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IX.—PARTY POLITICS IN INDIANA DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

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The study of politics in the States is essential to a proper discovery of the political history of the nation. It is obvious to a casual student that during the first half century of American history the political conditions, conflicts, and rival leaderships within any one of such States as New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, or the Carolinas were decisive factors in determining the course of political events in the nation at large. While this may not be asserted to an equal degree of the Western States and of more recent years, and while the influence and the weight of local political conditions may not now bear so great a proportion to the life of the whole as in earlier times, yet it will always be true that the historian of American politics will find his best materials in the political struggles within the several States.

Indiana has been until very recently a pivotal State in our party conflicts. For a quarter of a century following the civil war her electoral vote, combined with that of New Jersey, New York, and the former slave States, would have been decisive in the election of a President. In these party struggles Indiana, while always a hotly contested field, has appeared, when judged from its native constituency, to be normally a Democratic State. Out of sixteen biennial contests from 1862 to 1892 the Democratic party carried the State ten times, and in the other contests the Republicans won under unusual conditions or by very narrow margins.

One of the serious problems that confronted Mr. Lincoln in his conduct of the civil war was that of uniting the North in its vigorous prosecution—the problem of making the war a national, not a party, war. The party influences arrayed to

oppose and embarrass, with the ultimate purpose of defeating for reelection, the war administration of Mr. Lincoln were probably as formidable in Indiana as in any other State in the North. The extent and character of this party opposition to Mr. Lincoln in Indiana is the principle theme of this paper.

Indiana was settled chiefly from the South, by immigrants from the Carolinas, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee. They were pioneer home hunters of native American stock. The State felt less than any of its neighbors the influence from the several streams of foreign immigration that passed to the West, such, for instance, as came from the Germans with their dispositions toward nationality and liberty. A few of the settlers from the South, like the Quakers and the Scotch-Irish Covenanters from the Carolinas, brought anti-slavery principles with them, but the great mass of these immigrants were Southern in kinship, sympathies, and political ideas. These ideas were the ideas of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democracy—equality among men of the white race, local independence, economy in administration, simplicity in the life of the people and their rulers, little interference by Government, and the general tenets of the Virginia school of politics. As to slavery, the immigrants were either morally indifferent, caring not whether slavery was voted up or voted down, or they positively indorsed the peculiar institution of the South. They were filled with an intense race prejudice against the negro, which led them into an intolerance that was sometimes fierce and hateful, always unreasoning and unreasonable. George W. Julian said in a political speech at Raysville in 1858:

It is a sad truth that Indiana is the most proslavery of all the Northern States * * * Our people hate the negro with a perfect if not a supreme hatred * * * The proposal to repeal the Missouri compromise excited less opposition in Indiana than in any other free State. Some of the Whigs and Democrats denounced it, but their zeal for freedom seemed more a matter of geography than of conscience.

In the campaign of 1856 the territory south of the National Road was forbidden ground to antislavery speakers.

For forty-four years after the admission of the State, from 1816 to the election of Lincoln in 1860, the electoral vote of Indiana was given to the Democratic party with the exception of the two years when Gen. William Henry Harrison was the

candidate of the Whigs—in 1836 and 1840. In this period the southern section of the State, settled much earlier than the northern, held a preponderant control in the politics of the State. South of the National Road, from Richmond west through Indianapolis, the southern element was in almost complete control. This population gave Indiana what may be called a *conservative* character, especially as applied to antislavery proposals and to innovations in political ideas. Ultra men were not in favor with this old school, Virginia Democracy.

This conservatism was noticeable in its influence upon the Republican party, even among many of its members who were decidedly opposed to slavery. Mr. Henry S. Lane, the leader of the Indiana Republicans in 1860, and the party candidate for governor, in joint debates which he held with his opponent, Mr. Thomas A. Hendricks, reflected this conservative disposition. One is impressed with the very little attention given in these joint discussions to the question of slavery. In this notable campaign when, as we are accustomed to think, the burning and absorbing question of the hour was that of slavery—a question that, as it seems to us, was rending the Union in twain—Mr. Hendricks practically avoided the discussion of the question, while Mr. Lane, for the Republicans, resenting the charge of Abolitionism, claimed only to be standing where great leaders of the Democratic party had stood but a few years before, and he carefully explained that Republican opposition to slavery was merely opposition to its extension. “Wherever slavery exists by virtue of local law,” said Lane, “there it is sacred and protected by the Constitution of the United States.” For the agitation on slavery Lane held that the Democratic party was entirely responsible; it was owing directly to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. “All was peace and harmony before; there was no angry feeling between the North and the South. All the people and every party in the country acquiesced in the compromise measures of 1850.” While Lane spoke with no uncertain sound against the dogma that the Constitution carried slavery into the Territories and protected it there, he claimed the merit of the conservative in standing upon slavery where Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Clay, and Webster had stood. This conservative influence, it will be remembered, was ex-

erted by the Indiana delegation, headed by Lane, at the Republican National Convention at Chicago in 1860 in opposition to what was supposed to be the more radical candidacy of Seward and in favor of the more conservative candidacy of Lincoln for the Presidency.

An analysis of political discussion in Indiana during the war reveals certain distinct party elements and opinions. The mass of the Republicans in Indiana were at its beginning disposed to conduct the war on the basis of the Crittenden resolution of July, 1861, merely for the Union and the maintenance of the Constitution as it was. They would not disturb slavery. Antislavery purposes were suppressed. There were, however, many Republicans in Indiana, as elsewhere, who, like George W. Julian, would have it understood in "point-blank words" that, as Julian expressed it, "liberty was dearer to them than Union," and that they "had no love for a proslavery Union so highly prized by our modern Democracy."^a

Oliver P. Morton, Lane's running mate for lieutenant-governor in 1860, and who, upon Lane's election to the United States Senate, became the war governor of the State, was one type of Indiana Republicanism. He was a conservative but a positive leader, who was ready to temporize, or wait on time and public sentiment, for the sake of success. Julian was quite another type—a man of intense convictions, who had devoted himself to the antislavery cause and who believed in a thorough antislavery policy. These two wings of the Republicans came unitedly to the support of the war at all hazards—at the sacrifice, if need be, of property interests in slaves, of the rights of the States as formerly defined, and of the strict application of the Constitution for the protection of civil rights in time of war.

Turning to the Democratic party we discern three distinct divisions of the party forces. They may be called: (1) The War Democrats, (2) the Constitutional-Union Democrats, (3) the Anti-War Democrats, those who preferred disunion to war and who are more commonly known by the name of "Copperheads."

