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OUTLINES

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THEOLOGY.

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
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PREFACE.

In introducing this book to the reader, I have only a single word to say upon two points: first, as to the uses which I regard this form of exhibiting theological truth as being specially qualified to subserve; and, secondly, as to the sources from which I have drawn the materials composing these "Outlines."

As to the first point, I have to say, that the conception and execution of this work originated in the experience of the need for some such manual of theological definitions and argumentation, in the immediate work of instructing the members of my own pastoral charge. The several chapters were in the first instance prepared and used in the same form in which they are now printed, as the basis of a lecture delivered otherwise extemporaneously to my congregation every Sabbath night. In this use of them, I found these preparations successful beyond my hopes. The congregation, as a whole, were induced to enter with interest upon the study even of the most abstruse questions. Having put this work thus to this practical test, I now offer it to my brethren in the ministry, that they may use it, if they will, as a repertory of digested material for the doctrinal instruction of their people, either in Bible classes, or by means of a congregational lecture. I offer it also as an



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OUTLINES OF THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE BEING OF GOD.

1. Can God be defined?

As the human mind is finite, and conceives by defining the limits of the object of its thought, and as God is known to us to be infinite, it is evident that the human mind can never be capable of conceiving God adequately as he is, or of defining his being.

But God is known to us by certain attributes or modes of being, the conception of which is possible to us, and which truly represent him, as far as they go. We conceive of each of these attributes as possessed by God in a degree to which we put no limits, and to which we know that no limits can be assigned. In degree, therefore, our conception of the attributes of God is indefinite, and so can not be defined; but on the other hand we may be truly said to define our idea of God when we furnish a comprehensive statement of all the attributes of God that are revealed to us in Scripture, and in the form in which they are conceived of by our finite understandings.

2. How has God been defined?

As the conceptions which different men have formed of God are very various, so the forms in which these conceptions have been expressed have differed.

I. The Pantheist calls him $\tau \delta \tilde{\sigma} \nu$, absolute being, and $\tau \delta \pi \tilde{a} \nu$, the all-universal being, for this is the sum of what he knows of God.

II. The Deist calls him the absolute, self-existent, infinite Spirit. This is true as far as it goes.

III. The definition given under the seventh question of the Larger Catechism, and the fourth of the Shorter Catechism, is a comprehensive statement of the divine perfections as they are revealed in the holy Scriptures, and as under the light of Scripture they are significantly taught by the works of God, creative and providential, physical and spiritual.

3. What is the origin of that idea of God which is found to be universally diffused among people of all nations and ages of the world?

On this subject there are blended together two questions, which every human consciousness must/in some way answer for itself.

I. Is there any God? II. What is God? The answer to both of these questions, including his existence and his attributes, must enter into the complex idea which any mind entertains of God.

Now these conceptions and beliefs concerning the divine existence, which in one or another of their various forms are universally prevalent among men, originate in several different sources, all of which contribute, though in various proportions in different cases, to the conceptions which men form of God. These sources are—"I. The innate constitution of the human soul. II. The speculative reason of man operating reflectively upon the facts of consciousness and the phenomena of external nature. III. Tradition. IV. Supernatural revelation."

4. In what sense is the idea of God innate, and how far is it natural to man?

It is not innate in the sense either that any man is born with a correct idea of God perfectly developed, or that, independently of instruction, any man can, in the development of his natural powers alone, arrive at a correct knowledge of God. Some very debased fragments of the human family have been found who were even destitute of any definite idea of God at all. On the other hand, independently of all instruction, a sense of dependence and of moral accountability is natural to man. These logically involve the being of a God, and when the intellectual and moral character of an individual or race is in any degree developed, these invariably suggest the idea and induce the belief of a God. Thus man is as universally a religious as he is a rational being. And

whenever the existence and character of God as providential and moral ruler is offered as fact, then every human soul responds to it as true, seen in its own self-evidencing light, in the absence of all formal demonstration.

5. How far is the idea of God the product of the speculative reason?

If the phrase speculative reason be used to signify the abstract intellect of man, his moral constitution being excluded, acting upon its own à priori principles, then we believe that the reason can not be said to originate, but only to confirm and complete the idea of God furnished by other sources. But if that phrase be used to express the intellect as informed by the conscience and by the emotional and voluntary nature of man, and acting upon the abundant evidences of wise and beneficent design, powerfully executed, with which all God's works are filled, then the reason thus exercised must lead to certain knowledge that God is, and to some knowledge of his natural and moral attributes.

6. How far is the idea of God traditional?

It is impossible for us, who enjoy the light of a divine revelation, to determine how far the knowledge of God might be spontaneously attained by each generation for itself, and how far the actual knowledge possessed by each people is due to a tradition from the past. It is on the other hand very plain that the form in which the idea is conceived, and the associations with which it is accompanied, is determined among every people by the theological traditions they have received from their fathers. It is certain also that a tradition of the true God and of his dealings with man long lingered among the Gentiles, and even now, though variously perverted, enters as an element into the mythologies of heathen nations.

7. How far is the idea of God due to a supernatural revelation?

The natural revelation which God makes of himself to man, in the constitution of the human soul, and in the works of creation and providence, would unquestionably have been sufficient to lead him to the knowledge of God, if man himself had continued in his natural moral condition and relations. But since by reason of sin man's mind has been darkened, his heart hardened, and his relations to God infinitely involved, man never can be able, by the mere light of nature, to reach both a certain and an adequate knowledge of God. It is certain, both from the reason of the case and from universal experience, that a supernatural revelation is absolutely necessary, 1st, to make certain by additional evidences the conclusions of reason; 2d, to complete and render practically adequate the knowledge of God which reason otherwise has reached.

8. What are the two great questions involved in this inquiry as to the being of God?

I. Is there any conclusive evidence that such a being as God exists? II. What is the nature of God, as far as his attributes are manifested by the evidence which proves his existence. This second question resolves itself into two others. Ist. What are the attributes of God, as ascertained to us by the light of nature alone; 2d. What are his attributes, as ascertained by the light of the supernatural revelation given in Scripture.

9. Can there be any strictly logical demonstration of the being of God constructed?

The idea which we entertain of God is a complex one, the different elements of which are furnished to us by different sources. No one single line of demonstrative proof can establish the existence of that Infinite Spirit which is known to the Christian as Jehovah. Many different arguments, however, concur in converging to this inevitable center, each contributing at once confirmatory evidence that God is, and complementary evidence as to what God is, and thus concurrently establishing the being of God upon immovable foundations.

The conception of God, as a powerful and righteous person, is first given us in our constitutional feeling of dependence and of moral accountability. Starting with this conception, we may abundantly demonstrate his wisdom, goodness, power, etc., and thus reciprocally confirm the evidence for his being from the work of his hands in his physical and spiritual creation, in his works called natural, as providence, and in his works called supernatural,

as miracles, prophecies, inspiration, and spiritual regeneration.—See Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought. Lect. IV.

10. What are the principle arguments by which this great truth has been generally defended by orthodox Theists?

The six principle arguments used to maintain the being of a God are as follows:

- I. The à priori argument which seeks to demonstrate the being of a God from certain first principles involved in the essential laws of human intelligence.
- II. The cosmological argument, or that one which proceeds after the à posteriori fashion, from the present existence of the world as an effect, to the necessary existence of some ultimate and eternal first cause.
- III. The teleological argument, or that argument which, from the evidences of design in the creation, seeks to establish the fact that the great self-existent first cause of all things is an intelligent and voluntary personal spirit.
- IV. The moral argument, or that argument which, from a consideration of the phenomena of conscience in the human heart, seeks to establish the fact that the self-existent Creator is also the righteous moral governor of the world. This argument includes the consideration of the universal feeling of dependence common to all men, which together with conscience constitutes the religious sentiment.
- V. The historical argument, which involves—(1.) The evident providential presence of God in the history of the human race. (2.) The evidence afforded by history that the human race is not eternal, and therefore not an infinite succession of individuals, but created. (3.) The universal consent of all men to the fact of his existence.
- VI. The scriptural argument, which includes—(1.) The miracles and prophecies recorded in Scripture, and confirmed by testimony, proving the existence of a God. (2.) The Bible itself, self-evidently a work of superhuman wisdom. (3.) Revelation, developing and enlightening conscience, and relieving many of the difficulties under which natural Theism labors, and thus confirming every other line of evidence.—Dr. Hodge.

11. What is the meaning of the phrases à priori and onto-logical?

The phrase à priori, as contrasted with the phrase à posteriori, signifies an argument proceeding downward from causes to effects, or from general and necessary principles to some particular consequence necessarily resulting from them. An à posteriori argument, on the other hand, is one proceeding in the contrary direction, from effects upward to their cause, or from certain particular consequences to the general and necessary principles from which they result.

An ontological argument is one (ontology is compounded of two Greek words, meaning the science of real existence, or existence in its absolute reality, as distinguished from phenomena or things as they appear to us to be relatively to our faculties of perception), "which proposes to discover or establish the fact of any real existence, either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties of the human soul."—Ancient Philosophy by W. Archer Butler, vol. i., ch. 3, p. 68.

12. What is the famous à priori argument for the existence of God, as set forth by Dr. Samuel Clarke?

By far the ablest and most famous argument for the being of God ever constructed on à priori principles is that set forth in the Boyle lectures of Dr. S. Clarke, delivered in London, A. D. 1704. Its main points are as follows:

I. As it is certain that something does exist now, something must have existed from all eternity; since it is contradictory to conceive of any thing commencing to exist, except through the intervention of some preexisting cause, pp. 9 and 10, 4th London edition, A. D. 1716.

II. Whatever has existed from eternity must be self-existent, or necessarily existent, i.e., must have the ground or reason of its existence at all times and in all places alike of an equal necessity in itself, p. 15.

III. The only true idea of a self-existent or necessarily existent being is the idea of a being, the supposition of whose not existing is an express contradiction, p. 16.

IV. The material world can not possibly be the first and original being, uncreated, independent, and of itself eternal; because it involves no contradiction to conceive of the world, as to the matter, form, measure, or motion of it, either not to be at all, or

to be different from what it is, pp. 22, 23.

V. But since something does now exist, it is a contradiction not to conceive of something as necessarily self-existent from eternity; and besides infinite space and eternal duration can not be thought not to exist without a contradiction. They are therefore necessarily self-existent, and therefore also the essence of God, of which infinite space and eternal duration are the essential properties or attributes, must be self-existent also. For space and time are not substances but properties, which necessarily imply a commensurate substance to which they belong, p. 16.

He thence proceeds by a similar process to prove that God is

infinitely wise, free, powerful and good, etc.

13. What are the objections to this argument?

This argument, as employed by Dr. Clarke, is consummately able, and if not of itself conclusive, has been of the greatest use in confronting the ontological Pantheists on their own ground. The recent fashionable objections to all à priori reasoning on this subject have been carried too far. I. Because every à priori system of proof is partly à posteriori, starting from the experience which consciousness affords us of dependent existence. II. Because every à posteriori system of proof embraces of necessity an à priori element, thus the principles that every effect must have a cause, and that design argues intelligence, are à priori judgments. The special objections that lie against Dr. Clarke's argument are, 1. It confounds logical necessity of thought upon the part of man with physical necessity of being upon the part of God, making the power of man to conceive or not to conceive the measure of real existence, and II. It makes space and time, which are to us necessary abstract conceptions and conditions of all thinking properties of God. God is omnipresent and eternal, but in any other sense it is absurd to regard space and time as properties of which he is the substance. They are the conditions of all being, and are occupied by all existences in infinitely various proportions and relations.

14. What is the argument of Descartes and others, derived from the fact that we possess the idea of God?

Descartes, founding all knowledge upon the truth of human consciousness, maintained that in proportion to the clearness of an idea is the evidence that it actually represents an objective reality. But one of the clearest and most prominent ideas actually possessed by man is the idea of one infinitely perfect being. This idea could not spring from "any finite source, since the finite and imperfect could not give me the idea of the infinite and perfect. Hence, if I have an incontestibly clear idea of God, a God must necessarily exist."

He also argued that the existence of God is implied in the nature of the idea we have of him, just as the existence of a triangle is implied in the conception which we form of a triangle. Self-existence and necessary existence are essential elements of an infinitely perfect being. But as we have an idea of an infinitely perfect being, including his self-existence, it is a contradiction in terms to conceive of him as not existing. Therefore he must exist.—See Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, vol. i., p. 172.

15. What are the objections to that argument?

While we must ever regard this and all other à priori arguments for the existence of God as of value in the way of demonstrating the fact, that although the idea of God cannot be strictly said to be innate, yet it is complimentary to reason, i. e., when once presented, always afterwards felt to be necessary to satisfy the demands of reason, nevertheless we cannot regard this argument as being, when standing alone, a valid demonstration of the existence of God. The conceptions of the human mind, whether clear or vague, can not be held as the certain measure of real objective existence. They can only form the ground of a rational probability, and thus enhance the credibility of other arguments.

16. On what grounds do the German transcendental philosophers found their belief in the being of a God?

Schleiermacher, and his German and English followers, as Coleridge, Morell, and others, place the foundation of this divine

knowledge in the feeling of absolute and infinite dependence. This they claim to be an inseparable element of every man's self-consciousness, and they represent this feeling as apprehending God immediately as he is in himself, an infinite being, embracing and conditioning our dependent being upon every hand. Schelling, Cousin, and others maintain that human reason, in its highest exercise, is capable of an immediate intuition of the infinite, and thus God is directly seen in his all-perfect being, by the appropriate organ of such an infinite knowledge in the human soul.

Both of these pretended ways of the immediate and adequate apprehension of the infinite are disproved by the self-evident principle that the mind in every thought contains the conception which it forms of its object, but a finite mind cannot contain an infinite thought. We may know that God is infinite, but we can form only a finite conception of him. Every form of human consciousness, whether of thought or of feeling, is finite, and depends upon conditions, but the infinite has no limits or conditions. We believe God to be infinite, but we positively conceive of him only as indefinitely great, that is, of a degree of greatness from which we remove one by one the limitations which inhere in all human thinking.—See Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, pp. 101, 122, 124, and Sir William Hamilton's Discussions, pp. 29, 30.

17. What is the Cosmological argument, or that argument which deduces the necessary existence of a First Self-existent Cause from the fact that the world certainly exists, and is evidently an effect?

Whatever exists must have a cause, either without or within itself. It must either have at some time been brought into existence by some preëxistent cause, or it must have the necessary cause of its own existence in itself. If it have the necessary cause of its own existence in itself, it must be eternal, for the same necessary cause must have operated equally at all times, and if there ever was a time when it was not, it never could have caused itself to be.

Thus far even the Atheist, Pantheist, Materialist, and Idealist all agree with us. They maintain, however, under different forms,

the view that the world itself is eternal. We maintain that the world is not self-existent, but an effect created by a God.

18. What is a cause, and whence do we derive our conviction that every effect must have a cause?

A spiritual cause is a spirit originating its own acts and producing its effect out of its own energy. An effect is some new thing or change produced by the power or efficiency residing in the cause.

"A material cause consists always in two or more material substances with their active properties sustaining a certain relation to one another in a certain state, and the effect is the same substances in another state. Thus, when a hammer is made to strike a stone and break it, the cause consists of the hammer and stone in one state and relation, and the effect the hammer and stone in the state they are after the blow."—McCosh, Divine Government, p. 100.

The conviction that every effect must have a cause is an original and essential law of our intelligence, which, instead of being deduced as a consequence from experience, is involved in those elementary processes of thought upon which all experience depends. The judgment is not simply, that every change which we have ever seen did have a cause, but that every change of every kind, past, present, and future, must have a cause, and further, a cause adequate to produce the effect.

19. How can it be proved that the world is an effect?

The entire world, in all of its departments, as far as it is cognizable by our senses, consists of the results of past changes and of present changes, proceeding in continual succession. Now either one of these three things must be true:

I. Either there must be supposed one or more eternal, self-existent beings, which have the cause of their existence necessarily in themselves, and which cause all the succession of dependent changes which we see proceeding around us.

Or, II. All these dependent changes which we see passing around us are only the necessary modifications of the one universal, necessary, self-existent substance. This is the Pantheistic theory, and is disproved below, under question 35.

Or, III. The endless succession of changes which make up the phenomenal world must have gone on from all eternity without beginning or cause. This is self-evidently absurd. Every change is an effect, and every effect must have a cause; but an infinite chain of changes, each being in turn first effect and then cause, is impossible, because an infinite chain of effects demand an adequate cause, even more imperatively than a single effect. Thus the son, though begotten, is not caused by the father. 1st. Because the father does not contrive the son, nor understand the process of his production; and 2d, because the father is himself caused, and a thousand generations of men demand a cause a thousand times more imperatively than one.

This dream of an eternal succession is also annihilated by the testimony of human history and the science of geology, (see below, questions 20–22), and by the result of universal experience. 1st. That contrivance necessarily implies intelligence; and 2d. That intelligence is always the cause, never the result of organ-

ization.

20. What is the historical argument against the eternity of the world?

If the world be eternal, the human race must have existed for ever, and have descended to the present through an eternal succession of generations. Otherwise, if although the world be eternal, the human race began to exist in time, we would still be forced to believe in a God who created the human race. But every branch of human history, sacred and profane (and admitting, for argument's sake, that the books of Moses are merely human productions, they are still as trustworthy history as any other), the mythologies, traditions, records of all races and nations, concur with comparative philology, or the science of the origin and relations of human languages, and with ethnology, or the science of the origin and distribution of races of men, in converging to some more or less remote point in the past as the starting point of the human family. Also other arguments, "such as the recency of science; the vast capacity of the species for general or collective improvement, contrasted with the little progress which they have yet made; the expansive force of population, and yet its shortness still from the territory and resources of the globe;"

all alike prove that the human race began to be at a comparatively recent period.—See Chalmer's N. Theology, vol. i., book 1, chapter 5.

21. What is the geological argument against the eternity of the world?

Geology has clearly established the fact that the earth has existed many myriads of years, and passed through many successive physical revolutions. In the progress of these successive revolutions different races of plants and animals were successively brought into existence, as the physical conditions of the earth suited their respective habits. Thus, in order, the most elementary vegetable forms preceded the animal, and of these last the fish, the reptile, the bird, the mammiferous quadruped, and, last of all, man appeared in succession. The geologic record proves that in many sudden catastrophies whole races of plants and animals were destroyed, and then new and distinct species introduced.

In connection with these two facts all naturalists maintain these two principles, 1st, that there is no such thing as the development of one species or family of plants or animals into another; and 2d, that there is no such thing as the spontaneous generation of new species. Consequently geology demonstrates not only one, but many successive acts of absolute creation. "The infidel," says Hugh Miller (Footprints of the Creator, p. 301), "who in this late age of the world attempts falling back upon the fiction of an infinite succession would be laughed to scorn."

22. What was the famous development theory as set forth by the author of the "Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation," and how may it be disproved?

The great astronomer La Place originated the philosophical suggestion which has always since been known as the Nebular Hypothesis. He supposed that the stellar universe originated from an indefinitely rarified, and intensely hot nebulous matter, agitated by a uniform gyratory motion, and that from this origin the whole universe has gradually been evolved, through the calculable operation of the known laws of matter. This is cosmical development, or the development of worlds. La Place treated this theory chiefly in relation to astronomy, and claimed as its

most prominent practical confirmation the existence of large nebulous masses in the remote abysses of space, which the telescope could not resolve into stars, and which were, as he insisted, nebulæ in the process of world development.

The anonymous author of the Vestiges of Creation, whose work has excited such general attention, has carried out this theory of development into its furthest consequences and most detailed applications, to the successive origination of new species of plants and animals, and to all the contemporaneous geologic changes of the earth; thus leading into the question of organic development. He maintains "that the simplest and most primitive type gave birth to a type superior to it in compositeness of organization and endowment of faculties, and this again to the next higher, and so on to the highest." Every organic existence being developed by successive stages, the higher from the lower, and all at last from an original "fire mist," by an inherent law of progression.

This theory does not necessarily lead to theoretical atheism, since the creation of so wonderfully pregnant a "fire mist" would as much require an original intelligent cause as the immediate creation of the world in the Bible sense. It leads, however, to practical atheism, since it denies all providential intervention, and it sets forth man as developed through the tadpole, by virtue of the ultimate mechanical and chemical properties inherent in mat-

ter, instead of being created in the image of God.

We have to say, I. With reference to La Place's Nebular Hypothesis, or theory of cosmical development, that it is now generally held by Christian philosophers and astronomers as a highly probable speculation, agreeing with and interpreting all known facts. They agree, however, also in maintaining it only as an approximate account of the successive stages in which the infinite Creator, having previously created all things out of nothing by the word of his power, brought his work in the exercise of his ceaseless providential agency to its present condition. They maintain these two principles, (1.) That as far as it is known, without exception, God always perfects his works from an elementary commencement, by a regular method, and through successions of time. That is, he works by fixed law. And for this there appears this wise and beneficent reason, that if God should

exercise his infinite power any otherwise, his working would be perfectly inscrutable to his intelligent creatures, and therefore to them a revelation of his power merely, and not of his wisdom. (2.) That law is never a cause, but only the method according to which a cause acts. It is infinitely absurd therefore to offer the Nebular Hypothesis as a rational account of the way in which the universe might have come into its present condition without either an infinitely intelligent and powerful creating cause or an infinitely intelligent and powerful providential upholder and director.

II. With respect to the further application of this theory to the explanation of the origination of the simplest organic beings from inorganic material elements in the first place, and then the gradual development through successive stages of organic races, the higher from the lower in virtue of the inherent self-acting principles of nature, we have to say, (1.) As this view is held by the author of the "Vestiges," and generally by Deistical speculators, it rests wholly upon an absurd idea of "law." Law is only the method according to which a cause acts. The law itself, as well as its effects, must be referred to the cause which observes it. well as its effects, must be referred to the cause which observes it. The more general and comprehensive the law, the more powerful and intelligent must be the cause. (2.) All the leading naturalists, geologists and physiologists repudiate this theory upon scientific grounds, e. g., L. Agassiz, Dr. Carpenter, Mr. A. Pritchard, Hugh Miller, Dr. Hitchcock. (3.) Its pretended experimentum crucis, the generation under a galvanic current of small insects without a parent germ, is discredited as a mistake by the highest scientific authorities. (4.) Hugh Miller, in his "Footprints of the Creator," has annihilated this fiction. He proves, a, That one species never developes into another. b, That there is no such thing as spontaneous generation: that every living thing such thing as spontaneous generation; that every living thing comes from a parent. c, That geology presents, on the contrary, instances of the degradation of certain races, i.e., a retrograde movement in creation perfectly inconsistent with the Theory of Development. (5.) This theory developes mind from matter, which is absurd, see below, Question 32. (6.) The most recent and highest tendencies of scientific speculation indicate the conclusion that while all living organisms are formed of matter and are built up by material forces, yet that the vital principle which directs those forces is wholly immaterial, not subject to the known

laws of matter, and therefore the organism which that vital principle erects can not be developed by those laws.

23. What is the Telcological argument, or that which establishes the existence of God from the existence of design in his

works?

We have already proved that the world must have had a cause, a cause distinct from and exterior to itself, since eternal succession and successive development have both been proved to be absurd. In order to prove that this cause is a God, we have further to show that this eternal self-existent cause is an intelligent free agent, and a righteous moral governor.

Design, or the wise and skillful adaptation of means to a certain end according to an evident purpose, always infallibly proves two things with regard to the cause, 1st. That it is endowed with intelligence as well as power. 2d. That it is endowed with free will, exercised in purpose, selection, direction, etc. In other words, that the cause is a person, or a plurality of persons.

Now, God's universe in all its parts is full of design, as is evident in the balanced forces acting on such a vast scale in astronomy, in the laws of terrestrial nature, so wonderfully correlated to each other, and to the wider laws of the universe beyond. It is preëminently manifested in the wonderful organizations of plants and animals, and above all, of man, and the adaptation of each to his peculiar circumstances and purposes of life. It is manifested also in the constitution of the human soul, which is a created effect, the relation of the soul to the body, the adaptation of the world to the moral constitution of man, and the mutual relations of intellect, will, emotion, and conscience in man. It is manifested also in the constitution of man as a social being, in the organization of all communities, conjugal, family, and national, and in the universal history of the race, etc., etc. For the illustration of this great argument, see Paley on design in organized life, Chalmers and Brougham on design as exhibited in the mental and moral constitution of man, and Hugh Miller on design as exhibited in the successive creations during the geologic eras.—See Ps. xix., 1, and Rom. i., 20.

^{24.} How do we derive the conviction that design universally implies intelligence?

This principle necessarily resolves itself into the more elementary one above stated, viz., that every effect must have a cause. Every work evidencing design is an effect. The real nature of every effect proves as incontestibly, by force of the essential laws of reason, the nature of the cause from which it springs, as the mere fact of the effect proves the mere fact of the cause. A great effect proves a powerful cause. An intelligible effect proves an intelligent cause. A design not understood may to us prove nothing with regard to the cause from which it springs; but the instant we do understand it, that instant we must attribute to it intelligence and purpose in addition to efficiency.

Here we are necessarily brought to the decision of the great question presented by the Materialists. They hold that there is but one substance in the universe to which the phenomena of mind and matter are alike to be referred, because intelligence is only one of several special results of material organization.

Now, all we know of power, of intelligence, of free choice, of feeling, we derive from consciousness. But consciousness presents these as always the ultimate, never the derived or constituted, attributes of ourselves. And, moreover, as far as our experience ever reaches, free intelligence is always the cause of organization, and never organization or material aggregation the cause of intelligence. The reason of the case, therefore, and the analogy of an unexceptive experience, absolutely uniform and universal, constrain us to refer all intelligible design to intelligence, and never intelligence to organization, or any kind of material evolution.—See Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lecture 2.

25. What are the principal objections urged against this argument from design, and how may they be answered?

I. Hume, (see Essays, vol. i., p. 157,) as quoted by Chalmers, says that the sole rational source of our conviction that design implies intelligence is our experience in time past that such and such designs were produced by an intelligent cause. If we see a house, a watch, or a ship, we certainly know that they were formed by skillful men, because we have anterior experience of the production of precisely such effects by such causes. But the world he maintains, is altogether a "peculiar effect;" and since we have no experience whatever of world-making, so we have no reason to

conclude that the apparent contrivances of nature are the product of intelligence.

To this we answer: 1st. That design and intelligence are correlative terms, it is impossible for a sane mind to separate them. An intelligible design, wherever seen, must suggest intelligence. 2d. All our experience leads to the same result, viz., not merely that some instances of design have been produced by intelligence, but that all design is always and only so produced. 3d. The science of geology does bring an instance of world-making within the circle of our investigations, and we do practically find, as we were assured upon à priori principles we would, that the same laws of cause and effect, of intelligence and design, prevail in world-making that prevail in every human art.

II. It is objected that we arbitrarily stop short with this argument without leading it to its legitimate conclusion; for if the world must have a cause, so much more must God; and if the world must have a designer, so much more must God.

We answer: 1st. An infinite series of dependent causes is rejected as absurd by reason and disproved as false by science, therefore the eternal must be self-existent and uncaused. To this conclusion science leads, and in it reason rests, although the nature of self-existence can never be comprehended by a finite mind. 2d. The world and human souls being effects, or something new produced by causes, present indubitable traces of design; but God, being self-existent, presents no evidence of design. Self-existent intelligence no more suggests the idea of design than self-existent chaos.

III. M. Aug. Comte, the great apostle of the Positive Philosophy, maintains that human reason has to deal with phenomena and their order, or laws of succession solely, and that we have nothing to do with either causes or design. He says that the adaptations of elements and organs in nature are nothing more than "conditions of existence." If these were absent there would be no existence, and they are present only because they are necessary to the existence in question. Where the circumstances proper to the life of fish exist there fish are found. "Only those stars are inhabited which are inhabitable."

To this we answer: 1st. The human mind always has, and of rational necessity must discuss causes. Laws account for no-

thing, they merely discover how causes act. 2d. Happily contrived "conditions of existence" are the very marks of design for which we argue, but of necessity there must be a designing cause. A lake is the place for a fish to live in, but no fish will live there until he is made or put there. A star might be habitable for ever without being inhabited. 3d. A large part of the design with which God's works are full are not bare conditions of existence, but conditions of beautiful, happy, useful existence. Thus the symmetry of the human frame, and the relation of the eye and taste to beauty, are not mere conditions of existence, but the work of a God, whose thoughts are beautiful, wise, and benevolent, as well as effective.

IV. It is objected by many that the argument from existing dependent creatures to a first cause, and from design in the world to an intelligent designer, although valid as far as it goes, could not possibly lead us to the knowledge of an infinite God. The universe is only finite. The highest conclusion, therefore, that we ought to form from the premises is, that a great though finite

being exists adequate to produce the actual effect.

To this we answer: We not only admit but insist upon the fact, that all the modes of human consciousness, feeling, as well as thought, being finite, we can never positively embrace in our minds the idea of an infinite being. This arises from the essential limitations of our own minds. We must believe in the existence of the infinite, though our highest positive conception of God is that of a being indefinitely great, i. e., we set no limits to our view of any of his attributes in any direction. Precisely to this result does the argument from design lead us. We believe that the world is finite only from rational necessity, not as the result of experience. To us it is indefinitely great. The microscope and the telescope have alike failed to see through creation; on either hand it reaches indefinitely beyond our faculties of perception. Science of the infinite and absolute is impossible, but faith in them is necessary to reason. We can not think of time or space without believing in eternity and immensity. We can not think of dependent causes without thinking of one cause from which all the rest spring. We can not think of finite and dependent being without thinking of independent and absolute being.—See Morell's History of Moral Philosophy, vol. ii., App., p. 645, and

Introduction, pp. 57-60. "We can not think the divine attributes as in themselves they are, we can not think God without impiety, unless we also implicitly confess our impotence to think him worthily; and if we should assert that God is as we think, or can affirm him to be, we actually blaspheme. For the Deity is adequately inconceivable, is adequately ineffable, since human thought and human language are equally incompetent to his infinities."—Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Appendix, p. 692; and see also Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, Lecture 3, Note 11 on that Lecture.

26. What argument for the being of a God may be derived from the Sense of Dependence which is common to all men?

The religious instinct, which is one of the most universal and indestructible attributes of human nature, is constituted of two elements: 1st. an intimate and inseparable sense of dependence which always accompanies our self-consciousness; and 2d, conscience, including a sense of moral accountability. "With the first development of consciousness there grows up, as part of it, the innate feeling that our life, natural and spiritual, is not in our own power to sustain or prolong; that there is One above us on whom we are dependent, whose existence we learn and whose presence we realize by the same instinct of prayer."—Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, p. 120. This sense of dependence has often, in the absence of knowledge, been prostituted to various superstitions, but its universal presence, under all forms of faith, proves the being of a God.

27. State the argument for the existence of God derived from Conscience.

Conscience is a universal and indestructible principle of human nature. It asserts, even when it is unable to enforce, its supreme authority, as the organ of an ultimate law, over all the active powers of the soul. Now, if there be no God, universal conscience must be a lie, since its right to command over inclination and passion can be derived only from a superior authority, whose right it is to reign. Conscience essentially involves a sense of moral accountability, and in the case of the transgressor a fearful

looking for of judgment. Hence the universal prevalence among men of expiatory sacrifices and penances.—Mansel, p. 122.

These two, a sense of dependence and of moral accountability, constituting the religious instinct universally prevalent among men, and proving that God must be a person, endowed with intelligence and sovereign and righteous will, give us our first conception of God, which is afterwards corroborated and enlarged by the study of his works and of his word. As these are the primary sources of our faith in God, so they exert immeasurably the most prevalent influence in maintaining and enforcing that faith among men.

28. What is the Historical argument for the being of a God?

Several arguments for the being of a God may be derived from history.

I. Men of all nations, in all ages of the world, differing among themselves in all respects susceptible of change, have professed and acted upon this belief. Man is as essentially a religious as he is a rational animal. Either the nature of man is a lie, or there is a God. Cicero says, "What nation is there, or what race of men which has not, without any previous instruction, some idea of the gods? Now, that in which all men agree must necessarily be true."

II. The student of universal history will find evident traces of design running through and giving significance to the relative bearing of all events. God is as plainly in history as he is in creation.

III. History, as shown above (question 20), proves that the human race is of recent origin, and therefore has been created.

IV. Godliness has always worked beneficially for human nature, having, practically, "the promise of the life that now is." Every experiment of national Atheism has been morally, socially, and politically disastrous.

29. What is the argument for the being of a God derived from the phenomena of Scripture?

The only way in which the existence of God can be known to us at all is by some revelation of himself. Nature and providence are as much revelations of God as Scripture; and inspired Scripture, miracles, and prophecy are as much his works, and more clearly manifest power, intelligence, goodness, and righteousness. than does either nature or providence. All the evidences of Christianity, which are spread out in the third chapter of this volume. which prove that, if there be a God Christianity is a revelation from him, also just as legitimately prove that there is a God, since these are divine works. We are under the same necessity of accounting rationally for the phenomena of Scripture that we are of accounting for the phenomena of creation. Thus, 1st, miracles and prophecy are undoubted facts established by testimony. But miracles and prophecy are inconceivable except as acts of a God. 2d, The Scriptures themselves are evidently the work of a superhuman intelligence.—See chapter 3d, questions 13 and 14. 3d. The feeble and crude notion of God furnished by natural religion, is by revelation taken up, completed, glorified, and justified to the reason and conscience. 4th. The spiritual power of Christianity as an experimental system in the individual and in all communities, in proving its suitableness to the highest wants of human nature, proves also the being of a God.

- 30. State summarily the amount of knowledge concerning God we derive from the foregoing sources.
- I. Our constitutional sense of dependence and of moral accountability give us spontaneously our primary elemental notion of God, and assurance of his existence.
- II. Reasoning upon all existences and events known to us upon the two principles, (1,) that every effect must have a cause; (2,) that the power, intelligence and benevolence exercised by the cause in any special act of causation may be argued from their traces in the effect. We find, a, that God is the eternal, self-existent, first cause, and b, that he is indefinitely powerful, wise, free of will and benevolent.
- III. Reflecting upon the nature of intelligence and free will, and their relation to organization as always its cause, never its effect, as developed in our own experience, we rise by necessary inference to the conclusion that God, as a free intelligence, must be a personal spirit.
- IV. Reflecting upon the phenomena of conscience, and upon the constitution of our emotional nature and the general course of providence in relation to the law of conscience, we are necessarily led to the conclusion that God is also a moral governor,

who speaks through conscience and who will vindicate its sanctions, because he himself is a holy and righteous being.

V. From the profound constitution of our nature, although we are utterly incapable of forming any commensurate conception of the infinite and absolute, yet we must, as all men do, affirm their existence, and that they meet in the self-existent and incomprehensible God.

This much we may now, under the noonday light of revelation, certainly deduce from the phenomena of nature as to the being and attributes of God; but before the light of revelation no man was able to see thus much, nor to affirm with confidence

even what he did see.

VI. From the diligent and rational study of the Holy Scriptures, with the illumination of the Holy Ghost, we shall attain to a complete theology, as far as that is possible to man on earth.

31. What is Atheism, and how far is it possible?

Atheism is the denial of God. Of Atheists there are three classes. 1st. Those who confessedly deny the being of any God; such as those who believe in an eternal succession of things as they are, or in a successive development of nature in virtue of inherent mechanical laws, e. q., Comte, etc. 2d. Those who, while admitting God nominally deny any of his essential constituent attributes. In this sense the Pantheist, who denies the personality of God, and who confounds him with the universe, is really, though not nominally, an Atheist, since it makes little difference whether we say that the world is God, or that God is the world. 3d. To the same end tends practically, and by logical though not by confessed consequence, all materialism, which makes intelligence the result not the cause of physical organization, and of all naturalism, which, while verbally admitting a distant God in the first inconceivably remote act of creation, denies him altogether in all providence and supernatural revelation.

Atheism is possible. 1st. Practically; many men live thus without God in the world. 2d. Although, from the indestructible constitution of human nature, men must believe in and feel dependence upon some first self-existent being, and fear the judgment of some righteous ruler, yet through ignorance and want of intellectual development, and through the delusive power of so-

phistical speculation, many men honestly reject as untrue one or more of the essential constituent attributes of God, so that the gross superstition, or the barren notion left in their minds is not God. Not loving God, they for a time succeed in eliminating, as a matter of thought, his distasteful presence.—Rom. i., 21–26.

32. What is Materialism?

As soon as we begin to reflect we become conscious of the presence of two everywhere interlaced, but always distinct classes of phenomena—of thought, feeling, will on the one hand, and of extension, inertia, etc., on the other. Analyze these as we may, we never can resolve the one into the other. The one class we come to know through consciousness, the other through sensation, and we know the one as directly and as certainly as the other; and as we can never resolve either into the other, we refer the one class to a substance called spirit, and the other class to a substance called matter.

Materialists are a set of superficial philosophers, with whom the phenomena of feeling, conscience and will are not intense, and who have formed the habit of looking too exclusively outward upon the world present to the senses. Hence they fall into the fundamental error of affirming, 1st. That there is but one substance in the universe, and 2d. That intelligence, feeling, conscience, volition, etc., are only properties of matter under certain modifications. Intelligence did not create and organize matter, but matter, organizing according to its inherent laws, evolved intelligence.

To this we answer, 1st. This is no recondite dispute, as some Materialists pretend, concerning substance. The Materialist knows that by affirming conscience to be only a modification of matter he destroys its essential nature—because if it be material it is mechanical and not moral. His object doubtless is to reason away the phenomena of conscience and liberty. 2d. The theory is one-sided. Our knowledge of thought and feeling, conscience and will, is at least as immediate and certain as our knowledge of matter. Neither should be sacrificed to the other. 3d. It is unwarrantable dogmatism arbitrarily to refer the two classes of phenomena to the same ground, while we are utterly unable logically to resolve one class into the other. 4th. This theory is inconsistent with consciousness and experience, the solid grounds of all

our knowledge on this subject. (1.) While the senses are several, and the bodily organization constantly changing, yet in every complex experience, and through all time, the central I, which thinks and feels, is an absolute unit. (2.) Matter is seen to be incapable of originating action—the central I has the power of absolute causation. (3.) As far as we ever see organization is always the result, never the cause of intelligence.

33. What is Idealism?

As the Materialist holds that the sensible is the only real, and that mind is a modification of matter, so the extreme Idealist holds that the sensitive and cognitive mind is the only real, and that the phenomena of the material world are only modifications of mind. When a man sees or feels a material object, the thought or feeling of which he is conscious is within the mind itself. The Idealist argues consequently that all the man really knows is the thought or feeling of which he is conscious, and that he can never be rationally certain whether there is any outward reality corresponding to that inward state or not.

In the most extreme form this tendency leaves the individual philosopher a solitary dreamer in the midst of the world. He can know nothing outside of himself and the successions of his own thoughts. This is the subjective Idealism of Fichte.

In a lower degree this tendency leads to an Idealistic Pantheism, when all the phenomena of the universe, internal and external, is referred to the modifications of one infinite spirit, which is God. Such is the Pantheism of Schelling and Hegel.

But the phrase, Idealism, is also applied, in a modified sense, to those systems of philosophy which, while admitting the existence both of matter and mind, yet build themselves ultimately upon the unresolvable first principles of man's internal self-consciousness.

34. What is Hylozoism?

Hylozoism, compounded of two Greek words, $\tilde{v}\lambda\eta$ wood, $\zeta\omega\eta$ life—living, animated matter, designates a theory attributed to Strato of Lampsacus, who, confounding life and intellect with force and motion, regarded the universe as a vast animal self-developing through the plastic power of its own inherent life, *i. e.*,

unconsciously self-developing from eternity.—Ritter, Hist. An. Phil., book 9, chap. 6.

35. What is Pantheism?

Pantheism, as the etymology of the term indicates, signifies that system which maintains that all phenomena of every class known to man, whether spiritual or material, are to be referred to but one substance, and that the universal substance of God: and thus, matter and mind being declared to be only different modifications of one substance, Pantheism, from different points of view, assumes sometimes a materialistic and at others an idealistic complexion. The Atheist says that there is no God, the Pantheist that every thing is God. The Materialist says that all the phenomena of the universe are to be referred to one substance. which is matter. The Pantheist says that they are all to be referred to one substance, and that the absolute substance of God. Yet the Pantheist differs from the Atheist and Materialist more in the color and tone than in the essence of his creed. The Pantheist's God is not a self-conscious, voluntary person, separate from his creation, but he is that infinite, original, self-existent, universal, unconscious, impersonal essence to which all proper attributes belong, intelligence as well as the attraction of gravitation, whose infinitely various and ceaseless modifications of substance, by a necessary law of eternal self-development, constitute all things as they succeed each other in the universe of existence. God is neither sun nor star, ocean nor mountain, wind nor rain. man nor beast, but these are all fleeting modifications of God. God is ever eternally the same himself, but he is eternally, and by a necessary movement running through these endless cycles of self-modification, coming to self-consciousness only transiently in individual men, as they are born and die-and in the highest sense of all coming to himself in the greatest men, those heroes in whom all lesser men see and worship God.

This general system, modified endlessly as to special characteristics, has prevailed from the dawn of speculation as the necessary goal of those proud intellects which maintain their capacity to apprehend directly, and to philosphize worthily, upon the essential mysteries of infinite and absolute being. It was for ages before Christ the dream of the Hindoo theosophist, and of the Grecian Eleatic philosopher. In modern times, from the days of Spinoza to the pre-

sent, it has been taught, among others, by Schelling, Hegel, Cousin, Carlyle, and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Among the ancient Greeks, and to the present day among the Hindoos, the popular accompaniment of this abstruse and atheistical speculation has been Polytheism. The Pantheistic philosopher, by a sweeping generalization, referred all the powers of universal nature to one subject, the All. Their uneducated cotemporaries, unable to reach so wide a generalization, recognized a separate God in every energy of nature, and thus worshipped Gods and Lords many. In modern times, on the other hand, Polytheism having been for ever made impossible by Chistianity, the popular accompaniment of Pantheism in Germany, France, England, and America is the worship of man—sometimes heroworship, or the worship of great heroic men—sometimes of mankind in the mass, as the highest form into which the deity is ever developed, the clearest manifestation of God. This heresy is disproved—

1st. By the whole truth of human consciousness. If consciousness teaches us anything clearly it is that we ourselves are distinct individual persons. Pantheism teaches that we are only "parts or particles of God," springing from him and returning to him, yet always part of him, as the waves are part of the sea.

2d. By the truth of all the judgments of conscience with regard, first, to sin; second, to moral responsibility. Pantheism, by making every thing alike a necessary self-development of God, makes sin impossible, destroys all distinction between good and evil, and by denying the personality of God, and by making the fleeting personality of man an illusion of his own consciousness, it of course makes moral responsibility a myth.

3d. By the whole argument from Design, (see above, question 23,) Design proves intelligence and free will, self-conscious pur-

pose, and therefore personality.

4th. Pantheism, by referring the phenomena of mind and of matter to one substance, must oscillate between the absurdities of Materialism and of Idealism. There is a choice of follies, but no middle ground.

5th. By the whole system of historical testimonies and experimental evidences that establishes the truth of Christianity.

6th. By the uniformly degrading influence which this system has always exercised upon the morals of every community that has drunk deeply of its spirit.

CHAPTER II.

THEOLOGY AND ITS SOURCES.

- 1. How may religion be defined?
- I. In the abstract, religion signifies the relation which man as an intellectual and spiritual being sustains to God.
- II. In the concrete, religion signifies (1.) subjectively, that inward spiritual state and experience which justly corresponds to the reality of our relations to God; thus a religious man is one who has an inward religious experience; (2.) objectively, those doctrines, institutions, and practical observances whereby these relations of God to man, and of man to God are revealed and promulgated, and the duties corresponding to those relations are practiced. In this sense the Mahomedan is a false, and the Christian a true religion.—Dr. Hodge.
- 2. What is theology, and how is it to be distinguished from religion?

The English word theology is derived from the two Greek words, $\theta \epsilon \delta \varsigma$, $\lambda \delta \gamma \delta \varsigma$, signifying discourse concerning God, then that science which systematically comprehends all that is known to man concerning God, and our relations to him. The terms theology and religion are contrasted thus:

Religion is practical and experimental. Theology is scientific. Every religious man is a theologian just so far as his knowledge is accurate and comprehensive. Every true theologian must be a religious man as far as his knowledge is experimental. The more accurate and comprehensively systematic our religious knowledge, the more is it a theology; and the more real and practical our knowledge of God becomes, the more is our theology a religion.

Theology is to religion what physical science is to the practical arts. It is not essential, though it would be an evident advantage, if every artizan were a chemist, and every navigator an astronomer. Yet without science all art would be unintelligent and limited. Theology defines religion, and sets it upon a more certain ground. It purifies it from foreign alloy, and defends it from all hostile attacks. By making it more intelligent, it makes it more worthy of God, and more effective for the salvation of man.—Gaussen.

3. What is the distinction between natural and revealed theology?

✓ Natural theology is that science which proposes to itself the solution of these two great questions, 1st, Does God exist? and 2d, What may be legitimately ascertained concerning the true nature of God in himself, and concerning his relations to man, from the principles of human reason and conscience, or from the evidences of God's works, either in creation or providence. distinction here must be carefully observed between that knowledge of God to which the human reason was able to attain by means of its own unassisted powers independently of revelation, e. q., the theology of Plato and Cicero, and that knowledge of God which the human mind is now competent to deduce from the phenomena of nature under the clear light of a supernatural revelation, e. q., the theology of the modern rationalistic philosophers. Natural theology, as reached by unassisted reason, was fragmentary, inconsistent and uncertain. Natural theology, as appropriated and vindicated by reason under the clear light of revelation, is itself a strong witness to the truth and supernatural origin of that revelation.

Revealed theology, on the other hand, is that science which treats systematically, 1st, of the evidences authenticating the Christian revelation as from God; 2d, of the interpretation of the records which transmit that revelation to us; and 3d, of all the information furnished by those records of God and his relation to man, and of man and his relation to God.

4. What relation does Philosophy sustain to theology?

Philosophy includes, 1st, the systematic treatment of all that the reason of man teaches with regard to God, and those necessary and universal ideas, e. g., space and time, cause and effect, right and wrong, etc., which lie at the basis of all human thought.

2d. The discovery and systematic treatment of all the known facts of man's spiritual nature, *i.e.*, psychology, or the science of mind. 3d. The discovery and systematic treatment of all the known facts of God's works in material nature, *i.e.*, physical and physiological science in all their departments. 4th. The systematic treatment of all the known facts of God's direction of human actions in the events of history.

In its higher departments, philosophy includes the ground of natural theology, as explained under the preceding question.

In all its departments philosophy sustains to revealed theology solely the relation of an humble handmaid: 1st. By demonstrating the weakness and narrow limits of human reason, and the utter impossibility of the human mind, as at present constituted, either solving or finally dismissing certain insolvable questions conditioning every system of theological or philosophical thought. For "no difficulty emerges in theology which had not previously emerged in philosophy." Thus teaching "that humility is the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason," (Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 588), and thus proving the necessity for a supernatural revelation, and inculcating the necessity of a docile spirit upon the part of the interpreters of the inspired record. 2d. By helping us to understand more accurately the constitution of the human soul and the works of God in creation, and thus to interpret more intelligently the doctrines of revelation, as far as the constitution of man and the laws of outward nature are involved therein.

As a fact, however, the philosophy prevalent in any age or nation has always, because of the presumption of the human intellect, been allowed to intrude upon and pervert in a greater or less degree the cotemporaneous theology. Witness the influence of Neo-Platonism upon the early church; the supreme reign of the philosophy of Aristotle over the western church during the middle ages; the influence of the sensational philosophy of Hobes and Locke over the theological thinking of the school of Priestly in England, and of France during the last century, and of New England until to-day; the influence of the rationalistic philosophy of Leibnitz, Kant, etc., over the theology of Germany, France of the present day, and the followers of Coleridge and

Carlyle down to the Parker and Emerson school in America.—See Pearson on Infidelity, part ii., chap. 2.

- 5. What is the true source of an authoritative theology? and what are the three great parties which stand opposed to one another on this subject?
- I. The Rationalists, who are of different schools, (see below, question 8), yet unite in the common principle of exalting human reason as either the sole and sufficient source, or at least the measure and judge of all possible knowledge of God on the part of man.

II. The Romanists, who, denying that knowledge is necessary to genuine faith, or that faith is founded in any sense upon reason, maintain that the authority of the church as an infallible teacher is the ultimate foundation of all confidence, and that the Holy Scriptures, and ecclesiastical tradition as ascertained and interpreted by the church, are the sole sources of theological knowledge.—See below, chap. vi. and chap xxvii., question 6.

- III. Protestants occupy an intermediate position between the two extremes just stated. These hold (1.) That reason is an original revelation of God to man, and therefore no subsequent supernatural revelation can be given to man, which is not, a, addressed to us as rational beings, and through the channel of our reasons, and b, consistent with the clear and certain deductions of reason acting legitimately within her own sphere. (2.) As reason has, by all experience, been proved insufficient to guide man in religious knowledge, and as God has been pleased to put into our hands an infallible record of a supernatural and all-sufficient revelation of himself, therefore the ultimate ground of our confidence, and source of all our theological knowledge, is solely the word of God signified in the Holy Scriptures. (3.) Nevertheless, as revelation is addressed to our reason, (by reason including heart and conscience with the understanding), therefore its evidences are to be authenticated to reason, and the words of the record interpreted by reason according to her own laws.
- 6. How can the position of the Romish Church on this subject be disproved?

The Romish position with regard to ecclesiastical tradition

and the authority of the church as an inspired teacher are shown to be false in the chapter on "The Scriptures the only Rule of

Faith and Judge of Controversies."

I would say here in addition that the Romanist, in advocating his system of implicit faith, has to reason in order to prove that reason is a false guide. The Protestant, on the other hand, reasons in order to prove that reason in itself is insufficient, but that in her last result she leads to a revelation that reaches beyond, though it can not contradict her.

7. What are the different senses in which the term reason is used?

Sometimes the term reason is used as equivalent to the mere understanding as distinct from the higher moral and intuitive faculties of the soul. Sometimes it is used with exclusive reference to the à priori exercises of reason, in exclusion of all the materials of experience and history.

In this connection we, on the other hand, use the word reason to include the whole of man's faculty of knowing the truth as it exists at present in his fallen condition, informed by all the lights of his moral, emotional and spiritual nature, by his personal experience, and by all the natural light of the world without, as the works of God and the history of mankind.

8. What are the different positions held by the several classes of Rationalists?

The term Rationalist and Rationalistic have been used in different schools in very different senses. In general, however, it may be said, 1st, that in philosophy that system is rationalistic which, in a greater or less degree, starts from à priori principles constitutional to the human mind, and interprets all experience and history, except in those extreme systems where the validity of experience and history is altogether denied, in subordination to these principles. Thus every philosophical system may be said in some sense to be rationalistic which does not draw all knowledge from the bodily senses. But, 2d, in Christian theology that system is properly called rationalistic which either rejects the possibility of a supernatural revelation altogether, or which interprets the records of that revelation in subordination to the pre-

viously settled conclusions of the human intellect, or the intuitive sentiments of the human heart. Thus, when any philosophy whatsoever is allowed to modify the interpretation of the Scriptures by its own independent principles, the result is a rationalistic system, whether the philosophy so modifying them is itself rationalistic or eminently the reverse. For instance, 1st. The rationalism of Priestly and the old school of English and American Unitarians sprang from interpreting the Scriptures under the rule of the lowest sensational and materialistic philosophy. 2d. The rationalism of the modern Germans and their disciples in England and America springs from subjecting all revelation to the supreme rule of the à priori principles of reason. 3d. The rationalism of the new school of Newman and Parker, self-styled "spiritual," has its source in elevating the natural, moral intuitions and feelings common to all men to the seat of supreme judge.

It will serve a good purpose to group the different classes of rationalists thus.

- I. Those who deny the possibility and necessity of a supernatural revelation at all.
- (1.) The Pantheists of all schools. They maintain that since God is equally in all things and in all events, all phenomena are consequently equally modifications, and therefore equally revelations of him. There is a higher, though not more real sense, in which God reveals himself in man, and most conspicuously in heroic men, so that in a rising scale of revelation, God is in the same sense, though in different degrees, revealed in Plato, Moses, Paul, and Jesus Christ.
- (2.) Others, as F. W. Newman, Theodore Parker, etc., and intendency certainly Mr. Morell, in his "Philosophy of Religion," maintain that from the very nature of religion the object, and from the constitution of man the subject, of divine knowledge, no religious revelation is possible to man, except through the exercise of his natural faculty of spiritual intuition. Newman and Parker maintain that this intuition is sufficient for man in its normal state, and that there is therefore an element of permanent and universal truth common to Christianity and all other religions, while the special history and doctrines of all of them are the mere outward symbols which thinkers of the nineteenth century have outgrown. Morell, on the other hand, admits that in the

ase of the writers of the Christian Scriptures, this natural faculty of spiritual intuition was exalted in a manner very much the same is that which we understand by spiritual illumination, which accompanies every case of genuine Christian sanctification; thus the apostles were inspired only in so far as they were preëminently holy and profoundly experienced in divine things.

(3.) Others hold, like the old Deists, that no revelation has been given, because none was needed. Stealing their conceptions of God from revelation, they argue from the sufficiency of the knowledge which natural theology presents that no supernatural

revelation is necessary.

II. There remains another large class of rationalists, distinguished among themselves however by many special triats, and carrying their principles to very various degrees, who, while admitting the fact of a divine revelation, assert the right of reason to sit in judgment upon the truth, and to discriminate in the record the true from the false. Thus, (1.) different inspired books have been rejected on internal evidence. (2.) The supernatural element has been declared irrational. The old school rationalists denied that this element was in the Scriptures, and try by desperate feats of exegesis to prove it not there. The result of that controversy has anihilated that school of rationalists for ever. The new school admit that there is a supernatural element in the Scriptures, and that so far forth the Scriptures are not pure, rational truth, and are to be improved upon. (3.) The distinguishing doctrines of the gospel have either been rejected or radically perverted, because regarded in their genuine form inconsistent with man's innate, moral sentiments.—See Mansel's Lectures of Religious Thought, Lecture 1, and Pearson on Infidelity, Part I., chap. iii. and :v.

9. How may it be shown that a supernatural revelation is possible?

The natural sources through which men derive whatever knowledge they may attain to by nature are, 1st, Their bodily senses; 2d, Their inward consciousness informing them through the laws of their own mental, moral, and emotional constitution. 3d. By reflection and imagination these materials of knowledge are with infinite variety rearranged in new relations, and new



consequences are logically deduced from them. 4th. The experience and the results of the reflection of other men, conveyed to them through language.

Now it appears self-evident that the God who made man may at any time convey to men any new knowledge their faculties are

capable of receiving.

I. Even new simple ideas may be excited within his mind by means of a supernatural spiritual illumination and inward experience. God does act upon the finite soul, though we can not understand how he acts; and yet we can understand that if such an experience be excited in the mind, the man would have the same knowledge of the matter of this new experience that he has of the matter of his perceptions through his bodily senses.

II. It is clear that God may convey by means of visions, language or otherwise any information *not* involving new elementary ideas, just as any man may, by means of signs, convey any such information that he is possessed of to the mind of another.

Many modern rationalists make a very senseless objection to the possibility of what they call a "book revelation." They argue that a book is composed of words, and that words are mere arbitrary signs which have power to excite only those ideas which are already in the mind; and therefore if Paul, by a divine influence, had been elevated to the intuition of a new spiritual truth, he could not by words communicate those spiritual truths to any who have not already the same ideas latent in their minds. In answer to this, we admit that simple or elementary ideas can not be first taught by words. No man can know color without an eye, or moral right without a moral sense.—(See Lock's Essay, Book IV., chap. xviii, sect. 3.) But, on the other hand, it is too plain to be denied.

I. That the revelations of the Bible consist principally of facts, promises, commands, and threatenings, and that the reception of no new elementary ideas, in the proper sense of that word, is involved in Christian faith. The primary ideas of the soul, intellectual and moral, are involved in this revelation, and gloriously exalted in new combinations and relations.—See Alexander's Moral

Science, chaps. ii. and xii.

II. That God can convey to man, by means of language, information with regard to himself and his purposes, not involving

new elementary ideas, just as clearly and as certainly as one man can convey any new information to any other.

- III. The Scriptures themselves teach that the spiritual beauty and power of the revelation they convey can be discerned only by means of a supernatural spiritual illumination and inward practical experience. The work of the Spirit accompanying the word completes the revelation; and although the Spirit thus dispensed communicates no new truth, but only leads the heart and conscience to the experience of the full spiritual idea conveyed by the word, yet there is a true sense in which the Bible is a revelation only to those who have the Spirit.
- 10. How may it be shown that a supernatural revelation is necessary for man?
- I. From reason itself; for, although in man's original condition reason doubtless was a sufficient guide, yet reason itself teaches us (1.) that man's intellectual and moral nature is disordered and not capable of perfectly fulfilling its original functions. (2.) That man's relations to God are complicated by guilt and alienation, and that the light of nature discovers no remedy for men in this state.
- . II. The human heart universal craves such revelation from God, and has always manifested its readiness to receive even counterfeits of one in the absence of the true.
- III. Reason has never, in the entire course of human history, availed to afford man religious comfort and certainty, and to lead him in the way of moral rectitude.—1 Cor. i., 20, 21. Revelation has. Both have been tried upon a wide scale, the one has proved sufficient, the other has failed.
- IV. The highest prophets of reason are not agreed among themselves; no two prominent rationalists agree as to what the all sufficient and universal religious teaching of reason is. Their mutual inconsistency demonstrates the worthlessness of their common principle.
- 11. What is the distinction between reason and faith, and what in the legitimate use of reason in the sphere of religion?

The general definition of faith is, "assent to the truth upon the exhibition of its appropriate evidence," (see Chapter on Faith.) This assent in many of its modes is an act of the understanding alone, and in all cases it involves the action of the understanding, working concurrently with the will (or heart). But when we contrast faith and reason as mutually exclusive, then we define reason to be man's natural faculty of reaching the truth, including his understanding, heart, conscience, and experience, acting under natural circumstances, and without any supernatural assistance. And we define faith, on the other hand, to be the assent of the mind to truth, upon the testimony of God, conveying knowledge to us through supernatural channels. As to the authority and legitimate use of reason in the sphere of theology, Protestants admit,

I. That reason is the original and fundamental revelation of God to man.

II. Reason is therefore involved and presupposed in every other revelation God will ever give to man. The Scriptures address us as rational creatures, and to the irrational they are no more a revelation than light is to the blind.

III. God can not even be supposed to reveal any thing which contradicts reason, acting legitimately within her own province. For then (1.) would God, who speaks first in reason, contradict himself, and (2.) faith would be impossible. To believe is to assent to a thing as true. To see a thing to be contrary to reason is to see it not to be true. These opposite states of mind can not concur at the same time.

But, on the other hand, Protestants maintain that it is essential for us to settle definitely the limits of the office of reason with regard to divine things.

I. It is self-evident that there is a total difference between a thing being above reason, and its being clearly contrary to reason, acting legitimately in its own sphere. The ignorant boor has no right to measure the philosopher by his standard; and much less, of course, has the philosopher a right to measure God by his. Many things are claimed to be contrary to reason which only appear to be such because of our ignorance. "Humility becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation but of reason."

II. Human reason utterly fails to grasp the idea of the infinite, or to understand the relation of the infinite to the finite. From this universal incapacity springs the mystery which attends

so many of the revelations and providential dispensations of the infinite God. Hence the insolvable nature of such questions as the origin of evil, divine foreknowledge, foreordination, and concurrent próvidence with relation to the free agency of man, etc., etc.

III. Hence it follows that reason can not be the measure of our faith; we must believe, and that rationally, much that we can not understand. We must use reason to reach the knowledge of what God means by his words, and what he would have us believe. But to understand the meaning of words is one thing, and to understand how the thing we believe exists in all of its relations, is entirely a different thing. We believe ten thousand things with respect to the phenomena of our earthly life that we can not understand; how much more may we do so rationally with respect to the information conveyed to us by a supernatural revelation concerning divine things.

IV. Hence it follows that reason can not be the ultimate ground of our faith; this rests only upon the knowledge and truth of God, who speaks to us in his word. Reason established the fact that God speaks, but when we know what he says, we believe it because he says it.

The use of reason in the sphere of theology is, 1st, to examine the authenticating evidence of revelation, and to decide the fact that God is speaking therein.

2d. To interpret, with the help of every light of the most various learning, the records of revelation, and to determine impartially what God does say to us therein.

This work of interpretation includes besides the grammatical rendering of every text by itself, the careful comparison of Scripture with Scripture, the limitation of one class of passages by another bearing upon the same subject, and thus a development, by an impartial induction from all Scripture, of the entire harmonious system of truth God has therein revealed.

3d. Be it remembered that reason can accomplish this much successfully only as it is informed by a sanctified heart, and guided by the Holy Ghost.

4th. Reason can be of further use in this matter only as the servant and instrument of faith, in promulgating, illustrating, and in defending the truth.

12. Give a summary statement of the different departments of Christian theology?

The three grand departments of Christian theology are, I. The Exegetical, the object of which is to arrive at the exact mind of the Holy Spirit in the interpretation of the text. This department includes as preparatory the study of the original languages. the critical settlement of the text in its integrity, also Biblical geography, antiquities, and the science of the Old Testament types in their relation to the gospel.

II. The Dogmatic, or Systematic, the object of which is by means of a just comparison and impartial induction from the sacred text truly interpreted, to present a scientific exhibition of all the doctrines of the Bible in their essential relations. This includes (1.) Anthropology, or the teaching of the Scripture concerning man and his relation to God. (2.) Theology proper, or the doctrine concerning God and his relation to man, and (3.) Soterology, or the doctrine of salvation.

III. The Practical, the object of which is to deduce from the doctrines and precepts of the Bible rules for the organization and administration of the Christian Church in all her functions, and for the guidance of the individual Christian in all the relations of life.

CHAPTER III.

THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

1. How may the evidences authenticating the truth of Christianity be classified?

They have been most commonly classified as, 1st. External, i.e., Those evidences which accompanied the persons who acted as the organs of revelation and authenticated their claims, e.g., miracles and prophecy. 2d. Internal, i.e., Those evidences which are inherent in the divine message and in the inspired records thereof, such as may be decided without any reference to external sources of fact and testimony, e.g., the moral perfection of the Christian system, the miraculous harmony of all the books, the supernatural intelligence they discover, the spiritual power of the truth, etc., etc.

Another classification, less common, but more exact, may be founded upon the distinction between the different principles of the human soul to which the several kinds of evidence are addressed. Thus, 1st. The rational evidence, or that which presents itself to the rational faculties of man. This class embraces the evidence of history, miracles, prophecy, undesigned coincidences, general harmony of records, etc. 2d. The moral evidence, or that which presents itself to the judgment of the moral sense. 3d. Spiritual evidence, or that which, can be judged only by the spiritual man as the result of his personal experience of the power of these truths when spiritually discerned.

A third classification may be presented thus, 1st. These various sources of evidence theoretically considered, i. e., treated by the understanding as the basis of a theoretical judgment. 2d. That practical evidence which results from putting the principles of Christianity, its precepts and promises to the test of practical experience.

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Without following either of these principles exclusively, I shall attempt to establish the following positions in the order.

1st. God and human nature, being what they are clearly known to be in the mere light of reason and experience, a special revelation from God to man is antecedently in the highest sense probable.

2d. The Old and New Testaments, whether the word of God* or not, are, beyond question, both genuine and authentic historical records.

3d. The miracles alleged in evidence of the Christian religion are established as facts by abundant testimony, and when admitted as facts they invincibly demonstrate the religion they accompany to be from God.

4th. The same is true with regard to the prophesies contained in the Scriptures. The truth of Christianity is established also—

5th. By the miraculous harmony of all the books, and by the other phenomena of supernatural knowledge which they present.

6th. By the character of the moral system they teach.

7th. By the character of its Founder.

8th. By the spiritual power of Christianity, as testified in the religious experience of its individual subjects, and also by its wider influence over communities and nations in successive generations.

9th. By the history of its early successes.

2. How can it be proved that a supernatural revelation from God to man is antecedently probable?

We have already exhibited the evidences derived from the evident traces of design in the creation, and from the no less evident character of that design in its relation to sensitive creatures, and from the phenomena of conscience, that God is infinitely intelligent, benevolent, and righteous. He not only provides for all the wants of his creatures as they occur, but he always adapts their condition and circumstances to the nature with which he has endowed them.

But the preëminent characteristics of man are: 1st. That he is a moral agent, and therefore needs a clearly revealed rule of duty. 2d. That he is essentially religious. Universal history proves the universality and supreme power of this principle in the human heart.

In a state of nature this craving after God uniformly reveals

man's moral and religious darkness. Fear and uncertainty characterize every one of the thousand forms assumed by false religions, and the heart of man everywhere longs for light and certainty.—Acts xvii., 23.

The intelligence of God leads us to hope that he has adapted the means to the end, and that he will crown a religious nature

with a supernatural religion.

The benevolence of God leads us to hope that he will relieve the grievous bewilderment and avert the danger of his creatures.

The righteousness of God leads us to hope that he will speak

in distinct and authorative tones to the conscience.

Having already revealed himself in nature, though only sufficiently to stimulate us to uncertain and painful action, we may surely hope that by a second revelation he will lead us to certainty, if not to peace.

- 3. What two points are involved in the proposition, that the sacred Scriptures, whether the word of God or not, are yet unquestionably genuine and authentic historical records?
- 1st. That the Old and New Testaments were written respectively by the several writers, and in the several ages which they themselves set forth, and that they have come down to us without material change.
- 2d. That these writers were honest and intelligent, men who proposed to themselves to write authentic history.
- 4. How can it be proved that these books were written by the authors, by whom, and at the times in which they respectively profess to have been written?

The evidence establishing this fact in behalf of both Testaments is greater than that establishing the genuineness of all other ancient writings put together. This evidence is set forth at large under Chapter VI., on the Canon. They may be summarily indicated thus:—

1st. These writings are in the precise language, dialect, and general style which are known to be proper to their professed authors and age.

2d. The Jews and Christians, who were cotemporaries of the authors of these books, received them as inspired, circulated them

in all synagogues and churches, transcribed and preserved them with superstitious care.

3d. There remain to this day, among both Jews and Christians, those institutions and monuments the origin of which these records relate as part of their cotemporaneous history; the fact of the institution verifying, of course, both the credibility of the writings and the cotemporaneousness of their origin respectively with that of the institutions they describe.

4th. As to the Old Testament. The Pentateuch has been in the keeping of hostile parties, Jewish and Samaritan, since at least six or seven hundred years before Christ. The whole Old Testament has been in the custody both of Jews and Christians ever since the birth of Christ.

5th. The evidence borne by ancient versions.

6th. The testimony of Josephus and the Christian Fathers of the first three centuries, presented in their lists of the sacred books and numerous quotations from them.

5. How can it be proved that these writings contain authentic history ?

1st. Leslie, in his "Short Method with the Deists," sets down the four following marks as establishing, when they all meet together, beyond all doubt the truth of any matter of fact.

(1.) That the matter of fact be such that men's outward

senses may be judges of it.

(2.) That it be done openly in the face of the world.

(3.) That not only public monuments be kept up in memory of it, but some outward action be performed.

(4.) That such monuments and such actions be instituted, and do commence from the time that the matter of fact was done.

All of these marks concur in establishing the truth of the most remarkable facts related in the inspired records, and consequently in confirming their truth as a whole. These monuments and actions are such as follows: The weekly Sabbath, circumcision, the passover, the yearly feasts, the Aaronic priesthood, the temple and its services, baptism, the Lord's supper, and the Christian ministry. These must date from the facts they commemorate, and prove that the cotemporaries of those facts, and

every generation of their descendants since, have believed the history to be authentic.

2d. Many of the principal facts are corroborated by nearly cotemporary infidel writers, as Josephus, Tacitus, Pliny, etc.

3d. Many of the facts of the gospel history are corroborated by, it is said, as many as fifty Christian authors of the first four centuries.—Angus' Bible Handbook, page 85.

4th. The sacred historians are perfectly accurate whenever they allude to any facts of cotemporaneous profane history, e. g., Luke ii., 1, etc.—See Conybeare and Howson's Life of St. Paul.

5th. The character of the writers. (1.) They were honest a because their doctrine was holy—bad men never would have taught such a code, good men would not wilfully deceive; b, because both prophets and apostles sealed their testimony by their sufferings and death; and c because of their evident candor in narrating many things to their own disadvantage, personally, and apparently inimical to the interests of their cause.—See Paley's Evidences, Part II. (2.) They were not fanatics, because the modesty and moderation of their words and actions is as manifest as their zeal.

6th. There exists the most accurate agreement between the several historical books, as to matters of fact, and such subtle coincidences as to details between narratives widely differing in form and purpose, that all suspicion of fraud is rendered impossible.—See Paley's Horæ Paulinæ and Blunt's Undesigned Coincidences.

7th. All of their geographical and local allusions and references to the customs of ancient nations are verified by modern research.

6. What is a miracle, and how are such events designated in Scripture?

A miracle is an act of God, the physical effect of which is visible and evidently incapable of being rationally assigned to any natural cause, designed as a sign authenticating the divine mission of some religious teacher.

These are called, therefore, in the New Testament sometimes, ξογα, works, John v., 36; vii., 21; sometimes, σημεῖον, α sign, Mark xvi., 20; sometimes, δυνάμεις, translated in our version, wonderful works, Matthew vii., 22, and mighty works, Matthew

xi., 20, and miracles, Acts ii., 22; sometimes, τέρας, wonder. "Signs, wonders, and powers, or miracles," occur together, Acts ii., 22; 2 Corinthians xii., 12; Hebrews ii., 4.

7. What is Hume's famous argument against the credibility of miracles, and how may that argument be disposed of?

Hume argues, 1st, that miracles are professedly established on the evidence of human testimony. 2d. That the power of human testimony to induce our faith arises from our experience of the truthfulness of testimony. 3d. In cases of conflicting evidence we must weigh the one against the other and decide for the stronger. 4th. That a miracle is a violation of a law of nature. But the universal experience of ourselves, and of the whole human family, prove that the laws of nature are uniform without exception. We have, then, universal experience against the testimony of a few men, and, on the other hand, only a partial experience that human testimony is credible, for all testimony is not true. No amount of human testimony, therefore, the credibility of which is guaranteed only by a partial experience, can induce a rational belief that the laws of nature were suspended, because their absolute uniformity is established by universal experience.

In answer we admit that universal experience establishes the uniformity of a law of nature as such. But it is this precisely that makes a miracle possible, otherwise we could not discriminate between the natural and the supernatural. A miracle is a supernatural act, and universal experience testifies nothing upon the subject, further than that nature being uniform, a supernatural act might be recognized as such, if it occurred. Negative evidence has no force against well established positive evidence. But the fact that men in China never saw a miracle in six thousand years proves absolutely nothing as to whether men in Judea did or did not see them on many occasions.

More men and worthier have seen miracles than ever were in a condition to prove by testimony the descent of meteoric stones. Does water never freeze because universal experience in Africa knows nothing of such a phenomenon?

Hume argued that miracles are incredible, that even if they occurred they could not be established on the evidence of human testimony. Stauss, and the German Pantheists generally, main-

tain that miracles are impossible. They hold nature to be an eternal and necessary development of God, it, therefore, can not be suspended or violated. A miracle, therefore, being a suspension of the laws of nature, is impossible.

8. How far do miracles, when the fact of their occurrence is clearly established, avail to authenticate a divine revelation?

Some object that miracles may be wrought by evil spirits in support of the kingdom of darkness, Matthew xxiv., 24; 2 Thessalonians ii., 9; Revelations xiii., 13. To this class they refer witcheraft, sorcery, spirit-rapping, etc., (see Trench on Miracles, Preliminary Essays, chap. iii.) But surely the genuine miracle, being an act of God, can always, as every other divine act, be distinguished from the works of Satan. The marks are, the character of the person and of the doctrine in authentication of which the miracle is wrought, and the character of the miracle itself. Jesus constantly appeals to the miracles which he wrought as conclusive evidence as to the divinity of his mission.—John v., 36 and xiv., 11; Hebrews ii., 4.

- 9. In what essential qualities is the unquestionable genuineness of the New Testament miracles made manifest.?
- 1st. The dignity, power and benevolence of the works themselves.
- 2d. The peerless dignity and purity of the men whose missions they authenticated.

3d. The purity and spiritual power of the doctrines they ac-

company.

4th. Moreover, God's revelation constitutes one system, evolved gradually through seventeen centuries from Moses to the Apostle John, every step of which mutually gives and receives authentication from all that precedes and follows. Taking the two dispensations in their historical, typical and prophetical relations, the miracles performed in their several epochs mutually confirm one another.

Besides all this, the gospel miracles were definite, and unquestionably supernatural events, and were easily seen and recognized as such by all intelligent witnesses; they were performed in the sight of multitudes in various places, and on different occasions;

they were accurately recorded by several witnesses who, while varying as to details, corroborate each other; and they were never disproved by early enemies, nor doubted by early friends.

10. What is a prophecy, and how does it avail to authenticate a revelation claiming to be divine?

Prophecy has been well described as a miracle of knowledge, as those works of God, commonly so called, are miracles of power. A prophecy is a communication by God of supernatural knowledge concerning the future, with the design of proving thereby the divine origin of a message claiming to be from God.

A miracle of power proves itself such at once, and is then handed down to future generations only by the testimony of eyewitnesses. A prophecy, or miracle of knowledge, proves itself to be such only subsequently by its fulfillment, while, on the other hand, it has the advantage of always remaining a monument of its own truth, cotemporaneous with every succeeding generation.

Besides verbal prophecies, the Old Testament is full of types, or prophetical symbols, which have their exact fulfillment in the person and works of Christ.

11. What are the discriminating marks which must necessarily concur in any unquestionably authentic prophecy?

1st. It must have been uttered as a prophecy from the beginning. A happy coincidence must not be allowed to occasion such a claim as an after-thought.

2d. The prophecy must have a definite meaning, which is brought to light and put beyond question by the fulfillment. The more definite the statement, and the greater number of details corresponding between the prophecy and the event, the more conclusive is the evidence.

3d. The prophecy must not be of such a character that it can lead to its own fulfillment, by way of suggestion to the human agents engaged therein.

4th. It must be worthy of God, as to dignity and purity, both in its own character and in the system of faith and practice with which it is associated.—Dr. McGill in University Lectures.

12. State some of the more remarkable instances of fulfilled prophecy.

Ist. Old Testament prophecies concerning, (1.), the present state of the Jews.—Hosea, ix., 17; Jer. xxiv., 9, and (2.), Tyre, Isa. chap. xxiii.; Joel iii., 4–6; Ezek. chaps. xxvi.—xxviii.; Amos i., 9 and 10; Zech. ix., 1–8. (3.) Nineveh, Nahum, i., 8, 9; ii., 8–13; iii., 17–19, and Zeph. ii., 13–15. (4.) Babylon, Is. chaps. xiii., xiv., xliv., and xlv.; Jer. chaps. l. and li. (5.) The Chaldean, Medeo-Persian, Grecian and Roman empires, Dan. ii., 31–45; vii., 17–20, and chaps. viii. and ix.

2d. The Old Testament predictions concerning Christ. Gen. xlix., 10; Is. vii., 14; ix., 6 and 7; xi., 1 and 2; xlii., 1-4, and chap. liii.; Dan. ix., 24-27; Ps. xvi., 10; Zech. xi., 12, 13; Hag.

ii., 6-9; Mal. iii., 1; Micah, v., 2.

3d. The predictions uttered by Christ and the Apostles. (1.) The destruction of Jerusalem, Matt. chap. xxiv; Mark, chap. xiii., and Luke, chap. xxi. (2.) The anti-Christian apostacy, 2 Thess. ii., 3-12; 1 Tim. iv., 1-4.—Hornes' Introduction.

13. Show that the relation which the different books of Scripture and their contents sustain to each other prove them to constitute one divinely inspired whole.

This wonderful constitution of the sacred volume is a miracle of intelligence, the authenticating evidence of which is, therefore, analogous to that furnished by prophecy. It consists of sixtysix separate books, including every form of composition on every variety of subject, composed by about forty different writers of every condition in life, from peasant to prince, writing at intervals through seventeen centuries of time, from Moses to the death of the Apostle John. These men develope a revelation which is constantly unfolding itself through all those years. The preparatory portions served a temporary purpose in the immediate circumstances under which they were written, yet their true significance lay hid in their typical and prophetical relation to the parts that were to come. Now that we possess the whole, we can easily see that during all those years those various writers elaborated, without concert, one work; each subordinate part finding its highest reason in the great center and keystone of the whole, the person of Christ. Each successive part fulfilled all that has preceded it, and adjusted itself prophetically to all that came after. The preparatory system as a whole is fulfilled in the gospel; each type in its anti-type, each prophecy in its event. This intelligence is the mind of God, which is the same through all times, and which, adjusting all details, comprehends all in one end.—Dr. R. J. Breckenridge in University Lectures.

14. In what other respects do the Scriptures present the phenomena of a supernatural intelligence?

Every other ancient writing, attempting to set forth the origin, nature and destiny of man, whether it be professedly divine, as the Hindoo Veds, or simply the record of human speculation, as the works of Aristotle and Plato, betrays total ignorance as to astronomy, geography, terrestrial physics, and as to the intellectual and spiritual nature of man. Modern science overthrows the claims of every uninspired ancient writing to authority on these subjects. But observe,

1st. The Scriptures teach us all we know concerning the early history of the human race and the colonization of the principal divisions of the earth. The facts which they reveal explain much otherwise dark, and they come in contact with not one well established fact otherwise known.—Gen. chap. 10.

2d. This early history gives us the only known, and, in the view of reason, a transcendently luminous explanation, of many questions growing out of the painful mystery of man's present moral condition and relations.

3d. These writings alone, of all ever written, are entirely free from all the errors and prejudices of the age and people from whom they sprang; and from the earliest ages the results of human science, in its gradual advance, have without a single exception fallen into perfect harmony with them, so that the writings of Moses, sixteen centuries B. C., stand fully abreast of the last attainments of the human mind in the ninteenth century after Christ.

4th. The Ten Commandments, as a generalized statement of all human duties, the Proverbs of Solomon, as the highest lessons of practical wisdom, the Psalms of David, as utterances of the most profound religious experiences, all have remained for thirty centuries unapproachably the best of their kind.

5th. No other writing has exercised such power over the human conscience, or probed so deeply the human heart. This power it has tested upon the ignorant and the learned, the savage and the

efined, the virtuous and the vicious, the young and the old, of wery generation and tribe of men. Yet these books proceeded from the Jewish nation, a people rude and ignorant, and more narrow and bigoted than any other, and from writers chiefly drawn from the least educated classes. Surely they must have been moved by the Spirit of God.

15. How may the divine origin of Christianity be argued from its moral character?

It is neither a well-founded nor a safe position for the advocates of revelation to assume that they are competent to form an à priori judgment of the kind of revelation that God ought to make. Yet let it be considered that, although we cannot always know what it is wise for God to do, nor see the wisdom of all he has done, yet we can infallibly discern in his works the presence of a supernatural intelligence. Precisely so we cannot prescribe what it is right for God to do, nor always understand the righteousness of what he has done, nevertheless we can infallibly discern in his word a moral excellence and power altogether superhuman.

The moral system taught in the Bible is—

1st. The most perfect standard of righteousness ever known among men. (1.) It respects the inward state of the soul. (2.) The virtues which it inculcates, although many of them are repugnant to human pride, are, nevertheless, more essentially excellent than those originally set forth in any other system, e. g., humility, meckness, long-suffering, patience, love the fulfilling of the law, and the intrinsic hatefulness and ill desert of all sin.

2d. This morality is set forth as a duty we owe to an infinite God. His will is the rule, his love the motive, his glory the end of all duty.

3d. It is enforced by the highest possible motives, e. g., infinite happiness and honor as the objects of God's approbation, or infinite misery and shame as the objects of his displeasure.

4th. This moral system is perfectly adapted to the whole nature of man, physical, intellectual, moral, and to all of the multiform relations which he sustains to his fellow-men and to God. It includes every principle and rules every thought and emotion, and provides for every relation. It is never guilty of the least

solecism. It never falls below the highest right, and yet never generates enthusiasm or fanaticism, nor does it ever fail in any unexpected development of relations or circumstances.

Hence we conclude—

Ist. That this system necessarily presupposes upon the part of its constructors a supernatural knowledge of man's nature and relations, and a supernatural capacity of adapting general principles to the moral regulation of that nature under all relations.

2d. This system, when compared with all others known to man, necessarily suggests the possession by its constructors of a

supernaturally perfect ideal of moral excellence.

3d. Bad men never could have conceived such a system, nor having conceived it, would they have desired, much less died, to to establish it. Good men never could have perpetrated such a fraud as the Bible is if not true.

16. How is the divine origin of Christianity proved by the character of its Founder?

That character, as it is known to us, is the resultant of the biographical contributions severally of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. They evidently write without concert, and each with a special immediate object. They, in the most candid and inartificial manner, detail his words and actions; they never generalize or sketch his character in abstract terms, nor attempt to put their subject, or the word or action related of him, in an advantageous light.

Yet this character of Christ is-

1st. Identical, (see Paley's Ev., Part II., chap. iv.,) i. e., these four different writers succeed in giving us one perfectly consistent character in every trait of thought, feeling, word, and action. They must have drawn therefore from the life. Such a composition by four different hands, writing in their inartificial, unsystematic way, would be the most incredible of all miracles.

2d. Unique and original. There have been many other redeemers, prophets, priests, and incarnate gods portrayed in mythology; but this character confessedly stands without the shadow of competition in universal history or fiction. And Jews,

of all men, were the authors of it.

3d. Morally and spiritually perfect, by the confession of all

friends and foes. This perfection was not merely a negative freedom from taint, but the most positive and active holiness, and the miraculous blending of all virtues, strength, and gentleness, dignity and lowliness, unbending righteousuess and long-suffering patience and costliest grace.

He must then have existed as he is portrayed. The conception and execution of such a character by man would, as J. J. Rousseau confesses, be a greater miracle than its existence. If he existed he must have been the divine being he claimed. A miracle of intelligence, he could not have been deceived. A miracle of moral perfection, he could not have been an impostor.

17. How is the Christian religion proved to be divine by the spiritual power of its doctrines, and by the experience of all who sincerely put its precepts, provisions, and promises to the test of a practical trial?

Although man can not by his unassisted powers discover God, yet surely it belongs essentially to his spiritual nature that he can recognize God when he speaks.

Ist. The word of God reaches to and proves its power upon such deep and various principles of man's nature that even the unregenerate man recognizes its origin. It is a "fire and a hammer;" it is a "discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart.—Jer. xxiii., 29; Heb. iv., 12. This profound grasp that the word takes of human nature is in spite of the fact that it degrades human pride, forbids the gratification of lust, and imposes irksome duties and restraints upon the will. The mass of men are held subject to its power against their will. This is paralleled in no other religion.

2d. All who faithfully put this revelation to the test of practice finds it to be true in the deepest experiences of their souls.

(1.) They experience as realities all it sets forth as promises. It does secure the forgiveness of their sins, their communion with God and joy in the Holy Ghost. "Doing his will they know the origin of his doctrines.—John vii., 17. (2.) They are witnesses to others. Men are by nature aliens from God and servants of sin. This revelation pledges itself that it can deliver them, and that none other can. The sum of all human experience upon the point is, that many Christians have been made thereby new and spiri-

tual men, and that no other system ever produced such an effect.—
2 Cor. iii., 2, 3. Dr. R. J. Breckenridge's Univ. Lecture. (3.) This revelation makes provision also for all human wants. The more a man advances in religious experience the more does he find how infinitely adapted the grace of the gospel is to all possible spiritual exigencies and capacities; witness regeneration, justification, adoption, sanctification, the intercession of the Son, the indwelling of the Spirit, the working together of all events in the spheres of providence and grace for our good, the resurrection of the body, eternal glory. And, as far as our earthly life goes, all these are actually experienced in their truth, their fullness, and their infinite capability of accommodation to every form of character and circumstance.

18. How may the divine origin of Christianity be proved from its effects, as witnessed in the broad phenomena of communities and nations?

Christianity, when entering very disproportionately into any community, has often been counteracted by opposing influences acting from without, and often adulterated by the intrusion of foreign elements; some philosophical, as the new Platonism of the early church, and to e Rationalism and Pantheism of the present day; some traditional and hierarchical, as the Catholicism of the middle ages. Its sacred name has thus often been sacrilegiously ascribed to religious systems altogether alien to itself. Our argument however is—

Ist. That whenever the Christianity of the Bible is allowed free course, to that extent its influence has been wholly beneficial.

· 2d. That this influence has, as an unquestionable historical fact, availed to raise every race in the exact proportion of their Christianity to an otherwise never attained level of intellectual, moral and political advancement. If we compare ancient Greece and Rome with England or America; modern Spain, Italy and Austria with Scotland; the Waldenses with Rome of the Middle Ages; the Moravians with the Parisians; the Sandwich Islands and New Zealand with the gospel, with themselves before its advent, the conclusion is inevitable.

1st. That Bible Christianity alone furnishes a world embrac-

ing civilization, which adapted to man as man re-connects in one system the scattered branches of the human family.

2d. That only under its light has ever been discovered among men (1), a rational natural theology, or (2), a true philosophy

whether physical or psychological.

3d. That under its direct influence, and under its reign alone, have (1), the masses of the people been raised, and general education diffused, (2), woman been respected and elevated to her true position and influence, and (3), generally religious and civil liberty realized upon a practical conservative basis.

4th. That precisely in proportion to its influence have the morals of every community, or generation, been more pure, and the active fruits of that holy love which is the basis of all morality more abundant; as witness the provision made for the relief of all suffering, and the elevation of all classes of the degraded.

Hence we conclude, 1st. No imposture could have accomplished such uniform good. 2d. No system, merely human, could have achieved results so constant, so far-reaching and profound.

19. What argument for the truth of Christianity may be drawn from the history of its early successes?

Our argument is that Christianity extended itself over the Roman empire, under circumstances and by means unparalleled in the propagation of any other religion, and such as necessitates upon our part the belief in the presence of a supernatural agency.

The facts are, 1st. Christianity was bitterly repudiated and persecuted by the Jews among whom it originated, and to whose Scriptures it appealed. 2d. Its first teachers were Jews, the most universally abominated race in the empire, and for the most part illiterate men. 3d. It appealed to multitudes of witnesses for the truth of many open facts, which if untrue could easily have been disproved. 4th. It condemned absolutely every other religion, and refused to be assimilated to the cosmopolitan religion of imperial Rome. 5th. It opposed the reigning philosophies. 6th. It humbled human pride, laid imperative restraint upon the governing passions of the human heart, and taught prominently the moral excellence of virtues which were despised as weaknesses by the heathen moralists. 7th. From the first it settled and fought its way in the greatest centers of the worless philosophy and re-

finement, as Antioch, Alexandria, Athens, Corinth and Rome, and here it achieved its victories during the Augustan and immediately succeeding age. 8th. It was for three hundred years subject to a persecution, at the hands both of the people and the government, universal, protracted and intense. 9th. It achieved its success only by means of the instrumentality of testimony, argument, example and persuasion.

Nevertheless, the "little flock" became, soon after the ascension five thousand, Acts, iv. 4, and increased continuously by multitudes, Acts, v. 14. The heathen writers Tacitus and Pliny testify to the rapid progress of this religion during the first, and Justin Martyr, Tertullian and Origen during the second and the first part of the third century. So much so that the conversion of Constantine during the first part of the fourth century was politic, even if it was sincere, as the mass of the intelligence, worth and wealth of the empire had passed over to Christianity before him.—Paley's Ev., Part II., chap. ix., sec. 1.

20. How does Gibbon attempt to destroy the force of this argument in the fifteenth chapter of his history?

Without denying the presence of any supernatural element, he covertly insinuates that the early successes of Christianity may be adequately accounted for by five secondary causes. 1st. "The inflexible, or if we may use the expression, the intolerant zeal of the Christians." 2d. "The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficiency to that important truth." 3d. "The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church." 4th. "The pure and austere morals of the Christians." 5th. "The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent state in the midst of the Roman empire."

This is a very superficial view of the matter. As to the "1st." pretended secondary cause above quoted, it is itself the effect that needs to be accounted for. In the face of contempt and death it did not produce itself.

As to the "2d" cause cited we answer (1.) that this doctrine could have produced no effect until it was believed, and the belief of men in it is the very effect to be accounted for. (2.) The

doctrine of future torments has not, in modern experience, been found attractive to wicked men.

As to the "3d" cause we answer, (1.) if the miracles were real, then Christianity is from God. (3.) If false, they certainly would rather have betrayed than advanced the imposture.

As to the "4th" cause, the superior morality of Christians, we admit the fact.

As to the "5th" cause, we answer (1.) that this federative union among Christians could not exist until after the previous universal extension of their religion. (2.) That it did not exist until the close of the second century; and (3.) before Constantine it was only the union in danger of a despised and persecuted sect.—See Dr. M. D. Hoge's University Lecture.

21. Does the whole of the foregoing evidence in vindication of Christianity amount to a demonstration?

This evidence, when fully brought out and applied, has availed in time past to repel the just force of every infidel objection, and to render invincible the faith of many of the most powerful and learnedly informed intellects among men. It is adapted to reach and influence the minds of all classes of men; it addresses itself to every department of human nature, to the reason, the emotions, the conscience, and it justifies itself by experience; in its fullness it renders all unbelief sin, and sets intelligent faith within impregnable bulwarks. It is not, however, of the nature of mathematical demonstration. The evidence being that of testimony, of the moral power of truth, and of the practical verification of experience, of course prejudice, moral obliquity, refusal to apply the test of experience, must all prevent the evidence from producing conviction. Faith must be free, not mechanically coerced. Besides, many difficulties and absolutely insolvable enigmas attend this subject, because of the natural insurmountable limits of human thought. The evidences of Christianity thus constitute a considerable element in man's present probation, and a very adequate test of moral character.

22. What, in fact, is the principal class of evidence to which the Scriptures appeal, and upon which the faith of the majority of believers rests?

I. The moral evidence inherent in the truth and in the person of Jesus.—See questions 15 and 16.

II. The sanctifying effect of Christianity, as exhibited in the

persons of Christian acquaintances.

III. The personal experience of the spiritual power of Christianity.—See question 17.

This kind of evidence stands first in practical importance, be-

cause,

1st. The Scriptures command faith (1.), as soon as the Bible is opened upon intrinsic evidence, (2.) of all men, without exception, even the most ignorant.

2d. The Scriptures make belief a moral duty and unbelief a

sin, Mark xvi., 14.

3d. They declare that unbelief does not arise from excusable weakness of the reason, but from an "evil heart," Hebrews iii., 12.

4th. A faith resting upon such grounds is more certain and stable than any other, as the noble army of martyrs witness.

5th. A faith founded upon moral and spiritual evidence surpasses all others in its power to purify the heart and transform the character.

CHAPTER IV.

INSPIRATION.

The Christian religion having been proved to be from God, it remains to inquire what is the infallible source through which we may derive the knowledge of what Christianity really is. The Protestant answer to this question is, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, having been given by inspiration of God, are the only and all-sufficient rule of faith and judge of controversies. We will now establish the first of these propositions.

THE SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS ARE INSPIRED, AND THEREFORE INFALLIBLE.

1. What, in general terms, is the nature of inspiration?

Inspiration is that divine influence which, accompanying the sacred writers equally in all they wrote, secured the infallible truth of their writings in every part, both in idea and expression, and determined the selection and distribution of their material according to the divine purpose. The nature of this influence, just as the nature of the divine operation upon the human soul in providence, in regeneration, or in sanctification, is of course entirely inscrutable. The result of this influence, however, is both plain and certain, viz., to render their writings an infallible rule of faith and practice. See Dr. Hodge's article on Inspiration, Bib. Rep., October 1857.

2. In what respects do inspiration and revelation differ?

Revelation properly signifies the supernatural communication of any truth not before known. This revelation may be made either immediately to the mind of the recipient, or mediately through words, signs, or vision, or through the intervention of an

inspired prophet. Inspiration, on the other hand, signifies simply that divine influence which renders a writer or speaker infallible in communicating truth, whether previously known or not. Some men have received revelations who were not inspired to communicate them, e. g., Abraham. Nearly all the sacred writers were inspired to communicate with infallible accuracy much that they knew by natural means, such as historical facts; much that they reached by the natural use of their faculties, such as logical deduction, and much that was suggested by their own natural affections.

Inspiration, therefore, while it controlled the writer, so that all he wrote was infallibly true, and to the very purpose for which God designed it, yet left him free in the exercise of his natural faculties, and to the use of materials drawn from different sources, both natural and supernatural. On the other hand, revelation supernaturally conveyed to the writer only that knowledge which, being unknown to him, was yet necessary to complete the design of God in his writing. This revelation was effected in different ways, as by mental suggestion or visions, or audible voices, etc. Sometimes the revelation was made to the writer's conscious intelligence, and then he was inspired to transmit an infallible record of it. Sometimes the writer was used by the Holy Spirit as a mere instrument in executing an infallible record of that which to himself conveyed no intelligible sense, e.g., some of the prophesies.—1 Pet. i., 10–12.

3. How do inspiration and spiritual illumination differ?

Spiritual illumination is an essential element in the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit common to all true Christians. It never leads to the knowledge of new truth, but only to the personal discernment of the spiritual beauty and power of truth already revealed in the Scriptures.

Inspiration is a special influence of the Holy Spirit peculiar to the prophets and apostles, and attending them only in the exercise of their functions as accredited teachers. Most of them were the subjects both of inspiration and spiritual illumination. Some, as Balaam, being unregenerate were inspired, though destitute of spiritual illumination.

4. State what is meant by theological writers by the inspiration "of superintendence," "of elevation," "of direction," and

" of suggestion."

Certain writers on this subject, confounding the distinction between inspiration and revelation, and using the former term to express the whole divine influence of which the sacred writers were the subjects, first, in knowing the truth, second, in writing it, necessarily distinguish between different degrees of inspiration in order to accommodate their theory to the facts of the case. Because, first, some of the contents of Scripture evidently might be known without supernatural aid, while much more as evidently could not; second, the different writers exercised their natural faculties, and carried their individual peculiarities of thought, feeling, and manner into their writings.

By the "inspiration of superintendance," these writers meant precisely what we have above given as the definition of inspiration. By the "inspiration of elevation," they meant that divine influence which exalted their natural faculties to a degree of

energy otherwise unattainable.

By the "inspiration of direction," they meant that divine influence which guided the writers in the selection and disposition of their material.

By the "inspiration of suggestion," they meant that divine influence which directly suggested to their minds new, and otherwise unattainable truth.

5. What objections may be fairly made to these distinctions?

1st. These distinctions spring from a prior failure to distinguish between revelation the frequent, and inspiration the constant phenomenon presented by Scripture; the one furnishing the material when not otherwise attainable, the other guiding the writer at every point, (1.) in securing the infallible truth of all he writes; and (2.) in the selection and distribution of his material.

2d. It is injurious to distinguish between different degrees of inspiration, as if the several portions of the Scriptures were in different degrees God's word, while in truth the whole is equally

and absolutely so.

6. What are the different views which have been maintained as to the extent of inspiration?

1st. Some infidels, as Strauss, have maintained that the Scriptures are merely a collection of pre-historical myths.

2d. Some Socinians and extreme rationalists, as represented by Dr. Priestly, admit that the sacred writers were honest men, and competent witnesses as to the main facts which they record, but, for the rest, fallible men, as liable to error in opinion and fact as others.

3d. Others have confined the attribute of infallibility to the personal teachings of Christ, regarding the Apostles as highly

competent though fallible reporters.

4th. Many, as the Quakers, and Dr. Arnold of Rugby, regard the inspiration of the sacred writers as only a preëminent degree of that spiritual illumination which in a less degree is common to all Christians.

5th. Some, as Michaelis, admit that the inspiration of the sacred writers rendered them infallible in teaching religious and moral truth only, while, as to external facts of history, and opinions as to science they were liable to err.

6th. Many transcendental philosophers of the present day, as represented by Morell in his "Philosophy of Religion," hold that the inspiration of the sacred writers was nothing more than an exaltation of their "intuitional consciousness," i. e., that this divine assistance took the place in them of great genius and of great goodness, and effected nothing more than the best results of the highest exercise of their own faculties. And thus their writings have no other authority over us than that which their words severally manifest to our consciousness, as inherent in themselves, as we see and feel them to be preëminently wise and good.

7th. The true doctrine is that their inspiration was plenary, and their writings in every part infallible truth.—Bib. Rep., October, 1857, Dr. T. V. Moore's Univ. Lect., and Gaussen on Inspiration.

7. What is meant by "plenary inspiration?"

A divine influence full and sufficient to secure its end. The end in this case secured is the perfect infallibility of the Scriptures in every part, as a record of fact and doctrine both in thought and verbal expression. So that although they come to us through the instrumentality of the minds, hearts, imaginations, consciences and wills of men, they are nevertheless in the strictest sense the word of God.

8. On what ground is it held that the sacred writers were inspired as historians as well as in their character of religious teachers?

1st. The two elements are inseparable in Scripture. Religion is everywhere based upon and illustrated by the facts of history. Imperfection in one respect would invalidate the authority of its teaching in every department.

2d. The Scriptures themselves claim to be the word of God as a whole (2 Timothy iii., 16), and never hint at any distinction as to the different degrees of authority with which their several

portions are clothed.

3d. The perfect historical accuracy and agreement of so many authors, of such various ages and nations, which we find in the Scriptures, itself demands the assignment of a supernatural cause.

9. On what grounds is it assumed that their inspiration extended to their language as well as to their thoughts?

The doctrine is, that while the sacred writers thought and wrote in the free exercise of all their powers, nevertheless God exerted such a constant influence over them that, 1st, they were always furnished, naturally or supernaturally, with the material necessary; 2d, infallibly guided in its selection and distribution; and, 3d, so directed that they always wrote pure truth in infallibly correct language.

That this influence did extend to the words appears, 1st, from the very design of inspiration, which is, not to secure the infallible correctness of the opinions of the inspired men themselves (Paul and Peter differed, Gal. ii., 11, and sometimes the prophet knew not what he wrote), but to secure an infallible record of the

truth. But a record consists of language.

2d. Men think in words, and the more definitely they think the more are their thoughts immediately associated with an exactly appropriate verbal expression. Infallibility of thought can not be secured or preserved independently of an infallible verbal rendering.

3d. The Scriptures affirm this fact, 1 Cor. ii., 13; 1 Thess. i., 13.

4th. The New Testament writers, while quoting from the

Old Testament for purposes of argument, often base their argument upon the very words used, thus ascribing authority to the word as well as the thought.—Matt. xxii., 32, and Ex. iii., 6, 16; Matt. xxii., 45, and Psalms ex., 1; Gal. iii., 16, and Gen. xvii., 7.

10. What are the sources of our knowledge that the Scriptures are inspired?

The only possible sources of information on this subject are, of course, the phenomena of the Scriptures themselves; the claims they present, and their intrinsic character taken in connection with the evidences by which they are accredited.

11. How can the propriety of proving the inspiration of a book by the assertions of its author be vindicated?

1st. Christ, the prophets and apostles claim to be inspired, and that their word should be received as the word of God. The "evidences" above detailed prove them to be divinely commissioned teachers. The denial of inspiration logically involves the rejection of Christianity.

2d. The Bible, like every other book, bears internal evidence of the attributes of its author. The known attributes of human nature can not account for the plain phenomena of the Scriptures. A divine influence must be inferred from the facts. If partially divine, they must be all whatsoever they claim to be.

12. What à priori argument in favor of the inspiration of the Scriptures may be drawn from the necessity of the case, the fact of a divine revelation being presumed?

The very office of a supernatural revelation is to lead men to an adequate and certain knowledge of God and his will, otherwise unattainable to them. But an infallible record is the only channel through which a certain knowledge of a divine revelation, made by God to the men of one age and nation, can be conveyed to men of all ages and nations. Without inspiration the opinions of Paul would be of less authority than the opinions of Luther would be with an inspired Bible. And if the record be not inspired, the revelation as it comes down to us would not be more certain than the unassisted conclusions of reason.

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13. How may the inspiration of the apostles be fairly inferred from the fact that they wrought miracles?

A miracle is a divine sign (σημειον) accrediting the person to whom the power is delegated as a divinely commissioned agent, Matt. xvi., 1, 4; Acts xiv., 3; Heb. ii., 4. This divine testimony not only encourages, but absolutely renders belief obligatory. Where the sign is God commands us to believe. But he could not unconditionally command us to believe any other than unmixed truth infallibly conveyed.

14. How may it be shown that the gift of inspiration was promised to the apostles?

Matt. x., 19; Luke xii., 12; John xiv., 26; xv., 26, 27; xvi., 13; Matt. xxviii., 19, 20; John xiii., 20.

' 15. In what several ways did they claim to have possession of the Spirit?

They claimed—

1st. To have the Spirit in fulfillment of the promise of Christ.—Acts ii., 33; iv., 8; xiii., 2-4; xv., 28; xxi., 11; 1 Thes. i., 5.

2d. To speak as the prophets of God.—1 Cor. iv., 1; ix., 17;

2 Cor. v., 19; 1 Thes. iv., 8.

- 3d. To speak with plenary authority.—1 Cor. ii. 13; 1 Thes. ii. 13; 1 John iv. 6; Gal. i., 8, 9; 2 Cor. xiii., 2, 3, 4. They class their writings on a level with the Old Testament Scriptures.—2 Pet. iii., 16; 1 Thess. v., 27; Col. iv., 16; Rev. ii., 7.—Dr. Hodge.
 - 16. How was their claim confirmed?

1st. By their holy, simple, temperate yet heroic lives.

2d. By the holiness of the doctrine they taught, and its spiritual power, as attested by its effect upon communities and individuals.

3d. By the miracles they wrought.—Heb. ii., 4; Acts xiv., 3;

Mark xvi., 20.

4th. All these testimonies are accredited to us not only by their own writings, but also by the uniform testimony of the early Christians, their cotemporaries, and their immediate successors. 17. Show that the writers of the Old Testament claim to be inspired?

1st. Moses claimed that he wrote a part at least of the Pentateuch by divine command.—Deut. xxxi., 19-22; xxxiv., 10; Num. xvi., 28, 29. David claimed it.—2 Sam. xxiii., 2.

2d. As a characteristic fact, the Old Testament writers speak not in their own name, but preface their messages with, "Thus saith the Lord," "The mouth of the Lord hath spoken it,"etc.—Jer. ix., 12; xiii., 13; xxx., 4; Isa. viii., 1; xxxiii., 10; Mic. iv., 4; Amos iii., 1; Deut. xviii., 21, 22; 1 Kings xxi., 28; 1 Chron. xvii., 3.—Dr. Hodge.

18. How was their claim confirmed?

1st. Their claim was confirmed to their cotemporaries by the miracles they wrought, by the fulfillment of many of their predictions, (Num. xvi., 28, 29), by the holiness of their lives, the moral and spiritual perfection of their doctrine, and the practical adaptation of the religious system they revealed to the urgent wants of men.

2d. Their claim is confirmed to us principally, (1.) By the remarkable fulfillment, in far subsequent ages, of many of their prophesics. (2.) By the evident relation of the symbolical religion which they promulgated to the facts and doctrines of Christianity, proving a divine preadjustment of the type to the antitype. (3.) By the endorsation of Christ and his apostles.

19. What are the formulas by which quotations from the Old Testament are introduced into the New, and how do these forms of expression prove the inspiration of the ancient Scriptures?

"The Holy Ghost saith," Heb. iii., 7. "The Holy Ghost this signifying," Heb. ix., 8. "God saith," Acts ii., 17, and Isa. xliv., 3; 1 Cor. ix., 9, 10, and Deut. xxv., 4. "The Scriptures saith," Rom. iv., 3; Gal. iv., 30. "It is written," Luke xviii., 31; xxi., 22; John ii., 17; xx., 31. "The Lord by the mouth of his servant David says," Acts iv., 25, and Ps. ii., 1, 2. "The Lord limiteth in David a certain day, saying," Heb. iv., 7; Ps. xcv., 7. "David in spirit says," Matt. xxii., 43, and Ps. cx., 1.

Thus these Old Testament writings are what God saith, what

God saith by David, etc., and are quoted as the authoritative basis for conclusive argumentation, therefore they must have been inspired.

20. How may the inspiration of the Old Testament writers be proved by the express declarations of the New Testament?

Luke i., 70; Heb. i., 1; 2 Tim. iii., 16; 1 Pet. i., 10–12; 2 Pet. i., 21.

21 What is the argument on this subject drawn from the manner in which Christ and his apostles argue from the Old Testament as of final authority?

