

103

PACIFIC RIM ISSUES

Y 4. AP 6/2: S. HRG. 103-131

Pacific Rim Issues, S.Hrg. 103-131,...

HEARINGS

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



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PACIFIC RIM ISSUES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1992

**U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Honolulu, HI.**

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., in Courtroom Aha'Nonoe, U.S. Courthouse, Prince Kuhio Federal Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye and Stevens.

Also present: Senator Akaka and Representative Abercrombie.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING AND MILITARY-CIVILIAN LAND USE

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHNNIE H. CORNS, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY PACIFIC, HAWAII

ACCOMPANIED BY:

COL. FRANK R. FINCH, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR ENGINEERING, U.S. ARMY PACIFIC

COL. WALTER L. CLOYD III, USA, COMMANDER, OAHU CONSOLIDATED FAMILY HOUSING (PROVISIONAL)

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOUE

Senator INOUE. The hearing of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will please come to order.

Before we proceed with our hearing, I would like to, on behalf of the subcommittee, extend to the men and women in uniform through you, General Corns, the high regard and great gratitude for the work that you and your men and women provided in the recent Hurricane Iniki.

Reports we have received have been extraordinary. You came at a time of need. You provided the people of Kauai a hope when hope was no longer there. For all of this, you have the undying gratitude of the people of Kauai. Thank you very much, sir.

I wish to extend my warm regards to my colleague, Senator Akaka, and to the members of the public and the military who are here this morning and especially to my good friend from Alaska, the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Senator Stevens, for his presence at this hearing.

The subcommittee is pleased to be in Honolulu this morning to discuss two of the most important issues facing military service members and residents of Hawaii: Family housing and military-ci-

vilian land use. In no other State in the union are these two issues more controversial and pressing than here in the State of Hawaii.

This morning we will hear from panels on each of these issues. Our first panel on military housing will be led by Lt. Gen. Johnnie H. Corns, Commander of the U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific.

In April 1993, the subcommittee plans to return to Hawaii for additional hearings on these matters, and at that time we plan to hear from public witnesses. Today we will hear from military witnesses.

Perhaps the most important and controversial quality of life issue facing our military members stationed in Hawaii is the availability of affordable family housing. The shortness of Government-owned homes coupled with the longstanding tightness in the Oahu housing market has led to a severe lack of adequate housing for our service members and their families. The effects of this military housing shortage has been felt throughout the civilian and military communities as military members strive and compete with local residents to find affordable housing.

Yet despite the problems we face in this area, I believe that this hearing will make clear that the Congress and the military have embarked on an undeniable path of progress toward increasing the availability of affordable housing in Hawaii.

Congress, with the endorsement and support of military leaders in the Pacific Command and in Washington, has approved in the past 2 years significant amounts of funding for constructing over 1,200 new housing units, replacing old, substandard housing and planning to meet long-term housing requirements.

Thus, we have taken several important steps toward addressing the housing needs of our service men and women. No doubt we have many more to take. But I believe that through continuing efforts on the part of the Congress and the Department of Defense and with the full participation and support of our local residents, we can meet the needs of military members.

The family housing programs we support will make homes more affordable to all in Hawaii and bring meaningful jobs to those out of work. Work and shelter, basic human needs we are addressing, and so I thank you, General Corns, for your effort.

Before turning to our first witness, I would like to call upon the vice chairman of the subcommittee for any remarks he may have. Senator Stevens?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Senator Inouye. I am pleased to be back here in Hawaii. I found sort of an interesting thing looking out of my hotel window this morning. I was reminded I was in the same hotel 46 years ago when I came back from China just about this same time of year.

I know that on many occasions in Washington you have expressed concern to our subcommittee over the utilization of Department of Defense facilities here in Hawaii and the future of the military forces here on your islands. I am pleased to hear we will be back here in April to look at the 1994 requests with some public hearings.

It will be necessary, I think, for us, under the new administration, to review not only 1994 but also the urgency for spending the moneys that we have already provided for 1993.

And I am pleased to be here with Gen. Johnnie Corns, Commander of the U.S. Army of the Pacific. Johnnie and I are old friends. You recall he was the commander of the Sixth Light Infantry Division and also was commander of our forces in Japan. I consider General Corns to be the preeminent military expert for the Army in the Pacific.

I know that since you have been chairman of this subcommittee, we have made several trips throughout the Pacific Command to make certain we understand the role of our allies and our own military in maintaining stability in the Pacific.

I would just remind those here that Alaska is now part of the Pacific Command. We did not have that role until just a few years ago. We have become a subunified command as far as the Pacific Command.

I look forward to working with these component commanders here in Hawaii and I know that they have joined you, Senator Inouye, Admiral Larson, and I in trying to work to maintain the relationships that exist between the military and the State of Hawaii and the State of Alaska. This hearing should improve that dialog for us.

Only this past summer the Alaska National Guard joined your National Guard in being a component for the Reserve for the Pacific Command. It is a great interest to those of us in Alaska to know what the status of the command is and to try review the plans for the future of our military forces in the Pacific.

So, Mr. Chairman, the people of Hawaii do not know it, I do not think, but you have made many visits to my State and not in your role as chairman of this subcommittee but in your role as chairman of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs.

Having been a past chairman of this subcommittee, I want to commend you for your actions in trying to make sure that there is a public awareness of the role of the military in the Pacific. So I am pleased to join Senator Akaka with you this morning. I thank you for the privilege of being here.

Senator INOUE. Senator Akaka.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL AKAKA, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much the opportunity to participate in today's subcommittee hearing.

Let me join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses and in extending my warmest aloha to Lt. Gen. Johnnie Corns and the other flag officers and leading officers and also to tell you that I really appreciated your work on Kauai during Hurricane Iniki. At the outset you certainly made a big difference in the spirit of the people on Kauai. And, I, too, want to thank you for that.

I also want to welcome my good friend, Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska, and Representative Neil Abercrombie.

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, we have a responsibility to provide quality of life that meets the unique needs of military families. One of the most important questions facing military per-

sonnel and their dependents is where they live. The limited supply of military base housing and affordable housing in Hawaii's civilian market is an issue which affects everyone who resides in our beautiful State. We must undertake a number of initiatives to increase housing units on military bases and affordable housing in our civilian market. With your leadership, Mr. Chairman, we have started this difficult task.

In the past year Congress authorized and appropriated over 800 military family housing units for Hawaii in fiscal year 1993 and this no doubt will help resolve the dire need for military housing.

However, housing is not the only issue of major concern to Hawaii's residents. Military land use, especially in communities near military installations, has become a major concern to the people of Hawaii.

According to the State Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism, the military owns or controls over 265,000 acres of land in Hawaii. As a user of this important resource, the military has an obligation to remain a responsible conservator of our State's most important legacy.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses here today. It will no doubt provide us with important insights into the military's efforts to resolve these contentious issues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my full, written statement be included.

Senator INOUE. Without objection, so ordered.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Subcommittee's hearing on military family housing, land use, and Hawaii's strategic importance to our nation. Let me join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses and extending my warmest aloha to Lieutenant General Johnnie H. Corns and Rear Admiral John R. Ryan and, to our colleagues, Senator Ted Stevens from Alaska and Representative Neil Abercrombie.

As you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is undergoing a dramatic drawdown, due to the world's changing political and military landscape. Thousands of military personnel will be released from active duty over the next few years. For those who remain, we have an obligation and responsibility to provide a quality of life that meets the unique needs of military families.

Like their civilian counterparts, military personnel are strongly concerned about where their families will reside. The limited supply of military-based housing and affordable housing in the private market is an issue which affects everyone in our beautiful state. With the average cost of a single family home running close to \$340,000, many military personnel and their families seek base housing. However, given the inordinate demand, hundreds of military families must wait months before military-based housing becomes available. As a result, these families are forced to compete with civilians for already-scarce affordable housing resources within the community.

Given Hawaii's limited housing supply in general, this issue has been perceived as "us against them," the malihini against the kama'aina. However, this is not true. Military personnel and their families stationed in Hawaii are residents of this great state and have an equal stake in its future. It is time to change this negative perception and to work together for what is best for the State. We must strive to provide affordable housing to all who reside here in Hawaii. In order to accomplish this critical goal, we must undertake a number of initiatives to increase both the number of units on military bases and the quantity of affordable housing in our civilian market.

With your leadership, Mr. Chairman, we have started this admirable but difficult task. During the past year, Congress authorized and appropriated funding for more than 800 new military family housing units in Hawaii for fiscal year 1993. In addition, several Section 802 projects are expected to provide 800 more units to help al-

leviate the 5,000-plus military housing deficit facing those stationed in Hawaii. A study on housing demand in Hawaii that is being conducted by the Department of the Army calls for the Defense Department to construct 500 units annually until the year 2005.

The strategic importance of Hawaii to our national defense, the recent closure of Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, and the stability of our Pacific Rim neighbors all contribute to the need for Hawaii to maintain its robust military responsibilities and capabilities. As such, the demand for military housing will not greatly diminish, even given the projected drawdown. It is the call for reduced defense spending that may have a detrimental affect on the amount of resources the Department of Defense has available to provide an adequate supply of military housing for its personnel. I am pleased that the Defense Department is looking to the future in this area. Its commitment to expend over \$2 billion on military housing projects over the next decade is to be commended.

Also, its efforts to create alternative financial means, such as the development of Ford Island, may provide a blueprint for the Department in meeting its housing needs through more innovative measures. In this particular instance, a mutually-beneficial agreement has been reached between the Defense Department and the City and County of Honolulu. The City will provide the funding to construct a causeway to Ford Island, which will allow for more efficient use of the island and the development of 600 military homes. In return, the City will obtain the Manana and Pearl City Junction parcels from the military and may utilize them for civilian housing.

However, these types of land exchanges must be in the best interest of all parties. Housing is not the only issue that has become a major concern of Hawaii's residents. Military land use, especially in communities near installations, is another. According to the State Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism, the military owns or controls more than 265,000 acres of land in Hawaii.

The expansion of our urban areas has restricted the activities of our armed forces personnel on these lands. However, at the same time, proper training remains imperative to their readiness. With many of our military installations located near or within populated communities, military land use has become an emotional and confrontational issue—one, moreover, that is not unique to Hawaii. Many states with developing communities near military installations face the same concerns, and any solution to the problem must balance these community and national security needs.

We cannot expect the military to continue to station its personnel in areas where it cannot conduct necessary training exercises. It is only logical that, with limited defense dollars, training will become more crucial and forces relocated closer to training areas. The lack of adequate training grounds could well affect the military presence in our State, where defense expenditures rank second only to tourism.

This does not mean that communities are to be subject to the whims of the Defense Department. The Department must maintain its cooperative spirit and continue to work with the State to develop a land use program that is effective, efficient and sensitive. As a user of this important resource, the military has an obligation to remain a responsible conservator of our state's most important legacy.

Given the number of discrepancies in previous land management reports, the requirement for the Secretary of the Navy to coordinate a land use master plan for Hawaii is a vital first step in this direction.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to commend you for your leadership in these areas and stand ready to work with you and your colleagues on the Subcommittee in meeting the needs of Hawaii's military personnel.

I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses here today. They will certainly provide us with insights into the military's efforts to resolve these contentious issues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. On behalf of the committee, I am pleased to welcome you, sir.

Representative Abercrombie, would you like to make a statement before we proceed?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. My only statement, Senator Inoue, is to thank you for the opportunity to be here and to extend my heartiest aloha and welcome to Senator Stevens.

We are delighted that you are here. I know that you are a good and faithful colleague of Senator Akaka and Senator Inouye and the people of Hawaii are happy to have you here.

I will save my commentary for the—or observations and questions after the testimony, Senator. Thank you.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

Now it is my pleasure to call upon Lt. Gen. Johnnie H. Corns, Commanding General, U.S. Army Pacific.

General Corns.

OVERVIEW PRESENTATION

General CORNS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, Senator Akaka, Representative Abercrombie, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before this very important committee which has done so much, and I can say from personal recall, to advance the cause of housing for the U.S. military within the Pacific.

With personal experiences in Alaska and Japan as well as now here in Hawaii, I have seen houses erected and housing programs promoted. None of that could have been possible were it not for the strong, continuing support of, particularly, the Senate Appropriations Committee.

We have here in Hawaii a situation that the chairman has outlined very well, which requires a great deal of attention to, concern about and action on the part of a lot of people in order to meet the housing need. And I am pleased to say after well over a year of command experience here and being executive for military housing for the Department of Defense, the involvement of local, State, as well as congressional—Federal congressional personnel in attacking this problem is very, very encouraging.

I have seen estimates that suggested by the year 2000 that the shortage in housing overall in Hawaii, Oahu, would be about 86,000. Therefore, it is not surprising to me that as members of my Consolidated Housing Office and representatives of each of the services here on Oahu meet with local, county, and State officials, that often the discussion is a shared concern for promoting the additional housing to meet the requirement.

GROWING HOUSING REQUIREMENT

We have a history with a Consolidated Housing Family Office here in Hawaii in which we have seen a growth in the requirement for housing and, consequently, a growing shortfall, but a growing sense of awareness that action needs to be taken. We have a pattern of action, beginning within the military here in Hawaii, with the cooperation of the people locally, but most particularly with the cooperation of the Office of the Secretary of the Army, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the U.S. Congress in helping us to build solutions.

In about 1985, the shortfall of housing was less than 300. By 1988, the shortfall was somewhat over 2,000. Some people who are new to the housing business find it somewhat surprising that the numbers would grow in that way without major additions of military personnel.

Of course, the answer to that is that there must be the capability in the salaries and housing supplements of service members to be able to penetrate the market and to get into housing that is both suitable and affordable. It is in the rising cost of housing on Hawaii that both the average Hawaiian citizen, as well as the U.S. military members who are here, are confronted with this special challenge.

Currently, a three-bedroom house rental will average about \$1,400 a month on Oahu. That compares with a corporal's ability to pay by his basic housing salary and a variable housing allowance and then him supplementing that at about 15 percent to just over \$1,000 a month.

So there is a shortfall there of real concern, and it is in that shortfall that we find the need to expand the housing that is available to our military personnel.

We have seen the growth in the requirement and we now program against a requirement of an additional 5,088 sets of family quarters on Oahu. That would enable us to provide housing in the traditional manner by which we representatively provide housing for officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of all ranks.

STRATEGY 8000

We have also put together what we call Strategy 8000 which is primarily in recognition of the high cost of the individual rental unit. That Strategy 8000 provides for housing all of our enlisted personnel on post or on base.

For the 5,088 requirement, we project that we would require about \$1.7 billion by the year 2001 to build the necessary houses to complete that. For the Strategy 8000, there would be the addition of about \$600 million required and it would take to the year 2005 to complete that.

We have put that together in the form of a plan with the support and urging of this committee and the Congress, with the assistance of all the services here on Oahu. And earlier in this month, Admiral Larson, CINCPAC, forwarded that plan to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It serves as the basis for our annual planning and programming and submissions for housing.

LAND REQUIREMENTS

It includes some very key assumptions that were necessary in order to, in fact, put a plan together. The assumptions have mostly to do with acquiring or positioning the necessary land on which we can site the houses.

We have been able to identify about 80 percent of the land that would be needed to complete or satisfy our plan. We have made some assumptions with respect to some additional land that we might be able to obtain in order to house the total required number of personnel or number of military families.

In a later panel discussion today, I know you are going to address the very important matter of land management and, of course, housing, in order to meet the housing requirement. We are very, very much involved with the question of suitable housing and then once the land is available for that housing, have the capability

to put in the infrastructure, the utilities and those kinds of requirements.

COORDINATION ESSENTIAL

I am very pleased with the great commitment and the deep cooperation of each of the services and to the leadership of Admiral Larson in enabling us to put this plan together during the last year. It has required a considerable amount of coordination. It will, in execution, involve continuing coordination with private, local, and State activities and government agencies as well as, of course, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the various services, and the Congress.

We are optimistic that because the plan is dynamic and has flexibility characteristics, that as we deal with each year's budget request, level of appropriations and then we deal with contracting and the number of types of housing units that you can afford for a particular amount of money, that we can adjust the plan.

In other words, if in a given year of our program and plan, the level of funding is greater or lesser or even though the level of funding is that which is requested, in contracting we find we can build a lesser or greater number for a sum of money, that will have impact on the following year or two. What we are seeking to do with the execution of this plan is then to adjust our utilization of funds and our utilization of sites in order to keep the housing numbers that we have growing each year.

500-HOUSE GOAL

Our goal has been to add 500 houses under military construction each year. We are going to be very open to options other than straight military construction to add housing. I am talking about private and public ventures, particularly including 802, section 802 housing. And we are actively involved in discussions under which we can broaden the capability to take advantage of other public or private ventures.

Further, where siting is concerned and land, we are certainly looking at making optimum use of the land that is available to us right now. Each of our military and base commanders have responsibilities to shape their base or installation in an excellent manner that meets the overall needs of the military personnel and their families, that calls for a balanced approach, involving a great number of considerations.

QUESTION OF MORALE

But there is no single area that has higher priority among our component commanders or installation commanders than family housing. I have been reminded, in just the last few days as I watched on television the departure of some of our marines from Kaneohe Marine Air Station, of the importance of a service member, man or woman, about to leave his or her husband, wife and children, of knowing that, particularly going into a Christmas season, that they are leaving them in a home that represents an American dream, a home that is adequate, provides for their basic needs and in no way is a source of concern for that service member

as she or he goes forward, in this case, to help the people of Somalia.

For me personally and I am sure for many other service members and veterans, that rings a very clear note that it is in the area of esprit de corps of units and morale of individual service members' mother or father, that the role of housing does play such an importance. So even today with our mission in Somalia, the importance of quality and adequate housing is underscored.

We have a plan. We have a program to continue to add housing. We are extremely pleased with the housing that was provided by authorization or appropriation, particularly fiscal years 1992 and 1993.

Our fiscal years 1992 and 1993 are executable from the standpoint of resources we have to make available here. And because of flexibility involved in what we call Strategy 8000, because of the flexibility within the master plan that has been forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we are confident that we can provide those who are attempting to assist us a program that makes sense, that flows properly, and has inherent flexible capability to adjust to the kinds of changes that are inherent in an undertaking of this particular nature.

Finally, if I could, Mr. Chairman, in a way that broadens a little from the subject of this hearing, I would like to allude to a comment you made before the hearing and a comment of Senator Akaka.

HURRICANE INIKI

I am very, very proud to accept the complimentary statements that were made about the role of the U.S. military in response to Hurricane Iniki.

I have, on several occasions, said that with respect to my role as Joint Task Force Commander and Defense Coordinating Officer, I place that experience among the three or four most personally satisfying experiences I have ever had as a soldier.

I could not be more indebted to the cooperation that came first in the person of the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and then by his deputy, by the Governor, the Civil Defense Director, and the adjutant general of the State of Hawaii, by the commanders of all of the components of the military here in Hawaii, and by those specific commanders, some of whom are present in this hearing, who worked with us throughout the response to Iniki.

The bond that was established very quickly with the people on Kauai and the people on the western coast of Oahu is a lasting one. We have some members of our military who enjoy the opportunity to return again and share the friendships that were built then. Of course, for our Navy personnel who are stationed at Barking Sands, they, as they did before, continue with a very strong relationship with the people on Kauai.

On behalf of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, the members of the Coast Guard with whom we cooperated, the members of the Hawaii Air National Guard and Army National Guard, who played such an outstanding and important role and, for that matter, members of the Guard from other States of the United States,

on behalf of all those people, thank you for your complimentary remarks and thank you for the opportunity to be here today to address the more specific questions of housing on Oahu.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, General Corns.
[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHNNIE H. CORNS

Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I am Lieutenant General Johnnie H. Corns, Commanding General, United States Army, Pacific, and am here to provide you my perspective, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for military housing on Oahu, the top priority quality of life issue for our service members stationed here. As we all know, affordable housing is in short supply for all of us, both military and civilian, who are fortunate enough to live in this beautiful State. It is an issue that is constantly in the news and one without an easy solution. It is also a situation that by its very nature allows solutions applied to the military issues to directly benefit the civilian community as well.

The military has long been a part of the fabric of this State. Today, we have slightly over 59,000 military members stationed on Oahu. Of these, approximately 33,000 have family members residing here. Counting these family members, the total military community numbers close to 120,000. All of these people must compete for the same tight, affordable housing assets as the citizens of Oahu.

I currently have available, 19,930 military family houses and an acknowledged requirement to build 5,088 more. My ultimate goal and the goal of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Charles Larson, is to build over 8,000 units so we can house all of the enlisted personnel on post. Enlisted service members are the ones who can least afford to compete for adequate, affordable housing here. We are being very proactive in our attempts to meet this challenge. There is a dual benefit to our on-base military family housing program, in that we help resolve the State's shortfall of affordable housing. For every family we move into military quarters, a unit is made available for the residents of Oahu. We have recently completed a housing acquisition proposal that can be used if funds become available. This plan was forwarded to the Department of Defense on 1 December 1992 by Admiral Larson.

The proposal addresses a solution through the military construction program and it will be expensive. Part of the housing deficit, however, can be addressed through public/private ventures and we continue to pursue this option aggressively. A real success story in this area has taken place at Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, where 276 Marine and Navy families occupy quality homes built under the Section 802 Program. This is not only the first such use of the program in DOD, but the military community on Oahu stands ready to continue this innovative approach. A 368-unit project for the Navy is ready to be started and only awaits the result of two industry forums—one in Washington, D. C. and one here in Honolulu—before beginning. We sincerely appreciate the support received from Congress in the past as we pursue answers to the housing challenges before us and seek your continued support.

As stated previously, the military has been a proud member of the community in Hawaii for many years. As a result, we operate and maintain quarters constructed as long ago as 1907. Some, of course, are newer; however, when you are dealing with almost 20,000 homes, the operation and maintenance costs are staggering. Many of these homes require extensive repair and some need to be torn down and replaced. The funding to adequately maintain these homes has never been sufficient. As a result, the backlog of maintenance and repair continues to grow. I have, and will continue, to press the Department of the Army for adequate funding to meet this demand.

As you can see, the housing situation for the military and civilian communities is a serious problem; however, we are not just sitting back waiting for help. I believe the entire community is working together for solutions. My staff and I meet regularly with the State of Hawaii and City and County of Honolulu leadership. As an example, we all know land is also a limited commodity on Oahu. Space for housing has to compete with agriculture and conservation needs of the State and with needs for training and quality of life on military installations. Every land use program undertaken here has a potentially widespread impact on everyone. Recognizing this, Admiral Larson has assembled leaders from both the military and civilian communities to address land-use issues to ensure consistency in our effort. I know that you, Senator Inouye, have been very supportive of this initiative.

In closing, I would like to say that the housing challenge is the top quality of life issue for all of the military leadership here in Hawaii. I do not believe there is another situation, short of actual war planning, where so much interservice cooperation has existed. I would like to personally thank the Army Staff, OSD and the Congress for the continued support in resourcing the programs essential to the resolution of our housing situation.

PANEL MEMBERS

Senator INOUE. Before proceeding with the questions, will you identify the members of your panel for the record, sir?

General CORNS. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to do that.

Maj. Gen. Joe Redden, to my left, is the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans for U.S. Air Force Pacific. To my immediate left, John Ryan is the J4 Director of Logistics and Security Assistance with the J4 Office of USCINCPAC. To my right is Col. Walt Cloyd, who is the commander of our Consolidated Family Housing Operation on Oahu.

EFFECT OF MILITARY DRAWDOWN HOUSING

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, sir.

The demand or need for military housing would depend upon many factors, such as marriage rates, housing allowances or the numbers of personnel to be stationed here.

Beginning with the last item I mentioned, will the planned military drawdown that we are involved in at this moment affect this demand for housing?

General CORNS. Our plan assumes there is no reduction in the military houses to be provided here on Oahu, and I believe that is a sound assumption.

DEPENDENTS IN HAWAII

Senator INOUE. I recall when Senator Stevens and I were in the military, at that time I believe less than 5 percent of the military personnel had dependents. I realize today the picture has changed.

What is the situation at the present time? Has there been a change in the number of military personnel bringing in their dependents, their spouses to Hawaii?

General CORNS. Mr. Chairman, in the decade of the 1980's particularly, all the services have seen an increase in the number of military personnel who are married. I am more aware of and knowledgeable of the experience of the Army but I think it is representative. Even in organizations like our tactical divisions such as exist in Alaska with the Sixth Infantry Division Light and Hawaii with the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division Light, the growth in the number of soldiers who have families has been very, very dramatic.

I would not attempt to give you the specifics of those numbers by service although we would be happy to provide that for the record.

[The information follows:]

Our latest statistics on the married service member percentages follow:

	<i>Percent</i>
Army	57.1
Navy	50.2
Air Force	57.6
USMC	36

These figures are from the fiscal year 1990 Segmented Housing Market Analysis and verified by a fiscal year 1992 U.S. Army Audit Agency audit.

General CORNS. But we are very much now in the business as commanders and leaders of needing on a continuing basis to assess the impact on families of any decisions that we make because of the high percentage of our service members who have their families with them.

EFFECT OF HOUSING ALLOWANCES

Senator INOUE. If the Congress were to approve an increase in housing allowances, would that affect the demand for new houses?

General CORNS. In the event that the housing allowances increase here in Oahu was made available, I believe that the need for housing, both for the military and for the civilian population as a whole, would be largely unaffected because that deals with the unaffordability question.

We have some members of the military who occupy houses less than they would prefer because of the funding that they have. If they are provided more money, I believe it is fair to say that the situation we have in Oahu is such that they might migrate into a house where the rental fee, monthly, is greater but it will not diminish the fact that we still have a shortfall, not only for the military but the population at large.

Senator INOUE. Am I to conclude from your response that you would not recommend an increase in housing allowances?

General CORNS. I do not believe that is the primary means we should use to attack the problem, Mr. Chairman.

HOUSING SITUATION FOR FAMILIES

Senator INOUE. The subcommittee has been told that some military members, especially junior enlistees, are being urged not to bring their families to Hawaii in light of the troubling housing situation. Is that correct?

General CORNS. I think there are circumstances in which military family members and military personnel will communicate concern about the difficulty in getting an affordable house here. And that kind of information flows, certainly with respect to the Army, to some of our people on mainland who are receiving orders to come here. But as a matter of official policy, we are not doing that.

Senator INOUE. I suppose that would have an effect on the morale of the enlistee, will it not?

General CORNS. Because of the growth in families that I mentioned in the 1980's, the military is very proud of the fact that we were responsive to the families of the military and we have, in fact, improved a number of programs, many with direct support of the Congress, to take care of our families. The family is very much a centerpiece of the morale of the individual service member and, consequently, the esprit of our units.

So I would submit that for whatever reason we are forced to separate the service member from his family has the potential of adversely affecting the soldier's morale or the sailor's, airman's, marine's morale, therefore the esprit of the unit.

OAHU HOUSING

Senator INOUE. Do you believe that the recent numbers of housing that have been provided for Oahu, 1,200, has had any impact on the housing situation here?

General CORNS. I believe it is inescapable, Mr. Chairman. That as we provide the additional housing and are able to move a larger percentage of our military families who are living in private homes off base and off post on to base, on to post, it frees up those houses for other members of the population, which I perceive is a welcome effect of the improvement and the availability of housing for the military on base and on post. By that, I mean it is a welcome effect within the people of Oahu.

HIGH-DENSITY AND MIDRISE BUILDINGS

Senator INOUE. I have many other questions but I will ask this last one before I call upon my colleagues and come back again.

Your latest plan for reducing the family housing deficit calls for the construction of a number of high-density or midrise buildings to minimize the requirements for land acquisition. Do you believe that this is an appropriate strategy and what are the pros and cons of this? Because we have received letters indicating opposition to this high-density-type construction.

General CORNS. The type of housing which we incorporate within our plan is very much related to the availability of land. The land that we have on our military bases and posts, we have to this point put more typical single or two-story individual family homes on that land.

As we look to meeting the entire requirement of 5,088 homes or the Strategy 8000, it becomes apparent that we are going to have to acquire additional land, that could be by some swap between the military and other agencies. It could be by outright purchase. Also, it appears that from some of the options under public and private venture, that additional land would be a problem both in acquiring it and relevant to its cost.

The cost of the acquisition of the land, whatever might be the housing option used, caused us to look at higher densities in order to make use of the available housing sites. As we did that, the higher density that we identified was nine-story midrise.

The nine-story midrise helps us a great deal in solving the problem of the limited housing sites and lessening the requirement to purchase or acquire more land. But what it also does is it drives the dwelling unit cost, the cost of the individual family home within that midrise, up. We are in discussions now with the service's headquarters and OSD relevant to the tradeoff in the lessening of our land problem by going to the midrise with the high density because of the cost—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, General, excuse me. Senator?

Senator INOUE. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I want to make sure I understood you correctly, General Corns. Did you say that if you went to the midrise, it would drive the cost up? I would have presumed the opposite.

General CORNS. The first time I was briefed on this subject, Mr. Abercrombie, I had the same response that you have just had. We have had—Our Pacific Ocean Division Corps of Engineers and individual parties looked very closely at this and the answer is "Yes," that the best estimates that we can arrive at would indicate that in the nine-story midrise, the average cost per unit would approach \$250,000 compared to an average cost of around \$150,000, which is the estimate we carry for the type housing units we have been building.

We are now also looking at options such as townhouses in between whereby we can get some help on putting a slightly higher density of housing on the land and possibly not getting the high cost of \$250,000 per unit that we are associating with the midrise.

But we believe, we believe that we can go to industry with some requests for proposals and lay out a number of units that we desire for a particular cost and have them—see if they cannot come up with some inventive ideas along the spectrum of the individual, single or two-story house and the midrise, find us options whereby we can kind of optimize the problem we have where we are trying to drive the unit cost down and at the same time not create an extremely large land acquisition problem for ourselves.

Senator INOUE. Incidentally, the cost does not include the cost of land.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes; that is what I was thinking.

Senator INOUE. In the high-rise you have additional costs like elevators, I believe.

General CORNS. That is correct; structural steel, the structure.

Senator INOUE. And community centers.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So it was in relation to land, too.

General CORNS. No.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I will wait until the end. I just wanted to make sure I had not heard incorrectly.

Senator INOUE. Well, we have been told that military personnel would oppose this high-rise, high-density type of housing because of the high probability or increased probability of crime and other negative factors. Is there any validity to this concern?

General CORNS. I have had some experience, direct and indirect, with what you would call midrise housing: Fort Myer, VA, with some of the services on Okinawa in Japan. I think that the manner in which that is approached with your service members and the tradeoff they get with respect to the affordable housing in the high-rise or the midrise vis-a-vis what they have been experiencing will make the difference. In other words, it is quite the option that the individual service member gets when you make the midrise available to them compared to where they have been living and what they have been paying that makes the midrise attractive.

It is not a matter, I do not believe, of giving the service member an option of the midrise versus, say, a single-level family housing. That is not the nature of our problem. I believe that for many of our service members, a midrise option of housing would be welcome

because of the reduced costs and outlay to them of the housing and the convenience of being on base or being on post.

Senator INOUE. So the concern for increased probability of crime is not a major concern?

General CORNS. Not in my experience or knowledge, that is not a factor that normally comes into play because you have used midrise on your base or post.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Stevens?

Senator STEVENS. You recall seeing those high-rise apartments that the Marines had in Okinawa and you had some in Japan, and the experience has been rather good, has it not, from the point of view of the people who lived in them?

General CORNS. I have in my command now in Japan at Camp Zoma a relatively new midrise family housing dwelling. It is very successful and welcomed by the people who now occupy it.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING

Senator STEVENS. I recall visiting those.

General, Senator Inouye and I are both on the Military Construction Subcommittee and this subcommittee. We have tried to reprioritize the funding of the budget for some of these needs in the Pacific and particularly in terms of housing. The shifting of money from NATO and from other areas over to the Pacific, you have some \$140 million for new housing and we had funds for renovating existing housing, both here and in Alaska. That has changed your plan, has it not? That was not within the Army's plan. We shifted that money. It was not in the Army's plan.

General CORNS. That is correct.

Senator STEVENS. Have you modified your plans since we modified or changed the priorities?

General CORNS. With respect, first, to Oahu and Hawaii, in the first year of the master plan that I referred to, we laid out some requirements and what we would like to be able to do in fiscal year 1993. The action by the Congress very closely related to what we laid out as a requirement: some 858 units, Army, Marine Corps, and Navy. So we were able to take that action and have it fit our master plan.

In Alaska, the principal activity we have going on there is taking some of the eight-plex houses, which are substandard to DOD standards now, and converting those, as you know, to basically four-plexes. Taking a family unit in an eight-plex house that has three bedrooms and then converting that either to a unit that has three bedrooms and an integral garage, which is very important, as you know, in Alaska, or to four or five bedrooms and integral garage. We had programmed to convert 108 such units in fiscal year 1993 at a cost of \$10.8 million.

By congressional action, there were added on two additional projects for Alaska of the same nature: converting eight-plexes to four-plexes. One of them was for 48 additional units at Fort Richardson. The other one was for 56 additional units at Fort Wainwright.

However, when the funding flow came to the Congress, our request of some \$142 million was reduced by \$51 million. Con-

sequently we have recently worked with the Office of the Secretary of the Army and the Army staff on how to get the additional funds for the two projects that were added without additional funding. The result of all that was I was provided \$12.2 million rather than the \$10.8 million.

And given the option of in some way satisfying parts of the three requirements, the one that was programmed for fiscal year 1993 and the two had been fiscal year 1994 programs that were moved to fiscal year 1993, my option right now with the funding levels that the Department of Army has indicated they could support would be to continue with the program that we had planned for fiscal year 1993: 108 units. The reason is we have 125 sets of quarters now vacant to facilitate that.

At this point I have not gotten adequate funding from the Department of the Army to proceed with either the \$5.6 million requirement at Fort Richardson or the \$6.5 million requirement at Fort Wainwright. And I would have to go back in and try to get funding for that in a subsequent year.

So I was given some flexibility to adjust to pick up the two additional authorized projects but not enough to really undertake either of these in fiscal year 1993.

Senator STEVENS. Well, what about the new allocation for Hawaii, has that been released, the \$140 million?

General CORNS. We had \$23 million that will flow to the Army for the construction of 200 sets of quarters at Schofield and that is on track.

We have \$17.5 million military construction Army for phase 1 redesign and improvement of the Schofield sewage plant.

Of the funds otherwise that went to the Department of the Navy, I do not know yet what the specific flow of those funds are going to be. But they are oriented upon the construction of 300 sets of quarters at Marine Corps Air Station, Kaneohe, and then 358 additional sets of quarters for the Navy at various locations here on Oahu.

We are working with the Department of the Army and the Department of the Navy relevant to the flow of those funds. What they will specifically be, the intent right now is to provide a level of funding that would enable us to build the number of units that we had requested in the budget. Whether or not that is going to play out that way, I am not yet sure.

Senator STEVENS. What I am trying to get to, we added—we reprioritize those funds and we added funds for this Pacific Command. Have they been released to you now? They were beyond what was in the budget.

General CORNS. I understand. The answer would be “No” at this time. However, there is action being taken within the Office of the Secretary of Navy, Office of the Secretary of the Army in order to release the funds to us.

I think one of the considerations right now is the level of funding necessary to build the number of units we asked for within the budget depending upon what the nature of the housing is.

Senator INOUE. Will the Senator yield?

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

Senator INOUE. I think this might be a good juncture to advise you, General Corns, that a few hours ago they released—the Defense Department released \$172.7 million. So you can proceed and build 858 units.

We assumed that the Comptroller had notified you but apparently it has not reached this point here. In fact, we had a check to present to you, if you wish.

General CORNS. Well, as I have indicated, that is very compatible with the fiscal year 1993 requirement that we have laid out in our master plan. So we are certainly going to be able to make use of that and execute it, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Ted Stevens and I were just going to put on a photo opportunity and present you with this huge check here. [Laughter.]

Senator STEVENS. Really not playing the straight man, I did not have time.

General CORNS. But we would be more than happy to accept it, Mr. Chairman, I can assure you.

Senator INOUE. \$172 million.

General CORNS. Yes.

Senator STEVENS. Well, that is what I am trying to get at: They have been holding up your money, have they not? You really have not had the flow that we allocated last September?

General CORNS. They were still working with the question of whether the option we had promoted of the midrise was the best option and if they went to an alternative, the funding level required for the same number of units might be less. That is why they had not delivered the funds to us until today.

Senator STEVENS. I did not mean to anticipate your photo opportunity. [Laughter.]

ENLISTED HOUSING

Well, one of the problems I have, and I do not want to prolong this, is that as I see the Army of today, it is a different Army.

I remember when I went over to Germany when we had draftees over there years ago and the military people, particularly the young enlisted people, were not permitted to have families with them. But several had come along. And Senator Hollings and I went to visit them in third floor walkups, cold-water flats.

That has all changed now because of the policies you have mentioned about the allowances that are there. And the military with the very high educational attainment now and in my State, why, Johnnie, I think we have got 65 percent of the young military enlisted people in the Fairbanks area are married and have children. And, as you say, as soon as we build the housing, we find out they do not need just a two-bedroom house, they need a four-or five-bedroom house.

It has been a different climate for housing particularly out here because I think a lot of these young people are opting to come to Hawaii and Alaska and the funds are not going as far as we thought they would go.

Are you going to have three-, four-, or five-bedroom apartments in the high rises?

General CORNS. We have some additional housing that will provide four bedrooms. At this time that housing is not slated to be midrise. And then we will scope the midrise projects and conceivably we could have as many as four-bedroom housing and I would anticipate we will. I have not addressed the issue of five bedrooms within the midrise but that is not precluded as an option. We will take a profile of our housing population to decide that.

801 HOUSING CONCEPT

Senator STEVENS. Let me ask the last question in this series. As you know, in Alaska we face this problem and what we did, we used the tool that was known as the 801 concept. That was for housing constructed and maintained by private contractor on military land. But it would not be paid up front. It would be financed on a 20-year basis. And then the housing belongs to the Government.

Now, last year the Office of Management Budget terminated 801, primarily because of budget considerations. I am one that believes that really skews the budget. There are not many sectors of our society that pay for housing all at once. Whether it is private employer or an individual, we manage to schedule for the payment of housing over a period of years. As a consequence, it forces all of the funding for a large housing project into 1 year and makes it very difficult for us to manage.

If we restored the 801 project concept, would it assist you in Hawaii?

General CORNS. Senator Stevens, let me say that on that North Star project of some 400 units that we added at Fort Wainwright, I know that to be a very successful project, from the standpoint of watching the first houses being built and having been in positions now for 5½ solid years to have interest in how they have continued to be operated. That has been a very satisfactory project for our command and for the Army in Alaska.

The principal question related to 801 that I know would need to be solved to give it the potential of serving us so well, let us say, here in Hawaii is the issue of the fair market value of the land. In other words, if there was something about a reintroduction of 801 that could avoid for us that requirement to use the fair market value of the land, then I would think it would have some potential.

As I have testified earlier, we are interested in looking at a range of options of private and public venture to meet our requirement.

Senator STEVENS. You are talking about using that in the computation of the rental, not in—

General CORNS. That is correct.

Senator STEVENS [continuing]. Terms of the computation of the cost to the Government.

General CORNS. That is correct.

Senator STEVENS. The Government already owns the land.

General CORNS. That is correct.

Senator STEVENS. But in computing your rental to the individual, you have to put the fair market value of the land into that concept and that skews it so that your allowance will not meet it, right?

General CORNS. Exactly. And I, personally right now—and I am listening to all the experts that we can tap—do not know exactly

how we are going to correlate the fair market value of the land with the individual payment of the service member and just that financial arrangement.

But that is a matter that is being addressed and will be addressed further within the next 30 to 45 days on just how we might be able to do that, particularly under 802.

802 HOUSING CONCEPT

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman, I think that is a subject we could take up in April again. Because it does seem to me that, rightly or wrongly, the military people with large families are opting to come to this command. I have talked to some of the people concerning Fort Drum. They do not have anywhere near the family sizes that we have at Fort Wainwright or that you have out here.

I think it means that it is good for the command. There is a good, solid, stable group of people. But it does change the housing requirements, and we have to have the ability to have some flexibility in those financing arrangements so that we do not have to—it is just, in my opinion, smoke and mirrors to increase the allowances so that the people have more money to pay back the Government in order to cover the cost of the land we already own. And we have got to find a way to change that, Mr. Chairman, so that tool—it has worked very effectively in Alaska and I think it could work very effectively out here, too.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General CORNS. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to ask that Admiral Ryan be permitted to address that issue. I know that he has worked with it with CINCPAC.

Senator INOUE. Admiral Ryan.

Admiral RYAN. In April we will have some good news for you on both public and private venture.

Senator INOUE. Admiral, as you know, in the fiscal year 1992 authorization bill, it called for annual appropriations. Now, if I were a lender of funds, I would like to get some assurance of long-term financing. How would this affect the 802 Program?

Senator STEVENS. This guy is shaking his head like he is not hearing.

Admiral RYAN. It is going to have an effect but until we talk to industry officials, I think we are going to have—we may seek additional legislation. We may go back to OMB and look for a release on the scoring rules that have been established.

But I can assure you one thing and that is my boss, Admiral Larson, has worked very hard with all the components. He personally released a message to Secretary Cheney about a week ago where he said that he would really like to work through this public-private venture that we have worked so hard with this administration and OMB, to see that come to a conclusion so that we can get on with building public-private venture projects in Hawaii before this administration leaves office. And he has asked for Secretary Cheney's personal intervention to make that possible.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Senator?

Senator INOUE. Certainly.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Admiral, I do not believe your microphone was working when you had complimentary things to say about me. Would you like to repeat that? [Laughter.]

Admiral RYAN. As a matter of fact, I am not sure that it is still working. [Laughter.]

But I would say this again, in reality we did go—I recall Admiral Larson sent me back to talk to you about a year ago. And you were the—these may not be complimentary words to you but I would characterize your work as that of a real bulldog, in not taking “No” for an answer from a number of people back in Washington. And we do sincerely appreciate that.

Senator INOUE. Senator Akaka.

REPLACEMENT HOUSING

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General CORNS, I must commend you and the CINCPAC commanders for your efforts in housing for the Pacific and particularly for Hawaii. I understand that we have about 20,000 military homes in Hawaii. The plan is to build about 5,000 more. And the recent plan from CINCPAC, Admiral Larson, is for 8,000 more units.

My question concerns the issue of replacements. Of all the additional houses to be built, how many will be replacements?

General CORNS. In our master plan, Senator Akaka, we have addressed the overall question of renewal improvements and we have tied those into, particularly, our approaches of high-density housing being put in a form of midrise.

In our overall plan, the programming and the acquiring of funds for renewal is one of the areas that we would not grade ourselves as well as we have done in cooperative efforts with others, including members of the committee in meeting our requirements.

We have a significant amount of our housing and with some of the installation commanders with whom I deal on a routine basis, one of their major concerns is, in fact, the renewal and improvement upon some existing housing that we have no plans to demolish but, in fact, do need to upgrade.

In our plans, we have some specifics relevant to that and we need to identify, and intend to do so, more specifics on the renewal program of existing housing.

In our plan, we have by year and by service some funds identified as requirements to improve our execution of that program.

FORD ISLAND HOUSING

Senator AKAKA. In increasing the housing units in Hawaii by efficient land use of places such as Ford Island, I want to commend you and the military leadership for your creative initiatives on public-private ventures.

The arrangement that was made for Manana in regard to Ford Island and the causeway that will be built to allow about 600 new housing units on the island. Can you give me a status report on that arrangement?

General CORNS. In our housing plan to which I referred, we do assume the availability of Ford Island in the out-years of our plan for housing.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, if it is agreeable to the members, that in your second panel which addresses land management, I know that Admiral Ryan and his people are prepared to update you on Ford Island. And I think that would be more responsive to your question, if I can suggest that, Senator.

Senator AKAKA. Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you. And now may I call on "Bulldog" Abercrombie. [Laughter.]

802 HOUSING CONCEPT

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. General Corns, first of all, let me thank you on behalf, certainly, of my office and I am sure of the whole delegation for your efforts of you and your office, Colonel Cloyd, and others. The cooperation and the communication that we have had, I think, has been excellent and I think that that helped.

I appreciate your and Admiral Ryan's characterization of my work as being tenacious in this area. But I quite agree with you that every unit that we can get in the State, not only on this island but perhaps elsewhere, depending on how things go in the future, helps reduce the anxiety and tension that exists for people that have to depend on rental housing.

With that in mind, Senator Stevens has mentioned 801 housing and you mentioned 802 housing here. I would suggest this to you—and you can either comment on it or we can move along—I think you will find in Mr. Pinetta and in the new administration a more flexible attitude with respect to the 802 program and scoring.

Not everyone here in the islands who is listening today may be familiar with what we mean by scoring. So let me explain it this way, then, and get your comment.

If it is possible for us to prevail upon the new administration, most particularly the Office of Management and Budget, to view the 802 housing, this private and public partnership, if you will, in housing, in a way that would spread out the cost over a number of years as you would ordinarily with respect to a long-term mortgage, would that not enable you to implement whatever plan is finally arrived at with respect to housing here in the Pacific, including Alaska, whether or not it is 801 or 802?

General CORNS. If I could, Representative Abercrombie, respond to that in two parts: First is with respect to what we are currently doing to try to satisfy the requirement for 368 sets of quarters at West Loch for the Navy through 802, trying to make the existing ground rules work.

A number of very important meetings of which I think you are aware significantly in September, some general agreement between the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on scoring, and then in October further meetings involving OSD and the Navy with the Army monitoring has led us to these two meetings with industry that have been referred to, January 7 and 14.

One of the intents there is to try to shape some mock request for proposal to get the feedback from the industry in the hope that we can, in fact, make the West Loch project 368 units executable under the current guidelines for 802. And we are committed to work that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. These are the two industry forums you are referring to?

General CORNS. That is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. One in Washington and one here?

General CORNS. One in Washington on the 7th, the other one here on the 14th.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Still under the current restrictions of the current interpretation of what constitutes the liability of the services under 802?

General CORNS. That is correct. And the first part of my response is to emphasize we are committed to try to make that work and that is part of what those meetings, with the Navy taking the lead with OSD support, mean.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I want to compliment you, in addition, General. In case it has not been clear to everybody, dealing with housing under those circumstances, I am sure, has caused you to wonder whether you are going to lose what little hair remains. I know the situation. [Laughter.]

The fact that you have not torn it out, I think, working out under those circumstances is remarkable and the fact that you have carried through on it, you and Colonel Cloyd, in particular, I think, is a compliment to your command approach and your ability to—I am going to use the word flexible again—your ability to keep your calm demeanor under very trying circumstances.

General CORNS. I think the reason for that, to the extent that it may be descriptive, Representative Abercrombie, is the support that we all get far outweighs the detractors that you have referenced to. I think the chairman's introductory comments as well as yours and those of Senator Stevens, Senator Akaka, point out there is a very strong consensus in support of the housing need here.

Knowing the value to keep that consensus intact should cause any of us to be rather forbearing with respect to any of the problems that we are trying to negotiate our way through, because in the final analysis it is the individual service member and his family that stands to gain. And that should put patience in the blood of any commander or any leader. So if that is the case, I would submit that that is the reason.

Part 2 of my answer, though, to your question is that were a greater flexibility necessary and available, yes, we would welcome it because we want to capitalize on public and private ventures in executing this plan. Because if we do, we will complete it before the years 2001 and 2005.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then it would be in our joint interest, would it not, for our congressional delegation and that of Alaska, in fact, anywhere else where this might come into play, to present as quickly as possible to the Clinton administration and to Mr. Pinetta our rationale as we see it and then to try and see if we cannot have that built into the policy of the administration. That would advance our cause, well, I would say almost immeasurably, would it not?

General CORNS. Well, I think a cooperative effort that gives us the flexibility on public and private ventures that I have referred to would definitely help us and the more timely, the better.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And I want to comment, then, at that point, General, that it has been due to Senator Inouye's efforts in the Senate with respect to the full funding capacity. I am not sure everybody realizes that because of the way this scoring is kept, the way we define, if you will, what constitutes the liability of the Government with respect to the housing, it has been necessary to get what, in effect, is full funding up front for our housing needs here and in Alaska.

I am sure Senator Inouye would agree that we have had excellent cooperation from Mr. Hefner and others in the House of Representatives on this issue. I hope that we do not have to do it that way in the future.

HOUSING ALLOWANCES

The question of housing allowances, I wanted to make sure for the record that we are straight on that. In other words, an increased allotment would probably not increase the number of units available, if I understood your point. That is to say increasing the housing allotment to enlisted personnel is not likely to result in an increased building, say, of rental units, but more likely, simply, to increase the rent possibly being charged both to the civilian and the enlisted personnel. Is that your conclusion?

General CORNS. I am not confident on the suggested escalation of housing rentals that might occur, although I can understand how that might be the case. But I do believe that the result would be that some service members might migrate to housing that is, in fact, more expensive or they may, in fact, be able to afford housing that they think is more suitable to their needs. But I do not believe that would have the effect of reducing the housing shortage.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So would I be characterizing your response correctly as saying that that is not a direction? We need more housing as opposed to increasing the allotments.

General CORNS. Our entire—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Given the choice of one or the other.

HOUSING PLAN

General CORNS. Our entire housing plan is oriented on reducing the shortage and adding housing. We do not in our plan, as a matter of fact, specifically address the role of added housing allowance.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In the plan that has gone up, then, to the DOD, I want to make sure I have this timing right. It is one thing to deal with land use issues. It is another thing to deal with the approval of the plan. What is the time line on that? That will be much quicker than what land use planning is, will it not?

General CORNS. I do not know the timing that OSD would intend on approval of the plan or on responding to congressional request for such a plan. With respect to execution, we are already, in fact, involved in executing the first year of the plan itself. It is a dynamic plan. I do not really know what form approval might take. But within the military here in Hawaii and under the leadership of CINCPAC, Admiral Larson, we are executing now.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK, then, it is, again, from a congressional point of view, we want to emphasize that, do we not, getting that

plan approved and moving it along for congressional consideration as quickly as possible.

General CORNS. We seek as high a level of support and full support for the plan at OSD as we can obtain.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does that plan include infrastructure? That has been one of the difficulties. I know you have had to deal with that. It is one thing to talk about number of units, it is another thing to talk about sewage and roads and all the rest of it that is needed. So does the present plan take into account adequate capital infusion as opposed to the, shall we say, the operating cost of building the houses?

General CORNS. The plan by year identifies infrastructure, specific projects that are associated with the building of housing that would take place. For example, the current authorization and appropriation of funds for MCA, improvements for the Schofield sewage treatment plan is a part of the plan with that in mind. In a future year there will be a requirement for a modification of the road network at Helemano, that in anticipation of additional housing called for in the plan.

The simple answer to the question of whether or not infrastructure is adequately addressed within the plan is "Yes"; it is.

JOINT LAND USE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Last point, under the major issues category, if you will, of the U.S. Pacific Command and more specifically service issues, housing and joint use is listed. Joint use, does that refer, then, to civilian and military joint use of land? I am referring now to housing. You would not have any objection, would you not, to land now being utilized by the military if such land could be put together for housing purposes, if we could find a joint use on the civilian side, would that strike you as an innovative way of dealing with the housing question?

General CORNS. In principle, the housing plan approach that we are taking would encompass options of that nature. We have dealt primarily with the matter of land acquisition, land swaps. But we would be open in our planning and modification to the plan that might be prudent to shared usage.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will follow up with Admiral Ryan; yes.

The reason I am bringing up, I am not trying to throw a curve, is that much of the land that you are dealing with under military command today is ceded land. And I foresee a possibility, in fact, I would hope a probability, particularly as we approach the 100th year of the overthrow of the kingdom, that we recognize that ceded land where military activity has taken place offers us a terrific opportunity for perhaps joint housing activity.

General CORNS. As one of Admiral Larson's component commanders and a player within the land management initiative, it is my sensing that it is that kind of flexibility and approach that we are looking for—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Good. Thank you.

General CORNS [continuing]. In managing lands for housing needs. That would help me as Executive Director.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Senator, and thank you, General. Congratulations, again, on the terrific job you and the colonel have been doing and the rest of the command.

ARMY EXECUTIVE AGENT

Senator INOUYE. Thank you.

General, some have suggested that the present role that the Army plays as the exclusive agent for housing should be discontinued and that the separate commands should have their own budgets and own management programs. Do you have any comment to make?

General CORNS. Well, that is a consideration that I gave thought to shortly after assuming command and have continued to look at. And my thoughts run in this direction.

First, I have looked at the performance of the Consolidated Family Housing Office over the 9 years that it has been in effect. From just its beginning until the completion of the fiscal year 1991 appropriations, we saw some 964 housing units added at a cost of \$114.4 million. Then in 1992 and 1993, largely as a result of the cooperative efforts that have already been alluded to, we have seen a substantial surge in that.

I think that the Consolidated Family Housing Office has played a good role in that effort over time. Specifically, what the consolidation has done for us is given us a single management effort rather than four different management efforts within the services. That is in overall management and direction.

In the area of housing furnishings, having a single housing furnishing office lets us make large buys of economy for furniture. Then we have a single overhead in handling that furniture. In housing referral, of having our service members provided knowledge on possible locations that they can get housing on the civilian economy, it gives us a centralized direction and effort.

On the other side of that, I recognize as demonstrated in the fiscal year 1993 Congressional guidance on funding for construction and improvements and renewals in the future, that this suggests a flow of funding that by service lines we have to say, is that compatible with the functions of the Consolidated Family Housing Office.

With respect to funds for new construction, the answer is yes, we can handle that, I think, very effectively. The reason is that in the past, funds would flow from OSD to the Office of the Chief of Engineers and one of his subordinate elements and then to the Pacific Ocean Division, the Corps of Engineers.

With the guidance we have now for construction funds, the monies for the Navy and the Marine Corps would flow through the Office of the Secretary of Navy and then the Naval Defense Facilities or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and then come to the Pacific Division of that command for the Navy element to be the contracting agent as Pacific Ocean Division of Army Corps of Engineers has been the contracting agent in the past.

We still have a need for a consolidated effort in planning. We still have a need to get into a position in our programming where we speak with a single voice to the maximum extent possible. The Consolidated Family Housing Office would continue to be the single

customer representative when dealing with those contracting agencies, either Pacific Ocean Division, Corps of Engineers of the Army, or Pacific Division for the Navy.

And normally when design and construction meetings and discussions are taking place, you would have either Pacific Ocean Division or the Pacific Division for the Navy with the representative of the OCFHO, a representative of the installation commander and his engineer, and probably a representative of the service or services' engineers that would be involved.

So I think that the Consolidated Family Housing Office has served us well and can continue to do so even if funding for construction comes through service lines.

I am not yet quite as clear in my thinking on how certain improvement funds, moneys, will be handled. In other words, in the past those have come to OCFHO through the Army. Under those for a project where the individual unit is less than \$45,000 per unit, OCFHO has been able to make those judgments in the past. By implication, the services would have that authority in the future. Over \$40,000 has come back to the committee for approval.

We will have to work where that transfer of funds takes place, whether it occurs in OSD between the service secretaries, whether it would take place here in Hawaii or at installation level. So that I am not quite so clear on.

I think the major challenge in the flow of funding in the role of OCFHO lies in the question of operation and maintenance funds, maintaining what we have.

We estimate that on an annual basis we need about \$5,500 per year per unit for operation and maintenance. In the history of the Consolidated Family Housing Office, the experience has been that the annual amount of money for O&M for all of our housing has only increased \$20 million from 1983 to 1992, from \$132 million to \$152 million.

This year my budget request was for \$155 million. We have been able to scramble that and get \$148 million to go against that as of a couple of days ago. Even with the \$155 million request I had for fiscal year 1993, there is a deferred maintenance problem, a requirement of \$115 million.

So if I have a meeting with the installation commanders here today on Oahu, probably an area of major concern they will express to me is the level of funding to maintain what we have, in addition to the renewal program that Senator Akaka referred to.

It is not clear to me if the O&M funds, for example, although this was not in congressional language and I do not know that it is proposed, if the O&M funds were to be paid by the services, then it would be very, very difficult for the Consolidated Housing Office to manage that. Where you would pull those funds together for OCFHO to administer is not clear to me.

If, on the other hand, those funds were made available to each service to handle the maintenance requirement, I think you then would reduce OCFHO from a consolidated housing effort to merely a coordinating effort.

So, in sum, I believe that the Consolidated Family Housing Office has served the command and the service members and their families well. I think there is a challenge in the flow of funding

through the services that would either have to be met or a modification possibly in the role of OCFHO would have to take place.

In the final analysis, what I have learned as the Executive Director here in about 16 months is the key thing is not so much the organization that we use to administer the program, it is the level of funding for maintenance and renewal. We have got to make improvements, on which I am seeking to do with my higher headquarters.

HOUSING INVENTORY AND MAINTENANCE BACKLOG

Senator INOUE. Your response leads me to my final question. What are the statistics on your inventory under your command and control? How many housing units do we have? And of that number, how many would you consider unfit for residential occupation? And of that number, how many do you think feel should be repaired and what is the backlog, financial backlog on this?

General CORNS. I am going to ask Colonel Cloyd to respond to that and to the extent that we cannot fully respond, I would like to be able to submit the details for the record.

Senator INOUE. Certainly.

General CORNS. Colonel Cloyd.

Colonel CLOYD. Mr. Chairman, we currently have 19,930 military family housing units here on Oahu. Actually, that includes three that I have on the big island also. Of that, the units vary in when they were constructed, from 1907 all the way up until just recently, some units that we have opened.

We have what, as General Corns said, what we consider to be about \$115 million worth of backlog of maintenance and repair or deferred maintenance and repair as it is called in the family housing business.

I cannot with any degree of certainty give you a percentage of the houses that need repair. I would say that with exception of those that have been built in just the last few years, because as I am sure you know we did not build any housing here since consolidation until just recently within the last couple of years, that probably every set of quarters needs some work of one kind or the other.

The number of units has been mentioned, almost 20,000, even a small repair turns into a large dollar figure just because of the number of units that we are dealing with. But we will be glad to submit more details for the record, sir.

Senator INOUE. I would appreciate that because those numbers are necessary if we are to have a full picture of what we are dealing with here.

[The information follows:]

There are three levels of maintenance. The first is the cost of ownership, the everyday cyclic and recurring work that must be performed on all housing units, everything from maintaining infrastructure systems, painting, trash pickup—and it constitutes a major portion of our operations and maintenance account, which averages about \$7500 per unit for the older units and \$5500 for newly constructed assets. The second is the major repair program—reroofing, repairing sewer systems, termite damage, kitchen, bathroom, plumbing and electrical repairs as these components age and before there is failure and then must be taken off-line to undergo costly emergency repairs.

Last year (fiscal year 1992), the \$67.7 million available for maintenance and repair was insufficient to support recurring cyclic work and major repairs. Our present backlog of cyclic and major repair work is about \$115 million. The third level of maintenance is revitalization—the need to upgrade the inventory to comply with building codes, environmental, historic preservation requirements—and also modernize the housing units and infrastructure to meet current standards. Of the nearly 20,000 units now in the inventory, nearly 95 percent (19,000) were constructed in 1976 or earlier. More than 12,000 units, constructed between 1907 and 1967, are more than 25 years old, with 2300 units approaching 50 years and subject to historic preservation statutes. Our current estimate of revitalization costs, based on a 25 year dwelling unit life span, is that our backlog now is \$2.2 billion, increasing to \$2.7 billion in 2001 when the 1976 units are 25 years old.

Senator INOUE. Senator Stevens?

Senator STEVENS. Just one last question. I do not understand the figure \$5,500 per unit per year. That is every year and that is the average for maintenance of housing?

General CORNS. Yes, Senator Stevens, and that includes a fixed cost consideration.

Walt, do you want to—

Colonel CLOYD. Yes, sir; and that also includes things like the utilities and services, refuse collection, and things of that nature.

Senator STEVENS. You mean paying for electricity and water and sewer?

Colonel CLOYD. Yes, sir.

Senator STEVENS. Is in that?

Colonel CLOYD. Yes, sir.

General CORNS. Shared costs.

Senator STEVENS. That is a portion of the money you get back from the allowances?

Colonel CLOYD. No, sir; I do not get—

Senator STEVENS. Where do you get your funding for?

Colonel CLOYD. Sir, we get our funding directly in the Army family housing appropriation.

HOUSING ALLOWANCES

Senator STEVENS. I thought you got to use the money that you got for the allowances, that the individual service person gets the allowances and then pays it back to you; is that not right?

Colonel CLOYD. No, sir; there is no direct relationship between the amount of money that the individuals—in my case, 19,930 service members—are giving up in the way of the housing allowances and their basic allowance for quarters and the variable housing allowance and what I get in my budget to operate.

Senator STEVENS. I thought one of the reasons we provided those allowances was to pay for utilities, for water, for sewer, and for basic maintenance. You do not get that money back into your budget?

Colonel CLOYD. No, sir; not personally, we do not.

Senator STEVENS. I know it is not personal. I mean, as a unit. [Laughter.]

General CORNS. Senator, if I could say, obviously the people that do benefit from those allowances are the folks that live out in the community itself. But the folks that live on base give up that allowance. It is just money saved to the Government.

Senator STEVENS. They give it up, but I thought you got it when you provided the housing.

Colonel CLOYD. No, sir.

Senator STEVENS. All right; we will find out about that, too.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Would you yield?

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes; maybe we can clear this up a little bit.

What you are saying is that this is what you have to allot in your bookkeeping, Colonel; is that correct? With respect to people who are on base, you allot—or maybe, Admiral, I should ask you if this is what you meant.

Is \$5,500 what you carry on your books or as an average is what you would carry on your books with respect to estimating for purposes of budgeting what your sewage collection, your sewer fees, et cetera, is that correct, for those staying on the base?

And what that might be or how that translates into the civilian community has to be simply absorbed by the variable housing allowance or whatever unit of measurement is given by way of the dollar figure given to those living in the civilian community. They have to make their own arrangements in that respect. It might vary from place to place. Is that correct?

General CORNS. The statistic I used was oriented on military housing on base, on post only.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So this is your unit of measure?

General CORNS. That is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK.

General CORNS. For O&M budget estimation.

Senator INOUE. Senator Akaka, do you have any questions?

Senator AKAKA. No; no questions.

Senator INOUE. General Corns, on behalf of the committee, I thank you very much, sir.

General CORNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Without objection, your full statement has been made part of the record and we will be submitting, if we may, additional questions for your consideration.

General CORNS. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOHN R. RYAN, USN, DIRECTOR FOR LOGISTICS AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE (J4), U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, HAWAII

ACCOMPANIED BY:

REAR ADM. WILLIAM RETZ, U.S. NAVY

GEN. GARY BROWN, MARINE CORPS

MAJ. GEN. JOSEPH REDDEN, U.S. AIR FORCE

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN LAND USE

Senator INOUE. Now the subcommittee will hear from Rear Adm. John Ryan on military civilian land use issues in Hawaii. Admiral Ryan is the Director for Logistics and Security Assistance in the Pacific Command and has been designated by Admiral Larson to head the Hawaii Military Civilian Land Use Affairs Board.

Admiral Ryan will be accompanied by Rear Adm. William Retz, Brig. Gen. Gary Brown of the Marine Corps, and Maj. Gen. Joseph Redden of the Air Force.

The issue of the military's use of land in Hawaii has become increasingly controversial as the value and the public interest and alternative uses of such land have increased. Our Hawaii-based forces, like those stationed elsewhere, require a mix of permanent installations, housing, and training areas.

Establishing the proper mix of military facility in concert with community needs requires the Department of Defense to be especially sensitive to land use questions here compared to other places on the mainland. This is particularly true in light of some of the more unique historical and environmental characteristics to be found in the State of Hawaii.

Many in the State and some Members of Congress question the need for DOD's continued requirement for its land holdings, especially as military forces are being drawn down.

So at the urging of Congress, the Pacific Command has established a joint task force to develop a military land use master plan. This plan will account for the needs of all military components and reflect the long-range DOD objectives in light of the growing civilian demands for access to military lands.

So it is my hope that this morning's presentations will lead to a better understanding of this important issue, and obviously, we will return time and time again on this matter. I hope it will highlight some of the critical steps that have been taken and must be taken to address both the military's and our local community's concern.

Admiral Ryan, we have received your written statement. It has been made part of the record and you may proceed as you wish, sir.

STATEMENT SUMMARIZED

Admiral RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens, Senator Akaka, Congressman Abercrombie, I am pleased that we have the opportunity today to discuss an item that is of the utmost importance to the military's continued presence here in Hawaii. That issue is land.

The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral C.R. Larson, has stated that he has three requirements that are crucial for him to recommend maintaining current operational forces in any area. Those requirements are the availability of adequate training areas, sufficient quality of life infrastructure, and local community support for continued military presence.

The right mix of land is critical to the first requirement. We in DOD understand that land is important to every citizen and recognize our need for efficient management and stewardship of this scarce resource.

Today I will focus on Hawaii land use challenges and Admiral Larson's strategy for the military to continue to base, live and train here.

I believe that you all understand that as commander in chief, Admiral Larson does not directly control any land. By Department of Defense directive, individual service secretaries have the respon-

sibility for acquisition, oversight, and disposal of real estate for their service. As such, all significant land actions require Washington-level service chain-of-command review and approval.

Admiral Larson's view is that virtually no land, no piece of property in Hawaii stands on its own. In fact, it is interrelated. Thus, his intention is to improve our land management through a comprehensive more formal coordinated approach in the coming years.

BACKGROUND

First permit me to provide some background regarding the military's efforts to deal with this complex issue.

Mr. Chairman, you will recall that in 1976 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense requested a thorough one-time study of long-range military property requirements here in Hawaii. The study called "Military Property Hawaii," or Mil-Pro-Hi, was completed in 1979 and was the first major effort that recognized the unique need for joint service component land use planning here in Hawaii.

Since the 1979 study, the service components have worked closely to maximize efficient land use utilization particularly in the training and housing areas. As Hawaii's population grows, Federal, State, and local authorities realize that we must all strive together for improved land utilization.

Accordingly, back in May 1992, my boss, Admiral Larson, hosted a round table to discuss our land coordination concept with the service components to assure compatibility with Pacific Command's plans, missions and projected requirements.

Almost simultaneously, Senator Inouye called for the establishment of a joint task force on military land use in Hawaii. The purpose was to coordinate land use decisions. The task force was to ensure that the military services here in Hawaii cooperated more effectively with State and local leaders in long-range land use planning.

In June 1992, USCINCPAC discussed this concept for land use coordination with Senator Inouye, Governor Waihee, other members, local elected officials and our service secretaries back in Washington. These discussions led to a refinement of his coordination process to ensure optimum joint planning and use of scarce land resources. The end result, we believe, is a process that will be acceptable to all participants.

At this point I would like to give a few more details on the current picture of land in Hawaii. I would like to use some charts to highlight our challenges.

Land Classes




CHART 1

Petty Officer Tim Hagey, if you would help me.

He is my right-hand man here today.

The first chart that Tim will put up depicts the current land situation here in Hawaii. As you can see, the military is not a major landowner statewide. In Hawaii, we use roughly 239,000 acres or only about 5 percent of the State's area. The State itself is the largest single landholder with approximately 29 percent of all land. Approximately 60 percent of Hawaii is in private hands and 6 percent is controlled by counties and other Federal agencies.

However, if we look at the right side of that chart on the island of Oahu, where pressure for land is the greatest, we see that we control 87,000 acres, or just under 23 percent. That is the military. This compares to 57 percent in private hands, 17 percent in State, and 3 percent in county and other Federal agencies.

Key Classes of Land, State of Hawaii




CHART 2

Turning to our next viewgraph, discussing key classes of land in the State of Hawaii, of the military's 5 percent, we hold roughly 10

percent in fee, we lease 38 percent, and have 52 percent in ceded land.

When Kaho'olawe Island, which is all ceded land and consists of approximately 29,000 acres, is conveyed from the military ceded land category, our percentage will drop accordingly. Mr. Chairman, we intend to work to ensure conveyance occurs as smoothly as possible.

Key Classes of Land, Island of Oahu




CHART 3

Let us look at the key classes of land on Oahu. Of the military's 23 percent on Oahu, we hold 35 percent in fee. We lease 45 percent and have 20 percent in ceded land.

We recognize the importance of good land use management throughout the State, especially here on Oahu where, as I said before, competition between private growth and the military's need to operate, train, and house our people are the greatest.

The next chart that Petty Officer Hagey will put up represents Admiral Larson's Hawaii military land use coordination process. Typically, as I said before, service Pacific land use issues are handled by the military service that controls the land. Significant real estate actions require Washington level service chain-of-command review and approval. This traditional process will continue.

Looking at the left side of the chart, it shows some of the inputs to the coordination process. As mentioned earlier, the military property Hawaii study was completed in 1979 with each service identifying its land needs and excesses as well as consolidation of uses. This study was updated in 1991 with your assistance, Mr. Chairman.

Also, with your assistance, the ongoing DOD and GSA land inventory studies that you have sponsored will serve as the baseline for the discussion by the various working groups leading to a better military plan here in Hawaii.

The analysis of the land inventory data and the identification of land issues that cross service and civilian lines—and virtually all

do here in Hawaii—they will be discussed by three standing working groups that we have formed.

The first that is depicted under the "Working Group" heading is the deputy component commanders. The second one has J4 as shorthand, but essentially that is the Joint Military Task Force that has been formed. And the third is the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board. These working groups will result in better coordinated service decisions on long-term land use.

I would like to take a closer look at each one of these groups.

