THE PASSING OF THE NEW FREEDOM

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"It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those entrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres. *The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one*, and thus to create, whatever the form of the government, *a real despotism.* * * * Let there be no change by usurpation; for though this may be in one instance, the instrument of good, it is *the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.*"

WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS.

THE PASSING OF THE NEW FREEDOM

BY

JAMES M. BECK

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Moribus antiquis stat,
res Romana virisque.

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

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TO

HENRY CABOT LODGE

SCHOLAR, STATESMAN, PATRIOT

WHOSE RECENT SERVICE IN THE MAINTENANCE
OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS WILL BE HIS
TITLE CLEAR TO THE APPROVAL
OF POSTERITY

Justum, et tenacem propositi virum
Non civium ardor prava jubentium.

HORACE

FOREWORD

I need offer no apology for this frank discussion of the essential nature of President Wilson's policies. They are now on trial before the great quadrennial assize of the American people. No public official is above honest criticism, and, without such criticism, democracy would cease to be.

Moreover, Woodrow Wilson now belongs to history. His complex personality and his world-wide policies will be the subject of acute discussion for generations to come. To tell the truth about them, as one sees the truth—and who now sees it, except as through a glass darkly?—is the highest duty of citizenship. In this spirit, this book has been written.

If I am criticized for discussing grave political questions in dialogue form, let me reply that while these imaginary conversations are, in part, satirical in spirit, nothing was further from my intention than "to set on some quantity of barren spectators to laugh." Shaw, Landor, Gobineaux and Erasmus did not disdain to employ the dramatic dialogue as a literary medium, and indeed the greatest single product of the human mind in all the ages seems to me to be the Book of Job, where the great riddle of existence is discussed with unequalled power and sublimity in the imaginary conversation of the man of Ur and his three would-be comforters, who proved to be somewhat irritating disputants.

Even a later age could not resist the temptation to

break into this most wonderful discussion by the interpolation of the character of Elihu.

An acknowledgment is due Mr. Henry Litchfield West for valuable suggestions and careful revision of the proofs and to the courtesy of the publishers of *The North American Review* and *The National Review* in permitting me to republish in revised and amplified form the second of these dialogues, "It Might Have Been."

In both of these dialogues, I have put in quotation marks such speeches as were actually uttered by the character to whom they are attributed. I have done this in fairness to my distinguished *dramatis personæ*, so that the reader can easily distinguish between statements which were actually made and those which only represent my interpretation of the words and acts of the distinguished participants in the Paris Peace Conference. Obviously these quotations are scattered excerpts from addresses and writings at different times and places. My readers will distinguish between those portions of my imaginary conversation which are written in the spirit of jocose satire and those which have a more serious meaning.

Thus my allusion in the first of these dialogues to the reservation of the island of Yap for the United States, if read too seriously, would indicate a belief on my part that our Allies did not deal generously with America in the Paris Peace Conference. Such is not the fact or my opinion. The United States could have had anything in reason for the asking. Indeed, Constantinople, the golden prize of the Centuries, was offered to America. Mr. Wilson truly represented his country at Paris in declining to accept any part in the division of territorial spoils. Our moral in-

fluence in the councils of the nations will be the greater for such renunciation. Whatever else may be said of our part in the World War, it cannot be denied that we emerged from the titanic conflict, as we had entered, with a lofty spirit of altruism, which will be a landmark in history.

I should publish this book with greater hesitation if there were not ample assurance that Mr. Wilson has happily recovered from his distressing malady, in which he has had the deep sympathy of all Americans, without respect to party. His recovery is a subject for gratification even to those who differ with his policies; for American politics would be the poorer if this picturesque personality were eliminated. The United States, after next March, will need a vigorous opposition party, and who is more capable to lead it than the twentieth century Jefferson?

JAMES M. BECK.

New York, September 1, 1920.

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THE PASSING OF THE NEW FREEDOM

CHAPTER I

MR. WILSON EXPLAINS THE NEW FREEDOM

Quam parva sapienta regitur mundus.

SCENE: *Paris.*

PLACE: *Premier's Room, Quai d'Orsay.*

TIME: *January 15, 1919.*

[*As the curtain rises* PREMIER CLEMENCEAU, PRIME MINISTER LLOYD GEORGE *and* BARON MAKINO are *seated around a council table. They are looking over a map, and drawing the lines of the new boundaries.* PICHON and BALFOUR *are also present, but take little part in the discussion and thus recognize that once again the destinies of the world are for a time in the keeping of a new triumvirate, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson.*]

CLEMENCEAU. We are, then, agreed as to the division of Germany's overseas dominions. The Pacific islands north of the equator are to go to Japan; those to the south shall be given to Great Britain, together

with Germany's possessions in Africa and a protectorate over Persia and Mesopotamia. France will have its compensation in Syria, Morocco, and the Rhine frontier, including the Saar Basin. To Italy are given the Dalmatian littoral and the Trentino.

LLOYD GEORGE. [*Leaning back with the satisfied smile of one who has had a good meal.*] Is not this the greatest real estate transaction since the Almighty gave Adam a fee to the world?

CLEMENCEAU. You forget that Cæsar, Pompey and Crassus divided the world.

BALFOUR. Did not Pope Alexander VI also draw a longitudinal line through the Atlantic Ocean and divide the unknown Western World between Spain and Portugal?

LLOYD GEORGE. How long did it last?

MAKINO. My honorable confreres must not forget that, in deference to our illustrious American colleague's views, we only take the larger tracts of land as mandatories. [*All laugh heartily.*]

LLOYD GEORGE. You laugh at the scheme of mandatories; but it cost me much to reconcile President Wilson with Premier Hughes on this point. Our difficulties are unusually complicated by these new statesmen from the four corners of the earth.

CLEMENCEAU. Mandatories! *Mon dieu!* Great is the legerdemain of language. Our American colleague blandly tells us, who have sacrificed millions of lives and billions of treasure, that there are to be no annexations or indemnities. We defer to his views by calling annexations "mandatories" and the indemnities "reparations." However, our beneficial enjoyment of the

territories thus acquired will be the same whether our title be absolute or nominally in trust.

MAKINO. Does not my honorable *confrère* forget the League of Nations to which the mandatory is to be responsible? [*Renewed laughter, in which all join.*]

CLEMENCEAU. I confess I at first opposed the League of Nations; but I now see that, as a camouflage for the old diplomacy, it is not without its merit.

MAKINO. But should we not, for form's sake, offer something to the United States?

CLEMENCEAU. When, in any conference, was anything offered to a nation that did not ask for it? President Wilson, with or without his country's approval, has asked no territorial compensation for the sacrifices which the United States has made to win the war. Are we not justified in taking him at his word?

MAKINO. Still, as a matter of form, would it not be advisable to have America participate in the spoils of the victory?

CLEMENCEAU. There is much force in that suggestion.

[*They examine a map of the Pacific Ocean.*]

CLEMENCEAU. *Eureka!* Here is an island that we have overlooked. It rejoices in the singular name of Yap. Have either of your Excellencies ever heard of Yap?

LLOYD GEORGE. I confess that I have not. But then, I never heard of Teschen until some of our smaller allies quarreled among themselves as to this part of Europe.

CLEMENCEAU. Well, as the island of Yap has not

been distributed, I suggest that we offer it to Mr. Wilson.

LLOYD GEORGE and MAKINO. Agreed.

LLOYD GEORGE. For good measure, let us also give the United States a mandatory over Armenia. As even the boundaries of that mountainous desert have not yet been determined, let our American colleagues define them. Do we want Armenia?

CLEMENCEAU. It is a liability, not an asset. Give it to the great idealist.

LLOYD GEORGE. The territory of a considerable portion of the world being thus happily disposed of, our chief difficulty will be in adjusting the frontiers of Europe, and especially in the creation of new boundaries in Southeastern Europe. I fear that our smaller allies may quarrel among themselves to our embarrassment.

CLEMENCEAU. They are like a lot of hens being held by the feet and carried to market—although all doomed to the same fate, they contrive to fight each other while awaiting it.

LLOYD GEORGE. May not our chief difficulty be to adjust the inevitable differences as to boundaries between Jugo-Slavia and Italy? We have made some progress in the division of the Adriatic littoral; but have apparently reached the limit of concessions. It looks to me as if the fatal difference will be with reference to Fiume.

MAKINO. Is it likely that our American colleague will wish to be consulted upon this question?

CLEMENCEAU. Why should he? When did a sane statesman ever interfere in a quarrel between other

nations in which his own nation had no practical interest and in which it could only play the cat's paw to pull some very hot chestnuts out of a very hot fire? I venture to say that the American President, until this controversy arose, never heard of Fiume, and I am afraid our own previous knowledge was not much greater.

LLOYD GEORGE. I fear we are all somewhat deficient in geographical and ethnic knowledge. They tell me that during the war and when America was neutral, our esteemed colleague and loyal ally, M. Paderewski, applied to a member of President Wilson's cabinet for a Government transport to carry food to Dantzig and thence down the Vistula River into Poland. Mr. Wilson's learned cabinet minister heard the application, and then denied it on the ground that he could not risk a government transport by sending it through the Mediterranean.[1] [*All join in renewed laughter.*]

[*Enter* CLEMENCEAU'S *secretary, with the announcement: "His Excellency, the President of the United States."* MR. WILSON *enters. He has the exalted manner of a prophet. He literally exudes omniscience. He slowly approaches the council table and solemnly greets his associates.*]

CLEMENCEAU. Welcome, Mr. President. We were just discussing the necessary division of occupied German territory and the readjustment of European boundaries. In Signor Orlando's absence, we may say to

[1] This actually happened, but the Cabinet Minister in question was not alone in making a little blunder in geography.

you that we fear difficulty between his country and Jugo-Slavia, and the chief difficulty is with Fiume.

WILSON. What?

CLEMENCEAU. Fiume.

WILSON. Is it a man or a place?

LLOYD GEORGE. A little town on the Adriatic, composed of somewhat less than fifty thousand inhabitants, and your excellency may well be pardoned for not knowing of its existence. So small a place would hardly interest you or your great country.

WILSON. How have you disposed of it?

LLOYD GEORGE. Our disposition is to give it to Italy, even though the territory of which it is the chief seaport is predominantly Slavic.

WILSON. This will never do. Let me offer to your solemn contemplation the Fourteen Points.

CLEMENCEAU. The what?

WILSON. The Fourteen Points which I gave to the world in January, 1918, as the comprehensive basis of the peace.

CLEMENCEAU. I confess I never read them.

WILSON. What! You amaze me. And yet your country accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis of the Armistice and the future treaty of peace.

CLEMENCEAU. Yes, I accepted the Fourteen Points, of which I had heard by name, when your Colonel House intimated that in the event of our failure to accept them, he could not say what your action might be. What could I do? My concern then was to win the war. I knew that, without respect to your wishes or mine, the terms of peace would be adjusted by circumstances and not by academic formulas.

WILSON. I fear you do not consider sufficiently the sanctity of my Fourteen Points. "These are days of great perplexity, when a great cloud of trouble hangs and broods over the greater part of the world. It seems as if great, blind material forces had been released, which had for long been held in leash and restraint. I imagine I see, I hope that I see, I pray that it may be that I do truly see, great spiritual forces lying waiting for the outcome of this thing to assert themselves, and asserting themselves even now to enlighten our judgment and steady our spirits. Therefore, I came to Paris, literally to fight for my Fourteen Points, and I owe it to my people to see to it, in so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them and no possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what my soldiers offered their lives and blood to obtain. I can think of no call to service which could transcend this."

LLOYD GEORGE. You constantly refer to "my" Fourteen Points. May I not remind your Excellency that I had advanced this programme of peace adjustment before you promulgated the famous Fourteen?

MAKINO. I am heartily glad to know that your Excellency will put the adjustment of peace upon so high and noble a plane. And this reminds me of a matter of spiritual significance in which my country has a vital interest. What spiritual ideal can there be of greater nobility than the Fatherhood of God and the common Brotherhood of man? This emboldens me to bring up the matter of racial equality, to which, in this moral regeneration of the world upon which

we are now entering under your inspiring guidance, there should be the recognition of the Peace Conference.

WILSON. I think this subject had better be deferred. There are embarrassing circumstances, growing out of racial differences in my country, which would make it embarrassing to me to recognize the equality of races which our *confrère* from Japan suggests. The fact is, I may confidentially say to you, that my political strength in America is largely drawn from a section of the country which has a deep-rooted and unconquerable aversion to any suggestion of racial equality, and my reëlection was largely determined by the vote of a State which, situated on the Pacific Coast, feels deeply the question of Japanese equality and would never take kindly to your Excellency's request. I believe in the "great spiritual forces lying waiting for the outcome of this thing to assert themselves"; but, after all, my dear colleagues, we must draw the line somewhere.

MAKINO. [*Rises indignantly.*] With such a fatal negation of the fundamental condition of the permanent pacification of the world, I think that my presence would not, at the moment, add value to your deliberations. I will therefore withdraw, to relieve you of any present embarrassment; but, as the moral leaven of the new idealism works in Paris, I shall venture, on a later occasion, to bring again to your attention the just claims of my great people to equality with any other. With less than this, my people would not be contented.

[BARON MAKINO *bows gravely and withdraws.*]

LLOYD GEORGE. We must satisfy our Japanese colleague upon this point. After all, the recognition of racial equality is only of sentimental importance, and your Declaration of Independence did affirm that "all men are born free and equal."

WILSON [*Grimly*] But not so free and equal as to ignore the ethnic difference as profound as the difference between the yellow and white races.

CLEMENCEAU. Deeply and naturally as our Japanese colleague feels upon this subject, I think we can reconcile him to a negative reply by a concession of Japanese domination over Shantung. Your Excellency [*turning to* WILSON] will not object to this adjustment of the matter?

WILSON. How many people are there in Shantung?

LLOYD GEORGE. Nearly forty millions.

WILSON. Is not that a very considerable concession for yielding on a point of only sentimental interest?

LLOYD GEORGE. I fear it may be necessary, as England cannot afford to disappoint so faithful an ally as Japan. We trust we may have your Excellency's permission to offer such a compromise to the Japanese representatives.

WILSON. But it violates my great principle of self-determination. Have I not said very solemnly—I say everything very solemnly—that "every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live." [1] It offends me to the soul to sanction such a clear departure from that noble ideal. The Conference has not begun, and yet three of my Fourteen Points have been overridden. Have I not solemnly

[1] Address on League of Nations, May 27, 1916.

proclaimed the right of weak and small states to preservation against aggression? You now ask me to bargain away the rights of forty millions of people without their leave and against their protests. You forget that my prestige is at stake.

LLOYD GEORGE. After all, Mr. President, self-determination is a mere abstraction and biologically unsound at that; for when did man or nation, from the cradle to the grave, ever truly have the privilege of self-determination?

CLEMENCEAU. The first apostle of self-determination was my own countryman, Rousseau. He carried it to its logical results. "There is no other god but Self, and Rousseau is his prophet." We owe to him in great part the rampant individualism of the present day, and it is interesting to discover where the principle of self-determination led him. On his own confession, he was about the most unmitigated scoundrel in the Newgate calendar of literature.

BALFOUR. Quite so. Our Milton tells us that when Satan asserted the principle of self-determination against the Almighty, he fell for nine days before he touched bottom.

CLEMENCEAU. Even in your country, Mr. President, there has been no consistent adherence to self-determination. You did win your freedom by invoking it as a right; but we French helped you determine your independence. In your Civil War, you gave a half million lives and spent some billions of your dollars to deny it as a principle. I confess that I admired your Mr. Lincoln when he summoned the strength of his country to deny to the seceding States

a right of self-determination which conflicted with national sovereignty. However, we can give Shantung to Japan, with the understanding that she will give it back to China.

LLOYD GEORGE. Upon such terms as they agree upon.

WILSON. That alters matters. After all, we must satisfy our Japanese colleague to ensure his nation's adherence to the League of Nations. Let it be so arranged.

CLEMENCEAU [*Aside to* LLOYD GEORGE]. An easy adjustment. When Japan exacts the terms, China will, I fear, pay dearly for the province of Confucius.

[*Enter* CLEMENCEAU'S *Secretary.*]

SECRETARY [*Addressing* WILSON]. A delegation has called and insists that I should hand your Excellency a petition, as matter of special urgency.

[WILSON *takes the packet, breaks the seals, and examines it intently; then takes out his memorandum book.*]

WILSON [*Addressing Secretary*]. Tell them that "this question will form the subject of a thorough examination by the competent authorities of the Conference." I must give them an appointment. Let me see what my engagements are for to-morrow.

[*Opens memorandum book.*]

"11 A. M. Dr. Wellington Koo, to present the Chinese Delegation to the Peace Conference; 11:10

A. M., Marquis de Vogué and a delegation of seven others, representing the Congrès National Français, to present their view as to the disposition of the left bank of the Rhine; 11:30 A. M., Assyrian and Chaldean Delegation, with a message from the Assyrian-Chaldean nation; 11:45 A. M., Dalmatian Delegation, to present to the President the result of the plebiscite of that part of Dalmatia occupied by Italians; Noon, M. Bucquet, Chargé d'Affaires of San Marino, to convey the action of the Grand Council of San Marino, conferring on the President Honorary Citizenship in the Republic of San Marino; 12:10 P. M., M. Colonder, Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs; 12:20 P. M., Miss Rose Schneiderman and Miss Mary Anderson, delegates of the National Women's Trade Union League of the United States; 12:30 P. M., the Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox Eastern Church; 12:45 P. M., Essad Pasha, delegate of Albania, to present the claims of Albania; 1 P. M., M. M. L. Coromilas, Greek Minister at Rome, to pay his respects; Luncheon, Mr. Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War; 4 P. M., Mr. Herbert Hoover; 4:15 P. M., M. Bratiano, of the Roumanian Delegation; 4:30 P. M., Dr. Alfonso Costa, former Portuguese Minister, Portuguese Delegate to the Peace Conference; 4:45 P. M., Boghos Nubar Pasha, president of the Armenian National Delegation, accompanied by M. A. Aharoman and Professor A. Der Hagopian, of Robert College; 5:15 P. M., M. Pasitch, of the Serbian Delegation; 5:30 P. M., Mr. Frank Walsh, of the Irish-American Delegation."

Frank Walsh, from Ireland? How did my stupid secretary come to make that appointment. It was very careless. This gives me an excuse to put off the Irish delegation. [*Turning to the secretary.*] Tell the delegation from Corsica that I shall be pleased to consider their claims to autonomy to-morrow at four-thirty for fifteen minutes.

CLEMENCEAU. The what delegation?

WILSON. Why, I have a petition from the people of Corsica asking that I do what I can to secure them full autonomy on the principle of self-determination.

CLEMENCEAU. Is your Excellency aware of the fact that Corsica is a part of France?

WILSON. Why, no; for the moment I had overlooked the fact.[1] Such a mistake is very distressing [*Turning to secretary.*] Tell the Corsican delegation that of course I cannot interfere with the internal affairs of a friendly ally, and it is impossible for me to see them.

LLOYD GEORGE. I hope your Excellency, with that shining consistency which has characterized your public utterances and actions, will apply the same rule to Ireland, which, I need not remind you, is still a part of Great Britain. Your vague ideal of self-determination is already having a most unhappy effect upon the integrity of the Great Empire which I have the honor to represent. After all are we not your Ally?

WILSON. Associate, not ally.

[1] See Dillon's *The Peace Conference*, page 90, where the incident is related. Whether the blunder was that of the President or one of his Secretaries Dr. Dillon does not say. That President Wilson should even momentarily have forgotten that Corsica is a part of France seems unlikely.

CLEMENCEAU. Did your soldiers consider this distinction when they died with ours in a common cause?

WILSON. Ireland's claim for self-determination is very embarrassing, and my freedom of action is somewhat affected by the fact that my political strength in America is very largely drawn from the Irish-American vote. It will take some *finesse* to keep the eminent Irish-Americans, who are here in Paris to insist upon the right of self-determination at bay, but I shall manage it in some way. It is unfortunate that I did not bring Mr. Tumulty with me. He could have arranged it. I cannot trust these matters to Mr. Lansing, who is lacking in the nice skill which we statesmen must have of——

LLOYD GEORGE. "Keeping the word of promise to the ear, and breaking it to the hope."

WILSON. Your quotation is indelicate, and, may I not say, annoying. I never palter in a double sense. But may I not again remark that this Irish question makes me regret that I did not leave about nine-tenths of my learned experts in America and bring with me the resourceful Tumulty.

CLEMENCEAU. *Mon Dieu!* Let us drop these side issues and address ourselves to the present problem of making it impossible for Germany to renew this war. Until that is accomplished, of what avail is it to divide the world? Over two months have passed since the Armistice, and we have as yet made no progress. Let us imitate Napoleon's celerity after Jena. Our task grows more difficult with delay.

LLOYD GEORGE. Can we, with fairness, take up

any of these problems until our worthy *confrère* of Italy arrives?

CLEMENCEAU. I received word from him that he would be here in a half hour. I agree with you that we should do nothing until he comes.

BALFOUR. While waiting for him, I am wondering whether our illustrious colleague would not explain to us some of the features of the American Constitution, which we European statesmen have not as yet sufficiently understood. If European and American politics are hereafter to be intermingled, it is necessary for us in Europe to know more of American institutions than we have hitherto known, and [*turning to* WILSON] to what fountain head of knowledge could we better repair than to your Excellency? Your lectures on constitutional government have their admirers beyond the classic walls of the famous University of which you were once the distinguished head.

WILSON. I shall be most happy to explain any features of our Constitution which you do not understand; but I may say to you that you will find little enlightenment in my lectures at Princeton; for, when I entered public life and first became a candidate for office, a new light came to me, as that which fell upon Paul on his way to Damascus. I put aside, as childish things, many of my former views. At Princeton, I was a conservative,—I had almost said, a reactionary. But when I became a candidate for the Governorship of New Jersey, things seemed different. I gave to my countrymen a new Gospel in a book which I called "The New Freedom," which clearly discloses that my contact with the new currents of

thought in America had made me reject essential features of the old freedom with which my countrymen were short-sighted enough to be satisfied.

CLEMENCEAU. Do explain to us the difference between the old and the new freedom. As you know, I lived in your country and learned something of its institutions. I have studied the Constitution and the writings of those like the authors of the "Federalist" papers, who were once regarded as its great commentators. From them, I derived the idea that the underlying spirit of your government was sleepless jealousy of governmental power, whether it was legislative, executive, or even judicial. Thus, as I understand the writings of your Hamilton and Madison, you established a government of checks and balances, whereby the legislative should prevent usurpations by the executive, and the executive, usurpations by the legislative branch of the government, and the judiciary should hold both in check. As a Frenchman, I take some pride in the fact that this idea of a division of governmental authority into three separate and partly independent departments was derived by the framers of your Constitution from my great compatriot, Montesquieu. I have therefore been greatly puzzled by the events of the last three or four years; for we in Europe have seen a consolidation of authority, and if you will allow it, an unchallenged exercise of one-man power which would not be possible even in governments which did not follow the Montesquieu doctrine. It would thus seem that the whole nature of your Government has undergone a profound and portentous transformation, and, as all this has happened since I

left America, I should be deeply interested to know how such a revolution came to pass.

WILSON. It is my inestimable privilege to have wrought this transformation. May I not say that I have exercised a power greater than all my predecessors?