Christ constantly quotes the old Testament, Matt. xxi., 13; xxii., 43. He declares that it can not be falsified, John vii., 23; x., 35; that the whole law must be fulfilled, Matt. v., 18; and all things also foretold concerning himself "in Moses, the prophets, and the psalms," Luke xxiv., 44. The apostles habitually quote the Old Testament in the same manner, "That it might be fulfilled which was written," is with them a characteristic formula, Matt. i., 22; ii., 15, 17, 23; John xii., 38; xv., 25, etc. They all appeal to the words of Scripture as of final authority. This certainly proves infallibility.

22. What is the objection to the doctrine of inspiration drawn from the diversity of style and manner observable among the several sacred writings, and the answer to it?

It is an acknowledged fact that all of the national and sectional peculiarities and individual qualities and habits of each of the sacred writers appear in his work, because his natural faculties were freely exercised after their kind in its production. Some have argued from this fact that it is absurd to believe that those faculties could at the same time, and with reference to the same object, have been subject to any determinating divine influence.

However it may be with the Arminian, the Calvinist can find no special difficulty here. We can not understand how the infinite Spirit acts upon the finite spirit in providence or in grace The case of inspiration is so far forth precisely analogous. God works by means, from the beginning pre-adjusting the means to the end, and then concurrently directing them while they freely act to that end. God surely might as easily guide the free souls of men in spontaneously producing an infallible Scripture, as in spontaneously realizing in act the events foreordained in his eternal decree.

23. What is the objection to this doctrine drawn from the free manner in which the New Testament writers quote those of the Old Testament, and the answer to that objection?

In a majority of instances the New Testament writers quote those of the Old Testament with perfect verbal accuracy. Sometimes they quote the Septuagint version, when it conforms to the Hebrew; at others they substitute a new version; and at other times again they adhere to the Septuagint, when it differs from the Hebrew. In a number of instances, which however are comparatively few, their quotations from the Old Testament are made very freely, and in apparent accommodation of the literal sense.

Rationalistic interpreters have argued from this last class of quotations that it is impossible that both the Old Testement writer quoted from, and the New Testament writer quoting could have been the subjects of plenary inspiration, because, say they, if the ipsissima verba were infallible in the first instance, an infallible writer would have transferred them unchanged. But surely if a human author may quote himself freely, changing the expression, and giving a new turn to his thought in order to adapt it the more perspicuously to his present purpose, the Holy Spirit may take the same liberty with his own. The same Spirit that rendered the Old Testament writers infallible in writing only pure truth, in the very form that suited his purpose then, has rendered the New Testament writers infallible in so using the old materials, that while they elicit a new sense, they teach only the truth, the very truth moreover contemplated in the mind of God from the beginning, and they teach it with divine authority. - See Fairbairn's Herm. Manual, Part III. Each instance of such quotation should be examined in detail, as Dr. Fairbairn has done.

24. Upon what principles are we to answer the objections founded upon the alleged discrepances between the sacred writers, and upon their alleged inaccuracies in matters of science?

If either of these objections were founded on facts, it would

clearly disprove the doctrine we maintain. That neither of them is founded on fact can be shown only by a detailed examination of each instance alleged. As a general principle it is evident—

Ist. With regard to apparent discrepancies between the sacred writers, that nothing presents any difficulty short of a clear and direct contradiction. Different writers may, of course, with perfect accuracy represent different details of the same occurrence, or different views of the same fact, and different elements and relations of the same great doctrine, as may best suit their several designs. Instead of this course proving inconsistency, it is precisely God's plan for bringing the whole truth most fully and clearly to our knowledge.

2d. With respect to apparent inaccuracies in matters of science, that the sacred writers having for their design to teach moral and religious truth, and not physical science, use on all such subjects the common language of their cotemporaries, always speaking of natural phenomena as they appear, and not as they really are. And yet revelation does not present one single positive statement which is not consistent with all the facts known to men, in any department of nature. In the progress of science, human ignorance and premature generalization have constantly presented difficulties in the reconciliation of the word of God with man's theory of his works. The advance of perfected knowledge has uniformly removed the difficulty.

CHAPTER V.

THE RULE OF FAITH AND PRACTICE.

THE SCRIPTURES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS, HAVING BEEN GIVEN BY INSPIRATION OF GOD, ARE THE ALL-SUFFICIENT AND ONLY RULE OF FAITH AND PRACTICE, AND JUDGE OF CONTROVERSIES. (This chapter is compiled from Dr. Hodge's unpublished Lectures on the Church.)

1. What is meant by saying that the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice?

Whatever God teaches or commands is of sovereign authority. Whatever conveys to us an infallible knowledge of his teachings and commands is an infallible rule. The Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only organs through which, during the present dispensation, God conveys to us a knowledge of his will about what we are to believe concerning himself, and what duties he requires of us.

2. What does the Romish Church declare to be the infallible rule of faith and practice?

The Romish theory is that the complete rule of faith and practice consists of Scripture and tradition, or the oral teaching of Christ and his apostles, handed down through the church. Tradition they hold to be necessary, 1st, to teach additional truth not contained in the Scriptures; and, 2d, to interpret Scripture. The church being the divinely constituted depository and judge of both Scripture and tradition.—Decrees of Council of Trent, Session IV, and Dens Theo., Tom. II., N. 80 & 81.

3. By what arguments do they seek to establish the authority of tradition? By what criterion do they distinguish true traditions from false, and on what grounds do they base the authority of the traditions they receive?

1st. Their arguments in behalf of tradition are (1.) Scripture authorizes it, 2 Thess. ii., xv; iii., 6. (2.) The early fathers asserted its authority and founded their faith largely upon it. (3.) The oral teaching of Christ and his apostles, when clearly ascertained, is intrinsically of equal authority with their writings. The Scriptures themselves are handed down to us by the evidence of tradition, and the stream can not rise higher than its source. (4.) The necessity of the case. α , Scripture is obscure, needs tradition as its interpreter. b, Scripture is incomplete as a rule of faith and practice; since there are many doctrines and institutions, universally recognized, which are founded only upon tradition as a supplement to Scripture. (5.) Analogy. Every state recognizes both written and unwritten, common and statute law.

2d. The criterion by which they distinguish between true and false traditions is Catholic consent. The Anglican ritualists confine the application of the rule to the first three or four centuries. The Romanists recognize that as an authoritative consent which is constitutionally expressed by the bishops in general council, or by the Pope ex-cathedra, in any age of the church whatever.

3d. They defend the traditions which they hold to be true. (1.) On the ground of historical testimony, tracing them up to the apostles as their source. (2.) The authority of the Church expressed by Catholic consent.

4. By what arguments may the invalidity of all ecclesiastical tradition, as a part of our rule of faith and practice, be shown?

1st. The Scriptures do not, as claimed, ascribe authority to oral tradition. Tradition, as intended by Paul in the passage cited, (2 Thess. ii., 15, and iii., 6,) signifies all his instructions, oral and written, communicated to those very people themselves, not handed down. On the other hand, Christ rebuked this doctrine of the Romanists in their predecessors, the Pharisees, Matt. xv., 3, 6; Mark vii., 7.

2d. It is improbable à priori that God would supplement Scripture with tradition as part of our rule of faith. (1.) Because Scripture, as will be shown below (questions 7-14), is certain, definite, complete, and perspicuous. (2.) Because tradition, from its very nature, is indeterminate, and liable to become adulterated with every form of error. Besides, as will be shown below

(question 20), the authority of Scripture does not rest ultimately

upon tradition.

3d. The whole ground upon which Romanists base the authority of their traditions (viz., history and church authority) is invalid. (1.) History utterly fails them. For more than three hundred years after the apostles they have very little, and that contradictory, evidence for any one of their traditions. They are thus forced to the absurd assumption that what was taught in the fourth century was therefore taught in the third, and therefore in the first. (2.) The church is not infallible, as will be shown below (question 18.)

4th. Their practice is inconsistent with their own principles. Many of the earliest and best attested traditions they do not receive. Many of their pretended traditions are recent inventions

unknown to the ancients.

5th. Many of their traditions, such as relate to the priesthood, the sacrifice of the Mass, etc., are plainly in direct opposition to Scripture. Yet the infallible church affirms the infallibility of Scripture. A house divided against itself can not stand.

5. What is necessary to constitute a sole and infallible rule of faith?

Plenary inspiration, completeness, perspicuity, and accessibility.

6. What arguments do the Scriptures themselves afford in favor of the doctrine that they are the only infallible rule of faith?

1st. The Scriptures always speak in the name of God, and command faith and obedience.

2d. Christ and his apostles always refer to the written Scriptures, then existing, as authority, and to no other rule of faith whatsoever.—Luke xvi., 29; x., 26; John v., 39; Rom. iv., 3; 2 Tim. iii., 15.

3d. The Bercans are commended for bringing all questions, even apostolic teaching, to this test.—Acts xvii., 11; see also

Isa. viii., 16.

4th. Christ rebukes the Pharisees for adding to and perverting the Scriptures.—Matt. xv., 7-9; Mark vii., 5-8; see also Rev. xxii., 18, 19, and Deut. iv., 2; xii., 32; Josh. i., 7.

7. In what sense is the completeness of Scripture as a rule of faith asserted?

It is not meant that the Scriptures contain every revelation which God has ever made to man, but that their contents are the only supernatural revelation that God does now make to man, and that this revelation is abundantly sufficient for man's guidance in all questions of faith, practice, and modes of worship, and excludes the necessity and the right of any human inventions.

8. How may this completeness be proved from the design of Scripture?

The Scriptures profess to lead us to God. Whatever is necessary to that end they must teach us. If any supplementary rule, as tradition is necessary to that end, they must refer us to it. "Incompleteness here would be falsehood." But while one sacred writer constantly refers us to the writings of another, not one of them ever intimates to us either the necessity or the existence of any other rule.—John xx., 31; 2 Tim. iii., 15–17.

9. By what other arguments may this principle be proved?

As the Scriptures profess to be a rule complete for its end, so they have always been practically found to be such by the true spiritual people of God in all ages. They teach a complete and harmonious system of doctrine. They furnish all necessary principles for the government of the private lives of Christians, in every relation, for the public worship of God, and for the administration of the affairs of his kingdom; and they repell all pretended traditions and priestly innovations.

10. In what sense do Protestants affirm and Romanists deny the perspicuity of Scripture?

Protestants do not affirm that the doctrines revealed in the Scriptures are level to man's powers of understanding. Many of them are confessedly beyond all understanding. Nor do they affirm that every part of Scripture can be certainly and perspicuously expounded, many of the prophesies being perfectly enigmatical until explained by the event. But they do affirm that every essential article of faith and rule of practice is clearly

revealed in Scripture, or may certainly be deduced therefrom. This much the least instructed Christian may learn at once; while, on the other hand, it is true, that with the advance of historical and critical knowledge, and by means of controversies, the Christian church is constantly making progress in the accurate interpretation of Scripture, and in the comprehension in its integrity of the system therein taught.

Protestants affirm and Romanists deny that private and unlearned Christians may safely be allowed to interpret Scripture

for themselves.

11. How can the perspicuity of Scripture be proved from the fact that it is a law and a message?

We saw (question 8) that Scripture is either complete or false, from its own professed design. We now prove its perspicuity upon the same principle. It professes to be (1.) a law to be obeyed; (2.) a revelation of truth to be believed, to be received by us in both aspects upon the penalty of eternal death. To suppose it not to be perspicuous, relatively to its design of commanding and teaching, is to charge God with dealing with us in a spirit at once disingenuous and cruel.

12. In what passages is their perspicuity asserted?

Ps. xix., 7, 8; exix., 105, 130; 2 Cor. iii., 14; 2 Pet. i., 18, 19; Hab. ii., 2; 2 Tim. iii., 15, 17.

13. By what other arguments may this point be established?

1st. The Scriptures are addressed immediately, either to all men promiscuously, or else to the whole body of believers as such.—Deut. vi., 4-9; Luke i., 3; Rom. i., 7; 1 Cor. i., 2; 2 Cor. i., 1; iv., 2; Gal. i., 2; Eph. i., 1; Phil. i., 1; Col. i., 2; James i., 1; 1 Peter i., 1; 2 Peter i., 1; 1 John ii., 12, 14; Jude i., 1; Rev. i., 3, 4; ii., 7. The only exceptions are the epistles to Timothy and Titus.

2d. All Christians promiscuously are commanded to search the Scriptures.—2 Tim. iii., 15, 17; Acts xvii., 11; John v., 39.

3d. Universal experience. We have the same evidence of the light-giving power of Scripture that we have of the same property

in the sun. The argument to the contrary is an insult to the understanding of the whole world of Bible readers.

4th. The essential unity in faith and practice, in spite of all circumstantial differences, of all Christian communities of every age and nation, who draw their religion directly from the open Scriptures.

14. What was the third quality required to constitute the Scriptures the sufficient rule of faith and practice?

Accessibility. It is self-evident that this is the preëminent characteristic of the Scriptures, in contrast to tradition, which is in the custody of a corporation of priests, and to every other pretended rule whatsoever. The agency of the church in this matter is simply to give all currency to the word of God.

15. What is meant by saying that the Scriptures are the judge as well as the rule in questions of faith?

"A rule is a standard of judgment; a judge is the expounder and applier of that rule to the decision of particular cases." The Protestant doctrine is—

1st. That the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith

and practice.

- 2d. (1.) Negatively. That there is no body of men who are either qualified, or authorized, to interpret the Scriptures, or to apply their principles to the decision of particular questions, in a sense binding upon the faith of their fellow Christians. (2.) Possitively. That Scripture is the only infallible voice in the church, and is to be interpreted, in its own light, and with the gracious help of the Holy Ghost, who is promised to every Christian (1 John ii., 20–27), by each individual for himself, with the assistance, though not by the authority of his fellow Christians. Creeds and confessions, as to form, bind only those who voluntarily profess them, and as to matter, they bind only so far as they affirm truly what the Bible teaches, and because the Bible does so teach.
- 16. What is the Romish doctrine as to the authority of the church as the infallible interpreter of the rule of faith and the authoritative judge of all controversies?

The Romish doctrine is that the church is absolutely infalli-

ble in all matters of Christian faith and practice, and the divinely authorized depository and interpreter of the rule of faith. Her office is not to convey new revelations from God to man, yet her inspiration renders her infallible in disseminating and interpreting the original revelation communicated through the apostles.

The church, therefore, authoritatively determines, 1st, What is Scripture? 2d. What is genuine tradition? 3d. What is the true sense of Scripture and tradition, and what is the true application of that perfect rule to every particular question of belief

or practice.

This authority vests in the pope, when acting in his official capacity, and in the bishops as a body; as when assembled in general council, or when giving universal consent to a decree of pope or council.—Decrees of Council of Trent, Session IV., Deus Theo., N. 80, 81, 84, 93, 94, 95, 96. Bellarmine, Lib. III., de eccles., cap. xiv., and Lib. II., de concil., cap. ii.

17. By what arguments do they seek to establish this authority?

1st. The promises of Christ, given, as they claim, to the apostles, and to their official successors, securing their infallibility, and consequent authority.—Matt. xvi., 18; xviii., 18–20; Luke xxiv., 47–49; John xvi., 13; xx., 23.

2d. The commission given to the church as the teacher of the

world.-Matt. xxviii., 19, 20; Luke x., 16, etc.

3d. The church is declared to be "the pillar and ground of the truth," and it is affirmed that "the gates of hell shall never prevail against her."

4th. To the church is granted power to bind and loose, and he that will not hear the church is to be treated as a heathen.—

Matt. xvi., 19; xviii., 15-18.

5th. The church is commanded to discriminate between truth and error, and must consequently be qualified and authorized to do so.—2 Thes. iii., 6; Rom. xvi., 17; 2 John 10.

6th. From the necessity of the case, men need and crave an ever-living, visible and cotemporaneous infallible Interpreter and

Judge.

7th. From universal analogy every community among men has the living judge as well as the written law, and the one would be of no value without the other.

8th. This power is necessary to secure unity and universality, which all acknowledge to be essential attributes of the true church.

18. By what arguments may this claim of the Romish church be shown to be utterly baseless?

1st. A claim vesting in mortal men a power so momentous can be established only by the most clear and certain evidence, and the failure to produce such converts the claim into a treason at once against God and the human race.

- 2d. Her evidence fails, because the promises of Christ to preserve his church from extinction and from error do none of them go the length of pledging infallibility. The utmost promised is, that the true people of God shall never perish entirely from the earth, or be left to apostatize from the essentials of the faith.
- 3d. Her evidence fails, because these promises of Christ were addressed not to the officers of the church as such, but to the body of true believers. Compare John xx., 23 with Luke xxiv., 33, 47, 48, 49, and 1 John ii., 20, 27.

4th. Her evidence fails, because the church to which the precious promises of the Scriptures are pledged is not an external, visible society, the authority of which is vested in the hands of a perpetual line of apostles. For (1.) the word church, (ἐκκλησία,) is a collective term, embracing the effectually called (κλητοι,) or regenerated.—Rom. i., 7; viii., 28; 1 Cor., i., 2; Jude i.; Rev. xvii., 14; also Rom. ix., 24; 1 Cor. vii., 18-24; Gal. i., 15; 2 Tim. i., 9; Heb. ix., 15; 1 Pet. ii., 9; v., 10; Eph. i., 18; 2 Pet. i., 10. (2.) The attributes ascribed to the church prove it to consist alone of the true, spiritual people of God as such.-Eph. v., 27; 1 Pet. ii., 5; John x., 27; Col. i., 18, 24. (3.) The epistles are addressed to the church, and in their salutations explain that phrase as equivalent to "the called," "the saints," "all true worshipers of God;" witness the salutations of 1st and 2d Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, 1st and 2d Peter and Jude. The same attributes are ascribed to the members of the true church as such throughout the body of the Epistles .--1 Cor. i., 30; iii., 16; vi., 11, 19; Eph. ii., 3-8, and 19-22; 1 Thes. v., 4, 5; 2 Thes. ii., 13; Col. i., 21; ii., 10; 1 Pet. ii., 9.

5th. The inspired apostles have had no successors. (1.) There is no evidence that they had such in the New Testament. (2.) While provision was made for the regular perpetuation of the offices of presbyter and deacon, (1 Tim. iii., 1-13,) there are no directions given for the perpetuation of the apostolate. (3.) There is perfect silence concerning the continued existence of any apostles in the church in the writings of the early centuries. Both the name and the thing ceased. (4.) None ever claiming to be one of their successors have possessed the "signs of an apostle."—2 Cor. xii., 12; 1 Cor. ix., 1; Gal. i., 1, 12; Acts i., 21, 22.

6th. This claim, as it rests upon the authority of the Pope, is utterly unscriptural, because the Pope is not known to Scripture. As it rests upon the authority of the whole body of the bishops, expressed in their general consent, it is unscriptural for the reasons above shown, and it is, moreover, impracticable, since their universal judgment never has been and never can be impar-

tially collected and pronounced.

7th. There can be no infallibility where there is not self-consistency. But as a matter of fact the Papal church has not been self-consistent in her teaching. (1.) She has taught different doctrines in different sections and ages. (2.) She affirms the infallibility of the holy Scriptures, and at the same time teaches a system plainly and radically inconsistent with their manifest sense; witness the doctrines of the priesthood, the Mass, penance, of works, and of Mary worship. Therefore the Church of Rome hides the Scriptures from the people.

8th. If this Romish system be true then genuine spiritual religion ought to flourish in her communion, and all the rest of the world ought to be a moral desert. The facts are notoriously the reverse. If, therefore, we admit that the Romish system is true, we subvert one of the principal evidences of Christianity itself, viz., the self-evidencing light and practical power of true religion,

and the witness of the Holy Ghost.

19. By what direct arguments may the doctrine that the Scriptures are the final judge of controversies be established?

That all Christians are to study the Scriptures for themselves, and that in all questions as to God's revealed will the appeal is to the Scriptures alone, is proved by the following facts:—

1st. Scripture is perspicuous, see above, questions 11-13

2d. Scripture is addressed to all Christians as such, see above, question 13.

3d. All Christians are commanded to search the Scriptures, and by them to judge all doctrines and all professed teachers.—John v., 39; Acts xvii., 11; Gal. i., 8; 2 Cor. iv., 2; 1 Thess. v., 21; 1 John iv., 1, 2.

4th. The promise of the Holy Spirit, the author and interpreter of Scripture, is to all Christians as such. Compare John xx., 23 with Luke xxiv., 47-49; 1 John ii., 20, 27; Rom. viii.,

9; 1 Cor. iii., 16, 17.

5th. Religion is essentially a personal matter. Each Christian must know and believe the truth explicitly for himself, on the direct ground of its own moral and spiritual evidence, and not on the mere ground of blind authority. Otherwise faith could not be a moral act, nor could it "purify the heart." Faith derives its sanctifying power from the truth which it immediately apprehends on its own experimental evidence.—John xvii., 17, 19; James i., 18; 1 Pet. i., 22.

20. What is the objection which the Romanists make to this doctrine, on the ground that the church is our only authority for believing that the Scriptures are the word of God?

Their objection is, that as we receive the Scriptures as the word of God only on the authoritative testimony of the church, our faith in the Scriptures is only another form of our faith in the church, and the authority of the church, being the foundation of that of Scripture, must of course be held paramount.

This is absurd, for two reasons—

1st. The assumed fact is false. The evidence upon which we receive Scripture as the word of God is not the authority of the church, but (1.) God did speak by the apostles and prophets, as is evident a from the nature of their doctrine, b from their miracles, c their prophecies, d our personal experience and observation of the power of the truth. (2.) These very writings which we possess were written by the apostles, etc., as is evident, a from internal evidence, b from historical testimony rendered by all competent cotemporaneous witnesses in the clrurch or out of it.

2d. Even if the fact assumed was true, viz., that we know the

Scriptures to be from God, on the authority of the church's testimony alone, the conclusion they seek to deduce from it would be absurd. The witness who proves the identity or primogeniture of a prince does not thereby acquire a right to govern the kingdom, or even to interpret the will of the prince.

- 21. How is the argument for the necessity of a visible judge, derived from the diversities of sects and doctrines among Protestants, to be answered?
- 1st. We do not pretend that the private judgment of Protestants is infallible, but only that when exercised in an humble, believing spirit, it always leads to a competent knowledge of essential truth.
- 2d. The term Protestant is simply negative, and is assumed by many infidels who protest as much against the Scriptures as they do against Rome. But Bible Protestants, among all their circumstantial differences, are, to a wonderful degree, agreed upon the essentials of faith and practice. Witness their hymns and devotional literature.
- 3d. The diversity that does actually exist arises from failure in applying faithfully the Protestant principles for which we contend. Men do not simply and without prejudice take their creed from the Bible.
- 4th. The Catholic church, in her last and most authoritative utterance through the Council of Trent, has proved herself a most indefinite judge. Her doctrinal decisions need an infallible interpreter infinitely more than the Scriptures.
- 22. How may it be shown that the Romanist theory, as well as the Protestant, necessarily throws upon the people the obligation of private judgment?

Is there a God? Has he revealed himself? Has he established a church? Is that church an infallible teacher? Is private judgment a blind leader? Which of all pretended churches is the true one? Every one of these questions evidently must be settled in the private judgment of the inquirer, before he can, rationally or irrationally, give up his private judgment to the direction of the self-asserting church. Thus of necessity Romanists appeal to the Scriptures to prove that the Scriptures can

not be understood, and address arguments to the private judgment of men to prove that private judgment is incompetent; thus basing an argument upon that which it is the object of the argument to prove is baseless.

23. How may it be proved that the people are far more competent to discover what the Bible teaches than to decide, by the marks insisted upon by the Romanists, which is the true church?

The Romanists, of necessity, set forth certain marks by which the true church is to be discriminated from all counterfeits. These are (1.) Unity (through subjection to one visible head, the Pope;) (2.) Holiness; (3.) Catholicity; (4.) Apostolicity, (involving an uninterrupted succession from the apostles of canonically ordained bishops.)—Cat. of Council of Trent, Part I., Cap. 10. Now, the comprehension and intelligent application of these marks involve a great amount of learning and intelligent capacity upon the part of the inquirer. He might as easily prove himself to be descended from Noah by an unbroken series of legitimate marriages, as establish the right of Rome to the last mark. Yet he can not rationally give up the right of studying the Bible for himself until that point is made clear.

Surely the Scriptures, with their self-evidencing spiritual power, make less exhaustive demands upon the resources of private judgment.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CANON OF SCRIPTURE.

1. What is meant by the phrase, canon of Scripture?

The Greek word $\kappa a \nu \omega \nu$, canon, signifies primarily a reed, a staff, and then a measuring rod, then a rule of life and doctrine.—Gal. vi., 16; Phil. iii., 16. The canon of Holy Scripture is the entire word of God, consisting of all the books which holy men of old wrote as they were moved by the Spirit of God, constituting our complete and only rule of faith and practice.

In order to determine this canon we have to prove, 1st. That the writings now recognized by Protestants as a part of God's word were, in fact, written by the inspired men whom they claim as their authors. 2d. That they have not been materially altered in their transmission to us. 3d. That no other extant writings have any valid claim to a place in the canon.

2. What is meant by the genuineness and what by the authenticity of a book?

A book is said to be genuine when it was really written by the person from whom it professes to have originated, otherwise it is spurious. A book is said to be authentic when its contents correspond with the truth on the subject concerning which it treats, otherwise it is fictitious.

A novel, though always fictitious, is genuine when it bears the name of its real author. A history is both genuine and authentic, if it was written by its professed author, and if its narrations correspond with the facts as they occurred.

3. What are the general principles upon which Protestants settle the canon of Scripture, and wherein do they differ from those upon which Romanists proceed?

Protestants found their defense both of the genuineness and authenticity of the books severally constituting the canon of Scripture, as received by them, upon the same historical and critical evidence that is uniformly relied upon by literary men, to establish the genuineness and authenticity of any ancient writings whatever. The only difference is, that in the case of the books constituting Holy Scripture, these evidences are preëminently numerous and conclusive.

These evidences are generally, 1st. Internal, such as language, style, nature and mutual harmony of subjects. 2. External, such as testimony of cotemporaneous writers, the universal consent of cotemporary readers, and corroborating history drawn from independent, credible sources.

The Romish theologians, while referring to all these sources of evidence as of corroborating though subordinate value, yet maintain the plenary infallibility and authority of the church, upon which they found the credibility of Scripture, and of its several parts.

4. When was the canon of the Old Testament completed?

When the five books of Moses were completed, they were deposited in the ark of the covenant.—Deut. xxxi., 24–26. The writings of the subsequent prophets were accredited and generally received as they appeared, and were then preserved with pious care by the Jews.

The uniform Jewish tradition is, that the collection and sealing of the Old Testament canon was accomplished by Ezra and a number of other holy men, who, after the building of the second temple, formed with him the "Great Synagogue," consisting of one hundred and twenty members, among whom, however, they enumerated many who lived in far separate ages.

"The more probable conclusion is," says Dr. Alexander, "that Ezra (B. C. 457) began this work, and collected and arranged all the sacred books which belonged to the canon before his time, and that a succession of pious and learned men continued to pay attention to the canon," (the last prophetical writer being Malachi, B. C. 400,) "until the whole was completed about the time of Simon the Just," (B. C. 300,) who appears to have carried

down the genealogical lists to his own day.—Neh. xii., 22; 1 Chron. iii., 19, etc.

- 5. Give a synopsis of the argument by which the genuineness of the books constituting our received canon of the Old Testament is established?
- 1st. The canon of the Jewish Scriptures, as it existed in the time of our Lord and his apostles, was abundantly witnessed to by them as both genuine and authentic. (1.) Christ refers to these writings as an infallible rule.—Mark xiv., 49; John v., 39; x., 35. He quotes them by their comprehensive and generally recognized title—the law, the prophets, the holy writings—the last division being sometimes called the Psalms, from the first book it contained.—Luke xxiv., 44. (2.) The apostles refer to these books as divine, and quote them as final authority.—2 Tim. iii., 15, 16; Acts i., 16, etc. (3.) Christ often rebuked the Jews for disobeying, never for forging or corrupting, the text of their Scriptures.—Matt. xxii., 29.
- 2d. The canon of the Old Testament Scriptures, as it is received by all Protestants, is the same as that which was authenticated by Christ and his apostles. (1.) The New Testament writers quote as Scripture almost every one of the books we now recognize, and they quote no other as Scripture. The number of direct quotations and implied allusions to the language of the Old Testament occurring in the New have been traced in upwards of six hundred instances. (2.) The Septuagint, or Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures, made in Egypt B. C. 285, which was itself frequently quoted by Christ and his apostles, embraced every book we now recognize. (3.) Josephus, who was born A. D. 37, in his first book in answer to Apion, enumerates as Hebrew Scriptures the same books by their classes. (4.) The uniform testimony of the early Christian writers, e. g., "Melito, A. D. 177; Origen, A. D. 230; Athanasius, A. D. 326; Jerome A. D. 390; Augustine A. D. 395." (5.) Ever since the time of Christ, Jews and Christians have been severally custodians of the same canon. Their agreement with us to-day demonstrates the identity of our Scriptures with those of the Jews of the first century.

6. What are the Apocrypha?

The word Apocrypha, from $\dot{a}\pi\dot{o}$ and $\kappa\rho\dot{o}\pi\tau\omega$, signifying anything hidden, concealed, has been applied to certain ancient writings whose authorship is not manifest, and in behalf of which unfounded claims have been set up for a place in the canon of Scripture. Some of these are associated with the Old and others with the New Testament canon. This name, however, is more prominently associated with those spurious writings for which a place is claimed among the Old Testament Scriptures, because an active controversy concerning these exists between Romanists and Protestants. They were also styled by the early church ecclesiastical, to distinguish them from the acknowledged word of God. In later times they have been styled by some Romanists Deutero-canonical, as occupying a certain secondary place in the canon, some say as to authority, others merely as to succession in time.

These are Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruk, and the two books of Maccabees. They also add six chapters to the book of Esther. They prefix to the book of Daniel the History of Susannah, and insert in the third chapter the Song of the Three Children, and add to the end of the book the History of Bel and the Dragon. The Romish church, on the other hand, rejects as spurious certain other books which are found side by side with the above in the early Greek Scriptures, and in their Latin translations, e. g., the third and fourth books of Esdras, the third book of Maccabees, the 151st Psalm, the appendix to Job, and the preface to Lamentations.—Council of Trent, Sess. 4.

See Alexander on Canon, and Kitto's Bib. Eney., Art. "Deu-

tero Canonical."

7. How did they become associated with Holy Scripture, and upon what ground do the Romanists advocate their place in the canon?

They are believed to have been written by Alexandrian Jews between the ages of Malachi and Christ. They first appear in certain history in the Greek language, and in connection with the Septuagint translation of the genuine Scriptures, among which it is probable they were surreptitiously introduced by heretics.

The Romanists argue, 1st. That they appear in the first Greek copies of the Old Testament, and in the Latin translation from them. 2d. That they were highly reverenced and quoted by the early fathers. 3d. That the church in her plenary authority has authenticated them at the Council of Trent, A. D. 1546.

8. Give a synopsis of the argument by which their right to a place in the canon is disproved?

1st. These books never formed part of the Hebrew Scriptures.

2d. The Jews were the divinely appointed guardians of the ancient oracles.—Rom. iii., 2. Christ charged them with making the written word of none effect by their traditions, but never with mutilating the record.—Matt. xv., 6. Yet the Jews have uniformly denied the spurious books in question from the time of Josephus to the present.—Josephus' Answer to Apion, Book I., sec. 8.

3d. These books were never quoted either by Christ or his apostles.

4th. Although held by the early fathers to be useful as history for the general purposes of edification, they were never held as authoritative in settling matters of faith. They were not embraced in the earliest lists of the canon. Jerome, the most learned of the fathers, living in the latter half of the fourth century, rejected their claims. They were held as of very doubtful and secondary authority by many prominent Romanist teachers up to the very time of the Council of Trent, e. g., Erasmus, Cardinal Cajetan, etc.

5th The internal evidence presented by their contents confirms the external evidence above set forth. (1.) None of them make any claim to inspiration; the best of them plainly disclaim it, e. g., Ecclesiasticus, 1st and 2d Maccabees. (2.) The contents of many of them consist of childish fables; they are inconsistent in fact and defective in morality.

6th. All Protestants agree in rejecting them.—See 6th Article of Religion in the Episcopal Prayer-Book, and Confession of Faith, chap. i., sec. 3. Alexander on Canon, and Horne's Introduction, Vol. I., Appendix 5.

9. What is the Talmud, and how is it regarded by the Jews?

The Jews pretend that when Moses was with the Lord in the mount he received one law which he was to reduce to writing, and another law, explanatory and supplementary to the former, which he was to commit to certain leaders of the people to be transmitted through oral tradition to the remotest generations. This oral law he did thus commit through Aaron, Eliezer, and Joshua, to the prophets, and through the prophets to the rabbins of the early centuries of the Christian era, who reduced it to writing, because such a precaution was then necessary for its preservation under the dispersed and depressed condition of Israel. This oral law, as written, constitutes the Mishna, or text, which, together with the Gemara or commentary thereon, constitutes the Talmud.

There are two Gemaras, and, consequently, two Talmuds. The Jerusalem Gemara, compiled some say in the third, and others in the fourth century. The Babylonian, compiled in the sixth century. This last, together with the Mishna, constitutes the Talmud which is most highly esteemed by the modern Jews, and is really, to the exclusion of the Holy Scriptures, the fountain of their religion.

It is reputed by competent scholars as beyond parallel trivial, and full of intellectual and moral darkness. It derives not one iota of support from a single word of Scripture. Its incipient spirit was severely condemned by Christ in the Pharisees of his day.—Matt. xv., 1-9; Mark vii., 1-13.

10. When was the canon of the New Testament settled, and by what authority?

The authority of every inspired writing is inherent in itself as God's word, but the fact of its being the work of inspired men is ascertained to us by the testimony of cotemporaries, who were the only competent witnesses on the subject. Every gospel epistle or prophecy written by an apostle, or by a known companion of an apostle, and claiming scriptural authority, was received as such by all Christians to whom it was known. Considering the poverty of the early Christians, the persecutions to which they were subject, the imperfect means of multiplying copies of Scripture at their disposal, the comparative infrequency of intercommunication in those days, the apostolic writings were disseminated with a

rapidity, and acknowledged with a universality of consent truly wonderful. Such writings as were directed to particular churches were immediately accredited; while the circular letters or epistles generally were longer left in doubt. Each individual church and teacher received all of the apostolic writings which they were in a position to ascertain by legitimate evidence. With regard to most of the books composing our present Bibles general consent was established from the first, while with regard to a few a period of doubt and investigation intervened. During this period they were distributed into two classes. 1st. The homologoumena or universally received, comprising the large majority of the books we possess. 2d. The antilegomena or the controverted, 2d Peter, James, Jude, 2d and 3d John, Revelations, and Hebrews. Most of this last class, however, were received by the majority of Christians from the beginning, and their evidences, after the most thorough scrutiny, secured universal assent by the fourth century.—See Jones' New Method, Part I., chap. v.; Kitto's Bib. Ency., Art. "Antilegomena."

11. Give a synopsis of the argument establishing the genuineness of the books contained in the received canon of the New Testament.

1st. Any writing proved to be written by an apostle, or under the supervision of an apostle, is to be regarded as part of the canon

of Scripture.

2d. The universal or the nearly universal consent of the early Christians to the fact of the derivation of a writing from an apostle, or from one writing under an apostle's supervision, conclusively establishes the right of such a writing to a place in the canon.

3d. The fact that the early Christians unite in testifying to the genuineness of most of the books constituting our New Testament, and that a majority of these witnesses testify to the genuineness of all of them, is abundantly proved.

(1.) The early Christian writers in all parts of the world consent in quoting as Scripture the writings now embraced in our canon, while they quote all other writings only for illustration, not authority.

(2.) The earliest church fathers, beginning with Origen, about

- A. D. 210, furnish for the guidance of their disciples catalogues of the books they held to be canonical. Jones, in his work on the New Testament Canon, Vol. I., pp. 60–63, cites thirteen of the earliest catalogues, ranging from A. D. 210 to A. D. 390; seven of these agree perfectly with ours; three others agree perfectly with ours, only omitting Revelations; one other omits only Revelations and Hebrews; one other agrees with ours, only speaking doubtful of Hebrews; and one other speaks doubtfully of James, Jude, 2d Peter, 2d and 3d John.
- (3.) The earliest translations of the Scriptures into other languages prove that, at the time they were made, the books they contain were recognized as Scripture. a. The Peshito or ancient Syriac translation, made during the first or second century, includes the four gospels, Acts, all the epistles of Paul, the epistle of James, and the 1st epistle of John, and the 1st of Peter. Revelations was probably longer in being recognized, because its contents were so mysterious that it was not as much read or as diligently circulated as the others. b. The Italic or early Latin version is not now extant, but it is believed to have contained the same books afterwards embraced in the vulgate or version of St. Jerome, A. D. 385, which agrees wholly with ours.
 - 4th. The internal evidences corroborate the external testimony.
- (1.) The language in which these books were written (later Greek qualified by Hebrew idiom) proves their authors to have lived in Palestine, and at the precise age of the world in which their reputed authors did live there.
- (2.) They present precisely that unity in essentials with circumstantial diversities which is most convincing. Paley (in his Horæ Paulinæ) has demonstrated that the Acts and the Pauline Epistles mutually confirm each other. See also Blunt's Undesigned Coincidences, and the various Harmonies of the Gospels. The whole New Testament forms an inseparable whole.
- (3.) They have all been found precious by God's spiritual church of all ages, and are quick and powerful to the conscience.
- 5th. With respect to those smaller writings, the testimony for which is not as absolutely unanimous as for the rest, there remains this invincible presumption, that God would not permit his true people all over the world and of all ages to corrupt his word with the admixture of human compositions.

12. What special questions do the writings of Mark and Luke present?

The testimony that the second and third gospels were really written by these men is unanimous and unquestioned, but as they were not apostles the question is as to the proof that their writ-

ings are inspired.

Although not themselves apostles, they were the immediate associates of those princes of the church, and there was a well-accredited tradition among the fathers that Mark wrote his gospel under the direction of Peter, and that Luke wrote his under the direction of Paul. Their writings were widely circulated thirty years before the death of John, and while Peter and Paul were living, and yet they were among the very first Scriptures to be universally received as canonical. They therefore must have been approved by at least the apostle John. Besides this, their internal evidence, literary, moral, and spiritual, and their harmony with the other Scriptures in spirit and as to fact, establishes their claim.—See Alexander on Canon, Part II., Sec. 7.

13. By what marks have the Apocryphal writings of the New Testament era been discriminated from the genuine writings of the apostles?

The writings thus discriminated by the early Christians were of two kinds—

1st. The genuine writings of holy men who lived in the age immediately subsequent to the apostles, and who wrote edifying epistles and treatises on topics of Christian doctrine or practice. These were called *ecclesiastical*, and were often read in the churches for edification, though never appealed to as authority, e. g., Epistle of Clemens Romanus and the Shepherd of Hermas.

2d. Spurious compositions, falsely set forth as the writings of Christ or of his apostles, or of their disciples. Some of these were well intentioned pious frauds; others were the forgeries of heretics. A few of these appeared in the second, but most in the fourth century, and the greater part are now lost. As far as their names can be recovered, Mr. Jones has given a complete list both of those now extant and of those that have been lost.—Jones' New Method, Part I., chap. iii, and Part III. The principal writ-

ings of this class now extant are the Letter of our Saviour to Abgarus, king of Edessa; the Constitutions and Creed of the Apostles; the Gospel of our Saviour's Infancy; Letters of Paul to Seneca; the Acts of Paul and Thecla, etc.

Mr. Jones has set down several marks in his work, Part I., chaps. xi., xii., xiii., by which all these writings may be proved to constitute no part of Holy Scripture. The sum of the results of his investigations in the first and second parts of his work are, that all these writings are proved by their contents to be unworthy of a place in the canon; by their style not to be the work of their reputed authors; by frequent contradictions not to be consistent with the received Scriptures. That not one of them was ever quoted or enrolled as canonical by any competent number of cotemporaneous witnesses. That nearly all of them were expressly repudiated as spurious, or at least as uninspired, by the early church.

14. What are the sources from which the true text of the Old Testament is ascertained?

1st. Ancient manuscripts. The Jews have always copied and preserved their manuscripts with superstitious care, even counting the words and letters. "In the period between the sixth and tenth centuries they had two celebrated academies, one at Babylon, in the East, and the other at Tiberias, in the West, where their literature was cultivated, and their Scriptures frequently transcribed. Hence arose two distinct recensions or editions of the Hebrew Scriptures, which were collated in the eighth or ninth centuries," and the text thus prepared is the masoretic or traditional text which we now have in our Hebrew Bibles. The most ancient existing Hebrew manuscripts date from the ninth or tenth centuries. The majority range from A. D. 1000 to A. D. 1457. The oldest extant printed Hebrew Bible dates A. D. 1488. Dr. Kennicott collated in preparation for his critical edition of the Hebrew Bible six hundred and thirty manuscripts, and M. de Rossi collated nine hundred and fiftyeight. The various readings presented by these manuscripts in very few cases involve the sense of the passage, and chiefly relate to differences in the vowel points, accents, etc.

2d. We may correct the existing text by comparing it with (1.) The Samaritan Pentateuch, or the edition of the five books

of Moses which the Samaritans inherited from the ten tribes. (2.) The Targums, which are eleven books in number, some of them dating from the first century before Christ, and being generally very accurate paraphrases of the Hebrew Scriptures in the ancient Chaldee. (3.) With the early translations of the Scriptures into other languages. a The Greek Septuagint, made B. C. 285. b The Peshito or ancient Syriac version, A. D. 100 about. c The Latin Vulgate made by Jerome A. D. 385.—Horne's Introduction.

15. What are the sources from which the true text of the New Testament Scripture is ascertained?

1st. Ancient manuscripts. The oldest and most authoritative Greek manuscripts now extant: (1.) The Codex Alexandrinus of the fifth century, (called A.) now in the British Museum. (2.) The Codex Vaticanus of the fourth century, (called B.) now in the Vatican Library at Rome. (3.) Codex Regius of the sixth century, (called C.) now in the Royal Library, Paris. (4.) The Codex Bezæ of the sixth century, (called D.) now in the University Library, Cambridge. Manuscripts succeeding these in age, up to the end of the fifteenth century, abound all over Europe. Upwards of six hundred have been diligently collated in preparation for recent editions of the Greek Testament. The results of the most thorough investigations is uniformly declared by the most competent scholars to establish beyond question the integrity of the sacred text.

2d. The numerous and accurate quotations of the Scriptures preserved in the writings of the early Christians. "In not less than one hundred and eighty ecclesiastical writers, whose works are still extant, are quotations from the New Testament introduced, and so numerous are they, that from the works of those that flourished before the seventh century the whole text of the New Testament might have been recovered, if the originals had

perished."

3d. Early translations into other languages. (1.) The Peshito or ancient Syriac version about A.D. 100. (2.) The Latin Vulgate of Jerome A.D. 385. (3.) The Coptic of the fifth century, and others of less critical value.—Horne's Intro., and Angus' Bible Hand-Book.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

As the result of the argument for the being of God presented in the first chapter, we found (Chap. I., question 20) that even the light of nature surely discovers that there is a God, and that he is a personal spirit, infinite, eternal, self-existent, the first cause of all things, infinitely intelligent, powerful, free of will, righteous, and benevolent. It remains for us in the present chapter to attempt to collect and present that additional and clearer knowledge of the divine nature which the Scriptures make known to us by means of his names and his attributes.

1. State the etymology and meaning of the several names appropriated to God in the Scriptures.

Ist. Jehovah, from the Hebrew verb תְּיָה, to be. It expresses self-existence and unchangeableness; it is the incommunicable name of God, which the Jews superstitiously refused to pronounce, always substituting in their reading the word Adonai, Lord. Hence it is represented in our English version by the word Lord, printed in capital letters.

JAH, probably an abbreviation of the name Jehovah, is used principally in the Psalms.—Ps. lxviii., 4. It constitutes the concluding syllable of hallelujah, praise Jehovah.

God gave to Moses his peculiar name, "I AM THAT I AM," Ex. iii., 14, from the same root, and bearing the same fundamental significance as Jehovah.

- 2d. EL, *might*, *power*, translated *God*, and applied alike to the true and to the false gods.—Isa. xliv., 10.
- 3d. Elohim and Eloah, the same name in its singular and plural form, derived from મુક્ક, to fear, reverence. "In its singular form it is used only in the latter books and in poetry." In the

plural form it is sometimes used with a plural sense for gods, but more commonly as a pluralis excellentiæ, for God. It is applied to false gods, but preëminently to Jehovah as the great object of adoration.

4th. Addition Albanai, the Lord, a pluralis excellentiæ, applied exclusively to God, expressing possession and sovereign dominion, equivalent to $\kappa \nu \rho \iota \rho \iota \rho$, Lord, so frequently applied to Christ in the New Testament.

5th. Saddai, almighty, a pluralis excellentiæ. Sometimes it stands by itself.—Job v., 17; and sometimes combined with a preceding El.—Gen. xvii., 1.

6th. Elyōn, Most High, a verbal adjective from אָּבָּא, to go up, ascend.—Ps. ix., 3; xxi., 8.

7th. The term TZEBAOTH, of hosts, is frequently used as an epithet qualifying one of the above-mentioned names of God. Thus, Jehovah of Hosts, God of Hosts, Jehovah, God of Hosts.—Amos iv., 13; Ps. xxiv., 10. Some have thought this equivalent to God of Battles. The true force of the epithet, however, is "sovereign of the stars, material hosts of heaven, and of the angels their inhabitants."—Dr. J. A. Alexander, Com. on Ps. xxiv., 10, and Gesenius' Heb. Lex.

8th. Many other epithets are applied to God metaphorically, to set forth the relation he sustains to us and the offices he fulfills, e. g., King, Lawgiver, Judge.—Isa. xxxiii., 17; Ps. xxiv., 8; l., 6. Rock, Fortress, Tower, Deliverer.—2 Sam. xxii., 2, 3; Ps. lxii., 2. Shepherd, Husbandman.—Ps. xxiii., 1; John, xv., 1. Father, Matt. vi., 9; John xx., 17, etc.

2. What are the divine attributes?

As God is infinite in his being, and in all the affections and modes thereof, it is manifestly impossible for any creature to conceive of him as he is in himself, or as he apprehends his own infinite being in his infinite knowledge. Yet he has mercifully condescended to reveal himself to us under the form of certain finite conceptions, which are possible to us only after the analogy of our own spiritual constitution, and because of the revealed fact that man was created in the image of God. They are imperfect, because finite conceptions; they are true, because revealed by God himself to man created in his own image. The word attribute

signifies that which in numan thought, on the authority of divine revelation, is to be truly attributed to or predicated of God. They are not, however, to be conceived of as properties distinct from his essence, but as modes of conceiving of his essence. His knowledge is his essence knowing, as his love is his essence loving.

Concerning the nature and operations of God, we can know only what he has vouchsafed to reveal to us, and with every conception, either of his being or his acts, there must always attend an element of incomprehensibility, which is inseparable from infinitude. His knowledge and power are as truly beyond all understanding as his eternity or immensity.—Job. xi., 7-9; xxvi., 14; Ps. cxxxix., 5, 6; Isa. xl., 28. The moral elements of his glorious nature are the norm or original law of our moral faculties; thus we are made capable of comprehending the ultimate principles of truth and justice upon which he acts. Yet his action upon those principles is often a trial of our faith, and an occasion of our adoring wonder.—Rom. xi., 33–36; Isa. lv., 8, 9.

3. How are we to understand those passages of Scripture which attribute to God bodily parts and the infirmities of human passion?

The passages referred to are such as speak of the face of God, Ex. xxxiii., 11, 20; his eyes, 2 Chron., xvi., 9; his nostrils, 2 Sam. xxii., 9, 16; his arms and feet, Isa. lii., 10, and Ps. xviii., 9; and such as speak of his repenting and grieving, Gen. vi., 6, 7; Jer. xv., 6; Ps. xcv., 10; of his being jealous, Deut. xxix., 20, etc. These are to be understood only as metaphors. They represent the truth with respect to God only analogically, and as seen from our point of view.

When he is said to repent, or to be grieved, or to be jealous, it is only meant that he acts towards us as a man would when agitated by such passions. These metaphors occur principally in the Old Testament, and in highly rhetorical passages of the poetical and prophetical books.

4. How may the divine attributes be classified?

From the vastness of the subject and the incommensurateness of our faculties, it is evident that no classification of the divine

attributes we can form can be anything more than approximately accurate and complete. The most common classifications rest

upon the following principles:-

1st. The attributes of God, distinguished as communicable and incommunicable. The communicable are those to which the attributes of the human spirit bear the nearest analogy, e. g., his power, knowledge, will, goodness, and righteousness. The incommunicable are those to which there is in the creature nothing analogous, as eternity, immensity, etc. This distinction, however, must not be pressed too far. God is infinite in his relation to space and time; we are finite in our relation to both. But he is no less infinite as to his knowledge, will, goodness, and righteousness in all their modes, and we are finite in all these respects. All God's attributes known to us, or conceivable by us, are communicable, in as much as they have their analogy in us, but they are all alike incommunicable, in as much as they are all infinite.

2d. The attributes of God, distinguished as natural and moral. The natural are all those which pertain to his existence as an infinite, rational Spirit, e. g., eternity, immensity, intelligence, will, power. The moral are those additional attributes which belong to him as an infinite, righteous Spirit, e. g., justice, mercy, truth.

I would diffidently propose the following four-fold clasification:

(1.) Those attributes which equally qualify all the rest—Infinitude, that which has no bounds; absoluteness, that which is determined either in its being or modes of being or action by nothing whatsoever without itself. This includes immutability.

(2.) Natural attributes. God is an infinite Spirit, self-existent, eternal, immense, simple, free of will, intelligent, powerful.

(3). Moral attributes. God is a Spirit infinitely righteous, good, true, and faithful.

(4.) The consummate glory of all the divine perfections in union. The beauty of HOLINESS.

THE UNITY OF GOD.

5. In what sense is God one?

1st. There is only one God, to the exclusion of all others.

2d. Notwithstanding the threefold personal distinction in the unity of the Godhead, yet these three are one in substance, and ronstitute one indivisible God.

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6. How may the proposition, that God is one and indivisible, be proved?

1st. There appears to be a necessity in reason for conceiving of God as one. That which is absolute and infinite can not but be one and indivisible in essence. If God is not one, then it will necessarily follow that there are more gods than one.

2d. The uniform representation of Scripture.—John x., 30.

7. Prove from Scripture that the proposition, there is but one God, is true.

Deut. vi., 4; 1 Kings viii., 60; Isa. xliv., 6; Mark xii., 29, 32; 1 Cor. viii., 4; Eph. iv., 6.

8. What is the argument from the harmony of creation in favor of the divine unity?

The whole creation, between the outermost range of telescopic and of microscopic observation, is manifestly one indivisible system. But we have already (Chapter L) proved the existence of God from the phenomena of the universe; and we now argue upon the same principle that if an effect proves the prior operation of a cause, and if traces of design prove a designer, then singleness of plan and operation in that design and its execution prove that the designer is ONE.

9. What is the argument upon this point from necessary existence?

The existence of God is said to be necessary, because it has its cause from eternity in itself. It is the same in all duration and in all space alike. It is absurd to conceive of God's not existing at any time or in any portion of space, while all other existence whatsoever, depending upon his mere will, is contingent. But the necessity which is uniform in all times and in every portion of space, is evidently only one and indivisible, and can be the ground of the existence only of one God.

This argument is logical, and has been prized highly by many distinguished theologians. It however appears to involve the error of presuming human logic to be the measure of existence.

10. What is the argument from infinite perfection, in proof that there can be but one God?

God is infinite in his being and in all of his perfections. But the infinite, by including all, excludes all others. If there were two infinite beings, each would necessarily include the other, and be included by it, and thus they would be the same, one and identical. It is certain that the idea of the co-existence of two infinitely perfect beings is as repugnant to human reason as to Scripture.

11. What is polytheism? and what dualism?

Polytheism, as the etymology of the word indicates, is a general term designating every system of religion which teaches the existence of a plurality of gods.

Dualism is the designation of that system which recognizes two original and independent principles in the universe, the one good and the other evil. At present these principles are in a relation of ceaseless antagonism, the good ever struggling to oppose the evil, and to deliver its province from its baneful intrusion.

12. What is meant by the phrase simplicity, when applied to God?

The term simplicity is used, first, in opposition to material composition, whether mechanical, organic, or chemical; second, in a metaphysical sense in negation of the relation of substance and property, essence and mode. In the first sense of the word human souls are simple, because they are not composed of elements, parts, or organs. In the second sense of the word our souls are complex, since there is in them a distinction between their essence and their properties, and their successive modes or states of existence. As, however, God is infinite, eternal, self-existent from eternity, necessarily the same without succession, theologians have maintained that in him essence, and property, and mode are one. He always is what he is, and he is what he is essentially, and by the same necessity that he exists. Whatever is in God, whether thought, emotion, volition, or act, is God.

Although this distinction has the sanction of the highest names, it appears to involve at least a questionable application of human reason to subjects so far transcending the analogy of human consciousness.

13. What is affirmed when it is said that God is a spirit?

We know nothing of substance except as it is manifested by its properties. Matter is that substance whose properties manifest themselves directly to our bodily senses. Spirit is that substance whose properties manifest themselves to us directly in self-consciousness, and only inferentially by words and other signs or modes of expression through our senses.

When we say God is a Spirit we mean-

Ist. Negatively, that he does not possess bodily parts or passions; that he is composed of no material elements; that he is not subject to any of the limiting conditions of material existence; and, consequently, that he is not to be apprehended as the object of any of our bodily senses.

2d. Positively, that he is a rational being, who distinguishes with infinite precision between the true and the false; that he is a moral being, who distinguishes between the right and the wrong; that he is a free agent, whose action is self-determined by his own will; and, in fine, that all the essential properties of our spirits may truly be predicated of him in an infinite degree.—John iv., 24; Chap. I., questions 23, 24, 27, 30.

GOD'S RELATION TO SPACE.

14. What is meant by the immensity of God?

The immensity of God is the phrase used to express the fact that God is infinite in his relation to space, i. e., that the entire indivisible essence of God is at every moment of time cotempo-

raneously present to every point of infinite space.

This is not in virtue of the infinite multiplication of his Spirit, since he is eternally one and individual; nor does it result from the infinite diffusion of his essence through infinite space, as air is diffused over the surface of the earth, since, being a Spirit, he is not composed of parts, nor is he capable of extension, but the whole Godhead in the one indivisible essence is equally present in every moment of eternal duration to the whole of infinite space, and to every part of it.

15. How does immensity differ from omnipresence?

Immensity characterizes the relation of God to space viewed abstractly in itself. Omnipresence characterizes the relation of

God to his creatures as they severally occupy their several positions in space. The divine essence is immense in its own being, absolutely. It is omnipresent relatively to all his creatures.

16. What are the different modes of the divine presence, and how may it be proved that he is everywhere present as to his essence?

God may be conceived of as present in any place, or with any creature, in several modes, first, as to his essence; second, as to his knowledge; third, as manifesting that presence to any intelligent creature; fourth, as exercising his power in any way in or upon the creature. As to essence and knowledge, his presence is the same everywhere and always. As to his self-manifestation and the exercise of his power, his presence differs endlessly in different cases in degree and mode. Thus God is present to the church as he is not to the world. Thus he is present in hell in the manifestation and execution of righteous wrath, while he is present in heaven in the manifestation and communication of gracious love and glory.

That God is everywhere present as to his essence is proved, first, from Scripture (1 Kings viii., 27; Ps. exxxix., 7-10; Isa. lxvi., 1; Acts xvii., 27, 28); second, from reason. (1.) It follows necessarily from his infinitude. (2.) From the fact that his knowledge is his essence knowing, and his actions are his essence acting. Yet his knowledge and his power reach to all things.

17. State the different relations that bodies, created spirits, and God sustain to space.

Turretin says: Bodies are conceived of as existing in space circumscriptively, because occupying a certain portion of space they are bounded by space upon every side. Created spirits do not occupy any portion of space, nor are they embraced by any, they are, however, in space definitely, as here and not there. God, on the other hand, is in space repletively, because in a transcendent manner his essence fills all space. He is included in no space; he is excluded from none. Wholly present to each point, he comprehends all space at once.

THE RELATION OF GOD TO TIME.

18. What is eternity?

Eternity is infinite duration; duration discharged from all limits, without beginning, without succession, and without end. The schoolmen phrase it punctum stans, an ever-abiding present.

We, however, can positively conceive of eternity only as duration indefinitely extended from the present moment in two directions, as to the past and as to the future. These are improperly expressed as eternity a parte ante, or past, and eternity a parte post, or future. The eternity of God, however, is one and indivisible.

19. What is time?

Time is limited duration, measured by succession, either of thought or motion. It is distinguished in reference to our perceptions into past, present, and future.

20. What relation does time bear to eternity?

Eternity, the unchanging present, without beginning or end, comprehends all time, and co-exists as an undivided moment, with all the successions of time as they appear and pass in their order.

Thought is possible to us, however, only under the limitations of time and space. We can conceive of God only under the finite fashion of first purposing and then acting, of first promising or threatening and then fulfilling his word, etc. He that inhabiteth eternity infinitely transcends our understanding.—Isa. lvii., 15.

21. When we say that God is eternal, what do we affirm and what do we deny?

We affirm, first, that as to his existence, he never had any beginning, and never will have any end; second, that as to the mode of his existence, his thoughts, emotions, purposes, and acts are, without succession, one and inseparable the same for ever; third, that he is immutable.

We deny, first, that he ever had a beginning or ever will have an end; second, that his states or modes of being occur in succession; third, that his essence, attributes, or purposes will ever change. 22. In what sense are the acts of God spoken of as past, present, and future?

The acts of God are never past, present, or future as respects God himself, but only in respect to the objects and effects of his acts in the creature. The efficient purpose comprehending the precise object, time, and circumstance was present to him always and changelessly; the event, however, taking place in the creature, occurs in time, and is thus past, present, or future to our observation.

23. In what sense are events past or future as it regards God?

As God's knowledge is infinite, every event must, first, be ever equally present to his knowledge from eternity to eternity; second, these events must be known to him as they actually occur in themselves, e. g., in their true nature, relations, and successions. This distinction, therefore, holds true—God's knowledge of all events is without beginning, end, or succession; but he knows them as in themselves occurring in the successions of time, past, present, or future, relatively to one another.

24. What is meant by the immutability of God?

By his immutability we mean that it follows from the infinite perfection of God; that he can not be changed by anything from without himself; and that he will not change from any principle within himself. That as to his essence, his will, and his states of existence, he is the same from eternity to eternity. Thus he is absolutely immutable in himself. He is also immutable relatively to the creature, in so much as his knowledge, purpose, and truth, as these are conceived by us and are revealed to us, can know neither variableness nor shadow of turning.—James i., 17.

^{*}25. Prove from Scripture and reason that God is immutable.

1st. Scripture: Mal. iii., 6; Ps. xxxiii., 11; Isa. xlvi., 10; James i., 17.

2d. Reason: (1.) God is self-existent. As he is caused by none, but causes all, so he can be changed by none, but changes all. (2.) He is the absolute being. Neither his existence, nor the man-

ner of it, nor his will, are determined by any necessary relation which they sustain to any thing exterior to himself. As he preceded all and caused all, so his sovereign will freely determined the relations which all things are permitted to sustain to him. (3.) He is infinite in duration, and therefore he can not know succession or change. (4.) He is infinite in all perfection, knowledge, wisdom, righteousness, benevolence, will, power, and therefore can not change, for nothing can be added to the infinite nor taken from it. Any change would make him either less than infinite before, or less than infinite afterwards.

26. How can the creation of the world and the incarnation of the Son be reconciled with the immutability of God?

1st. As to the creation. The efficacious purpose, the will and power to create the world dwelleth in God from eternity without change, but this very efficacious purpose itself provided that the effect should take place in its proper time and order. This effect took place from God, but of course involved no shadow of change in God, as nothing was either taken from him or added to him.

2d. As to the incarnation. The divine Son assumed a created human nature into personal union with himself. His uncreated essence of course was not changed. His eternal person was not changed in itself, but only brought into a new relation. The change effected by that stupendous event occurred only in the created nature of the man Christ Jesus.

THE INFINITE INTELLIGENCE OF GOD.

27. How does God's mode of knowing differ from ours?

God's knowledge is, 1st, his essence knowing; 2d, it is one eternal, all-comprehensive, indivisible act.

(1.) It is not discursive, i. e., proceeding logically from the known to the unknown; but intuitive, i. e., discerning all things directly in its own light.

(2.) It is *independent*, *i. e.*, it does in no way depend upon his creatures or their actions, but solely upon his own infinite intuition of all things *possible* in the light of his own reason, and of all things *actual* and *future* in the light of his own eternal purpose.

(3.) It is total and simultaneous, not successive. It is one single, indivisible act of intuition, beholding all things in themselves, their relations and successions, as ever present.

(4.) It is *perfect* and *essential*, not *relative*, *i. e.*, he knows all things directly in their hidden essences, while we know them only

by their properties, as they stand related to our senses.

28. How may the objects of divine knowledge be classified?

1st. God himself in his own infinite being. It is evident that this, transcending the sum of all other objects, is the only adequate object of a knowledge really infinite.

2d. All possible objects, as such, whether they are or ever have been, or ever will be or not, seen in the light of his own in-

finite reason.

- 3d. All things which have been, are, or will be, he comprehends in one eternal, simultaneous act of knowledge, as ever present actualities to him, and as known to be such in the light of his own sovereign and eternal purpose.
- 29. What is the technical designation of the knowledge of things possible, and what is the foundation of that knowledge?

Its technical designation is scientia simplicis intelligentiæ, knowledge of simple intelligence, so called, because it is conceived by us as an act simply of the divine intellect, without any concurrent act of the divine will. For the same reason it has been styled scientia necessaria, necessary knowledge, i, e., not voluntary, or determined by will. The foundation of that knowledge is God's essential and infinitely perfect knowledge of his own omnipotence.

30. What is the technical designation of the knowledge of things actual, whether past, present, or future, and what is the foundation of that knowledge?

It is called scientia visionis, knowledge of vision, and scientia libera, free knowledge, because his intellect is in this case conceived of as being determined by a concurrent act of his will.

The foundation of this knowledge is God's infinite knowledge of his own all-comprehensive and unchangeable eternal purpose.

31. Prove that the knowledge of God extends to future contingent events.

The contingency of events in our view of them has a two-fold ground: first, their immediate causes may be by us indeterminate, as in the case of the dice; second, their immediate cause may be the volition of a free agent. The first class are in no sense contingent in God's view. The second class are foreknown by him as contingent in their cause, but as none the less certain in their event.

That he does foreknow all such is certain-

1st. Scripture affirms it.—1 Sam. xxiii., 11, 12; Acts ii., 23; xv., 18; Isa. xlvi., 9, 10.

2d. He has often predicted contingent events future, at the time of the prophecy, which the event has fulfilled.—Mark xiv., 30.

- 3d. God is infinite in all his perfections, his knowledge, therefore, must (1.) be perfect, and comprehend all things future as well as past (2.) independent of the creature. He knows all things in themselves by his own light, and can not depend upon the will of the creature to make his knowledge either more certain or more complete.
- 32. How can the foreknowledge of God be reconciled with the freedom of moral agents in their acts?

The difficulty here presented is of this nature. God's foreknowledge is certain; the event, therefore, must be certainly future; if certainly future, how can the agent be free in enacting it.

In order to avoid this difficulty some theologians, on the one hand, have denied the reality of man's moral freedom, while others, on the other hand, have maintained that, God's knowledge being free, he voluntarily abstains from knowing what his creatures endowed with free agency will do.

We remark—

1st. God's certain foreknowledge of all future events and man's free agency are both certain facts, impregnably established by independent evidence. We must believe both, whether we can reconcile them or not.

2d. Although necessity is inconsistent with liberty, moral certainty is not, as is abundantly shown in Chapter XVIII., question 12.

33. What is scientia media?

This is the technical designation of God's knowledge of future contingent events, presumed, by the authors of this distinction, to depend not upon the eternal purpose of God making the event certain, but upon the free act of the creature as foreseen by a special intuition. It is called scientia media, middle knowledge, because it is supposed to occupy a middle ground between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision. It differs from the former, since its object is not all possible things, but a special class of things actually future. It differs from the latter, since its ground is not the eternal purpose of God, but the free action of the creature as simply foreseen.

34. By whom was this distinction introduced, and for what purpose?

By the Jesuit doctors, for the purpose of explaining how God might certainly foreknow what his free creatures would do in the absence of any sovereign foreordination on his part, determining their action. Thus making his foreordination of men to happiness or misery to depend upon his foreknowledge of their faith and obedience, and denying that his foreknowledge depends upon his sovereign foreordination.

35. What are the arguments against the validity of this distinction?

1st. The arguments upon which it is based are untenable. Its advocates plead, (1.) Scripture.—1 Sam. xxiii., 9-12; Matt. xi., 22, 23. (2.) That this distinction is obviously necessary, in order to render the mode of the divine foreknowledge consistent with man's free agency.

To the first argument we answer, that the events mentioned in the above-cited passages of Scripture were not future. They simply teach that God, knowing all causes, free and necessary, knows how they would act under any proposed condition. Even we know that if we add fire to powder an explosion would ensue. This comes under the first class we cited above, (question 29,) or the knowledge of all possible things. To the second argument we answer, that the certain foreknowledge of God involves the certainty of the future free act of his creature as much as his fore-

ordination does; and that the sovereign forcordination of God, with respect to the free acts of men, only makes them certainly future, and does not in the least provide for causing those acts in any other way than by the free will of the creature himself acting freely.

2d. This middle knowledge is unnecessary, because all possible objects of knowledge, all possible things, and all things actually to be, have already been embraced under the two classes already

cited, (questions 29, 30.)

3d. If God certainly foreknows any future event, then it must be certainly future, and he must have foreknown it to be certainly future, either because it was antecedently certain, or because his foreknowing it made it certain. If his foreknowing it made it certain, then his foreknowledge involves foreordination. If it was antecedently certain, then we ask, what could have made it certain, except what we affirm, the decree of God, either to cause it himself immediately, or to cause it through some necessary second cause, or that some free agent should cause it freely? We can only choose between the foreordination of God and a blind fate.

4th. This view makes the knowledge of God to depend upon the acts of his creatures without himself. This is both absurd and impious, if God is infinite, eternal, and absolute.

5th. The Scriptures teach that God does foreordain as well as foreknow the free acts of men.—Isa. x., 5-15; Acts ii., 23; iv., 27, 28.

36. How does wisdom differ from knowledge, and wherein does the wisdom of God consist?

Knowledge is a simple act of the understanding, apprehending that a thing is, and comprehending its nature and relations, or how it is.

Wisdom presupposes knowledge, and is the practical use which the understanding, determined by the will, makes of the material of knowledge. God's wisdom is infinite and eternal. It is conceived of by us as selecting the highest possible end, the manifestation of his own glory, and then in selecting and directing in every department of his operations the best possible means to secure that end. This wisdom is gloriously manifested to us in the great theaters of creation, providence, and grace.



THE INFINITE POWER OF GOD.

37. What is meant by the omnipotence of God?

Power is that efficiency which, by an essential law of thought, we recognize as inherent in a cause in relation to its effect. God is the uncaused first cause, and the causal efficiency of his will is absolutely limitless.

38. In what sense have theologians admitted that the power of God is limited?

1st. By his own infinitely perfect nature. He can not act either unwisely or unjustly.

2d. By the nature of things. He can not work an essential contradiction.

We regard this language as inaccurate. For with regard to the first limit, his own nature, his power, resides in his will, and he certainly can do whatsoever he wills to do. It would be more accurate, therefore, to say that his infinitely wise and righteous will always chooses wisely and righteously, than to say that wisdom or righteousness limits his power.

With regard to the second limit. Contradictions are not things. To be and not to be at the same time, and in the same sense is a mere logical quibble.

39. How can absolute omnipotence be proved to belong to God?

1st. It is asserted by Scripture.—Jer. xxxii., 17; Matt. xix., 26; Luke i., 37; Rev. xix., 6.

2d. It is necessarily involved in the very idea of God as an infinite being.

3d. Although we have seen but part of his ways, (Job xxvi., 14), yet our constantly extending experience is ever revealing to us new and more astonishing evidences of his power, which always indicate an inexhaustible reserve.

THE WILL OF GOD.

40. What is meant by the will of God?

The will of God is the infinitely and eternally wise, powerful, and righteous essence of God willing. In our conception it is

that attribute of the Deity to which we refer his purposes and decrees as their principle.

41. In what sense is the will of God said to be free, and in what sense necessary?

The will of God is the wise, powerful, and righteous essence of God willing. His will, therefore, in every act is certainly and yet most freely both wise and righteous. The liberty of indifference is evidently foreign to his nature, because the perfection of wisdom is to choose the most wisely, and the perfection of righteousness is to choose the most righteously.

On the other hand, the will of God is from eternity absolutely

independent of all his creatures and all their actions.

42. What is intended by the distinction between the decretive and the preceptive will of God?

The decretive will of God is God efficaciously purposing the certain futurition of events. The preceptive will of God is God, as moral governor, commanding his moral creatures to do that which he sees it right and wise that they in their circumstances should do.

These are not inconsistent. What he wills as our duty may very consistently be different from what he wills as his purpose. What it is right for him to permit may be wrong for him to approve, or for us to do.

43. What is meant by the distinction between the secret and revealed will of God?

The secret will of God is his decretive will, called secret, because although it is sometimes revealed to man in the prophecies, and promises of the Bible, yet it is for the most part hidden in God.

The revealed will of God is his perceptive will, which is always clearly set forth as the rule of our duty.—Deut. xxix., 29.

44. In what sense do the Arminians maintain the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God, and what are the objections to their view of the subject?

This is a distinction invented by the schoolmen, and adopted

by the Arminians, for reconciling the will of God with their theory of the free agency of man.

They call that an antecedent act of God's will which precedes the action of the creature, e. g., before Adam sinned God willed him to be happy. They call that a consequent act of God's will which followed the act of the creature, and is consequent upon that act, e. g., after Adam sinned God willed him to suffer the penalty due to his sin.

It is very evident that this distinction does not truly represent the nature of God's will, and its relation to the acts of his creatures: first, God is eternal, and therefore there can be no distinction in his acts as to time; second, God is eternally omniscient and omnipotent. If he wills anything, therefore, he must from the beginning will the means to accomplish it, and thus secure the attainment of the end willed. Otherwise God must have, at the same time, two inconsistent wills with regard to the same object. The truth is that God, eternally and unchangeably, by one comprehensive act of will, willed all that happened to Adam from beginning to end in the precise order and succession in which each event occurred; third, God is infinitely independent. It is degrading to God to conceive of him as first willing that which he has no power to effect, and then changing his will consequently to the independent acts of his creatures.

It is true, indeed, that because of the natural limits of our capacities we necessarily conceive of the several intentions of God's one, eternal, indivisible purpose, as sustaining a certain logical, (not temporal,) relation to each other as principle and consequent. Thus we conceive of God's first (in logical order) decreeing to create man, then to permit him to fall, then to elect some to everlasting life, and then to provide a redemption.— Turrettin.

45. In what sense do Arminians hold the distinction between the absolute and conditional will of God, and what are the objections to that view?

In their view that is the absolute will of God which is suspended upon no condition without himself, e. g., his decree to create man. That is the conditional will of God which is sus-

pended upon a condition, e. g., his decree to save those that believe, i. e., on condition of their faith.

It is evident that this view is entirely inconsistent with the nature of God as an eternal, self-existent, independent being, infinite in all his perfections. It degrades him to the position of being simply a coördinate part of the creation, mutually limiting and being limited by the creature.

The mistake results from detaching a fragment of God's will from the one whole, all-comprehensive eternal purpose. It is evident that, when properly viewed as eternal and one, God's purpose must comprehend all conditions, as well as their consequents. God's will is suspended upon no condition, but he eternally wills the event as suspended upon its condition, and its condition as determining the event.

It is admitted by all that God's preceptive will, as expressed in commands, promises, and threatenings, is often suspended upon condition. If we believe we shall certainly be saved. This is the relation which God has immutably established between faith as the condition, and salvation as the consequent, i. e., faith is the condition of salvation. But this is something very different from saying that the faith of Paul was the condition of God's eternal purpose to save him, because the same purpose determined the faith as the condition, and the salvation as its consequent. See further, Chapter IX., on the decrees.

46. In what sense is the will of God said to be eternal?

It is one eternal, unsuccessive, all-comprehensive act, absolutely determining either to effect or to permit all things, in all of their relations, conditions, and successions, which ever were, are, or ever will be.

47. In what sense may the will of God be said to be the rule of righteousness?

It is evident that in the highest sense, with respect to God willing, his mere will can not be regarded as the ultimate ground of all righteousness, any more than it can be as the ultimate ground of all wisdom. Because, in that case, it would follow, first, that there would be no essential difference between right and wrong in themselves, but only a difference arbitrarily consti-

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tuted by God himself; and, second, that it would be senseless to ascribe righteousness to God, for then that would be merely to say that he wills as he wills. The truth is, that his will acts as his infinitely righteous wisdom sees to be right.

On the other hand, God's revealed will is to us the absolute and ultimate rule of righteousness, alike when he commands things in themselves indifferent, and thus *makes* them right, as when he commands things in themselves essentially right, because they are right.

THE INFINITE JUSTICE OF GOD.

48. What is meant by the distinctions absolute and relative, rectoral, distributive, and punitive or vindictive justice of God?

The absolute justice of God is the infinite moral perfection or universal righteousness of his own being.

The relative justice of God is his infinitely righteous nature, viewed as exercised in his relation to his moral creatures, as their moral governor.

This last is called rectoral, when viewed as exercised generally in administering the affairs of his universal government, in providing for and governing his creatures and their actions. It is called distributive, when viewed as exercised in giving unto each creature his exact proportionate due of rewards or punishment. It is called punitive or vindictive, when viewed as demanding and inflicting the adequate and proportionate punishment of all sin, because of its intrinsic ill desert.

49. What are the different opinions as to the nature of the punitive justice of God, i. e., what are the different reasons assigned why God punishes sin?

The Socinians deny the punitive justice of God altogether, and maintain that he punishes sin simply for the good of the individual sinner, and of society, only so far as it may be interested in his restraint or improvement. The new school theologians, maintaining the governmental theory of the Atonement, hold that God punishes sin not because of a changeless principle in himself demanding its punishment, but for the good of the universe, on the basis of great and changeless principles of govern-

mental policy. Thus resolving justice into a form of general benevolence.—See Beman on the Atonement.

Some hold that the necessity for the punishment of sin is only hypothetical, i. e., results only from the eternal decree of God.

The true view is that God is immutably determined by his

The true view is that God is immutably determined by his own eternal and essential righteousness to visit every sin with a proportionate punishment.

50. How may it be argued from the independence and absolute self-sufficiency of God, that punitive justice is an essential attribute of his nature?

It is inconsistent with these essential attributes to conceive of God as obliged to any course of action by the external exigencies of his creation. Both the motive and the end of his action must be in himself. If he punishes sin because determined so to do by the principles of his own nature, then he acts independently. But if he resorts to this merely as the necessary means of restraining and governing his creatures, then their actions control his.

51. What argument in support of this doctrine may be drawn from the instinctive sense of justice which is essentially inherent in our nature?

Man, especially as to his moral nature, was created in the image of God. We necessarily refer to him in an infinite degree our highest ideal of moral excellence. Conscience, as the organ of the moral law in our hearts, echoes the voice, and discovers to us the moral character of the great Lawgiver.

Now, the universal testimony of the human conscience is, that ill desert is of the essence of sin; that, irrespective of any general consequences to society, the malefactor deserves punishment; and that no amount of public benefit can justify the judicial injury of the innocent. This is implied in all human laws, in all superstitious fears, and in the penances and expiatory sacrifices which, in one form or another, have constituted a prominent element in all religions.

52. How may this principle be inferred from God's love of holiness and hatred of sin?

If the reason for God's punishing sin was founded simply in his own arbitrary will, then he could not be said to hate sin, but only to love his own will. Or if his reason for punishing sin rested solely upon governmental considerations, then he could not be strictly said to hate sin, but only its consequences.

But both our consciences and Scripture teach positively that God does hate sin and love holiness for their own sakes.—Hab. i., 13; Ps. v., 4, 5; xlv., 6, 7; cxlv., 17; Prov. xi., 20; Deut.

iv., 24.

To deny this doctrine is to deny the very essence of moral goodness, to resolve righteousness into prudence, and right into advantage.

, 53. How may it be proved from what the Scriptures say of the death of Christ?

The Scriptures teach that our sins were laid upon Christ; that he was made sin; that he suffered the just for the unjust that God might justly justify the unjust.--Isa. liii., 5-11; Rom. iii., 24-26; Gal. iii., 13, 14; 1 Pet. iii., 18; also see Chapter XXII. But if the necessity for the punishment of sin arises simply from the arbitrary will of God, then the sacrifice of Christ involved no punishment of sin at all, but a mere gratification of God's arbitrary will. Or if, on the other hand, it derives its necessity purely from governmental considerations, i. e., from the necessity of restraining sinners and preventing the spread of sin by manifesting to the universe a stupendous evidence that sin shall be punished, what would this be but to make the awful death of Christ a well-intentioned fiction. For if Christ died, not because all sin intrinsically deserves punishment, not because there is an immutable principle in God demanding its punishishment, but only that further sin may be prevented, then sin was not punished. Yet the Scriptures declare that it was. But if our doctrine be true, that God is immutably determined to punish all sin, then we can understand why, without the shedding of blood, there can be no remission, and a sufficient reason is given for the awful sacrifice of the incarnate Word.

54. How may it be proved from the law of God?

The penalty is as essential an element of the law as the pre-

cept, and together they constitute one inseparable and perfect rule of moral rectitude. The language of the law is, "the soul that sinneth it shall die." Now, if this rule be based upon the mere will of God, then it is no revelation of his moral nature, and no display of his essential righteousness. If, on the other hand, it is based on mere governmental considerations of general advantage, then there remains no distinction between right and wrong. We hold, however, that the one all-perfect law exhibits at once what God's infinitely perfect righteousness determines him to demand of his moral creatures, and in case of disobedience to inflict.

THE INFINITE GOODNESS OF GOD.

55. What distinctions are signified by the terms benevolence, complacency, mercy, and grace?

The infinite goodness of God is a glorious perfection which preëminently characterizes his nature, and which he, in an infinitely wise, righteous, and sovereign manner, exercises towards his creatures in various modes according to their relations and conditions.

Benevolence is the goodness of God viewed generically. It embraces all his creatures, except the judicially condemned on account of sin, and provides for their welfare.

The love of *complacency* is that approving affection with which God regards his own infinite perfections, and every image and reflection of them in his creatures, especially in the sanctified subjects of the new creation.

God's mercy, of which the more passive forms are pity and compassion, is the divine goodness exercised with respect to the miseries of his creatures, feeling for them, and making provision for their relief, and in the case of impenitent sinners, leading to long-suffering patience.

The grace of God is his goodness seeking to communicate his favors, and, above all, the fellowship of his own life and blessedness to his moral creatures, who, as creatures, must be destitute of all merit, and preëminently his electing love, securing at infinite cost the blessedness of its objects, who, as sinful creatures, were positively ill deserving.

- 56. What are the sources of our knowledge of the fact that God is benevolent?
- 1st. Reason. Benevolence is an essential element of moral perfection. God is infinitely perfect, and therefore infinitely benevolent.
- 2d. Experience and observation. The wisdom of God in designing, and the power of God in executing, in the several spheres of creation, providence, and revealed religion, have evidently been constantly determined by benevolent intentions.
- 3d. The direct assertions of Scripture.—Ps. clxv., 8, 9; 1 John iv., 8.
- 57. How may it be proved that God is gracious and willing to forgive sin?

Neither reason nor conscience can ever raise a presumption on this subject. It is the evident duty of fellow-creatures mutually to forgive *injuries*, but we have nothing to do with forgiving *sin* as sin.

It appears plain that there can be no moral principle making it essential for a sovereign ruler to forgive sin as transgression of law. All that reason or conscience can assure us of in that regard is, that sin can not be forgiven without an atonement. The gracious affection which should prompt such a ruler to provide an atonement, must, from its essential nature, be perfectly free and sovereign, and therefore it can be known only so far as it is graciously revealed. The gospel is, therefore, good news confirmed by signs and wonders.—Ex. xxxiv., 6, 7; Eph. i., 7–9.

- 58. What are the different theories or assumptions on which it has been attempted to reconcile the existence of sin with the goodness of God?
- 1st. It has been argued by some that free agency is essential to a moral system, and that absolute independence of will is essential to free agency. That to control the wills of free agents is no more an object of power than the working of contradictions; and consequently God, although omnipotent, could not prevent sin in a moral system without violating its nature.—See Dr. N. W. Taylor's Concio ad Clerum, 1828.
 - 2d. Others have argued that sin was permitted by God in in-

finite wisdom as the necessary means to the largest possible measure of happiness in the universe as a whole.

On both of these we remark-

1st. That the first theory above cited is founded on a false view of the conditions of human liberty and responsibility, (see below, Chapter XVIII.); and, further, that it grossly limits the power of God by representing him as desiring and attempting what he can not effect, and that it makes him dependent upon his creatures.

2d. With reference to the second theory it should be remembered that God's own glory, and not the greatest good of the universe, is the great end of God in creation and providence.

3d. The permission of sin, in its relation both to the righteousness and goodness of God, is an insolvable mystery, and all attempts to solve it only darken counsel with words without knowledge. It is, however, the privilege of our faith to know, though not of our philosophy to comprehend, that it is assuredly a most wise, righteous, and merciful permission; and that it shall redound to the glory of God and to the good of his chosen.

59. How can the attributes of goodness and justice be shown to be consistent?

Goodness and justice are the several aspects of one unchangeable, infinitely wise, and sovereign moral perfection. God is not sometimes merciful and sometimes just, nor so far merciful and so far just, but he is eternally infinitely merciful and just. Relatively to the creature this infinite perfection of nature presents different aspects, as is determined by the judgment which infinite wisdom delivers in each individual case.

Even in our experience these attributes of our moral nature are found not to be inconsistent in *principle*, though our want both of wisdom and knowledge, a sense of our own unworthiness, and a mere physical sympathy, often sadly distract our judgments as well as our hearts in adjusting these principles to the individual cases of life.

GOD'S INFINITE TRUTH.

60. What is truth considered as a divine attribute?

The truth of God in its widest sense is a perfection which

qualifies all his intellectual and moral attributes. His knowledge is infinitely true in relation to its objects, and his wisdom unbiassed either by prejudice or passion. His justice and his goodness in all their exercises are infinitely true to the perfect standard of his own nature. In all outward manifestations of his perfections to his creatures, God is always true to his nature—always self-consistently divine. This attribute in its more special sense qualifies all God's intercourse with his rational creatures. He is true to us as well as to himself; and thus is laid the foundation of all faith, and therefore of all knowledge. It is the foundation of all confidence, first, in our senses; second, in our intellect and conscience; third, in any authenticated, supernatural revelation.

The two forms in which this perfection is exercised in relation to us are, first, his entire truth in all his communications; second, his perfect sincerity in undertaking and faithfulness in discharging all his engagements.

61. How can the truth of God be reconciled with the apparent non-performance of some of his threatenings?

The promises and threatenings of God are sometimes absolute, when they are always infallibly fulfilled in the precise sense in which he intended them. They are often also conditional, made to depend upon the obedience or repentance of the creature.— Jonah iii., 4, 10; Jer. xviii., 7, 8. This condition may be either expressed or implied, because the individual case is understood to be, of course, governed by the general principle that genuine repentance and faith delivers from every threatening and secures every promise.

62. How can the invitations and exhortations of the Scriptures, addressed to those whom God does not propose to save, be reconciled with his sincerity?

See above, (question 42,) the distinction between God's preceptive and his decretive will. His invitations and exhortations are addressed to all men in good faith: first, because it is every man's duty to repent and believe, and God's preceptive will that that every man should; second, because nothing ever prevents the obedience of any sinner, except his own unwillingness; third,

because in every case in which the condition is fulfilled the promise implied will be performed; fourth, God never has promised to enable every man to believe; fifth, these invitations and exhortations are not addressed to the reprobate as such, but to all sinners as such, with the avowed purpose of saving thereby the elect.

THE INFINITE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD.

63. What is meant by the sovereignty of God?

His absolute right to govern and dispose of all his creatures, simply according to his own good pleasure.

64. Prove that this right is asserted in Scripture.

Dan. iv., 25, 35; Rev. iv., 11; 1 Tim. vi., 15; Rom. ix., 15-23.

- 65. On what does the absolute sovereignty of God rest?
- 1st. His infinite superiority in being and in all his perfections to any and to all his creatures.
- 2d. As creatures they were created out of nothing, and are now sustained in being by his power, for his own glory and according to his own good pleasure.—Rom. xi., 36.
- 3d. His infinite benefits to us, and our dependence upon and blessedness in him, are reasons why we should not only recognize, but rejoice, in this glorious truth. The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice.
- 66. Is there any sense in which there are limits to the sovereignty of God?

The sovereignty of God, viewed abstractly as one attribute among many, must of course be conceived of as qualified by all the rest. It can not be otherwise than an infinitely wise, righteous, and merciful sovereignty.

But God, viewed concretely as an infinite sovereign, is absolutely unlimited by any thing without himself. "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth."—Dan. iv., 35.

THE INFINITE HOLINESS OF GOD.

67. What is meant by the holiness of God?

The holiness of God is not to be conceived of as one attribute

among others; it is rather a general term representing the conception of his consummate perfection and total glory. It is his infinite moral perfection crowning his infinite intelligence and power. There is a glory of each attribute, viewed abstractly, and a glory of the whole together. The intellectual nature is the essential basis of the moral. Infinite moral perfection is the crown of the Godhead. Holiness is the total glory thus crowned.

Holiness in the Creator is the total perfection of an infinitely righteous intelligence. Holiness in the creature is not mere moral perfection, but perfection of the created nature of moral agents after their kind, in spiritual union and fellowship with the infinite Creator.—1 John i., 3.

The word holiness, as applied to God in Scripture, represents, first, moral purity.—Lev. xi., 44; Ps. exlv., 17; second, his transcendently august and venerable majesty.—Isa. vi., 3; Ps. xxii., 3; Rev. iv., 8.

To "sanctify the Lord," i. e., to make him holy, is to declare and adore his holiness by venerating his august majesty wherever and whereinsoever his person or character is represented.—Isa. viii., 13; xxix., 23; Exek. xxxviii., 23; Matt. vi., 9; 1 Pet. iii., 15.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE HOLY TRINITY.

1. What is the etymology and meaning of the word Trinity, and when u as it introduced into the language of the church?

This word, in its Latin form, Trinitas, is derived from the adjective trinus, three-fold, or three in one, and it thus exactly expresses the divine mystery of three persons in the unity of one Godhead.

It is said to have taken its place in the language of Christian theology, for the first time, in an apologetic work of Theophylus, bishop of Antioch, in Syria, from A. D. 168 to A. D. 183.—See Mosheim's Eccle. Hist., Vol. I., p. 121, Note'7.

2. What is the theological meaning of the term substantia (substance), and what change has occurred in its usage?

Substantia, as now used, is equivalent to essence, independent being. Thus, in the Godhead, the three persons are the same in in substance, *i. e.*, of one and the same indivisible, numerical essence.

The word was at first used by one party in the church as equivalent to *subsistentia* (subsistence), or mode of existence. In which sense, while there is but one essence, there are three substantiae or persons, in the Godhead.—See Turrettin, Tom. I., locus iii., ques. 23.

3. What is the theological meaning of the word subsistentia (subsistence)?

It is used to signify that mode of existence which distinguishes one individual thing from every other individual thing, one person from every other person. As applied to the doctrine

of the Trinity, subsistence is that mode of existence which is peculiar to each of the divine persons, and which in each constitutes the one essence a distinct person.

4. What is the New Testament sense of the word ὑπόστασις, (hypostasis)?

This word, as to its etymology, is precisely equivalent to substance; it comes from $i\phi i\sigma \tau \eta \mu \iota$, "to stand under."

In the New Testament it is used five times—

1st. Figuratively, for confidence, or that state of mind which is conscious of a firm foundation, 2 Cor. ix., 4; xi., 17; Heb. iii., 14, which faith realizes, Heb. xi., 1.

2d. Literally, for essential nature, Heb. i., 3.—See Sampson's

Com. on Heb.

5. In what sense is this word used by the ecclesiastical writers?

Until the middle of the fourth century this word, in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity, was generally used in its primary sense, as equivalent to substance. It is used in this sense in the creed published by the Council of Nice A. D. 325, and again in the decrees of the Council of Sardica, in Illyria, A. D. 347. These agreed in affirming that there is but one hypostasis in the Godhead. Some, however, at that time understanding the word in the sense of person, its usage was changed by general consent, chiefly through the influence of Athanasius, and ever since it has been established in theological language in the sense of person, in contradistinction to ôvola, essence. It has been transferred into the English language in the form of an adjective, to designate the hypostatical or personal union of two natures in the God man.

6. What is essential to personality, and how is the word person to be defined in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity?

The Latin word, "suppositum," signifies a distinct individual existence, c. g., a particular tree or horse. A person is "suppositum intellectuale," a distinct individual existence, to which belongs the properties of reason and free will. Throughout the entire range of our experience and observation of personal existence among creatures, personality rests upon and appears to be

inseparable from distinction of essence. Every distinct person

is a distinct soul, with or without a body.

That distinguishing mode of existence which constitutes the one divine essence coördinately three separate persons, is of course an infinite mystery which we can not understand, and therefore can not adequately define, and which we can know only so far as it is explicitly revealed. All that we know is, that this distinction, which is called personality, embraces all those incommunicable properties which eternally belong to Father, Son, or Holy Ghost separately, and not to all in common; that it lays the foundation for their concurrence in counsel, their mutual love and action one upon another, as the Father sending the Son, and the Father and Son sending the Spirit, and for use of the personal pronouns I, thou, he, in the revelation which one divine person gives of himself and of the others.

7. What is meant by the terms ὁμοούσιον (of the same substance), and ὁμοιούσιον, (of similar substance)?

In the first general council of the church which, consisting of three hundred and eighteen bishops, was called together by the Emperor Constantine at Nice, in Bithynia, A. D. 325, there were found to be three great parties representing different opinions

concerning the Trinity.

1st. The orthodox party, who maintained the opinion now held by all Christians, that the Lord Jesus is, as to his divine nature, of the same identical substance with the Father. These insisted upon applying to him the definite term $\delta\mu oo \nu \sigma io \nu$, (homoousion), compounded of $\delta\mu \delta \varsigma$, same, and $o\nu \sigma ia$, substance, to teach the great truth that the three persons of the Godhead are one God, because they are of the same numerical essence.

2d. The Arians, who maintained that the Son of God is the greatest of all creatures, more like God than any other, the only-begotten son of God, created before all worlds, through whom God

created all other things, and in that sense only divine.

3d. The middle party, styled Semi-Arians, who confessed that the Son was not a creature, but denied that he was in the same sense God as the Father is. They held that the Father is the only absolute self-existent God; yet that from eternity he, by his own free will, caused to proceed from himself a divine person of

like nature and properties. They denied, therefore, that the Son was of the same substance (homoousion) with the Father, but admitted that he was of an essence truly similar, and derived from the Father (homoiousion, δμοιόνσιον, from, ὅμοίος, like, and ὁνσία, substance).

The opinions of the first, or orthodox party, prevailed at that council, and have ever since been represented by the technical phrase, homoousian.

For the creed promulgated by that council, see Appendix A.

8. What are the several propositions essentially involved in the doctrine of the Trinity?

1st. There is but one God, and this God is one, i. e., indivisible.

2d. That the one indivisible divine essence, as a whole, exists eternally as Father, and as Son, and as Holy Ghost; that each person possesses the whole essence, and is constituted a distinct person by certain incommunicable properties, not common to him with the others.

3d. The distinction between these three is a *personal* distinction, in the sense that it occasions (1.) the use of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he, (2.) a concurrence in counsel, (3.) a dis-

tinct order of operation.

4th. These persons are distinguished as first, second, and third, to express an order indicated in Scripture; (1.) of subsistence, insomuch as the Father is neither begotten nor proceedeth, while the Son is eternally begotten by the Father, and the Spirit eternally proceedeth from the Father and the Son; (2.) of operation, insomuch that the first person sends and operates through the second, and the first and second send and operate through the third.

In order, therefore, to establish this doctrine in all its parts by the testimony of Scripture, it will be necessary for us to prove the following propositions in their order:

1st. That God is one.

2d. That Jesus of Nazareth, as to his divine nature, was truly God, yet a distinct person from the Father.

3d. That the Holy Spirit is truly God, yet a distinct person.

4th. That the Scriptures directly teach a trinity of persons in one Godhead.

5th. It will remain to gather what the Scriptures reveal as to the eternal and necessary relations which these three divine persons sustain to each other. These are distributed under the following heads: (1.) The relation which the second person sustains to the first, or the eternal generation of the Son; (2.) the relation which the third person sustains to the first and second, or the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost; and, (3.) their personal properties and order of operation, ad extra.

I. God is one, and there is but one God.

The proof of this proposition, from reason and Scripture, has been fully set forth above, in chap. vii, on the Attributes of God, questions 5-10.

The answer to the question, How the coördinate existence of three distinct persons in the Trinity can be reconciled with this fundamental doctrine of the divine unity is given below in question 85 of this chapter.

II. Jesus of Nazareth, as to his divine nature, is truly $^\circ$ God, and yet a distinct person from the Father.

9. What different views have been entertained with respect to the person of Christ?

The orthodox doctrine as to the person of Christ, is that he from eternity has existed as the cocqual Son of the Father, constituted of the same infinite self-existent essence with the Father and the Holy Ghost.

The orthodox doctrine as to his person as at present constituted, since his incarnation, is set forth in chap. 20. An account of the different heretical opinions as to his person are given below, in questions 87-91, of this chapter.

10. How far did the Jews at the time of Christ expect the Messiah to appear as a divine person?

When Christ appeared, it is certain that the great mass of the Jewish people had ceased to entertain the Scriptural expectation of a divine Saviour, and only desired a temporal prince, in a pre-eminent sense, a favorite of heaven. It is said, however, that scattered hints in some of the rabbinical writings indicate that

some of the more learned and spiritual still continued true to the ancient faith.

11. How may the preëxistence of Jesus before his birth by the Virgin be proved from Scripture?

1st. Those passages which say that he is the creator of the world.

—John i., 3; Col. i., 15–18.

- 2d. These passages which directly declare that he was with the Father before the world was; that he was rich, and possessed glory.—John i., 1, 15, 30; vi., 62; viii., 58; xvii., 5; 2 Cor. viii., 9.
- 3d. Those passages which declare that he "came into the world," "came down from heaven."—John iii., 13, 31; xiii., 3; xvi., 28; 1 Cor. xv., 47.
- 12. How can it be proved that the Jehovah who manifested himself as the God of the Jews under the old economy was the second person of the Trinity, who became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth?

As this fact is not affirmed in any single statement of Scripture, it can be established only by a careful comparison of many passages. The evidence, as compiled from Hill's Lects., Book III., ch. v., may be summed up as follows:

1st. All the divine appearances of the ancient economy are referred to one person. Compare Gen. xviii., 2, 17; xxviii., 13; xxxii., 9, 31; Ex. iii., 14, 15; xiii., 21; xx., 1, 2; xxv., 21; Deut. iv., 33, 36, 39; Neh. ix., 7–28. This one person is called Jehovah, the incommunicable name of God, and at the same time angel, or one sent. Compare Gen. xxxi., 11, 13; xlviii., 15, 16; Hosea xii., 2, 5. Compare Ex. iii., 14, 15, with Acts vii., 30–35; and Ex. xiii., 21, with Ex. xiv., 19; and Ex. xx., 1, 2, with Acts vii., 38; Is. lxiii., 7, 9.

2d. But God the Father has been seen by no man (John i., 18; vi., 46): neither could he be an angel, or one sent by any other; yet God the Son has been seen (1 John i., 1, 2), and sent (John v., 36).

3d. This Jehovah, who was at the same time the angel, or one sent, of the old economy, was also set forth by the prophets as the Saviour of Israel, and the author of the new dispensation.

In Zech. ii., 10, 11, one Jehovah is represented as sending another See Micah v., 2. In Mal. iii., 1, it is declared that "the Lord," "the messenger of the covenant," shall come to his own temple. This applied to Jesus (Mark i., 2). Compare Ps. xcvii., 7, with Heb. i., 6; and Is. vi., 1–5, with John xii., 41.

4th. Certain references in the New Testament to passages in the Old appear directly to imply this fact. Compare Ps. lxxviii.,

15, 16, 35, with 1 Cor. x., 9.

5th. The Church is one under all dispensations, and Jesus from the beginning is the Redeemer and Head of the Church; it is, therefore, most consistent with all that has been revealed to us as to the offices of the three divine persons in the scheme of redemption, to admit the view here presented. See also John viii., 56, 58; Matt. xxiii., 37; 1 Pet. i., 10, 11.

13. What evidence of the divinity of the Messiah does the 2d Psalm present?

It declares him to be the Son of God, and as such to receive universal power over the whole earth and its inhabitants. All are exhorted to submit to him, and to trust him, on pain of his anger. In Acts xiii., 33, Paul declares that Psalm refers to Christ.

14. What evidence is furnished by the 45th Psalm?

The ancient Jews considered this Psalm addressed to the Messiah, and the fact is established by Paul (Heb. i., 8, 9). Here, therefore, Jesus is called God, and his throne eternal.

15. What evidence is furnished by Psalm 110?

That this Psalm refers to the Messiah is proved by Christ (Matt. xxii., 43, 44), and by Paul (Heb. v., 6; vii., 17. He is here called David's Lord (Adonai), and invited to sit at the right hand of Jehovah until all his enemies be made his footstool.

16. What evidence is furnished by Isaiah ix., 6?

This passage self-evidently refers to the Messiah, as is confirmed by Matt. iv., 14-16. It declares explicitly that the child born "is also the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace."

17. What is the evidence furnished by Micah v., 2?

This was understood by the Jews to refer to Christ, which is confirmed by Matt. ii., 6, and John vii., 42. The passage declares that his goings forth have been "from ever of old," i. e., from eternity.

18. What evidence is furnished by Malachi iii., 1, 2?

This passage self-evidently refers to the Messiah, as is confirmed by Mark i., 2.

The Hebrew term (Adonai), here translated Lord, is never applied to any other than the supreme God. The temple, which was sacred to the presence and worship of Jehovah, is called his temple. And in verse 2d, a divine work of judgment is ascribed to him.

19. What evidence is afforded by the way in which the writers of the New Testament apply the writings of the Old Testament to Christ?

The apostles frequently apply the language of the Old Testament to Christ, when it is evident that the original writers intended to speak of Jehovah, and not of the Messiah as such.

Psalm 102 is evidently an address to the supreme Lord, ascribing to him eternity, creation, providential government, worship, and the hearing and answering of prayer. But Paul (Heb. i., 10–12) affirms Christ to be the subject of the address. In Is. xlv., 20–25, Jehovah speaks and asserts his own supreme Lordship. But Paul, in Rom. xiv., 11, quotes a part of Jehovah's declaration with regard to himself, to prove that we must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ. Compare also Is. vi., 3, with John xii., 41.

20. What is the general character of the evidence upon this subject afforded by the New Testament?

This fundamental doctrine is presented to us in every individual writing, and in every separate paragraph of the New Testament, either by direct assertion or by necessary implication, as may be ascertained by every honest reader for himself. The mass of this testimony is so great, and is so intimately interwoven with every other theme in every passage, that I have room here

to present only a general sample of the evidence, classified under the usual heads.

21. Prove that the New Testament ascribes divine titles to Christ.

John i., 1; xx., 28; Acts xx., 28; Rom. ix., 5; 2 Thess. i., 12; 1 Tim. iii., 16; Titus ii., 13; Heb. i., 8; 1 John, v., 20.

22. Prove that the New Testament ascribes divine perfections to Christ.

Eternity.—John i., 2; viii., 58; xvii., 5; Rev. i., 8, 17, 18; xxii., 13.

Immutability.—Heb. i., 11, 12, and xiii., 8.

Omnipresence.—John iii., 13; Matt. xviii., 20; xxviii., 20.

Omniscience.—Matt. xi., 27; John ii., 23-25; xxi., 17; Rev. ii., 23.

Omnipotence.—John v., 17; Heb. i., 3; Rev. i., 8; xi., 17.

23. Prove that the New Testament ascribes divine works to Christ.

Creation.—John i., 3, 10; Col. i., 16, 17.

Preservation and Providence.—Heb. i., 3; Col. i., 17; Matt. xxviii., 18.

Miracles.—John v., 21, 36.

Judgment. -2 Cor. v. 10; Matt. xxv., 31, 32; John v., 22.

A work of grace, including election.—John xiii., 18.

Sanctification, Eph. v., 26; sending the Holy Ghost, John xvi., 7, 14; giving eternal life, John x., 28; Turrettin, Tom. I., L. 3, Q. 28.

24. Prove that the New Testament teaches that supreme worship should be paid to Christ.

Matt. xxviii., 19; John v., 22, 23; xiv., 1; Acts vii., 59, 60; 1 Cor. i., 2; 2 Cor., xiii., 14; Phil. ii., 9, 10; Heb. i., 6; Rev. i., 5, 6; v., 11, 12; vii., 10.

25. Prove that the Son, although God, is a distinct person from the Father.

This fact is so plainly taught in Scripture, and so universally

implied, that the Sabellian system, which denies it, has never obtained any general currency.

Christ is sent by the Father, comes from him, returns to him, receives his commandment, does his will, loves him, is loved by him, addresses prayer to him, uses the pronouns thou and he when speaking to and of him. This is necessarily implied, also, in the relative titles, Father and Son. See the whole New Testament.

III. THE HOLY GHOST IS TRULY GOD, YET A DISTINCT ERSON.

26. What sects have held that the Holy Ghost is a creature?

The divinity of the Holy Ghost is so clearly revealed in Scripture that very few have dared to call it in question. The early controversies of the orthodox with the Arians precedent and consequent to the Council of Nice, A. D. 325, to such a degree absorbed the mind of both parties with the question of the divinity of the Son, that very little prominence was given in that age to questions concerning the Holy Ghost. Arius, however, is said to have taught that as the Son is the first and greatest creature of the Father, so the Holy Ghost is the first and greatest creature of the Son; a $\kappa \tau i \sigma \mu a \tau c c \mu a \tau c c c c$ a creature of a creature.—See Neander's Ch. Hist., vol. i., pp. 416–420.

Some of the disciples of Macedonius, who lived about the middle of the fourth century, are said to have held that the Holy Ghost was not Supreme God. These were condemned by the second General Council, which met at Constantinope A. D. 381. This council defined and guarded the orthodox faith, by adding definite clauses to the simple reference which the ancient creed had made to the Holy Ghost.—See the Creed of the Council of Constantinople, in Appendix A.

27. By whom has the Holy Spirit been regarded merely as an energy of God?

Those early heretical sects, generally styled Monarchians and Patripassians, all with subordinate distinctions taught that there was but one person as well as one essence in the Godhead, who, in different relations, is called Father, Son, or Holy Ghost. In the sixteenth century Socinus, who taught that Jesus Christ was a mere man, maintained that the term Holy Ghost is in Scripture used as a designation of God's energy, when exercised in a particular way. This is now the opinion of all modern Unitarians and Rationalists.

28. How can it be proved that all the attributes of personality are ascribed to the Holy Ghost in the Scriptures?

The attributes of personality are such as intelligence, volition, separate agency. Christ uses the pronouns I, thou, he, when speaking of the relation of the Holy Spirit to himself and the Father: "I will send him." "He will testify of me." "Whom the Father will send in my name." Thus he is sent; he testifies; he takes of the things of Christ, and shows them to us. He teaches and leads to all truth. He knows, because he searches the deep things of God. He works all supernatural gifts, dividing to every man as he wills.—John xiv., 17, 26; xv., 26; 1 Cor. ii., 10, 11; xii., 11. He reproves, glorifies, helps, intercedes.—John xvi., 7–13; Rom. viii., 26.

29. How may his personality be argued from the offices which he is said in the Scriptures to execute?

The New Testament throughout all its teachings discovers the plan of redemption as essentially involving the agency of the Holy Ghost in applying the salvation which it was the work of the Son to accomplish. He inspired the prophets and apostles; he teaches and sanctifies the church; he selects her officers, qualifying them by the communication of special gifts at his will. He the advocate, every Christian is his client. He brings all the grace of the absent Christ to us, and gives it effect in our persons in every moment of our lives. His personal distinction is obviously involved in the very nature of these functions which he discharges.—Luke xii., 12; Acts v., 32; xv., 28; xvi., 6; xxviii., 25; Rom. xv., 16; 1 Cor. ii., 13; Heb. ii., 4; iii., 7; 2 Pet. i., 21.

