agglutinate*, and the *Mono-syllabic*. Any pretence to exhaust the *data* thus supplied is out of the question. A short general view of the characters of the three stages, with an exposition of the chief materials that serve for the illustration of each of them, and an occasional instance of an Inflection reduced, or shown to be reducible, to its elements, is as much as the writer, in a short work like the present, can attempt, and he doubts whether he could do much more in a larger one. It is with these limitations that he wishes his book, though it bears a somewhat ambitious title, to be read. It is to the principles of the processes by which languages are changed, rather than to the changes themselves, that he chiefly refers. In the way of detail he limits himself to those that may serve as examples or illustrations. These he selects as he best can ; and when they either illustrate a rule, or explain a condition of thought, he makes much of them—sometimes, perhaps, too much. But this is about all that can be done safely.

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
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In p. 34, § 94. The meaning of the Laplandic verb *lånom* is not given. It is in English *loose*, or *loosen*, Danish *løse*, Greek  $\lambdaύω$ , Latin *luo* and *solvo*.



# ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.



## PART I.

SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS—MATERIALS FOR THE  
STUDY OF THE SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC  
STAGES OF LANGUAGE—AGGLUTINATION—SE-  
LECTED MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THIS  
STAGE—MONOSYLLABICISM—MATERIALS.

### SECTION I.

ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.—INFLECTION.

§ 1. WE know what is meant by the Numbers, Cases, and Genders of the Latin Nouns; we know what is meant by the Voices, Moods, Tenses, and Persons of their Verbs; and, finally, we know that all our examples of these parts of speech, and their like, are *single* words as '*homini*,' '*hominibus*,' '*scripseram*,' and dozens of others. Yet every one of these single words, when we translate it into English, requires more words than one to render it intelligibly; e.g. for '*homini*' we must say '*to (a) man*'; for '*hominibus*,' '*to men*'; for '*scripseram*,' '*I had written*'; and so on through a large portion of the grammar. Nevertheless, there is no part of the words '*homini*' and '*hominibus*' that exactly translates the preposition '*to*;' neither is there any syllable in words like '*scripseram*' which translates '*had*.'

§ 2. Yet we know what we are doing; and we understand the import of the difference. We know that, though

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in *form* the two modes of expression may be widely different from one another, they are absolutely identical in meaning, and that they both convey the same idea, though the language in which it is clothed may be different. In short, the Latin expresses by single words what the English expresses by the combination of more words than one. In Latin, the Nouns have more Cases than we have in English; and, for those signs of Case which are wanting, the English substitutes a Preposition. In Latin, the Verbs, moreover, have more Tenses than the English; and, for those signs of Tense that are wanting with us, we substitute certain words—‘*be,*’ ‘*am,*’ ‘*have*’—and these are called Auxiliars, or Auxiliary Verbs.

§ 3. The system of the Numbers, Genders, and Cases of Nouns, is called *Declension*; and Nouns are said to be *declined*. That of Voices, Moods, Tenses, Numbers, and Persons with Verbs, is called *Conjugation*; and Verbs are said to be *conjugated*. The Conjugation of the Verb and the Declension of the Noun are called *Inflections*; so that both Nouns and Verbs are *inflected*.

§ 4. There is a great deal more inflection in Latin than there is in English, and there are many more combinations like ‘*I have written*’ in English than there are in Latin. In fact, the two forms, or the two modes of expression, are in the inverse ratio to one another. Yet one form, by no means, excludes the other. The Romans said ‘*scripturus sum*’ = ‘*I am about to write*’: we say ‘*father’s,*’ just as the Romans said ‘*patris.*’ We also say, concurrently, ‘*of (a) father,*’ and sometimes use one form, sometimes another. It is doubtful, however, whether the meaning is exactly the same in both cases, or rather it is certain that it is not so. Still, roughly speaking, the forms may be said to correspond with one another. But be this as it may, it is certain that single forms like ‘*patris*’ and ‘*scripseram*’ are inflections, and that combinations like ‘*of a father*’ and ‘*I had written*’ are not.

§ 5. Such is the general view. It is probably a loose,

probably, an incomplete one. I believe, however, that the best way of amending it is to give a minute analysis of a single sentence. When Pontius Pilate said  $\delta$   $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\alpha$ ,  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\alpha$ , he meant something different from what would be conveyed by  $\delta$   $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\psi\alpha$ ,  $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\psi\alpha$ . This last combination would have implied simply 'I wrote.' The reduplicate form, which is Perfect and not Aorist, means a great deal more; viz., not only a recognition of the fact that he *had* written something, but that what he wrote had a *present* application of some kind or other: possibly to the effect that he would not write again; possibly to the effect that he meant to hold by what he had written. The act of writing was past; the determination was present; the result of it was future. It was all this because, instead of using the Aorist, he used the Perfect (*præteritum perfectum*).

§ 6. So much for the tense. But the sign of it—the reduplicate  $\gamma\epsilon$ —must also be noticed. The farther we go in the present researches the more clearly we shall see that in the expression of ideas wherein the repetition of an act, the plurality of an object, or the continuance of a state is an element, the repetition of either the whole word or a part of it is one of the first resources to which, in the earlier stages of language, the speaker resorts; indeed, it is so common that it seems as if it were the first contrivance that presented itself. No wonder, then, that in a tense like the Greek Perfect, where an action done in past time crops up (so to say) and reproduces itself in the present, the sign of it should be a reduplication.

§ 7. In Greek it stands in strong contrast to the Aorist, as we have seen. In Latin the line of demarcation becomes fainter; and, in English, the expression of the ideas conveyed by single words in a definite tense, like  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\alpha$  and others, is simply impossible. There are no such tenses.

§ 8. But there is something equivalent to them; indeed, there is an admirable substitute. But it is a circumlocution. The translation of  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\phi\alpha$  is *I have written*—three words

for one; an Analytic sentence instead of a Synthetic tense. This is a great change; and we cannot be too methodical or minute in our investigation of its nature. Let us, therefore, begin with ascertaining, in due order, the exact details of (1) the Meaning of the word *have*; (2) its Regimen, or Government; (3) the Concord; and (4) the Collocation of the whole sentence.

(1) *Have* means *hold*, *possess*, *own*, and the like; and where there are *holders*, *possessors*, or *owners*, of anything, there must be something that is *held*, *possessed*, or *owned*.

(2) Such being the case, it is an *Active* or *Transitive* Verb; so that the Noun which it governs must be in the Accusative Case.

(3) With this Noun any word in apposition to it must agree; and, so doing, must also be in the Accusative Case.

(4) In respect to the collocation, the Adjective in English generally precedes its Substantive: as *a good man*. But by a very slight change in the structure and an extension of the clause this order may be reversed; as *a man good and wise*. In all these cases it must be remembered that the syntax of the adjective is that of the passive participle as well.

§ 9. All this is, probably, not only intelligible, but self-evident. Nevertheless, in the combination under notice, every one of the statements must be taken with a qualification.

1. There are certain nouns incapable of being governed; in other words, there are certain nouns which only combine with an *in-transitive* verb. All words expressive of the manner in which a thing is done are of this kind, *e.g.* *mile*, *hour*, and the like; and, what is more, such expressions as '*I have ridden a mile*,' or '*I have talked an hour*,' are legitimate. We cannot, however, be said to *possess* either *miles* or *hours*. If so, where is the active, transitive, or governing power?

2. Again, the concord between the participle and its noun in the way of *gender*, is not quite so simple as it appears to be.



In English, indeed, its true nature is of no practical importance; inasmuch as the participles, like the adjectives, have dropped their signs of gender altogether. But there was a time when they had them; so that theoretically the question as to the Concord presents itself. What would it be in English, supposing that, in English, we had two, or even three, signs of gender for the Accusative Case? The answer that first suggests itself, of course, that in '*I have ridden a horse*' it is masculine, and in '*I have ridden a mare*' it is feminine.

This *may* be the case: but it is not so necessarily. The commoner concord is that of such sentences as '*Triste lupus stabulis*'=the '*wolf is a bad thing for the flocks.*' If so, '*habeo equam equitatum*'=*I have ridden a mare*' is as good as '*habeo equam equitam*;' and even in '*habeo equum equitatum*,' the '*-um*' is not masculine, but neuter.

3. Thirdly; the adjective, as a general rule, precedes the substantive it agrees with; and the same rule applies to the participle, *I have a black horse, I have a white mare.* Yet this is *not* the collocation in *I have ridden a horse.*

§ 10. But the explanation of these anomalies is easy; especially that of the third and second, which are closely connected with one another. In *habeo equam equitatum* the *-um* is not masculine, but neuter; and the noun it agrees with is not the word *equam*, but some word meaning *thing* or *object*, which is understood. Hence, the translation is *I have a mare (as) a ridden (thing)*; and, as this is the concord, the participle is in its proper place.

§ 11. The first anomaly is somewhat more perplexing; and in some languages it is, to a certain extent, avoided. In English we say *I have been*; whilst *J'ai été* is what the French say, and *Jeg har været* what the Danes say. But the Italians and the Germans, though with other participles they agree with the English, seem to shrink from using such an extreme form as *Io ho stato*, or *Ich habe gewesen* (*I have been*), and say '*Io sono stato*' and '*Ich bin gewesen* (*I am been*). Theoretically, the Germans and Italians are right;

yet, except in the case of the participle of the Verb Substantive, they do just as we do; and just like us follow a natural tendency: the tendency to stretch an analogy beyond its due bounds, and carry the influence of a legitimate precedent too far. We may call this *abusive*, or we may call it *catachrestic*; but, whatever be its name, the fact is both real and common. Out of natural combinations, like '*I have written a letter*,' non-natural ones, like '*I have spoken an hour*,' are constantly developed. In some languages the process goes farther than in others. In the English, Danish, and French, where it goes so far as the term for simple *being* or *existence*, it reaches its utmost limit.

§ 12. That the verb *have*, however much its full import may be disguised is, still the verb which translates the Latin *habeo*, *teneo*, or *possideo*, is manifest from the Spanish *tengo*, word for word, the Latin *teneo*, and from the Old German *eigan*, word for word, the English *own*, which are used concurrently with the ordinary '*have*.'

§ 13. Such is the sense or meaning of the combination, and such the principle that makes the relation between the two intelligible. What follows belongs to the *history* of the expression. A change in its application takes place; and it first shows itself in the Latin, in which language there is a confluence in meaning of the forms like *scripsi* and the forms like *momordi*. *Scripsi*, in Latin, means either '*I have written*,' or '*I wrote*;' and *momordi* either '*I have bitten*,' or '*I bit*;' so that the difference of import no longer coincides with a difference of form; as it does in the Greek ἔγραψα and γέγραφα.

§ 14. When this happens one of the two forms becomes superfluous, and, then, sooner or later, drops out of the language. The one that thus dies out is, almost invariably, the one represented by γέγραφα and *momordi*, i.e. the reduplicate perfect. Meanwhile the distinction in import, whether adequately or inadequately expressed, or whether not expressed at all, still exists.

§ 15. It exists in both Latin and English, but with a

difference. In English the forms like *swam*, *spoke*, and others, where the past tense is formed by a change of vowel, mean, in respect to time, exactly the same as those ending in *d* or *t*, as *moved*, *slept*, &c. &c., and there is only one meaning for each or both of them. That is the one of the Greek Aorist, *not* that of the Greek Perfect. In Latin each of the two forms *scripsi* and *momordi* can be used with either meaning; *scripsi* as ‘*I have written*,’ or ‘*I wrote*,’ and *momordi*, as ‘*I bit*,’ or ‘*I have bitten*.’ This being the case, the Analytic form in *have* has a different position in the two languages. In English it is pre-eminently common and conspicuous. In Latin it is exceptional, rare, perhaps rudimentary. ‘*Comperitum habeo, milites, verba viris virtutem non addere*,’ may be translated, ‘*I am in possession of a discovery*,’ but it is, really, word for word, ‘*I have discovered*.’ Even in Greek combinations like ‘ἔχω γράψας=*having written (something) I have it (now)*,’ has the same import, and the same elements. There is a participle in the past tense, and a verb in the present. The former places the action and object with which it is connected in time gone by; the latter connects it with the time of the speaker’s notification of it. When the participle is passive the past action is connected with the object (ἔχω γεγραμμένον), when active with the agent (ἔχω γράψας), i.e. ‘*I have—as a written thing=having written, I have*.’

§ 16. Why is ‘*have*’ the particular verb which takes the place of the reduplication ‘γε-’ in ‘*γγράφα*,’ and the like? We have already seen what it suggests, viz. *continuation represented by repetition*. In ‘*I have ridden a horse*’ what does ‘*have*’ govern? Undoubtedly ‘*horse*.’ And what does ‘*have*’ mean? Undoubtedly it means ‘*possess*,’ or ‘*own*.’ But what if the horse is *not* mine, and I am *not* the possessor, or owner, of it? Again: what is the notion of possession in ‘*I have written a letter*’? I may, perhaps, *have* it in my hand, or *hold* it. If I do I, *pro tanto*, possess or have it. But I may have posted it, and possibly be willing to give

much to get it back. All this seems to be a long way from anything like possession or holdership. But it is connected with *me*, and, to that extent at least, is *mine*; and if at the time of speaking I connect myself with the object spoken about, I am, in some sense, an owner, or possessor, or holder. At any rate, I have an interest in it, and am connected with a part of the transactions appertaining to it. If it were not so, why should I speak about it?

§ 17. The horse was *ridden*, and the letter *written* at a time anterior to the time of speaking about it. Hence the time of the verb *have* is present, the time of participle which implies the action is *past*.

§ 18. Let us now look to the changes which the reduplicate form, like *γέγραφα*, has undergone, as a sign of the Tense. There are some who believe that originally the whole word was doubled, i.e. that the reduplication was really a repetition. There is certainly some ground for this view. But, at present, it is sufficient to take the ordinary Greek Perfect as we find it. This repeats the first consonant of the root, whatever that may be. It expands it into a syllable by suffixing *é*—no matter what may be the vowel of the root.

If a word begin with *two* consonants it takes the first *only*. But this is not the case in Latin, where from *spondeo* they make *spo-spondi*. Nor is it so in Mæso-gothic, where from *hlaipa* they make *hlai-hlaup*.

§ 19. All three languages sometimes change the vowel of the root—*δέικω*, *δείδορκα*—*parco*, *peperci*, and *hlaipa*, *hlai-hlaup*, as we have seen. But this change of vowel probably arises from secondary causes.

§ 20. Thirdly, in Latin frequently, and still more frequently in Mæso-gothic, the reduplication drops off; in which case the sign of the Perfect tense consists only in the change of vowel.

§ 21. As the language becomes more and more Analytic, the abandonment of the reduplication increases; but not that of the changed vowels. There are no reduplications in the

languages derived from the Latin : a mere vestige (the word *did* is the chief instance) remains in the languages of the German family.

§ 22. Concurrent with this change of form is a change of meaning. In Latin, words like *cu-curri* mean either '*I ran,*' or '*I have run*'; and words like *scripsi*, either '*I wrote,*' or '*I have written*'; and it is only from the context that we can tell, in the way of import, which is which.

§ 23. When Cæsar writes '*veni, vili, vici,*' the reader who looks at the three propositions as they stand by themselves has two meanings to choose between ; for so long as the text stands isolated, there is nothing to help him in his choice. Does Cæsar mean '*I have come, I have seen, I have conquered,*' or does he mean '*I came, I saw, I conquered*'? If the letter, or message, which contained these words had contained more ; if it had given in extension his intentions in *coming, seeing, or conquering,* we might decide. If he means '*I have come, and have no intention of going,*' then *veni* has the sense of a Perfect ; but if he means '*I came, and then went farther,*' the import is that of an Aorist. More than this--we have no warrant from the mere form that the three words are in the same predicament, inasmuch as one may be Perfect in sense, while the other two are Aorist, or *vice versâ*. The chances are that what applies to one applies to all ; but it is by no means certain that such is the case. Compare, or rather contrast, this with the definitude and precision of the forms like  $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\alpha\phi\alpha$  and  $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\gamma\alpha\psi\alpha$ .

§ 24. In English we go farther than they did in Latin. In Latin, each of the two forms had two meanings. In English, both words like *swam* (originally a Perfect) and words like *moved* (an Aorist) have only one meaning between them ; and that is the meaning of the Aorist, or the *non-reduplicate* form.

§ 25. The Latin, as we have seen, lost in the way of definitude and precision by the ambiguity of each of its two Tenses ; for though such combinations as '*compertum habeo*'

and '*satis dictum habeo*' existed, they existed only as rudiments of little influence or efficacy. In English, however, the Analytical combinations '*I have found*,' '*I have said*,' and the like, are among the commonest expressions of our language.

Nevertheless, the English sins on the side of redundancy. If forms like '*I moved*,' '*I called*,' are sufficient, what is the function of forms like '*I wrote*,' '*I swam*'? There are, as aforesaid, two forms, originally and really; two Tenses with only one meaning between them.

§ 26. But of this redundancy the language is relieving itself.

(a) No new word, or word of foreign origin, when it finds a place in English, forms its past tense by a change of vowel. It is never conjugated like *wrote*, &c., but always like *moved*, &c.

(b) When one of the two forms gives way to the other, and becomes obsolete, it is, as a rule, the form constructed by the change of vowel, *i.e.* the old Perfect, shorn of its reduplication. The changes in the other direction are rare; perhaps non-existent. When the last of these has become obsolete, the long line of the reduplicate Perfects, from words like *γράφω* downwards, will have come to its end, and the typical representative of the Synthetic system will have become abolished by the typical representative of Analysis.

§ 27. Such is our exposition of a single example of the difference between Analysis and Synthesis, and it cannot be denied that it has been a long, we may say a lengthy, one. But '*the whole is easier than the part*,' and I believe that the example selected is the best one that can be found. How much is there beyond it? Is it a mere fact in the history of three languages, or is it a part of a systematic whole? How far can we invest it with generality?

§ 28. The principle, in nearly all its details, holds good for all the languages of the *German* family.

The principle, with nearly all its details, holds good for all the languages of the *Latin* family.

The principle, as far as the history of the language goes, holds good for both the ancient and modern Greek.

But the history of the Greek is not so varied as that of the Latin class. There are no separate and independent languages that have grown out of the Greek, as the French, Italian, &c., have grown out of the Latin; and no such languages as those of England and Scandinavia, that are the near congeners of the German. In short, we get fewer *data* in Greek; and besides this, the *rate of change* has been slower.

§ 29. Of the Sanskrit on one side, and of the Lithuanic and Slavonic on the other, we may say that the first ends too soon, and that the last begins too late, to give us more than a single stage—or, at any rate, any series of changes—commensurate with the difference between either the Latin and the French, or the Mæsothianic and the English. There is no doubt upon this point in respect to the Lithuanic and the Slavonic. Respecting the Sanskrit, more will be said in the sequel.

§ 30. The *rate* at which languages change varies with the language; and it is very rarely that it is the same with two together. The languages in which the stability seems to be at its *maximum* are the Greek, the German, and the Icelandic. The literary Romanic seems to be much less altered from the classical Greek than it really is; but this is because it is written as much as possible on the classical models; and it is beyond all doubt that, by this artificial adaptation, the natural tendency to change, even in the spoken language, has been modified. Of the dialects our knowledge has, of late, been greatly increased; and it is certain that there is much to be learnt from them.

§ 31. The German of Germany, and to some extent of the Netherlands, is much in the condition in which it was nine

hundred years ago; *i.e.* its inflexion is almost identical with that of the Old Saxon of Westphalia, and the West-Saxon (Anglo-Saxon) of Wessex: and though less Synthetic than the Mæsothetic, which, itself, is far less so than the Latin, Greek, and Sanskrit, it appears more Synthetic than it is when compared with the present literary English. This is certainly not only the most Analytic language in the world, but the one in which the change has been the quickest.

§ 32. The same applies to the Icelandic as compared with its derivative, the (literary) Danish and Swedish. These, less Analytical than the English, are Analytical as compared with the Icelandic. This last, since the twelfth century, when its prose literature begins, has been but slightly changed; and the Icelandic of the newspapers of to-day is, practically, the Icelandic of the old classics, Snorro Sturleson, and the Saga writers. Between this and the somewhat earlier language of the Edda there is a slight difference; and, again, there are certain archaic forms peculiar to the Runic period; *i.e.* the time of the introduction of Christianity. These have a special value, inasmuch as they help us to connect the Norse with the Mæsothetic—the oldest specimens of the Scandinavian with the oldest specimens of the German proper, or Teutonic, group.

§ 33. Upon the special question as to the *Rate of Change*, and the conditions which seem to regulate it, far too little has been written. But the best contribution to it is Petersen's work upon the relations, as Analytic and Synthetic, between the old Norse language and the new; or the Icelandic and the Scandinavian of the Continent, *i.e.* the Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish.

§ 34. In these three countries a form of speech, which in the tenth century was certainly intelligible over the whole of Scandinavia, and which was always treated as a single language, seems to have preserved its original character in Iceland, the colony, rather than in Denmark and Sweden, the mother countries. With Norway the case was somewhat



different. However, in all three there was change; though in each at a different rate. It went upon the same principle, and affected the same inflections in the same way throughout. But it went on in Denmark quicker than it did in Sweden. Denmark, Petersen observes, seems always to have been a century in advance of (*i.e.* more Analytic) than Sweden; so that the condition of the Danish in (say) 1400 was, there or thereabouts, that of the Swedish in 1500, and so on throughout. Both, however, began to change early, *i.e.* before the date of the first specimens of their respective literatures.

§ 35. With Norway it was different. In Norway the oldest literature is Icelandic; though, in Norway, it is more usual to call it *The Old Norse*; and such it really is. It is in one well-known instance more archaic than the Norse of Iceland. And, as it began, so it continued; little altered until the end of the fifteenth century. Then, concurrently with the Reformation, it changes so rapidly that, in less than a century, it is as Analytic as its sisters of Denmark and Sweden.

§ 36. We now return. Along with the question of rate we must take that of *Continuity*; clearly understanding that this is not so much the actual continuity of the language itself (for this is essentially continuous), but the continuity of our knowledge of it; the continuity of the literature which embodies and fixes it; the continuity which tells us what it was up to such a time, and what it was after that time. If gaps in the evidence present themselves, though the language is as continuous as ever, our knowledge of it, except so far as it is inferential, is interrupted.

§ 37. Now actual continuity of the history of any language in detail from the date of its earliest record to the time of its investigator is rare. Where there is actual continuity the chances are that the history of the language is a short one: and in respect to the two great classes—the Greek and the Latin—it is easy to see that, during one period at least, a break of

some sort must present itself. With a language long recognised as the standard of speech, long known as the only exponent of a literature; a language that has for centuries been colloquial among the men of any intellectual cultivation; a language which from the very fact of it being written had, to a certain extent, fixed and established itself as national—with a language invested with such a prerogative as the concurrence of elements of this kind cannot fail to establish, no subordinate form of speech can well become fit for writing; or, if so fitted, be applied to the composition of any work of importance, any work likely to survive the generation, or even the writer, that composed it. It must itself be established before it is written; and before the time can come when this can take place a long series of unrecorded changes must be in operation, and something like a separate language be acknowledged.

We know not when these changes first made their influence definitely perceptible; still less when the earliest of them began. The germs of some of them—as in *compertum habeo*, &c., belonged to the parent language; possibly in its earlier stages. But for their full development time is needed; and during this period the change goes on silently, and the details of it are unrecorded. With the derivatives from the Latin this is self-evident.

§ 38. With the Greek it is somewhat different. The dialects of the Greek never developed themselves into separate and independent languages like the French, Spanish, Roumanian, and others; and, besides this, they were rarely written without some classical, semi-classical, or would-be-classical model in the mind of the writer. The Byzantine literature was continuous, no doubt; but its vernacular character is more than doubtful; and even to the standard Romaic, as it is written at present, the same objection applies. It is only in the true provincial dialects of Greece, its islands, and parts of Asia Minor, that the real growth of the language can be studied, and that but imperfectly.

§ 39. In the German family this want of continuity is not so great: nor is it so closely connected with the history of the language in general; but, at the very beginning there is a deplorable *hiatus* in the record; for the Mæso Gothic stands by itself. The language was reduced to writing long before any other; and it was not upon German ground that the translation of the Gospels was produced. It is due to the influence of the Greek Church, and the alphabet was founded on the Greek. It was not till more than two centuries later that Christianity introduced the alphabet into either Germany or Britain: and the earliest records here are chiefly from Britain and Southern Germany. Neither of these is anything like identical with the other, and neither is what we look for as a lineal descendant of the Mæso Gothic. The German resembles it the most in its structure, the British in its phonesis. There is a gap, then, in respect to both time and space—both date and locality.

§ 40. This leads us to another point of view. The history of a language may be continuous; but histories of its dialects may be different. One dialect may represent the language at one time, another at another. In Great Britain, the present literary English is that of the Midland dialects; but for the Midland dialects we have no record earlier than A.D. 1175, if so early. The literary language of King Alfred's time was the West-Saxon, or the English of Wessex. By A.D. 1400 it was all but superseded by the Midland forms of speech. Its history, since then, is that of the provincial dialects south of the Thames, especially those of Dorset, Somerset, Devon, and Wilts, where the old characteristics are best preserved, or rather the least lost. The Lowland Scotch, a cultivated language from the time of the first Stuarts, is a dialect of the great Northumbrian division. But it is only represented by small and doubtful fragments until the 14th century. Hence we find, for the language of England at large, *one* history; for its dialects (all of which, under different political and geographical conditions, might pass for different lan-

guages), *three*. There is continuity here ; but it is continuity of an imperfect and *discontinuous* kind.

It may be continuous in respect to a language at large, or in a general way ; but not continuous in respect to its several dialects. Nevertheless, even in respect to these, it has a continuity, as we expect *à priori*. But the *records* of it may be discontinuous ; and this is the case when one dialect at one time is the literary language, and another at another. There are no *data* for the subsequent enquirer as to the language that has lost its prerogative. This is the case with no language more decidedly than our own. We know the West-Saxon up and down to a certain time ; and that well, for it was the literary language of the times of Alfred and Edward the Confessor. Then a change comes over the whole language ; we might say an eclipse. About A.D. 1200 the language revives, and it is only up to that time that we can trace the present literary English. But the language of Alfred is, at present, a provincial dialect ; while the English of Macaulay is unknown in its exact form beyond (about) 1200, and the Scotch of Burns is but obscurely known till a century later. Yet both existed when the West-Saxon was the sole (or main) representative of the German of Britain ; in other words, the English language. The record, then, of the *language*, is uniform ; of its representative *dialects*, fragmentary.

§ 41. We now return to our old friend, the typically Synthetic form *γέγραφα*, and the class it represents. It is destined to be superseded by the Analytic combination *I have written*. A change must come upon it, and upon all words like it. What the change may be is another question. It is only certain that *γέγραφα* is the word upon which it *falls*, or has its *incidence*. The change itself, which is purely formal, is from one word to more than one, the import being *unchanged*. This is the illustration of the term now under notice.

§ 42. How far are the same changes connected with the same forms ? How far are the changes that so occur of the

same kind, and leading to the same results? Thirdly, how far, when there are many of them, and different in kind, do they fall upon the words they affect in anything like a regular sequence?

These are, manifestly, questions which would not be asked if they were not meant to be answered, to some extent, at least, in the affirmative. So far as the Latin and the German families are concerned, the synthetic forms that become analytic are, generally, the same in both, and the equivalents for them the same also. If it were not so, the explanation of such combinations of '*I have written*' and '*J'ai écrit*' would have been less conclusive than it is. The same applies to the *order*, or sequence of the changes.

§ 43. The synthetic forms which are first to change in the Latin family are likewise the first to do so in the German, and *vice versâ*; for it is not to be supposed that whole groups of words transform themselves at once, or in companies. This the comparison of Petersen, as to the differences in the changes between the Danish and the Swedish, well exemplifies. They not only change in the same way, but in the same order.

§ 44. It is not held that this rule is general, except we apply it with some latitude. The word '*have*' in Greek, Latin, Slavonic, and Lithuanic, is scarcely used as an auxiliary at all. Still the rule is, to a considerable extent, general.

§ 45. A fourth suggestion is less susceptible of either proof or disproof; *viz.*, the doctrine that those inflections which are the last to be lost are the first to be developed. The presumption in favour of this view is their comparatively necessary or indispensable character. What we need most we are quick to acquire and slow to part with. It is manifestly impossible to prove this historically. All that can be said is that there is nothing against it, and that presumption is in its favour.

§ 46. But even if we are doubtful on this point, there is

something like certainty in regard to the others—so far, at least, as the evidence of a single family enlightens us.

§ 47. But the German is only one family out of five, and of these the Latin alone has, at least, as many derivative forms of speech as the German. It has the Italian, the Spanish, the Portuguese, the Roumanian, the Provençal, and the French, not to mention several dialects that may pass for languages.

§ 48. What do we learn from these? Much what we expect *à priori*; viz., illustrations of the same principle, with varieties in the way of detail.

§ 49. Upon one point, however, we must be on our guard, and remember, most especially, that the term 'old' is an equivocal one. We may say that the French and Italian are so much Latin in a newer form, or that the Latin is the French or Italian in an older. We may say, instead of *newer* and *older*, *later* or *earlier*, more *modern* or more *ancient*. We generally, however, use the terms *old* and *new*. That there is a show of inaccuracy in the ordinary use of these words we know; for we know that the longer a language, like anything else, lasts, the older it grows; and the English and French were never so old as they are at the present moment. This, however, is not the use or abuse of the terms that we must now be cautioned against.

§ 50. It is beyond all doubt that the present German, in one sense of the word *old*, is not only older than the present English, but older than that of Chaucer and Wickliffe; older, indeed, than the English of the thirteenth century. Of course, in this sense there is but one meaning that can be assigned to the term. It must mean not *aged* but *archaic*, or *old* in respect to structure rather than according to date. In the languages, moreover, which are at present under notice, *old* means more *Synthetic*, and less *Analytic*, while *new* means the contrary. The reason for this is evident. One language changes more rapidly than another; and the difference is a difference of *rate*.

§ 51. Even the familiar and important terms *Synthetic* and *Analytic* must be used with a certain amount of reservation. In strict language they are *correlative* terms, neither more nor less; one implying the other, and neither existing without its fellow. If so, a synthetic form without an analytical one to correspond, is as impossible as a relative without an antecedent, or *vice versâ*.

§ 52. It is not, then, every combination of *two* (or more) *words* with the import of *one* that gives an instance of Analysis. There must be a synthetic form to correspond. And here the meaning, or import, must correspond also. In this correspondence there are degrees. Tense for tense, and form for form, Latin words, like *mo-mordi* and *cu-curri*, answer to words like *γέγραφα* and *τέτυφα*. Yet *mo-mordi* is not so thoroughly and so completely the synthetic equivalent to *I have bitten*, as *γέγραφα* is to *I have written*. This is because the reduplicate tenses in Latin are not so thoroughly and completely Perfect in sense as they are in Greek. *Mo-mordi* is translated both by '*I have written*' and '*I wrote*.' It cannot be denied, however, that '*I have written*' is synthetic. It has its correlative single-worded equivalent, and the meaning, though sometimes varying, is as often unvaried.

§ 53. Again, the combination, '*I am singing*,' translates '*canto*.' Nevertheless, it is not so thorough a substitution for this word as '*I have written*' is for '*γέγραφα*.' This is because it does not wholly eliminate the single-worded form from the language, for we still say '*I sing*.' The sense, however, is slightly different. '*I sing*' means that *I sing* habitually, rather than that '*I am now in the act of singing*.' In Latin, words like '*canto*' had both meanings. By saying '*sum in cantatione*,' or '*sum cantans*,' they might indicate the same distinction that we do. Combinations, however, like the first were rare, and those like the second rarer—if existent. Here, then, we have Synthesis and Analysis, but without the displacement, or supercession, of the one by the

other. Still '*I am singing*' may pass as an instance of Analysis.

§ 54. But though it be this, it is notorious that it is not very easily analysed. We know that it is made up out of two words; but whether these are to be translated '*sum cantans*' or '*sum in cantatione*' is a point upon which there is no unanimity of opinion.

§ 55. Again—'*I do sing*'—this is a form that no one would translate by '*facio*' (or '*ago*') '*cantare*,' but rather by '*canto*.' Yet, even when it is so translated, the combination is anything but analytic, and *canto* is manifestly synthetic. But '*I do sing*' and '*canto*' are not analytic and synthetic *to one another*, for they by no means coincide in import. In other words, there is no correlation between them. '*Canto*' tells us that the speaker is either singing when he tells you that he is doing so, or that he sings habitually. In *I do sing* the speaker merely states that he *does-not not-sing*. It implies a previous state of denial or doubt as to whether he sings or not, and as such is used emphatically, as if in reply and contradiction to some one who said he did *not*.

§ 56. The full name of the stage of language under notice is either *Synthetico-Analytic* or *Analytico-Synthetic*. However, when spoken of as such, and especially when compared with the terms '*Agglutinate*' and '*Monosyllabic*,' '*Agglutination*' and '*Monosyllabism*,' it will simply be called '*Synthetic*,' and '*Syntheticism*' or '*Synthesis*.'

§ 57. *Analysis* by no means excludes *Synthesis*. Many forms of speech which, from the general amount of change that they have undergone, and from the undeniably analytical character of the majority of their phrases, may reasonably be called Analytic, preserve remains of their old and more original synthesis. This, however, only means that the change from the predominance of one form to that of another is not sudden, but gradual, a fact of which we only need to be reminded.



§ 58. More important than these are the Postpositive Article of the Norse and Roumanian languages, the so-called Passive Voice of the Norse, and the Futures (*parlero = parabolari habeo = I have to speak = loquar*) of the languages derived from the Latin. These have been actually constructed either within the Analytic period or during the more equivocal period of the transition. On these, more will be said in the sequel.

§ 59. It has manifestly been the *Inflectional* part of language which the foregoing criticism has most especially illustrated ; for it is this which the system of Synthesis and Analysis best explains. It, of course, when explanation is needed, can be made to do much more than this ; but the languages which have been referred to explain it better than all the other languages of the world put together. Moreover, it is only partially that even Inflection has been explained, inasmuch as next to nothing has been said as to what Inflection really is when considered *by itself*. All that *has* been said has been in respect to its connection with Analysis. What will soon follow will be the relation of the *Inflectional* system to that of the *Formatives* : and just as the *Synthetic* stage has illustrated the former, the *Agglutinative* stage will illustrate the latter.

§ 60. More, then, will be said upon the structure of the *Formatives* in the sequel. At present the difference between them is only indicated by a single instance. The *-mus* in both *voca-mus* and *vocit-amus* is *Inflectional* : the *-it-* in *vocit-amus* is *Formative*.

## SUB-SECTION II.

### MATERIALS FOR THE SYNTHETIC AND ANALYTIC STAGE OF LANGUAGE.

§ 61. The forms of speech that illustrate this period are few, but very important. One and all they represent language in its latest known stage. Hence, they are the mate-

rials with which we begin our investigations ; for the right method is that of proceeding from the later to the earlier, from the more certain *data* to the less uncertain, from the known to the unknown.

§ 62. Besides all this, the languages themselves are, upon the whole, those that are not only the best worth understanding, but the best understood, viz. the *Greek*, the *Latin*, the *Sanskrit*, and the *German* ; and, in a less degree, the *Lithuanic* and the *Slavonic*.

§ 63. Again, these are not only the languages that have undergone an important amount of change, but those which have an adequate literature wherein the several changes are recorded.

§ 64. Among these the first place must be assigned to the *Greek*. The Greek records begin earlier than the Latin ; and, like the Latin, the literature descends to the present time. But, on the other hand, and as a drawback to its otherwise high value, there are no languages that stand in relation to the Greek as the French and Spanish, &c. do to the Latin. As a set-off to this, the Greek *begins* with a greater variety of dialects ; some of which, as the *Æolic*, the *Doric*, the *Ionic*, and the *Attic*, may pass for different languages. Moreover, at the time when the structure of the two languages first becomes open to comparison, the Greek is the more synthetic of the two.

§ 65. The *Latin* begins later than the Greek, and with fewer dialects. On the other hand, it undergoes far more change than the Greek, and that in all the languages derived from it, which are more than one : viz. the *Italian*, the *Spanish*, the *French*, the *Provençal*, the *Romance*, and the *Roumanian*, not to mention numerous dialects and sub-dialects.

§ 66. The *Sanskrit*, both in its antiquity and its synthetic character, stands on the high level of the Greek ; but it has not the same undoubtedly continuous history.

§ 67. Again, the *Sanskrit*, both in its antiquity and its

synthetic character, stands on a higher level than Latin ; but here a similar question suggests itself. Has it an equal amount of difference and variety in the way of dialects and derived languages ?

§ 68. There is no answer to either of these questions which commands universal assent. There are those who consider that the present languages of Northern India, the *Hindi*, the *Gujerathi*, the *Marathi*, the *Bengali*, the *Uriya* (or *Udiya*), and others are *not* the descendants of the Sanskrit ; that they are *not* in their relation to that language what the English and German are to the Mæso-gothic, the Italian and French to the Latin, or the Romaic to the Greek. There are those who think that the Hindi, &c., are only Sanskrit in the way that English is Latin, *i.e.* through a strong intermixture of Latin words, whether directly from the language of Rome or indirectly through the French. They deny the grammatical or structural connection ; and this connection they take (as do their opponents) as the evidence and test of descent.

§ 69. Those who hold the last view are innovators ; for the doctrine in favour of the Sanskrit origin of the languages of Northern India is the older one, and it has also any amount of authority to support it. They are in a minority ; and a fair display of argument, whether sufficient or insufficient, has been brought against their views. Still the doctrine thus strongly supported is not (so to say) Catholic. The belief that the Romaic is Greek, the French Latin, and the English German is held *hic, ubique, et ab omnibus*. The same belief is *not* held respecting the Sanskrit and the Hindi. Hence, though at present I pass no opinion on the question, I abstain from putting a disputed fact on the same level as an admitted one ; for if the present work have any value at all, it derives it from the admitted certainty of the facts upon which its results are founded. Hence the most convenient way in which I find it necessary to treat the term '*Sanskrit*,' as a class-name, is to speak of it as the '*Sanskrit and its*

*congeners whatever they may be.* That the *Pali* and *Zend* are such congeners no one doubts.

§ 70. The *German*, though far inferior to the three above-named languages in both its synthetical structure and its date, gives us a more varied, as well as a more continuous, history than any of them.

Its high value in this respect is absolute and intrinsic; but to those who speak it, whether Germans proper, Englishmen, or Scandinavians, it is the *mother-tongue*, and as such the form of speech of which they know more than they know of all the other languages of the world put together. It is the language with which they compare, and by which they measure, all others. It is not only the best language to begin with, but it is the one with which we, as German, *must* begin.

§ 71. Of the *German* family of languages the history, which is scarcely half so long as that of the Greek, and full five hundred years shorter than that of the Latin, begins with what is known as the German of Mœsia, or the *Mœsogothic* of the Ulphiline Translation of the Gospels, of which the date is, within a few years, A.D. 375. As compared with the present English, the Mœsogothic is undoubtedly synthetic. But it is not synthetic after the manner of the two great classical, and the one great Indian, languages, viz. the Greek, the Latin, and the Sanskrit.

§ 72. The history of the German family of languages is both varied and continuous. It cannot, however, be added that its continuity presents itself in the first instance, inasmuch as the Mœsogothic, for more than three hundred years, stands entirely alone. Neither was the Mœsogothic, as we know it, adequately known in its historical or its geographical relations to Germany. It was for German emigrants rather than for the Germans of the mother-country that the Ulphiline Translation was made. Their settlement was in the Roman province of Mœsia, not far from Philippopolis. But

before they settled here they had occupied a part of Dacia ; and, before they crossed the Danube, had probably been soldiers in the Roman service on some part of the Marcomanic March.