All these wings of the Democratic party proclaimed their love for the Union. The devotion to the Union among the

^aSpeech at Raysville, 1857.

people of Indiana, if not overwhelming, was certainly decisive. All parties professed it. Among some this devotion, it is true, took a peculiar, even a questionable turn, but their professions were an undoubted and significant recognition of the popular mind on this subject. This devotion did not lead to the subordination of parties and party strife and to the fusion of all parties into one united party for the Union, as some desired, a desire which the Republicans attempted to make use of for their party cause. But the Democrats, whose loyalty to the Union was questioned, indignantly resented this imputation and they found it necessary in antagonizing the administration of Mr. Lincoln to assert, in their speeches and public declarations, their opposition to secession and their attachment to the Union, and to insist upon a distinction being drawn between opposition to the war and opposition to the civil and political measures of the Administration. A war for the Union—the old Union as it was and the Constitution as it is—they constantly avowed their purpose to support; a war for abolition and all means and measures looking in that direction they would strenuously oppose.

The mass of the Indiana Democracy had voted for Douglas in 1860. Of the 127,000 Democratic votes cast in the State only 12,000 had been cast for Mr. Breckinridge. John Bell, the candidate of the Constitutional Union Party received only 5,000 votes in Indiana. After Southern secession and the outbreak of war many of the Douglas Democrats became Republicans. These were the war Democrats, men who were ready to forego their party interests and unite by fusion with the Republicans into a Union party, men like ex-Governor Joseph A. Wright, Hon. James Hughes, of Bloomington, ex-member of Congress (who had supported Breckinridge in 1860), Martin M. Ray, and others. These men believed in a vigorous prosecution of the war, and that our attacks should be directed against the rebels in arms rather than against Mr. Lincoln and his Administration. This right wing of the Democratic forces, as it were, were ready to lay down their party arms and come into the camp of their political opponents, or, rather, they were ready, as they looked at it, to form a new camp in which there would be a cessation of party strife for the sake of alliance against their common foe, the enemies of the Union with arms in their hands. For June 18, 1862, the Republicans

and war Democrats called a *Union* convention to promote the cooperation of those who favored a vigorous prosecution of the war. At this convention the Democratic delegates held a separate meeting of their own. They adopted resolutions favoring the union of all good citizens for the support of the Administration in all necessary measures to crush the rebellion; for this they would unite with all citizens of whatever former name or association.

Governor Morton presided at this union convention of the war Democrats with the Republicans. The speech of Hon. Martin M. Ray, a Democrat who had voted for Douglas in 1860 may be taken to represent the attitude of war Democrats:

The issue [he said] was government or no government. All party issues should be put aside until the government is reestablished in every State. If slavery must perish in the conflict to restore the Union, let it perish. * * * Let us exorcise the fierce spirit of party and faction that has so fearlessly cursed our land. * * * To enter into a discussion as to the causes of the war is but to mock at our calamities. This is not the time to try that issue. The issue is between the Government and armed rebellion. Party spirit is striving to change and transfer this issue, the tremendous issue between the Government and armed treason, to a number of irrelevant and immaterial differences between the loyal people of the North. The opponents to the Administration affect to consider all the rest of us as abolitionists or secessionists. There are few of either among us.

Ray looked to this Union convention, not as a party movement but as a movement of the people—

a union against the scheme of baffled politicians to ally the Northwest and the South; also against the suicidal and visionary scheme of crazy enthusiasts to inaugurate forcible emancipation with its untold horrors.

Stern, unrelenting, crushing war, firmly supported by the masses of all political parties is the only panacea for the restoration of peace and union. We must meet the superannuated expounders of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, who still swear that if these resolutions mean secession they are secessionists, thus using the wedge of dogmatism and bigotry to split the Union. Cast-iron politics and Virginia resolutions are about played out.

What the country needs is that Democrats should go South and proclaim in the ears of all that treason has no ally in the North; that the Breckinridge faction that tried to commit the Democratic party to an alliance with the rebellion has failed; that the South must fight, not only Mr. Lincoln's political friends, but the whole Democratic party. The sooner this is understood all round the better for the country, but as long as a certain class of newspapers refuse to publish one generous, liberal, loyal, frank, patriotic, or earnest expression of sympathy for a struggling Government it need not be expected. This creates false hopes and protracts hostilities.

The war Democrats wish to save the Constitution and the Union by overthrowing the rebellion by the prosecution of the war. The Constitutional Democrats propose to save the Union by conniving at treason in the name of the Constitution and assailing everything under the name of abolitionism except the rebellion. They take no notice of the exigencies of an atrocious rebellion, but with well-dissembled alarm for the safety of the Constitution, with both hands up and eyeballs dilated, they inveigh furiously against abolitionism.

Such Democrats, no matter what may have been their antecedents, soon came into close harmony, if not identification, with the Republicans. They may be eliminated as a part of the Democratic opposition.

The opposite wing of the Democracy were the "Copperheads." On January 29, 1862, Jesse D. Bright, Senator from Indiana, was expelled from the Senate of the United States charged with complicity with the rebellion. Bright had written a letter to "His excellency, Jefferson Davis," introducing a friend who had a style of firearms for sale. In the discussions preceding his expulsion Bright defined three classes or parties in the North in respect to the attitude of the people toward the war: (1) An extreme party of Northern abolitionists, who favored invading the South, declaring the slaves free and arming them against their masters; all of which was to Bright the height of abomination. He named Mr. Sumner as the representative of this class. (2) The main body of the Republicans who opposed this line of policy, but who were in favor of furnishing all men and money necessary to invade any and every State in rebellion and by military force to subject the people there to submission. They were opposed to interfering with the rights of property or with slavery except as a military necessity. Senator Sherman, of Ohio, was named as a type of this class. (3) The party opposed to invading any of the States of the South, or attempting by force of arms the subjugation of her citizens and the destruction of their property, "until all efforts at reconciliation had been exhausted." A defensive war only was justifiable, and only the men and money necessary to defend the capital and the loyal States from invasion should be furnished. This meant that war for the Union was not to be supported. It would be a war of aggression, of subjugation, for the destruction of property, for the coercion of sovereign States; and these ends were all unrighteous and unconstitutional.