LLOYD GEORGE. But how did you bring it about, when we, in England, who have no written constitution, apparently cannot make constitutional changes so easily as you with your rigid written Constitution? Our last change in government, the impairment of the legislative power of the House of Lords, only followed the most acrimonious debate and a prolonged struggle, which nearly culminated in civil war. Only the moral authority of the King averted the peril.

WILSON. It was my new freedom that wrought the mighty change in the American government. I discovered a great truth and converted my countrymen to its acceptance. You will find it all in "The New Freedom." With this *magnum opus,* I inaugurated the new revolution to overcome the theory of the Constitution as Hamilton gave it to us. He was "a great man, but not a great American." He had not fed upon the imperishable food, "the food of those visions of the spirit where a table is set before us laden with palatable fruits, the fruits of hope, the fruits of imagination,—those invisible things of the spirit, which are the only things upon which we can sustain ourselves through this weary world without fainting."

BALFOUR [*Looks puzzled*]. I am not sure that I grasp your Excellency's meaning. We in England

greatly admire Hamilton, and envy America in having had such a master builder in the foundation of its institutions. Was it not his merit that he fed his countrymen upon the substantial bread of hard facts? Does not his superiority to Jefferson lie in the fact that the latter inflamed the minds of his people with impossible visions; whereas Hamilton built upon actual conditions the superstructure of a workable government?

WILSON. I admit that Washington, Franklin, Hamilton and Madison constructed a Constitution that was admirably adapted to their day, when the landowners were the real rulers of America. But this is the day of the People, and they need a stronger government. The Constitution has worked well; but that is "no proof that it is an excellent constitution, because Americans could run any constitution." The Constitution was a reactionary document. It distrusted democracy, and its careful provisions for a representative government must be destroyed; and this they will be by the initiative and the referendum, which I once denounced in my classes at Princeton; but which, since my entry into public life, I now advocate. I recognize that "we stand in the presence of a revolution. We are upon the eve of a great reconstruction. The old order changeth with the noise and heat and tumult of reconstruction. Society stands ready to attempt nothing less than a radical reconstruction, which only frank and honest counsels can hold back from becoming a revolution. We are in a temper to reconstruct economic society, as we were once in a temper to reconstruct political society, and political

society may itself undergo a radical modification in the process. I doubt if any age was ever more conscious of its task or more unanimously desirous of radical and extended changes in its economic and political practice." You will find the new gospel set forth in my "The New Freedom," published by Doubleday, Page & Co., at the modest price of one dollar. In that book, I showed that public opinion was in a state of flux. I was satisfied that we stood "in the presence of a revolution,—not a bloody revolution, but a silent revolution." [1] In this potential revolution, I recognized the possibility of the agitator. I warned the people that "some man with eloquent tongue, without conscience, who did not care for the nation, could put this whole country into a flame. This country, from one end to the other, believes that something is wrong. What an opportunity it would be for some man without conscience to spring up and say: 'This is the way. Follow me!'—and lead in the paths of destruction."[2]

CLEMENCEAU *(aside to Lloyd George.)* Apparently the man was found. *(Addressing Wilson.)* But you could not thus reconstruct your country without changing the point of view of the masses. As your country was contented and prosperous beyond any other country in the world, how could you convert a contented people into that state of discontent without which no revolution is possible?

WILSON. A revelation came to me that those who founded my government and framed its Constitution, while estimable men according to their lights, nevertheless proceeded upon a false theory. Washington,

[1] Wilson's *The New Freedom*, p. 30.
[2] *Id.*, p. 28.

Hamilton, Madison, Wilson and Franklin are not unworthy of commendation when we consider their limited qualifications and narrow outlook. They lived in a little world, and had the light of the New Freedom suddenly shone upon them, they would have been blinded by the effulgent light of the twentieth century. They were practical men; but, as such, incapable of seeing a great vision and hearing voices in the air.

CLEMENCEAU. I confess that to me their great virtue was that they kept their feet on the ground. That which they saw, they saw clearly.

WILSON. Columbus saw a vision, and discovered America; Jeanne d'Arc heard voices in the air, and saved France. I, too, hitched my wagon to a star.

CLEMENCEAU. A very hazardous method of transportation. Not all visions become realities, and not all voices in the air become harmonies that are attuned to mortal ears. But what was the profound truth with which you made so great a change in the American form of government?

WILSON. One day at Princeton "it was my good fortune to entertain a very interesting Scotsman who had been devoting himself to the philosophical thought of the seventeenth century. His talk was so engaging that it was delightful to hear him speak of anything and presently there came out of the unexpected region of his thought the thing I had been waiting for. He called my attention to the fact that in every generation all sorts of speculation and thinking tend to fall under the formula of the dominant thought of the age. For example, after the Newtonian theory of the universe had been developed, almost all thinking tended to ex-

press itself in the analogies of the Newtonian theory, and since the Darwinian theory has reigned amongst us, everybody is likely to express whatever he wishes to expound in terms of development and accommodation to environment. Now, it came to me, as this interesting man talked, that the Constitution of the United States had been made under the dominion of the Newtonian theory. * * * * The makers of our Federal Constitution read Montesquieu with true scientific enthusiasm. They were scientists in their way—the best way of their age—those fathers of the nation. Jefferson wrote of 'the laws of Nature,'—and then by way of afterthought—'and of Nature's God.' And they constructed a government as they would have constructed an orrery,—to display the laws of nature. Politics in their thought was a variety of mechanics. The Constitution was founded on the law of gravitation. The government was to exist and move by virtue of the efficacy of 'checks and balances.' The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its function by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs offset against each other, as checks, and live." [1]

BALFOUR. I once read Madison's record of the debates of your Constitutional Convention. I do not recall any reference to Newton or his theory of gravitation.

[1] Wilson's *The New Freedom*, pp. 45-47.

CLEMENCEAU. Nor do I recall anything in the *Federalist* papers which indicates that those men, who, notwithstanding your Excellency's modest estimate of their worth, I should regard as supremely great, ever conformed their theory of government to Newton's *Principia*. It may be so; but they were strangely silent on the subject.

WILSON. Well, so my friend from Scotland told me, and certainly this theory of the influence of the Newtonian theory of the siderial universe upon the formulation of the Constitution seemed impressive to the undergraduates at Princeton, when I explained it to them in my lectures.

CLEMENCEAU. Possibly they did not understand your theory. It sounds like the solemn obscurities of Hegel. That which we do not understand is apt to seem profound. But we do not yet understand what was your discovery.

WILSON. My discovery was that the Newtonian theory, as applied to the American Government, was a monstrous error, and that, in place of Newton's theory, it was necessary to substitute the Darwinian theory.

CLEMENCEAU. *Mon Dieu!* What an extraordinary intellect. Who but your Excellency would have thought either the Newtonian or the Darwinian theory had any reference to a form of government, or that the problems of government could be resolved into the elements of mechanics? But what feature of the Darwinian theory did you apply in your great work of reforming the Constitution of the United States?

WILSON. The basic principle of the Darwinian

theory is the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. I reached the conclusion that there had been and would always be an inevitable struggle between the Executive and Legislative branches of the government for power, and that the fittest would survive. I determined to be the fittest, and I proved to the satisfaction of the world that such is the fact.

LLOYD GEORGE. But how did you accomplish it, Mr. President?

WILSON. I knew that the Constitution had made the Presidential office immensely powerful in its control over public patronage. Long ago, I had pointed out in my earlier work on "Constitutional Government in the United States" that "there are illegitimate means by which the President may influence the action of Congress. He may bargain with members, not only with regard to appointment, but also with regard to legislative measures. He may use his local patronage to assist members to get or retain their seats. He may interpose his powerful influence, in one covert way or another, in contests for places in the Senate. He may also overbear Congress by arbitrary acts which ignore the laws or virtually override them. He may even substitute his own orders for acts of Congress which he wants but cannot get."[1] At that time I characterized any such attempt by the Executive to concentrate the power of the Government in his office as "deeply immoral." I even said that "no honorable man includes such agencies in a sober exposition of the Constitution or allows himself to think of them when he speaks

[1] Wilson's *Constitutional Government in the United States*, p. 71.

of the influence of 'life' which govern each generation's use and interpretation of that great instrument, our sovereign guide and the object of our deepest reverence. Nothing in a system like ours can be constitutional which is immoral or touches the good faith of those who have sworn to obey the fundamental law. The reprobation of all good men will always overwhelm such influences with shame and failure." [1]

With such views I did not utilize such crude means. I did not "overbear Congress by arbitrary acts" or substitute my orders for their will. I merely used my influence to redistribute the powers of the Government so that the Executive would be of overshadowing importance. In this way, I sought to defeat the system of checks and balances which the Darwinian theory had shown to be fundamentally unsound. Conscious of my power, I forced Congress, although after a bitter debate, to pass the so-called "Overman Law," by which the powers of Congress over the machinery of our government were materially impaired and I was given almost unlimited power to reconstruct the Executive branch of the Government according to my own views. My theory was that popular Government was promoted by the greatest possible concentration of governmental power in one man, for the time being myself.

BALFOUR. Does not your statement of the Darwinian theory ignore the fact that its disciples placed too much emphasis on the struggle for existence? Darwin also taught such coöperation and mutual dependence as the framers of your Constitution in-

[1] Wilson's *Constitutional Government in the United States*, p. 71.

tended in the coördination of the different branches of your Government. Did you not encounter serious opposition in making Congress abdicate its dominating position in your Government as the law-makers?

WILSON. I did that which any of my predecessors could have done and which many of them had attempted to do with less success. You do not appreciate the enormous influence of the President through his control of patronage, and, by patronage, I mean not merely the power of appointment, but the greater power to direct the business energies of the Federal Government and to influence the business energies of the people. With the lever of party patronage alone, the President can destroy the equilibrium of power which is supposed to exist between the President and the Congress. "The President can, if he chooses, become national boss by the use of his enormous patronage, doling out his local gifts of place to local party managers in return for support and coöperation in the guidance and control of his party. His patronage touches every community in the United States. He can often by its use disconcert and even master the local managers of his own party by combining the arts of the politician with the duties of the statesman, and he can go far towards establishing a complete personal domination. He can even break party lines asunder and draw together combinations of his own devising."[1] As I have said, I despised such crude methods. I knew that the mere power over patronage was as effective as its exercise. My party associates in Congress well knew that I could deprive them of

[1] Wilson's *Constitutional Government*, p. 215.

appointments in their territorial sphere of influence. They did my will. When did politicians not prefer to "crook the pregnant hinges of the knees" to political suicide?

CLEMENCEAU. Quite so. All this is intelligible, even to old world politicians. A former king of my country anticipated you in his famous assertion of a "new freedom"—for himself—when he said *"l'etat, c'est moi."* I think his successor said, "After me, the deluge." But how did you reconcile your countrymen to the new freedom? The new freedom must have succeeded in some less obvious way.

WILSON. I discovered the vulnerable heel of that Achilles of government, the United States. It was its fixed tenure of office. My people are a practical one and make little fuss over anything that cannot be immediately remedied. They prefer inaction to impotent action. Given a fixed tenure of office and the immeasurable power of a Chief Executive, and I knew that I could do much which, in a parliamentary form of government, would be impracticable. Impeachment was too slow and hazardous a process to be a corrective. Given a fixed tenure of office for four years, I could easily make it eight years, and in that time I could concentrate such power in the Executive that my will would be supreme. With a fixed tenure of office, parliamentary government exists in form, but not in substance. Congress becomes mere clay for me to mold into such shape as pleases me. My only weakness is once in four years, when a reëlection is necessary. It is not that the American people are fatalists, so much as that they are realists, and they accept what

they cannot promptly defeat. My predecessors, with their old-fashioned respect for a governmental system of checks and balances, had not realized this. Unable to displace me until the expiration of my term of office, I enjoyed a power which even the German Kaiser did not have in like measure.

LLOYD GEORGE. You amaze us. We had supposed that a rigid Constitution, subject to interpretation and enforcement by your Supreme Court of the United States, would have been less easily changed. Was this your only method? For, if so, it would seem to us, accustomed as we are to parliamentary forms of government, that, sooner or later, your Congress would have challenged your assertion of almost absolute power. In my country, we have no constitutional limitations in the true sense, and yet the power of the House of Commons over the purse of the nation has held kings in check, even in the time of seemingly arbitrary power. How could you avoid those Constitutional requirements which make the office of President dependent upon Congress, not merely in the matter of appropriations, but even in the matter of appointment? Take, for example, the matter of foreign relations. We have noted with interest that the President must not only get the consent of the Senate to the appointment of an ambassador or minister, but even an insignificant consul in the remotest corner of the world cannot be appointed by you without the consent of the Senate. This would seem to us to give the Senate a very practical and far-reaching control of the Executive's conduct of foreign relations.

WILSON. Under the theory of the Constitution,

your observations would be fully justified. But I developed a plan which enabled me, in the matter of foreign relations, to govern the United States outside of the Constitution.

CLEMENCEAU. You deeply interest us. How did you do that? We sit as Saul at the feet of Gamaliel to learn how written constitutions can be overcome by indirection.

WILSON. It was very simple, and it is passing strange that the possibility of an extra-Constitutional government did not occur to any of my predecessors, especially those of imperious will, like Andrew Jackson. In the six years that I have been President of the United States, I have controlled its foreign relations and even, to some extent, its domestic policies by appointing, on my own responsibility, officials who, not being created either by the Constitution or by the Congress, were responsible only to me. Under the archaic theory of the Constitution, the power was vested in Congress "to make all such laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Under this power, the great departments of the government, whose responsible heads constitute the so-called "Cabinet," were created by Congress. Thus, Congress provided at the beginning of the government that there should be "at the seat of government an executive department, to be known as the Department of State, and a Secretary of State, who shall be the head thereof." It is true that I nominate the head of the department;

but the nomination is subject to the consent of the Senate, and the powers and duties of the Secretary of State are determined by Congress. Under this theory, the members of my Cabinet are not my secretaries and subordinates; but they are servants of the government with rights, duties and limitations prescribed by Congress. If Congress required them to do a certain act or to refrain from doing a certain act, then the Cabinet officer must obey the command or respect the limitation, without regard to my wishes. If, for example, Congress prohibited the Secretary of the Treasury from compromising a claim against the United States except with the advice of the Attorney General, the Constitution, theoretically, deprives me of power to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to compromise the claim on my own direction. While the members of my Cabinet, being a part of the Executive branch of the government, are theoretically subject to my directions, yet my directions are theoretically limited by the power vested in such heads of departments by Congress and the limitations which it prescribes with reference to specific acts.

All this is destructive of the power which the President should have. It is Newtonian, and not Darwinian. It vainly attempts to confine the Executive and the Legislative branches within their prescribed orbits.

LLOYD GEORGE. This is very interesting. But how did you overcome the difficulty which presented so serious a limitation to your power?

WILSON. The solution was very simple. I converted a Newtonian form into a Darwinian, and, in the

struggle for existence between the different branches of the Government, proved myself the fittest to survive by creating an extra-Constitutional government, which was directly responsible to me. I left to the heads of the Departments the minor details of government; but I assumed sole responsibility for the larger public policies of the state and conducted them through agents who were solely responsible to me. I compelled Congress to be the instrument of its own undoing by inducing them to pass some fifty special war emergency bills, which virtually gave to me almost unlimited powers of administration. Under these powers, I was enabled to build up my extra-Constitutional government.

To Mr. Gompers, for example, I assigned all questions which concerned labor, and I identified myself with his great organization by appearing in person before the American Federation of Labor, at its annual convention. I insured the coöperation of labor by at that time acknowledging the political partnership which existed between Mr. Gompers and myself.

Then I created the War Industries Board and placed my most capable friend, Mr. Bernard Baruch, as its executive head. This gave me almost as complete control of capital as I already enjoyed, through Mr. Gompers, over labor.

I took over the railroads and put them into the control of my son-in-law, the Secretary of the Treasury. My enemies allege that I thus sought to convince the people of the folly of government ownership of railroads by a practical demonstration of its maximum incompetence. Such is not the case. I wanted among

other reasons to control the subject of wages. I won my last election by that means.

To Mr. Burleson, my very competent Postmaster-General, I allocated the telegraph and telephone lines.

After the war had ended, I assumed control of the cable lines and thus controlled the transmission of news from the old world to the new.

Thus I obtained a control over business such as my predecessors never enjoyed, and the so-called "captains of industry" were compelled to dance to the tune which I piped,—and a merry dance it was.

Then I secured from Congress a confidential fund, to be disposed of by me in my discretion. It amounted to one hundred millions of dollars, and was therefore far larger than the annual expenses of the Federal Government in the first half of my nation's history.

I created the Bureau of Public Information, and placed George Creel, a very capable panegyrist, at its head, and thenceforth, no circus ever had a more enterprising press agent. With the pæans of praise which he sounded in my honor in every part of the world and with the suppression of criticism through the Espionage Laws, and my control of the telegraphs, telephones, and cables, it was not difficult for me to create a public opinion which was irresistible.

I had become the master of America, and, as you well know, the potential dictator of world policies. The triumph of the Darwinian theory was complete.

CLEMENCEAU. But your Senate, Mr. President, could not have abdicated its authority, especially in the matter of your foreign relations, in a world crisis where power was so tempting and inviting.

WILSON. It was in this respect that I won my greatest triumph. I determined and I succeeded in dictating the foreign policies of the Government wholly on my own responsibility. In all previous crises in the foreign relations of America, my predecessors had weakly consulted the Senate, and, formally or informally, obtained its consent to the policy which the Executive followed. I ignored the Senate. I announced the policy of my Fourteen Points in the name of America, without consulting it. I created an extra-Constitutional State Department, of which I appointed my close personal friend, Colonel Edward M. House, as the head. His apartment in New York became known as the "American Downing Street." I virtually made him a super-Secretary of State and super-Ambassador to All Countries, and you will agree with me that his status as such was recognized in all your chancelleries.

CLEMENCEAU. Did you send his name to the Senate for its approval?

WILSON. Certainly not. Colonel House was my own appointee. He did not owe his status to Congress and was not subject to the limitations which that body had placed upon the Department of State. Thus, I have been enabled to conduct the most delicate and important negotiations outside of the State Department and in a manner that gave me a freedom that my predecessors never enjoyed.

I first tested the sentiment of my countrymen with respect to this new method of conducting our foreign relations in the first hours of my administration in the Mexican embroglio. The Government had a

diplomatic representative in the City of Mexico, who had been nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It was my desire to displace the President of Mexico, whose actions were very offensive to me.

LLOYD GEORGE. You deeply interest us, Mr. President. The citizens of my country have nearly a billion dollars of investments in Mexico and they have suffered grave injuries from the disorder that there prevailed. Your handling of the Mexican problem is therefore of deep interest to us. What was your real objection to Huerta?

WILSON. He had a refractory method of talking back to me, which I did not like. He was a strange man and little appreciated my efforts to secure a better government for Mexico. You will be surprised to know that, after I had disclaimed any intention to intervene in the internal affairs of Mexico, and after I had expressed my most "scrupulous regard for the sovereignty and independence of Mexico," and had merely suggested to Huerta that Mexico should forthwith hold another election for the Chief Magistracy, in which he should not be a candidate, he resented this and was bold enough to assert the right of the Republic of Mexico to have such government as it pleased, to hold an election and to elect whom it pleased. I resented the effrontery of this reply. In my classrooms at Bryn Mawr and Princeton, it had not been my custom to tolerate back talk from those who listened to my words of instruction.

All this, I communicated to them not through the regular representative of the United States in Mexico, but through a special representative, whom I sent there

upon my own responsibility and without consulting the Senate.

CLEMENCEAU. All this is very interesting. We, in the Old World, had been puzzled as to the exact status of your Colonel House. He came to us in 1915 and 1916, and apparently the ambassadors and ministers which your country had sent to our governments became *functus officio,* and we were left to deal with Colonel House; and yet we were ignorant as to the scope of his authority. We now understand it better.

WILSON. Yes; the Colonel was very useful to me. *He* never talked back. His mind ran fully along with mine. As the war clouds gathered, he agreed with me as to their shape, whether I thought they looked like a camel, a weasel, or a whale. His whole-hearted enthusiasm in accepting my point of view I shall always gratefully remember. I sent him to Berlin during the winter of 1914-15, and suggested to the German Government that I could make peace for them if they abandoned the war, by giving them the freedom of the seas.

LLOYD GEORGE. Yes; we marked that. Did your Excellency appreciate that the "freedom of the seas," as Germany defined the doctrine, meant the destruction of the naval power of England, and therefore the destruction of my nation as a power of the first rank?

WILSON. I wished to end the war, and the freedom of the seas, whatever its consequences, was a small price to pay. The fact that it was your country which would have paid the price is of minor importance. Unfortunately, your country was unwilling to accept this attempt to bring about a peace without victory—ex-

cept for Germany—and I therefore sent Colonel House a second time to Berlin, in January, 1916. I found its government quite willing to use my good offices to bring about a "peace without victory," provided that Germany received suitable reparations, guaranties, and, above all, the freedom of the seas.

On his return from Berlin, I put Colonel House into communication with the German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff. The advantage of my extra-Constitutional State Department then became manifest. The eyes of my country and of the world were upon the State Department, and the occasional pronunciamentos which it issued over Mr. Lansing's name—most of which I wrote—were given a consideration which they did not deserve. My real negotiations to bring about a "peace without victory" were with the German Ambassador, through the serviceable Colonel House. My choice was admirable. Bernstorff accredited House to his Foreign Office as "wholly neutral, very discreet and deserving."

In the autumn of 1916, we had reached an understanding that I was to negotiate a movement for a peace conference to end the war. The exigencies of the presidential election compelled me to defer it. Imagine my surprise when the German Government, contrary to our understanding and entirely anticipating my peace overtures, proposed a peace conference on December 12th! Ignoring this attempt, I, on December 18th, took the first step to sound public opinion by my note of that date, in which I suggested that the belligerents were, on their own statements, fighting for the same principles. Unfortunately my misguided

countrymen did not receive my efforts with approval, and your Governments rejected the idea of a conference at a time when, as you claimed, the German Kaiser was in a position to rattle his saber at the conference table. I thereupon, on January 22nd, made my great address to the Senate, in which I publicly advocated a "peace without victory," a peace where there would be no victors or vanquished.

CLEMENCEAU. Did your Excellency really believe that England and France, after each had sacrificed a million lives and uncounted billions of treasure, would have accepted such a peace, which would have brought to nought our sacrifices of a million lives?

WILSON. What could you do when I demanded it? You knew and I knew that, without the raw materials, the manufactures, and food supplies from America, you could not continue the war. A word from me to Congress, and an embargo would have been placed upon all exports to the belligerent nations. I knew my power. Imagine, then, my amazement when the German Government, notwithstanding this promising movement towards "peace without victory," on January 31st, canceled the submarine pledges and created in America such a storm of indignation that even I was unable to control it. Nothing remained for me to do but to give Count von Bernstorff his passports. While my efforts to bring the war to an end under conditions that would have left neither victors nor vanquished were thus defeated by the incredible stupidity and ingratitude of the German Government, yet the value of my extra-Constitutional State Department appeared strikingly manifested by the fact that

all of the negotiations between Colonel House and Count von Bernstorff had been kept a profound secret. My neutrality remained uncompromised. I therefore continued Colonel House as my super-Secretary of State and super-Ambassador to all countries, and, in this way, secured a domination over the affairs of the world that I can proudly say none of my predecessors ever enjoyed. Long before the Armistice, my worthy subordinate was organizing an elaborate department for the peace negotiations, which, at the time of the Armistice, had numbered hundreds of experts, who have, as you know, accompanied me on my great armada to your shores. As a matter of form, I have brought Mr. Lansing with me; but you will see that Mr. Lansing will know little and Colonel House will know much, during the progress of the negotiations that are before us, of my intentions.

