


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A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES

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


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
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THE DISEASE AND CURE

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A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES

By ANDRÉ CHÉRADAME



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NO. 1111
ANNOUNCER

[No student outside of Germany itself has studied the Pan-German scheme in all its details more thoroughly than the distinguished French publicist, André Chéradame. For more than twenty years he has devoted all his energies and resources, physical and intellectual alike, to a vigorous and exhaustive investigation of the origin and progress of the monstrous conspiracy which threatens to overwhelm the liberties of the entire world.

His articles from the Atlantic Monthly issued in paper-covered book form under the name of 'Pan-Germany: The Disease and Cure', have been distributed throughout the country by the thousands. To meet the constantly changing war conditions and to elaborate upon his earlier suggestions, M. Chéradame contributes much timely material to the new and enlarged edition. In the additional chapters, the author not only emphasizes his delineation of the menace of Pan-Germany and the proper means of meeting it, but he criticizes fearlessly the failure of the Allies to adopt comprehensive measures to that end, because of their belief that war is to be won or lost on the Western Front.

Published in inexpensive form with special rates for patriotic distribution, the new edition offers to the American people further understanding of the present crisis.

Besides the articles which M. Chéradame has contributed to The Atlantic Monthly, the same author has written 'Pan-Germany Plot Unmasked' and 'Pan-Germanism and the United States' (Charles Scribners & Son).

The last two chapters in the present edition, pertaining to 'A Plan for the Allies,' have never before been published in any form.]

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Pan-Germany

The Disease and Cure

CHAPTER I

HOW CHEAPLY GERMANY HAS FOUGHT THE WAR

AT the beginning of 1916, I said in my book *The Pan-German Plot Unmasked*,—

‘Finally, when all negotiations for an armistice have fallen flat and Germany’s situation has become still more critical, we shall see Berlin play her trump card. Protests against territorial annexations will become insistent beyond the Rhine, secretly sanctioned by the German government, which will finally say to the Allies: “Let this slaughtering of one another cease! We are willing to listen to reason; we resign our claims to those territories of yours now occupied by our armies. The game has been played to a draw; so let us treat for peace on that basis.”

‘On the day when this proposition is put forward, the Allies will find themselves face to face with the most subtle move yet made by Berlin — the most insidious German snare. Then, above all things, must the steadfastness, the perspicacity,

and the unity of the Allies be most brilliantly made manifest. The trick of the "drawn game," if successful, would involve an overwhelming triumph for Germany and an irreparable tragedy for the Allies and for the liberty of the world.'

Only a few months after these lines were printed, the prophecy began to be fulfilled more and more completely. Every possible step has been taken by Germany to bring about peace on the basis of a draw. The slogan, 'Peace without annexations or indemnities,' was coined to that end. At first the Allies believed that this formula originated in Russia; as a matter of fact, however, it was worked out in Berlin and then suggested to the Russian Socialists through secret agents whom Germany has successfully established in the Petrograd *Soviet*. These Socialists, doubtless well-meaning, but over-fond of theories and always ready to embrace the wildest utopian schemes, — ignorant, too, of all realities, as has been shown by the steady aggravation of the general situation in Russia since they came into power with the Revolution, — have declared enthusiastically for the 'peace without annexations and indemnities.' As there exist also in the other Allied countries groups of Socialists with a stronger grip on theories than on facts, and also because Allied sympathies naturally rallied strongly to the support of the Russian Revolution, the formula, 'peace without annexations or indemnities,' thanks to its apparent

origin, has unquestionably made serious inroads on a certain section of Allied public opinion.

The Stockholm manœuvres, engineered by all the powerful and varied means at the disposal of German propagandists, were designed to establish this formula as the fixed basis of all peace negotiations. When the astuteness of the Allied governments prevented the fulfillment of this attempt within the period desired by Berlin, the Vatican was persuaded through Viennese agencies to throw its influence on the side of peace as determined by Germany.

As a matter of fact, the Pope's peace proposals, while not embodying the exact terms of the Kaiser's formula, involved, in the last analysis, practically the same essential results. Berlin, therefore, in order to assure unceasing discussion of her formula, — a discussion tending at least to bring about an armistice, which would split up and morally disarm the Allies, thus making it possible for her to deal with them separately, — outdid herself in mobilizing toward one end the most widely divergent forces, from the Maximalist anarchists of Petrograd to the most hidebound reactionaries of the Sacred College. The extent, the vigor, and the persistence of the amazing 'pacifist' offensive launched by Germany were such that the expressions 'peace without indemnities or annexations,' 'drawn game,' 'white peace,' '*paix boiteuse*,' have become as current in the Allied countries as if

they had some established connection with reality. This is entirely contrary to the fact: with the best intentions in the world, *peace without annexations or indemnities, as things stand now, is impossible. There can be no 'white peace,' no 'drawn game,' no 'paix boiteuse.'*

To tell the truth, a section of Allied opinion has become befuddled by these formulæ of Berlin, whose function is to accomplish in the moral order the same asphyxiating action as that of the gases employed on the battlefield by the German General Staff. The result of this moral intoxication is that important groups of the Allies begin to juggle with words and lose sight of facts. As the natural outcome of giving serious thought to impossibilities, grave errors are made in weighing the present situation, with an attendant weakening of the joint action of the Allied democracies. It is imperative, therefore, that the pursuit of Utopias, leading only to disaster, be abandoned, and that we return to those realities which alone can lead to victory and the establishment of a durable peace.

If the formula 'peace without annexations and indemnities' has been allowed to insinuate itself into the general discussion, it is only because great numbers of the Allied peoples fail to understand the overwhelming advantages which Germany, by means of the war, has been able to assure to herself for the present and the future. The object of

this paper is to show just what these advantages are, and at the same time to brand the utter hypocrisy of the slogan, 'peace without annexations and indemnities,' which, regarded even in the most favorable light, would allow Germany to make off with immense booty, leaving the Allies to face the incalculable losses incurred by them in a war launched by their adversary.

*The significance of the low rate
of German exchange*

The continual fall of German exchange is regarded by many of the Allies as proof of the progressive and irremediable impoverishment of Germany. When, for instance, the mark drops 47 per cent in Switzerland, while the franc has depreciated only 13 per cent, Frenchmen are for the most part inclined to believe that the war has affected the two countries in relatively the same proportion; they then conclude that Germany's financial situation is infinitely worse than that of France. In reality, such a comprehensive conclusion cannot be reached simply through the rise and fall of exchange, which reflects only certain special aspects of the financial situation of a country.

Among the various causes affecting exchange, there are two principal ones. The first is moral. It cannot be denied that the fluctuation of exchange responds to foreign confidence. If German exchange is low, it implies, to a certain extent at

least, the existence of a universal conviction that in the long run Germany cannot hold out against her formidable ring of adversaries. As a result, there is no great demand for the currency of a state whose credit, it is thought, must finally collapse. It should be noted, however, that the reason for this fall of exchange is only a moral evaluation anticipating a probable outcome; it is not due to a mathematically certain estimate of what Germany now stands to win or lose as a result of the war.

The second great factor affecting exchange, on the other hand, is based on present realities which are susceptible of being accurately determined. Germany, since she has been blockaded by sea, exports infinitely less than formerly; consequently, her ability to settle her accounts in foreign countries is limited. When she was able to sell the United States a million marks' worth of merchandise, she then had at her disposal a million marks with which to pay cash for such imports as she needed. Now that her exports have been so reduced, she has little money to spare for spending abroad. If she wishes to increase these foreign purchases, she must export her gold and consequently reduce the security behind her banknotes. This results in a lowering of the basis of German credit, with a resulting drop in exchange.

We shall now see that this falling exchange, whatever its importance, does not take into ac-

count all the elements of the general financial situation.

If the blockade of Germany seriously complicates her food problems, on the other hand it is in a way advantageous from a financial point of view. In a word, when Germany found herself blockaded she was obliged to evolve means of existing on her own resources or those of her allies. Our enemies had great difficulties of organization to overcome, but they turned them to good account: for if Germany's exports are small, her imports have been correspondingly reduced. Hence she needs to send very little money abroad—a fact which is financially in her favor.

Now, the case of France is radically different. The French government, feeling assured of the liberty of the seas and believing that the war would be a short one, found it more expedient to place enormous orders abroad than to rely on domestic resources to supply the nation's need. As a result, French imports, according to published statistics, exceed exports by one billion of francs a month. This means that, as things stand now, France must pay to foreign countries the staggering sum of twelve billion francs a year, with no corresponding compensation, since her purchases consist of products which are destroyed in use. For this reason France is undergoing serious impoverishment while Germany gets off comparatively easily. It is therefore plain that the fluctua-

tions of exchange bear little relation to those conditions which must be taken into consideration in making an appraisal of the general situation; they reflect, in fact, only a special and limited aspect of the financial situation as a whole. Popular conclusions drawn from the fall in the value of the mark are false when attempts are made to give them an absolute or general significance.

Why people are still ignorant of the vast advantages gained by Germany from the war

Many of the Allies are hoodwinked by the 'great illusion' which even now prevents them, to their endless detriment, from seeing things as they actually are. In the Allied nations, in fact, people continue to speak of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, as if these states remained just as they were before the war. But these terms have no longer any relation to reality. The Quadruple Alliance of Central Europe is simply a great illusion, studiously fostered by William II, for by its means his plans are vastly facilitated. As a matter of fact, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary are not the allies, but the vassals, of Berlin, and their influence with her is less than that of Saxony or Bavaria. The rulers at Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest are simply marionettes moved by threads which are pulled by Berlin according to her strategic needs.

Very often we hear it said, 'Germany has created *Mittleuropa*.' This is another mistake. Geographically speaking, *Mittleuropa* includes only Central Europe; and Germany's dominion is infinitely further flung, extending as it does from the west front in France to the British front before Bagdad. If we wish to see things in the light of reality, we must say, for the present at least, '*There is no longer any Germany; instead, there is Pan-Germany.*' This is an essential assumption if we are to reason justly. The map of Pan-Germany at the beginning of 1917, which is printed above, shows clearly the essential, but all-too-little-known elements of the present situation, which is characterized by the fact that 73 million Germans, aided by 21 million vassals, — Magyars, Slavs, and Turks, — have reduced to slavery 82 millions of Latins, Slavs, and Semites, belonging to thirteen different nationalities. Pan-Germany, which has now almost completely reached the limits set by the Pan-German plan of 1911, consists, therefore, of one vast territory containing about 176 million inhabitants and natural resources of the greatest variety.

I beg my readers to refer to this map of Pan-Germany every time it is made desirable by the text. This repeated study of the map is indispensable to a clear and complete comprehension of the demonstration which follows. As regards the profits which Germany has wrung from the war,

it is particularly important, in order to grasp the idea of Pan-Germany; for it is the direct result of its creation that Germany, in spite of the losses and expenses inevitably incurred by a warring nation, has been able to assure herself of certain advantages which, considered as a whole, far out-balance her losses and expenses, as we shall see.

In order to understand the nature of these advantages, one point must first be made clear.

The war has cost the Germans comparatively little

For six fundamental reasons, the conduct of the war has really cost the Germans far less than it has cost their adversaries.

1. *No Experimentation.* Germany, in order to produce a vast output of various types of guns and projectiles economically evolved in times of peace, needed only to extend, by means of machinery of domestic manufacture, her arsenals and munition-factories, which before the war were already considerable. On the other hand, the production of war-material in France at the outbreak of hostilities was very slack, while in England and Russia it was almost negligible. In these three countries, therefore, it was necessary to improvise, as best might be, thousands of new plants, to equip them with machinery purchased in America at vast expense, and hastily to evolve new types of cannon, projectiles, and the rest. Now, improvisation, especially in war-time, means false starts

and inevitable bad work, which must be paid dearly for. Germany was not obliged to incur these very considerable expenses.

2. *Regulated Wages.* The fact that the problem of German wages was worked out at leisure in exact correlation to productions whose types were exhaustively studied in the calm of peace-time certainly allowed the Germans to obtain war-materials at a lower net cost than was possible for the Allies.

3. *The Prevention of Waste.* The absence of experimentation and the simple extension to war-work of highly efficient industrial methods tested in peace-time, naturally allowed the Germans to avoid in all spheres those immense losses of material of every nature whose bad effects and heavy cost were incurred by the Allies. This state of affairs in France caused losses which were as expensive as they were inevitable. One may imagine the conditions existing in Russia, where control is far more difficult of exercise than in France.

4. *Cheap Labor.* The Germans have forcibly enlisted the labor of about two million prisoners of war. Moreover, the official French report of April 12, 1917, concerning acts committed by the Germans in violation of international law, asserts that in the occupied territories deportation of workers has been a *general measure*. It has 'applied to the entire able-bodied population of both

sexes, from the ages of sixteen to sixty, excepting women with young children.'

Now, the Germans requisition labor from among 7,500,000 Belgians, 3,000,000 French, 4,500,000 Serbians, 5,000,000 Roumanians, 22,000,000 Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians—a total of 42,000,000 slaves.

Let us see what sort of remuneration is made. Take the case of a young girl of Lille, twenty years old, who was forced to work for six months, harvesting and threshing wheat and digging potatoes from six in the morning to twilight, receiving all the while the vilest food. For her six months of work she was given 9 francs, 45 centimes. The Germans, therefore, have at their disposal a vast reservoir of labor for which they pay next to nothing; moreover, the small amounts they do pay remain in Pan-Germany.

The Allies, on the contrary, pay high wages to their workers, and, when they run short, must needs pour out good gold in bringing reinforcements from Asia, Africa, and America. This means that a considerable part of the wages paid these foreign workmen will leave France or England for all time.

5. *Free Coal and Iron Ore.* In addition to their own mines, the Germans have seized important coal and iron mines in France, Belgium, and Poland. A vast proportion of their ore and coal therefore costs them nothing. Naturally, then, a

German shell made with French iron and Belgian coal costs far less than a French shell made with American steel and English coal. As a result, the net price of a greater part of German munitions is much lower than that paid by the Allies.

6. *Economical Transportation.* By reason of the grouping of the Central Powers, — a result of the conquest of the Danube front by the Teutons, — Germany profits by a geographical situation which is infinitely more advantageous than that of the Allies, as regards not only the speed, but also the cheapness, of war-transportation. It is evident that it costs far less to send a shell from the Krupp factory to any one of the Pan-German fronts than to send an American shell to France, a Japanese shell to the Polish front, a French shell to Roumania *via* Archangel, or an English shell to the army operating in Mesopotamia. By the same token, the cost of transporting a soldier of Pan-Germany to any of the battle-fronts is infinitely lighter than that of transporting Allied soldiers from Australia or America.

We should note that each one of these six factors which we have just enumerated reacts profoundly on the sum-total of general war-expenses, and that, taken together, they involve a formidable sum. It can therefore truthfully be said that Germany carries on the war much more economically than the Allies. Figures are so far lacking which will give the true proportions, but we shall

certainly remain well within the realities of the case if we conclude that, as a result of the six factors mentioned above, France must spend one hundred and fifty million francs for war material to every hundred million spent by Germany. When, therefore, France spends thirty billions, Germany evidently spends not more than twenty billions. And what is true of France applies even more accurately to some of the other Allied nations.

This is a fact of the greatest general importance in coming to a true understanding of the financial situation created by the war — a fact which takes on its full significance when we realize that Germany is not only carrying on the war cheaply, but that she has been enabled, by means of this war, to win *very important advantages*.

They consist of seven principal elements. The last six of these, it should be noted without fail, depend solely on the existence of central Pan-Germany — that is, on the hegemony exercised by Germany over Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; they are therefore wholly independent of the first element, which relates to Germany's occupation of enemy territories, particularly to the east and west. They may be summarized as follows: —

SEVEN ELEMENTS IN TWO GROUPS

The first group includes: —

The advantages derived directly from Ger-

many's aggression, comprised in a single element, namely, the plunder accruing from the occupation of enemy territory. This may be analyzed thus: —

(a) The value of the 500,000 square kilometres of Montenegrin, Serbian, Roumanian, Russian, Belgian, and French land held by the Germans.

This value, estimated according to the national fortunes of the respective countries before the war, — the area and population of the occupied portions being taken into consideration, — is in the neighborhood of 155 billion francs.

This figure, though naturally only approximate, is probably far below the real sum. We know that the entire national fortune of France, with its 536,000 square kilometres, was put before the war at 325 billion francs. The valuation of the 500,000 square kilometres of occupied territory at 155 billions seems therefore an underestimate, especially when one remembers that these 500,000 square kilometres include Belgium and the North of France — the richest districts in the world.

(b) The plunder of human beings, supplies, and property (laborers, war-material, provisions, minerals, raw products, manufactured products, personal property, art objects, war levies, specie, jewels, and securities) which has been going on, in some cases for as long as three years, throughout the occupied territories. This booty unquestionably represents a value of tens of billions of francs.

These tens of billions should be deducted from the total of the national fortunes of the invaded districts. The plunder in question is composed of property or supplies already used up by the Germans or taken away by them into Germany; the value it represents, therefore, no longer exists in the invaded districts.

The second group includes: —

The advantages which Germany has assured herself for the present or for the future through the creation of Pan-Germany, which in turn result from

(a) Germany's burglarization of her own allies — Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

(b) The seizure by Germany and her allies of Serbia; in all six elements:—

I. The Pan-German loans, which throw Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey into a state of absolute financial dependence on Berlin.

II. The value of Germany's monopoly in exploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor, resulting from the Pan-German loans.

III. The inherent value of the creation of Economic Pan-Germany. This cannot fail to be a powerful instrument for the acquisition of wealth.

IV. The value of Military Pan-Germany, which is a guaranty of the security of Economic Pan-Germany.

v. The value of the enormous economic profits

assured to Berlin through the existence of Pan-Germany *at the cost of Russia*. These are a direct consequence of the establishment of Military Pan-Germany.

VI. The taking over by Germany of at least 21 billions of French credit. This is a consequence of the establishment of Economic Pan-Germany.

CHAPTER II

HOW MUCH GERMANY HAS WON IN THE WAR

LET us now take up, in their order, the seven elements mentioned in the last chapter.

I

The first element of German advantage: the booty acquired from the occupation of enemy territory

Germany is getting direct war-profits from the enemy territories occupied by her. These territories, listed in the ascending order of their richness, are: Montenegro, 14,000 square kilometres; Albania, 20,000; Serbia, 87,000; Roumania, 70,000 (Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary share the pillage of these four territories); dependent territories of Russia, 260,000; Belgium, 29,000; and France, 20,000; making a grand total of 500,000 square kilometres.

In order to realize as clearly as possible the importance of the booty wrung by Germany from this enormous area, we may establish by means of examples or statistics that this plunder comes from nine principal sources:—

Seizure of Human Material.— Throughout these 500,000 square kilometres of occupied territory, the Germans have scientifically enslaved

42,000,000 human beings, who furnish a vast amount of labor — this labor being all the cheaper because, as we shall see, the slaves are robbed in various ways.

Seizure of War-Material. — By reason of their lightning advances in Belgium, France, Serbia, and Roumania the Germans have taken possession of vast stores of war-material: cannon, rifles, munitions, wagons, locomotives, cars, as well as thousands of kilometres of railway, of which they make full use, representing a certain value of billions of francs. (The Belgian railway system alone is worth three billions.)

Seizure of Food-stuffs. — The official report of April 12, 1917, on the acts committed by the Germans in France contrary to international law, states: 'The inhabitants, subjected as they were to annoyances of every sort, watched daily the theft of such food-stuffs as they happened to possess.' Everywhere the Germans steal horses, cattle, domestic animals, grain, potatoes, food-products of all kinds, sugar, alcohol, all of which constitute the reserve supply of the occupied countries. Their harvests, too, are appropriated through the cultivation of productive lands by means of labor obtained almost without cost from the enslaved peoples.

Theft of Raw Materials. — Throughout the length and breadth of the occupied territories, the Germans, at the dictates of expediency, have

seized raw materials: coal and iron ore, copper, petroleum, and so forth. Metals — bronze, zinc, lead, copper, tin — have been taken from private citizens, as well as textile fabrics — wool, cotton cloth, and the like. When one learns that from the cities of the North of France alone the Germans stole 550 million francs' worth of wool, it is easy to see that this single source of plunder has been worth a number of billions to them.

Theft of Finished Products. — Everywhere in the occupied territories, so far as means of transportation permit, motors, steam-hammers, machinery, rolling-mills, lathes, presses, drills, electrical engines, looms, and so forth, have been taken to pieces by mechanics and transported into Germany. The total value of this stolen material in Belgium and the North of France alone — the richest industrial districts in the world — is almost incalculable.

Theft of Personal Property. — The official French report previously quoted states: 'In the shops, officers and soldiers made free with whatever pleased their fancy. Every day the people witnessed the theft of property which was indispensable to them. At Ham, General von Fleck carried off all the furniture of M. Bernot's house, where he had been quartered.' The property thus stolen is sent to Germany, as is proved by this advertisement in the *Kölnische Zeitung*: 'Furniture moved from the theatre of military

operations to all destinations.' From this source, war-booty to the value of several billions has already been divided among an army of Germans.

Seizure of Works of Art. — The Germans have stolen countless works of art, 'in order' — so runs a recent official note of their government — 'that they may be preserved as a record of art and civilization.' — 'It would be impossible,' declares *Le Temps*, 'to find a more cynical admission of the thefts committed by the German authorities in our museums and public buildings.' If one remembers that this methodical pillage has gone merrily on among private individuals, drawing on the unlimited stores of works of art which have been accumulated throughout the centuries in Poland, and particularly in Belgium and France, it must certainly be apparent that the value of these stolen art treasures is immense.

War Imposts. — Our official report establishes that 'Requisitions have everywhere been continuous. Towns that have had to meet the expenses of troops quartered within their jurisdiction have been overwhelmed by huge levies.'

Belgium is staggering under an annual war assessment of 480,000,000 francs. Bucharest, after its capture by the Germans, was forced to pay a levy amounting to about 1900 francs per capita of the population. At Craiova the levy was 950 francs per capita. An edict forbids the circulation of paper money unless it has been specially

stamped by the Germans, who retain 30 per cent of its nominal value.

In April, 1917, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* announced that the leaders of the Austro-German forces of occupation in Roumania would shortly call for an obligatory internal loan of a hundred million francs. In Poland, the German government has just issued a billion marks in paper money for enforced circulation. These are only single examples.

Theft of Specie, Jewels, and Securities. — In September, 1916, the Germans seized three quarters of a billion francs from the National Bank of Belgium in Brussels, which was subsequently transferred to Germany. In January, 1917, on the steamer Prinz Hendrick, they stole a million francs from a Belgian who was traveling from England, and took ten million francs' worth of diamonds from the mail-bags. In the village of Vraignes, on March 18, 1917, the Germans, before evicting the inhabitants, stole from them the 13,800 francs they had in their possession. At Noyon — we learn from the official report already quoted — the Germans broke open and pillaged the safes of banks and private citizens before retiring from the town. The securities, jewels, and silver plate of Noyon represented a value of about eighteen million francs. And, as I have said, these are only random incidents.

Taking into consideration, then, the present

high prices of food-products, coal, metal, petroleum, war-material, machinery, and the rest, it can be seen at a glance that each one of the nine sources of booty just enumerated, on which the Germans have been steadily drawing, in some cases for as much as three years, has unquestionably yielded the value of several billions of francs, — certain of them, perhaps, tens of billions. Hence we may reasonably conclude that, without fixing a definite figure for the yield of these nine sources, the total plunder has mounted well up in the tens of billions.

Another basis for calculating the worth of the invaded territories to Germany lies in the fact that the national fortunes of these countries, according to ante-bellum statistics, amounted to about 155 billions of francs.

We shall now examine the six other elements of Germany's present advantageous situation — those which result from the domination which the war has enabled her to exert over her own allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. This domination, which amounts practically to actual seizure, has permitted her to fulfill the scheme of Central Pan-Germany as a result of the crushing of Serbia.

II

*The second element of German advantage:
the Pan-German loans*

A portion of the approximate sum of 115 billion francs devoted by Germany, up to the end of July, 1917, to the carrying on of the war has enabled her to burglarize her own allies by taking advantage of the extremely bad financial situation which faced them at the end of the Balkan wars. As a result of this situation, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, in order to sustain the present long-drawn-out struggle, have been forced to draw on the credit of Berlin. The sum total of the loans made by Germany to her allies and secured by her own war loans cannot yet be verified, but there can be no doubt that it mounts up to a respectable number of billions.

These loans have worked out to the immense advantage of Germany, for the following reasons. Established facts prove that, without the assistance of Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish troops, and without the numerous products supplied her by the Orient, Germany would have been beaten long ago, even in spite of the Allies' blundering. As these troops and resources are of priceless value to Germany, it would seem that she must have paid dearly for them, and in gold. However, as the reserve of the German Imperial

Bank was 1,356,875,000 marks in July, 1914, and 2,527,315,000 in February, 1917, it is certain that Germany has not lent gold to her allies, — in large quantities, at any rate, — but only paper, whose value depends solely on the strength of German credit.

In reality, therefore, Germany, simply by keeping a printing-press busy turning out little stamped slips of paper, has obtained troops, food-stuffs, and raw materials which were indispensable to her in avoiding defeat; and at the same time she has so established herself as a creditor as to give her the right to exact final payment by her allies for advances which were primarily made to them in Germany's own vital interest.

Now these obligations weigh so heavily on countries like Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, already in sore stress, that they incur loans which no one of these three countries can ever hope to pay off unless a victory of the Allied democracies should shatter the financial yoke of Berlin.

In order to appreciate the nature of these loans and their consequences, the example of Turkey is particularly instructive. 'Germany's advances to Turkey in no way represent Turkish war-expenditure. We must add to them the requisitions made in the country itself, and the war-material purchased in Germany and Austria-Hungary which is not yet paid for.'

At the beginning of 1917 Djavid Bey arranged in Berlin for a new loan of three million pounds, simply to enable Turkey to pay her debts to the Krupp firm, as well as the advances made her by the different groups of financiers and the German Minister of Finance. This means, therefore, that, when Germany sends arms to the Turks in order that they may use them to consolidate the Pan-German scheme, she also finds a means of making this consignment of arms serve to entangle the Turks still more hopelessly in the financial web. 'In Pan-Germanist circles, there has been much discussion of the compensations which Turkey must make to Germany in return for services rendered in the course of the war. It is the unanimous opinion that Germany, without gaining any territorial acquisitions in Turkey, must have controlling rights in the Ottoman Empire, so that the Pera-Galata bridge may be as near Berlin as Constantinople.'

What has taken place in the spheres of finance between Berlin and Constantinople has, by the very nature of things, been duplicated between Berlin and Sofia, though of course in a less pronounced form. Germany, therefore, by means of paper loans based on her own credit, has caused colossal obligations to be assumed by her allies — countries representing vast areas of land: Austria-Hungary with 676,616 square kilometres, Bulgaria with 114,104, and Turkey with 1,792,900, or

2,583,620 square kilometres in all.' Now these three countries are precisely the ones which are indispensable to the carrying out of the Central Pan-German 'Hamburg to the Persian Gulf' scheme; the loans, therefore, are Pan-Germanist loans.

It should be borne in mind, on the other hand, that although Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are financially encumbered *in their quality of states*, the exploitation of these countries by the Germans is very profitable. Their combined national fortunes were estimated, before the war, at about 269 billion francs. We must realize also that, although these loans granted by Berlin to her allies are merely paper loans, they bind Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary to Germany as closely as debtors can be bound to a creditor. None of these three countries can reasonably hope to get funds after the war from their present adversaries, who, it is certain, will have none too much money for their own needs; and so the financial situation as a whole combines with the enterprise shown by the Berlin General Staff to strengthen the grip which Germany has obtained over her allies through loans.

As this financial dependence of the three vassal states, with its tremendous consequences, is, as I have said, maintained simply by means of a printing-press and little slips of paper, which cost very little indeed; and since Germany receives in ex-

change for these slips of paper bearing her signature, men, food-stuffs, and supplies which, but for the action of the Allies, would enable her to establish Pan-Germany as mistress of Europe, we may safely say that the Pan-Germanist loans floated by Berlin at her allies' expense constitute a powerful element of military advantage, which, if one but examines the conditions of its origin, must stand out as the most profitable and extraordinary swindle ever perpetrated.

III

The third element of German advantage: the value of a monopoly in exploiting the latent resources of the Balkans and Asia Minor

The figure of 269 billions of francs quoted above takes no account of the enormous agricultural and mineral wealth, as yet unexploited and unappreciated, of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire. Now, the business of tapping these vast reservoirs is entirely in the hands of the Germans, as a result of the Pan-Germanist loans.

IV

The fourth element of German advantage: the value resulting from the creation of an economic Pan-Germany

Economic Pan-Germany, as it was outlined by List, Roscher, Rodbertus, and other German econ-

omists, may be defined as follows: A territory uniting under one supreme central control Central Europe, the Balkans, and Turkey—a territory large enough to include military and economic resources entirely sufficient to provide for the needs of the population in times of war; and to assure its rulers in times of peace the domination of the world.