30. What argument for the personality of the Holy Ghost may be deduced from the formula of baptism?

Christians are baptized "in the name of the Father, Son, and

Holy Ghost." It would be inconsistent with every law of language and reason to speak of the "name" of an energy, or to associate an energy coördinately with two distinct persons.

31. How may his personality be proved by what is said of the sin against the Holy Ghost?

In Matt. xii., 31, 32; Mark iii., 28, 29; Luke xii., 10, this sin is called "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost." Now, blasphemy is a sin committed against a person, and it is here distinguished from the same act as committed against the other persons of the Trinity.

32. How can such expressions as "giving," and "pouring out the Spirit," be reconciled with his personality?

These and other similar expressions are used figuratively to set forth our participation in the gifts and influences of the Spirit. It is one of the most natural and common of all figures to designate the gift by the name of the giver. Thus we are said "to put on Christ," "to be baptized into Christ," etc.—Eph. v., 30; Rom. xiii., 14; Gal. iii., 27.

33. Show that the names of God are applied to the Spirit.

Compare Ex. xvii., 7, and Ps. xcv., 7, with Heb. iii., 7-11.—
See Acts v., 3, 4.

34. What divine attribute do the Scriptures ascribe to him?

Omnipresence.—Ps. cxxxix., 7; 1 Cor. xii., 13.

Omniscience.—1 Cor. ii., 10, 11.

Omnipotence.—Luke i., 35; Rom. viii., 11.

35. What agency in the external world do the Scriptures ascribe to him?

Creation.—Gen. i., 2; Job xxvi., 13; Ps. civ., 30.

The power of working miracles.—Matt. xii., 28; 1 Cor. xii., 9-11.

36. How is his supreme divinity established by what the Scriptures teach of his agency in redemption?

He is declared to be the immediate agent in regeneration, John iii., 6; Titus iii., 5; and in the resurrection of our bodies,

Rom. viii., 11. His agency in the generation of Christ's human nature, in his resurrection, and in the inspiration of the Scriptures, were exertions of his divine power in preparing the redemption which he now applies.

37. How can such expressions as, "he shall not speak of him-self," be reconciled with his divinity?

This and other similar expressions are to be understood as referring to the official work of the Spirit; just as the Son is said in his official character to be sent by and to be subordinate to the Father. The object of the Holy Ghost, in his official work in the hearts of men, is not to reveal the relations of his own person to the other persons of the Godhead, but simply to reveal the mediatorial character and work of Christ.

IV. THE SCRIPTURES DIRECTLY TEACH A TRINITY OF PERSONS IN ONE GODHEAD.

38. How is this trinity of persons directly taught in the formula of baptism?

Baptism in the name of God implies the recognition of God's divine authority, his covenant engagement to give us eternal life, and our engagement to render him divine worship and obedience. Christians are baptized thus into covenant relation with three persons distinctly named in order. The language necessarily implies that each name represents a person. The nature of the sacrament proves that each person must be divine.—See Matt. xxviii., 19.

39. How is this doctrine directly taught in the formula of the apostolical benediction?

See 2 Cor. xiii., 14. We have here distinctly named three persons, and each communicating a separate blessing, according to his own order and manner of operation. The benevolence of the Father in designing, the grace of the Son in the acquisition, the communion of the Holy Ghost in the application of salvation. These are three distinct personal names, three distinct modes of personal agency, and each equally divine.

40. What evidence is afforded by the narrative of Christ's baptism?

See Matt. iii., 13-17. Here also we have presented to us three persons distinctly named and described as severally acting, each after his own order. The Father speaking from heaven, the Spirit descending like a dove and lighting upon Christ, Christ acknowledged as the beloved Son of God ascending from the water.

41. State the argument from John xv., 26, and the context.

In this passage again we have three persons severally named at the same time, and their relative action affirmed. The Son is the person speaking of the Father and the Spirit, and claiming for himself the right of sending the Spirit. The Father is the person from whom the Spirit proceeds. Of the Spirit the Son says that "he will come," "he will be sent," "he proceedeth," "he will testify."

42. What is the state of the evidence with regard to the genuineness of 1 John v., 7?

I have not room in which to present a synopsis of the argument for and against the genuineness of the disputed clause which could be of any value.—See Horne's Intro., Vol. IV., Part II., chapter iv., section 5.

It will suffice to say-

1st. The disputed clause is as follows, including part of the eighth verse: "in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost; and these three are one. And there are three that bear witness in earth."

2d. Learned and pious men are divided in their opinions as to the preponderance of the evidence; the weight of opinion inclining

against the genuineness of the clause.

3d. The doctrine taught is so scriptural, and the grammatical and logical connection of the clause with the rest of the passage is so intimate, that for the purpose of edification, in the present state of our knowledge, the clause ought to be retained, although for the purpose of establishing doctrine, it ought not to be relied upon.

4th. The rejection of this passage does in no degree lessen

the irresistible weight of evidence of the truth of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity which the Scriptures afford.

43. What passages in the Old Testament imply the existence of more than one person in the Godhead?

Mark the use of the plural in the following passages.—Gen. i., 26; iii., 22; xi., 7; Isa. vi., 8. Compare the three-fold repetition of the name Jehovah (Num. vi., 24–26) with the apostolical benediction.—2 Cor. xiii., 14. Mark also in Isa. vi., 3, the threefold repetition of the ascription of holiness.

44. What passages in the Old Testament speak of the Son as a distinct person from the Father, and yet as divine?

In Ps. xlv., 6, 7, we have the Father addressing the Son as God, and anointing him.—See also Ps. ex., 1; Isa. xliv., 6, 7, 14.

The prophecies always set forth the Messiah as a person distinct from the Father, and yet he is called "Mighty God," etc.—Isa. ix., 6; Jer. xxiii., 6.

45. What passages of the Old Testament speak of the Spirit as a distinct person from the Father, and yet as divine?

Gen. i., 2; vi., 3; Ps. eiv., 30; exxxix., 7; Job xxvi., 13; Isa. xlviii., 16.

- V. IT REMAINS FOR US TO CONSIDER WHAT THE SCRIPTURES TEACH CONCERNING THE ETERNAL AND NECESSARY RELATIONS WHICH THE THREE DIVINE PERSONS SUSTAIN TO EACH OTHER.
- (I.) THE RELATION WHICH THE SECOND PERSON SUSTAINS TO THE FIRST, OR THE ETERNAL GENERATION OF THE SON.
 - 46. What is the idiomatic use of the Hebrew word בון (son)?

It is used in the sense, 1st, of son; 2d, of descendant; hence in the plural "children of Israel," for Israelites. Also when joined to a name of place or nation to denote inhabitants or citizens thereof, as "sons of Zion," etc.; 3d, of pupil, disciple, worshipper; thus "sons of the prophets," (1 Kings xx., 35,) and "sons of God," applied, (1.) to kings, Ps. ii., 7; (2.) to angels, Gen. vi. 2; (3.) to worshippers of God, his own people, Deut

xiv., 1; 4th, in combination with substantives, expressing age or quality, etc.; thus, "son of years," for aged, Lev. xii., 6; "son of Belial," for worthless fellow, Deut. xiii., 13; "son of death," for one deserving to die, 1 Sam. xx., 31; "a hill son of fatness," for a fruitful hill. The same idiom has been carried into the Greek of the New Testament.—See Gesenius' Heb. Lex.

47. In what sense are men called "sons of God" in Scripture?

The general idea embraced in the relation of sonship includes, 1st, similarity and derivation of nature; 2d, parental and filial love; and 3d, heirship.

In this general sense all God's holy, intelligent creatures are called his sons. The term is applied in an eminent sense to kings and magistrates who receive dominion from God, (Ps. lxxxii., 6,) and to Christians who are the subjects of spiritual regeneration and adoption, (Gal. iii., 26,) the special objects of divine favor, (Matt. v., 9,) and are like him, (Matt. v., 45.) When applied to creatures, whether men or angels, (Job i., 6,) this word is always used in the plural. In the singular it is applied only to the second person of the Trinity, with the single exception of its application once to Adam, (Luke iii., 38,) when the reason is obviously to mark the peculiarity of his derivation from God immediately without the intervention of a human father.

48. What different views with regard to the sonship of Christ have been entertained?

1st. Some Socinians hold that he is called Son of God only as an official title, as it is applied in the plural to ordinary kings

and magistrates.

2d. Other Socinians hold that he was called Son of God only because he was brought into being by God's supernatural agency, and not by ordinary generation. To maintain this they appeal to Luke i., 35. For an explanation of this passage see below, question 70.

3d. Arians hold that he is so called because he was created by God more in his own likeness than any other creature, and

first in the order of time.

4th. The orthodox doctrine is, that Christ is called Son of

God to indicate his eternal and necessary personal relation in the Godhead to the first person, who, to indicate his reciprocal relation, is called the Father.

- 49. What is the distinction which some of the fathers made between the eternal, the ante-mundane, and the mundane generation of the Son?
- 1st. By his eternal generation they intended to mark his essential relation to the Father as his consubstantial and eternal Son.
- 2d. By his ante-mundane generation they meant to signify the commencement of the outgoings of his energy, and the manifestation of his person beyond the bosom of the Godhead, in the sphere of external creation, etc.—Col. i., 15.
- 3d. By his mundane generation they intended his supernatural birth in the flesh.—Luke i., 35.
- 50. What is the distinction which some of the fathers made between the λογος ενδιαθετος (ratio insita, reason), and the λογος προφορικος (ratio prolata, reason brought forth, or expressed)?

The orthodox fathers used the phrase logos endiathetos to designate the Word, whom they held to be a distinct person, dwelling from eternity with the Father. The ground of their use of this phrase was a fanciful analogy which they conceived existed between the relation which the eternal logos (word, or reason), (John i., 1,) sustains to the Father, and the relation which the reason of a man sustains to his own rational soul. Thus the logos endiathetos was God's own reflective idea hypostatized. They were led to this vain attempt to philosophize upon an incomprehensible subject by the influence exerted upon them by the Platonic philosophers of that age, who taught a sort of metaphysical trinity, e. g., that in the one God there were three constituent principles, τo $\dot{a}\gamma a\theta ov$, goodness, $vov\varsigma$, intelligence, $\psi v\chi \eta$, vitality. Their immediate object was to illustrate the essential unity of the Trinity, and to prove, against the Arians, the essential divinity of the Son, from the application to him by John of the epithet $\lambda o \gamma o \varsigma$ $\theta e o v$.

By the phrase logos prophoricos they intended to designate

him as the reason of God revealed, when he proceeded from the Father in the work of creation.—See Hill's Lectures.

The Arians, taking advantage of the essential inadequacy of this language, confused the controversy by acknowledging that the phrase logos prophoricos did truly apply to Christ, since he came forth from God as the first and highest creation and image of his mind. But declaring, with some color of truth, that the phrase logos endiathetos, when applied to Christ, taught pure Sabellianism, since it marked no personal distinction, but signified nothing else than the mind of the Father itself.

51. How is the doctrine of Christ's sonship stated in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds?

See those creeds in Appendix A.

52. What is the common statement and explanation of this doctrine given by orthodox writers?

The eternal generation of the Son is commonly defined to be an eternal personal act of the Father, wherein, by necessity of nature, not by choice of will, he generates the person (not the essence) of the Son, by communicating to him the whole indivisible substance of the Godhead, without division, alienation, or change, so that the Son is the express image of his Father's person, and eternally continues, not from the Father, but in the Father, and the Father in the Son.—See particularly Heb. i., 3; John x., 38; xiv., 11; xvii., 21. The principal Scriptural support of the doctrine of derivation is John v., 26.—Turrettin, Tom. I., L. 3, Q. 29.

Those theologians who insist upon this definition believe that the idea of derivation is necessarily implied in generation; that it is indicated by both the reciprocal terms Father and Son, and by the entire representation given in the Scriptures as to the relation and order of the persons of the Godhead, the Father always standing for the Godhead considered absolutely; and they hold that this theory is necessary to the vindication of the essential unity of the three persons. The older theologians, therefore, styled the Father $\pi\eta\gamma\eta$ $\theta\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\tau\sigma\varsigma$, fountain of Godhead, and altia ion, principle or cause of the Son, while the Son and Holy Ghost were both called $\delta\iota\tau\iota\iota a\tau\sigma\iota$ (those depending upon another as their principle or cause).

They at the same time guarded the essential equality of the Son and the Holy Ghost with the Father, by saying, 1st, that the whole divine essence, without division or change, and, therefore, all the divine attributes, were communicated to them; and, 2d, that this communication was made by an eternal and necessary act of the Father, and not of his mere will.

53. What is essential to the scriptural doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son?

In the above rendered account of the orthodox doctrine there is nothing inconsistent with revealed truth. The idea of derivation, as involved in the generation of the Son by the Father, appears rather to be a rational explanation of revealed facts than a revealed fact itself. On such a subject, therefore, it should be held in suspense. All that is explicitly revealed is, 1st, the term Son is applied to Christ as the second person of the Godhead. 2d. This term, and the equivalent one, "only begotten," reveal some relation, within Godhead, of the person of the Son to the person of the Father. The designation Father being reciprocal to that of Son. 3d. That this relation is such that Father and Son are the same in substance, and are personally equal; that the Father is first and the Son second in the order of revelation and operation, that the Son is the express image of the Father's person, not the Father of the Son's, and that the Son is not from the Father, but in the Father, and the Father in the Son.

54. How may it be shown that the common doctrine is not self-contradictory?

There is evidently no inconsistency in the simple scriptural statement given in the answer to the last question. Heterodox controversialists, however, have claimed that there is a manifest inconsistency in the orthodox theory that the Father communicates to the Son the whole divine essence without alienating it from himself, dividing or otherwise changing it. This subject does not fall within the legitimate sphere of human logic, yet it is evident that this theory involves no contradiction and no mystery greater than that involved in the whole essence of God being at the same time present, without division or diffusion to every point of space.

55. If God is "ens a se ipso," self-existent, how can the Son be really God, if he be "θεος εκ θεου," God from the Father?

The objection presented in this question does not press against the scriptural statement of the eternal generation of the Son presented above (question 53,) but solely against the theory of derivation as involved in the ordinary definition (see question 52.) Those who insist upon the validity of that view rebut the objection by saying that self-existence is an attribute of essence, not of person. The Father, as a person, generates the person, not the essence of the Son, whose person is constituted of the very same self-existent essence with the Father's. Thus the Son is $dv\tau o\theta eoc$, i. e., Deus a se ipso as to his essence, but θeoc en θeov , God from God, as to his person.

56. What argument for the eternal sonship of Christ may be derived from the designation of the persons of the Trinity as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost?

In the apostolical benediction and the formula of baptism the one God is designated as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. The term Son cannot here be applied to Christ as an official title, or as a miraculously generated man, because, 1st, he is so called as one of the three divine persons constituting the Godhead. 2d. The term Son is reciprocal to the term Father, and therefore designates the relation of the second person to the first. Whatever this relation may involve besides, it evidently must be eternal and necessary, and includes paternity on the part of the first person, and filiation on the part of the second.

57. What argument in support of this doctrine may be derived from the use of the word son in Matt. xi. 27 and Luke x. 22?

In both of these passages the term Son is used to designate the divine nature of the second person of the Trinity in his relation to the first. The Son, as Son, knows and is known by the Father as Father. He is infinite in knowledge and therefore knows the Father. He is infinite in being and therefore can be known by none other than the Father.

58. State the argument from John i., 1-14.

Here the eternal Word, who was God, discovered himself as such to his disciples by the manifestation of his native divine glory, "the glory as of the only begotten of the Father." He was "only begotten Son," therefore as God, and not either as Mediator or as man.

59. State the argument from the application in Scripture of the terms $\mu ovo\gamma \varepsilon v\acute{\eta} \varsigma$, (only begotten) and $i\delta \iota o\varsigma$, (own) to the Sonship of Christ.

Although many of God's creatures are called his sons, the phrase, Son of God in the singular, and when limited by the terms "own" and "only begotten," is applied only to Christ.

Christ is called "only begotten Son of God."—John i., 14, 18;

iii., 16, 18; 1 John iv., 9.

In John v., 18, Christ calls God his own Father, (see Greek.)

He is called the own Son of the Father.—Rom. viii., 32.

The use of these qualifying terms proves that Christ is called Son of God in a sense different from that in which any other is so called. Therefore it designates him as God and not as man, nor as the bearer of an office.

60. What is the argument derived from John v., 22, and context, and from John x., 33-37.

In the first passage the terms Father and son are used to designate two divine and equal persons. As Son, Christ does whatsoever the Father doeth, and is to receive equal honor.

In the second passage, Jesus assumes the title, "Son of God," as equivalent to assenting that he was God. The Jews charging it upon him as blasphemy.

61. What is the evidence furnished by such passages as speak of the manifestation, giving or sending of the Son?

See 1 John iii., 8; Rom. viii., 3; John iii., 16, etc.

To say that the Son was sent or manifested implies that he was Son before he was sent or manifested as such.

62. State the argument from Rom. i., 3, 4.

The argument from this passage is two-fold: 1st. The Son of

God is declared to have been made flesh, and therefore must have preëxisted as Son. 2d. By the resurrection he was powerfully manifested to be the Son of God as to his divine nature. The phrases, according to the flesh, and according to the spirit of holiness, are evidently antithetical, designating severally the Lord's human and divine natures.

63. State the argument from Rom. viii., 3.

Here God's own Son was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh. Obviously he must have preëxisted as such before he assumed the likeness of sinful flesh, the assumption of which certainly could not have constituted him the own Son of God.

64. State the argument from Col. i., 15-21.

In this passage the apostle sets forth at length the nature and glory of him whom, in the thirteenth verse, he had called God's dear Son. Thus he proves that Christ as Son is the image of the invisible God, and that by him all things consist, etc.

65. State the argument from Heb. i., 5-8.

Paul is here setting forth the superiority of Christ as a divine person. As divine he calls him "the Son," "the first begotten." This Son is brought into the world, and therefore must have pre-existed as such. As Son he is declared to be God, and to reign upon an everlasting throne.

66. What passages are relied upon by the opponents of the orthodox doctrine for proof that the term Son, as applied to Christ, is an official title, and how can they be explained?

From such passages as Matt. xvi., 16, and John i., 49, it is argued that the epithets, Christ or Messiah, and King of Israel, are equivalent to Son of God, and that consequently he is called Son only because he occupies these offices. From John x., 35, 36, it is argued that Christ is called Son, because the Father hath sanctified him and sent him into the world.

We answer that not one of these passages, nor any other, expressly declares that Christ is called Son because he bears the office of mediator; they merely declare that he is Son of God, and holds that office. But even if it could be proved that he is called

on occasion "Son of God," on the ground of any subordinate relation, which, as man or as mediator, he sustains to God, that fact could not in the least invalidate the testimony of those passages which we have above cited to prove that he is also called Son of God in a higher sense, as the Word who from the beginning was in the bosom of the Father.

67. Prove that neither the 2d Psalm nor Rom. i., 4, teach that Christ was made Son of God.

Dr. Alexander says (see Com. on Psalms) with relation to Psalms ii., 7, that it means simply, "Thou art my Son, this day I am thy Father, now always eternally thy Father. Even if 'this day' be referred to the inception of the filial relation, it is thrown indefinitely back by the form of reminiscence, or narration in the first clause of the verse. 'Jehovah said to me,' but when? If understood to mean from everlasting the form of expression would be perfectly in keeping with the other figurative forms by which the Scriptures represent things really ineffable in human language." With regard to Rom. i., 4, Dr. Hodge says (see Com. on Romans) that the Greek word δρισθέντος, translated in the authorized version declared, is always elsewhere in the New Testament used to signify constitute, appoint. But the great majority of commentators, including some of the most ancient Greek fathers, agree in interpreting it in this passage in the sense of declare, manifest.

It is very evident that Christ called himself Son of God, and was so recognized by his disciples before his resurrection, and, therefore, he might have been revealed or manifested to be the Son of God, but could not have been constituted such by that event.

68. Show that Acts xiii., 32, 33 does not prove that Jesus was made Son of God.

It is argued from this passage that Jesus was constituted Son of God by his resurrection, as the first stage of his official exaltation. This can not be, 1st, because ne was sent into the world as Son of God. 2d. Because the word ἀναστήσας, having raised up, refers to the raising up Christ at his birth, and not to his resurrection (there is nothing in the Greek corresponding to the

word again in the English.) When this word is used to designate the resurrection it is usually qualified by the phrase from the dead, as in verse 34th. Verse 32 declares the fulfillment of the promise referred to in verse 23d.—See Alexander's Com. on Acts.

69. How can those passages which speak of the Son as inferior and subject to the Father be reconciled with this doctrine?

It is objected that such passages prove that Jesus, as Son, is inferior and subject to the Father.

We answer that in John iii., 13 the "Son of Man" is said to have come down from heaven, and to be in heaven. But surely Jesus, as Son of Man, was not omnipresent. In Acts xx., 28 God is said to purchase his church with his own blood; but surely Christ, as God, did not shed his blood. The explanation of this is that it is the common usage of Scripture to designate the single person of the God-man by a title belonging to him as the possessor of one nature, while the condition, attribute, relation, or action predicated of him is true only of the other nature. Thus in the passages in question he is called "Son of God," because he is the eternal Word, while at the same time he is said to be inferior to the Father, because he is also man and mediator.

70. What is the true explanation of Luke i., 35?

That Jesus was revealed as the Son of God, and proved to be such by his miraculous conception. It is not probable that it is meant he was called Son because of that event, since his human nature was begotten by the Holy Ghost, and yet he is never called the Son of the Holy Ghost.

But even if it were affirmed that he was called Son of God for that reason, it would still remain true, as above shown, that he is revealed as from eternity the Son of God for an infinitely higher reason.

- (II.) THE RELATION WHICH THE THIRD PERSON SUSTAINS TO THE FIRST AND SECOND, OR THE ETERNAL PROCESSION OF THE HOLY GHOST.
- 71. What is the etymology of the word Spirit, and the usage of its Hebrew and Greek equivalents?

The English word spirit is from the Latin spiritus, breath, wind, air, life, soul, which in turn is from the verb spiro, to breathe. The equivalent Hebrew word, air, has a perfectly analogous usage. 1st. Its primary sense is wind, air in motion, Gen. viii., 1; then, 2d, breath, the breath of life, Gen. vi., 17; Job xvii., 1; 3d, animal soul, vital principle in men and animals, 1 Sam. xxx., 12; 4th, rational soul of man, Gen. xli., 8, and hence, metaphorically, disposition, temperament, Num. v., 14; 5th, Spirit of Jehovah, Gen. i., 2; Ps. li., 11.—Gesenius' Lex.

The equivalent Greek word, $\pi\nu\epsilon\tilde{\nu}\mu a$, has also the same usage. It is derived from, $\pi\nu\epsilon\omega$, to breathe, to blow. It signifies, 1st, breath, Rev. xi., 11; 2d, air in motion, John iii., 8; 3d, the vital principle, Matt. xxvii., 50; 4th, the rational soul spoken (1.) of, the disembodied spirits of men, Heb. xii., 23; (2.) of devils, Matt., x., 1; (3.) of angels, Heb. i., 14; (4.) the Spirit of God, spoken of God, a, absolutely as an attribute of his essence, John iv., 24; and b as the personal designation of the third person of the trinity, who is called Spirit of God, or of the Lord, and the Holy Spirit, and the Spirit of Christ, or of Jesus, or of the Son of God, Acts xvi., 6, 7; Rom. viii., 9; 2 Cor. iii., 17; Gal. iv., 6; Phil. i., 19; 1 Pet. i., 11.

72. Why is the third person of the Trinity called the Spirit?

As the one indivisible divine essence which is common to each of the divine persons alike is spiritual, this term, as the personal designation of the third person, can not be intended to signify the fact that he is a Spirit as to his essence, but rather to mark what is peculiar to his person, i. e., his personal relation to the Father and the Son, and the peculiar mode of his operation ad extra. As the reciprocal epithets Father and Son are used to indicate, so far forth, the mutual relations of the first and second persons, so the epithets, Spirit, Spirit of God, Spirit of the Son, Spirit which proceedeth from the Father, are applied to the third person to indicate, so far forth, the relation of the third person to the first and second.

73. Why is he called Holy Spirit?

As holiness is an attribute of the divine essence, and the glory equally of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, it can not be applied in any preëminent sense as a personal characteristic to the third person. It indicates, therefore, the peculiar nature of his operation. He is called the *Holy* Spirit because he is the author of holiness throughout the universe. As the Son is also styled *Logos*, or God, the Revealer, so the Holy Spirit is God, the Operator, the end and glory of whose work in the moral world is holiness, as in the physical world beauty.

74. Why is he called the Spirit of God?

This phrase expresses his divinity, his relation to the Godhead as himself God; I Cor. ii., 11; his intimate personal relation to the Father as his consubstantial spirit proceeding from him, John xv., 26; and the fact that he is the divine Spirit, which proceeding from God operates upon the creature, Ps. civ., 30; I Pet. iv., 14.

75. Why is the third person called the Spirit of Christ?

See Gal. iv., 6; Rom. viii., 9; Phil. i., 19; 1 Peter i., 11. As the form of expression is identical in the several phrases, Spirit of God, and Spirit of the Son, and as the Scriptures, with one exception, John xv., 26, uniformly predicate every thing of the relation of the Spirit to the Son, that they predicate of the relation of the Spirit to the Father, it appears evident that he is called Spirit of the Son for the same reason that he is called Spirit of God.

This phrase also additionally sets forth the official relation which the Spirit in his agency in the work of redemption sustains to the Godman, in taking of his, and showing them to us, John xvi., 14.

76. What is meant by the theological phrase, Procession of the Holy Ghost?

Theologians intend by this phrase to designate the relation which the third person sustains to the first and second, wherein by an eternal and necessary, i. e., not voluntary, act of the Father and the Son, their whole identical divine essence, without alienation, division, or change, is communicated to the Holy Ghost.

77. What distinction do theologians make between "proc"-sion" and "generation?"

As this entire subject infinitely transcends the measure of our faculties, we can do nothing further than classify and contrast those predicates which inspiration has applied to the relation of Father and Son with those which it has applied to the relation

of the Spirit to the Father and Son.

Thus Turrettin, Vol. I., L. 3., Q. 31. They differ, "1st. As to source, the Son emanates from the Father only, but the Spirit from the Father and the Son at the same time. 2d. As to mode. The Son emanates in the way of generation, which affects not only personality, but similitude, on account of which the Son is called the image of the Father, and in consequence of which he receives the property of communicating the same essence to another person; but the Spirit, by the way of spiration, which effects only personality, and in consequence of which the person who proceeds does not receive the property of communicating the same essence to another person. 3d. As to order. The Son is second person, and the Spirit third, and though both are eternal, without beginning or succession, yet, in our mode of conception, generation precedes procession."

"The schoolmen vainly attempted to found a distinction between generation and spiration upon the different operations of the divine intellect and the divine will. They say the Son was generated per modum intellectus, whence he is called the Word of God. The Spirit proceeds per modum voluntatis, whence he

is called Love."

78. What is the Scripture ground for this doctrine?

What we remarked above (question 53,) concerning the common theological definition of the eternal generation of the Son, holds true also with reference to the common definition of the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost, viz., that in order to make the method of the divine unity in trinity more apparent, theologians have pressed the idea of derivation and subordination in the order of personal subsistence too far. This ground is at once sacred and mysterious. The points given by Scripture are not to be pressed nor speculated upon, but received and confessed nakedly.

The data of inspiration are simply as follows: 1st. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, three divine persons, possess from eternity the one whole identical, indivisible, unchangeable essence. 2d.

The Father from his characteristic personal name, and the order in which his name uniformly occurs in Scripture, and from the fact that the Son is called his and his only begotten, and that the Spirit is called his, the one proceeding from him, and from the order of his manifestation and operation ad extra, is evidently in some way first in order of personal subsistence relatively to the Son and Spirit. 3d. For the same reason (see below, question 80) the Son, in the order of personal subsistence, is before the Spirit. 4th. What the real nature of these distinctions in the order of personal substance may be is made known to us only so far, (1.) that it involves no distinction as to time, since all are alike eternal. (2.) It does not depend upon any voluntary action, for that would make the second person dependent upon the first, and the third upon the first and second, while they are all "equal in power and glory." (3.) It is such a relation that the second person is eternally only begotten Son of the first, and the third is eternally the Spirit of the first and second.

79. What was the difference between the Greek and Latin churches on this doctrine?

The famous Council of Nice, A. D. 325, while so accurately defining the doctrine of the Godhead of the Son, left the testimony concerning the Holy Ghost in the vague form in which it stood in the ancient creed, "in the Holy Ghost." But the heresy of Macedonius, who denied the divinity of the Holy Ghost, having sprung up in the mean time, the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 381, completed the testimony of the Nicene Creed thus, "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord, the Author of Life, who proceedeth from the Father."

There subsequently arose a controversy upon the question, whether the Scriptures do or do not represent the Holy Spirit as sustaining precisely the same relation to the Son that he does to the Father. This the Latins generally affirmed, and at the third ecclesiastical assembly at Toledo, A. D. 589, they added the word filioque (and the Son) to the Latin version of the Constantinopolitan Creed, making the clause read "Credimus in Spiritum Sanctum qui à Patre Filioque procedit." The Greek church violently opposed this, and to this day reject it. For a short time they were satisfied with the compromise, "The Spirit proceeding from

the Father through the Son," which was finally rejected by both parties. The Constantinopolitan Creed, as amended at the Council of Toledo, is the one now adopted by the Catholic Church, and recognized by all Protestants, currently bearing the title of "Nicene Creed."

80. How may it be proved that, as far as revealed, the Spirit sustains precisely the same relation to the Son which he does to the Father?

The epithet "Spirit" is the characteristic personal designation of the third person. Whatever is revealed of his eternal and necessary personal relation to either the Father or the Son is indicated by this word. Yet he is called the Spirit of the Son, as well as the Spirit of the Father. He possesses the same identical essence of the Son as of the Father. The Son sends and operates through the Spirit as the Father does. Wherever their Spirit is there both Father and Son are revealed, and there they exercise their power.—John xiv., 16, 26; xv., 26; xvi., 7. With the single exception of the phrase, "which proceedeth from the Father," (John xv., 26,) the Scriptures apply precisely the same predicates to the relation of the Spirit to the Son that they do to his relation to the Father.

81. What office does the Spirit discharge in the economy of redemption?

In the economy of redemption, as universally in all the actings of the Godhead upon the creature, God the Son is the revealed God, God as known, and God the Spirit is that divine person who exerts his energy immediately upon and in the creature. For a more detailed answer see Chapter XXI., on "The Mediatorial Office of Christ," question 9.

- (III.) THE PERSONAL PROPERTIES PECULIAR TO EACH OF THE THREE PERSONS OF THE GODHEAD, AND THEIR ORDER OF OPERATION AD EXTRA.
- 82. What is the theological meaning of the word property as applied to the doctrine of the Trinity?

The attributes of God are the perfections of the divine essence,

and therefore common to each of the three persons, who are "the same in substance," and therefore "equal in power and glory." These have been discussed under Chapter VII. The properties of each divine person, on the other hand, are those peculiar modes of personal subsistence whereby each divine person is constituted as such, and that peculiar order of operation whereby each person is distinguished from the others.

As far as these are revealed to us the personal properties of the Father are as follows: He is begotten by none, and proceeds from none; he is the Father of the Son, having begotten him from eternity; the Spirit proceeds from him and is his Spirit. Thus he is the first in order and in operation, sending and operating through the Son and Spirit.

The personal properties of the Son are as follows: He is the Son, from eternity the only begotten of the Father. The Spirit is the Spirit of the Son even as he is the Spirit of the Father; he is sent by the Father, whom he reveals; he, even as the Father, sends and operates through the Spirit.

The personal properties of the Spirit are as follows: He is the Spirit of the Father and the Son, from eternity proceeding from them; he is sent by the Father and the Son, they operating through him; he operates immediately upon the creature.

83. What kind of subordination did the early writers attribute to the second and third person in relation to the first?

They held, as above shown, that the eternal generation of the Son by the Father, and the eternal procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son involved in both instances the derivation of essence. They illustrated their idea of this eternal and necessary act of communication by the example of a luminous body, which necessarily radiates light the whole period of its existence. Thus the Son is defined in the words of the Nicene Creed, "God of God, Light of Light." Thus as the radiance of the sun is coeval with its existence, and of the same essence as its source, by this illustration they designed to signify their belief in the identity and consequent equality of the divine persons as to essence, and the relative subordination of the second to the first, and of the third to the first and second as to personal subsistence and consequent order of operation.

84. What is expressed by the use of the terms first, second, and third in reference to the persons of the Trinity.

These terms are severally applied to the persons of the Trinity because, 1st. The Scriptures uniformly state their names in this order. 2d. The personal designations, Father and Son, and Spirit of the Father and of the Son, indicate this order of personal subsistence. 3d. Their respective modes of operation ad extra is always in this order. The Father sends and operates through the Son, and the Father and Son send and operate through the Spirit. The Scriptures never either directly or indirectly indicate the reverse order.

As to the outward bearing of the Godhead upon the creature it would appear, that the Father is revealed only as he is seen in the Son, who is the eternal Logos, or divine Word, the express image of the Father's person. "No man hath seen God at any time, the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him."—John i., 18. And the Father and Son act immediately upon the creature only through the Spirit.

"The Father is all the fullness of the Godhead invisible, without form, whom no man hath seen or can see."

"The Son is all the fulness of the Godhead manifested."

"The Spirit is all the fulness of the Godhead acting immediately upon the creature, and thus making manifest the Father in the image of the Son, and through the power of the Spirit."—
"Higher Christian Life," by Rev. W. E. Boardman, p. 105.

85. How can the assumption of personal distinctions in the Godhead be reconciled with the divine unity?

Although this tripersonal constitution of the Godhead is altogether beyond the capacity of reason, and is ascertained to us only through a supernatural revelation, there is evidently no contradiction in the two-fold proposition, that God is one, and yet Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are that one God. They are one in one sense, and three-fold in an entirely different sense. The eternal, self-existent, divine essence, constituting all those divine perfections called attributes of God is, in the same sense and degree, common to all the persons. In this sense they are one. But this divine essence exists eternally as Father, and as Son,

and as Holy Ghost, distinguished by personal properties. In this sense they are three. We believe this, not because we understand it, but because thus God has revealed himself.

86. How can the separate incarnation of the Son be reconciled with the divine unity?

The Son is identical with the Father and Spirit as to essence, but distinct from them as to personal subsistence. In the incarnation, the divine essence of the Son was not made man, but as a divine person he entered into a personal relation with the human nature of the man Christ Jesus. This did not constitute a new person, but merely introduced a new element into his eternal person. It was the personal union of the Son with a human soul and body, and not any change either in the divine essence, or in the personal relation of the Son to the Father or the Spirit.

87. What is Arianism?

This system was first advocated by Arius, who lived during the first half of the fourth century. He maintained that the Godhead consists of one eternal person, who in the beginning, before all worlds, created in his own image a super-angelic being, his only begotten Son, the beginning of the creation of God, by whom also he made the worlds. The first and greatest creature thus created, through the Son of God, was the Holy Ghost. In the fullness of time this Son became incarnate in the person of Jesus of Nazareth.

88. What was the doctrine of the Semi-Arians?

This party was so called as occupying middle ground between the Arians and the Orthodox. They held that the absolute, self-existent God was one person, but that the Son was a divine person of a glorious essence, like to $(\delta\mu oiv\sigma iov)$ but not identical with $(\delta\mu oiv\sigma iov)$ that of the Father, and from eternity begotten by the Father by a free exercise of will and power, and therefore subordinate to and dependant upon him. This party was largely represented at the Council of Nice.

It appears that some of the Semi-Arians agreed with the Arians in regarding the Holy Spirit as the first and most glorious creature of the Son, but that the majority regarded the words "Holy Spirit," as significant of a divine energy, or as a synonyme of the word God.—See Neander's Ch. Hist., Torrey's translation, Vol. II., pp. 419, 420.

9 89. What is Sabellianism?

This term represents the opinion that God is one single person as well as one single essence. The term Father is the name appropriated to this one person, when considered in his incomprehensible greatness, and in his absolute sovereignty. The term Son is the name appropriated to the same person when conceived of as revealing himself, and as becoming incarnate and dwelling among men. The term Holy Ghost is the name applied to him when conceived of as operating immediately upon the creature in his works of creation, providence or grace. The more significant and generic title of the sects holding this opinion is Monarchians, or those maintaining the absolute unity of the Godhead, personal as well as essential. They were also called Patripassians, because they believed that the one divine person, called Father, as well as Son or Holy Ghost was united to the man Christ Jesus, who suffered on the cross. This system was taught, with special modifications, by several heretical leaders of the early church, first by Praxeas, a confessor at Rome, at the end of the second century. It has, however, currently born the name of Sabellius, an African bishop who lived during the middle of the third century. The Swedenborgians of the present day are Sabellians.

90. What is Tritheism?

This opinion, the extreme opposite of Sabellianism, is said to have been first advocated by John Ascusnage, a Syrian philosopher, who flourished during the sixth century. He taught that the Godhead is constituted of three beings, distinct in essence as well as in person. Hence there are three Gods, united not in being, but only in the most intimate fellowship of counsel and will.

91. What is Socinianism?

This system regards God the Father as the only God, one in person as well as essence, and Jesus Christ as a mere man, though an inspired prophet, and called Son of God only on account of his miraculous conception in the womb of the Virgin; and the term Holy Spirit only as another name for the one God, the Father. The more common and significant title of this system is Unitarianism. It takes its designation of Socinianism from its most successful promulgators Lœlius and Faustus Socinus, uncle and nephew, who flourished during the latter half of the sixteenth century. Italians by birth, the uncle died in the bosom of the Reformed Church of Zurich, A. D., 1562, but the nephew, ultimately joining the Unitarians of Poland, gave the final form to their religious system, and from his writings the Racovian Catechism was principally compiled, which remains to this day the most authoritative exposition of the Unitarian faith.—See Mosheim's Ch. Hist., Vol. III., p. 235.

92. By what considerations may it be shown that the doctrine of the Trinity is a fundamental element of the Gospel?

It is not claimed that the refinements of theological speculations upon this subject are essential points of faith, but simply that it is essential to salvation to believe in the three persons in one Godhead, as they are revealed to us in the Scriptures. 1st. The only true God is that God who has revealed himself to us in the Scriptures, and the very end of the gospel is to bring us to the knowledge of that God precisely in the aspect in which he has revealed himself. Every other conception of God presents a false god to the mind and conscience. There can be no mutual toleration without treason. Socinians, Arians, and Trinitarians worship different Gods.

2d. The Scriptures explicitly assert that the knowledge of this true God and of Jesus Christ whom he hath sent is eternal life, and that it is necessary to honor the Son even as we honor the Father.—John v., 23; xiv., 1; xvii., 3; 1 John ii., 23; v., 20.

3d. In the initiatory rite of the Christian church we are baptized into the name of every several person of the trinity, Matt. xxviii., 19.

4th. The whole plan of redemption in all its parts is founded upon it. Justification, sanctification, adoption, and all else that makes the gospel the wisdom and power of God unto salvation, can be understood only in the light of this fundamental truth.

5th. As an historical fact it is beyond dispute that in whatever church the doctrine of the trinity has been abandoned or obscured, every other characteristic doctrine of the gospel has gone with it

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CHAPTER IX.

THE DECREES OF GOD IN GENERAL.

1. What are the decrees of God?

See Con. of Faith, chap. iii., Larger Cat., Q. 12, and Shorter Cat., Q. 7.

The decree of God is his eternal, unchangeable, holy, wise and sovereign purpose, comprehending at once all things that ever were or will be in their causes, conditions, successions and relations, and determining their certain futurition. The several contents of this one eternal purpose are, because of the limitation of our faculties, necessarily conceived of by us in partial aspects, and in logical relations, and are therefore styled Decrees.

2. How are the acts of God classified, and to which class do theologians refer the decrees?

All conceivable divine actions may be classified as follows:

1st. Those actions which are immanent and intrinsic, belonging essentially to the perfection of the divine nature, and which bear no reference whatever to any existence without the Godhead These are the acts of eternal and necessary generation, whereby the Son springs from the Father, and of eternal and necessary procession whereby the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, and all those actions whatsoever involved in the mutual society of the divine persons.

2d. Those actions which are extrinsic and transient, i. e., those free actions proceeding from God and terminating upon the creature, occurring successively in time, as God's acts in creation, providence and grace.

3d. The third class are like the first inasmuch as they are intrinsic and immanent, essential to the perfection of the divine

nature and permanent states of the divine mind, but they differ, on the other hand, from the first class, inasmuch as they have respect to the whole dependent creation exterior to the Godhead. These are the eternal and immutable decrees of God respecting all beings and events whatsoever exterior to himself.

3. How may it be proved that the decrees of God are eternal?

1st. As God is infinite, he is necessarily eternal and unchangeable, from eternity infinite in wisdom and knowledge, and absolutely independent in thought and purpose of every creature. There can never be any addition to his wisdom, nor surprise to his foreknowledge, nor resistance to his power, and therefore there never can be any occasion to reverse or modify that infinitely wise and righteous purpose which, from the perfection of his nature, he formed from eternity.

2d. Scripture directly affirms it.—Acts xv., 18, $(d\pi'd\iota\tilde{\omega}ro\varsigma, from\ eternity)$, Matt. xxv., 34; Eph. i., 4; 2 Thes. ii., 13; 2 Tim. i., 9; 1 Cor. ii., 7. Time is limited duration measured by succession, and therefore commenced at the creation; "before the world," therefore, means "before time," or from eternity;

"Æternitas est una, individua, et tota simul."

4. How may it be proved from Scripture that the decrees of God relate to all events?

Eph. i., 10, 11; Acts xv., 18; xvii., 26; Job xiv., 5; Isa. xlvi., 10. Even the free acts of men, (Eph. ii., 10,) even their wicked actions.—Acts ii., 23; iv., 27, 28; Ps. lxxvi., 10; Prov. xvi., 4. Also what men call accidental events.—Prov. xvi., 33, compare with Acts xv., 18. All things in heaven and on earth.—Dan. iv., 34, 35.

5. Prove the universality of God's decrees from providence.

It follows from the eternity, immutability, and infinite wisdom, foreknowledge, and power of God, that his temporal working in providence must in all things proceed according to his eternal purpose.—Eph. i., 11, and Acts xv., 18. But both Scripture and reason alike teach us that the providential government of God comprehends all things in heaven and on earth as a whole,

and every event in detail.—Prov. xvi., 33; Dan. iv., 34, 35; Matt. x., 29, 30.

6. Prove this doctrine from prophecy.

God has in the Scriptures foretold the certain occurrence of many events, including the free actions of men, which have afterwards surely come to pass. Now the ground of prophecy is foreknowledge, and the foundation of the foreknowledge of an event as certainly future, is God's decree that made it future. The eternal immutability of the decree is the only foundation of the infallibility either of the foreknowledge or of the prophecy. But if God has decreed certain future events, he must also have included in that decree all of their causes, conditions, coördinates, and consequences. No event is isolated; to make one certainly future implies the determination of the whole concatenation of causes and effects which constitute the universe.

7. What reasons may be assigned for contemplating the decrees of God as one, all-comprehensive purpose?

1st. As above shown, the decrees of God are eternal and immutable. 2d. No event is isolated. To decree one implies the foreordination of the whole concatenation of events which constitute the universe. As all events constitute one system, they must have been determined in one purpose. 3d. God decrees all things as they actually occur, i. e., as produced by causes, and as depending upon conditions, etc. The same decree, therefore, which determines the event, determines it as produced by its cause, and as depending upon its conditions.

Most of the mistakes which heterodox speculators have made, with reference to the nature of God's decrees, arise from the tendency of the human mind to confine attention to one fragment of God's eternal purpose, and to regard it as isolated from the rest. This decree never determined the certain occurrence of any single event as separated from the second causes which produce it, but it at once, and as a whole, determines the certain occurrence of all things that ever come to pass, the causes as well as their effects, the condition as well as that which is suspended upon it, and all in the very relations in which they actually occur.

8. In what sense are the decrees of God free?

The decrees of God are free in the sense that in decreeing he was solely actuated by his own infinitely wise, righteous, and benevolent good pleasure. He has always chosen as he pleased, and he has always pleased consistently with the perfection of his nature.

9. In what sense are the decrees of God sovereign?

They are sovereign in the sense that while they determine absolutely whatever occurs without God, their whole reason and motive is within the divine nature, and they are neither suggested nor occasioned by, nor conditioned upon anything whatsoever without him.

10. What is the distinction between absolute and conditional decrees?

An absolute decree is one which, while it may include conditions, is suspended upon no condition, i. e., it makes the event decreed, of whatever kind, whether of mechanical necessity or of voluntary agency, certainly future, together with all the causes and conditions, of whatever nature, upon which the event depends.

A conditional decree is one which decrees that an event shall happen upon the condition that some other event, possible but uncertain (not decreed), shall actually occur.

The Socinians denied that the free actions of men, being intrinsically uncertain, are the objects of knowledge, and therefore affirmed that they are not foreknown by God. They held that God decreed absolutely to create the human race, and after Adam sinned he decreed absolutely to save all repenting and believing sinners, yet that he decreed nothing concerning the sinning nor the salvation of individual men.

The Arminians, admitting that God certainly foreknows the acts of free agents as well as all other events, maintain that he absolutely decreed to create man, and foreseeing that man would sin he absolutely decreed to provide a salvation for all, and actually to save all that repent and believe, but that he conditionally decreed to save individual men on the condition, foreseen but not foreordained, of their faith and obedience.

11. What are the objections to attributing conditional decrees to God?

Calvinists admit that the all comprehensive decree of God determines all events according to their inherent nature, the actions of free agents as free, and the operation of necessary causes, necessarily. It also comprehends the whole system of causes and effects of every kind; of the motives and conditions of free actions, as well as the necessary causes of necessary events. God decreed sal-\ vation upon the condition of faith, yet in the very same act he decreed the faith of those persons whose salvation he has determined "Whom he did predestinate, them he also called." Thus his decree from the beginning embraced and provided for the free agency of man, as well as the regular procedures of nature, according to established laws. Thus also his covenants, or conditional promises, which he makes in time, are in all their parts the execution of his eternal purpose, which comprehended the promise, and the condition in their several places as means to the end. But that the decree of God can be regarded as suspended upon conditions which are not themselves determined by the decree is evidently impossible.

1st. This decree has been shown above (questions 3-7) to be eternal and all comprehensive. A condition implies liability to change. The whole universe forming one system, if one part is contingent the whole must be contingent, for if one condition failed the whole concatenation of causes and effects would be deranged. If the Arminian should rejoin that although God did not foreordain the free acts of men, yet he infallibly foreknew and provided for them, and therefore his plans can not fail; then the Calvinist replies that if God foresaw that a given man, in given circumstances, would act at a given juncture in a certain way, then God in decreeing to create that very man and place him in those very circumstances, at that very juncture, did foreordain the certain futurition of that very event, and of, all its consequences. That God's decree is immutable and does not depend upon uncertain conditions, is proved (1.) from its eternity, (2.) from the direct assertions of Scripture.—Is. xiv., 24, 27; xlvi., 10; Ps. xxxiii., 11; Prov. xix., 21; Rom. ix., 11; Eph. iii., 11.

2d. The foreknowledge of God, as Arminians admit, is eternal and certain, and embraces all events, free as well as necessary.

But, (1.) as shown in the preceding paragraph, this foreknownedge involves foreordination, and (2.) certainty in the foreknowledge implies certainty in the event; certainty implies determination; determination leaves us to choose between the decree of an infinitely wise, righteous, and benevolent God, and a blind fate.

3d. A conditional decree would subvert the sovereignty of God and make him, as to the administration of his whole government and the execution of all his plans, dependent upon the uncontrolable actions of his own creatures. But the decrees of God are sovereign.—Isa. xl., 13, 14; Dan. iv., 35; Rom. ix., 15–18.

4th. His decree is declared to depend upon his own "good pleasure," and the "counsel of his own will."—Eph. i., 5, 11;

Rom. ix., 11; Matt. xi., 25, 26.

5th. The decree of God includes the means and conditions.—2 Thes. ii., 13; 1 Pet. i. 2; Eph. i., 4.

6th. His decree absolutely determines the free actions of

men.—Acts iv., 27, 28; Eph. ii., 10.

7th. God himself works in his people that faith and obedience which are called the conditions of their salvation.—Phil. ii., 13; Eph. ii., 8; 2 Tim. ii., 25.

12. How far are the decrees of God efficacious and how far permissive?

All the decrees of God are equally efficacious in the sense that they all infallibly determine the certain futurition of the event decreed. Theologians, however, classify the decrees of God thus: 1st. As efficacious in as far as they respect those events which he has determined to effect through necessary causes, or in his own immediate agency. 2d. As permissive, as far as they respect those events which he has determined to allow dependent free agents to effect.

13. How may it be proved that the decree of God renders the event certain?

1st. From the nature of the decree itself as sovereign and unchangeable, (see above.)

2d. From the essential nature of God in his relation to his creation, as an infinitely wise and powerful sovereign.

3d. The foreknowledge of God regards future events as certain. The ground of this certainty must be either in God, or in the events themselves, which last is fatalism.

4th. The Scriptures ascribe a certainty of futurition to the events decreed. There is a needs be that the event should happen "as it was determined."—Luke xviii., 31-33; xxiv., 46; Acts ii., 23; xiii., 29; 1 Cor. xi., 19; Matt. xvi., 21.

14. How does this doctrine, that God's universal decree renders the occurrence of all future events certain, differ from the ancient doctrine of fate?

1st. The doctrine of fate supposed the certainty of events to be determined by a law of necessary causation, effecting its end irresistibly and irrespectively of the free choice of the human agents concerned. The Christian doctrine of God's decrees, on the other hand, regards that decree as determining the certainty of the event only in dependence upon, and in relation to all the causes and conditions which precede and attend it. It determines the free act through the free will of the free agent.

2d. Fate was regarded as the concurrent action of all material causes operating blindly and necessarily.

The decrees of Jehovah, on the other hand, are the infinitely wise and immutable purposes of a righteous and merciful Father.

15. What objection to this doctrine of unconditional decrees is derived from the admitted fact of man's free agency?

Objection.—Foreknowledge implies the certainty of the event. The decree of God implies that he has determined it to be certain. But that he has determined it to be certain implies, upon the part of God, an efficient agency in bringing about that event which is inconsistent with the free agency of man.

We answer: It is evidently only the execution of the decree, and not the decree itself, which can interfere with the free agency of man. On the general subject of the method in which God executes his decrees, see below, the chapters on Providence, Effectual Calling, and Regeneration.

We have here room only for the following general statement: 1st. The Scriptures attribute all that is good in man to God; these "he works in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure." All the sins which men commit the Scriptures attribute wholly to the man himself. Yet God's permissive decree does truly determine the certain futurition of the act; because God knowing certainly that the man in question would in the given circumstances so act, did place that very man in precisely those circumstances that he should so act. But in neither case, whether in working the good in us, or in placing us where we will certainly do the wrong, does God in executing his purpose ever violate or restrict the perfect freedom of the agent.

2d. We have the fact distinctly revealed that God has decreed the free acts of men, and yet that the actors were none the less responsible, and consequently none the less free in their acts, Acts ii., 23; iii., 18; iv., 27, 28; Gen. 1., 20, etc. We never can understand how the infinite God acts upon the finite spirit of man,

but it is none the less our duty to believe.

3d. According to that theory of the will which makes the freedom of man to consist in the *liberty of indifference*, *i.e.*, that the will acts in every case of choice in a state of perfect equilibrium, equally independent of all motives for or against, and just as free to choose in opposition to all desires as in harmony with them, it is evident that the very essence of liberty consists in uncertainty. If this be the true theory of the will, God could not execute his decrees without violating the liberty of the agent, and certain foreknowledge would be impossible.

But as shown below, in chapter 18, the true theory of the will is that the liberty of the agent consists in his acting in each case as, upon the whole, he pleases, i. e., according to the dispositions and desires of his heart, under the immediate view which his reason takes of the case. These dispositions and desires are determined in their turn by the character of the agent in relation to his circumstances, which character and circumstances are surely

not beyond the control of the infinite God.

16. What is meant by those who teach that God is the author of sin?

Many reasoners of a Pantheistic tendency, e. g., Dr. Emmons, maintain that as God is infinite in sovereignty, and by his decree determines so by his providence, he effects every thing which

comes to pass, so that he is actually the only real agent in the universe. Still they religiously hold that God is an infinitely holy agent in effecting that which, produced from God, is righteous, but, produced in us, is sin.

17. How may it be shown that God is not the author of sin?

The admission of sin into the creation of an infinitely wise, powerful and holy God is a great mystery, of which no explanation can be given. But that God can not be the author of sin is proved, 1st, from the nature of sin, which is, as to its essence, avouta, want of conformity to law, and disobedience to the Lawgiver.

2d. From the nature of God, who is as to essence holy, and in the administration of his kingdom always forbids and

punishes sin.

3d. From the nature of man, who is a responsible free agent who originates his own acts. The Scriptures always attribute to divine grace the good actions, and to the evil heart the sinful actions of men.

18. How may it be shown that the doctrine of unconditional decrees does not represent God as the author of sin?

The whole difficulty lies in the awful fact that sin exists. If God foresaw it and yet created the agent, and placed him in the very circumstances under which he did foresee the sin would be committed, then he did predetermine it. If he did not foresee it, or, foreseeing it, could not prevent it, then he is not infinite in knowledge and in power, but is surprised and prevented by his creatures. The doctrine of unconditional decrees presents no special difficulty. It represents God as decreeing that the sin shall eventuate as the free act of the sinner, and not as by any form of coaction causing, nor by any form of temptation inducing him to sin.

19. What is the objection to this doctrine derived from the use of means?

This is the most common form of objection in the mouths of ignorant and irreligious people. If an immutable decree makes all future events certain, "if what is to be, will be," then it fol-

lows that no means upon our part can avoid the result, nor can any means be necessary to secure it.

Hence as the use of means is commanded by God, and instinctively natural to man, since many events have been effected by their use, and many more in the future evidently depend upon them, it follows that God has not rendered certain any of those events which depend upon the use of means on the part of men.

20. What is the ground upon which the use of means is founded?

This use is founded upon the command of God, and upon that fitness in the means to secure the end desired, which our instincts, our intelligence, and our experience disclose to us. But neither the fitness nor the efficiency of the means to secure the end, reside inherently and independently in the means themselves, but were originally established and are now sustained by God himself; and in the working of all means God always presides and directs providentially. This is necessarily involved in any Christian theory of Providence, although we can never explicate the relative action (concursus) of God on man, the infinite upon the finite.

21. How may it be shown that the doctrine of decrees does not afford a rational ground of discouragement in the use of means?

This difficulty (stated above, question 19) rests entirely in a habit of isolating one part of God's eternal decree from the whole, (see question 7), and in confounding the Christian doctrine of decrees with the heathen doctrine of fate, (see question 14.) But when God decreed an event he made it certainly future, not as insolated from other events, or as independent of all means and agents, but as dependent upon means and upon agents freely using those means. The same decree which makes the event certain, also determines the mode by which it shall be effected, and comprehends the means with the ends. This eternal, all comprehensive act embraces all existence through all duration, and all space as one system, and at once provides for the whole in all its parts, and for all the parts in all their relations to one another and to the whole. An event, therefore, may

be certain in respect to God's decree and foreknowledge, and at the same time truly contingent in the apprehension of man, and in its relation to the means upon which it depends.

22. What are the proper practical effects of this doctrine?

Humility in view of the infinite greatness and sovereignty of God, and of the dependence of man. Confidence and implicit reliance upon the wisdom, righteousness, goodness and immutability of God's purposes, and cheerful obedience to his commandments; always remembering that God's precepts, as distinctly revealed, and not his decrees, are the rule of our duty.

CHAPTER X.

PREDESTINATION.

1. What are the different senses in which the word predestination is used by theologians?

1st. As equivalent to the generic word decreee, as including all God's eternal purposes.

2d. As embracing only those purposes of God which specially

respect his moral creatures.

3d. As designating only the counsel of God concerning fallen men, including the sovereign election of some and the most righteous reprobation of the rest.

4th. It is sometimes restricted in the range of its usage so far as to be applied only to the eternal election of God's people to everlasting life.

The sense marked as 3d, above, is the most proper usage.—See Acts iv., 27, 28.

2. In what senses are the words $\pi \rho \circ \gamma \iota \nu \omega \circ \kappa \omega$ (to know beforehand), and $\pi \rho \circ \gamma \iota \nu \omega \circ \iota \varsigma$ (foreknowledge), used in the New Testament?

Προγινώσκω is compounded of πρό, before, and γινώσκω, of which the primary sense is to know, and the secondary sense to approve, e. g., 2 Tim. ii., 19; John x., 14, 15; Rom. vii., 15. This word occurs five times in the New Testament. Twice, e. g., Acts xxvi., 5, and 2 Pet. iii. 17, it signifies previous knowledge, apprehension, simply. In the remaining three instances, Rom. viii., 29; xi., 2; 1 Pet. i., 20, it is used in the secondary sense of approve beforehand. This is made evident from the context, for it is used to designate the ground of God's predestination of individuals to salvation, which elsewhere is expressly said to be "not according to our works, but according to his own purpose

and grace," and "to the good pleasure of his will," 2 Tim. i., 9; Rom. ix., 11; Eph. i., 5.

Πρόγνωσις occurs but twice in the New Testament, e. g., Acts ii., 23, and 1 Pet. i. 2, in both of which instances it evidently signifies approbation, or choice from beforehand. It is explained by the equivalent phrase "determinate counsel."

3. What is the New Testament usage of the words ἐκλέγω (to elect) and ἐκλογή (election)?

'Εκλέγω occurs twenty-one times in the New Testament. It is used to signify, 1st, Christ's choice of men to be apostles, Luke vi., 13; John vi., 70. 2d. God's choice of the Jewish nation as a peculiar people, Acts xiii., 17. 3d. the choice of men by God, or by the church for some special service, Acts xv., 7, 22. 4th. The choice made by Mary of the better part, Luke x., 42. 5th. In the great majority of instances God's eternal election of individual men to everlasting life, John xv., 16; 1 Cor. i., 27, 28; Eph. i., 4; James ii., 5.

'Εκλογή occurs seven times in the New Testament. Once it signifies an election to the apostolic office.—Acts ix., 15. Once it signifies those chosen to eternal life.—Rom. xi., 7. In every other case it signifies the purpose or the act of God in choosing his own people to salvation.—Rom. ix., 11; xi., 5, 28; 1 Thes. i., 4; 2 Pet. i., 10.

4. To whom is election referred in the Scriptures?

The eternal decree, as a whole, and in all its parts, is doubtless the concurrent act of all the three persons of the Trinity, in their perfect oneness of counsel and will.

But in the economy of salvation, as revealed to us, the act of sovereign election is specially attributed to the Father, as his personal part, even as redemption is attributed to the Son, and sanctification to the Spirit.—John xvii., 6, 9; vi., 64, 65; 1 Thes. v. 9.

5. Are individuals, classes, or communities, the object of election?

The word "election" (as shown above, question 3) is applied to the designation by God of certain nations and classes of men to privileges and offices in the visible church. But that it is also applied to the eternal election of individuals to salvation is evident.

1st. The subjects of this election are everywhere spoken of as individuals.—Acts xiii., 48; Eph. i., 4; 2 Thes. ii., 13.

2d. The elect are distinguished from the general community of the visible church. All Israel, as a body, did not obtain that which they sought for, the election obtained it, and the rest were blinded.—Rom. xi., 7.

3d. The names of these are said "to be written in heaven," and to be "in the book of life."—Heb. xii., 23; Phil. iv., 3.

4th. The blessings which this election secures are such as pertains to individuals alone, and not to classes or communities as such, e. g., "salvation," "adoption of sons," "to be conformed to the image of God's Son."—2 Thes. ii., 13; Eph. i., 5; Rom. viii., 29.

6. What is the Supra-lapsarian theory of predestination?

The term supra-lapsarian (supra lapsum) designates that view of the various provisions of the divine decree in their logical relations which supposes that the ultimate end which God proposed to himself, was his own glory in the salvation of some men and in the damnation of others, and that, as a means to that end, he decreed to create man, and to permit him to fall. According to this view, man simply as creatible, and fallible, and not as actually created or fallen, is the object of election and reprobation. The order of the decrees would then be, 1st. Of all possible men, God first decreed the salvation of some and the damnation of others, for the end of his own glory. 2d. He decreed, as a means to that end, to create those already elected or reprobated. 3d. He decreed to permit them to fall. 4th. He decreed to provide a salvation for the elect.

7. What are the objections to this theory?

1st. It involves logical confusion. Man creatible is a nonentity. He could not have been loved or chosen unless considered as created.

2d. The whole language of Scripture upon this subject implies that the "elect" are chosen as the objects of eternal love, not

from the number of creatible, but from the mass of actually sin-

ful men.—John xv., 19; Rom. xi., 5, 7.

3d. The Scriptures declare that the elect are chosen to sanctification, and to the sprinkling of the blood of Christ. They must therefore have been regarded when chosen as guilty and defiled by sin.—1 Pet. i., 2; Eph, i., 4-6.

4th. Predestination includes reprobation. This view represents God as reprobating the non-elect by a sovereign act, without any respect to their sins, simply for his own glory. This appears to be inconsistent with the divine righteousness, as well as with the teaching of Scripture. The non-elect are "ordained to dishonor and wrath for their sins, to the praise of his glorious justice.—Conf. Faith, ch. 3, Sec. 3-7, L. Cat., question 13; S. Cat., question 20.

8. What is the true interpretation of Eph. iii., 9, 10.

This passage is claimed as a direct affirmation of the supralapsarian theory. If the "va," introducing the tenth verse, refers to the immediately preceding clause, which closes the ninth verse, then the passage teaches that God created all things, in order that his manifold wisdom might be displayed by the church to the angels. It is evident, however, that "va refers to the preceding phrase, in which Paul declares he was ordained to preach the gospel to the Gentiles, and to enlighten all men as to the mystery of redemption. All this he was commissioned to do, in order that God's glory might be displayed, etc.—See Hodge on Ephesians.

9. What is the sub-lapsarian view of predestination?

The sub-lapsarian (sub lapsum) theory of predestination, or the decree of predestination, viewed as subsequent in purpose to the decree permitting man to fall, represents man as created and fallen as the object of election. The order of the decrees then stand thus: 1st. The decree to create man. 2d. To permit man to fall. 3d. The decree to elect certain men, out of the mass of the fallen and justly condemned race, to eternal life, and to pass others by, leaving them to the just consequences of their sins. 4th. The decree to provide salvation for the elect. 10. What is the Arminian theory as to the order of the decrees relating to the human race?

Ist. The decree to create man. 2d. Man, as a moral agent, being fallible, and his will being essentially contingent, and his sin therefore being impreventible, God, foreseeing that man would certainly fall into the condemnation and pollution of sin, decreed to provide a free salvation through Christ for all men, and to provide sufficient means for the effectual application of that salvation to the case of all. 3d. He decreed absolutely that all believers in Christ should be saved, and all unbelievers reprobated for their sins. 4th. Forseeing that certain individuals would repent and believe, and that certain other individuals would continue impenitent to the last, God from eternity elected to eternal life those whose faith he foresaw, on the condition of their faith, and reprobated those whom he foresaw would continue impenitent on the condition of that impenitence.

With the Arminian the decree of redemption precedes the decree of election, which is conditioned upon the foreseen faith of the individual.

With the Calvinist, on the other hand, the decree of election precedes the decree of redemption, and the decree of election is conditioned upon the simple good pleasure of God alone.—See Appendix B.

11. What is the view of this subject entertained by the French Protestant theologians, Camero, Amyraut, and others?

These theological professors at Saumur, during the second quarter of the seventeenth century, taught that God, 1st. Decreed to create man. 2d. To permit man to fall. 3d. To provide, in the mediation of Christ, salvation for all men. 4th. But, fore-seeing that if men were left to themselves none would repent and believe, therefore he sovereignly elected some to whom he decreed to give the necessary graces of repentance and faith.

The new school theology of America, as far as it relates to the decrees of God, is only a revival of this system.

It differs from the Calvinistic view in making the decree of redemption precede the decree of election.

It differs from the Arminian view in regarding the sov-

ereign good pleasure of God, and not foreseen faith, the ground of election. The objection to this view is, that it is an essential element in that radically false view of the atonement called the governmental theory.—See Chapter XXII., questions 6, 7.

12. In what sense do the Lutherans teach that Christ is the ground of election?

They held that God elected his own people to eternal life for Christ's sake. They appeal to Eph. i., 4, "According as he hath chosen us in him (Christ) before the foundation of the world." This view may evidently be construed either with the Arminian or the French theory of the decrees above stated, i. e., we were chosen in Christ for his sake, either as we were foreseen to be in him through faith, or because God, having provided through Christ salvation for all men, would, by the election of certain individuals, secure at least in their case the successful effect of Christ's death.

This view, of course, is rebutted by the same arguments which we urge against the theories above mentioned. We are said to be chosen "in him," not for Christ's sake, but because the eternal covenant of grace includes all the elect under the headship of Christ. The love of God is everywhere represented as the ground of the gift of Christ, not the work of Christ the ground of the love of God.—John iii., 16; 1 John iv., 10.

13. What is the Arminian doctrine as to the ground of election?

The faith and repentance of the elect themselves, as foreseen by God.

14. What, according to the Calvinistic view, is the ground of predestination?

The eternal, sovereign, and infinitely wise, righteous, and loving will of God.

15. What arguments overthrow the Arminian and establish the Calvinistic view?

1st It is derogatory to the sovereignty and infinite perfections of God to regard any decree of his as conditional upon any thing without himself.—See above, Chap. IX., question 11.

2d. On the contrary, the Scriptures always assign the good pleasure of God as the ground of election.—Eph. i., 5, 11; 2 Tim. i., 9; Rom. viii., 28. Its ground is declared to be in God and not in us, John xv., 16-19; Matt. xi., 26; James ii., 5; and to be of grace and not of works, Rom. xi., 4-7. This is affirmed, argued and illustrated, Rom. ix., 10-13.

3d. Faith and repentence are themselves declared to be "the gift of God," Eph. ii., 8; Acts v., 31, and therefore were included in the decree, and could not have been the indeterminate condition

of it.—See Chapter IX., question 7.

4th. It is expressly affirmed that the elect were chosen "to be holy," and " to be conformed to the image of his Son," and not because these were foreseen; faith and repentance, therefore, are the consequents, not the grounds of election, Rom. viii., 29; Eph. i., 4; ii., 10; 2 Thess. ii., 13; 1 Pet. i., 2.

5th. Man, antecedently to election, could not have been foreseen as repentant and believing, because human nature can bring forth no such fruits. But God elects his people to grace, and through grace to faith and to all the fruits thereof. Therefore, "whom he did predestinate them he also called."-Rom. viii., 30; 2 Thess. ii., 13, 14.

6th. The elect and the effectually called are the same, and the calling is based upon the election, 2 Tim. i., 9, 10; Rev. xvii.,

14.—See Chapter XXV.

7th. All the elect shall believe, John x., 16 and 27-29; vi., 37-39; xvii., 2, 9, 24, and only the elect believe, and because they are such, John x., 26; Acts xiii., 48; ii., 47.

16. What argument may be drawn from the nature of the objections to Paul's doctrine, with which the Apostle deals in the 9th chapter of Romans?

Paul's doctrine is indentical with the Calvinistic view. Because he expressly teaches it. 2d. Because the objections he notices as brought against his doctrine are the same as those brought against ours. The design of the whole passage is to prove God's sovereign right to east off the Jews as a peculiar people, and to call all men indiscriminately by the gospel.

This, he argues, 1st, that God's ancien promises embraced not the natural descendants of Abraham as such, but the spiritual

seed. 2d. That "God is perfectly sovereign in the distribution of his favors."

But against this doctrine of divine sovereignty two objections are introduced and answered by Paul.

1st. It is unjust for God thus of his mere good pleasure to show mercy to one and to reject another, v. 14. This precise objection is made against our doctrine at the present time also. "It represents the most holy God as worse than the devil, as more false, more cruel, and more unjust."—Methodist Doctrinal Tracts, pp. 170, 171. This Paul answers by two arguments. (1.) God claims the right "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," vs. 15, 16. (2.) God in his providence exercises the right, as in the case of Pharoah, vs. 17, 18.

2d. The second objection is that this doctrine is inconsistent with the liberty and accountability of men. The same objection

is made against our doctrine now also.

Paul answers this objection by condescending to no appeal to human reason, but simply (1.) by asserting God's sovereignty as creator, and man's dependence as creature, and (2.) by asserting the just exposure of all men alike to wrath as sinners.—See Analysis of chap. ix., 6-24, in Hodge's Com. on Romans.

17. How can the doctrine of gratuitous election be reconciled with the justice of God?

Gratuitous election as the ultimate ground of salvation is not only clearly consistent with justice, but it is the only conceivable principle which is so. Justice necessarily holds all sinners alike as destitute of all claims upon God's favor, and will admit of salvation being offered at all only on the ground of sovereign favor. The essence of salvation by the gospel is that it is of grace, not of debt.—Lam. iii., 22; Rom. iv., 4, 5; xi., 6; Eph. i., 6, 7; ii., 8–10. If this be so it is evident that while no one can be saved upon any other ground than that of a gratuitous election, it rests only with God himself to save all, many, few, or none. Justice can not demand that because some are saved all must be. Those not elected are simply left to be dealt with according to justice for their own sins. There is a lurking feeling among many that somehow God owes to all men at least a full opportunity of being saved through Christ. If so there was no grace in

Christ's dying. "I reject," says Wesley, Meth. Doc. Tracts, pp. 25, 26, "the assertion that God might justly have passed by me and all men, as a bold, precarious assertion, utterly unsupported by holy Scripture." Then, we say, of course the gospel was of debt, not of grace.

18. How does this doctrine consist with the general benevolence of God?

The only difficulty at this point is to reconcile the general benevolence of God with the fact that he, being infinitely wise and powerful, should have admitted a system involving the sin, final impenitence, and consequent damnation of any. But this diffi-

culty presses equally upon both systems.

The facts prove that God's general benevolence is not inconsistent with his allowing some to be damned for their sins. This is all that reprobation means. Gratuitous election, or the positive choice of some does not rest upon God's general benevolence, but upon his special love to his own, John xvii., 6, 23; Rom. ix., 11–13; 1 Thess. v., 9.

19. How does this doctrine consist with the general gospel offer?

In the general offers of the gospel God exhibits a salvation sufficient for and exactly adapted to all, and sincerely offered to every one without exception, and he unfolds all the motives of duty, hope, fear, etc., which ought to induce every one to accept it, solemnly promising that whosoever comes in no wise shall be cast out. Nothing but a sinful unwillingness can prevent any one who hears the gospel from receiving and enjoying it.

The gospel is for all, election is a special grace in addition to that offer. The non-elect may come if they will. The elect will

come.

There is just as great an apparent difficulty in reconciling God's certain foreknowledge of the final impenitence of the great majority of those to whom he offers and upon whom he presses, by every argument, his love with the fact of that offer; especially when we reflect that he foresees that his offers will certainly increase their guilt and misery.

20. How far is assurance of our election possible, and on what grounds does such assurance rest?

An unwavering and certain assurance of the fact of our election is possible in this life, for whom God predestinates them he also calls, and whom he calls he justifies, and we know that whom he justifies, he also sanctifies. Thus the fruits of the Spirit prove sanctification, and sanctification proves effectual calling, and effectual calling election.—See 2 Pet. i., 5–10; 1 John ii., 3.

Besides this evidence of our own gracious states and acts, we have the Spirit of adoption, who witnesseth with our spirits and seals us.—Rom. viii., 16, 17; Eph. iv., 30.

In confirmation of this we have the example of the apostles (2 Tim. i., 12) and of many Christians.

21. What is reprobation?

Reprobation is the aspect which God's eternal decree presents in its relation to that portion of the human race which shall be finally condemned for their sins.

It is, 1st, negative, in as much as it consists in passing over these, and refusing to elect them to life; and, 2d, positive, in as much as they are condemned to eternal misery.

In respect to its negative element, reprobation is simply sovereign, since those passed over were no worse than those elected, and the simple reason both for the choosing and for the passing over was the sovereign good pleasure of God.

In respect to its positive element, reprobation is not sovereign, but simply judicial, because God inflicts misery in any case only as the righteous punishment of sin. "The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sins."—Con. Faith, Chap. III., Sec. 7.

22. How may this doctrine of reprobation he proved to be true?

1st. It is involved in the doctrine of unconditional election, and is therefore established by all the evidence upon which that doctrine rests, (see above, question 15.)

2d. It is directly taught in such passages as the following:

Rom. ix., 10-24; 1 Pet. ii., 8; 2d Pet. ii., 12; Jude 4; Rev. xiii., 8.

23. What is the objection to this doctrine stated, (Rom. ix., 19,) and how does Paul answer it?

"Why doth he yet find fault?" If he has not given gracious ability to obey, how can he command.—See also Methodist Doc-

trinal Tracts, p. 171.

The apostle answers by showing, 1st, (verses 20, 21,) that God is under no obligation to extend his grace to all or to any; and, 2d, that the "vessels of wrath" were condemned for their own sins, to manifest God's just wrath, while the "vessels of mercy" were chosen not for any good in them, but to manifest his glorious grace (verses 22, 23).

24. In what sense is God said to harden men (see Rom. i., 24-28, and ix., 18)?

This is doubtless a judicial act wherein God withdraws from sinful men, whom he has not elected to life, for the just punishment of their sins, all gracious influences, and leaves them to the unrestrained tendencies of their own hearts, and to the uncounteracted influences of the world and the devil.

25. How can the doctrine of reprobation be reconciled with the holiness of God?

Reprobation leaves men in sin, and thus leads to the increase of sin throughout eternity. How then can God, in consistency with his holiness, form a purpose the designed effect of which is to leave men in sin, and thus lead inevitably to the increase of sin.

But it is acknowledged by Arminians as well as Calvinists, that God did create the human race in spite of his certain fore-knowledge that sin would be largely occasioned thereby, and he did create individual men in spite of his certain foreknowledge that these very men would continue eternally to sin. The simple difficulty is, the fact that God does not convert all men.

26. What is the practical bearing of this doctrine on Christian experience and conduct?

It must be remembered, 1st. That this truth is not inconsistent with, but is part of the same gracious system with the equally certain principles of the moral liberty and responsibility of man, and the free offers of the gospel to all. 2d. That the sole rule of our duty is the commands, threatenings, and promises of God clearly expressed in the gospel, and not this decree of election, which he never reveals except in its consequents of effectual calling, faith, and holy living.

When thus held the doctrine of predestination—

1st. Exalts the majesty and absolute sovereignty of God, while it illustrates the riches of his free grace and his just displeasure with sin.

2d. It enforces upon us the essential truth that salvation is entirely of grace. That no one can either complain, if passed over, or boasts himself, if saved.

3d. It brings the inquirer to absolute self-despair, and the cordial embrace of the free offer of Christ.

4th. In the case of the believer, who has the witness in himself, this doctrine at once deepens his humility, and elevates his confidence to the full assurance of hope.

CHAPTER XI.

THE CREATION OF THE WORLD.

- "1st. Strictly, To hew, cut out. 2d. To form, make, produce, (whether out of nothing or not) Gen. i., 1, 21, 27; ii., 3, 4; Isa. xliii., 1, 7; xlv., 7; lxv., 18; Ps. li., 12; Jer. xxxi., 22; Amos iv., 13. Niphal, 1st. To be created, Gen. ii., 4; v., 2. 2d. To be born, Ps. cii., 19; Ezek. xxi., 35. Piel. 1st. To hew, cut down, e. g., a wood, Josh. xvii., 15, 18. 2d. To cut down (with the sword,) to kill, Ezek. xxiii, 47. 3d. To form, engrave, mark out, Ezek. xxi., 24."—Gesenius' Lex.
 - 2. What different theories have been advocated in opposition to the doctrine of creation?

Among the ancient philosophers of every school it was universally accepted as an indubitable axiom that the origination of any new existence out of nothing is impossible, i. e., ex nihilo nihil fit. All, therefore, theists and atheists alike, repudiated the idea of creation. Plato held that there are two eternal, self-existent principles, God and matter, which exist coördinately in an indivisible unsuccessive eternity; that time and the actual phenomenal world which exists in time, are the work of God, who freely molds matter into forms which image his own infinitely perfect and eternal ideas. Aristotle also held that God and matter are coordinately self-existent and eternal; but he differed from Plato in regarding God as eternally self-active in organizing the world out of matter, and consequently in regarding the universe thus organized as eternal as well as the mere matter of which it is formed.—Ancient Phil., W. Archer Butler, Series 3, Lectures

1 and 2. These, however, recognized God as the real author of the universe as a harmonious system. The Atomists, of whom Leucippus and Democritus were the first teachers, were, on the other hand, Atheists and Materialists. They held that the only self-existent principle of all things was an infinite number of atoms which from eternity move together in obedience to certain necessary forces, and in their fortuitous concourse combined and constituted the various forms and systems of bodies which compose the universe, as well as the intelligent and sensitive souls of men, which are as really material as their bodies, or any of the grosser forms of matter. This system was adopted in its essential features by the Epicureans.—Ritters' Hist. of Ancient Phil., Book VI., chap. ii.

Since the Christian era, all who have acknowledged the Holy Scriptures to be the word of God have agreed in maintaining the doctrine of God's absolute creation of the universe, alike matter and form, out of nothing by his mere power; although some of the schoolmen, following Aristotle, have held that God created the world from eternity. The Manicheans of the third and fourth centuries, an entirely antichristian sect, rejecting the Old Testament and corrupting the New, maintained the coördinate, eternal self-existence of two worlds, of spirit and light and of matter and darkness, presided over by two great antagonistic beings. Our present system is the result of the invasion of the world of light by the prince of darkness, and the consequent entanglement of a portion of that spiritual world with gross matter. The spirits of men belong naturally to the one world, their bodies and material nature generally to the other. All sin and suffering result from the evil inherent in matter. The object of Christ's mission was to deliver our spirits from our bodies, which it is the great end of all practical religion to mortify and subdue. In modern times the deniers of the doctrine of absolute creation ex nihilo, have been either Pantheists or Atheists. For a statement of the essential elements of Pantheism, see below, Chapter I., question 35. The Atheists have differed among themselves; some maintaining that the present system of the universe has continued just as it now is in unbroken succession from eternity; some resorting to the atomic theory of the ancients, and others holding to an endless development of all things from their primordial elementary principles. This doctrine of development has received its most perfect scientific exposition in La Place's Nebular Hypothesis, wherein he traces the evolution of the whole solar system by the rigid application of known mechanical principles, from a condition of intensely heated vapor, rotating on its axis from west to east, precisely similar to that of many nebulous bodies now existing in the universe. As an account of the successive stages through which God has carried his work of creating the world, in which sense this theory is very generally accepted by Christian philosophers, the nebular hypothesis is a peerless monument of its author's philosophical genius. But as an account of the manner in which the world might have come into existence without the intervention of either a divine wisdom or power, in which sense the author intended it, it is an equally eminent monument of his wickedness and folly.

3. How may creation ex nihilo be proved from Scripture?

Ist. The Hebrew word translated create in Gen. i., I, has a sense precisely equivalent to our word make, and it is the least indefinite term in the whole language that Moses could have selected if his purpose was to affirm the absolute creation of the world by God out of nothing. And a more limited sense can not rationally, and has never, by competent interpreters, been put upon these words, occurring as they do at the very opening of the inspired account of the "generations of the heavens and of the earth," without connection with any other proposition, and absolutely without limitations of any kind.

2d. This doctrine is implied in several other passages of Scripture, Rom. iv., 17; 2 Cor. iv., 6; Heb. xi., 3.

2d. This doctrine is also implied in all those innumerable passages of Scripture which declare that God's power and sovereignty are both infinite.

4. What other arguments may be adduced in proof of creation, properly so called?

1st. The doctrine that matter is self-existent and eternal, and that God has simply formed the world out of preëxisting material is plainly inconsistent with his absolute independence and all-

sufficiency. It evidently limits the Creator, and makes him in working dependent upon the nature of the material with which he works.

2d. It is inconsistent with the feeling of absolute dependence of the creature upon the Creator, which is inherent in every heart, and which is inculcated in all the teachings of the Scriptures. It could not be said that "he upholds all things by the word of his power," nor that "we live, and move, and have our being in him," unless he be absolutely the Creator as well as the Former of all things.

3d. It is manifest from the testimony of consciousness. (1.) That our souls are distinct individual entities, and not parts or particles of God; (2.) that they are not eternal. It follows consequently that they were created. And if the creation of the spirits of men ex nihilo be once admitted, there remains no special

difficulty, with respect to the absolute creation of matter.

4th. Although the absolute origination of any new existence out of nothing is to us confessedly inconceivable, it is not one whit more so than the relation of the infinite foreknowledge, or forcordination, or providential control of God to the free agency of men, nor than many other truths which we are all forced to believe.

5th. After having admitted the necessary self-existence of an infinitely wise and powerful personal Spirit, whose existence, upon the hypothesis of his possessing the power of absolute creation, is sufficient to account for all the phenomena of the universe, it is unphilosophical gratuitously to multiply causes by supposing the independent, eternal self-existence of matter also.

6th. When the physical philosopher has analyzed matter to its ultimate atoms, and determined their essential primary properties, he finds in them as strong evidence of a powerful antecedent cause, and of a wisely designing mind, as he does in the most complex organizations of nature; for what are the ultimate properties of matter but the elementary constituents of the universal laws of nature, and the ultimate conditions of all phenomena. If design discovered in the constitution of the universe as finished proves a divine Former, by equal right must the same design discovered in the elementary constitution of matter prove a divine Creator.

7th. Those among theistic thinkers who have been tempted to regard matter as eternal and self-existent, have been influenced by the vain hope of explaining thereby the existence of moral evil in consistency with the holiness of God. They would refer all the phenomena of sin to an essentially evil principle inherent in matter, and would justify God by maintaining that he has done all that in him lay to limit that evil. Now, besides the inconsistency of this theory's attempt to vindicate the holiness of God at the expense of his independence, it proceeds upon absurd principles, as appears from the following considerations: (1.) Moral evil is in its essence an attribute of spirit. To refer it to a material origin must logically lead to the grossest materialism. (2.) The entire Christian system of religion, and the example of Christ is in opposition to that asceticism and "neglecting of the body," (Col. ii., 23) which necessarily springs from the view that matter is the ground of sin. (3.) When God created the material universe he pronounced his works "very good." (4.) The second Person of the holy trinity assumed a real material body into personal union with himself. (5.) The material creation, now "made subject to vanity" through man's sin, is to be renovated and made the temple in which the Godman shall dwell forever.— See below, Chap. XXXVI., question 17. (6.) The work of Christ in delivering his people from their sin does not contemplate the renunciation of the material part of our natures, but our bodies, which are now "the members of Christ," and the "temples of the Holy Ghost," are at the resurrection to be transformed into the likeness of his glorified body. Yet nothing could be more absurd than to argue that the σωμα πνευματικόν is not as litterally material as the present $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu a \psi \nu \chi \iota \kappa \tilde{\sigma} \nu$. (7.) If the cause of evil is essentially inherent in matter, and if its past developments have occurred in spite of God's efforts to limit it, what certain ground of confidence can any of us have for the future.

5. Prove that the work of creation is in Scripture attributed to God absolutely, i. e., to each of the three persons of the Trinity coördinately, and not to either as his special personal function?

1st. To the Godhead absolutely, Gen. i., 1, 26. 2d. To the Father, 1 Cor. viii., 6. 3d. To the Son, John i., 3; Col. i., 16, 17. 4th. To the Holy Spirit, Gen. i., 2; Job xxvi., 13; Ps. civ., 30.

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6. How can it be proved that no creature can create?

Ist. From the nature of the work. It appears to us that the work of absolute creation ex nihilo is an infinite exercise of power. It is to us inconceivable because infinite, and it can belong, therefore, only to that Being who, for the same reason, is incomprehensible. 2d. The Scriptures distinguish Jehovah from all creatures, and from false gods, and establish his sovereignty and rights as the true God by the fact that he is the *Creator*, Is. xxxvii., 16; xl., 12, 13; liv., 5; Ps. xcvi., 5; Jer. x., 11, 12. 3d. If it were admitted that a creature could create, then the works of creation would never avail to lead the creature to an infallible knowledge that his creator was the eternal and self-existent God.

7. What opinion do modern geologists entertain as to the antiquity of our globe, and upon what does that opinion rest?

The universal opinion of all geologists, Christians and infidels, theists and atheists, is that the material composing our globe has been in existence for incalculable ages; that it has passed through many successive stages in its transition probably from a gaseous, certainly from a molten condition, to its present constitution; and that it has successively been inhabited by many different orders of organized beings, each in turn adapted to the physical conditions of the globe in its successive stages, and generally marked in each stage by an advancing scale of organization, from the more elementary to the more complex and more perfect forms, until the advent of man, the last and most perfect of all, about six thousand years ago. The facts upon which this opinion is founded are barely indicated in the following summary condensed from the 2d chapter of Pres. Hitchcock's able work on "Religion of Geology."

1st. The rocks are in their present form evidently the result of the operation of second causes. "Some of them have been melted and reconsolidated, and crowded in between others, or spread over them. Others have been worn down into mud, sand, and gravel, by water and other agents, and again cemented together, after having enveloped multitudes of animals and plants, which are now embedded as organic remains." They bear upon them as indubitable marks of change and wear as any of the ancient works of man. To infer that they were created in their

present form would violate every principle of analogical reasoning upon which all science proceeds.

- 2d. "Processes are now going on by which rocks are formed, on a small scale, of the same character as those which constitute the great mass of the earth. Hence it is fair to infer (1.) that all the rocks were formed in a similar manner. (2.) That by ascertaining the rate at which rocks are now forming we may form some estimate as to the time requisite to produce those constituting the crust of the earth."
- 3d. All the stratified rocks, especially that large proportion of them which contain the remains of animals and plants, appear to have been formed from fragments of other rocks, worn down by the action of water and atmospheric agencies. Yet this process is very slow.
- 4th. "Yet there must have been time enough, since the creation, to deposit at least ten miles of rocks in perpendicular thickness," by this process of attrition, washing, precipitation, drying, and hardening by means of heat, pressure, and the admixture of iron or lime.
- 5th. It is certain that since man existed, or in the last six thousand years, materials for the production of rock have not accumulated to the average thickness of more than one or two hundred feet, or about one five hundreth part of the entire thickness of the stratified rocks that have been formed since the creation.
- 6th. During the deposition of the stratified rocks many changes must have occurred in the temperature and the materials held in solution by the waters which deposited them, and in the positions of the rocks themselves, as they have been bent and dislocated while in a soft state.
- 7th. "Numerous races of animals and plants must have occupied the globe previous to those which now inhabit it, and have successively passed away as catastrophes occurred, or as the climate became unfit for their residence. Thirty thousand species have already been dug from the rocks, and with few exceptions none of them corresponding to those now living upon the earth." "Not less than four or five, and probably more, entire races have passed away, and been succeeded by recent ones, so that the globe has actually changed all its inhabitants half a dozen times."
 - 8th. Even since all the various strata of rocks have been in

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their present state and position changes have been accomplished, e. g., in the formation of deltas, and in the gradual wearing away of solid rock in channels by rivers (often hundreds of feet deep, and for miles in length), which must have required many thousands of years.

9th. The primary rocks, which everywhere form the foundation upon which the stratified rocks rest, and out of the fragments of which, by washing and wearing, the stratified rocks have been formed, were themselves evidently formed when the whole globe was gradually cooling from a condition of universal fusion from heat.

8. What are the different methods which have been suggested of reconciling the facts developed by geology with the truth of the Mosaic record of creation?

1st. The method adopted by Dr. Chalmers, President Hitchcock, and the great majority of Christian geologists, is as follows: The first verse of Genesis, disconnected from the subsequent context, affirms the truth that in the beginning, at some remote and unrevealed period in the past, God created the whole universe out of nothing; and then after an interval, the measure of which is not given, the subsequent verses relate the general order in which God, in the space of six natural days, established the present order of this world, adapting it to the residence of its present inhabitants, and in which he created the present races of plants and animals. This interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation was advanced as probable by many eminent biblical scholars before the rise of geological science, and it is now almost universally adopted by theologians as well as by geologists. There appears to be no objection to it upon any ground, and, as a general adjustment, it appears to be the best possible in the present state of our knowledge. It is only a general adjustment, however, leaving many questions of detail unsolved, both as to the interpretation of the record of the six days' work, and as to the reconciliation of the facts of geology, and the present scientific interpretation thereof, with the inspired record.

2d. In order to avoid several difficulties experienced in attempting to reconcile the Mosaic account of the six days' work with the science, Dr. John Pye Smith proposed to supplement

the above method of reconciliation with the hypothesis that the term earth in Genesis did not signify the whole globe, but "the part of our globe which God was adapting for the dwelling-place of man and animals connected with him," that is, "a large part of Asia, lying between the Caucasian Ridge, the Caspian Sea, and Tartary on the north, the Persian and Indian Seas on the south, and the high mountain ridges which run at a considerable distance on their eastern and western flanks."

- 3d. Many have argued that the days spoken of in this passage in 'Genesis were not natural days of twenty-four hours, "but periods of great, though indefinite length, during which all the changes exhibited by the strata of rocks took place," and in which the several orders of organized vegetable and animal beings were successively created, man being brought into existence at the end of the closing day of creation, and the Sabbath day of God's rest from his creation work continuing ever since. This view has been eloquently argued and illustrated in a comparison of the Mosaic text with the facts developed by geology, by the late Hugh Miller, in his last work, "The testimony of the Rocks." After all, however, theologians and geologists agree in regarding this method of reconciliation as doing equal violence to the language of the record and to the facts of the science.—President Hitchcock's "Religion of Geology."
- 9. What principles ought to be borne in mind by Christians in view of apparent discrepancies between the interpretation of nature by science, and the interpretation of the Scriptures by theologians?
- 1st. All truth must be consistent. God's works and God's word are alike absolute truth; whatever discrepancies appear, the difficulty must wholly exist in man's imperfect interpretation, either of the works upon the one hand, or of the word upon the other.
- 2d. Revelation was not designed to anticipate the natural progress of science, consequently the Scriptures teach us nothing concerning the interpretation of the phenomenal world of nature, but uniformly speak of phenomena as they appear, and in the common language of the age and people among whom they were written, and never of physical causes or laws as they are in fact.

Thus they speak of the sun "rising," "setting," "going back," "standing still," etc., etc.

3d. From the commencement of modern science apparent inconsistencies between nature and revelation have been constantly emerging, which, for the time, have occasioned great offense to zealous believers, but in every instance, without exception, the error has been found to exist either in the too hasty generalizations of science from imperfect knowledge of the facts, or from a prejudiced interpretation of the Scriptures, and invariably matured science has been found not only to harmonize perfectly with the letter of the word naturally interpreted, but, moreover, gloriously to illustrate the grand moral principles and doctrines therein revealed.

4th. There is no difficulty experienced in the attempt to reconcile Moses' account of the "genesis of the heavens and earth" with the science of geology, which is different either in kind or degree from those experienced in every attempt to reconcile prophecy with the facts of history. History and geological science are both in transitu; when they are finished the perfect harmony of both with revelation will be apparent to all.

5th. Christians should always rejoice in every advance of science, being assured that thereby the truth of their religion and the glory of their God must be confirmed and manifested. They should equally avoid all premature adjustments of the interpretation of Scripture to imperfect science in process of development, and all injurious and impotent jealousies of scientific discoveries or speculations, when apparently hostile to their traditional interpretation of Scripture. Perfect faith casteth out all

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CHAPTER XII.

ANGELS.

1. What are the different senses in which the word ἄγγελος, angel, or messenger, is used in Scripture?

"Ordinary messengers, Job i., 14; Luke vii., 24; ix., 52; prophets, Isa. xlii., 19; Mal. iii., 1; priests, Mal. ii., 7; ministers of the New Testament, Rev. i., 20; also impersonal agents, as pillar of cloud, Ex. xiv., 19; pestilence, 2 Sam. xxiv., 16, 17; winds, Ps. civ., 4; plagues, called 'evil angels,' lxxviii., 49; Paul's thorn in the flesh, 'angel of Satan,' 2 Cor. xii., 7." Also the second person of the Trinity, "Angel of his presence;" "Angel of the Covenant," Isa. lxiii., 9; Mal. iii., 1. But the term is chiefly applied to the heavenly intelligences, Matt. xxv., 31.—See Kitto's Bib. Ency.

2. What are the scriptural designations of angels, and how far are those designations expressive of their nature and offices?

Good angels (for evil spirits, see question 13) are designated in Scripture as to their nature, dignity and power, as "spirits," Heb. i., 14; "thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, mights," Eph. i., 21, and Col. i., 16; "sons of God," Luke xx., 36; Job i., 6; "mighty angels," and "powerful in strength," 2 Thes. i., 7; Ps. ciii., 20; "holy angels," "elect angels," Luke ix., 26; 1 Tim. v., 21; and as to the offices they sustain in relation to God and man, they are designated as "angels or messengers," and as "ministering spirits," Heb. i., 13, 14.

3. What were the cherubin ?

"They were ideal creatures, compounded of four parts, those namely, of a man, an ox, a lion, and an eagle." "The predomi-

nant appearance was that of a man, but the number of faces, feet, and hands differed according to circumstances."—Ezek. i., 6, compare with Ezek. xli., 18, 19, and Ex. xxv., 20.

To the same ideal beings is applied the designation "living creatures," (Ezek. i., 5-22; x., 15, 17; Rev. iv., 6-9; v., 6-14; vi., 1-7; vii., 11; xiv., 3; xv. 7; xix., 4,) rendered in our version "beasts."

"They were *symbolical* of the highest properties of creature life, and of these as the outgoings and manifestation of the divine life; but they were *typical* of redeemed and glorified manhood, or prophetical representations of it, as that in which these properties were to be combined and exhibited.

"They were appointed immediately after the fall to man's original place in the garden, and to his office in connection with

the tree of life."—Gen. iii., 24.

"The other and more common connection in which the cherub appears is with the throne or peculiar dwelling-place of God. In the holy of holies of the tabernacle, Ex. xxv., 22. he was called the God who dwelleth between and sitteth upon the cherubim, 1 Sam. iv., 4; Ps. lxxx., 1; Ezek. i., 26, 28; whose glory is above the cherubim. In Rev. iv., 6, we read of the living creatures who were in the midst of the throne and around about it."

"What does this bespeak but the wonderful fact brought out in the history of redemption, that man's nature is to be exalted to the dwelling-place of the Godhead? In Christ it is taken, so to speak, into the very bosom of the Deity; and because it is so highly honored in him, it shall attain to more than angelic glory in his members."—Fairbairn's Typology, Pt. II., Chapter I., Section 3.

4. What is the etymology of the word seraphim, and what is taught in Scripture concerning them?

The word signifies burning, bright, dazzling. It occurs in the Bible only once.—Isa. vi., 2, 6. It probably presents, under a different aspect, the ideal beings commonly designated cherubim and living creatures.

5. Is there any evidence that angels are of various orders and ranks?

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That such distinctions certainly exist appears evident, 1st. From the language of Scripture, Gabriel is distiguished as one that stands in the presence of God, (Luke i., 19,) evidently in some preëminent sense; and Michael as one of the chief princes, Dan. x., 13. Observe also the epithets archangel, thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, Jude 9; Eph. i., 21. 2d. From the analogy of the fallen angels, see Eph. ii., 2; Matt. ix., 34. 3d. From the analogy of human society and of the universal creation. Throughout all God's works gradation of rank prevails.

6. Do the Scriptures speak of more than one archangel, and is he to be considered a creature?

This term occurs but twice in the New Testament, and in both instances it is used in the singular number, and preceded by the definite article 5, 1 Thes. iv., 16; Jude 9. Thus the term is evidently restricted to one person, called, Jude 9, Michael, who, in Dan. x., 13, and xii., 1, is called "one of the chief princes," and "the great prince," and in Rev. xii., 7, is said to have fought with his angels against the dragon and his angels.

Many suppose that the archangel is the Son of God. Others suppose that he is one of the highest class of creatures, since he is called "one of the chief princes," Dan. x., 13; and since divine attributes are never ascribed to him.

7. What do the Scriptures teach concerning the number and power of angels?

1st. Concerning their number, revelation determines only that it is very great. "Thousand thousands, and ten thousand times ten thousand," Dan. vii., 10. "More than twelve legions of angels," Matt. xxvi., 53. "Multitude of the heavenly host," Luke ii., 13. "Myriads of angels," Heb. xii., 22.

2d. Concerning their power, the Scriptures teach that it is very great when exercised both in the material and in the spiritual worlds. They are called "mighty angels," and are said to "excel in strength," 2 Thess. i., 7; Ps. ciii., 20; 2 Kings xix., 35. Their power, however, is not creative, but, like that of man, it can be exercised only coördinately with the general laws of nature, in the absolute sense of that word.

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8. What are their employments?

1st. They behold the face of God in heaven, adore the divine perfections, study every revelation he makes of himself in providence and redemption, and are perfectly blessed in his presence and service.—Matt. xviii., 10; Rev. v., 11; 1 Pet. i., 12.

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2d. God employs them as his instruments in administering the affairs of his providence, Gen. xxviii., 12; Dan. x., 13. (1.) The law "was ordained by angels," Gal. iii., 19; Acts vii., 53; Heb. ii., 2. (2.) They are instruments of good to God's people, Heb. i., 14; Acts xii., 7; Ps. xci., 10-12. (3.) They execute judgment upon God's enemies, Acts xii., 23; 2 Kings xix., 35; 1 Chron. xxi., 16. (4.) They will officiate in the final judgment, in separating the good from the bad, in gathering the elect, and in bearing them up to meet the Lord in the air, Matt. xiii., 30-39; xxiv., 31; 1 Thess. iv., 17.

9. How are apparitions of angels to be accounted for?

See Num. xxii., 31, etc. What was apparent to the senses were doubtless miraculously constituted bodies assumed for the occasion for the purpose of holding intercourse with man through his bodily senses, and then laid aside.

10. What are the names by which Satan is distinguished, and what is their import?

Satan, which signifies adversary, Luke x., 18. The Devil (διάβολος always occurs in the singular) signifying slanderer, Rev. xx., 2; Apollyon, which means destroyer, and Abbadon, Rev. ix., 11; Beelzebub, the prince of devils, from the god of the Ekronites, chief among the heathen divinities, all of which the Jews regarded as devils, 2 Kings, i., 2; Matt. xii., 24; Angel of the Bottomless Pit, Rev., ix., 11; Prince of the World, John xii., 31; Prince of Darkness, Eph. vi., 12; A Roaring Lion, 1 Pet. v., 8; a Sinner from the Beginning, 1 John iii., 8; Accuser, Rev. xii., 10; Belial, 2 Cor., vi., 15; Deceiver, Rev. xx., 10; Dragon, Rev. xii., 7; Liar and Murderer, John viii., 44; Leviathan, Is., xxvii., 1; Lucifer, Is. xiv., 12; Serpent, Is. xxvii., 1; Tormentor, Matt. xviii., 34; God of this World, 2 Cor. iv, 4; he that hath the Power of Death, Heb. ii., 14.—See Cruden's Concordance.

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11. How may it be proved that Satan is a personal being, and not a mere personification of evil?

Throughout all the various books of Scripture Satan is always consistently spoken of as a person, and personal attributes are predicated of him. Such passages as Matt. iv., 1–11, and John viii., 44, are decisive.

12. What do the Scriptures teach concerning the relation of Satan to other evil spirits and to our world?

Other evil spirits are called "his angels," Matt. xxv., 41; and he is called "Prince of Devils," Matt. ix., 34; and "Prince of the powers of the Air," and "Prince of Darkness," Eph. vi., 12. This indicates that he is the master spirit of evil.

His relation to this world is indicated by the history of the Fall, 2 Cor. xi., 3; Rev. xii., 9, and by such expressions as "God of this World," 2 Cor. iv., 4; and "Spirit that worketh in the children of disobedience," Eph. ii., 2; wicked men are said to be his children, 1 John iii., 10; he blinds the minds of those that believe not and leads them captive at his will, 2 Tim. ii., 26; he also pains, harasses and tempts God's true people as far as is permitted for their ultimate good, Luke xxii., 31; 2 Cor. xii., 7; 1 Thess. ii., 18.

13. What are the terms by which fallen spirits are designated?

The Greek word ὁ διάβολος, the devil, is in the original applied only to Beelzebub. Other evil spirits are called δαίμονες, dæmons, Mark v., 12 (translated devils); unclean spirits, Mark v., 13; angels of the devil, Matt. xxv., 41; principalities, powers, rulers of the darkness of this world, Eph. vi., 12; angels that sinned, 2 Pet. ii., 4; angels that kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, Jude vi; lying spirits, 2 Chron. xviii. 22.

14. What power or agency over the bodies and souls of men is ascribed to them?

Satan, like all other finite beings, can only be in one place at a time; yet all that is done by his agents being attributed to him, he appears to be practically ubiquitous.

It is certain that at times at least they have exercised an inexplicable influence over the bodies of men, yet that influence is entirely subject to God's control, Job. ii., 7; Luke xiii., 16; Acts x., 38. They have caused and aggravated diseases, and excited appetites and passions, 1 Cor. v., 5. Satan, in some sense, has the power of death, Heb. ii., 14.

With respect to the souls of men, Satan and his angels are utterly destitute of any power either to change the heart or to coerce the will, their influence being simply moral, and exercised in the way of deception, suggestion, and persuasion. The descriptive phrases applied by the Scriptures to their working are such as—"the deceivableness of unrighteousness," "power, signs, lying wonders," 2 Thess. ii., 9, 10; he "transforms himself into an angel of light," 2 Cor. xi., 14. If he can deceive or persuade he uses "wiles," Eph. vi., 11; "snares," 1 Tim. iii., 7; "depths," Rev. ii., 24; he "blinds the mind," 2 Cor. iv., 4; "leads captive the will," 2 Tim. ii., 26; and so "deceives the whole world," Rev. xii., 9. If he can not persuade he uses "fiery darts," Eph. vi., 16; and "buffetings," 2 Cor. xii., 7.

As examples of his influence in tempting men to sin the Scriptures eite the case of Adam, Gen. iii.; of David, 1 Chron. xxi., 1; of Judas, Luke xxii., 3; Ananias and Saphira, Acts v., 3; and the temptation of our blessed Lord, Matt. iv.

15. Where do they reside, and what is the true interpretation of Eph. ii., 2, and vi., 12?

These passages simply declare that evil spirits belong to the unseen spiritual world, and not to our mundane system. Nothing is taught us in Scripture as to the place of their residence, further than that they originally dwelt in and fell from heaven, that they now have access to men on earth, and that they will be finally sealed up in the lake of fire prepared for them, Rev. xx., 10; Matt. xxv. 41.

16. By what terms were those possessed by evil spirits designated?

They are called "demoniacs," translated possessed with devils, Matt. iv., 24; "having the spirit of an unclean devil," Matt. xv.,

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22; "oppressed of the devil," Acts x., 38; "lunatics," Matt. xvii., 15.

17. What arguments are urged by those who regard the demoniacs mentioned in the New Testament as simply diseased or deranged?

That we can not discriminate between the effects of demoniacal possession and disease. That precisely the same symptoms have, in other cases, been treated as disease and cured.

That, like witchcraft, the experience of such possessions has been confined to the most ignorant ages of the world.

They argue further that this doctrine is inconsistent with clearly revealed principles. 1st. That the souls of dead men go immediately either to heaven or hell. 2d. That fallen angels are already shut up in chains and darkness in expectation of the final judgment, 2 Pet. ii., 4; Jude vi.

They attempt to explain away the language of Christ and his apostles upon this subject by affirming, that as it was no part of their design to instruct men in the true science of nature or disease, they conformed their language on such subjects to the prevalent opinions of the people they addressed, calling diseases by the popular name, without intending thereby to countenance the theory of the nature of the disease, out of which the name originated. Just as we now call crazed people "lunatics," without believing in the influence of the moon upon them.—Kitto's Bib. Ency.

18. How may it be proved that the demoniacs of the New Testament were really possessed of evil spirits?

The simple narratives of all the evangelists put it beyond peradventure that Christ and his apostles did believe, and wished others to believe, that the demoniacs were really possessed with devils.

