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**SECOND PART.**

**THE EPISTLES OF THE APOSTLE PAUL.**

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**SECOND CLASS OF THE PAULINE EPISTLES.**

**THE EPISTLES TO THE EPHESIANS, COLOSSIANS, PHILIPPIANS, TO  
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# THE EPISTLES OF THE APOSTLE PAUL.

## FOURTH CHAPTER.

### THE EPISTLES TO THE EPHESIANS AND TO THE COLOSSIANS.

THE Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Ephesians has only recently been challenged; yet, with the exception of the Pastorals, there is none of the shorter Pauline Epistles the genuineness of which is more questionable. The bold and original method of criticism which Schleiermacher applied to the First Epistle to Timothy was adopted by De Wette in his treatment of the Epistle to the Ephesians; by the same process, namely, by demonstrating its dependence upon another work, he raised the gravest doubts as to its authentic apostolic origin. And the verdict of criticism on this Epistle,<sup>1</sup> which De Wette was the first to pronounce, is, that it is nothing but a rhetorical expansion of the Epistle to the Colossians. It is of no avail to insist upon the contrast between the flowing style and copious language of this Epistle, and the thoughtful conciseness of that to the Colossians; on the contrary, this very difference, when considered along with those other elements in our Epistle which certainly cannot belong to the apostle, brings us very easily to the conclusion that it was formed upon the model of the other. In the same way, as Schleiermacher showed, the First Epistle to Timothy resulted from a free use of materials borrowed from the other two pastoral

<sup>1</sup> De Wette's judgment was still wavering in the fourth edition of his *Einführung in das N. T.* 1842; but in the *Kurze Erklärung des Epheserbriefs*, 1843, p. 79 (p. 89 in 2d Edition), we find him pronouncing distinctly for its spuriousness.

Epistles. This assertion of criticism has indeed given great offence, and a world of trouble has been expended in seeking to prove the Epistle genuine;<sup>1</sup> but the discovery once made was not one that could be proved either untrue or unimportant; and it only remains to be seen whether what happened in the case of the pastoral Epistles will happen here, that the doubts of criticism, once aroused by the proof of such a relation existing between the two writings, will not endanger only one of them, but draw both the Epistles so connected into the same condemnation.

The relation between the two Epistles is certainly striking enough,<sup>2</sup> and by the nearly unanimous judgment of critics and interpreters<sup>3</sup> it is the Epistle to the Ephesians, and not that to the Colossians, which must be held to be dependent on the other. How is it then, if this Epistle be genuine, that the apostle, who is not in general at any loss for ideas, writes to two different churches not far separate from each other, under the same circumstances, and, as is almost universally supposed, at the same time, two letters so very like each other? The resemblance which this Epistle bears to that to the Colossians in many of its arguments, ways of thinking, and expressions, is sought to be explained by

<sup>1</sup> This is done by Rückert in a very boisterous manner; *Der Brief Pauli an die Eph.*, 1834, p. 303 *sq.* "Only a man such as Paul was can be the author of this Epistle, and if it was not he, point out to me the spirit in that age that was his peer. It is impossible that he can have passed over the world and left no trace behind. I ask then, who was he, and where? In the ranks of the imitators, the compilers, or the quacks, we dare not seek him; where then?"

Critical doubts then, it appears, may be simply disposed of even now-a-days with declamations like this. The author of a canonical Epistle, such writers imagine, must either have been an apostle, or one of the most despicable class of men, "the botchers, forgers, and wooden-headed compilers" (p. 299); or, if he were not a compiler, he must have been known to us by reputation, since he could not have gone through the world without leaving his mark on history. But is not this product of his genius itself a sufficient trace of his existence?

<sup>2</sup> Compare the tabulated comparison of the passages given by De Wette in his *Einleitung*, p. 259, and the *Commentary on the Epistle*, p. 79. (Edition of 1847, p. 89.)

<sup>3</sup> The only exception here is Mayerhof, *Der Brief an die Colosser*, etc. (The Epistle to the Colossians critically examined, with special reference to the three Pastoral Epistles, 1838.)

supposing that Paul had been writing that Epistle a short time before, and that the direction of thought induced by his controversy with the sects there combated was still prevailing in his mind; hence, it is further said, it is clear that he must have written the Epistle to the Colossians the first of the two. This is the account of the matter given by Neander,<sup>1</sup> and to the same purpose Harless says:<sup>2</sup> "A writing directed by the apostle to a second body of Christians, just after he had discharged the mournful duty to which he saw himself compelled, of defending the infinite riches of the wisdom of God against the inroads of poor human wisdom; this Epistle naturally exhibits much greater play and movement in the treatment of its materials, while at the same time a multitude of similarities clearly demonstrate its kinship with that which he had just composed." In a word, then, the apostle wrote these two Epistles at the same time; this is the solution of the difficulty with which we are presented. But what, we cannot help inquiring, could induce the apostle, after finishing the Epistle to the Colossians, to continue writing in the same attitude of thought, and to compose another letter, which was not particularly called for, in addition to the first? Is it the apostle's habit to write such letters? And, if the only way to account for the character of this Epistle be to assume that it was intended as a circular in which Paul, as the apostle of the Gentiles, addressed himself to all the Gentile Christians of those regions, just because they were Christians, and in which he condescended to no special circumstances, but dealt with the one great interest which was common to them all, the indisputable efficacy of the gospel among the heathen,<sup>3</sup>—what does this amount to, but a statement of the great peculiarity of our Epistle, that the stamp of individuality, the colour, form, and manner, which the genuine apostolic Epistles carry on their front, are wanting here? Yet in fact, the assumption we have mentioned, not only does not explain the actual facts

<sup>1</sup> Planting and Training, i. 329.

<sup>2</sup> Comm. über den Br. Pauli an die Eph., 1834, Einleitung, S. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Neander, *ubi supra*.

of the case as they lie before our eyes ; it is but another attempt to deny these facts. The peculiar phenomena presented to us in the relation of these two Epistles are by no means adequately described by speaking of mere points of resemblance, or even of a multitude of points of resemblance. The whole contents of the two Epistles are substantially the same, and what are called points of resemblance are not merely chance repetitions of his former words, such as the writer might employ unconsciously. On the contrary, we find whole sentences repeated word for word, or with such alterations as clearly betray that the original was present to the writer's mind. And this is the case, whether we assume, on the one hand, that the Epistle to the Colossians was written first, and that its shorter and conciser contents were extended in that to the Ephesians, or that the lengthier contents of the Epistle to the Ephesians were drawn upon, and a sort of abstract of them produced in the Epistle to the Colossians. In either case, what we have before us is a reproduction of the one Epistle in the other, such as cannot be explained by any fortuitous and unconscious coincidence of thought, but only by a distinct intention on the part of the writer of one of these Epistles to give a more or less full recast of the other ; and even though interpreters and critics should succeed, while defending the Epistles' genuineness in demonstrating that there is a difference between the two letters as well as an agreement, it will be found that whatever can be made good in this direction will not tell in favour of the Epistle to the Ephesians, but of that to the Colossians. It is only the latter which, in addition to the general contents that are common to both, contains reference to peculiar local and individual circumstances, such as the letters of the apostle generally present, and so provides against total identity with the other Epistle. Such being the case, it is not to be wondered at that a recent critic has sought to solve the problem, not by assuming the contemporaneousness of the two Epistles, but in a totally different way. That the Epistles were written at the same time, says Schneckenburger,<sup>1</sup> "would explain a general

<sup>1</sup> Beiträge zur Einleitung ins N. T., 1832, p. 141 sq.

correspondence of ideas, but not such a similarity as we have here in details, nor what I must almost call such a mechanical use of materials. Nor is there any probable reason for Paul's sending two letters of so similar contents to the same district, and about the same time." Schneckenburger's opinion is, therefore, that the Epistle to the Ephesians (this Epistle is here put first, as that to the Colossians by the advocates of the other view) must have been before the apostle's eyes when he composed the Colossian Epistle. Why should it appear so improbable that when the occasion arose for writing to the Colossians, the apostle took up the earlier letter he had sent to the same region? There is no need to think of a scroll or draught of that letter, but it is easy to suppose, that having drawn out a sort of summary of Christian doctrine and morals for the use of his friends in Asia Minor, either he himself took a copy of it with a view to future use in the service of similar inquirers, or, if he did not do so, that his amanuenses copied it for their own improvement and instruction. Then when he had to write to the Colossians, he may have taken up that earlier letter, and so certain similarities of arrangement and expression may have found their way quite naturally into the letter he was writing. But the apostle would never have copied himself in this manner, nor does this hypothesis, any more than the other, escape from the objection that the agreement of the two Epistles is not the result of chance, but is certainly intentional. And to whom can this intention be imputed with the greater likelihood? Shall we impute it to the apostle? But we can conceive no reason why he should have appeared on this occasion as a re-writer of his own letters. Shall we not rather impute it to another man, who, by the very fact of his conceiving the idea of personating the apostle, and writing letters in his name, showed that he had some special end to serve, and who thought, perhaps, the better to further his end by putting in circulation two editions of one letter?

In addition to these considerations regarding the external form of the Epistle, we have further to consider that if it was actually addressed to the Ephesians, it cannot possibly have been written

by Paul. They were a church in the midst of which he had lived for a considerable time, and with which he was intimately acquainted; and how could he write to them as to a church that was strange to him, and speak of their faith as a thing he had learned about through others? (Cf. i. 15.) The title and address which are found in the text (i. 1) are indeed doubtful; but even in the case that the Epistle was not an epistle to the Ephesians, even though the local address were wanting altogether, or ran thus, "To the Laodiceans," this indistinctness and the uncertainty of the destination (which even in the last case is not removed), would of themselves afford a presumption against the Pauline origin of the Epistle.

If now we turn to the contents of the Epistle, or rather of the two Epistles,—for their contents are so essentially the same that they cannot well be distinguished,—and seek for internal evidence of their Pauline character, we shall meet here also with much that is peculiar. First of all, it strikes us as strange that in both Epistles the eye of the writer is directed chiefly to the transcendental regions of the spirit-world; and there is an effort visible throughout to magnify Christ on the side of his higher dignity by predicates borrowed from this supersensuous domain. The nearest approach to the theology of Paul is in the passage, Eph. i. 20 *sq.*, where it is said of Christ, that God raised him from the dead, and that he set himself at his right hand in the heavenly places, *ὑπεράνω πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ κυριότητος, καὶ παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, καὶ πάντα ὑπέταξεν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ.* This coincides with the apostle's conception of Christ's exaltation, who subjects everything to himself till the process reaches its highest stage, 1 Cor. xv. 24. But in which of the principal Epistles of Paul do we find those *ἐπουράνια* (cf. iii. 10), those regions of the supernatural world, classified as they are here, and in Colossians i. 16, 17,<sup>1</sup> according to the different spirits

<sup>1</sup> In Rom. viii. 38, only *ἀρχαί* and *ἄγγελοι* are spoken of, but nowhere do we find with Paul the *θρόνοι* and *κυριότητες* of this passage; and still less, what is

which, rising step by step, one above the other, severally inhabit them; and where do we find Christ placed, as he is here, at the head of the whole system of the spirit-world? The Christology of these two Epistles, however, does not confine itself to the contemplation of the dignity of Christ from beneath upwards, as shown in his exaltation; it also regards Christ as having been from the beginning the absolute principle of all existence. For it is asserted of him (Col. i. 15) that he is the likeness of the invisible God, the first-born of the whole creation, because in him all things were created, the visible and the invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers. Everything was created through him and to him (in him, that is, is the final purpose in which every created thing finds its realization), and he is before all, and all things subsist in him. To him, then, as the creative principle of everything existing, there is attributed absolute pre-existence. This is found explicitly only in the Epistle to the Colossians; but since that to the Ephesians presupposes the other, there can be no doubt that the Christology of both is in the main the same. It is true that we find certain hints of similar views in the homologoumena of the Apostle, but they are no more than hints, the meaning of which is open to question; while here, on the contrary, the absolute pre-mundane existence is the dominating idea, the pervading element within which the whole thought of these Epistles moves. Christ is the centre of the entire spirit-realm; his activity is represented as bearing chiefly on the invisible and supersensuous world, or at least as comprehending heavenly and earthly things, the visible and the invisible, at once and in the same degree. For this not only is there no analogy in Paul's writings, but we are here transported to a circle of ideas which belongs to a totally different historical era, viz., to the period of

evidently implied in these two passages above, such regular gradations of rank. It is true that in 1 Cor. xv. 24, Paul says of Christ that he *καταργήσῃ πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν καὶ δύναμιν*, but it is impossible to find here the different classes of an angelic hierarchy, and so this passage should not be used as a parallel.



Gnosticism. The properties which the Gnostics distributed in their myths among a number of æons, all of whom always resolve themselves again into the same central conception, are here united in the one Christ, in whom, as in the Gnostic Nous or Monogenes, the supreme and absolute God unfolds and reveals his secret essence, as the *εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*, the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, the highest principle of all life and being. In him, as on the one hand *αὐτός ἐστι πρὸ πάντων*, so on the other, *ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα, καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνέστηκε*, Col. i. 15 sq., for he is the *Χριστός*, who is *τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσι*, Col. iii. 11.<sup>1</sup>

The Gnostic systems rest upon the root idea that all spiritual

<sup>1</sup> According to the doctrine of the Valentinians, Christ sent out of the pleroma the Soter, *ἐνδύσας αὐτῷ πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ πᾶν ὑπ' ἐξουσίαν παραδόντος καὶ τῶν αἰώνων δὲ ὁμοίως, ὅπως ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα κτισθῆ τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, θρόνοι, θεότητες, κυριότητες*, Iren. Adv. Haer. i. 4, 5. Theodoret (Haer. Fabb. i. 7) mentions the same as the doctrine of the Valentinians, namely, that Christ sent the Redeemer Jesus, *ὥστε ἐν αὐτῷ κτισθῆναι καὶ τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, καὶ θρόνους, καὶ κυριότητας, καὶ θεότητας, ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι*. It is usually assumed that the Valentinians derived these representations and expressions from the Epistle to the Colossians; but how is it that this letter itself answered so closely to the forms of their thought and expression? We see from Iren. i. 3, 4, how they used other passages of these two Epistles for their own purposes, *ὑπὸ Παύλου φανερώς εἰρησθαι λέγουσι· καὶ αὐτός ἐστι τὰ πάντα* (Col. iii. 11), *καὶ πάλιν* (Col. ii. 9) *ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος, καὶ τὸ ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ διὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Eph. i. 10) *ἐρμηνεύουσιν εἰρησθαι, καὶ εἴ τινα ἄλλα*. It may very reasonably be supposed that the later Valentinians, whom Irenaeus is refuting, appealed to these passages in support of their doctrines, but that the agreement of these passages with their doctrines results from the fact that the circle in which those Epistles arose was permeated by similar Gnostic ideas. The first beginnings of Christian speculation coincided, as we know, with the beginnings of Gnosis, and thus Gnosis, when developing itself, and giving its peculiar impulse to Christian speculation, gave currency to many representations and expressions which, though springing from the soil of Gnosticism, and though containing Gnostic elements, yet were not offensive to the unprejudiced Christian consciousness. Even then, however, every speculation was not received equally as Christian; it is remarkable that the Epistle to the Colossians speaks of *κυριότητες*, but not of *θεότητες*, an idea at which the Valentinians took no offence. There can be no doubt that all these expressions, *ἀρχαί, ἐξουσίαι, θρόνοι, κυριότητες, θεότητες, αἰῶνες, πλήρωμα*, etc., belong to a circle where speculation about the spirit-world was carried on with peculiar zest; but where did this interest arise before Gnosticism began to take form? And with what other direction of thought is it more closely and more naturally connected than with the Gnostic?

life which has proceeded from the supreme God has to return to its original unity, and to be taken back again into the absolute principle, so that every discord which has arisen shall be resolved into harmony. Thus in these Epistles Christ's work is mainly that of restoring, bringing back, and making unity; the final purpose of it is, *εἰς οἰκονομίαν τοῦ πληρώματος τῶν καιρῶν* (*i.e.* according to the idea of a religious dispensation developing itself in the fulness of the times, that is, in definite epochs, in a series of moments mutually conditioning each other), *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*, Eph. i. 10, *καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτόν*, Col. i. 20. From this point of view both Epistles lay special weight on the consideration that Christ is, in respect of his death also, *εἰρήνη ἡμῶν, ὁ ποιήσας τὰ ἀμφοτέρα ἓν*, Eph. ii. 14, the *εἰρηνοποιήσας*, and that *εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*, Col. i. 20. It is in the light of this lofty and comprehensive conception that the work of Christ is here contemplated, *i.e.* as a mediation and atonement whose effects extend to the whole universe. And though it may be possible to harmonize this conception with the Pauline Christology and doctrine of atonement, yet it is certain that with Paul these ideas never assume the prominence which they have here. We have, therefore, good grounds for asserting that in these Epistles we are presented with a new and peculiar circle of ideas which is distinctly later than that of the Pauline Epistles. It is a transcendental region, into which Paul did look out now and then, but of which he had no definite views, and which he never introduced into his Epistles from a taste for metaphysical speculation.

As even the Christology of these letters bears unmistakably the impress of Gnosticism, we meet also with other Gnostic conceptions and modes of representation. Especially does that *πλήρωμα*, which holds so prominent a place in both Epistles, naturally suggest to us the Pleroma of the Gnostics. Indeed the two are so intimately connected, that the one can only be explained by the other. The Gnostic Pleroma is not the absolute itself; it is that in which the absolute displays itself as absolute, realizes the

conception of itself, and fills itself with its own definite contents. According to the doctrine of the Valentinians, the Bythos, the original divine source, is not in and of itself the Pleroma, but only in so far as it is thought as the sum of the aeons by which it is filled. "These thirty aeons," says Irenaeus (i. 1. 3), "as the Valentinian doctrine of aeons represents them, are τὸ ἀόρατον καὶ πνευματικὸν κατ' αὐτοὺς πλήρωμα, which is divided into an Ogdoas, a Dekas, and a Dodekas." The Logos, who is produced by the Nous or Monogenes, is called the ἀρχὴ καὶ μόρφωσις παντὸς τοῦ πληρώματος, that is, the being in whom the Pleroma first receives its form, in whom the conception of it is defined; since the Logos, in connexion with Ζωὴ as his σύζυγος, is the πατὴρ πάντων τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ ἐσομένων, and contains in his own nature the whole Pleroma, as he is himself only the more definite and more realized form of the Nous or Monogenes. The supreme and absolute God is not therefore himself the Pleroma, but has it in himself as his contents.<sup>1</sup>

Now this is just the conception of the Pleroma which we find in both our Epistles; the only difference is that there is no express mention here of a plurality of aeons as the complement of the pleroma, and that not the supreme God himself, but Christ, is the pleroma, since only in Christ does the self-existent God emerge from his abstract being, and unfold himself to the fulness of concrete life. For ἐν αὐτῷ, it is said, Col. i. 19, εὐδόκησε (ὁ Θεός), πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα κατοικῆσαι. Col. ii. 9: ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς, καὶ ἐστε ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι ὅς ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλὴ πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας. Eph. i. 22, 23: αὐτὸν ἔδωκε κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἣτις ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ, τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι πληρουμένου. Eph. iii. 19: Ἰνῶναι . . . τὴν ἀγάπην τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἵνα πληρωθῆτε εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Eph. iv. 13: τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ.

<sup>1</sup> Compare Iren. ii. 1; i. 2: Deus—solus pater et continens omnia.—Quemadmodum enim poterit super hunc alia plenitudo aut initium aut potestas aut alius Deus esse, cum oporteat Deum, horum omnium pleroma, in immenso omnia circumtenere et circumteneri a nemine.

Here we observe a further remarkable agreement. According to the doctrine of the Valentinians the aeons, who together make up the Pleroma, are divided into male and female, and form the so-called syzygies, pairs bound together as if in marriage. The pro-pator is united in syzygy with his *ἔννοια* (the thought of himself, his self-consciousness); in the same way, the Monogenes, or Nous, with Aletheia, the Logos with Zoë, the Anthropos with Ecclesia. From these the other aeons proceeded, also as syzygies. In the same way Christ forms, according to the Epistle to the Ephesians, a syzygy with the Church. Christ is indeed the head of the Church, but, in the same way, the man is the head of the woman, and husbands are exhorted to love their wives, just as Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for her, that he might sanctify her to himself, and present her glorious to himself without spot or blemish, Eph. v. 23 sq. This is the great *μυστήριον* of which the writer of the Epistle speaks in reference to Christ and the Church (ver. 32), that she is his wife, as it were, united to him in marriage. In virtue of this relationship the conception of the pleroma is transferred to her also. As Christ is the *πλήρωμα*, so also is the Church; that is to say, she is the *πλήρωμα* of Christ, since he himself is the *πλήρωμα* in the highest sense. This is the simple meaning of the words of which so many interpretations have been attempted: *τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι πληρωμένου*. What is meant is simply that Christ is the pleroma in the highest and absolute sense, inasmuch as it is all things absolutely that he fills with himself as the absolute contents. The conception of the *πλήρωμα* suggests the relation of one thing to another, the relation of abstract and concrete being, of absolute unconditioned being, and its manifestation or realization, or the relation of form and contents. As Christ is the pleroma because the absolute essence of God manifests itself and enters upon concrete existence in him, because the conception of God is here filled with its definite contents, so when the Church is called the pleroma of Christ, she is conceived as possessing a more concrete and realized existence than Christ himself. But if the Church, as the pleroma, is the concrete real existence with:

which Christ fills himself as his contents; on the other hand, and in a higher sense, Christ, as the form of these contents, is himself the contents with which everything that has existence, the self-existent, fills itself. The expression *πλήρωμα*, then, implies always a concrete and real existence,—the contents of another existence with which it combines to form a unity of form and contents. Thus the expression *πλήρωμα* is to be taken neither as simply active nor as simply passive. Both senses pass and re-pass into each other, for that which fills—which makes full—becomes itself that which is filled, is full, is informed with its definite contents. As *πληρούμενος τὰ πάντα ἐν πάσι*, Christ is the *πλήρωμα* which fills the *πάντα ἐν πάσι* with its definite contents, and this pleroma itself again is the absolute all, replenished with its absolute contents.

As with the conception of the *πλήρωμα*, so with that of the *σῶμα*. The church is the *σῶμα* of Christ, Eph. i. 23, iv. 12. But Christ himself is called *σῶμα*, the *σῶμα* of the Deity, inasmuch as there dwells *σωματικῶς* in him *πάν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*, all, that is to say, that informs the idea of the Deity with the concrete contents that belong to it, Col. ii. 9, an expression which can only be explained by the line of thought which we have indicated. If then he himself is the *σῶμα* of the Deity, the church can be his *σῶμα* only in a more concrete sense, since he, as *σῶμα* of the Deity, is the head of the church, and the principle, *ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συναρμολογούμενον καὶ συμβιβαζόμενον διὰ πάσης ἀφῆς τῆς ἐπιχορηγίας, κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐν μέτρῳ ἑνὸς ἐκάστου μέρους, τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ σώματος ποιεῖται εἰς οἰκοδομὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐν ἀγάπῃ*, Eph. iv. 16. Here the church is described, in true Gnostic fashion, as an organism fitted together by the concord of its members inwardly, and living in the idea of its own unity. The relation also in which the church stands towards Christ as his *σῶμα* brings us back to the idea of syzygy; according to Eph. v. 28, the *γυναῖκες* are the *σώματα* of their husbands, a representation where we again encounter the Gnostic idea of the pleroma, since here also the idea is present that the being of the husbands

receives its full contents only in that of the wives,—only there realizes its own conception.

The Gnostic representations afford, I think, the only satisfactory explanation of the obscure passage, iii. 9. The *οικονομία μυστηρίων* consists in this, that God has created all things, *ἵνα γνωρισθῆ νῦν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις διὰ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἢ πολυποίκιλος σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων, ἣν ἐποίησεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.* The final cause of the creation is here alleged to be that the *σοφία τοῦ Θεοῦ* should be known by the heavenly powers, and that through the medium of the church; the final cause of the creation is thus realized by a movement going back into the pleroma, an ideal movement, however, which is placed in the knowing of the *ἀρχαί* and *ἐξουσίαι*, which occupy the same position here as the aeons of the Gnostics. According to the doctrine of the Valentinians, the final end of the creation takes place in the return of Sophia, along with the spiritually-minded who make up the church, back to the Pleroma. Now the author of our Epistle could not place Sophia in this position at the realizing of the final cause of creation, for he had not made Sophia, but Ecclesia, the *σύζυγος* of Christ. But Sophia could not be altogether omitted, and she is placed here ideally as the divine wisdom which realizes itself in the realization of the divine world-scheme; she is made known as such to the celestial powers who form the highest spirit-world, and that through the church, which, as the object of this knowledge, is the medium through which it is communicated. The church, however, can be the object of this knowledge only in her syzygy with Christ. The Gnostic doctrine represents Sophia returning into the Pleroma as a bride united with her bridegroom, the Redeemer; and thus the realization of the purpose of creation is placed here in the marriage of the church with Christ, inasmuch as it is in her that the wisdom of God is known by the heavenly powers.<sup>1</sup> In this accomplishment of the ends of creation in the

<sup>1</sup> *ἵνα γνωρισθῆ* can only be construed along with *τίς ἢ οἰκ. τοῦ μυστ.*: Grace is given to me to proclaim the gospel and to instruct others *τίς ἢ οἰκ. τοῦ μυστ.*

γνωρίζειν of the ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἐξουσίαι, the πρόθεσις τῶν αἰώνων; the purpose of the aeons, or that which God has ideally proposed to himself in the aeons, returns into itself, having been accomplished and realized in Christ. The αἰῶνες here are like the Gnostic aeons (the αἰῶνες του αἰῶνος, Eph. iii. 21, the aeons of God as the primal Æon), the subjects of the Divine ideas of the world-plan which is developed and realized in the sequence of the aeons, ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις, Eph. ii. 7, and they constitute the being of God. All this, it is clear, can only be grasped and understood in the light of the Gnostic modes of thinking. The predicate, also, which Sophia here receives—πολυποίκιλος, this strange and singular compound, which has given so much trouble to the interpreters—cannot be rightly explained save from the same circle of ideas. Harless inclines ultimately to the view (which De Wette also in the main supports) that this πολυποίκιλος σοφία is so called on account of the difference of the present from earlier revelations, the revelations of God in nature and in the law. It is, that is to say, the wonderful wisdom, which adjusts the conflict between law and grace; it is the thought, συνέκλεισε γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἀπέθειαν, ἵνα τοὺς πάντας ἐλεήσει, which in another passage moves the apostle to exclaim, ὁ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας, etc., Rom. xi. 32 sq.; it is the preparatio evangelica of the Old Testament revelations, of which it is said at the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews, πολυτρόπως πάλαι, etc. The apostle, it is said, is not speaking here directly of that series of earlier revelations, for the wisdom he describes is that which is manifested through the church of the New Covenant, but he glances at all the various revelations of God, and calls the last and final one a revelation of the manifold wisdom of God. All this is perfectly sensible, still it does not preclude the question, why, if this was what the apostle had to say, he should have chosen such a peculiar expression as πολυποίκιλος, and should have spoken of a manifold (multiform) wisdom, when in reality it was the unity of it, as

namely, that this οἰκονομία τοῦ μυστηρίου finds its accomplishment in this ἵνα γνωρισθῇ, etc.

against the multiplicity of former revelations, that he wanted to express. I believe this *πολυποίκιλος σοφία* can only be explained thus: that the writer saw hovering before his mind that Gnostic *σοφία* of which this predicate is characteristic more than any other; for it was of the essence of that Sophia to pass through a series of the most varied forms and conditions. We even find Irenaeus using the same expression in speaking of the suffering condition in which for the most part she dwells.<sup>1</sup>

In this connexion we cannot set it down to chance that an idea occurs in one of these Epistles to which the apostle, Paul never makes the slightest allusion. I refer to the passage, Eph. iv. 8. In spite of the reclamation of most modern interpreters, it appears to me that we cannot, with any regard to the natural meaning of the words, refer this passage to anything but the descent into hell. Harless urges that this would be the only passage where the descent into hell would appear as a characteristic of Christ's appearance, which it certainly is not. But to this I can allow no weight, nor do the other reasons to which Harless appeals in support of his rendering appear to me to be more forcible. It is said that the antithesis of earth and heaven is alone suited to the context; but this is simply to take for granted that the two clauses of ver. 8 are to be referred to the same subjects, those, namely, whom Christ had won for himself upon the earth. It may be very true that in the psalm from which the words in verse 8 are taken, there is no trace of any reference to death or to a descent into hell; but Harless asserts further, "only then could we prove that the Apostle found such a reference in the psalm, if he quoted the passage in a connexion in which the death or the descent of Christ was directly before him, but that here the very contrary is the case; and what connexion can be shown between the gifts of grace which Christ gives to his own people, and his death or his *descensus ad inferos*? If the Apostle seeks to demonstrate that the procedure of God triumphant who brings his captives with him without waiting till

<sup>1</sup> Adv. Hæer. i. 4. 1, *συμπλέχθαι τῷ πάθει, καὶ μόνην ἀπολειφθεῖσαν ἕξω παρὰ μέρος τοῦ πάθους ἵποπεσεῖν, πολυμερούς καὶ πολυποίκιλον ἵπάρχοντος.*



they render themselves to him, is also the procedure of the Son, who also places his people in the Church on earth in the place he fixes for them, what need is there here for any reference to the death or the descent of Christ?" With all this I disagree, just because the reasoning assumes that the passage can be understood in no other sense but one exclusive of the descent into hell. But what is more natural than to take *αἰχμαλωτεύειν αἰχμαλωσίαν* of those captives whom Christ, when he descended into Hades, brought up with him as his own captives, *i.e.* as those whom he had set free? And this was the original and common view of the purpose of the descent. It is very true that the preceding verse 7 prepares us for only the second clause of verse 8, but what hinders us from assuming that it was just the passage he was quoting from the Old Testament, which led the writer to the further thought expressed in the first clause, namely, the idea of the descent into hell, and that then he worked out this idea in verses 9, 10, and came back in verse 11 to the connexion of verse 7? And as for the question what the gifts of grace which Christ gives his people have to do with the descent into hell, the answer is not far to seek. It is given us in this very passage in the words *πληρώση τὰ πάντα*, and that so clearly as to exclude all doubt on the subject. It might be possible to take the *κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς* as simply a circumlocution for *γῆ*, if that phrase stood alone, but it is altogether impossible in a passage arranged as this one is, where the writer speaks of an *ἀναβαίνειν* and a *καταβαίνειν*, and where the one is called *ἀναβαίνειν ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν οὐρανῶν*, that is, an ascending to the highest height, as far as it is possible to ascend: it is impossible to take the *καταβαίνειν εἰς τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς*, which forms the antithesis to *ἀναβαίνειν ὑπεράνω πάντων τῶν οὐρανῶν*, in any more limited sense than that which the nearest and most natural meaning of the words demands. By doing so we should take from the principal clause, *ἵνα πληρώση τὰ πάντα* (all things without exception, as the article indicates) its unrestricted meaning. What the author here seeks to express, is the activity of Christ which extends equally far upwards and down-

wards, which descends from the highest height to the lowest depth, and ascends again from the latter to the former, which embraces and replenishes the whole universe, so far as it is inhabited by intelligent beings, with its gracious and redeeming influence. It is the idea of the *pleroma* belonging to Christ in the highest sense, which is here dealt with on the side of its scope and extension. If Christ is the *pleroma* absolutely, then the activity, which according to this conception he exerts, cannot come short of comprehending everything in the widest possible circle, and of binding the highest and the lowest together.

If this be the sense of our passage, then not only does it contain the idea of Christ's descent into hell,—it exhibits to us very distinctly the genesis of that idea. Christ as the *πλήρωμα* is also the *τὰ πάντα πλήρωσας*, and if he be the *τὰ πάντα πληρώσας*, thus he must also be the *εἰς τὰ κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς καταβάς*. Now even if it were not possible to trace the idea of the descent of Christ into hell so distinctly as we do as one of the Gnostic doctrines, yet the Gnostic origin of this passage could not be doubtful, when we considered the inward connexion of these ideas, and the relation which, as we showed, exists between the Christology of these Epistles and the Christology of the Gnostics. Some Gnostic systems, notably the Valentinian, make the redeeming spirit return and close its earthly work before the catastrophe of death, and of course such a scheme as this can scarcely have contemplated a further action to deal with the under-world. But this was not universally the Gnostic conception; we know about Marcion at least, that in his system, Christ went down into the under-world after his death.<sup>1</sup> And it is not probable

<sup>1</sup> "Super blasphemiam," says Irenaeus, i. 27. 3, "quae est in Deum, adjecit et hoc (Marcion), Cain et eos, qui similes sunt ei, et Sodomitae, et Aegyptios et similes eis et omnes omnino gentes, quae in omni permixtione malignitatis ambulaverunt, salvatas esse a Domino, cum descendisset ad inferos et accurrissent et in suum assumpsisse regnum: Abel autem et Enoch et Noe et reliquos justos—non participasse salutem—non accurrerunt Jesu neque crediderunt annuntiationi ejus, et propterea remansisse animas eorum apud inferos. Cf. Epiph. Haer. xlii. 4: Χριστὸν (λέγει Μαρκίων) ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀοράτου καὶ ἀκατονομάστου πατρὸς καταβεβηκέναι ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ ἐπὶ ἐλέγχῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ

that Marcion, a man who borrowed so much from old Gnostic systems, and whose only peculiarity almost was to give a dualistic turn to what he borrowed, was the first to set this view in circulation. It fits so naturally into the whole Gnostic set of ideas, that we may well believe it to have existed before him. The greater the height was from which the Christ of the Gnostics came when descending from the all-encircling pleroma, the greater the number of heavens through which he had passed, the more natural was it to think of his descending also as far as it was possible to descend, not only down into the world, but even down into the underworld. And again, a thorough working out of the hostile relation in which Christ and the demiurge were conceived to stand to each other would itself suggest that Christ should visit the place where those souls lay whom the demiurge had caught and bound, and who had no hope of freedom in any other way.<sup>1</sup>

Besides all this, how many references do we find in these Epistles to Gnostic ideas and expressions! How often do they speak of a *μυστήριον*, a *σοφία*, a *γνώσις*, etc.—cf. Eph. i. 8, 17; iii. 3, 9, 19; iv. 13; vi. 19; Col. i. 6, 9, 26; ii. 2; iii. 10, 16. With what peculiar meaning and emphasis is the word *αἰών* used, as for example Eph. iii. 21. The *αἰῶνες* might seem here to be nothing more than the *γενεαὶ* (as in Col. i. 26, *αἰῶνες* and *γενεαὶ* are coupled together), but the aeons and the *γενεαὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τῶν αἰώνων*, in the same sense in which God himself, as the extratemporal unity of time, individualizes himself in the aeons, as the several stages of time, while unfolding itself. In the *πρόθεσις τῶν αἰώνων* also,

*τῶν Ἰουδαίων καὶ νόμον καὶ προφητῶν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ἄχρι ἄβδου καταβεβηκέναι τὸν κύριον, ἵνα σφύση τοὺς περὶ Καὶν, etc.*

<sup>1</sup> Thus what Irenaeus says, v. 31. 2, about the Gnostic denial of the idea of the descent into hell, refers only to those Gnostics for whom the whole history of Christ seems to have had a merely symbolical meaning, *si Dominus legem mortuorum servavit—commoratus usque in tertiam diem in inferioribus terrae, post deinde surgens in carne—ascendit ad patrem, quomodo non confundantur, qui dicunt inferos quidem esse hunc mundum, qui sit secundum nos, inferiorem autem hominem ipsorum, derelinquentem hoc corpus, in supercoelestem ascendere locum?* Thus there were those who understood the *ascendere ad patrem* even with reference to Christ, only of the Spirit of man. This was, however, by no means the general view.

Eph. iii. 11, the conception of the aeons in their relation to time, corresponds with the Gnostic conception of them as spiritual beings who are the bearers of the thoughts of God. Still more striking is this in the expression *αἰὼν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, Eph. ii. 2. The interpreters think that the passage is sufficiently explained by giving the word the meaning "earthly life," "course of the world," "era of the world," and declare it to be quite a mistake to render *αἰὼν* in the Gnostic sense. Yet it can scarcely be denied that the expression is at least not very unlike the Gnostic conception, and why should not the subject *αἰὼν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* be parallel to the other subjects, namely, the *ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος* and the *πνεῦμα ἐνεργούν*? The only Pauline expression with which this one can be compared is *Θεός τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου*, 2 Cor. iv. 4, and that instead of *Θεός* we have here *αἰὼν*, and that the *αἰὼν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* is mentioned by the side of an *αἰὼν τῶν αἰώνων*, can only be explained by the influence of Gnostic ideas. In the same passage, on inspecting it more closely, and comparing it with the kindred passage vi. 12, we detect still more Gnostic representations and expressions in which the eye of the author expatiates in the supernatural world of darkness, as at other times it does in the brighter regions of the spirit-realm. The *κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ σκότους*, Eph. vi. 12, cannot disown their Gnostic origin. The Valentinians gave the name of Kosmocrotor to the devil. To the same origin with Kosmocrotor are the *δαιμόνια* and *ἄγγελοι* to be referred. What he is in unity, these are in plurality.<sup>1</sup> Marcion gave the name of Kosmocrotor to the demiurge, who is in his system the representative of the evil principle.<sup>2</sup> Now if the *κοσμοκράτορες* cannot be subordinated to any principle but the *αἰὼν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, then the *αἰὼν* is the *κοσμοκράτωρ*. As *κοσμοκράτωρ*, he is, according to Eph. ii. 2, the *ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος* and the *πνεῦμα τὸ ἐνεργούν*, etc., that is, the devil described in Gnostic phrases. For the peculiar expression, *τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας*, Eph. vi. 12, there is no parallel to be found but in the language of the Gnostics.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. i. 5. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Irenaeus, i. 27. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Irenaeus says of the Valentinians (i. 5. 4): Ἐκ τῆς λύπης (of the Sophia) τὰ

That in connexion with such representations the contrast of light and darkness should be peculiarly dwelt upon (Eph. ii. 2, iv. 18, v. 8; Col. i. 18), may not be a very important circumstance; yet the universal proposition, Eph. v. 13, *πάν τὸ φανερούμενον φῶς ἐστὶ*, is worthy of remark. This sentence affirms, according to the Gnostic theory of light, that light is the principle through which everything that is and has existence for consciousness, is mediated. All becoming takes place just by that which existed already in its essence becoming manifest to consciousness. The Valentiniens used this proposition in this way in their explanation of the prologue to John's Gospel, when they said, When John called *ζωή* the *φῶς ἀνθρώπων*, he meant to include in the word *ἀνθρώπων* the *ἄνθρωπος* and the *ἐκκλησία*, *ὅπως διὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀνόματος δηλώσῃ τὴν τῆς συζυγίας κοινωνίαν, ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἐκκλησία· φῶς δὲ εἶπε τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὴν ζωὴν, διὰ τὸ πεφωτισθαι αὐτοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῆς, ὃ δὴ ἐστὶ μεμορφῶσθαι καὶ πεφανερῶσθαι. Τοῦτο δὲ ὁ Παῦλος λέγει πάν γὰρ τὸ φανερούμενον φῶς ἐστὶ*<sup>1</sup> *ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ἐφάνερωσε καὶ ἐγέννησε τὸν τε ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἢ ζωὴν, φῶς εἰρήσθαι αὐτῶν.* Life is called the light of man and the church, because the origin of the syzygy of the man and the Church is nothing but its becoming visible. Everything that arises simply emerges to the light out of

*πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας διδάσκουσι γεγονέαι, ὅθεν καὶ διάβολον τὴν γένεσιν ἐσχηκέναι, ὃν καὶ κοσμοκράτορα καλοῦσι, καὶ τὰ δαιμόνια καὶ τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν πνευματικὴν τῆς πονηρίας ὑπόστασιν.* The different states of mind are here described, into which Sophia or Achamoth fell outside of the Pleroma. Each of these states of mind is, through the subjective becoming objective, the principle of a definite sphere of the material and spiritual world. Sorrow objectivated itself to the substance of the air (*ἀέρα γεγονέαι κατὰ τῆς λύπης πῆξιν*), but from the same *λύπη* arose also the *πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας*, and especially the *διάβολος* or *κοσμοκράτωρ*, who has his seat *ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς κόσμῳ*. So in our Epistle the *αἰὼν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, who presides over the *κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ σκότους*, is the *ἄρχων τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος*. The spiritually evil beings are the inhabitants of the atmosphere which envelopes the earth, and as such, the *κοσμοκράτορες τοῦ σκότους*. The conceptions air and darkness are the physical substratum of the spiritually evil.

<sup>1</sup> This is, moreover, one of the oldest pieces of evidence for the supposed Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Ephesians, and should not be omitted from the catalogue.

what it was essentially before. There is, therefore, and this expresses accurately the Gnostic view of the universe, no becoming or originating, but everything that becomes and originates simply begins to exist for consciousness, for everything that is, is absolutely. Nothing therefore acquires essential existence; all becoming and originating is true only for the sphere of consciousness. The whole process of the world's becoming is just the process of the development of consciousness. If then such be the true sense of the supposed Pauline proposition, who does not perceive that it has come into this connexion out of a totally different set of ideas, and that the moral purport here given to it can only be properly understood if it be explained by the metaphysical meaning which underlies it?

The striking affinity of these two letters with Gnostic ideas and expressions has been for the most part disregarded by interpreters, but where this has not been the case, only two explanations seem to have been considered possible: (1.) That the Gnostics derived those views from the Pauline Epistles, or, (2.) That ideas like those of the Gnostics were already in circulation at the apostle's time, and that he set himself to combat and correct them. The latter alternative is thoroughly improbable; on the one hand there is no proof of the existence of Gnostic ideas at so early a period, and on the other, the Epistle to the Ephesians exhibits no trace of even an indirect polemic against the Gnostic doctrines. On the contrary, the apostle would have been playing into the hands of the Gnostics both in this and to some extent also in the Colossian Epistle. And the former alternative is just as unlikely or even more so. Tertullian has been appealed to in support of it.<sup>1</sup> But what can Tertullian prove for an opinion that has against it the whole constitution of the Gnostic systems, especially of the Valentinian system, the structure of which is far too original to be explained by what Tertullian says of it, that Valentine *materiam ad scripturas excogitavit*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Compare Harless on Eph. i. 23, where he cites Tert. de præscr. Haer. c. 38.

<sup>2</sup> Non ad materiam scripturas (as Marcion), et tamen plus abstulit et plus adjecit, auferens proprietates singulorum quoque verborum et adjiciens dispositiones non comparantium rerum.

If, then, both alternatives are equally inadmissible, both those sides combine to make us think that the Epistle to the Ephesians especially is of post-apostolic origin, and dates from a time when the Gnostic ideas were just coming into circulation, and still wore the garb of innocent Christian speculations.

We are the more led to think of this period, that the same Epistle to which these remarks chiefly apply, namely that to the Ephesians, indicates an acquaintance with another phenomenon of the age of Gnosticism, viz., Montanism. We may remark here that the elements out of which Montanism arose were in existence long before the reputed founder of that sect, and were as far as may be from being heretical. And thus, though we should find in our Epistle the echoes of Montanism, we should not be compelled to place it at too late a date. The emphatic designation of the *πνεῦμα* as the distinctive principle of Christian consciousness and life might of itself appear to point out such a relation. Compare Eph. i. 3, 13, 17; ii. 18; iii. 5, 16; iv. 3, 30, 23; v. 18; vi. 17; and Col. i. 8, 9; iii. 16. With the Montanists, the conception of the *πνεῦμα* was identical with that of *σοφία*;<sup>1</sup> it was to them the principle of Christian wisdom, of knowledge and insight, which constituted the peculiar distinction of the Christian, if at least he understood his position in the world. In this sense Tertullian speaks of the *administratio paracleti quod intellectus reformatur quod ad meliora proficitur*.<sup>2</sup> Through the *agnitio paracleti* which distinguishes them from psychical men, the Montanists are also *instructiores per paracletum*.<sup>3</sup>

Shall we seek here for an explanation of the fact that in both our Epistles, that to the Colossians also, the essence of Christian perfection is so often made to consist in *σύνεσις*, in *σοφία*, *γνώσις*, etc.? (Compare in addition to the passages last cited, Eph. v. 15; Col. ii. 23; iii. 16; iv. 5; i. 9.) The Montanists held the view

<sup>1</sup> In Epiphanius, Haer. xlix. 1, the Montanist prophetess Priscilla, or Quintilla, says that Christ had appeared to her in female form, *καὶ ἐπέβαλεν ἐν ἔμοι τῆν σοφίαν καὶ ἀπεκάλυψε μοι*, etc. Cf. Eph. i. 17, *πνεῦμα σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως*.

<sup>2</sup> De vel. Virg. c. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Tert. ad. Prax. c. 1.

of a divine Revelation which unfolds itself in definite successive stages, and is completed in the period of the Spirit, and in these stages the Christian perfection, which approves itself through the *σοφία*, etc., was reckoned analogous to the ripeness of manhood. So far, they held, had the Church advanced through the manifestations and communications of the Paraclete within her.<sup>1</sup>

The Epistle to the Ephesians takes up the same idea for the principle of the development of the Christian Church, which, as the body of Christ, has still to grow up to maturity, iv. 11 sq. "He has given some as apostles, others as prophets, others as evangelists; others as pastors and teachers, that the saints might be prepared for the work of ministration, for the building up of the body of Christ, till we all come to the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to the perfect man, to the measure of the age of the Church at which Christ is filled with her,<sup>2</sup>—that we should be no more children." Here also the end of the corporate life of the Christian Church is held to be reached by a progress stage by stage, from the state of infancy to that of manly maturity. But while Montanism held that end to be already attained in the presence of the Paraclete, the author of our Epistle, seeking to think the thoughts of the apostle, represented it as yet to be attained through the harmonious co-operation of all the Church's members.

That the age to which our Epistles belong was one in which there was a practical interest to take this idea as the principle of the development of the Church, is rendered still more likely by the fact that the Epistle to the Colossians also contains it, i. 28 ;

<sup>1</sup> Compare the fine passage Tert. de Vel. Virg. c. i. *Justitia primo fuit in rudimentis, dehinc per legem et prophetas promovit in infantiam, dehinc per evangelium efferbuit in juventutem, nunc per Paracletum componitur in maturitatem.*

<sup>2</sup> It is incorrect to take τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ in the sense of being filled with Christ; it is the fulness of Christ, or the contents with which Christ fills himself, that is, the church. The πλήρωμα Χρ. is thus equivalent to the σῶμα τοῦ Χρ. in the preceding verse, and it cannot be said that the Montanist phrase would be πλήρωμα τοῦ παρακλήτου.



καταγγέλλομεν (Χριστόν) διδάσκοντες πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐν πάσῃ σοφίᾳ, ἵνα παραστήσωμεν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ἐν Χριστῷ.<sup>1</sup>

But the most striking references to the ideas and institutions of the Montanists are contained in the passages, Eph. ii. 20; iii. 5; iv. 11; where the apostles and prophets are named together, and in each case the prophets after the apostles. Only a superficial method of interpretation, a thing, however, which is not absolutely unknown in the later commentaries, could hold this placing of the prophets after the apostles to be merely accidental, and so understand the prophets here spoken of to be the prophets of the Old Testament. Harless has with perfect justice repudiated this interpretation; but he goes on to say that the want of the article before *προφητῶν* shows the apostle to have united the two substantives at ii. 20, and iii. 5, as forming together one conception, that is, that he gives the apostles the additional designation of prophets; and that this is done in reference to the description of the state of the heathen Christians, ii. 12, who were there said to be without promise and without hope, but who now possess the promise which the apostles, as the bearers of the promise of the new covenant, have brought them. We cannot follow him in this; the interpretation is far too artificial to be a real solution of the difficulty. The text iv. 11 shows distinctly that the apostles are distinguished from the prophets. Harless remarks indeed that the *ἀποστολή* involves the *προφητεία*, while the *προφητεία* does not involve the *ἀποστολή*; and this is true; yet it is clear from iv. 11 that there were prophets who were distinct from the apostles, and the question must still be asked, Who are these prophets, and how came the author of our Epistle to couple them

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the Kritischen Miscellen. zum Epheserbriefe; Theol. Jahrb. 1844, p. 381 (now in Schwegler's Nachap. Zeitalter, ii. 371.—*Editor*), where it is justly remarked that Paul cannot have had these ideas. He regarded the end of all time and the second coming of Christ as imminent, and could not contrast his own time as the period of *νηπιότης* to the age of manly maturity, as an age still distant, the goal of Christian history to be attained historically through an immanent process of development. This is a later standpoint which, reflecting on the past, conceived the idea of such a division of epochs.

with the apostles? That it came about from a consideration of the contrast between the present and the former state of the Gentile Christians might possibly account for the passage ii. 20; but that the same expression should be found in two other passages and in wholly different connexions, evidently points to something peculiar in the circumstances of the age, or of the Church to which the Epistle is addressed.

The apostolic letters show no trace of an order of prophets who stand on the same level with the apostles. The passage which falls to be considered on the subject, 1 Cor. xii. 28, shows that Paul regarded prophecy as a *χάρισμα* among other *χαρίσματα*, and by no means as containing in itself all the gifts of grace, or the special criterion of the true Church. And this is the position of the author of our Epistle; with him the apostles and the new prophets, the latter manifestly as successors and representatives of the apostles in the post-apostolic Church, are the depositaries of divine revelations, the *θεμέλιον*, the foundation of the Church.<sup>1</sup>

Not Paul, but Montanism, attributed to the prophets such a position and such importance. The Montanist Tertullian coordinates apostles and prophets in the same way, as equally organs of the Spirit; what the apostles were formerly, the prophets are now.<sup>2</sup> And the author of our Epistle, identifying himself with Paul, and speaking of the whole time from the apostles to the date at which he was writing, says, iii. 5: *νῦν ἀπεκαλύφθη (τὸ μυστήριον) τοῖς ἀγίοις ἀποστόλοις αὐτοῦ καὶ*

<sup>1</sup> Krit. Misc. 1844, p. 380.

<sup>2</sup> De Pudic. c. 21, where Tertullian is speaking of the power to forgive sins, which, he says, belongs only to God and to those to whom it is committed by God, viz., the apostles, as it had been to the prophets of the Old Testament: *Exhibe igitur et nunc mihi, apostolice, so he addresses the Roman bishop, prophetica exempla, et agnoscam divinitatem, et vindica tibi delictorum ejusmodi remittendorum potestatem.—Sed habet, inquis, potestatem ecclesia delicta donandi. Hoc ego magis et agnosco et dispono, qui ipsum Paracletum in prophetis novis habeo dicentem: potest ecclesia donare delictum. If the Roman bishop appeal to Peter, Matth. xvi. 16, what right has he to apply to himself what is there said to Peter? Quid nunc et ad ecclesiam et quidem tuam, psychice? Secundum enim Petri personam spiritualibus potestas illa conveniet, aut apostolo aut prophetae. Nam et ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est spiritus.*

*προφήταις ἐν πνεύματι.* The addition *ἐν πνεύματι* is certainly significant. Several interpreters wish to refer *ἐν πνεύματι* to *προφήταις* exclusively, but this is justly condemned by Harless and others. If it be asked what reason can be alleged that this predicate, which the context shows to be a pregnant one, should be applied only to the prophets, and not to the apostles also, we must go a step further and ask, Why is it given to both? It was for the sake of the prophets that it was inserted and applied to the apostles also. The author lived at a time when the prophets were recognised as new organs of the communication of the Spirit; only this can account for his expressly calling the apostles and prophets *spiritales*, as Tertullian calls them in the same sense.<sup>1</sup> And if in the third passage, iv. 11, the *ποιμένες* refer to the same ecclesiastical personages as are commonly termed *ἐπίσκοποι*, then we see here just that depreciation of the bishops for which the Montanists are censured by Hieronymus.<sup>2</sup>

It arose from the nature of the case that the materials for these critical investigations were drawn chiefly from the Epistle to the Ephesians. The Epistle to the Colossians, however, has not been by any means lost sight of, and there is a further special task which it presents to criticism. It is well known how many theories have already been advanced about the so-called false teachers of this Epistle, without, however, finding for them any definite place in history, and least of all at the time of the apostle himself. It is even doubtful whether they were Jews or Christians; and this is certainly striking. If they were so considerable a power that the apostle thought it necessary to write an Epistle specially against them, we should expect that they had left some clearer traces of their historical existence. And certainly we should expect to find in the Epistle itself a more distinct indication of what they were. Yet how hard is it to construct the peculiar character of the sectaries in question from the various single traits, mostly the merest hints, which are given us of them; and

<sup>1</sup> Loc. cit.

<sup>2</sup> Epist. 27: ita in tertium, i.e. paene ultimum locum episcopi devolvuntur.

how little does the polemic of the author, indirect as it is, rather than direct, show these heretics, supposed to have been so dangerous, to be the real subject-matter of the Epistle, and the central point from which the whole contents are to be explained. In seeking then to sift this matter to the bottom, it is not only permissible, but necessary, to drop the common hypothesis that these so-called false teachers were the historical occasion of our Epistle, and to set up the contrary view, that all that is said about them is said only by the way, to strengthen and enforce that which is in reality the principal theme.