The seizure by Berlin of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey—all essential elements of Central Pan-Germany—was accomplished in three ways: *militarily*, by the supremacy acquired by the German General Staff over the troops of the vassal states; *financially*, by means of the paper loans granted by Germany; and *diplomatically*, by the treaties signed in Berlin on January 11, 1917, establishing the strongest sort of German protectorate over the Ottoman Empire. This done, the consolidation of Pan-Germany was quickly undertaken by Berlin in a great number of ways.

Control of Customs.—As the establishment of the great Pan-German *Zollverein* (Customs Union) was not to be accomplished at one stroke, the Kaiser's government set about preparing the necessary steps. Numerous conferences held at Berlin and attended by German, Austrian, and Hungarian statesmen and business men, resulted in the following essential provisions. (1) An economic customs agreement of long duration, which would make a single economic unit of Germany and Austria-Hungary; (2) to bring this about gradually, a

progressive increase of duty — free articles, and a unification of the customs charges on certain goods; (3) a close economic union between Austro-Germany and Bulgaria and Turkey, to be arranged and established with the greatest possible expedition.

Ethnographic Control. — Certain nations afford considerable resistance to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme. The Serbians, who are morally irreducible, are an obstacle to the permanent establishment of the Pan-German nexus between Hungary and Bulgaria; and without this the entire Pan-German programme falls flat. The systematic destruction of the Serbian people has been entrusted to the Bulgars, who, under pretext of quelling insurrections, slaughter not only the Serbian men, but also women and children, down to babies at the breast. In the Ottoman Empire the Armenians happen to occupy those regions which were characterized in the Reichstag by Herr Delbrück as 'Germanic India.' Berlin therefore puts to good use the Turks' inherited taste for massacres of Christians. Already more than one million Armenians have been got out of the way.

Agricultural Control. — The food crisis in Germany has led Berlin to proceed with the greatest haste toward utilizing the rich farming districts which the fortunes of war have put within her grasp. Hundreds of experts, with thousands of agricultural implements, have been sent to Rou-

mania, Serbia, and Asia Minor. In this latter country, two cultural centres in particular have received attention. In the province of Adana cotton-growing is being developed; on the plains of Anatolia the intensive cultivation of grain is in progress. These energetic efforts have had a two-fold result: the Turks will not revolt against Germanic domination — because of starvation, if for no other reason; and, by reason of the increasing yield of Serbian, Roumanian, and Turkish lands, more of which are continually being brought into service, the food-supply of the Central Empires becomes more and more completely assured.

Banking Control. — The exploitation of Eastern Pan-Germany calls for vast capital. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish banks have formed powerful combinations. As the leaders of this movement in Germany we find the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank, the Kölnische Bankverein; in Austria-Hungary the Vienna Kredit-Anstalt and the Hungarian Bank of Credit in Budapest.

Economic Control. — As the rapid exploitation of the latent resources of the Balkans and Turkey is the principal economic object of the Germans, they have just established, in coöperation with King Ferdinand, the 'Institute for Furthering Economic Relations between Germany and Bulgaria.' In order to facilitate the Germanic penetration of Turkey, ten thousand Turkish boys be-

tween the ages of twelve and eighteen years are to come to Germany for their technical education. These young Turks, living in German families, learning German, and saturating themselves with German ideas, will soon be able collaborators with the Teutons themselves in germanizing Turkey and exploiting the numerous concessions which, if the war turns out successfully for them, will be wrung from the Ottoman government by the subjects of the Kaiser.

Railway Control. — The railway systems of European Pan-Germany have been brought to the highest degree of perfection. In Turkey, German officers are absolutely in control of the railroads. Out of the 2435 kilometres which separate Constantinople from Bagdad, only 583 kilometres of line remain to be constructed — and this distance is traversed by automobile roads. As for the Turkish railroads belonging to French and English companies, the German government has suggested that the Turks ‘purchase’ them. One should cherish no illusions as to the real meaning of this word ‘purchase.’ It means, according to Turco-German methods, that the expenses involved in this purchase should be set down against the war damages which the Central Powers consider to be due them from the Allies.

Canal Control. — The canal project, outlined as far back as April 26, 1895, by the Pan-Germanist Dr. G. Zoepfl, was taken up and begun by the

Economic Congress of Central Europe, which met at Berlin on March 19, 1917. This project is made up of the following elements: (1) Union of the Rhine with the Danube by the opening up to navigation of the Main and of the canal from the Main to the Danube. (2) Completion of the central canal joining the Vistula and the Rhine. (3) The Oder-Danube canal, joining the Baltic and Black Sea. (4) Opening to navigation of the Rhine as far as Bâle. (5) Union of the Elbe with the Danube by means of the river Moldau. (6) Union of the Weser with the Main by means of the Fulda-Werra. (7) Connection of the Danube and the Vistula by means of canals. (8) Union of the Danube with the Dniester by means of the Vistula. (9) Opening to navigation of the Save. (10) Opening to navigation of the Morava and the Vardar as far as Saloniki. The Danube is the base of this gigantic programme of construction. 'The Danube means everything to us,' declared General von Groener, in December, 1916.

This rapid sketch of the preparations now going on in the economic sphere of Pan-Germany will permit any clear-thinking man to understand the crushing power which will lie in this formidable system when all its latent resources have been developed by the Germans to the profit of their hegemony. The organization of Pan-Germany is

only in its first stages; nevertheless, the concentrated military, economic, and strategic strength which it has already put at the disposal of Berlin is so great that it permits Germany to baffle her far more numerous, but widely scattered, adversaries. What, then, would be the strength of a completely organized Pan-Germany? It is undeniable, in fact, that a methodical, big-scale development of all the mineral, vegetable, animal, and industrial products of economic Pan-Germany, together with the low-cost transportation afforded by a complete system of canals, would make it possible for the Germans to pay high wages to their own workmen, and yet at the same time bring about such a reduction of net prices in every line of industry as to force Pan-German products on the whole world by their sheer cheapness.

It is easy to see, then, that in the face of economic Pan-Germany's overwhelming methods any economic revival on the part of the European nations now allied would be impossible. The economic ruin of the Allies, after so exhausting and costly a war as this, would by the nature of things bring about their political subjection to Berlin. Besides, there is not a country in the world which could escape the clutches of economic Pan-Germany on the one hand, or the consequences of the irremediable ruin of the Allies on the other. The fact that Pan-Germany is organizing itself is an ominous event which should receive the concen-

trated attention of all the world's free peoples; for it places in German hands the elements of such an overwhelming economic power as has no precedent in the world's history.

V

The fifth element of German advantage: the value of military Pan-Germany

Berlin relies, above all else, on her military resources to render secure for all time that economic Pan-Germany which is destined to provide her, in peace-time, with a permanent means of acquiring wealth and world-dominion. Military Pan-Germany is, therefore, the complement and the pledge of economic Pan-Germany. The Kaiser's successful seizure, through the fortunes of war, of new sources of man-power — Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman soldiery; of new strategic points or regions of exceptional importance, located in invaded countries *or in those of his own allies*, has furnished him with the basis of military Pan-Germany. In 1914, Prussian militarism held sway over only the 68 million inhabitants of the German Empire. At the beginning of 1917, it had been extended by consent or by force to the 176 million people of Pan-Germany.

This result — evidently the consequence of an immense extension of exclusive influence throughout Central and Eastern Europe — has permitted

the German General Staff to take over at will certain strategic points or regions of the greatest importance, over which it exerted no direct influence before the war. Zeebrugge, on the North Sea, for instance; Trieste, Pola, and Cattaro on the Adriatic; the Bulgarian coasts of the Ægean; the Ottoman Straits; the Turkish, Bulgarian, and Roumanian shores of the Black Sea, have always been strategic points or districts of exceptional value.

This value, however, has become vastly greater now that these points or districts form part of a single military system under the directing and organizing power of the Berlin General Staff. At present, these essential strategic points and districts are the strongholds of the Pan-German frontiers. They are, in fact, connected by continuous fortifications, defended in the most effective way the world has ever known by an intensive system of barbed-wire entanglements, deep-dug subterranean shelters, machine-guns, and heavy artillery. The internal military organization of Pan-Germany is being carried forward with uninterrupted speed. Factories of war-material have been judiciously distributed throughout the whole territory, with the double object of utilizing raw materials near their source of origin, thus avoiding useless transportation, and of making possible the swift dispatch of munitions to any threatened sector of front. For this reason the Krupp firm,

at the outbreak of war, established important branch factories, not only in Bavaria, but also in Bulgaria and Turkey.

The railway system and strategic automobile roads in Pan-Germany have been developed very swiftly—notably in the Balkans and in Turkey, where the need was relatively great. Back of every military front railroads running parallel with that front have been constructed, so that reinforcements may be sent to any given point with the maximum of speed. All this, taken as a whole, has converted Pan-Germany into one gigantic, extremely powerful fortress.

A new phase is now in preparation. The Kaiser's General Staff, not content with holding the high command of all forces in Pan-Germany, is determined to standardize as far as possible their arms, their munitions, and their methods of instruction. The Deputy Friedrich Naumann — one of the sponsors of the *Mittleuropa* idea — is plainly smoothing the way toward this end, which, because of geographic reasons, most intimately concerns Austria-Hungary. In the *Vossische Zeitung* he has just outlined a scheme of 'full and complete harmony of the Central Empires in so far as military matters are concerned.' He boldly adds an avowal which is well worth remembering. '*Mittleuropa* is in existence to-day. Nothing is lacking save its organs of movement and action. These organs can be provided by its

two emperors, since they have at their disposal the necessary elements for the creation of a common army.'

This prophecy merits our close attention; for it can readily be seen that, if the unification of the Armies of the two Central Empires were to take place, neither Bulgaria nor Turkey, on whose military resources the German General Staff is getting an increasingly firm grip, could prevent the absorption of their armed forces into the Pan-German system.

As for the military strength of Pan-Germany, it is an easy matter to estimate it. Even if the Kaiser's armies were to withdraw from Russia, Poland, Belgium, and France, Pan-Germany would still include 150,000,000 people. Now, as Germany has mobilized about 20 per cent of her own population and that of her allies, — who have become vassals, — we see that Central Pan-Germany can count upon approximately 30,000,000 soldiers. Prussian militarism, whose destruction by the Allies has become the true, legitimate, essential aim of the war, has therefore become far more widespread, through the carrying out of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, than it was in 1914. It is proved by well-established facts that Berlin, while vigorously pushing a peace campaign destined to disunite the Allies, is doing everything in her power to turn Pan-Germany into a fortress the strength of which is unexampled in the world's

history. In any case it is undeniable that, as military Pan-Germany is a pledge of the success of economic Pan-Germany, its establishment constitutes an important element of advantage for the German cause. This will be further proved when we come to examine the two final elements of advantage.

VI

The sixth element of German advantage: the importance of the vast economic profits which accrue to Berlin at the expense of Russia through the establishment of Pan-Germany

We need only glance at the map to realize that a really free Russian republic could never range itself on the side of Pan-Germany. It is self-evident that, if Pan-Germany were to succeed in splitting Europe in two, her economic and military pressure toward the East would be irresistible. The countless agents whom Berlin already maintains in the immense territory of Russia would find their work becoming easier and easier. Following up the hypothesis, then, Russia, succumbing to insoluble financial problems and unending internal difficulties, would break up, from the Baltic to the Pacific, into a series of anarchistic republics — all of which is according to the plans of Lenine, who is a creature of Berlin. After that there would be nothing to prevent German influence from becoming the controlling force in

the economic exploitation of the immense natural riches of European and Asiatic Russia.

We are well within the bounds of reason in predicting such a possibility. The fact that German agents have already succeeded in stirring up most serious trouble throughout the length and breadth of Russia — that they have provoked separatist movements in Finland, Ukrainia, and the Caucasus, and that all China is seething with disturbances which react on Asiatic Russia — proves to the satisfaction of the most skeptical that the break-up of Russia into little states inevitably subject to the political and economic influence of Berlin would be an inevitable consequence of a successful Pan-Germany.

It is plain, therefore, that the huge profits which the Germans would stand to gain by such a state of affairs — a direct result of military Pan-Germany — form an element of advantage worthy of being considered by itself.

VII

The seventh element of German advantage: the transfer to Germany of at least twenty-one billion francs of French credit

The creation of military and economic Pan-Germany makes possible a method of securing war-booty planned in advance by the Pan-Germanists, which may be stated as follows: *The*

transfer to Germany of funds owed to one of her enemies by another enemy, or by one of her own allies.

In order to understand this method of extortion one need only read a passage from Tannenberg's book, *Greater Germany*, published in French translation in 1916 by the firm of Payot. This work possesses exceptional interest for two reasons: first, it appeared in Germany in 1911; its publication, therefore, was evidently inspired, as in many other cases, by the ruling class at Berlin, in order to prepare the German people for war by promises of colossal booty; second, the facts of the case show that the German General Staff, ever since the outbreak of hostilities, has been modeling the political conduct of the war on the exact lines laid down by Tannenberg, who may be said to have officially declared the Pan-German scheme of 1911.

Now, independent of the 35 billion marks — nearly 44 billion francs — which were to be imposed on France in the coming war by way of regular war indemnity, Tannenberg, in Article 5 of the hypothetical treaty, outlined the following additional extortion: —

'France cedes to Germany her claim to the 12 billion marks (15 billion francs) lent by her to Russia.' This means nothing more or less than a cession of credit.

On page 308 of Payot's edition, Tannenberg indicates as follows the use to be made by Germany of these Russian debts to France: —

'We shall not be able to give thanks to Holy Russia for this splendid sum, for she has made such vile use of these billions that to-day almost nothing remains. There is no question of reimbursement. Russia is not a mortgaged property subject to payment of interest, which can be sold when this interest is not promptly forthcoming on the day it is due. However, we shall be able to collect our money in another way, simply by taking in exchange for these credits the territories of the Poles in Posnania, East Prussia, and Upper Silesia; of the Lithuanians on the banks of the Niemen; of the Letts on the Duna; of the Esthonians on the Embach and the regions bordering on the rivers of the northern coastal country; of the Czechs in Bohemia, Austrian Silesia, and Moravia; of the Slavs in Southern Ukraine, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, Dalmatia, Goerz, and Gradiska, in so far as they come within the southern and eastern limits of Greater Germany.

'This procedure enables us to kill three birds with one stone. Russia rids herself of the burden of debts and interest-paying which is crushing her; the Slavs of the West and South become citizens of a Slavic country; and we Germans obtain, free of debt and incumbrance, the much-needed territories for colonization.'

These words were written in 1911. On May 24, 1917, the Berlin *Tägliche Rundschau* thus exposed Germany's future attitude toward Russia:—

'If we reach an agreement with the new Russian government, or with the government which succeeds it, so much the better; but in making our terms we shall deliberately turn to account the internal situation of the ancient empire now in revolution. It is more essential to-day than ever before that we should push our claims against Russia for indemnity and for the annexation of that territory which we so sorely need for colonization.'

The similarity between this programme of annexation and indemnity, written so recently, and Tannenberg's outline, published six years ago, is indeed striking.

Let us now see how, in the present state of affairs, Tannenberg's plan for a transfer of credit could be worked out. Suppose we suggest a hypothesis.

In the first place, it is evident that, if Russia should continue to submit to anarchy fostered by German agents, her financial situation, already perilous, would no longer permit her to pay the interest on her bonds held abroad. Again, if Pan-Germany, now momentarily established, continues to exist, Berlin will be able to take over Russian obligations to France without the necessity of a formal treaty. In fact, the tremendous pressure against Russia, exerted by the mere geographical contact of Pan-Germany as she lies athwart Europe, would practically render unneces-

sary the formal cession of French credit. Berlin, taking fullest advantage of the situation, would then say to Petrograd, 'We consider that France owes us a considerable sum by way of war-indemnity. We are unable to collect this, but you Russians also owe an indemnity. We therefore assume the position of France as your creditor, and, as the strength of Pan-Germany has put you practically at our mercy, we demand the payment of your debts in such and such a form.'

What resistance could disorganized Russia make to this claim, presented with true German cynicism?

Russian extremists need not hope, as certain of them do, to avoid paying the debts contracted by the old régime. If they do not care to fulfill their obligations to France, which is working hard to sustain the Russian Revolution, they will have to pay those same debts to Berlin, where full use would be made of them to exploit the Russian people.

Moreover, the 'purchase' of French- and English-owned railroads in Turkey, suggested several months ago by Berlin, of which we have already spoken, proves convincingly that the Germans intend also to follow out the system of transferring credits in cases where money is owed by Germany's allies to Germany's enemies. For a long period great numbers of Frenchmen purchased the state obligations of Austria-Hungary, Serbia,

Bulgaria, Roumania, and Turkey. It is impossible to give the exact amount of French money thus invested in Pan-Germanized Central and Eastern Europe, for the securities of the above-mentioned countries were generally floated in several foreign financial centres at once; but persons who have the most thorough knowledge of French investments make a minimum estimate of six billion francs. As for the French money invested in Roumania and Serbia it will vanish into thin air as soon as the Austro-German conquests are consolidated. As for investments in Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, the assumption by Germany of French credits — supposing peace to be concluded on the basis of the present war-map — would be easily accomplished if she reasoned as follows with her allies:—

‘France now owes you war indemnities which you cannot collect. By putting them down against the obligations owed by you to France, you cancel this debt. However, we Germans have lent you during the war great sums, and furnished you with supplies without which you could never have continued the struggle. Since you cannot meet these obligations we shall secure ourselves, in part at least, by assuming France’s position as your creditor.’

On the whole, if the present state of things were to continue, Berlin, by the process of transferring credit, would be able to cause France the

very considerable loss of about 15 billion francs owed her by Russia, and 6 billions owed by Germany's vassal states — a total of at least 21 billions. Now that the Pan-German scheme has for the moment been accomplished, we can truthfully say that 21 billions of French money, at the lowest estimate, represented by Russia, Austrian, Hungarian, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Turkish securities, have been virtually Pan-Germanized.

CHAPTER III

THE NECESSITY FOR A DECISION

IN the preceding chapters I have pointed out that the advantages which Germany has already gained through the war, or has assured for herself in the future, if the present situation remains essentially unchanged, consist of seven chief elements. Before we arrive at final conclusions concerning these elements, let us establish the following facts:—

1. In three years of war, Germany has spent on the war 1612 francs per capita of her population. France, in the same period, has spent 2200 francs per capita — that is to say, 608 francs, or the immense figure of 38 per cent, more than Germany.

If the formula 'without indemnity' be adopted, with respect to the expenses of the war, far indeed from serving the cause of the Right, it would result in this unspeakable iniquity: each Frenchman who desired peace would have to bear a financial burden heavier by more than a third than that of each German and loyal subject of the Kaiser who loosed the dogs of war. Therefore this enormous difference—38 per cent—in the per capita war-expenses between France

and Germany would in itself suffice to make the economic — and hence the political — downfall of France, swift, complete, inevitable, and beyond recall.

2. Unquestionably Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, *as separate states*, have been ruined by their war-expenses, but this ruin is all to the advantage of Germany, as it throws her vassals into a condition of absolute financial dependence. As a result, if Pan-Germany is to continue to exist, the Berlin government must be the unchallenged controller of all the financial combinations on which the peace and well-being of Pan-Germany depend. Now these combinations evidently can serve only to strengthen the German hegemony.

No parallel situation is to be found among the Entente powers. The ruin of Russia, for example, would simply make the ruin of France more inevitable, unless a decisive victory of the Allies were to rob Germany of her iniquitous spoils and at the same time guarantee to France the legitimate reparation which alone can save her from irretrievable financial disaster.

3. If Germany can still continue to float new internal loans with comparative ease, it is because her wholesale territorial and Pan-German seizures are considered by her people as new pledges of the credit of the German state as the heart of Pan-Germany.

4. France, which has spent in three years of war 2500 francs per capita of her population, has suffered only loss: 20,000 square kilometres of her territory have been invaded, and given over to undreamed-of spoliation at German hands. Germany, on the other hand, which has spent only 1691 francs per capita for the war, has occupied 500,000 square kilometres of foreign soil, burglarized her own allies, and piled up huge profits from the war.

The diversity of these profits is so great, and the mortgage that they have placed on the future is so heavy, that no figures will convey the sum-total of these advantages; but enough has been said to show that the aggregate is enormous. If one deducts the 115 billions of francs devoted by Germany to the war from the total represented by all the elements of advantage already enumerated, one begins to realize that Germany has really wrung from the war present and future profits which can be computed only in *hundreds of billions of francs*. This war, therefore, has brought Germany boundless material gain, such as no war in history has ever brought to one people. It is equally certain, on the other hand, that Germany can utilize her advantages only on the express condition of maintaining certain indispensable conditions of the situation on which they are based. We shall now see to what minimum these conditions may be reduced.

Our table shows that out of the seven elements of advantage won by Germany from the war, the last six — that is, those in the second group — are altogether independent of the first, except for one small detail relating to the national fortunes of the territories occupied by Germany to the southeast — that is, in Albania, Montenegro, Roumania, and Serbia.

If, therefore, the formula, 'peace without annexations and indemnities,' were actually adopted, Germany, by withdrawing from Belgium and France to the west, Russian Poland to the east, and Montenegro, Albania, Roumania, and Serbia to the southeast, would renounce her first element of advantage, represented by the value of the invaded territories — that is, about 155 billion francs. From this, however, must be deducted the tens of billions' worth of plunder carried out of the invaded territories during these three years, consisting either of products already used up by the Germans, or of material, metals, and securities which have already been removed to Germany. Her renunciation of this first element of advantage would therefore be rendered relatively incomplete were the formula adopted.

We should note also that there are excellent reasons why Germany's renunciation could never apply in reality to the territories invaded by her to the southeast — *to Serbia, at all events.*

The six elements of German advantage forming

the second group of our table are infinitely more important to Berlin than the first element—which is in any case partially assured by the 'no indemnity' formula, as we have seen. Although they are less directly apparent to the Allies, the six elements of the second group are nevertheless *real*, for they depend on incontrovertible military, economic, and geographic facts. Now these six elements, big with possibilities for the future, depend entirely on the covert but certain seizure which the war has enabled Germany to make of her own allies. But this seizure was possible only as a result of Serbia's destruction. Serbia, therefore, formed the geographic bulkhead which Germany had to batter down before her influence could predominate over Bulgaria and Turkey. The destruction of Serbia was the *sine qua non* of the establishment of Central Pan-Germany, which assures the Kaiser of the six principal elements of advantage from the war. Moreover, it is undeniable that the essential prop of Central Pan-Germany has been furnished by the Berlin-Bagdad Railroad, of which the most important branch, that of Belgrade-Nish-Pirot, runs across Serbia. Now, that Germany is fighting for the Berlin-Bagdad line, Count Karoly, an ally of Berlin, admitted, speaking on December 12, 1916, in the Hungarian Chamber. (See *Le Journal de Genève*, December 30, 1916.)

To sum up, then, German victory and the

fruition of her most important war-advantages depend directly on the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, made up of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Now this maintenance is based on two prime conditions.

1. The continuance of Serbia's state of subjection to Austro-Germany.

2. The preservation of the new economic and military lines of communication between Berlin on the one side and Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople on the other. These are, indeed, the bonds which have enabled Berlin to reduce to practical slavery the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians, — the adversaries of Pan-Germany, — and then, without changing any names or long-established frontiers, to make Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria vassal-states of Berlin, and, consequently, active elements of Central Pan-Germany.

Finally, if the present order of things in Central Europe is preserved, Germany can maintain the Hamburg-Bagdad line. This would be assured by the adoption of the formula, 'peace without indemnities and annexations.' This is easily proved.

As we have already seen, even if Germany were to withdraw in the East and West, the stipulation 'no indemnities' would permit her to give back the territories stolen from Russia, France, Bel-

gium, and Roumania in a condition of complete economic, physical, and moral collapse: in a word, sucked dry. By reason, too, of the principle of 'no indemnities,' the reconstruction of these devastated countries would be another cause of financial exhaustion for France, Russia, Belgium, and Roumania, already overburdened with the costs of the war. But, even assuming that the Germans withdraw from these occupied territories to the East and West, — although at present there is no reason for seriously considering such an eventuality, — no one in his senses could believe that they would give up Serbia unless forced to do so by the most ruthless methods; for Serbia, by reason of her geographic position, is absolutely essential to the existence of Central Pan-Germany, on which, in turn, Germany's vast advantages depend.

Of course, it is easy to imagine that Germany would give her signature to treaties of settlement, even involving Serbia. But treaties signed by Germany have no value whatever. 'We snap our fingers at treaties,' said the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin. Besides, even supposing that Berlin were party to a treaty concerning Serbia, this treaty might allow Serbia to exist in theory, but not in fact. We must look the situation in the face: Serbia is one great graveyard. Her population has been systematically butchered by the

Bulgarians, with German approval. Serbia is utterly ruined: the Bulgaro-Austro-Germans have taken everything.

Now the principle 'no indemnities' would keep Serbia in this terrible and irremediable state of misery. It is evident that under these conditions the Serbian state would be hopelessly crippled. If, therefore, Austria-Germany were to say to the Allies, 'Very well; in conformity with the formula "no annexations, no indemnities," we are willing to recognize Serbia's dependence by treaty,' who would be deceived by this sinister and portentous joke? Who could believe in the sincerity of a proposition which, on the face of it, is rendered impossible of fulfillment by the 'no indemnities' clause. And what guaranty would the Allies hold that Germany, Austria, and Bulgaria would withdraw from Serbia at the same time, in view of the fact that such a withdrawal, if *bona fide*, would imply Berlin's renunciation of the whole Central Pan-German scheme and its vast attendant profits?

To suppose such a thing possible implies a complete ignorance of the Germanic spirit as it has manifested itself since the beginning of history. Besides, declarations made by the Germans themselves show that they will never recede from their position as regards Serbia. As early as December, 1916, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* prepared its readers in advance for the 'pacifist' tactics about

to be employed — tactics which are now being tried out with the help of the Russian anarchists, the Kienthal Socialists, and the Pope.

‘Certainly,’ said the Frankfort paper, ‘if we are to make a lasting profit from the military situation, both in its favorable and in its less advantageous aspects, it is essential that special questions should be severally considered in their relation to the whole. To-day our point of view should be as follows: in the East, the formulation of definite demands, and in the West, negotiations on a flexible basis. This is not a programme but a general line of action. “Negotiation” is by no means a synonym for “renunciation.”’

This last sentence should be read and pondered over by all the Allies. Here we find an absolutely clear statement as regards the fate of Serbia, whose restoration, by means indicated later, is the one thing which can save the world from the consequences of the Hamburg–Persian Gulf scheme.

On August 8, 1917, at a banquet given at London for M. Pachitch, the Serbian Premier, Mr. Lloyd George acknowledged in decisive terms Great Britain’s obligations to Serbia — obligations which are practically those of the whole Entente.

‘What I have already said in the name of the British Government regarding Belgium, I here repeat in the name of the same Government regard-

ing Serbia. The first condition of peace must be its complete and unrestricted restoration. I have not come here to make a speech. I have simply come to say that, no matter how long the war should last, Britain has pledged her honor that Serbia shall emerge from the conflict independent and completely restored. Moreover, it is not only a matter of honor. The security of civilization is directly involved here. In the West, Belgium has blocked Germany's way, and Serbia in the East has been the check of the Central Powers. She must continue to mount guard over the gateway to the East.'

To this the Berlin *Kreuzzeitung* made reply,—

'Mr. Lloyd George has said that the integral restoration of Serbia was an essential condition of peace and that British honor was pledged to this restoration. The war-aims of England and those of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria are in absolute opposition on this point.'

The *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, speaking for Germany as well, added, —

'Germany and Austria-Hungary have crushed Serbia. They alone will decide what disposition is to be made of King Peter's former realm.'

There can be no illusion here. The formula 'peace without annexations and indemnities' cannot apply to Serbia, which is the keystone of Pan-Germany.

We now see that, even if the withdrawal of Ger-

many from the territories of Belgium, France, and Russia now held by her were to take place, Central Pan-Germany would remain essentially intact; and her commercial competition alone would suffice to bring about the economic ruin of France, England, and Russia. The last-named countries would be staggering under their colossal war-debts, with no offsetting compensation, whereas Germany, thanks to six great elements of advantage, would find her war-losses more than counter-balanced by her profits. What chance would the Allied powers, exhausted by a deadly peace, have against the thirty million soldiers of Pan-Germany, when Berlin, refreshed by a short respite, should choose to renew her hold over those western territories which she had temporarily relinquished?

Is it not plain what depths of deception lie beneath that formula, 'peace without annexations and indemnities,' which the Russian Socialists, ignorant of the vast advantages accruing to Germany from the war, have adopted at the suggestion of Berlin's Leninist agents? Let us look at the facts, not at the words. If the formula 'peace without annexations and indemnities' is acceptable to the Germans, it is simply because this formula, in the opinion of Berlin, will assure the maintenance of Central Pan-Germany, which, in turn, pledges to Germany the domination of Europe and the fulfillment of all other elements of the Pan-German scheme.