War was disunion. If the Union could not be restored by compromise and conciliation it could not be restored at all, and these men were unwilling that any attempt should be made to restore the Union if it had to be done by war. In the description of this class Bright described himself. He represented a considerable element of the Democratic party in Indiana—men whose chief creed was to hate abolitionists; who were constantly haunted with the bogie of negro equality and race mixture; who sympathized with the South, believed in the sovereign rights of the States, opposed coercion, and bitterly denounced the war and all the positive measures of the Administration. It was this ultra element that gave the body of the Democratic party in Indiana a *copper* hue; that led to the secret political organizations and the treason trials resulting from the assumed necessity of the application of military law and the arbitrary arrests by the Government. No doubt their success would have been comfort to the enemy. But, like most extreme and aggressive classes, the "Copperheads" may have attracted an attention disproportionate to their numbers. What proportion they were of the rank and file it would be very difficult to determine. It was the Republican policy to identify the whole Democratic party with this noisy and turbulent and, in some cases, treasonable element.

It is certain, however, that the "Copperheads," while they were a force within the party to be reckoned with, and in some localities a prevailing force, did not determine the official utterances and leadership of the party. The party was wiser. The great body of the party, which I may describe as the center, standing between the War Democrats on one wing and the "Copperheads" on the other, knew the doom that would follow party complicity with disunion and disloyalty. This center of the Democratic forces, containing elements shading off toward either wing, make up what we have named the Constitutional-Union Democrats. We have no sufficient reason to doubt either their loyalty to the Union or their attachment to the strict application of the Constitution, though much of their party conduct and discussion certainly descended to the plane of mere demagoguery and faction. In much that they did partyism took the place of patriotism; whether this was because they were handicapped by the

“Copperheads” or because of their prejudice toward the negro and the abolitionists I do not attempt to determine.

The character of this Union Democracy and the nature of the party opposition that it aroused against Mr. Lincoln’s Administration, to what extent it represented the spirit of unjustifiable faction, to what extent its course was defensible party conduct, it is the next purpose of this paper to portray.

The discussions clearly reveal the constituent elements and opinions that went to make up the ruling public opinion of the party.

1. In the first place, on the sectional struggle of the preceding decade relating to slavery, the party was one of concession, conciliation, and compromise. It was a Union-saving party, when saving the Union meant satisfying by concessions the demands of the slave States. It would readily, perhaps unanimately, have accepted the Crittenden compromise of the winter of 1860 and 1861; and these organs and leaders charged upon the Republicans the defeat of this proposed amendment, soundly denouncing them as abolitionists and disunionists for this reason.

The Sentinel, the State organ of the Democratic party, in its issue of April 5, 1861, says:

The spring elections show the ascendancy of the conservative sentiment in the State. The people of Indiana are in favor of the adjustment of the unfortunate difficulty between the sections by any honorable compromise. There can be no doubt that if the Crittenden amendment had been submitted to a vote of the people at the elections in April it would have carried by an overwhelming majority. A vote of that kind would have made for reconstruction. The Republicans were, however, unwilling to take any steps looking to concession and conciliation, without which it is useless even to think of restoring the relations which have heretofore existed.

As late as March 30, 1861, the Sentinel indorsed Alexander H. Stephens’s proposal of a reconstruction of the country on the basis of the Montgomery constitution.

This [says the Sentinel] is the quickest process. The Montgomery constitution is in many respects a great improvement upon the Federal Constitution. The revenue system it provides is far in advance of any yet attempted since the General Government was organized. A reunion can never be accomplished without compromise. A national convention to arrange the terms is hardly practicable. The South would hardly participate. The border States propose a convention to lay down the conditions

upon which they will remain in the Union. These States would, therefore, not favor a convention, while the slow process of it would give the Confederacy time to gain strength. Why not meet the issue promptly and yield whatever is reasonable to satisfy the Union conservative men of the South, and thereby build up a National Union party which will neutralize and destroy the extremists, the disunionists of both sections? * * * If a majority of the people of the North are opposed to yielding what the South declare to be their rights under the Constitution, then shall it be war for the mastery or a peaceful separation—the formation of two confederacies.

“War for the mastery” was, in the opinion of the conservative Democracy, a course not to be entertained for a moment. This party, having no sense of wrong committed by the South, having no concern for the slave, having no cause for which to make a stand in the struggle between the sections, and no scruples against conceding all the demands the slave holders made, were, therefore, naturally and strenuously against what was called a policy of coercion. When, by April 8, 1861, it seemed that the Administration had decided on an aggressive policy, to the extent of attempting to collect Government revenue in Southern ports, the Sentinel said:

War will be precipitated by this conduct of Mr. Lincoln. Is it the object of the Administration to paralyze the efforts of the gallant men of the border slave States, who have been nobly battling for the Union, and force them to unite their destinies to the Confederacy? *We all know, or should know, that there is no hope for reunion except in conciliation or concession.* The most moderate of the Union men of the slave States demand guarantees like those proposed by Mr. Crittenden. The coercive policy of Mr. Lincoln can not be maintained without the cordial approval of the conservative citizens of the North. They believe that this Government can not be maintained by force. They do not believe in the doctrine of an “irrepressible conflict,” but they believe that the States can continue in a Union “half slave and half free.” * * * In the present crisis it is the duty of all patriotic and worthy citizens to withhold aid and comfort from the Administration if it adopts a coercive policy—a policy that can do nothing but confirm our divisions.

The Sentinel rebuked Governor Morton for pledging to Mr. Lincoln 6,000 volunteers from Indiana if he would adopt “a coercive policy” toward the Confederacy.

The people of Indiana [said the Sentinel] do not propose to engage in a crusade against the South for party purposes, to advance the schemes of abolitionists and of the protectionists of Pennsylvania and New England. The Southern States have not trespassed upon the rights of the people of Indiana, nor do they propose to do so. The legislation of the Confederate

States is not inimical to the interests of the Northwest, but in harmony therewith, while that of the Black Republican Congress discriminates against them.

If these expressions were representative of the party (and there is no reason to doubt it), it is evident that the Constitutional Democrats were at the beginning, as they continued to be, a party that favored compromise and concession—that favored peace and reunion in terms to be named by the South.

2. In the second place, the Constitutional Democrats, or the Conservative Union men, as they called themselves, were violently opposed to the antislavery movement. It was because of this that they were ready for almost any kind of compromise with the South. In their view, the abolitionists and the agitation which they had so persistently kept up for a generation were the cause of the war. War had come because of ultraism and sectionalism. The ultras had gotten into power in their respective sections, the abolition ultras in the North, the “fire-eating,” secession ultras in the South. The latter had been brought to the front in the South because of the persistent attacks of the disunion abolitionists upon Southern domestic institutions.