They distinguish between possession and disease, Mark i., 32; Luke vi., 17, 18.

The "demons," as distinct from the "possessed," spoke (Mark v., 12), were addressed, commanded and rebuked by Christ, Mark i., 25, 34; ix., 25; Matt. viii., 32; xvii., 18.

Their desires, requests and passions are distinguished from those of the possessed, Matt. viii., 31; Mark ix, 26, etc. The number of dæmons in one person is mentioned, Mark xvi., 9. They went out of the "possessed" into the swine, Luke viii., 32. We never speak of the moon entering into, and sore vexing a man, or being cast out of a lunatic, or of the moon crying aloud, etc. The argument of those who would explain away the force of Christ's language on this subject, therefore, fails.

CHAPTER XIII.

PROVIDENCE.

1. Define the term providence.

See Confession of Faith, Chapter V., and L. Cat., question 18, and S. Cat., question 11. Providence, from pro and video, literally signifies foresight. Turrettin defines this term as including, in its widest sense, 1st, foreknowledge; 2d, foreordination; 3d, the efficacious administration of the thing decreed. But in its common and technically proper sense, providence designates simply God's temporal preservation and governing of all things according to his eternal purpose.

2. What are the three principal theories respecting the relation which God sustains to the universe?

All the various views respecting God's relation to the universe entertained among men may be classed under one or other of the following heads, and in general terms stated as follows:

Ist. The deistical, including those views which admitting more or less fully that, when God created the universe, he communicated their inherent properties to all material elements and to spirits, and made them in their interaction subject to certain general laws, so constituted, as to bring forth in the ceaseless evolutions of events all his preordained ends, yet deny that God continues in immediate contact with each individual creature, or that he is now concerned in constant supervision and control of their actions and their destinies. His relation to the universe thus is like that of the maker, not of the keeper of a watch. The actions of men, therefore, must either be mechanically determined like those of material bodies, or entirely fortuitous and beyond the influence of God.

2d. The pantheistic including all those various views which

regard God as the only being in the universe, and the creature as in reality without separate existence, property, or agency, as only phenomenally distinct, and essentially more or less transient modes of the one universal divine being.—See above, Chapter I., question 35.

3d. The true doctrine, established by Scripture and sober philosophical induction, occupies intermediate ground between the above extremes. The Christian theory of providence agrees with the deistical in maintaining that, at the creation, God endowed every element, material or spiritual, with inherent properties after its kind, and made them all subject to general laws, thus constituting them in a real sense efficient second causes. On the other hand, it maintains, in opposition to the deistical theory, that God continues to support and control second causes in their action, and so to adjust the general laws which prevail in the several departments of nature as to direct all events, whether the actions of free agents or of unconscious matter, to the accomplishment of his own will.

As God is infinite in his relation to time and to space, it is evident that the difference between the Deistical and Christian views of providence does not turn upon the question as to the time when God makes provision for the determination of each individual event, but upon the question as to the nature of his relation to the creation. We maintain that the creature "lives, moves, and has its being in God," and that God, in the full exercise of his infinite wisdom, goodness, righteousness, and power, so directs and controls the actions of free agents freely, and of necessary agents necessarily, as at once not to coerce the nature of the agent, and yet infallibly to determine all things according to his eternal purpose:

3. Wherein does preservation consist?

Preservation is that continued exercise of the divine energy whereby the Creator upholds all his creatures in being, and in the possession of all their inherent properties and qualities with which he has endowed them at their creation, or which they have subsequently acquired by habit or development.

4. On what ground is it assumed that the universe would not continue to exist unless constantly upheld by God?

The old theologians held that, as the creature as such is not self-existent, it could no more continue to be than it could commence to be of itself, since the cause of its being is out of itself. This rationalistic argument, although logically plausible, is not certain. As by the law of inertia a body once moved ab extra will continue to move until stopped ab extra, so it might be that a being once created might continue to exist until annihilated ab extra.

This doctrine, however, is eminently congruous to that sense of dependence which is an essential element of our religious nature, and it is clearly affirmed by Scripture.—Heb. i., 3; Neh. ix., 6; Job x., 12; Ps. civ., 27–30; Acts xvii., 28.

5. State the argument for God's providential government of the world derived from his own perfections.

1st. The stupendous fact that God is infinite in his being, in his relation to time and space, and in his wisdom and power, makes it evident that a universal providence is possible to him, and that all the difficulties and apparent contradictions involved therein to the eye of man are to be referred to our very limited capacity of understanding.

2d. God's infinite wisdom makes it certain that he had a definite object in view in the creation of the universe, and that he will not fail in the use of the best means to secure that object in

all its parts.

3d. His infinite goodness makes it certain that he would not leave his sensitive and intelligent creatures to the toils of a mechanical, soulless fate; nor his religious creatures to be divorced from himself, in whose communion their highest life consists.

4th. His infinite righteousness makes it certain that he will continue to govern and reward and punish those creatures which

he has made subject to moral obligations.

6. State the argument from conscience.

Conscience essentially involves a sense of our direct moral responsibility to God as a moral governor, and this, together with a profound sense of dependence, constitutes that religious sentiment which is common to all men. But if God be a moral gov-

ernor, he can execute that function in relation to a being constituted of body and soul, and conditioned as man is in this world, in no other conceivable way than through a comprehensive providence, at once spiritual and physical, general and particular.

7. State the argument from the intelligence evinced in the operations of nature.

The great inductive argument for the being of God is based upon the evident traces of design in the universe. Now, just as the traces of design in the constitution of nature proves the existence of a designing mind in the relation of creator, so the traces of design in the operations of nature prove the existence of a de-

signing mind in the relation of providential ruler.

The material elements, with their active properties, are all incapable of design, yet we find all these elements so adjusted in all their proportions and relations as to work harmoniously in the order of certain general laws, and we find these general laws so adjusted in all their intricate coincidences and interferences, as, by movements simple and complex, fortuitous and regular, to work out harmoniously everywhere the most wisely and beneficently contrived results. The mechanical and chemical properties of material atoms; the laws of vegetable and animal life; the movements of sun, moon and stars in the heavens; the luminous, calorific, and chemical radiance of the sun; and the instinctive and voluntary movement of every living thing upon the face of the earth, are all mutually acting and reacting without concert or possible design of their own; yet everywhere bringing forth the most wise and beneficent results. As the designing mind can not be found in any of the elements, nor in the resultant of all combined, it must be found in the presiding control of the Creator.

8. How may this doctrine be established by the evidence afforded by the general history of the world?

If the constitution of human nature (soul and body), in its elemental relations to human society, proves a designing mind in the relation of creator, exactly so must the wisely contrived results of human association, in general and in individual instances, prove the exercise of a designing mind in the relation of providential ruler.

Individual men and communities, it is true, differ in their action, from the elements of the external world, inasmuch as they act, 1st, freely, self-moved; and, 2d, from design. Yet so narrow is the sphere both of the foresight and the design of every individual agent, so great is the multiplicity of agents, and the complications of interacting influences upon each community from within, from every other community, and from the powers of external nature, that the designs of either individuals or communities are never carried beyond a short distance, when they are lost in the general current, the result of which lies equally beyond the foreknowledge and the control of all. But the student of history, with the key of revelation, clearly discerns the traces of a general design running through all the grand procedures of human history, and at points even visibly linking itself with the actions of individual agents. God's providence, as a whole, therefore, comprehends and controls the little providences of men.

9. State the Scriptural argument from the prophecies, promises, and threatenings of God.

In innumerable instances has God in the Scriptures prophesicd with great particularity the certain occurrence of an event absolutely, and he has promised or threatened the occurrence of other events contingently upon certain conditions. This would be a mockery, if God did not use the means to fulfill his word.

It is not reasonable to object that God simply foresaw the event, and so prophesied, promised, or threatened it, because the event is frequently promised or threatened contingently, upon a condition which does not stand in the relation of a cause to that event. God could not foresee one event as contingent upon another which sustains no causal relation to it. The truth of the promise or threatening in such a case can not depend upon the natural connection between the two events, but upon God's determination to cause one to follow the other.

10. Prove from Scripture that the providence of God extends over the natural world.

Ps. civ., 14; cxxxv., 5-7; cxlvii., 8-18; cxlviii., 7, 8; Job ix., 5, 6; xxi., 9-11; xxxvii., 6-13; Acts xiv., 17.

- 11. Prove from Scripture that it includes the brute creation. Ps. civ., 21–29; exlvii., 9; Matt. vi., 26; x., 29.
- 12. Prove from Scripture that it extends to the general affairs of men.
- 1 Chron. xvi., 31; Ps. xlvii., 7; lxvi., 7; Prov. xxi., 1; Job xii., 23; Isa. x., 12-15; Dan. ii., 21; iv., 25.
- 13. Show from Scripture that the circumstances of individuals are controlled by God.
- 1 Sam. ii., 6; Ps. xviii., 30; Prov. xvi., 9; Isa. xlv., 5; Luke i., 53; James iv., 13-15.
- 14. Prove that events considered by us fortuitous are subject to the control of God.
- 1st. A fortuitous event is one whose proximate causes, because either of their complexity or their subtlety, escape our observation. Every such event, however, as the falling of a leaf, is linked with the general system of things, both by its antecedents and its consequences.
- 2d. Scripture affirms the fact.—Ex. xxi., 13; Ps. lxxv., 6, 7; Job v., 6; Prov. xvi., 33.
- 15. Prove that a general necessarily involves a particular providence.

Every department of existence in the universe is so intimately related to all the rest, that every change taking effect in one necessarily affects the others. All events, moreover, occur in successions of causes and effects, each link in turn being the effect of what preceds and the cause of what follows. In the present order of things it would be impossible to secure certain general ends, without necessarily determining all those particular events upon which those general ends depend; and thus, as no event is isolated, since even the least event springs from and contributes to the general system, every event must be presided over to that end.

The notion of a general providence, a particular one excluded,

is as absurd as that of a chain without links.

16. Prove that the providential government of God extends to the free acts of men:

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Ist. The free actions of men are potent causes influencing the general system of things precisely as all other classes of causes in the world, and consequently, on the principle indicated in the answer to the preceding question, they also must be subject to God, or every form of providence whatever would be impossible for him.

2d. It is affirmed in Scripture.—Ex. xii., 36; 1 Sam. xxiv., 9–15; Ps. xxxiii., 14, 15; Prov. xvi., 1; xix., 21; xx., 24; xxi., 1; Jer. x., 23; Phil. ii., 13.

17. Show from Scripture that God's providence is exercised over the sinful acts of men.

2 Sam. xvi., 10; xxiv. 1; Ps. lxxvi., 10; Rom. xi., 32; Acts iv., 27, 28.

18. What general principles, as to the nature of God's providential government, is it important to bear in mind?

1st. The fact that God does control all the actions, internal and external, necessary and free, good and bad, of all his creatures.

2d. That whatever may be the mode in which God exercises this providential control, or the nature of the influence he exerts upon any of his creatures, it can not be inconsistent either (1.) with his own infinite perfections, or (2.) with that constitution and those attributes with which he has himself endowed the creature upon whom he acts. His influence, therefore, must always be worthy of himself, and in each case congruous to the nature of the creature.

3d. It follows from the ascertained limits of human thought that we can never clearly understand the mode in which, in the ultimate act, the infinite spirit of God acts upon the finite spirit of man. The interaction of God's agency in providence and grace with man's dependent agency constitutes that limit of thought which is emerging at every step, which we may define, but neither avoid nor transcend.

19. What is the nature of God's agency in the material world?

All that we know upon this subject may be defined as follows: 1st. The properties of material elements are inherent in their subjects, and consequently they act efficiently as second causes.

- 2d. God has so adjusted these elements in their proportions and relations that they act and interact according to certain general laws, which he has established as an order of nature.
- 3d. In his ordinary providence God does not change or coerce, but rather preserves these properties in their integrity, and this order of nature.
- 4th. God, however, both in the original constitution of the material elements, in the adjustment of them in their mutual relations, and in his concurrent providential control of them in action, certainly determines all results, individual and general, regular and exceptional.
- 20. What is meant by a "material cause," and what by a "law of nature"?

The material world consists simply of a greater or less number of elements, each endowed with its own specific property or capacity of acting, and of being acted upon by all other elements respectively in a certain way. One of these bodies alone produces no effect, and therefore is no cause; but two or more of them brought together act upon each other mutually, according to their properties and to their relative circumstances. A material cause, therefore, is to be found in the relative properties of two or more bodies, so adjusted as to act upon each other, and the effect is the mutual change in each which results from this interaction, e. g., we have for cause the mutual chemical attraction of the oxygen of the air, and the hydrogen and carbon of the wood at a high temperature, and for effect we have the smoke and the ashes, or the elements of air and wood in new combinations after combustion.

But in order that such causes should act uniformly, these material elements must be adjusted uniformly in their mutual relations. This God has done with infinite wisdom with respect to the relation of these elements, "1st, as to their properties; 2d, as to their quantity; 3d, as to space; 4th, as to time."

A "law of nature" is nothing more than a general or uniform fact; it is only a general expression for the way in which material elements act in their mutual relations as providentially adjusted. Instead of producing the harmonious results in nature,

which are often superficially attributed to them, "they are themselves the result of nicely balanced and skilfull adjustments."—M'Cosh, Divine Gov., Book II., chap. i.

21. What do the Scriptures teach as to God's providential agency in the good acts of men?

The Scriptures attribute all that is good in man to the free grace of God, operating both providentially and spiritually, and influencing alike the body and the soul, and the outward relations of the individual.—Phil. ii., 13; iv., 13; 2 Cor. xii., 9, 10; Eph. ii., 10; Gal. v., 22-25.

It is to be remembered, however, that while a material cause may be analysed into the mutual interaction of two or more bodies, a human soul acts spontaneously, *i. e.*, originates action. The soul also, in all its voluntary acts, is determined by its own prevailing dispositions and desires.

When all the good actions of men, therefore, are attributed to God, it is not meant, 1st, that he causes them, or, 2d, that he determines man to cause them, irrespectively of man's free will; but it is meant that God so acts upon man from within spiritually, and from without by moral influences, as to induce the free disposition. He works in us first to will, and then to do his good pleasure.

22. What is taught in the Scriptures concerning his agency with respect to the sins of men?

There is involved in this question the insoluble mystery, 1st, of God's permission of moral evil, and, 2d, of the nature of God's action upon the dependent spirits of men.

Turrettin sets forth the testimony of Scripture upon this subject thus:—

1st. As to the beginning of the sin, (1.) God freely permits it. But this permission is neither moral, i. e., while permitting it physically, he never approves it; nor merely negative, i. e., he does not simply concur in the result, but he positively determines that bad men shall be permitted for wise and holy ends to act according to their bad natures.—Acts xiv., 16; Ps. lxxxi., 12. (2.) He deserts those who sin, either by withdrawing grace abused, or by withholding additional grace. This desertion may be either

a partial, to prove man's heart (2 Chron. xxxii., 31), or b for correction, or c penal (Jer. vii., 29; Rom. i., 24-26). (3.) God so orders providential circumstances that the inherent wickedness of men takes the particular course of action he has determined to permit (Acts ii., 23; iii., 18). (4.) God delivers men to Satan, a as a tempter (2 Thess. ii., 9-11), b as a torturer (1 Cor. v., 5).

2d. As to the progress of the sin, God restrains it as to its intensity and its duration, and as to its influence upon others. This he effects both by internal influences upon the heart, and by

the coutrol of external circumstances.—Ps. lxxvi., 10.

3d. As to the end or result of the sin, God uniformly overrules it and directs it for good.—Gen. 1., 20; Job i., 12; ii., 6-10; Acts iii., 13; iv., 27, 28.

23. What is the old doctrine of concursus, and the distinction between "previous" and "simultaneous" concursus?

This was an attempt to construct a philosophical explanation of the truth upon this subject taught in Scripture, rather than a simple statement of that truth, or a legitimate deduction from it. It was a product of the schoolmen, held by the disciples of Thomas Aquinas, and the orthodox party among the Romanists generally, and by almost all the early Protestant divines.

Previous concursus is that act of God wherein, by flowing into causes and their principles, he excites his creatures to act, and determines them to perform one action rather than another.

Simultaneous concursus is the influence of God upon the creature, continued and considered as carried over into their act. As he determined them to perform the act, so he concurs with them in the production of the act.

These theologians distinguished between the action viewed physically as an entity, and its moral quality. The action was from God; the moral quality, if evil, was from man. As when a man strikes an untuned harp, the sound is from him, the discord is from the disorder of the instrument. Concerning this theory we have to say, that while we fully believe that man lives and moves and has his being in God, and that God works in man to will and to do of his good pleasure; that he has eternally foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, and now providentially controls all the actions of all his creatures so that his eternal purposes are fulfilled;—yet this theory of concursus, 1st, in the first place attempts to explicate the nature of this divine influence, which is not supernaturally revealed, and which transcends our natural faculties. 2d. In vindicating the dependence of the creature, it denies the efficiency of second causes, makes God the only real agent in the universe, and logically leads to Pantheism. 3d. It fails to make the distinction which the Scriptures do between the relation which God sustains to the good actions of men, and that which he sustains to their evil actions.

It is enough for us to know that there is a constant, most holy, wise, and powerful influence exerted by the infinite spirit of God upon the dependent souls of men; we can never logically analyze it.

24. How far do the Scriptures teach anything as to the nature of God's providential government?

The mode in which the divine agency is exerted is left entirely unexplained, but the fact that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions is expressly stated and everywhere assumed, and many of the characteristics of that government are set forth.

It is declared—

1st. To be universal.—Ps. ciii., 17–19; Dan. iv., 34, 35; Ps. xxii., 28–29.

2d. Particular.—Matt. x., 29-31.

3d. It embraces the thoughts and volitions of men and events apparently contingent.—Prov. xxi., 1; xvi., 9, 33; xix., 21; 2 Chron. xvi., 9.

4th. It is efficacious.—Lam. ii., 17; Ps. xxxiii., 11; Job xxiii., 13.

5th. It is the execution of his eternal purpose, embracing all his works from the beginning in one entire system.—Acts xv., 18; Eph. i., 11; Ps. civ., 24; Isa. xxviii., 29.

6th. Its chief end is his own glory, and subordinately thereto, the highest good of his redeemed church.—Rom. ix., 17; xi., 36; viii., 28.

25. How can the existence of moral and physical evil be reconciled with the doctrine of God's providential government?

The mystery of the origin and permission of moral evil we can not solve.

As to physical evil we answer-

1st. That it is never provided for as an end in itself, but always a means to an overbalancing good.

- 2d. That in its existing relations to moral evil as corrective and punitive, it is justified alike by reason and conscience as perfectly worthy of a wise, righteous, and merciful God.
- 26. Show that the apparently anomalous distribution of happiness and misery in this world is not inconsistent with the doctrine of providence.
- 1st. Every moral agent in this world has more of good and less of evil than he deserves.
- 2d. Happiness and misery are much more equally distributed in this world than appears upon the surface.
- 3d. As a general rule, virtue is rewarded and vice punished even here.
- 4th. The present dispensation is a season of education, preparation, and trial, and not one of rewards and punishments.—See Ps. lxxiii.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

WE must preface this inquiry with an attempt to answer certain psycological questions concerning the constitution of human nature, which are necessary to prepare the way for the clear understanding of the Scriptural doctrines as to the relation of man to God's moral government, his fall, his estate in sin, and his regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Spirit.

1. What is the general principle which it is always necessary to bear in mind while treating of the various faculties of the human soul?

The soul of man is one single indivisible agent, not an organized whole consisting of several parts; and, therefore, what we call its several faculties are rather the capacity of the one agent, for discharging successively or concurrently the several functions involved, and are never to be conceived of as separately existing parts or organs. These several functions exercised by the one soul are so various and complex, that a minute analysis is absolutely necessary, in order to lay open to us a definite view of their nature. Yet we must carefully remember that a large part of the errors into which philosophers have fallen in their interpretation of man's moral constitution, has resulted from the abuse of this very process of analysis. This is especially true with respect to the interpretation of the voluntary acts of the human soul. In prosecution of his analysis the philosopher comes to recognize separately the differences and the likenesses of these various functions of the soul, and too frequently forgets that these functions themselves are, in fact, never exercised in that isolated manner, but concurrently by the one soul, as an indivisible agent, and that thus they always qualify one another. Thus, it is not true, in fact,

that the understanding reasons, and the heart feels, and the conscience approves or condemns, and the will decides, as different members of the body work together, or as the different persons constituting a council deliberate and decide in mutual parts; but it is true that the one indivisible, rational, feeling, moral, self-determining soul reasons, feels, approves, or condemns and decides.

The self-determining power of the will as an abstract faculty is absurd as a doctrine, and would be disastrous as an experience, but the self-determining power of the human soul as a concrete, rational, feeling agent, is a fact of universal consciousness, and a fundamental doctrine of moral philosophy and of Christian theology.

2. How may the leading faculties of the human soul be classified?

1st. The intellectual. This class includes all those faculties in different ways concerned in the general function of knowing; as the reason, the imagination, the bodily senses, and the moral sense (when considered as a mere source of knowledge to the understanding.)

2d. The emotional. This class includes all those feelings which attend, in any manner, the exercise of the other faculties.

3d. The will.

It will be observed that the functions of the conscience involve faculties belonging to both the first and second classes, (see below, question 5.)

It is often asked which of our faculties is the seat of our moral nature? Now while there is a sense in which all moral questions concern the relation of the states or acts of the will to the law of God revealed in the conscience, and therefore in which the will and the conscience are preëminently the foundation of man's moral nature, it is true, nevertheless, that every one of the faculties of the human soul, as above classified, is exercised in relation to all moral distinctions, e. g., the intellectual in the perception and judgment; the emotional in pleasant feeling or the reverse; the will, in choosing or refusing, and in acting. Every state or act of any one of the faculties of the human soul, therefore, which involves the judging, choosing, refusing, desiring, upon a purely moral question, or the

feeling corresponding thereto, is a moral state or act, and all the faculties, viewed in their relations to the distinction between good and evil, are moral faculties.

3. What is the Will?

The term will is often used to express the mere faculty of volition, whereby the soul chooses, or refuses, or determines to act, and the exercise of that faculty. It is also used in a wider sense, and in this sense I use it here, to include the faculty of volition, together with all of the spontaneous states of the soul (designated by Sir William Hamilton, "Lectures on Metaphysics," Lect. XI., the faculties of conation, the excitive, striving faculties, possessing, as their common characteristic, "a tendency toward the realization of their end") the dispositions, affections, desires, which determine a man in the exercise of his free power of volition. It must be remembered, however, that these two senses of the word will are essentially distinct. The will, as including all the faculties of conation (the dispositions and desires), is to be essentially distinguished from the single faculty of soul exercised in the resulting volition, i.e., the choosing or the acting according to its prevailing desire.

There is included in the doctrine of the will, 1st, that in the exercise of the faculty of volition, or self-decision, the soul truly originates action, i. e., acts as an original cause of its own acts, therein differing totally from all material causes, which act only as they are acted upon. This is the transcendental element of the human will, generally marked by the term spontaneity, which has rendered the whole subject so obscure. The truth must be recognized that we have here reached one of the impassable limits of human thought. Our minds are so constituted that we can understand only a chain of operations, each link of which is alternately effect and cause. The action of an absolute cause, that is, of one really originating action, is a mystery to our understandings, though it be daily part of our personal experience. Any attempt to analyse this ultimate fact only destroys it, and confuses the testimony of consciousness. This conclusion, stated in different language, is arrived at by different paths by Sir William Hamilton.—See Discussions, pp. 575-590; M'Cosh, see "Divine

Government," pp. 273-294; and Isaac Taylor, see "World of

Mind," pp. 83-93, and others.

- 2d. That this executive act of volition is always according to the present prevailing desires or affections of the soul, in respect to the object of action, in the view which the understanding takes of the whole case at the time. A man always chooses as, upon the whole, he desires to choose. The soul often decides in opposition to many of its most intense desires. Yet it always decides in conformity with that desire which is, upon the whole, the strongest. If the question be—Whence orginates the soul's action? the answer must refer to the soul's inherent power of acting as an original cause. If the question be—Why does the soul act thus rather than otherwise? the answer must refer to the inherent state of the soul itself in relation to the object of choice.
- 3d. That these prevalent dispositions and desires, although they are temporarily excited to action by the view which the understanding transmits of external objects, nevertheless have their only efficient cause and reason in the principles, or permanent nature of the will itself. These affections and desires are spontaneous, and are determined in their character by the will which exercises them. The understanding can give no further account of them.
- 4. What is the distinction between a TEMPORARILY PREVA-LENT AFFECTION or DESIRE, and a PERMANENT PRINCIPLE of the Will?

The "affection" or "desire" is a temporary spontaneous state of the will with respect to a certain choice or volition, for the time being, and in the view which the mind takes of all the circumstances and reasons of the case. The "principle" or the "disposition," on the other hand, is a permanent habit, inherent in the will, of exercising "affections" or "desires" of some particular kind.

A man chooses or refuses in every particular case, according to his prevalent desire in that case. But a man prevailingly desires, and so chooses and refuses in all similar cases, according to his permanent habitual principles and disposition. These permanent habitual principles or dispositions constitute the man's permanent character; as a moral agent, he is always as they are: by know-



ing them we know him, and can to a good degree predict his free action under given circumstances. These permanent principles are of two classes with respect to origin: 1st, innate; 2d, acquired by repeated actions of the same kind. This distinction, however, makes no difference with respect to character or moral responsibility. A man whose spontaneous dispositions are malignant, is a bad man, whether those dispositions be innate or acquired, and in either case he is equally responsible.

5. What is the conscience?

Conscience, as a faculty, includes a moral sense, or the power of discerning the distinction between right and wrong, which, combining with the understanding, or faculty of comparing and judging, judges of the right or wrong of our own moral dispositions and voluntary actions, and of the dispositions and voluntary actions of other free agents. This faculty judges according to a divine law of right and wrong, included within itself (it is a law to itself, the original law written upon the heart, Rom. ii., 14), and it is accompanied with vivid emotions, pleasurable in view of that which is right, and painful in view of that which is wrong, especially when our conscience is engaged in reviewing the states, or the actions of our own wills. This faculty in its own province is sovereign, and can have no other superior than the revealed word of God.—See M'Cosh, "Divine Government," Book III., chap. i., sec. 4.

6. What do we mean when we say that man is a free agent?

1st. That, being a spirit, he originates action. Matter acts only as it is acted upon. A man acts from the spring of his own active power.

2d. That, although a man may be forced by fear to will and to do many things which he would neither will nor do if it were not for the fear, yet he never can be made to will what he does not himself desire to will, in full view of all the circumstances of the case.

3d. That he is furnished with a reason to distinguish between the true and the false, and with a conscience, the organ of an innate moral law, to distinguish between right and wrong, in order that his desires may be both rational and righteous. And yet his desires are not necessarily either rational or righteous, but are formed under the light of reason and conscience, either conformable or contrary to them, according to the permanent habitual dispositions of the man, i. e., according to his own character.

7. What are the essential conditions of moral responsibility?

To be morally responsible a man must be a free, rational, moral agent, (see answer to preceding question.) 1st. He must be in present possession of his reason to distinguish truth from falsehood. 2d. He must also have in exercise a moral sense to distinguish right from wrong. 3d. His will, in its volitions or executive acts, must be self-decided, i. e., determined by its own spontaneous affections and desires. If any of these are wanting, the man is insane, and neither free nor responsible.

8. Is the conscience indestructible and infallible?

The conscience, the organ of God's law in the soul, may virtually, i. e., as to its effects and phenomena, be both rendered latent and perverted for a time, and in this phenomenal sense, therefore, it is neither indestructible nor infallible. But if the moral sense be regarded simply in itself it is infallible, and if the total history of even the worst man is taken into the account, censcience is truly indestructible.

Ist. As to its indestructibility. Conscience, like every other faculty of the soul, is undeveloped in the infant, and very imperfectly developed in the savage; and, moreover, after a long habit of inattention to its voice and violation of its law, the individual sinner is often judicially given up to carnal indifference; his conscience for a time lying latent. Yet it is certain that it is never destroyed. (1.) From the fact that it is often aroused to the most fearful energy in the hearts of long-hardened reprobates in the agonies of remorse. (2.) From the fact that this remorse or accusing conscience constitutes the essential torment of lost souls and devils. This is the worm that never dieth. Otherwise their punishment would lose its moral character.

2d. As to its *infallibility*. Conscience, in the act of judging of moral states or actions, involves the concurrent action of the understanding and the moral sense. This understanding is al-

ways fallible, especially when it is prejudiced in its action by depraved affections and desires. Thus, in fact, conscience constantly delivers false decisions from a misjudgement of the facts and relations of the case; it may be through a selfish, or sensual, or a malignant bias. Hence we have virtually a deceiving as well as a latent conscience. Notwithstanding this, however, the normal sense of the distinction between right and wrong, as an eternal law to itself, lies indestructible even in the most depraved breasts, as it can not be destroyed, so it can not be changed; when aroused to action, and when not deceived as to the true state of the case, its language is eternally the same.—See McCosh, "Divine Government," Book III., Chapter II., Section 6, and Dr. A. Alexander, "Moral Science," Chapters IV. and V.

9. What is the essential nature of virtue?

"Virtue is a peculiar quality of" certain states of the will, i.e., either permanent dispositions or temporary affections of the will, and "of certain voluntary actions of a moral agent, which quality is perceived by the moral faculty with which every man is endowed, and the perception of which is accompanied by an emotion which is distinct from all other emotions, and is called moral."—Dr. Alexander, Moral Science., Chap. XXVI.

The essence of virtue is, that it *obliges* the will. If a thing is morally right it *ought* to be done. The essence of moral evil is, that it intrinsically deserves disapprobation, and the agent

punishment.

This point is of great importance, because the truth here is often perverted by a false philosophy, and because this view of moral good is the only one consistent with the Scriptural doctrine of sins, rewards and punishments, and, above all, of Christ's atonement.

The idea of virtue is a simple and ultimate intuition; attempted analysis destroys it. Right is right because it is. It is its own highest reason. It has its norm in the immutable nature of God.

10. What constitutes a virtuous and what a vicious character?

Virtue, as defined in the answer to the last question, attaches

only to the will of man (including all the conative faculties), 1st, to its permanent disposition; 2d, to its temporary affections; and, 3d, to its volitions. Some of these states and actions of the will are not moral, i. e., they are neither approved nor condemned by the conscience as virtuous or vicious. But virtue or vice belong only to states of the will, and to voluntary acts. A virtuous character, therefore, is one in which the permanent dispositions, the temporary affections and desires, and the volitions of the will, are conformable to the divine law.

A vicious character, on the other hand, is one in which these states and acts of the will are not conformable to the divine law.

The acts of volition are virtuous or vicious as the affections or desires by which they are determined are the one or the other. The affections and desires are as the permanent dispositions or the character. This last is the nature of the will itself, and its character is an ultimate unresolvable fact. Whether that character be innate, or acquired by habit, the fact of its moral quality as virtuous or vicious remains the same, and the consequent moral accountability of the agent for his character is unchanged.

It must be remembered that the mere possession of a conscience which approves the right and condemns the wrong, and which is accompanied with more or less lively emotion, painful or pleasureable as it condemns or approves, does not make a character virtuous, or else the devils and lost souls would be eminently virtuous. But the virtuous man is he whose heart and actions, in biblical language, or whose dispositions, affections, and volitions, in philosophical language, are conformed to the law of God.

With this preface we come now to consider directly the

ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

11. How do our standards answer the question, How did God create man?

Con. Faith, Chap. IV., sec. 2. Larger Cat., Q. 17. Shorter Cat., Q. 10.

12. Do the Scriptures certainly sanction the distinction we make between the material and spiritual elements of man's nature?

Certainly. 1st. In their account of man's creation. God formed man out of the dust of the ground, and then breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and thus he became a living soul, Gen. ii., 7. This indicated his special relation to our souls as the Father of our spirits, Heb., xii., 9. 2d. In their account of the immediate result of the dissolution of the personal union of body and soul in death, Eccle. xii., 7. 3d. Both the words πνεῦμα and ψυχή, spirit and soul, are constantly used in the New Testament to signify the rational and immortal part of man, Luke i., 47, and viii., 55; Matt. x., 28; Heb. vi., 19. In two passages they are used together by Paul to embrace exhaustively, in the popular philosophical language of the day, the whole man. "Your whole body, soul and spirit," 1 Thess. v., 23; Heb. iv., 12. 4th. In their assertion that while the body waits in the grave, the spirit, at death, goes immediately to God, 2 Cor. v., 1-8, and Phil. i., 23, 24.

13. In what sense was man created in the image of God?

1st. In respect to the spirituality of his nature, man, like God, is a rational, moral and free agent.

2d. In respect to the moral integrity and holiness of his nature,

Eph. iv., 24; Col. iii., 10.

3d. In respect to the dignity and authority delegated to his person, as the head of this department of creation, Gen. i., 28, and ii., 19, 20, and the 8th Ps.

14. Wherein did man's original righteousness consist?

In the perfect conformity of all the moral dispositions and affections of man's will to the law of God, of which law his conscience was the organ.

As a consequence of this there was no schism in man's nature. The will, moving freely in conformity to the lights of reason and conscience, held in harmonious subjection all the lower principles both of body and soul. In perfect equilibrium a perfect soul dwelt in a perfect body.

15. In what sense is original righteousness said to be natural?

It was the moral perfection of man's nature as it came originally from the hands of the Creator. It is natural in the sense that it belonged to man's nature at the first, and that it is essentiated in the sense that it is essentiated in the sense

tial to his nature to render it perfect as to quality, but it is not natural in the sense of being necessary to constitute him a real man, or responsible as a moral agent. Man is as much responsible since his fall as ever before.

16. Prove that man was created holy.

It belongs to the essence of man's nature that he is a moral responsible agent.

But, 1st. As a moral creature man was created in the image

of God, Gen. i., 27.

2d. God pronounced all his works, man included, to be "very good," Gen. i., 31. The goodness of a mechanical provision is essentially its fitness to attain its end. The "goodness" of a moral agent can be nothing other than his conformity of will to the moral law. Moral indifferency in a moral agent is itself of the nature of sin.

3d. This truth is asserted, Eccle. vii., 29.

4th. In regeneration, man is renewed in the image of God; in creation, man was made in the image of God; the image, in both cases, must be the same, and includes holiness.—Eph. iv., 24.

17. What is the Pelagian doctrine with regard to the original state of man?

The Pelagians hold, 1st, that a man can rightly be held responsible only for his unbiassed volitions; and, 2d, consequently moral character as antecedent to moral action is an absurdity, since only that disposition is moral which has been formed as a habit by means of preceding unbiassed action of the free will, i. e., man must choose his own character, or he can not be responsible for it.

They hold, therefore, that man's will at his creation was not only free, but, moreover, in a state of moral equilibrium, equally disposed to virtue or vice.

18. What is the Romish doctrine as to the original state of man?

They agree that man was created holy; yet maintain that original righteousnesss did not pertain to man's nature as such, but was a supernatural grace added to it. They hold that the various wayward affections and desires which war against the law of conscience are natural to man, and in themselves not of the nature of sin, but tending necessarily to becoming inordinate, and

therefore sinful, whenever the supernatural endowment of original righteousness is withdrawn, for it is the office of that righteousness to preside over and hold them in order.—See Catechismus Romanus, Part I., Chap. II., question 18, and Part II., Chap. II., question 32, and Part IV., Chap. XII., question 3.

19. How may it be shown that a holy character may be formed in a creature at his creation, before he can have performed any holy action?

Pelagians hold, 1st. That it is an essential condition of moral responsibility, that the will must be left to act unbiassed by any preceding dispositions and desires. 2d. That the only dispositions or character which are consistent with free agency are those gradually formed as habits in consequence of repeated moral action. Therefore, a created moral character, holy or sinful, they hold to be an absurdity, for if it be created or innate it can not be moral.

To this we answer—

1st. It is contradicted by what the Scriptures plainly teach us concerning Adam as created, (see question 16), concerning infants as born children of wrath, etc., (see chapter on Original Sin), and concerning regeneration by the Holy Ghost, (see chapter on Regeneration.)

2d. It is absurd, because the very essence of virtue is, that it obliges the will. Moral indifferency of disposition in presence of any moral obligation is an impossibility, because it is *itself sin*.

3d. It is true that all character, in order to be moral, must be voluntary, i. e., it must be the character of the will itself, as a good or a bad will, (or, in Scripture language, a good or a bad heart,) and therefore it is free and spontaneous; but it is not true that such a character must be formed by a previous unbiassed choice of the will itself. Every man feels that he is morally responsible for the moral state of his own heart, no matter how that state originated, simply because it is the state of his own heart. If a man hates virtue and loves vice he is a bad man, no matter how he came to possess such affections. "The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will lies not in their cause, but their nature."—Pres. Edwards on Will, Part IV., Section 1.

4th It is also set forth by the same great writer as the universal judgment of men, that the goodness or badness of an act depends upon the goodness or badness of the disposition or affection which prompted it. It is the moral state of the will (or heart, see Matt. vii., 17-20 and xii., 33,) which makes the act of the will right or wrong, and not the act which makes the state wrong. A man's motives may be right, and yet his choice may be wrong through his mistake of its nature, because of ignorance or insanity; yet if all the prevalent dispositions and desires of the heart in any given case be right, the volition must be morally right, if wrong, the volition must be morally wrong; if indifferent, or neither right or wrong, the volition must be morally indifferent also. Hence appears the absurdity of their position. If Adam had been created, as they feign, with a will equally disposed either to good or evil, his first act could have had no moral character whatever. And yet Pelagians assume that Adam's first act, which had no moral character itself, determined the moral character of the man himself, and of all his acts and destinies for all future time. This, if true, would have been unjust on God's part, since it involves the infliction of the most awful punishment upon an act in itself neither good nor bad. As a theory it is absurd, since it evolves all morality out of that which is morally indifferent.

5th. This whole theory is built upon certain à priori notions, and is contrary to universal experience. If Adam was created without positive moral character, and if infants are so born, then the conditions of free agency in these supposed cases must be different from the conditions of free agency in the case of every adult man or woman, from whose consciousness alone we can gather the facts from which to deduce any certain knowledge on the subject. Every man who ever thought or wrote upon this subject, was conscious of freedom only under the conditions of an already formed moral character. Even if the Pelagian view were true, we never could be assured of it, since we never have consciously experienced such a condition of indifferency. It is nothing more than an hypothesis, contrived to solve a difficulty; a difficulty resulting from the limits of our finite powers of thought.—See Sir William Hamilton's "Discussions," p. 587, etc.

CHAPTER XV.

COVENANT OF WORKS

1. In what different senses is the term covenant used in Scripture?

1st. For a natural ordinance, Jer. xxxiii., 20.

2d. For an unconditional promise, Gen. ix., 11, 12.

3d. For a conditional promise, Is. i., 19, 20.

4th. A dispensation or mode of administration, Heb. viii., 6-9. For the usage with respect to the Greek term διαθήκη, usually

translated in our version testament and covenant.—See Chapter XIX., on "Covenant of Grace," question 1.

In the theological phrases "covenant of works," and "covenant of grace," this term is used in the third sense of a promise suspended on conditions.

2. What are the several elements essential to a covenant?

1st. Contracting parties. 2d. Conditions. These conditions in a covenant between equals are mutually imposed and mutually binding, but in a sovereign constitution, imposed by the Creator upon the creature, these "conditions" are better expressed as (1.) promises on the part of the Creator suspended upon (2.) conditions to be fulfilled by the creature. And (3.) an alternative penalty to be inflicted in case the condition fails.

3. Show that the constitution under which Adam was placed by God at his creation may be rightly called a covenant.

The inspired record of God's transactions with Adam presents definitely all the essential elements of a covenant as coexisting in that constitution.

1st. The "contracting parties," (1.) God, the moral Governor,

by necessity of nature and relation demanding perfect conformity to moral law. (2.) Adam, the free moral agent, by necessity of nature and relation under the inalienable obligation of moral law.

2d. The "promises," life and favor, Matt. xix., 16, 17; Gal.

iii., 12.

3d. The "conditions" upon which the promises were suspended, perfect obedience, in this instance subjected to a special test, that of abstaining from the fruit of the "tree of knowledge."

4th. The "alternative penalty." "In the day thou eatest

thereof thou shalt surely die," Gen. ii., 16, 17.

This constitution is called a covenant, Hosea, vi., 7.

4. How is it defined in our standards?

Con. Faith, Chap. IV., Sec. 2; Chap. VII., Sec. 1 and 2; Chap. XIX., Sec. 1; L. Cat., Q. 20; S. Cat., Q. 12.

5. Why is it called the Covenant of Works?

From the nature of its "condition," perfect obedience, and to distinguish it from the covenant of grace, which secures the salvation of God's people independently of their works. It is also, though less frequently, called the covenant of life, because of its design, and of the promise which was attached to it.

6. Who were the parties to this covenant, and how may it be proved that Adam therein represented all his natural descendants?

The "parties" were God and Adam, and in him representively all his natural posterity. That he did thus represent his descendants is evident. 1st. From the parallel which is drawn in Scripture between Adam in his relation to his descendants, and Christ in his relation to his elect, Rom. v., 12-19, and 1 Cor. xv., 22, 47.

2d. From the matter of fact that the very penalty denounced upon Adam, in case of his disobedience, has taken effect in each individual descendant.—Gen. ii., 17; iii., 17, 18.

3d. From the biblical declaration that sin, death, and all penal evil came into the world through Adam.—Rom. v., 12; 1 Cor. xv., 22. See below, Chapter XVI., questions 14-23, on Imputation of Adam's Sin.

7. What is the meaning of the term probation?

A probation is a trial. The word is sometimes used to express the time, and sometimes the state, and at others the act of trial. The probation of the human race took place once for all in the trial of Adam in the garden of Eden. That trial resulted in loss, and since then the conditions of the covenant being impossible, and its penalty having been incurred, any probation is of course impossible. "Men are by nature children of wrath."

Considering the advantages of Adam's character and circumstances in Paradise, our probation in him appears immeasurably more favorable than it would have been if each individual of us could have a separate probation in the dawn of moral agency in infancy.

8. How far does the covenant appear to rest upon natural and universal principles of justice, and how far upon the special and sovereign ordination of God?

It appears to be founded on a basis of natural and universal justice in respect to the following elements: 1st. The promise of divine favor, conditioned upon perfect obedience. 2d. The threatened penalty of death, conditioned upon disobedience. 3d. The appointment of a probationary period, during which man's loyalty was tested, upon which test his future character and destiny was made to depend.

It appears, on the other hand, to rest upon the special and sovereign, though most wise, righteous, and merciful ordination of God, in respect, 1st, to the representative element involved, whereby Adam stood for all his descendants; 2d, to the appointing of abstinence from the fruit of the tree of knowledge as the special test of obedience.

9. What was the condition of that covenant?

Perfect conformity of heart, and perfect obedience in act to the whole will of God as far as revealed. The command to abstain from eating the forbidden fruit was only made a special and decisive test of that general obedience. As the matter forbidden was morally indifferent in itself, the command was admirably adapted to be a clear and naked test of submission to God's absolute will as such.

10. Was there any virtue in the obedience required which could, of itself, have merited the promised reward?

It is infinitely absurd to conceive of the creature as ever meriting any thing from the Creator. Creation itself, and every opportunity for either obedience or enjoyment, is a free gift, and a ground of thanksgiving.—1 Cor. iv., 7.

The covenant of works, therefore, was a further gracious constitution, wherein additional benefits were promised to the creature on the condition of the performance of duties already due. The only right the creature would have acquired in case of obedience would have sprung from the free promise of God in the covenant itself.

11. What was the promise of the covenant?

The promise was not expressly stated, yet that it was life, or confirmation in a holy character, and in the blessedness of God's favor, is evidently implied in the very language, of the threatened penalty, as appears clearly from Matt. xix., 16, 17; Gal. iii., 12.

12. What was the nature of the death threatened in case of disobedience?

This word in this connection evidently includes all the penal consequences of sin. These are, 1st, death, natural, Eccle. xii., 7; 2d, death, moral and spiritual, Matt. viii., 22; Eph. ii., 1; 1 Tim. v., 6; Rev. iii., 1; 3d, death, eternal, Rev. xx., 6-14.

The instant the law was violated its penalty began to operate, although on account of the intervention of the dispensation of grace the full effect of the sentence is suspended during the present life. The Spirit of God was withdrawn the instant man fell, and he at once became spiritually dead, physically mortal, and under sentence of death eternal.

13. What is meant by the seal of a covenant, and what was the seal of the covenant of works?

A seal of a covenant is an outward visible sign, appointed by

God as a pledge of his faithfulness, and as an earnest of the bless-

ings promised in the covenant.

Thus the rainbow is the seal of the covenant made with Noah, Gen. ix., 12, 13. Circumcision was the original seal of the covenant made with Abraham, (Gen. xvii., 9–11; Rom. iv., 11,) in the place of which baptism is now instituted, Col. ii., 11, 12; Gal. iii., 26, 27. The tree of life was the seal of the covenant of works, because it was the outward sign and seal of that life which was promised in the covenant, and from which man was excluded on account of sin, and to which he is restored through the second Adam in the Paradise regained. Compare Gen. ii., 9; iii., 22, 24, with Rev. ii., 7; xxii., 2–14.

CHAPIER XVI.

THE NATURE OF SIN.—THE SIN OF ADAM, AND THE CONSE-QUENCES THEREOF TO HIS POSTERITY.

1. How is sin defined in our standards?

Confession of Faith, Chapter VI., Section 6, L. Cat., question 24, S. Cat., question 14.

Sin is any want of conformity, either of the moral state of the soul, or of the actions of a man to the law of God. Vitringa's definition is, "Forma peccati est disconvenientia, actus, habitus, aut status hominis cum divina lege," 1 John iii. 4.

2. What is the primary signification of the Hebrew and Greek words used to express the idea of sin in the original Scriptures?

The radical meaning of both the Hebrew and Greek words for sin is to miss, to fail, not to hit the mark, then to err from a rule or law (κτη, 'Αμαρτάνω, hence ἀμαρτία and ἀνομία, want of confor-

mity to the standard of the law).

Thus sin is not represented as a new, positive quality diffused in the soul, but as originating in a disordered action of the natural principles of the soul, leading thus to positive desires and affections contrary to the law of conscience, since that defect which consists in the absence of right desires leads immediately to the presence of sinful ones.

3. What are the three senses in which the term sin is used in Scripture?

1st. As the moral state of the sinner's heart, a power which controls, and a corruption which defiles him.—Ps. li., 2-5; Rom. vii., 8.

2d. As an act transgressing or failing to fulfill the law of

God.—James i., 15.

- 3d. As guilt or just liability to punishment.—Ps. xxxii., 1; 2 Cor. v., 21.; Heb. x., 2.
 - 4. What is meant when it is said that all sin is voluntary?

It is meant that all sin has its root in the perverted dispositions, desires, and affections which constitute the deprayed state of the will; this darkens the mind and controls the actions. If the will, as to moral states, is conformed to the law of God, then the man will be without sin. Disease, physical derangement in the essence of soul or body, can not be of the nature of sin.

Pelagians hold that sin consists solely in actions, and is voluntary in the sense that only volitions transgressing known law are sin.

- 5. How can it be proved that the depraved moral condition of the heart (or will) is as truly sin as the actions which flow from it?
- 1st. It is the universal judgment of men, (1), that the disposition which determines an act is that which gives the act its moral character; (2), that the heart of a man who habitually performs sinful actions is itself corrupt. This is what is understood by character, and it is this character, and not the mere act, which men regard as the principal object of moral approbation or disapprobation.

2d. This principle is distinctly asserted by our Saviour.—Luke vi., 43-45.

Luke vi., 45–45.

- 3d. That state of the heart which gives rise to sinful actions is expressly called sin.—Rom. vii., 7–17; John viii., 34.
- 6. What are the conditions necessary to constitute any act a sin?

Only a moral agent, or one endowed with intelligence, conscience, and free will can sin. Any act of such an agent, which is not conformed to the law of God, as far as that law has been revealed to that agent, is a sin.

Deliberate intention to sin is an aggravating element, the common quality of what the Scriptures call "presumptuous sins," (Ps. xix., 12, 13,) but it is not essential to constitute any act a sin. For it is evident that those spontaneous, undeliberate movements

of lust called "secret sins," which spring from the corruptions of the heart, are sinful also.

Clear knowledge of the sinfulness of an act is also an aggravating element in any sin, but not essential to constitute an act a sin, except in case of involuntary ignorance of some positive command of God. Because moral blindnesss, leading to ignorance of the essential principles of natural conscience, is itself a condition of aggravated depravity.

It is not necessary that the conscious motive to the act should be positively sinful, it may be only morally indifferent, because the absence of right affections and omissions of duty are sins.

Ability to fulfill the requirements of the law is not necessary to constitute the non-fulfilment sin.—See Chap. XVIII., question 25.

7. What appears from the history of the Fall to have been the precise nature of the first $\sin \phi A dam$?

It appears from the record (Gen. iii., 1-6) that the initial motives influencing our first parents, in their first transgression, were in themselves considered morally indifferent. These were, 1st, natural appetite for the attractive fruit. 2d. Natural desire for knowledge. 3d. The persuasive power of Satan upon Eve, including the known influence of a superior mind and will. 4th. The persuasive power of both Satan and Eve upon Adam. Their dreadful sin appears to have been essentially, 1st, unbelief, they virtually made God a liar. 2d. Deliberate disobedience, they set up their will as a law in place of his.

8. How far was God concerned in the occurrence of that sin?

The inexplicable mystery of the origin of moral evil is twofold.

1st. How could sin, the essence of which is want of conformity to God's will, find place in the creation and under the providential administration of an infinitely wise, holy, and powerful God! This we can not answer.

2d. How could the first sin originate in the will of a creature created with a holy disposition.—See next question.

This mystery, however, in both its parts concerns first and chiefly the apostacy of the Devil and his angels, which was the true origin of sin in the universe, and concerning the facts con-

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ditioning which we are not informed. The apostacy of Adam

evidently is dependent upon the other.

Concerning the relation sustained by God to the sin of Adam all we know is, 1st, God created Adam holy, with all natural powers necessary for accountable agency. 2d. He rightfully withheld from him, during his probation, any higher supernatural influence necessary to render him infallible. 3d. He neither caused nor approved Adam's sin. 4th. He sovereignly decreed to permit him to sin, thus determining that he should sin as he did.

9. How is it conceivable that sin_s should originate in the will of a creature created with a positively holy disposition?

The difficulty is to reconcile understandingly the fact that sin

did so originate,

1st. With the known constitution of the human will. If the volitions are as the prevalent affections and desires, and if the affections and desires excited by outward occasions are good or evil, according to the permanent moral state of the will, how could a sinful volition originate in a holy will?

2d. With universal experience. As it is impossible that a sinful desire or volition should originate in the holy will of God, or in the holy will of saints and angels, or that a truly holy affection or volition should originate in the depraved wills of fallen men without supernatural regeneration (Luke vi., 43–45), how could a sinful volition originate in the holy will of Adam?

That Adam was created with a holy yet fallible will, and that he did fall are facts established by divine testimony. We must believe them, although we can not rationally explain them. This is for us impossible, 1st, because there remains an inscrutable element in the human will, adopt whichever theory of it we may.

2d. Because all our reasoning must be based upon consciousness, and no other man ever had in his consciousness the experience of Adam. The origin of our sinful volitions is plain enough. But we lack some of the data necessary to explain his case.

In the way of approximation, however, we may observe, 1st, it is unsound to reason from the independent will of the infinite God to the dependent will of the creature.

2d. The infallibility of saints and angels is not inherent, but

is a superinduced confirming grace of God. They are not in a state of probation. Adam was—his will was free, but not con-

firmed.

3d. The depraved will of man can not originate holy affections and volitions, because the presence of a positively holy principle is necessary to constitute them holy. But, on the other hand, there were already in the holy will of Adam many principles morally indifferent, in themselves neither good nor bad, and becoming sinful only when, in default of the control of reason and conscience, they prompt to their indulgence in ways forbidden by God; e. g., admiration and appetite for the fruit, and desire for knowledge. The sin commenced the moment that, under the powerful persuasion of Satan, these two motives were dwelt upon in spite of the prohibition, and thus allowed to become so prevalent in the soul as temporarily to neutralize reverence for God's authority, and fear of his threatening.

4th. Adam, although endowed with a holy disposition, was

inexperienced in the assaults of temptation.

5th. He was assailed through the morally indifferent principles of his nature by a vastly superior intelligence and character, to whom, in the highest sense, the origin of all sin must be referred.

10. What was the effect of Adam's sin upon himself?

1st. In the natural relation which Adam sustained to God as the subject of his moral government, his sin must have instantly had the effect of (1.) displeasing and alienating God, and (2.) depraying his own soul.

2d. In the covenant relation which Adam sustained to God the penalty of the covenant of works was incurred, *i. e.*, death including, (1.) mortality of body, (2.) corruption of soul, (3.) sen-

tence of eternal death.

11. In what sense did he become totally depraved, and how could total depravity result from one sin?

By the affirmation that total depravity was the immediate result of Adam's first sin, it is not meant that he became as bad as he could be, or even as corrupt as the best of his unregenerate descendants; but it is meant—1st. His apostasy from God was

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complete. God demands perfect obediènce. Adam was now a rebel in arms.

2d. That the favor and communion of God, the sole condition of his spiritual life, was withdrawn.

3d. A schism was introduced into the soul itself. The painful reproaches of conscience were excited, and could never be allayed without an atonement. This led to fear of God, distrust, prevarication, and, by necessary consequence, to innumerable other sins.

' 4th. Thus the whole nature became depraved. The will being at war with the conscience, the understanding became darkened; the conscience, in consequence of constant outrage and neglect, became seared; the appetites of the body inordinate, and its members instruments of unrighteousness.

5th. There remained in man's nature no recuperative principle; he must go on from worse to worse, unless God interpose.

Thus the soul of man being essentially active, although one sin did not establish a confirmed habit, it did alienate God and work confusion in the soul, and thus lead to an endless course of sin.

12. What is the Pelagian doctrine as to the effect of Adam's sin upon his posterity?

Pelagians hold, 1st, with regard to sin, that it is an act of voluntary transgression of known law, and nothing else. 2d. With regard to free will, "that is of its essence that a man should have it in his power as much to cease from sinning as to deviate from the path of rectitude; therefore, a man's natural state is not changed (rendered corrupt) by sinning, but he only becomes guilty, i. e., liable to punishment."

They consequently deny, 1st, that Adam's sin could corrupt by natural generation the natures of his descendants. 2d. That the guilt (legal responsibility) of his sin is imputed to them. 3d. That death and the physical evils of this life, common to infants and adults, good and bad men alike, are penal. They hold these evils to be incident naturally to man's present life, and that infants being born as innocent and perfect, though as fallible, as Adam, fall into sin through the force of example.—Princeton Theo. Essays, pp. 102 and 103.

13. What is the Arminian view on this point?

The Arminian system denies, 1st, that the guilt of Adam's sin is judicially imputed to his descendants. 2d. That the corruption of nature, which they inherit from him by ordinary generation, and as natural heirs, is properly of the nature of sin, and deserving of the wrath of God, since it is involuntary. It maintains, however, that all men inherit from Adam a natural infirmity, characterized as a destitution of original righteousness, making it certain that every individual uniformly sins as soon as he commences voluntary agency.—Apol. Conf. Remonstr., p. 84; Limborch Theol. Christ. iii., 4, 4.

Death and the physical evils of this life are not properly the *penal*, but merely the *natural* consequences of Adam's sin.

14. What is the orthodox doctrine on this subject?

As Adam was the federal representative, as well as the natural head and root, of all his descendants, the guilt, i. e., legal responsibility of his public sin, which closed his probation and theirs, is righteously imputed to them, and its penal consequences, the wrath of God, divorcement from his Spirit, spiritual, natural, and eternal death, is inflicted upon them, in the line, and in part through the agency of natural generation.—Conf. Faith, chap. 6, sec. 3; L. Cat., Q. 25; S. Cat., Q. 18.

15. What is the usage of the Hebrew and Greek words translated "to impute" μτη, λογίζομαι?

The radical sense of these words in both languages is to think, to reason; then to judge or conclude; then to esteem or regard; then to impute or attribute, in which latter sense they occur in Ps. xxxii., 2; 2 Sam. xix., 19; Rom. iv., 6-24; 2 Cor. v., 19; Gal. iii., 6; James ii., 23.

The English word "impute" means, 1st, to ascribe to persons or things qualities which inhere in them; 2d, to ascribe to persons responsibilities or rights which attach to them according to some recognized rule of right.

16. In what sense was Adam's sin imputed to all his posterity?

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Sin is used in the sense of, 1st, the wrong moral condition or character of the will or heart; 2d, an act transgressing moral law; 3d, guilt, or legal responsibility for that which has transgressed law. In the first and second senses, sin can be imputed only to the sinful agent himself. In the third sense, of legal responsibility, the guilt of the sinful act of one man may be imputed to another, when that other is justly responsible for his conduct in the case. God never regards Adam's sinful disposition or character as ours, nor his act of eating the forbidden fruit as our act, as a matter of fact. But the legal responsibility of his act God does righteously impute to us, since Adam being our legal representative, we are legally responsible for his action in that character.

There is included, therefore, in the Scriptural doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin—1st. The recognition of our legal oneness with Adam, on the ground of that sovereign though right-eous element of the covenant of works which makes us legally responsible for his public action.

2d. The charging or imputation of the guilt of his public sin

upon us.

3d. The most righteous treatment of us according to the demerits of that sin.

17. What is the nature of the union of Adam and his posterity, which is the ground of the imputation of his sin to them?

This union with them is two-fold: 1st. Natural, as the root of the whole human family. 2d. Federal, as, by that divine constitution called the covenant of works, he represented and acted in behalf of all his descendants. It is the second, or federal union which is the legal ground of the imputation of his sin to them.

On the other hand, the ground in reason and right for the constitution of that federal union appears, 1st. In the sovereign right of God to order the probation of his creatures as he pleases, which right he evidently in this instance exercised most mercifully, in appointing the probation of the human family under the most favorable circumstances. 2d. Adam's natural relation to his children made him the proper person to represent them. 3d. The headship of the first Adam is part of that unsearchable plan which culminates in the headship of the second Adam.

18. What evidence on this subject may be derived from the history of the fall?

In the third chapter of Genesis Adam is presented as a public person, the human race, as a whole, being involved in the transaction. This appears—1st. Because Adam's name is generic as well as personal. It signifies (1.) red earth, (2.) man.

2d. All his posterity are equally involved in the judicial sentence which was immediately pronounced, e. g., the pain of childbearing, the curse of the ground, the sentence to live by painful labor, and physical death.

3d. All his posterity have equal interest with him in the promise of the woman's seed, which was then graciously made,

19. How may the truth of this doctrine be established from Rom. v., 12-21, and 1 Cor. xv., 21, 22?

In Rom. v., 12-21, the apostle is engaged in illustrating the method of justification through Christ by the parallel fact of the condemnation of men on account of the sin of Adam. The latter fact he proves thus: "The infliction of a penalty proves the transgression of a law, since sin is not imputed where there is no law (v. 13.) All mankind are subject to death or penal evils, therefore all men are regarded as transgressors of a law, v. 13. This is not the law of Moses, because multitudes died before that law was given, v. 14. Nor is it the law of nature written upon the heart, since multitudes (infants) die who never violated even that law, v. 14. Therefore, as neither of these laws embrace all the subjects of the penalty, we must conclude that men were subjoct to death on account of Adam; i. e., it was for the offense of one that many die (vs. 12, 15), and Adam is a type of Christ."-Hodge's Com. on Rom.

1 Cor. xv., 21, 22, asserts the same truth. All die in Adam, not only efficiently but meritoriously, because our relation to Adam, as legally one with him, is analogous to the relation of the elect to Christ.

20. What other scriptural proof of this doctrine may be adduced?

This doctrine is expressly asserted only in the passages above

cited. The principle involved, however, is affirmed in many places; e. g., second commandment, Ex. xx., 5. Case of Achan, Josh. vii.; of Saul's sons, 2 Sam., xxi.; and of Jeroboam, 1 Kings xiv., 9-16, etc., etc.

21. How may the imputation of Adam's sin he argued from the fact that we are born in sin?

The being born alienated from God, from which the corruption of our nature results, is itself not a sin, but a dreadful punishment. But punishment argues guilt, universal punishment universal guilt, and the punishment of all men can be referred to no other cause than to the universal guilt of all in Adam.

22. How is this doctrine of imputation involved in the doctrine of justification?

The doctrine of the substitution of Christ in the place of his elect, of the imputation of their sins to him, and of his righteousness to them, is the central doctrine of the gospel, involving all that is taught us concerning satisfaction to divine justice, justification, justifying faith, etc.—See Chap. XXII. and XXVII., where many clear and copious arguments from the Scriptures are presented to establish this principle of imputation, especially under the head of atonement, its nature.

But in Rom v., 12-19, and 1 Cor. xv., 21, 22, the relation of men to the guilt of Adam's sin is declared to be identical as to principle with that relation which the justified sustain to the righteousness of Christ. The two stand or fall together.

- 23. What difficulties flow from denying the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity?
- 1st. The perversion of the clear testimony of God's word, as above shown.
 - 2d. The perversion of the great doctrine of the atonement.
- 3d. If we had no probation in Adam, it would follow that every individual member of the human family has been introduced into an estate of sin and misery without any probation at all.
- 4th. All Christians hold that our present condition is in consequence of Adam's sin. But if the legal responsibility of Adam's

sin is not imputed, it would follow that all these consequences have been arbitrarily inflicted without any legal ground whatso-ever. Yet Paul calls these consequences a "condemnation."—Rom. v., 16, 18.

24. How can this doctrine be reconciled with the justice of God?

The unquestionable fact is that Adam's sin involved the race in ruin. Whatever difficulty exists in the matter lies there. The doctrine of imputation vindicates the justice of God by maintaining that all men had a probation under favorable conditions, and that their present suffering has been inflicted according to law.

25. Are men bound to repent of Adam's sin?

The imputation of Adam's sin to us did not make his sin our act, nor did it convey his moral character, nor the shame or pollution of his sin to us, but simply the legal responsibility of it. We can no more repent of Adam's sin, in any other sense than of being sorry for it, than we can feel self-complacent on account of the righteousness of Christ graciously imputed to us.

26. How can this doctrine be reconciled with such passages as Ezek. xviii., 20?

The prophet can not mean that no man ever shall bear the iniquity of another, because other texts teach the contrary, (see above, question 20.) His design is to direct the consciences of the people to their own sins, and he asserts merely the general purpose of God with regard to his treatment of the personal sins of individuals in the ordinary relations of life.

27. What is the doctrine of mediate imputation?

The doctrine we have above presented has been taught in the confessions of all the Reformed and Lutheran churches, by all the reformers and by all theologians of the Augustinian school in the Church of Rome. But Joshua Placœus, a professor of theology in the school at Saumur, in France, in order to defend himself from the adverse judgment of the Synod of France, A. D. 1645, invented the distinction between mediate or consequent and immediate or antecedent imputation. Immediate or antecedent

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imputation is the orthodox doctrine above aught, viz., that the legal responsibility of Adam's sin is imputed to his descendants immediately, and that their inheritance from him of their corrupt natures is in consequence of that imputation. Mediate or consequent imputation designates the theory of Placeus, who held that God charges the guilt of Adam's sin upon his posterity only in consequence of that inherent depravity which they inherit by natural generation, i. e., we are associated with Adam in his punishment, because we are like him, sinners.

This theory is evidently a virtual, though indirect denial of any imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity whatsoever. If the same penalty which was adjudged to him is adjudged to us only because we are personally depraved, it is plain that the legal responsibility of his sin is not imputed to us, but only our own inherent depravity. Besides this theory, moreover, makes the imputation of Adam's sin an effect of its own consequence. The truth is, we are abandoned by God, and so become inherently depraved as a part of the penalty of Adam's transgression, otherwise where were the justice of involving us in such a fate? And, worse than all, this theory of imputation leads by logical necessity to the perversion of the doctrine of justification. The analogy is affirmed by God. If Adam's sin is imputed, in consequence of our inherent depravity, we must attain an interest in Christ's righteousness in consequence of our sanctification.

28. What is the theory which assumes that the sin of Adam was literally and strictly the sin of the whole race, and what are the principal objections to it?

This is identical with the realistic theory, so prominent in scholastic theology and medieval philosophy, which assumes that universals as genera, species, etc., are objective realities. According to this view human nature is a substance, or essence, created and concentrated in the first instance in the person of Adam, and from him transmitted to all his descendants. The same numerical substance which now subsists in individual men, it is asserted, sinned in Adam. His sin, therefore, was as much and as truly ours as it was his. It is imputed to us because it is ours, as it was imputed to him because it was his.

The principal objections to this theory are, 1st, it is an un-

supported hypothesis. There can be no evidence of any such generic human nature, if all known phenomena can be otherwise accounted for. But all the facts as to the permanence of species and the propagation of peculiarities of nature can be explained as well without as with this hypothesis. And if not capable of proof by observation it can not be proved from Scripture, because it is not the design of the Bible to teach metaphysics. 2d. It is rationalistic to make a philosophical assumption of this kind the controling principle in interpreting the whole doctrine of the fall and redemption of man. 3d. The theory that community in a propagated nature constitutes the identity of all those to whom that nature is communicated, and involves them all in the relations, moral and legal, of their common progenitor, leads to manifold absurdities and contradictions. There is no reason why the application of this principle should be restricted to the single case of Adam. The Hebrews were in Abraham, so far as community of nature was concerned, as much as mankind were in Adam. The common consciousness of mankind testifies that we are not involved in the moral character and conduct of each one of our progenitors in consequence of our derivation of existence from them. The distinction between acts of nature and personal acts, by which this conclusion is sought to be avoided, means nothing. It besides contradicts the consciousness of men to saythat we should suffer remorse and self-condemnation for Adam's sin. Unless the understanding is confused the conscience can deliver no such verdict. 4th. The principle that God can not, on the ground of representation, or legal and federal union, regard and treat those not personally guilty as guilty, and those not personally righteous as righteous, which lies at the foundation of this whole theory, is contrary to the repeated and express declations of Scripture, and to the facts of providence. The Bible distinctly asserts that the sin of Adam, as something out of ourselves, is the ground of our condemnation, and that the righteousness of Christ, as something not subjectively ours, is the ground of our justification. But if the principle above stated be true, it would necessarily follow, (1.) if God can not regard and treat men otherwise than according to their personal character, or subiective state, then Christ did not bear our sins, nor are we treated as righteous on the ground of his righteousness, i. e., there can

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be no true atonement; or (2.) Christ, in virtue of his community of nature with us, was personally criminal, in the moral sense of the word, and for all the sins committed in that nature; and we, in virtue of our union with him, are personally and subjectively righteous. Our participation of Christ's righteousness is declared by Scripture to be analogous to our participation of Adam's sin. If, therefore, we sinned Adam's sin, we wrought Christ's righteousness. If we are condemned for Adam's sin, because that sin determined and constituted our moral character, then we are justified for Christ's righteousness, because it constituted our moral character. The believer, hence, has no ground of confidence beyond his own personal holiness.—Dr. Hodge, Bib. Rep., April, 1860.

CHAPTER XVII.

ORIGINAL SIN.

1. How is original sin to be defined?

See Confession of Faith, Chapter VI., L. Cat., questions 25,

26, S. Cat., question 18.

The phrase, original sin, is used sometimes to include the judicial imputation of the guilt of Adam's sin, as well as the hereditary moral corruption, common to all his descendants, which is one of the consequences of that imputation. More strictly, however, the phrase original sin designates only the hereditary moral corruption common to all men from birth.

In the definition of this doctrine WE DENY-

1st. That this corruption is in any sense physical, that it inheres in the essence of the soul, or in any of its natural faculties as such.

2d. That it consists primarily in the mere supremacy of the sensual part of our nature. It is a depraved habit or bias of will.

3d. That it consists solely in the absence of holy dispositions, because, from the inherent activity of the soul, sin exhibits itself from the beginning in the way of a positive proneness to evil.

On the other hand, WE AFFIRM-

1st. That original sin is purely moral, being the innate proneness of the will to evil.

2d. That having its seat in the will averse to the holy law of God, it biasses the understanding, and thus deceives the conscience, leads to erroneous moral judgments, to blindness of mind, to deficient and perverted sensibility in relation to moral objects, to the inordinate action of the sensuous nature, and thus to corruption of the entire soul.

3d. Thus it presents two aspects: (1.) The loss of the original

righteous habit cf will. (2) The presence of a positively un-

righteous habit.

4th. Yet from the fact that this innate depravity does embrace a positive disposition to evil, it does not follow that a positive evil quality has been infused into the soul. Because, from the essentially active nature of the soul, and from the esential nature of virtue, as that which obliges the will, it evidently follows that moral indifference is impossible; and so that depravity, which President Edwards says "comes from a defective or privitive cause," instantly assumes a positive form. Not to love God is to rebell against him, not to obey virtue is to trample it under foot. Self-love soon brings us to fear, then to hate the vindicator of righteousness.—Edwards on "Original Sin," Part IV., sec. 2.

2. Why is this sin called original?

Not because it belongs to the original constitution of our nature as it came forth from the hand of God, but because, 1st, it is derived by ordinary generation from Adam, the original root of the human race; and, 2d, it is the inward root or origin of all the actual sins that defile our lives.

3. How may it be proved that the doctrine of original sin does not involve the corruption of the substance of the soul?

It is the universal judgment of men that there are in the soul, besides its essence and its natural faculties, certain habits, innate or acquired, which qualify the action of those faculties, and constitute the character of the man. Those habits, or inherent dispositions which determine the affections and desires of the will, govern a man's actions, and, when good, are the subjects of moral approbation, and, when evil, the subjects of moral disapprobation on the part of all men. An innate moral habit of soul, e. g., original sin, is no more a physical corruption than any acquired habit, intellectual or moral, is a physical change.

Besides this, the Scriptures distinguish between the sin and the agent in a way which proves that the sinful habit is not something consubstantial with the sinner, Rom. vii., 17; "sin that

dwelleth in me," Heb. xii., 1, etc.

4. How can it be shown that original sin does not consist in

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disease, or merely in the supremacy of the sensuous part of our nature?

While it is true that many sins have their occasions in the inordinate appetites of the body, yet it is evident the original or root of sin can not be in them—

1st. From the very nature of sin it must have its seat in the moral state of the voluntary principle. Disease, or any form of physical disorder, is not voluntary, and therefore not an element of moral responsibility. It is, moreover, the obligation of the will to regulate the lower sensuous nature, and sin must originate in the failure of those moral affections which would have been supreme if they still continued to reign in the will.

2d. From the fact that the most heinous sins are destitute of any sensuous element, e. g., pride, anger, malice, and AVER-

SION FROM GOD.

5. How can it be proved that this innate disposition or habit of soul, which leads to sinful action, is itself sin?

1st. This innate habit of soul is a state of the will, and it is an ultimate principle that all the states as well as acts of the will related to the law of conscience are moral, i. e., either virtuous or vicious.—See above, Chapter XIV., questions 9 and 10.

2d. These permanent habits or states of the will constitute the moral character of the agent, which all men regard as the

proper subject of praise or blame.

- 3d. This inherent disposition to sinful action is called "sin" in Scripture, Rom. vi., 12, 14, 17; vii., 5-17. It is called "flesh" as opposed to "spiritual," Gal. v., 17, 24; also "lust," James i, 14, 15; and "old Adam" and "body of sin," Rom vi., 6; also "ignorance," "blindness of heart," "alienation from the life of God," and a condition of "being past feeling," Eph. iv., 18, 19.
- 6. How can it be shown that original sin does not consist simply in the want of original righteousness?
- 1st. It follows from the inherent activity of the human soul, and from the inherently obliging power of moral right that the absence of right dispositions immediately leads to the formation of positively sinful dispositions. Not to love God is to hate him,

not to obey him is to disobey. Disobedience leads to fear, to falsehood, and to every form of sin.—See above, question 1.

2d. As a matter of fact, innate depravity exhibits its positive character by giving birth to sins, involving positive viciousnes sin the earliest stages of accountable agency as pride, malice, etc.

3d. The Scriptures assign it a positive character, when they apply to it such terms as "flesh," "concupiscence," "old man," "law in the members," "body of sin," "body of death," "sin taking occasion," "deceived me," and "wrought all manner of concupiscence."—Rom. vii.

7. How may it be shown that it affects the entire man?

Original sin has its seat in the will, and primarily consists in that proneness to unlawful dispositions and affections which is the innate habit of the human soul. But the several faculties of the human soul are not separate agents. The one soul acts in each function as an indivisible agent, its several faculties or powers after their kind mutually qualifying one another. When the soul is engaged in understanding an object, or an aspect of any object, e. g., mathematics, with which its affections are not concerned, then its action has no moral element. But when it is engaged in understanding an object with respect to which its depraved affections are perversely interested, its action must be biased. The consequence, therefore, of the sinful bias of the will in its controling influence over the exercises of the soul, in all its functions, will be—

1st. The understanding, biased by the perverted affections, acting concurrently with the moral sense in forming moral judgments, will lead to erroneous judgments, to a deceiving conscience, and to general "blindness of mind" as to moral subjects.

2d. The emotions and sensibilities which accompany the judgments of conscience in approving the good and in condemning the wrong, by repeated outrage and neglect, will be rendered less lively, and thus lead to a seared conscience, and general moral insensibility.

3d. In a continued course of sinful action the memory will become defiled with its stores of corrupt experiences, from which the imagination also must draw its materials.

4th. The body in its turn will be corrupted. (1.) Its natural

appetites will become inordinate in the absence of proper control, (2.) Its active powers will be used as "instruments of unrighteousness unto sin."

5th. The Scriptures teach (1.) that the understanding of the "natural man" is deprayed as well as his affections, 1 Cor. ii., 14; 2 Cor. iv., 4; Eph. iv., 18; Col. i., 21. (2.) That regeneration involves illumination as well as renewal of the heart, Acts xxvi., 18; Eph. i., 18; v., 8; 1 Pet ii, 9. (3.) That truth addressed to the understanding is the great instrument of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification, John xvii., 17; James i., 18.

8. What is meant by the affirmation that man by nature is totally depraved?

By this orthodox phrase it is not to be understood, 1st, that the depraved man has not a conscience. The virtuousness of an agent does not consist in his having a conscience, but in the conformity of the dispositions and affections of his will to the law of which conscience is the organ. Even the devils and lost souls retain their sense of right and wrong, and those vindicatory emotions with which conscience is armed.

Or, 2d, that unregenerate men, possessing a natural conscience, do not often admire virtuous character and actions in others.

Or, 3d, that they are incapable of disinterested affections and actions in their various relations with their fellow-men.

Or, 4th, that any man is as thoroughly depraved as it is possible for him to become, or that each man has a disposition inclined to every form of sin.

But IT IS MEANT, 1st. That virtue consisting in the conformity of the dispositions of the will with the law of God, and the very soul of virtue consisting in the allegiance of the soul to God, every man by nature is totally alienated in his governing disposition from God, and consequently his every act, whether morally indifferent, or conformed to subordinate principles of right, is vitiated by the condition of the agent as a rebel.

2d. That this state of will leads to a schism in the soul, and to the moral perversion of all the faculties of soul and body (see preceding question.)

3d. The tendency of this condition is to further corruption in

endless progression in every department of our nature, and this deterioration would, in every case, be incalculably more rapid than it is, if it were not for the supernatural restraints of the Holy Ghost.

4th. There remains no recuperative element in the soul. Man can only and for ever become worse without a miraculous recreation.

9. What proof of the doctrine of original sin may be derived from the history of the Fall?

God created man in his own image, and pronounced him as a moral agent to be very good. He threatened him with death in the very day that he should eat the forbidden fruit, and only in the sense of spiritual death was that threat literally fulfilled. The spiritual life of man depends upon communion with God; but God drove him at once forth in anger from his presence. Consequently the present spiritual state of man is declared to be "death," the very penalty threatened.—Eph. ii., 1; 1 John iii., 14.

10. What is the account which the Scriptures give of human nature, and how can the existence of an innate hereditary depravity be thence inferred?

The Scriptures represent all men as totally alienated from God, and morally depraved in their understandings, hearts, wills, consciences, bodies and actions.—Rom. iii., 10–23; viii., 7; Job xiv., 4; xv., 14; Gen. vi., 5; viii, 21; Matt. xv., 19; Jer. xvii., 9; Is. i., 5, 6.. This depravity of man is declared to be, 1st, of the act, 2d, of the heart, 3d, from birth and by nature, 4th, of all men without exception.—Ps. li., 5; John iii., 6; Eph. ii., 3; Ps. lviii., 3.

- 11. State the evidence for the truth of this doctrine afforded by Rom. v., 12-21.

Paul here proves that the guilt, legal obligation to suffer the penalty, of Adam's sin is imputed to us, by the unquestionable fact that the penalty of the law which Adam broke has been inflicted upon all. But that penalty was all penal evil, death physical, spiritual, eternal. Original sin, therefore, together with

natural death, is in this passage assumed as an undeniable fact, upon which the apostle constructs his argument for the imputation of Adam's sin.

12. How is the truth of this doctrine established by the fact of the general prevalence of sin?

All men, under all circumstances, in every age of the world, and under whatever educational influences they may be brought up, begin to sin uniformly as soon as they enter upon moral agency. A universal effect must have a universal cause. Just as we judge that man is by nature an intelligence, because the actions of all men involve an element of intelligence, so we as certainly judge that man is by nature depraved, because all men act sinfully.

13. If Adam sinned, though free from any corruption of nature, how does the fact that his posterity sin prove that their nature is corrupt?

The fact that Adam sinned proves that a moral agent may be at once sinless and fallible, and that such a being, left to himself, may sin, but with respect to his posterity the question is, what is the universal and uniform cause that every individual always certainly begins to sin as soon as he begins to act as a moral agent? The question in the one case is, How could such an one sin? but in the other, Why do all certainly sin from the beginning?

14. By what other objections do Pelagians and others attempt to avoid the force of the argument from the universality of sin?

1st. Those who maintain that the liberty of indifference is essential to responsible agency, and that volitions are not determined by the precedent moral state of the mind, attribute all sinful actions to the fact that the will of man is unconditioned, and insist that his acting as he acts is an ultimate fact.

In answer, we acknowledge that a man always wills as he pleases, but the question is, Why does he always certainly please to will wrong? An indifferent cause can not account for a uniform fact. The doctrine of original sin merely assigns the de-

praved character of the will itself as the uniform cause of the uniform fact.

2d. Others attempt to explain the facts by the universal influence of sinful example.

We answer: (1.) Children uniformly manifest depraved dispositions at too early a period to admit of that sin being rationally attributed to the influence of example. (2.) Children manifest depraved dispositions who have been brought up from birth in contact with such influences only as would incline them to holiness.

3d. Others, again, attempt to explain the facts by referring to the natural order in the development of our faculties, e. g., first the animal, then the intellectual, then the moral: thus the lower, by anticipating, subverts the higher.

For answer, see above, question 4. Besides, while this is an imperfect explanation, it is yet a virtual admission of the fact of innate hereditary depravity. Such an order of development, leading to such uniform consequences, is itself a total corruption of nature.

15. What argument for the doctrine of original sin may be derived from the universality of death?

The penalty of the law was death, including death spiritual, physical, and moral. Physical death is universal; eternal death, temporarily suspended for Christ's sake, is denounced upon all the impenitent. As one part of the penalty has taken effect, even upon infants, who have never been guilty of actual transgression, we must believe the other part to have taken effect likewise. Brutes, who also suffer and die, are not moral agents, nor were they ever embraced in a covenant of life, and therefore their case, although it has its own peculiar difficulties, is not analogous to that of man. Geology affirms that brutes suffered and died in successive generations before the creation and apostacy of man. This is at present one of the unsolved questions of God's providence.—See Hugh Miller's Testimonies of the Rocks.

16. How may it be proved by what the Scriptures say concerning regeneration?

The Scriptures declare—

1st. That regeneration is a radical change of the moral character, wrought by the Holy Ghost in the exercise of supernatural power. It is called "a new creation;" the regenerated are called "God's workmanship, created unto good works," etc.—Ezek. xxxvi., 26; Eph. i., 19; ii., 5, 10; iv., 24; 1 Pet. i., 23; James i., 18.

2d. Regeneration is declared to be necessary, absolutely and

universally.—John iii., 3; 2 Cor. v., 17.

17. How may it be proved from what the Scriptures say of redemption?

The Scriptures assert of redemption—

1st. As to its nature, that the design and effect of Christ's sacrifice is to deliver, by means of an atonement, all his people from the *power* as well as from the *guilt* of sin.—Eph. v., 25–27; Titus ii., 14; Heb. ix., 12–14; xiii., 12.

2d. As to its necessity, that it was absolutely necessary for all—for infants who never have committed actual sin, as well as

for adults.—Matt. xix., 14; Rev. i., 5; v., 9.

Some have essayed to answer, that Christ only redeemed infants from the "liability to sin." But redemption being an atonement by blood, the "just for the unjust," if infants be not sinners they can not be redeemed. A sinless liability to sin is only a misfortune, and can admit of no redemption.—See Dr. Taylor's "Concio ad Clerum," (New Haven, 1828,) pp. 24, 25; also Harvey's Review of the same, (Hartford, 1829,) p. 19.

18. State the evidence afforded by infant baptism.

Baptism, as circumcision, is an outward rite, signifying the inward grace of spiritual regeneration and purification.—Mark i., 4; John iii., 5; Titus iii., 5; Deut. x., 16; Rom. ii., 28, 29. Both of these rites were designed to be applied to infants. The application of the sign would be both senseless and profane if infants did not need, and were not capable of the thing signified.

19. What is the objection that many present to this doctrine, drawn from their view of the nature of sin?

The Pelagians hold that sin consists alone in acts of the will

transgressing known law, and that it is essential to free agency that a man is always as free to cease from sinning as to continue to sin, and consequently that there is no such thing as inherent moral depravity, innate or acquired.

Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor, of New Haven, the prince of American new school theology, taught that sin consists solely in acts of the will. That "original sin is man's own act, consisting in a free choice of some object rather than God as his chief good." He includes in this definition the permanent, governing preference of the will, which determines special and transient acts of choice; which preference is formed by each human being as soon as he becomes a moral agent, and is uniformly a preference of some lesser good in place of God. He maintains also that the nature of man, in the condition in which it comes into being, in consequence of Adam's fall, is the occasion, not the cause, of all men invariably making a wrong moral preference, and consequently original sin is by nature in the sense that the will enacts it freely though uniformly as occasioned by nature, vet that the nature itself, or its inherent tendency to occasion sin, is not itself sin, or ill-deserving.—See "Concio ad Clerum," New Haven, 1828. and Harvey's Review thereof.

20. How may their objections be answered?

The Pelagian doctrine is disproved by the true theory of moral agency, (see below, Chapter XVIII.,); by the universal judgment of men that there is such a thing as moral character, properly the object of praise or blame, which determines the action, and from which any action derives all the moral quality it possesses; by all the Scriptures teach of depravity of heart as well as act, from birth and by nature; and by all that they teach also with respect to man's inability to change himself, and of the nature and necessity of the new birth.—See Chapter XVIII., questions 21–25.

The semi-Pelagian theory of Dr. Taylor may be disproved by the facts, 1st. That infants die, are baptized, and must be redeemed before the commencement of moral agency.—See above, questions 16–19. 2d. The Scriptures declare this corruption to be hereditary and innate.—Ps. li., 5; lviii., 3; John iii., 6; Eph. ii., 3. 3d. The Scriptures call this inherent principle or state of the heart sin.—Rom. vi., 12, 17; vii., 5, 17; Eph. iv., 17, 18;

John viii., 34. If men are "servants of sin," it follows that this principle, although in the will, lies back of and is superior to the mere volitional faculty.

21. If God is the author of our nature, and our nature is sinful, how can we avoid the conclusion that God is the author of sin?

That conclusion would be unavoidable if, 1st, sin was an essential element of our nature, or if, 2d, it inhered in that nature originally, as it came from God.

But we know, Ist, that sin originated in the free act of man, created holy, yet fallible; 2d, that entire corruption of nature sprang from that sin; and, 3d, that in consequence of sin God has justly withdrawn the conservative influences of his Holy Spirit, and left men to the natural and penal consequences of their sin.—See Calvin's Instit., Lib. II., Chap. I., sec. 6 and 11.

22. How can this doctrine be reconciled with the liberty of man and his responsibility for his acts?

Ist. Consciousness affirms that a man is always responsible for his free actions, and that his act is always free when he wills as, upon the whole, he prefers to will. 2d. Original sin consists in corrupt dispositions, and, therefore, in every sin a man acts freely, because he acts precisely as he is disposed to act. 3d. Consciousness affirms that inability is not inconsistent with responsibility. The inherent habit or disposition of the will determines his action, but no man, by a mere choice or volition, can change his disposition.—See Chap. XVIII., questions 4 and 25.

23. How is this corruption of nature propagated?

Several theories have been held upon this subject. 1st. The Manichæan doctrine was, that matter, eternal and self-existent, is inherently corrupt and corrupting; all souls, therefore, being severally created pure, become vitiated from connection with their bodies.—Mosheim, Book I., Part II., Chap. V.

2d. Some have supposed that all human souls were created cotemporaneously with Adam, having since remained in a state of unconsciousness to the moment of their individual births, and

that, by some law of connection, they became depraved together with him.

3d. The doctrine designated "ex traduce" supposes that, by some law of spiritual generation, the soul of the child is propagated by, and derives its qualities from the souls of its parents. This view is now universally abandoned. Yet it is evident that the soul of the child is created after the analogy of the souls of its parents, i. e., the child is like the parent, mentally and morally, as well as physically. And surely the soul of the child determines the individual idiosyncrasies of the body in the womb, not the body of the soul; as appears evident from the universally recognized truth of physiognomy, etc., etc.

4th. The sufficient answer is that the moral health of the soul depends upon its communion with God. But, because of God's displeasure with the race, he creates every infant soul in a state judicially excluded from that fellowship, and hence the tendency to sin.—Conf. Faith, Chap. VI., sec. 3; Gen. v., 3; Ps. lvii., 5;

Job xiv., 4; xv., 14; John iii., 6.

24. In what sense may sin be the punishment of sin?

1st. In the way of natural consequence (1.) in the interior working of the soul itself, in the derangement of its powers; (2.) in the entangled relations of the sinner with God and his fellowmen.

2d. In the way of judicial abandonment. Because of sin God withdraws his Holy Spirit, and further sin is the consequence.—Rom. i., 24–28.

25. What distinction do the Romanists make between mortal and venial sins?

By mortal sins they mean those that turn away the soul from God, and forfeit baptismal grace. By venial sins they mean those which only impede the course of the soul to God.

The objections are, 1st. This distinction is never made in the Scriptures. 2d. Except for the sacrifice of Christ, every sin is mortal.—James ii., 10; Gal. iii., 10.

26. What do the Scriptures teach concerning the sin against the Holy Ghost?

See Matt. xii., 31, 32; Mark iii., 29, 30; Heb. vi., 4-6; x., 26, 27; 1 John, v., 16.

These passages appear to teach that this sin consists in the malicious rejection of the blood of Christ, and of the testimony of the Holy Ghost against evidence and conviction. It is called the sin against the Holy Ghost because he is immediately present in the heart of the sinner, and his testimony and influence is directly rejected and contemptuously resisted. It is unpardonable, not because its guilt transcends the merit of Christ, or the state of the sinner transcends the renewing power of the Holy Ghost, but because it consists in the final rejection of these, and because at this limit God has sovereignly staid his grace.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL AND OF HUMAN INABILITY.

1. Is free-agency an inalienable attribute of the human soul, or has it been lost by sin?

Like conscience, free agency is an essential and indestructible element of human nature, and in every case necessary to moral accountability. Even devils and lost souls are as free, *i.e.*, voluntary in their sin, as saints in their holiness.—See below, question 4. For a definition of the essential elements of free agency, see above, Chap. XIV., question 6.

2. What are the different senses in which the word will is used?

For a full answer see above, Chap. XIV., question 3.

3. When is a man said to be free in willing?

When he wills in conformity with his prevailing dispositions or desires at the time, all things considered, in the view his understanding takes of the case.

A man, therefore, always is free in willing, and can never will otherwise than as free, because the volition, or executive action of the will is always determined by the man's subjective state of desire or aversion, and therefore is always free.

4. Do not the Scriptures, however, speak of man's being under the bondage of corruption, and his liberty as lost?

As above shown, a man is always free in every responsible volition, as much when he chooses, in violation of the law of God and conscience, as in conformity to it. In the case of unfallen creatures, and of regenerated men, however, the permanent state of the will, the voluntary affections and desires (in Scripture lan-

guage, the heart), are conformed to the light of reason and the law of conscience within, and to the law of God, in its objective revelation. There are no conflicting principles then within the soul, and the law of God, instead of coercing the will by its commands and threatenings, is spontaneously obeyed. This is "the liberty of the sons of God;" and the law becomes the "royal law of liberty" when the law in the heart of the subject perfectly corresponds with the law of the moral Governor.

In the case of fallen men and angels, on the other hand, the reason and conscience, and God's law, are opposed by the governing dispositions of the will, and the agent, although free, because he wills as he chooses, is said to be in bondage to an evil nature, and "the servant of sin," because he is impelled by his corrupt dispositions to choose that which he sees and feels to be wrong and injurious, and because the threatenings of God's law tend to coerce his will through fear.—See below, questions 13 and 17.

- 5. What are the two senses in which the word motive, as influencing the will, is used?
- Ist. A motive to act may be something outside the soul itself, as the value of money, the wishes of a friend, the wisdom or folly, the right or the wrong of any act in itself considered, or the appetites and impulses of the body. In this sense it is evident that the man does not always act according to the motive. What may attract one man may repel another, or a man may repel the attraction of an outward motive by the superior force of some consideration drawn from within the soul itself. So that the dictum is true, "The man makes the motive, and not the motive the man."
- 2d. A motive to act may be the state of the man's own mind, as desire or aversion in view of the outward object, or motive in the first sense. This internal motive evidently must sway the volition, and as clearly it can not in the least interfere with the perfect freedom of the man in willing, since the internal motive is only the man himself desiring, or the reverse, according to his own disposition or character.
- 6. May there not be several conflicting desires, or internal motives, in the mind at the same time, and in such a case how is the will decided?

There are often several conflicting 'desires, or impelling affections in the mind at the same time, in which case the strongest desire, or the strongest group of desires, drawing in one way, determine the volition. That which is strongest proves itself to be such only by the result, and not by the intensity of the feeling it excites. Some of these internal motives are very vivid, like a thirst for vengeance, and others calm, as a sense of duty, yet often the calm motive proves itself the strongest, and draws the will its own way. This of course must depend upon the character of the agent. It is this inward contest of opposite principles which constitutes the warfare of the Christian life. It is the same experience which occasions a great part of that confusion of consciousness which prevails among men with respect to the problem of the will, and the conditions of free agency. Man often acts against motives, but never without motive. And the motive which actually determines the choice in a given case may often be the least clearly defined in the intellect, and the least vividly experienced in the feelings. Especially in sudden surprizes, and in cases of trivial concernment, the volition is constantly determined by vague impulses, or by force of habit almost automatically. Yet in every case, if the whole contents of the mind, at the time of the volition, be brought up into distinct consciousness, it will be found that the man chose, as upon the whole view of the case presented by the understanding at the instant he desired to choose.

7. What is the distinction between a transient affection or desire, and a permanent principle or disposition of the will? (Will here understood in the wide sense of the term, as including the phenomena of desire as well as of volition.)

See above, Chap. XIV., question 4.

8. If the immediately preceding state of the man's mind certainly determines the act of his will, how can that act be truly free if certainly determined?

This objection rests solely upon the confusion of the two distinct ideas of liberty of the will as an abstract faculty, and liberty of the man who wills. The man is never determined to will by any thing without himself. He always himself freely gives,

according to his own character, all the weight to the external influences which bear upon him that they ever possess. But, on the other hand, the mere act of volition, abstractly considered, is determined by the present mental, moral, and emotional state of the man at the moment he acts. His rational freedom, indeed, consists, not in the uncertainty of his act, but in the very fact that his whole soul, as an indivisible, knowing, feeling, moral agent, determines his own action as it pleases.

9. Prove that the certainty of a volition is in no degree inconsistent with the liberty of the agent in that act.

1st. God, Christ, and saints in glory, are all eminently free in their holy choices and actions, yet nothing can be more certain than that, to all eternity, they shall always will according to righteousness.

2d. Man is a free agent, yet of every infant, from his birth, it is absolutely certain that if he lives he will sin.

3d. God, from eternity, foreknows all the free actions of men as certain, and he has foreordained them, or made them to be certain. In prophecy he has infallibly foretold many of them as certain. And in regeneration his people are made "his workmanship created unto good works, which God has before ordained that we should walk in them."

4th. Even we, if we thoroughly understand a friend's character, and all the present circumstances under which he acts, are often absolutely certain how he will freely act, though absent from us. This is the foundation of all human faith, and hence of all human society.

10. What is that theory of moral liberty, styled "liberty of indifference," "self-determining power of the will," "power of contrary choice," "liberty of contingency," etc., held by Arminians and others?

This theory maintains that it is essentially involved in the idea of free agency, 1st, that the will of man in every volition may decide in opposition, not only to all outward inducements, but equally to all the inward judgments, desires, and to the whole coexistent inward state of the man himself. 2d. That man is conscious in every free volition that he might have willed pre-

cisely the opposite, his outward circumstances and his entire inward state remaining the same. 3d. That every free volition is contingent, *i. e.*, uncertain, until the event, since it is determined by nothing but the bare faculty of volition on the part of the agent.—Hamilton's Reid, pp. 599—624.

The true theory of moral certainty, on the other hand, is that the soul is a unit; that the will is not self-determined, but that man, when he wills, is self-determined; and that his volition is certainly determined by his own internal, rational, moral, emotional state at the time, viewed as a whole.

In opposition to the former theory, and in favor of the latter, we argue—1st. That the character of the agent does certainly determine the character of his free acts, and that the certainty of an act is not inconsistent with the liberty of the agent in his act.—See below, question 12.

2d. The Christian doctrines of the divine foreknowledge, foreordination, providence, and regeneration. For the Scriptural evidence of these, see their respective chapters. They all show that the volitions of men are neither uncertain or indeterminate.

3d. We agree with the advocates of the opposite theory in maintaining that in every free act we are conscious that we had power to perform it, or not to perform it, as we chose. "But we maintain that we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not to perform an act is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise, had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been allowed their due weight. A man can not prefer against his preference, or choose against his choice. A man may have one preference at one time, and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time, but he can not have coexisting opposite preferences."

4th. The theory of the "self-determining power of the will" regards the will, or the mere faculty of volition, as isolated from the other faculties of the soul, as an independent agent within an agent. Now, the soul is a unit. Consciousness and Scripture alike teach us that man is the free, responsible agent. By this dissociation of the volitional faculty from the moral dispositions and desires the volitions can have no moral character. By its dissociation from the reason the volitions can have no rational

character. Since they are not determined by the inward state of the man himself, they must be fortuitous, and beyond his control. He can not be free if his will is independent alike of his head and his heart, and he ought not to be held responsible.—See Bib. Rep., January, 1857, Art. V.

11. What are the essential conditions of moral responsibility?

See above, Chapter XIV., question 7.

12. Why is a man responsible for his outward actions; why for his volitions; why for his affections and desires; and prove that he is responsible for his affections?

"A man is responsible for his outward acts, because they are determined by the will; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his own principles and feelings (desires); he is responsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own and constitute his character."—Bib. Rep., January, 1857, p. 130.

It is the teaching of Scripture and the universal judgment of men, that "a good man out of the good treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," and that a "wicked man out of the evil treasures of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil." The act derives its moral character from the state of the heart from which it springs, and a man is responsible for the moral state of his heart, whether that state be innate, formed by regenerating grace or acquired by himself, because, 1st, of the obliging nature of moral right, and the ill desert of sin; 2d, because a man's affections and desires are himself loving or refusing that which is right. It is the judgment of all, that a profane or malignant man is to be reprobated, no matter how he became so.

13. What is the distinction between liberty and ability?

Liberty consists in the power of the agent to will as he pleases, in the fact that the volition is determined only by the character of the agent willing. Ability consists in the power of the agent to change his own subjective state, to make himself prefer

what he does not prefer, and to act in a given case in opposition to the coexistent desires and preferences of the agent's own heart.

Thus man is as truly free since the fall as before it, because he wills as his evil heart pleases. But he has lost all ability to obey the law of God, because his evil heart is not subject to that law, neither can he change it.

14. But may not an unregenerate man truly desire to obey the law of God; and, if so, why does not that desire control his will?

An unregenerate man often does heartily desire to avoid the penalty of God's law, and consequently, through fear of the consequences of his sin, may be said to desire to eradicate the prevalent principle of sin from his heart. He may even, as a matter of taste and judgment, desire to obey the law of God in certain particulars wherein that law does not directly oppose his dominant dispositions. But no unregenerate man can love holiness for its own sake, and earnestly desire to fulfill the whole law of God in the spirit as well as the letter; for if he did so, the law in his case would be fulfilled.

15. What are the Pelagian and the Arminian theories as to the ability of the sinner to obey the commands of God?

The Pelagian doctrine is that it is the essence of liberty that the sinner is as free to cease from sin as to continue it. That man consequently is as able now to obey God's law perfectly as Adam was before he fell, and hence that regeneration is the sinner's act of simply ceasing to do evil, and commencing to do well.

The Arminian view is that man, by nature and of himself, is utterly unable to change his own depraved heart, or to obey the law of God, or savingly to receive the gospel, yet that God, for Christ's sake, gives to every man sufficient grace, if improved, to enable him to do all that he is responsible for doing. Without grace no man has ability to obey, with grace every man has ability either to obey or disobey.—Apol. Conf. Remonstr., p. 162., b.

16. What distinction is intended by the theological terms natural and moral ability?

By natural ability was intended the possession, on the part of every responsible moral agent, whether holy or unholy, of all the natural faculties, as reason, conscience, free will, requisite to enable him to obey God's law. If any of these were absent, the agent would not be responsible.—Edwards on the Will, Part I., sec. 4.

By moral ability was intended that inherent moral condition of these faculties, that righteous disposition of heart requisite to

the performance of duty.

Although these terms have been often used by orthodox writers in a sense which to them expressed the truth, yet they have often been abused, and are not desirable. It is evidently an abuse of the word to say that sinners are naturally able, but morally unable to obey the law; for that can be no ability which leaves the sinner, as the Scriptures declare, utterly unable either to think, feel or act aright. Besides the word natural, in the phrase "natural ability," is used in an unusual sense, as opposite to moral, while in the usual sense of that word it is declared in Scripture that man is by nature, i. e., naturally, a child of wrath.

17. State the common doctrine of the church as to the inability of the sinner to obey the law of God, or to accept the gospel, and state how far it is natural and how far moral?

All men possess those faculties of their nature essential to constitute them rational, and moral, and free agents, and therefore all that is necessary to render them responsible for their obedience to God's law. But the moral state of these faculties is such, because of the perverted dispositions of their hearts, that they are utterly unable either to will or to do what the law requires. This inability is "natural" since it is innate and constitutional. It is "moral" since it does not consist either in disease, or in any physical defect in the soul, nor merely in the inordinate action of the bodily affections, but in the corrupt character of the governing dispositions of the heart. This inability is total, and, as far as human strength goes, irremediable.—Confession of Faith, Chap. IX., sec. 3. Article X. of Church of England, and Article XVIII. of Augsburg Conf.

18. Prove the fact of this inability from Scripture.

Jer. xiii., 23; John vi. 44, 65; xv., 5; Rom. ix., 16; 1 Cor. ii., 14

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19. How may the fact of this inability be proved from our consciousness and experience?

Consciousness teaches us that while the dispositions and desires determine the volitions, no volition can change the character of the governing dispositions and desires of our hearts themselves. Our experience teaches us that while many men have, for outside considerations of self-interest, desired to serve God, and therefore have endeavored to change their inherent evil dispositions, they have always entirely failed in such effort. A specific evil habit may be abandoned, but the disposition to sin remains, and always breaks forth with renewed violence under some other form.

20. How may it be proved from what the Scriptures say concerning human depravity, and the necessity of a divine influence in order to salvation?

The Scriptures declare that by nature all men, without exception, are dead in sin. That the affections are depraved. That the wicked man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil. Christ died for us while we were without strength. Sinners are the servants of sin. Men are said to be subject to Satan, led about by him at his will.

The change accomplished in regeneration is said to be, not a mere change of purpose, but a "new birth," a "new creation," a "begetting anew," a "giving a new heart," the result is the "workmanship of God." Christ gives repentance to Israel. All Christian graces are the fruits of the Spirit. The work in us is accomplished by the "exceeding greatness of the mighty power of God."—Eph. i., 18-20; John iii., 3-8; Rom. viii., 2; Gal. v., 17.

21. How can the fact of man's inability be reconciled with his responsibility?

It is objected that "a man can not be justly responsible for doing that which he is unable to do." This maxim is self-evidently true when the inability arises either from the absence of the natural faculties proper to the agent, or from the want of opportunity to use them. Neither an idiot, nor a man devoid of the rudiments of a moral sense, nor a man whose volitions were not determined by the genuine disposition of his own heart, would be responsible.

But, on the other hand, it is just as clearly a matter of universal consciousness that when the cause of inability consists in the absence of the proper moral dispositions, that inability, instead of being inconsistent with responsibility, is the very ground of righteous condemnation. No matter whence the malignant or the profane disposition comes, whether innate or acquired, all men judge, 1st, that the stronger they are the less is the agent's ability to change them; yet, 2d, that the stronger they are the greater is the agent's ill desert on their account.

22. How can man's inability be reconciled with the commands, promises, and threatenings of God?

God rightcously deals with the sinner according to the measure of his responsibility, and not according to the measure of his sinful inability. It would have been a compromise altogether unworthy of God to have lowered his demands in proportion to man's sin. Besides, under the gospel dispensation, God makes use of his commands, promises, and threatenings, as gracious means, under the influence of his Spirit, to enlighten the minds, quicken the consciences, and to sanctify the hearts of men.

23. How can man's inability be shown to be consistent with the rational use of means?

The efficiency of all means lies in the power of God, and not in the ability of man. God has established a connection between certain means and the ends desired; he has commanded us to use them, and has promised to bless them; and human experience has proved God's faithfulness to his engagements, and the instrumental connection between the means and the end.

24. What are the legitimate, practical effects of this doctrine?

This dreadful fact ought to lead us to feel, 1st, with respect to ourselves, humility, and self-despair. 2d. With respect to God, sincere gratitude and perfect confidence. And, 3d, to the practice of constant circumspection lest we grieve the Holy Spirit, and be left to our own helplessness.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

1. What is the New Testament usage of the term διαθήκη?

This word occurs thirty-three times in the New Testament, and is almost uniformly translated covenant when it refers to the dealings of God with his ancient church, and testament when it refers to his dealings with his church under the gospel dispensation. Its fundamental sense is that of disposition, arrangement; in the classics generally that specific form of arrangement or disposition called a testament, which sense, however, it properly bears in but one passage in the New Testament, viz., Heb. ix., 16, 17. Although it is never used to designate that eternal covenant of grace which the Father made with the Son as the second Adam, in behalf of his people, yet it always designates either the old or the new dispensation, i. e., mode of administration of that changeless covenant, or some special covenant which Christ has formed with his people in the way of administering the covenant of grace, e. g., the covenants with Abraham and with David.

Thus the disposition made by God with the ancient church through Moses, the Old contrasted in the New Testament with the New διαθήκη (Gal. iv., 24), was really a covenant, both civil and religious, formed between Jehovah and the Israelites, yet alike in its legal element, "which was added because of transgressions, till the seed should come to whom the promise was made," and in its symbolical and typical element teaching of Christ, it was in a higher view a dispensation, or mode of administration of the covenant of grace. So also the present gospel disposition introduced by Christ assumes the form of a covenant between him and his people, including many gracious promises, suspended on conditions, yet it is evidently in its highest aspect

that mode of administering the changeless covenant of grace, which is called the "new and better dispensation," in contrast with the comparatively imperfect "old and first dispensation" of that same covenant.—See 2 Cor. iii., 14; Heb. viii., 6., 8, 9, 10;

ix., 15; Gal. iv., 24.