Now, if Central Pan-Germany were to survive, thus assuring to Germany all its vast attendant advantages, and leaving the Allies to face their incalculable war-losses, could such a peace properly be called a 'white peace'? Could a peace which gave Germany the domination of Europe be called a 'drawn game,' a 'peace without annexations or indemnities'? What sort of 'limping peace' (*paix boiteuse*) would permit Prussian militarism to hold sway over the 150 million people of Pan-Germany instead of the 68 millions of 1914, and put 30 million soldiers at Berlin's disposal? What one of the exhausted states of Europe could lift a hand under such conditions? This would be no *paix boiteuse*; it would be the peace of slavery.

If the Allies are to understand the crucial situation which lies before them, they must realize that, as Lloyd George said, 'The security of civilization is directly involved in the independence of Serbia.' But the independence of Serbia can never be assured so long as Germany practically exercises hegemony over the 50 million people of Austria-Hungary, for the Austro-German unit of 118 million inhabitants, all subject to Berlin, is geographically the mistress of the Balkans. *The pledge of Serbia's independence, therefore, does not lie in Serbia, but north of the Danube.* This pledge involves the liberation of the peoples under Hapsburg domination, — the Poles, Czecho-Slovaks,

Jugo-Slavs, and Roumanians, — which alone can permit the creation of a barrier sufficiently strong to block the Hamburg–Persian Gulf line, and, at the same time, annul the vast advantages that the definite establishment of the formidable economic and military Pan-German scheme would assure to the Kaiser and his people.

Now it is much easier to devise the destruction of Pan-Germany than is generally supposed. This fact will become plain as soon as the Allies as a whole realize that the freedom of the nationalities subject to the Hapsburgs should not only be an object of the Entente victory, but also a means to that victory. This, however, is a matter which needs greater elaboration than I can give it at this point. It is discussed at length in the concluding chapters of this volume.

In a word, the solution of the Central European problem means everything for the Allies. So long as it shall remain unsolved, victory will be out of their reach. On the other hand, when this one point has been settled, all the other special war-aims of each of the Allies can be fulfilled with ease.

Assuming now that the problem of Central Europe has been solved, could it be said that the resulting peace would be ‘without annexations and indemnities’? Plainly not: for this peace, if it is to break up forever the autocracies of the Central Empires, must, for reasons of nationality,

change the existing frontiers, which have made Austro-German imperialism possible. It might involve also certain legitimate reparations. Can it be said that peace on the terms of the Allies would be a 'white peace'—a 'drawn game'? Again we must say no; for such a peace would bring incalculable benefits to the world: the end of Prussian militarism, together with the possibility of organizing the society of nations under other and better conditions. Neither could it be called a '*paix boiteuse*,' for the destruction of Prussian militarism would insure to the world a long term of rest after the present awful struggle.

The formulæ 'peace without indemnities or annexations,' 'white peace,' 'drawn game' and '*paix boiteuse*' have therefore no more connection with reality in the event of an Allied victory than in that of a German victory. The truth in a nutshell is that, by virtue of the prime importance of the Central European problem, either the Allies will win victory through the destruction of Pan-Germany, or else the Germans, thanks to Central Pan-Germany and its economic and military advantages, will reduce all Europe to slavery. These are the two phases of the dilemma.

In any case, the fact that expressions without any practical application, and hence absurd, are constantly made use of in many Allied organs of public opinion in the discussion of peace, proves beyond doubt that certain Allied circles, poisoned

by the influence of Lenine or Kienthal, have lost their sense of realities. With such insidious enemies as the Germans, this involves a real danger for that moral resistance of the Allies which is so invaluable. The Americans, through their practical common sense, can be of the greatest service in helping the European Allies to set it at naught.

President Wilson, by his message to Russia and his Flag Day address, has already done much for the common cause by clearly setting forth the concrete difficulties to be overcome by the Allies if they are to live at liberty. Mr. Gompers has done the same by his firm stand regarding the Stockholm conference. By energetically opposing the pernicious Socialist theoreticians, he has supported those real Socialists in France, England, and Russia who understand the vital importance of killing Prussian militarism.

May all true Americans continue to speak as these two men have done! The common sense of their opinions, spread broadcast among the European Allies, will help us to neutralize the deadly action of those among us who have become intoxicated by theories. The cause of the Allies is an ideal, but the triumph of this ideal can never be insured by words; it can be compassed only by the accurate knowledge of military and economic realities.

CHAPTER IV

THE ALLIES AND PAN-GERMANISM

IT is now twenty years that I have worked tirelessly to tear the veil from the Pan-German scheme, which my investigations in all parts of the world have enabled me to unearth. In spite of the positive and abundant proofs of its existence which I have been publishing for nineteen years, I was unable to persuade the responsible authorities in France, Russia, or England, that a formidable peril was swiftly and more swiftly drawing near. Paris and London were steeped in blind pacifist delusions. As for Petrograd, the sinister Teutonic influences which, until only yesterday, were at work on the highest personages, prevented the great Russian people from knowing the real nature of Germany's projects.

If the Europeans most directly interested in knowing the truth were, until the very outbreak of hostilities, completely hoodwinked as to the true intentions of William II, it is only natural that Americans should take some time to realize the staggering facts concerning the fantastic and odious plan of world-domination so toilsomely built up by the government at Berlin. In peace times, too, the affairs of old Europe, especially the

intricate tangle of Austro-Hungarian and Balkan politics, had no practical interest for so vast and remote a nation as the United States. This was particularly true of her Western citizens. To-day, however, Americans as well as French, British, Russians, and Italians, are faced with the obligation of mastering the problems of Central European affairs; for, without exaggeration, it is on the proper solution of these problems that the independent existence of the United States depends.

As events have justified the views I have held for a score of years, I trust my American readers will hold this fact in my favor. If I should seem to run counter to the ideas they now hold, they should realize that I do so deliberately, in order to save priceless time and better serve their own legitimate interests.

I

The present situation in Europe is due to two factors: first, the almost complete fulfillment by the Germans of a plan which they had long been preparing with the utmost care; second, the repeated mistakes of the Allies in their carrying on of the war — mistakes which alone have permitted the Germans to consummate their plan almost without opposition.

The Pan-Germanist programme of 1911 called for the establishment of Prussian hegemony over a territory of nearly 4,015,000 square kilometres

— in other words, besides actual conquest in the East and West, it meant the indirect, yet effective seizure of Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey. At the beginning of 1917 — before the capture of Bagdad by the English and the strategic retreat of the German troops in the West — the programme had been realized to the extent of 3,600,000 square kilometres — that is, in nine-tenths of its entirety.

The basic explanation of this achievement lies partly in the fact that, if the Germans are outlaws they are very intelligent outlaws, perfectly trained for the task of seizing the booty on which they have set their hearts; partly in the fact that the leaders of the Allies, intelligent and animated by the best intentions though they are, have been quite unenlightened as to the multiple realities of the European tangle, a thoroughgoing knowledge of which is absolutely necessary for the conduct of the terrible war in progress.

The proof of this ignorance lies in the recognized truth that the heads of the European states now in league against Germany were, without exception, taken by surprise when war broke out. Posterity will look on this fact with amazement. The governments of the Allies were no better prepared to direct the war intellectually than were their generals to carry it on materially. Now, the intellectual prosecution of this war presents unprecedented difficulties: it calls uncompromisingly

for a detailed knowledge, not only of matters military and naval, but of geographic, ethnographic, economic, and political questions which, by reason of the scale of the present conflict, react profoundly on all military operations of general scope. As a result of this interpenetration of all the various problems, the world-conflict is not, as many people still believe, a purely military struggle, in which the mere machinery of war plays a decisive rôle. In spite of appearances, mind — that is, the intellectual element — dominates the material element which, though indispensable, can attain full effectiveness only when it is employed in furtherance of a definite plan of action, backed by clear thinking; and such a plan can never be formulated unless the ethnographic, psychological, economic, and geographic factors capable of affecting every great movement of a general strategic nature are calculated as carefully as the purely military factors. By reason of the potency of these many factors — invisible, but very real and powerful — it may be said: 'This war is not a mere war of armaments — it is a war of political science.'

It is because the strategists of Berlin have long recognized this conception of modern warfare; it is because they have at their fingers' ends a documentation of political science, slowly accumulated and of unquestionable worth, that they are in a position to meet endless problems as they present

themselves, and to achieve successes against the Allies which, on the surface, appear incomprehensible.

As for the leaders of the Allies, it seems as if many of them are not alive to the element of political science in the war, even at the present moment. The reason is simple. The same men who ignored the realities of Pan-Germanism before the war are, naturally enough, unable to grasp the politico-scientific, geographic, economic, ethnographic, and psychological realities of all Europe now that the conflict has burst on us. In the realm of the intellectual there can be no improvisation. To master the politico-scientific elements necessary for the prosecution of this war, there is need of minds trained by the unremitting application of fifteen or twenty years. Among the leaders of the Entente no man is to be found who has bent his will to such intellectual effort; and the pressing problems brought forth by each day give no time for minute, deliberate study by the men who have succeeded to the seats of power since war began.

II

The capital mistakes in the prosecution of the war committed by the Entente proceed directly from the defective equipment of its leaders which I have just pointed out. They explain the difference in the results obtained by the two groups of

belligerents, although the courage and self-sacrifice of the Allies' soldiers are as great as those of the Germans. They explain, too, why the three hundred millions of the Allies — this takes no account of their colonial resources or of the support drawn from trans-oceanic neutrals—have not yet succeeded in defeating Germany, which entered the war with a population of sixty-eight millions and one ally, Austria-Hungary, of whose thirty million people three quarters were directly antagonistic to Berlin.

These capital mistakes made by the Allies are as follows. They believed that a friendly agreement with Bulgaria was possible, although that country was treaty-bound to Berlin and Constantinople long before the war. They cherished illusions concerning King Constantine, who, above all else, was brother-in-law of the Kaiser. They organized the Dardanelles expedition, which should never have been attempted. Even if this operation had been judged technically feasible, its futility would have been apparent if the Allies had realized—and it was their arch-error not to realize—that the strategic key to the whole European war was the Danube. The mere occupation by the Allies of the territory stretching from Montenegro through Serbia to Roumania, would have resolved all the essential problems of the conflict. Cut off from the Central Empires, Bulgaria and Turkey, whose arsenals were depleted by the Bal-

kan disturbances of 1912-1913, would have found it impossible to make a strong stand against the Allies. Turkey, who had been imprudent enough to defy them, would have been obliged to open the Straits within a very short time, for sheer lack of munitions to defend them. This opening of the Straits would have been effected by a strong pressure by the Allies on the south of Hungary. Moreover, by the same action the Central Empires would have been barred from reinforcements and supplies from the Orient. Germany, finding herself cut off on land in the South as she was blockaded by sea in the North, would have been obliged to come to terms.

Unhappily, the general staffs of the Allies in the West were not prepared to grasp the politico-scientific character of the war, especially the cardinal importance of the economic factor. This ignorance remained unenlightened until Roumania was crushed in 1916. As a result, for twenty-seven months the Balkans were looked on by the leaders in the West as being of only secondary military importance. During these twenty-seven months the Allies were obsessed by the idea that they would vanquish Germany on the Western front by a war of attrition. This conviction delayed the Saloniki-Belgrade expedition, and when it was finally undertaken, it was on too small a scale to insure success. Such a grave error would never have been committed by the Allied strategists if

they had fully realized that the principal objective of the Pan-German scheme, for the attainment of which Germany was primarily fighting, was the seizure of the Orient. This point of view, however, was for a long time ignored, in spite of the tireless efforts made by a few to demonstrate its vital importance.

The Austro-Germans, profiting by this basic mistake of the civil and military chiefs of the Entente, were able in October–November, 1915, to join hands with Bulgaria and Turkey over the corpse of Serbia. From that time on, the General Staff at Berlin has been profiting by this situation, improving it and consolidating it by seizing half of Roumania toward the close of 1916. The direct result of the mistakes of the Allies, coupled with the methodical procedure of Berlin, has been the realization of nine tenths of Pan-Germany.

This Pan-Germany is composed of two elements. First, the great occupied territories taken by Germany from Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia, and Roumania. Second, the practical seizure effected by her at the expense of her own allies: Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey; for, as a matter of fact, the Quadruple Alliance is nothing but a great illusion carefully fostered by the Kaiser for the purpose of concealing the true situation from the neutrals — particularly the United States, which was then in that category. If one wishes to see things as they are, one must realize

that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are *not* the allies — that is, the equals — of Germany. These three states are practically the vassals of Berlin, in whose sight they count for scarcely more than Saxony or Bavaria. The principal proof of this state of affairs lies in the fact that the Kaiser wields an uncontested supremacy from Hamburg to the British front at Bagdad.

Since the beginning of hostilities there has been a formidable extension of Prussian militarism. At first, it held in its grasp only the sixty-eight million people of the German Empire. By April, 1915, it had extended and organized its influence among the thirty millions of Austro-Hungarians, who until that time had taken orders from their own independent military chiefs. After October–November, 1915, — the date of Serbia's downfall, — the Prussian system reached out to Bulgaria and Turkey. By taking account of these extensions and adding together the populations of the territories occupied by Germany, together with those of her infatuated allies, one finds that to-day Prussian militarism no longer controls sixty-eight million souls, as at the beginning of the war, but about one hundred and seventy-six million European and Ottoman subjects.

This is the brutal, overwhelming fact which Americans must face if they wish to learn the sole solution of the war which will assure to them, as well as to the rest of the world, a durable peace.

The following figures will show how the three groups of the population of Pan-Germany were divided at the beginning of 1917:—

1. THE MASTERS		
Germans		73,000,000
2. THE VASSALS		
Magyars	10,000,000	} 21,000,000
Bulgars	5,000,000	
Turks	6,000,000	
3. THE SLAVES		
French	(about) 3,000,000	} 82,000,000
Belgians	7,500,000	
Alsatians, Lorrainers	1,500,000	
Danes	200,000	
Poles, Lithuanians,	22,000,000	
Ruthenians	5,500,000	
Czechs	8,500,000	
Jugo-Slavs	11,000,000	
Roumanians	8,000,000	
Italians	800,000	
Armenians	2,000,000	
Levantines	2,000,000	
Ottoman Greeks	2,000,000	
Arabs	8,000,000	
<i>Total</i>		176,000,000

To sum up, seventy-three million Germans rule over twenty-one million vassals and eighty-two million slaves, — Latin, Slavic, Semitic, belonging to thirteen different nationalities, — who are bearing the most cruel and unjustifiable yoke that the world has ever known.

It is undeniable, moreover, that each extension of Prussian militarism over a new territory has enabled Germany to prolong the struggle by obtaining new supplies of food, new reinforcements to

press into her service and territory to exploit, new civil populations, whose labor is made use of even in works of a military nature. As a result, the technical problem now confronting the Allies in Europe is, through the mistakes of their former leaders, infinitely more complicated than at the outbreak of hostilities.

To-day Berlin, by means of Prussian terrorism methodically and pitilessly employed, disposes of the military and economic resources of one hundred and seventy-six million people, occupying a strategic position in the centre of Europe which is all to her profit. It is this very state of things, founded on the slavery of eighty-two millions of human beings, which is intolerable.

III

Many times, and rightly, the Allies have declared that it was not their object to exterminate the German people and bring about their political extinction. On the other hand, it is just and essential to proclaim that Pan-Germany must be destroyed. On this depends the liberty, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. This is the point of view which, in the crisis of to-day, should prevail with Americans, for the following reasons. Suppose that Pan-Germany were able to maintain itself in its present position. It cannot be denied that its territory contains considerable latent military and economic resources, as well as strategic

positions of world-significance, like the Dardanelles. If these resources were freely exploited and developed to their highest pitch by the relentless organizing spirit of Berlin, Prussianized Pan-Germany, dividing Europe in two, would dominate the Continent, uncontestedly and indefinitely, by means of her crushing strength. France, Russia, England, Italy, ceasing to exist as great powers, could only submit to Germany's will. And Berlin, mistress of Europe, would soon realize, not merely the Hamburg-Bagdad and Antwerp-Bagdad railways, but the Brest-Bagdad line as well; for Brest has long been coveted secretly by the Pan-Germanists, who would make of it the great military and commercial transatlantic port of Prussianized Europe.

Moreover, if Germany achieved the ruin of the Allies, it is entirely probable that the General Staff of William II would launch a formidable expedition against the United States without delay, in order to allow her no time to organize herself against the Prussian tyranny hypothetically dominating Europe. Even if Berlin felt it necessary to defer this step, Americans would none the less be forced to prepare for the inevitable struggle and to serve an apprenticeship to militarism which would be odious to them. If Americans; then, see things as they really are, and perceive the dangers to which they are pledging their future, they will be convinced that they, as much as Europeans,

have a vital interest in the annihilation of Pan-Germanism. In a word, it is clear that any peril accruing to the United States from Europe can arise only from so formidable a power as Pan-Germany, and not from a Germany kept within her legitimate frontiers, and forced to behave herself, by the balance of other powers.

We must also realize that the moral considerations at stake are a matter of the liveliest interest to the United States. Can republican America allow the feudal spirit which kindled the torch of this war to triumph over the world? This spirit is made up of the following elements: the feudalism of the Prussian Junkers, chief prop and stay of the Hohenzollerns; the feudalism of the great Austrian land-owners; the feudalism of the Magyar grandees, whose castè-spirit is precisely the same as that of the Prussian lordlings; and the Turkish feudalism of Enver Bey and his friends. In other words, this four-ply feudal spirit which is the basis of Pan-Germany is in radical and absolute opposition to the democratic spirit of the modern world. Granting for a moment that Germany were victorious, Russia, after a frightful reign of anarchy, would be forced to submit once more to the yoke of autocracy. As for the peoples of Western Europe, reduced to worse than slavery, they could only renounce their dearest ideals — the ideals for which they have shed their blood for centuries.

The present war, then, is manifestly a struggle *à outrance* between democracy and feudalism. To Americans as well as to Europeans falls the task, not only of preserving their corporeal independence, but of saving our common civilization. This can be accomplished only by the destruction of Pan-Germanism.

It is plain that Berlin, failing so far to crush the Allies completely, is bending every effort to maintaining Pan-Germany in its present position, so that, after peace is declared, it may crystallize and swiftly develop its full power. When, in December, 1916, President Wilson requested the belligerents to make known the causes for which they were fighting, the government of Berlin issued no definite statement. The reason for this attitude is plain. If Berlin still hopes to enforce her outrageous pretensions by her immense military power, she cannot possibly put down her terms in black and white, in a document subject to general perusal, without instantly calling down on her head the blazing reprobation of the civilized world.

The Allies, on the contrary, replied to Mr. Wilson's question easily and with precision.

The universal attention drawn to this reply has entailed advantages and disadvantages. By the very nature of things, the Allies definitely announced that the smaller nationalities in Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans must be set

free, thus implying a radical opposition to the Hamburg-Persian Gulf idea. This has enabled Berlin, for one thing, to bind her accomplices at Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople more closely, if possible, to her cause, and also to galvanize for a still longer period the forces of the German people, who are resolved to endure the bitterest suffering in order to insure, after peace comes, the immense advantages accruing from the *fait accompli* of Pan-Germanism.

By way of compensation for this, the publicity given the reply of the Allies has accomplished two excellent ends. First of all, it has permitted every one to see that the common purpose of the Allies is to solve the Central European problem, which, as a matter of fact, is not only of European, but of universal interest, since such a solution puts a quietus on German dreams of world-domination. This publicity, too, has made it possible to compare the principles invoked by the Allies in their peace-terms with those of President Wilson, proclaimed in his message to the Senate on January 22, 1917, and to establish the fact that these principles are identical.

IV

The reason for this harmonious point of view lies in the adoption of the principle of nationality by the Allies and by President Wilson as the fundamental basis for the reconstruction of the Eu-

rope of to-morrow. Because of this point in common, it is evident that the war measures of the Allies and the pacific endeavors of Mr. Wilson have in view the same general geographic solutions of the problem of organizing Europe on the lines of a durable peace. This is a fact of the utmost importance, as I tried to show with the aid of maps in an article in *L'Illustration*, of February 27, 1917. Allies and Americans, then, may join hands and press resolutely ahead, — especially since the Russian Revolution has come to pass, — for, with a common ideal, their general practical solutions for meeting this formidable crisis cannot but be identical.

In order to understand fully the seriousness of the situation, one must distinguish clearly between the moral position of the Allies and the strategic positions of the two groups of belligerents. The moral position of the Allies is excellent. After Washington and Peking broke with Berlin, and especially after the magnificent revolution in Russia, after Bagdad fell and a fraction of the invaded French territory was won back, the spirit of the Allies was all that could be desired. But even while recognizing the excellence of this moral strength and its potentialities of success, we must first of all consider the general strategic situation. The events of this war have plainly shown that, unfortunately, brute force in the service of the lowest passions can prevail over

the holiest rights, the purest aspirations. Since August, 1914, incontestable rights have been violated, and noble nations martyred.

Let us face the cruel truth and say: the Allies may yet be completely vanquished if certain developments come about, or if new strategic mistakes are added to those portentous ones which nearly lost them the fight, in spite of the righteousness of their cause and their immense, if badly employed, latent resources. If we wish, then, really to understand the crisis of to-day and the mighty peril which still menaces the world's liberty, we must not shrink from meeting the realities of the military situation. We must be ready to face the most serious developments that can be conceived. Such an attitude implies, not pessimism, but that readiness for the worst which lies at the root of military wisdom.

Let us now accept the following facts. The troops of France are beginning to be exhausted. The iniquitous administration of the Tsar had seriously compromised the provisioning of the Russian army with food and munitions. In that vast country, where conditions were ripe for idealistic extremists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the prevalence of the latter condition. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts shall finally succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dis-

solve. This would practically insure a German victory, for, with the Russian armies demoralized, all the forces of Pan-Germany could be flung against the Franco-British front. Moreover, if, from the moral standpoint, the Berlin government is universally to be despised, the same cannot be said about her general technical military ability, whose elements are as follows.

Berlin is incontestably mistress of Pan-Germany — that is, she has absolute disposal of vast resources in men and in the manifold products of a great territory with a population of one hundred and seventy-six millions. The Kaiser's Great General Staff, whose intellectual resourcefulness cannot be questioned, is quick to make the most of every lesson taught by the war. The annual levies of men from the various territories of Pan-Germany certainly outnumber the losses sustained each year by her troops. It is therefore, in my opinion, a grave error to assume, as the Allies have done, that the Germans can be beaten by mere attrition of their forces. By organizing under one uniform system the soldiery furnished by the many different countries of Pan-Germany, Prussian militarism has unquestionably given its troops a cohesion and a unity unknown to the vassal-allies of Germany before the war. This state of affairs has undoubtedly added to the military effectiveness of the vast armies which take their orders from Berlin.

The German military authorities most advantageously employed the respites given them by the strategic errors of the Allies. Never have the broad lines of trenches, the far-flung battle frontiers, been more powerfully guarded than now. Never have the Germans had more abundant stores of munitions. Never has the network of railways covering the length and breadth of Pan-Germany been so complete. Never has the Great General Staff, making full use of its central position, been better able to concentrate on any front with lightning speed. For these reasons, it is my opinion that we may safely say that never before has the Berlin government, from a military point of view, been so strong. The various statistics which justify such a conclusion are, I think, to be relied on. Even supposing them to be exaggerated, it is much better to run the risk of overestimating the enemy's strength than to underestimate it. Many of the Allies' mistakes sprang from neglect of this axiom.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY OPERATIONS

I

AS a prelude to the further consideration of certain aspects of the world-war, I should like, if I may, to quote a few paragraphs which I printed early last summer, by way of forecast, and which events have not wholly belied.

Let us now attempt to forecast the German military plans for 1917. For some weeks persistent reports have been telling of their tremendous preparations for hurling an offensive against the Russian front. As for the Franco-British front in the West, it was stated that the General Staff at Berlin would be glad to hold things stationary on that side until, after winning the victory on which they count in the East, they are free to devote their attentions to the occidental theatre. This project, of course, cannot be confirmed; but the voluntary shortening of the western line by the Germans would lend color to its probability. Moreover, such a plan would coincide perfectly with the present interests of Berlin, with the habitual methods of the Kaiser's General Staff, with the broad Pan-Germanist scheme, and with the personal preferences of Marshal von Hin-

denburg. It is natural also that the Germans should avail themselves of the sinister and undeniable effects of the Russian imperial administration on the army and civil population of the country before the new government at Petrograd has time to repair the all-too-abundant harm that has been wrought.

We must cherish no illusions. As long as it can dispose of the vast resources of Pan-Germany, which, to my thinking, are still taken too lightly by the Allies; while the results of the Russian Revolution are still uncertain; while the reorganization of the Muscovite armies still remains uncompleted, the government at Berlin, in spite of its serious problems connected with the food-supply, is still convinced that it can win a decisive military victory by dealing with its adversaries one by one. And so we should foresee that the German General Staff will meet its problems in succession.

It seems probable, then, that it will follow the basic principles of warfare and concentrate all the forces at its disposal against the weakest front. This, without question, is the Roumano-Russian line. Its great extent, together with the formidable development of the German railway system, — infinitely superior to that of the Russians, — makes it easier to introduce the element of surprise, which is of capital importance for swift, decisive victory. The Russians, too, are certainly less well

provided with munitions of war than the Franco-British troops; and the Germans have succeeded in further weakening them by means of the terrible explosions recently engineered by their spies at Archangel. As a result of the execrable administration of the former government, the food situation in Russia is most critical, while the revolutionists are not yet sure of the reorganization of the military forces. The Germans, therefore, have an unquestionable interest in profiting without delay by this state of affairs.

A vigorous offensive on the Eastern front is also in harmony with the Pangermanist plan, which for twenty-five years has looked forward to the seizure by Germany of Riga, Little Russia, and Odessa. And a German success in the south of Russia would be big with economic, naval, military, and moral consequences of world-import. The Germans would become masters of the rich and boundless wheat-lands of Little Russia, which, from the midst of their food-problems, they watch with greedy eyes. The capture of Odessa and the complete conquest of the Black Sea, by means of transports (sent in large numbers down the Danube, thus permitting surprise attacks at vital points), would end in the loss of the Crimea and, probably, the fall of the Caucasus into the hands of the Turco-Germans. The British, then, could no longer hold out at Bagdad. Freed by such successes from all immediate fear

of Russia, the Germans could then turn in enormous strength against the Balkan front of the Allies. Under these hypothetical conditions, one may assume that the Allied army north of Saloniki, demoralized by the Russian reverses, would be taken prisoners or driven into the sea.

These various operations in the East vigorously taken in hand, as the General Staff at Berlin knows so well how to do, would require four or five months for their execution. This interval of time, combined with the depressing moral effect brought about by the supposed German victories, would act, as it were, as an automatic preparation for the final Teutonic offensive on the Western front. It must be remembered that during these four or five months the submarine warfare, pursued more and more ruthlessly, would considerably impede neutral navigation and decimate the tonnage of the Franco-British merchant marine. The food-problems and the war-expenditure of the Allies would be enormously increased. Even if their pressure has forced the Kaiser to evacuate a considerable portion of France and Belgium, the importance of this retreat would be only relative, for it would be temporary. Following our hypothesis, then, if Russia were beaten, the army of Saloniki driven into the sea, and the food crisis in the West intensified, the moral depression and discouragement among the soldiers and civilians of France would be most profound. Under the

given material and psychological conditions, the concentration of all the Pan-German forces on the Western front would probably permit them to break through. This would spell ruin for France and for England as well, and assure that decisive German victory which would mean the mastery of Europe.

If this theoretical German plan is to be accomplished in 1917, however, the general technical situation in Europe must remain much as it stands at present. No new power capable of making itself felt on the battle-field must come to the support of the Allies. It is necessary, then, that the scheme be carried out in 1917, before the Russian Revolution, which is essentially favorable to the Allies, has time to repair the damage done by the former régime, and before the United States, realizing that it is to their vital interest to take part directly and without delay in the war on the Continent, are ready to do so effectively.

The tactics of Berlin, after being forced to a diplomatic rupture with Washington, consist in doing everything to avoid actual blows with the United States, while keeping up a vigorous submarine campaign, and in making frantic efforts to effect a miscarriage of American military preparation — especially as regards sending reinforcements to Europe. In pursuance of this scheme, Berlin instructed Vienna to send Washington a dilatory answer concerning submarine

warfare, in order to avoid a diplomatic break and thus gain time. This procedure was specifically intended to make America believe that Austro-Hungary can act independently of Germany. And so, by virtue of this delusion, William II veils the existence of that Pan-Germany whose reality, for the sake of his plans, must not be revealed until the latest possible moment.

II

If the programme for 1917, which we have good reason to attribute to the Germans, were substantially carried out (and, after all, this is not impossible), in six to eight months the United States would find themselves face to face with a Germany controlling the resources, not only of the present-day Pan-Germany, but of all Europe. And, Americans, do not think your turn would be long in coming. Do not take it for granted that the German people, worn out by the endless horrors of war, would cry to their masters, 'Peace at any price!' The German people, as I know them, filled with enthusiasm by a victory that would be without parallel in the history of the world, maddened by incalculable plunder, would follow the lead of their Emperor more blindly than ever. The pride and ambition of the Kaiser and his General Staff are so prodigious that, unless all signs fail, they would give the United States no chance to organize against a Prussianized Europe.

