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PAN-AMERICANISM  
ITS BEGINNINGS



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TORONTO

# PAN - AMERICANISM ITS BEGINNINGS

BY  
JOSEPH BYRNE LOCKEY

**New York**  
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1920

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MANAGEMENT AND  
ITS PRINCIPLES

BY HENRY L. MOORE

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Set up and printed. Published, April, 1920

NEW YORK  
MACMILLAN COMPANY  
1920



“ Nature in making us inhabitants of the same continent has in some sort united us in the bonds of a common patriotism.”

MAIA TO JEFFERSON.



## PREFACE

The history of Pan-Americanism falls roughly into three periods. The first, embracing the years of revolution and of the formation of new states, extends to about 1830; the second covers the succeeding three or four decades to the close of the Civil War; and the third extends from the Civil War to the present time. Of these periods the first is characterized by a strong tendency toward continental solidarity, the second by the opposite tendency toward particularism and distrust, and the third by the revival of the earlier tendency toward fraternal coöperation. The present study is devoted to the early period, the period of beginnings. It was undertaken and carried to completion as an academic task at Columbia University, under the direction and counsel of Professor John Bassett Moore, to whom the writer acknowledges a deep debt of gratitude. He is also under great obligations to Dr. Angel César Rivas, who, during the course of the preparation of the book and while it was in proof, made helpful suggestions and invaluable criticisms; to Miss S. Elizabeth Davis, who read the proof; and to Señor D. Manuel Segundo Sánchez for various favors received. Finally, he takes this method of expressing his thanks to the Hispanic Society of America for the use of its valuable collection of old newspapers, and to the New York Public Library, whose great assemblage of books and pamphlets relating to Spanish and Portuguese America, constituted the main body of his source material.

J. B. L.

George Peabody College,  
Nashville, Tennessee.  
April, 1920.



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# PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS

## CHAPTER I

### MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM

IT is obviously desirable to know what Pan-Americanism means, before an attempt is made to discover its beginnings. The term itself is new. It is one of an increasing number of similar compounds which have come to be widely used since the middle of the last century. Modern tongues are indebted to the ancient Greek for the prefix and for models of its use with national names. Pan-Hellenes, for example, signified the united Greeks; Pan-Ionian was used to describe whatever pertained to all the Ionians; and the Panathenaea was the national festival of Athens, held to celebrate the union of Attica under Theseus. Of the modern combinations Pan-Slavism and Pan-Slavist were the first to gain currency. The movement for the union of all the Slavonic peoples in one political organization originated in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and somewhat later began to be described as Panslavism. Jowett used Panslavismus in 1846;<sup>1</sup> and in 1850 Longfellow, in making an entry in his journal, defined the term as "the union of all the Slavonic tribes under one head, and that head Russia."<sup>2</sup> About 1860 the movement for the political union of all the Greeks began to be called Pan-Hellenism. Then followed Pan-Germanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Celticism, and so on, with an ever increasing number of movements designated by similar compounds.

<sup>1</sup> *Life and Letters*, I, 156.

<sup>2</sup> S. W. Longfellow, *Life of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow*, II, 176.

The term Pan-Americanism was first used in newspaper discussions relating to the International American Conference held at Washington in 1889-90. The New York *Evening Post* appears to have been the first to employ it.<sup>3</sup> To the *Post* is also to be credited the first use of the adjective, Pan-American. This term was introduced into the columns of the *Post* in 1882,<sup>4</sup> during the agitation of Mr. Blaine's first proposal for a conference of American states at Washington. But it was little used until the conference convened in 1889, when, having been adopted by other leading dailies, it soon won universal acceptance.<sup>5</sup> The substantive, Pan-Americanism, did not so quickly become current. Indeed, not until the last decade or two has it been widely employed. To-day it is encountered with ever increasing frequency. It is constantly recurring in newspapers and periodicals; and gradually it is also finding a place in works on international law and diplomacy.

The adjective, Pan-American, and the substantive, Pan-Americanism, were soon taken up and defined by the dictionaries; but the definitions are not satisfactory. The adjective is usually defined as including or pertaining to the whole of America, both North and South; which is inaccurate, as it pertains, by common usage, to the independent part of the continent only. The definitions of the substantive, though not subject to this criticism, are none the less inaccurate. Not only so, but they are widely divergent among themselves.

To become convinced of this requires but a glance at the definitions of some of the standard dictionaries. The New In-

<sup>3</sup> March 5, 1888.

<sup>4</sup> June 27. Murray erroneously attributes its first appearance to the issue of the *Evening Post* of September 27, 1889.

<sup>5</sup> The New York *Sun* used the term September 12, 1889; the London *Times*, September 30, 1889; the London *Spectator* January 29, 1890; Paul Leroy-Beaulieu in an article published in the *Journal des Débats* on October 15, 1889, discussed the conference at length, but did not describe it as Pan-American. On December 28, 1889, however, *L'Economiste Français*, a weekly of which Leroy-Beaulieu was editor, admitted the word into its columns. The term Pan-American appears to have been introduced into the other American republics from the United States.



ternational defines it as: "The principle or advocacy of a political alliance or union of all the states of America"; The New Standard, as "The advocacy of a political union of the various states of the Western Hemisphere; also the life of the American people as represented in republican forms of government and tending toward such a union"; Murray as "The idea or sentiment of a political alliance or union of all the states of North and South America"; *La Grande Encyclopédie* as a "Political doctrine tending to group all the American states in a sort of federation under the hegemony of the United States"; *Nouveau Larousse* as a "Doctrine according to which the people of European origin who have founded states in the New World aim to exclude other states from the exercise of sovereignty over them"; and finally, the second supplement of the *Diccionario Enciclopédico Hispano-Americano* as the "Aspiration or tendency of the peoples of the New World to establish among themselves ties of union; to promote good understanding and fraternal harmony between all the states of the continent; and to act always in accord with a view to preventing the dominance or the influence of European powers in American territory."

The bringing of these set definitions into juxtaposition suggests some important questions. Is Pan-Americanism an advocacy, an idea, a sentiment, an aspiration, a tendency, a principle, or a doctrine? Is it one, or all, or any number of these combined? Is it the life of the American people as represented in the republican form of government? Does it aim to federate the American republics under the hegemony of the United States? If so, exactly what is meant by hegemony? Is its only aim the exclusion of European powers from the further acquisition of territory or from the exercise of sovereignty in the New World? To raise these questions is to disclose the necessity of further inquiry.

That the formulation of a precise definition of Pan-Americanism would be attended with great difficulty is evident; and

little would be gained by attempting it. Our aim, therefore, will be rather to describe than to define. With this end in view, we shall endeavor to discover in the expressions of American statesmen and publicists the material for such a brief and exact description as will afford the reader an adequate conception of the meaning of the term. The views of James G. Blaine, the dominant figure in the Washington Conference which furnished the occasion for the adoption of the new name, may be considered first.

In an article on the foreign policy of the Garfield administration, which he published in the *Chicago Weekly Magazine* for September 16, 1882, Blaine set forth the ideas which he held at that time on the subject of the international relations of the American states. The foreign policy of the Garfield administration, he said, had two principal objects in view: "First to bring about peace and prevent future wars in North and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States by supplying those fabrics in which we are abundantly able to compete with the manufacturing nations of Europe." In order to attain the second object it was necessary, Blaine declared, to accomplish the first. "Instead of friendly intervention here and there — patching up a treaty between two countries to-day, securing a truce between two others to-morrow — it was apparent . . . that a more comprehensive plan should be adopted, if wars were to cease in the Western Hemisphere." In short, Pan-Americanism, as Blaine conceived it in 1882, was expressed in two words, peace and commerce, attained by means of the friendly counsel and coöperation of all the American states and redounding equally to the benefit of all.

Seven years later, in his address of welcome to the delegates to the International American Conference, he set forth his views with greater fullness. He said:

"The delegates I am addressing can do much to establish

permanent relations of confidence, respect, and friendship between the nations which they represent. They can show to the world an honorable, peaceful conference of eighteen independent American powers, in which all shall meet together on terms of absolute equality; a conference in which there can be no attempt to coerce a single delegate against his own conception of the interests of his nation; a conference which will permit no secret understanding on any subject, but will frankly publish to the world all its conclusions; a conference which will tolerate no spirit of conquest but will aim to cultivate an American sympathy as broad as both continents, a conference which will form no selfish alliance against the older nations from which we are proud to claim inheritance — a conference, in fine, which will seek nothing, propose nothing, endure nothing that is not, in the general sense of the delegates, timely and wise and peaceful.

“ And yet we cannot be expected to forget that our common fate has made us inhabitants of the two continents which, at the close of four centuries, are still regarded beyond the seas as the New World. Like situations beget like sympathies and impose like duties. We meet in firm belief that the nations of America ought to be and can be more helpful, each to the other, than they now are, and that each will find advantage and profit from an enlarged intercourse with the others.

“ We believe that we should be drawn together more closely by the highways of the sea, and that at no distant day the railway systems of the North and South will meet upon the Isthmus and connect by land routes the political and commercial capitals of all America.

“ We believe that hearty coöperation, based on hearty confidence, will save all American states from the burdens and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted the older nations of the world.

“ We believe that a spirit of justice, of common and equal interest between the American states, will leave no room for an

artificial balance of power like unto that which has led to wars abroad and drenched Europe in blood.

“ We believe that friendship, avowed with candor and maintained with good faith, will remove from American states the necessity of guarding boundary lines between themselves with fortifications and military force.

“ We believe that standing armies, beyond those which are needful for public order and the safety of internal administration, should be unknown on both American continents.

“ We believe that friendship and not force, the spirit of just law and not violence of the mob, should be the recognized rule of administration between American nations and in American nations.”<sup>6</sup>

Permanent relations of confidence, respect, and friendship; equality; no coercion; no secret understandings; no conquest; no selfish alliance against the older nations from which we are sprung; no balance of power; no threatening armies; mutual helpfulness; commerce; the spirit of just law as the rule of administration between American nations and in American nations — this was Blaine’s later conception of the guiding principles of Pan-Americanism. And with this conception the statesmen and publicists of all the American republics have been subsequently in substantial agreement.

President Roosevelt, in his instructions to the United States delegates to the second International American Conference, which met at Mexico City in October, 1901, declared among other things, that “ The chief interest of the United States in relation to the other republics upon the American continent is the safety and permanence of the political system which underlies their and our existence as nations — the system of self-government by the people. It is, therefore, to be desired that all the American republics should enjoy in full measure the blessings of perfect freedom under just laws, each sovereign

<sup>6</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), I, 40-42.

community pursuing its own course of orderly development without external restraint or interference.

“Nothing,” he added, “is of greater importance from a political point of view than that the United States should be understood to be the friend of all the Latin-American republics and the enemy of none. To this end it will be prudent to propose nothing radical, to favor a free expression of views among the delegates of the other powers, and to favor and support only such measures as have the weight of general acceptance and clearly tend to promote the common good.”<sup>7</sup>

When the third International Conference met at Rio de Janeiro in 1906, Roosevelt still being President, the United States delegates were provided with a copy of the instructions of 1901, by which they were to be guided, as a review of those instructions indicated no occasion for changing them except in some minor details. The delegates, however, were reminded by Mr. Root, who was then Secretary of State, that “The true function of such a conference is to deal with matters of common interest which are not really subjects of controversy, but upon which comparison of views and friendly discussions may smooth away differences of detail, develop substantial agreement, and lead to coöperation along common lines for the attainment of objects which all really desire.” And he added that the least of the benefits anticipated from the conference would be “the establishment of agreeable personal relations, the removal of misconceptions and prejudices, and the habit of temperate and kindly discussion among the representatives of so many republics.”<sup>8</sup>

It was during the summer of 1906 that Mr. Root made his celebrated visit to South America. Though not a delegate to the conference at Rio, he was present for a few days during its progress. On July 31 he made a speech at an extraordinary

<sup>7</sup> *Int. Am. Conf.* (1902), report of the U. S. delegates, 31, 32.

<sup>8</sup> *Int. Am. Conf.* (1906), report of the U. S. delegates, 39, 40.

session of the conference, in which he made the following declaration which has often been quoted:

“We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic. We wish to increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together.”<sup>9</sup>

In his message of December 7, 1915, President Wilson, declaring that we had been put to the test in the case of Mexico, and that we had stood the test, characterized Pan-Americanism as follows:

“The moral is, that the states of America are not hostile rivals but coöperating friends, and that their growing sense of community of interest, alike in matters political and in matters economic, is likely to give them a new significance as factors in international affairs and in the political history of the world. It presents them as in a very deep and true sense a unit in world affairs, spiritual partners, standing together because thinking together, quick with common sympathies and common ideals. Separated, they are subject to all the cross-currents of the confused politics of a world of hostile rivalries; united in spirit and purpose, they cannot be disappointed of their peaceful destiny. This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the spirit of empire in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual em-

<sup>9</sup> Root, *Latin America and the United States*, Addresses, 10.

bodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty and mutual service.”<sup>10</sup>

Before the second Pan-American Scientific Congress, which met at Washington in the latter part of 1915, Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State, made an address in which he expressed at some length his views on the subject of Pan-Americanism. According to him, “there has grown up a feeling that the republics of this hemisphere constitute a group separate and apart from the other nations of the world.” . . . This feeling, he said, we term “the Pan-American spirit,” and from it springs the “international policy of Pan-Americanism.” Continuing, he declared: “If I have correctly interpreted Pan-Americanism from the standpoint of the relations of our governments with those beyond the seas, it is in entire harmony with the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy of the United States; Pan-Americanism is an international policy of the Americas. The motives are to an extent different; the ends sought are the same. Both can exist and, I trust, will ever exist in all their vigor. . . . Pan-Americanism is an expression of the idea of internationalism. America has become the guardian of that idea, which will in the end rule the world. Pan-Americanism is the most advanced as well as the most practical form of that idea. It has been made possible because of our geographical isolation, of our similar political institutions, and of our common conception of human rights.”<sup>11</sup>

In a speech delivered before the Pan-American Financial Conference, which also met at Washington in 1915, Mr. John Bassett Moore declared that the idea of America’s being not simply a geographical term, but a term representing a community of interests, has existed so long that there is a fair presumption that it is not a term that misleads us, but a term that is thoroughly and persistently leading us in the right direction. Continuing, he said: “The word ‘America,’ be-

<sup>10</sup> Scott, *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, 129.

<sup>11</sup> *World Peace Foundation*, Pamphlet Series, VI, 99-101.

ginning with the early part of the last century, during the struggles of our neighbors for independence, represented the idea of a community of political interests, in which, as Henry Clay said, we should be regarded as standing together for the establishment of a human freedom league; and this idea has gradually advanced until to-day we are undertaking to establish a community of interests with regard to all our activities. . . . Identity of political interests we have had for many years. We now proceed to make the circuit complete by establishing the identity of our material interests on the broad basis of justice, contentment, and good-fellowship.”<sup>12</sup>

In the introduction to his “Principles of American Diplomacy,” Mr. Moore makes the following important statement:

“The idea of Pan-Americanism is obviously derived from the conception that there is such a thing as an American system; that this system is based upon distinctive interests which the American countries have in common; and that it is independent of and different from the European system. To the extent to which Europe should become implicated in American politics, or to which American countries should become implicated in European politics, this distinction would necessarily be broken down, and the foundations of the American system would be impaired; and to the extent to which the foundations of the American system were impaired, Pan-Americanism would lose its vitality and the Monroe Doctrine its accustomed and tangible meaning.”<sup>13</sup>

The views of representative men of the other republics of the continent must now be considered; for Pan-Americanism is not what only one of the American family of nations may conceive it to be. It is what the common opinion and the common action of all the states concerned make it.

The government of Peru, in replying to the invitation of the United States to take part in the first International American

<sup>12</sup> Proceedings of the First Pan-American Financial Congress, 481.

<sup>13</sup> Moore, John Bassett, *Principles of American Diplomacy*, X.



Conference at Washington, declared that the idea of increasing and strengthening the bonds which connect the American nations with each other, and in this way improving for the common good the opportunities afforded by their geographical position, and affording the union which nature itself created when it filled this continent with a galaxy of free, independent, vigorous, and youthful nations, was necessarily hailed by the government of Peru with feelings of sympathy and good will.<sup>14</sup> In the addresses made by the Hispanic-American delegates in the conference there also occur many expressions of a similar nature. It was not until some time later, however, that anything approximating a definition of Pan-Americanism was set forth by leading men of the Latin republics.

In a report which the Argentine delegation made to the second International American Conference, it was declared:

“In order that Pan-Americanism be not . . . a mere thesis under discussion, and that the recommendations and the professions of principles may not remain idle words, it is necessary to descend from abstract heights, to conform ourself to the spirit of modern times, and to map out the great lines of a positive policy, inspired in justice, in equality, in territorial integrity, and in commercial relations, founded upon a competition open to all.”<sup>15</sup>

A few months before the meeting of the third International American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, in 1906, a special session of the American Academy of Political and Social Science was held at Philadelphia in honor of Señor don Joaquín D. Casasús, Mexican ambassador at Washington. The subject for discussion was the Pan-American conferences and their significance. Speaking of the tendency of nations, as time elapses, to meet more frequently in conferences and congresses for the purpose of avoiding conflicts, dissipating prejudices, reëstablishing

<sup>14</sup> *Int. Am. Conf.* (1889-90), I, 22.

<sup>15</sup> *Informe que la Delegación Argentina Presenta a la Segunda Conferencia Pan-Americana*, 3.

peace, and for other similar purposes, Señor Casasús declared that the labors of the Pan-American Conferences were for concord and peace; that they did not seek, like the Congress of Laibach or that of Vienna, to restore a form of government and authorize a nation to reconquer her colonies; that they were not inspired, as was the Congress of Panama, with the necessity of uniting the persecuted to resist the attacks of a common aggressor; but that they sought rather the union of all in common effort, and the establishment of a basis of peace by means of the amicable solution of international conflicts.<sup>16</sup>

In an address which he made upon his election as permanent president of the third International American Conference, Senhor Nabuco, for many years Brazilian ambassador to the United States, declared that the aim of the conferences was intended to be the creation of an American opinion and of an American public spirit. He believed that they should never aim at forcing the opinion of a single one of the nations taking part in them; that in no case should they intervene collectively in the affairs or interests that the various nations might wish to reserve for their own exclusive deliberation. "To us," he said, "it seems that the great object of these conferences should be to express collectively what is already understood to be unanimous, to unite, in the interval, between one and another what may already have completely ripened in the opinion of the continent, and to impart to it the power resulting from an accord amongst all American nations."<sup>17</sup>

Two years later Senhor Nabuco declared on the occasion of the laying of the corner stone of the building of the Pan-American Union at Washington, that there had never been a parallel for the sight which that ceremony presented—"that of twenty-one nations, of different languages, building together a house for their common deliberations." Continuing, he said:

<sup>16</sup> "Proceedings of Special Session of the Am. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, February 24, 1906, 7.

<sup>17</sup> *Int. Am. Conf.* (1906), report of the delegates of the U. S., 57.

“The more impressive is the scene as these countries, with all possible differences between them in size and population, have established their union on the basis of the most absolute equality. Here the vote of the smallest balances the vote of the greatest. So many sovereign states would not have been drawn so spontaneously and so strongly together, as if by irresistible force, if there did not exist throughout them, at the bottom or at the top of each national conscience, the feeling of a destiny common to all America.”<sup>18</sup>

At the opening session of the third International American Conference, the Brazilian statesman, Baron de Rio Branco, in adverting to the fact that the meeting of the conference might, perhaps, give rise to the suspicion that an international league against interests not represented was being formed, declared: “It is necessary therefore to affirm that, formally or implicitly, all interests will be respected by us; that in the discussions of political and commercial subjects submitted for consideration to the conference it is not our intention to work against anybody, and that our sole aim is to bring about a closer union among American nations, to provide for their well-being and rapid progress; and the accomplishment of these objects can only be of advantage to Europe and the rest of the world.”<sup>19</sup>

At the special session of the third International American Conference held in honor of Mr. Root, to which reference has been made above, Señor Cornejo, a delegate for Peru, made in the course of a short address the following remarks:

“These congresses, gentlemen, are the symbol of that solidarity which, notwithstanding the ephemeral passions of men, constitutes, by the invincible force of circumstances, the essence of our continental system. They were conceived by the organizing genius of the statesmen of Washington in order that the American sentiment of patriotism might be therein exalted,

<sup>18</sup> *Pan-American Union Bulletin*, May, 1908.

<sup>19</sup> *Int. Am. Con.* (1906), report of the delegates of the U. S., 56.

freeing it from that national egotism which may be justified in the difficult moments of the formation of states, but which would be to-day an impediment to the development of the American idea, destined to demonstrate that just as the democratic principle has been to combine liberty and order in the constitution of states, it will likewise combine the self-government of the nations and fraternity in the relations of the peoples." <sup>20</sup>

On the occasion of Mr. Root's visit to Uruguay, the president, Señor Battle y Ordóñez, said in the course of an address that America will be the continent of a just peace, founded on the respect for the rights of all nations, a respect as great for the weakest nations as for the most vast and most powerful empires. A Pan-American public opinion would be created and made effective, he thought, by systematizing international conduct with a view to suppressing injustice, and to establishing amongst the nations ever more and more profoundly cordial relations. Continuing, he declared that the Pan-American conferences were destined to become a modern Amphictyon to whose decisions all the great American questions would be submitted.

Dr. Luis M. Drago, the well-known Argentine publicist, author of the Drago doctrine, speaking on the occasion of Mr. Root's visit to Buenos Aires, said:

"Enlightened patriotism has understood at last that in this continent, with its immense riches and vast, unexplored extensions, power and wealth are not to be looked for in conquest and displacement, but in collaboration and solidarity, which will people the wilderness and give the soil to the plow. It has understood, however, that America, by reason of the nationalities of which it is composed, of the nature of the representative institutions which they have adopted, by the very character of their peoples, separated as they have been from the conflicts and complications of European governments, and even by the gravitation of peculiar circumstances and wants,

<sup>20</sup> Root, *Latin America and the U. S.*, Addresses, 12.

has been constituted a separate political factor, a new and vast theater for the development of the human race, which will serve as a counterpoise to the great civilizations of the other hemisphere, and so maintain the equilibrium of the world.”<sup>21</sup>

In 1910, at the opening session of the fourth International American Conference, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. V. de la Plaza, said:

“It had come to be the inveterate custom of the powers to deliberate among themselves on the destinies of incipient and weak nations, as if dealing with states or sovereignties possessing neither voice nor weight in the control and development of the rules, principles, and declarations inherent in human societies, recognized as independent and sovereign in their international relations. This condition of precarious autonomy and liberty of action, and the constant danger of being subjugated or of suffering the mutilation of their territory, would have continued among these weak states but for the wise and famous declaration of President Monroe, to which we ought to render due homage; and but for the constant action of other continental powers of somewhat greater strength in the defense of their territory and sovereignties as well as their declared intention to coöperate for the protection of those states which were endowed with less strength and fewer means of self-defense.”<sup>22</sup>

The foregoing statements made by responsible men in public life in the Hispanic American republics may be fairly considered as representative of the best thought in that section of the continent. It is not to be inferred, however, that unanimity of opinion exists. On the contrary there is much diversity and not a few writers of more or less note, and occasionally men in public life advocate a closer union of the Hispanic states for the purpose of resisting the threatening (as they believe) encroachments of the United States. These views

<sup>21</sup> Root, *Latin America and the U. S.*, Addresses, 95.

<sup>22</sup> *Int. Am. Conf.* (1910), report of the delegates of the U. S., 46.

need not be discussed at length. A bare reference to two or three of the best-known writers of this group will suffice. *A Ilusão Americana* by a Brazilian, Eduardo Prado, is typical. Appearing some three decades ago, soon after the establishment of the Brazilian republic, this book expressed great skepticism respecting the fraternity of the American nations in general, and manifested particularly a hostile spirit toward the tendency of the Hispanic republics to establish more intimate relations with the United States. More recently an Argentine writer, Manuel Ugarte, has gained an extensive notoriety by his propaganda against Pan-Americanism. His ideas are set forth in a book which he published in 1911 under the title of *El Porvenir de la América Latina*. Finally, an article by Jacinto López on what he calls *Monroismo y Pan-Americanismo*, appearing in *Cuba Contemporánea* for April, 1916, may be taken as representative of the more serious adverse criticisms which have in recent years been made in Hispanic American periodicals. Monroeism, according to this writer, means empire, and Pan-Americanism is the mask of imperialism. The significance of Monroeism, he thinks, is clear; but Pan-Americanism is ambiguous, incomprehensible, susceptible of all sorts of interpretations. The remedy for the situation, in López's opinion, is to be found in the union of Hispanic American states as a counterpoise to the preponderant influence of the United States.

On the other hand such opinions are offset by those of other Hispanic American writers and publicists who in a private capacity maintain and justify the existence of Pan-Americanism. Alejandro Alvarez, a Chilean publicist, viewing the subject from the historical standpoint, is of the opinion that the notion of international solidarity is essentially American and that it manifested itself in most brilliant fashion in the struggle of the Spanish colonies for independence. This sense of unity which existed between the belligerent Spanish colonies was, he believes, different in its origin and in its manifestations from the sentiment of international fraternity about which certain of the

eighteenth-century philosophers had written. The sentiment, however, according to Alvarez, did not develop between the new Spanish American nations and Brazil, because there was no common action in the struggle for independence. When Brazil became an empire in 1822, it was still regarded as semi-European.

Between the new Spanish American powers and the United States, on the other hand, there existed a solidarity, different, it is true, from the other, but no less effective. That solidarity, though it did not yet embrace Brazil, was, according to Alvarez, Pan-American. It had its basis in the fact that the struggling colonies were in the same continent with the United States; that the United States had a few years before conducted a similar struggle to achieve its freedom; that it furnished a model for the political institutions of the new states; and that it could establish economic relations with the new nations with greater facility than with the countries of Europe.<sup>23</sup>

What Alvarez calls Latin American solidarity — that is the unity of the Spanish-speaking states with Brazil — did not develop, according to his view, until about the middle of the nineteenth century. It was then brought about by the identity of political and international problems with which the Latin states were all alike confronted. Thus, according to this writer, there are three phases of American solidarity — Spanish American, Pan-American, and Latin American, which developed in the order named.<sup>24</sup> Some further views of Señor Alvarez will be noted below.

In *Cuba Contemporánea* for October, 1916, there was published a lengthy article on Pan-Americanism by the well-known Peruvian writer, Francisco García Calderón. The following extracts will give a fair idea of his conception of Pan-Americanism:

<sup>23</sup> *La Diplomacia de Chile*, 65.

<sup>24</sup> Alvarez, *Droit International Américain*, 245.

“The likeness of peoples whom a doctrine and a policy strive to unite is not always complete. They may differ in religion as is the case with the diverse dominions of the Slavs, or the different provinces of German speech. The systems of government of the Spaniards of the Old and of the New World are diverse as also is the case with Saxons of the Monarchical Island and the Republican Continent. Among the immense number of Slavs the creed, the language, the customs, and political order vary; and yet they are moved by a common spirit. In America, unity is geographical and moral. Republicanism, liberalism, democracy, tolerance, constitute from north to south aspects of a common social gospel. Germanized Saxons and Latinized Spaniards succeed in defining similar aspirations and aversions. Though the North American is Protestant and the Ibero-American is Catholic; though they speak different languages and respond to a different logic, yet they derive from like lands, from a uniform system of government, from a growth free from secular traditions, from the absence of rigid castes, from a community of generous principles, such as arbitration and the love of peace, and from general enterprises of utility, an active Pan-Americanism, theory and militant reality, practical crusade and romantic apostleship.

“It is not, as in the book of Mr. Stead,<sup>25</sup> a plan for the Americanization of the southern continent, a mask for pacific penetration. Whoever defines this international system fixes its characteristics in free competition, and in organization based upon harmonious wills, and closer relations of peoples who neither obey the command of a despotic overlord, nor renounce, upon associating, a strong spirit of nationalism. Although in the history of the last century violence frequently prevailed over union and the expansion of the strongest was transformed into conquest, yet upon the development of a Pan-American ambition the United States announces that the era of unjust policy is at an end and that in the new moral federation con-

<sup>25</sup> W. T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World*.



sent is an essential virtue. . . . In ideal Pan-Americanism, free from ancient appetites, fraternal republics construct an economic and moral association, formulate aspirations for liberty and for peace which will affect continents grown old in wars of spoliation and slavery.”

The views of a sufficient number of representative men of both North and South America have now been set forth to show whether or not there is a consensus of opinion as to the general characteristics of Pan-Americanism. Before any attempt is made, however, to deduce from these particulars and from the pertinent facts of international American relations a concise description of Pan-Americanism, it is indispensable to inquire into a point about which there is some difference of opinion; namely, the doctrine of equality as applied to certain of the republics of this hemisphere. In this question is involved the position of the United States in the American family of nations.

The equality of nations as a principle of international law is not universally accepted. Lorimer, for example, says: “Men are not and never will be, equal: their equalization is not within the reach of human will; and as the inequalities of classes and the inequalities of states are the direct and necessary results of the inequalities of individuals, they are equally certain and equally permanent. However fondly the dream of equality may be cherished by the envious or the vain, whether it be manifested as an individual or a natural aspiration, it is a chimera as unrealizable as the union of the head of a woman and the tail of a fish.” But he goes on to say that “To the same category of absolute impossibilities belong all schemes which, in this changing world, assume as existing, or seek to establish, permanent relations of superiority or inferiority, whether between individuals, or classes, or states, in place of accepting as their basis the facts presented by the contemporary history of mankind.”<sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Institutes of the Law of Nations*, II, 193.

The weight of opinion, however, from Grotius to the present time supports the doctrine of equality. Phillipson, in a recent edition of Wheaton, says that sovereign states possessing legal personality as members of the society of nations enjoy equality before international law; but that from the political point of view it cannot be said that all the states of the world are equal. "In Europe the concert of the six great powers, and on the American continent the United States," he says, "exercise a leadership which, in each case, is real and possesses the greatest weight, though it is not determined by definite rules."<sup>27</sup>

Westlake, one of the profoundest of recent writers on international law, says on the subject of the political inequality of states in Europe that "when a matter arises, and the states which are agreed as to the mode of dealing with it carry their plan into effect as far as it is possible to do so by their own action, without directly compelling a state which does not agree with them to join in their action and without directly affecting that state, they do not violate its independence. But their action may indirectly compel that state to join in it, or to endure without opposition a conduct which it deems to affect it injuriously though indirectly, or of which it disapproves in the general interest of the European system. In that case a political victory has been gained over the state in question. And a state may be so weak that it is not much or at all consulted by the other powers, and that little attention is paid to its opinion, if given. In that case it is in a position of political inferiority, and many states of the European system are permanently in such a situation toward what are called the great powers, yet their equality is not necessarily infringed thereby."<sup>28</sup>

Declaring that at no time in no quarter of the globe can small states ever have been admitted by large ones to political equality with themselves, Westlake reviews the control of Euro-

<sup>27</sup> *Wheaton's Elements of International Law*, 261.

<sup>28</sup> *Collected Papers*, 92.

pean affairs during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by the great powers, and reaches the conclusion that a certain sort of political inequality is compatible in the European system with legal equality. This fact he thinks is not one to be condemned; for it may prove to be a step toward the establishment of a European government, and in no society, he holds, can peace and order be permanently enjoyed without a government.

If, then, such political inequality as has long subsisted in Europe is not incompatible with legal equality — equality before international law — it follows that in the American family of nations political inequality, if it exists, is not incompatible with legal equality. It will be remarked that Westlake makes no specific reference to the American situation. Lawrence points out the disparity in strength and influence between the United States and any other power in the Western Hemisphere, and he accords to this republic because of its preponderant strength and influence a position in America similar to that occupied in Europe by the great powers. But he is careful to point out differences, the most important of which is that the United States is not called upon in the exercise of its primacy to dictate territorial arrangements with a view to maintaining a shifting balance of power.<sup>29</sup> This difference is so fundamental and the preponderant influence of the United States is exercised in a manner so different from the way in which the European concert is made effective, that the comparison between the two systems is hardly valid. The marks of contrast are rather more striking.

In 1895 there occurred an incident which led not a few observers to believe that the United States contemplated the assertion of its preponderant influence to such an extent as to reduce the less powerful American states to a species of vassalage. Reference is made to the intervention of the Cleveland administration in the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. It was on this occasion that Secre-

<sup>29</sup> *Principles of International Law*, 242.

tary of State Olney declared in his instructions of July 20, 1895, to Mr. Bayard, the American ambassador at London, that "To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon subjects to which it confines its interposition";<sup>30</sup> and that President Cleveland in his message to Congress on December 17, 1895, affirmed that, "If the balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among the governments of the Old World and a subject for our absolute noninterference, none the less is an observance of the Monroe Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their government."<sup>31</sup>

The statement of Secretary Olney, standing alone, is perhaps susceptible of such an interpretation as was, for example, given to it by *The Nation* to the effect that it was "the first assertion of sovereignty over the whole Western Hemisphere since the Pope's Bull, and, of course, makes us responsible for all wrong-doing from Canada to Cape Horn."<sup>32</sup> And the words of President Cleveland, quoted above, give color to the assumption that it was desired to have the United States occupy a position in the Western Hemisphere similar to that occupied by the great powers in Europe. Such criticisms were not confined to the United States. In discussing a resolution defining the Monroe Doctrine which had been introduced into the United States Congress as a result of the Anglo-Venezuelan boundary agitation, the London *Times*, in its issue of January 22, 1896, says that it was understood that some of the South American republics had expressed themselves decidedly against the proposed definition, which they considered would impair their independence and reduce them to a condition of vassalage to the United States. The Paris *Temps* strongly expressed a similar opinion in the interests of the minor American communities, while entering at the same time an emphatic protest

<sup>30</sup> *Foreign Rel. of the U. S.*, 1895, 558.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.*, 543.

<sup>32</sup> LXI, 459.

in the name of Europe against what it called "the moral annexation, pure and simple, of the two continents of the Western Hemisphere."<sup>33</sup>

If these critics had paid heed to Secretary Olney's instructions as a whole, their criticisms, no doubt, would have been less severe. After making the declaration that to-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, Mr. Olney goes on to explain what he means. "It is not," he said, "because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers. All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperiled if the principle be admitted that European powers may convert American states into colonies or provinces of their own."<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, Mr. Olney expressly disclaimed any intention on the part of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of the other American republics. The Monroe Doctrine, he said, "Does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over the other American states. . . . The rule in question has but a single purpose and object. It is that no European power or combination of powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies."<sup>35</sup>

Subsequently the relations of the United States with Cuba and certain other republics in the region of the Caribbean have led to renewed discussion. According to Phillipson,<sup>36</sup> Cuba, since the treaty of June 12, 1901, by which the island was

<sup>33</sup> Cf. also Des Jardins in *Revue General de Droit Int. Public*, III, 159.

<sup>34</sup> *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1895, 558.

<sup>35</sup> *For. Rel. of the U. S.*, 1895, 554.

<sup>36</sup> *Wheaton's Elements of Int. Law*, 63.

made over to the Cuban people, has occupied, with respect to the United States, a position which "seems" to bring it within the category of international protectorates. Though it manages its own internal and external affairs, it is precluded from entering into any treaty with a foreign power which might endanger its independence; and it undertakes to contract no debt for which the current revenue will not suffice, and to concede to the United States the right of intervention to preserve Cuban independence, to maintain a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and the right to use its harbors as naval stations.

Phillipson, however, calls attention to the fact that as conditions are at present, there does not appear to be unanimity of opinion as to the precise international status of the republic. Benton, for example, in his *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War*, holds that it is a fully sovereign state, and Whitcomb, in *La Situación Internacional de Cuba*, maintains that it is a semi-sovereign state. But even admitting that the weak constitutional tie by which Cuba is bound to the United States has the effect of reducing it to the status of semi-sovereignty, yet since other states accept it as being sovereign and independent, its equality remains unimpaired; that is, the identity of rights and obligations for all is admitted; which is merely to say that the international law which they recognize is a body of general rules and not of particular solutions.<sup>87</sup>

In his fifth annual message, communicated to Congress December 5, 1905, President Roosevelt discussed the relations of the United States with the Dominican Republic, which may be taken as a case typical of these weaker republics. For a number of years conditions in that republic had been growing from bad to worse, until finally, according to Roosevelt, society was on the verge of dissolution. Fortunately, however, a ruler sprang up who, with his colleagues, saw the dangers threatening

<sup>87</sup> Westlake, *Collected Papers*, 89.

their country and appealed to the friendship of the United States. There was imminent danger of foreign intervention. The previous rulers of Santo Domingo had recklessly incurred debts; and, owing to internal disorders, the republic had been unable to provide means to meet its obligations. Roosevelt had accordingly negotiated a treaty under which the United States undertook to help the Dominican people rehabilitate their finance by taking charge of and administering their custom-houses. The treaty at the time this message was sent to Congress was pending before the Senate. An intervention such as the President had been foreshadowing in his previous messages had at last taken place. And in his message of December 5, giving an account of it to the Congress, he said:

“We must recognize the fact that in South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us. There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order, and prosperity that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this doctrine. These republics we now meet not only on a basis of entire equality, but in a spirit of frank and respectful friendship, which we hope is mutual. . . . Under the proposed treaty the independence of the island is scrupulously respected, the danger of the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the intervention of foreign powers vanishes, and the interference of our government is minimized, so that we shall only act in conjunction with the Santo Domingo authorities to secure the proper administration of the customs, and therefore to secure the payment of just debts and to secure the Dominican Government from demands for unjust debts.”<sup>38</sup> This treaty failed of ratification; but a new one was concluded and ratified in 1907.

<sup>38</sup> *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, IV, 607.

In the addresses which he delivered on his South American trip in 1913, Mr. Roosevelt made statements which clearly indicate a classification of the American states in two categories: those enjoying political equality with the United States and those politically inferior. He nowhere says or implies, of course, that all American states do not enjoy legal equality. This difference must be kept in mind in interpreting his remarks. In an address delivered at Rio de Janeiro, he said, in speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, that "all of the American nations which are sufficiently advanced, such as Brazil and the United States, should participate on an absolute equality in the responsibility and development of this doctrine, as far as the interests of the Western Hemisphere as a whole are concerned."<sup>39</sup>

At Buenos Aires he declared that certain of the Hispanic American nations had grown with astonishing speed to a position of assured and orderly political development, material prosperity, readiness to do justice to others, and potential strength to enforce justice from others. "Every such nation," he continued, "when once it has achieved such a position, should become itself a sponsor and guarantor of the doctrine; and its relations with the other sponsors and guarantors should be those of equality."<sup>40</sup> In Chile, Roosevelt declared that relations between certain Hispanic American countries, among which he included Chile, were based on exact equality of right and mutuality of respect.<sup>41</sup>

Representative of the best Hispanic American opinion on this subject are the views of Dr. Emilio Frers, who, on the occasion of Mr. Roosevelt's visit to Buenos Aires in 1913, admitted the political inequality of certain American states without conceding the right of the United States to intervene in the

<sup>39</sup> *The Outlook*, CV, 474.

<sup>40</sup> Frers, *American Ideals*, 23.

<sup>41</sup> *Souvenir of the Visit of Colonel Roosevelt to Chile*, 47.



affairs of those states either for their own good or in the interests of the American republics in general. He said:

“The nations of Latin America will not feel at their ease so long as they do not rest in the security that no master may arise for them either from within or from without, and that no one, no matter where he may come from, may place in danger their integrity or their independence and sovereignty. The sentiment of nationality and of independence is so deeply rooted and is so exalted among these nations, that it perhaps constitutes the dominant feature of their patriotism. . . . Fortunately there are now many states in South America which have well implanted institutions and which have fully entered upon an orderly and constitutional life. The Argentine republic, among them, may rest in the confidence of its own advances. . . . But her origin and her history inevitably bind her to the other Spanish American nations, and if, perchance, her people feel inclined to recognize the necessity of imposing peace and civilization on those who are fulfilling a less happy destiny than hers, I do not think it would sympathize with the idea of acknowledging the right of rich and powerful nations to rise up in self-constituted authority and judgment over the weaker and more disorderly nations, or to impose penalties upon them, even though it be for their offenses against civilization.”

Dr. Frers foreshadowed a possible solution of the difficulty in the following words: “Perhaps it may not be difficult to find the solution which is inevitably produced whenever turbulent or disorderly states commit offenses against civilization and expose the prestige of the entire continent. Perhaps in a more or less distant future some high authority may be constituted which shall have jurisdiction in these questions of offenses against civilization, which may settle such questions with absolute impartiality, and which may acquire confidence and establish peace. The undeniable fact is that some means must be sought for to resolve these conflicts between the right

to independence and autonomy and the supreme right of American civilization which must be defended as the common heritage of the New World." <sup>42</sup>

With a brief reference to the views of Dr. Alejandro Alvarez, the eminent Chilean authority, this discussion must be brought to a close. According to Dr. Alvarez <sup>43</sup> the first part of the Monroe message of 1823 contained an implicit recognition of the political equality of all the states of the New World and consequently the negation of the right of one state to intervene in the affairs of the others. But this idea, Alvarez affirms, has not been adhered to by the United States, especially since the development of its hegemony, which he defines as the exercise by the United States of preponderance when its interests are involved.

Calling attention to the fact that the policy of hegemony applies almost exclusively to the countries in the neighborhood of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, Alvarez declares that the policy is the inevitable fruit of the prodigious and rapid development of the United States and of its great territorial, economic and maritime superiority, compared with the other American republics. What has contributed to its success is the fact that it is always presented as the logical consequence of the Monroe Doctrine, and the powerful states, far from opposing it, have always respected it. It is interesting to note, says Alvarez, that in certain cases where the Monroe Doctrine might have been applied it was not invoked, and that frequently it is invoked as an act of hegemony, in order to make it appear as being founded in a traditional policy, generally accepted. It is for this reason that publicists seldom distinguish between the one policy and the other; that is, between the Monroe Doctrine and hegemony.

Alvarez maintains that the hegemony of the United States takes two distinct forms, corresponding to different situations.

<sup>42</sup> *American Ideals*, 15.

<sup>43</sup> *Droit Int. Am.*, 136.

The first he calls a policy of the maintenance, application, and development of the Monroe Doctrine. In this form of the policy the United States voices the needs and aspirations of the whole of America. Under the second form the policy becomes personal; that is, it becomes a policy (1) aimed at assuring the preponderance of the United States in the New World, and (2) a policy of intervention in the affairs of certain Latin American states. Recognizing the benefits which the American republics have derived from the hegemony of the United States as well as from the Monroe Doctrine, Alvarez raises the question whether it might not be better for both policies to be maintained by the active coöperation of all the American states. He thinks he is able to note in recent events a tendency in this direction.

It may be said in passing that the supremacy which the United States enjoys in the Western Hemisphere by virtue of its preponderant strength and influence and which it maintains under the Monroe Doctrine, cannot be in any historical sense of the word properly denominated hegemony. The hegemony of Athens was imperialistic. Athens stood in the relation of sovereign to certain members of the Delian League. The league was not one of equal states. And if in the Peloponnesian confederation the states were equal, the hegemony of Sparta was military in its nature. Its leadership was exercised for the purpose of waging war more effectively upon other states. And finally the supremacy of Prussia in the German Confederation, to which the term has often been applied, was wholly different from the position of the United States in the American family of nations. Though admitting that the United States is preponderant, it is undoubtedly misleading to call its preponderance hegemony. It is better, therefore, to avoid the term unless a definite meaning such as that given to it by Alvarez in his *Droit International Americain* be agreed upon. And even then its two aspects, as defined by him, are likely to lead to confusion.

The attempt must now be made to deduce from this lengthy

discussion a description of Pan-Americanism as exact and as concise as the nature of the conception will permit. It has already been found that the lexicographers do not agree among themselves as to the precise meaning of the term. Indeed it may well be doubted whether an adequate definition *per genus et differentia* is possible. As *genus* none of the terms employed — principle, advocacy, idea, sentiment, aspiration, tendency, doctrine — satisfies the logical and inquiring mind as to what the real nature of Pan-Americanism is. And even though the *genus* were agreed upon the *differentiae* of these set definitions would still fail to describe the concept in a manner sufficiently explicit. A choice from among the various descriptions given by statesmen and publicists would be but little more satisfactory.

Mr. Lansing calls Pan-Americanism an international policy of the Americas. Now a policy may be defined as a course of action adopted and pursued, or intended to be pursued, by a government, party, ruler, statesmen, or by some nonpolitical body or by an individual. If Pan-Americanism is a policy, what is the body which adopts and pursues the course of action which makes it effective? Evidently it cannot be a policy without such a formulating and directing force. Does the International Union of American Republics, formed in 1890, constitute such a body? It is with the greatest difficulty that it may be so conceived. The course of action which this union adopts in its periodical conferences, and which it pursues through the agency of its bureau at Washington and through the activity of the separate governments, is extremely limited in scope. But supposing that it were not so limited, the question would arise whether or not, according to this conception, Pan-Americanism existed prior to 1890. Evidently it could not be an international policy of the Americas until some international American body had adopted it as an appropriate course of action. The separate action of the American states could not make it an international policy. The ineffective international conferences which now and then took place from 1826 to 1889

between some of the American states could not make it such a policy. Was it something other than a policy, if it existed at all, prior to the meeting of the first International American Conference? That Pan-Americanism was brought into existence through the action of the representatives of the American states who met at Washington in 1889 is not a tenable proposition. It was in existence, at least in its beginnings, long before the Washington conference took place. As Ambassador Nabuco put it, the conferences merely express collectively what is already felt to be unanimous.

There is another way of viewing the matter which may help to dissipate the confusion. Cornejo, in the address cited above, speaks of "our continental system"; Drago conceives of America as constituting a "separate political factor"; and Moore states that "Pan-Americanism is obviously derived from the conception that there is such a thing as an American system." This conception of America as a separate political entity is not new. Monroe declared in his famous message that "it is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord." And two years and a half before Monroe made his declaration Henry Clay said on the floor of Congress: "It is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the center, and in which all South America will act with us. . . . We should become the center of a system which would constitute the rallying point of human wisdom against all the despotism of the Old World."<sup>44</sup>

It will be recalled that Lawrence compared the primacy of the United States in the New World to the primacy of the great powers in the Old.<sup>45</sup> As has already been pointed out

<sup>44</sup> Moore, *Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism*, in *Columbia Univ. Quar.*, Sept., 1915, 351.

<sup>45</sup> *Principles of Int. Law*, 242.

the differences between the two are so great as to destroy, practically, the validity of the comparison. But a view of the European system may help to determine the nature of Pan-Americanism. Von Gentz, writing in 1806, conceived of the balance of power as "a constitution subsisting between neighboring states, more or less connected with one another, by virtue of which no one among them can injure the independence or essential rights of another."<sup>46</sup> Fenelon even considered the whole of Christendom as "a kind of universal republic" all the members of which owed it to one another, for the common good, to prevent the progress of any other members who should seek to overthrow the balance existing between them.<sup>47</sup> Westlake has the same idea in mind with regard to the balance of power when he speaks of it as possibly being a step toward the establishment of a European government. And Lorimer considers the balance of power as an indirect solution of what he called the ultimate problem in international law; that is, how to find the international equivalents known to national law as legislation, jurisdiction, and execution.<sup>48</sup> In short, these authorities consider the balance of power as a political system constituting the beginnings of an international government. Now if the American nations constitute a separate political factor in relation to the rest of the world, their political system may be regarded as a step — and nothing more than a step — toward an international American government. But a step toward government implies a step toward constitution, for constitution, however vague and ill-defined, is necessary for the guidance of government. By constitution is meant a collection of principles according to which the powers of government, and the rights of the governed and the relations between the government and the governed, are adjusted. It may have no outward

<sup>46</sup> Taylor, *Treatise on Int. Public Law*, 98.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

<sup>48</sup> *Institutes of Int. Law*, II, 193.

form of expression further than is given by precedents and habits of political action.<sup>49</sup>

It cannot be said that the progress thus far achieved has produced any clearly defined organ of government. The International Conferences of American Republics may be considered as such an organ only in the vaguest and most tenuous sense of the term. But back of this organization lies a moral union of American states founded upon a body of principles growing out of the common struggle for independence. It is to this body of principles that we must turn for the meaning of Pan-Americanism. They are:

1. *Independence.* Not merely nominal independence with Old World attachments remaining; but independence in the sense of complete political separation, American states neither interfering in the affairs of the European powers nor allowing those powers to interfere in their own affairs. These principles, first formally proclaimed by Washington in his farewell address and by Monroe in his message of 1823, subsequently received, by tacit assent and by express governmental action, the sanction of the Hispanic American states. The establishment of the League of Nations tends rather to confirm than to invalidate this principle.

2. *Community of Political Ideals.* The fact that the American states are all republics is not so much the bond of union between them, as the fact that they all cherish common political ideals. It is the spirit of their governments rather than their form which serves to bring them together. It is not likely that if Brazil had continued as a constitutional monarchy the progress of Pan-Americanism would have been seriously retarded.

3. *Territorial Integrity.* The states of this hemisphere regard the principle of conquest as inadmissible in American public law. The *uti possidetis* of 1810 was generally adopted as a rule for the settlement of the boundary questions between

<sup>49</sup> Woolsey, *Political Science*, I, 284.

the new states, and while the application of the rule has given rise to numerous international conflicts, and important cessions of territory have been made as a result of wars growing out of other causes, the spirit of conquest has not generally prevailed among the American states. The repeated declarations of the United States to the effect that it neither covets the territory of its neighbors nor seeks to aggrandize itself by conquest, give additional sanction to the rule. Roosevelt, December 3, 1901; Root, July 31, 1906; Knox, February 28 and March 6, 1912; Wilson, October 27, 1913; Lansing, December 27, 1915.

4. *Law Instead of Force.* The American states rely upon law and amicable adjustments to settle their international difficulties rather than upon force. In their international conferences action is taken by unanimous consent. As far as concerns itself, every state is left free to interpose a negative to whatever measure it may consider prejudicial to its interests. This device of requiring unanimous consent has tended to prevent the development of the idea of the balance of power in this continent. The system of voting by the absolute majority tends to the formation of two groups more or less evenly divided along sectional or economic lines, and this in turn tends to the formation of a balance of power. Moreover, if the will of the majority is to prevail, it must be supported by force. Unanimous consent precludes the use of force. Although this rule has had definite application only since the organization of the Pan-American Conferences, it has prevailed none the less in spirit from the beginning.

5. *Nonintervention.* Believing that "every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has the right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other states,"<sup>50</sup> the American powers have never, as a body, undertaken to intervene in the affairs of any particular state or states. There has been in recent years

<sup>50</sup> *American Journal of Int. Law*, X, 213.



a tendency toward the joint use of good offices, but no tendency toward dictatorial interference.

6. *Equality.* The American powers not only recognize the principle of the equality of states under international law, but in the conduct of their international union they observe it to the fullest extent, presenting in this respect a striking contrast to the Concert of Europe. Only the great powers are admitted to the European conferences on a basis of equality. On the other hand all the American states are admitted to the American conferences, and the vote of the weakest republic has as much weight as that of the most powerful. The political inequality of certain American states gives rise to the exercise by the United States of international police power; but this is an individual policy of the United States and not Pan-American.

7. *Coöperation.* The American states, forming a separate political system, a distinct family of nations, entertaining the same political ideals, coöperate in a spirit of fraternal friendship, in the promotion of their common interests, whether these be political, economic, or cultural.

These principles may indeed be considered as bases of the constitution of what, by the free choice of all concerned, may develop into an international American government. Taken together with the whole mass of precedents and habits of political acting which have emerged from the international relations of the states of the Western Hemisphere, they constitute the particulars from which, by a process of generalization, the abstract concept Pan-Americanism is derived.

## CHAPTER II

### FORMATION OF NEW STATES

THE intervention of Napoleon in the affairs of Spain in 1808 marks the beginning of a series of events of the highest importance to the Western Hemisphere. The resistance of the Spanish people to the rule of Joseph Bonaparte, whom the emperor had placed on the throne of Spain in place of Ferdinand VII, was reflected in a movement on this side of the Atlantic, which, evolving through different phases, finally culminated in the independence of the vast expanse of Spanish territory extending from Mexico to Buenos Aires. And the flight of the Portuguese prince regent, John, afterward King John VI, with his court to Brazil, to escape the fate which had overtaken the Spanish king, proved to be the first step toward the conversion of that wide domain into an independent empire.

By the end of the year 1824 the process of emancipation was about complete, though there was still much to be done in the way of the political organization of the nascent states. The transformation in Brazil was rapid, and the establishment of an independent government was for obvious reasons relatively easy. The residence of the Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro for a considerable length of time, and the elevation of the colony in 1815 to the rank of a kingdom coördinate with that of Portugal, had already given Brazil a consciousness of its virtual independence. The return of John VI, therefore, to Portugal in 1821, leaving his son, Dom Pedro, as regent in Brazil, was quickly followed by the complete severing of the slight bonds which still held the two kingdoms together. The year following the king's departure, independence was formally declared

and Pedro was proclaimed "Constitutional Emperor and Perpetual Defender of Brazil."<sup>1</sup> The opposition which the Portuguese forces in the country interposed to the assertion of independence was so insignificant that the revolution was accomplished almost without bloodshed. The young empire was thus permitted to enter at once upon the undisturbed enjoyment of its freedom.

The Spanish colonies, on the other hand, achieved their independence only after long and bitter warfare. It was not until the victory of Ayacucho was won in the mountains of Peru on December 9, 1824, that the outcome of the struggle was definitely assured. Being driven, as an immediate consequence of that battle, from the Andean plateau where they were making a last stand, the Royalist forces were reduced to the possession of a mere foothold in southern Chile, of the fortresses of Callao, in Peru, and of San Juan de Ulúa in Mexico. These they were soon to be forced also to relinquish; San Juan de Ulúa in September, 1825, and the other places in January of the following year. While these great changes were occurring on the mainland, the island colonies of Cuba and Porto Rico had likewise been stirred by the spirit of revolution, but their attempts at independence failed and they were destined to remain under Spanish rule till the intervention of the United States in behalf of Cuba three quarters of a century later.

On the other hand, the French colony of St. Domingue, later the republic of Haiti, met with a wholly different result. If not the first of the revolting colonies to establish beyond peradventure its independence, it was at least the first to declare it formally, its declaration being made in 1804,<sup>2</sup> whereas the

<sup>1</sup> This title was later sanctioned by the constitution which was put into effect in 1824. Cf. Carvahlo Moreira, *Constituição do Imperio do Brasil*, 45. A translation into Spanish of the constitution of 1824 is found in Arosemena, *Estudios constitucionales sobre los gobiernos de la América Latina*, I, 1-27 (2nd ed.) A French translation is found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 936-958.

<sup>2</sup> The declaration was signed and proclaimed by Dessalines, the leader

first of the formal declarations upon the part of the Spanish colonies was made seven years later. Considering the ignorance of the mass of the population and its lack of experience in self-government, it is not to be wondered at that the political organization of this new state was accomplished with great difficulty. Years of disorder and of frightful excesses followed the separation from France. Jean Pierre Boyer, who assumed the presidency in 1818, was the first of the numerous rulers to unify the country and to maintain order throughout all its parts. For some years prior to his accession, two rival states struggled for supremacy, one of these being a republic in the south and the other a monarchy in the north. In 1820, Boyer, who had succeeded to the chief magistracy of the republic, managed to unite the two states under one government; and two years later, when the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo declared its independence<sup>3</sup> and was seeking annexation to the republic of Colombia, he marched an army into that part of the island and forced the leaders of the movement to accept union with Haiti. Thus, with the whole of the island under his control, Boyer remained in office, under a provision of the constitution giving the president a life tenure,<sup>4</sup> until 1843, when he was forced to resign. The following year the eastern portion of the island withdrew and set up the independent republic of Santo Domingo.

On the continent, the struggles of the Spanish colonies for independence, and the subsequent essays of their people in the field of political organization, present a varied and interesting record. The vicissitudes of the republic of Colombia are fully of the revolution, on January 1st of the year indicated. Cf. Madion, *Histoire d'Haiti*, III, 115-118.

<sup>3</sup> For the "Constitutive Act of the provisional government of the independent state of the Spanish part of Haiti," see *British and Foreign State Papers*, VIII, 557-570.

<sup>4</sup> Boyer took office under the republican constitution of 1816. From 1801 to 1816 there had been adopted five different constitutions. The instrument under which Boyer ruled remained in force as long as he continued to exercise the chief magistracy. Cf. Janvier, *Les Constitutions d'Haiti*, 1-154.

considered hereafter, in a chapter dealing with the ideals of Simon Bolivar; but it is proper here to remark that this new state, erected within the bounds of the old viceroyalty of New Granada and comprising what is to-day Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador, attained during the first years of its existence a position of the greatest promise. A republican constitution had been adopted in 1821,<sup>5</sup> and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government had entered at once upon the exercise of their several functions. The Colombians themselves believed that the foundation of a happy and prosperous nation had been laid; and foreign observers were equally convinced that the new republic, by virtue of the extent of its territory, the abundance of its natural resources, and the energy of its inhabitants, would soon take high rank among the nations of the world.<sup>6</sup> Moreover Colombia had acquired great prestige among the other new states by virtue of the contribu-

<sup>5</sup> For an English translation of this constitution, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIX, 698-722. A French translation was published at Paris in 1822 under the title of *Constitution de la République de Colombia*.

<sup>6</sup> In 1823 J. Q. Adams, then Secretary of State, in his instructions to Anderson, the first minister to Colombia, said: "The republic of Colombia, if permanently organized to embrace the whole territory which it now claims, and blessed with a government effectually protective of the rights of its people, is undoubtedly destined to become hereafter one of the mightiest nations of the earth. Its central position upon the surface of the globe, directly communicating at once with the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, north and south with the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, brings it into relations of proximity with every other part of the world: while the number and variety of its ports on every sea by which it is surrounded, the magnitude and extent of its navigable rivers, three of which, the Amazon, the Orinoco, and the Magdalena, are among the largest in the world, intersecting with numberless tributary streams, and in every direction, the continent of South America, and furnishing the means of water communication from every point of its circumference to every spot upon its surface; the fertility of its soil, the general healthiness and beauty of its climate, the profusion with which it breeds and bears the useful metals, present a combination of elements unparalleled in the location of the human race and relieve, at least from all charge of enthusiasm, the sentiment expressed by the late Mr. Torres (Colombian minister to the United States) that this republic appeared to have been destined by the Author of Nature 'as the center and the empire of the human family.'" *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, V, 894.

tion which it had made, in leadership and in men and material, to the final dissolution of Spanish dominion in the southern continent.

The provinces of Rio de la Plata and the former captaincy-general of Chile, though as successful on the whole as Colombia in throwing off the Spanish yoke, were less fortunate in their early efforts at political organization. Buenos Aires, loosely confederated with a number of the provinces which had constituted the vice-royalty of La Plata, maintained its independence in fact, after the first revolt in 1810, though the formal declaration was postponed until 1816; but conflicts between two opposing systems of government, the unitary and the federal, long delayed the organization of a constitutional régime, and no doubt caused the loss of a large part of the territory which the leaders of Buenos Aires aspired to consolidate into a single nation.

The province to the east of the river Uruguay, known as the Banda Oriental, having rebelled against the government of Buenos Aires, was occupied in 1817 by Brazil and held by that empire<sup>7</sup> for a decade until, as a result of a war between the two claimants, the disputed territory was recognized, by way of compromise, as the independent republic of Uruguay. Paraguay likewise declined to submit to Buenos Aires, and after successfully resisting a military expedition sent against it by the central authorities, its leaders set up an independent government which quickly fell into the hands of the dictator, Francia, under whose rule it was to remain almost completely isolated from the world until his death in 1840. Efforts were also made to bring the territory known as Upper Peru, which formerly constituted a part of the vice-royalty of La Plata, under the authority of the government at Buenos Aires, but the forces

<sup>7</sup> The revolt of the Banda Oriental against Buenos Aires was led by the famous José Artigas, who also opposed the occupation of the province by Brazil. Defeated by the Brazilians in 1820 Artigas was compelled to seek asylum in Paraguay, where he remained until his death in 1850.

sent to wrest it from the royalists were defeated. Its liberation was not effected until 1825, when the victorious patriot army under General Sucre marched into the country and organized a provisional government which was shortly afterward superseded by the definitely constituted republic of Bolivia.

Throughout the period of the wars of independence and for a generation afterward, the provinces which later united to form the Argentine Republic remained in a state of disorganization. A constitution framed by a constituent assembly composed of representatives of the several provinces was rejected in 1819, because, among other reasons, it failed to provide for local autonomy. During the next five years there was practically no national government, though the government of the province of Buenos Aires, which was then conducted in a wise and orderly manner, served, by virtue of treaty arrangements with the other provincial governments, as the representative of all in the conduct of foreign affairs. In December, 1824, a new constituent congress met at Buenos Aires, but the constitution for the "Argentine Nation," which, two years later, it adopted, was also rejected by the provinces. The state of anarchy which followed was taken advantage of by the dictator, Rosas, to impose his will upon the country, and it was not until his overthrow, in 1852, that any real progress was made toward the organization of a national government.<sup>8</sup>

Chile, unlike the Argentine provinces, met with serious reverses in the achievement of its independence. In 1814 the authority of Spain was reëstablished throughout the colony and Chilean independence might have been long delayed but for the aid furnished by Argentine forces under San Martín. Born in 1778 at Yapeyú, a village in the viceroyalty of La Plata, near the frontier of Paraguay, San Martín received his education in Spain and served in the Spanish army against the French until 1811, attaining the rank of colonel; but he aban-

<sup>8</sup> Vedia, *Constitución Argentina*, 13-15; Arosemena, *Estudios constitucionales sobre los gobiernos de la América Latina* (2d ed.), I, 176.

doned his promising military career in Spain to devote himself to the cause of the revolution in America. On his arrival in Buenos Aires he was entrusted with the organization of the national army. He later commanded the Patriot forces against the Royalists in Upper Peru, where, becoming convinced that independence could not be assured so long as the Spaniards remained in possession of Lima, he conceived the plan of driving them from that stronghold by first liberating Chile and then advancing on Peru by way of the Pacific.<sup>9</sup>

With this great project in mind, he obtained his appointment as governor of the province of Cuyo, situated on the eastern slope of the Andes at the gateway to Chile; and although the province was exceedingly poor, yet, with the help of Buenos Aires and the accession of Chileans who had fled across the Andes to escape Royalist persecution, he eventually succeeded in organizing and equipping an army which he considered adequate to his task. Accordingly, in January, 1817, San Martín led his band of Patriots across the Andes, and on February 12, with the coöperation of Chilean forces, won at Chacabuco a decisive victory over the Royalist forces. The viceroy of Peru, on learning of the Royalist defeat, sent a new expedition against the Chileans; but on April 5, 1818, the Patriots, after having suffered several severe reverses, were again victorious in the decisive battle of Maipo. The independence of Chile being now firmly established, San Martín turned his attention to the final step—the destruction of Spanish power in Peru; but the execution of this design was complicated by political events in Chile.

After the battle of Chacabuco the Royalists abandoned Santiago, the capital of the new Chilean republic, and a popular assembly, convened on the day the Chilean army entered the city, voted to place the supreme authority of the state in the

<sup>9</sup> For a full account of the formation of San Martín's army and of his passage of the Andes, see Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, I, 499-632. A good, brief account in English is found in the *Memoirs of General Miller*, I, 90-108.



hands of San Martín. But the Patriot leader, believing that the acceptance of such a post would be prejudicial to the accomplishment of his chief object, declined the honor, and on the following day the assembly named in his stead General Bernardo O'Higgins, who assumed office under the title of Supreme Director.<sup>10</sup>

O'Higgins, like San Martín and other leaders of the revolution, had been educated in Europe. His mother was a native Chilean. His father, Ambrose O'Higgins, was an Irishman, who, having been sent as a child to Spain to be educated, proceeded to seek his fortune, about the middle of the eighteenth century, in the Spanish colonies. After trading as an itinerant merchant from Costa Firme to Buenos Aires, he eventually settled in Chile and entered the royal service. Promoted in time to the captaincy-general of the province, he was afterward appointed by the king viceroy of Peru, a post which he continued to hold until his death in 1801. The son Bernardo, born in 1778, was sent at the age of sixteen to Spain, but he soon passed over to England, where he remained in school till 1799. He then returned to Spain, and, in 1802, after some misadventures, embarked for Chile. In Europe he met Miranda, San Martín, and other Spanish American pioneers in the cause of colonial independence, and imbibed their views. He therefore returned to Chile with ideas inimical to the Spanish régime; and, from the beginning of the revolt until he became Supreme Director of Chile, he contributed increasingly important services to the cause of independence.<sup>11</sup>

During the vigorous and effective administration of O'Higgins, the country enjoyed peace and prosperity. But his rule was autocratic. Believing that the deliberations of a national congress under the conditions then existing would result only

<sup>10</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, X, 628-632; Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, II, 24.

<sup>11</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XI, 663-680. Cf. also Lavalle, *Galeria de retratos de los gobernadores y virreyes del Perú*, and Mehegan, *O'Higgins of Chile*.

in arousing civil dissension, he employed his influence and the power of his office to frustrate all attempts to assemble such a body. Likewise, in order to avoid the calling together of representatives of the people to sanction the declaration of independence, he hit upon the device of opening registers throughout the country in which the citizens could record their wishes on the subject. By the same unique method he secured the acceptance of a provisional constitution framed by a commission which he appointed for the purpose.<sup>12</sup> This constitution, though intended to appease the demand for popular government, served to give the color of legality to the autocratic system already adopted. Attempts to disturb the established order, whether due to the personal ambition of military chiefs or to a more or less sincere desire to give the people a greater share in the management of their affairs, he firmly repressed, by means of the military forces at his command.<sup>13</sup>

By the middle of the year 1820 widespread discontent had come to prevail and the demand for political reform had become more and more insistent. Realizing the necessity of making some concession to public clamor, the Supreme Director caused a convention to be assembled at Santiago in 1822 for the purpose of framing a new constitution. But the convention was so clearly a creature of the administration and the constitution which it hurriedly adopted so evidently failed to make effective the desired reforms, that the prevailing discontent was in no wise allayed. Toward the close of the year 1822, open rebellion broke out in the provinces of Coquimbo and Concepción. In the latter province the movement was led by General Ramón Freire, whose distinction as a military leader was second only to that of O'Higgins. The troops sent to suppress the revolt abandoned the government and joined the rebels. In Santiago

<sup>12</sup> See *Proyecto de Constitución Provisoria para el Estado de Chile*, published in 1818, to which was appended an exposition of the proposed method of ratification.

<sup>13</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XI, 346, 520, 526.

the feeling of dissatisfaction, though manifested in a less violent manner, was no less acute, and in January, 1823, a popular assembly met in that city to consider means for remedying the evils of which the country complained. Unwilling to struggle longer against such formidable opposition, O'Higgins relinquished to a junta, named by the assembly, the authority with which he had been invested six years before.<sup>14</sup>

This junta was composed of three influential citizens of the capital; and it was hoped that, with public confidence restored, the new provisional authority would proceed to the definitive political and administrative organization of the republic. But the steps taken to that end did not meet with universal approbation. In the province of Concepción the local assembly, backed by General Freire, declared that the provisional government should be composed of a representative of each of the three provinces into which the republic was then divided; namely, Concepción, Santiago, and Coquimbo. Authorized to put this plan into execution, Freire transferred his army by sea to Valparaiso, whence he marched upon Santiago. Encamping a few miles from the capital, he entered into negotiations with the junta, and soon reached an agreement by which the solution of the anomalous situations was entrusted, in accordance with his demands, to a so-called congress of plenipotentiaries, composed of a representative of each of the three provinces.<sup>15</sup>

This "congress of plenipotentiaries" immediately set up a provisional government similar in every way to the autocratic system which had been the cause of O'Higgins's downfall, only three short months before. Freire was made Supreme Director. But the leaders in reality desired to organize the government on a democratic basis, and Freire convoked a constituent assembly which met in August, 1823, and toward the close of the year adopted a constitution. Early in its proceedings, how-

<sup>14</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XIII, 695, 732, 817. After his abdication O'Higgins lived in retirement in Peru until his death in 1842.

<sup>15</sup> Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XIII, 830; XIV, 18, 39.

ever, the assembly gave constitutional sanction to the office of Supreme Director, and unanimously designated Freire to fill it for a period of three years. The constitution was promulgated amid great rejoicing in January, 1824; but it was ill-adapted to the needs of the situation. Its framers, besides devising a complicated form of government, failed to take into account the established institutions and customs of the country. In any circumstances the new system would have been difficult to administer; and, with a state of disorder pervading the country, the Supreme Director, after a few months of trial, became convinced of his inability to fulfill the duties of his office under the constitution and offered his resignation. It is hardly surprising that, instead of being permitted to resign, he was clothed anew with the dictatorial powers which had been found necessary to the maintenance of public order. Thus the constitution of 1823 became a dead letter.<sup>16</sup>

Though the first attempts to establish popular government in Chile were failures, many of the leaders continued to cherish the hope that success would eventually crown their efforts. Among these was Freire himself. Returning to Santiago from the south, where he had brought to a happy termination, early in 1826, the final campaign against the few Spanish troops who still remained on Chilean soil, he convoked a constituent congress, to which he presented his resignation. Adopting a resolution to the effect that in future the official title of the chief executive should be that of president, the congress accepted Freire's resignation and elected Manuel Blanco Encalada in his stead. Thereafter the executive played a less important part in the affairs of the country. The congress also passed an act providing for the adoption of the federal system. In January, 1827, it proceeded to consider the draft of a complete constitution. This project, it appears, was based on the Mexican constitution of 1824. Its discussion was attended with heated debates as to whether the system should be unitary or

<sup>16</sup> Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XIV, 43, 125, 320, 391, 395.

federal, and on this question the congress closed its sessions without reaching an agreement. In February, 1828, a new assembly took up the task which its predecessor had abandoned, and, thanks to its labors, the country was soon provided with a fundamental law which, when promulgated, was received throughout the republic, as had been the case in 1824, with manifestations of great satisfaction.<sup>17</sup>

Although the constitution of 1828 was by far the best evidence which the Chileans had yet given of their capacity for political organization, yet it did not merit unqualified praise, nor did it in practice satisfy the general aspiration for a strong, vigorous government. Agitation continued, and in 1833, the system which had been adopted — a compromise between the federal and the unitary system — was replaced by one from which every vestige of federalism was removed. With this accomplished the republic at last settled down to a condition of political stability.<sup>18</sup>

Returning now to the expedition for the liberation of Peru,<sup>19</sup> it may be observed that O'Higgins, who was in complete accord with San Martín, lent to the latter his most cordial and effective coöperation in the recruiting and equipping of the expeditionary force. The enterprise, however, was beset with enormous difficulties. To form, in a country of limited resources, and impoverished by years of conflict, an army sufficient to dis-

<sup>17</sup> Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XV, 5, 32, 128, 144, 158, 269.

<sup>18</sup> Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, XVI, 62; for the constitution of 1833 and a brief account of the early attempts to organize politically the republic of Chile, see Arosemena, *Estudios constitucionales sobre los gobiernos de la América Latina*, I.

<sup>19</sup> For a full history of the expedition see *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú* (2 vols.), by the Chilean historian, Bulnes. Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, treats the subject fully. The best Argentine account is given by Mitre in his *Historia de San Martín*. For an account from the Peruvian standpoint, see Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*. The account given by one of the principal actors, Lord Cochrane, may be found in his *Narrative of Services in the Liberation of Chile, Peru, and Brazil* (2 vols.). Another foreigner (General William Miller), who took an active part in the expedition, has left an account in his *Memoirs* (2 vols.).

lodge and disperse the Royalist forces entrenched in the Peruvian capital and in occupation of advantageous positions in the interior of the country was an undertaking no less serious than that of obtaining transports for the troops and the improvising of a naval force to convoy the expedition to its destination and give it effective support. Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties and of the inability of the government of Buenos Aires to provide the pecuniary assistance which it had promised, preparations went forward with commendable rapidity, so that toward the middle of 1820 the expedition was ready to strike the blow which, it was confidently believed, would put an end to Spanish power in America.

The land forces, comprising about 4500 men, consisted of two divisions. One of these, composed chiefly of the remnants of the army which had accomplished the remarkable feat of crossing the Andes in 1817, was recruited with Chilean soldiers. The other, which was less numerous, contained Chileans only, though it was officered in part by men who had owed allegiance to Buenos Aires. Whether the majority of the men constituting the two divisions were Argentine or Chilean is a point upon which historians of the two countries do not agree.<sup>20</sup> But, as a large proportion of the troops and the greater part of the officers were Argentine, the expedition affords an excellent example of the spirit of solidarity which prevailed among the people then struggling for freedom from Spanish rule. In December, 1818, the naval forces were put in charge of Lord Cochrane, who, although he had been dismissed from the British navy, enjoyed unimpaired the fame which he had previously acquired as a naval officer. Under his direction the incipient Chilean navy had already obtained the ascendancy over the Spanish squadron in the Pacific, and, when the expedition was ready to sail, adequate naval protection was afforded. In all seven warships, mounting 231 guns, were provided, their crews

<sup>20</sup> Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, I, 207; Mitre *Historia de San Martín*, II, 532.

swelling the total number of men in the expedition to more than 6000.

The expedition, which was placed under the general command of San Martín, was, as originally planned, to be carried out under the joint authority of Chile and the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, and a treaty to that end was concluded between those governments.<sup>21</sup> By this treaty the contracting parties engaged to assist the inhabitants of Peru, in conformity with their expressed desires, in achieving independence, but were to leave them absolutely free to establish their own government, and, when the object of the expedition had been attained, were to withdraw the army from Peru, unless the three governments should agree to retain it there for a longer period. The cost of the undertaking was to be jointly borne by the contracting parties, it being understood that as soon as an independent government had been established at Lima, that government should reimburse Chile and the United Provinces for the expenses incurred on account of the expedition. The government at Buenos Aires having failed to ratify the treaty, Chile assumed sole responsibility for the expedition; but, while no formal instructions were given to San Martín relative to the conduct which he should observe in Peru, it appears to have been generally understood that the spirit of the unratified treaty should nevertheless control the relations between the expeditionary forces and the state which it was proposed to bring into existence.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, I, 115. The treaty was signed at Buenos Aires on February 5, 1819, and ratified by Chile on March 15 following. Cf. *Recopilación de tratados y convenciones celebrados entre la republica de Chile y las potencias extranjeras*, I, 5. Also, *Colección de tratados celebrados por la República Argentina con las naciones extranjeras*, I, 39.

<sup>22</sup> Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, II, 536, Dundonald (Lord Cochrane), *Narrative of Services*, I, 78. Instructions were prepared by the Chilean Senate but were never delivered by O'Higgins to San Martín. According to these instructions the objects of the expedition were: The emancipation of the inhabitants of Peru from the slavery and domination of the King of Spain; the establishment of a uniform system of civil and national liberty

While the rest of Spanish America had been swept into the movement for independence, the viceroyalty of Peru remained nominally loyal to the home government. The great mass of the population was composed of Indians of an exceedingly docile character. Accustomed under Inca rule to submission to a paternal government, they had been easily conquered by a handful of Spanish adventurers, who superimposed upon the social and political organization of the Inca régime a system which left the population in the state of serfdom to which it had for centuries been subjected. Thus three hundred years of Spanish rule had done little to change the condition or the character of these people. An inert mass, without the spirit of independence or the power of initiative, they were not easily moved to revolution; and although there existed in Peru a creole class, such as furnished the directing force of the movement for independence, it found greater difficulty in pursuing its designs there than it did elsewhere in Spanish America; for, in addition to the listlessness of the lower classes, it was obliged to reckon with the fact that the upper classes were generally opposed to revolutionary movements. Not only did the large number of Spaniards employed in the government service, or engaged in commercial or other pursuits, constitute a conservative element, but the nobility, at the top of the social scale, formed, by virtue of the number and distinction of its members, an important factor, the majority of whom used their influence to maintain the established order, in the fear that the titles which they so highly prized might otherwise be placed in jeopardy. In a society thus organized, the viceroy had been able, with the abundance of resources at his command, not only to suppress every outbreak occurring within the territory of

throughout South America; the destruction of the servile partisans of Ferdinand VII, who, quartered in that section, were carrying on an obstinate and destructive warfare; and the constitution of new, independent states, which, united with those already liberated, would present an impenetrable front to the power of Spain. The instructions are printed in Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, IV, 5-9. See, also, Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, I, 214.



Peru, but even to send troops to reduce to submission other sections in revolt. The Spanish power in Peru therefore constituted a menace, the destruction of which was one of the chief aims of the preparations which had been going on in Chile.<sup>23</sup>

The expedition landed on the coast of Peru in September, 1820. It was well received by the Peruvians, many of whom joined the invading army; and after some months San Martín, without risking a battle, succeeded, with the aid of the fleet, in compelling the forces of the viceroy to abandon the capital and retire into the mountains. Possession was then taken of the city, and on July 28, 1821, independence was formally declared, pursuant to an act signed by an assemblage of citizens previously convened by the Municipal Council of Lima for the purpose of giving expression to the popular will.<sup>24</sup> A few days later San Martín issued a decree establishing a provisional government, the supreme civil and military authority of which he himself exercised under the title of Protector. The only machinery of government for which the decree provided was a cabinet of three members, whom it designated as follows: Juan García del Río, a Colombian, Minister of Foreign Relations; Bernardo Monteagudo, an Argentine, Minister of War and Marine; and Hipolito Unánue, a Peruvian, Minister of Finance. By the terms of the decree this arrangement was to continue in force until the representatives of the Peruvian nation should organize the government and take its administration into their own hands.<sup>25</sup>

Prior to the evacuation of Lima, negotiations were begun between San Martín and the Viceroy, Pezuela, looking to some form of accommodation. Pezuela proposed an arrangement by which the government of Chile and the expeditionary army should agree to submit to the authority of Ferdinand VII, un-

<sup>23</sup> Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, I, 347, et seq.; Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú, Independiente*, I, 27.

<sup>24</sup> Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, IV, 262, 271.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 318-320. See, also, Hall, *Extracts from a Journal Written on the Coast of Chile, Peru, and Mexico*, I, 266-270.

der the Spanish constitution of 1812. This constitution had been cast aside by Ferdinand upon his return to the throne in 1814, but in March, 1820, it was restored in the Peninsula, and it had just been promulgated by the Royalist government at Lima. The exchanges came to nothing because of the Patriot leader's insistence upon the recognition of the independence of Peru as a prerequisite to conciliation. Subsequently, however, through the interposition of an agent of the Spanish Government, Manuel Abreu, who had just arrived in Peru, negotiations were renewed. Conferences were begun in May and were not finally broken off until the evacuation of Lima by the Royalists, two months later. These negotiations, like the first, were fruitless; but they gave rise to a proposal which is of more than passing interest. In common with many of his contemporaries, San Martín believed that the form of government best adapted to the needs of the new states was the monarchical. With a view therefore to its establishment in Peru, he proposed, in substance, that the independence of the country be declared by the joint action of the two armies; that a provisional government be organized under a regency, the president of which should be La Serna, who had succeeded Pezuela as viceroy; and that commissioners be dispatched to Spain to ask the king to consent to the placing of a prince of his family upon the new throne. Though La Serna was at first inclined to regard with favor the solution thus proposed by San Martín, he afterward declined to accept it, thus putting an end to the project of founding an independent kingdom in Peru with the cooperation of the Royalist authorities.<sup>26</sup>

But San Martín did not abandon the plan. Conditions in Peru appeared to him and to his political advisers to offer but little promise for the success of the republican form. On the other hand, for the monarchical form, the indispensable ele-

<sup>26</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, I, 69, 164-172; Bulnes, *Historia de la Expedición Libertadora del Perú*, II, 93-129. The documents relating to these conferences are published in Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, IV, 139-238.

ment of aristocracy was already at hand, while the traditions of reverence and respect for everything pertaining to royalty had continued to be cherished among both the creole and the native element of the population. The social organization and the example of the viceregal court had indeed made monarchical customs and practices much more familiar in Peru than elsewhere in Spanish America, with the possible exception of Mexico. Thus the establishment of a republic meant in Peru an especially violent break with the past, which, with the resulting disorders, San Martín desired to avoid. Accordingly, when he assumed the title of Protector, he took steps to revive the monarchical project. Though personally a man of great modesty, he preserved in the new government all the pomp and ceremony of the viceregal court; he validated the titles of the nobles of the old régime, created a new aristocratic order called the Order of the Sun, and appointed a council of state; he also established a patriotic society whose real object, it soon became clear, was to carry on a propaganda in favor of the monarchical form of government.<sup>27</sup>

Having thus adopted measures to counteract the further development of republican sentiment in Peru, San Martín appointed two agents, Juan García del Río and Diego Paroissen, to proceed to Europe with a view to secure a monarch for the Peruvian throne. These envoys, who were to solicit enroute the coöperation of the governments of Chile and Buenos Aires, were instructed to go first to England, where they were to endeavor to arrange with the government for the acceptance of the crown by the Prince of Saxe-Coburg,<sup>28</sup> or, if that were not practicable, by a prince of the reigning family, preferably the Duke of Sussex. In the event of failure in England, they were to negotiate in turn with Russia, Austria, France, Portugal, and lastly with Spain. Moreover, ministers plenipoten-

<sup>27</sup> Bulnes, *op. cit.*, 373 ff.; Paz Soldán, *op. cit.*, I, 268. Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América: Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 190-194.

<sup>28</sup> Leopold, afterward King of the Belgians.

tiary were accredited by San Martín to the governments of the new Spanish American states, with instructions to use every possible means to induce them to follow the lead of Peru in the matter of political organization.<sup>29</sup>

It is not desired to create the impression that San Martín's zeal for the monarchical form of government so far influenced his conduct as to lead him to disregard the moral obligation which he owed to the people of Peru, to allow them the fullest freedom in adopting for themselves whatever political system they might prefer. He believed not only that he was acting in harmony with the general sentiment, but also that the establishment of a republic would result in anarchy and perhaps in the loss of independence. Being himself without ambition, he desired unselfishly to contribute to the permanent welfare of Peru and of the other new states formerly colonies of Spain, by giving them the only kind of government which, in his opinion, could maintain order and insure for them a free and prosperous development. He did not intend to erect a throne at Lima in defiance of the will of the Peruvian people.<sup>30</sup> On the contrary, although he had little faith in popular assemblies, yet he convoked a congress to which he committed the responsibility of deciding upon the form of government and of fram-

<sup>29</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, I, 270-278.

<sup>30</sup> Captain Basil Hall of the British navy who was in Peru at this time had several interviews with San Martín and was impressed with his disinterestedness. In his *Extracts from a Journal Written on the Coasts of Chile, Peru, and Mexico*, the following interesting passage occurs (I, 229): "When all was quiet in the capital, I went to Callao, and hearing that San Martín was in the roads, waited on him on board his yacht. I found him possessed of correct information as to all that was passing, but he seemed in no hurry to enter the city, and appeared, above all things, anxious to avoid any appearance of acting the part of a conqueror. 'For the last ten years,' said he, 'I have been unremittingly employed against the Spaniards, or rather, in favor of this country, for I am not against any one who is not hostile to the cause of independence. All I wish is, that this country should be managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner in which it is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me. I propose simply to give the people the means of declaring themselves independent, and of establishing a suitable form of government; after which I shall consider I have done enough and leave them.'"

ing a constitution in harmony with the system which might be adopted.

But San Martín's plans were doomed to failure. Contrary to his expectation, there was an increasing trend of opinion toward republican institutions. Many of his administrative measures aroused bitter opposition. He was unpopular in the army. Conspiracies were hatched against him. Some of the ablest officers became disgusted and quit the service. Lord Cochrane openly defied his authority and sailed away with the warships under his command. The government of Buenos Aires was unfriendly. Misunderstandings arose with Chile over the pay of the expeditionary forces and with Colombia over the possession of Guayaquil. The severe defeat of a division of the patriot army added to the difficulties of the situation. As a consequence, the Royalists, who had never been dislodged from the greater part of Peru, took courage and began to threaten the very existence of the new government.

Desiring to placate public opinion and hoping to obtain material assistance in completing the emancipation of Peru, San Martín delegated early in 1822 to a Peruvian, the Marquis of Torre Tagle, the supreme authority which he as Protector had been exercising, and prepared to make a journey to Guayaquil to confer with Bolívar, who appeared to be in a situation which would permit him to furnish the desired help. San Martín expected Colombian aid not only on the ground of common interest but also on the ground of reciprocity, for troops from Peru were then fighting side by side with those of Colombia in freeing the province of Quito. Moreover, apart from the question of military support, he wished to come to an understanding with Bolívar in regard to the form of government to be adopted by the new states, as well as to determine the question of the status of Guayaquil, which, as has been seen, was an object of contention between Colombia and Peru.

The conference did not take place until July, 1822.<sup>31</sup> Mean-

<sup>31</sup> San Martín gives a brief account of this celebrated conference in a

while, Bolivar had completed the liberation of Quito, and by his aggressive action had assured the annexation of Guayaquil to Colombia. San Martín, by accepting the result, permitted this question to be eliminated. Upon the other questions, he found, after exchanging views with Bolivar, that it was impossible to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Liberator would neither furnish adequate assistance to San Martín, nor would he accept the latter's invitation to take command of the combined forces of the two countries, in which the Argentine leader offered to serve in a secondary capacity. Bolivar's objections were that the Colombian laws did not permit the extension of his operations beyond the limits of the republic, and that he was disinclined, for reasons of delicacy, to have under his command so great a general as San Martín. As to the remaining question, the views of the two leaders were hopelessly divergent. San Martín, as we have seen above, had taken steps looking to the establishment of a monarchy in Peru with a prince of some European house as sovereign; and to assure success he wished to have thrones erected in the other new states. Bolivar on the other hand was a partisan of republicanism and San Martín was unable to shake his attachment to that system. This divergence, was, doubtless, a still more effective reason for the Liberator's present unwillingness to place the Colombian army at the disposal of Peru.

Thus, San Martín failed to attain any of the objects for which he had made the journey to Guayaquil. Disheartened, he returned to Lima in August, 1822, only to find the city in a state of growing discontent. During his absence Monteagudo,

letter to General William Miller, dated Brussels, April 19, 1827. Cf. San Martín, *Su Correspondencia* (3d ed.), 70-74. For other accounts see Larrazábal, *Vida del Libertador*; Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, I, 308-312; Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, III, 602-635; Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 235-251. See also Destruje, *La entrevista de Bolívar y San Martín en Guayaquil*; La Cruz, *La entrevista de Guayaquil*; Goenaga, *La entrevista de Guayaquil*. This latter work, containing the report of the interview by Bolivar's secretary general, which until 1910 remained unpublished, throws new light on the subject.

his chief political adviser, who had exercised a controlling influence in the administration of the government, had, by reason of certain harsh and oppressive measures, become so obnoxious that the people finally took matters into their own hands, compelling him to resign and go into banishment. This incident still further discouraged San Martín and strengthened his resolve to quit the country; and when, a month after his return to Lima, the congress assembled, he resigned all authority into the hands of the representatives of the people and immediately embarked for Chile. Passing thence to his estate in the province of Cuyo, he tarried there until the beginning of 1824, when, in order to avoid being drawn into the civil strife with which the provinces of the Rio de la Plata were continually afflicted, he took passage for Europe, where he spent the remainder of his days in obscurity.<sup>32</sup>

The people of Peru being at last left free to establish their own form of government, the congress, in the reaction against the centralization of power which existed under the protectorship of San Martín, appointed three of its own members as a commission to exercise the executive authority under the title of *junta gubernativa*, until a constitution should be adopted and a government organized in accordance with its provisions.<sup>33</sup> No autocrat, no foreign prince, would be tolerated. The powers and instructions given to San Martín's agents in Europe, in so far as they related to the establishment of a monarchy in Peru, were declared to be without effect. In December, 1822, a provisional constitution, providing for a popular, representative government with the customary division of powers, was adopted. Eleven months later a definitive constitution, based on these principles, was formally promulgated, but, for reasons which will now appear, it never became effective.

The *junta gubernativa* having proved to be an unsatisfactory

<sup>32</sup> Bulnes, *Espedición Libertadora del Perú*, II, 484. San Martín died at Boulogne, France, in 1850.

<sup>33</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, II, 6,

executive body, the severe defeat of an expedition which it had sent against the Royalists was made use of to precipitate a change. In compliance with a petition of the officers of the army and in response to a general public demand, the congress abolished the junta and created the office of president, to which it appointed José de la Riva Agüero, a Peruvian patriot who had long been active in the cause of independence. As the nation's executive and as commander in chief of its armed forces, Riva Agüero displayed great activity, and within a few brief months greatly improved the situation. He augmented the army and sent a formidable expedition against the Royalists in the south; he organized reserves and strengthened the navy; he obtained an auxiliary force from Colombia, and in general put the country in a better posture for offensive and defensive operations. But in spite of these measures more serious reverses were in store. In June, 1823, upon learning that Lima had been weakened by the withdrawal of troops for the expedition to the south, the able Royalist leader, Canterac, marched upon the capital and took it without a struggle, the Patriot forces having in the meantime retired to the fortress of Callao. In consequence the congress was dispersed, some of the members remaining in Lima, others fleeing the country or escaping to neighboring provinces, and still others following the army to Callao. This latter group, though constituting a minority, continued to meet as the congress of Peru.

Riva Agüero was blamed for the loss of the capital and had to suffer accordingly. Not only did the congress deprive him of the chief military command, but, as a further mark of disapproval, resolved to transfer, contrary to his expressed wish, the seat of government to the town of Trujillo, some three hundred miles to the north of Lima. The command of the army was intrusted to General Sucre,<sup>34</sup> commander of the Colombian

<sup>34</sup> Antonio José de Sucre was born in Cumaná, Venezuela, in 1795. Enrolling in the patriot army in 1812, he rapidly rose to high rank and before the close of the wars of independence had become Bolívar's most



auxiliary force and Bolivar's diplomatic representative, who, by a later decree of the congress, was also authorized to exercise full power, civil as well as military, in the area in which the war was actively prosecuted. But, when Sucre took the field, he delegated the civil authority to Torre Tagle. Thus two governments were set up — one at Trujillo under Riva Agüero, and the other at Callao, and later at Lima, under Torre Tagle.<sup>35</sup>

The confusion into which the country had fallen caused the Peruvian patriots to forget local pride and petty jealousies and to look abroad for a leader skillful enough to unite the conflicting factions and strong enough to save the nation from the certain consequence of anarchy — resubjugation to the Spanish crown. This was the opportunity for which Bolivar had been waiting. Although the Peruvians had already entered into correspondence with him, they had been unwilling to grant him the authority which he required. But, with San Martín out of the way, there was no longer a leader whose achievements were comparable with his own. The Peruvians had made an essay at self-government and had failed. The moment was auspicious. Accordingly, when a commission arrived from Peru to renew the invitation, Bolivar accepted without further cavil, and, duly authorized by the congress of Colombia, set out to win new glory in the emancipation of Peru.

He reached Lima on September 1, the Royalists having again evacuated the city. The next day he was granted au-

trusted lieutenant. He was personally in command of the united Patriot forces at Ayacucho — Bolivar being absent at the time the battle was fought — and on account of that great victory he was made Grand Marshal of Ayacucho. After driving the Royalists from upper Peru he aided in the establishment of the republic of Bolivia and became its first president. He returned to Colombia in 1828 and met death two years later at the hands of an assassin. Second to none of his contemporaries as a military leader, he was no less eminent as a diplomatist and as a political administrator. See for his letters, O'Leary, *Memorias*, I. See also, Irisarri, *Historia Crítica del Asesinato cometido en la persona del Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho*.