I have thus shown that I can conduct the foreign affairs of the government without the advice and consent of the Senate, and through personal appointees in whose selection the Senate has no voice. This has given me a great power, which has brought me the enthusiastic acclaims of men of all nations. Under the Newtonian theory, it would have been impossible. Under the Darwinian theory, it is but the "survival of the fittest." Thus, in the long contest between the Congress and the Executive, which has marked the history of the American Government from its beginning, I am triumphant.

CLEMENCEAU. We, in turn, cannot regret the turn of affairs which the stupidity of our enemy brought about; for, great as were your intended services in

peace, they were even far greater in war, after you had brought your country into the conflict.

WILSON. Yes; it is a matter of regret that I did not earlier get into the war; for I should have brought it to a speedier conclusion. "Until the advent of America in the war, the Allied armies were inspired by no high ideals and were fighting with lowered heads, and it was not until they heard the accents of America's ideals that they lifted their heads and raised their eyes to Heaven, and——"

CLEMENCEAU. And you say this to us, who represent the heroes of the Marne, of Ypres, and of Verdun. When my poilus were saying to the armed millions of Germany, "You shall not pass," your ideal, as I recall it, was that there was such a thing as "being too proud to fight."

WILSON. You interrupt me. When, under my leadership, my armies came to your aid, "they were not like any other soldiers; they had a vision and were fighting in a dream, and they turned the whole tide of battle, and it never came back."

LLOYD GEORGE. But, Mr. President, you will admit the services of Great Britain's navy? They guarded your coasts as well as those of all the Allied nations. On all the waters of the high seas of all the world they kept watch and ward.

WILSON [*Calmly*]. Even while I was typing my momentous addresses on the pride which will not fight and a peace without victory, I was "greatly surprised at the failure of the British Admiralty to use Great Britain's naval superiority in an effective way. I noticed that your Admiralty was helpless, to the

point of panic." Even after our entry into the war, my Secretary of the Navy made many suggestions, which they rejected for some reason of prudence. That your Jellicoes, Beattys, Beresfords and Fishers were unwilling to be guided by me and Daniels seemed very strange. To me, it was clear that it was not a time for prudence, but for boldness, even at the cost of great losses. For my part, I should willingly have sacrificed half of our fleet and half of your fleet to end the submarine peril.

LLOYD GEORGE. Your willingness to make this sacrifice is very magnanimous. The only difficulty is that your nation had few, if any, of its battleships or larger cruisers in the zone of peril, and, had we followed your suggestion of a massed attack upon the submarine bases, we might have lost the flower of our fleet, and you, some smaller cruisers and torpedo chasers. However, it is a matter of regret that our Admiralty did not have the great advantage of your presence in London; for then our timidity and overweaning prudence would have vanished.

[*Outside of the hall are heard loud cries of* "WILSON! WILSON! *Vive le President des Etats Unis!" Enter* CLEMENCEAU'S *secretary.*]

SECRETARY. Your Excellency, great crowds are massed outside and are loudly calling for President Wilson.

[WILSON *rises and assumes the pose of an inspired prophet.*]

WILSON. Pardon me, gentlemen. The voice of the people calls me. Their will must be respected,

even if governments are broken. The voice of the people is the voice of God. "I would a great deal rather know what the men on the train, by the wayside, in the shops and on the farms are thinking about and yearning for than hear any of the vociferous proclamations of policy which it is so easy to hear and so easy to read by taking up any scrap of printed paper."[1]

CLEMENCEAU. Is not that a little hard on the representatives of the people? I am old-fashioned enough to deal with them, rather than with the men in the street.

WILSON. I cannot agree with you. We must constantly renew our contacts with the people. "Unless a man gets these contacts, he grows weaker and weaker. * * * He needs them as Hercules needed the touch of Mother Earth. If you lift him up too high, or he lifts himself too high, he loses the contact, and therefore loses the inspiration."[2]

CLEMENCEAU. May I venture to suggest to so great a scholar as the former president of Princeton University that it was not Hercules who needed the contact with his Mother Earth, but Antæus, and that Hercules slew Antæus by holding him up in the air until he grew weak, and then dashed him to the ground. I hope, for all our sakes, that your classical allusion may not prove to be a more telling analogy than we had anticipated; for your American Constitution is generally reputed by students of government

[1] Address of Wilson on February 26, 1916, Congressional Record, Vol. LIII, p. 3308.

[2] Wilson's address at Congress Hall, Philadelphia, Oct. 25, 1913, Congressional Record, Vol. L, p. 5809.

as a Hercules, and, if I correctly understand its fundamental philosophy, it was conceived in a spirit of distrust towards unrestrained democracy, and its provisions, like the mighty muscles of Hercules, have from time to time first held aloft and then thrown statesmen who, like Antæus, found their strength in contact with that most elusive and uncertain entity that we call "the people."

[WILSON *glares at* CLEMENCEAU, *who calmly folds his hands, covered with suede gloves, upon his knees and whose head drops upon his breast in a prophetic reverie.*]

BALFOUR [*Seeking to relieve a tense situation*]. Your classical allusion, Mr. President, is delightful, even though a little inaccurate. I have noted in your parliamentary discourses an unusual characteristic, and that is that you rarely quote any one. Except for some passing references in earlier writings to Bagehot and your effective use of Luther's famous phrase at the Diet of Worms, in your war address, I cannot recall an instance in which you have supported a view by quoting some great authority.

WILSON. I do not quote; I am quoted. But the crowd still calls me. Pardon me, if, like Antæus, I renew my contact with the people, and [*looking sternly at* CLEMENCEAU] no Hercules will break my strength.

[*He goes out on a balcony and addresses the multitude.*]

LLOYD GEORGE. An extraordinary colleague, our American President. His "voices in the air" seem

to be the voice of the mob; his "vision," that of the typical exploiter of mob passion. But the masses acclaim him as their hero.

CLEMENCEAU. They also acclaimed Dr. Cook,—for a time. Did not the Greeks say that " the laughter of the Gods is fatal to those who incite it"?

LLOYD GEORGE. Is he not the most egocentric of statesmen, unless we except the German Kaiser. I recall the words that Sidney Smith once wrote of Lord John Russell:

"There is nothing he would not undertake. I believe he would perform an operation for stone, build St. Peter's, assume (with or without ten months' notice) the command of the Channel Fleet; and no one would discover from his manner that the patient had died, that St. Peter's had tumbled down, and that the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms."

CLEMENCEAU. An apt quotation. Only the President would complain of such a limit upon his versatile capabilities. We spoke, a little while ago, of our division of the world and reminded ourselves of Pompey, Cæsar and Crassus. Our friend's assumed over-lordship reminds me of an analogy from classical mythology. You will remember that Jove made a similar division among an Olympian triumvirate. To Neptune, he assigned the sea; to Pluto, the lower regions; but, for himself, he claimed the rest of the earth, with an over-lordship over Neptune and Pluto. Our friend's conception of his place in Paris is not dissimilar. To England, he assigns the rôle of Neptune; to France, continental Europe, which, in its present chaos, is not unsuggestive of the Plutonic realm; while

for himself, he reserves the control of the sunlit earth, with himself playing the rôle of Jove. [*Loud cheers are heard: "Vive Wilson!"*] Our friend returns.

[*Door opens and the President smilingly enters.*]

WILSON. I have responded to their noble enthusiasm. When I see the confidence they repose in me and the power that it gives me to destroy any government which opposes the people, I tremble at my own power. "The way to success is to show that you are not afraid of anybody, except God and His final verdict. If I did not believe in that, I would not believe in democracy."[1]

[*Door opens and* CLEMENCEAU'S *secretary again enters.*]

SECRETARY. Your Excellency, a delegation is in an ante-chamber, which insists upon seeing President Wilson. They claim that he promised to see them in Paris, before the Peace Conference.

WILSON. Who are they that thus intrude upon this inner conference where we are openly arriving at open covenants?

SECRETARY. They say they are a delegation of the Irish people. Their names are Messieurs Dunne, Ryan and Walsh.

WILSON. Is Colonel House there?

SECRETARY. Yes; he is talking with them and endeavoring to dissuade them from insisting upon a conference.

[1] Address on July 4, 1914, at Philadelphia, Congressional Record, Vol. LI, App. 707.

WILSON. Oh! that Tumulty were here. Tell House to keep them for ten minutes.

[*Exit secretary.*]

WILSON [*Turning to* CLEMENCEAU]. Is there any private exit from this room? I have another engagement and I do not care to see these worthy gentlemen from America. They come to plead for a free Irish Republic. "It is not men that interest or disturb me primarily; it is ideas. Ideas live; men die." I cannot discuss the idea of an Irish Republic at this time. Let me out the side door.

CLEMENCEAU [*Turning to a door.*] This way, your Excellency. We will meet again in the near future, and, in the meantime, I wish you a happy deliverance from your difficulties with the Irish delegation.

[*Exit* MR. WILSON.]

LLOYD GEORGE. The supreme egotist, as your Excellency has defined him, seems to recognize one power stronger than his own.

CLEMENCEAU. The Irish vote? I thought he feared nothing but God.

LLOYD GEORGE. So Bismarck said of his Prussia; but he feared the Socialists, as our American friend fears his Irish fellow citizens.

CLEMENCEAU. I cannot understand your concern and that of our valorous American idealist in the matter of Irish aspirations. Your difficulties with the Irish people could be your greatest asset, and, appropriately exploited, would go far to pay your national debt.

LLOYD GEORGE. I fail to understand you.

CLEMENCEAU. My suggestion would be that you recognize an Irish Republic—but reserve the moving picture rights. Their commercial value would go far to relieve the anxiety of your Chancellor of the Exchequer.

LLOYD GEORGE. I fear that Mr. Wilson has pre-empted that field.

CLEMENCEAU. Well, we have had a lesson in Constitutional government, and we can now understand much that was unintelligible to us before America's entry into the war. However, we dare not offend our friend; for he represents her power and resources.

I have lived in America, and I know the passionate devotion of its people to their Constitution. For a time —and especially during the period of a war—they will remain silent while the Great Charter which their fathers gave them is treated as a "scrap of paper." But they are not fooled forever.

Slowly but surely that mighty Hercules, the American people, will hold our would-be Antæus aloft in the air, only to throw him to the Mother Earth of reality. After that rude shock, he will be the "mighty somnambulist of a shattered dream."

CHAPTER II

THE OLD FREEDOM

"Liberty, to be enjoyed, must be limited by law; for law ends where tyranny begins, and the tyranny is the same be it the tyranny of a monarch or of a multitude,—nay, the tyranny of the multitude may be the greater, since it is multiplied tyranny."

EDMUND BURKE.

Having now considered the New Freedom, as expounded by its foremost apostle, Mr. Wilson, let us briefly consider and contrast the Old Freedom, which was *and fortunately still is.*

The Old Freedom under which the United States has grown immeasurably great was best defined by the founders of the American Commonwealth in the Constitution of the United States. Those who framed that wonderful document clearly recognized that in this democratic age all governments are obliged to steer between the Scylla of mobocracy and the Charybdis of one-man despotism. They sought to avoid this by ordaining the noblest covenant of government that the wit of man has yet devised. Nothing was further from their thought than to give unrestrained power either to one man or to the people. The Constitution is a standing protest against either despotism.

It will be noted that in the Constitutional Convention the very great men who participated in its debates never referred to democracy, except in condemnation

of its excesses. The exact definition which they gave to the word democracy must be borne in mind.

Democracy, as they defined it, was the direct action of the people. Republicanism, as they defined it and of which the Constitution is the noblest expression, was government by representatives chosen by the people. Thus James Madison, in the tenth of the Federalist papers, declared that pure democracies "have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths." Alexander Hamilton asserted that "the members most tenacious of republicanism were as loud as any in declaiming against the evils of democracy," and added: "Give all the power to the many, they will oppress the few; give all the power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both, therefore, ought to have the power, that each may defend itself against the other." To establish a government which would, in Hamilton's phrase, "unite public strength with individual security," the Constitution of the United States was ordained.

When the Fathers met in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, they determined to create a representative democracy, and not a direct one. With full agreement on this basic idea, their final success was not reached without acute and almost fatal differences upon other questions. For nearly four months they labored in secret, with multiplied and accentuated differences: but the suspense ended and the crisis passed, Franklin, pointing to the half-disk of the sun, painted on the chair of the president of the convention, made

the prophetic remark that, while he had often, in the weary and arduous months of the Convention, wondered whether that sun was a symbol of a rising or a setting sun for that America, to which he had freely given more than half a century of his noble life, concluded:

"But now at length I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting sun."

To-day, when the Sun, whose rising Franklin so clearly saw, is seemingly in its noontide splendor, with its rays illumining the whole world, we can see the full realization of the sage's prophecy. Its partial eclipse, which we owe to the "New Freedom," will be like all eclipses, only temporary. Indeed the sun of our constitutional freedom emerged in 1787 from an eclipse of popular government. The present organic unity of the United States blinds us to the terrible conditions out of which the Constitution grew, and this notwithstanding the fact that there is a remarkable similarity between world conditions in 1787 and those of the present hour. Then, as now, a world war had just ended. Then, as now, there had been a swift and terrible reaction in the souls of men from the nobility of purpose and the divine spirit of self-sacrifice that had animated the nations in their fierce struggle for existence. As Washington said, "The whole world was in an uproar," and again he said the difficulty was "to steer between Scylla and Charybdis." Especially deplorable were the conditions in the colonies in the years that had intervened between the

treaty of peace and the meeting of the Constitutional Convention.

The days that followed Yorktown were as truly the times "that tried men's souls," as the period of bitter struggle, when the fortunes of Washington's little army found their lowest ebb at Valley Forge. In fact, the times were graver; for a nation can always resist external aggression better than internal dissension.

The spirit of anarchy, or, as we would now say, Bolshevism, had swept a people already gravely tried in the fiery furnace of war.

Credit was gone, business paralyzed, and lawlessness rampant. Not only between class and class, but between State and State, there were acute controversies and an alarming disunity of spirit. The currency of the little nation was valueless. It had shrunk to the nominal ratio of one cent on the dollar. Even its bonds were sold at one-fourth their value. The slang expression, "Not worth a Continental," is a surviving evidence of the contempt for the financial credit of the country. Tradesmen derisively plastered the walls of their shops with worthless bills. The armies were unpaid and only their love for their great leader kept them from open revolt. It seemed to many—and to Washington himself—that the heroic struggle for independence would end in a general fiasco, which would confound the lovers of liberty in every land and again enthrone autocracy or anarchy. To weld thirteen jealous and discordant States, inhabited by men of different races, creeds and classes, into a unified and efficient nation, was a seemingly impossible task. Its final

accomplishment blinds us to the difficulty of the problem.

In those trying times it was to Washington that a distracted people turned. Having surrendered his commission as Commander-in-Chief, he had retired to Mount Vernon, believing that "the noon-tide of life was past" and that all that remained was "to glide quietly down a stream which no human effort can ascend." He felt that his life-work was over; but viewed with acute apprehension the growing anarchy. At times even his brave spirit was discouraged. Writing in 1786, he said:

"I think often of our situation, and view it with concern. From the high ground we stood upon, from the plain path which invited our footsteps, to be so fallen, so lost, is mortifying; but everything of virtue has, in a degree, taken its departure from our land."

When invited to attend the proposed Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, he at first declined. Suddenly the news of Shay's rebellion in Western Massachusetts came to his startled ears. It was essentially, as we would now say, a Bolshevist movement, an uprising of debtors to prevent the collection of debts or of taxes. Courts of law were seized to subvert order and destroy property rights. The revolution spread from Massachusetts to adjoining States, and threatened to strangle the infant Republic at its birth. Only an army of five thousand men and an actual battle sufficed to end it. Civil war had come.

Washington saw this in his retirement at Mount Vernon. With acute anguish of spirit, he wrote:

"What, gracious God, is man that there should be such inconsistency and perfidiousness in his conduct? It was but the other day that we were shedding our blood to obtain the constitutions under which we now live, and now we are unsheathing our swords to overturn them. The thing is so unaccountable that I hardly know how to realize it or to persuade myself that I am not under an illusion of a dream."

Once again the Father of his people came to their rescue. Turning his back upon the sweet retirement of Mount Vernon, which he had thought would be his solace for the nine years of absence during the great struggle, Washington again accepted the call of his country.

So little was the interest in the project and so weak the faith in the possibility of any favorable result, that only a few delegates had arrived on the day set for the beginning of the Convention and for many days it was impossible to secure a quorum, but when it became known that Washington had come from Virginia, it had the same inspiring effect as when he galloped down the Freehold road and rallied his retreating army at the Battle of Monmouth.

While waiting for enough delegates to form a bare quorum of the proposed convention, Washington gathered the faithful few about him and, as Gouverneur Morris narrated years afterwards, said:

"It is too probable that no plan that we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. If, to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterwards defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise

and just can repair. The event is in the hand of God."

How splendidly his faith was vindicated! By appealing to the best in men, and not the worst, a work was wrought which has hitherto endured and which is the admiration of all men. The lesson then taught, which all generations of Americans can profitably remember, is that the best way to make democracy practicable is to trust it by telling it the truth. This the Fathers did and their faith had the richest reward.

When the terrible conditions out of which the Constitution was created are remembered, one can paraphrase the words of St. Paul:

"It was sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it was sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it was sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it was sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body."

It is a spiritual body; for the Constitution is something more than a written formula of government. It is a great spirit, the most quickening that now exists in the world. It is the highest assertion and, indeed, vindication, of the morality of government that the science of politics has yet given to the world. Underlying its formal provisions is a profound moral philosophy, and it is this fact which gives to its perpetuity a deep ethical significance. Should the Constitution now be undermined by the inundating waves of Socialism and Bolshevism, or by the more insidious and therefore more dangerous ideas of the "New Freedom," not only would the best hope of man in political

institutions perish, but the cause of righteousness would suffer in the destruction of some of its basic principles. The great purpose of the Constitution is to reconcile the authority of government with the rights of the individual as a responsible moral being. It not merely "renders unto Cæsar (the political state) the things that are Cæsar's"; but, in safeguarding the fundamental moral rights of the individual, it "renders unto God the things that are God's."

It must not be understood, however, that the Constitution was formulated in a spirit of political doctrinarianism. Nothing was further from its purpose. Its simplicity and brevity alike repel the suggestion. Read as a mere legal document, it is as dry and passionless as a manual of parliamentary law. Although it represented the concrete thought of more than fifty exceptionally able men, who had labored upon it for nearly four months, it contains little more than four thousand words, eighty-nine sentences, and about one hundred and forty distinct provisions. No document ever set forth more simply and briefly a comprehensive scheme of government.

None of its provisions even remotely suggests a speculative political philosophy or theoretical abstractions. The men who framed it were very practical men, and they were never more practical than when they formulated this wonderful instrument of government. They saw no visions and heard no voices in the air.

In 1776 the task was to make America safe for democracy; in 1787 it was to make democracy safe for America. The latter was the more difficult task.

While the Constitution apparently only deals with the practical and essential details of government, yet underlying these simply but wonderfully phrased delegations of power is a broad and accurate political philosophy, which constitutes the true doctrine of America, and, indeed, the "whole law and the prophets" of free government. Its principles are of eternal verity. They are founded upon the fundamental rights of man. They are not of the day or of temporary circumstances. If they are destroyed in principle, then the spirit of our government is gone, even if the form survive.

The essential principles of the Constitution, which form its political philosophy and which at least at one time constituted the American doctrine of free government, may be summarized as follows:

The first is *representative government.* In the discussions before the Constitutional Convention, all speakers made a distinction between that which they called "democracy" and that which they called "republicanism." By the former they meant direct legislative action by the people, or, as we would say, a pure democracy. By "republicanism," they meant representative government.

However much the Fathers disagreed upon other questions, they were substantially of one accord in the opinion that wise, direct legislative action was impossible without conference and that, in a commonwealth of many scattered communities, such a conference was impracticable, especially in cities, where the size of the population made a town meeting impossible.

Even in New England, the home of the town meet-

ing, it was provided as early as 1635 that wherever a community had more than five thousand inhabitants legislation should be committed to representatives, to whom they gave the title "Selectmen." The fathers had in mind the weakness of former republics, such as those of Greece and Italy, where the peoples attempted themselves to enact laws in tumultuous assemblies with only one result—disunion, civil strife and final anarchy.

The second principle of the Constitution was *our dual form of government.* The thirteen colonies were most reluctant to surrender even a portion of their sovereignty to the Federal Government. They were widely scattered communities and varied greatly in racial origin and local habits and customs. They were tenacious of the great principle of home rule, and, even when our country did not extend beyond the Alleghenies, there was, on the part of the local communities a deep-rooted objection to being governed by a central power. Only the immense influence of Washington triumphed over this feeling of local independence, and success could only be secured by confining the Federal Constitution to those matters of general concern which required of necessity a common rule and which each state was incompetent to determine for itself. For this reason the Tenth Amendment, without which the Constitution would not have been ratified, was formulated, providing that all rights not expressly delegated to the Federal Government should be reserved forever to the States and the people thereof.

The third principle was the *guaranty of individual liberty* through Constitutional limitations. This marked

the great contribution of America to the science of government. In all previous government building, the state was regarded as a sovereign, which would grant to individuals or classes, out of its plenary power, certain privileges or exemptions, which were called "liberties." Thus the liberties which the barons wrung from King John at Runnymede were virtually exemptions from the power of government. Our fathers did not believe in the sovereignty of the state in the sense of absolute power, nor did they believe in the sovereignty of the people in that sense. The word "sovereignty" will not be found in the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence. They believed that each individual, as a responsible moral being, had certain "inalienable rights" which neither the state nor the people could rightfully take from him.

This conception of individualism was wholly new and is the distinguishing characteristic of American constitutionalism. As to such reserved rights, guaranteed by Constitutional limitations, and largely by the first ten Amendments to the Constitution, a man, by virtue of his inherent and God-given dignity as a human soul, has rights, such as freedom of the press, liberty of speech, property rights, and religious freedom, which even one hundred millions of people can not rightfully take from him. The Fathers did not believe that the oil of anointing that was supposed to sanctify the monarch and give him infallibility had fallen upon the multitudinous tongue of the people to give it either infallibility or omnipotence. They believed in individualism. They were animated by a sleepless jealousy of governmental power. They be-

lieved that the greater such power, the greater the danger of its abuse. They believed that that people was best governed which was least governed. They felt that the individual could generally best work out his own salvation, and that his constant prayer to Government was that of Diogenes: "Keep out of my sunlight."

The worth and dignity of the human soul, the free competition of man and man, the nobility of labor, the right to work, free from the tyranny of state or class, this was their Gospel. Socialism was to them abhorrent.

This theory of government gave a new dignity to manhood. It exalted the human soul as no previous governmental institution had ever done. It said to the State: "There is a limit to your power. Thus far and no further, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed."