The Deputy CINC, Lt. Gen. Tom Fields, meets with his deputy component commanders approximately every 6 weeks and land use issues are discussed as required. They receive periodic briefings on military land use issues from the Joint Military Task Force which I chair. The deputies, in turn, forward their recommendations to Admiral Larson and the components CINC's as you can see.

The Joint Military Task Force is made up of my component equivalents in land management specialists. We are tasked to work joint issues and make recommendations to the deputy component commanders. The task force will develop a Hawaii military land use master plan which I will talk about shortly.

To do this, we have formed three additional working teams: a Navy-Marine Corps installation team, an Army-Air Force installations team, and a technical support group.

The Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board was chartered by Admiral Larson and is comprised of 15 members: 5 military members and 10 appointees recommended by the senior congressional delegate, Senator Inouye, Governor Waihee, and city and county government officials. My written statement includes the names of each of the 15 members, 10 of which I said are civilians.

The board provides a forum for the identification and discussion of land use matters of mutual interest in Hawaii. This board is chartered for 5 years. Admiral Larson hosted the first meeting back on October 30 at this headquarters and addressed the group personally with his goals for the board.

Our next meeting is scheduled for January 21, 1993. At the next meeting the State and each county will brief the board on their land use plans and issues that are germane to the military.

Turning to the right side of the chart, we see several products that will receive a joint military and civilian review. One such key initiative as mentioned earlier is the Hawaii military land use master plan, which will help us refine other programs that you see listed there such as housing, joint use facilities, and other construction. This plan was made possible through a 1993 fiscal year defense appropriations sponsored by Senator Inouye.

Mr. Chairman, we are indeed grateful for your leadership which made this effort possible.

Tim, if you put up the next viewgraph.

Land Use Categories

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Built Up Areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Housing • Personnel Support • Medical • Admin | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Airfield Ops 3. Land Ops 4. Ranges 5. Impact Areas 6. Water Areas 7. Recreation |
|---|---|

Major Issues

1. Service Issues: Housing, Joint Use
2. Congressional Initiatives: Kaho'olawe
3. State/City and County Initiatives: CZM, Infrastructure
4. Ceded/Hawaiian Home Lands
5. Environmental

CHART 4

I would now like to discuss the scope of the Hawaii land use master plan in more detail. Our primary objective with the study, we have two. One is to develop a solid rationale for future military land use. Our plan will look out 15 to 20 years. Our second objective is to develop a comprehensive land use plan for all DOD requirements here in Hawaii while considering joint service use where feasible.

This slide shows the various land use categories and some of the major issues that will be addressed during our look at military land use in Hawaii. I should note that although Kaho'olawe is listed here, it will not be covered in this plan. As I indicated earlier, we intend to work to ensure conveyance occurs as smoothly as possible.

Land operations will be looked at from the perspective of the services and the civilian community, major issues and initiatives. A few examples of the issues are included on the viewgraph here: housing, joint use, environmental, coastal zone management, and transportation.

Tim, would you put up the next slide?

Methodology




CHART 5

The next viewgraph is how we plan to proceed in putting together the final report, and it may be a little small for some of the folks in the back of the room.

We have initiated the preplanning that you see on the upper left-hand part of the viewgraph. Those efforts are underway with the first round of kickoff briefs. These briefs will be provided to the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board which I mentioned earlier as well as the service components in early January 1993.

We will collect data on land requirements and present uses in order to do the planning analysis while addressing civilian land use plans and concerns. The military land use requirements will depend on the service's best projections for mission and base loading as well as operational and training constraints. Of course, these land requirements will be affected by many conditions such as the various environmental factors that would include wetlands, flood plains, archeological, and historic site presentation, just to name a few.

This information will be used to develop a strawman land use plan which will be briefed at several levels, through the service components obviously, our various working groups, again to include the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board before being presented to Admiral Larson. Comments will then be incorporated into a final report that will be reviewed.

In this plan, Mr. Chairman, we intend to identify opportunities for functional military joint use and what areas should be made available for possible exchange or conveyance. The Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board will be our key civilian interface throughout this process.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we all understand that land use coordination is, indeed, complex. With only 5 percent of the land in the State, the Department of Defense cannot solve all of Hawaii's

land issues with our land use plan or with the forum created by the Land Use Affairs Board. But we believe both of these initiatives will clearly improve our utilization of land while ensuring that we maintain those adequate training areas, the infrastructure, quality of life improvements that we need and the support of the people of Hawaii.

We have a responsibility to the citizens of this State and this Nation to do the job right. This is precisely what we intend to do.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss USCINCPAC Hawaii land use strategy today.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF ADM. JOHN R. RYAN

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased that we have the opportunity today to discuss an item that is of the utmost importance to the military's continued presence in Hawaii—land. The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral C. R. Larson has stated that he has three requirements that are crucial for him to recommend maintaining current operational force levels in a specific area. Those requirements are the availability of adequate training areas, sufficient quality of life infrastructure and local community support for continued military presence. The right mix of land is critical to the first two requirements. The military understands that land is also important to every citizen and recognizes our need for efficient management of this scarce resource.

Today, I will focus on Hawaii land challenges and Admiral Larson's strategy for the military to continue to base, live and train here. First permit me to provide the current land picture. In the State of Hawaii the military uses roughly 239,000 acres or only about 5 percent of the state's area. The State of Hawaii itself is the largest single landholder with approximately 29 percent of all land in the state. Approximately 60 percent of Hawaii is in private hands and 6 percent is controlled by counties and other federal agencies. Of the military's 5 percent, we own roughly 10 percent in fee, we lease 38 percent and have 52 percent in ceded land. When Kaho'olawe Island, which is all ceded land and consists of 28,777 acres is conveyed from the military's ceded land category, our percentages will drop accordingly. We intend to work to ensure conveyance occurs as rapidly as possible.

On the island of Oahu we use almost 87,000 acres or just under 23 percent of this island. This compares with 57 percent in private hands, 17 percent state and 3 percent counties and other federal agencies. Of this 23 percent about 35 percent in fee, we lease about 45 percent and have 20 percent in ceded land.

I believe you all understand that as Commander in Chief, Admiral Larson does not specifically control any land. By Department of Defense directive, individual service secretaries have the responsibility for oversight and disposal of real estate for their service. As such, all significant land actions require Washington level, service chain of command review and approval.

A key study over 25 years ago was instrumental in improving military land use coordination in Hawaii. In 1976, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Housing) requested a thorough one-time study of long-range military property requirements in Hawaii. This study was the first major effort that recognized the unique need for joint Service Component land use planning in Hawaii. The study, Military Property—Hawaii, was completed in 1979 with each service identifying its land needs and excesses as well as consolidation of uses.

Since the 1979 study the service components in Hawaii have worked closely to maximize efficient land utilization particularly in the training and housing areas. Admiral Larson's view is that virtually no piece of military land stands on its own in Hawaii, its all interrelated. Thus, his intention is to improve our land management through a better, more formal coordinated joint approach in the coming years.

Accordingly, on 12 May 1992 he hosted a roundtable to discuss his land coordination concept with the components to ensure compatibility with USCINCPAC plans, missions, and projected requirements.

Almost simultaneously, on 21 May 1992, Senator Inouye called for the establishment of a Joint Task Force on Military Land Use in Hawaii. The purpose was to coordinate land use decisions. The task force was to ensure that military services in Hawaii cooperated more effectively with state and local leaders in long-range land use planning.

In June 1992, USCINCPAC discussed his concept for land use coordination with the Service Secretaries. These discussions produced positive feedback that led to refinement of the coordination process that included State and local leaders to ensure optimum planning and use of scarce land resources. The end result, a process acceptable to all participants.

Admiral Larson's three part strategy includes: a joint military task force to determine what land we need; a military-civilian land use affairs group as a sounding board for land issues to help USCINCPAC make informed recommendations and finally Service Components forwarding their recommendations through USCINCPAC to their Service Secretaries for approval.

I would like to review in greater detail the USCINCPAC military land use coordination process that has evolved.

Typically, service specific land use issues are handled by the military service that owned or controlled the land. Significant real estate actions require Washington level, service chain of command review and approval. This traditional process will continue. However, those land issues that cross service and civilian lines, and virtually all do, will have the opportunity to be discussed during three working groups; the Deputy Component Commanders, Joint Military Task Force and the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board. We believe that discussion of land issues in these working groups will result in better coordinated service decisions on long term land use.

The CINCPAC Deputy Commander In Chief meets with Deputy Component Commanders monthly and land use issues are discussed as required. The Deputy Commanders receive periodic briefings on the military land use issues from the Joint Military Task Force that I chair. The Deputies forward their recommendations to Admiral Larson and the Component CINC's.

The Joint Military Task Force is made up of my component equivalents and we are tasked to work joint issues and make recommendations to the Deputy Component Commanders. The Joint Military Task Force will also develop a Hawaii Military Land Use Master Plan for this effort, the Joint Task Force has developed three working teams: Navy/Marine Corps Installations team, an Army/Air Force Installations team, and a Technical Support Group. The Task Force working teams will be composed mainly of DOD civilian planners and engineers.

The Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board is comprised of Service Component representatives, and appointees recommended by Senator Inouye, the State, City and County Governments, including community leaders and private citizens. The Board will have the opportunity to provide input to and comment on our Land Use Plan.

The ongoing DOD land inventory studies will serve as the baseline for discussion by the various working groups leading to better military land plans in Hawaii. Some of the outputs will include joint military land use plans, service master plans translated into development programs such as housing, joint use facilities, and military construction.

USCINCPAC will serve as the Department of Defense focal point for land use issues that concern more than one service and are of interest to the civilian community. Bottom line, we understand the importance of land to our military future as well as to the community.

Permit me to now provide more information on two key initiatives of our strategy—the Joint Land Use Affairs Board and our Land Use Plan.

Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board was chartered by Admiral Larson to provide a forum for identification and discussion of land use matters of mutual interest in Hawaii. As mentioned earlier, this Board is comprised of representatives of the military, state and local government, and community leaders. The Board is advisory to Admiral Larson and serves as a forum to exchange facts and information for better cooperation in land-use matters. USCINCPAC provides all necessary administrative support and no add-on budgeting is required. The Board is chartered for five years, subject to renewal of the charter at that time.

MEMBERSHIP

The fifteen members include: RADM John R. Ryan, USN, Director, Logistics—Security Assistance, USCINCPAC J-4, Camp H.M. Smith, HI; Mr. Warren H. Haruki, President, GTE Hawaiian Telephone Company, Inc., Honolulu, HI; Col. Frank R. Finch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering, U.S. Army Pacific; RADM Bill Retz, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, HI; Col. Richard E. Post, Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB; Col. Hank Rudge, Force Engineer, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, HI; Mr. Harold S. Masumoto, Director, Office of State Planning, Honolulu, HI; Norman K. Hayashi, Director, Planning Department, County of Hawaii, Hilo, HI; Mr. Tom Batey, Administrative Assistant, Mayor's Office, Lihue, HI;

Mr. Donald Clegg, Department of Land Utilization, Honolulu, HI; Mr. Nolan G. Perreira, EA to the Mayor, Maui, Wailuku, Maui, HI; Mr. John DeSoto, Chairman, Committee on Planning, Honolulu City Council, Honolulu, HI; Mr. Donald G. Horner, Senior Vice President, First Hawaiian Bank, Honolulu, HI; Mr. Randolph G. Moore, CEO, Kaneohe Ranch, Kailua, HI; and Mr. Clayton Hee, Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Honolulu, HI.

We held our first meeting hosted by Admiral Larson, on 30 October 1992 at USCINCPAC Headquarters. The meeting focused on our proposed charter, and administrative procedures for operation of Board. I gave an overview of Military Land Use Coordination in Hawaii to the Board. The next meeting is scheduled for 21 January 1993 at Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii. This meeting will give the State of Hawaii and each county the opportunity to brief the Board on their land use plans and issues. The military will provide a status brief on our Land Use Plan.

Our next key initiative is the Hawaii Military Land Use Plan. This plan was made possible thru a fiscal year 1993 fiscal year Defense Appropriation sponsored by Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman we are indeed grateful for your outstanding support for this effort.

The kickoff briefing for the plan was held on 4 December 1992. This briefing marks the official start of our two year effort on this plan, which is a USCINCPAC initiative and will address Senator Inouye's call earlier this year for a Joint Military/Civilian Task Force to: Review Military Land Use and develop a Military Land Use Plan for Hawaii

Two primary objectives of this study are to: Based on our best projections for mission taskings and force levels, develop a solid rationale for future military land use; and develop a comprehensive land use plan for all DOD requirements in Hawaii while considering joint service use where feasible.

We will identify opportunities for functional military joint use in terms of what's already been accomplished and what areas could be reviewed for possible exchange or conveyance. The Plan will address environmental considerations or constraints that affect land use. We will also address civilian interfaces through the Joint Land Use Affairs Board.

The study area will include all the major islands of the State of Hawaii except for Kaho'olawe. As stated previously, we intend to work with the appropriate agencies to convey Kaho'olawe at the earliest possible time. The study team will work under the direction of the Joint Military Task Force with the Navy having overall coordination responsibilities. As mentioned there will be three teams: One addressing Navy/Marine Corps installations; one looking at Army/Air Force installations; and a technical support group preparing graphics support in the form of computerized GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and CADD MAPS (Computer-Aided Design and Drafting).

We have initiated our pre-planning efforts and are starting our round of kick-off briefs. This brief will be provided to both the Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board and Service components.

We will be collecting data on land requirements and existing conditions in order to do a planning analysis resulting in the total military land requirements while addressing civilian land use plans and concerns. This information will then be used to develop a strawman land use plan which will be briefed at several levels; through the service components, our working groups, to include the Land Use Affairs Board, and the combined DCINCs, before being presented to Admiral Larson. After Washington level briefs, a draft plan will be distributed for review. Comments will then be incorporated into a final report.

What's different about the Joint Land Use Plan from all the service master plans, is that this plan will be multi service. For example, land operations will be looked at from the perspective of all military services in Hawaii and the civilian community.

Bellows Air Force Station is a good example of the need for a total military approach to decide its future use. Air Force owns and is responsible for common use and maintenance. The Army, Marine Corps and National Guard are heavy training users. Both the military and civilians use for recreation as well as independent proposals for both military and possible civilian housing use. Thanks to the Chairman's strong support, we have commenced work on a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on Bellows AFS. Completion of both the EIS and Land Use Plan will permit us to make intelligent decisions regarding Bellows AFS.

As you can see, land use coordination is not an easy task. We will not solve all of Hawaii's land issues with our land use plan or with the forum created by the Land Use Affairs Board. But I think Admiral Larson's strategy will clearly improve our utilization of land while maintaining adequate training areas, sufficient quality of life infrastructure and local community support for continued military presence.

We have a responsibility to the citizens of this state and this nation to do the job right.

Chairman Inouye, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss USCINCPAC's Hawaii land use strategy.

JOINT HAWAII LAND USE AFFAIRS BOARD

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much. You have just been formed. You received your appropriation just a few weeks ago, and so one cannot expect any results coming out from your efforts.

Do you have any schedule or timetable as to your final report or your master plan?

Admiral RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I could address that.

Tim, would you put up the backup viewgraph?

This is an exceedingly ambitious plan of action and milestones that we have depicted here. We would like to complete the total effort within 24 months, Mr. Chairman. The plan of action that you see here has us completing it in approximately 18 months.

We are going to start off being as ambitious as we possibly can. As you can see, the preplanning was done in November and we actually did that without the appropriation, knowing that you would be good for the money, sir.

And, as you can see, we already are off to a good start. We have done the kickoff briefs for two of the groups and as I said, the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board and the components will receive their briefs in early January.

Our teams will be going out again in January to do the field investigations. And, as I discussed, we formed three working groups: an Army-Air Force installation team, a Navy-Marine Corps installation team, and a technical support group. And so we hope to have that report done by April of 1994.

I would caution that the one thing that may slow us down, we do obviously have to take into account the considerations and guidance that we get from the new administration. We hope that we will get that early on in the new year so that we can do our projections. The services can work those into their plans and we can come up with the final plan, the master plan by April 1994.

KAHO'OLAWE

Senator INOUE. I realize that there is a separate Kaho'olawe commission to deal with the conveyance of that island. This commission has had its life extended to the end of this fiscal year. A final report has to be submitted to the Congress by March 31 of next year. But from where you sit, do you see any obstacles that may put this final report in jeopardy?

Admiral RYAN. Senator, with your permission, I will turn to my colleague, Admiral Retz, representing the Navy and let him answer that question for you, sir.

Senator INOUE. Admiral Retz.

Admiral RETZ. Petty Officer Hagey, would you put up the Kaho'olawe chart?




CHART 6

Mr. Chairman, I think if I might, I would just like to describe where we are in the entire Kaho'olawe situation. As you can see, this chart represents the island of Kaho'olawe, some 28,800 acres.

Since the consent decree in 1980 and our efforts in 1981, the Navy has been working to clean up the environment of Kaho'olawe. We have to date cleared some 13,000-plus acres. As you know, the commission has been studying the transfer of the island and one of the considerations in that, of course, was the clearance of the island.

In addition to that, we have taken some steps to re-forest the island in planting some 74,000 trees and some various grasses. That red dot on the island represents the area where we have concentrated our reforestation effort. The green portions are those portions that have been cleared of surface ordnance. The gray areas have not been cleared at all.

As we see it at this time, the commission has recommended and estimated some \$88 million to satisfactorily clear the island of ordnance in order to be transferred. They have also recommended some \$22 million for the soil conservation and reforestation project.

From the Navy's perspective, we are ready to transfer that island as soon as the commission's report can be accepted and the final terms worked out. That, as you know, Mr. Chairman, is underway at this time. The commission has finished their public hearings and I believe their report is in its final stages as far as being forwarded to Washington.

Senator INOUE. Admiral Retz, I am certainly well aware that all sorts of dollar figures have been presented on the cost of cleanup, ranging from \$100 million you presented all the way up to \$2 billion, \$3 billion.

Would the amount recommended or anticipated to be recommended by the commission, would that amount make this island habitable for residential living?

Admiral RETZ. Mr. Chairman, the figures that I quoted are those of the commission, not Navy figures. And neither the Navy nor the commission are estimating that it would make the island habitable.

They are merely figures that would make the island usable for tourism. In the terms of tourism, I am not talking about everyday tourist type thing, but for access to heiaus and archeological sites on the island.

There is no water on the island as you know, which is another thing which would complicate any kind of a residential plan.

But we are merely talking about surface sweeps. The island has been used as a target area since 1941. It has as ordnance on that island anything from 2,000-pound bombs up to 16-inch shells. They are buried as deep as 20 feet in our estimation. The costs to clear that are inestimatable at this point, sir.

Senator INOUE. So from your vantage point, you see no major obstacle that could jeopardize the conveyance other than congressional approval of the sums involved. Am I correct?

Admiral RETZ. Our position, Mr. Chairman, is that with the transfer of the island, if the funds are provided to the authority to clear it and the responsibility is likewise transferred, we see no obstacle in that, sir.

BELLOWS AIR FORCE STATION

Senator INOUE. Admiral Ryan, on the matter of Bellows Field, what are your thoughts on the use of that area, its environmental problems, joint use with civilian sector, et cetera?

Admiral RYAN. Mr. Chairman, that was one of the first issues that the joint task force looked at. And, of course, the deputy components and the component commanders themselves got involved in that. Since that is Air Force property, I would permit Major General Redden to respond to the question.

Senator INOUE. General Redden.

General REDDEN. Yes, sir; the use of Bellows currently, as you know, of the 1,483 acres that we have there, we have the primary use as a joint training area for both the Army and Marine Corps used by some 796 acres, an Air Force communications site that occupies 508 acres, Hawaiian National Guard training site, 69 acres, and a recreational area that is administered by the Air Force for the use of all the services and the retired community in Hawaii of some 180 acres.

The environmental impact assessment will be able to best determine what might be used for the future use of those lands.

Currently, the Air Force is investigating potential movement of our communication site. There is a planned upgrade to the communications facilities there. Those facilities are very key because they are used for Presidential communications and for high-level visitors such as yourself that will travel throughout the region. But we have surveyed some 13 sites. There are two that are possible at some relocation costs, one of some \$3 million, the other of some \$3.5 million to relocate the communication site.

In reviewing the training requirements—and I would defer momentarily to General Brown to address that—that is a very, very well used and very valuable joint training area for both the Marine Corps and the Army. On an average daily training use, we have some 2,260 Marines and 1,680 soldiers that use that training area. There have been a survey of some nine proposed sites to replace that for the part of the Marine Corps and six on the part of the Army, none of which were suitable. And that is an invaluable training area because the ability to train across the beach. And, again, the expert witness sitting to my left will address that in a moment.

Senator INOUE. General Brown.

General BROWN. Yes, sir; the Bellows Air Force Station provides us the training area we need to conduct amphibious operations training. And, of course, that is absolutely essential to us. That is our primary reason for being.

We have not been able to find any other suitable location to accomplish this training on the island. And we would hope that when we finish the environmental impact statement for Bellows and land use master plan, that we will have a better idea of just how we can use Bellows for training and, perhaps, what we can use for other activities.

So we are looking at that in that regard. But for us, for training for the First Marine Brigade, it is absolutely essential and we need to retain the capability to train on at least part of that land.

Senator INOUE. As of this moment you have not found any alternative site to carry this mission out?

General BROWN. No, sir; we have looked very hard at that. We had a study that we conducted in 1991 and it looked very carefully through the Hawaiian Islands and it just—we were not able to find an alternative site.

Senator INOUE. General Redden, have you received the proposal of the Hawaii National Guard on the use of Bellows?

General REDDEN. Sir, there have been several discussions that we have undertaken with the adjutant general on options for training areas and for the use of Bellows, yes, sir.

Senator INOUE. Have you reviewed the proposal or the plan?

General REDDEN. Sir, not in detail.

Senator INOUE. As of this moment, can you say anything about approval or disapproval?

General REDDEN. Sir, as of this moment, the plan was to proceed on with the environmental impact study and to then coordinate very closely with our Army and Marine Corps counterparts and to incorporate all the training requirements, including those of the Hawaii National Guard, into future plans for the use of that land.

Admiral RYAN. Mr. Chairman, if I could add something to that. I think Bellows is a great example of how one piece of property is so interrelated, not just with all the components here, but obviously there are clear civilian potential uses of that property also. That is why Admiral Larson feels good about the direction we are moving on our land strategy.

With your help again, we have gotten the money for EIS which will commence in March 1993. We expect the EIS process will take about 2 years.

But it will give us the opportunity to look at that entire piece of property and include the results of that in our land use master plan—and, incidentally, we will look at Bellows early on in our land use master plan—and then be able to take the results of the plan and the EIS and do intelligent things for, not just the military, but for the State of Hawaii. We feel good about that.

Senator INOUE. Do you have any schedule on the EIS?

Admiral RYAN. Yes, sir; as I said, we hope to commence the effort very soon. It will be let for contract and we expect that to start in March 1993. These EIS's can run anywhere from 18 months to 3 years. It will depend on the scope of the public hearings and, of course, there have to be numerous public hearings where we can learn of the concerns of the citizens of the State. But we anticipate roughly that this will take anywhere from 22 to 24 months.

Senator INOUE. Obviously, we will be returning to you to address some of the concerns. At this stage because of the infancy of this organization, we are in no position to ask too many questions. So I thank you very much, Admiral.

May I now call on Senator Akaka.

LANDS FOR TRAINING

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The use of lands by the military, of course, has been of serious concern of the people of Hawaii and of the military, too. And I am glad to hear the networking and also the set-up of task forces to deal with this.

My particular concern is in your future planning and the future use of these areas. There has been discussions about how the training in the future will be. We are looking at the highly technical training. The question comes, does the military need the use of these lands.

So my question to you in your future planning, does your planning take this into consideration, a new kind of training, and whether the lands that you are using now will still be needed for those purposes?

Admiral RYAN. Senator, absolutely. As you saw on a couple of the charts there that Petty Officer Hagey put up, we will be taking a close look at each one of the services' training requirements and, where possible, we will be trying to use those lands as efficiently as possible.

I think the topic that we just discussed, Bellows Air Force Station, is a good example of where our four components have worked very closely together to maximize the benefits of that priceless real estate. I would indicate to you that obviously we have made great strides in our training areas. In Alaska, Senator Stevens has some of the best and most complete training facilities that we could possibly hope for, and we are making great strides to do that same thing in PTA.

I would encourage General Brown or Colonel Finch to comment on how we intend to look at the training areas and make sure that we are efficiently utilizing them in the future.

General Brown?

General BROWN. We are, as Admiral Ryan said, looking at all the available training areas on Oahu and in the neighboring islands.

The Army is taking the lead in looking at this for us because they are the largest user of the training areas.

Where we can reduce our requirements or consolidate our requirements, we are looking at that. That is going to be a big part of this land use master plan when we finish. So we are looking at that.

For the Marine Corps again, in addition to Bellows being an absolute requirement for training, PTA again is an absolute requirement to keep Marines here. It is the only place where we can do large-scale unit operation training, for battalion-size units, regimental-sized units. It is the only place that we can do combined arms training. So PTA is again a very valuable training location and we make maximum use of that area in coordination with the Army.

Admiral RYAN. Sir, with your permission—

Senator INOUYE. Just in case those in the audience may not know what PTA stands for, it is the Pohakuloa Training Area.

Admiral RYAN. Sir, with your permission, I would ask Colonel Finch also to address your question.

Colonel FINCH. Sir, I would just like to add that from an Army perspective, it is General Corns' intention to keep the Pohakuloa Training Area as the premier training area in the Pacific. A lot of time and effort has been invested in maintaining the technological improvements that you, Senator, have referred to but at the same time realizing that we have some environmental impacts that we need to keep watch on. We have gone to great lengths to ensure that the Department of Defense interests in the Pohakuloa Training Area are in concert with the environment and that we become good stewards of the land.

So, in summary, it is a very heavily utilized training area, a very important training area, one we intend to continue to modernize while we become good stewards in the environment.

Senator AKAKA. In the planning of PTA, Admiral Ryan, there has been a concern about improving transportation from the major airports, either Kona or Hilo, to the PTA area. Are there any plans to build a defense highway between PTA and these airports?

Admiral RYAN. Again, I would ask Colonel Finch to address that. I think the Army has worked closely with local authorities on this issue.

Colonel FINCH. Senator, the upgrade of Saddle Road, I think, is what you are referring to, and this is actually a Federal Highway Administration project. The Army is in an advisory capacity here to ensure that the work is done in concert with our training needs and in concert with good, environmental practice.

Senator INOUYE. If I may at this point, at the present time, the initial funding is from DOD and Department of Transportation; is that not correct?

Colonel FINCH. Yes, Senator; the lead agency, however, is the Federal Highways Administration.

Senator AKAKA. Finally, Admiral Ryan, I just want to commend the U.S. Army Pacific for the concerns in dealing with the public and, in particular, with the firing of shots from Schofield to the Waianae area. This has been an ongoing problem and a concern to the Waianae people. But, I want to commend you and the com-

mand for doing all you can to work these problems out and I hope that you can eliminate the overfiring in the future.

Admiral RYAN. So do we, Senator.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Congressman Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REPRESENTATIVE ABERCROMBIE COMMENTS

Admiral, I want to clear something up with respect to CINCPAC. I presume in your instructions to people—and you can take this back to the CINCPAC command—that this will be the last time you will have under your administrative notes that the CINCPAC commander intends to hold a stag party or a stag dinner. That phrase is used in a communication that you are sending out to the public.

I will tell you what that is, my little dictionary here: "Stag: an adult male, various large deer; stag, adjective, restricted to or intended for men, that is a party, movies."

You are having a stag dinner. Maybe not you, but apparently the admiral is. And I hope we will not see that anymore out here.

If I hear that again, you are going to have a serious problem. OK?

Admiral RYAN. I am not aware of what you are talking about, but I will deliver the message, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

CEDED LAND

Now, I would like to know inasmuch, as this will be an anniversary, a word I do not care to use, but inasmuch as the military and the business community were instrumental in the overthrow of the kingdom 100 years ago next month, almost this time, I would like to know how this Joint Hawaii Land Use Advisory Board and/or the military is addressing the question of how ceded land will be dealt with, with respect to seeing to it that recompense is made to the Hawaiian people in 1993.

Admiral RYAN. Sir, as I said in my statement, I think we have the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board which consists of 15 folks, 10 of which are civilian. They represent all of the elected officials, the chamber of commerce, the business community. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs is represented there.

Obviously, ceded lands and Hawaiian home lands have been the subject of numerous suits in our courts of justice. We in the military are basically going to follow those court decisions. I do not think that it is within our purview to make decisions like that. Those decisions will be made by Congress, by our courts, by our executive department, all of which we work for.

LAND NOT AVAILABLE FOR HOUSING OR AGRICULTURE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You stated in your testimony that once you get to the island of Oahu, that there are 87,000 acres in use by the military, 23 percent of the island. I believe that your graphic displayed that, am I correct, about one-quarter?

Admiral RYAN. That is approximately correct; yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Inasmuch as much of the State land and much of the land in private hands—well, let me go back to the State.

Much of the State land consists of conservation land, watershed land, land that might not otherwise be useful with respect to housing and agriculture.

I would say that is a considerable portion, would you not?

Admiral RYAN. Yes, sir; that is what I said in my statement.

FORT DE RUSSY

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now 35 percent of this land is in fee; 35 percent of the 23 percent is in fee. What role does Fort DeRussy play in that? Is that considered land in fee?

Admiral RYAN. I would ask the Army to address that question.

Colonel FINCH. Sir, I am afraid I do not have that answer. We can submit that answer for the record.

[The information follows:]

Fort DeRussy is a total of 72.75 acres comprised of 69.7 acres of fee (U.S. Army owned property), 1.47 acres of ceded land, and 1.58 acres in easements.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The reason I asked that question, Colonel, is that I think there is a misconception in the community that somehow Fort DeRussy is available for, perhaps, convention center use or something like that.

It is my clear understanding that it is not, and for some reason we cannot seem to get that out to people. That land at Fort DeRussy has been paid for and is under the control of those who are responsible for dealing with nonappropriated funds. There is not a penny of taxpayers' money in that.

That land is not available for utilization, that is to say, for sale or to be considered under circumstances of being available at commercial rates or what land might be selling for around there; is that not right?

Colonel FINCH. Representative Abercrombie, I think you are exactly right. The facilities at Fort DeRussy that you are referring to, Hale Koa Hotel, for example, have been built by morale, welfare, recreation funds generated at exchange sales, for example. So this is nonappropriated money.

And you are exactly correct. My—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And the money that is coming in for the expansion into the second phase of the hotel there and the movement of the highway and the new luau area, all of that has been paid for out of the funds coming from nonappropriated funds generated within the military community itself; is it not?

Colonel FINCH. Yes, sir; correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Has not the State of Hawaii benefited to the tune of between 90 million and 100 million dollars' worth of construction funds alone or will when this next phase is completed?

Colonel FINCH. Yes, sir; you are correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And is it not also the case that that hotel and its operations are virtually 100-percent committed all year long in terms of occupancy and utilization?

Colonel FINCH. Yes, sir; very high occupancy rate, in excess of 97 percent.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I believe it is also the case that with respect to utilization of that area by civilian and active and retired military, the like, it is an open area, that the facilities are available provided that there is a requisite military connection.

Colonel FINCH. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So can we end once and for all this endless speculation about whether or not Fort DeRussy is somehow available in Waikiki for somebody's scheme with respect to a convention center or anything else?

Colonel FINCH. That would be very fine with us, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK. I think that is a very well-run facility. I think anybody who is associated particularly with the latest manifestation of it, with the luau center and pool, recognizes that it is an absolutely first class effort.

Would you all agree that while I have not had the opportunity to visit every such facility in the world, I cannot imagine that there is a more comprehensive or more highly regarded recreational facility of its kind anywhere in the world for active and retired military. Is that a fair statement? There may be something to its equal but I do not think there is anything better.

Colonel FINCH. I would agree with you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you.

LEASE LAND

Now, you lease about 45 percent of the 23 percent. Where are those leases, or, that is to say, with whom are those leases held? Do you have a breakdown on that? Are they private landowners? Is it with the State of Hawaii? Is it Hawaiian homelands? What is the lease breakdown?

Admiral RYAN. We do have a breakdown of that. I could provide that for the record. But it includes all the groups that you just mentioned, Congressman.

[The information follows:]

Land on the island of Oahu leased by the military is as follows:

<i>Installation / owner</i>	<i>Acreage</i>
Army:	
Kahuku Training Area/Campbell Estate	8,204
Kahuku Training Area/State of Hawaii	11,149
Kawailoa Training Area/Associates Four	345
Kawailoa Training Area/State of Hawaii	4,390
Kawailoa Training Area/Dole Food Co., Inc	18,612
Makua Military Reservation/State of Hawaii	782
Subtotal	<u>33,482</u>
Navy:	
Mt Kahala/State of Hawaii	2
Maunakapu/Campbell Estate	2
Subtotal	<u>4</u>
Total	<u>33,486</u>

None of the leased land is Hawaiian homeland.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And then 20 percent of the 23 percent, if you look as the 23 percent as an entity of 100 percent of your activity, is in ceded land. Now, the area of Bellows is ceded land, is it not?

Admiral RYAN. That is correct.

HOUSING UNIT CONSTRUCTION

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, in the plan that has gone forward to the Department of Defense, it includes, if I remember correctly, the proposal to try to build over a period of time 8,000 units. While there could be an argument to 5,000 units will meet the immediate need, the question in terms of replacement—like some of the buildings, I think, the Corps of Engineers has responsibility for dealing with some of the oldest buildings. They go back to 1907, if I remember correctly.

Admiral RYAN. Yes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So what we are really talking about is between 5,000 and 8,000 units, correct, that we need to build in the, say, the next decade or so if we were to handle all of this correctly.

That being the case, is it part of this plan that there is an active effort being made to see where we can make joint use with housing and military operations?

Admiral RYAN. Yes, sir; there is. I think General Corns and Walt Cloyd covered that very well, that when we looked at the housing plan, we simply do not have enough land to build those 8,000 units. We are looking at both midrises and additional pieces of property including places like Bellows to build additional facilities.

BELLOWS AIR FORCE STATION

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. At Bellows you have 500 acres. Now, there is almost 1,500 acres there. The beach area, recreational area constitutes less than 200 of those acres. Where the Marines land is along a portion of those 200 acres. I am going to say 200—180 acres. Is that not correct, General?

General BROWN. That is fairly close; yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK. Now, it is also true, is it not, that even with the addition of the 802 housing at Kaneohe Marine Air Base, that there is not sufficient housing on the windward side of the island for Marine personnel?

General BROWN. Yes, sir; that is correct. We need about 1,055 additional units.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Air Force obviously has control over Bellows, that is, say that it has responsibility. General Redden, control may be a word that you would not want to use. But you have responsibility nonetheless, right?

General REDDEN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. There are 500 acres also associated with this antenna farm I will call it. Now, that was built, what, approximately 40 years ago?

General REDDEN. That is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And is not the mission of the antenna farm to monitor overflight of Presidential party and other dignitaries?

General REDDEN. It is a communications relay station for all high-frequency radio communications that take part in this part of the world.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Has the communications capacity, that is to say, the technological equipment associated with such activity, improved in the last 40 years?

General REDDEN. It has, in fact. But that communication system is still needed and it is being replaced—programmed for fiscal year 1994.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Understand, but, nonetheless, it has improved, has it not?

General REDDEN. Yes, sir; it has.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So replacement is not necessarily something that is out of the question or has not been thought of by the Air Force.

General REDDEN. In fact, replacement is programmed by the Air Force.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Very good.

We are aware that we have—so if some place could be found—do you need all 500 acres, given the state of equipment right now, you could withstand scrutiny with respect to whether or not 500 acres is needed to accomplish that mission that was set up almost 50 years ago?

General REDDEN. Given the footprint of the current equipment, the 500 acres is needed. That question that you raised is certainly the one that is being evaluated with regard to the new equipment that will be used as replacement.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the new equipment might not require 500 acres?

General REDDEN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And it does not have to be at that 500 acres right there, does it?

General REDDEN. In fact, we are evaluating two other potential sites for the location of that communication.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Might Barking Sands be one of them?

General REDDEN. No, sir; Barking Sands does not appear to be the best location, but there is an alternative for both an FAA site that is used now and one that is currently used by the Navy that we could co-locate the equipment in.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. So that might free up 500 acres at that site.

General REDDEN. It might end up freeing up that 500 acres for the use of the communication site.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The 500 acres at Bellows might be freed up if it is transferred somewhere else.

General REDDEN. The 500 acres at Bellows, sir, would be under review for the potential for training use and for consolidation purposes that will be used by the joint use master plan that is being developed.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. In other words, what I just said.

General REDDEN. Well, sir, I cannot tell you that 500 acres will be freed up.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I did not say that. I said it might not need to be used for the antenna farm.

General REDDEN. Most certainly, a communications site, that is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is what I meant by freed up.

General REDDEN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do not worry, General, I am not trying to lead you down a primrose path, I assure you. [Laughter.]

General, the amphibious activity that takes place there takes place in conjunction with the utilization of the 180 acres of recreation; does it not?

General BROWN. Well, the 180 acres, as you pointed out, is the beachfront that we use. We also need the contiguous land that we use off the beach.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes; I understand.

General BROWN. We have a total that is available to us of, I think it is 726 acres. And that 726 acres is really a bare minimum of what we need.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Understand.

General BROWN. So we need to retain the 726 acres we can use now for training.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Understand. Now, you are aware that the—going back, then, to the previous testimony, my question about housing, there is no inherent objection by the services, is there? And I guess in this instance I have to go to you, Admiral Ryan, as kind of the head Pooh Bah here today.

There is nothing inherently objectionable to housing going into that area, even joint housing, is there, in conjunction with the activities that are taking place by the Marines right now?

Admiral RYAN. Sir, I do not think there is anything inherently objectionable to that. My instructions from Admiral Larson were when we formed this task force and the land use master plan, that we should consider everything and anything.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That would include, then, using ceded land for the purposes that might be sought by those own the land, which is to say, the Hawaiians.

Admiral RYAN. I did not quite finish what I was going to say there. I said consider everything and anything that is considered legal by our lawyers. And so that will be considered.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Joint use with the Hawaiians.

Admiral RYAN. I would imagine just as General Corns said that we will consider everything.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Because we would not want to have a situation in which anybody got the impression that 1,500 acres of ceded land was not going to be considered for return if its military use or the strategic needs of the United States were not necessarily at stake.

Admiral RYAN. That is absolutely correct. And as I said in my statement, when we have completed this EIS and the land use master plan, it is our hope that any lands that are excess will be conveyed to the proper authorities.

JOINT HAWAII LAND USE AFFAIRS BOARD

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Let me just finish up with your Joint Military Task Force and its composition. What I mean is it is chartered by Admiral Larson; is that correct?

Admiral RYAN. That is correct. He is the one that formed this board. He calls it the Land Use Affairs Board. Its purpose is to exchange information, ideas and to advise—I should not use the word “advise,” inform him of the various state and military plans.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, aside from Mr. Moore from the Kaneohe Ranch, it appears that everybody on this board is an appointed or

an elected official of State or city or Federal agencies, including the military; is that not the case?

Admiral RYAN. I would not say that they are all state or elected officials. But as I said in my testimony—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Haruki.

Admiral RYAN [continuing]. I think you got called out of the room, I said that the way we came up, that Admiral Larson came up with this board, he consulted with various State, local officials with the senior congressional representative, Senator Inouye, talked to the chamber of commerce, the city council, the mayor, and the Governor and then wrote each of those individuals and asked them to name a representative that would be willing to volunteer to be part of Admiral Larson's Land Use Affairs Board.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And he did not think it was appropriate to have anybody that might have some contact with the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives?

Admiral RYAN. Sir, I could give you Admiral Larson's thoughts on this and basically he said he wanted to structure this working group so that it would be small but yet representative of all the interests.

As I said in my testimony, he approached Senator Inouye, who in reality we give a great deal of credit for the idea, and talked to the Governor, the mayor—the mayors of all the counties, the city council, and felt that was a representative group. And I think that most of the people that he talked to felt the same way about that.

We could add at least another 15 or 20 based on the calls that we have gotten from folks wanting to be part of the board. But the admiral's decision was that he would like to keep this as a working group, reasonably small, but yet broad enough to make sure that we have all viewpoints.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is it your contention—the Admiral's contention, then, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs is sufficient in this regard?

Admiral RYAN. Sir, he consulted the Governor on that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Who represents housing on this panel from the civilian sector or the Hawaiian sector?

Admiral RYAN. I think there are a number of people on there that could probably talk to the housing issue.

But, again, this board, 10 of which are civilians, are certainly going to go out and talk to other members of the community to get their thoughts. As we said at our first meeting of this board, we would encourage the members of the Affairs Board to invite in other members of the community to give presentations if they thought appropriate.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What opportunity will exist for the community sectors of various kinds to participate in what I presume is this environmental impact statement?

Admiral RYAN. I think on any environmental impact statement, the community is going to be given several opportunities, starting early on in the process, to make their desires clear and their concerns clear.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, you had a meeting in May, have you not? You had a meeting in December. You organized a meeting—

you had a meeting in December. You are having another on January 21 with the chamber of commerce. Is that an open meeting?

Admiral RYAN. Those, I think we—I may be a little confused on the meetings you are talking about. The Land Use Affairs Board has had one meeting. The first meeting where we approved the charter was at the end of October.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I beg your pardon. I forgot October.

Admiral RYAN. Our next meeting will be in January where, as I said in my statement, we have asked for the State and the counties to provide their land plans and issues that would be germane to the military.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is the meeting at the chamber of commerce for convenience sake, you cannot find another hall?

Admiral RYAN. No, sir; it is not. What we have asked the members of this Affairs Board to do is we would like to rotate the meetings, and the chamber of commerce volunteered to host the second meeting. CINCPAC hosted the first meeting at his headquarters.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. When will hearings begin?

Admiral RYAN. The hearings that I thought you were talking about were hearings regarding an EIS. We do not plan to hold any hearings, Land Use Affairs Board hearings. We plan to have working group meetings of the Land Use Affairs Board.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How do you intend to coordinate them, then, with the EIS?

Admiral RYAN. The EIS results will be briefed to the Land Use Affairs Board. The EIS will also, as with any EIS, for instance, the one that we have talked about this morning was the one at Bellows Air Force Base.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am confused, then. Is this Joint—let me get it straight—this Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board, then, to be a traveling road show to explain to people what your position is as opposed to that which will take place, that set of activities which will take place during the EIS process and will have community participation?

Admiral RYAN. No; any EIS that is conducted, we have to have public hearings. Those public hearings, for instance, on the EIS that will commence in March 1993 at Bellows will follow accordingly.

There will be no public hearings on the Joint Land Use Affairs Board. This is a working board that has been formed by Admiral Larson to help him in developing a coherent and logical land use master plan.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Understand. I am going to try and end this, Admiral, because I am not still sure, then, what its purpose is other than to be circular. "The Board," on page six of your testimony, it says, "The Board is advisory to Admiral Larson and serves as a forum to exchange facts and information for better cooperation in land use matters."

Do you mean the membership including yourself, then, is to talk among themselves about this?

Admiral RYAN. That is precisely right, but with input. We have asked all the members of the board to come prepared to discuss issues that are germane. That means, for instance, if there is a member of the community, a particular interest group, that desires to

make a presentation to that affairs board so that we are better informed to make a good decision on the land use master plan, they will be invited to attend and make a presentation.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, then you are going to hold hearings.

Admiral RYAN. We are not going to hold hearings, not public—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How are you going to do it?

Admiral RYAN. It is a closed board.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, then how are you going to get input from people—

Admiral RYAN. Members will make suggestions.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, why would you need a series of meetings for that? Why can you not have a—I mean, President-Elect Clinton managed to do that in 2 days for the economy of the United States. You have got Mr. Clegg from the Department of Land Utilization. You have got assistants to the various mayors. You have got somebody from a bank, et cetera, telephone company. I do not understand what you are going to do then. How often are you going to meet?

Admiral RYAN. As we said at our first meeting, we hope to meet at least quarterly. It looks like we will be meeting at least quarterly for the next 5 years.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Will you publish minutes?

Admiral RYAN. We do publish minutes. Be happy to provide you copies of those, Congressman.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much. I might be around 5 years from now.

Admiral RYAN. We hope so, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much.

Let me conclude, then, I fail to see the efficacy of this task force as it is constituted. I think people will be confused as to who they are to speak with or what group they are to speak with, if you are conducting an EIS particularly at Bellows or if you are conducting an EIS with respect to utilization of land throughout the State.

I do not think that it is clear at all as to how people are going to make their views known throughout the State, certainly not to this board apparently.

Admiral RYAN. I think regarding the EIS, again, Congressman, we are required by law to publish notices that we hold public hearings, for instance, regarding Bellows Air Force Base. And it will be clear to the people that they are permitted to come and relate their views.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK. Then, finally then, is it with respect to section 2853 of the Defense Authorization Act, which was spearheaded by Senator Inouye, that the public will have some opportunity, then, to deal with the question of Bellows Air Force Station in the context of an EIS?

Admiral RYAN. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But with respect to the Joint Military Task Force and its conclusions, deliberations, observations, perspective, et cetera, that the public is on a catch-as-catch-can kind of situation with respect to land use recommendations in the military in every other regard, other than that which is mandated by the congressional action.

Admiral RYAN. I would not characterize it that way, sir. I would say that, as I said as the answer to several other questions, that the EIS and the comments that come from the public will be considered as part of the land use master plan that will be developed over the next 2 years, 2-plus years.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. But that EIS is just for Bellows.

Admiral RYAN. That is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the rest of it will be discussed in this circular group called this joint task force.

Admiral RYAN. Called the Land Use Affairs Board.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The Land Use Affairs Board. The public, essentially, then, will have no access to it other than through the people named to it.

Admiral RYAN. That is correct. But I would say that when Admiral Larson formed this board, he went to the elected officials, the people that this community elected, and asked them to name representatives to his board.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, there are a lot of elected officials from private, nonprofit organizations, from civic organizations, from neighborhood boards, et cetera. They are elected, too.

Admiral RYAN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you mean certain elected officials.

Admiral RYAN. Elected officials that would be part—that would nominate people that would be part of a working group that would help Admiral Larson make decisions on land use for the military.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will conclude. Admiral, you have done an excellent job of explaining the position and the background and foundation for it.

But I will tell you that I find it inadequate, particularly in this 100th year of the overthrow of the monarchy, that I do not find it adequate, let me say, for resolving the very important issues with respect to land use in this State. I think it is in need of revision.

But we can take that up at another time. Thank you very much for your—

Ms. MOANI-KEALA AKAKA. Excuse me, Congressman Abercrombie. I am a trustee with the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and was re-elected for the third time by over 27,000 Hawaiians statewide. And I have not heard of this group nor have we been privy to any their meetings or any of their deliberations.

And you are right, Congressman. At this time of the commemoration of our overthrow, it is time that some of these Federal lands came back to our people. Because they are not Federal lands, they are our lands.

For the sake of harmony of the people of this state, it is imperative that we can pass back on each islands we are living on, not just Kaho'olawe.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Understand. I am sure there will, knowing Senator Inouye, there will be more than adequate opportunity to make that issue clear.

The hearing today is with respect to the testimony of Admiral Ryan and the particular issues before us at this hearing having to do with the Joint Land Use Commission and the overall issues of land. I am sure that Senator Inouye intends to address the other issues as well.

I just wanted to get on the record with you, Admiral Ryan, that I do not feel that this task force is organized in a fashion that will give confidence to the people that they are going to have an adequate capacity to make their views known.

I think that Senator Inouye has established a record here, in his conduct of his activities with respect to all issues having to do with land use, as one that gives everybody an opportunity to make their views known. And legislation has flowed as a result of that.

This ad hoc group, I think, is in need of serious revision.

Senator INOUE. Senator STEVENS.

TRAINING AREAS

Senator STEVENS. While I was out of the room, trying to keep an office running in Washington, I understand you did make a comment—Steve Cortese of my staff told me you made a comment concerning training areas available in Alaska and the impact they play on CINCPAC planning now. I had a question that I wanted to raise about just the general problem of the Pacific Command with regard to lands.

As I see it, we are going to have increasing pressures on the U.S. deployment in Korea and Japan and elsewhere out in the Pacific. If we do, there is going to be increased pressure on both Alaska and Hawaii to accommodate some of the forces that are out there if they are to remain under the Pacific Command.

That is a military decision, of course. They could go into another command.

But you already have some specific challenges here in Hawaii and we have some problems in Alaska, particularly with regard to the housing issues we have been discussing. Am I wrong that we should anticipate increased demands on both of these States for use of lands for military purposes, including training and exercises in the long term out here?

Admiral RYAN. Sir, I will ask each of the components to answer that question for you. But I would start off by saying that I would not anticipate any additional increase in the training areas here in Hawaii. I would expect some additional increase in the training lands in your great State.

Senator STEVENS. I would be pleased, if it is convenient with the chairman, to hear from the components and I would like to come back to you about the problem of joint operations in Hawaii and Alaska.

Gentleman, does any one want to comment upon, are we wrong to anticipate that there is going to be increased requests for facilities in both of the States here?

General REDDEN. Sir, I might, from the Air Force perspective, I think we probably see because of many of the issues that have been discussed already today, that the pressure for land use in Hawaii would possibly preclude more pressure for training from our perspective here in the State of Hawaii.

However, as you are well aware, the Cope Thunder operation, which was previously located in the Philippines, has been relocated to Alaska. We are already at a capability in terms of our ability to assess the performance that we had in the Philippines previously and with your support, we have been able to program improve-

ments that will see us have a premier training facility over the next several years in Alaska and the Yukon training areas. We have increased use on the part of all participants, including those of our allies.

Currently for all the Cope Thunder exercises, which average about 1,050 sorties a day, 25 percent of the participants are participants from the Navy and Marine Corps aviation arms that participate there, flying out of both Eielson and Elmendorf Air Force Bases.

The Canadians participate regularly. Great Britain has shown an interest in participating regularly. And we have had representatives from the Singaporean Air Force that have taken part.

We do have some difficulty, because of the great transit times for many of our allies in ASEAN, being able to come back to Alaska.

But certainly as you talk about a drawdown of forces in Europe and the strategic location of the Alaskan ranges, you will probably see an increased use on the part of European air forces and our own Air Force stationed in Europe using the Alaskan training areas. So we probably see nothing but growth in that area. And because of your support, we have been able to increase the dormitories, the operating buildings there and have an ongoing program of range improvements that will seek continued growth and use of those training areas through the end of the decade.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you for that. But what I am looking at is whether there is any plan that is going to be developed to have the use of our lands take the pressure off the forces here for use of Hawaii lands for exercises.

I mean, I see what you are saying in terms of Cope Thunder, and I obviously support that, as you say. But I am hearing that there is increasing pressure from Hawaiians to restrict the use of lands in Hawaii. And yet they do not want the forces to leave obviously. Are we going to see a joint use concept of using Alaskan lands for exercises in broader scale and take some of the pressure off of Hawaii?

General REDDEN. Sir, I would turn to General Brown to comment because even in Hawaii if you balance the training used at Bellows Air Force Station for amphibious training with being able to transport those amphibious training to the PTA, for example, that is a significant cost every time we run an exercise of that nature.

Senator STEVENS. I see.

General REDDEN. I would think certainly when you talk about joint forces, those that take our aviation forces to work jointly together are probably very capable of doing that. We exercised regularly with the Sixth Infantry Division, but the transit costs may be very expensive for both the Army and Marine Corps.

Senator STEVENS. What you are saying is the air arm may be able to do it but that the ground forces, really, at the cost of transportation, it is going to be prohibitive.

General REDDEN. It would appear that it would be prohibitive, sir. I would turn to General Brown.

General BROWN. We are already participating in Cope Thunder with our aircraft squadrons here since we lost Kaho'olawe. That was the only place we could drop live ordnance on the island. So

there is already an impact as far as shifting use from here to your State as far as our air wing goes.

As far as ground forces go, as the general said, the cost of transporting them from here to Alaska would probably be something that we could not afford. So I do not see that happening with the ground forces and the Marine Corps here on Hawaii.

As far as increased pressure for locating more forces here, if, in fact, we did draw down our forces in Japan, the forward stationed forces there. This would be a logical place to relocate them because of its strategic significance, mid-Pacific, able to go anywhere in the Pacific to respond to any crisis. We have no plans for that at this point.

Senator STEVENS. I will discuss it further, Mr. Chairman. But it does seem to me that we ought to look to trying to establish some of the same aircraft in Alaska so we can take crews and pilots to train there when you need live ordnance and not have the costs of movement to deter that also.

But I anticipate we are going to see in this Congress additional members raise the issue of withdrawal from Korea and Okinawa. Just have to wait and see. We have faced it before, and I think unless the forces are going to come here or Alaska, we are going to lose them from the Pacific Command.

Thank you very much.

Admiral RETZ. Senator Stevens, if I could just add a comment on that from the Navy perspective?

Senator STEVENS. Yes, sir.

Admiral RETZ. Certainly the loss or potential loss of Kaho'olawe for us will cause a shift of our exercises toward that area. It has already done that since we suspended live firing there as General Brown mentioned.

But also one thing that helps us in that regard is the advancing technology. Our ranges such as PMRF Barking Sands and that type of thing have helped to absorb some of those problems. So while I see an increasing demand for that, we also have some other factors that may help to compensate. But certainly there is a premium on exercise areas.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you.

Admiral Ryan and gentleman, we thank you for your testimony and for your responses to our questions. We are most grateful.

If we may, we may have questions we would like to submit to you for your consideration and response.

ADDITIONAL SUBCOMMITTEE QUESTIONS

We will submit the balance of the questions for response in the record.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INOUE TO SECRETARY ATWOOD

THE DEMAND FOR MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING

Question. General Corns, if Congress were to approve a significant increase in the housing allowances paid to service members stationed in the Pacific region, how would this affect the demand for new housing? Would you recommend such an increase?

Answer. As you know, Department of Defense policy relating to housing service members is to rely on the civilian community as a first priority. Because of the acute shortage of affordable housing on Oahu, the military member competes with civilians for limited housing. Increasing the service members housing allowance would allow those living off post to better afford adequate housing, but history has shown that an increase in allowances often precedes a rise in rents charged. This leads to a perception that the military is the proximate cause of high rents that civilians are forced to pay. Such was the case in the early 1960's when military members were on the Overseas Housing Allowance. This would help the service member, but have a negligible impact on the demand for housing. For this reason, we believe the best way, for all concerned, to address the problem is to build more housing.

THE SUPPLY OF HOUSING

Question. General Corns, what changes do you foresee in the local market, such as smaller increases in rental rates or improvements in the condition of local housing, which would improve the availability of affordable housing for military members?

Answer. The answer to the problem faced by military members is the same as that faced by the civilian community. If rental rates were to decrease or increase at a slower rate than the increases in the money available for housing, this would have a favorable impact on all renters. The primary problem which causes the high rent is the lack of affordable housing Oahu-wide. It will take many years, as a result of the sharp increases in the 1980s, for allowances to catch up to rental costs and as long as the demand exists for affordable housing beyond the available supply, rent will not come down at the speed required. Building more housing in the affordable category on and off post is the real answer.

Question. The "Strategy 8000" plan calls for providing all enlisted personnel with government-owned housing by the year 2007. Do you believe this is a realistic and warranted goal?

Answer. First, due to the actions by Congress to increase housing construction funding on Oahu in 1993, Strategy 8000 can accomplish the goal by 2005, rather than 2007. Current congressional direction and DOD policy does not allow construction to house all enlisted on post. However, this is one of the benefits of our acquisition plan. It brings the problem and proposed solution to the attention of those in leadership positions to change this policy. All of the component commands on Oahu and the Commander in Chief, Pacific, are in agreement that the goal is both realistic, warranted and achievable.

Question. Would you provide for the record your office's latest market analysis on the supply of housing on Oahu?

Answer. The total number of rental units on Oahu that are available and acceptable by the standards required for service members is 104,432 island-wide. It must be reemphasized that the general civilian population and the military compete equally for these units while at the same time the housing shortage in the State is currently 20,000 and is projected to be 86,000 by the year 2000.

FISCAL YEAR 1994 REQUIREMENTS

Question. General, in the past two years Congress has approved new housing starts of over 1,200 units, funding for long-range planning activities, and other relevant programs. Though I know you can't provide details at this time, what do you believe are the priorities for fiscal year 1994 that the Committee should focus on to continue the progress made thus far?

Answer. Our "Strategy 8000" plan calls for 562 new houses and related projects at a projected cost of \$122.7 million. Accomplishing this should be the priority focus for fiscal year 1994 to stay "on track" with the acquisition plan. However, fiscal year 1993 legislation requires that each service plan and program for their own new construction, revitalization and improvement projects beginning in fiscal year 1994. The problem here is that the fiscal year 1994/95 budget submissions took place prior to this new requirement being known. In order to stay "on track" in the acquisition

process it will be necessary to get Congressional assistance in the fiscal year 1994/95 budget of the various services.

FUTURE PLANNING AND FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

Question. General Corns, your plan for reducing the housing deficit is predicated on a number of important assumptions that must be met in order to achieve the proposed new construction schedule. For instance, there are certain infrastructure needs, such as modified sewage treatment facilities, new roads, and water and power systems, which must be completed prior to building new homes. Which of these infrastructure requirements are the most critical to meeting the planned housing construction schedule?

Answer. All of the problems are critical, because most are tied to similar problems faced by the civilian community as well. For this reason the solutions are not simple and may require many years to fix and, therefore, should be addressed now. First, sewage treatment and the disposal of effluent are common to military and civilian housing needs replacement, sewage effluent disposal at Schofield will be a shared problem with Wahiawa in fiscal year 1994, construction at Barbers Point will share the same problems with central Oahu, construction due to the issues of Honolulu Sewage Plant and the causeway to Ford Island is required by 1996 to stay "on track."

Question. The CINCPAC housing plan calls for a future stable program of building 500 new construction units per year. What's the rationale behind this figure? It appears to make economic sense. Is that your conclusion, as well?

Answer. Yes; the figure of 500 per year was based on two sound reasons. First, the figure appears to be supportable through the normal programming and budgeting process and second, the figure is about what our design and construction agents located on Oahu, Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers and Pacific Division, Navy Facilities Engineering Command, can comfortably handle a year. Also, consideration had to be given to the ancillary actions that are required for a program of this magnitude. Environmental concerns, infrastructure, studies/improvements in the civilian community, as well as military and related land issues, all are factors dictating a slow but steady approach to the deficit problem.

REPLACEMENT, REHABILITATION, AND REPAIR OF EXISTING FACILITIES

Question. General, while much attention is placed on the need to construct new housing facilities, there also are important issues related to repair and replacement of existing housing. My first question regarding these issues is: Can you identify housing areas which are particularly in bad shape and are candidates for replacement? What priority have you given to replacing current substandard housing compared to constructing new units?

Answer. Replacing substandard housing is a high priority that has not received the publicity afforded new construction, but has received considerable attention. The "Strategy 8000" plan only addresses revitalization that is required in order to free up additional land for new construction, but the next iteration of the plan will fully address revitalization to replace existing inadequate housing. Those housing areas in the worst shape have been, and continue to be, identified. The first increment of 100 units in the Navy housing area of Moanalua Terrace is in the fiscal year 1993 program for revitalization. Subsequent years will have continued revitalization in all services areas that have been identified. It is a program that enjoys equal priority, if no publicity, with new construction.

Question. In today's constrained fiscal environment, does it make better economic sense to build new housing or replace existing units?

Answer. What you are asking concerns two different problems. We build new housing to attack a severe shortage of housing affordable to service members stationed on Oahu and we replace existing housing because it has proven to be the economical way to deal with an aging, substandard inventory. Because of hidden termite damage, lead based paint and the need to increase density to provide land for future construction, it has proven to be more economical to replace rather than extensively repair existing housing. Regardless of how we address repair of existing housing, the need exists for new construction to address the military's deficit.

Question. Do you propose to demolish dilapidated single family units to make land available for the construction of new mid-size units? Will this save costs?

Answer. The "Strategy 8000" plan addresses those areas where older housing will be demolished and densities increased in order to free up land for new construction. These are primarily multi-family units, although some are single family. We do see costs savings associated with this methodology. Primarily, they are costs avoidance in that land acquisition requirements are reduced and infrastructure costs are de-

creased, since these sites already contain the required services. There may be requirements for upgrades because of increased demand and aged systems, but this is cheaper than building on raw land.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

Senator INOUE. This subcommittee will stand in recess until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 16, at 9 a.m., and at that time we will receive testimony from the Commanding Chief of the Pacific, Admiral Larson, regarding military and security issues in the Pacific region. The hearing will be held in this room.

[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., Tuesday, December 15, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Wednesday, December 16.]

PACIFIC RIM ISSUES

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1992

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Honolulu, HI.

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., in Courtroom Aha'Nonoe, U.S. Courthouse, Prince Kuhio Federal Building, 300 Ala Moana Boulevard, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Inouye and Stevens.

Also present: Senator Akaka and Representative Abercrombie.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES OF THE PACIFIC REGION

STATEMENT OF ADM. CHARLES R. LARSON, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, CAMP SMITH, HI

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOUYE

Senator INOUYE. The hearing of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will please come to order.

As we begin this morning's hearing, again, I wish to thank my vice chairman, Senator Stevens from Alaska, for his presence here. I wish to thank all of you from the military and the public for being with us.

Today the task before the subcommittee is to review the important military and security issues of the Pacific region. Though it seems that just very little time has passed since we last reviewed this issue in a public forum, much has happened. For example, in the last 1½ years, in fact, less than one-half, we have witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union. We see the continued global decline of communist governments. We have withdrawn our forces from the Philippines, and we brought home most of the forces deployed during Operation Desert Storm. Now we are in Somalia. This has happened in less than 1½ years.

Yet, in contrast to the fundamental reduction in the overall threat facing the United States as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, our interests in the Pacific region have grown steadily over the past two decades. I believe our interest and the means by which to secure them can be summarized in the following manner.

First, we protect the United States and support our allies by maintaining a sufficient military presence in the Pacific. This can

best be achieved through cooperative bilateral and multilateral diplomatic and military relations.

Second, we maintain stability in the region through a continued military presence and security commitment in the Pacific.

And, finally, through our military relations and security arrangements, we support the continued economic growth of the United States and other Pacific nations. I know that most of you here are aware of the value of our economic activities in the Pacific. The level of U.S. trade and economic growth in the region far surpasses that with other regions of the world. Unless anyone forgot, it is our military presence in the Pacific which assures access to this market and serves as a fundamental precursor to continued economic growth for our Nation and our friends and allies of the rim.

Those of us responsible for U.S. military policy will continue to face important questions about the role of the U.S. forces in the changing security environment. It is my hope that we can leave here this morning with a better understanding of the need for our forces in the Pacific and what is required to sustain them.

Thus, appearing before the subcommittee this morning is Adm. Charles Larson, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command and accompanying him, Gen. Jimmie Adams, Commander of the Pacific Air Forces; Adm. Robert Kelly, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; Lt. Gen. Johnnie Corns, Commander of USARPAC; and Lt. Gen. Henry Stackpole, Commander of the Marines in the Pacific.

Admiral Larson, it is always good to see you, sir. We have received your full statement and I can assure you that it is made part of the record. But before you proceed, sir, I would like to call upon my vice chairman, Senator Stevens.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR STEVENS

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Senator. I will be brief.

I do not think we could come to any headquarters in the world that has more significance to future expenditures for military than this one here at the Pacific Command. And that is not because I have parochial pride in this since we have joined this command, the Alaskan forces have. I say that on the basis of the 20 years that we have served together in this committee now. I commend you for having these hearings and I hope that we will continue them as indicated in April.

We have staggering problems, we know, in this committee and the military is familiar with those in terms of our budget problems. But there is no question that we have the job to convince the Congress of the need to continue support for military forces in the Pacific because of the strategic significance of this command that you have already outlined.

I think there is another reason for this committee to think about this because while our European allies can contribute virtually nothing to our participation in NATO—we still pay to equip German reservists I found out last week—the Pacific Command had secured landmark burden-sharing agreements with our allies in this region.

These gentlemen that are here this morning deserve a great deal of credit for that. The commitments obtained by PACOM from

Japan, Korea, and Singapore make real the concept of a partnership in defense in this area, rather than assuming the role of defenders in the area. We do, in fact, have Asian and Pacific allies who are willing to pay their way. The financial support agreements from these host governments are really significant in terms of training opportunities, not only for our own forces but for our friends in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

In short, I think these agreements that have been worked out give us a network of relationships that will permit us to achieve our first goal and that is to keep the peace in the region.

But there is no question that we need to do more to make Congress aware of these developments. And I hope that these witnesses who are this morning will explore that status and role of forces under this command, not only in the Pacific in general but, again, now being parochial, the status of forces in Alaska, too.

I do want to express my appreciation right at the outset, Mr. Chairman, to these senior leaders of the Pacific Command who have made great efforts to become acquainted with the unique conditions in Alaska since we have, in fact, become part of the Pacific Command. Their confidence in the forces of the 6th Light Infantry and the 11th Air Force and the Alaska National Guard, the special installations in the Aleutians now have led, I think, to a complete integration of all U.S. defense forces into the Pacific Command.

That is a milestone, the work of Gen. Jimmie Adams, that should be singled out, I think, Commander of the Pacific Air Forces, primarily because this may be your last opportunity to appear before this subcommittee. I am not sure that is exactly a privilege. [Laughter.]

But General Adams led PACAF through the aftermath of Pinatubo, the closure of Clark Air Force Base, the transfer of the 13th Air Force to Guam, the shift of Cope Thunder exercises to Alaska, and the establishment of our new agreements in Singapore, plus extending our relationships into the outlying areas of the Pacific.

I do think, since our emphasis in Alaska is so heavily on Air Force, that we are probably aware of what he has done more than he realizes. But I think the country should express its gratitude to you for your contributions during this career, and I look forward to coming back to be with you at the time of your retirement.

Thank you.

General ADAMS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator INOUE. Thank you. Before I call upon the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, I should respond to a question that was asked of me yesterday. The question was why have the hearings at this time in the midst of the transition. The new administration has not been established and determined.

Well, I felt that the subcommittee and U.S. Senate should be involved in this ongoing debate, a debate as to whether the importance of the Pacific should be recognized. Admittedly up until now, as a result of threat of the Soviet Union, the European theater was important.

Second, we are concerned with the funding level. All of us agree that there is a limit as to how much the U.S. Government can spend and how much our taxpayers will be willing to pay. So the

question comes down as to the drawdown: Should it be accelerated or should it be maintained at the present level or should it be slowed down.

These are questions of grave importance not only to the Nation but I believe to the world, and that is why we believe that time is of the essence. Although we recognize that the transition is still ongoing, we have our responsibilities as members of the legislature to acquaint ourselves with the issues and problems that we have to address in the coming year.

So with that, once again, welcome, Admiral.

Admiral LARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Stevens.

OVERVIEW PRESENTATION

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do this morning is give you a little overview, kind of my strategic view of the Pacific, using some charts to give you my assessment of where we think we are going and what our strategy is. Then I would call upon my service component commanders after that to each give a short oral statement, focusing on their respective services. Then at that point we would be ready for your questions.

Senator INOUE. That would be fine, sir, and without objection, the charts will be made part of the record.




CHART 1




CHART 2

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman and Senator Stevens, I am very pleased to appear before you today to talk about the Pacific Command, as you have mentioned, the largest unified command in the world. Our area of responsibility stretches over 100 million square miles, about 52 percent of the Earth's surface in an area that encompasses two-thirds of the Earth's population, an area where we have relations with more than 40 nations in a coordinated strategy.

It is a region of increasing importance to the United States, and I think the defining characteristics of our region are distance, diversity, and change. Today I am very pleased to talk to you about our strategic posture in the region, about my strategic vision for the Pacific Command, and how we are managing the challenge of change. As I do this, I will try to articulate the continuing value of our forward deployed, our forward based, and our forward station forces in the Pacific.

AN ERA OF REMARKABLE CHANGE

It is pretty hard to talk about the Pacific, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, without talking about the remarkable change that has taken place since I have been CINCPAC just short of 2 years. I think we need to have a clear understanding as you look at some of these changes that we must do more than just react to change. We have to anticipate change. We have to be flexible. We have to adapt. What we want to do here in the Pacific is to shape our future, shape our environment in a positive way so that we can protect our interests and promote our values.

Let me mention one thing that strikes me as I look at some of these major changes. When I arrived here almost 3 years ago and took the job of CINCPACFLEET, probably my biggest worry at that time was the Soviet Pacific fleet, that big, blue-water navy that was patrolling the Pacific.

Over the last 2 years who would have thought that I would host my Soviet counterparts twice, once at CINCPACFLEET and once at USCINCPAC, and that I would have made two trips to the former Soviet Union to be hosted there and travel to several locations in the Russian Far East. Who would have thought that we would have a Russian ship in the Persian Gulf, operating with U.S. ships under the U.N. umbrella, participating in the embargo and the sanctions against Iraq.

Now we are pushing our exchanges between Russia and the United States Armed Forces down to lower levels so junior officers and a broader array of our people can get acquainted in hopes that they can appreciate civilian control of the military, democracy, and some of the things we stand for. That is just one example of how the world has changed.

The point I would make here is that we will not be able to predict the future any better than we would have predicted these events 2 years ago. But we can be ready for them. I think we can protect and advance U.S. interests in the process if we do it right.




CHART 3

There is one thing that has remained constant in this sea of change. That is our national security objectives. Those four items there have really been remarkably consistent over the last 40 years or more. But what has really changed is the emphasis.