<sup>35</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, II, 83, 99.

thority to settle the anomalous situation which had arisen out of the establishment of the two governments under Torre Tagle and Riva Agüero. On September 10 he was invested by the congress with full military and political authority under the title of Liberator, Torre Tagle being permitted to retain only minor functions; and when, in November, Riva Agüero was arrested on a charge of treasonable correspondence with the enemy and banished from the country, the Liberator remained in undisputed control of the whole of the emancipated territory. It was during this period that the constitution of 1823 was adopted and promulgated. But in order that the Liberator might not be embarrassed by restrictions, the congress passed a resolution on February 10, 1824, amplifying his dictatorial powers and authorizing him in particular to suspend those articles of the constitution which "might be incompatible with the salvation of the republic." The congress then adjourned subject to the dictator's call.<sup>36</sup>

The outcome of the war has already been indicated. After its conclusion, Bolivar gave his attention exclusively to the realization of certain political plans which had long been revolving in his mind. As this subject receives full consideration in a subsequent chapter, a brief reference to it at this point will suffice. Shortly after the victory of Ayacucho, which assured the independence of Peru and relieved the other new states of the fear of resubjugation, Bolivar assembled the Peruvian congress<sup>37</sup> and resigned into its hands the dictatorial authority with which it had invested him. His resignation was not accepted. On the contrary, his dictatorial powers were extended until the congress should meet in 1826, and, as provided in the constitution of 1823, take steps to organize the government on a legal basis. But, when, in September, 1826,

<sup>36</sup> The decrees referred to are found in *Anales Parlamentarios del Perú*, I, 497, 499.

<sup>37</sup> The congress here referred to was the first congress convoked by San Martín in 1821. After being in session for a short time it was dissolved (March 10, 1825).

events in Colombia compelled him to return to that country, he had not been divested of his authority, a new congress having assembled and adjourned without taking action. Before embarking for Colombia, therefore, Bolivar delegated his powers to General Santa Cruz, in the hope that, by retaining a hold on Peru, the plan which was then uppermost in his mind — the federation of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia — might be more readily advanced. Once freed, however, from the dominating influence of Bolivar's personality, the national spirit of Peru asserted itself. Early in 1827 the authority which the Liberator still attempted to exercise through Santa Cruz was thrown aside and a provisional government under the constitution of 1823 was organized. A convention was then called to revise the constitution. The result was a new instrument which was promulgated in 1828, from which date constitutional government in Peru definitely takes its beginning.<sup>38</sup>

Mexico and Central America formed a group apart. During the three centuries of Spanish domination, intercourse between the colonies to the south of the Isthmus and those to the north of it was infrequent. Mexico and Guatemala were forbidden to trade by way of the Pacific with Peru and New Granada; and, although all commercial restrictions were relaxed during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the development of intimate relations between the two sections. On the other hand, the fleet system, which involved the distribution of all goods for the southern colonies through Porto Bello and Cartagena, led to a constant movement back and forth from the shores of the Caribbean overland to Quito and from Porto Bello across the Isthmus to Panama, thence by water to Lima, and then on by land to the closed port of Buenos Aires.<sup>39</sup> The habits of generations, therefore, had prepared the colonies of the

<sup>38</sup> Vargas, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, III, 243; Arosemena, *Constituciones Políticas* (2d ed.), II, 424.

<sup>39</sup> Bourne, *Spain in America*, 291; Alamán, *Historia de Mexico*, I, 112.

southern continent for coöperation; whereas between the southern and the northern groups the situation was just the reverse. Besides, as communication by land between Mexico and South America was not feasible, contact between the two sections, during the wars of independence, was rendered extremely difficult; for Spain controlled the seas.

Beginning in 1810, the revolution in Mexico continued for a decade without positive results. During its first stage, under the leadership of the priest, Miguel Hidalgo, there appears to have been no well-defined plan of political organization, though the object of the movement was declared by Hidalgo himself to be that of wresting the control of the government from the "Europeans"; that is, the Spaniards, who had fallen under the domination of the French.<sup>40</sup> During the second stage of the revolution, from 1811 to 1815, under the leadership of another priest, José María Morelos, the situation became, from the political standpoint, somewhat more clearly defined, yet it must be remarked that harmony of purpose and of action was by no means attained. When in 1811 Hidalgo was taken prisoner and executed, one of his ministers and his ablest supporter, Ignacio López Rayón, took the initiative in organizing a revolutionary government. Following the example which had been set in Spain and in different parts of America, Rayón formed a junta to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII. In the limited territory controlled by the Patriots, however, obedience was never generally accorded to this junta. Morelos himself, though maintaining friendly relations with it, never recognized its authority. To him a government in the name of the Spanish king was utterly repugnant.

Desiring to establish a government whose authority would be respected by all who were attached to the Patriot cause, Morelos convoked a congress, which assembled at Chilpancingo in September, 1813. This congress, after electing Morelos as

<sup>40</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, I, 361, 376; Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México*, I, 65.

commander in chief, proclaimed on November 6 the independence of Mexico. During the next year, though compelled to migrate frequently from place to place in order to escape capture, it framed a provisional constitution which was promulgated on October 24, 1814.<sup>41</sup> This instrument was an adaptation of the Spanish constitution of 1812 to the republican form of government. But its operation, even within the narrow limits of the territory controlled by the revolutionists, was only nominal, and its duration was brief, for the congress was soon dispersed and Morelos, the main support of the new régime, was, like his predecessor, Hidalgo, captured and executed.<sup>42</sup> For the next four or five years the revolution was prosecuted in a desultory fashion, without organization and without effectiveness, until it entered upon its final stage under circumstances which will now be briefly related.

By the year 1820 the fires of the revolution appear to have been almost extinguished. With the exception of a band under General Vicente Guerrero, now driven to seek refuge in the mountains of the south, no considerable force remained on foot to oppose the disciplined troops at the command of the Viceroy. In reality, as the result of a lack of leadership, of organization, and of unity of purpose, the revolutionary wars had been characterized by such ineffectiveness and by such excesses that the Mexican nobility, the higher clergy, the great landed proprietors, and in general the more enlightened classes had been rather confirmed in their attachment to the Royalist cause than attracted to that of independence. And yet the upper classes of Mexican society were not hostile to the idea of independence itself. On the contrary, they generally favored separation from the mother country, provided it could be effected without jeopardizing their special interests. That is to say, if the character of the revolution were changed from

<sup>41</sup> For the declaration of independence and the constitution of 1814, see Gamboa, *Leyes Constitucionales de México durante el Siglo, XIX*, 235, 237 ff.

<sup>42</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, III, 545; IV, 166, 313, 334.

a popular to an aristocratic movement, their opposition to it would largely disappear. An event which occurred in Spain early in 1820 furnished the occasion for just such a change and led to the rapid consummation of independence under conditions more or less satisfactory to all elements of the population.

The event referred to was the reëstablishment of the Spanish constitution. The restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1814 and his putting aside of the constitution of 1812 had caused great rejoicings among the Loyalists in Mexico, and now that a liberal system was again to prevail, they, and especially the clergy, became greatly concerned as to the security of their special interests. The first impulse was to prevent the promulgation of the constitution and to offer Ferdinand an asylum in Mexico, where absolute government might be maintained unimpaired. But wiser counsels prevailed. The constitution was proclaimed and the new order of things was nominally accepted. Meanwhile, plans were laid to unite all parties on a program whose end was independence.<sup>43</sup>

Colonel Augustin Iturbide, a Mexican who had won distinction in the royalist army against the insurgents and who up to this moment had remained loyal to the king, was chosen to carry the plans into effect. It was essential to win the support of those who had for a decade been fighting for independence, or if any should oppose, to break their power of resistance. Guerrero with his followers in the south appeared to present the most serious obstacle, and Iturbide determined to deal with him as the first step in the accomplishment of his enterprise. Obtaining from the viceroy, who was not a party to the conspiracy, a commission to put down the remnant of the insurgent forces, Iturbide marched against Guerrero late in the year 1820. After a few skirmishes in which the rebels were successful, Iturbide became convinced that the insurrection could

<sup>43</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 14, 60; Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México*, I, 108; Poinsett, *Notes on Mexico*, 264.

not be terminated by force as readily as he had hoped. He therefore resolved to try a different procedure.<sup>44</sup>

Entering into communication with the rebel leader, Iturbide obtained without great difficulty the promise of his adhesion to the revolution in its new form. In the meantime agents had been sent to win over the leaders in different parts of the country. Progress was rapid, and Iturbide was soon ready to make an open avowal of his intentions. Accordingly, on February 24, 1821, he issued a proclamation which, while explaining the causes that impelled the separation of Mexico from the mother country, set forth the principles on which it was proposed to found the new order. This declaration of principles, being associated in name with the place at which it was published, is known to history as the Plan of Iguala.<sup>45</sup> Its essential provisions were: First, the conservation of the Catholic religion without tolerance of any other; secondly, absolute independence under a constitutional monarchy to be known as the Mexican Empire; and thirdly, the intimate union of Americans and Europeans; that is, citizenship and equality of rights for all, regardless of place of birth. Thus, under the device, *religion, independence, union*, the Mexican revolution entered upon its final stage.

The Plan of Iguala provided that the crown be offered to Ferdinand VII, and in the event of his failure to accept it, to the other members of his family in succession. It further provided that the country should be ruled in the interregnum by a body of regents, the presidency of which was offered to the Viceroy, Apodaca, in the expectation that he would not be unwilling to give his support to the scheme as it was set forth in Iturbide's proclamation. But Apodaca, far from giving the movement his support, prepared to resist it by every means in his power. He did not proceed, however, with the

<sup>44</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 57, 84.

<sup>45</sup> The Plan of Iguala is printed in full in the Appendix to Vol. V of Alamán's *Historia de México*, and in Gamboa's *Leyes y Constituciones de México*, 283.

vigor which, in the opinion of the officers of the Royalist army, the occasion demanded, and they deposed him, appointing one of their own number, Francisco Novella, in his stead. This step did not result, as it was hoped it would, in arresting the progress of the revolution. On the contrary, the revolutionary ranks continued to fill with recruits from all sides and the country gradually passed into the control of the Patriots. Early in August, 1821, Iturbide entered the city of Puebla, which for some time had been invested, and from this advantageous position he disposed his troops to begin the siege of the capital itself.<sup>46</sup>

Shortly before the fall of Puebla a new viceroy, Juan O'Donojú by name, arrived at Vera Cruz. Being a liberal in politics, O'Donojú was little inclined to employ force to reduce the Mexicans to submission; and, when he perceived that all the important interests in the country had at last been drawn into the movement for independence, he readily concluded that the continuance of the struggle was futile. He therefore entered into negotiations with Iturbide, and on August 24 concluded with him, though without authority, an agreement confirmatory of the Plan of Iguala. This agreement, known as the Treaty of Cordova<sup>47</sup> because of its having been signed at a little town by that name some hundred miles inland from Vera Cruz, departed in one important particular from the Plan of Iguala; that is, it authorized the Mexican Cortes to elect an emperor in the event that none of the Spanish Bourbons should accept the crown. By this change the way to the throne was opened to the ambition of Iturbide.

Because of O'Donojú's lack of authority to conclude such an agreement, Novella and the leaders of the Royalist army declined to abide by it. Nevertheless Iturbide was able to take possession of the city of Mexico and to set up a government

<sup>46</sup> Alamán, *op. cit.*, V, 257 ff.

<sup>47</sup> A translation of the treaty is found in *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, IV; see also, Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, Appendix; and Gamboa, *op. cit.*, 286.



without serious interference from the Royalists. The Regency, under the Plan of Iguala, was organized with Iturbide as its president, to which office was attached the chief command of the armed forces on land and sea. O'Donojú, who had entered the capital with the Patriot troops, was made one of the regents; but he died suddenly a few days later. In February, 1822, a national congress, convoked by the regency, met in the City of Mexico. In this assembly opposition to the regency was at once manifested by the former followers of Hidalgo and Morelos—the “old patriots”—because of the evident intention of Iturbide to usurp the throne. Of the five members of the regency, three, who were strong partisans of Iturbide, were deposed and were replaced with persons hostile to him. Moreover an active propaganda was begun in the press in favor of the establishment of a republic, and conspiracies were formed with that end in view.

In due time news arrived of the rejection of the treaty of Córdoba by the Spanish Government. Iturbide then determined to gain possession of the throne without further delay. The situation was serious and uncertain, and the method of his procedure was altogether irregular. On the night of May 18, 1822, disorganized bands of soldiers and crowds of the lowest class of people, known in Mexico as *léperos*, acclaimed him as emperor; and on the following day a mob composed of like elements of the population invaded the halls of the National Assembly and by threats of violence compelled that body to give its approval to the choice of the populace. If the circumstance of intimidation had not deprived the action of the congress of its legal force, the further circumstance that less than a majority of the deputies were present and that a respectable number of these voted in the negative, would have sufficed to cast grave doubt upon the validity of the emperor's title.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Mexican historians are in substantial agreement as to the facts relating to the establishment of the empire. Cf. Alamán, *Historia de México*,

Although the conditions under which Iturbide assumed the crown were not such as to inspire confidence, yet, if he had possessed political sagacity, had had the good judgment to conciliate the partisans of representative government, and had not committed all manner of political blunders, he might have been able to induce the leaders of the various groups to give the new régime their united support. But, lacking penetration and balance, he pursued a contrary course. In the first place, he made his government ridiculous in the eyes of many of his subjects by forming an imperial court whose members were permitted to enact the farce of imitating manners and customs to which the precedents of generations alone gave sanction in the monarchies of the Old World. In the second place, he aroused bitter opposition on the part of those who were hostile to arbitrary government by gradually usurping the powers of the congress and finally by dissolving it altogether.<sup>49</sup>

The inevitable result was the downfall of the empire. In December, 1822, Colonel Antonio López de Santa Anna, destined to occupy the center of the stage in Mexican affairs for long years to come, raised the standard of revolt at Vera Cruz. Declaring in favor of the republican form of government, he was soon joined by Victoria, Guerrero, and other veterans of the early struggles for independence. The uprising spread rapidly and soon became so formidable that the emperor attempted to check it by reassembling the congress which he had boldly dissolved a few months before. But his efforts were of no avail. Realizing at length that his situation was hopeless, he sent to the congress on March 19, exactly ten months after his elevation to the throne, a formal renunciation of the imperial crown. This renunciation the congress, in order to avoid even

V, 591 ff.; Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico*, I, 164 ff.; Bustamente, *Cuadro Histórico*, VI, 91 ff. Both Zavala and Bustamente were members of the congress. A good, brief account is given by J. R. Poinsett in his *Notes on Mexico*, 265-274.

<sup>49</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 637, 662; Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico*, I, 175.

an implied recognition of his right to the thing renounced, refused to accept; but it voted to permit him to quit the country and to pay him an annual stipend of 25,000 pesos, on condition that he establish his residence in Italy.<sup>50</sup> To this condition Iturbide agreed.

His subsequent career was as brief as it was tragic. Placed aboard a British vessel chartered for the purpose, he was conducted to Italy; but he remained there only a short time. Making his way to England, where he arrived in January, 1824, he informed the Mexican Government of his movements, attributing his breach of agreement to the desire to aid in repelling an attack, which, he declared, Spain was preparing, in conjunction with the Holy Alliance, upon the independence of Mexico. The Mexican congress, however, fearing that it was his purpose to regain the imperial throne, decreed that he should be dealt with as a traitor and an outlaw, if, upon any pretext whatever, he should set foot upon Mexican soil. Ignorant of this measure, Iturbide, some four months after his arrival in England, embarked for Mexico. About the middle of July his ship cast anchor on the coast near Soto la Marina, where, accompanied by Colonel Beneski, a Polish officer who had formerly been in the imperial service in Mexico, he went ashore. But in spite of his disguise he was recognized and placed under arrest. The commandant of the district, Felipe la Garza, being in doubt as to whether he should at once give effect to the proscription, resolved to consult the provincial congress of Tamaulipas, which was in session at the neighboring town of Padilla. No sooner was the matter presented to that body than Garza was ordered immediately to proceed with the execution of the law, and in the afternoon of the same day, July 19, Iturbide was shot in the public square.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>50</sup> Bustamente, *Historia del Emperador D. Agustín de Iturbide*, 135.

<sup>51</sup> The best account of the capture and execution of Iturbide is that given by Garza in his official report, which is found in full in Bustamente's *Historia del Emperador*, 249-258. Iturbide's *Memoirs* were published in England by M. J. Quin, on the eve of the former Emperor's return to Mexico.

Meanwhile, progress had been made toward the establishment of popular government in Mexico. Upon the abdication of Iturbide the congress vested the executive authority of the nation in a junta of three members, each of whom was authorized to serve for alternate periods of one month in the office of president. In response to a general demand a new congress was convoked to meet the following October for the purpose of framing a constitution. Political parties at once began to form on the issue of a unitary system with little local autonomy, as opposed to a federal system with a weak central authority. Monarchism practically disappeared. The Bourbonists — that is, those who had favored the establishment of a Bourbon empire in Mexico, and who had never become reconciled to the elevation of Iturbide to the throne — gave their support to the group which stood for a strong centralized government; while the Iturbidists, moved in part, no doubt, by resentment against the Bourbonists, whom they blamed for the emperor's downfall, joined forces with the partisans of a federal system. The centralists drew into their ranks a majority of the Spaniards resident in the country, the higher clergy, and the men of wealth and standing in the community; while the federalists, composed in the main of the humble sort of folk, gained strength and prestige by the adhesion of the "old patriots" — now regarded as the real national heroes — to their cause. Thus the two parties came to be distinguished not only as centralistic and federalistic, but as aristocratic and democratic, respectively.<sup>52</sup>

The same year the volume was translated and published in French under the following title: *Memoires Autographes de don Augustin Iturbide, ex-empereur du Mexique, contenant le detail des principaux evenements de sa vie politique, avec une preface et des pieces justificatives*. A pamphlet by Beneski, entitled: *A Narrative of the Last Moments of the Life of Don Augustin de Iturbide, ex-emperor of Mexico*, was published in New York in 1825. The following recent studies of Iturbide have appeared: *La Guerra de Independencia, Hidalgo — Iturbide* (1910), by Francisco Bulnes, and *Don Augustin de Iturbide* by Augustin de Iturbide in the *Records of the American Catholic Historical Society* for December, 1915, and March, 1916.

<sup>52</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 763; Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico*, I, 254.

When the new congress assembled it was seen that the federalists were in the majority; in fact, they all appeared to have been federalists, differing only in the degree of local autonomy which they severally favored. A Constituent Act setting forth the fundamental principles upon which it was proposed to found the government was the first matter to receive consideration. The adoption of Articles 5 and 6 of the Act, providing that the form of government should be that of a federal republic composed of states "free and sovereign" in all matters pertaining to their internal administration, was the point upon which discussion principally turned. One of the representatives, Father Mier, a man of learning, whose long residence and varied experiences in Europe and in the United States added authority to his words, made a notable address in which he pointed out the dangers attendant upon too great decentralization in the government. The prosperity of the United States under a loosely federated system had served, he thought, to blind the Spanish American countries to important differences between the two sections. He called attention to the fact that the Thirteen Colonies were originally separate and independent states and that they had formed a federation for the purpose of opposing their united strength to the oppression of England. For Mexico, already united, to break up into a loose federation would be but to weaken itself by division and to give free rein to the very evils which it was desired to hold in check. The want of enlightenment among the masses, the political inexperience of those who would be called upon to administer the local governments, the necessity for vigorous action to maintain order and preserve independence, and finally the very geographical configuration of the country, demanded that power should be retained for the most part in the hands of the central authorities. The speaker did not, however, condemn the principle of federation itself. He merely opposed the application of it in such a way as to weaken the effectiveness of the national government. His ideal was a system mid-

way between that of the United States, where an excess of local autonomy prevailed, and that of Colombia and Peru, where centralization of authority was carried to an extreme.<sup>53</sup>

But argument was in vain. The Act was passed and, being promulgated in January, 1824, served as a fundamental law until the following October, when the constitution was completed and put into effect.<sup>54</sup> In respect to the general provisions which this instrument made for the organization of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the government, as well as in respect to the large measure of local control which it permitted to the provinces — henceforth to be called states — it followed the Constitution of the United States more or less closely. It is not to be inferred, however, that the Mexican constitution was a servile imitation of that of the United States; for throughout, in form as well as in spirit, it shows unmistakable evidences of having been strongly influenced by the Spanish constitution of 1812.<sup>55</sup> In accordance with the provisions of the new fundamental law, a president was elected — the choice falling to General Victoria who had already been elected provisionally — and the United Mexican states appeared at last to have attained definite political organization. Four years later, however, Victoria's term of office came to a close amid circumstances of the greatest disorder. The constitution from which so much had been expected was violated. The presidential succession was determined by force and a period of anarchy from which Mexico was long to suffer was begun.<sup>56</sup>

Amid the upheavals which for years had been stirring the other Spanish American countries, the captaincy-general of

<sup>53</sup> The speech is published in: González, *Biografía del Benemérito Mexicano D. Servando Teresa de Mier Noriega y Guerra*, 350-363; and in Bustamente, *Historia del Emperador Agustín de Iturbide*, 200-216.

<sup>54</sup> For the constitution see Gamboa, *Leyes y Constituciones de México*, 313-357.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. an article by James Q. Dealey on *The Spanish Source of the Mexican Constitution of 1824*, in the *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association* for January, 1900.

<sup>56</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 812-843.

Guatemala, embracing the provinces of Guatemala, Chiapas, Honduras, San Salvador, León (Nicaragua), and Costa Rica, had remained in a state of relative tranquillity. There had been revolts, it is true, but being sporadic they had been easily suppressed. Not until 1820, when the Spanish constitution was restored and freedom of speech was extended to the colonies, did a general movement in favor of independence make itself felt throughout Central America. The proclamation of the Plan of Iguala, to which Chiapas adhered, had the effect of hastening decisive action on the part of the other provinces. Guatemala, the capital, declared its independence on September 15, 1821; but, as the captain-general, Gainza, and the other colonial authorities joined in the declaration, they were continued in office under a consultative junta, which was authorized to exercise a general supervision over their acts. A congress was called, to which the other provinces were invited to send delegates, to decide whether or not independence should be made general and absolute, and if so, to determine the form of government and to frame a constitution. The way was thus purposely left open for a possible agreement, which Gainza and many others favored, for incorporation in the Mexican Empire under the Plan of Iguala. This idea, however, was not generally approved, and, when Gainza took the oath of allegiance under the new order, he was required to employ a formula declaring specifically that Guatemala was independent of Mexico and of all other nations.<sup>57</sup>

Guatemala's declaration had the effect of precipitating action on the part of the other provinces. All declared their independence of Spain, but not all entertained the same opinion as to their future status. San Salvador was inclined to maintain an independent position without connection with either Guatemala or Mexico. Nicaragua was divided, a part of the province being in favor of incorporation in the empire of

<sup>57</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico de las Revoluciones de Centro América*, I, 25. Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 344.

Mexico and a part preferring union with Guatemala. Honduras was similarly divided, while Costa Rica declared its independence of all powers and resolved to await the outcome of events to decide upon its future connections.<sup>58</sup>

When the news reached Mexico that the province of Chiapas had expressed a desire to become incorporated in the Mexican empire under the Plan of Iguala, the regency, but recently created, proclaimed its incorporation and ordered that in the convocation of the Cortes an invitation to send deputies to that body should be extended not only to Chiapas but to any other province or part of a province manifesting a desire to unite with Mexico.<sup>59</sup> Soon afterward, when Guatemala's action became known at the Mexican capital, Iturbide, as president of the regency, addressed a communication to Gainza, in which he declared that Guatemala, instead of attempting to remain independent, ought to unite with Mexico to form a great empire; that Guatemala was, in fact, incompetent to govern herself; and that, as it might fall a victim to foreign ambition, a strong Mexican army was already marching southward to give it protection.

While Iturbide's designs were made manifest by this letter, his agents and partisans, who were growing in number, set on foot an agitation to bring about their realization. Late in November, 1821, the Guatemalan junta, which now included in its membership representatives of the other provinces, resolved to lay the proposal of union before all the municipal governments and request them to take the sense of their several communities upon it. Thirty days were allowed for their replies; and, when the returns received by the end of that period were canvassed, it was found that a majority were in favor of immediate annexation. Thereupon, without waiting for the responses of a number of municipalities, the junta, in spite of its previous announcement that it would commit the question

<sup>58</sup> Gómez Carrillo, *Compendio de Historia de la América Central*, 163-171.

<sup>59</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 346.



to a congress for final decision, declared, on January 5, 1822, that the provinces of Central America were henceforth "incorporated" in the empire of Mexico. This hasty action was deemed necessary in order to avoid a civil war, which would, it was feared, destroy the political harmony which the provinces had so long enjoyed under a common government. Moreover, the incorporation was agreed to on condition that, if the provinces should in future find it practicable to constitute an independent state, they were to be permitted to do so.<sup>60</sup>

Although action of the junta was generally acquiesced in, San Salvador disputed its legality and prepared to maintain her independence by force. Gainza, acting in the name of the empire, attempted to reduce the province to submission and an armed conflict ensued. Shortly afterward General Filísola, who had been appointed by the Mexican government as captain-general with full military and political power over the newly acquired territory, arrived on the scene, and, desiring to end the conflict without further bloodshed, arranged an armistice and entered into negotiations with the authorities of the recalcitrant province; but, after some months of fruitless negotiations, he resolved to settle the difficulty by arms. Victorious in a number of encounters, he took the capital and finally compelled the remnant of the republican army to capitulate.<sup>61</sup> But the victory proved to be fruitless; for, a month after the war was brought to a close, the fall of the empire made inevitable the reestablishment of Central American independence.

Of San Salvador's resistance to forcible annexation to Mexico, there was an incident which merits a passing notice. During the negotiations between Filísola and the Salvadorean government, the latter proposed to unite with Mexico on conditions which would be disclosed to the Mexican congress alone. Filísola refused to transmit the proposal without full knowl-

<sup>60</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, 31-38. For the act of incorporation, see *Ibid.*, Appendix, doc. 2.

<sup>61</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, 50-51.

edge of its terms, and, in conformity with his instructions, demanded that the Salvadoreans lay down their arms as a condition preliminary to any form of accommodation.<sup>62</sup> The congress of San Salvador replied by an Act providing for annexation to the United States, and declaring that in the name of the latter the attack of the Mexican forces would be repelled.<sup>63</sup> This move produced upon Filísola no deterrent effect. On the contrary, adverting to the fact that Mexico was at peace with the United States, and declaring the opinion that territory belonging to the empire would not be admitted into the Anglo-American federation without a previous agreement between the two governments, he proceeded with his military operations. Nevertheless, the measure encouraged the Salvadoreans to continue their resistance, in the belief that succor would soon come to them from the United States. At one time, indeed, a baseless rumor prevailed that American warships were actually on the way to protect the province and redress its wrongs.<sup>64</sup>

Nor is it to be inferred that San Salvador, in invoking the protection of the United States, was moved solely by opposition to incorporation into the Mexican Empire. The fact that the congress dispatched three commissioners to the United States with full powers to conclude an arrangement would appear to indicate that the proposal of union was not a mere makeshift. The commissioners landed at Boston in May, 1823, and proceeded later to Washington.<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile the situation in Mexico had changed. Iturbide had abdicated, and, a republic having succeeded the empire, a more generous conception of liberty had come to prevail. The Mexican congress, acknowledging the right of the Central American provinces to determine for

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 48. García, *Documentos para la Historia de México*, XXXVI, 150-154.

<sup>63</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, I, 583, citing Clay, Secretary of State to Williams, chargé d'affaires to the Federation of the Center of America, February 10, 1823. *Mss. Inst. to Ministers*, XI, 5.

<sup>64</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, 49.

<sup>65</sup> Torrens to Alamán, May 31, 1823; *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 10.

themselves their future political status, accorded them a free choice as to withdrawal from the union; and San Salvador cast in its fortunes with those of the other Central American states.<sup>66</sup>

During the interval of several months between the fall of the Mexican Empire and the definite establishment of the Central American Republic, the Salvadorean commissioners remained in the United States, apparently awaiting further instructions. Torrens, the Mexican chargé d'affaires at Washington, kept his government advised regarding their movements. In a dispatch dated August 21, 1823,<sup>67</sup> he reported that he had talked with two of the commissioners, Arce and Rodríguez,<sup>68</sup> who informed him that since Mexico had become a republic they preferred union with it, and that their colleague, Castillo, had set out for the Mexican capital to inform himself respecting the situation there and to discover the attitude of the new régime toward San Salvador. In the same dispatch, Torrens stated that the commissioners were generally regarded as representing not a part but the whole of the ancient kingdom of Guatemala, and had been treated by the public with great cordiality; and that, even if San Salvador should, as they desired, decide in favor of union with Mexico, they had intended to approach the government at Washington at least for the purpose of explaining why the plan of annexation to the United States had been abandoned. He further stated, however, that one of them, Arce, had just departed in great haste for New York under circumstances calculated to arouse suspicion; that he had been

<sup>66</sup> Moore, *op. cit.*, I, 582.

<sup>67</sup> *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 20.

<sup>68</sup> In his dispatch of May 31, cited above, Torrens declared that four commissioners had arrived; namely, Rafael Castillo, Manuel José Arce, Juan Manuel Rodríguez, and Cayetano Vedoya. A fifth, Manuel Zelago, Torrens learned, had died at sea on the way to the United States. Apparently, however, not all of these were commissioned to treat with the United States on the subject of annexation. Marure mentions only one commissioner, *Rodríguez*. Valladares, in his biographical sketch of Arce (*Próceres de la Independencia*) refers to Arce's activities in the United States, but does not mention the question of annexation. Clay, in his instructions to Williams says that there were three commissioners, but does not mention their names.

commissioning military and naval officers and had at his disposal, either at Boston or New York, an armed vessel and a quantity of military supplies. Torrens was thus induced to believe that the Americans had persuaded Arce to lead an expedition to Central America with a view to annex to the United States not only San Salvador but all the other Central American provinces. The expedition never set out, if indeed it was ever seriously contemplated by any one. A month later Torrens informed his government that the commissioners had returned to San Salvador.<sup>69</sup> Although they had received encouragement from private individuals, yet persons in authority appear to have manifested but little interest in their mission. They, in fact, left the country without having seen either the President or the Secretary of State.<sup>70</sup>

In June, 1823, a congress met at the city of Guatemala, and, although composed of representatives of but two provinces, Guatemala and San Salvador, declared, on July 1, the former captaincy-general of Guatemala, as a whole, to be independent of Mexico and of all other powers; adopting as the title of the new nation the "United Provinces of the Center of America," in the hope that the other provinces would join the federation.<sup>71</sup> San Salvador from the first bore a leading part in the formation of the new state. The president of the congress and two members of the triumvirate, to which the executive authority was provisionally entrusted, were Salvadoreans. Possibly these developments may have had an influence in causing San Salvador to abandon any thought of annexation to the United States. Owing, however, to the infrequency of communica-

<sup>69</sup> According to Valladares (*Próceres de la Independencia*, 99), Arce sailed from New York on October 18, bound for Tampico in the interest of a scheme which he had been promoting in the United States for the liberation of Cuba.

<sup>70</sup> Torrens to Alamán, September 18, 1823; *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 32.

<sup>71</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, 62 ff. For the declaration of July 1, see *ibid.* Appendix, doc. 4.

tion, the events took place long before they were known to the Salvadorean commissioners.

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, as was expected, soon united their fortunes with those of Guatemala and San Salvador; and in December, 1823, a congress, composed of representatives of all the provinces, adopted the bases of a federal constitution, in accordance with whose provisions the provinces were erected into states and a national government was organized. In November, 1824, a definitive constitution was adopted and promulgated.<sup>72</sup> Modeled in its essential principles upon the constitution of the United States,<sup>73</sup> it contained some important departures from that instrument, due in part, as in Mexico, to the influence of the Spanish constitution, and in part to the influence of local conditions. It especially provided that the republic should be known as the "Federation of Central America." This provision, however, was not strictly observed in state papers, the old title being occasionally used, and, with yet greater frequency, the variant, "Federated Republic of Central America."<sup>74</sup>

A presidential election was held in 1824, in advance of the formal adoption of the constitution. There were two candidates for the office. One of these was José del Valle, a man of learning, and an able advocate of American unity. The other was Manuel José de Arce, the Salvadorean whose activities in the United States during the summer of 1823 have been mentioned. The election resulted in a contest which was not resolved until February, 1825, when the first congress under the constitution decided in Arce's favor. On the face of the returns, Valle appears to have received a majority of the

<sup>72</sup> For the constitution, see *Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Guatemala*, No. 1. A translation is found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 725-747.

<sup>73</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, 112 ff.

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, the treaty concluded, March 15, 1825, and December 5, 1825, with Colombia and the United States respectively. Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, Appendix, doc. 10.

electoral vote, and the action of the congress not unnaturally embittered him; but, unfortunately, his hostility to the new administration was but one of the many factors that produced in the new republic a serious state of discord.<sup>75</sup> Conflicts between state and national authorities, local quarrels of long standing, personal animosities, the alliance of the president with the enemies of the constitution,<sup>76</sup> and the general tendency to disregard the provisions of that instrument rapidly brought about a condition of affairs bordering upon anarchy. Opposition to Arce finally became so strong that he was obliged to resign. His retirement, however, did not save the situation. Order was not restored; and although the federation nominally continued to exist until 1839,<sup>77</sup> it had long before that time fallen into practical dissolution.

Briefly summarizing our account of the formation of the new American states, we have seen that, upon the ruins of the European colonial systems then remaining in the New World, there were erected, during the second and third decades of the nineteenth century, eleven independent powers. One of these, Haiti, successor to the colony which the French had long maintained in the western part of Santo Domingo, was later temporarily extended by conquest over the eastern part of the island, where, except for a short period, Spanish control had been supreme. Another, the empire of Brazil, embraced the whole of the vast Portuguese territory in the continent of South America. The rest — Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, Uruguay, and Paraguay, all of Spanish origin — formed an unbroken chain of independent states extending from the northern limits of California to the southernmost bounds of Chile and the Argentine. As between the nations of this group, composed of former colonies of Spain, abundant evidence has

<sup>75</sup> Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico*, I, 93, 139.

<sup>76</sup> Valladares (*Próceres de la Independencia*, 112 ff.) presents Arce in a more favorable light.

<sup>77</sup> Gómez Carrillo, *Compendio de Historia de la América Central*, 202.

been adduced of the existence of a unity of purpose during the struggle for independence. As colonies they had been subject for three hundred years to a common rule; they had a common ethnic origin; they spoke a common language; they were influenced by common social traditions and practices; and finally, they achieved their independence in a common struggle against a common enemy. Their cohesion was therefore the natural result of causes which operated only indirectly, in the formation of the more inclusive sentiment of Pan-Americanism. It remains to be seen what were the forces that drew together the nations of the Western Hemisphere irrespective of political origin, of racial composition, of religion, of customs, or of language. To make this clear will be the purpose of the succeeding chapters.

## CHAPTER III

### FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS

SOME reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the efforts of San Martín to set up an independent monarchy in Peru, and the history of Mexico's experiment as an empire under Iturbide has also been briefly related. Whether the new states should adopt the republican or the monarchical form of government was a question of vital importance; for, if the latter form had prevailed, and if dynastic connections had been maintained by the new governments with the reigning houses of Europe, the development of a separate political system on this continent would have been impossible. The subject, therefore, deserves further consideration.

Although the series of revolutions which took place throughout Hispanic America during the second and third decades of the last century did undoubtedly involve, from the first, an idea of separation from the mother country, yet the movements were not aimed primarily at the attainment of independence. Hence there was little thought, in the beginning, of the form of government most convenient to adopt. The conception of absolute freedom from European control and of an independent existence under a republican régime was slowly evolved out of the struggle. Moreover, loyalty to the Spanish sovereign was a remarkable characteristic of the revolution in its early stages. Napoleon's usurpation of the throne of Spain met with scant sympathy or support in the Spanish dominions in America. On the contrary, the colonial authorities, on hearing of the emperor's designs, proclaimed Ferdinand VII as their lawful king and established relations with the revolutionary junta, which had been formed in Seville to govern in the name of the



captive monarch. In some quarters, however, doubt was expressed as to the right of that body to exercise supreme authority and, in 1810 when the junta was forcibly dissolved, there followed, generally, a movement in the colonies to establish governmental committees owning no superior authority in the mother country. Still these provisional governments professed to act in the name of Ferdinand VII.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the general indifference toward independence, there were numerous leaders throughout Spanish America who looked forward to and labored to establish, a new order of things. Among these was the Chilean, Juan Martínez de Rozas, whose work may be mentioned to illustrate the conflict, which must have been going on in the minds of many, between loyalty to the Spanish king and the desire for a free national existence. In 1810 there were circulated in Chile<sup>2</sup> manuscript copies — there was no printing press in the province at that time — of a pamphlet entitled “Politico-Christian catechism arranged for the instruction of the free peoples of South America,” of which Rozas was believed to be the author. After considering the evils of a monarchy in all its forms he concluded that “a democratic-republican government in which the people rule by means of representatives or deputies whom they elect is the only government which preserves the dignity and majesty of a people; brings men nearest the equality in which God has created them; is least exposed to the horrors of despotism and arbitrariness; is the most moderate, the freest, and therefore the best calculated to make rational beings happy.” And yet he recommended that a government be constituted in the name of Ferdinand VII, because that unfortunate prince merited the sympathy and the tender consideration of every American heart. If Ferdinand should not return to his throne, however, Rozas believed that a government should be formed free from the control of “usurping kings, or of the English, or of Prin-

<sup>1</sup> Villanueva, *Resumen de la Historia de América*, 212–218.

<sup>2</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, VII, 184, 185.

cess Charlotte, or of the Portuguese, or of foreign domination of any kind whatever." <sup>3</sup>

By the time the restoration of Ferdinand had been effected in 1814, the inevitable drift of the revolution toward independence had attained irrepressible momentum. Moreover, the reactionary attitude of Ferdinand seriously impaired what remained of the traditional loyalty to Spain and inclined the colonies more decidedly toward independence. On the other hand, the success of the Royalist arms and the growing anarchy within the Patriot ranks led many of the leaders of the revolution to believe that independence was not to be achieved, nor internal order and tranquillity restored except through the protection of some powerful nation, or through the rule of a prince of some one or another of the reigning families of Europe.

This was the condition of affairs especially in the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. There the masses of the people warmly championed the idea of a federal republic, but many of the leaders were of the opinion that a constitutional monarchy was the only form of government capable of meeting the extraordinary conditions which had arisen. Accordingly two agents, Manuel Belgrano and Bernardino Rivadavia, were commissioned to proceed to Europe with secret instructions to secure independence by negotiating the establishment of a constitutional monarchy with a Spanish or an English prince as sovereign; or in their default one of any other powerful house of Europe.<sup>4</sup> They were further instructed to go by way of

<sup>3</sup> Reference is here made to the different proposals which had been made for the disposition of the Spanish colonies.

<sup>4</sup> Neither Rivadavia nor Belgrano, according to Mitre, was at heart a monarchist, as the sum total of their public life goes to show. In speaking of this chimerical mission, Mitre says: "These two great citizens, the two loftiest representatives of Argentine democracy, always admired and supported one another and continued, until separated by death, in their mutual esteem. Misled for the moment in their political principles, this passing error, motivated by their love of the public welfare involves a moral lesson, which teaches to what extent contemporary happenings may becloud the minds of the most intelligent and lead astray the moral sense of even the most noble characters." Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, II, 285.

Rio de Janeiro and there to open negotiations with Lord Strangford, British minister at the court of Brazil.

Shortly after the departure of these agents the Director of the United Provinces resigned and was succeeded by Carlos Alvear. The new Director appointed Manuel José García confidential agent to the court of Brazil with instructions to cooperate in the task intrusted to Belgrano and Rivadavia. In the face of serious internal disorders, which the acts of Alvear himself had served to aggravate, it was deemed expedient to take steps to place the United Provinces under the protection of Great Britain. García was made the bearer of two notes, one of which was addressed to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. In this note Alvear declared that the provinces desired to belong to Great Britain; that they wished to receive her laws; to obey her government and to live under her powerful influence; that they placed implicit trust in the generosity and good faith of the English people.<sup>5</sup> The note closed with an urgent request that troops be sent to restore order and that some person of authority and standing be designated to take charge of the colony and begin to mold the country to the will of the British king and nation. The second note was addressed to Lord Strangford, and in matter and form was of similar purport to the one directed to the Foreign Office at London.<sup>6</sup>

García arrived at Rio early in 1815. Though he shared with Alvear the opinion that it would be better in the last extremity to surrender the colony to England than to submit again to the domination of Spain, he was not convinced, as was Alvear, that the situation had become hopeless. Counseled by Rivadavia, to whom he confided his instructions, and comprehending the gravity of the proposed step, which partook somewhat of the

Barros Arana says that both were republicans in character, habits, and principles. He expresses the opinion that the majority of the leaders were likewise, by instinct and conviction, believers in the republican system. *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XII, 24-25.

<sup>5</sup> Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, II, 261 (ed. 1902).

<sup>6</sup> Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, II, 256-261.

nature of a criminal act, to use his own characterization, García resolved to disobey his instructions. In accordance with this resolution he withheld the note directed to the British minister at Rio and presented the matter to him orally, in a less humiliating form. But García found that Lord Strangford not only lacked authority to negotiate, but had been instructed by his government to act in harmony with Spain in matters relating to the war in America.

Thus, disappointed in their first efforts<sup>7</sup> the commissioners set out for England, where they arrived in May, 1815. A more unfavorable time for treating with Great Britain could scarcely be imagined. The whole of Europe was in arms against Napoleon, who, having shortly before escaped from the island of Elba, had again assumed the crown of France. Since the principle of legitimacy was being strongly invoked in the new struggle against the emperor, it was clear that England was not in a position to give encouragement to a plan which would have been in direct violation of that principle. Moreover, by the terms of the treaty of July 5, 1814, between Great Britain and Spain, of whose existence the Argentine agents appear to have been ignorant until their arrival in England, the two countries entered into an alliance in consequence of which they agreed to forward by all possible means their respective interests.<sup>8</sup> On August 28 of the same year additional articles were signed, the third article of which was as follows: "His Britannic Majesty being anxious that the troubles and disturbances which

<sup>7</sup> It appears that the commissioners during their stay at Rio de Janeiro entered into negotiations with the Brazilian chancellery and that on January 15, 1815, an agreement was reached which was to serve later as the basis of new negotiations.

According to this agreement, Brazil was to be permitted to occupy, without resistance on the part of Buenos Aires, the Banda Oriental, and the government of Buenos Aires engaged to see that the congress should seek annexation to Brazil, thus forming an independent empire under the scepter of the Prince Regent of Brazil, who should take the title of the Emperor of South America. Villanueva, *Bolívar y El General San Martín*, 31-32; 52-57.

<sup>8</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1814, I, 273.

unfortunately prevail in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty in America should entirely cease, and the subjects of those provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign, engages to take the most effectual measures for preventing his subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in America.”<sup>9</sup> It was evident, therefore, that no help was to be obtained from England.

Under the circumstances the Argentine commissioners, accepting the advice of Manuel Sarratea,<sup>10</sup> resident agent of the Buenos Aires Government in London, resolved to forego all efforts to treat with the government of Great Britain or that of Spain, and instead to open negotiations with the deposed Spanish king, Charles IV, who was at the time domiciled in Rome. Charles IV, it will be recalled, had been forced to abdicate, as a result of the rebellion of Aranjuez, shortly before the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, and the Prince of Asturias had been proclaimed as Ferdinand VII. During the occupation of Spain by the armies of Napoleon, Charles and Ferdinand, as well as other members of the royal family, were held as prisoners in France. By the treaty of Valençay,<sup>11</sup> the crown of Spain was restored to Ferdinand, who being released returned to his kingdom in the spring of 1814. The regency and the Cortes, representing the liberal element of the population, had

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 292.

<sup>10</sup> Sarratea, who, according to Mitre, was a man of versatility, a gifted conversationalist, a consummate political speculator, not lacking in ability or breadth of view, suffered the least illusion of any of those concerned in the project, with respect to its desirability or the possibility of realizing it, though he was its real author. He entered upon the affair merely as an interesting adventure. *Historia de Belgrano*, II, 277.

<sup>11</sup> After the invasion of Spain in 1808 Ferdinand was held as a prisoner at Valençay. Charles was detained at Marseilles. Toward the end of 1813 the continued success of the allies drove Napoleon to enter into negotiations with Ferdinand, in the hope that by restoring him to the throne of Spain he might embroil that power with its British ally. A treaty was concluded on December 11, 1813, which stipulated, among other things, that Ferdinand should be recognized by the emperor as King of Spain and the Indies. Alison, *History of Europe*, XII, 423, 426.

refused to ratify the treaty, and they were opposed to recognizing Ferdinand except on condition that he swear to the constitution of 1812. But the Liberals were a small minority. The great mass of the people acclaimed Ferdinand, and soon he was recognized on all sides as the lawful king.<sup>12</sup>

After the fall of Napoleon there was no disposition on the part of the powers to insist upon the return of Charles IV to the throne, although his abdication was originally brought about and was afterward maintained by force, in violation of the principle of legitimacy. Charles, therefore, left without support from any quarter, signed, January 14, 1815, a species of family pact in the form of a declaration renouncing forever in favor of Ferdinand VII all claims to the throne of Spain.<sup>13</sup> But it was thought that this agreement, ratified as it was at the moment of Napoleon's triumphant return, lacked binding force; that the very fact of the coalition of the powers against Napoleon placed Charles in a position of vantage, for, in order to be consistent with their declarations and maintain in all its vigor the principle of legitimacy, the members of the coalition could not fail to recognize him as the lawful King of Spain. Moreover, a failure of the allies to support him might result in his being thrown into the arms of Napoleon.

The commissioners proposed, therefore, first, to obtain from Charles IV a declaration as sovereign recognizing the separation of the colonies from Spain and constituting two or more independent monarchies upon whose thrones should be placed Spanish princes; secondly, to induce Charles to communicate the plan to the sovereigns of Europe and to request them to support it against the opposition of Ferdinand VII. It was believed that in this way the hostility of the absolutist governments of Europe could be overcome, and at a single stroke independence attained and the war ended. From the standpoint

<sup>12</sup> *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 212.

<sup>13</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, 1814, II, 873.

of European politics, the plan was not lacking in plausibility, for it offered a solution based on legitimacy. Nevertheless, it was destined to failure. Before the negotiations were well under way Napoleon's power had been destroyed, and in view of this turn of affairs Charles IV refused outright to give the scheme his approval, thus bringing the negotiations to an abrupt end.<sup>14</sup>

This venture having failed, Belgrano returned to America, leaving Rivadavia to continue negotiations in Europe. In March, 1816, shortly after Belgrano's arrival at Buenos Aires, the congress of Tucumán convened to consider a number of questions of vital importance to the provinces, among them being the declaration of independence and the form of government to be adopted. It must be remembered that the independence of the Buenos Aires Government, though actually an accomplished fact, had not yet been expressly declared. This step had been awaiting the selection of the form of government, for upon that would depend the question of recognition and the possibility of forming much desired alliances. Belgrano, strongly impressed by the course of events in Europe, declared in a secret session of the congress that the whole tendency of European politics was toward monarchy and away from republicanism. He had become convinced, however, of the desirability of separation from Spain, and he accordingly recommended the immediate declaration of independence. As to the form of government he inclined toward monarchy and he suggested the resuscitation of the ancient Inca empire, by erecting a throne at Cuzco and placing upon it a descendant of the Inca kings. The congress accepted this recommendation with reference to the declaration of independence, a resolution to that effect being passed on July 9, but though the body was overwhelmingly in favor of the principle of monarchy, it rejected the proposal for the restoration of the Inca dynasty, as there

<sup>14</sup> Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*; II, 271-282.

were other schemes under consideration which appeared to be more feasible.<sup>15</sup>

One of the first acts of the congress of Tucumán was the election of Juan Martín de Pueyrredón as supreme director of the United Provinces. Pueyrredón on assuming the directorate became interested in the promotion of plans for the conversion of the government of the provinces into a monarchy. As early as 1808, when Napoleon usurped the crown of Spain, Princess Charlotte, wife of the prince regent of Brazil and sister of Ferdinand VII, had begun to intrigue to get possession of the Spanish dominions in America,<sup>16</sup> considering them lost to Spain. Out of these intrigues grew a number of proposals, among which was one to create in Buenos Aires a monarchy with Princess Charlotte as regent. But this and other similar schemes being opposed by Great Britain, as the ally of Spain and virtual protector of Portugal, came to nothing, though they did not lack supporters among the American subjects of Ferdinand, particularly in Buenos Aires.<sup>17</sup>

The idea of establishing some sort of political connection between the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires was kept alive. Shortly before the congress of Tucumán declared the independence of the united provinces, a communication was received from García proposing that the King of Portugal be recognized as sovereign. The congress after consideration appointed a special agent to negotiate with the Brazilian court on the basis of the following alternative projects: First,

<sup>15</sup> Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, II, 329-333.

<sup>16</sup> According to a report made by Joel R. Poinsett to the State Department, November 4, 1818, on his mission to South America, manifestoes were published by the Infante don Pedro, nephew of Charles IV of Spain, and by the Infanta Carlota setting forth their right to the Spanish dominions in America. These manifestoes were accompanied by letters addressed to the viceroy and governors of provinces and were circulated from Buenos Aires to Mexico. *Am. State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 342-3. See also Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, VIII, 92-100.

<sup>17</sup> Villanueva, *La Monarquía en América: Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 10-17. Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, II, 201-205; III, 188-192.



the reëstablishment of the Inca dynasty and the union of that dynasty with the house of Braganza; secondly, the crowning in the United Provinces of a Brazilian prince or some European prince not Spanish who would marry a Brazilian princess; and finally, as a last resort, the recognition of the King of Portugal on condition that he remain on American soil. The agent designated, however, did not accept the post and the Director, under authority of the congress, continued the negotiations, employing for the purpose as before the agent, García.<sup>18</sup>

Pueyrredón, though born in Buenos Aires, was the son of a Frenchman and having been educated in France naturally felt a predilection for that nation. Though he continued negotiations with Brazil,<sup>19</sup> he turned his attention preferably to the prosecution of plans aimed at placing a French prince upon the prospective throne of the united provinces. It appears that about this time he received proposals in connection with a plot which had as its object the establishment of a great Hispano-American confederation, at the head of which was to be placed Joseph Bonaparte, who had not, it seems, abdicated his title of King of the Indies.<sup>20</sup> The promoters of this scheme were exiled followers of the Great Napoleon.<sup>21</sup> They proposed to raise a body of Indian troops in the western part of the United States, invade Mexico, and once in possession of that country, extend their operations to the colonies further south. The French minister at Washington, Hyde de Neuville, having learned of the plot, entered a protest to the Secretary of State against its further prosecution on the ground of the violation of neutrality. He was joined in this protest by the ministers of Great Britain and Spain. The American Government took

<sup>18</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 51-57.

<sup>19</sup> Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, III, 310-326.

<sup>20</sup> Villanueva, *Resumen de la Historia de América*, 253.

<sup>21</sup> The scholar and statesman, Lakanal, Marshal Clauzel, and General Desmonettes are mentioned by Villanueva. (*Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 59.) A colony of French exiles received from congress a grant of land

steps to comply with its obligations, and whether for this reason or some other the scheme was soon abandoned.<sup>22</sup>

Hyde de Neuville, having the opportunity to note the development of the revolution in the Spanish colonies and believing its success to be inevitable, unless Spain changed her colonial policy, recommended to the Duc de Richelieu that two constitutional monarchies be set up in America; one in the region of the Rio de la Plata and the other in Mexico.<sup>23</sup> These two monarchies, backed by that of Brazil, would be able, he thought, to smother the insurrection in the rest of the colonies, destroy the spirit of republicanism wherever it existed, and put an end to the predominance of Washington and London in the affairs of Spanish America. He supported his recommendation as to Mexico by an observation of the French consul at Baltimore to the effect that unless Mexico were given a Bourbon king it would fall under the direct influence of the United States and thus be lost to Europe; and as to the United Provinces, by a statement of Secretary Adams to the effect that within a few months the United States would be obliged to recognize their independence. Richelieu favored the plan of Hyde de Neuville and discussed it with the representatives of the powers. In August, 1818, he proposed to Spain that either the Prince of Lucca or the infante, Francisco de Paula, be crowned at Buenos Aires; and he offered to take the matter before the congress which was soon to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle,<sup>24</sup> if Spain so desired. But the negotiations failed, for Ferdinand VII maintained an uncompromising attitude, proudly refusing to acknowledge that he was powerless to prevent the further disintegration of his crumbling empire.<sup>25</sup>

on the Tombigbee River in Alabama and settled there in the winter and spring of 1816-1817. Pickett, *History of Alabama*, 623-633.

<sup>22</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 9, 19, 20.

<sup>23</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 62, citing Hyde de Neuville to Richelieu, May 14, 1817.

<sup>24</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 83-88.

<sup>25</sup> Other efforts were made to extend the influence of this congress to the Spanish colonies, but they were defeated by the stubborn attitude of Fer-

While these negotiations were going on in Europe, Pueyrredón and his colleagues were taking steps at Buenos Aires which were intended to lead to a definite agreement with France. After an unsuccessful attempt to communicate directly with the Duc de Richelieu, Pueyrredón received an agent, Le Moyne, by name, of the French Government who had been sent to Buenos Aires by the Marquis of Osmond, French ambassador at London, for the purpose of counteracting the influence of the Bonapartists who were in the councils of Pueyrredón, and of announcing that Europe would view with extreme repugnance the establishment of a republic in South America. In September, 1818, Le Moyne reported to Osmond<sup>26</sup> that the Buenos Aires Government was strongly in favor of a close political connection with France, that San Martín and Belgrano, who were formerly partisans of England, were now convinced that France offered greater advantages; that the monarchical system was generally preferred to the republican; that Chile and Peru would immediately unite with a monarchy set up at Buenos Aires; that the constitution which was at that time in preparation was being given as strong a monarchical character as circumstances would permit; and finally, that if a monarchy were negotiated the Duke of Orléans would be acceptable as sovereign.<sup>27</sup>

Early in 1819, at the instance of Pueyrredón, Le Moyne returned to Europe to report in person upon the favorable disposition of the Buenos Aires Government. He was followed shortly afterward by José Valentín Gómez,<sup>28</sup> who was authorized by the government to represent the interests of Ferdinand VII and the opposition of Great Britain. *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 19.

<sup>26</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 91-96; 109-121.

<sup>27</sup> Afterward King Louis Philippe of France.

<sup>28</sup> In his credentials it was declared "that the state of affairs in Europe and America had led to the decision to appoint Señor Gómez near the courts of Europe with authority to establish his residence at Paris, Señor Rivadavia returning to London; and that he was empowered to negotiate and make proposals to the ministry of France to the end of causing the cessation of the hostilities which were inundating with blood the provinces of Rio de la Plata, which deserved a better fate. For this result the native

ized by Pueyrredón to negotiate with the French Government the establishment of an Orleanist monarchy with its seat at Buenos Aires. France, however, was not in a position which would enable her to follow an independent course in a matter of such great importance, for she was not yet free from restrictions placed by the powers on her freedom of action.<sup>29</sup> Dessolle, successor of the Duc de Richelieu, therefore renewed negotiations at Madrid with a view to obtaining the agreement of Spain to the erection of a monarchy in the region of the Rio de la Plata with a Spanish prince as sovereign, though this procedure was not approved by Gómez. Failing to win the consent of Ferdinand, Dessolle proposed to Gómez as candidate for the Argentine throne Charles Louis of Bourbon, Prince of Lucca, and grandson of Charles IV of Spain. It is not clear whether Dessolle made this proposal, so close upon the heels of his failure at Madrid, merely as a device to prevent Gómez from treating with some other court, or whether he made it sincerely in the expectation, as he averred, of securing the coöperation of Russia and Austria in inducing Ferdinand to accept.<sup>30</sup>

Gómez objected to the candidacy of the Prince of Lucca on the ground that while it might facilitate the negotiation with Madrid, it would have an opposite effect in Buenos Aires, where a Spanish prince, he thought, would not be acceptable. Nevertheless he communicated the scheme to his government, and the matter was laid, by the Director, before the congress. On November 12, 1819, this body voted to accept the project under conditions which may be briefly summarized as follows: That the King of France would agree to obtain the consent of the great powers of Europe and especially of England and Spain; that he would use his influence to effect the union of

inhabitants were crying out, longing for the moment of this happy metamorphosis, though resolved to maintain to the last their independence." Mitre, *op. cit.*, III, 331.

<sup>29</sup> *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 18.

<sup>30</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 127-146.

the Prince of Lucca with a Brazilian princess and to secure the abandonment of the Brazilian claims in the Banda Oriental; that the new kingdom should embrace at least the territory which constituted formerly the viceroyalty of La Plata; that the constitution already adopted,<sup>31</sup> with such minor changes only as were necessary to adapt it to a monarchical régime, be accepted; that France, in case of resistance on the part of Spain, should engage to furnish the Prince of Lucca with troops to carry out the enterprise; and that if England offered armed opposition the project should be abandoned.<sup>32</sup> The events which followed made the realization of the scheme impossible.

In the United Provinces the period of relative order under the directorate of Pueyrredón was followed by an increase of unrest resulting in civil war. Rondeau, who succeeded Pueyrredón upon the adoption of the constitution of 1819, was like his predecessor, of French descent and partial to France and a monarchy. Taking the field against the rebels he was defeated by them in February, 1820, and compelled to resign. Sarratea, whose activities in London have been noticed above, now assumed the office of governor of the province of Buenos Aires. Championing the cause of republicanism he published a pamphlet<sup>33</sup> exposing the intrigues of the monarchists. This

<sup>31</sup> The constitution was promulgated on May 25, 1819. In the manifesto recommending it to the people, the state was thus described: "It is not the democracy of Athens, nor the régime of Sparta, nor the patrician aristocracy or the plebeian effervescence of Rome, nor the absolute government of Russia, nor the despotism of Turkey, nor the complicated confederation of some other states. It is a state midway between democratic convulsion and the abuse of limited power." But as a compromise between these extremes it was not a success, giving satisfaction to neither party. Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, III, 333-335. For the constitution of 1819 and the manifesto see Lemoult, *Constitution des Provinces Unies de l'Amérique du Sud* (Paris, 1819).

<sup>32</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 146-151. Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, III, 335 (ed. 1902).

<sup>33</sup> *Proceso original justificativo contra los reos acusados de alta traición en el Congreso y Directorio*, Buenos Aires, 1820. Cf. Blanco-Azpurúa *Documentos*, VII, 110-127.

publication was inspired, it was believed, by the partisans of England in Buenos Aires, Sarratea himself being among this number. The supporters of the candidacy of the Prince of Lucca being thus driven from office were unable to carry the negotiations forward. And if this had not been the case, failure would have been inevitable in Europe; for, apart from the fact that France failed to receive the expected support from the Holy Alliance, England, informed of the project, made known her hostility and would have been able, no doubt, to interpose successful resistance to its execution, had it been persisted in. Though the idea of a monarchy was not yet completely banished from Argentine soil, there were henceforth to be no more official efforts to establish that system of government there.<sup>34</sup>

The projects which have just been considered, although they were put forward with reference mainly to the provinces of the Rio de la Plata, yet extended in scope to Chile and Peru. The latter, held in strict subjection to the peninsular authorities, took no part in the negotiations. Chile, however, while much less inclined to the monarchical system than the United Provinces and usually refraining from active participation in the plans looking to the establishment of that system, did send an agent,<sup>35</sup> Antonio José Irisarri, at the solicitation of the government of Buenos Aires, to take part in the negotiations which issued in the candidacy of the Prince of Lucca. Irisarri was instructed to proceed to London and to let it be known in the conferences which he might have with the ministers of England and the ambassadors of the European powers, that it

<sup>34</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 151-160.

<sup>35</sup> Barros Arana declares that if there was in Chile at this time a deeply rooted sentiment it was that of nationality; that no consideration whatever could have overcome the desire of Chile to form a separate nation; that O'Higgins, in obedience to national sentiment, would never have lent his sanction to any plan violating that sentiment; and that if this intrigue for establishing a monarchy in Chile had become known there would have been aroused against it a storm of public opinion. *Historia de Chile*, XII, 41, 42.

was the ultimate aim of the government of Chile to adopt the "continental system of Europe"; that Chile would not be indisposed to set up a constitutional monarchy, such form of government being better adapted than any other to the legislation, customs, conventions, and religious organization of Chile; but that having no prince to whom the government could be intrusted, the country was willing to accept, subject to the constitution which was being framed, a prince of any of the neutral powers, who, under the protection of the dynasty to which he belonged and in the enjoyment of influence derived from relations with European courts, would fix his empire in Chile, thus assuring its independence of Ferdinand VII and of his successors and of every other foreign power.<sup>36</sup>

Irisarri, proceeding overland to Buenos Aires on his way to Europe found, after reaching San Luis in the province of Cuyo, that the instructions which had been given him did not bear the signature of the Supreme Director nor of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Returning the papers therefore to Santiago, to be signed and dispatched to England by sea, he continued his journey. Upon the return of the documents, O'Higgins, who had probably not read the instructions before with care, now refused to sign them, and as no new instructions were drawn up the Chilean envoy was left without a definite guide for his diplomatic functions in Europe. It appears, however, that he put himself in touch with the Argentine agents and sent dispatches to his government concerning the project for crowning the Prince of Lucca at Buenos Aires. It is not clear whether or not he favored the project; for shortly afterward O'Higgins had all the papers referring to the matter burned.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, XII, 48. Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, IV, 486 (ed. 1890).

<sup>37</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, XII, 51, 52. Irisarri left Santiago December 12, 1818, and reached his destination in May, 1819. While in London he was the principal editor of *El Censor Americano*, which was published in that city from July to October, 1820. Sánchez, *Bibliografía Venezolanista*, 176.

Villanueva states that Irisarri urged O'Higgins to accept the plan.

It was two years after the failure of this scheme for establishing a monarchy in southern South America with the Prince of Lucca as sovereign, that San Martín, as has been noted above, entered into negotiations with the viceroy of Peru with the aim of securing the recognition of the independence of the viceroyalty through its erection into a kingdom with a Spanish prince on the throne. With the breaking off of these negotiations and the retirement of San Martín from Peru before his plans for further negotiations with other reigning houses of Europe had matured, the monarchical form of government came to be regarded by the leaders of opinion in the newly formed states in this section of South America as less suitable to their peculiar needs than the republican form.

Some attention must now be given to the northern part of the continent; that is, to Venezuela, New Granada, and Quito. Here republican tendencies were, perhaps, not essentially stronger than in the south, but they found more positive expression in the early years of the struggle. On December 11, 1811, a constituent congress which had been assembled at Caracas adopted for Venezuela a federal constitution similar to that of the United States, though containing certain substantial variations. It is significant that the congress rejected at the same time an aristocratic plan, neither republican nor monarchical, proposed by Francisco de Miranda.<sup>38</sup> A constitution adopted by the "State of Cundinamarca" April 5, 1811, contained elements taken from the constitution of the United States and from that of France under the Directory. This instrument, however, provided that Ferdinand VII should be recognized as head of the state. Shortly afterward, this constitution was overthrown, and on November 27, 1811, an act was adopted constituting the "United Provinces of New Granada," and

He does not, however, give his authority. *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 147.

<sup>38</sup> Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda*. An. Rep. Am. Hist. Assn. 1907, I, 417-421, 456. Cf. also Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 156-172.



declaring that no official appointed by Spain without the consent of the people of New Granada would be recognized. At about the same time Cartagena set up an independent government under a republican constitution. Quito continued under the authority of Spain until 1822.<sup>39</sup>

The years immediately following these first essays in self-government were full of trials and disappointments for the Patriots. They were crushed by the Royalists on every hand. Miranda, who for a brief space was the hope of the revolution, was taken prisoner and transported to Spain, where he died in 1816. Bolivar, though continuing the struggle and winning important victories, was finally compelled to abandon the country. With the exception of a few localities where guerrilla warfare was continued both Venezuela and New Granada fell into the hands of the Royalists. Meanwhile, Bolivar, who had fled to the island of Jamaica and afterward to Haiti, devoted his energies to the organization and development of plans for renewing the war. Of his career as military leader, no more need be said here than to recall the fact that he returned in 1816, after an exile of about a year, at the head of an expedition, fitted out through the magnanimity of President Pétion of Haiti; that he overcame tremendous difficulties, gradually making himself master of Venezuela and New Granada, then of Quito and finally of Peru and Bolivia; that in 1821 he was made president of the republic of Colombia, a state nearly equal in area to the part of the United States east of the Mississippi; and that within a little more than a year thereafter he had become the arbiter of the destiny of the Spanish-speaking peoples from the Orinoco to the borders of Chile and the Argentine. It will be of interest therefore to study for a moment this great leader's political ideals.

During his exile in 1815, Bolivar wrote what has been called his "prophetic letter," setting forth the political principles which he held at the time and which no doubt served in great

<sup>39</sup> Villanueva, *Resumen de la Historia de América*, 200-237.

measure to guide his conduct during the succeeding eventful years of his lifetime. The letter was written in reply to one received from a person in Jamaica, whose name does not appear, requesting information as to what the political situation in each colony was; whether preference was being shown for the republican or for the monarchical system, and whether it was desired to establish a single great republic or a monarchy of like extent.<sup>40</sup> The following extract from Bolivar's reply expresses his view:

"Above all men I desire," he said, "to see formed in America the greatest nation on earth; greatest not so much by virtue of its extent and its wealth, as by virtue of its liberty and its glory. Though I long for a high degree of excellence in the government of my native land, I cannot persuade myself to believe that the New World will, for the present, be organized as a great republic. Since it is impossible to set up such a state I do not dare to wish for it; and much less do I desire a monarchy embracing the whole of America;<sup>41</sup> for that is likewise impossible. Under so great a state it would be impossible to correct the abuses which we at present endure, and hence our emancipation would be fruitless. The American states need paternal governments to cure the sores and wounds of despotism and war. If such a general government were organized the metropolis would be Mexico, the only country whose intrinsic strength could give it such a position. But let us suppose it were Panama, which is more central. Would not all the parts continue to be as weak and as badly governed as at present? For a single government to be able to infuse

<sup>40</sup> The letter was first published in a newspaper of Kingston. From that source General O'Leary obtained it and republished it in his *Memorias*, XXVII, 291-309.

<sup>41</sup> The context appears to show that Bolivar here meant Spanish America. Contemporary writers in Spanish frequently used the terms "*América*" and "*Nuevo Mundo*" to refer to the former colonies of Spain. In the same way *América del Septentrión* was sometimes used to designate Mexico. Cf. Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 587.

life into the New World, touch all the springs of public prosperity, carry out reforms and, in general, bring about a state of relative perfection, it would need to be possessed of the authority of a god and of all the intelligence and virtue of men." <sup>42</sup> A monarchy of such vast proportions, he concludes, would be a deformed colossus which would break to pieces from its own weight upon suffering the least strain.

With regard to the kind and number of governments that should be established, Bolivar referred to the fact that the Abbé de Pradt had suggested the division of America into fifteen or more independent monarchies governed by as many monarchs. As to the number of separate nations he was in agreement with the abbé; but not so with respect to the nature of the governments that should be given them. Small republics, he thought, were to be preferred because the legitimate sphere of their activity is the pursuit of national welfare and the conservation of independence. Their distinctive mark is permanence, while that of great states is change, with a tendency to imperialism. Nearly all small republics, he affirms, have had a long life. The fact that Rome survived some centuries as a republic was due to its being governed as a republic at the capital only, other laws and institutions prevailing in the rest of the territory under its sway. <sup>43</sup>

Discussing the kinds of government which the different divisions would be likely to set up he predicted that some would choose the federal republic and others the unitary or centralized republic; but that the more important sections would inevitably incline to monarchy. He thought a union of New Granada and Venezuela likely to occur, and he suggested that their government might imitate that of England, with the difference that the executive should be elected, preferably for life. A hereditary senate would check the waves of popular

<sup>42</sup>-O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVII, 303.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 304.

passion. The lower house should be elected without other restrictions than such as applied to the British House of Commons.<sup>44</sup>

Such a scheme Bolivar was destined to attempt to carry out, at least in its main features. Upon renewing the war in 1816, he was accorded dictatorial powers. Having made considerable progress toward the recovery of the country from the enemy, he called a congress which met at Angostura, afterward Ciudad Bolivar, February 8, 1819, for the purpose of restoring constitutional government. Into the hands of the congress, Bolivar resigned the extraordinary authority which he had been exercising, and recommended the adoption of the constitution of which he presented a draft. In an address to the congress, he set forth more fully than he had previously done his political principles. He was of the opinion that only a democracy is susceptible of absolute liberty. "But," he asks, "what democratic government has united at one time power, prosperity, and permanence? Is it not true, on the contrary, that aristocracy and monarchy have been the foundation of the great and powerful empires which have lasted for centuries? What government has endured longer than that of China? What republic has been more durable than that of Sparta, or that of Venice? Did not the empire of Rome conquer the earth? Has not France been a monarchy for fourteen centuries? What power is greater than England? These nations have been, nevertheless, either aristocratic or monarchical."

In spite of these painful reflections, he felt great satisfaction in the steps taken by the republic of Venezuela. She had achieved her independence, had proscribed monarchy and privilege, had set up a democratic government, had declared the rights of man. But admirable as was the constitution of Venezuela, it was not suited to existing conditions. In his opinion it was a marvel that its model in North America had happily endured, without being overthrown at the first appearance

<sup>44</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVII, 306.

of difficulty or danger. The people of the United States in many respects were unique; they were models of political virtue; they breathed the atmosphere of liberty; yet it was, after all, he repeated, astonishing that a weak, complicated federal system such as theirs should have survived the trials through which it had passed. Be that as it may, he had not the remotest intention of trying to adopt the system of a people so different from Spanish Americans as were the Anglo-Americans. Venezuela should have a constitution adapted to the political conditions of the country; to the religion, customs, inclinations, of its inhabitants; to the degree of liberty which they were prepared to receive. This was the code they should consult, and not that of Washington.<sup>45</sup>

The model, he insisted, should be the British constitution. The principle of federation should be abolished, the administration centralized, and the triumvirate which constituted the executive authority, under the constitution of 1811, be replaced by a president with greatly enlarged powers. The office, though filled by election, should be analogous to that of the British sovereign. The ministers alone should be responsible. The president of a republic should be invested with even greater authority than that exercised by the chief magistrate of a monarchy; for the throne is protected by the veneration of the people, by the loyalty of the nobility, and by the fraternal interest of other monarchs, whereas the president of a republic stands alone, resisting the combined attacks of opinion, interests, and passions of the whole social body of the state.<sup>46</sup> Bolivar did not on this occasion propose that the president be elected for life, but he warmly championed the hereditary senate.

The congress, in spite of Bolivar's great prestige, was not

<sup>45</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVII, 499.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 506-519.

For Bolivar's address to the congress of Angostura, February 15, 1819, see Blanco-Azurúa, *Documentos*, VI, 585-598.

inclined to accept his aristocratic scheme without due consideration. Their deliberations continued for six months, at the end of which time the project was adopted with no important changes other than the rejection of the hereditary senate, and the elimination of the provision for a fourth power to be known as the "censors."<sup>47</sup>

In the meantime, having provisionally accepted the presidency, Bolivar continued operations against the enemy, and having met with important successes in New Granada, in the liberation of which he had been invited to cooperate, he returned to Angostura in December, 1819. In an address to the congress he gave an account of his campaign and, declaring that the people of New Granada were generally convinced of the desirability of a union of the two provinces, he urged the adoption of the steps necessary to effect such a union. The congress acceded to his wishes and, consulting the expressed desire of the people of New Granada for a political union with Venezuela, enacted a "fundamental law" on December 17, 1819, creating the republic of Colombia. As but one province of New Granada was represented in the passage of the act it was provided that a general congress should meet at Rosario de Cúcuta, on January 1, 1821, for the purpose of framing a constitution for the United Provinces. It was determined, however, that the constitution adopted shortly before at Angostura should meanwhile remain in force and serve as a basis for the new instrument.<sup>48</sup> No sooner had the free provinces of New Granada heard of the step taken by the congress of Angostura than meetings were held, and formal sanction was given to the union.<sup>49</sup>

In due time the congress met at Cúcuta and adopted a constitution, thus definitively effecting the union of Venezuela

<sup>47</sup> The sections of Bolivar's project referring to the "Censors" or "Moral Power" may be consulted in Gil Fortoul's *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 545-551.

<sup>48</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 18-21.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

and New Granada. The republic was divided into departments, at the head of which were placed intendants directly responsible to the president. The legislative branch, contrary to Bolivar's desire, was vested with the exercise of the chief authority, except in times of invasion or of internal commotion, when the president was authorized to assume absolute control. Moreover the judiciary was made wholly independent of the executive. Bolivar, believing as he did in the necessity for the centralization of authority in the chief magistrate, naturally was not pleased at the weakening of this office by the relative increase of the power and of the independence of the other branches of the government.<sup>50</sup>

Elected president, and accepting the post reluctantly, the Liberator left the administration of the state to the vice president, and under the authority of the congress continued to lead his armies against the enemy in the south.<sup>51</sup> It was as a result of his conquests in that quarter that he was finally to have the opportunity to give concrete expression to his political ideals in the constitution of Bolivia,<sup>52</sup> which was adopted by that republic in October, 1826. A brief reference to some provisions of that instrument will throw further light upon the Liberator's political views.

The outstanding feature of the Bolivian constitution was the provision for a president to be chosen for life. Great authority was concentrated in his hands, and he was declared not to be responsible for his administrative acts.<sup>53</sup> The vice presi-

<sup>50</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 101, 102.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>52</sup> This constitution, together with Bolivar's address to the congress on presenting his project, is found in the Blanco-Azpurúa collection of *Documentos*, X, 341-358.

<sup>53</sup> Article 79 of the constitution is as follows: "*El Presidente de la República es el jefe de la administración del Estado, sin responsabilidad por los actos de dicha administración.*" Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, X, 353.

Freeman in his essay on presidential government declares that the main difference between a king and a president is that the president is distinctly responsible to the law; that he may be judged and deposed by a legal process. *Historical Essays*, first series, p. 379.

dent was appointed by the president and confirmed by the legislature. This body, however, was obliged to accept one of three candidates whom the president might name.<sup>54</sup> The parts of the constitution relating to the executive were adopted only after long debate, and then not unanimously, as was the case with practically the whole of the rest of the project. The body of "censors," for which provision had been made in the Angostura project, was included in the Bolivian scheme, the censors forming a third house of the legislative body, and the provision was now adopted. With the exception of an article declaring Roman Catholicism to be the religion of the state, which congress inserted of its own initiative, Bolivar's draft was adopted practically as presented. In the original project nothing had been said about religion.

The preparation of a constitution for Bolivia was but one phase of a great scheme which had been revolving in the mind of the Liberator for some time; namely, the union of the states of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. His plan is set forth in a letter to General La Fuente written at Lima shortly before submitting his draft of a constitution to the Bolivian congress. He said:

"At last I have finished the constitution of Bolivia, and am commissioning my aid-de-camp, Wilson, to take it to General Sucre, who will present it to the congress of Upper Peru. I may say to you now, therefore, that this constitution is going to be the ark in which we shall be saved from the shipwreck which on all sides threatens us, and especially from a direction which you would least suspect. A few days ago Señor Pando arrived from Panama, and the picture which he paints of affairs in general and of the situation in Colombia in particular has excited my attention and for some days past has forced me to the most distressing meditations. You have learned, no doubt, that party spirit has divided Colombia; that her treasury is empty; that her laws have become oppressive; that the num-

<sup>54</sup> Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, X, 352, 354.



ber of state employees increases with the decline of the treasury; and finally, you must know that in Venezuela they are clamoring for an empire. This is a very brief statement of the condition of things in Colombia; but it is sufficient to give you an idea of what I feel under the circumstances. This is not all, my dear general. The worst is that if the trend continues as at present we shall in time experience the same results in Peru; and here as well as there we shall lose what we have achieved by our sacrifices. After careful consideration we have agreed — men of the best judgment and myself — that the only remedy that we can apply in this serious situation is a general federation of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, closer than that of the United States, ruled by a president and vice president under the Bolivian constitution, which, the necessary changes being made, might serve for each state and the federation as well. The intention is to attain the most perfect union possible under the federal system. The government of each of the federal states will remain in the hands of a vice president and two legislative chambers. These governments will deal with questions of religion, justice, civil administration, economic matters, and, in short, everything not relating to foreign affairs and war. Each department will send a deputy to the Federal Congress which will be divided into three chambers, each chamber having a third of the deputies of each republic. These three chambers with the vice presidents and the secretaries of state, who will be elected from the republic at large, will govern the federation. The Liberator, as supreme chief, will visit yearly the departments of each state. The capital will be a central point. Colombia should be divided into three states: Cundinamarca, Venezuela, and Quito. The federation will take whatever name may be chosen for it.<sup>55</sup> There will be one flag, one army, and a single nation. It is indispensable that Peru and Bolivia should begin in some

<sup>55</sup> It is this proposed federation that Villanueva calls *El Imperio de los Andes* in his book of that title.

way to put this plan into effect, since their situation makes them more dependent upon one another. Later it will be easy for me to induce Colombia to adopt the only means left for her salvation. Upper and Lower Peru united, Arequipa will be the capital of one of the three great departments into which these united states will then be divided, after the manner of the great divisions of Colombia."<sup>56</sup>

The Señor Pando, to whom Bolivar refers above, was José M. Pando, one of the representatives sent by Peru in 1825 to take part in the Congress of Panama. In June, 1825, shortly before that body finally convened, Pando was recalled by Bolivar and made Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru. The fact that Pando upon his return began a vigorous propaganda in favor of the federation of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia makes it not unreasonable to suppose that the Liberator, having great confidence in that statesman's ability and judgment, recalled him for the purpose of furthering the scheme. Pando brought from Panama alarming reports to the effect that the Spanish had concentrated great forces in Cuba with the intention of attacking some point on the coast of Colombia, and that another expedition equally strong was being prepared in Spain for the same purpose; that the Spanish squadron in the harbor of Havana was greatly superior to the small Colombian fleet; that Mexico intended to make a separate peace; that France was offering to pay the expenses of the military operations of Spain; that the Holy Alliance was resolved to reduce the republics of America to obedience to the mother country, and that Great Britain, desirous of seeing the democratic foundations of the new states swept away, would not be opposed to the plans of the continental powers.<sup>57</sup>

The external dangers were exaggerated, no doubt, in order to bring the people of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to a realiza-

<sup>56</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 507-508.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 503-505.

*Ibid.* (Bolivar to Santander, April 23, 1826), 655-658.

tion of the necessity of organizing strong, effective governments to prevent internal disorder, as well as to repel invasion. Pando, in accordance with what appears to have been a preconcerted plan, urged the establishment of an empire embracing the territory from Potosi to the Orinoco. His views were shared by many others. Among this number was General Gamarra, afterward president of the republic of Peru, who offered to support Bolivar in the establishment of the only system, the monarchical, which in his opinion could destroy anarchy and make independence a blessing.<sup>58</sup>

O'Leary affirms that Bolivar never countenanced these monarchical schemes; that though he believed the adoption of such a system might assure for the new states the protection of Europe it would inevitably result in war between the partisans of republicanism and those of monarchy.<sup>59</sup> Bolivar's public utterances appear to bear out O'Leary's contention. In his letter to General La Fuente, the Liberator mentions the fact that in Venezuela they were clamoring for an empire. He had in fact received a letter from General Páez, commandant of the military forces in Venezuela, who wrote as the leader of a movement of revolt there, proposing, as Bolivar expressed it, Napoleonic ideas.<sup>60</sup> In a letter to Vice President Santander under date of February 21, 1826,<sup>61</sup> Bolivar said that in replying to General Páez he would direct his attention to the draft of the constitution for Bolivia, and that he wished opinion turned in favor of this instrument, for he believed it would satisfy the most extreme views. He thought that the over-

<sup>58</sup> La Fuente also favored the federation. Haigh gives an account (*Sketches*, 183) of a banquet given by La Fuente to promote good feeling between Colombia and Peru and between these and Great Britain.

<sup>59</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 57-60.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 57, 60.

General Páez declares in his autobiography that the letter referred to is not in accordance with the original and he gives what he claims is the correct version. *Autobiografía*, I, 487-490.

<sup>61</sup> Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, citing Consul Watts to Mr. Caning, Cartagena, May 20, 1826.

confidence which led to Iturbide's downfall ought to be guarded against; or rather that the thing to be guarded against was the just suspicion on the part of the people that a new aristocracy would destroy equality. The plan for establishing an empire offended him more than all the insults of his enemies, because it was based on the assumption that he was a man of vulgar ambition, capable of putting himself on a level with Iturbide and other such miserable usurpers. According to those who proposed such a plan nobody could be great except after the manner of Alexander, Cæsar, and Napoleon. "I wish to surpass them all," he said, "in unselfishness, since I cannot equal them in deeds."<sup>62</sup>

A few days later (March 6) he wrote to Páez reminding him that Colombia was not France nor he himself Napoleon, suggesting a possible solution of all difficulties through the adoption of the Bolivian constitution, and in general discouraging any effort to promote plans for the establishment of a monarchy.<sup>63</sup>

Realizing that the open discussion of the question of monarchy would lead to the formation of warring factions, Bolivar availed himself of the opportunity, on different occasions, to make declarations disclaiming any intention on his part to establish such a form of government. As early as September, 1823, at a banquet given him in Lima, he expressed the hope that the American people might never consent to the elevation of thrones in their territory; that as Napoleon was sent into exile and the new Emperor Iturbide driven from the throne of Mexico, so might the usurpers of the rights of the American people be dealt with. He wished to see not a single would-be sovereign triumphant in the whole extent of the New World.<sup>64</sup>

In June, 1824, Bolivar made certain remarks to an officer, sent by Commodore Hull of the United States Navy to treat

<sup>62</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 651-653.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, 653-655.

<sup>64</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 279.

Odrizola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, V, 328.

with him, respecting matters affecting American vessels in the Pacific, which confirm the view that he was opposed to the establishment of monarchical governments. "They say," the Liberator declared, "that I wish to found an empire in Peru or join Peru to Colombia and establish an absolute government with myself at the head of it; but this is all false and does me great injustice. If my heart does not deceive me I shall follow in the footsteps of Washington. I would rather have an end like his than be monarch of the whole earth, and of this all those who know me are convinced. My only ambition is the glory of Colombia and the desire to see my native land assume its place in the circle of enlightened nations."<sup>65</sup> This was said in the presence of officers of the Patriot army.

But these declarations antedated two years or more the Bolivian constitution and the efforts to found the "Empire of the Andes." Had Bolivar changed from republican to monarchist? The so-called "prophetic letter" cited above and his address to the congress of Angostura show that he was early convinced that his people were not ready for democratic institutions; and that he wished to see established strongly centralized governments with certain aristocratic tendencies. The following extract from the report of a conference between the Liberator and Captain Malling of the British Navy, which took place in March, 1825, serves to recall his former expressions and to raise anew the question of his republicanism. Beginning the conversation with a reference to the reports that had reached him from Bogotá, relative to the fear of an attack by France upon Colombia, Bolivar said:

"But what can France or Spain expect to gain? They can never obtain a permanent footing in our country. France has declared that she will not tolerate popular governments, that revolutions have distracted Europe during the last thirty years, and that America can never see peace so long as she gives way to the popular cry of equality; and, in truth, I am of the opin-

<sup>65</sup> Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, IX, 322.

ion of France, for, although no man is a greater advocate for the rights and liberties of mankind than I, and I have proved this by devoting my fortune and the best years of my life to their attainment, still I must confess this country is not ready for government by the people, which one must allow, after all, is generally better in theory than in practice. No country is more free than England under a well-regulated monarchy. She is the envy of all the countries of the world, and the pattern all would wish to follow in forming a new constitution or government. Of all countries South America is, perhaps, the least fitted for republican government. What does its population consist of but Indians and negroes? — who are more ignorant than the vile race of Spaniards we are just emancipated from. A country represented and governed by such people must go to ruin. We must look to England for relief, and you have not only my leave but my request that you will communicate our conversation and bring the matter under the consideration of H.B.M. government in any manner which may seem best to you, either officially or otherwise. You may say that I never have been an enemy of monarchies, upon general principles. On the contrary, I think it essential to the respectability and well being of new nations, and if any proposal ever comes from the British Cabinet for the establishment of an orderly government — that is, of a monarchy or monarchies in the New World — they will find in me a steady and firm promoter of their views, perfectly ready to uphold the sovereign whom England may propose to place and support upon the throne.

“ I know it has been said of me I *wish* to be a king, but it is doubtful [*sic*] *not* so. I would not accept the crown for myself, for when I see this country made happy under a good and firm government, I shall again retire into private life. I repeat to you if I can be of service in forwarding the wishes and views of the British Government in bringing about this desirable object, they may depend upon my services.

“ I owe it to England. I would infinitely sooner be indebted

to England for its always generous and liberal assistance than to any other country. France or Spain would treat with me, no doubt, were I to make similar proposals to them, but never will I submit to any interference with America on the part of those odious and treacherous nations.

“The title of king would perhaps not be popular at first in South America and therefore it might be as well to meet the prejudice by assuming that of *Inca*<sup>66</sup> that the Indians are so much attached to. This enslaved and miserable country has hitherto only heard the name of king confiled [*sic*] with its miseries, and Spanish cruelties and a change of vice kings has invariably proved a change of one rapacious oppressor for another. Democracy has its charms for the people, and in theory it appears plausible to have a free government which shall exclude all hereditary distinctions, but England is again our example.

“How infinitely more respectable your nation is, governed by its king, lords, and commons, than that which prides itself upon an equality which holds but little temptation [*sic*] to exertion for the benefit of the state; indeed I question much whether the present state of things will continue very long in the United States. In short I wish you to be well assured I am not an enemy of kings or of aristocratical governments, provided that they be under necessary restraints, which your constitution imposes upon the three degrees. If we are to have a new government, let it be modeled on yours, and I am ready to give my support to any sovereign England may give us.”<sup>67</sup>

<sup>66</sup> This title was proposed in Miranda's draft of a constitution prepared in London in 1808. Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 517.

<sup>67</sup> Rojas, *Tiempo Perdido*, 8-11; Villanueva, *Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados*, 257-261, citing archives of the British Government. Foreign office, Peru, 1825, No. 6. Captain Malling to Lord Melville, *Chorrillos*, March 20, 1825.

Rojas gives what purports to be an exact copy of the letter in the original English. His version is followed here. Apparently, however, errors have been made in transcribing and in printing the letter. Such

The letter of Captain Malling reached the Admiralty July 25, 1825, and on August 1 a copy of it was sent to Canning.

No action was taken by the Foreign Office. This unusual method of carrying on diplomatic intercourse is explained by the fact that the consul-general, Thomas Rowercroft, whom the government of Great Britain had sent out to Lima in October, 1823, and through whom the correspondence ordinarily would have been conducted, had been accidentally killed a few months before the conversation with Captain Malling took place. That Bolivar did not employ Peruvian or Colombian agents for this particular purpose was due, in the opinion of certain Venezuelan writers, to his lack of faith in their loyalty;<sup>68</sup> and they cite in evidence of this the fact that of his aids-de-camp in whom he most fully confided, three, O'Leary, Wilson, and Ferguson, were British, and another, Peru de la Croix, was French. That Bolivar trusted these foreigners on his staff is true; but it does not follow that he distrusted his own countrymen. Nor do his conversations on the subject of a monarchy necessarily disclose his real convictions. His aim may have been nothing more than to make soundings. Such, at least, seems to have been the object of his conference with the French admiral, Rosamel. At about the time of the conference with Captain Malling, Bolivar received Rosamel, and expressed to him views substantially the same as those which he had made known to Captain Malling. He even went so far as to manifest a desire to have France take the initiative in the matter of setting up monarchies in South America. On other occasions the Liberator expressed himself with similar freedom.<sup>69</sup> One example may be given. While Bolivar was an exile in Haiti in 1816,

errors as were plainly typographical have been corrected in the above extract.

<sup>68</sup> Villanueva, *Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados*, 261. Bolivar, at this time, says Rojas (*Tiempo Perdido 11*), did not confide in any Colombian or Peruvian with the exception of General Sucre, who alone merited his full confidence.

<sup>69</sup> Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, 72-74.



he received aid in fitting out an expedition from an influential British merchant by the name of Sutherland. Bolivar held Sutherland in high esteem, and it appears spoke freely to him on the subject of government in the new states.<sup>70</sup> The British merchant related his impressions afterward to his son, Robert Sutherland, who, as British consul at Maracaibo, wrote Canning on July 5, 1824, as follows:

"I must observe to you that it was all along Bolivar's intention to change the form of government, as he had expressed such an intention to the late Mr. Sutherland, his most cordial friend. . . . In another conversation with Mr. Sutherland Bolivar remarked that he was aware that a republican form of government was not suited to the genius of the Colombians, but that he felt it necessary to cry it up to aid the revolution and to attribute to Ferdinand all the despotic acts of the former system, but when I get rid of the Spaniards and you visit me I shall have you kneeling and kissing my hands. This was said in a jocular way. These are anecdotes which I believe are alone known to me."<sup>71</sup>

Do Bolivar's confidences to foreigners and his political philosophy as expressed, particularly in his Angostura address and in his Bolivian constitution, justify the conclusion that he was at heart a monarchist? Were the opinions which he expressed to foreigners, especially to representatives of Great Britain and France, his real political convictions? Were the frequent declarations which he made to his fellow countrymen of loyalty to the principles of popular representative government mere political strategy? And finally, was the real purpose of his Bolivian constitution to serve as an easy means of transition from the already established republican institutions and democratic tendencies to an aristocratic monarchical system, frankly avowed? A brief review of the Liberator's po-

<sup>70</sup> Villanueva, *Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados*, 250. *El Imperio de los Andes*, 97-108; 285.

<sup>71</sup> Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 278; citing British archives, Foreign office. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVII, 340. ,

litical activity during the four succeeding years, up to his death in 1830, will help to answer these questions.

At about the time Bolivar presented his draft of a constitution to the congress of Bolivia, the situation in Colombia had really become acute. An insurrection in Venezuela had resulted in the virtual separation of that province from the republic. General Páez had been proclaimed civil and military chief and empowered to continue in office as long as circumstances might demand, or until the return of Bolivar, whose authority as president there was no intention of disputing.<sup>72</sup> The spirit of rebellion soon spread to the south. On July 19, 1826, the municipality of Quito in secret session passed resolutions urging the Liberator to perpetuate himself in the office of chief executive with the title of life president, or with whatever other title he might find most suitable.<sup>73</sup> After several months of agitation the citizens and members of the local government of Guayaquil met, on August 28, and "reassumed" their sovereignty to resign it forthwith to Bolivar, "the father of the country." This assembly declared that the Liberator should have absolute control of the destinies of the nation until he had rescued it from the impending ruin; and that until the system of government should be definitely determined the Bolivian constitution should prevail.<sup>74</sup> On September 6, the authorities and citizens of Quito in public assembly adhered to the action taken at Guayaquil.<sup>75</sup>

Moved by these reports from the north, encouraged by the leaders of the rebellious factions to believe that his presence there was indispensable, and convinced that the moment had arrived for giving concrete form to his project of federating Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the Liberator resolved to quit Peru and return to Colombia. The announcement of his in-

<sup>72</sup> For a full account of this insurrection see O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 603-640.

<sup>73</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, II, 644-645.