And where is it more natural to find the chief theme of our Epistle than in that which is said about the higher dignity of Christ as the central point, not only of the Christian Church, but of the universe in general, and about the great mystery that has been made manifest in him? The author comes to this as soon as he has despatched the necessary introduction, and added to it, in the ordinary way, his expression of sympathy with the Christians to whom he is writing; he at once enforces this as the chief point to which the whole contents of his Epistle are to be referred. Now if Christ has this high and absolute importance, if he be considered in his divine supra-mundane nature, the substantial centre both of all spiritual and natural existence generally, and specially of the corporate life that is developed in the Christian Church, then it is of the first importance to hold steadfastly to this one foundation, and to suffer nothing to be brought by any one into competition with that communication of religious weal which is only possible through him, as if anything else could be the channel of such virtue. In this argument the author does certainly encounter some conflicting views which serve him for the further development of his main thesis; but these have not the special historical reference which is commonly attributed to them. They belong merely to certain phenomena here and there, which are a part of the general character of the time. We might think of gnosis in this connexion; we find it elsewhere, even as early as the Pastoral Epistles, a chief mark of Christian polemics. But

gnosis was, in the stage it had then reached, too nearly akin with the tendency of our Epistles to be spoken of in such a spirit; besides that gnosis also sought to place Christ as high as possible, and to adequately express his absolute dignity. Ebionitism, on the contrary, especially in the form in which it was most closely connected with Judaism, and in which it afterwards became a heresy, contained elements with which the higher conception of the person of Christ could not fail to come in conflict, as it became more and more intent upon excluding everything that might be put on the same level with Christ as a channel of grace. The polemical references of the Epistle to the Colossians are best explained by referring them to Ebionitism, and if this be so, then the special local occasion which is said to have led the writer of this Epistle to his task disappears; for what is here condemned as opposed to the Christian consciousness belongs to the whole general character of Ebionitism, as it stood over against the freer form of Pauline Christianity, not only at Colosse, but all over Asia Minor. A polemical reference of this nature is manifestly present, in what is said, ii. 11 *sq.*, against circumcision. The maintenance of circumcision is characteristic of Ebionitism; we see this early in the case of the antagonists of the apostle in the Epistle to the Galatians, and it continues to be so with those Ebionites who were too stiff to surrender their Judaism. Epiphanius expressly remarks this of his Ebionites, as well as of Cerinthus and his followers.<sup>1</sup>

Then, as for the principles about eating and drinking, and the observing of certain days and seasons, which gave occasion for the warning, ver. 16, we know further from Epiphanius that the Ebionites rejected altogether the use of animal food, considering that it defiled the eater, a view which is clearly to be recognised in those words of emphatic prohibition, *μη ἀψη, μηδὲ γέουση, μηδὲ θύγης*, ver. 21. They must also have held it unlawful to drink wine, for they celebrated their mysteries, namely, the Eucharist, with unleavened bread and unmixed water.<sup>2</sup> They were also

<sup>1</sup> Haer. xxx. 2, 16, 28; cf. xxviii. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Haer. xxx. 15, 16; cf. Clement. Hom. xiv. 1.

distinguished by their strict religious observance of certain days and seasons. Epiphanius mentions repeatedly the rite of circumcision and the celebration of the Sabbath as the ordinances of the Jewish religion which the Ebionites held most sacred.<sup>1</sup> The *νομηνίαι* are to be understood not only of the new moons, but generally of the festivals, the date of which was determined by the moon, and the phrase may bear special reference to the Jewish or Ebionite celebration of the Passover, which was customary in Asia Minor. But most of all do the worshipping of angels and the transcendental speculations about the spirit-world that were bound up with that worship, as it is described, ii. 18, appear to be a characteristic trait of Ebionitism. Not only did the Ebionites attach great importance to the doctrine of angels and the religious worship of them, they closely connected Christ himself with the angels, and even considered him to be one of them.<sup>2</sup>

And it is just here that we see what was the point of the polemics of the Epistle to the Colossians. The Ebionites agreed in saying of Christ that he was created before all, exalted above the angels, the ruler of all created things. But then again they placed the angels in a co-ordinate relation to Christ, ascribed to them also a redeeming and mediating function, even invoked them directly in this capacity, and regarded Christ as only *ἓνα τῶν ἀρχαγγέλων*. The Epistle to the Colossians, on the contrary, insists strongly on the point that the dignity of Christ is not a question of degree, but consists in an absolute superiority over

<sup>1</sup> Haer. xxx. 2, 16, 17.

<sup>2</sup> According to Epiph. Haer. xxx. 2, the Ebionite doctrine about Christ (though, as Epiphanius remarks, they were not all together at one on the subject, or perhaps he was unable to harmonize the statements which he had before him) was in the main this: λέγουσιν ἄνωθεν μὲν ὄντα πρὸ πάντων δὲ κτισθέντα, πνεῦμα ὄντα καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγγέλων ὄντα πάντων δὲ κυριεύοντα, καὶ Χριστὸν λέγεσθαι. Cf. c. 16: οὐ φάσκουσι δὲ ἐκ Θεοῦ Πατρὸς αὐτὸν γεγενῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἐκτίσθαι ὡς ἓνα τῶν ἀρχαγγέλων, μείζονα δὲ αὐτῶν ὄντα αὐτὸν δὲ κυριεύειν τῶν ἀγγέλων καὶ πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ παντοκράτορος πεποιημένων. Tertullian also says (De carne Christi, c. 14), "*Ebionem costituisse Jesum plane prophetis gloriosiore[m] ut ita in illo angelus fuisse dicatur.*"

everything created. Christ is accordingly not merely *πρὸ πάντων κτισθεὶς*, but the *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*; so far from being himself created, that on the contrary all things are created in him. Hence it is strongly asserted that Christ is the *κεφαλὴ* both *τοῦ σώματος*, *τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, and *πάσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας*; and the chief proposition of the whole contention is, in contrast to that Ebionite *οὐ κρατεῖν τὴν κεφαλὴν*, that in so pre-eminent a sense is Christ to be held as head, that whatever is not itself the head cannot be thought to stand to him in any relation but that of absolute dependence. What is said both against circumcision and against the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*, is to be regarded from the same point of view, namely, as opposition to everything that might detract from the absolute dignity of Christ. Now a doctrine which made man dependent in religion on his natural, physical being or material nature, which made religious welfare obtainable through the purifying and sanctifying power that was ascribed to the elements and substances of the world,<sup>1</sup> through the influence which the heavenly bodies were said to exercise on the sublunary world, through what was naturally clean as distinguished from what was held for unclean,—this doctrine placed the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* in the position which only Christ, as the Redeemer, ought to occupy. Just in this way do we find, ver. 8, that the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* and Christ are placed over against each other. This then is what our writer calls philosophy in the same sense in which the essence of philosophy is called worldly wisdom. It is the science which deals with the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*; it is only a *κοσμικὴ παιδεία*, as philosophy is termed in the Clementine Homilies (Hom. i. 10), in contrast with the doctrine of the true Prophet. It thus contains nothing to raise man above the world to God. It is a mere cosmology, not a theology, a distinction which seems to be before the writer's mind when he proceeds, after

<sup>1</sup> As was the case with the Ebionites, cf. Epiph. in loc. cit. They ascribed such virtue especially to water. According to the Clementine Homilies in the *Contestatio pro eis, qui librum accipiunt*, one is to invoke as *μάρτυρας* . . . *οὐρανὸν, γῆν ὕδωρ, ἐν οἷς τὰ πάντα περιέχεται, πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἅπασιν καὶ τὸν διὰ πάντων δῆλοντα ἀέρα οὐδ' ἀνευ οὐκ ἀναπνέω.*

the words, *κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ οὐ κατὰ Χριστὸν*, and adds that it is in Christ that the *πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος* dwells. It is this divine element which distinguishes Christianity from a philosophy which deals with nothing more than the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*. Such a doctrine is nothing but a philosophy; it may be called a *κενὴ ἀπάτη*, a mere *παράδοσις τῶν ἀνθρώπων*.

If, as can scarcely be denied, the polemical references of the Epistle to the Colossians are rightly accounted for by what we have brought forward, it must be admitted that the position occupied by our writer in this controversy is a totally different one from that of the apostle Paul in the Epistle to the Galatians. He was dealing there with the naked opposition in which Christianity was coming to stand towards Judaism, and with the question whether, in addition to faith in Christ, Jewish circumcision could have a place as a necessary condition of salvation. But here the stress of the antithesis is no longer, as formerly, in the sphere of soteriology (which was of course the first and chief contents of the Christian consciousness), it has advanced to the sphere of Christology, and the important point is now to bring what was thought to be the soteriological contents of Christianity to its absolute expression in the clearer and more definite conception which was coming to be formed of the person of Christ. The process of the development of the Christian consciousness consisted just in this, that instead of the immediate consciousness of the blessings of Christianity, there came a stage where these blessings were taken for granted, and here only such a conception of the person of Christ was admissible as would represent him with full capacity to produce all those effects, inwardly intense, and outwardly extensive, in which the work of redemption was held to consist. In this sense the absolute conception of the person of Christ is the theme of both Epistles, and if we find them (a point to which we must recur afterwards) insisting upon a unity in which all differences are done away, then Christ himself must be taken as the central point of that unity. Thus the dispute with Ebionitism was of importance only as the views of that body



came into collision with the conception of the person of Christ which was thus being developed.

Thus the more special subjects which seemed to give this Epistle an advantage over that to the Ephesians, fail to dispel the suspicion of its post-apostolic origin. But apart from the historical phenomena by which both epistles are to be explained, there are numbers of smaller points about them which would lead us to conclude that the author stood at some distance from the apostolic age. If Paul were the author of these Epistles, how could he himself have given to the *ἀπόστολοι* the predicate *ἅγιοι*? iii. 5. De Wette at once remarked this, and justly considered it as weighing against the apostolic origin of the Ephesian letter. To this Harless answered "that the predicate *ἅγιοι* was positively required by the context. Why, he said, should the apostle, who calls all Christians *ἅγιοι*, carry his modesty so far as to scruple to call the apostles the same, even though he himself was one of them? <sup>1</sup> Does he call himself so *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, or was it such a virtue in the apostles to be *ἅγιοι*, that they should not have ventured to mention it, however unobtrusively? Those whom he calls *ἅγιοι* are the apostles called by God, and so distinguished from other men." But the chief point is that this designation is not found in any other passage of an apostolical letter, but becomes a standing predicate of the apostles in a later age, which the greater the distance from them, looked up to them with the humbler reverence. The author of the Epistle, then, seems here to have made a slip, and to have betrayed himself involuntarily as a different man from the apostle, and as living in a later age. But on the other hand, we cannot fail to see how earnestly he tries to convince us of his identity with him. Thus he makes the apostle assure us again and again that he is Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles, the prisoner for the sake of the gospel. In Eph. iii. 1 the apostle says of him-

<sup>1</sup> As remarked in the Krit. Misc., p. 282, there is something remarkable in the frequent use of the predicate *ἅγιοι* as a convertible phrase with "believers" or "church." Compare with this the emphasis with which the Epistle to the Ephesians dwells on the sanctity of the Church, e.g. v. 27.

self: ἐγὼ Παῦλος, ὁ δέσμιος τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν τῶν ἔθνῶν... τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, οὗ ἐγενόμην διάκονος κατὰ τὴν δωρεὰν τῆς χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ... ἐμοὶ τῷ ἐλαχιστοτέρῳ πάντων τῶν ἁγίων ἐδόθη ἡ χάρις αὕτη, ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν εὐαγγελίσασθαι τὸν... πλοῦτον τοῦ Χριστοῦ· iv. 1, παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ ὁ δέσμιος ἐν Κυρίῳ· vi. 20, πρεσβεύω ἐν ἀλύσει. Col. i. 23, τοῦ εὐαγγελίου... οὗ ἐγενόμην ἐγὼ Παῦλος διάκονος· ver. 24, ἡ ἐκκλησία ἧς ἐγενόμην ἐγὼ διάκονος, κατὰ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι εἰς ὑμᾶς... ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. Is it the apostle's custom to speak thus of himself and his apostolate? How different are those passages which we naturally compare with the above, 1 Cor. xv. 9, 2 Cor. x. 1, Gal. v. 2. Is it not remarkable that the same thing should be insisted on again and again? How many words are used, how the expressions rise higher and higher! A notable instance of this exaggeration of expression is the peculiar form ἐλαχιστότερος, where the writer evidently had 1 Cor. xv. 9 (ἐγὼ ὁ ἐλάχιστος) before his mind. This simple and natural form, however, did not content him, nor did the phrase ἐλάχιστος τῶν ἀποστόλων, for which, with the same love of extremes, he substitutes ἐλαχιστότερος πάντων ἁγίων. And what a contrast to this ἐλαχιστότερος πάντων ἁγίων does it present, when the apostle not only reckons himself among the ἄγιοι, but even writes to the Church at Ephesus that they will be able to see from his Epistle how great insight he possesses into the mystery of Christ (iii. 4, 5).

Such digressions into personal matters, such exaggerations of the materials which are used,<sup>1</sup> such contradictions, in which the personation that is going on is clearly betrayed,—these are among the characteristic features of our two Epistles, as they are of the Pastorals. Here we have also to mention what De Wette justly remarks on the passage, Eph. ii. 20, that the apostle, who was actively engaged up to the end of his life, and who was conscious that his position was no other than that of a labourer for the kingdom of God, could hardly have

<sup>1</sup> Col. iii. 11 is also such a passage; it is evidently formed after the passage Gal. iii. 28, and exaggerates the differences there spoken of.

regarded himself (as we find in the passage named) as the foundation already laid, and still less in conjunction with other apostles who laboured in a different spirit from his. Such a view would be appropriate, as De Wette remarks, only to a disciple of the apostle who saw before him the complete results of the apostolical labours, who was filled with reverence for them, at whose time, moreover, the gift of prophetic inspiration had ceased to be generally diffused throughout the Church, so that the prophets of his age appeared to him in a higher light than that in which the apostle Paul regarded them.

The same late date of composition is betrayed in the passage, Eph. iv. 14, *ἵνα μηκέτι ὤμεν . . . κλυδωνιζόμενοι καὶ περιφερόμενοι παντὶ ἀνέμῳ τῆς διδασκαλίας, ἐν τῇ κυβείᾳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, etc. This unstable swaying to and fro between different and constantly changing doctrines, which is mentioned here as a state of things of which there had already been experience, is quite out of place as a picture of the apostolic age.

In conclusion, we may notice the salutations sent from Mark and Luke, Col. iv. 10, 14. Mark and Luke are mentioned at the close of the Second Epistle to Timothy, and as soon as doubt is thrown upon the genuineness of that Epistle, we are led to believe that there was some special reason for mentioning them. Their Gospels were at that time highly valued as a basis for that general unification of the Church which every one desired, and thus there was a motive to call attention on every occasion to the harmonious relation that existed between these two men, and between them and the apostles. Thus the mention of their names in the Epistle to the Colossians can scarcely be without some underlying motive. The mention of Mark is connected with a further difficulty. According to the Second Epistle to Timothy (iv. 12), which must have been the last of the apostle's letters, he was to be called to Rome at that date, while, according to the Epistle to the Colossians, with which that to Philemon agrees (ver. 24), he was with the apostle at Rome already. And this is the more remarkable, that the journey of Tychicus to Ephesus, mentioned at the

same time, 2 Tim. iv. 12, can scarcely be a different one from that spoken of, Eph. vi. 21 ; Col. iv. 7. We must therefore imagine the apostle's assistants to have taken journey after journey from the east to the west, and from west to east again, if these different dates are not to stand side by side in the most glaring contradiction.

It has long been acknowledged that in expression and style these Epistles have a character of their own, and are distinguished from the Epistles of Paul ; especially is this true of the Ephesian letter. In its heavy long-drawn periods, laden with far-fetched and magniloquent expressions, we miss both the lively dialectical process and the wealth of thought for which the apostle is distinguished. In the Colossian letter this is less strikingly the case, yet in many passages it also gives us the impression of a composition without life or spontaneity, moving forward in repetitions and tautologies, and sentences grouped together with a merely outside connexion.

What, then, we have still to ask, is the true object of these Epistles, if they be not by Paul, and can only be understood in the light of the features of that later age from which they sprang ? The central idea around which everything else revolves in them is to be found in their Christology ; but it is impossible to assume that the object for which they were written was the purely theoretical one of setting forth those higher views of the person of Christ. The occasion out of which they arose must have been some practical need in the circumstances of the time ; and even the idea of the person of Christ is at once brought into a certain definite point of view. Christ, it is manifest, is taken here as the centre of the unity of all opposites. These opposites embrace the entire universe ; heaven and earth, the visible and the invisible, and everything that exists has in Christ the basis of its existence ; in him, therefore, all oppositions and distinctions disappear ; even up to the highest spirit-world there is nothing that has not its highest and absolute principle in him. This metaphysical height is sought, however, only in order to descend from it to the immediate present

and its practical necessities ; for here also there are opposites of which only Christ can be the reconciling and atoning unity. Here, accordingly, we find the stand-point from which the object and the contents of the Epistles can be satisfactorily comprehended. It is obvious that they point to the distinction of Gentile and Jew Christians ; and thus they clearly belong to a time when these two parties were still, to some extent, opposed to each other, and when the removal of their mutual opposition was the only road to the unity of the Christian Church. How strongly the need of such unity, to be realized by the mutual approaches and the gradual fusion of the two still separated parties, was felt at the time when our Epistles were written, is clear on the face of them ; first, in the earnest exhortations to unity, as especially Eph. iv. 1 ; in the repeated commendations of love as the bond of peace, Eph. iv. 25, v. 2 ; Col. ii. 2 ; iii. 14 ; and further, in all those passages where the Church is described with such emphasis as an organism subsisting in the idea of its own unity and the inward connexion of all its members with each other. This unity of the Church as an organic whole is the object towards which those Epistles labour with all their powers ; they seek to make it clear that this oneness with the principle on which the Christian Church is based is necessarily contained in Christ as the head of the Church, and thus that the important point is to become fully alive to that which is already a fact, to recognise it practically, and carry it out. We find three momenta in which the conception of the person of Christ possesses itself its essential unity, and which supply the motives for this effort after unity which belongs to the idea of the Church. 1. The Epistle to the Colossians takes up the highest metaphysical stand-point : here Christ in his pre-mundane existence as the image of the invisible God, is the principle of creation itself ; if all things be created in him and through him, then all have in him their perfect unity and their highest teleological reference. As everything comes forth from him, so everything must return to him ; and there is no opposition, no distinction, which is not done away in him, the principle of all unity, from the

beginning and absolutely : τὰ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἔκτισται, Col. i. 16. 2. The second momentum is Christ as the κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, as the Lord raised through his resurrection and ascension, to be the head of the Church as his body. Here the view goes upwards from beneath, as in the first instance it went downwards from above, so that both are but the two sides which cannot be disjoined, of one and the same unity realizing itself through their difference. This second momentum is enforced with equal emphasis in both Epistles : Col. i. 18, *sq.*, and Eph. i. 20, *sq.* Here it is clearly set forth how in Christ, as the head of the Church, all oppositions and differences in the Church, and indeed in the world, must disappear, since he is pre-ordained, ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα in himself as κεφαλὴ; everything without distinction, both things in heaven and things on earth (this could not be the case were he not the absolute principle of all things existing, as he is described, Col. i. 15). The very obvious inference is drawn from this, how much it is the interest of the various parties in the Church to overlook all differences that keep them from each other, and in the consciousness of the unity of their common principle, to come together themselves to actual unity. 3. To these two momenta, standing as they do over against each other, comes the third in which they are mediated. This is found in the death of Christ. It is one of the peculiarities of those Epistles that they regard the death of Christ in the light of an arrangement made by God with the view of destroying the wall of partition between Gentiles and Jews, and of reconciling both at once to God through the peace that has thus been brought about. There is nothing that both Epistles together insist upon more than this general εἰρηνοποιεῖν, and ἀποκαταλάττειν, through Christ : Eph. ii. 14, *sq.* ; Col. i. 20, *sq.* All distinction between Jews and Gentiles is abolished; the absolute superiority which the Jew had over the Gentile is taken from him ; for through the death of Christ the Mosaic law, the handwriting that was against us of a law consisting in positive commandments and ordinances of direct authority, is now destroyed. Since, then, in Christianity all national differences and oppositions,

with everything else that divides men from each other in the various relations of life, are abolished through the death of Christ, there appears in it the new man who has now to lay off more and more in practical reality the old man that still cleaves to him, Col. iii. 9; Eph. ii. 10, 15; iv. 22. Connected with this, and starting from a metaphysical idea of the person of Christ, the Epistle to the Colossians represents the effects of his death in doing away with all distinctions and oppositions, as affecting even the invisible world. In that sphere, also, Christ has reconciled all things through the relation in which they stand to him, has made peace through the blood of his cross, and brought back all things, both in heaven and earth, to the unity that is in him. So essential a part is it therefore of the peculiar task of the Christian church to strive after unity, and to realize the idea which she sees presented to her in Christ, who is the highest and absolute principle of her existence, as he alone can be the goal of all her efforts.

All this carries us to that period when, not without the ferment and commotion of conflicting elements, the Christian church was coming to realize herself and to achieve her unity. With all the authors of the immediately post-apostolic age whose writings have come down to us, the prominent interest of the time appears to have been the unity of the Church, the necessity of which they recognised, and which they strove in various ways to usher in. We have thus before us a state of affairs which lies beyond the stand-point of the apostle Paul. His task was to lay the foundations of the Gentile Christian churches; but here we see the two parties fully formed, and confronting each other, and the great point is to bring them nearer to each other, and to bridge over the gulf which still divides them. Our Epistles find the point of meeting where these differences may be reconciled chiefly in the death of Christ. In the same way the author of the Johannine Gospel regards the unity which binds the different elements of the Church into one body as an effect which nothing but the death of Christ could have procured.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Abhandlg. über das joh. Ev.; Theol. Jahrb. 1844, p. 621 (Unters. über die Evang. 316).

To the apostle Paul himself this view is not familiar. It is true that the death of Christ is to him also the principle of a new creation, a new life, but with him this is only in essence, theoretically, generally, and in connexion with his doctrine of faith, inasmuch as to him who believes in Christ and his atoning death, old things are passed away, and all things are made new. But he never made a definite practical application of the death of Christ to the differences existing between the two parties out of whose union the Christian Church was to arise, such as is made here; still less did he ever ascribe to the death of Christ such an influence in the super-sensuous world as we find in our Epistles; that could be done only from the stand-point of their peculiar Christology.<sup>1</sup> Thus even here there is a very noticeable difference; on a closer view, however, we become aware that even the Pauline doctrines of justification by faith, and of the relation of Judaism and heathenism to each other and to Christianity, are modified in a way which can only be explained from the circumstances of the time in which these Epistles were produced, and the peaceful tendency which these circumstances impressed on them. The writer of the Epistle to the Ephesians cannot, as a true follower of Paul, degrade the Pauline doctrine of justification from the position which belongs to it; yet hardly has he mentioned faith, when he appears, although unconsciously, to be unable to refrain from going on to speak of works or love. This is most strikingly the case, ii. 8, where the sentence, *τῇ γὰρ χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν Θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἵνα μή τις καυχῆσθαι*, indorses the Pauline doctrine with laboured and abundant emphasis; but with how little inward sequence does the next sentence follow it, a sentence adopted from the doctrine of James: *αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἐσμεν ποίημα, κτισθέντες ἐν*

<sup>1</sup> Col. i. 20; Eph. iii. 9, *sq.* The Epistle to the Colossians represents the death of Christ as peculiarly a victory over the evil powers; Christ stripped them of their power, made a show of them openly, and triumphed over them, ii. 15. This is not found with the apostle in such immediate connexion with the death of Christ, but is a feature of later, particularly of Gnostic representations; Cf. *Gesch. der Lehre von der Versöhnung*, p. 27, *sq.*



Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς, οἷς προητοιμάσεν ὁ Θεός, ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς περιπατήσωμεν. Works are thus to go by the side of faith, but instead of faith being alleged to be the foundation of them, they are placed by the side of faith as the final purpose of the creation of men. It is the same with love; the apostle Paul expresses by his phrase, *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*, the inward unity of faith and love; in place of which the author of the Epistle to the Ephesians has only love by the side of faith, iii. 17, 18, and vi. 23, *ἀγάπη μετὰ πίστεως*. The Epistle to the Colossians prefers to take faith and works together as the moral praxis of the Christian life, i. 10; iii. 9, *sq.* By setting faith and love in this relation to each other, justice is to be done to both parties; and we see that in these Epistles, Gentile and Jew Christians are placed side by side, as equally privileged members of the Christian Church. Thus Judaism and heathenism equally occupy a negative position in relation to Christianity, Eph. ii. 11; Col. i. 20; yet as concessions may have been made to the Gentile Christians for the sake of unity, so out of regard for the Jewish Christians there are certain concessions made to Judaism of which the apostle Paul would not altogether have approved. It is said of the Gentiles, Eph. ii. 11, that they who were called uncircumcision by that which is called circumcision in the flesh, had been, during the whole period of heathenism, without Christ, aliens to the citizenship of Israel, unacquainted with the covenants of promise, without hope and without God in the world; but that now, they who before stood far off have come near in the blood of Christ. That is to say, the heathen have only received a share of what the Jews had before; and thus Christianity is not the absolute religion in which the negativeness of heathenism and that of Judaism come to an end together; on the contrary, the substantial contents of Christianity are just Judaism itself. Thus the universality of Christianity consists in this, that Judaism is extended to the heathen through the death of Christ. In it the hostility, the wall of division, and every thing positive that separated the two parties, has an end; both are reconciled to

God in one body and in one spirit, both have the same access to the Father. It is true that the heathen have thus, as Christians, everything that the Jews have; yet they are in the position of having been admitted, of having come near, of having received a share; for they, as the *ἔθνη*, are merely *συγκληρόνομα καὶ σύσσωμα καὶ συμμετοχα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*. They are merely partakers of that to which the Jews have the first and indisputable claim. Now, if we consider how the Apostle expresses himself on this subject, especially in the Epistle to the Romans, we cannot admit this to be a genuine Pauline view. The deeper reason of the difference is, that the peculiar Pauline conception of faith is not familiar to these Epistles. They know nothing of faith as an inward process in the consciousness, the most essential part of which is a personal conviction and experience of the impossibility of justification through the law. Hence the object of this faith, the death of Christ, remains purely external to them. The death of Christ has indeed brought about the cancelling of the law as well as the forgiveness of sins; but the law, which is set aside in the death of Christ, appears to be here little more than the injunction of circumcision.<sup>1</sup>

It is in this way that the chief result of the death of Christ is the reconciliation of heathens and Jews: this reconciliation was a thing of course, as soon as the wall of partition, that is, circumcision, the difference between *περιτομὴ* and *ἀκροβυστία*, was taken away. Such is the Christian universalism of these Epistles; it is not based upon the profound idea of the Apostle's religious anthropology, but only upon the coalition of heathens and Jews, which is one of the outward effects of the death of Christ. It is the same external universalism which the pseudo-Clementine homilies make the object of Christ's death in addition to the

<sup>1</sup> The *καθ' ἡμῶν χειρόγραφον τοῖς δόγμασιν, ὃ ἦν ὑπεραντίον ἡμῖν*, Col. ii. 14 (cf. Eph. ii. 15, *ὁ νόμος τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασιν*), is quite adequately accounted for by referring it to the penalty connected with the injunction of circumcision, that every man not circumcised was to be regarded as liable to be put to death.

forgiveness of sins. The Christian identifies himself with a new man, who, according to these Epistles, arises out of Christianity, so that he, as Christian, is neither Jew nor Gentile (cf. Eph. ii. 15), and, as Christian, has now to put off all the impurities of heathenism. Judaism thus loses, it is true, the absolute claim it made through the law of circumcision; but for this loss the Epistle to the Colossians seeks to provide a compensation; it is at some pains to show that even in these altered circumstances there is a circumcision, not *ἐν σαρκὶ χειροποίητος*, but *ἀχειροποίητος, ἐν τῇ ἀπεκδύσει τοῦ σώματος τῆς σαρκὸς, the περιτομὴ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, which takes place in baptism, in which rite Christ makes alive the *νεκροὺς ὄντας ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ τῆς σαρκὸς*, for in baptism they renounce all sensual desires, and dedicate themselves to a pure and holy life. This statement that Christian baptism was to have the same meaning with Jewish circumcision, is one we meet with elsewhere in post-Apostolic writings. The more importance the author of the Epistle to the Colossians attaches to the foundation thus gained for the union of Gentile and Jew Christians, the more must he have been led to controvert the principles of Ebionitism, a sect which repudiated universalism if coupled with such conditions, and would hear of no renunciation of those elements which, as he shows, were irreconcilable with the absolute Christian principle.

It is quite clear that the Epistle to the Ephesians is secondary to that to the Colossians; but it may be doubted whether it was written much later, and whether by another author. May not the twin Epistles have gone forth into the world together? A comparison of the contents of both suggests that the materials have been divided between them purposely with some such view. All that is polemical, special, and individual, is given to the Colossian letter: the Ephesian letter seems purposely to avoid all such topics, while, on the other hand, it treats the general subject of the Colossian letter more at large. The close relation of the Epistles to each other makes it somewhat striking that they seem to contain references to one another; the writer to the Colossians tells his readers

expressly, iv. 16, that they are to communicate their letter to the Laodiceans, and to get another letter from Laodicea communicated to themselves. The question is naturally suggested whether our Epistle to the Ephesians is this Laodicean epistle. Marcion asserts that the Epistle had the title, *To the Laodiceans*; but Marcion may have had no other authority for this statement than the passage, Col. iv. 16, itself. Yet though the letter was originally addressed *To the Ephesians*, and intended for them, i. 1, we may still suppose that the writer imagined the letter to have been taken by Tychicus to Ephesus, but to have been meant for other churches also; and thus it might reach Colosse from Laodicea. This would explain why the words, iv. 16, are not *τὴν εἰς Λαοδικείας*, but *τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας*. If the address, Eph. i. 1, contained originally nothing more than *τοῖς ἁγίοις καὶ πιστοῖς ἐν Ἰησ. Χρ.*, the addition *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ἐφέσῳ*, might easily arise from 2 Tim. iv. 12, where Tychicus is spoken of, the same who is named, Eph. vi. 21, Col. iv. 7, as the messenger of the apostle and the bearer of the Epistle, *Τύχικόν δὲ ἀπέστειλα εἰς Ἐφεσον*. Tychicus is thus, in any case, named as the bearer of both Epistles. Now it is curious to find it said, Eph. vi. 21, *ἵνα δὲ εἰδῆτε καὶ ὑμεῖς τὰ κατ' ἐμὲ, τί πράσσω, πάντα ὑμῖν γνωρῖσει ὁ Τυχικός*, etc. This *καὶ* before *ὑμεῖς* can only be explained from Col. iv. 7. The author of the Epistle to the Ephesians writes as if he, that is, the apostle, had just before been writing to the Colossians the letter intended for them. This may indeed be the invention of the author of the Ephesian letter writing later than the other author. But the circumstance can be accounted for equally well by supposing that the authors of both Epistles are one and the same man. He will then have referred, Eph. vi. 21, to the Colossian epistle, as, in Col. iv. 16, to the Ephesian epistle. What makes this the more likely is, that it is hard to see why the readers of the Colossian epistle should be referred to another epistle about to reach them from Laodicea, if there were not such an Epistle in existence at the time. The same author will thus have purposely divided into two letters what he could have said in one; and why? Probably because he

thought that what was said in the same way in two letters would produce the greater impression. The passage, Col. ii. 1, shows also how the author of this Epistle had two churches in his mind when he was writing, so that even this passage, taken in connexion with iv. 16, might make it seem not unlikely that as his subject was of equal importance to both churches, he felt himself induced to write two separate letters to them. Thus the more important the subject appeared to him with which both Epistles deal, the easier did it seem to imagine how the Apostle came to write these Epistles to two churches with which he was personally unacquainted (for this is especially remarked, Col. ii. 1, and the same thing is inferred, Eph. i. 15).<sup>1</sup> These explanations may have appeared necessary to the later author, but what reason could have induced the Apostle himself, judging even by the contents of our Epistles, to write to two churches with which he did not stand in any intimate relations? The Epistle to the Romans cannot be appealed to here as a case in point, unless a comparison were possible between the contents of the Epistle to the Romans and the contents of these two Epistles, which are so far inferior.

Whatever may be thought of the theory here advanced of the identical authorship of both Epistles, there can be no doubt of this, that the two are so much interwoven that they must stand or fall together in their claim to apostolic origin.

<sup>1</sup> If it be assumed that the Epistle to the Ephesians was addressed to Laodicea as a circular, we have still the difficulty that Col. ii. 1, iv. 16, mentions only Laodicea. Then it is to be considered that if Paul could not possibly write to the Ephesians in the words ascribed to him, i. 15, neither could an author, writing under his name, write in such terms, since the Apostle's relations with the Church at Ephesus were too well known to be passed over. Both Epistles appear to be written purposely to churches which were not personally known to the Apostle. Considering all this, and in addition to this, the close connexion which the Epistles bear to each other, one can scarcely avoid taking the Ephesian Epistle, in spite of its title and the *οὖτις ἐν Ἐφέσῳ*, to be an Epistle to the Laodiceans.

## FIFTH CHAPTER.

### THE EPISTLE TO THE PHILIPPIANS.

THE critic who first ventured to cast doubt on the genuineness of the Epistle to the Ephesians, has lately asserted of the Epistle to the Philippians that its genuineness is above all question.<sup>1</sup> It is true that no sufficient reasons have been alleged as yet for doubting its apostolic origin; yet I think there are such reasons, and I deem it necessary to state shortly, for the further consideration of criticism, what they are. I think there are three points to be considered.<sup>2</sup>

1. This Epistle, like the two we have just discussed, is occupied with Gnostic ideas and expressions, and that not in the way of controversy with Gnostics, but employing them, with the necessary modifications, for its own purposes. The passage, ii. 6, one of great importance for dogmatics, and of as great difficulty, can

<sup>1</sup> *De Wette*: Einl. in's Neue Test. 4 Aufl. 1842, p. 268. [In his Fifth Edition, published in 1848, de Wette referred to the doubts expressed on the subject in this work and by *Schwegler*, *Nachap. Zeit.* ii. 133, *sq.*, but only very cursorily, characterizing them, without reason shown, as an "attack on frivolous grounds." *Lünemann* (*Pauli ad Philipp. Epist.*, Göttingen, 1847); *Brückner* (*Epist. ad Philipp. Paulo auctori vindicata*); and *Ernesti* (*über Philipp. ii. 6, sq.*; *Theol. Stud. und Krit.* 1848, 4 H., pp. 858-924) defended the authenticity of the Epistle against Baur at greater length. He judged only the last of these arguments to possess any scientific value, but replied to them jointly in the *Theol. Jahrb.* viii. 1849, pp. 501-553 (in a section of the paper, "zur neutestamentlichen Kritik"). *Ernesti* returned to the subject in the *Stud. und Kritiken*, 1851, pp. 591-632, and was answered by Baur, *Theol. Jahrb.* xi. 1852, pp. 133-144, in the paper "über Philipp. ii. 6 f." I shall refer to these two essays where they add anything to the discussion in the text, and shall reproduce the more important parts of them.]

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *Theol. Jahrb.* viii. 502. "What appears suspicious to me in the Philippian Epistle may be reduced to the following three heads:—1. The appearance of Gnostic ideas in the passage, ii. 6-9. 2. The want of anything distinctively Pauline. 3. The questionableness of some of the historical data."

scarcely be explained save on the supposition that the writer's mind was filled with certain Gnostic ideas current at the time. What an extraordinary conception is it that Christ, though he was in the form of God, did not count it robbery, or, to give the words their exact grammatical force, did not think that he must make it the object of an *actus rapiendi*, to be equal with God. If he was God already, how could he wish to become what he was already? But if he was not equal with God, what an eccentric and perverted and self-contradictory thought must it have been, to become equal with God! Is it the inconceivableness of such a thought that is to be expressed in the words *οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο*? But how came the Apostle to say of Christ a thing so inconceivable, even were it merely to deny it? Though Christ did not proceed to such an act of rapacity and arrogance, yet it seems it was possible to him, not morally indeed, but abstractly. How is this to be explained? The doctrines of the Gnostics show us how our author may have come to entertain such a conception. It is a well-known Gnostic representation, that in one of the aeons, the last of the series of them, the Gnostic Sophia, there arose the passionate, eccentric, and unnatural desire to penetrate forcibly into the essence of the All-father, in order to connect herself directly with him the absolute, and to become one with him. This desire is described as a *προάλλεσθαι*, a darting forward, as a rash and passionate striving, as a *τολμή*, a bold and violent attempt.<sup>1</sup> That aeon then sought forcibly to seize and to appropriate what according to its nature could never belong to it, and what it had no claim to. This whole act, and what it aims at accomplishing, is a thing purely spiritual. Sophia wished, as the Gnostics express it, *κεκοινωνῆσθαι τῷ πατρὶ τῷ τελείῳ*, to associate herself with the father, the absolutely Perfect, and, *καταλαβεῖν τὸ μέγεθος αὐτοῦ*, to take up into herself spiritually his greatness, his absolute essence. This amounts to such an identity with God the Absolute, as is conveyed by the expression of our Epistle, *τὸ εἶναι ἰσα Θεῷ*, and only this consideration, that, according to the original Gnostic conception of it, the

<sup>1</sup> Iren. adv. Haer. i. 2. 2.

act was a purely spiritual one, makes it intelligible how our Epistle comes to speak of such a self-contradictory attempt as *εἶναι ἰσα Θεῶ*. On the one side, the identity with God is a thing still to be realized; on the other, the reality of it is presupposed. The interpreters of the Epistle are thus driven to assert that the correct rendering of *οὐχ ἀρπαγμὸν ἠγήσατο*, is compatible only with such a view of *εἶναι ἰσα Θεῶ*, as makes it a thing which Christ did not yet possess; for otherwise it could not be said that he did not wish to seize it for himself. But, they say, in order that the renunciation may be conceived as a voluntary one, we must ascribe to Christ the possibility which lies in the *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*. Christ then had the divine glory, *potentia*, in himself, and could have claimed it, could have made it appear in his life. But since it did not consist with the purpose of the plan of redemption that Christ should at once receive divine honour, it would have been a robbery, an act of presumption, if he had taken it to himself. But what, we must ask, was Christ, if, while *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*, he yet possessed the divine glory only *potentia*, if, though actually God, he yet was not God? And what conceivable reason is there for saying that he voluntarily renounced a thing which, from the nature of the case, it was impossible that he should have? This being and not being, this having and not having, is possible only in the spiritual sphere; the distinction drawn is that between what is essentially and what is not only essentially, but also for consciousness. And the Gnostic aeons are the categories and conceptions in which the absolute becomes the object of the subjective consciousness: they are themselves the spiritual subjects in which the absolute subjectivates and individualizes itself; or they are the subjective side, on which the absolute is not only the absolute in essence, but is also the absolute self-consciousness. Since, however, they are in plurality what the absolute is in unity, the descending series of aeons exhibits an ever-growing divergence between the consciousness of which the absolute is the object, and the absolute itself as the object of consciousness. The consciousness of these spiritual subjects, these aeons in which consciousness shows



itself as the subjective side over against the other objective side, can, by its own nature, deal with nothing but the absolute, and yet the further off they stand, the less can they with their consciousness embrace and comprehend it (*καταλαβείν*). Thus, then, the aeon we spoke of directs itself to the absolute with the whole energy of its spiritual force, seeks to grasp the absolute, to comprehend it, to become equal with it, to be one with it; but in this it undertakes a thing which is in itself impossible, by which it overleaps the boundaries of its own spiritual nature, and seeks, as it were, to commit an unnatural robbery of the absolute. Thus, in the very nature of the case, it cannot possibly succeed;<sup>1</sup> and if it let itself be borne along by this impulse, it will only become aware of the negativity of its own being,—a thing which the Gnostics represented by saying that the aeon fell down out of the *πλήρωμα* into the *κένωμα*.<sup>2</sup> Thus one passage speaks also of a *κενούν* in connexion with the *άρπαγμός*, and it is very clear from this that our author is familiar with the same representations, that he proceeds upon them, only with this difference, that what had a merely speculative interest to the Gnostics, has with him a moral significance. With the Gnostics the *άρπαγμός* is a thing that actually takes place, but by its unnaturalness comes to an end without spreading further, and has merely negative consequences;<sup>3</sup> in this case, however, there is

<sup>1</sup> διὰ τὸ ἀδυνάτῳ ἐπιβαλεῖν πράγματι. Iren. *loc. cit.*

<sup>2</sup> Iren. i. 4. 1: ἐν σκιάῃς καὶ κενώματος τόποις ἔξω φωτὸς ἐγένετο καὶ πληρώματος. 4. 2: ἐν τῷ σκότει καὶ τῷ κενώματι. Compare Theodoret, *Haer. Fab.* i. 7, ἔξω τοῦ πληρώματος, ἐν σκιᾷ τινὶ καὶ κενώματι διάγειν.

<sup>3</sup> This statement, however, requires to be qualified (as is observed, *Theol. Jahrb.* viii. 507): "That aeon which sought to grasp and comprehend the absolute essence of God, and fell from the *πλήρωμα* to the *κένωμα*, through attempting the impossible, did yet at last arrive at the *πλήρωμα*. For the *πλήρωμα* does at last, at the consummation of the world's history, receive all spiritual beings, and in it they all become one with the absolute. This shows us what the unnatural attempt spoken of here really signifies. It was unnatural, in that the aeon in question desired to attain immediately and at once, what could not, according to Gnostic conceptions, be attained save as a result of the whole process of the development of the world. The attempt was suggested to the aeon by a subjective and unreasonable impulse. It was however, at the same time, the beginning from which the development of the world proceeded, and was thus a necessary momentum. If the genesis of the world be regarded as a falling away (and this

a moral self-determination, which stops short of such a *ἀρπαγμός*. It is not, in this case, that the action has failed, but that it has not taken place at all: there is a voluntary renunciation and self-abasement, and instead of the Gnostic *γενέσθαι ἐν κενώματι* we have a *ἑαυτὸν κενοῦν*. Thus the voluntary act of refraining from *ἀρπαγμός*, in our Epistle, is a modification of the speculative *ἀρπαγμός* of Gnosticism. When the question is made an ethical one, as it is here, there seems to be little need for saying that Christ did not seek to seize a thing before his moral probation, which could only be attained in the way of moral probation. What can be gained only through moral effort, that will no one gain, save as the fruit of his moral effort. This is so self-evident, that if it be said, as it is here, we have a right to conclude that the statement has reference to, and is occasioned by, some previous speculation. The statement could not otherwise have been made, at least in the form in which we find it.<sup>1</sup>

is the point of view here), then it is of course both subjectively arbitrary and objectively necessary." The *ἀρπαγμός* therefore denotes "that the aeon sought to assert at a leap, as it were, at once, through a violent act or a robbery, that identity with the absolute which could only be realized through the whole cosmic process;" that it "sought to seize by an act of will, violently and prematurely, what it could only gain by a certain definite process." Christ did the opposite of this: he did not seize the *εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῶν*, the divine worship that should place him on an equality with God, violently, as a right belonging to him in virtue of his divine nature (the *μορφή Θεοῦ*), but earned it by voluntary self-abnegation (cf. Theol. Jahrb. xi. 134 sq., viii. 508 sq.). The author also admits distinctly (Theol. Jahrb. xi. 142) that *ἀρπαγμός* cannot be shown to be a Gnostic term; he thinks, however, that this is of no great importance if the idea denoted by the word is found in Gnostic systems.—*Editor*.

<sup>1</sup> The author insists again on this point in Theol. Jahrb. viii. 508 sq. "If," he says, "Christ was *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*, then his nature was from this very fact divine. Now if this *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν* was not equivalent to *εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῶν*, this must mean that what he was essentially, as *ἐν μ. Θ. ὑπάρχων*, could only proceed to the *εἶναι Ἰσα Θεῶν* (i.e. become the true and actual contents of his consciousness) by his vindicating his divine nature in the way of moral effort—by the proof of his obedience. But if the *εἶναι Ἰσα* be thus a question of moral achievement, how could it be said of Christ that he ever dreamed of the possibility of attaining, without moral action, that which could not exist save as the fruit of moral action? It is clear that the author is referring here to certain other views. It could never have suggested itself to him to connect with Christ such an absurd and self-contradictory idea or intention, even though it were only to deny that he cherished it. The idea must have been suggested to him from without."

The other expressions used in this passage afford additional evidence of Gnostic modes of thought and expression having been before the author's mind. The contrast *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* and *μορφὴ δούλου* looks indeed sufficiently simple, yet the peculiar conception indicated by *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* can only be understood by a reference to the use of those terms by the Gnostic. The expressions *μορφὴ*, *μορφοῦν*, *μόρφωσις*, were very common with them. That which constitutes the peculiar character of one of the higher spiritual beings is the *μορφὴ* of that being; hence the Gnostics said of the fallen aeon, that when it passed out of the light and the pleroma, it was *ἄμορφος καὶ ἀνείδεος, ὡσπερ ἔκτρωμα*, and that *διὰ τὸ μηδὲν κατειληφέναι* because that was wanting to him which was necessary to make up his definite spiritual nature. Hence when Christ was sent out of the pleroma to help him, the first thing he did to him was *τῇ ἰδίᾳ δυνάμει μορφῶσαι μόρφωσιν, τὴν κατ' οὐσίαν μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν κατὰ γνῶσιν*.<sup>1</sup> The aeon was to come to itself out of the state of utter negation in which it had been lying; it was to receive its own *μορφὴ*, and that in two stages. The first stage of the process of *μορφοῦν* was the *μόρφωσις κατ' οὐσίαν*, referring to that which the aeon was in essence, in substance; then followed the *μόρφωσις κατὰ γνῶσιν*, by which he became in consciousness also what he was already in essence. This of itself shows us that the *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχειν* means the same thing, and is identical with *εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*.<sup>2</sup> But this can be distinctly proved to be according to the Gnostic use of terms.

*Ernesti* admits the force of this, but finds the suggestion in the Mosaic narrative of the Fall. *Baur* replies, *op. cit.* viii. 509 *sqq.*, xi. 138 *sqq.*, that this parallel is little to the point, and that our passage exhibits no trace of any reference to that narrative. He points out that the condition of our first parents before the Fall does not in the least correspond to the *μορφὴ Θεοῦ* here ascribed to Christ; that the robbery of the tree in Paradise which they committed is entirely unlike the *ἀρπαγμὸς* said to have been before the mind of Christ; and that the *εἶναι ἴσα Θεῷ*, which he did not obtain through a *ἀρπαγμὸς*, is quite a different thing from the *ἔσεσθε ὡς θεοί*, promised to our first parents by the serpent, and which they actually attained by eating the forbidden fruit. This latter was simply the knowledge of good and evil.—*Editor*.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Iren.* i. 4. 1; 5. 1. *Theod. Haer.* Fab. i. 7.

<sup>2</sup> With the difference however (as the author explains, *Th. Jahrb.* viii. 507) of

The Gnostics said of the *νοῦς* or *μονογενῆς* that he was *ὁμοίος τε καὶ ἴσος τῷ προβαλόντι*, to the primal aeon, or the absolute ground of existence, as the *μόνος χωρῶν τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πατρὸς*, since he only comprehends the absolute greatness of the Father, and in him the absolute unfolds itself to consciousness.<sup>1</sup> On this account he is also called the sum of all the aeons of the Pleroma, the *ἀρχὴ καὶ μὀρφωσις παντὸς τοῦ πληρώματος*. The number of the aeons is completed by Christ and the Holy Spirit. Christ taught the aeons that the essence of the Father is in itself quite incomprehensible, and that the knowledge of it is possible only through the *μονογενῆς*, and that the cause of the eternal existence of the aeons was that absolute, and for them quite incomprehensible, being of the Father; the cause of the existence of the Monogenes, however, through whom alone the Father is known, and of his *μὀρφωσις*, was that which is comprehensible in the Father, *ὃ δὴ ἴσος ἐστὶ (ὁ μονογενῆς)*. Thus he is equal with him, identical with him, inasmuch as he comprehends the Father, and is subjectively what the Father is objectively. This *ἴσος εἶναι τῷ πατρὶ* is accordingly his *μὀρφωσις* or his *μορφῆ*, and since this *μορφῆ* is nothing but the being equal, the being one with the Father, he is himself in fact the *μορφῆ* of the Father, or *ὑπάρχων ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ*. Through the Holy Spirit all the aeons were held to have become *μορφῆ καὶ γνώμη ἴσοι*, equal to each other, so that each was what the others were, and thereby as much *ἴσος* to the Father as the *Νοῦς* or *Μονογενῆς* is; and their *μορφῆ* consisted just in this, that they were thus *ἴσοι*.<sup>2</sup> In a writer so obviously influenced by Gnostic ideas, it cannot surprise us to find a close approach to the Docetism of the

that which is essentially, and that which is not only essentially, but also for consciousness.

<sup>1</sup> *Iren. i. 1. 1.*

<sup>2</sup> To see how great the difficulties are with which this classical passage must be surrounded, so long as the solution is not sought in the way I have indicated, one has only to look at the exertions expended on it by USTERI (*Entw. des paul. Lehrb. 4 A., pp. 309-315*). In his position these exertions are certainly not uncalled for. The chief difficulty is, as he seems to be aware, to decide whether the expression *ἐν μορφῇ Θεοῦ ὑπάρχων* and *ἴσα εἶναι Θεῷ*, and their correlatives, are to be taken in an ethico-religious or in a physical and substantial sense.

Gnostics. This is undoubtedly the case in verse 7. If, as *ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος*, Christ was only *ὅμοιος* to men, then he was no true and actual man, but only seemed to be so. The expression *ὁμοίωμα* can signify only similarity, analogy; it cannot denote identity or parity of essence (compare Rom. vi. 5). The passage Rom. viii. 3, where it is said of the Son that God sent him *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, cannot be reckoned a parallel to this. The *ὁμοίωμα* there predicated of the Son is that likeness which as the Son he necessarily wears to the *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*. Here, however, the *ὁμοίωμα* is extended to human nature generally: and this is just the difference between the Docetic view and the orthodox. That this is the meaning of *ὁμοίωμα* in our passage is sufficiently clear from the phrase *σχήματι εὔρεθεις ὡς ἄνθρωπος*, which stands close beside it, and does not admit of any other interpretation. Though we should not press the *ὡς* and *εὔρεθῆναι* (*ὡς* indicates no more than an opinion, a view, a comparison, and *εὔρεθῆναι* is not equivalent to *εἶναι*; it refers merely to the outward appearance, to the qualities by which a subject presents itself to external observation), yet in *σχῆμα* we have as clearly as need be the notion of an *externus habitus*, of a thing changing, passing, and quickly disappearing (cf. 1 Cor. vii. 31).<sup>1</sup>

Purely Gnostic, again, is the author's view of the three regions, the heavenly, the earthly, and the subterranean, to all of which equally the power and rule of Christ extend. The *καταχθόνιοι* cannot but remind us of the Gnostic idea of the descent into hell. The peculiar manner, noticeable both in this Epistle and in the two which we last considered, in which Gnostic and Catholic conceptions are mingled and pass into each other; the unsuspecting use the writers make of notions, bearing unmistakably the stamp of Gnosticism, and which they modify only so far as the practical and religious objects they had to serve, made it necessary to do so—these things manifestly belong to a time when Gnosticism had not yet become the definite and striking phenomenon that it was afterwards, and when it was still in process of development out of

<sup>1</sup> Compare on this point Th. Jahrb. viii. 515 sq., xi. 144.

the various elements then present. It was the era of the first awaking of Christian speculation, excited by the floating ideas of the time, from which speculation the Christian consciousness itself was to receive its peculiar dogmatic contents. At its outset Christian speculation found its leading and most powerful interest in the idea of the person of Christ; it was around this idea that the absolute contents of the Christian consciousness crystallized into their definite objective form. This growing occupation with the person of Christ comes out very strongly in doxological passages, such as Eph. i. 19 *sq.*; iii. 8 *sq.*; Col. i. 15 *sq.*, and, more than in any of these, in the passage we have been considering, which has quite the air of a doxology.

2. This affinity with Gnosis is the chief feature which the Epistle to the Philippians has in common with those to the Ephesians and Colossians. It differs from them chiefly in its prevailing subjectivity of tone. This is generally extolled as the peculiar beauty of this Epistle, and the sentiments and dispositions which it exhibits to us are certainly sweet and touching; yet this must not blind us to the fact that the Epistle is characterized very decidedly by monotonous repetition of what has already been said, by a want of any profound and masterly connexion of ideas, and by a certain poverty of thought, of which the writer himself seems to have been somewhat painfully aware, as he says in excuse, iii. 1, τὰ αὐτὰ γράφειν ὑμῖν, ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐκ ὀκνηρὸν, ὑμῖν δὲ ἀσφαλές. Connected with this there is another consideration which must count as an important element in judging of the Epistle, viz. that we find no motive nor occasion for it, no distinct indication of any purpose, or of any leading idea. There is certainly polemic against Jewish opponents, yet one can hardly avoid the impression that this is there simply because it seemed to belong to the standing character of Pauline Epistles. There is nothing fresh or natural in this polemic; the circumstances do not stand out with any palpable form. Could any description of the opponents of Christianity be more vague or general than this?—iii. 18: πολλοὶ περιπατοῦσιν, οὓς πολλάκις ἔλεγον ὑμῖν, νῦν δὲ κλαίων λέγω, τοὺς ἔχθρους τοῦ


σταυροῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὧν τὸ τέλος ἀπώλεια, ὧν ὁ Θεὸς ἡ κοιλία, καὶ ἡ δόξα ἐν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ αὐτῶν, οἱ τὰ ἐπιγεια φρονοῦντες. The statements added by the interpreters in order to fill up the character of these Judaizing opponents and false teachers are borrowed from other Epistles; our Epistle itself affords no special features; it does not even appear where these opponents are to be looked for, whether at Rome or at Philippi. It is in vain that our author uses the strongest phrases to describe his antagonists; they fail to bring his polemic the colour which it wants. How harshly does his argument begin with the rude words, iii. 2, *βλέπετε τοὺς κύνas*; and how forced is the contrast that is attempted to be drawn between *κατατομῆ* and *περιτομῆ*, circumcision and concision! The Christians, that is, are the *περιτομῆ*; the Jews, the spurious circumcision, or the *κατατομῆ*. But how inaccurate is this; the difference between the true circumcision and the false is a qualitative one, but is here represented as quantitative by the exaggeration of *περιτομῆ* to *κατατομῆ*. Nor is this peculiar and unnatural contrast required by anything lying in the writer's way; it is evidently brought in in order to give the apostle an opportunity to predicate *περιτομῆ* of himself, that he may then go on to discourse of his own person. This, as we have already remarked, is always an important point to the writers of pseudo-apostolic letters, so conscious are they of their double personality.