§ 73. As to the part of Germany in which they originated there is no unanimity of opinion. Michaelis referred the language to Thuringia ; and suggested that the present dialect of that district was the best existing representative of the Mœsogothic. I am not aware that anything has been adduced that invalidates this opinion ; and I am satisfied that there is much which tends to confirm it. But, be this as it may, there is a gap of more than three hundred years between the Mœsogothic and the next representative of the German family.

§ 74. It is the parts south of the Danube, and on ground which made no part of the *Germany* of Tacitus, that we find the Old High German, which is mainly that of Suabia (*Decumates agri*), Alsace, Bavaria, and Switzerland. The earliest specimens of this are older than anything on the undoubted soil of Germany. These date from about the eighth century.

§ 75. It is in Britain that the German, now known as the *English*, first presents itself : a few years earlier than the oldest High German. And this is, for the third time, German, on ground other than that of the *Germany* of Tacitus. The German of Britain is represented by three literatures : (1) the *West-Saxon*, for the part south of Thames, from about A.D. 750 to 1400 ; (2) the *Middleland*, or *Mercian*, which is the present literary English ; and (3) the *Northumbrian*, of the parts between the Humber and the Forth.

Of German, on the undoubted soil of German, the Old Saxon of Westphalia gives us the earliest specimens ; about A.D. 900. The *Frisian* is specially akin to this, as well as to the West-Saxon of Britain, and, moreover, is considered to be transitional between the Teutonic and the Norse, or

Scandinavian groups. Of this last, which is most especially illustrative of the change from Synthesis to Analysis, enough has been said in §§ 32-35.

§ 76. It is manifest that in this family we have a most valuable store of materials: a fair amount of continuous history; a fair amount of separate and independent languages; a very considerable number of dialects and sub-dialects; and other elements of value besides. But with all this, the main element of its importance is relative rather than positive. It is the family to which our own language belongs, and, consequently, the family which we best understand.

§ 77. *The Lithuanic Family.*—In this there is nothing earlier than the sixteenth century, and this is in the language of the *western* parts of East Prussia, in which nothing is now spoken but German and Polish. This is called *Prussian*, as opposed to the *Lithuanian* of Lithuania proper, and *Old Prussian*, which, so far as it means anything, means the old language of Prussia; for of anything that can be called Middle, or New Prussia, we have no vestige. In this Prussian the demonstrative pronoun is used as the definite article, whereas the allied dialects are without one.

On the east and north-east of Lithuania proper lie the *Lett* districts of Courland, Livonia, Esthonia, Vitepsk, and Polotsk; and a division of some kind between the *Lett* and the *Lithuanian*, as dialects or languages, is rightly recognised. But what it amounts to is another question. The statement that *Lithuanian* is notably more synthetic than the *Lett*, and the two tongues are as widely separated from one another as Latin and Italian, is a gross exaggeration. What light the *Lithuanic* family throws upon the field of the philologue is practically that of a single language in a single stage. But, thus limited, the *Lithuanic* is a language of inordinate interest. In the declension of its nouns it is more synthetic than the Latin.

§ 78. *The Slavonic Family.*—The first point to notice in this is the number of its divisions and sub-divisions. Its

extreme forms, or the languages most unlike one another, are the Polish, or the Bohemian, on one side, and the Russian, or Moscovite of *Great Russia*, on the other.

1. The *Polish*, with the *Kassubic*; a fragment still spoken in Pomerania; and the *Linonian*, of which a fragment remained in Lünenburg in the latter half of the last century.

2. The *Sorabian*, still spoken in Lusatia and Brandenburg. Intermediate to the Polish and

3. The *Bohemian*, *Czech*, or *Tshekh*. This is the name that the Slavonians of Bohemia give themselves. In Moravia the language is called *Moravian*, and in Upper Hungary, *Slovak*.

These are more closely allied to each other than to the languages of the second branch.

4. The *Slovenian*, spoken by the Slavonians of Austria, who called themselves *Sloventzi*. It is a political, rather than a philological, division, inasmuch as it graduates into the *Servian*.

§ 79. All these nations use an alphabet of Roman origin, and, except when Protestant, are Roman Catholics. The Slavonians, however, originally used an alphabet founded on the Greek, and called *Glagolitic*, or *Glagolite*.

5. The *Servian*, spoken in Bosnia, Servia, and Montenegro. Alphabet of Greek origin; and creed, the Christianity of the Eastern Church.

6. *Russian*. This falls into the *Ruthenian*, *Rusniak*, or *Red Russian*, of Eastern Galicia (originally Lodomeria); the *Little Russian* (*Malo-russ*) of Kiev and the surrounding Governments; the *Black Russian* of Grodno and Minsk; the *White Russian* of Smolensko; and finally, the *Moscovite*, or *Great Russian*, of the rest of the Empire.

7. The *Bulgarian*; which probably differs from all the others as much, or more, than they differ from one another. Alphabet and creed of both Russia and Bulgaria. The same in Servia.

For so large an area, and so many divisions, the general uniformity of the whole Slavonic class is remarkable.

## SECTION II.

### AGGLUTINATION, FORMATIVES.

§ 80. The *-o* in *voc-o* is an *Inflection*; so also are the *-amus*, *-atis*, *-avi*, *-avissem*, &c., in *voc-amus*, *voc-atis*, *voc-avi*, *voc-avissem*, and the like.

The *-it-* in *voc-it-o* is a *Formative*; and so are *voc-it-amus*, *voc-it-atis*, *voc-it-avi*, and *voc-it-avissem*. A *Formative* is different from, and opposed to, an *Inflection*.

§ 81. The outward and visible difference between the two is that the *-it-* keeps its form throughout the whole conjugation of the verb to which it belongs; whereas the termination *-o-* changes with the Person, Number, Tense, Mood, and Voice, becoming *-amus*, *-atis*, and the like, according to circumstances. Changing the expression, the *-it-* is a *part* of the theme, and, as such, is permanent; whereas the inflection is *adjunct* to the theme, and mutable.

§ 82. The *-it-* in *voc-it-o* belongs to the *theme*, but not to the *root*, and it is to the root that it is attached. So attached, it precedes the inflection in the way of order. The inflection attaches itself directly to the root only when there is no such intervening syllable as the one under notice. This is the view of the two adjuncts simply and solely in respect to their place and permanence.

§ 83. The *logical* difference between them, or the nature of their respective meanings and functions, is another question. The *-it-* in *voc-it-o* expresses a difference in the nature of the act (that of calling) itself. The inflection denotes certain circumstances that attend the act; viz., the agency, the time, and the conditions under which it takes, or may take, place. In this way the first of them indicates that the speaker, the object spoken to, or some object spoken about, is the agent, or, if there be more than one, the agents. In



the way of time it indicates whether it is Past, Present, or Future; in the way of conditions, whether it be Indicative, Imperative, or Conditional. In other words, they give signs of Person and Number, Tense and Mood. With the character of the act (or state) itself these have nothing to do. On the other hand, the difference between *voc-* (the root) and *voc-it-* (the theme) relates to the act itself, which is, of course, so far as the *voc-* goes, one of the same kind as that denoted by *voc-it-*. The *-it-*, however, indicates a difference. *Voc-o* is translated *I call*; *voc-it-o*, *I call often*: and as there are many words thus differentiated, there is a class of forms which are called *Frequentative*. What *-it-* is in Latin, *-εθ-* is in Greek, as *φλέγ-ω*, *φλεγε-έθ-ω*. In *vire-sco*=*I begin to grow green*, and *γερά-σκω*=*I begin to grow old*, the *-σκω* and *-sco* are called *Inchoative*; and of names and classes of this kind they are many. For all such names the general name is *Formative*.

§ 84. Now it is the languages in the *Synthetic* stage that best illustrate the character of *Inflections*. In like manner it is the languages of the *Agglutinative* stage that best illustrate *Formatives*; and this is the reason why so much has been said about them. They must be clearly distinguished from *Inflections*; and, more than this, the difference between them must be shown to be both *formal* and *logical*.

§ 85. But it was only partially that, in our first group, even *Inflection* was dealt with. Very little, if anything, was said as to what *Inflections* were in themselves. The great deal that was said about them applied almost wholly to their relations to the *Analytical* forms by which they were so largely superseded. Yet they were never supposed to exclude *Formatives*. Neither will *Formatives*, in the consideration of the *Agglutinate* forms of speech, exclude *Inflections*. On the contrary, both forms will be considered together as we proceed.

§ 86. Hitherto the point of the chief importance is the difference between these two classes of words. It must

however, now be added that it is only in the extreme forms that this difference exists. This is because it will be seen in the sequel that *some* Formatives, at least, can become Inflectional.

§ 87. As a preliminary, it is necessary to classify the chief *Formatives* upon the principle that we classify the Inflections. Doing this, we get, for the Nouns, Gender, Number, and Case; for the Verbs, Mood, Tense, Person, and Voice.

#### § 88. NOUNS.

The Formatives for Nouns are (*a*) Substantival, (*b*) Pronominal, (*c*) Adjectival. To the first of these classes belong the forms like the *-en* in *vix-en* = *female fox*, the German *-in* as in *Freund-inn* = *female friend*, the *-esse* in the French *duch-esse*, and the *-ix* in the Latin *genetr-ix*, as opposed to *genit-or*, the so-called Signs of Gender. To the second belong the adjuncts in *-d* and *-th*, which characterise the Ordinals (*thir-d*, *four-th*, &c.) as opposed to the Cardinal Numerals. To the third belong the Degrees of Comparison. These are mentioned because, in many of the ordinary Grammars, under the old name of *Accidents*, they are taught along with the Inflections. There is no harm in this. There is harm, however, in confounding them with the true Inflections; and it cannot be denied that this is done sometimes—perhaps more than once too often.

#### *Substantives.*

Here we have Formatives for Natural Sex as opposed to Artificial or Conventional Sex, which is *Gender*, as has just been indicated; also Collectives, Diminutives, Augmentatives, Patronymics, Gentiles, and (more important than any) Abstract forms.

#### *Pronouns.*

Ordinal Formatives, as above mentioned.

#### *Adjectives.*

Degrees of Comparison, as above.

## § 89. VERBS.

*Verbals.*

The name for the agent as *hunt-er*, and for the action as *hunt-ing*. These are universally recognised as Nouns, rather than Verbs, and are declined like *Substantives*.

## VERBS.

Inchoative, as *viresco*, γεράσκω.

Frequentative, as *vocito*, φλεγέλω.

Desiderative, as *parturio*, δραστείω.

§ 90. Now with some of these there is a decided suggestion of something akin to some of the Inflections. *Gender* is manifestly involved in the Formatives for *Sex*; *Number*, in those for *Collectives*. With *Mood* and *Tense* the connection is not quite so clear.

§ 91. On the other hand, there is nothing that suggests *Person*, nor can there be.

§ 92. We may now change the subject, and notice some other characters of the Agglutinate class.

In this Agglutinate class the first languages that present themselves are those of the *Fin* or *Ugrian* family; and, on the first view, the difference between Agglutination and Synthesis is by no means decided. So far as the mere number of Cases goes, very many of the Agglutinate tongues are more inflectional than the Latin, the Greek, or the Sanskrit; for the most we can get out of these and their congeners is a small matter of seven or eight cases; whereas the Fin of Finland, or Finlandish proper, gives us fifteen, the Lap, eight, or, counting the Vocative, nine. With others, six or seven present themselves, as a matter of course. Thus—

## FINLANDIC OR FIN PROPER.

*Maa* = land. *Maat* = lands.

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	maa	ma-a-t
<i>Infinitive</i>	maa-ta	ma-i-ta
<i>Genitive</i>	maa-n	ma-i-tten
<i>Inessive</i>	maa-ssa	ma-i-ssa
<i>Elativē</i>	maa-sta	ma-i-sta
<i>Illative</i>	maa-han	ma-i-hin
<i>Adessive</i>	maa-la	ma-i-lla
<i>Ablative</i>	maa-lta	ma-i-lta
<i>Allative</i>	maa-ille	ma-i-lle
<i>Abessive</i>	maa-tta	ma-i-tta
<i>Prolative</i>	maa-tse	ma-i-tse
<i>Translative</i>	maa-ksi	ma-i-ksi
<i>Essive</i>	maa-na	ma-i-na
<i>Comitive</i>	maa-ne	ma-i-ne
<i>Instrumental</i>	maa-n	ma-i-in

## § 93. LAPLANDIC.

*Close Declension—Ending Consonantal.**Singular.*

<i>Nominative</i>	mâraś ( <i>sorrow</i> )	bavéas ( <i>pain</i> )	hævoś ( <i>horse</i> )
<i>Genitive</i>	mârraš	baféas	heppuš
<i>Infinitive</i>	mârraš	baféas	heppuš
<i>Allative</i>	mârrašî	baféasi	heppušî
<i>Factive</i>	mârrašēn	baféasen	heppušēn
<i>Locative</i>	mârrašēst	baféasist	heppušist
<i>Comitive</i>	mârrašîn	baféasin	heppušîn
<i>Curitive</i>	mârraštaga	baféastaga	heppuštaga

*Plural.*

<i>Nominative</i>	mârrašak	baféasak	heppušak
<i>Genitive</i>	mârrašî	baféasi	heppušî
<i>Infinitive</i>	mârrašid	baféasid	heppušid
<i>Allative</i>	mârrašidi	baféasidi	heppušidi
<i>Factive</i>	mârrašēn	bavéasen	hævošen
<i>Locative</i>	mârrašîn	baféasin	heppušîn
<i>Comitive</i>	mârrašigum	baféasigum	heppušigum
<i>Curitive</i>	mârrašitaga	baféasitaga	heppušitaga

*Open Declension—Ending Vocalic.**Singular.*

<i>Nominative</i>	jäkka ( <i>river</i> )	gietta ( <i>hand</i> )	oabba ( <i>sister</i> )
<i>Genitive</i>	jäga	gieða	oaba
<i>Infinitive</i>	jäga	gieða	oaba
<i>Allative</i>	jokki	gitti	oabbai
<i>Factive</i>	jäkkan	giettan	oabban
<i>Locative</i>	jägast	gieðast	oabast
<i>Comitative</i>	jägain	gieðain	oabain
<i>Caritive</i>	jäga-taga	gieða-taga	oaba-taga

*Plural.*

<i>Nominative</i>	jägak	gieðak	oabak
<i>Genitive</i>	jägai	gieðai	oabai
<i>Infinitive</i>	jägaid	gieðaid	oabaid
<i>Allative</i>	jägaidi	gieðaidi	oabaidi
<i>Factive</i>	jäkkan	gieðan	oabban
<i>Locative</i>	jägain	gieðain	oabain
<i>Comitative</i>	jägai-guim	gieðai-guim	oabai-guim
<i>Caritive</i>	jägai-taga	gieðai-taga	oabai-taga

## PERSONS.

*Singular Number.*

	<i>First.</i>	<i>Second.</i>	<i>Third.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	mân ( <i>I</i> )	dân ( <i>thou</i> )	sâu ( <i>he, &amp;c.</i> )
<i>Genitive</i>	muo	du	su
<i>Infinitive</i>	muo	du	su
<i>Allative</i>	munji	dunji	sunji
<i>Locative</i>	must	dust	sust
<i>Comitative</i>	muin	duin	suin
<i>Caritive</i>	muotaga	dutaga	sutaga

*Dual.*

	<i>First.</i>	<i>Second.</i>	<i>Third.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	mâi	dâi	sâi
<i>Genitive</i>	mâdno	dâdno	sâdno
<i>Infinitive</i>	mâdno	dâdno	sâdno
<i>Allative</i>	mâdnoidi	dâdnoidi	sâdnoidi
<i>Locative</i>	mâdnoin	dâdnoin	sâdnoin
<i>Comitative</i>	mâdnoguim	dâdnoguim	sâdnoguim
<i>Caritive</i>	mâdnotaga	dâdnotaga	sâdnotaga

	<i>Plural.</i>		
	<i>First.</i>	<i>Second.</i>	<i>Third.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	mi	si	di
<i>Genitive</i>	min	sin	din
<i>Infinitive</i>	min	sin	din
<i>Allative</i>	migjidi	digjidi	sigjidi
<i>Locative</i>	mist	dist	sist
<i>Comitative</i>	minguim	dinguim	singuim
<i>Caritive</i>	mintaga	dintaga	sintaga

lānom

## § 94. ACTIVE.

to cease

## INDICATIVE.

*Present.*

<i>Singular</i>	lānom	lānok	lādno
<i>Dual</i>	lodnu	lonobætte	lādnoba
<i>Plural</i>	ladnop	ladnobættet	lodnuk

*Preterit.*

<i>Singular</i>	lodnum	lodnuk	lānoi
<i>Dual</i>	lānoime	lānoide	lānoiga
<i>Plural</i>	lānoimek	lānoidek	lodnu

## CONJUNCTIVE.

*Present.*

<i>Singular</i>	lonuécam	lonuécak	lonuéa
<i>Dual</i>	lonuécædne	lonuécæppe	lonuécæva
<i>Plural</i>	lonuécæp	lonuécæppet	lonuécék

*Preterit.*

<i>Singular</i>	lonuším	lonušík	lonuší
<i>Dual</i>	lonušeime	lonušeide	lonušeiga
<i>Plural</i>	lonušeimek	lonušeidek	lonušeigje

## IMPERATIVE

<i>Singular</i>	.	lāno	lodnas
<i>Dual</i>	lodnu	lādno	lodnusga
<i>Plural</i>	lādnop	lādnot	lodnusek

## PASSIVE.

## INDICATIVE.

*Present.*

<i>Singular</i>	lodnujuvum	lodn <sup>z</sup> juvuk	lodnujuvvu
<i>Dual</i>	lodnujuvve	lodnujuvvubætte	lodnujuvaba
<i>Plural</i>	lodnujuvvup	lodnujuvvubættet	lodnujujek

*Preterit.*

<i>Singular</i>	lodnujuvvim	lodnujuvvik	lodnujuvni
<i>Dual</i>	lodnujuvuime	lodnujuvuide	lodnujuvuiga
<i>Plural</i>	lodnujuvuimek	lodnujuvuidek	lodnujuvve

## CONJUNCTIVE.

*Present.*

<i>Singular</i>	lodnujuvvuécam	lodnujuvvucak	lodnujuvvuúa
<i>Dual</i>	lodnujuvvuécadne	lodnujuvvucæppe	lodnujuvvuúeæve
<i>Plural</i>	lodnujuvvuóæp	lodnujuvvucæppet	lodnujuvvuúek

*Preterit.*

<i>Singular</i>	lodnujuvvuśim	lodnujuvvuśik	lodnujuvvuśi
<i>Dual</i>	lodnujuvvuśeime	lodnujuvvuśeide	lodnujuvvuśeiga
<i>Plural</i>	lodnujuvvuśeimek	lodnujuvvuśeidek	lodnujuvvuśeigje

## IMPERATIVE.

<i>Singular</i>	.	lodnujuvvu	lodnujuvvus
<i>Dual</i>	lodnujuvvujædno	lodnujuvvujække	lodnujuvvusga
<i>Plural</i>	lodnujuvvujædno	lodnujuvvujækket	lodnujuvvusek

§ 95. *Verbum Nominale.*

## ACTIVE.

## PASSIVE.

<i>Infinitive</i>	lâdnot	lodnut	and lodnujuvvut
<i>Factive (supine)</i>	lânoćet	lodnućet	„ lodnujuvvućet
<i>Comitative (gerund)</i>	lânodedin	lodnudedin	„ lodnujuvvudedin
<i>Caritive</i>	lânokætta	lodnukætta	„ lodnujuvvukætta

*Nomen Verbale.*

## ACTIVE.

## PASSIVE.

<i>Nomen Subst.</i>	{ <i>Abstract</i>	lâdnom	lodnujubme
<i>Verbale</i>	{ <i>Concrete</i>	lâdno	lodnujuvve
<i>Nomen Adject.</i>	{ <i>Pres. Part.</i>	lâdnome	lodnujuvvume
<i>Verbale</i>	{ <i>Pret. Part.</i>	lâdnom	lodjuvvum; lodnum

§ 96. This apparent Synthesis is only superficial ; for the doctrine that underlies the whole system of the growth, development, or evolution of language, presupposes that all Inflections, if we can only reduce them, are reducible to words originally independent. The mere amount of these is a secondary matter ; the question is the evidence in favour of their reducibility, and it is certain that in languages like the Fin, the Turk, and their congeners, this is notably improved.

§ 97. Roughly, and for the sake of illustration, we may compare the union of two or more words in Synthesis to a *graft*, in which the union is so close as to be indecomposable. The union in the way of Agglutination is a *splice*, whereof the separation is comparatively easy. We cannot always—perhaps we cannot often—say what the incorporated element was when it stood alone ; but we can generally convince ourselves that, of some sort or other, it is a superaddition.

§ 98. Again, when we have two inflectional elements in combination, one of which suggests the notion of (say) *number*, and the other of (say) *case*, we can, in Agglutination, separate the two signs with far greater certainty than we can in Synthesis. The Turkish grammar throws a strong light on these points.

*Adem* = man.

<i>Nominative</i>	âdem	âdemler	<i>man, men</i>
<i>Genitive</i>	âdemun	âdemler-un	<i>of „</i>
<i>Dative</i>	âdemeh	âdemler-eh	<i>to „</i>
<i>Accusative</i>	âdemi	âdemler-i	<i>man, men</i>
<i>Ablative</i>	âdemden	âdemler-den	<i>from „</i>

Compare this with the declension of *homo*, or any Synthetic substantive, and see whether the separation of the signs of number and case are anything like so distinct.

§ 99. The Conjugation of the Verb is still more suggestive of differences. How easily are the several significant affixes separated from each other.



Şumek = love (*Present Imperative*).

## ACTIVE.

<i>Negative</i>	şumemek	<i>not to love</i>
<i>Impossible</i>	şuehmemek	<i>not to be able to love</i>

## PASSIVE.

	şuilmek	<i>to be loved</i>
<i>Negative</i>	şuilmemek	<i>not to be loved</i>
<i>Impossible</i>	şuilehmemek	<i>not to be able to be loved</i>

## CAUSAL ACTIVE.

	şudermek	<i>to cause to love</i>
<i>Negative</i>	şudermemek	<i>not to cause to love</i>
<i>Impossible</i>	şuderehmemek	<i>not to be able to cause to love</i>
<i>Passive</i>	şuderilmek	<i>to be made to love</i>
<i>Neg. Passive</i>	şuderilmemek	<i>not to be made to love</i>
<i>Imp. Passive</i>	şuderilememek	<i>not to be able to be made to love</i>

## PASSIVE CAUSAL.

	şuildermek	<i>to cause to be loved</i>
<i>Negative</i>	şuildermemek	<i>not to cause to be loved</i>
<i>Impossible</i>	şuilderehmemek	<i>not to be able to cause to be loved</i>

## RECIPROCAL.

	şuishmek	<i>to love one another mutually</i>
<i>Negative</i>	şuishmemek	<i>not to love &amp;c.</i>
<i>Impossible</i>	şuishhmemek	<i>not to be able &amp;c.</i>
<i>Passive</i>	şuushilmek	<i>to be loved mutually</i>
<i>Neg. Passive</i>	şuushilmemek	<i>not to be loved mutually</i>
<i>Imp. Passive</i>	şuushilehmemek	<i>not to be able to be loved mutually</i>
<i>Causal</i>	şuishdermek	<i>not to be able to be caused to love mutually</i>

## PERSONAL.

	şuinmek	<i>to love himself</i>
<i>Negative</i>	şuinmemek	<i>not to love &amp;c.</i>
<i>Impossible</i>	şuinehmemek	<i>not to be able &amp;c.</i>
<i>Passive</i>	şuinilmemek	<i>to be loved</i>
<i>Causal</i>	şuindermek	<i>to cause to love himself</i>

§ 100. And last, not least, as an element in the more manageable character of the Agglutinate languages, most of them are without the distinction of Gender. That this facilitates the separation of case-endings into their elements is manifest. *Three* distinctions are involved in the Synthetic, *two* in the Agglutinate, inflections. By the final syllables in such words as *bon-um* and *bon-as*, three differences are indicated, that of Case, of Gender, of Number; and the work is done by a single combination of two letters.

§ 101. The following is an equally illustrative instance, from a language now nearly extinct, but probably intermediate to the Turk and the Mongol.

## YENISEIAN.

Bieng = *hand*.Bieng-en = *hands*.

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	bieng	bieng-en
<i>Genitive</i>	bieng-da	bieng-en-da
<i>Dative</i>	bieng-deng	bieng-eng-den
<i>Locative</i>	bieng-gei	bieng-eng-ei
<i>Ablative</i>	bieng-denger	bieng-en-denger
<i>Instrumental</i>	bieng-sâs	bieng-en-sâs
<i>Prosecutive</i>	bieng-bes	bieng-en-bes
<i>Comitive</i>	bieng-san	bieng-en-san

## SUB-SECTION II.

## MATERIALS FOR THE AGGLUTINATE STAGE OF THE LANGUAGE.

§ 102. In the amount of the material, or *data*, which it supplies the Agglutinate class shows to disadvantage. The languages are numerous, no doubt; but there is scarcely one Agglutinate language of which we have enough. Some begin early, but then they become extinct prematurely. Some (indeed, the majority) are in full life at the present moment; but, on the other hand, we know nothing of them in any earlier stage. We have, in the Agglutinate class, languages

which are in many respects semi-Synthetic, and others which are well-nigh Monosyllabic; but we have no *single* language which, in one of its stages, is Monosyllabic, and, in the other Agglutinate. In many cases there is a fair amount of both duration and continuity; but, even when this is the case, the amount of change is inconsiderable.

§ 103. The Fin of Finland, the Finlandic, the Finlandish, or the Fin proper of the Duchy of Finland, is a single language of a class: a class sometimes called *Fin*, sometimes *Ugrian*; and it is the number and character of the different divisions and sub-divisions of the classes which invest it with its recognised importance. *Tavastian, Karelian, Vod, Tshúd, Vesp* (or *Ludin*), *Krивonian, Lief, Esthonian, Permian, Zirianian, Votiak, Lap* (or *Laplandish*) of (a) *Norway*, (b) *Sweden*, (c) *Russia, Tsheremiss, Morduin, Vogul, Ostiak, Samoyed*, and (?) *Tshuvash*, are all denominations which, either as separate languages or dialects, supply illustrations of some kind of the difference and likeness between the several members of this very important class.

§ 104. Next in geographical order come the *Turk, Yeniseian, Mongol*, and *Mantshu* families, the last two of which are in contact with the Monosyllabic area. The *Yeniseian* is still unplaced; but it is probable that it belongs to the same division as the languages with which it is here associated. Of the remaining languages of Northern Asia, of which the affinities run either in the direction of Japan and the Kurile Islands, or that of Kamtskatka, the Aleutian Chain, and America, it is not necessary to take cognisance.

§ 105. The *Dravirian* or *Dravidian Family*.—Spoken in *Southern* India, and opposed to the languages represented by the Hindi. This means that, ever since attention has been paid to it, it has been recognised as other than Indian of the Hindi, Gujerathi, and Bengali type; *i.e.* has never, either rightly or wrongly, been considered a derivative of or from the Sanskrit. The four best known members of this group, each with a literature, are—

1. The *Telinga*, or *Telugu*, spoken by about 14,000,000 occupants of the Northern Circars, and parts of Hyderabad, Nagpúr, and Gondwana; bounded on the North by the Oriya of Orissa, and on the side of the Pacific by Chicacole, North, and Pulicat, South.

2. The *Tamul*, spoken by about 10,000,000 natives from the parts about Pulicat to Cape Comorin, and on the West as far as Trevandrum. In the interior it extends to the Ghauts and Nilgherris.

3. The *Canarese*, spoken by about 5,000,000. Mysore is its centre; bounded by the Telinga N.E., and the Tamul S.E.; on the North by the Marathi, other than Dravirian.

4. The *Malayalim*, spoken by about 2,000,000 along the Malabar coast.

§ 106. These are the four old, or long recognised, members of the Dravirian family; but a fifth has recently been added, and that as an independent language. This is—

5. The *Tulu*, spoken by about 150,000 about N.L. 13° 30' along the coast, and, like the Canarese, bounded by the Marathi.

The *Cúrgi*, of *Cúrg*, has scarcely been raised to the level of a language. As a dialect it has been claimed for the Tulu, the Malayalim, and the Tamul.

To these add not fewer than five barbarous dialects, or sub-dialects, of the Canarese, and spoken in the Nilgherris by the *Tudas* or *Todavas*, the *Budugars*, the *Kohatars*, the *Irular*, and the *Kurumbas*.

§ 107. Later researches have brought no less than four more groups within the range of the Dravirian family, though the position of one of them is equivocal.

§ 108. On the western frontier of the Uriya (Hindi) and the northern frontier of the Telinga (Dravirian), in the Circar of Gúmsúr, the *Khond* in several dialects is spoken: *Gadaba*, *Yerukale*, *Savara*; and in Gondwana the *Ghond*, or *Gundi*. This is not so manifestly Dravirian as the Khond; but still

it is more Dravirian than aught else. Little is said about it in Caldwell's standard Dravirian Grammar; but he does not exclude it.

§ 109. But with the next group he hesitates. It is the most Northern (North-Eastern) of any; and is fairly represented by vocabularies—*Sontal*, *Singbhum*, *Mundala*, and *Bhumij*. *Ho*, meaning *man*, is the name which the *Kolehan* apply to themselves. Ramguhr, Monghir, Chuta Nagpúr, Gangpúr, Sirgajah, Sumbulphur, Palamaw, and the Rajmahal Hills, where the *Sontals* are stated to be intrusive, are, in the ordinary maps, the most conspicuous names for the *Kol* districts, and *Kol* is the usual name for the group.

§ 110. The *Kol* has recognised affinities with the *Monosyllabic* family, and how closely the two groups approach one another geographically may be seen in § 135.

§ 111. The BRAHUI.—This is the last language that has been connected with the Dravirian; and, in respect to its geography, it is other than Indian. It is Persian; and, what is more, is separated from the most northern frontier of the Dravirian proper by the *Non-Dravirian* Gujerathi and Marathi, not to mention the Persian and Indian dialects of the Lower Indus. It is in the mountain districts of Beluchistan that the *Brahui*, *Brahooe*, or *Brahuiki* is spoken, unwritten, and its Dravirian structure disguised by the inordinate amount of Persian with which it is overlaid. Those, however, who have paid most attention to the subject, have pronounced in favour of the Dravirian affinity.

§ 112. With this ends the list of those Agglutinate languages of *Eastern* Europe and Asia which come under the conditions and limitations of the present treatise; viz., (1) that they should be spoken in something like geographical contact with the languages of the Synthetic and Monosyllabic division, and (2) that the recognition of them as Agglutinate should be universal.

§ 113. Far apart from those, however, and on the farther side of the Synthetic area, on the extreme south-west of

Europe, still stands over the *Iberian, Euskarian, or Basque*, which may reasonably be considered to represent, at least, the original language of the whole of the Spanish Peninsula. It is now limited to the provinces of Biscaya, Guipuscoa, Alava, and Navarre, in Spain, and parts about St. Jean de Luz and Labourdin, in France. Bounded on three sides by the sea, the Iberian Peninsula is isolated, whilst of the Peninsula itself the Basque area is but a fraction; and, fraction as it is, it is bounded on both sides by intrusive languages—the French and Spanish—both of Latin origin. After these, there is nothing nearer than the Celtic of Brittany, and the German of Switzerland, and the Slavonic of Bohemia. No wonder that its affinities are a mystery.

§ 114. Such are the chief Agglutinate languages of Europe and Asia in respect to their geographical areas. We see, at once, that they are in contact with one another, and that some of them, the Ugrian and Turk most especially, are in contact with the North and North-Eastern members of the Synthetic class; and we shall see, in the sequel, that as we move southward, others will touch the Monosyllabic frontiers of China, Tibet, and Northern India. This invests them with a special value, inasmuch as, over and above the intermediate or transitional character of the Agglutinate stage of growth or development, their geographical position has a like intermediate character, suggestive of elements of affinity of a more specific character.

§ 115. And such is the case. There are many more Agglutinate languages than these—languages that are to be counted by the score and hundred. Indeed, we may anticipate and add that, with a few possible exceptions, all the world over, whether in Africa, America, Australia, or Polynesia, whatever in the way of speech is neither Synthetic, nor Monosyllabic, is Agglutinate. Nevertheless, it is only the few under notice that will be specially dwelt upon.

§ 116. So far, then, as mere material goes, the Agglutinate class is abundant to excess. But the material is nearly

all of one kind ; viz., a multitude of different languages, and an average amount of dialects and sub-dialects for each. To set against this, we must state that, as a rule, the material is of the later, or latest, date.

§ 117. The great exception to this statement, the oldest language of the class, and, perhaps, of the world at large, is the Hebrew, the only language in the Agglutinate division that can be compared, in respect of its antiquity, to either the Greek and Latin of Europe, or the Sanskrit and its congeners of Asia. This, or the Jews' language, is that of the *Old Testament*.

But the language of the *New Testament* is Greek ; and it is in the earliest translations of the New Testament that we get the earliest monument of the languages that are now about to present themselves.

§ 118. To the time between the Birth of our Saviour and the Flight of Mahomet (*i.e.* the Christian and the Mahometan epochs), the New Testament (wholly or partly) is translated into *Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopic, and Armenian*. Then follows the *Amharic* and *Georgian* versions ; the former suggested by the Ethiopic, or Gheez, the latter by the Armenian.

The earliest *Irish* belongs to the same class. It is safe to say that before the Flight of Mahomet it was a written language, and it is possible that some of the existing specimens of it may be of that age. This is the period represented in the Synthetic stage by the Mæsogothic translation of Ulphilas.

Out of the Syriac alphabet grew the Arabic ; and with this, the Arabic itself, before the time of Mahomet, became a written language.

§ 119. The date of the oldest compositions in the Georgian is uncertain. Probably, they date from the introduction of Christianity ; but are not so old as the oldest Armenian.

§ 120. Lastly comes the *Tamul*, the representative language of *Southern India*. It is not pretended that this, in either its cultivation or antiquity, rivals the Sanskrit. Nor has it been so carefully studied. The old, or classical Tamul

—the *Shen* Tamul as it is called—is considered to have flourished as the language of a rich and varied literature as early as the ninth century, and to present itself in inscriptions earlier. Caldwell specially states that it was comparatively free from the influence of the Sanskrit, and that it was richer in forms than the present language. I have not, however, met with any definite exposition of these differences; nor has any considerable proportion of the literature itself been printed.

§ 121. With the discovery of America came a great flood of light upon what we may call the *unwritten* languages, or the languages which having no literature of their own had to be made known to us through the investigations of missionaries, travellers, traders, slavers, and, finally, professed philologists. This means the languages of the New World, as a matter of course; all Africa, with the exception of Egypt and part of Abyssinia; Siberia, Caucasus, North-Eastern Asia, and all the islands, whether of the Atlantic or Pacific, with the exception of Sumatra, Java, Bali, Celebes, and the Philippine Islands. Some of the grammars of this period were composed before A.D. 1600, for in Mexico, Guatemala, and Yucatan the zeal of the missionary had already found its vocation. Elsewhere, the accumulation of material was somewhat later. Enough, however, has been said to show that the languages of the Agglutinate division of which we have any precise knowledge are nearly all, in respect to their *data*, less than four hundred years old; and all, with the great exception of the Hebrew, later than the Christian era, or, compared with the classical languages and the Sanskrit, later than the Augustan age.

§ 122. Later than these, in respect to their oldest records, come the *Turkish*, the *Mongol*, and the *Mantshu*. Of these the alphabets are of Syrian origin, and, in all probability, some centuries older than the earliest specimens of the literature to which they gave origin. The Turkish is the oldest, the Mantshu the latest; and it was by the Christian mis-



sionaries of the Nestorian heresy that the Turkish, the earliest of them, was introduced. It was to the *Uighur* dialect that it was first applied; and, though manuscripts in it still exist, and represent the oldest form of the Turkish language, it has long been superseded by the Arabic, the alphabet of Mahometanism.

§ 123. It is in Eastern Europe and Western Asia that the languages which most especially lie *between* the Synthetic and the Monosyllabic areas present themselves. These, when we take the whole of them, are the languages of Caucasus and Transcaucasia, all of them falling into dialects, and many of them forming small groups of distinct languages: the *Circassian* (and *Abkazian*); the *Midzhedzhedzi* or *Tshentsh*; the *Lesgian* (of many denominations); the *Georgian* (with well-marked dialects for Gurjel, Mingrelia, Swaneti, and Lazestan); the *Iron* and *Armenian* (of which the ethnological affinities are not universally admitted), and an outlying obscure form of speech, called the *Ude*.

### SECTION III.

#### MONOSYLLABICISM. ACCENT. MATERIALS.

§ 124. *The Bhot, Bhotiya, or Tibetan*.—Beginning in the West, and on the confines of the Persian of the North-East, and the Turkish of Chinese, and Russian Turkestan, we find the first *Tibetan* in Bultistan, or Little Tibet; then in Ladakh, Tibet Proper, the Sub-Himalyan ranges of India between Cashmir and Kumaon, Butan, the obscure tract of country between the Eastern frontier of Tibet (or Butan) and China, and, more or less, along the whole Himalayan range, (North) from Cashmere to Assam.

§ 125. The age of the oldest literary records of the Tibetan is uncertain; but we know that the spoken Tibetan of the present time is notably more modern than the written language. This is because the older orthography is still kept

up, and in (I believe) the great majority of words there is a considerable difference between the two; indeed, it is a common practice of writers on the language to draw special attention to the difference between the '*spoken*' and the '*written*' Tibetan, and to give each word in both forms. I cannot state the precise nature of the difference between the two extreme forms. It is probably as great as any that is to be found in any of the *Non-Semitic* languages of the Agglutinate class; but, nevertheless, wholly incommensurable with differences that present themselves in the Synthetic and Analytic forms of speech, where the rate of change has been quicker, and the material to act upon greater.

§ 126. 1. In respect to its dialects little is known; the central parts being unexplored by Europeans. On the East and South it is difficult to say what is a dialect of the Tibetan and what a separate language; especially along the Southern slope of the Himalayas.

§ 127. 2. The *Burmese* of Burma Proper, Arakan, and Manipur; falling into the Khen, Karyen, and other undoubted dialects. On the frontier of Assam and India it is difficult to say when the forms of speech cease to be dialects of some superior language, or when they constitute separate and independent languages. The denomination *Naga*, applied to a long list of tongues spoken along the mountain-range on the south side of the Assam valley is a notable example of this. Some of the forms of speech have one, some another, set of affinities.

§ 128. 3. The *Singpho*. Spoken to the East of the Burmese, and to the North and East of the Siamese. That the Singpho, Burmese, and Tibetan are members of one and the same group, family, or class, is, pretty generally, admitted. What the value of the group may be is another question.

§ 129. 4. The *Thay* or *Siamese*, with the *Ahom*, *Khamti*, *Laos* or *Lau*, and the Shan dialects of the Burmese Empire.

§ 130. The *Môn*, or language of Pegu.

§ 131. The *Kha*, or *Ka*, of Cambojia.

§ 132. The *Anamese*, or Anamitic, of Cochin China.