Closely allied to this doctrine of limited governmental powers, even by a majority, is the fourth principle of an *independent judiciary*. It is the balance wheel of the Constitution, and to function it must be beyond the possibility of attack and destruction. Our country was founded upon the rock of property rights and the sanctity of contracts. Both the nation and the several States are forbidden to take away life, liberty or property "without due process of law." The guarantee is as old as Magna Charta; for "due process of law" is but a paraphrase of "the law of the land," without which no freeman could be deprived of his liberties or possessions.

"Due process of law" means that there are certain fundamental principles of liberty, not defined or even

enumerated in the Constitution, but having their sanction in the free and enlightened conscience of just men, and that no man can be deprived of life, liberty or property, or of his right to the pursuit of happiness, except in conformity with these fundamental decencies of liberty. It is the contradiction of Bolshevism, which means the unrestrained rule of a class. To protect these even against the will of a majority, however large, the Judiciary was given unprecedented powers. It threw about the individual the solemn circle of the law.

The fifth fundamental principle was a system of *governmental checks and balances,* whereby it was sought to divide official authority and responsibility in order that power should never be concentrated in one man, or even in one branch of the Government. The founders of the Republic were not enamored of power. They had just thrown off the tyranny of a king. They were as little disposed to accept the tyranny of a Parliament or Congress. As they viewed human history, the worst evils of government were due to excessive concentration of power, which like Othello's jealousy "makes the meat it feeds on."

The sixth fundamental principle was a *concurrent power of the Senate and the Executive over the foreign relations of the Government.*

Nothing, excepting the principle of home rule, was of deeper concern to the framers of the Constitution, and in nothing did they make a more radical departure from all existing forms of government. When the Constitution was framed, nearly every government of Europe was a monarchy, and it was the accepted prin-

ciple that whatever control parliaments or other legislative bodies had over domestic concerns the right to determine the foreign relations of the government, including the issues of peace and war, was the exclusive prerogative of the sovereign. In England, the freest of all governments at that time, the only check on the power of the King to select the diplomatic representatives of the government, to make treaties, and generally to determine the issues of peace and war, was the power which the House of Commons had over the purse of the nation. If the King had the necessary means to make war without a parliamentary grant, he was free to do so. But, as he rarely had sufficient means, he was generally dependent upon Parliament for the necessary grants. Many of the greatest struggles for English liberty concerned the attempt of the King to exact money without parliamentary grant, in order to carry on wars in which his dynasty was engaged.

When the Constitutional Convention met, it was at first resolved that the power to appoint ambassadors, ministers, and consuls, and to make treaties, should be vested *exclusively* in the Senate, as the body that most directly and equally represented the constituent States. It was, however, recognized by these practical men that the Senate was not always in session, and that it was not easy for a body, consisting originally of twenty-six men, to negotiate treaties with advantage, and therefore it was finally resolved that the President should "with the *advice and consent* of the Senate," appoint ambassadors, ministers and consuls, and make treaties; but that, if a declaration of war was contem-

plated, only the concurrence of both houses of Congress could authorize such a declaration.

The language of the Constitution was drawn with the greatest precision. It is a model of literary style. In it, there is no tautology, not even a wasted word, and when, therefore, the Constitution made necessary the "*advice* and consent of the Senate," something more than a mere ratification of an appointment or of a treaty was in contemplation. The word "advice" clearly meant coöperation with the Executive in an advisory capacity before a conclusion was reached and the nation, to some extent, morally committed.

It was the undoubted intention of the Fathers to make the Senate the final and principal treaty-making power, and, as such, to enable it, at any stage of the negotiations, either to propose a treaty to the Executive, to whom the task of negotiation with other nations was committed, to express disapproval of treaties in contemplation, to determine the suitability of those who were appointed to negotiate a treaty, to advise with the President at any stage of the negotiations, and, finally, to consent to, or reject, or to amend, any tentative draft.

As America is now the first power of the world and is destined to play the most potential part in shaping its destinies, it is vitally important that any decision which affects the future relations of this government with the rest of the world should have the consideration and approval, not merely of the Chief Magistrate, but of that body of Congress which, in a peculiar way, represents the sovereign commonwealths of the Federal Union.

This was recognized by the first Presidents, those who had sat in the Constitutional Convention which framed the Constitution, and therefore knew best the intentions of its framers. Thus, President Washington on more than one occasion appeared before the Senate and asked its instructions as to the character of the negotiations which he intended to initiate. In his conduct of foreign relations he kept in the most intimate touch with the Senate, in order to be sure that he would not exceed their wishes in what he was attempting to do. Thus, on April 16, 1794, he consulted the Senate as to the propriety of sending John Jay to England to negotiate the so-called "Jay Treaty," and gave his reasons and suggested the policy that he would instruct Mr. Jay to follow.

Washington's successor, President Adams, followed the same procedure. Jefferson, when he sent Livingston and Monroe to France to negotiate for the acquisition of Louisiana, suggested his proposed policy and invited the Senate's assent or dissent.

Gradually, however, a different procedure was adopted. For many reasons the President preferred to initiate the negotiations on his own responsibility and to defer any formal consultation with the Senate until he was prepared to submit a treaty in a concrete form. Even in these cases the President generally conferred informally with Senators, in order to be sure that he did not go to lengths which they would not sanction. In ignoring the Senate in the initial stages of negotiation, these former Presidents did so only in cases where they felt a reasonable certainty that the Senate would subsequently ratify their action. In all cases of doubt

the President, in order to prevent such a catastrophe as has now happened, either took the advice of the Senate as a body before initiating or concluding negotiations, or at least conferred with the Committee on Foreign Relations. Thus, as late as December 17th, 1861, President Lincoln sent to the Senate a draft of a convention proposed by the Mexican Government, not for ratification, but merely to ask their advice and whether he should proceed with the negotiations. A year later he again asked advice as to what instructions he should give the American diplomatic representative in Mexico, and when the Senate passed a resolution that it regarded the proposed policy inadvisable, President Lincoln, in a message dated June 23rd, 1862, said: "The action of the Senate is, of course, conclusive against acceptance of the treaties on my part."

In 1871 President Grant transmitted a dispatch from the American Minister to the Hawaiian Islands and asked the advice of the Senate as to the policy to be pursued. Again, in 1872, the same President asked the advice of the Senate with respect to the differences which had arisen with England under the Treaty of Washington.

In 1884 President Arthur asked the advice of the Senate as to how he should proceed with negotiations with the King of Hawaii for the extension of the existing reciprocity treaty.

In 1888 the Senate asked President Cleveland to open negotiations with China for the regulation of immigration.

Without multiplying precedents, which are numerous, it is enough to say that not only have previous

Presidents kept in touch with the Senate in negotiations, but the power of the Senate to shape them finally has been demonstrated by the fact that, in the matter of sixty-eight treaties with foreign countries, the Senate refused its ratification until amendments which they advised were accepted. The final power of the Senate has been repeatedly demonstrated by the complete rejection of many treaties favored by the Executive.

Undoubtedly in relatively unimportant negotiations, where the President can proceed with safety, he has negotiated without preliminary consultation with the Senate. But in all grave matters, especially where the issues of peace or war are concerned, every President, prior to the Treaty of Paris, consulted, formally or informally, with the Senate, and, as the latter has become a very large and cumbrous body, the method that has been followed generally in recent years is for the President to discuss matters of international policy with the Committee on Foreign Relations. As to many questions, especially in the initial stages, he may consult only with the members of that Committee who are of his own party; but in all grave crises, which rise above party politics, it was hitherto the unbroken custom for the President to confer with the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, without respect to party. The most recent illustration of this was the Spanish-American War, when President McKinley, as the crisis developed, called into frequent consultation the entire body of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and, when that war was ended, the President sent, as Commissioners to Paris, members of both

the political parties, including a distinguished Democratic Senator, who was not on domestic questions in political sympathy with the Administration.

In this way the Constitution has been so interpreted and applied that hitherto party politics stopped at the margin of the ocean, and America pursued, with reference to foreign affairs, a reasonably united policy.

It is obvious from what has preceded that President Wilson, in his negotiations at Paris, did not follow the wholesome and consistent precedents of his predecessors. He did not offend the letter of the Constitution, but he did not observe its spirit, which commanded him to "make," *i.e.,* negotiate, his treaties with the "advice" of the Senate. He has the justification that he works best alone and when least interfered with by divided counsels. Conflicts of opinion confuse him, and he has little of the judicial faculty of weighing the *pros* and *cons* of a question, and then deciding upon which side the balance lies.

When President Wilson returned to America with the first draft of the Covenant of the League, the dissent of the Senate—though informally expressed—was unmistakable. Thereupon the Paris Conference, in Mr. Wilson's absence, wisely decided to make a Treaty of Peace first with the Central Powers, and then consider, in a supplemental treaty, a League of Nations. On President Wilson's return to Paris he insisted that this action should be reversed, and the fatal blunder of the European Peace Commissioners was that they yielded to this demand, and, to please Mr. Wilson, forced the Covenant of the League back into the Peace Treaty. The obvious purpose was to compel, or at least induce,

the Senate to accept it as a choice of evils. While it may not have been so intended, in effect this was a challenge and almost an affront to the Senate and to a majority of the American people, who had, in the preceding November, given emphatic expression to their unwillingness to make President Wilson the sole judge of the extent and manner of America's participation in the proposed Treaty.

It has been generally assumed that, if the Senate of the United States had ratified the Treaty with the so-called "Lodge reservations," the President had power and would have exercised the power to pigeonhole the treaty, and thus ignore the judgment of the Senate as to the terms upon which the United States should enter the proposed League of Nations. Has the President such right?

It cannot be gainsaid that, as a mere juridical question, the President has such right. From the general provisions of the Constitution, an unwritten provision has been evolved, which gives to the President, except as the Senate may act as a brake in the matter of appointment and treaty ratification, the full control over the foreign relations of the government. This power, which I believe the framers of the Constitution never intended, is derived from the power of the President to receive foreign diplomatic representatives and to make treaties.

If the Senate had ratified the Peace Treaty with reservations which were objectionable to the President, his legal right, under the present generally accepted interpretation of the Constitution, to nullify the Treaty by pigeon holing it cannot be denied. The power has

been exercised without challenge by many of his predecessors.

A more serious question is whether the President has any *moral* power thus to disregard the will of the representatives of the States which form the Union in a matter that was so plainly committed to their final judgment. There is a clear difference between legal or technical constitutional power, and that which Grote once called "constitutional morality." The President is under a moral obligation, by reason of the whole spirit of the Constitution, to do things which, if he fails to do, he could not be justly subjected to impeachment. Such a moral duty, in my judgment, rests upon the President to accept the judgment of the Senators, when such judgment is reached by a two-thirds vote. The spirit of the Constitution imposes upon the President, as a moral duty, the responsibility of doing nothing which he has reason to believe the Senate will reject; but this is merely the negative or passive part of his duty. In my judgment, there is upon him an active and affirmative *moral* duty to defer to the wisdom of the Senate in the matter of our foreign relations. The Founders of the Republic believed, and, as I think, wisely believed, that the representatives of the sovereign States assembled in high council would have a wiser, or at least a safer, judgment than the President as to what treaties America should accept. Sound Constitutional morality requires that, when two-thirds of the Senate differ with the President as to the form of a treaty, he should defer to their views, and certainly this view has sanction in the basic theory of democracy that it is more likely that one official is

wrong when he differs from two-thirds of the Senate than that so large a number of Senators are wrong in their view.

I admit that this view is old-fashioned and reactionary; but, if America is to be involved in the affairs of the world, it will become increasingly important that we should so far go back to the Constitution of the Fathers as to accept that construction of the Constitution. The question of constitutional morality turns, not upon that which the President has the strict, legal power to do, but also upon the question as to what he *ought* to do to carry out the fundamental purpose of the Constitution.

It is this division of responsibility between the Executive and the Senate that makes it so difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to take any active part in the Executive Council of the League of Nations. Had the United States decided thus to participate, it could not have been an effective member of the Executive Council without a substantial modification of those provisions of the Constitution which relate to the treaty-making power. As long as the United States was detached from the European polity, its cumbrous method of making treaties with other nations was workable; but if it enters into the European polity —as President Wilson bids us do—and the United States becomes an active and continuous member of the Executive Council of the League of Nations, it is obvious from the present unfortunate *impasse* that the other nations which compose the Executive Council could not, with advantage, deal with the American representative who, unlike his European colleagues,

would not have any real power to bind his country. The result would be a constant repetition of the present dreadful deadlock in civilization. The President would necessarily be represented by his own appointee in the Geneva Council. Questions would arise which would require immediate and definite disposition. The American representative, in such event, would either be obliged to promise in behalf of his country a course of action which it might subsequently refuse to take, or he would be obliged to defer the vote of America until such time as the judgment of the Senate could be ascertained. Such a condition is plainly intolerable, and it is amazing that, in all the discussion of the League of Nations, so little attention has been paid to the fact that the Constitution of the United States is thus not adapted to the effective participation by the United States in the proposed super-state, as proposed in President Wilson's Covenant.

The present crisis suggests another interesting question. In all countries, there has always been a ceaseless war between the Executive and legislative departments for dominating power. Our Fathers sought to avert this by their system of checks and balances. On the one hand, they did not desire to make a king of the President, and, on the other, they were equally averse to parliamentary tyranny. Their own experience with both the Crown and Parliament had not made them partisans of either branch of government.

Unfortunately, the tides of popular action do not always run in the channels of constitutional theories. It is as difficult for two planets to continue in one orbit without collision, as it is for two branches of

government who are theoretically equal. Each is jealous of its power and ambitious for more.

Until recent years, the predominance of the legislature was regarded as the great ideal of democracy.

In this country, the opposite tendency has been observable for over fifty years. The Executive, in the person of the President, appeals more to the imagination of men than a many-headed body like the Congress. Thus, the attitude of the popular mind has been marked by an ever-increasing appreciation of the Presidential office, and an ever-decreasing respect for the legislative branch of the government.

In the last fifty years, the President has largely determined the policy of the nation, and when any difference arises between the Executive and the Congress, generally the sympathy of the people is with the President. He is regarded, rightly or wrongly, as more representative of the popular will.

If the experience of the past teaches us anything, it is that nations gradually lose their freedom by the undue exaltation of the Executive. When the President's prestige becomes so great that the popular mind will not brook any opposition to his wishes by the legislative branch, then America will be a republic only in name.

Moreover, nothing adds so much to the prestige of the Executive as the foreign relations of the government. When they become the dominating subject of popular solicitude, then differences as to internal policies yield to the exigencies of foreign relations and thus the office of President becomes of overshadowing importance.

The stupendous part which America is invited to play on the stage of the world by the League of Nations may possibly compensate for this possible change in the structure of our government. I very much doubt it. I fear that if America becomes a dominating element in the proposed superstate of the world, it will so enhance the dignity and power of the Presidential office that the equilibrium of power between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the government will be seriously, if not fatally, disturbed.

These are the six fundamental principles of the Constitution and constitute the great contribution of its framers to the ordered progress of mankind. In essence they are unchangeable, for they are fundamental verities. Destroy these one by one, and the Constitution will one day become a noble and splendid ruin like the Parthenon—useless for practical purposes, and only an object of melancholy interest.

Let me not be misunderstood as suggesting that the Constitution is too rigid to permit of adaptation to changed conditions. It is not static. It changes from generation to generation, sometimes by formal amendment, more frequently by judicial interpretation, and sometimes by mere usage. It contains many administrative details which need expansion to meet the changed needs of the most progressive nation in the world. Without such changes, the Constitution would soon be as an ocean bulkhead, which stands for a time, but, sooner or later, is destroyed by the invincible waves of the ocean. The Constitution is neither, on

the one hand, a sandy beach, which is slowly destroyed by the erosion of the waves, nor, on the other hand, is it a Gibraltar rock, which wholly resists the ceaseless washing of time and circumstance.

Its strength lies in its elasticity and adaptability to slow and progressive change. One serious change in our constitutional system seems to merit the most serious consideration of the American people. Our fixed tenure of office has gone far in the practical development of our institutions to destroy true parliamentary government. It is the vulnerable Achilles-heel of our form of government. In other countries the Executive cannot survive a vote of want of confidence by the Legislature. In America, the President, who is merely the Executive of the legislative will, continues for his prescribed term, although he may have wholly lost the confidence of the representatives of the people in Congress. This leads to the fatalism of our democracy, and the "native hue" of its resolution is thus "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." It would probably be unwise in a heterogeneous democracy as ours to make the continued tenure of the Executive to depend upon the confidence of a *majority* of both houses of Congress, but it would destroy the autocratic spirit, which too often marks the Executive and makes him a temporary King in all but name, if it were provided that the Executive should resign or be removed, whenever *two-thirds* of each house of Congress declared their want of confidence in him or his policies. If, in addition to this innovation, the members of his Cabinet were given seats in the House of Representatives and required at stated intervals to

reply to questions as to their policies and acts—as is the custom in the House of Commons—then we would have true parliamentary government, and the will of the people and not of one man would generally prevail. The two-thirds provision would endure a greater measure of popular government without impairing its stability.

In the fundamental principles above suggested, the Constitution asserted certain basic verities which "time cannot wither nor custom stale." These are eternal truths, and if these are subverted, the spirit of our government is gone, even if the form survive.

Were Franklin again to revisit the glimpses of the moon, would he, with his unequaled prescience, still regard the sun as a rising one? Would he, if he knew the developments of the last quarter of a century, and especially of the last eight years, regard this great luminary of the nations as in the noontide of its splendor, or would he regard it as slowly disappearing behind a dark cloud of Socialism—only to set some day in the flaming West, which would write its irrevocable sentence upon this as it has upon so many strong governments that have preceded?

What would Washington say if, clad in brown velvet and with sword by his side, he again appeared in our midst? We can know his thoughts from those which he expressed in the Farewell Address—the noblest political testament that any founder of a state ever gave to any people. Let me quote the significant words which he, as "an old and affectionate friend," addressed, not only to his own generation, but to all that were to follow, and therefore to this generation:

"It is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness . . . Toward the preservation of your government and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. *One method of assault may be to effect in the forms of the Constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what can not be directly overthrown.*"

Thirty-two years ago it was the author's privilege as a citizen of Philadelphia to participate in the Centennial Celebration of the adoption of the Constitution.

In all the public utterances that marked that celebration, there was undoubted faith that the Ship of State had weathered its hardest storms, had escaped the rocks and shoals which had wrecked other governments, and that, in the unlimited future, there were before it only smooth seas and cloudless skies.

If any of us who took part in that celebration had then anticipated the portentous changes of the next twenty-five years, and especially of the last eight years, the note of exultation would, like Macbeth's "Amen," have stuck in our throats. Little we then realized that before another quarter of a century had passed every fundamental principle of the Constitution would be challenged by great political parties, and responsible leaders of thought, and that, within that time, there would be Americans who would openly proclaim their belief that the Constitution was an anti-

quated and reactionary document, an obstacle to the progress of the American people, and a mistaken imitation of the Newtonian and not the Darwinian theory.

In measuring the force of Constitutional changes, it is necessary to note the changes in the Constitutions of the States, as well as in that of the Federal Government. Together they form the real Constitutional system of the American Commonwealth.

The representative principle has been challenged in twenty-two States of the Union by the initiative and the referendum.

The principle of home rule has been subverted by a steady submergence of the States, which has now made of them little more than glorified police provinces. The latest illustration is the Prohibition Amendment, whereby Congress is given power to prescribe the habits of the people. At such an abuse of power over personal liberty, Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and Hamilton would have stood aghast.

The guaranty of individual liberty has been violated by many socialistic measures, while property rights are destroyed from time to time by confiscatory legislation.

The independence of the judiciary is menaced by many provisions for the recall both of judges and of judicial decisions.

The system of governmental checks and balances has been disturbed by the persistent subordination, in the practical workings of the Government, of the Legislative to the Executive; while the concurrent power of the Senate over the foreign relations of the Government has been so weakened that more than one responsible leader of thought has boldly asserted that this

power is more nominal than real. Contemporaneous events happily show that the power of the Senate has not yet been wholly destroyed.

The taxing system has been perverted to redistribute property.

The commercial power of the Union has been utilized to attain unconstitutional results which were clearly outside of the sphere of the Federal Government.

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have largely broken down as bulwarks against confiscatory legislation.

Under more than one administration, the control of the Senate in the selection of diplomatic representatives of the Government has been nullified by the appointment of extra-constitutional diplomats.

Even the concurrence of the Senate in the treaty obligations of the country has been impaired under many administrations by protocols, informal treaties, and latterly by methods of treaty-making which make the free decision of the Senate difficult, if not impossible.

Alarming as are these tendencies, infinitely more portentous is the shifting of power from the government to organized classes—and this tendency of our time is so grave that it threatens the very existence of organized society. When any class becomes so numerous or powerful that it can force its will upon the Government, not through the ballot box, but through its control over the necessities of life, then the Government exists in form and not in name, and such a nation has been effectually Bolshevized. Bolshevism

means the rule of the majority; but in its practical operation, as now seen in Petrograd, it is the rule of a class. Of all oligarchies, that of a class is the most hateful.

On the eve of the last Presidential election, the organization which represents the labor engaged in transportation—as essential to the life of a nation as the circulation of the blood is to the life of an individual—arrogantly served notice upon the President and Congress that their wages must be raised by statute. With a stop-watch in their hands, they demanded immediate compliance with their imperious demands; and not only did the President and the Congress weakly yield, but even the Supreme Court bent to the storm in sustaining as constitutional an unprecedented exercise of the legislative power. "Can such things be, and overcome us as a summer cloud, without our special wonder?"

Such attempted subversions of constituted authority recall the solemn warning of George Washington in the Farewell Address in words of extraordinary aptness to present conditions:

"All obstructions to the execution of the laws, *all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character,* with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tendency. . . .

"However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things *to become potent engines by which cunning, ambitious and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power*

of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion."

Who can deny that, in recent years, our country has witnessed such "obstructions to the execution of the laws," such "combinations and associations" designed "to direct, control, counteract or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities."

Let us recall the extraordinary prediction made more than a half century ago by one of the most sagacious students of history of his or any time. In a letter written to the biographer of Thomas Jefferson, Lord Macaulay ventured the prediction that the Constitution of the United States would prove workable as long as there were large areas of undeveloped land. He added, however, that when our country became one of great cities, when we, too, had our Birminghams, Manchesters and Liverpools, that then the real test of our institutions would come. He added:

"I believe America's fate is only deferred by physical causes. Institutions purely democratic will sooner or later destroy liberty or civilization, or both. In Europe, where the population is dense, the effect would be instantaneous. The poor would plunder the rich, and civilization would perish or prosperity would be saved by a strong military government, and liberty would vanish. The American constitution is all sail and no anchor."

Macaulay was not alone in this direful prophecy. One of the most profound students of government of the nineteenth century, Herbert Spencer, wrote to ar American friend the following:

"I believe I wished you God speed in your enterprise, but I believe your enterprise is futile. In the United States, as here and elsewhere, the movement toward dissolution of existing social form and reorganization on a socialistic basis I believe to be irresistible. We have bad times before us, and you have still more dreadful times before you—civil war, immense bloodshed and eventually military despotism of the severest type."