Let us, however, examine the passage in which the apostle speaks of himself; it is manifestly nothing but an imitation of the passage in 2 Cor. xi. 13 *sq.* In the *ἐργάται δόλιοι*, verse 13, we have the *κακοὺς ἐργάτας* of our passage, and then the one passage follows the other in a number of details, even the introduction of the apostle's person through the idea of *περιτομῆ* finding its precedent in the original. In 2 Cor. xi. 18 *sq.* the apostle speaks of his *κανχᾶσθαι* in contrast to the *κανχᾶσθαι* of his Judaizing opponents, which he characterizes, verse 18, as a *κανχᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν σάρκα*. To it he replies that if so great importance is to be attached to outward things of that sort, he himself can boast of the same dis-

tinctions as they possess, reluctant though he be to speak of them. Now the author of our Epistle refers this *καυχᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν σάρκα* especially to the distinction of circumcision, and so puts these words into the apostle's mouth, verse 3, *ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἔσμεν ἡ περιτομή*. Then, in order to ascribe to the apostle the true *περιτομή*, he takes the idea of circumcision first in a spiritual sense; *οἱ πνεύματι Θεῷ λατρεύοντες, καὶ καυχόμενοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες*. In the following words, however, *καίπερ ἐγὼ ἔχων πεποιθήσιν καὶ ἐν σαρκί*, he returns to the idea of bodily circumcision. Here we recognise what the apostle says of himself, 2 Cor. xi. 18, *καὶ γὰρ καυχῆσομαι, ἰ.ε. ἐν σαρκί*; and as in what follows there (cf. verse 23, *ὑπὲρ ἐγὼ*) he seeks to outbid his opponents with his *καυχᾶσθαι*, so here also we read: *εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄλλος πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί, ἐγὼ μᾶλλον*. This *πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί*, which is merely another expression for the *καυχᾶσθαι κατὰ τὴν σάρκα* of 2 Cor. xi. 18, is then carried out into detail, verse 5, the *περιτομή* being placed at the head of the enumeration as the principal item. After the words *περιτομῇ ὀκταήμερος*, it is said *ἐκ γένους Ἰσραὴλ*, instead of *Ἰσραηλιταί εἰσι: καὶ γὰρ*, and *Ἑβραῖος ἐξ Ἑβραίων*, instead of *Ἑβραῖοι εἰσι; καὶ γὰρ*, 2 Cor. xi. 22. This, however, is merely to give the apostle an occasion to speak more at large about himself, and to contrast his present Christian view of life with that *πεποιθέναι ἐν σαρκί*. Can it possibly be doubted that the author had before his eyes that passage of the Corinthian letter, and followed it as the apostle himself could never have done? The use of the expression *κύνες* can only be explained from the strong and vehement language in which the apostle denounces his opponents, 2 Cor. xi, and from the accustomed exaggeration of imitators. But how uncalled for and how forced does this speech of the apostle about himself appear when we compare it with the manner in which he deals with his opponents in the original passage. There we see at once what it is all about. How weak and lifeless is this imitation! What the apostle is made to say about his former life is just what nobody could fail to know. How petty is the mention of the circumcision



on the eighth day, how far from Pauline is the conception of a *δικαιοσύνη ἐν νόμῳ*, how dull and uninteresting is the whole episode! There are other thoughts and expressions in this part of the Epistle which remind us of the Corinthian Epistles; cf. verse 10 with 2 Cor. iv. 10 *sq.*; verses 11-14, with 1 Cor. ix. 24 *sq.*; verse 15, *τέλειοι*, with 1 Cor. ii. 6; verse 17, *συμμιμηταί μου γίνεσθε*, with 1 Cor. xi. 1, *μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε*; verse 19, with 2 Cor. xi. 15; verse 21 with 1 Cor. xv. 47 *sq.* This more or less obvious reappearance of passages out of the older Epistles, together with the intentional leading of the discourse to the apostle's own person, his earlier and his present life, must certainly excite a prejudice against our Epistle. Nor do we find any clear reason which could have led the apostle to write this Epistle, and which might thus create an impression in its favour. A special reason is indeed mentioned, iv. 10 *sq.*, in the shape of a present which the Philippians are said to have sent to Rome for the apostle's support. This, however, is spoken of in connexion with former subsidies in such a way as to fail entirely to satisfy us. Speaking of this last subsidy, iv. 15, the apostle reminds his readers of the fact that from the commencement of his preaching of the gospel, ever since his departure from Macedonia, he has received such gifts from no church but that of Philippi, and that during his stay at Thessalonica they sent him assistance more than once. Now we must ask how this is to be reconciled with the apostle's distinct assertion, 1 Cor. ix. 15, according to which he stood in no such relation towards any church whatever: *ἐγὼ οὐδενὶ ἐχρησάμην τούτων, ἔκ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ζῆν*. His *μισθὸς* was *ἵνα εὐαγγελιζόμενος ἀδάπανον θήσω τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς τὸ μὴ καταχρησασθαι τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ μου ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ*. Now the exactness of the truth of these words is certainly qualified by the apostle's own confession, 2 Cor. xi. 9, that during his stay at Corinth, brethren who came from Macedonia supplied his wants. The statement of the first passage, however, is only qualified, not entirely falsified, by the second; and the case mentioned, 2 Cor. xi. 9, can only have been an exception. But here, Phil. iv. 15, it is made to appear as if there had been a system of subsidies all along,



as if the apostle had received regular contributions from the Philippians, and had a sort of account of debtor and creditor with them (*λόγος δόσεως καὶ λήψεως*). The explanation of this is, in our opinion, that the author had the passage 2 Cor. xi. 9 before him, and drew from it a conclusion which it does not warrant, failing to allow due weight to the other passage. The *λόγος δόσεως καὶ λήψεως* is evidently our author's equivalent for the balance spoken of, 2 Cor. xi. 9, in the words *προσαναπληροῦν τὸ ὑστέρημα*.

Another curious circumstance here claims our attention. The interpreters of this Epistle agree with us in thinking that there is a reference to 2 Cor. xi. 9: they say that the words *ὅτε ἐξήλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας* point to the subsidy received at Corinth, and that then (verse 16) the apostle goes back to what he had received at different times at Thessalonica in order to make his enumeration complete. De Wette thinks that the *καὶ* requires this interpretation, and that the reason why the enumeration does not follow the chronological order is that the subsidy received at Corinth was the most considerable, and so suggested itself first to the apostle's mind. But if it was so considerable, why is it not expressly mentioned? The words *ὅτε ἐξήλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας* cannot be held to refer specially to a subsidy received at Corinth; the statement made is a general one, that he received assistance from them from the time of his leaving Macedonia. The apostle could not have passed over the most important instance without mentioning it, and it is evidently not he himself, but some other man who expresses himself in this way. This other writer considered that the case mentioned in 2 Cor. was so well known that he did not need to refer to it specially; he took it for granted, and went on to speak of other acts of assistance, introducing them with the particle *καὶ*. This *καὶ* cannot be explained in any other way. Now if these subsidies were so frequent that the apostle was in a position to count upon them as ordinary occurrences (at least in the case of the Philippian church), it is hard to see how much is left of the principle which he asserts in 1 Cor. ix. 15. There is evidence, more-

over, to show that the apostle cannot have received many such subsidies at Thessalonica: for according to the Acts he did not reside there for any length of time. Thus hardly any other conclusion is open to us than this, that the author exaggerated what he found in 1 Cor. ix., about the *ἀδελφοὶ ἐλθόντες ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας*, and was thus led to represent the apostle as having been assisted by regular contributions from the Philippian church from the date when he left Macedonia (*ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας*); or rather, as soon as he left Philippi, since his residence in Thessalonica, a town which was also in Macedonia, is counted along with the *ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας*. Hence we notice that under the *ἀδελφοὶ ἐλθόντες ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας*, this writer understood none but Christians from Philippi. Thus what is told us, in chap. iv. 10, of a special occasion for the writing of the Epistle gives us no clear insight into the apostle's circumstances at the time, and this of itself might lead us to conclude that we have here no set of actual historical circumstances, but only an imaginary situation. The more we consider the historical groundwork of the Epistle, the more probable does this appear.

3. We have still to consider what is said in chap. i. 12, both about the great progress of the Gospel in Rome, and of the deep impression which the captivity of the apostle and his preaching of the Gospel are said to have produced in the whole Praetorium and throughout that city.<sup>1</sup> This statement stands quite alone and unsupported; it is not corroborated either by the Epistles which profess to have been written from the apostle's captivity in Rome, or from any other quarter. Yet the fact is not in itself incredible, and no one would have thought of calling it in question had not the author himself taken up into his Epistle another fact which gives us so clear an insight into his plot, that it is impossible for us to take his assertions as simple history. The attention which the Gospel commanded in the whole Praetorium, and in Rome generally, is supposed, as we see from iv. 22, to have had for one

<sup>1</sup> ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι: who are those *λοιποὶ πάντες*, but the general Roman public?

of its consequences that there were believers even in the imperial household. *Ἀσπάζονται ὑμᾶς*, the author says at the conclusion of his letter, *πάντες οἱ ἅγιοι, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος οἴκίας*. This is obviously meant to draw attention to the brilliant and noteworthy results of the apostle's preaching at Rome; and there can be no doubt that in the *λοιποὶ πάντες*, i. 13, the author was thinking particularly of those *ἐκ τῆς Καίσαρος οἴκίας*. How is it then that this remarkable result of the apostle's activity at Rome during his imprisonment, a thing so important for the history of Christianity, meets us nowhere but in the Epistle to the Philippians? The key to this question is found in the Clement who is mentioned, iv. 3; it is certainly a remarkable circumstance that this Clement, named nowhere else in the apostolic Epistles, is named here as sending greeting in a letter in which no other of the apostle's friends or assistants is mentioned as doing so. This marked mention of Clement cannot be held to be without significance. Since neither history nor tradition knows of any other Clement at that time, this must be the same who is placed elsewhere in the closest relations with the apostle Peter, and who is said to have been ordained by him as the first bishop of the Church at Rome. Now in the early legendary history it is reported of this same Clement that he was connected by blood with the imperial household. The Clementine Homilies, which derive their name from this Clement, represent him as the disciple, the companion, and the successor of the apostle Peter, and narrate his life in the form of a Christian romance, say of him that he was *ἀνὴρ πρὸς γένους Τιβερίου Καίσαρος*. Legend, then, was acquainted with a Clement who was a member of the imperial house, and who was converted by an apostle; and the Clement of our Epistle is exactly the man in whose person Christianity is represented in the imperial house. One being thus given, our author meant us to infer that there were several believing members of the imperial house, and so made his apostle send greetings from the whole of them to the Church at Philippi. But how had Christianity gained access to the imperial house? How could even the report

of it get there? There was another well-known circumstance at hand to explain this, namely, the position which Paul had come to occupy as a Roman prisoner in the Praetorium. The Praetorium was closely connected with the imperial household, and the apostle had been committed, at his arrival in Rome, to the praefectus praetorio, the *στράτοπεδάρχης* of Acts xxviii. 16, and guarded by a soldier of the imperial guard. Here, then, was a door through which, as soon as it had gained belief in the Praetorium, Christianity might penetrate to the house of the emperor. Thus one circumstance fits into another in a perfectly natural way, and it is easy to account for the emphatic mention of the *προκοπή τοῦ εὐαγγελίου* and the *φανερὸς γενέσθαι ἐν Χριστῷ τοὺς δεσμῶν ἐν ὄλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι* at the beginning of the Epistle. The two facts given are, on the one side, the Roman Clement, and on the other side the praefectus praetorio. What lies between the two—the interest of the whole Praetorium in Paul and in Christianity, and the conversion of several members of the imperial house—this seems scarcely more than the natural inference by which these two facts are linked together. Yet we must not conclude that because this combination seems so natural, the facts actually followed each other in this order; what we know of the Roman Clement will not allow us to do so. He cannot, indeed, be said to be altogether the creature of legend; there is some fact or other at the root of the legend; but the facts, so far as we know them, only serve to show that the apostle himself could not have named the Roman Clement in this way. It has long been remarked, and justly,<sup>1</sup> that the *fundus fabulae*, in the case of the Roman Clement, is that Flavius Clemens who is known to us from Suetonius,<sup>2</sup> Dio Cassius,<sup>3</sup> and Eusebius.<sup>4</sup> The correspondence can hardly be mistaken, and is remarkable as an example of the process of formation of a Christian legend. We can see to the bottom of the process, and that in the case of so important a

<sup>1</sup> Even by Cotelier, *Recogn. S. Clem.* 7, 8. *Patr. Apost.* vol. i. p. 554.

<sup>2</sup> *Domit.* c. 15.

<sup>3</sup> In the extract of Xiphilinus, lxvii. 14 (iii. 2, 23, in Appendix to Dio Cassius).

<sup>4</sup> *H. E.* iii. 18.

personage in Christian legend as the Roman Clement. It is reported of both, of the Clement of the Roman imperial history and of him of Christian legend, that they were related to the imperial family. Suetonius calls Flavius Clemens a *patruelis* of Domitian. We are warranted to hold him to have been a friend and adherent of Christianity, for the ἀθεόρτης for which he was sentenced to death by Domitian, and which is equivalent in the narrative of Dio Cassius to the ἡθὴ τῶν Ἰουδαίων, mentioned by him in the same connexion, is the common heathen designation of Christianity. The *contemtissima inertia* with which Suetonius charges him, agrees with this very well; as a Christian he could not take any great interest in the politics of Rome, and this must have come out markedly during his consulate; hence, as Suetonius reports his fate, Domitian *repente ex tenuissima suspicione tantum non in ipso ejus consulatu interemit*. Then, as the family of the Clement of the Homilies was forced to quit Rome by some dark fatality menacing them, and returned thither only after manifold vicissitudes, so the wife, at least, of Flavius Clemens, Flavia Domitilla, experienced a similar change of fortune. According to Dio Cassius, she was banished to the island Pandateria for the same reason for which her husband lost his life; but she afterwards returned to Rome, since Domitian, as Tertullian says, when speaking of his mode of persecuting, *facile coeptum repressit, restitutis etiam, quos relegaverat*.<sup>1</sup> This is the historical basis of the legend of the Roman Clement; there is no historical authority for any Clement but this one, and we have no warrant to assume an apostolic Clement different from him. The passage in the Epistle to the Philippians cannot count as evidence, if there be reason to doubt the apostolic origin of that Epistle.<sup>2</sup> The death

<sup>1</sup> Apolog. ch. 4.

<sup>2</sup> The Epistle extant under the name of Clement cannot be appealed to in evidence that there was actually an apostolic Clement different from the other. Whatever be the date assigned to that Epistle, the name prefixed to it can never prove that it was written by the Clement of Christian legend. We are not obliged to hold the Epistle of Barnabas to have been written by the Barnabas with whom we are acquainted, because it bears the name of Barnabas.

of Flavius Clemens is said to have been accompanied by certain terrible phenomena (*continuis octo mensibus*, says Suetonius, *fulgura facta nuntiataque sunt*), and to have been much spoken of on this account; and this would make it the more intelligible how this Clement, as one of the first Romans of good family to confess Christianity, and to become a martyr to that faith, received so prominent a place in Christian legendary history. In order to make him a companion of the apostles and the successor of Peter in the Roman Church, he was removed further back, and made a relative of Tiberius instead of Domitian. Now if he became a Christian only in the reign of Domitian, how could the apostle Paul call him his *συνεργός*? This connexion with the apostle Paul can only have been ascribed to him by one writing in the post-apostolic age, when the Clement we have spoken of had already been transformed into the well-known Clement of the Roman legend. The mention of him in the Epistle to the Philip- pians is thus a criterion in judging of the genuineness of that Epistle; and more than this, it throws a new light on the whole composition of the Epistle. From this Clement and the interest, of which he was held to be the evidence, which the *οἶκλα τοῦ Καίσαρος* took in the cause of the Gospel, the Epistle obtains the *προκοπή τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*, i. 12, and this is the reason of that fervent joy which is expressed all through the Epistle as the deep and prevailing sentiment of the apostle's heart. Whatever the author makes the apostle write about, no single subject is left without a reference to his prevailing joyfulness, that *χαίρω καὶ συγχαίρω πᾶσιν ὑμῖν τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὑμεῖς χαίρετε καὶ συγχαίρετέ μοι*, ii. 17, 18 (cf. iii. 1, *χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ*: iv. 1, *χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου*: v. 4, *χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ πάντοτε, πάλιν ἐρῶ χαίρετε*: v. 10, *ἐχάρην δὲ ἐν Κυρίῳ μεγάλως*) is found again and again as the refrain of every passage. This predominant feeling outweighed the pressure, the restraint, the clouded future in which there was so little prospect of further action in the cause of the Gospel, and all the cares of his position at the time. In this respect the Epistle to the Philip- pians presents such a contrast with the second to

Timothy, that it has long been felt that these two writings must be placed at very different periods of the apostle's captivity at Rome. Nothing but this prevailing feeling of joy can explain to us how the author ventures to make his apostle express the hope of speedy deliverance from his imprisonment. And yet it appears very natural that an author living at a later period could not quite conceal how the well-known death of the apostle was present to his mind. Mixed with his feelings of joy, we find thoughts of an approaching death, and these two conditions of his spirit neutralize each other in sentences such as these: *ὡς πάντοτε καὶ νῦν μεγαλυνθήσεται Χριστὸς ἐν τῷ σώματί μου, εἴτε διὰ ζωῆς, εἴτε διὰ θανάτου· ἐμοὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῆν Χριστὸς καὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν κέρδος. Εἰ δὲ τὸ ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, τοῦτό μοι καρπὸς ἔργου, καὶ τί αἰρήσομαι, οὐ γνωρίζω· συνέχομαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν δύο, τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἔχων εἰς τὸ ἀναλῦσαι, καὶ σὺν Χριστῷ εἶναι, πολλῶ γὰρ μᾶλλον κρείσσον, τὸ δὲ ἐπιμένειν ἐν σαρκὶ ἀναγκαιότερον δι' ὑμᾶς,* i. 20-24. Can it be questioned that a frame of mind alternating thus between life and death is far less appropriate to the apostle, if at least it be true that prospects so unexpectedly wide and splendid had been opening up before him for the success of the Gospel, than for an author who saw before him as a historical fact that end of the apostle which so little harmonized with all these expectations? It cannot be without some special purpose that the author of our Epistle places the Roman Clement, the genuine disciple of Peter, as he is always accounted, at the side of the apostle Paul as his *συνεργός*. He also is to be a link of that harmonious relation in which the two apostles were more and more to be exhibited,<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Clement was a very suitable personage for this. He was a Gentile by birth, and had yet attached himself to Peter and to Jewish Christianity; thus he was a natural mediator between the Judæo-Christian and the Gentile-Christian parties, and his great reputation could be serviceable in procuring acceptance for the Judaizing form of Christianity. He appears in this mediatorial capacity in the Shepherd of Hermas, L. i. vis. 2, where the Church appears to Hermas in the form of an old woman and commands him to write down the new revelations:—“scribes duos libellos et mittes manum Clementi—mittet autem Clemens in exteras civitates (Gentile-Christian churches) illi enim permissum est.” With this agrees the description given in the *Epitome de gestis Petri*, c. 149 (cf. the Martyr. Clem.



how was it possible that a man of such importance for the Roman Church could have been unacquainted with the apostle Paul? for was not the Praetorium the only quarter from which the imperial house was accessible to Christian teaching?

In general, the object of this Epistle may be said to be to give a representation of the apostle's personality, through which he should appear as great and as illustrious as possible. To this end everything conspires that the writer has to say; the great success of the apostle's preaching at Rome, the martyrdom, for it was nothing less, and it could never be sufficiently recognised, which he endured in his long incarceration, his affectionate and sympathetic feelings towards the Christian churches, and the constant direction of his spirit to Christ, in whom alone he lived. In conclusion, we may add that neither the *ἐπίσκοποι* and *διάκονοι* at the beginning of the Epistle, nor those persons named in the last chapter in such a peculiar and mysterious way, Euodia and Syntyche (in view of the exhortation to concord they might be thought to be rather two parties than two ladies), with the yet more peculiar *σύζυγος γνήσιος*, are in accordance with the apostle's manner in other Epistles.

#### ADDENDUM.<sup>1</sup>

No other Epistle contains so many passages, which from one

in Cotelier's *Patr. Apost. i.*, p. 808) of the character of Clement, that he as "tertius post magnum Petrum in excelso romanae ecclesiae throno sedens, ipsumque virtutis certamen suscipiens, magistri vestigiis insistebat, apostolicamque doctrinam ipse quoque praeferebat et similibus moribus effulgebat, non Christianis dumtaxat placens, verum etiam Judaeis ac ipsis gentilibus et omnibus omnia factus ut et sic omnes lucrifaceret Christoque praesentaret ac verae religioni connecteret." As middleman between Jewish and heathen Christians, he was represented as the depositary of all the traditions held for apostolic, which were to be valid and obligatory for Jewish and heathen Christians equally. Cf. my *Abh. über den Ursprung des Episcopats*; *Tüb. Zeitschr. für Theol.* 1838, 3 H. p. 126.

<sup>1</sup> The foregoing section (from p. 45) has received so considerable additions in the discussion *Theol. Jahrb. viii.*, pp. 517-532, that I think it best to print this part of that discussion entire; it would scarcely be possible to make extracts from it.

cause or another require to be explained, so many sentences wanting in clearness, loosely connected, and made up of nothing but repetitions and commonplaces. After the introduction, in which Paul's style of introduction is closely imitated, take the first passage where there is a distinct thought expressed, i. 15. Here we are at a loss to know who the *τινὲς μὲν* are, whether *ἀδελφοὶ ἐν Κυρίῳ* or others. "Some preach Christ from envy and contentiousness, some from goodwill; some from love, because they know that I *κείμαι* for the defence of the Gospel."—What an expression, take it as we may! "But others preach Christ from party-spirit, not with pure intentions, thinking to add affliction to my bonds." What are we to conceive the difference between these two parties to have been? "What then! notwithstanding, every way, whether from pretence or in truth, Christ is preached." How could the apostle, who elsewhere judges his opponents with such severity, write this, and take pleasure even in those who preached Christ only *προφάσει*, without goodwill or honest intentions? If, as the interpreters remark, the doctrine which these people preached must have been anti-Pauline and Judæo-Christian, since men of Pauline views would not have sought to counteract his influence, we know from other quarters what he thought of such opponents, and how he saw in them simply perverters of sound doctrine. Why is he so indulgent here? Several explanations are attempted: that the church which these adversaries disturbed was not one which he himself had founded, and that in his situation at the time, he must have been impressed with the importance of the spread of the Gospel at Rôme, even in the Judæo-Christian form; but all this is quite inconsistent with the apostle's character. The passages cited could not have been written, save by an author who, considering that *χαίρειν* ought to be the key-note of the Epistle, made it so, and made the apostle look in that spirit beyond all disturbing and distressing influences, and who thought that the difference was quite capable of being harmonized. Hence the *χαίρω* which recurs so often, and the intenser form *χαρήσομαι*. And what is the cause

of his joy? The word *τοῦτο* which follows (ver. 19), fails to suggest any definite idea on the subject. And then the collocation of the *δέσεις* of his readers and the *ἐπιχορηγία τοῦ Πνεύματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Did the apostle ever call the intercession of his fellow-Christians, and the grace of God working in him in furtherance of his apostolic calling, an *ἐπιχορηγία τοῦ Πνεύματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, as he does here? Gal. iii. 5 speaks of an *ἐπιχορηγεῖν τὸ πνεῦμα*, and the author of our Epistle doubtless borrowed the expression from that passage; but then the apostle means by the *ἐπιχ. τὸ Πν.* the communication of the Spirit to Christians generally. And how could he, who said of himself as an apostle, *δοκῶ κἀγὼ Πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἔχειν* (1 Cor. vii. 40), speak of an *ἐπιχορηγία τ. Π. Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* only now reaching him? Whatever the *τοῦτο* (ver. 19) may mean, the apostle knows that it will fall out to his salvation, because he cherishes in general the hope that in nothing will he be put to shame, but *ἐν πάσῃ παρρησίᾳ* etc. What *παρρησία* means here is not apparent, but yet more curious is the expression *μεγαλ. Χρ. ἐν τῷ σώματί μου*. Of course it can only be taken in a qualitative sense, but in what other passage does the apostle use such an expression about Christ? Is it according to his ideas at all, to say that Christ is made great through him? or is it not rather Christ who glorifies himself through him and in him? As the writer's use of *ἐπιχορ. τ. Πν.* proceeded from a misinterpretation of Gal. iii. 5, so here his un-Pauline sentiment seems to have been suggested to him by the *μεγαλυνθῆναι* of 2 Cor. x. 15. What follows (ver. 20) *εἶτε διὰ ζωῆς*, etc., is a variation of the two passages, Rom. xiv. 7 and 2 Cor. v. 6. It was certainly quite in keeping with the situation in which the author of this Epistle conceived the apostle to be, to represent him as reflecting on his state, how he hovered between life and death; yet the whole passage, vv. 20-26, is nothing but a general meditation on life and death, and is not explained by anything special in the apostle's situation. The remaining verses of this chapter (27-30) contain an exhortation to a Christian walk, of so general a nature that it could have stood in any other epistle just as well. Yet

traces of other passages are not wanting here. It is usually said that *ἦτις* (ver. 28) refers grammatically to the following *ἔνδειξις*, but factually to *τὸ μὴ πτύρεσθαι*. But why should not *ἦτις* be referred to *πίστις τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*, so that *καὶ μὴ πτύρ. . . ἀντικ.* should properly have stood after *συναθλούντες*? Thus the *πίστις τοῦ εὐαγγελίου* is an *ἔνδειξις ἀπωλείας* to the one side, and *σωτηρίας* to the other, and that *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ* just as in the passage (2 Cor. ii. 15) where the apostle calls himself an *εὐωδία Χριστοῦ τῷ Θεῷ ἐν τοῖς σωζομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις*, etc. With regard to the *καύχημα* (ver. 26), compare 2 Cor. i. 14, 15.

It is principally the Second Epistle to the Corinthians of which we recognise the traces here. The explanation of this is evident; in no other Epistle do the apostle's personal relations to his readers appear so distinctly and directly as in that one, so that if the author was to make the apostle write a letter of so subjective a character as this one is, it was the Second Corinthian Epistle that he would naturally be led to follow. I will not insist too strongly on the fact that he points his exhortation to unity *τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν* (which is the chief purpose of the epistle, cf. ii. 1 sq.) by a reference to the person of Jesus, just as Paul enforces his exhortation to benevolence, 2 Cor. viii. 9. But the passage ii. 19-30, it seems to me, must have been written under the influence of that chapter in the Corinthian Epistle. And irrespectively of this there are several curious features in that section. The apostle here expresses the hope that he will soon be able to send Timothy to the Philippians, that he also may be of good comfort by learning their state. Why should he be longing so much for news, if Epaphroditus had brought him news from Philippi a short time before? And can we think that he would have parted with Timothy for this object; the man of whom he says in this same passage, that he has no one on whose friendship and sympathy and straight-forwardness in the work of the Gospel he can so fully rely? It seems scarcely probable that he would have sent away a companion whose services he so much required in the position he was in, merely to take despatches to Philippi, which Epaphroditus, who was sent off

at the same time, could have taken equally well, or to bring news from Philippi, a task which there was no reason why he of all men should undertake. How harshly does the apostle judge his fellow-labourers and friends, whom this matter leads him to refer to! It is by no means enough to soften down the sentence by saying that Luke for one was no longer present at Rome at the time. Verse 21 is so general that we cannot help including Luke and Titus in the scope of it. Only a writer who projects the situations of his Epistle out of his own fancy could be led into such exaggerations. Now let us compare with this section the passage 2 Cor. viii. 17-24. As in our Epistle Timothy and Epaphroditus, so there Titus and another, are despatched on an errand of great importance, and here as there the messengers are recommended in the most honourable terms. In 2 Cor. viii. 23, the deputies are termed *ἀπόστολοι ἐκκλησιῶν*, and Phil. ii. 23 Epaphroditus is not called *συνεργός* as Titus is in that passage, but with regard to the Philippians their *ἀπόστολος*. The same word is used in both Epistles of the apostle's willingness in respect to this journey, with the difference that, at Phil. ii. 28, the *σπουδαιότερος* is the apostle who sends, and at 2 Cor. viii. 17 it is Titus, and ver. 22 the other *ἀδελφός*, the persons sent. Both passages conclude with a special exhortation to give the deputies a worthy reception. The expression, Phil. ii. 29, *προσδέχεσθε οὖν αὐτὸν ἐν Κυρίῳ μετὰ πολλῆς χαρᾶς, καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους ἐντίμως ἔχετε*, represents exactly the apostle's sentiment, 2 Cor. viii. 23, 24. It is, of course, obvious, that the two passages differ in many points; the reasons alleged for the mission are different, for one thing. The author, that is to say, was not a mere copyist, only an imitator. But can it be regarded as a mere chance, that the two Epistles agree in the several common features we have noticed? And do we not find here an explanation of the mission of Titus, which would otherwise appear so unaccounted for? The writer of the Epistle wished to represent the apostle as giving the Philippians a peculiar proof of the love he bore them. He describes that as happening now, which had happened before in similar circum-

stances. As Titus on that occasion, so here Timothy is sent with another brother ; this other brother is very naturally Epaphroditus, and the author gives them their recommendation in the highest possible terms.

It may be urged that if analogies and resemblances like this are to prove anything, the theory that is based upon them ought to be shown to be capable of further demonstration. But this is actually the case here. At iii. 1 we come to the passage, which, as I have already shown (p. 54 *sq.*), is imitated from 2 Cor. xi. 13 *sq.* The two apologetes cannot of course allow that this is so ; they clearly represent to us (Lünemann even by printing the texts side by side) how different the terms of the two passages are ; and show, with all due emphasis, how natural it is that the apostle should speak more than once of such advantages, which there is no doubt that he did possess, and how appropriately he does so here. How could I, they say, overlook, in speaking of the apostle's circumcision on the eighth day, that this was just the difference between the born Jew and the Proselyte ; and a descent from the tribe of Benjamin, the tribe which remained true to the house of David at the division of the kingdom, was by no means a worthless distinction. And if the passage 2 Cor. xi. 13 *sq.* be alleged to have been made use of here, why not also Gal. i. 13 *sq.*, vi. 12, Rom. xi. 1 ? Objections of this kind are not easy to answer, yet they cannot destroy the impression which the passage makes on me, and I have further to remark that this is not a mere question of words and expressions which may be found here or there, but of the whole character of the passage under consideration, and of a phenomenon which is not isolated, but connected with many points equally remarkable. And a passage like iii. 1 *sq.* surely suggests pretty clearly that if an Epistle such as this should not be reckoned among the products of the apostle's own genius, he would be no great loser. What have the two apologetes done to justify this passage against the charge that the spirit of the apostle is conspicuously absent from it ? They cannot even clear the writer of the Epistle of his own confession of constant repetition ; they go so far

as to say that the apostle wrote several other letters of this kind to the Philippians; that the *γράφειν* (iii. 1) shows him to have been in constant correspondence with them. (How this would agree with ii. 19, we scarcely need to remark.) The *τὰ ἀντὰ γράφειν* refers to nothing but the *χαίρετε ἐν Κυρίῳ*, that is, to the contents of the Epistle generally, for the key-note and the leading thought of it are expressed in this constantly recurring *χαίρετε*. De Wette thinks it decisive against the reference to *χαίρετε*, that *ἀσφαλές* could only refer to some danger such as is spoken of in the sequel, and in the case of another writer this consideration would have some weight. In our Epistle, however, there are so many awkward and illogical connexions that it is not so pertinent. The objection from the 'dogs' (iii. 2) is not removed by mentioning passages in Homer where this predicate is given even to goddesses (Lünnemann, p. 27). The apostle calls his opponents 'ministers of Satan' (2 Cor. xi. 15), but there we know the reason for his doing so. Here, however, we can discern no object, no train of thought leading up to this climax. The only thread of connexion here is the author's reminiscence of 2 Cor. xi. 12. Here, as there, the apostle speaks of himself in contrast to his opponents. What he says of himself there may be expressed in the general statement that he desires to know of nothing but what he is in his relation to Christ, and that he will let his grace be sufficient for him. His imitator here makes him express the same idea in the words that he counts all things but loss, damage to his true welfare, because of the surpassing excellence of the knowledge of Jesus Christ his Lord, for whose sake he had suffered loss of everything that he had counted or might yet count precious. What follows ver. 9 looks like an attempt to give as general as possible an abstract of the teaching of the Pauline Epistles; as if the apostle were to make a confession of his faith, since he is speaking of personal subjects already, he is made to expound and define with all due accuracy the chief proposition of the Pauline system, the doctrine of justification by faith. Where else does the apostle speak of the righteousness that is by faith with this purely subjective and personal reference to

himself? where else does he make the resurrection, the sufferings, the death of Christ, the subject of an abstract theoretical contemplation, as here, that he may know *τὴν δύναμιν τῆς ἀναστάσεως*, etc.? How differently does he speak of all this, 2 Cor. iv. 14 *sq.* v. 14-21, xiii. 3, 4, Gal. ii. 19, *sq.* etc. What is the import of the *δύναμις τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ*, ver. 10? How loosely are all these ideas connected with each other! When the apostle comes in other passages to speak of these, the great elements of his religious consciousness, he develops them in the fullest and most pregnant connexion with each other, and places them in such lights that we look at once into the whole profundity, and the whole inner necessity of the divine economy of salvation. And when he speaks of his own experience, he gives us a very different, and a much more life-like picture of his inner life.

Then the dubious *εἶπὼς καταστήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τῶν νεκρῶν*, which is annexed to what precedes, and carries on the discourse to a discussion of this doubt. The apostle has been made to recapitulate his whole life, beginning at his circumcision, and now he goes on to the very end, to the resurrection from the dead. But how could the apostle be in any doubt as to his own attaining to the resurrection from the dead? Do not all the dead arise? He means, it is asserted, the blessed resurrection of which the apostle speaks, 1 Cor. xv. 52, but there certainly in a connexion which precludes the reader from thinking of any other. But even if this be what is meant, we must ask how the apostle could speak of the resurrection in a tone of doubt and uncertainty, as he does here. Take all these statements in connexion with each other; the apostle wishes to win Christ, and to be found in him with the righteousness that is by faith, in order to know the secret of the *δύναμις τῆς ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ*, and the *κοινωνία τῶν παθημάτων αὐτοῦ*, while he is made conformable to his death (this death, analogous to that of Jesus, can only be understood of the death of martyrdom). In these ideas ranged outwardly beside each other, it is hard to see what is the connexion between the practical *συμμορφοῦσθαι τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ*



and the theoretical *γνώμαι*, and still harder to understand how he, being *συμμορφούμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ*, can ask further as if in doubt *εἴπως καταστήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τῶν νεκρῶν*. How differently, and with a consciousness how well assured, does the apostle speak elsewhere of his communion with the life and death of Christ! Compare Rom. viii. 11 : *εἰ δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἐγείρας τὸν Χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν, διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα ἐν ὑμῖν*. 2 Cor. iv. 11 : *ἀεὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες, εἰς θάνατον παραδιδόμεθα διὰ Ἰησοῦν, ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ φανερωθῇ ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ ἡμῶν. . . εἰδότες ὅτι ὁ ἐγείρας τὸν Κύριον Ἰησοῦν, καὶ ἡμᾶς διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐγερεῖ, καὶ παραστήσει σὺν ὑμῖν*. How can he who regards himself as one *συμμορφούμενος τῷ θανάτῳ αὐτοῦ*, be in doubt even for a moment, that he has in himself, along with death, the living principle that shall awake him out of death? *Εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα*, Rom. vi. 5. Is it conceivable that views like these, wrought as they were into his inmost consciousness, should ever have left him? that at that particular time he could not speak with any such certainty of his union with the life and death of Jesus, or of the good and happy conscience he had so often spoken of before in looking forward to the supreme decision? If there be anything that our apostle cannot possibly have written, it is that dubious *εἴπως καταστήσω εἰς τὴν ἐξανάστασιν τῶν νεκρῶν*, where his whole fellowship with Christ is put in question. And where in the apostle's writings does the resurrection appear, as it does here, as the last event man has to look for, removed from all connexion with the momenta by which it is conditioned, and relegated, it appears, to the most distant future? To the apostle's mind the Parousia was so near, that for his own case his expectation was rather to be changed than to rise again. Can we, then, resist the conviction that the apostle himself would not have spoken thus, and that this dubious *εἴπως* can only have proceeded from him in the representation of another,—a writer who, not being the apostle himself, could not make him

speak with that confidence and assurance, which a man can only have for his own person. The double consciousness which such a writer can never get quit of has for its natural result, that in matters of which he is not positively certain he makes the man under whose name he writes express himself waveringly and undecidedly, as if either the one thing or the other might be true. Then also, in the words *τί αἰρήσομαι, οὐ γνωρίζω* (i. 22), the writer imports into the apostle's consciousness his own uncertainty as to which course the latter would have chosen; there can be no doubt that the apostle himself would have known quite well which of the two to choose. The same wavering uncertainty and want of definite views runs on in the following verses, 11-14, where the author makes the apostle review his own moral and religious condition in self-contemplations which have, as little as the foregoing, any resemblance to Paul's own ways of thinking. When the apostle says that he has not yet apprehended, but that he is already apprehended by Christ, we have here again, as i. 22, two propositions which mutually limit each other in such a way that it is hard to see what is meant at all. It is clear that if the apostle be laid hold on by Christ, he must lay hold of him also, but he says that he has not yet laid hold; what does this mean? of what has he not yet laid hold? and how does the justification by faith, spoken of in verse 9, agree with this not having yet laid hold? Has not he who has laid hold of Christ in faith (and we see this assurance of faith expressed everywhere in the apostle's writings), received in his faith everything on which it is necessary to lay hold in order to be certain of his union with Christ, and of his salvation? Is there such a faith with Paul, as is not also an assurance of faith? It seems indeed a very plausible explanation to say that the apostle could not yet have been assured of his moral perfection; but let it be considered whether moral perfection, such as would be spoken of here, be a thing which the Pauline ideas recognise at all? Faith, with all that faith comprehends, cannot be conditioned by moral perfection; else this moral perfection would simply bring us back again to the old justification by works.

This is of a piece with the whole character of the Epistle ; it is written altogether in a very soft subdued tone ; differences are neutralized, not stated in their extremest forms. It appeared to the author that in an Epistle to the Philippians the apostle might be expected to speak much of himself ; that in speaking to so dear a church, he would disclose his inmost heart in confidences and confessions. So he concluded that he could not make him speak too humbly, and meekly, and depreciatingly of himself. And in fact the apostle does speak of himself here in such a style that his true self is not recognisable at all. Humility is certainly a strong trait of his character, but where, even when speaking of himself most humbly, did he ever employ such an expression as this—*οὐχ ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον*? Deep as his humility is, it is lost in the preponderating sense of the unspeakable grace of God, which is mighty in him, even in his weakness, through which alone he is what he is ; through which, however, he is already what he is to be. If he himself had been speaking here, there could not have failed to be some reference to this grace of God. In a passage where he looks to what still lies before him, and describes his striving towards that goal with the same metaphor which the author of our Epistle is using here, verse 14, he says to his readers : *οὕτω τρέχετε, ἵνα καταλάβητε*, but of himself he says : *ἐγὼ τοίνυν οὕτω τρέχω, ὡς οὐκ ἀδήλων, οὕτω πικτεύω, ὡς οὐκ ἄερα δέρων*, 1 Cor. ix. 24 sq. He knows nothing here of any *οὐχ ὅτι ἔλαβον, διώκω δὲ, εἰ καὶ καταλάβω*. It is simply the writer of the Epistle whose views are not sufficiently clear to distinguish the ideas of perfection in the ethical and the physical sense. The author has not yet quite reached the goal of his earthly career ; martyrdom is not yet achieved but only impending, and so the writer thinks it necessary to throw doubt in this manner on the question of his having apprehended. I need not here comment further on the want of any clear and natural sequence of thoughts or language in the following verses ; and the laborious efforts of interpreters to bring something definite out of these wavering statements, and especially out of the vague description of the apostle's opponents : cf. p. 54.

Another point which is by no means settled, is the occasion which may have led the apostle to write such an Epistle to the church at Philippi. The present of money said at the close of the Epistle to have been brought to the apostle by Epaphroditus, is generally held to be a sufficient explanation. If the Epistle vindicated its Pauline character in other respects, there could be no objection to this; the apostle will then have written an epistle, the first object of which was to express his gratitude towards a church that had given him so flattering a proof of their continued attachment. Yet even this point does not stand out with any distinctness, nor have my doubts been removed by the utterances of the latest advocates of the Epistle. They insist that it is a misunderstanding on my part to take the words of the apostle, 1 Cor. ix. 12 *sq.* (that it is his principle to preach the gospel without recompence), as true generally; instead of referring them especially only to the case of the Corinthian church. I will not discuss whether the words of the apostle in that passage, especially in the verses 15-18, admit of such a limitation. The question is merely whether what is said, Phil. iv. 15, of the subsidies received by the apostle from the Philippians, naturally suggests that in this particular also the author derived his information from the second Corinthian Epistle, and used what he found there for his own purpose. There is no trace in the authentic letters of the apostle of his having stood in such a special relation to the church at Philippi as is implied in Phil. iv. 15. The name of that church is not once mentioned; he speaks only of the churches of Macedonia, and we might even conclude from 2 Cor. xi. 8, where he speaks of *ἄλλαι ἐκκλησίαι*, as distinct from the Corinthian church, from which he had received assistance in money during his residence in Achaia, that other churches also stood in this relation towards him. According to Phil. iv. 15, however; this relation subsisted only in the case of the Philippian church. It is said expressly: *οὐδεμία μοι ἐκκλησία ἐκοινώνησεν εἰς λόγον δόσεως καὶ λήψεως, εἰ μὴ ὑμεῖς μόνοι.* Thus it is very natural to suppose, and this agrees very well with the other considerations which make the origin of the Epistle doubtful,

that the author, having, as the Epistle shows, a special interest in the church at Philippi, attributes the help which the apostle says came to him from Macedonia, to that church specially and individually. He thought very naturally that the Philippians would not leave the apostle without aid during his imprisonment, and he made use of this circumstance as the occasion of his Epistle to the Philippians. It may indeed be argued that since, as we know from 2 Cor., the apostle did receive aid from the Christians of Macedonia, it is very probable that the Philippians actually did what is reported of them, iv. 15. Since, however, the Pauline origin of the Epistle is questionable on other and more general grounds, the contrary supposition is equally probable; it simply exhibits in this one particular that derivative character of the Epistle which has already been demonstrated on other grounds. In a genuine Pauline Epistle we should expect that, besides what is directly spiritual, there will be some new information not derivable from other sources, about the position of affairs at the time, the occasion of the writing, and the various matters of interest which a piece of the original reality could not fail to bring with it. Here, however, we have poverty of thought, want of any historical basis, unconnectedness; we have nothing specific or concrete, nothing to give us the impression of originality, nothing but a dull and colourless reflection. As for the want of connexion, it is indeed possible by making out a general view and index of the contents, to bring to light a certain succession of sections, and thus to make the transition from one to the other somewhat easier to the reader. In this business Mr. Brückner shows a considerable amount of dexterity (*op. cit.* p. 38 *sq.*). De Wette, again, calls the Epistle a graceful contexture of two main themes, the affairs of the Philippians and those of the apostle, and makes it apparent in a table that these two themes come forward alternately. Yet at a passage, iii. 1, where the connexion is difficult to trace, he is forced to take refuge in putting a dash between the two chapters, a way of connecting which is certainly not after the apostle's manner. The Epistle consists of a multitude of independent sentences; the larger sections

are placed after each other with a merely external connexion; *χαίρετε* forms the close of one and the beginning of another (ii. 18, iii. 1), and there is a total want of any idea to bind the whole together. If it be alleged, in explanation of this, that this Epistle is more properly a private letter than any of the others, it must be said that 2 Cor. is such a letter quite as much. Yet how different is it in this particular!

As for my theory regarding the person of Clemens and the historical statements connected with it, I have little to add. Lünemann and Brückner bring all their acuteness to bear against my view, and seek to prove that the Clement mentioned, iv. 3, must be a Philippian. Lünemann exalts the merit of his refutation by the construction of the words of that verse which he gratuitously imputes to me. The critics might have said much more simply, as Ritschl does in his review of my 'Paulus,' in the *Halle Allgemeine Lit. Zeitung*, 1847, p. 1008: "This Clement is, unless I be greatly deceived, a member of the church at Philippi, and has nothing to do with that Clemens Romanus so famous afterwards in legend." What more is wanted to prove the authenticity of the Epistle, if Messrs. Lünemann and Brückner agree in this opinion! It is certainly quite in keeping with the vagueness of our Epistle that nothing in it can be fixed to its own definite locality, so that it is impossible to know where the persons spoken of belong to, where the opponents who are impugned are to be sought for, whether at Rome or at Philippi. And the apostle himself speaks in one passage of his bonds and his anticipations of death, and, immediately after of setting out for Philippi (ii. 24). Yet the chief point is, and these critics seem to have overlooked it altogether, that Clement is expressly called a *συνεργός* of the apostle, and thus is reckoned one of those who worked with him and beside him, and that for some time, in the proclamation of the gospel. Although nothing whatever is known from the apostle's own writings about such a fellow-labourer, yet in itself it might quite well be the case that besides the Roman Clement, who appears in other quarters as an adherent of Peter, there was another apostolical man of this

name. But let it be considered what stage has been already reached in the criticism of our Epistle, before we come to speak of this Clement named at iv. 3. Here is an author who exhibits so little independence in other particulars, who has nothing to say that is new or peculiar to himself, whose sources of information can be pointed out in a number of instances. And from what other quarter should his Clement come than from that tradition to which the Clement already known to us belongs? With this the rest is explained at once. About the enigmatical *σύζυγος* of the apostle I have nothing to say any more than others. Schwegler thought of the apostle Peter, and this is at least as reasonable as the suggestion of Wieseler (*Chronologie der Apostelgeschichte*, p. 458), who takes this yoke-fellow to be Christ, "who helps every one to bear his burden," or that of Rückert, who recognises in him the brother-german of the apostle, said to be spoken of in the *ἀδελφὸς*, 2 Cor. viii. 18, 22.

An author writing in the name of the apostle was of course obliged to write a Pauline style, yet the language of the Epistle betrays the imitator in many particulars. There is a considerable number of words and expressions which are peculiar to this Epistle (cf. Zeller, *Studien zur neutest. Theol.*, *Theol. Jahrb.*, 1843, p. 507 sq.) I have also been struck with the repeated use of the particle *πλὴν*, which the author is fond of using as a particle of transition, to join together, externally, sentences, which have no very close connexion inwardly. In this short Epistle *πλὴν* is used in this way three times, i. 18, iii. 16, iv. 14. In the unquestioned Epistles of the apostle, the particle is found only once, 1 Cor. xi. 11. The particle *ἄρα*, on the other hand, which the apostle uses so frequently, is not once found here. Then the emphasis which the author seeks to gain by the repetition of the same word: i. 9, *μᾶλλον καὶ μᾶλλον*; ver. 18, *χαίρω, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαρήσομαι*; ver. 25, *μένω καὶ συμπαραμενῶ*; ii. 17, *χαίρω καὶ συγχαίρω*; ver. 18, *χαίρετε καὶ συγχαίρετε*; ver. 27, *λύπην ἐπὶ λύπην*; iii. 2, *βλέπετε τοὺς κύνας, βλέπετε τοὺς κακοὺς ἐργάτας, βλέπετε τὴν κατατομήν*; iv. 2, *Εὐδοκίαν παρακαλῶ καὶ Συντύχην παρακαλῶ*; ver. 17, *οὐχ ὅτι*

ἐπιζητῶ τὸ δόμα, ἀλλ' ἐπιζητῶ τὸν καρπὸν. The same word used twice in the same verse (iii. 4, 8). Synonymous or similar expressions are used in conjunction : i. 20, ἀποκαραδοκία καὶ ἐλπίς ; ii. 1, σπλάγχχνα καὶ οἰκτιρμοί ; ver. 2, ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ φρονήτε . . . τὸ ἐν φρονούντες ; ver. 16, οὐκ εἰς κενὸν ἔδραμον, οὐδὲ εἰς κενὸν ἐκοπίασα ; ver. 17, θυσία καὶ λειτουργία τῆς πίστεως ; ver. 25, Epaphroditus is called not only ἀδελφὸς καὶ συνεργὸς, but also, with the exaggeration characteristic of such writers, συστρατίωτης ; and on all this follows ὑμῶν δὲ ἀπόστολος, καὶ λειτουργὸς τῆς χρείας μου. In contrast to this the apostle calls Timothy, 2 Cor. viii. 23, simply his κοινωνὸς, and in reference to the Corinthians his συνεργὸς ; iii. 9, δικαιοσύνη ἢ διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, ἢ ἐκ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει ; iv. 7, τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν καὶ τὰ νοήματα ὑμῶν ; ver. 12, ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι ; ver. 18, ὁσμὴ εὐωδίας, θυσία δεκτὴ εὐάρεστος τῷ Θεῷ. This phraseology is not specially Pauline ; the writer who used it was clearly one who sought to make up for what was wanting in his thought by the exuberance of his expression. Then again, there are expressions which though of rare occurrence with Paul are yet so specifically Pauline, that the use of them at once informs us of the quarter from which they were drawn,—Thus i. 8, μάρτυς γάρ μου ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς, ὡς, etc., cf. Rom. i. 9 ; Phil. i. 10, δοκιμάζειν τὰ διαφέροντα, as Rom. ii. 18. The apostle calls himself, 1 Cor. ix. 23, a συγκοινωνὸς of the gospel, and our author makes him say to the Philippians (i. 7), that they are συγκοινωνοὶ τῆς χάριτος ; Phil. i. 19, ἐπιχορηγία τοῦ πνεύματος, as Gal. iii. 5 ; Phil. i. 26, καύχημα ὑμῶν, as 2 Cor. i. 14 ; Phil. i. 22, ζῆν ἐν σαρκί, as Gal. ii. 20 ; Phil. ii. 16, εἰς κενὸν ἔδραμον, as Gal. ii. 2 ; Phil. ii. 30, τὸ ἔργον Χριστοῦ, as 1 Cor. xvi. 10 ; Phil. ii. 30, ἀναπληροῦν τὸ ὑστέρημα, as 2 Cor. ix. 12 ; Phil. iii. 3, καυχᾶσθαι ἐν Χριστῷ, 1 Cor. i. 31, 2 Cor. x. 17, etc. We are also reminded of the Apocalypse xiii. 8, by the expression used in Phil. iv. 3, ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα ἐν βιβλῷ ζωῆς.



## SIXTH CHAPTER.

### EPISTLE TO PHILEMON.

THE Epistle to Philemon takes its place beside the three Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians, as bearing, like them, to have been written during the apostle's captivity at Rome. It is connected most intimately with the Epistle to the Colossians, Philemon having been, according to the general assumption, a member of the Church at Colosse. In this Epistle, indeed, there is no distinct indication of the fact, except that the persons from whom greetings are sent are the same as in the Epistle to the Colossians, with the exception of Jesus Justus, Col. iv. 11. And there is no doubt that at Col. iv. 9, this same Onesimus, whom the author of the Epistle represents as sent to the Colossians along with Tychicus, is called one of themselves. In the case of this Epistle more than any other, if criticism should inquire for evidence in favour of its apostolic name, it seems liable to the reproach of hypercriticism, of exaggerated suspicion, and restless doubt, from the attacks of which nothing is safe. What has criticism to do with this short, attractive, graceful and friendly letter, inspired as it is by the noblest Christian feeling, and which has never yet been touched by the breath of suspicion? Yet criticism cannot possibly take an apostolic origin for granted here, and forbear from inquiries. If indeed the other Epistles, which profess, as this one does, to have been written in the apostle's captivity, had been above all doubt, then the claim of this one to the same origin might have passed unchallenged. But the case is quite different when this Epistle is regarded in the light of the critical doubts which those others have certainly appeared to us to warrant. If so much can be urged

against the Pauline origin of these three Epistles, and still more of the Pastoral ones, and if it be so extremely doubtful whether we have any apostolical Epistles from the period of the imprisonment at all, what claim has this small Epistle, a mere letter of friendship, and dealing with a purely private affair, to be considered an exception to that judgment? Whatever weight may attach to this inference from analogy, yet on the other hand the demand is certainly fair, that we should look at the Epistle in itself, and show, if not the probability, at least the possibility of its having a non-apostolic parentage. The difference between Pauline and non-Pauline Epistles cannot surely be so small that this one, if not Pauline, should bear no mark whatever of its different origin. Now what can be proved in this direction? We need not insist upon the nature of the language used; on the fact that in this short Epistle there is a considerable number of expressions which never occur in the apostle's own writings at all, or only in the disputed writings; as *συστρατιώτης*, ver. 2, in the metaphorical sense that later writers are so fond of;<sup>1</sup> *ἀνήκον, ἐπιτάσσειν*, ver. 8; *πρεσβύτης*, ver. 9 (the reference to his age is certainly peculiar); *ἄχρηστος* and *εὐχρηστος*, ver. 11; *ἀπέχω* in the sense of "have back," ver. 15; *ἀποτίω, προσοφείλω*, ver. 19; *ὀνίνασθαι*, ver. 20; *ξενία*, ver. 22 (the expression *σπλάγγνα* is also striking, not as being un-Pauline, but as occurring three times over, ver. 7, 12, 20). It is the contents of the Epistle that chiefly arrest our attention: these contents are certainly peculiar, and distinguish the Epistle from all others. Here there are no mere commonplaces, no repetitions of things known long before, no indefinite doctrine; on the contrary, it deals with an actual occurrence belonging to a certain definite set of circumstances. We must ask, however, whether this subject, which is the occasion of the writing, is not itself so very singular as to arouse our suspicions? A slave has run away from his master because of some delinquency; a theft, it is commonly assumed. His master is a Christian at Colosse in Phrygia, and an intimate friend of the apostle Paul; the slave, comes to Rome, is brought in contact with the apostle in his im-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Pastoralbriefe, p. 99.

prisonment, is converted by him to Christianity, and thereupon sent back to his master at Colosse as a Christian slave. This is a very remarkable concurrence of chances, such as rarely indeed takes place; and the letter given to the converted slave by the apostle to carry to his master regards the occurrence from the Christian point of view, and makes it the subject of Christian reflection. The slave converted to Christianity is represented as a child born to the apostle in his old age and in his captivity, and therefore loved by him with all the greater tenderness. As a converted slave he has been changed out of an *ἄχρηστος*, one from whom his master derived no profit, but rather the reverse, into an *εὐχρηστος* for both, for his master and the apostle. Here there is a play, not only on the slave's name, Onesimus (from *ὄνημι*, *ὀνίημι*, to be of use, serviceable), but on the Christian name itself, for the heathens often said *Χρηστὸς* instead of *Χριστὸς*, a thing which the Christians did not take at all amiss.<sup>1</sup>

The leading idea is this—that when the slave returned to his master he had become a Christian: this idea is expressed with all due clearness, and everything that the Epistle contains besides is just the development and illustration of what Christianity was held to imply. The beautiful idea is here taken as a part of Christianity, that those whom it connects stand to each other in a real community of essence, so that the one sees in the other his own self, knows himself to be completely one with him, and is thus included in a union which is to last for ever. The converted slave is no longer the slave of his master; he is more than a slave, he is his brother beloved, all whose misdeeds and debts are now forgiven. The apostle who has converted the slave is not only the spiritual father of the man who through him is now regenerate; the master of the slave receives in him not merely the convert, but

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Justin, *Apol.* i. c. 4: Ἐκ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου ἡμῶν ὀνόματος χρηστότατοι ὑπάρχομεν. Χριστιανοὶ γὰρ εἶναι κατηγορούμεθα, τὸ δὲ χρηστὸν μισεῖσθαι οὐ δίκαιον. In the same way Athenagoras says of the heathens, *Leg. cap.* 2: εἰς τὸ ὄνομα ὡς εἰς ἀδίκημα ἐνυβρίζουσιν, οὐδὲν δὲ τὸ ὄνομα ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ οὐ πονηρὸν οὔτε χρηστὸν νομίζεται. Tertull. *Apol.* 3: Cum perperam Chrestianus pronuntiat a vobis (nam neo nominis certa est notitia penes vos), de suavitate vel benignitate compositum est.

also the apostle who converted him. *Σὺ δὲ αὐτὸν, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὰ ἐμὰ σπλάγγνα, προσλαβοῦ*, ver. 12. *Εἰ οὖν ἐμὲ ἔχεις κοινῶν, προσλαβοῦ αὐτὸν ὡς ἐμέ*, ver. 17. As the converted slave, being a Christian slave, is to the apostle in place of his Christian master, so through the same bond of identity, he unites the apostle who converted him with his Christian master, who must needs behold in him the converted, his converter also. Thus Christianity does away with all differences which separate men from one another; as a new principle of life it creates a new set of relations, where one lives in the other; the consciousness is a common consciousness in which all are one. The apostle becomes surety for the converted slave to his master, and answerable for his debt; but then the Christian master himself is the apostle's debtor, ver. 19. What one is the other is also, because all are one in the same unity. The play on the word Onesimus in ver. 20 is doubtless meant to convey the same idea; the apostle says, in a certain way, "as thy Christian slave has only now become an Onesimus worthy of his name, so shouldst thou, his Christian master, be my Onesimus; let me rejoice in thee (*ἐγὼ σοῦ ὀναίμην ἐν Κυρίῳ*), give me the full enjoyment of thy love, let my inmost consciousness as a Christian consciousness repose on thine."