Both secessionists and abolitionists, the Democratic organs asserted, should be put down; but it is evident that the greater sympathies of the Democrats were with the South. Their prejudices and greater dislike were directed against the abolitionists and against New England, the nursery of abolitionists. It was the Democratic view that the abolitionists had forced the war upon the South. These abolitionists were “fanatics breathing pestilence from pandemonium, trying to destroy the Union, so as to secure over its broken fragments the emancipation of slaves—the Beechers, the Cheevers, the Phillipses, the Greeleys—monsters who come sneaking to Washington seeking the destruction of slavery.” They are “disunionists and should be hung with secessionists in pairs.” If it may be said of some abolitionists that they were not willing to save the Union with slavery, of equal truth it may be said of these abolition-hating Democrats that they were not willing to save the Union without slavery. In any case, the rights and wrongs of the slave had no consideration. The party officially resolved (1862) that in considering terms of settlement “we will look only to the welfare, peace, and safety

of the white race, without reference to the effect that settlement may have upon the condition of the African." The party thoroughly believed in the subordination of the negro race to the white, where they both exist together.

This proslavery disposition, voiced in constant and violent denunciations of the abolitionists—and all positive antislavery men were included under this term—is manifest in the Democratic literature of the time. An official document of the party^a refers to Sumner as the "craziest of all the crazy pack of abolitionists." The *Sentinel* refers to the "fanatical and insane ravings of Thaddeus Stevens," the "madness and recklessness of whose language" reminded the editor of "a monkey playing with fire in a ship's magazine. Such madmen should be sent to an asylum." It was "rabid abolition treason of Boston that urged the arming of the blacks." "He who loves abolition, hates the Constitution and the Union." "We must suppress the rebellion, and, as abolitionism produced it, abolitionism and secession must be buried in the same grave." "An abolitionist is as much a secessionist as any to be found in South Carolina. They abuse each other, but they both unite in laying violent hands on the Government." How those who were seeking to direct the war against slavery were laying violent hands on the Government was not made clear.

In this classification of the abolitionists with the secessionists, as equally enemies of the Union, the fallacy is obvious. Though extreme abolitionists had formerly denounced a Union with slaveholders as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell," and declared that such a Union must be broken up, yet they were opposing a proslavery Union with the force of opinion only, and were during the war loyally supporting the Government and were seeking only in legitimate and legal ways to turn the forces of the Union against slavery, while the secessionists, whom the Democrats were more ready to conciliate and excuse, were opposing the legitimate Government of the Union with arms in their hands. When Greeley suggested that the way to abolish this hated abolitionism was to abolish slavery, the *Sentinel* indorsed the reply of the *Louisville Journal*, that from Greeley's logic it follows that "the way to abolish rebellion is to abolish government; the way to

^a "Facts for the People," by a citizen of Indiana, published by order of the Democratic State central committee, July 30, 1862.

abolish thieving is to abolish property; the way to abolish murder is to abolish life; the way to abolish a wrong is to abolish the right on which wrong is inflicted." From this one is left to infer that it was clearly on the ground that slavery was as well founded in right as government and property and life that the Democratic discussion proceeded. It was, after all, this *rightfulness* of slavery in the Democratic view which was at the foundation of the party's attitude toward abolitionism and the antislavery measures of the war.

This proslavery disposition led the Democrats in all their discussion of the causes of the war to lay the burden of blame on the Republicans and the antislavery men of the North. The South was but standing for its rights; the antislavery men of the North were always the aggressors. Even so late as the day following the attack upon Fort Sumter, April 13, 1861, the *Sentinel* said, under the head lines, "Civil strife commenced," "The abolition war of Seward, Lincoln & Co.:"

Civil strife has commenced. The abolitionists and disunion administration have attempted the coercion of the Confederate States. Such are the first fruits of Republicanism—the end no one can see. Mr. Lincoln will seek to evade the responsibility of inaugurating civil war by charging the overt act upon the Montgomery government. If war was not intended, why was a military and naval expedition fitted out with the men and appliances to reinforce and occupy Fort Sumter at all hazards. This was not a peaceable mission. It was known the demonstration would be an act of war, and the men of the South would have been regarded as mere braggarts if they had not resisted unto death. Their honor was at stake. If they had yielded without resistance, they would have stood disgraced before the world. * * * It must not be forgotten that the Confederate States have made no hostile demonstrations upon the North. They sent commissioners to seek an adjustment of the difficulties, but they were repulsed. The door for reconciliation, compromise, or a peaceful separation was closed against them. The Declaration of Independence is our authority that any State or nation deliberately resolving that its government is intolerable has a right to change it. And the Confederate States, not we, have the right to judge whether our Government is oppressive to them. If we can not live in peace with the seceding States "let them go out." It is better to have them friends out of the family than enemies in it. Such considerations should influence every wise and good man.

In the following issue of April 15 the *Sentinel* quotes Mr. Greeley's noted article in the *Tribune* of November 9, 1860, entitled "Let the erring sisters go in peace," and commended it as "sound doctrine now as well as then." "Now," says the *Sentinel*, "the *Tribune* has changed front and is favoring

coercive measures. Why has this change occurred? The reason is the protective tariff and their desire to be true to the cotton lords of New England and the ironmasters of Pennsylvania.”

3. As this last expression indicates, there was another traditional sentiment that moved the Indiana Democracy. Coupled with this opposition to abolitionism was the old prejudice against New England and the Yankee, perhaps transmitted from the South, and the traditional opposition of the Southern and Western Democrats to the protective tariff. Such expressions as “the cotton lords of New England and the iron masters of Pennsylvania” are of frequent occurrence. The Republicans felt that the Democrats were attempting to fill the hearts of the people with hatred of the Yankees. Whether the Democrats were discussing abolitionism or protectionism, New England and the Yankee were sure to come in for attack. In “Facts for the people relating to the present crisis,” published by the order of the Democratic central committee, July 30, 1862, and in other campaign documents, the new tariff policy of the Republicans—the Morrill tariff—was vigorously denounced as being exactly in line with the class legislation that New England had been attempting for the past forty years. Her tonnage and tariff policies were provoking to certain sections of the country; her manufacturing and navigation interests reaped undue profits, while agricultural interests were prevented.^a

“The unfairness of the Morrill tariff is shown in that it reduces the duties on many articles which should have been increased, because of the character of those who use them.