I cannot share Macaulay's view that our Constitution is "all sail and no anchor"; for, hitherto, it has proved a very effective anchor; but it is sadly true that the anchor is dragging, and the Ship of State is slowly swinging away from its ancient moorings. Certainly the danger was never greater than in this hour, when in every country there is a revolt against accepted principles of government. Indeed, the future historian may say that the first quarter of the twentieth century was marked by a revolt against the past in all departments of human life. One can see this tendency in literature, art, music, sociology and political government. Everywhere there is a craze for innovation; everywhere hostility to that which has the sanction of the past.

This question is of vital importance; for there is no greater error than to suppose that the Constitution has some inherent vitality to ensure its perpetuity. The breath of its life is public opinion, and when that public opinion ceases to support any or all of its fundamental principles, they will perish. Its continued vitality must depend upon the continued and intelligent acceptance of its political philosophy by the people.

Human institutions gather no strength from pieces of parchment or red seals. In a democracy, the living soul of any human institution must be the belief of the people in its wisdom and justice.

It is true of all human institutions, ecclesiastical or political, that the form may often survive the substance of the faith, and while the Government, which the Constitution brought into being, might for a time survive the destruction of its vital spirit, even as a dead oak stands for a while after the sap has failed, yet if the fundamental principles of the Constitution cease to receive popular support, the whole edifice will slowly crumble.

This nation has spent its treasure like water, and, what is infinitely more, the blood of its gallant youth, to make "the world safe for democracy." The task is accomplished; but, in the mighty reaction from the supreme exertions of the war, it is now apparent to thoughtful men that a new problem confronts mankind—*and that is, to make democracy safe for the world.*

In this period of popular fermentation, the end of which no man can predict, the Constitution of the United States, with its fine equilibrium between efficient power and individual liberty, still remains the best hope of the world. If it should perish, the cause of true democracy would receive a fatal wound and the best hopes of mankind would be irreparably disappointed.

Can any thoughtful man assert that the edifice of the Union still remains in all its pristine beauty and vigor? Is it not as the Cathedral of Rheims, its great

walls and pillars still remaining upon enduring foundations of indestructible granite, but its great rose windows broken into fragments, and its high altar thrown down. The rose windows of the Union are the great traditions through which a great and noble past suffuses itself into the living present. The high altar of the Union is the Constitution itself. If it were destroyed, the splendor of the Union would perish with it.

Such was the Old Freedom.

CHAPTER III

"IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN"

> Talkers are no good doers. Be assured
> We go to use our hands and not our tongues.
> SHAKESPEARE.

PLACE: *Premier's room, Quai d'Orsay.*
TIME: *January* 15, 1919. SCENE: *Paris.*

As the curtain rises, CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, BALFOUR, PICHON *and* ORLANDO *are seated at Council table.*

ORLANDO [*Looking at the clock*]. Our illustrious American colleague is late.

CLEMENCEAU [*Dryly*]. He generally is. In that policy, no one will question his consistency.

LLOYD GEORGE. "Better late than never." His tardy arrival gives us the opportunity to discuss between ourselves the new complication of the active participation of an American President in European conferences. It may destroy the equilibrium of the European polity. This Messianic diplomacy, with its flotilla of ships and a thousand experts, journalists, photographers, and cinema operators may have rejected Machiavelli, but it is somewhat reminiscent of Barnum.

CLEMENCEAU. We need not quarrel with the methods of the new diplomacy if we can secure quick results. The vital question is one of time. A fear grips me that the work of the sword may be lost in

the wordy wrangles of diplomats, old and new. I sometimes wonder whether we could not wisely commit the establishment of peace to Maréchal Foch, as a Committee of One, with power. We could then discuss at our leisure the philosophy of government and plan a new charter for the world. For the present, our dead demand of us concrete results, not illusory abstractions. Above all, Russia is the *crux* of the situation. The time to crush Bolshevism is now. A year hence it will be too late and we may yet see Lenine and Trotzky dictating in Warsaw their terms of peace to Western Civilization. If so, it will be the "twilight of the Gods" for Western Europe, yes, even for America. Delay is fatal.

ORLANDO. Peace cannot come too soon for Italy. Our distinguished visitor's triumphal tour through my country has not been attended with the best results to the stability of our Government. He has appealed to the masses over our heads and already we hear the distant thunder of a coming storm. A Don Quixote may smash not only windmills but a democratic civilization.

CLEMENCEAU. Too much importance need not be attached to these popular ovations. "The shallows murmur; but the deep is dumb." We are apt to exaggerate the importance of popular demonstrations. There is a contagious, but unreasoning, character to such manifestations. The intensified enthusiasm of the mob, whether for good or evil, is but a survival of the herd instinct which we share with the lower forms of animal life. I have little doubt that the same crowd that welcomed the Saviour of Mankind on His entry

into Jerusalem with glad hosannahs were in part those who, five days later, vociferously shrieked: "Crucify Him! Release unto us Barabbas."

BALFOUR. Yes, our English Shakespeare has shown this in his masterly forum scene in *Julius Cæsar,* where the same crowd that applauded the cold patriotism of Brutus, a little later, lashed to a frenzy by Mark Antony's fervid speeches, picked up brands, not merely to destroy Brutus, but to set Rome on fire. How often, in the history of the world, have mobs acted with less reason than a pack of wolves? And yet our American friend is not alone in enjoying such precarious favor.

CLEMENCEAU. His nation's history could teach him its futility. My countryman, Genet, went to America, to gain support for France, and at first received the fervid plaudits of great assemblies, until it seemed as though he could push Washington himself from his throne of popular affection. One word from Washington, and the bubble burst.

Lafayette, on his return to America, had a reception of amazing enthusiasm, but Andrew Jackson was not less popular when only a few years later he threatened France with war because our Chamber of Deputies refused to pass an appropriation bill.

Later, Kossuth felt that all America was aflame with enthusiasm for Hungary, to find that it was only gratifying its desire to see in the flesh a distinguished European statesman.

The Prussian Prince Henry went to America and was greeted with popular demonstrations from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Our enemies were completely

deceived by his reception in America. At that time my Government was much concerned at the extraordinary receptions given to the Prussian Prince and feared that it marked a pro-German attitude on the part of the United States. Whom the masses applaud one day, they stone the next.

ORLANDO. All this is true, but the present danger remains. In Italy the demonstrations in Mr. Wilson's honor may shake the foundations of our Government. The times are abnormal and the passions and sufferings of the war have inflamed the minds of men to fever heat. Our great cities are so many powder magazines, to which the match cannot be safely applied. I confess that I would feel safer if the American President, who is a master of phrases and apparently an emotional idealist, had not come to Europe at this very critical time.

CLEMENCEAU. On the contrary, his coming is the most fortunate of occurrences to us.

ORLANDO. I fear I do not fully understand your Excellency's meaning.

CLEMENCEAU. Had Mr. Wilson remained in Washington he would have been the moral dictator of the world. He would have been seated as Cæsar in the Flavian amphitheater. In Paris he is in the arena and cannot escape the dust of conflict.

The President is certainly a remarkable man, a cross between Don Quixote and Mahomet. No such figure has appeared in European history since the Tsar of Russia appeared at the Peace Conference in 1815. Had he remained in Washington he would have had all the advantages of an exceptional position. We should

have been compelled to deal with his *fidus Achates,* Colonel House, who would not admit that two and two make four without an Imperial rescript. When the Texas Talleyrand had secured from us the maximum of benefits for the minimum of concessions, he would have pleaded the necessity of referring the final decision to Washington. Long delay would have resulted, during which President Wilson, through his control over the Press and the channels of communication, and his unrivaled power of suave but obscure statement, could prejudge the public opinion of the world. Inaccessible to any personal contact, he would at the psychological moment have descended from the cloudy summit of his Mount Sinai and delivered to us the tables of the law, with this unhappy difference, that *le bon Dieu* was content with Ten Commandments, whereas our Moses has already bewildered us with Fourteen, and God only knows how many more we may receive before we complete our labors.

In coming to Paris he has lost all these advantages of position. He must meet us face to face and give fair answer to our views and demands. [*Closes his eyes and looks meditatively at the ceiling, as he adds in an undertone*] They say he comes to match wits with us. I am old and my political race is nearly run, but my hand has not altogether lost its cunning. I rejoice that we see him in the arena and not in Cæsar's judgment seat. European diplomacy may be old, but it is not yet for America's "thumbs" to pronounce its fate.

LLOYD GEORGE. I agree that in coming to Paris Mr. Wilson has staked his all upon the success of his

venture. In this lies his weakness. He dare not fail, therefore he must concede. Before sailing from New York he announced that he went to fight for "the freedom of the seas" and the League of Nations. When your Excellency's reception of the latter project disappointed him, he came to England to seek my aid, and, to test the strength of his purpose, it was suggested that England could more readily accept the League if the issue of the freedom of the seas were eliminated from the deliberations of the Peace Conference. For a short time he remained silent, and then surprised me by bursting into a hearty laugh. He said that the joke was on him, and that it had never previously occurred to him that when the League of Nations was in operation there would no longer be any neutrals; and thus the question of the freedom of the seas was academic. While I could not share his enthusiasm in the prospect that every little war between nations would automatically become a world war, yet I gladly accepted his happy solution of a vexed question which vitally concerned my people. Paul's conversion on the way to Damascus was not more sudden or miraculous than his abandonment of his "freedom of the seas."

CLEMENCEAU. I congratulate England on your success in the first encounter with our American Hercules, but what of France? We prefer the balance of power and the tested offensive and defensive alliance which won this war. I would as soon defend Paris with a rainbow as France with a League of Nations. A nightmare fills me with a haunting dread that if we follow this *ignis fatuus,* the real victors of the war may yet be Trotzky and Lenine. Think of the humiliation if,

after the loss of millions of lives, the conquerors of the Marne, the Yser and the Meuse must bend their knees to a Lenine or Trotzky and make terms with them. To that Canossa I would not go with a Bolshevist Pope to keep me waiting in the snow of the outer courtyard of European civilization. When that day comes, as it may if we trust a League of Nations, what will that Debating Society do to avert our peril? We should make peace with Germany now on our own terms with utmost speed and then crush Bolshevism before it is too late.

LLOYD GEORGE. I promised to support him in *a* League of Nations. The remarkable fact that he had no concrete plan made my acceptance less difficult. I have noted in him an invincible repugnance to the concrete. In applying his lofty principles to the realities he is as luminous as a London fog. Like Micawber, he regards a debt as liquidated when he gives his promissory note. The method of payment is irrelevant and annoying. In this is our salvation. Let him have the visions if we can secure the desired provisions. We can give him a League in name, but have a strong alliance in fact, which will make America the underwriter of the new map of Europe. Can we not vest nominal power in all the members of the League, but reserve to a few nations the real power, of which our five nations will be a perpetual majority?

ORLANDO. But will not Mr. Wilson distinguish between the substance and the shadow? Can we assume that he will accept this plan, which conflicts with his explicit statement at Manchester a few days ago that the League must be a league of all nations and that

within it there can be no special grouping of powers?

CLEMENCEAU. He will accept it, for a reason that we have not yet discussed. We have all followed his utterances in this war with interest, and I think we can diagnose his peculiar temperament. To Mr. Wilson a successful pose is more than position. He seeks prestige rather than power. Give him all he asks in form, and he will not particularly care whether he gets it in substance. We will, therefore, give him the limelight and the Press notices, and content ourselves with an equitable division of the box-office receipts.

BALFOUR. A more difficult problem remains: Will the American Senate also fail to distinguish between form and substance, between reality and shadow?

CLEMENCEAU. That is the crux of the problem. I have some familiarity with the American Constitution. At one time I had some thought of becoming a citizen of that great country. Our friend the President, however, is not so fortunate as we, who have practically plenary authority over foreign relations. He cannot bind his country, legally or morally, unless two-thirds of the Senators present concur. Besides, Americans have, as a habit of mind, a peculiar aversion to one-man power. They denied it even to their illustrious founder. How, then, are we to deal with Mr. Wilson? Two months have passed since the Armistice was declared, and in that time the situation has daily grown more menacing and increasingly difficult. The eclipse of Bolshevism is slowly passing over Europe. Delay is fatal; the times are critical beyond precedent. Can we, then, safely negotiate a treaty with the American President which, six months or a year hence, the

Senate of the United States may refuse to ratify? Ought we not ask him, as a matter of common prudence, how far he can guarantee such ratification? Otherwise, a year from now, all of Europe may be on the verge of revolution and the fruits of the war hopelessly sacrificed!

LLOYD GEORGE. I appreciate all you say, but without adverting to the peculiar personality of our distinguished visitor, I am at a loss to know how we can inquire into his credentials without giving him mortal offense, and, as you know, he comes not merely as President, but as the dispenser of food and credit—a combination, if I may be jocose, of philanthropist and, incidentally, banker. Are we in a position to inquire by what authority he speaks?

CLEMENCEAU. Are we in a position not to ask him? President Wilson is not America. Any student of its institutions knows that fact. America will tolerate a dictator in times of war, but never in times of peace. Of that we already have evidence; for, last October, the President appealed to his people to make him, as he said, their "unembarrassed spokesman" by a vote of confidence, and he boldly said that, unless they did so, he and we could only regard it as a "repudiation" of his leadership. An election followed, and the American people by over a million votes did repudiate our august friend's claims to be an ambassador plenipotentiary of the American people. If we cannot safely ignore President Wilson's limited powers, can we with greater safety ignore the significant warning of the recent American elections? It seems to me that the American people have spoken with no uncer-

tain voice. Mr. Wilson will sooner or later pass from the scene of action but the American people will remain. They will be, if they are not now, the greatest force in civilization. Can we safely ignore them?

ORLANDO. My advice from our Embassy in Washington is that his coming to Europe has been in the teeth of almost universal opposition. Apparently the American people did not wish him to come.

LLOYD GEORGE. Nor can we ignore the fact that the American Senate has now a majority in opposition to the President's administration, and that the leader of the majority, less than a month ago, criticized five of the sacred Fourteen Points and specifically called our attention to the fact that we must reckon with the majority of the Senate. I confess that all this is a mystery to me; for when I appealed to my electorate, if a majority had been returned to Parliament hostile to my administration, I should have resigned. An impossible alternative confronts us. To please Mr. Wilson is to ignore the American people, who have so recently and emphatically spoken. To ignore Mr. Wilson is to close the only possible approach to an accord with America. What can we do?

ORLANDO. Italy is in desperate need of coal, oil, cotton, and copper. Where are we to get them except from America, and how can we get them except with President Wilson's goodwill?

CLEMENCEAU. What can we gain, what have we gained, by always yielding to President Wilson? Had we not conceded a modification of the blockade to meet his imperious demands, the war would have ended in 1916. These fatal concessions enabled Ger-

many to prolong the war by the supplies which she received from America through the Scandinavian countries. What is past is past. Let me again say insistently and prophetically that I am more concerned about the present situation in Russia, which to me is the crux of the peace problem. Unless we can crush Bolshevism the war may be lost, and the time to destroy that serpent is now. Again we find ourselves hampered by President Wilson's sentimental regard for the Russian revolution. He seems oblivious of the fact that Russia's repudiation of her debt to my Government and the French people, amounting to more than thirty milliards of francs, means an indirect indemnity paid by my unhappy country sevenfold greater than that which she paid to Germany in 1871. Is there no limit to our concessions?

LLOYD GEORGE. What you say is tragically true. I recall with the deepest regret that at Halifax, to please the Washington Government, we released Trotzky when we had him safely in irons. It was a tragic error.

ORLANDO. Why did the Washington Government interest itself in Trotzky's release?

LLOYD GEORGE. That is one of the enigmas of the war. He would never have reached Petrograd had not the Washington Government intervened in his behalf.

CLEMENCEAU. Let us avoid similar errors in the future. Only a fool is twice burned. Let us generously recognize all that President Wilson has done for the common cause, without forgetting our debt to the dead and our duty to the unborn. I remember the advice of the wise old Roman, Scipio, to Jugurtha, the

Numidian prince, to "make friends with Rome, but not with individual Romans." In this spirit, let us have more faith in America and a little less in Mr. Wilson's suave phrases. He may speak like the Beatitudes; but his methods sometimes suggest Metternich.

[*Door opens and secretary announces: "His Excellency the President of the United States." Enter* MR. WILSON. *The three Premiers arise and shake hands with him.*]

CLEMENCEAU. Welcome, Mr. President. Our heartiest congratulations upon your extraordinary receptions in Europe. The oldest of us cannot recall the like for enthusiasm.

ORLANDO. In my country, Mr. President, the multitudes hail you as a god. Such enthusiasm was never witnessed since Peter the Hermit preached the great Crusade with his *Deus vult.*

CLEMENCEAU [*Aside to* ORLANDO]. But Peter had no Monsieur Creel with the purse of Fortunatus and the modern method of advance notices.

LLOYD GEORGE. Even in our country, Mr. President, although we are colder in temperament than our Latin sisters, you must have appreciated the warmth and cordiality of your reception.

PRESIDENT WILSON. I thank you heartily, gentlemen. "The cause was greater than the advocate, and it was the great cause that has won for me the plaudits of your fellow-citizens. This should quicken in us a sense of deeper responsibility in the work that we have to do. We have assembled for the purpose of doing very much more than making the present settlements

that are necessary. I may say, without straining the point, that we are not the representatives of Governments, but representatives of the peoples. It will not suffice to satisfy Government circles anywhere; it is necessary that we should satisfy the opinion of mankind. We are bidden by these people to make a peace which will make them secure. If the Governments do not obey the peoples, the peoples will surely break the Governments. They will not brook any denial of their wish for a League of Nations."

CLEMENCEAU. Some of us, Mr. President, are not enthusiastic about your League of Nations. If past experience counts for anything, it is a dangerous mirage. We see in it a delusion which has repeatedly led peoples and nations to disaster. We are realists and do not wish to imitate the folly of the dog in dropping the bone of an offensive and defensive alliance for the shimmering shadow of an illusory compact between nations, which, under present conditions of thought, I fear is impossible.

WILSON. "The people who have fought this war have been men from the free nations who are determined that sort of thing should end now and forever; that there must now be not a balance of power, not one powerful group of nations set up against one another, but a single, overwhelming, powerful group of nations who shall be the trustees of the peace of the world."[1]

CLEMENCEAU. "This good old system of alliances called the 'balance of power' seems to be condemned nowadays in certain quarters. But let me say that if

[1] Wilson's speech at Guildhall, London, in December, 1918.

such a balance of power had preceded this great war—if England, America, France and Italy had been allied and balanced against the Teutonic powers—if those powers had declared among themselves that whoever attacked one of them attacked the whole world, the war would never have occurred. This system of alliances, of a balance of power, though condemned in some quarters, is not renounced by me, and will be my guiding thought throughout the Peace Conference." [1]

WILSON. "You know that heretofore the world has been governed, or the attempt has been made to govern it, by partnerships of interest, and that they have broken down. Interest does not bind men together. Interest separates men. For, the moment there is the slightest departure from the nice adjustment of self-interest, then jealousy begins to spring up. There is only one thing that can bind peoples together and that is common devotion to right. The United States has always felt from the very beginning of her story, that she must keep herself separate from any kind of connection with European politics. I want to say very frankly that the United States is not now interested in European politics, but she is interested in the partnership of right between America and Europe. If the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power, then the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination of powers which is not a combination of all. She is not inter-

[1] Clemenceau's address to the Chamber of Deputies in January, 1919.

ested merely in the peace of Europe, but in the peace of the world."[1]

LLOYD GEORGE. Theoretically, Mr. President, this is admirable. But our hesitation, based on general and even very recent experience, is that, when a crisis comes and the time of sacrifice arrives, nations do not recognize this sense of collective responsibility which you so eloquently advocate, and the solidarity of civilization is then seen to be as insubstantial as a rainbow. Thus, we cannot forget that when the present crisis in civilization was suddenly precipitated—than which none greater ever arose in the distracted affairs of man—you yourself felt that America's highest interest lay in a policy of neutrality, and, to our discomfiture, you proclaimed that with the objects and causes of the war, your great nation was not concerned, and that you were not even interested to explore the obscure fountains from which you said it had proceeded.

WILSON [*Sharply*]. Little will be gained in our deliberations, Mr. Prime Minister, by these unpleasant allusions. We are met to meet an immediate emergency. "There is a great voice of humanity abroad in the world just now, and he who cannot hear it is deaf. There is a great compulsion of the common conscience now in existence which, if any statesman resists, it will gain for him the most unenviable eminence in history. We are not obeying the mandate of parties or of politics. We are obeying the mandate of humanity. I hope we may do something like my very stern ancestors did, for among my ancestors were those very de-

[1] Wilson's address at Manchester, January, 1919.

termined persons who were known as the Covenanters. I wish we could—not alone Great Britain and the United States, but also France, Italy and all the world —enter into a great Covenant, declaring ourselves first of all friends of mankind and uniting ourselves together, for the maintenance and triumph of right." [1]

CLEMENCEAU [*Dryly*]. Suppose we drop the abstractions and consider that which is of first importance,—the *modus operandi* of this Conference. Without consulting us, Mr. President, you announced to the world, as the principles of peace, the so-called "Fourteen Points," which I confess I have not as yet read. I understand that the first of those points is your insistence that, in this and in all future peace conferences, there shall be a policy of "open covenants, to be openly arrived at." Do you mean this literally?

WILSON. I am accustomed to say what I mean, and I believe that I have some reputation for precision in language.

LLOYD GEORGE. Surely, Mr. President, you do not mean that a conference of such extraordinary difficulty as this, where the relations even between victorious nations are most delicate, shall be conducted with the same publicity as a town meeting? How far will we get if each of us, as the deliberations proceed, shall blare from the house tops our inner purposes? I never heard that partridges could be effectively hunted with a brass band.

CLEMENCEAU. Your country, Mr. President, has never adopted such a policy. As I understand it, your Senate generally debates the wisdom of treaties which

[1] From Wilson's address at Manchester, January, 1919.

are submitted for its approval in the secrecy of executive session, and I have never heard any criticism of this obviously wise course. Indeed, I recall, in reading your illuminating History of the American People, that your Constitutional Convention met for four months in secret session, and that, at the first session, each member made a solemn pledge to regard all that took place in the secret sessions of the Convention as inviolate. Indeed, I have heard that a heavy penalty was provided, to enforce such secrecy.

LLOYD GEORGE. I am not a student of your history, as you are; but I recall that, on the last day of that great Convention in Philadelphia, that the Convention, even then, placed all its records in the hands of its presiding officer, your great Washington, with the instruction that he should keep the deliberations of the Convention secret until it was safe to give publicity to them.

WILSON. [*Sharply.*] You need not remind me of this. These men lived in the eighteenth century, we in the effulgent light of the twentieth. I have pledged to the world that our proceedings shall be public. The representatives of the fourth estate, whose goodwill I would not willingly sacrifice, look to me as the champion of publicity.

CLEMENCEAU. Probably they are more concerned in selling their newspapers than in bringing our labors to a happy fruition.

WILSON. "I would like to ask whether there be any objection, owing to the likelihood of leaks, to having the representatives of the press present at the Peace Conference, *as practically nothing will be discussed in*

that large session, at which any statement will be little more than a public statement of what has been decided beforehand. For my part, I would prefer complete publicity to publicity by leak."

BALFOUR. "The suggestion that the press be present at the Conference is open to this *prima facie* objection, viz., that if this is carried out the meetings will become purely formal. Moreover if the press be present at the large Conferences, then it will be necessary to bring the other powers, say the Czecho-Slovaks, into the small conferences."