Among those sweet utterances of an author deeply imbued with the Christian spirit, there is another thought especially deserving of remark. The apostle writes to the master of the slave, ver. 15, that perhaps the slave who deserted him, but who has now become a Christian, departed from him for a season, in order that he might receive him back for ever. He receives him back for ever if he receives him as a Christian. This aspect of Christianity is dwelt upon in the pseudo-Clementine homilies: Christianity is the permanent reconciliation of those who were formerly separated by one cause or another, but who by a special arrangement of affairs brought about by Divine Providence for that very purpose, are again brought together; through their conversion to Christianity they know each other again, the one sees in the other his own flesh and blood, himself.<sup>1</sup> The point of the

<sup>1</sup> Die Christliche Gnosis, p. 372 sq.

historical narratives in the homilies is to be found in these scenes of recognition and reconciliation ; and if, on this account, they have been called, and justly so, a Christian romance, why should not our Epistle be the embryo of a similar Christian fiction? The historical materials which it contains are not worked out, yet it evidently contains materials for a more extended treatment. The author of the Epistle, however, does not dwell on his story for its own inherent interest ; he rather pre-supposes the story as a vehicle for the idea which it is his object to set forth. The moral of the story is, that what one loses in the world, one recovers in Christianity, and that for ever ; that the world and Christianity are related to each other as separation and reunion, as time and eternity. This idea is expressed with all proper clearness in the words, ver. 15 : *τάχα γὰρ διὰ τοῦτο ἐχωρίσθη πρὸς ὄραν, ἵνα αἰώνιον αὐτὸν ἀπέχῃς*. The occurrence spoken of is thus to be considered teleologically ; but the teleological view of history is the mother of historical fiction, and if once the idea be regarded as the substance of what has taken place, it is no great step to regard what has happened as having happened only in representation, and that it might serve as the outward form of the idea. Thus it cannot be called either an impossible or an improbable construction of this Epistle, if we regard it as a Christian romance serving to convey a genuine Christian idea.

If this Epistle be interpreted in the way in which it must be, as soon as we regard it, not merely in itself, but in its historical and critical connexion with the other Epistles which stand nearest to it, then the peculiar excellence for which it is extolled becomes much more questionable. The excellence is, that it contains nothing of importance either in relation to doctrine or to Church history, but is invaluable as a document, bringing before us the apostle's cheerful and amiable personality, and as a practical commentary on Col. iv. 6. But if the Epistle be actually written by Paul, is it not remarkable that the occurrence, which in that case actually happened, is simply used to illustrate a certain idea, and that the enforcement of this idea is the real aim and subject of the Epistle ?

## SEVENTH CHAPTER.

### THE TWO EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS.

THE second of these Epistles has already been attacked by criticism; but the first has as yet excited no suspicions. The reason of this is probably to be found in the nature of its contents, in which there is nothing at all striking or peculiar. In the whole collection of the Pauline Epistles there is none so deficient in the character and substance of its materials as 1st Thessalonians. With the exception of the view advanced in iv. 13-18, no dogmatic idea whatever is brought into prominence, as is certainly the case in the Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians, and even in the short Epistle to Philemon. The whole Epistle is made up of general instructions, exhortations, wishes, such as appear in the other Epistles merely as adjuncts to the principal contents; what is accessory in the other cases is here the preponderating and essential element. This might appear at first sight to favour the opinion that the Epistle is genuine—there is so little for criticism to lay hold of. The very insignificance of the contents, however, the want of any special aim and of any intelligible occasion or purpose is itself a criterion adverse to a Pauline origin; but not merely do these negative considerations demand explanation: a closer view of the Epistle betrays such dependence and such want of originality as is not to be found in any of the genuine Pauline writings. The chief part of the Epistle is nothing but a lengthy version of the history of the conversion of the Thessalonians as we know it from the Acts. It contains nothing that the Thessalonians would not know already, and the

author may have taken his account of the transaction either from the Acts or from some other source. To begin with i. 4 *sq.*, *εἰδότες, ἀδελφοὶ . . . τὴν ἐκλογὴν ὑμῶν*, etc.; this merely states how the apostle preached the gospel to the Thessalonians, and they received it; ch. ii. 1, *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε, ἀδελφοὶ, τὴν εἴσοδον ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς . . . προπαθόντες καὶ ὑβρισθέντες, καθὼς οἶδατε, ἐν Φιλίπποις*, etc., points more distinctly to the circumstances of the apostle's coming to Thessalonica, and the way in which he worked there. In the same way iii. 11 *sq.*, *εὐδοκήσαμεν καταλειφθῆναι ἐν Ἀθήναις μόνοι, καὶ ἐπέμψαμεν Τιμόθεον*, etc., refers to what happened only a short time before, and what the Thessalonians were quite well aware of. As the writer admits by the perpetually recurring *εἰδότες* (i. 4), *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε* (ii. 1), *καθὼς οἶδατε* (ii. 2), *μνημονεύετε γὰρ* (ii. 9), *καθάπερ οἶδατε* (ii. 11), *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε* (iii. 3), *καθὼς καὶ ἐγένετο καὶ οἶδατε* (iii. 4), *οἶδατε γὰρ* (iv. 2), only such things are spoken of as the readers knew well already; the history which is recapitulated is not an old one, but, on the contrary, quite fresh and new. In addition to all this, we find in the narrative reminiscences more or less distinct, of other Pauline Epistles, particularly of those to the Corinthians. The passage (i. 5) *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει*, is manifestly an imitation of 1 Cor. ii. 4;—i. 6, *μιμηταὶ ἡμῶν ἐγενήθητε καὶ τοῦ Κυρίου*, of 1 Cor. xi. 1;—i. 8, *ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν . . . ἐξεληλύθειν*, reminds us of Rom. i. 8, *ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν καταγγέλλεται ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ*. The passage ii. 4 *sq.* is a brief recapitulation of the principles enunciated in the Corinthian Epistles: cf. 1 Cor. ii. 4; iv. 3 *sq.*; ix. 15 *sq.*, and particularly 2 Cor. ii. 17; v. 11. The following expressions especially remind us of the second Corinthian letter, *πλεονεξία* (ii. 5), cf. 2 Cor. vii. 2; with *δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι* (ii. 6), *μὴ ἐπιβαρῆσαι* (ii. 9), cf. 2 Cor. xi. 9; ii. 7 also reminds us of 1 Cor. iii. 2. Thus the Corinthian Epistles are easily recognizable both in the thoughts and the expressions of the two first chapters. Of the passages referring to the story of the conversion of the Thessalonians, ii. 14-16 is particularly noticeable.

The writer makes the apostle say here that the Thessalonians had become imitators of the Christian Churches in Judæa, since they had suffered the same things from their own countrymen as the Jewish Churches from the Jews, who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets, and persecuted him, the apostle, and pleased not God, and were contrary to all men, forbidding him to preach the gospel to the heathen, that they might be saved, to fill up their sins always; wherefore at last wrath is come upon them. This passage has a thoroughly un-Pauline stamp. It agrees certainly with the Acts, where it is stated that the Jews in Thessalonica stirred up the heathen against the apostle's converts, and against himself;<sup>1</sup> yet the comparison is certainly far-fetched between these troubles raised by the Jews and Gentiles conjointly and the persecutions of the Christians in Judæa. Nor do we ever find the apostle elsewhere holding up the Judæo-Christians as a pattern to the Gentile Christians. It is, moreover, quite out of place for him to speak of those persecutions in Judæa; for he himself was the person principally concerned in the only persecution to which our passage can refer. Then do we find in any other passage that the apostle couples together, as he does here, his own sufferings for the sake of the Gospel with those which the Jews inflicted upon Jesus and the prophets? (in what a very different sense does he speak of his *νέκρωσις Ἰησοῦ*? 2 Cor. iv. 10). Is this polemic against the Jews at all natural to him; a polemic so external and so vague that the enmity of the Jews to the Gospel is characterized solely in the terms of that well-known charge with which the Gentiles assailed them, the *odium generis humani*? It is this which is alleged against them, ver. 15, when it is said that they are not merely *Θεῷ μὴ ἀρέσκοντες*, but also *πᾶσιν*

<sup>1</sup> We may take this opportunity of observing the unhistorical elements of the story, Acts xvii. 6. The Jews are said to have stirred up the heathen with the words: *οἱ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἀναστατώσαντες οὗτοι καὶ ἐνθάδε πάρευσιν*. This *ἀναστατώσαι* is thus said to have taken place at the time when Paul came first into these districts; how long afterwards was it that Christianity appeared to the Romans so politically dangerous as implied in the words used here: *ἀπέναντι τῶν δογμάτων Καίσαρος πράττουσι*?



ἀνθρώποις ἐναντίοι, ver. 15. It is evident on the face of this passage that the story in the Acts is the only source of its information; the expressions ἐκδιώκειν, κωλύειν, correspond accurately with the course of events described in Acts xvii. 5 sq. The expression τοῖς ἔθνεσι λαλῆσαι ἵνα σωθῶσι clearly suggests to us the author's familiarity with the Acts. This expression is quite after the manner of that work (xiv. 1; xvi. 6, 32; xviii. 9), but one which the apostle Paul himself never uses of his own preaching.<sup>1</sup> And when it is said that after the Jews have continually filled up the measure of their sins, ἔφθασε δὲ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἡ ὀργὴ εἰς τέλος, what does this suggest to us more naturally than the punishment that came upon them in the destruction of Jerusalem?

It is generally supposed that the apostle wrote the First Epistle to the Thessalonians during his first residence at Corinth, soon after Silas and Timothy had arrived from Macedonia (Acts xviii. 5). Our Epistle agrees perfectly with the Acts in making Timothy, who had left Thessalonica along with Paul, but remained at Berea while Paul went on to Athens, rejoin him at Corinth, (iii. 6). It represents Timothy, however (iii. 1), as having already been with Paul at Athens, and sent back thence to Thessalonica. The news which Timothy then brought the apostle (iii. 6) was obtained on this second journey. All this happened shortly after the apostle's first visit to Thessalonica, and so the Epistle must have been written a few months after that visit. If this be so, it is certainly strange how he could write to the Thessalonians at such length about things which must have been fresh in their memory; it is strange also that he should give such a description of the state of the Church as, it is obvious, can only refer to a Church that had been some time in existence. How can it be said of Christians belonging to a Church only lately founded, that they were patterns to all the believers in Macedonia and Achaia, that the fame of their reception of the word of the Lord has not only gone abroad in Macedonia and Achaia, but

<sup>1</sup> λαλεῖν, 1 Cor. ii. 13, iii. 1, cannot be compared to the above expression; the meaning of λαλεῖν in these passages is simply "speak;" it is not equivalent to λαλεῖν τὸν λόγον.

that their faith *ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ἐξελέλυθεν*, that people of every place were speaking of them, how they were converted, and turned from their idols to God, i. 7 *sq.*? How can the apostle say after so short an absence that, as he greatly desired to see them face to face he had been not only once, but twice on the point of coming to them? (ii. 17, iii. 10.) Here we have an echo of the Corinthian letters, where there is frequent mention of such repeated journeys and designs of travel. How can the brotherly love of the Thessalonians, which they exhibited to all the brethren in all Macedonia, be spoken of as a virtue already so widely proved? (iv. 9.) Were admonitions to a quiet and industrious life, such as are given in iv. 11, 12, necessary even at that early period? It is usual to pass very lightly over all these things, and perhaps to place the date of the Epistle somewhat later. Another critic, on the contrary, brings all his acuteness into play to find out new possibilities, and defend the old view as being after all the most probable. Such palliatives, however, fail to remove the infirmity; it lies deeper, and can only be covered over for a moment by the treatment.

As for the section, iv. 14-18, and the view it contains of the resurrection of the dead, and the relation of the departed and the living to the second coming of Christ, this seems to agree very well with 1 Cor. xv. 52; but it goes far beyond what is taught there, and gives such a concrete representation of those transcendent matters as we never find in the apostle. Yet, if only the apostolic character of the Epistle stood firmer upon other grounds, the countenance it obtains from the passage named would save it from condemnation as unapostolic. Since, however, this is not the case, and since not only does the exhortation on the subject of the second coming occupy a prominent place (iv. 13-18; v. 1-11), but the letter is pervaded throughout by the expectation of that event (i. 10; ii. 19; iii. 13; iv. 6; v. 23), it would appear that the First Epistle arose out of the same interest in the second coming which is more decidedly expressed in the Second. With regard to this leading thought, both Epistles are intimately connected with each other. The main purpose of the First must there-

fore be to give a comforting view of the second coming, such as the Christians of that age required.

This is the chief theme of the Second Epistle, and here the question arises, whether such absorption in the visions of the second coming of Christ as we find in the first, and much more markedly in the second, of these Epistles, can be considered as properly belonging to our apostle. The essential part of the Second Epistle is the section ii. 1 *sqq.*, and what we have here is the Christian representation of Antichrist in its essential features, as it rose out of its sources in Judaism, especially from the prophecies of the book of Daniel. Now it cannot be considered unlikely *a priori* that the apostle Paul shared the views of his Jewish countrymen at the time; his undisputed Epistles afford us abundant evidence how much his thought and imagination were still imbued with Jewish elements. On the other hand, however, we must remember that here is a man who resolutely broke through the limits of the national consciousness, and rose to a point of view essentially different from the Jewish, to whom, therefore, we must beware of ascribing more sympathy with Jewish ways of thinking than there is good evidence for. We must not overlook the fact that in this matter of the second coming of Christ, as much as in anything else, the strongest repulsion must have been discovered between the Pauline view of Christianity and the Judæo-Christian view. If, according to the apostle Paul, the Christian consciousness was taken up almost exclusively with the subjective relation of the individual man, feeling his need of salvation, to Christ and all the different elements of that relation, then the Christian's attention must simply have been turned away from a circle of ideas, where the essence of Christianity was made to consist only in the outward realization of the Messianic kingdom, conceived according to the form of the Old Testament theocracy. If the Pauline character of the section now under review is to be judged by any definite canon, that canon must be its measure of agreement with the genuine letters of the apostle. The question is thus narrowed to the relation which the two

passages dealing with the *parousia* in the Thessalonian Epistles, bear to those passages which alone fall to be considered here, 1 Cor. xv. 23-28, and 51, 52. Here the apostle is occupied with the same class of ideas, and we shall see in what sense he accepted them, and how far he was disposed to give himself up to them. But what a difference is here! In 2 Thess. at least this is the all-engrossing question, it is specially discussed; in 1 Cor. it is only touched by the way as a very subordinate question, and that in a connexion where the apostle is taking a broad sweep over the chief epochs of the development and final consummation of the kingdom of God, and cannot avoid touching on the point. And with what measured reserve does he say the little that he thinks it necessary to say; how carefully does he seem to avoid what does not belong to the matter in hand, or what seems to have a less immediate practical interest, such as the question how it is to be with those who are living at the time of the *parousia*. The last trumpet is the signal of the resurrection, which takes place at once when it has sounded; the curious view of an *ἀπάντησις ἐν νεφέλαις* is not even hinted at; and when the subjection of hostile powers is spoken of as preparing the way for this final catastrophe, the last enemy who is overcome is not Antichrist, but death. The views expressed in 1 Cor. are entirely free from the specific Jewish stamp of the later period, the two representations of the last time are related to each other as the Messianic prophecy of Ps. cx. quoted in 1 Cor. xv. 25 *sq.*, and that of the prophet Daniel, ch. vii. and xi. It is therefore scarcely probable that an author who expresses his views of the last things with such caution and reserve, as in 1 Cor. xv., should, in a writing of earlier date, have entered into the question so fully and given evidence of a belief entirely preoccupied with Rabbinical opinions.<sup>1</sup> We may

<sup>1</sup> It is said that Acts xvii. 7 shows the apostle's preaching at Thessalonica to have been mainly apocalyptic, to have hinged, that is to say, upon the expectation of the coming of Christ as king of the kingdom of God, so that the Jews took occasion to raise a charge against his adherents, as if they were about to desert from the emperor to another king, Jesus. This interpretation of the passage is entirely arbitrary; cf. De Wette, *Thess. Brief*, p. 92.

go further, and assert that the view expressed in 2 Thess. ii. is in direct opposition to the apostle's own expectation, 1 Cor. xv. ; for he writes, 1 Cor. xv. 52, on the assumption that he himself is to witness the *parousia*, and to be changed, along with those living at the time. Here there is a simple and confident faith in the immediate approach of Christ's coming. In 2 Thess. ii., however, we find a theory introduced to explain why the *parousia* cannot take place so soon ; thus it had evidently been expected for some time when this was written. Now it was impossible to give up faith in the reality of the event, and so it was said that it had been delayed by some obstructive agency in the way. This obstruction, this *κατέχων*, the agency through which the final catastrophe was still delayed, was believed to be the Roman Empire, as the fourth monarchy of the prophecy of Daniel, which had to fulfil its definite period before the kingdom succeeding it, the kingdom of Christ, could appear. At the time when the Second Epistle was composed, the increasing sin and godlessness of the world were believed to be the signs of the impending catastrophe ; the elements of evil were now consolidating themselves into the definite form and personality of Antichrist ; yet the actual advent of the catastrophe was still relegated to the dim and distant future. The principal exhortation that our Epistle contains is therefore to the effect that Christians should not be disquieted by any delusive assertion of the approach of the *parousia*, nor surrender their calm and rational frame of mind ; since it was impossible for Christ to appear before Antichrist came, and Antichrist could not come as long as that continued which had to precede the beginning of the last era. How far does this take us, not only beyond the apostle's point of view, but beyond the period in which he lived !

The view expressed in the First Epistle on the subject of the *parousia* is similar on the whole to the apostle's own view, 1 Cor. xv. 51 ; inasmuch as the principal element in it is the exhortation regarding the living and the departed. And here our Epistle simply repeats what the apostle himself had said. The Second Epistle

differs from the apostle's views on the subject, and goes therefore beyond the First. Yet this relation of the two Epistles to each other can scarcely warrant us to attribute the Second Epistle entirely to the writer's intention to correct the representation of the nearness of the *parousia* in the First Epistle by his own doctrine of Antichrist which removed that event further off. It is perfectly conceivable that one and the same writer, if he lived so much in the thought of the *parousia* as the two Epistles testify, should have looked at this mysterious subject in different circumstances and from different points of view, and so expressed himself regarding it in different ways. However this may be, the Epistles are alike in this, that they are greatly wanting in original matter, and that this deficiency discredits their apostolic authorship. The First Epistle merely repeats what was well known before. The dependence of the second on the first shows that the writer looked about him for some precedent which might warrant him in investing his doctrine of the *parousia*, which was the main thing he had to bring forward, with the form of a Pauline Epistle. The whole of the first chapter has reference, as has justly been observed, to the First Epistle. The commencement exactly resembles the commencement of 1 Thess. ; what is said about *θλίψις* for the sake of the gospel has several parallels in 1 Thess. ii. and iii.<sup>1</sup> At ver. 6 the author goes on to the main idea of the *parousia*, as it had already been expressed in 1 Thess. ; only that his view of Antichrist and of the judgment to follow his subjection is even here before his mind, as an addition to and modification of that earlier view. Ver. 11 *sq.* is similar to 1 Thess. i. 3, iii. 12 *sq.*, v. 23 *sq.* As little can ii. 13-17 deny its similarity to 1 Thess. i. 4 *sq.*, iii. 11 *sq.* The form of address *ἀδελφοὶ ἠγαπημένοι ὑπὸ Κυρίου*, which occurs nowhere in Paul's own writings, is found here, and is evidently derived from 1 Thess. i. 4. Chapter iii. contains a number of sentences borrowed and extended

<sup>1</sup> De Wette (K. Erkl. p. 129) insists upon the present *αἰς ἀνέχεσθε* against Kern (whose Abh. über 2 Thess., Tüb. Zeitschr. f. Theol. 1839, 2 H. S. 20 *sq.* may be compared). This present, however, merely serves to show us how the author transferred what had been said in 1 Thess. to his own time.

from 1 Thess. Compare 2 Thess. iii. 1-2 with 1 Thess. v. 25 ; 2 Thess. iii. 5 with 1 Thess. v. 24, iii. 11-13 ; 2 Thess. iii. 6-12 with 1 Thess. ii. 6-12 ; iv. 11 *sq.*, v. 14 ; 2 Thess. iii. 16 with 1 Thess. v. 23. The writer's want of originality is also apparent in the phrase *μη̄ ἐκκακήσητε καλοποιούντες*, which is evidently borrowed from Gal. vi. 9 ; and only seeks variety by changing τὸ καλὸν ποιεῖν into καλοποιεῖν. Phrases like *εὐχαριστεῖν ὀφείλομεν* are not, indeed, absolutely un-Pauline, yet circumlocutions such as this, instead of the simple Pauline *εὐχαριστεῖν* and with the further addition *καθὼς ἄξιόν ἐστιν* ; conscious exaggerations, as *ὑπεραυξάνει ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν καὶ πλεονάζει ἡ ἀγάπη ἐνὸς ἐκάστου πάντων ὑμῶν* (compare with this 1 Thess. iii. 10-12) ; strange and far-fetched expressions, as *ἐπιστεύθη τὸ μαρτύριον ἡμῶν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς* (i. 10) ; *δέχεσθαι τὴν ἀγάπην τῆς ἀληθείας* (ii. 10) ; with vague and confused relations of object to subject, as *ἀξιοῦν τῆς κλήσεως, πληροῦν πᾶσαν εὐδοκίαν ἀγαθώσυνης* (i. 11), are certainly not calculated to give evidence for a genuine Pauline origin. And lastly, the *καὶ* before *διὰ τοῦτο* (ii. 11), and *αἰρεῖσθαι* (ii. 13) instead of *ἐκλέγεσθαι*, for the idea of election, are distinctly un-Pauline.

The conclusion, iii. 17, 18, affords strong evidence against this Epistle. In order to understand it properly, we have first of all to dispose of the incorrect assertion that the greeting is contained in ver. 17 itself, and not in the benediction which follows in ver. 18. De Wette argues against this latter view, that in 1 Cor. xvi. 21, Col. iv. 18, the benediction does not immediately follow the words, *ὁ ἀσπασμὸς τῇ ἐμῇ χειρὶ* ; that, on the contrary, in the former passage, these words are succeeded by something quite opposite to the spirit of blessing, namely, by malediction. But this does not prove anything ; the Pauline benediction is not wanting in either of these Epistles. All Pauline Epistles have the same benediction at the close, though with some verbal differences ; and so the *ἀσπασμὸς* in this case is evidently meant to stand at the close of the Epistle after the Pauline manner, in the words *ἡ χάρις τοῦ Κυρ.* etc. Where is the greeting, if not in these words ? for *ὁ ἀσπασμὸς*, etc., is not itself the greeting, but only announces it. Now, the

statement made here that the apostle added this greeting and benediction to his Epistle with his own hand, is not in itself peculiar; the same statement is made, 1 Cor. xvi. 21, Col. iv. 18. But if we compare the conclusion of our Epistle with that of 1 Cor., we notice a very remarkable difference. Why does the apostle add the greeting to 1 Cor. with his own hand? clearly in order to give his readers one more living proof of his affection towards them. But in our Epistle the author has made it very apparent what a different intention the assertion is meant to serve. He says, *ὅ ἐστι σημεῖον ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιστολῇ οὕτω γράφω*. The words, then, stand here, not to enhance the affection of the greeting, but as a sign whereby the Epistle is to authenticate itself as Pauline, as a critical mark, to distinguish the genuine from the spurious. Not only is this quite un-Pauline in comparison with 1 Cor.; it is an unmistakable proof that our Epistle was written at a time when spurious apostolic writings were known to be in circulation, and there was cause for inquiry into the genuineness of each production. Against this inquiry no one could have a stronger motive to take precautions than one actually engaged in giving a pretended Pauline letter to the world. How far is the apostle himself from any such idea of spurious Epistles; in how different a spirit did he write his autograph greeting, and how could it ever have occurred to him to set up in an Epistle, which, according to the general view, is one of the very first of the series, a criterion applicable to each one; there being, on this hypothesis, several of them already in circulation? Are we to suppose that, at the time when the apostle had written hardly any Epistles at all, pretended Pauline ones had already made their appearance, which called for caution in discriminating, such as is given here, ii. 2; or could he foresee so distinctly, even so early as this, that he would have a large correspondence afterwards? And more, how could he reasonably regard such a criterion of the genuineness of his Epistles to be of the slightest value? For as soon as the mark became known, it would be used with all due care to foist in any Epistle that needed it. The idea of taking the Pauline form of salutation in



this sense can only have occurred to a later writer, who had a series of Pauline Epistles already before him, and who, being about to augment their number with a new one, not only provided his own with this badge of Pauline origin, but thought it necessary to draw attention to the fact. The repeated mention of Epistles, 1 Thess. v. 27, 2 Thess. ii. 2, 15; iii. 17, seems to ascribe an importance to the writing of Epistles, which it is impossible it should have had for the apostle, at least at the time from which these Epistles are professedly dated, but which it very naturally possessed in the eyes of a writer for whom the apostle himself existed nowhere but in his Epistles. How clearly does the exhortation given, 1 Thess. v. 27, with all due emphasis, reproduce the views of a time which regarded the apostle's letters no longer as the natural channels of spiritual intercourse, but as sacred objects to which the proper reverence was to be shown by forming as minute as possible an acquaintance with their contents, especially through public reading of them. In this way the custom arose of reading those Epistles, and others deemed important, before the congregation. But how could the apostle himself have thought it necessary formally to adjure the Church to which his Epistles were addressed, not to leave them unread? That could be done only by an author who was not writing in the living pressure of the circumstances of which he treated, but transporting himself while writing into an imagined situation, and who wished to vindicate for his own pretended apostolic Epistles the consideration with which the original apostolic Epistles had become invested by the growth of custom.

The accustomed apologetic method will doubtless bring up one objection and another to the arguments I have here advanced. Yet if they be fairly weighed in their whole connexion, they can scarcely produce any other impression than this: that both the Epistles are entirely destitute of marks of original Pauline authorship. Their character is best explained on the hypothesis that they are letters formed on the Pauline model, in order to impress upon the Christian consciousness an idea for which the passage

1 Cor. xv. 51 seemed to afford good grounds for claiming the apostle's authority,—the idea of the *parousia*, with the definitions and modifications which the time seemed to require.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The above discussion has been printed, without alteration, from the first edition. If the author had reached this point in his revision of the work, he would have remodelled this chapter, and, for one thing, have incorporated in it the substance of his treatise “die beiden Briefe an die Thessalonicher, u.s.w.” (Th. Jahrb. xiv. 1855, p. 141). I, of course, have not felt myself warranted to introduce this change, but as that treatise not only contains valuable investigations, especially with regard to the second Epistle, but also advances a different view from the above of the relation of the two Epistles to each other, I have printed it in the Appendix to this volume.

## THIRD CLASS OF PAULINE EPISTLES.

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### EIGHTH CHAPTER.

#### THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

EVEN at the present stage of the criticism of the Pauline Epistles, the Pastoral ones stand distinctly marked off from the class we have been considering, as a set of deutero-Pauline writings, doubts of whose authenticity are generally recognised as reasonable. The suspicion which Schleiermacher first conceived with respect to the First Epistle to Timothy has since then struck deep roots in the soil from which the three Epistles sprang; so that we need no longer fear any very decided reclamation when we appeal to those three Epistles in proof of the fact that there are forged Pauline letters in our canon. The more carefully and impartially these writings are examined, critically and exegetically, the less will it be possible to doubt their late origin. One critic and interpreter, the competency of whose judgment cannot be denied, has already declared, as the result of repeated examinations and of exegetical treatment in which no point was left untouched, that the verdict that they are spurious is the only possible one for him, and, he believes, for any one who does not close his eyes.<sup>1</sup> As this simply confirms the conclusions which I reached some time ago, and published in a work devoted to the subject, dealing especially with

<sup>1</sup> De Wette : Kurze Erkl. der Briefe an Titus, Tim., und die Hebr. 1844, Vorr. S. vi. Crœdner (das N. T. nach Zweck, Ursprung, Inhalt für denkende Leser der Bibel, 1841-43) has also, Th. ii. S. 96 *sq.*, renounced his previous eclectic opinion, and declared unconditionally his belief that the three Epistles are spurious.

these Epistles,<sup>1</sup> and as I still adhere to the view developed in that work, I need not now do more than indicate the point at which that view strikes in upon our present discussion. I will, therefore, content myself here with briefly mentioning the chief considerations on which the judgment of criticism respecting these Epistles rests, so far as it is already established.

To one seeking to form a correct judgment of the nature of the Pastoral Epistles, a main question for investigation must be found in the heretics who are mentioned here as playing a considerable part in the world. In the work I have mentioned, I was the first to assert, and to give evidence for the assertion, that in these heretics we recognise throughout the familiar features of Gnosticism; and nothing of importance has since been urged against this view. It is no arbitrary theory, but the nature of the case, that shuts us up to this one conclusion, that these heretics can belong to no other school. What the latest defender of the genuineness of the Pastoral Epistles<sup>2</sup> urges against this conclusion, is nothing more than this: that "at the period from which the Pastoral Epistles spring, the higher spirits are not yet developed and arranged into systems, that they appear as mere loose formless existences, and that, though they contain the elements or bases for more developed growths, yet what they want is just that form which, as members of the Gnostic systems, they possess." But how unnatural is the assumption that if the author of the Pastoral Epistles wished to controvert the Gnostics, he would himself have described their systems; and how unfair and absurd is the demand made on those who seek to prove that those Gnostic-looking representations actually belong to Gnosis! If the true state of affairs is really to be acknowledged, two things must first of all be allowed: first, that there may have been Gnostic systems in existence at the time, which may possibly be referred to here, even though the writer of the Epistles does not set

<sup>1</sup> Die sogenannten Pastoralbriefe des Apostels Paulus, 1835.

<sup>2</sup> Matthies, Erklärung der Pastoralbriefe mit besonderer Beziehung auf Authentie und Ort und Zeit der Abfassung derselben, 1840, S. 165. Compare my review of this work in the Jahrb. für wissenschaftl. Kritik, 1841, Jan. Nr. 12 f.

forth the heresies which he is combating in their systematic form, but only characterizes them in general terms; and then, that the task of historical criticism is to make combinations on the grounds of probability, and thus to arrive at the actual state of the case. If these two things be allowed, then we have simply to determine whether the features of the doctrine controverted in these Epistles warrant us, from what we can understand of them, to assume that it is no other doctrine than the Gnosis known to us in history. That this conclusion is warranted, De Wette now allows;<sup>1</sup> he only does not take the further step with me, that the Gnostics attacked here are the Marcionites in particular. And yet in the face of such clear indications of the Marcionite doctrine, as we have 1 Tim. vi. 20, this conclusion ought not to offer any great difficulty; if the apostolic origin of the Epistles is fairly given up, then half-a-century backwards or forwards in the date of their origin cannot so much matter, at least where, as is here the case, no further reasons can be adduced against a later date. This late origin of the Pastoral Epistles has a further point in its favour, which is not noticed in my work on those Epistles, but of which I spoke later in another place.<sup>2</sup>

The passage quoted by Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. iii. 32, from the historical work of Hegesippus, is an important one for the criticism of the Pastoral Epistles, especially of 1 Tim. Hegesippus says here distinctly, in speaking of the origin of the heresies and of their entrance into the Church, till then pure and immaculate, that only when the choir of the apostles became extinct did the *ψευδώνυμος γνώσις* boldly lift up its head. Now how could Hegesippus have said this, if the apostle Paul, as author of the pastoral Epistles, had mentioned this *ψευδώνυμος γνώσις* by the same name as a phenomenon existing at his time? We might suppose that Hegesippus happened not to know of 1 Tim. as a Pauline Epistle; yet the fact that there had been at that earlier period a Gnosis

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* p. 119 *sq.*, cf. p. 117.

<sup>2</sup> In the essay on the origin of the episcopate, which may be consulted on this whole subject, *Tub. Zeitschr. für Theol.* 1838, 3 H. S. 27 f.

falsely so called, could not possibly have escaped him. This piece of evidence speaks with all possible distinctness against the apostolic authorship of our Epistles, and the passage from which it is taken is the more remarkable, that in other points also it betrays an affinity with our Epistles which cannot be altogether the result of chance. Not only is the peculiar phrase *ψευδώνυμος γνώσις* found there as well as here, but the phrase *έτεροδιδασκαλείν* (with which Schleiermacher was so much struck, and which seemed to him to imply the existence at that time of the word *έτεροδιδάσκαλος*, a word which, he thought, did not occur)<sup>1</sup> finds its parallel in the term *έτεροδιδάσκαλοι* which Hegesippus (*in loc. cit.*) applies to those heretics. Again, Hegesippus speaks of a *ύγιής κανών τού σωτηρίου κηρύγματος*, and in the same way the phrase *ύγιαίνουσα διδασκαλία* is used of sound doctrine, 1 Tim. i. 10, and elsewhere. There are only two possible explanations of this: that Hegesippus had our Epistle before him, or the writer of our Epistle the work of Hegesippus. But Hegesippus can scarcely, considering his Ebionite views, have drawn from an Epistle supposed to be by Paul; and thus we are shut up to the latter alternative which is in itself the more probable of the two. Thus the origin of 1 Timothy at least belongs to the period of the Marcionite Gnosis. Hegesippus<sup>2</sup> enumerates Marcionites, Carpocratians, Valentinians, Basilidians, Saturninians, as sects who, with Simon Magus at their head, and springing from the seven Jewish heresies (it agrees very well with this that the heretics of the Pastoral Epistles are characterized in part as judaizers), as *ψευδόχριστοι, ψευδοπροφήται, ψευδαπόστολοι, έμέρισαν την ένωσιν τής έκκλησίας φθοριμαίους λόγοις*, or as it is expressed before, *άκοαίς ματαιαίς*. This agrees with the *έξετράπησαν εις ματαιολογίαν* of 1 Tim. i. 6. How then can it be thought so improbable that the Marcionite is one of the Gnostic doctrines attacked in these Epistles?

A second point in the criticism of the Pastoral Epistles, and one of no less importance than that just spoken of, is the reference

<sup>1</sup> Sendschreiben über den sogenannten ersten Brief des Paulus an Timoth., p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> Eusebius, Eccl. Hist., iv. 22.

they contain to the government and the external institutions of the church. This second point is intimately connected with the first. The Gnostics, as the first heretics properly so called, gave the first occasion for the episcopal constitution of the church. Now, if there were heretics of the same stamp in the age of the apostle Paul, then it was quite natural and proper that the importance of a well-defined constitution for the Christian church should have been urged at that earlier period. If, however, it appear unlikely that there were such heretics at that time, then this also must appear unlikely; then these ecclesiastical arrangements will be devoid of any historical occasion or connexion. And if the mention of such things in a Pauline Epistle be in itself a curious and suspicious circumstance, then the argument it furnishes against the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles is all the stronger. In any case it must appear very remarkable that only in these Epistles do we find the apostle Paul insisting with such serious emphasis on ecclesiastical institutions. In those Epistles which supply us with the surest standard of his principles, he never betrays the slightest interest in such things, not even when they might be thought to lie directly in his way, as in his dealings with a church like that of Corinth. And this want of interest in such things is not merely accidental; it is founded deep in the whole spirit and character of Pauline Christianity, so that we may not without substantial reasons make him the author and supporter of institutions which were not long in showing how closely they were akin to the hierarchical spirit of Judaism. This feature in the pastoral Epistles is so peculiar, that those who defend their genuineness have felt themselves compelled to seek for special motives, which may have led the apostle to impart such pastoral instruction in this instance. It must have been, it is alleged, very necessary and very beneficial for these churches, that the greatest attention should be bestowed on organization; and it was very fitting that this should be done in private letters, such as these, addressed to men who were functionaries in the church and associates of the apostle. But it is not proved that in this case there was any

such special need; and this explanation is bound up with hypotheses which stand themselves in need of proof. The consideration that, as private letters, these Epistles afforded peculiar opportunities for imparting such instruction can weigh for nothing, if we reflect that the form of the writing would not determine the object, but, on the contrary, the object the form.<sup>1</sup>

A further point in the criticism of the pastoral Epistles is that it is impossible to find a suitable place for the composition of them in the apostle's history as we know it. The latest attempt, that made by Matthies, furnishes an additional proof of this assertion. The Epistle to Titus is said to have been written during the

<sup>1</sup> One of the most decisive proofs of later origin is the ecclesiastical institution of widows, spoken of 1 Tim. v. 3. This passage is still misunderstood. The explanation given by Matthies is quite beside the mark. De Wette (Preface, p. vi.) thinks he has cleared up the whole difficulty. But the passage can never appear in a clear light so long as the expression *χήρα* is not taken in the sense which I have shown to be the ecclesiastical one (cf. especially Ignat. Ep. ad Smyrn., c. 13). If the *χήραι*, vv. 11 and 14, be actually bereaved persons, then we are met by the great difficulty that the apostle gives two directly contradictory precepts about them. According to vv. 11 and 14, the younger widows should marry again; and, according to ver. 9, a second marriage is to exclude them, should they become widows again, from the *viduatus* of the Church. De Wette says the distinction was a rare one, to which many did not aspire, and that the author set up the regulation, ver. 9, only out of respect for the custom of the church then subsisting; but this is very superficial. How can it be thought that a writer who gives such precepts would deal so loosely with second marriage, a thing so repugnant to the sentiment of the time? Not to insist upon the simple and unqualified *γαμεῖν*, ver. 14, the passage does not apply even to the younger widows, who alone would be spoken of here. If the *χήραι*, vv. 11, 14, be widows proper, then these younger widows, as distinguished from the older, ver. 9, must include all under the age of sixty. But how can such persons be meant in the general directions? vv. 11, 14. The whole passage applies, it is evident, only to younger females; and the sense becomes still clearer if we do not, as is generally done, take *νεωτέρας χήρας* together, but take *νεωτέρας* as subject, and *χήρας* as predicate, and *παραιτοῦ* as a negative of *καταλείψασθαι*. The words then bear the plain and natural meaning: Do not admit young persons of the female sex into the catalogue of the *χήραι*, for they are at an age when they cannot be trusted; for if they feel the sexual impulse, which is incompatible with faithfulness to Christ, they will marry. And if it thus appears that the passage can be satisfactorily explained only out of the ecclesiastical vocabulary of the second century, this is the clearest possible proof that the Epistle cannot belong to the apostolic age, when the church had no special order of the kind.



apostle's three months' residence in Greece before his return to Jerusalem, Acts xx. 2. There was also, it is said, plenty of time during this period for a journey to Crete. He made this journey with Titus for his companion, laid the foundation of the church there, then left Titus behind to take charge of further arrangements for the cause of the Gospel, and then wrote this letter to him,<sup>1</sup>—wrote to him in fact, what he could have said just before by word of mouth, and that much better. The result of this author's investigation regarding 1 Tim. is that shortly before Paul began his return journey from Achaia to Jerusalem, he sent Timothy before him to Ephesus with verbal messages (the passage 1 Tim. i. 3 is interpreted thus, though its natural meaning is entirely different, in order to harmonize it with Acts xx. 4); that he thought of going there himself, but did not know positively if he would do so, and that, a good opportunity presenting itself, he wrote this Epistle to Timothy from some place in Achaia or Macedonia, in order to give him some instructions that might be of use to him in the meantime.<sup>2</sup> But this account of the matter is full of contradictions. In the Acts Timothy accompanies the apostle on the journey through Macedonia to Troas, and presumably to Ephesus also; and 1 Tim. makes Timothy remain at Ephesus, when the apostle, after spending nearly three years in that city, leaves it for Macedonia; the apostle then writes this Epistle to him immediately after his departure, with a view to a complete ecclesiastical organization, and this while intending shortly to return there. What a mass of improbability is this! How plainly do we see that the apostle's departure and Timothy's remaining are arranged in this way simply to find an occasion for the Epistle! In a word, the Epistle is, as De Wette also judges, historically incomprehensible. And these Epistles are all alike in this. At whatever point a new attempt is made to rescue them, the proofs which are set up at once break down. In the great sea of possibilities, it may perchance be possible to find a calm spot for the Epistle to Titus and the second to Timothy

<sup>1</sup> Matthies, Comm., p. 194.

<sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 486.

(though in the case of the latter, the second Roman captivity is incapable of proof, and quite improbable, and is thus a sufficiently decisive piece of evidence); but their entire similarity to, and their intimate connexion with the first to Timothy—this is, and will be, the chief betrayer of the false fraternity—involves them all alike in the same condemnation.

In addition to all this, a close inspection reveals to us much that is peculiar and un-Pauline in their language, and in many of their conceptions and views.<sup>1</sup> In this particular also the three Epistles are so much alike that none of them can be separated from the others, and from this circumstance the identity of their authorship may be confidently inferred.

<sup>1</sup> Compare on this subject De Wette's *Kurze Erklärung*, p. 118 *sq.*

## NINTH CHAPTER.

### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SHORTER PAULINE EPISTLES.

FROM the foregoing investigation I think every unprejudiced student will be led almost irresistibly to conclude that each of the shorter Pauline Epistles, regarded separately, presents more or less formidable critical difficulties, and that there are some of them which it is scarcely possible to regard as authentic. If we take a general view of all these Epistles together, the verdict to be passed on them, as compared with the Epistles universally acknowledged authentic, can scarcely be in their favour. The comparison reveals at once how far they stand below the originality, the wealth of thought, and the whole spiritual substance and value of those other Epistles. They are characterized by a certain meagreness of contents, by colourlessness of treatment, by absence of motive and connexion, by monotony, by repetition, by dependence, partly on each other, and partly on the Epistles of the first class, which are often referred to in a style evidently not that of a writer at first hand. It is not the object of any of those Epistles, as of the principal ones of Paul, to develop fully some one peculiarly and essentially Pauline idea ; even the higher Christological idea which distinguishes the Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians, has no intimate relation with the Pauline system ; on the contrary, it is foreign to that system. The general character of these Epistles is, we may say, a certain smoothing of the specific Pauline doctrine with a dominant practical tendency. This may be recognised in the frequent recommendation of good works, and in the instructions and admonitions regarding the Christian behaviour, the *ἀξίως περιπατεῖν τῆς κλήσεως, περιπατεῖν ἐν ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς* (Eph. ii. 10 ; iv. 1). It is clear that the point of view

from which these letters are written is not that of one seeking to make good, and to develop a general principle which has still to vindicate itself, and on which the Christian consciousness and life are to be formed; but rather that of one applying the contents of Christian doctrine to practical life with its various circumstances. Very striking and significant is the difference between these later Epistles and the older ones, in all that belongs to the peculiar plan and composition of a Pauline Epistle. The authentic Pauline Epistles have a true organic development; they proceed from one root idea which penetrates the whole contents of the Epistle from the very beginning, and binds all the different parts of it to an inner unity, through the deeper relations in which it holds them, even though they appear at first sight to be only outwardly connected. They are founded in one creative thought, which determines not merely the contents of the Epistle, but its whole form and structure. Hence they exhibit a genuine dialectic movement, in which the thought possesses sufficient inherent force to originate all the stages of its development, and to advance from stage to stage in accordance with their inner connexion with each other. Especially does this merit distinguish the greater Epistles of the apostle, that to the Romans, and the first to the Corinthians. It would be a great mistake to think, of these Epistles, that the order in which they deal with the various matters contained in them, and pass from one subject to another, is merely fortuitous. The only way to grasp the whole contents of such an Epistle is to place one's-self within that one idea, from which, as the centre, each single part is assigned its place in the connexion of the whole; and this immanent movement of thought may be traced in each important section of those Epistles. Remark, for example, how methodically the apostle goes to work with the instruction he has to give about speaking with tongues (1 Cor. xii. 14); how he discusses the matter in all its various aspects; how what is said about love (chap. xiii.) is an essential element in helping his argument forward; and how he makes the thought with which he is chiefly concerned pass through the necessary stages of its

evolution in their order. In the shorter Epistle to the Galatians we find the same ; the rapid movement which brings the apostle at once to speak of himself and his own personal concerns does not come merely from the passionate warmth with which he speaks ; it is the immediate grasp of the subject of his Epistle at that point at which it presents itself to him in all its lines of influence at once. He who has recognised this depth of conception from which each genuine Epistle of Paul proceeded, this methodical development and dialectical process, as the characteristic distinction of these Epistles, will be prepared to admit how little of all this there is to be found in the smaller Epistles. Here the authors move forward not without visible effort ; they draw out one and the same thought with laboured expansion and manifold repetition ; the contents of their Epistles consist more of piece added to piece externally, than of any one subject developing naturally under their hands. If these Epistles were genuine productions of the apostle, why should they thus belie their Pauline origin ; how is it that none of them bears the features of that origin with any distinctness ? Even the Epistle to the Colossians, which might in many respects be best qualified to put forth such a claim, can make no pretence to equality with the older Epistles in these particulars.

Such is the position of these Epistles in respect of their inward character ; and in respect of the outward historical circumstances by which their origin is to be explained, the difference is equally striking. The older Epistles rest, with regard to their occasion and drift, on the whole historical connexion of circumstances to which they belong, in such a way that everything fits in perfectly ; their roots are native to the soil of the time in which they arose, and we cannot have the least doubt as to their historical position and reference. How little this is the case with the later Epistles has already been shown ; how uncertain and indefinite they are in nearly all their historical bearings, and by what feeble threads they are connected with the chief features of the apostle's life. The most of these Epistles presume to have been written during

the Roman captivity, but we nowhere find any pressing reason why they should have been written during that period (and if the apostle had been so fertile in correspondence, he might have written such letters as well during his two years' imprisonment at Cesarea, as has been surmised not without reason, and yet quite incorrectly), or any clear account of his personal condition at the time. If the apostle was to be made the author of other letters after the true ones, the Roman captivity certainly presented itself as a very suitable situation for that purpose. During the considerable period over which it seems to have extended, it might well be thought that he had ample leisure to write letters. Then when this situation had been used to a considerable extent, the letters ascribed to him were dated also from an earlier period, as we see in the case of the two Epistles to Timothy; the first of these, which is manifestly of later composition, dates, not like the second, from the imprisonment, but before it; and the two Thessalonian letters are probably later than Ephesians, Colossians, and Philippians.

The nature of the case may explain why we have not spoken hitherto of the external testimony to these Epistles, and why we merely touch upon it now. Testimonies to these Epistles, such at least as are deserving of any confidence, do not exist. In this respect also they are inferior to the older Epistles, which have at least the early testimony of the Roman Clemens. Evidences to the existence and the apostolic origin of these Epistles date only from the time of Irenæus, Tertullian, and Clemens of Alexandria, that is, from a period in which it is quite conceivable that post-apostolic Epistles, even though produced far on in the second century, could have come to count as genuine works of the apostle.

What gives these Epistles their claim to the name of the apostle is simply the circumstance that they profess to be Pauline, and make the apostle speak as their author. But if even one of them be unable to make good its apostolic name, and with regard to 1 Tim. this can scarcely be denied, then we see at once how little that circumstance can prove of itself; it must then be admitted that what has happened in one case may have happened

equally in several others. The great and prominent spirits of the ancient world count this among the proofs of their greatness and importance, and of the power with which they dominated the whole consciousness of their time, that whatever was thought in their spirit was, as a matter of course, invested, when published, with their name. The continued working of their overshadowing personality manifests itself in this, that even after their death they are made to speak and write as they spoke and wrote in their lifetime. Thus there are pseudo-Pauline letters, just as there are not only Platonic but pseudo-Platonic dialogues, and the form in which a new body of philosophical or religious thought was expounded seemed so much a part of the thought itself, that in order to reach the original stand-point of the thinker, it was held necessary to employ his forms of thinking. A Paulinist who wished to write in the sense of Paul had to employ the Pauline epistolary form, as a Platonist held that he must not make use of his master's dialogue-form without thinking himself into the spirit and personality of Plato as he wrote. From the unity of the form and contents of such modes of composition, it was thought that they could not be severed from the names of their originators; their imitators felt bound to write in their names. Viewed in this light, a Pauline Epistle is, equally with a Platonic dialogue, a classical form of representation, to the original type of which one sought, therefore, to be faithful as far as possible. Both these forms, indeed, arose in the same way, out of a definite circle of peculiar circumstances, in which a new form of consciousness had prepared for itself its outward shape by its own creative power. It is therefore a true observation which has frequently been made, that the forging of such Epistles must not be judged according to the modern standard of literary honesty, but according to the spirit of antiquity, which attached no such definite value as we do to literary property, and regarded the thing much more than the person.<sup>1</sup> There is therefore no reason to think here of deception

<sup>1</sup> De Wette, *Kurze Erkl. der Briefe an Titus*, u.s.w., S. 122 f. Cf. Schleiermacher, *Der chr. Gl.* ii. 372 f.

or wilful forgery ; yet even if it be asserted that the matter is not intelligible except on this hypothesis, that cannot be maintained as an argument against its possibility and likelihood.

The Epistles which thus carry us beyond the age of the apostle, and, as their contents for the most part clearly show, to a later set of circumstances, come under the same category with the legends of the apostle's last fortunes. They belong, not to the biography of the apostle himself, but to the history of the party which used his name, and to their party circumstances. How Paulinism was developed, what modifications it admitted, with what antagonisms it had to contend, what influence it exerted in moulding the features of the time, from the varied elements of which the unity of the Christian church was to emerge, this is what we find in these Epistles. It may be ground for regret that we cannot see in them genuine products of the apostle's genius, or sources for history of the same importance as attaches to his undisputed Epistles (and yet in no case could they be placed on a level with these ; their intrinsic value and the nature of their contents remain just the same, whether they be apostolic or not). But in the other scale we have to place this immense advantage, that these letters, as soon as they are critically examined, make it possible for us to obtain a somewhat clearer view of the circumstances of a period which is of such importance for the history of the development of early Christianity. If it be considered how meagre the materials are for the history of that period, and how valuable every new source that is opened up must be, what inducement can we have to maintain the apostolic character of letters, whose apostolic origin is surrounded by doubts which the ablest advocacy can never entirely overcome ; and the attempt to dispel which presents to us, at the best, not the natural truth of history, but a confused web of artificial combinations ? It is out of place to speak of any real loss in a case where that is simply given back to historical truth which rightfully belonged to it from the beginning.





**THIRD PART.**

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**THE DOCTRINAL SYSTEM OF THE APOSTLE.**



## INTRODUCTION.

THE sphere of our representation grows always more contracted as we approach the spiritual centre of the apostle's historical appearance and personality. It has been our task up to this point to detect the spurious elements both in the history of his life and work and in those Epistles which have reached us under his name. By this process we have sought to get at the true historical basis of his personality, and to confine it within those limits which he himself indicates to us in the true productions of his genius, and in the principles of action expressed in them. Having laid this foundation, our task is now to separate the essential and universal from the less essential, the fortuitous, and that which has reference only to the special circumstances of his time. The substance and contents of Paul's Epistles consist in nothing but his peculiar system of doctrine; and our task with regard to this is not only to impute to him nothing that is not really his, but also to seek to comprehend that which is essentially his, at the point from which it took its organic connexion and developed into a definite whole.

The following discussion of the Pauline system differs in three points from the treatment which the subject has commonly received :—

I. It follows, of course, from our critical investigations, that our representation of the apostle's doctrine can be founded on the contents of those Epistles only which are to be regarded as indisputably his. Whether the objections raised against the genuineness of the smaller Epistles be or be not well founded, at any rate till they are completely and manifestly refuted (and there is no great reason for expecting this), it is impossible to be certain that the use of these Epistles will not introduce features into our

view of the doctrine which will give it a physiognomy more or less different from what it had at first. A representation of the apostle's doctrine, which abstains completely from using these Epistles as materials, will, at the same time, yield a palpable proof how small their importance is in this respect, in comparison with the others, and how little their rejection will create any gap in the apostle's teaching. As his proper teaching is sharply defined and clearly recognised, we shall see distinctly how un-Pauline the doctrine and statements of these Epistles are, throughout nearly their whole extent. Attention has already been drawn to this in the proper place in our critical discussions, and it is not necessary to compare further the two doctrines, or to insist on their divergences.

II. The following representation seeks to avoid an error which has been made in the reconstruction of the Pauline system, by not clearly distinguishing, nor, in consequence, placing in their proper relation to each other, the two sides which ought to be distinguished. A comparison of the views of Usteri,<sup>1</sup> Neander,<sup>2</sup> and Dähne,<sup>3</sup> will show at once how far they differ from each other in the position they give to the different doctrines, and in the construction of the whole. Usteri divides his treatment of the subject into two parts of unequal extent, the first dealing with the ante-Christian, and the second with the Christian period. The ante-Christian period embraces both Judaism and heathenism, both being comprehended in the conception of sin. The general ruin of the human race points backwards to that beginning from which the dominion of sin and death arose; how this came about, how sin came to extend its power, the relation of sin and death to the law, the inadequacy of the law for justification and salvation, the end of the law, and the longing for redemption which was the result of the ante-Christian period,—all these points are considered here. In the second part, which deals with the provision for redemption made by God through Christ, the first section deals with the

<sup>1</sup> *Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs in seinem Verhältniss zur biblischen Dogmatik des N. T.* 4th Edition 1832.

<sup>2</sup> *Planting and Training, etc.*, i. pp. 416-531.

<sup>3</sup> *Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, 1835.

realization of redemption in the individual, while the second treats of Christians as a body,—the church of Christ. In passing to the second part, Usteri himself remarks, that the distinction here drawn between the life of the individual and the life of the body is a relative one, which cannot be carried out strictly, because the one always passes over into the other; he thus admits that his view and arrangement of the subject are unsatisfactory. The distinction is a just one, and the reason why it cannot be carried out is, that it is made in the wrong place. If a distinction is to be maintained between the life of the individual and the life of the body, the former must not be subordinated to the latter as if it issued in it at one definite point; the two should be set over against each other as independent momenta. Again, the contrast between the ante-Christian and the Christian period may have been clear enough to the apostle's mind, yet it was only something secondary; he had to start, in fact, from the individual life in order to obtain such a view of corporate life, of historical development, as should explain to him theoretically, looking at it historically, that which was the immediate result of his own most intimate experience. Thus what Usteri places first is not the first in fact, but presupposes something else.