No. 1 on the chart, the survival of the United States, dominated it. It dominated our thinking, our budgets, our posture, our strategy. We deployed our forces and used a strategy of containment to win the cold war with the Soviet Union. We were worried about a short notice global war. We were worried about the possibilities of the nuclear holocaust.

But with the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the shifting alignments in the global security posture now, we can look at Nos. 2, 3, and 4. We can devote much more interest there. We can look at what stands out now as the economic dimen-

sion as well as promoting U.S. values and a stable environment with friends and allies.

So our mission now becomes one more of advancing these U.S. interests. We are not postured against an ill-defined or poorly-defined threat. What we are trying to do is advance U.S. interests.

As we do this, we need to ask a very important question. That question is: Will the United States remain a political, economic, and military superpower? I would submit that the answer to that must be "Yes," and to do that, we need to have an adequate defense structure.




CHART 4

Let me look at the economic dimension and the economic importance of the Pacific because both you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Stevens, have touched on this.

If you look at the gross national product of Asia Pacific versus Europe, you will see there is a crossover here in 1990 where the Asia Pacific region gross national product exceeded that of Europe. It continues to grow at a larger rate. Some people have talked about the century of the Pacific being the 21st century. I submit that perhaps the century of the Pacific occurred 10 years early and we are into that century right now.




CHART 5




CHART 6

If you look at U.S. foreign trade, the trade with Asia has been larger than the trade with the European economic community for 20 years, since 1972. Our \$320 billion worth of trade to Asia Pacific region is larger than any other region of the world. As you can see, this gap continues to grow each year. The trend is accelerating if you look at the percentages of our trade worldwide. Trade with the Asia Pacific region is now 36 percent more than any other region

and last year for the first time more than our combined trade with North and South America.

So what we need is continued access to the money, to the markets, to the resources, to the trading partners in Asia and to have a contact with this dynamic region that will allow our country to continue to prosper. Our economic future is linked to the stability and the security of this region, and our military forces are key to maintaining that stability.




CHART 7

Some people might say, well, when you are talking trade, you are talking imports and balance of payments and maybe that could be a negative thing. But I am not just talking imports because almost one-third of our exports were to the Asia Pacific region last year. That is one-third of \$422 billion. I think the exports to the Pacific last year really helped moderate the effects of an economy that was weak and really dampened that somewhat.

Early reports this year say these exports may be up as much as 5 percent. The Department of Commerce said that that number, that amount of exports could directly or indirectly account for 2.5 million jobs.

The point I would make here is that our economic future is inextricably linked to the Asia Pacific region. We have to take advantage of these investment and export opportunities. Trade and our economic growth depend upon stability.

I must emphasize here I do not talk about stability as an end in itself or an independent goal. Stability is a by-product that creates an environment for economic development and cooperation. That is what we are after. That is what stability provides to us.

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS—SECURITY TREATIES

There are other reasons why we need to be involved in the Pacific. There are other reasons why the Pacific is very important to

us. Five of our seven mutual defense treaties worldwide are with treaty partners in the Pacific. We have five treaty partners out here. New Zealand, of course, is on hold right now because of the political problem with them as being part of ANZUS. However, we do have five other treaty partners here in the Pacific. Our support of these treaty commitments is a national responsibility. It is one that I must help carry out as part of my responsibilities.




CHART 8

But in the Pacific, this area that is so important to us, there are also some disturbing trends. If you look at some of the items that I have listed here, first of all, there is increased economic disparity. The economic progress out there is not equally distributed. We have haves and have-nots and this could create tensions in the future if this exacerbates.

We all know about the availability and the sale of weapons throughout the entire region and the increased social changes.

We have population growth. We have urbanization occurring. Much of the growth of the world is occurring in Asia right now. Some countries have aging populations. Some countries have youthful populations with large unemployment. So there are many social costs that will come to the fore in future social pressures.




CHART 9

And one of the things you see as you look at this growth is that it will put pressure on the environment. There is a temptation to go for economic growth without environmental protection. You can get environmental devastation as you try and face some of these social challenges.

And, we must consider the border disputes, the animosities and the insurgencies. You see ethnic violence all around us. These pressures certainly exist in many places in the Pacific.

Some people might say, why do you list a natural disaster as a trend, how can you predict a disaster? In the Asia Pacific region, they occur so regularly that they are trends, whether they are typhoons, whether they are volcanoes or other types of natural disasters, earthquakes, we have them and we have to be ready to respond.

These trends are threats to the stability, the peace, and the progress out here. I was asked a couple years ago when I started talking about some of these trends, What is the threat? I would say the news media today is filled with strife and identifies the threat very well for us. Look at what is happening in India, in Cambodia, Sri Lanka, North Korea, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, and the list continues to grow.

The United Nations is deployed in a record number of peacekeeping operations at the present time. When the world is unstable, the United States is called upon. The United States is involved.



National Defense Policy

Foundations

Strategic Deterrence

Forward Presence

Crisis Response

Force Reconstitution

CHART 10

In light of our interests and despite these concerns, I am responsible for discharging our defense Pacific policy. Our defense policy rests on these four foundations. These are the foundations to promote our interests and promote our values. I support all of four of these but on a day-to-day basis. Nos. 2 and 3 are really my bread and butter: forward presence and crisis response with the new focus on regional stability and shaping the environment in a way that will allow us to have progress and security. I do that in the Pacific.




CHART 11

I think we get a real bang for our buck out here, Mr. Chairman, because the Pacific Command is an economy of force outfit. The Pacific Command has only 20 percent of the active duty U.S. military forces to cover more than one-half of the world and less than one-third of those forces are forward deployed.

I would hope to show you today that these forces are really bare bones and they are very effectively used as we look at our strategy in the Pacific.

COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

I have designed a strategy to meet the challenge of change in the Pacific, that looks to the future security environment and moves us from the cold war strategy of containment to a new approach that supports our interests and our values. I call this strategy cooperative engagement and I would like to describe what it is.

It says that I have means; I have forces, assets, funds, programs. I have all the things that the Government has given to me, that I have at my disposal, to apply in three ways: forward presence, strong alliances, and crisis response.

What I am trying to do is achieve these ends through peaceful engagement and participation; be partners in shaping the environment; and cooperate with others as we try in peacetime to shape a stable world. In a crisis we want to come together to form cooperative coalitions if the need arises. In conflict, we must win, either unilaterally or multilaterally in coalitions. All of those support these very important national security objectives, national objectives and American values. We want to shape the future and we want to have a sense of a partnership out here on a daily basis.

We do not want anyone to be tempted to resort to force. We want that to be unthinkable. We want international cooperation in the crisis to be the norm, to be something that happens very smoothly. We want coalitions to form and operate smoothly with our partners helping us and doing their share for regional security.





CHART 12



Strategic Considerations: East Asia Strategic Initiative

Unique to USCINCPAC

Strategy framework country by country

Approved by the President

CHART 13

I believe you can see that the point of our strategy of cooperative engagement is to support our Nation's objectives, our interests, and our policies. I will come back in a minute to our forward presence, strong alliance, and crisis response, and more detail on how we are applying our forces to accomplish those ends.

EAST ASIA STRATEGIC INITIATIVE

Now, I do not apply these means or these resources that I have in isolation. I have a unique consideration in my theater, and that is the East Asia strategy initiative. It is unique to USCINCPAC. It is a document. It is a strategy. It is a framework. It is a country-by-country analysis of our strategic objectives.

It started out as a draft by CINCPAC, where we put this all together. We sent it forward to the Office of the Secretary of Defense via the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Then it was worked through the executive branch. It was approved and signed by the President and sent to the Congress and approved by the Congress.

And, the point I want to make here is it has been a bipartisan approach. It has been a bipartisan approach to Pacific security that is agreed upon on both sides of the aisles, where we have to justify everything we are doing out here. It is a program that also delineates which of our forces are forward stationed, which of our forces will be outside the U.S. territory.




CHART 14

These are delineated in that study. They are principally in Korea and Japan. They are Army divisions, they are Air Force wings and they are Navy forces afloat that are forward stationed in Japan. This is the only real U.S. troop concentration outside our territory. We have about 36,500 in Korea and about 47,000 in Japan. It is not a large force when you consider their responsibilities in encouraging international cooperation and protecting our interests in the Pacific.

This economy of force is forward stationed to promote U.S. interests, not just to secure the interest of our allies. This is an important point that is often misunderstood. We are not there just to protect others. We are there because it is in our vital strategic interests to be there and it supports our national objectives.




CHART 15

I said I would return to the forward presence crisis response and strong alliances. I would like to talk now about the resources that I have and how I apply those in forward presence.

As I look at my forces I have three tiers of forces that are strategically placed in the Pacific. Two of those forward stationed forces that I just talked about, that are basically in Japan and Korea, I also maintain forward deployed forces by rotating some forces afloat out to the western Pacific to join the 7th Fleet.




CHART 16

I have rotationally deployed forces, like Marine Corps units deploying to Okinawa, Air Force going to Singapore, and I have temporarily deployed forces, exercises, exchanges, all the things we do with other countries. That allows me to shape this forward presence in a very positive way, to shape it on a day-to-day basis to meet our needs and to get the coverage that we need for our strategy of cooperative engagement.

My second tier of defense, if you will, I call forward based. I say forward based, because these forces are closer to the action and are more strategically located than those in the lower 48 of the continental United States. These are the forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. Territories, predominantly Guam. So, I have another line through Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam that is forward based along with naval forces afloat from the 3d Fleet.

Finally, from the continental United States I have forces in California and Washington State. I can draw forces from other regional CINC's if I have a major need to tailor that forward presence. These same forces can be tailored for forward presence or for crisis response, which I will discuss in a minute.

I consider this kind of a tool kit. This is what is available for me to draw and to shape in a truly joint fashion for engagement, for deterrence, for influence and for rapid reaction. I call this process of shaping these forces adaptive presence.

COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT FOR REGIONAL STABILITY



Cooperative Engagement:

Peacetime Military Activities

Pacific Command Strategy

- Directed by CINCPAC
- Executed by components
- Adapted to individual nations

- Combined exercises (CPXs, FTXs, CAXs, small unit training, major exercises)
- OPLAN Preparation
- Training teams
- Senior official visitors
- Personnel exchanges
- Seminars-conferences
- MEDCAPs
- Humanitarian Assistance
- Commemorations & Celebrations
- Port Visits
- Passing Exercises
- Engineer Teams
- Disaster Relief
- CD Ops
- Intel Exchange
- IMET

CHART 17

How do we put this cooperative engagement in action for regional stability in peacetime? We make our presence felt overseas by having day-to-day operations and military contact with more than 40

nations in my region. These range from ship visits to personnel exchanges, seminars, intelligence exchanges, major combined operations, exercises and meetings with top-level officials.

On my most recent trip through the Pacific region about 2 weeks ago I went to the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia and met with senior officials in each of those governments to discuss a wide array of national objectives, both political, military, economic, and diplomatic. Our goal is to support our foreign policy objectives, and foreign policy does include military, political, diplomatic, and economic objectives. We do not separate those, because they are all inextricably linked and we must go forward with a united front.

I talked about what we do in peacetime, our peacetime military activities on a day-to-day basis. We try at the Pacific Command to give unity and direction to our effort. We have a Pacific Command strategy. It is directed by USCINCPAC. It is executed by the service component commanders and it is tailored to the individual nations.

The strategy is published as a large classified single document where we analyze each nation in the region according to their needs and according to our interests. We adapt our presence and our programs to provide support on a nation-by-nation basis tied to a regional strategy.

It is a joint coordinated effort. All of my service component commanders here support it. They have their contacts that are also in support of this and they coordinate all of their efforts along with my efforts so that we have a unified strategy.




CHART 18

Here are a few examples of some of the things that we do in coordination and in cooperation with each other to make sure that we are supporting our interests. It gives us maximum influence. It gives us maximum jointness and it gives us significant flexibility. It also draws on the very unique contributions that each of these

services can provide. More importantly, as we get reductions in forces, it allows us to streamline, reduce inefficiencies, eliminate any overlap and redundancies in our roles and missions.

I talked about strong alliances. We have our treaty partners. We must support them. It is a national responsibility. To do that I have entirely revised my Pacific Command exercise program. I have eliminated all of the vestiges of cold war operations.

We are focusing on alliance partners now. We have reduced the numbers and the costs of exercises overall. We have gone more to command post exercises, computer simulations, and we have tightened the focus of the joint exercises and combined exercises we do with our allies to make them highly beneficial. In doing so, we promote interoperability in our plans, in our training, in our equipment, and in our ability to work together for mutual defense. We are also able to come together in case of contingencies.

CONTINGENCIES




CHART 19

You might ask, what do you mean by contingencies? Contingencies are the type of situations that require us to commit the resources of our military and the prestige of our nation to meet a specific challenge. We face a wide variety of these in the Asia Pacific region:

One is disaster relief. We have been involved in Bangladesh, the Republic of the Philippines, Guam, and during Hurricane Iniki here in Hawaii.

Humanitarian assistance, where we have been involved in both Mongolia and Russia.

The possibility of a military confrontation, where the Korean Peninsula is the most likely place.

Combating drugs that flow out of the Golden Triangle in South-east Asia.

And, peacekeeping operations, and humanitarian conflict in areas like Cambodia and Somalia.

NEW MISSIONS FOR THE FUTURE




CHART 20

I also believe that, although some of the missions are new to the military, we will continue to have new missions in the future in this new environment. We are going to be used to enforce sanctions, to promote responsible behavior among the nations of the world. We will have more temporary ad hoc coalitions operating, perhaps under an UN umbrella or perhaps with nations coming together for common interests for a common cause.

It will not always mean direct or large U.S. involvement, but U.S. leadership and U.S. support are the keys. There are some things that we do very, very well that we need to contribute: logistics, planning, administration, communications, and interoperability. We have no intent of being the 911 number for the world, but coalitions coalesce around winners. And you have to have a credible capability for a coalition to coalesce around.

We are the only nation that has the status and the capability to really sponsor some of these larger international causes. We have the flexibility, the mobility and the power of projection capability to do things that other people cannot do. We were recently called into Somalia in a very graphic example of what the United States can very rapidly provide; then we can turn that over to the United Nations and other people as we withdraw.




CHART 21

Of course, there will be some contingencies that will require more of a direct military response, a crisis response. To do that we have developed a new organization that will allow us to do that, a two-tiered command relationship from USCINCPAC right down to a joint task force commander with service components operating for him. This is different from the old cold war organization.




CHART 22

What this means is, if there is a crisis or some event occurs, my service component commanders here, listed on this chart, come together with me and tell me what forces are available to meet that crisis. We tailor those forces very carefully to meet that crisis, into a joint task force with contributions from all services.

We pick a commander, a tactical commander for that joint task force. We give him an augmentation cell from my headquarters that is trained and ready to go and on alert at any time to go to an aircraft and deploy. They give him the joint expertise and the resources that he needs to go through crisis action planning and respond to national direction. Then the components that are formed under him are ready to operate as a cohesive tactical unit.

The components here are responsible for training, equipping, providing, and chopping those forces to me and to the joint task force and for logistically supporting them during the operation. They sit at my right hand as principal advisers on the use of service forces as we bring them together in a joint task force. This is very crisp and clean. I communicate very directly with the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for strategic direction and policy. I transmit that to the joint task force commander who gives tactical direction. It eliminates layering and is a very smooth way to operate.

So, in a crisis, if I had to go to a crisis response, I would identify a commander for that joint task force and look at the joint and combined forces available. Then I would make sure that our exercise program has them exercised and ready to go in a precrisis situation. That way I have tailored force packages ready to form into a module and to go.




CHART 23

What we did is look around our area at all the forces and commands available and we picked these people here as potential commanders of joint task forces or as components to form a part of that

joint task force. You see we have Navy numbered fleet commanders. We have the I Corps Army commander from the continental United States, Marine expeditionary force commanders, numbered Air Force commanders, infantry division commanders, and our Special Forces commander here from Hawaii.

We folded in the responsibility to train all these people into our exercise program and they are all trained annually with the top three here being trained to be commanders of that joint task force, the 7th Fleet, the I Corps from Fort Lewis, and the III MEF Commander from Okinawa in Japan. And they are trained and ready to go on a moment's notice.




CHART 24

They also have some forces available to them. As I go back and look at my three tiers here of forces strategically placed, you see that I have the forward-deployed forces with assets available, the forward based in Hawaii and Alaska and reserves that I can pull from the continental United States. You can see that the forward-based forces in Alaska and Hawaii have a strategic location and importance to me as I look at projecting power forward.

I pull those capabilities as I would pull tools from a tool kit to meet the needs of a specific situation. As I mentioned before, I call this adaptive presence. It works for crisis response the same way it works for forward presence. You pull the forces and you tailor them. I track the availabilities forces on a daily basis with readiness reports from components, daily situation reports, so we know at any time which ones are fully up, trained and ready to go for a rapid deployment. They are focused into our joint task force training.




CHART 25

I will give you an example here of how we made this work in an exercise called Cobra Gold 1992 that we did last year in Thailand.

We had the Tarawa Amphibious Ready Group come into the exercise. We took Air Force aircraft from wings in Japan and Korea. The III MEF commander in Okinawa, a Marine Corps two-star general, was the commander of the joint task force. From Alaska we pulled the 6th Infantry Division division-ready brigade and from the continental United States forces from Camp Pendleton and the air contingency force. We tailored them very quickly into a joint task force for a Southeast Asia scenario in Thailand.

And, by the way, we were challenged by a real world situation there in which we had to redeploy this force very rapidly because of the violence in Thailand. That redeployment, which was as challenging as a deployment, went very, very smoothly with the procedures that we have adopted.

Here is a plan for a similar exercise that will take place in 1993 in Thailand, called Cobra Gold. This time the commander will be the I Corps commander from Fort Lewis, WA, a three-star Army general. We will have the *Belleau Wood* Amphibious Ready Group which is forward stationed in Japan. We will have Marine forces from Okinawa, and aircraft from the Air Force in both Japan and Korea. This time we will pull the 25th Infantry Division division-ready brigade from Hawaii and forces from Camp Pendleton in California.




CHART 26



Adaptive Presence

TANDEM THRUST 92




CHART 27

Probably an even better example of how we come together in a large crisis was the exercise Tandem Thrust 1992 which was conducted last summer off the southern California coast area. We had 25 ships, 200 aircraft, 20,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and Coast Guard people in maneuvers in that area.




CHART 28

An interesting point here is that I wanted to prove the concept of the joint task force commander being afloat at sea and having his components widely distributed and not co-located with him.




CHART 29

The 3d Fleet commander was the commander of the joint task force. He worked directly for me and he had an Army brigadier general as his deputy commander. We had the Navy commander on a aircraft carrier. We had the Army force commander, a commander from Alaska from the 6th Infantry Division. The Air Force

commander, also 11th Air Force from Alaska who deployed with his Air Force forces also, was our joint force air component commander [JFACC].

The Marine forces started out on amphibious ships at sea and then transferred ashore. Our Special Operations Force Commander Pacific from Camp Smith here in Hawaii also deployed there.

It was a perfect example of adaptive force packaging and bringing a force together for a specific mission by drawing forces from all over the theater.

The movement was rather dramatic. We had airborne troops coming in from Alaska. The 11th Air Force commander flew in with his command post and also with aircraft for missions. Air Mobility Command, Air Combat Command, we had forces come from Hawaii; maritime prepositioning forces; Navy forces at sea; and amphibious operations. It was truly a joint operation with all services participating in coordinated battlefield operations and it was a remarkable demonstration of a joint capability.

As I mentioned, one of the things that I really wanted to do was to prove that my commanders could be widely distributed because this could happen in Southeast Asia in any type of contingency. And I did that, by having forces distributed, flags throughout the entire area connected through sophisticated communications for a massive transfer of orders and information and intelligence, all electronically.

And I am very pleased to say that it worked. We had considerable support from the Space Command and from other resources that worked very well. My new Joint Intelligence Center Pacific supported this entire operation in a very sophisticated way. It is exactly how we would do business if we were deployed for a contingency in the western Pacific.



Adaptive Presence in Action



Bangladesh



Philippines



Guam



Hawaii



Cobra Gold '92



Tandem Thrust '92

Also, I would like to point out that supporting our strategy of cooperative engagement is not a theory. It is something that we have put into practice and it works. We did it in Bangladesh, the Philippines, Guam, and Hawaii as well as the two exercises that I have just described to you. We have refined it over the last 18 months and I am convinced that we are ready now to respond to anything that we are called upon to do.

But I would like to point out, Mr. Chairman, that this is why realistic training is so important. If you look at this concept—and I pulled these forces together for crisis response—it means that my service component commanders here must be able to train their units on a daily basis. They must have the training areas. They must have the resources, the money, the hardware, the capability, and the people to have them trained up to the level that we can pull them into the joint community and into a joint task force for a rapid response. As the numbers comprising the force goes down, it is incredibly important that we remain ready and trained and have a quality force.




CHART 31

So, in summary, I would say that the CINCPAC model and what we are trying to do in this theater is unique, but it is also very adaptive. It meets the unique requirements of this very diverse, very large theater. It gives me the flexibility to meet a number of challenges without redundancy or overlap between my service components. It builds a framework for which we coordinate all of our exercises, plans, communications. It allows us to rapidly tailor forces in joint modules to be ready and it is as responsive for forward presence as it is for crisis response. It is good in peacetime; it is good in crisis; and it is good in conflict.



USPACOM Course for the Future

- Cooperative Engagement for U.S. interests & values; promote Regional Stability as a by-product.
- Focus on: Forward Presence, Treaty Support, Crisis Response.
- Cement close relations with Northeast Asian allies.
- Maintain strong alliance with Australia.
- Encourage closer bilateral ties with ASEAN countries. ("Places not Bases")

CHART 32

I would like to close with two view graphs here, Mr. Chairman, to summarize the course that I have set for the Pacific Command, where we are going in the political-military sense, and to identify our priorities.

I have talked about cooperative engagement, our interests and how we are promoting regional stability. I have talked about the forward presence, supporting our treaty partners in crisis response.

NORTHEAST ASIA

Let me mention a word about Northeast Asia. The Japanese-American Security Treaty is extremely important. It may be my most important relationship here in the Pacific. It is a foundation for stability not only in Northeast Asia but for the entire region. It will continue to be very, very important in the future. In our interaction in Northeast Asia, with Japan and Korea, the United States and then on periphery, China and Russia, will be very, very important in the future to the peaceful evolution of this region.

AUSTRALIA

We maintain strong alliances with Australia, an ally that has common values, common heritage, and who has stood with us for many, many years. They provide us with intelligence facilities, joint-use facilities in things that are very, very important. And they also help us in the South Pacific island area with some contacts that we are not able to make because we do not have the resources to be everywhere. We have found Australia to be a very valuable ally and key player in implementing our strategy of cooperative engagement.

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST NATIONS

One of the things that happened as we departed the Philippines is we found that ASEAN countries have moved closer to us and are willing to intensify their relationships: our exercise programs, our

exchanges, and our level of contact. At the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Manila last June, the ASEAN countries unanimously endorsed the forward presence of U.S. military forces as being stabilizing and a positive factor in the region.

FORWARD PRESENCE

I call our new process now of maintaining that forward presence one of "places rather than bases." Without establishing additional U.S. bases in the region, by having other countries that are willing to share the load and allow us to have increased access, we can maintain our presence in a new environment of fewer forces but still with a credible presence for our cooperative engagement strategy.

POW/MIA ACTIVITIES



USPACOM Course for the Future

- Direct POW/MIA activities in Southeast Asia.
- Continue exchange programs with Russia.
- Strengthen relations with India and in the Indian Ocean.
- Promote cooperative efforts with Pacific Island states.
- Monitor developments in China.
- Promote national policy thru Peacetime Military Activities.

CHART 33

I will continue to direct the POW/MIA activities in Southeast Asia. I have detachments in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and we will pursue this very, very difficult issue to the fullest possible accounting for the family members that deserve so much after 20 years of anguish.

EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA

We will continue our exchange programs with Russia. We will move those exchanges down to a lower level and get many more people involved to try to convince them to head down the path of democratization, economic reform, civilian control of the military, and demilitarization to the point that they can have their own defense but not threaten the security of their neighbors.

INDIA AND COUNTRIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

We also want to continue to strengthen our relations with India and countries in the Indian Ocean. We have moved ahead with military to military relationships with India in the past year. We

have strengthened our military relationship greatly. Each service component commander has formal programs that we are doing with India. I have visited there once. I will be going back in the near future. And we found that our increased military ties have led to stronger political ties now as senior civilian membership of the Indian leadership start exchanges as well. We need to explore our common interest in the region and see where we can cooperate and work together.

But we also need to work with India to defuse that difficult situation between India and Pakistan and to look at arms control, nuclear proliferation and the other issues on the subcontinent there that are so important to our own security.

PACIFIC ISLAND STATES

We want to promote cooperative efforts with the Pacific island states and have a level of contact there that will help them within our resources to advance their interests.

CHINA AND JAPAN

We want to monitor developments in China. I think the future of this region may pivot around China and where China goes in the future.

I think the three bilaterals between Japan, China, and the United States will be critical to our future. It is important that the United States maintain a strong bilateral relationship with China and with Japan and that we watch the Japan-China bilateral. Because if that triangle gets out of balance, it could have unpredictable results on the balance of power economically, militarily, and politically in the future in the region.

I think the China policy will be very important to our Government and how China evolves in the future, both militarily, politically, diplomatically, and economically will be extremely important to the long-term future of the Pacific region.

PEACETIME MILITARY ACTIVITIES

And then, finally, we will promote peacetime military activities that I have described at all levels with the countries out here to maintain that forward presence, that partnership, that sharing, and the ability to work for regional stability.

To achieve these goals, I have got to ensure that we are focused in the Pacific, that we have jointness in everything that we do, and that my headquarters is fully ready to be the warfighting command for the Pacific theater.

The key is that I must have the assets. I must have high-quality, trained, and ready forces. They have to be ready at the right time at the right place. I have to have adequate strength and adequate support. If the Congress of the United States and the American people can provide the assets, we can achieve the vision for the Pacific Command—for today and tomorrow.

CLOSING REMARKS

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would just like to say that the support of you and your committee has been very critical to our efforts in the past to maintain the things that we need to support our vital interests and our security interests in the Pacific.

If we continue this good support and we continue to implement our strategy, I am confident that we can have a positive future and that as events unfold we will be able to shape that environment in a positive way.

I look forward to continuing to work with you in the future as we move toward these goals.

And I thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF ADM. CHARLES R. LARSON

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate being here today, to address the opportunities and challenges of the Pacific. By virtue of geography and history, the U.S. is a Pacific power with enduring economic, political, and security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. For the United States, a maritime power, the Pacific Ocean is a major commercial and strategic artery—a major part of America's lifeline to markets and resources overseas. Our interests and stake in this dynamic region are substantial and growing. Clearly, the U.S. must remain engaged in this region to enhance its own vital interests.

Amidst the transformation taking place in international relations, it is useful to remember that U.S. interests in Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and preventing the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition.

Our economic and security engagement in the Asia-Pacific region since World War II has been a major factor in the region's emergence as one of the engines of global growth, and a major market for U.S. exports. Our forward deployed presence has underpinned stability in East Asia. This presence has made the U.S. the key regional balancer, contributed to regional stability, enhanced U.S. diplomatic influence, and promoted an environment conducive to the growth of U.S. economic interests.

Today, we stand at a key decision point in our nation's history. We must carefully consider our actions and their effect on our interests. We can maintain a military force capable of engagement and participation in peace, deterrence and cooperation in crisis, and victory in conflict. Or we can withdraw those forces to the continental United States, cutting them to the point that they have inadequate influence in peace and run unacceptable risk if they're needed in crisis. We must avoid this latter option no matter how tempting the promise of short-term profit.

We know that our own security and economic growth are linked to the political progress and economic growth of others. When democratic values advance and free market ideas flourish, so do we. When democracy retreats and access to markets and resources is closed, our nation suffers. We simply cannot withdraw from the new world and retreat to the isolation of pre-World War II America.

What we can do is seize the opportunities of a new age to shape a better world—a world built on shared interests, shared responsibilities, and shared ideas. We can create an environment for continued U.S. and world economic growth by promoting democracy and democratic values and by supporting regional security and stability through our forward military presence.

There is an important story to tell in the Asia-Pacific region, and our military is an important part of it. Through our continued engagement, we have the opportunity to advance vital U.S. interests, while shaping a prosperous and secure future.

CHALLENGES

The first challenge of the Pacific is the tremendous size of the region—from Arctic seas and tundra to tropical islands and inland deserts, separated by vast expanses of ocean. The sheer size, about 105 million square miles or 52 percent of the earth's surface, creates some critical time and distance factors. We often refer to its size

as a "tyranny of distance." It takes about 3 weeks for a Navy battle group or Marine Corps amphibious ready group to cross this region. A jet transport carrying troops to a crisis takes more than a day. A fighter plane would have to refuel more than a dozen times just to get to the trouble spot.

If the North Koreans invaded South Korea today, as they are poised to do on a few hours notice, it would take until early January to get there with large numbers of ground reinforcements from the United States. More immediate help will have to come from forward stationed forces in Japan, Alaska, and Hawaii.

The second principle challenge of this region is diversity—diversity among the nations as well as diversity within the nations. This diversity in history, culture, and religion, as well as territorial disputes, boundary disputes, and historic animosities color the perspectives of the regional leaders.

The third major challenge is change: political change, as people demand more open and democratic forms of government; economic change, as the growth of Asian economies continues to outstrip the rest of the world; and military change, as modern weapons proliferate and nations seek a replacement for the familiar structure of the old bipolar world. Today, the most rapidly modernizing forces in the world are in the Asia-Pacific region.

NATIONAL INTERESTS

Despite the substantive challenges and stunning changes around the world, the U.S. National Security interests have remained constant. We seek to promote four objectives: The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure; a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad; healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations; and, a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish.

National power ultimately rests on the strength and resilience of our economy. National security and economic strength are indivisible. But our focus on internal economic interests must not mean turning towards isolationism or rejection of external contacts. Economic recovery and expansion call for expanded overseas trade. As we seek to reinvigorate our economy and rekindle prosperity, we will look to Asia, the region that still leads the world in economic growth.

Already more than 36 percent of U.S. international trade is with the Asia-Pacific region, more than any other region of the world, including our North and South American neighbors, as well as the European Community. That trade is growing steadily more important. Of the \$422 billion in U.S. exports last year, more than 30 percent were with this area. That helped moderate the effects of our slow economy, just about offsetting the decline in our Gross National Product (GNP). Initial figures earlier this year indicated export traffic to the Asia-Pacific region is up about six percent, despite a weak world economic situation. Today 800 U.S. firms have business connections in Singapore alone and the number is growing. Furthermore, approximately 2.5 million jobs are directly dependent on markets and trade in Asia and the Pacific.

As economic issues move to the forefront and the pace of international trade quickens, our economy and our future are becoming intertwined with other nations in this region. There are increasing opportunities for U.S. prosperity through trade and investment, we hope to maintain the regional stability essential for that trade to flourish.

CONCERNS

Unfortunately, there are reasons to be concerned about that stability. These concerns fall into three general categories.

In the near term, I am most concerned about those unstable situations which could develop into conflict overnight. This includes Korea, where an isolated, aging leader may be producing not only a Communist family dynasty, but a nuclear weapon program. The leadership of North Korea has continued to modernize its military and commit a large portion of its budget to military projects. As a result, North Korea has put great deprivation on its people. I worry about what an irrational leader, such as Kim, Jong Il, might do if his country were on the verge of collapse.

Another near term concern is the tense stand off between India and Pakistan along the disputed line of control in Kashmir, where two nations who either now possess or could rapidly develop nuclear weapons have already fought three wars in the past 45 years.

In the mid term I am concerned about what the military calls "unforeseen contingencies"—those explosions of hostilities and pressures which cannot be anticipated but must be contained, to keep the violence from spreading and threatening our vital interests in the area. Historic border disputes, ethnic and religious divisions, and the pressures of nationalism, population growth, and resource or ecological disputes frequently bubble to the forefront. Examples include: an insurgency in the Philippines, continued political strife in Cambodia, tensions on East Timor, in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, in Tibet, and along Burma's borders with Thailand and Bangladesh. Not all these conflicts are "low intensity." In Sri Lanka, for example, 18,000 people have been killed in the past three years.

In other situations, the concern is not the level of violence, but the potential involvement of several nations in the region. An example is the Spratly Islands, a collection of tiny reefs and atolls in the South China Sea, where competing claims of six nations overlap, sea lanes to many markets converge, and a sizable reservoir of oil may lie waiting to be tapped. Some of those islands are heavily fortified, and China recently warned that it would not forswear violence to enforce its claims.

In the long term, my major worry is about the military scramble which would surely follow if we destabilized the region by withdrawing our forward presence. It's unclear what the effect would be on our long-term military and economic development versus that of Russia, China, Japan, the Korean peninsula, or India if we suddenly disengaged and withdrew our presence. I'm not saying that any or all of these would become hostile to our interests, but there is a high probability that some power center would emerge—a development which would probably be destabilizing and eventually threaten U.S. vital interests.

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK

In order to deal with our challenges and concerns in the world, we adhere to the clearly articulated four foundations of our National Defense Policy. They are: strategic deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and reconstitution.

As a Unified Commander, I support all four foundations; however, Forward Presence and Crisis Response are the critical parts of my primary day-to-day mission. They are my key tasks, with a focus on regional issues and stability.

These defense policy foundations underlie our three pillars for foreign policy in Asia. The first two, encouraging economic integration and fostering democratization, are certainly important to our long-term security and prosperity in Asia, but they cannot stand alone. They must be balanced by the third pillar: a defense structure for diverse security concerns.

In building a security structure on these foundations and pillars, we actively apply the six principles of our security policy: Assurance of American engagement in the Pacific region; strong bilateral security arrangements; modest but capable forward deployed U.S. forces; a sufficient overseas support structure; greater responsibility sharing by our Asian partners; and, deliberate policies of defense cooperation.

COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

In synthesizing these elements of the strategic framework, I have developed a strategy for the U.S. Pacific Command, which I call "Cooperative Engagement." This is a process: of aggressively employing the means available to USPACOM—the military assets, funds, programs, and forces; in three principal ways: forward presence, strong alliances, and crisis response; to achieve the desired ends: engagement and participation in peace, deterrence and cooperation in crisis, and unilateral or multi-lateral victory in conflict.

Cooperative Engagement not only advances U.S. interests and values, but as a by-product, promotes stability and progress which benefits our region as a whole. It is manifested in a network of bilateral relationships with more than 40 nations promoting political and economic progress, democratic ideals, and human values.

Here's how the Cooperative Engagement Strategy works. PACOM is organized into three tiers of forces: Forward Stationed, Forward Based, and CONUS Based. We begin by building on our Forward Stationed core of forces in Japan and Korea, and maritime forces continuously afloat in the Western Pacific. We also Forward Deploy forces rotationally: for example marines to Okinawa or the USAF to Singapore. And we temporarily deploy forces forward to exercises or projects. This provides all the benefits of forward presence—engagement, deterrence, influence, and rapid reaction—along with the flexibility to adjust or adapt to change.

We can tailor forces for specific challenges by pulling them from Forward Bases on U.S. territory (Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, etc.), or afloat in the Eastern Pacific, or

from PACOM forces CONUS Based. We can even draw on forces from other CINCs. I call this process of tailoring forces to the mission "Adaptive Presence."

In peacetime we reach out to virtually every nation in the Asia-Pacific region to promote engagement and participation through a wide variety of programs.

We sponsor combined exercises involving everything from tropical medicine and basic seamanship, to amphibious operations and computer simulated war games. This gives us the chance to reinforce our treaty relationships with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, France and Thailand, or open new channels to other nations. For example, this year for the first time in decades we conducted naval exercises with India and Russia.

We run one of the most effective education exchange programs in the world. More than 4,000 foreign military personnel trained with us in 1991. Participation in military seminars and conferences is growing; 28 nations joined us for a logistics seminar in Australia recently, and 29 attended a disaster relief conference in Honolulu.

At the same time, we promote a wide variety of contacts with senior leaders—not just with traditional allies like Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea, but with nations where we are just developing friendships, like Mongolia and the CIS. The exchange program has been so successful that we are expanding it to more junior officers to plant seeds for future cooperation.

The end product of this approach is a network of bilateral relations that spans the Pacific; a "framework for stability" which promotes our interests, with U.S. military forces acting as the glue that holds it together.

In crisis I respond by adapting forces from all Services to meet the specific challenge at hand with a tailored Joint Task Force. The Joint Task Force works directly for me. We have practiced this concept in exercises and employed it in crises. It may take many forms. It worked last year in Bangladesh when a massive storm killed 139,000 people and rocked a democratic government just 39 days old. It was a remarkable display of our flexibility. We used this same streamlined approach to tailor forces when Mount Pinatubo erupted in the Philippines. We activated a Joint Task Force to evacuate 18,000 Americans 6,000 miles in 8 days from a standing start. It works in support of the continuing missions of POW/MIA Accountability and Counterdrug Operations too.

And most importantly, the Joint Task Force concept will work in conflict. This past summer, we practiced the concept with 22,000 people deployed in and around Southern California, in an operation that duplicated every aspect of a Regional Conflict, from special forces teams, Army paratroopers, Marine amphibious assaults, and submarine and carrier operations, to multi-service air strikes. All our military services had forces working under the Navy Third Fleet Commander, who worked directly for me. It was a remarkable exercise with Army operators in Navy combat information centers aboard ship and Air Force planners scheduling Navy carrier strikes.

We have not just revised a Cold War strategy or forces; this is a new approach with a new force and a new vision.

The key to the Cooperative Engagement Strategy is forward presence—that aspect of our strategy occurring in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, exclusive of U.S. territory. Because of the vastness of the region, the time, distance, and cost savings that we realize by having forces forward is enormous. But just as important are the more subjective effects of forward presence: the perception among our friends and allies of U.S. reliability and leadership; the deterrence value with potential bullies who can see that we are committed to protecting our interests on a day-to-day basis. Quite simply, our modest forward presence provides the U.S. the opportunity to reap the economic benefits of Asian dynamism through trade and investment and allows us to avoid the enormous financial costs of conflict that instability would almost certainly generate. Cooperative engagement through forward military presence is truly a win-win policy.

Furthermore, we rely on forward presence and the international cooperation it encourages to build coalitions for collective action in time of crisis. But the cornerstone of our successful strategy for regional peace and prosperity is a continued credible military presence. As we draw down our military forces in this more competitive world, it is imperative that we do it wisely, with our national interests in mind.

Finally, it is important to note that we are not working for peace and stability in this region alone. Our friends and allies in the Pacific make a significant contribution to promoting our common interests. For example, through burden sharing the Japanese enable us to maintain an aircraft carrier battle group in Japan cheaper than in the United States. It would take three carriers rotating out of U.S. ports to provide the same forward presence as the one carrier now forward deployed to Japan. Australia provides us training and intelligence opportunities simply not available anywhere else in the world. And as we closed out the permanent American

presence in the Philippines, many countries in the region stepped forward to offer support for our forces who are stationed in the region or who are transiting the area, helping us replace "bases with places" for training, repair and resupply.

SUMMATION

As I look to the future, I see that Pacific economic prosperity, regional stability, and political influence—all vital for U.S. national interests—depend on our cooperation and engagement with others—and all will continue to rely on forward based American military power. In Cooperative Engagement we have a sound military strategy to achieve our National Objectives and promote our National Interests in peacetime, crisis, or conflict.

The Pacific is important to our future, and we absolutely must remain actively engaged in this region, to promote our values and to encourage the stability that allows trade and economic growth to take place. The key, from a military standpoint, is to maintain an adaptive forward presence—some forces stationed overseas and some deployed periodically, but all working with friends and allies on a daily basis.

With U.S. forces present and participating overseas, our allies are reassured, our potential adversaries are warned, and our commitment is assured. Without this clear signal of U.S. commitment, some aggressive nation may once again miscalculate.

The bottom line is that an adequate military force, especially with key elements forward deployed in the Pacific, is a wise investment in the future.

Before I close, I would be remiss if I failed to recognize our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who serve their nation with dedication in this region. These men and women stand ready to protect our citizens and our interests here in the Pacific. These husbands, wives, mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters represent America with distinction. They truly reflect all that is good about America. I know that you are as proud of them as I am. We owe them our full support.

Mr. Chairman, we need your support and the support of the distinguished members of this Committee to help us in maintaining our forward presence to protect and further America's vital interests in this region. By being here, the United States of America will remain a leader, partner, and beneficiary in this dynamic region.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Admiral Larson. Before proceeding with the questions, would you want to call upon your component commanders?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir; I would like to ask General Adams to say a few words.

Senator INOUE. Fine, sir.

General Adams.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JIMMIE V. ADAMS, USAF, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, PACIFIC AIR FORCES, HICKAM AIR FORCE BASE, HI

General ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am honored to appear before this committee today and I want to take the opportunity to thank you and the members of the committee for your steadfast support for the men and women of the Pacific Air Forces. Your help to improve the quality of life for our people is deeply appreciated and it is especially true in those regions of the world where we are stationed and the day-to-day amenities do not meet our U.S. standards.

We are also grateful for the support that you provided to our troops with equipment to ensure that we have the most modern and capable combat system available.

Admiral Larson has already described to you the importance of Asia and the Pacific area. As he said, the forward presence, crisis response provides the foundation of our national defense policy which are critical to our primary day-to-day missions here in the Pacific.

FORWARD MILITARY PRESENCE

The key to the cooperative and great engagement strategy that he has described is forward military presence. Forward presence earns us enormous time, distance, and cost savings plus equally important, subjective benefits in access, influence, deterrence, and victory in war.

Now, these capabilities require modest but capable forward presence and forward deployed forces. It requires a broad airport infrastructure in order for us to be able to reinforce, the mobility to provide for that reinforcement, and to deploy quickly using air lift and aerial refueling.

PACAF and the U.S. Air Force support our presence in the Pacific with an impressive array of forces available to USCINCPAC as he tailors his response to any regional contingency. PACAF forces are forward stationed in Korea and Japan and deploy frequently to many of the nations in Southeast Asia. Additionally, we have forces in Alaska and Hawaii to protect the sovereignty of our air space through the air defense mission as well as provide the quickest possible reinforcement to the specific area of responsibility.

PACAF REDUCTIONS

The PACAF forces have been reduced to approximately 15 percent over the last 2 years. Most of the reductions came as a result of the closure of Clark Air Base in the Philippines and from internal restructure of our own organizations.

As with the rest of the Air Force, we have flattened our staffs, we have eliminated and reduced intermediate headquarters levels, and we have more closely aligned command and functional responsibilities at the unit level. While our numbers are somewhat smaller, the combination of reorganization and modernization of equipment has provided for steady improvement in combat capability.

MODERNIZATION

In these last 2 years, we have equipped two squadrons of F-16's with a LANTIRN system to give us that much needed nighttime and precision-guided munitions capability. We have added the F-15E Strike Eagle long-range interdiction fighter. We have introduced ARAAM to provide a greatly improved air-to-air capability for our fighters. And we have improved our ability to suppress enemy air defenses by adding the HARM missile to our F-16's.

COALITION TRAINING

Our forward presence provides us a unique opportunity to train with our friends and allies in the region, ranging from an informal day-to-day interface on bases we share with our host nations to preplanned large-scale exercises.

This coalition training is invaluable to our preparation to respond to contingencies in the region. It ensures that our crews know the terrain, they know the weather. They know where the communications will be hooked up. But they also have a good un-

derstanding of the culture, the customs, and politics of places where we may be asked to operate.

RESERVE COMPONENTS

I am also pleased to say that the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve Forces in Hawaii and Alaska are now fully integrated into PACAF as full-fledged members of the total force. We welcome their significant combat contribution to our forces.

So let me say in summary, Mr. Chairman, PACAF is fully prepared to support Admiral Larson's strategy of cooperative engagement in the Pacific theater. Our forward presence is modest but capable and can be quickly reinforced to respond to any crisis to any region.

Again, I want to thank you and this committee for the support you give to our presence in the Pacific and also for your support to our ability to reinforce that presence wherever it is in the best interest of our country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, General Adams.

Now may I call upon Admiral Kelly.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT J. KELLY, USN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, PEARL HARBOR, HI

ADMIRAL KELLY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I also sincerely appreciate the opportunity to be with you this morning. We, in the Pacific Fleet, would like to echo the other speakers today who sincerely thank you for your unwavering support for our effort.

My job is to support Admiral Larson in this huge area with ready and capable naval forces. As has already been stated, as encouraged as I am by the many positive changes we have seen over the last year, I join with those that maintain the world is not yet settled and we should be very careful and give a great deal of thought before we precipitously dismantle our military capability.

FLEET CHALLENGES

The fleet in the Pacific is faced with the same two challenging constants that Admiral Larson mentioned: our enduring interest in the region and the sheer size and scope of this theater. Because neither of these two are going to diminish, I think it is going to be a little bit more difficult for me to provide both credible forward presence, which, in my view, is the bedrock of stability, and the on-call combat forces necessary to respond to emerging crisis as the fleet shrinks in size. Example today: 50 percent of the ships in the Pacific fleet are at sea or deployed.

CHANGES TO THE NAVY

Despite what some critics say, the Navy is changing, from its organization inside the beltway to the way we train and operate the fleet. The measure of that change is embodied in the recently published strategy white paper signed by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations [CNO], and the Commandant of the Marine Corps titled, "From the Sea." It is a real change in the way

we do business and certainly the most significant strategic shift in our thinking since the end of World War II.

Its purpose is to better prepare us to contribute to the national security strategy and, specifically, to Pacific strategy in an environment far different from yesterday's. It shifts our focus from preparation for open ocean warfare on a global scale to regional contingencies launched from the sea with an attendant focus on littoral operations.

JOINT OPERATIONS

The mandate requires even closer integration with the Marine Corps as well as an increased emphasis on joint operations with the other services. All of our recent operations that Admiral Larson mentioned have been joint. We have changed our tactical training in the fleet to better prepare our forces to operate in this new environment. I expect substantial changes to our requirements and procurement processes as we readjust to the new strategy.

CARRIER OPERATIONS

An interesting anecdote; I have seen some criticism in the paper recently that despite our recently published paper, one of the first reactions in Somalia was to send the *Ranger* carrier battle group down to that area and say if you are really serious about adaptive presence, why do you send a carrier there.

And the critic did not understand that the only tactical air reconnaissance that was available to us before that operation was provided from the decks of the carrier and, in fact, the carrier is still providing all the air traffic control in the region. When the functions are taken over by arriving forces, the carrier will go someplace else. It demonstrates the flexibility of that platform.

CONSTANT CREDIBLE FORWARD PRESENCE

One element of our past strategy, however, should not change. I completely agree with Admiral Larson that the best guarantee that we have for the safety, security, and free trade in the Pacific is constant credible forward presence, reinforced to me time and again by the region's military and political leaders that I run into on my travels throughout the Pacific. They value our leadership and recognize the central role we play in enhancing regional stability.

DRAWDOWN OF OVERSEAS BASES

I also conclude that with the inevitable drawdown of overseas bases, such as when I participated in the closing ceremonies in the Philippines 3 weeks ago, that a great deal of our forward presence will continue to be naval in nature, especially considering the maritime nature of the theater.

It is going to be somewhat of a challenge, but I believe Admiral Larson's focus on regional security and his strategy of cooperative engagement and our interplay with our sister services will enable us to remain a force for peace and stability in the region and, most importantly, will allow us to be seen as such by the others on the far side of the Pacific.

Although the fleet will be smaller, I am confident for the foreseeable future it will remain very capable of responding rapidly and decisively to potential regional conflicts, contingency situations in this region.

In order to preserve the capability of a smaller force, we have worked hard to better standardize operations and procedures between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. It will allow ships in tailored task groups to transfer to other fleets and geographical areas temporarily with no attendant loss of operational tempo or capability. We call that global sourcing.

UPGRADE OF FORWARD BASE FORCES

Additionally, we have significantly upgraded our forward base forces in the theater. The carrier *Independence* replaced the recently retired *Midway* in Japan. We have also placed an amphibiously ready group in Sasebo centered around the amphibious assault ship *Belleau Wood*.

WESTERN PACIFIC CHANGES

Beside upgrading our operational capability, moving these ships to Japan further demonstrated our resolve and credibility to our many friends and allies in the region. This is important as the number of ship days we currently spend in the western Pacific is much lower than it has been in prior years, due mainly to our requirements in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Thirty ships from the Pacific Fleet are in that area today.

We also are trying to change a growing perception that we are disengaging from our regional commitments by maintaining and, in some cases, increasing our exercise participation on a bilateral basis with East Asian nations.

Logistically, the closure of Subic has cost us in terms of convenience but not, I think, in theaterwide capability. Other nations in the region have stepped up their support of our operations. We are still working in cooperation with our sister components to identify adequate training facilities to fill the Subic void.

EXERCISE PROGRAM

Our exercise program throughout the theater allows us to refine our skills in joint, combined, and allied operations as well as to train in the actual environment where we might be called upon to operate. I can tell you from personal experience that flying in southern California does not compare to the monsoons of the South China Sea or the snowstorms of the Sea of Japan.

A perfect example of what I mean is Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The ability to put forces into the gulf nations in that area did not happen by accident or overnight. It took years of effort centered on forward presence and exercises to establish the trust and confidence necessary both in our own ability and among the gulf states. It was the key to our success over there and it is the same sort of program which is in place throughout the Pacific and Indian Ocean littorals.

In conclusion, I would like to say that while the Pacific theater is in transition and presents us with many new challenges, I am

happy to report that the Pacific Fleet provides a balanced naval force capable of supporting the national and the Pacific Command strategy.

We thank you for your continued support.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Admiral Kelly.

General Corns.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOHNNIE H. CORNS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ARMY PACIFIC, FORT SHAFTER, HI

General CORNS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I, too, want to express my appreciation for the opportunity to add information on the subject of this morning's hearing and on behalf of all of the soldiers and their families and our Department of Army civilians here in U.S. Army Pacific, thank the committee for its continuing staunch support for programs that enable us today to enjoy a high state of morale and a high level of effectiveness.

U.S. ARMY PACIFIC OVERVIEW—AROUND THE REGION

USARPAC, in support of USCINCPAC's strategy, maintains in a forward station status Headquarters U.S. Army Japan and IX Corps on Honshu, Japan, and 1st Battalion and 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa. The U.S. Army Japan and IX Corps have been instrumental, a catalyst, for improvement over the last dozen years in the capability of the maneuver divisions of the Japan ground self-defense force and the command and control capability of their five Army headquarters, particularly the northern and northeast headquarters through a cooperative, continuing bilateral training and exercise program.

We have forward based in Alaska, the 6th Infantry Division Light, which has for the last 3-plus years joined its sister light division, the 25th Infantry Division Light stationed here in Hawaii, in being prepared to go anywhere within the Pacific Command area of responsibility in furtherance of the accomplishment of the objectives set by Admiral Larson, USCINCPAC.

A unique capability of that 6th Infantry Division Light is an airborne task force which has on occasion suited up airborne at Eielson Air Force Base or at Elmendorf Air Force Base, flown to, in one case, Korea with nonstop flight, parachuted into an exercise and then operated under control of military forces of I Corps and other U.S. Army elements involved in exercise, Team Spirit.

As Admiral Larson referred to in his presentation, that airborne task force was part of the contingent that deployed out of Alaska and participated in exercises in southern California this past summer.

Further, the 6th Infantry Division Light has now participated in various types of training exercises and exchanges with a number of the two dozen or so armies with which we cooperate each year in training exercise that range anywhere from individual observers, small exchange elements, or training exercises involving companies in the battalion minuses. I would highlight the involvement of the 6th Infantry Division Light in our exercise Balikatan in the Philippines just this past November, a small but important contingent and exercise for us.

The 25th Infantry Division here in Hawaii similarly earlier this year participated in training exercises in Australia with the Australian military as part of a joint exercise. During that exchange, companies—infantry companies participated with one Australian company here with us at Schofield Barracks and one of the 25th Division's companies with Australia.

More importantly, the location of the forward-based 6th and the 25th Infantry Divisions give them an opportunity, which we capitalized upon, to come into contact with many of the different armies of our friendly nations within the Pacific. This point has been hit before; I do not think it can be overemphasized.

ARMY SUPPORT TO USCINCPAC

The Army can support USCINCPAC in his continuing everyday strategy to accomplish the objectives that have been briefed. What USARPAC does is being done by the presence of the forces where they are, by their availability to the command and control of USCINCPAC. By their ability to be involved, they contribute to that familiarity and that rapport that General Adams referred to which is so invaluable such as that when an activity, whether it is disaster relief or a contingency operation begins, you are operating from a base of familiarity, confidence, and trust, very, very invaluable to us.

Likewise, I would emphasize that for the U.S. Army in the Pacific, we enjoy the location in Hawaii and in Alaska because of the presence of our other component forces. It enables us to undertake one of the joint task forces that Admiral Larson may put together and we get out of the blocks quickly, in a very cooperative way, because we know one another.

Recently, I was involved in an exercise involving components of all the services as well as the Air and Army National Guard of Hawaii. We did not lose the time that you can sometimes lose even though you have components come together, well trained, well led, but not yet having that degree of familiarity and confidence in one another.

That is present here, both in Hawaii and in Alaska. The two divisions of USARPAC are able to enjoy that advantage.

PACIFIC ARMY MANAGEMENT SEMINAR

I would highlight within the cooperative engagement efforts of USARPAC our Pacific Army management seminar, which is part of a continuing expanded relations program. This seminar involves pulling together representatives of the armies of nations of the Asia Pacific region for purposes of professional discussion of matters of common interest.

This past June we hosted the 16th of those annual conferences here in Hawaii and the representatives included for the first time the country of Mongolia. Next month, January, the seminar will be hosted by India and USARPAC in India. For the first time it is indicated that the Russian Army will be represented at that conference.

All of these activities are being undertaken by Headquarters USARPAC, either or both of the two divisions, Headquarters U.S.

Army Japan or IX Corps, in furtherance of the objectives that have already been briefed to you.

In the U.S. Army Pacific we are very, very confident of the important role in which we are involved, the importance of the activities in which we are engaged to our country and we look to the future with great confidence that the U.S. Army Pacific has a role and will fulfill it proudly, particularly with the kind of support that we have enjoyed from our service headquarters, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present these comments.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, General Corns.

General Stackpole.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. HENRY C. STACKPOLE, III, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE FORCE PACIFIC, CAMP SMITH, HI

General STACKPOLE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I echo my colleagues in sincere gratitude for your support in our efforts here in the Pacific so vital to U.S. national interests.

As you know, I am privileged to command two-thirds of the operating force of the Marine Corps, 80,000 marines stretched from Yuma, AZ, to security forces at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. They are a competent, well-trained organization and add to the power of USCINCPAC.

MARINE SUPPORT TO USCINCPAC

What I wish to emphasize today is that the marines in the Pacific support U.S. strategic interest by providing Admiral Larson a ready, flexible, mobile, and sustainable force to meet the requirements of the region in the strategic sense and also provides to Admiral Kelly Marines for operation with the fleet in promoting regional stability through presence.

This force is a vital element of the USCINCPAC strategy, articulated earlier, of cooperative engagement. Because of our ability to tailor forces for specific tasks by drawing from marines in Okinawa, Japan, Hawaii, or Camp Pendleton or afloat, our marines also provide the adaptive presence that the Commander in Chief, Pacific desires. Forces may even be drawn as necessary from our units based outside the Pacific in echoing the global sourcing that Admiral Kelly referred to a few moments ago. It is all part of our regional focus/global sourcing orientation and that enhances our ability to support the USCINCPAC.

FORCES IN SOMALIA

A case in point is what is happening in Somalia at this moment. Virtually all the marines that are in Somalia come from the Pacific Command in support of General Hoar at the U.S. Central Command.

Naval power in the Nation's principal maritime regional command, the U.S. Pacific Command, is essential, and we cannot realize its full potential without a strong, readily available, amphibious power projection capability. The Nation's deterrent forces have to be forward based in order to avoid time-consuming transits from the continental United States. That is a given in an area of this

size. Clearly, a force in or near a crisis can influence developing events sooner than one which must transit.

Somalia, again, is a case in point. The approximately 21,000 marines stationed in Okinawa and the air wing in Japan offer the CINC these capabilities in being forward deployed.

Our East Pacific Marine Expeditionary Force, I MEF in California, which is the bulk of the force in Somalia, in addition to amphibious capabilities, maintains a high state of readiness for maritime prepositioned force [MPF] deployments.

MARITIME PREPOSITIONED SHIPPING

I also thank this committee for their support in maritime prepositioned shipping which has proven itself from Desert Storm to the present.

It focuses on preparation for contingencies requiring sustained large-scale operations ashore. In doing so, we offer Admiral Larson additional capability and enhanced flexibility. We have a forward presence amphibious task unit. But what those MPF ships do is provide a bridge, a peg for force expansion, which is occurring as we speak.

1ST MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE

The swing man element in this equation is the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade [MEB] right here in Hawaii. This MEB is prepared to execute arrival and assembly operations in support of any contingency, based upon its experienced, sharpened skills in executing MPF-based deployments, force expansion, and assembly of forces. I like to refer to them as the Pacific's maritime prepositioned force utility infielder.

Together, these forces offer Admiral Larson a wide variety of capabilities to address the challenges in the Pacific, which he has mentioned. Tyranny of distance, diversity and change are met by these forces as well as the overriding challenge offered by uncertainty.

MARINES IN JAPAN

I would be remiss if I did not comment on the situation in Japan since we have such a large element of marines positioned there.

Japan is the cornerstone of our Pacific forward defense strategy. Our bilateral relationship with Japan provides the bedrock for stability in the region. Japan's role in sharing some of the burden of our forward defense strategy yields the most economical means for achieving U.S. goals in the region. I would like to share some figures with the committee.

Currently, there are over \$3 billion worth of facilities on Marine Corps installations on Okinawa and on mainland Japan. This includes about 4,250 family housing units. These facilities have been constructed principally by Japan over the past 10 years. Japan currently provides construction to support U.S. Marine Corps forces at a rate of about \$190 million each year. As a consequence, the Marine Corps has no requirement for MILCON projects to support the force programmed for Japan in 1992 or beyond.

The Government of Japan pays the rent charged by the landowners for land occupied by United States forces. The total land provided to the Marine Corps is about 47,500 acres, plus access to an additional 47,000 acres of range and maneuver areas shared with Japanese defense forces. The annual cost of this land, borne totally by Japan, is \$162 million a year.

In addition to these contributions, in fiscal year 1992 Japan began to offset the United States costs for utilities and for the salaries and benefits for contract foreign nationals. In fiscal year 1992 this offset is valued about 25 percent of the total cost, or \$23 million. In fiscal year 1996 Japan will fund 100 percent of those costs.

If we were to move Marine forces from the western Pacific to bases in the United States, the cost would be dramatic. Existing CONUS facilities could not accommodate the demands of the additional forces. Acquiring land for facilities, land currently provided free by the Government of Japan, would be extremely difficult. Assuming we replaced only the 47,500 acres in operation in Japan for garrison, maintenance, and training ranges, the cost of land alone for a minimum facility at minimum price would be at least \$0.5 billion. The staff at Headquarters, Marine Corps estimates that it would cost \$1.75 billion to build the additional facilities on this land to simply support the forces.

Costs associated with maintaining this force in Japan or in the United States are roughly comparable. In fiscal year 1991, costs for utilities, maintenance of real property, and other engineering support at similar CONUS bases yields an estimated \$42 to \$45 million in annual operating costs. Costs for comparable support for Marine forces in Okinawa and Japan were \$65 million. These overseas costs will decline as the Government of Japan progressively increases its share of the utilities and foreign national salary and benefits costs.

Japan is very sensitive to any perceived reduction of the United States commitment in the Pacific. While Okinawa's Government and local media reaction to the Marine Corps presence has been negative at times, the Japanese Government has made it clear that they consider any drawdown of the United States presence as potentially destabilizing to the region.

They are not alone in this view. In fact, all of the region's nation states, as you have heard testified to today, share concern for the uncertainty of the future and the threat to regional stability that has emerged following the fall of the Soviet Union. So it is an important springboard.

During the course of Desert Storm, an important national asset that is the logistics base in Okinawa provided through put and support for Desert Storm. It is now doing so for Somalia.

JOINT TASK FORCE EFFORT

I would also close with just a comment pertaining to the actual operational function of what Admiral Larson has described as our joint task force effort.

I was privileged to be the Joint Task Force Commander in Bangladesh. In establishing that joint task force, I was joined by a deployable joint task force element from USCINCPAC. I was joined by Blackhawk helicopters from the 25th Infantry Division here in

Hawaii. I was joined by airlifters from Yokota, Japan, to provide support for flowing in supplies. And I was joined by the amphibious task unit of 7,000 marines and sailors who came from Desert Storm, hove off the coast of Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal and continued to provide support that ultimately saved thousands of lives, reached 1.7 million of people in a region 50 miles inland from the Bay of Bengal and along 110 miles of coastline. And most importantly, shored up a government that was 39 days old, literally, after having overthrown an autocracy of 9 years. Without the support that the United States showed in a humanitarian gesture, there is some doubt that Bangladesh would continue to be one of the region's most populous democratic nations.

Outside the Beltway where soldier, sailor, airman and marine come together, there is no service rivalry. The roles and missions are complimentary. As Admiral Larson has described, we have an economy of force package that works. I agree whole-heartedly with my colleague, Lt. General Corns, in talking about the way we have come together to provide stability in the Pacific.

And we trust that we will continue to have your support to maintain those forces necessary to keep that situation stable.

Thank you very much, sir, for the opportunity to appear before the committee.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF GEN. H.C. STACKPOLE III

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today as the Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific.

We believe that the current and ongoing draw down of forces will increase dependence on power projection from the sea. The Marine Corps will continue to modernize its forces and will work with our sister services to retain a formidable capability to project power whenever and wherever needed.

As you know, the Marine Corps maintains significant bases in the Western Pacific on Okinawa and on mainland Japan. We also have forces on Hawaii, and in California.

The forward presence of U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific recognizes the emerging importance of this region to our national interests. Consistent with our national policy and objectives, we must be capable of influencing events in the region. While recent strategy has focused on North East Asia, developments in the Philippines, South East Asia, and ASEAN serve to point out the tenuous dynamics of the region and the need for expanded U.S. influence in the Pacific. What I wish to emphasize is that Marines in the Pacific support U.S. strategic interests by providing to Admiral Larson a ready, flexible, mobile, and sustainable force to meet the requirements of the region, as well as promoting regional stability through presence. This force is a vital element of the CINC's strategy of "cooperative engagement," and because of our ability to tailor forces for specific tasks by drawing from Marines on Okinawa/Japan, Hawaii, Camp Pendleton, or afloat, our Marines provide the "adaptive presence" the CINC desires. Forces may even be drawn, as necessary, from our units based outside of the Pacific. It is all part of our regional focus/global sourcing orientation, which enhances our ability to support the CINC.

Forward presence is an integral part of our national policy and strategy. To realize our national objectives during peacetime, it is necessary to maintain forward deployed forces to signal commitment, respond to crisis, and promote regional stability. In the Pacific, USCINCPAC is responsible for meeting the requirements of protecting U.S. interests both in global and regional conflict. Admiral Larson has stated in the past that he considers Marines on Okinawa, the III Marine Expeditionary Force, an essential, deployable, forcible-entry force, and a key warfighting unit. In view of the demonstrated utility of afloat and readily deployable forces, maintenance of III MEF force levels is considered essential.

In essence, these statements recognize several key facts; (1) that naval power in the Nation's principal maritime regional command, PACOM, cannot realize its full potential without a strong, readily available, amphibious power projection capability.

ity, and (2) that the Nation's deterrent forces must be forward based in order to avoid time-consuming transits from the continental United States. Clearly, a force in or near a crisis can influence developing events sooner than one which must transit. The approximately 20,000 Marines stationed on Okinawa and Japan offer the CINC these capabilities.

Our "East PAC" MEF, I MEF in California, in addition to amphibious capabilities, maintains a high state of readiness for maritime prepositioned force deployments, and focuses on preparation for contingencies requiring sustained large scale operations ashore. In doing so they offer Admiral Larson additional capability and enhanced flexibility.

The "swing man" element in this equation is the First MEB right here in Hawaii. The MEB is prepared to execute arrival and assembly operations in support of any contingency, based upon its experience sharpened skills in executing MPF-based deployments, force expansion, and assembly of forces. I like to refer to them as the Pacific MPF "Utility infielder." Together, these forces offer Admiral Larson a wide variety of capabilities to address the challenges of the Pacific, which he has mentioned (Tyranny of distance, diversity, and change) as well as the overriding challenge offered by uncertainty.

At this point, I would like to make a few additional comments concerning relationships between the United States and Japan. Japan is the cornerstone of our Pacific forward-defense strategy. Our bilateral relationship with Japan provides the bedrock for stability in the region. Japan's role in sharing some of the burden of our forward-defense strategy yields the most economical means for achieving U.S. goals in the region.

Here are some interesting figures regarding this support:

Currently, there are over \$3 billion worth of facilities on Marine Corps installations on Okinawa and on mainland Japan. This includes about 4,250 family housing units. These facilities have been constructed principally by Japan over the past 10 years. Japan currently provides construction to support US forces at a rate of about \$190 million each year. As a consequence, the Marine Corps has no requirement for MILCON projects to support the force programmed for Japan in 1992 or beyond.

The government of Japan pays the rent charged by land owners for land occupied by US forces. The total land provided to the Marine Corps is about 47,500 acres, plus access to an additional 47,000 acres of ranges and maneuver areas shared with Japanese defense forces. The annual cost of this land, borne totally by Japan is \$162 million.

In addition to these contributions, in FY 92 Japan began to offset the US costs for utilities and for the salaries and benefits for contract foreign nationals. In FY 92 this offset is valued at about 25% of the total cost, or \$23 million. In FY 96, Japan will fund 100% of these costs.

If we were to move Marine forces from the Western Pacific to bases in the United States, the cost would be dramatic. Existing CONUS facilities could not accommodate the demands of the additional forces. Acquiring land for facilities, land currently provided free by the government of Japan, would be extremely difficult. Assuming we replaced only the 47,500 acres in operation in Japan for garrison, maintenance, and training ranges: the cost of land alone for a minimum facility at minimum price would be at least \$0.5 billion. The staff at Headquarters, Marine Corps estimates that it would cost \$1.75 billion to build the additional facilities on this land to support the force.

Costs associated with maintaining this force in Japan or in the United States are roughly comparable. In FY 1991, costs for utilities, maintenance of real property, and other engineering support at similar CONUS bases yields an estimated \$42 to \$45 million in annual operating costs. Costs for comparable support for Marine forces in Okinawa and Japan were \$65 million. This overseas cost will decline as the Government of Japan progressively increases its share of the utilities and foreign national salary and benefits costs.

Japan is very sensitive to any perceived reduction of U.S. commitment in the Pacific. While Okinawa's government and local media reaction to Marine Corps presence has been negative at times, the Japanese Government has made it clear that they consider any draw down of U.S. presence as potentially destabilizing to the region. They are not alone in this view. In fact, all of the region's nation states share concern for the uncertainty of the future and the threat to regional stability that has emerged following the fall of the Soviet Union.

I would like to close by emphasizing a few points. The most appropriate force to apply to an area of uncertain threat is one which offers maximum flexibility, mobility, responsiveness, and sustainability. In the Pacific Area, naval forces (Navy and Marines) provide this type of force. The Third Marine Division is the only major ground unit and the III MEF is the only combined arms force immediately available

for contingency operations in the region. The combat service support element of the III MEF, the 3d FSSG, maintains a strategically important forward logistics base and sixty days of supply and equipment for Marine forces in the Western Pacific. I MEF with its preparation and readiness for MPF deployment and emphasis on sustained operations ashore, provides enhanced capability. First MEB, with its own unique capabilities, is prepared to support any contingency involving either of the MEF's. Forward deployed Amphibious Task Units provide an immediately available crisis response capability, as well as the ability to act as a "bridge" for follow in force enhancement as the situation demands. Nowhere has the value of this ability been more clear than in Somalia where an ATU is even now demonstrating the unique capabilities offered by the complimenting of forward deployed amphibious forces with the sustainment and force expansion capabilities inherent in MPS operations. Taken as a whole, forward deployed, forward based, and Conus based Marine forces provide to the Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Command, a readily available, rapidly deployable, and multi-capable force to apply in the event of any threat to our national interests.

RUSSIAN FLEET

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much, General Stackpole.

I think we all agree that much has changed in the last 2 years. One can safely say that the cold war is over. Admiral Larson, I recall those early briefings 10, 20, 30 years ago by the Pacific Command in which the highlight would be a whole array of statistics relating to the presence of the Russian Pacific fleet.

What is the nature, to the extent that you can discuss publicly, of the presence of the Russian fleet here in the Pacific, compared to 2 years ago and today?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, what I have really seen in the evolution of the Russian fleet is the fleet is operating much less. They are much closer to home. The surface ship operating tempo has been greatly reduced. The operating tempo that has changed the least for them are submarine operations, both the ballistic missile and the nuclear attack submarines.

I have found that by watching them with my intelligence reports but also through two on-site visits to Vladivostok in September 1990 and in August of this year my analysis is that their readiness is way down. They still have good hardware. They have modern ships. They have modern equipment. But personnel readiness is down due to the fact that they have not had the resources to go out and train in a sophisticated manner to keep their level of readiness up.

In my conversations with the Russian naval officers in Vladivostok in August, they told me that they still yearn for a regional role. They also intended to keep their logistics station in Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. It serves as an important logistics base to support their regional objectives if called upon.