The present dispensation of the covenant of grace by our Sayiour, in one respect, evidently bears a near analogy to a will or testamentary disposition, since it dispenses blessings which could be fully enjoyed only after, and by means of his death. Consequently Paul uses the word διαθήκη in one single passage, to designate the present dispensation of the covenant of grace in this interesting aspect of it.—Heb. ix., 16, 17. Yet since the various dispensations of that eternal covenant are always elsewhere in Scripture represented under the form of special administrative covenants, and not under the form of testaments, it is to be regretted that our translators have so frequently rendered this term διαθήκη, by the specific word testament, instead of the word covenant, or by the more general word dispensation. - See I Cor. iii., 6, 14; Gal. iii., 15; Heb. vii., 22; xii., 24; xiii., 20

2. What are the three views as to the parties in the covenant of grace held by Calvinists?

These differences do not in the least involve the truth of any doctrine taught in the Scriptures, but concern only the form in

which that truth may be more or less clearly presented.

1st. The first view regards the covenant of grace as made by God with elect sinners. God promising to save sinners as such on the condition of faith, they, when converted, promising faith and obedience. Christ in this view is not one of the parties to the covenant, but its Mediator in behalf of his elect, and their surety, i.e., he guarantees that all the conditions demanded of them shall be fulfilled by them through his grace.

2d. The second view supposes two covenants, the first, called the covenant of redemption, formed from eternity between the Father and the Son as parties. The Son promising to obey and suffer, the Father promising to give him a people and to grant them in him all spiritual blessings and eternal life. The second, called the covenant of grace, formed by God with the elect as parties, Christ being mediator and surety in behalf of his people.

3d. As there are two Adams set forth in the Scripture, the one representing the entire race in an economy of nature, and the other representing the whole body of the elect in an economy of grace, it appears more simple to regard as the foundation of all God's dealings with mankind of whatever class only the two great contrasted covenants of works and of grace. The former made by God at the creation of the world with Adam, as the federal head and representative of all his posterity. Of the promises, conditions, penalty, and issue of that covenant I have spoken under a former head, see Chapter XV. The latter, or covenant of grace, formed in the counsels of eternity between the Father and the Son as contracting parties, the Son therein contracting as the second Adam, representing all his people as their mediator and surety, assuming their place and undertaking all their obligations, under the unsatisfied covenant of works, and undertaking to apply to them all the benefits secured by this eternal covenant of grace, and to secure the performance upon their part of all those duties which are involved therein. Thus in one aspect this covenant may be viewed as contracted with the head for the salvation of the members, and in another as contracted with the members in their head and sponsor. For that which is a grace from God is a duty upon our part, as St. Augustin prayed, "Da quod jubes, et jubes quod vis;" and hence results this complex view of the covenant.

As embraced under one or other of these two great covenants of works or of grace, every man in the world stands in God's sight. It is to be remembered, however, that in the several dispensations, or modes of administration of the eternal covenant of grace, Christ has contracted various special covenants with his people, as administrative provisions for carrying out the engagements, and for applying to them the benefits of his covenant with the Father. Thus, the covenant of Jehovah (the Second Person, see above, Chapter VIII., question 12,) with Noah, the second natural head of the human family, Gen. ix., 11, 15. The covenant with Abraham, the typical believer, bearing the visible sign and seal of circumcision, and thus founding the visible church as an aggregate of families. This covenant continues to be the charter of the visible church to this day, the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper now attached to it, signifying and sealing

the benefits of the covenant of grace, to wit, eternal life, faith, repentance, obedience, etc., on God's part, as matters of promise; on ours as matters of duty, i. e., so far as they are to be performed by ourselves. Compare Gen. xvii., 9-13, with Gal. iii., 15-17. The national covenant with the Jews, then constituting the visible church, Ex. xxxiv., 27. The covenant with David, the type of Christ as Mediatorial King, 2 Sam. vii., 15, 16; 2 Chron. vii., 18. The universal offers of the gospel during the present dispensation, also, are presented in the form of a covenant. Salvation is offered to all on the condition of faith, but faith is God's gift secured for and promised to the elect, and when given exercised by them. Every believer, when brought to the knowledge of the truth, enters into a covenant with his Lord, which he renews in all acts of faith and prayer. But these special covenants all and several are provisions for the administration of the eternal covenant of grace, and are designed solely to convey the benefits therein secured to those to whom they belong.

For the statements of our standards upon this subject, compare Confession of Faith, Chapter VII., Section 3, with L. Cat., question 31.

- 3. Prove from Scriptures that there is a covenant of grace between the Father and Son providing for the redemption of men.
- 1st. The Scriptures declare the existence of the promise and conditions of such a covenant, and present them in connection.—Isa. liii., 10, 11.
- 2d. The Scriptures expressly affirm the existence of such a covenant.—Isa, xlii., 6; Ps. lxxxix, 3.
- 3d. Christ makes constant reference to a previous commission he had received of his Father.—John x., 18; Luke xxii., 29.
- 4th. Christ claims a reward which had been conditioned upon the fulfillment of that commission.—John xvii., 4.
- 5th. Christ constantly asserts that his people and his expected glory are given to him as a reward by his Father.—John xvii., 6, 9, 24; Phil. ii., 6-11.
 - 4. Who were the parties to this covenant of grace; what

were its promises or conditions on the part of the Father; and what its conditions on the part of the Son?

1st. The contracting parties were the Father representing the entire Godhead in its indivisible sovereignty; and, on the other hand, God the Son, as Mediator, representing all his elect people, and as administrator of the covenant, standing their surety for their performance of all those duties which were involved on their part.

2d. The conditions upon the part of the Father were, (1.) all needful preparation, Heb. x., 5; Isa. xlii., 1-7; (2.) support in his work, Luke xxii., 43; (3.) a glorious reward, first in the exaltation of his theanthropic person "above every name that is named," Phil. ii., 6-11, and the universal dominion committed to him as Mediator, John v., 22; Ps. cx., 1; and in committing to his hand the administration of all the provisions of the covenant of grace in behalf of all his people, Matt. xxviii., 18; John i., 12; xvii., 2; vii., 39; Acts ii., 33; and, secondly, in the salvation of all those for whom he acted, including the provisions of regeneration, justification, sanetification, perseverance, and glory, Titus i., 2; Jer. xxxi., 33; xxxii., 40; Isa. xxxv., 10; liii., 10, 11.—Dicks' Theo. Lec., Vol. I., pp. 506-509.

3d. The conditions upon the part of the Son were, (1.) that he should become incarnate, made of a woman, made under the law, Gal. iv., 4, 5; (2.) that he should assume and fully discharge, in behalf of his elect, all violated conditions and incurred liabilities of the covenant of works, Matt. v., 17, 18, which he was to accomplish, first, by rendering to the precept of the law a perfect obedience, Ps. xl., 8; Isa. xlii., 21; John ix., 4, 5; viii., 29; Matt. xix., 17; and, secondly, in suffering the full penalty incurred by the sins of his people.—Isa. liii.; 2 Cor. v., 21; Gal. iii., 13; Eph. v., 2.

5. In what sense is Christ said to be the mediator of the covenant of grace?

Christ is mediator of the eternal covenant of grace because, 1st. As the one mediator between God and man, he contracted it. 2d. As mediator, he fulfills all its conditions in behalf of his people. 3d. As mediator, he administers it and dispenses all its blessings. 4th. In all this, Christ was not a mere mediatorial internuntius, as Moses is called (Gal. iii., 19), but he was medi-

ator (1.) plenipotentiary (Matt. xxviii., 18), and (2.) as high priest who actually effects reconciliation by sacrifice (Roin. iii., 25). priest who actually effects reconciliation by sacrifice (Rom. in., 25). 5th. The phrase $\mu \varepsilon \sigma i \tau \eta \varsigma$ $\delta \iota a \theta \eta \kappa \eta \varsigma$, mediator of the covenant, is applied to Christ three times in the New Testament (Heb. viii., 6; ix., 15; xii., 24); but as in each case the term for covenant is qualified by either the adjective "new" or "better," it evidently here is used to designate not the covenant of grace properly, but that new dispensation of that eternal covenant which Christ introduced in person in contrast to the less perfect administration of it which was instrumentally introduced by Moses. In the general administration of the covenant of grace, Christ has acted as sacerdotal mediator from the foundation of the world (Rev. xiii., 8). On the other hand, the first or "old dispensation," or special mode of administering that covenant visibly among men, was instrumentally, and as to visible form, "ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator," i. c., Moses (Gal. iii., 19). It is precisely in contradistinction to this relation which Moses sustained to the outward revelation of those symbolical and typical institutions, through which the covenant of grace was then administered, that the superior excellence of the "new" and "better" dispensation is declared to consist in this, that now Christ the "Son in his own house" visibly discloses himself as the true mediator in the spiritual and personal administration of his covenant. Hence he who from the beginning was the "one mediator between God and man" (1 Tim., ii., 5) now is revealed as in way of eminence, the mediator and surety of that eternal covenant under the "new" and "better" dispensation of it, since now he is rendered visible in the fullness of his spiritual graces, as the immediate administrator thereof, whereas under the "first" and "old" dispensation he was hidden.—See Sampson's Com. on Hebrews.

6. In what sense is Christ said to be surety of the covenant of grace?

In the only instance in which the term surety is applied to Christ in the New Testament (Heb. vii., 22), "surety of a better testament," the word translated testament evidently is designed to designate the new dispensation of the covenant of grace, as contrasted with the old. Paul is contrasting the priesthood of

Christ with the Levitical. He is priest or surety after a higher order, under a clearer revelation, and a more real and direct administration of grace, than were the typical priests descended from Aaron. Christ is our surety at once as priest and as king. As priest because, as such, he assumes and discharges all our obligations under the broken covenant of works. As king, (the two in him are inseparable, he is always a royal priest,) because, as such, he administers the blessings of his covenant to his people, and to this end entering into covenants with them, offering them grace upon the condition of faith and obedience, and then, as their surety, giving them the graces of faith and obedience, that they may fulfill their part.

7. What general method has characterized Christ's administration of his covenant under all dispensations?

The purchased benefits of the covenant are placed in Christ's hand, to be bestowed upon his people as free and sovereign gifts. From Christ to us they are all gifts, but from us to Christ many of them are duties. Thus, in the administration of the covenant of grace, many of these purchased blessings, which are to take effect in our acts, e. g., faith, etc., he demands of us as duties, and promises other benefits as a reward conditioned on our obedience. Thus, so to speak, he rewards grace with grace, and conditions grace upon grace. Promising faith to his elect, then working faith in them, then rewarding them for its exercise with peace of conscience, joy in the Holy Ghost, and eternal life, etc., etc.

8. What is the Arminian view of the covenant of grace?

They hold, 1st, as to the parties of the covenant of grace, that God offers it to all men, and that he actually contracts it with all believers. 2d. As to its promises, that they include all the temporal and eternal benefits of Christ's redemption. 3d. As to its conditions, that God now graciously accepts faith and evangelical obedience for righteousness, in the place of that perfect legal obedience he demanded of man under the covenant of works, the meritorious work of Christ making it consistent with the principles of divine justice for him so to do. They regard all men as rendered by sufficient grace capable of fulfilling such conditions, if they will

9. In what sense can faith be called a condition of salvation?

Faith is a condition sine qua non of salvation, i. e., no adult man can be saved if he does not believe, and every man that does believe shall be saved. It is, however, a gift of God and the first part or stage of salvation. Viewed on God's side it is the beginning and index of his saving work in us. Viewed on our side it is our duty, and must be our own act. It is, therefore, as our act, the instrument of our union with Christ, and thus the necessary antecedent, though never the meritorious cause of the gracious salvation which follows.

10. What are the promises which Christ, as the administrator of the covenant of grace, makes to all those who believe?

The promise to Abraham to be a "God to him and to his seed after him" (Gen. xvii., 7) embraces all others. All things alike, physical and moral, in providence and grace, for time and eternity, are to work together for our good. "All are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's."—1 Cor. iii., 22, 23.

- 11. Prove that Christ was mediator of men before as well as after his advent in the flesh.
- 1st. As mediator he is both priest and sacrifice, and as such it is affirmed that he is the "Lamb slain from the foundation of the earth," and a "propitiation for the sins that are past."—Rev. xiii., 8; Rom. iii., 25; Heb. ix., 15.
 - 2d. He was promised to Adam, Gen. iii., 15.
- 3d. In the 3d chapter of Gal. Paul proves that the promise made to Abraham, Gen. xvii., 7, xxii., 18, is the very same gospel that the apostle himself preached. Thus Abraham became the father of those that believe.
- 4th. Acts x., 43, "To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name, whosoever believeth on him shall receive remission of sin."—See 53d chap. of Is., also chap. xlii., 6.
- 5th. The ceremonial institutions of Moses were symbolical and typical of Christ's work; as symbols they signified Christ's merit and grace to the ancient worshiper for his present salvation, while as types they prophesied the substance which was to come.—Heb. x., 1-10; Col. ii., 17.

- 6th. Christ was the Jehovah of the old dispensation.—See above, Chap. VIII., question 12.
- 12. Prove that faith was the condition of salvation before the advent of Christ, in the same sense that it is now?
- 1st. This is affirmed in the Old Testament, Hab. ii., 4; Ps. ii., 12.
- 2d. The New Testament writers illustrate their doctrine of justification by faith by the examples of Old Testament believers.—See Rom. iv., and Heb. xi.
- 13. Show that Christ, as administrator of the covenant of grace, gave to the members of the Old Testament church precisely the same promises that he does to us.
- 1st. The promises given to Christ's ancient people clearly embrace all spiritual and eternal blessings, e.g., the promise given to Abraham, Gen. xvii., 7, as expounded by Christ, Matt. xxii., 32, and the promise given to Abraham, Gen. xxii., 18; xii. 3; as expounded by Paul, Gal. iii., 16; see also Is. xliii., 25; Ezek. xxxvi, 27; Dan. xii., 2, 3.
- 2d. This is plain also from the expectation and prayers of God's people, 51st Ps. and 16th Ps; Job xix., 24-27; Ps. lxxiii., 24-26.
- 14. How was the covenant of grace administered from Adam to Abraham?

1st. By promise, Gen. iii., 15.

- 2d By means of typical sacrifices instituted in the family of Adam.
- 3d. By means of immediate revelations and appearances of the Jehovah, or divine mediator to his people. Thus "the Lord" is represented throughout the first eleven chapters of Genesis as "speaking" to men. That these promises and sacrifices were then understood in their true spiritual intent is proved by Paul, Heb. xi., 4–7. And that this administration of the covenant of grace reached many of the people of the earth, during this era, is proved by the history of Job in Arabia, of Abraham in Mesopotamia, and of Melchisedec in Canaan.

15. How was it administered from Abraham to Moses?

1st. The promise given during the preceding period, (Gen. iii., 15,) is now renewed in the form of a more definite covenant, revealing the coming Saviour as in the line of Abraham's posterity through Isaac, and the interest of the whole world in his salvation is more fully set forth, Gen. xvii., 7; xxii., 18. This was the gospel preached beforehand, Gal. iii., 8.

2d. Sacrifices were continued as before.

- 3d. The church, or company of believers, which existed from the beginning in its individual members, was now formed into a general body as an aggregate of families, by the institution of circumcision, as a visible symbol of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and as a badge of church membership.
- 16. What was the true nature of the covenant made by God with the Israelites through Moses?

It may be regarded in three aspects-

1st. As a national and political covenant, whereby, in a political sense, they became his people, under his theocratical government, and in this peculiar sense he became their God. The church and the state were identical. In one aspect the whole system had reference to this relation.

2d. It was in one aspect a legal covenant, because the moral law, obedience to which was the condition of the covenant of works, was prominently set forth, and conformity to this law was made the condition of God's favor, and of all national blessings. Even the ceremonial system in its merely literal, and apart from its symbolical aspect, was also a rule of works, for cursed was he that confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them.—Deut. xxvii., 26.

3d. But in the symbolical and typical significance of all the Mosaic institutions, they were a clearer and fuller revelation of the provisions of the covenant of grace than had ever before been made. This Paul abundantly proves throughout the

Epistle to the Hebrews.—Hodge on Romans.

17. What are the characteristic differences between the dispensation of the covenant of grace under the law of Moses and after the advent of Christ?

These differences, of course, relate only to the mode of administration, and not to the matter of the truth revealed, nor of the grace administered. 1st. The truth was then signified by symbols, which, at the same time, were types of the real atonement for sin afterwards to be made. Now the truth is revealed in the plain gospel history. 2d. That revelation was less full as well as less clear. 3d. It was so encumbered with ceremonies as to be comparatively a carnal dispensation. The present dispensation is spiritual. 4th. It was confined to one people. The present dispensation, disembarrassed from all national organizations, embraces the whole earth. 5th. The former method of administration was evidently preparatory to the present, which is final.

CHAPTER XX.

THE PERSON OF CHRIST.

1. How can it be proved that the promised Messiah of the Jewish Scriptures has already come, and that Jesus Christ is that person?

We prove that he must have already come by showing that the conditions of time and circumstances, which the prophets declare should mark his advent, are no longer possible. We prove, secondly, that Jesus of Nazareth was that person by showing that every one of those conditions was fulfilled in him.

2. Prove that Gen. xlix., 10, refers to the Messiah, and show how it proves that the Messiah must have already come.

The original word, translated shiloh, signifies peace, and is applied to the Messiah. (Compare Micah v., 2, 5, with Matt. ii., 6.) Besides, it is only to the Messiah that the gathering of the nations is to be, see Isa. lv., 5; lx., 3; Hag. ii., 7. The Jews, moreover, have always understood this passage as referring to the Messiah.

Up to the time of the birth of Jesus Christ the sceptre and the lawgiver did remain with Judah; but seventy years after his birth, at the destruction of Jerusalem, they finally departed. If the advent of the Messiah had not occurred previously this prophecy is false.

3. Do the same with reference to the prophecy of Dan. ix., 24-27.

This prophecy refers expressly to the Messiah, and to his peculiar and exclusive work. That the seventy weeks here mentioned are to be interpreted weeks of years is certain, 1st, from the fact that it was the Jewish custom so to divide time; 2d, from the fact that this was precisely the common usage of the prophetical books, see Ezek. iv., 6; Rev. xii. 6; xiii., 5; 3d, from the fact that the literal application of the language as seventy common weeks is impracticable.

The prophecy is, that seven weeks of years, or forty-nine years from the end of the captivity, the city would be rebuilt. That sixty-two weeks of years, or four hundred and thirty-four years after the rebuilding of the city, the Messiah should appear, and that during the period of one week of years he should confirm the covenant, and in the midst of the week be cut off.

There is some doubt as to the precise date from which the calculation ought to commence. The greatest difference, however, is only ten years, and the most probable date causes the prophecy to coincide precisely with the history of Jesus Christ.

4. What prophecies, relating to the time, place, and circumstances of the birth of the Messiah, have been fulfilled in Jesus of Nazareth?

As to time, it was predicted that he should come before the sceptre departed from Judah, (Gen. xlix., 10,) at the end of four hundred and ninety years after the going forth of the command to rebuild Jerusalem, and while the second temple was still standing.—Hag. ii., 9; Mal. iii., 1.

As to place and circumstances, he was to be born in Bethlehem, (Micah v., 2,) of the tribe of Judah, of the family of David, Jer. xxiii., 5-6. He was to be born of a virgin, Isa. vii., 14; and to be preceded by a forerunner, Mal. iii., 1. All these met in Jesus Christ, and can never again be fulfilled in another, since the genealogies of tribes and families have been lost.

5. What remarkable characteristics of the Messiah, as described in the Old Testament, were verified in our Saviour?

He was to be a king and conqueror of universal empire, Ps. ii., 6, and Ps. xlv.; Isa. ix, 6, 7; and yet despised and rejected, a man of sorrow, a prisoner, pouring forth his soul unto death, Isa. liii. He was to be a light to lighten the Gentiles, and under his administration the moral condition of the whole earth was to be changed, Isa. xlii., 6; xlix., 6; lx., 1-7. His death was to be

vicarious, Isa. liii., 5, 9, 12. He was to enter the city riding upon an ass, Zech. ix., 9. He was to be sold for thirty pieces of silver, and his price purchase a potter's field, Zech. xi., 12, 13. His garments were to be parted by lot, Ps. xxii., 18. They were to give him vinegar to drink, Ps. lxix., 21. The very words he was to utter on the cross are predicted, Ps. xxii., 1; also that he should be pierced, Zech. xii., 10; and make his grave with the wicked and with the rich, Isa. liii., 9.—See Dr. Alexander's Evidences of Christianity.

6. What peculiar work was the Messiah to accomplish, which has been performed by Christ?

All his mediatorial offices were predicted in substance. He was to do the work of a prophet, (Is. xlii., 6; lx., 3,) and that of a priest, (Is. liii., 10,) to make reconciliation for sin, (Dan. ix., 24.) As king, he was to administer the several dispensations of his kingdom, closing one and introducing another, scaling up the vision and prophecy, causing the sacrifice and oblation to cease (Dan. ix., 24), and setting up a kingdom that should never cease (Dan. ii., 44).

7. What are the three points involved in the true doctrine of the person of Christ as the incarnate Son of God?

1st. The absolute divinity of Christ as the eternal Son of God, the second person of the Trinity. 2d. The perfect manhood of Christ; the presence in his divine person of a true body and a reasonable soul, which, beginning to exist only in union with the Godhead, never had a distinct personal subsistence. 3d. The person, therefore, is the eternal Son of God, into which personality has been assumed, and in which is ever more sustained a perfect human nature; so that he ever more continues one person, constituted of two entire and distinct natures.

8. How may it be proved that Christ is really a man?

He is called man, 1 Tim., ii., 5. His most common title is Son of Man, Matt. xiii., 37, also seed of the woman, Gen. iii., 15; the seed of Abraham, Acts iii., 25; Son of David, and fruit of his loins, Luke i., 32; made of a woman, Gal. iv., 4. He

had a body, ate, drank, slept, and increased in stature, Luke ii., 52; and through a life of thirty-three years was recognized by all men as a true man. He died in agony on the cross, was buried, rose, and proved his identity by physical signs, Luke xxiv., 36-44. He had a reasonable soul, for he increased in wisdom. He exercised the common feelings of our nature, he groaned in spirit and was troubled, he wept, John xi., 33, 35. He loved Martha and Mary, and the disciple that Jesus loved leaned upon his bosom, John xiii., 23.

The absolute divinity of Christ has been proved above, Chap.

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9. How may it be proved that both these natures constituted but one person?

In many passages both natures are referred to, when it is evident that only one person was intended (Phil. ii., 6-11). In many passages both natures are set forth as united. It is never affirmed that divinity abstractly, or a divine power, was united to, or manifested in a human nature, but of the divine nature concretely, that a divine being was united to a human being.—Heb. ii., 11-14; 1 Tim., iii., 16; Gal. iv., 4; Rom. viii., 3, and i., 3, 4; ix., 5; John i., 14; 1 John, iv., 3.

The union of two natures in one person is also clearly taught by those passages in which the attributes of one nature are predicated of the person, while that person is designated by a title derived from the other nature. Thus human attributes and actions are predicated of Christ in certain passages, while the person of whom these attributes or actions are predicated is designated by a divine title.—Acts xx., 28; Rom. viii., 32; 1 Cor., ii., 8; Matt. i., 23; Luke i., 31, 32; Col. i., 13, 14.

On the other hand, in other passages, divine attributes and actions are predicated of Christ, while his person, of whom those attributes are predicated, is designated by a human title.—John

iii., 13; vi., 62; Rom. ix., 5; Rev. v., 12.

10. What is the general principle upon which those passages are to be explained which designate the person of Christ from one nature, and predicate attributes to it belonging to the other?

The person of Christ, constituted of two natures, is one per-

son. He may therefore indifferently be designated by divine or human titles, and both divine and human attributes may be truly predicated of him. He is still God when he dies, and still man when he raises his people from their graves.

Mediatorial actions pertain to both natures. It must be remembered, however, that while the person is one, the natures are distinct as such. What belongs to either nature is attributed to the one person to which both belong, but what is peculiar to one nature is never attributed to the other. God, i. e., the divine person who is at once God and man, gave his blood for his church, i. e., died as to his human nature (Acts xx., 28). But human attributes or actions are never asserted of Christ's divine nature, nor are divine attributes or actions ever asserted of his human nature.

11. What were the effects of this personal union upon the divine nature of Christ?

His divine nature being eternal and immutable, and of course incapable of addition, remained unaffected by this union. The whole immutable divine essence continued to subsist as the same eternal person. That divine person now embraced a perfect human nature, exalted by, yet dependent upon, the divine nature, to which it is united.

12. What were the effects of that union upon his human nature?

The human nature, being perfect after its kind, began to exist in union with the divine nature, and as one constituent of the divine person, and as such it ever continues distinct and unconfounded.

The effect of this union upon Christ's human nature, therefore, was not so much change as exaltation of all natural and possible human excellence, in degree above every other creature, John i., 14; iii., 34; Is. xi., 2; together with an unparalleled exaltation of outward dignity and glory, above every name that is named, and a community of honor and worship with the divinity in virtue of its union therewith in the one divine person.

13. How far is the human nature of Christ included in the worship due to him?

We must distinguish between the object and the grounds of worship. There can be no proper ground of worship except the possession of divine attributes. The object of worship is not the divine excellence in the abstract, but the divine person of whom that excellence is an attribute. The God-man, consisting of two natures, is to be worshiped in the perfection of his entire person, because only of his divine attributes.

14. If Christ had a reasonable soul how can we escape the conviction that he was a human person?

It is indeed a great mystery that the unity of personality should remain in the God-man, while there are two centers of consciousness, an infinite knowing on the one hand, and a finite knowing on the other, and two distinct though ever harmonious wills. The fact, however, that a God took, not a man, but a human nature into his eternal personality, is clearly revealed in Scripture. The one person in both God and man. The mystery remains for the exercise of our faith.

15. What were the principle heresies which obtained in the early church concerning the constitution of Christ's person?

Ist. The Manichæan heresy, disseminated by Manes, one of the converted Magi, who, during the third century taught a mixed system of religious philosophy, adapting the historical facts of Christianity to the peculiar principles of the Persian philosophy. He taught that Christ and the Holy Ghost were immediate emanations from the eternal God, superior to all creatures, and that the Christ of history was this spiritual being, who appeared among the Jews in the shadow or appearance of a material body, which existed only in the perception of men. As Manes taught that matter is essentially evil, and that Christ appeared for the very purpose of delivering human souls from their entanglement in matter, he necessarily also taught that Christ's human body was only an appearance assumed for the purpose of making his presence known to man as at present organized.

2d. The Apollinarian heresy, disseminated by Apollinaris the younger, bishop of Laodicea, in the fourth century. He taught the orthodox doctrine concerning the trinity, and further that the

Eternal Word, second person of the trinity, became incarnate by taking to himself a true human body. On the other hand he denied that Christ had a human soul, since the place of a soul in his person was occupied by his divinity. In his view, then, the person of Christ embraced (1.) the Eternal Word, (2.) a $\psi v \chi \dot{\eta}$, or principle of sensitive animal life; and (3.) a true human body—but no rational human soul.

- 3d. The Nestorian heresy, charged upon Nestorius, a Syrian by birth, and bishop of Constantinople, during the fifth century, by his enemy, Cyril, the arrogant bishop of Alexandria. Cyril obtained a judgment against Nestorius in the Council of Ephesus, A. D. 431, to the effect that he separated the two natures of Christ so far as to teach the coexistence in him of two distinct persons, a God and a man, intimately united. But it is now, however, judged most probable by Protestant historians that Nestorius was personally a brave defender of the true faith, and that the misrepresentations of his enemies were founded only upon his uncompromising opposition to the dangerous habit then prominently introduced of calling the Virgin Mary the mother of God, because she was the mother of the human nature of Christ.
- 4th. The Eutychian heresy, disseminated by Eutiches, an abbot of a convent in Constantinople in the fifth century, was precisely the opposite extreme to that charged upon Nestorius. He taught "that Christ was truly God and truly man, united in one person, but that these two natures after their union did not remain two distinct natures, but constituted one compound nature."—Mosheim's Eccle. Hist.
- 5. While the Lutheran Church in her first standards affirm all the points of the orthodox doctrine as to the constitution of Christ's person, (see Augsburg Confession, article 3d,) yet, in order to maintain their doctrine of consubstantiation, or the literal local presence of Christ's body and blood, with, in and under the bread and wine of the sacrament, many of her theologians have used language on this subject very much assimilated to the Eutychian heresy above defined. They teach that while Christ's single person consists of two distinct natures, yet, in their union, the human body and soul participate in divine attributes, e. g., his human soul participates in the omniscience, and his body in the omnipresence of his divine nature, etc. This doctrine (com-

municatio idiomatum) was opposed by Melancthon, but affirmed by the Formula of Concord, generally adopted circum, 1850.

This imagination is inconsistent (1.) with the clearly revealed fact that the two natures in Christ are distinct, *i. e.*, that he ever remains truly man as well as truly God. For, if his human soul possesses divine attributes, it is no longer a human soul. (2.) With many passages of Scripture, which directly assert that his human nature ever continued subject to those limitations, as to knowledge, space and time, etc., which intrinsically belong to it as a creature, and as human.—Matt. xxviii., 5, 6; Mark xiii., 32; Luke ii., 52; Acts iii., 21; Heb. viii., 4.

16. How can it be shown that the doctrine of the incarnation is a fundamental doctrine of the Gospel?

1st. This doctrine, and all the elements thereof, is set forth in the Scriptures with *preëminent* clearness and prominence.

2d. Its truth is essentially involved in every other doctrine of the entire system of faith; in every mediatorial act of Christ, as prophet, priest and king; in the whole history of his estate of humiliation, and in every aspect of his estate of exaltation; and, above all, in the significance and value of that vicarious sacrifice which is the heart of the gospel. If Christ is not in the same person both God and man, he either could not die, or his death could not avail. If he be not man, his whole history is a myth; if he be not God, to worship him is idolatry, yet not to worship him is to disobey the Father.—John v., 23.

3d. Scripture expressly declares that this doctrine is essential.—1 John, iv., 2, 3.

CHAPTER XXI.

MEDIATORIAL OFFICE OF CHRIST.

1 What are the different senses of the word Mediator, and in which of these senses is it used when applied to Christ?

1st. In the sense of internuntius or messenger, to explain the will and to perform the commands of one or both the contracting parties, e.g., Moses, Gal. iii., 19.

2d. In the sense of simple advocate or intercessor, pleading the cause of the offending in the presence of the offended party.

- 3d. In the sense of efficient peace-maker. Christ, as Mediator, 1st, has all power and judgment committed to his hands, Matt. xxviii., 18, and ix., 6; John v., 22, 25, 26, 27; and, 2d, he efficiently makes reconciliation between God and man by an all-satisfactory expiation and meritorious obedience.
- 2. Why was it necessary that the Mediator should be possessed both of a divine and human nature?

Ist. It was clearly necessary that the Mediator should be God. (1.) That he might be independent, and not the mere creature of either party, or otherwise he could not be the efficient maker of peace. (2.) That he might reveal God and his salvation to men, "For no man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him," Matt. xi., 27; John i., 18. (3.) That being, as to person, above all law, and as to dignity of nature, infinite, he might render to the law in behalf of his people a free obedience, which he did not otherwise owe for himself, and that his obedience and suffering might possess an infinite value. (4.) That he might possess the infinite wisdom, knowl edge, and power requisite to administer the infinite realms of providence and grace, which are committed to his hands as mediatorial prince.

- 2d. It is clearly necessary that he should be man. (1.) That he might truly represent man as the second Adam. (2.) That he might be made under the law, in order to render obedience, suffering, and temptation possible, Gal. iv., 4, 5; Luke iv., 1–13. (3.) "In all things it behaved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest," Heb. ii., 17, 18, and iv., 15, 16. (4.) That in his glorified humanity he might be the head of the glorified church, the example and pattern to whom his people are "predestined to be conformed, that he might be the first-born among many brethren," Rom. viii., 29.
- 3. What diversity of opinion exists as to whether Christ acts as Mediator in one or both natures?

The Romanists hold that Christ was Mediator only in his human nature, arguing that it is impossible that God could mediate between man and himself.

The very opposite has been maintained, viz., that Christ was Mediator only in his divine nature.

The doctrine of the Bible is, that Christ was Mediator as the God-man, in both natures.

4. How may the acts of Christ be classified with reference to his two natures?

Theologians have properly distinguished (vide Turrettin, in loco) between the person who acts and the nature or inward energy whereby he acts.

Thus we affirm of the one man, that he thinks and that he walks. The same person performs these two classes of action so radically distinct, in virtue of the two natures embraced in his single person. So the single person of the God-man performs all actions involving the attributes of a divine nature in virtue of his divine nature, and all actions involving the attributes of a human nature in virtue of his human nature.

- 5. How can it be proved that he was Mediator, and acted as such both in his divine and human natures?
- 1st. From the fact that the discharge of each of the three great functions of the mediatorial office, the prophetical, priestly,

and kingly, involves the attributes of both natures, as has been

fully proved under question 2

- 2d. From the fact that the Bible attributes all his acts as Mediator to the one person, viewed as embracing both natures. The person is often designated by a term derived from the attributes of one nature, while the mediatorial action attributed to that person is plainly performed in virtue of the other nature embraced within it.—See Acts xx., 28; 1 Cor. ii., 8; Heb. ix., 14.
- 3d. From the fact that he was Mediator from the foundation of the earth, (see Chapter XIX., question 11,) it is clear that he was not Mediator in his human nature alone; and from the fact that the Eternal Word became incarnate, in order to prepare himself for the full discharge of his mediatorial work, (Heb. ii., 17, 18,) it is equally plain that he was not Mediator in his divine nature alone.
- 6. In what sense do the Romanists regard saints and angels as mediators?

They do not attribute either to saints or angels the work of propitiation proper. Yet they hold that the merits of the saint are the ground and measure of the efficiency of his intercession, as in the case of Christ.

7. How far do they ascribe a mediatorial character to their priests?

The Protestant holds that the church is composed of a company of men united to one another in virtue of the immediate union of each with Christ the head. The Romanist holds, on the contrary, that each individual member is united immediately to the church, and through the church to Christ. Their priests, therefore, of the true apostolic succession, subject to apostolic bishops, being the only authorized dispensers of the sacraments, and through them of Christ's grace, are mediators—

1st. Between the individual and Christ, the necessary link of union with him.

2d. In their offering the sacrifice of the Mass, and making therein a true propitiation for the venial sins of the people. Christ's great sacrifice having atoned for original sin, and laid the foundation for the propitiatory virtue which belongs to the Mass.

- 3d. In their being eminent intercessors.
- 8. How can it be proved that Christ is our only Mediator in the proper sense of the term?

1st. Direct testimony of Scripture, 1 Tim. ii., 5.

- 2d. Because the Scriptures show forth Christ as fulfilling in our behalf every mediatorial function that is necessary, alike propitiation and advocacy, 1 John ii., 1; on earth and in heaven, Heb. ix., 12, 24, and vii., 25.
- 3d. Because in virtue of the infinite dignity of his person and perfection of his nature, all these functions were discharged by him exhaustively, Heb. x., 14; Col. ii., 10.
- 4th. Because there is "complete" salvation in him, and no salvation in any other, and no man can come to the Father except through him, John xiv., 6; Acts iv., 12.
- 5th. There is no room for any mediator between the individual and Christ, (1.) because he is our "brother" and "sympathising high priest," who invites every man immediately to himself, Matt. xi., 28; (2.) because the work of drawing men to Christ belongs to the Holy Ghost, John vi., 44, and xvi., 14.
- 9. What relation do the Scriptures represent the Holy Ghost as sustaining to the mediatorial work of Christ?

1st. Begetting and replenishing his human nature, Luke i., 35; ii., 40; John iii., 34; Ps. xlv., 7.

2d. All Christ's mediatorial functions were fulfilled in the Spirit; his prophetical teachings, his priestly sacrifice, and his kingly administrations. The Spirit descended upon him at his baptism, Luke iii., 22; and led him into the wilderness to be tempted, Matt. iv., 1; he returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee, Luke iv., 14; through the eternal Spirit he offered himself without spot to God, Heb. ix., 14.

3d. The dispensation of the Spirit, as "the Spirit of truth," "the Sanctifier," and "the Comforter,' vests in Christ as Mediator, as part of the condition of the covenant of grace, John xv.,

26, and xvi., 7; and vii., 39; Acts ii., 33.

4th. The Holy Spirit thus dispensed by Christ as Mediator

acts for him, and leads to him in teaching, quickening, sanctifying, preserving, and acting all grace in his people. As Christ when on earth led only to the Father, so the Holy Ghost now leads only to Christ, John xv., 26, and xvi., 13, 14; Acts v., 32; 1 Cor. xii., 3.

5th. While Christ as Mediator is said to be our "παράκλητος," "advocate," with the Father, (1 John ii., 1,) the Holy Ghost is said to be our "παράκλητος," "advocate," translated "Comforter" on earth, to abide with us for ever, to teach us the things of Christ, and to hold a controversy with the world, John xiv., 16, 26, and xv., 26, and xvi., 7-9.

6th. While Christ is said to be our Mediator to make intercession for us in heaven, Heb. vii., 25; Rom. viii., 34, the Holy Ghost, by forming thoughts and desires within us according to the will of God, is said to make intercession for us with unutterable groanings, Rom. viii., 26, 27.

7th. The sum of the whole is, "We have introduction to the

Father through the Son by the Spirit," Eph. ii., 18.

10. On what ground are the threefold offices of prophet, priest and king applied to Christ?

1st. Because these three functions are all equally necessary, and together exhaust the whole mediatorial work.

2d. Because the Bible ascribes all of these functions to Christ. Prophetical, Deut. xviii., 15, 18; compare Acts iii., 22, and vii., 37; Heb. i., 2; priestly, Ps. ex., 4, and the whole Epistle to the Hebrews; kingly, Acts v., 31; 1 Tim. vi., 15; Rev. xvii., 14.

It is always to be remembered that these are not three offices, but three functions of the one indivisible office of mediator. These functions are abstractly most distinguishable, but in the concrete and in their exercise they qualify one another in every act. Thus, when he teaches, he is essentially a royal and priestly teacher, and when he rules he is a priestly and prophetical king, and when he either atones or intercedes he is a prophetical and kingly priest.

11. What is the scriptural sense of the word prophet?

Its general sense is one who speaks for another with authority as interpreter. Thus Moses was prophet for his brother Aaron, Ex. vii., 1.

A prophet of God is one qualified and authorized to speak for God to men. Foretelling future events is only incidental.

12. How does Christ execute the office of a prophet?

I. Immediately in his own person, as when (1.) on earth with his disciples, and (2.) the light of the new Jerusalem in the midst of the throne, Rev. xxi., 23.

II. Mediately, 1st, through his Spirit, (1.) by inspiration, (2.) by spiritual illumination. 2d. Through the officers of his church, (1.) those inspired as apostles and prophets, and (2.) those naturally endowed, as the stated ministry, Eph. iv. 11.

III. Both externally, as through his word and works ad-

dressed to the understanding, and,

IV. Internally, by the spiritual illumination of the heart, 1 John ii., 20, and v., 20.

V. In three grand successive stages of development. a Before his incarnation; b since his incarnation; c throughout eternity in glory, Rev. vii., 17, and xxi., 23.

13. How can it be proved that he acted as such before his incarnation?

1st. His divine title of Logos, "Word," as by nature as well as office the eternal Revealer.

2d. It has been before proved (Chap. XIX., question 11, and Chap. VIII., question 12) that he was the Jehovah of the Old Testament economy. Called Counselor, Is. ix., 6. Angel of the Covenant, Mal. iii., 1. Interpreter, Job xxxiii., 23.

3d. The fact is directly affirmed in the New Testament, 1

Pet. i., 11.

14. What is essential to the priestly office, or what is a priest in the scriptural sense of that term?

As the general idea of a prophet is, one qualified and authorized to speak for God to men, so the general idea of a priest is, one qualified and authorized to treat in behalf of men with God.

A priest, therefore, must-

1st. Be taken from among men to represent them, Heb. v., 1, 2; Ex. xxviii., 9, 12, 21, 29.

21. Chosen by God as his special election and property, Num. xvi., 5; Heb. v., 4.

3d. Holy, morally pure and consecrated to the Lord, Lev.

xxi., 6, 8; Ps. cvi., 16; Ex. xxxix., 30, 31.

4th. They have a right to draw near to Jehovah, and to bring near, or offer sacrifice, and to make intercession, Num. xvi., 5;

Ex. xix., 22; Lev. xvi., 3, 7, 12, 15.

The priest, therefore, was essentially a mediator, admitted from among men to stand before God, for the purpose, 1st, of propitiation by sacrifice, Heb. v., 1, 2, 3; and, 2d, of intercession, Luke i., 10; Ex. xxx., 8; Rev. v., 8, and viii., 3, 4.—Taken from Fairbairn's Typology, Vol. II., Part III., Chap. III.

15. Prove from the Old Testament that Christ was truly a priest.

1st. It is expressly declared. Compare Ps. ex., 4, with Heb. v., 6, and vi., 20; Zech. vi., 13.

2d. Priestly functions are ascribed to him, Is. liii., 10, 12;

Dan. ix., 24, 25.

- 3d. The whole meaning and virtue of the temple, of its services, and of the Levitical priesthood lay in the fact that they were all typical of Christ and his work as priest. This Paul clearly proves in the Epistle to the Hebrews.
- 16. Show from the New Testament that all the requisites of a priest were found in him.
- 1st. Christ was a man taken from among men to represent them before God, Heb. ii., 16, and iv., 15.

2d. He was chosen by God, Heb. v., 5, 6.

3d. He was perfectly holy, Luke i., 35; Heb. vii., 26.

4th. He had the right of the nearest access, and the greatest influence with the Father, John xvi., 28, and xi., 42; Heb. i., 3, and ix., 11, 12, 13, 14, 24.

17. Show that he actually performed all the duties of the office.

The duty of the priest is to mediate by (1.) propitiation, (2.) intercession.

1st. He mediated in the general sense of the word, John xiv., 6; 1 Tim., ii., 5; Heb. viii., 6, and xii., 24.

2d. He offered propitiation, Eph. v., 2; Heb. ix., 26, and

x., 12; 1 John, ii., 2.

3d. He offered intercession, Rom. viii., 34; Heb. vii., 25;

1 John, ii., 1.

That this propitiatory work of Christ was real, and not metaphorical, is evident from the fact that it superseded the temple services, which were only typical of it. A type and shadow necessarily presupposes a literal substance, Heb. ix., 10-12, and x., 1; Col. ii., 17.

18. What part of his priestly work did Christ execute on earth, and what part in heaven?

On earth he rendered obedience, propitiation, intercession, Heb. v., 7-9, and ix., 26, 28; Rom. v., 19.

In heaven he has presented his sacrifice in the most holy place, and ever liveth to make intercession for us, Heb. vii., 24, 25, and ix., 12, 24.

19. In what respects did the priesthood of Christ excel the Aaronic?

1st. In the dignity of his person. They were mere men. He was the eternal Son. They were sinners who had first to make atonement for their own sin, and afterwards for the sin of the people. He was holy, harmless and undefiled, Heb. vii., 26, 27. He was perfect man, and yet his access to God was infinitely nearer than that of any other being, John x, 30; Zech. xiii., 7.

2d. In the infinite value of his sacrifice. Theirs could not cleanse from sin, Heb. x., 4, and were repeated continually, Heb. x., 1-3. His sacrifice was perfectly efficacious, and once for all, Heb. x., 10-14. Thus theirs were only the shadow of his, Heb. x., 1.

3d. In the manner of their consecration. They without, he with an eath, Heb. vii., 20-22.

4th. They, being many, succeeded each other by generation. He continueth for ever, Heb. vii., 24.

5th Christ's priesthood is connected with a "greater and

more perfect tabernacle," earth the outer court, heaven the true sanctuary, Heb. ix., 11-24.

6th. Christ's intercession is offered from a throne, Rom. viii.,

34, and Heb. viii., 1, 2.

7th. While several of the Old Testament servants of God were at once both prophet and king, as David; and others both prophet and priest, as Ezra; Christ alone, and that in divine perfection, was at once prophet, priest and king. Thus his divine prophetical and kingly perfections qualified and enhanced the transcendant virtue of every priestly act.—Zech. vi., 13.

20. In what sense was Christ a priest after the order of Melchizedec?

The Aaronic priesthood was typical of Christ, but in two principal respects it failed in representing the great antitype.

1st. It consisted of succeeding generations of mortal men.

2d. It consisted of priests not royal.

The Holy Ghost, on the other hand, suddenly brings Melchizedec before us in the patriarchal history, a royal priest, with the significant names "King of Righteousness" and "King of Peace," Gen. xiv., 18-20, and as suddenly withdraws him. Whence he comes and whither he goes we know not. As a private man he had an unwritten history, like others. But as a royal priest he ever remains without father, without mother, without origin, succession, or end; and therefore, as Paul says, Heb. vii., 3, made beforehand of God, an exact type of the eternity of the priesthood of Christ, Ps. cx., 4. The prophecy was, "Thou shalt be a priest for ever," or an eternal priest "after the order of Melchizedec."

The similitude of this type, therefore, included two things: 1st, an everlasting priesthood; 2d, the union of the kingly and priestly functions in one person.—Fairbairn's Typology, Vol. II.,

Part III., Chap. III.

21. How can it be proved that the Christian ministry is not a priesthood?

1st. Human priests were ever possible only as types, but types are possible only before the revelation of the antitype. The pur-

pose of the Aaronic priesthood was fulfilled in Christ, and therefore the institution was for ever abolished by Christ, Heb. x., 1, 9, 18.

2d. Christ exhaustively discharges all the duties and purposes of the priestly office, so that any human priest (so called)

is an antichrist, Heb. x., 14; Col. ii, 10.

3d. There can be no need of any priest to open the way for us to Christ. Because, while the Scriptures teach us that we can only go to God by Christ, John xiv., 6, they teach us no less emphatically that we must come immediately to Christ, Matt. xi., 28; John v., 40, and vii., 37; Rev. iii., 20, and xxii., 17.

4th. No priestly function is ever attributed to any New Testament officer, inspired or uninspired, extraordinary or ordinary. The whole duty of all these officers of every kind is comprised in the functions of teaching and ruling, 1 Cor. xii., 28; Eph. iv.,

11, 12; 1 Tim. iii., 1-13; 1 Pet. v., 2.

5th. They are constantly called by different designations, expressive of an entirely different class of functions, as "messengers, watchmen, heralds of salvation, teachers, rulers, overseers, shepherds, and elders."—See Bib. Repertory, Jan., 1845.

22. In what sense are all believers priests?

Although there can not be in the Christian church any class of priests standing between their brethren and Christ, yet in consequence of the union, both federal and vital, which every Christian sustains to Christ, which involves fellowship with him in all of his human graces, and in all of his mediatorial functions and prerogatives, every believer has part in the priesthood of his head in such a sense that he has immediate access to God through Christ, even into the holiest of all, Heb. x., 19–22; and that being sanctified and spiritually qualified, he may there offer up, as a "holy priest," a "royal priest," spiritual sacrifices, not expiatory, but the oblation of praise, supplication and thanksgiving, through Jesus Christ, and intercession for living friends, Heb xiii., 15; 1 Tim. ii., 1, 2; 1 Pet. ii., 5, 9.

They are by equal reason also prophets and kings in fellowship with Christ, 1 John ii., 20; John xvi., 13; Rev. i., 6, and

v., 10.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE ATONEMENT: ITS NATURE, NECESSITY, PERFECTION, AND EXTENT.

- I. THE NATURE OF THE ATONEMENT.
- 1. What is the meaning of the word atonement, as used in Scripture?

The word atonement occurs but once in the English translation of the New Testament, Rom. v., 11. But the Greek word, of which in that case it is a translation, καταλλαγή, and the verb of the same origin and meaning, καταλλάσσω, (to change, exchange, to reconcile,) occur together ten times in the New Testament, viz., Rom. v., 10, twice; v., 11; xi., 15; 1 Cor. vii., 11; 2 Cor. v., 18, twice, verse 19, twice, and verse 20. In every case the verb is translated to reconcile, and except in Rom. v., 11, the noun is rendered, reconciliation. The mode of this reconciliation being clearly indicated, (Rom. v., 10,) viz., "by the death of his Son."

Throughout the Old Testament the word atonement is constantly used to signify the reconciliation of God, by means of bloody sacrifices, to men alienated from him by the guilt of sin. The priest made atonement for the transgressors of the law, by sacrifices, and it was forgiven them, Lev. iv., 20; v., 6; vi., 7; xii., 8; xiv., 18; Num. xv., 25. On the great "day of atonement" the high priest made atonement, first, for his own sin, by the sacrifice of a bullock, and then for the sins of all the people, by the sacrifice of a goat; and then the sins thus atoned for were confessed and laid apon the head of the live goat, and carried away by him into oblivion.—Lev. xvi., 6–22.

2. How do the words at nement and satisfaction differ?
Satisfaction is the more specific term; at one ment is the re-

conciliation of God to man by the death of his Son. Satisfaction expresses the relation which the work of Christ sustains to the demands of God's law and justice.

3. Wherein does the satisfaction rendered by Christ consist?

By the conditions of the covenant of grace, Christ assumes precisely the place and all the obligations of his people, under the broken and unsatisfied covenant of works. These obligations were evidently, 1st, perfect obedience as the condition of reward; and, 2d, the penalty of death incurred by the failure of obedience both in their representative Adam and in their own persons.

4. How may it be proved that the "active obedience" of Christ to the precepts of the law enters into his satisfaction?

1st. The necessity of the case. The position of Christ was that of second Adam, 1 Cor. xv., 22, 45. He came to fulfill the law in our behalf. But the law demands obedience as its condition of life, Rom. x., 5. Here the first Adam had failed.

2d. The fixed meaning of the word δικαιοσύνη, righteousness, in the New Testament, is perfect conformity to the whole law, Rom. vi., 13, 16; viii., 4; x., 4; Phil. iii., 6; Tit. iii., 5; 1 John ii., 29. Yet Christ is said to be for us, "the end of the law for righteousness," Rom. x., 4, and we are said to be made, "the righteousness of God in him," 2 Cor. v., 21.

3d. It is expressly asserted in Rom. v., 19, where Adam's disobedience, which subjected us to guilt, is contrasted with the

obedience of Christ, whereby we are made righteous.

5. What is the Socinian view as to the nature of the atonement?

They deny, 1st, of sin, that it inherently, for its own sake, deserves punishment, and, 2d, of God, that his infinitely perfect righteousness determines him to demand the punishment of all sin. On the other hand they hold that God may, in perfect consistency with his benevolent care for the best interests of his general moral government, forgive sin at any time, upon the repentance of the sinner. The death of Christ, therefore, was designed simply to soften the heart, and to encourage the confidence of the

sinner in God, and so dispose him to repentance, by that eminent exhibition of divine love.—Cat. Racov., pp. 261-268.

6. What is the Governmental theory as to the nature of the atonement?

The advocates of this theory, which is distinctively New England and New School, agree with the Socinians in their fundamental propositions.

1st. That sin does not intrinsically deserve punishment, i. e., the true end of punishment is rather to prevent sin, than to satisfy vindicatory justice, and, 2d, that there is no principle in God which demands the punishment of all sin for its own sake alone.

On the other hand, they differ from the Socinians in denying that God can consistently forgive sin upon the mere repentance of the sinner, since such a habit, on his part, would be inconsistent with the good government of the universe, by removing all the restraints which fear of punishment presents to sin. They regard the sufferings of Christ, therefore, as designed to make a moral impression upon the universe, by the emphatic display of God's determination to punish sin, and thus to make the forgiveness of sinful men consistent with the good government of the moral universe as a whole.

7. How may that system be disproved?

1st. This system regards the ill desert of sin as resulting from its tendency to produce disorder in the universe. But it is an ultimate fact of consciousness that virtue intrinsically deserves well, and that sin intrinsically is ill desert. (1.) Every awakened conscience feels this. (2.) God constantly asserts it, Jer. xliv., 4; Deut. xxv., 16. (3.) It is implied in all punishment. For any man to be hung for the good of the community is murder, and for any soul to be damned for the sake of an example would be an infinite outrage.

2d. This system resolves the justice of God into a mode of his universal benevolence, and denies that his perfect righteousness unchangeably demands the punishment of all sin, simply as such, in exact proportion to its ill desert. This is contrary to Scriptures, Heb. i. 13; Ps. v., 4, 5; Prov. xvii., 15; Heb. xii., 29, vi., 10; Rom. iii., 5; 2 Thess. i., 6, 8.

3d. It represents God as deriving the motives of his acts from the exigencies of his creation, and not from the inherent principles of his own nature, which is derogatory to his sovereignty and independence.

4th. It degrades the infinite work of Christ to the poor level of a governmental adjustment, whereas it was the most glorious

exhibition of eternal principles.

5th. This system makes the atonement a theatrical inculcation of principles, which were not truly involved in the case. For if Christ died, not that the sins of his people which he bore should be truly punished in him, but only to manifest to the moral universe that sin must be punished, it is very evident that then sin was not punished in this case, and that Christ's death consequently could not teach the really *intelligent* portion of the universe any such lesson as that sin must be punished, but rather the reverse.

6th. It has no support in Scripture, it is advocated simply on

· the principles of rational science, so called.

7th. It is absolutely inconsistent with the positive teaching of the Scriptures respecting the work of Christ, Is. liii.; Gal. iii., 13; Rom. viii, 3; 1 Pet. ii., 24; 2 Cor. v., 21; Heb. ix., 28. For only through this satisfaction to justice was it possible for God to be both just and the justifier of the transgressor, Rom. iii., 26.

Sth. If Christ's death is merely designed to produce a moral impression on the universe; if it did not really render satisfaction to divine justice, in what sense can we be said to be united to Christ, to die with him, or to rise again with him? "What is meant by living by faith, of which he is the object? The fact is, this theory changes the whole nature of the gospel; the nature of faith, and of justification, the mode of access to God, our relation to Christ, and the inward exercises of communion with him."—Hodge's Review of Beman on the Atonement.

8. State the common orthodox doctrine of the atonement.

The Socinian theory sets forth the sufferings of Christ as designed to produce a moral effect upon the heart of the individual sinner.

The governmental theory claims that that work was designed

to produce a moral effect upon the intelligent universe.

The orthodox view, while embracing both of the above as incidental ends, maintains that the immediate and chief end of Christ's work was to satisfy that essential principle of the divine nature which demands the punishment of sin. This theory embraces the following points:

"1st. Sin for its own sake deserves the wrath and curse of God. 2d. God is disposed, from the very excellence of his nature, to treat his creatures as they deserve. 3d. To satisfy the righteous judgment of God, his Son assumed our nature, was made under the law, fulfilled all righteousness, and bore the punishment of our sins. 4th. By his righteousness, those who believe are constituted righteous, his merit being so imputed to them that they are regarded as righteous in the sight of God."—Hodge's Essays, p. 131.

9. In what sense were Christ's sufferings penal, and what is the difference between calamity, chastisement, and punishment?

Calamity is suffering, which has no relation to sin; chastisement, that suffering which is designed for the improvement of the sufferer; punishment, that which is designed for the satisfaction of justice. The penalty of the law is that suffering which the law demands as a satisfaction to justice for the violation of its commands.—Hodge's Essays, p. 152.

The sufferings of Christ were penal, therefore, because he suffered precisely that kind and degree of evil that divine justice demanded as a complete satisfaction for all the sins of all his people.—Is. liii.; Gal. iii., 13; Matt. xx., 28; Rom. viii., 3; 2 Cor., v., 21. His sufferings are said to have been penal in distinction, 1st, to calamity or chastisement; 2d, to pecuniary satisfaction.

10. State the difference between pecuniary and penal satisfaction.

"1st. In the one case, the demand is upon the thing due; in the other, it is upon the person of the criminal. 2d. In the one, the demand is for an exact equivalent—a piece of money in the hands of a king is of no more value than in the hands of a peasant; in the other case, the demand being upon the person, and for the satisfaction of justice, must be satisfied by very different kinds and degrees of punishment, depending upon the dignity of the person and the conditions of the law. 3d. The creditor is bound to accept the payment of the debt, no matter by whom offered; whereas, in the case of crime, the sovereign is neither bound to provide a substitute, nor to accept one when offered. 4th. Hence penal satisfaction does not *ipso facto* liberate; the acceptance is a matter of free grace, and is determined by arrangement or covenant."—Hodge's Essays, pp. 165, 166.

11. What is the penalty of the law, and in what sense did Christ bear that penalty?

"The penalty of the law in Scripture is called 'death,' which includes every kind of evil inflicted by divine justice in punishment of sin, and inasmuch as Christ suffered such evil, and to such a degree as fully satisfied divine justice, he suffered what the Scriptures call the penalty of the law. 'It is not any specific kind or degree of suffering. The penalty in the case of the individual sinner involves remorse, despair, and eternal banishment from God; in the case of Christ, they involved none of these. It is not the nature, but the relation of sufferings to the law that gives them their distinctive value." It is not the degree of the sufferings merely, but the dignity of the sufferer also, which determines their sin-atoning efficacy.—Hodge's Essays p. 152.

Our standards declare that the penalty of the law in the case of Christ includes "the miseries of this life, the wrath of God, the accursed death of the cross, and continuance under the power

of death for a time."

12. In what sense and on what ground were the sufferings of Christ equivalent to the sufferings of all his people?

They were unutterably great, and equivalent to the sufferings of all his people, not in a pecuniary sense as precisely a quid pro quo, both in kind and degree; but in a penal sense, as in the judgment of God fully satisfying in their behalf all the penal claims of the law.

The ground upon which God judges the sufferings of Christ to be, in a penal sense, equivalent to the sufferings of all his people, is not the nature or degree of that suffering, but the dignity of the sufferer. Those sufferings, though endured in a finite nature, were of infinite value, because of the infinite dignity of his person.

13. In what sense were Christ's sufferings vicarious, and in what sense was he the substitute of his people?

A substitute is one who acts or suffers in the place of or in behalf of another, and that is vicarious obedience or suffering which is rendered or endured by the substitute in the place of another. In this sense Christ is our substitute, and his sufferings vicarious.—Rom. v., 8; Matt. xx., 28; 1 Tim. ii., 6; 1 Pet. ii., 24; iii., 18; Isa. liii., 6.

14. What were the qualifications necessary for such a substitute?

1st. That he should be personally independent of the law, owing it nothing on his own account.

2d. That, possessing the same identical nature with man, he might be made under the law, and introduced into precisely the same legal and covenant relations sustained by those for whom he stood.

3d. That his person should possess infinite dignity, in order to give an infinite moral value to his finite sufferings.

4th. That there should be a sovereign designation upon the part of the Father, and a voluntary assumption on the part of the Son, of the position of covenanted head and legal representative of his elect.

15. What is the Scriptural meaning of the phrase "to bear sin or iniquity?" and show what light is thence thrown on the nature of the atonement.

The phrase, "to bear sin or iniquity," has a perfectly definite usage, and it signifies to bear the guilt of sin, or the penal consequences attached by the law to sin.—Lev. v., 1; x., 17; xvi., 22; xx., 20; Num. xviii., 22; Ezek. xviii., 19, 20.

Of course, this language, which is applied frequently to Christ,

(Heb. ix., 28; Isa. liii., 6, 11, 12; 1 Pet. ii., 24,) precisely defines the relation of his sufferings to the penalty of the law.

16. In what sense was Christ an offering for sin?

Both Jews and Gentiles were familiar with sacrifices for sin, and both recognized in them precisely the same transference of guilt from the offerer to the victim, and the extinguishment of that guilt by the death of the victim. This was the definite sense of the phrase universally received by those to whom the apostle wrote.

This is plain-

1st. Because without the shedding of blood there was no remission, Heb. ix., 22. "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar to make an atonement for your souls," Lev. xvii., 11. Life was substituted for life.

2d. The sacrifice must be spotless, Lev. iii., 1. A spotless life must be offered in place of one forfeited by the guilt of sin.

3d. The offerer laid his hands upon the victim, which act was symbolical of transfer, Lev. i., 4; iii., 2; iv., 4, 15; 2 Chron. xxix., 23; and confessed his sins, and his sins were laid upon the victim, Lev. xvi., 21.

All this was said to be the shadow of good things to come, while the substance is Christ. He is called "the Lamb of God," "Lamb without blemish and without spot," "his blood cleanseth from all sin," "his soul is an offering for sin," Isa. liii., 10; 1 John i., 7; John i., 29; 1 Pet. i., 19.—Hodge's Essays, p. 149; Fairbairn's Typology, Vol. II., p. 221.

17. State the argument on this subject derived from those passages which ascribe our salvation to the death or blood of Christ.

See 1 Pet. i., 19; Rev. v., 9; 1 John i., 7; Rom. v., 9, 10; Heb. ix., 15; ii., 9, 14, 15. In these and similar passages it is taught that the "death" or "blood of Christ" "redeems us," "cleanses us from sin," "justifies us," "reconciles us to God," "delivers us from bondage," "redeems us from the curse of the law." This language can mean nothing, if the sole purpose of Christ's death was to produce a moral impression either upon the individual sinner, or upon the universe as a common subject of

divine government. But their use is appropriate, if the death of Christ really satisfies God's justice, and by satisfying the penalty of the law removes, by ending, the guilt, or legal obligations of our sins.

18. In what sense is Christ said to have purchased or redeemed his church?

Two Greek words are translated by the word redeem in our version, 1st, λυτρόω, to release for a ransom, mid., to ransom, redeem. 2d. ἐξαγοράζω, to buy out of the hands of, to redeem, buy off. These, of course, when applied to the work of Christ, 1 Pet. i., 18, etc., are not to be understood in the sense of a pecuniary transaction, i. e., purchase by the payment of an exact equivalent in value. But if they mean any thing they must teach that Christ has acquired a right to his church by doing and suffering that which God has demanded as the condition of its deliverance and his possession. It is expressly said that the ransom demanded was his blood, and that the condition from which his church was bought off was that of subjection to the curse of the law.

19. How can the Bible doctrine of the nature of the atonement be further proved from the revealed fact that Christ offered himself to God as our High Priest?

That he is truly a priest, and that he fulfilled all the functions of that office has been fully proved above, Chapter XXI., questions 14–17. Now when an Israelite sinned he went to the priest, who, taking a victim, offered it to God, life for life, and thus making atonement for sin it was forgiven the transgressor, Lev. iv., 20, 26, 31; v., 10, 18. "Therefore it is of necessity that this man have somewhat also to offer," and "not by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he hath obtained an eternal redemption for us," Heb. viii., 3; ix., 12. The priest never offered the sacrifice to obtain the possibility of salvation for his client, nor to manifest the determination of God to punish sin, but always to obtain remission of the penalty.

20. How may it be shown that the substitution of Christ in the place of his people did not cause him to become personally a sinner.

Reason and Scripture alike teach that the personal character of one man can never be transfered to another, but, on the other hand, that the legal responsibility, or liability to punishment, under which one man's labors may be transferred to another, whensoever sovereign authority recognizes one as legally representing the other. Christ is said (2 Cor. v., 21) "to be made sin for us" in the same sense that we are said "to be made the righteousness of God in him." When we are justified, or declared to be righteous for Christ's sake, we are no less than before personally sinners in heart and habit, because it is his legal merit, and not his personal holiness, that is counted ours. So Christ remains no less infinitely "holy, harmless, and undefiled," when the chastisement of our sins is laid upon him, or their legal responsibility counted his.

21. Show that the doctrine of a full satisfaction to justice does not destroy the gratuitous nature of salvation.

1st. Christ did not die to make the Father love the elect, but was given to die because of that love, John iii., 16; 1 John iv., 9.

2d. Christ made full satisfaction to divine justice in order to render the exercise of love consistent with justice, Rom. iii., 26; Ps. lxxxv., 10. The greater the obstacle, and the more costly the price demanded of love by justice, the greater the love and the freer. On this ground God commendeth his love, Rom. v., 8.

3d. God the Father and God the Son are one God, identical in nature, moved by the same love, and exacting the same satis-

faction.

4th. Penal satisfaction differs from pecuniary. If a sovereign

appoints or accepts a substitute it is all of grace.

5th. To Christ, as Mediator, the purchased salvation of his people belongs of right, from the terms of the eternal covenant, but to us that salvation is given in all its elements, stages, and instrumentalities only as a free and sovereign favor. The gift is gratuitous if the beneficiary has no shadow of claim to it, and if no conditions are exacted of him. The less worthy the beneficiary is, and the more difficult the conditions which justice exacts of the giver, the more eminently gratuitous the gift is.

II. THE NECESSITY OF THE ATONEMENT.

22. What view do the Socinians entertain as to the ground of the necessity of Christ's death?

Every man's view of the grounds upon which the necessity of Christ's atoning work rests must be determined by his view as to its nature. For the Socinian view, as to the nature of the atonement, see above, question 5. The necessity of the atonement according to this view, therefore, results simply in the indisposition of men to repent, and the necessity of providing motives adequate to that end.

23. On what grounds do those who maintain the governmental theory of the atonement hold it to have been necessary?

See above, question 6. According to this view the necessity of the atonement springs from the exigencies of God's general, moral government, which demand uniform and certain punishment as a warning to the subject, and thus as a restraint upon sin.

24. What is the doctrine of those who admit only a hypothetical necessity for the atonement?

These truly hold that the necessity for the atonement is in God, but they err in maintaining that this necessity springs from his <u>mere will</u>, and not from his <u>nature</u>, and that God sovereignly chose this as one of many ways of reconciling the forgiveness of sins with himself and his moral government.

25. What is the Scriptural view of the ground of this necessity?

1st. Sin itself intrinsically deserves punishment. 2d. God is, by the perfection of his own rightcous nature, immutably determined to punish all sin as intrinsically hateful. 3d. The necessity for the atonement, therefore, lies in God's infinite, wise, holy, just, free, and immutable nature.

26. How can the absolute necessity of the atonement be proved, i. e., on the assumption that sin is to be pardoned?

Every argument set forth above to prove that the atonement

was designed to satisfy divine justice for the sins of Christ's people, also clearly proves that it was absolutely necessary to the end of their salvation. There can be no such thing as an unnecessary "ransom," or "satisfaction," or "penal sufferings."

This is further evident from, 1st. The inherent ill desert of sin. 2d. The inherent righteousness of God. 3d. The nature of the human conscience, which will not be pacified unless justice be satisfied. 4. From the nature of God as infinitely merciful, and from the nature of the gospel as an eminent provision of mercy. Suffering not necessary would be inconsistent with both. 5th. From the infinite greatness and glory of the sufferer. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son." If that gift was not absolutely necessary to our salvation, it would be no real measure of God's love for us. 6th. God is limited by no impossibilities without himself, but it is his glory that his will is always freely determined by the immutable perfections of his nature.

III. THE PERFECTION OF THE ATONEMENT.

27. What is the Romish doctrine as to the perfection of the atonement?

The Romish theologians admit that the value of Christ's death is infinite; their frequent expression is, that "one drop of Christ's blood is sufficient to atone for the sins of the whole world." Yet they hold that the direct effect of Christ's satisfaction is only to atone for original sin, and to redeem believers from the eternal punishment thereof. All earthly sorrows they regard rather in the light of expiations than of chastisements. All sins committed after baptism must be expiated by sufferings endured by the believer in person. Thus they attribute to the repeated sacrifice of Christ's person in the Mass, to the pains of penance and purgatory, a real sin-atoning efficacy. They also hold that the death of Christ has secured an infinite fund of merit, the dispensation of which is intrusted to the church, whence flows the efficiency of priestly absolution, sacramental grace, and indulgences.—See Cat. Rom., Part II., Chapters IV. and V., and Decrees of Council of Trent, Sess. 13 and 14.

28. What is the doctrine of the Remonstrants or Dutch disciples of Arminius on this subject?

They taught that the sufficiency of Christ's sacrifice to atone for the sins of all men resulted from the free and gracious estimation of it as sufficient by God.—Limborch's Theologia Christiana 3, 22.5. and 21, 6.

29. What is the orthodox doctrine on this point?

That although the sufferings of Christ were not precisely, either in kind or degree, the same that justice would have demanded of his people in person, yet he suffered precisely that kind and degree of evil which the infinitely righteous judge demanded, as in his infinitely exalted person a satisfaction equivalent in the rigor of justice to the penalty denounced by the law

upon all his people, for whom he died.

His satisfaction to divine justice for the sins of his people, therefore, was perfect, 1st, intrinsically, and in the rigor of justice; 2d, as so satisfying the law that it demands no penal evils whatsoever of believers, all their sufferings being simply disciplinary; 3d, while it was perfect in securing the salvation of all his elect, it is perfect also in its sufficiency for all men, thus laying the foundation for the bona fide offer of an interest in his salvation to all who will accept it.

This absolute perfection of the atonement is proved, 1st, by the infinite dignity of the sufferer, and the consequent infinite

moral value of his sufferings.

2d. Paul proves the insufficiency of the Old Testament sacrifices from the necessity of their repetition, and establishes the fact that the one sacrifice of Christ is perfect, since it is never re-

peated, Heb. ix., 25-28; x., 1-14.

3d. Christ stood in the law place of his people, having assumed all their legal liabilities, but God set his scal publicly to his approbation of Christ's work as a perfect satisfaction to justice in behalf of his elect, in that he raised him from the dead and set him at his own right hand, 1 Cor., xv., 20-23; Phil. ii., 5-11; 1 Pet., i., 3-5.

4th. Our perfected redemption is always referred in Scripture to the death of Christ. The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from

all sin. Both the merit of works and the expiatory virtue of penance are destitute of all Scriptural evidence, and are repugnant to all else the Scriptures teach.

IV. THE EXTENT OF THE ATONEMENT.

30. What is the precise point in dispute between the different parties in the Church on this subject?

All parties agree, 1st, that the atonement accomplished by the sufferings of Christ was sufficient in its moral value to satisfy justice for the sins of all men; and, 2d, that it was exactly adapted to meet the requisitions of justice, growing out of the legal relations of all men. The only debate concerns the purpose of Christ in dying, and of the Father in giving his Son to die.

31. What is the Arminian view as to the design of God in the gift of his Son?

That he should die in the place and stead of all men as a sacrificial oblation, by which satisfaction is made for the sins of every individual, so that they become remissible upon the terms of the evangelical covenant, *i. e.*, upon the condition of faith.—Watson's Theo. Institutes, Part II., Chap. XXV.

The design of God, then, was, 1st, that Christ should die for all men; 2d, that by the satisfaction rendered by his death the

salvation of all men should be made possible.

32. What is the Scriptural doctrine on this subject?

Christ came in fulfillment of the eternal covenant of the Father with the Son. He assumed the federal and criminal relations of his people to the law of works, and it was provided that his people should receive all the benefits of his merits.

The design of God in the atonement, then, was-

1st. That Christ should bear the penalty which justice de-

nounced upon his own people.

2d. That he should not merely make the salvation of those for whom he died possible, but that he should actually achieve it for them, and freely present it to them.

The Arminian view, therefore, differs from the Calvinistic in two points. They maintain that Christ died, 1st, for the relief of all men; 2d, to make salvation possible. We hold, on the other hand, that Christ died, 1st, for his elect; 2d, to make their salvation certain.

The Calvinist, of course, admits that it was a subordinate design of Christ's death, as a means to the attainment of its chief design, that an interest in the satisfaction of Christ should be offered to all men, as available to all who believe. In this objective sense the salvation of all men is rendered possible by the death of Christ, since none to whom the gospel is preached are excluded except by their own wicked refusal.—See Dr. Hodge's Com. on 1 Cor. viii., 11.

33. How can the true doctrine as to the design of the atonement be proved from the nature of the atonement as above established?

If it is involved in the very nature of the atonement, as above proved, that all the legal responsibilities of those for whom he died were laid upon Christ; if he suffered the very penalty which divine justice exacted of them, then it follows necessarily that all those for whom he died are absolved, since justice can not demand two perfect satisfactions, nor inflict the same penalty once upon the substitute and again upon the principal.

34. What Scriptures teach that the love of God which was manifested in redemption was not mere benevolence but special love for his church?

John xvii., 6-19; xv., 13-16; x., 11; Rom. v., 8-10; viii., 32, 33; Eph. v., 25-27; iii., 18, 19; 1 John iii., 16; iv., 9-10.

The design of God must have been determined by his motive. If his motive was peculiar love to his own people then his design must have been to secure their salvation, and not that of all men.

35. What argument on this point may be derived from the doctrine of election?

As proved from Scripture above, in Chapter X., God, in his eternal decree, elected his own people to everlasting life, deter-

mining to leave all others to the just consequences of their own sins. Consequently he gave his son to die for these. He could not consistently give his Son to die for the purpose of saving the rest.

36. By what argument may it be proved that the effect of Christ's satisfaction was not merely to render salvation possible, but that of his elect certain?

1st. Christ is infinitely wise, powerful, and unchangeable, consequently his design can never be frustrated. His design, therefore, may be measured by the effect. He designed to save those whom he does save.

2d. The Scriptures prove that his purpose was actually to save those for whom he died, not merely to make their salvation possible, Matt. xviii., 11; Luke xix., 10; 2 Cor. v., 21; Gal. i., 4; iv., 5; 1 Tim. i., 15. Here his purpose is declared to be to redeem, to save, to deliver, to make righteous. "But to make salvation possible is not to save, to make holiness possible is not to purify, to open the door is not to bring us near to God."

3d. The Scriptures declare that the effect of Christ's death is reconciliation and justification, Rom. v., 10; Eph. ii., 16; remission of sins, Eph. i., 7; peace, Eph. ii., 14; deliverance from wrath, 1 Thess. i., 10; from death, Heb. ii., 14; from the curse of the law, Gal. iii., 13; from sin, 1 Pet. i., 18. To deliver from sin and the law is not to make deliverance possible, but actually to deliver, and Christ could not have designed to deliver those whom he does not actually deliver.—Hodge's Essays.

37. What connection do the Scriptures represent as subsisting between the work of Christ and the gift of the Holy Ghost, and how may it be hence argued that he died specially for his own people?

The Scriptures everywhere teach that the Holy Ghost was promised to Christ as the reward of his obedience and suffering, to be by him bestowed upon those for whom he obeyed and suffered. "Christ redeemed us from the curse of the law that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith," Gal. iii., 13, 14; Acts ii., 33; Titus iii., 5, 6; Eph. i., 3. Then it follows that all for whom he died must receive that Spirit whose in-

fluences were secured by his death. If the influences of the Holy Spirit are secured by his death, to teach, renew, and sanctify, it can not be denied that those, and only those thus taught, renewed, and sanctified, are those for whom he died."

38. How is this truth proved by the connection mutually sustained by the different parts of Christ's mediatorial work?

Christ came into this world, obeyed, suffered, died, appeared before God, intercedes and sends his Spirit as mediator. These are all essential parts of the same office. If he died for all, therefore, he must perform every other mediatorial act for all, he must sanctify all, and intercede for all. All these are represented as united in the Scriptures, 1 John ii., 1, 2; Rom. viii., 34; iv., 25; John xvii., 9. As these are all inseparably united in the execution, they must have been united in the design.

39. What is the Scriptural doctrine concerning substitution, and how does that principle answer the question as for whom Christ died?

As shown above, (question 16,) the sacrificial victim under the Old Testament was substituted in the place of the offerer. It was life for life. Christ as an "offering for sin" was the *substitute* of those for whom he died. As second Adam, also, he died by covenant in the place of and in behalf of those for whom he died, 2 Cor. v., 21; Gal. iii., 13; Isa. liii., 5; Rom. v., 19; 1 Pet. iii., 18. If so, then all for whom he died must be absolved, or else the substitution of Christ would be made of nought in each case wherein it fails.

40. What is the Scripture doctrine as to the union of Christ with his people, and how does that doctrine determine the design of the atonement?

This union is declared to be, 1st, federal, 1 Cor. xv., 22; Rom. v., 19; 2d, vital and spiritual, John xiv., 20; 1 Cor. xii., 13, 27; Gal. ii., 20. In consequence of this every gracious benefit the believer receives is said to be "in Christ," and "with Christ." We die in his death, live in his life, and thus are united to him in all his mediatorial actions and career. "I am crucified with Christ," "If one died for all then are all dead." "Now, if we be

dead with Christ we believe that we shall also live with him," Col. iii., 1-3; Rom. vi., 8-11; Gal. ii., 20; 2 Cor. v., 14; Eph. ii., 5, 6. Hence it follows, 1st, Christ could have designed to die only for those who were united with him in his death; 2d, those who are united with him in his death must also "walk with him in newness of life," i. e., the federal union necessarily leads to the vital and spiritual union of Christ and his people.

41. If Christ died only for his own people, on what ground does the general offer of the gospel rest?

"The Lord Jesus, in order to secure the salvation of his people, and with a specific view to that end, fulfilled the condition of the law or covenant under which they and all mankind were placed. These conditions were, (1.) perfect obedience; (2.) satistion to divine justice. Christ's righteousness, therefore, consists of his obedience and death. That righteousness is precisely what the law demands of every sinner in order to justification before God. It is, therefore, in its nature adapted to all sinners who were under that law. Its nature is not altered by the fact that it was wrought out for a portion only of such sinners, or that it is secured to them by the covenant between the Father and the Son. What is necessary for the salvation of one man is necessary for the salvation of another and of all. It is also of infinite value, being the righteousness of the eternal Son of God, and therefore sufficient for all."—Hodge's Essays, pp. 181, 182.

A bona fide offer of the gospel, therefore, is to be made to all men, 1st. Because the satisfaction rendered to the law is sufficient for all men. 2d. Because it is exactly adapted to the redemption of all. 3d. Because God designs that whosoever exercises faith in Christ shall be saved by him. The design of Christ's death being to secure the salvation of his own people, incidentally to the accomplishment of that end, it comprehends the offer of that salvation freely and honestly to all men on the condition of their faith. No man is lost for the want of an atonement, or because there is any other barrier in the way of his salvation than his own most free and wicked will.

42. How can the condemnation of men for the rejection of

Christ be reconciled with the doctrine that Christ died for the elect only?

A salvation all-sufficient and exactly adapted to his necessities is honestly offered to every man to whom the gospel comes; and in every case it is his, if he believes; and in no case does anything prevent his believing other than his own evil disposition. Evidently he is in no way concerned with the design of God in providing that salvation beyond the assurance that God intends to give it to him if he believes. If a man is responsible for a bad heart, and the exercises thereof, he must be above all worthy of condemnation for rejecting such a Saviour.

43. On what principles are those texts to be explained which speak of Christ's bearing the sins of the WORLD, and of his dying for ALL?

These are such passages as Heb. ii., 9; 1 Cor. xv., 22; 1 John ii., 2; 1 Tim. ii., 6; John i., 29; iii., 16, 17; vi., 51. These terms, "world" and "all," are unquestionably used in very various degrees of latitude in the Scriptures. In many passages that latitude is evidently limited by the context, e. g., 1 Cor. xv., 22; Rom. v., 18; viii., 32; John xii., 32; Eph. i., 10; Col. i., 20; 2 Cor. v., 14, 15. In others the word "world" is opposed to the Jewish nation as a people of exclusive privileges, Rom. xi., 12, 15; 1 John ii., 2. It is evident that statements as to the design of Christ's death, involving such general terms, must be defined by the more definite ones above exhibited. Sometimes this general form of statement is used to give prominence to the fact that Christ, being a single victim, by one sacrifice atoned for so many. Compare Matt. xx., 28, with 1 Tim. ii., 6, and Heb. ix., 28. And although Christ did not die with the design of saving all, yet he did suffer the penalty of that law under which all were placed, and he does offer the righteousness thus wrought out to all.

44. How are we to understand those passages which speak of the possibility of those perishing for whom Christ died?

Such passages are hypothetical, and truly indicate the nature and tendency of the action against which they warn us, and are the means which God uses, under the administration of his Spirit, to fulfill his purposes. God always deals with men, and thus fulfills his own designs through our agency by addressing motives. to our understandings and wills. As in the case of Paul's shipwreck, it was certain that none should perish, and yet all would perish except they abode in the ship, Acts xxvii., 24, 31. On the same principle, also, must be explained all such passages, as Heb. x., 26–30; 1 Cor. viii., 11, etc. See Dr. Hodge's Com. on 1 Cor. viii., 11.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE INTERCESSION OF CHRIST.

1. In what sense is Christ to continue a priest for ever?

This is asserted by Paul, Heb. vii., 3, 24, to contrast the priesthood of Christ with that of Aaron, which consisted of a succession of mortal men in their generations. His priesthood is perpetual, because, 1st, by one sacrifice for sin he hath for ever perfected them that are sanctified; 2d, he ever liveth to make intercession for us; 3d, his person and work as mediator will continue for all eternity the ground of our acceptance, and the medium of our communion with the Father.

2. Did he intercede for his people on earth?

He did exercise this function of his priesthood on earth, Luke xxiii., 34; John xvii., 20; Heb. v., 7; the principal scene of its exercise, however, is his estate of exaltation in heaven.

- 3. What is the view which the Scriptures present of the intercession of Christ?
- 1st. He appears in the presence of God for us, as the priestly advocate of his people, and presents his sacrifice, Heb. ix., 12, 24; Rev. v., 6.
- 2d. He acts as our advocate with the Father, and on the basis of his own perfect work under the terms of the covenant of grace, claims as his own right, though as infinitely free grace to usward, the fulfillment of all the promises of his covenant, 1 John ii., 1; John xvii., 24; xiv., 16; Acts ii., 33; Heb. vii., 25.
- 3d. Because of his community of nature with his people, and his personal experience of the same sorrows and temptations which now afflict them he sympathizes with them, and watches

and succors them in all their varying circumstances, and adapts his ceaseless intercessions to the entire current of their experiences. Heb ii., 17, 18; iv., 15, 16; Matt. xxviii., 20; xviii., 20.

4th. He presents, and through his merits gains acceptance for the persons and services of his people, I Pet. ii., 5; Eph. i., 6; Rev. viii., 3, 4; Heb. iv., 14-16.

4. For whom does he intercede?

Not for the world, but for his own people of every fold, and of all times, John x., 16; xvii., 9, 20.

5. Show that his intercession is an essential part of his priestly work.

It is absolutely essential, Heb. vii., 25, because it is necessary for him as mediator not merely to open up a way of possible salvation, but actually to accomplish the salvation of each of those given to him by the Father, and to furnish each with an "introduction" ($\pi\rho\sigma\sigma\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\dot{\eta}$) to the Father, John xvii., 12; Eph. ii., 18; iii., 12. The communion of his people with the Father will ever be sustained through him as mediatorial priest, Ps. ex., 4; Rev. vii., 17.

6. What relation does the work of the Holy Ghost sustain to the intercession of Christ?

Christ is a royal priest, Zech. vi., 13. From the same throne, as king, he dispenses his Spirit to all the objects of his care, while as priest he intercedes for them. The Spirit acts for him, taking only of his things. They both act with one consent, Christ as principal, the Spirit as his agent. Christ intercedes for us, without us, as our advocate in heaven, according to the provisions of the eternal covenant. The Holy Ghost works upon our minds and hearts, enlightening and quickening, and thus determining our desires "according to the will of God," as our advocate within us. The work of the one is complementary to that of the other, and together they form a complete whole, Rom. viii., 26, 27; John xiv., 26.

CHAPTER XXIV.

MEDIATORIAL KINGSHIP OF CHRIST,

1. How does the sovereignty of Christ as Mediator differ from his sovereignty as God?

His sovereignty as God is essential to his nature, underived, absolute, eternal and unchangeable.

His sovereignty as mediatorial King is derived, given to him by his Father as the reward of his obedience and suffering; it is special, having respect to the salvation of his own people and the administration of the provisions of the covenant of grace; and it attaches, not to his divine nature as such, but to his person as God-man, occupying the office of Mediator.

2. What is the extent of Christ's mediatorial kingdom, and what are the different aspects which it presents?

Christ's mediatorial authority embraces the universe, Matt. xxviii., 18; Phil. ii., 9-11; Eph. i., 17-23. It presents two great aspects. 1st. In its general administration as embracing the universe as a whole. 2d. In its special administration as embracing the church.

3. What are the objects of his mediatorial authority over the universe, and how is it administered?

Its object is to accomplish the salvation of his church in the execution of all the provisions of the covenant of grace, which devolves upon him as Mediator, Eph. i., 23. As the universe constitutes one physical and moral system, it was necessary that his headship as Mediator should extend to the whole, in order to cause all things to work together for good to his people, Rom. viii., 28; to establish a kingdom for them, Luke xxii., 29; John

xiv., 2; to reduce to subjection all his enemies, 1 Cor. xv., 25; Heb. x., 13; and in order that all should worship him, Heb. i., 6; Rev. v., 9–13. His general mediatorial government of the universe is administered, 1st, providentially; 2d, judicially, John v., 22, 27; ix., 39; 2 Cor. v., 10.

4. How was the kingship of Christ foretold in the Old Testament?

Ist. Typically in the persons of the theocratic princes, Jer. xxiii., 5; Is. ix., 7. 2d. By explicit prediction, Dan. ii., 44; Ps. ii., 6; Is. ix., 6.

5. What are the various senses in which the phrases "kingdom of God," and "kingdom of heaven," are used in the New Testament?

They signify the different aspects of that one spiritual reign, also called the "Kingdom of Christ." 1st. For true religion, or the reign of Christ in the heart, Luke xii., 31; xvii., 21; Mark x., 15; Rom. xiv., 17. 2d. For the visible church under the new dispensation see parables of the Sower, Tares, etc., Matt. xiii.; iv., 17; Mark i., 15. 3d. The perfected church in glory, Luke, xiii., 29; 2 Pet. i., 11.

6. What is the nature of Christ's kingly administration of the affairs of his own people, i. e., of his kingdom as distinct from the universe?

1st. It is providential. He administers his providential government over the universe with the design of accomplishing thereby the support, defence, enrichment and glorification of his people. 2d. It is accomplished by the dispensation of his Spirit effectually calling, sanctifying, comforting, preserving, raising, and glorifying his people, John xv., 26; Acts ii., 33–36. 3d. It is accomplished by his prescribing the form, and order, and functions of his church, the officers who are to act as the organs of those functions, and the laws which they are to administer, Matt. xxviii., 18, 19, 20; Eph. iv., 8, 11. 4th. By designating the persons who are successively to assume those offices, by means of a spiritual call, expressed in the witness of the Spirit, the leadings of providence,

and the call of the brethren, Acts i., 23, 24; vi., 5; xiii, 2, 3; xx., 28; 1 Tim. i., 12; iv., 14.

Under this administration this kingdom presents two aspects, 1st, as militant, Eph. vi., 11-16; 2d, as glorified, Rev. iii., 21. And accordingly Christ presents himself as fulfilling, in his administration of the affairs of his kingdom, the functions of a great Captain, Rev. xix., 11, 16, and of a sovereign Prince reigning from a throne, Rev. xxi., 5, 22, 23.

The throne upon which he sits and from which he reigns is presented in three different aspects, corresponding to the different relations he sustains to his people and the world; as a throne of grace, Heb. iv., 16; a throne of judgment, Rev. xx., 11-15; and a throne of glory, compare Rev. iv., 2-5 with Rev. v., 6.

7. In what sense is Christ's kingdom spiritual?

1st. The King is a spiritual and not an earthly sovereign, Matt. xx., 28; John xviii., 36. 2d. His throne is at the right hand of God, Acts ii., 33. 3d. His sceptre is spiritual, Is. liii., 1; Ps. cx., 2. 4th. The citizens of his kingdom are spiritual men, Phil. iii., 20; Eph. ii., 19. 5th. The mode in which he administers his government is spiritual, Zech. iv., 6, 7. 6th. His laws are spiritual, John iv., 24. 7th. The blessings and the penalties of his kingdom are spiritual, 1 Cor. v., 4–11; 2 Cor. x., 4; Eph. i., 3–8; 2 Tim. iv., 2; Tit. ii., 15.

8. What is the extent of the powers which Christ has vested in his visible church?

In respect to the civil magistrate the church is absolutely independent. In subjection to the supreme authority of Christ her head the powers of the church are solely, 1st, declarative, i. e., to expound the Scriptures, which are the perfect rule of faith and practice, and thus to witness to and promulgate the truth in creeds and confessions, by the pulpit and the press. And, 2d, ministerial, i. e., to organize herself according to the pattern furnished is the Word, and then to administer, through the proper officers, the sacraments, and those laws and that discipline prescribed by the Master, and to make provision for the proclamation of the gospel of the kingdom to every creature, Is. viii., 20; Deut. iv., 2; Matt. xxviii., 18–20; Heb. xiii., 17; 1 Pet. ii., 4.

9. What are the conditions of admission into Christ's kingdom?

Simply practical recognition of the authority of the sovereign. As the sovereign and the entire method of his administration are spiritual, it is plain that his authority must be understood and embraced practically, according to its spiritual nature. This is that spiritual faith which involves spiritual illumination, John iii., 3, 5; i., 12; 1 Cor. xii., 3.

10. What is the Romish doctrine of the relation of the Church to the State?

According to the strictly logical Romish doctrine, the state is only one phase of the church. The whole nation being in all its members a portion of the church universal, the civil organization is comprehended within the church for special subordinate ends, and is responsible to the church for the exercise of all the authority delegated to it.

11. What is the Erastian doctrine as to the relation of the Church to the State?

This doctrine, named from Erastus, a physician resident in Heidelberg in the sixteenth century, is precisely contrary to that of the Romanists, *i. e.*, it regards the church as only one phase of the state. The state, being a divine institution, designed to provide for all the wants of men, spiritual as well as temporal, is consequently charged with the duty of providing for the dissemination of pure doctrine, and for the proper administration of the sacraments, and of discipline. It is the duty of the state, therefore, to support the church, to appoint its officers, to define its laws, and to superintend its administration.

12. What is the common doctrine of the Reformed Church on this point?

That the church and the state are both divine institutions, having different objects, and in every respect independent of each other. The members and officers of the church are, as men, members of the state, and ought to be good citizens; and the members and officers of the state, if Christians, are members of the church, and as such subject to her laws. But neither the offi-

cers nor the laws of either have any authority within the sphere of the other.

13. What is the idea and design of the State?

Civil government is a divine institution, designed to protect men in the enjoyment of their civil rights. It has, therefore, derived from God authority to define those rights touching all questions of person and property, and to provide for their vindication, to regulate intercourse, and to provide all means necessary for its own preservation.

14. What is the design of the visible Church?

It is a divine institution designed to secure instrumentally the salvation of men. To that end it is specially designed—

1st. To bring men to a knowledge of the truth.

2d. To secure their obedience to the truth, and to exercise their graces by the public confession of Christ, the fellowship of the brethren, and the administration of the ordinances and discipline.

3d. To constitute the visible witness and prophetic type of the church invisible and spiritual.

15. What are the duties of the State with regard to the Church?

The State, of course, sustains precisely the same relation to the persons of church members and officers, and to the public property of the church, that she does to all other persons and property subject to her jurisdiction and under her protection. Otherwise the State neither possesses rights nor owes duties to the church; yet, as the Scriptures and the power which the State administers are alike directly from God, and since each individual, legislative, judicial, and executive officer of the State is bound to receive every word of Scripture as God's will, it follows necessarily that all the deliverances of Scripture upon all the subjects which fall within the jurisdiction of the State, ought, by a divine right, to be acknowledged and obeyed as an inviolable element in the supreme law of every State. For instance, no laws can be right upon the great subjects of marriage, oaths, the Sabbath day, the

duties and the rights of slaves, etc., which do not express the principles which God has revealed in his word upon those subjects. The church, however, hence acquires no rights to expound this law of God authoritatively for the guidance of the State. All her teaching must be within her own sphere, and her influence upon the State can only be indirect, through the citizens of the State, who have been enlightened not as citizens, but as members of the congregation.

16. What are the duties of the Church with regard to the State?

1st. The church owes obedience to the State in the exercise of her lawful authority over the public property of the church. 2d. She is bound to use all the lawful means in her possession for carrying the gospel to all the members of the State. Beyond this the church owes no duty to the State whatever.

17. In what sense is Christ to return his kingdom to his Father, and in what sense will his mediatorial headship continue for ever?

The sum of what is revealed to us upon this subject appears to be, that after the complete glorification of his people, and the destruction of his enemies, Christ will demit his mediatorial authority over the universe which he has administered as God-man. in order that the Godhead absolute may be immediately all in all to the creature, 1 Cor. xv., 24-28. But his mediatorial headship over his own people, including the offices of prophet, priest, and king, shall continue for ever. This is certain, 1st. Because he is a priest forever, and of his kingdom there is no end, Ps. ex., 4; Dan. vii., 14; Luke i., 33. 2d. The personal union between his divine and human nature is to continue for ever. 3d. As Mediator he is the head of the church, which is his fullness, and the consummation of the marriage of the Lamb is the beginning of heaven, Rev. xix., 7; xxi., 2, 9. 4th. As "a Lamb that had been slain," he is represented in heaven on the throne as ever more the temple and the light of the city, and as feeding his people, and leading them to fountains of living waters, Rev. v., 6; vii., 17; xxi., 22, 23.

CHRIST EXECUTED HIS OFFICE OF MEDIATOR BOTH IN HIS ESTATE OF HUMILIATION AND EXALTATION.

18. Wherein does Christ's humiliation consist?

See Larger Catechism, questions 46-50; Shorter Catechism, question 27.

19. In what sense was Christ made under the law, and how was that subjection an act of humiliation?

In his incarnation Christ was born precisely into the law place of his people, and sustained to the law precisely that relation which they did. He was born under the law, then, 1st, as a rule of duty; 2d, as a covenant of life; 3d, as a broken covenant, whose curse was already incurred. His voluntary assumption of such a position was preëminently an act of humiliation: 1st. His assumption of a human nature was voluntary, 2d. After his incarnation his person remained divine, and the claims of law terminating upon persons, and not upon natures, his submission to those claims was purely gratuitous. 3d. This condescension is immeasurably heightened by the fact that he accepted the curse of the law as of a covenant of life already broken, Gal. iii., 10–13; iv., 4, 5.

20. In what sense did Christ undergo the curse of the law, and how was that possible for God's well-beloved Son?

In his own person, absolutely considered, Christ is often declared by the Father to be his "beloved Son, with whom he was well pleased," Matt. iii., 17; 2 Pet. i., 17; and he always did that which pleased God, John viii., 29. But in his office as mediator he had assumed our place, and undertaken to bear the guilt of our sin. The wrath of God, then, which Christ bore, was the infinite displeasure of God against our sins, which displeasure terminated upon Christ's person vicariously, because of the iniquity of us all which was laid upon him, Matt. xxvi., 38; xxvii., 46; Luke xxii., 44.

21. What are the different interpretations of the phrase in the apostles' creed, "he descended into hell?"

Our standards teach that the phrase in the creed, which is

borrowed from Ps. xvi., 10, and Acts ii., 27, means Christ's continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death till the third day, Larger Cat., question 50. $\acute{a}i\delta\eta c$, translated hell, appears to be used in its etymological and most general sense for the invisible state of the dead, presenting no definite idea of place, but rather of a state marked, 1st, as invisible, i. e., to the living; 2d, by separation of soul and body. Compare Acts ii., 24–28; ii., 31; with Ps. xvi., 8–11.

The Romanists interpret "hell" in this phrase as signifying the "Limbus Patrum," or that region of the invisible world "into which the souls of the just who died before Christ were received, and where, without experiencing any sort of pain, and supported by the blessed hope of redemption, they enjoyed peaceful repose. To liberate these souls, who, in the bosom of Abraham, were expecting the Saviour Christ, the Lord descended into hell."—Catechism of Coun. of Trent, Part I., Art. 5th.

Some have held the revolting opinion that Christ actually descended into the place of torments to triumph over the powers of darkness, which is evidently inconsistent with Luke xxiii., 43, 46.

22. What is the true meaning of 1 Pet. iii., 19-21?

This passage is very obscure. The Romish interpretation is shown in the answer to the preceding question, *i. e.*, that Christ went to the Limbus Patrum and preached the gospel to those imprisoned spirits that were awaiting his advent.

The common Protestant interpretation is that Christ was put to death in the body, but quickened, or restored to life by the Spirit, by which Spirit, inspiring Noah as a preacher of righteousness, Christ many centuries previously had descended from heaven, and preached to the men of that generation, who in their sin and unbelief were the "spirits in prison." Only eight persons believed and were saved; therefore, Christian professors and teachers ought not to faint because of the unbelief of mankind now.

Another interpretation, suggested by Archbishop Leighton in a note, as his last opinion, and expounded at large by the late Dr. John Brown, of Edinburgh, is, that Christ dying in the body as a vicarious sacrifice is quickened in the spirit, *i. e.*, spiritually quickened, manifested as a complete Saviour in a higher degree

than was possible before, as a grain of wheat dying he began to bear much fruit; and thus quickened, he now, through the inspiration of his Spirit, preached to "spirits in prison," i. e., prisoners of sin and Satan, just as he had before done, though with less power, through Noah and all the prophets, when the spirits were disobedient; under the ministry of Noah only eight souls being saved; but since Christ was quickened in spirit, i. e., manifested as a complete Saviour, multitudes believed.

23. Wherein does Christ's exaltation consist?

Shorter Cat., question 28, Larger Cat., questions 51–54.

24. In what sense was it possible for the coequal Son of God to be exalted?

As the coequal Son of God this was impossible, yet his person as God-man was capable of exaltation in several respects.

Ist. Through the union of the divine and human natures, the outward manifestations of the glory of his person had been veiled from the eyes of creatures. 2d. As Mediator he occupied officially a position inferior to the Father, condescending to occupy the place of sinners. He had been inconceivably humbled, and, as a reward consequent upon his voluntary self-humiliation, the Father highly exalted him, Phil. ii., 8, 9; Heb. xii., 2; Rev. v., 6. 3d. His human soul and body were inconceivably exalted, Matt. xvii., 2; Rev. i., 12–16; xx., 11.

25. What are the various sources of proof by which the resurrection of Christ is established?

1st. The Old Testament predicted it. Compare Ps. xvi., 10, and Acts ii., 24-31. All the other predictions concerning the Messiah were fulfilled in Christ, therefore this.

2d. Christ predicted it, and therefore, if he was a true prophet, he must have risen, Matt. xx., 19; John x., 18.

3d. The event, his extraordinary origin and character considered, is not antecedently improbable.

4th. The testimony of the eleven apostles. These men are proved by their writings to have been good, intelligent and serious, and they each had every opportunity of ascertaining the fact, and they sealed their sincerity with their blood, Acts i., 3.

5th. The separate testimony of Paul, who, as one born out of due time, saw his risen Lord, and derived his revelation and commission from him in person, 1 Cor. xv., 8; Gal. i., 12; Acts ix., 3-8.

6th. He was seen by five hundred brethren at once, to whom

Paul appeals, Cor. xv., 6.

7th. The change of the Sabbath, from the last to the first day of the week, is a monument of the concurrent testimony of the whole of the first generation of Christians, to the fact that they believed that Christ rose from the dead.

8th. The miracles wrought by the apostles were God's seals

to their testimony that he had raised Christ, Heb. ii., 4.

9th. The accompanying witness of the Holy Ghost, honoring the apostles' doctrine and ministry not merely by miraculous gifts, but by his sanctifying, elevating and consoling power, Acts v., 32.—Dr. Hodge.

26. By whose power did Christ rise from the dead?

The Scriptures ascribe his resurrection—

1st. To himself, John ii., 19; x., 17.

2d. To the Father, Acts xiii., 33; Rom. x., 9; Eph. i., 20.

This is reconciled upon the principle that all acts of divine power, terminating upon objects external to the Godhead, may be attributed to either of the divine persons, or to the Godhead absolutely, John v., 17–19.

27. On what ground does the apostle declare that our faith is vain if Christ be not risen, (1 Cor. xv., 14)?

1st. If Christ be risen indeed, then he is the true Messiah, and all the prophecies of both dispensations have in that fact a pledge of their fulfillment. If he has not risen, then are they all false.

2d. The resurrection proved him to be the Son of God, Rom. i., 4, for (1.) he rose by his own power, (2.) it authenticated all his claims with respect to himself.

3d. In the resurrection of Christ the Father publicly declared his approbation and acceptance of Christ's work as surety of his people, Rom. iv., 25.

4th. If Christ has risen, we have an advocate with the Father, Rom. viii., 34; Heb. ix., 11, 12, 24.

5th. If Christ be raised, we have assurance of eternal life; if

he lives, we shall live also, John xiv., 19; 1 Pet. i., 3-5.

6th. Owing to the union between Christ and his members, which is both federal and spiritual, his resurrection secures ours, (1.) because, as we died in Adam, so we must live in Christ, 1 Cor. xv., 21, 22; (2.) because of his Spirit, that dwelleth in us, Rom. viii., 11; 1 Cor. vi., 15; 1 Thess. iv., 14.

7th. Christ's resurrection illustrates and determines the nature of our resurrection as well as secures it, 1 Cor. xv., 49; Phil.

iii., 21; 1 John, iii., 2.—Dr. Hodge.

28. When, at what place, and in whose presence did Christ ascend?

He ascended forty days after his resurrection, from a portion of the Mount of Olives, near to the village of Bethany, in the presence of the eleven apostles, and possibly of other disciples, while he was in the act of blessing them, and while they beheld him, and were looking steadfastly. Luke says, moreover, that there were two glorified men present, who are conjectured by Professor J. A. Alexander to have been Moses and Elijah. He was attended also with angels celebrating his victory over sin, and his exaltation to his mediatorial throne, Luke xxiv., 50, 51; Mark xvi., 19; Acts i., 9–11; Eph. iv., 8; Col. ii., 13–15; Ps. xxiv., 7–10; lxviii., 18.

29. What are the different opinions as to the nature of Christ's ascension?

Those who, as the Lutherans, believe that Christ's body is omnipresent to his church, of course, maintain that his ascension consisted not in any local change, but in the withdrawal of his former sensible intercourse with his disciples.

It is certain, however, that his human soul and body did actually pass up from earth to the abode of the blessed, and that his entire person, as the God-man, was gloriously exalted. He ascended as Mediator, triumphing over his enemies, and giving gifts to his friends, Eph. iv., 8–12; to complete his mediatorial work, John xiv., 2, 3; as the Forerunner of his people, Heb. vi. 20; and

to fill the universe with the manifestations of his glory and power, Eph., iv., 10.

30. What is included in Christ's sitting at the right hand of the Father?

See Ps. ex., 1; Mark xvi., 19; Rom. viii., 34; Eph. i., 20, 22; Col. iii., 1; Heb. i., 3, 4; x., 12; 1 Pet. iii., 22.

This language is evidently figurative, yet it very expressively sets forth the supreme glorification of Christ in heaven. It presents him as the God-man, and in his office as Mediator exalted to supreme and universal glory, felicity and power over all principalities and powers, and every name that is named, Heb. ii., 9; Ps. xvi., 11; Matt. xxvi., 64; Dan. vii., 13, 14; Phil. ii., 9, 11; John v., 22; Rev. v., 6. Thus publicly assuming his throne as mediatorial Priest and King over the universe for the benefit of his church.

SEATED UPON THAT THRONE HE, DURING THE PRESENT DISPENSATION, AS MEDIATOR, EFFECTUALLY APPLIES TO HIS PEOPLE, THROUGH HIS SPIRIT, THAT SALVATION WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ACHIEVED FOR THEM IN HIS ESTATE OF HUMILIATION.

CHAPTER XXV.

EFFECTUAL CALLING.

1. What is the New Testament usage of the words καλέιν (to call), κλῆσις (calling), and κλητός (the called)?

καλείν is used in the sense, 1st, of calling with the voice, John x., 3; Mark i., 20; 2d, of calling forth, to summon authoritatively, Acts iv., 18; xxiv., ii.; 3d, of inviting, Matt., xxii., 3; ix., 13; 1 Tim. vi., 12. Many are called, but few chosen. 4th. Of the effectual call of the Spirit, Rom. viii., 28–30; 1 Pet. ii., 9; v., 10. 5th. Of an appointment to office, Heb. v., 4. 6th. In the sense of naming, Matt. i., 21; κλῆσις occurs eleven times in the New Testament, in each instance it signifies the effectual call of the Holy Spirit, with the exception of 1 Cor. vii., 20, where it is used as synonymous with business or trade.—See Rom. xi., 29; 1 Cor. i., 26, etc., etc.—Robinson's Lex.

κλητός occurs ten times in the New Testament. It is used to signify, 1st, those appointed to any office, Rom. i., 1. 2d. Those who receive the external call of the word, Matt. xx., 16. 3d. The effectually called, Rom. i., 7; viii., 28; 1 Cor. i., 2, 24; Jude i.; Rev. xvii., 14.

The very word ἐκκλησία (church) designating the company of the faithful, the heirs of all the promises, signifies, etymologically, the company called forth, the body constituted by "the calling."

2. What is included in the external call?

1st. A declaration of the plan of salvation. 2d. A declaration of duty on the part of the sinner to repent and believe. 3d. A declaration of the motives which ought to influence the sinner's mind, such as fear or hope, remorse or gratitude. 4th. A

promise of acceptance in the case of all those who comply with the conditions.—Dr. Hodge.