Equally mistaken again is the procedure of Neander and Dähne. Starting from the idea of νόμος and δικαιοσύνη, and from the great proposition of the Pauline doctrine of justification that man requires for his salvation and justification by God out of grace, they subordinate the corporate to the individual life, and introduce, before the Pauline doctrine of justification, which moves entirely within the sphere of the individual life, has been developed in its connexion, propositions which belong to the sphere of the corporate life. Usteri's division is simply applied subjectively by Dähne, when he divides his subject into two sections: first, man needs for his salvation a justification before God through grace (and the guilt of Gentiles and Jews is spoken of in this connexion, there being no further review of the historical connexion of Heathenism and Judaism with Christianity); second, justification before God

through grace is offered to man in Christianity. I can discern no principle of division in the arrangement of Neander, which is as follows: First, the ideas of *δικαιοσύνη* and *νόμος*, the central point of the doctrine; Second, the central point of the Pauline anthropology, human nature in opposition to the law; sin, origin of sin and death, suppression by sin of the natural revelation of God, the state of disunion; Third, preparations for redemption, Judaism and Heathenism; Fourth, the work of redemption; Fifth, the appropriation of salvation by faith, etc. How can the development of the ideas *δικαιοσύνη* and *νόμος* be separated from the apostle's doctrine of justification, and how one-sided is it to make Judaism and Heathenism follow the doctrine of sin as being a preparation for redemption, when Judaism and Heathenism are just the domain where the principle of sin and death has its supremacy; and their relation to Christianity can only be defined by the opposition in which sin and grace, death and life, law and faith, stand to each other? For the same reason that they do not distinguish with sufficient accuracy the subjective and the objective sides, the representations of Neander and Dähne are deficient in this point also, that the religious historical position of Christianity in relation to Judaism and Heathenism is not specially considered. It is not possible to maintain order, connexion, and unity in our view of the whole, and to give the respective doctrines their proper place, except in this way: that the apostle's doctrine of justification with all that belongs to it be recognised as constituting his representation of the subjective consciousness, and kept separate from his view of the objective relation in which Christianity stands to Judaism and Heathenism in the religious development of mankind. The more this objective side is kept distinct from the other, the more clearly do we see what importance it also had for the apostle.

III. It is important to give more exact definitions, both grammatical and logical, of the various conceptions on which the Pauline system is based, and to place them more precisely in the order of their arrangement than has been done in former treatments of this subject.

## NOTE.

In the following review of the Pauline doctrine, the author first discusses (Chap. I.) "*The principle of the Christian consciousness,*" as it is determined by Paul. He finds the peculiar feature of the principle to be its absoluteness; namely, that the Christian has the Spirit in himself, and cannot therefore consider his salvation to be depending on anything outward; that he is conscious of his immediate union with God, of the identity of his spirit with the Spirit of God, of his own freedom and infinity. How the Christian arrives at this consciousness is explained by the apostle through his doctrine of justification; and this doctrine is discussed here (Chap. II.) in its negative, and (Chap. III.) in its positive aspect.

Chap. II. develops the proposition that man does not become righteous through the works of the law, and that the reason of the incapacity is to be found in the *σάρξ*.

Chap. III. shows that according to the apostle's teaching faith is the only way to justification; but it is this only in virtue of its contents, as faith in the atoning death of Christ. Thus the author inquires here what significance the apostle discovered in the death of Jesus. He then goes into an examination of the idea of justification, the question being, How far man can become a *δίκαιος* through faith in the death of Christ? He proceeds to discuss the nature of that faith through which he acquires the righteousness, a main element of it being shown to be a real and living fellowship with Christ.

Christianity having thus been considered as a subjective principle of life, the author turns (cf. p. 118) to the objective relation in which it stands towards Judaism and Heathenism.

In Chap. IV. he speaks of "Christ as the foundation, and the principle of the Christian society," or what amounts to the same thing, the church as the *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*, and takes up in this connexion the Christian charisms, and Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

In Chap. V. he deals with the relation of Christianity to Judaism and Heathenism. This relation is, broadly speaking, that of



opposition. Sinfulness is the character of the ante-Christian time, and accordingly Paul's doctrine of the origin and reign of sin has been kept for discussion at this point. Then his view of the law, his estimate of the Jewish religion, are taken up; and lastly, his views on heathenism.

In its relation to the preceding and subordinate forms of religion Christianity asserts itself as the absolute religion, and thus appears "as a new principle of the world's historical development." It is regarded from this point of view in Chap. VI., where we have a description of the Pauline doctrine of the first and the second Adam, and of the periods of the world inaugurated by each, which naturally introduces the Pauline eschatology.

Hope has reference to this future, faith to the past; and in its reference to the present, the Christian consciousness is love. Chap. VII. deals with "faith, love and hope, as the three momenta of the Christian consciousness."

Chap. VIII. adds to the foregoing, in the form of an appendix, a "special discussion of certain dogmatic questions not involved in the main system," the successive sections of which deal with the following points:—1. The nature of religion; 2. The doctrine of God; 3. The doctrine of Christ; 4. The doctrine of angels and demons; 5. The doctrine of the Divine predestination; 6. The heavenly habitation of 2 Cor. v. 1.

Chap. IX. is entitled, "On certain features of the apostle's character," and is an attempt to gather up the various traces of his character which are to be found in his writings, that we may thus form acquaintance with its most prominent features, though the data at our command do not carry us further.

The author's later discussion of the subject in his *Vorlesungen über Neutestamentliche Theologie* (128-207) deviates considerably from this one not only in many points of detail, which I shall notice in their place, but in the arrangement of the whole. The central point of the apostle's religious consciousness and of his doctrine is found in that work in the fact of his opposition on principle to the law, in the proposition, namely, that that which

Judaism is not able to effect is now effected by Christianity. This proposition, as is here remarked, was a natural and immediate corollary from the view the apostle had come to entertain of Jesus as a sacrifice. In demonstrating this proposition the apostle arrives at his peculiar doctrine of justification. Judaism and heathenism are comprehended in the common conception of religion; the task of both, which is indeed the ultimate object of all religion, is to bring man into union with God,—into that harmonious relation towards God with which God will be satisfied. Now, *a priori*, there appear to be two ways in which this may be accomplished; the way of the fulfilling of the law, and the way of faith. The distinctive peculiarity of Judaism is that it adopts the first of these two ways; Christianity, on the other hand, adopts the second. The apostle's contention is, then, that man obtains *δικαιοσύνη* not through works of the law, but through faith. The negative part of this assertion, the *οὐ δικαιοῦνται ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* is treated first (p. 134 *sqq.*), and is provided with three proofs drawn from Paul's different arguments: the purely empirical, Rom. i. 18-iii. 20; the religio-historical, provided by the contrast of the first and the second Adam, Rom. v. 12 *sq.*; and the anthropological, consisting mainly of the apostle's doctrine of the *σὰρξ* and the *νόμος* in their relation to sin (pp. 141-153). The positive part of Paul's central doctrine, the assertion of justification by faith, is then taken up (pp. 153 *sqq.*) and looked at from the different points of view: (1.) of actual facts; (2.) of anthropology; (3.) of religious history. Under the first of these heads the author speaks of the significance of the death of Jesus regarded as an atonement; under the second, of the real influence of that death as overcoming the *σὰρξ*; and, under the third, of the Pauline view of the law as an essentially imperfect and transitory dispensation, meant only to prepare for the coming of the true religion. In pp. 174-182, he defines the notion of justifying faith, and the relation of faith and works; p. 182 *sqq.*, he discusses the relation of faith to the freedom of man and the predestination of God; then p. 186, he comes to speak of Christ as the object of faith; p. 195, he enters on an

estimate of the importance Paul attributed to the death of Christ for the development of mankind, especially to his resurrection as the prototype of ours; p. 198, he takes up the doctrine of the influence the glorified Christ exerts upon the Church, of the church as the body of Christ, and of the sacraments; 202 sq., eschatology; and concludes, p. 205 f., with the apostle's definition of the idea of God.—*Editor's Note.*

## FIRST CHAPTER.

### THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS.

IN order to apprehend the principle of the Christian consciousness in all its depth and peculiarity, as it existed in the view of the apostle, it is necessary for us to refer as far as possible to what was characteristic in the fact of his conversion. In proportion as this change, not less decisive than rapid and immediate, not merely from Judaism to Christianity, and from one form of religious consciousness to another, but also from one direction of life into the very opposite direction, was characteristic of the man, it reveals to us the power and significance which Christianity had for him. That the same man, who just before was persecuting Christianity with the most violent hatred, should come all at once to believe in him whose followers he had been seeking to destroy, and that in this faith he should become a totally different man ;—what is this but a victory which Christianity owed to nothing but to the might of its own inherent truth ? Of all those who have been converted to faith in Christ, there is no one in whose case the Christian principle broke so absolutely and so immediately through everything opposed to it, and asserted so triumphantly its own absolute superiority, as in that of the apostle Paul. First of all, then, the Christian principle has this peculiarity with him, that it declares itself in its absolute power and importance, and asserts itself in its absoluteness, by overcoming all that conflicts with its supremacy. In the fresh consciousness of a stand-point, in the still recent attainment of which all his strength and energy had been engaged, the apostle stands upon the absoluteness of his Christian position, and Christianity is thus to him the absolute power of the spiritual life forcing its way through and overcoming the most formidable

obstacles. The spiritual process he passed through in the act of his conversion is simply the key to the Christian principle as unfolded in his person. The absoluteness of the Christian principle consists, however, simply in this : that it is essentially identical with the person of Christ. The entire absolute importance of Christianity resides, in the apostle's view, in the person of Christ ; hence it was in that person that the Christian principle came to his consciousness as that which it essentially is. This is what he asserts when he says of his conversion (Gal. i. 15, 16) that it pleased God, who separated him from his mother's womb, and chose him for this particular destiny, and called him by his grace, to reveal his Son in him, that is, to disclose the person of Jesus (against whom he had hitherto acted such a hostile part, as not only not to recognise him as Messiah, but to behold in him merely a false Messiah, quite repugnant to the true idea of the Messiah), in his consciousness, through an inward act of the consciousness, as that which he really was, the Son of God. The expression "Son of God" denotes the essential change which took place at his conversion in his view of the Messiah, and we must examine what this change was in order to appreciate its importance. It has already been remarked that up to that time the difference between the believing and the unbelieving Jew consisted mainly in this, that the former regarded Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah already actually come, as the same who was to appear as Messiah, according to the promises and prophecies of the Old Testament, and that notwithstanding that his whole appearance, and particularly the manner of his death, presented so great a contrast to all that the common imagination expected the Messiah to be and to do. The belief in the resurrection of Jesus did away with that contradiction, and thus the most essential element in the apostle's conviction of the Messianic dignity of Jesus was, that he believed in him as the risen One (1 Cor. xv. 8). But the peculiar inward process through which the belief in Jesus, as the Messiah, had arisen in him, made his conception of the Son of God, which he now recognised Jesus as being, one of far wider meaning than

that of the other disciples. For these latter the belief in the resurrection, which removed the offence of the death of Christ, meant simply that there was a prospect of a second appearance of the risen One, and that then all that had remained unaccomplished at the first coming would be realized (Acts iii. 19 *sq.*). For the apostle Paul, on the contrary, the death of the Messiah was in itself simply inconceivable, except by such a revolution in his Messianic consciousness as could not but produce the greatest effect in his whole view of Christianity. Everything that was national and Jewish in the Messianic idea (and this had been modified in the consciousness of the other apostles only by their changing the form of it and referring it to the second coming of Jesus) was at once removed from the consciousness of our apostle by the one fact of the death of Jesus. With this death everything that the Messiah might have been as a Jewish Messiah disappeared ; through his death, Jesus, as the Messiah, had died to Judaism, had been removed beyond his national connexion with it, and placed in a freer, more universal, and purely spiritual sphere, where the absolute importance which Judaism had claimed till then was at once obliterated. It is of this complete reversal of his Messianic consciousness, brought about by contemplation of the death of Jesus, that the apostle speaks in a passage which is important in this connexion, and which finds an appropriate place here in the sense in which it was formerly explained, 2 Cor. v. 16. He says here, that since he began to live for Christ who died for him as for all, and who rose again, he knows no Christ *κατὰ σάρκα* any longer. This is equivalent to saying that from the moment when the full meaning of the death of Jesus burst upon him, he had renounced all the limitations of his Jewish stand-point, and of the Jewish Messianic ideas. The Jewish Messiah was to him a Messiah after the flesh ; as a Messiah who had not passed through death, he was not free from the carnality which only death, as the destruction of the flesh, can put away. The apostle therefore saw in the death of Christ the purification of the Messianic idea from all the sensuous elements which cleaved to it in Judaism, and its

elevation to the truly spiritual consciousness where Christ comes to be recognised as (that which he was to the apostle) the absolute principle of the spiritual life. The absolute importance which the person of Christ has for the apostle is the absoluteness of the Christian principle itself; the apostle feels that in his conception of the person of Christ he stands on a platform where he is infinitely above Judaism, where he has passed far beyond all that is merely relative, limited, and finite in the Jewish religion, and has risen to the absolute religion.

A further definition of the absoluteness of the principle of the Christian consciousness, as it is presented in the person of Christ himself, is this: that in this principle the apostle is conscious of the essential difference of the spirit from the flesh, of freedom from everything by which man is only outwardly affected, of the reconciliation of man with God, and of man's union with God. It is the same absolute character of the Christian consciousness which finds its expression in all these different relations. The term "spirit" is used by the apostle to denote the Christian consciousness. He asks the Galatians, who were wavering in their Christian faith (iii. 2), whether they had received the spirit by the works of the law, or by the faith that had been born in them of the preaching they had heard; and if it were not the height of folly, having begun with the spirit to end with the flesh,—to relapse from Christianity the spiritual to Judaism the fleshly and material. The apostle refers the Galatians here to an immediate and undeniable fact of their Christian consciousness; this is that which declares itself most immediately in the Christian, which indeed constitutes his Christian consciousness itself, that he has within him the spirit, an essentially spiritual principle, which forbids him to regard anything merely outward, sensuous, material, as in any way a condition of his salvation; that he is conscious of his immediate communion and union with God. It is as a purely spiritual principle that the Christian consciousness, inasmuch as it proceeds upon a faith which rests on certainty of the divine grace, is the consciousness of the sonship of God; for all who are impelled by the spirit of God.

are also sons of God ; they do not receive a spirit of bondage, which could only work fear, but a spirit of adoption in which they cry, Abba, Father ; the spirit itself witnesses with our spirit that we are children of God (Rom. viii. 14-16), *i.e.*, since the *πνεῦμα ἡμῶν* (ver. 16) is the same *πνεῦμα* which, according to Gal. iii. 2, is itself one we have received, the spirit of God, as it is found expressed in our Christian consciousness, is at the same time so identical with the objective spirit<sup>1</sup> of God (the spirit as the objective principle of the Christian consciousness), that this sonship of God rests on the testimony of both, and thus is no mere subjective assertion of our subjective Christian consciousness, but has, in the absolute self-existent spirit of God himself, its objective reality and absolute certainty. This *συμμαρτυρεῖν* of the *αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα* with the *πνεῦμα ἡμῶν*, this identity of the spirit as it appears in us with the spirit as it is in God, is thus the highest expression for the absolute truth of that which the Christian consciousness asserts as its own immediate contents.<sup>2</sup>

The spirit, as principle of the Christian consciousness, is thus traced back to the objective spirit of God, and identified with it. The apostle takes up the same absolute stand-point in the passage

<sup>1</sup> Geist an sich.

<sup>2</sup> Gal. iv. 6 is exactly parallel to Rom. viii. 14 ; in the former passage we read, Because (*ὅτι*: must be taken in this sense) ye are sons, God has sent out the spirit of his Son into your hearts ; thus the sending of the spirit pre-supposes the *πίστις ἐνθα*. This is to be explained simply by the relation of faith to the spirit, which is the principle of Christian consciousness. One becomes *υἱὸς Θεοῦ* at once through faith, but this is a merely abstract relation, and the concrete contents which it must have in the living reality of consciousness come only through the spirit, which is nothing else but the very principle of the Christian consciousness. The apostle purposely writes : *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*, ver. 6, to correspond to *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ*, ver. 4. What the first *ἐξαποστῆλλαι* is objectively as an objective historical fact, the second is subjectively ; the sending of the Son becomes an inward experience, experimentally a fact of consciousness, only through the spirit, in which alone does objective Christianity become subjective. This subjective stage is indicated by the apostle by the addition *εἰς τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν* ; and as this is merely the subjective experience corresponding to the fact expressed in that objective *ἐξαποστῆλλαι*, he calls the *πνεῦμα* here very appropriately the *πνεῦμα* of the Son. The Christian consciousness, of which the spirit is the principle, is communicated by Christ himself, is Christ himself becoming inward.



1 Cor. ii. 9 *sq.*, where he expresses the infinity of the contents of his Christian consciousness in the words, "what no eye hath seen, no ear hath heard, what has entered into no heart of man, that has God prepared for those who love him. (The *ἰσὺς Θεοῦ*, Rom. viii. 14; Gal. iv. 6.) But God hath revealed it to us by his spirit; for the spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God. As what is human is known only to the spirit of a man that is in him, so only the spirit of God knows what is divine. But we have not received the spirit of the world, but the spirit from God, that we might know that which is given us by God." The Christian consciousness is thus an essentially spiritual one; what speaks in it is the spirit, as the principle of it; for the divine, which is the contents of the Christian consciousness, must be what only the spirit can know. For it is the spirit that searches all things, and all searching and knowing as such, the more therefore in proportion as its contents are the absolute, the divine, can only take place by means of the spirit. And this spirit which knows the divine is the spirit from God, not merely the spirit which God has communicated, but as the spirit of the Christian consciousness, identical with the spirit of God himself, with that spirit, which, just as the human spirit is the principle of the human self-consciousness, is in God the principle of the divine self-consciousness. Thus in the unity of this spirit, the knowledge a man has of the contents of his Christian consciousness is the knowledge of God Himself. In his Christian consciousness as an essentially spiritual one, the Christian knows himself to be identical with the spirit of God; for only the spirit, the spirit of God, the absolute spirit, can know the divine contents of the Christian consciousness. On this high and absolute stand-point does the Christian stand in the contents of his Christian consciousness which God has revealed to him. It is a truly spiritual consciousness, a relation of spirit to spirit, where the absolute spirit of God, in becoming the principle of the Christian consciousness, opens itself up to the consciousness of man.

Being in this sense spiritual, the Christian consciousness is also

absolutely free, absolved from all limits of finality, and unfolded to the full clearness of absolute self-consciousness. Now the Lord, says the apostle (2 Cor. iii. 17), the Lord as the contents and the principle of the Christian consciousness, is the spirit: but where the spirit of the Lord is, or the Lord as spirit, as principle of an essentially spiritual consciousness and life, there is liberty,—the liberty of self-consciousness. The apostle develops this idea in the passage we have named, in a connexion which asks for careful consideration. At the end of chapter ii. he was speaking joyously of the victorious issue of his apostolic activity, which the influence of his teaching seemed to render certain; but in order to exclude everything subjective, as if he should praise himself, or ascribe too much to himself, he turns (chapter iii.) to the self-consciousness of the Corinthians themselves, which must attest the fruits of his activity, and where everything could be read as if in an Epistle. Here there is not merely something subjective, but something real and actual. Here there is a result which cannot be denied; yet even with regard to this work that he has wrought, the apostle is unwilling to dwell upon himself as the author of it. It is not he, who, as author, by his merely subjective activity, has brought this to pass; it is his work only in so far as he is a *διάκονος καινῆς διαθήκης*. The personal is to be sunk entirely in the official, and here the apostle takes occasion, as against his Judaizing opponents, to discuss the nature of the *καινὴ διαθήκη*, and to show from it that the double dealing, reservation, and insincerity with which they charge him, are quite incompatible with the nature and principle of this *διαθήκη*, so that they cannot be the character of its *διάκονος*. As the principle of this *διαθήκη* is an absolute one, so the consciousness of a *διάκονος* of it cannot harbour any elements of disturbance or of restraint, or any limitation such as would destroy its absoluteness. The apostle shows that Christianity as the *καινὴ διαθήκη* is the absolute religion in contrast to the old, by the antithesis, verse 6, in which he develops the difference between the old religion and the new. The new religion is not letter, such as the old *διαθήκη* which was written upon tables of stone, but spirit,

and so does not kill as the letter does, but makes alive. The apostle then argues from the glory on the face of Moses, as a symbol of the glory which even the old *διαθήκη* possessed, how greatly the glory of this *διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος* outshines all others. The Old Testament has indeed its own glory; but if the two differ from each other, as letter does from spirit, and condemnation from justification, in the same proportion does the glory of the one differ from the glory of the other. Thus, so far as the glory of the old *διαθήκη* had a real existence, it was not permanent, verse 10, on account of the glory of the new *διαθήκη* which outshone it, for how could this be other than a far-exceeding glory (*εἰ γὰρ*, verse 11)? If that which was finite and vanishing had its own glory, the glory of the abiding must be vastly greater. Since, then, he goes on, I have such hope that the glory of the new *διαθήκη* is one which abides for the future, and will disclose itself more and more, I act quite freely and openly,<sup>1</sup> and not like Moses, who put a veil on his face, to the effect that the Israelites did not see the end of that which came to an end according to its finite nature. As Moses, the apostle means, covered his shining countenance with a veil, the Israelites were unable to perceive how long the glory lasted which rested on his face, and which lasted only a certain time in each instance. This is the first reference of *τὸ τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου*; but in this expression the apostle points further to the finiteness of the old dispensation, of which the periodical splendour of the face of Moses was a symbol. The Israelites could not see the *δόξα τοῦ προσώπου αὐτοῦ*, the *καταργουμένη*, and so could not know whether or not it still continued; and in the same way the Israelites are not now aware that a *διαθήκη*, which was designed from the beginning to last only a certain time, has come to an end simply because the *καινὴ διαθήκη* has appeared. What is characteristic of Mosaism is the opposite of that *παρρησία* spoken of, verse 12. This

<sup>1</sup> *παρρησία* is here properly the freedom of self-consciousness, such as is possible only from the Christian stand-point. As the principle of the Christian self-consciousness is the complete liberty of the spirit, nothing can remain before it concealed or confined, and thus all reserve and double-dealing is necessarily foreign to the Christian. It is clear that the apostle opposes this *παρρησία* to his opponents' charges, as being the principle of his own conduct.

opposite is not, however, as the interpreters have incorrectly understood the passage, a *tecte* or even *fraudulenter agere* on Moses' part, as if he had arranged intentionally to deceive the Israelites and to keep from them the true state of the case. Nor is it, as De Wette thinks, that he covered up the truth with symbols; we must look on the matter from the stand-point of the Israelites in their position towards Moses, and then we shall see that the point is, that the finiteness of the old *διαθήκη* was not recognised. That they had no idea of this finiteness,—this was the barrier in their consciousness, which, as long as it was unremoved, prevented them from being anything more than Jews. The step from Judaism to Christianity could only be made by recognising that Judaism was merely a finite form. That the Jews did not recognise this, and that on this account their minds were sealed against Christianity, such was the *κάλυμμα*, the covering, the concealing veil which, as the apostle says still more plainly, verse 14, lay upon their consciousness as upon the face of Moses. They do not see the end; their thoughts are become obtuse, for to this very day the same covering remains at the reading of the Old Testament, which, as long as it is not removed, prevents them from coming to perceive that the old *διαθήκη* is at an end in Christ. Yes, to this very day a veil lies upon their hearts when Moses is read (and here, still more distinctly than in the foregoing, it is intimated in the words *ἐπὶ τῇ ἀναγνώσει*, that this *κάλυμμα* is only subjective, and is to be accounted for, not by that which is read, by the writings of the Old Testament, by Moses himself, but only by the subjective condition of those who read and hear these writings); but when they turn to the Lord, the veil will be taken away; and as soon as this takes place, everything that is needed will follow. The conversion to the Lord is the taking away of the veil, but the Lord whom one has after the veil is taken away is the spirit, and where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. And hence he who stands on this platform and is a *διάκονος* of this *διαθήκη* cannot but have that perfect freedom and unclouded self-consciousness which sets him far above all that was limited, concealed, and finite, in the stand-point of the old *διαθήκη*.

And this, the apostle says, is true not only of me, the apostle, as the *διάκονος* of this *διαθήκη*:—it is true generally of us all. We have all of us in Christ the principle of spiritual freedom, of a consciousness released from all finite limits, from all dim and obstructing media. What Christ is to us objectively, as the object of our consciousness, as the *δόξα* which we see before us as in a glass, he is to become to us subjectively; that which is now objective is to become identical with ourselves by our being changed into the same image from glory to glory. This cannot but be the case, since the transformation proceeds from the Lord, whose whole essence is spirit.

The essence and principle of Christianity is thus defined here as simply spirit, and in what sense it is such is very clearly apparent from all those contrasts between the old *διαθήκη* and the new. It is spirit, because in the consciousness of the man who stands upon this platform there is no barrier, no veil, nothing disturbing or obstructing, nothing finite or transitory; it is a consciousness clear and free within, and one with itself. Or the Lord is the spirit, for the principle of Christianity and of the Christian consciousness is, in one word, an absolute principle, in which everything else, as being merely relative and finite, naturally comes to an end. He who is at this stand-point is conscious of his freedom and of his own infinity; he knows himself as the subject of all things, all things have their final reference to him, to his own self, which can never become a mere object for others; everything is for him, for he is above all. "All is yours," says the apostle (1 Cor. iii. 21), in order to awaken in the Corinthians a Christian self-regard which should make it impossible for them to surrender themselves to others, who would make them the mere puppets of their own sectarian egoism, "all is yours: whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things present, or things to come; all is yours; and you are Christ's; and Christ is God's." You then are the absolute subject, but only in that identity with Christ and God which is to the Christian the principle of his consciousness and of his life. At this point of absolute self-consciousness, the whole view of the world which the Christian has is a different one

from that of other men, because he can look at things only from the point of view of the absolute idea, the consciousness of which has been engendered in him by Christianity. The apostle shows this in 1 Cor. i. 19, and iii. 18. "If any man," he says in the latter passage, "thinks himself wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise. For the wisdom of this world is folly before God." From the stand-point of the Christian consciousness, wisdom and folly change places. What is wisdom is in fact folly; what is folly is in fact wisdom. So great is the difference and the contrast in which the divine in Christianity stands to all that is human. They are related to each other as finite and infinite, as relative and absolute. At the stand-point of one contemplating the absolute, everything that is not the absolute itself, everything finite, whatever importance it may seem to have when regarded by itself, can appear no otherwise but in its finiteness and nothingness; while, on the contrary, to him who lives only in the finite, and has never learned to direct himself towards the absolute, the absolute does not exist at all; it is a sphere entirely closed to his consciousness; it is a thing altogether transcendent and incomprehensible; he can hold it for nothing but foolishness. This is the difference between the psychical and the pneumatical man; the psychical man does not receive into himself the spiritual, the divine, that which is the contents of the spiritual Christian consciousness, for to him it is foolishness; it transcends his consciousness, he cannot comprehend it, because it must be spiritually comprehended. The spiritual man, on the other hand, possesses the adequate form of comprehension for everything, but he himself is beyond the adequate comprehension of every one who is not himself spiritual (1 Cor. ii. 14, 15). This is the absolute superiority of the stand-point of the Christian consciousness. He who occupies the absolute stand-point possesses in it the absolute standard for everything that is merely relative; but he who holds to the relative, the finite, will always remain in an inadequate relation to the absolute. In all this we have the explanation which the apostle himself has given us of the principle of his Christian consciousness.

## SECOND CHAPTER.

THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.—(1.) IN ITS NEGATIVE ASPECT :

*ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δικαιοῦται ἐξ ἔργων νόμου.*

THE Christian consciousness is, in its principle, as we have shown, an essentially spiritual one ; the spirit which speaks in it is the spirit of God himself. Being a spiritual consciousness in this sense, it is further the consciousness of the sonship of God, of communion and union with God, of reconciliation with Him. Since, however, this reconciliation with God is, as the Christian idea of it implies, a thing that has had a beginning, the first question to be asked in order to a more definite understanding of the contents of the Christian consciousness is, how this reconciliation has been brought about. The answer to this question is found in the chief proposition of the Pauline doctrine,—that man is justified, not by works of the law, but by faith. In this antithesis of the *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, and the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*, the apostle's doctrine moves through its essential momenta. In the conception *δικαιοσύνη*, it has its roots in the soil of the Jewish religion, to which that conception belongs ; but in the peculiar Christian conception of faith, it departs from that religion, and takes up an attitude of decided opposition to it. These two conceptions are what we have first of all to consider in seeking to develop the Pauline doctrine.

In the idea of *δικαιοσύνη*, Judaism and Christianity have their point of meeting, a fact which of itself may show that the meaning of the term must be wider than the Jewish use of it, viz., righteousness as the statutory perfection of the citizen in the theocratic state, or, morality in its merely legal aspect. In the apostle Paul's

language *δικαιοσύνη* is a conception applicable to both Judaism and Christianity, and must thus have a higher and more general meaning; righteousness is not here a term of a particular religion, but of a universal one. By the expression *δικαιοσύνη*, the apostle denotes that adequate relation towards God, to bring man into which is the highest task of religion. Religion is to make man blessed, to give him that *ζῆν*, that *ζωή*, which is so closely related to *δικαιοσύνη*. Man can become blessed only by having in himself that which is the condition of blessedness, and the conception of *δικαιοσύνη* is in general just this moral conformation which is the condition of his blessedness, and therefore puts him in his right relation towards God. The expression denotes, broadly, the adequateness of the relation subsisting between God and man; and since this adequateness can be realized only on the side of man, by man's having in himself what answers to the idea of God, the word *δικαιοσύνη* comes to have an almost entirely subjective meaning; it signifies that condition of man which answers to the will of God, or his justification. Since however, this subjective element on man's side has a real meaning only in so far as it answers to something objective, the word *δικαιοσύνη* is used further in a more definite sense to express this objective relation. *Δικαιοσύνη* is called *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (Rom. i. 17, iii. 21, 22, x. 3, 2 Cor. v. 21). The genitive *Θεοῦ* does not signify the originator, so that the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* would be the *δικαιοσύνη* which God gives; if so, it would only refer to the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*; it could not refer to *δικαιοσύνη* generally (as in the passage Phil. iii. 9, to which the interpreters who take *Θεοῦ* in this sense appeal, it is yet only *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* which is *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ Θεοῦ*), the *Θεοῦ* can only be taken objectively; the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is that *δικαιοσύνη* which is occupied with God, which can take its direction only towards God, and can be determined only by the idea of God, by that which God essentially is, and sets up as the absolute standard. In so far it may be said that the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is the righteousness which avails before God (compare with this, *δικαιούσθαι ἐνώπιον Θεοῦ*, Rom. iii. 20; *δικαιούσθαι παρὰ Θεῶ*,



Gal. iii. 11; *δίκαιον εἶναι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ*, Rom. ii. 13) or the *integritas quæ Deo satisfacit*, since what is to avail before God, and to be acknowledged by him as adequate, can be nothing but what is founded in his own being, and has its absolute basis in him the absolute.<sup>1</sup> This *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, then, is, generally speaking, the adequate relation founded in God's own nature, in which, as the idea of religion requires, man has to stand towards God. There are two forms in which this conception may be realized. It will be either *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* or *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*. Of the former, however, the apostle asserts that though it is theoretically a possible form of the relation, yet it never exists in fact; that man *οὐ δικαιοῦται ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, that it is not possible in

<sup>1</sup> Usteri (*Entwicklung des Paulin. Lehrb.*, 4 Ausg. 89) explains *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* incorrectly. He says:—"The righteousness which man seeks to achieve for himself is called *ἰδία (ἐμὴ) δικαιοσύνη*, Rom. x. 3, Phil. iii. 9. The other righteousness is that which God imputes to men, which is given to men in the way which God has instituted, by his free gift. This righteousness is *οὐ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα ἡμῶν*, but *δωρεὰν χάριτι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ ἔλεον*, and is therefore called *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ Θεοῦ*, Phil. iii. 9, or simply *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, Rom. x. 3. The *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* being thus the righteousness (of men) which emanates from God, is also a manifestation of the divine nature (in men). And so the expression is used as indicating simply a divine attribute, to signify that God's essence is both righteousness in itself, and the source of righteousness."

The conception *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* will not be properly understood unless we regard it as the general, which may appear in the form either of *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, which is theoretically a possible form of the relation, or of *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*. The *δικαιοσύνη* is the general which is implied in these two particular forms of *δικαιοσύνη*, and in which these forms satisfy their own conception. But, not to insist on this, the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* cannot possibly be taken as an attribute of God. God manifests his righteousness in it, it is true, but that implies that man has that which places him in an adequate relation towards God. It is this relation which is called *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*. Now the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* is an act of grace and not of righteousness (justice), and righteousness is not the attribute that would be spoken of in the connexion. The author speaks somewhat differently, *Neustet. Theol.* 134. The genitive *Θεοῦ* might be taken as the genitive of the object: "the *δικαιοσύνη* which is founded on the nature of God, or which avails before God;" but the correct interpretation is to take it as the genitive of the subject, "the righteousness proceeding from God as its cause, or produced by God, *i.e.* the way in which God brings men into an adequate relation to himself, the way opened up by God for this purpose, or indeed, the new theory of justification which God has proclaimed." He therefore asserts that *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* is not a general term, including both Judaism and Christianity, and to be divided into the two forms, the *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων* and that *ἐκ πίστεως*.—*Editor.*

this way to obtain justification, salvation, life, and all that makes up man's highest welfare. This is the apostle's distinct and perpetually recurring assertion. We have now to examine more closely what this assertion implies and means.

*Δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* is the Jewish form of the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, and is mediated by the law. The law is given to man simply that he should observe it and work it out in practice; and thus, the law being given and known, the way in which man can set himself in that adequate relation to God which answers to the idea of religion consists in that practical disposition which issues in active obedience, in keeping the commandments of the law. The law, the works of which are the *ἔργα νόμου*, is the law of Moses, and thus it is only in the domain of the Jewish religion as the religion of the law that the *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* can be expected or attained. The moral law generally and the Mosaic law were not distinguished from each other in the apostle's view, since the Mosaic law in which God had declared his moral requirements, was the most perfect expression of the moral law with which he was acquainted. Yet the heathen were not simply *ἄνομοι* to him. What the law aims at in general is the *ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν*, Rom. ii. 10. The law is first of all to bring home to man's consciousness the good which he is to realize practically. Now it cannot be denied that it is possible for the heathen also to do right, and therefore they must be supposed to have at least something analogous to the law. When the Gentiles, the apostle says, ii. 14, do by nature, without positive revelation, what the law commands, they are, without having any law, a law to themselves, whereby they practically prove that the essence of the law (this must be the sense of *τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου*; that which the law is abstractly, according to its fundamental contents, apart from the particular form in which it is expressed, as in the Old Testament; the *ἔργα νόμου* in their unity) is written in their hearts, while their conscience bears witness at the same time with the thoughts which of themselves accuse and excuse each other. There is thus, as a standard of moral conduct, a natural law independent of all

positive revelation, manifesting itself in conscience, to the truth of which the conscience bears witness. Hence if it had been possible at all to obtain the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* through the *ἔργα νόμου*, this road was not quite closed against the heathen. In their case also it was possible to obtain by the *ἐργάζεσθαι τὸ ἀγαθόν* that blessedness in which religion recognises the aim of man in his relations Godward. But the *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* is not possible at all; there is no *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, even where the law is declared with perfect clearness and impressiveness. On this negative proposition, first of all, the apostle's doctrine of justification is based, and we have only to inquire in what way he arrives at it. What is the reason that no true *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* can be attained by any *ἔργα τοῦ νόμου* whatever; is the reason of this to be found in the law itself? We might almost be led to think so when we find the apostle saying, Gal. iii. 21, *εἰ ἐδόθη νόμος ὁ δυνάμενος ζωοποιῆσαι, ὄντως ἂν ἐκ νόμου ἦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη*. If, that is to say, such a law were given in the Mosaic law as could itself give life or save, then righteousness would actually come by the law; then it would be possible to be justified in the way of law, through works of law. But this is by no means the case; on the way of the law no righteousness is to be obtained (cf. iii. 10). Thus it is directly asserted here that the law *οὐ δύναται ζωοποιῆσαι*; but how can this be if it be promulgated by God, and given to men on purpose to *ζωοποιῆσαι*? Do we not read, Gal. iii. 12, *Ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*? Nor can the apostle find the reason of this *οὐ δύνασθαι ζωοποιεῖν* in the nature of the law itself, for he recognises fully that the nature of the law is in itself spiritual and good. *Οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστίν*, Rom. vii. 14 (cf. ver. 12: *ὥστε ὁ μὲν νόμος ἅγιος, καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ ἀγία καὶ δικαία καὶ ἀγαθὴ*). In any case, then, it was not the defectiveness or imperfection of the law that produced the want, but on the contrary, the perfection of it, its spirituality, that it stands too far from him, and too high above him for man to be able to fulfil it. This may be regarded as a defect in the law, but, in order to decide how far the law itself is to blame, we must pass from the side of the law to the

side of man, and inquire into the nature of man in its relation to the law. This relation has already been suggested by the expression used of the law, Rom. vii. 14, that it is *πνευματικός*. If man's nature were as spiritual as the law is spiritual, both would agree together, so that any contradiction between them would be out of the question. The spiritual purpose of the law would find itself naturally and completely fulfilled in the spiritual nature of man. But this harmony cannot take place, since man is not only spiritual, but carnal. In the flesh lies the reason why the νόμος is not *δυνάμενος ζωοποιῆσαι*, as for its own part it might be. The apostle speaks, Rom. viii. 3, of the *ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου ἐν ᾧ ἠσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός*. The law's inability, as things are, to effect what for its own part it might have effected, is due to this,—that the flesh crippled its power, that the strength of the law was broken against the opposition which the flesh presented; and so it appeared in this case only in its weakness and inability. As man then is not only spirit, but, on one side of his nature at least, is flesh also, and as the law, which is spiritual in its nature, cannot effect what for its part it might have effected, what takes place in man when the law comes to him with its demands is just that opposition by which his whole nature is brought into conflict with itself, in which the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and as soon as the flesh obtains the mastery, all those works appear which the apostle calls *τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός*, Gal. v. 19 *sq.* The *σὰρξ* is in one word the seat and organ of *ἀμαρτία*, and the wages of sin is death, Rom. vi. 23. Where sin is, death is also, as, even in the first man, death came into the world along with sin, Rom. v. 12. How then can the law make alive, when man, following the impulses of his nature, and entangled in sin, which is the natural operation of the flesh, falls at once and entirely under the power of death? The law cannot but condemn what is opposite to the law in man, and so is worthy of condemnation. It must pronounce the verdict of death upon sin. Regarded in this light, the law is simply the *γράμμα* which kills, and its office is the *διακονία τῆς κατακρίσεως, τοῦ θανάτου*, 2 Cor. iii. 6 *sq.* If, however, we are to

understand aright this opposition which the law, originally and naturally life-giving, finds in the flesh of man, we must not take up too narrow an idea of what is meant by the flesh. Man is flesh, not only on one side of his nature; regarded according to his natural constitution he is flesh altogether. The spirit, which is the opposite of the flesh, has been imparted to man only through the grace that was given in Christ. Originally, then, he can have been nothing else but flesh. The flesh is therefore not merely the body with its bodily impulses, it is the sensuous principle which dominates the whole man in soul and body. Out of this arises sin in all the various aspects it assumes in human life, so that sin does not consist merely in the indulgence of bodily lusts and desires.<sup>1</sup> In himself, as he is by nature, man is only *σαρκικός* or *ψυχικός* (hence *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν* is, with our apostle, identical with *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν*), he becomes *πνευματικός* when, through faith in the grace of God in Christ, he has received the spirit into himself as the principle of his Christian consciousness and life, cf. 1 Cor. ii. 14; iii. 1 *sq.* Thus it is very natural that while man has no *ἔργα νόμου* to point to, but in place of these only *ἔργα σαρκός*, there can be no *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*. If the law be, as the apostle says, a *νόμος πνευματικός*, then the whole relation of the law to man must bring to light that state of contradiction between spirit and flesh in which the law is nothing but the condemnation of *ἀμαρτία* as the operation of the *σὰρξ*, and can hold no other relation towards man but that of negation and hostility. But the *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, as the apostle speaks of it, must be held to imply that *ἔργα νόμου* exist as well as *ἔργα σαρκός*. And thus, though man be essentially flesh, yet there must be in him a spiritual principle which is at least analogous to the divine *πνεῦμα*, and makes it possible for him not only *κατὰ*

<sup>1</sup> In the Neutest. Theol. (and compare my observations, Theol. Jahrb. i. 83 *sq.*, xiii. 301) it is asserted distinctly that according to the fundamental ideas of the Pauline anthropology the *σὰρξ* is the material body, which, however, is not conceived as inanimate, but as a being with life and peculiar impulses and powers inherent in it; that thus the *ψυχή* proceeds from it, and also the *νοῦς* or human *πνεῦμα*, to be carefully distinguished from the divine *πνεῦμα*.

*σάρκα περιπατεῖν*, but to raise himself above the sphere of the *σὰρξ* and of the *ἄνθρωπος σαρκικὸς* or *ψυχικὸς*. This must indeed be the case; for if man had nothing spiritual in him by nature, he would not have even that natural receptivity which is necessary for the entrance of the spiritual element, to be communicated by God's grace. If then there be *ἔργα νόμου*, which are essentially different from the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκὸς*, how can it be maintained at the same time that there is no such thing as *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*? Though they be not perfectly adequate to the law, yet they must be of such a nature as to stand in no positive opposition to it, as the *ἔργα σαρκὸς* do, but only in a position more or less inadequate. How then can it be said so nakedly that they have no justifying power, and stand in a merely negative relation to the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*? Yet this is the apostle's assertion, and the reason for this assertion is, that the *ἔργα νόμου* cannot do away with the might of the *ἀμαρτία* which reigns in man's *σὰρξ*. Thus, in this case also, the law can only condemn that which is sin; but the peculiarity of the apostle's doctrine here is, that not only does the law pass the condemning verdict on the sin actually existing in contradiction to itself, but that it also brings sin to its full reality in man. The reason of the *οὐ δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* is thus in the law itself after all. The negative part of the apostle's doctrine of justification comes to a point in the proposition which sounds so paradoxical: *ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀμαρτίας ὁ νόμος*, 1 Cor. xv. 56. What gives sin its power, its significance, and its reality—what makes it become that which it is, what makes it sin, is the law. How can this be?

The answer to the question lies in the undeniable truth, that sin is what it is essentially and simply through man's consciousness of it; where there is no consciousness of sin, there is no sin. Now the consciousness of sin comes by the law; for it is just the law that says to man what he is to do or not to do, and thus the law is to man the standard of his whole moral behaviour, to conform to it or not. This is what the apostle insists upon so emphatically in Rom. vii. At ver. 5, he says, "As long as we were living the life

which is dominated by the flesh, the passions which lead to sins were active in our members, being stirred up by the law, in order to bear fruit for death." Then at verse 7 he asks, "What do I say then? is the law sin? certainly not, but I would not have known sin except through the law, and I would have known nothing of lust if the law had not said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion therefrom, worked in me through the commandment the whole of lust, for without the law sin is dead. I lived once without the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I fell into the power of death, and the commandment which was given for life, was found by me to be a thing leading to death. For sin, having thus taken its occasion, misled me through the commandment, and by it slew me. The law indeed is holy, and the commandment is holy, just, and good. Did that which is good then become death to me? No, but sin; that it might appear how sin through that which is good works death to me, that sin through the commandment might appear as sinful as possible." Vers. 7-13.

Thus sin is dead or slumbers in the consciousness as long as the absence of consciousness of any law or prohibition precludes transgression; so soon, however, as one knows what one may do or not do, sin begins at once to stir; it awakes, as it were, out of its slumber, one becomes aware of the possibility of doing what he should not do. With the knowledge of what is forbidden comes also the desire to do it; and if sin has once been committed, the consciousness cannot be wanting that through it one has fallen into the power of death, which the law makes the consequence of sin. In proportion, therefore, as the consciousness of sin is awakened through the law (*διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*, Rom. iii. 20), sin itself reaches its reality, because sin exists essentially just in the consciousness that one has of it. Thus without the law there is no sin, and yet the law is not the cause of sin. The more the law brings home to a man the consciousness of sin, the less is a justification through the law, a *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, possible. He feels only his antagonism to the law, or if he has

*ἔργα νόμου* to show, he feels only the inadequate relation in which they still stand to the law; if the law can justify through *ἔργα νόμου*, it can only justify him whose *ἔργα νόμου* are completely adequate to the law, and extend to all its commandments. But what does the moral consciousness say here, when it is brought to confront the law? All who seek to obtain justification in the way of *ἔργα νόμου* are under the curse, for it is written, "Cursed is every one who does not keep all that is written in the book of the law to do it," to carry it out in his acts. As long as the law stands, therefore, no one can be justified before God, Gal. iii. 10. This is the testimony which every man's moral consciousness bears to him, and it is confirmed by universal experience among heathens and Jews, as the apostle shows in the first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans. But not only does the law awaken the consciousness of sin by saying to every man what sin is, and how much in what he does and leaves undone is simply sin, so that at no point in his life does he stand in a perfectly adequate relation to the law, so that he never is what he ought to be; the law also computes what is or is not possible, and makes men aware of the impossibility of fulfilling it. The more it quickens the perceptions with regard to sin, the more does it weaken the consciousness of any power in the will, so that in respect to sin, knowledge and will stand to each other in an exactly inverse ratio. The apostle speaks of this in the same section of Romans, vii. 14; he describes the antagonism of the carnal man and the spiritual law; as carnal man stands under the power of sin, is as it were sold under sin. "For what I do, I do not consciously, with the full consciousness of my freedom, for not what I will do I, but what I hate, that I do. But if I do that which I would not, then I consent to the law that is good. But now it is not I who do it, but sin that dwells in me. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, there dwells nothing good: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For not the good that I will do I; but the evil that I will not, that do I." Thus there reside in man two antagonistic laws. "I find the law that when I would do good, evil is present with me.



I delight in the law of God after the inward man : but I see another law, which in my members opposes the law of my spirit, and brings me into captivity to the law that is in my members. O wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?" (from the body which is the actual seat of sin, because it is in it that the consequences of sin are accomplished, namely, death.)

If the passage, vii. 7 *sqq.*, be regarded in its whole connexion with what precedes and follows it, we can have no scruple in rejecting as quite erroneous the opinion of those who would understand the condition depicted by the apostle, vii. 14 *sq.*, to be the condition of the regenerate. The contrast of the condition under the law and that under grace could not be expressed more forcibly than is done by the apostle, vii. 24, 25, and viii. 1. The apostle is here describing how the law in its bearing on the moral volitions and acts of man determines his self-consciousness. The highest state of mind man can reach, as long as he merely stands over against the law, is to recognise the good which the law prescribes, and to will to do it. But that he should never get past mere willing, that the possibility implied in willing never becomes a reality, that instead of the good he willed to do, he should do the evil which the law forbids, and which he himself does not will ; this is the imperfection and defect inherent in the condition under the law, and which cannot be explained but by assuming the presence of a power opposing man's will in its recognition and desire of what is good. This power can only be in the flesh, which, as it directs itself only to the sensuous, is the principle of sin, and which enables the sin that dwells in man, and manifests itself through the flesh as its organ, to become a special power, determining the man's whole actions. The apostle calls this power a law, inasmuch as that may be called a law which underlies a constant tendency as its determining principle. There is thus a νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι, which, as the sensual impulses accomplish the results to which they exclusively tend, becomes a νόμος ἁμαρτίας ; and there is a νόμος τοῦ νοός, a tendency determined by the rational principle, which is

opposed to the sensual. Thus, even in the state under the law, before man has received into himself by faith the divine *πνεῦμα*, there is, beside the *σὰρξ*, a higher and better principle which is spiritual in its nature. The apostle calls it reason, *νοῦς*, to mark it as distinguished from the *πνεῦμα*, which is the result of a communication from without, and as belonging to man's own nature. It is the inward man (*ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος*, ver. 22) in opposition to the outward or carnal man; it is the higher spiritual self-consciousness which is determined by reason, as opposed to the sensual consciousness, the determining principle of which is the *σὰρξ*.<sup>1</sup> This *νοῦς* becomes the *νόμος τοῦ νόος* which answers in so far to the *νόμος τοῦ Θεοῦ*, as it is a spiritual principle, and, by its nature as such, cannot but recognise the law, which is also spiritual, feel itself one with that law, and make it the principle of its thought and will. But as this thought and will never grows to anything more than thought and will, does not realize itself in practice, the more man becomes conscious of his union with the law, the more does he grow conscious of his opposition to it. Taking the law up into his consciousness, and being thus aware of that Shall which his union with the law brings home to him, he finds that this is only to discover how far he stands below that Shall, and how little it is possible to him to fill up the gap within him between the Shall and the Am. The whole being of the man is divided between two hostile powers which strive against each other; and the one is so greatly stronger than the other, that it might seem that this latter is only saved from extinction in order that the man, so divided and drawn to and fro in contrary directions, should feel the whole torture of the opposition and struggle with which he is fighting against himself. This is the difference between the *νοῦς* and the *πνεῦμα*; the spiritual principle of the *νοῦς* can never be the invader and conqueror of the *σὰρξ*; what it is, it is only

<sup>1</sup> This shows distinctly, as the author goes on to say, *Neutest. Theol. i. 48*, that the Pauline doctrine of sin is different from the Augustinian doctrine. In the *Theol. Jahrb. xiii. 29. 5 sqq.*, I have entered more fully into the relation of the Pauline doctrine of sin and grace to the Augustinian and the early Protestant doctrine.—*Editor.*

potentially, and can never come to be actually.<sup>1</sup> This is the condition in which man finds himself as long as he is under the law, it is a state of distraction, disunion, conflict; an unhappy consciousness, in which one longs for the redemption which can deliver from its torture. In this longing the man can do nothing but cry out, "O wretched man that I am! who will deliver me from the body of this death; as for me, as I am in myself, I serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin." Reason is the better principle in him, but the flesh is the predominant and ruling principle. Man cannot emerge from this state of division and distraction so long as he is under the law, and the law itself is there, just to create in him the full consciousness of the division. But as soon as he becomes conscious of the enormity of the division, and begins to long for deliverance from it, he has in reality got past it, and the lower negative standpoint is now looked back upon and judged by a standard which only the superior standpoint has given. It is seen namely, and that from above, how the position under the law is that of a mere naked Shall, which can never be fused into union with the human consciousness in its entirety. We have therefore a right to say that no one ever felt so truly this disunion of man with himself—this division which prevails at the standpoint of the law—as the apostle, who, when he felt it, had already overcome it. In this respect the interpreters are right, who hold that the so-called *gratia praeveniens* has to be presupposed to Rom. vii. 15. Only in presentiment of the state of grace can one feel rightly what is wanting in the

<sup>1</sup> This is the difference between Rom. vii. 18 *sq.* and Gal. v. 17 *sq.* In the *ἐπιθυμῶν* of the *σὰρξ κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος* and of the *πνεῦμα κατὰ τῆς σαρκός*, the *πνεῦμα* gains the victory just because it is the *πνεῦμα*. In the words, verse 17, *ὅνα μὴ ἂν θέλητε*, etc., the apostle does not mean that the struggle is so undecided that no *ποιεῖν* ensues at all, but only that this *ποιεῖν* cannot take place save through the subjection of an opposing power. These two tendencies, impulses, principles, are at strife with each other, as if they only aimed to effect that you shall not do just what you wish to do. But if in this contest of the two principles, in which the victory is yet undecided, you give yourselves to be determined by the *πνεῦμα*, and the *πνεῦμα* thus obtains the preponderance, then you will not only not fulfil that which the flesh desires,—you will also cease to stand under the law, you will have Christian freedom.

state of law.<sup>1</sup> Α δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, or an *ιδία δικαιοσύνη*, obtained through the fulfilling of the law (with regard to which only a *ζητεῖν, διώκειν*, is possible, which must not grow to an opinion of actual legal righteousness, Rom. x. 3, ix. 30) has thus no existence, not only because the *ἔργα νόμου* which man has to point to are never fully adequate to the law, but still more because he can never feel the possibility of fulfilling the law,—can never know himself one with the law in the totality of his self-consciousness. Διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ, Gal. ii. 16; Rom. iii. 20. If this union, this *δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ*, is ever to be reached, that can only be in a word, in this way: that the *νοῦς* (which is the highest element in this stand-point, and in which nevertheless we only see its negativity) is changed into the *πνεῦμα*. How this is brought about is the other side of the Pauline doctrine of justification.

<sup>1</sup> We are here supplied with a simple answer to the question how far the apostle is speaking in the first person at Rom. vii. 7 *seq.* He is speaking generally, and what he says applies not only to himself, but to all who are in the same case. At the same time, only he himself is properly the subject, and he has to use the first person in speaking of himself, because no one had gone through the same experience before him.

### THIRD CHAPTER.

THE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.—(2.) IN ITS POSITIVE ASPECT :

*ὁ ἄνθρωπος δικαιούται ἐκ πίστεως.*

It is not in the way of the works of the law, it is only in the way of faith, that the true *δικαιοσύνη* is to be realized. Faith is the indispensable and all-important element and condition of justification, as the apostle very clearly intimates in the passage Rom. i. 16, where he states the main proposition of the whole subsequent discussion in the words, "I am not ashamed of the gospel: for it is a power of God to salvation for every one that believes; both Jew and Gentile. For righteousness, the adequate moral relation to God, is manifested in it as one which goes from faith to faith, as it is written: The just shall live by faith." The apostle thus regards faith as all-important; he cannot speak of righteousness, even at the very threshold of his Epistle, without at once declaring faith to be its essential element. The peculiar expression which he uses here is to be explained by the supreme importance which faith possessed to him. He says of the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* that it *ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν*, i.e. it is manifested in the gospel as a righteousness which begins with faith and ends with faith, of which faith is the beginning, middle, and end; the essential and pervading element of which is simply faith: cf. Rom. iii. 22, *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς πιστεύοντας*.<sup>1</sup> Thus everything depends on faith; now what is faith? It comes externally from

<sup>1</sup> In this passage also the two prepositions only serve to add strength to the one conception. The addition of *εἰς πίστιν* to *ἐκ πίστεως* is best illustrated by the passage 2 Cor. ii. 16: *ὁσμὴ θανάτου εἰς θάνατον, ὁσμὴ ζωῆς εἰς ζωὴν*.

hearing the preaching of the gospel (*ἀκοή πίστεως*, Gal. iii. 2, 5, Rom. x. 17), and thus it is primarily a recognition of the truth of the contents of the gospel, *πίστις τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*. Now as Christ is the essential contents of the gospel, this *πίστις* becomes *πίστις Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, Gal. ii. 16, *i.e.* the faith of which Christ is the object, or *πίστις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, Gal. iii. 26, the faith which has in Christ the principle on which it rests. This *πίστις* is further defined as *πίστις ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ*, Rom. iii. 25, since what faith apprehends in Christ as its proper object is the atoning death of Jesus. And here the apostle defines the contents of faith yet further, as *πιστεύειν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγείραντα Ἰησοῦν, τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν, ἐκ νεκρῶν, ὃς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν, καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*, Rom. iv. 24, 25. Thus the object of faith is narrowed stage by stage, and in proportion as this is done the faith grows more intense and inward. From theoretical assent it becomes a practical trust in which the man's deepest interests find expression. This trust becomes in turn a certainty of conviction, in which what has once been taken up into the subjective consciousness, even though a mere representation or expectation has all the force of an immediate objective reality. Now this faith, awakened first by an external agency, but then proceeding to discover and to rest upon its own inward resources, has for its object the death of Jesus. How has the death of Jesus come to occupy this position, and how does the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* result from the direction of faith to this its object?