In eight or ten months, after new advances had been made to Japan, who would be isolated by the defeat of her allies in Europe, and with the aid of the German-Mexicans and German-Americans whose mission, as every one knows, is to paralyze by every possible means the military organization of the United States, it would be possible to look for ruthless action against America by the Pan germanized forces of Europe.

The prediction of such extraordinary eventualities will no doubt seem fantastic and improbable to many of my American readers. I beg them, nevertheless, to consider them seriously. As a matter of fact, if we consider all that has been achieved by the Germans since August, 1914, the events which I have forecast are much less amazing than those indicated by me in 1901, when, in my book *L'Europe et la Question d'Autriche au Seuil du XXe Siècle*, I unmasked the Pan-German plot, which was then looked on as a mere phantasmagoria — although as a matter of fact it was so real that it now stands almost completely fulfilled.

You Americans, then, should learn your lesson from the past. Your own best interest lays on you the obligation to face facts which may at present seem improbable, and to prepare yourselves without losing a day for meeting the gravest perils. As the situation now stands, a delay in making a decision may involve disastrous re-

sults. For instance, the three weeks of parleying indulged in by the Allies before deciding to send troops to Serbia were of the utmost significance. Those three lost weeks simply prevented the Allies from achieving victory, and resulted in an unthinkable prolongation of the war.

The surest, the most economical way for Americans to avoid excessive risks is to prepare at once for the severest kind of struggle, on the hypothesis that the Allies may sustain grave reverses. Everything favors concerted action by the United States and the Allies. Their material and moral interests are identical, and, in doing away with autocracy, Russia removed the well-justified distrust felt in the United States for the land of the Tsars. As we have seen, a German victory over Russia, involving the fall of Saloniki and, later, the breaking of the Western front, would be unquestionably the most dangerous eventuality imaginable for the future security of the United States. American interest therefore demands, not only that support should be given France and Great Britain, but that the United States should hasten to help the Russians, who will probably be called on first to meet the onslaught.

On reflection, perhaps, Americans may even find it worth while to give further thought to an idea which, a few months ago, would have seemed preposterous to them. Since President Wilson cherishes the ideal of the brotherhood of nations,

— a noble conception, but one which can be realized only after Prussian militarism is ground in the dust, after the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns have gone the way of the Romanoffs, — why should not this world-crisis provide an opportunity for intimate coöperation between the United States and Japan?

Even if Americans were to admit the necessity of so doing, it will be long before they are in the position to throw into the European conflict those reinforcements which, by exercising a decisive influence, would hasten the end of the mad slaughter. At the present moment Japan alone, outside of Europe, has at her disposal a trained army capable of taking the field at once. Everything considered, President Wilson might well decide that the interests of humanity called for the intervention of Japan in Europe. If he succeeded in convincing Tokyo of this, he would stand out as the great, decisive figure of the war. From the technical point of view, it is certain that victory for the Allies calls for a simultaneous concentric attack on all the fronts of Pan-Germany. For that reason, Japanese troops on the Russian line, at Bagdad, Alexandretta, and Saloniki, would furnish the Eastern positions of the Allies with the supplementary strength that they need to achieve decisive results and so hasten the end of the whole war.

Let me again urge my point that the line of

action morally and materially most profitable to the United States is that which, by achieving the total destruction of Pan-Germany and Prussian militarism, will terminate the horrible carnage once for all. This is the moral pointed by the past. If the Allies had undertaken the Saloniki-Belgrade expedition in the beginning of 1915, the war would have ended a year ago. If you, Americans, had cast your lot with us a year ago, it would be ending about now. If you act to-day, with all your energies, and especially if you compass the Japanese intervention, you will save the lives of millions of men who, without your military and diplomatic support, will surely be sacrificed.

The real problem for America is clearly to discern Pan-Germany lurking beneath the Quadruple Alliance of the Central Powers, and to decide to strike this Pan-Germany quick and hard. This is the one and only way to foil the odious Prussian militarism which threatens the liberty of the world.

CHAPTER VI

PAN-GERMANY'S STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

IN April last, when it was generally believed in Paris that the Revolution at Petrograd made certain the end of German influence over the vast former Empire of the Tsars, I wrote the study referred to on page 81 and reprinted here as Chapters IV and V.¹ I then said, [In Russia] 'Where conditions were ripe for idealistic extremists to guide the revolution toward pacifism or anarchy, there are alarming symptoms of the prevalence of the latter condition. The swarming agents of Germany are working there without respite. If their efforts succeed, the strength of Russia will swiftly dissolve.'

Unhappily, events have justified this word of caution in only too full measure. The efforts of the Allies to reorganize the forces of Russia have thus far met with small success. It is a task to which their duty and their interests alike make it imperative for them to devote themselves with their utmost strength. But we must cherish no illusions. The rebuilding of the forces of Russia must inevitably be a long, arduous, and doubtful undertaking. It is advisable, therefore, to

¹See *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1917, p. 721.

consider, at the same time, if there is not some method of making up for the Russian default by bringing into play, to further the victory of the Entente, certain powerful forces which the Allies have not thus far even thought of employing.

Now, these forces and this method do exist; but in order to enforce clearly their reality, their importance, and the way to make use of them, I must, in the first place, call attention to a fundamental and enduring error of the Allies, set forth the extraordinary credulity with which they allow themselves to be ensnared in the never-ending intrigues of Berlin, and describe the principal shifts which Germany employs, with undeniable cleverness, to annul to an extraordinary degree the effect of the Allies' efforts. These essential causes of mistaken judgment being eliminated, we shall then be able to understand what the existing forces are which will enable the Entente to make up with comparative rapidity for the Russian default, and to contribute with remarkable efficiency to the destruction of Pan-Germany.

I

THE FUNDAMENTAL AND ENDURING ERROR OF THE ALLIES

For three years past events have notoriously proved that the concrete Pangermanist scheme, developed between 1895 and 1911, has been fol-

lowed strictly by the Germans since the outbreak of hostilities. Now, the diplomacy of the Entente is devised as if there were no Pangermanist scheme.

This is the source of all the vital strategical and diplomatic errors of the Entente — consequences of the failure to understand the German military and political manœuvring. Here is proof derived from recent events — one of many which it would be possible to allege.

When it was announced a few weeks ago that Austria would play an apparently preponderating part in the reconstitution of Poland, a very large number of newspapers in the Entente countries decided that 'it is perfectly evident that the Austrian policy has carried the day in Poland.' A similar deduction has led Allied readers to believe that Vienna has prevailed over Berlin. The result has been to strengthen the faith of those who deem it possible to impose terms on Berlin through the channel of Vienna, and even to induce Austria to conclude a separate peace. Now, to convey such an impression as this to Allied public opinion is to lead it completely astray. If the Hapsburgs are playing an apparently predominant part in Poland it is solely because that part, as we are about to prove, is assigned to them by the Pangermanist scheme.

In the pamphlet, *Pan-Germany and Central Europe about 1950*, published in Berlin in 1895,

which contains the whole Pangermanist plan, we find the following: —

‘Poland and Little Russia [the kingdom to be established at Russia’s expense] will agree to have no armies of their own, and will receive in their fortresses German or Austrian garrisons. In Poland, as well as in Little Russia, the postal and telegraph services and the railways will be in German hands.’

For twenty-two years the Pangermanist scheme has been followed up. Tannenberg, in his book, *Greater Germany*, which appeared in 1911, — a work whose exceptional importance has been demonstrated by events, and which, in all probability, was inspired officially, — prophesies very distinctly, —

‘The new kingdom of Poland is made up of the former Russian portion, of the basin of the Vistula, and of Galicia, and forms a part of the new Austria.’

These most unequivocal words appeared, it will be admitted, *three years before the war*. Now *Le Temps* of September 7, 1917, said on the authority of the Polish agency at Berne, which is subsidized by Austria and publishes news communicated to it by the government of Vienna, —

‘Germany would take such portion of Russian Poland as she needs to rectify her “strategic frontiers.” This portion would include almost a tenth of Russian Poland. *The rest would be annexed to Austria. The Emperor Charles would*

thereupon issue a decree of annexation of Russian Poland to Galicia, under the title of Kingdom of Poland. . . . The dual monarchy would then become triple, and the first result of this readjustment would be to compel all Poles to undergo military service in the Austrian armies. All the deputies representing Galicia would automatically leave the Austrian Reichsrath, to enter the new Polish Parliament, which would give the German parties in the Austrian Parliament a certain absolute majority.'

This result of the present action of Vienna and Berlin, foreshadowed by the *Temps* apparently for the near future, has been in view for twenty-two years. In fact, in the fundamental pamphlet of 1895, already quoted, it is said that '*Galicia and the Bukowina will be excluded from the Austrian monarchy. They will form the nucleus of the kingdoms of Poland and Little Russia . . . which, however, may be united, by the personal link of the sovereign, to the reigning house of Hapsburg.*'

So it is that, very far from having forced anything on Germany in relation to Poland, Charles I of Hapsburg has shown that he submits with docility to the Pangermanist decrees, since he gives his entire adhesion to the carrying into effect of the plan followed at Berlin from 1895 to 1914 — for nineteen years before hostilities began! The actual fact, therefore, is the direct antithesis of what the conclusions of many Allied newspapers

have, of course in absolute good faith, permitted their readers to believe. Now everything goes to show that this error arises solely from a technical ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme, of which the guiding spirits of the Entente seem to have no more conception than a considerable portion of the Allied press. However, if they wish for victory, the Allies must inevitably act in systematic opposition to the Pangermanist scheme. They cannot therefore dispense with the necessity of becoming thoroughly familiar with it.

Nor is there any more reliable guide, since the events that have taken place for three years past have demonstrated the absolute accuracy of the Pangermanist outgivings anterior to the war. Knowing what the Germans are going to do, we can deduce therefrom the best means of opposing it. If this method had been followed, no serious error would have been committed by the Allies. They would have understood that Germany was making war in behalf of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise, — which was intended to supply her with the instruments of world-domination; that, consequently, the Danube front, *which the Allies held*, must be retained at whatever cost, which would have been, comparatively speaking, very easy, if they had recognized in time this imperative necessity.

Now, if the Allies had retained their hold of the Danube front, the war would have been over

nearly two years ago. It is, in fact, solely because they did not grasp the necessity of thus holding it, that the Germans have been able to carry out their Eastern plan and to constitute the Pan-Germany which must now be destroyed in order to avoid the defeat of civilization, and eventual slavery. To effect this destruction is infinitely easier than is generally believed, on the condition that the most is made of the causes tending to the internal dissolution of Pan-Germany. But, to understand these available causes, familiarity with the Pangermanist scheme is indispensable. It is urgently necessary, therefore, to put an end to this intolerable condition, namely, that, while the Allies have an extraordinary opportunity to become accurately acquainted with the whole programme of procedure at Berlin, as contained in a multitude of German documents, — that is to say, the real objects of Germany in the war, — while they have this opportunity, they go on acting and arguing as if that programme did not exist. It is this condition which proves most clearly the extraordinary and enduring credulity which the Allies exhibit in face of the endless German intrigues.

II

THE CREDULITY OF THE ALLIES

The heads of the Allied governments, moved by the best intentions but completely taken by

surprise by the war, are carrying it on far too much in accordance with the ordinary procedure of times of peace — negotiations, declarations, speeches. Notably in the gigantic palaver into which Maximalist Russia has developed, men fancy that they have acted when they have talked. The events of three years of war prove conclusively that the Boches, turning to their profit the predilection of the Allied leaders for verbal negotiations and manifestations, — a predilection complicated by ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme, — have succeeded in nullifying to an extraordinary degree the effect of the sacrifices of the Entente.

Until the Russian Revolution, Berlin brought to bear on the diplomacy of the Entente those allies of Germany who were then regarded by the Entente as neutrals. Indeed, the declarations of Radoslavoff, confirmed by the recently published Greek *White Book*, have conclusively established the fact that the agreements between Germany, Bulgaria, Turkey, and King Constantine, *in contemplation of this war*, antedated the opening of hostilities — that certain ones of them go back as far as April, 1914. Now, it is known that the Entente diplomacy had no knowledge of this situation, and that it allowed itself to be hoodwinked for three months by the Turks, for thirteen months by the Bulgarians, for thirty months by the King of Greece, the Kaiser's brother-in-law, and even,

to a certain degree, down to a very recent period, by Charles I of Hapsburg, certain Allied diplomats having persisted in coddling the chimera of a peace with Austria against Germany.

Unhappily, to solve the present problems, which are, above all, technical, the best intentions, or even the most genuine natural intelligence, are insufficient. *It is necessary to know how*, and one cannot know how without having learned. The Allied Socialists who have placed themselves in the spotlight have shown themselves to be, generally speaking, utopists, entirely ignorant of Germany, of the German mind, of geography, ethnography, and political economy, pinning their faith, before all else, to formulas, and knowing even less than the official diplomats of the technique of the multifold problems imposed by war and peace. As the anti-Prussian German, Dr. Rosemeier, has stated it so fairly in the *New York Times*, these idealists, by reason of their radical failure to grasp the inflexible facts, are doing as much harm to the world in general as the Russian extremists and their German agents.

It is undeniable that Berlin has found it easy to profit by the state of mind of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente by causing its own Social Democrats to put forth the *soi-disant* 'democratic' peace formulas, which for some months past have been infecting the Allied countries with ideas that are most pernicious because they are

impossible of realization. Despite the efforts of realist Socialists, men like Plekhanoff, Kropotkin, Guesde, Compère-Morel, Gompers, and their like, the Stockholm lure, notwithstanding its clumsiness, has helped powerfully to lead Russia to the brink of the abyss, and hence to prolong the war and the sacrifices of the Allies. In France and England a few Socialists have been so genuinely insane as to say that the occupations of territory by Germany are of slight importance; that we can begin to think about peace; that Germany is already conquered *morally*, and so forth. In view of such results, due to the astounding credulity of the idealistic Socialists of the Entente, it is quite natural that Germany should pursue her so-called 'pacifist' manœuvres.

Late in 1916, the Frankfort *Gazette* advised its readers of the spirit in which these intrigues were to be conducted by Berlin. 'The point of view is as follows: to put forward precise demands in the East, and in the West to negotiate on bases *that may be modified*. *Negotiation is not synonymous with renunciation.*'

This last sentence summarizes the whole of German tactics. All the proposals of Berlin have but a single object: to deceive and sow discord among the Allies by means of negotiations which would be followed by non-execution of the terms agreed upon, Germany retaining the essential positions of to-day's war-map which would as-

sure her, strategically and economically, the domination of Europe and the world.

Now, it is an astounding fact that the warnings given by the Germans themselves — the occupation of more than 500,000 square kilometres by the Kaiser's troops, the burglarizing of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by the government of Berlin — have not yet availed to prevent a considerable proportion of the Allies from continuing to be enormously deceived. At the very moment when the German General Staff is strengthening the fortifications of Belgium, especially about Antwerp, there are those among the Allies who seriously believe that, by opening negotiations, they will succeed in inducing Germany to evacuate that ill-fated country and to repair the immense damage that she has inflicted on her.

There are those who wonder what the objects of the war on Germany's part can be, when the occupations of territory by Germany, corresponding exactly to the Pangermanist scheme dating back twenty-two years, make these objects as clear as day.

There are those who attach importance to such declarations as the German Chancellor may choose to make, when every day that passes forces us to take note of monumental and never-ending German lies and of the unwearying duplicity of Berlin.

There are those who are willing to listen to talk about a *peace by negotiation*, when the facts prove that Germany respects no agreement, that a treaty signed by Berlin is of no value, and that, furthermore, it is the Germans themselves who so declare. At the very outbreak of the war Maximilian Harden said, '*A single principle counts — Force.*' And the Frankfort *Gazette* printed these words: '*Law has ceased to exist. Force alone reigns, and we still have forces at our disposal.*' To Mr. Gerard, United States Ambassador to Germany, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin said, '*We snap our fingers at treaties.*'

After such facts and such declarations, the persistent credulity of a certain fraction of the Allies is a profoundly distressing thing, for which the remedy must be found in a popular documentary propaganda, thoroughly and powerfully prepared.

The pacifist German intrigues are manifest enough. We can particularize six leading examples, employed by Berlin, either separately or in combination.

III

THE SIX LEADING PACIFIST GERMAN INTRIGUES

I. *A separate peace between Germany and one of the Entente Allies. The Alsace-Lorraine coup*

It is evident that the defection of one of the principal Allies would inevitably place all the

others in a situation infinitely more difficult for continuing the struggle. If we assume such a defection, the Germans might well hope to negotiate concerning peace on the basis of their present conquests.

That is why they have multiplied proposals for a separate peace with the Russians. At Berlin they are especially apprehensive of a continuance of the war by Russia because of the inexhaustible reserves of men possessed by the former Empire of the Tsars. The time will probably come when they will attempt also to lure Italy from the coalition by offering her the Trentino, and if necessary, Trieste, at Austria's expense, this last-named cession, however, being destined, in the German plan, to be temporary only.

The desire to break up the coalition at any cost is so intense among the Germans, that we must anticipate that, at the psychological moment, they will even go so far as to offer to restore Alsace-Lorraine to France. As for the sincerity of such an offer, these words of Maximilian Harden, written early in 1916, enable us to estimate it:—

‘If people think in France that the reëstablishment of peace is possible only through the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine, and *if necessity compels us to sign such a peace, the seventy millions of Germans will soon tear it up.*’

Moreover, nothing would be less difficult for Germany, thanks to the effective forces of Cen-

tral Pan-Germany, than to seize Alsace-Lorraine again, very shortly, having given it up momentarily as a tactical manœuvre.

2. *A separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary, and the Entente*

A particularly astute manœuvre on the part of Berlin consists in favoring, under the rose, not perhaps a formally executed separate peace, but, at least (as has already taken place), semi-official negotiations for a separate peace between her own allies named above and the Entente.

The particular profit of this sort of manœuvre in relation to the definitive consummation of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, is readily seen if we imagine the Allies signing a treaty of peace with Turkey, for instance. In such a hypothesis the Allies could treat only with the liegemen of Berlin at Constantinople, for all the other Turkish parties having any political importance whatsoever have been suppressed. Now, if the Allies should treat with the Ottoman government, reeking with the blood of a million Armenians, Greeks, and Arabs, massacred *en masse* as anti-Germans and friends of the Entente, the following results would follow from this negotiation: the Entente, agreeing not to punish the unheard-of crimes committed in Turkey, would renounce its moral platform: it could no longer claim to be fighting in the name of civilization. The Turkish government,

which is notoriously composed of assassins, would be officially recognized; and thus the self-same group of men who sold the Ottoman Empire to Germany would be confirmed in power — the group whose leader, Talaat Pasha, declared in the Ottoman Chamber in February, 1917, 'We are allied to the Central Powers for life and death!' The control by Germany of the Dardanelles, a strategic position of vast and world-wide importance, guarded by her accomplices, would be confirmed; the numerous conventions signed at Berlin in January, 1917, which effectively establish the most unrestricted German protectorate over the whole of Turkey, would accomplish their full effect during a Pan-German peace.

The Bulgarian intrigues for a so-called separate peace with the Allies have been at least as numerous as those of the Turks of the same nature. In reality, the Bulgarian agents who were sent to Switzerland to inveigle certain semi-official agents of the Entente into negotiations, were there by arrangement with Berlin for the purpose of sounding the Allies, in order to determine to what degree they were weary of the war. The Bulgarians have never been really disposed to conclude peace with the Entente based on compromise upon equitable conditions. They desire a peace which will assure them immense acquisitions of territory at the expense of the Greeks, the Roumanians, and, especially, the Serbians, for at Sofia they

crave, above all things, direct geographical contact with Hungary. Thus the great Allied Powers could treat with the Bulgarians only by being guilty of the monstrous infamy of sacrificing their small Balkan allies, and of assenting to a territorial arrangement which would permit Bulgaria to continue to be the Pangermanist bridge between Hungary and Turkey over the dead body of Serbia — an indispensable element in the functioning of the Hamburg–Persian Gulf scheme, and hence of Central Pan-Germany.

Now, this is precisely the one substantial result of the war to which Bulgaria clings above all else. So it is that a peace by negotiation — in reality a peace of lassitude — between the Allies and Bulgaria, would simply give sanction to this state of affairs.

In the same way, such a peace with Austria-Hungary could but give definitive shape to the Hamburg–Persian Gulf scheme. From the financial and military standpoint, the monarchy of the Hapsburgs, considered as a state, is to-day absolutely subservient to Germany. The reigning Hapsburg, whatever his private sentiments, can no longer do anything without the consent of the Hohenzollern. Any treaty of peace signed by Vienna would be, practically, only a treaty of which the conditions were authorized by Berlin. There must be no illusion. Nothing less than the decisive victory of the Allies will avail to make

Germany loosen her grip upon Austria-Hungary, *for that grip is to Germany the substantial result of the war.* In truth it is that grip which, by its geographic, military, and economic consequences, assures Berlin the domination of the Balkans, and of the East, hence of Central Pan-Germany, hence of Hamburg-Persian Gulf, and the vast consequences which derive therefrom.

Let us make up our minds, therefore, that all the feelers toward a separate peace with Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary, which have been put forth and which will hereafter be put forth, have been and will be simply manœuvres aimed at a so-called peace by negotiation, which would cloak, not simply a German, but a Pan-German peace.

3. *The democratization of Germany*

Certain Allied groups having apparently made up their minds that the 'democratization' of Germany would suffice to put an end automatically to Prussian militarism and to German imperialism, it was concluded at Berlin that a considerable number, at least, of their adversaries, being weary of the war, might be willing to content themselves with a merely formal satisfaction of their demands, in order to have an ostensibly honorable excuse for bringing it to an end. That is why, with the aim of leading the Allies off the scent and inducing them to enter into negotiations, Berlin devoted herself during the first six

months of 1917, with increasing energy, to the farce called 'the democratization of Germany.' Meanwhile the most bigoted Pangermanists put the mute on their demands. They ceased to utter the words 'annexations' or 'war-indemnities.' They talked of nothing but 'special political arrangements' — a phrase which in their minds led to the same result but had the advantage of not embarrassing the peace-at-any-price men in the Allied countries. The device of democratization of Germany was complementary to the Stockholm trick, which, as we know, was intended to convince the Russian Socialists that Russia had no further advantage to expect from continuing the war, since Germany in her turn, was about to enter in all seriousness upon the path of democracy — and so forth.

We must acknowledge that many among the Allied peoples allowed themselves to be ensnared for the moment by this manoeuvre, and honestly believed that Germany was about to reform, of her own motion and radically. But when the German tactics had achieved the immense result of setting anarchy loose in Russia, — a state of affairs which was instantly made the most of in a military sense by the Staff at Berlin, — the farce of the democratization of Germany was abandoned. Von Bethmann-Hollweg was sacrificed to the necessity of dropping a scheme which he had managed, and Michaelis — Hindenburg's man,

and therefore the man of the Prussian military party and of the Pangermanists — succeeded him.

As a matter of fact, the Germans have, for all time, had such an inveterate penchant for rapine that they are quite capable of setting up a great military republic and submitting readily enough to Prussian discipline, with a view to starting afresh upon wars for plunder.

We must bear this truth constantly in mind: if the Hohenzollerns have succeeded, in accordance with Mirabeau's epigram, in making war 'the national industry,' it is because, ever since the dawn of history, the Germans have always subordinated everything to their passion for lucrative wars. The same is true of them to-day. Especially in the last twenty years the secret propaganda of the Berlin government has convinced the masses that the creation of Pan-Germany will assure them immense material benefits. It is because this conviction is so firmly rooted among them that substantially the entire body of Socialist workingmen are serving their Kaiser without flinching, and are willing to endure the horrors of the present conflict so long as it may be necessary and so long as they are not conquered in the field.

4. *Peace through the International*

This is another of the tricks conceived at Berlin. In reality the International, having always

followed the direction of the German Marxists, has been the chief means employed for thirty years to deceive the Socialists of the countries now in alliance against Germany by inducing them to believe that war, thanks to the International alone, could never again break out. In a report on 'the international relations of the German workingmen's unions' (1914), the Imperial Bureau of Statistics was able to proclaim as an undeniable truth: 'In all the international organizations German influence predominates.'

The conference at Stockholm, initiated by German agents, and that at Berne, upon which they are now at work, are steps which German unionism is taking to reëstablish over the workingmen of all lands the German influence, which has vanished since the war began. The idea now is to force the proletariat of the whole world into subjection to the guiding hand of Germany. The object officially avowed is to rehabilitate the International in the interest of democracy. In reality, it is proposed, above all else, to replace in the front rank the struggle between classes in the Allied countries, in order to destroy the sacred unity that is indispensable to enable the most divergent parties to wage war vigorously against Pangermanist Germany. As the Berlin government is well aware that it has nothing to fear from its own Socialists, the vast majority of whom, even when they disown the title of Pangermanists, are parti-

sans of Central Pan-Germany, the profit of the manœuvre based on the International would inure entirely to Germany, who would retain her power of moral resistance unimpaired, while the Allied states, once more in the grip of the bitterest social discord, would find their offensive powers so diminished by this means that peace would in the end be negotiated on the basis of the present territorial occupations of Germany.

5. *The armistice trick*

All the schemes hitherto discussed, whether employed singly or in combination, are intended, first and last, to assist in playing the armistice trick on the Allies. This is based upon an astute calculation, still founded on the weariness of the combatants, which is so easily understood after a war as exhausting as that now in progress. At Berlin they reason thus — and the reasoning is not without force: 'If an armistice is agreed upon, the Allied troops will say, "They're talking, so peace is coming, and, before long, demobilization." Under these conditions our adversaries will undergo a relaxation of their moral fibre.'

The Germans would ask nothing more. They would enter upon peace negotiations with the following astute idea. If, hypothetically, the Allies should make the enormous blunder of discussing terms of peace on bases so craftily devised, Germany, being still intrenched behind her fronts

which had been made almost impregnable, would end by saying, 'I am not in accord with you. After all is said, you cannot demand that I evacuate territory from which you are powerless to expel me. If you are not satisfied, go on with the war.'

Inasmuch as, during the negotiations, everything essential would have been done by German agents to accentuate the moral relaxation of the country which was most exhausted by the conflict, as they succeeded in doing in Russia in the first months of the Revolution, the immense military machine of the Entente could not again be set in motion in all its parts. The result would be the breaking asunder of the anti-German coalition, and, finally, the conclusion of peace substantially on the basis of existing conquests. Thus Berlin's object would be attained.

6. *The 'status quo ante' trick*

The last of the German schemes, and the most dangerous of all, is that concealed under the formula, 'No annexations or indemnities' — a formidable trap, which, as I have pointed out in earlier chapters, has for its object to confirm Germany in the possession of the gigantic advantages which she has derived from the war, and which would assure her the domination of the world, leaving the Allies with their huge war-losses, whose inevitable economic after-effects would suffice to reduce them to a state of absolute servitude with respect to Berlin.

CHAPTER VII

THE BEST WAY TO CRUSH PAN-GERMANY

I

THE UNITED STATES AND THE VASSALS OF BERLIN

IN the wholly novel plan which I am about to set forth, the United States may play a preponderating and decisive part; but by way of preamble I must call attention to the fact that the United States is not, in my judgment, as I write these lines, in a position to give its full effective assistance in the conflict, because it is not officially and wholeheartedly at war with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey — states in thrall to Berlin and constituent parts of Pan-Germany. This situation is, I am fully convinced, unfavorable to the interests of the Allies, and it paralyzes American action, for these reasons.

As a matter of fact, Germany can no longer carry on the war against the Entente save by virtue of the troops and resources which are placed at her disposal by Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. If the Allies wish to conquer Germany, their chief adversary, it is necessary that they understand that they must *first of all* deprive Prussian militarism of the support — apparently secondary, but really essential —

which it receives from its allied vassals. It is, furthermore, eminently desirable that it should be recognized in the United States that Turkish, Bulgar, Magyar, and Austrian imperialism are bases of Prussian imperialism, and that in order to establish a lasting peace, the disappearance of these secondary imperialisms is as necessary as that of Prussian imperialism itself. Moreover, the fact that Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey are not officially at war with the United States enables Berlin to maintain connections in America of which we may be sure that she avails herself to the utmost.

This situation is propitious also for that German manœuvre which consists in making people think that a separate peace is possible between Turkey, or Bulgaria, or Austria-Hungary on the one side and the powers of the Entente on the other. However, as the game to be played is complicated and difficult, good sense suggests that we proceed from the simple to the complex, and hence that we strike the enemy first of all in his most vulnerable part. Now, as we shall see, it is mainly in the territory of the three vassals of Germany that the new plan which I am about to set forth can be carried out in the first instance, without, however, causing any prejudice — *far, far* from it, — to the invaluable assistance which the Americans are preparing to bring to the Allies on the Western front. For all these reasons, it

seems desirable that American public opinion should admit the imperious necessity of a situation absolutely unequivocal with regard to the governments of Constantinople, Sofia, Vienna, and Budapest, which are vassals of Berlin and by that same token substantial pillars of Pan-Germany.