They are commodities which are extensively used by the rich and by residents of our large cities. But the abolitionists in Congress from the Eastern States had the power and used it for their own purposes and that of their section.^b This tariff proceeds from bad to worse and comes to its climax of dishonesty by *removing all duty from many of the imported articles which are used by the New England manufacturers in the prosecution of their business.* At such a time, with such fearful responsibilities hourly increasing, when the nation is putting forth all its strength and jeopardizing its material wealth, when from almost every hamlet in the land the wail is heard above the din of arms and the roar of the cannon for loved ones killed or maimed in battle—can the imagination picture a scene more revolting than that of Congress discussing, for weeks and months, and finally adopting this *policy of increasing the semiannual dividends of the East-*

^a Facts for People, p. 2.

^b A table of reductions is appended.

ern manufacturers and at the same moment throwing additional burdens on the working classes of the people."^a

Mr. Hendricks spoke frequently and publicly of the common interests, commercially and materially, which bound the Northwest to the South, speeches on which his political opponents based the charge that Hendricks and his party were looking toward a Northwestern confederacy for alliance with the South, with the purpose of leaving New England and the Eastern States to themselves. The Democratic press and leaders constantly denied that such a design existed, and I know of no reason to believe that it did exist, unless it were held in reserve for the possible emergency of Southern success and independence. But the suggestion expressed a very common friendliness toward the South, a common hostility to New England. The Democrats of Indiana were constantly teaching that the politics of New England were noxious and that her material interests were constantly being promoted by government at the expense of agricultural States like Indiana. This feeling is accentuated in a campaign address by the "Committee of Thirteen of the Sons of Liberty," supposed to have been prepared by Mr. John C. Walker, one of the editors of the *Sentinel*, which was distributed through the State by the campaign committees and agencies of the Democrats.

"It was the fanaticism of New England that caused the war with the Southern States and brought desolation and sorrow to the hearthstones of our people. She ransacks the entire country for negroes to fill her quotas in the Army, and while crying for a vigorous prosecution of the war fattens on the blood of Western men. The tariff increases the wealth of New England at the expense of the West. She retains as far as possible her white men at home to manufacture goods for the Army, and redoubles her profits every year the war continues. When the war shall be ended, three-fourths of the Government debt, \$3,000,000,000 in 5 per cent and 6 per cent gold-bearing bonds, will be piled up in New England. These bonds, which cost the holder less than 40 cents on the dollar, and as a consequence pay 15 per cent interest in gold on the investment, represent New England's profits in the war for the emancipation of the negro. The bonds pay no taxes. Three thousand millions of property in New England accumulated by profits in the war which has impoverished the Northwest, will pay no taxes toward liquidating the public debt. But the people of the West will pay taxes on all the property they own. What they buy and what they sell, what they eat and what they wear, what they inherit and what they produce—all will be taxed. The time will come, with pay day, when the Western man will be required to set apart every third part of the product

^a Address of Democratic central committee, July, 1830, in report of mass convention.

of his labor, every third bushel of the produce of his field, every third ox, ass, horse, sheep, and hog to supply the demands of the taxgatherer. His lands, his houses, the bones and muscles of his children will be mortgaged to pay the interest on the debt held in New England, the pestilential source of all the fanaticism, all the proscription, all the bigotry that has cursed the country since the days when the Puritans burned old women for witches and banished Roger Williams for his religious opinions."

4. Besides being for compromise and concession toward the South and against abolitionism and protectionism, and as a consequence, against New England as the source of these woeful heresies, the Democratic party in Indiana professed to stand for the vindication of the Constitution. In the conduct of the war the Constitution was to be their chart and constant guide. In all their arguments their constant appeal was to the Constitution. Whether or not the measures of the Administration were politic or wise, it was certain in the Democratic view that they were unconstitutional. The Democrats stood, partly from principle and tradition and partly from force of circumstances, as a defender of the individual against the impositions of government and as a defender of the rights of the States against centralized power. On this it based its claim to be a legitimate opposition. The Democratic party has been traditionally, at least throughout most of its history, a party of opposition. Party discussion in Indiana during the war shows that in this period it was exclusively so. As the basis of its opposition to all the measures of the Administration, it appealed to the Constitution. This was the party's constant bulwark of defense. Its teachers and leaders were thoroughly wedded to and were constantly inculcating the doctrines of the Constitution taught by the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, adherence to the rights, sovereignty, and independence of the States, and resistance to the increase of centralized authority. Harrison H. Dodd, an extreme copperhead, but whose political doctrines, as expressed in the following extract the *Sentinel* publicly indorsed, took occasion to deny in a public speech that Democratic opposition to the war was inspired by their attachment to slavery. That opposition, he asserted, was based on constitutional grounds.

"So far as I am concerned [said Dodd] I am opposed to this war, and have been every day, hour, and minute since its inauguration, and stand ready to stop it if it were in my power to-morrow, *upon the basis of the sovereignty of the States* as contradistinguished from a centralized

power sufficient to reduce the States to Territories by any process and for any purpose. For myself, I am a firm believer that the relation of master and slave is the only practical and philosophical condition of blacks and whites when placed together on this or on any other continent. But many who do not so believe stand firmly opposed to this war, because though leveled ostensibly against slavery it is really leveled against sovereignty. At the same time it is engendering a central power not warranted by the Constitution and dangerous to liberty."

The Democrats in their literature constantly reiterated that they were for the Union of the fathers, the Union of the old Constitution. They demanded that the war be conducted in accordance with the principles of the Constitution strictly applied. They were for peace and reunion at the earliest practicable moment, but the restoration should be on the terms of the Federal Constitution "with all the rights and guarantees of the several States unimpaired," an expression which Morton denounced as a stereotyped form of speech for the preservation of slavery. Sumner's doctrine that the Constitution was made for peace, not for war; that war makes law for itself and must be conducted according to the laws of war and not according to the Constitution; that war, born of violence, looks to violence for victory and discards all limitations except such as are supplied by the rights of war,—such a doctrine made these defenders of the Constitution white with rage. It seemed to them merely a doctrine set up to enable the ultras to evade the Constitution and abolish slavery. To Horace Greeley's suggestion that he "was for the Union as it was under the Constitution, if it could not be improved;" but he "greatly preferred the Union as it ought to be," the Sentinel replied that this means that—

"Greeley and his tribe think the old Union can be improved upon, and that the way to bring about improvement is to engraft all the doctrines of abolitionism upon the parent stock—emancipation, negro equality, negro suffrage, and, whenever possible, negro office holders."

