

Sites of Memory

Tracing France's Cultural Self-Consciousness



Paroles Gelées

Special Issue

Volume 16.2 1998

*Selected Proceedings from
UCLA French Graduate Students'
Third Annual Interdisciplinary Conference*

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Selected Proceedings from
The UCLA French Department Graduate Students'
Third Annual Interdisciplinary Conference
April 17-18, 1998

*Ce serait le moment de philosopher et de
rechercher si, par hasard, se trouvait ici
l'endroit où de telles paroles dégèlent.*

Rabelais, *Le Quart Livre*

PAROLES GELÉES

Special Issue

UCLA French Studies

Volume 16.2 1998

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Introduction

Stacey Meeker

Pour exercer avec tous les Français leur droit à la longue mémoire.

Marc Fumaroli
Directeur de l'Académie Française
Président de l'Institut

It was in a distinctly French climate of retrospection and remembrance that *Sites of Memory* was chosen as the subject for the UCLA French Graduate Students' Third Annual Interdisciplinary Conference in the fall of 1997. The French *Institut*, the plenary body of the five Académies, had officially dedicated October 21, 1997 to *la mémoire*, reaffirming that for the French, memory is a matter of national import. Pierre Nora's monumental study, *Les lieux de mémoire*, had demonstrated its popularity and influence by appearing in paperback form in May, and the second volume of its English translation had just crossed the Atlantic. Hanoi, erstwhile "Paris of the Orient," had just hosted the seventh Francophone summit, reminding us once again of the global reach of things French. Finally, October 1997 saw the opening—after fifteen years of preparation, longest in French history—of the trial of Maurice Papon, General Secretary of the Gironde region under Vichy and later a prefect in Algeria and Paris, accused of "crimes against humanity" for having deported over 1500 Jews to Nazi concentration camps. (On April 2, 1998, just two weeks before our conference, France's continuing ambivalence toward the Vichy years was demonstrated as Papon was found guilty, then left free on appeal.)

Both a scholarly achievement and a cultural event, *Les lieux de mémoire* insists on the centrality of memory to French national self-consciousness at all levels of the social order, from the individual to the state. While emphasizing the distinction, even the opposition, between history and memory, *Les lieux* also points to the uncontrollably fluid nature of any such distinction. The ongoing struggle between history and memory has not diminished the enduring seductive power of French culture's paradoxical claim of universality—*au contraire*. By examining chosen Sites of Memory, we hoped to discover the means by which memory *à la française* undermines, mourns, or reinforces sentiments of collective identity, a crucial issue for those engaged in French Studies in the age of globalization.

Our participants' contributions map the variety of media in which memory manifests itself, in sites ranging from the traditional art forms—ballet under Louis XIV, Viollet-le-Duc's naturalism-informed architecture, the canonical literature of Chateaubriand and Proust—to the popular—post-

war film, the *néo-polar* and the contemporary novel, the patchwork of posters and *BD* surrounding the Algerian War. In our undergraduate exhibit, students transformed their personal experiences of *francisation* into poetry of their own creation or explored the accruals of memory around the figure of Salomé in late nineteenth-century decadent painting and literature. The open discussion of *Francité et mémoire sur "la Toile"* ventured onto the new terrain of the Internet and its role in the creation and/or deconstruction of both memory and "Frenchness" in centers multiplied far beyond the Hexagon.

The selection of articles contained in this volume represents the breadth and subtlety of the reflection imposed by memory. They range across the historical spectrum but frequently choose the still unhealed wounds of Vichy as the point of origin both for the divergent paths of French history and memory and for the emerging self-awareness of this divergence. The preoccupation with the "Vichy syndrome" puts into question the very bases of national identity and identification.

In *Sites, Sights, and Silences of Memory*, UCLA's Eugen Weber, an eminent French historian and himself a contributor to Nora's *Lieux de mémoire*, reminds us that the French create national memory "by teaching, and by the accumulated teaching of their monuments." Yet silence and forgetting are as important to memory as remembering. Weber suggests that French history, built upon rifts and resurrections, may be likened to Jewish history in its creation of "mythology, liturgy, and the demanding God of the *patria*." Weber's argument points to a form of collective identity older than that of the modern nation-state and reminds us that nation and memory cannot be reduced to partners in hegemonic hoodwinking but must be considered in the broader context of a communal faith, a *re-ligio* without which no society can survive.

Jean-François Fourny's *Oublier l'avant-garde?* explains the paradox of how Guy Debord and the Situationists disappeared from sight and apparent memory only to form a unique site in the history of French twentieth century avant-gardes. Fourny argues that Situationism, by the very fact of having been largely forgotten, has emerged as the most authentic and durable avant-garde movement where the more visible Surrealism and *Tel Quel* have become institutionalized memories, commodified and turned into spectacle by the very culture to which they were opposed.

If spectacle dominates questions of memory in Debord's case, Regina Sadono's *Details and Reproducing Domination: The Birth of the Ballet School, the Prison, and Other Correctional Facilities* builds on spectacle as

a defining element of Louis XIV's *pouvoir absolu*. Coincident with the beginning of the modern nation-state, the *Roi-Soleil*'s conception and institutionalization of ballet imposes a new form of memory on the subject by reassembling and dominating the body. This institutionalized *corps de ballet* remains a site of memory yet today.

Aron Vinegar's *Memory as Construction in Viollet-le-Duc's Architectural Imagination* demonstrates that a similar principle of dissection and reconstruction dominates Viollet-le-Duc's use of memory as an "imagination technology" in his nineteenth-century restoration of "Gothic" French monuments. Viollet-le-Duc's creative reconstruction, however, follows the naturalist's anatomical model rather than an autocrat's corrective mechanics. Cathedrals and chateaux are reconstituted as organic wholes in the spirit of Georges Cuvier's reconstruction of prehistoric vertebrates from fossil bone fragments.

Joseph Jenkins's *Swann, Vinteuil et Marcel, et la mémoire involontaire* tackles Proust, the writer whose *petite madeleine* springs to mind at the very mention of the word *mémoire*. Jenkins demonstrates through close textual analysis how the Proustian text exceeds in sophistication its narrator-protagonist's professed theory of *mémoire involontaire*. The reader who encounters Vinteuil's *petite phrase* as a memory trace in the context of Swann's love for Odette must await its release from this role in the Sainte-Euverte *soirée* before he can savor its particularity as an esthetic moment liberated from Time.

In Proust's novel, history as narrative is performed through the medium of memory. In *Clichés of Unity: History and Memory in Postwar French Film*, Marc Siegel describes the New Wave's revolt against the "tradition of quality" as reflecting a consciousness of social and psychological rifts that could not be integrated into the "Resistancialist" narrative of French national unity that de Gaulle attempted to impose after World War II. For Siegel, the spatio-temporal coordinates of traditional narrative, which implicitly assert the continuity of postwar with pre-war France, are disrupted by the New Wave's snapshot images of personal memory that reduce history to *cliché*.

Mary Wiles also links personal memory to the (re)writing of history in her *French Folie: Memory and Madness in Buñuel's "Belle de Jour,"* which explores the productive interplay between the film's implied psychoanalytic and Surrealist readings of protagonist Séverine's difficulty in reconciling herself to her personal history. For Wiles, Séverine's story is an allegory of postwar France, which too found itself traumatized by repressed memories of its past. In contrast with the psychoanalytic intertext that reveals the

need to obliterate memory in a return to historical normalcy, the surrealist subtext points to the liberation of memory from history figured by the trope of blindness.

Finally, Naomi Davidson's *Naming "la Guerre sans nom": Memory, Nation, and Identity in French Representations of the Algerian War, 1963-1992*, examines nationhood in its colonial context by exploring the dichotomies between the official history of the French-Algerian War and the subversive personal memories of the conflict that have emerged in cultural products ranging from comic books to films and novels. Davidson shows how institutional France's long refusal to recognize and commemorate the war reflects the challenge that its richly ambivalent memories pose to the very notion of "Frenchness." The broad conclusion suggested by Davidson's article as well as those of our other participants is that, however much our perspective on History becomes fragmented and problematic, our drive to narrativize remains intact.

We would like to thank our sponsors and the graduate students whose work made this conference possible. Bendi Benson, Brian Brazeau, Helen Chu, Diane Duffrin, Sheila Espineli, Vanessa Herold, Heather Howard, Daniel Johnson, Vera Klekovkina, Madeleine La Cotera, France Lemoine, Julie Masi, Martha Moore, Marcella Munson, Alison Rice, Michael Stafford, and Lena Udall deserve special mention. Jean-Claude Carron, Chair Patrick Coleman, conference advisor and web site designer Eric Gans, and Nicole Dufresne were particularly helpful at crucial moments. Finally, we wish to extend our very special thanks to Professor Weber for his gracious participation in our own Site of Memory.

Sites, Sights, and Silences of Memory

Eugen Weber

Memory is what we make it. Memory is what we make of it. When I was asked to talk about “Sites of Memory,” I went back to two documents: Pierre Nora’s great monument to the subject, and Sellers & Yeatman’s *1066 and All That. Les Lieux de Mémoire*, in case you don’t know, consists of seven volumes, the first of which came out in 1984, the last in 1992, and it includes 4710 pages and 155 essays by 106 contributors. *1066* came out in 1931 and its subtitle reads “A Memorable History of England, comprising all the points you can remember, including 103 good things, 5 bad kings, and 2 genuine dates.” The dates are 55 BC when the Romans invaded England and 1066 when the Normans landed at Hastings. “The Norman Conquest was a Good Thing, as from that time on England stopped being conquered and thus was able to become top nation.” The book is 116 pages long, including five test papers with questions like:

“Which came first, AD or BC? (be careful)”

“What is a Plantagenet? Do you agree?”

“Deplore the failure of the Gunpowder Plot.” And so on.

We have here two conflicting approaches to memorable memory, and I shall not try to reconcile them. But if serious subjects deserve to be treated seriously (sometimes), Sellers & Yeatman also make a serious point that has often been made more pretentiously and at greater length: that memory is what you remember, but also misremember, invent, are told or taught. It becomes part of our mind’s furniture and that of the society or social groups in which we move, a symbolic capital of commonalities, commonplaces, clichés that acquire significance and force by being held in common, that mold a particular idiom of the mind, that act as passwords and as bonds (remember that this is what *religio* means). There are, of course, memories that function as personal and private affairs—*madeleines*, if you like. But these only become significant when they go public: when they are shared with a friend, a lover, an audience, after which they *also* operate as bonds and identifiers to initiates until, precisely as in the case of Proust’s *madeleine*, they enter the baggage, and the flow, of public memory.

To a historian, events, doings, lives matter as part of a public story. Most of the time, the personal and private counts when it ceases to be personal and private and becomes part of the public sphere. And all, or almost

all, of the documents we work with originate in whole or part in private contributions or initiatives: letters and diaries, literature and art, but also inscriptions, charters, monuments, contracts, wills, treaties, reports, accounts, reflect the activities, minds, hands, styles, or forgeries in which private and public mingle.

Memory does too. It tends to be recast, recreated, created even, by reading, transmission, reflection, retrospection. My own impression of participating in events like battles is very much like that of Fabrizio del Dongo at Waterloo; and a true account of experience recollected in tranquility would be confused, busy, incoherent, and difficult of access. But when, in the course of research, I have interviewed actors of historical situations, they had ordered their doings, reordered them in quest of clarity, accuracy or political correctness, read up on the background, sometimes even read their own published memoirs and accounts of events. So public memory, on which I want to focus, is less likely to be spontaneous and artless, more likely to be contrived, deliberately or not. But private memory is too. And I myself have read accounts of what is now called the Battle of the Bulge, the better to orient myself before going back to the Ardennes where I was wounded.

The French approach this finding that memory is less spontaneous than contrived by declaring it a non-issue. Yes, memory is an artefact and its purpose (though not always acknowledged) is to sketch out and confirm the image, entity, identity of a person or, historically speaking, of a society. Let's say the word: a Nation. A common history does not make a nation, but it helps to keep it united. That is a serious consideration for a nation as disunited and riven as the French, which has indeed been held together not just by force, but by imagined and inculcated identities, including a passion for building barricades.

You know what Ernest Renan said about this, but I shall quote him all the same: "Avoir des gloires communes dans le passé . . . avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble . . . voilà des conditions essentielles pour être un peuple." Common glories, common deeds—the memories detailed, retailed in Nora's *Realms* demonstrate that this is the case. But I have left out two clauses, so let me cite Renan's lines in full: "Avoir des gloires communes dans le passé, une volonté commune dans le présent; avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore." This is where the memory of past achievements can make up for present failures of commonality and will. When cohesion is weak or threatened, the symbols in the armory of national memory can restore or reaffirm it.

Again, the success of Nora's enterprise demonstrates the demand for this sort of reassurance. And remember that in the years when *Realms* was in gestation France was on the wobble. The *trente glorieuses* had petered out, the economy was limping, unemployment was beginning its perilous ascent, immigration was becoming an issue (again!), politics looked increasingly precarious. No wonder that the 1980s were a great time for commemorations: 1980, centennial of making July 14 a national holiday; 1981, centennial of free elementary education; tricentennial of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1985, fiftieth anniversary of the Popular Front in 1986, Millenary of the Capetian Monarchy in 1987, twentieth anniversary of May 1968 in 1988, bicentennial of the French Revolution in 1989, centennial of General de Gaulle's birth in 1990. The one anniversary that did not evoke celebration was the bicentennial of Louis XVI's execution in 1991. Evidently, having done or undone great things together was supposed to cement solidarities that were getting very skittish.

Now look at the subjects that Pierre Nora's first volume sets out to evoke. They are symbols like the *tricolore* and the *Marseillaise*, monuments like war memorials and the Pantheon, commemorations like the *Quatorze Juillet*, and the pedagogy that rubs them in—especially as found in textbooks. Being the work of historians, the volume acknowledges that where there's myth there's also counter-myth; so counter-memories receive their due attention, like the Vendée and the *Mur des Fédérés* at the Père Lachaise. But these account for only ten per cent of the collection. A subsequent volume entitled "Les France" features other conflictual inheritances: Catholicism and secularism, Red and White, Right and Left, not to mention Vichy and xenophobia. But all emphasize the very *French* aspects of these divisive conflicts, all thereby fortify the image of national personality and identifiable national peculiarity. Whereas the Dreyfus Affair gets no mention.

You probably know that, under Mitterrand, Jack Lang ordered a very large bronze statue of Captain Dreyfus to be placed in the courtyard of the Ecole Militaire, where the unfortunate captain had been stripped and humiliated in December 1894 (another commemoration!). The military rebelled; and the statue, created by cartoonist-sculptor TIM, was banished to a distant, discreet corner of the Tuileries, where it languished until, a year or two ago, it was shifted to an equally unsung square on the Rive Gauche.

So certain memories are better swept under the carpet. You can't do that with Vichy, or with the Camisards; but you can at least try with Dreyfus; and sometimes, with some memories, you may even succeed. You can see this in the little town of Dreux, not far from Chartres, where four memorials honor: (1) those who died in the Great War, in the subsequent less-great

Second War, and in Indochina and Algeria; (2) those who died after being deported by the Germans in the 1940s; (3) young local Communists shot for resisting the Germans. And these are all the object of annual ceremonies on Armistice Day, November 11.

The fourth memorial, which receives little notice, is an obelisk inscribed “to the French soldiers killed outside its walls, the town of Dreux”; it marks the occasion, in October 1870, when the municipality decided *not* to resist the Prussians. They disarmed the National Guard, they demanded an evacuation of what troops there were, and they declared Dreux an open city. Certain patriots nevertheless wanted to try to stop the enemy, and their untoward enthusiasm led to an unfortunate incident in which anti-Prussians and anti-anti-Prussians fired on each other, with both parties suffering casualties. So the French killed outside the walls of Dreux in 1870 were killed by other French. These are the dead commemorated by the obelisk, and these are the memories—not exactly forgotten, because provincial memories go back a long way—but tacitly occulted when others are celebrated.

Renan had something to say about that too: “L’oubli, je dirai même l’erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d’une nation, et c’est ainsi que le progrès des études historiques est souvent pour la nationalité un danger.” Renan cites as typical sources of friction differences in language, religion, and race—meaning ethnic origin; and he is pleased to note (his lecture was delivered in 1882) that all these count for less and less.

1882 was the year in which Jules Ferry’s schools kicked in, which meant that within a generation or so most of the French would be speaking French; and *that* meant that memories would be couched and relayed in French, and would be learnt both orally and visually in the national language. It also meant that one of the great Franco-French conflicts, the religious war that goes back well beyond the French Revolution to the massacres of the sixteenth century, would rise to heights unprecedented for a hundred years and culminate in the separation of Church and State in December 1905.

Memories of religious conflict go back past the Vendée and the mini-Vendées that raged over other parts of France in the 1790s, to the times of the Catholic League in the sixteenth century and the Camisard rebellion in the seventeenth century, both of which left their mark on family and local remembrance, grudges that resurged into national awareness when they expressed themselves through universal suffrage, but also in the bloody disorders and broken careers that marked religio-political struggles from the 1880s to the early 1900s. It would take the hecatombs of the First World War and sometimes the massacres of the Second to paper that canyon over, to prove that pedagogy and commemorations had done their edulcorating job, that

memory had largely shifted from village and region to city and nation, to persuade most normal folk that they shared not only the same memories but also the same bygones.

It would be a long haul. The Belgians and the Italians who had been trickling into this large underpopulated country before the First World War were not much more foreign than Bretons and Auvergnats and Provençaux, who also spoke dialect, not the national language, and who had to learn it, along with the rituals of urban living and the rites of national belonging that school and military service taught. Recurrent festivities were also designed to expose all the citizenry to the allegedly common and commonly shared memory of a national past that led to the national present of democratic politics and of elections (another festive ritual), and of shared conflict—between Reds and Whites, Catholics and Anticlericals, French and French. Franco-French wars overrode even class war, even xenophobia; and they too reaffirmed a national identity first learned, then inscribed in personal memory and personal pride.

All these motifs and that of private memory bound and jointed with more public memories come out in the Resistance, and in the memorial treatment of Resistance, which are not mentioned in Nora's work. That is a pity, because here is an object lesson of how realms of memory are created, accreted, managed, manipulated, assimilated even as they are commemorated and studied; but also how they feed on each other.

We know a great deal about the competition between the Gaullist model of Resistance, unitary and patriotic; and the Communist model, class-consciously dominated by workers and peasants. We know less about the memorial tug-of-war between the uniformed Resistance in the African and Italian campaigns of the war and the clandestine *résistance de l'intérieur*. We hardly ever hear about the conflict between Resistance and Counter-Resistance that you can read about in Marcel Aymé, or view in films like *Lacombe Lucien*. All of which should remind us that memory is not a *bloc*, but a mosaic or a jigsaw whose parts often assert themselves over the would-be whole. Like family memory, which differs from clan to clan, political-family memories differ too. So do the memories and memorial claims of subsidiary groups that have in the past ten or twenty years claimed attention for their resistance activities: women; foreigners, especially Spaniards; and Jews who, in turn, tend to divide between Communist *franc-tireurs et partisans* and those who identify themselves as Jewish rejects of an anti-semitic society.

Then there is the fact that the Resistance itself was the heir of memories and of traditions that it sometimes ignored, but often drew upon for identification and legitimation. It called upon Joan of Arc, it referred to the na-

tional revolutionary tradition: *les soldats de l'an II*, Valmy, the *levée en masse*. The communists invoked the Bolsheviks of the great revolutionary war and the Republicans of the Spanish War. But most references went beyond, or around, Right and Left; and many bypassed general criteria inspired by national or international history for more specifically local memories.

In Lozère for example, the Catholic north of the department was imperious to Resistance and so, largely, was neighboring Aveyron. In the more difficult country of southern Lozère, Hérault, Ardèche, the Cévenols likened themselves to Camisards, as Audois referred to Cathares, as the Varois referred to the republicans of 1851 who rebelled against Louis-Napoleon's *coup d'état* of December 2, 1851. In Brittany, the *Chouans* of 1793-96, their sons and their nephews, had risen against Napoleon during the Hundred Days under the command of a La Rochejaquelein (brother of the leaders of 1793), then rose again in support of the Duchess de Berri in 1832, this time under a La Rochejaquelein *and* a Charette, then flowed into the Zouaves Pontificaux in the 1860s and volunteered against the Prussians in 1870. Yet *Chouan* regions showed little interest in Resistance in the 1940s. On the other hand, the central part of Brittany which in 1675 revolted against Colbert's new taxes, provided recruits for another kind of insurgency against foreign oppression. And everywhere the traditional guardians and interpreters of tradition—pastors, priests, *instituteurs*—mediated these interpretations too.

But, where it functioned, popular imagination established other parallels between resistance to authorities *then* and *now*: *maquisards* were assimilated to Mandrin and other social bandits, to smugglers who always played a social role in the countryside, to *réfractaires* who had fled conscription for a century and a half, above all to the *Jeunesse*—traditionally transgressive, violent, festive, and defending *their* community, their territory, against *horsains* from the outside.

So once again, memory, its transmission, its utilization, turn out to be matters of selection, of choice out of a stock of references that are there to be revived at need, that suggest themselves when the moment is right.

Then, when the moment of action was past, it was time for the memorable action to be institutionalized, to be declared an official part of patriotic patrimony, to be homogenized so that internal rivalries and dissensions were edulcorated, and unwanted participants like the *Armée Secrète* or General Giraud could be evaporated and, as the French say, *occultés*. It was time for memory to be eviscerated and stuffed for public exhibition and edification, ritualized by the State, defended by associations, played out in ceremonies and commemorations. That was when we got the cult of those who died in

battle, the victims transfigured as heroes and martyrs, the emblems like the Cross of Lorraine and the V for Victory, the memorials and monuments like that at Glières: the constitution of contemporary mythology.

That was also when the authorities, but not the authorities only, set out to conscript the cinema (*films d'intérêt national*, as the Ministry of Information put it in 1945) to produce a national and international memory of the Resistance as an inspiring national heritage. They did what they could to suppress embarrassing presentations like Marcel Carné's *Les Portes de la nuit*; they supported and subsidized and publicized René Clément's very fine *La Bataille du rail*, with its epic account of the resistance of railway workers that culminates in the sabotage of a German armored train, but that never hints (why should it?) that railwaymen never tried to sabotage a single train deporting Jews either to Drancy or to Germany.

We all know that Max Ophüls's *Le Chagrin et la Pitié*, made in 1970, was only shown on French television in 1981. It is not so well known that in 1945 a director called Jeff Musso made a film about the Resistance called *Vive la Liberté*, which sank without trace in 1946, the year *La Bataille du rail* triumphed, because it suggested *en passant* that French people who respected the authority of Pétain and of the Vichy regime might think themselves to be as good French as those who opposed them. In other words, again, deep divisions had to be papered over, which they were for some decades; and *that* had to be done because the past, as always, represents the present's idea of the future; and manipulating the past is one way of affecting the future, and the future of the future.

Now let me go back to generalities. Just ten years ago, in 1988, Isaiah Berlin remarked on the explosion of what he called "religious bigotry" which, he said, not one of the most perceptive thinkers of the nineteenth century had predicted. I suggest that if they did not, that was because, in the spirit of their time, they marginalized "bigotry" or swept it under the carpet; they privileged inventive imagination, utopian, millenarian, over that other imagination of the resurrectionist kind that we call memory. But even inventive imagination works by rearranging recollections.

The fuel that imagination runs on is the information and misinformation that we accumulate by experience and vicarious experience. Ideas and images do not arise by immaculate conception: they are born of ideas and images. Personification of memory, Mnemosyne was the mother of the nine Muses, and her realm, much vaster than that of lived experience, offers memories for all times; and you never know what a time or a situation will call for. The first *lieu de mémoire* in Western history, which is Christian history, is Jewish history: the genealogies, genocides, and other shenani-

gans of the Old Testament. Israel is a land of fathers and forebears. They and their deeds are remembered in words and in celebrations that commemorate historical—or allegedly historical—events.

Religio-historical sites, Jerusalem and the Temple, Megiddo and Babylon, a whole sacred geography, concretize remembrance and screw it firmly into sanctified space. A liturgy of feasts—Passover and so on—recalls moments in a national history that is not just redemptive but inspiring and energizing; that marks a people with an indelible mark, that ties them together with a powerful bond, that willy-nilly gives them a sense of election, identity, solidarity, loyalty—not necessarily with and to each other, but in terms of a common destiny and a common piety about the higher entity that comprehends and transcends them.

The storehouse of memory is not monopolized by Jewish and Christian material. It is easy to discover other references in it, for example Greek and Latin ones. And it is not surprising, in retrospect, that some of the most thoughtful agnostic intellectuals of the *fin de siècle* should have been epicureans and stoics; just as it should not surprise us that some of the most strident voices of *our fin de siècle* should be evangelical and fundamentalist. Nor that so many founders and innovators of contemporary societies (notably in France) should have sought to create and recreate sacred histories of their own, complete with prophecy, liturgy, mythology, and theology. It should not surprise us that tribes and sects in this country attempt to do it; and that nationalists and other French tribes and sects have worked at it for two hundred years.

It is the function of a functional memory first to stir the imagination, then to pervade it, permeate it, and settle in it, so that it can pop up as a matter of course. The French have succeeded in establishing their *lieux de mémoire*, not necessarily all of Nora's 150 but enough for them to count, and in fixing them as firmly as the Hebrews did: mythology, liturgy, not least the jealous, demanding God of the *patria*. And they have done it, as the Hebrews did it, largely by teaching, and by the accumulated teaching of their monuments.

A father's first duty to his son, says Jules Michelet, is to teach him about the fatherland. He takes him to Notre Dame, to the Louvre, to the Tuileries, to the Arc de Triomphe. From a balcony or a rooftop he shows him the people, the army marching past, the shimmering bayonets, the *drapeau tricolore*. "There, my child, look, there is France, there is the fatherland." A hundred years after Michelet, a lad who described himself as *un petit Lillois de Paris* had a similar experience: "nothing struck me more than the symbols of our glories: night falling over Notre Dame, the majesty

of evening at Versailles, the Arc de Triomphe in the sun, the flags we conquered floating under the vaulted roof of the Invalides." Charles de Gaulle had certainly imbibed the lesson from his father, but his vision is much the same as that of Michelet.

Now, as Mona Ozouf has suggested, let us move on to May 1981, when the newly-elected President of the French Republic walks up the steps of the Panthéon, flanked by a guard of honor, and on into the grim, gray nave of the building. On the face of it, he is engaging in a piece of public ritual much like what you find in other modern states: the new President inaugurates his term of office by paying homage at a shrine which is supposed to represent the unity and continuity of his country. The frieze over the portico under which Mitterrand passes proclaims the official intention: *Aux Grands Hommes, la Patrie Reconnaissante*. This was the didactic agenda which Mitterrand had in mind with his inaugural innovation: a ceremony of integrative memory, a gathering of the national community around its great men, a reaffirmation of French unity around their national greatness.

Except that the Panthéon does not stand for national consensus the way the Washington Monument does, or even the Lincoln Memorial. First of all, it is a disaffected church and hence a permanent reminder of one major Franco-French conflict. Second, it is a monument to men. And whilst anachronism is a menace, it is still hard to avoid the fact that the first and so far only woman, Marie Curie, entered it only as part of a couple in 1985. It is also a monument not just to any men, but specifically to Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary men, with earlier times represented only by Rousseau and Voltaire. Which reflects its third aspect: the sectarian significance of the great men enshrined in what appears to be a monument less to inclusion than to exclusion.

Just what this means you can see if (in Ozouf's wake) we contrast Mitterrand's ceremony at the Pantheon with the ceremony that followed it when Mitterrand crossed from the left bank of the Seine to the right bank (and remember not just the connotations of Left and Right, but the Eiffel Tower on the Left facing the Sacré Coeur on the Right), crossed from the Panthéon to the *Hôtel de Ville*, to be honored by the mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac.

At the Panthéon, Mitterrand had evoked the spirit of the place by calling up great key presences: Lazare Carnot, who organized the citizen armies of the Revolution, Victor Hugo, who celebrated the suffering poor, Jean Jaurès, the socialist tribune and advocate of justice, Jean Moulin, the Republican martyr of the Resistance—a kind of Popular Front of radical, populist figures. Across the river, in the town hall that the Commune burnt and the

Third Republic rebuilt, the memories that Chirac summoned were of Ste Geneviève, Ste Jeanne d'Arc, Henri IV, General de Gaulle, none of whom is represented in the Pantheon. And when elected to the presidency himself in 1992, Chirac's first official act was a flying visit to de Gaulle's grave at Colombey, followed by a ceremony at the Arc de Triomphe.