<sup>74</sup> Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, VII, 151-154.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, 155.

tention was the cause of anxiety in Peru; for no satisfactory governmental machinery had been organized. Bolivar's rule had been that of a beneficent despot. It was feared, therefore, that on his departure the country would fall into a state of anarchy similar to that with which it had been afflicted prior to his coming. Every effort accordingly was made to induce him to remain in Peru. Memorials of citizens and of civic and ecclesiastical corporations poured in from every part of the republic, beseeching him not to abandon the country. And finally, as a last resort, the electoral colleges were convoked and the Bolivian constitution was submitted to them for approval. They voted almost unanimously in favor of its adoption and designated at the same time the Liberator as life president. These measures, however, did not have the desired effect, for on September 4, having delegated the authority which he had been exercising as Dictator to the grand marshal, Santa Cruz, Bolivar embarked for Guayaquil.<sup>76</sup>

The Bolivian constitution, it may be said in passing, was proclaimed in Peru on December 9, 1826. Its life was short. On January 26, 1827, the Colombian troops still in Peru revolted, declaring against the constitution. It was charged that Vice President Santander of Colombia had fomented the rebellion in order to check Bolivar's imperial designs and to safeguard the Colombian constitution which was then threatened. On January 27 the government of Peru resolved to put into force the Peruvian constitution of 1823; and a congress was convoked to meet on May 1 for the purpose of electing a president and vice president. Bolivar had foreseen the breakdown of his system in Peru; for, writing to Santa Cruz in October, while on his way to Bogotá, he predicted the nationalistic reaction and counseled his friends not to oppose it, not to support his "American plans" as against purely Peruvian aims.<sup>77</sup>

When Bolivar reached Guayaquil toward the middle of Sep-

<sup>76</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 526-527.

<sup>77</sup> Vargas, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, III, 185, 233, 240-245.

tember, 1826, he learned of the revolutionary movement which had shortly before taken place in that department. In view of the reports which had for some time past been reaching him, respecting the state of affairs in Colombia, he was doubtless not surprised at what had occurred, nor was he disposed to condemn the acts of rebellion. On the contrary, his mild reproof of the insurrectionists and his promotion of the intendant, Mosquera, who had lent his support to the uprising, warrant the suspicion that the Liberator might have regarded with satisfaction the movement to overthrow the established order. His procedure shortly afterward at Quito, where he granted amnesty to those who had renounced the constitution, gives further ground for the suspicion.<sup>78</sup> Before he had been long in the republic it became clear that his powerful influence was not to be exerted toward the restoration of the constitution of 1821. That instrument had never met with his hearty acquiescence and it now stood in the way of the realization of his political plans. By its own provisions it could not be legally superseded until after a period of ten years from the time of its adoption. The empire of the Andes could not wait. Bolivia and Peru had just adopted the Bolivian constitution. Colombia must find the means to do likewise and the union of the three republics must at once be accomplished. Otherwise, the golden opportunity for the establishment of a great South American state would be forever lost.

Bolívar arrived at Bogotá in November. Assuming the office of president to which he had been reëlected the year before, he immediately suspended the constitutional guarantees, in accordance with a provision of the constitution granting the chief executive that authority in times of extraordinary danger, and at the same time issued a proclamation to the Colombian people declaring that he had returned anxious to comply with the will of the nation. He added, however, that he had taken upon himself with repugnance the exercise of the supreme power, be-

<sup>78</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 671-674; *Ibid.*, XXIV, 432-434.

cause by so doing he laid himself open to the charge of being ambitious and of desiring to establish a monarchy. "What," he exclaimed, "am I believed to be so insensate as to desire to descend? Is not the destiny of Liberator more sublime than the throne?"<sup>79</sup> Nevertheless he continued to exercise dictatorial authority. Instead of taking steps to compel the rebellious departments in the south to render obedience to the fundamental law, he permitted them to maintain an anomalous status with responsibility to himself alone. A little later he made a similar arrangement with Páez in Venezuela; and as other sections of the republic had repudiated the constitution while protesting allegiance to Bolivar personally, the situation appeared to favor the execution of his plans.

Accordingly, at the instance of Bolivar, the Colombian congress, in August, 1827, convoked an assembly to meet at Ocaña, early the next year, ostensibly to revise the constitution of 1821, but really to adopt the Bolivian constitution. For some months past, opposition to the Liberator's plans had been gaining ground under the leadership of Vice President Santander, and when the convention assembled it was discovered that the partisans of Bolivar were in the minority. By skillfully appealing to the sentiment of respect for the law, and by taking a stand in favor of the growing demand for the adoption of the federal system in Colombia, Santander had been able to attract to his standard a sufficient number of followers to defeat the ends of the opposing party. Finding that they were outnumbered, Bolivar's partisans withdrew from the convention, and as this left it without a quorum, the attempt to revise the constitution was abandoned.<sup>80</sup>

As soon as this was known at Bogotá, the public authorities and a number of the citizens of the capital assembled and

<sup>79</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 512.

<sup>80</sup> Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 423-433. For a full account of this attempt at constitutional reform see a work by José Joaquín Guerra entitled *La Convención de Ocaña*.

adopted a resolution requesting the Liberator to assume full authority and to continue to exercise it until he should deem it convenient to convoke a national assembly. The example of Bogotá was followed in time by a number of municipalities in other parts of the republic. But Bolivar did not wait for a further expression of the popular will. In June, 1828, he returned to Bogotá — he had been spending the past few months at Bucaramanga — and resumed the chief magistracy, virtually as dictator. Three months later his enemies made an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge him from power by force of arms, and this led him to cast aside the few remaining constitutional restraints in order that he might employ the most stringent means to maintain order and prevent the dissolution of the republic.<sup>81</sup>

Foreign complications no less than domestic troubles now demanded the attention of the Liberator. Late in 1828 hostilities broke out with Peru, and, taking the field to direct operations against the enemy who had invaded the southern departments, Bolivar remained in the South until the autumn of 1829, when, peace having been restored, he returned to the capital. During his absence he continued, in spite of his preoccupation with military matters, to give to the question of the political organization of the state all the attention the circumstances would permit. He was particularly anxious on the one hand to lay the rumors which were being spread abroad by his enemies, charging him with plotting the establishment of a monarchy, and on the other to keep before the minds of the people the fact that they themselves were to determine the fate of the republic through their representatives soon to be convened in a new assembly.<sup>82</sup> But as time passed he despaired of effecting without foreign assistance the political stability which he so ardently desired for Colombia and for the other countries to whose emancipation he had so largely contributed.

<sup>81</sup> Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 434-436.

<sup>82</sup> Bolivar to Vergara, Dec. 16, 1828. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXXI, 264.

In April, 1829, Bolivar wrote from Quito to the Minister of Foreign Relations at Bogotá recommending that he speak in a confidential manner with the diplomatic representatives of the United States and Great Britain respecting the state of anarchy into which the South American countries would likely fall unless some great Power should intervene in their affairs. A few months later his Secretary, who accompanied him in the South and who doubtless faithfully expressed the views of his chief, put the matter more insistently. "How is America," he wrote, "to be freed from the anarchy which is consuming it and from the European colonization which threatens it? There was convened an Amphictyonic Congress (that of Panama)," he continued, "and its work was disdained by the nations most interested in its decisions. There was proposed a partial federation of three sovereign states and maledictions and scandal were raised to the skies. In short, America needs a regulator. . . . His Excellency has not the remotest personal interest in this matter further than that of Colombia and of America. He adheres not to the word but to the thing. Call it what you will, if only the result corresponds with his desire that America be placed under the custody, protection, mediation or influence of one or more powerful states, who shall preserve it from the destruction to which it is being led by systematic anarchy and from the colonial regimen by which it is threatened. Did not England offer spontaneously her mediation between Brazil and Rio de la Plata? Did she not intervene by arms between Turkey and Greece? Let us seek therefore, Sir, something to which to cling, or resign ourselves to sink beneath the flood of evils which rise to overwhelm unhappy America."<sup>83</sup>

The Council of Ministers, upon whom the duties of government devolved in Bolivar's absence, took this note under consideration on September 3, 1829, and, convinced that the Liberator's idea could not be carried into execution until there

<sup>83</sup> Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 459.

should be in Colombia a "stable government," directed the Minister of Foreign Relations to open negotiations with the diplomatic representatives of England and France in accordance with instructions which were substantially as follows:

1. It should be made clear why Colombia found it necessary to change its form of government from a republic to a constitutional monarchy. Although the nation had the indisputable right of adopting the form of government which it deemed most appropriate, yet in order to act in harmony with his Britannic Majesty and his Most Christian Majesty, the Council of Ministers desired to know whether those governments, in the event the congress should agree to establish a constitutional monarchy, would give their assent to it.

2. In case assent were obtained, it was the opinion of the Council of Ministers that Bolivar should rule for the rest of his life, using the title of Liberator, and that the title of king or emperor should not be employed until his successor should come into power.

3. Inquiry should be made as to whether Colombia would be left free to designate the Liberator and such prince, house, or dynasty to succeed him as the interests of the country might demand.

4. Finally, the importance of the steps which Colombia contemplated with a view to its own political organization and that of the rest of America should be made clear to the representatives of Great Britain and France. But as it was probable that the United States and the other American republics would become alarmed at the action of Colombia, the effective and powerful intervention of England and France should be sought to the end that Colombia be not disturbed in the exercise of her right to adopt the form of government that she might find most acceptable. It should be made clear to France, though without entering into any engagement on the subject, that in the event some branch of the royal families of Europe should be selected, Colombia would prefer a prince of the house of



France, for he would have the same religion as that which prevailed in Colombia, and for other reasons of a political nature would be most acceptable to the Colombian people.<sup>84</sup>

The Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs complied with the instructions, and without delay the project was brought to the attention of the governments of Great Britain and France. But the plan was not well received. France did not wish to take any steps which might make it appear that she opposed the reëstablishment of Spanish power in the Western Hemisphere. England was no less opposed to the scheme in so far as it involved the royal families of Great Britain and of France. In a dispatch dated December 16, 1829, the minister of Colombia in London gave the verbal reply of Lord Aberdeen to the proposal. "The government of his Majesty," said Lord Aberdeen, "far from opposing the establishment in Colombia of a government similar to that of this country, would be very glad to see such a reform effected, for they are convinced that it would contribute to the order and therefore to the prosperity of that part of America; but the British Government would not permit a prince of the French house to cross the Atlantic to be crowned in the New World. . . . And in order that you may be convinced that there is no inconsistency or ulterior motive on our part, I declare also that the government of his Majesty could not allow a prince of the royal family to rule in any part of Spanish America, if this were proposed."<sup>85</sup>

This attitude of the British cabinet is confirmed in a dispatch, dated February 20, 1830, from the Spanish minister at London to his government. Lord Aberdeen, he said, had told him confidentially that the existing government of the so-called republic of Colombia had lately sent an official communication to the British Government, indicating that the pretended Liberator, Simon Bolivar, who was soon to be given supreme authority for life with the title of president, dictator, king, em-

<sup>84</sup> Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 460.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 465.

peror, or other such title, and to be vested with the power to appoint his successor, proposed to England that the succession be allowed to fall upon a prince of the reigning family; or if this were not agreeable, that no opposition be made to the election of a prince of some other royal family of Europe. Lord Aberdeen declared, furthermore, that while opposing the establishment of a member of any of the reigning families of Europe, with the exception of that of Spain, upon the throne of Bogotá, there was no objection to Colombia's placing the supreme authority of the state in the hands of one of its own citizens under the form of government which might be deemed most suitable. But the whole plan seemed to Lord Aberdeen impracticable, and the Spanish minister was given to understand that the British Government would not encourage it in any form.<sup>86</sup>

Bolívar did not approve the step taken by the Council of Ministers. Late in the autumn, while on his way to the capital he directed after "mature reflection" his Secretary, Espinar, to write the Minister of Foreign Relations at Bogotá requesting that "every proceeding tending to forward the pending negotiation with the governments of France and England" be suspended in view of the "resolution of his excellency to invite the nation to freely express its preference respecting the political system which should be established."<sup>87</sup> Years afterward Vergara, the Minister of Foreign Relations, declared that the whole responsibility belonged to the Council of Ministers,<sup>88</sup> and that the Liberator was in no wise to be blamed unless it were for his delay in officially disapproving a project which was repugnant to his sentiments. Thus by the close of 1829 monarchical plotting in Colombia had come to an end.

Some months later however a dying echo of the Colombian plots was heard in Peru. It appears that during the month of April, 1830, there were circulated in Lima copies of alleged

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 467.

<sup>87</sup> Posada Gutiérrez, *Memorias histórico-políticas*, I, 211.

<sup>88</sup> Monsalve, *El ideal político del Libertador Simón Bolívar*, 391.

instructions given by Bolivar to Mosquera, the Colombian minister to Peru.<sup>89</sup> These instructions were said to have been sent to the Peruvian capital by General Demarquet, one of Bolivar's aids-de-camp, who, through failure to observe due precaution, allowed copies of them to be made. The supposed instructions were thus secretly passed from hand to hand in Peru; and in Chile, where they were sent, extracts of them were published. A manuscript copy was obtained by the United States minister, Larned, at Lima and sent by him to the Secretary of State at Washington.<sup>90</sup> On June 30, *El Conciliador*, a government organ published at Lima, gave a summary of the instructions but maintained with well grounded reasons that they were apocryphal.

The instructions were in substance as follows: "The empire will be realized or rivers of blood will flow in America; therefore, I charge you to act with energy and constancy. What have you to fear from those impotent Peruvians? Have you not already obtained the assent of Gamarra and of La Fuente?<sup>91</sup> Are not our friends in control of the cabinet? . . . Are they not protected by our warships and by our power? Leave the llanero, Páez, and these doctors of Bogotá to me. If you do your work well there, I will answer for the outcome; not, it is true, as soon as I should like. In the meantime let the government of Peru destroy the liberals on the pretext of anarchy. . . . Lead Gamarra on by telling him that he will have the best dukedom, the richest, the most civilized, and the most extensive, for it will stretch from the Santa to the Apurimac. There could not be a better division. Tell La Fuente, confidentially, the same thing with reference to his dukedom which will embrace the territory between the Apurimac and the Desaguadero; and maintain continual jealousies between them and Eléspuru.

<sup>89</sup> Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, X, 130.

<sup>90</sup> Larned to Van Buren, June 24, 1830, No. 25: MSS. State Department.

<sup>91</sup> President and vice president respectively.

"Proceed in the fullest harmony with General Santa Cruz,<sup>92</sup> and when you note that he is becoming uneasy about his fate, because of what he may learn from talebearers, inform him that I intend to give the dukedom of Bolivia to Sucre, and that he may rely on my word of honor to award him the dukedom of Lima, by which means I shall punish Gamarra for his past unfaithfulness. Much care with O'Higgins.<sup>93</sup> Have him maintain discord in Chile so that I may be compelled finally to intervene in that country in his behalf with the forces of Peru. Do not extend your activities to Buenos Aires, for I have my spies and agents there. . . . See that the squadron is well supplied. Let it be your principal care to disarm the Peruvian forces, whether they be civil, veteran, or naval. . . . You understand the necessity for putting men devoted to me in the public offices; so you must intervene in the government in their behalf.

"I do not need to warn you to prevent those who are not good Colombians from getting into positions of influence with Gamarra and La Fuente; for they might bring these functionaries to realize their political situation; and in truth, if the cabinet should suffer a change in views or there should occur a change of government, everything would be lost. And what then would be our lot? . . . Let it always be understood that I am already old and worn out, and that I shall not, accordingly, live to see my plans put into effect; that I am not promoting the scheme for selfish motives but for the consolidation of America; that on this supposition the most worthy of the dukes of the empire will succeed me."<sup>94</sup>

Bolivar was now ill and discouraged. The constituent assembly which he had summoned met in January, 1830, and attempted to forestall the rapidly approaching dissolution of the republic. But all efforts proved to be useless. With-

<sup>92</sup> President of Bolivia.

<sup>93</sup> O'Higgins was still an exile in Peru.

<sup>94</sup> Larned to Van Buren, June 24, 1830, No. 25, MSS. State Department.

out further delay Venezuela seceded from the union, and the departments of the central and southern portions of the republic were ready to establish independent states as soon as Bolivar should relinquish the supreme authority. This he did in March. The congress made one more ineffectual effort to conciliate the disaffected departments and then the end quickly came. In May, Bolivar left Bogotá for the coast with the intention of embarking for Europe, where he hoped to spend his remaining days in peace. This aim was unfortunately not to be realized. Persuaded by his friends to await the outcome of their last efforts to maintain the unity of the Colombian republic,<sup>95</sup> the Liberator's health continued to decline. In a proclamation which he addressed to the Colombian people shortly before his death, he declared that he aspired to no other glory than the unity of Colombia; and that if his death might contribute to the cessation of party strife and to the consolidation of the union he would descend in peace to the grave. On December 17, 1830, he died, under the roof of a Spaniard to whose villa near Santa Marta he had retired a few days before in the hope that the air of the country would restore his waning strength.

Viewing Bolivar's political career as a whole, taking into consideration his public acts and utterances as well as his secret dealings with Great Britain and France, it seems futile to try to determine whether or not he was at heart monarchist or republican. Of his Americanism there is no doubt. His great aim was to organize into a strongly centralized and effective government the vast territory which he had liberated. He would have preferred to accomplish this under the Bolivian constitution with himself as life president. Failing that he would have accepted possibly, in order to save his country from ruin, a monarchy under British protection with a British or French prince on the throne. But he insisted always upon the severing absolutely of all political connections with Spain, and

<sup>95</sup> Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 496.

he never, even in his moments of greatest discouragement, contemplated submission to the Holy Alliance. He believed the protection of Great Britain to be essential to the independence of the new states and his manifest willingness to accept British coöperation in the establishment of stable governments was consistent with that belief. To his national aims and to his conception of the international situation he was loyal rather than to any less clearly defined and less fundamental principle of interior governmental organization.

In conclusion a word must be said as to the attitude of the United States toward the question of monarchy. Although the general sentiment of the country naturally favored the establishment of republican institutions throughout the continent, yet the government at Washington, in accordance with the national policy of nonintervention and neutrality, refrained from all interference. Though the mission which was sent to Buenos Aires in 1818 arrived there at a time when monarchistic plotting was at its height, the commissioners, however much their personal predilections might have prompted them to intermeddle, limited themselves to the most formal expressions in behalf of the republican system. Later, when recognition was extended to some of the new states, the question of independence alone was considered — monarchies and republics alike being recognized. The minister of the empire of Mexico was received in 1822 and some two years later the Brazilian monarchy was recognized. When recognition of the latter was under consideration in the cabinet, some interesting discussion took place. Wirt thought that immediate recognition of Brazil would be represented as favoring the Holy Alliance and monarchies generally; and alluded to General Jackson's refusal of the mission to Mexico when Iturbide was emperor, and to his assigning, as his reason for the refusal, that he would give no counsel to that usurpation. Calhoun maintained that the established policy of the country in relation to the new states had been to look only to the question of independence and invariably to recognize the

government *de facto*; that to decline to recognize the empire of Brazil because it was monarchical would be a departure from the policy hitherto observed and would introduce a new principle of interference in the internal government of foreign nations.<sup>96</sup> This, of course, was the view that prevailed.

Afterward, during the administration of J. Q. Adams, it appears that the monarchical schemes in some parts of Spanish America, rumors of which reached Washington, gave the government so much concern that it came near to departing from the policy of non-interference. This was especially true in the case of the alleged monarchical designs of Bolivar. Secretary of State Clay, once his profound admirer, wrote the Liberator adjuring him not to abandon the cause of liberty. In November, 1827, Bolivar had taken advantage of the departure of Colonel Watts, chargé d'affaires of the United States at Bogotá, to send Clay a polite letter, expressing admiration for the secretary's "brilliant talents and ardent love of liberty" and gratitude for the "incomparable services" which he had rendered the cause of the Patriots. Nearly a year later Clay replied in a not too cordial manner. "I am persuaded," he said, "that I do not misinterpret the feelings of the people of the United States, as I certainly express my own, in saying that the interest which was inspired in this country by the arduous struggles of South America, arose principally from the hope that, along with its independence, would be established free institutions, insuring all the blessings of civil liberty. To the accomplishment of that object we still anxiously look." Continuing, Clay admitted the difficulties which opposed the achievement of this end, but notwithstanding those difficulties the people of the United States, he said, cherished the hope that Providence would bless South America, as he had her northern sister, with the genius of some great and virtuous man, to conduct her securely through all her trials. "We had even flattered ourselves," he said, "that we beheld that genius in your Excel-

<sup>96</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, 281.

lency. But I should be unworthy of the consideration with which your Excellency honors me and deviate from the frankness which I have ever endeavored to practice, if I did not on this occasion state that ambiguous designs have been attributed by your enemies to your Excellency, which have created in my mind great solicitude." Declaring that he could not allow himself to believe that Bolivar would abandon the "bright and glorious path" for the "bloody road passing over the liberties of the human race," Clay continued as follows: "I will not doubt that your Excellency will, in due time, render a satisfactory explanation to Colombia and the world of the parts of your public conduct which have excited any distrust; and that preferring the true glory of our immortal Washington to the ignoble fame of the destroyers of liberty, you have formed the patriotic resolution of ultimately placing the freedom of Colombia upon a firm and sure foundation."<sup>97</sup>

About the time Clay's letter was dispatched to Bolivar, William Henry Harrison started on what proved to be an ill-fated mission to Colombia. The story of Harrison's brief diplomatic experience in Colombia has only recently been fully related, in a study by a Venezuelan writer.<sup>98</sup> It constitutes an interesting episode in the foreign relations of America, involving as it does the Liberator of half a continent and a future President of the United States. Harrison's "thirst for lucrative office," according to Adams, was "absolutely rabid." He had been "as hot in pursuit" of the office of vice president, major general of the army, and minister to Colombia "as a hound on the scent of a hare." Adams was opposed to sending Harrison on a diplomatic mission to Colombia, but at last acquiesced, as all the other members of the administration favored his appointment. The next year the Adams administration went out of office, and complaints having been made by Colombia against Harrison, he was promptly recalled by the new administration.

<sup>97</sup> Colton, *The Works of Henry Clay*, I, 267.

<sup>98</sup> Rivas, A. C., *Ensayos de Historia Política y Diplomática*.



On the occasion of a visit of the returned minister, Adams recorded in his journal a succinct account of what had happened. After reviewing the political situation in Colombia at the time Harrison arrived there, Adams declared: "He soon found himself an object of jealous observation. Inattentive to the admonitions of time and place, he indulged himself in panegyrics upon the freedom of speech and action enjoyed in the United States. He was immediately marked as an enemy of the government of Bolivar. From that moment every step he took was watched, every word he said was caught, scrutinized, and perverted. He was made accountable for the loose talk of his son and of his secretary of legation, and soon signalized as a conspirator against the Liberator. He visited the British consul, and they were both charged with plotting projects of assassination. He dined with a friend, and that friend was cast into a dungeon. His own life was not safe, and he was at last fortunate in getting safe out of the country." After he had taken leave of the Colombian Government Harrison wrote a letter to Bolivar to dissuade him from making himself king or dictator. This letter, Harrison published, upon his return in 1830 to the United States, in a pamphlet which was intended to justify his conduct in Colombia. Moreover, Clay's instructions to the representatives of the United States to the congress at Tacubaya, in which the "ambitious projects and views" of Bolivar were referred to, were made public at the close of the Adams administration. All these things taken together must have greatly exasperated Bolivar. It was reported, indeed, that he had written Lord Aberdeen complaining that the greatest obstacle to the settlement of affairs in Colombia was the government of the United States. "But," Adams ironically remarks, "I doubt this."<sup>99</sup>

Harrison was succeeded as minister to Colombia by Thomas Patrick Moore. In the summer of 1829 he was instructed by Van Buren, the new Secretary of State, to place the matter of

<sup>99</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, VIII, 211.

the Tacubaya instructions, which had just been made public, before the Colombian Government on its true ground. It was the undoubted right of the late President, said Van Buren, to form such opinions as to the conduct and views of the public functionaries of other countries as he might deem just, and to give them such publicity as might comport with his views of propriety; but the disposition of the Colombian Government toward the United States "should not take its character from sentiments which have been expressed by those whom the people of these states, in the exercise of their sovereign power, have divested of executive authority."<sup>100</sup> Continuing, he declared that events in Colombia had undoubtedly produced in the minds of the friends of liberty occasional and painful apprehensions as to the ultimate views of President Bolivar. In the opinion of the administration, however, "he ought to be considered responsible to the cause of free and liberal principles only for the honest and faithful application of the means placed under his control, and a liberal allowance should be made for the difficulties incident to all attempts to convert long oppressed subjects into discreet depositories of sovereign power. The application of a different rule," continue the instructions, "would be to make President Bolivar answerable for the oppressions which have been for a succession of years heaped upon his countrymen, and to the removal of which the best portion of his life has been devoted."<sup>101</sup> These instructions, together with Moore's discreet conduct, resulted in restoring the customary cordiality between the two countries. In dispatches to the Department of State during the summer of 1829, the new minister succeeded in removing much of the suspicion which had arisen as to Bolivar's designs. Toward the end of the year, Van Buren wrote again to Moore saying that he had read his

<sup>100</sup> In 1832, Van Buren having been appointed minister to England and having arrived at his post, learned that his nomination had been rejected by the Senate, partly on the ground that he had criticized and extenuated the acts of a previous administration. Moore, *Digest Int. Law*, VII, 787.

<sup>101</sup> Moore, *Digest Int. Law*, VII, 788.

observations with profound interest and satisfaction. "It would be superfluous," he said, "to repeat what was said to you in general instructions as to the policy of this government respecting intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. You are well informed as to this point and as to the President's determination to demand of our public agents abroad the most scrupulous obedience to those instructions."<sup>102</sup>

<sup>102</sup> Van Buren to Moore, December 12, 1829. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XII, 420.

## CHAPTER IV

### UNITED STATES AND HISPANIC AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

THE relation of the United States to the Hispanic American struggle for independence is often made a matter of controversy. An illustration of the sort of discussion to which the subject gives rise appeared some years ago in the *North American Review*. Matías Romero, then Mexican minister at Washington, opened the debate with a paper in which he maintained that "the United States Government did not render either material or moral assistance to the cause of the independence of the Spanish American colonies." Among other things he adduced in support of his contention certain statements in *Lyman's Diplomacy of the United States* affirming that the patriot cause did not awaken any great general interest in the citizens of the United States; that the government was left free and unembarrassed to pursue its steady course of good faith and exact neutrality toward Spain and of justice and policy toward the colonies; that neither the vicinity of some portions of their respective territories, nor the circumstance of being members of the same continent, nor the benefit to be derived from commercial relations, nor the similarity of their struggles for independence, appears in the least to have influenced the definite arrangements of the government; that on the contrary the authorities at Washington conducted the business with the utmost caution and circumspection, doing nothing to give offense to Spain, or to awaken in other nations the slightest suspicion of their loyalty to the system of neutrality.<sup>1</sup>

In a subsequent article Senator Money of Mississippi took the other side of the question. He declared that the view ex-

<sup>1</sup> *The North American Review*, CLXV, 70-86 (July, 1897).

pressed in Romero's paper "leaves a disagreeable impression on the mind of the American citizen, who has always gloried in the belief that his government had cordially sympathized with any people anywhere in their struggle for liberty, and especially with those of this continent." He maintained that in permitting the revolutionists to buy in our cities all kinds of supplies not contraband of war; that in expressing interest and sympathy for them in Congress, in the public press, and through other channels of publicity; that in recognizing them before other nations had done so; and that in arresting the movement designed by the Holy Alliance to reduce them again to subjection to Ferdinand, the government and people of the United States undoubtedly rendered their cause both material and moral assistance.<sup>2</sup>

The discussion, as may be readily perceived, hinges upon the definition of the terms "material and moral assistance." The disputants did not reach an accord on this point. Had "material assistance" been defined as substantial military and naval support such as that given by France to the Thirteen Colonies, this phase of the question would have been eliminated at once; for the United States formed no alliance with the Spanish possessions against the mother country. Had it been defined as such support given in violation of professed neutrality, then the problem would have been to determine its extent and importance; that is, whether or not it were material in the sense of affecting the outcome of the struggle. It is evident that assistance afforded by supplies, openly purchased in the markets of the United States and equally accessible to both parties to the contest need not be considered. Had "moral assistance" been defined as encouragement derived from the example and from the interest and sympathy of a neighboring people; the advantages flowing from the recognition of belligerency and of independence; in short, as every aid or support not originating in the violation of or departure from neutrality, then this phase

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 356-363 (September, 1897).

of the subject would have been greatly simplified. It would have become a matter of weighing the effect of certain undisputed facts upon the fortunes of the insurgent cause.

If the writers in the *North American Review* had placed some such limitation on the discussion, they would have arrived, doubtless, at substantial agreement. But in their case the failure to agree was due in part to another cause; namely, the confusion of government and people. Romero's proposition referred to the government of the United States. Money speaks of the government and people, or of one or the other, indifferently. This divergence of view on the part of men exceptionally well qualified to analyze the subject and to draw just conclusions from it but demonstrates the necessity for a careful review of the whole matter. Such is the purpose of the present chapter. As to whether, or to what extent, the patriots derived material or moral assistance from their relations with the United States the reader may be safely left to draw his own conclusions.

The United States maintained a neutral policy in the conflict between Spain and her colonies. This was in harmony with an already well-established tradition. At the beginning of its independent existence, the nation adopted a distinctive foreign policy, the first and foremost principle of which was nonintervention. By this was meant not only noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations, but also nonparticipation in the political arrangements between other governments and especially those of Europe. The system of neutrality was a logical derivative of this principle. The first occasion for its application was the war which broke out in 1793 between France on one side and Great Britain and her European allies on the other. In his famous proclamation, issued on April 22, 1793, Washington declared that "the duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward

the belligerent powers." Warning the citizens against "aiding or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers," he made known to them that prosecutions would be instituted against all persons violating the law of nations with respect to the powers at war.

At about the time this proclamation was issued the French minister, Genet, arrived in the United States and began fitting out and commissioning privateers and inciting the people to hostility to Great Britain. As is well known, this conduct led to his recall. In the correspondence growing out of the incident, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, set forth with clearness and force the principles of neutrality. Its bases he found in the exclusive sovereignty of the nation within its own territory and in the obligation of impartiality toward belligerents.<sup>3</sup> Not only did the administration enunciate principles, but it adopted measures to make them effective. To assist the judgment of officers on this head, Hamilton prepared a set of "Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs" which he directed to "be executed with the greatest vigilance, care, activity, and impartiality."<sup>4</sup> And on June 5, 1794, these principles and rules were embodied in the first neutrality law ever enacted by any nation. This act "forbade within the United States the acceptance and exercise of commissions, the enlistment of men, the fitting out and arming of vessels, and the setting on foot of military expeditions in the service of any prince or state with which the government was at peace."<sup>5</sup> The law was limited in duration to two years, but was later reënacted with some changes and continued in force indefinitely.<sup>6</sup> Having brought the nation safely through these first years of trial, Washington gave the policy of nonintervention and neutrality a sort of sanctity for succeeding generations of American statesmen by the following words of counsel in his farewell address:

<sup>3</sup> Moore, *The Principles of American Diplomacy*, 45.

<sup>4</sup> Hamilton, J. C., *Works of Alexander Hamilton*, III, 576.

<sup>5</sup> Moore, *The Principles of American Diplomacy*, 46.

<sup>6</sup> Bemis, *American Neutrality*, 52.

“The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations,” he said, “is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far distant when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?”<sup>7</sup>

Under increasingly trying circumstances this policy was maintained by John Adams. It was during his administration that a new factor arose to complicate the situation; namely, the revolt, actual or threatened, of the American colonies of France and Spain. The efforts of Miranda to obtain the support of the United States in carrying out his schemes for revolutionizing South America have been noted elsewhere. Although his plans met with more or less favor in the eyes of Hamilton and some of his prominent contemporaries, yet they were never countenanced by the government. In connection with Santo

<sup>7</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I, 222.



Domingo, however, there occurred during Adams's administration an incident which threatened to swerve the nation from its neutral course.

As a result of the serious difficulties between France and the United States, Congress passed the Act of June 13, 1798, suspending commercial relations with France and her dependencies. This act threatened to create distress in the French part of the island of Santo Domingo, where the revolted inhabitants had been receiving many of their supplies from the United States. Here Toussaint L'Ouverture held sway nominally as commander in chief under the French, but in reality as an independent ruler. Acting on the suggestion of the American consul he sent an agent to the United States with a letter to the President containing the assurance that if commercial intercourse were renewed between the United States and Santo Domingo, it would be protected by every means in his power. In consequence the President obtained from Congress a new act, approved February 9, 1799, which was intended to meet the situation. He also sent Dr. Edward Stevens, a friend of Hamilton's, to Santo Domingo with the title of consul general and with diplomatic powers. The British ministry dispatched General Maitland to the island with orders to go first to Philadelphia and arrange with the government of the United States a general policy with regard to Toussaint. Negotiations followed, which resulted on June 13 in a secret treaty between Toussaint and Maitland, by the terms of which the former agreed to abandon all privateering and shipping, receiving in return free access to those supplies from the United States which were required to meet the demands of his people.

Stevens was not openly a party to this treaty; but Toussaint believed him to be the real negotiator and his influence, no doubt, was paramount. Under the agreement supplies of every kind reached the island, and Toussaint was enabled to continue the struggle for independence. He began the siege of Jacmel, for which he could not bring the necessary supplies

and materials by land. The seizure by English cruisers of a flotilla which, after his promise to abandon shipping, was bringing his munitions of war along the coast for the siege, made Toussaint fear for the result of his enterprise. Writing once more to the President, he requested him to send some frigates to enforce the treaty by putting an end to all trade with the island except such as the treaty permitted. The request was granted and the frigate *General Greene* was sent to cruise off Jacmel in February and March, 1800. Later, other vessels were sent. The French garrison was starved out and Jacmel was abandoned.

When Jefferson became President, the situation changed. The treaty of Morfontaine, negotiated in the latter part of Adams's administration and ratified by the Senate in the first year of Jefferson's, restored relations between France and the United States. Santo Domingo was henceforth to be treated as a French colony and the negro chief to be left to his fate.<sup>8</sup>

The treaty with Toussaint can be explained only in the light of the maritime warfare then existing between France and the United States. It by no means signified an abandonment of the policy of neutrality. Hamilton, in spite of his predilections, wrote Pickering that the United States must not be committed on the independence of Santo Domingo; that it must give no guaranty, make no formal treaty, do nothing that could rise up in judgment. "It will be enough," he said, "to let Toussaint be assured verbally, but explicitly, that upon his declaration of independence, a commercial intercourse will be opened, and continue while he maintains it, and gives due protection to our vessels and property."<sup>9</sup> A few weeks later, Adams, writing from Quincy on the proposed participation of the United States in a project of the British ministry for liberating Santo Domingo, raised the question as to whether it would not involve

<sup>8</sup> Adams, *History of the United States*, I, 383-389.

<sup>9</sup> February 9, 1799, Hamilton, J. C., *The Works of Alexander Hamilton*, VI, 395.

the nation in a more inveterate and durable hostility with France, Spain, and Holland, and subject it more to the policy of Britain than would be consistent with its interest and honor. And he concluded that "it would be most prudent for us to have nothing to do in the business."<sup>10</sup> Sixteen years later he reverted to the subject. Speaking of Jefferson's "reign," he said that he had expected it to be very nearly what it had been. "I regretted it," he said, "but could not help it. At the same time I thought it would be better than following the fools who were intriguing to plunge us into an alliance with England, an endless war with all the rest of the world and wild expeditions to South America and Santo Domingo."<sup>11</sup>

The overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons by the Emperor Napoleon in the spring of 1808 aroused anew the interest of the United States in the fate of Spain's American colonies. In October of that year, after news had reached America of the resistance of the Spanish patriots and of their victories over the French invaders, the subject was discussed in the cabinet and Jefferson recorded the result in his memoranda as follows: "Unanimously agreed in the sentiments which should be unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influential persons in Cuba and Mexico; to wit: 'If you remain under the dominion of the kingdom and family of Spain, we are contented; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion or ascendancy of France or England. In the latter case, should you choose to declare independence, we cannot commit ourselves by saying we would make common cause with you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to the then existing circumstances; but in our proceedings we shall be influenced by friendship for you, by a firm feeling that our interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repugnance to see you under subordination to either France or England either politically or commercially.'"

<sup>10</sup> Adams to Pickering, April 17, 1799, *Life and Works*, VIII, 634.

<sup>11</sup> Adams to James Lloyd, April 5, 1815, *Life and Works*, X, 155.

Writing a few days later to Governor Claiborne of Louisiana, Jefferson said: "The truth is that the patriots of Spain have no warmer friends than the administration of the United States, but it is our duty to say nothing and to do nothing for or against either." Repeating what he had written in his memoranda about Mexico and Cuba, he added: "We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere."<sup>12</sup>

It was not until two years afterward that occasion arose for a more definite consideration of the matter. When news reached Washington of the important events taking place at Caracas, Buenos Aires, and elsewhere in the Spanish colonies, President Madison hastened to appoint agents to visit the principal centers of disturbance. One of these agents, Joel Roberts Poinsett, destined to play for many years an active and effective part in international American affairs, was appointed to Buenos Aires. His instructions, dated June 28, 1810, contain, it may be presumed, an exposition of the policy which the government proposed to follow in the impending struggle.

"As a crisis is approaching," ran the instructions, "which must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish America, and may dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe, and as the geographical position of the United States and other obvious considerations give them an intimate interest in whatever may affect the destiny of that part of the American continent, it is our duty to turn our attention to this important subject, and to take such steps not incompatible with the neutral character and honest policy of the United States as the occasion renders proper. With this view you have been selected to proceed without delay to Buenos Aires, and thence, if convenient, to Lima in Peru or Santiago in Chile or both. You will make it your object, whenever it may be proper, to diffuse the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest good will toward the people of South America as neighbors,

<sup>12</sup> Adams, *History of the United States*, IV, 340-342.

as belonging to the same portion of the globe, and as having a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse; that this disposition will exist whatever may be their internal system or European relations, with respect to which no interference of any sort is pretended; and that in the event of a political separation from the parent country and of the establishment of an independent system of national government, it will coincide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to promote the most friendly relations and the most liberal intercourse between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having all a common interest, and as lying under a common obligation to maintain that system of peace, justice, and good will which is the source of happiness for nations.

“Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and dispositions of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain those on the other side, not only toward the United States, but in reference to the great nations of Europe, as also to that of Brazil and the Spanish branches of the government there; and to the commercial and other connections with them respectively, and generally to inquire into the state, the characteristics, intelligence, and wealth of the several parties, the amount of the population, the extent and organization of the military force, and the pecuniary resources of the country.

“The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to explain the mutual advantages of a commerce with the United States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit seasonable information on the subject.”<sup>13</sup>

Poinsett exceeded his instructions and became an enthusiastic collaborator in the propagation of revolutionary ideas. The Chilean historian, Barros Arana,<sup>14</sup> describes him as alert, energetic, intelligent, and profoundly democratic and liberal in his views. At Buenos Aires he appointed William Gilchrist as vice consul and proceeded to Chile, where he arrived in Decem-

<sup>13</sup> Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics*, 107-109.

<sup>14</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, VIII, 564.

ber, 1811. His arrival in Chile gave great satisfaction to the Patriots. He was received by the revolutionary junta with grand ceremony, as though he were a public minister accredited to a sovereign nation. The president, José Miguel Carrera, welcomed him in a speech filled with the warmest expressions of friendship for the United States. Poinsett spoke briefly in Spanish, explaining the object of his visit and manifesting a spirit of international confraternity which greatly raised the hopes of the Chilean revolutionists. "The Americans of the North," said Poinsett, "view with the greatest interest the events taking place in these countries and they ardently desire the prosperity and happiness of their brothers of the South. I shall be pleased to inform the government of the United States of the friendly sentiments of your Excellency and I am happy to be the first to have the honor of establishing relations between two generous nations which should be united as friends and natural allies."<sup>15</sup> Everything appeared to justify the high expectations of the Chileans. Poinsett became an active propagandist. The government looked to him for counsel, and on every hand he left it to be understood from his conversations that the government and people of the United States had the liveliest interest in the triumph of the revolution. He gave the impression that military supplies were to be easily obtained in the United States and he gave the names and addresses of manufacturers and merchants who could furnish them.

Chile was soon to be disillusioned. The War of 1812 came on and distracted the attention of the United States from the events occurring in the southern continent. Moreover, the revolution in Chile received a backset as the result of civil strife which was followed by the temporary ascendancy of the Peninsular authorities. Poinsett, desiring to take part in the war in which his own country was engaged, made his way back to the United States, but arrived after peace had been declared. His unneutral activities in Chile apparently passed unnoticed and

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 566

he continued to enjoy the confidence of the administration.

Another of these early agents was Robert K. Lowry. He was dispatched to Venezuela, and, as he arrived at his post ahead of Poinsett, he bears the distinction of being the first representative of the United States in any of the revolted colonies. His conduct was more discreet than that of his colleague in Chile, though he maintained friendly relations with the revolutionists, and, it appears, gave the leaders counsel in their first essays at political organization. He remained in Venezuela throughout the period of revolution, was United States consul at La Guayra after the new states were recognized, and later engaged in business enterprises in Venezuela until his death some years later.

In his annual message of November 5, 1811, President Madison declared that it was impossible to overlook the scenes "developing themselves among the great communities which occupy the southern portion of our own hemisphere and extend into our own neighborhood. An enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast," he added, "concur in imposing on the national councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their destinies, to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will, to regard the progress of events, and not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established."<sup>16</sup> The committee to whom was referred this part of the President's message reported in the form of a public declaration, a resolution in which it was affirmed that the Senate and House of Representatives beheld with friendly interest the establishment of independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces in America; that as neighbors and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, the United States felt great solicitude for their welfare; and that when those provinces had attained the condition of nations, by the just exercise of their rights, the Senate and House would unite with the executive in establishing with them, as independent states, amicable relations and commercial intercourse.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I, 494.

<sup>17</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, III, 538.

From the instructions to Poinsett and from the declarations of the President and of Congress, it would appear that the United States thus early recognized the revolted colonies as belligerents. President Monroe declared at a later date, in fact, that the contest was regarded from the first "not in the light of an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal rights."<sup>18</sup> Legally, however, the situation remained for some time without definition. This was due mainly to the following causes: First, diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were suspended during the early years of the revolution. Casa Yrujo, the Spanish minister at Washington, was dismissed in 1806 and no new minister came to take his place until Luis de Onís arrived in 1809 as the representative of the Spanish Patriots. On account of the anomalous state of affairs in Spain, the United States declined to receive the new minister until a general peace was declared.<sup>19</sup> The exigencies of diplomatic intercourse with Spain then demanded that the situation be more clearly defined. Secondly, the conflict between Spain and her colonies being carried on at first almost wholly on land, the demand for the formal recognition of belligerency was not urgent. And finally, the strained relations between the United States and the two great maritime powers of Europe, resulting at last in war with one of them, kept the government at Washington absorbed in matters of more vital concern.

Conditions having changed, the legal status of the revolted provinces could no longer be left in doubt. The first authoritative statement on the subject appears to have been contained in a letter of July 3, 1815, from the Secretary of the Treasury to the collector at New Orleans. It was the President's desire, the collector was informed, that intercourse with the revolted provinces should strictly conform to the duties of the govern-

<sup>18</sup> Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, I, 173.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 131. See also Onís, *Memoir upon the Negotiations between Spain and the United States of America*, 10-13.



ment under the law of nations, the Act of Congress and the treaties with foreign powers; that there was no principle of the law of nations which required the United States to exclude from its ports subjects of a foreign power, in a state of insurrection against their own government; that any merchant vessel conforming to the laws of the United States was entitled to an entry to the customshouses whatever flag she might bear; that while a public war exists between two foreign nations, or when a civil war exists in any particular nation, the provisions of the Act of June 5, 1794, must be strictly enforced. A few weeks later the President issued under this Act a proclamation forbidding the setting on foot in the United States of military expeditions or enterprises against the dominion of Spain.<sup>20</sup> Thus the belligerency of the insurgents was at last definitively recognized.

Against the admission of vessels under the insurrectionary flags, Onís protested on the ground that it was subversive of the most solemn stipulations in the treaties between Spain and the United States. He maintained, moreover, that it was opposed to the general principles of public security and good faith and to the law of nations; and that as the independence of none of these provinces had been acknowledged, it was an offense against the dignity of the Spanish monarchy and against the sovereignty of the king. He protested also against the activities of a "factional band of insurgents and incendiaries" who were raising and arming troops in Louisiana "to light the flame of revolution in the kingdom of New Spain." Continuing, he declared that all Louisiana had witnessed those activities and that other expeditions under the ring-leaders, José Alvarez de Toledo and José Manuel de Herrera, the latter of whom had just arrived as representative of the Mexican Congress, were on foot to invade the dominions of his Catholic Majesty.<sup>21</sup> This

<sup>20</sup> *American State Papers, Fed. Rel.*, IV, 1.

<sup>21</sup> Onís to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1815. *American State Papers. For. Rel.*, IV, 422.

was the beginning of a voluminous correspondence which Onís carried on during the next five or six years with the State Department.

The Spanish minister without doubt had grounds for complaint. But he was not without prejudice. He viewed every move with suspicion. Soon after his arrival he declared that there was no hope of obtaining anything favorable from the United States except "by energy, by force, and by chastisement."<sup>22</sup> And in 1812 he informed the viceroy of Mexico that the United States contemplated extending its southwestern boundary to the Rio Bravo; that East Florida and Cuba would be seized as West Florida had been; that emissaries of the United States had been sent throughout the Spanish possessions to foment revolution; that great assistance in arms had been given to Caracas and to Buenos Aires; that an agent had been appointed to treat with the insurgents in Mexico and to offer them aid in money, arms, and officers; that in order to remain on good terms with Spain the United States affected to give the greatest attention to the repeated remonstrances which had been made against the arming of privateers in its ports, and had in fact given strict orders to prevent violations of the laws; but that in spite of this, the government was then raising seventy-five thousand troops, on the pretext of taking Canada, but really for the purpose of robbing Spain of her colonies.<sup>23</sup>

Alvarez Toledo, whom Onís mentioned as one of the "ring-leaders," was a Cuban by birth. He represented Santo Domingo in the Cortes at Cadiz, where his radical opinions made him obnoxious to the peninsular authorities. Fleeing to the United States he arrived at Philadelphia in September, 1811. He soon entered into informal relations with Secretary Monroe, to whom, it appears, he gave information of an alleged design

<sup>22</sup> Onís to the Captain General of Caracas, February 2, 1810. *American State Papers. For. Rel.*, III, 404.

<sup>23</sup> Onís to the Viceroy of Mexico, Philadelphia, April 1, 1812. Alamán, *Historia de México*, III, app. 46.

of Great Britain, acquiesced in by the Cortes, to take possession of Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Porto Rico. Claiming to represent his Spanish American associates in the Cortes, he sought the aid of the United States in forming these islands into an independent confederation.

Shortly before these informal relations began, a Mexican, José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara, appeared at Washington as the diplomatic representative of Hidalgo's government, seeking assistance for his countrymen in men, money, and arms. The two agents became acquainted, and after further conferences with representatives of the State Department revealed the fact that the government would not give the desired assistance, they turned their attention to the organization of an expedition to invade Texas from the Louisiana border.<sup>24</sup> With a force composed of some four hundred and fifty Mexican refugees and American adventurers, the invasion began in August, 1812.<sup>25</sup> Gutiérrez de Lara was nominally head of the expedition, but was later superseded by Toledo. The real commanding officer, however, was Colonel Augustus W. Magee, who resigned a commission as lieutenant in the United States Army to assume command. Hence the expedition is known to history as the "Gutiérrez-Magee raid." Welcomed by the creole population and opposed but ineffectively by the weak Royalist garrisons, the invaders, styling themselves the "Republican Army of the North," marched through the province to the capital, San Antonio de Bejar, where they established themselves and set about organizing a civil government. Here they remained until August, 1813, when a superior force of Royalists engaged them in a bloody battle and cut them to pieces. A few of the survivors, among them Toledo and Colonel Perry, an able American officer, escaped to Louisiana, where they joined with the

<sup>24</sup> Cox, *Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents*. *Am. Hist. Assn. Rep.*, I, 199-208.

<sup>25</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, III, 481, McCaleb, *The First Period of the Gutiérrez-Magee Expedition in Texas* *Hist. Assn. Quar.*, IV, 229.

Mexican refugees and the adventurers of different nationalities, who, undiscouraged, were planning new undertakings.<sup>26</sup>

It was against such enterprises, fomented for the most part by this polyglot group in Louisiana, that the Spanish minister urged the government to act. Before the correspondence of Onis with the State Department began, however, measures had been taken to frustrate the designs of the plotters. Arms supposed to be intended for an expedition which, according to rumor, was being organized by Colonel Perry were seized. It was later ascertained that Perry and a number of his followers, crossed the border separately and embarking from some point below the mouth of the Sabine for the coast of Mexico, were wrecked and dispersed. Toledo and a number of his associates were indicted in the United States District Court of Louisiana, and this had a tendency to check their activities.<sup>27</sup> Toledo himself shortly afterward deserted the Patriot cause, and, proceeding to Spain, was received with open arms and sent as ambassador to Naples.<sup>28</sup>

As to Herrera, whom Onis evidently regarded as particularly dangerous to Spanish interests, it appears that he never proceeded further than New Orleans, established no connections with the government at Washington, and accomplished nothing beyond dispatching small quantities of arms and ammunition to the insurgents. Associated with him was a Mexican, Antonio Francisco Peredo by name, who was furnished with a limited amount of funds and authorized to procure merchant vessels and privateers to sail under the flag of the new republic.<sup>29</sup> Exactly what Peredo accomplished is not clear; but as from this time a number of vessels were added to the Mexican fleet, it is to be presumed that he effected, with the concurrence of Herrera, some arrangement by which the acquisitions could

<sup>26</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, III, 480-492. Yoakum, *History of Texas*, I, 75-85.

<sup>27</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 431.

<sup>28</sup> Alamán, *Historia de México*, IV, 395.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 186, 395.

be made. The authority to commission the vessels was delegated to Luis Aury,<sup>30</sup> formerly in the naval service of New Granada, and at this time, according to Yoakum, "Commodore of the fleet of the republics of Mexico, Venezuela, La Plata, and New Granada."<sup>31</sup> By what authority this office of "Commodore" of the combined fleet was established, Yoakum does not explain; nor do other historians throw any light on the point. The title was of doubtful validity. But it is with Aury as an officer of the republic of Mexico that we are at present interested.

In September, 1816, Herrera went with Aury and his fleet to Galveston Island, where a government for the province of Texas was organized under the Mexican republic. Aury was chosen civil and military governor. From Galveston as a base, the vessels of the fleet were sent out to cruise against Spanish commerce. Prizes were brought in and adjudicated in a Court of Admiralty in which Aury himself sat as a judge.<sup>32</sup> The men whom Aury gathered about him were not all of spotless character. Many of them had been followers of the pirate, Jean Lafitte, at Baratavia, near the mouth of the Mississippi, until that establishment, harboring more than a thousand men, was broken up in 1814. It will be recalled that this band of freebooters under Lafitte had been pardoned by the President as a reward for the valiant part they played in the battle of New Orleans. They were now gradually returning to their old occupation of piracy and smuggling along the coast. It is not surprising, therefore, that among Aury's sea rovers, some should have failed to distinguish between friend and foe, especially when specie or other valuable article formed part of the cargo; that they should have found a way, as they did, to bring the slaves taken from Spanish slavers into the hands of Louisiana planters; that they should have disposed of the articles

<sup>30</sup> Robinson, W. D., *Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution*, 61.

<sup>31</sup> Yoakum, *History of Texas*, I, 88.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 89.

of merchandise, with which their numerous prizes were laden, to smugglers engaged in an illicit trade along the bays and bayous of the Louisiana coast.<sup>33</sup>

Though Galveston was the base of this fleet, the vessels came with great frequency to New Orleans. At least on one occasion reported by the collector, there were six privateers in the port, commissioned by Aury. It was reported and generally believed that many of the vessels of Aury's fleet were owned by persons resident in New Orleans and enjoying the privileges of American citizens. In admitting these vessels, the collector averred, great care was taken not to permit any violation of the Neutrality Act; but in defiance of every precaution, they violated the law, not while in port, but before they left American waters. Nothing was easier, said the collector, when a privateer was ready for sea, than to send both men and guns to Barataria, or any other convenient place where the vessel could sail, and take them on board. At the end of the cruise the same farce would be played over again. Thus it might be said that each cruise began and ended at New Orleans. Attempts had been made to secure convictions, but without success; for witnesses were difficult to obtain.<sup>34</sup>

It was by no means with the Southwest alone that the government had to deal in maintaining neutrality. Along the Atlantic seaboard, numerous unneutral activities mainly connected with privateering had to be watched for and, if possible, frustrated. Of this character was the Mina expedition, which sailed unhindered from the port of Baltimore. Xavier Mina was born in Navarre, Spain, in 1789. In the war against the French invaders, he distinguished himself. He was captured in 1811 and held a prisoner in France until peace was declared. As soon as he was at liberty, he returned to Spain and, with his uncle, Espoz, raised the standard of revolt against the reaction-

<sup>33</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 134. Yoakum, *History of Texas*, I, 92.

<sup>34</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 136.

ary Ferdinand. The conspiracy having failed, he fled to England, where he was well received. It is said he was granted a pension by the British Government. Desiring to continue his revolutionary activities in Mexico, he obtained a ship, arms, and military stores from some "English gentlemen attached to the cause of freedom," and, setting sail, accompanied by fifteen Spanish, Italian, and British officers, arrived at Baltimore in the summer of 1816. On the way over, four of the Spanish officers became disaffected, and, upon arriving in the United States, deserted the enterprise and gave such information of it as they possessed to the Spanish minister at Washington, who immediately called upon the government to suppress the threatened undertaking. But the complaints of the minister were not sustained by any positive data and the executive did not think proper to interfere as long as Mina and his agents moved within the sphere of the laws of the republic.

Quantities of military stores were put aboard the ship as cargo and, late in August, some two hundred "passengers" under the direction of Colonel the Count de Ruuth, having embarked, the vessel put to sea with a clearance for Saint Thomas. She was accompanied by a Spanish schooner which had been hired by Mina, and on board of which was Lieutenant Colonel Myers with a company of artillery. Mina and his staff sailed four weeks later aboard a fast sailing brig pierced for guns, joining the rest of the expedition at Port-au-Prince early in October.<sup>35</sup> Here Mina met Bolivar who had been driven a second time from his native shores.<sup>36</sup> From Pétion, the negro president of the republic of Haiti, he received generous assistance, as had Bolivar a few months before. On October 24 the

<sup>35</sup> Robinson, W. D., *Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution*, 43-55. The author of this memoir was an American who had spent some years in Venezuela and Mexico. He accompanied the Mina expedition to Mexico, was captured, and sent a prisoner to Spain. Escaping and returning to the United States, he published his memoir at Philadelphia in 1820. This is the account, with minor corrections, which Alamán follows in his *Historia de México*.

<sup>36</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVII (*Narración I*), 356.

expedition, consisting of the brig, ship, and schooner, made sail for Galveston Island. Arriving safely the troops were disembarked and the work of organization and training was begun. Mina made a trip to New Orleans where he purchased a transport to replace the ship with which he left England, and, having arranged the purchase of another smaller vessel, he returned with a few American and European officers to Galveston. Among the recruits who joined Mina at Galveston Island was a small band of Americans under Colonel Perry. These, together with a number of Aury's men and a few additions from miscellaneous sources, gave him about three hundred fighting men. On April 5, 1817, the expedition, accompanied by the whole Galveston Island naval establishment, sailed southward and, bearing down the coast, reached Soto la Marina, where a successful landing was made. Successes and reverses followed alternately during the next four or five months until finally Mina was captured. On November 11, 1817, he paid the penalty. He met death at the hands of a firing squad.<sup>37</sup>

In discussing Mina's failure, Robinson, the historian of the expedition, declares that the first great obstacle which Mina had to contend against was the want of proper support from the mercantile world. The giving of such support, he maintained, did not constitute either in the United States or Great Britain a breach of neutrality. "We have heard much," he said, "of the assistance which the Mexican Patriots have received from individuals in the United States; and indeed if we were to believe one tenth part of what the Chevalier Onis has stated on this subject, we might suppose that the American merchants had been liberal in the extreme in the supplies afforded to the Mexican people; but the real fact is, that a single house in London has supplied a larger amount of arms and clothing to Venezuela than has been afforded by all the merchants of the United States to Mexico; at the same time that

<sup>37</sup> Robinson, *Memoirs*, 58-62, 78-80, 259.



the royal armies [of Spain] were fed and furnished with ammunition, ships, and every species of supply from our principal seaports." Continuing, he declared that the resources which Mina obtained at Baltimore were small, though in the eyes of the Spanish minister they were greatly magnified, the expedition becoming in his terrified imagination a formidable army. "It was in vain," says Robinson, "that Mina endeavored to convince some merchants of the United States of the advantages they would derive from the political and commercial emancipation of Mexico. It was in vain that he offered the most flattering terms for ample supplies; while the influence of the Spanish agents, through the contracts which they were enabled to bestow, produced such an influence on the monied men, and the monied institutions of some of our principal cities, as to interfere materially with the necessities of Mina and the emancipation of Mexico."<sup>38</sup>

But in Mina's case as in numerous other cases the neutrality laws of the United States were, doubtless, violated. The failure to prevent these violations was due to certain defects in the laws. The Act as it stood did not give the executive, in cases where there might be reason to suspect an intention to commit the offense, authority to demand security or to adopt any other preventive measure. Thus it frequently happened that vessels belonging to citizens of the United States or to foreigners would arm and equip in the ports of the United States, and clearing as merchant ships, cruise as privateers under one or another of the belligerent flags, either immediately after getting to sea or after touching at other ports. In other instances, foreign vessels would abuse the privileges allowed in the ports, augment their armaments, as Mina did, and take on board citizens of the United States, who later assumed a military character. Accordingly, President Madison, in a special message to Congress of December 26, 1816, recommended the

<sup>38</sup> Robinson, *Memoirs*, 262-263.

adoption of such additional legislation as the situation might require.<sup>39</sup>

On January 14, 1817, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives and on March 3, following, after a long debate, in which Henry Clay led the opposition, it was enacted into law. This Act contained two provisions intended to remedy the defects in the old law. The first of these was a provision requiring the American owners, or part owners, of armed ships to give bond that such ships would not be used in hostilities against any "prince or state, colony, district, or people" with whom the United States was at peace. The second authorized the collectors of the customs to detain any vessel manifestly built for warlike purposes, when the arms and number of men shipped aboard, or other circumstances, rendered it probable that such vessel was intended to be used in violation of the law.<sup>40</sup> The law contained one other new feature. The statute of 1794 contemplated wars between "princes or states." This was disclosed as a defect in the case of *Gelston v. Hoyt*, where the fitting out of the ship *American Eagle* for one of the Haitian combatants, Pétion, to be used against another Haitian combatant, Christophe, was held to be no offense, for the reason that neither of the chieftains had been recognized as a "foreign prince or state" under the statute of 1794. Hence the law of 1817 contemplates belligerents, princes, states, colonies, districts, or peoples.<sup>41</sup> This Act was superseded by the comprehensive law of April 20, 1818, the provisions of which are now embodied in the Revised Statutes of the United States.<sup>42</sup>

The Act of 1817 was passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 83 to 62. The opposition did not spring from any widespread desire to intervene in the contest. It was attributable in part to party spirit, and in so far as it had any

<sup>39</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 102-103.

<sup>40</sup> *Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 2d Sess.*, 477, 740, 1308.

<sup>41</sup> Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, VII, 1076. Bemis, *American Neutrality*, 35.

<sup>42</sup> Moore, *Principles of American Diplomacy*, 49.

solid basis, it rested on the ground that the Act would increase the already existing inequality of condition as between the two contending parties. One of them, said Clay, had an accredited minister to watch over its interests, while the other had no organ through which to communicate its grievances. The nation being in a state of neutrality respecting the contest, and bound to maintain it, the question, according to Clay, was whether the provisions of the bill were necessary to the performance of that duty. "We ought to perform our neutral duties," he declared, "whilst we are neutral, without regard to the unredressed injuries inflicted upon us by Old Spain on the one hand, or to the glorious objects of the struggle of the South American Patriots on the other. We ought to render strict justice and no more." But, as the bill was not limited to that object, he could not give it his assent.<sup>43</sup>

On the day following the enactment of this new legislation James Monroe was inaugurated President. He appointed as Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, then serving as minister to Great Britain. Adams was an unwavering advocate of the system of neutrality. When but twenty-six years of age, he wrote, under the signature of "Marcellus," several articles in which he contributed greatly, at the critical moment of Genet's arrival in America, to the formation of a sound public opinion on the subject. These writings commended him to the favor of Washington and won for him the appointment in 1794 as minister to the Netherlands.<sup>44</sup> Sent as minister to Prussia in 1797, elected United States Senator in 1803, returned to Europe as minister to Russia in 1809, named one of the commissioners to negotiate a peace with Great Britain in 1813, appointed minister to the court of St. James in 1815, Adams had enjoyed an unparalleled opportunity for acquiring a knowledge and grasp of the international situation commensurate with the high office to which he was called. Moreover, his long

<sup>43</sup> *Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 2d Sess., 740-743.*

<sup>44</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Writings, I, 135, 148.*

residence in Europe had not left him unacquainted with the special set of relations which had developed between the United States and the belligerent communities in the southern part of the continent. Not only did he see those relations clearly but he saw more clearly, perhaps, than any of his contemporaries their wide-spreading European connections. Long before his return to the United States he had begun to point out the complications to which an abandonment of the traditional policy might give rise. In 1816 he told Del Real, a representative of New Granada, who called upon him in London, that the policy of the government of the United States, a policy dictated equally by duty to its own country, by amity with Spain, and by good will to the South Americans, was a strict and impartial neutrality between them and Spain. And he explained that he meant by saying that the policy was dictated by good will to the South Americans, that the neutrality of the United States was more advantageous to them, by securing the neutrality of Great Britain, than any support which the United States could give them by declaring in their favor and making common cause with them, the effect of which would probably have been to make Great Britain declare against both.<sup>45</sup> A few months later, commenting on news from the United States, he wrote: "There seemed to me too much of the warlike humor in the debates of Congress — propositions even to take up the cause of the South Americans. . . . A quarrel with Spain for any cause can scarcely fail of breeding a quarrel with Great Britain."<sup>46</sup>

But it was not merely with British hostility that the United States had to contend. "All the restored governments of Europe," declared Adams, "are deeply hostile to us. The Royalists everywhere detest and despise us as Republicans. All the victims and final vanquishers of the French Revolution abhor us as aiders and abettors of the French during their career of

<sup>45</sup> Adams to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1816, *Writings*, V, 551.

<sup>46</sup> Adams to George William Erving, June 10, 1816, *Writings*, VI, 45.

triumph. Wherever British influence extends it is busy to blacken us in every possible manner. In Spain the popular feeling is almost as keen against us as in England. Emperors, kings, princes, priests, all the privileged orders, all the establishments, all the votaries of legitimacy eye us with the most rancorous hatred. Among the crowned heads the only friend we had was the Emperor Alexander, and his friendship has, I am afraid, been more than cooled." <sup>47</sup> Adams's view was not a passing fancy. About six months later he returned to the subject, expressing more emphatically than ever his belief in European hostility to the United States. "There is already," he said, "in all the governments of Europe a strong prejudice against us as Republicans, and as the primary causes of the propagation of those political principles which still made the throne of every European monarch rock under him as with the throes of an earthquake. . . . We are considered not merely as an active and enterprising, but as a grasping and ambitious people. We are supposed to have inherited all the bad qualities of the British character, without some of those of which other nations in their dealings with the British have made their advantage. They ascribe to us all the British rapacity, without allowing us the credit of the British profusion. The universal feeling of Europe in witnessing the gigantic growth of our population and power is that we shall, if united, become a very dangerous member of the society of nations. They therefore hope what they confidently expect, that we shall not long remain united. That before we shall have attained the strength of national manhood our Union will be dissolved, and that we shall break up into two or more nations in opposition against one another." <sup>48</sup>

Thus, conscious of the difficulties and dangers of the international situation, Adams returned to America to take up at Washington the duties of Secretary of State. He found upon

<sup>47</sup> Adams to John Adams, August 1, 1816, *Writings*, VI, 61.

<sup>48</sup> Adams to William Plumer, January 17, 1817, *Writings*, VI, 143.

his arrival a growing demand for the early recognition of the new states. This was due to the more hopeful aspect which their affairs were assuming. The United Provinces of Rio de la Plata had declared and were maintaining their independence; San Martín had crossed the Andes and won the great victory of Chacabuco; Bolivar and his exiled followers had returned to Venezuela, where they were gradually gaining ground; and finally, the Mina expedition had entered Mexico and friends of the Patriots in the United States entertained hopes of success in that quarter. The President, however, did not trust wholly in the correctness and comprehensiveness of the information which was reaching him. Accordingly he determined to seek the truth through agencies of his own choosing. He turned first to Poinsett, writing him a personal note on April 25, 1817, and asking him to undertake a mission to Buenos Aires. But having entered the legislature of South Carolina, Poinsett declined the appointment. Then the President settled upon a commission which was partly constituted at once by the appointment of Cæsar A. Rodney and John Graham. The instructions were prepared during the summer by Richard Rush, who, until Adams's arrival in September, filled the office of Secretary of State. On December 4, Rodney and Graham, with Theodorick Bland as the third member and Henry M. Brackenridge as secretary, sailed from Hampton Roads aboard the frigate *Congress*. At about the same time John B. Prevost was sent on a similar mission to Peru and Chile.<sup>49</sup>

Two of the commissioners, Rodney and Graham, returned to the United States in July, 1818. Bland, who proceeded from Buenos Aires to Chile, returned in October. The work of the commission was not harmonious. Bland and Brackenridge quarreled and no two agreed. Each commissioner made a separate report, those of Rodney and Graham being communicated to Congress in November and that of Bland in December.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics*, 119-121.

<sup>50</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV., 217-348. *Niles' Weekly Register*, XIV, 356.

These reports were voluminous and in addition to them Brackenridge published in two volumes, a few months later, an extended account of the voyage and of the mission. Neither in the reports nor in Brackenridge's account was any important information given in addition to that already known. According to Adams, Brackenridge was a mere enthusiast and so devoted to South America that he wished to unite all America in conflict against all Europe. Rodney, who was suspected of being under his influence, traced the South American to the North American revolution, identifying them together in a manner which the President thought would be offensive to the European allies. His report, as did his personal efforts, tended to strengthen the party favoring immediate recognition. Graham was less enthusiastic, and Bland held views which were not at all favorable to the Patriots.<sup>51</sup>

But recognition became a pressing question before the commissioners had even left the United States. In September, 1817, the subject was discussed in the *Richmond Inquirer*; and a few weeks before the opening of Congress the editor of the *Intelligencer* announced that, if the President failed to treat the subject adequately in his message, it would be taken up in the House of Representatives, where it would form a good theme for the display of oratorical abilities.<sup>52</sup> Monroe was impressed and presented the question to his cabinet for advice. The Secretary of State, finding that his colleagues were backward in giving their opinions, explicitly avowed his as opposed to the expediency of recognition.<sup>53</sup> That opinion prevailed, and in his annual message of December 2, 1817, the President limited himself to expressions of sympathy and good will for the Patriots, and to a reiteration of the policy of neutrality.<sup>54</sup>

The display of oratorical abilities began without delay. As soon as the President's message was received, a series of resolu-

<sup>51</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV., 156, 159; V., 57.

<sup>52</sup> Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics*, 126.

<sup>53</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV., 15.

<sup>54</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 13.

tions embracing references of parts of it to appropriate committees was introduced in the House of Representatives. To the first, relating to foreign affairs, Clay proposed an amendment instructing the committee to inquire what provisions of law were necessary to insure the American colonies of Spain their rights as belligerents. He was moved to this course in consequence of certain cases which had been tried under the neutrality laws, resulting in decisions unfavorable to the Patriot cause. He cited a case in point. Nine or ten British, disbanded officers desiring to join the Patriots, had sailed from Europe, and in their transit to South America had touched at Philadelphia. During their stay there they wore the arms and habiliments of military men, making no disguise of their intention to participate in the struggle. They took passage in some vessel bound to a port in South America. A knowledge of this fact having come to the ears of the public authorities, a prosecution was commenced against them, and, from their inability to procure bail, they were confined in prison. Clay felt, he declared, perfectly sustained in saying that, if such proceeding were warranted by the existing law, it was the imperious duty of Congress to alter the law. For the essence of neutral obligation, as he conceived it, was that the belligerent means of the neutral should not be employed in favor of either of the parties. It certainly did not require one nation to restrain the belligerent means of other nations. To further illustrate the point he referred to the application of the law to privateers. "We admit the flag of those colonies into our ports," he said; "we profess to be neutral; but if our laws pronounce that the moment the property and persons under the flag enter our ports they shall be seized, the one claimed by the Spanish minister or consul as the property of Spain, and the other prosecuted as pirates, that law ought to be altered if we mean to perform our neutral professions." Continuing, he declared that whatever had been our intentions, our acts had been on one side;



they all bore against the Patriot cause. We had had one great and magnanimous ally to recognize us; but no nation had stepped forward to acknowledge any of these provinces. The disparity between the contestants, said Clay, demanded a just attention to the party which was unrepresented; and if the facts which he had mentioned and others which had come to his knowledge were correct, they loudly demanded the interposition of Congress.

The amendment moved by Clay was agreed to without opposition; but it had no importance beyond offering an opportunity for expressions of sympathy for the Patriots and furnishing an occasion for an opening onslaught on the administration.<sup>55</sup>

On one pretext or another, similar discussions were constantly recurring in the House until late in the spring, when the session adjourned. Early in December a resolution requesting the President for information relative to the independence and political condition of the belligerent provinces led to discussion, which was renewed, a few days later, on a resolution calling for information respecting the Amelia Island affair. In January a bill for the general revision of the neutrality laws was introduced and in March it was debated at some length and passed. That disposed of, discussion arose over a clause in the appropriation bill voting compensation for the commissioners to South America. Then followed an extended debate occasioned by an amendment offered by Clay to appropriate a sum of money for the outfit and salary of a minister to Buenos Aires. It was on this occasion that Clay spoke in advocacy of the "system of the New World," to which reference has been made elsewhere. This measure having been disposed of by an adverse vote, the discussions for this session came to a close.<sup>56</sup> On no occasion did the forces marshaled by Clay, though showing a strength which gave the administration

<sup>55</sup> *Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 401-404.*

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid., 406, 408, 1406, 1655.*

concern, accomplish their ends. Unhampered by Congress the executive continued to pursue the policy of neutrality. Recognition, however, as an issue was not dead.

In August, 1818, Adams set forth very clearly in a letter to the President the principles upon which the act of recognition should be based. "There is a stage in such contests," he said, "when the party struggling for independence have, as I conceive, a right to demand its acknowledgment by neutral parties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when the independence is established as a matter of fact, so as to leave the chance of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate. The neutral nation must, of course, judge for itself when this period has arrived, and as the belligerent nation has the same right to judge for itself, it is very likely to judge differently from the neutral and to make it a cause or a pretext for war, as Great Britain did expressly against France in our Revolution, and substantially against Holland. If war thus result in point of fact from the measure of recognizing a contested independence, the moral right or wrong of the war depends upon the justice and sincerity and prudence with which the recognizing nation took the step. I am satisfied that the cause of the South Americans, so far as it consists in the assertion of independence against Spain, is *just*. But the justice of a cause, however it may enlist individual feelings in its favor, is not sufficient to justify third parties in siding with it. The fact and the right combined can alone authorize a neutral to acknowledge a new and disputed sovereignty. The neutral may indeed infer the right from the fact, but not the fact from the right."<sup>57</sup>

The subject of recognition again came under consideration in the early part of the following November. The President, who was drafting his second annual message, appeared to have some hesitation what to say, and requested Adams to sketch a

<sup>57</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Writings*, VI, 442.

paragraph on the subject.<sup>58</sup> The secretary complied, with the result that, when the message was sent to Congress a few days later, it embodied his views. They were briefly that there should be no departure from the neutral policy hitherto pursued. This he based upon two grounds: First, that the independence of none of the regions aspiring to statehood was established as a matter of fact; and secondly, that the European allies had undertaken to mediate between Spain and her colonies. It was understood that the powers would confine their interposition to the expression of their sentiments, abstaining from the application of force.<sup>59</sup> And it was known that the mediation must fail, because there could be no resubjugation without the use of force. It was thought best, therefore, to let the experiment have its full effect, and after it had failed, as fail it must, the United States would then be at liberty to recognize any of the governments without collision with the allies.<sup>60</sup> Congress did not venture to dissent and thus for a time the matter rested.

The President's third annual message, sent to Congress on December 7, 1819, contained, contrary to Adams's advice,<sup>61</sup> passages from which the Patriots might well draw encouragement. The progress of the war, said the President, had operated manifestly in favor of the colonies. Their distance from the parent country and the great extent of their population and resources gave them advantages which, he believed, would be difficult for Spain to surmount. "The steadiness, consistency, and success," he declared, "with which they have pursued their objects, as evidenced more particularly by the undisturbed sovereignty which Buenos Aires has so long enjoyed, evidently give them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other nations." But, he maintained, "it is of the highest importance

<sup>58</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 164.

<sup>59</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 44.

<sup>60</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 166.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 460-461.

to our national character and indispensable to the morality of our citizens that all violations of our neutrality should be prevented." <sup>62</sup>

The President did not succeed, however, as he had hoped to do, in forestalling discussion in Congress. Clay again introduced a resolution upon which he spoke on May 10, 1820, providing for the outfit and salary of such ministers as the President might deem it expedient to send to the new states. Forgetting for the moment the principles of neutrality, to which he had always professed the strongest attachment, he declared that two years before would have been the proper time for recognizing the independence of the South; for then the struggle was somewhat doubtful, and a kind office on the part of the government would have had a salutary effect. Since then nothing had occurred to make recognition less expedient. The independence of several of the provinces was, in fact, established; and as to their capacity for self-government every evidence was in their favor. The delay, Clay believed, was due to the excessive deference on the part of the administration for the powers of Europe. We had gone about, he said, among foreign powers, seeking aid in recognizing the independence of these states. Was it possible, he scornfully inquired, we could be content to remain looking anxiously to Europe, watching the eyes of Lord Castlereagh and getting scraps of letters, doubtfully indicative of his wishes; and sending to the Czar of Russia and getting another scrap from Count Nesselrode? "Why not," he asked, "proceed to act on our own responsibility, and recognize these governments as independent, instead of taking the lead of the Holy Alliance in a course which jeopardizes the happiness of unborn millions? . . . Our institutions now make us free; but how long shall we continue so, if we mold our opinions on those of Europe? Let us break these commercial and political fetters; let us no longer watch the nod of any European politician; let us become real and

<sup>62</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 59.

true Americans, and place ourselves at the head of the American system." <sup>63</sup>

Though Clay's resolution now passed the House, yet no action was taken by the executive. Accordingly, at the next session, the attack was renewed. After an ineffectual attempt to revive his old resolution, Clay introduced on May 10, 1821, a new one to the effect that the House joined with the people of the United States in their sympathy with the South Americans; and that it was ready to support the President whenever he should think it expedient to recognize their governments. The question was divided and the first part was carried by the vote of 134 to 12; and the second by 86 to 68. <sup>64</sup> The executive, however, was still unmoved. Recognition was not yet to be accorded.

The "deference" of the administration for the powers of Europe, which Clay treated with such scorn, demands a word of explanation. It will be recalled that Adams returned to America in the summer of 1817 firmly convinced that the nations of Europe were moved by a strong feeling of hostility toward the United States. Moreover he had observed that in all their councils they showed a perpetual tendency to interference against the American insurgents, upon the principle of legitimacy. <sup>65</sup> Nothing would have been easier, he believed, and with reason, than to precipitate a general conflict with monarchist Europe arrayed against republican America. Such a conflict he desired by every means in his power to avoid. Hence the caution which Clay professed to believe was born of weakness.

Monroe, though at times vacillating, shared his secretary's views. In a "sketch of instructions" <sup>66</sup> prepared early in 1819, in which he reviewed at length the policy of the government in the contest between Spain and her colonies, the President explained the attitude assumed with respect to the Euro-

<sup>63</sup> *Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 2223-2230.*

<sup>64</sup> Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics*, 142.

<sup>65</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Writings*, VI, 176.

<sup>66</sup> Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 92-102.

pean powers. The best service we could render the Patriots, he thought, was to keep our ports open and to extend to them all the advantages enjoyed by Spain, at the same time promoting by communications with other powers a like neutrality on their part, so as to leave the future of the war to be decided by the parties themselves. If this were done the result could not be doubted. On the other hand, had we recognized them, there was much reason to believe that we should have given offense to every other power, and excited in them a disposition to counteract its probable effect. The least injury which could have attended such a measure, said the President, would have been to increase the indisposition of other powers to recognize the new states; and it might have resulted in war with Spain, the allies being drawn into it equally against the United States and the colonies. By the course pursued, therefore, the United States had given the belligerent provinces all the advantages of recognition without any of its evils. Declaring that our relations with the allies were of the most friendly character, he continued as follows: "We have been long in free communication with them in favor of the colonies, pushing their cause to the utmost extent that circumstances would permit. Our object is to promote a recognition of their independence by the allies at the earliest day at which it may be obtained, and we are satisfied that the best mode of accomplishing it is by moving in concert with the allies, postponing the recognition on our part until it can be obtained from them, or until it shall be manifest that it will at least do no harm."

In the course of time it became evident that nothing could be accomplished by concerted action with other powers. England, though gradually withdrawing from the European alliance and assuming an intermediate political position with respect to the Old and the New World, was not yet inclined to coöperate with the United States in the recognition of the new states. She had from the first, Lord Castlereagh declared in February, 1819, anxiously desired to see the controversy be-

tween Spain and her colonies at an end, and had done her best to effect this result; but always upon the basis of the restoration of the supremacy of Spain. The intervention of force as a means of its accomplishment, however, she had ever repudiated. When some months later Lord Castlereagh assured the American minister that, in the event of a rupture between Spain and the United States, Great Britain would not take the part of the former, the danger of a general conflict with all Europe against America had vanished.<sup>67</sup> Whether or not the United States should recognize the new states was therefore reduced from a proposition based largely upon expediency to one based wholly upon the fact of independence. In a previous chapter it has been shown that that fact became clearly established in 1821.

On March 8, 1822, the President transmitted to the House of Representatives certain documents called for by that body relating to the independence of the Spanish American provinces. In complying with the request, the President briefly reviewed the history of the struggle which had so long held the attention of the world. He declared that in Buenos Aires, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico it had been attended with complete success, and that these provinces "which had declared their independence and were in the enjoyment of it ought to be recognized." In proposing this measure, the President added, it was not contemplated to change our friendly relations with either of the parties, but to observe as theretofore the most perfect neutrality between them.<sup>68</sup> Congress concurring, made, some weeks later, the necessary appropriations.

<sup>67</sup> Rush, *The Court of London*, III, 154.

The British attitude was known in the belligerent colonies. Referring to the revolt of troops which occurred in Spain in 1820, Bolivar made the following estimate of the situation:—"She [England] fears revolution in Europe and desires it in America; there it gives her infinite concern, and here furnishes her inexhaustible resources. North America, pursuing its arithmetical course of business, will take advantage of the opportunity to acquire the Floridas, our friendship, and a dominion of trade. It is truly a conspiracy of Spain, of Europe, and of America against Ferdinand." Bolivar to Guillermo White, May 1, 1820. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 159.

<sup>68</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 117.

On June 19, 1822, Manuel Torres was received as chargé d'affaires from the republic of Colombia. Relative to this incident, which was the first formal recognition of a Latin American state by the United States, Adams makes the following interesting remarks in his *Memoirs*: "Torres, who has scarcely life in him to walk alone, was deeply affected by it. He spoke of the great importance to the republic of Colombia of this recognition, and of his assurance that it would give extraordinary gratification to Bolivar. The President invited him to be seated, sat down by him, and spoke to him with kindness which moved him even to tears. The President assured him of the great interest taken by the United States in the welfare and success of his country, and of the particular satisfaction with which he received him as its first representative."<sup>69</sup> Mexico was recognized on December 12, 1822, by the reception of Manuel Zozaya as minister plenipotentiary.<sup>70</sup> Buenos Aires and Chile were recognized on January 27, 1823, by the appointment of Cæsar Rodney and Heman Allen, respectively, as ministers plenipotentiary to those governments. Brazil was formally recognized by the reception of Senhor Rebello as chargé d'affaires on May 26, 1824; the Central American states by the reception of Antonio José Cañas, August 4, 1824; and Peru by the appointment of James Cooley as chargé d'affaires to that government on May 2, 1826.<sup>71</sup>

News of recognition by the United States was in due time disseminated throughout Latin America. It was treated in the public press as an event of transcendent importance. A single example may be cited. In the *Gaceta de Colombia* of June 2, 1822, a leading article commenting upon President Monroe's message of March 8, and upon the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations to which the message had been referred, declared that these two documents "honor the United States

<sup>69</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, VI, 23.

<sup>70</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 12.

<sup>71</sup> Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, I, 90-92.



as greatly as does the declaration of independence written by the pen of the immortal Jefferson." Continuing, the writer said, among other things: "Palpable are the inconveniences to which undefined relations give rise. The increase of our commerce and of our industry since we became masters of our extensive coast lines should convince Europe and America of the necessity of entering into friendly arrangements with us upon matters of such high importance. A magistrate like Mr. Monroe, whose private opinions, it appears, have been constantly in opposition to the duties which his public character imposed, has been able with most propriety to take the initiative and to enlighten the whole world respecting the true state of a country which is to-day the object of the animadversions of our enemies and of the praises of our friends. The United States has always given careful attention to the origin and progress of the war in which its neighbors are engaged and in which its foreign policy has been and is to some extent compromised. Its government never acted upon impressions of the moment. The deliberateness of its procedure, which is a matter of comment in Europe, is an additional proof of the rectitude with which it has acted on this occasion. There is nothing, therefore, which we can present so effectively to Spain and to the rest of Europe, to demonstrate the justice of our pretensions, as the impartial judgment of a foreign nation which, established in our continent, has had frequent opportunity to observe our conduct and to give to our actions the merit which they deserve."

## CHAPTER V

### INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS

THE execution of the neutrality laws was a source of many difficulties to the government at Washington and required its constant watchfulness. The legislation of 1817 and 1818 was not sufficient in itself to prevent such violations as were practiced with impunity under the old laws. There were still difficulties in the way of a perfect observance of neutral duty, the chief of which was the sympathy felt on all sides for the cause of the Patriots. Adams, who was less subject to its influence than any of his distinguished contemporaries, repeatedly testified in his writings to its existence. In 1812 he told Count Romanzoff, Chancellor of the Russian Empire, that the government of the United States regarded with favorable sentiments the change that was taking place in the Spanish provinces, believing it would be generally advantageous to the interests of mankind.<sup>1</sup> In 1816 he said to the agent of New Granada in London, Del Real, that the general sentiment in the United States was certainly in their favor.<sup>2</sup> In 1817, commenting on one of Abbé de Pradt's pamphlets, *Les trois derniers mois de l'Amérique Méridionale*, he declared that "the republican spirit of our country not only sympathizes with people struggling in a cause so nearly, if not precisely, the same which was once our own, but it is working into indignation against the relapse of Europe into the opposite principle of monkery and despotism."<sup>3</sup> In 1818 he remarked to Onís that if Spain had taken more pains to adjust her differences with the United States, there would probably have been less ardor in the country against

<sup>1</sup> Adams to the Secretary of State, February 29, 1812. *Writings*, IV, 300.

<sup>2</sup> Adams to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1816. *Writings*, V, 551.

<sup>3</sup> Adams to John Adams, December 21, 1817, *Writings*, VI, 275.

Spain and consequently less in favor of the South Americans.<sup>4</sup> If the testimony of such a witness were not sufficient, abundant corroboration might be found in the writings of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and others. Moreover the debates preserved in the annals of Congress show that the nation's legislators without exception desired to see the Patriots succeed; and similar views were generally reflected in the public press. The independence of the Spanish colonies was, indeed, according to a foreign observer, Hyde de Neuville, "the only cause popular here."<sup>5</sup>

The Spanish Americans themselves were convinced of the sympathy of the citizens of the United States, if not of that of the government. "Here as well as in Spain and in every other nation," said Juan German Roscio in 1819, "it is well not to compare the operations of the government with the sentiment of the people and of individuals, in order not to impute to them the intrigues and vices of their rulers, or of their system of administration. The great majority of the people of the United States are decidedly for our cause." And he goes on to mention the fact that in the invasion of Texas in 1813 and of Mexico in 1817 a large number of Americans took part; that a great part of the privateers sailing under the Patriot flags were fitted out and manned in the ports of the United States; that the juries never conformed to the "unneutral" Act of 1817, and that the state of Kentucky had made a declaration in favor of their cause.<sup>6</sup>

It is readily to be understood what an obstacle this propensity to sympathize with the cause of the Patriots constituted for the government in the execution of the neutrality laws. Through its influence citizens who were otherwise law-abiding embarked shamelessly upon illegal enterprises in aid of the insurgents; Federal judges failed to render strict justice under

<sup>4</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, IV, 200.

<sup>5</sup> Hyde de Neuville, *Mémoires et Souvenirs*, II, 203, 205.

<sup>6</sup> Urrutia. *Páginas de Historia Diplomática*, 207. For the Kentucky resolutions, see Niles' *Weekly Register*, XIII, 371.

the law; and executive officers of the government not only winked at violations but actively aided and abetted them. Privateering after 1815 was the chief source of annoyance. Unfortunately it came to be disgraced by a buccaneering and piratical spirit for which citizens of the United States were largely responsible. The vessels were "for the most part fitted out and officered in our ports and manned from the sweepings of our streets."<sup>7</sup> The center of illicit enterprises shifted from New Orleans and the Southwestern border to the Atlantic seaboard and more particularly to the port of Baltimore. In the course of time Baltimore became so notorious in its failure to suppress the illegal acts of the privateers that the matter was made the subject of a memorial by the government of Portugal to the Congress of Sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle. A declaration of displeasure concerning these practices was entered upon the protocols of the conferences and it was agreed that amicable expostulations concerning it should be made to the United States.<sup>8</sup>

When Hyde de Neuville told Adams of the action of the Congress of Sovereigns, the secretary vented his wrath in a long entry in his journal. "The misfortune," he wrote, "is not only that this abomination has spread over a large portion of the merchants and of the population of Baltimore, but that it has infected almost every officer of the United States in the place. They are all fanatics of the South American cause. Skinner, the postmaster, has been indicted for being concerned in the piratical privateers. McCulloh, the collector, Crawford says, is a very honest man, but only an enthusiast for the South Americans and easily duped by knaves, because he thinks all other men as honest as himself. . . . The district judge, Houston, and the circuit judge, Duval, are both feeble, inefficient men, over whom William Pinkney, employed by all the pirates as their counsel, domineers like a slave driver over his negroes.

<sup>7</sup> Adams to A. H. Everett, December 29, 1817. *Writings*, VI, 282.

<sup>8</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, IV, 317.

After the pirates were indicted last September, and before they were tried, a piece was published in the *National Intelligencer*, threatening that any judge who should condemn them could not be expected to live long, either as a judge or as a man. The paper containing this piece was sent under a blank cover to Judge Houston just before he opened court. He read the paragraph in open court, blustered about his independence and how impossible it was to intimidate *him*, and then (as well as Judge Duval), Wirt says, was perfectly subservient to whatever Pinkney chose to dictate. Middleton told me that he had seen that threatening piece in the handwriting of Skinner, the postmaster, one of the parties indicted. When the trials came on, Glenn [district attorney] wrote to me asking to be assisted in the management of the causes. I prevailed upon the President to direct the Attorney-General, Wirt, to assist him; but Wirt considered it as extra official, and made the public pay him fifteen hundred dollars for losing the causes. The grand jury indicted many, and the petit jury convicted one man, but every one of the causes fell through upon flaws in Glenn's bills of indictment. The conduct of the juries proves the real soundness of the public mind. The soldiers are good men and true. But the officers! the commanders! what with want of honesty in some and want of energy in others, the political condition of Baltimore is as rotten as corruption can make it. Now that it has brought the whole body of European allies upon us in the form of remonstrances, the President is somewhat concerned about it, but he had nothing but directions altogether general to give me concerning it. I must take the brunt of the battle upon myself, and rely upon the justice of the cause."<sup>9</sup>

Some time after this Adams received information from Brackenridge which put a still worse light on the whole affair. It appears that Theodorick Bland and the Baltimore postmaster, Skinner, who was his son-in-law, together with others associated with them, had entered into relations with the Carreras, exiles

<sup>9</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, IV, 318.

from Chile and Buenos Aires and conspirators against the existing governments there. They had lent these political refugees large sums of money and had obtained from them stipulations for exclusive privileges of commerce for a period of years. This private speculation, Adams believed, was the source of all the excitement stirred up in the newspapers during the autumn of 1817 over the question of recognition. The articles were written by Skinner aided by some others. The same cabal obtained the appointment of Bland as one of the commissioners and made him their private agent to recover from the governments of Buenos Aires and of Chile the moneys lent to the Carreras. These connections of Bland, with their links of attachment to the Baltimore privateering piracies, influenced and pervaded his conduct as a commissioner and were the cause of his quarrel with Brackenridge.<sup>10</sup>

"It is, in theory," said Adams, "one of the duties of a President of the United States to superintend in some degree the moral character of the public officers who hold their places at his pleasure. But the difficulty of carrying it into practice is great, and the number of instances in which I see corruption of the deepest dye, without being able to punish or even to displace it, is among the most painful appendages to my situation."<sup>11</sup> Adams evidently felt that, if the President had used his authority to remove certain Federal officers who were guilty of corrupt practices, the neutrality laws would have been more strictly observed. This doubtless was true. In certain cases the President was lenient. There was, however, no disposition on his part toward a general tolerance of these irregularities. On the whole, the administration adopted effective means to enforce neutrality. The legislative branch of the government lent its coöperation by passing early in 1819 "An act to protect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of piracy." This law empowered the President to instruct the

<sup>10</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, V, 158.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 159.

naval commanders of the United States to capture any vessel committing piratical aggressions upon ships of the United States or of any other nationality; and it authorized merchant vessels owned by citizens of the United States to resist aggressions by all vessels except the public armed ships of the nations in amity with the United States. Finally, a section of the law prescribed the death penalty for persons convicted of piracy as defined by the law of nations.<sup>12</sup>

A few months after the passage of this act an expedition was sent out under Commodore Perry to carry it into execution, to communicate the terms to the governments of Venezuela and Buenos Aires, and at the same time to make representations to those governments against the privateering piracies carried on in their names and under their commissions.<sup>13</sup> A number of piratical vessels were captured and within the next year some ten or twelve of the pirates were executed, executions taking place at Boston, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. A number of others of the culprits, after trial and conviction, were pardoned.<sup>14</sup> Although the executions produced a salutary effect, yet piracy continued for several years longer to thrive, especially around the island of Cuba. In the course of time the incipient South American navies becoming better organized, the line between legitimate privateering and piracy was more clearly distinguishable. Thus the task of suppressing the pirates became less complex and less likely to cause international friction.