To the Chicago Tribune's suggestion that in the war the nation was fighting for its life and that in such a struggle the Constitution was not intended and should not be used to hamper and defeat that great end, the Sentinel replied, indorsing an editorial from the New York Journal of Commerce:

The Constitution is the nation. The Constitution is the Republic. The Constitution is the Union. The Constitution gone, the Republic is dead.

The man who holds that the obligations of the Constitution are at an end can not be a loyal supporter of the Union. If the Constitution is not binding, against what are these men rebels? We are fighting for the Constitution, and for that alone. All other objects of the war are delusions.

When it is remembered that the Sentinel only a brief year before was willing to throw the whole Constitution over and take in its stead the Confederate constitution adopted at Montgomery, it will not be surprising if the historical student is led to suspect that such fidelity to the Constitution was not inspired so much by a desire to preserve that "matchless instrument," as Democratic speakers were in the habit of calling it, as by a desire to embarrass the Republican war administration and to defeat antislavery ends.

Turning from the general character and opinion of the Democratic party, we notice the public measures and policies on which the opposition joined issue with the Administration.

1. In the first place, the Democrats accused the Republicans of making use, for party purposes, of the universal devotion to the Union. The plea of the Republicans and their allies, the War Democrats, that all party should be forgotten in this emergency was denounced by the conservative Democrats as a "no-party dodge." In their eyes this "no-party party," as they called it, was merely an hypocritical pretense of the Republicans by which they hoped to take to themselves the spoils of office and perpetuate their own power. William H. English, in a letter to the Sentinel (June 28, 1862), warned the faithful against the no-party trap, set by men devoted to unscrupulous and vindictive warfare against the Democratic party.

"The same trap," said English, "had been periodically set for years; for it is notorious that combinations of odds and ends of other parties under various pretexts and names had been arrayed against us at almost every general election."

English voiced the uniform message of the Democratic leaders that Democrats should avoid fusion with Republicans and Abolitionists in the so-called "Union Party" of Indiana. The State platform of the Democratic party in 1862 ridicules the Republicans for hypocritically pretending "to sacrifice party platforms and organizations upon the altar of their country." The partisan character of appointments shows the insincerity of this pretense.

“If a mountain of war debt, paralysis of commerce, embezzlement on a gigantic scale; if the fruits of our labor are to swell the profits of the merchant princes of the East; if despotic interference with the liberty of the press and of persons are desirable, *then fuse*. The Abolitionists are hostile to the South. Friendly relations may be restored only by restoring the Democratic party to power. Abolitionism is the dominant element of the Republican party. * * * By fusion we become its abettors.” (W. M. McCarty, of Shelbyville, in the Sentinel, June 20, 1862.)

Mr. Julian, for a part of the Republicans, denounced and despised this catering to the Democracy. He would send the “Copperheads” across the lines and would have Democrats become Republicans if they wished sincerely to stand by their country.

But the Conservatives held that safety demanded the reorganization and maintenance of the Conservative National Democratic party, for the vindication of the Constitution and as offering the only hope of a constitutional basis for a restoration of the Union. Their policy, they asserted, would save the Union; the Republican policies would divide and destroy it. While Democrats at the opening of the war had “in good faith, for the time being, cast aside party feeling, their old political foes had availed themselves of the opportunity to put in force measures that had been repudiated by the people.”^a These Conservatives, in defending their right to a party existence, put forward prominently in their professions their attachment to the Union. The Sentinel kept standing at the head of its editorial columns Jackson’s historic declaration: “The Union must be preserved.” The party called itself the “Union Democratic” party; its State and local conventions, its platforms and tickets were all announced under that name. The lines on which this Conservative Democracy would base their party and join issue with the Administration are seen in the series of measures by which the party in power was turning the war for the Union into a war for the abolition of slavery. This was the general issue constantly urged by the Democrats. Their ever-present watchword was: “The Constitution as it is, the Union as it was.” The official platform of 1862 condemned the twin heresies, Northern sectionalism and Southern secession.

Both are radical enemies of the Constitution and the traditions of Democracy. The war should not be one of conquest or subjugation, but

^a Facts for the People.

should be solely for the maintenance of the Union. The war for the Union and the Constitution is just. But we condemn a war for the emancipation of the negroes or the subjugation of the South.

Similarly, the official call for the Democratic mass convention for July 30, 1862 (*Sentinel*, June 28), bore the familiar headline: "The Constitution as it is, the Union as it was." It calls upon the Democracy of Indiana, the true friends of constitutional liberty, and all who desire to preserve the Constitution, to come together to consider the new issues which have been recently forced upon the country by the party in power, measures which have no warrant in the Constitution and which are opposed to the spirit and purpose of our institutions; to insist that the war in its prosecution should be confined to the policy solemnly set forth by Congress in July, 1861, namely, that it is—

"not waged in a spirit of conquest or subjugation, nor for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and to assure the Administration that a generous support will be given it, as the representative of the Government, in all necessary, prompt, and vigorous measures to overthrow armed rebellion against the Union, to sustain its legitimate authority, and crush out abolitionism, which is equally as hostile to the Constitution as secessionism."

Then follows a recital of reasons for the call:

1. The Administration and Congress and the recent Union State convention in Indiana had "failed to announce what are the legitimate and proper means to put down the rebellion, and one and all have refused to even censure, much less condemn, the disunion scheme of the abolitionists."

2. The late Union convention had failed to repudiate the gross frauds and corruptions proven upon the party in power.

The other reasons consist of a recital of certain antislavery measures which the Democrats consider improper means of conducting the war, and the call closed with the following campaign appeal:

"In order that the people, the source of power in all constitutional governments, who sincerely desire to perpetuate the Union, as founded and administered by our patriotic fathers, may have the opportunity to condemn these unconstitutional measures; to express their sympathy and their determination to support the Administration in every legitimate

effort to crush out treason where'er it may rear its head; to uphold the rights and institutions of the States unimpaired; to say to those in authority, the servants of the people, what are the legitimate and appropriate means to put down this rebellion; to condemn fraud and corruption and all unconstitutional, illegitimate, and unnecessary measures calculated to weaken instead of strengthening a love and respect for the Union; to restore a wise, just, pure, equal, and beneficent administration of the Government such as the people desire; and to renew the pledge made by the last Democratic State convention in behalf of the Democracy of Indiana, namely, 'That we will sustain with all our energies a war for the maintenance of the Constitution and of the integrity of the Union under the Constitution; but we are opposed to a war for the emancipation of the negroes or the subjugation of the Southern States.'