The rift of French history, the conflict of rival memories, comes out in the resonances of such contrasts. *Hôtel de Ville* and *Panthéon* are both intended to represent commonality, civic and national patriotism, shared emotions of pride and gratitude. Yet both retain a partisan significance, and the Panthéon especially so. Insofar as it represents a monument to memory, it is to the memory of continuing cleavage and continuing feuds—precisely what the French have in common, which is their history, or at least their memorable histrionics.

That brings me back to Sellers & Yeatman's *Memorable History* of England, which is not multiple but singular, not complicated but simple; and that features only two dates, of which only one matters. How different this caricature looks from a comparable caricature of French memorability, which would be surfeited with bad kings, and with more bad things than good, and with far more dates than just 1066. As Michelet said somewhere (who insisted that history is not about narrative or analysis, but about resurrection), in France nothing is finished; everything always begins again: 1789 and 1815 and 1830 and 1832 and 1848 and 1851 and 1871 and 1968 and Old Uncle Tom Cobby and all. Which is another thing that the French have in common with the Hebrews: the soil of France, like that of Palestine, has an uncommon propensity to resurrections.

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Oublier l'avant-garde?

Jean-François Fourny

This presentation will deal with what is generally referred to as the second moment of the avant-garde in France in the twentieth century. The Situationist International (SI) was active in the late fifties and the sixties (1957-1972) so it came after surrealism and before the Tel Quel Group (TQ). These three intellectual movements shared many features, the main one being that they were all self-appointed avant-gardes before the very term avant-garde would be dropped for reasons I will discuss later. As for the differences between surrealism, situationism, and the TQ group, I will just mention for the moment that, unlike surrealism and TQ, situationism and its driving intellectual force, that is Guy Debord, remained largely ignored, underresearched, or, I'd rather say, forgotten until the mid-nineties. Let us just say that it is still somehow shrouded in mystery. Thus, the question of why Guy Debord and the situationists were suddenly remembered, or rediscovered, in the 90s must be addressed as a flow of books keeps appearing in several countries. It should first be said that this quasi-disappearance from the cultural memory for nearly twenty-five years had nothing to do with a lack of relevance: on the contrary, one may suspect that it was voluntary until it became impossible to ignore Debord any longer. Today Debord and his opus magnum *The Society of the Spectacle* are everywhere. However, it would be easy to show that Debord generates an enormous anxiety of influence since most French or Italian intellectuals who have made it their business to talk about society and the media, alleged hyperreality, or the role of images in today's world, define Debord negatively or start by taking a stand against him so that everybody understands that they will not repeat Debord. In other words, let's make sure that we exclude Debord before saying anything meaningful about the society of the spectacle we live in. No doubt Debord, who shot himself in 1994, was aware he was voluntarily forgotten by those who were so indebted to him; but he had never been interested in stardom, unlike Breton or Sollers, leaders of past and future avant-gardes. In fact, he had started killing himself through drink well before he committed suicide, as if his death was the price or the sacrifice to pay for future recognition. He wrote shortly before his death:

[J]’ai aimé ce qui est au delà de la violente ivresse, quand on franchit ce stade: une paix magnifique et terrible, le vrai goût du passage du temps . . . c’est un fait que j’ai été continuellement ivre tout au long de périodes de plusieurs mois; et encore, le reste du temps, avais-je beaucoup bu. (*Panegyrique* 43)

And then Debord, the man who first wanted to forget himself, proudly quotes Chinese poet Li Po: “Depuis trente ans je cache ma renommée dans les tavernes” (47).

Nevertheless, it remains true that the reason why Debord could not be entirely forgotten and is now being resuscitated is because his work amounts to a powerful updating of Marx’s *Capital* that can be summarized by the famous thesis No. 34 of *The Society of the Spectacle*: “The spectacle is capital accumulated to the point where it becomes image.” Here, the word “image” should encompass, of course, the images provided by the media but also the spectacle of speculation where capital is denoted by absurdly abstract and unreal numbers such as 7,000,000,000,000 (whatever the currency) manipulated by people who don’t even know what they are referring to (Bracken). In fact, no one knows what these figures refer to because they cannot be broken down into a precise and conceivable amount of hours of work, manufactured objects, square miles of property, and so on.

Along with the first serious, not to say prophetic, thinking on the identity between media and late capitalism, Debord and the situationists also provided a new approach to architecture and the modern city while challenging, well before poststructuralism, the notion of the author. Thus, my point is that situationism was the most productive avant-garde of the century. Surrealism has been relegated to museums and turned into an object of historical study. As for TQ, although credited for diffusing a new type of literary theory in the sixties and seventies, it amounts no more today than to another object of study or section of a PhD exam reading list. Debord, as opposed to Breton and Sollers, remains a most intimidating presence.

I would like, in what follows, to start briefly with three current and accepted definitions of what an avant-garde is in the historical sense. In a second part I will propose to compare surrealism and situationism so as to outline their common features—often typical of all avant-gardes—and their very real differences. I will finally try to ascertain the relevancy of Debord’s writings in the context of French media studies since important figures such as Pierre Bourdieu and Régis Debray are now condescending to busy themselves with the impact of television and images on society. And I will also try to explain why Debord disappeared from public memory for so long.

What is an Avant-Garde?

In his well-known *Sociology of Culture* Raymond Williams spends a fair amount of time on avant-gardes and literary movements so as to establish a typology. Based on what he calls “Internal organization,” Williams

divides these movements into three groups:

- 1) Those based on formal membership, with varying modes of internal authority or decision, and of constitution and election;
- 2) Those not based on formal membership, but organized around some collective public manifestation, such as an exhibition, a group press or periodical, or an explicit manifesto;
- 3) Those not based on formal membership or any sustained collective public manifestation, but in which there is conscious association or group identification, either informally or occasionally manifested, or at times limited to immediate working or more general relations (68).

As examples of group 2 (“Those not based on formal membership, but organized around some collective public manifestation, such as an exhibition, a group press or periodical, or an explicit manifesto”) Williams mentions the Futurists and the surrealists. I should point out that situationism met the criteria of both group 1 (“Those based on formal membership, with varying modes of internal authority or decision, and of constitution and election”) and group 2 since it was organized as an international association.

More interestingly, Williams argues that the emergence of these so-called “alternative and oppositional groups” is indicative of changes in the social basis such as:

- A. The crisis of the transition from patronage to market.
- B. The crisis of the transition from handwork to machine production.
- C. Crises within both patronage and the market, in a period of intense and general social conflict.
- D. The attachment of certain groups to a pre-capitalist and/or pre-democratic social order.
- E. The attachment of other groups to the democratization of the social order, as part of the process of general liberation and human enrichment to which the arts, if they were allowed, could contribute. It is this last criterion that situationism fits in the pre-1968 years.

As for the other two definitions of the avant-gardes I will ask you to bear in mind, they are those of Andreas Huyssen and Peter Bürger, which pick up and develop the last point made by Raymond Williams about “the process of general liberation and human enrichment to which the arts, if they were allowed, could contribute.”

Huyssen defines modernism as an attempt to maintain art's autonomy and preserve its purity against mass culture, technology and urbanization (one can think of Adorno, among many others). On the contrary, the avant-gardes try to make art closer to everyday life, or equate both, which supposes a social vision or a certain sense of society's future. The important point here is that Huyssen posits an underground complicity between avant-gardes and official culture in industrial societies, since the former do not reject technology as promoted by the latter. They may object to the social uses of technology but still want to put it to better social uses: in other words, technology is liberating if you know how to use it. As we shall see in a moment, this statement fully applies to the situationists.

Finally, Peter Bürger does not differ much on this point with Huyssen, but adds that avant-gardes were always caught in an insuperable contradiction. On the one hand, free or true art supposes a distance that allows for a critical "cognition of reality." On the other hand, merging art and reality would abolish this distance and this freedom (240). That may explain why twentieth-century avant-gardes were destined to fail, and I am thus taking the word "avant-garde" in a limited historical sense.

I will just add, before moving on to situationism proper, that Williams, Huyssen, and Bürger pay very little attention to the role of scandal in the making of an avant-garde—scandal and its orchestration through manipulations of the press as dada and surrealism did. The reason why there are no more avant-gardes may also be explained by the fact that there can be no more scandals since we are used to everything. Or also, as Debord would probably suggest, because it is now the press that manipulates everything.

Surrealism and Situationism

In 1958 the very first page of the very first issue of the journal *L'Internationale situationniste* opens with the title "Surrealism's Bitter Victory," and from its early days to its official disappearance in 1972, situationism will entertain its own anxiety of influence with surrealism, the first avant-garde, thus initiating a cascade of mimetic identifications with surrealism that will later be picked up by TQ.

Debord and his followers are literally obsessed with what they call the "avant-garde of the 30s," that is, surrealism, because, more than anything, they want to avoid "repetition." And I should point out right away that next to this situationist keyword, the terms "passé," "boredom," "everyday life," "playfulness," and "desire" represent the situationist lexical contributions to the events of May 1968. This obsessive fear of repetition may be ex-

plained by the fact that the structure of the literary field obviously contained since surrealism a space to be occupied by angry young men. It was thus structurally inevitable that the situationists would to some degree repeat the surrealists or would often give new names to surrealist practices while adamantly denying it. But first how did the situationists define themselves? Like the surrealists, they claimed to represent an artistic and political avant-garde aiming at social revolution. However, surrealism lost its revolutionary impulse when it allowed its art to be commodified and also because it believed too much in the unconscious and occultism. But also like the surrealists, the situationists found dictionary-like entries or definitions a most convenient way to introduce key concepts. I will mention just a few:

— PSYCHOGEOGRAPHY that studies the effects of the urban environment on emotions and behavior. On this the situationists are not being deeply original because it is a technocratic concern during this period of post-war reconstruction.

— DÉRIVE: “a technique of transient passage through varied ambiances. The *dérive* entails playful-constructive behavior and awareness of psycho-geographical effects, which completely distinguishes it from the classical journey and the stroll.” I would say that you still have to take a walk and that, in spite of their disclaimers, the situationist *dérive* remains very close to the surrealist stroll in Paris as described in *Nadja* or elsewhere. I would even add that the situationists here maintain, although in a repressed manner, the romantic element that since Baudelaire confers upon cities magic and mystery.

— SITUATION: Here I should mention that in the intellectual context of the times the word “situation” meant Jean-Paul Sartre, or his use of the term both as a key philosophical concept and the very visible title of a twelve-volume series of literary criticism started in 1948. When Sartre’s name is mentioned in situationist literature it is usually followed by insults, as to be expected in a general context of Sartre scapegoating. Still, the word “situation” is to be understood as “a constructed situation,” “a moment of life concretely and deliberately constructed by the collective organization of a unitary ambiance and a game of events.”

— And finally, DÉTOURNEMENT: as “the integration of present and past artistic production into a superior construction of a milieu. In this sense, there can be no situationist painting or music, but only a situationist

use of these means.” There is an essay (No. 3, p. 11) explaining what a *détournement* is supposed to be, but, to make a long story short, suffice it to say that Marcel Duchamp had already practiced it when painting a moustache on Mona Lisa. It simply means removing cultural artifacts from their context so as to show how meaningless they are. All these playful practices were to contribute enormously to the festive and carnivalesque atmosphere of May 1968.

As for other feared “repetitions” of features and tics of previous avant-gardes one could mention:

— the QUESTIONNAIRE addressed to readers, echoing the famous surrealist questionnaires on people’s sex life.

— the appeal to REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS, a surrealist “specialty” in the 1930s.

— the ANONYMOUS LETTERS from within the group and false death announcements as a symptom of the same INTERNAL CONFLICTS that had plagued surrealism. A dissident situationist faction announces officially in 1967 that Guy Debord passed away, an announcement that triggered an avalanche of angry denials and subsequent purges. Over fifteen years, and out of 70 members, 45 members were excluded, 19 resigned, and 2 took a secessionist stand (Gray 163). Debord will later be accused of being a CIA agent.

— HEGELIANISM. Hegelianism, here, should be understood as an attempt to reconcile what has been separated, to reunite the extremes within a totality. Breton yearned to reconcile the conscious and the unconscious or, as he put it so poetically, to reunite night and day. The twentieth-century avant-garde’s project to abolish the distinction between everyday life and art, as pointed out by Huyssen and Bürger, partakes of the same totalizing ambition aiming at reuniting the contraries. And I would add, in Debord’s case, a most Hegelian obsession with time.

The Society of the Spectacle Then and Now

I don’t think that it would be too far-fetched to suggest that some current media events are not only predicted but described by *The Society of the Spectacle* that Debord wrote in 1967. To take a few examples thirty years later:

— As president in a recent movie Michael Douglas appears to be a better actor than Bill Clinton but not as good as Ronald Reagan.

— However, Bill Gates may very well be the best actor in the world and Karla Faye Tucker and Monica Lewinsky are in dead heat for the prize for best supporting actress.

— And in the past an important event used to be followed by a movie. Now, a movie featuring Dustin Hoffman (*Wag the Dog*, 1997) and depicting a sex-crazed president about to launch a questionable war comes first.

In other words, as Debord put it in Thesis No. 9 of *The Society of the Spectacle*, “In a world that really has been turned on its head, truth is a moment of falsehood.” But what did Debord mean by “spectacle”?

The Spectacle can be said to represent a higher stage of capitalism and is consubstantial with the rule of the mafia. That is, the Spectacle and organized crime embody the supreme stage of capitalism when the mafia becomes the model for all business, but more on this later. The Spectacle is both a principle of world-wide unification and a principle of separation since access to reality is now mediated through representation and the word must somehow be understood as a *re-presentation* without origin in the Derridian sense. However, contrary to Derrida (and I mean the “classic” Derrida of the 60s and early 70s), this re-presentation or Spectacle is a social relationship translating class domination:

The Spectacle is not a collection of images; rather, it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images. (Thesis No. 4)

And again, mediation in the sense of separateness and unity:

The spectacle divides the world in two parts, one of which is held up as a self-representation to the world, and is superior to the world. The spectacle is simply the common language that bridges this division. Spectators are linked only by a one-way relationship to the very center that maintains their isolation from one another. The spectacle thus unites what is separate, but it unites it only in its separateness. (Thesis No. 29)

The society of the spectacle is the result of a long historical process that starts with the traditional privilege granted to *sight* by Western philosophy along with the technical rationality that turns the spectacle into the material reconstruction of the religious illusion (No. 20). However, this slow maturation will reach its full effects only when the modern State emerges through

Bonapartism. I do not need to dwell upon the importance of the two Napoleons to Hegelianism and Marxism, and Debord, after Marx, reads the Bonapartist episodes as the first fusion of State and capital, fusion that leads the bourgeoisie to relinquish all historical life so as to be reduced “to the economic history of things” as Marx put it. Consequently, the social cleavage expressed by the Spectacle goes hand in hand with the modern state. In Debord’s Hegelian *total history* very few periods can be said to represent freedom and true democracy.

Along with other twentieth-century left-wing mavericks such as Simone Weil, Debord developed a special fondness for Renaissance Florence. He agreed with Marx that the growth of cities and their increasing power as opposed to the backward countryside was an important step in the civilizing process. Here, the sixteenth-century Florentine Republic, maintaining its independence both against the feudal class and the emerging state, allowing a noisy street life and carnivals, epitomizes the very freedom the bourgeoisie and its state were soon to erase. Cities are at the heart of history, and in a way they are history, so the next step had to do with the reorganization of space and time.

In terms of space, and I am now returning to the situationist interest in urbanism through their concepts of psychogeography and urban *dérive*, the present period is marked by the disappearance of the traditional opposition between city and countryside. Let’s remember that Debord is writing during the post-war reconstruction era that saw the generalization of cars, television, and suburbs, and the quick elimination of the rural life millions of Europeans had shared for many centuries. Out of the same political milieu, for example, Jean Baudrillard was publishing his early books such as *La Société de consommation* or *Le système des objets*.

Through the suburb, the city disappears but so does the countryside: the suburbanized middle class replaces the peasants on the land in a pseudo-countryside without being either peasants or city dwellers. The reason is that the city means history and, of course, violence (because they are one and the same) so it had to be destroyed:

The city is the *locus of history* because it embodies at once a concentration of social power, which is what makes the historical enterprise possible, and a consciousness of the past. (Thesis No. 176)

And after all, what kind of truly historical event mobilizing masses of people could take place in a shopping mall parking lot? Moreover, if capital was in the past concentrated in cities it now needs to spread everywhere and absorb the periphery so as to reshape geography in its own image. A suburb

can thus be said to be the very face of capitalism for all to see. As Thesis No. 50 states: "Society in its length and breadth becomes capital's faithful portrait." But next to space, the reorganization of time also involves the eradication of memory, be it individual or collective.

A recent best-seller in France (Jean Ziegler, *Les seigneurs du crime: Les nouvelles mafias contre la démocratie*) is a fascinating study of the emergence of criminal cartels after the Cold War and the problems the authorities encounter when dealing with them. We are not talking here about the traditional neighborhood mafiosi but rather about gigantic organizations involved both in violent acts on a planetary scale so as to enforce their rule and crimes such as drug-trafficking, arms, and petrochemical and nuclear illegal exportation and, of course, money laundering. According to Ziegler, one of the reasons why the authorities' task has become nearly impossible is because time seems to have disappeared. Electronic communications make it possible to transfer money in a matter of seconds from one point of the planet to another or to make it vanish. I doubt very much that Guy Debord ever used a fax machine or sent an e-mail, but the 1967 book already announces the complete unification of human time and its natural cycles by the world market. And by natural cycles, I mean things as simple as night and day, with the different moods and maturation processes they may involve, the elementary sense of geographic distance, and so on. In other words it is history that has to go, history with its fragmented, parallel, and often contradictory times and memories. The Spectacle and the market can only tolerate the false immediacy of representation:

The development of capitalism meant the unification of irreversible time *on a world scale*. Universal history became a reality because the entire globe was brought under the sway of this time's progression . . . Unified irreversible time still belongs to the world market—and by extension, to the world spectacle. (Thesis No. 145)

If time in its individual and historical dimensions is now abolished, both history and memory are paralyzed (that's the word Debord uses). And one can think of the way the movie *Amistad*, with its false appearances of slaves in a Massachusetts court, is now marketed to high school teachers along with a Hollywood-designed handbook. The *Amistad* hero appeared before a Massachusetts court, even though historians deny he did, but he still did because we saw the movie. Guy Debord himself never appeared before a TV camera, so he never existed because we never saw him, and this *Amistad* anecdote clearly means that the Society of the Spectacle has completed Napoleon's project of "monarchically directing the energy of memories" (Debord's quote, Thesis No. 108).

I will now move on to my conclusion.

For a Debordology

There is now in France something called *la dianologie*, in reference to the late Princess of Wales. One of the most amazing phenomena is that a sort of shrine has developed in Paris just above the tunnel in which she died and where people still come to pay their respects and leave flowers and notes. The first wave of mourners in the aftermath of her death was mostly American and European. Even more amazing, Lady Di's shrine is now mostly visited by poor Muslim women who have turned her into a saint because they think she was murdered by the British when about to convert to Islam. So Guy Debord was both right and wrong.

He was right because Lady Di somehow epitomized the society of the Spectacle and the false temporality of glamour and paparazzi, when land mines only become real because there is a picture of the Princess next to them before we move on to the next issue, be it the Albanians or the next White House scandal. He was wrong because this *unspectacular* anonymous female Islamic devotion brings back the archaic, such as a medieval spontaneous sanctification and the theological resistance that Islam, by the way, opposes to images. It is really not for me, as a man, to comment on Lady Di, who obviously struck a very deep chord in many women, but she was the Society of the Spectacle incarnate. Nevertheless, it is through her that what Debord was most concerned about is maintained. Debord feared that the little people, the average person, would never be able to register their lives or, literally, inscribe them. Thesis No. 157 about the little people:

Such individual lived experience of a cut-off everyday life remains bereft of language or concept, and it lacks any critical access to its own antecedents, which are nowhere recorded. It cannot be communicated. And it is misunderstood and forgotten to the benefit of the spectacle's false memory of the unmemorable.

To begin with, I doubt very much that the lived experience of the average person in Debord's beloved Florentine Republic was better recorded. Secondly, the little personal notes in Arabic and the flowers left every day on the Lady Di shrine are just that. They individually commemorate an event that took place a very long time ago in media terms—August of 1997—and are not meant to generate any money. They represent *the archaic* that the Society of the Spectacle still lives with and that Debord's books failed to envision.

And why is Debord both forgotten and remembered? That's what a *debordology* should explain and one easy, but also obvious, possible answer would be to say that he always refused to deal with the media. We all tend to personalize everything at the urge of the society of the spectacle and there are very few pictures of him and very few witnesses to his life. Moreover, and for reasons unclear, after May 1968 he spent several years hiding in Spain and Italy. A *debordology* would thus have to do without pictures, biography, literary anecdotes, and salacious stories, which would be a refreshing exercise.

A book as old as 1979, *Le pouvoir intellectuel en France* by Régis Debray, created a scandal because it claimed that books' sales were strictly related to television appearances. In other words, literary fame and intellectual power had become a beauty contest with TV personalities as referees. Nearly ten years later, another book, *La République du centre*, written this time by three bourgeois intellectuals Debord would have deeply despised (Julliard, Rosanvallon, Furet), announced that le "créateur" had now replaced the flamboyant intellectual in the tradition of Voltaire, Hugo, Zola, Sartre, and Foucault. Since then, those in the generic category of *créateur*, which includes movie stars, top journalists, high fashion designers, great soccer players, and advertising executives, among others, were claiming for themselves the title of intellectuals. Hence the avalanche of bad novels and essays turned best-sellers written by journalists, reviewed by other journalists and promoted by newspapers, magazines, and TV programs run by the very same journalists. What the three authors of this book were worried about was the disappearance of scholarship or serious thinking at the expense of quickly written essays aimed at traditional Fall sales ("le roman de la rentrée") or at the literary prizes of the season.

Finally, now in 1998, another book became a best-seller—but this one Debord might have liked a lot because it could be regarded as an additional footnote to *The Society of the Spectacle* itself, an additional chapter to Marx. I should say, to be fair to Debord, that Serge Halimi's *Les nouveaux chiens de garde* adds very little at the theoretical level to *The Society of the Spectacle* but was not meant to be marketed the same way because it is, precisely, a 100-page essay. Halimi describes the interesting schedule of a well-known TV personality, Alain Duhamel, who can be described as a newspaper and TV journalist, a self-appointed authority on contemporary literature, a talk-show host, an expert on international and French politics, and, if time allows, a political science professor specializing in elections with an appointment in a Paris University. Here is his weekly schedule according to Halimi:

Duhamel speaks seven times on national radio between the 7th and the 10th of January 1995. The following Saturday Duhamel is involved in a TV literary program. On Sunday morning, at 8 am, he hosts a political radio program. At noon, he quizzes a national politician on national TV. The next day, that is Monday, at 7:25 am, he is back on the same radio program. At 7:00 pm Duhamel runs a political TV program featuring the General Secretary of the French Communist Party, then departs immediately to another TV studio to interview, thirty minutes later, the President of the Republic. The following day, that is Tuesday, Duhamel is "l'invité" of a political program on the French equivalent of CNN. (Halimi 77)

I suppose that I do not need to comment on the quality of Duhamel's comments or recommendations when it comes to novels. More interestingly, *Les nouveaux chiens de garde* quotes Debord twice and, in particular, Debord quoting Hegel. So here is Halimi, quoting Debord's Thesis No. 127, himself quoting Hegel:

C'est "*l'interminable série des affrontements dérisoires*" qu'évoquait Guy Debord dans *La société du spectacle*, avant d'en conclure, citant Hegel: "*L'errance des nomades est seulement formelle, car elle est limitée à des espaces uniformes.*" (Halimi 95)

So the nomads can go anywhere they want, but for Debord after Hegel, and unlike his contemporaries Deleuze and Guattari, they go nowhere because they never run into the mountains, the valleys, or city streets. It is because they travel the desert, the most enclosed of all territories, that their moves are meaningless just like Duhamel reviewing books he admits he did not have time to finish, or like Pat Buchanan "for the right" or Geraldine Ferraro "for the left" on CNN arguing within the confines of an intellectual desert preset by the network.

So Debord was both right and wrong. He was right, and convinced to be very right, in everything he predicted, well before Debray, Julliard, Rosanvallon, Furet, and Halimi, minus technicalities and anecdotes. He was wrong regarding memory. But first, why did Debord want to disappear?

An interesting essay on the Situationist International states that:

The quasi-clandestine nature of the organization as well as the systematic censorship that it had been subjected to by the political and artistic establishment, explain why so little is known and said about it. (Tardy 102)

And it is also true that Debord had also written:

Je méprise la presse, j'ai raison; et voilà pourquoi je refuse depuis toujours toute interview. Je la méprise pour ce qu'elle dit, et pour ce qu'elle est. (*Cette mauvaise* . . . 32)

I would only make one comment that may also apply to Huysen's and Bürger's views on the avant-garde, be it political or artistic. Revolutionary organizations want to change everyday life, that among their members themselves to begin with. Interpersonal dealings are supposed to be emancipated from greed, selfishness, and sexism as well as from any repressive type of morality in the midst of a society that is still dominated by them. Debord himself wrote:

The revolutionary organization cannot allow the conditions of division and hierarchy that obtain in the dominant society to be reproduced within itself. (Thesis No. 121)

However laudable this undertaking may be in itself, it amounts to claiming that the avant-garde is ahead of the rest of society and can only nurture an "us versus them" paranoia. Two left-wing groups that were born during the situationist / May 68 years, that is, the *Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire* and *Lutte Ouvrière*, have been making an unexpected comeback during recent French elections. They claim to be the avant-garde of the proletariat and seem to be more interested in fighting each other rather than the bourgeoisie because, like all Girardian mimetic twins, they are very much alike. They are the most paranoid political organizations in France, with secret membership and meetings, their archaic Bolshevik rhetoric of the twenties, and an obsession with "deviationism" and police informants. These pathetic remnants of the sixties give us a good idea of what life was at the Situationist International. Thus, all I am suggesting is that the elitist mentality often cultivated by all these different groups and quickly turning into paranoia should be taken into account in the definition of the avant-garde in the twentieth century.

Nevertheless, and in spite of his own paranoid attempts to disappear and refusals to deal with the media, Debord is better known and read today than thirty years ago. In other words, the very unspectacular Debord survives in the Society of the Spectacle. And I would finally add that through

him the living memory of what was perhaps the true twentieth-century avant-garde survives because it was never commodified or turned into a spectacle as a pre-condition to being quickly forgotten.

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Details and Reproducing Domination: The Birth of the Ballet School, the Prison, and Other Correctional Facilities

Regina Fletcher Sadono

On March 30, 1662, Louis XIV wrote:

Dance, besides the pleasures it accrues in *divertissements* for the eyes, forms impressions of decorum and resourcefulness in those who practice it, and in the minds of those who see it: these impressions can be of some use to the Nation, either for its politeness or for its facility in military exercises. (*The Establishment of the Royal Academy of Dance in the City of Paris*, quoted in Franko 182)

In his *Letters of Patent*, Louis XIV goes on to appoint thirteen dancing masters to safeguard the nobility of dance and to protect it from all degrading influence. These men are to meet once a month to discuss their curriculum, and anyone else who dares to call himself a dancing master will be subject to a fine. No one can join this elite group except by royal invitation, and these men and their heirs are to be in control of dance and dance pedagogy for all the days to come.