And, of course, that came true with their recent deployment of the guided missile destroyer *Admiral Vinogradov* to the Persian Gulf where she stopped at Cam Ranh Bay on the way and is currently on her way back with a replacement in route.

So I see them closer to home, readiness down, a lot of hardware still available, and yearning for a regional role and just now reaching out for the first time to participate in coalition operations.

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Senator INOUE. Admiral, as a result of our concerns relating to the North Korean nuclear program, we have halted the phased withdrawal of our forces from the Korean Peninsula. What arrangements must be present or reached before we will resume this withdrawal?

Admiral LARSON. As Secretary Cheney has stated, Mr. Chairman, we must satisfactorily resolve the nuclear issue. In my view, the critical element in resolving the nuclear issue is for the North to agree in conjunction with the South for on-call bilateral challenge inspections of facilities in both the North and the South.

The North has submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], inspection. But as we saw in Iraq, that is no guarantee that those inspections will expose all parts of a nuclear program.

So we feel—and the South Koreans feel—that the bilateral challenge inspections are critical to trying to resolve the nuclear issue. At this point they have made no progress in their talks in coming up with an acceptable regime and then a schedule for implementing that regime.

Senator INOUE. You have indicated that the Korean Peninsula is the greatest threat as far as potential conflict is concerned. If this phased withdrawal is resumed and continued, do you believe that we will be able to maintain one of your missions: deterrence?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, if they can resolve the nuclear issue, the only phase that is left in withdrawal is the withdrawal of about 6,500 Army troops.

But we would still maintain the division flag and, essentially, a robust brigade plus on the ground in Korea, backed by substantial capability for air and maritime rapid reenforcement of the peninsula, with them holding on the ground until more ground replacements arrive.

The intent of the current East Asia strategy initiative is to freeze at that level through 1995 and then reassess, based on the North Korea threat, deterrence, considerations, and the potential regional role of our forces. I think the path that we are on, going from a lead to a supporting role in turning many responsibilities over to the military in the Republic of Korea and our critical effort to rapidly reinforce maritime and Air Force forces there are a significant deterrent and we need to maintain that capability.

PHILIPPINE WITHDRAWAL

Senator INOUE. As a result of our withdrawal from Subic and Clark, I know that you have instituted a new concept called places not bases. What places have replaced Subic and Clark?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, we have strengthened our bilateral relationships with Indonesia, with Singapore, with Thailand, with Brunei, and we have distributed some of our ship repair facilities to Japan, to Singapore, to Malaysia, and to Indonesia. We have gotten access and throughput for aircraft flights and refueling rights from many of those same countries. So I would say virtually all of the ASEAN countries have stepped up a notch.

Australia has stepped forward and offered some valuable training facilities as well as access and our military to military relationships have strengthened with India.

When you put all of that package together, you see a rim of presence, of places around the Asia Pacific rim, where we are now able to take our forces to do some voyage repairs and to have the access and throughput that we need to maintain our presence.

Senator INOUE. Have we used American soil for this purpose also, such as Guam, Hawaii?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir.

Senator INOUE. What is the fact of that?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, the major number of forces that we have relocated from Subic and Cubi Point went to Guam, about 1,300 people. So the majority of the relocation went to U.S. soil. Much of what went from Clark, of course, went to Alaska. And some of the forces came back to Hawaii.

So the bulk of the forces that we relocated from the Philippines came to United States soil, but the access was distributed among the allies where we have no permanent bases.

DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

Senator INOUE. Admiral Larson, the committee has noted the heavy expenditure the Chinese are now experiencing to modernize their forces. Can you give us a capsule picture of the modernization of forces in China and tell us whether this change would have any effect upon the stability of that region?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. China, I call China my wild card. I think China is going to be pivotal to the development of Asia and the peaceful development of Asia in the future, that is, in the diplomatic, political, economic, and in the military spheres.

In the diplomatic sphere, they have done some positive things in cooperating with the United States, signing up for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and trying to adhere to the missile technology control regime. Additionally, although they did vote for the U.N. action in Somalia, they have abstained on other actions, which has allowed things to go forward.

Politically, they just had their 14th Party Congress and they have elected some younger, more reformist people. And by reformist, in their sense, I only mean more supportive of economic reform, not political reform.

In the economic sense you can see this tremendous development in southern China in the provinces, although it is decentralized and not controlled by the central government. They are going to have a difficult transition later from old, antiquated, indepth government type, centrally controlled industries into this tremendous free market economy that has occurred in southern China.

But you overlay that economic potential on that their military development and this is what concerns me right now. They are, in my view, moving toward developing a power projection capability, the SU-27 aircraft, an aerial refueling capability, airborne early warning, and a blue water navy. They stated several years ago that their priorities for modernization in their country were science and technology first, then agriculture, then industry and last the mili-

tary. But in the last 2 years their military budget has had the largest increase of those four areas, going at 10 percent or more.

At the same time in the Spratly Islands dispute, they made a statement that they will not forswear use of force to enforce their claims in the Spratly Islands. While at the same time that the rest of the world was talking about test ban treaties, stopping nuclear testing, imposing limits or moratoriums on nuclear testing, they set off a 1-megaton underground blast right in the middle of the whole thing.

So when I put all of this together, it draws a picture of increased resources for the military, military modernization, and a power projection capability at a time when there is tremendous economic development. The future is uncertain and they are trying to maintain tight, centralized political control of that system.

I think the way they develop will be crucial to the region and we need to watch their military very carefully. Other nations are watching them and other nations tell me that they are concerned.

PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS

Senator INOUE. Are you concerned about China's involvement in the proliferation of sophisticated weapon systems to other countries?

Admiral LARSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have two proliferators right now in my region that concern me: North Korea and China. China has shown a willingness to sell for hard cash to many regions of the world without a great consideration for the political stability, areas like Iran, Syria, and places where we would really question whether that should be done.

They have said they will adhere to the missile technology control regime. They are trying to do that, but we are watching them very carefully with some of their missile sales. Because some of their missiles are right on the borderline or exceed those parameters.

So we see some cooperation on nonproliferation, but China is still very much a weapons seller who continues to want to be a weapons seller in the region.

CARRIER FORCE REDUCTION

Senator INOUE. I will ask one more question and call upon my colleagues here. But I will come back again.

This last question relates to carriers. There is much talk that the next administration may well recommend the reduction of our carrier force from 12 to 10. I am certain it will have an impact on how well you can carry out your mission in the Pacific and I would like you to share with us your thoughts on that.

But before you do, I think it should be noted that to maintain a carrier in the gulf, in all likelihood you need another carrier on its way there, another carrier very likely undergoing repairs, another one for training. So it may well take four carriers to maintain one in the gulf. With that scenario, how would this reduction of 12 to 10 impact your role here?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, we need, in my view, carrier force levels for two reasons. The first is for the presence and the commitments that we have for that presence for carriers. The sec-

ond is to have a surge capability for crisis response where we can contribute to build up of overwhelming force if necessary as we did in the Desert Storm.

I have had a number of discussions with senior officials, both in the State Department and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I have had people say to me, "Well, if that is the issue, we will just change the commitments if you do not have enough carriers."

But we have found over the years that we do not set commitments. These commitments are set by rogue actors like Saddam Hussein and actions of people that cause the President of the United States to make a decision to put naval forces forward, and particularly carrier forces forward, in areas to promote deterrence and stability.

My concern—and Admiral Kelly can give you a better number, I think it is probably closer to six or more carriers to maintain one in the Persian Gulf—is if we arbitrarily reduce carrier numbers for budget purposes and the commitments stay high because of international actors and incidents and things that we need to provide for our national security, the only option will be to take it out of the hide of our people.

We did that once before in the late 1970's and the results were disastrous. We lost our quality people and our readiness went way down.

We have to maintain the readiness of whatever force size we decide upon. But the critical elements now are with today's carrier force levels, we are barely making our commitments in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. And that is in coordination with all of the unified CINCS giving and taking and sharing the shortages. So I would be concerned in the current security environment about what a reduction would mean, not only to me in my mission but my ability to support the U.S. Central Command in the Persian Gulf.

Senator INOUE. Admiral Kelly, would you like to add to that?

Admiral KELLY. I think Admiral Larson has stated that very well, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add one other thing.

If CVN 76 is funded this year, that would give us a total of 10 nuclear carriers which is a very convenient number for people to latch onto. One thing that might happen if you subscribe to that philosophy is it would probably take away our ability to maintain a carrier forward deployed which eases some of these restrictions. Because to believe that Japan would accept a nuclear carrier homeported over there is probably a little far-fetched right now. So I think it is necessary to maintain at least one conventional carrier so that we can maintain the only forward based carrier that we have.

But the numbers do not actually wind up three to one like some people would say. I think the number in the Persian Gulf if we maintain a reasonable optempo, is more like 6.8 or so. But the point is that it takes a lot more than one, sir.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Stevens.

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Senator STEVENS. Well, Admiral, we have had conversations before. My military background was in China. I am a little worried about what you said. We do have the transition coming now for Hong Kong in 1997. I think that is the most difficult relationship we have in the world. Do we have the capability for military-to-military relationship development there that you have mentioned in the other portions of the Pacific?

Admiral LARSON. Senator Stevens, right now we have no more military-to-military contacts with China. They were cut off after the Tiananmen Square incident.

I have had a number of conversations with people both inside and outside of Government and my personal opinion is that military-to-military contacts at high levels would be very useful with China. It would be very important in engaging, understanding, influencing, and trying to determine the role of the military in the future evolution of China. Without military relations, I feel like I am missing out in the way of information and in having an ability to contribute in a positive way toward shaping the evolution of our relations when I have no ability to contact or talk to them.

RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

Senator STEVENS. You have that relationship with Taiwan but you do not have it with the PRC, right?

Admiral LARSON. We have a very informal information channel with Taiwan, Senator, where—they do make trips to the United States and they make informal visits to different commands. But, yes, I have a limited line of communication with Taiwan that I do not have with the mainland.

SUPPLEMENTAL EMERGENCY FUNDS—GUAM

Senator STEVENS. At your request Senator Inouye and I asked the Congress to include supplemental emergency funds in September to shift some of your forces to Guam from the Philippines. You have mentioned briefly that effort. Could you tell us how that is coming along now?

Or maybe I should ask that of Admiral Kelly. What is the status, now, of that ship?

Admiral KELLY. Well, first of all, I would like to say, without your support we would be in deep trouble. The \$20 million which was appropriated has still not been given to the services. I understand that there is a discussion going on in the OSD/Navy Comptroller circuits as to what the language really meant. There are some who interpreted that language as saying that those funds could really only be spent in the Philippines for the actual withdrawal process as opposed to in Guam for some of the relocation efforts. I do not know how that is going to come out.

The share of that right now, if I am right, is \$10 million to the Air Force and \$10 million to the Navy. None of that money has come to us yet. We understand at this time that all of it may be applied, in the Navy's view, toward the losses that the public works centers in Subic took. So we are going to continue to have to work on that problem.

The other pieces of it, though, Senator, are going very well. We have funded the special projects in 1992. The 1993 MILCON is completely funded right now. We have about \$134 million or so in 1994, 1995, and 1996 which we will be coming forward with requests for and we have an unfunded O&M requirement in 1993 for \$37 million, which we are hoping some of the \$20 million gets applied to.

So I think all in all that the dialog is certainly very active. We will continue to keep your staff informed as to how this is going.

CONSOLIDATION OF INSTALLATIONS ON GUAM

Senator STEVENS. I asked Steve Cortese, who is with me here now, to go out there and take a look. What is the relationship now or the situation now with regard to the consolidation of your Naval Air Station and Anderson?

Admiral KELLY. General Adams and I have been very actively involved in that. All of the construction that is going on right now and the relocation effort would support a future relocation from Agana to Andersen. The Navy has stated publicly we are ready to do that. We are in bed with the Air Force as to how we would do that.

The issue is the funding to make that move. I do not know what the number is right now, but it is about \$260 million, I think, that would have to be appropriated to make that transfer. We are ready to do it, sir, at any time.

IMET PROGRAM

Senator STEVENS. Let me ask another question, Mr. Chairman, and I will come back to, because I would like to be sure we share the time here.

But Senator Inouye and I visited Indonesia and we have a great feeling there that there was value to our country in the continuation of the International Military Education Training Program. We all know what the result was. The Senate passed a continuation of that and the House did not. We did not continue that.

We have had—I think there is a vacuum there now in terms of our ability to relate to the training of the future leaders of these countries of the Pacific.

We are asked from time to time for examples of what we really mean by this. Do you have any examples—We mentioned some of them privately. But do you have any examples of IMET graduates who advanced to key leadership positions in the governments or the military of our partners here in the Pacific?

Admiral LARSON. Senator Stevens, I was in Indonesia 2 days before the Senate voted for IMET and then the House later voted against it, which was a great personal, as well as professional, disappointment for me when I looked at how far we have come in that country and how much it has meant to our relations with them.

After the Dili incident in East Timor, the military graduates of our IMET Program stepped forward and took significantly strong action, it was particularly strong action for the military in that country. The military has been a very strong influence in that country in the past. The military graduates of IMET Program re-

lieved commanders, they had court martials, they gave letters of reprimand, to a total of almost 20 officers.

I thought the significant thing was that the officer in charge of that judicial process was a three-star Army general who was an IMET graduate and a good friend who was familiar with our democratic principles and human rights and Uniform Code of Military Justice. And not a single one of those were punished or a single one of the perpetrators was an IMET graduate or had been to a U.S. school. All of the senior leaders in that government that I talked to were IMET graduates.

As I travel throughout Asia, virtually all of the senior military that have achieved positions that we have great relations with and understanding with are IMET graduates and they greatly appreciate the experience they had in the United States. Many of them are very proud to say, I was class number such and such at Leavenworth and my classmates were so and so and do you know them?

I think IMET has had a great influence in a positive way on the democratic evolution in many of these countries and particularly in the military's understanding of Uniform Code of Military Justice and limited use of force in some of the things that they have done.

I heard a statistic the other day and I will give the exact figure for the record because I would have to quote it, but I think it was about a dozen leaders of governments around the world that are IMET graduates.

It has been a very important program in fostering our ideals and our values: civilian control of the military, Uniform Code of Military Justice, the things that we would like to see other militaries use as they evolve.

And to my great personal disappointment, Senator, it appears to be used in a punitive sense to try and influence governments to do things. I can find no instance of IMET being cut off that ever had an influence as was intended by the cutoff. It just does not drive them in the direction because it is usually cut off for the wrong reasons. It affects the wrong people.

What we will lose, Senator, is a whole generation of young officers who are exposed to the United States. We will not see it now in the short term. But when that generation moves into a leadership position 10, 15, 20 years from now, there will be a vacuum there of people that understand our ideals.

[The information follows:]

Representative of current and past world government leaders who attended formal courses under the IMET program are Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Heads of State from Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Peru, Korea, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Guatemala. As evidenced by these prominent individuals, exposure to the U.S. professional military establishment and the American way of life, including our regard for democratic values, respect for individual and human rights, is an effective foreign policy tool.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. I will come back in a little while, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Maybe I can follow up on that question if I may. At the present time the State Department has responsibility over IMET. Do you believe it would make sense to have Department of Defense responsibility over IMET? After all, it is a military training.

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, I would be very comfortable having that as part of the defense budget. It is military training. It supports very strongly my strategy of cooperative engagement. It is factored into everything I do. And, frankly, I would be very comfortable making my case for IMET to the Armed Services Committee that I testify before every year and have to justify all of my programs in the Pacific. I would be delighted to justify IMET along with my other programs and priorities to you and the Armed Services Committee.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, sir.

Admiral Akaka. I mean, Senator Akaka. [Laughter.]

Senator STEVENS. You promoted him.

Senator INOUE. I promoted you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL AKAKA, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Larson, I want to commend you on your eloquent presentation of the Pacific Command in regard to how you will be managing the challenges, as you mentioned, of your theater and the Pacific Command and those of your component leaders. It was heartwarming for me to get an idea of what you are looking at out in the Pacific and especially how Hawaii will play a part.

This hearing is focusing on Hawaii's strategic importance to the United States and the Pacific rim. Due to our location, we have always been—Hawaii has always been—a vital bridge between our country and those of our Asian and Pacific island neighbors.

Just a bit of history before I continue. Before the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, the United States cultivated and fostered its alliance with the then Kingdom of Hawaii to develop its trade routes with countries in the western Pacific. During World War II, of course, Hawaii played a pivotal role in the defense of our country. Through the years Hawaii has continued to be critical to the Nation's defense, as you also pointed out.

Today, Hawaii is home to about 50,000 military personnel and about 60,000 dependents. Also, Hawaii hosts a number of vital installations like the Pohakuloa Training Area and also the Pacific Missile Range. We feel that those are the best training facilities available. There is no doubt that Hawaii will continue to be a crucial and integral part of the defense scenario of our country.

The question during these times of personnel cutbacks and reduced military budgets is to what extent America will keep its commitment to our national security and to that of our Pacific allies. As I stated, you have given us an eloquent presentation on this issue.

Also, you mentioned the U.S. commerce across the Pacific. Currently, it is exceeding our European partners. With the continued development and economic growth, tied to military presence, this whole development of financial and security interests can exist only if the American military umbrella based in Hawaii continues to foster the stable environment that you have mentioned. Stability is so necessary for commercial activity for our country and throughout the world.

I want to commend you for all of your ideas. It was a learning experience for me to hear what you had to say.

Particularly here in Hawaii, we worry about some of the utterings in Washington, DC, about drawbacks, drawdowns, and military presence in the Pacific. We know that with the military personnel reductions occurring in Europe, Europeans are making every effort to keep our forces there, and we have asked them to redefine the NATO mission. What you have done for me today is to redefine some of the activities and the missions of our component forces in the United States Pacific.

With these drawdowns coming, is there any possibility that Hawaii will be affected by some of the drawdowns?

CUTBACKS IN THE PACIFIC

Admiral LARSON. Senator Akaka, if I look at the base force as we have currently defined it now and the drawdown in the Pacific between now and 1997, the only significant drawdown that is on my plate right now is the 6,500 troops in Korea that are on hold in our transition there from a lead to a supporting role pending resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem. If that is resolved, I would expect that 6,500 to come down in a phase of time after that resolution. Other than that, my forces look quite stable right now in all of the service planning.

I think a critical issue—and I think Chairman Inouye addressed that yesterday during his visit to Kaneohe—is the question of ultimate force level in the Marine Corps. If the base force or a modified base force drives the Marine Corps below a certain level, something will become vulnerable somewhere in the Pacific where General Stackpole has this large percentage of their combat forces. There will have to be some difficult military and political decisions made as to how that drawdown can be accomplished and what the Marine Corps base structure would be.

But other than that, I see pretty good stability in the Pacific region as I look into my crystal ball between now and January 20.

Senator AKAKA. Having said that about Kaneohe, is there any possibility that there might be other bases here you anticipate may be closed? I would like a response for the record—other than what you have mentioned as a possibility.

Admiral LARSON. Senator Akaka, from my vantage point, I do not see any other bases for closure. We do have a Base Closure Commission currently deliberating and much of that is done in private. The unified CINCS get in on that at the later stages in coordination with the Secretary of Defense. But from my vantage point I do not see any other closure in Hawaii at this time.

[The information follows:]

As far as we know, there are no other bases or installations that might close.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your response.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Congressman Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Senator. Appreciate your courtesy, thank you very much, gentlemen.

General Stackpole, it is nice to see you in Hawaii. I am glad that your somewhat delayed arrival here, I assume, has been—that your experience here has put that well behind you.

General STACKPOLE. It has; thank you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Very good.

OKINAWA

The contention in your statement, I think, is fairly summarized by saying that there was an opinion in Okinawa in the governmental structure in Okinawa and in public opinion with respect to withdrawal from the island. I think when we spoke, I mentioned to you that I had had people in my office and I am sure Senator Inouye and other members of the Senate, both Appropriations and Armed Services Committee, have had similar experiences.

Is it your judgment that the opinion, political view in mainland Japan, will prevail in Okinawa or could that be part of the drawdown?

General STACKPOLE. No, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You would be the most directly affected. That is why I am asking you. I think Hawaii, in turn, Hawaii and Alaska, then, would be most directly affected if that took place in Okinawa.

General STACKPOLE. I believe because of the reformist governor that is currently in power in Okinawa that you have seen a bit more rhetoric in the press. The actual situation, and I just recently visited there, the actual situation is quite stable.

There is the problem, however, that on an island 67 miles long with 1 million people plus, that we occupy 20 percent of that land. That issue will not go away.

However, as part of the Nunn-Warner amendment, we are drawing down forces on Okinawa to the level of 17,000 which was a programmed level. That will ease some of the tension. What may portend for the future will be dependent very much on the view of the Japanese people on the mainland.

Our relationships in terms of the military and the locals are very, very sound. I attribute that to the number of families who have come to Okinawa so that cross-cultural awareness has improved dramatically. Incidents are at an all-time low. But still there will be constantly that friction because of that land.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To the degree, then, that say there would be a reduction—let us not use—The word drawdown, I think, has now taken on mythic status and conjures up all kinds of visions that are not necessarily the case. I mean, you can get a little bit hysterical about this kind of thing.

But to the degree, then, that there is reduction even, say, several hundred people—we do not have to get into thousands—there would be a good chance that those people might be coming to Hawaii in the context of this forward—if you are going to be as forward placed as possible and there is some reductions in troop levels, particularly in the marines, as Admiral Larson indicated, if you got to a certain level, there would be difficult political and military decisions to make, what I am coming toward is if, for any reason, geo-political or strategic or whatever it might be, that there would be more people coming to Hawaii, it takes us back to where we

were a little bit yesterday with the housing question and General Corns' quality of life, Admiral Larson mentioned as well, something that is very, very important particularly if you do have families. You just mentioned that there are more marines with more families than ever before, right?

Is your ratio, by the way, parenthetically, as great as some of the other services now approaching post 60-percent, maybe two-thirds, I think, overall in the services?

General STACKPOLE. It is very close. We are about 57 percent. We have more dependents than we have active duty marine personnel in the Marine Corps. We passed that mark about 2 years ago.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I remember General Gray telling me at one point that in his day, you had to get permission to get married.

General STACKPOLE. That is true.

HOUSING ON KANEOHE MARINE CORPS AIR STATION

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So that has changed around. So with a family-oriented military, the housing question then is very, very important.

Then moving to the context of Kaneohe again, it is, I assume—I am going to assume that you agree that providing housing for your people on the windward side of the island is a top priority.

General STACKPOLE. Absolutely.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is where I hope this joint-use question can come in. We might find more people coming rather than less people, and I hope we can lay to rest once and for all this question of Kaneohe and its staying viable.

Thank you very much.

Admiral Larson, with respect to the question that you raised or the implications that you raised about China, which you called the wild card, I agree that the—and recent experience, including discussion with a leading member of the institute with respect to foreign affairs in Beijing—the head of that institute passed through Hawaii and we had an opportunity to speak with him—it is clear to me that China continues to see itself as the middle kingdom.

In that context as you addressed it, the question, rhetorically and I understand why you would have to do it. And let me put rhetorically in very general terms. But I believe I am quoting you correctly here that you said that China was trying to deal with the control of the sale of nuclear missiles. I am not sure that I am quoting you exactly, but I believe you used the word trying twice. This is particularly with concern where Pakistan is concerned. Furthering the context, you mentioned our relations—strengthening the relations with India.

I am not quite sure I see the relationship or the direction you want to go with your idea of stability in the region, cooperation in the region, in the Pacific region, and what appears to me to be a determined long-term policy of the Chinese Government to deal in nuclear missiles, to be a destabilizing force, to favor those nations, particularly Islamic nations that may wish to acquire nuclear technology as well as missile capability, Pakistan, Iran, possibly Iraq.

So I am a little—I am not going to say confused, but I am concerned as to what meaning we may draw as those who must make

decisions with respect to the Pacific Command and all the regards that you have outlined, what conclusion—maybe precisely is the wrong word.

What is the meaning for you of what you presented—what meaning can we draw, rather, from what you have presented with respect to China and what I believe is a long-term commitment toward destabilizing from our side of the fence?

Admiral LARSON. Congressman Abercrombie, let me remove the confusion first, if I may. There are three different things here and I think we might have them confused.

There is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that they have agreed to adhere to. This means they can only transfer nuclear technology for peaceful purposes if it is protected under the IAEA safeguards.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes; I am familiar with that.

Admiral LARSON. OK. The second—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I do not believe that they are adhering to that.

Admiral LARSON. The second one is the missile technology control regime [MTCR] and they are not transferring nuclear missiles, they are transferring only conventional missiles.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is right.

Admiral LARSON. The MTCR imitations are 300 or 500 kilograms payload. That is the issue I describe when I said they are trying to adhere to the limits to the MTCR in any missiles that they transfer and, in fact, have stopped some transfers of missiles that might, such as the M-9 and M-11, which might exceed the limits of those regimes.

And they are selling conventional arms. They are protecting under the NPT as anyone else does any nuclear technology, but they have a desire to sell and there are elements in that government that want to sell for just the pure cash-and-carry basis without regard for stability.

I think you are absolutely right on the mark. Our concern is that from our point of view is that they look at arm sales or arm transfers within the region, that they do not consider as part of that equation the stability of the region to which they are transferring those missiles.

We try and make sure, for example, that we only transfer arms that have defensive capabilities, do not upset the balance of power, do not give a power projection capability to the Nation but only an ability to defend themselves.

They do not put these parameters into the decision process and this is one of the areas where we are trying to influence them in a positive way.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. From a political standpoint—

Admiral LARSON. Of course, I have no ability to participate in that with no military-to-military—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand.

Admiral LARSON [continuing]. Contact, to put the strategic balance of power part of that equation before you sell weapons to see what it does to the region.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Then it is our responsibility on the civilian, political side, then, in order not to put your forces into harm's way

or to try to get you to impose a military solution on something where there has been a political failure. It is up to us, then, is it not, to really renew our efforts, redouble our efforts, concentrate our political effort in ending all trading in nuclear missiles and getting a treaty that is hopefully backed by everybody in the United Nations, including China, that will forbid the transfer of missile technology which might be capable of even on a small scale of being utilized?

After all, if we are talking about kilotons of weapons with respect to nuclear explosives, we are talking about catastrophic consequences of political miscalculation and confrontation, are we not?

Admiral LARSON. If we could stop proliferation of offensive missiles of mass destruction, it would be a major accomplishment and it certainly would be one of my goals to contribute to nonproliferation in my region.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If we do not do that, we may be forcing you into a position to have to deal militarily with something that is utter political failure on our part.

Admiral LARSON. It could be.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. I really do feel that that is very, very important.

I think there has been a creation of a kind of aura. Senator Inouye very correctly pointed out, I think that we used to see, even when I was first elected, briefings in which the Soviet Union would be portrayed. And now we are dealing with Russia. There is no longer a Soviet Union. And we were even, if I remember correctly, dealing with a situation in which you have joint activity going on in coordination.

So that is now changed and because of that, I think there is a tendency to think that, well, all these major problems are resolved. We are not faced with SF-20's anymore and intercontinental missiles. And so, therefore, all the dangers in the world have been reduced.

But in some respect your difficulties have been increased because, if you will, smaller missile capabilities and a variety of weaponry, which is not as familiar to us as some of these more notorious examples, actually can create destabilizing situations which can have horrendous political consequences that you might find yourself thrust into. That is the reason for my efforts—or my question.

I want to be able to express to my colleagues when I go back, particularly on the Armed Services Committee, that we just cannot let this slide and then suddenly expect the military to come in and clean up our political mess if we let this go. I think it is one of the most important things we can do.

So I would not be exaggerating that situation in your view, would I?

Admiral LARSON. I would say, Congressman Abercrombie, that for all of the bad aspects of the cold war and that bipolar confrontation, it had constraining effects on the rest of the world.

When those constraints were lifted, the world has become a more dangerous place, more complex, more difficult, more challenging. We see violence all over the world and the United Nations involved all over the world in all sorts of ethnic conflicts.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So nuclear proliferation in that context is even more pertinent, perhaps?

Admiral LARSON. That is why we are so concerned about North Korea and that is why we suspended withdrawals there. Because that is a significant threat to the peninsula and to the region if someone like Kim Il Sung or Saddam Hussein would have nuclear weapons.

TIBET

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. One last thing. This may be, again, a political situation that we will have to resolve. In the maps that you show and the maps that you reproduce, Tibet does not appear. Mongolia appears but Tibet does not appear. Does the State Department give you the maps that you utilize?

I am asking the question in all seriousness because unless I am mistaken, we have now declared and I believe it is a joint declaration, Senator Inouye, that we have determined that as policy of the United States that Tibet is seen as an independent entity. I know the Chinese do not regard it in that way.

Admiral LARSON. That map did not come from the State Department. The map came from my graphics. That map gets redone frequently because of just the lines I draw to the countries that we have relationships with and Tibet is not a separate country, I have no independent relationship with Tibet.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK. I think we have declared that at least from a congressional point. I know that the present administration does not agree with that.

The only reason I bring it up, I believe, as you noted on page 8 of your testimony that Tibet is among the areas of tension that you cited. I believe that—in fact, the only reason that Tibet is not now independent is the occupation of its territory by the armed forces of China. I do not think you are going to be called upon to try and rectify that, but we certainly need to do it. I was a little concerned when you mentioned tension in Tibet as to whether or not you were being expected to somehow deal with that situation.

Admiral LARSON. Absolutely not.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So you are saying it is part of the general context.

Admiral LARSON. I was setting a context of refugees, ethnic tensions, and historic animosities and pressures that exist around the world.

THE GOLDEN TRIANGLE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Last question and I thank you for your patience.

You, I think, stated very clearly and very well part of our duties is to try and promote responsible behavior, particularly on the United Nations and you spoke about combating drugs also in this context of tensions.

I think you know that I have paid particular attention to the situation in Burma. I oppose the regime there which is keeping the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Ky: the rightfully elected

President of Burma, as a matter of fact, in prison, which they call house arrest. I mean they have her under guard. I believe a recent group in which Americans participated was forbidden to see her as recently as last week.

And you indicated also in there the Golden Triangle. Now, I am not quite sure you are going to resolve this issue militarily. Perhaps this is another political question. But my impression is that the Thai Government has been very, very lax at best in dealing with the question of distribution and transportation of drugs, that they have been, shall we say, again, at best casting a benign eye on the military regime in Burma, which in my estimation exists only to suppress its own people.

I do not believe we have an operating relationship with the Burmese military. Do we?

Admiral LARSON. We do not.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We do not; right.

So I am little concerned that our relationship with Thailand, particularly in the area of combating drugs and in promoting the values that we think that we espouse, that we are unable to do that, or you may find yourself compromised in trying to carry out your military mission and at the same time be able to deal adequately or to have a policy, a political policy, we have a political policy of dealing with drugs.

I do not believe the Thai Government is interested in combating drug shipments. And they are certainly not interested in promoting the restoration of civil government, duly-elected government, in Burma. I believe the Thai Government benefits financially from it. I think there is arrangements with people in Burma on stripping their forests, on destroying their natural resources and profiting from it.

So I cite these two not to be expecting you to give me an answer, a political answer in this, but saying that from my point of view military cooperation with the Thai Government is something that I do not want to see construed as being approval by America for some of the policies that I think are detrimental, not only in that area, but right here in this country. Because drugs from that area end up in this country and they are destroying our people.

Admiral LARSON. I can make a comment if you would like me to.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes; you understand why I am bringing it up. I do not want to see another situation in which the United States is characterized as having, because of its relationship with other military forces carried out in good faith on your part—let me make sure of that. But you know that this has happened time and time again where the United States gets characterized as supporting evil regimes and killers and death squads and all kinds of things as a result of our relationships carried out in good faith on the military level. I see this situation in Thailand is doing it.

When you witness it—we do not see it as much in Hawaii—when you witness it as we do in Washington, DC, every day the effects of a drug culture and murder and death and destruction of the community, anybody and anything that is connected with supporting even indirectly this drug culture where people shut their eyes to what is happening particularly coming out of that area, as far

as I am concerned, they are contributing directly to the death and destruction of people and the social fabric of the United States.

Admiral LARSON. Let me respond in two parts, if I may.

First of all, the role of the military in combating the drug problem from the Golden Triangle and from Southeast Asia is detection and monitoring. We work with the individual country teams and with law enforcement agencies and DEA reps overseas to help coordinate and work with them in that process. We have worked for a regionalization of data sharing, information sharing, computerization and intelligence sharing to help do that. We support the country teams in their efforts to work with the individual governments, to try and influence them to join us in trying to combat it. I work with the military in each of those countries and all of my visits to try and influence them to a more cooperative attitude toward fighting and joining their government in the antidrug thing.

I think your view of the current Thailand Government is probably much more extreme than mine, Mr. Abercrombie. I was just there and I met with the new supreme commander, the new military commanders, with Prime Minister Chuan, with Foreign Minister Prasong and I saw a different type government.

My role right now in my relations with the military in Thailand is a simple one, for step one, which is to support democratization, support the first truly civilian government that you have had in Thailand in decades, probably since the constitutional monarchy back in the 1930's and support an evolution to civilian control of the military, democratic government, subordination of the military and establishing a process there, then, that will allow us to face up to some of these issues.

As far as Burma, in my right—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Excuse me, so it is your view that you now have an opportunity maybe to alter that previous picture?

Admiral LARSON. It is very early in their tenure but I think we have made significant steps toward a true civilian democratic government and making a transformation in Thailand and taking some steps forward.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And that might have a positive effect in ending this drug trade?

Admiral LARSON. I will not say ending. I think there is certainly a possibility of moving in that direction.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. OK.

Admiral LARSON. I think their view of Burma is not as extreme, at least in my opinion, of wanting that government to stay in there and not wanting any change in Burma.

I think the difference is much like some of the debates over policy that go on in the United States. When a country acts in a way that is totally unacceptable to us, are you better off to cut them off or are you better off to engage them and try and influence them? Our policy has been to isolate Burma and to try and isolate them internationally.

The policy of most of the ASEAN countries, including Thailand, has been at least some sort of limited engagement to try and influence them in a positive way. If you talk to some of our DEA agents that are posted overseas, some of them come up with mixed impressions. Some of them feel that you have more influence in a

country where you have a limited engagement than you do with total isolation as far as trying to make inroads into the drug problems in those countries.

So I think it is a much more cloudy, much less clear picture. I think the Thai Government position is one of wanting to change Burma, but they have a different theory of how to go about that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I would say that the Burmese Government has isolated itself, but what you call a government. The Burmese military has done that.

But my principal concern is that we do not put ourselves in a position where it can be construed by others that we are being supportive of repressive regimes in that area.

Admiral LARSON. I totally agree with you as government policy of isolating Burma and we have worked very hard in trying to get the rest of the ASEAN countries to do that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Senator.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY ASSETS

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Admiral Larson, as you may be well aware, the Defense Subcommittee over the years, especially recent years, has become increasingly concerned about the availability of strategic mobility assets and accordingly, we have initiated funding for sealift forces and we have been very much supportive of the C-17 cargo plane. But our concern is not fully shared by everyone, including DOD. Under those circumstances, would you support greater funding for prepositioning ships?

Admiral LARSON. Mr. Chairman, I fully support all dimensions of strategic mobility which in my mind is airlift, sealift, and prepositioning and I think we have to be careful that we maintain a proper balance in that triad, if you will, so that we get the total capability that we need.

I supported the C-17. It was high on my integrated priority list that I submitted last year along with sealift. I have had a number of conversations of discussions with key players on both POMCUS-type prepositioning and also maritime prepositioning-type ships.

I think the recent mobility requirement study that came out of the Joint Staff was a very good study. I think it articulated very well and laid out a program now to increase our mobility and our ability to respond. That, of course, is being funded now as we look to the outyears and there are some funding shortfalls in there. So there will be some tough choices.

But in principle, I think prepositioning has really proved its worth. Our maritime prepositioned forces, I know, have proved themselves in Desert Storm, Desert Shield and now again in Somalia. We are making a very fast response due to a very prudent investment that we made a number of years ago. It is paying huge dividends now.

MARINE PREPOSITIONED SHIPS

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

General Stackpole, you have had experience with the Marines prepositioned ships. Do you have any recommendations as to how we can improve it or do you think we should just leave it as is?

General STACKPOLE. Sir, we, as a result of the maintenance cycle, are making some efforts to improve it in order to meet some of the challenges in front of us. For example, those ships are not to be loaded as we do gray-hulled warships for forcible entry in what we call combat loading.

However, we have learned that there are certain supplies, medical supplies, expendable consumables in the way of food, engineering equipment, water purification units, that should be located on weather decks and other locations. As we continue our maintenance cycle with the three maritime prepositioned squadrons, we are reordering that priority.

For example, the motor vessel *Lummas*, which was the first one to establish the bridgehead along with the amphibious task unit for securing the port and air head in Somalia, was loaded in such a fashion.

Could we use more? My answer as an operator is, "Yes." However, I go back to what Admiral Larson mentioned in what is the proper balance. Certainly, the Army, when we talk about contingency responses needs prepositioned ships, too, and fast rapid, response ships. The balance is the real question.

I would sit here and tell you as a marine I would like to see an additional ship with each one of those squadron simply because of the demands that we see coming in the uncertainty of the future. That is a personal opinion at this point in time.

ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

General Corns, DOD has approved a base force plan that calls for a force of 12 Active Army divisions by 1995. What impact would that decision have on the Pacific Army?

General CORNS. Mr. Chairman, at this time I do not know of any impact it would have. The key point regarding that is the Army leadership has not yet taken the decision of what the identification would be of the two additional divisions that would be deactivated from the Active component to get down to the 12.

Senator INOUE. I ask this because I have seen proposals that suggested two armored divisions in Germany, one infantry division in Korea, and one light division in Hawaii/Alaska as part of the plan to bring it down to 12. So naturally the question comes up, where is this light division going to be?

General CORNS. Mr. Chairman, I have seen that both in record of congressional testimony and in the public media. Naturally I have discussed it with Army leadership. There is clearly an implication there relevant to either the 6th or the 25th Division. But I am assured that there is no decision that has been taken that would affect either of those divisions with respect to getting down to 12 Active component divisions.

KC-135 TANKER UNIT

Senator INOUE. General Adams, in the fiscal year 1991 appropriations bill, we called upon the Air Force to create an Air National Guard KC-135 tanker unit at Hickam. What is the status now?

General ADAMS. They have begun to hire their personnel. We have done a site activation study in conjunction with the Guard. And so far as I know, they are hiring their personnel at this time and that the facilities are being readied for them. I do not know the delivery of the first airplane but, Rick?

RICK. December 4.

General ADAMS. The first one is here for this month, sir, and so they are—will begin their training program in order to reach full combat-ready status as quickly as they can.

Senator INOUE. So we are on schedule?

General ADAMS. We are on schedule.

DISASTER ASSISTANCE

Senator INOUE. Admiral Larson, I was intrigued and rather pleased to see on your graph natural disasters as one of your major concerns. The subcommittee suggested that we should establish some permanent disaster relief stockpile in the Philippines. What do you think about that? Because that is almost a central area where you have all of these monsoon disasters, earthquake disasters. It might be looked upon as a gesture of good will. Would CINCPAC support that?

Admiral LARSON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think a disaster relief kind of stockpile at any central location would be very useful to us. We have responded a number of times since I have been CINCPAC and it has been very helpful to have a forward stockpile that we can rapidly move.

It could be a gesture of good will and certainly it is close to one of the areas where we have those disasters. But it is an area that I think we will continue to be involved in, in the future.

As a matter of fact, I might add, Mr. Chairman, we have held here a disaster relief conference and seminar last year with over 20 nations participating. We have done disaster relief surveys in more than a dozen nations out there to try and prepare them to do the things they need to do to be ready for their next disaster. And we have even discussed the possibility of some of the nations maybe having some sort of standing coalition of people ready to respond in a partnership fashion to a natural disaster.

This looks to me to be one of the more natural evolutions of military-to-military regional multilateral contacts, an issue that everybody could come behind. I think it is an area that could be fruitful for our future and contribute to our stability.

C-17

Senator INOUE. On the question of strategic mobility assets, General Adams, as you know, there is much controversy over the C-17 program. As a senior commander in the Air Force, what is your position on the procurement of C-17's?

General ADAMS. Well, I fully support its procurement, Senator. The importance of strategic airlift, particularly to this region, cannot be overemphasized. The distances we have to span in order to make response time for any kind of crisis drives us, at least for that initial response, to strategic airlift.

The modernization program to allow us to improve our capability is essential. C-141's are old. They have been used very hard as well as our C-5's. And so this program needs to continue in order to give us that immediate response, strategic airlift ability.

I believe that those people that are working the problem have a handle on the difficulties that we have had during development. It is why we do test programs. It is why we do development programs to find those programs. But I believe the program is sound and will result in providing us a very capable system.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

TRAINING AREA/FACILITIES

Senator Stevens.

Senator STEVENS. My apologies for being out. We have got a little flap going on that I had to be involved in and I am sorry that I missed the questions and answers during this period.

General Corns, we had a conversation about this, but I have been thinking more about it and that is you and Admiral Ryan yesterday highlighted the necessity for training facilities and areas for the forces of Pacific. We have limited areas now after the decisions concerning the Philippines and some of the pressures here in Hawaii and other areas. We do have new ranges in Alaska and we have the opportunity to really have a new coordinated concept of training in Alaska with the Air Force and the Army.

But I am wondering if we ought to think about some kind of a Pacific region Army training center that would combine the facilities of Hawaii and Alaska so that we could almost follow the concepts of the National Training Center at Fort Irwin. Would that be possible and is it feasible and advisable?

General CORNS. Senator, I would like to say first by personal experience, I know full well of the excellent training facilities both in terms of acreage and instrumented ranges that exist in Alaska, not only for the Army but the Joint Air Attack Team Training Range near Eielson, which is utilized by the 11th Air Force elements and the 6th Infantry Division Light, I have had described to me the Chief of Staff of our Army and by representatives of other nations as the finest training of that nature they had ever seen. It is certainly the finest I have ever seen. And, therefore, part of the potential that you are alluding to, we have already experienced.

Next point, several years ago when I was the Commanding General, U.S. Army Japan and IX Corps, while participating in training with the Commanding General, Northern Army, Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces, I proposed to him at my level then that there were opportunities for training particularly for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in Alaska.

Later, when that officer became the Chief of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, we hosted him in Alaska to get more familiarity.

I think particularly with respect to countries that are in the northeast Asia area where proximity to Alaska is closer than, say, some of the nations in the western Pacific, that the potential to capitalize and build more training activity in Alaska exists. Per a discussion and guidance from Admiral Larson, CINCPAC, we are undertaking through our U.S. Forces Japan Commander, Lieutenant General Hawley, in Japan discussions with the Japanese whereby we could have an orientation visit for yet an additional group of officers to visit Alaska early next year, to try to explore, at least in the early stages, training activities that could eventually lead to what you are talking about.

Our primary thoughts right now rest with the concept of involving the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and possibly if the funding is there, a joint bilateral type exercise at some point in the future.

Senator STEVENS. It just seems to me we are looking to a downsizing of the Army just like we have been talking about the Navy and the Air Force. The question of what is going to happen to our two light divisions is in the forefront of our minds. There is no question about that.

I mentioned it before in the committee. But it does seem to me to marry the opportunities for training in Alaska and Hawaii for the total Pacific would make some sense. We have the land; there is no question about it. The capability for training in Alaska, I think, is unequaled even down in California with the pressures of the population in California. We do not have population pressures. We have a lot of land. Yet we are going to end up with a reduction in Army forces for in the Pacific.

I wonder if we ought not to look at the whole concept of trying to integrate the training for all of these forces in the Pacific that we are trying to have cooperation between in a Pacific training center and really look to Alaska as being that center for training of ground forces in the Pacific.

General CORNS. Senator, I would think that there is the potential for that, but I do think we need to take a careful step-by-step approach with respect to what nations we can involve and what the funding flow requirement would appear to be.

I feel that what we are planning to do next spring with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and possibly other elements of the Japan Self-Defense Forces is definitely in the direction of the concept you are expressing.

Senator STEVENS. Is there sufficient cooperation between the 6th and the 25th as we go into this process? They are liable to have to merge if some of our friends have their way in the Congress.

General CORNS. Cooperation is very, very close. They train together now, particularly now in command post exercises, in simulations, Senator. With respect to exchanges where they are involved, that is certainly possible, referring to the two divisions.

Senator STEVENS. General Adams, you mentioned the training facilities in Alaska for the Air Force. I think they are significant and we will have the state of the art range in place soon.

What is the status now of the Yukon training complex that we funded last year and could you tell us, if there is going to be any

additional requests to the Congress for rounding out those facilities for the Air Force in Alaska?

General ADAMS. Well, let me first thank you, sir, for the help that you and the committee have provided for helping us relocate our very valuable large-scale training exercise program from the Philippines at Crow Valley up to Alaska and it has gone very, very well.

We have moved all of the electronic emitter systems, some of the tracking radars, out of the Philippines. We were able to recover those before the eruption of Mount Pinatubo so all of that equipment was saved. It is in place and operating in Alaska today.

The contract for the instrumentation of the range to provide us the measurement and debriefing system will be let in March and that program is on track for 1995 operational capability. The construction of the operations building as well as the two dormitories to help house our people are all on track. So we are grateful for the funding that has been provided to us to be sure that we do not lose a step in the transfer from the Philippines to Alaska.

The airspace is very large. The range space is very large. It is larger than the area where we have the most realistic training today. That is at Nellis Air Force Base.

I am confident that we have finished with the modernization program, we will have the finest air-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-ground range complex probably in the world. Certainly I view it as a national asset. It will be a great training place for us.

My goal is to have each of my air crews cycle through there once a year. It is very realistic training. It is large scale. It provides complex operations so that the commanders become well trained in employing large forces. We have 400 aircraft participate in the four exercises this year: Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine forces all participated. Canadian Air Force participated.

I had observers from Japan, Korea, Malaysia, and India to observe. The Singaporeans have asked to participate next year. I have invited Indonesia and Malaysia and Thailand to come and observe.

We are looking to help to replace some of the joint training that was lost with those other Southeast Asian nations when they participated or observed in the Philippines. They are not able to bring their airplanes to Alaska, but at least they would like to come and see their exercise—our exercises.

And then we are looking for opportunity to expand some of our exercises in their part of the world so that we can make up for that training that was lost as it moved out.

But I am very pleased with the progress. We are on track and the programs you have provided to date will meet our needs. We also have made arrangements for growth to the system as technology continues to improve in the measurement debriefing system and as those needs become apparent, we will be back to you, Senator.

EQUIPMENT IN TRAINING AREAS

Senator STEVENS. I thank you for the answer but that brings to my mind the question I was going to ask you before and did not do it. And that is, why cannot we locate equipment in training area—and this would apply to you, too, General Corns—so that all

you have to do is transport the people and the equipment is there? We have the same model aircraft that the Singapore people use, that the Indonesians use to a certain extent. Why can we not have the equipment in place so that we do not have the expense of moving the equipment, we just put the people on one of our large transports and bring them in for a period of time and use the same equipment each time.

General ADAMS. Yes, sir; well, do you mean like airplanes?

Senator STEVENS. Airplanes and tanks—

General ADAMS. You would take F-16's and leave them there and just use them.

Senator STEVENS. Yes.

General ADAMS. Well, first you would have to buy these pieces of equipment because all the airplanes that we have are being used or you would have to provide for that kind of equipment.

Senator STEVENS. Do we not have them now in Alaska anyway, all that—We have got 16's and 15's and 10's.

General ADAMS. Well, we do, sir, but all of those aircraft are committed. For example, I fly my F-16's 20 times a month. That is sufficient flying time for the air crews that are assigned to Alaska. So there is no excess flying time available on those airframes for additional crews to come in and fly them. I would have to stand down the people that live there and work there and are stationed there. So you would have to bring in additional aircraft.

One of the things that we are trying to do is provide support equipment, spare parts, and those things that make up that package for deployment so that they are fixed and in place there and we do not have to bring those. Now, that means buying additional spare parts and having additional test equipment rather than have the unit bring their own.

Senator STEVENS. They have that at Nellis?

General ADAMS. We have a little bit of that at Nellis. When we were in Spain, we had some of that capability in Spain.

So we are behind in doing that and part of the money that you have provided to us this last year to help us make up for that, some of the shortfalls of the move, we are trying to invest that into test equipment and spare parts so that we minimize the air lift cost of going to train.

A second—

Senator STEVENS. I do not want to prolong this but we will talk about this later. But it just seems that distances in this command are greater than anywhere in the world.

General ADAMS. They are.

Senator STEVENS. If we are going to have training opportunities, it seems to me that we ought to find a way that we move people to the planes and the tanks and the ships and have them in an area where we have joint training and not have to steam in and fly in and ship in the equipment for each unit as they come to train in a central location.

And if there is a central location for the Navy, it is here. If there is a central location for the Air Force and the Army in the Pacific, it is Alaska. I think we ought to find some way to eliminate the costs of these training exercises and that would facilitate bringing in some of our allies and having joint operations.

It is just—I have gone beyond the scope of the hearing so I will drop it right there. Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Senator Akaka.

HURRICANE INIKI ASSISTANCE

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Briefly, again, I want to commend you, Admiral Larson, for your designation of General Corns in helping with the disaster on Kauai. You may recall we met with you the day after at Hickam and plans were rolled out at that time. I really want to commend you and your components for the excellent job and help the military provided on Kauai right after the disaster.

I want to comment along with Senator Inouye that I hope that some way—and you have pointed out in your challenges—this would be a definite part of your mission, that is, helping with disasters.

I also want to commend the National Guard that supported the work on Kauai with Hurricane Iniki, and the POD, Pacific Ocean Division Engineers, did a great job there. I was interested in their plans, or maybe it was your plans, to work with a drawout schedule. That is, after you arrive there and help, there is a gradual move out to let the county and other government levels handle it from then on. I hope that can be part of the mission of the military in disasters. That is one comment I want to make.

The other is Admiral Kelly mentioned a problem with the move out of the Philippines. I think you are asking for clarification as to how the money would be spent and that you have not received the funds yet. I ask you whether a clarification is needed at this point in time.

Admiral KELLY. Well, Senator, I think that there are some people who are very actively working this problem and I am specifically referring to the \$20 million that was appropriated in 1993. Our Navy's total shortfall, of which Pacific Fleet is a part, is about \$37 million that we need to spend in 1993. We have to get going on those projects because the rainy season is coming down the pike and we want to get going. So we are looking for easy resolution of that problem, yes, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Finally, Mr. Chairman, again just thinking about the challenges and thinking about the CINCPAC command, I was interested, Admiral Larson, in your description in how long it takes to cross your command area. Now, with political changes occurring in Vietnam, I just wondered whether there is any possibility of Canh Rahn Bay being included after normalization or should our relationship with the Vietnam Government develop. It seems as though that is on the way to the Indian Ocean. I just wondered about your thoughts on this, Admiral.

Admiral LARSON. Senator Akaka, I have been asked that question a lot. When I was asked that question 2 years ago, I thought it was kind of an outrageous question. When I am asked it now, I do not think it is so outrageous anymore when you look at many of the changes we did not anticipate.

If we do resolve the POW/MIA question significantly and have the fullest possible accounting and our Nation moves on to normal-

ization and full diplomatic relations, I do not think that kind of access would be out of the question.

The Russians have it now. They implied to me in my discussions in Vladivostok that they pay some kind of rent or fee or something for that capability, to have that logistics base there.

But we built it to our specs and it is a nice facility. I do not think it will happen on my tour, but perhaps sometimes in the future in those changes we do not anticipate, that could happen.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your response.

Admiral LARSON. Thank you, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you.

Before I call this hearing to a recess, I would like to make an observation, sir.

BURDENSARING

Burdensharing has been a matter of great concern to the Members of Congress. It has been highly politicized and widely debated. Oftentimes I receive letters suggesting that the Japanese should pick up more of the tab.

I thought I would, for the record, point out that in Germany the Germans pick up about one-third of the operating cost. In Japan the Japanese pick up 100 percent of the operating cost. In Japan we have no military construction funding requirements whereas in Germany, the United States by agreement, I believe, picks up 28 percent of the NATO infrastructure. So I think the record should show that the Japanese are doing pretty well.

With that, Admiral Larson, General Adams, Admiral Kelly, General Corns and General Stackpole, I thank all of you for your testimony and for your responses to our questions. If we may, we would like to submit to you questions of some technical nature for your response and with that, I thank you very much, sir.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

We will submit the balance of the questions for response in the record.

[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INOUYE TO ADMIRAL LARSON

SOVIET THREAT IN THE PACIFIC REGION AND STATUS OF U.S. AND ALLIED FORCES

Question. Admiral Larson, are you and your component commanders confident that, even with smaller forces in the future, the U.S. and its Pacific allies can meet any future challenges posed by Russian or other former Soviet forces?

Answer. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss a potential resurgent Russian or former Soviet threat. The demise of the former Soviet Union has clearly diminished the overall capabilities of Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) forces in the Far Eastern Military District. These forces today are faced with the larger problem of morale and welfare such as pay, housing and feeding military personnel and their families. As a result, I see that day-to-day training and exercises are reduced for lack of fuel, munitions and maintenance for aircraft, ships and submarines. My assessment is that it would take considerable effort and political direction to reconstitute the levels of military capability that might threaten regional stability. Military activities intended to challenge the supremacy of the U.S. and its

regional allies such as increased submarine patrols beyond the Sea of Okhotsk would of course leave "tell tale signs" that are easily recognizable and the U.S. would have ample time to prepare. I am confident that in concert with our traditional regional allies, the U.S. would be able to shift the correlation of forces in our favor and reject any future Russian or CIS challenge.

I would like to caveat my statement, however, with a reminder of the importance of forward stationed forces that contribute not only to deterrence but to Asian stability as well. Future force changes should be measured by the concerns of our regional friends and allies in order to avoid even the perception that the U.S. is retrenching from Asia, lead to a regional power vacuum or encourage foolhardy challenges to the regional calculus.

Question. Admiral Larson, clearly our ties with Japan will be affected by the changing Soviet threat. Would you describe what you foresee to be the major changes in United States-Japan military relations resulting from the Soviet demise?

Answer. The United States-Japan Bilateral relationship is the single most important relationship in the Pacific Command. The foundation of our alliance are the Mutual Security Treaty and excellent military-to-military relationship. Japan is the largest single U.S. customer of foreign military sales in Asia or Europe. The Japanese Self Defense Force use of U.S. weapons systems provides economic benefits and promotes interoperability among our forces while joint exercises continue to encourage professional interaction between our militaries. Japanese Self Defense Forces provide me operational flexibility in a crisis. They allow me to operate from well defended, secure bases in a strategic location of Northeast Asia. Japanese and U.S. military leaders recognize that forward deployed naval and air forces will be primarily regionally oriented in their mission.

Japan is searching for ways to develop its regional leadership outside the economic arena. Perhaps the most significant event of last year, in this regard, was the Japanese Diets passage of the International Peace Cooperation Law. The law authorizes the use of Self Defense Forces in Peace Keeping Operations (PKO). We seek close cooperation in this new endeavor. The role Japan plays in the United Nations Transition Authority Cambodia will be a key element in fostering a positive public image among the international community and in Japanese public opinion toward Japan's future PKO efforts. Japan is sensitive to a regional perception of remilitarization and looks to the U.S. to balance these perceptions, and provide allies with an objective view of Japan's true military capability and intent.

In the Cold War era the Pacific Command has been an economy of force theater. I believe with the force adjustments called for in the East Asia Strategy Initiative we will ensure a long-term forward presence at a level commensurate with the threat. With relocation of forces within the theater, our forces and bases in Japan are all the more important. With the reductions we are making, and the Japanese evaluation of their own force structure, I see obviously a smaller Japanese military force, but one with roughly the same delineation of roles and missions.

Question. Admiral, we have received reports that states of the former Soviet Union are engaging in a "fire sale" of weapons and military technology. Is this, in fact, the case and are you concerned that this will affect stability in the region?

Answer. Senator, the Russians haven't tried to obscure the fact that they are committed to selling arms to any country that can afford them, defending such sales as "one of the main levers of restructuring of the Russian economy in the principles of the market." (Sergey Yastrzhemsky, Director of Russian Foreign Ministry Information and Press Department, TASS, 3 December 1992.) Clearly, arms sales are one of the few sources of hard currency available to the depressed defense industry and the Asia-Pacific arms market is potentially too lucrative to ignore. Many countries are looking to build up their militaries "on the cheap." The following summarizes recent and prospective Russian/Commonwealth of Independent States arms sales activities within our area of responsibility (AOR).

[Deleted.]

Outside our AOR. Given that USPACOM forces were placed in harms way during hostilities against Iran, I would be remiss if I failed to at least mention the continuing transfers of Russian weapon systems to that country. The most significant, from our standpoint, are attack submarines and strike aircraft.

Burgeoning Russian arms sales leave us with two main concerns. First, we are worried about the dispersal of advanced technologies in contravention of international agreements, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime. Although the Russian government has assured the United States that it will not contribute to the proliferation of restricted weapons and technologies, its not at all clear that Moscow has been party to all arms sales negotiations. Some Russian weapons manufacturers have clearly been operating on their own.

Second, we are concerned about the impact of Russian arms sales on the long-term balance of power in Asia. With both Russia and the United States reducing their military presence in Asia, large-scale transfers of modern weapon systems could trigger an arms race among countries within our AOR. The fact that there are several "hotspots" in the region (e.g., the Spratly Islands, where the interests of several countries collide), and historical enmities suggest instability will be an inevitable result.

KOREA

Question. Admiral, I understand that the North Korean forces continue to modernize. Yet, reports indicate that shortages in supplies and fuel and other economic problems limit North Korea's ability to prosecute a war for any length of time. Would you care to comment on this?

Answer. [Deleted] calls for six-month sustainability for all classes of active duty forces' military supply. Pyongyangs inspection standards, however, indicate North Korea has achieved as little as 60 days of supply. Exact sizes of stockpiles are unknown. A goal of three months' sustainability for reserve forces reportedly is also being implemented, but progress is unknown. Shortages probably exist in specialized vehicle components, medical supplies and some spare parts. North Korea is dependent on foreign sources for sophisticated air/air defense systems and probably for specialized ground system components.

Question. Admiral Larson, to the extent you can in this public forum, would you describe how the South Koreans are improving their forces to meet the projected threat?

Answer. South Korea's near term Force Improvement Program (FIP) is focused on the modernization and mechanization of its ground forces, while increasing mobility and firepower through helicopter acquisitions, and improving counterair through purchases and co-production of additional F-16 aircraft. South Korea is improving its ground forces by producing indigenous K-1 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and co-producing U.S. 155mm self-propelled howitzers. It is improving its helicopter program by purchasing U.S. Cobra and Apache attack helicopters and co-producing U.S. Blackhawk helicopters and improving its Air Force by upgrading the radar and avionics on its F-4 Phantom aircraft and purchasing F-16's. South Korea's long term FIP will focus on meeting command, control, communications and intelligence requirements.

OTHER REGIONAL STABILITY PROBLEMS

Question. Admiral Larson, in your written statement you mention a number of potential destabilizing situations—Cambodia, the India-Pakistan conflict, the Spratly Islands dispute, to name a few. Which of these situations are you most concerned about and how have you and your component commanders structured and exercised your forces to prepare for possible outbreaks of hostility?

Answer. Predicting the future is not easy, especially in a region of this tremendous size, extreme diversity and constant change. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to tell you specifically which situation I'm most concerned about. But there are things I do to allay my concerns, to promote our interests and values and to shape the future we want in this theater. And, we are already doing those things today.

I have refined my approach to this theater with a unified, coherent strategy for the future. I call it Cooperative Engagement. The idea is: to coordinate and aggressively employ all the means available to me—the military assets, funds, programs and forces; in three principal ways—forward presence, strong alliances and crisis response; in order to achieve engagement and participation in peace, deterrence and cooperation in crisis and unilateral or multilateral victory in conflict. The end product of this approach is a network of bilateral relations that spans the Pacific.

In the current and growing climate of instability world-wide, the ability to respond rapidly with military force in a crisis, to deal with a contingency, to deter an aggressor, or to fight and win as part of a coalition, or even unilaterally, is essential. Our strategy of Cooperative Engagement supports that capability.

While putting the Cooperative Engagement Strategy into effect, I have also made some major changes in my forces and organization.

Specifically, to respond to any contingency with exactly the right force, I must have a flexible, adaptable and joint capability-based organization. I have developed a new one for the Pacific that will do just that, a two-tiered command relationship from USCINCPAC right down to a joint task force commander with Service components operating for me.

The key is the flexibility—the adaptability—of this approach. What we don't want (and can't afford) is to be caught with our training, planning and assets committed

to a single type of organization, or to an organization which turns out to be tailored for the wrong challenge at the wrong time and place.

Under my new streamlined concept, we respond to a regional contingency by tailoring forces from all Services to meet the specific challenge at hand. When the crisis occurs, my components tell me what forces are available to meet that crisis. I track the availability of forces through the periodic readiness reports and daily situation reports of my component commanders; so I know at any time which ones are fully up, trained and ready to go for a rapid deployment. I pull those capabilities as I would pull tools from a tool kit to meet the needs of a specific situation. This is called adaptive presence.

Next I select one of my three primary candidate Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders to lead the JTF. The primary candidate JTF commanders are Commander, 7th Fleet, Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and Commander, I Corps. These JTF commanders and staffs receive annual training consisting of a preparatory training phase and a JTF-focused exercise phase. The preparatory training phase (Exercise TEMPEST EXPRESS) consists of a doctrinal/procedural introduction to JTF operations and USCINCPAC's two-tiered command and control concept of operations followed by a crisis action phase command post exercise. The JTF-focused exercise phase consists of a field training phase (Exercise TANDEM THRUST or COBRA GOLD) or a simulation-driven command post exercise (Exercise TEMPO BRAVE). These exercises are designed to train our three primary candidate JTF commanders and staffs in joint force analysis, planning, coordinating, directing and tracking during a contingency operation.

The components are responsible for training, equipping, providing and chopping those forces to me and to the joint task force and for logistically supporting them during the operation. They sit at my right hand as principal advisors on the use of Service forces as we bring them together in a joint task force. This is very crisp and clean in that I communicate directly with the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for strategic direction and policy. I transmit that to the joint task force commander who gives tactical direction. It eliminates layering and is a very smooth way to operate.

We have practiced this concept in exercises like Tandem Thrust and Cobra Gold last year; and employed it in crises like Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh, Operation Fiery Vigil in the Philippines, Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii and Typhoon Omar in Guam. I can tell you it works and works well.

STATUS OF ONGOING FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PACIFIC COMMAND

Question. Admiral Larson, the U.S. has adopted a three-phased approach to reduce U.S. forward deployed presence in Asia. Phase One cut 15,250 personnel from the 135,000 personnel in foreign countries. Additionally, over 11,000 troops have been withdrawn from the Philippines. Phase Two portends reductions of 7,200 troops, mostly from Korea. Notwithstanding the stalled drawdown of forces from Korea, what is the status of the ongoing force reduction?

Answer. All Phase I cuts have been accomplished. Phase II calls for a total reduction of an additional 7,200 forward-stationed forces from Northeast Asia. The bulk of those, 6,500, as indicated are being held in abeyance pending progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. If and when that is resolved, we would anticipate the 6,500 troops will be withdrawn prior to 31 Dec 95. During this same period, we will reduce U.S. Japan-based forces by approximately 700, in keeping with the East Asia Strategy Initiative II guidelines. Phase III does not call for any force reductions.

Question. What further decreases do you expect in the next 5 years?

Answer. I envision little basic change in our force posture after implementation of Phase II of the East Asia Strategy Initiative. Forward deployed naval and air forces will be primarily regionally oriented in their mission. As long as we are welcome in East Asia, we plan to maintain a modest but appropriate presence in Japan and Korea.

I believe that the force adjustments called for in the East Asia Strategy Initiative will ensure a long term forward presence at a level commensurate with the threat.

Question. For this next question, I would appreciate hearing the views of Admiral Larson and all the component commanders. Gentlemen, over the coming months, pressures may build for additional force reductions in the Pacific Theater. Would each of you characterize what roles and missions your forces now have that would be at risk if such additional reductions were ordered?

Answer. As you are aware, the Pacific Theater employs the concept of "Economy of Force," promoting and protecting U.S. interests with a smaller force, forward deployed to achieve maximum benefit. I rely on the military services to provide me with ready forces capable of crisis response to a wide range of possible contingencies

within the Asia-Pacific region. These forces are tailored for specific missions, each with its own unique capabilities, readily adaptable to a variety of situations.

My day-to-day business is conducted using "in place" forces, those that are "on the ground" training and interacting with our friends and allies in the region. In the event of a crisis requiring additional forces, I receive augmentation from CONUS-based forces according to a specific plan. However, initial response is provided by forces on the scene that are assigned to me and live and work in my theater. It is critical to my missions and to the promotion and protection of our interests in the region, that any future reductions in the Pacific be considered in light of the overall impact on this very important region which is vital to U.S. National economic interests.

SEALIFT AND OTHER MOBILITY SUPPORT

Question. Admiral Larson, are you and your component commanders satisfied with the current procurement plans for strategic mobility assets?

Answer. Yes. If the current Mobility Requirements Study based procurement plan is fully funded, it will meet our requirements for the foreseeable future.

Question. To reduce the burden on our sealift forces, do Pacific Command component commanders think we should preposition more supplies and equipment in the future, given the success of this program in Operation Desert Shield?

Answer. We strongly support prepositioning of supplies and equipment afloat and ashore to provide flexibility to sustain our forces for contingencies and disaster relief operations. The Mobility Requirements Study, which we support, recommended additional afloat prepositioning ships. The Services and our components continue to refine the optimum balance of prepositioned supplies and equipment ashore in-theater against programmed stocks afloat. Ashore facilities in Japan, for instance, are far closer to Southwest Asia than the United States and access is not constrained by foreign owned and operated canals. In addition, Japan's burden sharing program makes operations in their country very cost effective. Prepositioning is an important part of our overall program of cooperative engagement.

Question. Admiral Larson, where on your priority lists do you and the component commanders place sealift enhancements and expansion of the prepositioning program?

Answer. Support for the Mobility Requirements Study defined sealift and prepositioning program is number six on my overall list of priorities, right after a forward deployed/forward based force structure. While we focus on individual priority line items, it is important to recognize that all of my top priorities are in support of a single strategy of cooperative engagement.

CHANGING NAVY PRIORITIES

Question. Admiral Kelly and Admiral Larson, changes in the world order and the Navy's strategy have led to a re-examination of the top priority emphasis placed on anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

What is your "number one warfighting priority?" How is this change reflected in your priority lists for the new budget request and the fiscal year 1994-2000 defense plan?

Answer. My number one warfighting priority is to maintain a trained, ready, high quality force. That means we need to attract and retain bright, motivated people. We need to provide them with quality training in sufficient amount to do their jobs. And we need to give them the resources and facilities to operate and maintain their equipment. More specifically, that translates to flying hours, steaming days, OPTEMPO, ship maintenance, training areas and training ranges in theater and operating and maintenance support for our bases and facilities. And of increasing importance as we draw down, I need sufficient funds to support joint and combined training and exercises.

This does not represent a change in my priorities. These requirements have been reflected in my guidance to Service components for input to the fiscal year 1994/95 budget.

AIRCRAFT CARRIER HOMEPORTING

Question. Admiral Larson, the next administration is likely to reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 12 to 10. If this occurs I understand that it will be very difficult to meet your peacetime responsibilities in the Pacific region—particularly the Persian Gulf—unless more ships are homeported overseas. You already have one aircraft carrier homeported in Japan, what would be your view on homeporting another aircraft carrier in the Pacific region?

Answer. In view of fiscal and political realities, I think the advantages that we might gain from another overseas carrier—and there would clearly be tangible benefits—are far outweighed by the liabilities. In short, its not necessary, practical or affordable. However, to more fully explain that answer, there are several aspects to consider. From an operational standpoint, homeporting another carrier overseas would certainly alleviate our very pressing scheduling problems as carrier numbers are reduced. Even now, with six carriers assigned in the Pacific, we're projecting a three-month gap later this year in providing continuous carrier presence in the Indian Ocean. To eliminate that gap, we'll have to juggle schedules and deploy a carrier with less than our minimum turnaround time between deployments. That, in turn, impacts on training, maintenance and most importantly on the quality of life for our sailors and marines.

However, homeporting another carrier overseas would almost certainly mean establishing a new base, or greatly enlarging an existing base to accommodate the infrastructure and support facilities that go along with a carrier battle group and the families that accompany them. I'm sure many of our friends and allies in the region would welcome a greater U.S. forward presence. This is particularly true in view of the widespread concern among Pacific nations over America's perceived "withdrawal" or "disengagement" from the region. As to the response of individual countries to hosting a base and a battle group, that's an entirely different question and very much dependent on a variety of factors specific to each country. From a domestic perspective, our current trend is clearly to reduce the overseas basing of our forces.

In summary, it would provide significant benefit from an operational standpoint, and be generally acceptable from a regional standpoint, but would require very difficult negotiations with any potential host government and would be contrary to our current trend of reducing overseas basing of our forces.

Question. Could this offset a reduction in total carrier numbers?