"All who desire to see the Stars and Stripes float over every inch of American soil in liberty, fraternity, and equality; all who insist that the Government shall have a fixed policy in the prosecution of the war, known to the whole country; all who sympathize with the 60,000 sons of Indiana who have volunteered and are in the field to defend and maintain the Constitution and the Union, and who wish to see them relieved from their arduous duties and exposure of health and life in defense thereof by a prompt suppression and restoration of the Union not only in name but in essence; all who wish to preserve constitutional liberty, and the integrity of the Government under the Constitution, are invited to attend the proposed convention and cooperate in the attainment of these objects."

No exception will be taken to these general purposes or to the professions thus eloquently made of the end in view. But as to the means employed to accomplish this desirable end, and as to other Democratic beliefs and purposes not thus publicly and officially expressed, quite a bill of exceptions has been filed.

The policy of the Democrats was to hold the Administration strictly to the Republican platform of 1860 and the Crittenden resolution of July, 1861. These guaranteed the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States and no interference with their domestic institutions. The wrong of secession, the outbreak of war and its woeful continuance made no difference in Democratic political ideas or in the policies that were to be applied. Interference with slavery should not be either an accompaniment, an incident, or a result of the war. Hateful abolitionism that had caused the war was now not willing that it should be conducted on the only platform on which the friends of the Union could be kept united and on which alone the Union could be restored—the platform of the Constitution and the rights of States.

“Congress, instead of calmly considering the ways and means of getting out of all our difficulties, and feeding white men called into the service as soldiers, have turned their halls into places of meeting for two negro debating societies, in which abolition members vie with each other in inventing ways and means to benefit the negro, to feed him when he has run off, to clothe him, to liberate him, to arm him, to open schools to educate him, to place him on an equality with the white man.”^a

Thus, from the time all parties had rallied to the support of the Union a year had not passed before the abolition party raised its hydra head for the production of a series of measures which were calculated further to rend rather than to restore the Union.

Following the course of events, and from a study of party platforms, official campaign addresses to the voters, and speeches from the stump, we find the following “abolition” measures upon which the Democracy antagonized the Administration:

1. The abolition of slavery in the Territories.
2. The abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.
3. The proposed confiscation of slave property. This was an interference with property rights and with the domestic institutions of the States, in violation of Republican platform pledges.
4. The military annulment of the fugitive-slave law.
5. The scheme for compensated emancipation, by which burdens of taxation would be imposed upon the labor of the North for generations to come.
6. The emancipation proclamation of Mr. Lincoln. This was but to incite to slave insurrection and would lead to savage slaughter.
7. Arming the blacks. This was but to admit that white men could not subdue the rebellion. It would equalize the white soldiery with the negro and invite the negroes to the slaughter of their masters.
8. The passage of a law permitting the testimony of negroes in certain cases against the whites.
9. The repeal of the law against the transportation of the mails by negroes.
10. The passage of a law recognizing as our equals the negro governments of Liberia and Hayti.

^a Facts for the People, p. 7.

11. Many speeches in Congress in favor of abolition.

12. Wild schemes of negro philanthropy; establishing free schools for the education of the blacks; supporting runaway negroes in idleness, and in agricultural experiments with negro labor, all at the expense of the people.

All these abolition schemes of emancipation and confiscation were declared to be in violation of the Constitution, inconsistent with the policy of the Government, solemnly declared in the Crittenden resolution; against sound political economy and against the dictates of humanity.^a

To all these negro-loving schemes the Democrats were opposed. They would have no "nigger war."

To these issues on slavery should be added:

1. Opposition to the tariff policy of the Republicans.
2. Opposition to the financial policy of the Administration.
3. Opposition to the draft.
4. Opposition to the Administration's foreign policy, including its settlement of the Trent affair.

This reveals a party attitude that seems purely negative. It seems to show that the Democratic policy was distinctively a policy of opposition.

Had the party no positive constructive policy to offer?

It is well to note the positive plan the Union Democrats proposed for saving the Union. If coercion, subjugation, and war were to cease, if those who were opposing the authority of the Union with bayonet and ball were not to be subjugated, how was the Union to be restored?

On this the Democratic State platform of 1862 asserted:

The maintenance of the Union on the principles of the Constitution can be brought about only by the ascendancy of a Union party in the South which by a counter revolution shall displace those who control and direct the present rebellion. No effort to create or sustain such a party can be successful which is not based on a definite settlement of the question at issue between the two sections. We therefore demand that some such settlement be made by additional constitutional guarantees, either initiated by act of Congress or through the medium of a national convention.

This, of course, was to treat with the rebellion. Subjugation was used in contradistinction to a treaty arrangement. What prospect was there of the cooperation of a Union party in the South? The plan involved not only the existence and

^aCall for mass meeting, Sentinel, June 28, 1862.

cooperation of such a party, but its success in bringing about a counter revolution. Mr. Rhodes, the historian of this period, is quite justified in his moderate condemnation of this proposal.

“One fact,” says Mr. Rhodes, “the Democracy ignored, that peace was impossible unless the Southern Confederacy was acknowledged and a boundary line agreed upon between what would then be two distinct nations. They pretended to a belief, for which there was absolutely no foundation, that if fighting ceased and a convention of the States were called the Union might be restored.”

The Democrats should have seen that the South would never consent to the Union as it was. The evidence of this was to be seen in every voice that came from the South. Here is a representative expression from the Richmond, Virginia, *Enquirer* published while the Indiana “Peace Legislature” was in session in 1863:

“We are happy to learn that some of the Northwestern States are sick of the war. This is a wholesome state of feeling and must produce the fruits of disorganization and discouragement among the Northwestern troops. But let us not mistake the case. Let the Northwestern States who are sick of the war be told when they accredit commissioners that the first thing for them to do is *to call back their forces to their own country*; that then we will be willing to make treaties with them, but as to a union with the confederacy under the old flag or any other they come two years too late. Two years and an abyss of horror and hatred and the blood of our slaughtered brothers crying aloud from the ground all prohibit the impious union. If they repudiate the debt they have contracted and abandon the Government they have established and recant their vows and break their pledges and eat dirt it is well; and although we shall not exactly respect the actors in that affair, yet we shall not be unwilling to trade with them—holding our noses a little—and to show them all suitable civilities, but at a proper distance.”^a

Statesmanship has been called the “science of circumstances.” In the face of such circumstances what shall we say of the Democratic proposal for saving the Union by a cessation of arms? If we admit their sincerity of purpose we must impeach their wisdom and common sense. Their opponents, however, gave them credit for adroitness and cunning, but doubted their loyalty to the Union and the purpose which they professed, and the Republican conviction was that the triumph of such a party as the Indiana Democracy would have

^a Copied by the New York Times, February 25, 1863.

resulted in the dismemberment of the Union. The best that can be said of this peace proposal is that it was well meaning but visionary and impracticable. Its advocacy resulted only in obstruction and harm. The patriotic Democrats—and no one questions that there were thousands of them in Indiana—should have seen that a reunion with slave States had been made impossible by the extent of the rebellion, and in the face of the impending danger to the national integrity they should have subordinated their opposition to the antislavery measures of the Administration and should have recognized that the terms of settlement and reunion could be determined only by the national will after the vindication of the national authority.