In the meantime, however, numerous cases of friction did occur, involving not only the relations of the United States with the European powers, but with the new states and Brazil as well. With the latter the situation became tense. Brazil, it will be remembered, was raised in 1815 to the dignity of a kingdom coördinate with the mother country. As long as the

<sup>12</sup> *Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., 2523.*

<sup>13</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 389.

<sup>14</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Writings*, VII, 45; *Memoirs*, V, 147.

court resided at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was in effect the Portuguese power. The memorial on privateering presented to the Congress of Sovereigns may be regarded, therefore, as having been presented by Brazil. And Brazil had cause to protest. It will be recalled that the territory now constituting the republic of Uruguay, the Banda Oriental, was occupied in 1816 by the Portuguese who, after driving out the forces of Buenos Aires and of the independent leader, Artigas, occupied Montevideo. Retiring northward, Artigas continued the struggle to recover Montevideo. Though he had no port, he managed to enlist a number of privateers in his service. The Portuguese minister, the Abbé Correa, made frequent complaints to the State Department at Washington of the depredations of these privateers, which he declared were fitted out and officered and manned in the ports of the United States. Adams believed that the situation was so serious that if the United States had been the injured party it would have declared war without hesitation.<sup>15</sup>

The Abbé Correa resided for many years in the United States, first as a fugitive from the Inquisition and afterward as minister plenipotentiary. In 1820 he returned to Brazil. At that time he was seventy years of age, though, as Adams described him, full of spirit, vivacity, and wit. "He is among the men I have known," said Adams, "one of the most entertaining conversation." Just before returning to Brazil, he went upon a visit to Jefferson, to whom he talked much about an American system, in which his government and that of the United States should be united, and, by concert with the European powers, should agree to keep the coasts of this hemisphere clear of pirates, on condition that they should clear the seas of the Eastern Hemisphere of the Barbary pirates. Jefferson was disposed to favor the project and thought that it might be carried into effect so that the United States vessels might be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. But Monroe believed, and

<sup>15</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, V, 177.



Adams was of the same opinion, that an American system upon that plan would be an alliance between the United States and Portugal against the South American independents, which was hardly reconcilable with any just view of our policy.<sup>16</sup>

Insisting that it was impossible for Portuguese subjects to obtain justice in the courts of the United States, Correa proposed the appointment of special commissioners to investigate their complaints. Told by Adams that such an arrangement was impossible, the Portuguese minister painted the situation in the darkest colors. Adams reported to the President, in part as follows: "These things had produced such a temper both in Portugal and in Brazil against the people and government of the United States that he was unwilling to tell me the proposal which had been formally made in the King's Council concerning them. That five or six years ago the people of the United States were the nation of the earth for whom the Portuguese felt the most cordial regard and friendship. They were now those whom they most hated, and if the government had considered the peace as at an end, they would have been supported in the declaration by the hearty concurrence of the people. . . . The desire of the king was to be on good terms with the United States, but the property of his subjects was robbed upon the high seas by pirates sallying from the ports of the United States, without the trouble to assume a disguise. This practice was continued year after year in the midst of professions of friendship from the American Government. It was impossible that he should put up with it."<sup>17</sup>

Events over which the United States had no control had already solved this difficulty with Brazil. Unknown to the Portuguese minister, the power of Artigas had been completely broken some months before and he was already a prisoner in Paraguay. Other events which soon followed — the return of the king and his court to Portugal in 1821 and the declaration

<sup>16</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, 172, 176.

<sup>17</sup> Adams to Monroe, August 30, 1820, *Writings*, VII, 70.

of independence by Brazil in 1822 — marked the beginning of a new era in the relations between these two great American states.

Other incidents caused friction between the United States and the new governments. The privateering enterprises of Thomas Lloyd Halsey, the United States agent at Buenos Aires, resulted in his dismissal. Another representative at Buenos Aires, W. G. D. Worthington, though not violating neutrality, did swell upon his agency, as Adams expressed it, until he broke out into a self-accredited plenipotentiary,<sup>18</sup> causing his dismissal also. The government of Buenos Aires was no less unfortunate in its early representatives to the United States. The first, Martin Thompson, sent to Washington in 1816, was dismissed by his government for having transcended his authority in granting commissions.<sup>19</sup> Manuel H. de Aguirre, who succeeded him the next year, suffered persecution, personal humiliation, and imprisonment. He was commissioned by his government to obtain the recognition of Argentine independence and to induce the United States to favor the interests of the new states.<sup>20</sup> And as a private agent of Chile, in addition to his public representation of Buenos Aires, he was authorized to build and dispatch six sloops of war to aid in the expedition against Peru which was then being organized.<sup>21</sup>

Arriving in the United States during the summer of 1817, Aguirre had an interview with the President and with the Secretary of State, Rush, the latter of whom informed him that nothing in the law prevented the building and sending away the vessels as a commercial speculation.<sup>22</sup> Not until October 29, did he communicate with the government on the subject of recognition. Receiving no reply, he wrote again on December

<sup>18</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 158; V, 93.

<sup>19</sup> Palomeque, *Orígenes de la Diplomacia Argentina*, I, 28. Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 46.

<sup>20</sup> Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano*, III, 309.

<sup>21</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 123.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, 124.

16. "My government," he said, "considering that of the United States as one of the first of whom it ought to solicit this acknowledgment, believed that the identity of political principles, the consideration of their inhabiting the same hemisphere, and the sympathy so natural to those who have experienced similar evils, would be so many additional reasons in support of its anxiety. . . . The recollection that it was these states which first pointed out to us the path of glory, and the evidence that they are enjoying most fully the blessed effects of liberty, inspire me with the conviction that it is for them also to show that they know how to appreciate our efforts."<sup>23</sup>

Failing in his effort to obtain recognition, Aguirre went to New York, where he had two sloops of war constructed, his funds not being sufficient for more. It was in this transaction that his troubles arose. At the instigation of the Spanish consul, he was once arrested in the streets, and at another time he was taken out of bed at midnight. For some weeks, his house became "a mere house of marshals and sheriffs and officers of the law."<sup>24</sup> When the vessels were ready for sea they were attached for personal debts of the captains in whose names they were registered. His officers and crews had been bribed; his funds were exhausted; and the two sloops were lying at New York at an expense of a thousand dollars a day. Aguirre's only resource was to sell them. But, being built as vessels of war, they were not salable for purposes of commerce. Hence, he turned to the government, complaining bitterly of his treatment and inquiring if it would purchase the vessels.

At the President's request, Adams wrote to Aguirre informing him that the executive was not authorized to make the purchase. Explaining that the interpretation and exposition of the laws, under the free institutions of the United States, belonged peculiarly to the judiciary, and reminding Aguirre as a stranger, unacquainted with the legal provisions of the United

<sup>23</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 180.

<sup>24</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 123.

States, he might have recurred to professional men of eminence for advice, Adams continued as follows: "You have, therefore, constantly been aware of the necessity of proceeding in such a manner, in executing the orders of your government, as to avoid violating the laws of the United States, and although it has not been possible to extend to you the privilege of exemption from arrest (an exemption not enjoyed by the President of the United States himself, in his individual capacity), yet you have had all the benefit of those laws which are the protection of the rights and personal liberties of our citizens. Although you had built and equipped, and fitted for sea, and manned, two vessels suitable for purposes of war, yet as no proof was adduced that you had armed them, you were immediately liberated and discharged by the decision of the judge of the Supreme Court, before whom the case was brought. It is yet impossible for me to say that the execution of the orders of your government is impracticable; but the government of the United States can no more countenance or participate in any expedient to evade the intention of the laws than it can dispense with their operation."<sup>25</sup> Shortly afterward Aguirre made the financial arrangements necessary to enable him to take the vessels away. As they sailed unarmed, their departure was not hindered by the government.<sup>26</sup>

Three questions connected with the acquisition of Florida affected to a greater or less degree the relations of the United States with the belligerent provinces. The first of these was the occupation of West Florida. The strip of territory lying south of the thirty-first parallel, between the Perdido River on the east and the Mississippi on the west, and known as West

<sup>25</sup> Adams to Monroe, August 27, 1818, *Writings*, VI, 450.

<sup>26</sup> The vessels reached Buenos Aires in November, 1818. One of them later joined the Chilean Navy. The other was taken away by her captain to Rio de Janeiro and sold to the Portuguese Government, the failure of the Buenos Aires Government to pay the crew and to reimburse the captain for funds advanced by him being alleged as the reason. Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XII, 280.

Florida, was claimed by the United States as a part of the Louisiana purchase. It had never been delivered to the French, however, and it continued under Spanish rule until 1810, when the inhabitants, as elsewhere in Spanish America, rose in revolt. Representatives of the several districts convened at Baton Rouge and on September 26, 1810, declared the territory to be a free and independent state. The convention then requested the government at Washington to take the infant state under its "immediate and special protection, as an integral and inalienable portion of the United States." The President deemed it "right and requisite" that possession should be taken of the territory, but on the ground of the claim to it under the treaty of cession. Accordingly, ignoring the independent government established there, he ordered Governor Claiborne to occupy the territory and administer it as a part of the Orleans Territory.<sup>27</sup> This transaction appears to have aroused at the time no resentment on the part of the Patriots in Mexico or in South America.

The next incident, however, did affect to some extent the relations of the United States with certain of the new states. This was the suppression of an insurgent establishment on what is known as Amelia Island at the mouth of St. Mary's River, near the boundary of the state of Georgia. The facts of the case are stated by the President in divers messages to Congress.<sup>28</sup> In the summer of 1817, Amelia Island was taken possession of by persons claiming to act under the authority of some of the revolutionary governments. As the island lay within territory which had long been the subject of negotiation with Spain, its occupation excited surprise. The unfolding of the undertaking, however, in the opinion of the President, marked it as a mere private, unauthorized adventure. "Projected and commenced," he declared, "with an incompetent force, reliance

<sup>27</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, III, 395-397. For a full history see *The West Florida Controversy* by Isaac Joslin Cox.

<sup>28</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, II, 13, 23, 32, 40, 51. December 2, 1817; January 13, 1818; November 16, 1818; January 30, 1819.

seems to have been placed on what might be drawn, in defiance of our laws, from within our limits; and of late, as their resources have failed, it has assumed a more marked character of unfriendliness to us, the island made a channel for the illicit introduction of slaves from Africa into the United States, an asylum for fugitive slaves from the neighboring states, and a port for smuggling of every kind."<sup>29</sup> Moreover, like Galveston Island, the place was made the rendezvous for privateers illegally fitted out in the ports of the United States. Under the secret Act of January 15, 1811, the President was empowered to occupy any part of East Florida in the event of an attempted occupation by any foreign government or power.<sup>30</sup> The Spanish authorities having made a feeble and ineffectual attempt to dislodge the invaders, the executive dispatched the United States ship *John Adams*, Captain Henley commanding, to the island with instructions to break up the establishment. This was accomplished with the coöperation of land forces in the latter part of December, 1817.<sup>31</sup> Subsequently the United States held the place, subject to negotiations pending with Spain.

The President expressed full confidence that the revolutionary governments would disclaim any connection with the enterprise, and the several agents who were being dispatched toward the end of 1817 to South America were instructed to bring the subject to the attention of the governments which they might visit. Aguirre, the Argentine agent, declared to Rodney and Bland before they set out for Buenos Aires, that the adventurers never had any authority from his government whatever; that in his judgment the United States was fully justified in breaking up the establishment; and that he was assured it would be considered in the same light by his government.<sup>32</sup> O'Higgins, the Director of Chile, declared to Bland that he had never heard

<sup>29</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, II, 14.

<sup>30</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 132.

<sup>31</sup> *Niles' Weekly Register*, XIII, 347.

<sup>32</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 46.

of such a place as Amelia Island.<sup>33</sup> And Bolivar assured Irvine, an agent sent to Venezuela, that his government had no knowledge of or part in the enterprise.<sup>34</sup> Mexico and New Granada, the other governments supposedly connected with the scheme, appear to have made no formal disavowal. The former possessed no responsible revolutionary government at the time, and as the latter was on the point of union with Venezuela, its failure to disavow, if indeed it did fail to do so, need not be regarded as a serious omission.

Inasmuch as certain recent Spanish American writers attribute to Bolivar the design of erecting a barrier in the Gulf of Mexico against the expansion of the United States toward the south, it will be of interest to inquire further into the insurgent occupation of Amelia Island with a view to determining whether or not it constituted a part of any such plan. Although there is much about the affair that remains obscure, yet certain facts, relating especially to the chief actors, throw light upon it.

Sir Gregor McGregor was the leader of the expedition which took possession of the island. Sir Gregor had then been in America for several years, having gone first to Venezuela in 1811. There he served under Miranda, rising to the rank of brigadier general. After Miranda's downfall, he joined Bolivar in the renewed struggle, and on a number of occasions distinguished himself. For a short time in 1816, during Bolivar's absence, he was in chief command of the forces in northern Venezuela. Later he surrendered the command to General Piar and abandoned the country. Had he already been designated as the leader of the Amelia Island expedition? Such evidence as is available proves the contrary. Early in 1817 news of his being at Saint Thomas was published in the United States. The reasons assigned for his quitting Venezuela were "the futility of his endeavors to establish concert, discipline, and a regular government."<sup>35</sup> That he abandoned the Venezuelan

<sup>33</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 292.

<sup>34</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 42.

<sup>35</sup> *Niles' Weekly Register*, XI, 380.

cause in disgust is confirmed by Larrazábal, by Baralt, and by the anonymous author of a *Voyage to the Spanish Main*.<sup>36</sup> It is further confirmed by circumstances and by the character of the man. After the close of the Napoleonic wars, foreign officers flocked to the standards of the revolutionists in great numbers. These officers, among whom many were unfit for the positions which they received, were inclined to despise the native officers under whose orders they had to serve. Hostility of the natives to the foreigners naturally arose, leading many of the latter to quit the service. Sir Gregor was an exceedingly vain man and it is not unlikely that the surrender of the command, the exercise of which for a short time must have given him great satisfaction, to a native officer whom doubtless he regarded as his inferior, was more than his pride could bear.

McGregor now had no other aim, apparently, than to seek some new field of adventure in which he could himself be the chief figure. His exploits were heralded to the world. It was reported that he was proceeding to Mexico; that upon arriving at Saint Thomas he had immediately recruited one hundred and fifty "choice spirits of various nations and complexions"; that with these he had embarked for Port-au-Prince, expecting to raise there enough men to get a footing in Mexico, where he supposed the natives would flock to his standard. He is next heard of at Baltimore, but without followers.<sup>37</sup> On March 31, 1817, he was commissioned at Philadelphia by certain "deputies of Free America" to take possession, either wholly or in part, of East and West Florida.<sup>38</sup> With a small expedition organized in the United States, he proceeded to Amelia Island, which he took without a struggle. His plans were next to attack St. Augustine. But almost immediately dissensions arose, and in September he resigned. Louis Aury, who put into the harbor

<sup>36</sup> *Vida de Bolívar*, I, 444; *Resumen de la Historia de Venezuela*, I, 285. Narrative of a voyage to the Spanish Main in the ship *Two Friends*, The occupation of Amelia Island by McGregor, etc.

<sup>37</sup> *Niles' Weekly*, XI, 380.

<sup>38</sup> *Executive Document, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 175, 33.*



about the time McGregor resigned, assumed command. Sir Gregor, it was reported, sailed away for England in his privateer, *The General McGregor*, to arrange his personal affairs. In 1819 he made a descent on Porto Bello, which he captured. Although this place lay within the territory claimed by the new republic of Colombia, Sir Gregor acted independently.<sup>39</sup> Surprised by Spanish forces and compelled to flee, he next established himself on the Mosquite shore, where he adopted the title of his Highness Gregor, Cacique of Poyais. In this enterprise he failed also. In 1839, he was naturalized by the Venezuelan Government and restored to his former military rank. His death occurred, it is said, at Caracas a few years later.<sup>40</sup>

It is even more clear that Aury as the head of the Amelia Island enterprise was not an agent of Bolivar. The privateering activities of this buccaneer, pirate, or patriot,<sup>41</sup> as he is variously called, have already been adverted to. He was originally a French sailmaker, becoming afterward a sailor. He lived in Santo Domingo until 1813. He then offered his services to the Patriots of New Granada, who gave him a commission as lieutenant in their navy, and promoted him afterward to the rank of commandant general of their naval forces.<sup>42</sup> In 1816, when the exiled leaders of Venezuela and New Granada met at Aux Cayes, in the republic of Haiti, to adopt measures for renewing the war, Aury alone opposed the election of Bolivar as supreme chief with full military and civil authority. But he was joined by Montilla, Bermúdez, and a few others who were also discontented with Bolivar's leadership. This small group attempted to break up the Venezuelan expedition by offering extraordinary rewards to those who would enroll in the service of Mexico.

<sup>39</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XVI, 390.

<sup>40</sup> Lee, *Dictionary of National Biography*, XXXV, 95.

<sup>41</sup> It is of especial interest to note that Alamán (*Historia de México*, IV, 553) calls him "the chief of the pirates." See also Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 58. Parton (*Life of Andrew Jackson*, II, 423) says that he seems to have been a man of honor, sincerely devoted to the cause.

<sup>42</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 75; *Executive Document 175*, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 36.

Failing to interfere materially with Bolivar's plans, Aury, with his band, proceeded to join the Mexicans.<sup>43</sup> His establishment at Galveston, his appointment as civil and military governor of Texas, and his connection with the Mina expedition have been noted. After having convoyed Mina's vessels down the coast of Mexico, he established his headquarters for a while at Mata-gorda Bay. Thence he proceeded late in the summer of 1817 to Amelia Island to join McGregor. Assuming command under the doubtful authority of the commission issued to him by the Mexican, Herrera, he hoisted the Mexican flag.<sup>44</sup> After his departure from Amelia Island he was employed in the service of Colombia.<sup>45</sup>

It appears, then, that Bolivar had no connection with either of these agents. But what of his relation to the principals? McGregor's commission was signed by Lino de Clemente as Deputy of Venezuela; by Pedro Gual as deputy for New Granada, and as proxy for F. Zarate, the Mexican deputy; and by Martin Thompson as deputy for Buenos Aires.<sup>46</sup> Of these, Lino de Clemente and Gual alone need be considered; for Thompson was without standing in Buenos Aires and, moreover, he was dismissed for exceeding his authority. The Mexican representative appears to have had no part in the undertaking. Clemente was most active in promoting the enterprise. He was Bolivar's brother-in-law, having married María Antonia de Bolivar. He was sent as an agent to the United States early in 1817. Nothing in the published documents and correspondence shows that in the Amelia Island affair he acted on any but his own responsibility; though there is some evidence that Bolivar did not strongly condemn the conduct of his agent. Writing to Clemente after the conference with Irvine, Bolivar said that his reply had reduced itself to a declaration that the

<sup>43</sup> Larrazábal, *Vida de Bolívar*, I, 417.

<sup>44</sup> *Executive Document 175, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 16.* Adams, J. Q., *Writings*, VI, 284.

<sup>45</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 510.

<sup>46</sup> *Executive Document 175, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 34.*

government of Venezuela was ignorant of what was going on at Amelia Island and that it did not recognize either McGregor or Aury as legitimate parties to the contest against Spain unless they had received authority from some independent government. "Mr. Irvine," he added, "expressed the greatest satisfaction at this reply, although it was nothing more than a private opinion confidentially expressed."<sup>47</sup> Moreover Bolivar now dispatched to Clemente an appointment as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near the government of the United States.<sup>48</sup>

This appointment proved to be offensive to the government at Washington. But there is no reason to believe that it was so intended. Irvine, another of the "mere enthusiasts," in all probability, had not given Bolivar any reason to suppose that Clemente's actions in the United States were regarded there as reprehensible. The administration, however, took a decidedly different view of them, and when Clemente, after receiving his commission, presented himself at Washington and requested a conference, the Secretary of State, by direction of the President, replied in the severest terms. "I have to inform you," he wrote, "that your name having been avowedly affixed to a paper, drawn up within the United States, purporting to be a commission to a foreign officer for undertaking and executing an expedition in violation of the laws of the United States, and also to another paper avowing that act, and otherwise insulting to this government, . . . I am not authorized to confer with you, and that no further communication will be received from you at this department."<sup>49</sup> When Clemente shortly afterward returned to Venezuela, he not only manifested great resentment toward the United States, but insisted that the Venezuelan Government approve his conduct in the Amelia Island affair. Bolivar being absent from the seat of government, it fell to

<sup>47</sup> Bolivar to Lino de Clemente, July 24, 1818. Urrutia, *Páginas de Historia Diplomática*, 120.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 116.

<sup>49</sup> Adams to Lino de Clemente, December 16, 1818, *Am. State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 414.

the vice president, Zea, to pass upon the matter. Zea denied Clemente's request, and in writing to Bolivar on the subject expressed the opinion that the United States was well disposed toward the cause of the Patriots and that the impolitic conduct of Clemente had alone prevented a positive declaration in their favor.<sup>50</sup>

Of Gual's connection with Amelia Island less is known. He resided there for a time and took part in the management of the establishment. Adams, who regarded him as the most respectable of all the men connected with the enterprise, leaves it to be inferred from an entry in his journal that Gual's conduct may have been influenced by his desperate circumstances and by the lack of means of subsistence. The President, however, regarded the project as peculiarly Gual's own, and attributed to him a feeling of acrimonious resentment for its failure.<sup>51</sup>

The names of Xavier Mina and Alvarez de Toledo were also connected with the enterprise. When the establishment was suppressed, Aury designated one of the adventurers, Vicente Pazos, to inform the United States of the grounds on which "this part of East Florida was dismembered from the dominions of the King of Spain." In his exposition, Pazos declared that the enterprise was decided upon in consequence of the arrival, in the summer of 1816, of Mina from England and of Toledo from New Orleans; and in consequence of the interception of a dispatch indicating the probable transfer of the Floridas to the United States. The plan was to launch two simultaneous attacks from Port-au-Prince under Mina and Toledo. But the damage sustained by Mina's fleet in a storm and the desertion of Toledo, says Pazos, frustrated the plan.<sup>52</sup>

It has already been stated that Mina and Bolivar met at Port-au-Prince. The two leaders discussed their respective

<sup>50</sup> Zea to Bolivar, June 8, 1819. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XVI, 398.

<sup>51</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 775; VI, 146.

<sup>52</sup> *Executive Document 175, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 23.*

plans, Mina having already proposed by letter the union of their forces in the liberation first of Mexico and then of Venezuela. This combination Bolivar did not approve.<sup>53</sup> Nor does it appear that either Bolivar or Mina designed measures for the wresting of Florida from Spain. Robinson, the historian of the Mina expedition, mentions in this relation only an overture made to Mina by certain persons at New Orleans for an attack upon Pensacola. This overture Mina rejected because it appeared to be nothing more than a mercantile speculation. "As a soldier and as a patriot," says Robinson, "he disliked to war for mercenary considerations and he was most decidedly hostile to all predatory projects."<sup>54</sup>

But the occupation of Florida may have formed at one time a part of Mina's plans. These plans, it will be recalled, were laid in England, and there, if anywhere, the plot to keep the United States out of Florida was hatched. During the War of 1812 the British used Florida as a base of operations against the United States, and after the war a certain Colonel Nicholls and other British subjects, among whom were Arbuthnot and Ambrister, remained there to perpetuate British influence.<sup>55</sup> During 1815 the English papers frequently discussed the subject of Florida, in a tone hostile to the United States. Rumors of the cession of the province by Spain to Great Britain were constantly circulated.<sup>56</sup> It was even reported that there was in preparation an expedition of ten thousand men, to be sent out from Great Britain and Ireland to take possession of it. The intimations of these things reaching Washington were so strong and confident that Adams was finally instructed to bring the matter to the attention of the British Government.<sup>57</sup> In February, 1816, he obtained from Castlereagh the assurance that there was not and never had been any foundation for the re-

<sup>53</sup> Larrazábal, *Vida de Bolívar*, I, 442.

<sup>54</sup> Robinson, *Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution*, 69, 76, 261.

<sup>55</sup> Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson*, 253.

<sup>56</sup> Niles' *Weekly Register*, IX, 197, 200, 215, 252.

<sup>57</sup> Monroe to Adams, December 10, 1815. Monroe, *Writings*, V, 380.

ports. "Military positions," he said, "may have been taken by us during the war of places which you had previously taken from Spain, but we never intended to keep them. Do you only observe the same moderation. If we shall find you hereafter pursuing a system of encroachment upon your neighbors, what we might do *defensively* is another consideration."<sup>58</sup> Later, when the expedition against Amelia Island was being organized in the United States, McGregor went to Bagot, the British minister at Washington and, unfolding the plans for taking Florida, asked him what the opinion of the British Government upon it would be. Bagot replied that he could give no answer to that question and could say nothing about it. In the Seminole War the British subjects, Nicholls, Arbuthnot, Ambrister, and others, incited the Indians to hostilities against the United States, and the fact that they acted in concert with McGregor was established. The British Government, however, disavowed the acts of its subjects.<sup>59</sup>

Hyde de Neuville, who kept his government informed of the Amelia Island affair, was convinced that the British Government was back of it. In June, 1817, he expressed his views in the following terms: "The *éclat* of this expedition, the funds which have been put into it, the affectation on the part of the leaders of encouragement by the Federal Government, the origin of McGregor, his secret relations with English agents, his confidences to some of the members of his party, all concur to convince me of what I have sought to make sure of; that is, that it is chiefly English influence which is at work in the ports of the United States and that McGregor is nothing more than a British agent. The English wish to compromise the Americans; they wish to create for themselves a pretext and to mask their own ambition, from the necessity of putting a check on that of the Federal Government. If Florida is attacked by the insurgents, the adventurers of the Union will flock to them from all sides.

<sup>58</sup> Adams to Monroe, February 8, 1816. Adams, *Writings*, V, 502.

<sup>59</sup> Adams, J. Q., *Memoirs*, IV, 50, 179.

The English would then have to choose whether to come to the aid of Spain against the Americans, or to support openly the insurgents, in either case under the pretext of the conduct of the government and people of the United States." Three months later, Hyde de Neuville, though still believing that McGregor was a British agent and that his mission was to make trouble and to compromise the Americans, thought that he had indirectly served the Americans, as the attack on Amelia would result in forcing Spain to the cession of the Floridas. A year later he again declared: "McGregor is certainly an agent of the English Government."<sup>60</sup>

In maintaining that the British Government directly supported the Amelia Island enterprise, Hyde de Neuville was in error, if the declarations of that government are to be credited. But the complicity of certain British subjects does not admit of question. What part they may have had in conceiving the plan is not known and, indeed, the final word on the subject cannot be spoken until the facts relative to its origin are revealed. Of all the explanations of the undertaking, however, the most improbable is that which attributes it to distrust of the United States on the part of Bolivar or of other influential Spanish Americans. That sentiment was the conjecture of a later day. The South American promoters of the scheme for seizing the Floridas, whatever hidden motives may have instigated their backers, professed to act in no unfriendly spirit toward the United States. They maintained that the occupation of Florida by the Patriots would in every way be beneficial to the United States, especially since Spain had manifested a willingness to transfer it to some European power. It is true that the United States had declared more than once that it would not consent to such a transfer and for obvious reasons; but it was no less obvious, they insisted, that those reasons did not apply to the other American states. The French or the English in Florida would be commercial and political rivals, whereas the Patriots

<sup>60</sup> *Mémoires et Souvenirs*, II, 271, 324, 369.

would be friends politically and commercially. With the independence of Florida established, they said, it would be recognized as a part of the confederation of South America; but this they did not wish to have interpreted as denying to the people of Florida the right to become a part of the United States if they and the people of the United States so desired.<sup>61</sup>

The suppression of the Amelia Island establishment appears to have aroused no great resentment except on the part of the insurgent agents in the United States. A long article, it is true, was published in the *Correo del Orinoco*,<sup>62</sup> the semi-official organ of the Venezuelan Government, in which the action of the United States was severely criticized. But this article has every evidence of having originated with Lino de Clemente, and it is to be doubted whether it reflected any widespread feeling among the leaders of Venezuela. That Bolivar knew nothing about the inception of the undertaking and that he did not object to the acquisition of the Floridas by the United States is singularly confirmed by two of his letters. Writing to Piar on June 14, 1817, about the time the Amelia Island expedition was ready to set out, Bolivar said: "Brion writes me of the early arrival of McGregor from Baltimore with seven large vessels loaded with arms and munitions. They are coming to join Brion and us."<sup>63</sup> A little more than a year later, writing to Briceño, and referring in a spirit of exultation to the victory of San Martín in Chile, and to the campaigns in Venezuela and New Granada, he declared: "The day of America has arrived, and everything appears to announce the end of our glorious and terrible struggle. The war of the United States leaves now no doubt. The American general, Jackson, has taken by assault

<sup>61</sup> Urrutia, *Páginas de Historia Diplomática*, 108.

<sup>62</sup> Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, VI, 565-570. It is to be noted also that Roscio, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Angostura, and one of the editors of the *Correo del Orinoco*, was in the United States early in 1818 just after the suppression of the Amelia Island establishment. He returned later in the year to Venezuela. Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, VI, 360.

<sup>63</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIX, 111.



the fort of Pensacola, and the Floridas, East and West, are in the possession of the Americans." <sup>64</sup>

The third of the Florida incidents which, it is sometimes said, affected the relations of the United States with the revolutionary governments, was the negotiation and final ratification of the treaty of cession. The United States had long desired to acquire the Floridas and efforts were repeatedly made during Jefferson's presidency to bring Spain to agree to the transfer. The breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1806 put an end to the discussions and the matter remained in abeyance until relations were restored in the early part of Monroe's first administration. Negotiations were then renewed and, under the able direction of John Quincy Adams, brought to a successful conclusion on February 22, 1819, when the treaty of cession was signed. The United States Senate immediately ratified the treaty, but Spain delayed; and the final act giving full force to the instrument, the exchange of ratifications, was not consummated until exactly two years after the date of signature. <sup>65</sup>

It has been charged that in these negotiations with Spain the United States pursued a purely selfish policy; that its one great desire being to acquire the Floridas, everything else was subordinated to that end; specifically, that the neutrality law of 1817 and the long-deferred recognition of the new states were a part of the price which the government at Washington had to pay for the cession of the Floridas. <sup>66</sup> The charge is, of course, without foundation. The system of neutrality, already a traditional policy of the nation, had the preponderant support of public opinion and of all branches of the government. The executive, being responsible for recognition, withheld it not in order to facilitate the negotiations with Spain, but on solid grounds of fact. The Spanish Government attempted, it is

<sup>64</sup> *Cartas de Bolivar (Sociedad de Ediciones)*, 236.

<sup>65</sup> Davis, *Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United States and other Powers*, 785.

<sup>66</sup> Calvo, *Recueil des Traités*, V, 174, 178.

true, to exact a promise as a condition of the ratification of the treaty that the United States should abandon the right to recognize the revolutionists or to form relations with them;<sup>67</sup> and, though the promise was not given, the Spanish Government, it seems, regarded the United States as morally bound. Such at least is the inference from the protest which the Spanish minister at Washington made to the Secretary of State upon learning of the President's message of March 8, 1822, proposing the recognition of the new states. "How great my surprise was," he wrote, "may be easily judged by any one who is acquainted with the conduct of Spain toward this republic, and who knows the immense sacrifices which she has made to preserve her friendship. In fact who could think that, in return for the cession of her most important provinces of this hemisphere; for the forgetting of the plunder of her commerce by American citizens; for the privileges granted to their navy; and for as great proofs of friendship as one nation can give another, this executive would propose that the insurrection of the ultramarine possessions of Spain should be recognized?"<sup>68</sup>

It is to British rather than to Spanish sources, however, that the aspersions on the motives of the United States in the Florida negotiations are to be traced. In this, much more than in the Amelia Island affair, the British manifested a spirit of jealous resentment and of suspicion, and their attitude was reflected, as they desired it should be, in the minds of some of the Spanish American leaders. As soon as it became known in England that the Treaty of Cession had been concluded, certain British agencies, if not the government itself, began to take measures to counteract the supposed advantage which the United States had obtained by the peaceable transfer of the Floridas, and which, it was feared, would now be greatly increased by an early recognition of the new states. A leading article published in the London *Times* of April 19, 1819, is typical of the means

<sup>67</sup> Davis, *Notes upon the Treaties of the United States*, 153.

<sup>68</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, IV, 845.

employed. Declaring that Great Britain and every Christian nation had an interest in seeing the war between Spain and her colonies terminated, the writer continued as follows: "It cannot be said that America [the United States] has not an interest in the conclusion of these fatal troubles; at least she has shown that she has been able to sack no small advantage from their continuance and that to our great and lasting detriment. Old Spain having rejected arbitration may carry on the contest more feebly and more feebly still, till at last she may concede all her trans-Atlantic possessions to America, one after another, simply because she herself is unable to reduce them, and because America finds their occupation necessary for the tranquillity of her contiguous provinces."

Having raised before the eyes of the Spanish American aspirants for statehood the specter of absorption by the United States, the writer reassures them by suggesting the means of their salvation. "Are we to stand by," he inquires, "and suffer a procedure which in its sinister effect upon us will have all the consequences of collusion between Old Spain and the United States? Are we to refrain from intercourse with the insurgent provinces of South America (simply because the Spanish Government at home calls itself at war with them) till they drop at last exhausted into the hands of our great commercial rival? The court of Madrid will be pleased to observe that America has been paid for her forbearance. If she has hitherto abstained from acknowledging the trans-Atlantic states, she has had her price for it, in the cession by Old Spain of certain wealthy provinces. Far indeed from Great Britain be such conduct as this! Far removed from us be the baseness of extorting a bribe from the impotence of the old government in order to induce us to disown the rising liberties of the new ones! No; let us remember that we are England still; that we have an established name for honor and integrity, as well as for valor and enterprise, among the nations of the world; and that, if we have hitherto abstained from interfering in the sanguinary

troubles which desolate the fields and towns of New Spain, it has been from dignity and moderation, not from the sordid hope of gain. We have not hovered like the vulture over the contending armies till we could seize a breathless carcass for our prey."

Continuing, the writer becomes more specific and reveals the secret of his choler. It was not the fear that the United States might become sovereign throughout the continent, but the fear that it might gain in the American family of nations a moral predominance detrimental to the interests of Great Britain. "We believe it is some time," he says, "since America proposed to us to acknowledge the government of Buenos Aires. This is an important fact; and so far the conduct of America appeared to be candid and friendly to England. We know not whether her secret objects might not be to quicken Spain in her bargain about the Floridas. However, the result is such as we have seen. America has *not* acknowledged any of the insurrectionary states as she proposed to us; and she has accepted a valuable cession from the court of Madrid. Hence, therefore, commences a fresh epoch in the war. Shall we suffer this or any similar traffic to succeed? We do not use the language of menace; there is no occasion to go to war; but shall we allow America to reap first the advantage of many valuable possessions from Old Spain as the price of withholding her acknowledgment of the Patriot governments; and then shall we suffer her to insure the gratitude of those Patriot governments by being still the first to treat with them as independent? America cannot deny this fact — she is at present leagued with Old Spain against the colonies. She has accepted the Floridas as the price of that union; for we know that she did propose to us to acknowledge the new states; that she has *not* so acknowledged them; and that she has, without the slightest pretext of justice, accepted the Floridas from Old Spain. She has, in familiar language, been, for a while at least, bought off. Our course is now, therefore, not one of our own choosing, it is imposed on us by the necessity of things; we cannot, without

madness, desist from acknowledging the independence of Buenos Aires and the other Spanish provinces. The court of Madrid must have looked to this as a result, when it gained the forbearance of the United States by consigning to them the Floridas in our detriment; and we should be sunk into a very abject condition, indeed, if we allowed Spain to think it of more importance, even to purchase the neutrality of America than to retain ours as a boon, or as the natural consequence of our disinterestedness."

Articles published in foreign newspapers, and especially in those of Great Britain, relating to the struggle between Spain and her colonies were widely copied in papers which had sprung up in those parts of Spanish America controlled by the revolutionists. The "leader" of the *London Times* was no exception. In the latter part of August, 1819, a translation of it appeared in the *Correo del Orinoco* and it may have been inserted in other South American papers. A curious evidence of its effect is found in the instructions of September 1, 1819,<sup>69</sup> to Manuel Torres, who had been appointed to succeed Lino de Clemente as agent of the Venezuelan Government in the United States. In the instructions to Torres, Juan Germán Roscio, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declared that in the light of the *Times* article of April 19, the conduct of the United States had acquired a new meaning. It is now revealed, says Roscio in substance, that the eyes of the United States have been upon the Floridas from the beginning, and though there may have been some other motive for the Neutrality Act of 1817, the obvious one was the acquisition of the Floridas. But, having come into possession of the coveted territory, the United States will be more likely to give its support to the Patriots. Unlike the British writer, Roscio drew comfort from the probability of such an outcome.

In instructions of July 7, 1819, to Peñalver and Vergara, agents of Venezuela to Great Britain, the question of Florida

<sup>69</sup> Urrutia, *Páginas de Historia Diplomática*, 138-140.

is considered more at length.<sup>70</sup> Roscio here says that there are two things to note relative to the Neutrality Act of 1817: First, that the United States, being desirous of acquiring the Floridas, sacrificed its neutrality, convinced that any act of hostility toward the Patriots would contribute to the attainment of the desired end; and secondly, that the British minister at Washington was most active in promoting the passage of the Act. Without reflecting, one might judge from this, said Roscio, that Great Britain did not desire the emancipation of Spanish America; but, viewing the matter in its true light, the English Government appeared to be striving to deprive the United States of the advantages which it might obtain from an independent South America, indebted to the elder republic for generous assistance. The object of the maneuver was to bring the United States into bad odor with the Patriots, so that in commercial and other relations it would receive but little consideration, whereas Great Britain would gain favor with the Patriots by giving them commercial and military aid. Returning again specifically to the subject of Florida, Roscio ventured the opinion that the English Government would not be pleased at the transfer of that territory to the United States, increasing thus the political importance of the American Confederation. And finally, he said that if it were true that Spain had money to send another expedition to America, it must have come from the sale of the Floridas.<sup>71</sup>

To what extent views such as those expressed by Roscio prevailed it is impossible to say, but there is reason to believe that they were not generally held. The great mass of the Spanish American population knew nothing about the Floridas, and the great majority of the leaders, it appears, were either indifferent to their fate, or regarded their acquisition by the United States as a natural outcome of the break up of the Spanish Empire.

<sup>70</sup> Urrutia, *Páginas de Historia Diplomática*, 202-204.

<sup>71</sup> By the terms of the treaty the United States undertook to make satisfaction for the claims of American citizens against Spain to an amount not exceeding \$5,000,000. No money was paid directly to Spain.

The latter was the point of view of the author of an article published in the *Correo del Orinoco*, while the ratification by Spain of the treaty of 1819 was pending. During the Peninsular War, according to this writer, there was neither Spanish nation nor true sovereign, and the United States would have been justified in taking out of the ruin of the empire in payment of its claims, a part of what was being saved. But, added the writer, it should be said to the honor of the American republic, whether it was due to respect for that part of the people who were struggling for independence or to confidence in the justice and in the sincerity of him who then aspired to the throne, or whether it was due to the belief that the opportune moment had not arrived, it abstained from taking advantage of the weakness of its opponent. The occupation of the Floridas in 1818 and the failure of the other nations, from whom Spain expected support, to protest, demonstrated that the United States could, whenever it desired, obtain justice. It was then, therefore, that the treaty was concluded. After discussing the causes which were delaying the ratification of the treaty, the writer concluded that, if a new war should be the result of the refusal of Spain to comply with its obligation, the Americans would seize the two Floridas without difficulty and would advance into New Spain, where the people were awaiting and would welcome their coming. The Floridas would then be held by right of conquest. Mexico would be avenged, the debts of Spain would remain unpaid, and the rest of America would have acquired indirectly a powerful ally.<sup>72</sup>

The reference to Mexico serves to raise the question as to what was really the attitude of that country to the transfer of the Floridas to the United States. As has already been intimated, the revolution in Mexico during these years had reached such a low ebb that it seems futile to attempt to discover its official attitude toward any important question. In consequence of the precarious situation, newspapers did not spring up until later,

<sup>72</sup> Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, VI, 371.

and contemporary documents, such as those which have been cited in the case of Venezuela, are not available. The contemporary historians, Alamán, Bustamente, and others, wrote their works some years afterward, when relations between Mexico and the United States had become embittered by numerous conflicting interests and finally by war. Even so, the question of the Floridas received but little consideration at their hands. There was published, however, in 1821, at Philadelphia, a little volume under the title of *Memoria Politico-Instructiva*, which contains some indication of the Mexican point of view. It was distributed to the independent leaders in Mexico, and it was reprinted there in 1822. This book, published anonymously, has been attributed to Vicente Rocafuerte, a citizen of Ecuador, then, and for several years afterward, in the service of Mexico; but every evidence points to Father Mier as author of the work.<sup>73</sup> Mier was, as has been pointed out in a previous chapter, one of the ablest and most influential Mexicans of his time. It will be of interest, therefore, to note his views on the cession of the Floridas. He, as did many others, regarded the neutrality of the United States as purchased by Spain, the Floridas being ceded as a part of the consideration. "All the cessions," he declared, "are injuries to us, not only by virtue of the rights acquired from our mothers, all of whom were Indians, but by virtue of the pacts of our fathers, the *conquistadores* (who won all on their own account and at their own risk) with the Kings of Spain, who, according to the laws of the Indies, cannot under any condition whatever alienate the least part of America. And if they do, their act has no binding force."<sup>74</sup>

And yet Mier was by no means unfriendly to the United States. He was an ardent republican and thought that the predictions often heard that the government of the United

<sup>73</sup> The internal evidence points unmistakably to Padre Mier. See pp. 74-105, 127. Bustamente (*Historia del Emperador Iturbide*, 201) confirms the authorship of Mier.

<sup>74</sup> *Memoria Politico-Instructiva*, 15.



States would not survive were a sad consolation to royalists and had no basis in fact. "Why should we be compared," he inquired, "with the corrupt peoples of Europe, unacquainted with the virtues of republicanism, rather than with our compatriots of the United States, among whom the republican form of government has had excellent results?" The interests of Europe and America, he declared, were diverse. The counsels of the crowned heads of Europe should not be heeded, and especially should England be distrusted. The philanthropy of British nationals should not be confused with the Machiavellian practices of the British ministry. Hiding her ambition under the veil of measures necessary to check the power of Napoleon, Great Britain, declared Mier, had proceeded with her system of seizing the strategic points in the waters of Europe, and she intended to follow the same practice in America. She was deeply wounded by the cession of the Floridas, which gave to the United States, the only power able to dispute her maritime supremacy, control of the Gulf of Mexico. The writer goes on to point out the places held in American waters by Great Britain — the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad, and other places which she had her eye upon. In the Guianas, she had a foothold on the continent of South America; and she was showing a disposition to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, so that she might raise her trident in both seas. Moreover, in the southern continent, Brazil was, he said, little more than a British colony, and in that quarter Great Britain had acquired or was attempting to acquire other points of vantage. In the northern continent not only did she possess the Canadas, but she held the coast of Honduras, in New Spain, and she was going on extending her dominion toward Yucatan. The British were so rooted in the country, said Mier, that the kings of the Mosquito nation received their authority at the hands of the governors of Jamaica. It was not, therefore, Spain, their open enemy, with whom they had mainly to contend in order to be truly inde-

pendent; but another, more formidable, because hidden — the British ministry.<sup>75</sup>

Not only did the author of this *Memoria* regard the tendency of Great Britain to add to her possessions in America as of much greater consequence to the continent than any similar tendency manifested by the United States, but he was so far from being intolerant of the cession of the Floridas to the United States that he included in the appendix of his book an extract from the *Letter of a Patriot*<sup>76</sup> in which that transaction was decidedly approved. The minister of his Catholic Majesty, said the writer of the letter, upon offering to the United States the Floridas — which were, and with reason, the object of their most ardent desires — demanded nothing less than an offensive and defensive alliance against the insurgents of South America and Mexico; that is, he demanded that the government at Washington obligate itself to guarantee the integrity of the Spanish dominions in America. Did the Spanish minister know, inquired the writer, that in putting forward this illegal, inhumane, scandalous proposition, he was placing the sword in the hands of the enemy? The Americans, feeling aggrieved, presented the dilemma, either Spain would deliver the Floridas in payment of the just claims against her, or the United States would occupy them by force and recognize the new governments. Spain could make but one choice. The Americans waited patiently and confidently and at the end of twenty months obtained the ratification of the treaty. Thus had the Floridas attained liberty. To-day they formed a part of the United States, and though sold, they escaped from the humiliating servitude and from the state of languor in which the mother country had held them for centuries.

There occurred in the southern part of the continent also a number of incidents affecting the relations of the United States

<sup>75</sup> *Memoria Politico-Instructiva*, 81, 90, 95.

<sup>76</sup> *Memoria Politico-Instructiva*, 140. The letter was published in full in the *Correo del Orinoco* early in 1820 and reprinted in Blanco-Azpurúa, VII, 446-449.

with the belligerent colonies. One of these, involving in a singular manner the principle of neutrality, is briefly related by Barros Arana.<sup>77</sup> In 1813, during the war between Great Britain and the United States, the famous American frigate, *Essex*, under the command of Captain David Porter, made a number of prizes in the southern Pacific, and arming and equipping one of them — at first the *Georgiana*, later the *Atlantic*, rechristened the *Essex Junior* — sent it out to cruise under Lieutenant Downes. No less fortunate than his chief, Lieutenant Downes captured a number of enemy vessels, which he was ordered to take to Valparaiso and dispose of to the best advantage. The government of Chile, believing that the United States was resolved to aid the Spanish colonies to achieve their independence, placed no obstacles in the way of the disposal of the prizes. The Viceroy of Peru and the Spanish officials generally had attempted to convince the insurgents that the alliance between Spain and England against Napoleon extended to America and that England would help to reduce the rebellious colonies to obedience. It was not strange that this propaganda should have had effect in a country which, like Chile, was located at such a great distance from the sources of information. Poinsett's activities, referred to in the preceding chapter, doubtless contributed also to the erroneous impression that assistance might be expected from the United States. Not only was Lieutenant Downes permitted, therefore, to dispose of the prizes, but the government itself manifested a disposition to acquire some of the vessels for the purpose of arming and equipping them as the beginning of the Chilean navy. This conduct of the government of Chile elicited from the junta at Buenos Aires a remonstrance, but expressed, says Barros Arana, in the most moderate and discreet terms it was possible to employ. The admission into the port of Valparaiso of an American war vessel with British prizes which had been permitted to be disposed of and sold in the country, declared the Buenos Aires junta, in-

<sup>77</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, IX, 220.

fringed the strict neutrality which should be maintained in the conflict between the two belligerents, England and the United States. In order that embarrassing consequences might be avoided, the junta suggested that reparation be made "to the satisfaction of the British commanders in these seas." Although it was thought in Chile that the commercial interests of the Buenos Aires Government might have prompted its action, most of the Chilean trade having been effected hitherto through Buenos Aires, yet the junta at Santiago, perceiving the danger of international complications, thereafter treated the Americans with greater reserve, maintaining as between them and the British strict neutrality.

The friendly attitude of the Chilean Patriots on the one hand and the hostile attitude of the Spanish authorities on the other, toward the United States is reflected in the pages of Captain Porter's *Journal*. When he first entered the port of Valparaiso in the spring of 1813, he believed the Spanish to be in control; and from the stand the United States had taken against British aggressions and from its conduct with respect to the Floridas he had no reason to expect a friendly reception. Before he cast his anchor, however, the captain of the port, accompanied by another officer, came on board with an offer of every civility, assistance, and accommodation that Valparaiso could afford. To his astonishment, Porter was informed that the country had shaken off its allegiance to Spain; that the ports of Chile were open to all nations; that they looked up to the United States for example and protection; and that the arrival of the American vessels would be regarded as most advantageous to their commerce, which had been much harassed by Royalist corsairs from Peru. On shore, Captain Porter was given a very cordial reception by the governor. He found that he had happily got among stanch republicans, men filled with revolutionary principles and apparently desirous of a form of government founded on liberty. As soon as his arrival was announced at Santiago, bells were rung the whole day and illuminations took place in

the evening. It was generally believed that the appearance of an American frigate in the Pacific signified nothing less than the offer of a friendly alliance and assistance in the struggle for independence. The captain and his officers were invited to visit Santiago. He was told that the president with a large military escort would meet them on the road and accompany them to the city; and he was assured that, from a political point of view, their coming was a most happy event.<sup>78</sup>

But, said Captain Porter, time was too precious to be spent in amusements. Preparations for continuing the cruise went busily forward. And not until the vessel was ready for sea did the captain determine to devote a few hours to relaxation. He then invited the ladies and gentlemen of Valparaiso on board the *Essex*. As they were on the point of embarking, however, a strange vessel appeared in the offing. The guests were left on shore, and the officers returned on board, where everything was found prepared for getting under way. The cables were cut, and in an instant, as Captain Porter expresses it, the frigate was under a cloud of canvas. On board were Poinsett and Luis Carrera, together with other Americans and Chileans who had come down from Santiago to visit the ship. As there was every expectation of an engagement, they requested the privilege of sharing the dangers. Luis Carrera was the brother of the Chilean president, José Miguel Carrera. He was a spirited youth, says Captain Porter, and evidently anxious to take part in an engagement. His constant request was to board the stranger and his disappointment was great when she was discovered to be a Portuguese frigate. "We could perceive the hills," records Captain Porter in his *Journal*, "crowded with men, women, and children, all equally and perhaps more anxious than Don Luis to see the fight. Among them, as it afterward proved, were our fair guests, who did not hesitate to declare their disappointment; and frankly acknowledged that a sight of a sea engagement would have had more

<sup>78</sup> *Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific*, I, 94, 97.

charms for them than all the entertainments we could afford them on board the ship." Returning to port the American officers were given a dinner by order of, and at the expense of, the supreme government of Chile. There were present the officers of the Portuguese ship and some English merchants; "but," says Captain Porter, "when the wine began to circulate and the Chilean officers to feel the ardor of their patriotism, such flaming toasts were given as to make them think it prudent to retire."<sup>79</sup>

Cruising along the coast of Peru, the *Essex* fell in with the *Nereyda*, a Spanish privateer out of Callao, and took possession of her, Captain Porter having discovered that she had been cruising for, and had captured, some American vessels. Her captain stated that as Spain and Great Britain were allies, he always respected the British flag; and that his sole object was the capture of American vessels. Captain Porter disarmed the privateer and, removing the American prisoners whom she had on board, sent her into the port of Callao with a letter to the viceroy, requesting that her captain be punished. At Tumbez, where the *Essex* touched a little later, Captain Porter found that the Royalist authorities there also were uncertain whether the war between Great Britain and the United States did not extend to the former's allies, the Spaniards.<sup>80</sup> In time, however, the relationship of the several belligerents to each other was better understood. Captain Porter continued his cruise, temporarily breaking up British navigation in the Pacific. At last, in March, 1814, a superior British squadron under Commodore Hillyar, composed of the frigate *Phæbe* and the sloop of war *Cherub*, appeared off the port of Valparaiso, where the *Essex* and the armed prize, *Essex Junior*, lay at anchor. Coming in and taking on provisions, the British vessels then cruised off the port for nearly six weeks, blockading the American vessels. Finally, the *Essex* attempted to escape, but becoming dis-

<sup>79</sup> *Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific*, I, 100-102.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 193.

abled in a gale, put back into port and cast anchor in a small bay on the east side of the harbor, for the purpose of repairing damages. The enemy approached and here, in the territorial waters of Chile, the fierce battle, so well known to naval history, was fought. The American vessels were compelled to surrender.<sup>81</sup> No claim for reparation was ever made nor does it appear to have been alleged that there was negligence on the part of the territorial sovereign in not preventing the attack.<sup>82</sup>

As a result of the surrender of the *Essex*, the prestige of the Americans on the Pacific coast of South America suffered a decline. British influence was henceforth in the ascendant. Commodore Hillyar offered his services as mediator between the Royalist authorities at Lima and the revolutionary government of Chile. The Royalists accepted at once, and the Patriots, having suffered reverses, accepted somewhat later. The outlook for the revolution was dark not only in Chile but throughout the revolted provinces. As a result of Commodore Hillyar's mediation, the Treaty of Lircay was concluded on May 3, 1814. By the terms of this treaty the Chileans recognized their dependence on the metropolis, but demanded and were promised an autonomous national government.<sup>83</sup> Of the subsequent disapproval of the treaty by the viceroy at Lima, of the renewal of the war and of the complete reconquest of Chile, it does not concern us here to speak. Captain Porter and the survivors of his crew were sent under parole to the United States aboard the *Essex Junior*, which was disarmed and used as a cartel. For the next four or five years relative quiet reigned on the Pacific coast. With the renewal of the war, however, and the preparation in 1819 of the expedition against Peru, the interests of the United States again became involved, through the operation, as on so many other occasions, of the principle of neutrality.

<sup>81</sup> *Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific*, II, 161-168.

<sup>82</sup> Moore, *A Digest of International Law*, VII, 1092.

<sup>83</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, IX, 416 *et seq.*

Late in 1818, Lord Cochrane, it will be recalled, arrived in Chile to assume command of the naval forces of that republic. His presence there, as may well be inferred from his imperious character and from the fact that the feeling between Great Britain and the United States was still bitter, was not calculated to contribute to cordial relations between the Patriots and the Americans, who for one reason or another happened to visit that quarter. He had no sooner entered upon his duties than an acrid correspondence between him and Captain Biddle of the American sloop of war *Ontario* arose over the question of salutes.<sup>84</sup>

On March 1, 1819, acting under the authority of the Chilean Government, Cochrane issued a proclamation declaring the whole coast of Peru to be in a state of formal blockade.<sup>85</sup> His forces being insufficient to maintain an effective blockade of such a great stretch of coast, the United States held that it was illegal throughout its whole extent; for otherwise, every capture under a notified blockade would be legal, because the capture itself would be proof of the blockading force. Lord Cochrane disavowed all claim of forfeiture as to any place where no actual force was employed; but this disavowal was not wholly satisfactory<sup>86</sup> and numerous disagreeable incidents involving American ships and merchants occurred and continued to occur until the Royalists were finally driven out of Peru.

A brief reference to the case of the *Macedonian*, an American brig, taken by her captain, Eliphalet Smith, to trade on the Pacific coast in 1818, will illustrate the friction which arose. On September 23, 1818, the Supreme Director of Chile, in order to keep secret certain measures of a naval and military character, issued a decree declaring an embargo for one month upon all ships in the ports of the country. The *Macedonian* had been lying in the harbor of Valparaiso, but a few days before

<sup>84</sup> Niles' *Weekly Register*, XVI, 204.

<sup>85</sup> The proclamation was published in Niles' *Weekly Register* for July 3, 1819, XVI, 318.

<sup>86</sup> *American State Papers, Naval Affairs*, II, 557.



the decree was issued put to sea and made for the port of Callao, arriving there early in October. Captain Smith, according to Barros Arana, was an unscrupulous adventurer who saw in the countries struggling for their independence nothing more than a field for his speculations. He gave the viceroy all the information which he had been able to obtain in Chile, and offered to sail out to meet the Spanish squadron, which was expected in the Pacific, to warn it of the naval preparations which were going on in the ports of Chile. This offer was not accepted by the viceroy. Smith continued to traffic along the coast, serving the interests of the Royalists, says Barros Arana, and giving rise to diplomatic complications which were not settled for many years afterward.<sup>87</sup> When Lord Cochrane appeared before Callao, the *Macedonian* proceeded to Huarmey, a little port some twenty or thirty miles to the north. Near that place Cochrane's forces captured the sum of \$80,000 which was being transported overland by Captain Smith under a small Royalist guard to be taken aboard the *Macedonian*. This sum, together with \$60,000 taken by Cochrane from a French vessel and claimed by Captain Smith, as the proceeds of the sale of his cargo, was confiscated as enemy property, which it was alleged, Smith was attempting to smuggle out of the country. These two seizures were the subject of a negotiation between the United States and Chile in 1820, the Chilean government agreeing to pay the sum of \$104,000 with interest in full settlement of the claims. Two years later another large sum of money which Captain Smith claimed as the proceeds of a cargo brought by the *Macedonian* from China and sold to Royalist merchants at Arica was seized by Chilean forces, delivered to Lord Cochrane, and distributed by him among his squadron. This seizure became the subject of a separate claim which the two governments agreed, in 1858, to submit to the King of Belgium for arbitration. By the award, which was not rendered until 1863, three-fifths of the claim, \$42,400, that

<sup>87</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XI, 634.

proportion being owned by Smith and his American associates, was allowed.

The *Macedonian* was the cause of still another claim against Peru. After the Patriots came into control of the government at Lima, Captain Smith took his vessel to Callao to dispose of the residue of the cargo brought from China. The brig was now seized and condemned as the property of Spanish refugees. By the terms of a convention entered into in 1841 between the United States and Peru the latter agreed to pay the United States the sum of \$300,000 in full satisfaction of all its claims; and of this sum nearly one-third was apportioned on account of the *Macedonian*.<sup>88</sup>

It would appear from the settlement of the various claims growing out of the trading of the *Macedonian* in Peru, that Captain Smith, in so far as these particular incidents were concerned, was guilty of no offense under international law. Apart from his trading activities, however, the Patriots believed him to be in sympathy with the Royalists, and actively engaged in promoting their interests. This charge was never the subject of judicial investigation, as were the claims. But, whatever may have been the truth of the matter, the conduct of Captain Smith, supported in so far as it was legal, by the government at Washington, contributed, together with other incidents of a similar sort, not a little to the dimming of the earlier impression of the Patriots that the United States would be, in the struggle, their friend and ally.

The *Macedonian* was only one of a number of American vessels trading with the Royalists in defiance of the so-called blockade. After Lord Cochrane returned to Chile in 1822, the Peruvian navy was organized and for the next two or three years thereafter attempted to prevent intercourse with the enemy. The United States maintained a squadron in Peruvian waters during this period and its commander, in looking out for

<sup>88</sup> Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations*, II, 1451 et seq.; V, 4602.

the interests of American shipping, incurred the ill will of the Patriot government. The Peruvian historian, Paz Soldán, declares that "the decided and vituperable partiality" of Captain Stewart of the U. S. S. *Franklin* aided the viceroy in keeping informed of the movements of the Patriots; that under the guns of the *Franklin* arms and ammunition were debarked at Arica for the Royalists; that the government of Peru asked in vain to have Captain Stewart relieved; that during the South American struggle for independence the United States gave more than one proof of its protection to Spain and of its lack of interest in the political fortunes of the former Spanish colonies; and that Great Britain pursued a wholly different course.<sup>89</sup>

The contrast, suggested by Paz Soldán, between the attitude of the United States and that of Great Britain toward the struggle of the Spanish American colonies to achieve independence demands a word of consideration. Both governments professed a policy of strict neutrality. The United States, as has been pointed out, in order better to comply with its neutral duty, passed the Act of March 3, 1817. This law was declared by Clay and his partisans to be "anti-neutral" and this characterization was widely copied throughout Spanish America, often with the implication that British legislation was more favorable to the insurgents. But the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed by

<sup>89</sup> *Historia del Perú Independiente*, II, 115.

Captain Stewart was recalled and tried by court-martial in 1824. In a letter to him dated November 16, 1824, the Secretary of the Navy said: "You have been already apprised that the government of Peru has made complaints against a part of your official conduct, while in command of the squadron in the Pacific Ocean, and that these complaints have been seconded by public rumor, and confirmed by the agent of our government in that country. I have, also, to inform you that other complaints have been made, though in a less imposing form." Captain Stewart was tried under the following charges: Unofficerlike conduct, disobedience of orders, neglect of duty, and oppression and cruelty. Under the first charge there were twenty-nine separate specifications, most of which set forth alleged unneutral conduct on the part of the accused. By the judgment of the court-martial, Captain Stewart was acquitted most honorably of all the charges which had been made against him. The record of the trial is found in *American State Papers, Naval Affairs*, II, 487-597.

Parliament in 1819, was avowedly based on the American Act of 1817 as amended in 1818. Prior to the enactment of this law, Great Britain had attempted to enforce neutrality under the provisions of international law. But violations were frequent. In 1818 alone six expeditions are said to have been dispatched by López Méndez to Venezuela. One of these, a brigade under Colonel English, consisted of some two thousand men. Even subsequent to the passage of the Foreign Enlistment Act, General D'Evereux, after an elaborate public banquet in Dublin, took out another expedition to South America.<sup>90</sup>

Out of these illicit expeditions grew the British Legion which served under Bolivar and which, in conjunction with the native troops, played a decisive part in the liberation of the northern part of South America.<sup>91</sup> For this assistance, however, and for the invaluable aid rendered in the south by Cochrane, Miller, and others, whose services were enlisted in England, no credit can be given to the British Government without convicting it of a shameless disregard for its own laws and of duplicity toward one of the parties to the contest. It was a question of individual enterprise. That citizens of the United States played no such part was due not at all to lack of sympathy with the cause, but to a stricter enforcement of the American neutrality laws and to the circumstance that the relatively small number of adventurous spirits who might have been drawn into the contest found agreeable occupation at home. The country was new. Savage tribes on the frontiers had to be subdued. Vast tracts of unoccupied territory called for settlers. Industry and commerce flourished. In Great Britain the situation was altogether different. The conclusion of the European wars turned many thousands back to peaceful pursuits. A period of industrial distress and of unemployment followed. Emigration set out for foreign shores. The countries of Central and South America, struggling to be free, offered promis-

<sup>90</sup> Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics*, 126.

<sup>91</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XVII, 571; XVIII, 80.

ing rewards to those bred to arms. To these causes and not to governmental policy was due the relatively large contribution of British subjects to the emancipation of Spanish America.

Although the British Government and that of the United States were in substantial accord on the subject of neutrality, yet, as to the question of the independence of the colonies, they differed widely. The United States, while maintaining neutrality, did not hesitate to express its sympathy with the cause of independence, and was never in the least inclined to contribute to any arrangement for reëstablishing the authority of the mother country. Great Britain, on the contrary, made several attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the insurgents and the Peninsular authorities on the basis of the supremacy of the latter, and not until the United States had formally recognized the new states did the British Government finally give up hope of accomplishing such a result. The first of these attempts was made in 1810 at the solicitation of a Venezuelan delegation headed by Bolivar. In a memorandum on the subject, Marquess Wellesley concluded that by a skillful use of Ferdinand's title as sovereign — the insurgents still professed loyalty to him — it would be possible for England to prevent a sudden and complete emancipation of the Spanish colonies and yet compel Spain to modify her colonial system; but that it was chimerical to suppose that the mother country could preserve her colonies otherwise than as allied states under a common sovereign. The regency at Cadiz, however, declined to enter into negotiations upon such a basis and no further effort was made for the time to bring about the desired reconciliation.<sup>92</sup>

In May, 1811, the British diplomatic representative at Cadiz was instructed to renew and urge the offer of mediation of Great Britain for the purpose of checking the progress of the unfortunate civil war and of effecting at least such a temporary ad-

<sup>92</sup> Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, II, 335-337.

justment as might prevent, during the contest with France, so ruinous a waste of the general strength of the Spanish Empire. "Heads of Articles of Adjustment" were drawn up as a basis for the proposed mediation. The provisions were in substance for a cessation of hostilities; a general amnesty; representation of the colonies in the Cortes; free trade with preference for Old Spain and her colonies; native Americans to be viceroys or governors; native representation in the cabildos and no appeals to Spain; and coöperation in the war against France. The articles were to be guaranteed by Great Britain. But it was understood that the British Government would not be induced to commit acts of hostility against the colonies on the ground of a refusal to recognize the constituted authorities in the Peninsula, because such a course would merely drive them into the arms of the enemy. The mediation was not proposed by Great Britain for her own benefit, it was declared, but in order to reconcile the colonies with the mother country and maintain the integrity of the Spanish monarchy. This attempt having failed because of Spain's insistence on the help of Great Britain to resubjugate the colonies in case the mediation failed, negotiations were once more renewed, in 1812, on the occasion of the election of a new regency. But Spain remained obdurate and no agreement was reached. The reëstablishment of Spanish authority in Chile in 1814 through the mediation of Commodore Hillyar has been referred to above. And in a previous chapter attention has been called to the treaty of July 5, 1814, between Great Britain and Spain, in which his Britannic Majesty, being anxious that the insurgents "should return to their obedience to their lawful sovereign," engaged to prevent his subjects from furnishing them "arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article." In 1815 Spain asked for the mediation of Great Britain, but refused to state the terms to which she was willing to agree. In 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle, the question of an arrangement between Spain and her colonies was discussed by the five great powers. The British attitude continued to

be that they could only mediate and facilitate and not compel or menace. But not even an approximation of opinion was reached.<sup>93</sup>

As Great Britain consistently refused to intervene by force to resubjugate the Spanish colonies, and as revolutionary principles showed a constant tendency to spread in Europe as well as in America, the allied sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and France resolved to take the matter in hand. At the Congress of Verona, in 1822, they agreed to restore, through the arms of France, the absolute power of Ferdinand VII, of which he had been deprived by a movement setting up a liberal government under the Spanish Constitution of 1820. This stand of their allies brought the British cabinet to a realization of the hopelessness of further attempts to mediate between the parties to the conflict in America, on the basis of the supremacy of the mother country. Moreover the government at Washington had just recognized the independence of the new states. The line of cleavage between liberal America and absolutist Europe was now clearly drawn. It was necessary for Great Britain to take her position definitively on one side or the other. At the Congress of Verona the British representatives had opposed the hostile intentions of the allies, and on April 14, 1822, Canning, who had succeeded Castlereagh as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made a declaration on the subject in the House of Commons.<sup>94</sup> With regard to the Spanish possessions in America, he said, there was no choice. As long as peace continued and Spain had no enemies in Europe, Great Britain was free to determine how far she could intervene in the contest in America. The situation, however, had changed. Spain had acquired a powerful and active enemy in Europe and it had become necessary for England to declare her views on the struggle of the colonies

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 340-350.

<sup>94</sup> The papers relating to the subject were given to the press. On July 20, 1823, the *Gaceta de Colombia* published an article based on an account in the *Jamaica Courant*, containing the substance of Canning's declaration.

for independence. As France might send fleets and armies to conquer and take possession of them, and as at the termination of the war a settlement might be made transferring some of them to France, Great Britain felt obliged to declare that she considered the separation of the Spanish colonies had reached such a point that she could not tolerate the cession of them to any other power.

In spite of the British attitude, the Holy Alliance persisted in its plans. The French army, which early in 1823 invaded Spain, soon accomplished its mission. Apprehensions were aroused in both Great Britain and the United States. It was stated and generally believed that the plan was the reëstablishment of Spanish authority over all the American possessions, except Mexico and California, which were to be ceded to France and Russia, respectively, in consideration of the military aid to be rendered to Spain by these two powers in the work of restoration.<sup>95</sup> Toward the latter part of August, 1823, Canning sounded Rush, the United States minister at London, as to whether the two governments might not come to an understanding on the subject of the Spanish American colonies, and as to whether it would not be expedient for themselves and beneficial for the world that its principles should be clearly settled and plainly avowed. The British Government, he added, considered the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless, and the question of recognizing their independence to be one of time and circumstances, but were not disposed to put any impediment in the way of a settlement by amicable negotiation. Disclaiming any selfish aim on the part of his government, he declared, finally, that Great Britain could not see with indifference the transfer of any portion of them to any other power. Rush, not being authorized to enter into such an agreement, communicated the substance of the conversation to the Secretary of State at Washington.<sup>96</sup> The circumstances which fol-

<sup>95</sup> Burgess, *The Middle Period*, 124. *Gaceta de Colombia*, July 13, 1823.

<sup>96</sup> Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, II, 353.



lowed and which led up to the famous declaration contained in Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, are well known.

Without waiting for the decision of the United States, Canning declared in an interview with Prince de Polignac, on October 9, that in the conflict between Spain and her colonies Great Britain would remain neutral; but that, if any foreign power joined with Spain against the colonies, an entirely new question would be created upon which Great Britain must take such decision as her interests might require.<sup>97</sup> In January following, Canning declared that, in the opinion of the British Government, it was vain to hope that any mediation not founded on the basis of independence could be successful, but if the court of Madrid desired it, they would willingly afford their countenance and aid to a negotiation commenced on the only basis which then appeared to be practicable, and would see without reluctance, the conclusion, through a negotiation on that basis, of an arrangement by which the mother country should be secured in the enjoyment of commercial advantages superior to those conceded to other nations.<sup>98</sup> A year later Great Britain recognized the independence of the new states, but she continued her efforts, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter on the Panama Congress, to mediate in favor of a settlement of the conflict on the basis of certain pecuniary advantages to the mother country.

It is not proposed to give a resumé of the history of the Monroe Doctrine. Numerous histories of it have been written and many able minds have been devoted to the analysis of its provisions. Relatively little, however, has been published in English on the subject from the standpoint of Hispanic America. Accordingly, in the next chapter, an effort will be made to determine from contemporaneous sources the attitude which the new states assumed toward the declaration at the time of its promulgation. For reference the paragraphs of Monroe's mes-

<sup>97</sup> Moore, *Principles of American Diplomacy*, 243.

<sup>98</sup> Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, II, 353.

sage commonly accepted as constituting the basis of the doctrine are given below. They cannot be too often read.

In the first part of the message, referring to an attempt which was being made to arrange by amicable negotiation with the Russian Government the rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast, President Monroe said:

“In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangement by which they may terminate the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”

Toward the end of the message, Monroe refers to events in Spain and Portugal and continues as follows:

“Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity,

this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

“The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it and to preserve those rela-

tions by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new governments and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.”<sup>99</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 339.

## CHAPTER VI

### HISPANIC AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

IT is important to keep in mind the fact that the former colonies of Spain, and to a greater or less extent Brazil also, during their struggle for independence and for some years afterward had their gaze constantly fixed on Europe. From that source would come, they feared, the forces which might succeed in subjecting them again to the hated authority of the mother country; and from that source also they hoped to receive the succor which would complete their independence and protect them in the continuous enjoyment of it. Mexico and Central America, after their disastrous experience as an empire, frankly accepted the republican system; but not for this reason did they cease to rely upon European and especially upon British assistance to fix their independence. Argentina, and to a less degree Chile, continued throughout the revolutionary period to look to Europe for a solution of their political problems. The Bolivarian republics — that is, Great Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia — although they achieved their emancipation mainly through their own efforts under the leadership of the Liberator, yet had received material aid from Great Britain and expected from her protection against reconquest by the allied powers of Europe. Brazil, likewise, owing to the peculiar relation existing between Portugal and Great Britain, was indebted to British influence in great part for the relative ease with which her independence was effected, and for the prospect of being able to live in undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over her vast territory.

Great Britain, in fact, had become strongly intrenched in the affections of the new American states. She, more than any

other foreign power, had contributed to their independence. From her shores, regardless of treaty obligations, and the obligations of international law, armed expeditions had sailed to aid the revolted colonists; in her ports ships had been fitted out to form units in the insurgent navies or to operate as privateers against Spanish commerce; from her citizens loans had been obtained and by them military supplies had been furnished; and on British soil thousands of men had been enlisted to serve in the revolutionary ranks. Moreover the prestige which Great Britain had acquired through the part she had played in the overthrow of Napoleon, together with her gradual withdrawal from the trammels of the allied powers of Europe, and finally her stand against the intervention of those powers in American affairs, tended very much to enhance friendly relations between her and the American beneficiaries of her policy, and to cause them to rely more strongly upon British protection.<sup>1</sup> The United States on the other hand enforced its neutrality laws with relative strictness and thus contributed much less in a material way to the outcome of the revolution than did Great Britain. And, as the military and naval strength of the United States was considerably inferior to that of Great Britain, it is not surprising that of the two nations that stood between the Hispanic American states and the Holy Alliance,

<sup>1</sup> During the greater part of the period of revolution in Hispanic America the interests of Great Britain were looked after by British naval officers, but special agents were later sent out and to their activities, no doubt, the good disposition toward England can in large measure be attributed. The following from a letter of Naval Lieutenant Samouel, an agent whom France sent to Mexico early in 1824 to effect a reconciliation between that republic and Spain is significant. Writing to the Minister of Marine and Colonies from Habana under date of August 14, 1824, he says: "I made strong efforts to destroy the lack of confidence with respect to the intentions of France, who is thought to be supporting King Ferdinand, and on all sides I noted great animosity toward the Spaniards, who are quite numerous in that province. Spain is considered as incapable of carrying out any undertaking unless she is aided by some power of the Continent, and the English have given out the information that if this should occur they would give Mexico strong support."—Villanueva, *La Santa Alianza*, 38, 283.

Great Britain should have occupied by far the more prominent place in the opinion of those states. Striking illustrations of this fact are to be found in the manner in which the new states received the Monroe declaration.

News of President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, apparently did not arrive in the City of Mexico until near the middle of the following February. The first direct reference to the message in the press of the Mexican capital occurs in the *Águila Mexicana*<sup>2</sup> of February 12, 1824, when the following brief notice appeared: "A person who left New Orleans on the fifteenth of last month says that the message of the President of the United States of North America containing a declaration with regard to maintaining the independence of Mexico and South America was received with the greatest approval and satisfaction; and that though the President insinuates that no intervention would be called for in case Spain alone undertook the reconquest of her colonies, nevertheless it is said the states of the West are determined to oppose reconquest under whatever circumstances and to assist in any way they may be able to defend the United Mexican states."<sup>3</sup>

Several days later the *Águila Mexicana* received a letter and newspapers from a correspondent writing from Habana under date of January 15. This correspondent discussed the international situation in such a way as to indicate that he had read the Monroe declaration, though he made no direct reference to it. He expressed the opinion that England and the United States would oppose foreign intervention in the affairs of the American states, but he believed that their action would be limited to opposition to what he called ostensible intervention, which would not prevent aid being given Spain through loans. He was of the opinion, therefore, that it was best for the Amer-

<sup>2</sup> This paper, the first daily to be published in Mexico, was the organ of the Federalist group of the Republican party. The Centralists depended upon *El Sol* to defend their interests. The Federalists were in power at this time.—Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico*, I, 256.

<sup>3</sup> *Águila Mexicana*, February 12, 1824.

ican states to trust to their own resources and not to rely too much on foreign protection.<sup>4</sup>

Among the papers received from the Habana correspondent there must have been one or more which contained either extracts from Monroe's message or possibly the message in full; for in the same issue of the *Aguila Mexicana* in which this correspondent's letter was inserted there was published a leading article entitled "Política," which embodied a short extract from that famous document. It is worthy of note that on this occasion, when the declaration of President Monroe might have been expected to arouse the liveliest interest, another question which in the mind of the editor was of much greater importance; namely, the recognition of Mexican independence by Great Britain and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, received the paper's chief attention, while the declaration of President Monroe was treated as purely incidental to that question. The author of the article, declaring that the British cabinet was in favor of the independence of Mexico, expressed the opinion that with England on their side the goal was already practically attained; for Spain in her weakness would be obliged to heed the least intimation of that great power. A favorable circumstance, he added, was the fact that the United States, naturally the friend of Mexico, had come to its aid in accord with the only nation capable of commanding respect in case opposition of interests should arise. Then to make clear the position of the United States an extract from that part of Monroe's message referring to the nonintervention of Europe in the affairs of the American states was given; but this was followed by no comment.<sup>5</sup>

In the course of a review of the year 1824, *El Sol*, another daily of Mexico City, though not referring to Monroe's message, makes the following significant observations: "The termination of the war in Spain we believe turned the attention

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, February 26, 1824.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*



of the powers of Europe to independent America. The despot Ferdinand as soon as he saw himself reëstablished in what he calls his rights, solicited the aid of his allies for the purpose of restoring his authority on this side of the Atlantic. To this end he proposed the convocation of a congress in the expectation that one of those reunions in which the sovereigns of Europe conspire against the liberties of the people would resolve upon the oppression of the Americas. In this he was disappointed, for the firm, constant, liberal conduct of the British Government prevented such a congress from meeting, and the positive declarations of that government closed the door to the idea of aggression by other arms than those of Spain. Moreover the power of a nation in a state of dissolution and anarchy, such as that in which Spain finds herself, is to be but little feared. Thus it is that though our independence has not been recognized it has been respected.”<sup>6</sup>

The foregoing expressions, unofficial though they are, nevertheless undoubtedly make manifest in a fairly exact way the relative importance which was attached in Mexico to the Monroe Doctrine at the time of its proclamation. Fortunately, however, a more authoritative statement is at hand. In a report which the Minister of Foreign Relations, Don Lucas Alamán,<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *El Sol*, January 2, 1825.

<sup>7</sup> Lucas Alamán was born in Guanajuato, Mexico, in 1792. He received his early education in the city of his birth, and afterward continued his studies in Mexico City and in Europe, where he remained from 1814 to 1820. During these years he traveled over the greater part of Great Britain and the Continent, perfecting himself in modern languages and pursuing studies in the natural sciences. On his return to Mexico he was elected deputy to the Spanish Cortes for the province of Guanajuato and thenceforth he occupied a prominent place in Mexican history. Returning once more to Mexico in March, 1823, he was shortly afterward made Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the exception of short intervals served in that office until the end of 1825, after which he retired to private life. At various times subsequently, however, he held high office in the republic and at the time of his death in 1853 he was once more occupying the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Alamán's *Historia de México* (5 vols.) is perhaps the most reliable and satisfactory history that has yet been written of the Republic of Mexico. This work was preceded by his *Disertaciones sobre la historia de la*

made to the Mexican Congress on January 11, 1825, he mentions, in discussing the state of affairs in Europe, the message of President Monroe. This he does in such a connection as to leave little doubt as to his estimate of its relative importance. Speaking of the invasion of Spain by France and of the desire of Ferdinand to secure the intervention of the Holy Alliance in his favor, Alamán says: "This conduct of the Spanish Government has given an entirely new direction to European policy. England refused Ferdinand's invitation to join in the proposed congress, and the papers presented by the English minister to Parliament, which were published, set forth with admirable frankness the liberal principles which were to guide her conduct. While not opposing the recognition of our independence England desired that Spain should be the first of the European powers to take this important step, though she has indicated that the circumstances are such that she will not wait very long for the results of Spain's tortuous procedure, and she has openly declared that she will not permit any power or league of powers to undertake armed intervention in favor of Spain in the pending questions with her former colonies. Very similar also was the resolution announced by the President of the United States of the North as set forth in his message presented to a former Congress. And as the French Government at about the same time manifested friendly intentions toward us there are very strong reasons for believing that the moment for the recognition of our independence by other European nations is at hand." <sup>8</sup>

*República Mexicana desde la Conquista hasta la Independencia*, forming in effect an introduction to the former. Alamán possessed ability of a high order, and he cultivated it with industry. He spoke English, French, and Italian fluently. He not infrequently displayed leanings toward monarchy, though he himself declared that his experience in Europe had converted him to republican principles.—Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, IV, 823; Bocanegra, *Hist. de Mex.*, 241, 557, 574; *Apuntes para la Biografía del Exmo. Sr. D. Lucas Alamán*.

<sup>8</sup> *Memoria presentada a las dos Cámaras del Congreso General de la Federación al abrirse las Sesiones del Año de 1825*, 4. See also *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII, 983.

As it is desired at this point merely to determine the immediate effect produced throughout Latin America by the message of President Monroe, but little importance will be attached to views expressed long posterior to that event. It is worth noting, however, that Alamán in his *Historia de México*, published about a quarter of a century later, found no reason to give a more important place in Mexican history to the Monroe Doctrine than he had ascribed to it in the report referred to above. Indeed the pages of his work may be searched in vain for any reference whatever to the Monroe declaration, whereas along with a brief notice of the recognition of the independence of Mexico by the United States, the author gives a relatively full account of the attitude of Great Britain respecting recognition and the opposition of that power to the interference of the Holy Alliance in American affairs.<sup>9</sup>

Other Mexican historians, contemporaries of Alamán, in like manner attached relatively less importance to the policy of Monroe than to that of Canning. Tornel,<sup>10</sup> in his *Breve Reseña Histórica*, affirms that if the United States had been content with exercising the supremacy to which every circumstance called her, or if she had been satisfied with laying the foundations for an American continental system, she would have met the expectations of the world and she would not have been reproached with having proceeded with selfish motives, rather than with the noble purpose of leading, counseling, and defending the American nations in their tempestuous infancy. Reviewing in detail the conduct of Great Britain in her relations to the continental system and to the Western Hemisphere, the author concludes by saying that the words of Canning to the effect that he had called a new world into existence, were

<sup>9</sup> Alamán, *Hist. de Mex.*, V, 815-818.

<sup>10</sup> General José María Tornel was a firm supporter of Santa Anna. He was twice appointed as Minister of War and on one occasion represented Mexico at Washington. He died in 1853, leaving his *Reseña Histórica* incomplete. Bancroft, *Hist. of Mexico*, V, 254; Bocanegra, *Hist. de Mex.*, II, 577.

in the nature of a boast for which he could be excused out of gratitude for the immense benefit conferred upon the American states by England in disconcerting the designs of the Holy Alliance. In this respect they had been favored also, he admits, by the United States, who opposed with energy and firmness the interposition of the powers of Europe in the affairs of the New World.<sup>11</sup>

Bocanegra, in his *Memorias para la Historia de México Independiente*, referring to the arrival at Vera Cruz in December, 1823, of a commission which the British Government had sent to Mexico to report on its political condition, says that this event was made much of on account of the prevailing conviction that recognition by Great Britain was essential to the conservation of the independence of the republic.<sup>12</sup> In May, 1824, news reached Mexico of certain conferences which Canning had held with the French ambassador at London, and in which Canning had declared in substance that he believed it to be useless for Spain to try longer to recover her colonies, and that if she insisted on making the effort England would not permit any other power to aid in the reconquest. In virtue of this stand, the fame of Canning, Bocanegra declares, spread throughout America, and in Mexico he was looked upon as the great champion of natural rights and of the independence of the Mexican nation.<sup>13</sup> From this writer President Monroe received no such praise as was given the "immortal Canning." Indeed the only reference to Monroe or to his doctrine to be found in Bocanegra's history is contained in a short discourse spoken by the minister of the United States, Poinsett, upon his reception by President Victoria on June 2, 1825. Vic-

<sup>11</sup> *Breve Reseña Histórica de los Acontecimientos más notables de la Nación Mexicana*, 31-32.

<sup>12</sup> José María Bocanegra was for a short time provisional president of the republic. In 1829, 1837, and 1841-1844 he served as Minister of Foreign Relations. He died in 1862 without having published his *Memorias*. They were not published until 1892, when an official edition appeared under the direction of J. M. Vígil.

<sup>13</sup> II, 288.

toria, however, in his reply made no reciprocal reference to the Monroe declaration.<sup>14</sup>

To cite opinions formed after the annexation of Texas and after the War of 1847 between Mexico and the United States had embittered the relations between the two countries, would not contribute to the aims of this chapter. Although the works of Alamán, Tornel, and Bocanegra were not published until toward the middle of the century or later, yet they appear to reflect faithfully the early attitude. This is confirmed by another Mexican author, Lorenzo Zavala,<sup>15</sup> whose sympathies were decidedly favorable to the people and to the institutions of the United States and whose work was published in 1831, at which time no serious friction had yet arisen between Mexico and the United States.

"It is evident," says Zavala, "that if it had not been for the forceful declarations of the governments of England and of the United States to the effect that they would not permit Spain to receive aid from any of the powers in her attempts to recover her colonies, France would have done in America, or at least would have attempted to do, what she had just accomplished in the Peninsula. At that time the propaganda of the Holy Alliance was altogether in Spain's favor. The undertakings in Naples, in the Piedmont, and in Spain ap-

<sup>14</sup> II, 381-382.

<sup>15</sup> Lorenzo de Zavala was born in Mérida, Yucatan, in 1781. In 1820 he was elected deputy to the Spanish Cortes and later served as deputy and then senator in the Mexican Congress. From 1827-1830 he was governor of the State of Mexico. Upon the downfall of Guerrero in December, 1829, Zavala left Mexico and traveled in the United States and Europe. Returning in 1833 he was again elected to Congress, serving also as governor of Mexico. In the following year he was appointed minister to France but resigned upon perceiving the direction toward centralism of the party in power in Mexico, and cast his lot with the Texans. He was a member of the convention which declared the independence of Texas, March 2, 1836, and was elected vice-president of that republic. He died in November of the same year. His *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México* (2 vols.) was first published at Paris in 1831. There he also published in 1834 his *Viaje a los Estados Unidos del Norte de América*. Bancroft, *Hist. of Mex.*, V, 87; *North Mexican States and Texas*, II, 218. Wooten, *A Comprehensive History of Texas*, I, 238. Alamán, *Hist. de Mex.*, V, 576.

peared to encourage the Holy Alliance in its crusade against the Americans, who, according to the phrase employed, were rebels against their legitimate sovereign. If it had not been for England and the United States the seas would have been covered with embarkations bearing new *conquistadores* to America. The language of Canning, though somewhat pompous and inflated, had nevertheless the positive effect of prohibiting the intervention of any other power in transatlantic affairs."<sup>16</sup> Then, referring to the famous speech of Canning, made in the House of Commons on December 12, 1826, on which occasion he boasted that he had called a new world into existence, Zavala declares that the language was poetic and exaggerated; but that it could not be doubted that though Canning did not give existence to the new states — for they existed without British recognition, Mexico first of all — he consolidated their independence and placed Spain in a position of isolation in her efforts to resubjugate them.<sup>17</sup>

President Victoria,<sup>18</sup> in a manifesto dated October 5, 1824, on the eve of the conversion of the provisional government into a constitutional one, reviewed the international relations of the republic but did not mention Monroe's message of December 2, 1823. In a similar document issued five days later he recommended to his countrymen, among other things, the advice of Washington on the importance of leaving to Congress the exer-

<sup>16</sup> *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México*, I, 325.

<sup>17</sup> The exact quotation to which Zavala refers is as follows: "If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked another way — I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain *with the Indies*. I called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old." *Speeches of the Right Honorable George Canning*. (Third edition) VI, 111.

<sup>18</sup> The real name of Victoria was Juan Félix Fernández, but during the war he changed his first name to that of Guadalupe, in honor of the Virgin patroness of Mexico, and his surname to that of Victoria to commemorate a victory over the Spaniards. He retired from office in 1829, never to appear again in public life except in an inferior rôle. He died in 1843. Bancroft, *Hist. of Mex.*, V, 28, 44, 45.

cise of the functions which the Constitution undoubtedly conferred upon it and to the executive the general direction of the government in the interests of the federation. "My feeble voice," said Victoria, "will be listened to when it mentions with profound respect the Hero of the North and I do not fear to be censured when covered by his august shade." In a speech on the opening of the first Constitutional Congress, January 1, 1825, the Mexican president again referred to Washington and eulogized the United States as the land of liberty. But on neither of these occasions did he refer to Monroe.<sup>19</sup>

In his message on the opening of Congress, January 1, 1826, Victoria made some pertinent remarks which it will be of interest to transcribe. Speaking of the relations of the republic of Mexico with the powers of Europe, and first of all with England, he said:

"The month of January of last year is deserving of eternal record, as the government of his Britannick Majesty then evinced a disposition, to the Diplomatic Agents in London, to enter into friendly relations with, and to recognize the independence of, the New American States. This proceeding of the wise British Cabinet has strengthened our interests, and at the same time disconcerted the plans of external Enemies, surprising the Cabinets of the Allied Powers. The latter have disclaimed all interference with the affairs of the Americans, and have thus discovered the ulterior plans which lay latent in their bosoms: they wished to waft across the ocean the absurd principles of Legitimacy, and to smother liberal ideas in the New World. All their intercourse with the court of Madrid indicated a wish again to subjugate the ancient Colonies of Spain by Foreign Forces. The invasion of the Peninsula, in 1823, had for its object to enable Ferdinand VII to *undertake the reconquest of his former Colonies*. The French Generalissimo proclaimed this to be the object of his *august uncle*. England has the credit of flying to the assistance of reason, justice

<sup>19</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII, 875, 884, 963.

and liberty, and of rescuing America from the disasters of war, by the interposition of her Trident.<sup>20</sup> This eventful circumstance has opened the means of communication between the two worlds; and Mexico, blessed by the inexhaustible resources of its soil, occupies a high station in the new order of things."<sup>21</sup>

After rapidly reviewing the relations of the United Mexican states with the other powers of Europe, President Victoria passed to a consideration of the relations with the nations of this hemisphere. "Justice and gratitude," he said, "compel us to mention, before all others, the most ancient State of America, and the first of the Civilized World which solemnly proclaimed our rights, after having preceded us in the heroick resolution of shaking off a dependence on the Mother Country. The United States of the North, models of political virtue and

<sup>20</sup> Victoria's evident partiality for Great Britain did not pass unnoticed in the United States. William Cabell Rives of Virginia, speaking in the House of Representatives, April 6, 1826, on a resolution which he had introduced respecting the proposed mission to Panama adverted to the partiality of President Victoria for Great Britain. "I have already briefly alluded," he said, "to the various offices of kindness, and manifestations of friendship, which we have exhibited towards these people. With what return have they ever met? Let any gentleman read the late message of the President of Mexico to his congress, and then let his feelings of mortified and indignant pride give the answer. Sir, we have vainly imagined that by the acts of disinterested friendship, and the solid and useful services we have rendered our southern neighbors, we had won their gratitude and confidence; that they looked up to us as their patron and guide, and regarded us with filial reverence—to use the language of a gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Metcalfe), as the mother of Republics. But, sir, this fine delusion is dissipated. The message of the Mexican president begins with celebrating, in the most fulsome strains, the power, the wisdom, the *magnanimity* of Great Britain, in her transactions with the Spanish American states, and distinctly attributes the disconcertion of the schemes of their enemies to the interposition of the *British trident*—which trident was never interposed in any other way than by forming commercial relations with them, for *her own benefit*, and even this was not done until three or four years after we had made a formal and explicit acknowledgment of their independence. But we recognize no traces of that ardent devotion, that fervent gratitude, that affectionate confidence, which we have been taught to believe were cherished in all Spanish American hearts toward us, and of which there are such ample and gratuitous displays toward Great Britain." *Register of Debates in Congress* (1825–26) Vol. II, Part II, 2085.

<sup>21</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 1068,



moral rectitude, have advanced under the system of a Federative Republick, which, having been adopted amongst us, by the most spontaneous act on record, exalts us to the level with the Country of Washington and establishes the most intimate union between the neighboring countries.”<sup>22</sup>

The Central American provinces, during the greater part of the period of the wars of emancipation, constituted a sort of eddy in which the general movement of revolution produced but few of the destructive effects suffered by other sections. Their independence was achieved with relatively little sacrifice.<sup>23</sup> Their contact with foreign powers had been limited, and though the government took measures, upon the establishment of the Federation in 1824, to encourage immigration and to promote intercourse with the nations of Europe and America,<sup>24</sup> progress in this direction was effectively checked by civil strife which soon began, and which in some parts of Central America has scarcely abated to this day. Under the circumstances it would not be surprising to find that public opinion with regard to international affairs was less definite there than in other quarters. Such indeed was the case.

An examination of the pages of the *Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Guatemala* from its first issue on March 1, 1824, in an unbroken series to November of the same year, reveals the fact that practically all that was printed in that paper, during the period mentioned, with reference to the Monroe Doctrine was taken from a foreign source. For example, on March 26 there appeared an article entitled “Reflections on the message of the President of the United States,” which was copied from *El Sol* of Mexico.<sup>25</sup> An article which appeared in the number for July 30, 1824, and which declared that the independence of the Hispanic American states, protected as it was by the

<sup>22</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 1069.

<sup>23</sup> *Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Guatemala*, March 1, 1824.