In the *Letters of Patent*, Louis XIV explains that the teaching of dance is much too important to be left in the hands of the unworthy. Dance has several important functions:

[T]he Art of the Dance has always been recognized as one of the most honorable and necessary for forming the body, and giving it the first and most natural dispositions for all sorts of exercises, and among others the exercise of arms, and consequently has been considered one of the most advantageous and useful for our Nobility, and for others who have the honor of approaching us, not only in wartime in our armies, but even in peace time in our Ballets . . . (Franko 176)

The connection between dance and the military is an important one and has had a long-term effect on the way ballet is taught, as well as on the aesthetic that ballet perpetuates. “Naturally, a great ballet always is an image of its epoch,” writes Jan Kott:

Moreover, it becomes its epoch. I understood this when I first saw “The Swan Lake” in the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow . . . The ballet dancers stand motionless with glassy smiles glued to their faces, stiff, prostrate, all of the same height—as the soldiers of the guard. They stand stiffly on two toes of one leg, the second they throw up high—as at an army parade. Then, suddenly, a *battement*, and the pirouettes begin. Corps de ballet busy themselves as the guard at the tsar’s inspection. This classical ballet *sur les*

pointes is abstract as a military muster, liturgical as an army parade, hieratic as a court ball. It has no face, and it is ready to react to a wave of hand—like the adjutants. A classical ballet is the guard and the court at once. Pushkin was the first to notice it. This ballet does not exist without a tsar. (Kott 20)

Kott, seeing the ballet in the late twentieth century, easily traces its relationship, not only to the military, but to the colonization of the body-as-subject that characterizes rulership by kings.

Ballet pedagogy, set in motion by Louis XIV in 1662, developed in a cultural climate that deliberately sought to colonize the body and enlist it in a form of socio-economic servitude. Ballet was a fertile ground for this predatory approach to the human body, since the aim of ballet, from its establishment during the reign of Louis XIV, was to appropriate grace and decorum in the service of a mystique of superiority that rationalized rulership by an aristocracy endowed with divine authority. The discourse of the contemporary ballet classroom is still permeated with this notion of genetic privileging: now referred to as “Genetic Pool.” This obsession with a particular body type reproduces the myth of Apotheosis that was structured into the first dance academy by Louis XIV.

The story of ballerina Merrill Ashley about her first class with the legendary George Balanchine illustrates this point. Here, Ashley’s story is linked to the stages in the myth of heroic ascension identified by Joseph Campbell in his book, *Hero With a Thousand Faces* (245-46).

Call to Adventure

Class with Balanchine! Class in the presence of this man who, like a god, embodied everything we admired and revered. Class given by this man who we had to please above all others. It was terrifying. Everyone in the class seemed straighter, more alert, expectant. We all had mixed feelings about getting his attention. We wanted to be noticed but we feared his corrections. What if we couldn’t do what he wanted right just after he showed us?

Appearance of a Helper

Balanchine entered the studio in a very business-like manner—no greetings, no idle words to create a friendly atmosphere. We were all at the barre, in preparation for the pliés that always started our classes at the School.

Crossing of the Threshold

Class began. We held the barre with our left hand, while our right arm was extended out to the side.

Encounter with the Shadow Presence

We hadn't done anything and we were wrong already!

"Stand like a turkey," he said, thumping his chest. "Chest out, shoulders back, head high. Look awake and alive."

Dismemberment and Descent

After we had straightened up a little bit, he said, "And what about your hands?"

He took the hand of a girl standing near me, tried to round the palm and make it more concave. He separated her fingers, indicating the right position of each one. He still wasn't happy: "Dear, too soft; looks like dead chicken. Must be strong, like this. Feel mine!"

With that the girl took his beautifully sculpted hand and squeezed it as hard as she could. Not a finger moved.

"Yours should be like that, dear."

Wonder Journey

To me it seemed like magic. Where did the strength come from? I tried to imitate him, but my hand simply looked like a claw.

Balanchine's immediate involvement in our first gestures fascinated and frightened me. Before, he had been only a distant figure, but now he was suddenly among us, touching us, chiding us, elaborating on the basics that we thought we had already mastered. He seemed so alert and animated, he didn't act at all like a man in his sixties. Slender, erect, quick and energetic, he didn't look like one either.

Tests/Helpers (Assumption of the Magical Object)

Slender, erect, quick and energetic, he didn't look like one either. That quiet, impassive figure on the platform high above the class was quite unlike the man now in our midst, who was tireless in his pursuit of perfection.

As we began our pliés, he demanded a perfect fifth position, with the heel of the front foot even with the tips of the toes of the back foot. Most teachers would give you a half-inch leeway or more, but he gave you nothing. Overcrossing was just as bad as undercrossing: the position of the feet had to be exact.

Then came the *battements tendus*: sixteen in each direction, more than we had ever done at one time. While we were doing them, Balanchine was down on one knee, next to various students, repositioning feet and guiding legs.

Supreme Ordeal

Each successive combination of tendus was faster than the last, and soon we were trying to do them faster than we had ever done them before. It was all so extreme and made our muscles burn with fatigue.

As the barre progressed, we did exercises in which he wanted us to move our limbs as if they were meeting resistance. He would provide that resistance by pushing and pulling us with his hands.

Apotheosis or Transfiguration

But it was when we moved to the center that the real surprise came. Suddenly Balanchine was jumping, landing, catlike, executing steps like a dancer half his age. He seemed more godlike than ever.

Return Flight as Emissary, or through Obstacles and Transformations

What a relief when it was all over! The class had been terribly stressful—physically, mentally, and emotionally. Fear of the unknown had been the worst part. We had wondered whether he would be patient and understanding or stern and unforgiving. We feared his high standards, yet he proved to be reasonable.

Return to the Threshold and Re-emergence into the World, Bringing Restoring Elixir

He never raised his voice or got angry, but he was very definite about what he wanted. He didn't praise anybody; the most he said was, "That's right." (Ashley 14-16)

This story of blatant hero worship rests on a narrative scaffolding around which Ashley constructs Balanchine in her imagination, and for the reader, in god-like proportions. The master has kept himself apart from these students, who have danced in his school for years without knowing him. They have seen him (Ashley tells us earlier in her book) only when he came in to stand high above them, Olympian, on a platform. Here is the reigning King

of Exclusivity, that private and privileged Wonderland where only the most radiant beings may ever hope to shine. Balanchine holds the mystical key to this world, the restoring elixir, the magic words: *That's right*.

The master delivers judgments. He makes pronouncements, thumping his chest. Next, the master seizes upon the *merest detail*, the position of a finger. This detail, as we will see, is the Glorified Obstacle that is constructed into the ballet classroom discourse. Ashley remarks how the master's hand is so beautifully sculpted, so magically strong that, by comparison, the hand of the young girl *seems like a claw*. One senses her hope that the alchemy of the class may someday transform her into a golden being such as she sees now before her *kneeling next to various students, repositioning feet and guiding legs*, symbolically dismembering these youthful organic beings into an assortment of mechanical parts.

"The training of the dancer is not unlike the initiation of a shaman," writes Joan Blackmer—a Jungian analyst—in *Acrobats of the Gods: Dance and Transformation*, "though it often takes *ten* years in the underworld space of the dance studio to complete the process of the body's dismemberment and renewal. Certainly, and above all, 'the candidate must watch his dismemberment with his own eyes'" (Blackmer 43-44). In ballet, the detail is the scalpel by which the dancer is separated from her body, so that she can be reassembled by the teacher. "I frequently received verbal corrections addressed to each part of my body in isolation," remembers ballerina Gelsey Kirkland, "figuratively dismembering me and dispelling any semblance of grace" (Kirkland 33).

When the mono-myth of heroic ascension is mapped onto Ashley Merrill's story, the reader of the Ballet Myth can locate a synthesis of light and dark forces in the figure of the ballet teacher, who is both Helper and Shadow Presence. This phenomenon reflects certain peculiarities of the ballet teacher/learner identification process, whereby the master absorbs the identity of the student, which then polarizes into the aspects of the Self that are idealized and those that are disowned. In the ballet classroom the individual is configured by *correctness*, discarding any aspect of her being that falls outside this narrowly prescribed aesthetic. The ones whom society casts as inferior, and therefore in need of reformation, are the most likely to be vulnerable to this process.

The aspects of the self, the body and the being that can't be assigned the value of correctness are disowned by the dancer and collected into the aura of the Shadow Presence, who can carry them back to her in the form of threats and admonitions. Thus in the ballet classroom the student can be blamed and even abused for an incorrect performance. Fused with the dark-

ness of the Shadow Presence is the shadow of the dancer's self-abnegation. In short, she becomes her own enemy. While the dancer constructs an external ideal to enact for the teacher's validation, she also constructs an inner antagonist to conspire with the teacher's dark side. "In the dance world," writes Gretchen Ward Warren in her recent book, *The Art of Teaching Ballet: Ten Twentieth Century Masters*, "of course, it is not unusual for dancers to forgive cruelty or eccentricity in teachers or choreographers if they sense they are in the presence of greatness" (184).

During a ballet class, the student projects herself into the teacher, and she also projects herself into the mirror as a screen which frames the Ballet Myth, forming a kind of self-policing gaze that merges with the omnipotent gaze of the Helper/Shadow Presence to colonize her body and her being. The conscious dancer lives out a sense of incorrectness and strives for an ideal correctness, which can only be awarded to her by the omniscient teacher/mirror. However, this process is hazardous to the soul:

To the extent that a dancer becomes a complacent reflection, he or she does not learn how to test beauty, how to discover its inner life. In this way, the mirror can trap a dancer's soul, ultimately breaking creative spirit. Such a dancer is created, but does not know how to create. (Kirkland 73, my emphasis)

The final product, glittering on the ballet stage, is the successful narcissist having a fulfilling and intimate romance with her teacher/mirror-self. "The relationship between the dancer and her mirror image," writes Kirkland, "is an intimacy of extraordinary power and potentially perilous consequence" (73).

The body in our culture is often linked to the feminine as a lower form of being, and ballet is a process that can elevate this feminine body into a higher state. "Ballet a woman's world?" asks Sigrid Nunez, in *A Feather on the Breath of God*:

But it was men who invented ballet—and the ballerina. It is men who put her feet in those shoes, and who take the food out of her mouth. All this to get the desired creature, more boy than woman, a kind of third sex—could it really be?—a woman with a penis, a woman capable of an erection. (Nunez 115)

Thus, little girls who feel outcast by the male-dominated society can go through a glass darkly into the miraculous world of ballet, and be *corrected*. Joan Blackmer, the Jungian analyst, writes:

I remember, when I was one of a class of rank beginners, being told by the teacher never to expect any help whatsoever from our bodies. The body, appallingly subject to the pull of gravity—the Great Goddess at her most insistent—longs to sit still, to sink into its mother soil. It reacts with pain, lethargy, obstinacy to the efforts of the dancer to move and train it. From the very start of dance training one is torn between the opposites of the body's lethargy and the ego's will. (Blackmer 26-28)

According to this doctrine, the body—with its appalling relationship to gravity—is the dancer's burden, it is her enemy, and must be lifted up into a realm of higher values by extraordinary measures.

This calls for heroic efforts on the part of both dancer and teacher, creating the ballet class as a proving ground for heroic ascension. In *Syncope: The Philosophy of Rapture*, Catherine Clément writes, "I recall having heard a very young choreographer explaining in disjointed words why she had come up with the idea of having her dancers dance along a wall, vertically. There is no longer any other way to reach the sky, she said, there is no longer any other way to rejoin something like a god" (230). Over the course of three centuries, ballet has conserved a technology that rationalizes the divine right of kings.

In support of this, Balanchine tells us in his inspirational Preface to *101 Stories of the Great Ballets*, that "The arts point to the glories we might attain as human beings, perfecting as they do God-given gifts some are lucky to have" (Balanchine and Mason x). Balanchine, as we have seen, was able to play his part in this script to the hilt, appearing to the young dancers in his school as a god-like entity with magical powers. Clément goes on to write that "Another dancer said without hesitating for a second: 'it is like the salt in food. It is the pebble in your shoe, the obstacle.' If, within the moral norms that are imposed on us, it is a matter above all of getting over obstacles and of overcoming resistance, dance on the contrary glorifies and sublimates the obstacle" (Clément 231).

The Glorified Obstacle is the key to the discourse of ballet, and is reproduced in the ballet classroom by the teacher's use of language. "Nobody knows how to stand," is just one example. In Warren's *The Art of Teaching Ballet*, there are hundreds. In today's ballet classroom, there are thousands. The dance student must struggle relentlessly against these Glorified Obstacles, which are more than just the physical challenges faced by an ordinary worker.

An illustration of the Glorified Obstacle and its importance in the construction of the Ballet Myth can be found in the Hans Christian Andersen tale of *The Princess and the Pea*. The pea is the Glorified Obstacle, manifested in the discourse of ballet by a scrupulous attention to the Almighty

Detail. "For the disciplined man, as for the true believer," writes Foucault, "no detail is unimportant, but not so much for the meaning that it conceals within it as for the hold it provides for the power that wishes to seize it" (Foucault 140). "Details make the difference between the amateur and the professional, and between the professional and the artist," says contemporary ballet teacher, Larisa Sklyanskaya (Warren 193). "She has an incredible eye," says a student quoted in Warren about her ballet teacher, "and will find nuances and details to bring out an individual's personality and technique" (84).

Who owns the nuances and the details of the dance performance? The teacher or the learner? The performance of dance and language intersect, since the dancer can no more be conscious of all of the nuances and details that make up a successful performance than a speaker can be conscious of all the rules of grammar and pronunciation that combine to produce a successful spoken communication. The language student takes possession of the information that is presented to her in class so that she may use it to put across her own message. However, in ballet, the teacher remains in sole possession of ballet information. She seizes the Almighty Detail for the sake of the power it gives her. Ownership of ballet information remains a privilege bestowed by higher powers upon the worthy, the chosen ones. The teacher/choreographer performs, using the student as a mouthpiece. The dancer has nothing to say for herself, she is the trained soldier who marches in step.

"Balanchine's disciples still speak of his ballets as being dancer proof," writes Gelsey Kirkland. His ballets are "dancer proof" because the dancer is a living VCR who records and plays back the movements in a way that completely bypasses her own creative process. She is reciting, not speaking. "Balanchine's conception of the human form was essentially mechanical. The body was a machine to be assembled" (Kirkland 185). This conception of the body as something mechanical that must be policed by the teacher permeates the Ballet Myth. "When you move you belong to the world of physics and mechanics, just like any other machinery," says Gabriela Taub-Darvash (Warren 88).

Dance, like language, has existed in every civilization since the dawn of recorded history. It is a natural and necessary expression of the human spirit. In 1662, Louis XIV recognized dance as a way to cultivate the body and harness its "decorum and resourcefulness" in the service of "the Nation." On the other hand, the body has an innate wisdom, a *dance instinct*. "I believe that the dance instinct inside of young students must be encouraged," says ballet teacher Anne Williams, "then, very slowly, you add the

medicine" (Warren 263). The dance instinct is diseased, it needs the medicine of ballet training; the body is a machine for the choreographers in their dancer-proof works. "The individual body becomes an element that may be placed, moved, articulated on others," writes Foucault (164).

Every ballet student must subscribe to the glorification of the detail in the context of an anxiety about time that penetrates her life: the pressure to start young, the relentlessly ticking biological clock, musical time, classes and schedules and contests and curtains that go up and down like clockwork. Most of all there is the cry of the ballet teacher: "There's never enough time!" mourns Christiane Vaussard (Warren 237). "There is *never* enough time!" yells Larisa Sklyanskaya (Warren 175). "Time penetrates the body and with it all the meticulous controls of power," writes Foucault (151-52). "This means that one must seek to intensify the use of the slightest moment, as if time, in its very fragmentation, were inexhaustible" (Foucault 154).

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Memory as Construction in Viollet-le-Duc's Architectural Imagination

Aron S. Vinegar

The nineteenth-century architect and theorist Eugène Viollet-le-Duc made a lasting impact on France's memory of its architectural past—and its imagination of an architecture of the future—through his restorations of numerous Gothic structures for France's state-run Monuments Historiques. Not surprisingly, he had a sophisticated conceptual, methodological, and practical understanding of the role of memory and imagination in historical investigation. This understanding is never explicitly discussed in scholarly commentary on Viollet-le-Duc, yet it is fundamental for his entire theory and practice of architectural restoration.

In his *Entretiens sur l'Architecture*, a series of lectures published in two volumes beginning in 1863, Viollet-le-Duc offers a meta-methodological explanation of the roles memory and imagination play in epistemological inquiry.¹ Viollet-le-Duc was directly inspired by D'Alembert's "Preliminary Discourse" to the first volume of the *Encyclopédie* and Voltaire's discussion of Passive and Active Imagination in his *Philosophical Dictionary*.² Included in D'Alembert's "Preliminary Discourse" was a genealogical tree of knowledge—the famous *Système figuré des connaissances humaines*. The *Système figuré* was divided into three faculties which gave rise to three major divisions of knowledge: Memory, which produced history; Reason, which resulted in philosophy and science; and Imagination, which created poetry and the fine arts. These faculties differed from each other according to how they processed sensations: memory received them, reason reflected upon them, and imagination combined them. In the "Preliminary Discourse," D'Alembert provides a detailed commentary on each of the three faculties, their interaction, and order of operation within the mind, a formula which Viollet-le-Duc followed closely.³

Viollet-le-Duc insists throughout the *Entretiens* that in architecture there is no invention *ex-nihilo*, "we must necessarily have recourse to the past in order to originate in the present" (Lecture VI, 173). Memory, the first faculty to be exercised, involved recalling sensations or ideas passively received by the mind. Viollet-le-Duc—like Voltaire and D'Alembert—uses the term "passive imagination" for this process rather than the word "memory" and believed that although passive imagination alone could not create, it was the fundamental basis of creative imagination. Active imagination is the next faculty to come into play. According to Viollet-le-Duc it was "nothing

more than the application of reasoning to the passive imagination”(174). Active imagination compares, chooses, and orders what the passive imagination—memory—presents in a confused mass. As Viollet-le-Duc noted, “In order to originate, judgment must arrange the elements gathered by the passive imagination”(174). Thus, active imagination was the analytic step leading to synthesis or creative imagination.

Viollet-le-Duc sums up the interaction of the passive and active imagination in his example of the centaur in the first and sixth *Entretiens*: “the passive imagination of a Greek presents the idea of a man on a horse; his active imagination suggests the combination of the two in a single being; reason shows him how to weld the torso of the one to the breast of the other: he creates a centaur, and this creation has style for us as well as the Greeks”(177).⁴ Viollet-le-Duc’s use of the centaur, the most extreme example of a fantastic entity generated from imagination and lacking an objective correlate in the real world, continued a long line of philosophico-epistemological commentary on such chimeras extending back to John Locke.⁵ Viollet-le-Duc understood the figure of the centaur as the perfect model of an impossible being, which, if given the coherence and organization of a real biological entity, was classifiable “as if” it was indeed a natural kind existing “out there,” independent of the consciousness that had conceived it.⁶

The imagination conceives the centaur, but the artist is responsible for giving an air of reality to this fiction: “his reasoning faculty has led him to observe how the different parts of an animal are united and welded together; he will therefore join the vertebral column of a man with that of the horse, the shoulders of the horse will give place to the hips of the man. He joins the abdomen of the man to the breast of the quadruped with such perfect address the most experienced critic would imagine he was contemplating a correct and delicate study from nature”(Lecture I, 25-26). For Viollet-le-Duc, an understanding of anatomical structure and physiological organization was the marker of any creation’s life-like status. By constructing such an internal structure, Viollet-le-Duc notes, “the impossible becomes so like reality that even now we think of the centaur as living and moving; [it is] as well known to us as the dog or the cat”(26).⁷ Viollet-le-Duc believed that the centaur (picture) had become so legible and coherent that it now existed independently of its radically subjective production; it had acquired an objective stability and repeatability verging on the scientific. Centaurs were now “classifiable” entities with distinct properties that could thus potentially generate further knowledge: a body of information that could be inter-subjectively shared, rather than intra-subjectively imagined.

Viollet-le-Duc's contemporary in England, John Ruskin, provides a similar example with his "True and False Griffins" in volume three of *Modern Painters* (1846-60) (104-11). The "true" Lombardic Griffin is made through such a convincing union of both horse and eagle that it appears to have been generated naturally from within, rather than artificially composed from without.⁸ According to Ruskin, the imagination creates the griffin "as if [my emphasis] it were gathering up the bones of the real creature out of some ancient rock"(109).

In Viollet-le-Duc's drawings for Pierrefonds (Figs. 1, 2), a chateau restored for Napoleon III, both real and chimerical creatures are rendered with striking white highlights which provide an underlying anatomical structure to their surface appearance.



Figure 1




Figure 2

These drawings display an internal structure—a syntax—that is not only achieved through patient observation of real organisms, but also through an experimental imagination that probes or dissects beneath the surface of representation in order to produce new knowledge.⁹ As Claude Bernard, the great experimental physiologist and contemporary of the architect, noted, "With the help of active experimental science, man becomes an inventor of phenomena, a real foreman of creation"(18). Gothic architecture—which was previously maligned or romanticized as incoherent and mystical—is analytically dissected and imaginatively shown by Viollet-le-Duc to have an internal structure and order equivalent to any living organism. Through dissective strategies of presentation, Viollet-le-Duc could re-member Gothic architecture "as if" it was a completely scientific and rational structure. His drawings for Pierrefonds are but two specific examples of Viollet-le-Duc's systematic, graphic re-imagination of Gothic architecture.

The most effective and sustained application of Viollet-le-Duc's dialectic between dis-membering and re-membering occurs in the illustrations—better yet, demonstrations—found in his ten volume *Dictionnaire Raisonné*

of French Gothic architecture, published between 1854 and 1868).¹⁰ The *Dictionnaire* was the amalgamation of all his experience restoring Gothic architecture for the Monuments Historiques; it was the locus not only for his observations about the architectural past but also for his belief in the French Gothic as a laboratory for future architectural creation. The anatomical analogy is the guiding metaphor of the *Dictionnaire*: to cut, separate, and imaginatively synthesize the structures of Gothic architecture is the *modus operandi* of his most famous text.¹¹ In particular, Viollet-le-Duc was influenced by the conceptual and graphic practices of the famous comparative anatomist, Georges Cuvier. Cuvier's practice offered the most sophisticated example of dissective methodology as applied to the study, excavation, and reconstruction of extinct fossil vertebrates: a methodology that Viollet-le-Duc imaginatively adapted for his own architectural investigations and restorations.

In the entry on "Restoration" in the *Dictionnaire*, Viollet-le-Duc specifically acknowledges his debt to Georges Cuvier: "Cuvier, by means of his studies of comparative anatomy, as well as his geological research, unveiled to the public almost literally from one day to the next a very long history of the world" ("Restoration," *Foundations* 197). Cuvier's "unveiling" of history was at the heart of his radical departure from the old order of natural history. His move from a Linnean taxonomy—based on external character traits—to a classification centered on the internal functions of the biological organism, initiated a paradigm shift from natural history to a history of nature. As Foucault noted in the *The Order of Things*: "From Cuvier onward it is life in its non-perceptible purely functional aspects that provides the basis for the exterior possibility of classification . . . the possibility of classification now arises from the depths of life, from those elements most hidden from view"(268).

Following Cuvier's example, the restoration and classification of France's architectural past—under the guidance of Viollet-le-Duc—would henceforth be predicated on internal structures and functions rather than a taxonomy of external and historical forms. Viollet-le-Duc specifically indicated that although the architect responsible for restoration must be familiar with the style and form of the building he is restoring, more importantly, he must know "the structure, anatomy, and temperament of the building" ("Restoration," *Foundations* 216). For Cuvier and Viollet-le-Duc, the primary means of revealing the interior structure of the biological or architectural organism was dissection. Viollet-le-Duc's Cuvierian amalgamation of dissective methodology, anatomy, and physiological explanation is neatly summed up in the preface to the *Dictionnaire*, where he states that in order

to understand the complex nature of Gothic architecture and its numerous parts, one must "dissect, as it were, each building, as well as describing the functions and applications of all the component parts" (vi).

If Viollet-le-Duc was going to implement anatomico-physiological strategies to maximum effect in the *Dictionnaire*, he would have to inscribe them not only conceptually and textually, but also visually. The spatial relationships of anatomy were best conveyed by visual means. As Cuvier often noted, the functional relationship of organs was a physiological coordination rather than a geometrical juxtaposition (Coleman 68). Viollet-le-Duc utilized the techniques of representation from anatomy itself because the strict architectural set of plan, elevation, and section was exactly the type of geometrical abstraction inimical to both his physiological interpretation of Gothic architecture and to his valorization of what Foucault has called the *regard médical*: the increasingly analytic gaze of nineteenth century science.

In addition, I would suggest that it was also anatomy's graphic capabilities to direct the viewer's gaze, and hence knowledge of the object presented, that Viollet-le-Duc found so attractive. Anatomy and its graphic representation is, by its very definition, an active critical process involving the cutting, separating, and exposing of certain organs for display at the expense of others. By inscribing the anatomical metaphor within his architectural drawings, Viollet-le-Duc could filter the viewer's conception of Gothic architecture through his own appropriation of anatomy's selective methods of representation. Thus the *Dictionnaire* operates as an *imagination technology*: it is an instrument for the extension of imagining or visualizing activities through the selective amplification and suppression of matter, form, and content.¹² The images in the *Dictionnaire* are never merely a reflection of a historical entity called Gothic architecture but rather a critical element in the construction of that history.

The two large-scale exploded views of a vault springing (Fig. 3) and a portion of a nave wall construction from *Notre-Dame at Dijon* (Fig. 4) are the most obvious examples of Viollet-le-Duc's novel drawing techniques and are emblematic of the visual strategies implemented throughout the *Dictionnaire*. There is no precedent for the exploded view in the tradition of academic architectural drawing; however, it has a long tradition in anatomical and machine drawing dating back to the sixteenth century.¹³ The exploded view reappeared with renewed vigor in nineteenth century anatomical illustration due, in no small part, to Cuvier's use of it to demonstrate his system of classification based on function.



Figure 3



Figure 4

Dorinda Outram's pertinent observation that Cuvier's *Gallery of Comparative Anatomy* at the Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle was full of objects to be looked not at, but into, probably refers to the striking number of skeletal parts displayed *démontées* and *separées* (175-76).¹⁴ Exploded skulls (Fig. 6) and vertebrae (Fig. 5) were pried apart, each bone separated from the next by metal rods. They encouraged the visitor to compare, contrast, and look into the differences and resemblances between species according to the functional properties of each bone, and the functional interrelationship of each bone within individual specimens. Cuvier's exploded views were quickly adopted by functional anatomists such as Jean-Marc Bourgery (Fig. 7), whose anatomical atlas was owned by Viollet-le-Duc and reviewed twice by Étienne Delécluze, Viollet-le-Duc's uncle.¹⁵




Figure 5

The materiality of Bourgery's finely dissected parts were characterized by Delécluze as *vérités palpables*, palpable truths ("Des travaux anatomiques" 210). Prosper Mérimée characterized Viollet-le-Duc's images for the *Dictionnaire* in similar terms: "The plates . . . thus render the descriptions palpable" (216); and further, "it's as if reality was substituted for convention" (217).



Figure 6



Figure 7

Viollet-le-Duc's exploded views (Figs. 3, 4) "showed" the organic interrelation of adjacent parts where each element that carried a load maintained its own independent function and could be freely compressed. With Viollet-le-Duc's visual and textual guidance, the reader/viewer, in an act of participatory cognition, reconnected the exploded masonry and in the process reenacted how the stress and strain of the vaults was transmitted down and out to the buttresses. Each stone in the springing of the vault served a definite purpose and related to the next in an organic union of interacting forces. Because Viollet-le-Duc believed medieval architecture embodied and distilled the principles of nature, he considered it a veritable "architectural organism" ("Style," *Foundations* 259).

Thus the exploded view "figured" a fundamental concept for Cuvier, Bourgery, and Viollet-le-Duc: natural kinds. The concept of natural kinds posits that there are divisions, gaps, or orderings in nature that exist independently of our conceptualization of them. Philosophical parlance often

describes natural kinds as “cleaving nature at the joints.” This unfortunate phrase taken from Plato, though inaccurate, does serve a point. It appears that it is difficult to avoid speaking of natural kinds in anything but metaphorical terms—to describe nature as a vertebrate dissected at its articulations.¹⁶ Viollet-le-Duc conflates literal description and metaphoric analogy by inscribing the exploded view directly into his drawings; the drawings collapse the semantic space necessary for the technique of metaphor. The *metaphorical* vertebrae become the *literal* backbone of his Gothic architecture (Fig. 4), and the reader/viewer is encouraged to scientifically analyze the structure “as if” it were a real organism by the instructions in the adjacent text: “Let’s dissect this construction piece by piece” (“Construction,” *Dictionnaire* 140).¹⁷

In a striking visual contrast to the paradigm of graphic dissection in the *Dictionnaire*, Viollet-le-Duc also synthesized features from numerous Gothic cathedrals into ideal typologies. Viollet-le-Duc’s entry on “Restoration” in the *Dictionnaire* begins with the following highly epigrammatic—and enigmatic—summation of his views on architectural restoration: “To Restore an edifice means neither to maintain it, nor to repair it, nor to rebuild it; it means to establish it in a finished state, which may in fact never have actually existed at a given time” (“Restoration,” *Foundations* 195). The ultimate visual embodiment of Viollet-le-Duc’s statement is the bird’s-eye view of the “Ideal Cathedral” (Fig. 8) in volume two of the *Dictionnaire*. As Barry Bergdoll has noted, Viollet-le-Duc created “an ideal invented composite, a perfect Gothic cathedral as such as even the Middle Ages had failed to realize in a single building”(251). However, like Viollet-le-Duc’s centaur, this imaginative construction is intended to produce real inter-subjectively shared knowledge even though it does not correspond to any known Gothic structure in existence.