§ 133. The *Chinese*.—This has long been considered to be the typical language of the Monosyllabic class; and that, probably, on good grounds. Of its paramount importance in both politics and literature there is no doubt. The Mandarin, or classical language, is uniform throughout the empire; though its history shows that it has undergone several changes—artificial rather than natural. The opposite to this, as a form that has been modified by the influence of commerce, and contact with other languages, is the Chinese of Canton. Of independent dialects, the best known is that of the Province of Fokien.

§ 134. On the antiquity of the Chinese literature little need be said; and as little about the method of writing it. It is not one which favours the exact representation of old and obsolete forms. Nor is there any warrant for any composition of any very great antiquity being exactly in the form it took under the hands of the original author. The matter may be as old as the time of Confucius or older; but the antiquity of the form—*ipsissima verba ipsissimis literis*—is another question. We are sure of nothing in this way older than the oldest manuscript, and who knows the date of this? Of the changes in the Mandarin dialect we know something; but this refers more to the *tones* than to the literal and syllabic structure of words and their combinations. In the opinion of the present writer—for which he claims very little—it is probable that more knowledge of the changes that any monosyllabic language has undergone is to be got from a comparison of *written* Tibetan in its older forms than from anything attainable from the older compositions in Chinese. It is not likely, however, that the comparison will be made for some time to come.

Of independent languages spoken within the area of China Proper the *Miaoutsé* of the Province of Yunnan has the best claim to be considered other than Chinese.

From a single short vocabulary which the present writer has seen in manuscript it seems to be equally unlike the Chinese, and the languages of its western frontier.

Of the languages of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands it is only necessary to state that they are not Malay.

In the Malayan Peninsula, the Siamese, which runs farther south than any member of the Monosyllabic family, but which appears to be of more northern origin, is succeeded by the Malay—other than Monosyllabic.

§ 135. 9. 10. *The Sub-Himalayan and Naga groups.*—Kunaweri, where the Sutlej, the most eastern of the Five Rivers of the Punjab, flows from the higher to the lower levels of the Sub-Himalayan slope, and first becomes an Indian river, is the point where, in the details of this large and mixed division, it is the most convenient to begin. Here it is where monosyllabic forms of speech, and those of Northern India which are other than monosyllabic, come in contact.

1. 2. For the *Kanet* of Kunawur we have, at least, two varieties, the *Sumchú* and the *Theburskul*, with sub-dialects: unwritten. Then Eastward, and in Nepaul rather than in Hindostan,—

3. 4. The *Magar* and *Bramhú*.

5. 6. The *Gurung* and *Murmi*.

7. 8. 9. The *Vayu* (or *Hayu*), *Kusunda*, and *Chepanj*.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. The *Denwar*, *Kuswar*, *Paksya*, *Thaksya*, and *Tharu*.

15. The *Nepalese* (*Pahari*).

16. 17. The *Kiranti*, or *Kirata*, with which we may associate the *Limbu*, which, until lately, was treated as a separate language. Of the Kiranti dialects Mr. Hodgson gives us vocabularies for no less than *nineteen*, of which the *Limbre* is the only one that has an alphabet.

18. The *Lepcha*—spoken in Sikkim, and the most eastern member of this range; inasmuch as, east of Sikkim, we find,

in Butan, the Butani, or Lhopa, form of speech, which is Tibetan. The Lepcha, also, has an alphabet.

19. 20. 21. *Bodo (Borro)* and *Dhimal*. In Hindostan ; spoken in Kooch Bahar, and Mymansing.

22. 23. 24. 25. *Garo, Mikir, Kuki (or Luncta), and Casia*.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. *Abor (Aka), Dofla, Miri, Mishimi (Tablung), Mithan, Deoria Chutia, and Jili (?)*.

It is in the southern members of this last division that the chief materials for the transition from Monosyllabism to Agglutination are the best studied ; and of the raw material no one has given us so much as Mr. Hodgson, and that both in the shape of vocabularies, and of grammar, or, at least, of valuable grammatical outlines. The number of dialects and sub-dialects is one element of their value. Another is the fact that lying, as many of them do, well within the frontier of India, they come into actual contact with languages other than Monosyllabic ; the Hindi and Bengali on the West, and, on the East, in approximation to the Dravirian forms of speech of the Khond class. In the parts about the Rajmahal Hills members of this last class are spoken up to the banks of the Ganges, which the most southern congeners of the Dhimal, Bodo, and Garo *approach* ; though it is doubtful whether there is ever any absolute contact.

§ 136. 10. The *Naga* group, to which allusion has been made, under the head of '*Burmese*,' must be taken along with another ; and both connected with the Valley of Assam. In this the Bengali is rapidly encroaching ; but the original speech of the whole district was Monosyllabic.

§ 137. Of these languages and dialects less is known in the central valley than in the mountain-ranges on each side of it. On the North they are the *Abor* (and *Aka*), the *Dofla*, and the *Mishimi (Tablung)*, and *Mithan*. These take us up, or near, to the Eastern extremity of the valley. For the line on the South we find, first, a series of dialects akin to the Burmese and Singpho, and also certain Northern offsets of the Siamese ; and, running from East to West, a list

of not less than twenty languages, dialects, or sub-dialects, known under the general name of '*Naga*.' These, of course, lie nearly parallel to the Abor and Dofla line from Tibet; the affinities being with the Northern and Southern Tibetan and Burmese respectively. Dr. Brown, however, to whom we owe the valuable series of illustrative vocabularies, has pronounced that, between the two we are justified in throwing the Burmese and Tibetan into a single class. Of the other groups, the Siamese is the most isolated.

§ 138. In respect to Accent and Tone more will be said in the sequel; for it is with the Monosyllabic languages that we may *begin*, and argue upwards, i.e. from the earlier to the later stage. We may now ask not only whether we can go farther back (which will be seen in the sequel), but whether we can go farther forward? We can certainly speculate on the tendencies of the more advanced languages, and point to the portions of them in which change is going on at present, and also seems likely to proceed. But there are points which are of a more practical character; points which are less connected with either of the two extremities of our chain than with the relation of these extremities to one another. Let us remind ourselves that, in way of growth, or development, the two most opposite languages are the English and the Chinese. The English is the most Analytic language in the world; the Chinese the most typically Monosyllabic. If we compare the two, we shall find something like the old adage—'*Extremes meet*.' Nor is it difficult to see how this may be the case; indeed, how, to some extent, it *must* be so.

§ 139. The chief and most conspicuous process in the Analytic stages of language is to divest the words it affects of all such additions, affixes, or appendages as constitute Inflection: indeed, if we compare the present English with the Greek, Latin, or Sanskrit, we may say that the function of Analysis in Britain has been to denude all English words of their inflections; and, if they leave any standing, to make

them as little distinctive as possible. We have, notoriously, very few real inflections of any kind, and it will be shown that of the majority the action, or influence, is incomplete. At present, it is enough to suggest the similar uninflectional character of the Chinese, and, at the same time, the very opposite reason for it. In Chinese the inflections have not been developed. In English they have been developed and dropped.

It is, probably, more important to understand this than to trouble ourselves about giving it a name. It is more like a *Circle* than anything else; and we may, if we choose, call it a *Cycle*—*ob differentiam*. This is what we do with 'Noun' and 'Name,' and, to some extent, with 'Mode' and 'Mood'; though the only difference is, that the words (identical in meaning) are taken from different languages. It would be somewhat technical to call it a *Cycloid*. It is, probably, more of a *Spiral* than aught else. But, be this as it may, there is certainly a tendency in the more advanced stages of Analysis for the non-inflectional character to return upon itself.

§ 140. It may now be shown that the English system of inflection, limited as it is at its best, is even more limited than at first it appears to be. This is because it is less distinctive; and 'distinctive' means as follows:—If two or more parts of speech have inflections of the same form, and, *totidem literis*, identical, however they may differ in import, their inflection is only distinctive in reference to words with *different* endings, and not distinctive in respect to one another. Thus the *-s* in *fathers* is distinctive as opposed to *father*; but whether it represent the Latin *patris* or *patres* is doubtful. In writing we can indicate the difference by the apostrophe: *father's=patris*, *fathers=patres*. But writing is Language, and something more. In Speech the *-s*, as between the Genitive Case and the Plural Number, is *not* distinctive, and, so far, is deficient in the function of an inflection. Again, from *love*, which is a verb as well as a noun, we have *love's=amoris*, *loves=amores*, and *loves=amat*; words which, in

meaning, are three, but in form, one. The context, no doubt, tells us what is meant. But, if so, what is the function of the inflection? Again, we know that, originally, such inflections were different; *i.e.* that the Genitive Singular ended in *-es*, the Plural in *-as*, and the Verb in *-eth*. But, now, we must take them as they stand; so that out of the few inflections which we have in English, the three in *-s* are imperfect. So are the two in *-ed* (*-d* or *-t*), as *loved*=*amavit*, and *loved*=*amatus*. So is the termination *-ing* in words like *speaking*, *moving*, and the like. Do they translate words like *motio*, or words like *movens*? Originally, the forms were different; for the Participle ended in *-nd*, the Verbal in *-ung*. So were, originally, the two forms in *-d*. Later on, they became confluent: and of the Analytic stage the tendency to confluence is a character; and, in proportion as inflections become confluent, their operation as distinctive signs is impaired.

When these imperfect inflections are duly considered, what, in the way of distinctive inflection, remains in our language? The *-t* in the words *wha-t*, *tha-t*, and *i-t* (*hi-t* from *he*). The form in *-en* for the Participle Passive is no inflection, but a formative.

Hence, it is, manifestly, of primary importance to know whether a language is on its way from Agglutination, or some lower stage, to Synthesis, or from Synthesis to Analysis: and between extreme forms, like the English and Chinese, it is not difficult to do so; with the intermediate ones it is otherwise. There are some combinations, however, such as '*I have been*,' that scarcely can be other than Analytic.

§ 141. Such are the stages and such the materials. The stages are recognised, and the names have an adequate amount of currency. They are not unexceptionable; but it is better to take them as they are, than to try to improve upon them. Nevertheless, both the names and their distribution must be taken with a certain amount of reservation.

It is probable that, in their two extreme forms the



Analytic and Synthetic constitute *two* distinct stages. But they are languages for which we have a long series of records ; languages which belong to the same great Indo-European class ; and, above all, languages which, to a degree not found elsewhere, can be studied continuously. Hence, independent of other reasons, the two classes may be taken as one ; and the stage which they constitute is here treated as such, not so much because it is a stage, but because it is a stage specially and pre-eminently susceptible of illustration.

§ 142. The Synthetic, or Analytico-Synthetic, stage stands first in order, because it is the one which, in Great Britain at least, is the best understood. It is the last of the series ; and it is from the newer to the older, from the more developed to the less developed, from the more certain to the less uncertain, that we must reason. The special elements of language that the above-named languages illustrate are the *Inflections*. They are fairly illustrated ; but when we, also, see how they transmute themselves into Analytical equivalents, the combined illustration of the two classes is very valuable ; and it is only from the languages of this period that we can arrive at it. But the difference between Syntheticism and Agglutination is not absolute ; nor are all the Agglutinate languages equally in contrast to the Synthetic. In the mere number of cases the Fin surpasses the Latin and Sanskrit. Neither is there much difference in the reducibility of the signs. In the Turkish, however, which is probably the nearest congener of the Fin, the signs both of Case and Number (Gender there is none) are easily divisible into separate syllables, independent of one another, and, in short, more like reducible compound words than irreducible signs of Inflection. On the frontier of the Monosyllabic area, *i.e.* on the parts between the Himalayas and the Ganges, the Agglutinate class is nearer in structure to the Monosyllabic than it is to the Synthetic. Nor should this surprise us. Between the spread of the Russian eastward and the Turkish westward, the displacement of (probably) intermediate forms

is inordinate. It is probable that nine-tenths of the area which is now Turk, Mongol, or Russ was originally other than Turkish, Mongolian, or Russian. Of one of these hypothetical languages—the Yeniseian, between the Turkish and Mongolian—a fragment still remains.

§ 143. In the Agglutinate stage there is, undoubtedly, Inflection, and that to a notable extent; just as in the Synthetic stage there was Agglutination. Neither of the two forms excludes the other. On the other hand, however, it is certain that the proportion which the two processes bear towards one another varies. By this, (like the other two stages) *i.e.* by its general character it must be judged, and by this general character each of the remaining stages will be tested. *Agglutination* will mainly coincide with the predominance of *Formatives*; *Monosyllabism* by the importance which it gives to *Accent*.

§ 144. The characteristic elements which the Agglutinate stage most specially illustrates are the *Formatives*; and, even if it were not so, the system of Inflections is more adequately illustrated in the section on Synthesis. That they should characterize the Monosyllabic series, is a contradiction in terms. But it is not merely because the Formatives, if not assigned as characteristics to the Agglutinate class, have no other place of allotment, that they are thus associated. Fair reasons will be given in the sequel for enabling us to refer the origin of some Inflections, at least, to a corresponding Formative.

§ 145. The Inflection, the Theme, and the Root, are, until we come to Phonesis, the three parts of a word in its latest stage of development; or, if we begin from the beginning, the Root, the Themative Affix, and the Inflection. Thus *voc-* is the root of both *voc o* and *voc-it-o*; it is in the latter the thematic element; and *-amus* in both *voc-amus* and *voc-it-amus* the inflection. The *-amus* may become *-atis*, *-ant*, *-ari*, and the like. The *-it-*, and *voc-* remain unchanged. Words without any superadded elements, and

that in their shortest form, are the elements of our ideal of a Monosyllabic form of speech; which we safely believe to be older in its structure than any wherein we find additions, sounds, or syllables. But words are not used singly. It must be an exceptionally short sentence in which there are not two or more than two in contact; and certain words may not only come in contact with others, but coalesce with them. This gives us *Composition*; which brings us to ask where and when *Composition* begins, *i.e.* when out of two separate words we get a compound.

§ 146. The Monosyllabic stage precedes the Agglutinate, and, *à fortiori*, it precedes the Synthetic. In its extreme—perhaps we may say ideal—form it gives neither inflectional nor thematic elements; but simply and solely the root. That this root should be monosyllabic is what we believe *à priori*, and, on the whole, rightly. But it does exclude dissyllables. A third syllable, however, would, in general, imply an addition of some kind.

§ 147. The paramount question in the languages of the Monosyllabic type is, the point at which two separate and independent words so coalesce as to become one. This means, when does *Composition* begin? There is no better example of which the difference actually is than the familiar instance of ‘*All bláck birds are not bláckbirds.*’ It is the difference of the *Accent* that indicates the change. But *Accent* underlies the Monosyllabic system, and belongs to *Phonesis*; under which head it will be considered.

§ 148. And now the treatment of the subject is changed; and, from the *data* supplied by the materials which we have indicated and classified, an attempt will be made to explain some of the chief details in the way of *Inflection* and its antecedents. It must be premised, however, that the whole mass of available material has not been treated exhaustively. For the Synthetic and Monosyllabic classes all the materials have been noticed. In the Agglutinate class there has been a selection. This is because, though there is no language,

dialect, or sub-dialect on the face of the earth which may not illustrate some other, there is a great difference in the extent to which they may illustrate the questions under consideration. The languages and classes which have been enumerated are (so to say) *on the line*. Europe, except so far as the Sanskrit is other than European, is exclusively the domain of the Synthetico-Analytical class. In like manner the South-Eastern parts of Asia are Monosyllabic; and that, not here and there, with a mixture of monosyllabism and agglutination, but in contact with one another, *en bloc*, and to the exclusion of anything polysyllabic. But the Agglutinate languages are ubiquitous; indeed, we may say, that whatever is neither Monosyllabic nor Synthetic is Agglutinate. It is manifest, then, that there must be a wide difference between some of these languages and others in respect to their value as *data*: and that those languages which, like the Mantshu, the Turk, the Yeniseian, the Fin, and the Dravirian, lie between the Monosyllabic and Synthetic areas, must have a special value of their own.

## PART II.

PARTS OF SPEECH—MIGRATION—THE INFINITIVE—  
VERB OR NOUN—PERSON, VOICE, NUMBER, CASE,  
AND TENSE—GENDER AND MOOD—ORIGIN OF, AND  
GROWTH OF INFLECTION.

## (1.) MIGRATION.

§ 149. ‘*Omne verbum, quum desinit esse quod est, migrat in Adverbium.*’ This is from Servius; and Horne Tooke remarks upon it that, when a man has a word of which he can make nothing, he makes an Adverb of it. It is doubtful whether he meant this to be complimentary to the grammarians. On the contrary, it looks like a grim sneer on either the word ‘*Migration*,’ or the goal towards which the grammarians directed it. Be this as it may; if one fact in language is more real than another, it is that of *Migration*. And equally real is the fact, that a large proportion of the *migrants* become Adverbs. Nor do they always stop at the Adverbial stage; but, on the contrary, go onwards and become *Prepositions*, and subsequently *Conjunctions*: indeed, we may fairly say, that until we have got a word as a *Conjunction* we have not got to the end of it.

§ 150. But migrations are of many kinds. Some carry the emigrant to a distance; some over a mere strip of country. And so it is with the Parts of Speech. Cases and Tenses may migrate. The Second Personal Pronoun Singular has long been migrating; so long that, in some cases, it has not only abandoned the domicile which it had in such a phrase as ‘*thou speakest*,’ to the Plural form ‘*you*’ but has, itself, gone no one knows where. But ‘*you*,’ itself an Accusative form, has replaced *ye*, which was the Nominative

so that in the sequence *thou speakest, ye speak, you speak*, we have a double change. But, along with itself the Pronoun takes its Verb; for *speak*, like 'ye' or 'you,' is a plural form. The result of all this is, that the Second Personal Pronoun Singular and the Second Person Singular of the Verb are simply eliminated from the current language.

§ 151. In German, they say *Sie=they*; so that, in German, the migration is that of the *Third* Personal Pronoun. But it is possible that this is not a true migration; or rather that it is not the migration of a *word*. It may be that it is a change of the subject-matter, and that, as a point of courtesy, a simple person spoken to may, by a fiction, be considered as *more than one*. Of fictions of this kind the Oriental languages supply numerous instances; instances of ceremonious, reverential, or, at any rate, of an artificial, language.

§ 152. There is another kind of approximate migration. *Two* words may be used to express what is sometimes expressed by one. We get an instance of this in the combinations '*I have spoken*,' and the like. But let '*have*' be omitted. In that case, the *Participle* alone expresses the same idea. If so, it then becomes a Tense; in which the difference, as in Latin, is either '*I have spoken*,' or '*I spoke*.' Now this formation of a Tense out of a Participle is neither a hypothesis nor a fiction. It exists in the Slavonic languages; and that throughout each of them, and through all the divisions and sub-divisions of the Family. And, as if to show that the so-called Tense is merely a Participle with an omission of its Verb, the Genders of the Participial form are retained in the Tense.

§ 153. The same is the case with the Second Person Plural in the Latin Passive. Words like '*amamini*,' '*regimini*,' and the like are merely participles; as truly participial as such forms as '*τετυμμένοι εἶσι*' are in Greek—the Verb Substantive being dropped.

§ 154. Again; were it not so, Speech would be un-

changeable. In fact, *Migration* is little more than another word for *Change*.

§ 155. Again, how do we translate into *thought* such sentences as ‘*Either John or Thomas is in the wrong.*’ If the thought run ‘*One of the two is in the wrong,*’ the word ‘*either*’ is a *Pronoun*. If it run ‘*In the way of an alternative,*’ &c., it is an *Adverb*. But, in Grammar, it is generally treated as a *Conjunction*. Yet this it is not. The real *Conjunction* is *or*; and the word ‘*either*’ only strengthens, or expands, its *Conjunctive* (or *Disjunctive*) force. Still the word takes the disguise of a *Conjunction*, though it is rather an adjunct to one. But, at any rate, it shows the instability of the word as a *Part of Speech*; and it is probable that most words, when they migrate, begin with being, more or less, equivocal.

§ 156. Finally, what is the whole system of *Synthesis* and *Analysis*? It is *Migration* reversed. In the foregoing illustrations we began with a form, or word, and traced the different, but allied, meanings to which it lent itself. In *Synthesis* and *Analysis* we begin with the thought, or idea, and follow it through the different combination of words by which it expresses itself. In *Migration*, a word changes its place as a *Part of Speech*. In *Synthesis* and *Analysis*, a thought, or idea, changes its garb, or clothing. But they both change, and that on the same principle. We can prove this in the change from *Synthesis* to *Analysis* historically. In the change from *Agglutination* to *Synthesis*, or from *Monosyllabicism* to *Agglutination*, we can only infer it. But it is reasonable to believe that the difference lies only in our want of *data*.

§ 157. In these illustrations it is almost needless to mention that by ‘*Parts of Speech*’ we mean not only the recognised classes of *Noun*, *Pronoun*, *Verb*, *Participle*, &c., but the parts of those parts, such as *Case*, *Person*, and the like. There is one migration from (say) the *Noun* to the *Adverb*, and another within the domain of the *Noun* itself, or from one

form of it to another. Of changes of each sort there is no better illustration than the words *then* and *there*. Let the substantive denoting *locality*, or *direction*, be understood. The form '*there*,' which is simply a Dative Feminine Singular, means '*at that place*,' '*on that spot*,' or '*in that direction*;' while '*then*,' the Accusative Masculine of the same number of the same pronoun, means '*at that time*.' In the present English these two words which, as Pronouns, have parted with their Substantives and lost their place in the Paradigm of a Declension, are preserved in the language as Adverbs—*migraverunt in Adverbia*.

Closely akin to this are the changes of the same Part of Speech in another direction. The Demonstrative Pronoun, in most languages where there is an Article at all, furnishes it. It becomes Definite; for between *pointing-out* and *defining*, as ideas, the connection is the closest. Then, for the Indefinite Article, the usual term is the Numeral for 1. Between the two we get a new Part of Speech. But this, from its close attachment to its noun, is almost a part of it, and, being this, is all but an Inflectional affix. In the Roumanian and Norse languages it is actually incorporated with it, affixed, and recognised as the Postpositive Article. It is this, no doubt; but, on the other hand, it is more of an Inflection than aught else. At the beginning it was a Personal or Demonstrative Pronoun. This is as much as can be said on this point.

## (2.) THE INFINITIVE (VERB OR NOUN) AS A PART OF SPEECH.

§ 158. The heading of this chapter is more than what the mere words imply. It is a text; a text upon the Infinitive Mood and other matters besides. And we can easily see why it is thus comprehensive. The Infinitive Mood stands on the border-land between the Noun and the Verb. In languages like the Greek, upon which the principles of the Grammars for, at least, the rest of Europe were founded, there was a



well-marked distinction between them. Both were inflected; but Nouns were inflected in the way of Declension, Verbs in that of Conjugation. Nouns had Gender and Case; Verbs had Person, Voice, Number, Tense, and Mood; and for every one of these groups the characteristic signs were clear and definite. But what when we come to languages where the Inflections are obsolete, obsolescent, or extinct? And what with languages where they have never been developed? There must be cases where the Greek system is, more or less, inapplicable; the more so as it was by logicians, rather than by philologists, that the system of Nouns, Verbs, and the like, was devised. The only wonder is that such a system carries so far as it does: a tribute to the genius of the great philosophers of antiquity.

§ 159. ‘*The Infinitive Mood stands on the border-land between the Noun and the Verb;*’ and when we investigate its relations, we must determine not only what are the characters of the Mood itself, but the characters of the Noun and Verb besides. It is probable that most of us do one of two things: we either (1) make too much of the distinction between the two Parts of Speech, or (2) carry the Infinitive too far into the domain of the Verb.

I am convinced that it is best, when we treat of the *Verb*, to begin with the *Verbals*, and when we treat of the *Noun*, to carry it on to the *Finite Verb*. This last, perhaps, is what we generally do. But it is not enough. We must be prepared, when we reach the *Finite Verb*, to consider the difference between it and the Noun as one of kind rather than of degree. When we see how thoroughly the Participle appears to connect the two, we are likely to underrate the difference. But (to anticipate) we must be prepared to realise the fact, that as words, terms, parts of speech, or whatever we call them, the *Finite Verb* and *Noun* are incommensurable; and that any difference of classification less than incommensurable is insufficient. The Noun is a *Word*: the Finite Verb is a *Sentence*.

§ 160. It is better to begin with the Verbals (*hunter* and *hunting*) than with the Infinitive; and, when we do this, we must go back farther still: we must rise into the region of the *Abstract* and the *Concrete*.

§ 161. What, as a part of speech, is a word like *hunting*? A Noun. And what are words like *hunter*? Nouns also. The first is the name of an action independent of its agent; the other the name of an agent independent of any action. There is nothing concrete about either of them. They are abstract terms, just like *redness*, *heaviness*, and the like, and they are formed with the same regularity and to the same extent. Every Adjective in our language can be made into a Substantive by adding *-ness*, and, by adding *-er* or *-ing* (originally *-ung*), every Verb can be made into a Noun.

§ 162. What applies to the Verbal abstracts like *hunt-ing*, *leap-ing*, and the like, applies also to the simpler forms, *hunt* and *leap*. There is a difference, no doubt, between such sentences as '*he is good at leaping*,' and '*he is good at a leap*.' There is, also, a difference (somewhat less perceptible) between such a line as

*To err* is human; *to forgive*, divine,

and

*Error* is human; *forgiveness*, divine;

but, in both cases, the import of the words under notice is that of a Noun. In both cases we get the name of an action without the name of the agent; just as in '*redness*,' '*goodness*,' &c., we get the name of a quality, but no name for substance, with which it is connected.

§ 163. The difference between the words like *leap* and those like *leap-ing*, as in '*he took a leap*' and '*leaping is a certain action of the lower extremities*,' is much the same as that between words like *red* and *redness*. We can say '*this is redness*,' and, as *redness* is the name of a general attribute of all red objects, it is a Noun. But '*red*' is not so much a name as a word that suggests a name; i.e. *redness*. The logicians get over this by saying that in expressions like '*this*

is *red*,' some such word as *thing* or *object* is understood. And such is doubtless the case. But, when this is the case, the Adjective is not so much a term *per se* as an element in a compound term. Now though the parallel scarcely runs on all-fours, this is essentially the difference between *leap* and *leap-ing*. The first points to a particular act, the latter to the character of the action in general.

Of the two words thus brought into comparison it is self-evident that the more general and indefinite, which is also the derivative form, is the newer; and that the less general, the one that most readily suggests (though it does not name) a second factor, is the older one. This secondary element in the case of the Adjective is the substance of which *redness* is the attribute, and in that of the Verb the agent in the action. But attributes and actions are equally abstractions, and though not equally *Substantives* are equally *Nouns*. This is not written for nothing. When we come to the names of the agents in actions (or states), and when these names are represented by the *Persons of Verbs*, the details of the present comparison are important.

§ 164. Now Verbs as well as Nouns are *names*; and so far as 'name' and 'Noun' coincide in import, they are Nouns. But the *Nouns* or *names* are of a peculiar kind. In the first place, they are Abstract as opposed to *Concrete*; but they are not Abstract in the way that the Adjective and their derivatives—*red* and *redness*—are Abstract. They do not represent Qualities. What the Verb represents is either an *Action* or a *State*. When, over and above this, it tells us who or what is in such or such a state, or who or what is the agent in such or such an act, it (then) becomes 'invested with circumstances,' or *Concrete*. But the name of an action, purely and simply, without the name of the agent, is as much of Noun as any other ordinary Abstract. Such a name is '*hunt*' = '*venari*' as opposed to '*hunter*' and '*venator*.' But words like '*hunter*' are incomplete in their import. What is a *hunter*, unless we know what is meant by *hunting*?

Unless this be known, he is agent without individuality, and without any definite action.

§ 165. In words like '*I hunt*,' &c., we get something more; *i.e.* we get the name of both action and the agent. But this is a name and something more; in fact, it is *two* names. *Per contra*, the Latin for '*I hunt*' is '*venor*,' and this is a single word. Nevertheless, it translates *two*; and, what is more, it contains the element, or representative, of a second term. What, then, are we to say? We may safely say thus much—that a Verb, whether in what is called the Infinitive Mood or in its simple radical form, is very like a Noun; and that a Verb with its Person is very like *two* Nouns.

§ 166. To which, then, are the Infinitives most like—the Nouns or the Verbs? They are wholly without the Persons of the Finite Verb; for if they had them, they would cease to be Infinitives. Have they the Declension of the Noun? and, if they have, to what extent? This is a point to be considered. Outward appearances are against their having it. It is certain that, *totidem litteris* and *totidem syllabis*, such inflections are wanting. But their absence is not due to anything in the nature of the Infinitive itself; but rather to another cause. Every Infinitive has its corresponding Substantive; the difference between the two forms being but slight. Thus *φθόρος* corresponds to *φθορεῖν*, *μῖσος* to *μισεῖν*; and these are declined. But even in Greek, at least, there is a concurrent system of Cases; though of an indirect kind—*τὸ φθορεῖν*=*invidia*; *τοῦ φθορεῖν*=*invidiæ*; *τῷ φθορεῖν*=*invidiâ*. In Latin, this indirect inflection is wanted. But in Latin there is no Article.

§ 167. I do not know that this particular construction is found in the Plural *number*, or that we can readily produce such words as *τὰ* or *τῶν τυπτεῖν*. But there is no logical reason why we should not; and, if we could, there would be no difficulty in translating them. They would simply give us equivalents to such words as *beatings*, *risings*, *findings*, and the like. There would be a shade of difference in their

import, just as there is one between *to err* and *error*—but that would be all.

§ 168. Can Infinitives have Gender? Are such combinations as ὁ φθονεῖν, and ἡ φιλοσοφεῖν possible? All that need be said on this point is, that words like ὁ φθόρος and ἡ φιλοσοφία are common, and that, as Substantives, they correspond with the Infinitives in sense.

The accidents of the Verbal Substantives are, also, the accidents of the Infinitive Mood *in import*. But there is one exception. However, in this there is nothing, either in form or import, which brings the Infinitive and the Noun within the same class. This one exception is that of *Person*. The Infinitives have no *Persons*. If they had, they would thereby cease to be Infinitives, and become Finite Verbs. This, at first, seems but a trifling distinction. In reality it is a very wide one. It is just the distinction between *two* words and *one*; just the difference between a single word and a sentence; just the difference between (in Logic) a *Proposition* and a *Single Term*. It is a distinction of no small import; indeed, it is the difference which justifies us in saying that the relations between the Infinitive and the Finite Verb are incommensurable.

§ 169. The Person of a Finite Verb is either a separate word, as 'I' in '*I swim*,' or its equivalent the *-o* in '*no*;' both of which are, in Grammar, *Sentences*, in Logic *Propositions*; short ones, no doubt, but still *propositions* and *sentences*. No Infinitive has a Person. No Finite Verb without one.

§ 170. The exceptions to this last statement are only formal; inasmuch as the Personal element may be implicit in the sense, though not explicit in the expression. This happens when the Subject is either so manifest that it needs no sign, or too indefinite to be represented by any particular name.

Instances of the first alternative are words like *dic* and

*fac*, Imperative Moods, where the personality of the individual addressed is self-evident.

Of the second we find examples in the so-called Impersonal Verbs, *talet*, *panitet*, and the like. In some cases the context supplies what is missing. But in short sentences the case is different. In combinations like '*it rains*,' it is hard to say who, or what, is the agent; yet this is not because there is no agency, but because its nature is indefinite. In the Infinitive, however, there is no name for an agent anywhere, or of any kind, no name whether explicit or implicit, no name either *extra dictionem* or *intra dictionem*.

§ 171. It is only then in the Imperative Mood, where there is no possibility of doubt as to the agent, and in some few Impersonals, where the Nominative Case is too indefinite to be expressed, that the Finite Verb thus loses its characteristic. Whether it take this name in the shape of a separate Noun, as '*I think*,' '*John speaks*,' or by the way of inflection, as '*puto*,' or by both processes, '*Ego puto*,' and '*I think*,' is immaterial.

§ 172. The Finite Verb then is a Verb, and something more. It is a Verb *plus* a Pronoun, or the equivalent to one. It is the name of an action *plus* the name of an agent. It is not one word, but two. It is not a single Part of Speech, but two Parts of Speech united as one.

§ 173. I know no better exposition of these details than the following, from Stockfieth's Laplandic Grammar, §§ 231-233.

A. There are two capital forms of the Verb: 1. the Subjective form, with the conception of Personality and Time; 2. the Objective form, without any other conception, especially of Personality.

B. The Subjective form has three Moods (*modi*):

1. The Indicative.
2. The Conjunctive.

This last has two divisions: *a.* Subjunctive (*præsens subjunctivus*);  
*b.* Optative (*præteritum conjunctivum*).

3. The Imperative.

C. The Objective form, independent of Person, and to some extent of Time, has two divisions: 1. *Verbum Nominale*; 2. *Nomen Verbale*.

To the *Verbum Nominale* belong—

1. *Infinitivus*, which answers to the ordinary Infinitive.
2. *Factivus*, which answers to the Latin Supine.
3. *Comitativus*, which answers to the Gerund.

To the *Nomen Verbale* belongs—

- a.* *Nomen Substantivum Verbale*.
- b.* *Nomen Adjectivum Verbale*.

Each falls into two subdivisions:

1. *Nomen Substantivum Verbale Abstractum*, which corresponds with the two [Danish] forms in *ing* and *-n*, *Læsning* (i.e. *lectio*) and *Læsen* (i.e. *legere*). It is inflected in both numbers.

*b.* *Nomen Adjectivum Verbale Concretum*, which answers to the Latin Participle.

1. *Præsens Participium*, without the conception of any definite time, and therefore, in conjunction with the auxiliary verb, it applies to any time.

2. *Præteritum Participium*, with the conception of past time; uninflected.

§ 174. This last word, ‘*uninflected*,’ applies to the Laplandic language, not to the Past Participle of the Indo-European class.

The name *Præteritum Conjunctivum* assigned to the Optative indicates its mixed character, and its relations to the Tense on one side, the Mood on the other.

Of a Negative Gerund, which is called ‘*Caritivus*,’ no notice has here been taken.

It is necessary, too, to draw attention to Stockfleth’s notice of the negative form of the English Infinitive. In the present language there is no sign for the Infinitive Mood, so that in English the Infinitive is *equivocal*, i.e. a form like *ride* and *hunt*, in which the Substantives *a ride* and *a hunt* are absolutely identical in form with the verbs *to ride* and *to hunt*.

## (3.) INFLECTION.

§ 175. The *Inflections* are a natural class; and their import is the expression of what, in Logic, is called the Accidents of a Substance, Action, or State. As such, they are signs of Person, Voice, Number, Case, Tense, Gender, and Mood. Of these, Person, Voice, and Tense are the most remarkable, *i.e.* the most readily analysed, and the most manifestly derived from separate and independent words. Those of Gender and Mood are, perhaps, the last to develop themselves and the first to become obsolete. Number and Tense seem to be both the earliest in origin and the most permanent in duration.

§ 176. The two principal methods of forming these Inflections are *Addition* and *Differentiation*. By Addition we get a wholly new sound, vowel or consonant as the case may be. By Differentiation we get either the substitution of one sound (vowel or consonant) for another, or the same vowel in a modified form. Sometimes, indeed, we have nothing more than a change of either tone or of accent; as, *I beat you if you do that = I shall beat &c.*

§ 177. Upon the difference between the results of Addition and Differentiation some important inferences depend. The termination *-as* in words like *bon-as* differentiates the Feminine form from the Masculine *bonos*; but between the *two* we get *three* distinctions—those of Gender, Number, and Case. It is not necessary to go into the explanation of the mechanism of this, and to show how it can be; but it is clear that when such forms present themselves, there must be one of the three inflections for which we have no extrinsic, audible, or definite sign. It is convenient to call these inflections either ‘*modified*,’ or ‘*differentiated*’; and it is evident that such abbreviated or modified forms are much more difficult to reduce than inflections *in extenso*. Now, the Inflection of Gender is generally expressed by either differentiation of this kind, or by the omission or non-existence



of some increment which is present in one gender, but absent in one of the others. In the Synthetic class of language, where Gender prevails, reduction is difficult. In the Agglutinate languages, on the other hand, where there is no Gender, it is comparatively easy; and we can, in many cases, lay our finger on the respective signs of Number and Case, and determine their sequence. Moreover, they often amount to syllables of notable length. Nevertheless, even here it is not easy to ascertain what they were as separate and independent words. It is enough, however, if they improve the presumption that such is what they were originally.

§ 178. The signs of the *Conjunctive* Mood are also, as a rule, *differentiations* or *modifications*; and the *Conjunctive* Mood, like Gender, is late in its development and early in its disappearance. This means that both look very like secondary formations, or formations from some earlier inflection—*with a difference*.

§ 179. It is submitted, then, that the distinction is natural; and that inflections formed by change rather than by the addition of some special separate element will be found to correspond with other characters, and with certain classes that such characters determine. When this is the case, we may presume that the arrangement is natural; though, of course, its value must be measured by the extent of the correspondence. How far this is the case will be seen in the sequel, especially under '*Gender*' and '*Mood*.'

#### (4.) DECLENSION AND CONJUGATION.

§ 180. Each of these terms is used in two senses. When we say that the Genitive Case is a part of the Declension of a Noun, and that the First Person Singular is a part of the Conjugation of a Verb, we mean that each belongs to the class for which *Inflection* is the generic name. This is a mere matter of classification, and requires no further notice.

But when we say that *musæ, domini, lapidis, gradûs,* and *faciæ*, all of which are Genitive Cases, belong to five different Declensions; and that *amo, moneo, rego,* and *audio* belong to four different Conjugations, we mean something which, when we come to understand what is involved in the difference, is perplexing.

§ 181. *Declension and Conjugation*, in this sense, mean classes under which, when we find *more forms than one* for the *same* Case or Tense, the different paradigms of the inflections are arranged. Sometimes words are placed in different declensions on the strength of very slight differences; sometimes a considerable amount of them is required before a second class is recognised. But this varies with the grammar and the language; and, in many cases, there may be different systems within the same language. This depends on the grammarian. The old number of the Greek Declensions was Five. They were subsequently reduced to Three. On the other hand, by giving the Simple and the Contracted Nouns a Declension each, they are raised to Ten. Again—the Conjugations of the Verbs in the Eton Grammar are (or were) thirteen—‘*sæ Barytonorum, tres Contractorum, et quatuor Verborum in -µ.*’ But these are manifestly reducible to three higher classes. Are we then to apply the same term to the Genus and Species? Or are we to have names for each class? These are questions which are not asked for the purpose of being answered. They are rather asked for the purpose of showing that the number of Declensions and Conjugations is, to some extent, a question of names rather than one of realities.

§ 182. The real question is—Why should there be any difference of Declension and Conjugation at all? If a given meaning is adequately represented by one form, what is the use of another? Either rightly or wrongly, we believe that Nature is not tolerant of superfluities. Still, if there are not a great many ideas which have more forms of expression than one, there must be something exceptionable in many of

our common modes of speech. Two such are the words before us ; and ‘*synonym*,’ or ‘*synonymous word*,’ is a term of the same kind. Are there such things in *Rerum Natura* as two words with *exactly* the same meaning ?