<sup>24</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII, 979.

<sup>25</sup> The article was originally copied by *El Sol* from the *National Gazette* of Philadelphia for December 9, 1823.

nations that possessed the institutions and spoke the language of liberty — Great Britain and the United States — was no longer in danger, is credited to the *Gaceta de Cartagena*, Colombia. In the issue for August 30, 1824, there was inserted a letter, written from London early in the preceding January, which contained interesting observations on the Monroe Doctrine and on the policy of Great Britain with regard to the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the affairs of the new states of the Western Hemisphere. But this communication also was first published in one of the gazettes of Colombia.

The Central American state papers also lacked positive expressions of opinion on the declaration of President Monroe or on the situation which that declaration was intended to meet. The message of the executive upon the opening of the congress at Guatemala on March 1, 1826, reviews the foreign relations of the republic, and in referring to the United States says merely that they "have acknowledged our independence with the greatest good will, and have given us testimony of great friendship and good understanding."<sup>26</sup> The executive, however, on a previous occasion was somewhat more definite. In a circular which he addressed to the provincial governors he declared that "England protects our just cause. She has dispatched consuls to the American nations. She coöperates in the development of our resources. She promotes our progress and she has decided to recognize our independence. The United States has a well-defined interest in the southern republics. That nation has recognized our independence and has sent us consuls. Moreover the message of the President on the opening of the Congress, December 2, 1823, declares in unmistakable terms that the government would resist an attack on our rights by the allied powers of Europe."<sup>27</sup>

Before passing to the continent of South America a brief reference may be made to the republic of Haiti. It will be re-

<sup>26</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 1020.

<sup>27</sup> *Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Guatemala*, September 13, 1824.

called that the independence of that republic had been declared as early as 1804; that France was never able thereafter to re-establish her authority over the colony; that the unification of the conflicting factions into a single government effective throughout the island had been accomplished by the time the United States resolved in 1822 to recognize the governments set up by certain of the former Hispanic American colonies. Haiti, however, was not included among the number to be recognized, and apparently the declaration of President Monroe of December 2, 1823, did not embrace that republic. In a communication to the Senate on the political condition of Santo Domingo, Monroe stated on February 26, 1823, that the government of the island had not been molested in the exercise of its sovereignty by any European power and that no invasion of it had been attempted by any power. He added, however, that it was understood that the relations between the republic and the government of France had not been adjusted.

The President had been requested to communicate to the Senate not only such information as he might possess as to the political condition of Haiti and as to whether sovereignty over it were claimed by any European nation, but also as to whether any further commercial relations with it would be consistent with the interests and safety of the United States. In complying with this request Monroe called attention to the provisions of the Haitian constitution which prohibited the employment of all white persons who had immigrated there since 1816, and which prohibited also the acquisition by such persons of the right of citizenship or of the right to own real estate in the island. The establishment of a government on such principles, he thought, evinced distinctly the idea of a separate interest and of a distrust of other nations. To what extent that spirit might be indulged or to what purposes applied, experience, he declared, had been up to that time too limited to make possible a just estimate. Commercial intercourse existed, he added, and it would be the object of the government to promote it.

But in this connection he assured the Senate that every circumstance which might by any possibility affect the tranquillity of any part of the Union would be guarded against by suitable precautions.<sup>28</sup>

It was evident, therefore, that Haiti was not placed by the United States on an equal footing with the governments which had been set up on the mainland. In this attitude toward Haiti the United States was not alone. England and France for obvious reasons looked with disfavor upon the establishment of a black republic in the West Indies.<sup>29</sup> And even Bolivar, who had received aid from President Pétiou in 1816 and who professed great friendship for the Haitian people, refrained from inviting the government of that island to participate in the congress of Panama.<sup>30</sup>

The omission of any allusion to Haiti in the message of December 2, 1823, met with protest on the island. A Haitian newspaper, *Le Propagateur*, commenting upon the declaration of President Monroe and applauding the procedure of the United States in extending the hand of friendship to the rising nations of South America, remonstrated against the treatment of Haiti as follows:

“ But why has not the name of Haiti been mentioned in this message? Does our course differ from that of the southern nations? Have we shown less courage, less idolatry, in the cause of liberty? Are we less advanced in civilization, or is our government weaker and less stable? To all these we answer in the negative. If we morally compare our population with that of Mexico or Peru, the result will be entirely to our

<sup>28</sup> *Am. State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 240.

<sup>29</sup> Léger, *La Politique Extérieure d'Haiti*, 6.

<sup>30</sup> Léger, *Haiti, Her History and her Detractors*, 171. Haiti sent an agent to propose a defensive alliance with Colombia, but not wishing to antagonize France and resenting the absorption by Haiti of the Spanish portion of the island, which had resolved upon annexation to Colombia, this republic declined the proposal. See the message of the vice-president to the Congress of Colombia, January 2, 1825. *British and Foreign Papers*, XII, 822.

advantage. We have proved our strength by long and terrible conflicts, and the troops that we have vanquished were neither small in number nor of ordinary bravery. They were the victors of the pyramids of Abouker and Marengo, whose remains now sleep on our plains." <sup>31</sup>

Continuing, the writer sets forth in greater detail the claims of Haiti upon the United States for recognition and for its good offices. The Americans, he averred, especially those of the north, were the natural friends of Haiti; and an extensive commerce already existed between the two countries. America could supply the articles which Haiti received from Europe, but Europe could never supply those furnished by America. Time would bring about closer relations which no future difficulties could interrupt. The people of the United States might possess the commerce of both Indies and the Haitians would not envy them the enjoyment of it. They were content to live on the soil where Providence had placed them. They would not emigrate. Haiti was justified, therefore, in desiring the good offices of the United States. It had been intimated, the writer added, that the question of color embarrassed the cabinet at Washington. He thought that if such pitiful considerations existed they would gradually lose their force. The red children of the American forests were admitted into the halls of Washington — why was that favor denied to the citizens of Haiti? They should not despair of obtaining it, for that era in America was so splendid, so magnificent in promises that it forcibly recalled to the writer's mind the prediction of a monarch of the preceding century: "L'Europe finit, l'Amérique commence." <sup>32</sup>

Turning now to the continent of South America, the state of opinion in the Bolivarian republics may first be considered. And in order that that opinion may be justly appreciated it

<sup>31</sup> Niles' *Weekly Register*, XXV, 413; *The Examiner* (London), October 24, 1824.

<sup>32</sup> Niles' *Weekly Register*, XXV, 413.

will be indispensable to view it in its proper historical perspective, for which the preceding chapters have in general furnished the guiding lines. There is, however, one important detail, barely referred to in the preceding pages, which must now receive fuller treatment: the opposition of the vice president of Colombia, Santander, to the policies of the Liberator.

It must be remembered that Bolivar believed that the people of the former Spanish colonies were not prepared to conduct highly democratic governments. He believed, on the contrary, that the aristocratic principle was essential to good government, especially where, as was the case throughout Spanish America, ignorance and political inexperience prevailed among the great mass of the people. He believed that the executive should be elected for life, should exercise his authority without responsibility, should name his successor; should, in fact, be king in everything except name. His dream was of a great federation of Hispanic American states of which his own Great Colombia should be the head. In this he undoubtedly had the good will of Great Britain, who viewed with jealousy the inevitable expansion of the United States toward the south and west.<sup>33</sup>

Francisco de Paula Santander, elected as vice president of the republic of Colombia in 1821, exercised the chief magistracy during the five years of Bolivar's absence in the south. He had been one of Bolivar's generals and, though still under thirty years of age and untried in statecraft when he was called to the presidential chair, he apparently enjoyed the fullest confidence of his chief and of the people as a whole. The origin and culmination of the break in friendly relations between the two men constitutes a long chapter in the history of Colombia. It is essential to the present purpose, however, to know merely the main issue. It is likely that the quarrel had an earlier origin than appears on the surface. Possibly, the beginning

<sup>33</sup> For the British attitude see Adams, E. D., *British Interests and Activities in Texas*, 15.

of the trouble goes back to the adoption of the constitution itself. The Liberator, displeased that so democratic and as he believed impractical an instrument as was the constitution of Cúcuta should have been accepted, finally countenanced, if he did not foment, its overthrow to make way for his Bolivian constitution. Santander on the other hand became the champion of the constitution of 1821, whether sincerely and patriotically as his partisans declare or whether as a demagogue, intent on selfish ends as his detractors maintain, is a matter of controversy with which this study has no concern.

The essential fact is that in the republic of Colombia there were, at the time the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed, in process of formation two main currents of opinion which were to become clearly defined two or three years later; one favorable to Bolivar and to the promotion of his political designs and another to Santander and to his conception of a democratic republic.<sup>34</sup> The former group inclined toward Great Britain and the latter toward the United States. In the light of these remarks, attention may now be directed to some of the comments evoked in Colombia by the message of December 2, 1823.

The following article appearing in *La Gaceta de Colombia*, a newspaper published at Bogotá, if not written by Santander himself must have been inspired by him.<sup>35</sup>

“The United States has now begun to play among civilized nations of the world that powerful and majestic rôle which befits the oldest and most powerful nation of our hemisphere. We deeply regret our inability to publish all of the message of the President to Congress of December 2, for it is one of the most interesting documents which has emanated from the American Government up to this time. It abounds in those sug-

<sup>34</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, 62-80 and *passim*. *Ibid.*, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 270-277.

<sup>35</sup> *La Gaceta de Colombia*, though not an official government organ, was at least friendly to the administration and responded to the desires of Vice President Santander. He often spoke of it as “our gazette” and according to his own statements frequently wrote articles for publication in its columns. O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 105, 111, 124, 137, 353, 390.

gestions and details which every free government ought to furnish its citizens in order that they may judge in regard to the interests of the nation with the proper exactness and discernment. How different is this frank and loyal mode of procedure from that horrid system which finds its stability in the secrets of the cabinet and in ministerial maneuvers. The enemies of liberty may take pleasure in the triumphs of that system on the European side of the Atlantic, where its favorite principle of legitimacy has numerous partisans. In this favored continent there are no classes interested in perpetuating the ignorance of the people that they may thrive upon prejudice and stupidity. In America man is only the slave of the law, while in a large part of the Old World people still believe and obstinately maintain that kings are an emanation of divinity.

“The partisans of this impious doctrine defend it rather because of self-interest than because of conviction. But, as they find some credulous persons and some persons who are victims of their own voluntary errors, they find support in them for their system of pretended legitimacy. Well and good, let the supporters of legitimacy extend their senseless system over that continent which, because of its enlightenment, is worthy of a better fate. If they wish, let them reduce to ashes the Swiss cantons, which rebelled against the august house of Hapsburg and established their independence by their own efforts. Let them take the throne of the Low Countries away from the house of Orange which to-day enjoys the fruit of its religious and practical rebellion against the Catholic kings. Let them punish, if they are able, the thousandth generation in their and other countries of Europe for the sins of their ancestors against legitimacy. Their rage will ever be impotent on this side of the Atlantic. America is separated from those less fortunate regions by a vast ocean in which there will be drowned forever the hopes of those who imagine that we have not yet emerged from the darkness of the fifteenth century.

“The perusal of the message which we have before us has



consequently furnished us with much pleasure, for the President of the United States has profited by the opportunity afforded by the differences pending with Russia to assert that the American continent is now so free and independent that henceforth it cannot be made the theatre of colonization by any European power. Indeed the Americans of the North and of the South of this continent shall not behold again in their lands those hordes of foreigners, who, with the cross in one hand and a dagger in the other, would disturb the happiness and the peace which they to-day enjoy." <sup>36</sup>

On April 6, 1824, Vice President Santander sent a message to the Colombian congress in which he referred to the Monroe declaration as follows:

"The President of the United States has lately signalized his Administration by an Act eminently just and worthy of the classic land of liberty: in his last Message to the Congress he has declared that he will regard every interference of any European Power directed to oppress or violate the destinies of the Independent Governments of America as a manifestation of hostile dispositions toward the United States. That Government considers every attempt on the part of the Allied Powers to extend their System to any portion of the American Hemisphere as perilous to the peace and safety of the United States. This policy, consolatory to human nature, would secure to Colombia a powerful Ally should its Independence and Liberty be menaced by the Allied Powers. As the Executive cannot regard with indifference the march which the Policy of the United States has taken it is sedulously occupied in reducing the question to decisive and conclusive points." <sup>37</sup>

The foregoing expressions are of still greater force when they

<sup>36</sup> *La Gaceta de Colombia*, February 1, 1824. The translation employed by W. S. Robertson in his article on South America and the Monroe Doctrine in the *Political Science Quarterly* for March, 1915, Vol. XXX, is followed.

<sup>37</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, 492. A translation of the message is found in *British and For. State Papers*, XI, 808, from which the above extract is taken.

are taken in connection with the brief remarks in the same message respecting Great Britain. The relations of the republic with Europe had been limited, the vice president declared, to Great Britain, whose policies were favorable to the American cause and whose commercial intercourse had been most extensive and active in Colombia. The sympathy of the public in England and the justice of the British Government inspired in the executive the most encouraging prospects; but he was sorry that he could not say what had been the final resolution of the government of his Britannic Majesty with respect to the republic. He concluded by referring to the presence in Bogotá of a British commission, which he considered a satisfactory sign of the interest that Colombia had inspired in the people of Great Britain.<sup>38</sup>

The friendly attitude of the Santander administration toward the United States is succinctly set forth in a dispatch of Richard C. Anderson, the American minister at Bogotá. Writing under date of February 17, 1824, he said:

“ Much of that solicitude, to which I have recently referred in my letters to you, in relation to the public affairs of this country as connected with the designs of certain European powers, is still felt by the persons in authority here and indeed by others; but great and I believe unaffected joy was expressed on the arrival of the President’s message, at the views therein communicated to Congress, regarding the feelings and policy of the United States in the event of European interference in the political affairs of this continent. Some declared that it would have the salutary effect of repressing the designs and averting the calamity so much deprecated, while others, less sanguine in their opinion of its preventive tendencies, seemed to derive their joy from the contemplation of the actual aid which the course indicated might give in the expected contingency; but all declared that the views assume the true American ground. From the conversations, which I have hitherto de-

<sup>38</sup> O’Leary, *Memorias*, III, 495.

tailed to you, between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and myself, you will readily believe that the language and sentiments of the message were very acceptable to him, and he took occasion in a recent conversation to tell me that they were peculiarly grateful to the vice president."<sup>39</sup>

The article of the *Gaceta de Colombia* quoted above and the message of Vice President Santander credit the United States with taking a high and independent stand with regard to the affairs of the New World. The contemporary discussions in Mexico, as has been shown, invariably placed Great Britain in first place as a champion of the rights of the new governments, leaving the United States in a secondary if not in a dependent position with respect to England. And indeed such was usually the case in Colombia also,<sup>40</sup> the attitude of Santander and perhaps of a few others to the contrary notwithstanding. Curiously enough, Santander himself in his correspondence with the Liberator, reflecting, no doubt, the common opinion and that of the strong, overpowering personality of the great leader whose influence was ever present to him, gave expression to views much more favorable to Great Britain and correspondingly less so to the United States.

Writing to Bolivar five days after the article on Monroe's message appeared in the *Gaceta de Colombia*, Santander expressed the opinion that England would prevent other powers from intervening in the war in America. He had received from the message of President Monroe, he said, a similar impression respecting the United States.<sup>41</sup> A month later, referring to the congress of the powers which it was proposed to convene for the purpose of discussing American affairs, Santander informed Bolivar that it had become clear that the

<sup>39</sup> Robertson, *South America and the Monroe Doctrine in Polit. Sci. Quar.*, XXX, 84.

<sup>40</sup> See *La Gaceta de Colombia* for March 21, 1824, April 4, 1824, and August 29, 1824; *El Venezolano*, for January 17, 1824; *El Patriota de Guayaquil* for May 1, 1824, and August 28, 1824; O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 29.

<sup>41</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 137.

United States and Great Britain would not intervene as long as Spain alone and with her own resources continued the war. Moreover the British commissioners who had recently arrived at Bogotá gave assurance that England would not permit Colombia to be subjugated.<sup>42</sup> In a letter dated March 15 he gave an account of the formal reception of the British agents, trusting that the news would cause in the *Liberator* an agreeable impression and inspire in him hopes of great consideration. Whatever proposals these commissioners had to make it seemed clear that England would take the part of Colombia against the Holy Alliance. And referring again to the message of President Monroe he said it had made a strong impression in Europe, causing the Holy Alliance to be extremely incensed, not merely because the President spoke in a threatening tone but because the Powers suspected that Great Britain had a hand in the declaration. King Ferdinand had solicited the mediation of the Powers, he said finally, but England persistently refused to take part in a congress to discuss American affairs.<sup>43</sup>

By the middle of the next year the importance of the United States as a factor in the international situation had, in the opinion of Santander, greatly diminished, while that of England had correspondingly increased. Meanwhile a most significant event for Colombia had occurred — the recognition of its independence by Great Britain. Spain, protesting against this procedure of the British Government, obstinately continued the war. France still occupied the Peninsula and, though professing neutrality in the war in America, sent a squadron to Martinique. On the pretext of illegal seizure of her merchant vessels by Colombian privateers, she also maintained men of war in front of Puerto Cabello while the claims were being adjusted. Moreover it was believed that French troops were being sent to Porto Rico and Cuba to relieve the regular gari-

<sup>42</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 139.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, III, 141.

sons for service against some one of the Central or South American states. These circumstances, together with the fact that the general disposition in Europe toward the new states had apparently not improved, convinced Santander that there still existed a propensity on the part of the Powers to intervene. Such at least seemed to be the situation as he saw and described it in letters to Bolivar in the first half of the year 1825. And it is significant that in view of the danger which he believed to exist he declared that the United States would do nothing; for the country was completely permeated with the idea of peace and President Adams was, as he was painted, a man of peaceful disposition and of but little force of character.<sup>44</sup> As to England he seemed to be more confident. Parliament had augmented the military forces of the nation, and Canning in recent negotiations with Spain had declared that Great Britain would not take a backward step in her American policy.<sup>45</sup>

During the early part of 1824, Bolivar was in northern Peru engaged in organizing his final campaign against the Royalists. It does not appear at what moment he first received intelligence of President Monroe's message. On March 21 he apparently had not yet heard of it; for, writing to Sucre on that date, he said: "I do not believe at all in the league between France

<sup>44</sup> *Los Estados Unidos Amalgamados con su estado de paz, qué sé yo qué harán: el Presidente Adams es hombre muy pacífico y de poca energía según lo pintan.*—Santander to Bolivar, June 21, 1825; O'Leary, *Memorias* III, 184. On a previous occasion Santander writing to Bolivar (May 6, 1825), had expressed a more favorable opinion. He said: "Mr. Adams, who was Secretary of State, is now President and Clay, our ardent friend, is Secretary of State. Rush, who was Minister to England, and was there of great service to Revenga, is Secretary of Treasury. I do not believe we could have an administration more friendly and decided for American interests and especially those of Colombia."—O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 175. On January 21, 1826, Santander wrote Bolivar that "If the Holy Alliance has not taken action against us actively and specifically I attribute it to two principles: First, to the policy of England, who fortunately was obliged by her own interests to take the part of the American states; second, to our not having given the sovereigns cause for provocation, for on the one hand our protests of respect and on the other our great sufferings have calmed the anger of the European cabinets." *Ibid.*, III, 239.

<sup>45</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 164, 172, 175, 179, 183.

and Spain. We have documents which prove the contrary. But I do believe that the English are resolved to protect us." <sup>46</sup> Between this date and April 9 following he must have received news from the northern coast of Colombia, probably by way of Panama, including information respecting the Monroe declaration, if not a copy of the message, for he then wrote to Sucre as follows: "The English commissioners who have arrived at Santa Marta have assured us that their government will soon recognize us and, if we should break with France, give us aid against that power. Spain can do nothing because she has no navy, no army, nor money; and whatever she should attempt would be attributed to France, and therefore opposed as a foreign usurpation directed against England and her liberty. Any move that the Holy Alliance might make would be checkmated by England and the United States." <sup>47</sup> Writing again to Sucre, five days later, Bolivar returns to the assurances made by the British commissioners, expressing the belief that England would protect Colombia not only against the Holy Alliance but against Spain as well, for Spain had come to be looked upon as one of the allies. He expressed also the conviction that recognition might be expected from Great Britain at any moment. If in the former letter he had really had in mind the declaration of President Monroe he did not on this occasion again refer to it. <sup>48</sup>

In none of his published writings does Bolivar mention specifically the Monroe declaration. A letter which he wrote to Admiral Guise of the Peruvian Navy, however, on April 28, 1824, contains what is undoubtedly a reference to it. On this occasion he made a brief summary of what he considered to be the international situation. He had received gazettes up to March 15 from Jamaica. They contained, said Bolivar, many extracts from the columns of a London paper which assured in the most positive manner:

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 459.

<sup>47</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 465.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 473.

“ 1. That Spain has neither the means nor the credit to fit out a single man-of-war. In England therefore they regard her proposed expeditions as quixotic.

“ 2. That France and Austria, in reply to England’s official inquiry as to what will be their attitude relative to Spain and her former colonies, have replied: France, that she will not intervene or take any other part; and Austria, that she will not go beyond mediation or the tender of good offices.

“ 3. That England has definitely decided to recognize the independence of the republics of South America and to consider as an unfriendly act any intervention on the part of any European power in the affairs of America.

“ 4. That the United States has solemnly declared that it will consider as an unfriendly act any measure that the powers of Europe should take against America and in favor of Spain.”<sup>49</sup>

Admiral Guise had become dissatisfied in the service of Peru and had threatened to return to Chile, whence he had come with Lord Cochrane in 1821. Bolivar wrote with the evident intention of conciliating him and of preventing his departure by presenting to him the prospect of victory and an early return to the pursuits of peace. He therefore brought forward all the factors that seemed to favor the cause. It is a remarkable fact that the only subsequent reference that the Liberator appears to have made to the declaration of Monroe had for its object to induce the Spanish general, Olañeta, to join the Patriot cause. “ England and the United States,” Bolivar wrote him on May 21, 1824, “ protect us, and you must know that these two nations are the only maritime powers and that no aid can come to the Royalists except by sea.”<sup>50</sup>

Whether Bolivar had by this time received the Bogotá gazettes and the letters of Santander, referred to above, his writings do not show; nor does he subsequently make any ref-

<sup>49</sup> O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 486-488.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, XXX, 496.

erence to them. This may be explained by the fact that the information therein contained had ceased to be news, or by the fact that other matters of more immediate importance occupied his attention. Leaving the coast early in April, Bolivar established his headquarters in the mountains and began an active prosecution of the campaign against the Royalists. During the next seven or eight months he appears to have been completely absorbed in the attainment of a final victory over the enemy. His letters, usually abounding in references to international affairs, were during this period confined almost exclusively to military matters.<sup>51</sup> Not until success was practically assured did he again turn his attention to the broader realm of international politics. It was on the eve of the battle of Ayacucho that he sent out his circular inviting the Spanish American states to the Congress of Panama. Henceforward his heart was set upon the building up of a great Hispanic American state or confederation under the powerful influence of Great Britain. In a word he did not greatly rely upon any protection that the United States might afford nor accept the leadership in this hemisphere which was implied in President Monroe's declaration.<sup>52</sup>

Brazil at the beginning of 1824 occupied with respect to Portugal a position analogous to that which the former Spanish colonies occupied with regard to Spain. Independence, which had been achieved in the one and the other case, had not been recognized by the mother country, and Brazil, like the Spanish speaking states, stood in more or less danger of subjugation in the event that the Holy Alliance should attempt to carry out its designs. If, however, the hopes of the Legitimists of Europe were illusory in so far as the recovery of the colonies of Spain was concerned, they were much more so with respect to Portugal and her American possessions; for this little kingdom was

<sup>51</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 465 et seq.

<sup>52</sup> For a fuller treatment of Bolivar's international policies see the preceding chapter on monarchy in America and those on the Congress of Panama.



even less able than Spain to provide the military forces required to reduce and to hold in subjection its vast expanse of American territory. Moreover the relation which had subsisted for more than a century between Portugal and Great Britain — at this time in reality almost one of suzerain and subject — made any interference of the continental powers in Portuguese affairs, internal or external, practically impossible without provoking war with the virtual sovereign. But in spite of this relation, the British Government, far from attempting on its own part to establish the authority of the mother country over her American colony, favored the separation. It was in fact through a British diplomat, Sir Charles Stuart, that the negotiations were begun in March, 1824, which resulted a year and a half later in the signing of a treaty in which Portugal recognized the independence of Brazil.<sup>53</sup>

Thus, in its actual and prospective relations with Europe, Brazil stood in a fairly satisfactory position. With regard to its South American neighbors, however, conditions were less favorable. The seizure of the Banda Oriental and later its incorporation into the empire was now a source of friction and of possible war with Buenos Aires. It was at this time that the train of circumstances was set in motion which led to the outbreak, in 1825, of hostilities between the two states.<sup>54</sup> And to add to Brazil's difficulties the sympathies of the Spanish speaking states ran strongly against the empire. Bolivar, for example, after his victory over the Royalists in Peru, actually had under consideration a plan for joining forces with the United Provinces and leading an expedition against Brazil for the purpose of effecting the overthrow of the monarchy. And it was rumored that the Congress of Panama would support such a design.<sup>55</sup> Isolated, then, in the southern continent, Brazil un-

<sup>53</sup> *Cambridge Modern History*, X, 319, *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 933, Constancio, *Historia do Brasil*, II, 378.

<sup>54</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 748-774.

<sup>55</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 215-216, 235, Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, 328-334. Senator Berrien of Georgia in a speech on the Panama

doubtedly welcomed the policy of President Monroe not merely as constituting a barrier against the Holy Alliance, but as offering the hope of a friendly interest on the part of the United States which might redound to the benefit of the empire in its threatened conflict with the neighboring republic.<sup>56</sup>

Brazil had not yet been recognized by the United States. Its status with respect to the declaration of President Monroe was therefore not so clear as was that of those governments who had "declared their independence and maintained it," and whose independence the United States had, "on great consideration and just principles," acknowledged. Desiring to terminate this undefined state of affairs the government of Brazil appointed José Silvestre Rebello as chargé d'affaires to the United States. His instructions, dated January 31, 1824, referred to the message of President Monroe as being applicable to all the states of the continent, since it recognized the necessity of combining and standing shoulder to shoulder for the defense of American rights and for the integrity of American territory. Rebello was accordingly instructed first to urge the recognition

mission delivered in the United States Senate in March, 1826, said: "Brazil yet bows beneath the imperial sway. The glitter of diadem is offensive to the Spanish American republics. The Liberator pants to finish the great work to which he thinks he is called—the emancipation of a continent. Ere long the arms of the confederacy will press upon Brazil." *Register of Debates in Congress, 1825-1826, II, part I, p. 230.*

<sup>56</sup> In *Cartas Políticas* by "Americus," published in London in 1825, from letters first appearing in the Brazilian newspaper, *O Padre Amaro*, frequent references are found indicating that in Brazil as in other sections of Latin America the United States and Great Britain were associated together in interposing a common barrier to the designs of the Holy Alliance. Such expressions as the following appear: "Fortunately the policies and interests of the two powerful nations, England and the United States, are opposed to the project of reconquest" (I, 25) . . . "It will be impossible for any European power or all of them together to subjugate Brazil, principally because of the aid which is offered by the maritime power of Great Britain and the United States" (I, 26) . . . "England and the United States oppose all coöperation of this sort" . . . (Coalition for the subjugation of the new American states) (I, 50). These letters have been attributed to the Brazilian statesman, J. Severiano Maciel da Costa.

of the independence of Brazil, and secondly to sound the government of the United States as to its attitude toward an offensive and defensive alliance to be based not on mutual concessions but on the general principle of mutual benefits. Rebello was received and thus the empire of Brazil was recognized on May 26, 1824. On this occasion the Brazilian spoke of a "concert of American powers to sustain the general system of American independence." To this the President did not particularly allude in his reply, confining himself rather to general expressions of friendly interest. The idea of forming an alliance with the United States was kept alive however, by the Brazilian representative for nearly a year afterward until finally, a definite proposal having been made in writing, Clay, then Secretary of State, disposed of the matter by declining to enter into any such agreement on the ground that it was contrary to the policy of the United States.<sup>57</sup>

The efforts of Brazil were thus directed from the beginning toward securing a definition of the Monroe Doctrine on the basis of what was called the principle of mutual benefits; that is, its transformation from a unilateral to a bilateral policy. As has been suggested above, the empire doubtless wished to strengthen its position among its neighbors by forming an alliance with the United States. This is not, however, the whole explanation. It was felt that the acceptance of the protection offered by the United States without giving anything in return placed Brazil in a position of inferiority. Accordingly Rebello in his written proposal, called attention to the fact that if the government of the United States should be obliged to put into practice the principles enunciated in President Monroe's message, thus giving proof of generosity and consistency, it would do so only at the sacrifice of men and treasure, and that it was

<sup>57</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, 484. Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, VI, 437. Adams speaking in his diary of the proposed treaty of alliance between Brazil and the United States says that Rebello agreed that "on certain contingencies the republican governments of South America should also be parties."—*Memoirs*, VI, 475.

not in accordance with reason, justice, and right that the government of Brazil should receive such services gratuitously. It was for this reason therefore that the convention had been proposed.<sup>58</sup>

In Argentina the first public notice of President Monroe's declaration appeared on February 9, 1824, when extracts from the message of December 2 were published in *La Gaceta Mercantil* of Buenos Aires. A few days later *El Argos* of the same city printed passages from the message and called attention especially to the noncolonization and the nonintervention clauses. On February 10 the American minister, Rodney, wrote President Monroe that his message had been received two days before, that it had inspired them all there and that it would have the "happiest effect throughout the whole Spanish provinces." On May 22 he wrote Secretary Adams that the frank and firm message of the President had been productive of happy effects; but that he looked not so much to its temporary influence as to its permanent operation. "We had it immediately translated," he wrote, "into the Spanish language, printed and generally distributed in this quarter, Peru and Chile."<sup>59</sup>

In a message of the provincial executive authority of Buenos Aires to the legislative assembly on the occasion of its opening on May 3, 1824, the following reference was made to the declaration of President Monroe:

"Peace has been maintained with the nations of the continent; and every true American heart has been filled with satisfaction at the reception in our city of the first minister plenipotentiary of the republic of the United States; an honor which has been returned by the appointment of a minister of corresponding rank, who has already departed for Washington. He has been instructed to suggest to the government of that republic how desirable it would be if, in addition to those two great

<sup>58</sup> Robertson, *South America and the Monroe Doctrine* in *Polit. Sci. Quar.*, XXX, 95.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

principles; namely, that of the abolition of piratical warfare, and that of the non-European colonization of American territory, it could also be declared that none of the new governments of this continent shall alter by force their respective boundaries as recognized at the time of their emancipation. Thus may be destroyed the germ of future dissensions which, springing up amongst new states, might have a fatal influence upon their civilization and manners. . . . The analogy of feelings and principles manifested by the cabinets of London and Washington will convince Spain that she must contend singly with the free nations of the New World. This conviction will perhaps introduce into her councils that wisdom and moderation which are of so much importance to her existence.”<sup>60</sup>

On December 16, 1824, the congress of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata opened its sessions at Buenos Aires. In a message of the government of Buenos Aires, laid before that body on the same date, the American policy of the United States was referred to in the following terms:

“ We have fulfilled a great national duty toward the republic of the United States of North America. That republic, which, from its origin, presides over the civilization of the New World, has solemnly acknowledged our independence. It has at the same time made an appeal to our national honor by supposing us capable of contending single-handed with Spain; but it has constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle in order to prevent any foreign assistance from being introduced to the aid of our rival.”<sup>61</sup>

A just estimate of the value of the foregoing expressions requires that they be regarded in their proper historical setting. As for the views of Rodney, his arrival in Buenos Aires in November, 1823, allowed him but little time to become ac-

<sup>60</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 803, 805.

<sup>61</sup> A translation of this message is found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII, 858. For the original in Spanish see *El Nacional* (Buenos Aires) for December 23, 1824.

quainted with the political opinions of the leaders of the country to which he was accredited.<sup>62</sup> He was moreover already suffering from the illness of which he died the following June.<sup>63</sup> Under the circumstances therefore his impressions are of little value. He merely served as a means for transmitting the formal expressions of diplomatic intercourse. And as for the official utterances of the government of Buenos Aires, they must be viewed in the light of the policies of the responsible leaders of the administration.

Elsewhere an account has been given of the efforts made by the United Provinces to solve the problems growing out of their revolt by establishing some sort of relation, dynastic or other, with some power of Europe, preferably Great Britain or France. Those efforts failed, and, the government responsible for the negotiations being driven from office, a new era dominated by republican aspirations began. An excessive spirit of localism, however, made impossible all progress toward the establishment of an effective national government. The constitution of 1819, promulgated with high hopes, being soon abandoned, the term "United Provinces" continued to be, as it had always been, more or less a fiction as the expression of organized nationality.<sup>64</sup> Such national functions as were exercised at all were exercised by the provincial authorities of Buenos Aires, whose leadership within certain limits was tacitly recognized. The governor of the province, General Martín Rodríguez, brought into his cabinet two of Argentina's ablest statesmen, Bernadino Rivadavia and Manuel José García, both of whom had played important rôles during the preceding five or six years in the negotiations looking to the establishment of a monarchical form of government. Rivadavia, who was appointed Minister of Interior, conducted the foreign affairs of

<sup>62</sup> *Registro Oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 46. For an account of Rodney's reception by the government of Buenos Aires see Palomeque, *Orígenes de la Diplomacia Argentina*, I, 114.

<sup>63</sup> Monroe, *Writings*, VI, 430. *Registro Oficial*, II, 61.

<sup>64</sup> Vedia, *Constitución Argentina*, 13.

Buenos Aires and of the other provinces as far as they had any intercourse with the exterior. He had been greatly influenced by the reaction toward absolutism in Europe and though he had given up the idea of seeing a throne erected at Buenos Aires, he looked with little favor upon the attempts to introduce too strong a democratic element into the government.<sup>65</sup> Moreover, his sympathies were decidedly European and he advocated measures calculated to bring Europe and America into more intimate relations rather than to divide them into hostile camps.<sup>66</sup>

For nearly a year past negotiations had, in fact, been going on with agents of the Spanish Government who had arrived in Buenos Aires in May, 1823, with instructions to effect a reconciliation with the American states. Rivadavia was appointed to represent the government of Buenos Aires in the negotiations and by a resolution of the Provincial Assembly, passed on July 19, he was authorized to treat with the Spanish commissioners on the basis of the cessation of hostilities against all the new states of the continent and the recognition by Spain of their independence. A preliminary treaty was signed on July 4, providing for an armistice of eighteen months within which period it was agreed that there should be negotiated a "definitive treaty of peace and amity between his Catholic Majesty and the states of the American continent." It was also provided by a separate agreement that the governments of the states

<sup>65</sup> López, *Historia de la República Argentina*, IX, 79.

<sup>66</sup> The Argentine publicist, Alberdi, referring to the Panama Congress, among whose aims he believed to have been: First, the formation of a permanent league against Spain or any other power that should attempt to dominate America; and secondly, the prevention of all European colonization on this continent and of all foreign intervention in the affairs of the New World, says: "To the honor of Rivadavia and of Buenos Aires be it remembered that he was opposed to the congress of Panama and to its principles, because he comprehended that if he favored it he would destroy all his hopes of European immigration and of establishing closer relations between this continent and the Old World, which had always been and would continue to be the source of our civilization and progress." *Organización de la Confederación Argentina*, I, 34. See *Registro Oficial*, II, 46, 47. The late president, Roque Sáenz Peña, entertained similar ideas. See an article by him in *Ateneo* (Madrid), III, 368-394.

which should be recognized as independent under the proposed treaty should pay to Spain the sum of twenty million *pesos* through a loan to be raised in England. The government of Buenos Aires engaged to obtain the accession of Chile, Peru, and Colombia, and with that end in view immediately dispatched an agent to those countries. Other agents were appointed to treat with the provinces of Rio de la Plata, Paraguay, and Upper Peru. Chile promptly declined to become a party to the convention, and Peru and Colombia after consideration likewise declined to accede to it. But this was not known in Buenos Aires until some time after the news of President Monroe's message arrived there early in February, 1824. By this time, however, there was probably no longer any hope of attaining the object of the negotiations.<sup>67</sup>

Though these negotiations came to nothing they are worthy of note not merely as the mark of a conciliatory attitude toward the mother country, but as the concrete expression of the desire on the part of Buenos Aires to revive and to extend the influence which it had formerly exercised in Chile and Peru especially, and to a less extent throughout the continent.<sup>68</sup> Buenos Aires, in short, disputed the leadership of Colombia. A "circular to the American states," signed by Rivadavia and dated February 5, 1824, singularly enough just three days before the news of the message of President Monroe reached Buenos Aires, furnishes evidence of this aspiration. Rivadavia declared that his government, being under the obligation to defend the independence which the united sister republics of the American continent had proclaimed, addressed their respective governments for the purpose of informing them of the steps being taken in Europe to prolong the war in Peru (the only part not yet freed), and to prevent the full enjoyment of the

<sup>67</sup> *Registro Oficial*, II, 38, 41, 42. López, *Historia de la República Argentina*, IX, 186, 189. Villanueva, *Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados*, 272-287.

<sup>68</sup> See a chapter entitled *Hegemonía de la República Argentina* in Guastavino's *San Martín y Simón Bolívar*.



emancipation for which that country was struggling. Discussing the propensity of the European powers to intervene in American affairs and the form that such intervention might take, the author of the circular assured the several governments that Buenos Aires was resolved to lend its active coöperation to whatever plan the necessities of the case might demand, and that it would work with energy and zeal to bring about a general peace based on independence and liberty.<sup>69</sup>

It appears, therefore, that the enthusiasm over the declaration of President Monroe was not as great as certain expressions of the American minister and of the Buenos Aires Government would seem to indicate. The message of May 3, cited above, was signed by Rivadavia and García and not by the governor of the province.<sup>70</sup> The references in that document to the United States are very friendly; but it is to be noted that President Monroe was credited with having enunciated two great principles; namely, the abolition of piratical warfare and the proscription of colonization of American territory by European powers. Why should no mention have been made of the nonintervention clause? It would not, perhaps, be far from the truth to say that the government of Buenos Aires was not inclined to accept that part of the Monroe declaration. Not that the nonintervention of Europe in American affairs was unacceptable in principle, but because it was not desired that any limitation should be placed by the United States upon the possibility of the adjustment of the difficulties between the new states and the mother country through the interposition of European powers. Significant also is the statement in the message of December 16, 1824, to the effect that the United States had constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle to prevent any foreign assistance from being given to the adversary of the American states. Thus far not even the full significance of the Monroe Doctrine had been recognized.

<sup>69</sup> Guastavino, *San Martín y Simón Bolívar*, 429-437.

<sup>70</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 808.

In May, 1824, General Las Heras succeeded Rodríguez as governor of Buenos Aires and García was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rivadavia having retired upon the change of administration.<sup>71</sup> On August 28, 1825, Las Heras, on the occasion of the reception of John M. Forbes, who had been appointed to succeed Rodney as American minister, declared unequivocally at last that the government of the United Provinces knew the importance of the two great principles laid down in President Monroe's message, and being convinced of the utility of their adoption by all the states of the continent, would consider it an honorable duty to avail itself of every opportunity to second them. These remarks were elicited by a speech of Forbes in which he restated the principles proclaimed by Monroe and announced that the views of President Adams entirely coincided with them.<sup>72</sup>

Of all the Hispanic American states, Chile, perhaps, gave the most genuine response to President Monroe's message; that is to say, a response the cordiality of which was least affected by such extraneous motives as those which complicated the attitude of Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and the United Provinces. The possibility of territorial disputes such as were to embitter the relations between the United States and Mexico were absent; ideas of leadership such as prevailed in Colombia and the United Provinces were not entertained by the Chilean leaders, and no impending conflict with a neighboring state suggested such an amplification of the doctrine as that proposed by Brazil.

It was not until April, 1824, that the papers of Santiago published the message of President Monroe. They seemed to discover in the document a frank and explicit promise of effective protection for the Spanish American republics against the political combinations and military projects of European mon-

<sup>71</sup> Las Heras was elected on April 2, 1824. Absent at the time on a mission to Upper Peru, he took office immediately upon his return, May 9, following. López, *Historia de la República Argentina*, IX, 238-240.

<sup>72</sup> Robertson, *South America and the Monroe Doctrine in Polit. Sci. Quarterly*, XXX, 101.

archs. It was believed also that the government of Great Britain, opposed as it was to the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the political affairs of Spain, was resolved to take a more decided stand to prevent the allied powers from carrying out any act of aggression against the new states of America. The arrival at this time of Heman Allen, accredited as United States minister to Chile, was considered as an event of great significance. He was received publicly and with great ceremony on April 22. In addition to the expressions of courtesy and good will customarily employed on such occasions, Allen assured Chile that pursuing an honorable and just course toward others she need not fear alliances or coalitions which might threaten her tranquillity and independence. The delegate of the chief executive who replied to Allen's speech expressed the gratitude of his government for the recognition of the independence of the new states, and for the recent declaration of President Monroe which placed them beyond the reach of the coalitions of European monarchs.<sup>73</sup>

Briefly summarizing the foregoing discussion, we may say that the Monroe declaration was welcomed throughout the newly erected states of America with no more than moderate enthusiasm; for the opinion generally prevailed that Great Britain constituted the real and most effective barrier to the aggressions of the Holy Alliance. In contemporary discussions the declaration of Monroe was seldom referred to without a corresponding reference to the policy of Canning; and although the interests of the two nations were thought to be identical respecting the nonintervention of the powers of Europe in American affairs, yet it was desired, at least in some quarters, that the influence of England should intervene to prevent the preponderance of the United States among the nations of this hemisphere. This appears to be the explanation of the attitude of Mexico, and it seems clear that Bolivar hoped by British protection to obtain superiority for a confederation of Hispanic

<sup>73</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XIV, 367-8.

American states of which Colombia, united with Peru and Bolivia, should be the head. Central America received the declaration with mild satisfaction. Haiti complained of not being included in its benefits. Brazil wished to give it bilateral force. The United Provinces of Rio de la Plata were inclined to regard it at first as not altogether in harmony with their national policies. And finally, Chile received it with unmixed if not extreme satisfaction. Such in brief was the reception which the Hispanic American states accorded the Monroe Doctrine.

## CHAPTER VII

### EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION

THE idea of continental solidarity was not a sudden development. On the contrary it was of slow growth and its roots reach far back into the colonial history of the continent. As early as 1741 a vast conspiracy against Spain was formed in Peru with centers in New Granada, Venezuela, Chile, and Buenos Aires. Though this revolt aimed to reestablish the Inca dynasty, the movement was not a mere Indian rebellion; for it was supported by both Creoles and Spaniards and enjoyed the protection of the Jesuits. At about the same time, Mexico, probably in accord with the southern colonies, was also planning to strike for its independence. Mexican commissioners were sent to the colony of Georgia, Spain and Great Britain then being at war, to confer with General Oglethorpe and to ask the aid of the British in the accomplishment of their purpose. It was the intention of the conspirators to establish in Mexico an independent kingdom with a prince of the house of Austria on the throne. In return for her help England was to be given a monopoly of the foreign trade of the kingdom. An agent whom Oglethorpe sent to Mexico to investigate the matter brought back a favorable report and Oglethorpe thereupon communicated the proposal to the home government. The scheme was looked upon with favor and some steps were taken to carry it into effect; but before anything was accomplished the project was abandoned.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Villanueva, *Resumen de la Historia de América*, 190.

It was in 1741 that Admiral Vernon's expedition against Cartagena was undertaken. See in this connection a memorial (*Amer. Hist. Rev.*, IV, 325-328) to the British Government, dated June 6, 1741, recommending that Great Britain aid the Spanish colonies in America to obtain their

During the remainder of the eighteenth century several revolutionary movements of more or less importance were set on foot in different parts of Spanish and Portuguese America. These movements often had ramifications which extended widely throughout the continent. They were usually undertaken in the expectation of receiving the support of Great Britain, and after 1783, of the United States also. Knowledge of a conspiracy formed in 1787 by a number of Brazilian students for the purpose of effecting the independence of Brazil was communicated in a letter by one of the conspirators, Maia by name, to Thomas Jefferson, who was at that time minister of the United States to France.<sup>2</sup> It was necessary, Maia wrote, that the colony should obtain assistance from some power and the United States alone could be looked to with propriety, "because nature in making us inhabitants of the same continent has in some sort united us in the bonds of a common patriotism."<sup>3</sup> By appointment, the Brazilian met Jefferson shortly afterward and gave him further information. Jefferson discreetly avoided committing himself, but appeared not to disapprove of the scheme and assured Maia that a successful revolution in Brazil could not be uninteresting to the United States.

Some time before this occurrence Jefferson had a conversation with a native of Mexico about the possibility of revolution in that colony. Though convinced by the information which he received, that Mexico was not so well prepared for a move for independence as was Brazil, he wrote Jay, nevertheless, that "however distant we may be, both in condition and dispositions, from taking an active part in any commotions in that country, nature has placed it too near us to make its movements altogether indifferent to our interests, or to our curiosity."<sup>4</sup>

independence rather than attempt to take them and hold them by right of conquest; and that an alliance be then formed with them as with a free people.

<sup>2</sup> Varnhagen, *Historia Geral do Brasil*, II, 1013-1017.

<sup>3</sup> Jefferson, *Writings*, VI, 115. For Maia's letter to Jefferson, see Oliveira Lima, *Formation Historique de la Nationalité Brésilienne*, 115-116.

<sup>4</sup> Jefferson, *Writings*, VI, 122.

At this time the revolutionary activities of the Precursor, Francisco de Miranda, had already begun. Certain features of his general plan may be adverted to. It was in 1797 that he received from a revolutionary junta in Paris, composed of Spanish Americans who had gathered there, powers and instructions for directing a general movement for the liberation of Spanish America. Crossing over to London he entered into negotiations with the British Government. He approached at the same time Rufus King, the American minister to England, for the purpose of obtaining through him the coöperation of the United States. According to the plan which Miranda had been charged to carry out, an alliance was to be formed between Great Britain, the United States, and the governments which it was proposed to set up. The two powers thus coöperating in the liberation of the colonies were to receive certain trade advantages in compensation for their assistance. Deputies representing the different parts of Spanish America were to meet, after independence had been achieved, to make general regulations regarding commercial relations among themselves.<sup>5</sup>

The British Cabinet took under consideration Miranda's plan for revolutionizing Spanish America, and after some months of deliberation decided not to lend it support. In the meantime Miranda had frequent conferences with King, who, being enthusiastic in his support of the project, wrote in advocacy of it to Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, then in France on their famous mission to the Directory. He wrote also to Alexander Hamilton and Secretary Pickering in the United States. Miranda himself wrote to President Adams and to Hamilton, with the latter of whom he had maintained friendly relations for some years past. Hamilton declared that he wished the enterprise to be undertaken and that he wished the principal agency in carrying it out to be in the United States. He would em-

<sup>5</sup> Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America*, 319-23; Baralt y Díaz, *Resumen de la Historia de Venezuela*, I, 22. See also C. J. Ingersoll, *Recollections*, 218.

bark upon the scheme, however, only on condition of its being officially sanctioned by his government. Adams did not reply to Miranda, but referred the matter to Pickering, remarking that the United States was at peace with Spain and inquiring whether the project would be useful in the event that that condition should change. Pickering made no response to Miranda's appeal and thus the matter rested.<sup>6</sup>

Upon the failure of the United States to give assistance to this project of Miranda's, was grounded in part the refusal of Great Britain to provide the aid which was sought of her. If the strained relations which then existed between the United States and France had resulted in war, the alliance which Miranda hoped to bring about would, in all probability, have become effective; for war with France would have meant war with Spain also, those two powers having entered into an alliance after the Peace of Basel. That war did not occur was due in part to the firm resolve of Adams to prevent it, in spite of the strong provocation which France gave the United States, and in part to the aversion of public opinion to a British alliance.<sup>7</sup> Whatever might have otherwise been the outcome of the project, the fact remains that its aim was not merely to

<sup>6</sup> Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America*, 328-32.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 336.

Schouler, *History of the United States of America*, I, 362, 395.

The idea of an alliance with Great Britain to combat the designs of Napoleon in America was later suggested by Jefferson in a letter which he wrote on April 18, 1802, to Robert Livingston, United States minister to France. He said: "The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very high ground; and having formed and connected together a power which may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations." *Writings*, X, 313.



achieve the independence of the American colonies but to effect as well some such continental unity as that which Bolivar strove ineffectually to achieve two or three decades later.

Miranda remained in England until near the close of 1805 when, having given up hope of securing assistance from the British Government, he set sail for the United States. Arriving at New York and beginning active preparations for an expedition to South America he went shortly afterward to Washington, where he met Jefferson and where he had more than one conference with Madison, the Secretary of State. From Madison, it appears, he received the impression that the project had "the tacit approbation and good wishes" of the government and that there were no difficulties in the way of private citizens of the United States promoting the enterprise provided "the public laws be not openly violated." Madison later declared that he warned Miranda that the government would not countenance or embark insidiously in any enterprise of a secret nature. But whatever may have been the attitude of the administration, Miranda succeeded in organizing without interference from the United States authorities an expedition consisting of two hundred men and three ships with an abundance of arms and supplies. Two of the ships having sailed some time before, Miranda with his recruits put to sea in the remaining vessel early in 1806.<sup>8</sup>

A few days before setting sail from New York Miranda wrote Jefferson a note in which the following interesting statement is found: "If the happy prediction which you pronounced on the future destiny of our dear Colombia is to be accomplished in our day, may Providence grant that it may be under your auspices and by the generous efforts of her own children."<sup>9</sup> What Jefferson's happy prediction may have been does not appear, but in view of his well-known ideas respecting the destiny

<sup>8</sup> Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America*, 361-369.

<sup>9</sup> King, *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, IV, 584.

of the Western Hemisphere it may be inferred that independence and some degree of continental solidarity were implied. Miranda's plans, indeed, seem to have been continental in scope and to have enjoyed the tolerance and the good will of the government of Great Britain as well as that of the United States; for upon his arrival in the West Indies he received material aid from the British navy and from the civil authorities of the islands; and there are good reasons for believing that his expedition proceeded in accordance with a secret understanding with Sir Home Popham, who was carrying out simultaneously an enterprise against Buenos Aires.<sup>10</sup>

Failing in this undertaking, Miranda continued his revolutionary activities until he was at last captured in 1812 by the Spanish forces in Venezuela and taken away to die in prison in Spain. His later plans were magnificent in scope, as had been his earlier ones. In a frame of government for Spanish America which he prepared about the year 1808 provision was made for establishing the capital of this new empire at the most central point, perhaps, it was stated, on the Isthmus of Panama. It is to be inferred from this that his scheme embraced all the American colonies of Spain. The extension of the projected

<sup>10</sup> "A symbolic design on a handkerchief of English manufacture found in the colonies near Miranda's point of attack in the spring of 1807 illustrates some contemporary sentiment on the English attitude toward Spanish America so well that it is worth a brief description. On this handkerchief were portraits of Sir Home Popham, General Beresford, Washington, and Miranda, associated, as it were, to obtain the same end, or because of the similarity of their undertakings, with many sketches of naval battles and bordered with these four inscriptions: *It is not commerce but union; Let arts, industry, and commerce flourish; Religion and its holy ministers be protected; Persons, conscience, and commerce be at liberty.* The apotheosis of Christopher Columbus filled the center and English colors adorned the sides. England was depicted as goddess of the seas, the lion of Spain at her feet. A youth was pictured rolling up the French colors, and poking the lion with the hilt of his sword. On the handkerchief was the inscription: *The dawn of day in South America.* The captain general of Caracas declared, in referring to this handkerchief, that the rebel Miranda worked in connivance and with the support of the English as the result of a comprehensive plan of Spanish American conquest formed by that government." Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America*, 397.

state was more definitely indicated in a plan which he presented for the consideration of the British prime minister in 1790. His proposal then was that its boundaries should be: on the east, Brazil, Guiana, the coast line, and the Mississippi River; on the north, a straight line, the parallel of 45° north latitude, from the source of the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean; and on the west, the Pacific coast line to the uttermost point of Cape Horn.<sup>11</sup>

Many examples might be given to show that the ideal of American unity appealed to men of vision in both North and South America during the first decade or two of the nineteenth century. Two years after the Miranda expedition sailed from New York, President Jefferson, feeling that the interests of the United States were intimately connected with those of the Spanish colonies, particularly of Mexico and Cuba, and unwilling to see them fall into the hands of England or France, either politically or commercially, appointed General James Wilkinson as an envoy to bear them a message of friendliness. Desiring to strengthen the position of the United States in the region of the Gulf of Mexico, Jefferson was doubtless influenced by motives of national expansion. His agent, who had unfortunately been discredited by the relations which he had maintained with the Spanish authorities in the Southwest and later by his connections with Aaron Burr, may not have been wholly free from motives of a baser sort.<sup>12</sup>

But motives apart, the history of these negotiations reveals the fact that America was being thought of as a whole. However corrupt Wilkinson may have been, his long experience on the western border had given him a comprehensive view of the possibilities of continental union. In a letter to Jefferson dated March 12, 1807, he declared that the United States and Great Britain should combine to preserve the Western World from

<sup>11</sup> Robertson, *Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America*, 272, 417, 471, 486, 525.

<sup>12</sup> Cox, *The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson*. (Reprint from the *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, Sept., 1914) 212-214.

Napoleon and his unwilling ally, the King of Spain; and later in the same month he suggested that Mexico, Peru, and Cuba if allied as independent states might, with the aid of the United States, bid defiance to the Old World. Writing a little more than a year later, but still before he had started on his mission, he expressed the hope of seeing Mexico and South America speedily emancipated. Advocating the termination of all transatlantic connections, he made the following extravagant declaration: "Our acquaintance with the European world would gradually subside, fleets and armies would insensibly become useless to a people of self-government; and a persevering respect for ancient habits, and a fine adherence to principle, would perpetuate the freedom and happiness of the people of United America, to endless time." And in a letter to Governor Folch of West Florida he declared that should Spain fall into the power of Napoleon, Spanish America, united, organized, and in alliance with the United States, might bid defiance to all the warring nations of Europe.<sup>13</sup>

Wilkinson started upon his mission in January, 1809, but having been delayed at Charleston did not reach Habana, where he was to confer with the captain general, Someruelos, until late in March. Thus Jefferson's administration had come to an end before Wilkinson began negotiations with the Spanish authorities. Proceeding from Habana to Pensacola and finding that Governor Folch had gone to Baton Rouge, the American agent continued his journey westward. In the meantime some discussion had taken place between Claiborne, governor of Orleans Territory, and Vidal and Folch, Spanish vice consul at New Orleans and governor of West Florida, respectively, with regard to an alliance between the United States and the Spanish possessions, in the event that they should declare their independence as the result of an unhappy outcome of Napoleon's invasion of Spain. Vidal spoke with reserve, but Folch admitted that Mexico and Cuba would need a foreign alliance to

<sup>13</sup> Cox, *The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson*, 217.

maintain their independence, and he declared that they would approach both Great Britain and the United States on the subject, but preferably the latter. Claiborne spoke of the exclusion from this continent of all European influence, particularly British and French, as a guarantee that in their struggle for independence Mexico and Cuba might rely absolutely on the friendship of the United States.

At a dinner given while these discussions were going on, Folch gave, though with doubtful sincerity, the following toast: "The liberty of the New World; may it never be assailed with success by the Old World." Upon his arrival Wilkinson had some conversations with Folch and Vidal, and on one occasion proposed that in the event of Spain's succumbing to Napoleon it would be highly desirable to form an alliance to embrace Spanish America, Brazil, the United States, and, if necessary, England. The latter power was included, doubtless, as a concession to the friendly feeling aroused in the colonies by the efforts which were being made by Great Britain to drive the French from the Peninsula.<sup>14</sup>

Although Madison discontinued the negotiations, and although the nation's freedom of action was greatly restricted by the increasing strain and final break with Great Britain, yet there was manifested during his presidency no less interest in the ideal of American unity than had been shown during previous administrations. Early in his first term, Spanish American revolutionary agents began with Monroe, then Secretary of State, a series of negotiations aimed at obtaining from the United States the aid necessary to make successful resistance to the rule of Napoleon, if not to achieve a complete separation from the mother country.<sup>15</sup> As early as July, 1809, it was suggested by the government at Washington, it is claimed, to certain of these agents that if the Spanish colonies would de-

<sup>14</sup> Cox, *The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson*, 222-236.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Cox. *Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents* (In: An. Rep. Am. Hist. Assn. for 1911, pages 197-215). Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 128.

clare their independence, their representatives would be admitted to the Congress of the United States and an effort would be made to form a confederation of the whole of America.<sup>16</sup> In 1811 an agent of the revolutionary party in Mexico asked for "men, money, and arms" to aid the Mexicans in their struggle for independence and offered in return mutually advantageous commercial treaties that would serve to cement the friendship of all American peoples. Monroe, it appears, was interested, sympathetic and ready to give advice, but not inclined to compromise his government with Spain or with Spain's ally, Great Britain.<sup>17</sup>

In the midst of growing international difficulties, President Madison's thoughts were of the continent as a whole.<sup>18</sup> Speaking in his annual message of November 5, 1811, of the great communities occupying the southern portion of the hemisphere, he declared, as has been pointed out in a previous chapter, that "an enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur in imposing on the national councils an obligation to take a deep

<sup>16</sup> Gil Fortoul, *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*, I, 128.

<sup>17</sup> Cox, *Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents*, 201.

<sup>18</sup> At this time Canada was included in the idea of American solidarity. The United States, about to go to war with Great Britain, proposed to wrest it from the mother country. The Annals of Congress, summarizing the speeches made in the House of Representatives during the first session of the Twelfth Congress on the subject of foreign relations, records the following remarks, in substance, of the eccentric Randolph of Roanoke: "He could but smile at the liberality of the gentleman (Grundy of Tennessee) in giving Canada to New York, in order to strengthen the northern balance of power, while at the same time he forwarned her that the western scale must preponderate. Mr. R. said he could almost fancy that he saw the capitol in motion toward the falls of the Ohio — after a short sojourn taking its flight to the Mississippi and finally alighting on Darien, which, when the gentleman's dreams are realized, will be a most eligible seat of government for the new Republic (or Empire) of the two Americas!" 426, 446.

Under the treaty of alliance of 1778 between France and the United States, it was provided that, if the remaining British possessions in North America should be wrested from the mother country, they were to be "confederated with or dependent upon" the United States, and provision was made in the Articles of Confederation (Article XI) for the full admission of Canada into the Union. Cf. Moore, *American Diplomacy*, 224.

interest in their destinies"; and on December 10, following, a committee to whom that part of the President's message had been referred, submitted a report declaring that the Senate and House of Representatives beheld with friendly interest the establishment of international sovereignties by the Spanish provinces in America.

With the War of 1812 at an end and peace established in Europe, the policy of neutrality which the United States had maintained from the beginning between Spain and her revolted colonies became more clearly defined. It was in September, 1815, that President Madison issued his proclamation warning the citizens of the United States, especially those of Louisiana, from conspiring together to set on foot hostile expeditions against the dominions of Spain; and it was in response to his recommendation that Congress passed the Neutrality Act of March 3, 1817. When Monroe became President, more cordial relations with Spain had been established. But in his first annual message he declared that it had been anticipated that the contest between Spain and her colonies would become highly interesting to the United States; that it was natural that the citizens of the United States should sympathize in events which affected their neighbors; that the prosecution of the conflict had interrupted the commerce of the United States, and otherwise had affected the persons and property of its citizens; but that strict neutrality had nevertheless been maintained.<sup>19</sup>

In 1815 there was published in the city of Washington a pamphlet under the title of *Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia*.<sup>20</sup> The author was William Thornton, who had long been interested in the fate of the part of the continent which still remained under the dominion of

<sup>19</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 13.

<sup>20</sup> The copy in the New York Public Library, which has been used by the present writer, is bound with ten other pamphlets in a volume containing the following inscription: "M. Dickerson — bo't at the sale of President Jefferson's Library — Mar. 6, 1829." On a fly leaf is written an index of the volume in Jefferson's handwriting.

European powers. Thornton was born on the island of Tortola in the West Indies, was educated as a physician at the University of Edinburgh, and, toward the last decade of the eighteenth century, came to the United States, settling finally at Philadelphia. In 1802 he was appointed to fill the newly created office of Commissioner of Patents, in which position he continued until his death, twenty-six years later. He was a man of great versatility and boldness of intellect. Chosen a member of the American Philosophical Society, he was awarded by that organization the Magellanic prize for an essay which he published in 1793 under the title of *Cadmus: or a Treatise on the Elements of Written Language*. He was a painter of no mean ability, and that he was an architect of merit is attested by the fact that he designed, among other notable buildings, the Philadelphia public library and the capitol at Washington. Moreover, he was an inventor. He became associated with John Fitch, who constructed, about 1789, a steamboat which was able to creep through the water at the rate of three miles an hour. Thornton made improvements which raised the speed of the vessel to eight miles an hour. This velocity the boat was able to sustain, and on one occasion was propelled a distance of eighty miles in one day. Hoping to make further improvements, the inventors began the construction of a new boat, which Fitch completed and tested while Thornton was away on a visit to the West Indies. As this boat proved to be a failure, Fitch became discouraged and went to France to continue his experiments. Upon resuming his residence at Philadelphia, Thornton turned his attention to other things, thus abandoning the honor which might have been his as a coinventor of the steamboat.<sup>21</sup> Other inventions which he made entitle him, however, to a place among American inventors.

Thornton's many-sided ability and his more or less intimate

<sup>21</sup> See article by Gaillard Hunt in *The Nation* for May 21, 1914; also a paper read before the Columbia Historical Society on May 19, 1914, by Allen C. Clark and printed in the Records of the Society, XVIII.



association with Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and other eminent men of his time give added interest to his views on the subject of a "United North and South Columbia." In a short introduction to his pamphlet he declared that the plan which he was then giving to the public was taken principally from what he had written on the subject some fifteen years before. Referring without doubt to Miranda, he declared that the plan was made "known to one in whom the worthy Patriots of Caracas since confided and who promised he would endeavor to execute what he appeared so much to approve; but," he continued, "unhappily the love of power dazzled a mind too weak for that magnanimous impulse of pure virtue. . . . He sought power on the ruins of his country, and wished to establish a consular government, expecting thereby to obtain supreme command." <sup>22</sup>

These remarks show that Thornton had an exaggerated idea of the importance of the venture which he had made as a political organizer. Nevertheless, he manifested an unusually clear understanding of the difficult situation in which the New World was placed, and in proposing his vast scheme, his aim was to prepare by means of union to meet the dangers which threatened the continent as a whole. At the time the plan was published, none of the new states, it must be remembered, had as yet definitely established its independence. That they were all destined to attain the status of free people, Thornton firmly believed. But he was afraid that "if nothing be done; if governments form themselves around us essentially different; if daring chiefs at the head of armies and ambitious politicians disturb our repose, it will be vain to offer the branch of peace. Our pacific system, if continued, would then but offer temptations to aggression, and we would repine at the necessity of armies and warfare, now so justly deprecated. . . . Men vested with high military authority have more generally obtained by promises of reward the support of the armies they commanded,

<sup>22</sup> *Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia*, 2.

and then assumed the power. We learn this not only from ancient but modern example, and millions now groan under the oppressive tyranny of despicable upstarts whose depravity is unbalanced by a single virtue. . . . With a knowledge of all that has preceded, who would leave to chance the fate of the Western Empire! The fool only that cannot think!"

Continuing, Thornton declared that it was essential to the future undisturbed repose of Columbia that a complete accord in political sentiments should be established; and that if all the nations of this vast continent were to constitute as rapidly as possible governments on the plan of the United States, as nearly as their traditional principles and practices would allow, the whole continent being divided into states under the confederate plan, but one more step would be required to complete "the grandest system that has ever been formed by the most expanded mind of man — a system that would secure to the remotest ages the tranquillity and peace, the virtue and felicity of countless millions."<sup>23</sup> In order that this high end might be realized, he proposed that the continent and its islands should be divided into thirteen sections or commonwealths.

The first and second sections or commonwealths were to embrace the whole of the North American continent lying north of the forty-fourth degree of north latitude, the first being the western half of the territory and the second the eastern half, each with the islands adjacent included. The third, fourth, and fifth commonwealths were to be comprised in the territory lying between the forty-fourth parallel of north latitude and the tropic of Capricorn. One of these, the third, was to be bounded by the Pacific, the Tropic of Capricorn, the Gulf of Mexico, the Rio Grande to the point at which it intersects the thirty-third degree of north latitude, thence by a line north to the southern boundary of the first commonwealth and along this line to the Pacific. It was to include, in short, what are to-day the Pacific and the extreme southwestern states of the United States and

<sup>23</sup> *Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia*, 6.

northern Mexico. The fourth republic was to lie between the third and the Mississippi River. The fifth was to be comprised in the remaining territory of the United States and the Floridas. The sixth was to include the portion of Mexico lying south of the Tropic of Capricorn and including Central America as far south as the present boundary between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The region which is to-day embraced in the republic of Costa Rica and Panama was to be known not as a commonwealth, but as the District of America, and contain on the "healthy hills that intersect the Isthmus at or near Panama, and where a canal may be made from sea to sea, by locks," the City of America. The seventh commonwealth was to embrace the West India islands.

The continent of South America was to be divided into six republics, from the eighth to the thirteenth, inclusive. The eighth was to include that part of the continent lying north of the equator; that is, what is to-day Colombia, Venezuela, the Guianas, and a narrow strip of northern Brazil, together with a small part of northern Ecuador. The ninth was to be comprised between the equator, the sixty-second degree of west longitude,<sup>24</sup> the thirteenth degree of south latitude, and the Pacific, including nearly all of Ecuador and Peru, northern Bolivia, and a part of western Brazil. The tenth was to include Brazil, with the limitations already indicated, as far south as the fifteenth degree of south latitude, west along that line to the Paraguay River, then northerly along that river to the eastern boundary of the ninth, and thence to the equator.<sup>25</sup> The eleventh was to be bounded by the southern boundary of the ninth, the Paraguay River to the twenty-eighth degree of south latitude, and thence westward to the Pacific. This would have included

<sup>24</sup> The author makes this line intersect the Paraguay River and follow that stream to the thirteenth degree of south latitude. Modern maps, however, indicate that the Paraguay does not extend so far north.

<sup>25</sup> This line would have been in effect along the fifteenth degree of south latitude to the sixty-second degree of west longitude and thence to the equator.

the greater part of Bolivia, southern Peru, and the northern parts of Chile and Argentina. The twelfth was to be comprised between the southern boundary of the tenth, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Paraguay River. It would have included southern Brazil, the greater part of Paraguay, Uruguay, and a small part of Argentina. The thirteenth was to include the remainder of the continent south of the twenty-eighth degree of south latitude; that is, the greater part of Chile and of the Argentine republic.<sup>26</sup>

The division in some instances, Thornton admitted, appeared unequal, but it arose from the situation of the countries with respect to soil, climate, natural boundaries, and political relations; and it was his opinion that, everything considered, a more equable division could not be easily made. If, however, the ancient attachment of the inhabitants to accidental boundaries, already established, should induce them to wish the continuance of the former boundaries, they ought to weigh maturely all the advantages that would be obtained in the equalization of limits; for whatever might be lost on one side would probably be more than compensated on the other. Besides, since all would be under the same general government, why should there be any petty disputes about limits? In the United States, individual states had given up as much, voluntarily, as was sufficient to create new states. The lines of the new states were imaginary with relation to the connection of the inhabitants; for the produce of all was sent to the nearest and best market, and it ought to be the same, Thornton thought, in the combined commonwealths or sectional governments; for it would be considered as a fundamental principle, that whoever was a citizen of one should be a citizen of all, with his rights extending throughout the whole.<sup>27</sup>

Thornton recommended that each commonwealth adopt, as far as circumstances would permit, the constitution of the

<sup>26</sup> *Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia*, 7-9.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 10.

United States. The Columbian, *Inca*, or supreme government, he would have to consist of an *Inca*, or chief executive, twenty-six sachems, two from each commonwealth, constituting a council of sachems, or senate, of the supreme government; fifty-two *caciques*, four from each commonwealth, constituting a council of *caciques*, or house of representatives, and thirteen judges, representing each of the commonwealths, forming a supreme court. It was proposed that the *Inca* should be elected from the council of sachems by a joint ballot of the sachems and *caciques*. The next on the ballot would be the grand sachem, who would preside in the council of sachems. In the event of the death, removal, or resignation of the *Inca* the grand sachem would succeed him. The *Inca* might be elected for eight years, but should not be reëligible. The sachems and *caciques* might be elected for eight and four years respectively, and they might be reëligible.

The *Inca* should have authority to make treaties with foreign nations, with the advice and consent of a majority of both houses of the legislature; and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of both houses he should have the power of declaring war. He should be commander in chief of the army and navy, with authority to call on each commonwealth for one-third of its marine force, in time of peace; but in time of war, he would command all vessels, no commonwealth being allowed to retain any warships except those necessary for the protection of trade and revenue. It was thought proper to clothe the chief executive with great naval power, because he would be able, by such authority, not only to repel the attacks of foreign enemies, but also to preserve uninterrupted harmony between the governments over which he would preside. The authority of the commonwealth presidents would extend over the armies of their respective sections during peace times, so that the *Inca* would not actually have at his command an army except in time of war.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 11-13.

The members of the Supreme Court were to be elected by the legislatures of the commonwealths upon nomination by the respective presidents. The judges should hold office during good behavior. They should have original jurisdiction in all disputes between the different sectional governments, in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls from foreign states, and treaties entered into by the supreme government. They would have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in law and equity arising from the written laws of the district of America, in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and in controversies in which the supreme government should be a party. And finally, their decisions should be given with their reasons at length, in writing, in both the English and Spanish languages.<sup>29</sup>

The difficulties which were presented by the establishment of a political system, extending over so vast a territory, would be overcome, Thornton thought, by the exercise of the federal power. It was by means of the federal power that the states comprising the United States were prevented from crumbling by internal division, the jealousy of rival, or the combination of adverse states. In Europe, where another system prevailed, the powers were kept continually embroiled by the spirit of jealousy. The efforts which had been made, especially by Henry IV, to establish and maintain peace by concerted action, had failed because based upon wrong principles. In America the probability of success was much greater, not only because the principle of federation was to be applied, but because "we are, happily, far removed from the Old World, where ancient prejudices and accustomed modes of thinking might tend to exclude extensive improvements as extravagant innovations." Furthermore, the system itself precluded the inconvenience that might arise from extent of territory. In the form in which the continent was divided, no commonwealth would be of unwieldy proportions, and since each would have immediate ac-

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*. 14.

cess by sea to the supreme government, the difficulties of communication would never be great. Moreover, the telegraph, when perfected, would convey, from the remotest bounds of this vast empire, communication to the supreme government with ease; and any measure dependent on this knowledge would be as rapid as the occasion might require! <sup>30</sup>

At this point a brief reference may be made to the views of Henry Clay, the most ardent of all the North American advocates of continental unity. As early as 1810 Clay, at that time a member of the Senate, speaking in defense of the occupation of West Florida and referring especially to the usurpation of the Spanish throne by Napoleon, declared that he had no commiseration for princes; that his sympathies were reserved for the mass of mankind.<sup>31</sup> And, several years later, as a member of the House, speaking on the bill for enforcing neutrality, he championed the belligerent rights of the colonies and expressed a strong desire to see them achieve independence. "I may be accused," he said, "of an imprudent utterance of my feelings on this occasion — I care not; when the independence, the happiness, the liberty of a whole people is at stake, and that people our neighbors, our brethren, occupying a portion of the same continent, imitating our example and participating of the same sympathies with ourselves, I will boldly avow my feelings and my wishes in their behalf, even at the hazard of such an imputation." <sup>32</sup>

On subsequent occasions Clay gave evidence of his interest in the welfare of the new states. On December 3, 1817, he called attention to the fact that all the acts of the government in enforcing the neutrality laws bore against the colonies. He trusted that the House would give the subject their attention and show that in that body the obligations of neutrality would be strictly regarded in respect to Spanish America. On March

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 3, 14.

<sup>31</sup> *Annals of the Congress of the United States, 11th Cong.*, 3d Sess., 35.

<sup>32</sup> *Annals of the Congress of the United States, 14th Cong.*, 2d Sess., 742.

24, 1818, when an appropriation to defray the expense of the mission to South America was taken up in the House, Clay moved an amendment providing for an outfit and a salary for a minister to Buenos Aires. In a long and eloquent speech which he made on the following day in support of this proposal he declared that "there could be no doubt that Spanish America, once independent, whatever might be the form of the governments established in its several parts, those governments would be animated by an American feeling, and guided by an American policy. They would obey the laws of the system of the New World, of which they would form a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe."

Clay's motion was lost and for nearly two years the agitation in Congress in favor of the recognition of the South American governments rested.<sup>33</sup> On May 10, 1820, Clay submitted in the House a resolution declaring it to be expedient to provide by law for the sending of ministers to such of the new governments as had established and were maintaining their independence of Spain. "It is in our power to create a system," he said, "of which we shall be the center, and in which all South America will act with us. In respect to commerce, we should be most benefited. . . . We should become the center of a system which would constitute the rallying point of human wisdom against all the despotism of the Old World."<sup>34</sup>

Discussions of continental unity were not confined to the United States. In 1810, in the *Politico-Christian Catechism* of the Chilean, Martínez de Rozas, it was proposed that local governments be set up in the different Spanish provinces of America and that through a national representation, which should reside at some point to be agreed upon, "a single nation and a single state" should be formed.<sup>35</sup> Somewhat later in the same

<sup>33</sup> Moore, *Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism* (Col. Univ. Quar., Sept., 1915), 348-350. *Annals of the Congress of the U. S., 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 1482.*

<sup>34</sup> Moore, *Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism*, 351. *Annals of the Congress of the U. S., 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 2226.*

<sup>35</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, VIII, 185-186.



year, Juan Egaña, noted in Chile as a man of learning and ability, submitted to the provisional government of that province a memorial in which he set forth at length a general plan of organization for the Spanish possessions in America. Unwilling that the colonies should accept the domination of France, he recommended that an attempt be made to organize them into a single nation. "It would be desirable," said Egaña, "for the government to write to the rest of the governments of America (or to those of the south only), suggesting that they have their deputies for the Cortes ready, to the end that if Spain should succumb, they might constitute, at a time and place agreed upon, a provisional congress in which the form of union and the relations of the provinces to the general congress might be determined. Otherwise, America, torn by a thousand civil dissensions, will disintegrate and become the prey of foreigners."<sup>36</sup>

That the Chilean projects for federation came to nothing is easily explained. In the first place Chile occupied a remote situation in the continent and communication with the other sections was slow and extremely difficult. Secondly, Peru, the contiguous province on the north, was loyal to the Regency and being under the immediate control of the viceroy afforded a soil none too favorable for the growth of revolutionary ideas. And finally Buenos Aires, whose coöperation would have been highly desirable, proved to be unfriendly to the plan of federating the different parts of Spanish America into one nation.

At the time the proposals of Rozas and Egaña were made, Buenos Aires had become practically independent of Spain, the viceroy having been deposed and a provisional government administered by a junta having been set up instead. The dominant figure in this junta was its secretary, Mariano Moreno,<sup>37</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, VIII, 241-244. Egaña's memorial setting forth his plan is printed in full in Alvarez's *La Diplomacia de Chile*, 257-262.

<sup>37</sup> Mariano Moreno was born in Buenos Aires in 1778. After studying in his native city, he went at the age of twelve years to the university of Charcas, in Upper Peru, where he studied law. Returning to Buenos

who, entertaining certain imperialistic designs which he hoped to carry out through an alliance with Great Britain, did not favor the plan of federating the colonies. "There would be nothing irregular," he wrote in the *Buenos Aires Gazette*, "in the coöperation of all the peoples of America in the great task which the provinces have under consideration. But that coöperation would be a question of convention and not of obligation, and I believe that it would be impolitic and harmful to insist on the adoption of such a convention. How would the wills of men who inhabit a continent where distances are measured by the thousand leagues be harmonized? Where would the great congress hold its sessions, and how could it meet the urgent demands of peoples from whom it could receive news only after the lapse of three or four months? It is chimerical to pretend that the whole of Spanish America should constitute a single state. . . . How could we conciliate our interests with those of Mexico? That kingdom would not be content with anything less than holding these provinces in the condition of colonies. But what American would to-day allow himself to be placed in such a condition? . . . Every effort that is aimed at preventing the provinces from establishing their own political systems is meant to paralyze the enthusiasm of the peoples until the occasion presents to give them a new master."<sup>38</sup>

Moreno's ideas on this subject have been handed down as a sort of political legacy to succeeding generations of Argentine statesmen. Though he died in 1811, yet his ideas lived after him. Thus Argentina has never favored any of the schemes for forming a political union of American states, because it has always considered that such combinations would be dan-

Aires he began the practice of his profession. When the provisional government was established on May 25, 1810, Moreno was made its secretary and soon became its moving spirit. He died in March, 1811, on his way to England. Cortés, *Diccionario Biográfico Americano*, 328.

<sup>38</sup> Moreno, *Escritos políticos y economicos*, 297. Antokoletz, *Histoire de la Diplomatie Argentine*, 105, 108.

gerous to national autonomy. When, therefore, Chile proposed in 1810 the convocation of a general congress the Argentine junta replied that the idea was wholly impracticable and suggested that an alliance of the two countries would be preferable. Later the attitude of the United Provinces toward the congress of Panama and toward the attempts which were afterwards made to bring about the desired confederation, had its inspiration in this political legacy of Mariano Moreno.<sup>39</sup> This, perhaps, is a sufficient explanation of Argentina's historic attitude toward the unification of American states; but if an additional motive were sought it would no doubt be found in the aspirations of Moreno and his successors for Argentine leadership. Of this more will be said in subsequent chapters.

Whatever may have been the political aims which prevented the United Provinces from joining in the early attempts to bring about a political union of the different nations of the continent, nothing stood in the way of their contributing to the general good in the struggle for independence. As has already been noted, the Argentine general, San Martín, led an army across the Andes and clinched the independence of Chile; he it was who struck, with an army composed in good part of his fellow countrymen, the first great blow for independence in Peru; and Argentine officers and soldiers continued to play an important part in the struggle against the enemy wherever he appeared, from the Rio de la Plata to the equator, until his power of resistance was at last destroyed at Ayacucho. This sort of cooperation was not, however, unusual. On the battlefields of Peru, men of Colombia, Peru, Chile, and the United Provinces fought side by side; and, but for the difficulties of communication, their brothers of Mexico and Central America would surely have been found on those same battlefields. While the struggle lasted, in fact, there was a strong tendency toward continental unity and correspondingly little inclination toward the

<sup>39</sup> Antokoletz, *Histoire de la Diplomatie Argentine*, 109-112.

intense spirit of nationalism which developed rapidly enough as soon as independence appeared to be reasonably well established.

The views of Bolivar must next be considered. At what point in his career he first conceived the idea of a union of American nations is not known. His first definite utterance on the subject is found in his famous "prophetic" letter of September 6, 1815, cited in a previous chapter. It is evident, however, from the thoroughgoing manner in which he dealt with the problems of political organization on that occasion, that he had given it mature consideration, possibly over a period of several years. Indeed, the idea of a great confederation had been suggested in Venezuela as early as April, 1810, when a circular sent out by the recently constituted provisional government of that province brought the matter to the attention of the authorities of the other Spanish American capitals. "The patriots of Caracas," it was declared, "ought to have imitators among all those inhabitants of America in whom the long-continued habit of slavery has not deadened the moral sense; and their resolution ought to be applauded by all those who esteem virtue and enlightened patriotism. Your body affords the most appropriate organ for spreading these ideas among the people over whom you preside and for arousing their interest and activity in the promotion of the great work of the confederation of Spanish America."<sup>40</sup>

Although Bolivar was not a member of the junta which was the author of the circular, yet he had already begun to play an important part in the affairs of the province and it is not likely that the suggestion escaped his attention. Moreover, when he was sent later in the same year with López Méndez and Bello on a mission to England, he received instructions marked by such expressions as the following: "Venezuela will always adhere to the general interests of America and will be ready to

<sup>40</sup> Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, II, 408; Mancini, *Bolívar et l'émancipation des Colonies Espagnoles*, 269.

enter into intimate union with all those who escape the domination of France. . . . Venezuela will gladly abide by the vote of the free parts of the Spanish Empire.”<sup>41</sup> If to these circumstances be added the fact that, upon the arrival of the mission in London, Bolivar became associated with Miranda in the prosecution of plans which were, as has been indicated above, continental in scope, it may be deduced that the plans of the future Liberator for forming a union of American states had thus early begun to take shape.

What his views were three years later scarcely admits of question. After the final collapse of Miranda’s revolutionary enterprises in 1812, Bolivar continued the struggle, and during the following year won notable successes in New Granada and Venezuela. It was as a result of these victories that he was given the title of Liberator. During this period he exercised, by common consent, dictatorial authority over the part of the country recovered from the enemy. He was assisted in his administration of the government by three secretaries, one of whom, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, made a report, dated December 31, 1813, in which some remarkable views on foreign policy are set forth. These views, Larrazábal, one of Bolivar’s biographers, considers as the Liberator’s own, rather than those of his secretary.<sup>42</sup> In boldness of conception and in broad comprehension of world politics, they are typical of the productions of Bolivar’s fertile mind. The following quotations from the report are given, therefore, in confidence that they represent the views of the chief of the state and not merely those of the secretary who formulated them.

“With respect to New Granada, the policy of your Excellency has been not solely to bring about a closer alliance between that region and Venezuela. Your aim has been rather to fuse the two into a single nation. Considerations of the greatest importance make this measure indispensable. The in-

<sup>41</sup> Mancini, *Bolivar et l'émancipation des Colonies Espagnoles*, 312-314.

<sup>42</sup> Larrazábal, *Vida del Libertador, Simón Bolívar*, I, 250.

terest of New Granada, our own interest, and the clearly expressed ideas of other cabinets urge your Excellency to take this step without delay. Our strength will be born of this union. The enemies of the American cause will tremble before so formidable a force, united to resist them on every hand. . . . Why should there not exist a close union between New Granada and Venezuela? Not only so, but why should not the whole of South America unite under a single central government? The lessons of experience should not be lost to us. The spectacle which Europe offers of drenching itself in blood to reëstablish an equilibrium which is constantly being disturbed, should correct our policy and save it from that sanguinary result. . . . We are, happily, so situated at present as to be able to give to our policy, without hindrance, the direction which we may consider most advantageous. Victorious in the eyes of all America, the admiration and hope of all your fellow citizens, your Excellency is most competent to unite the desires of the southern regions, to undertake at once the formation of the great American nation and to preserve it from the evils which the European system has brought upon the nations of the Old World.

“In addition to the continental balance, which Europe seeks where, apparently, it is least to be found — in the midst of war and upheavals — there is, Sir, another balance which is the one of importance to us: the balance of the world. The ambition of European powers imposes the yoke of slavery upon the other parts of the world, and these all ought to make an effort to establish the balance between themselves and Europe, with a view to destroy the preponderance of that part of the world. I call this the balance of the world and it should enter into the calculations of American policy.

“It is necessary that the force of our nation be capable of resisting successfully the aggressions which the ambition of Europe might attempt; and this powerful Colossus which should oppose that other Colossus, cannot be formed except by the

union of all South America in one nation, so that one government may apply all its enormous resources to the single end of resisting foreign aggression, and, multiplying mutual coöperation among the individual members of the union, elevate us to the pinnacle of power and prosperity." 43

In his letter of September 6, 1815, Bolivar discussed at some length the general political situation in the different sections of Spanish America, pointing out the difficulties that had been encountered in the struggle for freedom, and in the establishment of stable national governments. Declaring that the consolidation of the vast territory of the former Spanish colonies into a single monarchy would be extremely difficult, and into a republic of like dimensions impossible, he yet considered it feasible to associate these widely separated units into some sort of political union. "The consolidation of the New World," he declared, "into a single nation with a single bond uniting all its parts is a grand conception. Since the different parts have the same language, customs, and religion, they ought to be confederated into a single state; but this is not possible, because differences of climate, diverse conditions, opposing interests, and dissimilar characteristics divide America. How beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama should become for us what the Isthmus of Corinth was for the Greeks! Would to God that we may have the fortune some day of holding there some august congress of the representatives of the republics, kingdoms, and empires of America, to deliberate upon the high interests of peace and of war not only between the American nations, but between them and the rest of the globe." 44

The next reference which occurs in Bolivar's writings on the subject of a political union of American states is found in a letter dated June 12, 1818, to Pueyrredón, Supreme Director

43 Larrazábal, *Vida del Libertador*, I, 250-251.

44 Moore, *Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism*, 348; *Cartas de Bolívar*, *Sociedad de Ediciones*, 145-50.

of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. In this letter, Bolívar, in reciprocating the expressions of friendship contained in a communication previously received from Pueyrredón, made the following interesting declarations: "Your Excellency may assure your compatriots that they will be received and treated here not only as members of a friendly republic, but even as citizens of Venezuela. We Americans should have but a single country, since in every other way we have been perfectly united. . . . When Venezuela's triumphant arms shall have completed the work of independence, or when favorable circumstances allow us more frequent communication and make possible more intimate relations, we, for our part, shall hasten with the most lively interest to establish the American compact, which, forming all our republics into a single body politic, will present America to the world in an aspect of majesty and grandeur unexampled among the nations of antiquity. America thus united, if Heaven grant our desire, may be called the queen of nations and the mother of republics. I hope that Rio de la Plata will coöperate with its powerful influence in perfecting the political edifice whose corner stone was laid the day on which we first struck for freedom."<sup>45</sup>

These ideas were expressed at a time when there could have been little hope of carrying them immediately into execution; for the Patriots, having met with reverses on every hand, had only begun to achieve the victories which were to fix their destiny. By the middle of the year 1822, however, things had changed. The republic of Colombia had come into existence; Mexico had been proclaimed an empire; a part of Peru had been rendered independent; and the position of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata and of Chile had become more secure. Although independence was now well enough established and the governments were well enough organized to allow the separate units to feel a degree of security, yet prudence seemed to counsel the formation of some sort of league for the purpose of pre-

<sup>45</sup> Blanco-Azurúa, *Documentos*, VI, 402.



senting a united front to the internal and external dangers which were recognized as common to all. Accordingly, Colombia, at the instance of Bolivar, took the lead, and adopting certain preliminary articles as the basis of what was to be a "new federal system" dispatched envoys to negotiate treaties with the Spanish American governments.<sup>46</sup>

Joaquín Mosquera, the agent sent to negotiate with the governments of Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires, received instructions in part as follows:

"Nothing is of so much interest at the present moment as the formation of a league truly American. But this confederation ought not to rest merely upon the foundation of an offensive and defensive alliance; it ought to be more intimate than the one which has been lately formed in Europe against the liberty of peoples. It is necessary that ours should be a society of brother nations, for the present separated and in the exercise of their sovereignty through the course of human events, but

<sup>46</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 120, 537.

In a report which Pedro Gual, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, made to the Congress of Colombia on April 17, 1823, the bases were stated to be as follows:

I. "That the American states be forever in alliance and confederation, in peace and war, for the consolidation of the liberty and independence, guaranteeing to each other the integrity of their respective territories.

II. "That in order to render this guaranty effective, the *uti possidetis* of 1810, according to the demarkation of territory of each captain-generalship or vicereignty, erected into a sovereign state, be taken as the rule.

III. "That, with respect to the personal rights, trade, and navigation of each state, their citizens and subjects shall enjoy, indiscriminately, in their persons, properties, and foreign and domestic traffic, the same privileges and prerogatives as the natives of the country in which they reside, whether domiciled or transient.

IV. "That, in order to consummate this compact of perpetual alliance and confederation, a meeting be held in Panama, of two plenipotentiaries from each of the contracting parties, which might serve as a point of contact in times of common danger, be the faithful interpreter of their public treaties, when difficulties occur, and judges, arbiters, and conciliators, in their disputes and differences.

V. "That this treaty of perpetual alliance and confederation shall not interfere, in any way, with the exercise of sovereignty of each and all of the contracting parties, with respect to their relations with other independent powers." *British and Foreign State Papers*, X, 743.

united, strong, and powerful to resist the aggressions of the foreigner. It is indispensable that you should constantly insist upon the necessity of laying at once the foundations of an *Amphictyonic body* or *assembly of plenipotentiaries*, which shall promote the common interests of the American states, which shall settle the difficulties which may arise in the future between peoples who have the same manners and customs and who, for the lack of some such sacred institution, might perchance become involved in the desolating wars which have afflicted other less fortunate regions. The government and the people of Colombia are strongly disposed to coöperate in so praiseworthy an object and will immediately send one or more plenipotentiaries to the place that may be designated, provided the other American states agree to the plan. Then we should be able to determine definitely the functions of this truly august assembly.”<sup>47</sup>

On July 6, 1822, two treaties between the republic of Colombia and the state of Peru were concluded at Lima. One of these was a general treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation, and the other a special convention, relating to a meeting of plenipotentiaries, for which a provision had been made in the former instrument. An examination of these treaties is essential to a proper understanding of the subject under consideration. The following articles of the general treaty are quoted in full.

1. “The republic of Colombia and the state of Peru do unite, league, and confederate, from this time forward for ever more, in peace and war, to sustain with their influence, and forces by sea and land, as far as circumstances may permit, their independence of the Spanish nation, and of every other foreign dominion; and to secure, after the recognition of their independence, mutual prosperity, perfect harmony, and good understanding between their peoples, subjects, and citizens, as well as with such other powers as may enter into relations with them.

<sup>47</sup> Zubieta, *Congress de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 19.

2. "With this view, the republic of Colombia and the state of Peru do voluntarily engage in, and contract with each other, a perpetual treaty of intimate alliance and firm and lasting friendship for their common defense, the security of their independence and liberty, their mutual and general good, and for their internal tranquillity; binding themselves to succor each other and to repel, in common, any attack or invasion that may threaten their political existence.

3. "In cases of sudden invasion, both parties may engage in war in the territories of either party, should the exigency of the moment not afford time to communicate with the government to which the invaded territory may belong. But the party thus acting shall observe and cause to be observed, the statutes, ordinances, and laws of the invaded state, as far as circumstances may permit, and shall cause its government to be respected and obeyed. The expenses that may be incurred in these operations shall be arranged by separate conventions, and shall be settled within one year after the present war.

4. "In order to perpetuate and secure, in the best possible manner, a lasting friendship and good understanding between both states, the citizens of Colombia and Peru shall enjoy the rights and prerogatives which belong to native-born citizens of either territory: that is to say, Colombians shall be considered in Peru as Peruvians, and the latter in the republic as Colombians; without prejudice, however, to the amplifications or restrictions which the legislative power of both states may have made, or may think fit to make, regarding the qualifications necessary in order to exercise the chief magistracies; but in order to enjoy the other active and passive rights of citizens, it is sufficient that they establish their residence in the state to which they prefer to belong.

5. "The subjects and citizens of both states shall have full egress and ingress in their respective ports and territories; and shall enjoy in them all the civil rights and privileges of trade and commerce: being liable only to such duties, imposts, and

restrictions as the subjects and citizens of each of the contracting parties are liable."