The process that led to Viollet-le-Duc’s “Ideal cathedral” involved a similar idealizing process on a smaller scale. Each individual Gothic monument was graphically restored to its supposed original state according to the purity of its ideal-type, worked out by Viollet-le-Duc in terms of regional schools of architecture (“Architecture,” *Foundations* 79).¹⁸ Such an idealizing composite figure is also a prominent feature in Cuvier’s fossil reconstructions and Bourguery’s practice of functional anatomy. Bourguery, in the first volume of his anatomical atlas, explains that he created an ideal human body type in order to facilitate comparison between all anatomical elements in the atlas (*Traité complet* 3).¹⁹ As Lorraine Daston and Peter Gallison have

noted, "The purpose of these atlases was and is to standardize the observing subjects and observed objects of the discipline by eliminating idiosyncracies" (84-85).



Figure 8

The comparative method initiated by Cuvier and adopted by Bourgery and Viollet-le-Duc was a procedure for eliciting the secrets held by empirical data. The ultimate goal was to subsume the constant flux and variation

of phenomenal data to law-like statements. Thus, the interpretive act involved in constructing the ideal type—the differentiating of the perfect from the accidental or variable—was never seen as a submission to subjectivity, but rather as a bulwark against it. Like Cuvier or Bourguery, Viollet-le-Duc's exhaustive anatomical exploration of the Gothic monument was only possible through the matrix of ideal typologies. Therefore, there is no real dichotomy between dissective analysis and imaginative synthesis in the *Dictionnaire* (Figs. 3, 8)—one cannot function without the other. In Viollet-le-Duc's method, the construction of ideal types allowed him to explore the minutiae of each structural element with law-like confidence, and the dissection of each element in the Gothic structure provided—or perhaps confirmed—the knowledge for the construction of those ideal-types.²⁰

Viollet-le-Duc's graphic restorations problematize any clear distinctions between fact and theory, analysis and construction, scientific objectivity and creative imagination. Viollet-le-Duc's approach to the architectural past was not about reclamation or revival, but an act of critical imagination—an analysis that distilled and transformed the material structures of the past into new “relevant kinds” of architecture for the present. Viollet-le-Duc's incessant probing of Gothic architecture in the *Dictionnaire Raisoné* constructed a scientific body of architectural knowledge, the critical and rhetorical power of which continues to influence our understanding of the architectural past and present to this day.

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Notes

¹ Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, *Entretiens sur l'architecture*, 2 vols. (Paris: A. Morel et Cie., 1863-1872), particularly the first and sixth Entretiens. All English quotations are taken from the translation by Benjamin Bucknall, *Discourses on Architecture*, 2 vols. (New York: Grove Press, 1959).

² Jean le Rond D'Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*, trans. Richard N. Schwab (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963); Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary*, 2 vols., trans. Peter Gay (New York: Basic Books, 1962) is footnoted by Viollet-le-Duc in Lecture VI, p.174. Voltaire also wrote the article “Imagination” in vol. 8, pp.560-63, of Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*. Viollet-le-Duc appears to have drawn upon all three sources for his understanding of memory and imagination in the *Entretiens*.

³ D'Alembert, *Preliminary Discourse*, pp.50-53 and 143-55. Considering Viollet-le-Duc's careful reading of D'Alembert's commentary, it is hardly surprising that Viollet-le-Duc incorporated part of the title and much of the conceptual organization of Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisoné des Sciences, des Arts, et des Métiers*, 17 vols. (Paris and Neuchâtel, 1751-1780) into his own ten-volume *Dictionnaire Raisoné de l'architecture française du Xe au XVe siècle*, 10 vols. (Paris: Bance and A. Morel, 1854-1868).

⁴Viollet-le-Duc provides a more detailed discussion of the centaur in Lecture 1, pp.25-26.

⁵See John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Niddich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). For centaurs see bk.3, chap.3, p.420, and bk. 3, chap.10, pp. 506-07; the two related chapters on "mixed modes" are bk. 2, chap. 22, pp. 288-95, and bk. 2, chap. 5, pp. 428-38. Of the numerous philosophical commentaries on chimeras and mixed modes in Locke's work and beyond, I found the following particularly helpful: Michael Ayers, *Locke, Volume 2: Ontology* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 80-81; Paul de Man, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," *On Metaphor*, ed. Sheldon Sacks (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1979), pp.19-20; and John McCumber, *The Company of Words: Hegel, Language, and Systematic Philosophy* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern UP, 1993), pp. 279-89.

⁶Hans Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of "As if," a System of the Theoretical, Practical, and Religious Fictions of Mankind*, trans. C. K. Ogden (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & Co., 1925). For a sophisticated interpretation of fiction in Vaihinger's philosophy of "as if" see Wolfgang Iser, *The Fictive and the Imaginary: Charting Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993), pp.130-52. The relation between fiction and natural kinds—two seemingly polar opposites—is at the essence of my argument in this paper. I provide a more detailed discussion of natural kinds at a later point in the paper.

⁷The passage continues: "The physiologist—Cuvier in hand—comes and proves that this creature, which you know as well as if you had seen it running in the woods, could never have existed—that scientifically it is a chimera—that it could neither walk nor digest—that its two pairs of lungs and its two hearts are the most ridiculous of suppositions. Which would be the barbarian, the savant or the Greek sculptor? Neither: but the criticism of the savant shows us that Art and the knowledge of facts—Art and Science—Art and Civilization—may hold their course utterly apart. What matters it to me as an artist that a man of science proves to me that such a being cannot exist, if I have the consciousness of its existence; if I am familiar with its gait and its habits; if my imagination pictures it in the forests; if I endow it with passions and instincts? Why rob me of my centaur? What will the man of science have gained when he has proved to me that I am taking chimeras for realities? Most certainly the Greeks of Aristotle's time knew enough of anatomy to be aware that a centaur could not actually exist; but they respected the Arts in an equal degree with Science, and would not suffer the one to destroy the other..."

⁸See Stephen Bann's commentary on Ruskin's "True and False Griffins" in his introduction to *Frankenstein, Creation, and Monstrosity*, ed. Stephen Bann (London: Reaktion Books Ltd., 1994), pp. 5-6. Bann states that "what is being vindicated [in the example of the "True and False Griffins"] is the psychological truth of an aesthetic effect that is also, and crucially, the result of patient and clear-sighted observation." And the result, I would also add, of imaginative excavation, dissection, and reconstruction as the following quote from Ruskin indicates.

⁹The best book on experimental realism is Ian Hacking's *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983). Dissection has been the root metaphor for active "experimental" imagination (as opposed to passive observation) since Bacon and Locke.

¹⁰Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, *Dictionnaire Raisoné de l'architecture française du XIe au XVe siècle*, 10 vols. (Paris: Bance and A.Morel, 1854-1868). I have also drawn on the English translations of a few key entries from the *Dictionnaire* in *The Foundations of Architecture: Selections from the Dictionnaire Raisoné*, intro. Barry Bergdoll and trans. Kenneth D. Whitehead (New York: George Braziller, 1990). All other English translations are my own.

¹¹See my "Architecture under the Knife: Viollet-le-Duc's Illustrations for the *Dictionnaire Raisoné* and the Anatomical Representation of Architectural Knowledge," M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1995.

¹²My understanding of “imagining technologies” is inspired by Patrick Maynard’s *The Engine of Visualization: Thinking Through Photography* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997); however, for the larger issue of “deletion and supplementation” in “worldmaking” see Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1978), pp. 14-16.

¹³I have provided a more in-depth account of the historical development of the exploded view in my M.A. thesis, *Architecture under the Knife*. See footnote 11.

¹⁴J.P.F. Deleuze’s *Histoire et Description du Muséum d’Histoire Naturelle*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1823), pp. 670-72., lists extensive numbers of exploded skulls, hands, and feet in Cuvier’s Gallery of Comparative Anatomy.

¹⁵Jean-Marc Bourgery, *Traité complet de l’anatomie de l’homme, comprenant la médecine opératoire, par M. le Dr. J.M. Bourgery, avec planches lithographiées d’après nature, par N.H. Jacobs*, 8 vols. (Paris: C.A. Delaunay, 1831-1854). Étienne-Jean Delécluze’s reviews appeared under the following titles: “Des travaux anatomiques de M. le Docteur Bourgery,” *Revue de Paris* 3 ser. 17 (Mai 1840a), p. 210, and “Traité complet de l’anatomie de l’homme, comprenant la Médecine opératoire par M. le docteur Bourgery, avec planches lithographiées d’après nature, par N.H. Jacob,” *Feuilleton du Journal des Débats* (15 Novembre 1834). Aside from the *Traité complet*, Viollet-le-Duc owned Bourgery’s *Exposé philosophique du système nerveux* (Paris, 1844) and *Anatomie microscopique de la rate dans l’homme et les mammifères* (Paris, 1843).

¹⁶This quote and the following are taken from Mérimée’s review of volume one of the *Dictionnaire* which appeared in *Le Moniteur universel*, samedi 30 décembre 1854.

¹⁷Hilary Kornblith, *Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground: An Essay in Naturalistic Epistemology* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 15. See also Ian Hacking’s informative articles on natural kinds: “Natural Kinds,” *Perspectives on Quine*, eds. Robert B. Barrett and Roger F. Gibson (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 129-41; and “A Tradition of Natural Kinds,” *Philosophical Studies* 61 (1991), pp. 109-26. Hacking makes it clear that the concept of natural kinds was revived by the classificatory sciences—primarily biology—in the 19th century.

¹⁸The striking use of the scientific imperative (let’s) and ostensive language (this) in this short sentence is, in fact, ubiquitous throughout the *Dictionnaire*.

¹⁹Viollet-le-Duc classified the high Gothic churches into the following regional schools: Ile-de-France, Champagne, Picardy, Burgundy, Anjou and Maine, and Normandy.

²⁰The ideal body is a thirty year-old Caucasian male “doué des plus heureuses proportions.”

²¹Whether this is a vicious or productive methodological circle is still debated within the scholarship on Viollet-le-Duc.

²²Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*, p. 10: “I say ‘relevant’ rather than ‘natural’ for two reasons: first, ‘natural’ is an inapt term to cover not only biological species but such artificial kinds as musical works, psychological experiments, and types of machinery (including *imagination technologies* such as Viollet-le-Duc’s Gothic Architecture); and second, ‘natural’ suggests some absolute categorical or psychological priority, while the kinds in question are rather habitual or traditional or devised for new purposes.”

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Clichés of Unity: History and Memory in Postwar French Film

Marc Siegel

The final scene of Claude Autant-Lara's 1947 film, *Le diable au corps*, takes place at Marthe's funeral. As the pallbearers carry her coffin down the church steps, they hear the bells, raise their heads, and smile. The bells ring out peace, the Armistice, thus the end of World War I. But for François, Marthe's lover, who hovers in the background, the funeral is not a day for rejoicing. "Go hang your flags!" he shouts as he retreats into the darkness of the church. His personal grief, however, is no match for the pallbearers' joy. In the foreground of the image, they continue walking into the light of day (the brightness of the country's future?), while François, with his memories of Marthe, remains in the shadows behind them.

With its juxtaposition of two different orders of commemorative events, Marthe's funeral and Armistice Day, this overdetermined image can serve as a starting point for a consideration of the complex relationship between history and memory in postwar French film. After World War II, French society was divided by internal conflicts stemming from competing opinions about the war, the Occupation, Vichy, and the Resistance. According to Henry Rousso, the bitter experiences under the Nazi Occupation and the Vichy Regime resuscitated a history of ideological differences among the French people dating as far back as the Revolution. Of these various "*guerre[s] franco-française[s]*," the Occupation has remained the most divisive, as a result largely, though not exclusively, of the significance of the home-grown Vichy regime. As Rousso notes, "civil wars have always been the hardest to deal with afterward, for in a foreign war the enemy goes home when hostilities end—in a civil war the 'enemy' remains" (8). De Gaulle's triumphant return to France in 1944 was in itself insufficient cause for the unification of the country after such a hostile civil war. Whence the emergence and importance of what Rousso calls the "Gaullist resistancialist myth," a unifying vision for the country with the "unavowed objective [of presenting] an interpretation of the past in light of the urgent needs of the present" (18). This myth served in part to subsume the bitter personal differences among the French beneath the image of an eternal France united in resistance to external enemies.

Made soon after De Gaulle's return, *Le diable au corps* is an adaptation of Raymond Radiguet's 1923 novel by the prolific "tradition of quality" screenwriters Jean Aurenche and Pierre Bost. The novel is a remembrance of the

adolescent narrator's torrid love affair with an older soldier's wife during World War I. Claude Autant-Lara has explained that he was led to make the film because he saw Radiguet's book as an "anti-war novel" (qtd. in Truffaut 236). Instead of making an anti-war film, one that could explicitly draw attention to the complexity of emotions raised by World War II, Autant-Lara retained the time period of the Radiguet novel. His turn to the past, however unwittingly, exemplifies one of the central components of the resistancialist myth, the assertion of a "thirty years' war." By forging a link between the two wars, Gaullism attempted to suppress the disparate personal memories of the Occupation in favor of the more unified image of World War I remembrance—Armistice Day (Rouso 22).

Marthe's funeral scene, as described above, depicts the occurrence of two different commemorative events, the funeral and Armistice Day, indicating two different orders of memory, personal and national. In a crucial departure from the novel, the film joins in one image these two competing relationships with the past. In fact the desire for some kind of unification of memory within history was apparently so great that the filmmakers created Marthe's funeral scene (nonexistent in the novel) and set it on Armistice Day. This can be viewed as an attempt to remember Marthe's death, and the death of her relationship with François, through the lens of the Armistice. More specifically, it can be seen as an effort to suppress personal memory in favor of history. As Pierre Nora notes, "history is perpetually suspicious of memory and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it" (9).

This Gaullist revisionism runs counter to the interests of the novel within which the order of personal memory, specifically childhood memory, reigns.

In spite of appearances, however, nothing in the world has the power to age us, and it was as a child that I took part in the adventure which a grown man might well have found confusing. I was not the only one. My comrades will retain of that epoch a memory unlike that of their elders. Let those already hostile to me consider what the war meant to many very young boys: a four year holiday. (9)

From the perspective of the twelve-year-old narrator, the war offered great liberties. His parents and schoolmasters, conveniently distracted by the grave events, did not pay such close attention to his comings and goings. Thus his relationship with Marthe and his corresponding series of trancies were allowed to flourish. The intensity of the narrator's personal concerns was such that even the collective celebration on the occasion of the Armistice could not distract him from his "four year holiday."

I must confess that this rejoicing inspired me with little envy. I considered that I alone was capable of feeling emotions which are attributed to the crowd. I looked for patriotism, but in my unfairness, perhaps, I saw only the gaiety of the unexpected furlough . . . This spectacle, which I had thought would distress me, or make me jealous, or even infect me with the contagion of a sublime emotion, seemed as dull to me as any Saint Catherine's day. (135)

The novel, with its depiction of a dull Armistice unable to infect the narrator's emotions, differs from the film in which the first signs of peace are celebrated precisely *for* their ability to disrupt the couple's union. Leaving Marthe's house after peace has been declared, François is chastised by the landlords. Laughing at him, they place their flags into position outside their window. Though Marthe's neighbors had previously expressed their disapproval of her adulterous relationship by turning their heads, they now do so by displaying their flags. Thus what was previously a moral conflict in a small town has taken on national proportions. Separating the couple has become a patriotic gesture.

Cloaked in patriotism, this attack on Marthe's sexual relationship by fellow French citizens raises the specter of France's postwar purge, in which women were publicly humiliated as punishment for their sexual relationships with the Germans. The juxtaposition of Marthe's funeral scene with Armistice Day thus takes on connotations specific to World War II. For her death may be read as a punishment for her wartime sexual relationship with not an external but an internal enemy. In this reading of the film, Marthe's death appears to be a necessary sacrifice that paves the way for the nation's future.

As expressed in the novel, however, Marthe's death is linked instead to the future of the couple's child. "In the end order takes things in hand. Had I not just learned that Marthe had died calling for me, and that my son would have a reasonable life?" (144). This order which organizes the events of memory into some kind of timeless meaning ("my son [will] have a reasonable life"), is not the order of patriotism, or Gaullism, which emerges in the film. Yet, both means of transmitting memories from one generation to another—the metaphysical order invoked by Radiguet's narrator and the Gaullist myth reflected in the film—are relics of the past, according to Pierre Nora:

We have seen the end of societies that had long assured the transmission and conservation of collectively remembered values, whether through churches or schools, the family or the state; the end too of ideologies that prepared a smooth passage from the past to the future or that had indicated what the future should keep from the past—whether for reaction, progress, or even revolution. (7)

Order can no longer be expected to “take things in hand” because memories are not so easily gathered together. They escape containment and instead secrete themselves within what Nora calls *lieux de mémoire*, or symbolic, material, and functional sites of memory.

The Gaullist desire for unity in the face of conflict and ambiguity is perhaps what Gilles Deleuze refers to as the “properly French ‘dream’” which hindered the creation of a new cinematographic image in postwar France (*Cinema I* 211). Seeking a smooth passage from the past to the future, French cinema attempted to reconstruct what Nora might call *milieux de mémoire*, or “real environments of memory” (7). In *Le diable au corps*, for example, the relationship between the present and the past is not mediated by *lieux de mémoire*. Instead, these different temporalities are united within individual consciousness as signaled by the use of the flashback. The flashback, often used in New Wave films to emphasize a disjuncture between past and present—the films of Alain Resnais are exemplary in this regard—is employed by Autant-Lara to suggest the possibility of an unbroken continuity between memory and experience. The subject thereby remains intact as the transmitter of memory from one discrete present to another. Without any intermediary between memory and experience, the “spatio-temporal coordinates which were left over from the old Social Realism” remained dominant (Deleuze, *Cinema I* 213).

The *Cahiers du Cinéma* critics also bemoaned the inability of French postwar cinema to create a new image. François Truffaut, for instance, in his diatribe against the “tradition of quality” films, points to Jean Aurenche and Pierre Bost’s theory of equivalence as one stumbling block. By substituting equivalent scenes in the screen adaptation for presumably unfilmable ones in the original, Aurenche and Bost privilege, according to Truffaut, the literary idea over the *mise-en-scène*. These equivalent scenes are only ways “of resolving on the soundtrack problems that concern the image, plundering in order to no longer obtain anything on the screen but scholarly framing, complicated lighting-effects, and ‘polished’ photography” (Truffaut 230). In other words, the tradition of quality directors were simply *metteurs-en-scène*. They created a polished image without developing a new visual style. For Jacques Rivette, this new visual style could only emerge when linked to “a conception of the new world:”

I defy anyone . . . to find any conception of the world in Clouzot’s films, or Becker’s or Clément’s films. At very best it would be a conception of the world that is banal, literary, and twenty or thirty years out of date. (Bazin et al. 34)

By linking the creation of a new image to a conception of a new world, Rivette echoes Deleuze's claims that a new cinema can only come about when the spatio-temporal coordinates of the old world, the old literary realism, are recognized as "out of date."

One of the escape routes from the old world taken up in New Wave films, according to Deleuze, is the "voyage-form" (*Cinema I* 215). In the movements of New Wave narratives, the journeys of the characters through the city or from the city to the provinces, the coordinates of a new world are mapped out. By forging new spaces, the New Wave characters generate as well kinks or breaks in the sensorimotor mechanism which enabled them to function so smoothly in the "old world." Exemplary of the voyage-form is Louis Malle's *Ascenseur pour l'échafaud* (1957), an early New Wave film that depicts two generations of lovers implicated in two different murders.

The movement of the world in *Ascenseur pour l'échafaud* is ironically generated by a central character's immobility (Deleuze, *Cinema II* 60). Julian's murder of his boss, designed to ensure his and his lover's (the boss's wife's) freedom, only leads to his own more severe immobility. When an efficient building attendant turns off the power, Julian finds himself trapped in the elevator. His inability to meet his lover Florence leads her to wander aimlessly throughout the streets, while his abandoned automobile becomes the means by which the young couple, Louis and Véronique, move from the city to the suburban motel. Since the characters cannot be said to generate the reasons for their own actions, they would seem to be implicated in what Deleuze calls "white events, events which never truly concern the person who provokes or is subject to them, even when they strike him in the flesh" (*Cinema I* 207).

For Deleuze, white events occur in a disconnected world where characters' actions do not effectively unify disparate spaces. Though Florence's initial wanderings throughout the city are motivated by a desire to find Julian, her actions only serve to map out the coordinates for a new spatiality of the city, "the city as horizontal or at human height" (*Cinema I* 207). Louis and Véronique's horizontal movement leads them away from the city. In their flight they link up with the German tourists who redirect them to a new space, the motel. Even Julian, though confined to the elevator, etches out the lines for a different, in this case, vertical space, the burrow of the elevator shaft. These chance actions suggest the spatial configurations of a different world, a world in which connections between situations, actions, and reactions are not predictable or formalizable. Without the usual unifying links between movement and action, the only place in this world where one can find unity is within what Deleuze calls "the cliché."

We ask ourselves what maintains a set in this world without totality or linkage. The answer is simple: what forms the set are *clichés*, and nothing else. Nothing but clichés, clichés everywhere ... (*Cinema 1208*)

These clichés, which surround us and invade our psyche, are images or conceptions of the past which circulate in the present. These could be both literal images, like snapshots for instance, or figurative, mental images.

The opening scene of *Ascenseur* establishes the importance of the cliché as a reference point in the film. An extreme close-up of Florence's face introduces her character as she proclaims her love and her desire to join her lover: "You know I'll be there. I'll never leave you." We then cut to Julian also proclaiming his love. The passion expressed by the lovers suggests a physical proximity. Through alternating zooms-out, however, they are each revealed within separate, enclosed spaces—Florence within a phone booth; Julian within a modern high-rise. Their only connection with each other is through the phone lines over which they express a desire to be together. Florence's emphatic demand ("Kiss me!") only reinforces our awareness of the spatial distance between them and calls attention to its incommensurability with their passion. In contrast to *Le diable au corps* where the lovers' expression of passion is coincident with their physical proximity, *Ascenseur* presents us with an image of passionate embrace as an impossibility. The disjunction between Florence and Julian's dialogue and their situation thus reveals this image of lovers as a cliché.

In such a love story it is only appropriate that Florence and Julian's eventual union occurs within the space of another cliché, the photo. After her wanderings, Florence finds herself in darkroom. Here we (and she) encounter(s) the first literal image of the lovers united within a single space and time. A close-up reveals the image appearing within the photographic liquid, while on the soundtrack the detective provides his reading of the photo, namely that it proves their guilt. Visually, this scene recalls the opening moments of the film, as an extreme close-up of Florence's well-lit face in an undifferentiated dark space dominates the screen. As in the scene where she was only linked to Julian by the phone lines and their jointly invoked image of a passionate embrace, her connection to him here is mediated through the photo/cliché. Unable to touch her lover, she contents herself by "reading" the photos with her hands. Revealed in a close-up, her hands arrange the images in the liquid while we hear her attempting to arrange her memories in her head: "I did love you. But we are together. Somewhere. We are together." Florence is so enraptured by the image of passionate love that she ignores the image's signification as proof of her

guilt (for involvement in the plot to murder her husband). This relationship between a photo and the past is not missed by the detective beside her. Nor does it escape Louis who has entered the darkroom in an attempt to recover another photo precisely because he knows that it proves his culpability in the murder of the German tourists.

In contrast to Florence and Julian, the younger generation, Louis and Véronique, displays an acute awareness of the signification of clichés. In our first glimpse of Louis, he is assessing himself and his new leather jacket in a reflection on the wall while Véronique is praising a romanticized image of Julian Tavernier. Noting Tavernier's paramilitary action in Indo-China, North Africa, and the Foreign Legion, his "English chic," and his successful present career as a businessman, Véronique fantasizes about a life she could only "dream of." For Louis, however, these comments, which glorify a continuum between war and business, are "outdated." Later in the film Véronique also reveals a sensitivity to the contemporary function of the cliché. When she realizes that her and Louis' actions, namely stealing cars and killing tourists, will lead to their separation by the police, she takes comfort in the existence of another world, that of newspaper photos: "They'll separate us. We'll only be together on the front page." As their love is inevitably destined to become a cliché, she suggests that they end their own lives in order to generate a caption for the front page photo: "Tragic Lovers." Louis' desire not to "leave any traces," and Véronique's awareness of the power of providing captions for her newspaper photo distinguish them from the older generation that still believes in a smooth passage from past to future. As Louis tells the middle-aged German tourist, Louis' generation "thinks of other things, four years of Occupation, Indo-China, and Algeria." The younger generation's present alienation then is derived in no small part from an awareness of the failure inherent in unifying complex experiences, in obscuring attention to the traces of those memories which remain in the present. That Louis and Véronique's movements in the film, however, are still circumscribed by traces of Tavernier's identity—his car, gun, camera, and jacket—positions them as the prototypical New Wave characters in embryonic form.

With its reconfiguration of space and its relegation of unity to the closed set of the cliché, *Ascenseur pour l'échafaud* offers a conception of the world that is anything but "banal, literary, and twenty or thirty years out of date." In contrast to *Le diable au corps*, which attempts to contain personal memory within the continuum of history, Malle's film suggests instead that memory often escapes history's grasp, that memory, as Pierre Nora has noted, accrues into localizable sites. These *lieux de mémoire* are "moments torn away

from the movement of history, then returned; no longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory has receded" (12). By acknowledging these sites of memory, by attempting to incorporate, not brush away, "the shells on the shore," Malle's film and the New Wave films that followed it generated new possibilities for the cinematographic image.

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Naming *la Guerre sans nom*: Memory, Nation and Identity in French Representations of the Algerian War, 1963-1992

Naomi Davidson

Introduction: History, Memory and the Nation

Historian Jean-Pierre Rioux proclaims that

De mémoire nationale française du conflit algérien, il n'y en eut pas depuis 1962; jamais ne furent rendus à cette guerre sans nom les honneurs de la mémoire. On pardonnera la brutalité de ces affirmations, qui peuvent choquer tel membre de tel groupe qui entretient avec ferveur son souvenir propre de la tragédie. Mais l'évidence est massive, à répétition, et des lors, indiscutable: dans la mémoire métropolitaine, cette guerre fut à la fois 'un fantôme,' un tabou... (Rioux 499)

Inherent in this assertion that there is no French national memory of the Algerian War even though the individual groups that comprise France may hold their own memories of the event is Rioux's proposal that such a thing as metropolitan France exists. The "metropolitan memory" in which the war is taboo does not include the memories of "certain groups" whose own recollections do not fit into the metropole's vision. Thus those who participate in the naming of the war as "la guerre sans nom," subscribing to the French national representation of the war, are properly French, whereas the marginalized groups with their own stories are not. Rioux's statement that a collective memory of the war exists (along with the absences associated with it that represent group memories, silenced by the national memory) implies that France is a country still united by a common historical experience and memory, even though segments of its citizenry lived that experience in very different ways. The nineteenth-century French historian Ernest Renan also considered the issue of memory:

L'oubli, et je dirai même l'erreur historique, sont un facteur essentiel de la création d'une nation, et c'est ainsi que le progrès des études historiques est souvent pour la nationalité un danger. L'investigation historique, en effet, remet en lumière les faits de violence qui se sont passés à l'origine de toutes les formations politiques . . . L'unité se fait toujours brutalement. (Renan 891)

So, rewritten in Rioux's words, investigating, representing, and remembering the Algerian War would be detrimental to maintaining a "mémoire métropolitaine." The "events" in Algeria, resulting in the origin of two new

political formations, a France sans empire and an independent Algeria, were certainly violent.¹ Yet in this case, brutality brought not unity, but a terrible rupture. In forgetting, or seeming to forget the war, French hegemonic powers (the government ministries responsible for museums and memorials and schools in particular) are able to preserve a semblance of national unity. But from the very beginning of the post-war period, with the “return” of *pied noir* families to France, and throughout years of immigration from Algeria, the war memories of these disparate groups have been far from forgotten. Their representations of the war are problematic, for they compromise the idea of France as a unified nation. Rioux is sure that it is quite logical for metropolitan France to lack a coherent national memory or commemoration of the events in Algeria. But is it any more reasonable to insist on the existence of a collective memory of France’s previous wars? In creating or identifying a national memory of a war (or any other central historical event) the creators and participants in this memorializing process are also engaging in the creation of the nation itself by using the war as a means to define what it means to be a member of the nation. In briefly examining these “national memories” of the two World Wars, it should become clear that the representations of the events center upon establishing France as a nation with certain core values. In the case of the Algerian war, the lack of such a culture would suggest that the guardians of French culture, be they textbook authors or museum curators, did not deem it appropriate to defining France’s character or status as a nation. The individual group memories to which Rioux refers in his above statement effectively tear at the fabric of the *tricolore* and all it is meant to represent.