WILSON. "I assume that it will hardly be possible to discuss cases such as this in the large Conferences. Moreover, the Czecho-Slovaks could hardly do more than repeat at the large Conference what they have already given to the world. The determination as to what will be proposed by the Great Powers at the large Conference will be decided by the Great Powers beforehand."

PICHON. "I remark that should the press be admitted to the Peace Conference there will be no end of speaking."

LLOYD GEORGE. "I venture to express the hope that President Wilson will not press the suggestion. I fear there will be no end to the Conference if reporters are present. Small nations will want to speak at great length. Moreover, as Mr. Balfour has pointed out, this might result in very unpleasant incidents, for instance, between Serbia and Montenegro."

PICHON. "It is to be observed, too, that in the study of the preliminaries of peace, it will be dangerous to give the enemy too much information on the.

points on which there is any difficulty or particular discussion between the Great Powers."

CLEMENCEAU. "I feel we must be unanimous in what we do. There will be much that I will accept to maintain our unanimity. I will make sacrifices. I will say nothing that might tend to divide the Conference, but if one small power that has not been heard in our conversations asks how France has come to accept a certain provision, then I will have to reply, and do not forget that this reply will then be made before the public."

WILSON. "I raised the point for discussion, but will not press it."[1]

CLEMENCEAU [*Aside to* LLOYD GEORGE]. Thus vanishes the first of the Fourteen Points. The others will speedily follow, or I am no prophet.

WILSON. We are spending too much time on these details, and I am not fond of details. May I not again emphasize that "there is a great wind——"

CLEMENCEAU. I think "hot air" is your picturesque American phrase.

WILSON. [*Ignores interruption and continues*]. "of moral force moving through the world, and every man who opposes himself to that wind will go down in disgrace. The task of those who are gathered here to make the settlement of this peace is greatly simplified by the fact that they are the masters of no one; they are the servants of mankind, and if we do not heed the

[1] This entire colloquy from Mr. Wilson's inquiry beginning, "I would like to ask," to his abandonment of his plea for open covenants is in the precise language as recorded in the Conference minutes. See Thompson's *Peace Conference Day by Day*, p. 102 *et seq.*

mandates of mankind, we shall make ourselves the most conspicuous and deserved failures in the history of the world. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought, or be broken."[1]

CLEMENCEAU. What is this clarified common thought, Mr. President?

WILSON. It is, well, it is—the voices of good men and plain people everywhere.

CLEMENCEAU. This is somewhat vague. I have not found, in my political experience, that the voices of good men and plain people—whatever "plain people" are—are always in agreement. May we not understand with more definiteness what this wonderful synthesis of statesmanship, which you call the "clarified common thought," is?

WILSON. Well, there are great truths which do not permit of exact definitions. There are forces which rise and operate as the tides. Clarified common thought is the sober opinion of the people.

CLEMENCEAU. But who is the clarifier?

WILSON. They who have seen the great vision.

CLEMENCEAU. But what is the process of clarification? Is it the common organ of democracy—the ballot-box?

ORLANDO. Recent events in my country make me wonder whether your clarified common thought may not be such emotional excitement as raised Rienzi to power—only to hurl him down the steps of the Capitol.

WILSON. Your lack of faith surprises me. I pity

[1] Address of Wilson at the Sorbonne, December 21, 1918. See Thompson's *Peace Conference Day by Day*, p. 46.

those who have not seen the vision and heard voices in the air.

LLOYD GEORGE. I have a more concrete mandate. My people have recently returned me to power with overwhelming majorities. I trust the recent elections in your country have given you a similar mandate, or was their common thought not sufficiently clarified?

WILSON. Your reference to the recent elections in my country is indelicate. My countrymen have a deep and very genuine ardor for my great vision of a League of Nations.

CLEMENCEAU. True, Mr. President. We may not too curiously inquire into any possible difference between your authority and the will of your people, as expressed at the ballot-box; but, by the same token, might it not be well, in your public addresses, to put the soft pedal on this constant appeal over the heads of the existing Governments to the masses? It only serves to make our task more difficult. After all, the masses can only work their will through Governments of their own selection. The contrast that you have drawn in your speeches in England, Italy, and my own country, between existing Governments and the masses, as though their wills were at variance, is not calculated to strengthen the stability of these Governments or to render them effective for the great purposes that we all have in mind. Two months have passed since the Armistice, and to-day we are no further advanced towards peace than on the day of the Armistice. Napoleon would have made a peace in half the time.

WILSON. Do I understand that you are charging me with responsibility for this delay?

CLEMENCEAU. Not at all, Mr. President. When we learned that you were about to honor us with a visit, we rejoiced, not merely in having the great help of your coöperation at the peace table; but because it gave us an opportunity, which we had long desired, to pay a tribute to you and your great country which did so much to make the result a decisive and gratifying one. All this we gratefully appreciate. We are today confronted with the greatest problem that ever confronted any peace conference, and it is to be feared, with the inevitable differences of opinion and disappointments, that when once the Peace Conference adjourns it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reconvene it. We therefore think it most important that each of us should be reasonably sure that that which we promise in the name of our respective countries will be accepted by them, or, in any event, have binding obligation, and, as these questions cannot be discussed to any advantage in the Peace Conference, it seems the part of candor and sincerity to discuss the question now.

WILSON. Gentlemen, you seem to forget that I am President of the United States!

CLEMENCEAU. No, Mr. President; we have not forgotten it, and are greatly honored that, for the first time in history, a President of the United States is here. But we should be faithless to the great interests which are in our keeping if we were blind to the fact that under the Constitution of your country no treaty that you can make with us can have any moral or legal force unless two-thirds of the Senate concur.

WILSON [*Grimly*]. You can leave that to me,

gentlemen. I shall see to it that the Senate does concur in what I promise, without omitting the crossing of a "t" or the dotting of an "i."

LLOYD GEORGE. Under ordinary circumstances, Mr. President, that assurance would be quite satisfactory; but we are further embarrassed by the fact that those who share with your Excellency the responsibility for the making of treaties have already served notice upon us that they do not agree with some of your Excellency's ideas with respect to the nature of the Peace and particularly the League of Nations.

WILSON. Who are they that question my authority?

ORLANDO. Our dispatches from Washington indicate that the leading members of the majority of the Senate, who apparently are in opposition to your administration, have served notice that they do not favor all of the Fourteen Points and particularly question the value of the League of Nations.

WILSON. Pygmy minds, pygmy minds! You need not concern yourselves with them. They will accept what I bring from Paris. They will not even know what I do until it is done and past recall. Before leaving America I took possession of all the cables, and my Secretary of War and Postmaster-General will do the rest. The Senate! Bah! It is as putty in my hands.

CLEMENCEAU. Your Excellency's assurance is most comforting. Under ordinary circumstances it is all that we could ask; but it is a matter of life and death to the millions of people whom we represent that there should be no possible mistake. As your Excel-

lency knows, I, for one, have never believed in the League of Nations. There is an old system of alliances which I would not renounce except a better method of defense is offered. If, therefore, we abandon a tried method, which protected France for fifty years and finally saved her in 1914, in favor of the League of Nations, we must know primarily that your country will accept the League. So far as my imperfect knowledge of your politics can aid me, I do not know that your country has ever made the proposed League of Nations the subject of a referendum, or that it was an issue in either of the elections in which your people did themselves the great honor of electing you as Chief Magistrate. But we are naturally concerned that, during your last election a few months ago, and after you had announced your great purpose to form a league of nations, that you made an appeal to your countrymen for a vote of confidence. [*Draws a piece of paper out of his pocket.*] Ah, yes; I have it here. Let me read it:

[*Wilson, as Clemenceau reads, has a very pained expression. Clemenceau reads very slowly, as though rolling a sweet morsel under his tongue.*]

"If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives. *I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil,* but my power to administer the great trust assigned me by the

Constitution would be seriously impaired should your judgment be adverse, and I must frankly tell you so because so many critical issues depend upon your verdict. No scruple of taste must in grim times like these stand in the way of speaking the plain truth."

The response of your people to this appeal has greatly puzzled us. Apparently they replied by declining to "accept your judgment without cavil" and to make you their "unembarrassed spokesman" by a majority of over one million votes. It would be a great satisfaction to have you explain it to us. In effete Europe, such a negative reply to a request for a vote of confidence could only lead to the resignation of the public official who thus vainly challenged the confidence of his electorate. With your more democratic methods of ignoring the opinions of the people, as registered at the polls, we naturally have no concern; but, so far as the ratification by your Senate of any treaty that we may negotiate, is concerned, we are naturally and vitally concerned in the result of your recent elections in America and the speeches made upon the floor of the Senate by the leaders of the majority.

WILSON [*Somewhat brusquely*]. Are you qualified to interpret the recent American elections?

CLEMENCEAU. How could I misinterpret the significance of your elections, when your Government requested mine to suppress the fact in the French Press? However, it is not I, Mr. President, that interprets your mandate from your people. You interpreted it for us; for you said that "the return of a Republican majority to either House of Congress would certainly be interpreted on the other side of the water as a 'repu-

diation' " of your leadership. As your people have returned to both Houses of Congress large majorities against you, how can we ignore their reply to your appeal, unless we are prepared to assume that America is not a democracy but an autocracy?

WILSON. Enough of this. I am not here to be catechized.

LLOYD GEORGE. We are not catechizing, Mr. President; the matter is too great and vital for mere personalities. It is, as my *confrère* of France has said, a matter of life and death to us to know whether, if we concede to America that which you say she asks, America will accept the burdens as well as the benefits of your League of Nations. In your own eloquent words, which my French colleague has just read, you well said that "no scruple of taste must in grim times like these be allowed to stand in the way of speaking the plain truth." May we not, then, speak plainly?

WILSON [*Abandoning his angry tone*]. Gentlemen, you need give yourselves no concern about this point. I may say to you that I have a plan which will defeat my petty enemies in the Senate. I shall so interweave the Covenant with the Peace Treaty that the Senate cannot reject the former without also rejecting the Peace Treaty, and you will agree that this is inconceivable. Have, therefore, no concern, for I shall "delve one yard beneath their mines and blow them to the moon."

LLOYD GEORGE. A very happy Shakespearean quotation, Mr. President, and with our wish for the complete success of your efforts we can only hope that it will not be a case, to continue your quotation, of

a very able engineer "hoist with his own petard." Nevertheless, it would be more satisfactory if in some way we could have something more than your assurance of your ability to defeat your political adversaries, great as our confidence is in your resourcefulness. If I could venture a suggestion, therefore, might I ask whether it would not be practicable for you to bring to Paris some representatives of the majority of the Senate, so that they would be available for consultation at such times and places as your Excellency thought proper; so that when you and we had agreed upon the essentials of the Treaty, we could, before announcing them to the world, get the informal assent of these representatives of the majority in your Congress, and thus avoid a possible miscarriage of our great plans?

WILSON. Certainly not. I have managed the affairs of my administration without the coöperation of the leaders of the Opposition, and nothing would be more distasteful to me than to have any of them take part, even in a minor capacity, in the coming conference. Your suggestion is impossible.

CLEMENCEAU. Why impossible, Mr. President? We of France, of Italy, and of England have formed Coalition Governments, have gathered about us the representatives of the various Parties into a sacred union. We consult freely with them, and thus we know that we speak the voice of the united country.

WILSON. I will not further discuss the suggestion. It is now too late for me to discuss these questions with men of narrow vision who seek to undermine my influence.

LLOYD GEORGE. We cheerfully accept your conclusion, Mr. President. You know best the problems of your own Government; but would it not at least be practicable to give the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate, as we understand your predecessors have often done under similar circumstances, the tentative plan of your League of Nations, so that they can offer any criticism that occurs to them; so that, in default of criticism or objection, we can safely assume that the Senate will ratify any treaty we may formulate?

WILSON. Assuredly not. Your second suggestion is even more objectionable than the first. I do not propose to allow the Committee of Foreign Affairs to know anything until we have reached an agreement. Again my cable censorship will take care of that. I unfortunately have not the power to adjourn Congress, as you have [*turning to* LLOYD GEORGE], Mr. Prime Minister, with your Parliament. The present session of Congress expires by limitation on March 4, but on that day, no matter what the condition of the Government's business is, I shall refuse to reconvene the Congress until I have presented them with *un fait accompli*. When I return with that Treaty, the Senators "will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the Treaty tied to the Covenant that they cannot dissect the Treaty from the Covenant without destroying the whole vital structure." Let us drop any further discussion of the question, which concerns me and my country, and not you or your countries.

ORLANDO. But it does concern us. With Italy it is a matter of life or death. I confess, Mr. President,

we are all disappointed, for the situation in Europe is growing more critical every hour. I do not know what day revolution may break out in Italy. Is it a time for false delicacy? Do we not more justly deserve each other's esteem and confidence by speaking our inner thoughts? If we are, in this greatest of all peace conferences, to put an end to the "old diplomacy," against which you have eloquently inveighed, must we not reveal to each other our inner convictions? Otherwise we will make the world safe, not for democracy, but for hypocrisy.

LLOYD GEORGE. Your summary method of disposing of your Senate fills us with wonder and admiration. In English history there is nothing comparable to it since Cromwell entered the House of Commons and, pointing to the mace, said: "Take away that bauble!" But will your Senate so readily abdicate its authority? You cannot take reasonable offense, Mr. President, at our natural desire to know whether your demand for the League of Nations is shared by your Senate, whose final concurrence is necessary, for you have not hesitated, in your public addresses, to discriminate between our Governments and the people whom we are supposed to represent. We had assumed that our Governments presumptively represented their peoples; but you have suggested that this may not be so. Our inquiry as to the attitude of your Senate does not rest upon conjecture. The leaders of the present majority of your Senate have virtually served notice upon us that the Senate will not look with favor upon the League of Nations.

We are advised that thirty-nine members of the

Senate, more than a third of that body and therefore able to defeat any treaty that you may negotiate, have signed a formal declaration, which I think I have with me. [*Takes a piece of paper out of his pocket.*] Yes, here it is. They say

> "that it is the sense of the Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany, satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German Government, and the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should then be taken up for careful and serious consideration."

We cannot give exclusive recognition to their pointed intimation without an undue slight to your great office; but is it not equally true that we cannot give exclusive recognition to your views without the manifest danger of an equal slight to a representative body having at least equal powers with your own in the making of treaties for the United States? With you only can we deal, and to you only must we appeal to prevent such a catastrophe as would result from a rejection by the Senate of the United States of the Peace Treaty that we shall negotiate. Your country is the keystone of the arch of the League of Nations, and we must know, before irreparable consequences ensue, whether those who are charged by your Constitution with the treaty-making obligation are satisfied that the United States should be such a keystone.

CLEMENCEAU. It seems to us, Mr. President, that

if we are to accept your plan of a League of Nations, that it is inadvisible that it should be incorporated into the treaty of peace with Germany. Has it any place there, especially as France will not welcome Germany into the league, at least for many years to come. In making a treaty of peace with one nation, why should we incorporate into it a scheme for a world government in which that nation, for the time being, will have no part? The views of your Senators, who will have the final decision in your country, have my entire concurrence. Let us accept their very practical suggestion and make peace first and then construct your super-state.

ORLANDO. I agree with my *confrère* of France, as I think all European statesmen do. The immediate problem is peace, and never was that problem more urgent for mankind. European civilization will fall into ruin unless it can have peace speedily. We are all disposed to give a trial to your noble scheme for a superstate, but we must have peace first, or we European statesmen cannot be answerable for the consequences.

WILSON. Upon this point, I am adamant. The League of Nations *must* be a part of the treaty with Germany.

LLOYD GEORGE. Why "must," Mr. President?

WILSON. Because it concerns my prestige and power.

CLEMENCEAU. And must Europe be sacrificed to that end? Is it possible that your political fortunes can weigh against the welfare of the world?

WILSON [*Ignoring* CLEMENCEAU]. I say "must"

advisedly. I will frankly explain the reason. Under the archaic Constitution of the United States, with its Newtonian theory of checks and balances, I am "cribbed, cabined and confined" by a reactionary Senate. These thirty-nine Senators are the ruling spirits.

"The greatest consultative privilege of the Senate—the greatest in dignity, at least, if not in effect upon the interests of the country—is its right to a ruling voice in the ratification of treaties with foreign powers. The President really has no voice at all in the conclusions of the Senate with reference to his diplomatic transactions, or with reference to any of the matters upon which he consults it. He is made to approach that body as a servant conferring with his master, and of course deferring to that master. *His only power of compelling compliance on the part of the Senate lies in his initiative in negotiation, which affords him a chance to get the country into such scrapes, so pledged in the view of the world to certain courses of action, that the Senate hesitates to bring about the appearance of dishonor which would follow its refusal to ratify the rash promises or to support the indiscreet threats of the Department of State.*" [1]

To defeat my enemies in the Senate, I propose to get my country into such a "scrape" as it never was before, by making it a necessity to accept the League of Nations, which it might otherwise reject, or sacrifice the great name which it now enjoys as the world pacificator. It is essential to my plans that I create a situation which will make it impossible for the Senate to exercise an independent judgment—and this

[1] Wilson's Constitutional Government in the United States.

must be done if I am to participate in the coming conference.

CLEMENCEAU [*Quietly*]. Why again "must," Mr. President? Since Napoleon, the word "must" has not been applied to the representatives of the great European powers.

WILSON [*Angrily*]. I meet your challenge. I hold the sword and purse of America, and, for all practical purposes in this conference, I do not represent America —*I am America.* The events of the last five years should teach you this. I kept my country out of the war as long as it pleased me. I led it into the war when again it pleased me. I still control its credit and granaries, and if Europe wants money and food—and I think it is in sore need of both—it must respect my wishes.

CLEMENCEAU. You amaze us in your arbitrary demands. Who won this war? And who has the best right to impose the terms of peace?

WILSON. Without the army and the navy of the United States, of which I am the Commander-in-Chief, what would be your situation now?

CLEMENCEAU. For every dollar that your country spent, France spent five; for every life that it gave to the great cause, France gave at least eleven. Let me ask you, Mr. President, between 1914 and 1918, who were defending the frontiers of civilization when you were working overtime on your typewriter?

WILSON [*Ignoring* CLEMENCEAU]. I still insist that, whatever be the result, the Covenant must be a part of the treaty with Germany. I must return to America with my Covenant ratified by the conference. "I speak

for the peoples of the world. When I speak of the nations of the world, I do not speak of the governments of the world. I speak of the peoples who constitute the nations of the world. They are in the saddle and they are going to see to it that if their present governments do not do their will, some other governments shall. And the secret is out and the present governments know it."

[CLEMENCEAU *closes his eyes, crosses his hands, covered with suede gloves, on his lap, and, sitting back in his chair, apparently sinks into a dreamy reverie. A prolonged silence ensues, during which* ORLANDO *and* LLOYD GEORGE *look anxiously first at the President, who is standing erect, leaning with a clenched fist upon the table, and then upon* CLEMENCEAU, *with a face as impassive as parchment, as he, with half-closed eyelids, dreamily looks upon the clock, as though it were a symbol of the future. Finally,* CLEMENCEAU *breaks the painful silence.*]

CLEMENCEAU. *Well, we will not.*

WILSON. [*Greatly astonished, his voice shaken with emotion*]. Will not?

CLEMENCEAU. [*Quietly but firmly*]. Will not.

WILSON. Your attitude, gentlemen, is an affront. You ask the scope of my credentials, although I am here in my own right and in my own proper person. It does not comport with my dignity or that of my country that I should permit you thus to challenge my authority. Nothing is left for me but to leave the Peace Conference. I shall cable for the *George Washington* to-night and return at once to my country.

ORLANDO [*Rising in haste*]. You surely do not mean that, Mr. President. It would be an irreparable calamity for the United States to withdraw from the Peace Conference, especially after the great expectations which your eloquent speeches have aroused in the masses of Europe.

LLOYD GEORGE [*Rising*]. There must be some method of meeting so grave a situation without such a disastrous step as you now intimate. We hope that you will reconsider your determination and not take amiss our natural and vital interest in the question that we have discussed.

[PICHON *and* BALFOUR *also rise with great agitation to dissuade the President from leaving.*]

CLEMENCEAU [*Who has remained sitting, now arises and faces the President*]. Mr. President, your ultimatum surprises us. There is little hope for the Peace Conference and for the future of mankind if the representative of one of the great nations shall threaten to withdraw from the Conference if any inquiry is made as to the full scope of his credentials or the power of his nation. However, my *confrères* show no anxiety. You will not withdraw.

Why will you not? Who will stay me? Freely I came [illegible] freely I will depart.

CLEMENCEAU. Freely you may have come, but freely you may not depart. None of us is free in this great crisis of humanity. All of us are only as the seaweed which floats upon the surface of the Gulf Stream. It indicates the direction of that mighty current. We,

too, are floating on a great and irresistible current of events whose origin and destination, like the Gulf Stream, God only knows.

Let us face the situation and be frank with each other in this solemn hour of destiny. We cannot leave this Conference without some agreement, nor can you. You think that you are free to return to your country, your great task undone, but a moment's reflection will convince you that such is not the fact. From the time you put foot on the deck of the *George Washington* to come to Paris, you ceased to be a free agent, and you and we are all bound hand and foot by the force of imperious necessity. That necessity compels all of us to remain in Paris until some result is accomplished.

If you left Paris because we made a natural inquiry as to the scope of your credentials you would suffer more than we. From the pedestal to which you have been elevated by the acclaims of uncounted millions of Europeans, your great reputation would be dashed to the ground and broken into a thousand pieces.

You cannot leave. The dead forbid you. When you first arrived we urged you to visit the desolated regions of France. You preferred the plaudits of mobs in our large cities. Again I invite you to visit the desolated regions of the war. There lie the slain, among whom your noble youth are already numbered. Their tongues are mute and cannot vie in sound with the frenzied plaudits of the living masses who greeted you in London, Paris, and Rome. But the dead are eloquent beyond the power of the living, and admonish us, in this fateful hour, that for us to sep-

arate on account of petty considerations of personal dignity, with our work undone, would be to crucify the cause of justice afresh and put it to an open shame.

[President Wilson *hesitates for a few minutes, walks the floor in great emotion, and finally resumes his seat with his confrères, who have been awaiting his decision.*]

Wilson. Gentlemen, you are right. I dared to come, and no statesman of my country ever made a greater gamble. My worst critic cannot charge me with any lack of courage. I dare not, however, return unless I have accomplished something. I have a high and honorable ambition to shape the peace of the world in one of the greatest moments of history. Do not challenge my authority further. Leave the Senate of the United States to me. By conciliation or coercion I will make these recalcitrant Senators ratify what we agree upon. They, too, are only bubbles floating upon a swift current of events, and they, too, will feel the imperious force of manifest destiny. I accept the responsibility for their concurrence in what we agree upon.

Clemenceau. This does not solve the difficulty, but we have at least satisfied our own consciences by bringing this vital matter to your Excellency's attention. As, however, you think otherwise, and for reasons that have commended themselves to your discerning judgment have declined to associate with yourself in Paris the representatives of the Senate, we can only deal with you.

Therefore upon you is the terrible responsibility.