At the standpoint of the law, the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* was sought to be attained through the works of the law; thus what the *ἔργα νομοῦ* sought to effect, but, being an *ἰδία δικαιοσύνη*, could not, is now to be effected through faith as a *δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Faith then must have what works had not. But faith does not of itself possess this mediating power; all that it is, it is only in virtue of the object to which it is directed. There must, therefore, be something in the death of Jesus which qualifies faith to effect what the law with its works could not. This relation of the death of Jesus to the law is most explicitly stated by the apostle

in the passage, Gal. iii. 13, "Christ has bought us free from the curse of the law, in that he became a curse for us; for it is written in the Scriptures, 'Cursed is every one that hangs on a tree.'" There is thus a curse in the death of Christ on the cross; this curse cannot have been incurred by Christ himself,—it must have been laid upon him. It is the curse of the law, for the result at which one arrives on the way of the *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* is just this, that *ἄσσοι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσὶν, ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσὶ*, Gal. iii. 10, since man has not those *ἔργα νόμου* which he ought to have, and, instead of the righteousness of the law, has only sin, which the law can do nothing but condemn. It is this curse, then, which Christ has taken on himself, for he suffered the penalty which the law demanded for the sins of men, viz., death. By this men are bought free from the curse of the law; the demand which the law made upon them for penalty has been met, hence the law has now ceased to have any valid claim against them; in respect of the law they are free. That principle which the law sets up as its *ultimatum*, that only *ὁ ποιήσας ἀντὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*, and that thus every one who does not exactly observe all that the law prescribes, *τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἀντὰ*, has fallen under the curse of the law—this principle has ceased to apply to them. Man is thus free from the curse of the law—the *κατάρα τοῦ νόμου*, the curse, the penalty, which the law denounced, or the curse of which the law was the cause, the objective ground of which resided in the law. This deliverance is given to men, only in so far as Christ has died for their sake; but if he died for their sake, then this mutual relation between him and them must come home to their consciousness, must be recognised by them. They must, in order to appropriate to themselves what he has done for them, feel that they are one with him. Faith is this relation; only in faith in him, and in the death which he died for them upon the cross, are they free from the curse of the law. Faith is this union of man with Christ, by means of which the deliverance from the law which the death of Christ has effected, becomes his own deliverance from it. Here, however, something would seem

to be wanting in the logic of this theory. For though man be bought free from the curse of the law, all that is effected thereby is that that demand is cancelled which the law made on them in respect of sins already committed. But does it follow from this that the law itself is done away? The law remains what it is, it continues to be binding, the obligation to keep it can never cease, and every failure in the observance of it involves the same demand for penalty, the same curse; and so man remains under the curse of the law. How then can the apostle say that the law in itself is done away? This implies that the constant repetition of the law's demands is met by the death of Christ being constantly set over against them, and constantly producing the same effect in respect of them. Thus if the death of Christ be really a deliverance for men, then its doing away with the law must be a doing away with it for ever, or as such. And that is so: what the law could not effect because of the constant failure to observe it, and indeed cannot possibly effect, that the death of Christ accomplishes by doing away with the law; it accomplishes it without the law, but only in so far as it is the object of faith. How it is the object of faith can only be explained at a later stage in our discussion. The question before us now is in what way it is the abolition of the curse which lies upon man because of the law. The chief passage in which the apostle expresses his views on this point is Rom. iii. 21-26, "Now is made manifest without the law the righteousness which avails before God, as it is attested by the law and the prophets, *i. e.* that which is to be regarded as the condition of the adequate relation of man to God. This adequate relation is mediated by faith in Christ Jesus, so that all in general are merely such as believe, for there is no difference; all have sinned, and have nothing to glory of before God. They are justified freely through his grace through the redemption in Christ Jesus, whom God has set up as a propitiatory sacrifice through faith in his blood, for a proof of his righteousness, because he had passed over the sins that had been done before, in the long-suffering of God, for a proof, that is, of his righteousness at the present time,



that he might be just, and might justify him who is willing to be justified by faith." Here we have to distinguish two momenta which the apostle, in regarding the death of Jesus as an object of faith, keeps separate from, and opposes to each other. On the one hand, the redemption which is effected through the death of Jesus is an act of the free grace of God; sinners as they are, men can only be justified through the grace of God; but, on the other hand, there has been manifested in the death of Christ the righteousness of God, which cannot suffer sin to go unpunished. Redemption, which has been effected through the death of Jesus, is an act of grace, but with this qualification, that that death is a bloody sacrifice presented for the propitiation of God. In this sense the apostle calls the death of Jesus a *ἱλαστήριον*, an atoning sacrifice, and that in order to prove God's righteousness, which cannot but cause the guilt to be followed by the punishment of sin. This righteousness of God had therefore to be satisfied, and this was done by the penalty of sin being actually borne. De Wette justly remarks that this passage leads up to the Anselmic doctrine of justification; but as for the view held by our apostle there is no reason here to travel beyond the idea of *ἔνδειξις*, which does not imply that God requires such a sacrifice for the expiation of sins on his own account, in order to satisfy the claims of his own righteousness, but only that this was done for men to demonstrate his righteousness to them. Yet this distinction is seen ultimately to be unreal, for what God does can never be for the mere external purpose of an *ἔνδειξις*,—it must have its objective ground in God's own nature. Since it was inconsistent with the idea of the righteousness of God to leave sins unpunished that had been already committed, it was necessary that Christ should die for the punishment of the sins of men. Yet this is not to say that the obstacle to the forgiveness of men's sins which was to be removed by Christ's death was actually and essentially in God's nature, in his penal judgment, or his wrath against men. It was not that God himself is to be appeased; and though the apostle speaks of a reconciliation, a *καταλλαγὴ*, a *καταλλάττεσθαι*, the reconciliation



that he speaks of is not such a one as should have brought about a change of disposition towards man in God himself. We have received the reconciliation, says the apostle, Rom. v. 10, 11 ; though *ἐχθροὶ ὄντες*, we have been reconciled to God through the death of his Son. This *ἐχθροὶ ὄντες* must be understood rather of men's enmity against God than of God's enmity against men,—of that *ἐχθρα εἰς Θεὸν* which has its seat in the *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς*, Rom. viii. 7. Of course the death of Christ must have some reference to the righteousness of God, and what it was in this aspect may be said to have been the removal of the wrath of God, Rom. v. 9, and in so far a reconciliation of God with men ; but here, however, we must remember that it is God Himself who is the reconciler, who brings about the reconciliation of men with himself through Christ, *Θεὸς ἐν Χριστῷ κόσμον καταλλάσσωσαν εἰναι*, 2 Cor. v. 19. This implies the gracious disposition of God towards men as the condition without which the whole transaction would not have taken place, and on which alone it was possible for them to enter on a new relation towards him. Thus it rests entirely with men to cease from their enmity against God, and to allow that disposition with which God has always regarded them, and which he has actually proved through the death of Christ, to pass over into their minds ; or since God by His gracious and conciliatory disposition has reconciled the world to Himself in Christ, to let themselves be actually reconciled to Him. The *καταλλαγή* is nothing but the manifestation of the grace of God for men's acceptance. By their acceptance of it they enter upon a relation towards him where there is *εἰρήνη πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν*, and all enmity between the two parties has disappeared. Here we may already discern the relation which those two elements bear to each other, which are distinguished in the passage Rom. iii. 21-26, as the opposite aspects of the death of Christ, viz., righteousness and grace. The death of Jesus is to be regarded in the light of the Divine justice as having to do with a matter of guilt and penalty, yet this is merely the outside of the affair ; the merely judicial aspect pertaining to the sphere of law where that justice which is

based upon the law which God himself has given dare not be violated. The inward motive, however, of the provision made by God in the death of Jesus, that element in it in which God's essential nature is most distinctly revealed, is the grace of God (*ἡ αὐτοῦ χάρις*, Rom. iii. 24). This factor predominates so greatly over the other, that even the strong claim which God's justice puts forth in the death of Jesus may be regarded as simply a result of his grace. The *ἔνδειξις* of his *δικαιοσύνη* in the death of Jesus could never have taken place had he not, before he showed himself the just one, already been the gracious one, who gave the greatest proof of his graciousness in this, that so far as the penalty of sin had to be enforced in order to give his justice what it claimed, he desired it to be enforced not in men themselves, but in another for them. This leads us from the idea of satisfaction to the intimately related idea of substitution. The satisfaction which has met the divine justice in the death of Jesus could not have taken place without the grace of God; and so intimately is the idea of grace which gives rise to this whole process related to that of substitution, that the one preposition *ὑπὲρ* stands for both ideas, denoting both that which is done for men and that which is done in the place of men. On the one hand, what is done for men, in their interest, is done merely to make them partakers of the benefit of the grace of God. And it is truly remarked that the preposition *ὑπὲρ* does not of itself imply the idea of substitution, and that that other meaning, in which the death of Jesus is represented as having been for men, in their interest, is predominant. On the other hand, however, it is also certain that the idea of substitution cannot be dissevered from that one; the preposition *ὑπὲρ*, which is so much used in this connexion, contains both these ideas constantly passing over into each other, and present in each other. In the passage Rom. v. 6, it is said "Christ died when we were yet weak" (without value or importance, without any of those qualities which can determine another to do something for one; it is thus that *ἀσθενεῖς* must be understood in distinction from *δίκαιος* and *ἀγαθός*, and in opposition to *δικαιωθέντες*, ver. 9,

since, in their character as *δικαιωθέντες* they have in themselves something that gives them importance in God's sight); hardly does one die for a just man, for a good man (such a one as is more than *δίκαιος*, who has won the love of others through his amiable qualities) one might dare to die more readily than for another, but God proves his love to us in this, that when we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Here and in many similar passages the *ἀποθανεῖν ὑπὲρ* is merely a dying in the interests of others; but in the passages Rom. iv. 25, *παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν*; Gal. i. 4, *τοῦ δόντος ἑαυτὸν περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*; Rom. viii. 3, *περὶ ἁμαρτίας κατέκρινε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί*; 1 Cor. xv. 3, *Χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*; 2 Cor. v. 15, *εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον, καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν, ἵνα οἱ ζῶντες μηκέτι ἑαυτοῖς ζῶσιν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποθανόντι καὶ ἐγερθέντι*, the idea of substitution cannot certainly be rejected as out of place. If Christ died because of sin (*διὰ, περὶ, ὑπὲρ*), that is, from a cause which lay in the sins of men, inasmuch as death is the necessary penalty of sin, then he bore in his death that penalty which men had incurred through the guilt of their sin, and so should have borne themselves. He died then not merely for them, but also in their place, as the one instead of the many, who, just because he died for them and took their place, did not actually die themselves, but are regarded as having died in him their substitute. This comes out most clearly in the passage 2 Cor. v. 14, where, from the proposition *εἰς ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀπέθανεν*, the apostle at once draws the conclusion, *ἄρα οἱ πάντες ἀπέθανον*. This is not the spiritual death of which the apostle speaks, Rom. vi. 2, nor a mere ought-to-die; it is simply said that what is true of one is true of all, just because (as the article shows) these are the *πάντες*, those, namely, whose place the one has taken. Only if he died instead of them, and for them, have they also died. Only the one has actually died, but they are all contained in him ideally; if not really, yet essentially; and for his sake who died in their place and for them, they may all be regarded as dead themselves. The idea of substitution implies two things, first, that

the one who is to take the place of many others, and to be counted for them, is the same as they are; and secondly, that he possesses something which they have not; that, namely, the lack of which makes it necessary that he should represent them. If Christ has died for the sins of men, then he must have been without sin himself, in order that his death, which could not be a sacrifice on his own account, might avail as the penalty of the sins of others. Thus it is merely the development of the idea of substitution found at 2 Cor. v. 14, where the apostle says, ver. 21, that God made him who knew of no sin, who did not know from his own self-consciousness what sin was, to be sin for us, that is, to be an object of sin, and therewith one in whom sin is to be punished. But in order that he might thus represent the sins of men in himself, it was necessary for him to be a man like the men whose place he was to take; only in one point which was common to them all, he could not be like them, namely, in sin. Thus though he had a *σὰρξ*, yet since the *σὰρξ* of all men is a *σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας*, his *σὰρξ* could only be a *ὁμολωμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, Rom. viii. 3. Thus he was not quite as they were, but only similar to them; with all his identity with them, he had this essential difference from them, that his *σὰρξ* was not, like the *σὰρξ* of all other men, the seat of sin. This being a difference between him and them, the difference was done away and changed into perfect unity; through his becoming what they were, *ἁμαρτία*, they became free from *ἁμαρτία*, from the penalty of sin. This was the negative condition of the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*. God made him *ἁμαρτία* that we might become *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ*, that which it is necessary for us to be in order to stand in that relation to God which is adequate to the idea of God. Thus by one man's satisfying justice on behalf of all men, a justification was attained which sets men free from death, and makes them partakers of life. Through the obedience of one many were made righteous, 2 Cor. v. 21, Rom. v. 18, 19.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The author discusses at page 164, and more at length in his *Neutest. Theol.* 166, *sqq.* (cf. also my observations, *Theol. Jahrb.* 1. 87, *sq.*) another effect of

This *δικαιοσύνη γίνεσθαι* or *δίκαιοι καθίστασθαι*, which is equivalent to *δικαιούσθαι*, brings us back again to the conception of faith. Since faith is the subjective condition on which alone men can enter into the relation these words denote, the result of the foregoing is to confirm the proposition *ὅτι οὐ δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, Gal. ii. 16. Faith is subjectively what grace is objectively (the object of faith is indeed just the grace of God which has appeared in Christ), and thus grace is the objective principle of the Pauline doctrine of justification. Everything here depends on grace, as being the outcome of the divine love, which is the primary cause of the work of redemption in God's own nature, Rom. iii. 24, v. 8. We are *δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι*, and the antithesis between *δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* and the *δικαιοσύνη νόμου* consists just in this, that the former is done freely through grace alone. For if there be a righteousness of the law which it is possible to attain through works of the law, then Christ has died in vain, Gal. ii. 21, because the grace which his death has purchased would then be completely superfluous. There would then be no need of it, because the *δικαιοσύνη διὰ νόμον* proceeds on the directly opposite principle, that as the apostle says, Rom. iv. 4, *τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα*. That which comes about *κατὰ ὀφείλημα*, from indebtedness, is the opposite of what comes about *κατὰ χάριν* or *δωρεὰν*; the former is what a man has a right to claim, since it is nothing but an effect, arising from, and implicitly contained in, a cause which is present in ourselves. Here effect follows cause of necessity and without external intervention. He who has the *ἔργα νόμου* receives the *δικαιοσύνη κατὰ νόμον* by the same law by which the workman receives wages proportioned to his labour. With the *δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, however, the case is entirely different; the one is related to the other as *λογίζεσθαι* and *οὐ λογίζεσθαι*. In the case of the *ἐργάζεσθαι* and the consequent *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, there can the death of Christ, viz., that in his body, the *σὰρξ*, and with it the sin which resides in the *σὰρξ*, is destroyed in its principle.

be no question of any λογίζεσθαι; but there is this in the case of δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως. Faith itself λογίζεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην, namely, τῷ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ, who does not hold to ἔργα, πιστεύοντι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιούντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ, Rom. iv. 5. The one δικαιούσθαι is thus related to the other as the mere representation and supposition of a thing to the truth of the thing itself. Thus starting from the δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων, faith would require, first of all, to overcome the contradiction that the godless, the unjust, is held for just; that he, who in himself is unjust, is yet just. This is the proper contents of faith, through which δικαιούσθαι becomes a δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως. He who is to be justified by faith must first of all believe that this is so, and since the objective truth of justification consists in this, that what the justified person is to his own consciousness, he is also in the consciousness of God, in the judgment of God concerning him, in which the justifying act takes place, it must be a fact in the consciousness of God that he who in himself is unjust, is yet just. The Pauline doctrine of justification appears here in its greatest hardness. It supposes as actually existing what does not actually exist; its δικαιούσθαι is not an actual *being just*, but a mere *being held* or *being declared* just, and faith, as the principle of this δικαιούσθαι, is thus the imagination arrived at in looking to Christ, that what really is not, yet is.

If this be so, then the δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως certainly affords no occasion whatever for a καύχημα such as there might be in the case of δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων, Rom. iv. 2; indeed man has nothing in himself at all that could set him in the adequate relation to God which is required in order to δικαιούσθαι; for how is it possible that faith as a mere opinion that a thing is as it should be, although it is in fact the very opposite, could have any influence whatever to procure such a relation? We are here at the extreme point where faith in this merely putative sense, as a thing devoid of contents, seems destitute of all reality, and where at the same time it becomes clearly apparent, that if faith is to be the principle of δικαιούσθαι, it must contain in itself those definite contents without which it can have no reality. Whence then is faith to

draw these contents? When the apostle says, Rom. iv. 5, that to the *πιστεύων ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἄσεβῆ λογίζεται ἡ πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην*, he regards the faith which is imputed for righteousness as itself the *δικαιοσύνη*, as itself the subjective condition of *δικαιούσθαι*. Faith is *δικαιοσύνη*, or the moral quality which, when it is present, enables man to come into that adequate relation towards God which the idea of *δικαιούσθαι* represents. The moral element of faith can only consist in this, that the believer (not as Rückert observes on Rom. iv. 5, though he is not righteous yet, yet has the wish to become so, a consideration which is out of place here, but) believes the *δικαιῶν τὸν ἄσεβῆ* in this very point, that the *ἄσεβῆς* is no longer an *ἄσεβῆς*, but a *δίκαιος*. But how can he believe this without being at the same time conscious of the foundation on which this faith rests? The foundation on which this faith rests can only be Christ. While the believer makes Christ the contents of his faith, the *πίστις* which was reckoned for *δικαιοσύνη*, or the *δικαιοσύνη* which consists in nothing but *πίστις*, the *δικαιοσύνη* which faith does not realize but only takes for granted, and which is therefore only an imagined *δικαιοσύνη*, is turned into a real one. For it is impossible to believe in Christ without knowing one's-self one with him, and in this conscious unity with him, being aware of that which is the proper object of faith in Christ, as an immanent determination of one's own consciousness.

Faith is therefore counted for righteousness to those who believe in him who raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead; and in the faith in God as the raiser up of Jesus, there is implicitly contained faith in Jesus himself, as the one who was delivered for our sins, and raised again for our justification, Rom. iv. 24, 25. While believing in him we know at the same time that we are one with him and we become in him the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, 2 Cor. v. 21, the *δικαιοσύνη* which he is made to us of God, 1 Cor. i. 30. His death is the cause why we, being now free from all the guilt of sin, can be the same as he is, without sin, and being in this sense righteous, are able to stand in the same adequate relation towards



God, in which he stands towards him. It follows, however, from his death, that our faith in him brings us not merely this negative righteousness, consisting in freedom from the guilt of sin; he is also a *δικαίωμα εἰς πάντα ἀνθρώπους εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς* (Rom. v. 18). As he shows himself righteous in his death, so his death is for all men the ground of a justification which leads to life. For as in the disobedience of the one man, the many who have their unity in him became sinners, so through the obedience of the one man, the many who have their unity in him are made righteous. In his obedience, in which he himself appeared as *δίκαιος*, they themselves become *δίκαιοι* in virtue of their faith in him; such, namely, as have in themselves the subjective condition of the adequate relation between man and God. In that negative aspect the liberation of men from the guilt and penalty of sin has removed everything that might have proved to men the cause of wrong relations towards God. There is, as the apostle says, Rom. viii. 1, nothing subject to condemnation in those who are in Christ Jesus; all who stand in communion with Christ, who have become one with him in faith, are, as justified persons, no longer subject to the divine sentence of condemnation. But not only have they in themselves this negative righteousness; they are positively, through a principle that has become immanent in them, placed in an adequate relation towards God. What renders the *δικαιοσύνη διὰ νόμου* impossible, is that the law, though in itself spiritual, could not take up its place in man as spiritual, and thus become a unity with him. Now, however, what man takes up into himself through faith in Christ, as the mediating agency of his justification, is the *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. The law of the spirit (that is, the spirit as the principle which determines the whole direction of the man, the principle of the Christian consciousness as the vital principle of those who believe in Christ, and find in him alone the principle of their spiritual life) has made me free, the apostle says in the same passage, from the law of sin and death, from the power they have as a dominating principle. For what was impossible through the law because it

was too weak through the flesh, God has done by sending his Son in the likeness of the flesh of sin, and on account of sin, condemning sin in the flesh, that that which, according to the law, is accounted righteous, as the act which is highest, and which corresponds to the idea of righteousness or morality, might be realized in us, inasmuch as we walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. For those who are after the flesh think only fleshly things, but they who are after the spirit think spiritual things. The νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος, as the apostle here designates the principle of the Christian consciousness, distinguishing it both from the νόμος Θεοῦ which one serves only with the practically impotent νοῦς, and from the νόμος ἁμαρτίας, which comes out through the σὰρξ, is the highest expression for the Pauline conception of justification, the δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως in its opposition to the δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. There must be πίστις before there can be πνεῦμα, yet πίστις is only the form of which πνεῦμα is the contents; it is only in the πνεῦμα that πίστις becomes the living reality of the Christian consciousness, informed with its positive contents. It is in the πνεῦμα, therefore, that the whole process of justification, as the apostle traces its development through its different stages, is at last completed. The true Christian δικαιοῦσθαι is no longer a δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως in the sense in which πίστις λογίζεται εἰς δικαιοσύνην to the πιστεῶν ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιούντα τὸν ἄσεβῆ, in which case the relation of the person justified to God rests on a merely imaginary δικαιοσύνη, since, though essentially an ἄσεβῆς, he is regarded by the δικαιοῶν as a δίκαιος, and pronounced to be δίκαιος. On the contrary, it is a true and real δικαιοῦσθαι, because in the νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος, in the πνεῦμα as the principle which determines his whole consciousness and life, he is truly and actually placed in the relation to God which is adequate to the idea of God. The relation which, in the case of faith imputed for righteousness, was a merely outward one, has now by means of the πνεῦμα, in which God communicates his spirit to man, and in which he dwells in man as the spirit of Christ, become a truly inward one, Rom. viii. 9. It is now a

relation of spirit to spirit, in which the spirit, as the principle of the subjective consciousness, is drawn into union with the spirit of God, as the spirit of Christ which is its objective basis. The *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*, the moral contents of the law as the moral self-determination of man, is fulfilled and realized in this, that the justified persons walk, not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. This walking according to the spirit is not indeed that *ἐμμένειν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου, τοῦ ποιῆσαι αὐτά*, Gal. iii. 10 ; for that remains even in this case a demand which can never be satisfied ; but in place of this merely quantitative fulfilment of the law, there has come the qualitative fulfilment ; the spirit is the principle of the fulfilment of the law or of moral conduct, and the spirit, the totality of disposition, contains in itself also the totality of the law, the *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*. The *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου* which is thus satisfied is the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* realized in man, and this *δικαιοσύνη* is also *ζωή*, for the *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος* is the *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, and the spirit of God who dwells in us as the spirit of Christ is as the *πνεῦμα, ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην*. Where *δικαιοσύνη* is, there is also *ζωή*, because the principle of the one as well as of the other is the divine spirit which has come to reside in man as the principle of his Christian consciousness and life. Thus, though the body still carries in itself, that is, in the *σὰρξ*, the principle of sin, and is consequently subject to the power of death, yet in the spirit the man has in himself the principle of life ; the spirit which dwells in him, the spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the dead, and will penetrate what of him is mortal more and more with the power of life, Rom. viii. 10, 11. Thus that *δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, in which the apostle concentrates his whole doctrine of justification, has now become a truth and a reality. All that he says in the same connexion, Rom. viii. 12-17, of the spirit of the sonship of God, which makes itself heard in the Christian consciousness, is simply the definition of that highest stage, in which the whole process of justification comes to its completion and passes into the living reality of the immanent Christian consciousness.

Thus the spirit is the element in which God and man are related to each other as spirit to spirit, and where they are one with each other in the unity of the spirit. But this union of man with God, in which the essence of justification consists, is only possible on the condition of faith. The spirit is indeed the true and living medium of the union of man with God; yet it must not be forgotten that since we only receive the spirit on the ground of faith, the essential element of justification is nothing but faith, and that the bond of union, in which justification consists, is formed by faith only, being here the union of the man with Christ, Faith of itself transfers the man from his former condition into a totally different one—into a new circle of tasks and duties. We see this in the Epistle to the Romans. The apostle describes the life of justification in its highest stage, viii. 1-17, but before this he has deduced from the conception of *δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, and of the divine grace which is given in faith, Rom. v., the manner in which the union of man with Christ which faith has formed is to realize itself in practice, Rom. vi. What faith in Christ lays hold of first of all is the grace of God reconciling men to himself in the death of his Son, and not imputing their trespasses to them, Rom. v. 10, 2 Cor. v. 19. But where grace is, there the law is no longer; throughout the whole domain of grace there is an end to every claim the law could make. If we be under grace, says the apostle, Rom. vi. 14, 15, we are no more under law; law and grace are mutually exclusive of each other, Gal. ii. 21. Now if this be the relation between law and grace, if grace have so much the predominance over the law as to abolish the law altogether by grace, and render null and void all claims which it could make on account of the guilt of sin, then it appears that sin is not such a serious affair, and why should a man not sin if he be certain that grace is stronger than the law and sin? The apostle takes up this question, Rom. vi. 1, and shows, first, that his doctrine of justification is not open to the charge of allowing licence to sin; and then, that the justification which he teaches kills and extirpates sin from its very roots. The law is indeed abolished by grace, but grace has faith as its essential condition, and faith places a man in such a state of union with Christ, that what is true

of Christ must also be true of him who has faith in him. In the fellowship with Christ's life and death which faith procures, sin is put an end to in two ways : first, the death of the *σὰρξ* is also the death of sin; and, second, in the new life to which he who has died with Christ must rise in virtue of his union with him, sin can find no place. All who are baptized into Jesus Christ, says the apostle, Rom. vi. 3, are baptized into his death; they are, therefore, buried with him through baptism into death, that as Christ has been raised up from the dead through the glory of the Father, so they also should walk in a new life. For if they be grown together with him in the likeness of his death, they will be one with him in his resurrection. The first of these two points, the being dead with Christ, is then further defined, verse 6; for we know that our old man is crucified with Christ, that the body of sin should be destroyed, so that we should no more serve sin, for he that is dead is absolved from sin. In order to apprehend correctly this latter proposition which embodies the general truth, on which the apostle's argument proceeds, we have to remember how he regards the *σὰρξ* as the principle and the seat of sin. It is through his *σὰρξ*, his physical nature, that man is subject to sin and death. This dominion of sin and death can last only so long as the *σὰρξ* is vitally active and capable of asserting itself. As soon as it is dead, man is free from its dominion over him, and absolved from the claim which it makes on him; if in the death of the *σὰρξ* he himself has died to the *σὰρξ*, then he has discharged his debt to it; not only is he free from it, but he has, as it were, formally and judicially cleared off scores with it, so that he stands over against it as a *δίκαιος*, a justified person. The apostle expresses this relation by the phrase, *δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. The *σὰρξ*, however, is dead, or the man in the *σὰρξ* has died to it, because he has died with Christ; for Christ is crucified for this purpose, that the body of sin might be destroyed, Rom. vi. 6. Inasmuch as he died, he died unto sin, in reference to sin, Rom. vi. 10, since he condemned sin in the flesh. Through the surrender of his body to crucifixion he took from sin the power which it possessed in the sinful body.

Now from this the apostle draws the immediate inference that he who believes in Christ cannot, being dead, live in respect to sin, or in the service of sin, ver. 11. "Thus do you also regard yourselves, that you are dead for sin; let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body (the physical mortality of which ought to symbolize to you that other mortality, that it is already *νεκρὸν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ*), so that you should obey the lusts thereof. Nor do you yield your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin, for sin will not or cannot have power to rule over you, because you stand no longer under the law, but under grace." He, then, who is dead to sin, is also dead to the law, Rom. vii. 4, for this simple reason, that the law can reign only so long as sin reigns; for only under the rule of the law does sin develop its whole power, Rom. vii. 5. Thus the law itself seemed to call forth sin just in order that, in the guilt and punishment of sin it might appear in its whole power over man (hence there was at last nothing for it but to die to the law through the law, since it stood self-condemned in its insufficiency for man's salvation, Gal. ii. 19). A further reason why he who is dead to sin is dead to the law also is, that he who has died to sin can have died to it only in one way, viz., that Christ in his crucified body has destroyed the body of sin. As being dead with Christ, he now belongs, in virtue of this unity, to Christ alone, and thus through the death of Christ, all who have died with him are freed from the bond which binds mankind to the law. The apostle shows this, Rom. vii. 1 *sq.*, through the analogy of a wife who is bound to her husband only so long as he lives. As death is in this instance the termination of a legal obligation, so in the case of the law; the law's binding power ceases so soon as he who stands under the law is dead; thus, as soon as a man has died to sin through that unity with Christ which faith procures him, he is no longer subject to the law,—the old relation has ceased, and in the death of Christ, a new one has been formed. You have, says the apostle, Rom. vii. 4, become dead to the law through the body of Christ, that you should belong to another, to Christ, who has risen from the dead; and that in this fellowship you should no longer, as when under the dominion

of the law, the flesh, and sin, bear fruit to death, but should bear fruit to God, Rom. vii. 4-6. Thus the second of the momenta above mentioned, life with and for Christ, is conditioned by the first, the being dead with Christ. The bond which binds a man to the law is loosed because he has died to sin, and has been absolved from the law; the new bond now takes the place of the old one, the bond of union with Christ, whose life is also his life; and he who lives in and with Christ lives to God. "If we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him; for we know that Christ, being raised from the dead, dies no more. In that he has died, he died to sin for ever; in that he lives, he lives to God. So we also must regard ourselves as those who are dead to sin, and live to God in Christ Jesus," Rom. vi. 8-11. Christ himself lives in us as the higher principle which directs our whole being and life, in which everything in us that is merely finite, and belongs only to our self, or private *ego*, is done away, that we should live no longer to ourselves, but only to him. I am crucified with Christ, says the apostle, Gal. ii. 20; he who is crucified with Christ, who knows himself one with the crucified Christ, has also the life of Christ in himself. In this unity of life with Christ, then, do I live, but I live only in such a way that that which lives is not this *ego* of mine; I for myself do not live at all, but Christ lives in me because I am one with him, and in this unity with him, he only can be the principle of the life that is lived. It is true that my fleshly life itself has not on this account entirely ceased, so that I should no more live in the flesh at all; but I live, so far as I live in the flesh, in faith in the Son of God, who has loved me, and given himself for me; my life in the flesh is entirely a life of faith, and its being a life in faith causes it to be both these things at once, a life in the flesh, and a life of Christ in me; faith, as the bond of union with Christ, makes it possible for these two to exist together. What gives faith the power to unite the believer with Christ, or that in Christ which attracts faith, and unites us to him in faith, is the love through which he died for us and in our stead; for the love of Christ to us constrains us as a power coming upon us;

while we consider that he, as one, died for all, and that thus they are all dead; and he died for all, that they, in so far as they live, should no longer live to themselves, but to him who died for them, and is risen again, 2 Cor. v. 14. All that is particular, individual, self-concerned is done away in him, and, in the thought of his self-sacrificing and devoted love, disappears before the universality of a spiritual principle. This love of Christ proceeds itself from the love of God, who caused him to die for us, and it works love in us when it is received by us through faith; faith passes over into love as the *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*, Gal. v. 6. Faith contains from the first the element of love, as its practical principle. What faith is in itself as faith must become practical, and this takes place through love; love is practical faith. Love in its connexion with faith is thus an important feature of the Pauline doctrine, for in it the law which was done away in the death of Christ is taken up again, only with a higher meaning. Love is indeed the whole sum of the law; in it the law becomes the law of Christ himself, Gal. v. 14, vi. 2 (cf. *ἐννομος Χριστοῦ*, 1 Cor. ix. 21). Though the law is abolished through the death of Christ, it is not abolished altogether; only that in it is taken away which was merely external, which was merely positive. Set free from its outward form, the legal becomes the moral,—the law is received back into the self-consciousness of the spirit, and the law of Christ is the moral consciousness in its essential oneness with the Christian consciousness. Thus what on the one side is freedom, is on the other side subordination. The Christian is called to freedom as being free from the law, but it is not a freedom in which the flesh, his sensual nature with its sensual impulses, may have its play with less constraint; his freedom is *δουλεύειν ἀλλήλοις δι' ἀγάπης*, Gal. v. 13. The ideas of freedom and unfreedom (servitude, constraint) pass here into each other. So long as a man is a servant of sin he is free from righteousness (*ἐλεύθερος τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ*, i.e. free over against righteousness, so that he is not bound by it, will not be determined by it, Rom. vi. 20); but when he is freed from sin, he is a bondsman to righteousness, and has now to make



his members, which were formerly members of lawlessness, servants of righteousness to holiness of life, Rom. vi. 16 *sq.* This also is a condition of bondage, and bears a certain analogy with the condition of the man under the law and sin, so that it also may be regarded as a *δουλεύειν* and *δουλωθῆναι*; but where faith is, that is, the faith that works by love, there is also the spirit, and they who will be led by the spirit do not stand under the law, because they walk in the spirit, nor do they fulfil the lusts of the flesh; as those who belong to Christ, they have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts, Gal. v. 16, 18, 24. Thus the spirit, the principle of the Christian consciousness, which is the highest stage of justification, is also the principle in which the adequate relation in which justification places man towards God, is practically realized. The spirit presupposes faith as the subjective form in which man takes up the spirit into himself. Through the spirit, that which he is as a justified person in his relation to God, in his consciousness of sonship of God, is practically operative. It brings in a life which, in its relation to God, approves itself a holy one, and such that man is a temple of God through the spirit dwelling in him, 1 Cor. iii. 16. In its reference to men, this life approves itself as one which brings forth out of itself the fruits of faith, which consist in love. In both these references, it is a life in which we live not to ourselves, but to Christ who lives in us.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The same subject is dealt with by the author, *Neutest. Theol.* 174 *sq.* He there enters more specially into the question how Paul's demand for good works consists with his propositions as to the impossibility of justification by works of the law. To this he answers, p. 180 *sq.* (in agreement with my views, *Theol. Jahrb.* xiii. 303 *sqq.*), that the reason why Paul never thinks of any inconsistency here is,—that his doctrine of justification refers entirely to the relation of Christianity to Judaism; that to be a Christian and to be justified are one and the same thing to him (so that the question could never arise in his mind whether the good works which have their origin in Christian faith contribute anything to justification). At the same time, he remarks that the antithesis of faith and works is only one of abstract thought and of general principle; that in reality the two are not thus independent of each other, so that the one might be present and the other entirely absent; and that thus the opposition of justification by faith and justification by works is reconciled and brought to rest in the simple moral truth of such passages as Rom. ii. 6, 1 Cor. iii. 13 *sq.*, ix. 17, 2 Cor. v. 10, ix. 6, Gal. vi. 7 *sq.*—*Editor's Note.*

## FOURTH CHAPTER.

### CHRIST AS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY WHICH HE FOUNDED.

THE doctrine of justification by faith was entirely within the sphere of the individual consciousness. It is only the relation of the individual to Christ that is there in question. Faith in Christ is first of all a personal thing; the most prominent fact of the believer's consciousness is what Christ is for him, in this definite relation to him. But he cannot be conscious of this relation in which Christ stands to him without being aware, at the same time, that what is true of him is true of all the others for whom Christ died, as he died for him, since he, as the one, died for all, 2 Cor. v. 14. The Christian consciousness which is awakened and inspired by faith in Christ is necessarily also the consciousness of a communion of believers, whose unity consists simply in this, that Christ is the principle of their fellowship. In order to denote the organic unity with each other of those who stand within this communion, the apostle compares them with the organism of the human body, Rom. xii. 4. "As we have many members in one body, but all the members have not the same office; so we, being many, are one body in Christ, and as for each individual regarded separately, we are related to each other as members." The apostle reminds his readers of this, in order to exhort them to unity and unanimity. As the body has different members, so in the Christian community there are different gifts of grace, according to the grace that is given to every man. There is prophecy according to the proportion of faith, there is ministry, doctrine, exhortation, etc. All these gifts then ought to work together for the common good

of those who are combined in the one fellowship, Christ being looked up to by all as the principle of this communion, it being always remembered that we *ἐν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ*. But not only are we one body in Christ, as the apostle says, that is, as Christians, in so far as we are one with Christ in faith; we ourselves also are, as he says, 1 Cor. xii. 27, *σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους*. This is generally taken as if the apostle called the Christian community, the *ἐκκλησία*, of whose different offices and gifts he is speaking in the passage, itself the body of Christ. But it must not be overlooked that the phrase is only *σῶμα Χρ.*, not *τὸ σῶμα Χρ.* Now *σῶμα Χρ.* (gen. obj.) is only a body which has the objective reason of its existence in Christ; it is only in view of its relation to Christ that it is called a body, that is, it is a body (as the apostle expresses it in the first passage) inasmuch as we *ἐν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ*. This designation of the Christian fellowship as *a σῶμα Χρ.*, not *the σῶμα Χρ.*, seems intended to bring out the merely figurative intent of the term; and the apostle explains his meaning more fully, verse 12: "As the body is one (a unity equal to itself) and has many members, but all the members of the body, though they be many, are one body, so it is with Christ." Here it might appear very natural to understand *ὁ Χριστὸς* as standing simply for the Christian church; yet the apostle's meaning in this case also is probably that as there is a natural body, so also there is, in a figurative spiritual sense, a body, the whole significance of which—the proper conception of the essence of which—is in Christ; a *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*. And as every natural body is both one and complex, and consists of many members which are different from each other, and yet bound together to the unity of a whole, so also with the Christian community as a spiritual body. The principle of unity of this spiritual body is originally Christ, but Christ operates here through the spirit. Thus in the spirit all who became Christians are one body, however they may differ in their natural extraction and in other particulars. For we are all, says the apostle, verse 13, baptized in one spirit to one body (so that as baptized persons we form one and the same society), and have been

all made to drink of One Spirit.<sup>1</sup> Since, then (we must supply this thought after verse 13), all who have been baptized form in this way one body in the fellowship of the same spirit, this unity cannot be formed by any one man for himself, but only by all together; or, this unity can only be brought about by the difference of the many from each other, and must be such a unity as will allow each man to have his rights and free development (in the transition from ver. 13 to 14 the apostle brings the idea *πάντες* into prominence, that all are to be taken together, that it is to be kept in view that in their unity they are also a plurality of subjects existing beside each other). For the natural body also does not consist of one member, but of many; and thus no single member must assume such importance for its own individuality, as to seek to exist only for itself and not as a member of the body. Thus no member can tear itself from its connexion with the body and with all the other members, as if to be only for itself, and itself to compose the whole body; for the organism is that of a human body, a unity in plurality, and a plurality in unity, and can only subsist in all together. In this sense, then, does the apostle regard the Christian fellowship as one body; it is a totality, the constituent members of which form a unity by their reference to Christ; and it is an organic unity in which no one excludes the other, but every one receives the complement of all the others to make up the unity of the whole. The conception of this fellowship includes those two momenta, that of unity and that of variety; and the principle which enables these two to exist together is the spirit. The spirit resolves the variety into unity, and introduces variety into the unity, and reconciles unity to itself through variety. The Christian community is a thing that is only becoming, and that it may be realized, it is necessary that every difference which

<sup>1</sup> There can be no doubt that the only admissible reading is *καὶ πάντες ἐν πνεύμα ἑπορίσθημεν*, and if this be so, then *ἑπορίσθ.* can only refer to baptism. Our reception into the Christian church by baptism at the first planting of our Christian life was effected through the same spirit, and through the same spirit was that principle communicated to us in baptism, which is to serve for the continual nourishment and furtherance of our Christian life.

originates elsewhere, every natural difference by which men are divided in their national, their political, or any other relations, should be done away. This is brought about, as the apostle says, by all being baptized in one spirit to one body. But the spirit which makes all differences disappear in unity makes them disappear only that they may proceed again out of itself; and that having taken them up into itself, and purified and spiritualized them in its own essence, it may send them forth as forms of its own nature. The very idea of its nature impels it to destroy itself, to disintegrate and divide itself into its elements, to cause the conception of its essence to separate into its essential momenta; for here there is not only a unity, but in the unity also a diversity, without which there is no living organic unity, no vital development. This is what the apostle says very significantly in the words: *διαίρέσεις χαρισμάτων εἰσὶ, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα*, 1 Cor. xii. 4. The one spirit individualizes itself in the various charisms which make one man to differ from another. As Christianity itself is *χάρις*, and the spirit is the principle through which what Christianity is essentially, objectively, becomes a living reality in the subjective apprehension of the individual, so the charisms are the various operations and appearances which Christianity assumes, according to the nature of the different individualities in which it finds expression. Thus, while the spirit individualizes itself in the several charisms, it can do so only in accordance with the different individualities in which these charisms are deposited, and which become Christian personalities only through the agency of the spirit. The natural, then, is given to Christianity; it has only to penetrate and inspire it with its own spirit. The charisms are originally nothing but the gifts and qualities which each man brings with him to Christianity; and these gifts and qualities are exalted into charisms because the Christian consciousness and life are found on them, and reared on the materials which they bring, and moulded by the operation of the spirit into their different individual forms. What the *διαίρέσεις χαρισμάτων* are in relation to the spirit as their principle, the *διαίρέσεις διακο-*

*νιῶν* are in relation to the Lord, since they have no object save to be used, through the services which every one can yield with his charisms, for the welfare of the fellowship of the Lord, and to be means towards the realizing of the common good. Thus the *διακονίαι* are only another phase of the *χαρίσματα*, and are related to them simply as the outward to the inward. The *διαιρέσεις ἐνεργημάτων* are essentially the same, only regarded from another point of view. Here these same operations are referred to the causality of God, which works all in all, as the first cause. They are also phenomena in which (as was the case with some of them) a peculiar divine influence is manifest. The spirit manifests itself in each of them after its individual character for the general good.

The special charisms which the apostle mentions as wrought by the same spirit are the *λόγος σοφίας*, the gift of delivering a lecture or discourse of special instructiveness in point of form and contents; the *λόγος γνώσεως*, a discourse in which the deeper spiritual sense of Scripture is unfolded, chiefly by means of allegorical interpretation,<sup>1</sup> *πίστις*, the faith in divine providence, which exhibits its special strength in extraordinary circumstances and emergencies. Then the *χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων*, the gift of uttering a prayer full of faith in cases of severe illness, and that with such peculiar power and intensity as to elevate and soothe both the sick persons and others who are present. In this prayer the sick persons were commended to the divine succour, and their recovery was promised, if according to God's will, with more or less assurance; and thus the *ἰάματα* to which this charism referred were not a consequence which followed in every case, but rather what was aimed at—what was made the object of faithful prayer. Then the *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*, the gift of coming forward and working in special cases with remarkable energy, in the interests, and for the cause of Christianity, of exercising extraordinary vigour of spirit and power of action; to work *δυνάμεις*, wonders, in this wide sense: the *προφητεία*, the *διακρίσεις πνευμάτων*, the gift of distinguishing whether those who declared

<sup>1</sup> Γνώσις sometimes stands specially for allegory. Cf. die Chr. Gnosis, p. 85 sq.

themselves prophets really were so, whether the Spirit of God really spoke through them, the *γένη γλωσσῶν*, and the *ἐρμηνεία γλωσσῶν*.<sup>1</sup> All this is worked by one and the same spirit, who divides and distributes himself to each man specially as he will. All these charisms are free gifts and operations of the divine spirit, which manifests itself in them in its divers forms, and as it were disintegrates itself into the momenta of its own conception. All of them are simply the manifestation of that spiritual life which proceeds from the spirit as the principle of the Christian communion, to display and diffuse itself in that communion as the whole fulness and manifoldness of its *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*. And as it is the same divine spirit which produces all these operations, so it is the same which, as the spirit identical with itself, operates through all the periods of the Christian Church, in the same fundamental types of the Christian life. These types are, indeed, subject to modification, with the diversities of different ages and individuals, yet they are always present in the deep tendencies which are perpetually recurring and exhibiting the same variations and contrasts. The whole history of the development of the Christian Church is only the unfolding of the divine spirit, and shows how it more and more individualizes itself and distributes itself into all its variations. As it can become manifest only because there are *διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων*, as it *διαιρεῖ* itself in them, so the variety which this fact implies must work itself out in an ever-widening circumference. The greater the fulness of the spiritual life which it includes within itself as the principle of the Christian body, the greater must be, not only the manifoldness, but also the divergency of the forms in which the idea of the Christian Church moves towards its realization. In this way everything which the one spirit that works in the Church contains within itself must be brought forth and made to appear. Only this must be observed, that however great the variation and the contrast of the forms may be in which the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. with reference to these latter charisms the essay mentioned, vol. i. p. 15.

Christian life is developed, the bond is nevertheless not severed which connects them with each other, and with the spirit, and makes them one; the spirit goes forth out of itself, only to return into itself, and to take back into itself the phenomena in which it has become external and objective to itself. It is this other side (essentially connected with that first one) on which the spiritual process in which the Christian life is developed comes back to itself again in the unity of its own inward motion, and becomes the process of the spirit mediating itself with itself, that the apostle has in view, when he insists again and again upon the point, that the principle of all those various charisms is that same spirit, identical with itself; when he insists so strongly that the one purpose of them all is to serve as means to further the common purpose of the Christian fellowship; and when in this connexion he speaks of love as the element in which all diversity and contrast, all particular and subjective interests must subside, and be subordinate to the unity of the idea. Thus what he says of the nature of love (1 Cor. xiii.) has an intimate connexion with his doctrine of the charisms and of the Christian community. In that love which inspires all her members, the church ought to realize the idea of her own unity; in that love she should seek to return from all her differences to her unity. To this unity from which she comes forth, and to which she returns again when she is perfected, she is to be built up on the foundation which is laid once for all, which is no other than Jesus Christ. Everything that contributes to the furtherance of the Christian life is termed very fittingly, in the Pauline language, a building up; in this building up, the common work is to be advanced towards its end by every one doing his part in his own sphere, under the continual operation of the Holy Spirit. Thus the Christian Church is, as a whole, what each individual ought to be for himself, a temple of God, in which the Spirit of God dwells; as the temple of God is holy, so Christians should be holy, for they are a temple of God (1 Cor. iii. 16 sq.) The notion *holiness* comprehends here everything that the Christian communion has to be in its most



general character, as the kingdom of God founded by Christ, and working out its accomplishment in Christ. The spirit which dwells and governs in the Christian communion, both in the whole and in every individual, is named the Holy Spirit—this is his specific predicate; and the object of his activity can be nothing else than the holiness of the Christian Church, to be realized in the progressive sanctification of all her members. Christ himself is eminently the ἅγιος, who has himself the πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης; and Christians are not merely κλητοί, persons called to the Messianic blessedness through the free grace of God in Christ, κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, but also ἅγιοι; as κλητοί, they are also ἅγιοι, κλητοὶ ἅγιοι, or ἡγιασμένοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ (1 Cor. i. 2), i.e. those who have in Christ the principle of their being made holy, who are themselves holy persons in their union with him, the Holy One. The fundamental and ever-recurring thought of the apostle is, that only in union with Christ can the Christian be what he is and ought to be as a Christian, that in him alone has he the essential principle of his being and his living, or is he himself a Christ, a Christian, as the German language expresses so significantly in the Christian name.<sup>1</sup> The name χριστιανοί, used only by the adversaries of Christianity, expresses nothing but the external side of this relation; the expression ἐπικαλούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1 Cor. i. 2), turns from the outward to the inward side of the relation; but the ὄντες ἐν Χριστῷ, 1 Cor. i. 30; 2 Cor. v. 17, expresses its most intimate principle. In the ὄντες ἐν Χριστῷ, Christ is the immanent, substantial principle of their being and life; in them, as a σῶμα Χριστοῦ, he is himself to be beheld in his identity with them; what is true of them is true of him. Whatever interferes with or destroys the unity of the Christian communion; whatever, instead of drawing its members closer together in the unity of the spirit, divides them, or rends them asunder, is not merely a severance of the bond which connects the individual with Christ—it is a division and dismemberment of Christ himself (μεμέρισται ὁ

<sup>1</sup> The German word for Christian is *der Christ*, the Christ.

Χριστός; 1 Cor. i. 13). As the εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ is, in its original conception, true of the individual as well as of the whole, it is a merely figurative way of stating the relation of the church to Christ, to compare it with the marriage-bond. The apostle says of himself (as founder of the Corinthian Church) (2 Cor. xi. 2) that he had espoused her to one man, in order to present her as a chaste virgin to Christ. The church is therefore united as a bride with Christ her bridegroom. The comparison, however, is merely figurative, and used for the purpose of exhortation. It is devoid of the dogmatic intention with which the idea is accompanied in Eph. v. 23 sq.<sup>1</sup>

Entrance to the Christian Church, admission to it in order to incorporation in it as a σῶμα Χριστοῦ, takes place by means of baptism, for all who are baptized into Christ put on Christ, Gal. iii. 27. They are baptized into Christ, because baptism is in His name, and thus accompanied with believing acknowledgment of all that that name implies. One cannot, therefore, be baptized into Christ without believing in him, and becoming one with him, so far as faith makes the believer one with him. This relation to Christ which is brought about by baptism is called putting on Christ, an expression which represents the relation, not as an outward, but as an essentially inward one. He who puts on a garment goes altogether inside it, and identifies himself with it, and since all who are baptized into Christ become one with him in the very same way, there is an end in this identity of everything

<sup>1</sup> A comparison of the Epistle to the Ephesians shows distinctly throughout, how, at the standpoint which it occupies, the ideality of the Pauline conception of the Christian church has passed over into the material conception of the Catholic church. What is with Paul quite ideally σῶμα Χριστοῦ is here quite definitely τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ, Eph. iv. 12; there is one Lord, one faith, one baptism, iv. 4. A unity of faith in this objective sense, as the faith of the church, is not known to our apostle; he merely says, πάντες εἰς ἓστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, Gal. iii. 28. Nor is Christ called κεφαλὴ in the earlier Epistles, because the conception of the σῶμα has not yet reached, as a whole, this concrete and material development. The whole machinery of the organism of the church may be clearly recognised in the expressions of the Epistle to the Ephesians, iv. 12, 16. Cf. Misc. zum Eph. Brief, Theol. Jahrb. 1844, p. 385 (Schwegler, Nachap. Zeit. ii. 381 sq.).

in the outward circumstances of life that divides or distinguishes them from each other. In this new relation which is entered externally by baptism, internally by faith, there is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither bond nor free, neither male nor female, all are one in Christ Jesus. In this unity with Christ they are all one among one another, every man is simply a Christian, as all the others are, Gal. iii. 28, cf. 1 Cor. xii. 13. In order to be one with Christ, it is also necessary to partake in everything that is inseparable from his person. He who is one with him lives in him and with him; but in order to live with Christ, one must also have died with him as he himself died. Therefore baptism, as baptism into Christ, is itself a baptism into his death, and in its form as an immersion, baptism represented this fellowship in Christ's death as symbolically a fellowship in his burial. It was very graphically represented in the rite, how one had to descend with Christ into death, and the grave, and the under-world, in order to rise with him again to a new life, Rom. vi. 3 *sq.* Being a baptism into the death of Jesus, it is, of course, a baptism for the forgiveness of sins, or, figuratively speaking, a washing away of sins. But this negative includes in itself all that is positive. When the apostle says of Christians, 1 Cor. vi. 11, that they are washed, that they are sanctified, that they are justified, in the name of the Lord Jesus, and in the Spirit of God, this is nothing but a general description of the Christian character as imparted to the Christian even in his baptism. The operative principle by which one is incorporated at baptism into the Christian fellowship is the spirit; the spirit communicates itself in the rite as the principle of Christian consciousness, 1 Cor. xii. 13.

Along with baptism, the apostle speaks of the Lord's Supper (not perhaps at 1 Cor. xii. 13, where, according to the correct reading and interpretation, there is nothing said of the Lord's Supper; yet) at 1 Cor. x. 1, where he says of the Israelites, that "they were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea; and all ate the same spiritual food; and all drank the same spiritual drink." This is all said with typical reference to

baptism and the Lord's Supper, as the two essential elements of the religious life of the Christian community. The apostle here goes back to the analogies which the Jewish religion presents to Christian baptism and the Christian supper, in order to get a foundation for his argument about participating in the Gentile sacrificial feasts; he impresses the thought upon his readers, that the higher the stage one has reached in the religious life, the more need is there for caution lest one fall: that all the privileges and blessings by which a religion is distinguished can give no security against the penalties which God inflicts on those who violate the religious communion that is sacred to him, or who fall away from the one true religion to heathenism and idolatry. Baptism and the Lord's Supper are thus equally essential elements of the Christian communion, and both equally contain in themselves that which constitutes its peculiar character and superiority. If it be through baptism that a man is incorporated in the Christian fellowship, the Lord's Supper, on the other hand, must be a means for the furtherance of the religious life in this fellowship, and as baptism not only unites all who are baptized into one body, but makes them a body of Christ, translates them, as it were, into the communion of one and the same vital organism with Christ, so, in the Lord's Supper, the reference to Christ must be the same, and of equal scope. The apostle regards it from this point of view when he asks, 1 Cor. x. 16, if the cup of blessing which we bless be not a fellowship with the blood of Christ? and the bread which we break a fellowship with the body of Christ? Since it is one loaf, the many are one body, for they all partake in the one bread. It can scarcely be thought accidental that in this connexion, where he is speaking of the body of Christ, he calls the Christian fellowship a body, and that because in it many are bound together into a unity. The leading thought on which the apostle is here insisting is, that by partaking of the cup and the bread, many are brought into one and the same common relation to Christ, and partake of Christ in the same way. And here the idea was probably before his mind, that the reason why Christ called the

bread with which he instituted the Lord's Supper his body, was that this action makes the Christian fellowship a *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*, since many take part in that same relation to him which his death has brought about. What the apostle, however, considered the chief object of the institution of the Lord's Supper was, as he explains in the second passage which the same Epistle contains on the subject, xi. 23 *sq.*, that it was to be an action for the continuous remembering of Jesus, and especially of his death, in which he gave himself for men, and brought them into a new relation towards God. The cup is the new covenant, or contains a representation of the new covenant as founded on the blood of Christ,—on the death of Christ on the cross. As often, then, as one eats of the bread and drinks of the cup, one is to show forth the death of the Lord till he come; what the partakers have before them, as the body and the blood of Christ, is to take the place of Christ himself, and to be to them instead of his own personal presence. The peculiar action of the rite is to be one connecting the past, in which he was personally present, with the future, in which he is to come again in person, and that by the most graphic and living commemoration. And this commemoration, having to serve such a purpose, could fasten only on that crisis in the life of Christ, in which he was on the point of completing, by the sacrifice of himself, that which was the essential basis of the new religion he was founding. Thus the peculiar idea of the Lord's Supper is, that in the elements the partakers have him, as it were, before them, as one who died for them; and in the elements become conscious of his bloody death on the cross, and thus regard them as the symbols of his body and blood. And so there can be no greater offence in reference to the Lord's Supper than to partake of the bread and wine without being distinctly conscious that they are the body and blood of Christ. By doing this, the partaker becomes guilty of a sin against the body and blood of Christ, because, not keeping in his mind the great difference that obtains between this eating and drinking, which are so full of meaning, and every other, he fails thereby to realize the object for which the

Lord's Supper was instituted—the ever-recurring proclamation of the death of Christ, and the continuous representation of his personal presence. Taking all this together, we see that the chief significance of the Lord's Supper consists, with the apostle, in the historical commemoration of Christ as the founder of Christianity. As he himself received what referred to it in the way of historical tradition, 1 Cor. xi. 23, so the Lord's Supper is itself to be a chief means of keeping alive the historical memory of Christ as the founder of Christianity. As a historical religion, Christianity depends on, and is bound up in, the person of its founder, and to keep up the historical connexion with him, constantly and livingly, is thus an essential condition of the continued existence of the Christian communion. The more nearly and the more immediately, then, the Lord's Supper connects the members of the Christian fellowship with Christ, the more does it become itself the actual centre of that fellowship, and that which constitutes its characteristic difference from all other religious fellowships. The central point of a religion must be just where its professors become most immediately conscious of that which is the essential contents of every religion,—atonement with God. According to the apostle's own comparison of Christianity with Judaism and heathenism in this respect, 1 Cor. x. 18, this central point is, in the Jewish religion, the sacrificial altar of the one temple; in the heathen religion, the sacrificial *cultus* generally; in the Christian religion, the Lord's Supper. The Lord's Supper is the showing forth of the death of Jesus, and thus of the atonement effected through him. One can appropriate this atonement only by historically remembering the fact of the death of Jesus on the cross. Thus the Lord's Supper, as the central point of the Christian religion, cannot be dissociated from this historical commemoration, and he who fails to hold the feast in living consciousness of what it means must thereby be removed more or less from the centre of the Christian religion. It is only in the living reference to Christ and to his atoning death, as brought home to the consciousness in the Lord's Supper, that the Christian community becomes a *σῶμα Χριστοῦ*.