Pierre Nora, in his influential *Les lieux de mémoire*, discusses the difference between history and memory. This clarification is helpful in attempting to establish what exactly is present or absent in France from 1962 onwards in relation to the Algerian war. If we accept his definition, which follows, what seems to be absent in French national discourse is not a memory (or memories) of the war but a history, or coherent narrative, of the events in question. Taking Nora’s analysis farther, this absent history, if it did exist, would in some ways function as a meta-narrative, or as the commemorative culture that is said to have existed after each of the world wars and which was instrumental in defining the French nation.

Memory, according to Nora’s definition, is “par nature, multiple et démultipliée, collective, plurielle, et individualisée.” History, on the other hand, “appartient à tous et à personne, ce qui lui donne vocation à l’universel” (Nora xix). For Nora, history and memory are not only quite different beasts,

they are also engaged in a power struggle over the past. History, “se découvrant victime de la mémoire [fait] effort pour s’en délivrer.” History’s raison-d’être is to critique memory, its avowed enemy; “la mission vraie [de l’histoire] est de détruire [la mémoire] et de la refouler. L’histoire est délégitimisation du passé vécu . . . [elle n’est] pas l’exaltation de ce qui s’est véritablement passé, mais sa néantisation” (Nora xx).

Thus when Rioux claims absence of memory, when he describes what seems to be missing from official French discourse, he is actually talking about an entirely different thing, a lack of a national history of the Algerian War. What exists in France, from 1963 to 1992 (the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Evian Accords, which ended the Algerian War), is a collection of memories that historians have sought to delegitimize, relying rather on military or political analyses of the war that do not necessitate the interrogation of France as a nation. *Pieds noirs*, French veterans and *harkis* (Algerians who fought for the French army during the war), anti-war activists, and French citizens of Maghrebian descent who arrived in France before and after the war, are some of the groups that “fervently maintain” their memories of the war, not to mention the different memories experienced by men and women, and members of different social classes. These memories are maintained through autobiographies, films, novels, yearly celebrations and reunions of *pied noir* or veterans’ organizations, and oral histories.² These sets of representations of lived pasts have not coalesced into a “national” memory; there is no official commemorative culture surrounding *la guerre d’Algérie*, nor is there an accepted, government-sponsored version of the war.³ However, this begs the question of why there is such resistance to writing histories or creating commemorative cultures which would enlarge the frameworks that define the boundaries of Frenchness.

Like other wars, the Algerian War has served the guardians of French culture as a tool for identifying what is and is not French. The insistence on a lack of discourse about the war and the devaluation of memories which do exist have begun to give way towards official inclusionary gestures introducing new paradigms of Frenchness, such as a 1992 museum exhibit about the war. But the exhibit is a brilliant representation of history which conceals “France” as subject, a phenomenon explained by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak: “[a]lthough the history of Europe as subject is narrativized by the law, political economy and ideology of the West, this concealed subject pretends it has ‘no geo-political determinations’” (Spivak 271-72). The government-sponsored paradigms of Frenchness constructed as a response to the Algerian War are still based firmly in a hegemonic conception of the

nation, one which incorporates its diverse citizens into a new but still rigidly defined community that reproduces and re-authorizes the center-periphery relationship of the colonial period.

I: Imagining France after World Wars I and II, or Constructing a Nation

Collective cultures and national memories which surround wars exist because someone creates them, and they represent a selection from among the memories of an event and an erasing of those not valued in the commemorator's context. In the cases of the two World Wars, there are lovingly constructed national images and fictions to be found in "official" French discourse, that which is propagated by museums, school curricula, memorial commemorations, and statues. *La Grande Guerre*, the first World War, "malgré toutes ses horreurs, est trop belle, trop consensuelle, trop glorieuse. Elle évoque certes avant tout le deuil, le sacrifice des poilus,⁴ mais elle rappelle aussi la victoire incontestable d'une nation en armes, unie pour défendre le sol de la patrie, elle fait revivre les derniers jours d'une splendeur passée" (Frank 604). Although we might question many of the assertions about the first World War made in this statement, it is nevertheless this representation of the war that continues to serve in official capacity; certainly the "splendid past" of pre-World War I France was not quite so splendid for all sectors of French society.⁵

As Daniel Sherman suggests, during

the interwar period in France the urgency of injunctions to remember the experience of the Great War produced what amounted to an entire culture of commemoration. Just as experience itself is far from an unproblematic concept, commemoration privileges certain kinds of experience and excludes others: it deploys and organizes not only memory but forgetting. ("Monuments" 84)

Sherman views the culture that grew up around WW II as being primarily concerned with preserving the masculine cast of the French nation; thus the role of women during the war was recorded as that of passive supporters and their entry into male domains was effectively erased from the official memory of the war. In lived experience, Sherman explains, the war meant an entry for women into the workplace which had been closed to them before, while for men, the war signified separation from home and comfort. When injured veterans returned to civilian life to find newly independent women, they felt emasculated (*ibid.*). It is clear, in part from the opening of two museums celebrating the version of WW I as recorded by Frank in the

last thirty years, that this image of *la Grande Guerre* continues to be cultivated (Sherman "Objects" 50-52). The image of France as a united and patriotic nation is the one that is inscribed for posterity even though that requires the forgetting of the lived experience and memories of, for example, women. The Second World War provides an even more complicated study of remembering and forgetting in creating a commemorative culture.

Representations of the Second World War have gone through several metamorphoses since its end in 1945, but each wave has been concerned with images of France as a nation. The Gaullist version of World War II was one in which every French man, woman, and child was a courageous resistance fighter who fought against the Nazis to protect Free France. The *mode rétro* of the 1970s, however, consisted of a "wave of nostalgia for the 1940s and the Occupation." Michel Foucault and others accused adherents of the *mode rétro* idea of history of trying to bring about "a sinister rewriting of history . . . to undermine the image of heroic and widespread resistance against Nazism, an image nurtured by the recently defeated Gaullists." They also saw it as "the bourgeoisie's effort to rid itself and the nation of a heroic image of resistance with which it felt uncomfortable and that failed to coincide with its own role during the Occupation" (Golsan 139-41). The difference, of course, is that the Gaullist image of Free French parachutists is the one embraced by Gaullist textbooks, politicians' speeches, and memorial statues, such as the one I saw near the bunker associated with the Battle of the Atlantic (in Carnaret, Brittany) which, like many others, consists of a huge granite Croix de Lorraine,⁶ an image of Marianne (the female visual representation of France), and an inscription honoring the dead who fought for La France Libre (Free France). The *mode rétro*, on the other hand, was propagated by the anti-Gaullist bourgeoisie (in Foucault's eyes) and was accepted as a valid representation of France's wartime experience by political opponents of de Gaulle. The Second World War introduces another set of problems for those considering commemorative cultures of wars as compared to their memories: cultures and representations are always intrinsically tied to the current political bent of the government, and do not necessarily have anything to do with the lived experiences and memories of those who participated in the war. In each of these collective representations of the war, one set of memories was privileged above another set, and the opposing images and representations are visible only when the more recent layers of memory are peeled back.

French historian Henry Rousso has labeled the intersection of history and memory of the Second World War "the Vichy syndrome": the pattern of mourning, repression, explosion of discourse, and obsession that dominates

French memory since the end of the war. Many French intellectuals consider the Algerian war to be closely related to WW II in terms of the discourse produced about it and the problems of representing the French nation, problems that do not seem quite so glaring in the case of WW I.⁷ Historian Isabelle Lambert writes that “On a l’impression que, vingt ans après, la guerre d’Algérie n’est exprimable que par comparaison avec la Seconde Guerre mondiale . . . Le parallèle entre maquisards français et maquisards algériens est facilement fait” (Lambert 557).⁸ Rousso makes this connection explicit when he writes that:

It is no accident that these events were all associated with times of deep crisis for France’s national unity and identity. These are the times that have left the most lasting, most controversial, and most vivid memories—all the more so in that each new crisis has fed upon its predecessors: the Dreyfus Affair on the French Revolution, Vichy on the Dreyfus Affair, the Algerian War on Vichy, and so on. Memories of the past have themselves become components of the crisis . . . (Rousso 34)

Yet, as Frank writes, “[m]ême si dans les souvenirs de 1939-1945 le chagrin et la pitié l’emportent sur la gloire, il reste des événements et des héros à célébrer . . . Mais de la guerre d’Algérie que reste-t-il, sinon des morts, faciles à honorer mais presque impossibles à commémorer?” (Frank 605).

II: Lacunae: Interrogating the “Absence” of Discourse about the Algerian War

What, indeed, is left? French historians are hard-pressed to find reasons for the French to commemorate and discuss the Algerian War, but they are quite capable of explaining why it is not discussed. These accounts for an absence of discourse are based either in the specific nature of the war which does not lend itself to discussion, or to the political circumstances of post-1962 France which did not encourage commemorations of the events in Algeria. The most obvious reason for discomfort in talking about the war is related to WW II:

L’image du S.S. de la Seconde Guerre mondiale vient se superposer, consciemment ou non, avec celle du soldat français . . . ces analogies sont nombreuses. Elles sont incontestablement l’une des causes de l’amnésie collective et volontaire qui entoure la guerre d’Algérie. (Lambert 557)

Lambert also suggests that the viewing of the war as a civil war has contributed to the lack of discourse: "Ce n'est pas tant dans la guerre franco-algérienne qu'il faut rechercher les causes du silence . . . mais plutôt dans la guerre franco-française qui oppose les partisans de l'Algérie française à la France" (559). Related to this issue of a civil war is the fact that the war was never declared, and was referred to variously as a peace-keeping mission, an insurrection, or simply "events" (Stora 13-14). Rioux proposes that the Algerian War does not have a national memory surrounding it because "la France . . . n'a jamais fait de la colonisation un projet collectif à large surface sociale, idéologique et morale" (Rioux 500). He adds a concern of a more physical nature when he points out that the war, unlike WW II, did not take place in France, but in another country: "Comment . . . ne pas constater que, pour la masse des Français du métropole, cette guerre n'a ni investi ni circonscrit de lieux auxquels on puisse . . . commémorer et construire quelque effet de mémoire?" (Rioux 501). In enumerating reasons for the *lack* of a collective memory of the war, none of the historians who offer them ever interrogates the category of national or collective memory itself. Nor do they historicize notions of "French national character," such as opposition to torture. Their explanations for the silences are also problematic; the lack of an official declaration of war did not seem to create any confusion over its goal; the war's opponents and proponents both saw it as a struggle to maintain French imperial territory. Rioux uses the Mediterranean effectively to separate metropolitan France and Algeria. His definition of a sense of national territory ignores *pied-noir* and Algerian families. These women and men who would arrive by boatloads in 1962 had certainly experienced the war physically as well as politically; the absence of the war's physical presence in their new territory does not seem as though it would hinder them from talking about it. Secondly, this argument ignores the fact that the war did take place on French soil; that Paris' own streets were as bloody as battlefields across the Mediterranean in 1961 during a massacre of Algerian immigrants peacefully demonstrating in support of the F.L.N., and that southwestern France housed several prison camps for Algerian revolutionaries.⁹

These explanations for the lack of discourse on the Algerian war are not satisfying, but the most difficult to accept is Rioux's statement that Algeria is not discussed because it simply did not matter, or perhaps did not even exist, for metropolitan France. Before examining how integral Algeria was to France's idea of nation by looking at schoolbooks, the colonial exhibits in Paris of the early twentieth century, and other sources to determine how Algeria was represented in "French national memory" before the war, one must first acknowledge that such a statement was written after the

loss of the war, after Algeria's independence, when it would have been much easier to suggest that colonialism was never extremely important to France. There is a difference between looking at what textbooks, politicians' speeches, and posters said vis à vis Algeria's importance for French citizens and what French citizens actually thought about Algeria and the colonial project. But even if one cannot gauge the relative importance of Algeria in the imagination of the French masses, the emphasis placed on colonial projects by the government leaves no doubt that Algeria was indeed important to the ruling elite in France, if to no one else. The government, however, was not to produce official discourse about the war after its loss, while writers, artists, and filmmakers were left to represent the different ways the war affected them (and the many different viewpoints of class, political orientation and consciousness, gender, and other factors led to many different views of the colony).¹⁰

Algeria was, technically, a part of France in the same way as the Savoie: Algeria was divided into three *départements*, which was the unit of territory used to divide metropolitan France administratively. Thus Algeria's independence "would . . . profoundly damage the integrity of the nation itself" in an official sense at the least (Loughlin 153).¹¹ As Elizabeth Ezra points out in an article describing the Miss France D'Outre-mer contest of 1937, in which the competitors were "nées de l'alliance d'un Français avec une Indigène de nos colonies," the interwar French government was extremely concerned with the country's declining birthrate (which was seen as leaving France vulnerable to Germany) (Ezra 50). The contest, whose official name was Concours du Meilleur Mariage Colonial, was designed to encourage Frenchmen to marry suitable indigenous women to raise the birthrate through "l'amalgame de ces races prolifiques avec la nôtre" (Ezra 52). As Ezra points out, this "was not the first time that France had appealed to its colonial empire for a solution to its manpower problem: the use of colonial subjects . . . as cannon fodder in World War I has been well documented" (Ibid.). The year 1930, of course, was also the centennial of Algeria's status as a French colony, which was celebrated with great fanfare (Ageron 561, Guilhaume 187). Colonialism, especially the French presence in the Maghreb, created a situation where populations shifted back and forth between metropole and colony; Algerian men often emigrated to France to work in factories, and brought their families along after a few years. The population of Algerians in France grew from 22,000 in 1946 to 805,000 in 1992 (Hargreaves 12-15). Like France's other territories, Algeria provided important material benefits to residents of metropolitan France—whether or not they were aware of it. Posters at the Exposition Coloniale of 1931

exhorted the French to understand the intrinsic link between France and its colonies; one reads: “FRANÇAIS, tes colonies t’achètent, chaque année, des produits valant 14,000,000,000 frs. et mettent à votre disposition en matières premières 8,000,000,000 frs” (Ageron 582).¹²

Algeria was also essential for less material reasons. As official discourse in the form of textbooks and colonial exhibitions makes clear, colonialism was an essential part of France’s moral development. A 1933 geography textbook for first year high school students explains, “L’expansion coloniale de la France lui était impérieusement commandée pour des raisons géographiques, politiques, sociales, économiques et morales” (Fallex and Gibert 447). Among these moral reasons cited are the need for men to escape the suffocation of old European states and the fact that it is the role of “civilisations dites supérieures d’élever jusqu’à elles les peuples inférieures” (Fallex and Gibert 451).

Stora injects another element into the discussion of the memory of the Algerian war when he traces the twists and turns French political and economic life took after 1962; representations of the war were always related to the changing fortunes of France’s leaders. He writes that the “wind of modernity” blew out the “last glimmers” of the war, that “lorsque le soldat français rentre des Aurès ou de Kabylie et la famille ‘*pied noir*’ d’Oran débarque à Marseille, ils découvrent une société française lancée à grande vitesse dans le changement” (Stora 211). Structural changes in agriculture ended the existence of a French peasantry and the population in cities exploded (Stora 212). In addition, the war also marked Charles de Gaulle’s return to power, and the Gaullist program emphasized the “unified character” of the French nation. During the 1960s and 70s, forty-three military museums opened their doors all over the country; they were dedicated to WW I, the D-Day invasion, and WW II’s Resistance movement (Stora 221). De Gaulle, because of his own Resistance experience, relied heavily on the imagery of WW II during and after the Algerian War and thus silenced representations of the more recent conflict (Stora 222). Propaganda posters from 1954 to 1962 reflect the Gaullist tendency to emphasize the past and the personal achievements of de Gaulle; one announcing his tour of France’s overseas territories in August 1956 proclaims:

De Gaulle arrive! **Le Général de Gaulle l’Homme qui sauva la France** de la défaite et du déshonneur, **De Gaulle, le Chef de la RESISTANCE et le Libérateur de la PATRIE**, arrivera . . . venez en grand nombre, sans considération de race ni de parti **venez témoigner votre Reconnaissance** à celui qui nous sauva de l’esclavage Allemand. (Lefranc and Guichard 19)

Later posters often echo the same images from the 1940s, but those surrounding the student revolts of 1968 reflect what can be read as representations of the Algerian War: both are in lurid red and black, and both are supporting de Gaulle in the June 1968 elections. One shows a barricade, a burning car, and waving flags and reads “PAS ÇA! Mais la réforme avec de Gaulle,” while the other shows a bust of Marianne on a pedestal, as a black hand drops a bomb underneath it. “Ne vous endormez pas!” the poster screams, “La république est toujours en danger” (Lefranc and Guichard 32).¹³ Those who participated in the 1968 revolts used the slogan “CRS-SS” (the CRS is the French security police) which evoked for them memories of Algeria; but which others saw as an excessive comparison with the actual SS and the events of WW II (Stora 224). In the 1980s, the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National gave rise to another series of representations of the Algerian War, this time much more directly. In a 1987 speech addressed to “jeunes beurs” (young second-generation Maghrebians), he remarked, as the audience shouted “Algérie française” and “F.L.N. terroriste”:

Si vous prétendez vivre dans vos lois, vos moeurs à vous, avec votre culture, alors il vaut mieux que vous rentriez chez vous, sans cela tout se terminera très mal . . . Je voudrais dire à un certain nombre de beurs arrogants que certains des leurs sont morts pour leur donner une patrie, et non pas pour qu’ils viennent dans la nôtre. (Stora 289-90)

For the extreme right in the 1980s the war was an event that served to fundamentally divide French and Arab, Algeria and France. The war, for Le Pen, should have stopped immigration into France and preserved “French” culture. One sees that political life and events in France have continued to influence the layering of official, or political, representations of the Algerian War.¹⁴

III: Representing the Algerian War from the “Margins,” Unofficially

The infinite number of representations of the Algerian War are the products of both the “certain groups” who produce them as well as members of “metropolitan,” that is, “mainstream,” society. Among the sectors of French society remembering and representing the war are French veterans and former anti-war activists or opponents of the war,¹⁵ the “rapatriés”—*harkis* and *pieds noirs*—as well as Algerian immigrants to France. Over two million soldiers were sent to fight in Algeria from 1954 to 1962; in 1988 the association for veterans of the war (the FNACA) listed 310,000 members, which included soldiers who had fought in Morocco and Tunisia (Stora 7, Rouyard

545). There were 70,000 *harki* troops during the war, 50,000 of these were sent to France in 1962. A 1989 survey places the current *harki* community (the original *harkis* and their French-born descendants) at 450,000 (De Wenden 191-93).¹⁶ As for the *pied noir* population, 930,000 people were “repatriated” from Algeria in 1962 (Stora 256).¹⁷ The statistics on Algerian immigrants to France have been given above. All three of these populations faced hostility upon arriving in France. Algerian immigrants faced and continue to face racism in their movement to the metropole; soldiers were seen as torturers, and saw themselves as having been “des chiffres insignifiants dans l'énoncé truqué d'un problème sans solution” (Stora 220). *Harkis* were similarly rejected, as André Wormser, an administrator in the repatriating of the *harkis*, writes. “L'ensemble de nos compatriotes, l'ensemble de la population métropolitaine, a considéré . . . tous ces harkis comme étant des traîtres” (Stora 207).¹⁸ *Pied noir* families were greeted upon disembarkment by disgruntled bureaucrats forced to return from vacation to process their papers and by metropolitan French who called them “petits blancs,” “artisans de leur propre malheur,” and “blousons noirs” (Hureau 287-88). Each of these populations, as well as the different sectors of metropolitan society who spent the war within the hexagon's boundaries, carries its own set of representations of the war.

The voices of soldiers, *pieds noirs*, women, and immigrants are those heard most often in the literature and films about the Algerian War. The works examined in this paper range in date from 1963 to 1992, though they are concentrated in the 1980s.¹⁹ They are not always the products of members of the group whose experience they seek to represent, but in that respect they reflect the extent to which those who are not members of Rioux's marginal groups have access to a system of representations to describe the experiences of a soldier, a *harki*, and others. The texts have little in common save their reference to the Algerian War; some are set during or immediately following the war itself regardless of when they were written, others are set in the 1980s and discuss the war in retrospect. Occasionally, the works address (often implicitly) the issue of silence surrounding the war; in doing so they respond to the reasons produced by historians to explain the lack of discourse about it. These films and books often represent the war in ways official discourse could not, and push at the boundaries of “Frenchness.” These texts are valuable not only because they produce sound where there is said to be silence, but also because they testify to the existence of memories of the Algerian War that challenge the notion that there can be one “national” experience of history. Some works go so far as to implicitly chal-

lunge the primacy of the nation itself; they do not locate the nation at the center of the narrative, as the official cultures surrounding the two World Wars invariably do.

The issue of discourse and silence, and the reasons for each, is most explicitly addressed in works that focus on the experiences of soldiers, such as *Muriel ou le temps d'un retour*, Alain Resnais's 1963 film, *Quel petit vélo à guidon chromé au fond de la cour?*, Georges Perec's 1966 novel, Guy Vidal and Alain Bignon's 1982 comic book *Une éducation algérienne*, and Mehdi Charef's 1989 novel *Le harki de Meriem*.²⁰ *Quel petit vélo*, while the second work in chronological order, focuses on the earliest stage of being a soldier: conscription in France. In a deeply ironic critique of the military's discourse about the army and the Algerian war, Perec, with a manic gift for untranslatable word-play, tells the story of Karatruc (literally, Kara-thing; Perec continually changes the second half of his character's name) and his attempts to evade being sent to Algeria.²¹ Karatruc announces one day to Henri Pollak (another foreign name!), a friend who serves as a marshal in the army, that

le Haut, le Très Haut (béné soit-il) Commandement aurait décidé, l'on ne sait avec précision si c'est sur le coup d'une implosion subite ou après mainte et mûres réflexions, aurait décidé donc, le Haut Commandement, de confier à M le Capitaine Commandant . . . l'exténuante tâche de préparer la liste de ceux-là d'entre nous qui, à la prochaine occasion, iront nourrir de leur sang ces nobles collines d'Afrique dont notre histoire glorieuse a fait des terres françaises. Il ne serait pas impossible, il serait même probable que le nom que ma famille porte avec honneur et dignité depuis cinq générations, et qu'elle m'a livré sans tache, figurât sur cette liste. (Perec 20)

The god-like army clearly has no interest in the lives of the men it sends to Algeria, according to Perec, nor does it respect the multicultural nature of its population sent to defend "French lands": the name Karatruc wears so proudly is ridiculed throughout the book. His friends, nevertheless, resolve to help him fake an injury which will keep him from being sent off at least for a while, during which time "peut-être que les Algériens, ils finiraient bien par la gagner leur sale guerre et que le cessez-le-feu il sera conclu et que la paix elle est signée" (Perec 70). Although the "dirty war" is described as belonging to the Algerians, the young men in this book see an Algerian victory as inevitable and do not subscribe to the military's doctrine that "la France et Dieu comptaient sur eux . . . et qu'ils tenaient bien haut le flambeau sacré de la civilisation occidentale en péril (jaune)" (Perec 35). In the end, the plan fails, and Karatruc is indeed sent off to Algeria rather than being allowed to stay in Paris. His friends, remaining at home, mourn his fate: "nous pensâmes à la guerre, là-bas, sous le soleil: le sable, les pierres et

les ruines, les froids réveils sous la tente, les marches forcées, les batailles à dix contre un, la guerre, quoi. C'est pas joli joli la guerre, ça non" (Perec 94). For them, the discourse of colonial pride foisted on them by the military is meaningless; these young men know the truth about the war.

Albert, the protagonist of Vidal and Bignon's comic book *Une éducation algérienne*, knows too. Although neither the text nor the illustrations are particularly well done, this 1982 work still creates a representation of a young soldier's life that echoes the testimonies of veterans in a popular format more likely to be consumed by the public than the gymnastic writing of Perec. Vidal and Bignon's depiction of military life leaves little to the imagination: they recreate a brochure given to soldiers in the 1960s called "Un ancien te parle," which assures the new soldiers that they'll soon find friends, that they will become men whom women will adore, that their health and spirits will improve, and that they are doing their duty, unlike the intellectuals. Then the authors set about showing what military life was really like. The men spend all day grumbling about what they will do after the war is over, bemoaning their lack of sexual contact ("Toute l'Algérie française pour un seul cul!") or turning to each other for sex (to the chagrin of Albert, who is aroused by dancing with "ce pédé de Jean-Claude") (Vidal and Bignon 9-11). The soldiers spend their nights listening to the screams of Algerians being tortured, which prompts Albert to curse himself for not having deserted (Vidal and Bignon 12). When he questions his commander about the use of torture as a military technique, he is told "Ne faites pas trop de reproches à l'armée. Si nous avons vraiment voulu nous transformer en S.S., nous pouvions le faire" (Vidal and Bignon 12). At the end of the book, after eight of his fellow soldiers are killed by friendly fire, Albert is jailed for insubordination (he refers to Indochina and Algeria as big wastes) and eventually returns to France physically unharmed. This text speaks to many of the reasons given for the lack of discourse about the war, or, more specifically, about the role of the French army. It shows the soldiers wondering why they are defending rich *pieds noirs* and a land they don't care to dominate, why their army practices torture, and why their comrades are killed by their own army rather than by the Arabs they are taught to fear or the O.A.S. that they truly fear.²² Vidal and Bignon make use of many free-floating representations of the Algerian experience in their story: the army of torturers, the O.A.S. terrorists waging war against the French state, and the detestable *pieds noirs*, among others. The utilization of these symbols, which immediately conjure up "Algerian War" in the French imagination, indi-

cates that there is a common frame of reference to discuss the war, even though people from different backgrounds might not interpret these representations in the same way.

Muriel ou le temps d'un retour addresses explicitly the question of memory and reasons not to remember: more than once, characters protest, "Let's not dig up the past," or explain "It will be a long time before I can talk about it," or laugh sadly, "Excuse me, I have no memory, I forget everything." *Muriel* is a ghost story; its main characters are all haunted by someone or something. Hélène struggles to stay afloat in a city whose street names and bombed-out buildings keep the Second World War firmly imprinted in its citizens' lives. Her stepson Bernard lives in his own world of war memories and constantly replays an old film of his company while reliving the torture and death of "Muriel," an Algerian woman. Bernard's tape never shows Muriel, but he recounts in spectacular verbal detail her torture and death. "I felt nothing," he says calmly as he watches the film, "I went to bed, slept well." Yet he watches it incessantly and becomes enraged when anyone touches the tape or his equipment. When Bernard's comrade Robert, the leader in Muriel's torture, returns to town, Bernard nearly goes mad, and in fact kills him by the film's end. The fight between them was sparked by Robert's mocking of Bernard's obsession. "You want to discuss Muriel," Robert accuses, "Well, Muriel, that's not talked about." *Muriel* addresses the question of how to represent and talk about torture, but all of the characters struggle with memories they do not necessarily want to keep with them. The soldier in this movie is unable to reinsert himself into mainstream society mostly because he cannot possibly express his experiences to his acquaintances. All of the characters in Resnais's film, which is in fact a representation of the effects of the Algerian War, say that it is impossible to talk about the war. But Resnais talks about it by emphasizing its silences and absences, and presents this as an equally valid representation of the experience of the war.