Answer. An additional carrier homeported overseas would certainly help to offset a reduction in carrier inventory, particularly with respect to meeting our forward presence requirements. A substantial percentage of operating time for our west coast carriers on deployment is dedicated to transit—nearly 50 percent for a carrier deploying to the Persian Gulf. For example, to keep a continuous presence in the Persian Gulf means that only three months of a west coast carrier's six-month deployment will be on station, and so it takes multiple carrier deployments each year to provide twelve months of coverage. And that's completely aside from requirements for maintenance, training and any other operational commitments levied on our carriers. When you factor those in, and the fact that one of our six carriers is always in overhaul, you can see that we're rapidly forced into a situation where the only way to meet all commitments is to keep our ships at sea for unreasonably high percentages of time. In the short term, to meet a one-time emergent crisis, that's probably an acceptable cost, and our people will understand why we ask that additional commitment of them. But to put ourselves in the position where that's our standard operating procedure, and becomes a way of life, will have long-term detrimental effects on morale, retention of our quality people and the condition of our ships.

The USS *Independence*, our carrier stationed in Japan, fulfills a forward presence role 365 days each year, in addition to meeting a host of operational commitments with allied forces and deployed U.S. forces. This year, she'll also be part of our Persian Gulf coverage, which will alleviate some of the burden on our west coast carriers. By being homeported overseas, her transit is much reduced, and she'll provide more on-station time than a west coast carrier could. The cost however, is that for a substantial period of time, we'll have no carriers anywhere between the Persian Gulf and the west coast waters of the United States.

Exactly how much a carrier overseas would offset a reduction in our carrier inventory would depend on a number of factors, such as the location of the homeport; the location of our commitments, which will vary over time; the length of the "tethers" that we deem acceptable; and how many carriers remain in our inventory. For example, (and this is strictly for illustrative purposes) a carrier homeported in Fremantle, Western Australia, with our current commitment to maintain continuous coverage in the Persian Gulf, and allowing a 10-day tether, could fulfill our commitment nearly 100 percent of the time, except for periods of maintenance. From a broader perspective, considering only the forward presence role, we use the general thumb rule that an overseas homeported carrier replaces in excess of three west coast carriers, since it provides year-round presence, instead of 5 to 5½ months presence during an 18-month cycle.

As long as we foresee having substantial commitments in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, the simple answer to your question is that overseas carriers can sub-

stantially offset a reduction in total carrier numbers. But, considering the realities we face, I think the potential for putting another carrier overseas is virtually nil. I would rather emphasize the importance of maintaining the overseas carrier we already have and insuring we have the economic and diplomatic support to keep our present forces trained and ready.

Question. Can you explain why the Atlantic Fleet has seven aircraft carriers and the training carrier and the larger Pacific region only has six carriers?

Answer. I think the most obvious reason is that the LANT/PAC split was based on our previous commitments, and we've been reluctant to revise it while the world has been in such a state of flux. The crumbling of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union heralded the arrival of the so-called "New World Order," but also ushered in a period of serious instability in European and Asian interrelationships. Following close on the heels of these events was the Persian Gulf crisis, which even today remains a volatile and unstable flashpoint for conflict. At the same time, the domestic scene has been far from sedate, with the ongoing debates concerning base closures, the size of the military, roles and missions for the military, and of course the election year and the arrival of President Clinton's administration. With much of that behind us, and even the instability in the Persian Gulf now becoming the status quo, it's probably time for our senior military leadership to address that issue and provide a long-term plan to balance force levels with commitments. In the interim, we have the flexibility to share commitments.

Question. Are there any locations in the Pacific theater that may be a suitable home port for Navy ships?

Answer. There are a number of locations that could be considered for overseas homeports, but none of them are realistically feasible in the near term, for a variety of reasons. All of them offer significant operational advantages, but likewise have significant drawbacks. In any case, we would incur enormous startup costs in terms of infrastructure—basically the cost of building a base that could accommodate upwards of 10,000 active duty personnel and their families. Since none of our allies have expressed a desire for a permanent carrier presence, there's little chance of a burdensharing agreement to reduce our costs. Along with that dollar cost, we would have to consider the diplomatic ramifications of establishing a major base on foreign soil and the attendant questions of sovereignty that would naturally arise. As we retire our older carriers, we'll eventually be faced with asking an ally to accommodate the semi-permanent presence of a nuclear warship.

Since late 1990, when the Philippine Senate elected not to renew our bases agreement, we have vigorously pursued a philosophy of "places, not bases", as a means of demonstrating our commitment to remain engaged and to maintain our forward presence. That path has yielded benefits throughout the region, actually improving our access in several places. It's an approach our allies and friends seem comfortable with, allows us the operating flexibility we need and avoids many of the contentious issues associated with a large overseas base. For the time being, I recommend we continue using that approach and set aside the idea of expanding our overseas basing.

NAVY'S RESPONSE TO PACIFIC DISASTERS

Question. Admiral Larson, recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the number and intensity of natural disasters around the Pacific, particularly in the Philippines, Guam and Samoa. What steps can be taken by the Navy to improve the United States response to these emergencies?

Answer. Although your question refers to only the Navy's response to emergencies, I will answer in terms of the USCINCPAC response to emergencies. As a Unified Commander, I direct the joint military response to disasters. My staff develops plans, policies and procedures which apply to all Services in the USPACOM area of responsibility. For both domestic disasters (Guam) and foreign disasters (Philippines), USCINCPAC response was to establish a joint task force (JTF). USCINCPAC will continue to ensure its commanders who might be designated as Commander, JTF, participate in exercises having disaster relief scenarios, such as TEMPEST EXPRESS 93-1.

For domestic disasters, the USCINCPAC After Action Report (AAR) on Typhoon Omar recommended that USCINCPAC should be initially designated the federal lead for the crisis response/lifesaving phase, with a transition to a FEMA lead for recovery operations. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) draft AAR for Hurricane Andrew, Typhoon Omar and Hurricane Iniki made a similar recommendation. For foreign disasters, to facilitate reimbursement, USCINCPAC will ensure subordinate headquarters understand USCINCPAC relationships with the U.S. Agency for

International Development/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of the Secretary of Defense International Security Affairs.

Question. In light of the devastation caused by Hurricane Iniki on the Island of Kauai, what steps have you taken to modify your disaster response plan for Oahu, and particularly, the Naval facilities located on the island?

Answer. CINCPACFLT, through COMNAVBASE Pearl Harbor as executive agent, is in close coordination/planning with the State of Hawaii and City/County of Honolulu. The Navy's plan is part of the "Joint Standing Operating Procedures (JSOP) for Military Assistance to Civil Authorities in Emergencies and Disasters in the State of Hawaii." The plan pertains to the facilities of all military Services on Oahu, and it was exercised in June 1992. The response during Iniki was exceptional across the board. To date, I have taken no steps to modify this plan; however, during the next scheduled meeting of the Joint Armed Services/State of Hawaii Civil Defense Coordinating Committee meeting on 28 January 1993, committee members will consider the lessons learned from Hurricane Iniki and modify the JSOP as required.

Question. Have you developed a disaster response strategy in cooperation with state and local authorities? If so, what material or funding deficiencies have you uncovered?

Answer. Yes; our disaster response strategy is in the Statement of Understanding for Military Support of Domestic Emergencies in the State of Hawaii, signed by all the military Services and the State of Hawaii in April 1991. USCINCPAC's response to Hurricane Iniki revealed no deficiencies in material; however, it revealed deficiencies in funding. USCINCPAC AAR recommended that "DOMS develop a DOD domestic disaster finance revolving fund to provide immediate funding to DOD units tasked with disaster assistance." DOMS draft AAR reinforced USCINCPAC by recommending the following: "DOD Comptroller review and modify the existing Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) guidance to make it more readily available for DOD organizations when the need arises." It is important to remember that in a Presidentially declared domestic disaster relief operation, Federal Response Plan, published by FEMA, establishes the basis for the provision of Federal assistance to a State and its affected local governments. I recently responded to correspondence from the Director, FEMA Region IX, supporting his proposal to develop a joint USCINCPAC/FEMA Region IX/FORSCOM memorandum of agreement establishing a Regional Military Emergency Coordination Team for USCINCPAC.

HAWAII ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP

Question. Admiral Larson, according to the Department's latest annual report, there are a total of 54 Army sites in Hawaii in need of environmental clean-up—99 for the Navy—and 230 for the Air Force. For such a small state and one which has been such a gracious host to the United States military for many years, this is an outrageous level of contamination. I should note, as well, that the small island of Guam has 48 contaminated Navy sites and a staggering 102 sites belonging to the Air Force.

When do you anticipate having most of these sites in the final stage of remediation?

Answer. The size of the State has nothing to do with the level and amount of contamination found on DOD installations. Environmental contamination is the result of the type and number of industrial activities found at each installation. In the normal course of doing business, DOD installations unfortunately contain operations that can contaminate the environment. Typical operations on the installations which have the potential to pollute the environment include petroleum product facilities, landfills, entomology operations and repair shops among others. The installations in Hawaii have been in existence a long time and many have operations that have polluted the Hawaiian environment. Hawaii installation restoration sites include oil and PCB contaminated areas, past landfills, pesticide disposal pits and former crash crew fire fighting training pits. Most of the contaminated sites are the result of changing environmental laws and industrial practices. These existing contaminated sites are the result of past acceptable practices for the handling and disposal of hazardous material/wastes. Of course this is no excuse for all the contaminated sites found in Hawaii and the Services are aggressively addressing this problem. The Services are moving as fast as they can but are limited by the extensive procedures that must be followed in addressing each site. Besides the environmental clean-up procedures, there are also manpower, federal acquisition regulations and funding constraints. Because of the numerous constraints, a realistic projection on remediation of these sites cannot be determined at this time. Many environmental clean-up projects are anticipated to be delayed until additional funding is provided. For

fiscal year 1994, the Army and the Navy have programmed a total of 72 Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA) projects for Hawaii.

Question. Why has the Army only now just completed the inspection phase for the 7 contaminated sites at the Army's Pohakuloa Training Area—a habitat with the highest concentration of unique plant and animal species in the nation—when you have known for some time the danger posed to this important natural resource?

Answer. Installation environmental preliminary assessments were completed on all Army Hawaii installations, including Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), in May 1984. The assessments were submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as directed by Executive Order 12580. PTA is not on the Federal Agency Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket which represents Federal facilities that may be contaminated with hazardous substances or that manage/managed hazardous waste. The PTA assessment, as reviewed by the PTA and the Army, indicates there is no risk to public health or the environment by these sites.

Question. When do you estimate that all of the 19 contaminated areas at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, a National Priorities Listed site, will have completed the remediation process?

Answer. Under the Federal Facility Agreement (FFA), signed in September 1991 between the Army and EPA (Hawaii Department of Health signature is pending), the Army is required to investigate the 19 sites mentioned along with 37 other sites ranging from landfills to motor pools. These have been broken down by priority into four operable units to place emphasis on: 1) identification of sources of trichloroethylene (TCE); 2) investigation of the former landfill for contaminant migration and potential hazards; 3) determination of the extent of contamination in the aquifer underlying Schofield Barracks; and finally, 4) investigation of small waste generators on site. Under the schedule set forth in the FFA, confirmed TCE sources and the former landfill are to enter the remedial design/remedial actions phase by July 1994. Remedial actions for the contaminated aquifer are scheduled to begin in August 1995. Schedules for remedial investigation and remedial actions at the remaining small generator sites will be prepared upon completion of the ongoing preliminary assessment; most of these sites are expected to require no further action.

Question. Why, as of today, have only 3 of the 19 Schofield areas moved into the Remedial Action Phase when the Army was first notified of high level of trichloroethylene (TCE) in base well water in April 1985?

Answer. The Army's first priority at Schofield Barracks was to provide a permanent clean source of drinking water to the customers of the Schofield Barracks water supply wells. This was accomplished in October 1986 through the construction of an air stripper to remove TCE. Placement on the National Priority List in August 1990 and negotiations of a Federal Facility Agreement with EPA and Hawaii Department of Health in September 1991, have only recently (fiscal year 1991) raised the priority of Schofield Barracks, in relation to all of the other Army sites around the country, to the funded level and allowed remedial investigations to proceed.

PEARL HARBOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP

Question. Admiral Larson, last year the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex on the island of Oahu was nominated to the National Priority list of the Environmental Protection Agency. However, it has been nearly 10 years since the first preliminary assessment identified 31 potential sources of hazardous substances, including waste oils, pesticides, heavy metals, PCBs and solvents. Since then, additional sites have been uncovered.

According to the Department's own annual report on environmental restoration activities, "most of these sites are located close to the shoreline waters. Some sites are located near drinking water wells and wetlands. The potential exists for migration of contaminants to receptors or resources of concern."

If "the potential exists" for even more widespread contamination, why has the Navy been so slow to act on these problems, investing only \$10.7 million in their clean-up so far?

Answer. Up through fiscal year 1991, Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command (PACNAVFACENGCOM) has spent \$23.4 million on Installation Restoration (IR) sites. Out of that total, \$10.7 million, which is approximately 44 percent of the total Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA) funds, was spent on IR sites within the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex.

For fiscal year 1992, PACNAVFACENGCOM obligated \$30.2 million. Out of this total, \$13.1 million, which is approximately 44 percent of the total fiscal year 1992 DERA funds, was obligated on IR sites within the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex.

The majority of the obligated and expended DERA funds were for site inspection, a remedial investigation/feasibility study and remedial design action. These processes must be completed, in accordance with the National Contingency Plan (NCP) 40 CFR 300, before any remedial action can be implemented. The NCP has the full force of law and must be complied with by the Department of the Navy. These preliminary actions, because of the complex analysis and investigations required, take many months to complete. These actions also require, by law, interaction with the public and community adjacent to the site.

PACNAVFACENGCOM is currently investigating 76 IR sites in Hawaii and Guam; 17 of these sites being in the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex. Twenty-two percent of PACNAVFACENGCOM's IR sites are within the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex.

In Hawaii, we have completed two cleanup actions; one in the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex and the other at Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, Eastern Pacific, Wahiawa. We are in the process of three more cleanups within the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex. To date, we have spent \$2.8 million on cleanups within the Pearl Harbor Naval Complex and a total of \$3.2 million in Hawaii.

Question. Have you calculated the extent of the Navy's liability should any of these contaminants foul the scarce fresh water resources of the state or drive tourists from our beaches? If not, why not?

Answer. We have not yet determined the extent of the Navy's liability should any of these contaminants foul the scarce fresh water resources of the State. The majority of these sites do not impact the fresh water resources of the City and County of Honolulu; most of these sites are at elevations well below that of the water supply wells. The Navy, however, is still aware of the importance of the islands fresh water source and addresses all natural resources, including water, in their environmental investigations.

FUTURE ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE IN HAWAII

Question. Do you believe that one infantry division and one light division on the Pacific rim are sufficient to meet our security commitments?

Answer. Based on our studies of the current and near term potential threats in the Pacific Theater, our assessment is that we need a minimum of six infantry brigades to adequately support Admiral Larson in the Asia-Pacific Theater. The theater CINC must be able to conduct forward presence operations and be able to respond quickly in crisis to defuse situations at a lower intensity level. This minimum structure is adequate when considered with larger force projection packages which would deploy from CONUS or other theaters in the event of a major regional contingency. Normally, infantry divisions have three brigades, so the answer to your question is, if we have two full divisions (of three brigades each), it should be sufficient to meet our security commitments in the Pacific.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INOUE TO GENERAL ADAMS

KC-135 TANKER UNIT AT HICKAM AFB

Question. Can you provide us with the Air Force timetable for completing this project?

Answer. The KC-135 tanker unit is the 203rd Air Refueling Squadron. The squadron was activated on 1 January 1993. The five KC-135s (4PAA, 1BAI) will arrive Jan-Jun 93. The unit will be operationally ready by 31 Dec 94.

STATUS OF ONGOING FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PACIFIC COMMAND

Question. For this next question, I would appreciate hearing the views of Admiral Larson and all the component commanders. Gentlemen, over the coming months, pressures may build for additional force reductions in the Pacific Theater. Would each of you characterize what roles and missions your forces now have that would be at risk if such additional reductions were ordered?

Answer. PACAF's primary role is forward presence, a deterrent force demonstrating U.S. commitment to our theater allies. Our forward presence not only deters those not acting in our best interests, but provides influence in other countries, ensuring balance and stability in the theater. This requires hands on work with our allies, like combined exercises. Through the close association forward presence allows, we are building strong, lasting and useful relationships with our allies.

Currently PACAF force structure is at 3.8 fighter wing equivalents (FWE). In Korea there are 72 F-16Cs performing Close Air Support (CAS), Suppression of

Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), interdiction and air superiority missions plus 12 OA-10s. In Japan there are 54 F-15C Air Superiority fighters and 48 F-16s performing CAS and interdiction missions. Alaska has 54 F-15C/E Air Superiority/Fighter Bombers, 24 F-16C CAS aircraft and 6 OA-10s. In Hawaii there are 24 F-15A Air National Guard Air Defense fighters. Despite this forward deployed force structure PACAF relies heavily on CONUS-based reinforcements should deterrence fail. Any further reductions in force structure would seriously damage this deterrent posture.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INOUE TO ADMIRAL KELLY

STATUS OF ONGOING FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PACIFIC COMMAND

Question. For this next question, I would appreciate hearing the views of Admiral Larson and all the component commanders. Gentlemen, over the coming months, pressures may build for additional force reductions in the Pacific Theater. Would each of you characterize what roles and missions your forces now have that would be at risk if such additional reductions were ordered?

Answer. Force reductions will reduce our overall capability to respond across the entire spectrum of naval warfare roles and missions. Without knowing the size and types of reductions envisioned, it is simply not possible to comment in other than a general way as to the impact a reduction would have.

The Navy presently enjoys the best equipped and trained sailors in our long and proud history. Any force structure cuts must be judicious with due regard for the kinds of skilled people the Navy needs to retain. As a corollary, force structure cuts should not be so severe that we no longer have the training resources to maintain our readiness posture. In order to retain these superbly trained sailors and airmen, we must also not cut our force structure to the point that our OPTEMPO becomes too high. If force structure cuts make OPTEMPO so high that our people leave the Navy, we will lose.

The Navy is built around a great number of multi-mission platforms. No matter where you cut the force structure, you will affect more than one mission area. Again, the number of forces and the particular type of forces cut will determine the extent to which our capability to continue to perform in all our roles and mission is impacted. To be any more specific will require a study of the particular proposals which come forward in the coming months. As you know, a current review of roles and missions is being conducted by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would like to call your attention to the fact that there is more here than just roles and missions. Our national security strategy must have the requisite forces for implementation. Strategy is more than a threat assessment; it is a statement of what the nation wants its military forces to accomplish. The resources the nation has expended on its naval forces in the Pacific have been put to good use. We continue to be a force for peace and stability.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INOUE TO GENERAL CORNS

STATUS OF ONGOING FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PACIFIC COMMAND

Question. For this next question, I would appreciate hearing the views of Admiral Larson and all the component commanders. Gentlemen, over the coming months, pressures may build for additional force reductions in the Pacific Theater. Would each of you characterize what roles and missions your forces now have that would be at risk if such additional reductions were ordered?

Answer. I do not see the role of the United States Army in this theater or elsewhere changing as a result of additional force reductions. The requirement, mandated by Congress, for the Army to organize, train and equip forces for prompt and sustained combat incident to land operations will remain regardless of the Army's size. Therefore, my response will focus on missions that would be at risk if there were additional force reductions in the Pacific Theater. I will discuss the potential risks by describing Army operations in the Pacific under three conditions—peace, crisis and war.

Peace: As the Army component commander to USCINCPAC, my peacetime charter is to maintain and support a trained and ready Army fighting force which can succeed in crisis operations and achieve national peacetime objectives.

The United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC) has developed an effective Expanded Relations Program over the last 17 years by sending soldiers of the 6th Infantry Division (Light), 25th Infantry Division (Light), 45th Support Group, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and reserve component forces throughout the thea-

ter conducting civic action programs, building school houses/hospitals, carving out roads and training soldiers of Asia-Pacific nations. The Expanded Relations Program and the joint/combined exercise programs afford our soldiers the opportunity to train with other services and our allies and friends and reinforces the perception of a strong U.S. commitment in the theater.

Further, our Army has significant professional relationships with Army leaders of the regional countries. This is an important point to consider because in many countries in this theater the Army is the defacto or actual government.

Little "military" risk arises from reducing peacetime forces in the Pacific. But as you can see, tremendous political influence is lost in a region vast in natural resources where national economies are developing at a colossal speed. The economic super powers and world economic partners of the 21st century are emerging today in the Asia-Pacific region.

A diminished U.S. presence in the region would be troublesome to our allies and create a situation where other regional powers might feel a need to fill a perceived vacuum. Of course, their motives would be suspect in the eyes of their neighbors and could trigger increases in military power that would be counter to U.S. interests.

Crisis: In a crisis situation, oftentimes the key to successful diffusion is the timeliness U.S. forces show in deploying to the area of operations and executing the mission. USARPAC currently maintains a division ready brigade (DRB) capable of deploying at no notice in 18 hours anywhere in the Pacific. The "tyranny of distance" dictates that such a force be maintained since CONUS based forces would take much longer to arrive with equivalent capability. The risk of a reduced crises reaction capability and the ability to defuse at a lower intensity level would increase exponentially with a loss of forward-based forces in the CINCs area of responsibility. Specifically, if additional reductions resulted in the removal of a maneuver brigade from a full light division, the ability to field a DRB on 18-hour notice would be in peril, considering other training, maintenance, quality of life requirements. The no notice response capability could conceivably be reduced to a battalion-sized force.

The Pacific Theater has traditionally been an economy of force theater, particularly for the Army. As a result much of what we do is accomplished by relying on "work around." For example, Admiral Larson and I rely on I Corps, headquartered at Fort Lewis, Washington, to provide command and control of joint forces during major exercises and disaster assistance operations. Additionally, the echelons above division and echelons above corps logistics structure in this theater is not complete and requires augmentation from CONUS. Further reductions in Army structure would hinder the CINC's ability to efficiently employ his in-place forces during a crisis.

One of the greatest benefits our soldiers get from their experiences in the Asia-Pacific area is that they are able to train in areas where one day they may have to fight. They gain operational knowledge of the region by becoming familiar with the armies of the region and with the people, terrain, weather, road systems, language and customs. Professional relationships are developed with leaders and soldiers of other nations which will be essential if we should be required to fight as a coalition force. This knowledge and these unique relationships are irreplaceable by forces outside of the theater.

Extended War: Again, the risk is grave when forces are not available in the theater to conduct extended or protracted war. The same rationale applied for a crisis is applicable here. If a major regional conflict erupts in another theater, a contingency force must be available, in this theater, to guard against an awakening adversary who might be tempted to test U.S. resolve during a vulnerable period in our nation's readiness. We must maintain our current base structure so that the CINC retains the full range of military options necessary to maintain stability in the theater and if necessary, employ those forces in a manner which is doctrinally sound. To do that we need whole units supported by the necessary support structure.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR INOUE TO GENERAL STACKPOLE

STATUS OF ONGOING FORCE REDUCTIONS IN PACIFIC COMMAND

Question. I would appreciate hearing the views of Admiral Larson and all the component commanders. Gentlemen, over the coming months, pressures may build for additional force reductions in the Pacific Theater. Would each of you characterize what roles and missions your forces now have that would be at risk if such additional reductions were ordered?

Answer. We believe that the ongoing and future draw down of forces in the Pacific Theater will increase dependence on power projection from the sea. At present, the Marine Corps maintains significant bases and forces in the Pacific Theater on Okinawa, in mainland Japan, Hawaii and California.

This forward presence of Marine forces in the Western Pacific (Okinawa and Japan) recognizes the growing importance of this region to our national interest. Consistent with our national policy and objectives, we must be capable of influencing events in that region. The Marines in the Pacific support U.S. strategic interests by providing the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) with a ready, flexible, mobile and sustainable force to meet the requirements of the region, as well as promoting regional stability through presence. This force is a vital element of CINCPAC's strategy of "cooperative engagement", and the "adaptive presence".

Further draw down of Marine forces in the Pacific, beyond that already programmed, would impact upon our capability to rapidly respond to crises in the Pacific. This becomes a critical issue if the U.S., in support of national policy and objectives, must respond around the Pacific littoral with a force that is self-sustaining and has an amphibious forcible entry capability. Response to crises, such as possible contingencies in Korea, maintaining a credible balancing force in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, potential Noncombatant Evacuation Operations or humanitarian assistance from continental based forces would be constrained by time consuming transits not necessary with the current forward deployed Marine forces in the western Pacific region. In summary, naval power within the principal maritime regional command, PACOM, cannot obtain its full potential without a strong, readily available, amphibious power projection capability. Deterrent forces must be forward based in order to avoid time consuming transits and to maintain credible, visible presence. The approximately 29,000 Marines stationed on Okinawa, mainland Japan and Hawaii offer the CINC such capabilities.

CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

Senator INOUE. That concludes the hearings. The subcommittee will recess and reconvene at the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., Wednesday, December 16, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

PACIFIC RIM ISSUES

FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE,
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS,
Honolulu, HI.

The subcommittee met at 9 a.m., in the Aha Kupono Courtroom, U.S. Courthouse, Prince Kuhio Federal Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senator Inouye

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

MILITARY LAND USE IN HAWAII

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WAIHEE, GOVERNOR, STATE OF HAWAII

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR INOUYE

Senator INOUYE. The subcommittee will please come to order.

This morning, the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate will receive testimony from Federal and State officials and representatives of public organizations on the subject of military use of land in Hawaii. As chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, I have been authorized by the committee to receive this testimony and to prepare a hearing record to be made available to the Members of the Senate. This record will serve as a guide to the Senate in its deliberations on defense authorization and appropriations later this year and, as a matter of fact, for many years to come.

It is altogether fitting and appropriate that we hold this hearing this morning on the day during which we honor the memory of our first delegate, Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalaniana'ole. Today, we give recognition to the unique position Hawaii holds in the history of the United States and to the significant role the military has played in that history.

The issue of the military's use of land in Hawaii has become increasingly controversial in recent years as the value of, and the public's interest in alternative uses of such land, have increased. Hawaii-based forces, like those stationed elsewhere, require a mix of permanent installations, housing, and training areas. In Hawaii, that makes land use by the Department of Defense a delicate proposition, particularly in the light of some of the more unique historical and environmental characteristics to be found here. For example, a number of land plots occupied by the military are former crown lands transferred to Federal control following the overthrow

of Queen Liliu'okalani during the time Hawaii was in territorial status.

As a matter of record, I would like to note that the Department of Defense controls approximately 5 percent of all Hawaiian lands and, in particular, about 23 percent of the lands of the island of Oahu. Many in the State and some Members of Congress question the need for the DOD's continued requirement of such large land holdings, especially as military forces are being drawn down. This, coupled with a rising demand for alternative use of scarce land by local residents, has increased pressure on the Department to re-examine its land requirements.

In this regard, I am proud to have sponsored a number of measures to facilitate the transfer of land back to the State and to the Hawaiian people and to establish a comprehensive inventory of all federally held land—military and civilian. For example, it was legislation passed by my subcommittee which stopped the bombing of Kaho'olawe and provided for the establishment of the Kaho'olawe Conveyance Commission. The Commission's final report, outlining its recommendations for the return of Kaho'olawe to the State of Hawaii, will soon be published.

Let me also note two other initiatives for which I, as chairman, was able to secure funding and support from my colleagues. Today, we will hear from a representative of the General Services Administration who will provide the committee with an update of GSA's efforts and a completion timeframe for the inventory of all Federal lands in Hawaii.

Second, last December we heard from the representatives of the Commander in Chief, Pacific [CINCPAC] on the establishment of a joint military task force to develop a military land use master plan addressing the requirements of the military for installations in Hawaii—to identify those which must be kept to preserve military effectiveness and those which can and should be returned to the State. The master plan on military land use will be completed later this year.

I believe that it is important for these initiatives to come to an early conclusion. It does little, and quite possibly a great deal of harm, to discuss military land use in a fragmented, disordered way. The GSA report and study will identify all Federal lands in Hawaii. The military land use master plan will identify all DOD lands which can be returned to the State of Hawaii. With this information, we can begin an orderly process of consolidating military land holdings so that they may more readily serve military requirements and so that excess military lands can be put to more productive uses by the civilian population.

Let me be clear where I stand. I recognize the significant contribution which the military makes to the economy and the general welfare of our State. We all know that the military is the second largest engine in our State's economy. We all know that in time of natural disasters we turn to the military for help. We all know that the constructive participation of military personnel in community affairs is the hallmark of their presence on our islands.

But these alone are not the reason I believe we must give serious consideration to the requirements of the military for use of land in Hawaii. The military is here not only as a forward-positioned force

to protect the mainland, the military is here to protect us. Obviously, there is no threat on the horizon today. But can we say the same for tomorrow?

Yeltsin is in trouble. We see that on the front pages, on our TV tubes. Russia may soon be enmeshed in civil war. What about Korea? What about the nuclear potential of North Korea? I believe that it is not farfetched to think about the negative aspects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and perhaps of Russia itself, what it could have, the impact on our island State.

Yes, we can reduce the size of the military; we can reduce its presence in Hawaii. There is, however, an irreducible minimum which the military must hold as permanent bases and for housing and training areas. Our job is to identify, with the full awareness that our safety depends on it, what that irreducible minimum is.

We will now begin the hearing on military land use in Hawaii. Because we have a lengthy witness list, may I ask that each of our witnesses submit their prepared statements. I can assure you that your prepared statement will be part of the official record.

In addition to that, we have received countless statements from the citizens of Hawaii and their statements will be part of the record.

INTRODUCTION OF GOVERNOR WAIHEE

Our first witness is the distinguished Governor of the State of Hawaii, the Honorable John Waihee.

Governor, welcome, sir.

Governor WAIHEE. Good morning, Senator. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely hearing in Hawaii. Please extend our gratitude to the members of your subcommittee as well. This hearing is timely especially in the wake of the recent Base Closure Commission report.

Although no one likes to see loss of military personnel and related civilian jobs, particularly in this current, tight fiscal climate, the impact of the recent base closures on Hawaii's military community and surrounding civilian community was significant. It could have been much more severe, especially when compared to the more dramatic effects of base closures in other parts of the country.

We believe that the intended action by the Defense Department relating to Hawaii is due to a recognition of the strategic importance of the State to the defense of this country and to the pursuit of our international interests. With this latest realignment and consolidation of our military installations, I believe Hawaii, as the nerve center for the Pacific area, will play an even more important role in the defense of our country.

HAWAII'S ECONOMY

So while acknowledging Hawaii's importance to the Nation's defense efforts, we should also acknowledge the importance of our military's activities to the State's economy, a very significant one, given the size of our military presence and the length of time that it has been part of our community. As you have indicated, Senator, defense spending is second only to tourism as a source of income in Hawaii. As of July 1, 1992, there were approximately 53,000 offi-

cers and enlisted men and women and 57,000 military dependents in the islands with more than 19,000 civilian employees. Total expenditures by our military in Hawaii amounted to about \$3.3 billion with \$697 million in prime military contracts awarded.

In addition, the military in Hawaii also plays a significant role in fulfilling peacetime agendas. I was glad, Mr. Chairman, that you pointed out the role of the military in emergency preparedness as demonstrated very recently here in Hawaii during the Hurricane Iniki emergency. The military has also helped our efforts on drug interdiction, working cooperatively with local and other Federal agencies.

Moreover, we would like to see the peacetime roles of our military expanded in the future. An example might include a suggestion by—a suggestion was made by President Clinton to utilize military expertise for urban and renewal infrastructure development. In Hawaii this may possibly mean that military resources might be used to help us develop Hawaiian Home Lands. Also, the military expertise could be used, I think, in peacetime to help us with environmental recovery. The island of Kaho'olawe awaits that type of cleanup.

Land use by the military is also a significant way—some would suggest a most significant way—in which the military impacts Hawaii and its economy. Presently, the military owns or controls about 239,000 acres across the State. Because of the scarcity of land in Hawaii, military planners must also plan well to use the land wisely.

In this context we suggest that wise land use translates first to developing cross-service efficiency; second, to recognize the interdependence of military and civilian communities, land use and economy; third, being environmentally sensitive; and, fourth, Mr. Chairman, in Hawaii especially, being culturally sensitive to the community at large.

The recent hearings on the island and use—actions taken with regard to the use of Kaho'olawe is a good example of increasing that type of sensitivity. Using land wisely is most critical on Oahu where the military use is approximately 23 percent of our land base, two-thirds of which it owns and one-third of which it leases.

CLOSING BARBERS POINT

The proposed closing of Barbers Point presents the specific challenge and opportunity to employ the previously mentioned criteria for Hawaii's land use. In this regard we have some preliminary suggestions.

First, we suggest that cooperative joint planning between the State, county, and military can aid the transition for both communities.

Second, the 3,614 acres at Barbers Point should be a mixed-use development area to include job as well as housing opportunities. Mixed-use complements the development plans for the Ewa Plain and central Oahu. There are currently 832 naval housing units at Barbers Point and another 236 being planned. With a projected shortfall of 5,000 units, it makes sense for military housing to remain. But we would suggest that it makes even more efficient sense that such housing remain as a multiservice housing initia-

tive. In addition, we would suggest that there would still be room for civilian housing as well.

Third, certain Federal functions at Barbers Point are too important to be afterthoughts in the base closure. In particular, the Coast Guard and National Guard, if not retained at Barbers Point, need to be thoughtfully relocated. Also, it may make sense to relocate Federal functions to Barbers Point from other locations and thus alleviate other land use problems, for example, the FAA facility on Diamond Head and the communications facilities from Bellows and Lualualei.

Fourth, we would also strongly urge the consideration of a reliever airport, too long an unresolved and potentially tragic safety problem.

Finally, with an eye to the future, there are other opportunities for more efficient land use if we are creative. Moving supply facilities from Shafter Flats to Barbers Point, for example, would uniquely position Barbers Point as the major supply and logistics center while freeing valuable ceded lands for civilian industrial use.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me take advantage of this time to state that as the military realigns its missions, we have other land use challenges in addition to Barbers Point, including these four items on the State's immediate horizon: resolving title and compensation issues of the military use of Hawaiian Home Lands, the cleanup and return of Kaho'olawe, moving toward the joint use of Bellows including a return of the substantial portion of its lands to the State, and the creation of a larger buffer zone around military facilities on Kauai.

In this regard, let me state that, as a general principle, we favor the movement of military activity currently located on ceded lands to lands held in fee or lease by the U.S. Government. For these and other tasks, the idea of a joint land use task force would seem worth replicating. However, we strongly suggest that such a task force would need to move expeditiously or be overtaken by events and circumstances. I think, Mr. Chairman, we would join in your statement that land use issues need to be resolved as expeditiously as possible.

This concludes my testimony this morning. I again want to thank you and the members of the subcommittee for giving us this opportunity to speak before your body.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Governor, for your statement. It is an important statement because it represents the position of the Government here.

NAVAL HOUSING AT BARBERS POINT

I would like to point out that the naval housing, which is presently located on naval land at Barbers Point, under the base closure proposal of the Secretary of Defense, will remain at that site but will be available for multiservice use. It will not just be for the Navy's use.

Governor WAIHEE. I think that is a very good position.

Senator INOUE. And, second, on the matter of military use of Hawaiian Home Lands, that is high on the agenda of the Joint Task Force of CINCPAC and a report should be forthcoming soon.

Second, as to the return of Kaho'olawe, as soon as we receive the formal report from the Commission, we will draft appropriate legislative language and we will hope to expedite this and provide sufficient moneys for the cleanup of explosive ordnance there.

As to the matter of Bellows Field, this is also high on the agenda of the task force, and I have been advised that joint use of that area is now under very, very serious consideration.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS RELATED TO BASE CLOSURE

I would like to, if I may, Governor—and this may be important to your operations—advise you of the sequence of events related to the base closure.

As you know, on March 12 of this year the Secretary of Defense submitted his recommendation to the Commission, and it was published in the Federal Register. During the 60-day period of April and May, hearings and discussions will be held on the Secretary's recommendation.

I have taken the initiative of requesting that the Commission, or representatives of the Commission, conduct hearings on site in Hawaii. And at that time the people of Hawaii, the Governor, and the mayor and interested citizens may be given the opportunity of sharing their *mana'o* and their thoughts with the Commission. I decided to do that because to expect the citizens to travel all the way to Washington is a bit too much. We have not decided on exactly what day it will be, but it will be in the timeframe of April or May.

Then on April 15 the GAO will submit its report to the Commission, analyzing the land situation. June 1 the Commission will publish any proposed changes to the Secretary's recommendation. They may add, delete, or do anything they want, and this will also be published in the Federal Register.

July 1 the Commission will transport the report to the President. By July 15 the President will have to approve or disapprove the package; he cannot amend it. It has to go up or down. If he should decide to disapprove that, then the President has 45 days to come forth with a new one.

But whatever it is, if the President approves it, then it goes to the Congress and the Congress will have 45 days for both Houses to approve or disapprove. In order to reject, both Houses must reject.

When that happens, the recommendation would have been following all the sequence proposed and it will be final.

So the Barbers Point situation is far from being complete and, in a sense, it may be a bit premature to be discussing its potential use. But I think it would be wise to be prepared for that because, as history shows, the Secretary's recommendation to the Commission is almost always approved by the Commission.

SENATOR INOUE'S SUPPORT

Governor WAIHEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say that, first of all, we want to thank you for your support, your cooperation for helping us achieve some of the objectives that we have with regard to the issues that you mentioned, the introduction of the

Kaho'olawe legislation and in the necessary followup work that will occur as a result of the, hopefully, positive report.

Also, Mr. Chairman, we want to acknowledge the work that your committee has done in recognizing our interest, that in military realignment the military look at the restoration of ceded lands to the State and people of Hawaii and the relocation of activities, where possible, to lands that are owned and leased directly by the military.

I can say quite frankly that were it not for the support that we have received from this committee, the achievements that we would have—we have thus far been able to have would not have been possible. I can look forward, on behalf of the State of Hawaii, to working with you through the hearings process to continue to indicate the principles that we feel are to guide your decisions in our State.

With regard to Barbers Point, we take your advice to begin at least anticipating the possibility, the real possibility, that it may be restored and to handle that possibility in a way that would be most efficient for the people of Oahu and to our State.

So, once again, Mr. Chairman, we do appreciate your bringing the hearing and giving the people of Hawaii a chance to speak their record to you on these issues.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Governor.

On the matter of the Commission hearings in Hawaii, may I suggest to all citizens that they have prepared statements because I am certain the Commission will insist upon prepared statements. Generally, as a matter of course, they would limit oral presentations, for the most part, to about 5 or 10 minutes. I am certain the Governor of Hawaii will be granted all the time he wants, but to others it may be limited. So whatever it is, I would suggest to citizens who are interested in Barbers Point, for and against, to begin preparing their statements.

I thank you very much, Mr. Governor.

Governor WAIHEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Now it is my pleasure to call upon the distinguished mayor of the city and county of Honolulu, the honorable Frank Fasi. Good timing.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. FRANK FASI, MAYOR, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HI

MILITARY PRESENCE SUPPORTS ECONOMY

Mr. FASI. Good morning.

The city and county of Honolulu, as you all know, is home to 27 military installations, 53,000 military personnel, and the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific. Hawaii plays a vital role in the Armed Forces' mission to maintain security in this growing and volatile region. We all know that.

Conversely, the military presence here is vital to Oahu's economy. I have been told, for example, that the Marine air base at Kaneohe contributes as much to the gross State product as sugar and pineapple together, not quite as much, some \$365 million. And if that base ever closed down, as we learned from the operations of Saudi Arabia, it would have a direct and immediate effect on the

people living on that side of the island. Direct military expenditures in the State total \$3.5 million annually and nearly all of it is expended on the island of Oahu.

We want the military to stay in Hawaii on a long-term basis and we understand the military's need for harbors, airfields, and the many other facilities required to support modern forces.

In specific, we recognize the need for adequate training areas to maintain our fighting forces in readiness. Although unpopular, areas for live-fire training are an absolute necessity. We intend to work closely—and when I say “we,” I am talking about the city administration—with the military to ensure that the use of these areas is safe for our people and our environment.

Having said that, we must also acknowledge that Oahu is a small island with a growing population. Land is scarce and valuable. Military installations occupy over 81,000 acres, 21 percent of our total land area. While we want to provide an adequate land base to support military need, surplus lands should be returned to the people of Hawaii to use for housing, recreation, and businesses that will contribute to our economic well-being.

BARBERS POINT NAVAL AIR STATION

Last week, the Department of Defense announced that Barbers Point Naval Air Station might possibly be closed. While some functions and personnel would be transferred to Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, fixed-wing aircraft now based at Kaneohe would be transferred to the mainland. The net loss of 2,240 military personnel and 1,162 civilians will have a negative effect on our economy.

But we are not complaining. Defense budget cuts are inevitable and other communities on the mainland will suffer more severe economic impacts than ours. In our present economy, however, any loss of jobs is cause for concern. President Clinton has promised economic assistance to communities hurt by base closing. But we do not know what kind of assistance will be provided. Will any of this assistance come to Hawaii?

In the very near future, I will appoint a committee of local business and community representatives with the specific charge of advising me on the subjects I have discussed: first, cooperation, continuing cooperation with the military in meeting its long-term operational needs in Hawaii; second, mitigation of the economic impacts of any force reductions; and third, a continuing review of military land.

The approximate 3,700 acres released at Barbers Point lies, if it is released, lies in the heart of the Ewa region and will become part of what we call the planned Second City. These lands can support affordable housing, ocean recreation for the Ewa region, and possible future resorts uses, as well as commercial and industrial uses.

Discontinuing the airfield at Barbers Point will lift noise and accident zone encumbrances for another 750 acres in the region. In addition, future roads crossing the Barbers Point lands will improve transportation between the eastern and western parts of Ewa.

I do not believe—and I think, possibly, I am disagreeing with the State administration—I do not believe that we ought to have a gen-

eral aviation airport in that area. That area is a very, very large area. It is a prime area. And 20 years down the line, maybe 30 years down the line, that wonderful beach that they have out there will not only be used for public purposes but possibly for needed and added hotel resort use. There are people who oppose that. But I am looking at it 20 or 30 years down the line. To have a general aviation airport in an area that is valuable for development, of the Second City, is like putting a general aviation airport at the Ala Wai golf course, next to Waikiki. It does not make sense. Again, I reiterate, this is looking 20 or 30 years down the line.

The city and county of Honolulu are planning for the future use of Barbers Point, even though we realize that the State government will more than likely opt to take it over completely. But we would like to assist them wherever possible and give them more input. And we look forward to working closely with Federal agencies in the closing of the air station and disposition of the lands.

Over the years, the city and county of Honolulu and the military have developed creative, win-win solutions, answering the needs of both the military and the citizens of Oahu. One example is the city recreational use of Bellows Air Force Base. Another is the recent exchange of surplus military land at Manana for a causeway to Ford Island. And I believe our senior Senator is aware of that whole project. And we worked very, very closely on that. And thanks to you, I think, we are going to be able to get on with it.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MILITARY

Looking to the future, we envision a continued strong military presence in Hawaii and cooperative problem solving. We have the following specific recommendations.

First, the Department of Defense should aggressively identify and divest itself of the lands no longer needed to support the military mission. These lands can be put to productive use by Government and private enterprise. I urge the Department especially to review the use of ceded lands which could and should be returned to the Hawaiian people.

Second, future planning for military force cuts should recognize the growing economic importance of the Pacific region, the reliance of Asian countries on U.S. military protection, and Hawaii's strategic location. Future planning should include close consultation with the local governments.

Third, Department of Defense should continue its program to construct additional military housing on Oahu. Supplying adequate housing stock is the only way to relieve pressure on Oahu's overheated housing market and to slow the escalation of rental prices.

I believe that the State and/or the county working separately or together to acquire that property should, if the Defense Department finally releases it, I believe that the property can be picked up, if you want to figure the fair market value of \$50,000, say, an acre would come to \$200 million.

In any event, whatever money to come from the purchase or disposition of that property ought to be used exclusively for housing and housing only.

The Coast Guard airplanes that they have stationed there now, I believe, ought to be moved to Wheeler Field. And I believe that

if a general aviation airport is of that importance to us, that Wheeler Field and the lands surrounding that area ought to be considered to move not only the Coast Guard planes there, which are needed in the Pacific, but also to have a general aviation airport.

I know time is of essence here and there are lot of other speakers. I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify here.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF FRANK F. FASI, MAYOR, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

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In specific, we recognize the need for adequate training areas to maintain our fighting forces in readiness. Although unpopular, areas for live-fire training are an absolute necessity. We intend to work closely with the military to ensure that the use of these areas is safe for our people and our environment.

Having said that, we must also acknowledge that Oahu is a small island with a growing population. Land is scarce and valuable. Military installations occupy over 81,000 acres, 21 percent of our total land area. While we want to provide an adequate land base to support military needs, surplus lands should be returned to the people of Hawaii—to use for affordable housing, for recreation, and for businesses that will contribute to our economic well-being.

Last week, the Department of Defense announced that Barber's Point Naval Air Station would be closed. While some functions and personnel would be transferred to Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, fixed-wing aircraft now based at Kaneohe would be transferred to the mainland. The net loss of 2,240 military personnel and 1,162 civilians will have a negative effect on our economy.

We are not complaining. Defense budget cuts are inevitable, and other communities on the mainland will suffer more severe economic impacts than ours. In our present economy, however, any loss of jobs is cause for concern. President Clinton has promised economic assistance to communities hurt by base closings. What kind of assistance will be provided? Will any of this assistance come to Hawaii?

In the very near future, I will appoint a committee of local business and community representatives with the specific charge of advising me on the subjects I have discussed: (1) cooperation with the military in meeting its long-term operational needs in Hawaii; (2) mitigation of the economic impacts of any force reductions; and (3) review of military lands.

The 3,700 acres released at Barber's point lies in the heart of the Ewa region and will become part of the planned "Second City." These lands can support affordable housing, ocean recreation for the Ewa region, and possible future resort uses, as well as commercial and industrial uses.

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2. Future planning for military force cuts should recognize the growing economic importance of the Pacific region, the reliance of Asian countries on U.S. military protection, and Hawaii's strategic location. Future planning should include close consultation with local government.

3. The Department of Defense should continue its program to construct additional military housing on Oahu. Supplying adequate housing stock is the only way to relieve pressure in Oahu's overheated housing market and to slow the escalation of rental prices.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

Senator INOUE. Mr. Mayor, I thank you very much for your statement and it will go on to my colleagues.

I would like to emphasize, once again, that the military presence in Hawaii has a major impact upon our economy; we all know that. But its real reason for its presence here is that military presence enhances the national interest of our country.

Keeping that in mind, I would like to make a flatout statement, because of confusion that may have resulted from other statements. We will bring home the Marines from Okinawa before we authorize the Department of Defense to close Kaneohe. I can assure you that.

Mr. FASI. One other thing, Mr. Chairman. I would like to point out at one time I called for the complete return of all the lands at Bellows Field. In fact, I proposed that 20 years ago.

Being a former marine, I am aware of the necessity of ship-to-shore movement by the Marine Corps. Whatever happens to 1,600-plus acres, we must maintain a capability of the Marine Corps at Kaneohe to have operational land use on the coast at the Waimanalo side at Bellows Field.

So I have kind of changed my position on that, noting the importance of Kaneohe Marine Air Station to the economy of this island and this State.

Senator INOUE. At the present, the Joint Military Task Force has this matter high on its agenda. I believe that the recommendation will call for joint use of Bellows.

CONSTRUCTION OF FAMILY HOUSING AT SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

Mr. Collins, the chief of staff, just advised me that in view of your interest in housing, today the Army issued a \$26,961,000 contract to complete design and construction of 102 family housing units at Schofield Barracks. I think this should indicate that we are here to stay for a little while longer.

Mr. FASI. I might add, Senator, that if a value of \$200 million were—and obtained from the Barbers Point land, the city could guarantee to build 2,000 one-, two- and three-bedroom units on Government land in exchange.

Senator INOUE. I will convey your thoughts to the appropriate body, sir.

Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor.

Mr. FASI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator INOUE. Now may I call upon the senior representative of the General Services Administration, Mr. James Cayce.

Welcome.

Mr. CAYCE. Thank you, sir.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

STATEMENT OF JAMES CAYCE

DETAILED INVENTORY

Mr. CAYCE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the Acting Administrator of the General Services Administration, it is my pleasure to appear before you and to announce that the detailed inventory of real property mandated by the fiscal year 1992 Defense and Treasury and Postal Service appropriation bills has been completed. It is currently being packaged by my office and is undergoing internal clearance procedures.

Once these clearance procedures have taken place, and I do not anticipate that they will be very lengthy, I will be scheduling a more formal briefing in your office in Washington to brief you on the result of the inventory. Let me just give you a few highlights, sir, of what the inventory looks like and what it will tell you.

The inventory that we prepared, unlike past efforts, is not merely a listing of data showing what the Federal community owns in the State of Hawaii. Rather, it talks to how land was acquired, whether it was through negotiations or a condemnation proceeding, and also whether it was ceded and how it was ceded. The report goes into length as to the background of ceded lands and acquisitions. I think that you and the task force will find this narrative very useful as you determine what the Federal presence will and should be in the State of Hawaii.

The report identified a total of 560,122 acres of land that was ceded since 1898 to the Federal Government. Of these, 418,543 acres are under the custody and accountability of various Federal civilian agencies, predominantly the Department of Interior, National Park Service, and Fish and Wildlife Service.

A total of 141,579 acres are lands that have been ceded to the military for military or related military purposes.

HOW LANDS WERE CEDED

Again, the report goes to great lengths to provide the narrative to discuss how those lands were ceded and to what purposes they are being used now. As background, as you see the report, particularly on the defense side because the defense community has a much greater data base on their lands, historically because there has been much more attention paid to defense lands in the State of Hawaii. The defense portion of the report provides master planning maps and master planning data that details the use of acquired and ceded lands. So I do feel that you will find the report very useful and the task force will also.

As we complete the inventory and once I turn it over to you, certainly the General Services Administration stands ready to assist you and the task force as you determine what the Federal presence should be in the State of Hawaii.

We consider that the activity that is going on in the State of Hawaii right now is a precursor of what many communities will be doing in the United States as they decide what the mix should be, military lands in the community where there is a predominant Federal presence, military and civilian lands.

Also, for the record, I would like to thank members of your staff in Washington and here in Hawaii, members of the Governor's staff who have been very, very helpful as we went through this process and also the Department of Defense has been very, very helpful in preparing the input.

Sir, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any other questions.

Senator INOUYE. I thank you very much, sir.

When can we anticipate the official publication of this report?

Mr. CAYCE. Sir, I would anticipate in 2 to 3 weeks. The internal clearance procedures I mentioned relate to clearing it with all Federal agencies to ensure that they are comfortable with the data, and predominantly that has already taken place. I would anticipate 2 weeks.

Senator INOUYE. I am pleased to hear that you will approach this in a different manner such as providing narrative on how the Government acquired these lands, under what circumstances and its legal status. Because there is much confusion whenever we work on land matters: Is this owned in fee by the Government? Is it leased? Is it ceded land and, if so, what type of ceded land?

So that would be most helpful, sir, and I look forward to meeting with you in my office.

Mr. CAYCE. Thank you.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.

Now, may I call upon the distinguished chairman of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, Mr. Clayton Hee.

Welcome, sir.

NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES

STATEMENT OF CLAYTON HEE, CHAIRMAN, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. HEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, Senator.

I am Clayton Hee, chairman of the board of trustees for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and appreciate this opportunity to, once again, speak before you.

FUTURE USE OF LAND

Given the limited time afforded to all presentations, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus my remarks on the future use of such lands of which the military presently occupy.

One, outstanding Hawaiian claims for land based on the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii by armed American forces in 1893 and the subsequent annexation of the islands in 1898 when, without the consent of or compensation to the Hawaiian people, nearly 2 million acres of former crown and government lands were transferred to the United States.

Two, unaddressed harms to the Hawaiian Home Lands trust by the Federal Government.

And, three, the continuing Federal practices of selling nonceded lands at auction.

I do not believe that the spirit and substance of this hearing is best served by presenting competing uses—housing, commercial development, transportation facilities—anticipated for these lands. It

is more important to set forth the fundamental purpose to be served by such returns, and to recognize the decisionmaking authority and capability of those mandated to implement such purposes.

RIGHTS OF HAWAIIAN PEOPLE

Clearly, I am here to assert the primacy and too-long deferred claims and rights of the Hawaiian people to all such lands, and also to assert our right and ability to decide what uses will be permitted or pursued on such lands.

It is somehow fitting that this hearing is being held on the birthday of Prince Kuhio Day. Today we honor the memory and achievement of the prince in achieving passage of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act in 1921. Unfortunately, it is also fitting to remember that by that act, native Hawaiians received only the available lands—the rocky, arid, inaccessible properties not needed by the sugar and pineapple plantations.

It has not been lost on Hawaiians that our needs have unanimous support and endorsement so long as no one else wants it. Kaho'olawe, valued and cherished by Hawaiians for her sacred and cultural dimensions, is to be transferred to a restored Hawaiian nation without opposition or competition from State or local government. But then, it appears that no one else really wants or could use Kaho'olawe in modern American terms.

Yet, the same principles and justifications of returning Kaho'olawe should guide all decisions regarding lands under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.

REDRESS REQUIRED

Native Hawaiian claims, rooted both in native tradition and law, and an American sense of justice require redress. Knowing that such restitution and recognition must be achieved in this decade, I believe, it is incumbent on this subcommittee and eventually the entire Congress to incorporate this eventuality into all transitional decisions affecting land use and jurisdiction.

I believe that it is an evasion of this duty to make artificial separations of ceded and nonceded lands.

First, there are genuine strategic needs which must be met by the United States. There is no foreseeable possibility of, for example, Pearl Harbor being closed and those former Government lands being ever returned. Yet, those lands are part of the claim and the fee lands of Barbers Point could be conveyed as a partial and appropriate resolution.

The existing trusts, derived from the constraints of the annexation resolution ceding certain public lands, do not reflect or in any way acknowledge the larger harms and obligations tied to the Hawaiian claims for land. As such, the range and possible land restitution should also more broadly and justly assess repair as a value and a need, not simply the return of a property or properties.

If someone stole my car and then demolished it, I would not accept the return of the wrecked car as just compensation. I would demand a comparable property. The same is true of compensation for stolen land.

Although the overriding issue on all discussions of possible use should center on Hawaiian land claims, there have also been harms to existing trusts which must also be faced. In no way should these claims be substituted for or confused with the claims linked to the overthrow.

Currently, Hawaiian Home Lands are being immorally used for nontrust purposes. Perhaps the most conspicuous is the firing and training facility at Pohakuloa.

The release and return of Bellows Field could seek to resolve this breach of trust. Again, the status of these lands may be nonceded. However, the consolidation of these lands with adjoining Waimanalo homelands should argue persuasively for maximizing infrastructure investments, meeting the demand for homesteads on this island, and also retain the character of that area of Oahu.

Given these possibilities, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs urges that the current Reagan-Bush policies of auctioning off nonceded lands to the highest bidder be formally discarded and discredited.

The opportunity for a profound Federal review of the uses of military lands in Hawaii is here. The cold war has ended. The economic imperative to shift our national resources and energies to peace is self-evident. And the determination and rightness of Hawaiians to win a settlement of our claims is unquestioned.

This opportunity cannot be twisted or misunderstood as in any way un-American or motivated by antimilitary feelings. The undeniable role of the U.S. Navy in the destruction of the Hawaiian nation is historically clear. But our claims and expectations for a comprehensive settlement are drawn from a deep belief in the American will to right past wrongs. It would be truly pono if that settlement could begin with the return of surplus military lands.

As a member of the task force mandated to discuss and review Federal lands, I look forward to future meetings like this one. With the completion of the "Federal Survey of Lands," such meetings will become more intense and more substantive.

Senator, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and your members.

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much, Mr. Hee. Your statement is an important one. I will most certainly discuss this with my colleagues.

FUTURE OF POHAKULOA

But I should like to point out to you at this juncture, since you mentioned Pohakuloa. Pohakuloa, as you know, is a major live ammunition training area for the military. It is widely used by the men stationed at Schofield, or the ground forces Marines at Kaneohe.

I am convinced that if Pohakuloa was required to close and such lands be returned, the military would have to change its plans on its presence in Hawaii. Because in order to maintain readiness at all times, training is absolutely essential. Without that training, I am certain they will have to think about going elsewhere.

So from the standpoint of our military presence, our national interest, at this moment the use of Pohakuloa, although you have indicated is immoral and I do not question your views, Pohakuloa cannot be closed at this time.

On the matter of the base closure, I submitted an amendment which is now part of the law which makes Native American sovereign governments equal to State and local governments on the return of lands. For example, lands that are owned in fee by the Federal Government, if they are closed, the State, the county, and an Indian government may apply for it.

In the case of Hawaii, since we do not have the sovereign Hawaiian entity, it cannot qualify. But I would hope that someday soon there will be a sovereign entity that could qualify to receive such lands. So I want you to know that steps are being taken to bring about to some degree, albeit small, some of the thoughts that you have expressed this morning.

Mr. HEE. Well, Senator, I appreciate this opportunity and I believe you, perhaps better than other Members in Congress, know that to a large extent the sovereign movement in Washington has been led by you. And to the extent that the community, both Hawaiian and non-Hawaiian, have been working quite hard, quite arduously to accomplish that, is, in some ways, a part of you. The legislature presently is poised, hopefully, to pass a bill which would provide that opportunity through a Hawaiian Congress. Part of those efforts, as you know, are because of you.

With regard to the firing ranges and other military uses, there is no argument here but rather the appropriateness of those uses on trust lands which were not designated for such uses. And I think you know quite well to what I speak, sir. But I appreciate this opportunity.

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Hee.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF CLAYTON H.W. HEE

ALOHA AND GOOD MORNING, SENATOR INOUE AND MEMBERS OF THE U.S. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE. I AM CLAYTON HEE, CHAIR OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS (OHA). THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY OF APPEARING BEFORE YOU THIS MORNING TO PRESENT THE VIEWS OF OHA REGARDING FUTURE USES OF MILITARY LANDS IN THE STATE OF HAWAII.

GIVEN THE LIMITED TIME AFFORDED TO MY PRESENTATION THIS MORNING, I WOULD LIKE TO FOCUS MY REMARKS ON FUTURE USE OF SUCH LANDS TO:

1. OUTSTANDING HAWAIIAN CLAIMS FOR LAND BASED ON THE ILLEGAL OVERTHROW OF THE KINGDOM OF HAWAII BY ARMED AMERICAN FORCES IN 1893, AND THE SUBSEQUENT ANNEXATION OF THE ISLANDS IN 1898 WHEN -- WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF OR COMPENSATION TO THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE -- NEARLY TWO MILLION ACRES OF FORMER CROWN AND GOVERNMENT LANDS TRANSFERRED TO THE UNITED STATES;
2. UNADDRESSED HARMS TO THE HAWAIIAN HOMELANDS TRUST BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT; AND
3. CONTINUING FEDERAL PRACTICES OF SELLING NON-CEDED LANDS AT AUCTION.

I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE SPIRIT AND SUBSTANCE OF THIS HEARING IS BEST SERVED BY PRESENTING COMPETING "USES" -- HOUSING, COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES -- ANTICIPATED FOR THESE LANDS. IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO SET FORTH THE FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE TO BE SERVED BY SUCH RETURNS, AND TO RECOGNIZE THE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY AND CAPABILITY OF THOSE MANDATED TO IMPLEMENT SUCH PURPOSES.

CLEARLY, I AM HERE TO ASSERT THE PRIMACY AND TOO-LONG DEFERRED CLAIMS AND RIGHTS OF THE HAWAIIAN PEOPLE TO ALL SUCH LANDS. AND ALSO TO ASSERT OUR RIGHT AND ABILITY TO DECIDE WHAT USES WILL BE PERMITTED OR PURSUED ON SUCH LANDS.

IT IS SOMEHOW FITTING THAT THIS HEARING IS BEING HELD ON PRINCE KUHIO DAY. TODAY WE HONOR THE MEMORY AND ACHIEVEMENT OF THE PRINCE IN ACHIEVING PASSAGE OF THE HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION ACT IN 1921. UNFORTUNATELY, IT IS ALSO FITTING TO REMEMBER THAT BY THAT ACT NATIVE HAWAIIANS RECEIVED ONLY THE "AVAILABLE LANDS" -- THE ROCKY, ARID, INACCESSIBLE PROPERTIES NOT NEEDED BY THE SUGAR AND PINEAPPLE PLANTATIONS.

IT HAS NOT BEEN LOST ON HAWAIIANS THAT OUR NEEDS HAVE UNANIMOUS SUPPORT AND ENDORSEMENT -- AS LONG AS NO ONE ELSE WANTS IT. KAHO'OLAWA -- VALUED AND CHERISHED BY HAWAIIANS FOR HER SACRED AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS -- IS TO BE TRANSFERRED TO A RESTORED HAWAIIAN NATION WITHOUT OPPOSITION OR COMPETITION FROM STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. BUT THEN, NO ONE REALLY WANTS OR COULD USE KAHO'OLAWA IN MODERN AMERICAN TERMS.

YET, THE SAME PRINCIPLES AND JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RETURNING KAHO'OLAWA SHOULD GUIDE ALL DECISIONS REGARDING LANDS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

NATIVE HAWAIIAN CLAIMS, ROOTED BOTH IN NATIVE TRADITION AND LAW, AND AN AMERICAN SENSE OF JUSTICE, REQUIRE REDRESS. KNOWING THAT SUCH RESTITUTION AND RECOGNITION MUST BE ACHIEVED IN THIS DECADE, IT IS INCUMBANT ON THIS SUBCOMMITTEE AND EVENTUALLY THE ENTIRE CONGRESS TO INCORPORATE THIS EVENTUALITY INTO ALL TRANSITIONAL DECISIONS AFFECTING LAND USE AND JURISDICTION.

I BELIEVE THAT IT IS AN EVASION OF THIS DUTY TO MAKE ARTIFICIAL SEPARATIONS OF "CEDED" AND "NON-CEDED" LANDS.

FIRST, THERE ARE GENUINE STRATEGIC NEEDS WHICH MUST BE MET BY THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS NO FORESEEABLE POSSIBILITY OF, FOR EXAMPLE, PEARL HARBOR BEING CLOSED AND THOSE FORMER GOVERNMENT LANDS BEING RETURNED. YET, THOSE LANDS ARE PART OF THE CLAIM -- AND FEE LANDS OF BARBER'S POINT COULD BE CONVEYED AS A PARTIAL, AND APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION.

THE EXISTING TRUSTS -- DERIVED FROM THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE ANNEXATION RESOLUTION CEDING CERTAIN PUBLIC LANDS -- DO NOT REFLECT OR IN ANY WAY ACKNOWLEDGE THE LARGER HARMS AND OBLIGATIONS TIED TO THE HAWAIIAN CLAIMS FOR LAND. AS SUCH, THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE LAND RESTITUTION SHOULD ALSO MORE BROADLY -- MORE JUSTLY -- ASSESS REPAIR AS A VALUE AND A NEED, NOT SIMPLY THE RETURN OF PARTICULAR PROPERTIES.

IF SOMEONE STOLE MY CAR AND THEN DEMOLISHED IT, I WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE RETURN OF THE WRECKED CAR AS JUST COMPENSATION. I WOULD DEMAND A COMPARABLE PROPERTY. THE SAME IS TRUE OF COMPENSATION FOR STOLEN LAND.

ALTHOUGH THE OVER-RIDING ISSUE ON ALL DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE USE SHOULD CENTER ON HAWAIIAN LAND CLAIMS, THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN HARMS TO EXISTING TRUSTS WHICH MUST ALSO BE FACED. IN NO WAY SHOULD THESE CLAIMS BE SUBSTITUTED FOR OR CONFUSED WITH THE CLAIMS LINKED TO THE OVERTHROW.

CURRENTLY, HAWAIIAN HOMES TRUST LANDS ARE BEING IMMORALLY USED FOR NON-TRUST PURPOSES. PERHAPS MOST CONSPICUOUS IS FIRING AND TRAINING FACILITY AT POHAKULOLO.

THE RELEASE AND RETURN OF BELLOWS FIELD COULD SEEK TO RESOLVE THIS BREACH OF TRUST.

AGAIN, THE STATUS OF THESE LANDS MAY BE NON-CEDED. HOWEVER, THE CONSOLIDATION OF THESE LANDS WITH ADJOINING WAIMANALO HOMELANDS SHOULD ARGUE PERSUASIVELY FOR MAXIMIZING INFRA-STRUCTURE INVESTMENTS, MEETING THE DEMAND FOR HOMESTEADS ON THIS ISLAND, AND ALSO RETAIN THE CHARACTER OF AREA OF O'AHU.

GIVEN THESE POSSIBILITIES, OHA URGES THAT THE CURRENT REAGAN-BUSH POLICIES OF AUCTIONING OFF NON-CEDED LANDS TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER BE FORMALLY DISCARDED AND DISCREDITED.

THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A PROFOUND FEDERAL REVIEW OF THE "USES" OF MILITARY LANDS IN HAWAI'I IS HERE. THE COLD WAR IS ENDED. THE ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE TO SHIFT OUR NATIONAL RESOURCES AND ENERGIES TO PEACE IS SELF-EVIDENT. AND THE DETERMINATION AND RIGHTNESS OF HAWAIIANS TO WIN A SETTLEMENT OF OUR CLAIMS IS UNQUESTIONED.

THIS OPPORTUNITY CANNOT BE TWISTED OR MISUNDERSTOOD AS IN ANY WAY UNAMERICAN OR MOTIVATED BY ANTI-MILITARY FEELINGS.

THE UNDENIABLE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION IS HISTORICALLY CLEAR. BUT OUR CLAIMS AND EXPECTATIONS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ARE DRAWN FROM A DEEP BELIEF IN THE AMERICAN WILL TO RIGHT PAST WRONGS.

IT WOULD BE TRULY "PONO" IF THAT SETTLEMENT COULD BEGIN WITH THE RETURN OF MILITARY LANDS.

AS A MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE MANDATED TO DISCUSS AND REVIEW FEDERAL LANDS, I LOOK FORWARD TO FUTURE MEETINGS LIKE THIS ONE. WITH THE COMPLETION OF THE FEDERAL SURVEY OF LANDS, SUCH MEETINGS WILL BECOME MORE INTENSE AND SUBSTANTIVE.

THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME TO TESTIFY THIS MORNING.

STATEMENT OF KEITH M. KANESHIRO, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY,
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, HI

Senator INOUYE. Now may I call upon the distinguished prosecuting attorney of the city and county of Honolulu, Mr. Keith Kaneshiro. Mr. Prosecutor.

Mr. KANESHIRO. Good morning, Senator, and thank you very much for this opportunity to testify before you.

As Honolulu's prosecuting attorney, you may be asking why am I here today testifying on the issue regarding the use of surplus Federal lands. We are currently in a war, the war against drug abuse. It is an international war affecting many nations, including the United States and Hawaii. And this war has casualties. Our prison's overcrowded condition and lack of drug treatment programs are threatening public safety.

NEED FOR LOW-SECURITY PRISON

Three years ago I asked the State legislature to study the possibility of obtaining surplus Federal facilities for a low-security prison. A resolution was introduced and passed by the House and the Senate. Nothing happened.

This year after the announcement of the proposed closing of Barbers Point Naval Air Station, I again went to the legislature. Senate Concurrent Resolution 249, introduced on behalf of my department, urges, "That the Department of Public Safety contact the Federal Government to discuss the possible use of the facilities at Barbers Point Naval Air Station for a secured residential drug treatment center." This resolution requests a report back to the legislature before it convenes next year.

As you can see, I strongly believe that the conversion of surplus Federal lands for a low-security prison and treatment centers may provide some relief to our overcrowded prison situation.

As prosecuting attorney, I have witnessed over the past 4 years how overcrowded prisons have turned the criminal justice system upside down in Hawaii. The lack of prison space is posing a very real threat to public safety in our local community. The lack of prison space is affecting how judges sentence criminal offenders and even how lawmakers legislate our criminal laws.

People who should be behind bars because they are dangerous are being placed on probation or released on early parole. A number of them are committing more crimes while they are free. Legislators at this moment are moving to soften the State's hardline antidrug policy by eliminating mandatory sentences for the most serious drug offenders who are responsible for spawning drug-related violence and crimes on our streets and in our homes.

What went wrong? How did the tail end up wagging the dog?

What happened is that the leaders of our State have been reluctant to invest taxpayers' money in both prisons and prison alternatives. Hard economic times have made it tougher for community leaders to build a new prison. There has been so much inaction and indecision that today we find ourselves painted into a corner without a choice. We must have more prison space or dangerous and unrehabilitated criminals will be released back into our community.

However, a lean budget provides all the more reason for exploring the use of surplus Federal lands for a secured residential treatment center for drug offenders. This would enable the State to divert low-security inmates, many of whom are drug offenders, from a high-security facility. The freed-up prison space could then be used to incarcerate criminals who pose a greater danger. Meanwhile, drug offenders would still be incarcerated, receiving treatment and rehabilitation in a secured setting.

With some sensible planning and cooperation, I believe that the use of abandoned and surplus Federal lands may be a cost-effective solution to our prison's overcrowded situation that will protect the public while rehabilitating criminal offenders.

Again, Senator, thank you very much for this opportunity to testify before you.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PRISONS

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Kaneshiro. As you are well aware, at the present time the Bureau of Prisons is in heavy discussion with your office and that of the mayor and the Governor's office to come forward with a site that can meet the requirements and the needs for the Bureau of Prisons. I believe they are looking at five potential spots at this moment.

However, there are certain requirements. One, it has to be in reasonable proximity of the judicial system here because they are fearful of long distances of conveyance of prisoners back and forth. One might argue that Barbers Point may be too distant a location.