## FIFTH CHAPTER.

### THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO JUDAISM AND HEATHENISM.

THE deep inward foundation on which the apostle's doctrine of justification rests is the moral consciousness of man: it is in the moral consciousness of man, as he is while yet standing under the law, that the law works out the proof of its own inability to save him. In this sphere law and faith stand over against each other in the relation of division and atonement. Now this contrast, which is found deepest and most intense in the individual human consciousness, presents itself also as a great historical contrast in the relation of Judaism and Christianity. It was through a breach with Judaism that the apostle's Christian consciousness first took shape, and thus it came about that he regarded Christianity in the main as the opposite of Judaism. His deep conviction that Christianity was a new *διαθήκη*, and that it contained a totally new principle of the religious life, rendered it inevitable that he should define the relation of the two *διαθήκαι* to each other as a relation of contrast. In describing this contrast, he exhibits profound and comprehensive ideas of the historical development of religion.

The apostle sums up the chief result of the ante-Christian history of religion in the proposition, Rom. iii. 9, that Jews and Gentiles are both equally under sin, *i.e.* that it cannot be said of any one in the Jewish or heathen world that he was a truly justified person, because no one is without sin, and without faith there can be no forgiveness of sins. The apostle's discussion in the three first chapters of the Epistle to the Romans amounts to an empirical proof of the proposition with which his doctrine of justification had already furnished him, that no man can be righteous without faith.

If there be no righteousness without faith, the whole pre-Christian period must attest the fact by its predominant and continual sinfulness. While, however, the apostle takes sinfulness to be the general character of the whole pre-Christian period, he refers it at the same time to a general principle. In that period sin reigns alone; there was as yet no opposing principle to break the power of sin. Sin itself is the ruling principle of that period, and the ante-Christian and the Christian time, or Adam and Christ, are related to each other as sin and grace, as death and life, or as law and faith. The apostle deals with this great contrast in the passage Rom. v. 12 *sqq.* After contrasting the want of *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* in the ante-Christian time with the *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* as the new principle of religious life which has appeared in Christ, he rises to the general standpoint we have indicated, from which the ante-Christian and the Christian time are regarded in their essential difference. The universality of the reign of sin and death is proved by the simple fact that both had their beginning in the very first man; from him they have been diffused to all men. Therefore—the apostle draws this conclusion from the preceding—it is the same with Christ as with Adam; the one is, equally with the other, the beginning and the principle of a great world-historical period. It is here, as it is there, where through one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for a distinct proof that all have sinned. This rendering of the words *ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, which are the key to the whole passage, is at variance with the explanations of that phrase which have hitherto been current, but I think it is the only admissible one. Grammatically *ἐφ' ᾧ* cannot be taken in any other sense than “because,” which is undoubtedly very common; nor, if the statement *ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμ.* be taken only in its connexion with the foregoing, is there any objection to this rendering. Do not the apostle's words yield a perfectly adequate sense, if we interpret them thus; when once through Adam sin and death, thus intimately connected with each other, acquired the force of a dominating principle, death passed upon all men, because they have all sinned?



Even if the apostle do regard sin and death as a general principle which rules irrespectively of the individual, that does not by any means preclude the supposition that the connexion between sin and death, which was first established through Adam, is brought home to each individual by means of his own sin. In order that it might not appear as if the sin of the individual were the only true cause of his death, it was sought, instead of translating ἐφ' ᾧ simply "because," to give it the meaning, "the fact being that," "under the additional circumstance that," "in such a way as that." In this way death would not be deduced from the sin of each individual, but this sin of the individual would be merely mentioned as a circumstance which takes place in connexion with that death which reigns already because of Adam's sin. But what end can it have to give the sentence ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμ. a merely subordinate importance, and how ambiguously must the apostle have expressed himself if all he did to deny that the sin of the individual was the cause of his death, was merely to use a particle which, in addition to its first indisputable meaning, "because," perhaps possessed that other meaning; for even though ἐφ' ᾧ = ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὅτι, as well as ἐπὶ τούτῳ ὥστε, yet "under condition that," "and under the circumstances that," are not entirely the same. The question that has to be answered for a proper rendering of ver. 12 can be no other than this; why in the second part of the verse the apostle places death first, and sin after it; why he does not say, after the analogy of what precedes, "and so all men have sinned, and death has passed upon all." But it is no answer to this question merely to take from ἐφ' ᾧ the meaning of causality, and make the death as far as possible independent of the ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἡμ.; what we have chiefly to attend to is the connexion with what follows, since the apostle goes on with γὰρ, ver. 13. And this is the great mistake in the way the passage has been treated hitherto: no regard has been paid to the connexion of ver. 12 with ver. 13, at least no satisfactory explanation of that connexion has been given. To make the connexion clear, we have to take the passage in this way: that, as in ver. 13, the apostle infers the presence of sin from the fact of the dominion of death, so also,

in ver. 12, he infers the universality of ἥμαρτον from the universality of death, or regards the latter as a proof of the former. Through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death, and so death passed upon all men, which shows that, which involves the presupposition that, all have sinned. For until the law sin was in the world; not even this period was without sin; but sin is not imputed where there is no law, and it might therefore be said that there was no sin during this period; but the presence of sin in this period is clearly demonstrated by the death which reigned from Adam to Moses. The men of this period must have sinned also, though their sins were not altogether like those of Adam, who sinned against a positive injunction. The apostle's idea here is that sin as well as death is universal, and that they are inseparably linked to each other. The universality of sin, however, is not so immediately and clearly apparent as the universality of death, and so it is inferred that sin is universal from the fact that death is universal, there being no death apart from sin, which is its cause. The whole argument, therefore, shows distinctly that though he sees in sin and death the operation of a principle reigning in humanity since Adam, he yet conceives the death of man to be brought about only by the imputation to each individual of his own actual sin. The passage thus proves the very opposite of what has generally been drawn from it as a *locus classicus* for the doctrine of original sin. The only question is whether ἐφ' ᾧ can be taken in the sense here alleged, and of this there can hardly be a doubt. The ordinary meaning "because," is simply stated more distinctly in the phrase "proceeding on the fact that," "it being presupposed that." The difference is simply that what "because" expresses objectively, is by that other rendering logically defined for the subjective consciousness. For the purpose of a logical demonstration, cause and effect, the thing implied and that which proceeds upon it, are held apart. Ὁ θάνατος διήλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ π. ἥμ. means accordingly: Death came to all under the presupposition that all sinned, *i.e.* the coming of death is a thing which involves, which cannot be explained except on the supposition that, all sinned; the one always implies the other. If there

be a time in which it might be expected that there was no sin, it is the time from Adam to Moses, and yet, as certainly as death reigned during this period, so certainly it was not without sin. That this logical explanation of cause and effect is the proper sense of ἐφ' ᾧ, may be shown from the other two passages of the New Testament in which the phrase occurs; 2 Cor. v. 4; Phil. iii. 12. In these passages, also, the meaning I have indicated affords a much better sense than the ordinary "because." In the first of these passages the apostle says; as being in the body we groan under the burden; now if he goes on, *because* we do not wish to be unclothed, but to be clothed upon, this yields no clear sense. Here also we must take ἐφ' ᾧ as marking the purpose of the argument. In the body we sigh under a burden; yet this does not imply that we desire to be unclothed, but only that we desire to be clothed upon; what is to be inferred is not the wish to ἐκδυς, but the wish to ἐπενδ. The second passage is commonly taken thus: but I follow after, if I may also apprehend that for which I also have been apprehended. This, however, is neither accurate nor clear. The proper rendering of ἐφ' ᾧ must be this: which presupposes that, etc.; I follow after, if I may also apprehend it, which, of course, is only possible on the presupposition that I have been apprehended by Christ. A comparison of these three passages shows at once that ἐφ' ᾧ is inseparable, and is to be taken as a conjunction. Thus that other interpretation, which certainly adheres more closely to the ordinary meaning of the preposition ἐπι, but makes ᾧ refer to θάνατος or to the sentence εἰς πάντας διήλθεν, cannot be defended. Death is said to be the established consequence of sin, under the presupposition of which all individuals sinned, or the pre-ordained result to accomplish which they sinned. This, however, would require not ἐφ' ᾧ, but εἰς ᾧ.

It is thus explained in what sense Adam is a type of the future or second Adam. These two, Adam and Christ, stand over against each other as the dominion of sin and death, and the reign of grace, in which the dominion of sin and death is done away. What the apostle remarks, ver. 15, of the difference between the two, is less essential and serves only to increase the contrast. It is

not, he says, with the gift of grace as with the trespass. For if by the trespass of one many died, much more (the more there were who died) has the grace of God and the gift in grace of the One Man, Jesus Christ, proved effectual in many. And it is not as it happened there through one that sinned, with the gift of grace. The judgment came from one man, as a judgment of condemnation; but the gift of grace from many trespasses, as a judgment of justification. If through the transgression of the one death reigned through the one, much more shall they who receive the abundance of the grace and the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one Jesus Christ. (The contrast is thus not merely the quantitative one of *ἐξ ἑνὸς* and *ἐκ πολλῶν*, ver. 16, but also a qualitative one, inasmuch as the reign of life through grace is infinitely better than the reign of death through sin, ver. 17.) As, then, through one transgression it came to a judgment of condemnation for all men, so through one judgment of justification it came to justification for all men. For as through the disobedience of the one man the many were made sinners (those who are bound up in him, under the principle he represents), so through the obedience of the one the many shall be made righteous. The relations denoted in these antitheses are, in fact, more outward than real; but they serve to bring into prominence the leading thought of the passage, that Adam and Christ are each the representative of a world-historical principle. The whole period before Christ was the period of the reign of sin and death. Though each individual dies on account of his own sin, and each man's sins are reckoned to him as transgressions, just as Adam's sins to Adam, yet there was a principle developed and realized in the first sin from the power of which principle no man could afterwards be free. This principle is identified with the person of Adam, and thus Adam has a determining influence over all his posterity, since the principle reached actuality in him, and operates from him downwards. The question of Adam's own relation to the principle which in him became as it were a living personal power, whether the appearance of the principle is to be regarded as the consequence of an act performed

by him while yet in the state of freedom, or whether this act itself is to be accounted for by the operation of the principle, this question lies outside of the apostle's sphere of vision. So far as the development of his views allows us to judge, there can have been no question in his mind on either of these two points : that the principle does not operate without, but only in and through freewill, and that it is a power independent of, and standing above, freewill. We cannot here discuss how the relation to each other of the two principles represented by Adam and Christ is worked out further in detail. It is time that we should turn to Judaism and the relation it bears to Christianity.

The ante-Christian period was the period of the reign of sin ; and in this description Judaism is included : in Judaism also sin reigned. Now Judaism is distinguished from heathenism by its law ; Judaism and the law are so identical to the apostle, that where the Mosaic law is not in force, he sees nothing more than something analogous to the law. How then is the reign of sin in Judaism related to the law ? does the law restrict it or confirm it ? It might appear hardly necessary to raise the question ; that it needs no further answer than what the apostle says, Gal. iii. 19, that the law was given because of transgressions, *i. e.* as a barrier against them. But the apostle makes two seemingly contradictory assertions : that the law conflicts with the reign of sin ; and that the law has confirmed that reign. He says very clearly, Rom. v. 20, that the law entered the reign of sin just on purpose to increase the transgression ; to let sin, as it were, manifest all that it is and can effect, and work out its reign to the utmost. It can scarcely be wondered at that a seeming paradox like this has frequently proved a stumbling-block to the apostle's readers. If the law were given for a certain definite purpose, surely that purpose must have been the prevention, limitation, and subjection of sin, and not its increase or furtherance. And yet from the apostle's standpoint the difficulty is very easily solved. The explanation given by Rückert and others cannot indeed be deemed satisfactory : that the apostle does not recognise any such thing as chance, that with him every-

thing that happens is willed and ordained by God, and especially everything bearing on the great plan of redemption, so that when he considered that the law had brought about not less sin but more, and that by this means mankind grew riper and more prepared for the acceptance of salvation, that grace might find at last her great opportunity, he could come to no other conclusion than that this result—the increase of sin through the law which lay before him as a matter of observation—had been willed by God. But God can never have willed the increase of sin through the law; if the law paved the way for grace through the increase of sin, then God willed sin or the law only for the sake of grace, and the question is not removed how, even on this hypothesis that the way to grace is to be through sin, the increase of sin could be brought about by the law? If this be an essential characteristic of the law, then God could not will the law without willing this as a condition attached to it. But how is it that the law, which is essentially and necessarily the negative of sin, was a positive means for the furtherance of sin?

Here we have simply to remember what the apostle's conception of sin was, that it is what it is only through the consciousness a man has of it. The law has increased, intensified, and confirmed sin, inasmuch as it was through the law, because the law was there, that sin came into consciousness, and in consciousness sprang into vital existence and reality. *Διὰ γὰρ νόμου*, says the apostle, Rom. iii. 20, *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*, and *ἁμαρτία οὐκ ἔλλογεῖται μὴ ὄντος νόμου*. Here it might be said that the qualitative side of sin cannot be all that the apostle has in view; that he would have expressed himself differently if all he meant to say was that actions which are not sinful in themselves receive the character of sinfulness only through the law, since one becomes conscious of their disagreement with the law when they are held up to it; that he would have spoken not merely of *παράπτωμα* (Rom. v. 20), but of *ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας*. But a correct analysis of the apostle's proposition *διὰ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις* will show us that this qualitative relation of the law to sin is not essentially different from the

quantitative relation, the *πλεονάζειν τὸ παράπτωμα*; that the one is the subjective and the other is the objective expression for the same quality and operation of the law. Of course the law is not the immediate cause of sin; it does not itself produce those actions which are to be regarded as sin; it only brings out their disagreement with the law, and shows them to be sinful. Now, the more the law becomes the universal and exclusive standard for judging of men's actions, the more deeply it sinks into their consciousness, the more does sin increase in quantity; sin is heaped on sin, because in the light of the law there is so much that must be judged to be sin. In this way the law appears to serve no other purpose but to multiply men's transgressions and fill up the measure of their sins. What it produces, however, to this end, is not sin itself, but the consciousness of sin, and thus if we confine ourselves to the objective side of the matter, we may say that the law was added to sin for the purpose of increasing it, or to cause the process of sin to complete itself in its whole quantitative extent, by the *πλεονάζειν τὸ παράπτωμα*; and this process is completed just in this way, that what is already sin in essence becomes sin to the consciousness. The law is given therefore for the realization of sin, only in so far as sin is not sin without the consciousness of it. Here we see in what way it is true that the law is for sin as well as against it. It is for sin, because sin runs its course through the law, and not without it; because without the law there is no sin, or without the consciousness of sin there is no sin. It is against sin because the consciousness of sin is in another aspect the necessary condition on which alone sin can be removed. Only where there is a vivid apprehension of what sin is, is there a possibility that it will be removed; the stronger the consciousness of sin is, the more is the power of sin broken even in this very fact. Where, the apostle says, Rom. v. 20, sin has reached its utmost measure, there grace predominates all the more; that, as sin has reigned in death (in the element of death), so grace might reign through righteousness to eternal life. The apostle's view thus sees in the law only a *stadium* in the reign of sin, of which

he is speaking in the section Rom. v. 12-21. The law must come in order that the reign of sin may have full swing. Sin and death are the reigning powers of this period ; but this is not to be taken objectively : it is only in the subjective sense in which the apostle says, 1 Cor. xv. 56, that *ὁ νόμος* is the *δύναμις τῆς ἁμαρτίας*.

This is enough to show us that Judaism in the form of the law does not stand in such a merely negative relation to Christianity as the apostle's words seem at first sight to imply. Judaism, as law, is opposed to the grace of Christianity, and thus admits of no other religious position than that which the apostle describes as arising out of the impossibility of any *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*. But Judaism is further the subjective mediation of this opposition ; for the knowledge of sin is only possible through the law. And this brings Judaism incomparably nearer Christianity than heathenism ; indeed, the way from heathenism to Christianity lies, properly speaking, through Judaism, since that knowledge of sin, which is the indispensable and only preparation for the reception of grace, can only come from the law. But the relation of Judaism, or the Old Testament dispensation, to Christianity is more than this : not only is it in virtue of the law a preparatory mediating and necessary stage : the Old Testament and the New are related to each other as promise and fulfilment ; the Old Testament contains ideally what is realized in Christianity. The most essential, the central point in Christianity, justification by faith, as opposed to justification by the works of the law, is prefigured in the Old Testament. The faith of Abraham is essentially the same thing as the justifying faith of the Christian. Judaism, or the Old Testament, is not, therefore, to be regarded in the narrower sense in which it is equally with heathenism a particular form of religion, and stands in a negative relation to Christianity. It is something more than this ; it rests on a foundation from which it looks beyond everything particular, and contains the same universality that is characteristic of Christianity. This is what the apostle means when he calls justification by faith a law, a *νόμος πίστεως*. Here, from what is specific in the law, he abstracts this as its essence, as the proper



conception of it, that it is more than anything else a religious norm for the determination of the relation subsisting between God and man. Thus the law, as the law of works, is only the particular of that universal which is present even in this instance, and which is differentiated to one or other of two modes, the νόμος ἔργων or the νόμος πίστεως. And as the particular cannot be thought here without the general, which it presupposes, so, as the apostle says in the same connexion, the God of Judaism is not only the God of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles; he is God absolutely, and as such, as the one Absolute, he must set up one universal norm of justification, and both for circumcision and uncircumcision this can be nothing else than justification by faith. How can it then be said that the law is made void through faith, when justification by faith simply realizes that which the law contains already as its universal, as the conception breaking through the particular form? With this the apostle passes on to his discussion of the faith of Abraham, Rom. iv, 1 *sqq.*<sup>1</sup>; and shows that in Abraham's faith in the Divine promise there was that very imputation of faith as righteousness which belongs to the Christian idea of justification. Abraham's faith was imputed unto him, and that while he was yet uncircumcised; circumcision was by no means the reason of this imputation, but only a consequence of it. He received circumcision merely as a sign of that justification by faith which he had received while yet uncircumcised; so that he might be a father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised, and a father of the circumcision to them who are not of the circumcision only, but who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abraham, which he had being yet uncircumcised, *i.e.* to those who, although circumcised, yet do not find the essence and the ground of justification in circumcision, but in faith, and so do not seek to

<sup>1</sup> I take the passage, Rom. iv. 1, thus: If then the law itself consists essentially of faith, and everything depends on faith, what shall we say that Abraham, our father, gained by circumcision (*κατὰ σάρκα* can only refer to circumcision, even though the expression is a general one)? He gained nothing by it, as little as by other works of this kind which belong to the same category with circumcision.

be justified by the law, but only by faith. The apostle now goes on to show how little the law (that is, in its particular and specific sense) has to do with the promise which was given to Abraham in consequence of his faith. The promise given to Abraham or his posterity was the possession of the world. This possession, however, was to be theirs not through the law, but through the righteousness of faith. Indeed, from the nature of the case it could not be otherwise; for if they had been to receive it in the way of the law, through the keeping of the law, then faith would have been void and the promise made of none effect. For the law works wrath, *i.e.* the opposite of that disposition from which the promise comes—law and sin being correlative ideas, so that where there is no law there is no transgression, but where there is law there is also sin and punishment, and the punitive displeasure of God. Since, then, the law had nothing to do with this matter, they were to receive the possession not in the way of the law, but in the way of faith, that they might receive it in accordance with grace, in order that the promise might be valid for all posterity, not only for the posterity from the law, but also for those from the faith of Abraham, who is the father of us all (as it is written: I have made thee the father of many nations) before God, in whom he believed, as in him who makes the dead to live and calls into existence the things that are not. Thus faith showed itself even in Abraham to be the principle through which alone man can arrive at a saving relation towards God. As Abraham believed God, and his faith was reckoned to him for righteousness, so do Christians now believe, and as believers they are the children of Abraham, for it was in respect that God justifies the nations by faith, that the Scripture promised Abraham that all nations should be blessed in him, Gal. iii. 6. So far then is the Christian justification by faith, as opposed to the law, from being an encroachment on the religion of the Old Testament, that on the contrary it merely carries out what the Old Testament itself declares with regard to the law; it fulfils a prophecy which was given before the law, and the superiority of which to the law cannot possibly be questioned. The apostle

shows, Gal. iii. 15, that this is the true position of the law, that the place it occupied in the organism of the Old Testament religion was only a subordinate one, and that it stands as far below Christianity as below the promise given to Abraham, which simply pre-figured that which was to arrive at full maturity in Christianity. To his argument in this passage he prefixes the following principle as a truth universally recognised :—"A man's testament, when it is legally executed and ratified, no one sets aside nor adds to it, nor alters anything in it by subsequent modification. If then even a man's testament, when properly confirmed, is beyond the power of any one to set aside, or modify, still less can this take place in the case of a divine testament." This major, containing the universal, is now followed in the apostle's argument by the particularizing minor. "Now in the promise made to Abraham in respect of his *σπέρμα* there is a distinct divine disposition; it is defined in such a way that it can only point to Christ, can only be realized in him. Thus (this is the conclusion) the disposition made by God, or the promise given by him to Abraham, can by nothing be set aside or made invalid; it must be fulfilled in Christ to whom it refers." Owing to the intervention of the explanation about the *σπέρμα* the apostle intimates his conclusion somewhat loosely, with the phrase, verse 17, *τοῦτο δὲ λέγω*, by this I mean, etc. If the divine disposition cannot be made void at all, then it cannot be made void by the law. The discussion turns on the law; what is to be proved is that the law cannot interfere with the continued validity of the *διαθήκη* in question. A disposition having reference to Christ and already confirmed by God cannot possibly be invalidated by the law which was not given till 430 years afterwards, so that the promise should become of none effect. For the promise would be made of none effect: for though the law also promises a blessing, so that those who keep the law may expect an inheritance (the *κληρονομία*, blessedness, as the reward and fruit of the fulfilment of the law: as even in the Pentateuch the possession and continuous inheritance of the land of Canaan is coupled with the condition of keeping the law), yet this *κληρονομία* or inheritance is

in form a totally different one. If the *κληρονομία* comes from the law, it is conditioned by the keeping of the law, and can only be realized in proportion as the law is actually kept; now as the law is always kept so very imperfectly, the *κληρονομία ἐκ νόμου* is as good as none at all; while, on the other hand, if salvation be the result simply of the promise, then it is entirely free, bound to no limit or condition: it is an affair of grace alone. And this was the manner of the salvation which God promised to Abraham: *δι' ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται*, verse 18. And if this be so, if everything depends on that *διαθήκη*, and on it alone, on the promise given to Abraham, and if the law is to be left out of consideration altogether by virtue of this promise, then what is to be said of the law,—what importance attaches to it? The apostle had to meet this question here: he could not rest satisfied with the merely negative relation of the law to the promise; it was necessary for him to say something positive about it, if his utterances were not to lead to the conclusion that the law had been without purpose or significance. But the answer he returns to the question allows the law only a very subordinate function. The significance ascribed to the law is only intermediate, secondary, provisional: it was added, he says, *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν*. It was given after the promise had been given already, and was to have effect only during the interval between the promise and its fulfilment in Christ. The promise is and remains the most important, the substantial foundation of the whole relation in question; the scope of the law is entirely subordinate; it was added, so to speak, only *per accidens*, *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν*. The whole tenor of the passage shows that the view these words were meant to express was, that the law was given to set bounds to transgressions, to hold men in check in regard to transgressions, lest they should go too far in them. All that the apostle says, be it observed, is that the law was given *τῶν παραβ. χάριν*, *i.e.* because there were transgressions; the article points, as Rückert justly observes, to transgressions which had already been committed. The passages, Rom. iv. 15, and. vii. 8, seem to assert that before the *νόμος* there is no *παράβασις*, but we

have to distinguish two meanings of *παράβασις*, a wider and a restricted meaning. The *παράβασις* cannot, of course, precede the *νόμος* as the transgression of a positive law; this is the sense of Rom. iv. 15; but inasmuch as the way man had to choose according to the will of God was always in some sense prescribed, there were always transgressions and deviations. *Ἀμαρτία* is indeed *χωρὶς νόμου νεκρά*, but that does not mean that without the law there was no sin at all, but only that sin does not properly awake nor disclose itself in its full extent until it finds in the positive law the object in comparison with which it thus appears; the more is commanded, the more is sinned.

But scarcely has the apostle conceded to the law that it is a useful barrier against transgressions, when he at once adds two qualifications which serve no other end than to point out the subordinate position of the law as distinguished from the promise. First, that it was given by angels (in accordance with the later and peculiarly Alexandrine view, which did not allow even the giving of the law to be thought of as an immediate act of God, who is exalted absolutely above the material world): second, that it was given through a mediator, Moses. The passage, verse 20, in which the apostle defines the office of the mediator, is one of the most vexed passages in the New Testament: yet it only requires to be looked at from the point of view which the context naturally suggests, in order to receive a very clear and simple meaning. The distinction drawn above, between the *ἐπαγγελία* and the *νόμος*, was that the former was given directly by God, and the latter through the mediation of angels (and here this can only be said in depreciation of the law, though it is true that angels are made elsewhere to exalt the glory of the legislation, Acts vii. 53). The phrase *ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου* must thus denote something by which the law is made subordinate to the promise. And as *διαταγείς δι' ἀγγέλων* does not touch the inward difference between the *νόμος* and the *ἐπαγγελία*, but dwells on a merely external feature, so the definition contained in verse 20 is to be taken in the same way, as merely external. The question is, it is true, the idea of the mediator, but

what is dwelt upon first in defining this idea, is not the essence of the matter, viz., that the mediation he effects presupposes a conflict, that he has to mediate between two divided and discordant parties. The first thing to notice about a mediator is this merely external and local feature, that he stands in the middle between two parties standing over against each other ; that he occupies the middle position, and so mediates the one with the other. It is thus that the idea of *mediator* is understood in the rabbinical passages which the interpreters have adduced, in order to explain *μεσίτης*. The function Moses has to discharge as *mediator* is simply to take what is delivered to him, given into his hands, by one of the parties, and to hand it over to the other. *Data est lex manu mediatoris*, it is said in one of these rabbinical passages, and in the same way *ἐν χειρὶ*, verse 19, directs attention to the hand which bears and delivers the document of the law ; it is thus that the mediator's peculiar function is characterized. The sense of this passage, which has been twisted to so many purposes, is therefore this :—That the mediator belongs not to one party, but to both parties ; the mediator as such cannot be conceived of otherwise than as standing between the two parties : he is not himself therefore one of the parties, he stands in the middle between them in order to be the middle person between the one party and the other. But God is one, *i. e.*, God is not such a mediator : he is only one of the two parties, he stands only on one side, and not between the two parties, who stand over against each other on the one side and on the other ; he is thus one party for himself, as the other of the two parties, with which God is dealing in a *διαθήκη*, such as the *ἐπαγγελία* to Abraham, is one party for himself. Thus interpreted the passage bears a very simple and natural meaning ; it at once becomes clear why the apostle says the first time *ένος οὐκ ἔστιν* and the other time *εἰς ἔστιν*, and that without any further definition, since indeed none is required. It is hard to see what objection can be raised to this interpretation. Thus *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἔστιν* does not refer in the least to the absolute, eternal and unchanging unity of God ; this is entirely apart from the discussion ; God is

one simply as standing for himself, as one of the two contracting parties in this party-relation. And as for the law, what is said about it is the merely external statement that the νόμος has a quite subordinate importance, just as the position of the μεσίτης, as one who is not εἰς, or rather (what can be said of none but him) who ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, is a merely subordinate position. The ἐπαγγελία as a διαθήκη in which God εἰς ἔστιν, and in which no μεσίτης is concerned, stands higher than the νόμος, which cannot be thought of without the μεσίτης and is essentially conditioned by him. The law belongs to the same sphere as the μεσίτης, to whom it is bound, and whose position is determined for him by the conception of what he is. One is not therefore warranted to place the νόμος on the same line with the ἐπαγγελία, to compare it with or exalt it above the promise. All these other ideas about the relation of the ἐπαγγελία and the νόμος which interpreters have fancied they discovered in our passage, have simply been imported into it; however correct they may be in themselves, they do not belong to this passage. The apostle has indicated his meaning with sufficient clearness, and we need not travel beyond it.

Up to this point the apostle has spoken of the νόμος in such a way as if it were of no importance whatever, in comparison with the ἐπαγγελία. He admitted indeed, in verse 19, that it τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη, yet no sooner was this said than he placed it far below the ἐπαγγελία, saying that it was διαταγὴς δι' ἀγγέλων ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου; and when he added ὁ μεσίτης ἐνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς εἰς ἔστιν, he represented the relation of the νόμος to the ἐπαγγελία as one of actual opposition. Thus he comes very pertinently to put the question: Is the law, then, so far below the promise, that we should think there is an actual opposition and conflict between the two, that they are mutually exclusive of each other, and that thus in comparison with the promise the law is to be held not only unnecessary and useless, but an element of disunion and conflict? To this he answers: That is by no means the case. I am far from wishing to set up so disparaging a view of the law, and one which so little

recognises its significance. I do not depreciate the law to such an extent as to consider it of no further importance to me. Yet, on the other hand, I cannot, as the Jewish Christians do, value it so highly as to make *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* my highest principle. I must declare against this view. For if the Mosaic law contained such a law as could make alive or save, then righteousness would actually come from the law, then it would be possible to be justified in the way of the law, by the works of the law. But this is far from being the case: in the way of the law there is no righteousness to be attained; the scripture itself asserts the contrary and declares the result of the operation of the law to be the very opposite. The scripture declares (*συγκλείειν* in the declaratory sense, as Rom. xi. 32) that all is held under the might of sin, stands under the principle of sin, so as to be more or less affected by it. It declares this in passages such as those quoted, Rom. iii. 10 *sq.* And this has come to pass in order that through the knowledge (the apostle here expresses objectively and teleologically a process which cannot be conceived, but as subjectively mediated) that one cannot be saved in this way, the promise in the way of faith in Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe. And it is just this consideration, that that which, according to the scripture, is the result of the operation of the law, the manifest universality of sin, serves simply to prepare the way for the promise being fulfilled through faith, it is just this that leads us to the true view of the law, that it is to be regarded in itself, in its whole essence, as a mediating and preparatory stage. The chief stages in the apostle's view of the world's religious history are the *επαγγελία*, the *νόμος*, and *πίστις* (*πίστις*, though in itself subjective, is here taken objectively, the apostle regarding the subject entirely from the objective point of view as a divinely ordained historical process). Now before faith came, faith that is, as a new stage of the objective process of development, we were kept under the law as if shut into a prison with a view to the faith which should afterwards be revealed. Thus the law was our school-master till Christ, that we might be justified by faith. Here the



apostle is merely drawing a conclusion which results of itself from the foregoing; and the idea of the *παιδαγωγός* contains nothing that was not present in the foregoing; he simply reverts to the principal idea prefixed to this section in verse 19, that the law *τῶν παραβάσεων χάρις προσετέθη*. He now takes up this idea again as it has been defined and substantiated in the intervening verses. The paedagogic nature of the law must thus, from the context, refer to its holding back from transgressions, setting a limit to them. In the same way the law is likened, verse 23, to a prison where a man is detained and watched. It is only in this negative sense that the law is to be regarded as a *παιδαγωγός*, nor must what follows lead us to ascribe to it the function of an educator, as if it had been meant to lead to Christ by awaking the inward longing for redemption: the words *εἰς Χριστὸν* simply express that the law retained this interim and provisional importance, until, in the course of this development, the time came at which Christ could appear.<sup>1</sup> And in this negative sense the word points to another class of men, so named among the ancients, the slaves namely, who accompanied boys not so much for education or training, as merely to watch over them. It is such a tutor and guide that the law is said to be. It was God's intention, and the scope of this whole scheme of religious history that only when Christ had come, should justification by faith begin, a thing which was impossible under the law. This paedagogic state was only for the interval, only a preparation, and so it came to an end at once, and of itself, as soon as a new stage of the religious consciousness and life had come with the appearance of *πίστις*. Thus we

<sup>1</sup> Neander says, *op. cit.* i. 435: "Since the law put an outward check on the sinful propensity, which was constantly giving fresh proofs of its refractoriness, as by this means the consciousness of the power of the evil principle became more vivid, and hence the sense of need both of the forgiveness of sin and freedom from its bondage was awakened, the law became a *παιδαγωγός εἰς Χριστόν*." Here two stages are taken together which neither belong to each other essentially, nor are thus connected by the apostle, at least in this Epistle. As a rein, a check, the law awakens in the first instance merely the consciousness of hindrance, of opposition, in which the man seeks to be freed, not from sin, but only from the law. [There are some modifications of the above view of the *παιδαγωγός* and the *μεσίτης* in my N. Theol. 166 f.—*Editor.*]

stand no longer under the *νόμος παιδαγωγός* ; for us the law has lost its meaning and its use. Here the questions naturally arise whether *πίστις* has made an end altogether of the *παραβάσεις*, for the sake of which the law was given ? why, if the *νόμος* be so far inferior to faith, the latter had not appeared before ? and whether those, who as being under the law had nothing but the *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου*, had not been justified nor saved at all ? The apostle does not enter into those questions in this passage, he only takes a broad view of the process as it moves through the three stages, *ἐπαγγελία, νόμος, πίστις*. *Πίστις* is just the *ἐπαγγελία* fulfilled and realized ; the actual appearance of that which was implicitly contained in the *ἐπαγγελία*. Thus the chief difficulty is presented by the *νόμος*, which stands between these two, how it comes to be there at all. The apostle almost seems to say that it should not properly have been there at all : the relation of the *νόμος* to the other two momenta is at any rate taken as purely external : the *νόμος* has no inward connexion with the other ; it is there merely *τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν*, that there may not be a total want of government and order in the interval until *πίστις* arrives, and that there may be something to serve as a thread, though in a merely external way, for the religious development. As long as man stands under the law's discipline and severity, he is in a condition of bondage ; law and faith are related to each other as servitude and freedom, or as the slave to the son and heir of the house. The apostle finds this relation also prefigured in Abraham, in his two sons, Ishmael and Isaac. Ishmael the son of the bondwoman, the slave by birth, stands for the law, because the law places man in a position of bondage before God. Isaac, the son of the free woman Sarah, born, moreover, after a special divine promise, is the type of Christians as *τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. The one is a son only in the literal outward sense, the other not in a literal, but in a higher spiritual sense. The mothers of these two sons represent the two *διαθήκαι*, or forms of religion, Hagar the Jerusalem that now is, Sarah the upper, heavenly Jerusalem. This upper Jerusalem, the free, is our mother : for we Christians are Christians simply in

virtue of our Christian consciousness which assures us of our freedom from the law. Having this freedom, we belong to a *διαθήκη* essentially different from the Mosaic, Gal. iv. 22 *sq.*

When we consider the position which the apostle assigns to the law, and the terms he uses to describe its distinctive character, we see that the law is here degraded from its absolute value, and reduced to the rank of a subordinate stage. Thus we can easily understand how Gnostics of the most pronounced Antinomianism appealed to our apostle's authority. The law is given only for discipline and punishment, it is to act as a barrier, as a dam against men's constantly increasing transgressions, that they may not exceed all bounds. And the law has not proved adequate even for this negative task of prevention; the scripture and the law itself attest that under the law sin acquired an unlimited sway. The law then is there only to appear in its impotence as against the might of sin, which it has failed to subdue. The apostle has not further explained what in his view was the reason why the law was thus, as it appeared, so uselessly interposed between the promise and faith, as if to hold the two as far as possible asunder, and cause an interval to intervene before the promise was fulfilled in faith. But we are able to infer the thought which was present to his mind on this point, from his comparison of the law to a *παιδαγωγός*, a functionary who has only children to deal with. Then he calls the man who stands under the law an infant (minor) in a state of dependence, in which he differs nothing from a bondsman, and is under tutors and governors, and who cannot emerge from that state of pupilage and become the master of his inheritance until a certain fixed period. Gal. iv. 1 *sq.* In the same connexion it is said expressly that only when the time had come to its fulfilment, when this period had expired, did God send his Son. Considering this statement, and in conjunction with it the term *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* which is applied to Judaism, Gal. iv. 3, we see that the apostle stands here at the standpoint of a great and wide historical view, in which he distinguishes two periods of the history of the world and of religion. The former

of these, the ante-Messianic, as commonly distinguished in the Jewish view of history from the Messianic, he regards as in general the period of the *tirocinium* of the world or of the world's history, in which, as it must be at the beginning of everything that is to have a great history, all was yet rude and wild. This character, which the world as a whole possessed at that period, belonged also to the law : its *raison d'être* as a *νόμος παιδαγωγός* was to take the Jews under its hard discipline, and hold them there till the beginning of a new period of cosmic and religious history. This new period was that of spiritual freedom, in which the unfree servile condition had reached its term, and humanity, hitherto a pupil and in need of a tutor, had grown into a free and independent man. Short as the apostle's words are, they are so chosen as to exclude every thought of chance or caprice entering into this process. The apostle places himself within the process, one which had indeed been predetermined in God's decree, but which was nevertheless conditioned by the successive stages of a historical development, and in which no other cause than this was possible, since, as he indicates, humanity as a whole, no less than the individual man, is appointed to pass through certain periods of life. From this point of view the apostle recognised in the law simply a pedagogue appointed for the period of youth, and whose office was little more than to curb the wild outbreaks of sin. But the law proved unequal to this office, and simply demonstrated by its powerlessness the universality of the reign of sin. Thus in one aspect the apostle recognised in the law a mere *παιδαγωγός*, but, on the other hand, he looked at it in the light of a divine plan of education ; could he then rest satisfied with this merely external view of the law ? We see from the Epistle to the Romans that he did not confine himself to this view of it ; and the harsher view of the law which we find in the Epistle to the Galatians is clear evidence that that work belongs to an earlier stage of the apostle's activity. To apprehend the deeper meaning of the law, it was necessary to regard it not as a mere instrument of correction thrust in externally between the *ἐπαγγελία* and *πίστις*, but as itself an essential and

influential factor in the religious development under review. And this could only be through the assertion of a more inward relation between the law and sin. The object of the law was not now to be sought in the transgressions which stood over against it externally and existed independently of it and before it; and its relation to which was one of mere repression and prevention: the transgressions must be referred to their principle, *ἀμαρτία*, and this latter could not be understood in its essence except in the light of the law. If the essence of sin be not what it is objectively, but what is subjective about it, the consciousness one has of it, then sin can only be realized through the law; but as it is realized only in the element of consciousness, the law, in proportion as it brings it to reality, brings about also the inward possibility of its removal. Sin, being thus developed by the intervention of the law, comes to a head in the division of the man with himself which it brings about. Here the man realizes the whole power of sin; but in this state of mind he is already inwardly loosed from it and turned towards the operation of grace. Thus the law is not merely an outward stage of the history of religion: it is an inward momentum in the development of the religious consciousness: it is the consciousness of sin turning in upon itself, and it fulfils its mission in the religious development simply by appearing as the consciousness of sin to mediate between sin and grace. This is the apostle's standpoint in the Epistle to the Romans, where it is said of the law not merely that it *τῶν παραβάσεων χάρις προστέθη*, but that it is *δύναμις τῆς ἀμαρτίας*, and that because *διὰ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἀμαρτίας*.

We come now to heathenism and its relation to Judaism and Christianity. It might be thought that the principle stated by the apostle, Rom. v. 13, that where there is no law sin is not imputed, furnished us with his moral estimate of heathenism. But, on the one hand, the universality of death attests the universality of the reign of sin among the heathens also; and, on the other hand, if they were judged incapable of having sin imputed to them, this would not elevate them in the scale of moral and religious life, it

would, on the contrary, degrade them in that scale ; for unconsciousness of sin must necessarily be followed at some time or other by consciousness of it. But the principle appealed to is not applicable to heathenism ; though the heathens did not possess the Mosaic Law, and were to that extent *ἀνομοι* (Rom. ii. 12, 1 Cor. ix. 21), yet they were not absolutely without law. The place of a positive law is supplied in their case by the natural moral consciousness, which of itself informs them what they ought to do, and what to leave undone, Rom. ii. 14 *sq.* Thus the same reign of sin is found to prevail in heathenism as in Judaism, and even more strikingly than there ; for the natural law could not be so effective a barrier against transgressions as the positive law, and the reign of sin declares itself in exhibitions of the grossest sensuality, which reduce heathenism morally far below the level of Judaism. But the characteristic difference between Judaism and heathenism is not to be looked for on this moral side, where both alike fall to be included under the idea of sin. The essential conception of heathenism is that it is a declension from the true idea of God, a denial and perversion of the original consciousness of God. There is an original and universal revelation of God to humanity in which the heathens shared, which comes from nature and history as well as from conscience, and which was sufficient to make them acquainted with the nature of God, so far as it can be the object of human apprehension. It is therefore entirely their own fault that they did not preserve and complete the knowledge which God himself had thus given them of his true nature. This is a moral delinquency to be charged to their own free-will, the source of which is to be looked for mainly in their ingratitude, Rom. i. 21. But when once through their own free-will they had turned away from the true God, their thought and imagination could not but turn from the truly existent to the non-existent, the vain, the empty shadow. Their consciousness being no longer enlightened by the true idea of God, fell into an obscurity which not only debarred them from seeing the true, but caused them to set the false in the place of the true. Wanting the true knowledge of God they wanted also the absolute

principle of truth ; they could place the standard of truth nowhere but in themselves, and so they came to regard their own thoughts and imaginations as the highest wisdom. *Φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν*, says the apostle, Rom. i. 22, obviously with reference to the Hellenic philosophy or culture. He saw in this philosophy a knowledge that was nothing more than subjective, devoid of all objective truth, sprung from the turbid source of human egoism. For, of course, heathenism could not be simply the negation of the true idea of God ; it necessarily set up something else to take the name and honour of the absolute, in place of the true Absolute whom it denied. Though the absolute contents of the idea of God had vanished from consciousness, yet there remained behind the formal postulate that there must be something absolute. Hence heathenism is not merely a turning away from the true Absolute, but the perversion of it to its opposite ; it is the falsehood that that which is essentially finite and transitory is the absolute itself. This is the character of the heathen idol-worship, in which the *δόξα* which properly belongs to the absolute God alone is transferred to finite beings, and the latter are substituted, as a spurious likeness, for the former. Heathenism, as the apostle apprehends it, is the theoretical confusion of the finite with the absolute, the identification of the true, the real, which is the nature of none but God himself, with the untrue, the unreal, the lie,—the placing of the creature on the level of the Creator. As the radical error of heathenism is an unnatural transposition of the true natural order of the universe, so its practical outcome in the moral life of man could be nothing but a perversion of the natural relations. Heathenism and Judaism both fall under the common term *ἀμαρτία* ; the difference between them is the difference between sin and vice : vice differing from sin in this, that it is not merely the transgression of a specific injunction, which may have reference to a merely outward act, but an inward immorality, a degradation, disgrace, the pollution of the man's nature. This is what the apostle means in the words, Rom. i. 24, *παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεὸς . . . εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν* (verse 26 : *εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας*) *τοῦ ἀτιμᾶσθαι τὰ*

*σώματα αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.* In enumerating the heathen vices, the apostle gives precedence to those, as most characteristic of heathenism, in which the unnatural perversion of the order of nature appears most clearly, verses 26, 27. He deduces this practical perversion from that theoretical perversion of the consciousness which all heathenism exhibited, verse 28. And as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, so that they did what is not convenient. The moral self-debasement into which they sank was the natural, and in so far divinely ordained, consequence of the inadequate relation which their religious consciousness sustained to the idea of God. This view of heathenism followed of necessity from the idea with which the apostle started, and which is the corner-stone of his whole thinking on the subject, that it is an apostasy from the true idea of God, which arises out of a moral aversion of the will from him.

Striking and profound as the apostle's description and explanation of heathenism are, yet to trace it altogether to moral perversity is only half the truth. There is another and an equally essential consideration to be added, namely, that this moral deflection could never have gone so far if the consciousness of God had been clearer and deeper to begin with. When all the elements are considered which go to make up the conception of the heathen religion, this must not be forgotten, that the consciousness of God originally present in it was not so deep and clear as elsewhere, that it laboured from the beginning under this radical defect, and stood in a position from which it had yet to develop itself, by working itself clear of the natural element with which it was entangled. At Rom. i. 19 *sq.*, where he is concerned with a moral estimate of heathenism, the apostle devotes himself chiefly to the first of these two sides; but the other was not necessarily excluded, since he distinguishes different stages and periods of the religious development of mankind. We saw from Gal. iii. 19 *sq.*, iv. 1 *sq.*, that he regarded Judaism from this point of view, and so we might expect that he would look at heathenism in the same way. Accordingly we find that in that section of the Galatian Epistle he expressly



comprehends heathenism and Judaism in one term which places them both at the same subordinate stage in the development of religion. There can be no doubt that this is the force of the expression used, Gal. iv. 3, 9, τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου. The στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου are not the elements as the ultimate principles of the world in a physical sense, but the elements as beginnings of instruction, appropriate for those who are still νήπιοι, still in the age of childhood. The στοιχεῖα must certainly include the law: and as the νήπιοι for whom the στοιχεῖα are designed have already been placed (iv. 1) in the category of bondsmen, the apostle is here characterizing the relation to the στοιχεῖα as a relation of bondage. Yet the point of view from which the law is regarded in the expression στοιχεῖα is different from that where it is called a παιδαγωγός. There is at any rate something more than mere discipline and punishment; here the law is not merely for this negative purpose, but also for the positive end of instruction. The νήπιος is to be instructed, as befits his age, in the first elements. As for the words τοῦ κόσμου, the writer is treating of the periods of religious development, and κόσμος can only signify cosmic or religious history. The primary elements in which the νήπιος is instructed are the elements and beginnings of the world itself at the very beginning of its history, when it was in a state still rude and imperfect, and the forms it had assumed were hard and severe. It is true that the law is the first and most important of these στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου; but that is only in so far as it is regarded generally under the aspect of a religious development which still bears the features of a rude beginning. Thus it is probable that the apostle meant to include in the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου both Judaism and heathenism. In verse 9, however, there can be no doubt that this is so. Here he is addressing Gentile Christians whom Jews were seeking to influence in the direction of Judaism. He calls their leaning towards Judaism a return to those στοιχεῖα, weak and beggarly elements, as he terms them, because there is nothing in them from which a strong spiritual life could be evolved. Where God is not yet known as a spirit, where religion is occupied with nothing but

the material, sensual, carnal (for this is the idea of the *στοιχεῖα*), there all is dead and empty, there is no true vital principle, the religion is void of spiritual contents. These two religions are at the most elementary stage of religion ; they are occupied with the material, not with the spiritual ; they place the essence of religion in things which belong entirely to the region of the physical life. The *στοιχεῖα* are thus the first beginnings, the elements of religion, and the word conveys further the impression that this elementary religion is occupied with nothing higher than the elements, principles, and substances of the outward physical life. Judaism contained many of those purely natural elements : it also was bound to the natural, the material, as to days, months, fixed times ; thus it also was a nature-religion, based upon those physical *στοιχεῖα*, the natural being invested as such with religious significance. The *στοιχεῖα*, then, the elements of religion<sup>1</sup> of which the apostle speaks

<sup>1</sup> The meaning generally given to *στοιχεῖα*, elements of religion, or beginnings of religious knowledge, is asserted by Neander to be inadmissible, because Paul would then be indicating by it a common conception, applicable to a certain extent to heathenism and Judaism equally (Pl. and Tr. i. 465). "But how," he says, "could this agree with the views of Paul, who regarded Judaism as indeed a subordinate and preparatory stage of religion, but yet as one founded on a divine revelation ; who saw in heathenism, on the other hand, that is, in idolatry, of which he is speaking here, not a subordinate stage of religion, but a thing entirely foreign to the nature of religion, a suppression, brought about by sin, of the original knowledge of God?" He proposes, instead, the following interpretation : the entanglement of religion in sensuous forms, that is, her state of servitude under the elements of the world, is what is common to Judaism and heathenism. But we must ask if this be not as much as the other a common conception, applicable to a certain extent to Judaism and heathenism equally ? What difference is there logically between the one interpretation and the other ? And what difficulty is there in supposing that Paul placed heathenism on one side on the same level with Judaism, and on another side beneath it ? [In his *Neutest. Theol.*, 171, Baur adheres only to one side of the above interpretation of *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* (on the meaning of the term in the Epistle to the Colossians, vide p. 30). He says there that the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* are physical elements and substances as the basis of the heathen nature-religion, that is, the constellations : that in many things, in its symbols and ceremonies, its feasts, and its sumptuary laws, and in many other ordinances, such as circumcision, Judaism had the same physical character ; that the radical ideas of both, the principle of the religious consciousness in both, were so much bound up in the natural, the material, the sensuous, as to place man before God in no higher relation than that of bondage :

here, are the physical elements, which were reckoned objects of reverence in both religions, the Jewish and the heathen, and served in a slavish and unspiritual way.

Though this be so, yet heathenism stands far below Judaism : for the latter consists not only in the *στοιχεία*, but also in the law, and in the promises which stand above the law. Heathenism has indeed a law in itself, yet it is essentially different from the law ; and in the same way it is a religion, and yet no religion, because the conception of religion is only realized in the form of revelation. Thus Judaism, negative as its relation to Christianity is, is yet on the same line with Christianity in this,—that it is a *διαθήκη*, a special institution of God, through which he has entered on a definite relation towards man. There is an old and there is a new *διαθήκη*, 2 Cor. iii. 6, 14, and the two *διαθήκαι* are so closely and so essentially connected, that the new could not have come into existence without the old. It is true that circumcision has no religious significance for the Christian ; yet the way from heathenism to Christianity does, in a certain aspect, lie through Judaism ; it is impossible to understand the new *διαθήκη* without being acquainted with the old. This explains to us why when the apostle speaks of the Old Testament in his Epistles he makes no distinction between the Judæo-Christian and the Gentile-Christian sections of his readers ; and how, even when addressing Gentile Christians, he does not scruple to call the members of the old dispensation their fathers, 1 Cor. x. 1, thus indicating how in his view the two dispensations formed one connected whole. This is the essential advantage which Judaism has over heathenism, *περιτομή* over *ἀκροβυστία*. Though there is no distinction between Jews and Gentiles in their relation to Christianity, though in this respect the two are precisely equal, yet as soon as a comparison is instituted between the two, the *Ἰουδαῖος* is preferred to the *Ἕλληγ*, Rom. i. 16. The Jew stands at a higher stage of religious consciousness,

so that in neither religion was God known as a spirit. In this he follows Schneckenburger : was sind die *στοιχ.* τ. κ. Theol. Jahrb. vii. 1848, p. 445 sq.—*Editor.*]

OR, as the apostle defines the superiority of the *περιτομή* to the *ἀκροβυστία*, Rom. iii. 2, *ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ τῇ περιτομῇ*. This, it is evident, does not refer to circumcision as such, but to Judaism as the religion of the circumcised. There is committed to Judaism something that heathenism does not possess. There is a peculiar treasure deposited in Judaism for preservation. God has declared himself in it in a special manner; or, in a word, the religion it contains is the religion of revelation. Being the religion of revelation it is also the religion of the promise, in which that is contained in idea, which is realized in Christianity. It is to the Israelites that the sonship belongs, and the visible presence of God, the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; to whom belong the fathers, of whom Christ came according to the flesh; wherefore God who is exalted above all is to be blessed for ever, Rom. ix. 4, 5. This also is part of that relation of identity in which Judaism stands to Christianity, that in it everything that is distinctive and valuable in Christianity is already contained typically, symbolically, allegorically. The baptism of the Israelites unto Moses is a type of Christian baptism. The food and drink with which they were supplied in the wilderness is a type of the Christian supper, 1 Cor. x. 1 *sq.*; the slain paschal lamb is a type of Christ killed at the feast of Passover, 1 Cor. v. 7. Thus Judaism is related to Christianity as the type to the antitype.