Article 6 relates to the payment of duties on importation, exportation, anchorage, and tonnage, under the general principle laid down in the preceding article; article 7 provides that succor be given to ships of war and merchantmen entering the ports of the respective states, in distress; article 8 extends the jurisdiction of the maritime courts of justice of the contracting parties to all privateers of either state and to their prizes; article 9 provides for the settlement of boundaries by a special convention; article 10 binds both parties to make common cause against the internal enemies of their respective governments, "lawfully established by the voice of the people"; article 11 provides for the extradition of persons guilty of treason, sedition, or other grave crime, including desertion from the army and navy; and finally, article 12 describes the manner of ratification.<sup>48</sup>

The essential articles of the special treaty are as follows:

1. "In order to draw closer the bonds which should in future unite both states, and to remove any difficulties which may arise, and in any way interrupt their harmony and good understanding, a meeting shall be held, composed of two plenipotentiaries on each side, in like manner, and with the same formalities, as are observed according to established usage, in the nomination of ministers of similar rank to the governments of foreign powers.

2. "Both parties oblige themselves to interpose their good offices with the other states of America, formerly belonging to Spain, to induce them to enter into this treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation.

3. "As soon as this grand and important object shall be attained, there shall be assembled a general meeting of American states, composed of their respective plenipotentiaries, instructed

<sup>48</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 105-112.

Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, VIII, 453-455.

With reference to article 10 see *infra*, p. 300.

to lay the most solid foundation for, and to establish the intimate relations which ought to subsist between all and each of them; and that may serve them as counsel in great emergencies, as a point of union in cases of common danger, as a faithful interpreter of their public treaties should difficulties arise, and as a judicial reference and mediator in their disputes and differences.

4. "The Isthmus of Panama being an integral part of the republic of Colombia, and the best adapted for this august meeting, this republic pledges itself cheerfully to furnish all the aid which hospitality demands among friendly nations, and to observe a sacred and inviolable regard toward the persons of the plenipotentiaries who may there form the Assembly of American States.

5. "The state of Peru binds itself to the like obligations, should the events of the war, or the will of the majority of the American states, cause the before-named meeting to be held in its territories, in the same manner that the republic of Colombia has engaged to do by the preceding article; as well with regard to the Isthmus of Panama, as to any other part of its jurisdiction, which on account of its central position between the northern and southern states of America formerly belonging to Spain, may be deemed convenient for this most important purpose.

6. "This treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation shall not in any wise interrupt the exercise of the national sovereignty of each of the contracting parties, as far as relates to their laws, and the form and establishment of their respective governments, as well as to their relations with foreign powers. But they bind themselves, expressly and irrevocably, not to accede to any demands in the nature of tributes or exactions which either the Spanish Government may propose on account of the loss of its dominion over these countries, or which any other nation may prefer in the name, or as a representative, of that government; nor to negotiate any treaty, either with Spain

or any other nation, in prejudice or depreciation of this independence; sustaining everywhere and on all occasions their reciprocal interests, with the energy and dignity of free, independent, friendly, brotherly, and confederated nations.

7. "The republic of Colombia especially binds itself to keep on foot a force of four thousand men, armed and equipped, for the ends stated in the foregoing articles. Its national navy, whatever it may be, shall likewise be employed in such manner as to give effect to the above stipulations.

8. "The state of Peru shall likewise assist with its maritime forces, whatever they may be, and with a like number of troops as the republic of Colombia."<sup>49</sup>

These treaties were ratified by Peru on July 15, 1822, and by Colombia on July 12, 1823. Colombia, however, in ratifying the general treaty made exception of the words "and for their internal tranquillity," in the second article; rejected the whole of article 10; and of article 11 accepted only the part relating to deserters from the army or navy. The other treaty was ratified without change.<sup>50</sup>

The Colombian envoy, in compliance with his instructions, proceeded southward to arrange similar conventions with Chile and the United Provinces. With the former he signed, on October 21, 1822, a treaty embodying the principal provisions of the treaties of July 6 between Colombia and Peru. This instrument, however, was never ratified by the government of Chile, the failure being due, perhaps, more to the disorganized condition of the country than to indifference or hostility to the plan of union, the realization of which was the main purpose of the treaty.<sup>51</sup> Passing to Buenos Aires, Mosquera entered into negotiations with the government of that province. True

<sup>49</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 115-120; Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, VIII, 455-457.

<sup>50</sup> Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, V, 161, 165; *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 114, 121.

<sup>51</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XIII, 691-693; *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 213-225.

to the policy of Mariano Moreno, Buenos Aires declined to become a party to the proposed confederation. Accordingly the representatives of the two governments — Rivadavia acting for Buenos Aires — omitting all reference to an assembly of plenipotentiaries, signed, on March 8, 1823, a brief treaty of friendship and alliance, which was ratified by Buenos Aires on June 10 following, and by Colombia exactly a year later.<sup>52</sup>

The government of the United States received, through its agents, information regarding these negotiations. Todd had sent communications on the subject from Bogotá; Prevost had written from Peru, and Forbes from Buenos Aires. Secretary Adams, in giving instructions, on May 27, 1823, to Anderson, the first United States minister to Colombia, declared that Prevost, as well as Gual, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, entertained higher expectations of the success of the negotiation at Buenos Aires than Mr. Forbes; that Prevost thought that it must succeed, although the government of Buenos Aires was secretly averse to it, as it was implicated in secret intrigues with the Portuguese Government and General Le Cor, for a confederacy of a different character; that Gual told Todd that proposals had been made by the Portuguese Government at Lisbon, to Colombia, for a general confederacy of all America, north and south, together with the constitutional governments of Portugal and Spain as a counterpoise to the European *Holy Alliance*, but that the proposals had been rejected on account of their *European aspect*. Adams added that loose and indefinite projects of the same kind had been presented by the Portuguese Government to the United States, but that they had never been considered even as objects of deliberation.<sup>53</sup>

A treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation, embodying in substance the main provisions of the treaties of

<sup>52</sup> Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, IV, 57; *Registro Oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 38; Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, IX, 298.

<sup>53</sup> *Register of Debates in Congress* (1826) II, Appendix, 80; *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 894.

July 6, 1822, was signed by representatives of the governments of Colombia and Mexico on October 3, 1823.<sup>54</sup> This was, it will be noted, some time after the negotiations with Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires had been brought to a close. The delay, however, was not due to design on the part of Colombia; for President Bolívar appointed in October, 1821, a minister, Miguel Santa María, to the Mexican Empire, with authority to negotiate a treaty in accordance with the general plan of union,<sup>55</sup> and as this minister arrived in Mexico in April of the following year, the treaty might have been concluded within a very short time thereafter if the course of events in Mexico had not prevented.<sup>56</sup>

Santa María, upon reaching Vera Cruz in March, 1822, immediately wrote José Manuel de Herrera, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at Mexico, of his arrival. In the letter to Herrera the Colombian envoy spoke of the joy with which the news of Mexican independence was received in Colombia and of the great interest of his government in extending and strengthening the friendly relations of the two countries "called by nature and impelled by circumstances to lend each other assistance in a spirit of fraternal good will." He congratulated the empire of Mexico upon its brilliant military success, expressed the most ardent wishes for its future prosperity, and finally invited it to enter into a treaty of perpetual peace, friendship, and union with the government of Colombia.<sup>57</sup> Upon reaching the capital, Santa María addressed another letter to Herrera with which he sent a copy of the constitution of Colombia. Santa María declared that he had been instructed to assure the government of Mexico that whatever its form the republic of

<sup>54</sup> For the treaty see *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 243-249, and *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 784-792.

<sup>55</sup> Santa María's letter of credence was dated October 10, 1821. *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 239.

<sup>56</sup> *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 212.

<sup>57</sup> Santa María to Herrera, March 23, 1822, *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 8-12.



Colombia, for its part, would always have the glory of contributing to the maintenance of the cause of national independence.<sup>58</sup> Events seemed to show that this assurance may have been intended to be ambiguous. On May 11 Santa María was informed that the regency of the empire recognized him as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the republic of Colombia.<sup>59</sup> A few days later, May 19, Iturbide was proclaimed emperor, after which Santa María, awaiting instructions from his government, declined to treat with the new régime. What instructions he may have received can only be inferred from the fact that he soon became involved in a conspiracy aimed at the overthrow of Iturbide and was dismissed by the imperial government.<sup>60</sup> Upon the downfall of the empire, Santa María, who had not yet left the country, was recalled by resolution of the congress "to fulfill in accordance with the desires of the Mexican nation the high duties of his mission."<sup>61</sup> Under these altered circumstances, negotiations were begun, and the treaty having been concluded as indicated above was ratified by Mexico on December 2, 1823, and by Colombia on June 30, 1824.<sup>62</sup>

The treaty, as has already been said, was substantially the same as those concluded with Peru and Chile. But it contained one important article on the subject of territorial integrity which was not included in the earlier conventions and which indeed seems to have been framed to meet a special situation. In the case of the treaty between Colombia and Peru the question of the delimitation of their respective territories proved to be the only obstacle to the acceptance by Peru of the draft of the treaty presented by Mosquera, and as no agreement could be reached on that point it was left to be settled by a special

<sup>58</sup> Santa María to Herrera, April 16, 1822, *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 19.

<sup>59</sup> Minuta del Ministro Herrera, *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 24.

<sup>60</sup> Herrera to Gual, September 28, 1822; Herrera to Santa María, October 18, 1822. *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 33-35; 36.

<sup>61</sup> *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 211.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 251, 253.

convention.<sup>63</sup> In the draft presented by Mosquera as a basis of discussion with Chile two articles were proposed, one guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the respective states, and the other indicating specifically the boundaries of Colombia. But Chile saw no advantage in such an arrangement and consequently declined to subscribe to the articles.<sup>64</sup> The fact that Mexico accepted the proposal of a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity may have been in prevision of future conflicts with the United States.<sup>65</sup>

The article to which reference is made is as follows: Article 8. "Both parties mutually guarantee the integrity of their territories on the footing on which they stood before the present war, also recognizing as integral parts of either nation every province which though formerly governed by an authority entirely independent of the late viceroalties of Mexico and New Granada, may have agreed or shall agree in a lawful manner to become incorporated with it."<sup>66</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, I, 304; Olarte Camacho, *Los Convenios con el Perú*, 21-24.

<sup>64</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XIII, 692.

What is believed to be the Mosquera draft is printed in *Sesiones de los Cuerpos Legislativos de la República de Chile, 1811 á 1845* (VI, 328-330). A translation of article 10 of that document follows: "Both parties mutually guarantee the integrity of their territories on the same footing on which they stood before the present war, the limits of each captaincy general or vice royalty which has reassumed the rights of sovereignty being accepted, unless in some lawful way two or more may have agreed to form a single nation, as has happened in the case of the former captaincy general of Venezuela and the new kingdom of Granada, which to-day constitute the republic of Colombia," p. 329.

<sup>65</sup> There is reason for believing that Mexico had for some time past foreseen trouble over boundary questions with the United States. On October 31, 1822, Zozaya, the minister of the empire to the United States, was instructed confidentially to find out the real opinion of "those republicans" with regard to their limits beyond Louisiana and the Floridas; to learn whether they were content with the last treaties with Spain, and whether they had planned or effected any establishments that might in any way prove prejudicial to the empire. (*La Diplomacia Mexicana*, I, 85.) Moreover at the time the treaty between Colombia and Mexico was being negotiated it was not yet known what would be the outcome of San Salvador's move for annexation to the United States.

<sup>66</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI, 788.

At the time the negotiations with Mexico were begun the provinces of Central America constituted a part of the empire. Upon the overthrow of Iturbide those provinces, it will be recalled, withdrew and set up an independent federal republic. With this republic there was concluded at Bogotá on March 15, 1825, the last of the treaties of perpetual union, league, and confederation. This treaty was ratified by Colombia on April 12 and by Central America on September 12, 1825.<sup>67</sup>

During this period of two or three years of diplomatic negotiation, a campaign of publicity was carried on with a view to the formation of a public opinion favorable to the plan of confederation. Newspapers not infrequently published articles on the subject and these were widely copied throughout the continent. Pamphlets were published in both Europe and America and distributed wherever it was believed support might be obtained. Finally, private correspondence was employed to gain adherents among the influential men of the time. The need of propaganda was great, for indifference was great. Moreover the spirit of localism tended to increase as the common danger decreased. An idea of the need for the awakening of public interest may be obtained from the following extracts from an article entitled *Confederación Americana*, published in *El Patriota de Guayaquil* and copied by the *Gaceta de Colombia*. "We can do no less," declared the writer of the article, "than express our surprise, and we might say our despair, at seeing pass unnoticed the greatest of American acts. The *Gaceta de Lima* of September 17, 1822, published the compact of perpetual union, league, and confederation between Colombia and Peru. Everybody has read this treaty with the indifference with which they might read a pastoral or a pamphlet such as those which constantly afflict the public. It seems that a general meeting of America under a social pact excites no interest, notwithstanding the fact that all men of enlightenment have

<sup>67</sup> Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, IX, 717-720; Bancroft, *History of Central America*, III, 81.

desired this confederation as the means of obtaining the liberty and salvation of America. And if at last the editor of *La Abeja Argentina* of Buenos Aires has broken the silence it has been to tell us in the most absolute manner that the best compact of league and confederation that America can make, is none at all." Following this rather disconsolate introduction the writer takes up in detail the objections of the Argentine paper — the great distances which separate the parts to be confederated, the difference in institutions, the inability of a congress of plenipotentiaries to command obedience to its decrees and the like — and arrives at the conclusion that none of these obstacles is insuperable. "For," he declares, "in America it is a question of unity, unity, unity. . . . From upper California to Chile is a single nation. One faith, one language, one sentiment, one being, we may say, covers the face of America."<sup>68</sup>

If space permitted, extensive quotations from newspaper articles might be given. No more can be done, however, than to mention some of the principal discussions appearing in the press of the time. In a paper called *Noticioso General de México* there appeared an article in which it was declared that the proposed congress would without sword or cannon destroy the Holy Alliance and that persecuted liberty would fly to the protection of the new league.<sup>69</sup> The *Gaceta del Gobierno* of Lima, referring to the entry of Simon Bolivar in that city on September 1, 1823, avers that on that occasion there was heard in the midst of general applause nothing but repeated expressions of good will for the formation of a permanent alliance between the four great sections of the continent.<sup>70</sup> An article

<sup>68</sup> *Gaceta de Colombia*, June 29, 1823. The article of *La Abeja Argentina* referred to was probably one which appeared in the issue of December 15, 1822 (No. 9, Tomo 2). Another article entitled *Nueva Ojeada sobre el tratado de Colombia y Lima* appeared in the number of *La Abeja* for February 15, 1823.

<sup>69</sup> Reproduced in the *Gaceta de Colombia* of September 21, 1823.

<sup>70</sup> *Gaceta del Gobierno*, September 3, 1823.

in the *Gaceta de Colombia* called attention to the fact that the people of South America, electrified by the idea of independence and moved by the noble desire of following in the footsteps of their "brothers of the north," began to form separate federal governments, thus destroying the precious unity which was the indestructible foundation of freedom. The writer recommended the formation of strong central governments as a prerequisite to a closer imitation of the sons of Washington. With Mexico, Peru, Chile, New Granada, and Buenos Aires forming, as before the war, great independent states with a strongly centralized administration, he thought that an excellent federal system might then be effected.<sup>71</sup> In July, 1825, a paper published in Cartagena, the *Correo de Magdalena*, taking as a point of departure a letter received from Europe with news that the Congress of Milan had probably by that time taken place, pointed out in a lengthy article the contrast between the two systems represented by the Holy Alliance and the proposed American Confederation. It was the opinion of the writer that the assemblies of kings, or, tyrants as he preferred to call them, had no other object than the extinction of the ideas of liberty; that the hopes of the liberals in Spain, in Naples, and in the Piedmont had been frustrated by a league which with unheard-of audacity was called holy; that on the contrary the proposed congress of plenipotentiaries at Panama had a beneficent design not only toward America but toward the rest of the world as well, and that it aimed to hasten the epoch when, with liberty and justice enthroned in America, happiness and prosperity would prevail throughout the world.<sup>72</sup>

As the agitation of the subject grew in Spanish America, the newspapers of the United States became interested and joined in the discussion. According to the *Gaceta de Colombia*, a New York paper published on January 6, 1825, extracts from a Mexican paper in which the objects of the confederation and the nature of its organization were set forth.

<sup>71</sup> *Gaceta de Colombia*, January 11, 1824.

<sup>72</sup> *Correo de Magdalena*, July 21, 1825.

The plan suggested was that the congress be composed of three representatives from each state and that it meet at any place in the Floridas that the United States might choose to designate. An expedition composed of the combined forces of the confederation — that is, of the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Buenos Aires, Peru, Chile, and Santo Domingo — would forthwith be fitted out against the island of Cuba. Afterward an amphictyonic council would be formed at Habana, which in case of emergency would name a general to command the forces of the confederation, though the election might be left to each of the states by turn.

Commenting on the Mexican proposal, a writer in the *Gaceta de Colombia*, described as being one of the highest officers of state in that republic, expressed the fear that a meeting of American plenipotentiaries in Florida would not fail to suggest objections arising from the neutrality of the United States. He believed that the deliberations could be conducted at Panama with greater freedom and that if their "good and illustrious friends, the United States," were willing to contribute, they might do so with propriety by taking part in those deliberations which were not of a hostile character. Having made this distinction the writer proceeded to indicate in detail the objects upon which the congress might deliberate. As those objects will be considered in the next chapter they need not be mentioned here. A translation of the article of the *Gaceta de Colombia* was published some time later in Niles' *Weekly Register*. This paper regarded the congress as of great importance and believed that the United States ought to take part in it, for the time might come when it would be necessary to rally the free nations of the American continent in opposition to "the despots of the other with their herds of slaves."<sup>73</sup>

<sup>73</sup> The article of the *Gaceta de Colombia* referred to was copied by the *Gaceta del Gobierno* (Peru) in its issue of May 22, 1825, and by Niles' *Weekly Register* of April 30, 1825. For other articles in the press of the United States see the *National Gazette and Library Register* of Phila-

In Great Britain, interest in the affairs of Spanish and Portuguese America had always been keen. The English newspapers gave attention to the project of federating the new American states and opinion was generally favorable to the project. The following extract from a leading article of the *Times* of April 11, 1825, may be taken as typical of British opinion and of the attitude of the British public.

“It is stated in accounts from the United States,” says the *Times*, “that after the return of Bolivar from Peru one of his first acts will be to attend a meeting of deputies from all the new American states, who are to assemble at Panama to confer on such measures as may be necessary for the general safety. To contrast this congress and the confederation which may probably result from it with the Holy Alliance, it is to be denominated the Most Holy Alliance. The name may be needless or ill chosen; but far different is the thing which it signifies. The most important and alluring event that we can well imagine to those against whom it is to operate must undoubtedly be a defensive league against the unjust — of the injured against the aggressors — of free nations and their magistrates against a band of tyrants, who have none to protect them but their own dissatisfied and distrusted slaves. In truth, such an union requires no congress to sanction or attest it. The alliance of all the free against all the enemies of freedom exists and flourishes at this moment, substantially and sensibly over the whole earth, without any formal compact. . . . The free confederacy which was acted upon in one shape by the new republics when they assisted each other and extinguished the Spanish power in Peru, has not been confined to the western coast of the Atlantic. It embraces England, as distinctly and specifically, as if she had been enrolled by positive treaty among its members. England became a member of the league from the moment in which she declared that no European power but Spain (and Spain long delphia for April 23, 1825, and the *National Intelligencer* of Washington for April 26, 1825.

ceased to be a power), that is, in fact, that no power whatever should molest the American republics." <sup>74</sup>

In France opinion on the American question was divided, the liberal element of the population, as was the case throughout Europe, sympathizing with the aims of the new states and desiring the government to establish friendly relations with them. The liberal paper, *Le Constitutionnel*, was an important organ of propaganda in favor of the American cause. In its issue of March 24, 1825, there appeared an article in which the success of the revolution in America was described as marking the beginning of a new era in the world's history. It was the opinion of the writer that Europe could not reduce these countries to submission and that consequently everything should be done to gain their friendship and to secure a share in their rich commerce.<sup>75</sup> But in France a special propaganda in favor of the new states had been carried on for some time through the publications of the Abbé de Pradt. In the month of August, 1825, the abbé published in Paris a pamphlet on the proposed congress of Panama in which the highest praise was given to the author of the idea. De Pradt based his study upon an official announcement of the objects of the congress which, he says, appeared in the *Gaceta de Colombia*, and was reproduced some four months later by *Le Moniteur of Paris*.<sup>76</sup> And he may have received information direct from the government of Colombia or from Bolivar himself; for, with the latter, the abbé had been in correspondence for some time past.<sup>77</sup> It does not appear that De Pradt was commissioned to write the pamphlet on the Congress of Panama, but it is known that beginning with 1825 he received from Bolivar an annuity of 3,000 pesos,

<sup>74</sup> *Supplement to The Times*, April 11, 1825.

<sup>75</sup> *Gaceta del Gobierno* (Peru), September 18, 1825. For the attitude of *Le Constitutionnel* toward the Monroe Declaration of 1823 see *Polit. Sci. Quar.*, VI, 555.

<sup>76</sup> Pradt, *Congrés de Panama*, 4, 92.

<sup>77</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XII, 181-188.



undoubtedly as compensation for carrying on a general propaganda in favor of the American cause.<sup>78</sup>

That Bolivar should desire his project for holding a congress at Panama to be favorably regarded in Europe is not to be explained by mere vanity on his part, but by the hard necessity in which he found himself of maintaining the credit of the new states until their internal affairs should have reached some degree of stability and until their relations with Spain and the other powers should have been placed on a satisfactory footing. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the highly eulogistic manner in which De Pradt refers to the Liberator in his *Congrés de Panama* was meant to give popularity to the movement by directing attention to the man who initiated it. But in America, naturally, the case was different. It was necessary to avoid bringing the prime mover too much into view, for already jealousy of his power and suspicion of his designs had begun to undermine his influence. In a pamphlet prepared by Bernardo Monteagudo and first published in Peru in 1825,<sup>79</sup> the subject was treated in a wholly impersonal way; and moreover the general aims of the congress were dealt with in the main, rather than the specific ones as was the case in De Pradt's little treatise. Monteagudo's ability and the post of confidence which he held under the rule of Bolivar in Peru make it of interest to examine briefly the ideas which he advanced on the subject of a confederation of American states.

Monteagudo was born about 1787 in the viceroyalty of La Plata, studied law at Chuquisaca, was involved in the early revolutionary movements in Upper Peru, and later took an active and zealous part in the overthrow of Spanish rule in Buenos

<sup>78</sup> Sánchez, *Bibliografía*.

<sup>79</sup> Monteagudo, Bernardo, *Ensayo sobre la necesidad de una federación general entre los Estados Hispano-Americanos y plan de su organización* (Library of Congress), Guatemala edition. The essay was reprinted from the Chilean edition in the *Colección de Ensayos y Documentos relativos á la unión y confederación de los pueblos Hispano-Americanos*, published in Santiago, Chile, in 1862.

Aires. Compelled by intrigue to leave the country in 1815, he returned in time to accompany the expedition of San Martín to Chile in 1817. Going with San Martín to Peru he served as that leader's chief political adviser and as minister of war and navy in the provisional government which was organized at Lima in 1821. Shortly before San Martín's abdication, Monteagudo, who had never been popular, was again forced into exile. Upon the accession of Bolívar he returned and was restored to his former position in the government. He was later made Minister of Foreign Affairs, at which post he remained until his death by assassination in January, 1825. Among the papers which he left was found an essay in manuscript on the necessity of a general federation of the Spanish American states. The essay, though unfinished, was immediately printed at Lima and during the same year it was reprinted in Chile and in Guatemala.<sup>80</sup> And although the pamphlet was not translated and reproduced in the United States, yet it was reviewed at length in the *North American Review* in an article attributed to Jared Sparks.<sup>81</sup>

Independence, peace, and security (*garantías*), according to Monteagudo, were the three great interests of the new states. Of these, independence was the chief. To throw off the yoke of Spain, to destroy the last vestige of her domination, and to admit no other was an enterprise which demanded, and would demand for a long time to come, a common fund of resources and unity of action in the employment of them. There was still danger from the Holy Alliance, and although the first vessel that should sail from the shores of Europe against the liberty of the New World would give the signal of alarm to all those who formed the liberal party in both hemispheres, and although Great Britain and the United States would play their proper part in the universal conflict which would result, yet the dangers were such as to demand that the new states band them-

<sup>80</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente*, I, 199-202, 313.

<sup>81</sup> *North American Review*, XXII, 162-176.

selves together. "Human foresight," he declared, "is unable to predict the accidents and the vicissitudes which our republics will suffer unless they unite. The consequences of an unfortunate campaign, the effects of some treaty concluded in Europe between powers that maintain the present balance, a few domestic disturbances and the consequent change of principles, might favor the party of legitimacy, unless we assume in time an attitude of uniform resistance; and unless we hasten to make a real compact, which we may call a family compact, to guarantee our independence, as a whole and in detail."<sup>82</sup>

By the second interest, peace, Monteagudo meant to imply peace as between the confederates and the rest of the world, peace as between state and state of the union, and peace as between factions within each separate state.<sup>83</sup> Without attributing to the proposed assembly any power of coercion, which would degrade its institution, it nevertheless seemed indispensable that, at least for the first ten years, the general direction of the foreign and domestic policy of the confederation should be in charge of such a body in order that the peace might not be disturbed and in order that its conservation might not be purchased at the sacrifice of the very foundations of the Amer-

<sup>82</sup> *Colección de Ensayos y Documentos relativos á la unión y confederación de los Pueblos Hispano-Americanos*, 164-169.

<sup>83</sup> Article 10 of the treaty of union, league, and confederation between Colombia and Peru signed at Lima, June 6, 1822, provided that in case the internal tranquillity of either of the confederated states should be interrupted by turbulent and seditious persons, enemies of the governments lawfully established by the people, the contracting parties engaged to make common cause against them until order should be reestablished. This article, it will be recalled, was not ratified by Colombia, on account, probably, of the following incident: While the discussion of the ratification of the Colombia-Peru treaties was going on in the Colombian Senate, news reached Bogotá of the revolution which had deposed O'Higgins in Chile and placed Freyre at the head of the government. The Senate requested the executive to say whether the government of O'Higgins or that of Freyre should be recognized. The Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that he had no authority to decide the question and the article was rejected. Santander, writing to Bolivar concerning this incident, declared that if it had not been for the question between Freyre and O'Higgins the article would have passed. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 538.

ican system. The assembly would be able, by the influence of its august councils, to mitigate the spirit of localism, which in the first years would be active and destructive. An interruption of the peace and harmony of any of the Hispano-American republics would cause a continental conflagration from which none could escape, however much distance might favor, at first, its neutrality. For the political affinities created among the Hispano-American republics by the revolution, united to moral and physical similarities, would cause any stress or movement which any one or more of them might receive to be communicated to the rest, as when in mountains the echo of the thunder-clap rebounds from one peak to another. It seemed clear, therefore, that in case of the disturbance of the internal tranquillity of any one of the states, the interposition of the assembly would be necessary to prevent the evil consequences which might arise from the spread of the disaster.<sup>84</sup>

Discussing the third great interest, security, Monteagudo declared that among the causes which might disturb the peace and friendship of the confederates none was more obvious than the lack of rules and principles as a basis for their public law. Every day there would occur among these new republics questions of reciprocal rights and duties. The progress of commerce and navigation, the growing intimacy of their relations in general, and the existence of unjust laws and practices would demand constant negotiation and the formation of numerous treaties, from which much friction would arise unless recourse to an impartial assembly provided the necessary guarantees.<sup>85</sup>

Such was Monteagudo's conception of the nature and function of an American League of Nations. Under the conditions which then existed it was natural that independence should be regarded as the chief desideratum. It was the great object for which the struggle had been waged against Spain for fifteen long years. Once independence were attained, the other in-

<sup>84</sup> *Colección de Ensayos, etc.*, 171-172.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 174.

terests, peace and security, would take first place. These indeed have been the aims of all the historic schemes of international coöperation, from the Great Design of Henry IV to the Covenant of Versailles.

An idea has now been given of the early views on the subject of continental unity; of the first positive steps taken to convene a general American congress, and of the character of the propaganda carried on to gain adherents to the plan.<sup>86</sup> The congress itself must now be considered in detail.

<sup>86</sup> No special consideration has been given to the propaganda carried on by means of private correspondence. In the first twelve volumes of O'Leary's *Memorias*, consisting of letters mainly to Bolivar, there may be found many evidences of the attention which the subject received in the letters of the public men of the time.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE PANAMA CONGRESS

CONFIDENT of a final victory over the Royalist forces in Peru, Bolivar began toward the close of the year 1824 to direct his attention anew to the project which had long been the object of his solicitude; namely, the unification of the new Spanish American states through the medium of an international assembly composed of representatives of the several independent entities. The official action which he had taken three years prior to this time, looking to the establishment of such a body, having failed to give the desired results, he now revived the project in his well-known circular letter of December 7, 1824, inviting the American republics, formerly colonies of Spain, to take part in an "Assembly of Plenipotentiaries" to be held at Panama. Subsequently the United States and Brazil were invited; the United States by the governments of Colombia, Mexico, and Central America, and Brazil by that of Colombia alone. It was understood that these two powers should participate to such extent as their position as neutrals would permit.

Great Britain was apparently the only non-American power to be distinguished with an invitation, though the Netherlands, whether formally invited or not, sent an agent to be present at the seat of the council. It was rumored that France would do likewise, but this proved not to be true. The invitation to Great Britain was extended by the minister of Colombia at London with the assurance that a commissioner sent to Panama by the British Government would be treated "cordially and without the least reserve." The Assembly, usually referred to as the Congress of Panama, finally opened its sessions on June 22, 1826, and adjourned on July 15 following, with the under-

standing that the plenipotentiaries, after having reported to their respective governments, should reconvene at Tacubaya, near the City of Mexico, where it was proposed to continue the labors of the congress.<sup>1</sup>

Of the Spanish American states, Peru, Colombia, Central America, and Mexico were represented in the Assembly. The United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, for reasons which will be explained later, declined to take part. Chile professed to be friendly to the movement, and the Supreme Director of the republic, after some delay, submitted the question to the national legislature for its approval. Further delays followed, and when the Chilean congress finally authorized the appointment of representatives the meeting at Panama had long since adjourned.<sup>2</sup> Paraguay in its self-imposed isolation gave a negative reply. Bolivia, the newest of the republics, appointed delegates, but too late for them to be able to participate in the congress.<sup>3</sup> Brazil accepted the invitation and designated a plenipotentiary; but for some reason — perhaps for fear of the intervention of the congress in the impending conflict of the empire with Buenos Aires — he was not dispatched on his mission.<sup>4</sup> The British Government appointed as its agent Edward J. Dawkins. He was present at Panama from the opening of the congress to its close, when he returned to England.<sup>5</sup> The Netherlands were represented by Colonel van Veer, who attended, however, in a wholly unofficial capacity.<sup>6</sup>

The United States accepted the invitation, and on December 26, 1825, President Adams nominated to the Senate, Richard C.

<sup>1</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 533-540; Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 13, 28, 34, 36, 66, 130; *International American Conference* (1889-1890), IV, 23-24, 111; *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V., 919.

<sup>2</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XV, 87.

<sup>3</sup> Paz Soldán, *Historia del Perú Independiente, Segundo Período*, II, 178.

<sup>4</sup> *Arisмени Brito, Contestación al Discurso de F. Tosta García*, 32; O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 216.

<sup>5</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 555.

<sup>6</sup> Torres Caicedo, *Unión Latino-Americana*, 38, citing Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución de Colombia*.

Anderson of Kentucky and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania "to be envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the assembly of American nations at Panama."<sup>7</sup> These appointments were not confirmed by the Senate until the middle of the following March, and, owing to a long debate in the House of Representatives over the appropriation necessary for carrying the mission into effect, it was not until May 8 that Clay's general instructions to Anderson and Sergeant were signed. From the instructions it appears that Anderson, who was United States minister to Colombia, had been directed to proceed from Bogotá to Porto Bello to be joined by Sergeant, whence the two should travel overland to Panama.<sup>8</sup>

Under the circumstances Anderson could scarcely have reached Panama until after the congress had adjourned. As it happened he left Bogotá on June 12,<sup>9</sup> fell ill on the way, and died at Cartagena on July 24.<sup>10</sup> The departure of Sergeant from the United States was postponed until the end of the year, when he went to Mexico for the purpose of attending the congress upon the renewal of its sessions at Tacubaya.<sup>11</sup> Joel R. Poinsett, minister of the United States to Mexico, was appointed to replace Anderson.<sup>12</sup> As the congress did not reassemble at Tacubaya at the time set, Sergeant, after a few months' sojourn in Mexico, returned to the United States.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 318, 320.

<sup>8</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-1890), IV, 113.

<sup>9</sup> *Gaceta de Colombia*, June 18, 1826; *Am. State Papers: For. Rel.*, VI, 555.

<sup>10</sup> Niles' *Register*, XXXI, 16.

<sup>11</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 356; Adams, *Memoirs*, VII, 183.

<sup>12</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, VII, 223.

<sup>13</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 385; Adams, *Memoirs*, VII, 312.

Writers have not always been accurate in their reference to the congress of Panama. Lyman, for example (*Diplomacy of the United States*, II, 489), and Benton (*Thirty Years' View*, I, 66) declare that the congress never assembled at Panama. Nearly all fall into error respecting delegates of the United States. Von Holst (*Constitutional History of the U. S.*, I, 432) says that when the ambassadors of the United States arrived



President Adams in his special message of March 15, 1826, transmitting to the House of Representatives certain documents relating to the Congress of Panama, expressed the opinion that accidents unforeseen and mischances not to be anticipated, might

in Panama the congress had already adjourned; Tucker (*The Monroe Doctrine*, 34), that Anderson and Sergeant at last set out to attend the meeting, but before their arrival the congress had assembled and adjourned; McMaster (*History of the People of the United States*, V, 459), that Anderson died on the way and that Sergeant reached Panama to find that the delegates had assembled and adjourned to meet again in Tacubaya; Turner (*American Nation: A History*, XIV, 285), that one of the delegates died on his way and that the other arrived after the congress had adjourned; O'Leary (*Memorias*, XXVIII, 556), that the delegates of the United States did not take their seats in the assembly because Anderson died on the way and upon the arrival of Sergeant the representatives of the other countries had left for Tacubaya. Torres Caicedo (*Unión Latino-Americana*, 38, quoting the Columbian historian, Restrepo), that Anderson died in Cartagena on his way to the Isthmus and that Sergeant arrived too late; Calvo (*Le Droit International*, I, 72), that of the two envoys one died on the way to the Isthmus and the other arrived after the adjournment to Tacubaya; Zubieta (*Congresos de Panama y Tacubaya*, 42), merely that the representatives of the United States did not attend.

It seems quite clear that Sergeant did not go to Panama at all. Secretary Clay, in a report dated January 31, 1827 (*For. Rel.*, VI, 555), gives the date of Sergeant's commission as March 14, 1826 (*Am. State Papers*), but states that his salary did not begin until October 24, 1826, when he was notified to prepare to proceed on the mission. Clay referred here to Tacubaya undoubtedly, for before this time the Department of State must have received the dispatches of Poinsett, dated August 20 and 26 (*Am. State Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 357) relative to the change of meeting place. Moreover, in his annual message of December 5, 1826, President Adams says: "The decease of one of our ministers on his way to the Isthmus and the impediments of the season which delayed the departure of the other, deprived us of the advantage of being represented at the first meeting of the congress." (*Am. State Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 209). If further evidence were required it might be mentioned that Adams speaks in his *Memoirs*, (VII, 126, 154) of traveling in July, 1826, with Sergeant from Philadelphia to New York and of seeing him again in Philadelphia in the following October. He made no reference to the mission to Panama. Finally the U.S.S. *Lexington* which, according to Clay's instructions of May 8, should have conducted Sergeant to Porto Bello was later assigned to other duty, spending the whole summer from June to September on a cruise to northern waters. Immediately upon her return this vessel was sent on a mission to the Port of Spain. (*American State Papers, Naval Affairs*, II, 731, 745). Schouler (*History of the United States*, III, 365) makes an exact statement of facts relative to the representatives of the United States; likewise Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain*, 214.

baffle all the high purposes and disappoint the fairest expectations of that undertaking. "But the design," he declared, "is great, is benevolent, humane."<sup>14</sup> Clay thought that the assembling of a congress at Panama composed of diplomatic representatives from the independent American nations would form a new epoch in human affairs. "The fact itself," he said, "whatever may be the issue of the conferences of such a congress, cannot fail to challenge the attention of the present generation of the civilized world and to command that of posterity."<sup>15</sup> And Bolivar, the father of the idea, had previously predicted, in his circular letter referred to above, that the day on which the plenipotentiaries of the several governments should exchange their powers, would mark an important epoch in the diplomatic history of America. "When after a hundred centuries," he wrote, "posterity shall search for the origin of our public law and shall recall the compacts which fixed our destiny, it will consult with veneration the protocols of the Isthmus. In them will be found the plan of the alliances which first gave direction to our relations with the world. What, then, will the Isthmus of Corinth be compared with that of Panama?"<sup>16</sup>

It is needless to say that the Congress of Panama did not meet the high expectations of its great protagonist nor of its numerous friends and supporters who played a lesser part in the attempt to realize its noble aims. Bolivar, in a moment of disgust, likened it to the crazy Greek who of old sat on a rock in the midst of the sea and tried to direct the ships that sailed about him.<sup>17</sup> The failure of the congress to produce tangible results was sufficient to cause it to be passed over with indifference or to be characterized, and thus condemned, as illusory.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II, 340.

<sup>15</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 114.

<sup>16</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 253.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, XXVIII, 563.

<sup>18</sup> Historians of the United States who give any consideration at all to the congress of Panama treat it almost wholly from the standpoint of internal politics. The fact, for example, that Benton believed the congress had never assembled is a strong witness to his lack of interest in it as a

The greatness, the benevolence, the humanity of its design appeared to make no appeal to men's imaginations. The mere fact of a meeting of American states did not command, as Henry Clay predicted that it would do, the attention either of that generation or of those that immediately followed. Nevertheless the central idea, continental solidarity, at no time entirely ceased to be a force in American affairs.<sup>19</sup>

This idea, called to-day Pan-Americanism, is acquiring a wider extension and greater momentum than it ever possessed in the time of Bolivar. And the movement is now being carried along mainly by states which ninety years ago were but indifferent or mildly interested spectators of the Liberator's efforts to establish an American political system. The republics which he founded and those which adhered without reservation to the Congress of Panama are far from occupying at the present time the position of influence which he aspired to have them occupy in the international affairs of the Western Hemisphere. The structure which is to-day being reared wears, therefore, a different aspect from that which he would have given it. But it rests upon the same foundation of common interests and common ideals as that upon which it was proposed to build at Pan-

matter of continental importance. And yet he says it was a master subject on the political theatre of its day (*Thirty Years' View*, I, 65). Von Holst treats rather fully the constitutional questions involved. McMaster gives some twenty-five pages to a consideration of the debates in Congress, but views it mainly from the national standpoint. Schouler declares that the whole project, incongruous under any aspect, proved abortive (*History of the U. S.*, III, 364). Other historians of the United States either give the subject scant attention or do not mention it at all. The same criticism applies generally to Latin American historians. Alamán does not discuss the congress, nor does Baralt. Restrepo, as might have been expected from his intimate association with Bolivar, gives a sympathetic account which is closely followed by Paz Soldán. Barros Arana gives a succinct history of the movement, but declares it to have been chimerical (*Historia Jen. de Chile*, XV, 87). Mitre dismisses the subject with a few words as a fantastic dream (*Historia de San Martín*, IV, 108).

<sup>19</sup> About the middle of the last century there was manifested a strong movement throughout Hispanic America toward a revival of Bolivar's scheme of federation. In 1847 and in 1864 congresses were held at Lima, Peru, for the purpose of putting the idea into effect.

ama. And as the edifice grows toward perfection it may be possible to recognize in its general design many of the lines traced by the hand of the original architect. Thus posterity will ever be more and more constrained to search for the origins of American policy not in the protocols of the Isthmus, perhaps, but in the political ideals of Simon Bolivar.

Upon the receipt of Bolivar's circular of December 7, 1824, the government of Colombia renewed its activity, and Vice President Santander, writing immediately to the Liberator, suggested that the governments of Colombia and Peru authorize their plenipotentiaries to proceed within a period of four months to the Isthmus and having begun their preparatory conferences, to enter into direct correspondence with the governments of Mexico, Guatemala, Chile, and Buenos Aires. He proposed also that the plenipotentiaries of Colombia and Peru be given full liberty to select a place on the Isthmus for the meeting; that as soon as they should be joined by the delegates of Mexico or by those of Guatemala, a day for the opening of the assembly should be set by common consent; and that the plenipotentiaries of Colombia and Peru should on no account absent themselves from the Isthmus until the general congress should have met and terminated its sessions.<sup>20</sup>

In accordance with the plan proposed by Santander the government of Peru appointed its representatives to the congress and dispatched them to the Isthmus in June, 1825.<sup>21</sup> The delegates of Colombia were appointed in August of that year and they arrived at Panama in December.<sup>22</sup> Preliminary conferences were at once begun by the representatives of the two countries, and communications were also addressed by them to the governments of Mexico, Central America, Chile, and Buenos Aires, urging that their plenipotentiaries be sent to the Isthmus at the earliest possible moment. The ministers designated by

<sup>20</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 254, 256.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIV, 262.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIV, 270, 290.

the united provinces of Central America soon arrived. Those of Mexico, however, though long expected, did not reach Panama until June 4, 1826, almost a year after the delegates from Peru.<sup>23</sup> It was then decided not to await the arrival of the representatives of other countries, and the congress began its sessions on June 22.<sup>24</sup>

The delegates of Peru were José María de Pando and Manuel Lorenzo de Vidaurre. Pando, though born in Peru, was educated in Spain and remained there until 1824. For a time during the constitutional régime he occupied a position in the cabinet of Ferdinand VII. He was the author of works on diverse subjects, among which was a posthumous treatise on international law. Before the congress opened he was recalled to be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs at Lima. He was superseded by Manuel Pérez de Tudela, who, like his colleague, Vidaurre, had held high judicial positions under the independent government of Peru.<sup>25</sup>

Colombia was represented by Pedro Gual and Pedro Briceño Méndez. The former became prominent in the early revolutionary movements in Venezuela and served for a while as secretary to General Miranda. Upon the defeat of the Patriots in 1812, he escaped to the United States, where, after studying law and being admitted to the bar, he began the practice of his profession at Washington.<sup>26</sup> He was involved in the Amelia Island affair of 1817, as related elsewhere, and soon thereafter returned to South America to become the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia under the constitution of 1821. After the dissolution of Greater Colombia in 1830, he lived for some years in retirement. In 1837 he was sent on a mission to Europe by the government of Ecuador. In 1860 he became President of Venezuela, but resigned the following year. He died

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIV, 291, 292, 296-8, 307, 325.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIV, 327.

<sup>25</sup> Calvo, *Le Droit International*, I, 97; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 468, 550.

<sup>26</sup> Appleton, *Cyclopedia of American Biography*.

shortly afterward at Guayaquil. His associate, Briceño Méndez, had won distinction as a soldier in the wars for independence. Both ably represented their government at Panama.

Pedro Molina and Antonio Larrazábal were the delegates of the republic of Central America. Molina had done much by his writings to prepare the way for independence. He opposed the union of Central America with the Mexican empire under Iturbide, and upon the separation in 1823 became a member of the provisional government of the Central American republic. Sent as minister to Colombia he negotiated with that republic in 1825 the treaty of union, league, and confederation to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. In 1830, while he was at the head of the state government of Guatemala, under the federation, charges were brought against him as a result of which he was suspended from office and tried. He was acquitted, but never occupied a position of prominence thereafter.<sup>27</sup> His associate, Larrazábal, had been a member of the first Spanish Cortes and was reputed to be "a man of much learning, of great probity, and of a firm and reliable character."<sup>28</sup>

The Mexican delegates were José Mariano Michelena and José Domínguez. The former, having been involved in the early revolutionary plots in Mexico, was arrested and sent as a prisoner to Spain, where he later served in the army. Having returned to Mexico, he became a member of the provisional government established after the downfall of Iturbide. In 1824 he was sent on a diplomatic mission to Colombia, and was recalled to be given the appointment to Panama. Domínguez had been Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Iturbide and at the time of his appointment was president of the Court of Justice of Guanajuato.<sup>29</sup>

Before entering upon the examination of the work of the

<sup>27</sup> Montúfar, *Reseña Histórica*, I, 205-217.

<sup>28</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 307.

<sup>29</sup> Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, IV, 402; Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 46.

congress, it is desirable to turn back for a moment and consider certain documents which have essential bearing upon its deliberations.

The first of these is a dispatch dated March 6, 1825, from the government of Colombia to Dean Funes, its chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires, by which he was instructed to make known to the latter sovereignty the objects of the assembly and to express the hope that the views of the two governments were in perfect accord. The objects of the congress were stated as follows:

1. "To renew the treaty of union, alliance, and perpetual confederacy against Spain or any other power which might attempt to dominate over us.

2. "To issue, in the name of their constituents, a suitable manifesto upon the justice of their cause, exposing the sinister views of Spain and declaring our system of politics with respect to the other powers of Christianity.

3. "To consider the condition of the islands of Porto Rico and Cuba; the expediency of a combined force to free them from the Spanish yoke; and the proportion of troops which each state should contribute for that purpose; and to determine whether the islands shall be united to either of the confederated states or be left at liberty to choose their own government.

4. "To conclude or renew a treaty of commerce between the new states as allies and confederates.

5. "To conclude a consular convention between all, which should clearly and distinctly lay down the functions and prerogatives of their respective consuls.

6. "To take into consideration the means of giving effect to the declarations of the President of the United States of America, in his message to the Congress of last year, with a view to frustrating any future idea of colonization on this continent by the powers of Europe, and to resist any principle of interference in our internal affairs.

7. "To establish in concert those principles of the rights of nations, which are of a controversial nature, and especially those

which relate to two nations, one of which is engaged in war, whilst the other is neutral.

8. "Lastly, to declare on what footing the political and commercial relations of those parts of our hemisphere, which, like the island of Santo Domingo or Haiti, are separated from their ancient government, and have not yet been recognized by any European or American power, should be placed."<sup>30</sup>

A few days before this letter was written, there appeared in the *Gaceta de Colombia* an article, heretofore mentioned as having been copied by newspapers in Peru and in the United States, and as having been used by De Pradt in the preparation of his pamphlet, in which the objects of the congress were stated, with some exceptions, in almost the same language as that employed in the dispatch. The article in the *Gaceta*, however, while enumerating as one of the objects of the congress the adoption of measures for the liberation of Cuba and Porto Rico, did not raise the question of the future disposition of the islands; nor did it mention the subject of a consular convention, or the extension of the war to the coasts of Spain or to the Canaries and the Philippines. The last three objects specified in the dispatch and in the *Gaceta* were identical, and in both places they were declared to be appropriate for the joint consideration of belligerents and neutrals, if any of the latter should take part in the congress.<sup>31</sup>

The foregoing details derive importance from the fact that the statement of the objects of the congress which must have been sent to the rest of the allied governments early in February, 1825, is not to be found among the published documents relating to the Congress of Panama.<sup>32</sup> Nor does the letter to the

<sup>30</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII, 894.

<sup>31</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, VII, 894; *Gaceta del Gobierno* (Perú), May 22, 1825; *Niles' Weekly Register*, XXVIII, 132.

<sup>32</sup> Alamán, minister of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, writing, March 30, 1825, to Michelena, Mexican minister at London, refers to communications received from the governments of Colombia relative to the proposed Congress of Panama. President Victoria's reply to Bolívar's circular of December 7, 1824, was dated February 23, 1825. As the circular was not re-



Colombian chargé at Buenos Aires appear in either of the collections published by the government of Venezuela. O'Leary in his *Memorias* says that Colombia proposed to Peru and to the rest of the allies the essential matters upon which the congress should deliberate, and, without giving the source of his information, proceeds to specify the subjects thus proposed. The matters mentioned by him as appropriate for discussion by belligerents only were in substance the same as those enumerated in the *Gaceta*; but with regard to the subjects suitable for discussion by both belligerents and neutrals there are important differences. The most important of these relates to the pronouncement of President Monroe, which O'Leary describes as a declaration "relative to frustrating in the future any attempt of Spain to colonize the American continent,"<sup>33</sup> thus depriving it of its true significance.

O'Leary's narrative evidently lacks at this point the exactness which characterizes his work as a whole; for, besides misdescribing the Monroe declaration, he includes among the topics for the joint consideration of belligerents and neutrals several matters which clearly pertained to belligerents and to belligerents only; such as the adoption of a plan of hostilities against Spain, and the determination of the contingent of land and sea forces which each state should provide. It can scarcely be

ceived at Bogotá until February 4, the copy sent to Mexico must have gone direct from Peru, for the time intervening between February 4 and February 23 would not have been sufficient to permit communication between Bogotá and Mexico. In view of all the circumstances it seems to be a fair deduction that the government of Colombia communicated to the other governments a statement of the objects of the congress similar to that contained in the letter to Dean Funes. The unpublished documents which undoubtedly exist in the archives of Colombia and Mexico would clear up this point. Cf. *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, III, 175; *British and Foreign State Papers*, XII, 175. Gual, in a letter to his government dated Guaduas, October 4, 1825, refers specifically to a communication of February 9, 1825, to the minister of Colombia in Mexico, which communication evidently contained a statement of the objects of the congress. Copies of it appear to have been sent to other governments. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 283, 285.

<sup>33</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 542-548,

doubted that these are inadvertences; but they show the importance of having recourse to a source of information free from any suspicion of inaccuracy. Such a source fortunately is available in the text of the instructions which the governments of Colombia and Peru gave to their respective delegates.

The general instructions of the government of Peru were the first to be prepared. They were signed on May 15, 1825, by Tomás de Heres, who then occupied the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Council of Government entrusted by Bolivar with the exercise of the supreme authority which he had possessed in that country for more than a year.<sup>34</sup> As Heres was a Colombian by birth and as Bolivar's popularity in Peru was then at its height, there is every reason to believe that the instructions embodied, in the main at least, the ideas of the Liberator. They contained no set statement of the objects of the congress; and the part relating to the organization of the proposed confederacy need not be examined. But of the parts relating to the pronouncement of President Monroe, to the liberation of Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the question of determining the future status of Haiti, the substance may be given.

With regard to the first, the delegates were instructed to endeavor to have included in the manifesto which it was proposed to publish to the world, "a forceful and effective declaration such as that made by the President of the United States of America, in his message to the Congress of last year, relative to preventing any future colonization on this continent by European powers and in opposition to the principle of intervention in our domestic affairs." It is worthy of note that there is no suggestion here of a joint declaration to which the United States should be a party, nor any suggestion of coöperation with that power to defeat the aims of the Holy Alliance. Very different was the attitude of the government of Colombia, as will presently be seen.

<sup>34</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIII, 65.

As to Cuba and Porto Rico, the delegates were instructed to make efforts to have the congress decide upon their fate; for as long as those islands remained in the possession of Spain, the Spanish Government would be able to promote discord, encourage domestic troubles, and even threaten the independence and the peace of different parts of America. If the congress should resolve to liberate the islands the delegates were instructed to advocate that the allies should enter into a treaty setting forth in detail the contribution which each state should make to the enterprise, and determining whether the islands should be annexed to some one of the confederated states or be left free to set up for themselves the government which they might consider most appropriate. And finally the delegates were instructed to urge that a declaration be made regarding the political and commercial relations to be established with those parts of the hemisphere which, like Haiti and Santo Domingo, had emancipated themselves from the metropolis, but had not yet been recognized by any power, either American or European.<sup>35</sup>

On August 31, 1825, the delegates of Colombia were given a general credential and full power with corresponding instructions, signed by José R. Revenga, who had succeeded Gual as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On September 23 they were furnished with a special credential and full power relative to questions upon which both belligerents and neutrals might deliberate. In the general instructions the Colombian plenipotentiaries were informed that their activities should be limited to the following objects: 1. The renewal of the pact of perpetual union, league, and confederation between all and each of the American states. 2. The fixing of the contingents of land and of sea forces for the confederation. 3. The promulgation of a declaration or manifesto relating to the motives and objects of the assembly. 4. The arranging of commercial affairs. 5. The definition of the rights and duties of consuls. 6. The abo-

<sup>35</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 250-262; XXVIII, 468.

lition of the slave trade. With reference to the first and second objects the delegates were told that their full powers were broad enough to permit the admission into the American league of any power whatever that might wish to make common cause with it; and that, if the allies of Spain should arrogate to themselves a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the American states, the result would be a war in which all the powers of the Western Hemisphere, as well as a number of European powers, would be involved. The delegates were accordingly instructed to do whatever they could to increase the number of Spain's enemies by bringing into the confederation as many states as possible.

In special instructions of September 23, 1825, the delegates of Colombia were informed, among other things, of the steps taken by their government to secure the coöperation of the United States and of Great Britain. It appeared that Hurtado, the Colombian minister to England, had been authorized to acquaint Canning with the objects of the assembly,<sup>36</sup> and that Salazar, at Washington, had been instructed on October 7, 1824, to invite the United States to take part in it.<sup>37</sup> The instructions of October 7, a copy of which was furnished to the delegates, contained interesting references to the Monroe pronouncement. The following extract is pertinent:

“The United States is as interested as we are in maintaining certain conservative principles upon which the destiny of this continent in general depends. This is clearly shown by the last message of President Monroe, which establishes two maxims from which deductions of another kind may be made. These maxims are: First, that no further European colonization shall be permitted on the American continent; and secondly, that the fundamental principles of the Holy Alliance are con-

<sup>36</sup> Cf. a minute of the conference of Colombian minister with Canning on November 7, 1825; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIII, 352.

<sup>37</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 270-280.

sidered to be prejudicial to the peace and security of the said United States. These two important declarations have brought the interests of Colombia and its allies into closer touch with the United States. And as the declarations are of vital importance to both nations, the necessity for arriving at a definite understanding with regard to them becomes clearer every day. In order therefore to promote this essential object and in order that America may be seen for the first time in some sort united, the executive ardently desires that the United States should send its plenipotentiaries to Panama, so that together with those of Colombia and its allies they may agree upon some effective means for preventing foreign colonization in our continent and for resisting the application of the principles of legitimacy to the American states in general.

“If the publication of these proposed objects,” continued the instructions to Salazar, “should seem to you to be prejudicial you may withhold them, and give as the ostensible object of the meeting of the plenipotentiaries the necessity arising out of the confusion produced by the late wars in Europe for the American states to reach an agreement upon certain principles of international law applicable to times of war. As this ostensible object would not indicate in any way an intention on the part of the United States to depart from the neutrality which it proclaimed at the beginning of the present war, it is to be presumed that the invitation which you are authorized to extend to that government, whenever you deem it opportune to do so, will not be considered to be lacking in propriety. If the United States should agree to send its plenipotentiaries to the first congress of American states, as it is to be assumed it will do, the business of the congress will be of two kinds; first, *confidential*, to agree upon a plan for giving effect to the two maxims of which I have spoken above, and secondly, *public*, to agree upon the controversial points of maritime law in war, in order to make more stable and lasting the relations of peace, friend-

ship, commerce, and navigation which are being established between all the states of the continent.”<sup>38</sup>

In the special instructions of September 23 Revenga declared that steps had been taken to secure the adhesion of the United States and Great Britain because of the frankness and friendship of which those powers had given proof. Moreover it was desired to defeat by this means the enemies of the new states who might take advantage of the occasion to represent the confederation as dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the civilized world. Adverting to the plan of conducting both secret and public discussions, the author of the instructions declared that the latter would serve to cloak the real purpose of the congress. “This is,” he said, “to determine what part Great Britain and the United States will take with us in case the allies of Spain intervene in the affairs of the new American powers. The expressions of President Monroe and those of the British ministers have been so explicit on this subject that there appears to be no doubt of their disposition to enter into an eventual alliance with us. If the *casus fœderis* which these treaties would recognize as a basis should never arise, nothing would have been lost, by having taken a step counseled by prudence and foresight.”<sup>39</sup>

Neither the instructions of August 31 nor those of September 23 contained any reference to Cuba, Porto Rico, or Haiti. Regarding the island of Haiti, however, special instructions were given by Revenga on September 24. In these the Colombian delegates were directed to consult the assembly as to the future status of Haiti and of any other parts of the hemisphere which might be found in a similar situation. “Upon bringing the matter before the congress,” said Revenga, “you should make it known that Colombia feels a great repugnance to maintaining with Haiti those relations of courtesy generally observed among civilized nations, but that it desires at the same time to avoid,

<sup>38</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, 513-515.

<sup>39</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 278.

by a policy of temporization, every occasion for unpleasantness. There is no objection, however, to continuing to admit into Colombian ports merchant vessels flying the Haitian flag, subject always to the customary laws relating to foreigners. Thus you are authorized to evade any proposal which has for its object the recognition of the independence of Haiti; that is, any proposal looking to the exchange of ministers with that government or to the celebration of treaties with it in the form which is customary between Colombia and the other powers of Europe and America.”<sup>40</sup>

After Gual had set out for Panama and before he had seen Briceño Méndez, who was to meet him at Cartagena, he wrote to his government requesting instructions respecting Cuba and Porto Rico;<sup>41</sup> for he was certain, he declared, that the Mexican ministers would be interested in discussing the fate of those islands. On October 14 Revenga wrote the desired instructions. They had to do partly with the determination of the quota of troops, ships, or money to be contributed by each state to the liberation of the islands, and partly with the disposition which should be made of the islands after they had been liberated. On the latter point Revenga said: “As to the future condition of these islands and of any other Spanish colonies or possessions which it may be decided to emancipate, the vice president cannot give you other instructions than those which are comprehended in the law of March 24, 1824,<sup>42</sup> a copy of which I have the honor to send herewith. Some of the American states would perhaps like to annex one or another of the islands, but if suspicions should arise as to the motives for engaging in the undertaking, its principal merit would be lost. Striving, there-

<sup>40</sup> O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 285.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIV, 283.

<sup>42</sup> The law referred to is not included in O’Leary’s collection of documents relating to the Congress of Panama. Indeed it is not clear to what law Revenga here refers; for there were no laws passed in Colombia in March, 1824, the congress not having convened that year until April 5. In the Blanco-Azpurúa collection a list of the laws passed at that session is given (IX, 336-366), the first bearing the date of April 11.

fore, to induce the other confederates to be content with the gratitude and the friendship which would result from so beneficent an act, you will endeavor to secure their adhesion to the law referred to; and as it would be imperative to establish provisional governments to begin with, the inhabitants of the islands would have the opportunity to determine their own political condition. However, you will inform this office as soon as possible in the event you discover designs on the part of any of the states relative to these islands."<sup>43</sup>

Although the delegates of the new republic of Bolivia received their appointment too late to enable them to take part in the congress of Panama, yet the instructions which were prepared for their guidance are of great interest. It will be recalled that a provisional government under General Sucre had been established in Upper Peru in the year 1825, and that about the middle of the following year a constitution framed by the Liberator was taken into consideration and was shortly afterward adopted by the congress of the republic. For the moment Bolivar's influence in that quarter was supreme. Sucre, who had been provisional president and who later became the first constitutional president, was greatly beloved, and his loyalty to Bolivar made it possible for the Liberator to secure more consistent support for his political plans in the Bolivian republic than he had been able to obtain in Colombia or in Peru. Moreover his influence there apparently had not begun to wane, as it had begun to do in the rest of the territory which claimed him as Liberator. He was in constant communication with Sucre, and the instructions of the Bolivian Government to its delegates to Panama undoubtedly represented a conscious effort to embody, at least in part, the ideas which Bolivar entertained at the time on the subject of an American confederation.

In a letter to Bolivar, dated July 12, 1826, Sucre, in referring

<sup>43</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 287.



to the appointment of the delegates,<sup>44</sup> one of whom was then in Lima, says: "I am sending the credentials, etc., for you to deliver to Mendizábal with whatever instructions you may desire to add. You will also note our instructions to these gentlemen, and you will find a sheet in blank upon which you may write, if you wish, other instructions, kindly sending me a copy, as I have to report to congress upon the whole matter."<sup>45</sup> This letter of Sucre's, together with the documents which accompanied it, could not have reached Lima until at least a month later. By that time it is quite certain that Bolivar had practically lost interest in the congress of Panama. It is not likely, therefore, that he wrote any new instructions, nor is it likely that he changed in any way those which Sucre had sent him for delivery to the delegate, Mendizábal. They were succinctly expressed, and they differ in some important respects from the instructions to the Colombian and Peruvian delegates.

The following statement of the aims of the congress, though containing no new idea, is unique in form and worthy of being quoted in full: "You will advocate the making of the assembly a permanent body with the following objects: 1. To see to the exact execution of the treaties and to provide for the security of the federation. 2. To mediate in a friendly way between any of the allied states and foreign powers in the event of a difference arising between them. 3. To serve as a conciliator and even as an arbitrator, if possible, between the allies themselves who may have suffered, unfortunately, a disturbance of their friendly relations. 4. To expel from the confederation the state who fails to live up to its obligations. 5. To direct the united forces of the confederation against that state who, because of ideas of ambition and of aggrandizement,

<sup>44</sup> The Bolivian delegates were not appointed until July, 1826. They were José María Mendizábal, minister of Bolivia to Peru, and Mariano Serrano, Bolivian minister at Buenos Aires. Cf. O'Leary, *Memorias*, I, 359; XXIV, 375.

<sup>45</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, I, 359.

should attempt to violate the independence of another state of the league." <sup>46</sup>

In connection with the last statement, especially, it will be of interest to note what instructions were given relative to the forces necessary to make effective the will of the federation. The delegates were directed to advocate the formation of a federal army and navy — an army of 25,000 men and a navy of thirty ships. The army should consist of contingents furnished by each state according to population, and the navy should be manned by similar contingents. Each state should provide for the maintenance of its forces. The allies should contribute according to population to the purchase of war vessels, but as it would only cause delay to undertake to build warships, the vessels then owned by each state should be justly appraised and turned over to the confederation. The commanders of the army and of the navy, respectively, should be designated by the assembly. In the event of the union of the land and sea forces, the senior officer should be commander in chief. The object of such a union of forces would be: The defense of any of the allies from invasion; the liberation of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico; or, finally, the carrying of the war to the coasts of Spain, if that power should continue to refuse to make peace.

No reference, other than that just indicated, was made to Cuba and Porto Rico. Nothing was said respecting a manifesto similar to that of President Monroe and nothing was said about the United States further than to instruct the delegates to sound the disposition of that government relative to the recognition of the independence of Bolivia. As to relations with Brazil, the other neutral American state, in the event that that power should send representatives to the congress, the delegates were instructed to act in harmony with the rest of the confederates. And as to Great Britain, they were instructed to sound

<sup>46</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 336.

the British minister at Panama for the purpose of discovering, if possible, the real policy of his government with respect to the new states of America, the nature of the relations which that power would be disposed to establish with the American states, and the extent to which it would carry its intimacy with them; for once the disposition of Great Britain were known an alliance with her might at an opportune moment be sought. It was suggested to the delegates, further, that close association with the ministers of Colombia would afford the means of becoming acquainted with British aims. Concise references to the renewal of the treaty of union, league, and confederation, to the question of the conditions of peace with Spain, to matters of commerce, to the abolition of the slave trade, and to certain debated principles of international law, none of which questions need be discussed here, constitute the remainder of these brief instructions.<sup>47</sup>

The preliminary treaties, considered in the preceding chapter, indicate in a general way the character of the confederation which it was proposed to organize. It remains now to review briefly the efforts made in the assembly at Panama to render effective and permanent the union whose foundations were laid in those treaties.

The informal conferences between the representatives of Peru and Colombia were begun on December 17, 1825. At the first meeting, Vidaurre, one of the ministers of Peru, presented a plan which he called the "Bases for a general confederation of America." His plan differed in some essential points from the general scheme provided for in the preliminary treaties and for this reason is given below in full.

1. "The interests of the Confederation shall be cared for by a general assembly to be called the Amphictyonic Congress.
2. "The confederated states shall be represented by plenipotentiaries.

<sup>47</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 337-338.

3. " Each member of the confederation shall contribute not only to the defense of America in general, but also to that of each state in particular.

4. " This defense shall be for the purpose of preventing foreign attacks.

5. " The territorial integrity of the states comprehended in the confederation shall be reciprocally guaranteed.

6. " No state shall be allowed to enter into a treaty of alliance with any non-American power without having previously obtained the consent of the assembly.

7. " Upon no pretext whatever shall the states of the confederation make war upon one another. All of their differences shall be decided in the general congress.

8. " The assembly shall indicate the points to be fortified, the forces to be maintained in each state, and the funds which each state shall contribute to carry on war or to put down anarchy.

9. " The assembly shall pass the general laws which may be necessary to maintain the existence of the confederation.

10. " To this end the assembly shall be perpetual and shall be composed of two plenipotentiaries from each state.

11. " The citizens of the confederated republics, upon passing from the state of which they are citizens to another state of the confederation, shall enjoy the same rights and privileges as those which the native-born citizens of the latter enjoy.

12. " Any American residing in the confederation may be appointed to any office or dignity in any of the states without limitation whatever. The citizens of any one of the confederated states shall not be held to be aliens in any other state.

13. " Import and export dues when applied to native goods or products shall be the same in all the republics.

14. " No article of commerce shall be prohibited in the reciprocal trade between the republics.

15. " To meet emergencies the congress may dispose of an

armed force whose commander in chief the congress shall appoint.

16. "The states which compose the confederation shall not have the right to withdraw until after a period of fifty years shall have elapsed.

17. "They shall not have the right to reject articles that may have been stipulated and ratified by the assembly.

18. "During the said fifty years they shall not change their form of government.

19. "The acts of the congress shall become valid either by common consent or by a majority vote.

20. "The decisions of the congress shall be valid without the ratification of the individual states.

21. "The plenipotentiaries shall not be held answerable for their opinions or for their votes, being inviolable in their persons, employments, and property during the time of their membership in the assembly and after their connection with it shall have ceased."<sup>48</sup>

Vidaurre's plan met with a cold reception. It did not have the approval even of his colleague, Pando. The Colombian delegates, in giving an account of the conference to Revenga, spoke of the conflict between some of Vidaurre's bases and the instructions which the delegates of both countries had been given by their respective governments. And Revenga, in replying, reminded the delegates that certain stipulations of Vidaurre's plan, notably numbers 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, and 20, were contrary to the fundamental laws of Colombia. The provisions objected to, it will be noticed, were those which were meant by the author of the plan, no doubt, to give consistency to the confederation. That the congress should make general laws, that it should be permanently constituted, that there should be one common citizenship, that the citizens of one state should be eligible to office in the other states, that there should

<sup>48</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 293-294.

be no barriers to commercial interchange, that the form of government in each state should be guaranteed by the congress, and that the acts of the congress should be valid without the ratification of the individual members of the confederation, were all provisions which implied a movement in the direction of a common sovereignty. Such proposals, Revenga declared, were inadmissible. Colombia desired, he said, to perpetuate the American confederation, but preferred to employ indirect means to effect that end. The positive benefits of such an association would contribute more to give it permanency than would such restrictive measures as those advocated by Vidaurre. Moreover Revenga feared that these proposals would serve to increase the suspicion with which some of the states had already begun to view the confederation and that they would also be the means of arousing jealousies and ill feeling in general among the republics, which condition it was naturally desired to avoid.<sup>49</sup>

It will be recalled that by Article 10 of the treaty of union, league, and confederation concluded between Colombia and Peru on July 6, 1822, it was provided that if unfortunately the internal tranquillity of any part of either state should be interrupted by "turbulent and seditious persons," the contracting parties would make common cause against all such disturbers, aiding each other with all the means in their power to establish order and the authority of the laws. And it will be remembered that, while the treaty was under consideration by the senate of Colombia, the question raised as to the application of this stipulation to the dispute between O'Higgins and Freire in Chile led Colombia to reject the article. Buenos Aires, as has elsewhere been shown, was also extremely jealous of any outside interference in its domestic affairs. No state except Peru had in fact reached the point of ratifying a treaty containing the intervention principle; and it was now one of the delegates of Peru who proposed a plan of confederation which

<sup>49</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 292, 302.

would have given the general assembly the right to intervene for the purpose of maintaining the lawful governments<sup>50</sup> of the states of the confederacy as well as for the purpose of guaranteeing their territorial integrity. The manner in which Vidaurre's plan was received gave evidence of a growing spirit of nationalism. The difficulties of establishing a real confederation began to be more clearly seen. The delegates of Peru themselves soon received new instructions which indicated that the attitude of that republic had undergone a profound change. The new instructions were brought to Panama early in April by Manuel Pérez de Tudela, who had been sent to relieve Pando.<sup>51</sup> The Colombian delegates noted at once the changed attitude of the representatives of Peru, who now declared that the assembly could accomplish within a few days all that was required of it. Having obtained an informal statement of the instructions which Tudela had brought, the Colombian ministers described them in a communication to Revenga, in substance as follows:

Not desiring to contribute to the establishment of a federal navy, Peru would provide troops and money in proportion to its population, but it would not permit its troops to advance be-

<sup>50</sup> The following articles of the instructions of May 15, 1825, to the delegates of Peru show what the attitude of that government was at the time the instructions were prepared.

Article 19. "As America is in need of a long period of rest and peace for recovering from the harm she has suffered in the war with Spain, and as a tendency toward local independence and sovereignty is clearly noticeable through the whole of the continent, you shall endeavor to settle these questions which may arise out of this tendency, and obtain some decision about what portion of the new states can be considered representatives of the sovereignty and national will, and in what manner can this will be expressed to have legal effects.

Article 20. "After this point is decided, you shall endeavor to obtain a declaration to the effect that the American states, far from encouraging and aiding seditious and ambitious disturbers of the public peace and order, will on the contrary cooperate with each other, by all the means in their possession, in supporting and maintaining all legally constituted governments." *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 172-173; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 262.

<sup>51</sup> Gual and Briceño Méndez to Revenga, April 6, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 313.

yond its own frontiers in defense of the other members of the confederation. It would make, however, a money contribution to the defense of the other states. As a prerequisite to entering into commercial treaties the new instructions demanded that the Peruvian Congress should first agree upon the fundamental principles which were to serve as the basis for these treaties. Peru apparently hesitated, said the Colombian delegates, to establish an alliance or to adopt sane rules for the conduct of international relations because its government had conceived the absurd idea that the assembly would attempt to make its decisions "obligatory upon all the powers of Christendom." Another matter which the government of Peru was now unwilling to have discussed at Panama was the boundary question with Colombia. And finally the government of that republic would decline to treat with the United States and Brazil unless they entered into the proposed league.<sup>52</sup>

Commenting upon the changed attitude of the government of Peru, the Colombian delegates declared that they foresaw insuperable obstacles in the way of a successful outcome of the congress. Considerations of a local character, selfishness, jealousies, and mistrust of the most puerile sort, inherent in the colonial state under which the inhabitants of the new republics had hitherto lived, made united action extremely difficult to attain. Nevertheless they had remonstrated with their Peruvian colleagues, who, convinced of the justice of the protest, had engaged to ask for more liberal instructions.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 314.

Gual declared in a private letter to Bolivar dated April 11, 1826, that it was the desire of Colombia to treat with the United States and Brazil as neutrals, in order to open the way to the establishment of more intimate relations, if circumstances should demand. O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 438.

<sup>53</sup> Gual and Briceño Méndez to Revenga, April 10, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 314.

Briceño Méndez, writing to Bolivar under date of April 12, 1826, voices his disappointment at the changed attitude of the Peruvian delegates and attributes the change to the delegates themselves rather than to their government. "Who would have believed," he said, "that Peru would be the



In a letter to Santander, dated February 21, 1826, Bolivar explained the situation in Peru as follows:

“As to the proposals of this government relative to the federation I shall say to you that I have refrained, through motives of delicacy, from intervening in its resolutions upon this subject. I foresee that they will not care to become involved in a very close federation, for several reasons. Those which occur to me I regard as reflecting honor upon myself, but there may be always a second intention. They are afraid, moreover, of expenses, for they are very poor and greatly in debt: here they owe much and they owe everybody. They do not wish to go to Habana because they have to go to Chiloé, which belongs to them, and because they can pay Chile with that island. They have more than enough naval forces and will not, therefore, care to buy more vessels. They are afraid to become too closely bound to the English and they do not fear an uprising of the colored folk, who are very submissive. I give you this information in order that you may know what are the principal ideas opposed to those of Colombia.”<sup>54</sup>

first to depart from the fundamental principles of the confederation? When I arrived here I was afraid that our time would be thrown away because the rest of the states would not accede to the project proposed by the Peruvians; for to do so would have given an excessive and even a dangerous extension to the central authority. Each state would have lost its political importance by being absorbed in the confederation. But this liberality is a thing of the past. They now intend that the league shall be no more than defensive. . . . I have good reasons for believing that its [Peru's] ministers here are the ones who have suggested this negative policy, and as Señor Pando has been recalled by his government, it is to be supposed he will promote his ideas there. He is not a friend of the league and less of Colombia and Colombians. Señor Vidaurre is a partisan of the former; but perhaps I am not too bold in affirming that this is promoted more by hatred of Colombia than by a desire for the welfare of America.” O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 188-189. See also Briceño Méndez's letter to Bolivar of April 26, *Ibid.*, 199.

<sup>54</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXXI, 167.

Later Bolivar apparently lost all hope of seeing Peru form a part of the confederation; for in August he proposed through his secretary, Pérez, to the Colombian ministers at Panama a plan by which Colombia, Mexico, and Central America alone should constitute a federal army and navy to continue the war against Spain. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 376.

Revenge received the news of the threatened defection of Peru with deep concern. He feared that the assembly would merit the contempt of the American states, if, after having attracted to itself the attention of the world, it should now lay aside the important objects for which it had been convened. For his own part he would do what he could to induce the government of Peru to return to the more liberal policy which it had previously maintained. He believed that the proximate arrival of the Mexican plenipotentiaries would react favorably upon the attitude of Peru; for the republic of Mexico appeared to have a more exact idea of the benefits to be derived from the union, entertained stronger hopes of its success and had a broader view of its bearing upon the happiness of mankind.<sup>55</sup>

In reality the arrival of the Mexican delegates, early in June, appeared to revive the hopes of Gual and Briceño Méndez, who now wrote more encouragingly of the outlook. The Mexican Government, they learned, desired to see the confederation made effective; and even though nothing more should be done than to present a respectable and imposing front to Spain, they believed that a vast deal would thus have been accomplished, that peace would have been attained, and that the existence of the confederation would be assured by the practical demonstration of its convenience and utility. But Mexico wished to see the sessions of the congress promptly begun, and, like Peru, believed that its work might be quickly finished.<sup>56</sup>

Accordingly, after a few days more of preliminary discussion, the first formal meeting of the assembly took place. Between June 22, the date of its opening, and July 15, the date of its adjournment, four separate conventions were concluded. They were: First, a treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation, based upon the preliminary treaties discussed in the preceding pages; second, a convention providing for the future meetings of the congress, fixing the qualifications of its

<sup>55</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 322-323.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, XXIV, 325-326.

members, and making other regulations respecting its constitution and procedure; third, a convention fixing the contingent of armed forces and the subsidies which each republic should contribute to the formation of a permanent army and navy, and establishing certain regulations relative thereto; fourth, a confidential agreement additional to the last-mentioned convention, relating to the organization and movements of the army and navy.<sup>57</sup>

The treaty of union, league, and confederation contained thirty-one articles, and an additional article. Among its most important provisions were those relating to the common defense, the peaceful settlement of disputes between the members of the confederation, the status of the citizens of one state residing in another, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the several states, the admission of other powers into the confederation, the abolition of the slave trade, and the revision of the treaty upon the conclusion of peace. Article 25 provided that the commercial relations between the contracting parties should be regulated in the next assembly. The additional article stipulated that as soon as the treaty of union, league, and confederation had been ratified, the contracting parties should proceed to fix by common agreement all the points, rules, and principles that were to govern their conduct in peace and war; and it was provided that in the accomplishment of this task all friendly and neutral powers should be invited to take an active part. None of the provisions of the treaty gave the congress the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the allied states, and by Article 28 it was expressly declared that the treaty did not in any wise interrupt, nor should ever interrupt, the exercise of the sovereignty of any of the contracting parties in the conduct of its foreign relations. Article 29 provided that if any of the republics should change substantially its form of government such republic should by that act be excluded from

<sup>57</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 174; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 372.

the confederation, subject to reinstatement only upon the unanimous consent of the parties concerned. That the character of the congress was intended to be no other than diplomatic is made clear by Article 13, which sets forth its objects. In view of the importance of this article it is here quoted in full:

“Article 13. The principal objects of the assembly of ministers plenipotentiary of the confederate powers are:

“*First.* To negotiate and conclude between the powers it represents all such treaties, conventions, and arrangements as may place their reciprocal relations on a mutually agreeable and satisfactory footing.

“*Second.* To contribute to the maintenance of a friendly and unalterable peace between the confederate powers, serving them as a council in times of great conflicts, as a point of contact in common dangers, as a faithful interpreter of the public treaties and conventions concluded by them in the said assembly, when any doubt arises as to their construction, and as a conciliator in their controversies and differences.

“*Third.* To endeavor to secure conciliation, or mediation, in all questions which may arise between the allied powers, or between any of them and one or more powers foreign to the confederation, whenever threatened of a rupture, or engaged in war because of grievances, serious injuries, or other complaints.

“*Fourth.* To adjust and conclude during the common wars of the contracting parties with one or many powers foreign to the confederation all those treaties of alliance, concert, subsidies, and contributions that shall hasten its termination.”

The articles relating to the question of territorial integrity are also of special interest. The first of these appears to have been designed to give effect to the declaration of President Monroe regarding noncolonization; nothing whatever is said as to the nonintervention principle. The articles read as follows:

“Article 21. The contracting parties solemnly obligate and bind themselves to uphold and defend the integrity of their respective territories, earnestly opposing any attempt of colonial

settlement in them without authority of, and dependence upon, the governments under whose jurisdiction they are, and to employ to this end, in common, their forces and resources, if necessary.

“Article 22. The contracting parties mutually guarantee the integrity of their territories as soon as, by virtue of special conventions concluded between each other, their respective boundaries shall have been determined; and the preservation of these frontiers shall then be under the protection of the confederation.”<sup>58</sup>

The special conventions relating to the army and navy show the effects of the nationalistic reaction. Although elaborate regulations were made respecting the number of troops to be maintained by each republic, the conditions under which one state should send its forces to the aid of another, and the equipment and support of such forces in the field, yet no provision was made for a central direction or command of the combined forces. The dream of a confederate army had not been realized. The troops of one state, as provided in the treaty, when sent to the aid of another, came nominally under the control of the latter state; but since they remained under the command of their own officers, the control of the state to which they belonged was by no means relinquished. It was possible, however, that, even if it should in any case be deemed advisable to take the offensive against a common enemy beyond the territory of the allies, the contracting parties would then agree as to the object of the expedition, the means to be employed in carrying it out, the commander to direct the operations, and the tem-

<sup>58</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 184-190; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 352-360. In an instruction dated April 8, 1826, Revenga referred to the dispute between Buenos Aires and Brazil over the possession of the Banda Oriental, as a concrete illustration of the danger that might arise out of a stipulation guaranteeing the territorial integrity of the members of the confederation. He thought that a promise mutually to respect the territory held by each state at the moment of concluding the treaty would be as far as it would be safe to go. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 312.

porary or permanent organization to be given to the country which might be occupied as a result of such expedition.<sup>59</sup> No reference to Cuba or Porto Rico other than this veiled one appears in the protocols of the sessions.

With regard to the navy the delegates of Peru, in accordance with their later instructions, declined to become a party to any convention on the subject. But Colombia, Central America, and Mexico agreed to coöperate in the maintenance of a navy the direction and command of which was to be placed under a commission of three members appointed by the three republics, respectively. The commission, it was agreed, should have the authority of a high military officer, if the contracting governments so desired; and in order that its members might have the independence and liberty necessary to the fullest discharge of their duties, it was further agreed that they should enjoy the privileges and immunities of diplomatic officers. But the significance of the provisions for a united navy as marking a tendency toward effective confederation, was in great part destroyed by an article making the agreement optional after the conclusion of peace with Spain.<sup>60</sup>

Article 11 of the treaty of union, league and confederation provided that the congress should meet every two years in time of peace and every year in time of war.<sup>61</sup> Article 1 of the special convention on the subject of future meetings stipulated that the assembly should remove to the village of Tacubaya, one league distant from the City of Mexico, and that it should continue to hold its sessions there or at some other point in Mexican territory, so long as reason and circumstances should not demand the selection of a different locality having equal advantages of healthfulness, security, and convenience for

<sup>59</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 192-199; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 362-369.

<sup>60</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 199-200; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 370-371.

<sup>61</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 186; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 355.

communicating with the nations of Europe and America.<sup>62</sup>

The unhealthfulness of the Isthmus was undoubtedly an important factor, if not the determining one, in the decision to abandon Panama as the seat of the congress. Soon after the arrival of the Colombian delegates at Panama, Briceño Méndez wrote Bolivar that the place was the worst enemy the project had. The people were not opposed to the congress, he said, but the climate was so merciless, the city was so ugly and uncomfortable, poverty was so general, the roads were so difficult to travel over, and the necessities of life so scarce and so dear that it was impossible to think of Panama as a suitable meeting place.<sup>63</sup>

Fearing that Bolivar would be displeased at the decision of the congress to remove to Tacubaya, Briceño Méndez wrote on July 22 and explained that the change had been deemed necessary: First, because by that means it was assured that Mexico would continue in the league; secondly, because the unhealthfulness of Panama made it impossible for the delegates to live there. Yellow fever and the black vomit, said Briceño Méndez, were frightening every human being from the city. The British commissioner had lost in one month his secretary and another member of his suite. The Colombian delegation had lost two servants, and almost everybody connected with the congress had been ill.<sup>64</sup> Gual called attention, in addition to the reasons assigned by his colleague, to the consideration which Mexico merited by virtue of the importance of its contingents — more than half of the total,<sup>65</sup> to the greater respectability which

<sup>62</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 191; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 361.

<sup>63</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 186.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 210.

<sup>65</sup> The contracting parties obligated themselves to raise and maintain on a war footing an army of 60,000 men in the following proportions: Colombia, 15,250; Central America, 6,750; Peru, 5,250; and Mexico, 32,750. For the organization and maintenance of a competent naval force the sum of 7,720,000 pesos was appropriated, apportioned as follows: Colombia, 2,205,714 pesos; Central America, 955,811 pesos; and Mexico, 4,558,475 pesos. *Int. Am. Conf.* (1889-90), IV, 193; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 363, 365.

the congress would acquire at its new seat, and to the more direct contact which it would have with foreign governments.<sup>66</sup>

Other considerations undoubtedly entered into the resolution of the congress to remove to Mexico, among which were personal jealousies and the ever-present spirit of localism. Gual and Briceño Méndez refer frequently in their letters to the unfriendly attitude of the Peruvian delegates toward Colombia and toward Bolivar and the Colombians in general.<sup>67</sup> Gual later became convinced that the failure of the congress to renew its sessions at Tacubaya was due in great part to the indifference of the government of Mexico.<sup>68</sup> It was even charged that Mexico defeated the project out of jealousy of Bolivar.<sup>69</sup> Whether or not this was true, it is certain that Bolivar viewed the removal with misgivings. "The transfer of the assembly to Mexico," he wrote Briceño Méndez, "is going to put it under the immediate influence of that power, already too preponderant, and also under the influence of the United States of the North. These and other reasons oblige me to ask that the treaties be not ratified until I arrive at Bogotá and have the opportunity of examining them with you and others."<sup>70</sup>

It was agreed at the tenth and last conference, held on July 15, that the ministers, Briceño Méndez, Molina, and Vidaurre, should return to their respective countries for the purpose of reporting upon the work accomplished at Panama and for the purpose of securing, if possible, the ratification of the four conventions which had been concluded. The other delegates, Gual, Larrazábal, and Pérez de Tudela, together with the Mexican representatives, were to proceed to Tacubaya, where it was proposed to renew the sessions of the congress. This plan was

<sup>66</sup> Gual to Bolivar, July 17, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 448.

For the report of the Mexican delegates on the subject of the transfer of the congress to Tacubaya see: *American State Papers: For. Rel.*, VI, 362.

<sup>67</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, VII, 189, 199, 439, 442.

<sup>68</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 397, 407.

<sup>69</sup> Niles, *History of South America and Mexico*, I, 194.

<sup>70</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 560.



carried out, as far as the several destinations of the delegates were concerned, with the exception that Pérez de Tudela, after having waited at Panama until the following January (1827), received instructions from his government to return to Peru, as it was considered that his services would be more useful at home than in the general assembly of American nations.<sup>71</sup>

Of the republics represented at Panama, Colombia was the only one to ratify the conventions. The ratification did not take place, however, until about the middle of the year 1827, and then it was effected in spite of the indifference and perhaps even the opposition of the Liberator. That Peru should have failed to ratify the treaties is not difficult to understand, in view of the attitude which that republic assumed before the formal sessions of the congress began. Moreover the return of Vidaurre to Lima for the purpose of securing the ratification of the conventions occurred at a moment when the reaction against Bolivar's political plans had strongly set in.<sup>72</sup> Bolivar himself was opposed to the ratification of the treaties by Peru as he had been to their ratification by Colombia, and wrote to Pando, who was still loyal to him, to that effect. In replying Pando declared that he rejoiced to learn Bolivar's opinion; that he had himself always believed that the philanthropic project of confederating the whole of America was impracticable and that nothing would come of the general assembly, and that he regarded the Panama conventions with indifference. More than that, he regarded them as doubly prejudicial to Peru; that is, they would be a burden to the country standing alone and an obstacle to its federation with Colombia and Bolivia, as pro-

<sup>71</sup> Torres Caicedo, *Unión Latino-Americana*, 36; O'Leary, *Memorias*, X, 417. *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 183.

<sup>72</sup> Bolivar left Lima early in September, 1826, to return to Colombia. At Guayaquil he met Vidaurre, who had stopped there on his way to Lima from Panama. On September 14, Bolivar wrote José de Larrea as follows: "Yesterday I talked with Vidaurre and he expressed to me a desire to proceed to Lima with the treaties; dissembling my motives I tried to lead him to change his mind, advising him to remain here a while longer." O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXXI, 266.

posed, under a general government presided over by the Liberator.

A sufficient explanation of the failure of the government of the Central American republic to ratify the conventions is to be found in the state of anarchy into which that section of the continent had fallen.<sup>73</sup> The rejection of the treaties by Mexico, as well as the final abandonment of the plan for the reassembling of the congress at Tacubaya, is set forth in a series of illuminating dispatches which the Colombian plenipotentiary, Gual, sent to his government during his stay of more than two years in Mexico.<sup>74</sup>

Proceeding upon his mission, soon after the adjournment of the Panama Congress, Gual reached Acapulco in August, and remained there until toward the close of the year, when he continued his journey to the City of Mexico. On January 29, 1827, he wrote from the Mexican capital that the Panama treaties were being considered by the house of deputies, and that he believed they would be approved.<sup>75</sup> The only foreign representatives present, he said, were Larrazábal, the Central American delegate, and Sergeant, the minister of the United States, who had arrived a few days before. As the Mexican congress later adjourned without having acted upon the treaties, Gual became somewhat discouraged. No other representatives had arrived. On the other hand, Sergeant had returned to the United States, while Van Veer, the agent of the Netherlands, who had come to Mexico from Panama, had quit the country. Moreover a discouraging state of disorder reigned throughout the new republics. Reviewing the situation, Gual raised the question whether it was possible to establish a con-

<sup>73</sup> For an account of the situation in Central America at this time, see Bancroft, *History of Central America*, III, 79-104. For a fuller account see Marure, *Bosquejo Histórico de las Revoluciones de Centro-América*, I, 169-191; II, 6-143.

<sup>74</sup> Extracts from these dispatches are found in O'Leary's *Memorias*, XXIV, 377-408.

<sup>75</sup> Article 50, section 13, of the Mexican constitution of 1824 provided that treaties should be approved by the general congress.

federation of such discordant and disorganized elements. Was the confederation, he inquired, to be the efficient means of correcting the internal evils of the several states, or was it to be itself the product of order and purpose in each of the units? To his concern over this state of affairs and over the failure of Mexico to ratify the treaties, was now added the anxiety caused by the continued inaction of his own government. In July, however, he was cheered by a decree of President Victoria calling an extra session of the congress to consider, among other things, the pending treaties. And in November he at last learned through a private source that the long-awaited ratification by Colombia had been effected.<sup>76</sup>

But Gual was destined to suffer further disappointment. The special session of the Mexican congress took no action upon the treaties and the government showed no disposition to advance the cause of union. By the end of January, 1828, the Colombian representative became convinced that to remain longer in Mexico would lead to no useful result. Upon informing President Victoria, however, of his intention to retire from the country, Gual was urged by that functionary with such manifestations of sincerity to postpone his departure until a further effort had been made to secure favorable action on the part of the national congress, that he resolved to remain at his post a while longer. Some days later he wrote in a more hopeful vein. It then seemed likely that the American assembly would soon be able to resume its sittings. In March the treaties were approved by the house of deputies and having passed to the senate were referred to a committee of that body. But this led Gual to suspect that further delay would follow; for it was uncertain when the senate committee would report. He again became greatly discouraged when he learned that some of the members of the Mexican congress were saying that Mexico had no need of a confederation, and that the republic ought not to cast in its fortune with a lot of unimportant republics where

<sup>76</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 378, 380, 383-386, 389,

anarchy reigned supreme. One of the gentlemen, indeed, had even had the impudence, as Gual expressed it, to speak, after the manner of the ungrateful Peruvians, disparagingly of Colombia, supposing it to be dominated by a tyrant, as the illustrious Bolivar was characterized.<sup>77</sup>

In May Gual wrote that the congress had again adjourned without ratifying the treaties. But, inasmuch as the president had spoken hopefully of the future, the Colombian plenipotentiary deemed it prudent, in spite of his growing distrust, to await the holding of another special session, which was soon to be called. It met on July 1, 1828, but the senate shortly afterward resolved, without explaining upon what ground, that the treaties should be again referred to the executive. This in effect meant their defeat. Gual now began to make preparations to return to Colombia.<sup>78</sup> On October 9, he had a formal conference with Larrazábal, and the two Mexican ministers, Michelena and Domínguez, in which he reviewed the efforts he had made to discharge his mission and explained the motives that at last impelled him to leave the country. In brief, he made it clear that he had become convinced that the plan of re-assembling the congress at Tacubaya was a failure, thanks mainly, as he believed, to Mexico. With these views the Central American delegate was in substantial accord.<sup>79</sup>

In fairness to Mexico it must be said that the charge that its government was responsible for the failure of the project of confederation was not altogether just. The Mexican plenipotentiaries maintained that, even if the conventions had been ratified by Mexico, it would not have been possible to proceed to the exchange of ratifications; for in Central America there was no legislative body in existence to approve the treaties, and in Peru there was not sufficient interest to induce the government to send ministers to Tacubaya. What advantage would there

<sup>77</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 397-399.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 401, 405.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 405. For the protocol of the conference of October 9, see Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 169-181.

have been, they inquired, in having the approval of Mexico and Colombia alone? And of what value, they might have added, was the ratification of Colombia, then already on the eve of dissolution? It was true that the sessions of the congress could not be renewed in Mexican territory without the effective coöperation of the Mexican government; but it was also true that the congress could not fulfill its mission without the concurrence of the other members of the proposed confederacy. That concurrence, under the circumstances, it was impossible to secure. The spirit of particularism had become supreme.