II

DESTRUCTION OF PAN-GERMANY BY INTERNAL EXPLOSION

I believe that I have demonstrated, in earlier chapters of this book that, because of the advantages, economic and military, which the existence of Central Pan-Germany guarantees to Germany for both present and future, the essential, vital problem that the Allies have to solve — a problem which sums up all the others — is, how to destroy this Central Pan-Germany.

It is infinitely easier to destroy than is generally supposed among the Allies, because it contains potent sources of dissolution. The Allied leaders seem not to have bestowed upon this situation the extremely careful attention which it deserves. In any event, down to the present time they have not sought to take advantage of a state of affairs which is eminently favorable to them.

To understand this situation, and how it may be utilized at once, we must set out from the following starting-point. Of about 176,000,000

inhabitants of Pan-Germany in 1917, about 73,000,000 Germans, with the backing of only 21,000,000 vassals, — Magyars, Bulgars, Turks, — have to-day reduced to slavery the immense number of 82,000,000 allied subjects — Slavs, Latins, or Semites, belonging to thirteen different nationalities, all of whom desire the victory of the Entente, since that alone will assure their liberation. In addition, a considerable portion of Germany's vassals would, under certain conditions, gladly throw off the yoke of Berlin.

Among the 176,000,000 people of Pan-Germany we distinguish the following three groups.

Group 1. Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals capable of immediate action favorable to the Entente — say, 63,000,000, made up as follows:—

(a) In Turkey, —

Arabs	8,000,000
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Generally speaking the Arabs detest the Turks. A portion of them have risen in revolt in Arabia, under the leadership of the King of Hedjaz.

(b) In Central Europe, —

Polish-Lithuanians	22,000,000
Ruthenians	5,500,000
Czechs	8,500,000
Jugo-Slavs	11,000,000
Roumanians	8,000,000
	55,000,000

There are, then, in Central Europe alone, 55,000,000 people determinedly hostile to Germanism, forming an enormous, favorably grouped mass, occupying a vast territory, commanding a part of the German lines of communication, and comparatively far from the fronts where the bulk of the German military forces is.

Moreover, at the present crisis, these 55,000,000 human beings, subjected to the most heartless German and Bulgarian terrorism, are coming to understand better and better that the only means of escape from a ghastly slavery, from which there is no appeal, is to contribute at the earliest possible moment to the victory of the Entente. The insurrectionary commotions that have already taken place in Poland, Bohemia, and Transylvania, prove what a limitless development these outbreaks might take on if the Allies should do what they ought to do to meet this psychological condition. It is clear that, if these 55,000,000 slaves of Central Europe should revolt in increasing numbers, this result would follow first of all: *the default of Russia would be supplied*. Indeed, the Germans, being harassed in rear of their Eastern fronts, would be considerably impeded in their military operations and in their communications. Under such conditions the attacks of the Allies would have much more chance of success than they have to-day.

Group 2. Slaves of the Germans or of their vassals, who cannot stir to-day, being too near the military fronts, but whose action might follow that of the first group — nearly 16,000,000, made up as follows: —

<i>(a)</i> In Turkey, —	
Ottoman Greeks	2,000,000
Armenians	1,000,000
	<hr/>
	3,000,000
<i>(b)</i> On the Western front, —	
French	3,000,000
Belgians	7,500,000
Alsations and Lorrainers	1,500,000
Italians	800,000
	<hr/>
	12,800,000

Group 3. Vassals of Germany, possible rebels against the yoke of Berlin after the uprising of the first group — about 9,000,000.

Of 10,000,000 Magyars, there are — a fact not generally known among the Allies — 9,000,000 poor agricultural laborers cynically exploited by one million nobles, priests, and officials. These 9,000,000 Magyar proletarians are exceedingly desirous of peace. As they did not want the war, they detest those who forced it on them. They would be quite capable of revolting at the last moment against their feudal exploiters, if the

Allies, estimating accurately the shocking social conditions of these poor Magyars, were able to assure them that the victory of the Entente would put an end to the agrarian and feudal system under which they suffer.

Is not this a state of affairs eminently favorable to the interests of the Allies? Would not the Germans in our place have turned it to their utmost advantage long ago? Does not common sense tell us that if, in view of the pressure on their battle fronts, the Allies knew enough to do what is necessary to induce the successive revolts of the three groups whose existence we have pointed out, a potent internal element in the downfall of Pan-Germany would become more and more potent, adding its effects to the efforts which the Allies have confined themselves thus far to putting forth on the extreme outer circumference of Pan-Germany?

Let us inquire how this assistance of the 88,000,000 persons confined in Pan-Germany in their own despite can be obtained and made really effective.

Let us start with an indisputable fact. The immense results which the German propaganda has achieved in barely five months in boundless Russia, with her 182,000,000 inhabitants, where it has brought about, in Siberia as well as in Europe, separatist movements which, for the most part, — I speak of them because I have traveled

and studied much in Russia, — would never have taken place but for their artificial agitation, — these results constitute, beyond dispute, a striking demonstration of what the Allies might do if they should exert themselves to act upon races radically anti-Boche, held captive against their will in Pan-Germany. Assuredly, in the matter of propaganda, the Allies are very far from being as well equipped as the Germans and from knowing how to go about it as they do. But the Germans and their vassals are so profoundly detested by the people whom they are oppressing in Pan-Germany; these people understand so fully that the remnant of their liberty is threatened in the most uncompromising way; they are so clearly aware that they can free themselves from the German-Turkish-Magyar yoke only as a result of this war and of the decisive victory of the Entente, that they realize more clearly every day that their motto must be, 'Now or never.'

Considering this state of mind, so favorable to the Allies, a propaganda on the part of the Entente, even if prepared with only moderate skill, would speedily obtain very great results. Furthermore, the desperate efforts which Austria-Hungary, at the instigation of Berlin and with the backing of the Stockholmists and the Pope, was making to conclude peace before its threatening internal explosion, show how precarious German hegemony in Central Europe still is.

The Austro-Boches are so afraid of the extension of the local disturbances which have already taken place in Poland and Bohemia, that they have not yet dared to repress them root and branch. Those wretches, to fortify themselves against these anti-German popular commotions, resort to famine. At the present moment, notably in the Jugo-Slav districts and in Bohemia, the Austro-Germans are removing the greatest possible quantity of provisions in order to hold the people in check by hunger. But this hateful expedient itself combines with all the rest to convince these martyred peoples of the urgent necessity of rising in revolt if they prefer not to be half annihilated like the Serbs.

To make sure of the constant spread and certain effectiveness of the latent troubles of the oppressed Slavs and Latins of Central Europe, there is need on the part of the Allies, first of moral suasion, then of material assistance.

To understand the necessity and the usefulness of the first, it must be said that, despite all the precautions taken by the Austro-Boche authorities, the declarations of the Entente in behalf of the oppressed peoples of Central Europe become known to these latter comparatively soon, and that these declarations help greatly to sustain their *morale*. For example, President Wilson's message of January 22, 1917, in which he urged the independence and unification of Poland, and

his 'Flag Day' speech, on June 15, in which he set forth the great and intolerable peril of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf scheme, manifestly strengthened the determination of the Poles, the Czechs, and the Jugo-Slavs to free themselves at whatever cost from the fatal yoke of Vienna and Berlin. In addition, the constantly increasing power of the aeroplane enables the Allies to spread important communications broadcast over enemy territory.

First of all, it is essential that the three races which, by reason of their geographical situation and their ethnographical characteristics are indispensable in any reconstitution of Central Europe based on the principle of nationalities, and who consequently have a leading part to play in the centre of the Pan-Germany of to-day, should be, one and all, absolutely convinced that the victory of the Entente will make certain their complete independence. The Poles have received this assurance on divers occasions, notably from President Wilson, and very recently from M. Ribot, commemorating in a dispatch to the Polish Congress at Moscow 'the reconstitution of the independence and unity of all the Polish territories to the shores of the Baltic.' But the 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs and the 8,500,000 Czechs have not yet received from the leaders of the Entente sufficiently explicit and repeated assurances.

There are two reasons why this is so. In the

first place, the absolutely chimerical hope of separating Austria-Hungary from Germany has obsessed, down to a very recent date, certain exalted personages of the Entente, who, having never had an opportunity to study on the spot the latest developments in Austria, still believe in the old classic formula, 'If Austria did not exist, we should have to create it.' In the second place, certain other personages of the Entente incline to the belief that, in order to obtain a swift victory, the problem of Central Europe is a problem to be avoided. Now, as to this point, the few men who unquestionably know Austria well — for example, the Frenchmen Louis Léger, Ernest Denis, M. Haumant, Auguste Gauvain, and others, and the Englishmen, Sir Arthur Evans, Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, and others — are unanimous in being as completely convinced as I myself am that the breaking-up of the monarchy of the Hapsburgs is indispensable to the establishment of a lasting peace — and furthermore, such a breaking-up as a result of the revolt of the oppressed peoples is one of the most powerful instruments in the hands of the Entente to bring the war to a victorious close.

In fact, there are certain quasi-mechanical laws which should guide in the reconstruction of a Europe that can endure. Now, without a free Bohemia and Jugo-Slavia it is impossible — impossible, I insist — that Poland should be really

free, that Serbia and Roumania should be restored, that Russia should be released from the grip of Germany, that Alsace-Lorraine should be restored permanently to France, that Italy should be protected from German domination in the Adriatic, in the Balkans, and in Turkey, that the United States should be warranted against the world-wide results of the Hamburg-Persian Gulf enterprise. Bohemia is the central point of the whole. With its circle of mountains, it is the indispensable keystone of the European edifice, rebuilt upon the basis of the principle of nationalities. Whosoever is master of Bohemia is master of Europe. It must be, therefore, that liberty shall be master of Bohemia.

On the other hand, it is undeniable that the successive uprisings of 8,500,000 Czechs and 11,000,000 Jugo-Slavs, taking place concurrently with that of 22,000,000 Poles, is absolutely in line with the present military interests of the Entente. Therefore, for the Allies to assume an attitude of reserve toward the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs is as contrary to the democratic principles they invoke as to their most urgent strategic interests. But this mistake has been frequently made, solely because the exceptional importance of Bohemia has not yet been fully grasped. Mr. Asquith, in his speech of September 26 last, furnishes an example of this regrettable reserve with respect to the Czechs — a reserve which is

diminishing, no doubt, but which still exists. He said:—

‘If we turn to Central and Eastern Europe, we see purely artificial territorial arrangements, which are repugnant to the wishes and interests of the populations directly concerned, and which, so long as they remain unchanged, will constitute a field fertile in new wars. There are, first, the claims of Roumania and Italy, so long overdue; there is heroic Serbia, which not only must be restored to her home, but which is entitled to more room in which to expand nationally; and there is Poland. The position of Greece and the South Slavs must not be forgotten.’

Thus, while Mr. Asquith manifests the best intentions toward the oppressed peoples of Central Europe, he does not even mention the Czechs, that is, Bohemia. Now, in reality, all the promises that the Entente can make concerning Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and Italy, are not capable of lasting fulfillment unless Bohemia is set free, for Bohemia dominates all Central Europe. Furthermore, Mr. Asquith’s silence as to the fate of Bohemia may be a legitimate cause of uneasiness to the Czechs, who are now doing the impossible to contend with Germanism, despite the shocking terrorism which lies so heavy upon them. So we may say, that Mr. Asquith would have served the interest of the Entente more effectively if he had emphatically named Bohemia and the

Czechs who are so much in need of being supported and encouraged by the Allies, whom they regard as their liberators.

The misconceptions that have led to the ignoring of the claims of the Central European Slavs, and of their extreme importance in the solution of the war-problem, will soon prove themselves an even heavier load to carry than those committed in Bulgaria and Greece. To put an end to these vagaries, it is necessary that henceforth the leaders of the Entente should earnestly encourage, at least the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs — that is to say, about 42,000,000 slaves of Berlin in Central Europe. The encouragement of these peoples as a single body is indispensable, for, although the Boches are able to control the local and, so to say, individual insurrectionary movements, on the contrary, because of the vast area which a general insurrection of the 42,000,000 would involve, its repression by the Austro-Boches would be practically impossible. The example of a successful general uprising would certainly induce a similar movement by the balance of the 88,000,000 human beings who are vitally interested in the destruction of Pan-Germany. To bring about this result, then, the first essential thing to be done is for the leaders of the Entente to put forth a most unequivocal declaration, giving the Poles, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs assurance that the victory of the Entente will make certain

their complete liberation. It is impossible to see what there is to hinder such a declaration. Its effects would soon be discerned if it were enthusiastically supported by the Allied press and by the Allied Socialists, who, let us hope, will finally realize that, while it is impossible to bring about a revolution against Prussian militarism in Germany, it can very easily be effected in Austria-Hungary.

But, some one will say, a revolution is not possible without material resources. Naturally, I shall discuss this point only so far as the interests of the Entente will allow me to do it publicly. In the first place I will call attention to the fact that, by reason of the immensity of the territory they occupy, simple passive resistance on the part of the oppressed races of Central Europe, provided that it is offered in concert and accompanied by certain essays in the way of sabotage and strikes, which are easy enough to practice without any outside assistance, would create almost inextricable difficulties for the Austro-Germans.

But there is something much better to be done. At first sight, it seems very difficult for the Allies to bear effective material aid to the oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany, because they are surrounded by impregnable military lines. In fact, by combining the results of the tremendous development of the aviation branch made possible by the ad-

hesion of the United States, *with certain technical resources* which are available, the Entente can, comparatively quickly and easily, supply the Poles and the rest with material assistance which would prove extraordinarily efficacious.

I am not writing carelessly. I have studied for twenty years these down-trodden races and the countries in which they live. I know about the material resources to which I refer. If I do not describe them more explicitly, it is because no one has yet thought of employing them, and in such matters silence is a bounden duty. But I am, of course, at the disposition of the American authorities if they should wish to know about the resources in question, and to study them seriously. I am absolutely convinced that, if employed with due method, determinedly, and scientifically, in accordance with a special technique, these resources, after a comparatively simple preparation, — much less in any event than those which have been made in other enterprises, — would lead to very important results which would contribute materially to the final decision.¹

¹ To the editor, M. Chéradame has written with less reserve on this vital subject; but it seems best to put in print at this time no more than the suggestion indicated. — *The Editor of the Atlantic Monthly.*

CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL STRATEGY

GERMANY is, to all intent, mistress of Central Europe and the Balkans, of Turkey, and of Russia. As I write these lines (in December, 1917), the last part of the German scheme which I set forth in the June *Atlantic*¹ is in preparation. All the disposable forces of Pan-Germany are concentrating on the Western front. If such a state of affairs is possible when the Entente has an abundance of admirable troops and boundless resources, it is because, as Mr. Lloyd George declared in his speech of November 12, with his wonted and most salutary frankness, after more than three years of war the Entente has no strategic plan. What is the cause of this unfortunate condition? That is what it is most important to ascertain first of all, for the Allies cannot think seriously of winning a decisive victory unless the problem of the strategy which is an indispensable necessity of their position is stated in such terms that it can readily be solved. But it has not yet been so stated. To be sure, Mr. Lloyd George dwelt upon the extreme gravity of the situation, but, despite the fact that he is certainly the most

¹ See Chapter v, *supra*.

keen-sighted of the leaders of the Entente in Europe, he did not point out definitely the positive remedies capable of putting an end to a state of affairs which is intolerable because it is infinitely dangerous.

The reason for this absence of concrete suggestions on Mr. Lloyd George's part is that, notwithstanding his great natural intelligence, he too is subject to that profound failure of insight in respect to the conduct of the war which has befallen all the leading men of the Entente without exception. This failure, which is wholly independent of their will, is due mainly to the fact that the present leaders of the Entente, having one and all been firmly convinced that the war would never take place, had not trained themselves intellectually to carry it on when it should break out.

Moreover, for we must set things down as they are, the majority of these leaders of the Entente knew the political geography of Europe only in the most superficial way. As for the ethnographic detail which plays in this war a fundamental part that is still far from being understood, they know absolutely nothing about it. It is the same with the practical political economy of Central Europe, of the Balkans, and of Turkey, and with their national psychology. Now, these sciences — geography, ethnography, political economy, and national psychology — are absolutely indispensable to the wise conduct of the

war; and they do not teach themselves. It is altogether impossible to become familiar with them without hard work, long continued. That is why, even assuming that all the guiding spirits of the Entente are endowed with innate genius, it is absolutely impossible for them, held fast as they are at every moment by the daily, always urgent, demands of a war which took them entirely by surprise and in which they had to improvise everything, to acquire during the conflict that intellectual preparation without which the war cannot be effectively carried on.

Strictly speaking, it is possible, by spending enough money, to extemporize in two or three years a supply of war material, and armies in the shape of soldiers and regiments, whereas these same operations would require half a score of years in time of peace; but all the gold on earth is powerless to implant swiftly in any man's brain, however well endowed he may be, the enormous mass of positive knowledge which alone will enable him to evolve the guiding ideas which are indispensable for the conduct of a war so complex as this. Such knowledge and such ideas cannot spring to life spontaneously in a human brain; they cannot make their way into it, and arrange themselves there in the logical order of their relative importance, except as the result of a mental training which demands, not only a native intelligence, but an enormous amount of time.

To acquire these essentials William II and his collaborators, despite the vast resources at their disposal, had to work a full quarter of a century. Now, not one of the leaders of the Entente had received, even in the most rudimentary form, down to twenty-five *days* before the war, the special kind of intellectual training without which it is impossible to direct effectively the conduct of this war, which resembles no other war in history because of the vast scope which the Germans have given to it and the endlessly varied methods which they are employing in carrying it on.

These reasons, then, furnish a simple explanation of the fact that, although all the leaders of the Entente have at last agreed to form an Allied Staff, in order to unify the conduct of the war, no one of them is able to say how this staff should be constituted to meet the special necessities of the conflict. Doubtless they understand perfectly — as indeed the great mass of the public understands — that this is not simply a military war, but a political one as well. But this idea of the connection between the war and politics is still extremely vague and confused. Consequently, then, it is essential, first of all, to give it a definite form.

I

THE REAL CHARACTER OF THE WAR

The first cause of the errors of the Allies in their conduct of the war is their failure thus far to understand clearly its predominant characteristic. Some say, 'This is a war of effectives.' Now the Allies have had for three years an overwhelming superiority in effectives. They have had entire liberty in arming them and making use of them, and yet they are not victorious.

Others of the Allies declare, 'This is a war of matériel.' Another mistaken idea. In the third year of the war the Allies, as a whole, certainly had more matériel at their disposition than their adversaries. Now if, in the second half of 1917, the Russians have given way; if the Italians have allowed their Friuli front to be pierced, it is because they elected not to avail themselves of the matériel on hand. In these instances, then, it is very clear that the moral factor far surpassed the material factor.

Lastly, others of the Allies declare that 'This is a war of credit. When Germany is ruined, she will go to pieces all in a moment.' These men do not understand that, although Germany's *external* credit is beyond question sorely shaken by the stoppage of her exports, on the other hand, her *internal* credit is constantly augmented by the enormous profits which the war enables her to

realize.¹ Now this internal credit is based upon actualities so evident that it will permit the Berlin government to negotiate all the internal loans it may desire, to support the burden of the war as long as is necessary. If the character of the war is not yet understood, it is because it has been shaped in every detail by the Germans themselves, who, having embarked upon it with a concrete end in view, have long been studying the question by what endlessly diversified means they might attain that end. It is their employment of these means which gives to the war its wholly unique character.

The Berlin government entered into this war in order to obtain by conquest the instruments of universal domination. As this was a far-reaching object, the Germans devoted themselves for a quarter of a century to studying all the military, naval, geographic, ethnographic, economic, and national-psychologic problems of the whole world, and especially of Europe. This preparation — profoundly scientific, we must admit — for the gigantic Pangermanist scheme, led the Germans to make a most thorough investigation, not only of everything relating to the army and navy, but also of four political sciences — geography, ethnology, political economy, and national psychology. These four sciences are known, outside of Germany, only in the theoretical or rudimentary

¹ See Chapters I and II, *supra*.

stage; whereas the Germans have carried their study of them so far, that they derive from them immense practical powers which have a constant and far-reaching influence on the whole evolution of the war.

The Allied leaders do not even suspect the extreme importance of these factors — for two reasons. In the first place, not one of them has made a sufficient study of the four political sciences in their application to Central and Eastern Europe to realize the extraordinary efficacy of the intensive use that the Germans are making of them. Secondly, while the powers derived from the political sciences are immense, and as real as the X-rays, like those rays they are invisible.

The constant use of the political sciences, in enormous doses, made by the Germans in their conduct of the war, has this result: that the utilization of the military art alone, even when most highly perfected from a material standpoint, is absolutely insufficient to ensure victory to the Allies. It is because of their failure to understand this that, notwithstanding their boundless resources, they have condemned themselves to the most unremitting, the most cruel, the most heart-rending disappointments. As a matter of fact, this war not only is not solely a military and naval war — it is, in addition, a geographical war, an ethnographical war, an economic war, a war of national psychology. To define its

endlessly complex character by a brief phrase which includes all these factors, we may say that it is a *war of political sciences*.

A few examples derived from actual events will prove that this is not a matter of words alone, but that the utilization of the political sciences is an absolute necessity for the Allies.

Down to the present time the swift invasion of Roumania — October–November, 1916 — has been regarded as a triumph of the German heavy artillery. But, while the action of the heavy artillery in forcing the Dobrudja and the passes of the Carpathians was the great physical fact, manifest to all, which determined the German victory, the effective use of the heavy guns was possible only because, long before the military movement was begun, the ground had been prepared for the invasion of Roumania, by the Staff at Berlin, with the aid of a practical application of the political sciences.

Geographical preparation. In March, 1916, it was known that a system of espionage had been organized in the Roumanian Dobrudja by Germans who alleged archæological explorations as a pretext for their travels. The very precise information thus acquired by the Staff at Berlin was quite indispensable to it. In fact, the Roumanian Dobrudja is a swampy region of a very peculiar nature, altogether impassable under ordinary conditions by the immense and heavy

matériel of modern armies. To move quickly through such a country, it was necessary to look ahead — to construct months beforehand, and have in readiness for use on the Bulgarian frontier, innumerable small bridges to be thrown across the streams, and enormous supplies of movable floors to be used in building, on the unstable soil, artificial roads practicable for motor caissons and the tractors of the heavy artillery.

It was the turning to account of the minute details of the geographical information in the hands of the Germans, operating long before the invasion, which enabled her Staff to realize precisely the nature and amount of the special matériel which it was necessary to manufacture and to get together long before the offensive, in order to ensure, when it should be launched, a rapid forward movement of the troops at the predetermined points.

Ethnographical preparation. In the Dobrudja there were Bulgarians and Turks as well as Roumanians. Side by side with the geographical study went the ethnographical research, which made it possible to arrange systematically for a general uprising of these Pro-German elements — a movement which was considerably facilitated by the rapidity of the German invasion.

Economic preparation. Early in October, 1916, before the movement was begun, a number of merchants, experts in cattle and cereals, and cer-

tain specialists in political economy, assembled behind Falkenhayn's front, and were thus all ready to exploit Roumania after the invasion.

Therefore the overthrow of Roumania by means of military operations, — advance of the Kaiser's troops and effective employment of heavy artillery, — which alone were regarded by Allied public opinion as having had a decisive effect, was long anticipated by the geographical, ethnographical, and economic preparation for the military invasion, which was simply a consequence of that preparation. In fact, when one is familiar with the swampy character of the Dobrudja, one can but be satisfied that, without careful forethought for the geographical obstacles and without preparing the means to overcome them, the rapid advance of Falkenhayn's heavy artillery — an inescapable condition of military success after the offensive was started — would have been impossible. On the other hand, it was due to the previously arranged scheme for the economic exploitation of the country that the German troops were able to obtain their supplies on Roumanian soil and thus to force the Russo-Roumanian troops back without loss of time. Now, this rapidity of movement was an essential condition of the military success. It is perfectly certain, therefore, in the case we are considering, that the military success of the Germans, which was apparent to all eyes, was achieved only by

virtue of the previous employment of three extremely powerful invisible forces, derived from the practical application of geography, ethnography, and political economy — redoubtable forces of which the Allies have as yet made no use in any of their operations.

Utilization of national psychology. The recent occurrences in Russia and Italy will enable me to demonstrate the even more tremendous power of still another political science — national psychology.

The extraordinary disruption of Russia by Germany, which entails such threatening consequences for the whole world, was brought about, not by force of arms, but by means of a moral propaganda carried on by speech or in print. The reason that this manœuvre has produced such tremendous results is that it was based upon exact data supplied by national psychology — a political science of which the Allies seem not even to suspect the existence. It was by favor of this science, no less subtle than powerful, founded on minute observations, that the Germans were able to exploit unerringly the extraordinary ignorance of actualities of the Russian Socialists, their immeasurable pride, and the artlessness, even the very genuine evangelical spirit, of the Russian people, which lead them naturally to forget affronts, and, lastly, the particularist tendencies of certain Russian nationalities, which the Boche

propaganda has transformed into separatist movements to be immediately carried out. Thus the moral, and even the material, dissolution of the vast Russian ex-Empire of one hundred and eighty millions of people was made possible in a few months by the application of the science of national psychology.

Now, although this force is invisible, it is unquestionably far greater than the most stupendous military force imaginable, since its knowledge of the national psychology of the mixed peoples of Russia enabled the Berlin government to obtain a result which could never have been obtained by millions of German troops using the most highly perfected weapons and the most terrifying explosives of the present day in greatest profusion.

Again, it was this same gigantic force, national psychology, which enabled the Boches to manufacture systematically the 'defeatist' frame of mind, by virtue of which they were able to break through the Italian front at Friuli, which they would probably never have succeeded in doing if they had had to carry by sheer assault the exceedingly strong mountain positions held by the Italians.

II

POLITICAL STRATEGY AND THE THREE PHASES OF
THE WAR

The utilization of these invisible forces by the Germans has varied in accordance with the changing phases of the war.

One can distinguish three very clearly marked phases in their conduct of the war. By studying them, we can appreciate how the Grand General Staff at Berlin has unvaryingly pursued the same end — the fulfillment of the Pangermanist plan of 1895-1911 — with the assistance of widely different methods, which, taken as a whole, constitute the 'strategy of political sciences,' which necessarily coördinates with the 'war of political sciences.'

First phase — from August 1, to the early days of October, 1914; about two months.

The Staff at Berlin plunged into war confident of a speedy triumph by means of a whirlwind campaign in two acts: first, utter defeat of France in five or six weeks, following an initial blow of formidable and unparalleled intensity; second, a powerful blow against Russia, which would certainly be incapable of resisting single-handed the German armies which had just triumphed over France.

If this scheme could have been carried out, Germany, after a contest of about three months,

would have been mistress of the whole of Europe. In that case no Balkan campaign would have been necessary. Serbia and Roumania would have had no other choice than to submit on the most severe conditions. As for Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, by the force of events they would have fallen under the absolute hegemony of Berlin. As a result of this new state of affairs Pan-Germany would have been constituted without visible effort, — automatically as it were, — thus assuring Prussianism of the domination of the rest of the world.

But the calculations of the German Grand General Staff were upset by events not only unforeseen but coincident: the invasion of East Prussia by the Russians, the resistance of Belgium, the intervention of Great Britain, the much greater consumption of munitions than had been anticipated, and, finally, by the victory of the Marne, which was in large measure the consequence of all these facts. During this first phase, marked throughout by violence carried to the point of frenzy, the German strategy was purely military — the strategy of political sciences had not yet appeared.

Second phase — from October, 1914, to December, 1917; about thirty-eight months.

At the beginning of October, 1914, William II's Grand Staff found itself constrained to abandon the idea of carrying through the Pangerman-

ist scheme by means of the whirlwind campaign which it had prepared. It was obliged therefore to plan to attain its object by means of a long war. It resigned itself the more readily to this necessity because it knew that it was infinitely better supplied than the Allies with material to bring about the essential moral and physical conditions — various and complicated as they are — of a long-drawn struggle.

Furthermore, on the morrow of the battle of the Marne, the Staff had been in a position to appreciate the extraordinary defensive power of strongly fortified continuous points, consisting of deep trenches protected by barbed-wire entanglements; a defensive system the technique of which it had studied exhaustively since the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), whereas it was wholly unknown to the French and British. For these reasons, from the battle of the Marne (October, 1914) down to the end of the first phase of the offensive against Italy, that is, to December, 1917, a period of thirty-eight months, the whole tactics of Berlin has been directed to the object of carrying out a programme composed of the following elements: —

1. To organize an immovable defensive on the Western front, while pretending now and then to attempt a genuine attack.

2. To carry out without pause a series of circular offensives against Russia, Serbia, and Rou-

mania, in order to seize one after another the territories of those states, which are essential to the constitution of Central Pan-Germany according to the plan of 1895.

3. To take advantage of these successive offensives on the Eastern fronts in order to strike at the very vitals of Germany's allies, properly so-called: that is to say, under color of helping Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to defend themselves against Russia, Serbia, and Roumania, to organize those three countries militarily and economically to the precise degree and in the precise form necessary to bring it about that even, at need, without changing their ancient names and the frontiers of 1914, they should contribute to practical purpose, and almost without suspecting it, to the constitution of Central Pan-Germany. The plan of 1895 assigned to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey an essential and indispensable part to play in its execution.