§ 183. There are not. Neither is there any method of forming a second inflection absolutely identical with one already existing, and along with which it can be used concurrently. There is, doubtless, something like it. There are differences of structure in the fundamental parts of the word, which may produce small changes ; there are differences in the effect which two, or more, inflectional elements in combination may have upon each other ; there are differences in the permanence of certain elements, (*i.e.* an archaic form may become obsolete in one class of words earlier than in another) ; and there may be confluence in meaning between two forms originally distinct. All this we may expect, and all this we actually find ; but they fail to give us a single instance of Language being, in the strictest sense of the word, tautological. Wherever it appears to be so, we must suspect the rule, or formula, which embodies it. We need not condemn it. Grammars are written less for comparative philologists than for learners of foreign languages. We therefore must frame the rules in the way that is most convenient. We cannot make them so stringent as to be followed by a long list of exceptions ; nor yet so guarded by qualifications and conditions as to include all possible variations. We must do the best we can for the purpose in hand. But the philologue must not mistake this for anything more than a special exposition of a special form of speech. From the Grammar of Language as it exists in nature he must exclude tautology. There are no such things as *absolute* synonyms ; no such things as declensions and conjugations that give us double forms for *exactly* the same cases and tenses ; and no such things as exceptions to a rule, provided the rule be expressed in terms sufficiently general.

It is not, however, meant by this that, for the ordi-

nary purposes of teaching, rules of less general character are inadmissible. Neither is a certain amount of exceptions. But we must be very cautious in admitting tautology as a real element in Speech.

(5.) PERSON. NOUN AND VERB.

§ 184. The PERSONS are the INFLECTIONS with which it is the most convenient to begin. No other inflection plays so important a part in classification; and in no other inflection is the structure so readily analysed. It is the Pronoun, moreover, which constitutes the broad and primary distinction between the Noun and the Finite Verb.

In the Infinitive, whether Verb or Noun, we deal with a single word. In the Finite Verb we deal with *two* words; one a Verbal name or the Abstract name of an action without the name of the Agent, the other a Pronoun, Personal or Demonstrative as the case may be. The Finite Verb, then, consists of two Nouns, and constitutes a sentence, or (in Logic) a Proposition. Hence it is a Term, and something more.

§ 185. The Noun as well as the Verb has Persons, though not in English and its Synthetic congeners. The Magyar, which is Fin and Agglutinate, is only one of the numerous languages which supply us with examples of this.

VERB.

1. Olvas-om = *I read = reading-my.*
2. Olvas-od = *thou readest = reading-thy.*
3. Olvas-uk = *we read = reading-our.*
4. Olvas-atok = *ye read = reading-your.*

SUBSTANTIVE.

1. Almá-m = *my apple = apple-my.*
2. Alm(a)-d = *thy apple = apple-thy.*
3. Alm(a)-uk = *our apple = apple-our.*
4. Alm(a)-tok = *your apple = apple-your.*

The Celtic does the same; and, in both the construction or parsing, is the same. It is not that of the Government of the Verb by a Nominative Case, but that of the Concord of a Noun with either a Possessive Case or a Pronominal Adjective. It is upon this difference that the little which need here be said about the Person of the Verb depends.

§ 186. The basis of everything connected with the Pronoun is the all-comprehensive dualism of the logicians—*Ego*, with its counterpart *Non-ego*. Everything in the Universe is either *Ego* or *Non-ego*. Everything, too, is either *A* or *Not-A*, and whatever is *not Not-A* must be *A*. In Philology this dual becomes a triple partition. Every Name in Language is that of (1) the Speaker; (2) the Object spoken *to*; and (3) the Object spoken *about*. Out of this Triad we get the Three Persons of the Verb.

§ 187. The very term '*Person*' suggests such an origin; and with such terminations as the  $-\mu$  of  $\tau\iota\theta\eta\mu\iota$ , and the  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$  of the Second and Third Persons, nothing suggests itself so readily as a connection between them and the Pronoun; due allowance being made for wear and tear. There are difficulties in detail, but not more than we expect. The Persons are old inflections, and have undergone very many changes. Transitional forms, however, that we miss in one language often present themselves in another; so that the doctrine that the Persons of the Verb are Pronouns in disguise has grown up spontaneously, and in the main is correct.

§ 188. In what *Case* are there incorporated Pronouns? This is a question which until lately has scarcely been thought worth the asking. Does not '*I love*' translate '*amo*,' and is not *I* the Nominative Case to its Verb—its own special verb which it governs? It is all this, no doubt. On the other hand, however, the  $-\mu$ - in the Verbs in  $-\mu$  manifestly points to the *m*- in *me* rather than to the *-g*- in *ego*.

It was the famous Welsh lexicographer, Lhuyd, who

indicated the likelihood of the signs of Person having been *oblique* cases; and it is due to Garnett that its full importance has been recognised, and the details of the change been investigated. Garnett, who, with his usual justice to his predecessors, makes special reference to Lhuyd, maintained that the Verb to which the signs of Person were attached was not so much a Finite Verb as a Verbal, that the Pronoun which invests it with personality was not a Nominative in concord with that Verb, but one in the Possessive Case, the Verb being in a state of regimen or government; in other words, we held that *scribo* was not *write-I*, but *writing-my*. He proceeds:

The second person plural does not end with the nominative *chwí*, but with *ech*, *wch*, *och*, *yeh*, which last three forms are also found coalescing with various prepositions—*iwch*, ‘to you;’ *ymoch*, ‘in you;’ *wrthych*, ‘through you.’

Now the roots of Welsh words are confessedly nouns with an abstract signification; as, for instance, *dysg* is both ‘*doctrina*’ and the second person imperative ‘*doce*.’ *Dysg-och*, or *wch*, is not, therefore, *docetis* or *docibitis vos*; but *doctrina vestrum*, ‘teaching of’ or ‘by you.’ . . . *Doctrina ego* is a logical absurdity; but *doctrina mei*, ‘teaching of me,’ necessarily includes in it the proposition *ego doceo* in a strictly logical and unequivocal form.

§ 189. For some years no one found this doctrine harder to believe than the present writer. There was no denying the oblique character of *m-*, and *-och*, or *-yeh*.

(1) But the identity of form between the verbal *dysg*, and *dysg* as the second person imperative, and (as such) an undoubted verb, is not the same in English as in Welsh. In English *teach*, which translates *dysg*, only translates it as the equivalent to *doce*. The English equivalent to *doctrina* is not *teach*, but *teach-ing*. Now this so manifestly invests the Verb with a radical character that, to an Englishman, the abstract noun is reduced to a derivation or secondary idea. There are many words, no doubt, in English where the two forms have the same meaning. Thus we say, I took

*a swim, a walk, a dip, or a rest, &c. &c.* ; but we do not say, 'I got a teach.' *Per contra*, however, there was a time when there was no such sign as *-ing* for the verbal abstract, and when the affixes *my, thy, &c.* might be affixed to every verb or verbal in the language. The more we think upon this, the more we feel that this *must* have been the case. As the exposition of the doctrine is not my own, I may say that it is thoroughly convincing. There *must* have been a time when words like *swim* and *move* existed, and when words like *swimming* and *moving* did not. Perhaps the difference between terms like *nare* and *natatio* was not recognised ; but even in that case it must have been implicit in the root, and destined in due time to take a special and distinctive form. It may do this in some languages, in others not. When it fails to be developed, there is not much tendency to demur to such a doctrine as Garnett's. When it presents itself, it is a stumbling-block. There is visible evidence of the formative being of secondary origin ; and we in England have to divest it of this, and to treat it as equally primitive with the simpler one. In the Welsh this is unnecessary. Still the doctrine is pre-eminently intelligible, and we, with no great difficulty, understand it. But when the existing Abstract forms, with these unmistakeable marks of a secondary origin and derivation, are presenting themselves in almost every sentence, we are slow to become familiar with it. We are like beginners in arithmetic. We can understand the principles of computation, but are slow and dubious when we do a sum. So it is with those whose languages abound with the signs under notice. It takes a long time to get rid of their influence, and a long time to shake off its effects. It may be different with others, but this is what it has been with the present writer. Again. Most of us are in the habit of thinking that nothing but a Nominative Case can be the Subject to a Verb. Upon this more will be said in the notice of the Nominative Case. Hence, then, the real difficulty is the confirmed habit of thinking

otherwise. Some minor points lie in the details of the construction. Is the affix a Personal Pronoun in its radical form (*me, te, &c.*), or is it the *mei*, or the *tuus*, which is Possessive? Something depends on the difference. The forms like *mei* and *tuus* suggest a later, those like *me* and *te* an earlier, period for the language in which the change took place, and when the Infinitive Verb first became Finite. The Personal element in any form is less evident, and the elements of the inflection are less easily distinguishable in the Dual than in the Plural, and in the Plural than the Singular. But this lies more in the complex character of those two Numbers than in the principle itself. If it only held good for the Singular Number, it would be sufficient to separate the Finite Verb from the Infinitive, and make them incommensurable.

#### (6.) VOICE. NOUN AND VERB.

§ 190. Nouns as well as Verbs have Voice, though it is not recognised in the ordinary Grammars. Nor, for the purposes of special teaching, need it be. Indeed, in many languages it belongs wholly to Syntax. In some we have different sorts of expression in different stages. In some cases there is no sign at all, no formative, no inflection, nothing whatever *in esse*. Nevertheless, whether adequately or inadequately represented by signs, there is in the Noun a far more elaborate system of conceptions in the way of Voice than there is in the Verb.

These, from the very nature of the language, may, with a certain amount of data, be determined and arranged *à priori*. This is because in the notion of Voice there are always an antithesis and a correlation. Hence, if we have only one form *in esse*, we are sure of another *in posse*, and, without saying exactly what it will be in language, can construct it for ourselves in thought. Thus, given such a word as *hunter*, *i.e.* the Verbal Agent from a *transitive* Verb, we know that there must be something that he is supposed to *hunt*; in other words, an object. There may or may not be a name



for this ; and in *intransitive* verbals, such as *sleep-er*, it is not wanted, though it is sometimes used, almost tautologically, to strengthen or specify the character of the state, *e.g.* *he sleeps the sleep of the righteous*. If the verbal element, however, of the name of the Agent be transitive, there must be an object, and the name of this object is the correlative (signified or not) to the Verbal of the Active Voice. Thus far there is absolute certainty. On the other hand, however, it is well known that in English, at least, no such correlative exists. In a foxhunt both the horsemen and horses are *hunters*, though with a difference. The *huntzman*, too, is a *hunter* ; but, as opposed to the *whipper-in*, he is a *hunter* of a special kind. For these then we have, either by composition or derivation, two forms deduced from the verb *hunt*, with certain distinctions between them. The horses, then, and the men are *hunters*, and take their class-name from the verb involved in their agency. But the fox has surely something like a similar connection. He is the object, or the *thing hunted*. Yet he has no single name as such. The *thing hunted*, the *hunted animal*, or the *object of the hunter* has to be expressed by a combination of different words. There is no necessity for this. One syllable is as easily attached to words like *hunt* as another. Nevertheless, we have no such word as the one suggested in English.

§ 191. Yet there is no scruple as to other modifications of the *-er*, (the *-er agentis*) under notice. One female takes to the hunting-field and becomes a *hunt-r-ess*, another to the hotel and becomes a *waitress*. We have got, then, one form ; but the one that we most especially expect we have not got. We have not got a correlative to the Verbal Agent. Such is the case ; but it is necessary to add, that the affix *-ess* is other than English in origin. And this implies more than it states. We did not in English often apply the affix till it was specially wanted for the expression of a practical distinction ; and when we had to apply it, we took it from the French.

Again, notwithstanding what has just been said, the formative that gives us a correlative to the *-er* in *hunt-er* is not wholly and absolutely un-English. *Mortgag-or* and *mortgag-ee*, *grant-or* and *grant-ee*, *trust-or* and *trust-ee*, are correlative to one another. But, again, they are words of a particular class; and again, they are words of un-English origin.

They are French, as we all know. But even in French they are not exactly what we want, not exactly the counterparts to the verbals like *hunter*. They are rather Passive Participles with a special application; and, as such, of secondary origin. But in a context they correspond exactly. They can stand as Nominative Cases to the Verb without either an expressed or an understood Substantive with which they have to agree; and they (in English) can take the sign of the Plural Number, which the Passive Participle can not.

§ 192. Two points are now transparently clear: (1) that the ordinary Passive Participle is not exactly the correlative of the Verbal in *-er*; and (2) that, at the same time, it is something very like it. And with this likeness the history of the Inflection begins.

The words of which *hunter* is the type have always had their opposites or counterparts, but not their exact ones. They never seem to have stood quite alone in import; this meaning that they seem always to have had certain approximate parallels, *i.e.* words of different form, but of like meaning. It was a difference, however, which did not amount to much. It might require a special and separate sign to express it, or it might not. But it was by no means indispensable. One language might adopt it, another not. One language might have it in one stage, but not in another. At any rate there has generally been for the two *Active* Verbals the Participle proper, like *amans*, *-antis* (= *qui amat*), and the Verbal proper, like *amator* (also = *qui amat*); but only one form in Passive sense. It was more Participial than Substantival, and its Greek sign is the *-θ-* in *ρωϑ-θ-ε̄ις*. Whether

it was always thus participial, and never substantival, in other words, whether it prevailed to the exclusion of the more substantival counterpart, will soon be seen.

§ 193. But what if both *amans* and *ámator* can be translated by *qui amat*, and are yet expressed by words as distinct as *amans* and *amator*? what is the difference between this *pair of words* that in the Active Voice is recognised and in the Passive is ignored? There are three ways of discovering it.

*a.* In the first we must *think* it out. We must clearly see what we mean by correlation, and also that each of the forms under notice, no matter whether it exist or not, is correlative. They may exist in the shape of formatives, or they may not. This is the *à priori*, or theoretical method; and by it we get what we may call the ideal correlative to such words, as *hunter* and its congeners, *i.e.* the class of Active Verbal Abstracts.

*b.* We may *work* it out. We may write a sufficient amount of Latin prose, and see when and what distinctions we make ourselves; or we may read so much classical Latin, and see what distinction the writers make.

*c.* We may get what we can from such grammars as touch upon the subject. From which we learn that words like *amator* are concrete, substantial, and substantival rather than adjectival, and that they imply the actor rather than the act; whereas words like *amans* (*amantis*) apply to the act rather than to the agent, and are more general. By substituting for the single term a combination of the relative pronoun with the verb, we get farther into the nature of the difference. *Amator* and *amans* are equally *qui amat*. But what does *qui* mean? Does it equal *ille*, or *iste*, *qui*, denoting some particular individual whose name is implied by the context, or does it equal *quisquis*, or any *qui* whatever? If it mean the latter, it makes something like a class of *lovers*. A *hunter* is a certain one of a class which *hunts*; one of more than one, perhaps one of many. Now this brings out the

element of Plurality; and we shall see, as we proceed, that *Plurality* combined with the *Substantival* nature of the Verbal under notice implies a great deal.

But why not have a pair of Verbals on both sides, or why should there be any difference at all? The explanation of this lies in the history of the form more especially under notice. At present it is enough to say that it exists. There is no doubt about it. It exists; and the only question that stands over for consideration is that of its extent and influence. Does it absolutely and entirely exclude any second form? Does it make any second form impossible? It certainly does not do this.

In the Lap language we have a recognised *Nomen Substantivum Verbale* :

## ACTIVE.

*Abstract* lādnom = λύειν.

*Concrete* lādno = λύτηρ.

## PASSIVE.

*Abstract* lodnojubme = τὸ λύεσθαι.

*Concrete* lodnojuvve = τὸ λύθηεν.

All these are declined as Substantives. Each has its full complement of Numbers and Cases. The Preterite *Participle* is *lodjuvvum*; but between this and *lodnojuvve* the difference is slight, and, scarcely a real one.

The Latin Supines carry us somewhat farther. That in *-u* is both Passive and Substantival. But, on the other hand, the Supine in *-um* is Adjectival. This perplexes us. Still more do words like *rec-t-or*, *duc-t-or*, *pis-t-or*, and the like; for, in these, the formative affix contains the sound of *-t-*, which is that of the *Passive* form. But still it is not necessarily the *-t-* in *ama-t-us*. It may be this, or it may not; but with the *-at-* in words like *luct-at-or*, *amator*, and a host of others, there is no doubt. It is admittedly the *-at-* in *amatus*. But its sense is *Active*.

§ 194. Here we get a second complication. Of the two

Supines, one was Active and the other Passive in import ; both Passive in form. Of the substantives like *luctator* the form is also Passive, but the import wholly Active. Now both these difficulties are recognised, and both will be explained, as we best can, in the sequel.

§ 195. Next come such words as *trustee*, *mortgagee*, *grantee*, and others. They are Passive, Substantival, and Correlative to so many actual, obsolete, or probable *Active* Verbals. It may be said that they are Participles ; and in one sense they are so. But they fail to comport themselves in a context as such. *Trust-ee* is, up to a point, the same as *trust-ed* ; but we can speak of *trust-ee-s* and we cannot speak of *trust-ed-s*. It may be objected that *trustee* is not wholly an English word. Granted. But it is a word, nevertheless ; and what is more, it exists in concurrency with, and as parallel to, *trusted* ; and, so doing, indicates not only the recognition of the double form, and a notable difference between the import of the two, but comports itself, in its form for the *plural*, as a Substantive.

§ 196. At present, this is enough to say about it. It is not denied that two objections may be made to the view taken here ; but these will be treated in a more appropriate place, for the question is a complex one, and involves other considerations. Meanwhile, the words *trustee* and others may pass for Passive Verbal Abstracts ; and, so doing, serve as the basis of a more special argument, viz. the development of the rule, that this or that formative, when absent where, *à priori*, we may expect it, is absent not so much from anything inherent to it, or *per se*, but that it is developed or undeveloped according to the conditions or state of the language, in which it occurs. As it is, words like *trustee* seem to show themselves only in the eleventh hour. They do something very like this, but they do not do it quite.

## VOICE OF VERBS.

§ 197. *The Scandinavian (or Norse) Reflective, Middle, Passive, Reciprocal, and Deponent.*—Upon the principle of working backwards, or from the later to the earlier, and the more certain to the less uncertain, it will be well to begin with a Voice which in many respects stands alone; in one respect, most fortunately. It is a Voice of which we know the history. We know what it is now, and we know the time when it was not. This is the Passive of the Scandinavian languages. It is, there or thereabouts, a thousand years old. Before A.D. 900 it was a palpable compound, of which we knew the elements; and of which the import was eminently intelligible. There are at least three names which are applicable to it. It began as a *Reflective* combination; a combination of a Verb and the Pronoun *sik* or *sig*, *self*; the Verb, of course, being generally and normally Transitive. But the additament extends occasionally to Intransitives. What is called Reflective may also be called *Middle*, because Middles imply Passives. But at present it is chiefly *Passive*; and so it is called in the Grammars. Many, however, of its applications are to *Active* Verbs; and in this case it is *Deponent*.

§ 198. In the simple structure of this Scandinavian Voice, as at present represented by the literary Danish and Swedish, the addition is that of *-s*, as an affix to the Active form with which it corresponds. *Kalle*=*vocare*, *kalles*=*vocari*; *jeg*, *du*, *han*, &c. *kaller*=*ego*, *tu*, *ille*, *voco*, *vocas*, *vocat*; *jæg*, *du*, *han*, *kalles*=*ego*, *tu*, *ille*=*vocor*, *vocaris*, *vocatur*. So *kallade*=*vocari*, *kallades*=*vocabar*. Now in the Icelandic this *-s* appears as *st*, a fuller form, but not the one we expect. The true form is *sik*, the reflective pronoun, and this is what we find in the shape of *-sc* in the older Norse of *Iceland* mixed up with a form in *-st*; but in the Norse of *Norway* used exclusively, or nearly so.

The word *sik*, meanwhile, is the ordinary reflective pronoun as a separate word, sometimes preceding, sometimes following,

the verb. When it precedes, it keeps its full form. Here, then, we see the whole process of the change.

§ 199. The extension of *sik*, which is the pronoun of the third person to the other two, is perhaps mysterious. So long as the three pronouns *precede* the verb and keep their full form, they are used as regularly as they are in the Italian. But *sik* is a simpler form of *self*, and *self*, in our own language, to go no farther, may denote any of the three Persons. In the Slavonic and the Lithuanic its extension goes farther; and the possessive form, that naturally means *suus* or *sui*, is used in the place of *meus* or *mei*, and *tuus* or *tui*.

§ 200. Here, then, we have a Voice beginning, proceeding in its development, notably altered in its final character, and perhaps transformed; every change being, if not under our very eyes, within the range of our reading. Every change of its structure and of its import can be verified. It begins as a combination of a Verb and the Reflective Pronoun: proceeds as a compound, with its latter element modified, yet still referrible to its original form; is Reflective in the first instance, then Middle, then Reciprocal, then Passive, and then besides this, also, to a great extent Deponent. I doubt whether any second instance of the like kind can be found. It is now in the Swedish and Danish Grammars classed as *Passive*; and practically it is one. In General Philology the Reciprocal and the Deponent phases are the ones which most claim consideration. It is Passive, as has been stated, and that, structurally, to the exclusion of many so-called Passives. But even in the way of structure, it is by no means a true Passive—a Passive both in import and in origin.

§ 201. *The Passive Voice as represented by the Greek Aorist.*—The typically *Passive Voice* is best represented by the Greek Aorist—ἐ-τύφ-θη, τύφ-θητι, τυφ-θη-εἶην, τυφ-θη-ᾶ, τυφ-θη-ῆναι, τυφ-θη-εἶς = *I was beaten, be beaten, might be beaten, may be beaten, to be beaten, or being beaten, beaten.* In this

we have the Verb Substantive as manifestly as in the Reflective Voice we had the Reflective Pronoun; and the parsing this combination is, in one respect, easier than that of the Reflective, inasmuch as the affix *sik* has to serve for all the three Persons.

*a.* Of the Passive *Future* the most obscure point is the question how a Substantive Verb like *εἰμι* could have any Voice but the Active. I am constrained to consider it Deponent.

*b.* The peculiar forms like *κεκλήσομαι* may safely be considered more Middle than Passive.

§ 202. In these two instances two constructions are very clearly explained. There is one Middle Voice that we understand thoroughly, and there is one Passive that we understand as well. The Greek Aorist is wholly and absolutely, in origin, in form, and in import truly Passive, and we know how it comes to be so. It is the Passive Verbal Abstract *plus* the Substantive Verb. Now Passives of this kind differ *toto caelo* from the majority of the Passives of the ordinary Greek Grammars; the structure of which is less Passive than Middle. In English, on the other hand, there is no Passive Voice at all, except for the Participle. This combined with the Verb Substantive gives the English language and others their Analytical equivalents to such tenses as *τύπτομαι*, *amor*; *ἐτυπτόμην*, *amabar*; *τέτυμμαι*, *τύψομαι*, and the like. Hence, whatever is left unconsidered here will be considered under the head of *Participle*. What the *non-participial* portion of the dominant inflection in Greek—*i.e.* that of the forms like *τύπτομαι*, *τέτυμμαι*, &c.—may be is no easy question. They are certainly not Passives, like *ἐτύφθην*.

§ 203. *The Deponent.*—Of Deponents there are two kinds: (1) those like *εὐρύλο*, and others where there is a Passive, import but an Active form; (2) those where the form is Passive, but the sense is Active. The expla



of the first of these generally lies on the surface, and is involved in the meaning of the Verb itself. Being this, it requires no sign, whether inflectional or formative. *Ἐαυλο* may as easily be interpreted 'I take,' or 'suffer a beating,' as 'I am beaten.' Still better are the instances of *αὐδιο*, and *κλυο*='Jupiter audit'='answers to the name of Jupiter;'  
'κακῶς κλύει'='bears a bad name.' Here the sense is reflective, and often means *hears (him)self called*. A name which a person gives himself, or even takes to himself as permanent, is of this kind; e.g. *κληθήσομαι*=*I shall be called, or named*; *κεκλήσομαι*=*I shall take to myself the name, and keep it*.

§ 204. The other change is also to a very considerable extent explicable; and in this the element of the chief importance is, no doubt, the connection between reflectiveness and reciprocity; indeed, reciprocity is simply a double reflection: '*I strike myself*'='*myself strikes me*.' This however is only a change of form. But '*A. strikes B., and B. strikes A.,*' gives a real reciprocation of blows. Closely akin to such combinations as this is the meaning of a great number of words which, in their proper import, involve the idea of action and reaction—such as *fight, wrestle, speak, exhort*, and others. In the Greek and Latin these run *μάχομαι, luctor, loquor, hortor*, &c. In the Greek nothing much is said about them; in Latin they may almost be said to be recognised as a Voice; while in Scandinavian, where they are at least as numerous as in Latin, the evidence that they are derived from the Reflective is as clear as is that of the Reflective sign itself. *Sik* from the very beginning means *one other* or *each other*, as regularly as it means *self*. The Swedish Grammar of the late Professor of History in Christiania, L. C. Daae, specially draws attention to this; indeed, the doctrine that the Reciprocals are the main sources of the Deponents may be considered to be admitted in the languages where the structure of the Middle Voice is best understood; i.e. the Norse forms of speech.

§ 205. From words such as *loquor*, *luctor*, *hortor*, and the like, the next step is to the Verbal Abstracts derived from them—*locutor*, *luctator*, *hortator*, &c. These have hitherto perplexed us, inasmuch as the formative *-t*, *-at*, or *-it* is *passive*. But the Verbal may be what the Verb is; and the Verb, as we have seen, is Deponent. Even if the doctrine of Deponency carry us no farther than this, it carries us far; and here for the present we may leave it.

(7.) NUMBER.—NOUN AND VERB.

§ 206. Simple repetition seems to have been the earliest way of expressing plurality. It is so natural, that we can imagine nothing that is likely to have preceded it. It is one, however, which is destined to be superseded by more refined, but somewhat less intelligible, methods. The Malay languages, and after these the American and African, give this process in its fullest development. In a single short vocabulary of the language of the island of Enganho (off Sumatra), one of the most primitive of the Malay languages, are found, almost in succession: fire, *howi howi*; water, *lewo lewo*; stone, *vakeo vakeo*; sand, *hawo hawo*; bird, *weo weo*; and that these are plural, or if not collectives, we infer from their import, and often find them expressly recognised as such by grammarians.

Next to this comes Reduplication, or the doubling of the first syllable of the word.

FROM THE SAHAPTIN (*British Columbia*).

SUBSTANTIVES.—*Woroit*, *woworoit*=man, men; *tokon*, *to-tokon*=woman, women; *kitsh*, *kikitsh*=house, houses; *pail-kukar*, *papailkukar*=bow, bows; *haikh*, *hahaikh*=mountain, mountains; *wasi*, *wawasi*=dog, dogs; *ishot*, *isishot*=wolf, wolves. ADJECTIVES.—*Mohai*, *momohai*=<sup>1</sup>bad; *tshinui*, *tshitshinui*=small. †

§ 207. Than this no more convenient method could be devised ; indeed, it seems to have devised itself. To plurality in its simplest form, or to the *plurality* consisting in the repetition of a certain number of actions, or a certain number of objects, of the *same* kind, what sound is a better ‘*echo to the sense*’ than a reduplication ? Nor could it be better placed than at the beginning of the word, for so it left ample room for the signs of Gender (if wanted), or of Case, or aught else, at the end.

§ 208. But there are many other combinations under which the notion of plurality may suggest itself. There is the plurality arising out of a mixture of objects in which the same idea is *not* repeated. There is the plurality which constitutes a collection ; in which case a form may be *collective* rather than truly *plural*. In some, as in the case of the stars, the equality between the two ideas of individual difference and collective unity is so great, that it is difficult to say whether the original conception is plural or singular, collective or disjunctive. Again, a family is as much a real unity as each individual member of it ; and when the unity of the whole becomes more impressive than the singleness of its parts, we have such a fact as a Singular form may derive from a (*collective*) Plural.

§ 209. *Partition* is the very opposite to Collection. But when we take parts from a whole, we have a plurality. This is the notion that a word like ‘*some*’ expresses ; *i.e.* *more than one, less than one, less than all.*

§ 210. These and others are the ideas which create conflicting forms of expression for what, when put in its more general sense, is the representation of ‘*more than one,*’ as opposed to ‘*one.*’ Which of them at the end of centuries will be the typical representative, or prerogative, form which survives and subordinates the other ? Which will give the most general expression of the idea ? Which will be *the sign*

of the Plural? The fittest, no doubt. It will unconsciously become adopted. But the unconscious choice is divided among many languages, and spread over hundreds and thousands of years. There is always a Plural Number; though the original sign of it may have been superseded by others, suggested from different points of view. There is no more natural, and, inferentially, no more primitive form of the expression of *plurality* by the repetition of like objects than the reduplication already noticed. But we have to go to the Pacific and the New World before we can find it in anything like current use.

§ 211. Yet we find it elsewhere. We find it in the Greek reduplication, and that conspicuously. But it has another import, a different application. It implies, indeed, repetition, but repetition of another kind. It is a sign of Tense, past in one respect but present in another. But upon this much has been written already. In some of the American languages it serves as a sign of the Superlative degree; in which we again have the idea of repetition. It is the third degree in the way of Magnitude or Quantity. Historically, however, it seems to have fallen away as language advanced. There was pressure upon it in two directions. There were new expressions needed for the increasing varieties of Plurality; and there were conceptions akin to, but different from that of simple Plurality, which it was called upon to express. In the older stages of language it had three important applications. In the English it has practically ceased to exist—*fruit Ilium*.

Such, then, has been the fate of what we may safely call the earliest and most natural sign not only of Plural Number, but probably of anything in the way of either Declension or Conjugation; and of the inflectional forms in the Synthetic languages it is the only one which is at one and the same time a definite separable syllable, and one which we may call self-developed, *i.e.* made out of the ele-

ments of the root to which it belongs, without any additions *ab extra*.

§ 212. From all this it is manifest that the elements of the present signs of Number must be sought elsewhere. What were they? They were certainly not deducible from any single source, or limited to any single sort of plurality. We may arrange them in at least four classes:—

1. The Dual.

2. The Non-Singular (*i.e.* Dual and Plural taken together) of the Personal Pronouns—*Inclusive* and *Exclusive* Plurals.

3. The Plural of the Noun.

4. The Plural of the Verb.

§ 213. In the Dual, if anywhere, the Inflectional element ought to be pre-eminently reducible. It ought to be the Singular *plus* the name for 2. It is this sometimes, but only sometimes. It is this in Lithuanic; but then it is only a grammarian's inflection, *i.e.* no inflection at all, but simply two words—just as *hi duo, he duo, horum duorum*, are two. This is the dilemma which is always presenting itself. When we can reduce any inflection to its elements it ceases to be an inflection. But this is really no discouragement. On the contrary, it shows the reducibility of certain inflections, and this is all we need attempt.

§ 214. In the German languages we get such forms as *wi-t* and *gi-t*=*we two, ye two*. This is somewhat more to our purpose. *Bo-th*—through its derivation from *bâ-twâ*=Danish *begge to*, German *beide*, has been objected to—is probably the same combination.

*Our-two*, or *of us-two*, and *your-two*, or *of you-two*, are also respectively *incer* and *ungker*; the first of which, and perhaps the second, are in use in provincial Westphalian at the present time. *Incit* and *ungkit* are the Accusatives.

This, however, goes for very little. They all seem second-

ary formations; though it is only the first which is, like the Lithuanic, a simple compound.

§ 215. It is highly probable that there was in some language or other a Dual Number before there was the Numeral 2.

§ 216. But this is not conclusive. There may possibly have been some natural *dyad*; which suggested not only the inflections subservient to the expression of Duality, but possibly the Numeral=2 itself; some word like '*pair*,' '*brace*,' '*couple*,' and the like. The words quoted are of foreign origin, and probably artificial. Hence they throw no light on the special details of our enquiry. But they illustrate the character of it. It is suggested, then, that in natural *dyads* of this kind the elements of the Dual Number are the likeliest to be found. But these are numerous; and who can say, *à priori*, which was the one originally pitched upon for the purpose of being made up into a combination expressing *more than one and less than three*, for this is what the Dual representation comes to? This is likely. But it does not carry us far.

§ 217. The Greek and Latin *ἀμφω* and *ambo* look as if they meant *one on each side*, and so applied to a part<sub>2</sub> of a triad. Again, there is in the West-Saxon a strange form, *wit Skilling*=*we-two Skilling*=*I and Skilling* or *Skilling and I*. This looks like something that carries us farther, and leads to the consideration of—

#### THE EXCLUSIVE AND INCLUSIVE PRONOUNS.

§ 218. It is patent from mere inspection that in our own language, as well as in its congeners of the Synthetic Stage, there is a difference in the Pronouns of the First and Second Persons, between the Singular and the Plural Numbers, wholly opposite to that which presents itself in the ordinary Nouns. The Plural of '*I*' is '*we*,' and the Plural of '*thou*'

is 'ye.' Now there is a process in the less advanced languages of the Agglutinate and Monosyllabic stages which is beginning to be duly recognised as an important element in the explanation of this anomaly, viz. the system of the *Inclusive and Exclusive Pronouns*. Thus—

## FROM THE AUSTRALIAN.

*Ngaia* = I; *ngulle* = we two = thou and I; *ngullina* = we two = he and I.

## FROM THE MELANESIAN.

*Ainyak* = I; *akaijan* = you two + I; *ajunrai* = you two - I; *akataji* = you three + I; *ajeimtai* = you three - I; *akaija* = you + I; *ajjama* = you - I.

§ 219. These two examples may suffice to give a general idea as to the import of the two terms. But much more than this must be said about them. The Double Plural, though not equally prominent in all languages, is present in most of them; sometimes in its rudiments, sometimes in its fragments. Even in its fullest form the system is widely spread. We have it conspicuously in the languages of the Sub-Himalayan range; and this, as we have seen, is the district in which the Monosyllabic class comes in contact with the Agglutinate. Within the Agglutinate area Melanesia, Polynesia, and America abound in Persons of this kind; so that these give us the chief materials for our criticism. But there is both Exclusiveness and Inclusiveness elsewhere, as will soon be seen.

§ 220. In some languages they play a very notable part, in others, they are almost latent; and between the two extremes there are differences and degrees of all sorts. When at its maximum the proportion of these two Plurals to the Accidents of the other Parts of Speech is inordinate. Of its development in a single dialect, the following paradigm speaks for itself:

DECLENSION OF BÁHING PRONOUNS AND OF  
NOUNS.

## I.—OF PRONOUNS.

*1st Personal Pronoun.*

1. *Nom.* I, Go.
2. *Gen.* Of me,  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Conjunct. Wa} = \text{my.} \\ \text{Disjunct. Wake} = \text{mine.} \end{array} \right.$
3.  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Dat. To me,} \\ \text{Ac. Me,} \end{array} \right\}$  Go. No sign.
4. *Loc.*  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{In me,} \\ \text{Within me,} \end{array} \right\}$  Wake gwáre (interior).
5. „  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Into me,} \\ \text{In me,} \end{array} \right\}$  Wake di (entering, resting in).
6. *Abl.* From me, Wake ding (removal).
7. *All.* Towards me, Wake la (nearing).
8. „ From towards me, Wake lang (departing).
9. „ Towards me, Wake taure (behaving).
10. *Soc.* With me,  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Wakenung} \\ \text{Gonung} \end{array} \right\}$  (society).
11. *Priv.* Without me,  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Wake mantli} \\ \text{Gomantli} \end{array} \right\}$  (privation).
12. *Inst.* By me, Go mi.
13. *Loc.* At, by me, Wa pumdi (proximity. Hind. pás).

*Dual.*

1. Gósi, inclusive. Gósúkú, exclusive.
2.  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Conjunct. I'si, incl. Wási, excl.} \\ \text{Disjunct. I'sike, incl. Wásike, excl.} \end{array} \right.$
3. Gósi, incl. Gósúkú, excl.
4. I'sikegwáre, incl. Wásikegwáre, excl.
5. I'sike di, incl. Wásike di, excl.
6. I'sike ding, incl. Wásike ding, excl.
7. I'sike la, incl. Wásike la, excl.
8. I'sike lang, incl. Wásike lang, excl.
9. Gosi taure, incl. Gosuku taure, excl.
10. Gosi nung, incl. Gosuku nung, excl.
11. Gosi mantli, incl. Gosuku mantli, excl.
12. Gosi mi, incl. Gosuku mi, excl.
13.  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{I-si-} \\ \text{Wasi-} \end{array} \right\}$  pumdi,  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{incl.} \\ \text{excl.} \end{array} \right.$



*Plural.*

1. Gó-i, incl. Góku, excl.
2. { *Conjunct.* Ike, incl. Wake, excl.  
       { *Disjunct.* Ikke, incl. Wakke, excl.
3. Gó-i, incl. Góku, excl.
4. I'kegwáre, incl. Wakegwáre, excl.
5. I'ke di, incl. Wake di, excl.
6. I'ke ding, incl. Wake ding, excl.
7. I'ke lá, incl. Wake lá, excl.
8. I'ke lang, incl. Wáke lang, excl.
9. I'ke taure, incl. Wake taure, excl.
10. Góí nung, incl. Goku nung, excl.
11. Góí manthi, incl. Goku manthi, excl.
12. Góí mi, incl. Goku mi, excl.
13. { I'ke- } pumdi, { incl.  
       { Wake- } { excl.

§ 221. How these Plurals combine with the Verb we may see in the following :—

## CONJUGATION OF BÁHING VERBS.

## I.—PARADIGM OF VERBS TRANSITIVE IN 'WO.'

Root, Já, *to eat*. Imperative, já-wo, *eat*.

## ACTIVE VOICE.

*Imperative Mood.*

1. SINGULAR OF AGENT.	1. DUAL OF AGENT.	1. PLURAL OF AGENT.
Já-wo, <i>eat it.</i>	Já-se, <i>ye two eat it.</i>	Já-ne, <i>ye all eat it.</i>
	2. DUAL OF OBJECT.	
Já-wosi, <i>eat them two.</i>	Já-sesi, <i>ye two eat them two.</i>	Já-nési, <i>ye all eat them two.</i>
	3. PLURAL OF OBJECT.	
Já-womi, <i>eat them all.</i>	Já-semi, <i>ye two eat them all.</i>	Já-némi, <i>ye all eat them all.</i>

*Negative Form.*

By má prefixed Má já wo, &c., and só in all the subsequent Moods.

## INDICATIVE MOOD.

*Present and Future Tenses.*

SINGULAR OF AGENT.      DUAL OF AGENT.      PLURAL OF AGENT.

*First Person.*

1. { Já-gna, I eat or will eat it.	1. { Já-sa, incl. Já-suku, excl. we two eat it.	1. { Já-ya, incl. Já-ka, excl. we all eat it.
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## DUAL OF OBJECT.

2. { Já-gna-si, I eat them two.	2. { Ja-sa-si, incl. Ja-suku-si, excl. we two eat them two.	2. { Já-ya-si, incl. Já-ka-si, excl. we all eat them two.
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## PLURAL OF OBJECT.

3. { Já-gna-mi, I eat them all.	3. { Ja-sa-mi, incl. Ja-suku-mi, excl. we two eat them all.	3. { Ja-yami, incl. Ja-ka-mi, excl. we all eat them all.
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*Preterite Tense.*

1. Já-tong	1. { Já-tá-sá, incl. Já-tá-súku, excl.	1. { Ján-tá-yo, incl. Ják-tá-ko, excl.
2. Já-tóng-si	2. { Já-tá-sá-si, incl. Já-tá-súku-si, excl.	2. { Ján-tá-yo-si, incl. Ják-tá-kó-si, excl.
3. Já-tóng-mi	3. { Já-tá-sá-mi, incl. Já-tá-súku-mi, excl.	3. { Ján-tá-yó-mi, incl. Ják-tá-kó-mi, excl.