Second, I would assume that if the county or the State should seriously consider using Barbers Point for the housing of very serious offenders of the law, the people living in proximity in that area would rise up in great indignation.

It is not in my office to decide what the use would be, but I would urge you to discuss this matter with the appropriate officials. But I do not see the possibility of success, sir.

Mr. KANESHIRO. Senator, I have discussed with the Federal officials of a new site and the new facility that they are contemplating building in Hawaii. It will be a Federal prison. I discussed with them whether they could use the space in the Federal prison to house State inmates in that Federal prison. And they are taking that into consideration.

Second, the site proposed recommendations that I am making for Barbers Point Naval Air Station is not so much to house high-risk, high-security inmates but to put the low-security inmates who are in need of drug treatment and to have that site used as a drug treatment center and a secured treatment center for these inmates who are ready to be released back into our community. Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, sir.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF KEITH M. KANESHIRO

Senator Inouye and Honorable Members of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee of Defense,

Thank you for this opportunity to testify.

As Honolulu's Prosecuting Attorney, you may be asking why I am here today testifying on the issue regarding the use of surplus federal lands. Let me provide some background.

Three years ago I asked the State Legislature to study the possibility of obtaining surplus federal facilities for a low-security prison. A resolution was introduced and passed both the House and the Senate. Nothing happened.

This year after the announcement of the proposed closing of Barbers Point Naval Air Station, I again went to the Legislature. Senate Concurrent Resolution 249, introduced on behalf of my department, urges "that the department of Public Safety contact the federal government to discuss the possible use of the facilities at Barbers Point Naval Air Station for a secured residential drug treatment center." (My emphasis.) This resolution requests a report back to the Legislature before it convenes next year.

As you can see, I strongly believe that the conversion of surplus federal lands for low security prison and treatment centers may provide some relief to our overcrowded prison situation.

As Prosecuting Attorney, I have witnessed over the past four years how overcrowded prisons have turned the criminal justice system upside down in Hawaii. The lack of prison space is posing a very real threat to public safety in our local community. The lack of prison space is affecting how judges sentence criminal offenders and even how lawmakers legislate our criminal laws.

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What happened is that the leaders of our state have been reluctant to invest taxpayers' money in both prisons and prison alternatives. Hard economic times have made it tougher for community leaders to build a new prison. There has been so much inaction and indecision that today we find ourselves painted into a corner without a choice: We must have more prison space or dangerous and unrehabilitated criminals will be released back into our community.

However, a lean budget provides all the more reason for exploring the use of surplus federal lands for a secured residential treatment center for drug offenders. This would enable the state to divert low-security inmates, many of whom are drug offenders, from the high-security facility. The freed-up prison space could then be used to incarcerate criminals who pose a greater danger. Meanwhile, drug offenders would still be incarcerated, receiving treatment and rehabilitation in a secured setting.

With some sensible planning and cooperation, I believe that the use of abandoned and surplus federal lands may be a cost-effective solution to our prison overcrowded situation that will protect the public while rehabilitating criminal offenders.

Thank you for this opportunity to testify.

Senator INOUE. Now it is my great pleasure to call upon distinguished members of the State legislature: Senator Brian Kanno, Senator Randall Iwase; and Ms. Jane Ross and Mr. Guy Fujimura. Are they here?

STATEMENT OF BRIAN KANNO, SENATOR, HAWAII STATE LEGISLATURE

BARBERS POINT CLOSING

Mr. KANNO. Good morning, Senator Inouye.

My name is Brian Kanno and I am State senator representing the area from Makakilo to Ewa Beach, surrounding the Barbers Point Naval Air Station. I appreciate this opportunity to share my concerns about Barbers Point.

Since the announcement of the recommending closing of Barbers Point on March 12, various parties have jumped at the chance to suggest future uses including a Federal prison, a reliever airport, a visitor destination on the scale of Waikiki, housing, a park the size of Ala Moana Beach Park, a West Oahu campus of the University of Hawaii, and various private developments. Some of these may, indeed, be good ideas.

But the first thing we must think about are the people who are losing their jobs. The net loss in jobs for Barbers Point, Kaneohe, and Pearl Harbor would be 2,420 military and 1,162 civilian personnel. These are our brothers and sisters, our neighbors and friends, and by one swift act, they would be out of a job.

Has anyone here ever been laid off from a job? My father has. Though temporarily, my family knows what it feels like.

We need to examine closely how this affects people.

The closing of Barbers Point would result in the loss of 3,534 military and 618 civilian personnel and its impact will be far-reaching. Those directly affected are an integral part of the surrounding community of Makakilo and Ewa Beach. They and their families rent homes, attend schools, shop in our stores, and patronize small businesses in our community. All of these impacts need to be examined before a decision to close Barbers Point is finalized.

If the decision of closing Barbers Point is finalized, it is critical that we initiate measures that will deal with affected individuals. Any and all options that lessen the number of workers who are laid off should be considered. Any future plans for Barbers Point should include job replacement programs.

ANALYSIS AND STUDY CALLED FOR

A comprehensive impact analysis and planning study for Barbers Point is vital to the future of our community. Kapolei, the area immediately adjacent to Barbers Point, has been designated as the secondary urban center for the island of Oahu. Due to planned growth of the surrounding community, the population will grow

from 43,820 in 1990 to 126,400 in 2010. Development will include government buildings and services, residential communities, industrial and commercial business centers, resort and recreation facilities, and a deep-draft harbor.

Input from affected communities will be critical to the planning process. Coordination between base employees, community residents, Federal, State and county officials, and the military during the coming months will be essential.

Efforts should be undertaken to see that if Barbers Point closes, the land is made available at the least possible cost to the State of Hawaii.

Most important of all, we must consider the people whose lives are being affected by the proposed closing of Barbers Point. Thank you.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HAWAIIAN STATE SENATOR BRIAN KANNO

Good morning. My name is Brian Kanno and I am the State Senator representing the area from Makakilo to Ewa Beach, surrounding the Barbers Point Naval Air Station. I appreciate this opportunity to share my concerns about the future of Barbers Point.

Since the announcement of the recommended closing of Barbers Point on March 12, various parties have jumped at the chance to suggest future uses of the land, including a federal prison, a reliever airport, a visitor destination on the scale of Waikiki, housing, a park the size of Ala Moana Beach Park, a West Oahu campus for the University of Hawaii and various private developments. Some of these may indeed be good ideas.

But the first thing we must think about are the people who are losing their jobs. The net loss in jobs for Barbers Point, Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor is 2,420 military and 1,162 civilians. These are our brothers and sisters, our neighbors and friends, and by one swift act, they could be out of a job. Have any of you ever been laid off from your job? My father has. Though temporarily, my family knows what it feels like.

We need to examine critically how this affects people.

The closing of Barbers Point would result in the loss of 3,534 military and 618 civilian personnel and its impact will be far-reaching. Those directly affected are an integral part of the surrounding communities of Makakilo and Ewa Beach. They and their families rent homes, attend schools, shop in our stores and patronize many small businesses in our community. All of these impacts need to be examined before the decision to close Barbers Point is finalized.

If the closure of Barbers Point is finalized, it is critical that we initiate measures that will deal with the affected individuals. Any and all options that lessen the number of workers who are laid off should be considered. Any future plans for Barbers Point should include job replacement programs.

A comprehensive impact analysis and planning study for Barbers Point is vital to the future of our community. Kapolei, the area immediately adjacent to Barbers Point has been designated as the secondary urban center for the island of Oahu. Due to the planned growth of the surrounding community, the population will grow from 43,820 in 1990 to 126,400 in 2010. Development will include government buildings and services, residential communities, industrial and commercial business centers, resort and recreation facilities, and a deep draft harbor.

Input from affected communities will be critical to the planning process. Coordination between base employees, community residents, Federal, State and County officials and the military during the coming months will be essential.

Efforts should be undertaken to see that if Barbers Point closes, the land is made available at the least possible cost to the State of Hawaii.

Most important of all, we must consider the people whose lives are being affected by the proposed closing of Barbers Point.

STATEMENT OF RANDALL IWASE, SENATOR, HAWAII STATE LEGISLATURE

Senator INOUYE. Senator Iwase.

Mr. IWASE. Thank you, Senator Inouye.

Good morning, Senator Inouye, and let me apologize for my aloha shirt. I——

Senator INOUE. Noticed; I will not fine you. [Laughter.]

Mr. IWASE. Thank you very much. Thank you.

I would like to thank you for holding this hearing. We are extremely grateful to you and the committee for taking time to travel here on an issue which is of importance to our State. Let me also add that I concur fully with the statements previously made by Senator Kanno.

Hawaii, in size, is a small State. Landownership and use is, and has always been, an issue of critical importance to the people of Hawaii.

The focus of your committee's hearing today is on military land use. In this regard, I would like to make some specific comments on the possible closure of Barbers Point Naval Air Station.

In our land-scarce State, the Federal Government owns over 8 percent of all lands. Of the over 4 million acres of land in Hawaii, Oahu has approximately 403,000 acres, and of that amount the military owns in fee 26,397 acres.

Oahu is approximately 600 square miles in size and houses over 800,000 people, nearly four-fifths of our State's population. We have a population density of nearly 1,400 persons per square mile. This is to be contrasted with the Big Island's population density of 29 persons per square mile, Maui's at 86 per square mile and Kauai at 82 per square mile.

With this statistical backdrop, let me state that the possible closure of Barbers Point raises both concerns and opportunities.

IMPACT OF BARBERS POINT CLOSING

From an economic standpoint, the closure would result, as you have heard testimony today, in the loss of both military and civilian jobs. For the surrounding communities in Ewa, the impact remains to be more clearly defined, but undoubtedly loss of this employment center can only have a negative impact on the businesses in the area, particularly the small businesses. This is of special concern given the sluggish economic situation in our State and in the particular area.

From a land use standpoint, the closure does provide opportunities. First, given Oahu's size and population density, it is not often that over 3,600 acres of land, including beautiful beaches, become potentially available for housing, recreation, and job creation.

Second, under the city and county of Honolulu's general plan, population growth is to be directed to an area known as the secondary urban center, or Second City, in Ewa. Over the course of the next 10 years, the leeward and central Oahu regions could have a population increase of 100,000 to 150,000 people. To put the magnitude of this population growth in perspective, 100,000 people is about twice the present population of Kauai and 150,000 is approximately the present population of the Big Island. To deal with this growth, particularly the resulting horrendous traffic congestion and to fully implement the Second City concept, we need major job centers in the Second City area and the land to construct such centers.

Among the job centers under consideration by the State of Hawaii for the Ewa area are, one, a family court center and, two, a permanent site for the University of Hawaii, West Oahu.

As chair of the Senate's Planning, Land, and Water Use Management Committee, we recommended and the Senate passed to the House a bill designating Kapolei, in Ewa, as the site for the family court center. This matter is still pending in the House.

WEST OAHU COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY

With regards to West Oahu College and University, there is in my committee a concurrent resolution introduced by Senator Kanno, urging a study of Barbers Point as the site of UH-West Oahu. It is my understanding that the board of regents is seeking 700 acres for the campus. Barbers Point, given its location in the Second City area and given its present infrastructure and amenities, may well be an ideal location. The land is there. UH-West Oahu would be an economic catalyst for the area and the location is also consistent with the directed growth concept set forth in the city and county's general plan. It is my hope that should the base be closed, the possibility be explored that land area for the UH-West Oahu be given to the State by the Federal Government at no cost.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to present testimony, Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Senator Iwase.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HAWAIIAN STATE SENATOR RANDY IWASE

First of all I would like to thank you for holding this hearing. We are extremely grateful to the Committee and to you as Chair for taking the time to travel here on an issue which is of importance to our State.

Hawaii, in size, is a small state. Land ownership and use is and has always been an issue of critical importance to the people of Hawaii.

The focus of your committee's hearing today is on military land use. In this regard I would like to make some specific comments on the possible closure of Barbers Point Naval Air Station.

In our land-scarce state, the federal government owns over 8 per cent of all lands. Of the over 4 million acres of land in Hawaii, Oahu has approximately 403,000 acres. On the island of Oahu the military owns, in fee, 26,397 acres.

Oahu is approximately 600 square miles in size and houses over 800,000 people—nearly four-fifths of our State's population. We have a population density of nearly 1400 persons per square mile—this is to be contrasted with the Big Island's population density of 29 per square mile, Maui's at 86 per square mile and Kauai 82 per square mile.

With this statistical backdrop, let me state that the possible closure of Barbers Point raises both concerns and opportunities.

From an economic standpoint, the closure would result in the loss of both military and civilian jobs. For the surrounding communities in Ewa, the impact remains to be more clearly defined, but undoubtedly loss of this employment center can only have a negative impact on businesses in the area—particularly the small businesses. This is of special concern given the sluggish economic situation.

From a land use standpoint, the closure does provide opportunities. First, given Oahu's size and population density, it is not often that over 3,600 acres of land, including beautiful beaches, becomes potentially available for housing, recreation and job creation. Second, under the City and County of Honolulu's General Plan, population growth is to be directed to what is known as the Secondary Urban Center—or Second City—in Ewa. Over the course of the next ten years the Leeward and Central Oahu region could have a population increase of 100,000 to 150,000 people. To put the magnitude of this population growth in perspective, 100,000 people is about twice the present population of Kauai, and 150,000 is approximately the

present population of the Big Island. To deal with this growth, particularly the resulting horrendous traffic congestion, and to fully implement the Second City concept, we need major job centers in the Second City area and the land to construct such centers. Among the job centers under consideration by the State for the Ewa area are 1) A Family Court Center and 2) a permanent site for the University of Hawaii, West Oahu.

As Chair of the Senate's Planning Land and Water Use Management Committee we recommended and the Senate passed to the House a bill designating Kapolei—in Ewa—as the site for the Family Court Center. This matter is still pending in the House.

With regards to UH-West Oahu, there is in my committee a Concurrent Resolution introduced by Senator Brian Kanno, urging a study of Barbers Point as the site for UH-West Oahu. It is my understanding that the Board of Regents is seeking 700 acres for the campus. Barbers Point—given its location in the Second City area and given its present infrastructure and amenities—may well be an ideal location. The land area is there, UH-West Oahu would be an economic catalyst for the area, and the location is also consistent with the directed growth concept. It is my hope that should the base be closed, the possibility be explored that land area for the UH-West Oahu be given to the State at no cost.

Again, thank you for this opportunity to present testimony to the United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.

STATEMENT OF JANE ROSS, CORRESPONDING SECRETARY, HONOKAI HALE/NANAKAI GARDENS COMMUNITY, EWA, HI

EWA PLAIN

Senator INOUYE. Now may I call upon Ms. Jane Ross.

Ms. ROSS. Thank you, Senator. Good morning. My name is—

Senator INOUYE. Will you speak into the microphone, please? Thank you.

Ms. ROSS. My name is Jane A. Ross. I am a 29-year resident of the Honokai Hale/Nanakai Gardens community located very close to Barbers Point Naval Air Station. I have also served on the Ewa Neighborhood Board also continuously since its formation in 1977. As a result, I am quite familiar with the Ewa Plain and its developments.

Barbers Point Naval Air Station has never been a problem for the Honokai Hale community since its flight paths usually bypassed us. But now that developments are popping up all over the Ewa Plain in close proximity to Barbers Point, problems have arisen about where they can be placed without interfering with the air station's operations and without causing construction, noise, or health and safety problems for the new developments.

While I am a staunch supporter of a strong military and hate to see jobs lost due to the base closing, I, and those with whom I have talked in the community, believe now is the time to do so if the base is no longer of strategic importance to our national defense.

FUTURE USE OF BARBERS POINT FACILITIES

It is also our feeling that the entire facility, or as much of it as possible, including housing, should be turned over to the State at as small a cost as possible, and that the land with all its infrastructure and buildings be committed to the development of a much needed full-fledged University of Hawaii-West Oahu, which, as you well know, is presently only a 2-year institution that is housed in a couple of portables on a parking lot of the Leeward Community College.

Use of housing and existing buildings, even temporarily, would enable such a university to open up relatively quickly with less need for large amounts of tax dollars in very tight economic times. The existing stables would enable the new university to offer and engage in equestrian pursuits. Even a university lab school using the Barbers Point Elementary School could become an early reality.

We have heard suggestions that the site be turned into a reliever airport. This is definitely not acceptable and would be opposed by the present residents of the neighboring communities who are already complaining about more Barbers Point Naval Air Station noise and are concerned about low-flying aircraft. It would also be too close for comfort to the new city of Kapolei with its taller office buildings, which are planned for the area—actually, an accident ready to happen.

We have also heard a suggestion that the site become another resort area, primarily because of its fine beaches. This seems ridiculous since practically next door to Barbers Point is the large Ko Olina Resort, which really does not need the competition.

Those beaches could be put to better use as part of a university site for the conducting ocean research and ocean activities not available at the Manoa campus. We do feel strongly, however, that the Barbers Point beaches should be available for public use, even if they are part of a university site.

While enthusiastic about the possibility of having a university located at Barbers Point to meet the needs of our rapidly expanding Ewa population and while hopeful that such a full service, 4-year institution will create some jobs relatively quickly, we are still much concerned about the number of jobs that will be lost with the base closing and wonder what the Federal Government can do to ease that loss.

I appreciate having the opportunity to provide citizen input on this important issue.

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much, Ms. Ross.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF JANE A. ROSS

My name is Jane A. Ross. I am a 29 year resident of the Honokai Hale/Nanakai Gardens community located close to Barbers Point Naval Air Station, and currently serve as the Corresponding Secretary of our association. I have also served on the Ewa Neighborhood Board #23 almost continuously since its formation in 1977. As a result I am quite familiar with the Ewa Plain and its developments.

Barbers Point Naval Air Station has never been a problem for the Honokai Hale community since its flight paths usually by-passed us, but now that developments are popping up all over the Ewa Plain in close proximity to Barbers Point, problems have arisen about where they can be placed without interfering with the Air Station's operations, and without causing construction, noise, or health and safety problems for the new developments.

While I am a staunch supporter of a strong military, and hate to see jobs lost due to the Base closing, I, and those with whom I have talked, believe now is the time to do so if the Base is no longer of strategic importance to our National defense.

It is also our feeling that the entire facility, or as much of it as possible, including housing, should be turned over to the State, and that the land with all its infrastructure and buildings be committed to the development of a much needed University of Hawaii-West Oahu.

Use of housing and existing buildings - even temporarily - would enable a University to open up relatively quickly with less need for large immediate tax dollars in tight economic times. The existing stables would enable the new university to offer and engage in equestrian pursuits. Even a University Lab School, using the existing Barbers Point Elementary School, could become an early reality.

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While enthusiastic about the possibility of having a University located at Barbers Point to meet the needs of our rapidly expanding Ewa population, and while hopeful that such a full service, four year institution will create some jobs relatively quickly, we are still much concerned about the number of jobs that will be lost with the Base closing, and wonder what the Federal Government can do to ease that loss.

I appreciate being given the opportunity to provide input on this important issue.

**STATEMENT OF GUY FUJIMURA, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN
WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 142**

Senator INOUE. Mr. Fujimura?

Mr. FUJIMURA. Thank you.

The ILWU represents 29,000 workers statewide in longshore and trucking, tourism, agriculture, and dozens of miscellaneous enterprises.

We have long been involved with the question of conversion of military resources to civilian uses, not only because of the impact of such actions on the communities, such as Ewa and Waipahu, where our members live and work, but also because of the need for the economic opportunities that this can bring to our State.

IMPACT OF JOB LOSS

At the outset, however, let us clearly express our concern about the jobs that would be lost because of this closure. Unfortunately, my union has had too much experience with shutdowns and downsizings.

The preference, of course, would be to retain these jobs in some shape or form for as long as possible. If jobs are to be eventually lost, we hope that the timing of the closure can be controlled and coordinated so that new economic opportunities can be up and running to absorb the displaced workers and, of course, training monies be made available to make the transition possible.

While we believe that more nonmilitary related jobs may be created than the military related jobs lost when the base is closed, that will be of little comfort to the individual who is unemployed and cannot make the transition to comparable employment. Also, in determining what is comparable employment, pay and benefits currently enjoyed must be considered when judging whether a replacement job is satisfactory.

Much attention of this hearing will be placed on the potential of Barbers Point Naval Air Station and other bases for other uses. And, of course, because it is Hawaii, much attention will be focused on park uses, the beach areas.

We believe that a task force approach involving as many interests and viewpoints as possible is the best way to go. We think that the west Oahu campus may be the best major use of the land. But this should be worked out by the people of Hawaii. The benefits of this proposal should be carefully weighed against other proposals, especially in relationship to directly cushioning any negative impacts on the workers involved.

DISPOSAL OF ASSETS

In particular, we propose the assets of any bases that are closed, land, buildings, et cetera, should be considered as part of the peace dividend to be reinvested. There must be no effort to sell these installations fair market value to maximize returns. The installations are part of the public trust and must be made available to the State as part of an economic and public interest plan.

Perhaps legislation can be passed to treat all of the resources embodied in the bases slated to be closed in this round as part of an economic stimulus package. The State and county governments

and private sector can cooperate in proposing planned uses for the land to best provide economic benefits to the community without disrupting the values of that community.

Why was it possible for mining and lumbering leases to be practically given away by the Federal Government so that private enterprise could prosper and the lands and buildings of base slated for closure cannot be made available for free or at minimum cost for public benefit?

We would also ask that before any of these lands and structures be turned over, that any cleanup necessary for toxic and hazardous material be the responsibility of the current operator.

Thank you for this opportunity to express our views on this very important matter.

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF GUY FUJIMURA

The ILWU Local 142 represents 29,000 workers statewide in longshore and trucking, tourism, agriculture and dozens of other miscellaneous enterprises.

We have long been involved in the question of conversion of military resources to civilian uses, not only because of the impact of such actions on the communities, such as Ewa and Waipahu, where our members live and work, but also because of the need for the economic opportunities that this can bring to Hawaii.

At the outset, however, let us clearly express our concern about the jobs that would be lost because of the Barbers Point Naval Air Station (NAS) base closure. Unfortunately, the ILWU has had too much experience with shutdowns and downsizings of our own.

The preference, of course, would be to retain these jobs in some shape or form for as long as possible. If jobs are to be eventually lost, we hope that the timing of the closure can be controlled and coordinated so that new economic opportunities can be up and running to absorb the displaced workforce and that training monies will be available to make the transition possible.

Statistics showing that more non-military related jobs are created than military related jobs lost when a base closes are of little comfort if the individual who is unemployed cannot make the transition to comparable employment. Also, in determining what is comparable employment, pay and benefits currently enjoyed must be considered when judging whether a replacement job is satisfactory.

Much attention of this hearing will be placed on the potential of Barbers Point Naval Air Station and other bases for other uses. Because this is Hawaii, much attention will be focused on park and other recreational uses for beach areas.

We believe that the task force approach involving as many community interests and viewpoints as possible is the best way to go. We think that the West Oahu Campus of the University of Hawaii may be the best major use of the land, but this should be worked out by the people of Hawaii. The benefits of this proposal should be carefully weighed against other proposals, especially in relationship to directly cushioning any negative impacts on the workers involved.

In particular, we propose that the assets of any bases that are closed—land, buildings, etc.—should be considered as part of the peace dividend to be reinvested in our community. There must be no effort to sell these installations at "fair market value" to maximize returns to the federal government.

The installations are part of the public trust and must be made available to the State as part of an economic and public interest plan.

Perhaps legislation can be passed to treat all of the resources embodied in the bases slated to be closed as part of an economic stimulus package. The state and county governments and the private sector can cooperate in proposing planned uses for the land and other resources to best provide economic benefits to the community without disrupting the values of the community.

Why was it possible for mining and lumbering leases to be practically given away by the federal government so that private enterprise could prosper and the lands and buildings of bases slated for closure cannot be made available for free or at minimal cost for the public benefit?

We would also ask that before these lands and structures are turned over, any clean-up necessary for toxic and hazardous material be the responsibility of the current operator.

Thank you for this opportunity to express our views on this very important matter.

BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION

Senator INOUYE. As I indicated earlier, during the time period of April in Hawaii—and I am not certain as to the exact time—members of the Commission or their senior representatives will be in Hawaii to receive testimony from interested citizens on the matter of base closure.

Second, the decision as to the use will not be determined by the Base Closure Commission. Because if the State of Hawaii is the successful recipient of those lands, I suppose the State would make its decision or the county may do the same.

As to the closure itself, under the law, if the President approves the recommendation of the Base Closure Commission, then on or about September 1, that recommendation will become law. That is assuming that the President accepts it and the Congress accepts it.

ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP

Now, as to the implementation of that recommendation, experience has shown that it takes about 5 years. For example, as Mr. Fujimura pointed out, most, if not all, military bases have some pollution, some greater if you have a nuclear base, for example. And before the recipient agency takes title to it, under the law we would have to clean it up. At the present time we anticipate, and this is rather conservatively, that the cost of cleanup that will take our toxic waste and other material would exceed \$25 billion. So here at Barbers Point if we do have toxic material, it will take some time to get rid of it.

Second, we will have to provide facilities to receive the air-wing squadron that will move out of Barbers Point. Kaneohe will have to be restructured because of its expansion of activities. These things take time.

ECONOMIC IMPACT

If assuming that it takes 4 or 5 years to fully implement the program, we are convinced that no one will be fired because the reduction in force will be first carried out for attrition, because there are many who are on the verge of being retired. At the same time, the National Government has plans in place to provide alternative employment here in Hawaii or elsewhere. So every step has been taken to soften the blow. When one compares this State with other States, you will note that the blow is about the softest here. For the State of California, the base closure of this round has the potential of bringing about an unemployment increase of about 350,000. That is a major blow to the State of California. Well, whatever it is, whether it is California or Hawaii, we will do our utmost to alleviate the pain. There is a naval base in Charleston, for example. That one base alone has 30,000 employees. So it is a major impact on the economies of many other localities. But we will do our best, Senators, as you indicated your concern for your peo-

ple, we are concerned about the people. As to the use of Barbers Point, if this recommendation is approved by the President and the Congress of the United States, that decision will have to be made by the entities of which you participate in.

So we should prepare ourselves. If you wish to testify before the Commission, I would suggest you begin preparing your statement. Thank you very much.

Mr. KANNO. Senator Inouye, if I might add.

Senator INOUE. Yes.

Mr. KANNO. There is a concern of ours that the community have a role in helping to decide the future of what happens to Barbers Point. Senator Iwase and myself have introduced a resolution in the State legislature to create a task force of affected parties. There will be 20 people on the task force, State and county participation as well as community residents and employees. We would be looking at impacts as well as possible future plans for the base.

Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. I think that is a good idea. It brings about an orderly way of making decisions.

Mr. KANNO. Thank you.

Senator INOUE. Thank you.

Now may I call upon Representative Jackie Young, Dr. Linden Burzell, and Ms. Mabel Spencer.

Representative Young, it is good to have you here with representatives of your area, Waimanalo.

STATEMENT OF JACKIE YOUNG, SENATOR AND VICE SPEAKER, HAWAII STATE LEGISLATURE

Ms. YOUNG. Thank you very much, Senator Inouye.

Senator INOUE. If you sit in the back, you will not be seen by the camera.

Ms. YOUNG. We try not to sit there.

BELLOWS AIR FORCE STATION

Senator INOUE. Representative Young, please proceed.

Ms. YOUNG. Thank you, Senator Inouye. Thank you for this opportunity to present testimony on the particular issue of the future use of Bellows Air Force Station.

My name is Jackie Young and for the past 3 years I have had the honor and privilege of serving as a State representative for the 51st District which includes Waimanalo where Bellows Air Force Station is located.

The 51st District is a spectacular region in Windward Oahu whose coastal boundaries extend from Makapu'u Lighthouse along Waimanalo Beach, Bellows Beach, Lanikai Beach, to Kailua Bay. It is on these shores where it is believed the ancient Hawaiians first landed.

Our OHA chair, Clayton Hee, mentioned about the character of the community. Well, today, Waimanalo is regarded by many as a beach community, as a community with a large native Hawaiian population, an agricultural community, a place where there are more horses per capita than in any other place in Hawaii.

Today the voices of the *kanaka maoli* speak loud and clear for the return of their native lands throughout the State. I join them

in strongly supporting the return of Bellows Air Force Station to the people of Hawaii. Above all, I request that any planning for the future use of Bellows must have the active consultation and participation of community members.

Senator Inouye, with me today are Mabel Spencer and Linden Burzell, two community leaders from Waimanalo. Both are very articulate and eloquent spokespersons for the community. So I yield my time in order that they have may full opportunity to express their views.

Also with me for moral and spiritual support is Kamahine Kamakuni'ohelo and kupuna Lydia Hale and with us also is Bumpy Kanahele and Levi Ka'aawa. Thank you, Senator.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HAWAIIAN STATE REPRESENTATIVE JACKIE YOUNG

Senator Inouye and members of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. Thank you for this opportunity to present testimony on the particular issue of the future use of Bellows Air Force Station.

For the past three years I have had the honor and privilege of serving as the state representative for the 51st District, which includes Waimanalo where Bellows Air Force Station is located. The 51st District is a spectacular region in Windward Oahu whose coastal boundaries extend from Makapuu Lighthouse, along Waimanalo, Bellows Beach, Lanikai Beach to Kailua Bay. It is on these shores where it is believed the ancient Hawaiians first landed. Today Waimanalo is regarded by many as a beach community, an agricultural community, a place where there are more horses per capita than in any other place in Hawaii, and a community with a large Native Hawaiian population. Today, the voices of Kanaka Maoli speak loud and clear for the return of their native lands throughout the state.

I join them in strongly supporting the return of Bellows Air Force Station to the people of Hawaii. Above all, I request that any planning for the future use of Bellows must have the active consultation and participation of community members. Senator Inouye, with me today are Mabel Spencer and Linden Burzell, two community leaders from Waimanalo. Both are very articulate and eloquent spokespersons for the community so I yield my time in order that they may have full opportunity to express their views.

Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LINDEN A. BURZELL, PH.D., CHAIRMAN, WAIMANALO NEIGHBORHOOD BOARD NO. 32

Senator INOUE. Mr. Burzell.

Mr. BURZELL. Senator Inouye, thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss today the future of Bellows Air Force Station which is a matter of great importance to all of us who make our home in Waimanalo.

BELLOWS AFS OCCUPIES CEDED LAND

For our community, any consideration of the future of Bellows Air Force Station is governed by one overriding factor: Bellows Air Force Station occupies ceded land. As we contemplate the future of the station, we continuously bear in mind that the land it sits on is an integral part of the patrimony of the *kanaka maoli*, and was alienated from them under the terms of a temporary arrangement unilaterally instigated by the Government of the United States on the grounds of military necessity.

I am here today as a representative of the Waimanalo Neighborhood Board. However, please bear in mind that because we are discussing the future of ceded lands, those of us who are not of Hawai-

ian ancestry have a duty to listen to those who are. The main contribution I hope to make today is to urge you to listen the voices of native Hawaiians on this issue as our neighborhood board has done. Native Hawaiians, as you will hear today, are eloquent in the presentation of their position.

But as a secondary contribution, I will lay out the arguments for the return of major parts of the Bellows Air Force Station according to the ground rules laid out by the U.S. Government itself, my point being that even apart from the sovereign claims of native Hawaiians, the return of most of all of Bellows conforms to the guidelines laid down for the return by the U.S. Government itself.

We understand that absent a continuing military necessity, current law specifies that such lands shall be returned by the military to local control and administered by competent local authority for the benefit of the Hawaiian people. With this in mind, we sought to determine whether and to what extent a continuing military necessity for all or part of Bellows exist. And if no military necessity can be demonstrated for some or all of the lands in question, then the question really becomes how to achieve the quickest possible orderly return of these ceded lands to their rightful owners.

MILITARY USES OF BELLOWS

We in Waimanalo have reached several tentative conclusions concerning military uses of Bellows.

First, it is now clear that of the 1,500 acres or so that the station occupies, approximately 800 acres is not presently being put to any useful purpose, military or otherwise, and has lain idle for at least 25 years.

With regard to the remaining approximately 700 acres, these acres are used by the military for four purposes that we know about.

First, amphibious landing exercises require about 100 acres of fast land along the beach.

Second, Bellows is the site of an antenna array which is used for the control of VIP overflights which we understand to mean either primarily or exclusively overflights by the President of the United States. The antenna array occupies about 500 acres. We concluded that the use of 500 acres for the antenna array is a wasteful and unnecessary use since current technology would permit the military to control VIP overflights with an antenna occupying perhaps one-quarter acre. And that antenna could be located virtually anywhere on Oahu.

Third, Bellows is used for recreation for service-connected personnel. Recreational uses, both in terms of park land and structures, occupy perhaps another 50 or 100 acres along the beach. And while recreation is certainly a legitimate use for coastal lands, we doubt that a valid justification could be advanced for retaining recreational lands primarily exclusively in military control.

Fourth, Bellows is the site of a military training college of some sort. We do not know what its function is, but it occupies less than an acre.

Add these uses up, and we conclude that the military needs no more than about 200 acres to fulfill the assignments the station is charged with, with room to spare, especially since none of the

present military uses is of such a sensitive nature as to require a buffer zone.

Do these 200 acres need to be at Bellows or are there alternative sites for those uses? Probably so, but we do not presume to know with certainty at present.

To summarize, we find about 800 acres not presently used at all, aptly attested to by 25 years of jungle growth and nearly 500 additional acres used imprudently for an obsolete antennae array. This yields a total of about 1,300 acres or so that could be returned to local control in the immediate future without compromising military operations in any way.

Every military installation imposes some burdens and inconveniences on the host community, but these are usually offset by a range of economic benefits. Jobs are created, businesses thrive on the economic activity which the installation creates.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELLOWS AND WAIMANALO

The relationship between Bellows Air Force Base and Waimanalo is somewhat different. While on the one hand the station imposes costs on the community in terms of restricting recreational access, exacerbating the shortage of lands for parks, schools, and housing, on the other hand it offers essentially nothing in return for the community. Essentially no jobs, no extra trade for local business, all for the principle reason that the working population at the base is negligible.

To the extent that there are economic benefits, they accrue primarily to Kailua, the host community of the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, not to Waimanalo.

I think I can best sum up Waimanalo's view of Bellows as one of relatively benign dismay. While there is little active dislike of the station, we see it behaving somewhat like a relative by marriage who has taken up residence in our house, staked out the most comfortable chair in the living room and the one with the ocean view, and who makes little effort to help out around the house. We do not actively dislike the old fellow but can scarcely be expected to miss him if he moves away.

I should mention that opportunities to build a better relationship in the past have been missed. As a case in point, 2 years ago the community was desperately seeking suitable sites to house our homeless and we asked for about 5 acres near Kalaniana'ole Highway for a homeless shelter, and we were turned down flat. That was not a helpful act and did nothing to build aloha for the station.

In the present economic and political climate we see the closure of Bellows as inevitable, especially when real military facilities like Barber's Point are being closed. Closure will inevitably start a feeding frenzy among powerful interests, most of whom have little concern for our community.

As a community, we know what we do not want. We do not want a general aviation airport, and we do not want another major resort complex, and we do not want a golf course, and we do not want the military's need for more housing to be satisfied at Bellows while the even more pressing needs of Waimanalo's people go unmet.

MASTER PLAN OFFERED

But we also know what we do want, and accordingly the Waimanalo community has begun to prepare a master plan outlining potential uses for Bellows that are in harmony with the needs of our community.

We have included for further discussion expanded parks and recreational facilities, a green belt surrounding the community, low-cost rental housing for our families and elderly housing for our kupuna, a new satellite campus for the Kamehameha schools, re-routing Kalaniana'ole Highway, an extensive network of bikeways, and creation of a more compact urban center. And we look to the Kanaka Maoli to determine the future use of these lands and welcome the opportunity to support them in their decision.

In conclusion, we urge Congress to carefully scrutinize the facts. When you get the facts we believe that you will conclude, as we have that, no less than 1,300 acres of Bellows Air Force Station could be returned to local control immediately with no effect whatever on the national security or military convenience.

Specifically, the return of these lands would in no way interfere with the amphibious training or other functions that are said to be essential to the viability of the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station.

COOPERATION WITHOUT CONFRONTATION

Finally, let me say that we are more than willing as a community to cooperate with the military in seeking to work out the future of Bellows in the spirit of aloha and cooperation, without confrontation. But in all sincerity, we must urge the military to thoughtfully consider that their best interests will be served by reasonable and supportable arguments for military necessity.

And while we will listen closely to arguments for the retention of certain military functions at Bellows, if such arguments can be found, we will rightfully judge any contention that a majority of Bellows' lands are essential to national security or military necessity as absurd on its face. Making any such claim in the face of demonstrable facts to the contrary will be seen by most of us to be prima facie evidence of bad faith.

We are a tougher, wiser, more united community than we have ever been. And this makes a better friend and, of course, a stronger adversary. We look forward to being a strong, informed, independent-minded friend to the new military as it works out arrangements suitable to the times and circumstances that we all live in.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important matter.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Dr. Burzell.
[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF LINDEN A. BURZELL

Senator Inouye, it is a pleasure to testify regarding the future of Bellows Air Force Station, a matter of great importance to all of us who make our home in Waimanalo.

For most residents of our community, any consideration of the future of Bellows Air Force Station is governed by one over-riding fact: Bellows Air Force Station occupies Ceded Land. As we contemplate the future of the Station, we continuously bear in mind that the land it sits on is an integral part of the patrimony of the kanaka maoli, and was alienated from them under the terms of a temporary arrangement unilaterally instigated by the Government of the United States on the grounds of military necessity.

I am here today because I was invited to speak as the representative of the Waimanalo Neighborhood Board. However, please bear in mind that because we are discussing the future of ceded lands, those of us who are not of Hawaiian ancestry have a duty to listen to those who are. The main contribution I hope to make today is to urge you to listen to the voices of native Hawaiians on this issue as our Neighborhood Board has done. Native Hawaiians as you will hear today, are eloquent in the presentation of their position.

As a secondary contribution, I will lay out the arguments for return of major parts of Bellows Air Force Station according to the ground rules laid out by the United States government itself, my point being that even apart from the sovereign claims of native Hawaiians, the return of most or all of Bellows conforms to the guidelines laid down for return by the U.S. government itself.

It is important to what follows to recall that, absent a continuing military necessity, current law specifies that such lands shall be returned by the military to local control and administered by competent local authority for the benefit of the Hawaiian people.

Therefore, in our view the over-riding task before us is to determine whether and to what extent a continuing military necessity for Bellows exists. In the event that no military necessity can be demonstrated for some or all of the lands in question, the question becomes how to achieve the quickest possible orderly return of these Ceded Lands to their rightful owners.

Recently, we in Waimanalo have reached several important conclusions concerning military uses of Bellows. First, it is now clear that of the 1,500 acres or so that the Station occupies, approximately 800 acres is not presently being put to any useful purpose, military or otherwise, and has lain idle for at least 25 years. With no military purpose laid out for the future, we conclude that these 800 acres or so are superfluous to the military or security interests of the United States.

With regard to the remaining 700 acres or so, they are used by the military for four purposes that we know about. First, amphibious landing exercises require about 100 acres of fast land along the beach, give or take a few.

Second, Bellows is the site of an antenna array which is used for the control of VIP overflights, which we understand to mean either primarily or exclusively overflights by the President of the United States. This antenna array occupies about five hundred acres. We conclude that the use of 500 acres for the antenna array is wasteful and unnecessary, since current technology would permit the military to control VIP overflights with an antenna situated on about a quarter-acre.

Third, Bellows is used for recreation by service-connected personnel. Recreational uses, both in terms of park land and recreational structures, occupy perhaps another 50 or 100 acres along the beach. While recreation is certainly a legitimate use for coastal lands, we doubt that a valid justification can be advanced for retaining these recreational lands in military control.

Fourth, Bellows is the site of a military training college of some sort. We don't know what its function is, but it occupies about one acre or so.

Though present military uses of Bellows spread out across some seven or eight hundred acres, it seems clear to us that all could be accommodated on about 250 acres, with room to spare, especially since none of the present military uses is of such a sensitive nature as to require a buffer zone.

To summarize, we find about 800 acres not presently used at all, amply attested to by 25 years of jungle growth, and nearly five hundred additional acres used imprudently for an obsolete antenna array. This yields a total of at least 1,200 acres that can be returned to local control without affecting military operations in any way.

The relationship between Bellows and its host community of Waimanalo is unusual. Usually, though a military installation typically imposes some burdens and inconveniences on the host community, these are offset in the minds of most by the economic opportunities which the installation offers. Jobs are created and businesses thrive on the economic activity which the installation creates. The relation between Bellows and Waimanalo is different.

While on the one hand, the Station imposes costs on the community, restricting recreational access, exacerbating the shortage of lands for parks, schools and housing, on the other hand it offers essentially nothing in return: essentially no jobs, no extra trade for local businesses, for the principle reason that for all practical purposes nobody is posted there and nothing is done there. Any benefits that might be said to accrue, accrue to Kailua, the host community of the Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, not to Waimanalo. Further, the benefits to the community are far less in any terms than they would be if the land were returned to civilian control.

I can best sum up Waimanalo's view of Bellows as one of relatively benign dismay. While there is little active dislike of the Station, we see it as a sort of large, parasitic relative who has taken up residence in our house, staked out the most comfortable chair in the living room (the one with the ocean view), and who makes little effort to help out around the house. We don't actively dislike the old fellow, but could scarcely be expected to miss him if he moves on.

I should mention that opportunities to build a better relationship in the past have been missed. As a case in point, two years ago the community was desperately seeking suitable sites to house our homeless. We asked for about five acres near Kalaniana'ole Highway for a homeless shelter site, and we were turned down flat. That was not a helpful act and did nothing to build aloha for the Station.

In the present economic and political climate, we see the closure of Bellows Air Station as inevitable, especially when real military bases like Barber's Point are being closed. Closure will inevitably start a feeding frenzy among powerful interests, most of whom have little concern for our community's interests. As a community, we know we don't want. We don't want a general aviation airport, we don't want another major resort complex, we don't want a golf course, and we don't want the military's need for more housing satisfied at Bellows while the even more pressing housing needs of Waimanalo's people go unmet.

We also know what we do want. Accordingly, the Waimanalo community has begun to prepare a master plan outlining potential uses for Bellows that are in harmony with the needs of our community. We have included for further discussion expanded parks and recreational facilities; an extensive network of bikeways; a green belt surrounding the community; low cost rental housing for our families and elderly housing for our kupuna; a new satellite campus for the Kamehameha Schools; a re-routing of Kalaniana'ole Highway; and the creation of a more compact urban center.

In conclusion, we urge that Congress carefully scrutinize the facts. When you get the facts, we believe that you will conclude, as we have, that no less than 1,200 acres of Bellows

Air Station could be returned to local control immediately, with no effect whatever on national security or military convenience. Specifically, the return of these lands would in no way interfere with the amphibious training or other functions that are said to be essential to the viability of Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station.

Finally, let me say that we are more than willing to cooperate with the military in seeking to work out the future of Bellows in a spirit of aloha and cooperation, without confrontation. But in all sincerity, we urge the military to thoughtfully consider that their best interests will be served by reasonable, supportable arguments for military necessity. While we will certainly listen with respectful attention to arguments for the retention of certain military functions at Bellows, we will rightfully judge any contention that a majority of Bellows lands are essential to national security or military necessity as absurd on its face. Maintaining such a claim in the face of demonstrable facts to the contrary will be seen by us as prima facie evidence of bad faith.

We are a tougher, wiser, more united community than we have ever been. This makes us a better friend and of course a more formidable adversary. We look forward to being a strong, informed, independent-minded friend to the new military as it works out arrangements suitable to the times and circumstances in which we all live. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on this important matter.

STATEMENT OF MABEL ANN IWALANI KEL'IHO'OMALU SPENCER

SOVEREIGNTY

Senator INOUE. May I now call on Ms. Spencer.

Ms. SPENCER. Aloha, congressional delegates. My name is Mabel Ann Iwalani Keli'ihō'omalū Spencer. We are Kanaka Maoli, which are the true native people of this land. We believe and support the return of native Hawaiian lands back to native people. We speak sovereignty.

Like many others, we are not part of any group. We represent ourselves and our Ohana. Sovereignty means self-determination, becoming independent, and having control of our land.

Reflecting back on Hawaiian history when the Kanaka Maoli lived in a self-sufficient society in harmony with the powers of the world, negotiating 14 different relationships on the form of treaties. Kanaka Maoli lived in peace, caring for each other.

Upon annexation an agreement with the United States was established and was prearranged by a group of conspirators that promised prime lands to the United States. These lands should be clarified to State, native Hawaiian lands.

This annexation set up with the United States gave preferential land to be utilized by the military at military bases, exclusively for personnel, for the past 100 years at no cost to the United States unlike situations in the other 49 States where they pay a rental fee.

This sets precedents to the managers, the State of Hawaii, who have the ultimate control of the land to help and care for the host populous people.

Today, military bases expand. Look at Mokapu military base located on the windward side of Oahu which plans to increase its public housing to be 1,000 units, including infrastructure. We are talking massive relocation to the point that the United States needs to keep Bellows Air Force Base as a recreational site. The success of this plan has the immediate political support in Washington.

Meanwhile, the list of native Hawaiians grows to an estimated 19,000 waiting for a place to live and raise their families. It is a fact that many native Hawaiians have died waiting for a chance. Some wait 37 years. There are many barriers, but the real issue focuses on funding and getting the political support needed in Washington.

NATIVE HAWAIIAN CONCERNS IGNORED

Recently, our Governor, the Honorable John Waihee, a native Hawaiian, along with the department of Hawaiian homes delegates, went to Washington to echo these concerns to Congress which fell on deaf ears. Native Hawaiian concerns were ignored. The practice of negligence is incestuous and gives birth to other criminal acts.

The disconnection of a host people to their lands ensures the extinction of their race. There are more than 10,000 homeless in Hawaii and 68 percent are Hawaiian. In 1992, two homeless individuals in Waimanalo, a man and woman in their early 30's who were pure-blooded Hawaiians died of pneumonia both leaving back children, both on the Hawaiian homestead waiting list. In this age and this time it is just criminal.

The management by the State of Hawaii is very, very slow. I mean centuries slow. It is an accepted response of those in authority to the point that the same attitude is perpetuated. I attest that the State of Hawaii has no fear of being punished or held accountable to such blatant crimes.

The State of Hawaii is only as good as its parent, the United States of America. The State of Hawaii is convinced that the United States will never acknowledge their role in the overthrow of our native ruler, Queen Lili'oukalani, which was an act of war. This represents a chain reaction which has continued 100 years with not real evidence to correct and improve the situation.

There are supporters trying their best in key positions to change, to preserve, and to stop this track record of broken promises.

The native Hawaiian waits for reparation, for justice. Hawaiians should have a fair and full representation in Congress as do the military. We should be able to have preplanned expert resources with enough elaborate space to the limit that there is no need to travel outside the base, thus creating our own exclusive community.

We here today are committed to our ancestors, to hold fast to the practices, values, and customs of a Hawaiian government under the control of Hawaiian people. We are ready to take charge, grasp our language, and implement our plan our way, but we are at a serious disadvantage to monitor the injustices done to us by those in control and unable to even the odds.

We are continually asking for use of what is by right ours. We humbly demand the return of Bellows Air Force Base and stand here begging for its release.

I ask for your political support in ensuring that Bellows Air Force Base be returned quickly, demolishing these condescending tones and derogative attitudes plaguing the Hawaiian race today.

Mahalo a nui loa for giving Waimanalo the opportunity to share our concerns regarding this issue.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF MABEL ANN IWALANI KELI'IHO'OMALU SPENCER

My name is Mabel Ann Iwalani Keli'ih'o'omalua Spencer. We are Kanaka Maoli, which are the true native people of this land. We believe and support the return of Native Hawaiian Lands back to the Native People. We speak sovereignty! Like many others we are not part of any group. We represent ourselves and our Ohana. Sovereignty means self-determination, becoming independent and having control of our land. Reflecting back at Hawaiian History where the Kanaka Maoli lived in a self-sufficient society in harmony with the powers of the world negotiating 14 different relationships in the form of treaties. Kanaka Maoli lived in peace, caring for each other.

Upon annexation an agreement with the United States was established which was prearranged by a group of conspirators that promised prime lands to the United States. These Lands should be clarified to state "Native Hawaiian Lands". This annexation set up with the United States gave preferential land to be utilized by the military as military bases, exclusively for personnel, for the past 100 years at no cost to the United States, unlike situations in the other 49 states where they pay a rental fee.

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It is a fact that many Native Hawaiians have died waiting for a chance, some wait 37 years. There are many barriers, but the real issue focuses on funds, and getting the political support needed in Washington. Recently, our Governor, the Honorable John Waihee, a Native Hawaiian, along with Department of Hawaiian Homes Delegates went to Washington to echo these concerns to Congress, which fell on deaf ears. Native Hawaiian concerns were ignored, the practice of negligence is incestual and gives birth to other criminal acts.

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We here today are committed to our ancestors, to hold fast to the practices, values and customs of a Hawaiian Government, under the control of the Native People. We are ready to take charge, grasp our language and implement our plan our way but we are at a serious disadvantage to monitor the injustices done to us by those in control and unable to even the odds. We are continually asking for use of what is by right ours. We humbly demand the return Bellows Air Force Base, and stand here begging for its release. I ask for your political support in ensuring that Bellows Air Force Base be returned quickly, demolishing these condescending tones and derogative attitudes plaguing the Hawaiian race today.

Mahalo a nui loa for giving Waimanalo the opportunity to share our concerns regarding this issue.

ALOHA SPIRIT

Ms. SPENCER. I ask the Senator for a little bit of time to submit one more testimony on behalf of Mr. Kanu.

Aloha. With the understanding that anything we do or accept in our plight toward total independence is not and can never be wrong as Kanaka Maoli, indigenous Hawaiians, the spiritual, intellectual, physical, and emotional genocide committed against all Kanaka Maolis, indigenous Hawaiians, is the biggest wrong in the world. Anything that has built up that wrong is null and void.

The spirit of aloha gives this within the heart of all human beings in the world. Still people throughout the world need to know that Kanaka Maolis, indigenous Hawaiians, are the physical, living examples of this spirit. There needs to be a reconnection of the aloha spirit, creating environmental balance. The destruction of the environment has paid enough for that injury and is now beginning to haunt us.

Now because of the love and the forgiveness of hearts of Kanaka Maoli, indigenous Hawaiian people, toward the powers of the world we as human beings have wanted to right for all mankind. The first step is to recognize the wrong doing that is happening to the indigenous inhabitants of Hawaii.

Condemning the powers that be will cause a dislocation of reasoning which is very necessary for the spirit of aloha. Aloha, the Oahu Council of Hawaii Kingdom.

Senator INOUE. Is that the statement of Mr. Kanu?

Ms. SPENCER. Yes.

RETURN OF BELLOWS FIELD

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much, Mr. Kanu.

I am certain you are aware that the task force created in Hawaii to look into the military use of land is on the agenda, and on the highest point is the use of Bellows Field. In anticipation that a good portion of that military reservation will be returned, last year we provided \$900,000 at my request to carry out an environmental impact statement for Bellows Field.

Usually funds like this would be appropriated after decisions have been made. But I feel so certain that the task force will recommend that a good portion be returned, in anticipation these funds were appropriated to further expedite the process.

So, that is where we are at this time. The GSA will be filing its report in about 2 weeks, as they have indicated, on the status of lands in all of Hawaii, Federal lands, and the legal consequences of the land. The joint task force is in the process of preparing reports also.

So, I think it is beginning to converge, again, to that point. Now, I do not anticipate that the task force will recommend the complete return of Bellows Field because there is some military use there, as Dr. Burzell pointed out. But a goodly portion, and I have no idea what the percentage will be, I am certain it will be recommended for return. That is why the Department of Defense did not object to the EIS requirement for Bellows Field.

So, we are getting there.

Representative Young?

Ms. YOUNG. Thank you, Senator Inouye. Now could we be assured that the community will have active participation in the planning?

Senator INOUE. Oh, absolutely.

Ms. YOUNG. Thank you.

Senator INOUE. If they close the door on you, let me know.

Ms. YOUNG. Thank you.

Senator INOUE. Now it is my pleasure to call upon the Director of the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, the Honorable Hoaliku Drake.

STATEMENT OF HOALIKU L. DRAKE, CHAIRMAN, HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS

Ms. DRAKE. If I may Senator at this time welcome you home, and may I come forward and present you with a lei?

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

Ms. DRAKE. Mr. Chairman and members of the U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, *ano ai me kealoha ia ou kou apau.*

MILITARY'S IMPROPER USE OF HAWAIIAN HOME LAND

I am Hoaliku L. Drake, chairman of the Hawaiian Homes Commission. I thank you for the invitation to present testimony on issues related to military land use in Hawaii. My testimony will discuss the military's improper use of Hawaiian Home Lands that were set aside by Congress in 1921 for the exclusive use of native Hawaiians, and the need to have the Federal Government remedy breaches to the Hawaiian Home Lands trust, breaches that occurred before Hawaiian statehood.

If I may in the interest of time, Senator, and with your permission, I would like to summarize my testimony.

Senator INOUE. Your full statement will be made part of the record, so you can summarize now.

Ms. DRAKE. Thank you. For the record, Senator, I would like to introduce in the record that this is the Prince Kuhio's 122d birthday. I just came from the mausoleum where many of Hawaiian society and the homestead associations honored him with a ceremony. It is, I think, right that on this particular day that this hearing should be taking place on the birthday of Prince Kalaniaanole, the delegate to the Congress that made possible the Hawaiian Homestead Act of 1920 for the rehabilitation of the Hawaiian people. And if I may have this introduced as part of my record.

Senator INOUE. Yes; you may.

HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS TRUST

Ms. DRAKE. Part one of my testimony provides background information about the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands. Part two described the State's responsibility for the Hawaiian Home Lands trust and what the State is now doing to make the trust whole. Part three discussed the Federal responsibilities for the trust. Part four provides information about military uses of Hawaiian Home Lands without compensation to the trust.

Six categories of wrongful actions on the part of the Federal Government have been identified. A number of breaches involving the

U.S. military have resulted in the outright loss of trust lands, the use of trust lands without compensation, and the devaluation of our land by adjoining military activities.

These include, No. 1, the loss of 1,300 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands at Lualualei, Oahu, that were illegally set aside by executive orders in 1930 and 1933 for military uses. These lands are used by the U.S. Navy for munitions storage and communications facilities.

The loss of 141 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands at Lualualei through illegal grants to private parties, land later condemned by the United States.

No. 3, the use of Hawaiian Home Lands by the military for \$1 for a 65-year term with no benefits to the trust at Humuula, Hawaii, and Waimea, Kauai. The Humuula lands at Pohakuloa are used by the Army for field training exercises. The Waimea lands at Kekaha are used by the Navy for munitions storage.

Trust lands adversely affected by ammunition blast zones created by activities of the military that extend over Hawaiian Home Lands at Lualualei and Waimea, Kauai.

I would like to expand on how one of the illegal takings of trust land is adversely impacting the settlement of native Hawaiians on their land. The trust has the least amount of land on the island of Oahu—6,600 acres, or about less than 4 percent of our total holdings. Yet, this is the island with the highest demand for residential homesteads.

Territorial executive orders issued in 1930 and 1933 illegally set aside more than 1,300 acres of trust land in Lualualei for military and other purposes.

LUALUALEI LANDS BLIGHTED

The U.S. Navy is a dominant user of our Lualualei lands. Much of the flat valley is now blighted by munitions storage, blast zones, or electromagnetic fields. The Navy uses our aquifer, which, by the way, is the sweetest water in the State of Hawaii. It has been tested. The sweetest water comes from Lualualei, Hawaiian home land.

The Navy uses our aquifer, which has an estimated potable water capacity of 10 million gallons a day. The land now used by the Navy, if returned to the trust, can be consolidated with other trust lands to develop a master-planned community of about 2,200 acres supporting at least 4,000 housing units.

Our inability to use and develop that land deprives beneficiaries of not only homestead opportunities but jobs, since a master-planned community would include commercial and service facilities.

It is most painful to see our lands being used illegally while our people wait for homestead leases, and the trust incurs higher costs to develop other holdings. The injustice must be corrected.

At the very least, a moral obligation on the part of the Federal Government to make the trust whole would require return of the land or replacement of the land taken, and compensation for past use of the land.

When the State of Hawaii agreed to take on the responsibilities for the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust in 1959, the trust turned over to its management not a whole trust due to a number of wrongful

acts that occurred when the Federal Government, the predecessor trustee, was in charge.

The State of Hawaii is taking remedial action to right these wrongs for which it is responsible. The Federal Government's obligation to take remedial action for those wrongs that began prior to statehood has yet to be recognized by the Federal Government.

We would be most willing to work with the Federal Government to explore how Federal lands no longer needed for military purposes can be used to compensate the trust for illegal takings of trust lands that occurred before statehood.

Senator, in the spirit and context of ho'oponopono, to set things right, we ask the United States of America to set right those wrongs that occurred long ago, and to correct those deficiencies that continue today.

On behalf of all native Hawaiians who will benefit from your actions, I thank you for the opportunity to make this plea on their behalf.

And, Senator, I know you have tried and you have demonstrated your willingness to both do it in the political arena and also to work with all administrations that have come and, unfortunately, have been Republican maybe, I do not know. But nothing has occurred. But, hopefully, the fact that we have a Democratic administration and that, to my mind, you have worked very hard within the Senate, you are very respected in the Senate, Senator, I know you will do your best to correct the wrongs done our native people.

Mahalo a nui loa and aloha.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Ms. Drake. Your suggestion was also made by Clayton Hee that lands declared to be surplus to the needs of the military be provided to the native Hawaiians in lieu of those lands that are now presently used by the military.

So, I can assure you that I will check into the legal consequences because under the present laws that cannot be achieved, although if the State of Hawaii should decide to acquire those lands, the State can by its action transfer title of those lands to the Hawaiian Homestead Trust.

So, I suggest that you discuss this with the State Government.

Mr. DRAKE. Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HOALIKU L. DRAKE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the United States Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, *Ano ai me kealoha ia ou kou apau!* (May the warmth that emanates from within me embrace you forever!)

I am Hoaliku L. Drake, Chairman of the Hawaiian Homes Commission. I thank you for the invitation to present testimony before you on issues relating to military land use in Hawaii. My testimony will discuss the military's improper use of Hawaiian Home Lands that were set aside by Congress in 1921 for the exclusive benefit of native Hawaiians, and the need to have the federal government remedy breaches to the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust,—breaches that occurred prior to Hawaiian statehood.

PART I. THE DEPARTMENT OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS

The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands is one of 18 principal departments of the State of Hawaii. The Hawaiian Homes Commission, whose nine members are

appointed by the Governor of Hawaii with the advice and consent of the State Senate, heads the department. The Chairman of the Commission serves as the full-time administrator.

The mission of the department is to administer the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust effectively, and to develop and deliver land to native Hawaiians, the beneficiaries of the Trust created by the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended (hereinafter, the "Act"): The Act was passed by Congress and enacted in 1921 to provide for the rehabilitation of native Hawaiians, persons of at least 50% Hawaiian blood.

Pursuant to the Act, the department provides direct benefits to native Hawaiians in the form of 99-year homestead leases at an annual rental of \$1. Homestead leases may be extended for an aggregate term not to exceed 199 years. Existing leases are for residential, agricultural, or pastoral purposes. The intent of the homesteading program is to provide for the economic self-sufficiency of native Hawaiians through the provision of land.

Other benefits provided by the Act include financial assistance through direct loans or loan guarantees for home construction, home replacement or repair, and for the development of farms and ranches; technical assistance to farmers and ranchers; and the operation of water systems.

In addition to administering the homesteading program, the department also leases land and issues revocable permits and licenses for lands not in homestead use. Revenues from lands in commercial, industrial, and other income-producing uses support homestead development activities and are also used to cover operating costs.

The Native Hawaiian Rehabilitation Fund, established by amendments to the Hawaii Constitution in 1978 and incorporated in the Act, enables the department to fund programs and projects for the educational, economic, political, social and cultural advancement of native Hawaiians. This fund is derived from 30% of the State's revenues from sugarcane leases and water licenses.

The actual number of native Hawaiians is not known. A population survey by the Office of Hawaiian Affairs in 1984, based on random sampling, estimated that there were 80,953 native Hawaiians in the State. Of that number 53,267 were 20 years or older.

Hawaiian Home Lands are located on the islands of Oahu, Kauai, Molokai, Maui, and Hawaii, with a total estimated acreage of 187,413. Exhibit "A" contains two tables: Table 1 shows the distribution and use of Hawaiian Home Lands; Table 2 shows homestead leases, by islands and by types of leases.

In August, 1989, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs and the U.S. House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held hearings throughout the State on the administration of the Hawaiian Home Lands Program. From the eloquent and moving testimonies submitted, new insights were gained as to the hopes and aspirations of native Hawaiians in the fulfillment of the Act. Beneficiaries strongly conveyed a need for affordable housing. In particular, the provision of homestead leases under the Act was seen as a way to meet the needs of native Hawaiians for affordable housing.

In response, the department has committed itself towards making a major impact on the housing needs of native Hawaiians. Our resources are being directed towards the acceleration of housing development on Hawaiian Home Lands through the construction of off-site and on-site improvements and homes. We have established a goal to deliver more than 14,000 homes to our people over a ten-year period.

The department is very much aware of the need to step up placement of beneficiaries on the land. In the 72 years since the Act was passed, only about 22% of the land is in homestead leases. The major obstacles have been first, the kind of lands the Act set aside for the homesteading program, much of which are marginal lands in remote areas that are costly to develop, since Congress had decided to exclude prime public lands then in sugarcane cultivation from being designated as Hawaiian Home Lands. Secondly, from the very beginning of the program to the present day, there has been a lack of funds for infrastructure development. While the State in recent years has provided significant financial support by appropriating capital improvement funds and general funds for operating costs, federal assistance has been negligible.

The demand for homestead leases is high; today there are more than 24,000 applications for homestead leases, although the actual number of interested individuals may be far below that number because a person may apply for two types of leases and inactive applications have not been purged from the list. Members of the same family applying for homestead lots was estimated at 12,300 in 1989.

The goal of providing more than 14,000 homes takes into account estimated affordable housing needs and anticipated growth in the waiting lists. To meet the goal

will require large outlays for land development and for interim loan financing for home construction.

The department currently has under design or construction a number of projects to develop homestead lots for building homes. The target is to complete 4,000 lots by December 1994.

PART II. STATE OF HAWAII RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE TRUST

The responsibilities assumed by the State of Hawaii for the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust are clear. Upon statehood, the State entered into a compact with the United States and assumed the duties of management and disposition of Hawaiian Home Lands. The State further agreed to adopt the Act as a provision of the State Constitution. This compact was further affirmed by this statement in the Constitution: "The State and its people do further agree and declare that the spirit of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act looking to the continuance of the Hawaiian homes projects for the further rehabilitation of the Hawaiian race shall be faithfully carried out." [Hawaii Const., Art. XI, Sec. 2 (1959), renumbered Art. XII, Sec. 2, (1978).]

Upon statehood the State of Hawaii assumed title to Hawaiian Home Lands, title to which had been vested in the federal government since 1898.

The State's trust responsibilities have been reaffirmed in court decisions. The Hawaii Supreme Court in *Ahuna v. DHHL*, 64 Haw. 327 (1982), concluded that the State of Hawaii assumed a fiduciary obligation upon being admitted into the Union as a state. Further, the Court concluded that the Hawaiian Homes Commission is the specific state entity obliged to carry out the fiduciary duty under the Act on behalf of eligible native Hawaiians.

In 1982 the Federal-State Task Force on the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, comprised of eight members from Hawaii and three from the U.S. Department of the Interior, was formed. The purpose of the Task Force was to make recommendations to the Governor of Hawaii and to the U.S. Secretary of the Interior on ways to better effectuate the purposes of the Act and to accelerate the distribution of benefits to the beneficiaries of the Act.

The Task Force studied four substantive areas in depth: Federal and State trust and/or legal responsibilities; land and other trust assets; financial management; and acceleration of homestead awards. The Task Force submitted its report in August 1983.

Among its findings and recommendations were a number relating to controversies affecting to the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust, including land inventory discrepancies, unlawful takings and uses of Hawaiian Home Lands, and the use of trust lands without compensation for past use. The Task Force also recommended that the Hawaii Legislature enact legislation granting beneficiaries the right to sue for breach of trust in State courts and that Congress enact legislation granting beneficiaries the right to sue for breach of trust in Federal court.

In 1988 the Native Hawaiian Judicial Relief Act was enacted (Act 395, SLH 1988) granting beneficiaries the right to sue for breach of trust for actions that occurred from July 1, 1988. The 1988 legislation also required the Governor to submit an action plan to resolve controversies that had occurred prior to that date. In 1991 the State Legislature accepted the Governor's Action Plan with amendments.

One of the recommendations of the Governor's Action Plan provided for the formation of a Task Force on Department of Hawaiian Home Lands Land Title and Related Claims made up of the Office of State Planning, the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, the Department of Land and Natural Resources, and the Attorney General. The Task Force has been working since February 1991 to verify and accelerate resolution of this department's claims.

The Task Force developed and adopted these guiding principles:

1. The federal government is responsible and should compensate the trust for illegal or improper withdrawals, transfers, dispositions and associated uses of Hawaiian Home Lands that occurred after the Act was enacted in 1921, and that accrued until statehood in 1959.

2. The state government is responsible, and should compensate the trust, for illegal or improper withdrawals, transfers, dispositions and associated uses of Hawaiian Home Lands that occurred after statehood.

3. The state government will take responsibility for remedying post-statehood circumstances of illegal or improper withdrawals, transfers, dispositions and associated uses of Hawaiian Home Lands, which were initiated before statehood. State remedies, however, will not include compensation owed to the trust for such illegal or improper dispositions and uses before statehood. The State may hold the federal government responsible for certain post-statehood circumstances.

4. Compensation owed to the trust from the state government for illegal or improper withdrawals, transfers, dispositions and associated uses of Hawaiian Home Lands may take the form of cash, land, services, capital improvement projects, or combinations thereof.

A first resolution proposal was submitted to the legislature in 1992 to compensate the Trust for the past use of 29,633 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands that had been illegally set aside for public purposes by Executive Orders and Governor's Proclamations. Act 316, Session Laws of Hawaii 1992, appropriated \$12 million as back rent and interest for the use of those lands from statehood through 1992.

The remedy provided by Act 316, SLH 1992, is only a partial resolution of breaches of the Trust, but it is significant. It is the first legislative action to address breaches of the Trust and to make the Trust whole. It recognizes the State's responsibility to the Trust, and the compensation provided by Act 316 included back rent and interest for the use of approximately 321 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands that had been leased to the military by the State for a nominal sum of \$1 for the term.

PART III. FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES

From the beginning of its enactment in 1921 until Hawaii was admitted into the Union in 1959, the Act was a federal law. Title to Hawaiian Home Lands vested in the United States. The Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, an appointee of the President of the United States, was designated as Chairman of the Hawaiian Homes Commission until 1935. Members of the Commission were appointed by the Governor. The Hawaiian Homes Commission was not made a part of the Territory's Executive Branch, and indeed, its status could be compared with other independent boards and commissions of the federal government. The Territory of Hawaii itself was administered by the U.S. Department of the Interior.

Federal responsibilities as trustee for the Hawaiian Homes program are well documented in the discussion on this subject in the Report on the Hawaiian Home Lands Program submitted in January 1992 to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and in the Report on Federal Breaches of the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust, Part I, prepared by the Office of State Planning, Office of the Governor, State of Hawaii, April 1992.

Six categories of wrongful actions on the part of the United States include: (1) no funding; (2) a limitation imposed on revenues derived from trust assets that could be used for the program; (3) alienation of Hawaiian Home Lands; (4) public use of Hawaiian Home Lands without compensation; (5) permanent reservation of trust lands without compensation or land exchange; and, (6) discriminatory denial of federal funds for the benefit of native Hawaiians.

The actions (or non-actions) of the federal government associated with each of these categories are discussed in the above reports. However, I would like to emphasize that federal assistance to the program since 1921 has been negligible.

To our knowledge, there have been no federal monies provided the program during the Territorial period except for a grant of \$62,000 from the Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works in 1935. This grant was the federal government's share of the cost in the development and improvement of the Molokai water system, for which the total cost was \$252,918.

The 1983 Federal-State Task Force on the Act recommended that the state and federal governments each make matching contributions of \$25 million annually in appropriations or services for a period of five years to support the program to accelerate awarding homestead lots. No federal funds were appropriated, although since fiscal year 1985 more than \$128 million for capital improvement projects were made available by the State (including authorization to issue \$43 million in revenue bonds).

We gratefully acknowledge Senator Daniel K. Inouye's initiatives in 1989 and in subsequent years in providing federal assistance of \$6 million in HUD appropriations for Hawaiian Home Lands infrastructure development.

PART IV. MILITARY USE OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS

A number of breaches of the Trust involve the U.S. military and have resulted in the outright loss of land from the Trust, the illegal use of Hawaiian Home Lands without compensation, and a devaluation of our land. These include:

- The loss of 1,356.496 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands at Lualualei, Oahu, that were illegally set aside by executive orders in 1930 and 1933 for military uses. These lands are used by the U.S. Navy for munitions storage and communications facilities.
- The loss of 141.420 acres of Hawaiian Home Lands at Lualualei through illegal grants to private parties, land later condemned by the U.S.