3. How can it be proved that the external call to salvation is made only through the word of God?

The law of God, as impressed upon the moral constitution of man, is natural, and inseparable from man as a moral responsible agent, Rom. i., 19, 20; ii., 14, 15. But the gospel is no part of that natural law. It is of grace, not of nature, and it can be made known to us only by a special and supernatural revelation.

This is further evident, 1st, because the Scriptures declare that a knowledge of the word is essential to salvation, Rom. x., 14-17; and, 2d, because they also declare that those who neglect the word, either written or preached, are guilty of the eminent sin of rejecting all possibility of salvation, Matt. xi., 21, 22; Heb. ii., 3.

4. On what principle is this external call addressed equally to the non-elect as well as to the elect?

That it is addressed indiscriminately to both classes is proved, 1st. From the express declaration of Scripture, Matt. xxii., 14. 2d. The command to preach the gospel to every creature, Mark xvi., 15. 3d. The promise to every one who accepts it, Rev. xxii., 17. 4th. The awful judgment pronounced upon those who reject it, John iii., 19; xvi., 9.

It is addressed to the non-elect equally with the elect, because it is equally their duty and interest to accept the gospel, because the provisions of salvation are equally suited to their case, and abundantly sufficient for all, and because God intends that its benefits shall actually accrue to every one who accepts it.

5. How can it be proved that there is an internal spiritual call distinct from an external one?

1st. From those passages which distinguish the Spirit's influence from that of the word, John vi., 45, 64, 65; 1 Thes. i., 5, 6. 2d. Those passages which teach that the Spirit's influence is necessary to the reception of the truth, Eph. i., 17. 3d. Those that refer all good in man to God, Phil. ii., 13; Eph. ii., 8; 2

Tim., ii., 25, e. g., faith and repentance. 4th. The Scripture distinguishes between the two calls; of the subjects of the one it is said "many are called and few are chosen," of the subjects of the other it is said, "whom he called them he also justified." Of the one he says, "Because I have called, and ye have refused," Prov. i., 24. Of the other he says, "Every man therefore who hath heard and bath learned of the Father cometh unto me," John vi., 45. 5th. There is an absolute necessity for such an internal, spiritual call, man by nature is "blind" and "dead" in trespasses and sins, 1 Cor. ii, 14; 2 Cor. iv., 4; Eph. ii., 1.

6. What is the Pelagian view of the internal call?

Pelagians deny original sin, and maintain that right and wrong are qualities attaching only to executive acts of the will. They therefore assert, 1st. The full ability of the free will of man as much to cease from sin at any time as to continue in its practice. 2d. That the Holy Spirit produces no inward change in the heart of the subject, except as he is the author of the Scriptures, and as the Scriptures present moral truths and motives, which of their own nature exert a moral influence upon the soul.

7. What is the Semi-Pelagian view?

These maintain that grace is necessary to enable a man successfully to return unto God and live. Yet that from the very nature of the human will man must first of himself desire to be free from sin, and to choose God as his chief good, when he may expect God's aid in carrying his desires into effect.

8. What is the Arminian view?

The Arminians admit the doctrine of man's total depravity, and that in consequence thereof man is utterly unable to do anything aright in the unaided exercise of his natural faculties. Nevertheless, as Christ died equally for every man, sufficient grace, enabling its subject to do all that is required of him, is granted to all. Which sufficient grace becomes efficient only when it is cooperated with and improved by the sinner.—Apol. Conf. Remonstr., p. 162, b.; Limboreh, Theo. Christ., 4, 12, 8.

9. What is the doctrine on this subject taught by the symbols of the Lutheran Church?

The Lutherans agree entirely with the Calvinistic view on the point of efficacious grace, although they are logically inconsistent in denying the doctrine of election.—Additions to Luther's Small Catechism, III. Order of Salvation, questions 74–88.

10. What is the Synergistic view of this point?

At the call of Maurice, the new elector of Saxony, the divines of Wittemburg and Leipsie assembled at Leipsic, A. D. 1548, in conference, and on that occasion the Synergistic controversy arose. The term signifies coöperation. The Synergists were Lutheran theologians, who departed from their own system on this one subject, and adopted the position of the Arminians. Melanchthon used these words at that conference: "God so draws and converts adults that some agency of their will accompanies his influences."

11. What is the common doctrine of the Reformed Churches as to the internal call?

That it is an exercise of divine power upon the soul, immediate, spiritual, and supernatural, communicating a new spiritual life, and thus making a new mode of spiritual activity possible. That repentance, faith, trust, hope, love, etc., are purely and simply the sinner's own acts; but as such are possible to him only in virtue of the change wrought in the moral condition of his faculties by the recreative power of God.—See Conf. of Faith, Chap. X., Sections 1 and 2.

12. What diversity of opinion prevails among the Romanists upon this subject?

The disciples of Augustin in that church, of whom the Jansenists were the most prominent, are orthodox, but these have been almost universally overthrown, and supplanted by their enemies the Jesuits, who are Semi-Pelagians. The Council of Trent attempted to satisfy both parties.—Council of Trent, Sess. 6, Can. 3 and 4. The doctrines of Quesnel, who advocated the truth on this subject, were condemned in the Bull "Unigenitus," A. D.

- 1713. Bellarmine taught that the same grace is given to every man, which, by the event only, is proved practically congruous to the nature of one man, and therefore in his case efficacious, and incongruous to the nature of another, and therefore in his case ineffectual.
- 13. What is meant by "common grace," and how may it be shown that the Spirit does operate upon the minds of those who are not renewed in heart?
- "Common grace" is the restraining and persuading influences of the Holy Spirit acting only through the truth revealed in the gospel, or through the natural light of reason and of conscience, heightening the natural moral effect of such truth upon the understanding, conscience, and heart. It involves no change of heart, but simply an enhancement of the natural powers of the truth, a restraint of the evil passions, and an increase of the natural emotions in view of sin, duty, and self-interest.

That God does so operate upon the hearts of the unregenerate is proved, 1st, from Scripture, Gen. vi., 3; Acts vii., 51; Heb. x., 29; 2d, from universal experience and observation.

14. How does common differ from efficacious grace?

1st. As to its <u>subjects</u>. All men are more or less the subjects of the one; only the elect are subjects of the other, Rom. viii., 30; xi., 7; 2 Thes. ii., 13.

- 2d. As to its nature. Common grace is only mediate, through the truth, and it is merely moral, heightening the moral influence natural to the truth, and exciting only the natural powers of the soul, both rational and moral. But efficacious grace is immediate and supernatural, since it is wrought directly in the soul by the immediate energy of the Holy Ghost, and since it implants a new spiritual life, and a capacity for a new mode of exercising the natural faculties.
- 3d. As to its effects. The effects of common grace are superficial and transient, modifying the action, but not changing the nature, and its influence is always more or less consciously resisted, as opposed to the prevailing dispositions of the soul. But efficacious grace, since it acts not upon but in the will itself, changing the governing desires, and giving a new direction to the

active powers of the soul, is neither resistible nor irresistible, but most free, spontaneous, and yet most certainly effectual.

15. How can it be proved that this efficacious grace is confined to the elect?

1st. The Scriptures represent the elect as the called, and the called as the elect, Rom. viii., 28, 30; Rev. xvii., 14. 2d. This effectual calling is said to be based upon the decree of election, 2 Thes. ii., 13, 14; 2 Tim., i., 9, 10. 3d. Sanctification, justification, and all the temporal and eternal benefits of union with Christ are declared to be the effects of effectual calling, 1 Cor. i., 2; Eph. ii., 5; Rom. viii., 30.

16. Prove that it is given on account of Christ.

1st. All spiritual blessings are given on account of Christ, Eph. i., 3; Titus iii., 5, 6. 2d. The Scriptures specifically declare that we are called in Christ, Rom. viii., 2; Eph. ii., 4-6; 2 Tim. i., 9.

17. What is meant by saying that this divine influence is immediate and supernatural?

It is meant, 1st, to deny, (1.) that it consists simply in the moral influence of the truth; (2.) that it consists simply in the moral influence of the Spirit, heightening the moral influence of the truth as objectively presented; (3.) that it excites the mere natural powers of the soul. It is meant, 2d, to affirm, (1.) that the Holy Spirit acts immediately upon the soul from within; (2.) that the Holy Spirit, by an exercise of recreative power, implants a new moral nature or principle of action.

18. What arguments go to show that there is an immediate influence of the Spirit on the soul, besides that which is exerted through the truth?

1st. The influence of the Spirit is distinguished from that of the word, John vi., 45, 64, 65; Rom. xv., 13; 1 Cor. ii. 12-15; 1 Thess. i., 5, 6.

2d. A divine influence is declared to be necessary to the reception of the truth, Ps. exix., 18; Acts xvi., 14; Eph. i., 17.

3d. Such an internal operation on the heart is attributed to God, Phil. ii., 13; 2 Thess. i., 11; Heb. xiii., 21.

4th. The gift of the Spirit is distinguished from the gift of the

word, John xiv., 16; 1 Cor. iii., 16; vi., 19; Eph. iv., 30.

5th. The nature of this influence is evidently different from that effected by the truth, Eph. i., 19; iii., 7. And the effect is called a "new creation," "new birth," etc., etc.

- 6th. Man by nature is dead in sin, and needs such a direct intervention of supernatural power.—Turettin, Theo. Instits., L. XV., Quæstio 4.
- 19. What are the different reasons assigned for calling this grace Efficacious?
- 1st. Most of the Jesuits, and the Arminians, holding that all men receive sufficient grace to enable them to obey the gospel if they will, maintain that this grace becomes efficacious when it is coöperated with by the will of the individual, and in any case is proved to be such only by the event.
- 2d. Bellarmine, and others, maintain that the same grace given to all is congruous to the moral nature of one man, and in that case efficacious, and incongruous to the nature of another, and in his case ineffectual.
- 3d. Some Romanists have maintained what is called the doctrine of cumulative influence. The consent of the soul is secured by the suasive influence of the spirit, rendered effectual by constant repetition and long continuance.
- 4th. The orthodox doctrine is that the efficacy of this grace is inherent in its very nature, because it is the exercise of the mighty power of God in the execution of his eternal and unchangeable purpose.

20. In what sense is grace irresistible?

It must be remembered that the true Christian is the subject at the same time of those moral and mediate influences of grace upon the will, common to him and to the unconverted, and also of those special influences of grace within the will, which are certainly efficacious. The first class of influences Christians may and constantly do resist, through the law of sin remaining in their members. The second class of influences are certainly effi-

cacious, but are neither resistible nor irresistible, because they act from within and carry the will spontaneously with them. It is to be lamented that the term irresistible grace has ever been used, since it suggests the idea of a mechanical and coercive influence upon an unwilling subject, while, in truth, it is the transcendent act of the infinite Creator, making the creature spontaneously willing.

21. How can this grace be proved to be certainly efficacious?

Ist. By the evidence we have given above, as to its nature as the immediate operation of the mighty power of God.

2d. By the description of the work of grace. Men by nature are "blind," "dead," "slaves," etc. The change effected is a "new creation," etc.

3d. From the promises of God, which are certain. The means which he uses to vindicate his own faithfulness must be efficacious, Ezek. xxxvi., 26; xi., 19; John vi., 45.

4th. From the connection asserted by Scripture between calling and election. The called are the elect. As God's decrees are certain, the call must be efficacious.—See above, question 15.

5th. Faith and repentance are the gifts of God, and he who truly repents and believes is saved. Therefore, the grace which communicates those gifts is effectual, Eph. ii., 8; Acts xi., 18; 2 Tim. ii., 25.

22. How may it be proved that this influence is congruous with our nature?

While discarding utterly the distinction made by Bellarmine, (for which see above, question 19,) we say that efficacious grace is congruous to human nature as such, in the sense that the Spirit of God, while exerting an immediate and recreative influence upon the soul, nevertheless acts in perfect consistency with the integrity of those laws of our free, rational, and moral nature, which he has himself constituted. Even in the miraculous revelation of the new birth, he acts upon our reasons and upon our wills in perfect accordance with the constitution of each. This is certain. 1st. The same God creates and recreates; his object is not to destroy, but to restore his own work. 2d. The Scrip-

tures and our own experience teach that the immediately consequent acts of the soul in the exercise of implanted grace, are preëminently rational and free. In fact, the soul never acted normally before, Ps. cx., 3; 2 Cor. iii., 17; Phil. ii., 13. 3d. This divine influence is described by such terms as "drawing," "teaching," "enlightening," John vi., 44, 45; Eph. i., 18.

23. What do the Scriptures teach as to the connection of this influence with the truth?

In the case of the regeneration of infants the truth, of course, is not used. In the regeneration of adults the truth is always present. In the act of regeneration the Spirit acts immediately upon the soul, and changes its subjective state, while the truth is the object consciously apprehended, upon which the new faculties of spiritual discernment and the new affections are exercised. The Spirit gives sight, the truth is the light discerned. The Spirit gives feeling, the truth presents the object beloved, Rom. x., 14, 17; James i., 18; John xvii., 17.

24. What reason may be assigned for the belief that the Spirit does not renew those adults to whom the truth is not known?

Negatively. The Bible never leads us to expect such an extension of grace, and neither the Scriptures nor our own experience among the modern heathen ever present us with any examples of such a work.

Positively. The Scriptures always associate all spiritual influence with the truth, and declare the necessity of the preaching the truth to the end of saving souls, Rom. x., 14.

25. What are the objections to the Arminian doctrine of sufficient grace?

They hold that God has willed the salvation of all men, and therefore has called all alike, giving to all a grace sufficient, if they will improve it.

We object, 1st. The external call of the gospel has been extended to comparatively few. The heathen are responsible with the light of nature, and under the law of works, yet they have no means of grace, Rom. i., 18-20; ii., 12-15.

2d. This doctrine is inconsistent with God's purpose of elec-

tion.—See above, Chapter X.

3d. According to the Arminian system it depends upon the free will of the man to make the sufficient grace of God common to all men efficient in his case. But the Scriptures declare that salvation is altogether of grace, and a gift of God, Eph. ii., 8; 2 Tim. ii., 25; Rom. ix., 15, 16.

4th. The Scriptures expressly declare that not even all who receive the external call have sufficient grace, Rom. ix., 16-24;

xi., 8.

CHAPTER XXVI.

REGENERATION.

1. What are the various Scripture terms by which this work of God is designated?

1st. "Creating anew," Eph. iv., 24. 2d. "Begetting," James i., 18. 3d. "Quickening," John v., 21; Eph. ii., 5. 4th. "Calling out of darkness into marvelous light," 1 Pet. ii., 9. The subjects of it are said, 1st, to be "alive from the dead," Rom. vi., 13. 2d. To be "new creatures," 2 Cor. v., 17. 3d. To be "born again," John iii., 3, 7. 4th. To be "God's workmanship," Eph. ii., 10.

2. What is the Pelagian view of regeneration?

They hold that sin can be predicated only of volitions, and that it is essential to the liberty and responsibility of man that he is always as able to cease from as to continue in sin. Regeneration is therefore a mere reformation of life and habit. The man who has chosen to transgress the law, now chooses to obey it.

3. What is the doctrine of the Romish church on this subject?

The Romanists, 1st, confound together justification and sanctification, making these one act of God, whereby, for his own glory, for Christ's merits sake, by the efficient powers of the Holy Ghost, and through the instrumentality of baptism, he at once cancels the guilt of our sins, and delivers us from the inherent power and defilement of original sin.—Council of Trent, Sess. VI., Chap. VII.

2d. They hold the doctrine that regeneration is accomplished only through the instrumentality of baptism. This is effectual in every instance of its application to an infant. In the case of adults its virtue may be either resisted and nullified, or received and improved. In baptism (1.) sins are forgiven; (2.) the moral

nature of the subject is renewed, (3.) he is made a son and heir of God.—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. II.

4. What are the different views as to baptismal regeneration entertained in the Church of England?

1st. The theory of the party styled Puseyite, which is identical with that of the Romish church.

2d. That of a large party most ably represented by the late Bishop H. U. Underdonk, in his "Essay on Regeneration, Phila., 1835." He maintained that there are two distinct regenerations; one a change of state or relation, and the other a change of nature. The first is baptismal, the second moral, though both are spiritual in so far as both are wrought by the Holy Ghost. The first or baptismal regeneration is a new birth, since it constitutes us sons of God, as the Jews were made his peculiar people by that covenant, the seal of which was circumcision. The second is a new birth, or creation in a higher sense, being a gradual sanctifying change wrought in the whole moral character by the Holy Ghost, and not necessarily connected with baptism.

5. What view of regeneration is held by those in America who maintain the "Exercise Scheme?"

These theologians deny the existence in the soul of any permanent moral habits or dispositions, and admit the existence only of the soul or agent and his acts or "exercises." In the natural man the series of acts are wholly depraved. In the regenerated man a new series of holy acts are created by the Holy Ghost, and continued by his power.—Emmons, Sermon LXIV., on the New Birth.

6. What is the New Haven view, advocated by Dr. N. W. Taylor, on this subject?

Dr. Taylor agreed with the advocates of the "Exercise Scheme," that there is nothing in the soul but the agent and his actions; but he differed from them by holding that man and not God is the independent author of human actions. He held that when God and the world is held up before the mind regeneration consists in an act of the sinner in choosing God as his chief good, thus confounding regeneration and conversion. The Holy Spirit, in some unknown way, assists in restraining the active operation

of the natural, selfish principle which prefers the world as its chief good. "A mind thus detached from the world as its supreme good instantly chooses God for its portion, under the impulse of that inherent desire for happiness, without which no object could ever be regarded as good, as either desirable or lovely." This original motive to that choice of God which is regeneration is merely natural, and neither morally good nor bad. Thus, 1st. Regeneration is man's own act. 2d. The Holy Spirit helps man, (1.) by suspending the controlling power of his sinful, selfish disposition; (2.) by presenting to his mind in the clear light of truth the superiority of God as an object of choice. Then the sinner chooses God as his chief good under the conviction of his understanding, and from a motive of natural, though not sinful, self-love, which is to be distinguished from selfishness, which is of the essence of sin.—See Christian Spectator, December, 1829, pp. 693, 694, etc.

7. What is the common doctrine held by evangelical Christians?

Ist. That there are in the soul, besides its several faculties, habits, or dispositions, of which some are innate and others are acquired, which lay the foundation for the soul's exercising its faculties in some particular way. Thus we intuitively judge a man's moral disposition to be permanently evil when we see him habitually acting sinfully, or to be permanently good when we see him habitually acting righteously.

2d. These dispositions are anterior to moral action, and deter-

mine its character as good or evil.

3d. In creation God made the disposition of Adam's heart holy.

4th. In the new creation God recreates the governing disposition of the regenerated man's heart holy.

It is, therefore, properly called a "regeneration," a "new creation," a "new birth."

8. When it is said that regeneration consists in giving a new heart, or in implanting a new principle or disposition, what is meant by the terms "heart," "principle," or "disposition?"

President Edwards says, "By a principle of nature in this

place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any particular kind or manner of exercise of the faculties of the soul. So this new 'spiritual sense' is not a new faculty of understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of understanding. So that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercise of the same faculty of will."—Edwards on Religious Affections, Pt. III. sec. 1.

The term "heart," signifying that prevailing moral disposition that determines the volitions and actions, is the phrase most commonly used in Scripture, Matt. xii., 33, 35; xv., 19; Luke vi., 43, 45.

9. How may it be shown that this view of regeneration does not represent it as involving any change in the essence of the soul?

This charge is brought against the orthodox doctrine by all those who deny that there is any thing in the soul but its constitutional faculties and their exercises. They hence argue that if any thing be changed except the mere exercises of the soul, its fundamental constitution would be physically altered. In opposition to this, we argue that we have precisely the same evidence for the existence of a permanent moral quality or disposition inherent in the will, as the reason why a good man acts habitually righteously, or a bad man viciously, that we have for the existence of the invisible soul itself, or of any of its faculties as the reason why a man acts at all, or why his actions are such as thought, emotion, volition. It is not possible for us to conceive of the choice being produced in us by the Holy Spirit in more than three ways. "First, by his direct agency in producing the choice, in which case it would be no act of ours. Second, by addressing such motives to our constitutional and natural principles of self-love as would induce us to make the choice, in which case there would be no morality in the act. Or, thirdly, by producing such a relish for the divine character, that the soul as spontaneously and immediately rejoices in God as its portion as it rejoices in the perception of beauty."

"If our Maker can endow us, not only with the general sus-

ceptibility of love, but also with a specific disposition to love our children; if he can give us a discernment and susceptibility of natural beauty, he may give us a taste for spiritual loveliness. And if that taste, by reason of sin, is vitiated and perverted, he may restore it by means of his spirit in regeneration."—Hodge's Essays.

10. In what sense may the soul be said to be passive in regeneration?

Dr. Taylor maintains that regeneration is that act of the soul in which man chooses God as his portion. Thus, the man himself, and not God, is the agent.

But the Christian church, on the contrary, holds that in regeneration the Holy Ghost is the agent, and man the subject. The act of the Holy Spirit, in implanting a new principle, does not interfere with the essential activity of the soul itself, but simply gives to that activity a new direction, for the soul, though active, is nevertheless capable of being acted upon. And although the soul is necessarily active at the very time it is regenerated, yet it is rightly said to be passive with respect to that act of the Holy Spirit whereby it is regenerated.

1st. The soul, under the conviction of the Holy Ghost, and in the exercise of merely natural feelings, regards some aspect of saving truth, and strives to embrace it. 2d. The Holy Ghost, by an exertion of creative power, changes the governing disposition of the heart in a manner inscrutable, and by an influence not apprehended by the consciousness of the subject. 3d. Simultaneously the soul exercises new affections and experimentally em-

braces the truth.

11. What is the difference between regeneration and conversion?

The term conversion is often used in a wide sense as including both the change of nature and the exercise of that nature as changed. When distinguished from regeneration, however, conversion signifies the first exercise of the new disposition implanted in regeneration, *i. e.*, in freely turning unto God.

Regeneration is God's act; conversion is ours. Regeneration is the implantation of a gracious principle; conversion is the ex-

ereise of that principle. Regeneration is never a matter of direct consciousness to the subject of it; conversion always is such to the agent of it. Regeneration is a single act, complete in itself, and never repeated; conversion, as the beginning of holy living, is the commencement of a series, constant, endless, and progressive. "Draw me, and I will run after thee," Cant. i., 4.

12. How can it be proved that there is any such thing as that commonly called regeneration?

1st. By those Scriptures that declare such a change to be necessary, John iii., 3; 2 Cor. v., 17; Gal. vi., 15.

2d. By those passages which describe the change, Eph. ii., 5;

iv., 24; James i., 18; 1 Pet. i., 23.

3d. From the fact that it was necessary for the most moral as well as for the most profligate, 1 Cor. xv., 10; Gal. i., 13-16.

4th. That this inward change is not a mere reformation is proved by its being referred to the Holy Spirit, Eph. i., 19, 20; Titus iii., 5.

5th. From the comparison of man's state in grace with his

state by nature, Rom. vi., 13; viii., 6-10; Eph. v., 8.

6th. From the experience of all Christians, and from the testimony of their lives.

13. What is the nature of supernatural illumination?

The soul of man is a unit. A radically defective or perverted condition of any faculty will injuriously affect the exercise of all the other faculties. The essence of sin consists in the perverted moral dispositions and affections of the will. But a perverted condition of these affections must affect the exercises of the intellect, concerning all moral objects, as much as the volitions themselves. We can not love or desire any object unless we perceive its loveliness, neither can we intellectually perceive its loveliness unless its qualities are congenial to our inherent taste or dispositions. Sin, therefore, is essentially deceitful, and man as a sinner is spiritually blind. This does not consist in any physical defect. He possesses all the faculties requisite to enable him to see the beauty, and to experience the power of the truth, but his whole nature is morally perverted through his evil disposi-

tions. As soon as these are changed he will see, and, seeing, love and obey the truth, although no constitutional change is wrought in his nature, i. e., no new faculty given, but only his perverted faculties morally rectified. This illumination is called supernatural, 1st, because, having been lost, it can be restored only by the immediate power of God. 2d. In contradistinction to the mained condition of man's present depraved nature. It, however, conveys no new truths to the mind, nor does it relieve the Christian, in any degree, from the diligent and prayerful study of the Word, nor does it lead to any fanciful interpretations of Scripture foreign to the plain sense of the letter, it only leads to the perception and appreciation of the native spiritual beauty and power of the inspired word, and the truths therein revealed.

14. How may it be proved that believers are the subjects of such illumination?

1st. It is necessary, 1 Cor. ii., 14; 2 Cor. iii., 14; iv., 3; John xvi., 3, From the constitution of our nature we must apprehend an object as lovely before we can love it for its own sake.

2d. The Scriptures expressly affirm it. "To know God is eternal life," John xvii., 3; 1 Cor. ii., 12, 13; 2 Cor. iv., 6; Eph. i., 18; Phil. i., 9; Col. iii., 10; 1 John iv., 7; v., 20; Ps. xix., 7, 8; xliii., 3, 4.

As the soul is a unite, a change in its radical moral dispositions must simultaneously modify the exercise of all its faculties in relation to moral and spiritual objects. The soul can not love that the loveliness of which it does not perceive, neither can it perceive the loveliness of an object which is totally uncongenial to its own nature. The first effect of regeneration, or a radical change of moral disposition, in the order of nature, therefore, is to open the eyes of our understandings to the excellency of divine truth, and the second effect is the going forth of the renewed affections toward that excellency so perceived. This is what Pres. Edwards (Religious Affections, Pt. III., sec. 4) calls "the sense of the heart."

15. What is the nature of that conviction of sin which is the attendant of regeneration?

Spiritual illumination immediately leads to the perception of the rightcourness, goodness, and exceeding breadth and exactness of God's law, and by contrast of the exceeding sinfulness of sin in the abstract, Rom. vii., 7, 13; and above all of his own sin—thus revealing, in contrast to the divine purity and righteousness, the pollution of his own heart, his total ill-desert, and his entire helplessness in all his relations to God, Job xlii., 5, 6. This is a practical experimental knowledge,—produced by the wrestling ἐλεγχος, of the Holy Ghost (John xvi., 8)—of guilt, of pollution, and of helplessness.

16. What is the nature of that conviction of sin which often occurs before or without regeneration, and how may it be distinguished from the genuine?

Natural conscience is an essential and indestructible element of human nature, including a sense of right and wrong, and painful emotions associated with a sense of the latter. Although this faculty may be for a time perverted, and the sensibility associated with it hardened, yet it may be, and often is, in the case of the unregenerate quickened to a painful activity, leading to a senes of ill desert, pollution, helplessness and danger. In eternity this will constitute a large measure of the sufferings of the lost.

On the other hand, that conviction of sin which is peculiar to the regenerate is distinguished by being accompanied by a sense of the positive beauty of holiness, and an earnest desire to escape not merely the pangs of remorse, but chiefly the pollution and the dominion of sin.

17. What is the nature of those new affections which flow from the renewal of the heart, and how are they distinguished from the exercises of unrenewed men?

Spiritual illumination gives the perception of that loveliness which the renewed affections of the heart embrace and delight in. These are spiritual because they are formed in us, and preserved in healthy exercise by the Spirit of God. They are holy because their objects are holy, and because they delight in their objects as holy. The affections of unrenewed men, on the other hand, however pure or even religious they may be, are merely natural in their source, and attach merely to natural objects. They may be grateful to God for his benefits, but they never love him simply for the perfections of his own nature.

18. What is the nature of that new obedience which results from regeneration, and how does it differ from mere morality?

The perfect law is spiritual, and consequently requires perfect conformity of being as well as of action; the central and governing principles of life must be in harmony with it. The regenerate man, therefore, thinks, and feels, and wills, and acts in conformity with the spirit of the whole word of God as far as revealed to him, because it is God's word, from a motive of love to God, and with an eye single to his glory. The sanctified affections are the spring, the heart-searching law the rule, and the glory of God the end, and the Holy Ghost the co-worker in every act of Christian obedience.

Morality, on the other hand, has its spring in the merely natural affections; it aims only at the conformity of the outward actions to the letter of the law, while self, in some form of self-righteousness, reputation, safety, or happiness, is the determining end.

19. How may the absolute necessity of regeneration be proved?

1st. The Scriptures assert it, John iii., 3; Rom. viii., 6; Eph. ii., 10; iv., 21-24. 2d. It is proved from the nature of man as a sinner, Rom. vii., 18, viii., 7-9; 1 Cor. ii., 14; Eph. ii., 1. 3d. From the nature of heaven, Isa. xxxv., 8; lii., 1; Matt. v., 8; xiii., 41; Heb. xii., 14; Rev. xxi., 27. The restoration of holiness is the grand end of the whole plan of salvation, Eph. i., 4; v., 5, 26, 27.

20. Are infants susceptible of regeneration; and, if so, what is the nature of regeneration in them?

Infants, as well as adults, are rational and moral agents, and by nature totally depraved. The difference is, that the faculties of infants are in the germ, while those of adults are developed As regeneration is a change wrought by creative power in the inherent moral condition of the soul, infants may plainly be the subjects of it in precisely the same sense as adults, in both cases the operation is miraculous, and therefore inscrutible.

The fact is established by what the Scriptures teach of innate depravity, of infant salvation, of infant circumcision and baptism, Luke i., 15; xviii., 15, 16; Acts ii., 39.—See below, Chapter XXXIX.

CHAPTER XXVII.

FAITH.

1. What, according to its etymology and New Testament usage, is the meaning of the word $\pi i \sigma \tau i \varsigma$, "faith," "belief?"

It is derived from the verb $\pi \epsilon i \theta \omega$, to persuade, convince. In the New Testament it is used, 1st. To expresss that state of mind which is induced by persuasion, Rom. xiv., 22. 2d. It often signifies good faith, fidelity, sincerity, Rom. iii., 3; Titus ii., 10. 3d. Assent to the truth, Phil. i., 27; 2 Thes. ii., 13. 4th. Faith towards, on, or in God, ($\epsilon \pi i$, $\epsilon i \epsilon$, $\pi \rho \delta \epsilon$,) Heb. vi., 1; 1 Thes. i., 8; 1 Pet. i., 21; Mark xi., 22. In Christ, Acts, xxiv., 24; Gal. iii., 26; and in his blood, Rom. iii., 22, 25; Gal. ii., 16, 20. 5th. It is used for the object of faith, viz., the revelation of the gospel, Rom. i., 5; x., 8; 1 Tim. iv., 1.—Robinson's Lex. of New Testament.

2. State the different meanings of the verb πιστεύειν (to believe), and of the phrases πιστεύειν εἰς, or ἐπί (to believe in or upon.)

πιστεύειν signifies—

1st. To assent to, to be persuaded of the truth, Luke i., 20; John iii., 12.

2d. To credit the truth of a person, John v., 46.

3d. To trust, to have confidence in, Acts xxvii., 25.

The phrases πιστεύειν εἰς, or ἐπί, are always used to express trust and confidence terminating upon God, or upon Christ as Mediator. We are often said to believe or credit Moses or other teachers of the truth, but we can believe in or on God or Christ alone. Upon God, John xiv., 1; Rom. iv., 24; 1 Pet. i., 21; upon Christ, Acts xvi., 31; John iii., 15–18.

3. How may faith be defined?

Faith is a complex act of the soul, involving the concurrent action of the understanding and the will, and modified in different instances of its exercise by the nature of its object, and of the evidence upon which it rests. The most general definition, embracing all its modifications, affirms faith to be "assent to truth upon the exhibition of the appropriate evidence. But it is evident that its nature must vary with the nature of the truth believed, and especially with the nature of the evidence upon which our assent is founded. Assent to a speculative or abstract truth is a speculative act; assent to a moral truth is a moral act; assent to a premise made to ourselves is an act of trust. Our belief that the earth moves round its axis is a mere assent; our belief in the excellence of virtue is of the nature of a moral judgment; our belief in a promise is an act of trust." So likewise with respect to the evidence upon which our faith is founded. "The same man may believe the same truth on different grounds. One may believe the Christian system simply because others around him believe it, and he has been brought up to receive it without question; this is the faith of credulity. Another may believe it on the ground of its external evidence, e. g., of miracle, prophecy, history, its logical consistency as a system, or its plausibility as a theory in accounting for the phenomena of creation and providence. This is speculative faith. Another may believe, because the truths of the Bible recommend themselves to his reason and conscience, and accord with his inward experience. This faith is founded on moral evidence. There is another faith founded on the intrinsic excellence, beauty, and suitableness of the truth from a sense and love of its moral excellence. This is spiritual faith, which is the gift of God."-Way of Life.

4. How far is faith an act of the understanding, and how far an act of the will?

The one indivisible soul knows and loves, desires and decides, $b_{\bar{t}} \lambda_{\bar{t}}$ and these several acts of the soul meet on the same object. The soul can neither love, desire, nor choose that which it does not know, nor can it know an object as true or good without some affection of will towards it. Assent to a purely speculative truth may be simply an act of understanding, but belief in a moral

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truth, in testimony, in promises, must be a complex act, embracing both the understanding and the will. The understanding apprehends the truth to be believed, and decides upon the validity of the evidence, but the disposition to believe testimony, or moral evidence, has its foundation in the will. Actual trust in a promise is an act of the will, and not a simple judgment as to its trustworthiness. There is an exact relation between the moral judgment and the affections, and the will, as the seat of the moral affections, determines the moral judgments. Therefore, as a man is responsible for his will, he is responsible for his faith.

5. What is the difference between knowledge and faith?

Generally, knowledge is the apprehension of an object as true, and faith is an assent to its truth. It is obvious, therefore, that in this general sense of the term every exercise of faith includes the knowledge of the object assented to. It is impossible to distinguish between the apprehension of the truthfulness of a purely speculative truth and an assent to it as true. In such a case faith and knowledge appear identical. But while the apprehension of the trustworthiness of a promise is knowledge, the actual reliance upon it is faith. The apprehension of the moral truthfulness of an object is knowledge, the assent to it, as good and desirable, is faith.

Sometimes the Scriptures use the word knowledge as equivalent to faith, John x., 38; 1 John ii., 3.

Generally, however, the Scriptures restrict the term knowledge to the apprehension of those ideas which we derive through the natural sources of sensation and reason and human testimony, while the term faith is restricted to the assent to those truths which rest upon the direct testimony of God alone, objectively revealed in the Scriptures, as discerned through spiritual illumination. Thus, faith is the "evidence of things not seen," Heb. xi., 1. We are commanded "to walk by faith, and not by sight," 2 Cor. v., 7. Here the distinction between faith and knowledge has reference particularly to the mode of knowing. The one is natural and discursive, the other supernatural and intuitive.

6. What distinction do the Romanists make between implicit and explicit faith?

Romanists and Protestants agree that it is not essential to faith that its object should be comprehended by the understanding. But, on the other hand, Protestants affirm, and Romanists deny, that it is essential that the object believed should be apprehended by the mind; that is, that knowledge of what we believe is essential to faith. The Romanists, therefore, have invented the distinction between explicit faith, which terminates upon an object distinctly apprehended by the mind, and implicit faith, which a man exercises in the truth of propositions of which he knows nothing. They hold that if a man exercises explicit faith in a general proposition, he therein exercises implicit faith in every thing embraced in it, whether he knows what they are or not. If a man, for instance, has explicit faith that the church is an infallible teacher, he thereby exercises virtual or implicit faith in every doctrine taught by the church, although he may be ignorant as to what those doctrines are. They distinguish, morcover, between those truths which it is necessary to regard with explicit faith, and those which may be held implicitly. They commonly teach that it is necessary for the people to hold only three doctrines explicitly, 1st, that God is; 2d, that he is a rewarder, including future rewards and punishments; 3d, that he is a redeemer.

"This doctrine has been recently revived by the Puseyites, under the title of reserve. The distinguishing truths of the gospel, instead of being clearly presented, should, it is said, be concealed or kept in reserve. The people may gaze upon the cross as the symbol of redemption, but need not know whether it is the form, or the material, or the great sacrifice once enacted on it, to which the efficacy is due. 'Religious light is intellectual darkness,' says Dr. Newman. This theory rests upon the same false assumption that faith can exist without knowledge."—Dr. Hodge.

7. What is the difference between knowing and understanding a thing, and how far is knowledge essential to faith?

We know a thing when we simply apprehend it as true. We understand it only when we fully comprehend its nature, and the perfect consistency of all its properties with each other and with the entire system of things of which it forms a part. We know

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the doctrine of the trinity when its several parts are stated to us, but no creature can ever understand it.

That knowledge, or simple apprehension of the object believed and confided in, is essential to faith is evident from the nature of faith itself. It is that state of mind which bears the relation of assent to a certain object, involving that action of understanding and of will which is appropriate to that object. If a man loves, fears, or believes, he must love, fear, or believe some object, for it is evident that these states of mind can exist only in relation to their appropriate objects. If a real object is not present the imagination may present an ideal one, but that very fiction of the imagination must first be apprehended as true (or known) before it can be assented to as true (or believed.) Just as it is impossible for a man to enjoy beauty without perceiving it in some object of the mind, or to exercise complacent love in a virtuous act without perceiving it, so it is, for the same reason, impossible for a man to exercise faith without knowing what he believes. "Implicit faith" is a perfectly unmeaning formula.

8. How can the fact that knowledge is essential to faith be proved from Scripture?

Ist. From the etymology of the word $\pi i \sigma \tau \iota \varsigma$, from $\pi \epsilon i \theta \omega$, to persuade, instruct. I is that state of mind which is the result of teaching. 2d. From the use of the word knowledge in Scripture as equivalent to faith, John x., 38; 1 John ii., 3. 3d. From what the Bible teaches as to the source of faith. It comes by teaching, Rom. x., 14–17. 4th. The Scriptures declare that the regenerate are enlightened, have received the unction, and know all things, Acts xxvi., 18; 1 Cor. ii., 12–15; Col. iii., 10. 5th. The means of salvation consist in the dissemination of the truth. Christ is the great teacher. Ministers are teachers, 1 Cor. iv., 1; 1 Tim., iii., 2; iv., 13. Christians are begotten by the truth, sanctified by the truth, John xvii., 19; James i., 18.—Dr. Hodge.

9. How are those passages to be explained which speak of knowledge as distinguished from faith?

Although every act of faith presupposes an act of knowledge, yet both the faith and the knowledge vary very much, both with

the nature of the object known and believed, and with the manner in which the knowledge is received, and with the evidence upon which the faith rests. The faith which the Scriptures distinguish from knowledge is the strong persuasion of things not seen. It is the conviction of the truth of things which do not fall within the compass of our own observation which may entirely transcend the powers of our understanding, and which rest upon the simple testimony of God. This testimony faith relies upon in spite of whatever to human reason appears inconsistent or impossible.

Knowledge, though essential to faith may be distinguished from it, 1st, as faith includes also an act of the will assenting, in addition to the act of the understanding apprehending. 2d. As knowledge derived through a natural is distinguished from knowledge derived through a divine source. 3d. As present imperfect apprehension of divine things (i. e., faith) differs from that perfect knowledge of divine things we shall have in heaven, 1 Cor.

xiii., 12.

$\dot{}$ 10. If faith necessarily includes knowledge, how can men be commanded to believe ?

1st. No man is ever commanded to believe that which is not revealed to him, either in the light of nature or by the inspired word. 2d. No man is ever commanded to believe a purely speculative truth. The truths of religion rest on the testimony of God. They are enforced by moral evidence, and faith in them involves a moral and spiritual knowledge of them, and delight in them. Moral evidence can be appreciated only by a mind possessed of moral sensibility. And such moral insensibility as leads to blindness to the distinction between right and wrong is itself a very aggravated state of depravity.

The Scriptures, therefore, luminous with their own self-evidencing light, present the truth to all to whom they come, and demand its instant reception upon the testimony of God. If that evidence is not felt to be conclusive by any one, it must be because of the sinful blindness of his mind. Therefore Christ says, "ye will not come unto me that ye may have life." And unbelief is uniformly charged to the "evil heart."

11. What are the ultimate grounds of that assent to the truth which, is of the essence of faith?

In general, the ultimate ground upon which our assent to the truth of any object of knowledge rests is the veracity of God. The testimony of our senses, the integrity of our consciences, the intuitions of our reasons, all rest upon his veracity as Creator. Practically the mind is moved to this assent through our universal and instinctive confidence in the constitution of our own natures.

Religious faith rests, 1st, upon the faithfulness of God as pledged in his supernatural revelation, John iii., 33; 2d, upon the evidence of spiritual illumination, personal experience of the power of the truth, and the witness of the Holy Ghost, the Sanctifier, and thus "not in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God," 1 Cor. ii., 5–12.

12. What are the two kinds of evidence by which we know that God has revealed certain truths as objects of faith?

1st. The evidence which resides in the truth itself. Moral, spiritual, experimental, rational, John vi., 63; xiv., 17, 26; Jer. xxiii., 29.

2d. The accrediting evidence of the presence and power of God accompanying the promulgation of the truth, and proving that it is from him. These are miracles, providential dispensations, the the fulfillment of prophecy, etc., John v., 36; Heb. ii., 4.—See above, Chapter III.

13. How can it be shown that the authority of the church is not a ground of faith?

See above, Chapter V., question 18.

14. What is the nature of historical faith, and upon what evidence does it rest?

That mode of purely rational faith called historical is that apprehension of and assent to the truth which regards it in its purely rational aspects as mere facts of history, or as mere parts of a logical system of opinion. Its appropriate evidence is purely rational, e. g., the solution afforded by the Scriptures of the

facts of history and experience, and the evidence of history, prophecy, miracles, etc.

15. What is the nature of temporary faith, and of the evidence upon which it is founded?

Temporary faith is that state of mind often experienced in this world by impenitent hearers of the gospel induced by the moral evidence of the truth, the common influences of the Holy Ghost, and the power of religious sympathy. Sometimes the excited imagination joyfully appropriates the promises of the gospel, Matt. xiii., 20. Sometimes, like Felix, the man believes and trembles. Oftentimes it is at first impossible to distinguish this state of mind from genuine saving faith. But not springing from a divine work of recreation it has no root in the permanent principles of the heart. It is always, therefore, 1st, inefficient, neither purifying the heart nor overcoming the world; 2d, temporary.

16. What is the specific evidence upon which saving faith is founded?

This is the light let into the soul by the Holy Ghost in his work of spiritual illumination. Thus is the beauty, and excellence, and the suitableness of the truth to the practical wants of the subject apprehended. With this the witness of the Holy Ghost with and by the truth coöperates, 1 Cor. ii., 4, 5; Rom. viii., 16; 2 Cor. iv., 6; Eph. ii., 8.

17. How may it be proved from Scripture and experience that spiritual illumination is the ground of saving faith?

1st. The Scriptures, wherever they come, make a demand unconditional, immediate, and universal upon the most intelligent and the most ignorant alike, that they should be received and believed, and unbelief is always charged as sin, and not as mere ignorance or mental incapacity. The faith which they demand must, therefore, be a moral act, and must depend upon the spiritual congeniality of the believer with the truth.

2d. By nature men are spiritually blind, and subjects of an "evil heart of unbelief," 2 Cor. iii., 14; iv., 4.

3d. Believers are said to be enlightened, and to discern the

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source must be also spiritual."

things of the Spirit, Acts xiii., 48; 2 Cor. iv., 6; Eph. i., 17, 18; 1 John ii., 20, 27; v., 9, 10.

4th. Men believe because they are taught of God, John vi.,

44, 45.

5th. Every Christian is conscious of believing, because he sees the truth believed to be true, lovely, powerful, and satisfying.

6th. This is proved by the effects of faith. "We are said to live by faith, to be sanctified by faith, to overcome by faith, to be saved by faith. Blind consent to authority, or rational conviction, produce no such effects; if the effects are spiritual, the

18. What are the different opinions as to the relation between faith and trust?

In consequence of their doctrine of implicit faith, that nothing is required beyond blind assent to the teachings of the church, Romanists necessarily deny that trust enters into the essence of saving faith.

The Sandemanians, as the Campbellites, holding that faith is a mere affirmative judgment of the understanding passed upon the truth on the ground of evidence, also deny that trust is an element of saving faith.

Some orthodox theologians have held that trust is rather to be regarded as an immediate and invariable consequent of saving faith, than an element of that faith itself.

Religious faith, resulting from spiritual illumination, respects the entire word of God and his testimony, and, as such, is a complex state of mind, varying with the nature of the particular portion of revealed truth regarded in any particular act. Many of the propositions of Scripture are not the proper objects of trust, and then the faith which embraces them is only a reverent and complacent assent to them as true and good. But the specific act of saving faith which unites to Christ, and is the commencement, root and organ of our whole spiritual life, terminates upon Christ's person and work as mediator, as presented in the offers and promises of the gospel. This assuredly includes trust in its very essence, and this is called "saving faith" by way of eminence, since it is the faith that saves, and since only through

this as their principle, are any other more general exercises of saving faith possible.

19. How may the fact that saving faith includes trust be proved from the language of Scripture?

The uniform and single condition of salvation presented in the Scriptures is expressed in the words believe in or on Christ, εἰς or ἐπί τὸν χριστὸν, John vii., 38; Acts ix., 42; xvi., 31; Gal. ii., 16. To believe in or on a person necessarily implies trust as well as credit.

The same is abundantly proved by the usage with respect to the phrases "by faith in or on Christ," 2 Tim. iii., 15; Acts xxvi., 18; Gal. iii., 26; Heb. xi., 1. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, but the foundation of hope is trust.

20. How may the same be proved from those expressions which are used in Scripture as equivalent to the phrase "believing in Christ?"

"Receiving Christ," John i., 12; Col. ii., 6. "Looking to Christ," Is. xlv., 22; compare Num. xxi., 9, with John iii., 14, 15. "Flying to Christ for refuge," Heb. vi., 18. "Coming to Christ," John vi., 35; Matt. xi., 28. "Committing," 2 Tim. i., 12. All these illustrate as well as designate the act of saving faith, and all equally imply trust as an essential element, for we can "receive," or "come to," or "look to" Christ only in that character of a propitiation, an advocate and a deliverer, in which he offers himself to us.

21. How may the same be proved from the effects which the Scriptures ascribe to faith?

The Scriptures declare that by faith the Christian "embraces the promises," "is persuaded of the promises," "out of weakness is made strong," "waxes valiant in fight," "confesses himself a stranger and pilgrim seeking a better country." As faith in a threatening necessarily involves fear, so faith in a promise necessarily involves trust.

Besides, faith rests upon the trustworthiness of God, and therefore necessarily involves trust, Heb. x., 23, and the whole of the 11th chapter.

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22. How may it be shown that this view of faith does not confound faith and hope?

To our doctrine that saving faith involves trust, the Romanist objects that this confounds faith and hope, which the Scriptures distinguish (1 Cor. xiii., 13), since hope is only strong trust. But hope is not merely strong trust. Trust rests upon the grounds of assurance, while hope reaches forward to the object of which assurance is given. Trust is the foundation of hope. Hope is the fruit of trust. The more confiding the trust, the more assured the hope.

23. What are the different opinions as to the relation between faith and love?

Ist. The Romanists, in order to maintain their doctrine that faith alone is not saving, distinguish between a formed, or perfect, and an unformed faith. They acknowledge that faith is distinct from love, but maintain that love is essential to render faith meritorious and effectual as the instrument of our salvation.

2d. Some have regarded love as the root out of which faith

springs.

3d. The true view is that love is the immediate and necessary effect of faith. Faith includes the spiritual apprehension of the beauty and excellence of the truth, and an act of the will embracing it and relying upon it. Yet these graces can not be analytically separated, since they mutually involve one another. There can be no love without faith, nor any faith without love. Faith apprehends the loveliness of the object, the heart spontaneously loves it. Thus "faith works by love," since these affections are the source of those motives that control the will.

The Romish doctrine is inconsistent with the essential principles of the gospel. Faith is not a work, nor can it have, when formed or unformed, any merit, it is essentially a self-emptying act, which saves by laying hold of the merits of Christ. It leads to works, and proves itself by its fruits, but in its relation to justification it is in its very nature a strong protest against the merits of all human works, Gal. iii., 10, 11; Eph. ii., 8, 9.

The Protestant doctrine that love is the fruit of faith is established by what the Scriptures declare concerning faith, that it "sanctifies," "works by love," "overcomes the world," Gal. v.,

6; Acts xxvi., 18; 1 John v., 4. This is accomplished thus—by faith we are united to Christ, Eph. iii., 17, and so become partakers of his Spirit, 1 John iii., 24, one of the fruits of the Spirit is love, Gal. v., 22, and love is the principle of all obedience, Rom. xiii., 10.

24. What is the object of saving faith?

The spiritual illumination of the understanding and renewal of the affections, which lays the foundation for the souls acting faith in any one portion of the testimony of God, lays the foundation for its acting faith in all that testimony. The whole revealed word of God, then, as far as known to the individual, to the exclusion of all traditions, doctrines of men, and pretended private revelations, is the object of saving faith. That particular act of faith, however, which unites to Christ, called, by way of distinction, justifying faith, has for its object the person and work of Christ as Mediator, John vii., 38; Acts xvi., 31.

25. What is meant by an article of faith as distinguished from a matter of opinion?

The Romanists hold that every dogma decided by the church to be true, whether derived from Scripture or tradition, is, upon pain of damnation, to be believed by every Christian as an article of faith, if known to him by an explicit, if not known by an implicit faith. On the other hand, with respect to all subjects not decided by the church, every man is left free to believe or not as a matter of opinion.

26. What is the Anglican or Puseyite criterion for distinguishing those doctrines which must be known and believed in order to salvation?

They agree with the Romanists (see above, question 6) that knowledge is not essential to faith. As to the rule of faith, however, they differ. The Romanist makes that rule the teaching of the Papal church. The Puseyites, on the other hand, make it the uniform testimony of tradition running in the line of the succession of apostolic bishops.

27. What is the common Protestant doctrine as to fundamen-

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tals in religion, and by what evidence can such fundamentals be ascertained?

Every doctrine taught in the Bible is the object of an enlightened spiritual faith. No revealed principle, however comparatively subordinate, can be regarded as indifferent, nor may be adopted or rejected at will. Every man is bound to credit the whole testimony of God. Yet the gospel is a logically consistent system of truth, some of whose principles are essential to its integrity, while others are essential only to its symmetry and perfection, and ignorance, feebleness of logical comprehension and prejudice may, and constantly do, lead good men to apprehend this system of truth imperfectly.

A fundamental doctrine, then, is either one which every soul must apprehend more or less clearly in order to be saved, or one which, when known, is so clearly involved with those the knowledge and belief of which is essential to salvation, that the one

can not be rejected while the other is really believed.

A fundamental doctrine is ascertained—

1st. In the same way that the essential principles of any other system are determined by their bearing upon the system as a whole.

2d. Every fundamental doctrine is clearly revealed.

3d. These doctrines are in Scripture itself declared to be essential, John iii., 18; Acts xvi., 31; 2 Cor. v., 17; Gal. ii. 21; 1 John i., 8.

28. What is the object of that specific act of faith whereby we are justified?

The person and work of the Lord Jesus Christ as Mediator.

This is proved—

1st. The Scriptures expressly declare that we are justified by that faith of which Christ is the object, Rom. iii., 22, 25; Gal. ii., 16; Phil. iii., 9.

2d. We are said to be saved by faith in Christ, John iii., 16,

36; Acts x., 43; xvi., 31.

3d. Justifying faith is designated as a "looking to Christ," a "coming to Christ," etc., John i., 12; vi., 35, 37; Isa. xlv., 22.

4th. Rejection of Christ; a refusal to submit to the righteous-

ness of God is declared to be the ground of reprobation, John viii., 24; iii., 18, 19.

29. How is the Romish doctrine on this point opposed to the Protestant?

The Romanists, confounding justification and sanctification, hold that faith justifies through the sanctifying power of the truth. As all revealed truth has this sanctifying virtue, it follows that the whole revelation of God as ascertained by the decisions of the church, is the object of justifying faith. This is refuted by all we have established from Scripture concerning justification, sanctification, and faith.

30. Is Christ in all his offices, or only as priest, the immediate object of justifying faith?

In this act the believer appropriates and rests upon Christ as Mediator, which includes at once all his functions as such. These may be analytically distinguished, but in fact they are always inseparably united in him. When he acts as prophet he teaches as king and priest. When he reigns he sits as prophet and priest upon his throne. Besides this, his prophetical and kingly work are consciously needed by the awakened soul, and are necessarily apprehended as inseparable from his priestly work in the one act of faith.

It is true, however, that as the substitutionary work which Christ accomplished as priest is the meritorious ground of our salvation, so his priestly character is made the more prominent, both in the teachings of Scripture and in the experience of his people.

31. How far is peace of conscience and peace with God a necessary consequence of faith?

Peace with God is reconciliation with him. Peace of conscience may either mean consciousness of that reconciliation, or the appearement of our own consciences which condemn us. Faith in every instance secures our peace with God, since it unites us to Christ, Rom. v., 1; and in the proportion in which faith in the merits of Christ is clear and constant will be our consciousness

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of reconciliation with God, and the satisfaction of our own moral sense that righteousness is fulfilled, while we are forgiven. Yet as faith may be obscured by sin, so the true believer may temporarily fall under his Father's displeasure, and lose his sense of forgiveness and his moral satisfaction in the perfection of the atonement.

32. What are the three views entertained as to the relation between faith and assurance?

Ist. The Reformers generally maintained that justifying faith consisted in appropriating the promise of salvation through Christ made in the gospel, *i. e.*, in regarding God as propitious to us for Christ's sake. Thus the very act of faith involves assurance.

2d. Some have held that assurance in this life is unattainable.

3d. The true view is that "although this infallible assurance does not belong to the essence of faith, but that a true believer may wait long and conflict with many difficulties before he partake of it, yet being enabled by the Spirit to know the things which are freely given him by God, he may, without extraordinary revelation, in the right use of ordinary means attain thereunto. And, therefore, it is the duty of each one to give diligence to make his calling and election sure." It is agreed by all that a true faith can not admit of any doubt as to its object. What is believed is assuredly believed. But the object of saving faith is Christ and his work as Mediator guaranteed to us in the promises of the gospel on the condition of faith. True faith does, therefore, essentially include the assurance, 1st, that Christ is able to save us. 2d. That he is faithful and will save us if we believe. It is meant that this is of the essence of faith, not that every true believer always enjoys a state of mind which excludes all doubt as to Christ's power or love; because the spiritual illumination upon which faith rests is often imperfect in degree and variable in exercise. Faith may be weak, or it may be limited by doubt, or it may alternate with doubt. Yet all such doubt is of sin, and is alien to the essential nature of faith. But the condition, if we believe, upon which all assurance of our own salvation is suspended, is a matter not of revelation, but of experience, not of faith, but of consciousness.

Theologians have, therefore, made a distinction between the assurance of faith, Heb. x., 22, and the assurance of hope, Heb. vi. 11. The first is of the essence of saving faith, and is the assurance that Christ is all that he professes to be, and will do all that he promises. The second is the assurance of our own personal salvation, is a fruit of faith, and one of the higher attainments of the Christian life.

33. How may it be proved that assurance of our own personal salvation is not essential to saving faith?

Ist. From the true object of saving faith as given above. 2d. From the examples given in the Scriptures of eminent saints who doubted with regard to themselves, 1 Cor. ix., 27. 3d. From the exhortations addressed to those who were already believers to attain to assurance as a degree of faith beyond that which they already enjoyed. 4th. From the experience of God's people in all ages.

34. How may it be proved that assurance is attainable in this life?

Ist. This is directly asserted, Rom. viii., 16; 2 Pet. i., 10; 1 John ii., 3; iii., 14; v., 13. 2d. Scriptural examples are given of its attainment, 2 Tim. i., 12; iv., 7, 8. 3d. Many eminent Christians have enjoyed an abiding assurance, of the genuineness of which their holy walk and conversation was an indubitable seal.

35. On what grounds may a man be assured of his salvation?

"It is an infallible assurance of faith, founded, Ist, upon the divine truth of the promises of salvation; 2d, the inward evidence of those graces unto which those promises are made, and, 3d, the testimony of the spirit of adoption, Rom. viii., 15, 16, witnessing with our spirits that we are the children of God. Which Spirit, Eph. i., 13, 14; 2 Cor. i., 21, 22, is the earnest of our inheritance whereby we are sealed to the day of redemption."—Con. of Faith, Chap. XVIII.

This genuine assurance may be distinguished from that presumptuous confidence which is a delusion of Satan, chiefly by these marks. True assurance, 1st, begets unfeigned humility, 1 Cor. xv., 10; Gal. vi., 14; 2d, leads to ever-increasing diligence

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in practical religion, Ps. li., 12, 13, 19; 3d, to candid self-examination, and a desire to be searched and corrected by God, Ps. exxxix., 23, 24; 4th, to constant aspirations after nearer conformity, and more intimate communion with God, 1 John iii., 2, 3.

36. How may it be shown that a living faith necessarily leads to good works?

1st. From the nature of faith. It is the spiritual apprehension and the voluntary embrace of the whole truth of God, the promises, the commands, the threatenings of the Scripture viewed as true and as good. This faith occasions, of course, the exercise of the renewed affections, and love acted out is obedience. Each separate truth thus apprehended produces its appropriate effect upon the heart, and consequently upon the life.

2. The testimony of Scripture, Acts xv., 9; xxvi., 18; Gal.

v., 6; James ii. 18; 1 John v., 4.

3. The experience of the universal church.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

UNION OF BELIEVERS WITH CHRIST.

1. To whom are all men united in their natural estate?

To Adam. Our union with him includes, 1st, his federal headship under the covenant of works, Rom. v., 12-19. 2d. His natural headship, as per force of ordinary generation, the source of our nature, and of its moral corruptions, Gen. v., 3; 1 Cor. xv., 49.

But the law upon which rested the covenant of works, whereby we were held in union with Adam, having been slain by Christ, "that being dead wherein we were held," we were "married to another," that is, to Christ, Rom. vii., 1—4.

2. What is the general nature of our union with Christ?

It is a single, ineffable, and most intimate union, presenting to our view two different aspects, and giving rise to two different classes of consequents.

1st. The first aspect of this union is its federal and representative character, whereby Christ, as the second Adam, (1 Cor. xv., 22,) assumes in the covenant of grace those broken obligations of the covenant of works which the first Adam failed to discharge, and fulfills them all in behalf of all his "sheep," "they whom the Father has given him." The consequences which arise from our union with Christ under this aspect of it are such as the imputation of our sins to him, and of his righteousness to us, and all of the forensic benefits of justification and adoption, etc.—See Chaps. XXX., XXXI.

2d. The second aspect of this union is its spiritual and vital character, the nature and consequences of which it is our business to discuss under the present head.

• 3. What is the foundation of this union?

The eternal purpose of the triune God, expressed in the decree of election (we were chosen in him before the foundation of the world, Eph. i., 4), providing for its own fulfilment in the covenant of grace between the Father as God absolute, and the Son as Mediator, John xvii., 2-6; Gal. ii., 20; in the incarnation of the Son, whereby he assumed fellowship with us in community of nature, and became our brother, Heb. ii., 16, 17; and in the mission and official work of the Spirit of Christ (1 John iv., 13), through the powerful operation of whom in the bodies and souls of his people the last Adam is made a quickening spirit (1 Cor. xv., 45), and they are all constituted the body of Christ and members in particular, 1 Cor. xii., 27

4. By what analogies drawn from earthly relations is this union of believers with Christ illustrated in Scripture?

The technical designation of this union in theological language is "mystical," because it so far transcends all the analogies of earthly relationships, in the intimacy of its communion, in the transforming power of its influence, and in the excellence of its consequences. Yet Holy Scripture illustrates different aspects of this fountain of graces by many apt though partial analogies.

As, 1st, foundation of a building and its superstructure, 1 Pet. ii., 4, 6. 2d. Tree and its branches, John xv., 5. 3d. Head and members of the body, Eph. iv., 15, 16. 4th. Husband and wife, Eph. v., 31, 32; Rev. xix, 7-9. 5th. Adam and his descendants, in both their federal and natural relations, Rom. v., 12-19; 1 Cor. xv., 21-49

5. What is the essential nature of this union?

On the one hand, this union does not involve any mysterious confusion of the person of Christ with the persons of his people; and on the other hand, it is not such a mere association of separate persons as exists in human societies. But it is a union which, 1st, determines our legal status on the same basis with his. 2d. Which revives and sustains, by the influence of his in-

dwelling Spirit, our spiritual life, from the fountain of his life, and which transforms our bodies and souls into the likeness of his glorified humanity.

It is, therefore—

1st. A spiritual union. Its actuating source and bond is the Spirit of the head, who dwells and works in the members, 1 Cor. vi., 17; xii., 13; 1 John iii., 24; iv., 13.

2d. A vital union, i. e., our spiritual life is sustained and determined in its nature and movement by the life of Christ, through the indwelling of his Spirit, John xiv., 19; Gal. ii., 20.

3d. It embraces our entire persons, our bodies through our spirits, 1 Cor. vi., 15, 19.

4th. It is a legal or federal union, so that all of our legal or covenant responsibilities rest upon Christ, and all of his legal or covenant merits accrue to us.

5th. It is an indisoluble union, John x., 28; Rom. viii., 35, 37; 1 Thes. iv., 14, 17.

6th. This union is between the believer and the person of the God-man in his office as Mediator. Its immediate organ is the Holy Spirit, who dwells in us, and through him we are virtually united to and commune with the whole Godhead, since he is the Spirit of the Father as well as of the Son, John xiv., 23; xvii., 21, 23.

6. How is this union between Christ and the Christian established?

It was established in the purpose and decree of God, and in the covenant of the Father with the Son from eternity, Eph. i., 4; John xvii., 2, 6. Nevertheless, the elect, as to personal character and present relations, before their effectual calling by the Spirit, are born and continued "by nature children of wrath even as others," and "strangers to the covenants of promise," Eph. ii., 3, 12. In God's appointed time with each individual of his chosen, this union is established mutually, 1st. By the commencement of the effectual and permanent workings of the Holy Spirit within them, (they are quickened together with Christ); in the act of the new birth opening the eyes and renewing the will, and thus laying in their natures the foundation of

the exercise of saving faith. 2d. Which faith is the second bond by which this mutual union is established, by the continued actings of which their fellowship with Christ is sustained, and its blessed consequences developed, Eph. iii., 17. Thus we "come to him," "receive him," "eat of his flesh and drink of his blood," etc.

7. What are the consequences of this union to the believer?

1st. They have a community with him in his covenant standing, and rights. Forensically they are rendered "complete in him." His righteousness and his Father is theirs. They receive the adoption in him, and are accepted as to both their persons and services in the beloved. They are sealed by his Holy Spirit of promise; in him obtain an inheritance; sit with him on his throne and behold his glory, Rom. viii., 1; Col. ii., 10; Eph. i., 6, 11, 13; Phil, iii., 8, 9.

As Mediator, Jesus is "the Christ" anointed one, and the believer is the Christian or receiver of "the unction," Acts xi., 26; 1 John ii., 20. His mediatorial office embraces three principal functions, (1.) That of prophet, and in fellowship with him the believer is a prophet, John xvi., 13; 1 John ii., 27. (2.) That of priest, and the believer also is a priest in him, Isa. lxi. 6; 1 Pet. ii., 5; Rev. xx., 6. (3.) That of king, and in him the believer is a king, 1 Pet. ii., 9; Rev. iii., 21; v., 10.

2d. They have fellowship with him in the transforming, assimilating power of his life, making them like him; every grace of Jesus reproducing itself in them; "of his fulness we have all received, and grace for grace." This holds true, (1.) with regard to our souls, Rom. viii., 9; Phil. ii., 5; 1 John iii., 2; (2.) with regard to our bodies, causing them to be now the temples of the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. vi., 17, 19; and his resurrection to be the cause of ours, and his glorified body to be the type of ours, Rom. vi., 5; 1 Cor. xv., 47, 49; Phil. iii., 21. And thus believers are made to bear fruit in Christ, both in their bodies and spirits, which are his, John xv., 5; 2 Cor. xii., 9; 1 John i., 6.

3d. This leads to their fellowship with Christ in their experience, in their labors, sufferings, temptations, and death, Gal. vi., 17; Phil. iii., 10; Heb. xii., 3; 1 Pet. iv., 13. Thus ren-

dering sacred and glorious even our earthly life.

4th. Also to Christ's rightful fellowship with them in all they possess, Prov. xix., 17; Rom. xiv., 8; 1 Cor., vi., 19, 20.

5th. Also to the consequence that, in the spiritual reception of the holy sacraments, they do really hold fellowship with him. They are "baptized into Christ," Gal. iii., 27. "The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ; the cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ," 1 Cor. x., 16; xi., 26; John vi., 51-56.

6th. This leads also to the fellowship of believers with one another through him, that is, to the communion of saints.

8. What is the nature of that "communion of saints" which springs from the union of each saint with the Lord?

See Confession of Faith, Chapter XXVI. Believers being all united to one head are, of course, through him mutually related in the same community of spirit, life, status, and covenanted privileges with one another.

This involves upon the part of all believers—

1st. Reciprocal obligations and offices according to the special grace vouchsafed to each. Like the several organs of the body all have part in the same general life, yet each has his own individual difference of qualification, and consequently of duty; "for the body is not one member but many," 1 Cor. xii., 4-21; Eph. iv., 11-13.

2d. They have fellowship in each others gifts and complementary graces, each contributing his special loveliness to the beauty of the whole, Eph. iv., 15, 16.

3d. These reciprocal duties have respect to the bodies and temporal interests of the brethren as well as to those which concern the soul, Gal. ii., 10; 1 John iii., 16-18.

4th. They have fellowship in faith and doctrine, Acts. ii., 42; Gal. ii., 9.

5th. In mutual respect and subordination, Rom. xii., 10; Eph. v., 21; Heb. xiii, 17.

6th. In mutual love and sympathy, Rom. xii., 10; 1 Cor. xii., 26.

7th. This fellowship exists unbroken between believers on earth and in heaven. There is one "whole family in heaven and on earth," Eph. iii., 15.

8th. In glory this communion of saints shall be perfected, when there is "one fold and one shepherd," when all saints shall be one as Father and Son are one, John x., 16; xvii., 22.

CHAPTER XXIX.

REPENTANCE.

1. What are the words used in the original to express this change of mind and feeling?

1st. μεταμέλεσθαι, from μέλομαι, to care for; combined with μετά, to change ones care. This is used only five times in the New Testament.

2d. μετανοείν, from νοέω, to perceive, understand, consider; combined with μετά, to change ones mind or purpose. This is the verb constantly used in the New Testament to designate this change.

3d. From the same source comes the noun $\mu\epsilon\tau\acute{a}\nu o\iota a$, repentance, change of mind or purpose. In the New Testament usage of these words the idea of sorrow and contrition is included.

. 2. What is saving repentance?

See Con. Faith, Chap. XV. Larger Cat., Q. 76. Shorter Cat., Q. 87.

It includes, 1st, a sense of personal guilt, pollution and help-lessness. 2d. An apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ. 3d. Grief and hatred of sin, a resolute turning from it unto God, and a persistent endeavor after a new life of holy obedience.

3. Prove that repentance is a grace or gift of God.

1st. This is evident from the nature of repentance itself. It includes (1.) sense of the hatefulness of sin, (2.) sense of the beauty of holiness, (3.) apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ. It, therefore, presupposes faith, which is God's gift, Gal. v., 22; Eph. ii., 8.

2. The Scriptures expressly affirm it, Zech. xii., 10; Acts v., 31; xi., 18; 2 Tim. ii., 25.

4. What is the nature of that sense of sin which is an essential element of repentance?

That spiritual illumination and renewal of the affections which is effected in regeneration, brings the believer to see and appreciate the holiness of God as revealed alike in the law and the gospel, Rom. iii., 20; Job xlii., 6, and in that light to see and feel also the exceeding sinfulness of all sin, and the utter sinfulness of his own nature just as it is in truth. This sense of sin, thus corresponding to the facts of the case, includes, 1st, consciousness of guilt, i. e., exposure to righteous punishment, as opposed to the justice of God, Ps. li., 4, 9. 2d. Consciousness of pollution as opposed to the holiness of God, Ps. li., 5, 7, 10; and, 3d, consciousness of helplessness, Ps. li., 11; eix., 22. See Way of Life.

5. What are the fruits and evidences of this sense of sin?

A sense of guilt, especially when coupled with a sense of help-lessness, will naturally excite apprehension of danger. This painful feeling is experienced in infinitely various degrees and modifications, as determined by natural temperament, education, and the special dealings of the Holy Spirit. These legal fears, however, are common both to false and to true repentance, and possess no sanctifying influence.

A sense of pollution leads to shame when we think of God,

and to self-loathing when we think of ourselves.

Confession of sin, both in private to God and before men, is a natural and indispensible mode in which this sense of sin will give genuine expression to itself, Ps. xxxii., 5, 6; Prov. xxviii., 13; James v., 16; 1 John i., 9.

The only indubitable test of the genuineness of such a sense of sin, however, is an earnest and abiding desire and endeavor to

be delivered from it.

6. Show that an apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ is essential to repentance.

1st. The awakened conscience echoes God's law, and can be appeased by no less a propitiation than that demanded by divine justice itself, and until this is realized in a believing application to Christ, either indifference must stupify, or remorse must torment the soul.

2d. Out of Christ God is a consuming fire, and an inextinguishable dread drives the soul away, Deut. iv., 24; Heb. xii., 29.

3d. A sense of the amazing goodness of God to us in the gift of his Son, and of our ungrateful requital of it, is necessary to excite in the repentant soul the proper shame and sorrow for sin as committed against God, Ps. li., 4.

4th. This is proved by the teachings and examples furnished

in Scripture, Ps. li., 1; exxx., 4.

7. What is the nature of that "turning unto God" which constitutes the essence of genuine repentance?

It is a voluntary forsaking of sin as evil and hateful, with sincere sorrow, humiliation, and confession; and a returning unto God, because he has a right to us, and because he is merciful and willing to forgive, together with a determination to live, by the help of his grace, in obedience to his commandments.

8. What are the evidences of genuine repentance?

1st. The agreement of our own internal experience with the teachings of the word of God on this subject. This is to be determined by the prayerful study of the Scriptures in connection with self-examination. 2d. The permanent effects realized in the life. These are the hatred and forsaking of secret as well as of open sins, the choice of God's service as both right and desirable, public confession, and entire practical consecration. "These things must be in us and abound," 2 Cor. vii., 11.

9. What are the relations which the ideas represented by the terms "faith," "repentance," "regeneration" and "conversion" mutually sustain to one another?

Regeneration is the ineffable act of God implanting a new nature. The term conversion is used generally to express the first exercises of that new nature in ceasing from the old life and commencing the new. Faith designates the primary act of the new nature, and also that permanent state or habit of mind which continues the essential condition of all other graces. It is the spiritual apprehension of the truth by the mind, and the loyal embrace of the truth by the will, without which there can be neither love, hope, peace, joy, nor repentance. The common sense attached to the

word repentance is very similar to that attached to the word conversion, but it differs from it as to its usage in two particulars. Ist. Conversion is the more general term, and is used to include the first exercises of faith, as well as all those experiences of love of holiness and hatred of sin, etc., which are consequent upon it. Repentance is more specific, and expresses that hatred and renunciation of sin, and that turning unto God which accompanies faith as its consequent. 2d. Conversion is generally used to designate only the first actings of the new nature at the commencement of a religious life, or at most the first steps of a return to God after a notable backsliding, Luke xxii., 32. While repentance is applied to that constant bearing of the cross which is one main characteristic of the believer's life on earth, Ps. xix., 12, 13; Luke ix., 23; Gal., vi., 14; v., 24.

10. What doctrine concerning repentance was taught by many of the Reformers?

Some of them defined repentance as consisting, 1st, of mortification, or dying unto sin; and, 2d, of vivification, or living unto God. This corresponds to our view of sanctification. The Lutherans make repentance to consist in, 1st, contrition, or sorrow for sin; and, 2d, in faith in the gospel, or absolution.—Augsburg Conf., Art. 12. This, although a peculiar phraseology, is the true view.

11. What in general terms is the Romish doctrine of penance?

They distinguish penance, 1st, as a virtue, equivalent to the Protestant doctrine of the grace of repentance. 2d. As a sacrament. Penance, as a virtue, is internal, or a change of mind, including sorrow for sin and turning unto God. External penance, or the outward expression of the internal state, is that which constitutes the sacrament of penance. The matter of this sacrament is constituted by the acts of the penitent in the way of contrition, of confession, and of satisfaction. Contrition is sorrow and detestation of past sins, with a purpose of sinning no more. Confession is self-accusation to a priest having jurisdiction and the power of the keys. Satisfaction is some painful work imposed by the priest, and performed by the penitent to satisfy justice for sins committed. The form of the sacrament is

the absolution pronounced judicially, and not merely declaratively, by the priest. They hold "that it is only by means of this sacrament that sins committed after baptism can be forgiven."—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. V., Qu. 12 and 13.

12. How may it be proved that it is not a sacrament?

1st. It was not instituted by Christ. The Scriptures teach nothing concerning it. 2d. It is an essential consequent of the false theory of baptismal regeneration. 3d. It does not either signify, seal, or convey the benefits of Christ and the new covenant.—See below, Chap. XXXVIII., questions 2–5.

13. What is their doctrine concerning confession?

Confession is self-accusation to a priest having jurisdiction and the power of the keys. All sins must be confessed without reserve, and in all their details and qualifying circumstances. If any mortal sin is not confessed, it is not pardoned, and if the omission is willful, it is sacrilege, and greater guilt is incurred. Cat. Rom., Pt. II., Chap. V., Qu. 33, 34 and 42.

14. What are the Protestant arguments against auricular confession?

1st. It has no warrant in Scripture. The command is to

"confess one to another."

2d. It perverts the whole plan of salvation, by making necessary the mediation of the priest between the Christian and Christ, which has been refuted above, Chap. XXI., questions 8 and 21.

3d. We are commanded to confess to God immediately, Matt.

xi., 28; 1 Tim. ii., 5; 1 John i., 9.

4th. The practical results of this system have always been evil, and this gross invasion of all the sacred rights of personality is revolting to every refined soul.

15. What is the nature of that absolution which the Romish priests claim the power to grant?

It absolves judicially, not merely declaratively, from all the penal consequences of the sins confessed by the authority of Jesus

Christ. They appeal to Matt. xvi., 19; xviii., 18; John xx., 22, 23.—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. V., Qu. 13 and 17. Council of Trent, Sess. XIV., De Pœnitentia Can. IX.

16. What are the arguments against the possession upon the part of the Christian ministry of such a power to absolve?

1st. The Christian ministry is not a priesthood.—See above,

Chap. XXI., question 21.

2d. But even if it were, the conclusion which the Papists draw from it would not follow. Absolution is a sovereign, not a priestly act. This is plain, from the definition of the priesthood given, (Heb. v., 1-6,) from the Levitical practice, and from the very nature of the act itself.

3d. The grant of the power of the keys, whatever it was, was not made to the ministry as such, for in Matt. xviii., 1–18, Christ was addressing the body of the disciples, and the primitive ministers never either claimed or exercised the power in question.

4th. The power of absolute forgiveness is incommunicable in itself, and was not granted as a matter of fact; the words in question will not bear that sense, and were not so understood. The practice of the apostles shows that their understanding of the words was that they conveyed merely the power of declaring the conditions on which God would pardon sin, and in accordance with that declaration, of admitting or excluding men from sealing ordinances.

5th. This one false principle makes Christ of none effect, and

perverts the whole gospel.—Bib. Rep., Jan. 1845.

17. What is the Romish doctrine concerning satisfaction as a part of penance?

By satisfaction is meant such works as are enjoined by the priest upon confession, which being set over against the sins confessed, for which contrition has been professed, are supposed to constitute a compensation for the breach of God's law, and in consideration of which the sins are forgiven.—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. V., Qu. 52 and 53. Council of Trent, Sess. XIV., De Pœnitentia Cans. XII.—XIV.

This doctrine logically involves two great errors.

1st. That Christ's atonement does not render perfect satisfaction for all sins, original and actual, those committed as well after as before baptism.

2d. That any thing we can do or suffer temporarily can satisfy for sin. Every sin incurs the penalty of the law, which is eternal death. These works of satisfaction are, moreover, commanded duties, or they are not. If they are, then the performance of one duty can never satisfy for the neglect of another, nor for the transgression of the law. If they are not, then they are only a form of will-worship, which God abhors, Col. ii., 20–23.

CHAPTER XXX.

JUSTIFICATION.

1. What is the sense in which the word δίκαιος, just, is used in the New Testament?

Its fundamental idea is that of perfect conformity to all the requirements of the moral law.

1st. Spoken of things or actions, Matt. xx., 4; Col. iv., 1.

2d. Spoken of persons (1.) as personally holy, conformed to the law in character, Matt. v., 45; ix., 13. (2.) In respect to their possessing eminently some one quality demanded by the law, Matt. i., 19; Luke xxiii., 50. (3.) As forensically just, i. e., as conformed to the requirements of the law as the condition of the covenant of life, Rom. i., 17. (4.) Spoken of God in respect to his possession of the attribute of distributive justice in administering the provisions of the law and the covenants, Rom. iii., 26; 1 John i., 9. (5.) Spoken of Christ in respect to his character as the only perfect man, and to his representative position in satisfying all the demands of the law in behalf of his people, Acts iii., 14; vii., 52; xxii., 14.

2. What is the usage of the verb δικαιόω, to justify, in the New Testament?

It means to declare a person to be just.

1st. Personally conformed to the law as to moral character, Luke vii., 29; Rom. iii., 4.

2d. Forensically, that is, that the demands of the law as a condition of life are fully satisfied with regard to him, Acts xiii., 39; Rom. v., 1, 9; viii., 30-33; 1 Cor. vi., 11; Gal. ii. 16; iii., 11.

3. How can it be proved that the word δικαιό ω is used in a

forensic sense when the Scriptures use it with reference to the justification of sinners under the gospel?

1st. In many instances it can bear no other sense. The ungodly are said to be justified without the deeds of the law, by the blood of Christ, by faith, freely, and of grace, through the agency of an advocate, by means of a satisfaction and of imputed right-eousness, Rom. iii., 20-28; iv., 5-7; v., 1; Gal. ii., 16; iii., 11; v., 4; 1 John ii., 2.

2d. It is used as the contrary of condemnation, Rom. viii.,

33, 34.

3d. The same idea is conveyed in many equivalent and interchangeable expressions, John iii., 18; v., 24; Rom. iv., 6, 7; 2 Cor. v., 19.

4th. If it does not bear this meaning, there is no distinction between justification and sanctification.—Turrettin, L. XVI., Questio 1.

4. What is the usage of the term δικαιοσύνη, righteousness, and of the phrase "righteousness of God," in the New Testament?

The term "just" is concrete, designating the person who is perfectly conformed to the law, or in respect to whom all the demands of the law are completely satisfied. The term "righteousness," on the other hand, is abstract, designating that quality or that obedience or suffering which satisfies the demands of the law, and which constitutes the ground upon which justification proceeds.

Consequently, it sometimes signifies, 1st, holiness of character, Matt. v., 6; Rom vi, 13; 2d, that perfect conformity to the law in person and life which was the original ground of justification under the covenant of works, Rom. x., 3, 5; Phil. iii., 9; Titus iii., 5; 3d, the vicarious obedience and sufferings of Christ our substitute, which he wrought in our behalf, and which, when imputed to us, becomes our righteousness, or the ground of our justification, Rom. iv., 6; x., 4; 1 Cor. i., 30; which is received and appropriated by us through faith, Rom. iii., 22; iv., 11; x., 5-10; Gal. ii., 21; Heb. xi., 7.

The phrase, "righteousness of God," occurs in Matt. vi., 33;

Rom. i., 17; iii., 5, 21, 22, 25, 26; x., 3; 2 Cor. v., 21; Phil iii., 9; James i., 20; 2 Pet. i., 1. It evidently means that perfect righteousness or satisfaction to the whole law, precept, and penalty alike, which God provides, and which God will accept, in contrast to our own imperfect services or self-inflicted penances, which God will reject, if offered as a ground of justification.

5. What is the usage of the term δ ikaí ω oi ς , justification, in the New Testament?

It occurs only in Rom. iv., 25; v., 16, 18. It signifies that relation to the law into which we are brought in consequence of the righteousness of Christ being made legally ours. We are absolved from all liability to the penalty, and the rewards promised to obedience are declared to belong to us.

6. Define justification in its gospel sense.

God, as sovereign, elected his chosen people, and gave them to his Son in the covenant of grace, and as sovereign he executes that covenant when he makes the righteousness of Christ theirs by imputation. Justification, on the other hand, is a judicial act of God proceeding upon that sovereign imputation, declaring the law to be perfectly satisfied in respect to us. This involves, 1st, pardon; 2d, restoration to divine favor, as those with regard to whom all the promises conditioned upon obedience to the commands of the law accrue. It is most strictly legal, although he sovereignly admits and credits to us a vicarious righteousness, since this vicarious righteousness is precisely in all respects what the law demands, and that by which the law is fulfilled.—See below, question 29.

7. What does the law require in order to the justification of a sinner?

The law consists essentially of a rule of duty, and of a penalty attached to take effect in case of disobedience. In the case of the sinner, therefore, who has already incurred the penalty, the law demands that, besides the rendering of perfect obedience, the penalty also should be suffered, Rom. x., 5; Gal. iii., 10-13.

8. Prove that works can not be the ground of a sinner's justification.

Paul repeatedly asserts this, (Gal. ii., 16,) and declares that we are not justified by our own righteousness, which comes by obedience to the law, Phil. iii., 9. He also proves the same by several arguments--

1st. The law demands perfect obedience. All works not perfect, therefore, lead to condemnation, and no act of obedience at one time can atone for disobedience at another, Gal. iii., 10, 21; v., 3.

2d. If we are justified by works, then Christ is dead in vain, Gal. ii., 21; v., 4.

3d. If it were of works it would not be of grace. Rom. xi., 6; Eph. ii., 8, 9.

4th. It would afford cause for boasting, Rom. iii., 27; iv., 2. 5th. He also quotes the Old Testament to prove that all men are sinners, Rom. ii., 10; that consequently they can not be justified by works, Ps. exliii., 2; Rom. iv., 7, 8. He quotes Hab. ii., 4, to prove that "the just by faith shall live;" and he cites the example of Abraham, Gal. iii., 6,

9. What are the different opinions as to the kind of works which the Scriptures teach are not sufficient for justification?

The Pelagians admit that works of obedience to the ceremonial law are of this nature, but affirm that works of obedience to the moral law are the proper and only ground of justification. Romanists admit that works wrought in the natural strength, previous to regeneration, are destitute of merit, and unavailable for justification, but they maintain that original sin and previous actual transgressions having been forgiven in baptism for Christ's sake, good works afterwards performed through grace have, in consequence of the merits of Christ, the virtue, 1st, of meriting heaven; 2d, of making satisfaction for sins. We are justified, then, by evangelical obedience.—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chapter V. Council of Trent, Sess. VI., Can. XXIV. and XXXII. Protestants deny the justifying efficiency of all classes of works equally.

10. How may it be shown that no class of works, whether ceremonial, moral, or spiritual, can justify?

1st. When the Scriptures deny that justification can be by works, the term "works" is always used generally as obedience to the whole revealed will of God, however made known. Works of obedience rendered to one law, as a ground of justification, are never contrasted with works wrought in obedience to another law, but with grace, Rom. xi., 6; iv., 4. God demands perfect obedience to his whole will as revealed to any individual man. But since every man is a sinner, justification by the law is equally impossible for all, Rom. ii., 14, 15; iii., 9, 10.

2d. The believer is justified without the deeds of the law, Rom. iii., 28, and God justifies the ungodly in Christ, Rom. iv., 5.

3d. Justification is asserted to rest altogether upon a different foundation. It is "in the name of Christ," 1 Cor. vi., 11; "by his blood," Rom. v., 9; "freely," "by his grace," "by faith," Rom. iii., 24, 28.

4th. Paul proves that instead of our being justified by good works, such works are rendered possible to us only in that new relation to God into which we are introduced by justification, Eph. ii., 8–10; Rom. 6th and 7th chapters.

11. How can James ii., 14-26, be reconciled with this doctrine?

James is not speaking of the meritorious ground of justification, but of the relation which good works sustain to a genuine faith as its fruit and evidence. The meritorious ground of justification is the righteousness of Christ, Rom. x., 4; 1 Cor. i., 30. Faith is the essential prerequisite and instrument of receiving that righteousness, Eph. ii., 8. James, in the passage cited, simply declares and argues the truth that the faith which is thus the instrumental cause of justification, is never a dead, but always a living and fruitful principle. Paul teaches the same truth often, "Faith works by love," Gal. v., 6, and "love is the fulfilling of the law," Rom. xiii., 10.

12. What do the Scriptures declare to be the true and only ground of justification?

Justification is a declaration on the part of the infinitely wise and holy God that the law is satisfied. The law is, like its Author, absolutely unchangeable, and can be satisfied by nothing

else than an absolutely perfect righteousness, at once fulfilling the precept, and suffering the penalty. This was rendered by Christ as our representative, and his perfect righteousness, as imputed to us, is the sole and strictly legal ground of our justification. Thus he is made for us the end of the law for righteousness, and we are made the righteousness of God in him, Rom. iii., 24; v., 9, 19; viii., 1; x., 4; 1 Cor. i., 30; vi., 11; 2 Cor. v., 21; Acts iii., 39.

13. How can it be proved that Christ's active obedience to the precepts of the law is included in that righteousness by which we are justified?

1st. The condition of the covenant of works was perfect obedience. This covenant having failed in the hands of the first Adam, it must be fulfilled in the hands of the second Adam, since in the covenant of grace Christ assumed all of the undischarged obligations of his people under the covenant of works. His suffering discharges the penalty, but only his active obedience fulfills the condition.

2d. All the promises of salvation are attached to obedience, not to suffering, Matt. xix., 16; Gal. iii., 12.

3d. Christ came to fulfill the whole law, Is. xlii., 21; Rom. iii. 31; -1 Cor. i., 30.

4th. The obedience of Christ is expressly contrasted with the disobedience of Adam, Rom. v., 19.

14. How may it be shown that Christ's obedience was free?

Although Christ was made under the law by being born of the woman, and rendered obedience to that law in the exercises of his created human nature, yet he did not owe that obedience for himself, but rendered it freely that its merits might be imputed to his people, because the claims of law terminate not upon nature, but upon persons; and he was always a divine person. As he suffered, the just for the unjust, so he obeyed, the Lawgiver in the place of the law-subject.

15. In what sense is Christ's righteousness imputed to believers?

Imputation is an act of God as sovereign judge, at once judicial

and sovereign, whereby he, 1st, makes the guilt, legal responsibility, of our sins really Christ's, and punishes them in him, Is. liii., 6; John i., 29; 2 Cor. v., 21; and, 2d, makes the merit, legal rights, of Christ's righteousness ours, and then treats us as persons legally invested with all those rights, Rom. iv., 6; x., 4; 1 Cor. i., 30; 2 Cor. v., 21; Phil. iii., 9.

As Christ is not made a sinner by the imputation to him of our sins, so we are not made holy by the imputation to us of his righteousness. The transfer is only of guilt from us to him, and of merit from him to us. He justly suffered the punishment due to our sins, and we justly receive the rewards due to his righteousness, 1 John i., 9.

16. Upon what ground does this imputation proceed?

Upon the union federal, spiritual, and vital, which subsists between Christ and his people. Which union, in turn, rests upon the eternal decree of election common to all the persons of the Godhead, and upon the eternal covenant of grace formed between the Father as God absolute and the Son as Mediator. Thus the ultimate ground of imputation is the eternal nature and imperial will of God, the fountain of all law and all right.

17. How may the fact of this imputation be proved from Scripture?

See Rom. v., 12-21. Compare Rom. iv., 6; iii., 21, with Rom. v., 19.

The doctrine of imputation is essentially involved in the doctrine of substitution. If Christ obeyed and suffered in our place it can only be because our sins were imputed to him, which is directly asserted in Scripture, Isa. liii., 6; 2 Cor. v., 21; 1 Pet. ii., 24; and, if so, the merit of that obedience and suffering must accrue to us, Matt. xx., 28; 1 Tim. ii., 6; 1 Pet. iii., 18. See above, Chapter XXII., question 13.

This doctrine is also taught by those passages which affirm that Christ fulfilled the law, Rom. iii., 31; x., 4; and by those which assert that we are justified by the righteousness of Christ, 1 Cor. vi., 11; Rom. viii., 1, etc.

This doctrine, moreover, stands or falls with the whole view we have presented of the priesthood of Christ, of the justice of God,

of the covenants of works and of grace, and of the nature of the atonement; to which subjects, under their respective heads, the reader is referred.

18. What are the two effects ascribed to the imputation of Christ's rightcourness?

Christ's righteousness satisfies, 1st, the penalty of the law; 2d, then the positive conditions of the covenant of works, *i. e.*, obedience to the precepts of the law. The imputation of that righteousness to the believer, therefore, secures, 1st, the remission of the penalty, pardon of sins; 2d, the recognition and treatment of the believer as one with respect to whom the covenant is fulfilled, and to whom all its promises and advantages legally accrue. See below, question 29:

19. Are the sins of believers, committed subsequently to their justification, included in the pardon which is consequent to the imputation of Christ's righteousness; and, if so, in what way?

The elect, although embraced in the purpose of God, and in his covenant with his Son from eternity, are not effectively united to Christ until the time of their regeneration, when, in consequence of their union with him, and the imputation of his right-cousness to them, their relation to the law is permanently changed. Although the immutable law always continues their perfect standard of experience and of action, it is no longer to them a condition of the covenant of life, because that covenant has been fully discharged for them by their sponsor. God no longer imputes sin to them to the end of judicial punishment. Every suffering which they henceforth endure is of the nature of chastisement, designed for their correction and improvement, and forms, in its relation to them, no part of the penalty of the law.

20. What are the different opinions as to the class of sins which are forgiven when the sinner is justified?

Romanists teach that original sin and all actual transgressions prior to baptism are forgiven for Christ's sake, through the reception of that sacrament, and that after baptism, sins, as they are committed, are through the merits of Christ forgiven in the

observance of the sacrament of penance. See above, Chapter XXIX., question 11.

Dr. Pusey has revived an ancient doctrine that in baptism all past sins, original and actual, are forgiven; but his system makes no provision for sins subsequently committed.

Many Protestants have held that only past and present sins are forgiven in the first act of justification, and that sins after regeneration, as they occur, are forgiven upon renewed acts of faith.

The true view, however, is, that in consequence of the imputation to him of Christ's righteousness, the believer is emancipated from his former *federal* relation to the law, and consequently henceforth no sin is charged to him to the end of judicial condemnation. This follows from the nature of justification, as stated above, and it is illustrated by the recorded experience of Paul, who, while complaining of the law of sin, still waring in his members, yet never doubted of his filial relation to God, nor of the forgiveness of his sins.

21. What are the different opinions as to the relation between faith and justification?

Socinians hold that faith, including obedience, is the proper meritorious ground of justification.—Cat. Rac., quest. 418–421, and 453.

Arminians teach that although faith has no merit in itself, since it is the gift of God, yet, as a living principle, including evangelical obedience, it is graciously, for Christ's merits' sake, imputed to us for righteousness, *i. e.*, accepted as righteousness, upon the ground of which we are declared just.—Limborch, Theol. Christ. 6, 4, 22, and 6, 4, 46.

The orthodox view is that the active and passive obedience of Christ satisfying both the precept and penalty of the law as a covenant of life, and thus constituting a perfect righteousness, is, upon being appropriated by the believer in the act of faith, actually made his, in a legal sense, by imputation. Faith, therefore, is the mere instrument whereby we partake in the righteousness of Christ, which is the true ground of our justification.

22. Prove from Scripture that faith is only the instrumental cause of justification.

Ist. From the nature of faith itself. (1.) It is not of ourselves, it is the gift of God, Eph. ii., 8; Phil. i., 29. (2.) It is one of the fruits of the Spirit, and, therefore, not the meritorious ground of spiritual blessings, Gal. v. 22. (3.) It is an act of the soul, and therefore a work, but though, by means of faith, justification is not by works, Rom. iv., 2-5; xi., 6. (4.) Justifying faith terminates on or in Christ, in his blood and sacrifice, and in the promises of God; in its very essence, therefore, it involves trust, and, denying its own justifying value, affirms the sole merit of that on which it trusts, Rom. iii., 25, 26; iv., 20, 22; Gal. iii., 26; Eph. i., 12, 13; 1 John v., 10. (5.) The law necessarily demands a perfect righteousness, but faith, even when combined with the evangelical obedience which springs from it, is not a perfect righteousness.

2d. The Scriptures, when referring to the relation of justification to faith, use the terms $i\kappa$ $\pi i\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, by faith, and $\delta\iota\dot{\alpha}$ $\pi i\sigma\tau\epsilon\omega\varsigma$, by or through faith, but never $\delta\iota\dot{\alpha}$ $\pi i\sigma\tau\iota\nu$, on account of faith,

Gal. ii., 16.

3d. Faith is distinguished from the righteousness which it apprehends, Rom. i., 17; Phil. iii., 8-11.—Turrettin, L. 16, Q. 7.

23. What is the specific object of justifying faith?

The Socinians, denying the divinity of Christ, make the act of justifying faith to terminate "in God through Christ."—Rac. Cat., Q. 418.

The Romanists, confounding justification and sanctification, make the whole revelation of God the object of the faith that

justifies.—Cat. Rom., Part I., Chap. 1.

The scriptural doctrine is, that while the renewed heart believes equally every ascertained word of God, the specific act of faith, whereby we are justified, terminates upon the person and work of Christ as Mediator.

This is proved, 1st, from express declarations of Scripture, Rom. iii., 22, 25; Gal. ii., 16; Phil. iii., 9. 2d. By the declaration that we are saved by believing in him, Acts x., 43; xvi., 31; John iii., 16, 36. 3d. By those figurative expressions which illustrate the act of saving faith as "looking to Christ," etc., Is. xlv., 22; John i., 12; vi., 35, 37; Matt. xi., 28. 4th. Unbelief is

the refusing the righteousness which God provides, i. e., Christ, Rom. x., 3, 4.

24. What is the nature of that peace which flows from justification?

1st. Peace with God, his justice being completely satisfied through the righteousness of Christ, Rom. v., 1; 2 Cor. v., 19; Col. i., 21; Eph. ii., 14. In witness whereof his Holy Spirit is given to us, Rom. viii., 15, 16; Heb. x., 15, 17. His love shed abroad in our hearts, Rom. v., 5, and our habitual fellowship with him established, 1 John i., 3. 2d. Inward peace of conscience, including consciousness of our reconciliation with God through the operation of his Spirit, as above, and the appearement of our self-condemning conscience through the apprehension of the righteousness by which we are justified, Heb. ix., 14; x., 2, 22.

25. What other benefits flow from justification?

Being justified on the ground of a perfect righteousness, our whole relation to God and the law is changed; the gift of the Holy Ghost, adoption, sanctification, perseverance, the working of all things together for good in this life, deliverance in death, the resurrection of the body, and final glorification, all result.

26. How may it be shown that this view of justification is not inconsistent with its free and gracious character?

See above, Chap. XXII., question 21.

27. How does the apostle show that justification by faith does not lead to licentiousness?

Prop. 1st. Where sin abounded grace did much more abound, Rom. v., 20.

Prop. 2d. Shall we conclude, therefore, that we are to continue in sin that grace may abound? God forbid. Rom. vi., 1, 2.

Prop. 3d. The federal union of the believer with Christ, which secures our justification, is the foundation of, and is inseparable from, that vital spiritual union with him, which secures our sanctification, Rom. vi., 2-7.

Prop. 4th. This method of justification, so far from leading to licentiousness, secures the only conditions under which we could be holy. (1.) This method of justification, by changing our relation to God, enables us to return to him in the way of a free, loving service, Rom. vi., 14; vii., 1-6. (2.) It alone delivers us from the spirit of bondage and fear, and gives us that of adoption and love, Rom. viii., 1-17; xiii., 10; Gal. v., 6; 1 John iv., 18; 2 John 6.

28. In what respect did the doctrine of Piscator on this subject differ from that of the Reformed Churches?

Piscator, a French Protestant divine, who flourished during the closing years of the sixteenth century, taught, 1st, that, as to his human nature, Christ was under the law in the same sense as any other creature, and that, therefore, he could only obey the law for himself; 2d, that if Christ had obeyed the law in our place, the law could not claim a second fulfillment of us, and, consequently, Christians would be under no obligations to obey the law of God; 3d, that if Christ had both obeyed the precept of the law and suffered its penalty, then the law would have been doubly fulfilled, since the claims of the precept and the penalty of the law are alternative, not coincident.

This doctrine was expressly condemned in the Reformed churches of Switzerland and Holland, and by the French synods held in the years 1603, 1612, and 1614. In 1615, however, the Synod tacitly allowed these views to pass without condemnation.—Mosheim's Hist.

29. How may it be shown that justification is not mere pardon?

Piscator erred, from failing to distinguish, 1st, that the claims of law terminate not upon natures, but upon persons. Christ was a divine person, and therefore his obedience was free. 2d. That there is an evident difference between a federal relation to the law as a condition of salvation, and a natural relation to law as a rule of life. Christ discharged the former as our federal representative. The latter necessarily attaches to the believer as to all moral agents for ever.

Justification is more than pardon. 1st. Because the very

word means to pronounce just, i. e., complete in the eye of law, and the law in its federal relation "embraced a two-fold sanction, viz., the penalty of death for transgressors, and the reward of eternal life for the obedient." 2d. That righteousness which is the ground of justification is that which satisfies law. 3d. Because we are said to be made the righteousness of God in him. 4th. We are declared not to be any longer under the law, but under grace, Rom. vi., 14; Gal. iv., 4, 5. Therefore, the whole law must have been satisfied. 5th. Because not only pardon, but peace, reconciliation, adoption, coheirship with Christ, and eternal glory, are all secured for us by the work of Christ just as much as forgiveness of sins, but these rewards were attached to the precept, not the penalty. See above, question 13. Rom. v., 1–10; Acts xxvi., 18; Rev. i., 5, 6, etc.

30. In what respect does the governmental theory of the atonement modify the doctrine of justification?

See above, Chap. XXII., question 6.

1st. It follows, from that theory, that justification is a sovereign, not a judicial act of God. Ohrist has not satisfied the law, but merely made it consistent with the government of God to set aside the law in the case of believing men.

2d. As Christ did not die as a substitute, it follows that his righteousness is not imputed; it is the occasion, not the ground

of justification.

- 3d. As Christ did not die as a substitute, there is no strictly federal union between Christ and his people, and faith can not be the instrument of salvation by being the means of uniting us to Christ, but only the arbitrary condition of justification, or the means of recommending us to God.
- 31. How does the Arminian theory as to the nature and design of the satisfaction of Christ modify the doctrine of justification?

They hold, 1st, as to the nature of Christ's satisfaction, that although it was a real propitiation rendered to justice for sins, it was not in the rigor of justice perfect, but was graciously accepted and acted on as such by God.—Limborch, Apol. Theo., 3, 22, 5. 2d. That it was not strictly the substitution of Christ in place

of his elect, but rather that he suffered the wrath of God in behalf of all men, in order to make it consistent with justice for God to offer salvation to all men upon condition of faith.

Therefore they regard justification as a sovereign, not a judicial act, 1st. In accepting the sufferings of Christ as sufficient to enable God consistently to offer to men salvation on the terms of the new covenant of grace, i. e., on the condition of faith. 2d. In imputing to the believer his faith for righteousness for Christ's sake.

This faith they make, 1st. To include evangelical obedience, i. e., the whole principle of religion in heart and life. 2d. They regard it as the graciously admitted ground, rather than the mere instrument of justification; faith being counted for right-eousness, because Christ died.—Limborch, Theo. Christ., 6, 4, 22, and 6, 4, 46.

This theory, besides being opposed by all the arguments we have above presented in establishing the orthodox doctrine, labors

under the further objections-

1st. It fails to render a clear account as to how the satisfaction of Christ makes it consistent with divine justice to save men upon the condition of faith. If Christ did not obey and suffer strictly as the substitute of his people, it is difficult to see how the justice of God, as it respects them, could have been appeared; and if he did so fulfil the demands of justice in their place, then the orthodox view, as above stated, is admitted.

2d. It fails to render a clear account of the relation of faith to justification, (1.) Because faith in Christ, including trust, necessarily implies that the merits of Christ upon which the trust terminates is the ground of justification. (2.) Faith must be either the ground or the mere instrument of justification. If it be the latter then the righteousness of Christ, which is the object of faith, is that ground. If it be the former, then what is made of the merits of Christ upon which faith rests?

32. How do the Romanists define justification?

They confound justification with sanctification. It is, 1st, the forgiveness of sins; 2d, the removal of inherent sin for Christ's sake; 3d, the positive infusion of grace.

Of this justification they teach that the final cause is the glory

of God and eternal life. The efficient cause is the power of the Holy Ghost. The meritorious cause the work of Christ. The instrumental cause baptism. The formal cause the influence of grace, whereby we are made not merely forensically but inherently righteous.—Council of Trent, Sess. VI., Chapter VII.

They define faith in its relation to justification to be the beginning of human salvation, the fountain and root of all justification, *i. e.*, of spiritual life. They consequently hold that justification is progressive, and that when a man receives a new nature in baptism, and the work of justification is commenced in him with the forgiveness and the removal of sin, the work is to be carried on by the exercise of the grace implanted, *i. e.*, by good works. Since they confound justification with sanctification, they necessarily deny that men are justified by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, or by mere faith without works.—Canon 9th and 11th de Justificatione.

They admit that justification is entirely gracious, i. e., of the mere mercy of God, and for the sake of the merits of Jesus Christ, as neither the spiritual exercises nor the works of men previous to justification have any merit whatsoever.—Council of Trent, Sess. VI., Chapter VIII.

33. What are the points of difference between Protestants and Romanists on this whole subject?

1st. As to the nature of justification. We regard it as a judicial act of God, declaring the believer to be forensically just, on the ground of the righteousness of Christ made his by imputation. They regard it as the infusion of inherent grace.

2d. As to its meritorious ground. Both say the merits of Christ. But they say these merits are made ours by sanctification. We, by imputation, through the instrumentality of faith.

3d. As to the nature and office of faith. We say that it is the instrument; they the beginning and root of justification.

4th. They say that justification is progressive.

5th. That it may be lost by mortal sin, and regained through the sacrament of penance. 34. What are the leading arguments against the Romanist view on this subject?

Ist. This whole doctrine is confused and unintelligible. (1.) It confounds under one definition two matters entirely distinct, namely, the forensic remission of the condemnation due to sin with the washing away of inherent sin, and the introduction to a state of covenant favor with God with the infusion of inherent grace. (2.) It renders no sensible account as to the manner in which the merit of Christ propitiates divine justice.

2d. Their definition is refuted by all the evidence above exhibited, that the terms "justification" and "righteousness" are

used in Scripture in a forensic sense.

3d. Their view, by making our inherent grace wrought in us by the Holy Ghost for Christ's sake the ground of our acceptance with God, subverts the whole gospel. It is of the very essence of the gospel that the ground of our acceptance with the Father is the mediatorial work of the Son, who is for us the end of the law for righteousness, and not our own graces.

4th. The Scriptures declare that on the ground of the propitiation of Christ God justifies the believer as ungodly, not as sanctified. It certainly could not require an atonement to render God both just and the sanctifier of the ungodly, Rom. iv., 5.

5th. The phrases to impute, reckon, count sin or righteousness are absolutely consistent only with a forensic interpretation. To impute righteousness without works in the forensic sense, in the 4th chapter of Romans, is reasonable. To impute inherent grace without works is nonsense.

6th. Their definition is refuted by all those arguments which establish the true view with respect to the nature and office of justifying faith. See above, questions 21-23.

CHAPTER XXXI.

ADOPTION.

1. To what classes of creatures is the term "sons," or "children of God," applied in the Scriptures, and on what grounds is that application made?

1st. In the singular it is applied, in a supreme and incommunicable sense, to the Second Person of the Trinity alone.

2d. To angels (1.) because they are God's favored creatures, (2.) because as holy intelligences they are like him, Job i., 6; xxxviii., 7.

3d. To human magistrates, because they possess authority delegated from God, and in that respect resemble him, Ps. lxxxii., 6.

4th. To good men as the subjects of a divine adoption.

This adoption, and the consequent sonship it confers is two-fold, (1.) general and external, Ex. iv., 22; Rom. ix., 4; (2.) special, spiritual and immortal, Gal. iv., 4, 5; Eph. i., 4-6.

2. What is the Adoption of which believers are the subjects in Christ; and what relation does the conception which this word represents in Scripture sustain to those represented by the terms justification, regeneration, and sanctification?