§ 222. This forms but a small part of the space devoted to these remarkable Plurals in Mr. B. Hodgson's Grammar of the Báhing Language; itself one out of the nineteen dialects of the Kiranti, one of the ten, or more, languages of Nepaul. It belongs to the Monosyllabic class, and this is indicated by the hyphen between the several syllables. But this must not lead us to suppose that each syllable is a separate word,

inasmuch as at the very point where our extracts end the author writes, that he has thus far separated the syllables 'merely to facilitate the student's comprehension, and that I shall do so no further, for the genius of the language is averse to any such treatment of its finely blended elements.' It is certain then that we are on or within the boundaries of the Agglutinate class of languages.

§ 223. Beyond all doubt there is a very great deal of this inclusion and exclusion expressed in the later and more advanced languages, and that in more ways than one. *Wit Skilling* = *we-two Skilling* = *Skilling and I*, has been already noticed. Let us now take a text from a different quarter :

*Tecum Philippos et celerem fugam  
Sensi; relictæ non bene parmula,  
Cum fracta virtus et minaces  
Turpe solum tetigere mento.*

Here the Inclusive Plural is as clearly expressed as is possible, the person addressed being in the ablative case, governed by a preposition denoting association, and the verb being in the singular number. It *might* be Plural, as might also the Pronoun; and this would give *sensimus* and *vobiscum*. We know, here, that this is the parsing of the expression; but in an uninflected language, or one of which the inflections were known only by bits and fragments, *tecum* might pass for a nominative plural. As for such combinations as *tucum*, it is probable that they are common; the *-cum* being translated adverbially, or as *ἀμα*; and so giving *those simultaneously, at the same time, or accompanying*.

§ 224. For *tecum sensi* write *mecum sensisti*. The result is the same. Two persons are indicated, and to some extent two persons are named; *i.e.* one by the pronoun as a separate word, and the other by the person of the verb. Which of these two is the Included, which the Including, term? Perhaps there is no actual inclusion at all, but only something akin to it. Which is the original, primary pronoun?

Is it *I and you*, or *You and I*? It is hard to say; and, at present, there is no need to enquire. But in the languages where the system is at its full development no distinction is more difficult. Perhaps it is one of the same kind as that which perplexes us in the case of *shall* and *will*; but this amounts to an explanation.

In the extract just given the change of Person in *tetigere* suggests the excluded agents.

§ 225. This indefinite number of individuals involved in the affair or action spoken of, and therefore in some degree connected with the speakers, is what we have in the Spanish *nos otros*, the Italian *noi altrui*, and the French *nous autres*. Let A. ask B. what C. thinks of D., and let the answers be, '*Comme nous autres*,' or, conversely, '*Comme vous autres*.' The first means '*As I and you and others like us*;' the second, '*As you and others like you, but not as I*' (or '*like of me*').

§ 226. It is not easy to get an insight into the details of this system; and less easy for an Englishman than for a native of many other countries. Beyond those who, as Frenchmen, Italians, and Spaniards, are familiar with the European use of *otros*, *altrui*, and *autres*, the only Europeans and Americans who know much about the system of ruder languages are the missionaries; and these, as a rule, admit that the right use of the form is difficult. So good a general philologist as Norris observed, that in all the explanations he had met with the so-called *Inclusive* was really *Exclusive*, and the so-called *Exclusive Inclusive*; and that most men had confounded the two, and that he himself was only in the process of learning which was which. The point from which the line is drawn has, in my mind, something to do with it. Is it *I* with or without *you*, or *you* with or without *me*? Is it *I* + or — *you*, or *you* + or — *I*? For the exclusion of a third object, the methods are numerous; and some of them, such as the French &c., require an additional word—*autres* &c.

§ 227. Then comes the question of *Case*. We have seen that what is generally called the government of the Verb by its Nominative Case was, in the earlier stages of language, either a combination like *speaking-my*, or *speaking-from-me*. If so, these Persons, notwithstanding their correspondence with the Casus Rectus in import, may really be *Oblique* cases—perhaps Possessives. At any rate, there is no great difference between the Possessive and the Personal expression of the Pronoun, especially in Greek, where τὸ ἐμὸν=ἐγὼ, τὸ σὸν=σύ. Let then (τὸ) ἡμέτερον=ἡμεῖς; and then compare form for form, and meaning for meaning, and place for place, the Greek ἔτερ- with the French *autre*. Mark, too, that the *spiritus* of ἡμέτερος and ἡμεῖς is not the *spiritus lenis* of ἐμός, but the aspirate of ἔτερος.

§ 228. Again: from the Melanesian group of the New Hebrides we get such sequences as the following: *Inau*=I; *kha-im*=you; *naü*=he; *namuhl*=we two exclusive, or I + some one not the person spoken; *arivan*=we two inclusive, or I + the person spoken to; *kha-müllh*=ye two; *natarvi*=you three; *dra-tin*=we three; *dra-tavats*=we four; *na-tavatz*=you four.

These look like *trinal* and *quaternal* Numbers, and it has been suggested that such they are in reality. They are rather so many Numerals, the numerical value of which varies. Of the speaker or the person spoken to, one or both may be included.

§ 229. It is little, then, that the Dual Number does in the way of explaining the Plural. It rather complicates the question. Even when we have got an intelligible Dual, we are by no means sure of keeping it. What if it encroach upon the higher denomination, and so doing *pluralise*? What, if having done this, it eliminate the original plural? Now if word for word the Greek *νῶι* and *σφῶι* are the Slavonic *nos* and *jus*, and the Slavonic *nos* and *jus* be the Latin *nos* and *vos*? It has done this. If so, we are taught that definite and precise as the structure and the formation

of the Dual seem to be, they help us but little in our enquiries. The Duals here adduced are those of the Pronouns. But the whole subject of the Pronominal Numbers is peculiar.

§ 230. *Plural of the Finite Verb.*—The Verb here means the Finite Verb; for the Infinitive and, à fortiori, the theme and root are *Nouns*. The ordinary Grammars, however, recognise the Number of the Verb, though they ignore it in the Infinitive. They can scarcely do otherwise. The most that a grammar for teaching purposes could tell us would be that in the Finite Verb the verbal portion of it has no sign of Number of its own, and that what it has it takes from the inflection of its pronouns. Practically this would be enough. But in general grammars it is necessary to add, that the Finite Verb, when divested of these adjuncts, is a Noun; and that though the Infinitives have no outward sign of Number, the Verbal Abstracts, which are almost identical with them in meaning, and sometimes identical in form, have one: *hunting, huntings; fast, fastings*, and the like.

§ 231. We can speak of twenty acts of *dining*, i.e. of twenty *dinings*, as readily as we can of twenty *dinners*; those who partake of them being the *diners*. But twenty *dinings* may be made by twenty different partakers of a single *dinner*; and twenty different *diners* (agents) may dine off a single *dinner*. Of the Seven Captains against Thebes every one may have fought in seven, or seventy-times seven, *fightings* or *fight*s. But it was no part of any inflection to express any number beyond that of the agents.

#### PLURAL OF THE VERB AND NOUN.

§ 232. Is there then no such thing in *verborum naturâ* as a Plural Finite Verb? As a definite sign of Plurality there is nothing. Is there anything like it? There is something not unlike it. There is the  $-\epsilon\theta-$  in  $\phi\lambda\epsilon\gamma-\acute{\epsilon}\theta-\omega$ , or the  $-it-$  in *voc-it-o*. There is the Frequentative *Formative*. It

is not exactly a Plural, but it is sufficiently akin to one to enable us to perceive that when we say *tu voc-it-as* there is more than one act of *calling*; and that, even though the *caller* may be a single individual. In *vos voc-it-amus* we get a plural import for *both* numbers; the *-it-* in the Verbal part of the combination, or the theme, and the *-amus* in the Pronominal part, or the Inflection. But it is only the *-amus* that is an Inflection. The *-it-* is Formative.

All this is written partly to illustrate the statement that the verbal part of the Finite Verb has no sign of Number; but partly with a far more important object. It is submitted that these Frequentative formatives are virtually the Verbal Plurals, *i.e.* the signs which denote the plurality of the *callings*, the *dinings*, the *fightings*, and the '*omne quod exit in -ing.*'

§ 233. It is now submitted that, *mutatis mutandis*, what applies to the Frequentative Verb applies also to the *Collective* of the Noun. There is no question of any double Plurality in the Nouns, so that the Collective Formative has nothing to prevent its becoming an actual sign of Plurality; and that, as an *Inflection*, *i.e.* a changeable affix, rather than a permanent part of the theme. The plurals, too, that are required for such words as *eye*, *ear*, *nose*, *tongue*, *hand*, and the multitudinous concrete, individual, separable, and numerable substantives of the same kind, are far more numerous than those required for such abstractions as *seeing*, *hearing*, *smelling*, *touching*, and the like. Nouns, then, have more Plurals than Verbs, and keep them longer. Probably, too, they took signs for them earlier. But for all this, the Noun must take its place in its typical form, *i.e.* the Concrete, and the visible, audible, or palpable *Substantive*. With Abstract Nouns and Adjectives the case is somewhat different; and the Personal Pronouns have, as we have seen, a system of their own.

§ 234. If this be the origin of the Plural, the Collective formatives of the Noun, now existing in language, should be

less numerous and less definite than the Frequentative formatives of the Verbs— $\phi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\text{-}\acute{\epsilon}\theta\text{-}\omega$ , *voc-it-o*. This is because they are all by hypothesis converted into plurals. And such is the case. There are but a few collectives, just as there are but few successful traitors. When the usurper becomes a king he is no longer traitorous, and when collectives become plurals, they are no longer formative.

§ 235. But this does not carry us far. Nine-tenths of the details concerning formatives and inflections in the present work have been applied to the illustration of the *difference* between them, and not to the likeness. Again and again the *-it-* in *voc-it-amus* has been opposed to *-amus*, as a part of the theme, and not as a part of the inflection; as a permanent part of the word, and not as a changeable or moveable one. There is no doubt upon this point. But behind this lies the leading doctrine of the work at large, viz. the hypothesis that the inflections are, as a rule, deducible from, and reducible to, formatives; which themselves were originally separate and independent words. If so, it is only in these extreme or typical forms that they can be definitely separated. When we come to the boundaries, it must be by Type rather than by Definition that we classify.

§ 236. But we need not at present do this. Definition by type, though valid, necessary, and in some cases indispensable, is deficient in validity and precision. The following is from the Hindostani, in which *mard*=man; as it also does in the Persian.

## I. HINDOSTANI.

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	mard	mard
<i>Genitive</i>	mard-ká	mard-on-ká
„	mard-ke	mard-on-ke
„	mard-ki	mard-on-ki
<i>Dative</i>	mard-ko	mard-on-ko
<i>Ablative</i>	mard-se	mard-on-se
<i>Inessive</i>	mard-men	mard-on-men
<i>Adessive</i>	mard-ne	mard-on-ne



## 2. PERSIAN.

	<i>Singular.</i>	<i>Plural.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	mard	mard-ân
<i>Genitive</i>	i-mard-i	i-mard-ân
<i>Dative</i>	mard-râ	mard-ân-ra
<i>Accusative</i>	mard	mard-ân
<i>Ablative</i>	az mard	az mard-ân

The *-on-* here is universally treated as a sign of plurality. Yet in place and stability it is more of a formative than a plural. Are we then to deny that it is a plural of any kind? Are we to say that it is a plural, but not an inflection? Are we to say that the distinction between the permanent and the changeable parts of a word is unimportant, or that *Plurality* is only a modified form, or Variant, of *Collectiveness*? We may certainly say all this, and more, and not be very far from the truth.

§ 237. I submit, then, that Plurals are not naturally changeable or movable, and that naturally they are parts of the theme—just like the *-it-* in *voc-it-o*, &c.; and that it is not till we get to a certain stage of development that they are other than formative, or thematic. It is only in the Synthetic languages that they become generally and manifestly movable, and not only this, but indistinct—indeed, it is because they are indistinct that they are movable. They are this because, in the Synthetic languages, there is a great development of a new element—*Gender*; and with Gender Number becomes fused, combined, or amalgamated. Hence, in the main, the Formative Inflections, or the Collective Plurals, are movable, non-radical, or non-thematic only when these signs are complicated by those of Gender. I do not then say forms like the *-on-* in *mard-on-kâ* and the like, are not Plural, for we must take the term *Plural* as we find it. I only say that under certain circumstances the word *Plural* may become ambiguous.

§ 238. *Collectiveness*, however, seems to be an older idea,

and as such it prevails as language advances. There are, and must be, in the domain of Thought more plurals than collectives : just as there are, and must be, more units than pairs, more twos than threes, more parts than wholes. Every collection is what it is because, as a unity, it contains more than one individual. In the earlier stages of language it may not be very necessary to separate such unities into their elements ; and, moreover, it may not be very easy to do so, for it must be remembered that the art of counting is of comparatively recent origin. It seems, then, that before the series of Numerals became adequately developed (and how low it is in some countries even now will be seen in the sequel), the notion of Collectiveness prevailed over that of Plurality. As definite Numeration became easier, Plurality would prevail over Collectiveness. How closely they are allied, and how naturally we mix them together in thought, and how difficult it is to say which, in certain cases, should determine our choice of an expression we well know ; for we know how naturally with a Collective Substantive we connect a Plural Verb ; and how the majority of grammarians warn us not to do it, and how, nevertheless, we continue to do it.

§ 239. The sign of Number follows that of Person, and precedes that of Case ; and from this it is readily separated. With Gender (or Conventional Sex) it takes the same place ; but, whether it be that one of the signs is omitted or that the two coalesce, there is often but a single syllable ; sometimes only a single sound or letter serves for the expression of both—*e.g.* *bon-us*, *bon-æ*, *bon-os*, *bon-is*.

(8.) CASE ( F NOUNS).—TENSE (OF VERBS).

§ 240. Signs of Case, or Case-endings, fall into two classes : (1) those of the Greek, Latin, and Sanskrit type ; (2) those of the Fin and Turk type.

In the first the signs of Case, Gender, and Number

become confluent ; or, perhaps, two drop out. There is nothing to be done with these without a great deal of preliminary analysis, which is by no means easy. In the second we get an independent and separable syllable. But this goes for little until it can be shown what it is as an independent word. We cannot often do this ; and when we succeed in doing it, the result may be that the combination is one of simple composition rather than a true inflection.

Short of this, however, we get a fair amount of information so far as it goes ; for it is something to know in a word like the Turkish *adem-ler-un* = the Latin *hom-in-um*, that the *-ler-* denotes Number only. But this depends upon a fortunate coincidence ; viz. the fact that where we get what we may call *syllabic* signs of Number, we also fail to find the signs of *Gender* wanting. It is certain that in the Synthetic languages it is a very difficult matter in many cases to say what represents Gender, what Number, and what Case. It is not so difficult to do this in the Agglutinate forms of speech, and it is often very easy. The inflections are fewer, and the signs of them are more distinct.

We get thus much, no doubt. But, until we get more, Case-endings look like mere arbitrary signs ; being what they are solely through their relation to the main words. What they are of themselves we have to discover, if we can. The earliest doctrine was (and *is* to a great extent) that they were *prepositional* in origin and in character ; modified in form ; and *affixes* rather than *prefixes* to the words with which they were connected. It is not worth our while to incriminate the compound *Post-positive Pre-position* as a contradiction in terms. We must take it as we find it ; just as we must recognise *Dis-junctive Con-junctions* and the like.

They are this, doubtless, to some extent, and in a certain way ; but it is probable that the extent to which the doctrine presented itself to the philological world (we might almost say *obtruded* itself) has depended on an accident. Nine philologists out of ten are familiar with some synthetic

and with some analytic forms of speech; and as words like *lapid-is*, *lapid-i*, *lapid-e*, &c. are translated *of a stone*, *to a stone*, *from a stone*, the notion that words like *of*, *to*, *from*, &c. correspond to the terminations like *-is*, *-i*, *-e*, &c. forces itself upon them; or, at least, presents itself spontaneously. But this is little more than a reproduction of the translation of *γέγραφα*, or *τέτυχα* by *I have written*, or *I have beaten*; wherein no one thinks that, word for word, or rather syllable for syllable, the formal elements of the two combinations are identical in origin. The words *vobis-cum*, *nobis-cum* give us true *post-positive* prepositions; but in these it is the syllable *-bis-*, and not *-cum*, which is the sign of Case. The real fact is that, as a rule, the actual Prepositions of a language do *not* coincide with the Case-endings in form, whatever they may do in import.

§ 241. There is no better instance of this than the history of the so-called Genitive Case in English and French. What the *Case* which, both in French and English, comes next to the Nominative may be in import, is equivocal. The English has a sign for *it-'s*. But the French has nothing of the kind. Taken by itself, the French Genitive (*tête*=*head*) is no more Genitive (or Possessive) than it is Nominative, Dative, Vocative, Accusative, or Ablative. But it has its special pronoun, *de*=*of*; at least, so far as '*de tête*' corresponds with '*of head*.' With *head's* and the like the French has nothing correspondent. But, in both languages, the Preposition represents the *-is* in *capit-is*. So far, then, as they do this, each is an Analytic equivalent to the Latin inflection. But so is '*I have written*' to '*γέγραφα*;' only, however, so far as the import goes. Word for word, *de* and *of* no more stand for the *-is* of *capitis* than the *have* in *I have written* stands for the *γε-* in *γέγραφα*. But, at any rate, we may say, the import is the same. Not so in all cases. In English a *picture of John* is a very different thing from *John's picture*. At least, however, *de* and *of* govern a Genitive Case. This is just what they do *not*. The Case that both *de* and *of*

govern is the Ablative. To come to the worst, the Prepositions are Genitival in sense. This depends on circumstances; and it does this occasionally because what we now call *Genitive* is partly Genitive and partly Ablative; Genitive when it is possessive in import, Ablative when it is partitive. Now it is with the notion of partitivity only that both *of* and *de* are naturally connected. The real history of the two particles and the inflections with which they become connected, is that the meanings of the two Cases are sufficiently akin to become confluent. In like manner, the Greek Ablative is the Latin Genitive. But this is a question connected with the Affinity of Cases, which is here only alluded to. The reason, however, for alluding to it is much to the present point—viz. the inaccuracy of identifying the inflections of the Synthetic parts of the Noun, with the Prepositions which represent it (more or less approximately) in sense. There is confusion when we call the French *de* a sign of the Genitive Case; and when we say that the Genitive is the Case that it governs, there is '*confusion worse confounded.*' A combination of separate words with the same meaning as a single word with which it corresponds, and has superseded, is one thing; the identity of the respective elements of the two combinations, is another. Between '*I have written*' and '*γέγραφα*' we see it clearly; between *capitis* and *de tête* we see it indistinctly.

§ 242. Notwithstanding all this, it cannot be denied that, in some instances, we have what to all intents and purposes are Cases formed from actual Prepositions. Such a word is *whilom*=*at* or *about some time (while)*; *some time ago*. The Preposition is obsolete; the Substantive obsolescent. Such, however, is the structure. Here the Preposition is a *post*-positive. On the other hand, in Italian, such combinations as *pello*=*per illum*; *collo*=*cum illo*; *nello*=*in illo* and the like; where it is truly *pre*-positional. These are manifestly secondary formations. The Gaelic, which gives us the language of an earlier stage, has also words like it, which are,

in like manner, *pre*-positional. But in Gaelic and Italian we have the several Prepositions as separate words. These are, also, secondary. Are they inflections, or are they mere compounds? They are certainly the latter; perhaps the former. But in no case are they the inflections of which we have to analyse the structure. We see this at once. The inflections that we have here to examine are those of which the origin is problematic. And here comes the difficulty which always besets us. When the case is plain, there is no problem at all.

§ 243. Between the combinations like *whilom* and those like *collo* we get both *pre*-positions and *post*-positions. The real Preposition is neither one nor the other. Wherever there is a Preposition there are *two* Nouns, and its place is generally *between* them; thus being *inter*-positional, *i.e.* *pre*-positional to one, *post*-positional to the other.

§ 244. Such is the criticism that applies to the doctrine of the connection between the Prepositions and the Cases of Nouns. There is a connection of some kind, but the one that has just been noticed is too much of a sectional, or partial, character. Reasons will be given in the sequel for believing that the signs of Case are of earlier origin than the Prepositions; and that, where case-endings can now be replaced by Prepositions, they were not Prepositional in origin, though akin to the Prepositions in import. And this is as much as need be said at present.

And even less than this will be said about *Tense*. All that is, at present, said about the two is, that Case and Tense belong to the same system of Inflection, and are analogous to one another; *i.e.* that, *mutatis mutandis*, Case is Tense in respect to Time, and Tense is Case in respect to Space; and that words like '*behind*,' '*here*,' and '*before*' correspond with words like '*past*,' '*present*,' and '*future*.' It is, however, from Space that the principle of direction is deduced. This is because the relations in Space are the most *definite*, *i.e.* those that most specially present themselves to senses. Such, at least, is the presumption.

## (9.) GENDER (OF NOUNS).—MOOD (OF VERBS).

§ 245. *Gender* is one thing; *Sex* is another. So is the import of the word *Masculine* and *Feminine* as opposed to *Male* and *Female*. Sex with its Males and Females is a natural division of objects: Gender, with its Masculines and Feminines, is an artificial, a conventional, or a grammatical one. Artificial, however, as it is in the nature of external objects, it is real in Language. This reality we must recognise and explain as best we can.

Of forms like *θεός, λίαυρα*; *genitor, genetrix*; *duke, duchess*; *freund, freundin*; *fox, vixen*, and others, where there is no change in the inflection, and where the *gender* corresponds with the sex, nothing will be said. The forms and combinations that specially illustrate *gender* are those like *bonus clypeus, bona parma, and bonum scutum*, where we get well exemplified the two chief difficulties connected with this part of grammar. These are: (1) the little agreement there is between *sex* as we find it in nature and *gender* as we find it in language; and (2) the incomplete and indirect way in which the gender, thus characterised, is expressed. *Clypeus, parma, and scutum* have very nearly the same meaning, viz. that of a *shield* of some kind: a shield which is not only invested with a *sex*, but which, as *clypeus*, is Masculine, as *parma*, Feminine; and, as *scutum*, Neuter, *i.e.* neither one nor the other, or else both.

§ 246. There, certainly, is something in this which is widely different from what is meant by *Sex, Male, and Female*; or, in other words, there is a variance between the Genders of Thought and Language and the Sexes of external Nature. And it is this that perplexes us. What is this Gender which has no counterpart in Sex? What is it in Thought? What is it in Form? How far does it extend? What is the history of its development?

§ 247. *What is it in thought?* The principle that has commanded the most attention is that of *Personification*.

In the earliest stages of language and in the newest we can always find some inanimate or some immaterial object which is invested with Sex of some kind. It may be as material and common-place as the *scythe* or *spade* of a day-labourer, or as high and abstract as the Seven Cardinal Virtues of the philosopher. It need not be indicated by an inflection, nor by any such formative as the *-ess* in *duchess*, &c. &c. It may show no sign of its existence in the substantive to which it refers, any more than it does in such words as *ship* and *scythe*. Nevertheless, if, when these are represented by their Pronouns, the sailor calls his ship '*she*' or '*her*,' while the mower calls his scythe '*he*' or '*him*,' the principle of personification asserts itself; and with it comes the notion of Gender, or conventional Sex. There are other subordinate and partial explanations of this contrast; and these, so far as they go, may be valid. But Personification carries us the farthest.

§ 248. Yet it does not carry us far. It is the most conspicuous in the domain of Mythology, with its Gods and Goddesses. Here the Personification does not so much personify individual objects already existing, as it creates, or makes for itself, imaginary persons. For the more indefinite objects of thought it makes Abstractions; which, in general, are Feminine. Sometimes there is a physical element manifestly suggested; as when in certain American languages the Sun is the Man in the Sky, the Moon the Woman in the Sky. Here the difference of bulk and power originates the image. But in the German languages there is a *Man in the Moon*, and the Moon is Masculine whereas the Sun is Feminine. Here the Sex is determined on different principles; but, in both there is purely physical element. In respect to the habit of unlettered Englishmen calling one implement a '*he*' and the other a '*she*,' it may be merely a remnant of the older system of Genders preserved; though of Gender in the Noun itself all conspicuous traces are lost. It may in some cases be what



is suggested by Cobbett, viz. because certain objects are more specially connected with himself—like a wife. It *may* be this. It *may* be that in some cases a number of individual objects may have only the value of one of a higher denomination ; so that if many females are required to make up the value of a single male, the question is as much one of Number as of Sex. There are some forms in Tutshek's Grammar of the Galla Language that favour this view, and in a very low state of language something of the kind is not unlikely. Then there is the whole of the Vegetable Kingdom, which so far as it is productive of seed and fruit is Feminine rather than Masculine. Nevertheless, we may take all that has been thus suggested, and making the most of it, ask how far it carries us. The answer is, '*Not very far*;' farther in some languages than in others, especially in those where it connects itself with Mythology. But it nowhere gives us a general principle. We have only one foundation for our argument, and this we must get from the actual nature of the objects themselves with the nature of the words, or formatives which symbolise them in Language. With these we can consider the two essential questions. How did the idea of Sex first present itself? and how far did it extend itself beyond the domain of *Natural Sex*?

§ 249. The fundamental fact in this is the undeniable existence of such a difference as that of *Sex*, not only in external Nature, but in Thought, and in the Language that expresses it. All that we have to do with this is to recognise it. In words like *boy* and *girl* its expression is clear enough. In words like *man-servant* and *maid-servant* it is equally so. In words like *genit-or* and *genet-r-ix* we can, also, understand it, though not so readily. But all this is intelligible. We may wish to know more; to know, for instance, the exact origin of the formative syllable like *-ix*; but why they are used, and what they imply, we know. There is a difference in Nature with which, as forms, they correspond. It is in the *Substantive* that we comprehend it best.

§ 250. In the Adjectives and Pronouns, especially the Demonstrative and Relative, we do not see our way quite so clearly. A male or a female '*good*,' a male or a female '*this*,' a male or female '*which*,' we can only understand when we know what they mean as Substantives. But this we can discover from the context. In a language where there are neither formatives nor inflections all this is mysterious. But when we get these, and, along with them, *Concords*, we can realise the character of the change. They adapt themselves in form to the Substantives with which they agree. This agreement is of two kinds. The Adjective gives us a *Quality*, *i.e.* when attached to its Substantive, tells us that a *good man* is a *man* and something else. The Pronoun gives us the actual Substantive with which they correspond *under another name*. In fact, it gives us a *Synonym*. There is the element of a *Concord* in all this.

§ 251. If neither the Adjective nor the Pronoun have any sign of Gender whatever, there is no *positive Concord*; *i.e.* there is no sign whatever by which we get either agreement in form or disagreement. But there is no *Discord*; nothing by which the notion of *Concord* can be violated. There is nothing of this kind in the present English. We cannot, in English, violate the rule of *Concord* (which is a natural one), because the Adjective has no sign of Gender. We could do so when it had one. We *can* do so, even now, with the Pronouns of the Third Person and the Relative, because they have one. If speaking of a female we cannot say '*he did this*.' The *Concord*, then, when there is a sign to express it, is a matter of common sense rather than aught else. We must avoid a *Discord*.

§ 252. Given, then, a language which has arrived at a state in which we get Parts of Speech, Substantives, Adjectives, Participles, Demonstrative, Relative, and Personal Pronouns with signs denoting difference of Sex, there must be a *Concord* in form when any two words applying to the same object come together. We may dispense with such

Concords altogether ; but, if we have them, we must use them in their proper places ; and just as we have Concords of Person, Number, and Case, we may have one of Sex. In short, we have it ; and we ‘*know the reason why.*’ If we have words like *genitor* and *genetrix*, and *bonus* and *bona*, we must not say *bona genitor*, or *bonus genetrix*. There is no reason why we should have such forms ; but if we have, we must not combine them *discordantly*.

§ 253. But *Gender* is not exactly co-extensive with *Sex* ; and the perplexing fact now confronts us, that we have signs of a difference of Sex extended to Substantives where there is no Sex at all. In other words, we have *Masculines* and *Feminines* in Gender and Language where we have no corresponding *Males* and *Females*. This is our fundamental difficulty.

§ 254. *What is the sign of Gender in Form? An Inflection rather than a Formative.* The *-ix* in *genet-r-ix* is a formative ; for its inflections are exactly those of *genitor*. The Plural of both is *-es* ; their Cases *-is*, *-i*, *-em*, *-e*, and so on, the Plural. The *-or* and *-ix* are parts of the theme—unchanged throughout the Declension. In words like *bonam*, *bonas*, *bonarum* the Vowel changes with the Case and Number. In combining these we must avoid a Discord ; and the sign which makes this Discord possible is an Inflection rather than a part of the theme.

§ 255. *How far does this system extend? It does not extend to the Neuter.* We may call Nominatives like *regnum* or *bonum* Neuters. But they are not Neuter as opposed to *Masculine* and *Feminine*, or to *Male* and *Female*. They are not Neuter as to anything in the way of either Grammatical Gender or of Natural Sex. They are the Negatives or Opposites to something of a very different kind ; and they represent a contrast which originated in an earlier stage of language. At present, the Neuter may, conveniently, be treated as a third *Gender* ; but, in origin, so far as Gender is equivalent to Sex, it is no Gender at all.

It was *not* in the difference between Male and Female that the Neuter originated, but in the difference between *Animate* and *Inanimate*, for that is the difference which was the first to be recognised. There is no doubt about this. The Dual division of *Animate* and *Inanimate* preceded the Triple distinction of Masculine, Feminine, and Neuter.

§ 256. More than this. As this Dual division was the first to be recognised, it will probably be the last to be abandoned. In the Old Norse (or Icelandic), the Genders are the *three* ordinary ones—Masculine, Feminine, and Neuter. But in the Danish and Swedish they are reduced to two; the one that is abandoned being the Feminine, the one that is retained the Neuter. Of something akin to this we have an example nearer home. In the inflection of an Interrogative and Relative Pronoun the division is, also, Dual: (1) *Masculine* or *Feminine*, *i.e.* *Common*, and (2) *Neuter*—(1) *who*, (2) *wha-t*; (1) *who*, (2) *whi-ch*; though the *-ch* in the last example is not exactly an inflection, but the *-lk* of the Scottish *whi-lk*, which is the Adjective *like*.

§ 257. In some grammars, instead of *Animate* and *Inanimate*, we find such words as *Rational* and *Irrational*. And we see our way to this when we consider how readily the lower animals may be looked on as *things*. But this is not all. There is a great deal which makes the division a natural one. Whatever may be the exact difference between States and Actions, and, however clearly we may make out a case for every state being, to some extent, an action, there is a great practical difference between the agent or subject on one side and the patient or object on the other, especially when we consider the proportion in which names are likely to be allotted to them. The more conspicuous the agent the greater will be the likelihood that he will take a name; especially when he belongs to a class that gives names; and this is the class which the *Animate* beings of the world best represent; and of the *Animate* beings the *Rational* most exclusively.

§ 258. The relegation of the lower animals to the class of Things rather than Persons, is diametrically opposite to the later system of Gender. In Gender we invest objects which have no natural with a non-natural Sex. The older process, which limited the Animate world to the Rational, divested of Sex such animals as had it.

§ 259. This leads us farther. It is probable it was neither Sex, nor Life, that determined the original division. It is more probable that it was the difference between the class of Agents and the class of Objects.

§ 260. So much for a limitation of one kind; a limitation which reduces the number of Genders. But there is another, and one of another kind, that we must, also, take under consideration. To what Parts of Speech does the system, as we have it, extend? Does it extend to the *Substantives*? If it do so, does it manifest itself by the same clear, and definite signs that present themselves elsewhere? Supposing it to do so, does it do so to the same degree throughout the class? To all this we must answer, that the Substantive is *not* the Part of Speech wherein the system of Gender is most typically represented. In the typical Substantives there is no inflection to express it; no sign or mark whatever. The words, nevertheless, are Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter, as the case may be. They are supposed to be this always; and, when the difference of Sex is real, they are so; but Sex is not Gender, neither is Gender Sex. When the Gender, then, neither coincides with Sex, nor has any distinctive sign of its own, how far is it Gender at all? How far are words like *lapis* Masculine, and words like *nubes* Feminine, when they stand alone? The sense tells us that, in the way of Sex, they are neither the one nor the other; while in their declension they are identical. In fact, the terms in question have neither real Sex nor any sign of grammatical Sex or Gender when we take them as single words; and, when we have to do this, we find them

somewhat troublesome. In our language they are not so, because in English there are practically no signs of Gender; but in French and German there are scores and hundreds of words which when found for the first time have to be looked out in a dictionary before we know their Gender. In short, except for the fact that an Adjective or Pronoun, which *has* a sign of Gender, agrees with them, and they with it, they have none.

§ 261. The Substantives to which this most specially applies are those of the Third Declension in Greek and Latin; and these it is which are most typically Substantival. The inflection of words like *dominus* and *domina* is that of the Adjective.

§ 262. Gender, then, is the result of a *Concord* rather than of aught else; and it is in the Adjective rather than in the Substantive that we find it.

§ 263. It is in the Adjective rather than in the Substantive that we find the Gender as opposed to Sex. It is in the Substantive, however, that we find Sex as opposed to Gender (*genitor*, *genetrix*). The Concord, too, is a strange one; with Nouns of the Third Declension it is the Substantive that agrees with its Adjective or Pronoun rather than the Adjective or Pronoun that agrees with its Substantive. Are we, then, free to say that the signs like the *-or* and *-ix* in *genitor*, &c., the formatives expressive of Natural Sex, originated in the Substantive? and that those like *-us*, *-a*, *-um*, the signs of Gender or conventional Sex, are adjectival in origin? The first statement we may safely make; the second is not so clear. We can only say something like it. It by no means follows that because the Substantive may have taken its Gender from the Adjective, it is the Adjective in which we are to seek its origin; for this is by no means the case. I submit that the Adjective took it from the *Pronoun*. If so, it was in the class of Demonstratives and their nearest congeners that Gender took birth. By '*nearest congeners*' I mean the Relatives, the Interrogatives, the

Definite Articles, and, above all, the Pronouns of the Third Person.

§ 264. It is in the *Demonstrative Pronoun* that Gender seems to have originated. Demonstratives are Pronouns, and Sex is a *Quality*. Pronouns, however, have no Qualities. They have only *Relations*. But every Pronoun has its duplicate; *i.e.* a Noun which corresponds with it. And this Noun *has* Qualities; and when the Pronoun is, so to say, *translated, interpreted, or specified*, by its correspondent Noun, it, in its adopted form, takes to itself Qualities; and amongst them that of Sex. It has *not* these in itself; inasmuch as words like ‘*this*’ and ‘*that*’ imply nothing but a greater or less distance between the objects they apply to and the speaker. If a *man*, a *woman*, and a *tree* present themselves at different distances, the man being the nearest and the tree the most distant, nothing but the difference of the intervening space is suggested by such terms as ‘*this*,’ ‘*that*,’ and ‘*you*.’ Nevertheless, ‘*this*’ is the name of the Masculine man; ‘*that*’ the name of the Feminine woman; and ‘*you*’ the name of the Neuter tree. But change their places, and the Sex of the object changes also; and each name may have any one of the three imports. Relations are changeable; and so is the power of their signs in Speech; but so long as words like ‘*this*,’ ‘*that*,’ or ‘*you*’ mean man, woman, or tree respectively, so long are they Male or Masculine, Female or Feminine; or neither one nor the other, which is Neuter. It is only, then, for the time being that these Pronouns have Sex. But this time is always changing.

§ 265. The *Demonstrative Pronouns*, then, *have* Sex just as much as the Nouns. But only *for the time being*. They have the sex (for the time being) of the Noun with which they correspond. This depends upon the Attribute of Relations; but Relations are always changing. It is impossible under these conditions that such Pronouns can have any permanent sign of them; for any integral part of their natural

structure ; anything that would not be every instant liable to be converted into something else ; anything essential to, and inherent in, their structure ; anything like an Attribute that might be attached to them as *Pronouns*. Such an Attribute must be a *Quality*—an *inherent* Quality, if we like ; but it is just because a Pronoun has the Attribute of *Relation*, to the exclusion of that of *Quality*, that it is what it is. On the other hand, the counterpart Nouns had the Attribute of *Quality*, to the exclusion of that *Relation* ; and, because they had it, they were Nouns as opposed to Pronouns ; and, because the Attribute of *Quality* is permanent, they were permanent names. Some change must now take place in respect to the Pronoun. There must either be more of them, *i.e.* new words, like *he*, *she*, or *the*, or else existing words modified, as *heo*, *leo*, *hit*, *is*, *ea*, *id*, and the like. Or both processes may be adopted. In the Synthetic language we have both forms, but with differences. In our own language we get the Neuter of both *he* and *the* ; or *it* (*hit*), and *that*. Still, the first is used in a Personal, the latter in a Demonstrative sense. But the West-Saxon Personal form is *se*, and its Feminine *seo* ; of this the only Gender or Number is, extant in the present English, *she*. In the Lithuanian, and I believe in that language only, it is declined throughout—in six Cases and three Numbers ; for it has its Dual forms, though they are only compounds formed by the addition of the term for Quantity, or rather, Quotity.

§ 266. But it is not this that we need enlarge on. The point to which we must most specially attend is the fact, that in the passage from the Demonstrative to the Personal Pronoun, we get not only Gender in a Pronoun, to which, as an Attribute of *Quality* rather than *Relation*, it is naturally and essentially foreign, but a reason for its being adopted, and an argument in favour of its being the Pronoun in which it originated ; or rather the Pronoun in its transition from Demonstrative to Personal.



§ 267. It is in this transition that we find the germ of the triple division into Masculine, Feminine, and Neuter. The dichotomy of everything in the Universe into, '*Everything is either I (Ego) or Not-I (Non-ego)*', is that of the logicians; and it is exhaustive. In Language it becomes, for the Pronouns of the Third Person, a trichotomy; viz. *I (the Speaker)*; *Thou (the object spoken to—generally Rational, and always Animate)*; and '*This,*' '*That,*' or '*The other.*' For the first two no sign of either Animation or Sex is needed. For the third, something of the sort is required. The special name of each of the three objects in a narration cannot be continually repeated. Neither can we ring an indefinite number of changes on '*This,*' '*That,*' and '*The other.*' A change of form takes place.

§ 268. When this is completed, the Inanimate, or Irrational division of the older stage of language, and the Neuter of the newer, become, in a way, confluent. But only partially; and so as to meet the classification of the grammarians of the Synthetic languages. The older division *includes* the Neuter, *and something more*. Hence it is only to a certain extent that they coincide. There is a partial confluence, but there is no co-extension.

§ 269. Traces of the older division still survive. The Danish and Swedish Genders have already been noticed. So have the Interrogatives and Relatives of our own language. In the Slavonic, the Masculine Gender falls into two divisions: the Masculine Animate, and Masculine *Inanimate*. With the Masculine *Inanimates* it is the Nominative (as elsewhere) with which the Accusative agrees in form. With the Animate, it is the Genitive.

§ 270. We now see something to which such an apparent anomaly as Gender, or *non-natural* Sex, can be traced.

(a) There is *real* Sex in Nature, and in Language there is a Formative to *signify* it. It is in the Substantive that this originates.

(b) In another direction there is, also, a concurrent process. The Demonstrative and (or) Personal Pronouns take to themselves a sign of Gender, and, this being done, agree—or stand in Concord—with the Noun to which, as names, they correspond.

(c) This tendency to *sign*-ify the Concord extends itself. When a Substantive has an Adjective in combination with it, there is, whether *sign*-ified or not, a Concord—at least, so far as a *Discord* would involve a contradiction. There need not be any formal, external, or positive sign of it; in other words, it is not necessary, nor is it always the case, that there is any sign of Gender for the Adjective. If, however, there *be* signs, they must not be discordant. In some cases, the Substantive being understood, a single word such as *bonus*=*good man*, *bona*=*good woman*, stands by itself. When this is the case, the Adjective is, *pro tanto*, Substantival.