Let us, first of all, prove, with the aid of a document of unquestionable authenticity twenty-two years old, that this was actually the plan of the Berlin Staff.

The Pangermanist plan of 1895, which is that of Central Pan-Germany, the formation of which is the first condition of carrying out all the other Pangermanist plans, is set forth in detail in a pamphlet published at Berlin in 1895, with a colored map, under the title, *Greater Germany and*

Central Europe about 1950. The extraordinary importance of this pamphlet is no longer open to question, for these three reasons. First: from 1895 on it was spread broadcast among the German masses by the Pangermanist League (*All-deutsche Verband*), whose action after that time in making war inevitable was as deplorable as it was persistent and notorious. Second: everything points to the probability that this action of the Pangermanist League toward executing a concrete scheme of annexations was secretly but very definitely agreed upon with the Berlin Grand Staff. Third: the force of this assumption is peremptorily proved by the fact that *the German Grand Staff, from the beginning of the second phase of the war, has carried it on in a way exactly in accord with the political Pangermanist plan set forth in the pamphlet of 1895.*

In very truth, after an interval of a score of years, coincidences so perfect as these between plans and their execution assuredly cannot be fortuitous. The verification of what I say is supplied by the map printed on page 146, a reproduction of the map of the pamphlet of 1895, on which I have had the colors represented by lines and have shown the German front as it was at the end of 1917. Now, it will be noticed that the German armies have stopped a little beyond the lines marking the future frontiers of Central Pan-Germany; or in the positions that are necessary



MAP PRINTED IN 'GREATER GERMANY AND CENTRAL EUROPE ABOUT 1950' (1895)

to make sure the creation of the satellite states of Pan-Germany to the eastward. Thus, on the Eastern front, they have stopped on lines laid down beforehand, even when they had before them no Russian troops capable of opposing their further advance. Our map also enables us to declare on the most irrefutable testimony that the offensive against Italy — that is to say, first of all, the seizure of Italian Friuli, which was such a surprise to the Allied Staffs — was provided for most definitely in the plan of 1895. In fact, on our map Italian Friuli is plainly included in Pan-Germany, and in the text of the pamphlet, *published in Berlin twenty-two years ago*, is a passage on the rectification of frontiers between Italy and Austria which the Pangermanists had already determined to be indispensable. On page 19 we read as follows: —

‘The frontier between Italy and Austria will start at Marmolata, and will run by Monte Cristallo, Monte Croce, and Paralba to the watershed between the Piave and the Tagliamento. It will continue by Monte Cridola, Monte Premaggiore, Monte Valcolda, and Spilimberga, and will follow the line of the lower Tagliamento to the sea.’

Now, on November 22, Italian aviators recorded the fact, confirmed by German officer-prisoners, that extensive fortifications had been constructed by the Austro-Germans to form a Hindenburg line ‘on the line of the Tagliamento,’

that is to say, precisely on the frontier line laid down in 1895.

Lastly, the Austro-Boche schemes of annexation in this region have been plainly asserted. In the orders of the day to his troops on November 4, the Emperor of Austria described the invasion of Italian Friuli as the 'liberation of my territory on the Adriatic littoral,' a phrase which suggests explicitly both the idea of premeditation and the idea of conquest.

Let us remark in passing that, as in the matter of Poland and indeed in all others, the Emperor of Austria coöperates docilely in the execution of the Pangermanist ideas of Berlin. Certain persons of the Entente believe that the government of Vienna is subjugated by Berlin, whose tyrannous yoke it would be glad to shake off. Nothing of the sort is true. Even though the hegemony of Berlin may be offensive to Austrian self-esteem, the leaders in Vienna and Budapest submit to it readily enough for this simple reason: the dynasty of the Hapsburgs is quite well aware that its fate is bound up with that of the Prussian autocracy, and that it can save itself only by saving the Hohenzollerns, that is to say, by strengthening the enormous extension of Prussian militarism. If this point of view had been grasped at the outset by the Entente, blunders resulting in endless evil consequences could never have been committed.

Our pamphlet and map prove, therefore, that in the second phase of the war the German Staff subordinated everything to the determination to create Central Pan-Germany first of all. This determination is easily explained when one is familiar with the Pangermanist ideas and the conditions of their fulfillment. Brought abruptly face to face, after the battle of the Marne, with a redoubtable coalition which it had not foreseen, and which threatened to take in the whole world, the German Staff realized perfectly that the military forces alone of Germany and Austria-Hungary, in view of the ineradicable hostility of the Slavs and Latins who form the majority of the population of the Empire of the Hapsburgs, and because of the insufficient food-supply of the Central Empires, could not resist the combined forces of Russia, France, and Great Britain. On the other hand, the exhaustive investigations pursued for more than twenty years in preparation for putting into effect the Pangermanist plan, had shown the German staff that a Central Pan-Germany actually constituted, comprising, in addition to the Central Empires, the Balkans and Turkey, would contain all the military and economic elements necessary to confront a formidable coalition.

Indeed, it was because it had been established before the war that Central Pan-Germany would supply Germany with the means of universal

domination, that the war was begun. Under these conditions, then, it was absolutely logical that the German Staff, before seeking to obtain a final decision in the West, should determine to create a Central Pan-Germany, either at the expense of Russia, Serbia, and Roumania, or, by dissembling its purpose, at the expense of Berlin's own allies, who, by the very fact of this creation of Pan-Germany would automatically become more and more completely the vassals of Germany.

It is not true, therefore, as people still persist in saying among the Allies, because of their extraordinary and obstinate ignorance of the Pangermanist plan, that the Germans, for three years past, have by their circular offensives simply been seizing territorial pledges; no — during the second phase of the war the Germans have taken possession of the various fragments of territory essential to the formation of Central Pan-Germany, not regarding them as pledges, but as acquisitions long anticipated, or as destined to remain forever in subjection to the will of Berlin.

Of course, to refute my interpretation of events, any one can say, 'But Verdun proves that the Germans wished to break through on the Western front early in 1916.' This objection has only an apparent or very imperfect force. In reality, the German offensive against Verdun was of a two-fold character which is not yet understood by the

Allies, still because of their ignorance of the Pan-germanist plan. In the conception of the German staff the Verdun operation had, not one, but two objectives — a *maximum* and a *minimum*. If the maximum objective could have been secured, that is to say, if the morale of the French *poilus* could have been destroyed by the length and the savagery of the German offensive; if the Germans had succeeded in breaking through and taking Paris, France, struck to the heart, would unquestionably have been put out of the war. Verdun, therefore, may and should be regarded as an attempt to break through and to resume the warfare of movement.

But what must be clearly understood is that, even if they had been certain at the outset that this maximum result was absolutely impossible of attainment, still the Germans would have undertaken the Verdun operation; for to them it had its full justification in view of the extreme importance of the *minimum* objective which it had in the conception of the Staff — an objective which, as we shall see, was in conformity with the general decision at Berlin to constitute Central Pan-Germany first of all, before really thinking of annihilating France by a genuine offensive.

This demonstration brings me to the setting forth of a number of points of view which have never, to my knowledge, been suggested.

Not until the early days of 1916 did Germany,

as a sequel of the recent seizure of Serbia, come into direct geographical contact with Bulgaria and Turkey. Berlin was still a long way from having organized the various resources of those two countries — resources which were indispensable to her to enable her to continue the war.

Now, at that very time, certain persons in France were making persistent efforts to have the French and British supply the expeditionary force at Saloniki with the powerful means of action which it ought to have. These efforts were on the point of success, for a very large body of public opinion had become convinced of the considerable importance of the Balkan theatre. If therefore the Eastern army of the Allies had received quickly the powerful reinforcements which the leaders in Paris and London did not give it, as the Bulgarians had not as yet the necessary matériel for fortifying themselves strongly, it is exceedingly probable that the Allies would have been able to recover the Danube front — that is, the strategic position which is the key of the whole war; for its possession alone, by putting into effect automatically the land blockade of Austria-Germany, and depriving her of the men and supplies without which she could not go on fighting, would have assured the Entente a complete victory, with efforts tenfold less vigorous than those which have been compulsorily decided upon, with the result that we know.

The German Staff, realizing fully that the lengthening of the war would be of advantage only to that one of the two groups of belligerents which should be in possession of the Danube front, spied an immense peril in the campaign carried on in France in favor of Saloniki. It determined therefore, at any cost, to prevent the Allies from ascribing to their actions in the Balkans the importance which would have made it possible to bring to naught all the Pangermanist plans. To divert the attention of the Allies from Saloniki-Belgrade, a violent and persistent offensive against Verdun was the best expedient that could be imagined, given the fact that the Pangermanist scheme was at that time wholly unknown to the Allied leaders.

In fact, the Verdun operation, by threatening the very heart of France, presented from the German standpoint this enormous psychological advantage, that it apparently justified those of the French and British leaders who at that time regarded the Saloniki expedition with the opposite of sympathy. Indeed, early in 1916 they were still claiming that the Balkans could not have any decisive influence on the result of the war, since they were sure, as they declared, that they could break through the Western front — which they called the most important one — whenever and wherever they chose.

Under these conditions it is easy to see why a

part of the press also — and hence of public opinion — was hostile to the Saloniki expedition, in France, but especially in England. This being so, a vigorous offensive against Verdun could not fail to strengthen these currents running counter to the Balkan expedition by seeming to justify the opposition that had been offered to it. Thus the minimum — but exceedingly important — objective of the Verdun operation consisted in preventing the Allies from shifting the chief theatre of the war to the Balkans in the beginning of 1916. This minimum objective was completely attained.

Unquestionably the Verdun operation was expensive to the Kaiser's troops; but in reality these enormous sacrifices had their justification, since they resulted in enabling Berlin to complete the formation of Central Pan-Germany, which alone could furnish the means of contending against the world-wide coalition. It cannot be denied that Verdun, by reason of the Allies' ignorance of the Pangermanist plan, caused them to throw away their last chance of sending sufficient reinforcements to the Balkan front before the Austro-Germans and Bulgars had the necessary time and matériel to make it, humanly speaking, about as hard to break through as the Western front.

Third phase — from December, 1917, to ——. As Central Pan-Germany has become an accomplished fact in thirty-eight months, and as its military and political forces have been sufficiently

developed, the combined consequences of the length of the war and of the existence of Central Pan-Germany, have manifested themselves in accordance with the anticipations of the German Staff. As Russia, under the government of the Tsar, was not put in a condition to sustain a long struggle either morally or materially, and as she was, later, completely disorganized by the Maximalist traitors and maniacs, she has gone under. As a result, Roumania has been reduced to impotence. Thus, at this moment, only the Allied army at Saloniki continues to embarrass the German Staff. But that army not having been reinforced sufficiently to form as dangerous a menace as was essential, the Staff has already, in effect, a sufficiently free hand in the East to enter upon the third and last phase of the war, that is to say, to concentrate on the Western front the whole of the disposable forces of Pan-Germany, — Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Turks, — in order to make another trial of the war of movement likely to bring about the final decision.

At this moment the concentration is proceeding with all possible speed. But we must thoroughly grasp the fact that in the German scheme the general offensive in the West is regarded as a very complex operation, necessitating recourse to the strategy of the political sciences, and hence of national psychology, which lies at the root of all the German pacifist manœuvres.

CHAPTER IX

GERMAN PACIFIST MANŒUVRES

IN reality Germany has succeeded in creating Central Pan-Germany only with the aid, since the beginning of the second phase of the war, of her six main pacifist manœuvres: a separate peace between Berlin and one of the Entente Allies; a separate peace between Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary and the Entente; the democratization of Germany; peace through the International; the armistice trick; and the drawn game of the deceptive formula, 'peace without annexations or indemnities.'

These six manœuvres, which have served in some sort as a screen for the never-ending military achievements of the German armies, had as their chief object the exploitation to the utmost extent of the intellectual lacunæ of which the Germans had detected the existence among the Allies — that is to say: —

1. The incredible yet indubitable ignorance on their part of the Pangermanist plan. Even at the present moment this ignorance is still so great that some of the leaders and some even of the great newspapers of the Entente are wondering what Germany's real war-aims can be, although

they have been laid bare for twenty-two years in numberless German publications, and the whole German people knows them, and the geographical boundaries of Pan-Germany correspond exactly to those indicated in the basic plan of 1895, as our map shows. It is this undeniable ignorance on the part of the Allies which has enabled the Germans constantly to spread the belief that they were going to stop; whereas in reality they have planned and executed without a pause the series of offensives destined to constitute Central Pan-Germany.

2. The credulity of the Allied diplomacy, which ever since the outbreak of war has allowed itself to be deluded into incessant negotiations, official or semi-official, with the Turks, the Bulgars, and the government of Vienna. This credulity contributed largely to the loss by the Allies of the Danube front, the key to the war.

3. The credulity of the Allied Socialists, which is as extraordinary as that of the diplomatists. The Socialists have been hoodwinked by means of the Stockholm manœuvre, which has had the following disastrous results: the accession to power of Lenine; anarchy in Russia; the capture of Riga; the conquest of the Baltic; the fact that many Allied Socialists have declared their adherence to the Boche formula of 'no annexations or indemnities,' without a suspicion that its application would assure the overwhelming triumph of

Prussian militarism and the autocracy; the piercing of the Italian front through the 'defeatist' campaign; and, finally, the armistice with Russia and Roumania, which puts them at Germany's discretion while leaving her at liberty to devote all the effectives at her disposal to the final offensive in the West.

This last manœuvre was sure to be attended by a lot of others, of which the chief are easily detected already. Portugal is to be detached from the Entente. The recent pronunciamento, issued at Lisbon early in December, 1917, has begun the process. Switzerland, deeply undermined by the German propaganda, as was proved by the disturbances at Zurich in November last, is to be violated. If the passage of troops through Switzerland should become possible, the Germans would seize Marseilles and Toulon. France would then be cut off from the Mediterranean, and the situation for which the Boche propaganda has long been laying wires in Spain, would then produce all the results foreseen. The scheme is to align Spain against the Entente through the medium of the junta of pro-German officers who are to create a military dictatorship, receiving its orders from Berlin and managed by Prince von Ratibor, German Ambassador at Madrid.

To sum up — the 'idealistic' offensive of Pan-Germany against all of Western Europe which is still outside the rays of the light that shines from

Berlin, as it is projected by the Staff of William II, is to be executed finally by means of a land attack, on a line which will form a complete envelopment on the day when the intrigues of Berlin have reached their fruition in Switzerland and Spain. Furthermore, it is probable that the attack on the Western front will be made up of several simultaneous Verduns, in order to involve the Franco-British troops, admirable in their gallantry and courage, but manifestly fatigued by three years and a half of atrocious warfare, in a momentary weakness which will make possible the piercing of the wall behind which the freedom of the world is still sheltered.

It is clear, moreover, that the general offensive of the Pan-German forces against the Western front must, in order to be successful, take place before American troops, having gone through the training that is indispensable to make them into effective fighting men, have arrived in sufficient numbers to reinforce that front.

Let us glance now at the other side. If the German offensive now in preparation on the West presents a very serious and undeniable danger, we must consider as well that it will have to reckon with many contingencies. The disposable forces of Pan-Germany which can be concentrated on the Western front are tired out, whereas the Allied troops on that front are infinitely more numerous, better equipped and disciplined than they were

at the time of the attack on Verdun. It is extremely probable, therefore, that the Verdun achievement will be repeated on a gigantic scale, thus postponing the definitive decision and giving the Allies another chance to conquer Pan-Germany if they decide to make use at last of the long unemployed forces existing in Pan-Germany itself which I have described in a previous paper.

The grave nature of these contingencies is well understood at Berlin. That is why the preparation for the general offensive against the Western front is sure to be attended by the same pacifist manœuvres which, by bringing about anarchy in the Russian front and rear, have enabled the German Staff to avoid an expensive military movement which the moral downfall of Russia has made unnecessary, while leaving the Germans to become *de facto* masters of the former Empire of the Tsars by virtue of the monstrous Maximalist delusion.

It is plain, in truth, that if — let us pose this hypothesis in order to make our argument plausible — a decided moral backsliding should manifest itself among the Allies in the West, the general military offensive against them of the forces of Pan-Germany, involving such great losses and so many contingencies, would cease to have any purpose; for fallacious negotiations on the basis of a so-called peace by agreement, of which the negotiations of the Boches with the Maximalists

give a very succinct idea, would suffice to assure Germany of a complete victory, avoiding the necessity of its making itself manifest by a brilliant military operation as a tangible sign.

For this reason. The war-expenditures of France and Great Britain are so formidable that, unless the conflict ends with the utter defeat of Germany, making possible a progressive reparation for the incredible damage caused by her, a few months of the Boche peace — the 'peace by agreement' — would suffice, if our hypothesis should prove true, to cause the French and English bank-notes to lose their value, and there would ensue in France and Great Britain a financial, economic, and moral disaster of such gigantic proportions that those two countries could no longer offer the slightest resistance to the constantly augmented economic and military resources of triumphant Pan-Germany. At that moment the Germans, without the slightest risk, could overrun France as far as Bayonne. And on the day when affairs reached this pass, the Germans would meet with no serious obstacle to their projected invasion of the British Isles.

The analysis we have made of the German methods of warfare proves that the strategy of the Grand Staff at Berlin, infinitely more complex than the purely military variety, is a strategy of the political sciences.

This is a result of the fact that the creation of the complex Pangermanist scheme has brought the Germans to realize that the solution of every great problem susceptible of statement demands for its performance an accurate acquaintance with, and, generally speaking, the employment of six well-defined factors: a military factor; a naval factor (in fact, a problem that seems to affect only the centre of Europe always reacts to some extent on the general naval situation); a geographical factor; an ethnological factor; an economic factor; and a national-psychologic factor.

It results from this that a military operation to be executed on land, on the sea, or in the air, as soon as it proves to have any relation whatsoever to the general conduct of the war, is not decided upon at Berlin until the following points have been determined by means of a documentation always kept in sight.

1. The military or naval, geographical, ethnographical, economic, and national-psychologic conditions of the execution of the operation proposed.

2. If the operation should be successful, what would be its military, naval, geographical, ethnological, economic, and national-psychologic reactions on the general situation?

The result of these considerations is that the solution of every problem presented by the general conduct of the war requires the solution of an

equation with six unknown quantities, not one of which is negligible.

To place in relief the extreme importance of this last aspect of the matter, I will take as an example the unknown ethnographic quantity. The determination of this quantity is so indispensable to the proper conduct of the world-war, that the German Grand Staff, although already possessed of a documentation of exceptional value on the ethnographic questions, carefully got together in peace-time, does not, nevertheless, deem itself justified in neglecting other sources of information. That is why it has mobilized in its service all Germans who are specially familiar with foreign countries, particularly those who are experts as to the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Russia. Thus no major operation which may have an effect on foreign peoples is decided upon at Berlin until the opinion of these specialists has been most seriously considered.

It was by virtue of this information, — of a purely psychological and intellectual order, — that the Germans were able to obtain in the East, and especially in Russia, the successes of which we are all aware, although the normal condition of affairs was exceedingly unfavorable to them, and would have remained so, had the Allies known enough to make the very slight effort which would have sufficed to effect that result.

To summarize, then — it is in the strategy of scientific politics — that is to say, in the intellectual management of the war in every domain — that the whole secret of the German victories resides. In like manner, it is the ignorance on the part of the Allies of this kind of strategy which explains their successive set-backs and their constant disappointments despite the superabundance of their material resources. Now, this ignorance is so undeniable that, after three years and a half of war, it is impossible to point to a single operation of theirs, of which the geographical, ethnological, economic, and national-psychologic conditions of its execution have been first seriously studied. They have not even thought of such a thing; and at the present moment their leaders have no organization intellectually equipped to solve a complete strategic equation.

But such an organization is absolutely essential to winning a victory. All the elements exist for creating it whenever they choose, in such wise that it will give practical results with comparative promptitude.

CHAPTER X

THE WESTERN FRONT

I HOPE that I have shown in my last chapter what the real, deep-seated reason is of the successes that the Germans have achieved over the Allies. We have seen that, while the Germans are past masters in burglary and murder, and, in committing these thefts and other crimes, employ the most highly perfected material resources, the most thorough study of chemistry, and the most ingenious mechanical inventions, they are equally far advanced in the purely intellectual domain, which enables them to derive from the four fundamental political sciences—geography, ethnography, political economy, and national psychology—important practical results. Now, the Allies, having even at this moment no comprehension of the extraordinary potency of these invisible forces, are making no use of them. The result is that they are still in considerably less advantageous condition to contend with the Boches, notwithstanding their vast resources.

Our deductions have led us also to define the 'strategy of the political sciences' and the integral strategic equation which makes its application possible. This equation contains six un-

known quantities: military, naval, geographical, ethnographical, politico-economic, and national-psychologic. The facts established by three and a half years of war prove that it is absolutely indispensable to find these six unknown quantities before undertaking any operation capable of exerting an appreciable influence on the general development of the war. Indeed, the amazing and perilous present state of affairs is susceptible of this explanation, which summarizes all others: the general operations of the Staff at Berlin have been planned and carried out in accordance with the strategy of the political sciences. On the other hand, the operations of the Entente have been conducted in such utter ignorance of this strategy, that none of them could reasonably be expected to succeed.

It is of supreme importance for Americans to understand quite clearly the fundamental cause of the strategic errors of the Entente. Indeed, such a clear understanding is the only means by which the United States can avoid sacrifices in men and money infinitely greater than are necessary, as the European Allies of three and a half years must agree. I shall, therefore, treat this part of my subject by appealing to the unmitigated truth, without the slightest regard for other considerations.

I

THE THEORY THAT THE WESTERN FRONT
IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE

I propose to show that, as a matter of fact, all the strategic errors of the Entente are derived from this: that the Western front has been regarded as the most important front. The first source of this idea is the incredible but undoubted ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme on the part of the leaders of the Entente. This ignorance is a phenomenon which I set down, but which I cannot explain. The Pangermanist scheme dates from 1895. Since then it has been elaborated in Germany in thousand of lectures. Innumerable pamphlets, spread broadcast, have made this scheme familiar to an immense majority of the sixty millions of Germans. Moreover, it was for the reason that this scheme was carefully devised a long while beforehand that the Germans became earnestly desirous of its execution, and, generally speaking, went cheerfully forth to war, believing, doubtless, that it would be short, but firmly convinced that it would bring them enormous booty — a bait which has always set the Germans in motion from the beginnings of history.

Now, despite the extraordinary publicity of the Pangermanist scheme throughout Germany for twenty-two years, the guiding spirits of the Entente did not believe in its existence during the

first two years of the war. I agree that this statement seems incredible, but I receive constantly so many new proofs of its truth that to doubt it is impossible.

This ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme on the part of the Allies has had this result; that they have failed to realize that Germany made war, before all else, to make the Hamburg-Persian Gulf plan a reality, and that that achievement, by reason of its inevitable consequences, would suffice to assure Germany of the dominion of the world. It is this failure to grasp the real war-aim pursued by Germany, which explains why the supreme importance of the Danube front — which was the key of the war, which the Allies had in their possession, and which it was relatively easy for them to retain — did not receive serious attention while it was time. At the opening of hostilities, and even for a very long time thereafter, the leaders of the Allies were convinced that Germany was fighting to rid herself of France, and especially of England. France and England therefore undertook simply to fight Germany and Austria-Hungary, very little importance being attributed to the action of the latter. Practically then the war was regarded, at Paris and London, as a sort of prize-fight, in which one of the two chief adversaries — either the French and British on the one hand or Germany and Austria on the other — would fall in the ring.

This quasi-‘sportive’ idea of the war was particularly prevalent among the British. Having in reality no military traditions, they regarded the conflict as a gigantic boxing-match, in which the best ‘slugger’ would necessarily be the victor. So it came about that to the British the war was, and perhaps still is, solely a matter of endurance. On the other hand, once the war was begun by Germany, the question of Alsace-Lorraine inevitably came to the front for the French. Now, Alsace-Lorraine was close at hand. Must she not be set free first of all?

For these diverse reasons, the French and British were inclined to argue that the chief theatre of operations was necessarily where the chief adversaries were, and, at the same time, to all appearance, their principal and mutual interests — that is to say, in the West. This conviction once formed, this consequence was deduced from it in London and Paris, namely, that the Balkans and Turkey could have no serious effect on the result of the war; that it was not only useless, therefore, but positively dangerous, to send a considerable force to the East, because the principal front — that in the West, where everything was destined to be decided — would thus be deprived of the benefit of armies which the Entente, taken by surprise by the war, had been obliged to raise and equip in haste, and therefore had no right to send them a long way from home.

This extraordinarily limited conception of the vast conflict inaugurated by Germany also prevented the realization of this fact: if it be true that the Western front is the principal one from the standpoint of the Germans, because there alone can they win a decisive victory over France and England, on the other hand, the Germans could not undertake to bring about such a definitive decision in the West until the day, the moment indeed, at which we have now arrived, when the Allies have committed the error of concentrating all their forces in the West.

Furthermore, we must reflect that the Western front could not be the principal one for the Allies — the one, that is to say, on which to bring about a final decision. For, ever since the day when it was demonstrated that fortified fronts which could be very rapidly increased in depth by means of trenches, deep shelters, and barbed-wire entanglements could not be quickly pierced, — a demonstration which was almost conclusive in October, 1914, — it has been contrary to common sense for the Allies to hope that they could obtain on the Western front a victory so overwhelming as to compel Germany to abandon the Hamburg-Persian Gulf idea. But this controlling point of view was unheeded — a perfectly natural consequence of the Allied ignorance of the Pangermanist scheme.

II

THE MILITARY EXPERT OF THE 'TIMES'

However that may be, the theory that the Western front is all-important has been repeatedly laid down by Colonel Repington, lately the military critic of the *London Times*.¹

Finding myself compelled, in order to make more clear my indispensable demonstration, to show how far Colonel Repington has gone astray, and what infinite harm his errors have done to the cause of the Entente by reason of the mighty influence of the *Times* which is almost a national organ, I conceive that no sinister motive can be attributed to me if I make, by way of preamble, this statement. I was one of the first Frenchmen who favored the Franco-British *rapprochement*, at a time when public opinion in my country was opposed to that policy. To the powerful *Times*, which has many a time assisted me in propagating my ideas, I am most grateful. To me personally, therefore, it is really distressing to take issue with one of its chief collaborators. But according to my honest belief, Colonel Repington, because of the extraordinary influence of the organ in which he writes, has been instrumental in leading the Allies to commit errors in strategy which have cost millions of men and endangered the issue of the war. I feel, therefore, in duty bound to call

¹Now of the *Morning Post*.

the attention of the Allies to the immense amount of harm done by Colonel Repington. His constantly repeated forecasts have this characteristic in common, that for three years and a half they have been falsified by events in the most striking way.

But the Repington peril still exists. In fact, even to-day a large number of Allied newspapers continue to reproduce his forecasts because they appear in the *Times* as coming from one having authority, although any sort of credit should have been denied to him a long while since. But his failure to reason from the most indubitable indications and the most notorious facts seems to be complete. This appears from certain passages in an interview on the general condition of affairs given by the colonel to the *Temps*, October 10, 1917.

'The situation [declared the military critic of the *Times* at that late date] is that the Boches are getting the worst of it except in Boche *communiqués*, and that they know it. Moreover, every time that we go into battle they are beaten. . . . Our losses are slight now because we are proceeding according to the plan of an offensive with a limited objective. . . . Our victories are almost automatic. . . . Italy and Russia still have very strong effective forces. . . . Russia? Yes, she is passing through a serious crisis, but we must not lose confidence in her. Russia is a jack-in-the-box, and the winter is working on her side.'

Less than a month after these statements the Italians suffered a serious disaster, Russia went to pieces, and Roumania was reduced to impotence. Now, these disastrous events might very easily have been forecast several months before, with the help of the frequent and accordant intelligence from Italy and Russia. But Colonel Repington has been so hypnotized by the Western front that he has consistently refused to give any weight to what was going on in the rest of Europe. We proceed now to trace the chronological development and the influence of his theory.

At the end of August, 1914, Colonel Repington set forth his own conception of the most important front when he described the part to be played by the Russian armies on the one hand and by the Franco-British armies on the other, in the words quoted below, disclosing at the same time his idea of German strategy. I quote from *Le Temps* of September 1, 1914:—

‘We must fight, even if we have to fall back to the Atlantic, without allowing Germany to overwhelm us. It is absolutely indispensable for her to have her Metz and her Sedan, and a long war would be disastrous for her with her largely industrial population, her business paralyzed, her coast blockaded. Her entire strategy is based on these considerations, and it should be our aim to bring this plan to naught and to fight with all our

strength, without endangering the welfare of our people by brilliant *coups* which would expose us to attack by the enemy.

'It is fear that is behind the present German tactics, borrowed from the dervishes — the German vandalism and this policy of terrorizing the civil population; it is fear — not physical fear, but fear of the consequences which would result for her if France and England should not be quickly and completely crushed.

'Russia, for her part, is performing the function of a "steam-roller." Her rôle in the war is most important, and final triumph depends in large measure on the way in which she carries it out. The Franco-British armies have diverted the main bulk of the German armies from Russia; and while the Allies operating in France keep their claws in that bulk, Russia must take advantage of the opportunity.