Turrettin makes adoption a constituent part of justification. He says that in execution of the covenant of grace God sovereignly imputes to the elect, upon their exercise of faith, the righteousness of Christ, which was the fulfilling of the whole law, precept as well as penalty, and therefore the legal ground, under the covenant of works, for securing to his people both remission of the penalty and a legal right to all the promises conditioned upon obedience. Upon the ground of this sovereign imputation

God judicially pronounces the law, in its federal relations, to be perfectly satisfied with regard to them, *i. e.*, he justifies them, which involves two things, 1st, the remission of the penalty due to their sins, 2d, the endowing them with all the rights and relations which accrue from the positive fulfillment of the covenant of works by Christ in their behalf. This second constituent of justification he calls adoption, which essentially agrees with the definition of adoption given in our Con. Faith, Chapter XII., L. Cat., Q. 74; S. Cat., Q. 34.—Turrettin, L. 16, Q. 4 and 6.

The definition we have given of justification, under the preceding chapter, agrees precisely with that of Turrettin, only we have not made the same application of the word adoption, because this word, as used in the Scriptures, does not appear to convey the idea of a mere forensic act of God, changing the relations of his adopted children, but rather a most excellent complex view of the believer as at once the subject of regeneration and justification together. That is, of the new creature in his new relations.

The instant a sinner is united to Christ in the exercise of faith, there is accomplished in him simultaneously and inseparably, 1st, a total change of relation to God, and to the law as a covenant; and, 2d, a change of inward condition or nature. The change of relation is represented by justification; the change of nature is represented by the term regeneration. Regeneration is an act of God originating by a new creation a new spiritual life in the heart of the subject. The first and instant act of that new creature, consequent upon his regeneration, is faith, or a believing, trusting embrace of the person and work of Christ. Upon the exercise of faith by the regenerated subject, justification is the instant act of God, on the ground of that perfect rightcoursess which the sinner's faith has apprehended, declaring him to be free from all condemnation, and to have a legal right to the relations and benefits secured by the covenant which Christ has fulfilled in his behalf. Sanctification is the progressive growth toward the perfected maturity of that new life which was implanted in regeneration. Adoption presents the new creature in his new relation; his new relations entered upon with a congenial heart, and his new life developing in a congenial home, and surrounded with those relations which foster its growth, and crown it with bless-

edness. Justification is wholly forensic, and concerns only relations, immunities, and rights. Regeneration and sanctification are wholly spiritual and moral, and concern only inherent qualities and states. Adoption comprehends the complex condition of the believer as at once the subject of both.

3. What is represented in Scripture as involved in being a child of God by this adoption?

1st. Derivation of nature from God, John i., 13; James i., 18; 1 John v., 18.

2d. Being born again in the image of God, bearing his likeness, Rom. viii., 29; 2 Cor. iii., 18; Col. iii., 10; 2 Pet. i., 4.

3d. Bearing his name, 1 John iii., 1; Rev. ii. 17; iii., 12.

4th. Being the objects of his peculiar love, John xvii., 23; Rom. v., 5-8; Titus iii., 4; 1 John iv., 7-11.

5th. The indwelling of the Spirit of his Son, (Gal. iv., 5, 6,) who forms in us a filial spirit, or a spirit becoming the children of God, obedient, 1 Pet. i., 14; 2 John 6; free from sense of guilt, legal bondage, fear of death, Rom. viii., 15, 21; 2 Cor. iii., 17; Gal. v., 1; Heb. ii., 15; 1 John v., 14; and elevated with a holy boldness and royal dignity, Heb. x., 19, 22; 1 Pet. ii., 9; iv., 14.

6th. Present protection, consolations, and abundant provisions, Ps. exxv., 2; Isa. lxvi., 13; Luke xii., 27-32; John xiv., 18; 1 Cor. iii., 21, 23; 2 Cor. i., 4.

7th. Present fatherly chastisements for our good, including both spiritual and temporal afflictions, Ps. li., 11, 12; Heb. xii., 5-11.

8th. The certain inheritance of the riches of our Father's glory, as heirs with God and joint heirs with Christ, (Rom. viii., 17; James ii., 5; 1 Pet. i., 4; iii., 7; including the exaltation of our bodies to fellowship with him, Rom. viii., 23; Phil. iii., 21.

4. What relation do the three Persons of the Trinity sustain to this adoption, and into what relation does it introduce us to each of them severally?

This adoption proceeds according to the eternal pursose of the

Father, upon the merits of the Son, and by the efficient agency of the Holy Ghost, John i., 12, 13; Gal. iv., 5, 6; Titus iii., 5, 6. By it God the Father is made our Father. The incarnate God-man is made our elder brother, and we are made, (1.) like him; (2.) intimately associated with him in community of life standing relations and privileges; (3.), joint heirs with him of his glory, Rom. viii., 17, 29; Heb. ii., 17; iv., 15. The Holy Ghost is our indweller, teacher, guide, advocate, comforter, and sanctifier. All believers, being subjects of the same adoption, are brethren, Eph. iii., 6; 1 John iii., 14; v., 1.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SANCTIFICATION.

1. What sense do the words ἄγιος, holy, and ἀγιάζειν, to sanctify, bear in the Scriptures?

The verb ἀγιάζειν is used in two distinct senses in the New Testament:

1st. To make clean physically, or morally. (1.) Ceremonial purification, Heb. ix., 13. (2.) To render clean in a moral sense, 1 Cor. vi., 11; Heb. xiii., 12. Hence the phrase "them that are sanctified" is convertible with believers, 1 Cor. i., 2.

2d. To set apart from a common to a sacred use, to devote, (1.) spoken of things, Matt. xxiii., 17; (2.) spoken of persons, John x., 36; (3.) to regard and venerate as holy, Matt. vi., 9; 1 Pet. iii., 15.

"Aylog, as an adjective, pure, holy, as a noun, saint, is also used in two distinct senses, corresponding to those of the verb.

1st. Pure, clean; (1.) ceremonially, (2.) morally, Eph. i., 4,

(3.) as a noun, saints, sanctified ones, Rom. i. 7; viii., 27.

2d. Consecrated, devoted, Matt. iv., 5; Acts vi., 13; xxi., 28; Heb. ix., 3. This word is also used in ascriptions of praise to God, John xvii., 11; Rev. iv., 8.

2. What are the different views entertained as to the nature of sanctification?

Pelagians denying original sin and the moral inability of man, and holding that sin can be predicated only of acts of the will, and not of inherent states or dispositions, consequently regard sanctification as nothing more than a moral reformation of life and habits, wrought under the influence of the truth in the natural strength of the sinner himself.

The advocates of the "exercise scheme" hold that we can find nothing in the soul than the agent and his exercises. Regeneration, therefore, is nothing more than the cessation from a series of unholy, and the inauguration of a series of holy exercises; and sanctification the maintenance of those holy exercises. One party, represented by Dr. Emmons, say that God immediately effects these holy exercises. Another party, represented by Dr. Taylor, of New Haven, held that the man himself determines the character of his own exercises by choosing God as his chief good; the Holy Spirit in some unexplained way assisting. See above, Chap. XXVI., questions 5 and 6.

3d. Many members of the Church of England, as distinguished from the evangelical party in that church, hold that a man conforming to the church, which is the condition of the Gospel covenant, is introduced to all the benefits of that covenant, and in the decent performance of relative duties and observance of the sacraments, is enabled to do all that is now required of him, and to attain to all the moral good now possible or desirable.

4th. The orthodox doctrine is that the Holy Ghost, by his constant influences upon the whole soul in all its faculties, through the instrumentality of the truth, nourishes, exercises, and develops those holy principles and dispositions which he implanted in the new birth, until by a constant progress, all sinful dispositions being mortified and extirpated, and all holy dispositions being fully matured, the subject of this grace is brought immediately upon death to the measure of the stature of perfect manhood in Christ.

Con. Faith, Chap. XIII.; L. Cat., question 75; S. Cat., question 35.

3. How can it be shown that sanctification involves more than $mere\ reformation\ ?$

See above, Chap. XXVI., question 12.

4 How may it be shown that it involves more than the production of holy exercises?

See above, Chap. XXVI., questions 7-10.

Besides the arguments presented in the chapter above referred

to, this truth is established by the evidence of those passages of Scripture which distinguish between the change wrought in the heart and the effects of that change in the actions, Matt. xii., 33-35; Luke vi., 43-45.

5. What relation does sanctification sustain to regeneration?

Regeneration is the creative act of the Holy Spirit, implanting a new principle of spiritual life in the soul. Conversion is the first exercise of that new gracious principle, in the spontaneous turning of the new born sinner to God. Sanctification is the sustaining and developing work of the Holy Ghost, bringing all the faculties of the soul more and more perfectly under the purifying and regulating influence of the implanted principle of spiritual life.

6. What is the relation which justification and sanctification sustain to each other?

In the order of nature, regeneration precedes justification, although as to time they are always necessarily cotemporaneous. The instant God regenerates a sinner he acts faith in Christ. The instant he acts faith in Christ he is justified, and sanctification, which is the work of carrying on and perfecting that which is begun in regeneration, is accomplished under the conditions of those new relations into which he is introduced by justification. In justification we are delivered from all the penal consequences of sin, and brought into such a state of reconciliation with God, and communion of the Holy Ghost, that we are emancipated from the bondage of legal fear, and endued with that spirit of filial confidence and love which is the essential principle of all acceptable obedience. Our justification, moreover, proceeds on the ground of our federal union with Christ by faith, which is the basis of that vital and spiritual union of the soul with him from whom our sanctification flows. See above, Chap. XXXI., question 2.

7. How can it be shown that this work extends to the whole man, the understanding, will, and affections?

The soul is a unit, the same single agent alike, thinking, feeling, and willing. A man can not love that loveliness which

he does not perceive, nor can he perceive that beauty, whether moral or natural, which is uncongenial to his own heart. His whole nature is morally depraved, 1st, blind or insensible to spiritual beauty; 2d, averse, in the reigning dispositions of the will, to moral right, and therefore disobedient. The order in which the faculties act is as follows: The intellect perceives the qualities of the object concerning which the mind is engaged; the heart loves those qualities which are congenial to it; the will chooses that which is loved.

This is proved, 1st, by experience. As the heart becomes more depraved the mind becomes more insensible to spiritual light. On the other hand, as the eyes behold more and more clearly the beauty of the truth, the more lively become the affections, and the more obedient the will. 2d. From the testimony of Scripture. By nature the whole man is depraved. The understanding darkened, as well as the affections and will perverted, Eph. iv., 18.

If this be so, it is evident that sanctification must also be effected throughout the entire nature. 1st. From the necessity of the case. 2d. From the testimony of Scripture, Rom. vi., 13; 2 Cor. iv., 6; Eph. i., 18; Col. iii., 10; 1 Thess. v., 23; 1 John iv., 7.

8. In what sense is the body sanctified?

1st. As consecrated, (1.) as being the temple of the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. vi., 19; (2.) hence as being a member of Christ, 1 Cor. vi., 15. 2d. As sanctified, since they are integral parts of our persons, their instincts and appetites act immediately upon the passions of our souls, and consequently these must be brought subject to the control of the sanctified soul, and all its members, as organs of the soul, made instruments of righteousness unto God, Rom., vi., 13; 1 Thess. iv., 4. 3d. It will be made like Christ's glorified body, 1 Cor. xv., 44; Phil. iii., 21.

9. To whom is the work of sanctification referred in Scripture?

1st. To the Father, 1 Thess. vi., 23; Heb. xiii., 21. 2d. To the Son, Eph. v., 25, 26; Titus ii., 14. 3d. To the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. vi., 11; 2 Thess. ii., 13.

In all external actions the three Persons of the trinity are always represented as concurring, the Father working through the Son and Spirit, and the Son through the Spirit. Hence the work of sanctification is with special prominence attributed to the Holy Spirit, since he is the immediate agent therein, and since this is his special office work in the plan of redemption.

10. What do the Scriptures teach as to the agency of the truth in the work of sanctification?

The whole process of sanctification consists in the development and confirmation of the new principle of spiritual life implanted in the soul in regeneration, conducted by the Holy Ghost in perfect conformity to, and through the operation of the laws and habits of action natural to the soul as an intelligent, moral and free agent. Like the natural faculties both of body and mind, and the natural habits which modify the actions of those faculties, so Christian graces, or spiritual habits, are developed by exercise; the truths of the gospel being the objects upon which these graces act, and by which they are both excited and directed. Thus the divine leveliness of God presented in the truth, which is his image, is the object of our complacent love; his goodness of our gratitude; his promises of our trust; his judgments of our wholesome awe, and his commandments variously exercise us in the thousand forms of filial obedience, John xvii., 19; 1 Pet, i., 22; ii., 2; 2 Pet. i., 4; James i., 18.

11. What efficiency do the Scriptures ascribe in this work to 'the sacraments?

There are three views entertained on this subject by theologians—

1st. The lowest view is, that the sacraments simply, as symbols, present the truth in a lively manner to the eye, and are effective thus only as a form of presenting the gospel objectively.

2d. The opinion occupying the opposite extreme is, that they, of their own proper efficiency, convey sanctifying grace ex opere operato, "because they convey grace by the virtue of the sacramental action itself, instituted by God for this very end, and not through the merit either of the agent (priest) or the receiver."—Bellarmine de sac., 2, 1.

- 3d. The true view is, "that the sacraments are efficacious means of grace, not merely exhibiting but actually conferring upon those who worthily receive them the benefits which they represent;" yet this efficacy does not reside properly in them, but accompanies their proper use in virtue of the divine institution and promise, through the accompaning agency of the Holy Ghost, and as suspended upon the exercise of faith upon the part of the recipient, which faith is at once the condition and the instrument of the reception of the benefit, Matt. iii., 11; Acts ii., 41; x., 47; Rom. vi., 3; I Cor. xii., 13; Titus iii., 5; 1 Pet., iii., 21.
- 12. What office do the Scriptures ascribe to faith in sanctification?

Faith is the first grace in order exercised by the soul consequent upon regeneration, and the root of all other graces in principle, Acts xv., 9; xxvi., 18. It is instrumental in securing sanctification, therefore—

1st. By securing the change of the believer's relation to God and to the law, as a condition of life and favor. See above, question 6.

- 2d. By securing his union with Christ, 1 Cor. xiii.; Gal. ii., 20; Col. iii., 3.
- 3d. It is sanctifying in its own nature, since, in its widest sense, faith is that spiritual state of the soul in which it holds living active communion with spiritual truth.
- 13. What, according to Scripture, is necessary to constitute a good work?

1st. That it should spring from a right motive, i. e., love for God's character, regard for his authority, and zeal for his glory, reigning as a permanent and controlling principle in the soul.

- 2d. That it be in accordance with his revealed law, Deut. xii., 32; Isa. i., 11, 12; Col. ii., 16-23.
- 14. What is the Popish doctrine as to "the counsels" of Christ, which are not included in the positive precepts of the law?

The positive commands of Christ are represented as binding

on all classes of Christians alike, and their observance necessary in order to salvation. His counsels, on the other hand, are binding only upon those who, seeking a higher degree of perfection and a more excellent reward, voluntarily assume them. These are such as celibacy, voluntary poverty, etc., and obedience to rule, (monastic.)—Bellarmine de Monarchis, Cap. VII.

The wickedness of this distinction is evident-

1st. Because Christ demands the entire consecration of every Christian: after we have done all we are only unprofitable servants. Works of supererogation, therefore, are impossible.

2d. All such will worship is declared abhorent to God, Col. ii., 18-23; 1 Tim. iv., 3.

11., 10–25; 1 1111. 10., 5.

15. What judgment is to be formed of the good works of unrenewed men?

Unrenewed men retain some dispositions and affections in themselves relatively good, and they do many things in themselves right, and according to the letter of God's law. Yet—

1st. As to his person, every unrenewed man is under God's wrath and curse, and consequently can do nothing pleasing to him. The rebel in arms is in everything a rebel until he submits and returns to his allegiance.

2d. Love for God and regard to his authority are never his supreme motive in any of his acts. Thus while many of his actions are civilly good as respects his fellow-men, none of them can be spiritually good as it respects God. There is an obvious distinction between an act viewed in itself, and viewed in connection with its agent. The sinner, previous to justification and renewal, is a rebel; each one of his acts is the act of a rebel, though as considered in itself any single act may be either good, bad, or indifferent.

16. In what sense are good works necessary for salvation?

As the necessary and invariable fruits of both the change of relation accomplished in justification, and of the change of nature accomplished in regeneration, though never as the meritorious grounds or conditions of our salvation.

This necessity results, 1st, from the holiness of God; 2d, from his eternal purpose, Eph. i., 4; ii., 10: 3d, from the design and

redemptive efficacy of Christ's death, Eph. v., 25-27; 4th, from the union of the believer with Christ, and the energy of his indwelling Spirit, John xv., 5; Gal. v., 22; 5th, from the very nature of faith, which first leads to and then works by love, Gal. v., 6; 6th, from the command of God, 1 Thes. iv., 6; 1 Pet. i., 15; 7th, from the nature of heaven, Rev. xxi., 27.

17. What is the theory of the Antinomians upon this subject?

Antinomians are, as their name signifies, those who deny that Christians are bound to obey the law. They argue that, as Christ has in our place fulfilled both the preceptive and the penal departments of God's law, his people must be delivered from all obligation to observe it, either as a rule of duty or as a condition of salvation.

Paul, in the 6th chapter of Romans, declares that this damnable heresy was charged as a legitimate consequent upon his doctrine in that day. He not only repudiates the charge, but, on the contrary, affirms that free justification through an imputed righteousness, without the merit of works, is the only possible condition in which the sinner can learn to bring forth holy works as the fruits of filial love. The very purpose of Christ was to redeem to himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works, and this he accomplished by delivering them from the federal bondage of the law, in order to render them capable as the Lord's freedmen of moral conformity to it.

18. What are the different senses which have been applied to the term "merit?"

It has been technically used in two different senses. 1st. Strictly, to designate the common quality of all services to which a reward is due, ex justiciâ, on account of their intrinsic value and dignity. 2d. Improperly, it was used by the fathers as equivalent to that which results in or attains to a reward or consequent, without specifying the ground or virtue on account of which it is secured.—Turrettin, L. XVII., Quæstio 5.

19. What distinction does the Romish Church design to signalize by the terms "merit of condignity" and the "merit of conquity?"

The "merit of condignity" they teach attaches only to works wrought subsequently to regeneration by the aid of divine grace, and is that degree of merit that intrinsically, and in the way of equal right, not by mere promise or covenant, deserves the reward it attains at God's hands. The "merit of congruity" they teach attaches to those good dispositions or works which a man may, previously to regeneration, realize without the aid of divine grace, and which makes it congruous or specially fitting for God to reward the agent by infusing grace into his heart.

It is extremely difficult to determine the exact position of the Romish Church on this subject, since different schools of the ologians in her midst differ widely, and the decisions of the Council of Trent are studiously ambiguous. The general belief appears to be that ability to perform good works springs from grace infused into the sinner's heart for Christ's sake, through the instrumentality of the sacraments, but that afterwards these good works merit, that is, lay for us the foundation of a just claim to salvation and glory. Some say, like Bellarmine de justific., 5, 1, and 4, 7, that this merit attaches to the good works of Christians intrinsically, as well as in consequence of God's promise; others that these works deserve the reward only because God has promised the reward on the condition of the work.—Coun. Trent, Sess. VI., Cap. XVI., and canons 24 and 32.

20. What is necessary that a work should be in the proper sense of the term meritorious?

Turrettin makes five conditions necessary to that end. 1st. That the work be not of debt, or which the worker was under obligation to render, Luke xvii., 10. 2d. That it is our own, i. e., effected by our own natural energy. 3d. That it be perfect. 4th. That it be equal to the reward merited. 5th. That the reward be of justice due to such an act.—Turrettin, L. XVII., Questio 5.

According to this definition, it is evident, from the absolute dependence and obligation of the creature, that he can never merit any reward for whatever obedience he may render to the commands of his Creator. 1st. Because all the strength he works with is freely given by God. 2d. All the service he can render is owed

to God. 3d. Nothing he can do can equal the reward of God's favor and eternal blessedness.

Under the covenant of works, God graciously promised to reward the obedience of Adam with eternal life. This was a reward, however, not of merit, but of free grace and promise. Everything under that constitution depended upon the standing of the person before God. As long as Adam continued without sin, his services were accepted and rewarded according to promise. But from the moment he forfeited the promise, and lost his standing before God, no work of his, no matter of what character, could merit any thing at the hand of God.

21. How can it be proved that our good works, even after the restoration of our person to God's favor by justification, do not merit heaven?

1st. Justification proceeds upon the infinite merits of Christ, and on that foundation rests our title to the favor of God and all the infinite consequences thereof. Christ's merit, lying at the foundation and embracing all, excludes the possibility of our meriting any thing. 2d. The law demands perfect obedience, Rom. iii., 23; Gal. v., 3. 3d. We are saved by grace, not by works, Eph. ii., 8, 9. 4th. All good dispositions are graces or gifts of God, 1 Cor. xv., 10; Phil. ii., 13; 1 Thess. ii, 13. 5th. Eternal life itself is declared to be the gift of God, 1 John v., 11.

22. What do the Scriptures teach concerning the good works of believers, and the rewards promised to them?

Both the work and its reward are branches from the same gracious root. The covenant of grace provides alike for the infusion of grace in the heart, the exercise of this grace in the life, and the rewards of that grace so exercised. It is all of grace, grace for grace, grace added to grace, presented to us in this form of a reward:—1st. That it may act upon us as a rational motive to diligent obedience. 2d. To mark that the gift of heaven and eternal blessedness is an act of strict legal justice (1.) in respect to the perfect merits of Christ, (2.) in respect to God's faithful adherence to his own free promise, 1 John i., 9. 3d. To indicate that the heavenly reward stands in a certain gracious proportion to the

grace given in the obedience on earth; (1.) because God so wills it, Matt. xvi., 27; 1 Cor. iii., 8; (2.) because the grace given on earth prepares the soul to receive the grace given in heaven, 2 Cor. iv., 17.

Is perfect sanctification attainable by believers in Christ in this life?

23. What, in general terms, is perfectionism?

The various theories of perfectionism all agree in maintaining that it is possible for a child of God in this world to become, 1st, perfectly free from sin, 2d, conformed to the law under which they now live. They differ very variously among themselves, however, 1st, as to what sin is; 2d, as to what law we are now obliged to fulfill; 3d, as to the means whereby this perfection may be attained, whether by nature or by grace.

24. How does the Pelagian theory of the nature of man and of grace lead to perfectionism?

Pelagians maintain, 1st, as to man's nature, that it was not radically corrupted by the fall, and that every man possesses sufficient power to fulfill all the duties required of him, since God can not in justice demand that which man has not full power to do. 2d. As to God's grace, that it is nothing more than the favorable constitution of our own minds, and the influence exerted on them by the truth he has revealed to us, and the propitious circumstances in which he has placed us. Thus, in the Christian church, and with the Christian revelation, men are, in fact, placed in the most propitious circumstances possible to persuade them to perform their duties. It follows from this system directly that every one who wishes may certainly attain perfection by using his natural powers and advantages of position with sufficient care.—Wigger's Historical view of Augustinianism and Pelagianism, quoted by Dr. G. Peck.

25. What, according to the Pelagian theory, is the nature of the sin from which man may be perfectly free; what the law which he may perfectly fulfill, and what are the means by which this perfection may be attained?

They deny original and inherent corruption of nature, and

hold that sin is only voluntary transgression of known law, from which any man may abstain if he will.

which any man may abstain if he will.

As to the law which man in his present state may perfectly fulfill, they hold that it is the single and original law of God, the requirements of which, however, in the case of every individual subject, are measured by the individual's ability, and opportunities of knowledge. As to the means whereby this perfection may be attained, they maintain the plenary ability of man's natural will to discharge all the obligations resting upon him, and they admit the assistance of God's grace only in the sense of the influence of the truth, and other propitious circumstances in persuading man to use his own power. Thus the means of perfect sanctification are, 1st, man's own volition, 2d, as helped by the study of the Bible, prudent avoidance of temptation, etc.

26. In what sense do Romanists hold the doctrine of perfection?

The decisions of the Council of Trent upon this subject, as upon all critical points, are studiously ambiguous. They lay down the principle that the law must be possible to them upon whom it is binding, since God does not command impossibilities. Men justified (sanctified) may by the grace of God dwelling in them satisfy the divine law, pro hujus vitæ statu, i. e., as graciously for Christ's sake adjusted to our present capacities. They confess, nevertheless, that the just may fall into venial sins every day, and that while in the flesh no man can live entirely without sin, (unless by a special privilege of God); yet that in this life the renewed can fully keep the divine law; and even by the observance of the evangelical counsels do more than is commanded; and thus, as many saints have actually done, lay up a fund of supererogatory merit.—Council of Trent, Session VI. Compare Chapters XI. and XVI., and canons 18, 23, and 32. See above, question 14.

27. In what sense do they hold that the renewed may, in this life live without sin; in what sense fully satisfy the law; and by the use of what means do they teach that this perfection may be attained?

As to sin, they hold the distinction between mortal and venial

sins, and that the concupiscence that remains in the bosom of the renewed, as the result of original and the fuel of actual sin, is not itself sin, since sin consists only in the consent of the will to the impulse of concupiscence. In accordance with these views they hold that a Christian in this life may live without committing mortal sins, but that he never can be free from the inward movements of concupiscence, nor from liability to fall through ignorance, inattention, or passion into venial sins.

As to the law, which a believer in this life may fully satisfy, they hold that as God is just and can not demand of us what is impossible, his law is graciously adjusted to our present capacities, as assisted by grace, and that it is this law pro hujus vitæ statu, which we may fulfill.

As to the means whereby this perfection may be attained, they hold that divine grace precedes, accompanies, and follows all of our good works, which divine grace is to be sought through those sacramental and priestly channels which Christ has institued in his church, and especially in the observance of works of prayer, fasting, and alms deeds, and the acquisition of supererogatory merit by the fulfillment of the counsels of Christ to chastity, obedience, and voluntary poverty.—Council of Trent, Sess. XIV., Chapter V., Sess. VI., Chapters XI. and XII., Sess. V., canon 5; Cat. Rom., Part II., Chapter II., question 32, and Part III., Chapter V., questions 5–10.

28. In what form was the doctrine taught by the early Arminians?

Arminius declared that his mind was in suspense upon this subject, (Writings of Arminius, translated by Nichols, Vol. I., p. 256.) His immediate successors in the theological leadership of the remonstrant party, developed a theory of perfectionism apparently identical with that taught by Wesley, and professed by his disciples. "A man can, with the assistance of divine grace, keep all the commandments of God perfectly, according to the gospel or covenant of grace. The highest evangelical perfection, (for we are not teaching a legal perfection, which includes sinlessness entire in all respects and in the highest degree, and excludes all imperfection and infirmity, for this we believe to be

impossible,) embraces two things, 1st, a perfection proportioned to the powers of each individual; 2d, a desire of making continual progress and increasing one's strength more and more."—Episcopius, quoted by Dr. G. Peck, "Christian Perfection," pp. 135 and 136.

29. What is the Wesleyan doctrine on this subject?

1st. That although every believer as soon as he is justified is regenerated, and commences the incipient stages of sanctification, yet this does not exclude the remains of much inherent sin, nor the warfare of the flesh against the Spirit, which may continue for a long time, but which must cease at some time before the subject can be fit for heaven.

2d. This state of progressive sanctification is not itself perfection, which is properly designated by the phrases "entire," or "perfect sanctification." This, sooner or later, every heir of glory must experience; although the majority do not reach it long before death, it is the attainment of some in the midst of life, and consequently it is the duty and privilege of all to desire, strive for and expect its attainment now.

3d. This state of evangelical perfection does not consist in an ability to fulfill perfectly the original and absolute law of holiness under which Adam was created, nor does it exclude all liability to mistake, or to the infirmities of the flesh, and of natural temperament, but it does exclude all inward disposition to sin as well as all outward commission of it, since it consists in a state in which perfect faith in Christ and perfect love for God fills the whole soul and governs the entire life, and thus fulfills all the requirements of the "law of Christ," under which alone the Christian's probation is now held.

30. In what sense do they teach that men may live without sin?

Mr. Wesley did not himself use, though he did not object to the phrase "sinless perfection." He distinguished between "sin, properly so called, i. e., a voluntary transgression of a known law, and sin, improperly so called, i. e., an involuntary transgression of a divine law, known or unknown," and declared "I believe there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involun-

tary transgressions, which I apprehend to be naturally consequent on the ignorance and mistakes inseparable from mortality." He also declares that the obedience of the perfect Christian "can not bear the rigor of God's justice, but needs atoning blood," and consequently the most perfect "must continually say, 'forgive us our trespasses," and Dr. Peck says that the holier men are here "the more they loathe and abhor themselves." On the other hand they hold that a Christian may in this life attain to a state of perfect and constant love, which fulfills perfectly all the requirements of the gospel covenant. Violations of the original and absolute law of God are not counted to the believer for sin, since for him Christ has been made the end of that law for righteousness, and for Christ's sake he has been delivered from that law and been made subject to the "law of Christ," and that only is sin to the Christian which is a violation of this law of love. See Mr. Wesley's "Tract on Christian Perfection" in the volume of "Methodist Doctrinal Tracts," pp. 294, 310, 312, and Dr. Peck's "Christian Doc. of Perfection," p. 204.

31. What law do they say the Christian can in this life perfectly obey?

Dr. Peck says, p. 244, "To fallen humanity, though renewed by grace, perfect obedience to the moral law is impracticable during the present probationary state. And consequently Christian perfection does not imply perfect obedience to the moral law."—Peck, p. 244.

This moral law they hold to be universal and unchangeable, all moral agents are under perpetual obligations to fulfill it, and they are in no degree released therefrom by their loss of ability through sin.—Peck, p. 271. This law sustains, however, a two-fold relation to the creature. 1st. It is a rule of being and acting. 2d. It is a condition of acceptance. In consequence of sin, it became impossible for men to obtain salvation by the law, and therefore Christ appeared and rendered to this law perfect satisfaction in our stead, and thus is for us the end of the law for righteousness. This law, therefore, remaining for ever as a rule of duty, is abrogated by Christ as a condition of our acceptance. "Nor is any man living bound to observe the Adamic more than the Mosaic law (I mean it is not the condition either of present or

future salvation.)"—Doctrinal Tracts, p. 332. "The gospel, which is the law of love, the 'law of liberty,' offers salvation upon other terms, and yet provides the vindication of the broken law. The condition of justification at first is faith alone, and the condition of continued acceptance is faith working by love. There are degrees of faith, and degrees of love. . . Perfect faith and perfect love is Christian perfection." "Christian character is estimated by the conditions of the gospel; Christian perfection implies the perfect performance of these conditions and nothing more."

32. By what means do they teach this perfection is to be attained?

Wesley says, "I believe this perfection is always wrought in the soul by a simple act of faith, consequently in an instant. But I believe there is a gradual work, both preceding and following that instant."—Quoted by Dr. Peck, pp. 47, 48.

They hold that this entire sanctification is not to be effected through either the strength or the merit of man, but entirely of grace, for Christ's sake, by the Holy Ghost, through the instrumentality of faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, which faith involves our believing, 1st, "in the sufficiency of the provisions of the gospel for the complete deliverance of the soul from sin." 2d. "That these provisions are made for us." 3d. "That this blessing is for us now."—Peck, "Ch. Doc. Sanc.," pp. 405-407.

33. What is the Oberlin doctrine of perfection?

"It is a full and perfect discharge of our entire duty, of all existing obligations to God, and all other beings. It is perfect obedience to the moral law." This is God's original and universal law, which, however, always, not because of grace, but of sheer justice, adjusts its demands to the measure of the present ability of the subject. The law of God can not now justly demand that we should love him as we might have done if we had always improved our time, etc. Yet a Christian may now attain to a state of "perfect and disinterested benevolence," may be, "according to his knowledge, as upright as God is," and as "perfectly conformed to the will of God as is the will of the inhabitants of heaven." And this, Mr. Finney appears to teach, is

essential for even the lowest stage of genuine Christian experience. The amount of the matter appears to be, God has a right to demand only that which we have the power to render; therefore, it follows that we have full power to render all that God demands, and, therefore, we may be as perfectly conformed to his will as it regards us, as the inhabitants of heaven are to his will as it regards them.

Pres. Mahan, "Scripture Doctrines of Christian Perfection," and Prof. Finney, Oberlin Evangelist, Vol. IV., No. 19, and Vol. IV., No. 15, as quoted by Dr. Peck.

34. State the points of agreement and disagreement between these several theories, Pelagian, Romish, Arminian, and Oberlin?

1st. They all agree in maintaining that it is possible for men in this life to attain a state in which they may habitually and perfectly fulfill all their obligations, *i. e.*, to be and do perfectly all that God requires them to be or do at present.

2d. The Pelagian theory differs from all the rest, in denying the deterioration of our natural and moral powers, and consequently, in denying the necessity of the intervention of super-

natural grace to the end of making men perfect.

3d. The Pelagian and Oberlin theories agree in making the original moral law of God the standard of perfection. The Oberlin theologians, however, admitting that our powers are deteriorated by sin, hold that God's law, as a matter of sheer justice, adjusts its demands to the present ability of the subject. Romish theory regards the same law as the standard of perfection, but differs from the Pelagian theory in maintaining that the demands of this law are adjusted to man's deteriorated powers; and on the other hand, it differs from the Oberlin theory, by holding that the lowering of the demands of this law in adjustment to the enfeebled powers of man, instead of being of sheer justice, is of grace for the merits of Christ. The Arminian theory differs from all the rest in denying that the original law is the standard of evangelical perfection; in holding that that law having been fulfilled by Christ, the Christian is now required only to fulfill the requirements of the gospel covenant of grace. This,

however, appears to differ more in form than essence from the

Romish position in this regard.

4th. The Romish and Arminian theories agree, 1st, in admitting that the perfect Christian is still liable to transgress the provisions of the original moral law, and that he is subject to mistakes and infirmities. The Romanist calls them venial sins; the Arminian, mistakes or infirmities. 2d. In referring all the work of making man perfect to the efficiency of the Holy Ghost, who is given for Christ's sake. But they differ, on the other hand, 1st, as to the nature of that faith by which sanctification is effected, and, 2d, as to the merit of good works.

35. What are the arguments upon which perfectionists sustain their theory, and how may they be answered?

1st. They argue that this perfection is attainable in this life, (1.) From the commands of God, who never will command impossibilities, Matt. v., 48. (2.) From the fact that abundant provision has already been made in the gospel for securing the perfect sanctification of God's people; in fact, all the provision that ever will be made. (3) From the promises of God to redeem Israel from all his iniquities, etc., Ps. cxxx., 8; Ezek. xxxvi., 25-29; 1 John i., 7, 9. (4.) From the prayers of saints recorded in Scripture with implied approval, Ps. li., 2; Heb. xiii., 21.

2d. They argue that this perfection has in fact been attained, (1.) From biblical examples, as David, Acts xiii., 22. See also Gen. vi., 9; Job i., 1; Luke i., 6. (2.) Modern examples—Peck's "Christian Perfection," pp. 365-396.

We answer—

1st. The Scriptures never assert that a Christian may in this life attain to a state in which he may live without sin.

2d. The meaning of special passages must be interpreted in consistency with the entire testimony of Scripture.

3d. The language of Scripture never implies that man may here live without sin. The commands of God are adjusted to man's responsibility, and the aspirations and prayers of the saints to their duties and ultimate privileges, and not to their present ability. Perfection is the true aim of the Christian's effort in every period of growth and in every act. The terms "perfect"

and "blameless" are often relative, or used to signify simple genuineness or sincerity. This is evident from the recorded fact:—
4th. That all the perfect men of the Scriptures sometimes

4th. That all the perfect men of the Scriptures sometimes sinned; witness the histories of Noah, Job, David, Paul, and compare Gen. vi., 9, with Gen. ix., 21, and Job i., 1, with Job iii., 1, and ix., 20; also see Gal. ii., 11, 14; Ps. xix., 12; Rom. vii.; Gal. v., 17; Phil. iii., 12-14.

36. What special objections bear against the Pelagian theory of perfection?

This is a part of a wholly Anti-Christian system. Its constituent elements are a denial of the Scripture testimony with regard to original sin, and the work of the Spirit of grace in effectual calling, and an assertion of man's ability to save himself. It involves low views of the guilt and turpitude of sin, and of the extent, spirituality, and unchangeableness of God's holy law. This is the only perfectly consistent theory of perfection ever ventilated, and in the same proportion it is the most thoroughly unchristian.

37. What special objections bear against the Romish theory?

This theory is inconsistent—

1st. With the true nature of sin. It denies that concupiscence is sin, and admits as such only those deliberate acts of the will which assent to the impulse of concupiscence. It distinguishes between mortal and venial sins. The truth is that every sin is mortal, and concupiscence, "sin dwelling in me," "law in my members," is of the very essence of sin, Rom. vii., 8–23.

2d. It is inconsistent with the nature of God's holy law, which is essentially immutable, and the demands of which have never been lowered in accommodation to the weakened faculties

of men.

3d. It is essentially connected with their theory of the merit of good works, and of the higher merit of works of supererogation which is radically subversive of the essentials of the gospel.

38. What special objections bear against the Oberlin theory? This theory appears to assimilate more nearly than the others

with the terrible self-consistency and the Anti-Christian spirit of the Pelagian view. It differs from that heresy, however, in holding, 1st. That the law of God is, as a matter of sheer justice, accommodated to the weakened faculties of men. 2d. That the shortcomings of men in the present life, as measured by the original law of God, are not sin, since a man's duty is measured only by his ability. 3d. In making the principle of this perfection to consist in "perfect and disinterested benevolence." In all these respects, also, this theory is inconsistent with the true nature of God's law, the true nature of sin, and the true nature of virtue.

39. What special objections bear against the Arminian theory?

This view, as presented by the Wesleyan standard writers, is far less inconsistent with the principles and spirit of Christianity than either of the others, and consequently it is precisely in the same proportion less self-consistent as a theory, and less accurate in its use of technical language. These Christian brethren are to be honored for their exalted views, and earnest advocacy of the duty of pressing forward to the highest measures of Christian attainment, while it is to be for ever lamented that their great founder was so far misled by the prejudices of system as to bind in unnatural alliance so much precious truth with a theory, and terminology proper only to radical error. I will make here, once for all, the general explanation, that when stating the Arminian doctrine on any point, I have generally preferred to refer to the form in which the doctrine was explicitly defined by the Dutch Remonstrants, rather than to the modified, and, as it seems to me, far less logically definite form in which it is set forth by the authorities of the Wesleyan churches, who properly style themselves "Evangelical Arminians." I attribute the peculiar theoretical indefiniteness which appears to render their definitions obscure, especially on the subjects of justification and of perfection, to the spirit of a warm, loving, working Christianity struggling with the false premises of an Arminian philosophy.

1st. While over and over insisting upon the distinction as to the two-fold relation sustained by the original law of God to man (1.) as a rule of being and acting, (2.) as a condition of divine favor, their whole theory is based upon a logical confusion of these

two things so distinct. Dr. Peck teaches earnestly, and confirms by many Wesleyan testimonies, excellent Calvinistic doctrine upon the following points: The original law of God is universal and. unchangeable, its demands never can be changed nor compromised. Obedience to this law was the condition of the original covenant of works. This condition was broken by Adam, but, in our behalf, perfectly fulfilled by Christ, and thus the integrity of God's changeless law was preserved. Therefore, he goes on to argue, the believer is no longer under the law, but under the covenant of grace, i. e., to use Wesley's own qualifying parenthesis, "as the condition of either present or future salvation." Certainly, we answer, Christ is the end of the law for us for righteousness, in its forensic sense, that is, to secure our justification, but surely Christ did not satisfy that changeless law, in our place, in such a sense that it does not remain our rule of action, to which it is our duty to be personally conformed. The question of perfection is one which relates to our personal character, not to our relations; it is moral and inherent, and not forensic. To prove, therefore, what we also rejoice to believe, that the original law of God, under the gospel covenant, is no longer our condition of salvation, does not avail one iota towards proving that God, under the gospel, demands an obedience adjusted to any easier standard than was required before.

2d. This theory is part of the Arminian view of the covenant of grace, which we regard so inconsistent with the gospel, and which Mr. Watson (see Institutes, Part II., Chap. XXIII.) appears to attempt to avoid while refusing to admit the imputation to the believer of Christ's righteousness. This view is, that by Christ's propitiation, he having fulfilled the original law of God, it is made consistent with divine justice to present salvation upon easier conditions, i. e., faith and evangelical obedience; Christian perfection requiring nothing more than the perfect fulfillment of these new gracious conditions. Now this view, besides confounding the ideas of law, and of covenant, of a rule, and of a condition, of a ground of justification, and of a standard of sanctification, is inconsistent with the broad teachings of the gospel concerning the righteousness of Christ, and the office of faith in justification. It makes the merit of Christ only in some uncertain and distant way the occasion of our salvation, and faith, and

evangelical obedience, in the place of perfect obedience under the old covenant, the *ground* instead of the mere *instrument* and fruit of our justification. Logically developed, this theory must lead to the Romish doctrine as to the merit of good works.

- 3d. This theory denies that mistakes and infirmities resulting from the effects of original sin, are themselves sin, yet admits that they are to be confessed, forgiveness implored for them, and the atonement of Christ's blood applied to them, and that the more perfect a man becomes the more he abhors his own internal state. Surely this is a confusion of language, and abuse of the word sin. What is sin but (1.) that which transgresses God's original law, (2.) which needs Christ's atonement, (3.) which should be confessed, and must be forgiven, (4.) which lays a proper foundation for self-abhorrence.
- 40. What express declarations of Scripture are contradicted by every possible modification of the theory of Christian perfection?
- 1 Kings viii., 46; Prov. xx., 9; Eccle. vii., 20; James iii., 2; 1 John i., 8.
- 41. How may it be shown to be in opposition to the experience of saints, as recorded in the Scriptures?

See Paul's account of himself, Rom. vii., 14-25; Phil. iii., 12-14. See case of David, Ps. xix., 12; Ps. li.; of Moses, Ps. xc., 8; of Job, Job xlii., 5, 6; of Daniel, ix., 20. See Luke xviii., 13; Gal. ii., 11-13; vi., 1; James v., 16.

42. How does it conflict with the ordinary experience of God's people?

The more holy a man is, the more humble, self-renouncing, self-abhorring, and the more sensitive to every sin he becomes, and the more closely he clings to Christ. The moral imperfections which cling to him he feels to be sins, laments and strives to overcome them. Believers find that their life is a constant warfare, and they need to take the kingdom of heaven by storm, and watch while they pray. They are always subject to the constant chastisement of their Father's loving hand, which can only be designed to correct their imperfections, and to confirm their graces. And it has been notoriously the fact that the best Chris-

tians have been those who have been the least prone to claim the attainment of perfection for themselves.

43. What are the legitimate practical effects of perfectionism?

The tendency of every such doctrine must be evil, except in so far as it is modified or counteracted by limiting or inconsistent truths held in connection, which is preeminently the case with respect to the Wesleyan view, from the amount of pure gospel which in that instance the figment of perfectionism alloys. But perfectionism, by itself, must tend, 1st, to low views of God's law; 2d, to inadequate views of the heinousness of sin; 3d, to a low standard of moral excellence; 4th, to spiritual pride and fanaticism.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS.

- 1. What is the Scriptural doctrine as to the perseverance of the scints?
- "They whom God hath accepted in his beloved, effectively called and sanctified by his Spirit, can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace; but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved."—Con. Faith, Chap. XVII.; L. Cat., question 79.
- 2. By what arguments may the certainty of the final perseverance of the saints be established?

1st. The direct assertions of Scripture, John x., 28, 29; Rom.

xi., 29; Phil. i., 6; 1 Pet. i., 5.

2d. This certainty is a necessary inference, from the Scriptural doctrine (1.) of election, Jer. xxxi., 3; Matt. xxiv., 22-24; Acts xiii., 48; Rom. viii., 30; (2.) of the covenant of grace, wherein the Father gave his people to his Son as the reward of his obedience and suffering, Jer. xxxii., 40; John xvii., 2-6; (3.) of the union of Christians with Christ, in the federal aspect of which Christ is their surety, and they can not fail, (Rom. viii., 1,) and in the spiritual and vital aspect of which they abide in him, and because he lives they must live also, John xiv., 19; Rom. viii., 38, 39; Gal. ii., 20; (4.) of the atonement, wherein Christ discharged all the obligations of his people to the law as a covenant of life, and purchased for them all covenanted blessings; if one of them should fail, therefore, the sure foundation of all would be shaken, Is. liii., 6, 11; Matt. xx., 28; 1 Pet. ii., 24; (5.) of justification, which declares all the conditions of the cove

nant of life satisfied, and sets its subject into a new relation to God for all future time, so that he can not fall under condemnation, since he is not under the law, but under grace, Rom. vi., 14; (6.) of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, a as a seal by which we are marked as belonging to God, b as an earnest, or first installment of the promised redemption, in pledge of complete fulfillment, John xiv., 16; 2 Cor. i., 21, 22; v., 5; Eph. i., 14; (7.) of the prevalency of Christ's intercession, John xi., 42; xvii., 11, 15, 20; Rom. viii., 34.

3. What is the doctrine of the Romish Church on this subject?

Council of Trent, Sess. VI., canon 23. "If any one maintain that a man once justified can not lose grace, and, therefore, that he who falls and sins never was truly justified, let him be accursed."

4. What is the Arminian doctrine on this point?

It is an inseparable part of the Arminian system, flowing necessarily from their views of election, of the design and effect of Christ's death, and of sufficient grace and free will, that those who were once justified and regenerated may, by neglecting grace and grieving the Holy Spirit, fall into such sins as are inconsistent with true justifying faith, and continuing and dying in the same, may consequently finally fall into perdition.—" Confession of the Remonstrants," xi., 7.

5. What objection is urged against the orthodox doctrine on the ground of the free agency of man?

Those who deny the certainty of the final perseverance of the saints hold the false theory that liberty of the will consists in indifference, or the power of contrary choice, and consequently that certainty is inconsistent with liberty. This fallacy is disproved above, Chapter XVIII, see especially question 9.

That God does govern the free acts of his creatures, as a matter of fact, is clear from history and prophecy, from universal Christian consciousness and experience, and from Scripture, Acts ii., 23; Eph. i., 11; Phil. ii., 13; Prov. xxi., 1.

That he does secure the final perseverance of his people in a

manner perfectly consistent with their free agency is also clear. He changes their affections and thus determines the will by its own free spontaniety. He brings them into the position of children by adoption, surrounding them with all of the sources and instruments of sanctifying influence, and when they sin he carefully chastises and restores them. Hence the doctrine of Scripture is not that a man who has once truly believed is secure of ultimate salvation, subsequently feel and act as he may; but, on the contrary, that God secures the ultimate salvation of every one who is once truly united to his Son by faith, by securing, through the power of the Holy Ghost, his most free perseverance in Christian feeling and obedience to the end.

6. What objection is urged against the orthodox doctrine upon the ground of its supposed unfavorable influence upon morality?

The objection charged is, that this doctrine, "once in grace always in grace," must naturally lead to carelessness, through a false sense of security in our present position, and of confidence that God will secure our final salvation independently of our own agency.

Although it is certain, on the part of God, that if we are elected and called, we shall be saved; yet it requires constant watchfulness, and diligence, and prayer to make that calling and election sure to us, 2 Pet. i., 10. That God powerfully works with us, and therefore secures for us success in our contest with sin, is in Scripture urged as a powerful reason not for sloth, but for diligence, Phil. ii., 13. The orthodox doctrine does not affirm certainty of salvation because we have once believed, but certainty of perseverance in holiness if we have truly believed, which perseverance in holiness, therefore, in opposition to all weaknesses and temptations, is the only sure evidence of the genuineness of past experience, or of the validity of confidence respecting future salvation, and surely such an assurance of certainty can not encourage either carelessness or immorality.

7. What objection to this doctrine is founded on the exhortations to diligence; and on the warnings of danger in case of carelessness addressed to believers in the Scriptures?

The objection alleged is, that these exhortations and warnings necessarily imply the contingency of the believer's salvation, as conditioned upon the believer's continued faithfulness, and consequently involving liability to apostasy.

We answer-

1st. The outward word necessarily comes to all men alike, addressing them in the classes in which they regard themselves as standing; and as professors, or "those who think they stand," are many of them self-deceived, this outward word truly implies the uncertainty of their position, (as far as man's knowledge goes,) and their liability to fall.

2d. That God secures the perseverance in holiness of all his true people by the use of means adapted to their nature as rational moral and free agents. Viewed in themselves they are always, as God warns them, unstable, and therefore, as he exhorts them, they must diligently cleave to his grace. It is always true, also, that if they apostatize they shall be lost; but by means of these very threatenings his Spirit graciously secures them from apostasy.

8. What special texts are relied upon to rebut the arguments of the orthodox upon this subject?

Ezek. xviii., 24; Matt. xiii., 20, 21; 2 Pet. ii., 20, 21, and especially Heb. vi., 4-6; x., 26.

All of these passages may be naturally explained in perfect consistency with the orthodox doctrine which is supported upon that wide range of Scripture evidence we have set forth above, question 2. They present either, 1st, hypothetical warnings of the consequences of apostasy with the design of preventing it, by showing the natural consequences of indifference and of sin, and the necessity for earnest care and effort; or, 2d, they indicate the dreadful consequences of misimproving or of abusing the influences of common grace, which, although involving great responsibility, nevertheless come short of a radical change of nature or genuine conversion.

9. What argument do the opponents of this doctrine urge from Bible examples and from our own daily experience of apostates?

They cite from the Scriptures such instances as that of David

and Peter, and they refer to the many examples of the apostasy of well-accedited professors, with which, alas! we are all familiar.

All these examples, however, fall evidently under one of two classes, either, 1st, they were from the beginning without the real power of godliness, although bearing so fair an appearance of life in the sight of their fellow-men, Rom. ii., 28; ix., 6; 1 John ii., 19; Rev. iii., 1; or, 2d, they are true believers who, because of the temporary withdrawal of restraining grace, have been allowed to backslide for a time, while in every such case they are graciously restored, and that generally by chastisement, Rev. iii., 19. Of this class were David and Peter. No true Christian is capable of deliberate apostasy; his furthest departure from righteousness being occasioned by the sudden impulse of passion or fear, Matt. xxiv., 24; Luke xxii., 31.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

DEATH AND THE STATE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH.

1. By what forms of expression is death described in the Bible?

A departure out of this world, 2 Tim. iv., 6. A going the way of all the earth, Josh. xxiii., 14. A being gathered to one's fathers, Judges ii., 10; and to one's people, Deut. xxxii., 50. A dissolving the earthly house of this tabernacle, 2 Cor. v., 1. A returning to the dust, Eccle. xii., 7. A sleep, John xi., 11. A giving up the ghost, Acts. v., 10. A being absent from the body and present with the Lord, 2 Cor. v., 8. Sleeping in Jesus, 1 Thess. iv., 14.

2. What is death?

The suspension of the personal union between the body and the soul, followed by the resolution of the body into its chemical elements, and the introduction of the soul into that separate state of existence which may be assigned to it by its Creator and Judge, Eccle. xii., 7.

3. How does death stand related to sin?

The entire penalty of the law, including all the spiritual, physical and eternal penal consequences of sin, is called death in Scripture. The sentence was, "The day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," Gen. ii., 17; Rom. v., 12. That this included natural death is proved by Rom. v., 13, 14; and from the fact that when Christ bore the penalty of the law it was necessary for him to die, Heb. ix., 22.

4. Why do the justified die?

Justification changes the entire federal relation of its subject

to the law, and raises him for ever above all the penal consequences of sin. Death, therefore, while remaining a part of the penalty of the unsatisfied law in relation to the unjust, is like all other afflictions changed, in relation to the justified, into an element of improving discipline. It is made necessary for them from the present constitution of the body, while it is to both body and soul the gateway of heaven. They are made free from its sting and fear, 1 Cor. xv., 55, 57; Heb. ii., 15. They are now "blessed" in death because they die "in the Lord," Rev. xiv., 13, and they shall at last be completely delivered from its power when the last enemy shall be destroyed, 1 Cor. xv., 26.

5. What evidence have we of the immateriality of the soul, and what argument may be derived from that source in proof of its continued existence after death?

For the evidence establishing the immateriality of the soul see

Chap. I., question 32.

Now although the continued existence of any creature must depend simply upon the will of its Creator, that will may either be made known by direct revelation, or inferred in any particular instance by analogical reasoning from what is known of his doings in other cases. As far as this argument from analogy goes it decidedly confirms the belief that a spiritual substance is, as such, immortal. The entire range of human experience fails to make us acquainted with a single instance of the annihilation of an atom of matter, i. e., of matter as such. Material bodies, organized or chemically compounded, or mere mechanical aggregations, we observe constantly coming into existence, and in turn passing away, yet never through the annihilation of their elementary constituents or component parts, but simply from the dissolution of that relation which these parts had temporarily sustained to each other. Spirit, however, is essentially simple and single, and therefore incapable of that dissolution of parts to which material bodies are subject. We infer, therefore, that spirits are immortal since they can not be subject to that only form of death of which we have any knowledge.

6. What argument in favor of the immortality of the soul may be derived from its imperfect development in this world?

In every department of organized life every individual creature, in its normal state, tends to grow toward a condition of complete development, which is the perfection of its kind. The acorn both prophesies and grows toward the oak. Every human being, however, is conscious that in this life he never attains that completeness which the Creator contemplated in the ideal of his type; he has faculties undeveloped, capacities unfulfilled, natural desires unsatisfied; he knows he was designed to be much more than he is, and to fill a much higher sphere. As the prophetic reason of the Creator makes provision for the butterfly through the instinct of the caterpillar, so the same Creator reveals the immortal existence of the soul in a higher sphere by means of its conscious limitations and instinctive movements in this.

7. What argument on this subject may be derived from the distributive justice of God?

It is an invariable judgment of natural reason, and a fundamental doctrine of the Bible, that moral good is associated with happiness, and moral evil with misery, by the unchangeable nature and purpose of God. But the history of all individuals and communities alike establishes the fact that this life is not a state of retribution; that here wickedness is often associated with prosperity, and moral excellence with sorrow; we must hence conclude that there is a future state in which all that appears at present inconsistent with the justice of God shall be adjusted. See Ps. lxxiii.

8. How do the operations of conscience point to a future state?

Conscience is the voice of God in the soul, which witnesses to our sinfulness and ill-desert, and to his essential justice. Except in the case of those who have found refuge in the righteousness of Christ, every man feels that his moral relations to God are never settled in this life; and hence the characteristic testimony of the human conscience, in spite of great individual differences as to light, sensibility, etc., has always been coincident with the word of God, that "after death comes the JUDG-MENT."

9. How is this doctrine established by the general consent of mankind?

This has been the universal faith of all men, of all races, and in all ages. Universal consent, like every universal effect, must be referred to an equally universal cause, and this consent, uniform among men differing in every other possible respect, can be referred to no common origin other than the constitution of man's common nature, which is the testimony of his Maker.

10. Show that the Old Testament teaches the same distinction between soul and body that is taught in the New Testament.

1st. In the account of the creation. The body was formed of the dust of the earth, and the soul in the image of the Almighty, Gen. i., 26; ii., 7.

mighty, Gen. i., 26; ii., 7.

2d. In the definition of death, Eccle. xii., 7. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return to God who gave it." See also Eccle. iii., 21.

11. What does the Old Testament teach concerning Sheol? and how is it shown, from the usage of that word, that the immortality of the soul was a doctrine of the ancient covenant?

Sheol is derived from the verb by, to ask, expressing the sense of our English proverb, that the "grave crieth give, give." It is used in the Old Testament to signify, in a vague and general sense, the state of the departed, both the good and bad, intermediate between death and the resurrection of the righteous, (Hosea xiii., 14,) generally invested with gloomy associations, and indefinitely referred to the lower parts of the earth, Deut. xxxii., 22; Amos ix., 2. Thus it is used for grave as the receptacle of the body after death, (Gen. xxxvii., 35; Job xiv., 13,) but principally to designate the receptacle of departed spirits, without explicit reference to any division between the stations allotted to the righteous and the wicked. That they were active and conscious in this state appears to be indicated by what is revealed of Samuel, 1 Sam. xxviii., 7–20; Is. xiv., 15–17. With regard to the good, however, the residence in Sheol was looked upon only as intermediate between death and a happy resurrection, Ps. xlix., 15. In their treatment of this whole subject, the Old Testament

Scriptures rather take the continued existence of the soul for granted, than explicitly assert it.—Fairbairn's Herm. Manual; Josephus' Ant., XVIII., 1.

12. What is the purport of our Saviour's argument on this subject against the Sadducees?

Luke xx., 37, 38. Long after the death of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Jehovah designated himself to Moses as their God, Ex. iii., 6. But, argues Christ against the Sadducee who denied the resurrection of the dead, "he is the God, not of the dead, but of the living." This more immediately proves the immortality of their souls, but as God is the covenant God of persons, and as the persons of these patriarchs included alike body and soul, this argument likewise establishes the ultimate immortality of the body also, i. e., of the entire person.

13. What passages of the Old Testament assert or imply the hope of a state of blessedness after death?

Num. xxiii., 10; Job xix., 26, 27; Ps. xvi., 9-11; xvii., 15; xlix., 14, 15; lxxiii., 24-26; Is. xxv., 8; xxvi., 19; Hosea xiii., 14; Dan. xii., 2, 3, 13.

14. What other evidence does the Old Testament afford of the continued existence of the soul?

1st. The translations of Enoch and Elijah, and the temporary reappearance of Samuel, Gen. v., 24; Heb. xi., 5; 2 Kings ii., 11; 1 Sam. xxviii., 7-20.

2d. The command to abstain from the arts of necromancy implies the prevalent existence of a belief that the dead still continue in being in another state, Deut. xviii., 11, 12.

3d. In their symbolical system Canaan represents the permanent inheritance of Christ's people, and the entire purpose of the whole Old Testament revelation, as apprehended by Old Testament believers, had respect to a future existence and inheritance after death. This is directly asserted in the New Testament, Acts xxvi., 6–8; Heb. xi., 10–16; Eph. i., 14.

15. What does the New Testament teach of the state of the soul immediately after death?

"The souls of the righteous, being made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies," Luke xxiii., 43; 2 Cor. v., 6, 8; Phil. i., 23, 24. "And the souls of unbelievers are cast into hell, where they remain in torment and utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the last day," Luke xvi., 23, 24; Jude v., 6, 7

16. What is the signification and usage of the word ἄιδης, Hades, in Scripture?

"Aιδης, from a primitive, and lôειν, designates generally the invisible world inhabited by the spirits of dead men. Among the ancient classical heathen, this invisible world was regarded as consisting of two contrasted regions, the one called Elysium, the abode of the blessed good, and the other Tartarus, the abode of the vicious and miserable.

It was used by the authors of the Septuagint to translate the Hebrew word Sheol, compare Acts ii., 27, and Ps. xvi., 10. In the New Testament this word occurs only eleven times, Matt. xi., 23; xvi., 18; Luke x., 15; xvi., 23; Acts. ii., 27, 31; 1 Cor. xv., 55; Rev. i., 18; vi., 8; xx., 13, 14. In every case, except 1 Cor. xv., 55, where the more critical editions of the original substitute the word $\theta \acute{a}va\tau \varepsilon$ in the place of $\mathring{a}\delta \eta$, hades is translated hell, and certainly always represents the invisible world as under the dominion of Satan, as opposed to the kingdom of Christ, and as finally subdued under his victorious power. See Fairbairn's Herm. Manuel.

17. What is the signification and usage of the words παράδεισος and γέεννα?

Παράδεισος, Paradise, derived from some oriental language, and adopted into both the Hebrew and Greek languages, signifies parks, pleasure gardens, Neh. ii, 8; Eccle. ii., 5. The Septugint translators use this word to represent the garden of Eden, Gen. ii., 8, etc. It occurs only three times in the New Testament, Luke xxiii., 43; 2 Cor. xii., 4; Rev. ii., 7; where the context proves that it refers to the "third heavens," the garden of the Lord, in which grows the "tree of life," which is by the river which flows out of the throne of God and of the Lamb, Rev xxii., 1, 2.

Γέεννα is a compound Hebrew word, expressed in Greek letters, signifying "Valley of Hinnom, Josh. xv., 8, skirting Jerusalem on the south, running westward from the valley of Jehosaphat, under Mount Zion. Here was established the idolatrous worship of Moloch, to whom infants were burned in sacrifice, 1 Kings xi., 7. This worship was broken up and the place descerated by Josiah, 2 Kings xxiii., 10-14, after which it appears to have become the receptacle for all the filth of the city, and of the dead bodies of animals, and of malefactors, to consume which fires would appear to have been from time to time kept up, hence called Tophet, an abomination, a vomit, Jer. vii., 31."—Robinson's Greek Lex. By a natural figure, therefore, this word was used to designate the place of final punishment, forcibly carrying with it the idea of pollution and misery. It occurs twelve times in the New Testament, and always to signify the place of final torment, Matt. v., 22, 29, 30; x., 28; xviii., 9; xxiii., 15, 33; Mark ix., 43, 47; Luke xii., 5; James iii., 6.

18. What various views are maintained as to the intermediate state of the souls of men between death and the judgment?

1st. Many Protestants, especially of the Church of England, retaining the classical sense of the word Hades, as equivalent to the Jewish Sheol, (as given above, question 11), hold that there is an intermediate region, consisting of two distinct departments, in which the disembodied souls, both of the lost and of the redeemed, respectively await the resurrection of their bodies, the award of judgment, and their translation to their final abodes of bliss or misery.

2d. The Romanists hold the above view, modified by their doctrine of purgatory. See below, question 20.

3d. Materialists and some Socinians hold that the souls of men remain in a state of unconsciousness from death until the moment of the resurrection. The only positive argument they are able to advance in favor of this view is, that we know nothing by experience, and hence are utterly unable to conceive of a state of conscious intelligent activity, when the soul is separated from the body. Archbishop Whately, on most subjects so judicious, has advocated this view in his "View of Sc. Rev. concerning a Future State."

19. How may it be proved that the souls of believers do immediately pass into glory?

The view held by the great majority of evangelical Christians, (see above, question 15,) includes these two points—

1st. The souls both of believers and of the reprobate continue after death both conscious and active, though until the resurrection separated from their bodies.

2d. The souls of believers are present with the person of Christ, and enjoy bright revelations of God and the society of holy angels; the souls of the reprobate being in the place assigned to the devil and his angels. Nevertheless it is also held that, as the complete man consists both of soul and body, the souls of the blessed during the interval between their death and the resurrection, although with Christ, and inconceivably happy, have not attained to the perfection of either the glory or blessedness which is designed for them in Christ. This highest state of all must await the redemption of their bodies, and of their purchased possession, and the restitution of all things.

This hope of Christians in both of the above points appears to be abundantly established by the following Scriptures: The reappearance of Samuel, 1 Sam. xxviii., 7–20. The appearance of Moses and Elias at the transfiguration of Christ, Matt. xvii., 3. Christ's address to the thief upon the cross, Luke xxiii., 43. The parable of the rich man and Lazarus, Luke xvi., 23, 24. The prayer of dying Stephen, Acts vii., 59. Paul's dilemma, 2 Cor. v. 1–8; Phil. i., 23, 24; 1 Thes. v., 10. See also Eph. iii., 15; Heb. vi., 12, 20; Rev. v., 9; vi., 9–11; vii., 9; xiv., 1, 3.

20. What do Romanists teach with regard to the souls of men after death?

1st. That the souls of unbaptized infants go to a place prepared expressly for them, called the "limbus infantum," where they endure no positive suffering, although they do not enjoy the vision of God.

2d. That all unbaptized adults, and all those who subsequently have lost the grace of baptism by mortal sin, and die unreconciled to the church, go immediately to hell.

3d. That those believers who have attained to a state of Christian perfection go immediately to heaven.

4th. That the great mass of partially sanctified Christians dying in fellowship with the church, yet still encumbered with imperfections, go to purgatory, where they suffer, more or less intensely, for a longer or shorter period, until their sins are both atoned for and purged out, when they are translated to heaven, during which intermediate period they may be efficiently assisted by the prayers and labors of their friends on earth.

5th. That Old Testament believers were gathered into a region called "limbus patrum," where they remained without the beatific vision of God, yet without suffering, until Christ, during the three days in which his body lay in the grave, came and released them, 1 Pet. iii., 19, 20.—Cat. Rom., Part I., Chapter VI., question 3; Council of Trent, Sess. XXV de Purgatorio.

The Council of Trent settled only two points, 1st, that there is a purgatory; 2d, that souls therein may be benefited by the

prayers and mass of the church on earth.

It is generally held, however, that its pains are both negative and positive. That the instrument of its sufferings is material fire. That these are dreadful and indefinite in extent. That satisfaction may be rendered in this world on much easier terms. That while their souls can neither incur guilt nor merit any thing they can alone render satisfaction for their sins by means of passive sufferings.

They confess that this doctrine is not taught directly in Scripture, but maintain, 1st, that it follows necessarily from their general doctrine of the satisfaction for sins; 2d, that Christ and the apostles taught it incidentally as they did infant baptism, etc. They refer to Matt. xii., 32; 1 Cor. iii., 15.

- 21. How may the Anti-Christian character of this doctrine be shown?
- 1st. It confessedly has no direct, and obviously has true foundation in Scripture. This consideration alone suffices.
- 2d. It proceeds upon an entirely unchristian view of the method of satisfying divine justice for sins. (1.) That while Christ's merits are infinite, they atone only for original sins. (2.) That each believer must make satisfaction in his own person for sins which he commits after baptism, either in the pains of penance or of purgatory. This is contrary to all the Scriptures teach,

as we have above shown under their respective heads, (1.) as to the satisfaction rendered to justice by Christ; (2.) the nature of justification; (3.) nature of sin; (4.) relation of the sufferings and good works of the justified man to the law; (5.) state of the souls of believers after death, etc., etc.

3d. It is a heathen doctrine derived from the Egyptians through the Greeks and Romans, and currently received through

the Roman empire.—Virgil's Encid, vi., 739, 43.

4th. Its practical effects have always been, 1st, the abject subjection of the people to the priesthood; 2d, the gross demoralization of the people. The church is the self-appointed depository and dispenser of the superabundant merits of Christ, and the supererogatory merits of her eminent saints. On this foundation she dispenses the pains of purgatory to those who pay for past sins, or sells indulgences to those who pay for the liberty to sin in the future. Thus the people sin and pay, and the priest takes the money and remits the penalty. The figment of a purgatory under the control of the priest is the main source of his hold upon the fears of the people.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE RESURRECTION.

1. What is the meaning of the phrase, "resurrection of the dead," and "from the dead," as used in Scripture?

'Aνάστασις signifies etymologically "a rising or raising up." It is used in Scripture to designate the future general raising, by the power of God, of the bodies of all men from the sleep of death.

- 2. What Old Testament passages bear upon this subject? Job xix., 25-27; Ps. xlix., 15; Is. xxvi., 19; Dan. xii., 1-3.
- 3. What are the principal passages bearing upon this subject in the New Testament?

Matt. v., 29; x., 28; xxvii., 52, 53; John v., 28, 29; vi., 39; Acts ii., 25–34; xiii., 34; Rom. viii., 11, 22, 23; Phil. iii., 20, 21; 1 Thess. iv., 13–17, and 15th chap. of 1 Cor.

4. What is the meaning of the phrases, σῶμα ψυχικὸν, natural body, and σῶμα πνευματικόν, spiritual body, as used by Paul, 1 Cor. xv., 44?

The word $\psi v \chi \dot{\eta}$, when contrasted with $\pi \nu \tilde{\epsilon} v \mu a$, always designates the principle of animal life, as distinguished from the principle of intelligence and moral agency, which is the $\pi \nu \tilde{\epsilon} v \mu a$. A $\sigma \tilde{\omega} \mu a \ \psi v \chi \iota \kappa \dot{\delta} v$, translated natural body, evidently means a body endowed with animal life, and adapted to the present condition of the soul, and to the present physical constitution of the world it inhabits. A $\sigma \tilde{\omega} \mu a \ \pi \nu \epsilon v \mu a \tau \iota \kappa \dot{\delta} v$, translated spiritual body, is a body adapted to the use of the soul in its future glorified estate, and to the moral and physical conditions of the heavenly world,

and to this end assimilated by the Holy Ghost, who dwells in it, to the glorified body of Christ, 1 Cor. xv., 45-48.

5. How does it appear that the same body is to rise that is deposited in the grave?

The passages of Scripture which treat of this subject make it plain that the same bodies are to be raised that are deposited in the grave, by the phrases by which they designate the bodies raised: 1st, "our bodies," Phil. iii., 21; 2d, "this corruptible," 1 Cor. xv., 53, 54; 3d, "all who are in their graves," John v., 28; 4th, "they who are asleep," 1 Thess. iv., 13-17; 5th, "our bodies are the members of Christ," 1 Cor. vi., 15; 6th, our resurrection is to be because of and like that of Christ, which was of his identical body, John xx., 27.

6. How does it appear that the final resurrection is to be simultaneous and general?

See below, Chap. XXXVI., questions 9 and 10.

7. What do the Scriptures teach concerning the nature of the resurrection body?

1st. It is to be spiritual, 1 Cor. xv., 44. See above, question 4. 2d. It is to be like Christ's body, Phil. iii., 21. 3d. Glorious, incorruptible and powerful, 1 Cor. xv., 54. 4th. It shall never die, Rev. xxi., 4. 5th. Never be given in marriage, Matt. xxii., 30.

8. How may it be proved that the material body of Christ rose from the dead?

1st. Christ predicted it, John ii., 19-21. 2d. His resurrection is referred to as a miraculous attestation of the truth of his mission, but unless his body rose literally there was nothing miraculous in his continued life. 3d. The whole language of the inspired narratives necessarily implies this, the rolling away of the stone, the folding up of the garments, etc. 4th. He did not rise until the third day, which proves that it was a physical change, and not a mere continuance of spiritual existence, 1 Cor. xv., 4. 5th. His body was seen, handled and examined, for the space of

forty days, in order to establish this very fact, Luke xxiv., 39.—Dr. Hodge.

9. How can the materiality of Christ's resurrection body be reconciled with what is said as to the modes of its manifestation, and of its ascension into heaven?

The events of his suddenly appearing and vanishing from sight, recorded in Luke xxiv., 31; John xx., 19; Acts i., 9, were accomplished through a miraculous interference with the ordinary laws regulating material bodies, of the same kind precisely with many miracles which Jesus wrought in his body before his death, e. g., his walking on the sea, Matt. xiv., 25; John vi., 9–14.

10. How does the resurrection of Christ secure and illustrate that of his people?

Body and soul together constitute the one person, and man in his entire person, and not his soul separately, is embraced in both the covenants of works and of grace, and in federal and vital union with both the first and the second Adam. Christ's resurrection secures ours, 1st, because his resurrection seals and consummates his redemptive power; and the redemption of our persons involves the redemption of our bodies, Rom. viii., 23. 2d. Because of our federal and vital union with Christ, 1 Cor. xv., 21, 22; 1 Thess. iv., 14. 3d. Because of his Spirit, which dwells in us, (Rom. viii., 11,) making our bodies his members, 1 Cor. vi., 15. 4th. Because Christ by covenant is Lord both of the living and the dead, Rom. xiv., 9. This same federal and vital union of the Christian with Christ (see above, Chap. XXVIII.) likewise causes the resurrection of the believer to be similar to, as well as consequent upon that of Christ, 1 Cor. xv., 49; Phil. iii., 21; 1 John iii., 2.

11. How far are objections of a scientific character against the doctrine of the resurrection of the body entitled to weight?

All truth is one, and of God, and necessarily consistent, whether revealed by means of the phenomena of nature or of the words of inspiration. On the other hand, it follows from our partial knowledge and often erroneous interpretation of the data both of science and revelation, that we often are unable to discern the

harmonies of truths in reality intimately related. Nothing can be believed to be true which is clearly seen to be inconsistent with truth already certainly established. But, on the other hand, in the present stage of our development, the largest proportion of the materials of our knowledge rests upon independent evidence, and are received by us all as certain on their own respective grounds, although we fail as yet to reconcile each fact with every other in the harmonies of their higher laws. The principles of physical science are to be taken as true upon their own ground, i. e., so far as they are matured, and the testimony of revelation is to be taken as infallible truth on its own ground. The one may modify our interpretation of the other, but the most certain of all principles is that a matured science will always corroborate rightly interpreted revelation.

12. How may the identity of our future with our present bodies be reconciled with 1 Cor. xv., 42-50?

In verses 42–44 this identity is expressly asserted. The body is to be the same, though changed in these several particulars. 1st. It is now subject to corruption, then incorruptible. 2d. It is now dishonored, it will then be glorified. 3d. It is now weak, it will then be powerful. 4th. It is now natural, i. e., adapted to the present condition of the soul and constitution of the world. It will then be spiritual, i. e., adapted to the glorified condition of the soul, and constitution of the "new heavens and new earth."

Verse 50 declares simply that "flesh and blood," that is, the present corruptible, weak, and depraved constitution of the body can not inherit heaven. Yet the passage as a whole clearly teaches not the substitution of a new body but the transformation of the old.

13. What facts does physiological science establish with respect to the perpetual changes that are going on in our present bodies, and what relation do these facts sustain to this doctrine?

By a ceaseless process of the assimilation of new material and excretion of the old, the particles composing our bodies are ceaselessly changing from birth to death, effecting, as it is computed, a change in every atom of the entire structure every seven years.

Thus there will not be a particle in the organism of an adult which constituted part of his person when a boy, nor in that of the old man of that which belonged to him when of middle age. The body from youth to age is universally subject to vast changes in size, form, expression, condition, and many times to total change of constituent particles. All this is certain; but it is none the less certain that through all these changes the man possesses identically the same person from youth to age. This proves that neither the identity of the body of the same man from youth to age, nor the identity of our present with our resurrection bodies consist in sameness of particles. If we are sure of our identity in the one case, we need not stumble at the difficulties attending the other.

14. What objection to this doctrine is derived from the known fact of the dispersion and assimilation into other organisms of the particles of our bodies after death?

The instant the vital principle surrenders the elements of the body to the unmodified control of the laws of chemical affinity, their present combinations are dissolved and distributed throughout space, and they are taken up and assimilated by other animal and vegetable organisms. Thus the same particles have formed, at different times, part of the bodies of myriads of men, in the successive periods of the growth of individuals, and in successive generations. Hence it has been objected to the scriptural doctrine of the resurrection of the body, that it will be impossible to decide to which of the thousand bodies which these particles have formed part in turn, they should be assigned in the resurrection; or to reinvest each soul with its own body, when all the constituent elements of every body have been shared in common by many. We answer that bodily identity does not consist in sameness of constituent particles. See above, question 13. Just as God has revealed to us through consciousness that our bodies are identical from infancy to age, although their constituent elements often change, he has, with equal certainty and reasonableness, revealed to us in his inspired word that our bodies, raised in glory, are identical with our bodies sown in dishonor, although their constituent particles may have been scattered to the ends of the earth.

15. What is essential to identity?

1st. "It is evident that identity depends upon different conditions in different cases. The identity of a stone or any other portion of unorganized matter consists in its substance and form. On the other hand, the identity of a plant from the seed to its maturity is, in a great measure, independent of sameness of substance or of form. Their identity appears to consist in each plant's being one organized whole, and in the continuity of the succession of its elements and parts. The identity of a picture does not depend upon the sameness of the particles of coloring matter of which it is composed, for these we may conceive to be continually changing, but upon the drawing, the tints, the light and shade, the expression, the idea which it embodies," etc.

2d. Bodily identity is not a conclusion drawn from the comparison, or combination of other facts, but it is itself a single irresolvable fact of consciousness. The child, the savage, the philosopher, are alike certain of the sameness of their bodies at different periods of their lives, and on the same grounds. This intuitive conviction, as it is not the result of science, so it is no more bound to give an account of itself to science, i. e., we are no more called upon to explain it before we believe it than we are to explain any other of the simple data of consciousness.

3d. The resurrection of our bodies, although a certain fact of revelation, is to us, as yet, an unrealized experience, an unobserved phenomenon. The physical conditions, therefore, of the identity of our "spiritual bodies" with our "natural bodies," we can not now possibly comprehend, since we have neither the experience, the observation, nor the revelation of the facts involved in such knowledge. This much, however, is certain as to the result, 1st. The body of the resurrection will be as strictly identical with the body of death, as the body of death is with the body of birth. 2d. Each soul will have an indubitable intuitive consciousness that its new body is identical with the old. 3d. Each friend shall recognize the individual characteristics of the soul in the perfectly transparent expression of the new body.—Dr. Hodge.

16. How far was the doctrine of the resurrection of the body held by the Jews?

With the exception of some heretical sects, as the Sadducees,

the Jews held this doctrine in the same sense in which we hold it now. This is evident, 1st, Because it was clearly revealed in their inspired writings, see above, question 2. 2d. It is affirmed in their uninspired writings, Wisdom, iii., 6, 13; iv., 15; 2 Maccabees vii., 9, 14, 23, 29. 3d. Christ in his discources, instead of proving this doctrine, assumes it as recognized, Luke xiv., 14; John v., 28, 29. 4th. Paul asserts that both the ancient Jews, (Heb. xi., 35,) and his own cotemporaries, (Acts xxiv., 15,) believed this doctrine.

17. What early heretical sects in the Christian church rejected this doctrine?

All the sects bearing the generic designation of gnostic, and under various specific names embodying the leaven of oriental philosophy, which infested the church of Christ from the beginning for many centuries, believed, 1st, that matter is essentially vile; and the source of all sin and misery to the soul; 2d, that complete sanctification is consummated only in the dissolution of the body and the emancipation of the soul; 3d, that consequently any literal resurrection of the body is repugnant to the spirit, and would be destructive to the purpose of the whole gospel.

18. What is the doctrine taught by Swedenborg on this subject?

It is substantially the same with that set forth by Professor Bush in his once famous book, "Anastasia." They teach that the literal body is dissolved, and finally perishes in death. But by a subtle law of our nature an etherial, luminous body is eliminated out of the $\psi v \chi \dot{\eta}$ (the seat of the nervous sensibility, occupying the middle link between matter and spirit), so that the soul does not go forth from its tabernacle of flesh a bare power of thought, but is clothed upon at once by this psychical body. This resurrection of the body, they pretend, takes place in every case immediately at death, and accompanies the outgoing soul.

19. How do modern rationalists explain the passages of Scripture which relate to this subject?

They explain them away, denying their plain sense, either, 1st, as purely allegorical modes of inculcating the truth of the continued existence of the soul after death; or, 2d, as concessions to the prejudices and superstitions of the Jews.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE SECOND ADVENT AND GENERAL JUDGMENT.

1. What it the meaning of the expressions "the coming," or "the day of the Lord," as used in both the Old and New Testaments?

1st. For any special manifestation of God's presence and power, John xiv., 18, 23; Is. xiii., 6; Jer. xlvi., 10. 2d. By way of eminence. (1.) In the Old Testament, for the coming of Christ in the flesh, and the abrogation of the Jewish economy, Malachi iii., 2; iv., 5. (2.) In the New Testament, for the second and final coming of Christ.

The several terms referring to this last great event are, 1st, ἀποκάλυψις, revelation, 1 Cor. i., 7; 2 Thess. i., 7; 1 Pet. i., 7, 13; iv., 13. 2d. παρουσία, presence, advent, Matt. xxiv., 3, 27, 37, 39; 1 Cor. xv., 23; 1 Thess. ii., 19; iii., 13; iv., 15; v., 23; 2 Thess. ii., 1-9; James v., 7, 8; 2 Pet. i., 16; iii., 4, 12; 1 John ii., 28. 3d. ἐπιφάνεια, appearance, manifestation, 2 Thess. ii., 8; 1 Tim. vi., 14; 2 Tim. iv., 1, 8; Titus ii., 13.

The time of that coming is designated as "the day of God," 2 Pet. iii., 12. "The day of the Lord," 1 Thess. v., 2. "The day of the Lord Jesus, and of Jesus Christ," 1 Cor. i., 8; Phil. i., 6, 10; 2 Pet. iii., 10. "That day," 2 Thess. i., 10; 2 Tim. i., 12, 18. "The last day," John vi., 39-54. "The great day," "the day of wrath," and "of judgment," and "of revelation," Jude 6; Rev. vi., 17; Rom. ii., 5; 2 Pet. ii., 9.

Christ is called δ ἐρχόμενος, the coming one, with reference to both advents, Matt. xxi., 9; Luke vii., 19, 20; xix., 38; John iii., 31; Rev. i., 4; iv. 8; xi., 17.

2. Present the evidence that a literal personal advent of Christ still future is taught in the Bible.

Ist. The anology of the first advent. The prophecies relating to the one having been literally fulfilled by a personal coming, we may be certain that the perfectly similar prophecies relating to the other will be fulfilled in the same sense.

2d. The language of Christ predicting such advent admits of no other rational interpretation. The coming itself, its manner and purpose, are alike defined. He is to be attended with the hosts of heaven, in power and great glory. He is to come upon the occasion of the general resurrection and judgment, and for the purpose of consummating his mediatorial work, by the final condemnation and perdition of all his enemies, and by the acknowledgment and completed glorification of all his friends, Matt. xvi., 27; xxiv., 30; xxv., 31; xxvi., 64; Mark viii., 38; Luke xxi., 27.

3d. The apostles understood these predictions to relate to a literal advent of Christ in person. They teach their disciples to form the habit of constantly looking forward to it, as a solemnizing motive to fidelity, and to encouragement and resignation under present trials. They teach that his coming will be visible and glorious, accompanied with the abrogation of the present gospel dispensation, the destruction of his enemies, the glorification of his friends, the conflagration of the world, and the appearance of the "new heaven and new earth." See the passages quoted under the preceding chapter, and Acts. i., 11; iii., 19–21; 1 Cor. iv., 5; xi., 26; xv., 23; Heb. ix., 28; x., 37.—Dr. Hodge's Lecture.

3. What three modes of interpretation have been adopted in reference to Matt. xxiv and xxv.?

"It is to be remarked that these chapters contain an answer to three distinct questions. 1st. When the temple and city were to be destroyed. 2d. What were to be the signs of Christ's coming? 3d. The third question related to the end of the world. The difficulty consists in separating the portions relating to these several questions. There are three methods adopted in the explanation of these chapters. 1st. The first assumes that they refer exclusively to the overthrow of the Jewish polity, and the establishment and progress of the gospel. 2d. The second assumes that what is here said has been fulfilled in one sense in the des-

truction of Jerusalem, and is to be fulfilled in a higher sense at the last day. 3d. The third supposes that some portions refer exclusively to the former event and others exclusively to the latter. It is plain that the *first* view is untenable, and whether the second or third view be adopted, the obscurity resting upon this passage can not properly be allowed to lead us to reject the clear and constant teaching of the New Testament with regard to the second personal and visible advent of the Son of God."—Dr. Hodge.

4. In what passages is the time of Christ's second advent declared to be unknown?

Matt. xxiv., 36; Mark xiii., 32; Luke xii., 40; Acts i., 6, 7; 1 Thess. v., 1-3; 2 Pet. iii., 3, 4, 10; Rev. xvi., 15.

5. What passages are commonly cited in proof that the apostles expected the second advent during their lives?

Phil. i., 6; 1 Thess. iv., 15; Heb. x., 25; 1 Pet. i., 5; James v., 8.

- 6. How may it be shown that they did not entertain such an expectation?
- Ist. The apostles, as individuals, apart from their public capacity as inspired teachers, were subject to the common prejudices of their age and nation, and only gradually were brought to the full knowledge of the truth. During Christ's life they expected that he would establish his kingdom in its glory at that time, Luke xxiv., 21; and after his resurrection the first question they asked him was, "Wilt thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?"
- 24 In their inspired writings they have never taught that the second coming of their Lord was to occur in their life-time, or at any fixed time whatever. They only taught (1.) that it ought to be habitually desired, and (2.) since it is uncertain as to time, that it should always be regarded as imminent.
- 3d. As further revelations were vouchsafed to them, they learned, and explicitly taught, that the time of the second advent was not only uncertain, but that many events, still future, must

previously occur, e. g., the anti-Christian apostasy, the preaching of the gospel to every nation, the fullness of the Gentiles, the conversion of the Jews, the millenial prosperity of the church, and the final defection, Rom. xi., 15–32; 2 Cor. iii., 15, 16; 2 Thess. ii., 3. This is clear, because the coming of Christ is declared to be attended with the resurrection of the dead, the general judgment, the general conflagration, and the restitution of all things. See below, question 9.

7. What is the Scriptural doctrine concerning the millenium?

1st. The Scriptures, both of the Old and New Testament, clearly reveal that the gospel is to exercise an influence over all branches of the human family, immeasurably more extensive and more thoroughly transforming than any it has ever realized in time past. This end is to be gradually attained through the spiritual presence of Christ in the ordinary dispensation of Providence, and ministrations of his church, Matt. xiii., 31, 32; xxviii., 19, 20; Ps. ii., 7, 8; xxii., 27, 29; lxxii., 8–11; Is. ii., 2, 3; xi., 6–9; lx., 12; lxvi., 23; Dan. ii., 35, 44; Zech. ix., 10; xiv., 9; Rev. xi., 15.

2d. The period of this general prevalency of the gospel will continue a thousand years, and is hence designated the millenium, Rev. xx., 2-7.

3d. The Jews are to be converted to Christianity either at the commencement or during the continuance of this period, Zech. xii., 10; xiii., 1; Rom. xi., 26-29; 2 Cor. iii., 15, 16.

4th. At the end of these thousand years, and before the coming of Christ, there will be a comparatively short season of apostasy and violent conflict between the kingdoms of light and darkness, Luke xvii., 26-30; 2 Pet. iii., 3, 4; Rev. xx., 7-9.

5th. Christ's advent, the general resurrection and judgment, will be simultaneous, and immediately succeeded by the burning of the old, and the revelation of the new earth and heavens. Confession of Faith Chapts. XXXII and XXXIII.

8. What is the view of those who maintain that Christ's coming will be "premillenial," and that he will reign personally upon the earth a thousand years before the judgment?

1st. Many of the Jews, mistaking altogether the spiritual character of the Messiah's kingdom, entertained the opinion that as

the church had continued two thousand years before the giving of the law, so it would continue two thousand years under the law, when the Messiah would commence his personal reign, which should, in turn, continue two thousand years to the commencement of the eternal Sabbath. They expected that the Messiah would reign visibly and gloriously in Jerusalem, as his capital, over all the nations of the earth, the Jews, as his especial people,

being exalted to preëminent dignity and privilege.

2d. The majority of the early fathers of the Christian church adopted this view in its essential elements, adapting it to the literal interpretation of Rev. xx., 1–10. They held, 1st. That after the development of the Anti-Christian apostasy, at some time very variously estimated, Christ was suddenly to appear and commence his personal reign of a thousand years in Jerusalem. The dead in Christ (some say only the martyrs) were then to rise and teign with him in the world, the majority of whose inhabitants shall be converted, and live during this period in great prosperity and happiness, the Jews in the mean time being converted, and restored to their own land. (2.) That after the thousand years there shall come the final apostasy for a little season, and then the resurrection of the rest of the dead, i. e., the wicked and their judgment and condemnation at the last day, the final conflagration, and new heavens and earth.

3d. Modern premillenarians, while differing among themselves as to the details of their interpretations, agree substantially with the view just stated. Hence they are called Premillenarians, because they believe the advent of Christ will occur before the Millenium.

9. What are the principal Scriptural arguments against this view?

1st. The theory is evidently Jewish in its origin and Jew-

daizing in its tendency.

2d. It is not consistent with what the Scriptures teach. (1.)
As to the nature of Christ's kingdom, e. g., a that it is not of
this world but spiritual, Matt. xiii., 11-44; John xviii., 36;
Rom. xiv., 17; b that it was not to be confined to the Jews,
Matt. viii., 11, 12; c that regeneration is the condition of admission to it, John iii., 3, 5; d that the blessings of the kingdom are

purely spiritual, as pardon, sanctification, etc., Matt. iii., 2, 11; Col. i., 13, 14. (2.) As to the fact that the kingdom of Christ has already come. He has sat upon the throne of his Father David ever since his ascension, Acts ii., 29–36; iii., 13–15; iv., 26–28; v., 29–31; Heb. x., 12, 13; Rev. iii., 7–12. The Old Testament prophecies, therefore, which predict this kingdom must refer to the present dispensation of grace, and not to a future reign of Christ on earth in person among men in the flesh.

3d. The second advent is not to occur until the resurrection, when all the dead, both good and bad, are to rise at once, Dan. xii., 2; John v., 28, 29; 1 Cor. xv., 23; 1 Thes. iv., 16; Rev. xx., 11-15. Only one passage, (Rev. xx., 1-10,) is even apparently inconsistent with the fact here asserted. For the true interpretation of that passage see next question.

4th. The second advent is not to occur until the simultaneous judgment of all men, the good and the bad together, Matt. vii., 21, 23; xiii., 30-43; xvi., 24, 27; xxv., 31-46; Rom. ii., 5, 16; 1 Cor. iii., 12-15; 2 Cor. v., 9-11; 2 Thes. i., 6-10; Rev. xx., 11-15.

11-15.

5th. The second advent is to be attended with the general conflagration, and the generation of the "new heavens and the new earth," 2 Pet. iii., 7–13; Rev. xx., 11; xxi., 1.—" Brown on the Second Advent."

10. What considerations favor the spiritual and oppose the literal interpretation of Rev. xx., 1-10?

The spiritual interpretation of this difficult passage is as follows: Christ has in reserve for his church a period of universal expansion and of preëminent spiritual prosperity, when the spirit and character of the "noble army of martyrs" shall be reproduced again in the great body of God's people in an unprecedented measure, and when these martyrs shall, in the general triumph of their cause, and in the overthrow of that of their enemies, receive judgment over their foes and reign in the earth; while the party of Satan, "the rest of the dead," shall not flourish again until the thousand years be ended, when it shall prevail again for a little season.

The considerations in favor of this interpretation of the

passage are-

1st. It occurs in one of the most highly figurative books of the Bible.

2d. This interpretation is perfectly consistent with all the other more explicit teachings of the Scriptures on the several points involved.

3d. The same figure, viz., that of life again from the dead, is frequently used in Scripture to express the idea of the spiritual revival of the church, Is. xxvi., 19; Ezek. xxxvii., 12-14; Hosea vi., 1-3; Rom. xi., 15; Rev. xi., 11.

The considerations bearing against the literal interpretation

of this passage are-

1st. That the pretended doctrine of two resurrections, i. e., first of the righteous, and then, after an interval of a thousand years, of the wicked, is taught nowhere else in the Bible, and this single passage in which it occurs is an obscure one. This is a strong presumption against the truth of the doctrine.

2d. It is inconsistent with what the Scriptures uniformly teach as to the nature of the resurrection body, i. e., that it is to be "spiritual," not "natural," or "flesh and blood," 1 Cor. xv., 44. It is, on the contrary, an essential part of the doctrine associated with the literal interpretation of this passage, that the saints, or at least the martyrs, are to rise and reign a thousand years in the flesh, and in this world as at present constituted.

3d. The literal interpretation of this passage contradicts the clear and uniform teaching of the Scriptures, that all the dead, good and bad, are to rise and be judged together at the second coming of Christ, and the entire revolution of the present order of creation. See the Scripture testimonies collected under the preceding question.

11. Show that the future general conversion of the Jews is taught in Scripture?

This Paul, in Rom. xi., 15-29, both asserts and proves from Old Testament prophecies, e. g., Isa. lix., 20; Jer. xxxi, 31. See also Zech. xii., 10; 2 Cor. iii., 15, 16.

12. State the argument for and against the opinion that the Jews are to be restored to their own land?

The arguments in favor of that return are—

1st. The literal sense of many old Testament prophecies, Isaxi., 11, 12; Jer. iii., 17; xvi., 14, 15; Ezek. xx., 40-44; xxxiv., 11-31; xxxvi., 1-36; Hosea iii., 4, 5; Amos ix., 11-15; Zech. x., 6-10; xiv., 1-20; Joel iii., 1-17.

2d. That the whole territory promised by God to Abraham has never at any period been fully possessed by his descendants, Gen. xv., 18-21; Num. xxxiv., 6-12, and renewed through Ezekiel, Ezek. xlvii., 1-23.

3d. The land, though capable of maintaining a vast population, is as preserved unoccupied, evidently waiting for inhabitants. See Keith's "Land of Israel."

4th. The Jews, though scattered among all nations, have been miraculously preserved a separate people, and evidently await a destiny as signal and peculiar as has been their history. The arguments against their return to the land of their fathers are—

1st. The New Testament is entirely silent on the subject of any such return, which would be an inexplicable omission in the clearer revelation, if that event is really future.

2d. The literal interpretation of the Old Testament prophecies concerned in this question would be most unnatural, (1.) Because, if the interpretation is to be consistent, it must be literal in all its parts. Then it would follow that David himself, in person, must be raised to reign again in Jerusalem, Ezek. xxxvii., 24, etc. Then the Levitical priesthood must be restored, and bloody sacrifices offered to God, Ezek. xl. to xlvi.; Jer. xvii., 25, 26. Then must Jerusalem be the center of government, the Jews a superior class in the Christian church, and all worshippers must come monthly and from Sabbath to Sabbath, from the ends of the earth to worship at the Holy City, Isa. ii., 2, 3; lxvi., 20-23; Zech. xiv., 16-21. (2.) Because the literal interpretation thus leads to the revival of the entire ritual system of the Jews, and is inconsistent with the spirituality of the kingdom of Christ. above, question 9. (3.) Because the literal interpretation of these passages is inconsistent with what the New Testament plainly teaches as to the abolition of all distinctions between the Jew and Gentile; the Jews, when converted, are to be grafted back into the same church, Rom. xi., 19-24; Eph. ii., 13-19. (4.) Because this interpretation is inconsistent with what the New Testament teaches as to the temporary purpose, the virtual insufficiency,

and the final abolition of the Levitical priesthood and their sacrifices, and of the infinite sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ, and the eternity of his priesthood, Gal. iv., 9, 10; v., 4-8 Col. ii., 16-23; Heb. vii., 12-18; viii., 7-13; ix., 1-14.

3d. On the other hand, the spiritual interpretation of these Old Testament prophecies—which regards them as predicting the future purity and extension of the Christian church, and as indicating these spiritual subjects by means of those persons, places and ordinances of the old economy which were typical of them—is both natural and accordant to the analogy of Scripture. In the New Testament, Christians are called Abram's seed, Gal. iii., 29; Israelites, Gal. vi., 16, Eph. ii., 12, 19; comers to Mount Zion, Heb. xii., 22; citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, Gal. iv., 26; the circumcision, Phil. iii., 3, Col. ii., 11, and in Rev. ii., 9, they are called Jews. There is also a Christian priesthood and spiritual sacrifice, 1 Pet. ii., 5, 9; Heb. xiii., 15, 16; Rom. xii., 1. See Fairbairn's Typology Appendix, Vol. I.

13. Who is to be the judge of the world?

Jesus Christ, in his official character as Mediator, in both natures, as the God-man. This is evident, 1st, because as judge he is called the "Son of Man," Matt. xxv., 31, 32, and the "man ordained by God," Acts xvii., 31. 2d. Because all judgment is said to be committed to him by the Father, John v., 22, 27. 3d. Because it pertains to him as Mediator to complete and publicly manifest the salvation of his people, and the overthrow of his enemies, together with the glorious righteousness of his work in both respects, 2 Thess. i., 7–10; Rev. i., 7; and thus accomplish the "restitution of all things," Acts iii., 21. And this he shall do in his own person, that his glory may be the more manifest, the discomfiture of his enemies the more humiliating, and the hope and joy of his redeemed the more complete.

14. Who are to be the subjects of the judgment?

1st. The whole race of Adam, without exception, of every generation, condition and character, each individual appearing in the integrity of his person, "body, soul and spirit." The dead will be raised, and the living changed simultaneously, Matt. xxv.,

31-46; 1 Cor. xv., 51, 52; 2 Cor. v., 10; 1 Thess. iv., 17; 2 Thess. i., 6-10; Rev. xx., 11-15. 2d. All evil angels, 2 Pet. ii., 4; Jude 6. Good angels appearing as attendants and ministers, Matt. xiii., 41, 42.

15. In what sense is it said that the saints shall judge the world?

See Matt. xix., 28; Luke xxii., 29, 30; 1 Cor. vi., 2, 3; Rev. xx., 4.

In virtue of the union of believers with Christ, his triumph and dominion is theirs. They are joint heirs with him, and if they suffer with him they shall reign with him, Rom. viii., 17; 2 Tim. ii., 12. He will judge and condemn his enemies as head and champion of his church, all his members assenting to his judgment and glorying in his triumph, Rev. xix., 1–5.—Hodge's Com. on 1st Cor.

16. Upon what principles will his judgment be dispensed?

The judge is figuratively represented, (Rev. xx., 12,) after the analogy of human tribunals, as opening "books" in judgment, according to the things written in which the dead are to be judged, and also "another book," "which is the book of life." The books first mentioned doubtless figuratively represent the law or standard according to which each one was to be judged, and the facts in his case, or "the works which he had done." The "book of life" (see also Phil. iv., 3; Rev. iii., 5; xiii., 8; xx., 15) is the book of God's eternal electing love. Those whose names are found written in the "book of life" will be declared righteous on the ground of their participation in the righteousness of Christ. Their holy characters and good deeds, however, will be publicly declared as the evidences of their election, of their relation to Christ, and of the glorious work of Christ in them, Matt. xiii., 43; xxv., 34-40.

Those whose names are not found written in "the book of life" will be condemned on the ground of the evil "deeds they have done in the body," tried by the standard of God's law, not as that law has been ignorantly conceived of by each, but as it has been more or less fully and clearly revealed by the Judge himself to each severally. The heathen who has sinned without

the written law "shall be judged without the law," i. e., by the law written upon his heart, which made him a law unto himself, Luke xii., 47, 48; Rom. ii., 12–15. The Jew, who "sinned in the law, shall be judged by the law," Rom. ii., 12. Every individual dwelling under the light of the Christian revelation shall be judged in strict accordance with the whole will of God as made known to him, all of the special advantages of every kind enjoyed by him individually modifying the proportion of his responsibility, Matt. xi., 20–24; John iii., 19.

The secrets of all hearts, the inward states and hidden springs of action will be brought in as the subject matter of judgment, as well as the actions themselves, Eccle. xii., 14; 1 Cor. iv., 5; and publicly declared to vindicate the justice of the Judge, and to make manifest the shame of the sinner, Luke viii., 17; xii., 2, 3; Mark iv., 22. Whether the sins of the saints will be brought forward at the judgment or not is a question not settled by the Scriptures, though debated by theologians. If they should be, we are sure that it will be done only with the design and effect of enhancing the glory of the Saviour and the comfort of the saved.

17. What do the Scriptures reveal concerning the future conflagration of our earth?

The principal passages bearing upon this point are Ps. cii., 26, 27; Is. li., 6; Rom. viii., 19-23; Heb. xii., 26, 27; 2 Pet. iii., 10-13; Rev. xx. and xxi.

Many of the older theologians thought that these passages indicated that the whole existing physical universe was to be destroyed. This view is now universally discarded. Some held that this earth is to be annihilated.

The most common and probable opinion is that at "the restitution of all things," Acts. iii., 21, this earth, with its atmosphere, is to be subjected to intense heat, which will radically change its present physical condition, introducing in the place of the present an higher order of things, which shall appear as a "new heavens and a new earth," wherein "the creature itself, also, shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God," Rom. viii., 19–23, and wherein the constitution of the new world will be adapted to the "spiritual" or resurrection bodies of the saints, 1 Cor. xv., 44, to be the scene of the

heavenly society, and, above all, to be the palace-temple of the God-man for ever, Eph. i., 14; Rev. v., 9, 10; xxi., 1-5. See also Fairbairn's Typology, Vol. I., Part II., Chap. II., sec. 7.

18. What should be the moral effect of the Scripture doctrine of Christ's second advent?

Christians ought thereby to be comforted when in sorrow, and always stimulated to duty, Phil. iii., 20; Col. iii., 4, 5; James v., 7; 1 John iii., 2, 3. It is their duty also to love, watch, wait for, and hasten unto the coming of their Lord, Luke xii., 35, 37; 1 Cor. i., 7, 8; Phil. iii., 20; 1 Thess. i., 9, 10; 2 Tim. iv., 8; 2 Pet. iii., 12; Rev. xxii., 20.

Unbelievers should be filled with fearful apprehension, and with all their might they should seek place for immediate repentance, Mark xiii., 35, 37; 2 Pet. iii., 9, 10; Jude 14, 15.—Brown's Second Advent.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

HEAVEN AND HELL.

 What is the New Testament usage as to the terms δυρανός, "heaven," and τά ἐπουράνια, "heavenly places?"

Overvéç is used chiefly in three senses. 1st. The upper air where the birds fly, Matt. viii., 20; xxiv., 30. 2d. The region in which the stars revolve, Acts vii., 42; Heb. xi., 12. 3d. The abode of Christ's human nature, the scene of the special manifestation of divine glory, and of the eternal blessedness of the saints, Heb. ix., 24; 1 Pet. iii., 22. This is sometimes called the "third heaven," 2 Cor. xii., 2. The phrases "new heaven," and "new earth," in contrast with "first heavens" and "first earth," 2 Pet. iii., 7, 13; Rev. xxi., 1, refer to some unexplained change which will take place in the final catastrophe, by which God will revolutionize our portion of the physical universe, cleansing it from the stain of sin, and qualifying it to be the abode of blessedness.

For the usage with regard to the phrase "kingdom of heaven,"

see above, Chap. XXIV., question 5.

The phrase $\tau \acute{a} i \pi o v \rho \acute{a} v a$ is translated sometimes, "heavenly things," John iii., 12, where it signifies the mysteries of the unseen spiritual world; and sometimes "heavenly places," Eph. i., 3; and ii., 6, where it means the state into which a believer is introduced at his regeneration; see also Eph. i., 20, where it means the "third heavens;" and Eph. vi., 12, where it signifies indefinitely the supermundane universe.

2. What are the principle terms, both literal and figurative, which are used in Scripture to designate the future blessedness of the saints?

Literal terms: - "life, eternal life, and life everlasting, Matt.

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vii., 14; xix., 16, 29; xxv., 46. Glory, the glory of God, an eternal weight of glory, Rom. ii., 7, 10; v., 2; 2 Cor. iv., 17. Peace, Rom. ii., 10. Salvation, and eternal salvation, Heb. v., 9."

Figurative terms:—"Paradise, Luke xxiii., 43; 2 Cor. xii., 4; Rev. ii., 7. Heavenly Jerusalem, Gal. iv., 26; Rev. iii., 12. Kingdom of heaven, heavenly kingdom, eternal kingdom, kingdom prepared from the foundation of the world, Matt. xxv., 34; 2 Tim. iv., 18; 2 Pet. i., 11. Eternal inheritance, 1 Pet. i., 4; Heb. ix., 15, The blessed are said to sit down with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, to be in Abraham's bosom, Luke xvi., 22; Matt. viii., 11; to reign with Christ, 2 Tim. ii., 11, 12; to enjoy a Sabbath or rest, Heb. iv., 10, 11."—Kitto's Bib. Ency.

3. What is revealed with respect to heaven as a place?

All the Scripture representations of heaven involve the idea of a definite place, as well as of a state of blessedness. Of that place, however, nothing more is revealed than that it is defined by the local presence of Christ's finite soul and body, and that it is the scene of the preëminent manifestation of God's glory, John

xvii., 24; 2 Cor. v., 9; Rev. v., 6.

From such passages as Rom. viii., 19-23; 2 Pet. iii., 5-13; Rev. xxi., 1, it appears not improbable that after the general destruction of the present form of the world by fire, which shall accompany the judgment, this world will be reconstituted, and gloriously adapted to be the permanent residence of Christ and his church. As there is to be a "spiritual body," there may be in the same sense a spiritual world, that is, a world adapted to be the theater of the glorified spirits of the saints made perfect. As nature was cursed for man's sake, and the creature, through him, made subject to vanity, it may be that they shall share in his redemption and exaltation. See Fairbairn's Typology, Part II., Chap. II., sec. 7.

4. Wherein does the blessedness of heaven consist as far as revealed?

1st. Negatively, in perfect deliverance from sin, and from all its evil consequences, physical, moral, and social, Rev. vii., 16, 17; xxi., 4, 27.

2d. Positively. (1.) In the perfection of our nature, both ma-

terial and spiritual; the full development and harmonious exercise of all our faculties, intellectual and moral, and in the unrestrained progress thereof to eternity, 1 Cor. xiii., 9–12; xv., 45–49; 1 John iii., 2. (2.) In the sight of our blessed Redeemer, communion with his person, and fellowship in all his glory and blessedness, and through him with saints and angels, John xvii., 24; 1 John i., 3; Rev. iii., 21; xxi., 3, 4, 5. (3.) In that "beatific vision of God," which, consisting in the ever increasingly clear discovery of the divine excellence lovingly apprehended, transforms the soul into the same image, from glory unto glory, Matt. v., 8; 2 Cor. iii., 18.