§ 271. Then comes the extension of such signs of Concordance *beyond* the bounds of Natural Sex. ‘*Gender*’ now becomes a convenient term; and, when once the change has begun, there is much to promote it. The Demonstrative Pronoun itself is something more than a Demonstrative. It is also Interrogative and Relative; also the Definite Article. This being the foundation of the Third Person, it presents itself in the Verbs more often than the other two Persons put together. Then there is older division of Animate and Inanimate; and, still more important, that of Rational and Irrational. This would make the whole of the lower animals Neuter; and, so doing, contribute greatly to the confusion of Sex and Gender. Then there are the minor elements which, in detail, would promote the same intermixture—Personification, especially when connected with Mythology, being the chief of them. But, with all this, it must be remembered that the extension is by no means very wide; or, at least, that, except with the Pronoun and the Adjective, it is of an equivocal and imperfect character. In words like *dominus*

and *domina*, the distinction is real. In words like *mensa* and *sylva*, it is conventional; but in both cases the declension is Adjectival. With the typical Substantives of the Third Declension there is no sign of Gender at all. There are words like *genitor* and *genetrix*; but, in these the difference is real, and the formative signs are in their proper place. In Neuters like *opus* the Nominatives and the Accusatives are alike; and, in the Plural number, they end in *-a* (*oper-a*), rather than in *-es* (*lapid-es*). But this is not a difference of Masculine and Feminine, it is the older difference of Animate and Inanimate.

§ 272. Of the extent to which the present class of *Neuters* is something more than a mere collection of the names which are neither Masculine nor Feminine, we have already had evidence. We have seen that the present triple division of Gender is of secondary origin. The lower languages tell us that the older division was a *Dyad*, or *Dualism*; and that this was the first in origin. The later languages—the Danish and the Swedish—tell us that the double division survives the triple, and that throughout the whole domain of Gender. The present English tells us that in the Interrogative and Relative Pronouns there is no Feminine; whereas, there is a Masculine and a Neuter. The Slavonic tells us that, concurrently with the ordinary triple division into three Genders, the *Masculine* draws a distinction between *Animate* and *Inanimate*.

§ 273. From another point of view, however, the whole gist of the present observations on *Gender* have been to the effect that, over and above its tendency to present itself late and to disappear soon, its signs are of an indefinite character. To the Neuter, however, *neither* of these criteria appertain. This is because the Neuter is not an instance of *Gender*. The Neuter shows itself early; and has yet to become either obsolete or obsolescent. And it is just the same with its Inflection. Its signs are definite; no mere differentiations of some vowel or diphthong, but con-

sonantal in form and permanent in duration. The difference between *ó* and *ij*, *eum* and *eam*, *the* and *theo*, *se* and *seo*, is indicated by an evanescent vowel. The signs of the Neuter are Consonantal; and, if not exactly everlasting, permanent. The Neuter sign, in short, is always the most positive of the three.

It is, certainly, in the Pronouns that this comparatively definite, permanent, and undoubtedly consonantal sign presents itself. I do not use this as a reason in favour of its having originated in the Pronoun. I merely indicate it as a presumption in favour of its having done so. Against this view I know nothing. In the German Family of Languages, however, the Adjectives follow, in its signs, the Gender of the Pronoun. *Pro tanto*, this is in favour of the view. Of course, practically, the Neuter is a Gender; but, historically, it is connected with a system in which Sex was only a secondary and accidental element.

§ 274. Of the extent to which the earliest Inflections are the most persistent there is no better evidence than that of the Interrogative Pronoun. The Greeks said *ός*, *ί*, *ό*; the Latins *qui*, *que*, *quod*; the English *who* and *what*, having nothing that corresponds to *ij* and *que*. We may, or may not, call this *Gender*. It is certain that it is not *Gender* founded on *Sex*. We may, or may not, call this *Gender Neuter*; but it is certainly not the Neuter of a *triple* division, or *trichotomy*. It represents one of *two* classes, not one of three; and it is not expressive of a mere residue, consisting of something that is neither '*this*' nor '*that*.' It is a term like '*The other*' when it applies to one object out of two; but it is not '*The other*' in such a phrase as '*This, That, and Tother*.' It is '*The other*' as opposed to either '*This*' or '*That*' singly; but not '*The other*' as opposed to '*This*' and '*That*' collectively. The difference, for the purposes of practical grammar, is of no great importance; but the fact of being retained, to the exclusion of the Feminine, in the Interrogatives, is not without its import.

§ 275. We may now add, that the sign of *Gender* is one of a peculiarly faint and indistinct character; being formed by modifying some sign previously existing, rather than by the introduction of any new element. Few, if any, of these signs contain a consonant, neither can they always be separated from the sign of the Number and Case; indeed, as a rule, the three become confluent, and one syllable may stand for all. When inflections are of this indefinite character, they are rarely either old or permanent. They come into language late, and they fall out of it early. This is mentioned—not for the first time—to show that the two characters may be taken together; and that so they give a natural character to any class founded upon them.

§ 276. It was not, then, for nothing that the §§ 172, 195 were written upon the difference between Inflections formed by the separate and definite addition of what, by hypothesis, was originally a distinct and independent word, and Inflections formed by *Differentiation*; and that, at the first opportunity, it was laid before the reader; nor is it without a purpose that the term *Variant* has elsewhere been suggested. More in the special notice of the *Mood* will be said about this. At present it is sufficient to state that in Inflection the differentiated form is common to both Mood and Gender.

#### MOOD.

§ 277. The remarks with which the notice of '*Gender*' concluded are those with which it is convenient to begin the notice of '*Mood*.' This is because, in the present treatise, some pains are taken to establish a comparison between them. In both divisions there is a *minimum* of Inflection in the way of *addition*; the chief changes being from one vowel or diphthong to another, *i.e.* by *differentiation*. In both divisions the result is short-lived. The distinction of both Gender and Mood come into language late and drop out early.

§ 278. Of the way in which a Mood like the Conjunctive dies off, we have a good instance in our own language. In very correct English we are supposed to say 'If this *be* the case, you are right,' rather than 'If this *is* the case,' &c. But '*be*' and '*is*,' it may be objected, are two different verbs, and not the same verb in two different Moods. Hence, 'if I *were* you' as opposed to 'if I *was* you' is nearer to the point. Now this is the only instance in English of a *positive* distinction in the way of *Mood*. In sentences like 'if he *choose*, he will comply with your request,' the form '*choose*' is preferred to '*chooses*'; but we know that the distinction is often neglected. What, however, when we get it, is the sign of the Conjunctive? Simply the *omission* of that of the Indicative. With the exception of the word *were* as opposed to *was*, all the English Conjunctives are of this *negative* character. The signs, then, of Mood, in English, are obsolescent, those of Gender obsolete.

§ 279. It is easier to say what Mood is *not*, than what it is. Etymologically, it is a *Mode* of some kind or other; but it is certain that, in the divisions and subdivisions of the class to which the term applies, there is very little regularity of relation. In words like *Vocito* = *I call often*,  $\gamma\eta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\omega$  = *I begin to grow old*, we express the *kind* of action, but none of the circumstances, conditions, or accidents under which it presents itself to the person spoken to.

In words like  $\acute{\tau}\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ ,  $\acute{\tau}\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omega$ ,  $\acute{\tau}\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\epsilon$ , or  $\acute{\tau}\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omicron\iota\mu\iota$  there is no change whatever in the character of the action, which is neither frequentative, nor inchoative, nor anything else ending in *-ive*, but purely and simply *beat*. In words like *vocamus* and *vocitamus* we have two different verbs; in words like *vocamus* and *vocemus*, *vocitamus* and *vocitemus*, we have identical verbs in different moods.

§ 280. In Greek and Latin, Frequentatives like *vocito* and  $\phi\lambda\epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\theta\omega$ , and Inchoatives like *viresco* and  $\gamma\eta\rho\acute{\alpha}\sigma\kappa\omega$ —in contrast to such forms are *amarem* or  $\acute{\tau}\acute{\upsilon}\pi\tau\omicron\iota\mu\iota$ —are not likely to be mistaken for anything but what they are. But

in many languages all these formations are considered to constitute *Mood*; so that the Moods of this may amount to more than a dozen. These, however, we may wholly exclude; and the Infinitive Verb we have excluded already. This last may, of course, be called a *Mood*, if a definition of that term be framed so as to allow the Mood to Nouns. But this is another question. The Moods now under notice are those of the Finite Verb exclusively.

§ 281. How many of them are they? This is a question which partly belongs to Logic, and partly to Grammar; and when this is the case, each illustrates the other. It is the *Finite* structure of the Verb that makes that Part of Speech what it is in the eyes of the logician. The *Infinitive* portion of the compound supplies the Predicate, the Personal part the Subject. Between the two we get a Proposition; sometimes a very short and compact one—as *eo=I go, no=I swim*, and others. But it is not with *all* these forms that the logician has to deal. It is only when the verb delivers a statement, an assertion, or a predication to the effect that some one does, or does not do, something, or that some one is or is not, something, that the logician recognises the Verb. The simple union of the name of an agent, or being, with that of an action or state, is not enough for him. He may or may not allow that such combinations constitute sentences—perhaps even propositions; but such propositions and such sentences are excluded from the province of Logic. One class of this kind is that of *Commands*; another, that of *Questions*. We can found no argument on either. The Command must be either obeyed or disobeyed, and the Question must be answered in some way before the first *datum* in any inference can be recognised.

§ 282. The logicians, then, ignore *Commands*, and that rightly. They also ignore *Questions*, but not so rightly. This is because in such sentences as '*What is this?*' there are two terms; viz., '*what*' and '*this*;' and between the two the result is, '*this is something concerning which infor-*

*mation is required.*' But this is incommensurably between two propositions, and one is what we have already seen in the case of the Finite Verb and the Infinitive ; nor need it detain us now. What we more especially need notice is the extent to which the element of uncertainty and conditionality is common to the Verbs of the Conjunctive Mood and the class of *Questions*.

§ 283. Hence, between what the logician admits, and what he excludes, we get something like a rule, by which we may ascertain the number and nature of the Moods ; for the triple division is, undoubtedly, meant to be exhaustive of the different forms under which a Subject and a Predicate in combination can present themselves. Hence, also, the more we bring these divisions of the logician into harmony with those of the grammarian, the more do we give precision and definitude to our conception of the function and number of the Moods. In respect to the last point, we may safely say that, for the *Finite* Verb, they are not more than *four*—not more ; possibly not so many.

§ 284. *Four* in Greek, and *Three* in Latin, are the numbers with which we are the most familiar. The names are (1), Indicative ; (2), Imperative ; (3), Conjunctive, for both languages ; (4), Optative, peculiar to the Greek. The *Indicative* is the one which the logician adopts. The *Imperative* he has recognised ; but only to exclude it. With the *Conjunctive* and *Optative* the case is different. These are, by no means, so evidently the counterparts to the class of Questions as the Imperative is the counterpart to the class of Commands.

§ 285. As a Mood (for nothing need be said about the Indicative), the Imperative is, on the first view, a very simple one ; and if its character depended on the purely imperative part of it, there would be little to be said about it. The object addressed must, of necessity, be in the Second Person, and his name may be dispensed with ; for its presence and its relation to the speaker are self-evident. Hence, we may



have such words as *dic*, and *fac*, and others, where the verb presents itself in its simplest form. As more individuals than one may receive a Command, the Imperative may have more *Numbers* than one; but as a Tense, it is essentially *Future*. The time when a command is delivered is Present; that of its contemplated fulfilment, Future. An Imperative Mood in a *Past* Tense is a contradiction in terms.

§ 286. These are the characters of the Infinitive which give us as formulas. But if a formula is one thing, the practice of language is another. *Eamus*=*let us go*, and *eant*=*let them go*, are in form Conjunctive. But it is in sense wholly unconditional; so that by the double test of form and import it is neither Imperative nor Conjunctive. But its sense is Precative, and as such, implies permission, which is akin to an order. Again, in

*Moriamur et in media arma ruamus,*

the sense is Hortative. With a secondary verb, like *let* or *may*, we may find these differences expressed. But then the combinations are analytic.

§ 287. *Wishes* are of the same class with orders, supplications, and exhortations; but in wishing, a man need not go beyond himself. When he says, '*I wish you well*,' he does not so much give vent to the wish, as he tells us that *he wishes*, or that he is a *wisher*. The purely Optative expression partakes of the nature of an Interjection. Between the Interjection and the Verb, as Parts of Speech, there is a wide interval; but in combinations like *utinam, εἴθ' ὄφελε*, '*would I could*,' we have, between the elliptical forms of the expression and the suggestive, rather than indicative, character of the sentence, something that is truly Interjectional. In English, when we use '*may*,' we get the difference between the Conjunctive and Optative sense by a transposition—'*you may be happy*'—'*may you be happy*.' And so it is in the Latin *sis*—

*Sis licet felix, ubicunque mavis,  
Et memor nostri, Galatea, vivas.*

In the Greek—

᾿Ω παῖ, γένοιο πατρός εὐτυχέστερος,  
 Τάδ' ἀλλ' ὅμοιος καὶ γένοι' ἂν οὐ κακός,

the same word is both Optative and Future; in the latter case with ἂν superadded.

§ 288. Then, in the way of Tense, we have such abnormal forms as the Imperatives of the Greek, and extravagant forms as the Imperatives of the Greek Aorist. In the Active Voice, the form may as easily be considered Future as Aorist: *τύπον, δράσον, ποιήσον*, &c.; but in the Passive there is no doubt as to the tense of *τύφθητι, τύφθητον, τύφθητον, τυφθήτωρ, τύφθητε, τυφθήτωσαν*. This is telling a man on Saturday to take a beating on the *preceding* Friday. We cannot do this; though, in saying, '*consider yourself' beaten,*' we can get at something like it; and that loose likeness of the kind may pass for real ones, is a fact that we must recognise in language, and take it as it presents itself. There is a great deal of it, and that in several languages. Thus, in the Fin paradigm of § 92, we may notice the entry of a '*Factive*' case; the ordinary explanation of which term is, not so much that something is actually *made, converted, or transformed* into something else, as that it is *made, or becoming like, or as* something else. In languages where there either is or has been the recognition of the system of *Exclusive* and *Inclusive* Plurals, the paradoxes connected with the *Person* of the Imperative can scarcely be said to exist; for it is often hard to say how far the designation of the object addressed is that of any particular person at all. It certainly applies, in the first instance, to a second person; but if, when either excludes or includes the speaker and the objects spoken about, its import becomes equivocal. That the ideas, notions, or conceptions, connected with that of *Command* are numerous, we have already seen. They have, also, a tendency to graduate and run into one another.

§ 289. The Indicative and Imperative Moods are commensurable. In each there is but one term, and only one proposi-

tion. Neither of them, however, is commensurable with the Conjunctive; because in the Conjunctive there are *two* propositions. The difference here is the difference between the Finite Verb and the Infinitive repeated; except that, in the question between the Finite and Infinitive it was one of *terms*, whereas, here it is one of *propositions*.

§ 290. There are no two propositions which may not stand in juxtaposition to one another. They need not be connected; inasmuch as, to use a familiar simile, they may touch one another like marbles in a bag; nor even, when connected, need they have any sign of the connection. But, given some such sign, the possible series of them must be co-extensive with the possible ways in which connection of any kind can be expressed. It is not impossible that the number and nature of these may be calculated *à priori*; and that each of them may have a class-name; even though the class be limited to a single conjunction.

This is what is possible. Actually, however, we have a limited series of classes, each with its distinctive term, which is amply adequate to illustrate the meaning of the term *Conjunctive*. They fall into two classes: those which exercise no influence upon the *Verb* in the secondary proposition; and those which influence, or modify, it. All of these, however, except the first two, have some effect or other upon it; in respect to either its form, or the interpretation of the connecting link. It is this influence which makes the difference between two propositions in mere juxtaposition (the marbles in the bag) and propositions with a sign of connection, or Conjunctives. There is, however, only one form of the conjunction that affects the Mood, *exclusively*. There is another that affects *either* the Mood or the Tense; but which of the two be the one that is so affected depends upon the language rather than the power of the conjunction taken by itself. This, of course, anticipates the contrast between the Greek and the Latin; in which, between the two, we find a *Tense* in one language where a *Mood* presents itself in

the other ; a point of no small importance in showing how unstable is the character of the Mood, and how readily it is converted into something else.

§ 291. The principal conjunctions, each with its own recognised class-name, are as follows :—

(a)

CAUSAL.

The day is fine ;

*because*

The sun is bright.

(b)

ILLATIVE.

The sun is bright ;

*therefore*

The day is fine.

(c)

COPULATIVE.

The sun rises in the east ;

*and*

The sun sets in the west ;

*or*

The sun rises in the east *and* sets in the west.

Here the single word *sun* serves as the *Subject* for two Propositions :

The sun shines ;

*and*

The moon shines ;

*or*

The sun *and* moon shine.

Here the word *shine* serves as the *Predicate* for two Propositions.

In like manner :

(d)

DISJUNCTIVE.

John will do it ;

*or*

Thomas will do it.

This may take the more compendious form :

John, *or* Thomas, will do it.

(e)

ADVERSATIVE.

All fled *but* Hector.

Here the import of *but* is equivocal. This is because we can understand the Proposition either as—

All fled *except* Hector ;

In which case *but* is a Preposition ;

*Or,*

All fled *but* Hector (did not fly) ;

where *but* is a Conjunction.

(f)

COMPARATIVE.

You are fairer *than* she.

This we must parse as if it were written :

You are fairer *than* she (is fair) ;

*or*

You are fairer *than* her.

Here *than* is a Preposition, and governs *her* in the Objective Case.

Thou art a girl as much fairer *than* her  
As he is a poet sublimer *than* *me*.

Here we may write *she* instead of *her*, and *I* instead of *me*; but the lines are by Prior, and this is how he wrote them. Which gives the better grammar of the two is another question. Both are current in the average English.

It is clear that, with the exception of the first two, all these conjunctions affect either the form or the parsing of the second proposition, supposing that they are two, or, as in the case of the Adversatives and Comparatives, raise the question as to whether there are two propositions, or one. On the other hand, it is equally clear that none of them affect either the Moods or the Tense of the Verb.

§ 292. With two other conjunctions, however, the case is different—these being ‘*if*’ and ‘*that*.’ The first of these affects the *Mood*, the second the *Tense*, in *English*. In Greek and Latin it is different; as will be seen in the sequel. At present, it is enough to say that the difference is an important one. For this a single illustration of each is sufficient.

(a) IF, and IF—NOT. Here it is considered better to say :

	If he <i>do</i> this he will repent;
than	If he <i>does</i> this he will repent.

Whether every one who speaks English does, in ordinary conversation, so speak, is another question. Such, however, is the rule; and the older the stage of the language the more valid it is; but, as language advances, it becomes obsolescent. Still the difference is, fundamentally, a real one. We may call the import of this ‘*if*’ *Conditional*.

(b) THAT and THAT—NOT, or LEST. Here we say :

	I <i>do</i> this that I <i>may</i> succeed,
rather than	I <i>do</i> this that I <i>might</i> succeed;
also	I <i>did</i> this that I <i>might</i> succeed,
rather than	I <i>did</i> this that I <i>may</i> succeed.

We may call this ‘*that*’ (or *lest*) *Intentional*, or, perhaps, more conveniently, *Potential*.

§ 293. In each of these instances we get a new structure. In the first we get what we may fairly term a Mood with its special sign. It is a negative one in the present English; nevertheless, between the two there is a differentiation. So there is in the second; but it is a differentiation of *Tense* rather than of Mood; and its element is a Concord—a Concord of *Tense*. But it is one of *Mood* as well. If the two propositions did not depend upon one another, and were merely unconnected sentences, there would be no call for a concord. Both, however, are Conjunctive; inasmuch as they involve not only propositions, but imply a link between them. In this way, however, all the other conjunctive pairs of propositions were in the same predicament. With ‘*if*’ and ‘*that*’ we have something more; viz. a special structure for the subordinate one.

§ 294. ‘*Conjunctive*,’ then, and ‘*Mood*,’ are passable names; but neither is unexceptionable. There are Conjunctive sentences in which the verb undergoes no change; and in the case of ‘*that*’ the Concord was one of *Tense*. Still, the terms may pass; and now we may take the two foregoing cases separately.

§ 295. The construction that depends upon ‘*if*,’ and words of a similar import, is the one that we must first investigate. This is because it is pre-eminently a construction in the way of *Mood*; for the other, or the one indicated by ‘*that*,’ &c., is partly one of *Mood*, partly one of *Tense*. Words like ‘*if*’ are *conditional*. The propositions which they give us in Logic are called *hypothetical*; but both terms point to the same relation between the two sentences or clauses. Something will *be*, *take place*, or *be done*, provided that something *be done*, or *take place* in reference to, and in connection with, it; in other words, one of the two propositions depends upon the other; and the conditional Conjunctive

tion connects them. In the mind of the Speaker there is a manifest difference between the two propositions in respect to the certainty or reality of the action or state indicated by them. It need not be absolutely certain in both, inasmuch as we can say ‘*If I do this I may succeed,*’ as readily as we can say, ‘*If I do this I shall succeed.*’ But *one* of them must be more or less *uncertain*. This difference is a difference *per se*; or, at any rate, it is not one of Person, Voice, Number, or Case. Nor is it one of Frequentativeness, Inchoativeness, or anything indicated by the Formatives. There is a Negative suggested by it; but to express this *in extenso* would be to do away with the element of uncertainty upon which the conditional character of the clause or proposition depends. It does not, however, so much matter what it is, as how it suggests itself to the speaker. Nor is the exact form of the suggestion important. The real question is whether the difference between them be sufficiently striking to suggest a different form for the less certain term as opposed to that of the certain one.

§ 296. It is submitted, then, that it is the perception of this difference that suggests the process of differentiation—when it takes place, which it may or may not do. The contrast, however, in the speaker’s mind between the less certain and the more certain is the *primum mobile* in the change. It is by no means necessary that there should be one at all; but if there be, this is its origin. It is rarely, if ever, of a very decided or conspicuous character, and it rarely, if ever, suggests the notion that it was once an independent word, or even a biliteral syllable. It is something more than an ordinary accent, but to the class of Accents, Tones, and Modified Vowels, it belongs, rather than to that of substantial and definite increments. It effects such changes as those from *τύπτω* to *τύπτῃ*, from *τέτυφα* to *τέτυφω*, or from *sum* to *sim*, and not much more. There is a little more than this, in the difference in Greek between the Conjunctive and Optative, and this will be noticed in the sequel.



§ 297. In the Agglutinate languages there is also something more, as may be seen in the Lap, § 94. But, so far as the present writer can form an opinion, these are not *Inflectional*. The sign, which in the Lap is consonantal, and, as such, formed by *Addition* rather than by *Differentiation*, probably belongs, like the *-it* in *voc-it-o*, to the original verb. This we must suppose to be defective in the other moods, and, in the Conjunctive, suggestive of some kind of action or state which is less positive or definite than that suggested by the Indicative. A *Consuetudinal* import would meet this condition; for in sentences where the Verb implies merely that such or such an act or state is habitual, would make its connection with the associated proposition more or less doubtful. In other words, it would give us the elements of a *condition*. There might be a habit, but there might also be exceptions to it.

§ 298. This is how we get the Conjunctive Mood as governed by the Conditional Pronoun; *i.e.* by some word like '*if*.' But '*if*,' and its equivalents, are words of a very wide import, and they are this because, in all kinds of doubt or uncertainty, there are degrees. In many cases we can measure these, and hence calculate the probabilities. Sometimes an '*if*' gives us little more than a mild form of denial, and is all but negative. Sometimes it is the '*if dubitantis*' = '*as may or may not be.*' Sometimes it is the '*if concedentis*,' or the '*if*' of one convinced (perhaps against his will), by what he has learned, in favour of a more affirmative view. In this case we often say '*since*,' a word referring to past time, and indicating a change of opinion. When we do this, the Verb that follows is properly Indicative; *i.e.* the word '*if*' means '*since*,' and the doubt is dispelled.

But on the doubtful ground of admission or denial, '*if*' itself may be used as *since*. If so, it may be followed by a verb in the Indicative.

## THE OPTATIVE.

§ 299. In strong contrast to words like ‘*if*,’ stand words like ‘*that*.’ In sentences like—

I *do* this that I *may* succeed,  
and

I *did* this that I *might* succeed,

we have *Tense*, where before we had *Mood*. This leads us to the consideration of the *Optative* forms in Mood or Tense, as the case may be.

There are two sorts of Optativeness ; and, between them, the Greek makes a special Mood of many Tenses, whereas the Latin gives many Tenses to a single Mood.

1. The Optative element of the first is simply that of a vague wish, vaguely expressed. The wish is one in which the element of intention, or the will to do anything to forward it, is at its *minimum*. The accomplishment depends upon uncertain circumstances, rather than on any action of the wisher. It may, perhaps, partake of the nature of a prayer, or, when mixed up with past time, of a regret. *May something occur favourably!* *Would that something had happened*, or (what is commoner) *that something had not happened!* If we translate ‘*opto*’ by ‘*wish*,’ rather than by ‘*choose*,’ the first gives a purely *Optative* expression. The second may be called *Desiderative*. In the first the time involved is *Future*; in the second, *Past*—past and irremediable. In Thought this is, perhaps, as much akin to the *Interjection* as it is to the Verb; indeed, expressions like ‘*would I could*’ are verbal only in form, especially when compared with such interjections as *lo*, *ecce*, *proh* (vocative or deprecativ), and the like. When phrases like ‘*would I were*’ are changed for phrases like ‘*O, that I were*,’ the mixture of the two elements, as connected in thought, is conspicuously clear.

§ 300. In this no second proposition is involved, except so far as the word expressive of a wish may be verbal. In ‘*would I were*,’ the word ‘*would*’ is, doubtless, a verb; but

it can, with a very slight difference of meaning, be replaced by the Interjection. We may not, however, say that this kind of meaning *excludes* a second preposition. We may only say that it can dispense with one.

§ 301. The more we look into the import of the Optative, the more clearly do we see that it is not to the Conjunctive Mood that it is more especially akin. It is far more so to the Precative variety of the Imperative ; and the more it resembles this the more it partakes of the nature of an Interjection. We, doubtless, have it in Conjunctive form, as in—

*Sis licet felix, ubicunque mavis,  
Et memor nostri, Galatea, vivas, &c. ;*

and

*Serus in cœlum redeas, dinque  
Lætus intersis populo Quirini ;*

and in innumerable other cases. But the Imperative has a similar connection. On the other hand, both in Greek and Latin, we have particles of an Interjectional character in such elliptical expressions as—

*Εἴθ' ὤφελ' Ἀργούς μὴ διαπτόσθαι σκάφος  
Κολχῶν ἐς αἶαν κτανείας Συμπλήγαδας, &c.,*

when the Optative sign is *εἴ*, whereas *ὤφελε* represents something that the ship *Argo* ought not to have done.

In—

*O utinam subitæ raperent mea poma procellæ,  
Vel possem fructus excutere ipsa meos,*

the force of *utinam* is Present, while that of *raperent* is Past ; a construction impossible if there were any element of *intention* in the exclamation. The past import, then, lies less in the wish that the winds would do something that they will not do on the strength of the prayer, than in the feeling of regret that both, for the time subsequent to it, and the time anterior to it, the winds did not do such things at all. The wish, by implication, had been made before, and that in vain.

§ 302. We may now look to certain Latin forms. The forms like *amarem, amavissem, amaverim*, are *Tenses* of the Conjunctive Mood. In Greek, forms like *τύπτοιμι, τεύφοιμι, τύψοιμι*, &c., are *Tenses*, and something more; *i.e.* they are *Tenses* of a *Mood* which, in Latin, is wanting, *viz.* the *Optative*. Hence, to a certain extent, what is *Tense* in Latin is *Mood* in Greek, and the Latin Conjunctive *Tenses* represent a great deal of what, in Greek, is represented by the *Optative* as a *Mood*. To some extent, too, these *Tenses* and *Moods* are complementary to one another.

§ 303. It matters little whether we take the Greek *Optative*, as a *Mood*, or the Latin combinations as *Tenses*, separately; or whether we take the two systems as a whole. Little, too, does it matter what we call them. In any case, the purely *optative* element is at a *minimum*. In such exclamations as—

᾿Ω παῖ, γενοῖο πατρός εὐτυχέστερος,  
Τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὁμοῖος, καὶ γενοῖ' ἂν οὐ κακός,

it is only one of the forms that expresses a wish. The remaining forms are for the greater part other than *optative*—*i.e.* they are (with the affix *ἂν*) *Future*; with *ἵνα* and the like *intentional*; and, with the Latin *an*, if not actually *Interrogative*, a near approach to an *interrogation*.

§ 304. This brings us back to the triple division of the *Logicians*; which, by what it *includes* and by what it *excludes*, is held to be *exhaustive* of the three primary forms in which the combination of a *Subject* and a *Predicate* may be conveyed. We may call this a *Proposition* in reasoning, which, considering that *Logic* is merely a part of *Language*, specially applied, we are free to do. Or we may call a *Command*, or a *Question*, by some other name; though I submit that this limitation of the term *Proposition* as determined by the *logicians* is in no way valid in *Language*. In either case, however, the division of the *Logicians* into *Statements*, *Commands*, and *Questions* is sufficiently near to that

of the grammarian, to limit the number of his Moods ; and it must be admitted that, as a Mood, the Optative is one of a very mixed character.

§ 305. The bearings of this approximate relation, and partial correspondence, between the division of the Logicians and that of the Philologists now explains itself. Between what the logician admits, and what he excludes, we get *three* different ways in which a Subject and a Predicate in combination may present themselves to the speaker. Definite statements correspond with the *Indicative* Mood ; Mandative or *Imperative* with *Commands* ; questionable cases, or cases which involve a question, with *Questions*. What this way of presentation may be, is not so easy to say. But it is easy to say what it is *not*. The relation of *voca* or *vocato* is *not* the relation of *voc-o*, and *voc-it-o*, inasmuch as *vocito* forms as good a Proposition as *voco* ; whereas neither *voca* (*vocato*) or *vocita* (*vocitato*) forms any proposition at all. And the same is the case with the other *Formatives*. *Viresco* and *γηράσκω* comport themselves, in a logical proposition, exactly as *vireo* and *γερῶω* do. The difference, then, between the Imperative, or Conjunctive, on the one hand, and the Indicative on the other, is not one connected with any difference in the character of the verb itself. We may call differences of the last kind *Modes*. We may even call them *Moods* ; but they are not the Moods represented by the *Indicative*, *Imperative*, and *Conjunctive* denominations. As little are the differences of Voice, Tense, or Number ; because all these are present in the Moods which correspond with *Commands* and *Questions* (*Questionables*). With *Person* there is an apparent difference ; but it is only partial. The *Imperative* is, formally, limited to the Second Person. But the Second Person is common to it and to the Indicative. It is no difference, then, of this kind that constitutes a difference of Mood. Besides this, we have seen that the Imperative Mood, in Thought, has more Persons than one. *Eamus*, in Latin=*let us go*, which is Imperative. This is, in *Thought*,

'*may we go,*' a *Precative Imperative*, if we choose to call it so. In like manner, '*moramur et in media arma ruamus*' is what we may call *Hortative*—'*do as I do.*' We may call these *Mandatives*; but, whatever we call them, they are Variants of the Imperative.

§ 306. What, then, is the difference which the *Non-Indicate* moods signify? It is certainly a peculiar one; one *per se*. It is the difference between '*Yes*' and '*No.*' But it is not the exact and absolute difference. Combinations like '*This is not good,*' are as truly *Indicative* as '*This is good.*' But the *Negative* when definitely expressed is as positive as the *Affirmative*; *i.e.* as free from any uncertainty. It is not, then, to this extent, a difference of '*Yes*' or '*No.*' An absolute denial is only a contradiction; and as such simply the affirmative of an opposite. In the *Command*, however, of the logician, and the *Imperative Mood* of the grammarian, we get something that is neither one nor the other, but a mixture of the two; *viz.* an explicit affirmative with the suggestion, or recognition (either consciously or unconsciously), of a possible, or probable, denial. And this is something wholly different from anything like any other *Formative* or *Inflection*. It is, also, one of a more subtle and less definite character than any of them. It is also one which is not very necessary to language. It is long before it is recognised by any sign; so that language does, for a long time, without it. It is also, early in its disappearance; so that language, hereafter, is likely to dispense with it altogether. Its sign, like that of *Gender*, with which it agrees in the last respect, is either differential or negative—at any rate, it is indefinite and indistinct. It coincides but loosely and indifferently with its distribution; for we have seen *Imperatives* replaced by *Conjunctives*, and *Optative Moods* by *Conjunctive Tenses*, in the *Synthetic languages*; while, in the *Analytic* we have such purely *Imperative combinations* as '*let us go*' superseding forms like the Latin '*eamus.*' Finally, we have no separate syllable, no con-

sonantal sound, nothing in short beyond the modification of a vowel to which we can assign its inflection. The *-m* in *ame-m* as appended to *am-o* is no instance to the contrary; inasmuch as the most that we can get from it is the fact, that the original sign of the Person was retained in one Mood after it had become obsolete in another.

§ 307. We can go farther in this direction. We not only get no definite sign, or additament *aliunde*, as we do in the signs of Person, Voice, Number, Case, and Tense, but we cannot very readily find a probable one; in other words, we not only fail to discover an additament sign, but fail to see our way to the making of one. The two quarters in which we are most inclined to look for it, are the Particles that indicate either a denial or an interrogation—the Negatives and the Interrogatives. But this is just where we fail to find them. Of the Particles themselves there are plenty; but even though they may partially coalesce with their verbs, they never help us to the origin of the differences that separate forms like *τύπτ-ε*, *τύπ-τω*, and *τύπτοιμι* from *τύπτ-ω*. The likeliest word to enter into an inflection is the Greek *ει*; but we have seen how it comports itself. In

*Εἶθ' ὤφελ' Ἀργὸς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος,*

the word suggests a wish, much as the Interjection 'O' may do so; whilst *ὤφελε* is governed by *σκάφος*. To look for such possible elements in their analytic equivalents, such as *may*, *can*, *would*, and *let*, is like looking for the roots of such words as *will* and *shall* in such Futures as *γράψω*, and *αμῶ*.

§ 308. That the signs of the Moods are real is beyond doubt. There is a difference, of some kind, between the three, four, or whatever the number may be of them. But it is not a sign of the ordinary kind. It is one of two things: (*a*) a mere Negation, as we find it in the Imperative, where the sign of Person may be dispensed with; or (*b*) a mere modification of a certain element, rather than an

element superadded to the theme or root in a definite and separable form. It is not suggested that this rule is invariable; it is only stated that such is usually the case. Except in the instances of Gender and Mood, the general sign is made by an addition of something *ab extra*. If, in Gender and Mood, there is no such material to apply, it is useless to try to reduce the signs of them to any originally independent and separate word. But their forms can scarcely be said to stand alone; even though they be ever so alien to the class of Persons, Number, Cases, and Tenses. There is a system towards which it (so to say) the formation of Mood gravitates. The difference between an Indicative and a Conjunctive is not exactly one of Accent, or Tone, or Emphasis. But it belongs to the same order of mutations, neither is it, in Thought, independent of the rules of Collocation. In the present English, we may get three different imports from the same combination, word for word:

(1) '*You may be happy*' = *You may, (or not) be, happy* — *may, possibly or probably, be happy.*

(2) '*You may*' &c. = *You are free to be happy, or 'I let you be happy.'*

(3) '*May you be happy?*'—This conveys a question—*Are you free, or able, to be happy?*

(4) '*May you be happy!*' This expresses a wish—*I wish you may* &c.

Here we have four Moods; in the *signification* of which the only two elements are Accent and Collocation; and in Collocation we get a new element, and one of a different kind.

§ 309. Of the two, or three, *Non-indicative* Moods (for this is the safest general term for them) four characteristics have been notified:

(1) The differential and (as such) indistinct nature of their signs.

(2) The lateness of their appearance, and the earliness of their disappearance, in language.

(3) The difficulty of seeing our way to any elements out



of which any sign in the way of an additament can be made.

(4) The comparative closeness of their affinity with the system of *Tones* and *Accents* (though they are not exactly either one or the other), as opposed to the more distant connection with the system that gives us the signs of Person, Voice, Number, Case, and Tense, as to *Inflections*, or that of the *Formatives* of any kind.

The first two of these characteristics are, probably, related to one another as cause and effect; because what is faintly *sign-ified* may easily be neglected.

Of the third it may be said, that we have, at the present time, a conspicuous series of equivalents in such familiar verbs as *may, can, might, would, should, ought*, and (to some extent) *will* and *shall*. It is by these that, in the Analytic stage, they are superseded. That such is the case is a very good reason for considering that, in Thought, the two systems have the same import. On the other hand, the very fact of the system of Analytic combinations of Auxiliaries being later than that of synthetic Inflections (and originating in its decay) is conclusive against its being the origin of it.

§ 310. The system that gives us the three *Non-indicative* Moods is a system *per se*. And it is not this by accident. Its typical illustration presents itself in the *Conjunctive* as governed by '*if*.' Its basis, in Thought (we may almost say Feeling) is the contrast between a statement conveying a certainty (or what passes for one) and a statement conveying an *uncertainty*; the two being connected with one another—if not exactly as Cause and Effect—as a result and a condition. We know how important little like '*if*' are in matters of this kind. We know that when one word assumes a '*Yes*,' the other suggests a '*No*.' We know that, though in some cases, the contrast may fail to impress itself on the mind of a speaker, there are others wherein it makes itself painfully apparent. We know this from our own experience; and we know, from the history of language, that there is a special

way of indicating it. And now we may remind ourselves that it is only the Moods under notice, only in those equivocal sentences which involve an uncertainty, and recognise in its expression, that we have anything of the same kind—anything that has its foundation in the intention, hope, fear, wish, or curiosity of the speaker who utters them. The nearest approach to it is in the Future; and it is with the Future and the Consuetudinal Present that the Con-junctive is most closely allied.

In the Conditional Con-junctive we have this influence of uncertainty in its typical form, and the conjunction *governs* the Verb; *i.e.* determines a change in its form. In this change it has the difference of *Mood*.

In the use of words like ‘*that*,’ words implying an intention, it is not so much a case of *Government* as one of *Con-cord*. In the Greek it is one of Tense and Mood; in the Latin it is one of Tense and Tense. In Stockfleth’s Lap Grammar it seems to be the same. At least, he writes—

1. *Modus Indicativus* (experience).
2. *Modus Con-junctivus* (feeling).

This falls into two divisions :

- (a) *Modus Sub-junctivus* (*præsens con-junctivus*).
- (b) *Modus Optativus* (*præteritum con-junctivum*).

3. *Modus Imperativus* (will).

Here, as in Latin, the Optative is the Past Tense of the Con-junctive.

§ 311. In the Imperative no second clause is needed. Yet it is implied. The command may be obeyed or disobeyed. The same secondary sentence, in the form of an answer, is implicit in the delivery of a Question. In the simple Optative there may or may not be a second verb, the difference between a simple *wish* and an intention being the fact that, in the latter, something is done with a view to a result. But in all, the secondary element is a question of ‘*Yes*’ or ‘*No*,’ or the

equivocal ‘*Perhaps*,’ in which the original uncertainty presents itself.