In this matter there must be no doubt. History will judge all of us and woe to him who makes a wreckage of the world's peace which has been so dearly bought by the blood of millions! If we yield to your imperious demand and America repudiates you, and the peace of the world is wrecked, the Future will justly hold you and you alone responsible. With this understanding, let France, which has little faith in your League of Nations, accept it, because, as you say, America wishes it. God grant that in this there may be no mistake; for if, to please America, we accept the League of Nations in lieu of the more direct and practical protection of an offensive and defensive alliance, and America rejects the League, then our last state is worse than our first, and children yet unborn will rue the fatal error. Let us face realities and remember the future. If we err now, a year hence you may be a President without a nation or a Party, and even drag us down in your fall from power. Indeed, like Samson, you may throw down the whole Temple of the World's Peace into a cureless ruin.

WILSON [*After long thought, marked by deep emotion*]. I am deeply impressed by that which you, my dear colleague, have said. A new light has come to me. The advantages of my coming to Paris have already been demonstrated by this Conference, for you have given me a point of view which I lacked when I sat alone in the isolation of the White House, surrounded by flatterers and sycophants, who "crooked the pregnant hinges of the knee that thrift might follow fawning."

This is no time for selfish ambition or pride of

opinion. The safety of the world is in our keeping, and we must leave nothing undone to bring about a speedy and just peace and the reconstruction of civilization upon a surer foundation.

Recognizing your just concern as to the possible attitude of my Constitutional partner in the treaty-making power, I shall at once cable an invitation to Senator Lodge, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations; to Senator Hitchcock, the ranking minority member; to my illustrious predecessor, ex-President William H. Taft, who has done so much to promote the League of Nations; and to my distinguished opponent of the last Presidential election, former Associate Justice Hughes, and shall ask them to come to Paris as an advisory committee with whom I can confer from time to time as to what America, without respect to divisions of political opinion, fairly asks. That which I shall ask in its name, with the approval of this advisory committee, three of whom are distinguished members of the Republican Party, will undoubtedly be promptly accepted by the Senate.

As I consider all that you, my good *confrères* and loyal allies, have said, I am further deeply impressed with the truth which my illustrious predecessor, the first President of the United States, said in his Farewell Message to his country. He strongly advised that the permanent foreign policy of the United States should be marked by a disinclination to implicate America "by artificial ties in the *ordinary* combinations or collisions" of European politics. It is now clear to me that in representing the United States at the coming Conference I must bear in mind this preg-

nant distinction between "extraordinary emergencies" which concern all civilization, and the ordinary affairs of Europe, which are peculiarly its own concern and with which its statesmen are more competent to deal than I can possibly be. For this reason, I venture to suggest that the Peace Conference shall first take up the peculiarly local European questions which require adjustment, such as the control of the Adriatic, the frontier protection of France, and all questions of European boundaries. In these America has no practical interest and its representatives little real knowledge of them. Even my thousand experts who have accompanied me in my formidable peace armada know less of these matters than one qualified European expert.

While you, my *confrères,* are adjusting these peculiarly local concerns, I will pass through your countries bringing a message of goodwill from America, and what is far better, practical relief for your starving millions. "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right," I will, in Lincoln's spirit and with the vast resources of my country, bind up the wounds of the world and "care for him who has borne the battle, and for his widow and orphan."

When you have settled these peculiarly European questions, and the time has come to discuss those of world-wide concern, I shall then, as the chief representative of my great nation, venture to participate in your deliberations, and with the coöperation of the Senate, whose advice I shall fully consider, will make

every effort to help in the greatest problem that ever confronted the assembled statesmen of the world.

Your Mr. Canning, Mr. Lloyd George, said, in substance, that the Monroe Doctrine has been called into existence to redress the ill-adjusted balance of the Old World. In a larger sense, America, if it abstain from a policy of meddlesome interference in your local concerns and coöperates with you in the larger problems which concern all civilization, will so redress the ill-adjusted balance of civilization that an equilibrium of power, with peace and justice, may be established, to last, please God, for many centuries. Thus we will, again to quote the wise and patient Lincoln, "do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace."

[CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, *and* ORLANDO *rise and grasp* PRESIDENT WILSON'S *hands.*]

CLEMENCEAU. In behalf of my colleagues, and anticipating the verdict of posterity, I acclaim you the acknowledged leader of the liberal forces of mankind.

EPILOGUE

(*Spoken by the Muse of History*)

Of all sad words of tongue and pen,
The saddest are these, "It might have been."

WHITTIER

CHAPTER IV

THE APOSTLE OF THE NEW FREEDOM

"The First Minister does not deserve pardon for the past, applause for the present, or confidence for the future." Gibbon (1778).

These words of Gibbon, written with reference to another ambitious executive, suggest an inquiry, which may have occurred to those who have read thus far, as to what extent the satire of the two dialogues, which have preceded, is justified by Mr. Wilson's personality, policies and public utterances.

Mr. Wilson belongs to history and is likely to be one of its great enigmas. The subtle complexity of his personality does not readily lend itself to analysis. With respect to his policies, men of equal patriotism and candor may reasonably differ. He has played a large part in one of the greatest crises in history, and no full and definite appraisement of his unique personality is possible at this time. The inner history of his Administration remains to be written.

In the earlier period of the war, President Wilson spoke much of a time of assessment. That time has come. The war happily ended, history is now revaluing personalities and events. That world-old assessor, to whose grim audit all public men must submit, is

now readjusting the individual ledger account of each of the great participants in the most portentous reckoning of history. Of all these individual accounts, none is more perplexing than that into which the merits and demerits of Woodrow Wilson are inscribed by the great Appraiser. Already the world is conscious of a distinct revaluation of that interesting and complex personality, and it must be sorrowfully added that this revaluation adds nothing to his prestige.

There is one portrait of Mr. Wilson which is likely to remain long on the walls of the great gallery of history. It is the pen picture by Mr. Keynes in his masterful book, "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," whose publication approached the dignity of an historical event.

Observe this stroke of his facile brush:

"The President was not a hero or a prophet; he was not even a philosopher; but a generously intentioned man, with many of the weaknesses of other human beings, and lacking that dominating intellectual equipment which would have been necessary to cope with the subtle and dangerous spellbinders whom a tremendous clash of forces and personalities had brought to the top as triumphant masters in the swift game of give and take, face to face in Council,—a game of which he had no experience at all." (*Page* 39).

And this:

"But more serious than this, he was not only insensitive to his surroundings in the external sense, he was not sensitive to his environment at all. What chance could such a man have against Mr. Lloyd George's unerring, almost medium-like, sensibility to every one immediately round him? . . . Never could

a man have stepped into the parlor a more perfect and predestined victim to the finished accomplishments of the Prime Minister. The Old World was tough in wickedness anyhow; the Old World's heart of stone might blunt the sharpest blade of the bravest knight-errant. But this blind and deaf Don Quixote was entering a cavern where the swift and glittering blade was in the hands of the adversary." (*Page* 41).

Or this:

"He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He could have preached a sermon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfillment; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe.

"He not only had no proposals in detail, but he was in many respects, perhaps inevitably, ill-informed as to European conditions. And not only was he ill-informed—that was true of Mr. Lloyd George also—*but his mind was slow and unadaptable.* The President's slowness amongst the Europeans was noteworthy. He could not, all in a minute, take in what the rest were saying, size up the situation with a glance, frame a reply, and meet the case by a slight change of ground; and he was liable, therefore, to defeat by the mere swiftness, apprehension, and agility of a Lloyd George. There can seldom have been a statesman of the first rank more incompetent than the President in the agilities of the council chamber." (*Page* 43).

And, finally, the much-quoted final stroke of a portrait that has captured the imagination of the English-speaking world:

"Now it was that what I have called his theological or Presbyterian temperament became dangerous. Having decided that some concessions were unavoidable, he might have sought by firmness and address and the use of the financial power of the United States to secure as much as he could of the substance, even at some sacrifice of the letter. But the President was not capable of so clear an understanding with himself as this implied. *He was too conscientious.* Although compromises were now necessary, he remained a man of principle and the Fourteen Points a contract absolutely binding upon him. He would do nothing that was not honorable; he would do nothing that was not just and right; he would do nothing that was contrary to his great profession of faith. . . . After all, it was harder to de-bamboozle this old Presbyterian than it had been to bamboozle him; for the former involved his belief in and respect for himself." (*Pages* 50-54-55).

Reduced to a few lines, Mr. Keynes' portraiture of Mr. Wilson amounts to this: that he was a conscientious idealist, but dull in his mental processes and unequipped in knowledge of statecraft.

In both respects, the portrait is misleading. By "conscientious," Mr. Keynes obviously means that the President has that intellectual integrity that would lead him to adhere to an opinion even if it were a case of *Athanasius contra mundum.* As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilson has little of this quality. No public man of this generation has been a shiftier opportunist, or has shown a more acrobatic facility in adapting his views to those passing expressions of popular opinion which are euphemistically styled "the voice of the people." He has changed his convictions time and

again with the same startling rapidity as the Kaiser formerly changed his costumes. He has been, in his public career, both an extreme conservative and an extreme radical. His conservative views on the maintenance of our Constitutional institutions, which he once taught the undergraduates of Princeton, he freely disavowed as soon as he entered public life, after, on his first political errand to the Pacific Coast, he had caught the breeze of the new radicalism of the great West.

He denounced the child-labor bill as unconstitutional, and then signed a bill which provided for this unwarranted exercise of Federal power.

While President of Princeton, he wrote a most effective attack, in a letter which has never been published, against the essential spirit of trades unionism; and yet, when he entered public life, he did not hesitate to form a political partnership with Mr. Gompers, the great head of the labor oligarchy, and, to emphasize the fact of this association between the President of the United States and the president of the greatest labor organization in the world, he did not hesitate to appear at the annual meeting of the Federation and proclaim the identity of his views with those of Mr. Gompers.

He thought that William Jennings Bryan should be "knocked into a cocked hat," and then made him his Secretary of State.

He denounced the initiative and the referendum and subsequently accepted them, although, if adopted, they would have gone far to destroy the representative character of our governmental institutions.[1]

[1] See *The New Freedom*, pp. 234-245.

Similarly, he at first opposed women's suffrage, and later became its most active advocate.

During the World War his lightning changes were such that the Muse of History will be afflicted with strabismus when she vainly tries to reconcile his contradictory and therefore self-destructive statements. Proclaiming that America had no concern "with the objects and causes of the war," and that it was not even "interested to explore its obscure fountains," he nevertheless subsequently proclaimed a holy war against Germany and characterized the cause of the Allies as that of humanity itself. If this were true in 1917, it was not less true in 1914. The invasion of Belgium was a wanton challenge to Civilization. Mr. Wilson ignored this and never discovered the eternal righteousness of the war until Germany had affronted him by first using him as a diplomatic catspaw to force a peace and then affronted him by an open challenge. Wounded vanity and not a holy zeal for the basic principles of Civilization induced Mr. Wilson to recommend war to Congress. If the reader has any doubt upon this point, let him only read Bernstorff's *My Three Years in America*, where the whole diplomatic intrigue of 1916 is set forth with indubitable evidence.

If the cause of the Allies were that of America in 1918, it was equally so in 1914. The moral issues did not change in the first years of the conflict. Mr. Wilson not only utilized all his intellectual powers in the early days of the war to chloroform the conscience of the American people into insensibility; but, in his Presidential message of 1915, he openly denounced those patriotic Americans like Eliot, Roosevelt, Robert

Bacon, and others, who were endeavoring to bring the people of the United States to a realization that the cause of the Allies was not only just,—as to which the American people were never in any real doubt—but vitally concerned the welfare and honor of the American people, which they were slower to realize.

Having excoriated, while tolerating by inaction, the pro-German aliens in America, who were blowing up bridges and destroying munition plants and virtually using America as a base of operations against the Allies, President Wilson, in his annual message of December 7, 1915, proceeded to denounce the true Americans, who clearly saw from the beginning that which he failed to see until 1917. He said:

"There are some men among us and many residents abroad who, though born and bred in the United States and calling themselves Americans, have so far forgotten themselves and their honor as citizens as to put their passionate sympathy with one of other side in the great European conflict above their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. They also preach and practice disloyalty. No laws, I suppose, can reach *corruptions of the mind and heart,* but I should not speak of others (the Pan-German conspirators on American soil) without also speaking of these, and expressing the even deeper humiliation and scorn which every self-possessed and thoughtfully patriotic American must feel when he thinks of these things and the discredit they are daily bringing upon us."

It is hard to imagine more bitter language than this indictment by the President of the United States of true Americans who were loyally attempting to arouse their countrymen to a sense of their peril and their

common interest with the cause of the Allies. To speak of brave, patriotic Americans, who as the event proved, had a vision where he had none, as corrupt in mind and heart passes the limits of fair criticism. Those sensitive Wilson idolators, who resent any criticism of Mr. Wilson, should remember that he has at times not spared those who disagree with him from virulent abuse, although he has generally been free from such intemperance in expression.

History has a long memory, and notwithstanding the splendor of the achievements of the army and navy of the United States, which came to the relief of the Allies at a critical time under the leadership of President Wilson, it will be impossible for posterity to regard him as a hero and a prophet, when it reviews—as, one day, it will—with its acid test of critical analysis, the patchwork of contradictory utterances and actions which make up the Wilson foreign policy.

Still less defensible is Mr. Keynes' characterization of Mr. Wilson as a man of slow mental processes, who was fooled and misled by the superior intellects of Clemenceau and Lloyd George.

Mr. Wilson did not lack sagacity. What he lacked was courage and disinterestedness. He has one of the most acute minds in leading—and sometimes misleading—people that have appeared in the public life of America since his great prototype, Thomas Jefferson. A whole volume could be written on the instructive parallel which their two records disclose.

It is true that Mr. Wilson's speeches, in their vague nebulosity, would seemingly indicate muddy mental processes. But Mr. Wilson has always recognized,

both in the classrooms at Princeton and later in the greater classroom of the world, that there is, at least for a time, no surer way to get a reputation for wisdom than to be obscure. If it is impossible, in reading his many essays and addresses, to get a clear idea as to his real meaning, it does not follow that he himself did not have a very clear idea as to the impression that he sought to convey.

Dr. Dillon's portrait of Mr. Wilson, which is only less popular in the reading world than that of Mr. Keynes, is less easy to state, because it is scattered in disconnected sentences through his notable work on the Peace Conference. His pen picture of the President has the greater value as Dr. Dillon approaches more nearly to the former type of the journalist-ambassador than any newspaper publicist of our time since Blowitz wielded his enormous power a half century ago as the Paris correspondent of the London *Times*. It may be questioned whether to-day there is a more acute student of international affairs. His impeachment of Mr. Wilson's course at the Paris Conference is largely an indictment of his moral courage; and in this view he is joined by the intellectual radicals of the *New Republic* type who first surrounded Mr. Wilson in Paris, and later deserted him. Dr. Dillon's estimate can best be summarized by the following passage from his work:

"Thus Mr. Wilson had become a transcendental hero to the European proletarians, who in their homely way adjusted his mental and moral attributes to their own ideal of the latter-day Messiah. His legendary figure, half saint, half revolutionist, emerged from the trans-

parent haze of faith, yearning and ignorance, as in some ecstatic vision. In spite of his recorded acts and utterances the mythopeic faculty of the peoples had given itself free scope and created a messianic democrat destined to free the lower orders, as they were called, in each state from the shackles of capitalism, legalized thraldom and crushing taxation, and each nation from sanguinary warfare. Truly, no human being since the dawn of history has ever yet been favored with such a superb opportunity. Mr. Wilson might have made a gallant effort to lift society out of the deep grooves into which it had sunk, and dislodge the secular obstacles to the enfranchisement and transfiguration of the human race. At the lowest, it was open to him to become the center of a countless multitude, the heart of their hearts, the incarnation of their noblest thought, on condition that he scorned the prudential motives of politicians, burst through the barriers of the old order, and deployed all his energies and his full will-power in the struggle against sordid interests and dense prejudice. *But he was cowed by obstacles which his will lacked the strength to surmount,* and instead of receiving his promptings from the everlasting ideals of mankind and the inspiriting audacities of his own highest nature and appealing to the peoples against their rulers, he felt constrained in the very interest of his cause to haggle and barter with the Scribes and the Pharisees, and ended by recording a pitiful answer to the most momentous problems couched in the impoverished phraseology of a political party." (*Pages* 94-95).

In effect, Dr. Dillon charges the President with moral cowardice. I cannot accept this estimate.

Mr. Wilson's harshest critic cannot fairly deny him the courageous aggressiveness of a fighter. He has been the storm center of one of the most acute con-

troversies that ever raged in the political annals of America. He has fought his battles almost alone. If he has never given quarter, he has never asked any. He has taken blows like Cæsar, standing up, and never an *"et tu Brute"* has come from his embattled soul. In all the controversy that has raged about his merits or demerits, I cannot recall an ignoble whine or complaint when the lance of his adversary rang against his shield. Assuredly he has not been a coward. In militant aggressiveness, though not in moral sincerity, he has "stood four-square to every wind that blew," and as he is now happily recovering from a distressing ailment, in which he has had the sympathy of all Americans of all parties and classes, it can easily be predicted that, with his facile pen and vigorous mind, he will hereafter argue his own case at the bar of history with telling power. Whatever else he may do, his proud and imperious spirit will not weaken.

While we are adverting to one of the great credits in his individual account on the great ledger of history, let me digress to say that another very admirable trait of President Wilson is the dignity with which he has played his great rôle on the boards of the world's theater.

Before he became President, the growth of the democratic spirit in America had led to the mistaken convention that a President should affect an air of breezy sociability with his fellow-citizens.

Mr. Wilson ignored this convention, even to the point of winning a reputation of being cold in temperament. He ended the meaningless and at times dangerous public receptions at the White House. He

saw only those who had legitimate business with the Executive, and unfortunately only too few of them. No President since Washington ever so wholly withdrew himself from contact with the people, and no American President of recent times has made a less bid to popularity through the methods to which I have referred. Neither in Washington, London, Paris, nor Rome can any one recall a single instance in which the President was not conscious that he was the Chief Magistrate of the greatest republic that the world has ever known.

In this respect, he resembles Alexander Hamilton far more than Thomas Jefferson.

A Dr. Joseph Collins has given in the *North American Review* of May, 1920, another portrait of Mr. Wilson which has attracted widespread attention. It is the criticism of a psychiatrist. With the cold poise of the surgeon, he has placed Mr. Wilson's moral personality on the operating table and has ventured to dissect it in the eyes of all men. His characterization may be summed up in his statement that Mr. Wilson "has the mind of Jove but the heart of a Batrachian."

Both tribute and invective are as inaccurate as Mr. Keynes' characterization. Indeed, Dr. Collins' classical analogy is unfortunate; for Jove was not distinguished among the Olympian deities for his intellectual character. His activities were more frivolous. To the Greeks, Minerva was the deification of wisdom, as was Mercury of nimble wit. However, accepting the analogy as Dr. Collins intended it, as suggesting an Olympian brain, I venture to say that

Mr. Wilson has given no evidence of it. The author has read most of his essays and addresses, and has yet to find one acute or profound observation. He has a faculty of clothing moral commonplaces in suave but obscure words. Even from the standpoint of finished diction, Mr. Wilson's literary product leaves much to be desired, although the suavity of his phrases has blinded many to the fact. I have seen a portion of one of Mr. Wilson's addresses to Congress subjected to the critical analysis of a master of rhetoric in one of the leading universities of America, and the effect was not favorable to the purity of Mr. Wilson's English.

Dr. Collins is so indiscriminate, both in his praise and censure of Mr. Wilson, as to suggest the possibility that, in his clinical dissection, two operating surgeons were at work. The first half of the criticism seems to be written by one of Mr. Wilson's fervent admirers, while the second half suggests the spirit of an inveterate enemy.

Thus, in the first part of the article, we are advised that, in the world crisis, Mr. Wilson's sagacity was greater than that of "all the Solons of America put together." This will surprise the student of contemporary politics when he reflects that at no time during the crisis did Mr. Wilson have a really sagacious view of its nature. From the beginning to the end he was invariably behind the march of events and of public opinion. It is to his credit that he profited by his own blunders; but every wise thing he did was only after a policy of fatuous "watchful waiting." He rarely recognized his errors and made a new and better de-

parture in his policies until he had been lashed by the whip of an angry public opinion. There were doubtless many who did not see the enormous stake which America had in the righteous result of the world conflict. But no one was slower in his appreciation of the fact than Mr. Wilson. He did not lead his people into the war; but the will of the people, aided by the incredible stupidity of the German Government, drove Mr. Wilson very tardily into a policy of action in the eleventh hour of the crisis. A little more delay, and the world war would probably have been lost, and, in that event, Mr. Wilson would have become a "figure for the time of scorn to point his slow unmoving finger at."

Again Dr. Collins, in the earlier part of his article, tells us that Mr. Wilson is "an idealist and a theorist," and then adds that he "has done more to make our government a republican government representative of the people and not of the party bosses, than any one in the memory of man."

This suggests the possibility that Dr. Collins knows more of medicine than he does of contemporary politics; for "who, to dumb forgetfulness a prey," can ignore the fact that Mr. Wilson concentrated in himself a one-man power which has never had a parallel in American politics since the imperious reign of Andrew Jackson? He may have destroyed some party bosses, but it was only to concentrate their power not in the people but in himself. No such autocrat ever sat in the White House. To differ with him was to invite political destruction.

Having exhausted the language of eulogy, Dr. Col-

lins then makes a surprising turn by telling us that his scalpel discloses that the defect in Mr. Wilson's personality is "temperamental." We are told that Mr. Wilson does not love his fellow man and that "selfishness is another conspicuously deforming trait of the President. He is more selfish than cruel . . . He is ungenerous by sentiment, and unfair by implication."

In other words—to repeat the learned physician's disrespectful analogy—Mr. Wilson, while having "the brain of Jove, has the soul of a Batrachian."

To Dr. Collins' praise and censure I equally dissent. Mr. Wilson has a clear brain, but not a profound one. He has great versatility, but no culture above that of the average student of affairs. He has an effective gift of expression, without purity of diction. He is equally a poor judge of both men and events. The former, no one would dispute; the latter, history, which has a long memory, will adjudge. Far from having the soul of a Batrachian, he is a man of the same mold as all of us. He has eyes, a tongue, affections, dimensions, passions. He is not more selfish than most of the public men of our past history. A pure, unselfish spirit, like those of Washington and Lincoln, is rare indeed. For the rest, nearly all the men who have been distinguished in the annals of the United States have been men who pursued the policy of personal success. He only differs with them in his remorseless indifference to the conventions of a democracy. He is not a cold Batrachian. Warm blood courses through his veins, and he loves and hates with equal intensity. No one can be more gracious and kindly, and, in the calm indifference with which he has generally ignored the attacks of his ad-

versaries, is shown a fine magnanimity in the original sense of the word. The leading statesmen of Europe, many of whom deprecated his coming to Paris, were carried away with the grace of his personality. Dignified in manner as though born to the purple, with a fine intellectual power which captivated the keen critics of the Old World, the President unquestionably made a deep impression when he first went to Europe and became, by the sheer force of his personality, a leading—if not the leading—figure of the greatest peace conference in the annals of mankind. He may have few friends; but he cares for few. In social life, as in political life, he prefers to play a lone hand.