Mehdi Charef's Azzéline, the protagonist of his 1989 novel *Le Harki de Meriem*, is also a veteran who "returns" to France after the war 1962. His children are ridiculed in school by other Arab children and cannot understand how their father could possibly have fought with the French against his own people. Most of the novel consists of Azzéline's painful remembrances of his experiences in the French army, which he joined because of economic necessity, including several scenes of rape and torture. As he tells his wife after returning from his service, "C'est eux ou nous . . . voilà pourquoi j'ai tué . . . J'ai torturé aussi, pour savoir où nous attendaient ceux qui voulaient notre mort, je leur ai fait peur pour pouvoir dormir en paix" (Charef

128-29). Though it is clearly a shameful thing to have served in the French army, as all Azzédine's neighbors remind him daily, he cannot help but speak of his experiences and try to explain them to his wife. Charef's novel raises uncomfortable questions about Algerian identity as it relates to class; as he experiences the war and its aftermath, Azzédine has forfeited his Algerian identity because he could literally not afford to keep it. For him, the war was a nightmare adventure that had much in common with the experiences of the cartoon soldier in *Une éducation algérienne*.

Other texts are more concerned with representing the war and people's memories of it in ways that do not make the war itself, or France and Algeria themselves, the central focus of the work. These novels and films showcase the many different ways that the people who now live in France may have experienced the Algerian War, and often comment on the way people's identities color their representations of it. One of the most evocative presentations of the world of the wealthy *pied noir* elite is Brigitte Rouan's 1991 film *Outremer*. The story is told in three parts, by the three sisters of a rich family (one of the sisters is Rouan's mother), a device which makes clear that even those who share the same background still experience and therefore remember and represent the war in different ways. Each sister recounts the same events from her perspective; thus by the end of the film, all the gaps have been filled in our understanding of the family's life. The oldest sister, Zon (the filmmaker's mother) begins the story in 1949, complaining about the interference of the rebels in the lives of the *pieds noirs* ; the music for the wedding that opens the film has to compete with the Muslim call to prayer. Zon's facade of a perfect marriage and beautiful children fades quickly as the audience learns that her husband, a naval officer, is rarely around and has just been sent away for an extended tour of duty. She keeps up a strong *Algérie française* front in her household, singing "Les Africains" at Christmas with her sisters ("C'est nous les Africains . . . loyaux à la patrie, nous serons là pour mourir à ses pieds, le pays, la patrie, les Gaulois") instead of Christmas songs and correcting a daughter who remarks that the Arabs must be our brothers too as she learns her catechism. Malène, the second sister, is also involved in a less-than-perfect marriage in which her husband, the owner of a large winery, does little work and leaves it all to her. She, unlike her husband, is cordial with the Arab workers and knows some of them by name; but Malène is a firm believer in French Algeria. As the war intensifies, her husband is threatened several times, and they begin to suspect that their workers are planning to kill them. Gritte, the youngest sister, is a nurse in an Arab neighborhood who begins an affair with an F.L.N. fighter she meets there. For every comment or reference to

the war, however, Rouan shows her viewers a shot of the family's beautiful villa, a panoramic view of the ocean and beautiful people sunbathing, the sisters playing tennis together. She is engaged in representing the world her mother knew, of which the war was just one part.

Outremer is also one of the few major works to focus exclusively on the stories of women in the war; almost all of the other works examined here leave women on the sidelines and do not address the fact that they may have experienced the war very differently from the men in their own social groups. For Zon, the war meant the loss of her husband, who was reported dead after having been missing at sea for two years. She herself became ill after his death was reported and finally died wearing his uniform. Malène, who was forced into the male role in her family, was killed by someone trying to shoot her husband because it was she in the driver's seat rather than he. Gritte survived, but her lover was one of the men killed in an ambush on her sister Malène's land. She flees to France at the end, and the movie closes with her seeing and hearing her sisters as she stands at the wedding altar. Rouan tried to capture the lives of her mother and aunts as women and *pièdes noirs*, and succeeded in introducing another set of experiences of the war, those of women. Their version of the war, or at least Rouan's representation of it, related much more to their personal lives (marriages, children, lovers) than did male versions of the war.

Etcherelli's *Elise ou la vraie vie* tells the story of Elise's Algerian War, which is essentially the story of her relationship with her Algerian lover Arezki and her politically-oriented brother Lucien. Elise, unlike her brother, had very little consciousness of the Indochinese war; she referred to it as "une guerre lointaine, discrète, aux causes imprécises, presque rassurante, une preuve de bonne santé, de vitalité" (Etcherelli 23). Older, she moves to Paris and wonders at her surroundings: the newspapers devote large amounts of space to the deeds of the F.L.N. and Elise wonders if the Algerians on the bus next to her are members of the group (Etcherelli 92). The first anti-war meeting she attends is with Lucien and his lover; it is sponsored by the workers' union to protest the death of one of its members in service in Algeria. As Elise begins to get involved in the union, the overseers warn her: "N'allez pas vous mettre dans les pattes d'un syndicat. Et ne parlez pas trop avec les Algériens!" (Etcherelli 118). The first time she goes out in public with Arezki, she realizes the unusual nature of her situation: "J'étais avec un Algérien" (Etcherelli 134). Elise slowly enters Arezki's world, in which people have no fixed address, live in fear of the police, and attend secret meetings. Though she becomes quite well-versed in the daily events of the war and develops a strong anti-war consciousness, Elise expresses the war

in relation to the man she loves: "Il n'était pas souhaitable, en ce début de 1958, d'être un Algérien à Paris . . . Arrestation, chômage . . . Arezki ne s'indignait de rien . . . Et il riait de mes révoltes" (Etcherelli 226). But while she attends a demonstration organized by the unions (which Arezki had mocked as meaningless), he is arrested in the metro. Having recently been fired, he has no papers and is thus at the mercy of the police. The book ends with Elise's hopeless, frantic search through Paris streets for Arezki. "Je pourrai bien crier," she says, "qui m'écouterà? S'il vit, où est-il? S'il est mort, où est son corps? Qui me le dira?" She finally admits that she will never see Arezki again (Etcherelli 271-72). For Elise, the memory of the Algerian War is certainly the memory of her union meetings and demonstrations, but it is also the memory of her lover. Her representation of the war could well be one of absence, the absence of Arezki's grave. It is also a representation of the war based in the metropole, which challenges Rioux's assertion that because the war was a distant event, there was no memory of it.

Many Beur²³ novels also focus on the Algerian War specifically and France's colonial history in general as experienced in France; they concern themselves with the way the war has become part of the identity of anyone living in post-colonial France. Nacer Kettane's *Le sourire de Brahim* (1985) and Leila Sebbar's *Shérazade 17 ans, brune, frisée, les yeux verts* (1982) both address this issue in radically different styles. Kettane's earnest, awkwardly written, mostly autobiographical novel reads more like a speech than fiction but nevertheless provides readers with an idea of the kinds of experiences an Algerian family living in Paris during the war could expect to have. Its most affecting sequence is the opening one, a description of the F.L.N.'s March 17, 1961 demonstration. Brahim, Kettane's then eight-year old narrator, remembers that

Tous semblaient à la fête, pourtant ce n'était ni Noël ni l'Aïd. C'était ou plutôt ce devait être beaucoup mieux: le début d'une nouvelle vie. Cette manifestation devait dire non une bonne fois pour toutes à la situation de sous-hommes faite aux Algériens de Paris: après vingt heures, impossible d'acheter des victuailles, de prendre l'air ou d'aller rendre visite à des amis. Une idée géniale de Maurice Papon, préfet de police . . . (Kettane 16)

But the idyllic chanting of Arabic slogans is disrupted by the invasion of CRS forces, and Brahim's little brother Kader is killed. The papers the next day made little mention of the event even though, Brahim says, the quays of the Seine were littered with corpses and blood had flowed under the bridges (Kettane 23). The rest of the novel is a collection of anecdotes

that each keenly demonstrate the fact that Kettane's alter ego and his family do not hate the French; one of Brahim's best friends is Patrick, the son of *pieds noirs* who were forced to leave Algeria by the O.A.S. (Kettane 36). His father, who fought for France during WW II and spent time in prison for it, later joined the F.L.N. and went to prison again: but he never learned to hate (Kettane 46). The war in *Le sourire de Brahim* is an epic, heroic event, a proud point of reference for Beurs. Its memory is inscribed in the immigrant community in France not only because of events like the 1961 demonstration, but because it offers them an identity other than that imposed on them by the native-born French.

Sebbar's *Shérazade* concerns itself with trying to account for every possible representation of the Algerian War in the identities of her creations. Its cast of characters includes Beur and African teenagers, their families, the marginalized white French teenagers who round out their group, and the middle-aged white Frenchman who has an open-ended relationship with the seventeen-year-old Shérazade of the title, the daughter of Algerian immigrants. Each chapter is a brief two or three page vignette narrated by a different character; it is not infrequent to find a reference to the Algerian War in many different contexts. Julien, Shérazade's would-be lover, remembers his mother's activity as a nurse-midwife before and during the war and his parents' lives in France after 1962, and uses the war as a marker for his own life (he was born one year before it) (Sebbar 20, 111). Farid, one of Shérazade's crowd, reads "avec passion tout ce qui concernait la guerre d'Algérie qu'il n'avait ni vécue ni connue . . . il avait retrouvé l'exaltation, la détermination de ceux qui préparaient la guerre de libération algérienne" (Sebbar 56). Krim, another friend, calls Shérazade "harki" when she answers him in French rather than Arabic (Sebbar 139). Rachid laments the fact that his Jewish ex-girlfriend was so aware of Jewish history, whereas he knows nothing of the Algerian war "parce que personne ne lui en avait jamais parlé" (Sebbar 164). The war is never at the foreground of the lives of these characters—drugs, sex, music and money are—but it is often a point of reference or an attempt to create a proud, positive ethnic identity in the 1980s mixture of ethnic groups that populate Paris' immigrant neighborhoods.

IV Representing the War from the "Center," Officially

"La France en guerre d'Algérie: 1954-1962," created by historians Rioux and Benjamin Stora in collaboration with curator Laurent Gervereau, ran from 4 April to 28 June 1992 at the Musée d'histoire contemporaine, Hôtel

des Invalides in Paris. The exhibit signals the beginning of an attempt by France's officialdom to begin synthesizing representations of the war from numerous sources to create what could be called a commemorative culture of the war, then thirty years past. The exhibit, according to Gervereau, "bien qu'étant sur un sujet extrêmement controversé, n'a pas, bizarrement, reçu d'attaque, ni du côté de l'armée, ni du côté des différentes associations ou interlocuteurs présents en France" (Gervereau). While the exhibit may not have been attacked, *Le Monde*, one of France's major newspapers, devoted only a short column to reviewing it and dismissed its creators as having "les yeux plus gros que le ventre" in trying to create such a synthesis (Guerrin "Regards"). Perhaps the reviewer from *Le Monde* was not merely being dismissive when he wrote that the creators of the 1992 exhibit "La France en guerre d'Algérie" had eyes bigger than their stomachs: he wonders how their attempt to synthesize every possible representation of the Algerian War could be consumed by a public trying to understand or come to terms with it. "La France en guerre d'Algérie," with contributions from male and female Algerian and French historians, may be seen as the first step in the creation of a "national French memory" of the Algerian war that reflects what it means to be French after colonialism, anti-colonial struggles, and the emergence of newly independent nations. Unlike the war museums opened under de Gaulle, this exhibit is designed not only to expose its audience to uncomfortable topics (the use of torture by the French army, the terrorism of the O.A.S., the treatment of *pieds noirs* and *harkis* by metropolitan France) but to make the emphatic statement that all these subjects *must* be represented to create the fullest picture of what the war signified. The contribution to pushing back the boundaries of "Frenchness" by the authors of the texts discussed earlier in the realm of fiction is appreciated in the exhibit, which addresses the multiplicity of voices talking, writing, and painting about the war. Gervereau, Rioux and Stora framed their project as a way to talk about national identity and the Algerian War: Hureau's section on the *pieds noirs* concludes by explaining that the reason the memory of the Algerian war is so important is because it is an essential part of their identity and must "être, sinon partagé, au moins connu de la communauté nationale à laquelle ils appartiennent" (Hureau 288-30).²⁴ Stora also discusses *harkis'* representations of the war in terms of struggling with their identities as French, Muslim, and Algerian (Stora "Harkis" 292). The exhibit, say its makers in their conclusion to the catalogue, was necessary because, thirty years after the war, a large part of the French population persists in believing that "ce drame de huit ans n'a pas posé en métropole une réelle question d'identité" (Gervereau, Rioux and Stora 304). The cre-

ators also focus on the ways in which the personal and political spheres interacted to create specific representations of the war. The inclusion of tabloid magazines and top-40 records next to war photographs is the best way to recreate the war as it may have been experienced by a “typical” French citizen. Their finished product documents both the official history of the war (battles, statistics, treaties, parties) and the experience of *la guerre d’Algérie* by the different groups in France, and suggests that it might be possible to create a national memory of the Algerian war that is more reflective of the experiences of the entire population than are the collective cultures surrounding the two World Wars.

It is hard to object to an exhibit that its creators describe as an attempt to introduce questions about French identity. But “La France en Guerre d’Algérie” is nonetheless a project that shares its origins with what Daniel Sherman has identified as the cult of masculinity that arose after the first World War and with the cult of *Résistance* France cultivated by de Gaulle after the Second World War. This 1992 cultural production must be seen as yet another elaboration on the “national project,” the attempt to create and recreate new visions of the French nation, with “nation” being the operative word. In many ways, the exhibit’s inclusionary tactics mask its participation in the historically constituted process of nation building. Dipesh Chakrabarty reminds us that it is difficult to, as he puts it, “liberate history from the metanarrative of the nation state.” He explains that “the reason for this lies in what European imperialism and third-world nationalisms have achieved together: the universalization of the nation state as the most desirable form of political community” (Chakrabarty 19). Chakrabarty’s concern lies with histories which claim to incorporate the experiences of non-Europeans into “world” histories which ultimately subsume these other narratives under the meta-narrative of the nation, which is a European construct, without ever questioning how the nation came to be paramount. I borrow his point about Indian historiography here to argue that while Gervereau, Stora, and Rioux were among the first to incorporate the diverse voices and memories of the peoples who experienced the Algerian war in an officially-sanctioned commemorative production, their final product is still concerned with *la France*. They recreate France as a multicultural community, but this representation ultimately acts as a re-authorization of certain hegemonic discourses about nation. The exhibit’s creators have added lower-class soldiers, *harkis*, anti-war activists, pre-1962 Algerian immigrants, and *pièdes noirs* to the “traditional” mix (Brigitte Bardot movie posters, debates between Camus and Sartre) and stirred; the colonized and those carrying post-colonial baggage have been brought into the fold. The boundaries of

the French nation have only been enlarged; but the historical contexts in which they have been inscribed have not been interrogated, nor have the frontiers simply been abolished. When official culture represents the nation as all-inclusive, it does not really need to question the nation and its construction, its right to primacy, and its universal desirability.

Conclusion: The National Project and the Dangling Conversation

In a 1992 survey of 17 to 30 year olds conducted by Paris' Institut du Monde Arabe, 66% responded that it would be very useful for the future of French society to talk seriously about the Algerian war (Bernard). The utility of such a discussion cannot be overemphasized, especially when people like Jean-Marie Le Pen mobilize certain representations of the Algerian War to make explicitly xenophobic comments about North African immigration. Considerations of the significance of the war are also essential in a climate in which it is possible to argue that colonialism was never really an integral part of the French past. But such conversations *have* been held since 1954, some of them led by the artists whose work was discussed earlier. The existence of memories and representations of experiences of the Algerian War has never been in question, though it has never had an official commemorative culture surrounding it. The problem with these representations of the war is that they often involve realigning or abolishing "French" borders, in terms of both geography and identity. The commemorative cultures surrounding the two World Wars also revolved around difficult attempts to define what it meant to be French; Vichy's scars have still not faded from the French political and moral landscape. Yet in both those cases, French hegemonic powers have identified national memories of the wars, which continue to serve as representations of those periods through the media of textbooks, museums, and statues. The lack of a commemorative culture surrounding the Algerian War is not something to be lamented, but rather an occasion to reject such a nation-building enterprise which tries to disguise its own aims and ambitions. The unofficial artistic representations of memories of the Algerian War, as depicted by people originating from many different places (gender, religion, class, country) in the larger francophone world, sometimes escape Chakrabarty's prison of the nation-state and focus on other locations as the central points of their narratives. These fragments should continue to serve as the commemorations of the Algerian War. Rioux is justified in saying that there is no "metropolitan

memory” or official culture of commemoration of the war, but there should not be as long as the colonial genealogy of nation and metropole is left unquestioned.

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Notes

¹ As Anne Donadey points out, “This stable regime [the Fifth Republic] of which the French are so proud, was born out of the Algerian-French conflict, a source the French prefer not to remember” (223).

² I cannot explore these other representations and memories of Algeria and the war in this paper, but a brief perusal of *Le Monde* on significant dates relating to war anniversaries reveals several meetings or rallies being held across France. For a discussion of oral testimonies of *pieds noirs* and of veteran organizations’ attempts at commemorations, see Anne Roche, “La Perte et la parole: Témoignages oraux de pieds-noirs” and Frédéric Rouyard, “La Bataille du 19 mars,” in *La Guerre d’Algérie et les Français*.

³ In fact, until 1983, history classes taught to students in their last year of school before university ended with the Second World War (Donadey 216).

⁴ *Poilus* is a term used to describe French soldiers in WW I

⁵ Eugen Weber titles the first chapter of *Peasants into Frenchmen* “A Country of Savages,” and cites countless characterizations of 19th century peasant life as uncivilized, sinful and miserable; peasants were said to live “two or three centuries behind their fellows” in terms of morality, intelligence and physical health. The latter half of the 19th century was dedicated to civilizing the peasant (4-5). Perhaps this would have brought them into the splendid 19th century mentioned in reference to WW I.

⁶ The type of cross associated with Jeannet d’Arc; it was appropriated by de Gaulle and his RPR party.

⁷ Rousso points out that the relationship between WW II and the Algerian War is not only evident in post-1962 historiography, but was perceived by French citizens during the Algerian War itself:

The war in Algeria, observed from the metropolis, was indeed a reprise of the guerre franco-française, but only insofar as old cleavages reproduced themselves in people’s minds. What they saw, then, was not an image of the past but a transformation of that image to suit contemporary conditions. (82)

⁸ On the connection between la Seconde Guerre mondiale and la guerre d’Algérie, Frank echoes Lambert in describing the French inability to recognize the torture practiced by their own army on Algerians, given their recent history with Nazism, as a major factor in the lack of discourse (604).

⁹ The events of March 17, 1961, which could very well serve as a possible date for a commemoration, are also linked to WW II. Maurice Papon, the police official responsible for the orders to fire on the marchers, was convicted in April 1998 for his role in the deportation of Jews during the Vichy regime.

¹⁰ Claire Etcherelli's 1967 novel *Elise ou la vraie vie* contains an interesting analysis of this question. Elise's lover's co-revolutionary, disdainful of her participation in communist and union-sponsored anti-war rallies, tells her that the French proletariat cares about Algeria only because the war has driven up prices, and suggests that the only reason any French citizens ever concerned themselves with or thought about Algeria was in its economic relation to them (212).

¹¹ Loughlin continues his analysis by saying that the successful war for Algerian independence led regional separatists in metropolitan France to conclude that they too could break away from Parisian hegemony; the idea of "France" as a unified nation was thus attacked from within as well as without (160).

¹² The poster continues,

Par contre, tu dois assurer à ces
60,000,000 de travailleurs repartis sur 15,500,000 Kil. carrés
LA PAIX. LA LIBERTÉ DE TA CIVILISATION;
pour cette oeuvre que donnes-tu?
165,000 soldats coloniaux
2,000,000,000 frs.

22,000,000,000 frs. d'affaires
assurés seulement par
2,000,000,000 frs. de dépenses,
Trouves-tu souvent un tel placement pour
tes capitaux?

¹³ The refrain on the metro warning passengers to be ceaselessly vigilant shows that this 1968 poster still finds resonance for the French government and police forces.

¹⁴ "Political" in the sense of representations made by political figures.

¹⁵ These two groups were not mutually exclusive; the men called to fight in Algeria sometimes resisted the war. The years 1955 and 1956 saw many anti-war demonstrations on the part of soldiers, up to 400 protested the war through desertion, and 25 texts produced by soldiers during the war for public consumption detailed the methods employed by the French army in waging war against the F.L.N. (Liauzu 276-77).

¹⁶ In 1991, Prime Minister Edith Cresson responded to the demands of the *harki* community for "reconnaissance de dignité et d'identité" as well as a rehabilitation of their role in the war "dans la mémoire nationale" in the form of a statue honoring fallen Muslim soldiers by devising a plan which dedicated 100 million francs for the families of former *harkis* (Rollat 6).

¹⁷ They, like the *harkis*, demanded reparations and acknowledgment from the French government. In 1970, President D'Estaing provided 19 million francs for this purpose (Stora 260).

¹⁸ Wormser continues to say that the label "traitor" was bestowed on the *harkis* by the media, teachers and politicians (especially on the left). He judges the French harshly, explaining that the Algerians may have the right to call the *harkis* traitors, but that the French cannot possibly consider traitorous men who, believing themselves to be part of the French empire, wore the French uniform and fought against their countrymen. While this paper does not allow for a detailed discussion of the motives Algerians had for joining the French army, Wormser's remarks raise important questions about the boundaries of identity in a colonial setting: the issue of how *harkis* chose to identify themselves (and how others identified them) is important in looking at fictional representations of the war.

¹⁹ This is only partially a reflection of the increased production of literature and film about the war in the late 1970s and 1980s; it owes more to the resources available to me in the fall of 1997 when this paper was written. I should also point out that I do not intend to provide a thorough literary analysis of these novels, for such a critique; see Philip Dine, *Images of the Algerian*

War: French Fiction and Film, 1954-1992 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), which was helpful in locating appropriate novels and films. See also Alec G. Hargreaves, *La Littérature Beur: Une Guide Bio-Bibliographique* (New Orleans: CEFLAN Edition Monographs, 1992), which was also useful.

²⁰ These are fictional works; there is also a growing body of literary and cinematic testimony from veterans of the Algerian War. One of the most recent is *La guerre sans nom*, Bernard Tavernier and Patrick Rotman's 1992 documentary featuring a group of veterans relating their experiences in the war.

²¹ The hapless Karatruc's mercurial name is described as "peu banal, un nom qui vous disait quelque chose, qu'on n'oubliait pas facilement," though of course the narrator continually "forgets" Karatruc's real name, as he is an Armenian, a Bulgarian, "une grosse légume de Macédoine, enfin un type de ces coins-là, un Balkanique, un Yoghourtophage, un Slavophile, un Turc" (Perc 13). Karatruc, who is being asked to die for France, is not "French," and many of the names of his fellow soldiers also originate from other parts of the world. Perc alludes to the fact that the glorious country whose interests the military spoke of defending was not the "purely French" state they praised.

²² L'Organisation armée secrète was the army of *pieds noirs* who felt betrayed by de Gaulle's acceptance of Algeria's eventual independence and attacked Algerians and French "collaborators" alike.

²³ *Beur*, slang for Arab, has been claimed as a name by many second-generation Maghrebian immigrants. Or, as Azouz Begag and Abdellatif Chaouite define it in their "Lexique des idées arrêtées sur des gens qui bougent...(dans le désordre)":

Beur: mot désignant une substance alimentaire, grasse et onctueuse (voir Petit Robert). De plus en plus écrit de cette façon par les journalistes (grosse faute d'orthographe!...) Voudrait maintenant désigner une population issue de l'immigration maghrébine . . . on a eu *Pain et Chocolat*... manquait le Beur. Décidément, l'immigration ça se mange bien au petit déjeuner! (Begag and Chaouite 9-10)

²⁴ Hureau's analysis of the *piéd noir* community's desire to make the French nation understand their past is supported by the 1992 observances around the 30th anniversary of their "exode d'Algérie." They and the *harkis* organized a weekend-long program to "célébrer la mémoire mais aussi de mettre en valeur des traditions d'hospitalité, des exemples d'intégration réussie, et d'inscrire la communauté dans 'le futur paysage culturel européen'" ("Plusieurs rassemblements").

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Swann, Vinteuil et Marcel, et la mémoire involontaire

Joseph S. Jenkins

“La petite phrase” from Vinteuil’s Sonata in F Sharp follows the movements of Swann’s love for Odette in *Un Amour de Swann*. The Phrase is also a figure through which *A la Recherche du temps perdu* performs both the movements of involuntary memory and the powerful images this memory can unveil. Swann’s revelations regarding Odette’s love, occasioned by a performance of the Sonata at the Sainte-Euverte (Guermantes) reception, parallel the narrator’s (Marcel’s) ecstatic realization, recounted in the work’s final volume, of the nature of artistic creation and his own vocation as a writer.

Marcel there “finds” that episodes of involuntary memory liberate the essence of things and thus make possible the work of artistic creation. A subject accidentally experiences a sensation similar to one experienced by that subject in its past; not only is the memory of that past sensation involuntarily stimulated, but so are the memories of sensations contiguous at that prior point in time. Because the subject’s perspective on all these prior sensations is one of extra- or a-temporality (it experiences them vividly—*as present*, but not *in the present*) the “reality” of prior impressions may be perceived. Unlike the *moi* of the temporal present, this essential, atemporal *moi* perceives “reality” (including its own) free of concerns for utilitarian means and ends (III, 872), the vicissitudes of the future, and death (873).

For this Marcel of the final volume, “reality” and the aesthetic ideal are practically identical: both are antidotes for the *ennui mondain* that is chronic in this text:

[J]’avais pu trouver le monde et la vie ennuyeux parce que je les jugeais d’après des souvenirs sans vérité, alors que j’aurais un tel appétit de vivre maintenant que venait de renaître en moi, à trois reprises [de mémoires involontaires], un véritable moment du passé. (872)

This moment of truth unleashes so strong a desire that its superlative importance cannot be denied. Marcel expresses no doubt that uncovering subjective “first impressions” may perhaps be less important than engaging in acts of direct political significance. For Marcel, political engagement is just an excuse to avoid more difficult work—that of plumbing the depths of the atemporal *moi* (878). It is those who plumb these depths who are rewarded. When impressions of the atemporal *moi* are discovered, intense (but ephem-

eral) joy, pleasure, felicity, beauty are achieved; the work of the artist then is to give expression to these impressions, to convert them to their spiritual equivalents (878).

Marcel speaks of an internal book of hieroglyphic characters, of unknown signs. Reading this book is an act of creation. But the book is relevant beyond the individual subject into which it is incised. The very fact that impressions leave their trace in the stuff of a subjectivity is the guarantee of their authenticity (878-79). Authentic traces mark a broader truth, a shared type of emotional experience, that is common to a segment of humanity, yet is beyond the power of logic to convey (880).

These revelations are occasioned in Marcel by an unprecedented multiple episode of involuntary memory that occurs in the final volume (*Le temps retrouvé*). We are invited there to consider Marcel's conclusions regarding involuntary memory in conjunction with the story of Swann's love recounted earlier in *Un Amour de Swann*:

Je sentais bien que la déception du voyage, la déception de l'amour n'étaient pas des déceptions différentes, mais l'aspect varié que prend, selon le fait auquel il s'applique, l'impuissance que nous avons à nous réaliser dans la jouissance matérielle, dans l'action effective. Et, repensant à cette joie extra-temporelle causée, soit par le bruit de la cuiller, soit par le goût de la madeleine, je me disais: "Était-ce cela, ce bonheur proposé par la petite phrase de la sonate à Swann qui s'était trompé en l'assimilant au plaisir de l'amour et n'avait pas su le trouver dans la création artistique . . . ? (877)

The happiness missed by Swann is that of artistic creation. Marcel will not repeat this mistake. Since Swann's story constitutes the past in the universe of this work, a retracing of this textual regression/deferral allows us to follow not only Swann's various experiences of subjective impression (including the actions of temporality on their significance) but also the text's performance of such impressions (its simulation of them in the reader). Both for Swann and the reader, the impressions of certain moments may be re-read through the perspective of others.