'The results obtained by her thus far indicate that such is her purpose.

'Taking into account the season of the year and its natural concomitants, Russia must reach Berlin within two months; if, at the end of that time our claws are still buried in the mass of the German armies of the West, and if Serbia has succeeded in maintaining until then her hold on the Austrians, the strategic and political object of the war will have been attained.'

These lines expose very clearly the germ of the

theory of the main front afterward developed by Colonel Repington. According to his idea, the Franco-British armies must 'operate in France,' Russia playing the part of 'steam-roller,' moving forward slowly but surely in such wise as to reach Berlin in two months. The plain inference from these words is that Colonel Repington was the original inventor of the phrase, 'Russia, the steam-roller.' Events have shown the value of this metaphor.

The passage quoted proves in addition the error of Colonel Repington as to what military Russia really was, as to the condition of the Russian fortresses in 1914, and as to the very different condition of the German armies and fortresses at that same time.¹

As the 'steam-roller' had not arrived at Berlin in November, 1914, according to his forecast, Colonel Repington gave the final touch to his theory of the main front by publishing the following in the middle of 1915, when the question arose of sending Franco-British troops to Serbia:—

¹I deem myself justified in these reflections because, on page 414 of my book, *Le Monde et la Guerre Russo-Japonaise*, published in 1906, eight years before the war, I wrote, after much investigation in Russia and the Far East: 'Will Russia become again a great military power? First of all, is the Russian people bent upon it? Nothing is less certain. Putting the best face on affairs, and recalling what happened in France after 1870, we must nevertheless conclude that she will not within ten or fifteen years have become again a great military power, in condition, for example, to take part in really effective fashion in a war against Germany.'

'What we must do is kill Germans until the German losses mount up to ten thousand daily. If we accomplish our task, we shall make final victory inevitable. What we must avoid are adventures which might give Germany an opportunity to secure important strategic successes, as at Ulm and Sedan.

'The war of attrition, in the trenches, on both fronts, is exceedingly burdensome; there is nothing inspiring about it, but it must kill Germany in the end if it is kept up.'¹

The Allies having followed Colonel Repington's advice and sent no troops to the Danube, the attack on Serbia was begun in October, 1915. At that time energetic action on the part of the Allies in the way of sending to Serbia, by way of Saloniki and by the Santi Quarante route, sufficient reinforcements, might still have saved the greater part of Serbia and thus have maintained the Allies in a position to recover the Danube front. Thereupon Colonel Repington reiterated with singular vigor his theory of the main front as opposed to the dispatch of Allied troops to the rescue of Serbia.

'No new units [he said] have made their appearance in the East or the West for several months. It may well be true, therefore, that Germany has not the necessary men to create such units. Under these conditions our manifest

¹ See *Le Matin*, June 18, 1915.

duty is to persevere on the main front, that is, in France and Flanders. That is where the final decision will be had, and nothing on earth would justify us in withdrawing troops from there. We must send thither all the men and all the munitions at our disposal, in order to kill the greatest possible number of Germans.

'The Germans are still capable of holding out against Russia, and of massing more troops against us. What a plight we should find ourselves in if, at such a time, our forces in the Western theatre had been reduced! The responsibility would fall, not on the army, which has fought so superbly, but on those who have the supreme management of the war.'¹

These vigorous arguments had a tremendous influence on British public opinion, and Serbia was abandoned to her fate. Furthermore, still as a result of this theory of the main front, Colonel Repington afterwards, whenever he had a chance, made the bitterest opposition to the dispatch of the Allied expeditionary force to the Balkans. As he found important supporters in France, the army at Saloniki is still without sufficient means of action.

However that may be, Colonel Repington's campaign in support of his disastrous theory that the Western front is the most important one has produced such far-reaching effects that it has

¹*Le Petit Parisien*, October 15, 1915.

influenced men occupying very high official positions. For example, early in October, 1917, General Smuts, a Boer officer, unquestionably of great valor, but, by reason of his foreign birth, having never been in a position to study the vast complexities of the European war, in a speech at a luncheon given by the President of the Chambers of Commerce of the United Kingdom, — a speech of special importance because of his membership in the British War Cabinet,—declared: —

‘The Central allies are beaten everywhere, are retreating everywhere, except in Russia. . . . To whip Germany we need not go as far as the Rhine. To effect this purpose one strip of land is as good as another, so long as the Germans choose to occupy it; and, take my word for it, long before we have reached the Rhine, Germany will sue for peace. . . . Our military superiority on the Western front is no longer open to the slightest question. . . . If we turn to the Italian front, can we entertain any doubt, after the great victories of the Italian army, that our Allies on that front have obtained a complete preponderance over the Germans?’

A few days later events proved the value of these assertions. As General Smuts had several times announced that Germany was virtually whipped, the *Weekly Dispatch* did not hesitate to make the following truly stupefying comment on these statements: —

'When so circumspect a soldier and statesman as General Smuts declares that we have won the war, we can assume that there are good and sufficient reasons why so bold an assertion is a proof that we have won it.'

Comments of this description unfortunately do not stand alone. For three years and a half a number of Allied newspapers have reproduced declarations of men of more or less prominence, about as valuable as those of General Smuts, as being undeniable truths. As a result, very great harm has been done, for Allied public opinion has been misled by men of unquestionable sincerity, who are, nevertheless, incapable of forming an accurate judgment of the situation because they have never been trained for it, and because they do not know a hundredth part of what it is necessary to know in order to put forth a prophecy of any value.

It is because of these divagations that a forest of false ideas has been nurtured among the Allies like a carefully tended garden, until in December last the majority of newspapers proclaimed the victory of the Entente at the precise moment when the Pangermanist schemes were on the point of fulfillment.

Be that as it may, the aberration caused in numerous controlling councils of the Allies by the theory of the Western as the principal front has gone so far that, even after the Italian catastro-

phe, when Germany was already master of three fourths of Europe, Major Sir Philip Sassoon, M.P., private secretary to Sir Douglas Haig, in a letter to his constituents, reiterated this theory, declaring that the outstanding facts of the war are not the momentary collapse of Russia and the invasion of Italy, but the steady, inexorable advance of the British armies in Flanders, which neither the enemy nor the weather conditions can check. At that time Major Sassoon believed that the British advance on Cambrai would prove to be irresistible and continuous. A few days later, the German counter-attack, and the serious British losses which resulted from it, gave the lie once more to forecasts of this sort.

On the occasion of Major Sassoon's amazing letter the Socialist journal *L'Humanité*, which often indulges in Utopian conceits, published so accurate a summary of the doctrine of the principal front at the end of 1917, that I deem it my duty to quote it.

“Don't be alarmed,” say the partisans of Occidentalism, or Repingtonians, “by the confusion and backsliding of Russia. Don't ascribe too much importance to the invasion of Northern Italy, Serbia, Roumania — there is no use in stopping to talk about them. All this is of no account. The absolute definitive victory we shall win on the Western front, or, more precisely, on the British front. The irresistible advance of the

British army in Flanders will give it to us. The occupation by the enemy of Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, of Wallachia and Venetia; Riga captured, Venice within cannon-shot of the Austro-German lines — all this is of no account in comparison with the taking of Passchendaele (a small village in Flanders). What's the use of unifying the conduct of operations, when there is but one operation of any importance?" — Such is the doctrine. It has never varied.¹

¹ *L'Humanité*, November 17, 1917.

CHAPTER XI

THE WESTERN FRONT THEORY CRITICIZED

As for the reasons given to justify this theory of the principal front by its partisans, they are all summed up in this statement, which, however, has never been supported by any technical evidence. 'This is a war of attrition. As the resources of the Allies are inexhaustible, they can certainly hold out much longer than the Germans, who are the besieged party. We have only to establish ourselves more and more strongly on the Western front. As the Germans cannot remain in a state of war indefinitely, they will be compelled to attack us. Consequently the Kaiser's troops will have, perforce, to come and be killed on the Western front. It is a mathematical certainty, therefore, that a time will come when we shall have inflicted upon Germany losses in man-power so prodigious, that, finding herself bled white, she will sue for a peace every condition of which we shall be in a position to impose upon her. At that moment we shall be completely victorious without having been compelled to cross the Rhine, as we have many times declared.'

Such is, in reality, incredible as it may appear, the ominously puerile and prodigiously rudimen-

tary reasoning which has been the sole basis of the management by the Allies of this complex, world-embracing war; whereas the Germans in carrying it on act consistently according to some plan or other, but always one that has been studied in every part of the Universe without exception. In truth, this theory by which the Western front is regarded as the principal one does not deserve even to be considered as a strategic plan at all, for it rests upon an accumulation of such gigantic blunders that it would seem impossible that they could have been committed, were we not constrained to admit their reality by facts that are only too manifest.

Let us remark first of all that this theory is strictly opposed to the fundamental principle of warfare as established by military history from its most far-off origins. This immutable principle may be stated thus: While supporting one's allies to the utmost, to carry the war into the enemy's country, at the weakest spot, with superior forces. Now, the theory that we are considering has had the following results: —

1. It has prevented the Allies from carrying the war into the enemy's country, and has confined the most frightful struggle that has ever taken place to the richest and most densely populated territory of Belgium and France.

2. It has compelled the Allies to abandon the hope of striking their enemy at his weakest point,

which was beyond question the southern line of Hungary.

3. It has led the Allies to concentrate their most powerful forces against the strongest portions of the German front, where the German staff could most easily manage the most stubborn defense by virtue of the vast network of railways that it controls in the West.

4. It has abandoned successively to the Pan-germanist Moloch such admirable, gallant, and loyal allies as the unhappy Serbs and Roumanians. Such abandonment not only was an unpardonable moral error on the part of the Allied leaders, but also consummated the substantial strategic blunder of the Entente. For, by an extraordinary chance, the territories of Montenegro, Serbia, and Roumania were, and still are, strategically considered, the key of the world-war, because they form the natural Danube front, the mere possession of which by the Allies deprived Austro-Germany of the aid of the Bulgarian and Turkish effectives, and of the resources of the Orient, without which it could not have continued the war. Therefore, by supporting with vigor their small Balkan allies, the great Allies would not only have fulfilled their moral duty, but would at the same time have forwarded their essential strategic interests and the war would long since have ended victoriously.

Now, the sole obstacle to this logical develop-

ment of the military efforts of the Allies has been the theory that the Western front is the principal front.

Given the huge blunders, even of a strictly military description, which have resulted from this disastrous theory, one can readily understand that it makes no account of the strategy of the political sciences, the existence of which is not suspected, even at the present moment, by the supporters of that theory. Let us note once more that it is based by them upon a long succession of material misconceptions. Events have proved that Colonel Repington's reckoning of the German reserves was erroneous. Furthermore, in his calculation of the enemy's forces, Colonel Repington has never dealt seriously with the Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish effectives, which, however, do actually exist and whose support enables Austro-Germany to keep the field. Not taking into the account the total military effectives of Pan-Germany, Colonel Repington has neglected also to consider the resources in supplies and raw materials of this vast territory. But these resources, because of the effects of the submarine campaign, are to all intent greater for the Boches — or, at all events, more readily accessible and transportable — than the resources of the Western Allies, who cannot live now without America and Australia, that is to say, without articles of prime necessity brought from a great

distance by slow, infinitely burdensome, and uncertain means of transport.

Lastly, if it had been true that Austro-Germany, blockaded by land, — the Allies being on the Danube front, — would have been in effect a besieged fortress inevitably doomed to capitulate by reason of the insufficiency of food-supplies, — because, in fact, the resources of Austro-Germany alone would have been insufficient for its population, — on the other hand, it was utterly absurd to regard Austro-Germany augmented by the Balkans and Turkey (that is to say, Pan-Germany) as a fortress susceptible of being reduced by starvation. Pan-Germany to-day is in very truth a fortress, in the sense that it is encircled by continuous fortified fronts; but it is nonsense to liken Pan-Germany to a fortress having necessarily to surrender because of famine, when, by virtue of its geographic immensity, including the vast exploitable territories of the Balkans and Turkey, it affords the most diverse products of the soil. And the *latent* resources of Pan-Germany are immeasurably increased now that the whole of European and Asiatic Russia is open to it.

To sum up — the theory that the Western front is the principal one is the capital strategic blunder of all the Allied leaders, and it explains all their other blunders. The facts are at hand to prove that it was impossible to conceive of any

general plan for the conduct of the war by the Allies which would have made it easier for the German General Staff to carry out the Pangermanist scheme. For, from this point of view, the theory has had the following further results:—

1. It has allowed Germany to lay hold freely of the territories necessary for the creation of Pan-Germany.

2. It has given her all the time that she required so to organize Pan-Germany that its military strength should bring about one of its first effects — the collapse of Russia.

3. It has confirmed Germany in the possession of all the sources of troops, supplies, and raw materials existing in the Balkans and Asiatic Turkey.

4. On the other hand, it has deprived the Allies of the sources of strategic strength, and of effectives, represented by the Balkans and Russia, and has compelled them to seek beyond the Atlantic those things which are indispensable for their subsistence.

5. It has enabled the German General Staff to concentrate all the disposable effectives of Pan-Germany on the Western front, which concentration was impossible so long as the Allies were sufficiently formidable in the East.

Doubtless it is no longer possible to deny to the Western front the title of principal front; but this is because there is, practically, no other now. Clearly it is the principal one for the Germans,

because they can unquestionably bring about a definitive decision there. But it is assuredly not the principal one for the Allies except so far as it is a question, first of all, of not being hopelessly defeated there.

Thus the first effort of the Allies must be to do their utmost not to be crushed in the West. But will all the successes that they may be able to win in the West suffice to give them the victory — that is to say, to force Germany to abandon her grip on Central Europe and the Balkans, in other words, on the instruments of universal domination? Of course, no one could undertake to say absolutely that it will not be, but the chances of such a result are exceedingly slender. The facts developed by the war, and the concordant precedents of all military history, enable one easily to convince one's self that it cannot be so. In fact, Germany not only is proceeding with the organization of Pan-Germany, but she proposes also to exploit Russia, whence she will obtain immense supplemental resources. The means of resistance of the Germans on the Western front must be regarded therefore as augmented in at least as great measure as the means of offensive action which the Allies will be able to accumulate on that front. Consequently it is, to say the least, extremely doubtful whether the results on the Western front can be decisive for the Allies.

Now, the mere fact that any doubt about it

exists is enough to make it the duty of the Allies to take the precautions which wisdom enjoins against this new possible blunder, which this time would be beyond remedy. The Allies must therefore understand that, to win the war, they must, by new methods, enter upon military operations elsewhere than on the Western front. As I hope to show, such supplementary operations are comparatively simple to prepare.

III

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AND THE WESTERN FRONT

In his reverberating speech at Paris on November 12, 1917, Mr. Lloyd George performed the service of proclaiming aloud the military blunder of the Allies, — which he justly characterized as ‘inconceivable,’ — in having fixed their attention solely on the Western front. I quote the essential passages of this speech which particularly merit the notice of American readers. But I must call attention to the fact that, although Mr. Lloyd George did fully realize the essential nature of the Danube front from the *military* standpoint, he did not grasp its capital *political* importance, as is shown by his speech of January 5, 1918, in which he sanctions the maintenance of the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; I allude further to this speech at the end of this chapter.

‘There is one feature of this war which makes it unique among all the innumerable wars of the past. It is a siege of nations. The Allies are blockading two huge Empires. It would have been well for us if at all times we had thoroughly grasped that fact. In a siege, not only must every part of the line of circumvallation be strong enough to resist the strongest attack which the besieged can bring to bear upon it; more than that, the besieging army must be ready to strike at the weakest point of the enemy, wherever that may be. Have we done so? Look at the facts.

‘The enemy was cut off by the Allied navies from all the rich lands beyond the seas, whence he had been drawing enormous stores of food and material. On the east he was blockaded by Russia, on the west by the armies of France, Britain, and Italy. But the south, the important south, with its gateway to the East, was left to be held by the forces of a small country with half the population of Belgium, its armies exhausted by the struggles of three wars, and with two treacherous kings behind, lying in wait for an opportunity to knife it when it was engaged in defending itself against a mightier foe.

‘What was the result of this inconceivable blunder? What would any man whose mind was devoted to the examination of the whole, not merely to one part, of the great battlefield, have expected to happen? Exactly what did happen.

While we were hammering with the whole of our might at the impenetrable barrier in the West, the Central Powers, feeling confident that we could not break through, threw their weight on that little country, crushed her resistance, opened the gate to the East, and unlocked great stores of corn, cattle, and minerals, yea, unlocked the door of hope — all essential to enable Germany to sustain her struggle.

‘Without these additional stores Germany might have failed to support her armies at full strength. Hundreds of thousands of splendid fighting material were added to the armies which Germany can control — added to her and lost to us. Turkey, which at that time had nearly exhausted its resources for war, cut off from the only possible source of supply, was reëquipped and resuscitated, and became once more a formidable military power, whose activities absorbed hundreds of thousands of our best men in order to enable us at all to retain our prestige in the East. By this fatuity this terrible war was given new life.

‘Why was this incredible blunder perpetrated? The answer is simple. Because it was no one’s business in particular to guard the gates of the Balkans. The one front had not become a reality. France and England were absorbed in other spheres. Italy had her mind on the Carso. Russia had a thousand-mile frontier to guard, and,

even if she had not, she could not get through to help Serbia, because Roumania was neutral. It is true we sent forces to Saloniki to rescue Serbia, but, as usual, they were sent too late. They were sent when the mischief was complete.

‘Half of those forces sent in time — nay, half the men who fell in the futile attempt to break through on the Western front in September of that year — would have saved Serbia, would have saved the Balkans and completed the blockade of Germany.

‘You may say that is an old story. I wish it were. It is simply the first chapter of a serial which has been running to this hour. . . .

‘When we advance a kilometre into the enemy’s lines, snatch a small shattered village out of his cruel grip, capture a few hundreds of his soldiers, we shout with unfeigned joy. And rightly so, for it is the symbol of our superiority over a boastful foe and a sure guaranty that in the end we can and shall win. But what if we had advanced 50 kilometres beyond his lines and made 200,000 of his soldiers prisoners and taken 2,500 of his best guns, with enormous quantities of ammunition and stores?’

Fundamental strategic errors, then, have been committed. The responsible cause of these errors is very simple. The leaders of the Entente, with the assurance born of their misconstruction of actual European conditions, of which they have

afforded so many proofs, deeming themselves sure of their position, have obstinately refused to listen to the few men who are aware of the real object with which Germany entered upon the war, and consequently of the means which would permit an effective opposition to her success.

The same reason explains why Mr. Lloyd George's speech of January 5, 1918, contains the heartrending contradictions and technical blunders to which I deem it my imperative duty to call the attention of my American readers. If his declarations relative to war-indemnities should be followed by a practical application, France, on the signature of the treaty of peace, would be condemned to absolute bankruptcy, and the value of the French bank-note would vanish with magical rapidity.

On the other hand, the declaration concerning the maintenance of the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire is utterly at variance with the principle laid down by the Allies, that the different races must be permitted to decide freely concerning their own destiny. Now, the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs want no more of the Hapsburgs or of Austria-Hungary. Why compel them to remain subject to the yoke of Vienna, which, as all those familiar with the Central European problem are well aware, is unable to escape from the grip of Berlin? They know equally well that it is altogether impossible to place the least reliance

on Austria-Hungary, which is not a nation, which is not even a state, but which is, in reality, a system of ultra-reactionary oppression, operating for the benefit of the German-Magyar hegemony of Europe. As for the Hapsburg dynasty, for centuries past it has broken its word as freely as the Hohenzollerns have broken theirs. Not the slightest credit can be given to its signature by any sane person.

On the other hand, if Austria-Hungary is allowed to exist, the promises of integral restitution made by Mr. Lloyd George to Roumania, Montenegro, and Serbia, are valueless, because incapable of fulfillment by reason of the contiguity of the Austro-German mass. Nor has the promise of restitution of Alsace-Lorraine any greater value. Such restitution could not be permanent unless Pan-Germany is definitively crushed, that is to say, unless Austria-Hungary disappears.

It is not pleasant to place one's self in opposition to the almost universal concert of approval, which has greeted Mr. Lloyd George's declaration in the Allied countries; but I cannot consent to conceal a truth of which, in my judgment, it is indispensable for the Allies to be informed. For twenty years I stood alone in proclaiming the Pangermanist peril, and the impending war in exactly the shape which it has assumed. I shall stand alone, if I must, in telling you this: Lloyd

George's peace terms are either unrealizable or can result only in a terrible deception of the Allies which would cause them to lose the war by making Pan-Germany triumphant.

If the enormous political blunders which I am forced to point out have been committed by Mr. Lloyd George in his peace programme, it is still for the same old reason: he has neglected to consult the real experts, that is, the Englishmen who have given long study to the problem of Central Europe. To consult these men is an absolute necessity, for at this moment there is not, in the whole Entente, any political leader, any diplomat, who is personally thoroughly conversant with this question of Austria-Hungary, the thorough comprehension of which requires about twenty years of study. What has Mr. Lloyd George done? He has consulted Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Henderson, who certainly have never been to Austria-Hungary to make serious investigations. *Per contra*, Mr. Lloyd George would assuredly never have been guilty of the serious errors that I am indicating, if he had chosen to listen for one hour to the only three Englishmen who, to my knowledge, have given genuine study to the Austro-Hungarian question on the spot, for many months: Sir Arthur Evans, Mr. Seton-Watson, and Mr. Wickham Steed. The last-named gentleman was for ten years before the war the remarkably able correspondent of the *Times* at

Vienna. His service of information was so well organized that it was to him that the French and British embassies applied for information on a multitude of matters, which they were utterly unable to procure for themselves. It is, therefore, altogether contrary to the most elementary common sense, to say nothing of British interests, not to place the greatest reliance on his opinion as to the proper solution of the problem of Central Europe.

All the foregoing leads us to insistence upon the urgent necessity of this step: to revise the revision of the war-aims of the Allies as set forth in Mr. Lloyd George's programme; for that programme embodies technical blunders which make it either infinitely hazardous or practically unworkable.

It will be enough, I believe, for every right-thinking American to know that Mr. Lloyd George made these no less justifiable than alarming statements concerning the strategic blunders of the Entente in November, 1917, or after forty months of warfare; and that in the forty-second month the same Lloyd George was guilty of the technical political blunders that I have pointed out, in connection with the Allies' terms of peace — this will be enough, I say, to convince every such American that the conduct of the war and the preparation for peace, so far as it has developed

at present as well in the military as in the political aspect, can no longer be tolerated.

One of the greatest services that the United States could render to the Allies in Europe would be to say to them: 'We, the United States, are determined to wage war to the limit by all the means at our disposal, but we do not propose that our men and our money shall be wasted to no avail. Henceforth the war must be carried on, and peace prepared for, in accordance with seriously considered, and hence truly scientific, plans, as well in the intellectual as in the material domain, and as well from a political as from a military standpoint.'

I am well aware that you Americans, by the very force of circumstances, have much to learn from our military leaders, in order to be able to carry on effectively this great war in which you have become involved so suddenly; but you have special advantages over the Allies in Europe, which should be utilized. Your distance from the other side of the Atlantic gives you the necessary interval of space to avoid being hypnotized by the special views of each of the Allies, and hence to see the conflict as a whole, which is most essential. Having never been obliged up to the present time to take sides in European political questions, you have none of the old-time, erroneous ideas with regard to them which are held by the Allied diplomats in Europe — archaic

ideas which are the initial cause of all the diplomatic set-backs of the Allies. You have therefore nothing to forget; and that fact gives you an immense chance of avoiding many disastrous blunders.

As you certainly have no predetermined plan, and as you are seeking honestly the actual truth, you will inevitably find it if you follow the method of your great captains of industry, all of whom know that, in order to accomplish anything important and efficacious in a province with which they are not familiar, they must begin by applying to the 'expert.' Of course, the expert is not infallible. He may, like all of us poor mortals, be mistaken; but when he really deserves to be called an expert, he avoids, with certainty, the commission of such monumental blunders as those heaped up by the European Allied leaders, simply because they did not realize the necessity of consulting experts. Now, there are among the Allies experts on each of the great questions presented by the war and the peace that is to ensue, who are neither politicians, nor diplomats, nor soldiers, but who must be consulted because they *know* these questions, root and branch, for the very simple reason that they have studied them long and freely. To be sure, these men are far from numerous, but I declare that they do exist. If you Americans demand that henceforth a call shall be made upon men

of real competence, and that there shall be no more discussion about phrases, but solely about carefully studied realities, you will confer upon all the Allies a tremendous service, which will bring us considerably nearer to victory.

All these advantages are peculiarly yours, Americans. If you choose to make the utmost use of them, you will then be, in many instances, in a position to play the part of a beneficent arbiter between the European Allies. Although their leading minds, having been taken unawares by the war, have not conducted it as they should have done, they are honest and well-meaning men. Your advice will certainly be well received, provided that they feel that it is invariably dictated in the interest of a mutual, decisive, complete victory — the only sort of victory that will ensure peace for many years to come, and will save civilization.

CHAPTER XII

THE LESSON OF THREE YEARS OF WAR AND OF EVENTS IN RUSSIA

IN the preceding chapters, seeking only the truth, I have laid before my American readers the actual situation of affairs with regard to the war, the causes of the blunders heretofore committed by the Allies, and the operation of political strategy — or what I have called ‘the strategy of the political sciences.’ In my mind these studies are not simply of an historical or theoretical nature. They were intended to precede, and at the same time to justify, the exposition of a concrete war-plan for the Allies — a plan which should be quite new, based upon the political sciences, and really adapted to conditions as they exist to-day.

I have devoted twenty years of my life to study of the Pan-German scheme, in order to prevent its execution by giving warning of the peril. I have not succeeded in making myself heard in time. And now when, in spite of everything, Pan-Germany is actually created, I would like to demonstrate the surest method of destroying it, and hence of putting an end to the war by winning it, and — making due allowance for the blunders already committed — winning it comparatively quickly.

I have laid down the broad outlines of the plan which I recommend, in my paper, 'The Best Way to Crush Pan-Germany,' in the *Atlantic* for December, 1917.¹ The pages which follow are written with the object of setting forth this plan in detail, and of convincing public opinion in America of its possibilities and advantages. When it shall be so convinced, the mighty force of American opinion will go far to secure quickly the adoption of the measures essential for its execution.

The plan that I suggest is in reality the outcome of much meditation on the war and the means of winning it. As for the technical information which the plan assumes, I can fairly say that it is derived from the most reliable sources. Naturally, like every novel idea, it may cause surprise at the first glance; but it must be clearly understood that it is impossible to get out of the strange and unprecedented situation now existing in Europe as a result of the audacity of the Boches, except by adopting ideas which are themselves unprecedented and of premeditated audacity. Moreover this plan is based solely on the employment of elements now in being, in the moral no less than in the material domain. In reality, therefore, there is nothing fanciful about it.

I beg leave to remind those who may be tempted to ascribe especially great weight to the possible objections which every momentous pro-

¹See Chapter VII, *supra*.

posal is likely to arouse, of these facts: that events have shown, unhappily, that the other plans suggested by myself since the beginning of the war, — for instance, that relating to the formation of the Danube front, the strategic key to the whole business, — were not only the simplest, but the most susceptible of execution, the most efficacious, and the least costly in men and money. But these plans were regarded as chimerical by persons who were considered especially competent to judge.

At the present moment, the question is how to put an end to the existing cataclysm as soon as possible — but only by victory, for slavery is more cruel than death. I may be permitted therefore, I trust, to be listened to in season for at least once in my life.

That is why I am making a personal appeal to American public opinion, and I urge it to support me vigorously and instantly if I succeed in convincing it.

For my own part, I have a deeply rooted conviction that, if the execution of the general plan set forth in this study is begun without delay, methodically, persistently, and upon broad bases, it will certainly bring the Allies a complete victory by the end of 1918; but I must make one explicit reservation. *The longer the execution of this plan is postponed, the less efficacious it will be.* If this be true, it is for the reason that the Austro-

German seizure of Russia involves tremendous consequences which are even yet imperfectly realized by the Allies. If they give Germany and Austria-Hungary time to double, yes, even to triple, the railways connecting them with South Russia, the Austro-Germans will have at their disposal limitless supplies of every description, — food, metals, and all the rest, — which will enable them to hold out as long as is necessary against the universal coalition. But, on the other hand, such multiplication of the railways connecting the Central Empires with South Russia cannot be effected within six months. It follows that during that interval the communication of Austria-Germany with the East, where are the particularly sensitive and vulnerable strategic positions of Pan-Germany, must be definitively cut. Furthermore, the state of mind of the slaves of Central Europe is still such that they can be led to rebel. We must not run the risk of moral collapse on their part which would inevitably come about if the Allies should neglect to give their attention immediately and by practical methods, to the fate of the eighty-six millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites who are immured against their will in Pan-Germany and are atrociously oppressed. Thus there are very serious motives for entering at once upon the execution of the plan proposed.

For these divers reasons, I regard it as my

imperative duty to declare emphatically my conviction that this plan is not only necessary, but indispensable, to the victory of the Allies.