§ 312. The faint and negative nature of the inflection of the Optative *Mood*, as we find it in Greek, is by no means characteristic of the *Tenses* by which it is replaced in Latin.

In—

<i>am-arem</i>	<i>am-ares</i>	<i>am-aret</i>
<i>am-aremus</i>	<i>am-aretis</i>	<i>am-arent</i>
<i>am-arissem</i>	<i>am-arisses</i>	<i>am-arisset</i>
<i>am-arissemus</i>	<i>am-arissetis</i>	<i>am-arissent</i>
<i>am-avero</i>	<i>am-averis</i>	<i>am-averit</i>
<i>am-averimus</i>	<i>am-averitis</i>	<i>am-averint</i>

we have an inflection of a more than ordinary character; *i.e.* one wherein the additaments are of more than the average length.

§ 313. The structure of these forms is doubtful, inasmuch as it may be got by two processes.

*a.* One of these gives us the doctrinal fact that the will appended simply the same as those of *vell-em* and *noll-em*, &c., *volu-isse* and *nolu-isse*, &c., and that these are the same as those of the Verb Substantive, *si-m* and *ess-em*, the question as to which is oldest being beyond the range of our criticism.

*b.* The other would make them the tenses of the Verb Substantive, bodily attached to the tense-signs of the ordinary Verb, in which case the system of expression must be held to have originated in the Verb Substantive. Against this lies the difficulty of seeing how such a combination of tense-signs as *voc-av-* or *scrip-s-*, and *-essem* or *ero (erim)*, can be made to give any sense; in other words, how they can be *parsed*. It cannot be done in any instance but *one*. But with one it can be done, *viz.* with *pos-sum*. If the *pos-* stands for *potus* or *pote sum*, we can parse the compound throughout, allowing only for the difference between an Adverb and Adjective. By identifying the *pos-* with the *-pos* in *com-pos* we can parse it without any abatement whatever.

If so, the process of formation which is here intelligible may have become extended to combinations which are not so; and how far this extension of a false analogy (*catachrestic*) may affect a language we know from the existence of such combinations as ‘*I have been,*’ and other less extreme instances of the same kind. But *pos-sum* is only one word, and a single word is a very insignificant precedent for a system of catachresis to be established on. This is true. But, when we consider that the ‘*pos-*’ represents the auxiliary ‘*can,*’ with its special *Potential* import, and that the ‘*-sum*’ is the Verb Substantive—a verb more in use than any hundred words put together—this latter view becomes less improbable than it is at first sight. It is not one, however, that is pressed upon the reader very decidedly. In any case, however, the Latin equivalents to the Greek Optative *Mood* are *Tenses*; and that, not only because they are classed as such in the Latin Grammar, but on the internal evidence of their structure.

§ 314. In §§ 176–179, attention was drawn to the difference between Inflection by *Addition* and Inflection by *Differentiation*. It is in ‘*Gender*’ and ‘*Mood*’ that the latter principle most especially displays itself.

Both *Gender* and *Mood* have an inflection of a less definite, decided, and reducible character than that of *Person*, *Voice*, *Number*, *Case*, and *Tense*.

§ 315. Both are more or less exceptional in language, and disappear early.

It is now added, that in the case of *Mood* the signs seem to be more closely connected with the system of *Tone*, *Accent*, and similar forms of *emphasization*, in which there is a change of *existing* elements, rather than the introduction of *new* ones, than with the system of the other recognised Inflections, which, by hypothesis, are either actually or possibly reducible to words originally separate and independent.

§ 316. *Non-Indicative* was the general but negative term

which best seemed applicable to the Imperative, Conjunctive, and Optative denominations; and, upon the same principle, it is convenient to call the Infinitives *Non-finite*. As such, they must be considered as *Verbs*, inasmuch as the Finite forms are treated as Verbs, so that the term *Non-finite* invests the words to which it applies with a Verbal element.

§ 317. In import, however, the Infinitives are *Nouns*; nouns giving the name of either a state or an action. They are nouns, then, but *not* substantives. But neither are the Abstract Nouns substantival in sense, whatever they may be in their declension. At any rate, they are not *substantial*. The Abstracts, however, are substantival in their declensions, which the Infinitives are not. But neither are they Verbal in this respect. Between the two, the Non-Finite Verbs are a class *per se*; but a class on the borderland between Noun and Verb. That, so far as Voice and Tense, they have an undoubted and actual inflection, which is best seen in the Greek forms like *τετυφέναι*, *τύψεσθαι*, and the like, is evident. In Greek, too, they can be invested with an approximation to *Case*; *i.e.*, by considering that in combinations like *τὸ φθορεῖν* and *τοῦ φθόρειν*, the infinitive is, virtually, in the same case as its article. And what we can say about such combinations as *τὸ φθορεῖν* and *τοῦ φθορεῖν*, can be said about *τὰ φθορεῖν* and *τῶν φθορεῖν*, in case we find them. But such combinations are either rare or non-existent. Nevertheless, they are as actual in Thought as words like *invidia* and *invidiarum*. *These*, however, are rare; but this is simply because they are *Abstract Nouns*, not because they are *Non-Nominal*. In respect to Gender, we can only say that, if in '*invidia*' we can think of *envy* as Feminine, we could do the same with *ἡ φθορεῖν*, if it chanced to exist. The Greek Article is *Neuter*; but this does not preclude both Masculine and Feminine Infinitives. Without over-refining, we may say of the *τὸ*, in combination with the Greek infinitive, that its function is less to express Gender than to *signify* the

Nominal (as opposed to the Verbal) character of the name with which it is connected.

§ 318. There is no class of inflections in which the difference between the Greek and the Latin is more conspicuous than it is in the case of the *Non-finite* Verbs (or Verbals); for, in the Latin, their Nominal character is conspicuously prominent. Of these, the most remarkable character (and that all through the class) is that in the Gerund, the Supine, and even in the proper Infinitive Mood, there is an intermixture (we can scarcely call it a confusion) between the Voices. The nature of this, in Thought, is fairly indicated by such combinations in our language as, '*you are to blame,*' where the form is Active, the import Passive=*'you are to be blamed.'* Here '*to blame*'=*'ad culpandum,*' rather than either '*culpate*' or '*culpari!*' In the *Gerunds* the same inflection is sometimes Active, sometimes Passive, in sense. Again, the Supine in *-um* is Active; the *Supine* in *-u* is Passive. In—

*Spectatum* veniunt, veniunt spectentur ut ipsæ,

the second clause might be expressed by *spectatu*. This is the declension of a noun like *gradus*. In English, '*they come for a spectacle*' or '*sight,*' may mean either come '*to see a sight,*' or '*to be seen as a sight.*' In the Fin, the *Factive* case applies to the second of these senses; and '*sight*' means '*a thing to be seen,*' or '*as a sight.*' In '*you are to blame,*' we have the Analytic equivalent to a Dative case with both meanings, or either. Here we have *Case* taking the import of *Voice*. But in Thought, it is neither Case nor Voice so much as it is *Mood*, which gives us the division, to which the forms must be referred. In Thought, the relation of the object, action, or state is akin to the relation between the words '*if he succeed,*' and '*he succeeds,*' or '*he will succeed;*' *i.e.* it is determined by the view which the speaker takes of the object, rather than the view suggested by the conditions of Time, of Place, of Number, or of any

other *external* circumstance. On the other hand, it is by *external* circumstances, that every one of the conceptions connected with Person, Voice, Number, Case, and Tense are suggested; and the farther we proceed in our classification the more important will this difference, or contrast, be seen to be.

§ 319. Returning to the consideration of the Latin Infinitives, I have no hesitation in stating that as '*spectatum*' and '*spectatu*' are to one another, so are '*amare*' and '*amari*'; the Declension of the two Supines being that of *gradus*, the Declension of the two Infinitives being that of '*mare*.' If so, we have a second process for the formation of the Passive Voice; *i.e.* the Voice which, in its elements, structure, and origin, is other than Middle, Reflective, or Reciprocal; for from this it must be distinguished. On the first view this looks as if there were another principle for the formation of a Passive Voice; or one over and above that which gives us such forms as *ἐτίφθην*, &c. But so exceptional a fact as absolute Tautology is one which we must be slow to receive without scrutiny. It is more than probable that, in the strict sense of the term, the Latin may be said to have no pure infinitive at all, but only an approximative one; one such as *running* as opposed to *run*, or (closer still, for the Latin has no Article), as *τὸ φθορεῖν* is opposed to *φθόρειν*. This difference may be imperceptible in practice; but in our method of investigation it must be recognised. We must be slow to acknowledge any second sign for *exactly* the same conception; though the converse, or the extension of one sign to two allied conceptions is one of the commonest phenomena in Language.

§ 320. Upon this view the Roumanian throws some light. In the Roumanian, even in the *Active* Voice (for the *Passive* is formed analytically), the simple Infinitive is founded, *not* on the forms in *-are*, *-ēre*, *-ēre*, and *-ire*, though they are ready at hand, but from the Gerund in *-dum*, preceded by *ad*; as *ad laudandum*. Yet not to the exclusion

of the old familiar forms in *-re*. The functions of these, however, is to express the Abstract Verbal; and the two are used concurrently. The following examples are from a German grammar of the Roumanian; and, as the German uses the Article in the same way as the Greek, they give us the exact parallels to τὸ φθονεῖν, &c.

(1)

## THE TRUE INFINITIVE.

A lyudá = *loben*, or *zu loben*.A tyaçé = *schweigen*, or *zu schweigen*.A vinde = *verkaufen*, or *zu verkaufen*.A auzi = *hören*, or *zu hören*.

(2)

## THE VERBAL ABSTRACT.

Lyudare = *das loben*.Tyacere = *das schweigen*.Vindere = *das verkaufen*.Auzire = *das hören*.

§ 321. We may now revert to the approximate correspondence between the Commands and Questions of the logician, and the *Non-indicative* Moods of the grammarian, premising that, in both classifications, we have an element of uncertainty; an element which implies, in different degrees of directness or indirectness, a *Negative* of some kind—actual, probable, or possible. For what is the whole relation of *Affirmative* and *Negative* but *Modal*? And, as everything either ‘*is*’ or ‘*is not*,’ we have in the Dual division of the different aspects under which an action or state can present itself, the exhaustive alternative between ‘*Yes*’ and ‘*No*,’ the *Summum Genus* in the way of logical predication. They are both equally positive; and both, as such, *Indicative*. We know, too, that the *Negative*, in *Logic*, may be made *Affirmative* by a mere manipulation of the Copula—as ‘*this is-not black*,’ or ‘*this is not-black*.’ In *Logic*, we measure



the amount of Affirmation or Negation by Quantity in respect to the proportion which the members of a class are, or are not, in correspondence with the Predication—*one, more than one (some), and all*. In Grammar we measure the relation of one proposition to another by the actuality, the probability, or the possibility of its *being* what is ordered, required, wished, hoped, or intended to be. In Grammar we consider what a certain object of thought is as real or unreal. In Logic we ask how many objects of thought constituting a class have such or such an attribute in common with the rest. But in both the question of Negative or Affirmative is involved.

§ 322. In the logical formula  $All A=B$ , the correspondence between the Subject and the Predicate, for the intents and purposes of the argument, is amply adequate and complete. So it is in  $No A=B$ . But in  $Some A=B$ , which implies that *Some A is not B*, we have the Negation and Affirmation mixed and indeterminate. In Logic there are two distinct and definite Copulas. But in Language, except in the case of the Verb Substantive, there is only one *expressed* Copula, *i.e.* one *with a sign*. This is because the connection between two Verbs is always and naturally Affirmative unless it be specially shown that it is not. Its place in the Collocation of the words of a Proposition shows the connection; which, until it is shown by a special sign to be otherwise, is always *con-junctive*. In combinations like *fire burn-s* the *-s*, which stands for a repetition of the idea conveyed by *fire*, the fact of the two words belonging to the proposition being connected is beyond doubt. On the other hand, in *fires burn* there is no such sign at all.

§ 323. Is there, then, since Negation is, in Thought, so thoroughly *Modal*, no such thing as a Negative *Mood* in Language? That there are Moods in which a Negation is, more or less directly, involved we have seen. But a Mood for the absolute Negative is a different thing. There is something like one. But it is only imperfectly *inflectional*.

It is only inflectional in the way the Greek Aorist Passive, or the Norse Reflectives (Middle, Passive, Reciprocal, or Deponent as the case may be) are inflectional—inflectional so far as it is compound, reducible, and made up of elements, separable and intelligible. Words like  $\acute{\epsilon}\text{-}\tau\acute{\iota}\phi\theta\text{-}\eta\nu$  are as truly combinations of the Passive Participle and the Auxiliary Verb as are words like *I was beaten*; and *Jeg calles* is equally identical with *I call (my) self*. This is, we may say, just what all inflections are; *i.e.* by hypothesis, reducible to separate words. But, in these, the two elements are distinguishable. Now, in this way, we certainly have Negative Moods. So far as the coalition of two words into one goes, such combinations as *won't* and *can't*, *winna* and *canna*, are just as much one word as *am* and *amat*. Yet they are scarcely inflections in the ordinary sense of the term. In the older English we have words like *nam*, and *nis*=*not am* (*am not*) and *not is* (*is not*); and that with the negative element *cither* as a prefix or an affix. In Roumanian we have:

1. Eu n'am, or nu am = *I have not*.
2. Tu n'ai, or nu ai = *Thou hast not*.
3. El nare, or nu are = *He has not*.

In the Fin Family the Negative inflection is common. In Lap it is classed with the Substantive Verb as *Auxiliary*—not, of course, as an *Auxiliary Verb*, but as a recognised member of the class to which the Auxiliaries are considered to belong. Of this the Negative forms are the most conspicuous; and form three-fourths of the whole class. The other is the verb *let*=*to be*, or *have*, *i.e.* 'have' in its sense as an *Auxiliary*.

## PRESENT INDICATIVE.

	1	2	3	
<i>Singular</i>	Im	ik	i	}
<i>Dual</i>	Æm	æppe	æva	
<i>Plural</i>	Æp	æppet	ei	
				<i>lek.</i>

§ 324. For *lek* substitute *lem*, in the Preterite Indicative; *læzá* in the Conjunctive Present, and *liféi* in the Conjunctive Preterite, or Optative. The combination here is with the Pronoun rather than the Verb; and so it is in—

	1	2	3	
<i>Singular</i>	Amam	amad	amas	= <i>that not I, thou, he, she, or it</i>
<i>Dual</i>	Amame	amade	amasga	= <i>that not we two</i>
<i>Plural</i>	Amamek	amadek	amasek	= <i>that not we &amp;c.</i>

In the Imperative the inflection, of which the import is Vetative, is—

	1	2	3
<i>Singular</i>	—	ale	ellus
<i>Dual</i>	allo	allo	ellusga
<i>Plural</i>	allop	allet	ellusek

In Gaelic we have—

#### PRETERITE TENSE.

##### *Negative.*

- |                 |                |
|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. Ni raibh me. | Ni raibh sinn. |
| 2. Ni raibh tu. | Ni raibh sibh. |
| 3. Ni raibh se. | Ni raibh siad. |

##### *Interrogative.*

- |              |             |
|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Raibh me? | Raibh sinn? |
| 2. Raibh tu? | Raibh sibh? |
| 3. Raibh se? | Raibh siad? |

This means *Am, verily, I not?* &c. and *Am, verily, I?* &c. There are two words, but only one syllable; so that, so far as the incorporation of two words into one goes, it is inflectional. But it is, also, a reducible compound; inasmuch as the *bh-* is the Substantive Verb, and *rai* the Adverb *ro=very (verily)*. It serves not so much to convey either an Affirmation or a Negation; for it belongs to both. It merely strengthens or emphasises each.

§ 325. In *Questions* we have the same mixture of Affirmation and Negative—so long, at least, as they are

Categorical, *i.e.* answered by *Yes* or *No*. Even when they are not so, as in '*What is this?*' there is an element of uncertainty, and the collocation is peculiar. The places of the Subject and Predicate are reversed; inasmuch as *This* is the Subject. It implies—'*something concerning which I want information.*' Such is the nature of the Question, whether Categorical or not; and between the two the whole class is exhaustively divided. In combinations like '*It is not so. Is it?*' '*This is not so. Is it?*' to which the answer is categorical, we get in words like *anne* and *nonne*, the Negative and the Affirmative combined. Here the answer is anticipated in the expectation of the speaker; and the combination of the two signs is the result.

§ 326. In the Gaelic Negative and Interrogative we had in the prefix *ro-* (*rai*) a strengthening or emphasising of the form in which the Question was put—*Is it verily so? Is it verily not so?* This emphasising process is common, especially in Negations. Both *Yes* and *No*, as compared with *Yea* and *Ne*, are compounds. The affix indicates not so much either the Affirmation or the Negation as the extent, or reality, of it. *Aye*, or *No, certainly, verily*. In French this is conspicuous; *e.g. ne—pas, ne—rien*, with the Verb between. We may call this, if we choose, *Tmesis*. But the name is less important than some of its results. Let the *ne* be omitted, and we get such negations as *pas de paroles, rien de tout, point d'argent*; where the only sign of negation is a word of a very positive sort—in Latin *passus, res, punctum*. Let words of this kind be further abbreviated, then coalesce with their verb so closely that the two shall be represented by a single syllable, and finally, let them, as single separate words, either change their meaning or form, or else drop out of the language. The result is a pre-eminently irreducible inflection; and of inflections of this kind there is a large per-centage—a very large one, but not one that should discourage us in our attempts to reduce it to a *minimum*.

§ 327. But beyond the range of even Negation, Affirmation, and the uncertainty between the two, this mental, internal, or subjective view is found in what are called the *Figures of Speech*; in all of which there is some deviation from the strictly normal rules of construction and parsing. What is an expression like ‘*Rundle and Bridges*,’ ‘*St. Paul’s*,’ ‘*Ubi ad Dianæ veneris*’ &c.? What are those like ‘*The more serene spirit*,’ ‘*The most straightest sect*,’ and others? What those like ‘*The cities who aspired to liberty*’? What are such anomalies as ‘*χρῶμαι βιβλίους οἷς ἔχω*,’ ‘*Whom say they I am?*’ These are familiar examples, the result of well-known processes, or, at least, of processes that are recognised under the well-known names—*Ellipsis*, *Pleonasm*, *Personification*, *Attraction*, *πρὸς τὸ σημαϊνόμενον*, and others of less importance. All these express conception, and indicate differences widely foreign to the character of the differences expressed by Person, Voice, Case, and Tense; for in these last the accidents of the conceptions belong to the *external* world, and not to the world of Mind. In this respect even *Gender*—*i.e.* conventional as opposed to natural Sex—is in the same great dichotomous class of Mood and its numerous congeners. Finally, we may note the connection between the Conjunctive Mood and the Relative; the consideration of the place that Mood takes in Language being a more complex question, and one involving a general classification of the other denominations—*viz.* Person, Voice, Number, Case, and Tense.

(10.) RETROSPECT.

§ 328. The order in which the different denominations of Person, Voice, Number, Case, and Tense, along with Gender and Mood have been examined, will now be repeated in a general and retrospective view of these relations in the way of classification.

PERSON.

§ 329. In every *Finite Verb* there are *two* names; either separate, or combined into a single word; as, *I love*, *am-o*.

The result is a statement, Negative or Affirmative, as the case may be. This means that in the *Finite* Verb we have a Verb and something more. It is a Verb *plus* its Noun; and when we have this we have not so much a single word as a sentence.

#### VOICE.

§ 330. In Voice, as in Person, we have more words than one. But though there are two names, there is but one individual to which they apply; inasmuch as the Agent and the Object are identical—*I strike me (myself)*. Here the second pronoun by no means constitutes the whole Predicate. It is only a part of it. This is what we find in the Middle Voice; as considered only in respect to its structure. In import it, having been purely Reflective, becomes Passive, Reciprocal, Deponent, and, occasionally, Active. Still the structural characteristic is the incorporation of the Personal Pronoun as the name of the Subject, and the Reflective Pronoun as that of the Object, with a Transitive Verb. The elements then of the Middle Voice are *three* in number; so that combinations like *amatur* and *τύπτεται* are even more compound, or composite, than words like *amat* and *τύπτει*.

§ 331. The structure of the true Passive is, also, one that gives us two words rather than one, the second element being the Verb Substantive—as *ἐ-τύφθ-ην*. The *-ην* here is Finite; and it is from this that the sign of Person is derived.

#### NUMBER.

§ 332. Whatever may be the minor differences between *Person* and *Voice*, as denominations, they belong to the same Class, Order, Section, or whatever we choose to call it.

§ 333. So far as Verbs are Personal, or Finite, they are, in respect to Number, in the same class as their Pronoun; so that words like *amamus*, &c., give us *two* words. The *Non-finite* portion of it, or the Infinitive element—except in a few possible exceptions—has no

signs of Number. Yet in every Finite Verb there are two elements: (1) the Number of Agents, or Subjects; and (2) the Number of the Actions, or States. Of these, as a rule, the Finite Verb gives us the first only. It tells us that more captains than one fought against Thebes, but it does not tell us how often each captain fought against either Thebes or any other place or person. Logic, in questions of Language, is a good servant but a bad master; and some of its obsolete terms are useful. Of the *Quotity*, then, of the agents, it tells us in the Plural Number that they were more than one. Of the *Quotity* of their fightings it tells us nothing. It could not well do so; though in forms like *voc-it-amus*, *φλέγομεν*, and (possibly *γεγράφαμεν*), it gives us something like it. Again; the Infinitive, or *Non-Finite*, Verb has no signs of Plurality. But it might have them, as has been indicated elsewhere. It is not difficult to see our way to this. It is not in the nature of language to express too much in a single word and at once. The recognised Plural, then, of the Verb is the Plural of the *Person*; that is, the Plural of a term which is other than Verbal. The Plural of Infinitives exists in reality, and if need be could be expressed by a special sign. But the Verbal Abstract, in such words as '*erring*,' or '*error*,' is sufficiently akin to the Infinitive in Thought to make a Plural for the Infinitive superfluous.

§ 334. Having thus put the Plural of the Finite Verb in its proper place, and having accounted for its absence in the Infinitive, we get the question of Number in its proper form. This means the Number of Agents, irrespective of their States or Actions; but not the number of States or Actions, irrespective of the Agent, or the object in such or such a state. In this we get but *one* name, or term; *i.e.* a single word rather than either a sentence or a proposition. It is this exclusion of any second noun which separates Number, as a denomination, from Person and Voice. We need not be very careful to measure the exact difference between the

groups, or to ask whether it be one of Class or Order. It is certainly not one of Section or Subsection. It is one of a broader—a much broader—description. But just as it is removed from Person and Voice, it approaches Case and Tense. We have now done with the Inflections that convey, in a single word, both a Subject and a Predicate, or those which give us sentences rather than single words.

Between the ideas of *Repetition*, expressed by Reduplication; of *Collectiveness*, or Number with Totality; and *Plurality*, or the conception of more than one irrespective of the extent to which they constitute a whole, we see our way clearly to the development of the signs of Number.

#### CASE AND TENSE.

§ 335. *Case* and *Tense* are more closely connected with one another than either of them is with Number. Nevertheless, as opposed to Person and Voice, they are allied. Person and Voice belong to the division in which there is *either* a Subject or a Predicate, or both. The undoubted Noun has Case, but not Tense. The *Finite* Verb has Tense, but not Case. The *Infinitive* Verb has both Tense and Voice. But its Cases, as has been shown in § 166, are of an equivocal, indirect, or constructive, character.

In respect to their connection and relation with one another, Case and Tense are *analogous*. What Case refers to in Place, Tense refers to in Time; though, with Time, Tense is more exclusively connected than Case is with Place. As inflections, Case and Tense are the most important and typical of the class; and in the way of criticism there is more to be said about them than all the others put together.

§ 336. Number, though different in many respects from Case and Tense, has been shown to be more akin to them than it is to Person and Voice. We cannot exactly measure the value of the classificational divisions thus suggested. We need only insist on the wideness of the difference involved in



the primary Classes, Orders, or whatever we choose to call them. Between combinations which, in a single word, give us *both* a Subject and a Predicate, and those that, in a single word, give us but *one* of the two, the distinction is a very broad one. It is now submitted that just as these two higher classes stand apart from one another, so do Gender and Mood, subordinate members of a third Class or Order, stand apart from both.

§ 337. It is, also, submitted that, so far as the changes of form in individual words are concerned, these three classes exhaust the different ways in which Inflection presents itself; whether its character be determined by the structure of a word or by its import; out of the elements by which it is made up, or through the idea upon which it is founded. If so, all the forms that belong to neither of the preceding classes belong to this. And such seems to be the case; the links by which they are connected being the internal, mental, or subjective character of the conception that determines the expression. In the other division, *i.e.* in those where it is founded upon the name of the Agent or the Object in a state or action, this is often an individual of the most material sort, while, even when it is abstract, it is founded on something pre-eminently cognisable by the senses. In Number, names of this kind are implied, and the only question is as to the nature of them. In Case and Tense we have, in each, the notion of direction, and that in its three most general forms: *to, from, at; hither, hence, here; thither, thence, there; this, that, yon*, and the like; and in time, *now, then, hereafter; at the present time, in past time, in time to come*. These, especially the latter, which deal with the States or Actions and (as such) Abstractions, though not material, or substantial, belong to, and originate in, the external world; and they are what they are because they do so. In Mood the question is not so much what the object of any conception actually is, but whether it is or is not; whether it exist at all, and, if it do, under what conditions.

## (11.) TENSE. THE GREEK AORIST.

§ 338. We may now notice one or two instances of a more special kind than those which have already presented themselves. These, as a rule, have been introduced for the sake of illustrating some general principle. The present criticism is submitted to the reader for a different reason. It applies to a particular Tense, and to a very important one; one, too, in a very important language. In the mind of the present writer, the current doctrine concerning it is founded on a misconception. Up to about 1830 this doctrine was generally admitted; mainly, or perhaps exclusively, because the reasons against it were unknown. Since that time they have been recognised; and, by no lower an authority than Bopp, have been authoritatively rejected. That the question to which the criticism applies is a wide one may be seen on the surface.

The special Tense in question is the Greek Aorist (*Aoristus primus*). What it is generally held to be is well known. What the present writer believes it to be is as follows. The doctrine he defends is laid down somewhat dogmatically; but this is because the question is easily presented under its different divisions, and because it is thus that the issue is most clearly stated. Hence, the true sign of the Perfect is the reduplication; with or without a change of vowel. The true signs of the Aorist are the augment and the affix *-κα*. The true sign of the Future is *-σ-*; and between the Future and the Aorist there is no connection; though *σ* is common to the two. The *-σ-* of the Aorist is the *-κ-* of words like *ἔθηκα* and *ἔλωκα* *assibilated*; in the first instance through the influence of the *small* vowel (*ἔγραψε*); from which it affects the other persons by *extension*. That *ἔθηκα* and *ἔλωκα* are Aorists which do not assume the characteristic of the Future is true; but it is by no means true that the *-σ-* in the other and ordinary Aorists is the *-σ-* of *τύψω* and *γράφω*. On the contrary, it is the *-σ-* of the

Aorist itself, developed out of the -κ- by Assibilation. The -σ- of the Future is, probably, the -σ- of the Aoristus Æolicus, *τυψεῖα*; but this is no true Aorist; the -σ- being the -σ- of the inchoative, or desiderative Verbs in -σειω; in which, signifying something desired, or something about to be begun, it involves a Future element.

§ 339. The -κ-, in forms like *κέκληκα*, *ἔε̄χορκα* and others is not the true, original, and normal sign of the Perfect; but the -κ- of the Aorist with the reduplication of the Perfect, and generally (but by no means always) its import. It has *extended* itself from the Aorist to the Perfect; and there is reason for its having done so.

§ 340. This must, in the first instance, be investigated with a view to the Verbs of which the fundamental form ends in a vowel—*i* or *υ* (not contracted), and *a*, *ε*, and *ο* (contracted). All these are in the same predicament. These have no consonant wherewith to close the syllable to which the sign of Person is affixed; and, as this sign is vocalic, two vowels would be brought into contact with one another. It is suggested that, in this, there is an element of instability, and that words like *τέ-τι-α* from *τίω*, would be likely to change their own termination for a stronger one. To a change of this kind the -κ- of the Aorist would readily lend itself.

§ 341. With the Contract verbs the same condition presents itself; with the exception, that the vowels *a*, *ε*, and *ο* have less of a radical character than the *ι* in *τίω*. They come, however, at the end of the word to which the personal affix is to be attached.

§ 342. With the Barytone Verbs ending in *λ*, *μ*, *ν*, or *ρ* (a liquid) the contact is, at the first view, identical with that of the -*a* in *τέ-τυφ-α*, *γέ-γραφ-α*, *πέ-πηγ-α*, and *πέ-ποιθ-α*. But this is not the case. Liquids, more especially *λ* and *ν*, have in most languages a tendency to take after them a semivowel; in which case they stand much in the same position as the true vowels. Except in these two divisions the rule that the sign of the Perfect (with or without a change of vowel) is

nearly absolute; the chief exceptions being the preterites of the comparatively few words which end in  $\tau$ ,  $\delta$ , or  $\theta$ , *i.e.* the dentals.

The *primum mobile* for this hypothesis lies in the Slavonic; which gives us two points of support.

1. In the Slavonic the sign of the Past Tense is  $h$  ( $k$ ), just as it is in  $\acute{\epsilon}\theta\eta\kappa\alpha$ , and  $\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omega\kappa\alpha$ . And this Bopp allows to be the  $\sigma$  in  $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\rho\alpha\psi\alpha$ . Omit the Augment and the sign of the First Person, and the two forms are identical; Greek,  $-\theta\eta\kappa-$  and  $-\delta\omega\kappa-$ ; Slavonic, *bih*=*fwi*, *tshitah*=*I read*. The Persons run thus:

(a) *I was, &c.*

1. bih	bismo
2. bi	biste
3. be	bisheh

(β) *I was, &c.*

1. biyah	biyasmō
2. biyashe	biyaste
3. biyashe	biyashu

(a) *I read, &c.*

1. tshitah	tshitasmō
2. tshita	tshitaste
3. tshita	tshitashe

(β) *I read, &c.*

1. tshitah	tshitasmō
2. tshitashe	tshitaste
3. tshitashe	tshitahu

It is submitted then that it is from the  $-h-$  ( $k$ ) that the  $-s-$  has been deduced; and that, in accordance with one of the most general rules of Philology; *viz.* that, when the palatals  $g$ ,  $k$ , change their sound, their tendency is to become sibilants. The change is one of the commonest in language, and it almost invariably takes the same direction. The Palatal becomes Sibilant; the Sibilant rarely, if ever, becomes Palatal. Indeed, the process is known as that of the *Assibilation of the Palatals*.

In this Assibilation, then, lies the hypothesis as to the origin of the  $-\sigma$ - of ἔγραψα ( $\pi\sigma$ ) $\alpha$  and the Aorists in general; and thus far it looks as if the authoritative sanction of Bopp recommends it. But such is not the case. He stops at the identification of the Greek  $-\sigma$ - with the Slavonic  $-k$ ; but with the belief that, of the two,  $-\sigma$ - is the older form. Yet no one knew better than Bopp how decidedly the change between the Gutturals and the Palatals ran exclusively in one way; and how thoroughly his explanation was exceptional. He seems, however, to have ignored the objection. Few, too, know better than the same illustrious scholar the difference between the antiquity of the structure of language and the antiquity of its early records. But this he seems also to have ignored, or at least to have made the Sanskrit an exception. Be this as it may, he certainly takes no notice of the change from  $k$  to  $s$  under the influence of the small vowel that succeeded.

If this view be considered correct, it explains something more than the mere structure of the Aorist; for it enables us to account for something that is, otherwise, almost unaccountable, viz. the suggested affinities between the Aorist and the Future. The  $-\sigma$ - is the characteristic of each; and, the artificial rule which deduces the Aorist from the Future ‘mutando  $\omega$  in  $\alpha$  et præponendum augmentum,’ is so convenient that it almost looks natural. But Tense for Tense, the Aorist and the Future, except on the assumption that ‘*Extremes meet*,’ are antipodes to one another; one a Tense of Past, the other of Future time. The true history of the Aorist gets rid of this anomaly. Whether the  $-\sigma$ - of the Future be the  $-\sigma$ - of the Desiderative Verbs and the Aoristus Æolicus, is a question that must be investigated on its own merits. At any rate, however, the investigation is simplified by the riddance of the Aorist connection.

#### (12.) THE POSTPOSITIVE ARTICLE.

§ 343. The Postpositive Article means the Article that not only follows its noun, but is absolutely incorporated with

it; so that the two words become one, and the Article takes the form of an inflection. In some cases this second element in the declension of nouns (for it is by no means uncommon) may be overlooked; but in three languages, at least, of Europe they are conspicuous.

§ 344. *Roumanian—Latin Family.*—The *Roumanian* of Wallachia and Moldavia, or the ancient Dacia, is a derivative from the Latin. In the Latin there was no Article. In its later stages the Pronoun of the Third Person became its substitute; *i.e.*; *il* in Italian, *el* in Spanish, *le* in French. In Roumanian it is as follows:—

LATIN, *homo ille*; ROUMANIAN, *óm-ul*.

<i>Nominative</i>	óm-ul	oameni-i
<i>Genitive</i>	óm-ului	oameni-lor
<i>Dative</i>	óma-ului	oameni-lor
<i>Accusative</i>	óm-ul	oameni-i
<i>Vocative</i>	óm-ul	oameni-lor
<i>Ablative</i>	óm-ul	oameni-i

LATIN, *parens ille*; ROUMANIAN, *perinte-le*.

<i>Nominative</i>	perinte-le	perinzi-i
<i>Genitive</i>	perinte-lui	perinzi-lor
<i>Dative</i>	perinte-lui	perinzi-lor
<i>Accusative</i>	perinte-le	perinzi-i
<i>Vocative</i>	perinte	perinzi-lor
<i>Ablative</i>	perinte-le	perinzi-i

LATIN, *casa illa*; ROUMANIAN, *kas-a*.

<i>Nominative</i>	kas-a	kase-le
<i>Genitive</i>	kas-ei	kase-lor
<i>Dative</i>	kas-ei	kase-lor
<i>Accusative</i>	kas-a	kase-le
<i>Vocative</i>	kas-e	kase-lor
<i>Ablative</i>	kas-a	kase-le

LATIN, *mulier illa*; ROUMANIAN, *muer-ea*.

<i>Nominative</i>	muere-a	muer-ile
<i>Genitive</i>	muere-i	muer-ilor
<i>Dative</i>	muere-i	muer-ilor
<i>Accusative</i>	muer-a	muer-ile
<i>Vocative</i>	muer-a	muer-ilor (?)
<i>Ablative</i>	muere-a	muer-ile (?)

LATIN, *sacerdos (papa) ille*; ROUMANIAN, *pop-a*.

<i>Nominative</i>	pop-a	popi-i
<i>Genitive</i>	pop-i	popi-lor
<i>Dative</i>	pop-i	popi-lor
<i>Accusative</i>	pop-a	popi-i
<i>Vocative</i>	pop-a	popi-lor
<i>Ablative</i>	pop-a	popi

§ 345. *Lithuanic Family*.—Here the Demonstrative Pronoun is *jis*=Latin *is (ea, id)*.

	<i>Masculine.</i>	<i>Feminine.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	jis	jì
<i>Accusative</i>	jì	ję
<i>Locative</i>	jamè	jei
<i>Dative</i>	jam	jojè
<i>Instrumental</i>	jûme	ję
<i>Genitive</i>	jo	jós

In combination with the Adjective it runs thus—

	<i>Masculine.</i>	<i>Feminine.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	geràsis	geróji
<i>Accusative</i>	gerājì	geraje
<i>Locative</i>	geramjame	geroroje
<i>Dative</i>	geramjām	gérαιjee
<i>Instrumental</i>	gerāju	geraje
<i>Genitive</i>	gerojò	gerósés

And so on through the Dual and Plural.

§ 346. In the late Slavonic there is no Article *eo nomine*. But there is a Demonstrative Pronoun—*Vruć*=*warm*.

## INDEFINITE.

	<i>Masculine.</i>	<i>Feminine.</i>	<i>Neuter.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	vruć	vruća	vruće
<i>Genitive</i>	vruća	vruće	vruća
<i>Dative</i>	vrukū (-ćem, -mu)	vrućoi	vruću
<i>Accusative</i>	vruća (vruć)	vruću	vruće
<i>Locative</i>	o vruću (-ćem, -mu)	vrućoi	vruću
<i>Sociative</i>	vrućim (iyem)	vrućom	vrućim (iyem)

## DEFINITE.

	<i>Masculine.</i>	<i>Feminine.</i>	<i>Neuter.</i>
<i>Nominative</i>	vrućí	vruća	vruće
<i>Genitive</i>	vrućega	vruće	vrućege
<i>Dative</i>	vrućemu	vrućoi	vrućemu
<i>Accusative</i>	vrućega	vruću	vruće
<i>Locative</i>	o vrućemu	vrućoy	vrućemu
<i>Sociative</i>	vrućim	vrućom	vrućim

§ 347. *The Scandinavian, or Norse, Family.*—In the Danish *sol-en*=*the sun*, *bord-et*=*the table*; the first form being Masculine (or Feminine), the second Neuter; the Genitive Case is *sol-en-s*, *bord-et-s*, the Plural *sol-ene*, *bord-ene*. With a slight change of the vowel, the same is the case in the Swedish. In the Icelandic, however, we get with an older form a fuller inflection; and *en* becomes *hin*; *et*, *hitt*. In Danish there are only two Genders. But the older Icelandic had the ordinary three—*Masculine*, *Feminine*, and *Neuter*. All the signs of the Definitude, Number, Case, and Gender were, *totidem literis*, the Numbers, Cases, and Genders of the Demonstrative Pronoun *he*, *heo*, *hit*; save and except the omission of the Aspirate in the compound Article, along with a few minor points of euphonic accommodation.



## NEUTER.

<i>Nominative</i>		-it
<i>Accusative</i>		-it
<i>Dative</i>		-nu
<i>Ablative</i>		-ins

## MASCULINE.

<i>Nominative</i>	-inn	-ina
<i>Accusative</i>	-inn	-ina (-na)
<i>Dative</i>	-num	-inni (nni)
<i>Ablative</i>	-in	-innar(-nnar)

And so on in the Plural. The order of the Cases and Genders here given is Rask's; for Rask was the philologue who of all others strove to combine, so far as was practicable, the natural order, in the way of affinity, of the Cases and Genders, with the ordinary paradigms of the Grammars written for the purposes of teaching.

§ 348. To show how the extreme forms of Declension may meet, the newer Norse, as compared, or contrasted, with the old, supplies a curious example. For the purpose of practical teaching, a grammar-writer for the Danish might write thus:—'The Definite Article is the same as the Indefinite, except that its place is transposed. The Indefinite Article *precedes*, the Definite *follows*, its Noun.' For teaching purposes this rule is both short and true, and, as such, safe as a recipe for the formation of the two, one being known. But the correspondence is a pure accident, and, in the way of representing either the agreement or the difference between them, as wrong as wrong can be. It is good as a formula. The Masculine of the Demonstrative Pronoun is *han*, the Neuter *hit*=*he* and *it* (*h-it*). The Masculine of the Numeral *s* is *-en*, the Neuter *-ett*. Between the very definite *he*, *the*, and the very indefinite *one*=*some one*, *rus*, the difference, in *thought*, is a wide one. However, between the two *forms* the original distinction, small at first, becomes as language advances obliterated.