The reader's first exposure to the Phrase is in a scene at the Verdurin *arriviste* salon. Swann has been seated next to Odette, the pianist has been introduced, yet somehow between paragraphs we have missed the concert entirely (I, 207-08). We are told instead that Swann, after the music has been played, is extremely pleasant with the pianist because of an experience he has had with this music at a previous party. The bulk of the text's treatment of the Sonata in this scene concerns the impressions it made on Swann on that prior occasion. We shall see that it is those impressions that allow the Vinteuil Sonata to become the "hymn national" of Swann's love for Odette. As Marcel

states in the final volume, “les choses . . . deviennent en nous quelque chose d’immatériel, de même nature que toutes nos préoccupations ou nos sensations de ce temps-là, et se mêlent indissolublement à elles” (III, 885).

At this prior party, Swann begins by appreciating only the material qualities of the Sonata’s sound (I, 208), but he then experiences the Phrase as something other than this:

Mais à un moment donné, sans pouvoir nettement distinguer un contour, donner un nom à ce qui lui plaisait, charmé tout d’un coup, il avait cherché à recueillir la phrase ou l’harmonie—il ne savait lui-même—qui passait et qui lui avait ouvert plus largement l’âme, comme certaines odeurs de roses circulant dans l’air humide du soir ont la propriété de dilater nos narines. (208-09)

This opening of Swann’s soul upon hearing the Phrase is similar to the making accessible of truths by involuntary memory (as described in the final volume). Just as the Phrase is separate from the material qualities of the music, so are these emotional truths ideal, inaccessible to the earthly, utterly non-transcendental mechanics of logic.

The impression of the music on Swann is confused, irreducible to any other. Sensations formed by a part of the Phrase are quickly submerged in the tones following. The text marks Swann’s attempts to remember the Phrase, which consists no longer of music itself but is rather an architecture of thought designed to contain it (209). The music itself, however, prior to these attempts (such priority established by the use of the past perfect verb tense), proposes to Swann certain manners of voluptuousness that he has never before considered, that he feels can be made known to him only through the Phrase. Swann feels for the Phrase a profound new love (211).

The text here gives a description of the Phrase’s rhythm that can be read retrospectively (once the remainder of *Un Amour de Swann* has been internalized) as a musical metaphor for Swann’s love for Odette:

D’un rythme lent elle le [Swann] dirigeait ici d’abord, puis là, puis ailleurs, vers un bonheur noble, inintelligible et précis. Et tout d’un coup, au point où elle était arrivée et d’où il se préparait à la suivre, après une pause d’un instant, brusquement elle changeait de direction, et d’un mouvement nouveau, plus rapide, menu, mélancolique, incessant et doux, elle l’entraînait avec elle vers des perspectives inconnues. (210)

So too does Swann’s love for Odette (in the pages that follow) begin at a slow rhythm. The happiness toward which this love first moves is noble, unintelligible, and precise, but the reader cannot yet know this. Only retrospectively, after the episode of the Sainte-Euverte reception, will the Phrase have performed (for Swann, for three hundred bystanders indifferent to Swann’s

particular case, and for the reader as well) the importance, the dignity, the “charmes d’une tristesse intime” (349), like Swann’s love for Odette, regardless of its seeming lack of logic. Likewise will the change in direction of Swann’s love, adumbrated here in this musical metaphor, later be clear: the adjectives “rapide, menu, mélancolique, incessant et doux” will all find their justification in the story of Swann’s jealousy. And the remarks in the final volume on Swann’s mistaken impressions concerning the Phrase will have all the more force because the reader, like Swann himself, once deprived of a perspective gained through time, will him(her)-self not have been able to read the first time all the signs contained in the Phrase.

At the prior party, the Phrase raises in Swann new hopes of rejuvenation, of his setting and striving for ideal goals long forgotten. Swann has previously taken to the habit “de se réfugier dans des pensées sans importance qui lui permettaient de laisser de côté le fond des choses” (210). This habit is not unlike those of the realist novelists and political activists of whom Marcel complains in the last volume. Neither they nor Swann have engaged in the artistic work of exploring this “fond.” Even Swann’s vision of rejuvenation is only an insufficient, momentary glance. Unable to identify the author of the Sonata (until later at the Verdurin get-together), Swann soon forgets his new-found desire to consecrate his life to the “fond des choses” (211). The glimpse of “reality” occasioned by the Phrase has been wasted by Swann. He is soon to make the mistake of relating its profundity to the woman sitting next to him at his second hearing.

Following this lengthy regression concerning the prior party, the narrator returns to a moment within the “little pianist’s” Sonata performance at the Verdurin gathering:

[T]out d’un coup, après une note haute longuement tenue pendant deux mesures, il [Swann] vit approcher, s’échappant de sous cette sonorité prolongée et tendue comme un rideau sonore pour cacher le mystère de son incubation, il reconnut, secrète, bruissante et divisée, la phrase aérienne et odorante qu’il aimait. (211)

Introduced here is the imagery of the veil: a curtain of sound that works to conceal the mysterious origins of the Phrase. The new imagery speaks to the mystification of the subject on which the Phrase has already left an impression.

With respect to Swann’s hearing at the prior party, the essential, non-material aspects of the Phrase were expressed in terms of liquid: the mass of the piano part, which rises to overtake the lead line of the violin, is the “clapotement liquide” (208) of a gently rolling sea surface in the *clair de lune*. The Phrase provides its effects in a cluster of imagery involving sub-

mersion in water: “Et cette impression continuerait à envelopper de sa liquidité et de son ‘fondu’ les motifs qui par instants en émergent, à peine discernables, pour plonger aussitôt et disparaître” (209). Water, rolling, and submersion are figures of the ineffable, immaterial wave-like quality of the Phrase. But while this (prior) Phrase may be indescribable, the translucent imagery nonetheless represents the Phrase itself. This is not true of the imagery provided with respect to Swann’s second (Verdurin) hearing of the Phrase. The “rideau” represents not the Phrase but the veil that obscures it. This new imagery (representing a subtle shift from water submersion to veil—so subtle that the reader too, along with Swann, may fail to notice the change) figures as well Swann’s failure to hold onto the Phrase’s meaning after the prior party. Swann now recognizes aspects of the Phrase that make it “secrète, bruisante et divisée,” whereas the Phrase he “aimait” (a reference to his reaction at the prior party) was “aérienne et odorante” when he first encountered it. But Swann remains enchanted, as if the Phrase were a reintroduction to “une personne qu’il avait admirée dans la rue et désespérait de jamais retrouver” (212). The Phrase continues to seduce Swann, even while providing him with reflections of his own missed impressions (he has indeed “admired” the phrase, in the superficial sense of the word, despite the intensity of his emotions) and pointers toward the sufferings (*secrète, bruisante et divisée*) to which it is leading him.

The Phrase’s exit from chez les Verdurin is narrated as follows: “A la fin, elle s’éloigna, indicatrice, diligente, parmi les ramifications de son parfum, laissant sur le visage de Swann le reflet de son sourire” (212). Whereas once before “la petite ligne du violon” was “directrice” (208), the Phrase chez les Verdurin has become less assuring—*indicatrice*. The *parfum*, which has previously dilated the confines and opened the possibilities of Swann’s soul, now is the site of mystifying and ambiguous “ramifications.” Even Swann’s *sourire* (one of the traces that the last volume will tell us mark the authenticity of the subjective impression) is immediately surrounded by the banal commentary of the Verdurin arrivistes. Their quick contiguity marks Swann’s smile as the idiot’s grin. It is Madame Verdurin, the quintessentially superficial bourgeoisie, whose remark shifts the object of Swann’s words of love from the Sonata to Odette. Swann is delighted at the simplicity of Odette’s response; he is thus not only surrounded by platitudes, but taken in by them as well.

With textual hindsight it will be evident that Swann’s impressions are leading him into a state of mystification. Less clear is whether we, the readers, should be led (through our regression here) to refine our idea (from the final volume) of the subjective impression as mark of its own authenticity. Is the authentic impression then not necessarily a guidepost to a recom-

mended path, but rather the sign of a truly and intensely lived emotion, even one that may lead to pain and loss? Or are Swann's impressions here not authentic?

The subsequent (and climactic) appearance of the Phrase at the Sainte-Euverte reception is germane to consideration of these questions. This appearance follows, both textually and plot-chronologically, several other episodes in which Swann reads the Phrase as directly relevant to his love for Odette. He is agonized by aspects of the Phrase's meaning extrinsic to Odette and himself (218); the Phrase liberates blank pages of Swann's soul, onto which he is at liberty to inscribe the name of Odette (237); Swann turns to the Phrase as a confidante who can convince Odette not to take up with Forcheville (264). It is chez les Sainte-Euverte, however, that Swann for the first time feels his pity and tenderness for Vinteuil, for the suffering that brought that man to such heights of musical creation (348). This change in Swann's impression can be linked to the manner in which the Phrase here appears.

Swann has been absent from society for a time as a result of his infatuation with Odette. When he finally attends the Sainte-Euverte reception, he does so free of desire. This party means nothing to him because it is unconnected to his love. But the same lack of desire that frees Swann's perspective from temporal, practical constraints (that allows him, for example, to see the specifically ridiculous in the manner of each monocled luminary there assembled) also renders him susceptible to atemporal effects when the Phrase unexpectedly arises:

[T]ous ses souvenirs du temps où Odette était éprise de lui, et qu'il avait réussi jusqu'à ce jour à maintenir invisibles dans les profondeurs de son être, trompés par ce brusque rayon du temps d'amour qu'ils crurent revenu, s'étaient réveillés et, à tire-d'aile, étaient remontés lui chanter éperdument, sans pitié pour son infortune présente, les refrains oubliés du bonheur. (345)

Whereas in previous scenes the Phrase impressed Swann regarding the object of his then-current desire (at the prior party, the abandoned ideal quest; in subsequent appearances, Odette), only here does Swann experience impressions "à la fois dans le moment actuel et dans un moment éloigné, jusqu'à faire empiéter le passé sur le présent" (III, 871). While the Phrase has deeply moved Swann before, only here has it triggered *la mémoire involontaire*. The lengthy regression from the Verdurin scene to the prior party, which seemed to insert Swann's former hearing of the Phrase in the place of its actual performance by the Verdurins' "little pianist," was in fact a structural trap for the reader similar to the "siren's song" (I, 347) the Phrase has been for Swann.

The gap in the Verdurin scene (present) was indeed filled by impressions from the prior party (past), but Swann brought forward to the Verdurin gathering a voluntary architecture of memory that contained (and veiled) the Phrase he had heard. Only by a close rereading, following one of *Le Temps retrouvé*, can the reader see the lack of the “empiètement,” of overlapping extra-temporality, between these two scenes. After reading the final volume, the reader can deduce that the impressions Swann experiences are the effects of a previously created work. Approaching it with only his voluntary (architectural) memory, at each moment unable to see beyond (extra-temporally) his then-present desires, Swann falls prey to mystifications that seem profound, but are in fact self-absorbed. It is not until the Sainte-Euverte reception that Swann’s own episode of involuntary memory occurs. Only here does the “reality” become clear:

‘Qu’est-ce cela? tout cela n’est rien.’ . . . C’est que la petite phrase, au contraire, quelque opinion qu’elle pût avoir sur la brève durée de ces états de l’âme, y voyait quelque chose, non pas comme faisaient tous ces gens, de moins sérieux que la vie positive, mais au contraire de si supérieur à elle que seul il valait la peine d’être exprimé. Ces charmes d’une tristesse intime, c’était eux qu’elle essayait d’imiter, de recréer, et jusqu’à leur essence qui est pourtant d’être incommunicables et de sembler frivoles à tout autre qu’à celui qui les éprouve, la petite phrase l’avait captée, rendue visible. (348-49)

These “charmes d’une tristesse intime” that the Phrase renders visible, even to those who don’t happen to be hopelessly in love, are a shared type of emotional experience, a broader truth, of which the Marcel of the last volume will speak. There he will tell us that authentic trace impressions of involuntary memory will mark such broader truths, but he will do no more than posit this. Despite the relatively discursive style of the surrounding narrative, there will be no analysis of the distinction between subjective impressions of broader applicability and impressions interesting only to the subject into which they happen to be incised.

The earlier episodes of Swann and the Phrase serve as an illustrative parable that seems to address these issues. However, as Paul de Man remarks, a rhetorical mode (such as parable) may both assert and simultaneously deny its own authority (17). De Man’s point applies here, as Swann has been wrong on so many occasions, but here seems to be right. We too, in reading the novel linearly, at each moment trapped in the temporal present of its narrative flow, have probably been taken in along with Swann. The narrator’s lyric song is as enchanting and seductive as the Phrase’s siren call. And the novel’s structural decoys, such as the flashback to the prior party that *seemed* to be an episode of involuntary memory but was not, draw the reader further

into sharing Swann's mystification. The Sainte-Euverte scene seductively adds a series of apparently positive resolutions: Swann's new insights into the courtesan life that Odette has led all along; his sense of resignation that her love for him will never be again as he once experienced it; a direct intervention by a seemingly omniscient narrator claiming that Swann was right about the Phrase's existence; a description of Swann's aesthetic theory concerning the "clavier incommensurable" (349). But despite the aesthetic lure of this agglomeration of positive elements, it cannot be determined whether the overcoming of a prior mystification (by Swann and the reader) marks a true resolution or rather a gesture toward a continuing process of seeming comprehension and later demystification. And even if that indeterminacy were removed, there still has been no elucidation of the broader applicability issue left open in the final volume.

The parallel between Swann's conclusions chez les Sainte-Euverte and those of Marcel in the final volume is not one of resolution; it is a parallel of the impossibility of answer. De Man has described this novel's "rhetoricization of grammar" (17), in which thematic strategies are deconstructed by the grammar through which they are spoken, in which the announced priority (the pronounced necessity) of the metaphor is undermined by the subversive power of (merely contingent) syntactical metonymy. As de Man puts it, "persuasion is achieved by a figural play in which contingent figures of chance masquerade deceptively as figures of necessity" (67).

The structural decoy of Swann's prior-party flashback may too be viewed as such a figural play. But it is a juxtaposition of whole scenes rather than of figures within the syntax of a sentence or paragraph—a "rhetoricization" of structure rather than grammar. These two types of rhetoricization may be viewed as concentric elements of the novel's elaborate form. It may be that the coherence of that form, its strict adherence to its own necessities, is a surer guide to aesthetic practice than Marcel's theory of involuntary memory. For while Marcel's theory is both asserted and denied by the rhetorical strategies of the novel, this same novel performs a model of art more difficult to disown: a creative will that lifts form to a level of necessity within the universe of the work that is sufficient to challenge the paradigmatic necessity of the metaphors contained therein.

De Man's model points to similarities between Proustian and Valéryan aesthetics. Formal necessities are paramount to both: necessities dictated not by the conventions of culture at large, but by a particular poetic universe which affirms itself as emerging from an accident of sensory perception. Both writers attempt to transform the intimacy of the subject into a work of art. These

aesthetic views project the field of formal innovation in our own century: negotiating the relevance of a poetic universe to the world outside in terms not of boundary but coincidence.

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French Folie: Memory and Madness in Buñuel's

Belle de Jour

Mary M. Wiles

Historian Henry Rousso has proposed that the Liberation functioned as a “screen memory” (15) for the postwar French populace. It masked loss and internal conflict while effectively preventing the nation from mourning its traumas. During the postwar Gaullist period, collective amnesia foreclosed resolution and rendered meaningful commemoration impossible. As Rousso notes, “Memory of the war would therefore develop largely outside this official framework [of Gaullist resistancialism], which had gained acceptance only at the cost of distorting the realities” (26). As historian Lynn Higgins points out, literature and film provided arenas where conflicting memories could be worked through, but usually under a self-imposed (when not official) censorship (182). Rousso’s description of the Liberation and its attendant mythologies corresponds closely to the Buñuelian fantasmatic. In *Belle de Jour*, Buñuel captures the fictional character Séverine just as her traumatic memories are beginning to resurface, and we can begin to witness the spectacle of violence and degradation behind the screen of glacial tranquillity.

Belle de Jour opens with a long shot of a carriage approaching, accompanied by the unsourced sounds of bells. A well-dressed French couple transported by carriage through the Bois de Bologne provides a compelling portrait of the professional *jeune cadre* of the Gaullist régime. Yet the image simultaneously recalls a past moment, providing an historical allusion to the landscape of prerevolutionary France, where the decadent nobility traveled by carriage to remote country châteaux. The scene that follows displays the beating and rape of the character Séverine, presided over by her husband Pierre and the coachmen. The coachmen pull Séverine from the carriage and proceed to drag her body across the ground. As Pierre tears the dress from her body, he threatens her, “Don’t scream or I’ll kill you.” The coachmen whip her violently. The final shot of the scene frames Séverine in close-up as she is kissed by the coachman who intends to rape her. On the soundtrack in voice-off narration, a man asks, “What are you thinking about, Séverine?”

The scene then cuts abruptly to a medium close-up of Pierre in a sparkling clean bathroom looking into the mirror. Séverine is visible as a mere reflection in the mirror, lying on the bed. As the young doctor buttons his pajamas, he turns towards her to again pose the question, "What are you thinking about?"

Séverine's response mirrors his expectation, "I was thinking about you... about us... we were driving in a landau..." Her reply is accompanied by a rapid zoom-in that accents her perplexed facial expression. As Paul Sandro points out in *Diversions of Pleasure*, this zoom-in serves as a visual marker within this film, signaling that subsequent shots will portray Séverine's inner thoughts (132). Within this scene, the signified of the zoom-in is inverted, for here it indicates a return from a fantasy. The code of glances between Pierre and Séverine renders the initial segment of the film intelligible as an aberrant moment outside of the normal flow of events, recognized as such from Pierre's dominant point-of-view in the scene. Pierre's glance "cuts off" Séverine from the unconscious space of violent sexual contact to reposition her within a space designated as fictional reality. Séverine's partial response to Pierre's query exposes her duplicitous persona, serving simultaneously as the expression of her conscious will to conform to the conventional role prescribed by her bourgeois marriage as well as the denial of the dream content to which the spectator has been privy. As Sandro points out, this aberrant moment of fantasy that opens the film inaugurates the opposition between separate diegetic spaces: the interior space of Séverine's unconscious activity and the stable exterior space that is the normal flow of narrative events (Sandro 131).

I. Psychoanalysis: The Inviolable Body

Within the opening sequence, the narrative connection between rape and chastity determines a division that structures the film text. I will suggest that this sequence and the film itself can simultaneously be read against the intertextual frame that feminist film theorist Mary Ann Doane describes as the representation of psychoanalysis and its incorporation into classic Hollywood cinema (39). Others have read the film from a psychoanalytic perspective on feminine desire, notably Paul Sandro in *Diversions of Pleasure: Luis Buñuel and the Crises of Desire*.¹ I will suggest that while Hollywood psychoanalysis is not the subject of the film, the grammar and codification that the psychoanalytic intertext presupposes inform the film's narrative structure. Doane points to psychoanalysis as the source of a system of symbols and themes that are typically compatible with Hollywood classical

narrative (47). Film theorist Marc Vernet has affirmed that Hollywood films rely on the theme of the “talking cure” as Freud practiced it between 1880 and 1895 (qtd. in Doane 47). In American films such as *Lady in the Dark* (1944) and *The Snake Pit* (1948), the problem of the “talking cure” is translated into visual terms (Doane 47). Mental illness becomes codified as the problem of vision within the Hollywood psychoanalytic film, so optical metaphors abound: the out-of-focus shot, superimpositions, zoom-in, and zoom-out. Within the opening sequence of *Belle de Jour*, the rapid zoom-in that signals Séverine’s return from the interior space of fantasy invites the spectator to speculate, “What is wrong with Séverine? What event caused her to be like this?” The solution to this central enigma becomes, in conformance with the grammar determined by the psychoanalytic intertext, synonymous with the cure to her “complex,” which is defined within the opening bedroom scene as her frigidity with her husband.

Within the film’s opening sequence, the spectator is initiated to the grammar of the psychoanalytic intertext of Hollywood cinema that provides a justification for the classical device of repetition (the compulsion to reenact the trauma, the recurrence of symptoms) and a final solution (the cure) (Doane 47). The spectator is invited to read Séverine’s frigidity as the symptom of a psychoanalytic complex and, consequently, to accord a linear determinism to the recurrent dreams associated with this complex (the dream of the child being kissed by a plumber, the dream of the child being offered a communion wafer by a priest, the dream of Séverine in a coffin overseen by the father). Dreams invite the spectator to speculate on the nature of her complex (which event caused her to become like this?) and provide clarification of her actions within the space of fictional reality (her work at the brothel). It is highly probable that Buñuel was familiar with the codes and grammar that generated Hollywood psychoanalysis, for, as Sandro points out, Buñuel realized how highly codified American cinema was in terms of genre (*Diversions* 12). When Buñuel visited Hollywood in 1930 to observe production techniques, he constructed his own “synoptic table of American cinema,” which he describes here:

The principle was the following: at the time American cinema obeyed such a precise and mechanical codification that it was possible, thanks to my system of sliding columns, by aligning a given setting with a given era and a given character, to know infallibly the main storyline of the film. (qtd. in Sandro 12)

While it is likely that Buñuel was familiar with the codes that generated the Hollywood psychoanalytic film, *Belle de Jour*’s recirculation of this intertext is coincident with the emergence of pop psychoanalysis during the

early to mid-1960s within articles published in periodicals such as *Marie-Claire* and *Elle*, which were devoted to an investigation of women's sexual lives. As feminist historian Claire Duchen points out, "Sexual pleasure was discussed in articles medicalised to give them legitimacy" (196). In November 1960, *Marie-Claire* would ask the question, "Doctor, why are there unsatisfied wives?" while the magazine's resident medical adviser was asked "Are there really women who are frigid?" (qtd. in Duchen 196). In December 1967, *Elle* would disclose to its readership, "The medical truth about frigidity," offering its reflections on the medical fact that frigid women were often blocked by inhibitions that were acquired in childhood (89). In the terms of popular psychology, *Elle* would provide a profile of the frigid woman, "Let's not forget that the frigid woman is often an incredible romantic. She dreams. The sexually active woman accepts herself and accepts her partner as he is" (91). In 1960, a research study conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion entitled *Patterns of Sex and Love: A Study of the French Woman and Her Morals* was published that was considered the French equivalent of the American Kinsey report, *Sexual Behavior in the Human Female*, published in 1953. In the section of the psychosocial study entitled "Marriage," many of the participants interviewed by "psychological investigators" point to the problem of frigidity:

Many women are frigid, but it's because they've never developed their potentialities. I believe that there are no more than three or four women out of ten who normally experience sexual pleasure. Maître M., attorney

In most cases, not having seen marriage as a gift of the body, the wife was shocked and disgusted by sexual relations from the beginning. It wasn't until I became a confessor that I realized that there are many frigid women. Abbé R.

I'm appalled by the number of frigid women there are in the world . . . There are many women who have always been frigid, who have never known anything else. More than a third of all my women patients are frigid, and most of the others do fairly well . . . Dr. C., Physician

Within this landmark research study, women's sexual pleasure is discussed in most interviews as the locus of a psychosocial and/or medical problem. This discursive rash of interest in the problem of frigidity documented within this research study and reflected within the articles of the popular French press resurfaces in *Belle de Jour*. The medicalized discourse on sexual pleasure that was circulating through the French press from the early to the mid-1960s overlaps with and serves as a supplement to the ready-made grammar of Hollywood psychoanalysis. Thus, the film's cen-

tral enigma, "What is wrong with Séverine? What event caused her to become like this?" does not only indicate the film's conformance to the psychoanalytic intertext of classical Hollywood cinema but also mirrors the medicalized discourse surfacing in the popular press and psychosocial studies published in France during the 1960s

II. Surrealism: The Contaminated Body

In *Belle de Jour*, the pop psychoanalysis of both classical Hollywood cinema and the French press converge at the overdetermined moment of Séverine's gaze, which serves as the metonymical signifier of madness. Her gaze is situated within the filmic fiction at the nexus of a discursive construction designed to perpetuate the ideology of the inviolate bourgeois family. This codification of her vision that conforms to the conventional grammar of classical Hollywood cinema appeals systematically to the spectator's desire for a certain type of conventional narrative, if only to block and redirect this desire. Within the opening bedroom scene, certain oppositions common to the psychoanalytic intertext are established. The divided space of the diegesis determines the representation of the relationship between the couple Pierre and Severine, which is negotiated across oppositional lines of masculine/feminine, health/illness, order/disorder, cleanliness/filth, real/imaginary. The negative connotations of illness that Séverine carries are conventionally codified in conformance with the Hollywood psychoanalytic film as a problem of vision. Within the initial scene of the film, Séverine's inability to frame fictional reality is generated from the grammar of the Hollywood psychoanalytic intertext, and thus, her glance is read as the metonymic signifier of her sickness. Yet, the spectator is simultaneously invited to read this problem of vision that opens the filmic narrative as the emblematic signifier of the surrealists' stance, blindness indexing the internal nature of their quest. Historian C.W. Bigsby has described the surrealist fascination with the problem of vision: "the surrealists deliberately closed their eyes to a reality so empty of imaginative insight. The famous photograph of the surrealists with their eyes shut is only partly a joke" (60). Within the initial scene, the conventional signification determined by Hollywood psychoanalysis intersects with the surrealist subtext at an overdetermined point of fusion—the glance of Séverine.

Throughout the film, Séverine's glance, its inability to frame the reality of the fiction, serves as the surrealist code that signals the opening up of the interior space of her imagination. Louis Aragon had claimed to see a surrealist glow in the eyes of all women (Bigsby 73). André Breton had remarked,

“the act of love, just like the picture or the poem, is disqualified on the part of the person giving himself to it, if it does not presuppose entering into a trance” (qtd. in Bigsby 73). For the surrealists, the recollections of dreams or hallucinations provide the means to an end, for they saw in the dream not evidence of undesirable neurosis or a neural memory of trauma but proof of the power of the erotic imagination (Bigsby 74). “Madness” is the key to perception within the surrealist doxa. While the surrealists’ fascination with the erotic and the unconscious was the product of Freudian influence, unlike Freud, they were not interested in restoring individuals to sanity. Within the surrealist doxa, “madness” is the key to a revolution in consciousness in which the mundane is transformed into the marvellous (Bigsby 74). In Buñuel’s surrealist film *Un Chien Andalou* (1928) (the emblematic surrealist film to many historians), the opening segment graphically depicts the deliberate slitting of the female protagonist’s eye. I will propose that in the film *Belle de Jour*, the psychoanalytic intertext of classic Hollywood cinema fuses with the surrealist subtext at the overdetermined moment of the glance. Séverine’s glance is the site of a semantic reversal insofar as it signifies separate and contradictory readings of the intertextual frame of Freud. Thus, the blindness that serves as the metonymic signifier of Séverine’s unchaste mind can simultaneously be viewed from within a surrealist perspective as the badge of rebellion brandished against the conventional values of the bourgeoisie.

III. French National Identity: The Inviolable Body

I will suggest that the fictional filmic narrative of *Belle de Jour* that is structured around the story of a character who experiences difficulty reconciling herself to her personal history provides an allegory of postwar France, a nation that had experienced similar trauma. The film invites us to read the “complex” of Belle de Jour, her chaste body entombed within a bourgeois marriage and severed from memories of a contaminated past, as the dramatic metaphor for the neurotic evolution of the French nation. Film historian Maureen Turim discusses flashbacks in film narratives such as those that appear in *Belle de Jour*, pointing to the possibility that there “is an implicit analogy between the project of writing history and a phenomenological view of the functioning of personal memory” (105). As Turim notes, the historian imagines the past as the actual experience of individuals or groups and treats archival documents as pieces of a hypothetical memory to be reconstructed (105). Additionally, Turim suggests that attitudes and images from the past do not simply awaken by themselves in the present but

“are framed by mythologies operative in the present” (105). In *Belle de Jour*, the reinvention of the trope of chastity through the discursive frame of pop psychoanalysis that was surfacing in the popular press of the 1960s is historically overdetermined for, as Rousso has pointed out, the year 1964 marked “a turning point and a culmination” in the evolution of a national neurosis that had its source in Vichy (82).² Rousso traces the contours of the neurosis that he has termed “the Vichy syndrome” from its commencement in 1944 to its culmination in the media events of 1964.