- The use of Hawaiian Home Lands by the military for one dollar for a 65-year term with no benefits to the Trust at Humuula, Hawaii (295 acres) and Waimea, Kauai (25,686 acres). The Humuula lands at Pohakuloa are used by the Army for field training exercises. The Waimea lands at Kekaha are used by the Navy for munitions storage.
- Trust lands adversely affected by ammunition blast zones created by activities of the military that extend over Hawaiian Home Lands at Lualualei and Waimea, Kauai.

I would like to expand on how one of the illegal takings of trust lands is adversely impacting the settlement of native Hawaiians on their land. The Trust has the least amount of lands on Oahu, 6,600 acres, or about less than 4% of our total holdings. Yet this is the island with the highest demand for residential homesteads. It is estimated that a great number of our applicants would prefer a residential homestead on Oahu if more lands were available.

Lualualei Valley, on the island of Oahu, is less than 30 miles from downtown Honolulu. The Territorial Governor issued Executive Order 382 in 1930 and Executive Order 599 in 1933, which illegally set aside more than 1,356 acres of trust lands at Lualualei to the U.S. Navy for military and other purposes.

The U.S. Naval Magazine and Radio Station is the dominant user of Lualualei lands. Much of the flat valley area is now blighted by munition storage blast zones or electromagnetic fields. The Navy has drilled its own wells into the underlying aquifer which has an estimated potable water capacity of ten million gallons a day.

The land now used by the Navy, if returned to the Trust, can be consolidated with other trust lands to develop a master-planned community of about 2,200 acres. The development can support at least 4,000 housing units. The department's inability to use and develop that land, taken from the Trust, deprives beneficiaries of not only homestead opportunities, but jobs, since a master-planned community would include commercial and service facilities.

In 1986 the State of Hawaii filed suit in the U.S. District Court to have the United States return the land to the Trust. In 1988 the court granted the United States' motion for summary judgment barring the State's action under the 12-year statute of limitations in the Federal Quiet Title Act. This decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1989. This procedural technicality has prevented the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands from asserting the substance of its claim to lands illegally taken from the Trust.

It is most painful to see our lands being used illegally while our people wait for homestead leases and the Trust incurs higher costs to develop other holdings. The injustice must be corrected.

At the very least a moral obligation on the part of the Federal government to make the Trust whole would require return of the land or replacement of the land taken, and compensation for past use of the land.

PART V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

When the State of Hawaii agreed to take on the responsibility for the Hawaiian Home Lands Trust in 1959, the Trust turned over to its management was not whole, due to a number of wrongful acts that occurred when the federal government, the predecessor trustee, was in charge.

The State of Hawaii is taking remedial actions to right those wrongs that occurred since taking over the Trust. The federal government's obligation to take remedial actions for those wrongs that began prior to statehood has yet to be recognized by the federal government.

We would be most willing to work with the federal government to explore how federal lands no longer needed for military purposes can be used to compensate the Trust for illegal takings of trust lands that occurred before statehood.

In a culturally Hawaiian sense, the creation of the Hawaiian Homes Program was inspired and conceived in the spirit of *aloha*. In the spirit and context of *ho'oponopono* (to set things right), we ask the United States to set right those wrongs that occurred long ago and to correct those deficiencies that continue today.

On behalf of all native Hawaiians who will benefit from your actions, I thank you for the opportunity to make this plea. *Mahalo a nui loa.*

EXHIBIT A

TABLE 1.—DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF HAWAIIAN HOME LANDS AS OF JUNE 30, 1992

Uses	Islands					Total acreage
	Hawaii	Kauai	Maui	Molokai	Oahu	
Homesteads	27,237	803	438	11,005	888	40,371
General leases	49,741	16,373	20,677	1,930	242	88,963
Licenses	94	9	12	9,660	99	9,874
Revocable permits and other ...	30,811	1,384	7,868	2,771	5,371	48,205
Total	107,883	18,569	28,995	25,366	6,600	187,413

TABLE 2.—HOMESTEAD LEASES, BY ISLANDS AND BY TYPES AS OF JUNE 30, 1992

Type of lease	Hawaii	Kauai	Maui	Molokai	Oahu	Total
Residential	1,032	397	451	393	2,340	4,613
Agricultural	443	43	63	383	58	990
Pastoral	257	2	27	286
Total	1,732	442	514	803	2,398	5,889

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE PETER K. APO, HAWAII STATE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Senator INOUE. May I now call upon a very distinguished member of the State of Hawaii House of Representatives, Representative Peter Apo.

Mr. APO. Good morning, Senator. *Aloha*.

Mr. Chairman, *mahalo* for the opportunity to provide comment on a subject that has been a critical issue for Hawaii.

First, Mr. Chairman, I would join you in recognizing that the military presence in Hawaii has made a major contribution to our economy, that across the board the military has made commendable efforts toward becoming good neighbors and a part of the Hawaii community. Local commanders have made a visible effort to befriend Hawaii's people and institutions, and have certainly risen to the occasion of providing relief and support during crises such as the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki. And for this I am grateful.

However, the good neighbor policies of local commanders are severely constrained when issues of military land use are raised for which solutions might compromise a mandated mission carrying out national defense policies and priorities. I recognize the conflict and appreciate the fact that addressing such issues requires a higher forum of authority such as is being provided here.

Mr. Chairman, for purposes of today's hearing, I would like to offer some brief general comments on military land use in Hawaii, followed by remarks specifically regarding the Makua Military Reservation.

Mr. Chairman, you are no stranger to the phenomenon that as urban densities, particularly on Oahu, continue to press towards the boundaries of military occupied land, there is a correlative rise in public concern on how these lands are used. This is particularly true of those lands being used for combat readiness training that requires live fire and ordnance disposal activities.

HEALTH AND SAFETY CONCERNS

Questions of health and safety are more frequently being posed as incidents that compromise the public safety occur, such as the impacting of live ordinance on private farmlands on the Waianae coast, from artillery fire generated from the Schofield Artillery Range.

Among other concerns, questions of environmental impact are raised with respect to health and safety hazards whereby the military use of public lands are apparently not held to the same environmental review standards to which other users are expected to rise.

As a matter of formulating public policy for the 21st century, I would suggest that this contention deserves serious consideration and review by the Congress as well as the executive branch.

Mr. Chairman, you are also no stranger to the questions, several of which have been already raised this morning, about (1) fair compensation for use of State public lands, particularly ceded lands; (2) the criteria applied for determining when federally controlled lands qualify as surplus lands, as well as the criteria used in considering the disposition of surplus lands for return to the State or State acquisition; and (3) which lands held by the military, either by executive order or forced lease agreements, are intended to be held in perpetuity where there is no reasonable expectation that these lands would ever be returned to State control, in which case a compensation plan should be discussed that grants fee title to the Federal Government.

Mr. Chairman, I would tell you that I am elated to have heard your words earlier this morning when addressing the Governor that apparently we are at the point in time when there will be a very comprehensive review of military land use in Hawaii, both in the executive and congressional branches.

MAKUA MILITARY RESERVATION

Mr. Chairman, I would now turn attention specifically to the Makua Military Reservation. I note that the recent draft permit application for open burn, open detonation of hazardous materials is the first opportunity ever afforded the community to provide comment in a public hearing process on any of the activities occurring in Makua Valley by the executive branch. This is a history opportunity.

For those not familiar with the Makua situation, the Army has conducted live fire and explosive ordinance detonation training, and disposed of unexploded waste ordnance at Makua since World War II. The Army has also indicated it intends to continue these activities in the foreseeable future.

Of equal concern is that these live fire and EOD training activities are presently not permitted or regulated by any government agency despite the fact that unexploded waste ordnance meets the Federal definition of a solid waste and a hazardous waste.

By Federal regulations, open burning and open detonation of unexploded waste ordnance constitutes the treatment of hazardous waste. And anyone treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous

waste is required to apply for a permit from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

In its draft permit application, the Army acknowledges that soil, surface water, and ground water contamination have occurred as a result of waste disposal activities at the Makua Military Reservation, and that no sampling or analysis of the Makua Valley sediments, surface waters, or ground water has ever been conducted.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the application is inadequate and that the State should be involved in this process. I have introduced a resolution in the State legislature to that effect, asking Hawaii's Board of Land and Natural Resources to examine the Army permit application to the EPA.

The lands at Makua Military Reservation are ceded lands, under section 5(f) of the Admission Act, and are held by the State of Hawaii as a public trust. Section 5(f) of the Admission Act vests legal title and ownership of the ceded lands with the State of Hawaii as evidenced by the State's granting of revocable permits and general leases for use of lands at Makua. And Federal regulation requires the land owner of the hazardous waste management facility to be a signatory to the hazardous waste permit application.

I believe the Board of Land and Natural Resources should be a signatory to any amended permit application submitted by the Army to the EPA for hazardous waste management at Makua Military Reservation, and should assess the proposed use of State lands to determine whether there may be significant environmental impacts which require preparation of an EIS.

We must have baseline sampling and analysis of the soil, surface waters, and ground water of Makua Valley if we are to evaluate present and potential threats to human health and do the endemic and endangered plants and animals in that area.

I would hope that we could work out an equitable settlement with the Army on the permit application, but if not I am asking my colleagues in the State legislature to voice our concerns to the region IX administrator of the EPA, the commanding officer of the U.S. Army Support Command in Hawaii, and members of Hawaii's congressional delegation.

This issue is too important to the residents of Waianae and the people of Hawaii to deny the State a part in the decisionmaking for the future activities at the reservation.

Mr. Chairman, I have attached several exhibits to my testimony today, and ask that they be made part of the record, although you have already been presented with some of them in the public hearing process.

There are three documents, Mr. Chairman, that provide a host of information. All of them as far as I know are reliable and factual with regard to the Army's permit application at Makua Valley.

Mr. Chairman, I close my comments today by stating the obvious. The future use of military lands in Hawaii are greatly constrained by present and past uses. The reality is that the millions of dollars required to render some of the land safe for future uses presents a considerable barrier to ever having these lands returned or acquired by the State. The cost of reclaiming Kahoolawe is only the tip of iceberg.

I sincerely thank you for this opportunity to provide comment.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, sir. We shall most certainly look into the Makua Military Reservation matter. We will study the attachments that you have submitted and I will carry on correspondence with you.

Mr. APO. If I might add, Mr. Chairman, most of us who are concerned about Makua are trying to stay away from making value judgments on the activity that occurs there and simply ask for compliance with the law as it is written.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, sir.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HAWAIIAN STATE REPRESENTATIVE PETER K. APO

Mr. Chairman, mahalo for the opportunity to provide comment on a subject that has been a critical issue for Hawaii.

First, Mr. Chairman, I would recognize that the military presence in Hawaii has made a major contribution to our economy and that across the board the military has made commendable efforts toward becoming good neighbors and a part of the Hawaii community. Local commanders have made a visible effort to befriend Hawaii's people and institutions and have certainly risen to the occasion in providing relief and support during crisis such as the aftermath of Hurricane Iniki. For this I am grateful.

However, the good neighbor policies of local commanders are severely constrained when issues of military land use are raised for which solutions might compromise their mandated mission in carrying out national defense policies and priorities. I recognize the conflict and appreciate the fact that addressing such issues requires a higher forum of authority such as is being provided here today.

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Mr. Chairman, you are no stranger to the phenomenon that as urban densities, particularly on Oahu, continue to press toward the boundaries of military occupied lands, there is a correlative rise of public concern on how these lands are used. This is particularly true of those lands being used for combat readiness training that requires live fire and ordnance disposal activities. Questions of health and safety are more frequently being posed as incidents that compromise the public safety occur such as the impacting of live ordnance on private farm lands on the Waianae coast, from artillery fire generated from the Schofield artillery range. Among other concerns questions of environmental impact are raised with respect to health and safety hazards. Whereby the military use of public lands are apparently not held to the same environmental review standards to which other users are expected to rise. As a matter of formulating public policy for the 21st century, I would suggest that this contention deserves serious consideration and review by the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, you are also no stranger to the questions of:

- Fair compensation for use of state public lands—particularly ceded lands;
- The criteria applied toward determining when federally controlled lands qualify as surplus lands, as well as the criteria used in considering the disposition of surplus lands for return to the State or State acquisition; and
- Which State lands held by the military either by executive order or forced lease agreements are intended to be held in perpetuity where there is no reasonable expectation that these lands would ever be returned to State control, in which case, a compensation plan should be discussed that grants fee title to the Federal Government.

Mr. Chairman, I would now turn attention specifically to the Makua Military Reservation. I note that the recent draft permit application for open burn/open detonation of hazardous materials is the first opportunity ever afforded the community to provide comment in a public hearing process on any of the activities occurring in Makua Valley. This is a historic opportunity.

- For those not familiar with the Makua situation, the army has conducted live fire and explosive ordnance detonation (EOD) training, and disposed of unexploded waste ordnance at Makua since the Second World War. The Army has also indicated it intends to continue these activities in the foreseeable future
- Of equal concern, is that these live fire and EOD training activities are presently not permitted or regulated by any government agency—despite the fact

that unexploded waste ordnance meets the Federal definition of a "solid waste" and a "hazardous waste."

- By Federal regulations, open burning and open detonation of unexploded waste ordnance constitutes the treatment of hazardous waste.
- And anyone treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste, is required to apply for a permit from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
- In its draft permit application, the Army acknowledges that soil, surface water, and groundwater contamination have occurred as a result of waste disposal activities at the Makua Military Reservation—and that no sampling or analysis of the Makua Valley sediments, surface waters, or groundwater has ever been conducted.
- I believe the application is inadequate, and that the State should be involved in this process.
- I have introduced a resolution in the State legislature to that effect, asking Hawaii's Board of Land and Natural Resources to examine the Army permit application to the EPA.
- The lands at Makua Military Reservation are ceded lands under section 5(f) of the Admission Act, and are held by the State of Hawaii as a public trust.
- Section 5(f) of the Admission Act, vests legal title and ownership of the ceded lands with the State of Hawaii as evidence by the State's granting of revocable permits and general leases for use of lands at Makua.
- And Federal regulation requires the landowner of a hazardous waste management facility to be a signatory to the hazardous waste permit application.
- I believe the Board of Land and Natural Resources should be a signatory to any amended permit application submitted by the Army to the EPA for hazardous waste management at Makua Military Reservation—and should assess the proposed use of State lands to determine whether there may be significant environmental impacts which require preparation of an environmental impact statement.
- We must have baseline sampling and analyses of the soils, surface waters, and groundwater of Makua Valley if we are to evaluate present and potential threats to human health and to the endemic and endangered plants and animals in that area.
- I would hope that we could work out an equitable settlement with the Army on the permit application, but if not I am asking my colleagues in the State legislature to voice our concerns to the region IX administrator of the EPA; the commanding officer of the U.S. Army support command in Hawaii; and members of Hawaii's congressional delegation.
- This issue is too important to the residents of Waianae and the people of Hawaii to deny the State a part in the decision making for the future activities at the reservation.

Mr. Chairman, I have attached several exhibits to my testimony today and ask that they be made part of the committees public record, although you have already been presented with some of them separate from the public hearing process.

House Concurrent Resolution 424; House Concurrent Resolution 177; House Concurrent Resolution 178; responses to permit applications; and a special publication on Makua Valley.

Mr. Chairman, I close my comments today by stating the obvious. The future use of military lands in Hawaii are greatly constrained by present and past uses. The reality is that the millions of dollars required to render some of the lands safe for future uses presents a considerable barrier to ever having these lands returned or acquired by the State. The cost of reclaiming Kahoolawe is only the tip of the iceberg.

I sincerely thank you for this opportunity to provide comment.

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. HOAG, CHAIRMAN, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HAWAII

Senator INOUE. Now may I call upon the distinguished members of the Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii, Mr. John Hoag and Mr. Gerald Czarnecki.

Gentlemen, welcome, Mr. Hoag and Mr. Czarnecki.

Mr. HOAG. Thank you, Senator Inouye, it is an honor for my colleague and I, Gerry Czarnecki, to be here with you today. My colleague will cover the military's land requirements more thoroughly,

and with your permission I will concentrate on the military's importance to our State's economy.

However, I think I would first like to say, Senator, that having heard much of the testimony that has transpired thus far, I think we come here also in the same spirit of ho'oponopono in the essence of working together, as all citizens in Hawaii, in attempting to assist our friends in the military, our economy, as well as the Hawaiian community.

As a matter of fact, much of my family lives on Hawaiian homeland, so I can appreciate the concerns that have been expressed thus far.

I might just say that just as someone in the storage business would require warehouses, a major tool of the military in Hawaii is land for realistic training, operational installations, and housing. With an infantry division and a Marine expeditionary brigade, along with the Naval and Air Force troops, Hawaii has almost 53,000 active duty troops and almost 15,000 Reserve and Guard members assigned. These young people, those that are on active duty, average in age of 21 and must be trained to assure their best chance of survival in a conflict.

Now, we have heard much lately about the post-cold war economy and defense conversion. But despite disaster relief, charitable works, environmental cleanup, and other activities, warfighting unfortunately will always be the No. 1 mission of national defense. President Clinton has validated this.

Hawaii is strategically important, having served as a springboard for Pacific operations in peace and in war for over 50 years. This has brought great prestige and wealth to our State and we want to keep it that way for other economic as well as security reasons.

Now, let me just say a little bit about the economic clout felt by many industries and everyone in this room that is affected by the trickle-down of the military's effect here in Hawaii. The 1992 payroll purchasing power of Hawaii of 226,000 active duty and related citizens and civilian workers, retirees, and disabled veterans was about \$2.3 billion.

MILITARY IMPACT ON RETAIL SECTOR

We often overlook the military impact on the retail sector of our State. We know that the military people do not buy all of their consumer goods from the PX. Neighborhoods surrounding bases such as Pearlridge and Kaneohe, and certainly it was felt in Kailua during the Persian Gulf war, knew of the impact.

Both installations and military families are major users of electricity, phone service, refuse collections, and the like. Our ailing construction and architectural industries also benefit. More than \$171 million was spent on military construction here in 1992.

Overall, the military is a major employer in our State, whose expenditures totaled \$3.6 billion in 1991, and \$3.4 billion in 1992. The Armed Forces brought in nearly one-third of what tourism generated during those years.

While we cannot look to defense as a growth sector, we do see it an area representing opportunity in light of ongoing defense realignment and consolidation. Such changes may draw forward-

based units and activities to our shores. We would welcome this, viewing it as offsetting any downturns we may experience in the interim such as jobs lost in the Barbers Point closure.

STATE'S HIGH-TECHNOLOGY PROFILE

The presence of the armed services here has long contributed to the State's high-technology profile in such areas as health services, ship repair, marine research, environmental studies, scientific testing and evaluation, engineering, computer science, and communications. Such fields provide jobs for a highly skilled and an educated work force, both civilian and military, public and private.

It is difficult to capture the numbers, but I am certain we underestimate the Armed Forces contributions to our economic powerhouse—tourism. The military brings people from all parts of the Nation and the world who, in turn, promote the State through a vast word-of-mouth network. We cannot afford to buy this kind of advertising and promotion.

All our military branches host conferences visited by dignitaries and social events at various Waikiki hotels and restaurants. Just recently, when the commander of a Barbers Point aircraft squadron moved on to a new assignment, he was farewelled with a dinner for 90 people at that Royal Hawaiian Hotel. It happens constantly, adding up to big revenues.

Hawaii is a source of powerful memories among veterans. During World War II, about 400,000 service members passed through here. Those here during those years are now retired and financially secure. They represent an appealing pool of potential visitors anxious to visit again and relive their memories.

In summary, Senator Inouye, the military controls 5 percent of the land statewide with 239,000 acres. With the military-connected population comprising about 12 percent of the State's overall population, the acreage under military control is reasonable. By comparison, the State of Hawaii hold 29 percent of the land. Of it, 60 percent is in private hands. Clearly, the military is a modest landholder.

ECONOMIC CONVERSION

The term "economic conversion" mentioned earlier has been popular this year, but it is misnomer for Hawaii. With the high cost of labor, transportation, warehousing, and land my economists at First Hawaiian Bank tell me that we simply do not have the wherewithal to convert Hawaii's economy. If the military were to leave, we would not be able to replace it with comparable economic stimulators.

The military people and units in Hawaii will be based somewhere in the western part of the country, bestowing their significant buying power and patriotic citizenship wherever they are assigned. Hawaii should remain their home and the hub for Pacific defense.

We are not embarrassed to be called a military town. The Armed Forces have been an integral part of our community since World War II. This is something that gives us, a small State, great clout in the eyes of the Federal Government and the rest of the Nation.

The chamber will strive to keep those who wear the uniforms of their Nation assigned on our soil. We hope that the many sons and daughters of Hawaii serving in the Armed Forces receive the same welcome wherever they serve throughout the world.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to visit with you today, Senator, and I would like to turn to my colleague.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF JOHN A. HOAG

Chamber Policy: The Military Affairs Council strives to maximize the Armed Forces' economic benefit to the state. The military is second only to tourism in economic impact here, contributing 15-20 percent of the gross state product.

Overview

Just as someone in the storage business would require warehouses, a major tool of the military in Hawaii is land for realistic training, operational installations and housing. With an infantry division and a Marine expeditionary brigade, along with Naval and Air Force troops, Hawaii has 52,871 active duty troops and 14,659 Reserve and Guard members assigned. These young people, average age 21, must be trained to assure their best chance of survival in a conflict.

We've heard much lately about a "post Cold War economy," and "defense conversion." But despite disaster relief, charitable works, environmental clean up and other activities, war fighting will always be the number one mission of national defense. President Clinton has validated this. Hawaii is strategically important, having served as the springboard for Pacific operations, in peace and in war, for over 50 years. This has brought great prestige and wealth to our state. And we want to keep it that way for both economic and security reasons.

In the past two weeks, the uncertainty in the world has become clearer. Russia, with its huge military apparatus still intact, teeters on the brink of political upheaval; North Korea has refused to honor the anti-nuclear proliferation treaty; China is building the strongest armed force it can afford; arms trading is a global enterprise, and severe inhumanity continues in Bosnia. As we speak, our Marines remain in lawless Somalia.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues here today will cover the military's land requirements more thoroughly, with your permission I'll concentrate on the military's importance to our state's economy:

Military's Economic Clout Felt in Many Industries

- The 1992 payroll purchasing power of Hawaii's 226,641 active duty and related citizens (civilian workers, retirees and disabled veterans) was about \$2.3 billion.

- We often overlook the military's impact on retail's health in our state. We know military people do not buy all their consumer items in the PX. Neighborhoods surrounding bases, such as Pearlridge and Kaneohe, know military consumers are a large part of their customer base.

- Both installations, and military families are major users of electricity, phone service, refuse collection - you name the service, they buy it. In 1992, the military spent almost \$862 million on supply/service contracts to support Hawaii's installations.

•Our ailing construction and architectural industries also benefit. More than \$171.2 million was spent on military construction here in 1992. The military opened about 300 new homes last year. A housing master plan calls for construction of at least \$1.75 billion in new housing over the next ten years.

•Overall, the military is a major employer in our state, whose expenditures totaled \$3.6 billion in 1991 and \$3.4 billion in 1992. The Armed Forces brought in nearly one-third of what tourism generated during those years.

You'll note that even with the Armed Forces undergoing notable downsizing since 1990, Hawaii's figures have remained fairly stable. The recent Barbers Point announcement notwithstanding, we expect and will work toward continued stability in our military presence, because we know what it means to the state's economic health.

•While we cannot look to defense as a growth sector, we do see it as an area representing opportunity in light of the ongoing defense realignment and consolidation. Such changes may draw forward-based units and activities to our shores. We'd welcome this, viewing it as offsetting any downturns we may experience in the interim, the jobs lost through a Barbers Point closure for example.

•The presence of the Armed Forces here has long contributed to the state's high technology profile in areas such as health services, ship repair, marine research, environmental studies, scientific testing and evaluation, engineering, computer science, and communications. Such fields provide jobs for a highly skilled and educated work force, both civilian and military, public and private.

•Much opportunity exists for expansion here in the area of electronic combat ranges at Kauai's Pacific Missile Range Facility and the Big Island's Pohakuloa Training Area. Both facilities provide the foundation for integrated land, sea, and air training operations. Such advances could infuse the economy while enhancing the state's high-tech record. Maui's Congressionally funded super computer could aid in the development of such sophisticated military training facilities.

Tourism and the Military

•It's difficult to capture the numbers, but I am certain we underestimate the Armed Forces' contributions to our economic powerhouse - tourism. The military brings people from all parts of the nation and the world, who in turn promote the state through a vast word-of-mouth network. We cannot afford to buy this kind of advertising and promotion.

•Service members, almost one for one, bring their families to Hawaii at least once during their tours of duty. These "tourists" enjoy our attractions, visit neighbor islands and spend money just like other visitors.

•All our military branches host conferences, visits by dignitaries, and social events at Waikiki hotels and restaurants. Just recently when the commander of a Barbers Point aircraft squadron moved on to a new assignment, he was farewelled with a dinner for 90 people at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. It happens constantly, adding up to big revenues.

•Hawaii is the source of powerful memories among veterans. During WWII, about 400,000 service members passed through here en route to Pacific campaigns. Our state was also the primary rest and recuperation site for Vietnam troops. Those here during those eras are now retired and/or financially secure. They represent an appealing pool of potential visitors anxious to visit again and relive their memories.

The Bottom Line

•The military controls five percent of the land statewide, or 239,000 acres. With the military-connected population comprising about 12 percent of the state's overall population, the acreage under military control is reasonable. By comparison, the State of Hawaii holds 29 percent of the land. Sixty percent of it is in private hands. Clearly, the military is a modest land holder.

•The term "economic conversion" mentioned earlier has been popular this year. But, this is a misnomer for Hawaii.

•With high costs for labor, transportation, warehousing and land, my economists tell me we simply do not have the wherewithal to convert Hawaii's economy. If the military were to leave, we would not be able to replace it with a comparable economic stimulator.

•The military people and units in Hawaii will be based somewhere in the western part of the country, bestowing their significant buying power and patriotic citizenship wherever they're assigned. Hawaii should remain their home and the "hub" for Pacific defense. We are not embarrassed to be called a military town. The Armed Forces have been an integral part of our economy since WWII. This is something that gives us, a small state, great clout in the eyes of the federal government and the rest of the nation. The Chamber will strive to keep those who wear the uniforms of their nation assigned on our soil. We hope the many sons and daughters of Hawaii serving in the Armed Forces will receive the same welcome wherever they serve throughout the world.

STATEMENT OF GERALD M. CZARNECKI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY AFFAIRS COUNCIL, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, HI

Senator INOUE. Mr. Czarnecki.

Mr. CZARNECKI. Senator, as you know the Military Affairs Council is a part of the chamber of commerce that is committed to furthering the environment that is supportive of the very military that Jack was talking about.

We recognize that military land use in the State of Hawaii is a real challenge. The military is under constant pressure to demonstrate the need, as we have heard earlier today, and good management of scarce and fragile resource is essential.

We believe they meet this challenge in an admirable manner, but we also know that there a number of reasons why constant review of their use of the lands that they have are important.

LAND USE MASTER PLANNING PROCESS

As you have helped in establishing the land use master planning process that is now underway, we think that process is a critical component of being able to constantly review the land use in this State. We believe that that process, by identifying opportunities for

conveyance of ceded lands, joint use, partnership with the private sector, and real estate exchanges are all a number of considerations that should be viewed as important.

As you commented earlier, the \$900,000 that you managed to appropriate for the purpose of that study is critical.

Our view is that these initiatives all call out for all of us to recognize that land is at the heart and the essence of the military's ability to bring the economic power that it does to this community.

The chamber continues to encourage the State to resolve these issues that come up on occasion, and have been mentioned earlier; issues such as the Hawaiian home land parcels that included tracts of ceded lands leased decades ago. We think these are critical issues.

We are optimistic that these parcels, which are natural irritants among the Hawaiian community will, in fact, be removed soon through land swaps and other innovative means.

We also encourage settlement of the major concerns centered on a large block of home lands at the Naval Magazine, Lualualei. If the Barbers Point closure goes through, perhaps there is an opportunity again for swapping lands to clean up this long-standing problem.

Among some of these issues that we face there is, as Mr. Hoag has indicated, perhaps on occasion an exaggerated perception of the military's land holdings in Hawaii. They are critical, however, land holdings in the accomplishment of their mission. And it is that mission and those land holdings that I would like to take a moment to talk to because we think that there are some critical areas that play heavily on the military's ability to remain as a training facility here in Hawaii.

POHAKULOA TRAINING AREA

Pohakuloa Training Area is an example of one of those. This is a huge parcel of land that is critical to the Army and Marine Corps infantry training in the Pacific. And EIS has been written for a new \$20 million multipurpose range there, and should the military ever be denied the ability to have this presence, it is our view and in so many discussions with so many people who have a view on these matters, that it would surely degrade dramatically the ability of the military to perform. We consider it a vital use of Hawaii lands. Without that training facility, we believe the military's presence would be greatly endangered.

Makua Valley has been mentioned earlier. On Oahu, there exist only two sites—Schofield Barracks and Makua—where troops can maneuver and practice live firing. Again, these are critically important to the military's warfare readiness. Travel and shipping costs to move a battalion of troops and equipment to our premier training range, Pohakuloa, tops \$300,000 per deployment.

With budgets dropping, the military can only afford a few PTA trips annually. Oahu training ranges are needed to fill the void.

The Army is now seeking an Environmental Protection Agency permit to resume detonations, as was pointed out earlier. This has been done safely for years, but we agree, it is essential that any activities that the military performs should be, in fact, in compliance with the expectations that the community has. We believe

that this is an essential component in being able to preserve the use of Makua for the purposes that the military has.

BELLOWS AIR FORCE STATION

Bellows Air Force Station was recognized earlier as an area of some concern to much of the community. Your comments with respect to the recognition that there are major components of the station that may well be reasonable candidates for returning to the State it seems to us are appropriate in many of the contexts, but we are extremely concerned that the community recognize that the huge economic impacts that exist in Kailua and Kaneohe with the Marine Corps components are, in fact, significantly dependent upon the ability of the Marine Corps to have training facilities that are available now at Bellows. So, we feel strongly that it is essential that the entire community recognize the critical nature of this impact on the community's needs for preserving the military's involvement.

Obviously, with respect to environmental issues, the military is probably the heaviest industry we have in the State. It runs shipyard, pier operations, aircraft repair facilities, wastewater treatment plans, and industrial repair shops.

With these kinds of activities always go the risks of environmental damage. We believe that the military has made major efforts in recent years to, in essence, comply with all of the expectations that the civilian community feels strongly is appropriate.

Actually, the military has one of the most aggressive environmental stewardship in the Nation. Since 1991, \$103 million has been programmed for environmental projects in Hawaii alone. Key goals have included minimizing hazardous waste and restoring installations, which involves cleaning up problems stemming from the past. We believe that the military has become an extremely responsible citizen in this area and will continue to improve its record in this respect.

MAINTAINING CURRENT TROOP LEVELS

In conclusion, there really are three requirements that we believe are central to maintaining current troop levels, which are at the heart of the economic impacts that Mr. Hoag has represented.

One is the availability of adequate training areas. And I have made reference to the critical areas that we think must exist. Sufficient housing and quality of life and morale support—Bellows provides some of that. That is why some of the land at Bellows is, in fact, important not just for landing military troops.

Bellows also does provide an opportunity to be able to expand the housing requirements. Housing is, as we all know in Hawaii, probably our most significant social issue. It remains the same significant social issue for the military. If we cannot house the military adequately, then there is no way that the military can remain here.

Third, we believe that there is a requirement for a community to have a climate of good will and acceptance of the military. We believe that our community works very hard. We know that the majority of the community feels strongly about the value of the military presence.

The military are good citizens. They are good members of our community. And we hope that everybody will keep in mind that as we look at the land use issues in relationship to the importance of the military and the community.

Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Czarnecki. I appreciate your statement.

Mr. Hoag, thank you.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF GERALD M. CZARNECKI

Military land use in the State of Hawaii is a challenge. The military is under constant pressure to demonstrate need and good management of this scarce and fragile resource. We believe they meet this challenge in an admirable manner.

During the past year, we've worked steadfastly with federal, state and civic leaders to prompt a comprehensive look at military land use in Hawaii. With your help, Mr. Chairman, senior Pacific commander Admiral Charles R. Larson initiated a re-evaluation of the rationale for military land holdings, based on foreseeable missions. This in-depth assessment is now underway, designed to create a road map for Defense Department land, facilities and housing in the state. All military property will be included in the plan, except Kahoolawe.

A "Land Use Master Plan" will result, identifying opportunities for conveyance of ceded lands, joint use, partnerships with the private sector and real estate exchanges. Thank you Mr. Chairman for appropriating \$900,000 for this plan. This evaluation includes:

- Joint Military Task Force—an internal land evaluation under which commanders from Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force work together to scrutinize their land requirements and consolidate needs. This will determine military land use based on projected missions and land availability over the next 10 to 20 years.

- Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board—Representatives from the Congressional delegation, Governor's cabinet, the military, counties, business, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs and others meet to address land needs, constraints and issues. This group is a barometer for public opinion on land issues. Their ideas will be considered in the master plan.

- Land Inventory—Congress appropriated nearly \$1 million in 1992 to fund an updated inventory and survey of federal land holdings in Hawaii.

In addition to these initiatives, the Chamber continues to encourage the State to resolve the issue of Hawaiian Home Land parcels included in tracts ceded or leased decades ago. We are optimistic these parcels, which are natural irritants among many in the Hawaiian community, will be removed soon through land swaps and other innovative means. We also encourage settlement of a major concern centered on a large block of Home Lands at Naval Magazine, Lualualei. If the Barbers Point closure goes through, it might offer a swap opportunity to clear up this long-standing problem.

TODAY'S MILITARY LAND USE PICTURE

Among some, there seems to be an exaggerated perception of the military's land holdings in Hawaii. About 12 to 15 percent of our total population is military-connected. The Armed Forces control about five percent of the land in the state, or around 239,000 acres. This isn't a lot considering their population figures. By comparison, the state controls 28 percent of Hawaii's land and the Big Island's privately owned Parker Ranch is larger than the military's entire acreage here.

There are 50 military installations in the state, ranging from the tiny Ka'ena Point Satellite Tracking Station to the large Pearl Harbor Naval Complex. Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island covers 108,000 acres, or nearly half of the total military acreage.

It's interesting to note that since the '70s, over nine military reservations have been conveyed to the state or sold, including Fort Ruger at Diamond Head, Fort Armstrong on the downtown waterfront, and Kapalama Military Reservation in the centrally located Nimitz corridor. Kahoolawe is soon to be conveyed and Barbers Point, located in the midst of our Second City, is a likely candidate for closure. As long as the military presence isn't degraded, land transfers do not bother us.

Today, the military's overall land mix statewide looks like this: they own 10 percent of their 239,000 acres in fee; 38 percent is leased from private owners, Campbell Estate for example; and 52 percent is ceded land, for which the state sets the terms and compensation. (Note: Percentage will drop when Kahoolawe is conveyed.)

The Armed Forces use 23 percent of the land on densely populated Oahu, or 87,000 acres, much of it in rural areas. Of that, 35 percent is federally owned in fee; and 45 percent is leased from private owners. Only 20 percent is ceded.

SPECIFIC CONCERNS

Pohakuloa Training Area [PTA].—A critical Army and Marine Corps infantry training area serving the entire Pacific. An EIS is being written for a new \$20 million multi-purpose range complex, taking into consideration rare plants and critical habitats for the endangered palila. Should the military ever be denied use, our troop presence would surely degrade. This concerns us.

Makua Valley.—On Oahu, there exist only two sites, Schofield Barracks and Makua, where troops can maneuver and practice live-firing. Again, these are critically important to the military's warfighting readiness. Travel and shipping costs to move a battalion of troops and equipment to our premier training range, Pohakuloa Training Area, tops \$300,000 per deployment. With budgets dropping, the military can only afford a few PTA trips annually. Oahu training ranges are needed to fill the void.

The Army is now seeking an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permit to resume detonation of old munitions in Makua Valley. This has been done safely for years. Destruction of obsolete munitions is part of the overall stewardship program, as stockpiling aging munitions is imprudent.

Bellows Air Force Station.—Recent pressure to return this ceded property to the state has been strong. A couple of points on this Mr. Chairman. Bellows is already in joint military-civilian use; portions are open to the public on weekends. Though an Air Force station, Bellows is used by all services and supports several activities such as: U.S. Marine Corps amphibious training across the beaches; U.S. Army, National Guard, and Reserve force training; an antenna farm for ground to air communications; and a modest recreation area offering low-cost tent camping and cottage rentals for service members.

An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is underway. Housing may be feasible at Bellows to serve the Marine Base. We hope to see the EIS and land use study completed before irreversible decisions are made. If the Barbers Point units move to Kaneohe MCAS as expected, it's worth considering the recreational needs of the additional service member population.

ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

The military is probably the heaviest industry in the state. It runs a shipyard, pier operations, aircraft repair facilities, wastewater treatment plants, and industrial repair shops. The military also has an irrevocable need to conduct realistic training on its three live-fire ranges here. These are industry requirements. While defense operations pose some environmental concerns, we do not believe they are insurmountable; and we know the military complies with state and federal environmental laws.

The Armed Forces has in recent years dramatically improved its track record in environmental stewardship. The real problem with defense and the environment is one of perception. The military training and operational requirements are sometimes seen as incongruent with sound environmental management.

Actually the military has one of the most aggressive environmental stewardship programs in the nation. Since 1991, \$103 million has been programmed for environmental projects in Hawaii. Key goals include minimizing hazardous wastes and restoring installations, which involves cleaning up problems stemming from a less enlightened past era. Restoration began in the '80s. All known problem sites have been identified and are being analyzed. On a grass-roots level, the military runs an effective and lucrative recycling program.

There are three requirements central to maintaining current troop levels in Hawaii. These are: availability of adequate training areas; sufficient housing, quality of life and morale support; and a community climate of good will and acceptance.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Chamber works very hard on all these requirements with an eye toward issues management and problem resolution. Military residents are good neighbors and patriotic citizens, who also happen to be big players in our economic picture. With about 226,000 paychecks circulating here every two weeks from the hands of civilian defense workers, active duty members, retirees, and Guard/reserve troops, the Armed Forces is clearly important to our state.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

STATEMENT OF CLINTON R. CHURCHILL, MEMBER, HAWAII NATIONAL GUARD

Senator INOUE. Now, may I call upon Mr. Clinton Churchill. Welcome.

Mr. CHURCHILL. Good morning, Senator. My name is Clinton R. Churchill. I am here to testify today as a citizen of the State, while making it clear that I am a trustee of the estate of James Campbell and a member of the Hawaii National Guard.

MILITARY AS ACTIVE MEMBER OF COMMUNITY

I am not here to convey any particular position of either organization regarding military land use in Hawaii, but to express my support of our military as an active member of our community.

I would like to make three points. First, the importance of the military to Hawaii, and vice versa. Second, the importance of training land in Hawaii for the military. And third, the importance of active duty military in so far as the readiness of our National Guard and Reserve forces is concerned.

First, on the importance of the military to Hawaii and vice versa. It goes without saying—I think Jack Hoag has covered quite well that the military plays a vital role in both the economy and in the community of the State of Hawaii.

While the military contribution as a percentage of Hawaii's economy is perhaps greater than most States, this in itself should not be a valid justification for the location of military units.

It seems to me that Hawaii's strategic location in the Pacific cannot be overstated. In addition to the command structure that is based here, the presence of quick reacting land, sea, and air power is essential for deploying to a short-notice conflict in the vast Pacific region.

Speaking as a member of the business community, we are most supportive of the military currently based in Hawaii. An excellent infrastructure exists to support and supply our military bases.

The presence of the Armed Forces here has long contributed to the State's high technology profile in such areas as health services, ship repair, marine research, environmental studies, scientific testing and evaluation, engineering, computer science, and communications.

The military's contribution to the skill level of our work force goes hand-in-hand with private sector businesses contributing toward military readiness.

Speaking as a resident of Kailua, we live about one-half mile from Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station, the relationship between the military and the community has never been better.

During my and my wife's involvement with the Aikahi Elementary PTA and the Kalaheo High School PTA, members of the military have time and again made significant contributions toward improving educational and extra curricular activities. They are an integral part of our community, and we have tried to show our support for them in many ways, just as they have shown support for our schools and communities.

The presence of the military in Hawaii for nearly a century has contributed directly to the cultural, professional, and economic vitality of our State. The military brings people from all parts of the Nation and the world who, in turn, promote our State through a vast word-of-mouth network.

IMPORTANCE OF TRAINING LAND

The second point I would like to make is the importance of training land. Simply stated, military units based in Hawaii need land to conduct realistic training. Hawaii is a State blessed with excellent weather that enables year-round training. It is this type of realistic training that the military is able to conduct in Hawaii that contributed significantly to the level of readiness and thus the effectiveness for conflicts such as Desert Storm.

In my role as trustee of one of Hawaii's land trusts, I want to reiterate the support the Campbell estate has for military training. For several decades, we have leased more than 7,500 acres of property in the Kahuku area to enable the Army, Marine Corps, and Army National Guard to conduct field training.

The military, primarily the Army, has been a most responsible leasee. They have been able to conduct their training with minimal environmental impact and, in fact, the Army has successfully implemented a program to prevent erosion resulting from their activities.

We recognize the importance of the Kahuku training area and want to do all that we can to ensure the continuation of the excellent relationship that we have maintained with the Army over the years.

POHAKULOA TRAINING AREA

As a Hawaii Air National Guardsman and F-15 pilot, I can also relate to you the importance of land for our Reserve training. One example is Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island. In addition to the obvious value to the active military, Marine Corps, Army, and the Army National Guard, it might be of interest to you that the Air Guard made excellent use of this area in preparing our younger pilots for deployment in Exercise Red Flag near Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Since we normally train exclusively over water, the ability to conduct step-down training and what we call terrain masking was essential for our younger pilots to fly safely at Red Flag, and thus to be able to fly effectively in the event that they are deployed to an overland conflict. Pohakuloa is an extremely important asset to both the Active and Reserve components.

The third point I wanted to make is the importance of the active duty forces in so far as their training for the National Guard and other Reserve forces. As you know, the successful integration of the Air National Guard into the Air Force in Desert Storm proved the total force concept. There is no doubt that with the downsizing of the military we will have to place an even greater dependence upon the National Guard and Reserves.

QUALITY OF TRAINING

In a place as isolated as Hawaii, if active forces are downsized too much then the quality of training for our Guard and Reserve forces will diminish significantly.

A case in point is the extent to which our Air Guard F-15 pilots train with the three Marine F-18 squadrons based at Kaneohe. When we conduct our air combat training solely in-house, we are limited to no more than two versus two F-15's for safety reasons. That is, identifying who is on the offensive force and who are the defenders.

With dissimilar aircraft, such as the Marine's F-18's, we are able to conduct highly realistic four versus four training, and even larger training scenarios. Relocation of the three Marine F-18 squadrons to Miramar Naval Air Station will certainly affect the quality of our air-to-air training.

In summary, I feel that the importance of the military to Hawaii and the importance of Hawaii to the military cannot be overstated. Well prior to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, and especially since, Hawaii and the military have grown up together. The military is part of Hawaii and Hawaii is part of the military.

Perhaps, unlike other residents, I for one am not afraid to express my support for the military and its future use of land, air space, and the sea in and around Hawaii.

I thank you for the opportunity to express my feelings this morning.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Mr. Churchill. I am certain the military in Hawaii appreciates the strong support, sir. Thank you, sir.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF CLINTON R. CHURCHILL

Mr. Chairman and Honorable Subcommittee Members, good morning, my name is Clinton R. Churchill and I am here today to testify as a citizen of the State of Hawaii, while making it clear that I am a trustee of the Estate of James Campbell and a member of the Hawaii Air National Guard. I am not here to convey any particular position of either organization regarding military land use in Hawaii, but to express my support of our military as an active member of our community.

I would like to make three points: (1) the importance of the military to Hawaii (and vice versa), (2) the importance of training land in Hawaii for the military, and (3) the importance of the active duty military in the readiness of our National Guard and Reserve forces.

1. The Importance of the Military to Hawaii and Vice Versa.

It goes without saying that the military plays a vital role in both the economy and the community in the State of Hawaii. While the military contribution as a percentage of Hawaii's economy is perhaps greater than most states, this, in itself, should not be a valid justification for the location of military units. It seems to me that Hawaii's strategic location in the Pacific cannot be understated. In addition to the command structure that is located here, the presence of quick-reacting land, sea, and air power is essential for deploying to a short-notice conflict in the vast Pacific region.

Speaking as a member of the business community, we are most supportive of the military currently based in Hawaii. An excellent infrastructure exists to support and supply our military bases. The presence of the Armed Forces here has long contributed to the state's high technology profile in areas such as health services, ship repair, marine research, environmental studies, scientific testing and evaluation, engineering, computer science, and communications. The military's contribution to the skill level of our work force goes hand-in-hand with our private sector businesses contributing towards the military readiness.

Speaking as a resident of Kailua (where my home is about 1/2 mile from Kaneohe MCAS), the relationship between the military and community has never been better. During my and my wife's involvement with the Aikahi Elementary School and Kalaheo High School Parent-Teacher Associations, members of the military have time and again made significant contributions toward improving educational and extra-curricular activities. They are an integral part of our community and we have tried to show our support for them in many ways, just as they have shown support for our schools and communities.

The presence of the military in Hawaii for nearly a century has contributed directly to the cultural, professional, and economic vitality of Hawaii. The military brings people from all parts of the nation and world, who in turn promote the state through a vast word-of-word network.

2. The Importance of Training Land in Hawaii.

Simply stated, the military units based in Hawaii need land to conduct realistic training. Hawaii is a state blessed with excellent weather that enables training year-round. It is the type of realistic training that the military is able to conduct in Hawaii that contributed significantly to the level of readiness (and thus the effectiveness) for conflicts such as Desert Storm.

In my role as a trustee of one of Hawaii's land trusts, I want to reiterate the support that the Campbell Estate has for military training. For several decades, we have leased more than 7,500 acres of property in the Kahuku area to enable the Army, Marine Corps, and

Army National Guard to conduct field training. The military, primarily the Army, has been a most responsible lessee; they have been able to conduct their training with minimal environmental impact. In fact, the Army has successfully implemented a program to prevent any erosion resulting from their activities. We recognize the importance of the Kahuku training area and want to do all that we can to assure the continuation of the excellent relationship that we have maintained with the Army over the years.

As a Hawaii Air National Guardsman and F-15 pilot, I can also relate to you the importance of land for our reserve training. One example is the Pohakuloa training area on the Big Island. In addition to its obvious value to the Army National Guard, it might be of interest to you that the Air Guard made excellent use of this area in preparing our younger pilots for deployment to the Red Flag exercise near Nellis AFB in Nevada. Since we normally train exclusively over water, the ability to conduct step-down training and terrain masking was essential for our younger pilots to safely fly at Red Flag. Pohakuloa is an extremely important asset to both the active and reserve components.

3. Importance of Active Duty Forces for National Guard and Reserve Training.

As you know, the successful integration of the Air National Guard into the Air Force at Desert Storm proved the Total Force concept. There is no doubt that with the downsizing of the military, we will have to place even greater dependence upon the National Guard and Reserves. In a place as isolated as Hawaii, if active forces are downsized too much, then the quality of training for our Guard and Reserve forces will diminish significantly. A case in point is the extent in which our Air Guard F-15 pilots train with the three Marine F-18 squadrons based at Kaneohe MCAS. When we conduct our air combat training missions solely "in-house," we are limited to no more than two vs. two F-15s for safety reasons (in identifying who is on the offensive force and who are the defenders). With dissimilar aircraft such as a Marines' F-18s, we are able to conduct highly realistic four vs. four training and even larger training scenarios. The relocation of the three Marine F-18 squadrons to Miramar NAS will certainly affect the quality of the our air-to-air training.

In summary, I feel that the importance of the military to Hawaii and the importance of Hawaii to the military cannot be overstated. Well prior to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 and especially since, Hawaii and the military have grown up together. The military is part of Hawaii and Hawaii is part of the military. Perhaps unlike other residents, I for one am not afraid to express my support for the military and its future use of land, air space, and the sea in and around Hawaii.

Thank you for the opportunity to express my feelings on this subject.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL L. WILSON, PRESIDENT, INDUSTRIAL BUILDING ASSOCIATION

Senator INOUE. Now may I call upon the president of the Industrial Business Association, Mr. Michael Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Good morning, Senator. My name is Michael Wilson and I am the president of the Industrial Business Association, an association formed about 2 years ago to handle the needs of industrial users primarily in the airport area.

SUPPLY OF AVAILABLE LAND

I am here today primarily to seek the cooperation of the Federal Government to supply, if available, unused and underutilized lands as they become available, primarily in the port area of Honolulu or the airport area.

There has been a tremendous shortage of this type of property and because of the shortage the price or the least rent and the

taxes attributed to the property that is available has skyrocketed in the last 3 or 4 years—5 years. This effect is going on and is being passed on to the citizens of Hawaii in the form of higher food costs and in everything they do.

It seems to me, in the form of a dividend because of the reduction of hostilities and in the ways wars are fought, if land—underutilized land and really idle land becomes available it could be put to much better use in this way in Hawaii.

We look at this opportunity of making land available as a tremendous opportunity for the people of Hawaii, and we thank you for your support in helping us along these lines.

Thank you very much, sir.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, Mr. Wilson. I would like to assure you that your concern is being considered by the task force created by CINCPAC, and I think the GSA report on inventory of Federal lands in the State of Hawaii will be helpful as you plan your involvement in the airport area.

So, I think in about 3 weeks or so you should be able to study the report and come forth with your recommendations.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Senator INOUE. Thank you, sir.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL L. WILSON

My name is Michael L. Wilson, President of the Industrial Business Association, representing the lessees and business tenants in Airport Industrial Park.

We are testifying here today to emphasize the importance of reserving for the people of Hawaii an adequate supply of essential industrial land near the ports.

Our industrial tract houses approximately 355 companies that employ nearly 7,000 people in over 300 different types of businesses ranging from appliance parts distribution to welding. The cost of occupying industrial space has risen so dramatically within a short time as to threaten the very ability of these companies to continue their operation.

Industrial land users like ourselves are being priced out of the market due to the recent condemnation of property for the airport; nearby sales transactions during the now past highly speculative and overheated market which have caused land values in the area to soar; and creeping "boutiqueing" via IMX zoning which has rubbed off onto the true industrial user.

These conditions have already led to increased property taxes based on the new assessment of \$70.00 per square foot. Property taxes have more than doubled in the last two years. The lease rents demanded by the lessors and based on these values are 148% over present rents.

If we don't start now to address the problems due to severely limited and astronomically priced industrial lands near the port, the residents of Hawaii will be depending on a distribution system that is so expensive and unwieldy that it can never be fixed.

Industrial businesses, by providing essential products and materials, function as the base, or foundation supporting all the commercial activities in the State. When industrial costs rise rapidly and have to be passed on, the increase is multiplied at every succeeding level of the economy.

My company, Unicold, like others in the area, must now deal with the impact of the extraordinary run-up in value of the immediate past years. Already, our annual real property tax bill approaches \$250,000--a 35% increase in just one year. We are being asked to pay \$100,000 more per month in ground lease rents over our present level.

When we write that check, the cost is passed right on to the consumer, and we question whether the Hawaii consumer can--or in fact should be asked to--handle this increase.

Again, to use my company as an example, we are a cold storage food warehouse that receives an average of 91 containers, or over 3,077,000 pounds of vital food products a week. An additional 150,000 pounds per week is off-loaded on site as "Store-Door" product.

Between 22 to 24% of the total refrigerated containers and product tonnage for Oahu passes through there; 288 individuals are employed through the facility, and 639 indirectly associated with the distribution of product to the hundreds of retail stores, hotels and restaurants throughout the Island.

A break-bulk distribution business like ours requires ready access both to the sea lanes and major roadways, we can not contemplate relocation to remote areas of the Island in search of lower valued land.

Such a move would mean having to haul our more than 3 million pounds a week from the port to the distant warehouse, just to haul them back to their ultimate urban destinations. Consider the cumulative effect of the traffic on our congested highways, the additional energy requirements, and increased pollution. Again, these costs must be passed on to the consumer.

Given an opportunity to design the ideal city from scratch, we would put the distribution district directly at, or as close as possible to, the harbor. The reality is that we can not design Honolulu anew; but we must act decisively now before it's too late, as possible sites are developed for other uses, and the people of Hawaii are irreversibly burdened by ever escalating costs of a grossly inefficient distribution system.

The 16th Legislature of the State of Hawaii has recognized that a serious problem exists. House Resolution (H.R.) No. 16 H.D.1 called for a study to explore potential remedies such as converting federally-held land areas close to the ports to a warehousing district for essential services. A copy of the Resolution is included with my testimony, along with the resulting report of the Legislative Reference Bureau, A Warehousing District for Hawaii?

As these lands are brought back into the mainstream of the economy of the State of Hawaii in the form of a peace dividend, we need to reserve a portion of them for development in partnership with individual users to assure an adequate supply of essential industrial space to service the urban center.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH FREEMAN, RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

Senator INOUE. Now may I call upon a representative of the Responsible Citizens for Responsible Government, Ms. Elizabeth Freeman.

Ms. Freeman, welcome.

Ms. FREEMAN. Thank you. My name is Elizabeth Freeman, and I am the president of Responsible Citizens for Responsible Government on Kauai.

CANCEL STARS PROGRAM

Where to cut? Try Kauai. Kauai to Clinton: cancel the launch pad. How to save \$480 million and a lot of aggravation? Say aloha to crazy missile tests on Kauai. Protest, arrest, protest. Star wars target attached on House floor.

Sound familiar? These are but a few of the hundreds of headlines hitting the American public in the wake of the first STARS launch last month. SDIO launched a 30-year-old missile for 17 seconds.

Kauai citizens launched a crusade that has caught the attention of the American public, the national media, and Members of Congress across the country. "60 Minutes" flew out to interview us. CBS news wants all the details. USA Today has a story written and ready to go. The list is enormous and still growing. The launch was supposedly successful, but in terms of public relations, it failed miserably.

Our intelligent plea to cancel the shameful and wasteful STARS Program is being carried by a powerful new coalition on Kauai. Environmentalists and Hawaiians alike are carrying this message of the abuse of Kauai's environment and sacred sites and the misuse of scarce tax payer dollars. It is a message that raises the ire of every tax payer frustrated over military waste.

I have come here today to put you on notice. We will continue to relentlessly pursue every avenue available to us to focus public scrutiny on these ridiculous launches. There is no way to win the media battle for you.

Just what is the story that Kauai citizens have to tell? It is quite simply the story of David and Goliath. It is the story of the tiny garden island versus the budget busting Pentagon. It is the story of Kauai's pristine ecology and her harmony threatened by SDI's arrogant and indulgent waste of \$30 billion taxpayer dollars.

Please do not try to salvage SDI's tarnished image by media hype of one successful launch or a new need for global defense. I

understand the Admiral is touting the Chinese as the current enemy of the week. To a weary American public saddled with yet another tax hike, it sounds like nothing more than crying wolf.

It is 1993, a decade after the inception of the program. \$30 billion have been spent, and there is no hardware, and there is nothing to show for the money invested. And SDIO wants more? Get real. Believe me, Americans are acutely aware that SDI provides no defense against Trade Tower-like terrorist attacks, the real imminent threat from the Third World.

REVIEW SDI

Although Pentagon officials have not been able to tune in to the voice of reason from Kauai, the national media certainly has. The voice of reason sounds like this. Could we please hold off any further launches until a thorough reexamination of SDI is conducted?

Perhaps President Clinton heard our message. He has ordered a Presidential review directive calling for a top-to-bottom reanalysis of SDI and ballistic missile defenses. It is about time that our leaders take the lead.

We are very proud Representative Patsy Mink denounced SDI and STARS on the House floor. We are buoyed your statement, Senator, that you are open to alternatives to STARS at PMRF and that you have challenging the delegation to come up with new ideas. It is clear that you understand, Senator Inouye, that Kauai citizens want sustainable economic growth, not feeble and unstable economic trickle-down from dying programs like SDI.

Kauai's economy suffered a cardiac arrest last September. Missile launching is not the key to Kauai's economic recovery, nor is it a part of the vision Kauai has to offer for the future.

So here is the straight talk. Project manager, Colonel Manguso, confirmed to Congressman Conyers that STARS creates three to four jobs at PMRF, and that 40 launches have been slashed to 14 and maybe less over the next 10 years. It is insulting to our intelligence to call this program urgent and vital to America, and necessary to PMRF's survival. This program is not vital, it is not urgent, and it certainly will not ensure PMRF's future. The program has lost its rationale.

Halt the STARS Program now, Senator Inouye. Insist again that conversion ideas be implemented immediately. Inspire our leadership and public to work together to finding alternatives to compliment and supplement the ongoing naval mission at PMRF. Focus on sustainable alternatives, like the Permanent Disaster Relief Depot and other island friendly high-technology ideas that would keep the base's heroic profile in the public eye. We say PMRF yes; STAR Wars no.

Bob Bell of the National Security Council said you are the man in the driver's seat on this issue. Please, Senator, cancel the launch pad. Preserve our garden island from those who still have, as Mary McGrory wrote in the Washington Post, the Berlin wall in their minds. Promote Kauai's transition to a healthy economy and environmentally sound future now.

Malama i ka'aina.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Ms. Freeman.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH FREEMAN

These are but a few of the hundreds of headlines hitting the American public in the wake of the first STARS launch last month. SDIO launched a 30-year-old missile for 18 seconds. Kauai citizens launched a crusade that has caught the attention of the American public, the national media and members of congress across the country. Our intelligent plea to cancel the shameful and wasteful STARS program is being carried by a powerful new coalition on Kauai. Environmentalists and Hawaiians alike are carrying this message of the abuse of Kauai's environment and sacred sites and the misuse of scarce taxpayers' dollars. It is a message that raises the ire of every taxpayer frustrated over military waste.

60 Minutes flew out to interview us. *CBS News* wants all the details. *USA Today* has a story written and ready to go. The list is enormous and is still growing. Did you see the giant banner flying boldly in San Jose as President Clinton lectured? It said: "Cancel STARS on Kauai." Don't worry if you missed it—hundreds of thousands of Bay Area residents saw it on the San Francisco evening news.

The launch was supposedly successful, but in terms of public relations it failed miserably! I quote an SDIO internal document: "Overall, I feel that we have little real support on Kauai. Our support seems limited to veterans groups and retirees from the missile range. The County Council does not want to side with the activists, not does it want to 'take on' DoD. However, they too have fears about the safety of the launches in general and the Polaris in particular. One official told us that the great 'silent majority' on Kauai supports us. I believed that until I started talking to the local people."

I've come here today, gentlemen, to put you on notice. There is **no way** for you to win this media battle. Just what is the story we have to tell? It is quite simply the story of David and Goliath. It is the story of the tiny Garden Island versus the budget-busting Pentagon. It is the story of Kauai's pristine ecology and her harmony threatened by SDI's arrogant and indulgent waste of 30 billion taxpayer dollars.

Please don't try to salvage SDI's tarnished image by media hype of one successful launch or a new need for global defense. To a weary American public saddled with yet another tax hike, it sounds like nothing more than "crying wolf." It's 1993, a decade after the inception of the program, 30 billion dollars have been spent and there is no hardware and there is nothing to show for the money invested. And SDIO wants more? Get real. Believe me, Americans are acutely aware that SDI provides **no** defense against "trade-tower like" terrorist attacks—the **real** imminent threat from the 3rd world.

Although Pentagon officials haven't been able to tune into the voice of reason coming from Kauai, the national media certainly has. The voice sounds like this: Given the fragile ecology of Kauai, the impact to Native Hawaiian culture and rights, the pressing recovery needs of post-Hurricane Iniki Kauai, the soon-to-be-released GAO report examining the cost and necessity of the program, the existence of immediate alternatives to STARS on Kauai,

the possibility that this program is designed to test against missiles that will no longer pose threats, our desire for **real defense** (not silly sci-fi fantasies that enrich only contractors), could we **please** hold off any further launches until a thorough re-examination of SDI is conducted? Perhaps President Clinton heard our message. He has ordered a Presidential Review Directive calling for a top-to-bottom re-analysis of SDI and ballistic missile defenses. It's about time that our leaders take the lead.

We are very proud Representative Patsy Mink denounced SDI and STARS on the House floor. We are bouyed by Senator Inouye's statement that he is "open" to alternatives to STARS at PMRF and his challenge to the delegation to come up with new ideas. It is clear that Senator Inouye understands that Kauai citizens want **sustainable** economic growth, not feeble and unstable economic trickle down from dying programs like SDI. Kauai's economy suffered a cardiac arrest last September. Missile launching is **not** the key to Kauai's economic recovery.

So here's the straight talk. Colonel Manguso confirmed to Congressman Conyers that **STARS creates only 3 to 4 jobs at PMRF** and that 40 launches have been slashed to 14 and maybe less over the next 10 years. It is insulting to our intelligence to call this program urgent and vital to America and necessary to PMRF's survival. This program is not vital. It is not urgent. It will not insure PMRF's future. It has lost its rationale.

Halt the STARS program now, Senator Inouye. Insist again that conversion ideas be implemented immediately. Inspire our leadership and public to work together devising alternatives to complement and supplement the ongoing naval mission of PMRF. Focus on sustainable alternatives like the Permanent Disaster Relief Depot and other island-friendly high-tech ideas which would keep the base's heroic profile in the public eye.

Bob Bell of the National Security Council said that you are the man in the driver's seat on this issue. Please, Senator, cancel the launch pad. Preserve our Garden Island from those who still have, as Mary McGrory wrote in the Washington Post, "the Berlin Wall in their heads." Promote Kauai's transition to a **healthy** economy and **environmentally sound** future now.

Mālama i Ka 'Aina.

STATEMENT OF REV. KALEO PATTERSON, PASTOR, KOOLAU HUI IA CHURCH; DIRECTOR, HAWAII ECUMENICAL COALITION; AND SPOKESPERSON, NOHILI COALITION

Senator INOUE. Now may I call on the Reverend Kaleo Patterson.

Reverend PATTERSON. Good morning, sir. I am here today from Kauai representing the Nohili Coalition, a statewide coalition concerned about the military use of PMRF facilities for the purpose of the administration and implementation of the STARS Program Ms. Freeman just spoke of.

I think many of the concerns that I am about to share with you are concerns that are not new, and my position in these concerns needs to be echoed again in these chambers and before you and your committee.

STARS PROGRAM LAUNCH PAD

On the island of Kauai, an SDI STARS Program launch pad was built right on top of a well-known ancient Hawaiian burial dune called Nohili. In the construction of the launching facility, a desecration of this sacred place has taken place. The desecration escalated to a new level last month when the first STARS missile launch took place amidst the cheers of military and civilian observers connected with the program.

Immediately after, a media campaign supporting the launch was to be seen in the newspapers and the local TV. On one cable TV channel the missile launch was played over and over again for more than a couple of weeks, so much so that it became sickening to see that the Government of the United States and the SDI program would be so insensitive to native Hawaiian's values and community concerns.

If you study the photographs, the many photographs that followed the missile launching that took place last month, and there are many that go around, you will notice quite readily the size and magnitude of the Nohili Dune, the backdrop for the missile launching, a place held sacred and special to the Hawaiian people, now held captive and desecrated by the U.S. military now considered by many Hawaiians to be a foreign power with unlimited control over and with complete disregard for Hawaiian lands, concerns and cultural values.

PMRF, FRIEND OR FOE?

This STARS launch for me raises the concern of the true mission and future of PMRF. Is PMRF friend or foe of the Hawaiian people? Is the military to be trusted? Is there no way to incorporate the concerns of Hawaiians? We have tried, we have done critiques, we have been to the hearings, yet none of the concerns have been addressed adequately.

Must we continue to be bulldozed in our concerns the same way the island has been stripped and desecrated? Can there not be a more constructive way to facilitate a better understanding of the Hawaiian issues, the understanding of sacred lands, or is it true that it really does not matter what the Hawaiians want? That is the message we get over and over again.

If the U.S. Government and military cannot malama the aina, aloha the aina, cannot use the land with wisdom and respect then return the land now to the Hawaiian people. Respect the claims and the rights of Hawaiians to the land, the people of the land.

In the cemetery of the Hawaiian church that I pastor, one of the oldest cemeteries of Hawaii, you will find buried there the very first Japanese immigrant to Hawaii, a man by the name of Bondo. You see, the Hawaiians understand that the land is sacred for all people, not just for Hawaiians; sacred even for the hoale or the foreigner. But there are those that do not understand the idea of sacred and that is why, I think, we have the problems that we have today.

Of course, perhaps we should not expect this from the military whose image it is to not only defend but in the defending desecration and destruction of all that we cherish and value as Hawaiians.

God forgive us all for the great wrongs we perpetuate upon the land. God forgive us all for the fear and insecurity that rules our lives, that the idea and threat of the enemy is forever a heavy darkness upon the soul of humanity.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Reverend Patterson. Now may I call on a representative of the Sierra Club, Ms. Suzanne Marinelli.

STATEMENT OF SUZANNE MARINELLI, PACIFIC BASIN VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SIERRA CLUB

Ms. MARINELLI. I am Suzanne Marinelli, the Pacific basin's vice president of the National Sierra Club. As such, I represent approximately 600,000 people nationwide and about 4,000 to 5,000 people locally. I also speak here today as an individual human being.

POLIHALE PARK

On Kauai, 100 miles away from here, lies an achingly beautiful sacred piece of land known as Polihale. People are buried there. Their headstones are the ever-shifting, never changing dunes of time. It is the land of the Hawaiian people, ceded land held in trust for them by our own State government. I use the term "in trust" very loosely here. The government that controls that land has put it to fairly good use over time for land it does not own. There are cane fields, a public highway, and a State park. That park lies adjacent to a small missile base situated on a thin strip of land. It has been there for decades.

For years, I am told, the military would occasionally go into Polihale Park and clear people from the launch area outside the base whenever launches required a protective arc bigger than the bases own boundaries. This may have been illegal, but it was apparently allowable to our Department of Land and Natural Resources. The Department of Land and Natural Resources, the agency entrusted with the stewardship and care of Polihale Park.

Sierra Club's recent STARS-related law suit against the Federal and State governments changed all that, as you probably know. Now the agencies involved are required, by increased public awareness if nothing else, to obey their own laws. In a way this is a pity and has lead to a very curious loss on the island of Kauai.

You see, when Iniki's incredible winds abated last September very little of the garden island stood unharmed. Some areas, though, took less damage than others. Kokee came through fairly well, as did Polihale. We are grateful that some of our precious recreational resources were spared by the wind because our lives are very hard now in many ways.

We drive past mountains of mattresses, piles of housing pieces, acres of our lives heaped in desolate roads day after day after day after day. Recovery is very slow.

We turn to recreation when we can, but how far can we turn? We can go to Kokee. Soon we will be able to visit Napale, an area deeply harmed by the storm. But we cannot go to sweet Polihale. Our park is ours no more. This lightly damaged area, facilities intact, remains closed to the public it is meant to serve. People are using the park, it is true, but they are doing it illegally.

The department of land and natural resources [DLNR], now looks the other way when the public arrives the way it once did when the Army arrived wanting that hazard area to cross its own boundaries. So, life is probably easier at the missile base now. With the park closed, they simply have the DLNR security forces go into Polihale Park with trained dogs on potential launch days to force the public out of its own park.

What is happening here? Why is Polihale still closed 6½ months after Iniki? I believe I can tell you. I believe the Army wants another STARS launch in May of this year. And I predict today, and I ask you please to pay attention, if public outcry does not change our fate, our paid stewards will withhold this part from the public until after that second STARS launch is completed, stopped, or aborted. They will do it on behalf of the military.

This is a sin, and it is only one example of something being repeated with variations all across Hawaii and the Pacific basin. It is a sin against our freedom, against the land and sea themselves, their inhabitants, our visitors, and the rightful caretakers of that sacred land.

One-half the human economy, I am told, is involved with militarism. One-half our labor, one-half our lives. If this is what we have to deal with in these times, then please give us something real in exchange for half ourselves.

Bases are closing, expanding, evolving all over this country. Some are even colonizing indigenous people's lands.

I do not envy you. You and your people have to oversee the spending process that governs all this, plus securing our safety and that of much of the world.

You have a formidable task before you. You must find real niches for those displaced soldiers who have given their years to our protection. At the same time you have to secure for a tighter, more real, more functional military than what we have had in the last few years, and you must do it with less money.

Best wishes. I am sure you are up to the challenge.

ROLE OF MILITARY ON HAWAII

These are my closing pieces of advice. One, please remember that the military is here to serve our Government and not direct it.

Two, let us help you find some real military conversion plans. We desperately need a disaster preparedness depot in the Pacific. Put it on Kauai.

Three, expect more of the military. Once upon a time the auto industry said it could not conform to fleet milage standards, but when the laws that governed them changed they complied. The military can too. It is at least as smart as the auto industry and, hopefully, much smarter.

Four, stop these expansions on nonmilitary land. If you allow us to lose our freedoms for the sake of nonproductive militarism, you will have done us a deadly harm, for if we pay with our freedom, nothing remains.

Senator INOUE. I thank you very much Ms. Marinelli. Thank you.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF SUZANNE MARINELLI

Aloha. I am Suzanne Marinelli, the Pacific Basin's Vice President for Sierra Club. As such, I represent approximately 600,000 people nationwide, and about 4,000 people locally. I also speak here today as an individual human being.

A hundred miles away from here, on Kauai, lies an achingly beautiful sacred piece of land known as Polihale. People are buried there. Their headstones are the ever shifting, never changing dunes of time. It is land of the Hawaiian people, ceded land held in trust for them by our own state government. I use the term 'in trust' very loosely here. The government that controls that land has put it to fairly good use over time, for land it doesn't own - here are cane fields, a public highway, and a state park.