In meditating upon what is revealed of the conditions of heavenly existence two errors are to be avoided: 1st, the extreme of regarding the mode of existence experienced by the saints in heaven as too nearly analogous to that of our earthly life; 2d, the opposite extreme of regarding the conditions of the heavenly life as too widely distinguished from that of our present experience. The evil effect of the first extreme will, of course, be to degrade by unworthy associations our conceptions of heaven; while the evil effect of the opposite extreme will be in great measure to destroy the moral power which a hope of heaven should naturally exert over our hearts and lives, by rendering our conceptions of it vague, and our sympathy with its characteristics consequently distant and feeble. To avoid both of these extremes, we should fix the limits within which our conceptions of the future existence of the saints must range, by distinguishing between those elements of man's nature, and of his relations to God and other men, which are essential and unchangeable, and those elements which must be changed in order to render his nature in his relations perfect. 1st. The following must be changed: (1.) all sin and its consequences must be removed; (2.) "spiritual bodies" must take the place of our present flesh and blood; (3.) the new heavens and the new earth must take the place of the present heavens and earth, as the scene of man's life; (4.) the laws of social organization must be radically changed, since in heaven there will be no marriage, but a social order analogous to that of the "angels of God" introduced.

2d. The following elements are essential, and therefore unchangeable. (1.) Man will continue ever to exist, as compounded

of two natures, spiritual and material. (2.) He is essentially intellectual, and must live by knowledge. (3.) He is essentially active, and must have work to do. (4.) Man can, as a finite creature, know God only mediately, i. e., through his works of creation and providence, the experience of his gracious work upon our hearts, and through his incarnate Son, who is the image of his person, and the fullness of the Godhead bodily. God will therefore in heaven continue to teach man through his works, and to act upon him by means of motives addressed to his will through his understanding. (5.) The memory of man never finally loses the slightest impression, and it will belong to the perfection of the heavenly state that every experience acquired in the past will always be within the perfect control of the will. (6.) Man is essentially a social being. This, taken in connection with the preceding point, indicates the conclusion that the associations, as well as the experience of our earthly life, will carry all of their natural consequences with them into the new mode of existence, except as far as they are necessarily modified (not lost) by the change. (7.) Man's life is essentially an eternal progress toward infinite perfection. (8.) All the known analogies of God's works in creation, in his providence in the material and moral world, and in his dispensation of grace, (1 Cor. xii., 5-28,) indicate that in heaven saints will differ among themselves both as to inherent capacities and qualities, and as to relative rank and office. These differences will doubtless be determined a by constitutional differences of natural capacity, b by gracious rewards in heaven corresponding in kind and degree to the gracious fruitfulness of the individual on earth, c by the absolute sovereignty of the Creator, Matt. xvi., 27; Rom. ii., 6; 1 Cor. xii., 4-28.

5. What are the principal terms, literal and figurative, which are applied in Scripture to the future condition of the reprobate?

As a place, it is sometimes literally designated by ἄιδης, Hades, and sometimes by γεέννα, both translated hell, Matt. v., 22, 29, 30; Luke xvi., 23. Also by the phrase, "place of torment," Luke xvi., 28. As a condition of suffering, it is literally designated by the phrases, "wrath of God," Rom. ii., 5, and "second death," Rev. xxi., 8.

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Figurative terms.—Everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, Matt. xxv., 41. The hell of fire, where the worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched, Mark ix., 44. The lake which burneth with fire and brimstone, Rev. xxi., 8. Bottomless pit, Rev. ix., 2. The dreadful nature of this abode of the wicked is implied in such expressions as "outer darkness," the place "where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth," Matt. viii., 12; "I am tormented in this flame," Luke xvi., 24; "unquenchable fire," Luke iii., 17; "furnace of fire," Matt. xiii., 42; "blackness of darkness," Jude 13; "torment in fire and brimstone," Rev. xiv., 10; "the smoke of their torment ascendeth for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night," Rev. xiv., 11.—Kitto's Bib. Ency.

6. What do the Scriptures teach as to the nature of future punishments?

The terms used in Scripture to describe these sufferings are evidently figurative, yet they certainly establish the following points. These sufferings will consist, 1st, in the loss of all good, whether natural, as granted through Adam, or gracious, as offered through Christ. 2d. In all the natural consequences of unrestrained sin, judicial abandonment, utter alienation from God, and the awful society of lost men and devils, 2 Thess. i., 9. 3d. In the positive infliction of torment, God's wrath and curse descending upon both the moral and physical nature of its objects. The Scriptures also establish the fact that these sufferings must be, 1st, inconceivably dreadful in degree. 2d. Endless in duration. 3d. Various in degree, proportionately to the deserts of the subject, Matt. x., 15; Luke xii., 48.

7. What is the usage of the words, diwr, eternity, and diwros, eternal, in the New Testament, and the argument thence derived establishing the endless duration of future punishment?

1st. The Greek language possesses no more emphatic terms with which to express the idea of endless duration than these. 2d. Although they are sometimes employed in the New Testalment to designate limited duration, yet, in the vast majority of instances, they evidently designate unlimited duration. 3d. They

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are used to express the endless duration of God. (1.) ἀιών is thus used, 1 Tim. i., 17, and as applied to Christ, Rev. i., 18. (2.) ἀιώνιος is thus used, Rom. xvi., 26, and as applied to the Holy Ghost, Heb. ix., 14. 4th. They are used to express the endless duration of the future happiness of the saints. (1.) ἀιών is thus used, John vi., 57, 58; 2 Cor. ix., 9. (2.) ἀιώνιος is thus used, Matt. xix., 29; Mark x., 30; John iii., 15; Rom. ii., 7. 5th. In Matt. xxv., 46, the very same word is used in a single clause to define at once the duration of the future happiness of the saints, and the misery of the lost. Thus the Scriptures do expressly declare that the duration of the future misery of the lost is to be in precisely the same sense unending, as is either the life of God, or the blessedness of the saints.

8. What evidence for the truth on this subject is furnished by the New Testament usage of the word ἀίδιος?

This word, formed from dei, always, for ever, signifies, in classical Greek, eternal. It occurs only twice in the New Testament, Rôm. i., 20, "even his eternal power and Godhead," and Jude 6, "Angels reserved in everlasting chains." But lost men share the fate of lost angels, Matt. xxv., 41; Rev. xx., 10. Thus the same word expresses the duration of the Godhead and of the sufferings of the lost.

9. What other evidence do the Scriptures furnish on this subject?

1st. There is nothing in the Scriptures which, even by the most remote implication, suggests that the sufferings of the lost shall ever end.

2d. The constant application to the subject of such figurative language as, "fire that shall not be quenched," "fire unquenchable," "the worm that never dies," "bottomless pit," the necessity of paying the "uttermost farthing," "the smoke of their torment arising for ever and ever," Luke iii., 17; Mark ix., 45, 46; Rev. xiv., 10, 11, is consistent only with the conviction that God wills us to believe on his authority that future punishments are literally endless. It is said of those who commit the unpardonable sin that they shall never be forgiven, "either in this world nor in that which is to come," Matt. xii., 32.

10. What are two views on this subject, which have been held by different parties in opposition to the faith of the whole Christian church, and the clear teaching of God's word?

The only two classes of theories possible as alternatives to the orthodox doctrine on this subject, are those, 1st, which involve the idea of the total destruction of being (annihilation) as an element of the "second death." 2d. Those which maintain the future restoration of the sinner after an indefinite period of aton-

ing and purifying suffering in proportion to his guilt.

In refutation of the former of these theories, which has been rendered respectable chiefly by the adventitious circumstance that it is countenanced by Archbishop Whately, "View of Sc. Rev. Concerning a Future State," we argue, 1st, the Scriptures never express the idea contended for, but consistently use language which has naturally and almost universally conveyed an opposite idea. 2d. The Scriptures plainly assert (1.) that the future state is one of conscious suffering, (2.) that this conscious suffering is to continue for ever—"worm dieth not," "everlasting fire," "unquenchable fire," "weeping and gnashing of teeth," "the smoke of their torment ascendeth up for ever and ever, and they have

no rest day nor night." See above, question 9.

In refutation of the latter opinion, that the lost will be restored after an indefinite period of suffering, we argue, 1st, it has no foundation in Scripture. 2d. It is directly refuted by all the positive evidence we have above presented in establishing the orthodox doctrine. 3d. The atonement of Christ and the sanctifying work of the Holy Ghost are the exclusive means of salvation. (1.) These have been finally rejected by the lost. (2.) They are never applied in hell. 4th. The essential nature of sin determines it when left to itself to multiply itself and its consequent miseries at a fearful ratio. 5th. Suffering per se has no cleansing power; penal evils, when sufficient, may satisfy justice for past sin, but they can not cleanse the heart, nor prevent renewed transgressions. 6th. This essential insalvability of the lost sinner will be in the highest degree aggravated by his circumstances; banished from God, subject to his curse, in unutterable torments, without grace and without hope, and surrounded with the society of all the workers of ahomination gathered from the whole universe.

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11. What objection is urged against this doctrine derived from the justice of God?

The justice of God demands that the punishment should be exactly proportioned to the guilt of the subject. But it is objected. 1st. No sin of any finite creature can deserve an infinite punishment. 2d. All everlasting punishment is infinite, but the infinite does not admit of degrees, yet the guilt of different sinners is various. 3d. The moral difference between the lowest saint saved, and the most amiable sinner lost, is imperceptible, vet their fate differs infinitely.

To the first objection we answer. The human mind not being able to conceive of the infinite, only confuses itself when it attempts to deal with its negative conception of the indefinite as a reality. Every sin of man against the infinite God is declared by Scripture, and is felt by every enlightened conscience to be, worthy of instant and final expulsion from the divine presence, which necessarily leads to an absolutely endless increase both of sin and misery, Gal, iii., 10; James ii., 10. The same is proved by the infinite sacrifice justice demanded for the propitiation of sin. "If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" Luke xxiii., 31.

The second objection is a dishonest cavil. It is very plain that sufferings may be at once infinite in duration, and various

as to degree.

To the third objection we answer. That although there may be little difference as to their respective personal demerits between the feeblest saint and the most moral reprobate, yet there is rightly made an infinite difference in their treatment, because of their essentially different relations to Christ. The feeblest and the loftiest saint are alike justified upon an equal foundation; each has the whole of Christ, and nothing more.

12. What objection drawn from the benevolence of God has been urged against this doctrine?

It has been objected that God is essentially benevolent, and that it is inconsistent with his nature to inflict any suffering upon his creatures which is not necessary as a means to the end of their attaining some higher good. We answer: 1st, God is just as well as benevolent, and one of the elements of his infinite perfection can not be inconsistent with another. 2d. We have constant experience that God does in principle involve his creatures in sufferings which are not to the individual subjects thereof the means of any conceivable advantage. 3d. It would follow that. Christ was sacrificed in vain if those who reject him, and who fail of all share in his grace, are not eternally punished. 4th. The very benevolence of God, as concerned for the general good of the universe, concurs with his justice in demanding the execution of the full penalty of the law upon all unbelievers.

13. What argument for the future restoration of all rational creatures to holiness and happiness is founded upon Rom. v., 18, 19; 1 Cor. xv., 22–28; Eph. i., 10; Col. i., 19, 20?

In regard to Rom. v., 18, it is argued that the phrase "all men" must have precisely the same extent of application in the one clause as in the other. We answer, 1st, the phrase "all men" is often used in Scripture in connections which necessarily restrict the sense, John iii., 26; xii., 32. 2d. In this case the phrase "all men" is evidently defined by the qualifying phrase, ver. 17, "who have received abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness." 3d. This contrast between the "all men" in Adam and the "all men" in Christ is consistent with the analogy of the whole gospel.

In regard to 1 Cor. xv., 22, the argument is the same as that drawn from Rom. v., 18. From verses 25–28 it is argued that the great end of Christ's mediatorial reign must be the restoration of every creature to holiness and blessedness. To this we answer, 1st, this is a strained interpretation put upon these words, which they do not necessarily bear, and which is clearly refuted by the many direct testimonies we have cited from Scripture above. 2d. It is inconsistent with the scope of Paul's subject in this passage. He says that from eternity to the ascension God reigned absolutely. From the ascension to the restitution of all things God reigns in the person of the God-man as Mediator. From the restitution to eternity God will again reign directly as absolute God.

The ultimate salvation of all creatures is argued also from

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Eph. i., 10; Col. i., 19, 20. In both passages, however, the "all things" signify the whole company of angels and redeemed men, who are gathered under the dominion of Christ. Because, 1st, in both passages the subject of discourse is the church, not the universe; 2d, in both passages the "all things" is limited by the qualifying phrases, "the predestinated," "we who first trusted in Christ," "the accepted in the beloved," "if ye continue in the faith," etc., etc. See Hodge's Commentaries on Romans, 1st Corinthians and Ephesians.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

SACRAMENTS.

1. What is etymology, and what the classical and patristic usage of the word "sacramentum?"

1st. It is derived from sacro, are, to make sacred, dedicate to gods or sacred uses.

2d. In its classical usage it signified (1.) that by which a person binds himself to another to perform any thing. (2.) Thence a sum deposited with the court as pledge, and which, if forfeited, was devoted to sacred uses. (3.) Also an oath, especially a soldier's oath of faithful consecration to his country's service.—Ainsworth's Dic.

3d. The fathers used this word in a conventional sense as equivalent to the Greek $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\dot{\eta}\rho\iota\sigma\nu$, a mystery, i. e., something unknown until revealed, and hence an emblem, a type, a rite having some latent spiritual meaning known only to the initiated, or instructed.

The Greek fathers applied the term $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\eta\rho\iota\sigma\nu$ to the Christian ordinances of baptism and the Lord's supper, inasmuch as these rites had a spiritual significance, and were thus a form of revelation of divine truth.

The Latin fathers used the word "sacramentum" as a Latin word, in its own proper sense, for any thing sacred in itself, or having the power of binding, or consecrating men, and in addition they used it as the equivalent of the Greek word μυστήριου, i. e., in the entirely different sense of a revealed truth, or a sign or symbol revealing a truth otherwise hidden. This fact has given to the usage of this word "sacramentum," in the scholastic theology, an injurious latitude and indefiniteness of meaning. Thus

in Eph. iii., 3, 4, 9; v., 32; 1 Tim. iii., 16; Rev. i., 20, the word μυστήριον truly bears the sense of "the revelation of a truth undiscoverable by reason," and it is translated in such passages in the English version, mystery, and in the Latin vulgate, "sacramentum." Thus the Romish church uses the same word in two entirely different senses, applying it indifferently to baptism and the Lord's supper "as binding ordinances," and to the union of believers with Christ as a revealed truth, Eph. v., 32. And hence they absurdly infer that matrimony is a sacrament.

2. What is the definition of a sacrament, as given by the Fathers, the Schoolmen, the Romish Church, the Church of England, and in our own Standards?

1st. Augustin's definition is "Signum rei sacræ," or "Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiæ visibile signum, ad nostram justificationem institutum."

2d. The schoolmen defined, "Sacramentum invisibilis gratiæ visibilem formam.

3d. The Council of Trent defines them, "A sacrament is something presented to the senses, which has the power, by divine institution, not only of signifying, but also of efficiently conveying grace."—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. I., Q. 6.

4th. Church of England, in the 25th article of religion, affirms that "Sacraments instituted by Christ are not only the badges and tokens of the profession of Christian men, but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace, and of God's good will towards us, by the which he doth work inwardly in us, and doth not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in him."

5th. The Wesminster Assembly's Larger Cat., Q. 162 and 163, affirms that a "Sacrament is a holy ordinance instituted by Christ in his church, to signify, seal, and exhibit to those who are within the covenant of grace the benefits of his mediation, to increase their faith and all other graces, to oblige them to obedience, to testify and cherish their love and communion with one another, and to distinguish them from those that are without." "The parts of a sacrament are two, the one an outward and sensible sign used according to Christ's own appointment; the other an inward spiritual grace thereby signified."

3. On what principles is such a definition to be constructed?

1st. It is to be remembered that the term "sacrament" does not occur in the Bible.

2d. From the extreme latitude with which this term has been used, both in the sense proper to it as a Latin word, and in that attributed to it as the conventional equivalent of the Greek word $\mu\nu\sigma\tau\eta\rho\iota\sigma\nu$, it is evident that no definition of a gospel ordinance can be arrived at by a mere reference either to the etymology or ecclesiastical usage of the word "sacramentum."

3d. The definition of a class of gospel ordinances can be properly formed only by a comparison of all the Scriptures teach concerning the origin, nature, and design of those ordinances universally recognized as belonging to that class, and thus by determining those essential elements which are common to each member of the class, and which distinguish them as a class from all other divine ordinances.

4th. Those ordinances which are "universally recognized" as sacraments are baptism and the Lord's supper.

4. How many sacraments do Romanists make, and how may the controversy between them and the Protestants be decided?

The Roman church teaches that there are seven sacraments, viz., baptism, confirmation, the Lord's supper, penance, extreme unction, orders, marriage.

We maintain, however, that only baptism and the Lord's supper can be properly embraced under either the Protestant or the Catholic definitions of a sacrament, as given above, question 2.

1st. Confirmation, penance, and extreme unction are not divine institutions, having no warrant whatever in Scripture.

- 2. That marriage instituted by God in Paradise, and ordination to the gospel ministry instituted by Christ, although both divine institutions, are evidently not ordinances of the same kind with baptism and the Lord's supper, and do not meet the conditions of either definitions of a sacrament, since they neither signify nor convey any inward grace.
 - 5. What two things are included in every sacrament?1st. "An outward visible sign used according to Christ's own

appointment; 2d, an inward spiritual grace thereby signified.— L. Cat., Q. 163.

The Romanists, in the language of the schoolmen, distinguish between the matter and the form of a sacrament. The matter is that part of the sacrament subjected to the senses, and significant of grace, e. g., the water, and the act of applying the water in baptism, and the bread and wine, and the acts of breaking the bread, and pouring out the wine in the Lord's supper. The form is the divine word used by the minister in administering the elements, devoting them thus to the office of signifying grace.

6. What, according to the Romanists, is the relation between the sign and the grace signified?

They hold that in consequence of the divine institution, and in virtue of the "power of the Omnipotent which exists in them," the grace signified is contained in the very nature of the sacraments themselves, so that it is always conferred, ex opere operato, upon every receiver of them who does not oppose a positive obstacle thereto. Thus they understand the "sacramental union," or relation between the sign and the grace signified to be physical, or that which subsists between a substance and its properties, i. e., the virtue of conferring grace is, in the sacraments, as the virtue of burning is in fire.—Council of Trent, Sess. 7, Cans. 6 and 8. Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. I., Q. 18. Bellarmine de Sacram. 2, 1.

7. What is the Zuinglian doctrine on this subject?

Zuingle, the reformer of Switzerland, held a position at the opposite extreme to that of the Romish church, viz., that the sign simply represents by appropriate symbols, and symbolical actions, the grace to which it is related. Thus the sacraments are only effective means of the objective presentation of the truth symbolized.

8. In what sense is the word "exhibit" used in our standards in reference to this subject?

Compare Con. of Faith, Chap. XXVII., Sec. 3, and Chap. XXVIII., Sec. 6, and L. Cat. Q. 162.

This word is derived from the Latin word "exhibeo," which bore the twofold sense of conveying and of disclosing. It is evi-

dent that the term "exhibit" has retained in our standards the former sense of conveying, conferring. As in medical language, "to exhibit a remedy" is to administer it.

9. What is the common doctrine of the reformed churches as to the relation of the sign to the grace signified?

The reformed confessions agree in teaching that this relation is, 1st, simply moral, i. e., it is established only by the institution and promise of Christ, and it depends upon the right administra-tion of the ordinance, and upon the faith and knowledge of the recipient. And, 2d, that it is real, that is, when rightly administered, and when received by the recipient with knowledge and faith they do really, because of the promise of Christ, seal the grace signified, and convey it to the recipient, i. e., the recipient

does receive the grace with the sign.

This doctrine, therefore, includes, 1st, the Zuinglian view, that the outward visible sign truly signifies the grace. And, 2d, that they are, as ordinances of God's appointment, seals attached to the promise to authenticate it, as the natural phenomenon of the rainbow was made a seal of God's promise to Noah in virtue of the divine appointment. 3d. That as seals thus accompanying a divine promise by divine authority, they do actually convey the grace they signify to those for whom that grace is intended, and who are in a proper spiritual state to receive it, "as a key conveys admission, a deed, an estate, the ceremony of marriage the rights of marriage." See Turrettin, L. XIX., question 4; Conf. Faith, Chap. XXVII.; L. Cat., questions 162, 163; Cat. Gene., sec. 5th, de Sacramentis; Conf. Faith of the French Church, article 34; Old Scotch Conf., section 21.

10. What is the design of the sacraments?

1st. That they should signify, seal and exhibit to those within the covenant of grace the benefits of Christ's redemption, and thus as a principle means of grace edify the church, Matt. iii., 11; Gen. xvii., 11, 13; 1 Cor. x., 2-21; xi., 23-26; xii., 13; Rom. ii., 28, 29; iv., 11; vi., 3, 4; Gal. iii., 27; 1 Pet. iii., 21.

2d. That they should be visible badges of membership in the

church, to put a visible difference between the professed followers

of Christ and the world, Gen. xxxiv., 14; Ex. xii., 48; Eph. ii., 19; Conf. Faith, Chap. XXVII., section 1.

11. What is the Romish doctrine as to the efficacy of the sacraments?

In consistency with their view of the relation of the grace signified to the sign, (see above, question 6,) they hold that the sacraments, in every case of their legitimate administration, convey the grace they signify to every recipient not opposing a positive resistance, not depending upon the faith of the receiver, but exopere operato, by the inherent grace-conferring virtue of the sacrament itself. The external action of the sacrament they hold to be the sole active and proximate instrumental cause in conferring the grace of justification.

"By the sacraments all true righteousness is commenced, or having been commenced, is increased, or having been lost, is restored."—Coun. Trent, Sess. 7, Proæmium, and canons 6, 7, 8;

Bellarmine de Sacram. 2, 1.

12. How may this doctrine be disproved?

That the sacraments have not the power of conveying grace to all, whether they are included within the covenant of grace or not, or whether they possess faith or not, is certain, because—

1st. They are seals of the gospel covenant (see below, question 14). But a seal merely ratifies a covenant as a covenant. It can convey the grace promised only on the supposition that the conditions of the covenant are fulfilled. But salvation and every spiritual blessing is by that covenant declared to depend upon the condition of faith.

2d. Knowledge and faith are required as the prerequisite conditions necessary to be found in all applicants, as the essential qualification for receiving the sacraments, Acts ii., 41; viii., 37; x., 47; Rom. iv., 11.

3d. Faith is essential to render the sacraments efficacious, Rom. ii., 25-29; 1 Cor. xi., 27-29; 1 Pet. iii., 21.

4th. Many who receive the sacraments are notoriously without the grace they signify. Witness the case of Simon Magus, Acts viii., 9-21, and of many of the Corinthians and Galatians, and of the majority of nominal Christians in the present day.

5th. Many have had the grace without the sacraments. Witness Abraham, the thief upon the cross, and Cornelius the centurion, and a multitude of eminent Christians among the Society of Friends.

6th. This doctrine blasphemously ties down the grace of the ever living and sovereign God, and puts its entire disposal into

the hands of fallible and often wicked men.

7th. This doctrine is an essential element of that ritualistic and priestly system which prevailed among the Pharisees, and

against which the whole New Testament is a protest.

8th. The uniform effect of this system has been to exalt the power of the priests, and to confound all knowledge as to the nature of true religion. As the baptized, as a matter of fact, do not always or generally bear the fruits of the Spirit, all ritualists agree in regarding these fruits as not essential to salvation. Where this system prevails vital godliness expires.

13. What efficacy is attributed to the sacraments by the Re-formed churches?

That they signify, seal, and actually confer the blessings of Christ's redemption, but that this efficacy is not in the sacraments themselves, nor in any virtue derived from the piety or intention of him by whom they are administered, but only by the working of the Holy Ghost and the blessing of Christ, by whom they were instituted, and that this efficacy is confined to those who are within the covenant of grace, and in case of adults, to the worthy recipients.—Conf. Faith, Chaps. XXVII. and XXVIII.; L. Cat., question 162; S. Cat., question 92.

14. How may the correctness of the Protestant doctrine be proved?

1st. As far as this doctrine stands opposed to the Romish heresy, it is established by the arguments presented above, under

question 12.

2d. As far as this doctrine stands opposed to the meager Zuinglian or rationalistic view, as stated above, question 7, it may be established as follows. (1.) That the sacraments are not only signs of the grace of Christ, but also seals of the gospel seconant

offering us that grace upon the condition of faith, "is evident from the fact that Paul says that circumcision is the seal of the righteousness of faith, Rom. iv., 11. And that the apostle regarded baptism in the same light is evident from Col. ii., 11. In reference to the Lord's supper, the Saviour said, 'this cup is the new covenant in my blood, i. e., the new covenant was ratified by his blood. Of that blood the cup is the appointed memorial, and it is therefore both the memorial and the confirmation of the covenant itself. The gospel is represented under the form of a covenant. The sacraments are the seals of that covenant. God, in their appointment, binds himself to the fulfillment of his promises; his people, by receiving them, bind themselves to trust and serve him. This idea is included in the representation given (Rom. vi., 3, 4), in the formula of baptism, and in all those passages in which a participation of Christian ordinances is said to include a profession of the gospel." (2.) As seals attached to the covenant, it follows that they actually convey the grace signified, as a legal form of investiture, to those to whom, according to the terms of the covenant, it belongs. Thus a deed, when signed and scaled, is said to convey the property it represents, because it is the legal form by which the intention of the original possessor is publicly expressed, and his act ratified. It is on this ground that in Scripture, as in common language, the names and attributes of the graces sealed are ascribed to the sacraments by which they are sealed and conveyed to their rightful possessors.—Conf. Faith, Chap. XXVII., section 2. They are said to wash away sin, to unite to Christ, to save, etc., Acts ii., 38; xxii., 16; Rom. vi., 2, 6; 1 Cor. x., 16; xii., 13; Gal. iii., 27; Titus iii., 5.—Way of Life.

15. What is the Romish doctrine of "intention" as connected with this subject?

Dens (Vol. V., p. 127) says, "To the valid performance of the sacrament is required the intention upon the part of the officiating minister of doing that which the church does. The necessary intention in the minister consists in an act of his will, by which he wills the external action with the intention of doing what the church does;" that is, of performing a valid sacrament. Otherwise, although every external action may be regularly performed, the whole is void. See Coun. Trent, Sess. 7, canon 11.

This leaves the recipient entirely at the mercy of the minister, since the validity of the whole service depends upon his secret intention, and is evidently one of the devices of that antichristian church to make the people dependent upon the priesthood.

16. What is the sense in which Protestants admit "intention" to be necessary?

They admit that in order to render the outward service a valid sacrament, it must be performed with the ostensible professed design of complying thereby with the command of Christ, and of doing what he requires to be done by those who accept the gospel covenant.

17. What doctrine do the ritualists maintain as to the necessity of the sacraments?

The Romanists distinguish, 1st, between a condition absolutely necessary to attain an end, and one which is only highly convenient and helpful in order to it. And, 2d, between the necessity which attaches to essential means, and that obligation which arises from the positive command of God. Accordingly, they hold that the several sacraments are necessary in different respects.

Baptism they hold to be absolutely necessary, either its actual reception, or the honest purpose to receive it, alike for infants and

adults, as the sole means of attaining salvation.

Penance they hold to be absolutely necessary in the same sense, but only for those who have committed mortal sin subsequently to their baptism.

Orders they hold to be absolutely nocessary in the same sense, yet not for every individual, as a means of personal salvation,

but in respect to the whole church as a community.

Confirmation, the Eucharist, and Extreme Unction are necessary only in the sense of having been commanded, and of being eminently helpful

MARRIAGE they hold to be necessary only in this second sense, and only for those who enter into the conjugal relation.—Cat.

Rom., Part II., Chap. I., Q. 13.

Puseyites, and high churchmen generally, hold the dogma of

baptismal regeneration, and of course the consequence that baptism is absolutely necessary as the sole means of salvation.

18. What is the Protestant doctrine as to the necessity of the sacraments?

Ist. That the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's supper were instituted by Christ, and that their perpetual observance is obligatory upon the church upon the ground of the divine precept. This is evident (1.) from the record of their institution, Matt. xxviii., 19; 1 Cor. xi., 25, 26; (2.) from the example of the apostles, Acts ii. 41; viii., 37; 1 Cor. xi., 23–28; x., 16–21.

2d. That nevertheless the grace offered in the gospel covenant does not reside in these sacraments physically, nor is it tied to them inseparably, so that, although obligatory as duties, and helpful as means to those who are prepared to receive them, they are in no sense the essential means, without which salvation can not be attained. This is proved by the arguments presented above, under question 12.

19. What sacraments impress a "character" according to the Romanists, and what do they mean by that term?

They hold that the effects of the sacraments are twofold, 1st, sanctifying grace, which is an effect common to them all. 2d. The "character" they impress, which is an effect peculiar to three, baptism, confirmation, and holy orders. This "sacramental character" (from the Greek word χαρακτήρ, a mark, or device, engraved or impressed by a seal) is a distinctive and indelible impression stamped on the soul, "the twofold effect of which is, that it qualifies us to receive or perform something sacred, and distinguishes one from another." It is upon this account that baptism and confirmation are never repeated, and that the authority and privileges of the priesthood can never be alienated.—Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. I., Q. 18 and 19; Council Trent, Sess. 7, can. 9.

This is an idle conceit, altogether unsupported by Scripture.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

BAPTISM, ITS NATURE AND DESIGN, MODE, SUBJECTS, EFFICACY, AND NECESSITY.

THE NATURE AND DESIGN OF BAPTISM.

1. How is baptism defined in our standards?

Con. of Faith, Chap. XXVIII. L. Cat., Q. 165. S. Cat.,

Q. 94.

The essential points of this definition are, 1st, it is a washing with water. 2d. A washing in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. 3d. It is done with the design to "signify and seal our ingrafting into Christ, and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and our engagement to be the Lord's."

2. What is essential to the "matter" of baptism?

As to its "matter," baptism is essentially a washing with water. No particular mode of washing is essential, 1st, because no such mode is specified in the command. See below, questions 7-17. 2d. Because no such mode of administration is essential to the proper symbolism of the ordinance. See below, question 6. On the other hand, water is necessary, 1st, because it is commanded. 2d. Because it is essential to the symbolism of the rite. It is the natural symbol of moral purification, Eph. v., 25, 26; and it was established as such in the ritual of Moses.

3. What is necessary as to the form of words in which baptism is administered?

It is essential to the validity of the ordinance that it should be administered "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." This is certain, 1st, because it is included

in the command, Matt. xxviii., 19. 2d. From the significancy of the rite. Besides being a symbol of purification, it is essentially, as a rite of initiation into the Christian church, a covenanting ordinance whereby the recipient recognizes and pledges his allegiance to God in that character and in those relations in which he has revealed himself to us in the Scriptures. The formula of baptism, therefore, is a summary statement of the whole Scripture doctrine of the Triune Jehovah as he has chosen to reveal himself to us, and in all those relations which the several Persons of the Trinity graciously sustain in the scheme of redemption to the believer. Hence the baptism of all those sects which reject the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity is invalid.

The frequent phrases, to be baptized in "the name of Jesus Christ," or "in the name of the Lord Jesus," or "in the name of the Lord," (Acts ii. 38; x., 48; xix., 5,) do not at all present the form of words which the apostles used in administering this sacrament, but are simply used to designate Christian baptism in distinction from that of John, or to indicate the uniform effect of that spiritual grace which is symbolized in baptism, viz., union with Christ, Gal. iii., 27.

4. What is the meaning of the formula "to baptize in the name (εἰς τὸ ὄνομα) of any one"?

To be baptized "in the name of Paul," ($\epsilon i \varsigma \tau \delta \ \delta \nu o \mu a$,) 1 Cor. i., 13, or "unto Moses," ($\epsilon i \varsigma \tau \delta \nu \ M \omega \bar{\nu} \sigma \tilde{\eta} \nu$,) 1 Cor. x., 2, is, on the part of the baptized, to be made the believing and obedient disciples of Paul and Moses, and the objects of their care, and the participants in whatever blessings they have to bestow. To be baptized in the name of the Trinity, (Matt. xxviii., 19,) or "in the name of the Lord Jesus," (Acts xix., 5,) or "into Jesus Christ," (Rom. vi., 3,) is by baptism, or rather by the grace of which ritual baptism is the sign to be united to Christ, or to the Trinity through Christ, as his disciples, believers in his doctrine, heirs of his promises, and participants in his spiritual life.

5. What is the design of baptism?

Its design is—

1st. Primarily, to signify seal and convey to those to whom they belong the benefits of the covenant of grace. Thus (1.) It

symbolizes "the washing of regeneration," "the renewing of the Holy Ghost," which unites the believer to Christ, and so makes him a participant in Christ's life and all other benefits, 1 Cor. xii., 13; Gal. iii., 27; Titus iii., 5. (2.) Christ herein visibly seals his promises to those who receive it with faith, and invests them with the grace promised.

2d. Its design was, secondarily, as springing from the former, (1.) to be a visible sign of our covenant to be the Lord's, i. e., to accept his salvation, and to consecrate ourselves to his service. (2.) And, hence, to be a badge of our public profession, our separation from the world, and our initiation into the visible church. As a badge it marks us as belonging to the Lord, and consequently a distinguishes us from the world, b symbolizes our union with our fellow-Christians, 1 Cor. xii., 13.

6. What is the emblematic import of baptism?

In every sacrament there is a visible sign representing an invisible grace. The sign represents the grace in virtue of Christ's authoritatively appointing it thereto, but the selection by Christ of the particular sign is founded on its fitness as a natural emblem of the grace which he appoints it to represent. Thus in the Lord's supper the bread broken by the officiating minister, and the wine poured out, are natural emblems of the body of Christ broken, and his blood shed as a sacrifice for our sins. And in like manner in the sacrament of baptism the application of water to the person of the recipient is a natural emblem of the "washing of regeneration," Titus-iii., 5. Hence we are said to be "born of water and of the Spirit," John iii., 5, i. e., regenerated by the Holy Spirit, of which new birth baptism with water is the emblem; and to be baptized "by one Spirit into one body," i. e., the spiritual body of Christ; and to be "baptised into Christ," so as "to have put on Christ," Gal. iii., 27; and to be "baptized into his death," and to be "buried with him in baptism . . . sc that we should walk with him in newness of life," Rom. vi., 3, 4, because the sacrament of baptism is the emblem of that spiritual regeneration which unites us both federally and spiritually to Christ, so that we have part with him both in his life and in his death, and as he died unto sin as a sacrifice, so we die unto sin in its ceasing to be the controling principle of our natures, and as

he rose again in the resumption of his natural life, we rise to the possession and exercise of a new spiritual life.

Baptist interpreters, on the other hand, insist that the Bible teaches that the outward sign in this sacrament, being the immersion of the whole body in water, is an emblem both of purification and of our death, burial, and resurrection with Christ. Dr. Carson says, p. 381, "The immersion of the whole body is essential to baptism, not because nothing but immersion can be an emblem of purification, but because immersion is the thing commanded, and because that, without immersion, there is no emblem of death, burial and resurrection, which are in the emblem equally with purification." He founds his assumption that the outward sign in the sacrament of baptism was designed to be an emblem of the death, burial, and resurrection of the believer in union with Christ, upon Rom. vi., 3, 4, and Col. ii., 12.

We object to this interpretation, 1st, in neither of these passages does Paul say that our baptism in water is an emblem of our burial with Christ. He is evidently speaking of that spiritual baptism of which water baptism is the emblem; by which spiritual baptism we are caused to die unto sin, and live unto holiness, in which death and new life we are conformed unto the death and resurrection of Christ. We are said to be "baptised into Christ," which is the work of the Spirit, not "into the name of Christ," which is the phrase always used when speaking of ritual baptism, Matt. xxviii., 19; Acts ii., 38; xix., 5. 2d. To be "baptized into his death" is a phrase perfectly analogous to baptism "into repentance," Matt. iii., 11, and "into remission of sins," Mark i., 4, and "into one body," 1 Cor. xii., 13, i. e., in order that, or to the effect that we participate in the benefits of his death.

3d. The Baptist interpretation involves an utter confusion in reference to the emblem. Do they mean that the outward sign of immersion is an emblem of the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, or of the spiritual death, burial and resurrection of the believer? But the point of comparison in the passages themselves is plainly "not between our baptism and the burial and resurrection of Christ, but between our death to sin and rising to holiness, and the death and resurrection of the Redeemer."

4th. Baptists agree with us that baptism with water is an em-

blem of spiritual purification, i. e., regeneration, but insist that it is also an emblem (in the mode of immersion) of the death of the believer to sin and his new life of holiness.—Dr. Carson, p. 143. But what is the distinction between regeneration and a death unto sin, and life unto holiness?

5th. Baptists agree with us that water baptism is an emblem of purification. But surely it is impossible that the same action should at the same time be an *emblem* of a washing, and of a burial and a resurrection. One idea may be associated with the the other in consequence of their spiritual relations, but it is impossible that the same *visible sign* should be emblematical of both.

6th. Our union with Christ through the Spirit, and the spiritual consequences thereof, are illustrated in Scripture by many various figures, e. g., the substitution of a heart of flesh for a heart of stone, Ezek. xxxvi., 26; the building of a house, Eph. ii., 22; the ingrafting of a limb into a vine, John xv., 5; the putting off of filthy garments, and the putting on of clean, Eph. iv., 22-24; as a spiritual death, burial and resurrection, and as a being planted in the likeness of his death, Rom. vi., 3-5; as the application of a cleansing element to the body, Ezek, xxxvi., 25. Now baptism with water represents all these, because it is an emblem of spiritual regeneration, of which all of these are analogical illustrations. Hence we are said to be "baptized into one body," 1 Cor. xii., 13, and by baptism to "have put on Christ," Gal. iii., 27. Yet it would be absurd to regard water baptism as a literal emblem of all these, and our Baptist brethren have no scriptural warrant for assuming that the outward sign in this sacrament is an emblem of the one analogy more than of the other. See Dr. Armstrong's "Doctrine of Baptisms," Part II., Chap. II.

THE MODE OF BAPTISM.

7. What are the words which, in the original language of Scripture, are used to convey the command to baptize?

The primary word $\beta \dot{a}\pi\tau\omega$ occurs four times in the New Testament, (Luke xvi., 24, John xiii., 26, Rev. xix., 13,) but never in connection with the subject of Christian baptism. Its classical meaning was, 1st, to dip; 2d, to dye.

The word $\beta a\pi\tau i\zeta\omega$, in form, though not in usage, the frequentative of $\beta a\pi\tau i\zeta\omega$, occurs seventy-six times in the New Testament, and is the word used by the Holy Ghost to convey the command to baptize. Its classical meaning was dip, submerge, sink. Besides these, we have the nouns of the same root and usage, $\beta a\pi\tau i\sigma\mu a$ occurring twenty-two times, translated baptism, and $\beta a\pi\tau i\sigma\mu i\omega$ occurring four times, translated baptism, Heb. vi., 2, and washing, Mark vii., 4, 8; Heb. ix., 10. The only question with which we are concerned, however, is as to the scriptural usage of these words. It is an important and universally recognized principle, that the biblical and classical usage of the same word is often very different. This effect is to be traced to the influence of three general causes.

1st. The principal classics of the language were composed in the Attie dialect. But the general language used by the Greekspeaking world at the Christian era was the "common, or Hellenic dialect of the later Greek," resulting from the fusion of the

different dialects previously existing.

2d. The language of the writers of the New Testament was again greatly modified by the fact that their vernacular was a form of the Hebrew language (Syro-Chaldaic); that their constant use of the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Scriptures had largely influenced their usage of the Greek language, especially in the department of religious thought and expression; and that, in the very act of composing the New Testament Scriptures, they were engaged in the statement of religious ideas, and in the inauguration of religious institutions which had their types and symbols in the ancient dispensation, as revealed in the sacred language of the Hebrew Scriptures.

3d. The New Testament writings are a revelation of new ideas and relations, and hence the words and phrases through which these new thoughts are conveyed must be greatly modified in respect to their former etymological sense and heathen usage, and "for the full depth and compass of meaning belonging to them in their new application we must look to the New Testament itself, comparing one passage with another, and viewing the language used in the light of the great things which it brings to our apprehension."

As examples of this contrast between the scriptural and clas-

sical usage of a word, observe, ἄγγελος, angel; πρεσβύτερος, presbuter or elder : ἐκκλησία, church : βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ, or των οὐρανῶν, kingdom of God, or of heaven; παλιγγενεσία, regeneration; χάρις, grace, etc., etc.—Fairbairn's "Herm. Manual," Part I., section 2.

8. What is the position of the Baptist churches as to the meaning of the Scriptural word βαπτίζω, and by what arguments do they seek to prove that immersion is the only valid mode of baptism?

"That it always signifies to dip, never expressing any thing but mode."—Carson on Baptism, p. 55. They insist, therefore, upon always translating the word βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα by the words immerse and immersion.

They argue that immersion is the only valid mode of baptism, 1st, from the constant meaning of the word βαπτίζω. 2d. From the symbolical import of the rite, as emblematic of burial and resurrection. 3d. From the practice of the apostles. 4th. From history of the early church.

- 9. What is the position occupied upon this point by all other Christians?
- 1st. It is an established principle of scriptural usage that the names and attributes of the things signified by sacramental signs are attributed to the signs, and on the other hand that the name of the sign is used to designate the grace signified. Thus, Gen. xvii., 11, 13, the name of covenant is given to circumcision; Matt. xxvi., 26-28, Christ called the bread his body, and the wine his blood; Titusiii., 5, baptism is called the washing of regeneration. Thus also the words BAPTIZE and BAPTISM are often used to designate that work of the Holy Ghost in regeneration, which the sign, or water baptism, signifies, Matt. iii., 11; 1 Cor. xii., 13; Gal. iii., 27; Deut. xxx., 6. It follows consequently that these words are often used in a spiritual sense.
- 2d. These words when relating to ritual baptism, or the sign representing the thing signified, imply the application of water in the name of the Trinity, as an emblem of purification or spiritual regeneration, and never, in their scriptural usage, signify any thing whatever as to the mode in which the water is applied.

I have answered, under question 6, above, the second baptist argument, as stated under question 8. Their first and third arguments, as there stated, I will proceed to answer now.

10. How may it be proved from their scriptural usage that the words βαπτίζω and βάπτισμα do not signify immersion, but WASHING to effect PURIFICATION, without any reference to mode?

Ist. The word occurs four times in the Septuagint translation of the Old Testament, in three of which instances it refers to baptism with water. 2 Kings v., 14—The prophet told Naaman to "wash and be clean," and "he baptized himself in Jordan, and he was clean." Eccle. xxxiv., 25—"He that baptiseth himself after the touching of a dead body." This purification according to the law was accomplished by sprinkling the water of separation, Num. xix., 9, 13, 20. Judith xii., 7, Judith "baptized herself in the camp at a fountain of water." Bathing was not performed among those nations by immersion; and the circumstances in which Judith was placed increase the improbability in her case. It was a purification for she "baptized herself," and "so came in clean."

2d. The question agitated between some of John's disciples and the Jews, John iii., 22–30, and iv., 1–3, concerning baptism is called a question concerning purification, περὶ καθαρισμοῦ.

3d. Matt. xv., 2; Mark vii., 1–5; Luke xi., 37–39. The word $\theta a \pi \tau i \zeta \omega$ is here used (1.) for the customary washing of the hands before meals, which was designed to purify, and was habitually performed by pouring water upon them, 2 Kings iii., 11; (2.) it is interchanged with the word $\nu i \pi \tau \omega$, which always signifies a partial washing; (3.) its effect is declared to be to purify, $\kappa a \theta a \rho i \zeta \epsilon \iota \nu$; (4.) the baptized or washed hands are opposed to the unclean, $\kappa o \iota \nu a i \zeta$

4th. Mark vii., 4, 8, "Baptism of pets and cups, brazen vessels, and of tables," $\kappa\lambda\ell\nu\alpha\iota$, couches upon which Jews reclined at their meals, large enough to accommodate several persons at once. The object of these baptisms was purification, and the mode could not have been immersion in the case of the tables, couches, etc.

5th. Heb. ix., 10, Paul says the first tabernacle "stood only in meats, and drinks, and divers baptisms." In verses 13, 19, 21, he specifies some of these "divers baptisms" or washings, "For

if the blood of bulls and goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh," and "Moses sprinkled both the book and all the people, and the tabernacle, and all the vessels of the ministry."—Dr. Armstrong's "Doc. of Bapt.," Part I.

11. What argument in favor of this view of the subject may be drawn from what is said of baptism with the Holy Ghost?

Matt. iii., 11; Mark i., 8; Luke iii., 16; John i., 26, 33;

Acts i., 5; xi., 16; 1 Cor. xii., 13.

If the word $\beta a\pi \tau i \zeta \omega$ only means to immerse, it would be incapable of the figurative use to which, in these passages, it is actually subjected. But if, as we claim, it signifies to purify, to cleanse, then water baptism, as a washing, though never as an immersion, may fitly represent the cleansing work of the Holy Ghost. See next question.

12. What argument may be drawn from the fact that the blessings symbolized by baptism are said to be applied by sprinkling and pouring?

The gift of the Holy Ghost was the grace signified, Acts ii., 1-4, 32, 33; x., 44-48; xi., 15, 16. The fire which did not immerse them, but appeared as cloven tongues, and "sat upon each one of them," was the sign of that grace. Jesus was himself the baptizer, who now fulfilled the prediction of John the Baptist that he should baptize with the Holy Ghost and with fire. This gift of the Holy Ghost is set forth in such terms as "came from heaven," "poured out," "shed forth," "fell on them."

These very blessings were predicted in the Old Testament by similar language, Is. xliv., 3; lii., 15; Ezek. xxxvi., 25-27; Joel ii., 28, 29. Hence we argue that if these spiritual blessings were predicted in the Old Testament by means of these figures of sprinkling and pouring, and if in the New Testament they were symbolically set forth under the same form, they may, of course, be symbolized by the church now by the same emblematical actions.

13. What argument may be drawn from the mode of purification adopted under the Old Testament?

The rites of purification prescribed by the Levitical law were in no case commanded to be performed by immersion in the case of persons. Washing and bathing is prescribed, but there is no indication given by the words used, or otherwise, that these were performed by immersion, which was not the usual mode of bathing practiced in those countries. The hands and feet of the priests, whenever they appeared to minister before the Lord, were washed, Ex. xxx., 18-21, and their personal ablutions were performed at the brazen laver, 2 Chron. iv., 6, from which the water poured forth through spouts or cocks, 1 Kings vii., 27-39. On the other hand, purification was freely ordered to be effected by sprinkling of blood, ashes, or water, Lev. viii., 30; xiv., 7, and 51; Ex. xxiv., 5-8; Num. viii., 6, 7; Heb. ix., 12-22. Now, as Christian baptism is a purification, and as it was instituted among the Jews, familiar with the Jewish forms of purification, it follows that a knowledge of those forms must throw much light upon the essential nature and proper mode of the Christian rite.

14. How may it be shown from 1 Cor. x., 1, 2, and from 1 Pet. iii., 20, 21, that to baptize does not mean to immerse?

1 Cor. x., 1, 2. The Israelites are said to have been "baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea." Compare Ex. xiv., 19–31. The Israelites were baptized, yet went over dry-shod. The Egyptians were immersed, yet not baptized. Dr. Carson, p. 413, says, Moses "got a dry dip."

1 Pet. iii., 20, 21. Peter declares that baptism is the antitype of the salvation of the eight souls in the ark. Yet their sal-

vation consisted in their not being immersed.

15. Was the baptism of John Christian baptism?

John was the last Old Testament prophet, Matt. xi., 13, 14. He came "in the spirit and power of Elias," Luke i., 17, in the garb, with the manners, and teaching the doctrine of the ancient prophets. He preached that the "kingdom of heaven was at hand," and pointed to Jesus as the Lamb of God. His baptism

was a purification, emblematic of repentance, which Christ had . tome to give, Acts v., 31.

It was not Christian baptism, because, 1st, it was not administered in the name of the Trinity. 2d. It was not a rite of initiation into any church, John himself belonging to the old economy. 3d. Those who had only received John's baptism were rebaptized by Paul, Acts xviii., 24–26; xix., 1–7.

16. What argument as to the proper mode of baptism is to be drawn from the record of the baptisms performed by John?

1st. John's baptism was not the Christian sacrament, but a rite of purification administered by a Jew upon Jews, under Jewish law. From this we infer (1.) that it was not performed by immersion, since the Levitical purification of persons was not performed in that way; yet (2.) that he needed for his purpose either a running stream as Jordan, or much water as at Ænon (or the springs), because under that law whatsoever an unclean person touched previous to his purification became unclean, Num. xix., 21, 22, with the exception of a "fountain or pit in which is plenty of water," Lev. xi., 36, which he could not find in the desert in which he preached. After the gospel dispensation was introduced we hear nothing of the apostles baptizing in rivers, or needing "much water" for that purpose.

2d. In no single instance is it stated in the record that John baptized by immersion. All the language employed applies just as naturally and as accurately to a baptism performed by affusion (the subject standing partly in the water, the baptizer pouring water upon the person with his hand.) The phrases "baptized in Jordan," "coming out of the water," would have been as accurately applied in the one case as in the other. That John's baptism was more probably performed by affusion appears (1.) from the fact that it was a purification performed by a Jewish prophet upon Jews, and that Jewish washings were performed by affusion. The custom was general then, and has continued to this day. (2.) This mode better accords with the vast multitudes baptized by one man, Matt. iii., 5, 6; Mark i., 5; Luke iii., 3-21. (3.) The very earliest works of Christian art extant represent the baptism of Christ by John as having been performed by affusion.—Dr. Armstrong's "Doctrine of Baptisms," Part II., Chap. III.

- 17. What evidence is afforded by the instances of Christian baptism recorded in the New Testament?
- Ist. It has been abundantly shown above that the command to baptize is a command to purify by washing with water, and it hence follows that even if it could be shown that the apostles baptized by immersion, that fact would not prove that particular mode of washing to be essential to the validity of the ordinance, unless it can be proved also that, according to the analogies of gospel institutions, the mere mode of obeying a command is made as essential as the thing itself. But the reverse is notoriously the fact. The church was organized on certain general principles, and the public worship of the gospel ordained, but the details as to the manner of accomplishing those ends are not prescribed. Christ instituted the Lord's supper at night, reclining on a couch, and with unleavened bread. Yet in none of these respects is the "mode" essential.

2d. But, in fact, there is not one instance in which the record makes it even probable that the apostles baptized by immersion, and in the great majority of instances it is rendered in the last

degree improbable.

(1.) The baptism of the Eunuch by Philip, Acts viii., 26-39, is the only instance which even by appearance favors immersion. But observe a the language used by Luke, even as rendered in our version, applies just as naturally to baptism performed by affusion as by immersion. b The Greek prepositions, $\epsilon i \varsigma$, here translated into, and $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa$, here translated out of, are in innumerable instances used to express motion, toward, unto and from, Acts xxvi., 14; xxvii., 34, 40. They probably descended from the chariot to the brink of the water. Philip is also said to have "descended to" and to have "ascended from the water," but surely he was not also immersed. c The very passage of Isaiah, which the Eunuch was reading, Is. lii., 15, declared that the Messiah, in whom he believed, should "sprinkle many nations." d Luke says the place was "a desert," and no body of water sufficient for immersion can be discovered on that road. (2.) Every other instance of Christian baptism recorded in the Scriptures bears evidence positively against immersion. a The baptism of three thousand in Jerusalem on one occasion on the day of Pentecost, Acts ii., 38–41. b The baptism of Paul, Acts ix., 17, 18; xxii., 12–16. Annanias said to him "standing up, be baptized," ἀναστὰς βάπτισαι, and, "standing, up he was baptized." c The baptism of Cornelius, Acts x., 44–48. d The baptism of the jailor, at Philippi, Acts xvi., 32–34. In all these instances baptism was administered on the spot, wherever the convert received the gospel. Nothing is said of rivers, or much water, but vast multitudes at a time, and individuals and families were baptized in their houses, or in prisons, wherever they happened to be at the moment.

SUBJECTS OF BAPTISM.

18. Who are the proper subjects of baptism?

Conf. Faith, Chap. XXVIII., section 4; L. Cat., question

166; S. Cat., question 95.

All those, and those only, who are members of the visible church, are to be baptized. These are, 1st, they who make a credible profession of their faith in Christ; 2d, the children of one or both believing parents.

19. What in the case of adults are the prerequisites of baptism?

Credible profession of their faith in Jesus as their Saviour. This is evident, 1st, from the very nature of the ordinance as symbolizing spiritual gifts, and as sealing our covenant to be the Lord's. See below, Chap. XL., question 23. 2d. From the uniform practice of the apostles and evangelists, Acts ii., 41; viii., 37.

20. What is the visible church, to which baptism is the initiating rite?

1st. The word church, ἐκκλησία, is used in Scripture in the general sense of the company of God's people, called out from the world, and bound to him in covenant relations.

2d. The true spiritual church, therefore, in distinction to the phenominal church organized on earth, consists of the whole company of the elect, who are included in the eternal covenant of

grace formed between the Father and the second Adam, Eph. v., 27; Heb. xii., 23.

3d. But the visible church universal consists of "all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children, and is the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ, the house and family of God, out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation," Conf. Faith, Chap. XXV., section 2. This visible kingdom, Christ, as Mediator of the covenant of grace, has instituted, as an administrative provision, for the purpose of administering thereby the provisions of that covenant; and this kingdom, as an outward visible society of professors, he established by the covenant he made with Abraham, Gen. xii., 1–3; xvii., 1–14.

4th. Christ has administered this covenant in three successive modes or dispensations. (1.) From Abraham to Moses, during which he attached to it the ratifying seal of circumcision. (2.) From Moses to his advent, (for the law which was temporarily added did not make the promise of none effect, but rather administered it in a special mode, Gal. iii., 17,) he added a new seal, the passover, emblematic of the atoning work of the promised seed, as set forth in the clearer revelation then vouchsafed. (3.) From Christ to the end of the world, when the promise being unfolded in an incomparably fuller revelation, the original seals are superseded by baptism and the Lord's supper. See below, question 21.

5th. That the Abrahamic covenant was designed to embrace the visible church of Christ, and not his mere natural seed in their family or national capacity, is plain. (1.) It pledged salvation by Christ on the condition of faith. Compare Gen. xii., 3, with Gal. iii., 8, 16; Acts iii., 25, 26. (2.) The sign and seal attached to it symbolized spiritual blessings, and sealed justification by faith, Deut. x., 15, 16; xxx., 6; Jer. iv., 4; Rom. ii., 28, 29; iv., 11. (3.) This covenant was made with him as the representative of the visible church universal. a It was made with him as the "father of many nations." Paul said it constituted him the "heir of the world," "the father of all them that believe," Rom. iv., 11, 13, and that all believers in Christ now, Jew or Gentile, are "Abraham's seed and heirs according to the promise," Gal. iii., 29. b It contained a provision for the intro-

duction to its privileges of those who were not born of the natural seed of Abraham, Gen. xvii., 12 Multitudes of such proselytes had been thus introduced before the advent of Christ, and many such were present in Jerusalem as members of the church under its old form on the day of Pentecost, "out of every nation under heaven," Acts ii., 5–11.

6th. That the church thus embraced in this administrative covenant is not the body of the elect, as such, but the visible church of professors and their children, is evident, because, (1.) the covenant contains the offer of the gospel, including the setting forth of Christ, and the offer of his salvation to all men (all the families of the earth) on the condition of faith, Gal. iii., 8. But this belongs to the visible church, and must be administered by means of inspired oracles and a visible ministry. (2.) As an indisputable fact, there was such a visible society under the old dispensation; and under the new dispensation all Christians, whatever theories they may entertain, attempt to realize the ideal of such a visible society, for Christian and ministerial communion. (3.) Under both dispensations Christ has committed to his church, as to a visible kingdom, written records, sacramental ordinances, ecclesiastical institutions, and a teaching and ruling ministry. Although these are all designed to minister the provisions of the covenant of grace, and to effect as their ultimate end the ingathering of the elect, it is evident that visible signs and seals, a written word and a visible ministry, can, as such, attach only to a visible church, Rom. ix., 4; Eph. iv., 11. (4.) The same representation of the church is given in the New Testament, in the parable of the tares, etc., Matt. xiii., 24-30, and 47-50; xxv., 1-13. It was to consist of a mixed community of good and evil, true and merely professed believers, and the separation is not to be made until the "end of the world."

7th. This visible church from the beginning has been transmitted and extended in a twofold manner. (1.) Those who are born "strangers from the covenants of promise," or "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel," Eph. ii., 12, were introduced to that relation only by profession of faith and conformity of life. Under the old dispensation these are called *proselytes*, Acts ii., 10; Num. xv., 15. (2.) All born within the covenant had part in all of the benefits of a standing in the visible church by inheri-

tance. The covenant was with Abraham and his "seed after him, in all their generations, as an everlasting covenant," and consequently they received the sacrament which was the sign and seal of that covenant. Hence the duty of teaching and training was engrafted on the covenant, Gen. xviii., 18, 19; and the thurch made a school, or training institution, Deut. vi., 6-9. In accordance with this, Christ commissioned his apostles to disciple all nations, baptizing and teaching them, Matt. xxviii., 19, 20. Thus the church is represented as a flock, including the lambs with the sheep, Is. xl., 11, and as a vineyard in which the scion is trained, the barren tree cultivated, and, if incurable, cut down, Is. v. 1-7; Luke xiii., 7, 8.

21. How may it be shown that this visible church is identical under both dispensations, and what argument may be thence derived to prove that the infant children of believers should be baptized?

Ist. The church, under both dispensations, has the same nature and design. The Old Testament church, embraced in the Abrahamic convenant, rested on the gospel offer of salvation by faith, Gal. iii., 8; Heb. xi. Its design was to prepare a spiritual seed for the Lord. Its sacraments symbolized and sealed the same grace as those of the New Testament church. Thus the passover, as the Lord's supper, represented the sacrifice of Christ, 1 Cor. v., 7. Circumcision, as baptism, represented "the putting off the body of the sins of the flesh," and baptism is called by Paul "the circumcision of Christ," Col. ii., 11, 12. Even the ritual of the Mosaic law was only a symbolical revelation of the gospel.

2d. They bear precisely the same name. ἐκκλησία κυρίου, the church of the Lord, is an exact rendering in Greek of the Hebrew Τρος translated in our version the "congregation of the Lord." Compare Ps. xxii.,22, with Heb. ii., 12. Thus Stephen called the congregation of Israel before Sinai "the church in the wilderness." Compare Acts vii., 38, with Ex. xxxii. Thus also Christ is the Greek form of the Hebrew Messiah, and the elders of the New Testament church are indentical in function and name with those of the synagogue.

3d. There is no evidence whatever furnished by the apostolical

records that the ancient church was abolished and a new and a different one organized in its place. The apostles never say one word about any such new organization. The preëxistence of such a visible society is everywhere taken for granted as a fact. Their disciples were always added to the "church" or "congregation" previously existing, Acts ii., 47. The Mosaic ritual law, by means of which the Abrahamic character of the church had been administered for about fifteen hundred years, was indeed abolished. But Paul argues that the introduction of this law, four hundred and thirty years after, could not make the promise of none effect, Gal. iii., 17, and consequently the disannulling of the law could only give place to the more perfect execution of the covenant, and development of the church embraced within it.

4th. There is abundant positive evidence that the ancient church, resting upon its original charter, was not abolished by the new dispensation. (1.) Many of the Old Testament prophecies plainly declare that the then existing visible church, instead of being abrogated by the advent of the Messiah, should thereby be gloriously strengthened and enlarged, so as to embrace the Gentiles also, Is. xlix., 13-23, and lx., 1-14. They declare also that the federal constitution, embracing the child with the parent, shall continue under the new dispensation of the church, after "the Redeemer has come to Zion," Is. lix., 21, 22. Peter, in Acts iii., 22, 23, expounds the prophecy of Moses, Deut. xviii., 15-19, to the effect that every soul which will not hear that prophet (the Messiah) shall be cut off from among the people, i. e., from the church, which of course implies that the church from which they are cut off continues. (2.) In precise accordance with these prophecies Paul declares that the Jewish church was not abrogated, but that the unbelieving Jews were cut off from their own olive tree, and the Gentile branches grafted in in their place; and he foretells the time when God will graft the Jews back again into their own stock and not into another, Rom. xi., 18-26. He says that the alien Gentiles are made fellow-citizens with believing Jews in the old household of the faith, Eph. ii., 11-22. (3.) The covenant which constituted the ancient church also constituted Abraham the father of many nations. The promise of the covenant was that God would "be a God unto him and to his seed after him." This covenant, therefore, embraced the "many nations"

with their father Abraham. Hence it never could have been fulfilled until the advent of the Messiah, and the abolishment of the restrictive law. Hence the Abrahamic covenant, instead of having been superseded by the gospel, only now begins to have its just accomplishment. Hence, on the day of Pentecost, Peter exhorts all to repent and be BAPTIZED, BECAUSE the Abrahamic covenant still held in force for all Jews and for their children, and for all those afar off, i. e., Gentiles, as many as God should call, Acts ii., 38, 39. Hence also Paul argued earnestly that since the Abrahamic covenant is still in force, therefore, from its very terms. the Gentiles who should believe in Christ had a right to a place in that ancient church, which was founded upon it, on equal terms with the Jews. "In thee shall all nations be blessed, so then," says Paul, "they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham," and all who believe in Christ, Jew or Gentle indiscriminately, "are" to the full intent of the covenant, "Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise," Gal. iii., 6-29, which promise was, "I will be a God to thee, and to thy seed after THEE"

The bearing of this argument upon the question of infant baptism is direct and conclusive.

1st. Baptism now occupies the same relation to the covenant and the church which circumcision did. (1.) Both rites represent the same spiritual grace, namely, regeneration, Deut. xxx., 6; Col. ii., 11; Rom. vi., 3, 4. (2.) Baptism is now what circumcision was, the seal, or confirming sign, of the Abrahamic covenant. Peter says, "be baptized for the promise is to you and to your children," Acts. ii., 38, 39. Paul says explicitly that baptism is the sign of that covenant, "for as many as have been baptized into Christ are Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise," Gal. iii., 27, 29; and that baptism is the circumcision of Christ, Col. ii., 10, 11. (3.) Both rites are the appointed forms, in successive eras, of initiation into the church, which we have proved to be the same church under both dispensations.

2d. Since the church is the same, in the absence of all explicit command to the contrary, the members are the same. Children of believers were members then. They ought to be recognized as members now, and receive the initiatory rite. This the apostles took for granted as self-evident, and universally admitted; an

explicit command to baptize would have implied doubt in the ancient church rights of infants.

- 3d. Since the covenant, with its promise to be "a God to the believer and his seed," is expressly declared to stand firm under the gospel, the believer's seed have a right to the seal of that promise.—Dr. John M. Mason's "Essays on the Church."
- 22. Present the evidence that Christ recognized the church standing of children.
- 1st. Christ declares of little children (Matthew, $\pi a \iota \delta i a$, Luke $\beta \rho \epsilon \phi \eta$, infants) that "of such is the kingdom of heaven," Matt. xix., 14; Luke xviii., 16. The phrase "kingdom of God and of heaven" signifies the visible church under the new dispensation, Matt. iii., 2; xiii., 47.
- 2d. In his recommission of Peter, after his apostasy, our Lord commanded him as under shepherd to feed the *lambs*, as well as the sheep of the flock, John xxi., 15-17.
- 3d. In his general commission of the apostles, he commanded them to disciple *nations* (which are always constituted of families) by baptizing, and then teaching them, Matt. xxviii., 19, 20.

23. Show that the apostles always acted on the principle that the child is a church member if the parent is.

The apostles were not settled pastors in the midst of an established Christian community, but itinerant missionaries to an unbelieving world, sent not to baptize, but to preach the gospel, 1 Cor. i., 17. Hence we have in the Acts and Epistles the record of only ten separate instances of baptism. In two of these, viz., of the eunuch and of Paul, Acts viii., 38; ix., 18, there were no families to be baptized. In the case of the three thousand on the day of Pentecost, the people of Samaria, and the disciples of John at Ephesus, crowds were baptized on the very spot on which they professed to believe. Of the remaining five instances, in the four cases in which the family is mentioned at all, it is expressly said they were baptized, viz., the households of Lydia of Thyatira, of the jailer of Philippi, of Stephanas, and of Crispus, Acts xvi., 15, 32, 33; xviii., 8; 1 Cor. i., 16. In the remaining instance of Cornelius, the record implies that the family was also baptized.

Thus the apostles in every case, without a single recorded exception, baptized believers on the spot, and whenever they had fami-

lies, they also baptized their households, as such.

They also addressed children in their epistles as members of the church. Compare Eph. i., 1, and Col. i., 1, 2, with Eph. vi., 1–3, and Col. iii., 20. And declared that even the children of only one believing parent were to be regarded "holy," or consecrated to the Lord, i. e., as church members, 1 Cor. vii., 12–14.

24. What argument mag be inferred from the fact that the blessings symbolized in baptism are promised and granted to children?

Baptism represents regeneration in union with Christ. Infants are born children of wrath, even as others. They can not be saved, therefore, unless they are born again, and have part in the benefits of Christ's death. They are evidently, from the nature of the case, in the same sense capable of being subjects of regeneration as adults are. "Of such is the kingdom of heaven," Matt. xxi., 15, 16; Luke i., 41, 44.

25. What argument may be drawn from the practice of the early church?

The practice of infant baptism is an institution which exists as a fact, and prevails throughout the universal church, with the exception of the modern Baptists, whose origin can be definitely traced to the Anabaptists of Germany, about A. D. 1537. Such an institution must either have been handed down from the apostles, or have had a definite commencement as a novelty, which must have been signalized by opposition and controversy. As a fact, however, we find it noticed in the very earliest records as a universal custom, and an apostolical tradition. This is acknowledged by Tertullian, born in Carthage, A. D. 160, or only sixty years after the death of the apostle John. Origen, born of Christian parents in Egypt, A. D. 185, declares that it was "the usage of the church to baptize infants," and that "the church had received the tradition from the apostles." St. Augustin, born A. D. 354, declares that this "doctrine is held by the whole church, not instituted by councils, but always retained."

26. How is the objection, that faith is a prerequisite to baptism, and that infants can not believe, to be answered?

The Baptists argue, 1st, from the commission of the Lord, "Go preach—he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned," Mark xvi., 16, that infants ought not to be baptized because they can not believe. 2d. From the nature of baptism, as a sign of a spiritual grace and seal of a covenant, that infants ought not to be baptized since they are incapable of understanding the sign, or of contracting the covenant.

We answer, 1st, the requisition of faith evidently applies only to the adult, because faith is made the essential prerequisite of salvation, and yet infants are saved, though they can not believe. 2d. Circumcision was a sign of a spiritual grace; it required faith in the adult recipient, and it was the seal of a covenant; yet, by God's appointment, infants were circumcised. The truth is that faith is required, but it is the faith of the parent acting for his child. The covenant of which baptism is the seal is contracted with the parent, but as it embraces the child the seal is properly applied to it also.

27. How can we avoid the conclusion that infants should be admitted to the Lord's supper, if they are admitted to baptism?

The same reason and the same precedents do not hold in relation to both sacraments. 1st. Baptism recognizes and seals church membership, while the Lord's supper is a commemorative act. 2d. In the action of baptism the subject is passive, and in that of the Lord's supper active. 3d. Infants were never admitted to the Passover until they were capable of comprehending the nature of the service. 4th. The apostles baptized households, but never admitted households as such to the supper.

28. Whose children ought to be baptized?

"Infants of such as are members of the visible church," S. Cat., Q. 95; that is, theoretically, "infants of one or both believing parents," Con. of Faith, Chap. XXVIII., sec. 4; and practically, "of parents, one or both of them professing faith in Christ."—L. Cat., Q. 166. Roman Catholics, Episcopalians, the

Protestants of the continent, the Presbyterians of Scotland (and formerly of this country), act upon the principle that every baptized person, not excommunicated, being himself a member of the visible church, has a right to have his child regarded and treated as such also.

It is evident, however, from the following principles, that only the children of those who are professors of a personal faith in Christ ought to be baptized. 1st. The example of the apostles. They baptized the households only of believers. 2d. Faith is the condition of the covenant. If the parent is destitute of faith, the transaction is a mockery. 3d. Those who, having been baptized in infancy, do not by faith and obedience discharge their baptismal vows when they are of mature age, forfeit their own birthright, and of course can not plead its benefits for their children.

THE EFFICACY OF BAPTISM.

29. What is the Romish and High Church doctrine as to the efficacy of baptism?

The Romish doctrine, with which the high church doctrine essentially agrees, is, 1st, that baptism confers the merits of Christ and the power of the Holy Ghost, and therefore (1.) it cleanses from inherent corruption; (2.) it secures the remission of the penalty of sin; (3.) it secures the infusion of sanctifying grace; (4.) it unites to Christ; (5.) it impresses upon the soul an indelible character; (6.) it opens the portals of heaven.—Cat. Rom., Pt. II., Chap. II., Q. 32-44. 2d. That the efficacy of the ordinance is inherent in itself in virtue of the diviae institution. Its virtue does not depend either on the merit of the officiating minister, nor on that of the recipient, but in the sacramental action itself as an opus operatum. In the case of infants, the only condition of its efficiency is the right administration of the ordinance. In the case of adults its efficiency depends upon the additional condition that the recipient is not in mortal sin, and does not resist by an opposing will.—Dens De Baptismo, N. 29.

30. What is the Lutheran doctrine on this subject?

The Lutherans agreed with the Reformed churches in repudiating the Romish doctrine of the magical efficacy of this sacra-

ment as an opus operatum. But they went much further than the Reformed in maintaining the sacramental union between the sign and the grace signified. Luther, in his Small Cat., Pt. IV., sec. 2, says baptism, "worketh forgiveness of sins, delivers from death and the devil, and confers everlasting salvation on all who believe," and, in sec. 3, that "it is not the water indeed which produces these effects, but the word of God which accompanies, and is connected with the water, and our faith, which relies on the word of God connected with the water. For the water without the word is simply water and no baptism. But when connected with the word of God, it is a baptism, that is, a gracious water of life, and a washing of regeneration."

31. What was the Zuinglian doctrine on this subject?

That the outward rite is a mere sign, an objective representation by symbol of the truth, having no efficacy whatever beyond that due to the truth represented.

32. What is the doctrine of the Reformed churches, and of our own among the number, on this subject?

They all agree, 1st, that the Zuinglian view is incomplete.

2d. That besides being a sign, baptism is also the seal of grace, and therefore, a present and sensible conveyance and confirmation of grace to the believer who has the witness in himself, and to all the elect a seal of the benefits of the covenant of grace, to be sooner or later conveyed in God's good time.

3d. That this conveyance is effected, not by the bare operation of the sacramental action, but by the Holy Ghost, which

accompanies his own ordinance.

4th. That in the adult the reception of the blessing depends

upon faith.

5th. That the benefits conveyed by baptism are not peculiar to it, but belong to the believer before or without baptism, and are often renewed to him afterwards.

Our Conf. Faith, Chap. XXVIII., sections 5 and 6, affirms, "1st. 'That by the right use of this ordinance the grace-promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost to such, (whether of age or infants,) as that grace belongeth unto.'

- "2d. That baptism does not in all cases secure the blessings of the covenant.
- "3d. That in the cases in which it does the gift is not connected necessarily in time with the administration of the ordinance.
- "4th. That these blessings depend upon two things: (1.) the right use of the ordinance; (2.) the secret purpose of God."—Dr. Hodge.

THE NECESSITY OF BAPTISM.

33. What is the Romish and Lutheran doctrine as to the necessity of baptism?

They hold that the benefits conveyed by baptism are ordinarily conveyed in no other way, and consequently, baptism is absolutely necessary in order to salvation, both for infants and adults.—Coun. Trent, Sess. 7, canon 4; Cat. Rom., Part II., Chap. II., question 28; Bellarmine Bapt., 1, 4; Augsburg Conf., article 9. The Papists except from this absolute necessity martyrs, and those who, desiring, can not obtain baptism.

34. What is the doctrine on this point of the Reformed churches?

They all agree that the necessity of baptism arises simply from the command of Christ to baptize; and that the grace signified belongs to all within the covenant, (whether adult or infant,) and would be attained by them with or without the sign and seal.—Conf. Faith, Chap. XXVIII., section 5; Calvin's Institutes, 4, 16, 26.

35. What opinion has prevailed as to lay baptism?

The Romanists and Lutherans believing in the absolute necessity of baptism as a means of salvation, have consequently always allowed the validity of baptism administered by laymen in cases of necessity. The Reformed, on the other hand, not believing the ordinance to be necessary to salvation, have uniformly agreed that baptism is to be regarded valid only when administered by a regularly ordained minister.

CHAPTER XL.

THE LORD'S SUPPER.

1. What are the various phrases used in Scripture to designate the Lord's supper, and their import?

Ist. "Lord's Supper," 1 Cor. xi., 20. The Greek word δεῖπνον, translated supper, designated the dinner, or principal meal of the Jews, taken towards or in the evening. Hence this sacrament received this name because it was instituted at that meal. It was called the "Lord's," because it was instituted by him, to commemorate his death, and signify and seal his grace.

2d. "Cup of blessing," 1 Cor. x., 16. The cup was blessed by Christ, and the blessing of God is now invoked upon it by the

officiating minister, Matt. xxvi., 26, 27.

3d. "Lord's Table," 1 Cor. x., 21. Table here stands by a usual figure for the provisions spread upon it. It is the table at which the Lord invites his guests, and at which he presides.

4th. "Communion," 1 Cor. x., 16. In partaking of this sacrament, the fellowship of the believer with Christ is established and exercised in a mutual giving and receiving, and consequently also the fellowship of believers with one another, through Christ.

5th. "Breaking of bread," Acts ii., 42. Here the symbolical action of the officiating minister is put for the whole service.

2. By what other terms was it designated in the early church?

1st. "Eucharist," from ἐυχαριστέω, to give thanks. See Matt. xxvi., 27. This beautifully designates it as a thanksgiving service. It is both the cup of thanksgiving, whereby we celebrate the grace of God and pledge our gratitude to him, and the cup of blessing, or the consecrated cup.

2d. " $\Sigma \dot{\nu} r a \xi \iota \varsigma$," a coming together, because the sacrament was administered in the public congregation.

3d. "Aειτουργία," a sacred ministration, applied to the sacrament by way of eminence. From this word is derived the English word liturgy.

4th. "Ovoía," sacrifice offering. "This term was not applied to the sacrament in the proper sense of a propitiatory sacrifice. But (1.) because it was accompanied with a collection and oblation of alms; (2.) because it commemorated the true sacrifice of Christ on the cross; (3.) because it was truly a eucharistical sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, Heb. xiii., 15; (4.) because, in the style of the ancients, every religious action, whereby we consecrate any thing to God for his glory and our salvation, is called a sacrifice."

5th. 'Ayá $\pi\eta$. The Agapæ, or love feasts, were meals at which all the communicants assembled, and in connection with which they received the consecrated elements. Hence the name of the feast was given to the sacrament itself.

6th. Μυστήριον, a mystery, or a symbolical revelation of truth, designed for the special benefit of initiated Christians. This was applied to both sacraments. In the Scriptures it is applied to all the doctrines of revelation, Matt. xiii., 11; Col. i., 26.

7th. Missa, mass. The principal designation used by the Latin church. The most probable derivation of this term is from the ancient formula of dismission. When the sacred rites were finished the deacons called out, "Ite, missa est," go, it is discharged.—Turrettin, L. 19, Q. 21.

3. How is this sacrament defined, and what are the essential points included in the definition?

See L. Cat., Q. 168; S. Cat., Q. 96.

The essential points of this definition are, 1st, the elements, bread and wine, given and received according to the appointment of Jesus Christ. 2d. The design of the recipient of doing this in obedience to Christ's appointment, in remembrance of him, to show forth his death till he come. 3d. The promised presence of Christ in the sacrament by his Spirit, "so that the worthy receivers are not after a corporeal and carnal manner, but by faith,

made partakers of Christ's body and blood, with all his benefits, to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace."

4. What kind of bread is to be used in the sacrament, and what is the usage of the different churches on this point?

Bread of some kind is essential, 1st, from the command of Christ; 2d, from the significancy of the symbol; since bread, as the principal natural nourishment of our bodies, represents his flesh, which, as living bread, he gave for the life of the world, John vi., 51. But the kind of bread, whether leavened or unleavened, is not specified in the command, nor is it rendered essential by the nature of the service. Lutherans and many Baptists maintain that the use of unleavened bread is essential. The Romish church uses unleavened bread, although she does not affirm it to be essential.—Cat. Rom., Pt. II., Chap. IV., Q. 13. The Greek church uses leavened bread.

5. What is the meaning of the term oros, wine, in the New Testament, and how does it appear that wine and no other liquid must be used in the Lord's supper?

It is evident from the usage of this word in the New Testament that it was designed by the sacred writers to designate the fermented juice of the grape, Matt. ix., 17; John ii., 3-10; Rom. xiv., 21; Eph. v., 18; 1 Tim. iii., 8; v., 23; Titus ii., 3.

The Romish church contends, on the authority of tradition, that water should be mingled with the wine. But this has not been commanded, nor is it involved in any way in the symbolical significancy of the rite. That wine and no other liquid is to be used is clear from the record of the institution, Matt. xxvi., 26–29, and from the usage of the apostles.

6. How does it appear that breaking the bread is an important part of the service?

1st. The example of Christ in the act of institution, which is particularly noticed in each inspired record of the matter, Matt. xxvi., 26; Mark xiv., 22; Luke xxii., 19; 1 Cor. xi., 24.

2d. It is prominently set forth in the reference made by the apostles to the sacrament in the epistles, 1 Cor. x., 16. The entire service is designated from this one action.

3d. It pertains to the symbolical significancy of the sacrament.
(1.) It represents the breaking of Christ's body for us, 1 Cor. xi.,
24. (2.) It represents the communion of believers, being many in one body, 1 Cor. x., 17.

7. What is the proper interpretation of 1 Cor. x., 16, and in what sense are the elements to be blessed or consecrated?

The phrase to bless is used in Scripture only in three senses, 1st, to bless God, i. e., to declare his praises, and to utter our gratitude to him. 2d. To confer blessing actually, as God does upon his creatures. 3d. To invoke the blessing of God upon any person or thing.

The "cup of blessing which we bless" is the consecrated cup upon which the minister has invoked the divine blessing. As the blessing of God is invoked upon food, and it is thus consecrated unto the end of its natural use, I Tim. iv., 5, so the elements are set apart as sacramental signs of an invisible spiritual grace, to the end of showing forth Christ's death, and of ministering grace to the believing recipient, by the invocation by the minister of God's blessing in the promised presence of Christ through his Spirit.

8. What is the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation?

Transubstantiation means "conversion of substance," and is used by the Romanists to designate their dogma that when the words of consecration are pronounced by the priest the whole substance of the bread is changed into the very body of Christ which was born of the Virgin, and is now seated at the right hand of the Father in heaven, and the whole substance of the wine is changed into the blood of Christ, while only the species or visible appearance of the bread and wine remain, accidents without a substance; and that, together with his real flesh and blood, the entire person of the God-man, humanity and divinity, is really physically present.—Council of Trent, Sess. 13., Cans. 1 and 2; Cat. Rom., Pt. II., Chap. IV., Q. 22.

Almost immediately after the apostolic age the Christian church began to leave the simplicity of the gospel, and to exalt the outward symbols and services of religion above the spiritual truth which they represented. Thus gradually the New Testa-

ment ministry became a priesthood, and more and more superstitious views were entertained as to the efficacy and necessity of the sacraments, and as to the manner in which the literal body and blood of Christ is physically present in the supper. The doctrine in its present form, however, was first defined and affirmed by Paschasius Radbert, abbot of Corbey, A. D. 831. After many controversies it was first decreed as an article of faith and a universally recognized dogma of the church, and designated by the term transubstantiation, at the instance of Innocent III., by the fourth Lateran Council, A. D. 1215.—Mosheim Eccl. Hist., Cen. IX, Pt. II., Chap. III., and Cen. XIII., Pt. II., Chap. III.

9. Present an outline of the argument against this Popish doctrine?

Ist. The Romanists seek to establish their doctrine by three arguments, (1.) Scripture, (2.) tradition, (3.) decisions of councils. But we have above, (Chap. V.), proved that the Scriptures are the only rule of faith and judge of controversies. Their scriptural authority is nothing more than the language used by Christ in instituting the sacrament, Matt. xxvi., 26. They claim that the word "is" must be understood literally. Protestants insist, on the contrary, that this word, from the plain sense of the passage, and from the analogy of Scripture usage in many other passages, simply means represents, symbolizes.—See Gen. xli., 26, 27; Ex. xii., 11; Dan. vii., 24; Rev. i., 20.

2d. Paul calls one of the elements bread, as well after as before its consecration, 1 Cor. x., 16; xi., 26-28.

3d. This doctrine is inconsistent with their own definition of a sacrament. They agree with Protestants and with the fathers in distinguishing, in every sacrament, two things, viz., the sign and the thing signified. See above, Chap. XXXVIII., question 2. But the doctrine of transubstantiation confounds these together.

4th. The senses, when exercised in their proper sphere, are as much a revelation from God as any other. No miracle recorded in the Bible contradicted the senses, but, on the contrary, the reality of the miracle was established by the testimony of the senses. See the transubstantiation of water into wine, John ii., 1–10, and Luke xxiv., 36–43. But this doctrine flatly contradicts our senses,

since we see, smell, taste and touch the bread and wine as well after their consecration as before.

5th. Reason also, in its proper sphere, is a divine revelation, and though it may be transcended, never can be contradicted by any other revelation, supernatural or otherwise. See above, Chap. II., question 11. But this doctrine contradicts the principles of reason (1.) with respect to the nature of Christ's body, by supposing that, although it is material, it may be, without division, wholly present in heaven, and at many different places on earth at the same time. (2.) In maintaining that the body and blood of Christ are present in the sacrament, yet without any of their sensible qualities, and that all the sensible qualities of the bread and wine are present, while the bodies to which they belong are absent. But qualities have no existence apart from the bodies to which they belong.

6th. This doctrine is an inseparable part of a system of priest-craft entirely antichristian, including the worship of the host, the sacrifice of the mass, and hence the entire substitution of the priest and his work in the place of Christ and his work. It also blasphemously subjects the awful divinity of our Saviour to the control of his sinful creatures, who at their own will call him down from heaven, and withhold or communicate him to the people.

10. What is the Lutheran doctrine of consubstantiation?

Consubstantiation (literally constituting of the same substance) was the term used by Luther to designate his doctrine, that while the bread and wine continue the same that they were before, and what they appear to our senses to be, the body and blood of Christ are nevertheless literally and corporeally present in a miraculous manner, in, with, and under the sensible elements.

This view agrees with that of the Romanists, in asserting— 1st. A real corporeal and local presence of the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament.

2d. That they are received by the mouth.

3d. That they are received equally by the believer and unbeliever.

But it differs from the Romish doctrine, in denying-

1st. That the bread and wine are changed.

2d. That the union of the person of Christ with the elements

is effected by the power of the officiating priest.

3d. In confining the presence of Christ's person within and under the elements to the very moment of the sacramental celebration. It follows that although this doctrine is false, absurd, and injurious, it is by no means so fatally dangerous as that of transubstantiation. It does not lead to the idolatrous worship of the host, to the denial of the cup to the laity, nor to the anti-christian sacrifice of the mass.

11. What is the doctrine of the Reformed churches as to the nature of Christ's presence in the supper?

On account of the controversy on the subject of the real presence which raged immediately after the Reformation, between the Lutherans and the Reformed, and between Calvin and the immediate followers of Zuingle, the early Reformed Confessions were composed generally under the bias of an effort to compromise radically distinct views, and hence a want of definiteness and consistency in their statements upon this subject has resulted. In all essentials, however, they agree, and immediately after the age of controversy, the language of all the confessions subsequently composed, and of theological writers, became both distinct and uniform. They agree in holding—

1st. That the human nature of Christ is confined to heaven.

2d. That the presence of his body and blood in the sacrament is not physical, nor local, nor to our bodily senses, but only by its gracious influences to the mind, and by the power of the Holy Ghost.

3d. That they are received only by the true believer, not by the mouth, but only spiritually, in the exercise of faith. See Consensus Tigminus, article 21; Helv. Conf., Chap. XXI.—Bib. Rep., April, 1848.

12. What is meant by the body and blood of Christ as received in the sacrament?

"The whole church united in saying that believers received the body and blood of Christ. They agreed in explaining this to mean that they received the virtue, efficacy, or vigor of his body and blood. But some understood thereby, the virtue of his body as broken, and his blood as shed, i. e., their sacrificial efficacy. Others said, that besides this, there was a mysterious virtue in the body of Christ, due to its union with the divine nature, which virtue was by the Holy Spirit conveyed to the believer." The first view, or that which limits the reception of Christ's body and blood to their sacrificial efficacy, is the true one, and the only one which maintained its ground in the faith of the Reformed churches.—Bib. Rep., April, 1848.

- 13. What is meant by feeding upon the body and blood of Christ, as used in the Reformed confessions?
 - "All the Reformed agree as to the following particulars:
 - "1st. This eating was not with the mouth in any manner.
 - "2d. It was only by the soul that they were received.
- "3d. It was by faith, which is declared to be the hand and mouth of the soul.
 - "4th. It was by or through the power of the Holy Ghost."
- "But this receiving Christ's body is not confined to the Lord's supper; it takes place whenever faith in him is exercised."—Bib. Rep., April, 1848.
- 14. What is the Zuinglian doctrine as to the relation between the sign and the thing signified in the supper?

The bread and wine in this view are regarded as simply signs, symbolizing the body and blood of Christ sacrificially broken and shed. There is no other presence of Christ than as he is thought of and believed in by the soul.

- 15. In what sense and on what ground do the Romanists represent the eucharist as a sacrifice?
- "The sacrifice of the mass is an external oblation of the body and blood of Christ offered to God in recognition of his supreme Lordship, under the appearance of bread and wine visibly exhibited by a legitimate minister, with the addition of certain prayers and ceremonies prescribed by the church for the greater worship of God and edification of the people."—Dens, Vol. V., p. 358.

With respect to its end it is to be distinguished into, 1st, Latreuticum, or an act of supreme worship offered to God. 2d. Eucharisticum, thanksgiving. 3d. Propitiatorium, atoning for sin, and propitiating God by the offering up of the body and blood of Christ again. 4th. Imperatorium, since through it we attain to many spiritual and temporal blessings.—Dens, Vol. v., p. 368.

The difference between the eucharist as a sacrament and a sacrifice is very great, and is twofold; as a sacrament it is perfected by consecration, as a sacrifice all its efficacy consists in its oblation. As a sacrament it is to the worthy receiver a source of merit, as a sacrifice it is not only a source of merit, but also of satisfaction, expiating the sins of the living and the dead.—Cat. Rom., Pt. II., Chap. IV., Q. 55; Council Trent, Sess. 22.

They found this doctrine upon the authority of the church, and absurdly appeal to Mal. i., 11, as a prophecy of this perpetually recurrent sacrifice, and to the declaration, Heb. vii., 17, that Christ is "a priest for ever, after the order of Melchisedec," who, say they, discharged his priestly functions in offering bread and wine to Abraham, Gen. xiv., 18.

16. How may this doctrine be refuted?

1st. It has no foundation whatever in Scripture. Their appeal to the prophecy in Malachi, and to the typical relation of Melchizedec to Christ, is self-evidently absurd.

2d. It rests wholly upon the fiction of transubstantiation,

which was disproved above, question 9.

3d. The sacrifice of Christ on the cross was perfect, and from its essential nature excludes all others, Heb. ix., 25-28; x., 10-14, and 18, 26, 27.

4th. It is inconsistent with the words of institution pronounced by Christ, Luke xxii., 19, and 1 Cor. xi., 24-26. The sacrament commemorates the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, and consequently can not be a new propitiatory sacrifice itself. For the same reason the essence of a sacrament is different from that of a sacrifice. The two can not coexist in the same ordinance.

5th. It belonged to the very essence of all propitiatory sacrifices, as well to the typical sacrifices of the Old Testament, as to the all perfect one of Christ, that life should be taken, that blood

should be shed, since it consisted in vicariously suffering the penalty of the law, Heb. ix., 22. But the Papists themselves call the mass a bloodless sacrifice, and it is wholly without pain or death.

6th. A sacrifice implies a priest to present it, but the Christian ministry is not a priesthood. See above, Chap. XXI., question 21.

17. What is the Lutheran view as to the efficacy of the sacrament?

The Lutheran view on this point is that the efficacy of the sacrament resides not in the signs, but in the word of God connected with them, and that it is operative only when there is true faith in the receiver. It, however, lays stress upon the virtue of the literal body and blood of Christ as present in, with, and under, the bread and wine. This body and blood, being physically received equally by the believer and unbeliever, but being of gracious avail only in the case of the believer.—Luther's Small Cat., Part V.

18. What is the view of the Reformed churches upon this subject?

They rejected the Romish view which regards the efficacy of the sacrament as inhering in it physically as its intrinsic property, as heat inheres in fire. They rejected also the Lutheran view as far as it attributes to the sacrament an inherent supernatural power, due indeed not to the signs, but to the word of God which accompanies them, but which; nevertheless, is always operative, provided there be faith in the receiver. And, thirdly, they rejected the doctrine of the Socinians and others, that the sacrament is a mere badge of profession, or an empty sign of Christ and his benefits. It is declared to be an efficacious means of grace; but its efficacy, as such, is referred neither to any virtue in it, nor in him that administers it, but solely to the attending operation of the Holy-Ghost (virtus Spiritus Sancti extrinsecus accedens), precisely as in the case of the word. It has indeed the moral objective power of significant emblems and seals of divine appointment, just as the word has its inherent moral power; but its power to convey grace depends entirely, as in the case of the word, on the cooperation of the Holy Ghost. Hence the power is in no way tied to the sacrament. It may be exerted without it. It does not always attend it, nor is it confined to the time, place, or service.—Bib. Ref., April, 1848; see Gal. Conf., Arts. 36 and 37; Helv. ii., e. 21; Scotch Conf., Art. 21; 28th and 29th Articles of Church of England; also our own standards, Conf. Faith, Chap. XXIX., sec. 7.

19. What do our standards teach as to the qualifications for admission to the Lord's supper?

1st. Only those who are truly regenerated by the Holy Ghost are qualified, and only those who from their own profession and walk are to be presumed regenerate are to be admitted.

2d. Wicked and ignorant persons, and those who know themselves not to be regenerate, are not qualified, and ought not to be admitted by the church officers.—Conf. Faith, Chap. XXIX., section 8; L. Cat., question 173.

3d. But since many who doubt as to their being in Christ are nevertheless genuine Christians, so if one thus doubting unfeignedly desires to be found in Christ, and to depart from iniquity, he ought to labor to have his doubts resolved, and, so doing, to come to the Lord's supper, that he may be further strengthened.—L. Cat., question 172.

4th. "Children born within the pale of the visible church, and dedicated to God in baptism, when they come to years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear sober and steady, and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body, they ought to be informed it is their duty and their privilege to come to the Lord's supper." "The years of discretion in young Christians can not be precisely fixed. This must be left to the prudence of the eldership."—Direct. for Worsh., Chap. IX.

20. What is the practice which prevails in the different churches on this subject, and on what principles does such practice rest?

1st. The Romanists make the condition of salvation to be union with and obedience to the church, and, consequently, admit all to the sacraments who express their desire to conform and obey. "No one," however, "conscious of mortal sin, and having an opportunity of recurring to a confessor, however contrite he may

deem himself, is to approach the holy eucharist, until he is purified by sacramental confession."—Coun. Trent, sess. 13, canon 11. The Lutherans agree with them in admitting all who conform to the external requirements of the church.

- 2d. High Church prelatists, and others who regard the sacraments as in themselves effective means of grace, maintain that even those who, knowing themselves to be destitute of the fruits of the Spirit, nevertheless have speculative faith in the gospel, and are free from scandal, and desire to come, should be admitted.
- 3d. The faith and practice of all the evangelical churches is that the communion is designed only for believers, and therefore, that a credible profession of faith and obedience should be required of every applicant. (1.) The Baptist churches denying altogether the right of infant church membership, receive all applicants for the communion as from the world, and therefore demand positive evidences of the new birth of all. (2.) All the Pedobaptist churches, maintaining that all children baptized in infancy are already members of the church, distinguish between the admission of the children of the church to the communion. and the admission de novo to the church of the unbaptized alien from the world. With regard to the former, the presumption is that they should come to the Lord's table when they arrive at "years of discretion, if they be free from scandal, appear to be sober and steady, and to have sufficient knowledge to discern the Lord's body." In the case of the unbaptized worldling, the presumption is that they are aliens until they bring a credible profession of a change.
- 21. How may it be proved that the Lord's supper is not designed for the unrenewed?

It can, of course, be designed only for those who are spiritually qualified to do in reality what every recipient of the sacrament does in form, and professedly. But this ordinance is essentially—

1st. A profession of Christ.

2d. A solemn covenant to accept Christ and his gospel, and to fulfill the conditions of discipleship.

3d. An act of spiritual communion with Christ.

The qualifications for acceptable communion, therefore, are such knowledge, and such a spiritual condition as shall enable the recipient intelligently and honestly to discern in the emblems the Lord's body as sacrificed for sin, to contract with him the gospel covenant, and to hold fellowship with him through the Spirit.

22. What have the church and its officers a right to require of those whom they admit to the Lord's supper?

"The officers of the church are the judges of the qualifications of those to be admitted to sealing ordinances." "And those so admitted shall be examined as to their knowledge and piety."—Direct. for Worsh., Chap. IX. As God has not endowed any of these officers with the power of reading the heart, it follows that the qualifications of which they are the judges are simply those of competent knowledge, purity of life, and credible profession of faith. It is their duty to examine the applicant as to his knowledge, to watch and inquire concerning his walk and conversation, to set before him faithfully the inward spiritual qualifications requisite for acceptable communion, and to hear his profession of that spiritual faith and purpose. The responsibility of the act then rests upon the individual professor, and not upon the session, who are never to be understood as passing judgment upon, or as indorsing the validity of his evidences.

23. What is the difference between the Presbyterian and the Congregational churches upon this point?

There exists a difference between the traditionary views and practice of these two bodies of Christians with respect to the ability, the right, and the duty of church officers, of forming and affirming a positive official judgment upon the inward spiritual character of applicants for church privileges. The Congregationalists understand by "credible profession" the positive evidence of a religious experience which satisfies the official judges of the gracious state of the applicant. The Presbyterians understand by that phrase only an intelligent profession of true spiritual faith in Christ, which is not contradicted by the life.

Dr. Candlish, in the Edinburgh Witness, June 8th, 1848, eays, "The principle (of communion), as it is notorious that the

Presbyterian church has always held it, does not constitute the pastor, elders, or congregation, judges of the actual conversion of the applicant; but, on the contrary, lays much responsibility upon the applicant himself. The minister and kirk session must be satisfied as to his competent knowledge, credible profession, and consistent walk. They must determine negatively that there is no reason for pronouncing him not to be a Christian, but they do not undertake the responsibility of positively judging of his conversion. This is the Presbyterian rule of discipline, be it right or wrong, differing materially from that of the Congregationalists. In practice there is room for much dealing with the conscience under either rule, and persons destitute of knowledge and of a credible profession are excluded."

APPENDICES.

A.

I. The Apostles' Creed, so called, but known to have assumed its present form only gradually. It has, however, been in substantially its present form the creed of the whole Christian church ever since the close of the second century. The clauses which were the latest added to the creed are, "he descended into hell," "the communion of saints," and "the life everlasting." See Mosheim, Cén. I., Part II., Chap. III.; Bingham's Christ. Ant., Book X., Chapter III.

I believe in God the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ his only Son, our Lord; who was conceived by the Holy Ghost; born of the Virgin Mary; suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified, dead and buried: he descended into hell; the third day he rose again from the dead, he ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father almighty; from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy catholic church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting. Amen.

II. The Nicene Creed, as it was actually enacted by the

Council of Nice, A. D. 325.

We believe in one God the Father almighty, the maker of all things, visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father; only begotten, (that is,) of the substance of the Father; God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God; begotten, not made; of the same sub518

stance with the Father; by whom all things were made, that are in beaven and that are in earth; who for us men, and for our salvation, descended, and was incarnate, and became man; suffered, and rose again the third day; ascended into the heavens, and will come to judge the living and the dead: and in the Holy Spirit. But those who say, that there was a time when he was not, and that he was not before he was begotten, and that he was made out of nothing, or affirm that he is of any other substance or essence, or that the Son of God is created, and mutable or changeable, the Catholic church doth pronounce accursed.

III. The creed set forth by the Council of Constantinople, called by Theodosius the Great, A. D. 381, and the second œcumenical council. This is the creed used in the Catholic, Lutheran, and English churches, and erroneously styled the Nicene Creed, a true version of which I have given above, from which this Constantinopolitan creed differs chiefly in being much more full and definite in the article concerning the Holy Ghost. It was for the purpose of condemning errors concerning the personality and divinity of the third Person of the Trinity, which had prominently emerged since the Council of Nice, that the Council of Constantinople enacted these additional definitive clauses.—Mosheim, Cen. IV., Part II., Chap. V.

I believe in one God the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds; God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father; by whom all things were made; who for us men, and for our salvation came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man, and was crucified, also for us, under Pontius Pilate. He suffered and was buried; and the third day he rose again according to the Scriptures; and ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father. And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead; whose kingdom shall have no end. And I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son (this phrase "filioque" was added to the creed of Constantinople by the council of the western church held at Toledo, A. D., 589), who, with the Father and the Son together, is worshiped and glorified, who spake by the prophets. And I believe one Catholic and apostolic church, I acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins; and I look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come.

IV. The Athanasian Creed, so called, vulgarly ascribed to the great Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, from about A. D. 328 to A. D. 373, and the leader of the orthodox party in the church in opposition to the arch heretic, Arius. "But the best and latest critics, who have examined the thing most exactly, make no question but that it is to be ascribed to a Latin author, Vigilius Tapsensis, an African bishop, who lived in the latter end of the fifth century, in the time of the Vandalic Arian persecution."—

Bingham's Christian Antiquities, Bk., X., Chap. IV.

1. Whosoever wishes to be saved, it is above all necessary for him to hold the Catholic faith. 2. Which, unless each one shall preserve perfect and inviolate, he shall certainly perish for ever. 3. But the Catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in trinity, and trinity in unity. 4. Neither confounding the persons, nor separating the substance. 5. For the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, and of the Holy Ghost another. 6. But of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost there is one divinity, equal glory and coeternal majesty. 7. What the Father is, the same is the Son, and the Holy Ghost. 8. The Father is uncreated, the Son uncreated, the Holy Ghost uncreated. 9. The Father is immense, the Son immense, the Holy Ghost immense. 10. The Father is eternal, the Son eternal, the Holy Ghost eternal. 11. And yet there are not three eternals, but one eternal. 12. So there are not three (beings) uncreated, nor three immense, but one uncreated, and one immense. 13. In like manner the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, the Holy Ghost is omnipotent. 14. And yet there are not three omnipotents, but one omnipotent. 15. Thus the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God. 16. And yet there are not three Gods, but one God. 17. Thus the Father is Lord, the Son is Lord, and the Holy Ghost is Lord. 18. And yet there are not three Lords, but one Lord. 19. Because we are thus compelled by Christian verity to confess each person severally to be God and Lord; sc

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we are prohibited by the Catholic religion from saying that there are three Gods or Lords. 20. The Father was made from none, por created, nor begotten. 21. The Son is from the Father alone, neither made, nor created, but begotten. 22. The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. 23. Therefore there is one Father, not three fathers, one Son, not three sons, one Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts. 24. And in this trinity there is nothing first or last; nothing greater or less. 25. But all the three coeternal persons are coequal among themselves; so that through all, as is above said, both unity in trinity, and trinity in unity is to be worshiped. 26. Therefore, he who wishes to be saved must think thus concerning the trinity. 27. But it is necessary to eternal salvation that he should also faithfully believe in the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ. 28. It is, therefore, true faith that we believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is both God and man. '29. He is God, generated from eternity from the substance of the Father; man, born in time from the substance of his mother. 30. Perfect God, perfect man, subsisting of a rational soul and human flesh. 31. Equal to the Father in respect to his divinity, less than the Father in respect to his humanity. 32. Who, although he is God and man, is not two but one Christ. 33. But one, not from the conversion of his divinity into flesh, but from the assumption of his humanity into God. 34. One not at all from confusion of substance, but from unity of person. 35. For as a rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ. 36. Who suffered for our salvation, descended into hell, the third day rose from the dead. 37. Ascended to heaven, sitteth at the right hand of God the Father omnipotent, whence he shall come to judge the living and the dead. 38. At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall render an account for their works. 39. And they who have done well shall go into life eternal; they who have done evil into eternal fire. 40. This is the Catholic faith, which, unless a man shall faithfully and firmly believe, he can not be saved.

В.

As the system of doctrine commonly designated Calvinism, from its ablest expounder, the illustrious reformer of Geneva, was in fact first clearly defined and advocated by the great St. Augustin, bishop of Hippo, in Northern Africa, during the last years of the fourth and the first of the fifth century, so that antagonist system, now generally known as Arminianism, from the fact that its most able and prominent modern advocates, the Remonstrants, of Holland, were led, in the order of time, by James Arminius, professor of theology in the University of Leyden, from 1602 to 1609, was really in the first instance set forth by John Cassianus, an Eastern monk settled in Marseilles, in France, during the first half of the fifth century. The advocates of this system were at first called Massilians (from Massilia, Marseilles), and afterwards, by the schoolmen, Semipelagians.

During the controversies which immediately preceded the General Synod of Dort, in Holland, A. D. 1618 and 1619 (when the churches of England, Scotland, Holland, the Palatinate, and Switzerland, united in condemning, by their representatives, this doctrine, and in reasserting Calvinism as the faith of the Reformed churches), the Remonstrants set forth their position, as contrasted with the established doctrine of the Protestant churches, in five propositions. These are known as the FIVE POINTS OF CONTROVERSY between the disciples of Arminius and of Calvin. These, as given by Mosheim, Cent. XVII., Sec. II., Part II., Chap. III.,

are as follows:

1st. "That God, from all eternity, determined to bestow salvation on those who, as he foresaw, would persevere unto the end in their faith in Jesus Christ, and to inflict everlasting punishment on those who should continue in their unbelief, and resist, to the end of life, his divine succours.

2d. "That Jesus Christ, by his death and sufferings, made an atonement for the sins of mankind in general, and of every individual in particular; that, however, none but those who believe

in him can be partakers of that divine benefit.

3d. "That true faith can not proceed from the exercise of our natural faculties and powers, or from the force and operation of

free will, since man, in consequence of his natural corruption, is incapable of thinking or doing any good thing; and that therefore it is necessary to his conversion and salvation that he be regenerated and renewed by the operation of the Holy Ghost, which is the gift of God through Jesus Christ.

4th. "That this divine grace or energy of the Holy Ghost, which heals the disorders of a corrupt nature, begins, advances, and brings to perfection every thing that can be called good in man; and that, consequently, all good works, without exception, are to be attributed to God alone, and to the operation of his grace; that, nevertheless, this grace does not force the man to act against his inclination, but may be resisted and rendered ineffectual by the perverse will of the impenitent sinner.

5th. "That they who are united to Christ by faith are thereby furnished with abundant strength and succor sufficient to enable them to triumph over the seductions of Satan, and the allurements of sin; nevertheless they may, by the neglect of these succors, fall from grace, and, dying in such a state, may finally perish. This point was stated at first doubtfully, but afterwards positively as a settled doctrine."

It must be remembered that this statement was put forth during the early stages of this controversy, while the Remonstrants were deprecating all ecclesiastical investigation of their divergencies from the creeds of the national church, and before, in fact, their system had been thoroughly elaborated by their own teachers. The fundamental positions set forth in these *five points* led by logical necessity to that rationalistic anti-evangelical system matured by the later Remonstrant theologians, and presenting unscriptural views upon almost every question concerning Christianity, as concerning our federal relation to Adam, original sin, predestination, providence, redemption, free will, grace, faith, regeneration, justification, sanctification, perseverance, good works, etc., etc.

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