A protocol of the conference of October 9 was drawn up and signed by Gual, Larrazábal, Michelena, and Domínguez. Apart from the recital of the unavailing efforts which had been made to clear the way for the reassembling of the congress at Tacubaya, the protocol contains a brief reference to what appears to have been the only measure of importance which the delegates in their informal conferences had had under consideration during their residence in Mexico; namely, the mediation of Colombia and Mexico — in default of a general congress with authority to intervene — between the parties to the civil war then raging in Central America.<sup>80</sup> Gual believed that such a friendly interposition would have resulted in restoring order in that distracted quarter. Nothing, however, was done, and this failure Gual also charged to the Mexican Government.

In this conference of October 9, Poinsett, the American minister to Mexico, though he had been authorized to attend the meetings of the general congress whenever they should be resumed, took no part. Indeed Poinsett appears not to have participated in, nor to have desired to participate in, any of the informal negotiations which the delegates of Colombia, Central America, and Mexico had been conducting in the Mexican capital. Having gone to Mexico at a time when British influence was in the ascendancy, he had intervened in the internal

<sup>80</sup> See a memorandum by Gual of a conference held on December 28, 1827, to discuss the subject. Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 153-158.

affairs of the republic with a view to forming what he repeatedly spoke of as an American party. In this he met with success and soon the York rite masons whom he helped to organize were in control of the government. After a time resentment against Poinsett on account of his intermeddling in domestic affairs became very bitter. In the latter part of the year 1827 the Plan of Montaña, the principal demand of which was that the minister of the United States should be furnished with his passports, was proclaimed, and a revolution was started to force its adoption. The movement was soon put down by government forces and Poinsett remained at his post. But as it was believed that he continued to exercise undue influence in domestic affairs, attacks upon him in the public press became frequent. Finally, in July 1829, President Guerrero, who had succeeded Victoria, requested his recall. In October the request was complied with.<sup>81</sup>

In the mind of Gual, and perhaps also in the minds of the other ministers accredited to the congress of Tacubaya, Mexico's lack of interest in the plan of confederation was associated with the undue influence which Poinsett was thought to exercise over the government. In the published extracts of the Colombian representative's dispatches there are casual references to Poinsett, and these leave one to wonder whether the relations between the two ministers were on the most cordial footing. In May, 1827, Gual wrote that it seemed strange that the pending treaty between Mexico and the United States had not been approved by the Mexican government, in view of the influence which Poinsett had acquired in the republic by means of the York rite lodges. In January, 1828, he wrote that Poinsett had been spreading the report that Peru had disapproved the Pan-

<sup>81</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the U. S. and Mexico*, 80-82, 190-204; 349-377. See also *Poinsett's Career in Mexico* by Justin Harvey Smith in *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, April, 1914, 77-92. The contemporary Mexican historians were generally hostile to Poinsett; but for a friendly appreciation see Zavala, *Ensayo Histórico de las Revoluciones de México*, I, 339.

ama treaties, the implication being that Poinsett's object was to put obstacles in the way of the resumption of the conferences of the general assembly at Tacubaya. And in May following Gual declared that to whatever it might be due, whether to party spirit, whether to a conviction that Mexico could stand alone, or whether to the intrigues of the American minister, Poinsett, the fact remained that the business of the assembly had made no progress.<sup>82</sup>

Under the circumstances Poinsett's colleagues would have been unlikely to solicit his participation in the preliminary conferences. And if they had done so it is not likely that he could have acceded to their desire, for the general instructions given by Clay under date of March 16, 1827, supplementary to the general instructions of May 8, 1826, appear to have contemplated little activity on the part of the delegates of the United States in promoting the designs of the congress as they were then understood. "The intelligence," said Clay, "which has reached us from many points as to the ambitious projects and views of Bolivar, has abated the strong hopes which were once entertained of the favorable results of the congress of the American Nations. If that intelligence is well founded (as there is much reason to apprehend), it is probable that he does not look upon the Congress in the same interesting light that he formerly did." Although the secretary of state went on to say to the delegates that the highly important objects contemplated by their instructions ought not to be abandoned while any hope remained, and that the value of those objects did not depend entirely upon the forms of government which might concur in their establishment,<sup>83</sup> yet it is an evident conclusion that in the words quoted above, Poinsett found warrant for his passivity concerning the general assembly.

With the signature of the protocol of October 9, the efforts to revive the assembly of American plenipotentiaries came to an

<sup>82</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 385, 394, 403.

<sup>83</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 152.

end. Gual soon afterward presented his letter of recall, and when in January, 1829, he set out for Colombia it was to return to a land torn by internal strife and bleeding from a war with a sister republic. When Gual reached Bodegas de Babahoyo, a little town near Guayaquil, he wrote Bolivar in a spirit of despair. "I left Mexico," he said, "sick of revolutions caused by those exaggerated doctrines which our people neither understand nor can understand. On the way down [from Acapulco] we ran short of water and had to put in at Realejo, a port of Central America, where we found everything in the greatest confusion; for, having executed their governor, Cerda, they had not so much as a vestige of government. I left there with the hope of finding further to the south a more consoling order of things and I ran upon the Peruvians in Guayaquil, converted into propagandists of anarchy and of the subversion of all social principles. What a terrible state of affairs! Colombia is apparently in a better situation than the rest of Spanish America, for it still possesses a single bond of union, which I hope you will not think for a moment of allowing us to lose. They tell me that you have aged greatly and that your health is bad. Take care of yourself and preserve with your life the hopes of the three millions of your compatriots."<sup>84</sup>

The Liberator, the single bond of union, had indeed become prematurely old and his increasing ill health obliged him within a year to release his hold on the conflicting elements which now only nominally constituted the republic of Colombia. This was the signal for the dissolution of the republic. And thus the state which Bolivar desired to weld into a powerful nation and which he hoped to make the controlling factor in a great American confederation abdicated its claim to a position of leadership in the Western Hemisphere.

<sup>84</sup> Gual to Bolivar, May 29, 1829. O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 449.



## CHAPTER IX

### BRITISH INFLUENCE

APART from the adoption of the four conventions referred to in the preceding chapter, no official action of importance was taken by the Congress of Panama. Matters of weight were discussed informally, however, as is revealed by the correspondence of some of the delegates and by the dispatches of the British commissioner. Relative to Cuba, for example, Briceño Méndez, writing from Buenaventura on July 22, 1826, makes the following remarks: "The Mexicans have also manifested a desire to incorporate Cuba into their already immense republic. They have proceeded with caution, it is true, and they have succeeded in evading our efforts to make them speak out clearly on the matter; but as good understanders require few words, we are no longer at a loss to know what their attitude is. We have in this question the first germ of division in America, unless we know how to reach a compromise, putting aside our national egoism." <sup>1</sup>

In a postscript to the letter from which the above extract is taken, Briceño Méndez expressed the opinion that the fate of Cuba and of Porto Rico was one of the great difficulties which stood in the way of the recognition of the independence of the new states by Ferdinand VII. The desire of that monarch was to have his possession of Cuba and Porto Rico guaranteed by the mediating powers (England, France, and the United States) and by the new states. This pretension of the Spanish king, said Briceño Méndez, was being supported by the United States, who had formally declared that it would not permit the islands to pass to any of the new republics nor to be held by any European power other than Spain. England apparently adhered to this policy because she desired to be on friendly terms with the

<sup>1</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 210.

United States and because she feared to have the islands fall into the hands of some power that might absorb the British possessions in the West Indies.<sup>2</sup> To an understanding of this subject a brief review of the negotiations which the United States had been conducting relative to Cuba and Porto Rico is essential.<sup>3</sup>

The United States was in effect unwilling that Cuba and Porto Rico should be transferred to any European power or be annexed by any of the new American states. Not only so, but the United States, being convinced that the islands were incapable of self-government, was opposed to any project to liberate them with a view to their independence. The situation was one of great concern to the government at Washington; for, as long as the war lasted, there was danger of a change in the *status quo* of Cuba and of Porto Rico, with possibly serious conse-

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 214. The part of the letter here referred to is as follows: "The question of recognition is progressing, so much so that even France has taken an active part in our favor. Do not doubt it. There are only two difficulties that keep Ferdinand from deciding: first, the fate of Cuba and Porto Rico, which he asks to have guaranteed by us and by the powers that mediate in the recognition, and secondly, Spain's burden of debt, and especially the part of which she contracted with France during the campaign of restoration and during the occupation. In the first, Spain is sustained by the government of the United States, which has formally declared that it will not consent to the possession of those islands by any of the new republics nor by any European power other than Spain. It appears that England also adheres to this in conformity with her policy of courting and humoring the United States, and because she does not view with pleasure the creation of an insular power in the Antilles, which might absorb her colonies or fall into the power of Haiti. In the second, interest is shown in a general way by France, who sees no other way of being reimbursed by a ruined Spain; the worst of it is that England is supporting France in this because England has debts to cover and above all because it suits her convenience to keep France as a friend against the Holy Alliance. You see how the question of our independence has become involved with the great interests of the leading maritime powers. We are forced therefore to make a prompt decision, for each day the outcome grows more complicated and more difficult."

<sup>3</sup> For the general diplomatic history of this period relative to Cuba and Porto Rico see: Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, VI; Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations*; Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*; Chadwick, *The Relations of the United States and Spain*; *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V.

quences to the peace and tranquillity of the United States. Accordingly, early in Adams' administration, Clay began negotiations looking to the termination of the war on the basis of Spain's recognizing the independence of the new American republics, while retaining Cuba and Porto Rico. Middleton, the American minister at St. Petersburg, was instructed in May, 1825, to disclose this policy to the Russian emperor in the hope that that monarch would lend the high authority of his name to the attainment of peace and to the prevention of further waste of human life.<sup>4</sup>

At about the same time instructions were given to Alexander Everett, the United States minister at Madrid, to impress upon Spain the necessity of peace. The American ministers in France and England were instructed to invite the cabinets of Paris and London to second this advice. It was hoped that by the united exertion of all the powers, and especially of Russia, Spain might be brought to see her true interest in ending the war.<sup>5</sup> The negotiations, however, produced no favorable result, and Middleton was later instructed to say to the Russian Government that, if Spain should obstinately resolve on continuing the war, the United States, although it did not desire to see either Colombia or Mexico acquire the islands, could not forcibly interfere to prevent them from so doing. The liberation of Spain's remaining possessions being a lawful operation of war, Clay declared that his government could not interpose unless the struggle should chance to be conducted in such a manner and with such results as to endanger the quiet and safety of the United States. Nor did he, he said, apprehend that it would become necessary for the United States to depart from its position of a neutral observer of the progress of events.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825. *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 846-849.

<sup>5</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 887; for the correspondence referred to see Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the U. S. and Mexico*, 115.

<sup>6</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 850.

Before these instructions were prepared, Clay had taken steps to forestall the complications that might have arisen from an invasion of Cuba and of Porto Rico by the new states. Although he recognized the right of Spain's enemies to attack her at any vital point, Clay requested the governments of Colombia and Mexico to suspend the expedition which it was understood they were fitting out against the islands until the results of the negotiations already initiated by the United States with a view to bring about peace, should have been ascertained.<sup>7</sup> Colombia's reception of this request was friendly though not very cordial. In a note addressed to the American minister at Bogotá the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the importance of the matter demanded that it be duly weighed. On one side of the balance, he observed, were the noble efforts of the United States to effect and to maintain a general peace and to afford to the American continent an opportunity to heal its wounds; on the other side were the treaties which bound Colombia to its allies, the greater probability of bringing the war to a close by driving the enemy from the Western Hemisphere, and the guarantee which would be obtained for the future tranquillity of the continent by withholding from Spain the hand of friendship until she had recognized her utter defeat.

He therefore expressed the opinion that, as it was not clear that Spain intended to abandon hostilities against the American states, the suspension of vigorous and effective war against her would be a cause for regret, and that the postponement of operations against Cuba and Porto Rico in order to give the United States a new proof of friendship and of confidence in the continuance of its good offices, would result only in making more evident the contumacy and heedlessness of Spain. Nevertheless Colombia wished, he said, to carry its deference to the

<sup>7</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 840, 851.

A good, brief account of the question of Cuba and Porto Rico from the Colombian standpoint is given by Restrepo, *Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia* (1858), III, 488-494.

United States as far as its own security, its treaty obligations, and its vital interests would permit; in consequence of which, operations of magnitude against Cuba would not be carried forward until the allies had had an opportunity to deliberate upon the matter in the congress to be assembled at Panama.<sup>8</sup>

Mexico on the other hand gave to Clay's request a cold reception. President Victoria, after having received from Poinsett a full explanation of the attitude of the United States regarding Cuba, declared that his government "had no intention to conquer or keep possession of the island, [but] that the object of the expedition which they contemplated was to assist the revolutionists to drive out the Spaniards and in case they succeeded to leave that people to govern themselves." A few days before this conference took place the Mexican senate had passed a resolution granting permission to the executive to undertake an expedition against Cuba jointly with Colombia. When the question came before the chamber of deputies that body voted to postpone further consideration of the subject until the executive should have submitted to them the plans which were to be agreed upon at Panama.<sup>9</sup> These things occurred shortly before Clay's request for a suspension of the expedition against Cuba and Porto Rico came into the hands of the Mexican cabinet.

<sup>8</sup> Revenga to Andersin, March 17, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIII, 506-508.

A few days before this Santander had written to Bolivar, making the following comment on the subject: "Revenga will inform you confidentially of the interposition of the United States for the purpose of asking us to suspend the expedition against Cuba, because it might interfere with the negotiations which Russia is carrying on at Madrid in favor of our recognition. Habana is a point of great commercial importance to the United States, and as commerce is the god of the Americans, they are afraid that the independence of that island would be harmful to their trade. I shall have the answer given in equivocal terms in such a way as neither to reject the interposition nor declare that we will suspend our preparations, which would give great satisfaction to our enemies and encourage them to come and attack our coasts." O'Leary, *Memorias*, III. For Revenga's communication to Bolivar, see O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIII, 484.

<sup>9</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 143-144.

The request was presented by Poinsett in March, 1826, and he soon discovered that the reasons urged by Clay for suspending the expedition tended rather to incline the government of Mexico to persist in it. He reported that Mexico, relying upon the protection of Great Britain and of the United States, no longer feared Spain nor the Holy Alliance, and regarded with indifference the question of Spain's recognition of her independence; that her greatest apprehension was that the powers might compel a peace on the basis of Spain's retaining Cuba and Porto Rico, "which would deprive Mexico of the advantage and glory of emancipating those islands," and that she also feared that Colombia alone might liberate and thereafter control them. Poinsett further reported that a messenger had recently brought news of the fitting out at Cartagena of a large squadron against Cuba; that it was current rumor that Bolivar would arrive in April to take command; that the Mexican Government was desirous to participate in the enterprise in order to acquire the right to a voice in the future disposition of the conquered territory; and that President Victoria, being without authority to send troops out of the country, was planning to dispatch the Mexican fleet, with as many men as by a forced interpretation might be considered marines, to cooperate with the Colombian expedition. Poinsett believed that this would be done in spite of Clay's request.<sup>10</sup>

That Victoria's plans were not carried into execution by no means detracts from their significance. As has been shown in a previous chapter, Mexico, almost from the beginning of its independence, had regarded Great Britain as the only effective barrier to the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the war between Spain and her former colonies in America.<sup>11</sup> The establishment of relations of friendship and commerce with Great Britain, it was believed, would be the "foundation of the pros-

<sup>10</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 145-147.

<sup>11</sup> See *supra*, p. 228 *et seq.*

perity and greatness of Mexico, which needed only to obtain the protection of so important a power to be able to advance rapidly to a high position among nations.”<sup>12</sup> England in turn being desirous of cultivating friendly relations with Mexico, early established informal diplomatic intercourse with that country. Dr. Mackie, the first British agent to be sent to Mexico, was appointed in December, 1822, and arrived in Mexico about the middle of the following year, after the downfall of the empire. The Mexican Government appointed General Victoria to treat with Mackie, and four conferences were held in July and August, in which the foundations were laid for future diplomatic relations.<sup>13</sup> Upon the conclusion of the conferences Mackie returned to England. A second mission, consisting of Hervey, O’Gorman, and Ward, was appointed, and receiving instructions from Canning on October 10, 1823, set out in time to reach Mexico before the close of the year.<sup>14</sup> Migoni, the first diplomatic agent of Mexico in Great Britain, was appointed, but without diplomatic character, soon after the fall of Iturbide. A commission as diplomatic agent which was later issued to him was borne to England by Mackie upon his return. Michelena, the first regular minister, was appointed in March, 1824. He reached England aboard a British warship about the middle of the year.<sup>15</sup> *De facto* relations continued until England recognized the independence of Mexico early in 1825. The British Government then appointed Ward, one of the three commissioners above mentioned, as chargé d’affaires to the Mexican republic.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 98. For Colombia’s plan relative to Cuba, see Santander to Bolivar, January 21, 1826; O’Leary, *Memorias*, III, 237.

<sup>13</sup> For the protocols of these conferences, see *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 109–113, 128.

<sup>14</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 62.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 56; *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 135, 150; III, 1, 13, 19.

<sup>16</sup> Ward was received by President Victoria on May 31, before Poinsett, the American minister, was received. See Bocanegra, *Historia de México*, I, 379.

During these years the United States had done little to establish definitive relations with Mexico. Zozaya, who was sent by the empire to Washington as minister in 1822, was received by President Monroe; but, being neglected by his own government and therefore unable to accomplish anything, he finally left the legation in charge of the secretary, Torrens, and quit the country. Not until the arrival of Obregon as minister in the fall of 1824 did the Mexican legation at Washington have any important dealings with the government of the United States.<sup>17</sup> On the other hand, the mission of Poinsett in 1822 had tended rather to postpone than to hasten the appointment of a minister to Mexico by the United States; and when Poinsett, who was finally designated as minister in March, 1825, reached the Mexican capital, he found that British influence in the affairs of Mexico had become thoroughly entrenched. Any advantage the United States might have derived from having been the first to recognize the independence of the new states, or from having taken a stand against the intervention of the Holy Alliance in behalf of Spain, was in great part lost.<sup>18</sup>

The question of Cuba was early discussed between Great Britain and Mexico. In the last of the four conferences heretofore mentioned, Mackie protested that the British Government desired the absolute freedom of Habana, with no other design than to prevent its being occupied by any foreign power, leaving to the island the choice of constituting an independent state or of uniting with Mexico.<sup>19</sup> But, in spite of this declaration, the British Government later offered to mediate between Spain and her former colonies on the basis of the recognition of the independence of the new states and the retention of Cuba by

<sup>17</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 6, 12, 15, 17, 19, 25.

<sup>18</sup> For a full account of British influence in Mexico prior to Poinsett's arrival, see Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 55-88.

<sup>19</sup> *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 127.



Spain under the guarantee of Great Britain.<sup>20</sup> About the middle of 1825, however, Canning informed Michelena, who had been seeking a conference with him, that, as much time had passed and Spain had not accepted the offer of mediation, both parties were at liberty to act as they pleased. Canning further intimated, so Michelena avers, that England, while opposing the acquisition of Cuba either by France or by the United States, would not be displeased if it were united to Mexico.<sup>21</sup>

Michelena had been led to seek a conference with Canning on the subject of Cuba by news from Obregon at Washington to the effect that the United States was planning to seize the island on the pretext of suppressing piracy. In Mexico the same news caused consternation, and although it soon became evident that the United States had no intention of seizing Cuba on such a pretext,<sup>22</sup> the report had the effect of intensifying the suspicion with which the policy of the government at Washington had begun to be regarded. In these circumstances, it is not a violent assumption that Mexico's belief that Great Britain would not object to her annexing Cuba, to say nothing of Canning's avowed policy of defeating "certain claims and pretensions" of the Monroe pronouncement,<sup>23</sup> materially influenced her in her refusal to suspend hostilities against Cuba and Porto Rico.

Returning now to the Congress of Panama, it is interesting to note the course of the British representative on the Isthmus in promoting Canning's policy as to Cuba and Porto Rico. From the published correspondence of the delegates it can scarcely be determined what really took place at Panama respecting those

<sup>20</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 102.

<sup>21</sup> *Memorandum de la conferencia del día 17 de Junio de 1825, entre el Honorable Sr. George Canning, el General Michelena y el Sr. Rocafuerte. La Diplomacia Mexicana*, III, 196-197.

<sup>22</sup> Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 103-104.

<sup>23</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *American Historical Review*, XI, 779-782.

islands. The reference to the subject in the letter of Briceño Méndez, heretofore cited, leaves to surmise the nature of the discussions that may have taken place. In a later communication, however, which he made to his government on arriving at Bogotá in August following the adjournment of the congress, Briceño Méndez drops a remark which is not without significance. The British agent, Dawkins, had been urging upon the delegates the necessity of a compromise with Spain, maintaining that the question of recognition by the mother country became more complicated day by day. "In order to support this assertion," said Briceño Méndez, "he adduced the declaration which the United States had made relative to Cuba and Porto Rico, adding that the intervention which that republic had given to Russia in the matter had already caused great difficulties, and would cause greater ones."<sup>24</sup> Was Dawkins trying to defeat certain "pretensions" of the United States by arousing suspicions relative to its policy in Cuba and Porto Rico and by disparaging its efforts to bring about peace between Spain and the new American states? The answer to this question is to be found in Canning's instructions to Dawkins and in the latter's report of what occurred at Panama.

In the autumn of 1825 negotiations took place between Great Britain and the United States with reference to the designs of France in sending a squadron to the West Indies and the proposed expedition of Bolivar against Cuba. Vaughan, the British minister at Washington, conversing with Clay on the latter subject, actually "suggested an interference by the United States of America to dissuade the Mexicans and Colombians from making any attack upon Cuba." Canning promptly disavowed Vaughan and gave him fresh instructions in which the following declaration is found: "If it be merely the interests of the United States that are concerned, that ground of interference can only belong to them, nor is there any obligation upon

<sup>24</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 574.

us, to share the odium of such an interposition.”<sup>25</sup> In his instructions to Dawkins, Canning, though avowing an earnest desire on the part of his government to have Cuba remain a colony of Spain, sought to create the impression among the delegates

<sup>25</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *American Historical Review*, XI, 791, citing Public Record Office, F. O., America.

The instructions to Vaughan, dated February 8, 1826, were printed in full in the *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* for November, 1912, 233-235.

Temperley, in his otherwise excellent study of the later American policy of George Canning, is extremely severe and unsympathetic in his treatment of the Panama Congress. He says, “The congress was announced with the most extravagant boasts and rodomontades, fully worthy of the swaggering Don Guzmans and Don Alvarados of Spanish romance. Bolivar and his friends frequently spoke of it as one of the most important events of the world’s history.” To confirm this judgment he quotes as follows from a speech of the Peruvian delegate, Vidaurre: “An entire world is about to witness our labors. . . . From the first sovereign to the last inhabitant of the southern hemisphere nobody is indifferent to our task. This will probably be the last attempt to ascertain whether mankind can be happy. Companions! the field of glory — cleared by Bolivar, San Martfn, O’Higgins, Guadalupe, and many others superior to Hercules and Theseus, is before us. Our names are about to be written either in immortal praise or in eternal opprobrium. Let us raise ourselves above a thousand millions of inhabitants, and may a noble pride inspire us, likening us to God himself on that day when He gave the first laws to the universe.” *American Hist. Rev.*, XI, 785, 786.

Although the other representatives disclaimed responsibility for this speech, yet Temperley is of the opinion that it represented — more or less — the general feeling of the time. It is true that high hopes were entertained by men of distinction in both Americas with regard to the Panama Congress. But the extravagant expression of Vidaurre did not represent the feelings of the time, as contemporary records abundantly demonstrate. The address was printed in a *Gazeta Extraordinaria* of Panama on June 23, the day after the congress assembled. On that same day the Colombian delegates entered a formal protest against the publication (O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 340). After the Mexican delegates had returned to Mexico, Poinsett wrote Clay that he had adverted, in the course of a conversation with them, to the very extraordinary sentiments contained in Vidaurre’s speech on the opening of the congress. They assured Poinsett that Vidaurre had never delivered that discourse, but published it without the knowledge of his colleagues; that on the following day they, the Mexican delegates, remonstrated, verbally, both against the publication and against the sentiments it contained. (*American State Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 361.) The address is to be found in *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 359-361; in O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 329-336; and in Blanco-Azpurúa, *Documentos*, X, 433-436.

at Panama that the United States was the only obstacle in the way of an expedition against the remaining Spanish strongholds in the Western Hemisphere. The instructions were dated March 18, 1826, and the part referring to Cuba reads as follows:

"You will see how earnestly it is desired by the U[nited] S[tates], by France and by this country that Cuba should remain a colony of Spain. The B[ritish] Gov[ernment] indeed, are so far from denying the right of the new States of America to make a hostile attack upon Cuba, whether considered simply as a possession of a power with whom they are at war, or as an arsenal from which expeditions are fitted out against them, that we have uniformly refused to join with the U[nited] S[tates] in remonstrating that we should feel displeasure at the execution of it. We should indeed regret it, but we arrogate to ourselves no right to control the operations of one belligerent against another. The Government of the U[nited] S[tates] however professes itself of a different opinion. It conceives that the interests of the U[nited] S[tates] would be so directly affected by either the occupation of Havannah by an invading force, or by the consequences which an attack upon Cuba, even if unsuccessful, might produce in the interior of the island, that the cabinet of Washington hardly disguises its intention to interfere directly, and by force, to prevent or repress such an operation. Neither England nor France could see with indifference the U[nited] S[tates] in occupation of Cuba. Observe, therefore, the complicated consequences to which an expedition to Cuba by Mexico and Colombia might lead, and let the States assembled at Panama consider whether it is worth while to continue a war the only remaining operation of which (that is likely to be sensibly felt by their adversary) is thus morally interdicted to them by the consequences to which it would lead." <sup>26</sup>

<sup>26</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *American Historical Review*, XI, 792, citing Public Record Office, F. O., Colombia.

These instructions require no comment. The spirit in which Dawkins would be likely to carry them out may be inferred from Canning's definition of the general attitude of England toward the whole American situation. Referring to the nascent states he requested information "about their feelings toward each other, and the degree of influence in their concerns which they may appear to allow to the United States of North America. You will understand," continued Canning, "that to a league among the states, lately colonies of Spain, limited to objects growing out of their common relations to Spain, H[is] M[ajesty']s Gov[ernment] would not object. But any project for putting the U[nited] S[tates] of North America at the head of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be highly displeasing to your Gov[ernment]. It would be felt as an ill return for the service which has been rendered to those states, and the dangers which have been averted from them, by the countenance and friendship, and publick declarations of Great Britain; and it would, too, probably at no very distant period, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe."<sup>27</sup>

Dawkins did not take part in the deliberations of the congress, but apparently held frequent informal conferences with the delegates.<sup>28</sup> He reported to Canning that on making one of

For a translation into Spanish of the instructions to Dawkins, see Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, 149-159.

<sup>27</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 787, citing Canning to Dawkins, Public Record Office, F. O., Colombia.

<sup>28</sup> In his instructions to Vaughan, written shortly before the instructions to Dawkins, Canning had said: "The avowed pretension of the United States to put themselves at the head of a confederacy of all the Americas, and to sway that confederacy against Europe (Great Britain included), is *not* a pretension identified with our interests, or one that we can countenance as tolerable." See also Dunning, *The British Empire and the United States*, 56. In a dispatch dated September 23, 1826, Poinsett makes the following statement: "The agent sent to Panama by his Majesty, the King of Netherlands, is arrived here, but his Britannic Majesty's commissioner, Mr. Dawkins, is returned to England. These gentlemen were not present at the deliberations of the congress." (*American State Papers, For. Rel.*, VI, 362.) Poinsett meant, of course, that the representatives of Great Britain and the Netherlands did not attend the meet-

his almost daily visits to Gual on June 26, he had found the Colombian delegate somewhat cold and incredulous as to the good wishes of England. He discovered later that Gual's attitude had been caused by his having read some published dispatches of Everett, the minister of the United States to Spain. These dispatches were distinctly unfavorable in their criticism of the English procedure at Madrid, and among other things asserted that Lambe, the British minister to Spain, had not been active in persuading Ferdinand to grant recognition.<sup>29</sup>

ings of the congress and not that they were not present in the city of Panama while the assembly was in session; for he must have had accurate information on this point. It is probably due to the above statement that Manning makes the mistake of saying, in speaking of the congress, that "neither the English nor the American representatives were present." (*Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 157.)

<sup>29</sup> The dispatches here referred to were undoubtedly those contained in a document entitled, "The executive proceedings of the Senate of the United States on the subject of the mission to the congress at Panama together with messages and documents relating thereto," published March 22, 1826. The following extract (p. 84) from one of the dispatches, dated October 20, 1825, would account for Gual's attitude and for Dawkins' concern.

"Mr. Lambe's sentiments in regard to the South American question are, of course, precisely the same with ours. I was desirous to ascertain whether the British Government had lately made any attempts to urge Spain to a recognition of the new states, and questioned Mr. Lambe upon this point. He said he had had one or two conversations with Mr. Zea soon after his arrival (he has been here about five months), and stated the substance of what had passed between them. The minister, it seems, gave to him the same answer which he has since given to me, and cited, to illustrate his argument, the same examples of Louis XVIII and Bonaparte. No offer of formal mediation has been made by England since her recognition. Indeed her interest as a commercial and manufacturing country, is now on the other side. The longer the war continues, the longer she enjoys monopoly of the Spanish American market for her fabrics, and the more difficult will Spain find it to recover her natural advantages upon the return of peace. England will, therefore, probably be very easy in regard to this matter, and will leave Spain to pursue, unmolested, the course she may think expedient. I suggested this point both to Mr. Zea and to the Russian minister, and was inclined to think from what they said of it, that it had more weight with them than any other consideration in favor of recognition. They both admitted the justice of my remarks, and the great inconvenience that resulted in this way from the present state of things, and could only avoid the proper conclusion, by reverting to their common places, of the probability of a return of the colonies to their allegiance, which they really seem to imagine will come about sooner or later, without any effort on the part of either Spain or her allies, and by the aid of some unlooked for in-

Dawkins was greatly concerned and, having read the correspondence, wrote to Gual and contradicted the statements of Everett. He also furnished Gual with copies of English dispatches which were intended to prove that Great Britain had been active and sincere in her attempts to secure recognition. According to Dawkins, British ascendancy at the congress was soon completely recovered, and Gual freely expressed his opinion "of the imprudence of the United States, of the errors committed by Mr. Everett, and of the mischief which may be done by the indiscreet publication of his correspondence." Furthermore, Gual promised to bring before the congress a project for terminating the war through the mediation of Great Britain.<sup>30</sup> Evidently the British agent believed that he had satisfactorily accomplished at least a part of his mission — the making of the United States an object of suspicion to the Spanish Americans. In summing up the general results of the congress in a later dispatch he called attention to the fact that

tervention of Divine Providence. I learned nothing material from Mr. L. excepting the fact that the British Government is now quiet in regard to this matter, and makes no attempts to influence the decision of Spain. He professed to have but little information as to the state of the Spanish settlements in America, and having passed the greater part of his life, including the last eight or ten years, on the Continent, has been, in fact, rather out of the way of obtaining it." Cf. also *American State Papers*, *For. Rel.*, V. 869.

About a year prior to the date of Everett's dispatch the French minister at Washington had written his government as follows: "North America believes that the mere force of its example will be sufficient protection against the dangers of democracy; as for England, she does not yet wish to see in all these commotions anything beyond her commercial interests, for which reason she is secretly putting obstacles in the way of any agreement between Spain and her colonies." Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, citing Mareuil to Villele, *Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Etates Unis*, 1823-1824, No. 80.

It seems unlikely in view of Canning's instructions to Dawkins that the policy of Great Britain was to prevent the termination of the war between Spain and her former colonies. It appears to be indisputable, however, that Canning was doing everything possible to prevent any other power, and especially the United States, from gaining the good will of the new states by mediating in their behalf.

<sup>30</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 789.

the United States had failed to get any commercial treaties in its favor, owing to the opposition of Mexico and Peru. "The general influence of the United States," he said, "is not, in my opinion, to be feared. It certainly exists in Colombia, but it has been very much weakened even there by their protests against an attack on Cuba, and by the indiscretions they have committed at Madrid."<sup>31</sup>

Though a man of discernment and not lacking in diplomatic experience and skill,<sup>32</sup> Dawkins appears to have placed too high a valuation upon what he was able to accomplish at Panama. The attitude of the new states toward Great Britain and the United States was the product of a number of factors which had been quietly producing their effects over a period of years. No amount of manipulation at the congress could have added greatly to British prestige in Mexico and South America, nor could have detracted appreciably from the friendly feeling with which the United States was generally regarded throughout the continent. Even though Dawkins had been able to affect in the most profound manner the opinions of the delegates, he could not have been sure of any consequent change in the attitude of the republics which they represented; for the congress itself was destined to have little immediate influence, and as the individual members did not occupy commanding positions in their respective countries they were powerless to produce important changes. To the question of Cuba, particularly, Dawkins attached too great importance as affecting the relations between the United States and the southern republics. On this question there was no clear division of Spanish America

<sup>31</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 793; Dawkins to Canning, October 15, 1826.

<sup>32</sup> He was formerly British minister at Athens. Temperley calls him "the astute Mr. Dawkins." (*Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 788) and the Spanish American delegates at the congress generally spoke of him with praise. He was born in 1792 and died in 1865. (Cf. Burke's, *The Landed Gentry of Great Britain and Ireland*, IV, *sup.*)



against Anglo-America. Peru and Central America had much less interest in the subject than had Colombia and Mexico. And the latter republics were more suspicious of one another than either was of the United States. Briceño Méndez laments not that the United States had designs on the islands but that he and his colleague, Gual, had not been able to induce the Mexican delegates to speak out clearly on the subject. And Mexico had been pushing its plans for an expedition against Cuba more through jealousy of Colombia than through fear that the United States would seize the islands. These were conditions which Dawkins' efforts could have done little to change.

But Dawkins' mission to Panama was intended to be not merely negative, not merely destructive of the influence of the United States. The great aim was the positive one of achieving a lasting ascendancy for Great Britain in Hispanic American affairs. Such an end could be attained only by positive contributions to the welfare of the new states, the pressing need of which, for the moment, was peace and tranquillity. Accordingly Dawkins was instructed to tender the good offices of his government for reopening negotiations with Spain. As to the proposal of peace — a proposal which had often been discussed and which had usually been indignantly rejected — Canning gave no instructions.<sup>33</sup> Some record of this subject has been left by the delegates of Colombia and Peru in the O'Leary papers. The following references throw light upon this particular point and upon the whole mission of the British agent, as it was viewed by the delegates assembled at Panama.

The British commissioner arrived at Panama on June 2, and his credentials, according to which it appears that he had been appointed to reside at whatever place the congress should meet and to maintain with it a "friendly and frank communication," were considered at the second formal meeting held on June 23.

<sup>33</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, *American Hist. Rev.*, XI, 788.

In consideration of the "generous and liberal policy of the government of his Britannic Majesty toward the American states," the assembly resolved that a letter be written to Canning and another to Dawkins in acknowledgment of the receipt of the credentials<sup>34</sup> No further reference to the British commissioner appears in the protocols of the sessions until July 15, when it was recorded that the president was requested to inform him of the removal of the congress to Tacubaya.<sup>35</sup> More extended allusions are to be found in the unofficial correspondence of some of the delegates.

On June 4, Briceño Méndez wrote that Dawkins had said to the Colombian delegates, among other things, that his mission was merely one of deference and consideration on the part of Great Britain toward Colombia; that there were great hopes of Spain's giving in finally and recognizing the new states; that France had a lively interest in the matter and had agreed to take steps which could not fail to compel Ferdinand VII to acknowledge the independence of his former colonies in America.<sup>36</sup> On June 6, Vidaurre wrote that the British minister had paid a visit on that day to the Peruvian delegation, on which occasion the question of the recognition of the independence of Peru by Great Britain was discussed. Dawkins expressed an opinion unfavorable to such a measure, because, he said, Peru had not yet established a constitutional government (*gobierno constituido y procedente del congreso nacional*). "He tells me," wrote Vidaurre, "that we ought to be careful to proceed in such a way as to avoid coming into conflict with the system of Europe, as well as to avoid arousing the prejudices of America. It is important that this should be duly considered. This gentleman assures us at the outset that his government wishes nothing and asks nothing. It is willing to help us, however,

<sup>34</sup> Protocol of the second conference of the congress. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 340.

<sup>35</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 348.

<sup>36</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 205. Briceño Méndez to Bolívar.

when opportunity may permit.”<sup>37</sup> Under the same date but in a separate communication, Tudela gave an account of the conference with Dawkins, agreeing in substance with the report of his colleague.<sup>38</sup>

In a joint letter dated June 10, Gual and Briceño Méndez wrote that the amiable and frank character of the British agent had inspired confidence; that he, Dawkins, detested the idea of intrigue or of spying; and that his greatest desire was to be a friend to all.<sup>39</sup> A month later the Colombian delegation wrote that the assembly had not had time to investigate what object the British commissioner might be seeking in Panama other than that stated in his credentials, but that his expressions to some of the delegates demonstrated that Great Britain was moved by a desire to contribute to the termination of the war.<sup>40</sup> After the adjournment of the congress, Briceño Méndez wrote: “The English commissioner in Panama never ceased preaching to us about the necessity of granting an indemnity to Spain as a *sine qua non* of recognition. After the assembly had adjourned he suggested that Mr. Canning would be very much displeased to know that we had made no proposal of peace to Spain, and that this would be viewed in Europe as proof that we were for settling everything by force and thus following the footsteps of the French republic. A statement of so positive a nature, after all we had heard on the subject of an indemnity, could do no less than cause us to view the proposition as coming from the British ministry, in spite of the fact that the commissioner always protested that these opinions were his own, and should by no means be taken as those of his government. Gual and I had several conferences with him on this subject, and finally after we had strongly urged him to say what in his opinion would

<sup>37</sup> Vidaurre to the minister of foreign affairs of Peru. O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 324.

<sup>38</sup> Pérez de Tudela to Bolívar, O’Leary. *Memorias*, X, 415.

<sup>39</sup> Gual and Briceño Méndez to the secretary of foreign relations of Colombia, O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 325.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 335.

be acceptable, he told us that the amount was between sixty and eighty millions, and that this could be paid without making it appear as an indemnity, for everything has a remedy.<sup>41</sup>

“He concluded by assuring us that on this basis recognition was more than certain, and that his government would take charge of the mediation, if it were believed to be necessary. We had him understand that what we might say was on our own responsibility, for we were not authorized to enter into negotiations on this subject; that we did not know of any intentions of our government except in a contrary sense, as appeared in our treaties with the rest of the republics; and that even though we had the requisite knowledge and authority we would refrain from making any proposal for paying an indemnity, because by merely making such an offer we would lose the fight, and would encourage Spain to increase her pretensions beyond measure, which would not be the case if the proposal came from her and we were the ones to consider it. He tried to reassure us on this point, giving us to understand that neither France nor England would permit too great pretensions on the part of the metropolis, since both were greatly interested in seeing that the new republics were not sacrificed, and that Spain should not escape too suddenly from the difficult situation in which she then found herself.”<sup>42</sup>

<sup>41</sup>The attitude of the United States on this point was in contrast to that of Great Britain. Speaking in his instructions to Anderson and Sergeant of the desirability of peace, Clay declared that there was “nothing in the present or in the future, of which we can catch a glimpse, that should induce the American republics, in order to obtain it, to sacrifice a particle of their independence. They ought, therefore, to reject all propositions founded upon the principle of a concession of perpetual commercial privileges to any foreign power. The grant of such privileges is incompatible with their actual and absolute independence. It would partake of the spirit and bring back, in fact, if not in form, the state of ancient colonial connection. Nor would their honor and national pride allow them to entertain or deliberate on propositions founded upon the notion of purchasing, with a pecuniary consideration, the Spanish acknowledgment of their independence.” *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 124.

<sup>42</sup>Briceño Méndez to Bolívar, aboard the *Macedonia*, in front of Buena-ventura, July 22, 1826. O’Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 215.

Upon his return to Bogotá, Briceño Méndez made a more extended report on the proceedings at Panama, in which he again referred to Dawkins' mission. Expressing great satisfaction at being able to say that the conduct of the British agent had been "noble, frank, and loyal," he added: "We have had no cause for complaint against Mr. Dawkins and no reason to distrust him; on the contrary all the delegations manifested toward him very flattering marks of respect and consideration. We Colombians, particularly, were the object of his special attentions and I am not ashamed to confess that my famous friend and colleague, Señor Gual, received greater consideration than any of the rest, showing clearly the high opinion in which his talents, his learning, and his character are held." Alluding to the fact that Dawkins' relations to the congress were not official, Briceño Méndez continued: "He limited himself to counseling that we show respect for the institutions of other countries, whatever they might be; that we not only avoid everything that might serve to increase the fears and misgivings which Europe already had relative to revolutionary principles, but that we make an effort to demonstrate that republicanism in America is not what France professed under a republican régime; that we do not confirm the suspicion that we are aiming to form a separate political system in opposition to Europe, but that we confine ourselves to looking after our own interests and to providing for our national security; that above all it was important that we give proof of a love of peace and of a disposition to embrace it, even though it were at the cost of some pecuniary sacrifice. On this last point he insisted with such tenacity that I have had no doubt but that it was the principal object of his mission, in spite of the fact that he constantly protested that what he said was his own and not the opinion of his government."<sup>43</sup>

Continuing, Briceño Méndez says that Dawkins gave every assurance that mediation by England would have a successful

<sup>43</sup> Briceño Méndez to the Secretary of Foreign Relations of Colombia, Bogotá, August 15, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 573-574.

outcome, provided the money consideration were taken as a point of departure in the negotiations; for otherwise France, without whose aid England could make no progress, would not coöperate in the enterprise. It is at this point that Briceño Méndez made reference to Dawkins' veiled warning against the designs of the United States in Cuba and Porto Rico and against the joint mediation of the United States and Russia, for the purpose of terminating the conflict. Furthermore Dawkins declared, in a moment of ardor, that none of the republics would be able to obtain a loan in Europe for continuing the war, especially a war of invasion, but that on the contrary there would be no trouble in procuring money as the price of peace. Expecting that the congress would not adjourn without taking some notable step toward peace, Dawkins was unable to hide his surprise and disappointment on learning the contrary. Briceño Méndez concludes his references to the mission of the British agent in the following significant passage: "As to the results of the deliberations of the assembly he manifested great alarm, on the occasion of a visit which Gual and I made him, at the action of the confederates in renouncing, as he believed, the right to negotiate with foreign nations except through the assembly. We showed him his mistake and in order to remove any suspicions which public rumors might have inspired in him, we permitted him to read the treaty of union and that of contingents. After having read these he approved all their provisions, excepting the one relating to the removal of the congress to Mexico; because, he said, apart from its geographical position and its political importance, the services of Colombia to the cause of America gave it the right to have the assembly on its soil." <sup>44</sup>

In view of the prominent part which the name of Gual has played in the foregoing discussion, the following remarks which

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 574. The delegates of the United States were authorized to agree upon a transfer of the conferences from Panama to any other place on the American continent. *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 117.

he made in a private letter to Bolivar, relative to the mission of the British agent, will be of interest. Declaring that in his opinion the object which was then demanding the chief attention of the British cabinet was peace between Spain and the new states, and advertng to the persistence of Spain in her attempts to reconquer the lost colonies, Gual said: "We are thus between two extremes which offer not the least point of contact. Mr. Dawkins believes that peace may be bought with money, and this he has repeated so many times as an opinion of his own (not of the ministry) that I am almost persuaded that France is the one who desires to negotiate peace under these conditions in order to reimburse herself for what Spain owes her. In a word, from all I have heard on this subject, I deduce that France wishes to get *something* out of the recognition and *leave something* to Ferdinand VII, who, they say, thinks of nothing but getting money to buy gewgaws and such trifles in London and Paris. . . . I confess that my private opinion is not altogether contrary to making some sacrifice for peace,<sup>45</sup> provided we do it voluntarily and are not forced into it by a decree in the French style, as was the case with Haiti. Peace would be an immense blessing to America, for without it, exposed as we are to domestic disturbances and to foreign wars of the most complicated nature, our fate would always be uncertain. . . . The proposition in any case ought to come from the other side, so that we might consider it; for it may be made in such diverse forms that it would be impossible to decide upon its acceptability beforehand."<sup>46</sup> No such proposal was ever

<sup>45</sup> Sentiment, however, particularly in Colombia and Peru, was decidedly against the payment of an indemnity. On May 21, 1826, Revenga wrote to Bolivar as follows: "I have to add a request which I make from the bottom of my heart. I believe it to be very desirable that you should urge the congress of the Isthmus to ratify or renew the compact which prohibits Colombia and her allies from conceding in return for peace, indemnity or recompense of any kind in detriment to our honor and to our independence. The plenipotentiaries of Colombia have instructions in conformity with this ideal. But you will do it because you know I am no visionary." O'Leary, *Memorias*, VI, 515.

<sup>46</sup> Gual to Bolivar, June 23, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, VIII, 447.

made, of course, by the obstinate Ferdinand, and it is unlikely that it would have been accepted, even if it had been made, at so late a day. It may be added that Gual's correspondence, like that of Briceño Méndez and of the Peruvian delegates, gives no evidence that his attitude toward the United States had in the least been affected by his conferences with Dawkins.

Of doubtful success in one of its main objects, that of counteracting the influence of the United States in the concerns of the new governments, the mission of the British agent in another of its principal aims, the bringing about of an accommodation between the allied belligerents and the mother country, was a complete failure. But this failure must by no means be regarded as a sign of the inefficacy of Canning's American policy; for on the whole that policy, skillfully prosecuted as it had been over a period of several years, had succeeded in establishing in at least some parts of Spanish and Portuguese America the ascendancy which Great Britain sought. On the whole, also, it may well be said that Dawkins' mission, in view of the failure of the congress itself and in view of what British diplomacy had already accomplished, did not fall far short of what might reasonably have been expected of it. He had stood in the relation of an adviser to the congress, had offered the services of his government to bring about peace, had cultivated friendly relations with the delegates present, and in a general way had, no doubt, contributed to the cordiality of intercourse between Great Britain and the states taking part in the assembly. Under the circumstances little more was possible.

Canning's policy of maintaining British supremacy in the Western Hemisphere had a singularly ardent and tenacious supporter in Simon Bolivar. Not that Bolivar was interested in British supremacy as such, but that he believed it to be essential to the independence and future prosperity of the new states. If the Liberator's hopes could have been realized the Congress of Panama would have been the scene of the negotiation of a



compact in virtue of which the nascent American states would have been placed under the protection of Great Britain. In such a contingency the declarations of President Monroe by implication would have ceased to be effective in their original intention and scope. Apparently Canning did not at any time approve of the plan. The idea was Bolivar's and for a period of nearly fifteen years he worked untiringly to carry it into execution. It was in 1815, while he was in exile in Jamaica, that Bolivar began a propaganda aimed at securing the assistance and protection of Great Britain, and in order that the plan which he later wished to have the Congress of Panama adopt may be viewed in its proper setting, it will be well to glance for a moment at some of his earlier expressions on the subject.

Writing to Maxwell Hyslop on May 19, 1815, more than three months before he penned the famous prophetic letter so often referred to, Bolivar said: "The time has arrived, Sir, and perhaps there will not be another opportunity, for England to take part in determining the fate of the peoples of this immense continent, who will succumb or be exterminated unless some powerful nation comes to their rescue. . . ." Referring then to the great possibilities which were open to England for the extension of her trade, and calling attention to the undeveloped resources, especially of New Granada, where he declared the mountains were filled with gold and silver, he exclaimed: "What a bright prospect for British industry is offered by this spot of the New World! I shall not speak of the other regions which but await the day of freedom when they will receive into their midst great numbers of continental Europeans who will constitute in a few years another Europe. Increasing by this means her weight in the political balance England rapidly diminishes that of her enemies, who will come here and indirectly and inevitably contribute to England's commercial preponderance and to an increase in her military strength sufficiently to maintain the colossus which embraces every part of the earth.

. . . These great advantages may be obtained at a very small cost: twenty or thirty thousand rifles, a million pounds sterling, fifteen or twenty war vessels, munitions, a few agents, and the number of volunteers who may choose to follow the flags of America. Here you have all that is needed to give liberty to this hemisphere and to establish the balance of the world."<sup>47</sup>

Continuing, Bolivar declared that Costa Firme could be saved with six or eight thousand rifles and ammunition in proportion, together with five hundred thousand pesos to pay the expenses of the first months of campaign. Finally, he made the following remarkable statement: "With this assistance the rest of America will be relieved from danger; and at the same time the provinces of Panama and Nicaragua may be delivered to Great Britain in order that she may make of these countries the center of the world's trade by constructing canals, which, breaking through the barriers separating the two seas, will bring nearer the remote parts of the earth and render permanent England's dominion over commerce."<sup>48</sup> Bolivar explained his reasons for seeking the aid of Great Britain a few days later in a letter to Richard Wellesley. He said: "If I had had a single ray of hope left that America would be able to triumph unaided, no one could have desired more than I to serve his country without the humiliation of soliciting foreign protection. This is why I have left Costa Firme. I came in search of aid; I will go to seek it in that superb capital — if it were necessary I would go to the north pole — and if everybody is insensible to the voice of humanity, I will have done my duty, though ineffectually, and I will return to die fighting in my native land."<sup>49</sup>

Whether or not as a result of Bolivar's appeals, the struggling patriots of Costa Firme during the next three or four years received substantial aid from Great Britain. Meanwhile, and

<sup>47</sup> *Cartas de Bolívar (Sociedad de Ediciones)*, 116-117.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 118.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 123.

during the years that followed, Bolivar's faith in England apparently never wavered and his desire to enter into some sort of intimate political association with the British Empire grew stronger as the difficulties of organizing the former Spanish colonies into stable governments became more evident. It was not, however, until Great Colombia had been established and not until the Liberator had taken the first definite steps to bring about a confederation of the new states that he began what appears to have been a positive propaganda aimed at inclining the minds of the leaders in Colombia and Peru to the acceptance of the scheme which he was destined later to propose. During the eventful period immediately preceding the battle of Ayacucho the references in his correspondence to Great Britain are frequent and most friendly. With his plans for the liberation of Peru still in formation, with his restless, imaginative mind running forward to the time when the whole of America would be free, and to the time when the necessity for the organization of a stable political system would be at hand, he wrote Sucre that after deep meditation he had become more strongly confirmed in his first designs and that every day he was becoming more convinced of the correctness of his political opinions. "Everything confirms most positively," he said, "my conjectures relative to an early peace. England is the most interested in this transaction because she desires to form a league with all the free peoples of America and Europe, against the Holy Alliance, for the purpose of putting herself at their head and ruling the world."<sup>50</sup>

Later it became evident, at least in a general way, what part Bolivar would have had the new states play in this great scheme of world dominion. In July, 1825, he wrote to Revenga and to Santander setting forth his ideas on the subject,<sup>51</sup> and although these letters are not included among the published documents relating to the Liberator, it is nevertheless possible to

<sup>50</sup> Bolivar to Sucre, May 24, 1823. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 274.

<sup>51</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 207, 209; VI, 499.

determine from other sources what were the essential features of the plan which he must have had in mind. He did not, it seems, set forth his scheme in detail; for Revenga in replying declared that, although he had read the *Liberator's* letters on the subject, together with other papers furnished him by the vice president, yet he was left in doubt as to the nature of the arrangement which it was desired to make. The plan, which at first seemed "perfectly clear, relatively easy to carry out, and from every point of view desirable," now appeared to present certain difficulties. Was it, he inquired, a question of alliance between two nations, or a question of intimate federation, in which there was a protector with more or less privilege or authority of one kind or another? In attempting to answer this question Revenga made some observations which it is of interest to quote.

"The indefinite nature of the fears," said Revenga, "which are expressed for our existence and which in present circumstances cannot be attributed to the policies of continental Europe, for those policies are gradually becoming milder with respect to us; and the supposition that supremacy must be yielded to some one, induce the conclusion that it be the second [*i.e.* a protectorate]; and if it be the second, however much the authority and the privileges of the protector be reduced, it appears clear that the strength of none of the confederates can grow without increasing in geometrical proportion that of the protector, who will excel the rest in this way as well as in knowledge, industry, and sources of wealth. It appears equally clear that there would be no hope of being able to separate from the federation later, for that same growth of power would give the protector greater prestige among foreign nations, more means for working secretly among the confederates, a stronger hold on their respect, and a greater number of pretexts for demanding their consideration and gratitude. . . . I speak of the objections to this kind of protectorate, or immediate supremacy, such as England exercises over the Ionian Islands, because the

other species of protectorate consisting of a confederation of sovereigns, like that of Austria over the empire is not advantageous except in so far as it presents to the outside world a greater, more formidable, more harmonious mass. It cannot have any influence in bettering the internal condition of any of its members except by means of friendly counsel, exclusively; for what has excited in the Austrian Empire the greatest number of complaints has been the attempt to influence, through the Diet, the institutions of the separate states.

“After considering both systems I have come to the conclusion that you were referring rather to an alliance as close and as cordial as it is possible to conceive, an alliance which will contribute to the conservation of the federation, present it to the world, shielded by all the power of the new ally, and at the same time point out to the members of the confederation the road to prosperity. Such is the alliance which from time immemorial has existed between England and Portugal. And although it might be argued that the alliance practically exists already as far as foreign powers are concerned, in virtue of declarations which have been made; that the breach of neutrality which it would occasion and the results which would follow in Europe are opposed to it; and that the friendly counsels which would be obtained under such an arrangement would be available without it, yet I judge that it may be brought about if, the minds of the people being prepared, the opportunity is taken advantage of.”

In conclusion Revenga requested Bolivar to explain with “precision and exactness” what were his wishes relative to the proposed arrangement with Great Britain.<sup>52</sup> Without waiting for a reply, however, he set to work and prepared a plan which, with the approval of the cabinet, he communicated to the Liberator in the shape of additional stipulations or objects for the consideration of the Congress of Panama. They were in substance as follows:

<sup>52</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, VI, 499-501.

1. That the penalty for failure to conform to the decisions of the confederation, serving as arbitrator between two of its members, should be exclusion.

2. That none of the confederates should be permitted to form an alliance with a foreign power or with one or more of their own number independently of the rest.

3. That the confederation should necessarily be the mediator in disputes arising between one of the confederates and a foreign power.

4. That the assembly, or a person or persons to whom it might delegate the necessary authority, should negotiate and conclude in the name of the confederation one or more treaties of alliance, purely defensive, whose aim should be the conservation of peace.

5. That it should be the duty of the assembly to meet at fixed periods.<sup>53</sup>

In the letter in which this plan is set forth, Revenga states that he had requested the representative of Colombia near the government of Peru to explain to the Liberator the reasons for the adoption of the additional stipulations and to inform him of the measures that had already been taken for securing the proposed alliance between "our confederation and the very noble and very powerful King of Great Britain and Ireland." When that should be accomplished, "the whole of America," he said, "being united by motives of common interest will rest without fear in its adhesion to justice and will flourish tranquil and content in the shade of peace." In a private letter dated the next day he declared: "I have conceived the project without an apparent protector, though there is one in reality; and to allay the fears which an alliance with such a strong power inspires, provision is made for easy separation from the confederation. Nevertheless I have aimed at embracing the whole hemisphere, for the least of the benefits that would result from the project

<sup>53</sup> Revenga to Bolivar, November 5, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIII, 351.

would be that there should never be occasion for those fears. I tried at the same time to strengthen the bonds of the confederation, not only with a view to the conservation of peace but with a view to protecting the independence of small states. I communicate the scheme as being exclusively Colombian, because you are a Colombian and do not need the glory of being its author, and because it will be more acceptable in the other states if you support it as the initiative of some one else rather than your own. It seems to me that we are going to renew with greater glory the ancient Hanseatic League.”<sup>54</sup>

There is reason to believe that the government of Colombia, in spite of its formal protestations to Bolívar, did not enter with enthusiasm into this scheme of political union with Great Britain. In communicating the additional stipulations to the Colombian delegation at Panama, Revenga declared that the extension which it was desired to give to the objects of the federation, however advantageous such a move might appear to be, ought not to be too readily acceded to.<sup>55</sup> It cannot be definitely affirmed that this was taken as a hint not to push the matter, but for some reason the Colombian delegates did not manifest great interest in the project. Though informed of it in November, 1825, they do not mention it in their correspondence, beyond an acknowledgment of the receipt of the papers, until the latter part of April, when their interest was momentarily aroused by hearing from Hurtado that Great Britain had appointed a representative to the congress. This led Gual and Briceño Méndez to believe that the British Government had accepted the proposed plan and that as representatives of Colombia they would be required to enter into negotiations with the British agent upon his arrival at Panama. As a measure therefore of provision they asked for instructions relative to certain points upon which they were not clear.<sup>56</sup> The desired instructions never

<sup>54</sup> Revenga to Bolívar, November 6, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIII, 351.

<sup>55</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 289.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 296, 316.

were sent. The delegates of Peru were wholly without instructions on the subject, and while those of Central America were authorized to solicit an alliance with Great Britain, they were not empowered to carry the negotiations to a definite conclusion.<sup>57</sup> It was assumed that the Mexican delegates, who had not yet arrived, would not be favorably instructed, because of the disagreeable impression produced in Mexico by the failure of Great Britain to ratify a treaty which had been concluded between the two countries shortly before.<sup>58</sup> There was, however, no occasion for the Mexican delegates to intervene in the matter, for Dawkins who arrived two or three days ahead of them, had no instructions on the subject, and he apparently put to rest all talk of such an alliance as had been proposed. Thus the additional stipulations never became matter of formal discussion in the Congress of Panama, and it is unlikely that they would have been seriously considered, in view of the attitude of the other republics, even if the government of Colombia had been sincerely striving to obtain their adoption.

It appears on the other hand that a mere defensive alliance such as was provided for in the additional stipulations was not what Bolivar had in mind. It is true that in replying to Revenga's communications on the subject, he seemed to agree with the interpretation which had been given to his suggestions and to share with the government of Colombia its fear of too close a union with England. "It now appears to me," he wrote, "that the alliance with Great Britain will considerably add to our influence and to our respectability; for enjoying her protection we would grow to man's estate, and acquiring en-

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 321.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, VI, 515. The treaty referred to was signed at Mexico City on April 6, 1825. Great Britain refused to ratify it because of certain articles which it contained favorable to Mexico and contrary to principles which England did not wish to abandon. A new treaty was concluded between the two countries at London on December 26, 1826, and was duly ratified by the respective governments the following year. Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 70; *Derecho Internacional Mexicano, Tratados y Convenciones*, I, 445.



lightenment and strength take our place among the nations possessed of the civilization and power which characterize a great people. But these advantages do not dissipate the fear that that powerful nation might become in the future sovereign of the counsels and decisions of the assembly; that her voice might become one of command and that her will and her interests might become the soul of the confederation, which would not dare to displease nor to come into conflict with an enemy so irresistible. This, in my opinion, is the greatest danger in allowing a nation so powerful to become involved with others so weak." Continuing, Bolivar declared that the additional objects appeared to be as proper and as useful as the main part of the project, and he agreed with Revenga that if the plan were adopted by the whole American continent and by Great Britain it would present an immense mass of power which would necessarily produce stability in the new states.<sup>59</sup> What Bolivar really thought is more adequately set forth in the memorandum which he wrote in February, 1826, either shortly before, or just after, the date of the letter above quoted. This memorandum, until recently unpublished, is found in the "Archives of the Liberator" at Caracas.<sup>60</sup> Here he appears to be not in the

<sup>59</sup> Bolívar to Revenga, February 17, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXXI, 164.

<sup>60</sup> Simón Bolívar — *Un Pensamiento Sobre el Congreso de Panamá. Obsequio de Vicente Lecuna a los delegados al Segundo Congreso Científico Pan-Americano*, Washington, D. C., 1916.

First published with an English translation (of which the part quoted is a copy) and presented to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress at Washington in January, 1916. On account of its importance the Spanish text is given below in full:

#### UN PENSAMIENTO SOBRE EL CONGRESO DE PANAMA

(Inedito — El original se halla en el archivo del Liberator, Caracas.)

El Congreso de Panamá reunirá todos los representantes de la América y un agente diplomático del Gobierno de S. M. B. Este Congreso parece destinado a formar la liga más vasta, más estraordinaria y más fuerte que ha aparecido hasta el día sobre la tierra. La Santa Alianza será inferior en poder a esta confederación, siempre que la Gran Bretaña quiera tomar parte en ella, como Miembro Constituyente. El jénero humano daría mil bendiciones a esta liga de salud y la América como la Gran Bretaña cojerían cosechas de beneficios.

least moved by the fear of British domination. The memorandum is as follows:

“The congress of Panama will bring together all the representatives of America and a diplomatic agent of H. B. M. This congress seems to be destined to create a further reaching, more

*Las relaciones de las sociedades políticas recibirían un código de derecho público por regla de conducta universal.*

1. El nuevo mundo se constituiría en naciones independientes, ligadas todas por una ley común que fijase sus relaciones esternas y les ofreciese el poder conservador en un Congreso general y permanente.

2. La existencia de estos nuevos Estados obtendría nuevas garantías.

3. La España haría la paz por respeto a la Inglaterra y la Santa Alianza prestaría su reconocimiento a estas naciones nacientes.

4. El orden interno se conservaría intacto entre los diferentes Estados y dentro de cada uno de ellos.

5. Ninguno sería débil con respecto a otro: ninguno sería más fuerte.

6. Un equilibrio perfecto se establecería en este verdadero nuevo orden de cosas.

7. La fuerza de todos concurriría al auxilio del que sufriese por parte del enemigo esterno o de las facciones anárquicas.

8. La diferencia de orijen y de colores perdería su influencia y poder.

9. La América no temería más a ese tremendo monstruo que ha devorado a la isla de Santo Domingo; ni tampoco temería la preponderancia numérica de los primitivos habitantes.

10. La reforma social, en fin, se habría alcanzado bajo los santos auspicios de la libertad y de la paz — pero la Inglaterra debería tomar necesariamente en sus manos el fiel de esta balanza.

La Gran Bretaña alcanzará, sin duda, ventajas considerables por este arreglo.

1. Su influencia en Europa se aumentaría progresivamente y sus decisiones vendrían a ser las del destino.

2. La América le serviría como de un opulento dominio de comercio.

3. Sería pa. ella la América el centro de sus relaciones entre el Asia y la Europa.

4. Los ingleses se considerarían iguales a los ciudadanos de América.

5. Las relaciones mutuas entre los dos países lograrían con el tiempo ser unas mismas.

6. El carácter británico, y sus costumbres los tomarían los americanos, pr. los objetos normales de su existencia futura.

7. En la marcha de los siglos, podría encontrarse quizá una sola nación cubriendo al Universo — la federal.

Tales ideas ocupan el ánimo de algunos Americanos constituidos en el rango más elevado; ellos esperan con impaciencia, la iniciativa de este proyecto en el Congreso de Panamá, que puede ser la ocasión de consolidar la unión de los nuevos Estados con el imperio Británico.

BOLIVAR.

(Lima: febrero de 1826.)

extraordinary, stronger league than has ever been formed in the world. The Holy Alliance will be less powerful than this confederation should England be willing to be a party as a constituent member. Mankind will bless a thousand times such a league for the public weal, and America as well as Great Britain will reap its benefits.

“ The relations of political communities would obtain a code of public law for their universal rule of conduct.

“ 1. The New World would be formed by independent nations bound together by a common set of laws which would fix their foreign relations and would give them a conservative power in a general and permanent congress.

“ 2. The existence of these new states would obtain new guarantees.

“ 3. Spain would make peace through respect for England and the Holy Alliance would recognize these new rising nations.

“ 4. Internal order would be preserved untouched, both among and within each of the different states.

“ 5. No one would be weaker than the other, no one the stronger.

“ 6. A perfect balance would be established in this true new order of things.

“ 7. The strength of all would come to the aid of one suffering from a foreign enemy, or anarchical factions.

“ 8. Difference of origin and color would lose their influence and power.

“ 9. America would have nothing more to fear from that awful monster which has devoured the island of Santo Domingo, nor would there be any fear of the preponderance in numbers of the primitive inhabitants.

“ 10. Social reform, in short, would have been attained under the blessed auspices of liberty and peace — but England should necessarily take in her hands the beam of the scales.

"Great Britain would undoubtedly attain considerable advantages through this arrangement.

"1. Her influence in Europe would progressively increase and her decisions will be like those of destiny.

"2. America would serve her as a wealthy commercial domain.

"3. America would be to her the center of her relations between Asia and Europe.

"4. English subjects would be considered equal to the citizens of America.

"5. The mutual relations between the two countries in time would become the same.

"6. British characteristics and customs would be taken by Americans as standards of their future life.

"7. In the advance of the centuries, there would be, perhaps, one single nation covering the world — the federal nation.

"These ideas are in the mind of some Americans of the most prominent class; they are awaiting impatiently the initiation of this project in the Panama Congress, which may be the occasion of consolidating the union of the new states with the British Empire."

On February 10, 1826, Bolivar arrived in Lima after a sojourn of nearly a year in the south of Peru and in the new republic of Bolivar. Immediately on reaching Lima, he sent for the British consul general, Ricketts, and had a long conference with him.<sup>61</sup> A few days later Ricketts sent an account of the conference to his government and included with his report a memorandum in Spanish substantially the same as the one quoted above, though differing from it in some parts in phraseology.<sup>62</sup>

Bolivar was then deeply absorbed in the question of the internal organization of the new states, and the object of the con-

<sup>61</sup> Villanueva, *El Imperio de los Andes*, 97-108.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 144-146.

ference was in part to make his ideas on the subject known to the British Government. Thus the proposal for an alliance or a species of protectorate was closely related to the question of monarchy, which has been duly considered in a previous chapter and need not be dwelt upon here. But there is an important question which remains to be answered.

What was the attitude of Great Britain toward the project? It has already been intimated that Canning probably did not go so far at any time as to approve of the plans for placing the new states under British protection. He had declared, however, in his instructions to Dawkins that Great Britain would not object to "a league of the states, lately colonies of Spain, growing out of their common relations to Spain," but that "any project for putting the United States of North America at the head of an American Confederation, as against Europe," would be highly displeasing to the British Government. In so far, therefore, as the project dispensed with the leadership of the United States and was intended to assure to England the degree of influence which she hoped to exercise in the affairs of the new states, Canning must have regarded it at least with sympathy. But it is unlikely that he would have imperiled the friendly relations existing between Great Britain and other sections of America recently emancipated, particularly Buenos Aires, Brazil, and Mexico, by making his government a party to an arrangement which was viewed with suspicion in each of those sections. Indeed he could have adopted no more effective means for dividing the new states into hostile groups than by supporting the Liberator's grand project. Canning's policy aimed at maintaining harmonious relations with all these nascent powers and between them all. His diplomacy had been especially directed toward bringing about a friendly settlement of the differences between Buenos Aires and Brazil and toward preventing Bolivar from interfering in the quarrel between those countries.<sup>63</sup> And he was even more desirous of

<sup>63</sup> Cf. the Minute of a conference which Hurtado, the minister of Colom-

avoiding a course which would have surely resulted in an interruption of the friendly relations then existing between Great Britain and the United States. In accordance with this policy he rejected the overtures which were finally made by the Colombian minister in London.<sup>64</sup>

bia at London, had with Canning on November 7, 1825 (O'Leary, *Memorias*, 352-354); Hurtado to Revenga, November 16, 1825 (O'Leary, *Memorias*, 358-360); Revenga to Bolivar's secretary general (O'Leary, *Memorias*, 478-479).

<sup>64</sup> In a letter to Bolivar, dated December 23, 1826, Santander said:

"Hurtado has at last spoken to Mr. Canning concerning the alliance and the protectorate. The minister [Canning] fears that the rest of the nations will view the league unfavorably, and particularly the United States of the North. He declared that England aspired only to maintain the relations which she had established with the American states, unless some unforeseen event should oblige her to adopt some other course." O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 341.

## CHAPTER X

### ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTENTION must now be directed to the fuller consideration of the attitude of the United States toward the Panama Congress, as well as of the attitude of the great protagonist of that congress toward the United States.

It will be recalled that the circular of invitation which Bolivar sent out under date of December 7, 1824, was directed specifically to the "republics formerly colonies of Spain." Nevertheless, two months previously the government of Colombia had instructed Salazar, its minister at Washington, "to sound gradually and in a manner confidential and private, the opinion and desires of the government of the United States relative to the proposed American confederation," with a view to extend an invitation to that government if it should show a disposition to accept.<sup>1</sup> In replying to Bolivar's circular, Santander, the acting president of Colombia, wrote early in February, 1825, that he had deemed it expedient to invite the United States to send representatives to the assembly, and that he was firmly convinced that the allies of Colombia would not fail to see with pleasure friends so enlightened and sincere taking part in deliberations for their common interest. Santander sent with his communication to Bolivar a copy of the instructions to Salazar.<sup>2</sup> In April, Bolivar wrote expressing the fear that the invitation to the United States would not be favorably regarded by Great Britain,<sup>3</sup> to which objection Santander re-

<sup>1</sup> Gual to Salazar, October 7, 1824. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXII, 615.

<sup>2</sup> Santander to Bolivar, February 6, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 255.

<sup>3</sup> The letter referred to has not been published. The inference is drawn from Santander's reply.

plied that if the United States entered the confederation it would be only after having arrived at an understanding with Great Britain, as he was sure had been done when President Monroe announced his opposition to the American projects of the Holy Alliance.<sup>4</sup>

The government of Colombia was not alone in inviting the United States to participate in the Congress of Panama. Replying to Bolivar's circular of December 7, 1824, President Victoria declared that, as he was persuaded that the cause of independence and liberty was the cause not only of the republics formerly colonies of Spain but also of the United States, he had instructed the Mexican minister at Washington to broach the subject of the congress to the President and to inquire whether he would desire to send representatives to take part in its deliberations.<sup>5</sup> During the spring of 1825, Clay held separate conferences on the same day with the ministers of Mexico and Colombia, at their request, in the course of which each of them stated that his government was desirous that the United States should send representatives to the proposed congress. Clay informed the ministers that if certain preliminary points relative to the subjects to be considered, the substance and form of the powers of the delegates, and the mode of organizing the congress could be arranged in a satisfactory manner, the President would be disposed to accept in behalf of the United States the invitation which had been provisionally tendered. Thus the matter rested until early in November, when Obregón and Salazar, the ministers of Mexico and Colombia, presented formal invitations, which were soon followed by a similar communication from the minister of the republic of Central America, who had not been a party to the previous conferences. In an identical note to Obregón and Salazar, Clay, while lamenting the fact that the preliminary conditions

<sup>4</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 189.

<sup>5</sup> Victoria to Bolivar, February 23, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 256-257.



had not been satisfactorily arranged, declared that the President had resolved, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, to send commissioners to the congress, and that, while these commissioners would not be authorized to enter upon any deliberations nor to concur in any acts inconsistent with the neutrality of the United States, they would be fully empowered and instructed on all questions likely to arise in which the nations of America had a common interest. On the same day Clay, in a shorter note, accepted the invitation which the minister from Central America had extended in behalf of his government.<sup>6</sup>

In his first annual message of December 6, 1825, President Adams referred briefly to the proposed assembly at Panama and made known the fact that he had accepted the invitation which had been extended to the United States to be represented in it.<sup>7</sup> On December 26, he sent to the Senate his special message nominating Anderson and Sergeant as delegates. Accompanying this message there was a report from the secretary of state, together with copies of the correspondence with the ministers of Mexico, Colombia, and Central America. On January 9, 1826, he sent to the Senate, in compliance with a resolution of that body, yet another report of the secretary of State, furnishing translations of the conventions which Colombia had entered into with Peru, Mexico, Central America, and Chile;<sup>8</sup> and with these there were transmitted such parts of the correspondence of the United States with Russia, France, Colombia, and Mexico as were supposed to bear upon the subject of the resolution. These messages and the accompanying papers were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, from which, on January 16, Senator Macon made a report concluding with the recommendation that the following resolution

<sup>6</sup> *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V. 835-839.

<sup>7</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, II, 302.

<sup>8</sup> The convention was never ratified by Chile.

be adopted: “*Resolved*, that it is not expedient, at this time, for the United States to send ministers to the Congress of American Nations assembled at Panama.”<sup>9</sup>

On February 1, to which day the consideration of the resolution was postponed, the President transmitted to the Senate, at its request, extracts from the correspondence between the United States and Spain, relative to the interposition of the Emperor of Russia to induce Spain to recognize the independence of the South American states.<sup>10</sup> No action of importance was taken by the Senate until February 15, when, on motion of Van Buren, it was resolved, first, that, upon the question whether the United States should be represented in the Congress of Panama, the Senate ought to act with open doors, unless it should appear that the publication of the documents would be prejudicial to existing negotiations; and secondly, that the President be requested to inform the Senate whether such objection existed. The President, in reply, declared that the communications relating to the Congress of Panama had been made in confidence, and that, as he believed in maintaining the established usage of free confidential intercourse between the executive and the Senate, he deemed it his duty to leave to the Senate itself the decision of the question.<sup>11</sup> On February 23 a resolution was passed declaring that, although the Senate had the right to publish confidential communications, yet circumstances did not then require the exercise of that right. With this question disposed of, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations, and after a long debate it was defeated on March 14 by a vote of 19 to 24. The confirmation of the President’s nominations followed without further difficulty, the

<sup>9</sup> *Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States on the Subject of the Mission to Panama*, 3-14, 15-56, 57-76.

<sup>10</sup> *Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States on the Subject of the Congress of Panama*, 77-86.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 87.

vote being 27 to 17 and 26 to 18 for Anderson and Sergeant respectively.<sup>12</sup>

Agitation over the Panama Congress began in the lower house even earlier than in the Senate. On December 16, 1825, Hamilton of South Carolina introduced a resolution calling upon the President for information concerning the invitation extended to the United States to take part in the congress. Three days later, however, having heard that the President intended in due time to send to the House all papers bearing upon the matter, he postponed the consideration of his resolution, reserving, nevertheless, the right to call it up later if he should conceive this to be necessary.<sup>13</sup> On January 25, 1826, Miner of Pennsylvania introduced resolutions expressing sympathy with the new states and declaring that provision ought to be made by law for defraying any expenses which might result from the appointment of ministers to the assembly on the Isthmus. But at the request of their author the resolutions were ordered to lie on the table.<sup>14</sup> On January 31 Hamilton's resolution was called up, and after a debate occupying a large part of the time of the House for four days it was adopted.<sup>15</sup> On March 15 Adams sent to the House the desired documents; and, as the nominations of Anderson and Sergeant had been confirmed the day before, he asked the House to make an appropriation to defray the expenses of the mission.<sup>16</sup>

On March 25 Crowinshield from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which the President's message and the accompanying documents were referred, made a favorable report.<sup>17</sup> But when, on April 4, the House in committee of the whole

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 98, 101-104. For the debates, see *Register of Debates in Congress* (1826), II, 152-342.

<sup>13</sup> *Register of Debates in Congress*, 1826, II, 817-819.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1116-1118.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1208-1301.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* (appendix), 9. Other documents were sent to the house on March 30, on April 5, and on April 15. *Ibid.*, 83, 89, 91.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* (appendix), 100-105.

took up the report, McLane of Delaware offered an amendment which was designed to place upon the executive certain limitations respecting the powers and instructions to be given to the envoys.<sup>18</sup> The debate which followed was long and spirited and involved every phase of the relations between the United States and the other American countries. There were, however, as Webster pointed out, only two questions for the House to decide: First, whether it would assume the responsibility for failure to make the appropriation; and secondly, whether it should interpose with its opinions, directions, or instructions as to the manner in which that particular executive measure should be conducted.<sup>19</sup> When the amendment came to a test on April 21, it was lost by a vote of 54 to 143. Three days later the appropriation was passed by a somewhat smaller majority.<sup>20</sup>

It is no part of the purpose of the present study to review the debates which took place in the United States Senate and in the House of Representatives on the subject of the Panama mission; for those debates had little if any influence, either directly or indirectly, upon the Congress of Panama. The internal conditions of the new states, and their relations not only with one another but also with other countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, were factors which had already determined the character of the assembly and its probable outcome. As has been intimated elsewhere in these pages, the discussions in the Congress of the United States are of interest chiefly on account of their bearing upon the condition of domestic politics. The opposition to the mission to Panama, in so far as it was genuine, was based upon Washington's precept against entangling alliances; but it was in fact largely factitious, and indi-

<sup>18</sup> *Register of Debates in Congress*, 1826. II, 2011. For the debates, see *ibid.*, 2011-2098; 2135-2514.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 2254.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 2490, 2514.

cated hostility to the administration much more than disapproval of the idea of coöperation with the new states.

The question of slavery was brought into the discussion for the purpose of inflaming party passion, but it had practically no effect upon the policy either of the United States or of the other American states regarding Haiti, Cuba, and Porto Rico.<sup>21</sup> No American state had recognized the independence of Haiti, or had manifested a disposition to receive the black republic on terms of equality. And as to Cuba, the policies of the United States, Colombia, and Mexico had been determined in the main independently of the question of slavery, long before the discussions began in the United States Congress. It is difficult to believe that the United States would have been less opposed to the transfer of Cuba to another power, or that Colombia and Mexico would have been less anxious to acquire it, had there been no slaves on the island. It is true that, if the congressional debates had not caused delay, the delegates of the United States might have set out in time to reach the Isthmus before the assembly adjourned. But, even so, it may be doubted whether the issue would have been more successful. It is possible, on the contrary, that the presence of representatives of the United States might not have contributed to the harmonious carrying out of the aims of the congress.

Nevertheless, in the papers sent by President Adams to the

<sup>21</sup> The vote in the Senate followed strictly party lines and not sectional lines, as would have been the case if slavery had been a determining factor. Of the nineteen senators who maintained by their votes that it was inexpedient to send ministers to Panama seven were from non-slave holding states and of the twenty-four who voted in favor of the mission, eight represented slave states. The seven Northern senators who cast their votes against the mission were: Chandler and Holmes of Maine; Woodbury of New Hampshire; Van Buren of New York; Dickerson of New Jersey; Findlay of Pennsylvania, and Kane of Illinois. The slave-state senators in favor of the mission were: Benton of Missouri; Boulogny and Johnston of Louisiana; Chambers and Smith of Maryland; Clayton and Van Dyke of Delaware; Johnson of Kentucky. Cf. *Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the U. S. on the Subject of the Mission of the Congress of Panama* (1826), 101; Roosevelt, *Thomas Hart Benton*, 65.

two branches of the national legislature and occasionally in the speeches of senators and representatives, there are passages of great significance regarding the place the United States should occupy in the American system. Thus, in a letter of Adams, who was then Secretary of State, to Rodney, the first United States minister to Buenos Aires, dated May 17, 1823, the following interesting reference to the subject is found:

“ In the meantime a more extensive confederation has been projected under the auspices of the new government of the republic of Colombia. In the last dispatch received from Mr. Forbes, dated the 27th January last, he mentions the arrival and reception at Buenos Aires of Mr. Joaquín Mosquera y Arboleda, senator of the republic of Colombia, and their minister plenipotentiary and extraordinary upon a mission, the general object of which, he informed Mr. Forbes, was to engage the other independent governments of *Spanish*<sup>22</sup> America to unite with Colombia in a congress, to be held at such point as may be agreed on, to settle a general system of *American Policy*, in relation to Europe, leaving to each section of the country the perfect liberty of independent self-government. For this purpose he had already signed a treaty with Peru of which he promised Mr. Forbes the perusal; but there were some doubts with regard to the character of his associations, and the personal influence to which he was accessible at Buenos Aires, and Mr. Forbes had not much expectation of his success in prevailing on that government to enter into his project of extensive federation.

“ By letters of a previous date, November, 1822, received from Mr. Prevost, it appears that the project is yet more extensive than Mr. Mosquera had made known to Mr. Forbes. It embraces North, as well as South America, and a formal proposal to join and take the lead in it is to be made known to the government of the United States.

“ Intimations of the same design have been given to Mr.

<sup>22</sup> Italics as in the printed instructions.

Todd, at Bogotá. It will be time for this government to deliberate concerning it when it shall be presented in a more definite and specific form. At present it indicates more distinctly a purpose on the part of the Colombian republic to assume a leading character in this hemisphere, than any practicable objects of utility which can be discovered by us. With relation to *Europe* there is perceived to be only one object in which the interests and wishes of the United States can be the same as those of the Southern American nations, and that is, that they should all be governed by republican institutions, politically and commercially independent of Europe. To any confederation of Spanish American provinces, for that end, the United States would yield their approbation and cordial good wishes. If more should be asked of them, the proposition will be received and considered in a friendly spirit, and with a due sense of its importance.”<sup>23</sup>

Ten days later, in his instructions to Anderson, who was being dispatched as minister to Colombia, Adams again refers to the question of confederation, as follows: “Of this mighty movement in human affairs, mightier far than that of the downfall of the Roman Empire, the United States may continue to be, as they have been hitherto, the tranquil but deeply attentive spectators. They *may*, also, in the various vicissitudes, by which it must be followed, be called to assume a more active and leading part in its progress. Floating, undigested purposes of this great American Confederation have been for some time fermenting in the imaginations of many speculative statesmen, nor is the idea to be disdainfully rejected, because its magnitude may appall the understanding of politicians accustomed to the more minute, but more complicated machinery of a contracted political standard.

“So far as the proposed Colombian Confederacy has for its object a combined system of total and unqualified *independence*

<sup>23</sup> *Register of Debates in Congress* (1826), Vol. I, Part II, 90 (App.); *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 918.

of Europe, to the exclusion of all partial compositions, of any one of the emancipated colonies, with Spain, it will have the entire approbation and good wishes of the United States, but will require no special agency of theirs to carry it into effect.

“ So far as its purposes may be to concert a general system of popular representation for the government of the several independent states which are floating from the wreck of the Spanish power in America, the United States will still cheer it with their approbation and speed with their good wishes its success.

“ And so far as its objects may be to accomplish a meeting, at which the United States should preside, to assimilate the politics of the South with those of the North, a more particular and definite view of the end proposed by this design, and of the means by which it is effected, will be necessary to enable us to determine upon our concurrence with it.”<sup>24</sup>

In the foregoing instructions Adams touches upon what is perhaps the most vital point in the whole question of the confederation of independent American states; namely, which of the several governments should be the preponderant factor in the formation and maintenance of the proposed league? Bolivar had raised the question nearly a decade before and his efforts from that time onward had been directed toward building up a state, in which he himself, perhaps, should be the dominant figure, sufficiently strong to assume the position of leadership. Adams would have been unwilling, it may be deduced from the instructions to Rodney and Anderson, to commit the United States to participation in a league in which the influence of some other power should preponderate. Not only so, but he would give no assurance as to the course his government would adopt if invited to head the movement. In his own language, it was necessary to have first a more definite view of the end proposed and of the means by which it was to be effected.

<sup>24</sup> *Register of Debates in Congress* (1826), Vol. I, Part II, 80 (App.); *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, V, 895.



As has already been shown, during the two years from 1823 to 1825 but little was heard of the project for confederating the American states. Toward the close of 1824, however, the Congress of Panama began to be discussed anew and, shortly after Adams became President, was the subject of diplomatic interchanges at Washington and of discussion in the public press of the country. Henry Clay, who had been, in the Congress of the United States, the ardent advocate of the cause of the southern republics, was now Secretary of State; but Adams, while acting as his predecessor in that office, had, during the period of agitation in favor of the new states, stood in the way of the realization of Clay's policy of a more benevolent attitude toward them. The two men had not changed their opinions. Clay, ever enthusiastic with respect to the possibilities of an intimate political association of the free states of the continent, saw in the Congress of Panama an opportunity to realize his dream of an American system. Adams, cold, judicial in his attitude toward the southern neighbors, critical of their accomplishments, and skeptical of their capacity for self-government, inclined to adhere to the traditional policy of no entangling alliances.<sup>25</sup> And, strange to say, when the adminis-

<sup>25</sup> In March, 1821, Adams wrote in his diary as follows: "That the final issue of their present struggle would be their entire independence of Spain I had never doubted. That it was our true policy and duty to take no part in the contest I was equally clear. The principle of neutrality to *all* foreign wars was, in my opinion, fundamental to the continuance of our liberties and of our union. So far as they were contending for independence, I wished well to their cause; but I had seen and yet see no prospect that they would establish free or liberal institutions of government. They are not likely to promote the spirit of either freedom or order by their example. They have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions. Civil dissension was infused into all their seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was in every member of their organization, moral, political, and physical. I had little expectation of any beneficial result to this country from any future connection with them, political or commercial. We should derive no improvement to our institutions by any communion with theirs. Nor was there any appearance of a disposition in them to take any political lessons from us." *Memoirs*, V, 324.

tration was less than two months old, the President and his Secretary of State set forth, or caused to be set forth, their respective views in articles published in the daily press. These articles were cited a year later in the debate on the Panama mission in the House of Representatives.<sup>26</sup>

The article attributed to Clay first appeared in the *Democratic Press* of Philadelphia and was copied by the *National Intelligencer* of Washington in its issue of April 26, 1825. The writer of the article, advertng to the fact that it had been announced by the government of Colombia that a congress of the states of South America would be held at Panama during the course of the year, inquired whether or not the United States would be represented there. "If we do not appear there," the writer declared, "we shall most probably, and very deservedly, find those feelings that ought to unite all America transferred to other governments which know better how to appreciate the singular importance of reunion, and which will, by their forethought, derive, to our exclusion, the advantages arising from affectionate feelings, and from relations which we will have justly forfeited. At this congress, will, no doubt, be suggested the natural idea of a coalition, perhaps confederation, of all the South American states.

<sup>26</sup> Ingham of Pennsylvania, speaking in the House of Representatives on April 18, 1826, quoted extracts from the articles in question. "I will not," he said, "conceal my belief as to the authorship of the two papers: so far, at least, as to declare that I am convinced that in the Philadelphia paper was written under the eye of the Secretary of State, and that in the *National Intelligencer* under the eye, if not by the pen, of the President himself. I pretend not to have any other evidence of this fact than what will be found in the articles; the circumstances of their appearance and the known opinion of these two gentlemen on the subject discussed in the papers; I will not, therefore, be suspected of having betrayed any confidence in relation to any supposed knowledge of their authorship. I will only add that the last contains more good sense, upon a subject somewhat intricate, than I have ever seen comprised in so small a space. It is in my judgment one of the ablest papers that I ever put my eye upon. If I am correct in my supposition as to the authorship, these two papers will give us the free and untrammelled opinions of the two statesmen at the head of the executive department of the government at that time." *Register of Debates in Congress* (1826) Vol. I, Part 11, 2363.

“ Let them propose to all the *American nations a confederation*. The details of so magnificent a work would require long and laborious consideration; but the leading principle should be the establishment of a constitution something like our own, by which an Areopagus or congress should watch over the mutual relations of the confederated states, without interfering with their several or internal regulations or governments — which should govern to a limited extent the relations with foreign powers, of the whole, and of the several confederated states — and which should wield the force of the confederated states in defense of any member that may be attacked.

“ Is it objected that foreign nations will view the confederation with jealousy? I answer, first, it will be strong enough to conciliate the good, and to regard the rage of unjust men with indifference. Treaties of mere alliance have not hitherto been found sufficient; they have almost always terminated in disgust, and have been broken. Secondly, I answer that in modern times the example has been repeatedly set us; the Holy Alliance is itself an example; the Germanic Confederation as it was, and as it stands is a case in point, the Confederation of the Rhine another; the former union of the three Crowns of England, Scotland, and Ireland another; as are also the former, and perhaps in a certain degree the present condition of the dominions of the Emperor of Austria; the heptarchy of England; and nearly all the nations of Europe in the dark ages; to say nothing of the Greek confederation in ancient times. The errors of these exemplars are before us, to warn us against their repetition, and to instruct us how to organize our confederation. The fate of most of them, that of fusion into one mass, can never result from our confederation; the regions are too enormous, and the distance too vast; they were within the compass of boundaries less than almost any of the states we propose to unite, and by language and many other causes, naturally formed to make one nation — but it would be the height of absurdity to attempt to form one government, or one na-

tion, out of the two Americas, or even out of one of them; and impossible, because absurd.<sup>27</sup>

“This scheme of a general confederation of the Americas, is submitted to the public as means of securing peace and power *abroad*, peace and happiness at home. Every argument of humanity, policy and reason, calls upon us to rivet the bonds of fraternal affection between the inhabitants of the same continent, and to guard with a sacred vigilance against the rupture of a single link.

“A confederation alone is competent to this duty, and without it we must submit to the ordinary fate of other nations, jealousy, discord and war, whenever any nation thinks itself strong enough to wage one with impunity.”<sup>28</sup>

The article attributed to Adams appeared in the same issue of the *National Intelligencer*, as a reply to the proposals contained in the article from which the foregoing extracts are taken. Declaring that the United States had no concern with the policy of the governments of the other independent nations of America, in their relations to one another, further than to wish to see them in amity, the writer said: “As concerns this nation, we know not what might be the answer of the executive to an invitation to join the proposed confederation, but we know what we should wish it to be — what we hope nine tenths of the American people would desire it to be. If the public sentiment be in accord with ours on this point, we shall never send a representative to any congress of nations whose decisions are to be *law* for this nation. Our own confederacy insures us the power and the mode of asserting our rights, and vindicating our wrongs. By an alliance with any other nation or nations, it is obvious we shall not strengthen but expose ourselves. We shall lose, by such an alliance, the independence which is our boast. For what is independence

<sup>27</sup> Compare the ideas here expressed with those set forth by Bolivar in his prophetic letter of a decade earlier.

<sup>28</sup> *National Intelligencer*, April 26, 1825.

but a name, if the question of peace or war, and other questions equally as important, are to be determined for us, not by the Congress of the United States, but by a stupendous confederacy, in which the United States have but a single vote?

“It will be seen that we consider the proposed congress, or confederation, as being intended to possess the powers, as well as the name which has been given to it, of the ancient council of Amphictyons, having the power to coerce obedience to its decrees. The proposition from the *Democratic Press* looks to a body having such powers, if the Bogotá proposition does not, and our objections apply still more strongly to our own government moving in this matter, than they would to its meeting the overtures on the subject from the government of Colombia, or from any other government.

“It is surely not necessary here to urge arguments against any departure from that cardinal principle in our foreign intercourse which distrusts and rejects alliances with foreign nations, for any purpose. We do not mean, of course, voluntary coöperation with other nations for definite objects but that sort, which, by an alliance, becomes compulsory. Every one will see, at a glance, the vital objections there are to this government's coupling its destinies with those of any other people on earth. The Amphictyons of Greece were a body perhaps necessary in that age, among other objects, to keep alive its religious institutions, and to protect its oracle. We have, thank Heaven, escaped the bondage of such follies and are regenerated from such superstitions. We have no sacred wars to wage, nor occasion for a Holy Alliance, to protect either our religion or our political rights. It is no reason, because such a measure has found favor among the nations of Europe, that it should be resorted to by the nations of America.”