§ 349. So much for the incorporation of the Definite Article, and the extent to which it takes the guise of an Inflection. It is the languages of the *Synthetic-Analytical* stage which best exhibit it. The incorporation of the *Indefinite Article* is commoner in those of the *Agglutinate* class.

CINGALESE. *Balla* = dog.

<i>Nominative</i>	balla	ballek
<i>Genitive</i>	ballage	ballekuge
<i>Dative</i>	ballata	ballekuta
<i>Accusative</i>	balla	balleku
<i>Ablative</i>	ballagen	ballekugen

Here the 'ek' is the numeral *one* just as 'un' is in French ; and, as we expect *à priori*, it is not extended to the Plural number. This, however, is only because the sign of it is a Numeral. In Thought, there is no such limitation. A collection of objects can be just as indefinite as a single one, and, analytically, it has the word 'some' to express it. In Speech, however, it is chiefly in the Singular that its inflection occurs ; though in Coptic and some other languages we have such combinations as *ou-moui*=*lion*, *ha-moui*=*lions* ; where, by the way, the Article, or Numeral, is *pre-*positive. In French this would be *des lions*, *i.e.* a combination denoting *indefinite* plurality ; although, as an abbreviated form of *de les*, an Oblique Case, it takes, in Syntax, the place and import of a Nominative. This is because, 'as 'some' = 'more than one,' it is plural, and because it also = 'less than all,' it is partitive.

(13.) THE AUXILIARY VERBS. HAVE AND AM.

§ 350. The remarks upon what we may call the *non-*natural sense of the word *have* in such expressions as 'I have written a letter' (which has gone out of my possession), 'I have ridden a horse' (which is not mine), and the extreme

anomaly involved in such a phrase as '*I have been*' (when the notion of *possession* is wholly out of the question), which were made in the analysis of the parsing, and general character of such and suchlike substitutes for the Greek Perfect, were only made so far as they illustrated the identity of the word '*have*' in these cases with the ordinary verb denoting *possession*. They showed that the word *eigan* (= *own*) and *tengo* (*teneo*) were used in the same sense. But they connected the use of the word '*have*' itself somewhat too closely, or rather, too exclusively, with the special notion of *possession*. A more comprehensive term, or rather series of terms, might have been used. But they would have been unfamiliar ones. The better words would have been such coinages as *my-ness*, *thy-ness*, *his-ness*, *her-ness*, or *their-ness*; inasmuch as these would have given a wider and more general connection between the object on one side and the speaker, the person spoken to, and the object, or objects, spoken about on the other. Such coinages, however, are useful at times; for there are instances in which they actually suggest themselves in the expression. The single phrase, in Latin, *est mihi pater*=*habeo patrem*, tells us this. And what we find in Latin we find, also, in the Gaelic: *ta caraid agam*, *ta sgain agam*. This is, syllable for syllable, '*est amicus me + ad*,' '*est culter me + ad*'; and so on throughout the Possessive Pronouns. This use of the Substantive Verb with the Personal Pronoun is carried to a great length in Gaelic; at least, as compared with the extent to which it is carried in Latin; indeed, in Gaelic it seems to exclude the word '*have*' or its equivalent.

§ 351. In words like '*own*' and '*possess*,' then, it is possible that the term for '*my-ness*' and the like occurs only in its more special and definite sense, so that the more indefinite form represented by '*have*' may have been the older one, and an outgrowth from the circumlocution '*there is to me*,' or something like it.

This would be a somewhat unnecessary refinement, if it

were not for the fact of 'have' being so closely allied to 'am' in its history; and that, in respect to its prevalence as an Auxiliary Verb, in connection with, or rather in contrast to, the Verb Substantive. This latter is essentially Intransitive. The former is essentially Transitive; and this is the distinction involved in the difference between the Active and the Passive Voices; and it is also probable, considering the functions of the two verbs in the Analytic stage, that, as Auxiliaries, they nearly represent what is represented by the two Voices.

§ 352. At any rate, the Irish use of the Substantive Verb with the Possessive Pronoun is eminently conspicuous.

Mhaith liom go raibh me	= <i>I wish I were</i> &c.
Bfear liom go raib me	= <i>I wish I were</i> &c.
Is eigin daimh a bheit	= <i>I must be</i>
Is feidir liom a beit	= <i>I may be</i>
Ba choir damh a bheit	= <i>I should be</i>
Ni tig liom a bheit	= <i>I cannot be</i>
Caitfid me a bheit	= <i>I must be</i>
Is truach liom nhach raibh me	= <i>I am sorry I am not</i>

Here *mhait*=desire; *bfear*=advantage; *eigin*=necessity; *feidir*=possible; *coir*=right; *tigim*=I come (*tig*=impersonal); *caitfid*=constraint, obligation; *truach*=sorrow; *le*=with; *da*=to; *m* and *me*=me and I; *beit*=be; *go*=that; and *raib*, a compound of *ro* (=very or verily) and the Verb Substantive. Finally, *nhach* is a Negative.

§ 353. This is how the two ideas ('*est mihi*' and '*habeo*') are connected in Thought. How the two are intermixed in their history may be seen from the Roumanian.

FI = *be* (*esse*). FOST = *been*.

1. Sint = <i>sum</i>	sintem = <i>sumus</i>
2. Eshti = <i>es</i>	sintetsi = <i>eis</i>
3. Er = <i>est</i>	sint = <i>sunt</i>

AVE = (*habere*). AVUTO = *habitus*.

- |                       |                        |
|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Am = <i>habeo</i>  | avem = <i>habemus</i>  |
| 2. Ai = <i>habes</i>  | avets = <i>habesis</i> |
| 3. Are = <i>habet</i> | an = <i>habent</i>     |

*I have been* &c.

- |               |  |
|---------------|--|
| 1. Eu am fost | noi am fost (also <i>ash</i> )               |
| 2. Tu ai fost | voi atsi fost (also <i>au</i> and <i>a</i> ) |
| 3. El au fost | ei au fost                                   |

*Als* (eale).

- |                      |                     |
|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Am fi fost laudat | am fi fost laudat   |
| 2. Ai fi fost laudat | atsi fi fost laudat |
| 3. Av fi fost laudat | av fi fost laudat   |

The Infinitive here is that of '*fuo*'; of which the Passive Participle would be '*futus*,' but is, here, '*fost*.' '*Sint*,' the Latin '*sunt*' = '*sum*.' '*Eshte*' is a variant of the Plural '*estis*'; '*sint etsi*,' is '*sunt + estis*.' '*Am*' = '*habeo*,' is, as a word, as like to '*sum*' or  $\epsilon\iota\mu\text{-}i$  as it is to '*habeo*'; whilst '*are*' is much more like the Substantive '*er*' than any probable form of '*habet*.'

In '*Eu am fost*' we have '*I have been*'; but '*voi atsi fost*' is '*vos estis fut-i*' = '*ye are been*.' '*Am fi fost laudat*' = '*habeo* (possibly *sum*) *fore futus laudatus*'; while '*atsi fi fost laudat*' = '*estis fore futi laudati*.'

This certainly suggests that as auxiliars the two verbs are mixed up into one another. But, auxiliar for auxiliar, this is a mixture of the signs of two Voices; and the corollary from this is that, in Analytic combinations, the Verb Substantive (*am* &c.) may combine with an Active Participle, and the Verb Possessive (for such *habeo*, or its equivalents in other languages, may conveniently be called) with a Passive one.

§ 354. But what if the Auxiliary Verb thus combined be omitted, and the Participle alone stand for a Tense (in Past Time)? In such a case a combination like ' $(\epsilon\iota\mu\text{-}i)$   $\tau\epsilon\tau\upsilon\phi\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ ' = '*I am one who has beaten*,' may bear the import of  $(\epsilon\iota\mu\text{-}i)$   $\tau\epsilon\tau\upsilon\mu\mu\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\varsigma$ , and *vice versa*. Then let this Participle

have signs of Gender, and retain them after it has been used as a Finite Verb. The result is, a Finite *Tense* with *Gender*; and in the Slavonic languages, and in more than one of the Agglutinate stage, this is what we actually find, and recognise; *i.e.* a Verb with Gender. Such, at least, is what we find it in the Slavonic paradigms. But the interchange of the two Auxiliaries is all that we are now considering.

§ 355. The more general way of stating this is to say that when the Verb Substantive (*am* &c.) and the Verb Possessive (*habeo* &c.) become auxiliars, they, to a very considerable extent, lose the power they have as *Non*-auxiliars, or mere ordinary verbs, and become to some extent fused into a single or equivocal auxiliar with a variable import.

§ 356. We have seen, then, that in one language, at least, the Auxiliary Verb answering to 'have,' as it presents itself in the ordinary grammars, is made up out of *two* verbs. Is there anything unusual in this? Nothing. In the German Family it is made up out of *three*—*is, be, was*; the last, I believe, being peculiarly German. In Latin it is made up out of *two*—*sum* and *fui*. In Greek, each of these verbs has something like a complete Conjugation. But elsewhere it is defective in respect to one of them. What, however, is wanting in the one is made good by what presents itself in the other. This gives us a whole, on the principle of *Defect* and *Complement*. In the Greek we get an inkling, and something more, of the difference, in sense, too, between *εἶμι* and *φύω* (*φῦμι*); inasmuch as we translate the former by *be*, the latter by *become*. That the latter involves a Future sense we infer *à priori*, and we also know that in the German Family *be* had the sense of a Future. But in Futurity there is Contingency; and *be*, rather than *is*, in strict grammatical English, follows, or is supposed to follow, the Conditional Conjunction 'if.' What the import of *was*, as an independent Verb, may be is not so evident. It is only certain that three Verbs may pass for one in the Conjugation of the Auxiliary Verb Substantive. We know,

too, that 'is' is the one which is the most purely and especially auxiliar, because when we use it as an ordinary Verb, we identify it with 'exist.' This gives us *Existence* as a state and *Entities* as beings. Of these we think simply and solely as to whether they *are* or *are-not*. *What* they are, or may be, we do not consider at all. In this we have the *Summum Genus* of things thinkable. In '*Deus est*' the Verb has a double import. As an ordinary one, it implies the existence of *Deus*. As an Auxiliary it denies its *non-existence*.

§ 357. We now revert to the difference between the pure and proper Infinitive Mood and the Verbal Abstract, which is illustrated in § 320 from the double forms '*laudé*' and '*laudare*' of the Roumanian. Of these, that in *-re* is not so much the Infinitive Verb as the Abstract Noun. If this be true, and there be no second form, the Latin must be considered to have no true Infinitive at all; but, instead of one, the closely allied Verbal Abstract. There is nothing improbable in this; notwithstanding the universal and reasonable use of the term '*Infinitive Mood*' in all our Latin Grammars. A difference of the same kind is not only conspicuous in the Gaelic, but is recognised by the grammarians, who have long considered that, in origin, it is a Participle, though, for the purposes of ordinary grammar, an Infinitive. Here, then, the substitute for the Infinitive is not the Verbal Abstract, but the Participle.

## ACTIVE.

<i>Imperative</i>	bi = <i>be (thou)</i>
<i>Infinitive</i>	do (or a) bheith = <i>to be = at, or to being</i>
<i>Participle</i>	ag (or a) bheith = <i>being</i> iarm beith = <i>having been</i> ar ti bheith = <i>about to be</i>
<i>Imperative</i>	buail = <i>strike thou</i>
<i>Infinitive</i>	do (or a) buladdh = <i>to strike</i>
<i>Participle</i>	a buladh = <i>striking</i> iar mbualadh = <i>having struck</i> le (or ar) ti bualadh = <i>about to strike</i>

## PASSIVE.

<i>Infinitive</i>	a bheit buailte = <i>to be struck</i>
<i>Participle</i>	buailte = <i>struck</i>
	iar mbeith buailte = <i>having been struck</i>
	le na bualadh, or ar ti bualadh = <i>about to be struck</i>

Upon this series of examples Nielson writes thus :

Some writers on Irish Grammar deny the existence of an infinitive, and say that the place of it is supplied by a verbal noun ; but this is only quibbling about names ; the infinitive and participle imply the force of nouns in Irish, as in all other languages.

Again, in giving the paradigm of the recognised Participle, he writes :

These, and the like, may more properly be considered as participial phrases, composed of the infinitive and a preposition, than as simple participles.—*Irish Grammar, Notes 28, 29, p. 148, published 1808.*

§ 358. Between the Participle and the Verbal Noun, the least we get from the two is that the recognised Infinitive is more akin to either one or the other than it is to the normal Infinitives of the grammars.

This, perhaps, may be condemned as a refinement. But it is a necessary one. We must think twice before we assume, for *exactly* the same conception, two different signs. If we fail to do this, as is often the case, we are generally misled by the ambiguous use of the terms *Declension* and *Conjugation*. Twice, too, must we think before we assign to a single form two meanings. When we fail to do this, we are misled by such statements as ‘*The Present and Imperfect Middle are the same as the Present and Imperfect Passive.*’ What is really the fact in the first case is that two closely allied forms may, in a certain stage of the language, come to have but one sensible import ; and, in the second, that one form under the same conditions may come to have two allied senses. They may, and do, at some time or other, come to this. But



they do not originate in it; and, in the philology which treats of growth and development, the difference or identity of origin is of more importance than the difference or identity of either form or meaning at any subsequent period.

(14.) RETROSPECT. PERSON—VOICE—NUMBER—CASE AND  
TENSE—GENDER AND MOOD.

§ 359. PERSON.—This, in the main, means the Person of the Finite Verb; though it has been shown that the Noun as well as the Verb may have the sign of Person. In the first Person, especially in the Verbs in *-μ*, the *-m* of the Personal Pronoun is easily and has long been recognised. In the later forms, such as *am-o*=*I love* &c. its structure is, to say the least, obscure. But, to a certain extent, we see that the second element is a Personal Pronoun. How either this or the Verb with which it is connected came to be what they are, is another question. What we can see clearly is the structure of the combination. We may or not see this *à priori*; but between what we get from the presumptions and from what we get from the history of the compound we see our way to the nature of its elements. All this, however, is the analysis of a sentence, and not that of a single word.

§ 360. VOICE.—The *Reflective (Middle) Voice* is the combination of the name of the object with that of the Verb, sometimes with that of the Agent as a part of the compound, sometimes as a separate word—*am-o*, *I love*. We see our way also to this.

In the *Passive* we may do the same; the elements here being the Verb in its Passive form, either as a Participle or as the Passive Abstract, and the Verb Substantive.

In forms like *amare* and *amari* we get the same difference of sense by means of a difference of *Case*; but, as has been suggested, these formations may belong to the declension of

the Passive Verbal Abstract rather than to that pu.  
Infinitive Verb.

§ 361. NUMBER.—(1) *Of the Verb*.—This is that of the Person, or Pronoun ; not that of the Verb itself.

(2) *Of the Pronoun*.—This is peculiar ; viz. that of the *Exclusive* and *Inclusive* Personals ; and, until we know more about these, our speculations are unprofitable.

(3) *Of the Noun*.—Of the nature of this, in Thought, we have an inkling *à priori* ; at least, we can, *à priori*, get a presumption in favour of what it is likely to be ; in other words, we know where to look for it. We may, however, fail to do this ; for it does not suggest itself quite so readily as the signs of Person. The least, however, that can be said about it is that, when we get an example of what it actually *is*, we can understand the process that gives it to us. When we learn that, in the earlier stages of Language, we find it to consist in the reduplication of either the whole or a part of the word to which it belongs, we see that this is a natural—perhaps *the* natural—sign of *Plurality*. It is this, as an element in the sign of *Plurality* for the Noun, as truly as the *Personal* Pronoun is of *Personality* in the Finite Verb. Still, the evidence of its being this is less patent. In the Finite Verb we have the actual Pronoun attached to the main word ; so that there is no mistake as to what it means. It means the Speaker, the Person spoken to, or the Object spoken about. The Reduplication, however, even though it means this, does not express its meaning so definitely. It means what it does only so far as Plurality is a form of Repetition and Repetition a sign of Plurity. On the other hand, however, it has a remarkable prerogative. It is not an addition, or increment *ab extra*. It is a part of the word to which it is prefixed ; and, being this, it is permanent so long as it is recognised as a sign : and is wholly independent of any difference of language. It is just the same whatever the form of speech may be ; and in being this, is either wholly or almost wholly alone.

§ 362. For all this, however, it is only in the earlier stages of Language that it occurs. But this is not so much because the Reduplication was a sign that could be improved, but because there were other forms of Thought to which it was equally applicable. We get it in the less developed languages (not to mention other more indirect associations), as a sign of the Superlative Degree; in the Greek as the sign of an action that is Past continued, by a *Quasi*-repetition, up to the Present, viz. in the Greek Perfect as opposed to the Aorist. Again: we get it, in the Turkish, as a sign of what passes for Mood. The simple negative gives us a *Negative* form. Double it, and it represents an *Impossible*—something which has no very definite denomination.

§ 363. This is not exactly Plurity, nor is it exactly Plurality. Nevertheless, in all the cases, it is something that implies repetition. *Plurity*, then, in Nature is not necessarily *Plurality* in Grammar; for of Plurity, as of Repetition, there are many forms, and a sign that suits one, and which, so doing, is an adequate one when it stands alone, is something very different when it applies to more conceptions than one. And when it does this, it is likely to become obsolete. It *sign*-ifies too many ideas to be distinctive.

§ 364. By adding one, or more than one, to a unit we get Plurity; and the sum of the additaments is an Aggregate, or Collection. But this is, itself, a Unity. By resolving it, however, into its parts we get, by a reversal of the process of Thought, a Plurity. In the Welsh, not to mention other languages, we get certain Singular Numbers derived from the Plural; as if the Plural (Collective) was the fundamental or radical form. We can understand this when we look either at the stars or the inside of a peashell. We take cognisance of the Aggregate before we distinguish the Individual. It is not, then, too much to say that, for certain objects, the Plural form may not be older than, or as old as, the Singular. Here, then, there is a conflict; not, however, between the actual idea of '*one or more than one*,' but in regard to the aspect in which we see it.

§ 365. That out of the signs of Collectiveness, the later signs of Plurity have been developed, has already been suggested; but between the extent to which we see our way to the nature of the two inflections, there is a notable difference. The reduplicate form explains itself; and, also, contains, within itself, the elements of its structure. The sign of Collectiveness, like the signs of Case and Tense, which are now coming under notice, belongs to a different class.

§ 366. We can see, then, our way, partially, to the origin of the signs of Number; though not so clearly as we see our way to the structure of Person and Voice. But both Person and Voice are scarcely Inflections. They are certainly not the inflections of single words. They give us not so much a single word with an additament as a sentence with two terms. In Gender and Mood we may also neglect the inflective element; at least in the words where the differences are signified by Differentiation rather than by Addition. This is because they are not made out of any combination of separate words; so that there is nothing to which we can reduce them; and this reduction is one of the main objects of the present treatise. Such being the case, there is now no other outstanding division of the system of Declension and Conjugation but that of *Case* and *Tense*.

§ 367. CASE AND TENSE.—These we may take together, since they are analogous; *Case* being to Place what *Tense* is to Time. Tense, however, is more exclusively connected with Time than Case is with Place; a fact of no small importance, because it tells us that the analogy is only partial, and, what is more, it suggests the division of the class into, at least, a dichotomy; viz., (*a*) Cases based upon the conceptions of Space, and (*b*) Cases not so based.

§ 368. It is certain that several inflections are, reasonably, called Cases, in which the notion of either fixation or direction in Space is, to say the least, obscure and indirect. The *Nominative*, *Vocative*, and *Accusative* in the Synthetic, the *Factive*, *Comitative*, *Instrumental*, and *Caritive* in the

Agglutinate languages, are of this kind. Between such a Case as the *Caritive* and the *Dative* or *Ablative* we have, probably, the *maximum* amount of difference in the import of any two inflections which come under the same Class; and it is not too much to say that in neither Person nor Voice, in Number nor Tense, any difference of the same amount can be found. In other words, Inflections bearing the name of Cases may be found which are more widely separated from one another in import than they are from Inflections belonging to another class, denomination, category, or whatever we like to call the heads under which the Parts of Speech, and the elements of the system of Declension and Conjugation, are arranged. Nor should this surprise us. In Person, Voice, Number, and Tense, the amount of possible inflections is limited by the nature of the idea. In Gender there is a like limitation—Male, Female, and Neuter. In the older divisions of Animate and Inanimate, the range of difference was even less. Gender, no doubt, is a more difficult class to explain than Case; but this is not because it embraces more numerous and heterogeneous conceptions, but because it deals with and creates a fictitious, conventional, and *non-natural* distinction.

§ 369. *Mood*, on the other hand, agrees with Case. It mainly deals with the difference between the Positive and the Conditional; but when we find that this involves all the possible questions of Affirmation, Negation, and Doubt, its range of application becomes indefinite.

§ 370. It is not difficult to see what this leads to. *Case* and *Mood*, as categories, or something akin to them, are, as much as anything like a category can be said to be so, *Negative*, and, as such, indefinite in their extent. They take—in Case more especially—besides the expression of certain conceptions more characteristically their own, such others as, either expressed or capable of being expressed by inflection, are not included under the heads of Person, Voice, Number,

Tense, or Gender; and this is why they are only partially and imperfectly commensurate with them. Take away their accessory and extraneous details, and Case and Mood have their own proper series of conceptions which it is the function of the truly *Casual* and *Modal* signs to indicate. Limited to these they are like the Classes with which, both in the ordinary grammars and in the present work, they are associated; and, accordingly, Case, with its primary equivalents, 'to,' 'from,' and 'at,' agrees in the limitations of its import in thought, not only with Tense ('Past,' 'Present,' 'Future'), but with Person ('the Speaker,' 'the Object spoken to,' 'the Object spoken about'); with Number ('one,' 'more than one,' or in some cases 'two'); and with Gender ('Male,' 'Female,' 'neither Male nor Female' in Nature, or 'Masculine,' 'Feminine' and 'Neuter' in Grammar).

§ 371. *Voice*, when it is Reflective or Middle, is simply an extension of Person, of which it involves two signs—two signs applying to the same individual, who is, at once, the Agent and the Object of his own act. When *Passive*, it is made by the combination of either the Passive Participle, or the Passive Abstract Verbal *plus* the Substantive Verb. In neither instance, however, is it anything more than two separate words. But neither are the combinations which signify Person. There is a difference, however, between the two in the extent to which the compound character is perceptible, and the ease or difficulty with which the two compounds are reducible to their elements. But, whether we call such combinations 'Person' or 'Voice,' they constitute sentences or propositions rather than single terms.

§ 372. 'Cases,' however, in no instance give us more than a single term; neither do 'Numbers;' so that both in this respect differ from *Voice* and *Person*.

§ 373. But *Cases* are not all alike, and some are, so to say, more *Cas(e)-ual* than others. Those that keep their places in language the longest and are the last to be super-

seded by analytical combinations, being, presumptively, among the first to be developed, have a fair claim to this distinction. Such are the *Ablative* and the *Dative*, represented, analytically, by the prepositions 'to' and 'from.' In these we have, in space, both motion and direction. In the Slavonic *Locative*, and in the *Adessive* and *Inessive* cases of the Fin, we only get simple position (*in, at*) without any idea of movement or direction. Further modifications of this conception are the combinations formed by the prepositions *by, without* (or *external to*), and *within*, or the affixes by which they may be represented inflectionally.

§ 374. Thus far *Case* as a denomination is commensurable with *Tense* especially; and in some degree with *Person* and *Number*. There are certain conditions of Thought, and certain combinations of idea, with which they each, respectively, correspond; and for each there is a limited number of aspects. In Time and Space, as we have seen, in the triple but exhaustive classification of all the objects of a real or imaginary universe which gives us the Persons of the Verb, with *none, some, and all* in the way of Number, and even with the logician's triad of *Propositions Indicative, Commands, and Questions*, we find that, as a rule, there is something more than the mere additament of a movable sign to a Noun or Verb to make an inflection of any definite and peculiar class. It cannot be said that a denomination such as Case, under which we find a *Nominative, a Vocative, and an Accusative*, in the same division with an *Ablative, or a Dative*, is anything of the kind. It is rather a mixture of orders, or no order at all.

§ 375. It is now submitted that all the remaining Cases of our grammars, in which we have, over and above those which, like the *Locative, the Adessive, the Inessive, the Dative, and the Ablative* and, here and there, others having a similar connection with the conceptions of Place and Time, and which have no definite limitation in respect to the ideas

to which they apply, are considered Cases not so much because they are combinations of the same type as that of the Ablative, the Dative, and their congeners, or because they have any such connection with them as the Three Persons, the Three, or Two Numbers, and the Three fundamental Numbers with one another, as because there is no recognised denomination to which they can be referred; and that, *mutatis mutandis*, the same reasoning applies to such other combinations as, with the exception of the Indicative, the Imperative, and the Conjunctive, are known among the Verbs as *Moods*. Between the two—one for the Noun and the other for the Verb—they constitute a considerable group of inflections (or formatives), which have yet to be brought not only into order, but into *co-ordination*.

§ 376. The following paradigms are from a Grammar of the *Sahaptin* language, spoken in the American, or southern, part of what before the partition was known as the great, but indefinite, district of Oregon. It is a language of the Agglutinate stage, or period, and has, for the Adjective at least, a Plural Number :—

#### SUBSTANTIVES.

*Nom.* inít, *house*

*Gen.* inínna, *of a house*

*Acc.* inína, *house*

*1st Dat.* inítph, *to or for a house*

*2nd Dat.* inítpa, *in, on, or upon a house*

*1st Abl.* inítki, *with a house (instrument)*

*2nd Abl.* inítpkínih, *from a house*

*3rd Abl.* inítain, *for the purpose of a house*

inítash, *the place of a house*

inítpama, *belonging to a house*

inínót, *without (or destitute of) a house*

inítin, *having a house*

inítih, *like a house*

inítsim, *only a house*



## ADJECTIVE.

Tahs, *good*

SINGULAR	PLURAL
<i>Nom.</i> tahs	titals
<i>Gen.</i> tahsnim	titalsnim
<i>Acc.</i> tahsna	titalсна
<i>1st Dat.</i> tahsph	titalphsh
<i>2nd Dat.</i> tahspa	titalspa
<i>1st Abl.</i> tahski	titalski
<i>2nd Abl.</i> tahspkinih	titalspkinih
<i>3rd Abl.</i> tahsain	titalhsain

## DEGREES OF COMPARISON.

*Positive*, tahs = *good**Comparative*, tahs kammakanm = *better**Superlative*, tahsni or talstamaumn = *best*

This is the best illustration that the present writer can adduce, rather than the best which can be given. The best would be one from the Monosyllabic period. But this is sufficient to illustrate the principle suggested. Here we have a fundamental root, and a series of additaments which we can scarcely call inflections; and unless we know that they are constant, and apply to something like classes of words, they hardly amount to formatives. But they are manifestly compounds, rather than separate and independent words. In the monosyllabic stage, they or their like would be the latter; in other terms, each would be two separate words in contact with one another rather than two words combined into one. Their import would be, in most cases, some word connected in sense with the relation which they, respectively, express as affixes; but of a less abstract character.

§ 377. The first paradigm the grammarian, not unnaturally, calls a *Declension*; and it is mainly Prepositional. The suffixes of the other he calls *Adjectival* or *Adverbial*, and the distinction is real. But the form is the same for

both : and except in the rare instances where the additament can be found elsewhere as a separate word, they are Compounds rather than pairs of words ; and they have imports of various kind—in some of which we have classes or subclasses ; i.e. variations in the expression of a single fundamental and general notion, or conception ; e.g. in the numerous forms of the Ablative. Some of them are compound ; i.e. additaments to an additament.

§ 378. This is what we get from the single grammar of a single language. But there are dozens of languages which would give us paradigms of the same kind. In most of these we may find some new combination, or some form which has not presented itself elsewhere. The sum total of these combinations would exceed that of all the recognised inflections, and all the classified formatives, in any single known language. It would certainly give us, by dozens and scores, combinations of one sort or another for which we have no uniform grammatical names, and no definite classification. Each, however, has its own particular history, and each when it originated had its special import. Perhaps we are not bound to find a name for them, inasmuch as they have dropped out of the languages to which they belonged ; or the languages themselves have become extinct ; or, if not exactly this, so altered in character as to have become partially transmuted. What are these additaments, and what do they *signify* ? Do they give us *Cases* ? They do this, to some extent, in *Nouns*. Do they give us *Tenses* ? They do this to some extent in *Verbs*. Do they give us *Moods* ? They are beyond doubt Modal in *Adjectives*. But there are many which have no class to which they can be unanimously referred ; whereas, on the other hand, there are some from which they must manifestly be excluded. The classes known under the denominations of ‘ *Person*,’ ‘ *Number*,’ and ‘ *Tense*’ have a very narrow range of comprehension, and unless there is something specially *Personal*, *Numerical*, or *Temporal* about a combination, it would hardly be asso-

ciated with our First, Second, and Third Persons; our Singular, Dual, and Plural Numbers, or our *Past*, Present, and Future Tenses.

§ 379. It is submitted, then, that *Case* and *Mood* are the names of two classes—Case for Nouns and Mood for Verbs—which only partially coincide with those that are known under the names of Person (Voice), Number, and Tense; and that, practically, they contain all those combinations recognised as inflections which are *not* contained in the other groups. And this, of course, implies that, out of each, certain minor divisions of equal value with the other three (or four) could be constructed if necessary. Even within the Indo-European languages we may see, by mere inspection, the elements of three groups which are, at least, as different from one another as Voice is from Person—these three being (1) the Nominative, Vocative, and Accusative; (2) the Possessive; and (3) the Dative and Ablative. The first of these, or the first group, gives us something that, allowing for the difference between the Noun and the Verb, is very like *Mood*, the Nominative answering to the Indicative, the Vocative to the Imperative, and the Accusative (Objective), somewhat less evidently, to the Conjunctive. The Possessive (Genitive) is so much akin to the Adjective in its import, that Wallis for one has treated such combinations as ‘*man’s hat*,’ ‘*father’s son*,’ as Adjectival; while the Factive in the Fin language gives a sense which, in many cases, has the import of the *-ly* in *lovely*, *softly*, and the like; the Caritive in the same class giving us the equivalents to the negative adjectives in *-less*—*loveless*, *harmless*, &c. As for the third class, in which the idea is that of position or direction in place, and of which the analogy with the Tense of the Verb is undoubted, it is manifestly a group by itself, and also the group that in its dimensions and limitations best harmonizes with those of the other three (or four) denominations. Whether this be the division to which the term ‘*Case*’ most conveniently applies, and how far, for the pur-

poses of ordinary teaching, it may be necessary to excogitate any new class-names, is another question. It is certainly the one in which we best see our way to the idea upon which the combinations are founded—viz. those relations in Place which are indicated by the Demonstrative Pronoun; a Pronoun which, in the word ‘*then*,’ at least, serves to indicate Time.

§ 380. We may now revert to the double process by which we get Inflection—(1) that of *Addition*; (2) that of *Differentiation*; and, having done this, eliminate from the present treatise the question of both *Gender* and *Mood*, so far as they are signified by mere modifications in the form of a syllable, rather than by the addition of a new and extraneous element. This we must do because, by hypothesis, all the inflections which we are now investigating are held to have been, originally, separate and independent words. This doctrine may or may not be correct; but it is the one which is most generally received, and, certainly, the one which presents itself in the most definite and manageable form. But, in doing this, we must remember that there is a third kind of inflection; one that partakes of the nature of Addition on one side, and that of Differentiation on the other. This is *Reduplication*—*γέ-γραφα*, &c. It is something more than differentiation, because it adds a syllable to the main word. Yet it is something less than addition, because the elements of the additament are not taken *aliunde*, but supplied from the original word itself.

§ 381. Upon the signs of Person, Voice, and Tense, in respect to their origin, little has been said, because little has been needed—at least, in the present investigation. But in respect to *Number* and *Case*, two doctrines had to be alluded to. The connection between the *Numeration* of the arithmetician and the *Number* of the grammarian could not but suggest itself. Such being the case, it was necessary to allude to it, and to recognise the criticism that it might suggest; or rather, to some extent had already suggested. Besides this, there was the connection in

sense between such pronouns as *to* and *from*, along with others, and the signs of certain cases, especially the Dative and Ablative. Now, these were noticed; not, however, to be recommended, though not, on the other hand, to be wholly ignored. There are a few individual cases that they may illustrate; just as, in the cognate question of *Gender*, there are a few (perhaps many) that may be explained by the doctrine of *Personification*. But for all the three questions we must take a wider and a more general view; and, in doing this, go back to a stage of language not impossibly anterior to the ideas of Numeration, Prepositions, and even Personification—early as this last may have been.

(15.) GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN OF INFLECTIONS AND  
FORMATIVES.

§ 382. Here our method must be as follows—(1) Treat every combination—real or hypothetical—simply as such; *i.e.* as a single word made up out of more words than one. This means that the question, whether it results in a sign of Person, Voice, Number, Case, or Tense, is reserved for future investigation. All that interests us at present is the simple fact of the fusion of more words than one into one.

§ 383. (2) Give special attention to those recognised inflections which, like the Norse Reflective Verb, the French and Italian Futures (*parlerò*, &c.), and the Postpositive Article, have been developed out of two separate words within the historical period.

§ 384. (3) Analyse carefully the numerous compounds, of every kind, which present themselves in the languages of the present time, or, at least, those of our own, with special attention to the extent to which they differ from the separate and uncombined words by which they are constituted in (1) import, (2) form. In this respect few languages teach us more than the English; not only as to the extent to which inflections have been superseded by combinations of an analytical character, but also by the instructive exposition

of the numerous processes either in action at the present time, or else adequately illustrated by the long history of our literature, and the variety of our dialects. How far more words than one take the guise of even a single syllable is shown in compounds like '*such*,' and '*which*,' from '*so + like*,' and '*how + like*,' and, better still, in the word '*not*'; of which the elements are no fewer than three, viz. the negative '*ne*,' the '*ev*'- in '*ev-er*,' and the half-obsolescent word '*whit*,' meaning *jot*, *tittle*, or small part of any thing. In a language with a short history and an inadequate literature words like these and scores of others might easily be mistaken for simple roots. Indeed, the whole history of the word '*like*' is suggestive. Had it dropped out of the language as a separate word with its proper adjectival import, such combinations as '*soft-ly*,' '*gent-ly*,' and all such others as have an adjective for their first element would be obscure; while combinations like '*man-ly*' &c., where the basis is substantival, might pass, in grammars like those of the Fin family, for a Case, viz. the Factive. From the same point of view all the words ending in *-less*, as '*blood-less*,' &c., would be called *Caritives*. Again, the whole series of the participial forms in *-and*, *-end*, and *-ind*, concurrent with that of the Abstract Nouns in *-ung* and *-ing*, from forms like '*burn-and*' to those like '*glintin*,' and '*darklins*' (*Scoticè*), is full of instruction; and that both in the way of form and import. Again, a combination like '*oak-tree*' = a '*tree which is an oak*'; whereas in those like '*dust-hole*' or '*wine-bin*' we get not so much a '*hole that is dust*,' or a '*bin that is wine*' as a '*hole*' or '*bin*' for '*dust*' or for '*wine*.' The difference here lies in the difference of the elements as taken by themselves rather than in any difference of sign, accent, or collocation. This is noted because it is necessary to see how much, even in the clearest and most manifest compounds in their most unaltered form, has to be supplied, or (to use a commoner term) *understood*.

§ 385. In words like *nam* (*am not*), *canna* (*can not*),

*catch'em* archaic, provincial, or vulgar as they may be considered, we find in even a language so analytic as the English the tendency to composition, or the fusion of more words than one into one with a loss of integrity on the side of the additament, reasserting itself. It may be objected that, in combinations of this kind, we have nothing more than a pair of words taken out of a sentence and pronounced with abbreviations, and that in true composition the elements are brought together from different quarters, and, as such, are the result of something more than the mere slovenly pronunciation of a short sentence, or a part of one. It is doubtful, however, whether juxtaposition of this latter kind may not be quite as common a cause of combination and fusion as any other.

§ 386. This and much more of the same kind is what we get from the study of the languages of our own time—that of the student's his own country, whatever it may be, being the one which will teach him the most. In this, or upon the principle of arguing backwards from the later to the earlier, from the more certain to the less uncertain, or from the known to the unknown, lies the basis of our criticism.

§ 387. The process, however, should be reversed; though the reversal can, at best, be but partial and approximate. We can never arrive at the actual origin of language, nor can we ever say how far we are from it. Indeed, anything like dates in the way of Time is out of the question. What we *can* determine is the stage of growth, evolution, or development in which we find any particular language; and, between the two extremes of the Analytic and the Monosyllabic classes, we have an ample amount of material, and, to some extent, a continuity. The greatest break is that which separates the Agglutinate class from the Synthetico-Analytic (*Indo-European*). Between the Monosyllabic and the Agglutinate the transition is much more gradual. How far it has been studied, or whether it will ever be studied in the way that we study the Indo-European forms of speech, is another question.

§ 388. In the Monosyllabic languages the words, so far as they are spelt by any ordinary alphabet, are few, the Tones and (or) Accents numerous and refined, the rules for Collocation stringent, the general character of the roots monosyllabic, and the import of the great majority of them of a concrete or sensible character, belonging to no *Part of Speech* in particular. In this, as in other points, they agree with the English element of our own language, when, as is the case in its present highly Analytical condition, it is denuded of inflections, inflections which it once had but has now lost—their absence in the Monosyllabic languages being due to the fact of their never having been developed. Many of these words are naturally brought into contact with one another in ordinary speech; and then fusion begins, and, after this, change in the form of the additament word. When this happens two words take the guise of one. Some of these keep their place as permanent parts of the theme. Others are changeable, and vary with the Person, Number, or Sex, with the relations of the Subject as agent or object, and the time of the Action or State. But these, as language advances, drop off, and are replaced by separate words. The rate at which changes proceed is not to be measured by years, or centuries, or milleniums, but by the rate at which the language develops itself; and we know how great, at the present time, is the difference between those of the highest degrees of development and those of the lowest.

§ 389. At some period between the development of the Alphabet and the completion of the Greek system of Logic the nature of these additaments commanded attention; less, however, with a view to the history of Language than to the Rules of Reasoning. Then the place of the main words as Parts of Speech, and of the additaments as signs of Person, Voice, Number, Case, Tense, Gender, and Mood gave the basis of Grammar. They gave us, *inter alia*, the class-names that have just been alluded to; and it has been submitted that, in the matter of Case and Mood further subdivisions



are required. But all these denominations refer to Inflection only; and it is only the recognised inflections of which the present treatise takes cognizance. Of these in the way of the *Cases of Nouns* alone the Fin Grammars give us *fifteen*, the Chinese at one extremity and the French at the other give us *none*. But enough upon the general principle of development in the line from Monosyllabism to Synthesis-and-Analysis has been said in the body of the work. The general character of the growth and evolution of the additaments under notice is manifest.

§ 390. What, then, are we to say of the Inflections, whether English, French, Latin, Greek, Sanskrit, or Fin; between which we have for Case, at least, the *minimum* and the *maximum*?

That they are the remains of a system beginning with certain pairs (or more) of words in juxtaposition, in contact, and, finally, in a state of fusion, amalgamation, or apparent unity; yet at the same time, as either affixes or prefixes, liable to fall off from the body of the word, when they ceased to be necessary, or were liable to be superseded by a substitute. As a rule, they *have* been dropped; generally superseded by something else—something else on a different principle, i.e. the combination of different words. It is probable that the fittest, or those for which no preferable substitute has presented itself, are those that still survive.



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