I

HOW RUSSIA WAS DESTROYED

In view of the general condition of affairs in Europe at the beginning of 1918, the dissolution of Russia, provided that the lesson it teaches is thoroughly learned, in no wise lessens the chances of the complete victory of the Entente, as the German propagandists are doing their utmost to convince Allied public opinion that it does, through the medium of pacifists of various breeds. The one thing that the dissolution of the forces of Russia by Germany demonstrates above all else is the potency of the strategy of political sciences, which the Allies can employ in their turn to dissolve Pan-Germany, and thereby to obtain, in a comparatively short time, a complete victory.

It was not by the employment of military force, in the sense ordinarily given to that phrase, that the Germans put Russia out of the game, but by turning to account their knowledge of the ethnography and psychology of the various races living in Russia. Indeed, it was this knowledge which enabled the Germans to exploit unerringly the extraordinary ignorance of actualities of the Russian Socialists, and their stupendous pride;

the artlessness, even the very genuine kindness, of the Russian people, which predispose them to forget speedily the most cruel outrages; and, lastly, the particularist tendencies of certain Russian nationalities — tendencies which the Berlin propaganda has artificially transformed into separatist movements to be put into effect at once.

Now, I maintain that the ethnographic and psychological facts of which the Germans cynically take advantage to reduce these peoples to slavery, can *very quickly* be turned to account, equitably and effectively, by the Allies, to free those who are oppressed by the Boches and Pan-Germans, to assure the triumph of liberty, and to make certain the absolute defeat of Prussian militarism.

II

THE OPPOSED FORCES

To make sure that we do not deceive ourselves, we will not only leave Russia out of the reckoning, but will also omit the resources, considerable and varied though they are, which the Allies derive from their extensive colonies, and the assistance (although, taken as a whole, it is very important) of the Belgians, Portuguese, Serbs, Greeks, Roumanians, and Japanese. We will enumerate simply the forces of the great Allied powers.

France has forty millions of inhabitants; Great Britain, forty-six millions; Italy, thirty-six mil-



MAP SHOWING OUTLINE OF THE PAN-GERMANY, AND PAN-GERMANY AS IT IS TO-DAY

lions; the United States, one hundred millions; making in all two hundred and twenty-two millions of the Allies, who have to contend against seventy-three millions of Germans, ten millions of Magyars, five millions of Bulgars, and six millions of Turks — or only ninety-four millions of actual adversaries.

But we have, in addition, allies in the fortress that we have to subdue.

In fact — and this is a matter of extreme importance¹ — all the rest of the one hundred and eighty millions of inhabitants of Pan-Germany, the enormous number of eighty-six millions (that is to say, nearly one half), of French, Belgians, Alsace-Lorrainers, Danes, Poles, Lithuanians, Letts, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, Italians, Armenians, Greeks and Arabs, are slaves, imprisoned in their own despite in Pan-Germany. They are, therefore, anti-Boche by conviction, being well aware that only the decisive triumph of the Entente can put an end to their serfdom.

Having studied these oppressed peoples on the spot for more than twenty years, knowing their interests and their sentiments, I affirm that this is a psychological situation of enormous concern to the Allies. I maintain further that these eighty-six millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites represent, by virtue of the strategic importance of the dis-

¹See map opposite.

tricts in which they live, a force which — on the single condition that they are supplied with the means of action adapted to their unique situation, — may assist materially in the final victory, and a force infinitely stronger than that which the hundred and eighty-two millions of inhabitants of the former Empire of the Tsars ever represented.

Estimated according to its psychological value, the minimum bulk of the Allies is composed of two groups: —

(a) The two hundred and twenty-two millions of the declared Allies;

(b) The eighty-six millions of latent allies immured in Pan-Germany.

Thus, regarded from the standpoint of their sentiments, the Allies form a total minimum of three hundred and eight millions, opposed by only ninety-four millions of Boches and Pro-Germans; that is to say, they are about three to one.

III

GREAT IMPORTANCE OF OUR LATENT ALLIES

But some one may say: 'These eighty-six millions of latent allies can do nothing because they are shut up in Pan-Germany.' But it is this very condition which is extraordinarily favorable. In order to win the war the Allies must absolutely subdue the immense fortress which Pan-Ger-

many now is. The experience of three years has proved that its ramparts, constantly strengthened by the Boches, are very hard to raze; but hitherto the Allies have assailed it only from the outside, heedless of the important fact that half of the garrison is inclined to favor their action.

Now, out of these eighty-six millions of anti-Boches in Pan-Germany, an ethnological analysis enables us to reckon that about seven millions (Slavs, Latins, and Arabs) have been mobilized, that is to say, incorporated against their will in the armies directed from Berlin. At the present moment, therefore, in the armies of Pan-Germany, one man in every three — an enormous proportion — is an anti-Pangermanist, who detests this war, who is a soldier by compulsion, who is fully aware that his own sacrifice helps to confirm his own servitude and that of his family, and who holds his oppressors in horror; who is armed, and who will beyond question be overjoyed to use his weapons against his Boche or Pan-German neighbors the moment that a condition of general unrest enables him to do it effectively.

It is possible, too, for the Allies to arm the other, immobilized anti-Boches, who are shut up in Pan-Germany, to such effect that there will result a condition of general unrest so far-reaching that the seven millions of anti-Pangermanist soldiers mobilized contrary to their wishes will be able to rise suddenly and use their weapons

against their oppressors with irresistible force, if at that moment a carefully planned Allied offensive is started on the Western front.

Judging from what the Boches have done in Russia, and what they are at present trying to do in Greece, Switzerland, and Spain, it is very certain that if they were in our place they would long gone have profited tremendously by the exceedingly favorable conditions which we have described. The essential reason that the Allies have not yet taken this situation into serious consideration is that they have deemed it necessary to employ only the material instruments of war, not ascribing the importance that they deserve to intellectual methods based upon a knowledge of ethnography and national psychology. But the dissolution of Russia by the Boches has proved — and herein it may be of use to the Allies — the extraordinary potency of these intellectual methods, which is certainly much greater than that of the most terror-inspiring explosives.

On the other hand, from a moral standpoint, the Allies unquestionably have, not only the right, but the absolute duty of conveying to those Slavs and Latins and Arabs effective means of successful revolt, since they are now subjected to the most odious form of servitude. Finally, there are in each of the Allied countries numerous students who are thoroughly familiar with the

ethnographical and psychological facts which make it possible to prepare upon genuinely scientific lines the contest for the liberty of the oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany.

IV

THE FORMULA OF VICTORY

To bring about an explosion in Pan-Germany, we must start with the following formula, deduced from the lessons of the war, which seems, in view of the present situation and the blunders hitherto committed, to be the formula by which the Allies are destined to win a complete victory.

To combine henceforth the military pressure of the Allies outside of Pan-Germany with the scientific, methodical, constant, and persistent development of the internal causes of dissolution which exist in a considerable part of the territory of Pan-Germany.

To maintain on the Western front an impenetrable and vigilant defensive; but, in order to keep down the losses to the lowest point, to undertake no offensive on a grand scale on that front until the German rear has been thrown into confusion, morally and physically, by means of legitimate and essential insurrections systematically organized by the Allies and carried out by the slaves shut up in Pan-Germany, demonstrably to their advantage.

V

THE STRATEGICALLY VITAL REGIONS
OF PAN-GERMANY

This programme, if carried into effect, would have enormous and prompt consequences; and yet it can be carried into effect with comparatively little exertion. Indeed the effectiveness of such exertion depends, not on its extent, but on its intelligence. It must be put forth against the specially vulnerable parts of the military organization of Pan-Germany.

Of the eighty-six millions of Boches shut up in Pan-Germany, at least fifty millions of non-mobilized inhabit the vast territories stretching from the Baltic to the southern Balkans (about 1500 kilometres). Now these territories constitute the most essential and, at the same time, the most vulnerable strategic bases of all military Pan-Germany. In fact all the channels of communication — rail and water — which connect Austria-Germany with Russia, the Balkans, and Turkey, pass through these territories. Now, three years have shown clearly that without the troops and multifarious supplies of the Balkans and Turkey, — to which are now to be added the resources of South Russia, — Austria-Germany would long ago have found it impossible to continue the struggle. In reality, therefore, it is enough that the Austro-German communica-

tions should be seriously disturbed, for the situation to become, with extraordinary swiftness, very difficult both morally and materially for the armies concentrated on the Western front by the German Staff.

This result can be secured by an entirely novel method of carrying on the war.

CHAPTER XIII

A PLAN FOR THE ALLIES

I

WHY IT MUST BE DISCUSSED PUBLICLY

A NEW war-plan may bring about very swiftly the explosion of Pan-Germany, and, as a result, the complete triumph of the Allies; hence it may make possible the conclusion of a peace on genuinely democratic principles.

This plan presents several original features. In the first place, for technical reasons set forth later, the Boches, even if they knew that the Allies were working to carry out this plan, could not oppose its execution to any effective purpose. Moreover, on the twofold condition that the exposition is limited to the general outlines of the plan, and that no allusion is made to any features of the eventual preparation except those which it would be impossible to conceal from Boche espionage, publicity ensures to the Allies the following immediate and worth-while advantages.

1. It cannot fail to impair the morale of the Germans by letting them know that they are not by any means so near a final triumph as their

leaders give them to understand, since the Allies are able to employ new media of victory, exceedingly powerful and of great rapidity of execution.

2. This publicity cannot fail to strengthen materially the morale of all the Allied nations by showing them that the vanished Russian coöperation can really be replaced by forces of a different character, to be sure, and to be employed in an unforeseen way, but which, by reason of the peculiar vulnerability of the points upon which they will be brought to bear, make it possible to secure a complete victory much more quickly than it has ever been possible to expect it with the assistance of the Russian forces.

3. This publicity, again, cannot fail to demonstrate what an enormous and fatal blunder it would be for the Allies, yielding to a momentary lassitude, to allow themselves to be trapped by the Austro-Boche pacifist manœuvres, when a definitive and comparatively speedy victory is still entirely possible.

4. Lastly, this publicity cannot fail to embarrass the Germans very seriously, from now on, from the strategic standpoint. At this time the German Staff is concentrating as rapidly as possible on the Western front all the troops at its disposal. A definite demonstration that its vital lines of communication with the Orient can actually be threatened by unforeseen means and at widely separated points, will inevitably cause

havoc in the calculations of Berlin. On any hypothesis the decisions resulting from this embarrassment must be advantageous to the Allies. If, for prudential reasons, in consideration of possibilities which it has not as yet confronted, the German Staff should slow up its concentration in the West so as to leave sufficient forces in the oppressed districts of Pan-Germany, it will thereby decrease its chances of success in its approaching offensive in the West; the result being a reprieve for all the Allied troops. But if, persisting in its present plan, the Kaiser's Staff continues to denude of reliable troops extensive regions of Pan-Germany which are capable of being roused to revolt, then they will simply make it easier than it now is to carry the proposed plan into effect.

II

MORAL CONDITIONS OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PLAN

Common sense warns us that we cannot seriously expect the oppressed peoples to rebel, if at the same time we refuse to guarantee that they shall not long remain under the yoke of their oppressors. In order, therefore, that the desired rebellion may become possible, the Allies must give the Poles, Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Roumanians, and the rest a categorical promise that, after the victory, they shall actually and freely decide their own destiny. Indeed it is sufficient to ap-

ply to the conduct of the war the democratic principle invoked by the Entente — by the Allied governments and by the Allied Socialists alike — for the peace-settlement; a principle which is the basis, and, moreover, the justification of President Wilson's intervention in the affairs of Europe. The proposed plan, then, assumes that, in order to bring about a democratic peace, the war itself will be waged on democratic lines. Under this assumption one of the essential objects of the war — the right of 'self-determination' on the part of the different peoples — becomes likewise one of the instruments of victory. Thus are set in motion new forces which can but hasten the coming of peace.

I have now to prove that the Allies have actually in their hands the material means to make the insurrection within Pan-Germany exceedingly effective in a very short time.

III

THE ESSENTIAL SPECIAL WEAPON EXISTS

To enable them to act efficaciously, the oppressed peoples of Pan-Germany must be put in a condition to contend successfully against the troops employed to suppress the insurrection. The Allies must, therefore, supply in large quantities a very effective weapon, which, however,

will meet the complex necessities growing out of the present military situation and of the peculiar conditions in which the insurgent masses will have to operate. For these various reasons the weapon in question must be manufactured by the Allies rapidly and by the million. It must be easy to transport, hence very light; easy to conceal, hence small; and yet it must be indisputably powerful. Now, there is in existence a weapon which meets all these diverse conditions. I can describe it with absolute certainty that I am revealing no secret, for, by the irony of fate, the weapon best adapted to bring about the explosion of Pan-Germany and thus to revolutionize the war even more completely than the machine-gun, the barbed-wire entanglement, or the submarine has done, is a German weapon, which the Allied factories — notably those in the United States — can turn out rapidly by the million, at a relatively small expense compared with all the other expenses imposed upon the Allies by the war.

The German automatic ten-shooter Mauser pistol has sights graded to a thousand metres. Its bullet is deadly at that distance, which is practically sufficient for all purposes. Again, thanks to its wooden sheath which acts as a stock, it is very accurate at five hundred metres. So that the ammunition of this weapon — and this is a point of great importance — can be expended

with pretty good practical results, which is not the case with a pistol without a stock.

For practical purposes, then, this pistol, — or some other similar one, provided that it is as light and as powerful, has the same range, and is supplied with a stock, — which is essential, — is as effective a weapon as a rifle. Now, this pistol weighs only 1650 grammes. It constitutes, therefore, a sort of pocket machine-gun, very easy to keep out of sight. Furthermore, the 7.63 *mm.* cartridge used in it weighs only 12 grammes. Thus the whole thing — pistol, sheath, 200 cartridges, and cartridge-box — weigh less than five kilogrammes, with which a man can be effectively equipped for several weeks. So that the weapon that is perfectly adapted to the special needs of the slaves of Pan-Germany unquestionably exists. The next point is to inquire if it can be supplied to them in large quantities.

IV

THE MEANS OF TRANSPORT EXISTS

On this point, again, I shall make my demonstration without revealing anything to the Boches. I shall rely solely upon something that exists already, and I shall give only reliable information which may well be in the possession of those well informed in aviation matters. I shall give figures relating only to one type of airplane,

which not only is in being but is sufficiently standardized to be built at the present time in series. This airplane — or other similar ones which are certainly in use in the Allied armies; for of course I do not recommend one type rather than another, for I am thinking only of victory — this airplane, then, can be built by hundreds or by thousands, in a few months, without further study.

Now, the powerful motor of this standardized airplane will run for nine consecutive hours. With a tank of sufficient size and an average speed of 150 kilometres an hour, it would have a range of 1350 kilometres — that is to say, it could make a raid of 600 kilometres and return to the starting-point. Now a range of 600 kilometres is more than sufficient to permit an unlimited number of expeditions to widely separated and strategically vital parts of Pan-Germany, in Europe or Asia.

In addition to the stock of fuel for 1200 kilometres, the pilots, and their equipment, our airship can carry on the journey a load of 340 kilogrammes, that is to say, 68 packages of arms and munitions of five kilogrammes each, or enough to equip 68 anti-Boches. On the other hand, the life of an airplane may be reckoned at 80 hours; so that as nine hours is enough for a raid of 1200 kilometres (600 to go and 600 to return), our vessel will be able to carry out nine such raids, or to

carry nine times 68 packages of arms a distance of 600 kilometres. At that distance, then, one hundred Allied airplanes can in a few days equip 61,200 men in the heart of Pan-Germany, for several weeks. A thousand planes would equip 612,000 men. If four thousand planes were assigned to this service, — a figure not at all chimerical if all the Allies chose to take part, — 2,448,000 men, all new combatants, could be equipped within a few months, in the strategically vital portions of Pan-Germany.

And so, inasmuch as the requisite type of transport aircraft exists, the Allies, if they are really determined upon it, can send millions of arms to the slaves of Pan-Germany within a very few months from the day the decision is reached. And as the Boche and pro-Boche elements of the armies of Pan-Germany are held by force of circumstances in the West, as their present reserves are not inexhaustible, the Staff at Berlin certainly could not hold its own against large hostile forces, fully armed, operating with rapidity in the very heart of Pan-Germany — a contingency which has never been provided for in its plans.

For all these reasons, therefore, it is quite within bounds to assert that it is possible to establish the ascendancy of the revolt of the oppressed democratic races of Pan-Germany over the Austro-Boche tyranny.

V

ADVANTAGES, AND CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS

1. *Possible large increase in the output of Allied aircraft.* — In its eighty hours of serviceable life, a bomb-dropping airplane can carry about 11,000 kilogrammes of projectiles 300 kilometres. Again, in eighty hours this same vessel could carry only 3060 kilogrammes 600 kilometres; but those 3060 kilogrammes represent the wherewithal to equip 612 men in the very heart of Pan-Germany. If we deduct military bombardments in the rear of the Boche armies on the Western front, — which are indispensable operations, — what practical effect do 11,000 kilogrammes of bombs produce? They result in reparable local damage, money loss, and the deaths of a few women and children; but it is certain that they put very few enemy fighting men where they can do no harm. On the other hand, the 3060 kilogrammes which would make possible the fitting out with arms for several weeks 612 determined anti-Boches who constitute a new fighting force for the Entente, dwelling in the strategically vital portions of Pan-Germany, and placed in a position to account for many Germans and pro-Germans, would manifestly have an infinitely greater influence on the winning of a speedy complete victory than the 11,000 kilogrammes of bombs would have. This reasoning seems to prove that by

assigning to the armament of these oppressed peoples at least a part of their bomb-carrying aircraft, which are beginning to come from the factories in large numbers, the Allies can very soon augment very largely the effectiveness of their thousands of aircraft now under construction.

2. *The helplessness of the Boches to defeat the new plan.*—If it were a question of fomenting an insurrection in a small district of two or three million people, and the Boches were in no uncertainty as to the locality threatened, they would not hesitate to protect themselves against any revolutionary uprising by massacring the population. But such is not the case. The oppressed territories in Pan-Germany are of enormous extent. The Allies, therefore, can equip the people in widely separated districts, and postpone making their choice of the special regions to be supplied until the last moment. Thus the Germans will be forced to remain in a state of uncertainty. Moreover, as these oppressed districts contain, all together, eighty-six millions of Slavs, Latins, and Semites, the Austro-Boches, hard-pressed as they are by the Allies on the West, cannot, even if they would, put such vast masses of people to the sword. On the other hand, the Germans and their vassals are already inflicting the most shocking terrorism on these populations. Long since they were forbidden to have weapons, and those

who have them in their possession are shot when they are discovered. But despite the prohibition and despite the terrorism, there are constant disturbances throughout the oppressed districts. It follows that, even if they knew that the proposed plan was being put into effect, the Germans could not terrorize these enslaved people more than they are doing. Conversely, since they are constantly revolting even now, when they are without arms and have small chance of success, it is plain that they would make much more trouble if they were effectively and abundantly armed, so that their chance of success would be much greater than it is to-day.

It is impossible to prevent the Boche airships from flying over London and Paris, which are especially well looked after and defended. Manifestly, therefore, the Boches could not interfere with numerous passenger-carrying aircraft which would have an endless choice of routes a long way from the military fronts, and by flying low, could drop their packages of munitions in many different parts of Pan-Germany (in Europe and Asia), by means of a very simple apparatus, without even alighting. How then could the Boches, threatened on all sides, set up a really effective anti-aircraft organization over hundreds of square miles of territory situated as we have described?

If the Boches can, almost at will, with their

submarines, strew the sea with mines which destroy Allied ships, it is equally true to say that, whenever the Allies choose to do it, they can, much more freely, strew these Boche-harried districts with innumerable packages of munitions — veritable mines which will, by virtue of their combined action, blow up the whole of Pan-Germany.

I am justified, therefore, in saying that the Boches could not effectively interfere with the plan proposed.

3. *The conditions of success of the new plan.* — If it is to be surely efficacious, this plan must be methodically prepared with a view to its execution on a large scale. It is plain that such preparations on a large scale could not be concealed from the Boches, — for example, that passenger-carrying airships are being built in large numbers, — any more than we have been able to conceal from them the manufacture of heavy artillery. But the fact that the Boches were apprized of these preparations would not only be no drawback, but would actually be of advantage. Indeed, it is essential, in view of the lasting moral shock that they are destined to receive, that they and their vassals should have the sense of being constantly threatened in all those parts of Pan-Germany which are not pro-German. This threat, indubitable so far as the possibility of its being translated into action is concerned, but always

vague as to the exact localities concerned, would be to our foes a source of wearing fatigue, which, added to all the rest, would hasten the moment of their final collapse, and hence of victory.

The time for carrying out the plan having arrived, the transport of arms must take place as rapidly as possible to widely separated districts of Pan-Germany. Thus the Boches and their vassals, having to deal hurriedly with a well-equipped insurrection breaking out over extensive territories and at points far removed from one another, would find it practically impossible to put it down.

Although the general preparation we have described may be known to the Boches without disadvantage, on the other hand, the actual execution of the plan must be rigorously kept secret: for example, the starting-point of the aircraft, the time fixed, and the objective of the raid. As general preparations would be made at all possible starting-points, which are innumerable, the Boches would feel that they were threatened in every direction — a most desirable consummation; but the Allied high command will always have the power to issue starting orders, at the last moment, to the leaders of the air-squadron, as well as to indicate the precise points to be reached. Under these conditions, the secrecy indispensable to success will be easy to secure. Thus it will be a comparatively simple matter

to surprise the Boches despite their knowledge of the plan as a whole.

I have pointed out why the plan in question, that its success may be assured, should be undertaken on a large scale. I propose now to show why a few hundreds of thousands of automatic Mausers, if they are judiciously distributed in Pan-Germany, would alone have a probably decisive effect on the war.

The disturbances which have already taken place in Poland, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans have seriously embarrassed the Austro-Germans and the Bulgarians. Down to the present time the Boches and their vassals have been able to deal with the situation because the insurgents are without arms; but if, in certain parts of Pan-Germany, there were supplies of weapons practically as effective as the rifle, such as the automatic Mauser, the present situation would be made much harder for the Boches, even if the number of these pistols sent by the Allies amounted to no more than 500,000 to 600,000, which a bare thousand aircraft could deliver.

This estimate of the weapons and aircraft to be employed, although comparatively small, is large enough nevertheless to have a great effect, because to-day, after so long and exhausting a struggle, a simple rupture of equilibrium is sufficient to ensure victory.

At this moment the scales of Destiny may be likened to a steelyard, of which the hook is on the Western front and the end of the beam in Eastern Pan-Germany. For the moment the balance is in equilibrium. To break it, the Boches are preparing to place the supplementary weight of their disposable forces from the East *on* the hook at the West. On their side, to prevent the equilibrium being thus broken, which would mean their defeat, the Allies are preparing to station all their disposable forces *under* the hook, in order to checkmate the new German movement. But if, in addition, the Allies could place a supplementary weight on the end of the beam in Eastern Pan-Germany, even though the weight be a light one, it will act with great force, because of the length of that arm of the lever; and its force will be exerted in the same direction as the upward push of the Allies in the West. Thereupon the hook of the steelyard, rising abruptly, will give the Allies victory by destroying the equilibrium.

This comparison, which summarizes the actual facts of the situation, will make it clear why this army of only a few hundred thousands of Allied combatants, recruited from among our latent allies, could not fail to have an extremely far-reaching influence on the issue of the conflict, because they would be a newly organized force, operating in territory through which the vital

lines of communication of Pan-Germany pass. Indeed, serious disturbances in Eastern Pan-Germany, by disturbing these essential lines of communication, would react powerfully, both from a moral and a material standpoint, upon every one of the Austro-Boches fighting on the Western front. As soon as this condition of affairs is brought about, there would result instantly the special situation which would enable the seven millions of Slav and Latin troops incorporated against their will in the armies of Pan-Germany — of whom Berlin is so far from sure that she dares not use them in large bodies on the Western front — to join the insurgents in Central Pan-Germany, and, armed with their German weapons, to act effectively and with little risk against their Austro-Boche oppressors.

Now, if, at that precise juncture, a carefully prepared Allied offensive is launched in the West, it would manifestly have a vastly greater chance of success than in the past, while at the same time the danger of heavy losses on the Allies' part would be much less than heretofore.

4. *Cost of carrying out the plan.* — An airplane of the type under consideration, with all its accessories, is worth at most 100,000 francs. The value of a package of munitions weighing five kilogrammes, reckoning the price of an automatic Mauser at the cost to a private individual before the war, is about 100 francs. The fuel for a trip

of 600 kilometres, with equipment for 68 men, would cost 1500 francs. And in its eighty hours of serviceable life one airplane can make nine of such trips. We have, then:—

Airplane,	100,000 francs
Fuel, 9×1500 ,	13,500
Packages of munitions, $68 \times 9 \times 100$,	<u>61,200</u>
Total cost,	174,700 francs

Thus the net cost of one armed man 600 kilometres away in Pan-Germany is only 285 francs, or, in round numbers, 300. So that the equipment of 612,000 men, which can be effected by using 1000 airplanes would cost only 184,000,000 francs in round numbers— or just about as much as Great Britain is spending in a single day.

Now, in order to place half a million men on the Western front, the Americans will certainly have to spend tens of billions of francs. Consequently the cost per capita of their combatant troops will be ten times greater than that of equipping one fighting man in the strategically vital portions of Pan-Germany.

Not only, then, is the plan proposed likely to prove extremely efficacious on the military side, but its execution would require a relatively small outlay in comparison with what the Allies have to spend every day in the effort to obtain results immeasurably less important.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

Beyond question, the plan of which I have set forth only the main outlines, like every conception of the human mind, involves numerous difficulties, of different kinds, to be overcome; but by studying them one by one, I have convinced myself that they can be surmounted more easily than the problems which must be solved in order to carry on a successful offensive in the West.

In any case, after all that has been attempted fruitlessly, are we justified in not at least giving this plan a trial? The moral situation of the eighty-six millions of slaves in Pan-Germany is indisputably favorable to its execution. The essential physical instruments are in being. If the Allied leaders really wish it, these instruments can be produced in ample quantities with comparative promptitude. The general strategic idea of the plan is consonant with good sense. The outlay it demands is comparatively insignificant. The plan would supply the Entente with a new fighting force without necessitating the sacrifice of more men on its part. It solves the problem of effectives for the Allies and makes it insoluble for the Boches and their vassals. It is in strict conformity with the democratic peace-aims of the Allies. Furthermore, its adoption

would give the war a direction which would pave the way for the reconstitution of Europe at the peace conference. Lastly, it would make the offensive operations on the Western front infinitely less costly in men for the Allies, while considerably increasing their chances of success.

During twenty years of peace I warned public opinion of the formidable peril that was drawing near. Since the outbreak of the war my various prognostications have, on the whole, been justified by the event. I may be permitted, therefore, in the interest of the Allied cause, to appeal for the support of public opinion in inducing those in authority, first, to examine the proposed plan thoroughly and without prejudice; and, secondly, to set about the intensive construction, with rights of priority, of passenger-carrying aircraft with a very extensive radius of action.

It is my sincere conviction that this plan may well lead to a swift and definitive decision before the end of 1918.

The present time (February, 1918) is especially favorable for preparing to put it into effect morally. After the signature of the treaty with the Poles, despite the momentary concessions made to them, they cannot fail to see that they have been duped by Vienna and Berlin. The Roumanians, Czechs, and Jugo-Slavs, always admirable for their physical energy, are demanding independence. The Italians realize at last

the necessity of coming to an understanding with the Jugo-Slavs and all the other Slavs, Latins, and Semites in Pan-Germany, who also are in the bonds of a degrading servitude.

In very truth, then, the moral cohesion of the eighty-six millions of slaves in Pan-Germany, fifty millions of whom inhabit the strategically vital portions thereof, can be achieved at once.

Under these conditions, can we, without betraying the cause of democracy, without in some sort refusing to accept victory, fail to attempt at least to carry out this plan? Can we refuse to play this card when it seems to be the best one that we can ever hold to win the war?

As a matter of fact, the present situation is perfectly well defined. If the Allies are content to fight on on the Western front, allowing the numerous pacifist machinations to depress the morale of their people, they risk — on the most favorable hypothesis — being compelled within a few months to negotiate a peace on the deceptive basis of 'no annexations and no indemnities.' In that case, as the governments of Berlin and Vienna have never kept their word, whatever terms the Allies may make with them will be absolutely worthless. Pan-Germany will survive. The Boches will derive a formidable accession of power from their enormous war-profits, whereas the European Allies, sinking under the deadly

weight of their incredible war-expenditure, will be reduced to servitude. And — mark it well, Americans — the assault of Pan-Germany on the United States will begin forthwith.

On the contrary, if, desiring to conclude a democratic peace, we are able, in addition, to conduct the war on democratic principles, — that is to say, to supply the eighty-six million slaves of Pan-Germany, at the earliest possible moment, with effective means of fighting for the liberty of the world, — we shall inevitably bring about an internal explosion in Pan-Germany, and, before the close of 1918, complete victory will be ours. Then will the conclusion of an equitable, restorative, and durable peace become possible.

The choice must be made between these two alternatives.



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