To my mind, one of the most acute analyses of Mr. Wilson and a far better portrait of a complex personality than those of Keynes, Dillon and Dr. Collins, is that of Mr. H. H. Powers, as published in the Boston *Evening Transcript* of January 6, 1920:

Mr. Wilson's mind is singularly lacking in power of analysis and in feeling for the concrete. On the other hand he is credited by many with rare powers of generalization. This faculty, however, is peculiar. His generalizations are not of a kind that are valued in science. They are æsthetic and literary rather than scientific. Apt in their phrasing and taking in their original appeal, they are nebulous and when subjected to scientific tests, they yield little in the way of positive content. These literary generalizations abound in his writings, not only in those of recent date, but in the publications of his academic period. A sympathetic reviewer some twenty years ago noted his inability to concrete his propositions and subject them to the test of reality. President Lowell ten years ago, at that time professor of Government in Harvard, instanced

Wilson's books to his classes as examples of how not to treat the subject.

This explains Mr. Wilson's helplessness and irritation when cross questioned and challenged to explain more exactly what his proposals mean and how they would work out in practice. Thus put to the test, he is one of the most helpless of mortals, and since his own mind never compels him to be explicit and concrete, he quite naturally regards such demands on the part of others as captious and intended for his embarrassment. With a wise instinct he avoids these encounters. . . .

I have insisted upon this fundamental characteristic of Mr. Wilson's mind because it is the key to his whole undertaking. It is in such a mind, exuberant but uncritical and but feebly conscious of the obstinate eccentricities of fact, that germinate those fantasies which men sometimes dignify by the inappropriate name of ideals. Such minds are not weak nor yet without value. The faculty of literary generalization and emotional appeal may be both very great and very useful. But it is a faculty that is peculiarly unsuited to tasks of practical administration and statesmanship. It is valuable primarily as stimulating suggestion, and under conditions of comparative detachment from practical situations.

There are those who see in Woodrow Wilson the most dangerous man whom accident ever elevated to high position in the United States. This is preposterous flattery. Were he able to work his will, such a judgment would be justified. But no man so weak in practical detail, so restive of opposition and delay, so incapable of using competent instruments, so lacking in elementary courtesy and tact, above all, no man *with such a genius for antagonism,* will ever jeopardize the liberties of the American people. His power to cause us temporary embarrassment, to obstruct world reorganization, and to prolong the world's misery, is

beyond question. *A million lives are on his conscience as the toll of this blackened year.* But all this means reaction and the reassertion of those rights and those saving principles which we have incautiously allowed him briefly to contravene. His amazing ineptitude is our salvation.

In the author's opinion, this describes Mr. Wilson's metaphysical limitations to a nicety. It is, however, like all portraits, only one aspect of his subject. It fails to take in account, as I shall hereafter endeavor to show, the moral defect in his complex character, which aggravated this intellectual inability to see concretely.

It will be noted that these four estimates of trained observers present, in a composite form, a very unfavorable portrait of President Wilson.

William E. Dodd, Professor of History in the University of Chicago, has come to the aid of the President's reputation by a book entitled "Woodrow Wilson and His Work," which, as an indiscriminate eulogy, has not been surpassed since J. S. C. Abbott, a generation ago, clothed Napoleon in the robe of a holy saint and crowned him with a sacred nimbus.

He attempts no real analysis of this complex character, but contents himself with a review of the epoch-making events of the last five years, all of which, in Dr. Dodd's opinion, have been due to the superhuman sagacity of the President. Mr. Wilson's contradictory statements or acts do not for one moment appall the learned professor, whose function—judged by this book—should not be the teaching of history. As Ignatius Donnelly found a connected autobiography in

the plays of Shakespeare, written by the Master in cipher and woven into the First Folio, without taking into account the fact that these plays were published by his fellow actors after his death and in such order as they pleased, with equal folly Dr. Dodd finds in the contradictory policies of Mr. Wilson a consistent intention to do that which, under the spur of necessity, he finally did do. If Dr. Dodd's theory is to be carried to its logical conclusion then the chaos in which the world now finds itself, largely through Mr. Wilson's pretentious but blundering statecraft, was also a part of the same original purpose—a conclusion from which obviously the Chicago professor, as a Wilson idolator, would shrink.

His final estimate of Mr. Wilson can be summarized in the concluding sentences of his book:

"Never robust in health, he entered office already overworked. But he spared not himself, challenged Congress and all public officials to keep his pace, and quickly stirred the whole country to new conceptions of public duty. The tone of public life was lifted to a high plane. What he said and did in those exciting and sometimes awful years must ever remain a heritage of the people. Unless Democracy itself should fail, he will be read and quoted hundreds of years from now, as Jefferson and Lincoln are read and quoted now. It is surely a record unsurpassed; and the fame of the man who now lies ill in the White House can never be forgotten, the ideals he has set and the movement he has pressed so long and so ably can not fail. It is a compelling, almost a tragic, story."

Dr. Dodd's indiscriminating eulogy hardly justifies comment. It belongs to the perfervid literature of a

political campaign. Mr. Wilson never stirred his countrymen "to new conceptions of public duty." He did much to chloroform the American conscience into insensibility, by upholding as long as possible the "too proud to fight" doctrine, but his chief purpose by subtle appeals was to inflame the passions of the masses against the so-called classes. He has lowered the tone of our public life. When he retires from his high office, he leaves behind him the deluge of class passion. His passionate utterances may be quoted centuries from now—I doubt it—but if so, they will be regarded as other vaporings of ambitious men, who sought to revolutionize American ideals in favor of a so-called "New Freedom." I venture to predict that he will be regarded by posterity as the most dangerous and destructive leader who has sat in the White House since Jackson. Time will tell.

I cannot leave these pen portraits of a great personality without briefly referring to one drawn by a not unfriendly pen. I refer to Count von Bernstorff's estimate of him in the German Ambassador's *apologia,* entitled "My Three Years in America." It is true that his *post factum* comments will be read in America with little disposition to believe anything that this shrewd diplomat says. German diplomacy was as untruthful as it was unscrupulous. It now suffers from the fate that always attends the liar. But von Bernstorff quotes at length his *contemporaneous* cipher dispatches to his Foreign Office and it is incredible that these can be forged. Here, then, are *res gestæ,* and as such convincing evidence of this shrewd diplomat's real estimate of Mr. Wilson. He had full opportunity

to judge him, for it is a humiliating fact that the doors of the White House, which in 1916 were generally closed to the British and French ambassadors, were open to Bernstorff, who directly—or indirectly through Colonel House—was in constant communication with the President. The story thus told will, when it is fully understood by the American people, constitute one of the most humiliating chapters of America's diplomatic history. It will thus be seen that at the very time that Mr. Wilson was professing an honest neutrality, he was discussing—generally through Colonel House, as his *alter ego*—a plan of intervention which would inevitably have brought the sacrifices of the Allies to nought by forcing a compromise peace by American intervention.

Bernstorff's estimate may be summed up in the one word, which he uses, that Mr. Wilson was "egocentric." Throughout the world crisis he saw all problems in their effect upon his own prestige. The noble unselfishness of Lincoln was wholly wanting. His vanity—with which at first he aspired to be the Peace Dictator—later, when wounded by Germany's unexpected cancellation of its promises to him, played a large part in determining his policies. As Bernstorff well says:

"Truth to tell, if Mr. Wilson had really been striving to declare war against us, *he would, of course, only have needed to nod in order to induce his whole country to fight after the Lusitania incident, so great was the war feeling at that critical time.* Later on, the President concentrated all his efforts upon the idea of being the Peacemaker of the world, and even made

such prominent use of the motto 'He kept us out of war' in the campaign for his reëlection, that it is quite unthinkable that all this time he should have secretly cherished the intention ultimately to enter the war against Germany. In this matter, the fact that after the rupture of diplomatic relations between America and Germany, Mr. Wilson really did urge war by every means in his power, proves nothing. *For after January 31, 1917, Wilson himself was a different man.* Our rejection of his proposal to mediate, by our announcement of the unrestricted U-boat warfare, *turned him into an embittered enemy of the Imperial Government."*

I cannot quote at length from this remarkable book, but I commend it to the Dr. Dodds, and other Wilson idolators, as illuminating evidence as the character of Mr. Wilson's "neutrality" in 1915-16, when he was striving to bring about a Peace Conference, which would give a "Peace without Victory," and thus make of no avail for the redemption of the world the sacrifice of all the brave men who had died on the Marne, on the Yser, and on the Meuse. Such a peace, when Germany at the Peace Table could still have rattled its Prussian sabre, would have been a moral vacuum, and God abhors a vacuum.

Without attempting to draw my own portrait of Mr. Wilson, and freely recognizing that no one now can "pluck out the heart of his mystery," let me state that which I believe to be the dominant characteristic that at first led to his unexampled success, and then culminated in his equally unexampled failure.

While I have attempted to indicate this defect in

the two dialogues which I am now publishing, yet, acting as my own Greek chorus to two very un-Greek playlets, I venture to state it in a more formal way.

In the tragedy of *Hamlet,* the keynote was struck by the master dramatist in a sentence in the first act, to which the students of *Hamlet* have given too little attention. Commenting upon one defect in the Danish character, Hamlet utters a philosophic truth by saying that there are "particular men," who

> "Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect,
> Being nature's livery, or fortune's star,—
> Their virtues else—be they as pure as grace,
> As infinite as man may undergo—
> Shall in the general censure take corruption
> From that particular fault; the dram of eale
> Doth all the noble substance *of a doubt.*[1]
> To his own scandal."

Upon no moral truth did Shakespeare, in his clinical studies of human nature, dwell with greater or more telling insistence than upon the destructive power of a single fault. Hamlet himself, Shylock and Macbeth, are familiar illustrations.

The most striking instance, however, of this truth in Shakespeare's clinical studies was *Malvolio.* It is "passing strange" that this essentially tragic figure should be regarded as the mere vehicle for comedy. In the essential dignity of manhood, Malvolio was a finer man than the languid lovers of the *Orsino* type or the boisterous roisterers of the *Sir Toby* type. He was obviously a man of fine intelligence, great dignity,

[1] The slip of an Elizabethan compositor. One good emendation for the italicized words would be "oft adulter."

and an admirable and conscientious administrator. His gracious mistress, *Olivia,* who thoroughly understood him and appreciated his faithful stewardship and admirable qualities as a man, fully understood her steward's "dram of eale." She says:

"O, you are sick of self-love, Malvolio, and taste with a distempered appetite. To be generous, guiltless and of free disposition, is to take those things for bird-bolts that you deem cannon-bullets."

Maria said of him that he was, at times, "a kind of Puritan." But, with fine judgment, she thus distinguished between the austerity of his Puritan nature and the essential defect in his character:

"The devil a puritan that he is, or any thing constantly, but a *time-pleaser; . . . that cons state without book and utters it by great swarths: the best persuaded of himself, so crammed, as he thinks, with excellencies, that it is his grounds of faith that all look on him love him.*"

There is much of *Malvolio* in President Wilson. The yellow stockings which he put on to attract the attention of civilization was a world diplomacy for which he had, in fact, very little aptitude. With one leg cross-gartered by the Fourteen Points and the other with the League of Nations, and with the forced smile which became known as the "Wilson smile," he trod, for a little time, the great stage of the world, only to find that his yellow stockings were not popular and that his Fourteen Points and League of Nations, instead of winning him the admiring favor of mankind, had cost him the leadership of civilization.

Even in the *dénouement* of the two tragic-comedies, there is a striking parallel between the fate of *Malvolio* and that of Wilson. The latter had persuaded his associates in Paris, very much against their will, that America would accept the League of Nations which he inopportunely forced upon them. Notwithstanding thrice-repeated warnings from the representatives of a majority of the American people, the European statesmen blindly accepted the assurance of Mr. Wilson and incorporated the fatal Covenant in the Peace Treaty. When it was seen that Wilson's real control of the American people was as weak as that of *Malvolio* upon the affections of his fair mistress, the European statesmen, who cared little for the League of Nations but very much for America's participation in the European settlement, implored him to accept the Covenant with such reservations as a majority of the Senate demanded.[1] Lord Grey was sent to America on a special mission to advise the President of the fact that England would accept the American reservations; but, though he waited for months, he did not receive an audience, and was obliged to interpret the views of his government on his return to England in a letter to the London *Times*. The French Ambassador had a like experience. President Wilson's closest friends and most faithful party associates implored him, in order to save the Treaty, to accept the suggestion of his associates in Paris and permit the ratification of the Treaty with the saving reservations.

[1] While giving the proofs of this book a final revision in London, I attended a much heralded debate in the House of Lords on the League of Nations. There were less than fifteen peers present. The rest had gone to the King's Garden party. Such was the interest in the League of Nations!

All was to no purpose. *Malvolio* was not more unyielding in his implacable opposition than President Wilson to any modification of his Covenant. Like *Malvolio,* because he was virtuous, there could be no ale or cake for civilization. The result was inevitable. The Covenant was rejected and, with it, the Treaty. Wilson's refusal to friend and foe to accept anything less than the Covenant, which unstatesmanlike hodge-podge the common sense of mankind had already rejected, is most suggestive in its obstinate character of the last words with which *Malvolio* makes his exit:

"I'll be revenged on the whole pack of you."

Wilson and *Malvolio* are alike in the fact that they were both unconscious *poseurs.* The word "unconscious" is used advisedly, for each of them deceived himself more than he deceived the world. Psychology increasingly emphasizes man's subconscious self, whose reasoning and impulses slowly infiltrate the conscious self without the latter's recognition. Mr. Wilson could deny with entire sincerity that his public utterances and actions were often mere poses, but he is not the first man to be thus the victim of self-deception. A man may be a *poseur* or actor quite unconsciously. Mr. Wilson is unconsciously one of the most accomplished actors who ever trod the boards of that great theater, the world. His performance of the modern Moses descending from Mt. Sinai was a masterpiece of acting. He played the rôle of the prophet and law-giver, and in fact he was neither. He delivered his "Fourteen Points"—in which he had been anticipated by Lloyd George—with a priestly unction which deceived the world as to their true authorship.

His assumption of Messianic authority, only waiting for a crazy world, deafened by the roar of the cannon, to hear his voice and authority, was wonderfully effective. At times he played, before the eyes of the world, the rôle of that weary Titan, Abraham Lincoln, long before Drinkwater conceived the dramatic possibilities of the part. To Mr. Wilson the world crisis was a drama in which he was, Calvinistically, predestined to play the leading rôle, and, for this reason, he saw every great problem of that crisis as it was reflected in the mirror of his own prestige. Always he was, consciously or unconsciously, playing a part which he believed should be the leading rôle. A great ambition, and one which, as the event proved, was not beyond his reach; for, representing, as no previous American ever had done, the unbounded resources of the United States, he was in a position to impose his terms upon the world, provided that those terms concurred with the best traditions of his own country and did not run counter to the increasing purpose of the ages. His ambitious but vague plans failed in both respects.

Woodrow Wilson is the son of a clergyman. He was born and nurtured in the environment of the Church. And not of an ordinary church, but of a church in which the stern discipline of John Knox still has some survival. I suspect that Mr. Wilson has often reminded himself of John Knox.

In his unbending and dogmatic manner of maintaining his policies in the teeth of opposition, the spirit of his Calvinistic training is manifest.

If such was Wilson's heredity, his career before he

became a politician was, with the exception of the few years when he attempted to practice law, that of a teacher. Pascal said that if Cleopatra's nose had been an inch longer, the whole history of the world would have been written differently; and if Woodrow Wilson (in 1882 a member of the firm of "Renick & Wilson, attorneys at law," of Atlanta, Georgia) had remained a lawyer, the history of the Peace Conference of 1918 might have been written differently. Even if he had become President of the United States after a successful career at the Bar, he would probably not have been the unbending and tactless master of affairs that he subsequently became, at least to the same extent, for if there is one profession that is destructive of the spirit of posing, it is that of the Bar. The sharp conflict of the court room, where a lawyer finds his level, and even if he overrides his adversary, is subject to the superior power of the court, inculcates a certain spirit of *savoir faire* and tolerance.

Mr. Wilson became a teacher, and in this profession his congenital tendency to pose as an "I am Sir Oracle" became greatly magnified; for the professor in the class-room, who stands on a platform above his pupils and speaks with superior authority and intelligence, too often acquires the unconscious habit of posing as the embodiment of superior wisdom. The pedagogue immensely increased the *ex-cathedra* pose of the son of the Calvinistic Clergyman. In Mr. Wilson's ritual there was no place for *"nolo episcopari."*

Leaving Princeton, Mr. Wilson thereupon entered public life, and neither the pulpit of the church nor the lecture platform of the college gives a greater

temptation to posing than the theater of public action. In public life, each man always has two personalities. The first is that which he really is, and the second that which he seems to be to the people. Of the two, so far as temporary success is concerned, the second is from a practical standpoint the more important. "Assume a virtue, if you have it not" is the beginning and end of practical politics. To create an impression, which in time becomes a legend, is one purpose of a statesman. No one understood this better than the greatest actor of all time, Napoleon. He had no need of lessons from Talma.

A striking evidence of this distinguishing trait in Mr. Wilson's character will be found in the marked contrast which exists in his style when he is standing on the ground speaking on terms of familiar intimacy with his fellows and when speaking on a pedestal. In ordinary conversation, Mr. Wilson's English is clear, precise, vigorous and unaffected. No one can readily mistake its meaning. He knows what he wishes to say and he says it with clarity and terseness. When, however, Mr. Wilson ascends the platform or rostrum, or speaks *ex-cathedra* in one of his formal addresses or official messages, his style shows an artificiality of thought and expression which at once suggests the assumption of a pose. He is often so obscure that men can only guess at his real meaning, and even if his purpose is generally revealed, the precise limits of his message are imperfectly defined. To this air of obscurity is added an assumption of moral authority which reminds us of Gratiano's words: "I am Sir Oracle. When I ope my lips, let no dog bark."

An interesting parallel has often been drawn between Mr. Wilson at the Paris Conference and the Czar Alexander at the Conference of Vienna. As a matter of fact, there is no real parallel between them, except in the barren results of their efforts. The Czar was a superstitious mystic. Mr. Wilson is a clear-headed thinker and a very practical statesman; but he has preferred to make his appeal to the imagination of men by wrapping himself in a mantle of obscurity and playing the rôle of an inspired prophet.

If this theory of subconscious posing be consistently kept in mind in reviewing President Wilson's activities during the war, much of his record will be intelligible that would otherwise be quite unintelligible and contradictory. Thus, when the cataclysm came in August, 1914—the greatest moral crisis in the history of the world—Mr. Wilson's first thought was that he, and he alone, would do the thinking for the American people. He said:

"The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. *We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments* as well as upon every transaction that might be construed *as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.*"

No more preposterous idea ever influenced a responsible statesman to his undoing than to suppose that, in a supreme moral crisis which went down to the very foundations of society, a hundred millions of people, who, of all people, are accustomed to the exercise of

independent judgment, would remain neutral in thought and silent in expression. As Milton said of another Majesty "his words impression left of much amazement."

The American people speedily ignored the demand and, outside of certain racial elements in America, the overwhelming judgment of the American people favored the cause of the Allies.

Unquestionably, as the war progressed and as the varied colored diplomatic papers appeared and as Mr. Wilson slowly chloroformed the conscience of the American people with his morally stupefying notes, public opinion did become at first confused, and then sharply divided. At the beginning of the war, when all America rose in frenzied indignation at the wanton murder of women and children in the sinking of the *Lusitania,* a brave and sagacious President could have led the American people into the war, and it would have successfully ended within two years at most. Von Bernstorff's testimony on this point is very convincing. He knew, for he had every reason to study the state of the public mind. He tells us in a passage already quoted that a "nod" from Mr. Wilson at that time would have brought America into the war and thus saved millions of lives and billions of treasure and perhaps Civilization itself. It is gratifying to have this testimony to the righteous indignation of the American people at the murder of their women and children, when Wilson apologists still tell us that it was not he who then failed, but the American people, and that it was his wonderful statecraft that made America's final intervention possible. Such a theory is

a libel upon the American people. But, a year later, the pacifism, which Mr. Wilson's public addresses and diplomatic notes had engendered and his frequent statement that "with the objects and causes of the war, we are not concerned," etc., and others of like import, had so confused the judgment of the American people and so affected their spirit, that that which was possible in the first year of the war had become more difficult, but not impossible, for there was never a time in the whole crisis that the American people would not have supported their President, if he had bravely urged a declaration of war in behalf of America's honor.

Mr. Wilson had chosen his rôle. He could have led the country into the war at the beginning, and, had he done so, millions of lives would have been preserved and uncounted billions of treasure saved. No one knew better than he did that, after the sinking of the *Lusitania,* one clear and forceful utterance from his eloquent tongue to the effect that "the murder of American women and children on the high seas must stop," would have rallied a substantially united people behind him, and the war would have been brought to a reasonably speedy close. When did the American people ever fail to sustain their President, when he championed their honor?

Either on his own volition or persuaded by the sycophants who surrounded him, he believed that his greater glory lay in dictating the world's peace, and, throughout the whole war, every move that he made on the chessboard of the conflict was to that end.

The incredible stupidity of the German Foreign Office, induced by the absolute faith of the Kaiser in

the speedy success of an unrestricted submarine warfare, prevented Mr. Wilson from carrying into effect his plan to force a peace conference in December, 1916.

War thus being forced upon him, not only by Germany's callous pronunciamento of January, 1917, but by the indignant public sentiment of America, which had grown weary of repeated and unavenged outrages upon American women and children, Mr. Wilson, with extraordinary skill, changed his pacific program of dictating peace to the more warlike rôle of a militant conqueror. He who had been "too proud to fight" suddenly became the advocate of "force, without limit or stint." He, who had said that "with the causes and objects of the war, we have no concern," and that, stated in their own terms, both groups of belligerents were fighting for the same principles, suddenly discovered in the war aims of the Allies the principles of eternal justice.

While, however, Mr. Wilson changed his pose of peace-maker to that of a militant conquerer, he had not forgotten his greater pose as the peace dictator. Without consulting, so far as is known, any one except his immediate associates, he announced, on January 18, 1918, the famous "Fourteen Points," which were to him as sacred as the Ten Commandments were to the great Jewish law-giver. Then, after bringing to pass a premature armistice, against the judgment even of his closest friends, he made his grandiose tour to Paris, in the hope that he would still be able to play the leading rôle in a stupendous drama. *Malvolio* did not make his entrance with prouder mien or more ingratiating smile than Mr. Wilson, as he appeared

in Paris with one leg cross-gartered by the Fourteen Points and the other with the League of Nations.

How utterly he failed is now a matter of history. One after another of the "Fourteen Points" was "more honored in the breach than in the observance," but this did not prevent the President, on his return to America, from blandly saying:

"I think the Treaty adheres to the Fourteen Points more closely than I had a right to expect, in view of the difficulties which arose and the great number of divergent views which had to be reconciled. The Fourteen Points were the guiding spirit throughout, and their spirit entered pretty much into everything that was done."

If this represented his real conviction, he is almost alone in such a plain misinterpretation of the facts.

Returning to the United States, he still posed as a conqueror, and, with affected confidence, submitted the Covenant, which he had forced into the Peace Treaty against the wishes of his European associates, to the Senate for its concurrence. After one of the most notable debates which ever took place in the Senate and which recalls the best traditions of the Republic, the revolutionary Covenant was rejected.

When was an American President visited with a like humiliation?

He now appeals to the American people to endorse a course which has gone far to make a wreckage of the world's peace. I predict that on March 4, 1921, the American people will write their final stage direction to the drama. It will be:

"Exit Malvolio."