The arguments and pleas and appeals by which the Democrats sustained their opposition to the measures of the Administration are interesting and suggestive, but the limits of this paper will not permit me to present them here. One appeal against Mr. Lincoln's proposal for compensated emancipation will serve for illustration. A campaign document issued by the Democratic State central committee, after showing that the proposal was, of course, unconstitutional, proceeded to demonstrate, in the second place, that the measure would pile up a debt that the country would never be able to pay. It would cost \$1,200,000,000 to free the slaves, and as it was unthinkable that they should be freed and left in the country, it would cost \$400,000,000 more to export them. This, added to the debt accumulating by the war, estimated at \$1,400,000,000, would present an appalling sum. The annual interest on the bonded debt contracted for the slaves would be \$96,000,000.

“Reader, have you a conception of a million? Ninety-six millions is about the distance in miles from the earth to the sun. A locomotive traveling from the sun to the earth at 40 miles an hour would require four generations to arrive. Our great grandchildren would not live to greet it. To haul this load of annual interest would require 2,650 two-horse wagon loads of silver, 1 ton each, and this would be the annual tax we should pay to the slaveholders of the South. A beautiful sight it would be to see each year the blood and toil and sweat of the white men of the North gathered into a wagon train 14 miles long as our tribute to the fell demon of abolition. May God, in his infinite mercy, save us from such a fate and such a sight.”

A voice from the "Sons of Liberty" may indicate the temper of the extreme Democratic faction—the "Copperheads"—whom moderate and loyal Democrats found it necessary at times to restrain and who gave the administrations of Lincoln and Morton no small annoyance.

H. H. Dodd, to whom we have previously referred, was grand commander of the "Sons of Liberty" of Indiana. In an address before a convention of the society February 16, 1864, speaking for his compatriots of this secret order, Dodd said:

"The great principle now at issue is the centralization of power, or the keeping it diffused in State sovereignty, as it is by the organic laws constituting States and forming the General Government.

The creation of an empire or republic, or the reconstruction of the old one by brute force is simply impossible. The liberation of 4,000,000 blacks is a scheme which can only bring its authors into shame, contempt, and confusion. No results of this enterprise will ever be realized beyond the army occupation.

Ours is the noble work of preserving the States from ruin and the races from intermixture. In the long campaign against the mass of error, corruption, and crime now thickly spread over and through the body politic, our views must not change with victory or defeat. * * * We must not stand aloof from political alliances. Our political affinity is unquestionably with the Democratic party, and if that organization goes boldly to the work, standing firmly upon its twice-honored principles, it will receive the moral and physical support of this widely extended association.

The great boast of the Democratic party has been that it has met and beaten back the party of centralization since the formation of the Union, and although it has never ordained any principles in regard to the status of the inferior races, it has always regarded slavery as a local matter, leaving it to the States to regulate as a domestic institution in their own way.

There need be no apprehension that a war of coercion will be continued by a Democratic administration. With the experience of the present Administration, which has for three years, with the unlimited resources of 18,000,000 of people in men, money, and ships, won nothing but its own disgrace and probable downfall, it is not likely that another will repeat the experiment.

Governor Seymour should be arraigned for allowing the exercise of usurping Federal authority within New York. The Democratic party of Indiana, too, is a culprit. A Senator, by the mean and contemptible action of a majority of the United States Senate, was wrongfully and maliciously expelled from his seat. The legislature plainly acquiesced in this insult to the State and the party by refusing to return him. Again, our cherished Vallandigham resides in exile, not so much by the power of Lincoln as by the demands of those who are controlling or did control the Democratic party of that State.

This organization is bound to oppose all usurpations of power. We find our State and Federal Governments overturned. Lincoln's government is a usurpation. Morton's government is a usurpation. I am willing the ballot box shall decide who shall be the officers under the law and the Constitution, but I shall obey them only so far as they exercise their delegated powers. I will not agree to remain passive under usurped authority affecting my rights and liberties. The future to you and to me is death, confiscation of our property, starvation of our children, the forced marriage of our heirs to their new-made colored brethren-in-arms. * * * If these men be prolonged in power they must either consent to be content to exercise the powers delegated by the people, or, by the gods, they must prove themselves physically the stronger. This position is demanded by every true member of this fraternity. Honor, life, aye, more than life, the virtue of our wives and daughters, demand it, and if you intend to make this organization of any practical value, you will do one of two things—either take steps to work the political regeneration of the party with which we are affiliated up to this standard, or, relying upon ourselves, determine at once our line of action.

Shall men be coerced to go to war for emancipation, miscegenation, and confiscation? It would be the happiest day of my life if I could stand up with any considerable portion of my fellowmen and say, Not another man, not another dollar, for this nefarious war."

The worthy commander then called upon the "Sons of Liberty" to arise.

"The day is rapidly approaching in the which you can make good your promise to your country. The furnace is being heated that will prove your sincerity; the hour for daring deeds is not distant. Let the watchword be 'onward.' "

The Democrats carried Indiana in 1862, electing both their State ticket and the legislature. This legislature elected two Democratic United States Senators, one of them to fill out the unexpired term of Bright. The conduct of the Democratic peace legislature, the measure of its opposition to the war, its antagonism to the State administration of Governor Morton, the influence of arbitrary arrests in the State, the influence and extent of secret political societies, the arrest of Dodd and his prosecution, the treason trials, and especially the Milligan case, which was one of the most important in the Constitutional history of the country, all these themes are suggestive of valuable studies in Indiana history during the civil war. But the extent to which this paper has already been carried will not permit of their consideration in this paper.