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You have a formidable task before you: You must find real niches for those displaced soldiers who've given their years to our protection. At the same time, you have to secure for us a tighter, realer, more functional military than what we've had in the last few years. And you must do it with less money.

Best wishes. I'm sure you are up to the challenge.

These are my closing pieces of advice:

- 1) Remember that the military is here to serve our government, and not direct it.
- 2) Let us help you find some real military conversion plans; we desperately need a disaster preparedness depot in the Pacific, for instance. Put it on Kauai.

3) Expect more of the military. Once upon a time the auto industry said it couldn't conform to fleet mileage standards, but when the laws that governed them changed, they complied. The military can too; it's at least as smart as the auto industry, and hopefully much smarter.

4) Stop these expansions onto non-military land. If you allow us to lose our freedoms for the sake of non-productive militarism, you will have done us a deadly harm.

For if we pay with freedom, what remains?

STATEMENT OF PATRICK ALVAREZ, PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY EMPLOYEE, OFFICER OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS UNION

Senator INOUE. Now may I call upon Mr. Patrick Alvarez.

Mr. Alvarez, welcome.

Mr. ALVAREZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on issues related to the military land use in Hawaii. My name is Patrick Alvarez and my testimony will focus on the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands, which is where I have worked for 24 years, since July 1969.

I was born in Waimea and raised in Kekaha. After graduating from Waimea High, I served with the U.S. Army. Because PMRF was located at Barking Sands I was able to return home and put my electronics training to work in a high-technology job. PMRF has allowed many other veterans like me to return home, provide for our families, and raise our children. I cannot emphasize how important this is to the local community. I hope that my son will have the same chance I had.

PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY

I came here today to tell you that in my opinion PMRF has a very positive impact on the land that it occupies. Mr. Chairman, PMRF employs approximately 700 civilians, which is more than the county of Kauai. PMRF is the single largest employer on the island, offering higher paying jobs than comparable employers on the island. The pay checks of these workers amount to \$30 million per year. This facility is the economic and social anchor of the West of Kauai and adds stability to our community.

Projects conducted at PMRF also help the visitor industry. Every year, many different operations bring in outside engineers, scientists, and technicians. For example, the recent STARS launch brought in more than 100 launch-related personnel for about 2 weeks. This resulted in a direct infusion to our visitor industry approaching \$300,000. This was a big boost in our post-Iniki economy.

Also, hundreds of military veterans who served at PMRF since its inception during World War II come back to visit the island and reminisce.

On a national and global level, PMRF is a U.S. Department of Defense asset. We help to keep our military fit and strong through training and we help to develop new technology through testing and evaluation.

This is a contribution that most of us take pride in. We are not out only to reap economic benefit. Our job is to contribute to na-

tional defense. In turn, PMRF makes a great contribution to our community. I would like to see this mutually beneficial relationship continue.

This is why, Mr. Chairman, as a representative of the majority of the voting public, I want to express my strong opposition to the views of a small portion of the community that has been attacking PMRF.

Projects conducted at PMRF, including the STARS project, are not damaging the environment. All of operations are conducted safely. Furthermore, access to the base for fishing, surfing, camping, and cutting of kiawe firewood is open to the public.

In conclusion, I ask that you do all that you can to protect PMRF and continue to allow us to support all of the national defense projects that we have been assigned. PMRF is good for Kauai. PMRF is good for national defense. The jobs at PMRF bring our young people back home.

Mr. Chairman, as you consider military land use in Kauai, please remember that many of us depend on PMRF for sustenance, and that we are also proud that we able to make a positive contribution to the preservation of freedom and democracy.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much Mr. Alvarez.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF PATRICK ALVAREZ

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On the national and global level, PMRF is a United States Department of Defense asset. We help to keep our military fit and strong through training and we help to develop new technology through testing and evaluation. This is a contribution that most of us take pride in. We are not out only to reap economic benefit. Our job is to contribute to national defense. In turn, PMRF makes a great contribution to our community. I would like to see this mutually beneficial relationship continue.

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In conclusion, I ask that you do all that you can to protect PMRF and continue to allow us to support all of the national defense projects that we have been assigned. PMRF is good for Kauai. PMRF is good for national defense. The jobs at PMRF bring our young people back home. Mr. Chairman, as you consider military land use in Hawaii, please remember that many of us depend on PMRF for sustenance and that we are also proud that we are able to make a positive contribution to the preservation of freedom and democracy.

LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN

Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

4 MAR 1993

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of February 16, 1993, regarding the Strategic Target System (STARS) program. I have carefully reviewed the STARS program and have decided not to delay the launches at this time. I believe that postponements could adversely affect the Defense Department's ability to develop effective ballistic missile defenses for our nation. Let me explain my reasoning for this decision.

STARS is a general target system for National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD). For NMD, STARS can simulate multiple reentry vehicle systems. For TMD, it can simulate theater ballistic missiles, such as the CSS-2.

The first STARS launch is a "shake-down" flight test that will effectively demonstrate the booster system. The launch window extends from February 25 to March 3, 1993.

It is important to note that the STARS program is a well-conceived and managed program that has been underway for 7 years. STARS has been approved by the Department of Defense (DoD) Treaty Compliance Review Group in 1991, 1992, and 1993. STARS is compliant with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and is specifically excluded from the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits.

The program's environmental dimensions have been similarly rigorously reviewed. This includes an Environmental Assessment and Environmental Impact Statement. The environmental aspects have been challenged and upheld in both Federal and state courts.

A joint mission with the United Kingdom (U.K.) to evaluate a strategic payload is scheduled for launch on a STARS booster in June 1993. This event is driving the launch schedule for the initial "shake-down" flight test. The many delays already incurred over the past two years have degraded our ally's plan to evaluate the system's capabilities.

I have decided to allow the "shake-down" flight for the February 25 to March 3, 1993 window. This will keep the program on schedule and within cost. In addition, it allows the United States to keep faith with the U.K. joint effort.

I appreciate your concern about the STARS program. I assure you that the Defense Department will continue to ensure that the STARS program is consistent with our goal of developing ballistic missile defenses for the United States.

Sincerely,



(From the Honolulu Advertiser, Oct. 20, 1992)

KAUAI LAUNCHES: HURRICANE BRINGS A REPRIEVE

It's almost as if Mother Nature was in cahoots with opponents of "Star Wars" launches from Kauai.

Of several setbacks the Army has encountered in its plan to launch Polaris missiles toward Kwajalein to test defense systems, Hurricane Iniki may be the worst.

In August it looked like all systems were go. The Army had a missile ready on its pad at the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Barking Sands.

But then a judge ordered the state to complete an environmental assessment before giving the Army authority to close adjacent state lands during launches. The Army said it was within its rights to go ahead and launch, but agreed out of neighborliness to hold off for the assessment.

No problem, promised the state. The Waihee administration was satisfied with the Army's earlier environmental impact statement; the state assessment would just crib from Army data.

That was where things stood when Hurricane Iniki stormed ashore September 11.

Now, the Army has postponed its first launch indefinitely. The Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Organization will conduct its own evaluation of the environmental situation on Kauai in the storm's aftermath. Senator Dan Inouye has asked that it be "detailed and comprehensive."

Windfallen trees in surrounding areas will make for a long-term, serious fire hazard. But once that danger's past, we continue to think the Army's missile launches can be clean and safe. And opponents shouldn't forget the splendid hurricane relief effort mounted by that base's personnel.

Meanwhile, the debate continues in Washington about whether "Star Wars" is a vital defense measure or an expensive joke. If it outlasts the delay posed by Iniki, though, there's no reason Barking Sands shouldn't get the job.

(From the Garden Isle, Honolulu, HI, Feb. 3, 1993)

PMRF CAPTAIN IS READY TO WORK WITH STATE AND CIVILIANS ON SAFETY ZONE

By CAPT. ROBERT MULLINS
Guest commentary

I am pleased that the First Circuit Court of the State of Hawai'i has lifted the temporary restraining order that prevented the Director of the State Department of Land and Natural Resources from signing a Memorandum of Agreement with us. The agreement, which formalizes a longstanding informal arrangement under which PMRF occasionally establishes a safety area that extends to lands adjacent to the base, is extremely important for Navy training and test programs at the facility.




Figure 2-13. Strategic Target System ground hazard area

On all launches the PMRF conducts, we must establish a buffer zone around the launch pad to ensure public safety. Because PMRF occupies a narrow strip of land, those buffer zones occasionally extend beyond our boundaries. In these cases, our practice has always been to notify the State as well as the Kekaha Sugar company which leases some of these lands for agricultural purposes. If any members of the public happen to be in the buffer area, they too are notified and requested to remain outside the area until the launch is completed. Many launches have taken place this way at PMRF without controversy.

A little more than a year ago, the Navy and the State decided to formalize this arrangement through a Memorandum of Agreement. The agreement ensures that PMRF will continue to be able to establish a buffer area during launch operations. At the same time, the agreement places a limit on the number of times that the Navy can exercise the buffer area.

Under the agreement, the Navy can exercise the buffer area a maximum of only 19 times per year, with the extreme likelihood that it will be exercised much less than that. In 1991 the buffer area was not exercised at all, while in 1992 it was activated only once and that was for a period of approximately 30 minutes. The agreement stipulates that during each operation clearance of the off-base area will not be initiated any more than three hours prior to a launch. Public access to Polihale State park cannot be interrupted for any more than 20 minutes. The beach area, camping area and pavilions in the northern end of the park will not be impacted at all. This agreement is beneficial for both PMRF and the public because it allows us to carry on the mission of the facility while ensuring the continued lowest possible impact on the general public.

As a military base, we have a strong commitment to support Department of Defense training and testing programs. As good neighbors on the island of Kaua'i, we also have a strong commitment to the environment of this beautiful island. I believe that this agreement allows us to fulfill both commitments.

Capt. Robert Mullins is the Commanding Officer at Pacific Missile Range Facility.

HOUSE RESOLUTION

SUPPORTING THE ON-GOING MISSION OF THE PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY AT MANA, ON THE ISLAND OF KAUAI, IN THE STATE OF HAWAII, TO MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S DEFENSES THROUGH EFFECTIVE TRAINING, TESTING AND EVALUATION, AND TO MAKE THE STATE OF HAWAII A MORE VIABLE LOCATION FOR OUR ARMED FORCES.

WHEREAS, the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Mana, on the island of Kauai, in the State of Hawaii, was established twenty-eight years ago and has long been acclaimed as the world's premier missile testing and fleet maneuvering site; and

WHEREAS, through the years, hundreds of millions of taxpayers' dollars have been invested in structures, runway and missile firing facilities, as well as sophisticated testing, tracking, missile retrieving, and related telecommunications equipment, to attain this needed capability; and

WHEREAS, the PMRF covers a land area of 2,478 acres at Mana, Kokee, Makaha ridge, Kaumokala ridge, and Port Allen, on the island of Kauai, and a radar site at Mauna Kapu, on the island of Oahu, as well as an underwater tracking range of 1,000 square miles, which is cabled to provide subsurface monitoring and tracking capability; and

WHEREAS, the total range of designated operations at the PMRF spans 29,000 square miles of open ocean, far removed from traveled sea lanes, as well as the flight patterns of commercial air carriers, unlike the congestion and conflict that exists anywhere along the continental coastline of the United States; and

WHEREAS, experiences from war in the Persian Gulf and other recent conflicts mandate that national defense and world security be maintained to guard against unscrupulous dictators who intentionally mislead and rally their unwary citizenries against depicted enemies to satisfy their personal quests for power; and

WHEREAS, the PMRF and its personnel and employees--numbering 135 active-duty Navy personnel and 711 civilian employees, tenant employees, and Hawaii Air National Guard personnel--have been good and caring neighbors who, in their official and volunteer capacities, have established a proud history of willingness to provide various services to the community, including contributions to the Kauai United Way and four-year college scholarship grants to Kauai's youth; and

WHEREAS, the vast, albeit silent, majority of the people on the island of Kauai recognize:

- (1) The beneficial presence of the PMRF through the facility's creation of technical and skilled job opportunities, as well as the facility's substantial contribution to the island's economy; and

- (2) That there would be a devastating effect on the island's residents should the PMRF's activities, with an annual operating budget of \$73,000,000, be significantly curtailed or completely terminated;

now, therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED by the House of Representatives of the Seventeenth Legislature of the State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 1993, that the House of Representatives respectfully urges the President of the United States, the Congress of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the elected officials of Kauai County and the Commanding Officer, Pacific Missile Range Facility, to support the ongoing missions at the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Mana, on the island of Kauai, in the State of Hawaii, and to maintain the PMRF, not only for the reasons cited in this Concurrent Resolution, but more particularly in the interest of assuring the nation's defenses through effective training, testing and evaluation and thereby preserving world security and peace; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that certified copies of this Resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Congress of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the Mayor of the County of Kauai, the members of the Kauai County Council, and the Commanding Officer, Pacific Missile Range Facility.

OFFERED BY:

Donald Babin
By Request

FEB 8 1993

SENATE RESOLUTION

SUPPORTING THE ON-GOING MISSION OF THE PACIFIC MISSILE RANGE FACILITY AT MANA, KAUAI, HAWAII, TO STRENGTHEN OUR NATION'S DEFENSES THROUGH EFFECTIVE TRAINING, TESTING, AND EVALUATION, AND TO MAKE THE STATE A MORE VIABLE LOCATION FOR OUR ARMED FORCES.

WHEREAS, the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) at Mana, Kauai, Hawaii, was established twenty-eight years ago and has long been acclaimed as the world's premier missile testing and fleet maneuvering site; and

WHEREAS, through the years, hundreds of millions of taxpayers' dollars have been invested in structures, runway and missile firing facilities, as well as sophisticated testing, tracking, missile retrieving, and related telecommunications equipment, to attain this needed capability; and

WHEREAS, the PMRF covers a land area of 2,478 acres at Mana, Kokee, Makaha ridge, Kaumokala ridge, and Port Allen, on the island of Kauai, and a radar site at Mauna Kapu, on the island of Oahu, as well as an underwater tracking range of 1,000 square miles, which is cabled to provide subsurface monitoring and tracking capability; and

WHEREAS, the total range of designated operations at the PMRF spans 29,000 square miles of open ocean, far removed from traveled sea lanes, as well as the flight patterns of commercial air carriers, unlike the congestion and conflict that exists anywhere along the continental coastline of the United States; and

WHEREAS, experiences from war in the Persian Gulf and other recent conflicts mandate that national defense and world security be maintained to guard against unscrupulous dictators who intentionally mislead and rally their unwary citizenries against depicted enemies to satisfy their personal quests for power; and

WHEREAS, the PMRF and its personnel and employees--numbering 135 active-duty Navy personnel and 711 civilian employees, tenant employees, and Hawaii Air National Guard personnel--have been good and caring neighbors who, in their official and volunteer capacities, have established a proud history of willingness to provide various services to the community, including contributions to the Kauai United Way and four-year college scholarship grants to Kauai's youth; and

WHEREAS, the vast, albeit silent, majority of the people on the island of Kauai recognize:

- (1) The beneficial presence of the PMRF through the facility's creation of technical and skilled job opportunities, as well as the facility's substantial contribution to the island's economy; and



- (2) That there would be a devastating effect on the island's residents should the PMRF's activities, with an annual operating budget of \$73,000,000, be significantly curtailed or completely terminated;

now, therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED by the Senate of the Seventeenth Legislature of the State of Hawaii, Regular Session of 1993, in response to a resolution adopted at the 1992 State Democratic Convention, that the Senate respectfully urges the President of the United States, the Congress of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the elected officials of Kauai County and the Commanding Officer, Pacific Missile Range Facility, to support the ongoing missions at the Pacific Missile Range Facility at Mana, Kauai, Hawaii, and to maintain the PMRF, not only for the reasons cited in this Resolution, but more particularly in the interest of assuring the nation's defenses through effective training, testing and evaluation and thereby preserving world security and peace; and

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that certified copies of this Resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Congress of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the Mayor of the County of Kauai, the members of the Kauai County Council, the Commanding Officer, Pacific Missile Range Facility, and members of Hawaii's Congressional Delegation.

OFFERED BY:

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES M. ANTHONY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HAWAII-LA'IEIKAWAI ASSOCIATION

Senator INOUE. Now our final witness for this morning's hearing, Dr. James Anthony of the Hawaii'i-La'ieikawai Association.

Dr. ANTHONY. Thank you, Senator. I am encouraged by the biblical position that they that are last shall be first. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning, and I sat through the proceedings from when they opened earlier on this morning, and I am pleased that I am fortunately in the position of not having to repeat anything that has been said before me.

I should like to address you on the subject that is almost entirely new, and that has to do with the delicate matter of procedure concerning the matters that I think this hearing is supposed to address.

You will recollect that there was a meeting in Honolulu on December 15 of this past year which you chaired. And at that time, no testimony was received from representatives of the community, that being deferred to this date.

We were surprised to hear, on December 15, 1992, in a lengthy statement that was made by Rear Admiral Ryan, that a Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board had been chartered by Admiral Larson to, in quotes, provide a forum for identification and discussion of

land use matters of mutual interest in Hawaii. That quote is taken from Rear Admiral Larson's testimony.

COMPOSITION OF JOINT HAWAII LAND USE AFFAIRS BOARD

You may also recollect, Senator, that on that particular occasion, Representative Abercrombie was also present at the hearing, and with reference to the board that had been appointed by Admiral Larson, that Representative Abercrombie said that it was in need of serious revision.

Now, following that hearing we made the representations to Admiral Larson and we were fortunate enough to be able to have extensive discussions with Capt. Fred Dew, who is liaison to Admiral Larson. And what we said in substance, Senator, was that we hoped that Admiral Larson, on the basis of the representations that had been made to him by a number of people, and they are listed in an appendix to the testimony that I am submitting for the record, that the composition of the Board ought to be changed.

And we waited for 2 months and 2 days ago we got a reply from Captain Dew. And Captain Dew said in that letter that Admiral Larson was not prepared to change the composition of the committee.

Now, obviously the reason why we, as community representatives are focusing on the question of representation on this board is because we recognize, as you do yourself, Senator, that they who write the rules have power. We do not want to be in a situation where we are cast in a reactive mode, because those who are in the reactive mode, we have learned from bitter experience, have only a very small amount to say about what is actually and finally signed by the Department.

But I am afraid, based upon the letter that we have just received from Captain Dew on behalf of Admiral Larson, that Admiral Larson's position is that there will be no revision with respect to the composition of the Board.

The Board continues, as far as we can judge it, to meet behind closed doors and public participation is thus limited to a specially selected few—men, I might add. All of the members of this committee are men with safe, mainstream views. In our opinion, such an apparently incestuous arrangement is not good for public policy-making in an area where there ought to be plenty of room for vigorous and creative debate.

The present arrangement, in short, Senator, is seriously flawed. Our attempts to change it have met what I can only describe as with a stone wall of official silence.

You sat through 3 hours of testimony this morning, Senator. I will not read the substance of my testimony word for word, but I do want to end on this note. I think that we, in the community, and I list people who are committed to Hawaiian cultural and other issues, have been put in the embarrassing position of having to point out that we are being denied credible citizen participation.

If Admiral Larson's Board is firmly and irrevocably to operate behind an iron curtain, then surely other courses of credible community participation can and must be found. One that suggests itself is that a parallel, community-based, oversight committee should be

immediately appointed to review and veto if necessary the recommendations of Admiral Larson's Board.

There are options we are sure. But none of them can be explored as long as Admiral Larson stays locked away in imperial splendor at Camp Smith like a colonial governor who refuses to meet with representatives of the community.

I do not couch my argument in those terms in order to be necessarily disputatious, but we take such a dim view of a lack of sympathetic response that perhaps in order to get your attention I have used those words.

Our plea is a very simple and elegant one. The process you now have is possessed of very little credibility in my view. It can and must be changed. And I think it can be changed with some prodding from yourself and some consultation with us.

I hope, Senator, that environmentalists and people who labor long and hard, often voluntarily on behalf of the Hawaiian community can be treated a little bit better than mere potted plants.

Thank you very much.

Senator INOUE. Thank you very much, Dr. Anthony. Apparently, there is an abundance of misunderstanding in the community. When the Congress of the United States authorized the creation of this task force, it was to begin the process.

Part of that process calls for the GSA to come forth with an inventory of all Federal lands because there is no question at the present time that there is no reliable inventory of Federal lands, and without such an inventory we have no way of making plans—appropriate and legal plans.

That inventory is ready for publication in about 3 weeks. In addition to that, this task force was convened to receive the views and the recommendations of the military. In the beginning, that task force was scheduled to be all military, because we wanted to hear from the military what plans they had in mind, what plans for the use of such lands.

But that report is not the final report, nor is it the final recommendation. It will be received by Congress. It will be received by the people of Hawaii. Once it is received, then we are now in the position to discuss and debate with the military. It does not mean we are going to concur with the military on everything.

But they, in turn, are going to be taking steps in suggesting to us for the first time that they have no use for certain lands. We declare that to be excess, and so we recommend that that be returned. This process is going to expedite the return of lands to Hawaii.

It is not intended for the military to go behind closed doors in the regal splendor, as you say, of Camp Smith. They, on their initiative, opened it up to other citizens of the State of Hawaii. What we wanted to know was what does the military think of certain bases, and we are going to receive their views.

A time will come when all of us can reconvene to discuss the attitude of the military, to discuss the recommendations of the military, and to discuss the report itself. So, this is not the final thing. They are not keeping you silent. They have discussed it with you, and you were there to testify.

So, I want you to know that in our process we are not closing our doors to anyone. We could have said that we would not discuss base closure, but since that involves land use we opened it up to everything.

Dr. ANTHONY. If I could just make this one point for the record, Senator. I trust that we are talking about the same thing. There is a Board that has been appointed by Admiral Larson that has representatives from various State and county agencies, and we know nothing about the operations of that Board. Their agenda is not being published.

I would argue, as I did in my formal testimony, that since State officials and county officials are represented on that Board that those meetings ought to be open to the public in keeping with the State sunshine law. I do not know that that is being done.

It may be that I stand corrected, based on your explanation. But I think it is very important, even though we are not bound by what might be decided and what might come out of this Board, I think the idea of citizen participation at this very first level is extremely important.

Senator INOUE. Well, as I pointed out, this is not the Base Closure Commission where the report is filed and you either take it or leave it. This will be a report to the people of Hawaii, to the Congress of the United States, to make it possible for us to look at land use keeping in mind the military's perspective of it. It is not intended to keep you silent, I can assure you of that.

Dr. ANTHONY. Thank you, Senator.

[The statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES B. ANTHONY

On December 15, 1992 the Senate Appropriations Committee (Defense Subcommittee) met in Honolulu under your Chairmanship.

At that time community representatives were not permitted to present testimony to you. That opportunity was deferred until this morning.

We were very surprised to learn from the official written statement made by Rear Admiral Ryan on December 15, 1992, that a Joint Hawaii (sic) Land Use Affairs Board had been chartered by Admiral Larson "to provide a forum for identification and discussion of land use matters of mutual interest in Hawaii" (sic).

You will recollect that Representative Abercrombie, who was also in attendance at the December 15, 1992 meeting, said that the composition of the Board was "in need of serious revision". A copy of a letter dated December 22, 1992 addressed to Representative Abercrombie written by Dr. Anthony, the Executive Director of the Hawai'i-La'ieikawai Association, is attached for your reference.

On January 8, 1993 Captain Fred Dew, liaison to Rear Admiral John Ryan, (along with a Mr. Ishikawa) met with a wide range of community representatives to hear our concerns about the composition, the proposed functioning and legitimacy of the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board (hereafter "the Board") chartered by Admiral Larson. A list of those present at the meeting is attached. After a wide ranging discussion of our concerns Captain Dew undertook to convey both the tenor and the substance of what we had said to Admiral Larson (see letter from Dr. Anthony to Captain Dew dated January 8, 1993, attached). After more than two months, we finally received a reply on March 23, 1993 (attached) from Captain Dew. The terms of the letter are wholly unacceptable.

Our objections to both the manner in which the Board was appointed as well as its composition remains unaltered.

Permit us to review how precisely it was that the Board came into existence and what precisely it will do and how. All of what follows is culled from Rear Admiral Ryan's December 15, 1992 statement:

1. In June 1992, USCINCPAC discussed Admiral Larsons's "concept for land use coordination with the Service secretaries."

2. "Admiral Larson's three-part strategy includes: a Joint Military Task Force to determine what land we need; a military-civilian Land Use Affairs Group as a sounding board for land issues to help USCINCPAC make informed recommendations and finally Service Components forwarding their recommendations through USCINCPAC to their service secretaries for approval." Note: the military-civilian Land Use Affairs Group is a sounding board and nothing more. It will have the opportunity of providing input to, and comment on, our (i.e. the military's) Land Use Plan. The Board will thus be merely advisory to Admiral Larson. It will serve as a forum and it will be chartered for 5 years. Comment: There is not a single individual from the community of environmentalists or from the non-bureaucratic/governmental segment of the Hawaiian community on the Board. We note with wry amusement that some peculiar logic has dictated the appointment of a male representative from First Hawaiian Bank and one representing Kane'ohe Ranch.

3. "There is to be a Joint Military Task Force" . . . and it will "develop a Hawaii (sic) Military Land Use Plan". There will be three working teams: Navy/Marine Corps; Army/Air Force and a Technical support group—all composed mainly of DOD civilian planners and engineers.

4. USCINCPAC will serve as the DOD focal point. Comment: this means that USCINCPAC will be the effective decision makers.

The Board continues, no doubt, to meet behind closed doors and "public participation" is thus limited to a specially selected few with "safe, mainstream views". In our opinion such an apparently incestuous arrangement is not good for policy making in an area where there ought to be plenty of room for vigorous and creative debate.

The present arrangement, in short, is seriously flawed. Our attempts to change it have been met with a stone wall of official silence.

It seems clear to us that many of the issues which will come before Admiral Larson's Board are covered by the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization and Appropriations Act: Economic Adjustment Provisions. That Act (revised, October 23, 1992) calls for "community planning and coordination". Only in the most contorted way can it be said that the community's views are being taken into account by these hand picked individuals nominated to the Board. The Board's membership is thus, as Representative Abercrombie said pointedly in December 1992, still "in need of serious revision".

We further argue that since there are state officials on Admiral Larson's Board the State sunshine Law applies and therefore all meetings attended by them have to be open to the public and properly noticed. We hasten to add, in this connection, that we do not only seek to have the Board's meetings open; the very composition of the Board's membership must be changed. The ritual of "participation" (which Kurt Vonnegut in another context called "the promise of small gifts and silly privileges") as non-members of the Board is one thing; full membership on the Board is another.

What we are dealing with here in no small part is what should accrue to the community—the Hawaiian segment in particular—from the so called "peace dividend". "Defense downsizing", to use the conventional term, yields a dividend—there ought to be a healthy and wide ranging dialogue as to a determination of the size of that dividend and how it should be distributed and to whom the proceeds should be given. These purposes are not likely to be fully addressed by a small number of specially chosen men whose views are truncated and narrow.

Not only is the composition of the Board flawed but so is the process. This whole issue is being dealt with as if it were a matter of "national security" which it is not.

May we remind you, senator Inouye, that in your recent election campaign you spoke repeatedly of the importance of "citizen based processes". Here is a chance to put your campaign promises into practical effect.

We are in somewhat of a quandary as to why you have convened yet another "public hearing" on this matter when there is no report—even one of the most preliminary kind—from Admiral Larson's Board. What, we ask, has the Board done so far? What will it be doing? What is its short, medium and long term agenda? Public disclosures about these issues are of great importance.

We have been put in the embarrassing position of having to point out that we are being denied credible citizen participation. If Admiral Larson's Board is firmly and irrevocably to operate behind an iron curtain then surely other courses of credible community participation can and must be found. One that suggests itself is that a parallel community based oversight committee should be immediately appointed to review, and veto if necessary, the recommendations of Admiral Larson's Board. There are other options, we are sure. But none of them can be explored as long as Admiral Larson stays locked away in imperial splendor at Camp Smith like a colonial governor who refuses to meet with representatives of the community.

Our plea is a simple and elegant one: The process you now have is possessed of very little credibility. It can and must be changed. And you can do it in consultation with us. This submission is made in behalf of the following:

Hekela Miller, Environmentalist; Hula; Kuleana landowner
 Winnie Miller, Environmentalist; Hula; Community Health
 Mililani Trask, Attorney; Hia'aina, Ha Lahui Hawai'i
 Pohaku Rodenhurst, Ha Lahui Hawai'i (sovereignty)
 Mary Protheroe, Hawai'i Golf Course Action Alliance
 Carole Collins, President, Waialua Community Association; North Shore Environmental Council
 Dawn Wasson, President, Hui Malama 'Aina 'O La'ie; President, Hawai'i La'ieikawai Association, Inc. ("H-LA")
 Gladys Pualoa, Ho'olauloa Hawaiian Civic Club; H-LA
 Carol Anamizu, sovereignty; Community Health
 Ipo Tano, Preservation of Hawaiian Sacred Sites
 Dr. Carl Honig, Citizen/Environmentalist
 Creighton Mattoon, President, Punalu'u Community Association; vice president, H-LA; Chair, Neighborhood Board No. 28

LETTER FROM CAPT. FRED W. DEW, CEC, USN

RECEIVED MAR 23 1993

Dr. Jim Anthony
 Executive Director
 The Hawai'i - La'ieikawai Association, Inc.
 P.O.Box 720
 Ka'a'awa, Hawai'i 96730

Dear Mr. Anthony:

Please accept my sincerest apology for not responding in writing to your request made at our January 8, 1993 meeting. At this meeting you requested Admiral Larson consider increasing the membership of the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board and to allow public comment on the Military Land Use Master Plan.


During my last telephone conversation with you on, as I recall, 23 February 1993 I advised you that Admiral Larson had decided not to expand the Board membership. Regarding the Military Land Use Master Plan, however, public comment will be requested once the draft plan has been completed.

As you know the Joint Hawaii Land Use Affairs Board consists of Service component representatives, and appointees from the Hawaii Congressional Delegation, the State, City and County Governments, including business and community leaders. This group is a forum to exchange general information on Hawaii land use issues.

The Hawaii Military Land Use Master Plan will develop a long-range road map for all the DOD-controlled land, facilities and housing in the State of Hawaii. The goal is to look 10-20 years into the future and decide how best to manage DOD resources during that time frame. All military property, with the exception of Kaho'olawe, will be included in the plan. The plan will take 18 to 24 months to complete. The process involves engineering field investigations and planning analysis at all bases in Hawaii followed by a draft report. At this point information forums will be held to obtain public comments on the draft plan.

Again, please accept my apology for not responding to you sooner in writing.

Sincerely,



FRED W. DEW

Captain, CEC, USN

Chief, Facilities Engineering
 Division

031

LETTER FROM JIM ANTHONY


8 January 1993

Dear Captain Dew:

All too often in the rush of everyday events we do not seem to have enough time for each other to stop and express sentiments like: "Thank you for being patient and a good listener" or "I appreciate your courtesy, your uncommon good sense, your civility." I wish to communicate these sentiments to you and more: you were a good and entirely worthy swordsman in the course of our encounter this morning; I applaud you and thank you for making the long trek to meet community representatives.

I trust that your efforts to convey to Admiral Larson the importance of meeting with us will bear fruit. I look forward to hearing from you soon. Aloha.

Sincerely yours



Jim Anthony

LETTER FROM JIM ANTHONY

December 22, 1992

Congressman Neil Abercrombie
Prince Kuhio Federal Building
300 Ala Moana Boulevard, Room 4104
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96850

Dear Neil:

I am fully in agreement with the views you expressed at the Senate Appropriations Committee (Defense Subcommittee) held here in Honolulu on December 15, 1992 over the Joint Hawai'i Land Use Affairs Board established by Admiral Larson. In particular, I concur with your statement that the Board is "in need of serious revision". As it stands the Board is a "stag" Board in that all of its members are male and so carefully chosen as to represent a narrow range of views.

I have today spoken with Captain Fred Dew (phone #477-6011), liaison to Rear Admiral John Ryan, USN, and have asked him for a meeting at which we would like to discuss the composition of the Board with a view to diversifying the interests represented on it. To this end we will be suggesting that representatives from the environmental movement as well as those who hold other than "safe, mainstream views" on Hawaiian issues be made full members of the Board.

I also plan to urge that the male domination of the Board be altered as substantially as possible. I shall urge, too, that the House Armed Services Committee be consulted about the matters we intend to submit for Admiral Larson's consideration. I hope that we can in turn closely coordinate our efforts with yours in what I consider to be a matter of considerable public importance. I hope that the meeting with Rear Admiral Ryan and his colleagues that I

have in mind can be held in early January. I wonder whether it might be prudent to have a senior staff person from your Honolulu office at this meeting so that he/she can report to you first hand on both the tenor and the substance of the discussions we hope to have. Please let me know. I look forward to hearing from you soon. Aloha.

Sincerely yours



Jim Anthony

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Senator INOUE. We have received the testimony today of 23 witnesses. In addition to that we have 13 citizens who have submitted prepared statements, and they will be made part of the record at this point.

[The statements follow:]

STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on an issue of vital importance to Hawaii and our Nation. As our state population grows, and the land upon which we live, work and play becomes scarcer and scarcer, we must focus our resources to wisely use our land.

The Department of Defense land inventory study currently being conducted will allow us to carefully evaluate the land use requirements for our national security based on the current threat assessment. This will lead to a more efficient use of lands currently occupied by the Department and allow for greater public use of under-utilized military lands. It is estimated that the Department of Defense currently retains over 265,000 acres of land in the State.

These lands are used for a host of activities, including training and housing for military personnel. As we all know, training is imperative to ensure the safety of our troops in conflict. In light of the current and anticipated reductions in the defense budget, the proximity of training areas to personnel will become an important factor in providing a cost-effective national defense. Thus, without training areas available in the State, the Department of Defense would have to relocate the majority of its personnel closer to their training areas. With this in mind, and given the important strategic role Hawaii plays in our national defense, reassessing our training area needs will be an important part of the evaluation.

As the number of active duty personnel declines, less demand will be placed on housing requirements on and off military bases. However, for the personnel who remain, we must ensure that they are provided quality, affordable housing. Thus, we must continue to increase the number of military housing units in Hawaii to alleviate the pressure on our civilian and military housing markets. The Army Audit Agency conducted a preliminary estimate of the housing deficit. Their findings show that Hawaii needs eight thousand units to satisfy military requirements. As we all know, Senator Inouye has been very successful in obtaining desperately needed funds to increase the housing inventory in Hawaii. In addition, the Defense Department has moved forward on a number of Section 802 projects which will also increase the number of homes on military installations. In fact, the Army recently awarded a contract for the design and construction of 102 family housing units at Schofield Barracks, 38 units at Hickam Air Force Base, and 120 units at Barbers Point Naval Air Station.

Although Barbers Point Naval Air Station has been placed on the Base Closure and Realignment list, the housing area of the base is to remain under military jurisdiction. However, before the fate of the base is decided, we must ensure that any decision made will not affect military housing at Barbers Point. This includes possible future Section 802 projects. Barbers Point is relatively close to Pearl Harbor and Schofield Barracks and could help address the housing needs of these two installations. Should Barbers Point remain on the Base Closure list, its housing can be still be integrated into the overall community. Thus, increased housing on the base can only help Hawaii and its military.

Once we evaluate our land requirements to ensure a strong national defense in the Pacific, we can then address the under-utilization of military lands and work for their return to the State or appropriate land owners. For example, the Defense Department is negotiating a deal which would give 108 acres at Manana Storage Area and an additional 14 acres at Pearl City Junction to the city, and in return, the city would build a causeway to Ford Island. The causeway would allow the Department to fully utilize Ford Island and provide 600 additional homes for military families. The City could then develop Manana and Pearl City Junction for housing or mixed-use requirements. If successful, both military and civilians will benefit from such an exchange.

The land management report, however, must also focus on the fair and equitable restitution of ceded and Hawaiian Home Lands currently being used by the Federal Government, including the Department of Defense. Fifty-two percent of the lands currently used by the military are ceded lands, twenty percent of these lands are located on Oahu.

As we all know, the history of land jurisdiction is one of the most complex and controversial issues in the State. It is fueled by the high value and scarcity of land, the high cost of living, and the political history and developments which have shaped current day Hawaii. It is the failure of the United States government to address the wrongfulness of its actions in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1883 and the annexation in 1898 that further contributes to the controversy surrounding land jurisdiction.

As a result, Hawaiian sovereignty is inevitably intertwined with Hawaii's public land issues. As we move forward to redress past wrongs committed against Native Hawaiians, I urge the Department of Defense, and all federal agencies, to understand the sensitivities behind these very complex issues.

We must work together to resolve these contentious issues and develop a land management program which balances the national security needs of our nation with the local needs of our people. I appreciate the opportunity to submit my Views on this important issue facing our State, and I look forward to reviewing the concerns of the multitude of witnesses here today. I stand ready to work with my colleagues in Congress to develop a comprehensive approach which ensures effective utilization of land resources in Hawaii.

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN NEIL ABERCROMBIE OF HAWAII

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to submit my views on issues relating to military land use in Hawai'i.

Issues relating to land use and ownership have a special dimension for Native Hawaiians and those who support their claims for justice. That dimension is embodied in the historical wrongs suffered by the Hawaiian people. As public discourse accompanying this year's 'Onipa'a centennial of the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy made abundantly clear, the wounds inflicted by that tragic event still rankle.

And no wound rankles more painfully than the loss of Hawaiian lands. Many of the lands lost were ceded lands occupied by the U.S. military during the territorial period. As former Hawaiian crown lands, title to these ceded lands still resides with Hawaii's people. That fact was reaffirmed by the Admission Act of 1959 and subsequent legislation directing that ceded lands no longer required for military purposes be returned to the State of Hawai'i.

If the spirit of that legislation is to be accorded even a shred of respect, Bellows Air Force Station should be returned forthwith. Strained assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, Bellows is the most underutilized military property in the state. Recent attempts to make a military case for Bellows border on blackmail, the last resort for advocates of a weak case. A hard look at the installation shows why the retention proponents are so desperate. An abandoned runway, an obsolescent radio antenna facility and recreational beach cottages are the installation's principal assets.

Training exercises now conducted at Bellows can be accommodated at other bases on Oahu. The use of Bellows beach for amphibious landings can continue under a license arrangement after reversion. Such agreements are made routinely for use of state lands, including Hawaiian Homelands. Why should the military be shy about following a similar procedure in regard to Bellows?

The difference apparently is that Bellows is ceded land, and the military command in Hawai'i has come to resemble nothing so much as a real estate holding company. Barbers Point Naval Air Station, which is slated to be closed, is owned in fee by the federal government. The closure will no doubt yield some degree of

compensation for the military. The salient point is that closure of Bellows Air Force Station, by contrast, would benefit no one but the rightful owners of that land.

I was not a party to the decision that placed Barbers Point instead of Bellows on the closure list, but one thing is clear: the interests of the Hawaiian people were not considered. And no wonder . . . the record of military land use in Hawaii shows little inclination to address the needs and desires of the statutory beneficiaries of any ceded land return—the Hawaiian people.

It is time to begin settling accounts for a century of injustice. That settlement must include the return of lands to the possession and/or benefit of Native Hawaiians. As ceded lands, Bellows should be relinquished. And if not Bellows, exactly which ceded lands can we expect to be returned to Hawaiian hands?

STATEMENT OF STATE REPRESENTATIVE ROY M. TAKUMI

My name is Roy Takumi and I presently serve as a state Representative from the 36th District (Waipahu-Pearl City). I thank the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense for holding a public hearing in Hawaii on the critical issue of military land use in Hawaii.

It is especially timely since earlier this month, Defense Secretary Les Aspin released a list of 31 military bases recommended for closure by the Department of Defense including Barbers Point Naval Station. When the list was announced, cries of alarm immediately arose from public officials representing communities threatened by the proposed closing. In contrast, I believe that the announcement provides a rare opportunity for us to reassess military land holdings in our state and see whether their re-use can enhance and renew economic opportunities for our community.

The recent history of base closure indicates that while concerns about economic dislocation are legitimate, successful base conversion can be accomplished. Communities can meet the base closure challenge by working together to create positive outcomes for as many of their members as possible.

Can we do it? Of course, we can; not only that, it's been done. We should remember that much of American industry converted to weapons production at the outbreak of World War II, then re-converted to civilian production at the end of the war. Over 75 percent of the automobile industry switched to the production of tanks and armored vehicles in 1940, then returned to making automobiles in 1945.

Ironically, the most substantial contemporary program of conversion is guided by the Department of Defense through its Office of Economic Adjustment. It was set up in 1961 by then-Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara to help ease the impact of base closings and to transfer defense facilities to civilian use. In the sixty-one communities in which the OEA had terminated its assistance by 1973, 82,000 civilian jobs were lost due to Department of Defense cutbacks. However, by careful planning, these communities have generated 162,000 new jobs. Only seven of the sixty-one communities affected lost more civilian jobs than they gained.

The bases closed during that period have been converted to a wide array of civilian uses, including airports and air cargo facilities, industrial parks, port facilities, commercial developments, business parks, governmental centers, educational institutions (e.g., community colleges and vocational training centers), residential complexes, prisons, hospitals, parks and open space preserves.

We should remember, however, that those conversions occurred during a period of relatively high economic growth which eased the transition of affected communities. The economic climate of the 1990's is much less conducive to rapid base redevelopment. Also, excess capacity and saturated markets have resulted in less need today for previously common re-use options such as community college and airports.

Several federal economic assistance programs which were used effectively during that period are no longer in existence (e.g., urban development action grants) or are much more limited in capacity (e.g., the Economic Development Administration and the Small Business Administration).

Toxic contamination of bases was not recognized as much of a problem in past decades, and often inadequately addressed in the conversion process. Now, the past extent of the problem is increasingly clear: almost all military installations—those still in use, those being closed, and many of those already converted—require extensive clean-up. The need to decontaminate bases, many of which are Superfund sites, prior to their re-use could slow down the conversion process and inhibit full re-use of some bases.

Most bases were essentially given away by the federal government in previous decades. Today, since part of the justification for the closures is cost saving, there is an effort to sell many installations at "fair market value."

Several factors seem to greatly affect the prospects of rapid and effective base conversion during the 1990's, including:

- The effectiveness of the local base re-use planning process. Communities that rapidly organize a planning process which meaningfully involves all stakeholders have a much higher likelihood of success.
- Jurisdictional cooperation. In situations where more than one local government agency is involved, it is crucial that they develop mechanisms enabling them to work through differences and identify and achieve common objectives. Long legal battles over jurisdictional disputes complicated re-use planning at several recently closed bases.
- The timing of the military's departure. Communities face a much more difficult conversion challenge when the military departs rapidly.
- The location of the installation. Bases in rural areas are often difficult to convert due to the low level of economic activity, whereas those in more populated areas can often choose from a number of re-development options.
- The nature and extent of toxic contamination. Virtually all bases are contaminated with an array of materials including jet fuel, solvents, heavy metals, unexploded ordnance, asbestos and radioactive substances. Heavily contaminated bases, especially hard-to-clean-up sites such as large landfills and munitions testing ranges, are not easy to rapidly convert.
- The number of civilian jobs on the base. Communities hosting installations with a large number of employees, especially military-industrial facilities such as ship yards and aviation-repair depots employing blue collar workers, will encounter difficulty replacing those jobs with ones of comparable skill and pay levels.

Given the above, what can we do to ensure that the planning process for conversion works? For starters:

- We must move rapidly to develop and implement an effective conversion planning process. This can take the form of a task force or a commission comprised of a diversity of interests. The exclusion of key constituencies (e.g., environmentalists and labor) is likely to seriously undermine the decision-making process and produce flawed results.
- The state and county should establish a joint powers agreement or other mechanism that enables them to collaborate effectively.
- To deal with the significant employment loss, retraining and other efforts to mitigate the socioeconomic affects of layoffs should be implemented rapidly.
- Toxic contamination is a serious problem that can complicate and delay re-use efforts. The nature and extent of contamination should be rapidly determined, and a cleanup plan developed and implemented in a timely manner. Environmental standards should protect human health, permit bases to be reused in accordance with community land use plans, and ensure long-term, flexible use options.
- We should redevelop a base with a mix of compatible uses, including activities that address critical unmet local needs (such as affordable housing, education and health care).
- The military's departure timetable should be determined and taken into consideration in planning a base's conversion. Too rapid or too slow a departure can undermine a community's ability to clean up toxics, adjust to changes (e.g., decline in school enrollments and funding), and implement an effective re-use plan.
- We should explore interim uses for bases while long-term plans are being finalized. This can generate income and diminish the deterioration of facilities.
- Communities should negotiate with the DOD to acquire useful surplus machinery, equipment, and rolling stock on an installation as part of the turnover process.
- Adequate funding for conversion planning and implementation is necessary. The Pentagon's Office of Economic Adjustment is a valuable resource both as a source of planning funds and as a conduit to other financial and technical resources.

Lastly, we should take a hard look at the present level of military land holdings in our state and assess which sites could be recommended for closing (e.g., Bellows Air Force Base) which could then be incorporated into the conversion planning process.

I would like to close by emphasizing that we live in a fragile economic relationship to the mainland. Witness the dock strikes of the 60's, the United Airlines strike, and the oil embargo of the 70's. But the oil embargo showed us that if there is the political will to respond, things can happen: we saw a decrease in gasoline consump-

tion, increased installation of solar heaters, energy efficient building designs, wind generators, ocean thermal energy projects, etc.

A systematic conversion plan involving labor, government, and community can be developed to identify viable economic alternatives for bases scheduled for closure. It is within our means to create an economic conversion plan that will contribute to altering the economic future of Hawaii—from one of dependence, dominance, and vulnerability to one of growth and stability. By doing so, we will be helping to create an economy that will be further diversified, stable, and independent. With so much at stake, we can do no less.

STATEMENT OF STATE REPRESENTATIVE SAM LEE OF HAWAII

In view of the closure of Barbers Point Naval Air Station, and the loss of several thousands of military personnel as well as over one thousand civilian jobs, the Federal Government should assist in the conversion as it is doing in California and other States.

The Federal Government has an obligation to Native Hawaiians under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, an obligation assumed by the State in the Admissions Act. But neither the Federal Government nor the State, until recently, has made whole their obligations.

Barbers Point should be added to the lands under the Hawaiian Homes Act. In the open area of Barbers Point, the State can build houses on homesteads for the aging beneficiaries.

The runway and flight facilities can serve as the reliever and general aviation airport.

Existing and new military housing at Barbers Point will continue to be available to the services in the same manner as military housing on ceded lands in Camp Stover, Wheeler, Kaneohe MCAS, etc.

STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS B. HAYWARD, U.S. NAVY (RET.)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for providing me this opportunity to participate at this significant hearing related to the importance of military lands to the state of Hawaii and our national interests. I appear before this committee today without portfolio—but not without certain measures of credibility based upon my Pact and present involvement here in Hawaii. It was my honor to serve for forty years in the United States Navy, largely in the Pacific theatre, which included assignments as Commandant, 14th Naval District (now Commander Naval Bases Pearl Harbor,) Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, and Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Subsequent to my retirement from the Navy in 1982 as Chief of Naval Operations, I have proudly become a resident of the State of Hawaii and have willingly sought out many opportunities to be a contributory citizen in this State, participating with such activities as the Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii, the Military Affairs Council, Chairman of the High Technology Development Corporation, and now as Chairman of the Hawaii Space Development Authority. As a resident of the State, I have a strong sense of commitment to the economic development and economic diversification within the State, and believe that there is a high degree of correlation between the military's presence in Hawaii and these objectives.

Wishing to be as succinct as possible in my contribution to your deliberations, I will seek to briefly emphasize three major points, each of which has considerable relevance to military land use: the military's requirement to be in Hawaii; the relevance of military land in Hawaii; and the importance of military presence to high technology development of Hawaii's economy.

First, then, to the military's requirement to be in Hawaii. I will not belabor this point knowing that in your previous hearing of a few weeks ago the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Admiral Larson, and others aptly and adequately described the strategic importance of the military presence in the Pacific and the strategic relevance of military's presence in Hawaii in support of our national strategy. I would

simply wish to add my conviction to the weight of evidence based upon my extensive military background in the Pacific to reinforce their positions. Despite the major changes going on in the former Soviet Union that provide us some hope that the level of U.S. military presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean can be lessened over time, the time will not come during the period in which decisions made by today's Congress on U.S. defense posture will alter in any significant way the critical importance of Hawaii to the strategic posture of the Pacific Command. Hawaii is and will remain strategically vital.

Second, for the military to carry out its responsibilities in response to national policy and strategy, its highest order of priority is READINESS. Every military commander today, and every committee in the Congress with responsibility for national security, has been consistently on record emphasizing that a high state of readiness is the first order of priority, especially during this downsizing evolution. Critical to the maintenance of readiness of Hawaii's military forces is the adequacy of training. And critical to training is the availability of adequate training grounds, ranges and facilities. I strongly suggest that no action should be taken by the Congress to degrade in any measure the military training facilities available in Hawaii today to the Armed Services. To the contrary, every means should be examined to upgrade the technological quality of the facilities so that the level of training can remain at the cutting edge. This goes for the maintenance of research and development, test and evaluation capabilities in Hawaii as well.

Thirdly, a few comments with respect to the importance of the military's presence in Hawaii to its high technology expertise and the diversification of Hawaii's economy. A cursory examination of the numerous technology oriented companies in Hawaii will quickly reveal that the vast majority—which is small-business oriented—are highly dependent upon the military's presence and upon the Defense Department financial resources. As a result of the wisdom of the Congress, especially this committee, new opportunities have been foreseen and supported that add to the technological competence of various entities in Hawaii which support defense requirements. One can confidently conjecture that additional capabilities will be identified that are vital to keeping America's military first in the world.

An issue of particular relevance in this regard has to do with the capabilities and viability of the Pacific Missile Test Facility at Barking Sands. We in Hawaii are sensitive to the fact that this facility has been eyed, and will no doubt continue to be examined, as an option for reduction from the Navy's base structure. It is clear that if an action were taken to decommission Barking Sands it would have dramatic impact on the training and readiness of the Pacific Fleet forces located in Hawaii as well as those West Coast based forces and allied Navies that rely upon the exceptional three-dimensional range capability present at Barking Sands. Not to be overlooked is the fact that Barking Sands constitutes the largest single employer on the island of Kauai and is the only technologically oriented capability of any significance in the county. This positive economic impact has been demonstrated time again—almost to the point of cavalier acceptance. This was recently demonstrated in the STARS program of which I know this committee is very familiar. Loss of the STARS program to Kauai would not simply have an immediate impact on the test and development program supported by the Sandia Laboratory at Barking Sands, but would be the forerunner of relegating that expertise to a caretaker status, thereby shutting off any new initiative that might be undertaken to further utilize that capability on the long term.

For example, in my capacity assisting with the development of the State of Hawaii space initiatives, I am aware of a number of potential programs that could be brought to Barking Sands in support of both commercial and government projects. These opportunities could be significant and should be exploited to the fullest extent possible by the political and business communities in Hawaii with the guidance and support of the federal government. The exploitation of the President's defense conversion concept could find application at Barking Sands in ways totally consistent with the administration and Congress' wishes. We need to be given a chance to bring these new opportunities to the State of Hawaii, especially to the County of Kauai which has been devastated economically within the past decade by two hurricanes of monumental proportions.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I urge your continued support of the military land use program being pursued by CINCPAC in cooperation and coordination with State authorities. I urge your understanding of the critical importance of training areas to the ongoing readiness of the Pacific forces here in Hawaii. And, in conclusion, I urge your awareness that the vast majority of the people in the State of Hawaii strongly support the military's presence here and are highly appreciative of the overwhelming correlation of military presence to the economic health and viability of the state. This is a pro-military state. The vast majority of us are not im-

pressed by the anti-military rhetoric that is forthcoming at times from a very small segment of the community. While we support the preservation of their right to vocally object to any project, such as STARS, we likewise count upon the good judgement of our political leadership to acknowledge the irrelevance of their argumentation when it is so singularly biased against the military. Obviously, I speak with a level of bias of my own in this regard. But, I believe that my past record and my present unyielding commitment to the economic growth of this State for the betterment of its citizens should give weight to my argument.

Thank you for this opportunity to express my personal views to you in this important deliberation.

STATEMENT OF BILL PATY OF HAWAII

You have already heard of the need for military training areas and the economic impact of the military on our community. Let me spend a little time to share with you the genuine effort that the Army has undertaken to "Malama the aina" (to care for these lands). The Army is the caretaker for 165,872 acres of training lands in Hawaii. This includes Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), Makua Military Reservation, Kahuku Training Area, Dillingham Military Reservation, East Range and Schofield Barracks. I am going to give a few examples of the Army's environmental achievements at Makua and PTA.

Makua Military Reservation has been used as a military training area since World War II, 1943 to be exact. The Army has made a special effort at Makua, in my opinion, to ensure a strong and active readiness program for fire control in order to protect the Oahu tree snail. The area above Makua is one of the few remaining enclaves for the Hawaiian tree snail.

For the past 6 years, ending Feb. 1st, I was chairman of the board for the State Department of Land and Natural Resources. I was actively involved at Makua Military Reservation in the upgrading of fire control measures with the Army, the county fire department, and the state to ensure that the plans and the readiness response were adequate. Today, due largely to the Army initiative to improve fire fighting capabilities in cooperation with the county, the risk to endangered plants and animals (namely to the Oahu tree snail and the native forest area above Makua) is minimal. In reality, a more likely threat to the snail are the many hikers who trek through this area.

As the chairman of the board for the State Department of Land and Natural Resources, I also served as the State Historical Preservation Officer and was very aware of the Army's efforts to protect the historic and archeological sites, to include several heiaus in the Makua Valley.

There have been claims that were it not for the Army activity, this area would be some kind of a pristine national forest. It was, in fact, used extensively for ranching and farming prior to its use as a military reservation. The area was inhabited through the 1930's, and a railroad bisected the Makua Valley and ran up to Kaena Point to transport agricultural products. If it were not presently being used by the military, it is likely that the land would still be used for farming or ranching. It would more than likely resemble the other valleys along the coastline. I have hiked miles of the adjacent valleys to look at

historic sites and the vegetation is almost, without exception, guinea grass and keawe with cattle trails everywhere.

I have also been impressed with my observation and contact with PTA post commanders and local staff with regard to the care given to protecting endangered plants in the PTA. The Army has provided kokua (help) to the state at Mauna Kea State Park and in the adjacent state lands.

The Army's record in recent times has been excellent with regard to the care given to protecting endangered plants and animals at PTA. For example, in 1984 the Army relocated the endangered bird species, the Alala (Hawaiian crow), from PTA to Olinda, Maui. The Army took the initiative to move these birds after learning that military training noises disturbed the breeding cycles of the crow. The Army has actively worked with government agencies to establish new enclaves for the propagation of native plants. The Army has also worked hard at being good neighbors with the hunting community and the state to provide access to hunting areas. In addition, were it not for the capability of the PTA fire protection unit, the state would most likely have experienced extensive acreage losses of state forest lands.

Mr. Chairman, I submit to you that not only are these training areas in Makua and PTA essential to the military to maintain the readiness level necessary for their mission, but that the Army has and is making demonstrated effort to ensure that the concerns of the community and the state relative to the care for endangered plants and animals and the protection of the native forests and historic sites are well provided for and maintained.

STATEMENT OF THE HONOLULU COUNCIL, NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

On behalf of the 4,500 members of the Honolulu Council, Navy League of the United States, I wish to express our deep concern in regards to the possible loss of military bases and training areas in Hawaii and the resulting orderly transfer and use of those lands thereafter.

We fully understand that downsizing of the military is a reality which must be addressed. However, we also believe that base closures and budget cutting scenarios makes it imperative that a Hawaii Land Use Task Force consisting of military, government and private sector representatives must first address issues such as ownership, use, need, economic and environmental impacts before any closures, sales or transfers of Hawaii lands occurs.

Hawaii's strategic location will always be a factor in maintaining America's presence in the Pacific area. The proposed military drawdowns will only increase that importance. The decisions which must be made in regards to the military's future in Hawaii will not only affect us nationally but will also affect the State of Hawaii infrastructure and quality of life for the foreseeable future.

The resolutions on military land use in Hawaii must be right for today and even more importantly tomorrow.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD UYEHARA, PRESIDENT, HAWAII FEDERAL EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL

Dear Defense Subcommittee, my name is Richard Uyehara and I am the President of the Hawaii Federal Employees Metal Trades Council and I represent 10,000 employees at Pearl Harbor and its surrounding areas. The Metal Trades Council supports the Military in their current use of the lands in Hawaii.

The preservation of the Military Bases/Industries is crucial to the State of Hawaii in that it represents the second largest employer in this state. In preserving the Military Industry the need for certain activities exist such as an area where live fire and training can be done. The Military must be trained and ready for any unexpected event. Our peace friends speaks of the peace that exist, but we do not see this peace. The current unrest that exist at Russia and its surrounding countries sets a stage for more unrest in this world also the nuclear armaments are no longer under the control of one central government and if a civil conflict occurs then these weapons could be sold to get funds to fuel the conflict or worst it could be used. There are still conflicts in the Mid-East that have not been resolved. We do not see the peace that our peace friends see.

The Star Wars Program which would set up a defense network is important to our national defense as a primary defense against missiles. With the loss of this important strategic defense could leave the Island more vulnerable as well as the rest of the nation.

If the Military loses these lands then the other Military Supports will have very little need to stay in Hawaii and this would mean a loss of employment for thousands and a loss of revenue of millions of dollars for this state. There is also a domino effect that would happen if the Military leaves Hawaii. As an example the Kailua lost about half its business during the desert storm conflict and during the Vietnam era a similar situation occurred at Wahiawa when the Army mobilized and went to Vietnam. The Community would also suffer by the loss of millions of dollars that private contractors gets from the military contracts and also as there will be less funds in the state coffer to support our social services.

In summarizing the Military plays a vital and important role in the State of Hawaii and the Metal Trades Council supports them fully in accomplishing their task of protecting our Country.

STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN T. TOYAMA, VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL ENGINEERS, LOCAL UNION 121, AFL-CIO

My name is Benjamin T. Toyama, and I am the vice-president of the International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, Local Union 121, AFL-CIO. I speak on the behalf of the Federal employees in and around the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.

The Pearl Harbor naval complex is more than sufficient to accommodate additional naval vessels. During 1970, eighty (80) ships were homeported at Pearl Harbor. We now have less than forty (40) ships homeported in Pearl Harbor.

Supply logistic services to support the fleet is in Pearl Harbor. The Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, employs approximately 600 civilians and 30 military personnel, and covers 800 acres of land with 138 buildings providing 3.7 million square feet of warehouse space.

The Naval Supply Center controls one of the largest fuel storage and fueling operations in the Department of Defense. There are fuel storage capacity of 7.7 million barrels and 4,000 linear feet of fueling docks capable of providing services to any ship and task group in the Navy. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has the industrial capacity and capability to handle all phases of ship overhaul and repair on all types of U.S. Navy vessels in the Pacific area. It has 13,000 feet of berthing space, 18 industrial shops supporting 29 shipbuilding repair trades skills. there are four (4) drydocks, two (2) floating drydocks, two floating cranes fifteen (15) portal cranes, and numerous truck cranes. There are numerous buildings which house medical facilities; quality control laboratories; engineering, operations and planning functions; training; supply warehousing; and safety and administrative offices totalling more than three (3) million square feet of floor space.

Several new buildings have been constructed and facilities modernized to improve the overall efficiency and to accommodate the requirements of our modern Navy. Some of these are: upgraded utilities systems, new electrical/electronics shops, new piping shop, new quality assurance and asbestos control facilities. the shipyard also has many ongoing programs to upgrade or install new facilities, utilities, equipment and tools to maintain the shipyard plant in ready condition to undertake any alteration or repair on any vessel of our modern Navy.

The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard currently has a workforce of about 4,900 civilian personnel. At the peak workload during World War II, the shipyard employed more than 25,000 civilian employees. During the Korean and Vietnam conflicts the shipyard employed about 8,000 employees.

The industrial capacity of the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is not being fully utilized in accordance with its capabilities or strategic location in the Pacific ocean area. Superior facilities and skill trades are already in place. Additional homeported vessels will insure optimum utilization of existing capacity during peacetime conditions and provide for the necessary industrial surge capability needed for mobilization.

In conjunction with the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard industrial capability, four (4) private companies hold master ship repair contracts and are performing overhaul and repair support to selected navy vessels at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.

During 1992-93, the combined available workforce of the private sector industrial capability including subcontractors was in excess of 500 skilled personnel. The private sector companies have the drydock/shiplift capacity in excess of 2,800 long ton capacity and 1,200 linear feet of berthing space. These private companies are operating at about 10 percent capacity. The private sector repair capacity can be expanded to over 1000 skilled personnel if the workload is available.

Fleet training is an important aspect of our peacetime readiness posture, and it is readily available in Hawaii. Hawaii's excellent weather and sea conditions are most conducive for fleet training. Established training support activities are well organized to handle the most complex types of fleet training.

Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is a very important asset for the State of Hawaii. The Navy provides the opportunities to the citizens of Hawaii to enter into highly skilled and complex trades. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is important to our national defense, the Hawaiian economy, and world peace.

I speak in favor of the continued use of Pearl Harbor for Navy use. I speak in favor of the continued use of military lands in and around the Pearl Harbor area.

STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE M. MOORE, JR., CHAIRMAN OF TRUSTEES, HAWAII
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES METAL TRADES COUNCIL

Dear subcommittee members, I am giving written testimony in support of Military Land use. I am a serving officer of the Metal Trades Council at Pearl Harbor. I'm also a army Vietnam vet., two hitches. Among other duties in the council I serve on the Shipyard Environmental Steering Committee.

First I would like to address the Army's Makua impact range. I attended the briefing that the Army and E.P.A. held at Makua. While at first the public relations wasn't handled very well, it was easy to see that they were trying their best to alleviate the community's concerns about the burning of munitions at Makua. As you know the military has given up it's sovereignty on E.P.A. matters, and this was explained to the community but as is always the case not everybody is willing to listen. No matter what the officials said or demonstrated with charts and graphs some would not listen. I know some of them and they were not prepared to listen to anything that was said or done anyway. I have met them at the Peace Institute. At the meetings I attended the only thing they wanted was to get the military out of Hawaii. This is a very vocal minority and knows how to play the media well.

Second, as I sit on the Environmental Steering Committee I can tell you that whereas in the past the union might have to fight to get something done in regards to the health of the workers. Now they anticipate our health concerns or I am asked if there is anything that I would like to put in. It has been stated over here in Pearl that we would like to show the way for environmental cleanup, and I firmly believe that the military is not just paying lip service-. You can believe me when I tell you that I have gotten plenty of lip service in the past.

Third, I would like to tell you as a former soldier that if it wasn't for training there is a good chance I would not be here today. There are times on the battlefield when there is no time to think only time to do. If it wasn't for training our reactions would be slow or even panic, maybe resulting in death, sometimes friendly.

I'm not going to elaborate further because I know you have an awful large amount of testimony to sort through.

I thank you for this opportunity to give my testimony.

STATEMENT OF KEVIN R. LIBORIO, VICE PRESIDENT, HAWAII FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
METAL TRADES COUNCIL

Dear members of the Defense Subcommittee, I am giving written testimony in support of the Department of Defense. I represent Ten Thousand (10,000) Employees whom have a direct benefit as to Military spending in Hawaii. I am also of Hawaiian descent.

During the past years the union has become exposed to the Natsunaga Institute for Peace. We attended several meetings which consisted solely ridding the military from Hawaii. Their secondary goal is to remove tourism. The Matsunaa Institute for Peace is comprised of special interest groups. Their objective is to destroy the lively hood of all working class citizen's in Hawaii. These proponents of peace had never supported an industrialized base. Their lack of interest in the economy and job market, prior to the down sizing of the Department of Defense supports this position. The union believes their sudden interest in our well being is a facade.

My opening statements I clearly stated my Hawaiian ancestry. I would also like to take this opportunity to address this subcommittee as a private individual. My parents have waited a considerable amount of time for their Hawaiian Home-land. The distribution and utilization of these lands are currently being investigated. I, as well as my family members would much rather see the Military maintain control of these lands. The Bellows Field Air Base is a great example which shows dual usage and the protection of the native Hawaiian lands. The Department of Defense's utilization of these lands and the economic stability for the State of Hawaii must take precedence. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF JEFF ALEXANDER, EWA BEACH, HI

Senator;

I am writing in regards to the Barbers Point Naval Air Station. I feel we should keep Barbers Point active. The number of jobs lost to the community would be too many and with Kapolei being built, we don't need to turn over any more land for development as the Ewa plain is getting too crowded already.

Barbers Point was purchased by the federal government, have them give back Bellows as that is ceded Hawaiian lands. Have the government move Kaneohe Marine Corps Air Station over to Barbers Point. One third of Barbers Point is designated historic preservation and the Navy has been doing a good job of protecting it. Why not consolidate Schofield and Fort Shafter? Also turn over Wheeler to the state, there are many, many more options available to the government as to which bases to close. The Governor of Gaum doesn't want the military there, close those bases. I realize we need to downsize our military, but I don't think a very detailed study was done by the committee looking into it.

Currently, I am Chairman of the Save Ewa Beach Ohana, we are a non-profit group dedicated to making Ewa Beach better. We have several hundred members and after polling them for the last two weeks, asking if they would want Barbers Point to close or not, over 90% responded to keep it open. We have a diverse membership that includes Japanese, Filipino, Caucasian and Hawaiian and even most of the Hawaiian membership wanted to keep Barbers Point open.

I grew up in Ewa Beach and have been in construction for twenty-two years. I am appalled as to what is happening to our Ewa Plain area. All this massive construction benefits a few and the so-called affordable housing is a joke. I am all for jobs and progress, but it should be done right, such as infrastructure and preservation. Again, we don't need the developers getting their hands on Barbers Point, please do what you can to prevent its closing.

STATEMENT OF ANNE ROSE, MAKAHA, HI

Dear Senator Inouye, as you consider use of Federal lands in the state of Hawaii, I want to call your attention to the unfortunate abuse of land which is occurring on Makua Beach on the Waianae coast.

I am a nurse practitioner recently transplanted from Massachusetts. I am in family practice in the busy walk-in clinic at the Waianae Coast Comprehensive Health Center which serves the 40,000 residents of the leeward coast of Oahu. Many of my patients are homeless and living on Makua Beach; many are native Hawaiiin and were born and raised here. Given the high incidence of asthma and lung disease which already exists in this community, it is frightening to think of the tons of munitions which are detonated and burned by the Army in this beautiful valley. There is a lack of information about the exact hazards to which this community is exposed. But it doesn't take a scientist to know that when contaminants are in the air, asthma gets worse.

I appeal to your sense of fairness in developing policy which takes into consideration the health status of the surrounding community in determining appropriate use of federal land. It is not right that a community which is already suffering from poor health to endure further insult of open burning and open detonation of munitions which will only make matters worse. Malama Makua. Mahalo for your attention to this matter.

STATEMENT OF ANDERSON KAHOLOIKI KILAUANO,
POLIHALE, HI

I am an 81 year-old native Hawaiian. My parents were born and raised at Polihale and my ancestors are buried in the Polihale sand dunes. (My sister, Margaret Aipoalani and I tend to these graves yearly.)

I am not an activist; and, like my ancestors, I love the land. With the military base on Kauai, the Pacific Missile Range Facility, I have been able to fish, camp and my family has been able to enjoy the lifestyle I enjoyed growing up here. Because the military base is here, my children, and many, many native Hawaiians have kept their families together because of the higher paying jobs available at the base.

I am afraid to think what would replace the military base here on Kauai if the base were to close down. Right now, the pristine beauty is protected. The precious Nohili Dunes are intact and fishing is great.

The highly-visible STARS program has been in the limelight for sometime now. As one of the oldest living native Hawaiians in the immediate area of the base, I was surprised to see lots of people I had never seen before come forward to "protect" our aina. The controversy began with "outsiders." Some Hawaiian activists got on the band wagon and recently it turned into a sovereignty issue. It's like mixing apples and oranges.

If we (the Hawaiians) are after compensation for use of the land, then they should talk or negotiate that issue. I ask that they do not cut off their noses or spite their faces. If the base has no mission, it will close. I support the military on Kauai and have asked my family to also do so.

I have seen many things happen in my lifetime. Some changes have been good and some bring tears to my eyes. I'm tired of having others come forward as spokespersons for the Hawaiians.

This Hawaiian will speak for himself. I support the PMRF and all missions assigned to it.

005

STATEMENT OF CHARLES R. BEAMER, PH.D, EWA BEACH, HI

I oppose closing the Naval Air Station, Barbers Point for three reasons: The political unrest in Russia at the present time, the recent incident of a Russian nuclear submarine with a United States submarine and the loss of 1,100 civilian jobs

Naval Air Station, Barbers Point has been the mainstay of the anti-submarine warfare in the Pacific for many years, protecting United States ships from possible attack by Russian submarines.

The Loss of 1,100 civilian jobs would defeat the goals of promoting more jobs in the Ewa area.

I urge your committee to retain Naval Air Station Barbers Point as an active installation.

CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

Senator INOUE. I wish to thank all people of Hawaii for responding to the invitation of this committee to submit testimony. This will not be the final hearing, as I indicated. We have several other hearings relating to the use of military lands in the State of Hawaii.

I thank all the witnesses very much. The hearing is concluded.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., Friday, March 26, the hearings were concluded and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

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
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