Continuing, the writer declared that if nothing more were meant than a conference of ministers to consult upon the interests of the whole, there would be no other objection to it

than that it could be productive of nothing beneficial. But if such a conference were proposed, perhaps mere courtesy might induce an assent to it on the part of the United States, were it only to assert, in that conference, the doctrine that in becoming independent of the metropolitan governments, the governments of America ought not, and as far as the people of the United States were concerned, would not, be dependent on one another. Against the magnificent scheme set forth in the Philadelphia paper the writer made, therefore, a decided protest, concluding as follows: "We want not his Areopagus any more than we do the Amphictyons. For *our* Areopagus we are satisfied with our bench of judges, and for *our* council of Amphictyons we choose our own congress. We desire, in fine, to be members of no confederation more comprehensive than that of the United States of America."<sup>29</sup>

The articles in question, whether or not they were correctly attributed to Clay and Adams, respectively, nevertheless expressed certain ideas of which those statesmen had previously been exponents. There is no reason to suppose that either of them had at this time essentially changed his attitude toward the new states. A slight accommodation of ideas, perhaps, made it possible for them to proceed at first without apparent friction. And as it soon became clear that the United States was not expected to form a part of the confederacy whose foundations were to be laid at Panama, a source of possible disagreement between the President and his Secretary of State was thereby removed; for Clay by force of circumstances was now driven to assume an attitude substantially the same as that which had from the beginning characterized the policy of Adams. On the other hand Adams, without altering in a fundamental way his own policy, was able to champion the cause of the assembly with something of Clay's enthusiasm.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>29</sup> *National Intelligencer*, April 26, 1825.

<sup>30</sup> Adams thought that it would be indulging too sanguine a forecast of events to promise that the Panama Congress would accomplish all, or even any, of the transcendent benefits to the human race which warmed the con-

Indeed the President now warmly urged upon the legislative branch of the government the adoption of the measures necessary to enable the executive to dispatch representatives to the Isthmus. Speaking in his special message of March 15, 1826, to the House of Representatives, of the motives which led him to accept the invitation to take part in the deliberations of the congress, he declared that his "first and great inducement was to meet in the spirit of kindness and friendship an overture made in that spirit by three sister republics of this hemisphere." He did not consider it a conclusive reason for declining the invitation that the proposal for assembling such a congress had not first been made by the United States. The project had "sprung from the urgent, immediate, and momentous common interests of the great communities struggling for independence and, as it were, quickening into life. From them the proposition to us appeared respectful and friendly; from us to them it could scarcely have been made without exposing ourselves to suspicions of purposes of ambition, if not of domination, more suited to rouse resistance and excite distrust than to conciliate favor and friendship." The first and paramount principle, he concluded, upon which it was deemed wise and just to lay the corner stone of future relations between the United States and the new states was disinterestedness; the next was cordial good will to them; and the third was a claim of fair and equal reciprocity.<sup>31</sup>

It was in harmony with the general principles laid down by Adams that Clay's instructions of May 8, 1826, to Anderson and Sergeant were prepared. "It is distinctly understood by the President," said Clay, "that it [the Congress of Panama]

ceptions of its first proposers. But he said, "it looks to the melioration of the condition of man. It is congenial with that spirit which prompted the declaration of our independence, which inspired the preamble of our first treaty with France, which dictated our first treaty with Prussia and the instructions under which it was negotiated, which filled the hearts and fired the souls of the immortal founders of our revolution," Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, II, 340.

<sup>31</sup> Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, II, 330-331.

is to be regarded in all respects as diplomatic in contradistinction to a body clothed with powers of ordinary legislation; that is to say, no one of the states represented is to be considered bound by any treaty, convention, pact, or act to which it does not subscribe and expressly assent by its acting representative, and that, in the instance of treaties, conventions, and pacts they are to be returned for final ratification to each contracting state according to the provisions of its particular constitution. . . . All notion is rejected of an amphictyonic council invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct. . . . The complicated and various interests which appertain to the nations of this vast continent cannot be safely confided to the superintendence of one legislative authority." Continuing, Clay declared that with this necessary restriction upon the action of the congress great advantages might nevertheless be derived from an assembly of American ministers. Such an assembly would afford great facilities for free and friendly conferences, for mutual and necessary explanations, and for discussing and establishing some general principles applicable to peace and war, to commerce and navigation, with the sanction of all America. Treaties might be concluded in the course of a few months at such a congress, laying the foundation of lasting amity and good neighborhood, which it would require many years to consummate, if, indeed, they would be at all practicable by separate and successive negotiations conducted between several powers at different times and places.<sup>32</sup>

Proceeding to give the delegates instructions upon the specific subjects which would probably engage the consideration of the congress, Clay warned them, first of all, to refrain from taking part in discussions of matters relating to the future prosecution of the war with Spain. But while it was perfectly understood, said Clay, that the United States could not jeopardize its neutrality, it might be urged to contract an alliance, offensive

<sup>32</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 115-116.



and defensive, on the contingency of an attempt by the powers of Europe, commonly called the Holy Alliance, either to aid Spain to reduce the new American republics to their former colonial state or to compel them to adopt political systems more conformable to the policy and view of that alliance. "If, indeed," said Clay, "the powers of continental Europe could have allowed themselves to engage in the war for either of the purposes just indicated, the United States, in opposing them with their whole force, would have been hardly entitled to the merit of acting on the impulse of a generous sympathy with infant, oppressed, and struggling nations. The United States, in the contingencies which have been stated, would have been compelled to fight their own proper battles, not less so because the storm of war happened to rage on another part of this continent at a distance from their borders; for it cannot be doubted that the presumptuous spirit which would have impelled Europe upon the other American republics in aid of Spain, or on account of the forms of their political institutions, would not have appeared if her arms in such an unrighteous contest should have been successful until they were extended here, and every vestige of human freedom had been obliterated within these states." <sup>33</sup>

There was a time, added Clay, when such designs were seriously apprehended. But the declaration of the late President to the Congress of the United States had had a powerful effect in disconcerting them; and, after Great Britain had manifested a determination to pursue the same policy, thus showing that those two great maritime powers would not see with indifference any forcible interposition in behalf of Spain, it became evident to the European alliance that no such interposition could be undertaken with any prospect of success. <sup>34</sup>

Clay also adverted to the negotiations formerly initiated by the United States with the Emperor of Russia looking to the

<sup>33</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 118-119.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 119.

establishment of peace between Spain and her former colonies through his mediation. An alliance between the United States and the new republics would therefore be worse than useless, since it might tend to excite feelings in the Emperor of Russia and his allies which should not be needlessly touched or provoked. Another reason which concurred to dissuade the United States from entering into an alliance was, declared Clay, the fact that illustrious statesmen, from the establishment of the Constitution, had inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim of the nation's foreign policy. Without asserting that an exigency might not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind between the United States and the other American republics would be highly proper and expedient, it might, he said, be safely affirmed that only an occasion of great urgency would warrant a departure from that established maxim, and none such was believed then to exist. There was, besides, less necessity for such an alliance, because no compact, by whatever solemnities it might be attended, or whatever name or character it might assume, could be more obligatory upon the nation than the irresistible motive of self-preservation, which would be instantly called into operation in the supposed contingency of a European attack upon the liberties of America. If, however, it should appear that the positive rejection of the proposed alliance would be likely to be regarded by the representatives of the other states in an unfriendly light, the delegates of the United States were authorized to receive written proposals on the subject *ad referendum*.<sup>35</sup>

With reference to the noncolonization principle proclaimed in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, the delegates were authorized to propose a joint declaration of the several American states, each, however, acting for and binding only itself, that within the limits of their respective territories no new European colony would thereafter be allowed to be established. It was not intended to commit the parties who

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 120-123.

might concur in that declaration to the support of the particular boundaries which might be claimed by any one of them; nor was it proposed to commit them to a joint resistance against any future attempt to plant a new European colony. It was believed that the moral effect alone of a joint declaration, emanating from the authority of all the American nations, would effectually serve to prevent the effort to establish any such new colony; but if it should not, and the attempt should actually be made, it would then be time enough for the American powers to consider the propriety of negotiating between themselves, and, if necessary, of adopting in concert the measure which might be necessary to check and prevent it. It would not be necessary to give to the proposed declaration the form of a treaty. It might be signed by the several ministers of the congress, and promulgated to the world as evidence of the sense of all the American powers.<sup>36</sup>

On the subject of Cuba and Porto Rico, the instructions adhered closely to the previous policy of the United States regarding those islands, and especially so as to Cuba. As that policy has already been set forth in these pages it need not be restated. On the question of the recognition of Haiti, the instructions were likewise free from innovation. Considering the nature of the governing power, the manner of its establishment, and the little respect shown to other races than the African, the question of acknowledging its independence was, said Clay, far from being unattended with difficulty. In this connection, he mentions an arrangement, then lately made, under which the parent country, France, had acknowledged a nominal independence in her former colony, in consideration of the latter's agreeing forever to receive French products at a rate of duty one half below that which was exacted from all other nations. This was, declared Clay, a restriction upon its freedom of action to which no sover-

<sup>36</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 137. Between Clay's discussion of the noninterference principle and of the noncolonization principle there intervene several pages devoted to other matters.

eign power, really independent, would ever subscribe. But he intimated that, while the United States did not think it proper to recognize Haiti as a new state, the question of its recognition was not one of sufficient magnitude to require a concert of all the American powers.<sup>37</sup>

Next to the pressing object of putting an end to the war between the new republics and Spain, Clay placed that of devising means for the preservation of peace among the American nations, and with the rest of the world. "No time could be more auspicious," he declared, "than the present for a successful inquiry by the American nations into the causes which have so often disturbed the repose of the world, and for an earnest endeavor, by wise precaution, in the establishment of just and enlightened principles for the government of their conduct, in peace and in war, to guard, as far as possible, against all misunderstandings. They have no old prejudices to combat, no long-established practices to change, no entangled connections or theories to break through. Committed to no particular systems of commerce, nor to any selfish belligerent code of law, they are free to consult the experience of mankind, and to establish without bias principles for themselves, adapted to their condition, and likely to promote their peace, security, and happiness. Remote from Europe, it is not probable that they will often be involved in the wars with which that quarter of the globe may be destined hereafter to be afflicted. In these wars, the policy of all America will be the same, that of peace and neutrality, which the United States have heretofore constantly labored to preserve."<sup>38</sup>

Clay furthermore declared that if the principles which that probable state of neutrality indicated as best for the interests of the Western Hemisphere were just in themselves and calculated to prevent wars or to mitigate their rigor, they would

<sup>37</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 138, 145.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 124.

present themselves to the general acceptance with a union of irresistible recommendations. Observing that uncontrolled power, on whatever element it was exerted, was prone to abuse, and that, when a single nation found itself possessed of a power which no one nation, nor all the other nations combined, could check or countervail, such nation grew presumptuous, impatient of contradiction or opposition, and found the solution of national problems by the sword easier and more grateful to its pride than the slow and less brilliant process of patient investigation, he declared that, if the superiority was on the ocean, the excesses in the abuse of such power became intolerable. And since the progress of enlightened civilization had been much more advanced on land than on the ocean, there could scarcely be any circumstance which would tend more to exalt the character of America than that of uniting its endeavors to bring civilization on the ocean to the same forward point that it had attained on land.

On these grounds the representatives of the United States were instructed to bring forward a principle for which the United States had ever contended — the abolition of war against private property and noncombatants on the ocean. If, by the common consent of nations, private property on the ocean were no longer liable to capture as lawful prize of war, the principle that free ships make free goods would, said Clay, lose its importance by being merged in the more liberal and extensive rule. But inasmuch as some nations might be prepared to admit the limited, who would withhold their assent from the more comprehensive principle, the delegates were authorized to propose the adoption of the rule that free ships make free goods, and its converse, that inimical ships make inimical goods. And in order that nations might be rendered still more secure in time of war against abuses at sea, the delegates were directed to propose a plain and intelligible definition of blockade, the want of which had been the source of many difficulties, espe-

cially between the United States and the nascent American powers.<sup>39</sup>

Among the most important matters to which the attention of Anderson and Sergeant was drawn was that of the establishment of some general principles of intercourse applicable to all the powers of America for the mutual regulation of their commerce and navigation. The United States had on all proper occasions, said Clay, disclaimed any desire to procure for itself from the new powers peculiar commercial advantages. This disinterested doctrine would be adhered to, and in the joint negotiations at Panama no privileges would be sought by the United States which were not equally extended to all the American states. Indeed the United States was prepared to extend to the powers of Europe those same liberal principles of commercial intercourse and navigation. Two general principles were in particular to be observed. The first was that no nation should grant any favor in commerce or navigation to any foreign power whatever, either upon this or any other continent, which should not extend to every other American nation; and the second, that whatever might be imported into or exported from any American nation in its own vessels might in like manner be imported or exported in the vessels of other nations, the vessel, whether national or foreign, and the cargo paying in both instances exactly the same duties and charges and no more.

Since nations were equal, common members of a universal family, why, asked Clay, should there be any inequality between them in their commercial intercourse? Why should one grant favors to another which it withheld from a third? If this principle were correct in its universal application, it must, he said, be allowed to be particularly adapted to the condition and circumstances of the American powers. The United States had had no difficulty in negotiating on this point with the republics of Colombia and Central America, and the principle had been

<sup>39</sup> *International American Conference (1889-90)*, IV, 125, 127.

accordingly inserted in the treaties which had been made with both those powers.<sup>40</sup> Other American nations were believed to have a disposition to adopt it. The United Mexican states alone had opposed it, and in their negotiations with the United States had brought forward the inadmissible exception of the Spanish American states, to which the government of Mexico insisted upon being permitted to grant commercial favors which it might refuse to the United States. On this point Clay spoke with some impatience. The minister of the United States at Mexico had, he said, been instructed to break off the negotiations if, contrary to expectation, the Mexican Government should persist in the exception.<sup>41</sup> What rendered it more extraordinary was that, while they pretended that there was something like an understanding between the new republics, no such exception was insisted upon by either Colombia or Central America. The delegates were accordingly instructed to resist any attempt to bring forward such an exception and to subscribe to no treaty which should admit it.<sup>42</sup>

<sup>40</sup> The treaty between the United States and Colombia, which was the first treaty to be concluded by any of the new states with a foreign power, was signed at Bogotá on October 3, 1824. Article II of that treaty was as follows: "The United States of America and the republic of Colombia, desiring to live in peace and harmony with all the other nations of the earth, by means of a policy frank and equally friendly with all, engage mutually not to grant any particular favor to other nations, in respect of commerce and navigation, which shall not immediately become common to the other party, who shall enjoy the same freely if the concession was freely made, or on allowing the same compensation if the concession was conditional." The treaty with Central America which was concluded at Washington on December 5, 1825, contained an article identical with the one just quoted. Cf. Davis, *Treaties and Conventions*, 108, 117, 169-177.

<sup>41</sup> The negotiations began in August, 1825. Mexico insisted on the exception and negotiations were after a time broken off. They were renewed, however, in April, 1826, and a treaty containing the most favored nation clause was concluded on July 10 of that year. This treaty was never ratified. A treaty of limits was concluded on April 5, 1828, but not until exactly three years later was a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation containing the most favored nation clause finally concluded between the two republics. Cf. *American State Papers, Foreign Relations*, VI, 578-613; Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico*, 205-251.

<sup>42</sup> *International American Conference (1889-90)*, IV, 129-131.

The representatives of the United States were urged to press the general principle of reciprocal freedom of navigation, with an earnestness and zeal proportionate to its high value. But while they were to emphasize its reciprocity, which was thought to be perfect, they were warned against any proposal to impose precisely the same rates of duty on vessels and cargoes in all the ports of the American nations. Such a procedure would, it was declared, subject each state to inconvenient restrictions upon its power of taxation instead of leaving it free to consult its own peculiar position, its habits, its constitution of government, and its most fitting sources of revenue. If it should, on the other hand, be objected that the other American nations were not ready for reciprocal liberty of navigation, because their marine was still in its infancy, they should be urged to seek the elements of its increase, not in a narrow and contracted legislation neutralized by the counteracting legislation of other nations, but in the abundance and excellence of their materials for shipbuilding, in the skill of their artisans and the cheapness of their manufactures; in the number of their seamen, and their hardy and enterprising character formed by exposure in every branch of a seafaring life and by adventure on every ocean, and invigorated by a liberal, cheerful, and fearless competition with foreign powers. If, in spite of these considerations, opposition to the principle should be found to be unyielding, the delegates were instructed to propose a modification of it, comprehending at least the products and manufactures of all the American nations, including the West Indies. While the reasoning used in support of the general principle was believed to sustain it in this restricted form, the further consideration was suggested that the great similarity in the produce of the American states made it difficult to trace articles, imported in different vessels or blended in the same vessel, to the countries of their origin for the purpose of subjecting them to different rates of duty. And finally if the principle as thus modified was still opposed, the delegates were to endeavor to secure its ac-



ceptance by any two American nations who might agree to apply it to their own navigation, when employed in transporting their respective produce and manufactures.<sup>43</sup>

In urging upon the Panama Congress the adoption of the foregoing principles of maritime war and of commerce and navigation, Clay was following authoritative precedents. In 1785, more than forty years before the Panama instructions were written, Franklin had declared it to be the policy of the United States to endeavor to abolish the practice of privateering by offering to incorporate in all its treaties an article engaging that in case of future war no privateer should be commissioned on either side and that unarmed merchant ships on both sides should pursue their voyages unmolested. In the same year this principle was embodied in a treaty between the United States and Prussia. During the years which followed the United States continued to advocate the principle, and in 1823 opened negotiations with several of the maritime powers of Europe looking to the adoption of a convention to make it effective.<sup>44</sup> The United States had also long advocated a definition of blockade, and had from the beginning of its existence as a nation striven to establish by treaty the liberal principles of commerce and navigation which Clay was now urging upon the congress of American nations.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, in advocating concerted action on these subjects by the American nations at Panama, Clay could not have been unmindful that such action would constitute a great advance toward the ideal of continental solidarity, nor that it would tend to diminish British influence in the concerns of the new states.

In 1829, after the Panama instructions were made public, the opinion seems to have prevailed in England that the latter consideration furnished a controlling motive in their preparation, and that the United States aimed to secure for itself an

<sup>43</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 131-135.

<sup>44</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VII, 461, 463-465.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 788-789.

undisputed place of leadership in the New World, with a view to enjoy certain commercial privileges to the exclusion of the powers of Europe. The London *Times* declared: "There is an obvious anxiety throughout these long documents to assume, as a sort of political datum, that all 'American' states are to constitute a system and a community of their own, recognizing interests, and establishing maxims for their common regulation as affects each other, and for their separate, exclusive, nay, repulsive use, as regards the other nations of the world. The first obvious consequence of such a scheme, if adopted by Mexico and the states of South America, would be to place the United States at the *head* of the new federation, in virtue of superior strength, maturity, safety, commercial and political resources." <sup>46</sup>

An anonymous writer who published in 1829 a pamphlet containing Clay's instructions,<sup>47</sup> accompanied with observations of his own, expressed in a manner no less positive the opinion that the instructions plainly avowed the design of placing the United States "at the head of the American family." If, said this writer, the United States should do this in a magnanimous spirit, without any exclusive views, Great Britain would not be likely to take offense. But what did the United States do? "To infant states without maritime force, without the possibility of becoming maritime powers for many generations, if at all," the United States, he declared, urged the adoption, in their intercourse with Europe, of the "highest pretensions, which, in the maturity of her naval strength, the United States herself ever ventured to urge — and even then, without the remotest hope of success," and, instead of advising those states

<sup>46</sup> *The Times* (London), May 18, 1829.

<sup>47</sup> *Spanish America. Observations on the instructions given by the President of the United States of America to the representatives of that republic, at the congress held at Panama in 1826.*

The pamphlet is inscribed to the Earl of Aberdeen, "in the hope that no sentiment will be found in these pages at variance with those high principles of national justice of which his Lordship is the uncompromising advocate."

to cultivate the most friendly relations with the powers of Europe, to be wise and not meddle with questions which did not affect their interests, said to them, "Take the highest ground in your negotiations with Europe, that an old-established, powerful state would propose. Insist that free ships shall make free goods. Demand also a definition of blockade."<sup>48</sup>

"What," continues this writer, "must have been the effect of counsel such as this, if it had been followed, but to have produced embarrassment and coldness between the new states and the European powers, and between them and Great Britain in particular? . . . Having recommended to the new states that they should call upon us, to renounce in their favor, a belligerent right which we have never yet conceded to any other power, the elder branch of the American family further suggests to them the experiment of prevailing upon us to make a slight inroad into our navigation act. One of the principles of this code is, that we admit from other nations their own produce, in their own shipping, or in our own; but in no other, unless such produce be again exported from this country. Thus, a ship of the United States brings us cotton or tobacco from New York; but she cannot do so from Colombia; it must come from the latter country either in a Colombian or a British ship. Now, the government of the United States says to these young republics, 'America is one continent — insist in your treaties with Europe that it is one nation — and that it shall be so considered for all commercial purposes — that we, your elder brethren, may come to your ports, and be the carriers of your produce.'"<sup>49</sup>

In the instructions to the delegates to Panama, Clay did not fail to discuss the subject of an interoceanic canal. This vast object, if it should ever be accomplished, would, he declared, be interesting in a greater or less degree to all parts of the world. But to this continent would accrue the largest amount

<sup>48</sup> *Op. cit.*, 8-9.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, 9, 12.

of benefit from its execution; and to Colombia, Mexico, Central America, Peru, and the United States more than to any of the other American nations. What was to redound to the advantage of all America should, in his opinion, be effected by common means and united exertions, and should not be left to the separate and unassisted efforts of any one power. With the limited information then at hand as to the practicability and probable expense of the object, Clay thought that it would not be wise to do more than make some preliminary arrangements. The best routes would, he thought, be most likely to be found in the territory of Mexico or in that of Central America. He stated that the latter republic had made, the year before, a liberal offer to the United States respecting the construction of a canal through its territory; but the answer had gone no further than to make suitable acknowledgment of the friendly overture and to assure the central republic that measures would be adopted to place the United States in possession of the information necessary to enlighten its judgment. Finally, the delegates were instructed to receive and to transmit to their governments any proposals or plans that might be suggested for the joint construction of the canal, with the assurance that they would be attentively examined, with the earnest desire to reconcile the interests and views of all the American nations.<sup>50</sup>

A word may be said in explanation of the "liberal offer" of the republic of Central America. On February 8, 1825, Cañas, the minister of that republic at Washington, addressed a communication to the Secretary of State soliciting the cooperation of the United States in the construction of an inter-oceanic canal upon the ground that the noble example of the elder republic was a model and a protection to all the Americas and entitled it to a preference over any other nation in the merits and advantages of the proposed undertaking. Williams, the American chargé d'affaires at Guatemala, was instructed to

<sup>50</sup> *International American Conference (1889-90)*, IV, 143.

assure the Central American government of the great interest taken by the United States in an enterprise "so highly calculated to diffuse a favorable influence on the affairs of mankind," and to investigate carefully the facilities afforded by the route and transmit the intelligence acquired to the government at Washington. But Williams never made any report of his action under these instructions.

During the year 1825 a number of propositions for the construction of the canal were received by the Central American government from Europe. None of these was accepted; but, on June 14, 1826, a contract was entered into with a company in the United States, called "The Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company." Under this contract the company was to open a canal through Nicaragua, which should be navigable for large ships. The sum of two hundred thousand dollars was to be deposited in the city of Granada, within six months, for the payment of preliminary expenses. The company was to erect fortifications for the protection of the canal, and was to begin its construction within a year. Not having sufficient capital for the purpose, the contractors addressed a memorial to the United States Congress, praying the assistance of the government in their work, which they represented to be of national importance. The memorial was referred to a committee, but was never reported upon. A subsequent attempt to secure capital in England having failed, the enterprise was abandoned.<sup>51</sup>

A few remaining points in Clay's instructions may be briefly mentioned. On the subject of religious toleration the delegates of the United States were authorized to propose a joint

<sup>51</sup> Bancroft, *History of Central America*, III, 741-742, citing Daniel Cleveland's *Across the Nicaragua Transit*, MS. Cf. also a short article entitled *Ship Canal through Central America* in *Niles' Register* for May 7, 1825, and another in the same paper entitled *Atlantic and Pacific Canal* in the issue for September 30, 1826; also *National Intelligencer* for April 26, 1825.

declaration to the effect that within the limits of the several states there should be freedom of worship. Should the congress attempt an amicable adjustment of questions of boundary and other matters of controversy among the American powers, the delegates were instructed to manifest a willingness to give their counsel and advice or to serve as arbitrators, whenever their assistance should be required. A dispute was understood to exist between Mexico and Central America as to the province of Chiapas.<sup>52</sup> It was, said the instructions, the desire of the President that the commissioners of the United States should give this matter their particular investigation, and if justice should be found on the side of Central America, they were to lend to its cause all the countenance and support which they could give without actually committing the United States. "This act of friendship on our part," declared Clay, "is due as well on account of the high degree of respect and confidence which the republic has on several occasions displayed toward the United States, as from its comparative weakness."

The attention of the delegates was next directed to the subject of forms of government and the cause of free institutions

<sup>52</sup> It will be recalled that the provinces of Central America, with the exception of Salvador, became incorporated voluntarily in the empire of Mexico in 1823, and that upon the downfall of Iturbide they withdrew and set up an independent republic. Mexico did not resist the separation, and on August 20, 1824, issued a decree recognizing the independence of the new republic, but declaring that the border province of Chiapas was not included in the territory recognized as independent. Central America in negotiating the recognition of its independence by Mexico requested that Chiapas be left to choose its allegiance as between the two republics. Chiapas chose Mexico and the Central American republic protested on the ground that the province had been coerced, the troops which General Filisola had maintained in Guatemala and Salvador having been transferred to Chiapas. In the constitution adopted by Central America in 1824 it was provided the province of Chiapas would be received into the federation as a state whenever it should freely seek such a union. This was the condition of affairs when Clay's instructions were written. Cf. *La Diplomacia Mexicana*, II, 215, 223; Alamán, *Historia de México*, V, 759; *Memorias para la Historia de la Revolución de Centro América* (Montúfar), XVI.

in the Western Hemisphere. The United States, it was declared, was not and never had been animated by any spirit of propagandism. Allowing no foreign interference either in the formation or the conduct of its own government, it was equally scrupulous in refraining from all interference in the original structure or subsequent interior movement of the governments of other independent nations. Its interest in the adoption and execution of their political systems was rather a matter of feeling than a principle of action; and the general habit of cautiously avoiding a subject so delicate would be adhered to in the present instance. But there was, it was intimated, reason to believe that one European power, if not more, had been active both in Colombia and in Mexico, if not elsewhere, in efforts to substitute the monarchical for the republican form, and to plant on the newly erected thrones European princes. It was due the sister republics, said Clay, to state that this design had met with a merited and prompt repulse; but the scheme might be revived. It has been plausibly suggested that the adoption of monarchical institutions would conciliate the European powers, and hasten their recognition of the new states. Such recognition could not, however, be much longer postponed. It was not worth buying; nor could anything be more dishonorable than to purchase by mean compliances the formal acknowledgment of what had actually been won by so much valor and so many sacrifices. While, therefore, it was not anticipated that there would be any difficulty in dissuading the new states from entertaining or deliberating on such propositions, the delegates were instructed to take advantage of every fit opportunity to strengthen the political faith of the new republics and to inculcate the solemn duty of every nation to reject all foreign dictation in its domestic concerns. At the same time they were to manifest a readiness to satisfy inquirers as to the theory and practical operation of the federal and state constitutions of the United States and to illustrate and explain the manifold blessings which the people of the

United States had enjoyed and were continuing to enjoy under them.<sup>53</sup>

Finally, Clay referred to the war which had recently broken out between Brazil and the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata as being a cause of most sincere regret. In that war, he said, the United States would be strictly neutral. But the delegates were to avail themselves of every suitable opportunity to represent to the parties how desirable it was to put an end to the conflict and with what satisfaction the United States would see the blessings of peace restored.<sup>54</sup>

The foregoing summary of Clay's instructions serves to make clear the policy of the Adams administration with reference to the other American countries. The United States would take no part in an assembly whose object was to legislate for the whole continent; would form no alliance with the new powers for the purpose of maintaining their independence, nor for the purpose of preventing European interference in their affairs; would enter into no arrangement by which its freedom of action in any contingency might be restricted; and finally, would not lend its aid to the formation of a powerful neighboring confederation, which might become a menace to republican institutions, or which might succeed in assuming the position of leadership which the United States desired to retain for itself. Adams had declared in 1823 that to any confederation of Spanish American provinces which had for its aim the establishment of republican institutions, politically and commercially independent of Europe, the United States would yield its approbation and cordial good wishes. But the confederation which it was proposed to constitute at Panama appeared not to be limited to the objects enumerated by Adams. There was some doubt about Bolivar's designs. One of the cardinal points of his policy was the establishment of intimate relations, not only commercial but also political, with Great Britain.

<sup>53</sup> *International American Conference* (1889-90), IV, 148-149.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 150.



Whether this fact was definitely known to the government at Washington is not clear. The United States, however, would hardly have departed in any event from its settled policy of avoiding entangling alliances, although knowledge of Bolivar's plans would necessarily have tended to intensify distrust of the scheme of a southern confederacy.

Nevertheless, the spirit of American unity pervades Clay's instructions. Dangers to be met, interests to be promoted, problems to be solved, were common to all and demanded common counsel and united action. Remoteness from the scenes of European conflicts permitted the establishment of an American policy of peace and neutrality. No old prejudices, no long-established practices, no entangled connections, prevented the states of the New World from adopting for themselves principles of international intercourse suited to their peculiar condition and calculated to promote their peace and happiness. In short, the idea of continental solidarity, in so far as it could be attained by means short of the alliance or the political union of the separate states, was strongly advocated.

While it is of interest to know what was the attitude of the United States toward the Panama Congress, it is of no less importance to know what was the attitude of the other countries toward the participation of the United States. Much has already been disclosed from which deductions may be drawn. We have seen that in Colombia a party led by the acting president, Santander, early developed in opposition to what was thought to be the imperial designs of the Liberator. This party, strongly republican in its sympathies, was inclined to look to the United States rather than to any European power for political guidance. Moreover the predominant sentiment in Mexico and Central America had come to be strongly republican in its tendencies, in spite of the powerful British influence in Mexico. Much light remains to be thrown on the circumstances surrounding the invitation which was extended to the United States by Colombia, Mexico, and Central America be-

fore anything can be positively affirmed with reference to the significance of that invitation. The fact that the three republics acted in concert might have been due to a common distrust of Bolivar's political designs, and to a common belief that the presence of delegates from the United States would be, in a measure, a guaranty of their respective national aspirations under a republican form of government. The adoption of a clause in the general treaty of union, league, and confederation concluded at Panama, by which any member changing substantially the form of its government should by that act be excluded from the league, lends color to this surmise.

No revelation has ever been made of the instructions by the Spanish American governments to their respective delegates regarding the position to be held by the United States in the proposed confederation. The general instructions to the delegates of Peru — no special instructions have been published — do not refer to the northern republic except in an incidental way. The general instructions to the delegates of Colombia do not allude to the United States; but, by direction of Vice President Santander, Revenga, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, late in May or early in June, 1826, appears to have dealt with the subject in special instructions, of which, unfortunately, only a fragment seems to be extant. In this fragment, which is printed in the *Memorias* of General O'Leary, Revenga, after acknowledging the receipt of a number of communications from the Colombian delegates at Panama, and adverting briefly to the new aspect which the conduct of the Peruvian delegates had placed upon the affairs of the assembly, takes up the subject of the United States. "The opposition in the United States," he said, "to sending plenipotentiaries to the Panama Congress has been sustained principally by the representatives of the states of the south. The object may have been to discredit the assembly and thus to prevent an agreement among the countries as to the emancipation of the Spanish Antilles, to the end that the tranquillity of the south-

ern part of the United States might not as a consequence be disturbed. It was probably proposed that their government . . .”<sup>55</sup> Here the extract abruptly ends. A footnote states simply that the conclusion of the letter is not found in the archives.

Whatever may have been the instructions to the delegates of Colombia, Mexico, and Central America, it is not likely that they contained anything indicating a desire to exclude the United States from contributing with its counsel, at least, to the formation of the proposed league. But altogether different was the attitude of the great protagonist of the movement of confederation. Bolivar was anxious to have a representative of Great Britain present at Panama, and he was apparently not averse to the presence there of commissioners from other European countries; yet he did not welcome the participation of the United States in the congress. Of this there can scarcely be any doubt; for, although he did not openly express his disapproval, yet his writings may be searched in vain for any approbation of the action of Colombia, Mexico, and Central America in extending an invitation to the United States. What is the explanation of this attitude of the Liberator? The answers given by certain Latin American writers may be briefly examined.

Gil Fortoul, in his *Historia Constitucional de Venezuela*,<sup>56</sup> published in 1907, concludes his treatment of the Panama Congress with a paragraph reading as follows: “Thus was frustrated the double purpose of Bolivar: that of saving from the domination of Spain — and of the United States — the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico, and that of establishing a permanent balance between the great republic of English origin and the republics of Spanish origin. This probably would have made impossible the hegemony of the United States and would have prevented that power from exercising a protectorate over the

<sup>55</sup> O’Leary, *Memorias*, XXIV, 323.

<sup>56</sup> I, 386.

other countries of this hemisphere. In any case the accomplishment of Bolivar's purpose would have been the means of developing among the Latin American people the position of influence in the world which they lack to-day."

Vargas, in his *Historia del Perú Independiente*,<sup>57</sup> declares that Bolivar instantly comprehended the danger to which the ambiguous protection of the Monroe Doctrine subjected Hispanic America, and that, recognizing the necessity of emancipating the Hispanic states from the power of the Anglo-American republic, he desired to oppose to that power an insuperable barrier in the Gulf of Mexico. With the foregoing opinions Villanueva seems to agree when he says that the Bolivar doctrine was, *Spanish America for the Spanish Americans*.<sup>58</sup>

Jacinto López, in a recent number of *La Reforma Social*, declares that the idea of the Liberator in assembling the Congress of Panama was to prevent foreign domination, and that, believing the United States to be a menace to the other American states, he desired to preserve the latter from the domination of the former as well as from the domination of the powers of Europe. The invitation extended to the United States to take part in the congress was, in López's opinion, a mistake. There was no place in that body for any but the confederates — that is, Mexico, Central America, and the nations of the southern continent. It was a congress essentially, exclusively, Hispano-American. This, López thinks, being the cardinal point in the history of the Panama Congress, cannot be too much insisted upon. The departure from the plan of the Liberator, which was implied in the invitation to the United States, was the source of a train of evil consequences. The United States was thus led to form a concept of the congress entirely different from Bolivar's and to entertain aims relative to it altogether contrary to those which the Liberator entertained. If the idea of Bolivar had been realized — that is, if the grand American

<sup>57</sup> III, 69.

<sup>58</sup> *El Imperio de los Andes*, 140.

confederation had been consummated, with all its great results — it would have been time then to think of a congress of all the nations of America for the solution of their common problems.

Between the American states, continues López, from Mexico to Buenos Aires, there was no conflict of interests. There might have been petty, vulgar rivalries between the men who held the reigns of government, such as prevented the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata from participating in the Congress of Panama, but no such spirit existed between the peoples themselves. On the other hand, between the United States and the American countries still at war with Spain, there was an irreconcilable conflict of interests and aims, of which the question of Cuba and the manifesto which the congress was to formulate in accordance with the Liberator's instructions<sup>59</sup> were important signs. The United States was not confederable. Bolivar never allowed himself to be deceived on this point. He knew that, even if the United States could have joined the confederation, it would have been too powerful and its influence would have been too preponderant to make desirable an alliance between it and the other states.<sup>60</sup>

According to these writers, the aim which was uppermost in Bolivar's mind was that of interposing a barrier to the future expansion of the United States and of disputing its pretensions to a position of leadership in the western world. That Bolivar really entertained such an idea has not been clearly demonstrated. On the other hand, it does seem clear that the fear of the growing power of the United States was never the controlling motive in the determination of his national and international

<sup>59</sup> The delegates of Peru were instructed (*Int. Am. Conf.*, 1889-90, IV, 170) to secure the great compact of union, league, and perpetual confederation against Spain, and *against foreign rule of whatever character*. López, in the article referred to, is of the opinion that the manifesto which the delegates were instructed to issue, similar to that made by the President of the United States, was accordingly aimed to prevent the domination of the United States as well as that of the powers of Europe.

<sup>60</sup> *La Reforma Social*, VI, 376.

policies. More than once he expressed doubts as to the ability of a nation to progress, or indeed long to exist under such a political system as the United States had adopted. This he may have done with a view to discourage what he conceived to be the too prevalent tendency of his countrymen to look to the United States for their political doctrines; and he may have had at bottom a higher opinion of the governmental system of the United States than he was willing to admit. But to affirm that his chief purpose in calling together the Congress of Panama was to prevent the United States from taking a position of leadership in the Western Hemisphere is to do him an injustice, is to detract from his greatness, is to deny him that breadth of vision and that nobility of ideal which have marked him as one of the great men of all time.

The chief purpose of the Liberator was not negative but positive. He had much less interest in challenging the leadership of the United States than in assuming a commanding place for the confederation in which his own Colombia should be the dominant power — a consummation which, in his opinion, depended infinitely more upon the behavior of Great Britain than upon any action which might be taken by, or in relation to, the United States. Bolivar, no doubt, believed that the presence of delegates from that republic might interfere with the freedom of negotiations with Great Britain; and that it might deepen the tendency toward particularism, which was the principal obstacle to the accomplishment of his immediate political designs. Hence, if he had been able to control the situation, the United States would have been permitted to remain in the background until his American confederation had been definitely established under some satisfactory arrangement with Great Britain. But there was no intention on his part permanently to exclude either the United States or any other section of the continent from a share in the grand project of which the American confederation was to be only a part. The whole of America was to stand with Great Britain against the Holy Alliance.

Liberalism was to be pitted against absolutism; freedom against despotism. Bolivar's great aim was not an American balance of power but a world balance of power, and ultimately a federal nation of the world, whose capital, perhaps, should be located upon the Isthmus of Panama. The author of so magnificent a conception cannot be fairly charged with minor aims incommensurate with the realization of his grand ideal.

## CHAPTER XI

### ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE

THE international situation in the southern part of the continent, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, must now be considered more at length. Argentina — that is, the loose confederation then known under the name of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata — was represented in its foreign affairs by the province of Buenos Aires. Under the able guidance of Mariano Moreno, the provincial junta early adopted, as we have seen in a previous chapter, a distinctive policy in relation to the other belligerent communities of America. Jealous of the national autonomy, the junta declined in 1810 an invitation of the government of Chile to send representatives to a general congress, and proposed, instead, defensive alliances as the most effective means of coöperation between the governments of the revolted colonies. To this policy the Buenos Aires authorities continued to adhere, and when the Colombian envoy, Mosquera, arrived early in 1823 on his mission of negotiating the preliminary treaties which were intended to pave the way to definite union at Panama, he was obliged to put aside the extensive Colombian project and conclude with Buenos Aires merely a brief treaty of friendship and defensive alliance.

A few months later this treaty was sent by the executive to the junta of representatives, the legislative body of the province, for action authorizing its ratification. It appears from the discussion which arose in the junta that Rivadavia, who was then serving as Minister of Government and of Foreign Affairs, and who represented Buenos Aires in the negotiations with Mosquera, upon declining to accept the Colombian draft as a basis



of discussion, presented a counter project containing two articles which Mosquera in turn rejected. By the first of these articles the two contracting parties engaged not to accept from Spain, or from any other power, the recognition of independence unless it was extended simultaneously to both, and by the second they entered into a mutual guarantee of the integrity of their respective territories against all powers except those which, like themselves, were formerly possessions of Spain.<sup>1</sup> Around these two rejected articles the discussion chiefly revolved, for in them were expressed the two great immediate ends of Argentine policy — leadership in the southern continent and the consolidation of the old viceroyalty of La Plata into a single state.

Leadership and the integration of the national territory as features of Argentine policy were intimately connected. If integration were consummated, leadership would be assured; and if leadership were first attained, national consolidation would more surely follow. The greatest obstacle in the way of the attainment of these aims seemed at the moment, at least, to be the extraordinary progress of Colombia and the plan of union which it advocated. In 1822, when the Colombian agents first set out to negotiate the treaties preliminary to carrying this plan into effect, the Buenos Aires government, in alliance with Chile, had in hand an undertaking by which it expected to checkmate the growing influence of Colombia and to promote at the same time its own ends. This undertaking was the liberation of Peru. In accord with its foreign policy the Argentine Government had long maintained an *entente cordiale* with Chile, and in 1819, it will be recalled, concluded a treaty with that government under the terms of which the two countries sent an expedition into Peru, under the Argentine general, San Martín. But San Martín, after expelling the Royalists from Lima and creating the republic of Peru, found himself unable

<sup>1</sup> *Diario de Sesiones de la Junta de Representantes de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, Año de 1823*, 44, 51.

to dislodge the enemy from the interior of the country. Having appealed in vain to Bolivar for assistance, and having become aware that his authority over the discordant elements in Peru was being gradually undermined, the Argentine leader, in September, 1822, abandoned the great enterprise, leaving the expeditionary forces to continue the struggle as best they could in coöperation with the Peruvians. Such was the situation when Mosquera reached Buenos Aires in the course of his mission. As Bolivar had not yet taken up San Martín's unfinished task, Argentine statesmen were still hopeful of maintaining their influence in Peru and through that means of achieving their national aims.

Specifically the government of Buenos Aires aimed, by means of the expedition under San Martín, to liberate Upper Peru and thus to assure its incorporation in the Argentine nation. There had prevailed throughout Spanish America a tacit understanding that the boundaries of the new states should conform to those which marked the limits of the major divisions in 1810, when in the most of them the movement of revolt began. This was in accordance with a principle described in international law by the term *uti possidetis*. Its meaning is made clear by the complementary phrase, *ita possidetis*, the whole then signifying, "As you possess, so you may possess."<sup>2</sup> Under this principle, the empire, and afterward the republic, of Mexico conformed to the later boundaries of the viceroyalty of Mexico, and the Central American republic, after a brief voluntary union with Mexico, to those of the captaincy-general of Guatemala. The vice-royalty of New Granada was comprised within the bounds of a single state, the republic of Colombia. Voluntarily associated with it under the same flag were the captaincy-general of Venezuela and the presidency of Quito. Chile had established itself within the bounds of the former captaincy-general of that name; and the viceroyalty of Peru, with the

<sup>2</sup> Moore, Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration. Memorandum on *Uti Possidetis*, 9.

help of its neighbors, was now struggling, with every prospect of success, to convert its domains into a single independent nation. The viceroyalty of La Plata alone stood in danger of permanent dismemberment of its territory.<sup>3</sup> The province lying on the eastern shore of the estuary of La Plata, and variously known as the Banda Oriental, the province of Uruguay, or the province of Montevideo, had been seized by Portuguese forces in 1817, and four years later had been definitely incorporated into the united kingdoms of Portugal and Brazil. Paraguay, a province of the old union, had rebelled against the central government at Buenos Aires, and, having declared its independence, had successfully maintained it. Upper Peru, comprising the four provinces of the former presidency of Charcas, also an undisputed part of the viceroyalty of La Plata, was still in the hands of the Royalists. If it were freed through the agency of Argentine troops there was every hope of its joining the confederation. Success in that quarter would give the government at Buenos Aires the influence and prestige required to restore by peaceable means the other dismembered parts of its territory. Failure, on the other hand, meant not only the loss of Upper Peru, but its attraction to the ever growing Bolivarian system.

The rejection by Mosquera of the proposed articles on recognition and territorial integrity, together with San Martín's abandonment of the undertaking in Peru, placed the Buenos Aires government in an embarrassing and difficult situation. In a vain endeavor to extricate the nation from this situation and to recover in part at least its lost prestige, the junta of representatives, on July 19, 1823, passed an Act authorizing the executive to employ whatever means he might "find most efficacious to hasten the termination of the war and to secure the recognition of independence." But the Act forbade the es-

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *La desmembración del territorio Argentino en el siglo XIX. Conferencia dada en la Real Sociedad Geográfica en su sesión pública del 3 de diciembre de 1914.*

establishment of treaty relations with the mother country except on two conditions — the termination of the war throughout America, and the recognition of the independence of the new states. If, however, one or more governments should treat with Spain independently of Buenos Aires or should establish conditions for recognition different from those of the Argentine Government, the Act authorized the executive to negotiate in behalf of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata alone.<sup>4</sup> For a year or more past informal negotiations had been going on between the Buenos Aires Government and the Peninsular authorities looking to some form of accommodation. Toward the middle of 1823 two Spanish agents arrived at Montevideo, and, entering into correspondence with the Argentine Government, were permitted to pass over to Buenos Aires where, under the Act of June 19, negotiations were begun, resulting shortly in the conclusion of a preliminary treaty of peace,<sup>5</sup> which provided for the suspension of hostilities for a period of eighteen months, and bound the government of Buenos Aires to negotiate between Spain and the American states a definitive treaty of peace. After authorizing the ratification of the preliminary treaty, the junta of representatives empowered the government, in case the definitive treaty were concluded, to negotiate with the new states an agreement to vote twenty million pesos, ostensibly as a grant to enable the mother country to maintain her independence, but really as an indemnity for the loss of her colonies.<sup>6</sup> At the Panama Congress, three years later, the British agent, Dawkins, it will be recalled, proposed the payment of a similar sum as a part of the peace settlement which he urged the delegates to enter into with the Spanish Government. The Argentine proposal, though not originating with the British Government, doubtless had its approval.

This plan for terminating the conflict in America without

<sup>4</sup> *Diario de la Junta*, 1823, 51.

<sup>5</sup> *Registro Oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 38, 41, 42.

<sup>6</sup> *Colección de Tratados celebrados por la República Argentina*, I, 71.

further bloodshed proved to be illusory. The ministers sent out from Buenos Aires to negotiate with Chile, Peru, and Colombia failed to obtain the desired results; for Bolivar's agents had already created an atmosphere of hostility to the Argentine plan. In September, 1823, the Liberator himself arrived at Lima and took personal charge of the operations in Peru. Opposed to any species of compromise with the enemy, he believed that the independence of the new states could only be achieved and made secure by an unrelenting prosecution of the war. This he undertook, with what success is already known. His political achievements kept pace with his military successes. In February, 1824, Rivadavia tried once more by diplomacy to stem the rising tide of Colombian influence in Peru.<sup>7</sup> It was of no avail; the victories of Junín and Ayacucho made Bolivar's name resound throughout the civilized world, and established his influence in the lands which he had liberated, beyond the possibility of any rival to shake. Early in 1825, his veterans under General Sucre marched into Upper Peru and dispersed the remaining bands of Royalists in that quarter. Meanwhile the Patriot, General Lanza, had taken possession of the city of La Paz and declared the country independent.<sup>8</sup> Sympathizing with the national aspirations of the people, Sucre convoked an assembly which, after reaffirming the declaration of independence, undertook the provisional organization of the new state. In honor of the Liberator, the name chosen for it was the republic of Bolivar, which was later changed to Bolivia.

The government of Buenos Aires, accepting the *fait accompli*, made no protest against the independence of Upper Peru. On the contrary, it sent thither a mission, composed of Carlos Alvear and José Miguel Díaz Vélez, to congratulate the Liberator, who was expected soon to visit the new state, on "the high and distinguished services" which he had rendered the "cause of the world," and to arrange with him all questions

<sup>7</sup> Guastavino, *San Martín y Simón Bolívar*, 420.

<sup>8</sup> Barros Arana, *Compendio*, 495.

that might arise as a result of the liberation of these provinces. The envoys were instructed also to invite the Bolivian assembly to send representatives to the constituent congress sitting at Buenos Aires, with the assurance that although the provinces of Upper Peru had always belonged to the Argentine state, yet it was desired that they should exercise full liberty to make such choice as might best accord with their own interests and happiness.<sup>9</sup> This invitation was, doubtless, merely a matter of form; for the aim, momentarily at least, appears to have been to conciliate the Liberator and to obtain his assistance in the impending struggle with the empire of Brazil over the Banda Oriental. The loss of Upper Peru was to be balanced by the recovery of the important province guarding the entrance to the Rio de la Plata. "The Emperor of Brazil," said the Argentine representatives in an address to the Liberator at Potosi, "has dared, in violation of every right, to provoke the free peoples of America by attempting to rob the Argentine nation of its eastern province and to insult the immortal Colombia and the government of Peru by aggressions in Upper Peru, which is under the protection of these two illustrious republics. It is high time," they said, "that American honor be stirred and that the Liberator of Colombia and Peru undertake to compel the Brazilian Government to desist from a course no less disloyal to the rest of America than contrary to its own interests." Bolivar in replying expressed surprise that an American prince, who had raised his throne upon the indestructible foundations of popular sovereignty and of law, a prince who was destined, it would appear, to be the friend of the neighboring republics, should nevertheless be guilty of holding without right a province dominating the very existence of a neighboring state. Not only so, but the invasion by his troops of one of the provinces of Upper Peru, with the consequent illegal seizure of its property and citizens, had greatly added to his offenses against the law of nations. And yet those officers had remained unpunished.

<sup>9</sup> *Registro Oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 77.

"But," said the Liberator, "let us be thankful that events have made the ties which bind us together so strong that we shall be able to vindicate our rights as successfully as we have acquired them."<sup>10</sup>

It is evident that Bolivar wished to intervene in the dispute between Argentina and Brazil. Some months before, in a letter to Santander, he had expressed the hope that the Colombian Congress would authorize him to "tread upon Argentine soil," if his presence there should be demanded by circumstances.<sup>11</sup> The repeated references to the matter in subsequent letters leave no doubt. With the arrival of the Argentine mission the opportunity for which he had longed seemed to be at hand. It only remained to reach an agreement upon the conditions under which he should lend his support. As in the case of Peru, legal objections would doubtless have been easily overcome, if every other difficulty were removed. Accordingly in a series of interviews which he held with the Argentine representatives efforts were made to surmount the obstacles which presented themselves and reach a common ground of understanding. Alvear and Díaz Vélez proposed an offensive and defensive alliance of the four republics of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and the United Provinces against the Empire of Brazil. In support of their proposal they mentioned, in addition to the aggressions of the Brazilian Government, the pernicious influence of monarchical institutions upon the neighboring republics, and the tendency of the Brazilian court to introduce into America ideas of absolutism and of intervention based upon the European principle of legitimacy. The Liberator, avowing the justice of the cause, assured the Argentine envoys of his willingness to lend his assistance, if the laws of Peru and of Colombia would permit. But as to entering into such an alliance as they proposed, he could not fail to remind them of the indifference with which Colombia's invitation to enter

<sup>10</sup> Odriozola, *Documentos Históricos del Perú*, VI, 318-320.

<sup>11</sup> February 18, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 40.

into an offensive and defensive alliance had been received by Buenos Aires. To that invitation Buenos Aires had responded with an insignificant treaty which, in the existing crisis, was of no value whatever. The United Provinces had now to suffer, declared the Liberator, for Rivadavia's lack of prevision. Nothing would conduce more efficaciously to the security and prosperity of America, he said, than the union of all the republics to defend their rights. From the beginning of the revolution he had been advocating an alliance and he still believed it to be the only means of giving the new states consistency and respectability. That was the aim of the Panama Congress, and all he could promise the Argentine representatives was to recommend their case to that body for favorable action.<sup>12</sup>

What Bolivar's attitude would have been if the freedom of action which he demanded and finally obtained in Peru had been offered in Argentina can hardly be a matter of surmise. But the situations were altogether different. Peru, when Bolivar intervened there, had been but partly liberated. Anarchy menaced the life of the new state. Reconquest was imminent. The Argentine provinces, on the contrary, with the exception of Upper Peru, had been among the first to shake off foreign domination. They had successfully maintained their independence. No enemy threatened to resubjugate them. No interference in the internal affairs of the republic was desired, therefore, or would be tolerated. Coöperation of equal states on equal terms alone was sought, as a means to restore to one of the provinces of the old union, the union under the viceroyalty, the liberty to determine its own destiny. There were other obstacles also which stood in the way of the Liberator's further conquests. Public sentiment at Buenos Aires was decidedly hostile to him.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, opinion in Colombia was little inclined to favor such an undertaking. Santander wrote

<sup>12</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 425-435.

<sup>13</sup> Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, IV, 118; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 439.



to caution that under Colombian laws the Liberator had no authority to go beyond the territory of Peru. "Our intermeddling in the war with Brazil," he said, "is certainly a very grave and delicate matter, and it would be still more so if you should take part in it formally. . . . You should under no conditions think of directing the contest in person." This he advised, first, because the Liberator's presence was indispensable in Colombia; and secondly, because Great Britain would not take well a war against a government which owed so much to British influence, and whose very existence rested upon British consent.<sup>14</sup>

In referring to the attitude of Great Britain, Santander hit upon what was, doubtless, the most influential factor in the whole situation. He did not overrate the importance of British influence in Brazil; and Buenos Aires sought with eagerness its exercise in favor of the United Provinces. Bolivar, ever constant in his admiration of British institutions and in his desire to conciliate British favor, would undertake no enterprise of such magnitude without the approval of the British Government. Writing to Santander, he said, "We shall save the New World if we act in accord with Great Britain in *political and military matters*. This simple clause should say to you more than two volumes."<sup>15</sup> Doubt as to the British attitude would have made Bolivar hesitate even though satisfactory arrangements had been made with Buenos Aires. He suspected, but did not know, that Great Britain frowned upon any tendency of the South American republics to unite for the purpose of overthrowing monarchy in Brazil. The matter was, in effect, under consideration by the British Cabinet. In February, 1826, Lord Ponsonby was appointed minister plenipotentiary to Buenos Aires, and in instructions to him Canning defined his view of the normal relations and attitude of England toward the new states as that of "anxiety to restore and preserve peace" among

<sup>14</sup> November 25, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, III, 215.

<sup>15</sup> March 11, 1825. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 49.

them with a view to prevent the "interference of foreigners in their political concerns." In a subsequent instruction, the British minister declared: "Important as the question of Montevideo may be to the Brazilian Government, it is scarcely less important that the discussion of that question should not be conducted on such principles, or supported on their side by such arguments, as to array against the monarchy of Brazil the common feeling and common interests of all the republican states of Spanish America." He went on then to warn the Brazilian Government against trying "too high" the patience of Bolivar, who was being incited to undertake a war against Brazil, "for the express purpose of overturning a monarchy which stands alone on the vast continent of America, and which is considered by those enamored of democratical forms of government, as essentially inconsistent with the existence of the American republics."<sup>16</sup>

Uncertainty as to the attitude of Great Britain led Bolivar to suggest an alternative project, which greatly appealed to his spirit of romance. This was a scheme to create a diversion in favor of the United Provinces by invading Paraguay, with the ostensible object of liberating the scientist, Bonpland, who was being held a prisoner there, and of compelling the tyrant Francia to restore to the people of the country the political freedom of which he had deprived them.<sup>17</sup> The phase of the scheme which most strongly challenged the Liberator was, doubtless, the liberation of Bonpland. In 1821, Bonpland, the companion of Humboldt on his famous voyages to America, having entered the territory of Paraguay by way of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, was arrested and held by the Dictator as a spy. The scientist had been invited by Bolivar to reside in Colombia and, it appears, had come to America with that intention. His excursion into Paraguay and his detention

<sup>16</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*, in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 783.

<sup>17</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXVIII, 426; Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, IV, 120.

there, however, had interfered with his plans and caused no little annoyance to his great patron. Great Britain and Brazil interceded in behalf of the unfortunate traveler, and France sent a special commissioner to pray for his release, but despite all remonstrances Dr. Francia remained firm.<sup>18</sup> Nothing daunted, Bolivar added his protest. "From my early youth," he wrote in the midst of his campaigns in Peru, "I have had the honor of cultivating the friendship of M. Bonpland and of Baron von Humboldt, whose learning has been of greater benefit to America than all the deeds of its *conquistadores*." Pained to learn that his "adored friend," Bonpland, was detained in Paraguay, and convinced that the charges against him were false, Bolivar urged Francia to set the scientist at liberty. "I induced him to come to America," declared Bolivar, adding: "This learned man can enlighten my country with his knowledge." Upon these grounds the Liberator rested his claim. Suggesting that Bonpland could give assurances that his departure would in no way be prejudicial to the interests of Paraguay, Bolivar added: "I await him with the anxiety of a friend and the respect of a pupil. I would march all the way to Paraguay for no other purpose than to liberate this best of men and the most celebrated of travelers."<sup>19</sup>

To this letter Bolivar probably never received a reply. He ventured, however, three or four months before the negotiations in Upper Peru began, to send another; but this time he wrote in a different vein and made no mention of Bonpland. Great events had occurred in the meantime. The Liberator had reached the height of his glory. The emancipation of the vast territory from the Orinoco to the bounds of Chile and the Argentine provinces had been completed, and throughout its

<sup>18</sup> Rengger y Longchamp, *Ensayo Histórico sobre la revolución del Paraguay*, 101; O'Leary, *Memorias*, XI, 145.

<sup>19</sup> Bolivar to Francia, October 22, 1823, O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXIX, 317. Humboldt, writing from Paris under date of November 28, 1825, thanked Bolivar for the efforts which he had made to liberate "poor Bonpland, who continues a prisoner in the mysterious empire of Dr. Francia." O'Leary, *Memorias*, XII, 236.

whole extent Bolivar's influence was supreme. He had now high hopes of being called to further achievement in the southern part of the continent. The Spaniards still held out in the island of Chiloé and he had made a proposal to the government of Chile to reduce that stronghold with his veteran forces. Conferences with representatives of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, out of which might grow the liberation of the Banda Oriental and the overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy, were soon to begin. Why should not the rich section lying isolated under the despotic rule of Dr. Francia also be brought under his influence? With a view to accomplish this end Bolivar wrote the Dictator inviting him to abandon the policy of neutrality and isolation under which he had governed the country for the past twelve years. The letter was sent by Captain Ruiz with a detachment of twenty-five men. Setting out from La Paz, the detachment, after a month's travel, reached the Paraguayan frontier. There it was halted and Captain Ruiz alone, under guard, was permitted to proceed to Asunción. Two hours after his arrival there Captain Ruiz, still under guard, was started back toward the frontier bearing Francia's reply. It read: "Patrician: The Portuguese, Argentine, English, Chileans, Brazilians, and Peruvians have expressed to this government desires similar to those of Colombia, without other result than to confirm the foundation principle of the happy régime which has liberated this province from rapine and other evils, and which it will continue to follow until that tranquillity is restored to the New World which it enjoyed before the apostles of revolution appeared, concealing with a branch of olive the perfidious dagger, to water with blood the liberty which the ambitious proclaim; but Paraguay understands the situation and, if it can help it, will not abandon its system, at least so long as I am at the head of the government, even though it be necessary to draw the sword of justice to compel respect for such sacred ends, and if Colombia would assist me I would be pleased

to devote my efforts to her good sons, whose life may God protect for many years." <sup>20</sup>

It was after receiving this curt reply that Bolivar proposed an invasion of Dr. Francia's domains. But the Argentine representatives interposed objections. Even though the government should wish to accede to it, congress, they said, would hardly lend its approval, for that body had adopted the principle of not compelling by force any territory to join the national association.<sup>21</sup> The Colombian agent at Buenos Aires, Dean Funes, wrote Bolivar that the government was extremely averse to the scheme. In the first place, he said, it was thought to be an odious procedure to force Paraguay to join the union; secondly, at the first show of force there was danger of its rushing into the arms of Brazil; and thirdly, there was good reason to hope that it could be won over by peaceable means.<sup>22</sup> Thus this proposal came to nothing. Other plans were discussed, among them an overture by the Argentine representatives to Bolivar to obtain his support for an intimate alliance between Bolivia and the United Provinces, and a suggestion by Bolivar that he mediate in the dispute over the Banda Oriental. But the negotiations finally came to an end without having accomplished anything.

Early in January, 1826, Bolivar started on the laborious journey back to Lima, and Alvear turned southward to Buenos Aires, Díaz Vélez remaining at Chuquisaca. A few days after Bolivar reached Lima he wrote Revenga, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Bogotá, that he had no hope of seeing Chile and the Argentine provinces enter the confederation which it was proposed to establish at Panama. "These two countries," he said, "are in a lamentable situation, and almost without government." <sup>23</sup> To remedy the situation he had interposed his

<sup>20</sup> Rengger y Longchamp, *Essayo Histórico*, 227.

<sup>21</sup> Mitre, *Historia de San Martín*, IV, 122.

<sup>22</sup> O'Leary, *Memorias*, XI, 143.

<sup>23</sup> February 17, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XXX, 165.

good offices, but, he added, without result. A few days later he wrote Santander, referring to the importunities of certain members of the Peruvian congress who wished him to remain in Peru. "There are also others," he declared, "who would like for me to be absolute chief of the south. They expect Chile and Buenos Aires to need my protection this year, for war and anarchy is devouring these countries. The emperor and Chiloé will make an end of them."<sup>24</sup> And though the Liberator declared that to play such a part did not enter into his calculations, a faint hope, doubtless, still lingered in his mind that some turn of fortune might yet make him the arbiter of the destiny of the whole continent. Such, however, was not to be his fortune. He was already entering upon the period of his decline.

The failure of the negotiations in Upper Peru was the death-blow to Bolivar's dream of American union. For a time there had been some hope of winning the adherence of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata. At about the time Alvear and Díaz Vélez were sent to treat with the Liberator, the constituent congress, then in session at Buenos Aires, voted funds for the expenses of a mission to Panama. Though the unsatisfactory outcome of the negotiation with Bolivar definitely precluded the active participation of the United Provinces, yet the government of Buenos Aires, late in April, 1826, appointed Manuel José García, who as Minister of Foreign Relations had been the dominant figure in the government for nearly two years past, to represent the provinces at Panama. A few days later he resigned, and Díaz Vélez, still in Upper Peru, was appointed in his stead.<sup>25</sup> Some weeks later Díaz Vélez wrote Bolivar that the Argentine Government would surely be represented at Panama, that he, Díaz Vélez, had been appointed minister, and that his acceptance had been forwarded to Buenos Aires.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> February 21, 1826. *Ibid.*, 167.

<sup>25</sup> *Registro Oficial de la República Argentina*, II, 123, 125.

<sup>26</sup> June 16, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XI, 325.

But it was too late. The congress at Panama had already convened, and would have adjourned before the Argentine representative could reach the Isthmus, even though he had proceeded at once and with all haste. It does not appear, however, that he ever started on the journey, and there is little reason to believe that the authorities at Buenos Aires intended that he should go. Moreover, had he attended the congress, his participation in its deliberations, under instructions from his government, would have been, doubtless, extremely limited.

The half-hearted policy of conciliation toward Bolivar which the government at Buenos Aires had temporarily pursued had been, in fact, definitely abandoned. In October, 1825, Rivadavia returned from England, where for some months past he had been serving as Argentine minister at the court of St. James's. As soon as he arrived he began to advocate open war upon Brazil; and it was due, in part at least, to his decided stand that the congress publicly declared what had long been timidly considered in secret — the "reincorporation" of the Banda Oriental in the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata.<sup>27</sup> This amounted to a declaration of war, and to support it Rivadavia was elected to the chief magistracy of the union. Thus there was placed at the head of the state "the man," according to Dean Funes, "most opposed to the views" of the Liberator.<sup>28</sup> "For some time," wrote Bolivar's faithful agent at Buenos Aires, "I have noted not without great surprise the profound silence which has been observed on the subject of sending delegates to the Congress of Panama. As they should have already been on their way, this silence led me to believe that the ministry had changed its policy, departing from that upon which it agreed with me when I presented the invitation of Colombia. In order to make sure of this, I approached, a few days ago, Dr. Manuel Moreno, who I knew had already been appointed

<sup>27</sup> Funes to Bolivar, October 26, 1825. For the Act of the congress see *Registro Oficial*, II, 89.

<sup>28</sup> Funes to Bolivar, January 10, 1826. O'Leary, *Memorias*, XI.

to the post. He is worthy of the place and his appointment is desirable because of his decided adhesion to your Excellency. With me he agreed there had really been a change of policy, and, searching for its origin, we could find no other than the influence of the former minister, Rivadavia." <sup>29</sup>

At Panama the action of the United Provinces was a matter of concern, especially to Colombia's delegates. Early in 1826, a report reached the Isthmus, by way of Peru, that the government of Buenos Aires had reconsidered its resolve not to take part in the congress. To meet the situation, Gual and Briceño Méndez wrote to Bogotá for special instructions. The sudden change of policy, they thought, was intended to involve Colombia in the war with Brazil. It was indispensable, therefore, to examine two cardinal points: First, whether Brazil planned to attack the independence of the United Provinces; and secondly, whether Colombia was under obligations to lend the Argentine Government assistance in the maintenance of its rights. In other words, was this the *casus fœderis* contemplated under the treaty of May 8, 1823, between Colombia and Buenos Aires? Under the terms of this treaty, the Colombia delegates pointed out, the alliance was defensive and was to become effective in the maintenance of independence only. Moreover, the conditions of the alliance in any particular case were to be arranged according to the circumstances and resources of each of the contracting parties. If, then, the question should come up in the congress, would Colombia reject any proposal tending to involve it in the war, or would it regard active participation on the side of Buenos Aires as "conducive to the general interests of our hemisphere, and to the establishment of some sort of balance between the American states" ? <sup>30</sup>

Revena, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his reply promptly dispelled all doubt as to the attitude of Colombia.

<sup>29</sup> Funes to Bolivar, January 26, 1826. *Ibid.* The appointment of Moreno was not published in the *Registro Oficial*.

<sup>30</sup> Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 25-6.



The situation which had arisen between Brazil and the Provinces of La Plata was not, he declared, the *casus fœderis* contemplated under the treaty; for Brazil, far from attacking the independence of the United Provinces, was merely disputing the possession of a territory which it had occupied and held without protest on the part of Buenos Aires. Moreover, the inhabitants of the disputed province had voted to unite with Brazil and had been given a voice in the legislation of the empire. These same people now being free of the evils from which the Brazilian forces had liberated them, were seeking to return to the Argentine confederation. To accede to their wishes, to permit a province or section to belong to-day to one association and to-morrow to another, without other motive than a "versatile inclination" would be to sanction irregularity and disorder. And though Revenga admitted that the uprising of the Uruguayans favored Buenos Aires, yet he saw in the conflict between the two claimants for the possession of the disputed territory nothing but "a war of state against state" in which the government of Colombia should in no way be involved.<sup>31</sup>

As has been pointed out above, no Argentine representatives ever reached Panama, and the congress therefore had no occasion to take action upon the dispute between the United Provinces and Brazil. Had the government at Buenos Aires been willing to abandon its traditional policy of relative aloofness, and had it been able to overcome its aversion to Colombian leadership, its advances might have resulted in consolidating the whole of Spanish America against the Brazilian monarchy. But the Argentine authorities, despite the overtures which they made, never had any serious intention of entering frankly and unreservedly into the Colombian scheme of continental union. This was made clear in a series of articles published at Buenos Aires, apparently setting forth in a semiofficial manner the attitude of the government toward the plan of confederation.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 28.

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.* Unfortunately Zubieta does not give the name of the paper

The following extracts embody the essential points:

"We have demonstrated that the idea of establishing a supreme or sublime authority to regulate the most important affairs between the states of the New World is, from every point of view, dangerous, and it would not be strange if such an establishment should become the source of destructive wars between peoples much in need of the tranquillity of peace. Consequently, if this is the great and chief object of the reunion of an American Congress at Panama, we believe that the republic of the United Provinces should decline frankly and firmly to send representatives, and indeed, if hitherto it may have been thought that Colombia, the first to conceive the idea of a supreme authority, had given it up, such is known now not to be the case, for the treaty which she has just concluded with the provinces of Central America involves the idea with the same interest and ardor with which it was proposed to us in 1822. It might be said, therefore, that for us the matter is ended. Nevertheless, we wish to go a little deeper into it. . . .

"We cannot fail to realize that there may be points of general interest which it would be convenient to settle in a common treaty, in the conclusion of which plenipotentiaries of all the states should participate, in a gathering equivalent to what is to-day called an American Congress. But even this, which under other circumstances might appear to be advantageous, at present would be dangerous. The reason which we have given for resisting the creation of a supreme authority with respect to the whole of the New World, apply with scarcely less force to the negotiation of a common treaty under such conditions as will prevail in the projected Congress of Panama. The influence, real or potential, of Colombia in the deliberations would be sufficient to inspire jealousy and cause to be viewed with suspicion any treaty, however rational or beneficial it

nor the dates of publication. The reference, however, to the treaty between Colombia and Central America which was ratified by Colombia in 1825 places the publication some time after that date.

might be, or however scrupulously it might establish the equality of rights and duties of the states of the league. This leads us to regard it as imprudent for the American states to compromise themselves so soon in such a pact. But such is the mania for an American Congress that, if the other states agree to participate, we cannot stand apart without making our position very conspicuous. Even though we should not send delegates, therefore, we should at least agree to what is stipulated if our particular interests permit. In such case, since it is out of the question to consider the establishment of a common sovereignty, we shall discuss some of the other objects which the congress may consider.

“The government of Colombia, in its note cited above, suggests two objects, in our opinion, the principal and perhaps the only ones which merit the trouble to send delegates such long distances to discuss. We single these out because of their particular importance, the rest being so obvious that for all the states of America to assemble in congress to discuss them would lead to no useful result. The two objects of which we speak, the importance of which cannot be denied, are the wise principles proclaimed by the enlightened government of the United States; namely, that which proclaims that in future no part of America shall be subject to colonization by foreign powers, and that which deprecates and resists every pretension on the part of Europeans to intervene in American affairs. But, let us repeat, these two principles are so clearly accepted by America that the convening of a congress to establish them and agree upon them would create the idea at once that the real objects in view are other than these. As to the first of these principles, there is no need to comment. As to the second, resistance to the intervention of European powers in our affairs, now that this point is touched upon, it is worth while to give it all the extension to which it is susceptible. In effect, in the actual state of things, the American republics have little or no fear of intervention on the part of the European powers, nor would

these powers aspire to intervene in our affairs unless we should commit the imprudence of soliciting it in our differences. Imprudence, yes; this point is worth considering. We have hitherto abstained from entering into detailed discussion. But while accepting the principle of no European intervention in our affairs, we regard it as no less important to resist it when it is attempted under whatever name or pretext by one or more American states. This kind of intervention is more probable than the European, and, in our opinion, would be, at least in our present state, more harmful. Everything is to be feared from new, inexperienced peoples and nations united in the noble pride of recent triumphs. The new states of America, if they are to win the good opinion of the onlooking world, must display no small amount of unselfishness and the greatest of moderation. The American state which should presume to give laws to other peoples and to intervene in their domestic affairs might perhaps humiliate its neighbor for the moment; but henceforward it should expect the hatred and execration of all the states of the New World.”<sup>33</sup>

Continuing, the writer discusses the question of Cuba and Porto Rico, to illustrate further the objectionable tendency of the Panama Congress to intervene in American affairs. The promotion by every possible means of plans for the liberation of these unfortunate peoples was, he thought, altogether commendable, and, as the provinces of La Plata claimed the glory of having given liberty to two new states, they would gladly contribute to the emancipation of Cuba and Porto Rico. But it had been declared that the Congress of Panama would resolve whether the islands would be permitted to determine their own fate or whether they would be annexed to some other state. “See,” exclaimed the writer, “how already, even before the congress meets, its unfortunate results begin to be felt! See how already peoples are forced to suffer the pus of American intervention, precisely when an effort is being made to estab-

<sup>33</sup> Zubieta, *Congresos de Panamá y Tacubaya*, 32.

lish a principle of resistance to the intervention of European powers! ”<sup>34</sup>

The conflict between Brazil and the United Provinces, which has been so constantly before our view in the preceding pages, demands further consideration. The strip of territory over which the contest arose lies to the eastward of the Rio de la Plata, and for that reason was commonly known as the *Banda Oriental*. In colonial times it was often in dispute between the crowns of Spain and Portugal. At the outbreak of the Spanish American wars of independence, however, its possession by Spain had long been recognized by Portugal and as it had constituted from 1776 onward an integral part of the viceroyalty of La Plata, as the province of Uruguay, its union with the independent state founded upon the old viceroyalty was taken as a matter of course by the revolutionary authorities at Buenos Aires. Civil war having broken out between the central government of the United Provinces and the Uruguayans under the leadership of Artigas, the Portuguese king, then residing with his court at Rio de Janeiro, took advantage of the resulting disorder to seize the territory. Buenos Aires being unable, on account of its domestic troubles, to repel the invaders, withdrew from the contest. The Portuguese, after taking possession of the principal city, Montevideo, continued, with greatly superior forces, the war against Artigas, and finally, having driven him to seek refuge in the neighboring state of Paraguay, proceeded to take steps to ground their title on a basis of legality. Apparently foreign occupation was not wholly unwelcome to the inhabitants of the province, for they thus escaped the constant turmoil of civil war and the fierce, lawless sway of Artigas. Moreover, the Portuguese king had declared that he was moved to occupy the territory not by the spirit of conquest, but solely by the desire to preserve order in his own neighboring provinces. The inhabitants were not to be deprived of the right freely to determine their political future. Accordingly an opportunity

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

was given them to register their will. This was accomplished by means of a representative assembly, which was convened at Montevideo in 1821. It voted in favor of annexation to the united kingdom of Portugal and Brazil. The next year, Brazil having declared its independence, the province after some hesitation adhered to the new order, and later sent delegates to the congress which met at Rio de Janeiro to frame a constitution for the empire.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile the situation in the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata had greatly improved. Civil strife had abated and a national government with clearly defined policies, under the inspiration of Rivadavia, was inaugurated. The time was thought opportune to press with renewed vigor the negotiations which had been initiated with a view to restore the province to the Argentine confederation. Valentín Gómez, whose mission to Europe in 1819 was referred to in a previous chapter, was now sent as special commissioner to conduct the negotiations with the Brazilian court. Under date of September 15, 1823, he handed the Brazilian Government a memorandum in which the claims of the United Provinces to the territory in dispute were reviewed at length. As Brazil grounded its claim chiefly upon the vote of the representative assembly which met at Montevideo in 1821, it was upon this point that Gómez mainly directed his attack. The gist of his argument was that the assembly was illegal. It was convoked, he maintained, by incompetent authority and held in the presence of a foreign army interested in the revolution. Its deliberations and acts he considered, therefore, "as illegal as were the famous transactions at Bayonne, in the year 1808." Urging Brazil not to "depart from that line of conduct so honorable to her and moreover so befitting her own interests," Gómez appealed to the spirit of America. "How," he inquired, "would the other states of the continent contemplate that spirit of conquest, developed thus early, and the abandonment of those principles which, with

<sup>35</sup> Saldías, *Historia de la Confederación Argentina*, I, 200-204.

strict propriety, may be said to constitute American policy?" To this he added that the American states "united together by the identity of their principles, by the cause which they uphold, and above all, by the ideas of justice with which their minds are so strongly impressed," would be "capable of successfully repelling any aggression" directed against their "rights or the liberties which they have proclaimed." In conclusion, Gómez declared that the United Provinces would, if necessary, adventure their very existence to obtain the reincorporation of the disputed territory and to obtain control of the river which "washes their shores, offers channels to their commerce, and facilitates communication between a multitude of points in their territory."<sup>36</sup>

To this memorandum the Brazilian Government replied only after repeated insistence on the part of the Argentine commissioner. Finally, on February 6, 1824, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luis José Carvalho Melo, in a letter addressed to Gómez, set forth the position of the imperial government. The Brazilian minister pointed out the difficulty of reaching a definite decision as to the restoration of the province by reason of the fact that both governments based their claims on the same principle; namely, the choice of the province itself. There was no reason to believe, he maintained, that the inhabitants desired separation from the monarchy, and even admitting the right of remonstrance on the part of Buenos Aires, the expedient of again ascertaining their wishes could not in justice be resorted to. Maintaining that the decision of the Montevideo assembly expressed the will of the people, he declared that his imperial majesty would not wish to take upon himself to decide peremptorily, for in countries with representative governments it belongs exclusively to the legislature to alienate territory in actual possession. Nevertheless, should the province be again consulted and should its wish be expressed (which was

<sup>36</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 752-756; *Colección de tratados celebrados por la República Argentina*, I, 75-86.

scarcely credible) in favor of incorporation with Buenos Aires or other power, the imperial government could not but regard such a result as a measure directed, not only against the true interests of the province itself, but against the rights acquired by Brazil at the cost of so many sacrifices; because the convention solemnly concluded between the province and the empire could not be annulled at the option of one of the contracting parties alone, the consent of the other being necessary, and without that consent the empire would be under the obligation of defending its rights. These rights, the Brazilian minister maintained, were as sacred as the cause out of which they grew, as without reference to the ancient treaties of limits concluded with the crown of Spain it was sufficient to consider: (1) That the inhabitants of Montevideo, being exposed to the despotism of Artigas, and the province being almost annihilated by the horrors of civil war, could not find protection from any other power than Brazil. (2) That the Brazilian Government had since that time expended immense sums of money in the province, for which it has an evident right to be indemnified. (3) That after the province became tranquil and free, his Most Faithful Majesty enabled it to decide its future condition without restraint, the province having the same right to dispose of its destiny as the other provinces of the viceroyalty.<sup>37</sup>

Convinced that to continue the negotiations would be futile, Gómez returned to Buenos Aires. Meanwhile the government of Brazil took steps to strengthen the bonds uniting the disputed territory to the empire. The constitution, which had just been adopted at Rio de Janeiro, was presented to the Cabildos of the Cisplatine province, which ratified it with great pomp and ceremony. Deputies were then elected to the Cortes. These events produced great excitement in Buenos Aires, where many *emigrados* (exiled Uruguayans) were gathered. Popular clamor demanded war; but, in view of the strong national spirit

<sup>37</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 761-763; *Colección de tratados celebrados por la República Argentina*, I, 90.



of the Oriental Province Buenos Aires hesitated to enter upon the enterprise. If the province were liberated there was no assurance that it would freely join the Argentine confederation. When news of the victory of Ayacucho reached Buenos Aires early in 1825, however, the agitation was renewed with increased vigor. As the government still declined to act, the *emigrados*, with every promise of the material and moral support of the citizens of Buenos Aires, dispatched Juan Manuel Rosas, the future Argentine dictator, on a secret mission to foment revolution among the inhabitants of the province. In April, 1825, General Antonio Lavalleja, who was the leader of the movement, followed with thirty-two companions. This intrepid band of "thirty-three," quickly growing to a formidable military force, was able from the first to maintain itself in the field. Lavalleja, in order to bring the government of Buenos Aires decisively into the struggle, organized a provisional government, which declared in August, 1825, that the general will of the Oriental Province was in favor of union with the rest of the Argentine provinces. Some two months later the Argentine Congress declared the Banda Oriental as "in fact incorporated in the republic of the United Provinces, to which it has belonged and to which it wishes to belong." Upon being informed of this act the Brazilian Government immediately declared war.<sup>38</sup>

For more than two years the war continued. Its details do not interest us here. Its outcome and its international aspects, however, must receive our attention.

It has been made clear in preceding pages that Brazil had cause to fear a combination of Spanish American powers against her. It was not a mere coincidence that about the time the question of the Banda Oriental became acute, Rebello, the Brazilian chargé d'affaires at Washington, began sounding the United States on the subject of a defensive alliance. Upon the invitation of Secretary of State Adams, Rebello submitted, early

<sup>38</sup> Saldías, *Historia de la Confederación Argentina*, I, 215-223.

in 1825, a definite proposal, stipulating first, "that the United States should enter into an alliance with Brazil to maintain its independence, if Portugal should be assisted by any foreign power to reëstablish her former sway"; and secondly, "that an alliance might be formed to expel the arms of Portugal from any part of Brazilian territory of which they might happen to take possession." This proposed alliance, though based in part upon the Monroe declaration of December 2, 1823, and directed ostensibly against resubjugation by Portugal, whether with or without European assistance, was doubtless advocated by Brazil with a view also to its moral effect in preventing the other American states from making a combined attack upon the empire. Clay, who had succeeded Adams as Secretary of State, replied that while the President adhered to the principles of the Monroe declaration, "the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil, founded on the independence which the United States was the first to acknowledge, seemed to remove the ground which would be necessary to justify the acceptance of the first proposition." He added, however, that "if there should be a renewal of demonstrations on the part of the European allies against the independence of American states, the President would give to that condition of things every consideration which its importance would undoubtedly demand." As to the second proposition, Clay declared that it was contrary to the policy which the United States had pursued, which was "that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its former colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their friendship and doing equal justice to both parties."<sup>39</sup>

The conflict over the Banda Oriental led Buenos Aires also to seek the assistance of the United States. In the fear that the Holy Alliance might intervene in behalf of Brazil, the Argentine government addressed an inquiry to the government at Washington as to the scope of the declarations contained in President Monroe's message. In his reply, Clay restated the

<sup>39</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 437.

principles of the Doctrine and, referring specifically to the war which had then broken out between the United Provinces and Brazil, declared that that struggle could not be conceived "as presenting a state of things bearing the remotest analogy to the case which President Monroe's message deprecates. . . . It is a war," he continued, "strictly American in its origin and its object. It is a war in which the allies of Europe have taken no part. Even if Portugal and the Brazils had remained united," he declared, "and the war had been carried on by their joint arms against the Argentine Republic, that would have been far from presenting the case which the message contemplated."<sup>40</sup>

Far from taking sides in the contest the United States wisely maintained a strict neutrality, insisting upon a scrupulous observance of the rules of international law in so far as the interests of the nation were concerned. In maintaining this position the United States chargé d'affaires at Rio de Janeiro, Condy Raguet, unfortunately brought his government to the verge of a break with Brazil and destroyed every possibility of its serving as a mediator in the conflict. The source of difficulty was the unenforceable blockade which Brazil declared of all Argentine and Uruguayan ports. Against the legality of this blockade Raguet made heated and injudicious remonstrances, and finally, losing his temper, demanded his passports. They were granted and he returned to the United States. Raguet had, on the whole, reason and law on his side, but his "too hasty" proceedings made his government "much trouble" from which it could "derive neither credit nor profit." Though the Cabinet concurred in the opinion that his conduct had been "deficient in temper and discretion," the President declared that it had been "dictated by an honest zeal for the honor and interests of his country" and for that reason did not disapprove it.<sup>41</sup> William Tudor, being appointed in Raguet's stead, represented

<sup>40</sup> Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 434.

<sup>41</sup> Adams, *Memoirs*, VII, 270. See also Manning, *An Early Diplomatic Controversy between the U. S. and Brazil*, in *Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev.*, I, 143.

the nation creditably; but unfortunately causes of complaint continued to accumulate as long as the war continued.

Meanwhile, Great Britain took advantage of the opportunity to strengthen the position of influence which she so much coveted in American affairs. Canning, as we have seen above, was particularly interested in preventing the union of Spanish America against the Brazilian monarchy. Discussing more particularly in his instructions to Lord Ponsonby the question at issue between Brazil and the United Provinces, he suggested that Buenos Aires had the stronger claim to Montevideo, but that if it were transferred to the Argentine confederation, it would still be reasonable "to secure to Brazil an uninterrupted enjoyment of the navigation of the River Plate." And though "on the general principle of avoiding as much as possible engagements of this character" the British Government would prefer to stand aside, it would give this guaranty "if it were desired by both parties. . . . rather than that the treaty should not be concluded." Great Britain, he added, "while scrupulously neutral in conduct" during the war, could not fail to be in favor of the belligerent showing the readiest disposition to bring the dispute to a "friendly termination." In a secret instruction, Ponsonby was told that in case of "any essential change" in the form of government his functions would be suspended. Finally, he was "studiously to keep aloof from all political intrigues and all contentions of party in Buenos Aires." Upon this point Canning again insisted in November, 1826, when he wrote: "As to taking part with either side in the contest, your Lordship cannot too peremptorily repress any expectation of that nature."<sup>42</sup>

Arriving at Buenos Aires after the war had broken out, Ponsonby was unable to mediate between the parties to the conflict. Of this he duly informed his government. "There is much,"

<sup>42</sup> Temperley, *The Later American Policy of George Canning*. In *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XI, 784.

Canning wrote, "of the Spanish character in the inhabitants of the colonial establishments of Spain; and there is nothing in the Spanish character more striking than its impatience of foreign advice, and its suspicion of gratuitous service." In his original instructions, Canning declared, it was foreseen that the suggestion respecting Montevideo "was not unlikely to excite a jealousy of some design favorable to British interests. Such a jealousy," he declared, "has been openly inculcated by the public press of the United States of North America, and no doubt secretly by their diplomatic agents." He advised Ponsonby, therefore, "to let that matter drop entirely," unless Buenos Aires itself should raise it. The best chance to suggest their doing so, he added, would be by "some slight manifestation of resentment at any such misconstruction of motives." Canning's last instruction to Ponsonby on this subject was in February, 1827. He then wrote that Gordon, the new British minister at Rio de Janeiro, would "press the many considerations which render peace essential to the interests and safety of Brazil. . . . with all the means in his power short of that degree of importunity which, after the repeated refusal, would become derogatory to the dignity of Great Britain."<sup>43</sup>

On May 24, 1827, there was concluded at Rio de Janeiro a preliminary treaty of peace. Under this treaty the United Provinces acknowledged the independence and integrity of the empire of Brazil and renounced all rights to the territory of the Cisplatine Province. The Emperor of Brazil equally acknowledged the independence and integrity of the United Provinces. Article VIII of the treaty was as follows: "For the purpose of securing in the best manner the benefits of peace and to avoid temporarily all distrust, until the relations which ought naturally to subsist between the two contracting states be established, their governments agree to solicit, jointly or separately, their great and powerful friend, the King of Great

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 785.

Britain (Sovereign Mediator for the establishment of this peace) that he will please to guarantee to them, for the space of fifteen years, the free navigation of the River Plate.”<sup>44</sup>

This document the government at Buenos Aires refused to ratify, on the ground that the Argentine commissioner had exceeded his instructions. The war continued, and not until August, 27, 1828, was a treaty concluded which finally brought it to an end. The two governments, desirous “of establishing upon solid and lasting principles that good intelligence, harmony and friendship which ought to exist between neighboring nations, who are called by their interests to live united by the bonds of perpetual alliance,” agreed, again through the mediation of Great Britain, to settle forever their differences. Under the terms of the treaty both parties renounced all claim to the territory of the Cisplatine Province, with a view to its establishment as an independent state, and bound themselves to defend its independence and integrity, until it should be duly constituted and for five years thereafter. It was also stipulated that should questions be raised in the definitive treaty of peace upon which, notwithstanding British mediation, they might not agree, hostilities between the republic and the empire should not recommence until after the five years of the guaranty should have elapsed, nor should they then be renewed without a previous notice of six months being given, reciprocally, with the knowledge of the mediating power.<sup>45</sup> To this compromise, setting up the Banda Oriental as an independent state, Brazil was driven to agree by the military success of the Argentine and Uruguayan forces, and doubtless also by the mediating influence of Great Britain. Buenos Aires had never been strongly inclined to bring the territory into the Argentine Confederation by force, and when, as the war progressed, the Uruguayans began to manifest a strong spirit of nationality, it wisely re-

<sup>44</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIV, 1027-1031.

<sup>45</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XV, 935-943. This treaty remained in force until 1856, when a definitive treaty of peace, friendship, commerce, and navigation was concluded between the two countries.

linquished its claims. Thus the republic of Uruguay came into being.

In view of the circumstances which have here been related, it is not surprising that Brazil was not represented at the Congress of Panama. Before the question of the Banda Oriental became acute, the government of Colombia invited the empire, however, to participate in the congress. The invitation was sent through the Brazilian minister at London, who replied on October 25, 1825. "The policy of the emperor," he said, "is so generous and benevolent that he will always be ready to contribute to the repose, the happiness and the glory of America." And he added that as soon as the negotiations relative to the recognition of the empire should be honorably terminated, a minister plenipotentiary would be appointed to take part in the deliberations of general interest that would be compatible with the strict neutrality which the empire had observed between the belligerent states of America and Spain. In January, 1826, Theodoro José Brancardi, chief clerk of the Home Department, was appointed "plenipotentiary" to the congress;<sup>46</sup> but as war had then begun with the United Provinces, the intention doubtless was no other than to have an observer at the Isthmus in case the Buenos Aires representative should attend. As we have seen, the representative of neither government was ever dispatched to the place of meeting.

In Chile the scheme of continental confederation was viewed at first with less suspicion than in Buenos Aires; but distrust grew as a result of certain acts and declarations of the Liberator which were believed to imply a spirit of supremacy contemptuous of the other states.<sup>47</sup> In replying to the invitation to send delegates to the congress, Chile dissembled these feelings and approved the idea of confederation. But the Chilean congress which met in 1825, whose approval was necessary, dissolved without taking action, and there the matter rested. Early the

<sup>46</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIII, 497.

<sup>47</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XV, 87-93.

next year the government received communications from the Colombian and Peruvian delegates at Panama, urging that representatives be sent to the Isthmus at once. The Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Blanco Encalada, replied that while his government recognized the importance and the utility of the congress, it was impossible to send delegates without the approval of the national legislature, which was expected soon to convene. On July 4 this body met at Santiago, but the question of representation at Panama was not brought up until some six weeks later. In September the committee, to whom the matter had been referred, reported, maintaining that the pacts of "union, league, and confederation which might be concluded should not in any way interrupt the exercise of the national sovereignty of each of the contracting parties." This committee pointed out also the danger that "some state or its head, taking advantage of its influence over the majority of the plenipotentiaries, might arrogate to itself over the rest prerogatives and rights which might be irresistible when supported by the force of the whole confederation." It was desired, therefore, that the Chilean delegates should be instructed to safeguard the absolute sovereignty of the nation. The report was approved, and in November José Miguel Infante and Joaquín Campino were appointed as delegates to the congress and given instructions in accordance with the desires of the national legislature. Not even then, however, were funds voted for the expenses of the mission. In the meantime the congress had assembled at Panama and adjourned to reconvene at Tacubaya.

Though the government of Chile put obstacles in the way of the formation of an American league under the inspiration of Bolivar, it was favorably inclined to the idea of alliances in the form advocated by the government of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. While the question of the Panama Congress was being agitated at Santiago, in fact, a treaty of alliance was negotiated with Buenos Aires. This pact consisted of two parts, the first stipulating the terms of alliance, and the second



relating to matters of commerce and navigation. By the terms of the alliance the contracting parties bound themselves "to guarantee the integrity of their territories, and to cooperate against whatever foreign power should attempt to alter, by force, their respective boundaries, as recognized before their emancipation or subsequently in virtue of special treaties." They also bound themselves not to conclude treaties with the Spanish Government until the independence of all the states formerly Spanish should be recognized by the mother country. It was further agreed that in respect of the alliance the cooperation of the contracting parties should be regulated conformably to their respective circumstances and resources.<sup>48</sup> Upon the interpretation of this latter provision there arose a lengthy discussion in the Chilean congress, which resulted finally in the rejection of the treaty. Under the existing circumstances, when no part of the territorial domain of Chile was in dispute, and when on the other hand the United Provinces were engaged in a war with Brazil to recover the Banda Oriental and were maintaining rights over Upper Peru and Paraguay, it was thought that the terms of the treaty involved Chile in a grave promise without possible reciprocity.<sup>49</sup> Although public opinion had been openly expressed in favor of Buenos Aires as against Brazil, yet it was realized that it would be impossible for Chile to take part in the struggle. Hence the caution in declining to ratify a document generally expressive of the strong friendship and hearty cooperation which had always characterized the relations of the two countries.

<sup>48</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, XIV, 968-73.

<sup>49</sup> Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, XV, 95.

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Among the books and pamphlets are included a few bound volumes originally published in periodical form. Here are also included, for ready reference, under the authors' names, a number of useful articles appearing in periodical publications. Owing to the difficulty of tracing a clear line of demarcation between the secondary works and the sources, both classes of material have been included in a single alphabetical list. The bibliography does not pretend to be exhaustive.

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