In a pivotal speech at the Hôtel de Ville on August 25, 1944, Charles de Gaulle established the founding myth of the post-Vichy period:

Paris! Paris humiliated! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, by its own people with the help of the armies of France, with the support and aid of France as a whole, of fighting France, of the only France, of the true France, of eternal France. (qtd. in Rousso 16)

De Gaulle’s statement to the French people marked the first attempt to effectively rewrite the history of the war years through the invention of the myth of an inviolate and eternal “France,” which would render the memory of the collaborationist Vichy regime null and void (Rousso 17). In this manner, the Liberation would serve Gaullist France as a “screen memory,” which would mask loss and internal conflict, thereby preventing the nation from mourning its traumas. In the year of 1964, Gaullism would consecrate its own legitimacy through a sublimated version of history and seek to confer on France an “invented honor” (Nourissier qtd. in Rousso 82). During the postwar years, the Resistance had become the subject of films, novels, and historical treatises, while Vichy and collaboration were rarely discussed (Rousso 83). By 1964, this nostalgia for the war years had given way to the optimism of a future planned and promoted by the cheerful technocrats known as the *jeune cadre*. Gaullism would thus seek to definitively orient all future memory and to forge an official version of the past suited to the nation’s grandiose self-image (Rousso 82). It was in 1964, as Rousso points out, that the new version of the Occupation achieved its definitive form in which France was cast as a nation that “forever and always resists the invader” (Rousso 82). This “invented honor” called for ceremonial consecration and an auspicious occasion was found: the ashes of martyred Resistance hero Jean Moulin were to be transferred to the Pantheon. The nationally televised spectacle focused on the connection between the martyr Moulin and the General, consolidating the fundamental axiom of Gaullist resistancialism in a series of equations in which, as Rousso points out, “the Resistance equals de Gaulle; de Gaulle equals France; hence, the Resistance equals

France (90). The commemoration was designed to produce a diversion of memory, recasting the martyr Moulin's role in the Resistance within the Gaullist mission to restore France's "grandeur." This retroactive reimagining of French history as an inviolate, commemorated national body provides the reference point to which the film *Belle de Jour* refers for, as we have seen, the trope of chastity resurfaces across the profilmic body of its heroine several years later.

Midway through the decade of the 1960s, French national identity that had been constructed under Gaullism and that had culminated in the televised ceremony would gradually begin to crack. This crack would be reflected in the realm of representation following the cultural revolution of May '68, but it is already evident in 1967 in the film *Belle de Jour*. The severed diegesis of the film, in which the codes of the conventional psychoanalytic intertext coexist beside the revolutionary codes of the surrealist subtext, crystallizes across the oppositional lines of health/illness, order/disorder, cleanliness/filth, real/imaginary. While film historian Susan Hayward has claimed that the political and national schizophrenia created by "the unreal reality" of Vichy has "little to no record in film" (140), the schizoid split evidenced within the fictional narrative of *Belle de Jour* does, indeed, provide a record several decades after the fact of the co-presence of two Frances, which were destined to clash in May '68: right against left, a party of order versus libertine and libertarian tendencies, a culture attached to tradition versus a culture that promoted reform, if not revolution (Rouso 98). The film *Belle de Jour* would provide an arena where conflicting memories could be worked through, for as Rouso points out, "the battle over the past was waged below the surface. Memory resembled not a paving stone hurled in anger but a 'cultural time bomb'" (99).

IV. The Dream: The Psychoanalytic Symptom or Sign of Subversion

The co-presence of intertextual frames in *Belle de Jour*, which refer to the codes of both conventional Hollywood psychoanalysis and revolutionary surrealist cinema, points to the coextensive presence of two Frances that would precipitate the guerre franco-française of May '68. In this manner, the division in diegetic space that structures the split identity of Belle de Jour provides an allegorical metaphor of the "broken mirror" of French national identity (Rouso 98). The severed diegetic space of the film, which self-consciously signifies not only the traumatized identity of Belle de Jour

but of France as well, is most evident in dream events that can be read by the spectator simultaneously as psychoanalytic symptoms or as signs of subversion.

Let's look at Séverine's daydream that follows her first visit to Madame Anaïs's brothel. Séverine retires to her bedroom with the excuse of a headache and then, suddenly, hears the sounds of cowbells and hooves. We are then shown, in the following tracking shot, bulls galloping through an open field. Our reading of the dream beneath the code of the psychoanalytic intertext is determined by the discourse of the men, Pierre and Husson, which anchors the visual images of the dream, bringing together the distant realities of the exterior space of the narrative and the interior space of the dream. Husson asks, "Is the soup ready?" to which Pierre responds, "It's cold and I can't warm it up again." Within this brief exchange, the image of the soup is anchored and given a metaphoric signified, for both the soup and Séverine share the property of coldness. Husson continues, "What's the time?" to which Pierre responds, "Between two and five, not later than five." Thus the phrase that, within the space of the real, denotes Séverine's working hours in the brothel anchors the image of the men shoveling cow shit, and we must conclude that Séverine and the manure share the common property of "dirtiness." The men's discourse forces us to read Séverine's dream as providing retroactive clarification of her actions in the exterior space of the real (her actions at the brothel were the re-enactment of an interior event).

Séverine's lack of vision in the real indexes her lack of desire, delineated within exterior space as the "complex" of her frigidity. Her interiorized vision is the space of her unconscious desire that culminates radically in the final image of the dream. This image shows her face progressively blackened and covered in the cow shit being thrown by the men who chant the invectives, "Bitch! Slut! Whore! Maggot! Pig! Scum! Garbage! Tramp!" to which Séverine can only murmur, "Pierre, Pierre, please stop. I love you." The image of Séverine that opens the dream and the image of her that marks closure share a pictorial sameness, as both represent her illness as "blindness." The conceptual antecedent renders the difference. Séverine's lack of vision, her metaphorical blindness within the space of fictional reality denoted her lack of desire. Her blackened face, her literal blindness, within the interior space of the dream was precisely the mark of her perverse masochism, the mirage of her sickness.

The codification determined by the psychoanalytic intertext would demand that we read Séverine's lack of desire as denoted by her lack of vision as an illness, a sickness, the locus of her complex. Our reading of the dream that fixes its signified as "the return of the unconscious repressed" is pinned

down by the men's invectives that are uttered like a magical incantation. Yet in this film, the shock aesthetic that characterized surrealist erotica is recirculated and narrativized within the dream event. While the surrealist code of blindness that informs Séverine's dream recalls the opening images of *Un Chien Andalou*, the surrealist intertext can also be located in the iconography, the representation of the interior space of the dream. The representation of Séverine's unconscious desire that shows bulls galloping across the plains accompanied by the sound of hooves and cowbells is a citation of the surrealist film *L'Age d'or*, which contains the image of a Jersey cow lying on a bed accompanied by the sound-off of cowbells. The codification of erotica within the surrealist films *Un Chien Andalou* and *L'Age d'or* was intended to defamiliarize conventional representations of erotica and to revolutionize conventional morality. Séverine's unconscious desire was precisely to "shock" and to "be shocked" by men, and it is in this manner that the surrealist aesthetic is recodified within the interior space of dreams, where it serves to index her "subversive" and "transgressive" character. The final image of her blackened face can be read as an overdetermined moment of surrealist erotica, her blindness the emblem of the shock aesthetic. In *Belle de Jour*, "the return of the unconscious repressed" becomes synonymous with the sexual revolution.

The surrealist shock aesthetic that informs our reading of the dream is interlaced with traces of Sadian eroticism.³ This intertextual layering is unsurprising, for as Arnold Heumakers has noted in "De Sade, a Pessimistic Libertine," the surrealists held the Marquis de Sade in high esteem precisely for his moral and sexual candor (119). Sadian eroticism is derived from the philosophical dimension of libertinism, which sees the universe as dichotomized into victims and libertines. From a Sadian perspective, the sincere belief of virtuous people in their own morality and religion marks them as victims, while the libertine has relinquished all prejudice and superstition (Heumakers 117). The Sadian libertine is without scruples and so is free to satisfy all lusts and to find the highest satisfaction possible in criminal acts (Heumakers 117). The dream in which Séverine encounters her father "the Duke" recalls the remote estates, inaccessible castles, and subterranean vaults where the decadent aristocracy of de Sade's novels indulged in uninhibited orgies. In de Sade's cosmology, destruction becomes the universal force of nature and consequently, the natural imperative of the libertine (Heumakers 116). The spectacle of Séverine's annihilation that closes on the emblematic image of her blindness seems essential to the film's

rhetoric of destruction and revolt in which the intertextual invocation of the surrealist shock aesthetic is interlaced with a Sadian erotics of annihilation, prefiguring sexual and cultural revolution.

The film's invocation of Sadian libertinism recreates the ethos of the *ancien régime* as historically associated with the moral depravity and disease peculiar to pre-revolutionary France. Indeed, Séverine's nightmarish phantasm—her blindness, her blackness, and her madness that surface within the interior space of the dream—invokes the mythic specter of the syphilitic, which had continued to haunt the collective unconscious of the French nation since the infamous orgies of the aristocracy. Syphilis, often called “the French sickness” (Quétel 10), had already enjoyed five centuries of colorful history. The disease had served as the status symbol of the philanthropic nobility during the *ancien régime* and was described by one writer as “the exclusive property of gentlewomen and gentlemen” (qtd. in Quétel 71). The virus, conveyed by the blood, would spread throughout the body, and patients would, “lose an eye, and often both, or large portions of their eyelids, and . . . remained hideous to behold, on account of their scarred eyes” (Paré qtd. in Quétel 57). The libertines of Louis XIV's reign, the generation of nobility that had precipitated the French revolution through excessive self-indulgence, had been notorious pox victims. It was within prerevolutionary France that an anti-pox propaganda campaign was waged by the bourgeoisie, who would attempt to define itself strategically as the only viable alternative to the debauchery of the aristocracy. The insurgent bourgeoisie promoted the notion that the disease was the cause of the “decline of the French temperament,” capable of destroying not only “the present race” but also “that yet to be born” (qtd. in Quétel 103).

Contemporaneous with the inter-war surrealist film movement and the popularization of Freudian psychoanalysis, there appeared in France a mythic archetype called the “hérédo,” an abbreviation of “hereditary syphilis” (Quétel 170). Historian Claude Quétel's observation that the whole inter-war generation was literally obsessed with the fear of syphilis seems pertinent to our discussion of the film, which was adapted from Joseph Kessel's novel *Belle de Jour* originally published in 1929 (192). During the 1920s and 1930s, a wave of anti-syphilitic propaganda suddenly surfaced in France, surfeiting the media with thousands of posters, tracts, press articles, and pamphlets, not to mention lectures, radio programs, the theatre, and the cinema (Quétel 180). This obsessive fear of contagion culminated during the Occupation, when syphilis served the Vichy régime as a scapegoat. The disease was seen by the supporters of Maréchal Pétain as symptomatic of the moral degeneracy responsible for France's defeat. As Quétel points out, the three con-

straining watchwords of the time “Travail, Famille, Patrie,” “signaled a concern with the idea of *mens sana in corpore sano* that was far from the former attachment to “liberties,” which had had such disastrous consequences” (206). The remarks of Dr. J. Payenneville published in *Que sais-je?* (1942), dedicated to *Le péril vénérien*, provide insight into the role syphilis played during the Occupation:

We are conscious of the fact that, having supported to the utmost the organization of the anti-venereal struggle in this country, we have made a substantial contribution to the work of rebuilding and regeneration of France, to which Marshal Pétain has dedicated himself with so much courage and self-denial. (qtd. in Quéтел 207)

In this manner, the moral degeneracy of the French state was displaced to a “medicalized” degeneracy. The “Ligue française pour le relèvement de la moralité publique,” a product of Vichy dedicated to the improvement of the moral standards of the country and the defense of family spirit, made an appeal to Maréchal Pétain to close all brothels. According to their plan of campaign, soliciting would be firmly suppressed; “male demand” would be reduced thanks to a “climate of moral cleanliness”; “the female invitation” would be reduced by moral surveillance (including the monitoring of women’s magazines, such as *Confidences*, which “distort the minds of hundreds of thousands of young women”) (qtd. in Quéтел 246).

While syphilis no longer posed an immediate threat following World War II, the phantom disease would continue to haunt the collective unconscious of the mass public, becoming what Nicole Valleur calls “the living symbol of a past transgression (a curse on two generations)” (qtd. in Quéтел 168). French author Louise Hervieu’s description of the mythic *hérédo* in her feverish novel *Le Crime* (1937) discloses the mythic resonance of the contaminated race:

How can we escape the heredity of our Species? We are *hérédos* . . . In the white races the disease concentrates on the most vulnerable parts, the overworked and enfeebled nerve centres. It produces people who are mad, half-mad, quarter-mad, unbalanced, obsessed. (qtd. in Quéтел 171)

The mythic archetype of the *hérédo* reappears in *Belle de Jour*, where it serves once again as the symbol of a past national transgression. The inability of Séverine’s glance to frame the real thus becomes not simply the code of her psychoanalytic “complex” but simultaneously the symptom of the contaminated race that had been historically linked to blindness, madness, degeneracy, and death. Indeed, the discourses of hereditary syphilis and psychoanalysis intersect, for Freud acknowledged hereditary syphilis as

a possible factor in the Dora case, speculating that the descendants of syphilitics seemed especially susceptible to grave neuropsychosis. In *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud further speculates that hysteria and obsessional neurosis could be attributable to hereditary syphilis:

In more than half of the severe cases of hysteria, obsessional neurosis, etc., which I have treated psychotherapeutically, I have been able to prove with certainty that the patient's father suffered from syphilis before marriage . . . I should like to make it perfectly plain that the children who later became neurotic bore no physical signs of hereditary syphilis, so that it was their abnormal sexual constitution that was to be regarded as a last echo of the syphilitic heritage. (102)

As Alain Corbin points out in an article devoted to hereditary syphilis, "it was as if doctors were translating the bourgeois fantasies of their time into scientific language" (qtd. in Quétel 169). The myth of the *hérédé*, which had been generated in the scientific language of the psychoanalytic and medical communities as well as in the fictions that appealed to the popular imagination, was a discursive construction that perpetuated the ideology of the chaste bourgeois family by serving as its scapegoat.

Séverine's unchaste unconscious thus serves as the emblematic return of a repressed national memory that the film intentionally invokes in order to exorcise. Her unconscious mind not only serves as the symptom of a psychoanalytic complex that requires self-abasement as the prelude to sexual ecstasy but also as the invocation of the mythic specter of hereditary syphilis, the emblematic French disease that had historically served as the scapegoat and the scourge of the Vichy régime. The return of Séverine's unconscious repressed in aberrant dream events thus simultaneously serves as the return of repressed national memory, symbolizing the moral stain of Vichyism and collaboration, which in this film is displaced from the female sexual organ onto the female gaze, the metonymical signifier for the female mind. The eruption of the dream event thus poses an implicit political threat not simply to the chaste construct of Séverine's personal identity but to the chaste and homogeneous version of national identity invented and consecrated by the Gaullist state. The trope of female madness, codified as blindness in this film, invokes the memory of a national contagion that would provide the point of comparison between two distinct historical epochs: the French malady not only symbolized the moral scourge of Vichy but simultaneously served as the emblem of the infectious aristocratic libertinism that had originally flowered in prerevolutionary France. Indeed, it is Madame Anaïs who describes Belle de Jour to her prospective client as a "true aristocrat."

The sexual depravity associated with Séverine's aristocratic character is thus seen as the sign of rebellion against the values of the "moral" bourgeoisie. As Rousso points out, the generation of May '68 repudiated the Gaullist vision of France and, therefore, implicitly, the inviolate version of its history (98). The students of May '68 were contesting the Gaullist state that conceived of itself as the heir to the Resistance (Rousso 99). Their challenge was directed not only at its present identity but at its history as well for, as Rousso remarks, "it was because the students sensed something invented in de Gaulle's attempt to substitute himself for the Resistance that it left them unmoved" (99). Unlike their parents, they refused such panaceas, choosing instead to expose the moral contamination at stake in the history of the Occupation. The generation of May '68 would denounce the sublimated revision of history represented in the commemorative ceremony of 1964 and thus would precipitate France's reconceptualization of the Occupation (Rousso 98). Reflecting the mood of pre-revolutionary France, the severed diegesis of *Belle de Jour* reveals the crack in the mirror of French national identity that would create a revolution in memory and thereby mark a fundamental break with what had gone before.

V. Dual Closure: The Broken Mirror of National Identity

Belle de Jour provides dual closure according to the dual hermetic logic of the pop psychoanalysis of classical Hollywood cinema and the revolutionary intertext of surrealist cinema. While each reading is valid according to the internal logic of the given intertext, each reading invalidates the other. As Sandro points out in *Diversions of Pleasure*, the solidarity of the entire narrative system is shattered retroactively, for the dichotomy upon which its logic has been based has been discredited (134).⁴

At this point, I will briefly review the final events of the film that culminate in the confrontation scene between Pierre and Séverine in their Paris apartment. Pierre, who has been shot by Séverine's lover, the young hoodlum Marcel, is seated in a wheelchair wearing dark glasses, completely paralyzed, speechless, and blind. Séverine remarks to Pierre that since "his accident" she no longer dreams. At this moment, the scene is interrupted by the entrance of Husson. When Séverine meets him at the door, Husson insists on revealing to Pierre the truth of the situation, the identity of the assassin, and the secret of Séverine's activities at Anaïs's brothel. While Husson meets with Pierre in private, we must assume that he exposes the whole story of Séverine's clandestine life. When Husson leaves, Séverine reenters the room. A close-up reveals Pierre's expressionless countenance

from behind his dark glasses. Séverine picks up her embroidery and starts to work, but she no longer has the strength. A close-up shows Pierre's hands unclenching in his lap, suggesting that he has died. Startled, Séverine leans forward to look, while the sound of cowbells and the thunder of hooves accompany her glance. We remember that these same sounds had served earlier in the film to signal the shift to an interior vision, the space of Séverine's unconscious. Suddenly, Pierre takes off his dark glasses, sits up in his wheelchair, smiles at Séverine and asks her, "What are you thinking about, Séverine?" She responds simply, "I was thinking of you, Pierre." His question and her response are identical to those at the opening of the film that had signaled Séverine's return to consciousness. Let's not forget that in the opening scene it was Pierre's dominant glance that had reframed Séverine's rape as a dream.

If precedence is accorded to the dominant intertext of psychoanalysis within the final scene, Séverine's vision is reframed beneath Pierre's dominant glance within the exterior space of the real. The internal logic of the Hollywood psychoanalytic intertext provides perfect closure to the fictional filmic narrative, providing a miraculous cure to Séverine's complex—through the elimination of dreams seen as symptoms. This cure to Séverine's complex of frigidity within the exterior space of the real leads us directly back in circular fashion to bourgeois marriage where the story began. The harmonious reunion of the husband and wife is the guarantor of her cure, the cure provided within the code of glances. As the marriage couple raise their glances as if to propose a toast, Séverine comes forward and kisses Pierre on the forehead. They stand momentarily holding one another in their arms. The final shot of the film, the landau that passes below, framed within Séverine's glance, is the final iconic signifier of the cure, for Séverine no longer projects herself into the scene.

Yet, as we had pointed out, the film provides dual closure according to the dual hermetic logic determined not only by the grammar of Hollywood psychoanalysis but by the revolutionary surrealist cinema as well. Within the final scene, the audio cue of cowbells and hooves accompanying the question and answer exchange between Pierre and Séverine had been established as a surrealist code that signified a shift from the exterior space of the diegetic real to the interior space of dream. If precedence is accorded to the surrealist code of sound, then Pierre's return to life and the couple's reunion occurs within the space of Séverine's dream. Yet such a reading of the scene would contradict not only the significance of the code of glances but the couple's question and answer exchange upon which the division of diegetic space has been based.

The surrealist code of blindness had informed the dream events and was localized at the overdetermined moment of the glance. If precedence is accorded to the surrealist intertext, we must read the final scene as the inversion of the reading predetermined by the psychoanalytic grammar. Seen from this perspective, Séverine literally and metaphorically opens her eyes to reframe and fix the scene within the interior space of her vision as her dream. Consequently, Pierre's blindness is literally and metaphorically validated within Séverine's interiorized vision: his shooting, his convalescence, consequent blindness, and death. Séverine's vision determined by the surrealist intertext provides magical closure in which the reunion of the couple occurs with the interior space of her dream.

Within the final scene, the intersection and rupture of the counter-code systems defamiliarizes the codes and the ideologies that the codes presuppose. If the final scene occurs within the space of the diegetic real, it becomes clear that our definition of fictional reality must be radically altered to accommodate a reading in which the sanctity of bourgeois marriage is celebrated. If, on the other hand, the final scene occurs in the space of a surrealist dream, then we must distrust the narrative codes that suggest the contrary. This crystallized moment of dual narrative closure offered to the spectator immediately implodes from the force of the film's logic to offer, instead, a dramatic metaphor for the interrogation of personal and national identity that occurs when memory is cut loose, dispersed—like the dreams of *Belle de Jour* that allegorically invoke the nightmarish phantasms of the national past. We are invited to read this moment of dual closure as allegorically pointing to the co-presence of two Frances—to see the film's shattered diegetic space as the broken mirror of French national identity (Rouso 98).

The film, similar to the surrealist text, calls for the murder of conventional vision and, in this way, aligns itself with a surrealist notion of the radical disorientation of the self. Blindness, which is the condition of true vision, and which is metaphorical in the film's imagery, is extended within the final scene of the film *Belle de Jour* to the profilmic spectator's perceptual process (Sandro, "Assault" 7). The pre-revolutionary body of May '68 constructed itself beneath the banner of perceptual and sexual liberation, promising its apocalyptic vision as the only viable alternative to the inviolate version of national history consecrated under Gaullism. Blindness that serves as the code of perceptual revolution paradoxically predicts the outcome of the May '68 revolution, which would not affect the realm of power but the realm of representation. After the death of de Gaulle in 1970, France suddenly found itself "unable to find the thread of its history and anxious

about not living up to its heroic dream" (Thibaud qtd. in Rousso 100). New images of the past, new representations of Vichy such as Marcel Ophuls's *The Sorrow and the Pity* (1971) marked a definitive break with what had gone before. Ophuls's documentary that focuses on daily life in Clermont-Ferrand, a city regarded as typical of France under the Occupation, shows a diversity of characters, actors in the narrative of history. The film records the eye-witness accounts of Pétainists, collaborators, along with the testimonials of nameless resistance fighters, while it elides the great figures of *la grande histoire*, such as General de Gaulle, who is virtually erased from the film (Rousso 101). The year 1968 marked a turning point in France's conceptualization of the Occupation, the year in which repressed national memory returned in full force, precipitating what Rousso has termed the "broken mirror" of French identity consecrated under de Gaulle (99). In the pre-revolutionary year of 1967, *Belle de Jour* represents the first crack in the mirror, if not a first symptom of the national neurosis that had originated in Vichy.

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Notes

¹ Paul Sandro's compelling discussion of *Belle de Jour* as "an erotic machine" (138) in *Diversions of Pleasure: Luis Buñuel and the Crises of Desire* underlies much of my thinking about the film throughout this essay. The chapter on *Belle de Jour* to which I refer first appeared as "Textuality of the Subject in *Belle de Jour*" *Sub-Stance* 26, 1980: 43-56. See also "Assault and Disruption in the Cinema: Four Films by Luis Buñuel" Diss. Cornell U, 1974, in which Sandro analyzes in detail *Un Chien Andalou* (1928), *L'Age d'or* (1930), *The Exterminating Angel* (1962), and *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie* (1972). This valuable study provides an elaboration of the figural discourse of surrealism, using A.J. Greimas's functional classification of roles in narrative fiction. See also Linda Williams, *Figures of Desire* (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1981) and Marvin D'Lugo, "Glances of Desire in *Belle de Jour*," *Film Criticism* 2.2-3 (1978): 84-89.

² See also Stephanie Jed's *Chaste Thinking* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989), in which she traces "the logic of chaste thinking" to its origins in the legend of the rape of Lucretia, which was reproduced in Coluccio Salutati's *Declamatio Lucretiae* in the second half of the fifteenth century in northeastern Italy. Jed offers her perspective on this legend that serves as a master narrative: "The humanistic tradition that has transmitted the legend of the rape of Lucretia has performed a similar function of isolating the meaning of Lucretia's rape from the material circumstances in which interpretation takes place each time this rape is reproduced. In this way, the rape of Lucretia has acquired a universal meaning divorced from historical conditions; in every age and place, it always serves the same function, as a prologue to liberty" (12). Jed points out that the rape of Lucretia has come to serve as the necessary prologue to the act of political liberation, and that consequently, it is essential to identify the tropes of chaste thinking, which persistently reappear in contemporary narratives. Jed's insights seem pertinent to our discussion of *Belle de Jour*, which was released in France at such a pre-revolutionary moment.

³ Paul Sandro in *Diversions of Pleasure* points out that the final segment of *L'Age d'or* represents the last episode of de Sade's *The 120 Days of Sodom*, depicting a band of men who successfully perpetuate anarchy within the enclosed space of the castle of Selligny. The title reads: "Four well-known and utter scoundrels had locked themselves up in an impregnable castle for one hundred and twenty days to celebrate the most brutal of orgies. These fiends had no law but their depravity. They were libertines who had no god, no principles, and no religion. The least criminal among them was defiled by more evil than you can name. In his eyes, the life of a woman—what am I saying, of one woman, of all the women in the world—counts for as little as a fly's" (66-67).

⁴ In *Diversions of Pleasure* Sandro argues that the film functions like Barthes's *text of bliss*, insofar as this final scene serves as "an interrogation, one that leads cross-referentially to any and all segments of the film, questioning, indeed canceling, the very possibility of narrative causality" (133).

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Sites of Memory

Tracing France's Cultural Self-Consciousness

Friday, April 17, 1998

4:30 pm

Welcome

Stacey Meeker, Conference Chair
Vanessa Herold, Assistant Chair
Juliette Salzmman, Attachée Culturelle

Introduction of Professor Fourny
Jean-Claude Carron, UCLA

5:00 pm

Jean-François Fourny

The Ohio State University,
French and European Studies

"Oublier l'avant-garde?"

Introduction of Professor Weber
Patrick Coleman, Chair

6:00 pm

Eugen Weber

Emeritus, UCLA Department of History

"Sites, Sights, and Silences of Memory"

7:00 pm

Reception

Saturday, April 18, 1998

8:30 am **Breakfast for participants and guests**

9:00 am *Francité et mémoire sur "la Toile"*

Open breakfast discussion on French web sites and memory. Participants, students, and faculty are invited to join in an informal discussion about the Internet and its role in the creation or deconstruction of "Frenchness."

10:00 am *Language of Memory*

Moderator: Vanessa Herold

1. "Details & Reproducing Domination: The Birth of the Ballet School, the Prison, and Other Correctional Facilities,"
Regina Sadono (*UCLA, Theatre Arts*)
2. "Memory as Construction in Viollet-le-Duc's Architectural Imagination,"
Aron Vinegar
(*Northwestern University, Art History*)
3. "The *néo-polar* Against Historical Amnesia,"
Josiane Peltier (*University of Iowa, English*)

12:00 pm **Luncheon at Sunset Village West**

Saturday, April 18, 1998

1:30 pm

Geography of Memory

Moderator: Heather Howard

1. "Le Paradis ou la mémoire retrouvée,"
Sophie Renoult (*University of Arizona, French*)
2. "Culture Swapping: Chateaubriand in Native America,"
Peggy J. Ackerberg (*Harvard University, French*)
3. "Clichés of Unity: History and Memory in Postwar
French Film,"
Marc Siegel (*UCLA, Critical Studies in Film*)
4. "Naming *la Guerre sans nom*: Memory, Nation and
Identity in French Representations of the Algerian
War, 1963-1992,"
Naomi Davidson (*Bryn Mawr College*)

3:30 pm

Subject as Memory / Memory as Subject

Moderator: Lena Udall

1. "Swann, Vinteuil et Marcel, et la mémoire involontaire,"
Joseph Jenkins (*UCLA, Comparative Literature*)
2. "French Folie: Memory and Madness in Buñuel's
Belle de Jour,"
Mary M. Wiles (*University of Florida, Film Studies*)
3. "Le temps perdu retrouvé: *Les champs d'honneur* de Jean
Rouaud,"
Sandrine Collomb Pilchowski
(*University of Cincinnati, French*)

5:00 pm

Closing remarks

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
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