## SIXTH CHAPTER.

### CHRISTIANITY AS A NEW PRINCIPLE IN THE WORLD'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

THE relation of Christianity to heathenism and Judaism is, as we have seen, defined as that between the absolute religion and the preparatory and subordinate forms of religion. We have here the progress from servitude to freedom, from nonage to majority, from the age of childhood to the age of maturity, from the flesh to the spirit. The state left behind is one in which the divine spirit is so little apprehended, that those dwelling in it are without any higher guiding principle: this is heathenism, 1 Cor. xii. 2, 3: or it is the torturing conflict between the law and sin, beyond which Judaism can never pass. The state now reached is a truly spiritual consciousness charged with its own proper contents and at one with itself. It is only in Christianity that man can feel himself lifted up into the region of the spirit and of the spiritual life: it is only here that his relation to God is that of spirit to spirit. Christianity is essentially the religion of the spirit, and where the spirit is there is liberty and light, the clear and unshadowed identity of the spirit with itself. Now what Christianity thus is as the absolute religion it is only through Christ. And the explanation can only be found in Christ, how the transition is effected from the first period, including heathenism and Judaism, to the second. This of itself, of course, should warn us not to think of a transition lying in the nature of the case and proceeding naturally out of it. In the apostle's view Christ's entrance into the world and into the life of humanity is a thing entirely supernatural. Christianity comes into existence by God's sending his Son. Yet

this does not prevent the apostle from regarding the appearance of Christ and of Christianity in the light of a process developing itself in history and advancing through various stages. In all those contrasts in the light of which Christianity is regarded, as that between servitude and freedom, nonage and majority, sin and grace, death and life, the first and the second Adam, we trace the idea of an immanent process of development, proceeding by the conflict of mutually reacting momenta. Supernatural though the appearance of Christianity is, it is not entirely incomprehensible. It is to be comprehended, in part philosophically, from the essential inward connexion of one momentum with another, and in part historically, from the historical conditions in which it appeared. As for the first, Christianity is the natural outcome of the process in which sin grows by the operation of the law into the consciousness of sin; for this is the necessary condition for the approach of grace. The latter is most clearly stated by the apostle in the passage Gal. iv. 4. When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son, as one *γενόμενον ἐκ γυναικὸς, γενόμενον ὑπὸ νόμον, ἵνα τοὺς ὑπὸ νόμον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα τὴν υἰοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν*. That is to say, that God placed the man Jesus when he destined him to be the Messiah, or the Son of God, in that historical crisis where the fulness of the time was to ensue and the one period was to pass over into the other. On this account he was to be essentially man, and to enter into the world just as any other man, as one *γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικὸς*. This expression for being born as man does not directly exclude a supernatural generation, but in the connexion it certainly seems very unlikely that such an idea was entertained. He who is born of a woman is simply a man coming into existence in the ordinary and natural way. He is *γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικὸς*, and he is *γενόμενος ὑπὸ νόμον*; he bears the impress and character of the *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου*. The apostle's idea seems to be that since the transition from one period to another was to be made in his person, it was necessary that he should represent the first period in his own person. As he entered at his birth into the conditions of humanity, he stood also under the law: the law made

the same claim on him that it makes on all other men. Indeed he became the curse of the law, but not on his own account,—it was that by dying on account of the curse and discharging the claims of the law, he might bring in freedom from the law and make men children of God, *υιοὶ Θεοῦ*. He himself is in a special sense the *υἱὸς Θεοῦ*: for in him humanity rises to the consciousness of unity with God, in him there is for humanity the principle of its new existence, where it is not servile, but free, not under guardianship, but of full age. Thus as it belongs to human nature that the man passes from the restrictions of infancy and youth to the independence of maturity, from the unfree to the free, from the servant to the son, so Christ entered into humanity as a Son at the time appointed for that event, that is, when humanity had arrived at its maturity. In this view Christianity is not merely a thing that has been imported into humanity from without; whatever conception be formed of Christ's person, Christianity is a stage of the religious development of the world which has proceeded from a principle that is internal and immanent in humanity. Christianity is reached by the progress of the spirit to the freedom of its own self-consciousness, and humanity cannot arrive at this period till it has traversed that of unfreedom and servitude. Christ as the principle of this period of human development is the second Adam over against the first. This antithesis as much as the others suggests that Christianity is one of the stages of an immanent process of development. This antithesis contains the main ideas with which we are concerned in this chapter.

In the period of the first Adam sin and death are the ruling powers. Death is the wages of sin: that is, so certainly as a man sins, so certainly does he also die. The universal reign of death is what chiefly distinguishes the first period from the second. But do not men die in the second period just as much as in the first? And if death comes because of sin and is the punishment which sin deserves and draws after it, then how can the apostle say, as he does, Rom. iii. 25, that God has left unpunished the sins committed before Christ? If men died during that period, then their

death paid the penalty their sins had incurred and they required no other means of expiation. And if the death of Christ be a means of expiation set up by God, available to all men for the forgiveness of their sins, if sin has ceased to have such a hold on men that nothing but their death can discharge the penalty of it, and the power of death which reigned throughout the first period is thus broken in the second, then those who have received into themselves the grace bestowed in Christ and therein the justification by which life is imparted, should not die in this latter period. But if they do die in this period as much as in the former, then what is the difference between the two? Or are we to understand the long-suffering which God manifested in the first period to have consisted in this: that he did not suffer the human race to die out altogether, and that the dead were always succeeded by the living? But this is the case in the second period as well, and we fail to see in what sense it is true that the one period is distinguished from the other by death being the dominating principle of the one and life of the other. The solution of this difficulty lies in an accurate apprehension of what the apostle means by the words *ζωή* and *θάνατος*. He uses these words in a double sense, as including both the physical and the ethical, and neither of these two spheres is thought of without an implicit reference to the one and original element in which both have their common root. Death and life stand over against each other as the first and the second Adam. In the first Adam men die, in the second they rise to life, those namely who believe in him. From this qualification of the statement, that only those rise who believe in him, we see how the physical notion of life and the ethical are interwoven. If it be said that men die in the first Adam, the death here spoken of is first of all physical death; they die because sin runs its course in them and is followed by death, the wages of sin. But this is merely the physical death to which man is liable at any rate in virtue of his bodily constitution, and which is not necessarily the extinction of his whole existence. Why should so great importance be attached to death in this sense? This arises from the Jewish view of the nature and office



of the body as an essential element of the human personality. Without the body man is in this view without any material basis for his existence ; if death asserts its power over his body, then the power of death reigns over him in his entirety ; all the privations bound up in the idea of death are now realized in him ; there is no longer any life for him, nor any salvation, nor any connexion with the kingdom of God. And if death is not to be the total severance of this connexion, if he is to look for a life worth having after death, then he must be assured of this point first of all, that death has no power entirely to destroy his physical life. Hence the great importance which the resurrection of Jesus possesses for the Christian consciousness. It is the positive and actual evidence of a power of life by which death is overcome. Physical death is abolished by physical life : in the resurrection of Jesus a new principle of life has entered into humanity.

But physical death is not merely the natural end of life : it also results as the wages of sin under God's decree of condemnation. Thus the life imparted to humanity through the resurrection of Jesus must be something more than physical life. Over against the *κατάκριμα* of death there stands, as the apostle says in a pregnant expression, Rom. v. 18, the *δικαίωσις ζωῆς*. That is to say, the life given to humanity in the resurrection of Jesus is co-extensive with the change which transfers a man from the state of sin into the state of justification ; it comes in that change, and so is more than physical life, though it includes that also—it is life in the fullest and truest sense. But the chief evidence that there is such a life, in which death is conquered and abolished, is the great fact of the resurrection of Jesus. The apostle regards the resurrection as the principal doctrine of the Christian faith. He writes to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. xv. 3, that among the chief points of the doctrine which had been delivered to him, and which he had communicated to them, were these : that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and was buried, and that he rose again on the third day. Now that Jesus rose again after his death is an outward historical fact, from which Christianity derives its objective

historical character. In virtue of this fact it is the *λόγος τοῦ σταύρου*, a doctrine founded on a distinct historical basis, and thereby essentially different from such truth as is evolved from pure reason, 1 Cor. i. 18. It is therefore all-important that that fact should be properly authenticated; and the apostle brings forward evidence on the subject, appealing to the appearances of Jesus both to the older apostles and to himself. One great function of the apostles in their preaching of the Gospel is to be witnesses of the resurrection of Jesus, 1 Cor. xv. 15. But the resurrection is something more than this single historical fact: it also involves a general truth. For if it were in itself impossible that the dead should rise, then Christ could not have risen. Christ's resurrection therefore has made it clear and certain to us that resurrection from the dead is possible, that there is such a resurrection. This knowledge is due to Christianity; nor is its connexion with Christianity a merely outward or accidental one; Christianity as a whole is based upon the fact that a resurrection from the dead is possible, and that it has actually come to pass in Christ. If Christ be not risen, the apostle says, verse 17, then the faith that Christians have is vain and delusive: then there is no forgiveness of sins, and the guilt of sin is not removed from us; hence the Christians who have fallen asleep are lost. Death reigns over them with the same dominion which it exercised from Adam to Christ: then there are no more miserable men than Christians are,—they have much to suffer for their faith, and their hope in Christ is limited to this world, there is no hope in him beyond. If the death of the body be not done away, if death as the end of this life be not succeeded by another life, then there is no power of life to overcome the mortality of man. Inspiring and blessed as the Christian faith is even for the present, with its assurance of mercy, of justification, and of atonement with God, yet it is always liable to be disturbed and darkened by the thought of the death which is coming to the body; and there is no way out of this darkness and perplexity unless the Christian can become assured that out of the death of the body he will rise again to a new life. Even the spiritual life, which is the contents

of the Christian consciousness, would be no true life at all, if it were not at the same time a physical life. Without the resurrection of the body the personality cannot continue, and the spiritual life of Christianity must embrace this, and bring the Christian the assurance that he will continue to exist with the same personality as at present. Christianity is therefore meaningless, and its absolute idea is untrue except in the light of this fact—that there is a resurrection of the dead. It is not only that Christ rose from the dead—he could not have risen if resurrection were in itself impossible,—but that what happened in his case is also to happen to all others.

Thus in Christ and through his resurrection a new principle has been introduced into humanity; that principle has to be developed in humanity. This is what the apostle means when he says that Christ was raised up from the dead as the ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων. As death reigns over the period beginning with Adam, so the new principle of life which appeared in Christ rules over the second period. The two periods and principles agree in this, that Adam and Christ are both human, since Christ is a man as much as Adam; the one principle as well as the other is immanent in humanity. Christ as much as Adam belongs essentially to humanity, is subject to all its conditions and part of its history, and hence it is, that the principle which he brought in becomes incorporate with and a living power in humanity. As then in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive, verse 22. They are made alive in him because of their common nature with him, because he, who has in himself the principle of life, is a man like them. Now how are we to account for this sweeping statement, "All shall be made alive"? On the one side, only those who are in Christ are made alive; on the other side, the life is spoken of as co-extensive with the death in Adam. The reason of this is that the physical and the ethical idea of life are not held apart from each other. The life that comes from Christ is the life of the resurrection, and therefore a physical life; but, on the other hand, only those can obtain it who have the spiritual life that is awakened by faith in Christ. The life which comes from Christ, then, is a thing which is

mediated by the spiritual life of faith, and must be life in the highest sense, the blessed life. The being made alive would thus seem to mean nothing more or less than salvation. But it is asserted of all universally, and this plainly implies the apostle's belief that the principle which has come to actuality in Christ is of sufficient energy and power to quicken all men for the resurrection to the blessed life. His whole argument on the subject leads to this conclusion. Adam and Christ are related to each other as death and life, as dying and rising again. The same human nature which perishes in the one rises again in the other. In contrasting Adam and Christ with each other as the physical and the spiritual principle, the apostle goes on to show that the one cannot exist without the other, that the two things, death and resurrection, are essential momenta in one and the same process of development. For so it is written, he says, verse 45, "The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit. Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is psychical; and afterward that which is spiritual. The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven. As the earthy was, so are they that are earthy; and as the heavenly was, so are they that are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly. For flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; nor can the corruptible inherit incorruption." There is thus not only a material earthly life, but also a spiritual, heavenly life; not only a physical, but also a pneumatical Adam. Some think that as the apostle is discussing the resurrection he must be speaking merely of the bodily constitution of the first man, with a view to showing that there are different kinds of bodies, higher and lower, physical and pneumatical, and that man rises from the lower to the higher. The human race, the apostle is thought to argue, is first endowed with an earthly body after the type of the first man, and only at a later period does it attain to a higher, more than earthly nature, after the type of the Redeemer, *i.e.* of his glorified body. The present human body, then, is to be changed and glorified. But this

is not what the apostle is saying. It is not only the bodily structure that he is thinking of when he calls the first Adam a living soul, and the second a quickening spirit,—the one psychical and earthy, the other spiritual and heavenly. He is thinking of the whole personality of the two. This is quite clear when we remember how he does not regard the resurrection as being merely the restoration of the body, but as that state of higher greater life of which the glorified body is to be the seat.<sup>1</sup> The resurrection does not consist, in his view, in a change of the human body taking place instantaneously at a certain crisis through a supernatural operation of God. This was the unspiritual Jewish view. But to the apostle the resurrection is a form, a stage, of life, to which the whole system of organic life, natural and human, bears witness. He adduces the following arguments to show the possibility of the resurrection. 1. That nature presents us with phenomena precisely analogous to it, changes in which new life springs from death and corruption in the same individual. The most appropriate symbol of the resurrection is the seed-corn which dies and yet lives again, verses 36-38. 2. Nature presents to us a great multiplicity and diversity of bodies or existences, some less perfect, and some much more perfect. Hence we conclude that man also may have not only a mortal but an immortal nature, verses 39-43. 3. The two elements that make up man's nature being the *ψυχή* and the *πνεῦμα* (*ψυχή* here as the sensuous part, and including the *σὰρξ*, the *ψυχικός* being equivalent to the *σαρκικός*), and the two opposite sides of human nature which are combined to a unity in him, being represented by Adam and Christ, the first and the second, the earthly and the heavenly man, the relation of the

<sup>1</sup> When the apostle says, 1 Cor. xv. 44, *σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν· ἔστι σῶμα ψυχικόν, καὶ ἔστι σῶμα πνευματικόν*, this refers to the whole personality and substance of the man in the two distinct periods. It is not to be overlooked that *σῶμα* is to the apostle a different thing from *σὰρξ*, and a much higher thing. He knows of no resurrection of the *σὰρξ*; the *σὰρξ* is no part of the man's personality after the resurrection. Those who resurge exist only in a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*; *σῶμα* is thus to the apostle the concrete form in which the substance of any being's existence is contained.

present life to the future cannot be conceived to be anything else than an advance from the psychical life to the pneumatical. If in his present state man stands at the stage of the psychical life, what is more natural than that this subordinate stage should be succeeded by a higher, should develop into the stage of the pneumatical life? (verse 44.)

Now the contrast drawn by the apostle between Adam and Christ is not merely that they are the antagonist principles of life and death, and that in the one men die, and in the other rise again. They are also the representatives, the one as *ψυχή*, the other as *πνεῦμα*, of the two great historical periods in which the life of humanity runs its course. The collective life of mankind is treated here after the analogy of the individual life. As with the individual the psychical element predominates in the earlier period of life, the spiritual principle being quite undeveloped as yet, though of course not wholly wanting; and as this psychical period is succeeded by another in which the spiritual principle asserts itself more and more, till in the man's full and mature age when he has reached the freedom of the spiritual self-consciousness, it gains complete ascendancy,—so is it with humanity. The two periods are determined by their respective principles, Adam and Christ. In the first period it is only the psychical, sensual, carnal, side of human nature, that side which suffers the dominion of sin, that comes to the surface. In the second the spiritual is the predominating principle, the whole thoughts, desires, and actions of men are determined by it. If human history be thus divided into two periods represented by and depending on Adam and Christ respectively, then we reach two important conclusions on the nature of these two periods. 1. The apostle does not seek to deduce the sin of Adam and of his posterity from any other source than their own free-will; yet, at the same time, he could not altogether escape from the idea that the reign of sin during the first period was simply the natural predominance of the sensuous side of human nature at the time. The relation of the two elements of human nature to each other dictated a certain course which the develop-

ment of humanity could not but follow: no other course was possible. An earthly sensual man, as Adam was, he lacked the strength required to master the sensual impulses of his nature and to resist the tendency to sin which was inherent in his constitution. Abstractly his free-will may have been competent for such an effort, yet his will was insufficiently informed by motives, many of which could only be supplied by the reason and the spiritual sensitiveness to be reached at a later stage. This predominance of sense, this impotence of the moral will, this tendency to sin, were a part of human nature from the beginning, and the apostle does not suggest in the remotest way that this was a result of the sin of the first man. Indeed he cannot have thought so; for if Adam was to stand in such a contrast with Christ, he must have been essentially *ψυχικὸς* and *ἐκ γῆς χοϊκὸς*. 2. As Adam represents this side of human nature, and is its principle and the common root of all those in whom it is predominant, so we behold in Christ the principle of the other, spiritual side of human nature. This contrast of the two principles, however, shows us that it is something more than the resurrection and the state to follow it in the future, and the abolition it involves of the death inherited from Adam, that Christ is regarded as procuring. What is obtained through him is the higher spiritual consciousness of man, awakened by Christ and invested with permanent authority and power. Christ is the principle of this consciousness, and the reason why the apostle speaks of it as a resurrection still in the future, is that the victory of the new principle over the old, of life over death, is most vividly represented in that form. The power of the new principle, moreover, can be best recognised and appreciated when viewed in its effects in the future world and in bringing about the final consummation. These future results throw a strong light back on the beginnings of Christianity, and show the immense importance of the epoch in the development of humanity which Christ brought about. The principle which has been brought to light in Christ is thus of infinite extension: and it is also infinite intensively as realized by the individual. It is the infinite Christian conscious-

ness, as a truly spiritual consciousness. The apostle expressly calls the principle with which Christ stands over against Adam, pneumatical, and that though he is speaking of the resurrection. But the ideas of physical and spiritual life are so closely interwoven here, that the Christian principle could not be the principle of the resurrection, save in virtue of what it is in itself. The Christian principle includes and proceeds upon faith in Christ, on the assurance of reconciliation and unity with God, on the fellowship of the spirit, whose communications are the beginning and the condition of the whole new relation ; and it lifts the Christian up so high in the religious life, that all things give place to the idea of the absolute with which he is inspired : he knows that neither death nor life, neither things present nor things to come, can separate him from the love of God in Christ Jesus. In this absolute consciousness he already possesses that life which is superior to everything worldly, fleeting, and finite ; and all that remains is that this life should manifest itself outwardly and extensively in the resurrection of the body.

In order to understand how the physical and the spiritual elements are both comprehended and united in this life of which Christ is the principle, we have only to remember that the apostle represents the development of this life as the continued negation of the opposite principle of death. It is in the victory it achieves over death that its power and energy are manifested. To the Christian consciousness death is already abolished ; it remains that it should be abolished in outward fact. The resurrection is not merely a life given to men by Christ at a certain definite point of time : it is a life which men receive now, and which carries with it the triumph of life over death. Each stage in the development of this principle is thus a stage in the victory over death. Every man rises again in his own order, the apostle says, verse 23. There are therefore several distinct stages of the process. The first negation of death is the resurrection of Christ himself, for he is risen from the dead as the firstfruits of them that slept : the principle is identical with his person, and he was necessarily



the first in whom it proved its power to conquer death. The second negation of death is the resurrection of those who belong to Christ, at his coming. At the Parousia of Christ, those who are dead rise again, those who are still living at the time are changed. Though they have not yet died and fallen under death's dominion, yet the principle of death is in them, and they would necessarily succumb to it sooner or later. In them also, therefore, death has to be overcome, the mortal in them has to be transmuted into immortality, else they cannot share that life which begins with the resurrection for those who rise. Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor can the corruptible, this material and sensuous life which is composed of earthly elements, inherit incorruption. On this account the apostle designates as a mystery what was an unavoidable feature of his view of the future life as a post-resurrection life. It was a mystery in so far as it was not clearly realized—that all would not have died at the time of Christ's coming, but that all would undergo a transformation (since the resurrection is also a transformation); in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump, as soon as it sounds, the dead will be raised incorruptible, and the living will be changed. For according to the order ordained by God, in which the whole process moves, from which the victory of the principle of life over the principle of death is to result, it cannot but be the case that this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal, immortality, 1 Cor. xv. 50-53. After the resurrection of the dead, and the transformation of the living, comes the end, the end of the whole present history; then, that is to say, when Christ delivers up the kingdom to God and the Father, when he shall have destroyed every rule and every authority and power, for he must reign till he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death, for he has put all things under his feet. But when it is said that all things are put under him, it is manifest that this means all things except him who put all things under him. And when all things are subdued under him, then shall he himself, the Son, subject himself also to

him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all : vv. 24-28. It is very evident that the apostle here regards the whole history of the world and men as the scene of the conflict of two principles, one of which has sway at first, but is then attacked and conquered and entirely destroyed by the other. The first of these principles is death ; the history of the world begins with this one, and comes to a close when death, and with death the entire dualism of which the course of history is the development, has entirely disappeared from it. In order to break the might of the principle of death, Christ appeared at the time appointed him as the Son of God the Father. God caused him, as it were, to issue from himself, enters in him into the process of history, and subjects himself in him to the limitations of the world in its subjection to the principle of death ; that in the finite the principle of infinity may be born and appear, and the world of death be changed into the world of life. The power of the death-principle is broken by the resurrection of Jesus, yet the life-principle cannot assert its full supremacy as long as the world's history still goes on in time. Thus the common division of history into the ante-Messianic and the Messianic period is replaced in the apostle's mind by the higher view that we are now in the *αἰὼν οὗτος*, and that the *αἰὼν μέλλων* is to follow it. Now is the world of opposition and of struggle : Christ bears rule in the name of God, but only that he may subdue all hostile powers in which the principle of death continues to assert itself. The world to come is the higher world where the battle between life and death has been fought out, and the victory is complete ; where every jar is stilled. Here the eternal and absolute God, who stands above all, takes back into himself, out of the historical process in which the world he had created stood over against him, all that is his, and embraces it all in the eternal unity of his own undivided essence. If the conflict of the two principles, life and death, be now concluded, and transformed to unity, then Christ, who is identical with the principle of life, cannot be any longer outside of God,—he must be in God. The opposition through which God sought to bring about the unity of

the world with himself has now come to an end, and there is no longer any need of mediation or of a mediator. Corruption has put on incorruption, the mortal has put on immortality, and the words of Scripture are fulfilled: death is swallowed up in victory; death is robbed of its sting. The apostle adds, The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law; but the victory is given through the Lord Jesus Christ. In these words he recapitulates the momenta through which the transition from the one principle to the other takes place inwardly as well as outwardly. The mediation consists, in a word, in this: that the life in which death is overcome and abolished is the *δικαίωσις ζωῆς* (Rom. v. 18).

Here we might ask if God's being all-in-all is held to imply the final cessation of evil by the conversion of the wicked and of the devil. The question might be answered in different ways, but is of slight importance. It makes little difference in the main, whether the evil powers continue to exist in a state of entire exhaustion and impotence, or whether they be at last attracted by the irresistible power of good. Whatever be thought on the question, it must be perfectly clear that if death is to be robbed of his last sting, then there can be no eternal punishment.

Among the changes to take place in this development of the world's history there are two which we may mention specially. They are connected with the great final catastrophe, one in the physical, the other in the moral world. The first is the transfiguration of external nature spoken of by the apostle, Rom. viii. 19 sq. Nature is to be set free from the vanity and finiteness to which she has been made subject, and to be raised to the state of liberty which is the glory of the sons of God. Thus external nature also is one day to wear the likeness of that unshadowed Christian consciousness which is at one with itself and God, and is absolved from every limitation. The other occurrence which the apostle expects from the future is the conversion of the Jews. The blindness of a part of the Jews, he says, Rom. xi. 25, will last only till the fulness of the Gentiles be come in to the Christian body. Then all Israel will be saved. If this is to happen only after the con-

version of all the Gentiles, then it must be at the end, just before the Parousia, and the general resurrection. And the apostle expected that he himself would live to see the Parousia! What mighty events did he compress into the immediate future! But he has not given his reasons for these two expectations, nor did he make definite doctrines of them.

## SEVENTH CHAPTER.

### FAITH, LOVE, AND HOPE, AS THE THREE MOMENTA OF CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS.

THE process of the world's history is thus divided into two great periods, with Adam at the head of the first and Christ at the head of the second. The first comes to an end in the present world; the second has its beginning here, but stretches into the infinite beyond of the world to come. The Christian consciousness is similarly divided between the two elements of the past and of the future. It goes back in Adam to the past, and follows the whole process of the history that lies between Adam and Christ; and in Christ it directs its view to the most distant future, reaches out to the consummation of all things, and finds its rest in the result that lies behind that consummation, in God who has then become all in all. As directed to the past, the Christian consciousness is Christian faith; as directed to the future, it is Christian hope. Christian faith must of necessity be directed to the past. It is indeed the living present consciousness of Christ's dwelling in us through his spirit; yet the proper object of faith is something that has happened, that is past, and in this instance it is the death of Christ upon the cross. All the different momenta of Christian faith are centred in the cross. And it is impossible to understand these momenta except by tracing them backwards, and going up through the series, sin, death, law, to Adam, with whom the series originated. Christian faith is essentially historical; what is immediate in it has yet been mediated by past events, and has its roots in the past. Faith, therefore, goes back to the past. It does not, however, take its stand at any

one point of the past, it is under the necessity of going back to the beginning; from the beginning it is led forward again from stage to stage, from the past to the present, from the present to the future. Thus faith stands in the present as an element of consciousness, but lives in the past. This attitude of the mind towards the past comes out very distinctly in the view that everything in the past has reference to us, and happened principally for our sake. In the history of the Old Testament, in the fortunes and vicissitudes of the ancient people, the apostle finds a multitude of types of the various aspects of Christianity. He says, 1 Cor. x. 6, after mentioning a number of occurrences from the Old Testament, *ταῦτα τύποι ἡμῖν ἐγενήθησαν*, that we should not lust after evil things, nor be idolaters, etc. All this happened to them as a type, and had reference to the future. The past thus contains a picture of the future, and does not find the object which it serves save in that future. Hence it is written for our admonition, *εἰς οὓς τὰ τέλος τῶν αἰώνων κατήγγησεν*, on whom the end of the world's history is advancing, on whom the last eventful time is just about to break, in which that history shall reach its end and consummation. The whole interest of the world's history is concentrated in the *τέλος τῶν αἰώνων*; here every event is solemn and important; to this period all past events have been converging; this period all past events have been prefiguring. Thus the past is consulted for an explanation of the present. But not only so: the present itself points us forward; it also is to reach a fulfilment in the future. The chief interest of the Christian consciousness is in the future, and thus faith, including as it does all the momenta of the Christian consciousness, yet admitting of different aspects and expressions, comes to be hope or longing. In thinking of the future, the faith which justifies assumes the character of hope. In the spirit, the apostle says, Gal. v. 5, that is, in our Christian consciousness, we look through faith for righteousness or justification as the object of our hope (*ἐλπὶς δικαιοσύνης* as 2 Cor. i. 22, *ἄρραβὼν τοῦ πνεύματος*, the *πνεῦμα* as *ἄρραβὼν*), we expect that that *δικαιοσύνη*, which is the object of our hope, will be realized.

Though justification belongs to the present as being *πνεύματι* and *ἐκ πίστεως*, yet as *ἐλπίς δικαιοσύνης* it is placed in the future. The divine act of justification is only accomplished in the blessedness of the future ; this is a part of *δικαιούσθαι*, thus faith may come to be more occupied with the future than with the present, and then it will be hope. The Christian's whole thought, and desire, and effort is occupied with the future ; he is drawn to it by all the ties by which he is bound to Christ. He knows—for the apostle's words, 2 Cor. iv. 14, may be understood of Christians as Christians—"that he who raised up the Lord Jesus from the dead will raise up us also by Jesus. For this cause we do not weary, but though our outward man perish, yet our inward man is renewed day by day. For our transitory light afflictions procure for us a transcendently exalted and eternal glory, while we look not at the things that are seen, but at the things that are not seen, for the visible is temporal, but the invisible is eternal." The visible present is a vanishing momentum of the future which is as yet invisible ; if the two be held side by side it cannot but appear that the sufferings of the present time are of no account whatever in comparison with the glory which the future will make manifest in us. The Christian cannot but long for this glory, the thought of which engrosses him ; his whole mind and soul are possessed with longing, and he even imputes his own mood to outward physical nature and thinks that it sympathizes with his yearning. "For expectant nature waits for the manifestation of the sons of God, for the catastrophe at which they shall appear in their glory as the sons and heirs of God. For nature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but for the sake of him who subjected her ; the hope being reserved to her, that she also should be freed from the bondage of corruption to the freedom which is the glory of the sons of God. For we know that all nature groans with us, and is in travail from of old till now : and not only she, but we also, who have the firstfruits of the spirit, we also groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of our body. For we have been saved for hope (our

salvation is only the object of hope) : but a hope which is visible is no hope : for what a man sees he can no longer be hoping for. But if we hope for what we see not, then we wait for it with patience," Rom. viii. 18-25. Thus everything is summed up in hope : the deepest feeling of the Christian's heart is yearning,—the patient waiting for what is yet to come. Even the spirit, which the Christian has already received, and in which the blessings of the gospel are already consciously his, even the spirit is only an *ἀπαρχή*, only the sacred initiation, only the pledge of something higher which has yet to come, of this namely : that the mortal shall be swallowed up of life, 2 Cor. v. 5. This being so, the apostle proceeds :—"I have always good courage, and look beyond the present to the future. I know that so long as I am in the body I am absent from the Lord, for we walk in faith not by sight, but I have good courage and wish rather to go forth out of the body and to be at home with the Lord," vv. 6-8. By force of yearning after the Lord and reaching forth towards him beyond the present to the future, the present and the future come to appear to the apostle to lie quite close together. Everything seemed to be pressing on to the close, all existing relations and arrangements were uncertain, and on the brink of being dissolved, 1 Cor. vii. 29. The future world was already beginning to appear, he believed that he himself was to live to see the appearance of the Lord when he should come again and close the world's history by his arrival, 1 Cor. xv. 52.

Thus the Christian lives only in the future ; the present has no interest except as pointing to the future ; so little does it weigh in itself, that if the present has been filled with a hope in Christ which is not to have its fulfilment in the future, then Christians are of all men most miserable ; that if there be no resurrection of the dead, then those are right who say : Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die, 1 Cor. xv. 19, 32. The consciousness of the Christian has nothing in itself to hold on to, if it do not go out beyond the present. The consciousness of atonement and unity with God is indeed such a blessed thing that there is no greater



happiness for a man than to be by his holy life a temple of the indwelling God ; and yet here it is as if it were not so, as if all this blessedness and holiness of soul were nothing in itself, and were of value only in the light of the future. There could be no stronger expression of the Christian's dependence on the world to come.

And is it then the case that the Christian has nothing in himself now, and irrespective of what the future is to bring, that can lift him up absolutely above the limitations of his existence? Is the infiniteness of the Christian consciousness a thing yet to be attained, and not already present? To this we answer, that where faith is as yet nothing more than hope, and the spirit works only as the ἀπαρχή, there love comes in as a new element. The apostle describes the nature of love in the classical passage, 1 Cor. xiii. ; without it, he says, the most distinguished spiritual gifts are nothing worth, since it is love alone that teaches how to use them well, so that they are really serviceable. Of the highest practical virtues it is the same, the utmost devotion and self-sacrifice are worthless if they do not proceed from love. He goes on to describe love and invest it with every possible distinction as the moral quality by means of which man becomes free from every selfish feeling, lives not for himself, but only for others, and has no ends but such as are lofty and universal. Thus it is love which gives the Christian consciousness and life its absolute value. Even faith is nothing without love, though love again is simply faith actively operative. In comparison with faith and hope, then, the apostle distinctly calls love the greatest, since she is what she is immediately and absolutely, and therefore always remains what she is. She is greater than hope, for when the fulfilment comes hope ceases to exist ; and she is greater than faith, for faith does not reach its object immediately, but mediately, it is not a περιπατεῖν διὰ εἶδους. Our present knowledge is obscure and dim, not a seeing face to face. This knowing in part has to give place to perfect knowledge, this mediate and reflected knowledge to the immediate and direct. Even faith as a form of knowledge will

cease to be when it rises into sight. Thus love is the greatest of the three momenta of the Christian consciousness; it remains what it is, it has absolute value even in the present. Now if love have absolute value in herself, if it be possible for the Christian even now to be filled with a love which leaves everything that is particular, egoistic, and limited, behind, and is her own reward instead of having to expect her reward in the future world,—if this be so, then is it not quite untrue to say that if there be no resurrection of the dead there is nothing better to be done than to eat and drink, since this life makes an end of all, and it is all the same whether a man lives so or so? If love be in herself of absolute value, then she is so without the resurrection, and all the more the more she is without any ulterior interest to inspire her. But the reason of her having this absolute value is that the principle of the Christian consciousness from which she also springs, faith with all that makes up its living contents, has absolute value in itself. Faith, love, and hope, are the three momenta of the Christian consciousness, the three essential forms in which it finds expression; but while to faith and hope that infinity of the subject which Christianity promises is reserved for the transcendent hereafter, and is unattained here, love possesses that infinity here and now as her own immanent virtue. *Πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη* is *πίστις* in possession of those absolute contents, which to *πίστις* as expressed in *ἐλπίς* were still unattained and only to be expected from the future world. Love, therefore, or faith in the form of love, is a greater thing than hope. What faith is theoretically love realizes, a consciousness that is free within itself, and absolved from all limits and barriers. Thus the three momenta in which the apostle while at the highest stage of his contemplation sums up the whole contents of his Christian consciousness coincide with that principle, as we sought to apprehend and to develop it at the outset of our discussion.

## EIGHTH CHAPTER.

### SPECIAL DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN SUBORDINATE DOGMATIC QUESTIONS.

IN the preceding chapters we have been considering the Pauline doctrine as a connected and organic system, in which one idea rose logically out of the other, till the whole stood before us. We have still to consider some questions which may serve to throw light on individual points of the apostle's system, though they do not materially affect its main positions. The question of greatest importance under this head is, how the apostle conceived of the higher nature of Christ. His doctrine of Christ is not indeed a key to his system; that system can be quite well examined and described even before this question is discussed; yet we must of course devote some attention to it, and we may dispose of several other points at the same time.

#### 1. The conception or the essence of religion.

If it be asked what is the apostle's conception of religion, or what he held to be the essential element of religion, we must, of course, answer—Faith. This is man's part in religion; what is to put man in a right relation towards God is faith and what springs out of faith. The chief proposition of the apostle's doctrine of justification, *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*, contains his definition of religion. Religion is essentially faith. Faith is taken here not in its contracted, but in its widest sense; it is faith in that which God must have in himself in order to make man blessed, confidence in his omnipotence. With regard to faith in Jesus, faith, that is, in its more specific sense, when the apostle means to exhibit that element in it which belongs to religion generally, he uses the expression *πιστεύειν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγεῖραντα Ἰησοῦν τὸν Κύριον ἡμῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν* (Rom. iv. 24).

And the distinguishing feature of Abraham's faith is that he believed in God as the *ζωοποιῶν τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ καλῶν τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα* (ver. 17). This faith, that God can bring about what seems impossible, contains, on the one hand, an expression of absolute dependence on God, and, on the other, an attitude of mind, in which the standard of possibility is not taken from what actually is, which surmounts the present reality, and takes account not only of the visible, but also of the invisible. Faith here means, to abstract from self and from one's own subjectivity, and to cast one's-self on the objective by which the subject is determined. It is the trustful surrender of the whole man to God. The ground of this confidence is not only God's omnipotence, but also his love; but first of all it must be his omnipotence, because if God is to be the object of confidence, he must, first of all, have the power to do what love suggests. The most essential element of religion is thus, that man feel his dependence on God, and place an unlimited trust in him.

The apostle, however, counts not only faith and confidence to be of the essence of religion, but also a certain amount and kind of action. He says, Rom. ii. 13, that not the hearers but the doers of the law are just before God; the difference between circumcision and uncircumcision is given up, but is replaced by that between the observance and the non-observance of the law. For circumcision profits if one keeps the law, but if one be a transgressor of the law then circumcision is made uncircumcision. If then uncircumcision observes what the law pronounces to be right and good, then uncircumcision is counted for circumcision. And the uncircumcision that is by nature, if it fulfil the law, judges him who with the letter and with circumcision is a transgressor of the law. For it does not matter what one is outwardly, but only what one is inwardly in regard to the spirit with which he keeps the law (Rom. ii. 25). Compare 1 Cor. vii. 19: Circumcision is nothing and uncircumcision is nothing; the main point is the *τήρησις ἐντολῶν Θεοῦ*. This view of the essence of religion rests on the idea that justification by works of the law is abstractly a possible road to attain that salvation which is religion's ultimate end. If we omit,

what the apostle teaches further, that this road does not actually lead to that end, then the essence of religion must be the doing, the observance, of the commandments of God. But works and faith are related to each other in respect of the essence of religion as *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου* to *δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*; works, as distinguished from and separate from faith cannot but be imperfect, and can only be the essence of religion in one of its lower stages. At a higher stage that essence is faith.

There are, however, some indications that the apostle regarded knowledge as the highest region in which religion moves, and placed knowing above both doing and believing.

He draws a contrast between dim and obscured seeing in a mirror, and seeing face to face; between his piecemeal knowledge now, and that which was to come, the knowing perfectly as he was known (1 Cor. xiii. 12). These last words may be understood either generally, thus: I shall be both the subject and the object of the knowledge of the future world, where all is clear and transparent; or they may be taken of the knowledge of God: my knowledge of God will be as immediate and absolute as God's knowledge of me. In any case the highest stage and form of religion is to the apostle that in which it is an immediate relation of spirit to spirit; if man's knowledge of God be as absolute as God's knowledge of man, then it is nothing but a knowledge identical with itself, the identity of subject and object in pure knowledge. Of the same knowledge the apostle says, 1 Cor. viii. 3, If any man love God, the same is known of him. The context of the passage is not satisfied by the interpretation *Deo probatur*. The apostle is speaking, verse 2, of the *γνώσις* which *φυσιοί*, of the *γνώσις* which is disjoined from love; and says that this is not the right knowledge, that there can be no right *γνώσις* without the *καθὼς δεῖ γινῶναι*, which nothing but love can supply. Then he takes up the converse, verse 3, referring *γνώσις* to *ἀγάπη*, and here he cannot mean anything but this,—that in the true *ἀγάπη* the true *γνώσις* is also contained. In such a man the conception of *γνώσις* is realized through his being known by God in loving God. This passive, being known, implies the active,

knowing: as the object of the absolute divine knowledge he is also the subject of it, in so far as it is in him, as he, the object of it, has it in himself. Thus he is not only the object, but also the depositary, the subject of this divine knowledge of him. Thus religion is also knowledge—the highest absolute knowledge on man's part, as on God's part. God is known by man in the same absolute way as man by God; in this same absolute knowledge God and man are one.

## 2. The doctrine of God.<sup>1</sup>

What is most remarkable in the apostle's doctrine of God is how he seeks to remove from the idea of God everything particular, limited and finite, and to retain nothing but the pure idea of the absolute. The final result of the whole world-process is that God may be all in all, and this point of view is consistently adhered to throughout. Whatever subject he happens to be considering, its reference to God is always an essential part of it; and the more he labours to grasp the subject in all its various aspects, and exhibit the whole system of its parts and connexions, the more does the whole train of thought seem to carry him at last by a natural attraction to the absolute idea of God, to find there his conclusion and resting-place. As everything proceeds from God, so everything is to be referred to him. The one God is the Father, *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸν* (1 Cor. viii. 6), or in the more comprehensive expression of Rom. xi. 36, *ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα*, all things proceed from him, all things come to actuality through him, all things have in him their final purpose. As God in this absolute sense, he is further the Father of Jesus Christ, by whom the whole work of redemption was ordained: *τὰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τοῦ καταλλάξαντος ἡμᾶς ἐαυτῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* (2 Cor. v. 18). This constant reference to the one and universally efficient causality of God, and the consequent feelings of gratitude and wonder at God's greatness and goodness, causes the apostle to break out in direct doxology, as in Rom. ix. 5, 2 Cor. i. 3, xi. 31. This view of the absoluteness of the idea of God is the root of the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Neutest. Theol.* 205 sq.

apostle's universalism ; he declares repeatedly that God is as much the God of the Gentiles as of the Jews, and that in this matter there is no respect of persons with God (Rom. ii. 11, iii. 29, x. 12). Christianity indeed is simply the negation of all particularism to the end that the pure and absolute idea of God may be realized in humanity. The barriers which divide Jews from Gentiles are removed in the justification that is by faith, because faith is the freest way of justification, and the only way that answers to the absolute idea of God (Rom. iii. 30). But God has proved himself from the very beginning to be the God of the Gentiles ; he did not leave them without a witness ; he could not do so, for it belongs to the idea of God that he should manifest himself. *Τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστι ἐν αὐτοῖς*, the apostle says (Rom. i. 19),—for God has manifested it to them, for the invisible things of him are spiritually beheld since the foundation of the world, both his eternal power and his divinity. This sentence implies, on the one hand, that it belongs to the essence of God to reveal himself, and, on the other, that his absolute nature cannot be revealed by any revelation. Invisible as it essentially is, it became visible so far as the invisible can become visible, through the creation of the world and all that God has been doing since then, through all God's works in nature. But then this is brought about only through the instrumentality of thought : *τὰ ἀόρατα . . . νοούμενα καθορᾶται* : it is only through thought that it comes to presentation. This knowledge of God through the works of nature is not immediate but mediate ; nature may be made the subject of thought and contemplation, and, from the operations that are visible there, we may infer an invisible cause. The apostle thus indicates that the conclusion from effect to cause is the natural way to the knowledge of God. That which is known of God in this way is his power, and in general the divinity of his nature. Whether *θειότης* be understood specially of the goodness of God as a further element in his nature, and different from his power, or, more accurately, of the sum of his divine attributes in general, in any case the apostle places the power of God before all his other attributes. It is the property by

which God calls the non-existent to exist (*τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα καλεῖ*, Rom. iv. 17). By his omnipotence God created the world; and Christianity; as a spiritual creation, is also to be referred to his omnipotence. The same God at whose command light shone out of darkness has also, as the apostle says (2 Cor. iv. 6) (here he is speaking of himself personally, but what he says is true of all Christians), shined into our hearts, to give us a clear knowledge of the glory of God as it appears on the face of Jesus Christ. Christianity is a creation of light, as the first appearance of the world was; as creator of the world God called the non-existent into existence, and that important event on which Christianity depends, the resurrection of Jesus, is a similar act of his omnipotence (the Apostle places the *ζωοποιεῖν τοὺς νεκροὺς* in the same category with the *καλεῖν τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα*, Rom. iv. 17). Thus while the general conception which the Christian consciousness entertains of God is that he is the Father of Jesus Christ, this conception is further defined in this way: that God is he who raised up Jesus from the dead (Rom. iv. 24, 25, 2 Cor. iv. 14). The reason for the omnipotence of God occupying so large a place in the Christian consciousness of him is, that it is essential to be assured that he *δυνατός ἐστι καὶ ποιῆσαι* what he has promised (Rom. iv. 21). Next to his omnipotence, however, is his love: for his love is the first and highest cause to which the whole work of redemption which he ordained and set in motion, is to be referred (Rom. v. 8, viii. 38, 2 Cor. xiii. 13). But his love cannot have its way without satisfaction being done to his justice: for his justice is the attribute through which that relation between God and man which is adequate to the idea of God must be accomplished. Thus Christianity and the scheme of salvation which it declares is itself a revelation of God's justice (Rom. i. 17). When his justice has been satisfied then his love appears in the forgiveness of sins as grace, and, where grace prevails, the wrath of God, his retributive justice, has no longer any part to play.

### 3. The doctrine of Christ.

Our consideration of the Pauline doctrine has not as yet carried



us beyond the idea of the *κύριος*, the risen and glorified Lord. All that that doctrine involves in regard to the person of Christ is that Christianity could not have inaugurated the new epoch, which dates from the resurrection of Christ, and reaches its full accomplishment at the end of the world, if Christ did not possess in the higher dignity to which he has ascended the principle of that new life which is to prevail when death has been subdued. But the higher dignity which Christ attained after his resurrection suggests to us very naturally that we should direct our view backwards and inquire, what is Christ? What was he before he entered on his human existence? He was sent as the Son of God: he entered as the Son of God, at the time which God had fore-ordained, into the history of humanity and of the world (Rom. viii. 3, Gal. iv. 4). This, however, indicates nothing more than his exalted office as Messiah. These expressions do not inform us whether he was the son of God before he was sent, or became the son of God by being sent. We have therefore to look for something more than this *υἱὸς Θεοῦ*, and to inquire how much is implied in his pre-existence. This question has been frequently discussed of late,<sup>1</sup> yet the apostle's position on this subject has never yet been accurately determined. It is clear on the one side that a pre-existence such as that of the Johannine Logos-doctrine cannot be traced in our apostle's writings; yet on the other side, it is equally clear that we cannot believe him to have regarded Christ's personality as originating only in his human existence. We have to define what the view is that is situated between these two extremes.

By this time there should surely be little doubt among interpreters that Christ is not called God at Rom. ix. 5. When we consider how absolute the idea of God is to the apostle, how powerfully the absoluteness of God had taken possession of his mind, and how distinctly and consistently he represents the rela-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. my *Geschichte von der Lehre der Dreieinigkeit* u.s.w., 1 Thl. p. 81. Zeller, *Ueber einige Fragen in Betreff der neutestamentlichen Theologie*, Theol. Jahrb. 1842, p. 51 sq. Küstlin, *der Lehrb. des Evangeliums und der Briefe Joh. und die verwandten neutest. Lehrb.* 1843, p. 290 sq. Theol. Jahrb. 1845, p. 89 sq.

tion of Christ to God as one of subordination, we cannot possibly believe that in this one passage he meant to describe Christ as the absolute God exalted above all. The Pauline mode of thought on such subjects recognises the limits of the monotheism of Judaism, and such an expression would be simply inconsistent with that monotheism. Nor is there any reason why these doxological phrases should be taken in a different sense from the other doxologies which occur in the apostle's writings. Why should they not be a doxology referring to God? For this is what the context requires. It is said that the preceding *τὸ κατὰ σάρκα* leads us to expect some higher predicate to be ascribed to Christ. But that is not the case: the apostle's intention here is not, as Rom. i. 3, to expound his conception of Christ in all its elements, and to indicate that in him which is more than the *σὰρξ*. If this were his intention, it is certainly carried out in a very different way from what we find in Rom. i. 3,—indeed in a very peculiar and inexplicable way. What he is saying here is simply that one of the great advantages by which the Israelites are distinguished, is that Christ appeared among them, and as a descendant of their fathers, that Christ, in fact, belongs first of all to them. He feared, however, to allow too much to the particularism of the Jews, and so he had to modify what he had said of Christ's descent by adding that this applied only to the natural extraction of the Messiah; that it was only *κατὰ σάρκα*. And this did not require to be balanced by another opposite predicate any more than the *γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικὸς* of Gal. iv. 4. Here then we have a passage in which the apostle sums up all the benefits and advantages conferred on the Israelites by God: and the climax of all these is said to be that the Messiah appeared among them, and as the descendant of their fathers; and what is more natural than that, when he arrived at that climax, he should give utterance to his feelings of thanks and adoration? In doing so he uses the words *εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, as if to indicate that proofs like these of the divine favour, which the Israelites had enjoyed, could never be obliterated, nor cease at any future time to be a ground of gratitude and praise. De Wette

thinks it unnatural that God should be spoken of as the Being who is all in all, as if purposely to overshadow Christ : yet it cannot be alleged that there is no sufficient reason for thus subordinating Christ to God, and for this doxology in which God is praised. The passage, if properly understood, proves exactly the opposite of what is commonly deduced from it ; it proves, namely, how little it consisted with the apostle's ideas to place Christ on an equality with God, and to give him the name of God.

The passage 1 Cor. viii. 6 affords much more plausible grounds for the assertion that the apostle ascribed divine pre-existence to Christ. That this is the force of the words *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ*, is argued on the following grounds :—1. That it is implied in the analogy of these words with the preceding *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα*, and that the expression used of God, Rom. xi. 36, is precisely identical. 2. That it is implied in the collocation of *πάντα* and *ἡμεῖς*, the latter being understood most naturally of the whole body of Christians, and the former of the totality of things existing. 3. That the context requires it. The reason given here why Christians need not scruple to eat meat offered to idols is the same as that given x. 25 *sq.*, viz., that the meat which is dedicated to idols belongs in fact to the God of the Christians. This is what is meant by the words *ἐξ οὗ τ. π.* Now what is said here of Christ must be meant to have the same force as what was said before of God, and the conclusion is : You are at liberty to eat what the heathens have presented to their masters, for this also belongs to your master, Christ, since it, with all existing things, was made by him.<sup>1</sup> In spite of all this, I still fail to see that this is the correct interpretation of the passage. As for the last of the three points, the words do not bear the meaning that is put into them ; there is no such immediate reference to the flesh offered to idols. What the apostle means is just this, that the *εἰδωλα* as such have no reality, for though there be many so-called gods, higher and lower (*θεοὶ* and *κύριοι*), yet they are no true existences. Christians only have the one God, the Father, from whom all things are, and to whom the

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, *op. cit.* p. 57.

Christian has to refer all things; and the one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things are, and through whom Christians also are. Thus if the formal distinction drawn in heathenism between *θεοὶ* and *κύριοι* be a correct one, yet only in Christianity are there a *θεὸς* and a *κύριος* who answer to the distinction. In this passage also we have to observe that Christ is not himself called God; he is placed beside the one God as *κύριος*, as a subordinate being, corresponding to those beings of lower rank whom the heathens worshipped in addition to the beings they called gods, and who stood in a more familiar relation to men than the gods did. What does this show with regard to the pre-existence of Christ? If the distinction between the *θεὸς* and *κύριος* be a clear and well-defined distinction, then it is very improbable that the apostle ascribed to Christ as *κύριος* the highest prerogative of deity, the creation of the world. If everything were created by him, then, of course, he would be not only *κύριος* but *Θεὸς*. The Logos is *Θεὸς*, just because all things were made by him. The only conclusion open to us in interpreting this passage is therefore that between the creation (*ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα*) and the consummation (*ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτὸν*), the apostle interpolates what is attributed to Christ, in the words *καὶ εἰς . . . δι' αὐτοῦ*, that is, the government and preservation of inanimate beings. *Τὰ πάντα* will then be all that is continually coming to pass throughout the course of time; all things that come to pass in whatever way come to pass through Christ; and we also are what we are through him.<sup>1</sup>

This rendering of the *πάντα* attributed to Christ is certainly quite consistent with his character as *κύριος*; yet if we reflect upon the sense in which the apostle uses the particle *διὰ* of Christ in other passages, we shall see that this rendering of *πάντα* ascribes too much to him. 2 Cor. v. 17, 18, he says that at the standpoint of the Christian consciousness all things are become new, *τὰ δὲ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ καταλλάξαντος ἡμᾶς ἐαυτῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. Here also all things are of God, because God is always the ultimate causality from which all things proceed. But these

<sup>1</sup> Köstlin, *op. cit.* p. 309.

words are obviously inclusive of the *τὰ πάντα διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*. All that Christ has done for the redemption and salvation of men is regarded by the apostle as done by God through Christ (*διὰ*—Rom. i. 5, iii. '24, 25, v. 2, 9, 10, 11, 18, etc.) This *πάντα διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* is a part of the *τὰ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Thus we see that the words 1 Cor. viii. 6, *ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ*, refer not only to the creation of the world, but also to the work of redemption in all its parts. Now is it not obvious that the words immediately following these, *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ*, do not cover more than the *τὰ πάντα* of 2 Cor. v. 18, and signify all things referring to the redemption and atonement wrought by God *διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*.

Another of the principal *loci* from which it is sought to show that the pre-existence of Christ occurs in Paul's writings is 1 Cor. x. 4. There may be a question, it is said, as to the exact sense in which Christ is called the spiritual rock which followed the Israelites in the wilderness; yet there can be no question, that he is represented as living, and in some way active at that time. I do not see that even this is necessarily implied in the passage. Christ is called a *πέτρα πνευματικῆ* in that sense only in which it is said of the Israelites that they *τὸ αὐτὸ βρῶμα πνευματικὸν ἔφαγον* and *τὸ αὐτὸ πόμα πνευματικὸν ἔπιον*. Now the reason why the manna is called a spiritual food, and the water which sprang up in the wilderness a spiritual drink, is simply that they are invested with a symbolical reference to the Lord's Supper. Here as elsewhere that is called pneumatical which appears to be the higher spiritual sense of Scripture in the light of allegorical interpretation. And when the apostle calls Christ the *πνευματικῆ πέτρα*, that simply means that he gave an allegorical meaning to the rock which followed the Israelites, and discovered in it a type of Christ. We should at any rate require more evidence before we could allow that this passage contains an assertion of Christ's pre-existence, and of his actual working in his pre-existent state.

Nor is this pre-existence to be extracted from the passage 2 Cor. viii. 9. Accurately interpreted that passage simply affirms

that Christ was poor (not became poor), although he was rich : *i.e.* that he lived in poverty and low estate, though as the redeemer he was rich enough to make us rich with the grace of the redemption which he brought us.<sup>1</sup> It is true that spiritual riches are not a direct contradiction to outward poverty ; but the point is just that we ought to have the same self-sacrificing spirit as Christ had, who was poor and lowly, though exalted so far above us in the riches of his grace.

Thus none of these passages is enough to prove that the apostle ascribed pre-existence to Christ, a divine glory antecedent to his human existence. None of the predicates which he applies to Christ refers to a previous existence : he calls him simply *κύριος*, never *Θεός*. Indeed it cannot be allowed that he could possibly have regarded him as God. He calls him a man, not meaning thereby that there was a human side of his nature ; he calls him man in a way which precludes us from thinking of a higher divine nature essentially belonging to him. Over against the one man through whom sin and death entered into the world, he is the *εἰς ἄνθρωπος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, in whom the grace of God has been extended to many, Rom. v. 15. As by a man came death, so by a man came the resurrection of the dead, 1 Cor. xv. 21. As Adam was the first man and earthy, so he is the second man, the Lord from heaven, verse 47. What does the apostle mean by such statements as these, but that Christ was essentially man, man like Adam, only man in a higher sense ? All that is left for us to ask is what that higher conception is which is to be connected with the person of Christ over and above that of human nature. The apostle calls the higher principle of the person of Christ the spiritual, the heavenly, in him, and that not in the sense that a divine principle different from human nature had been added to that human nature from without ; the higher principle is the purer form of human nature itself. As the pneumatical man, as the Lord from heaven, Christ is, in a word, the archetypal man ; and this archetypal man does not exist merely in idea, he exhibits in a real form what man

<sup>1</sup> Köstlin, p. 310.

is according to the principles of his nature. Adam is the earthly, psychical man, who has fallen under the power of sin and death, but Christ is the spiritual heavenly man, the man in whom the lower side of human nature has completely given place to the higher, the sinless man. That Christ was without sin (*μὴ γνοὺς ἁμαρτίαν*, 2 Cor. v. 21) is an essential part of his character as distinguished from that of Adam. As sin began to manifest its power in Adam, so the principle of death also made its appearance in his person; Christ, on the other hand, as he is free from sin, is also free from death: not only was he not subject to the principle of death, he had within himself the opposite principle of life, the life-giving spirit. Thus though Christ had a physical nature like all other men, he yet differed from them in this respect, that his *σὰρξ* was not affected by the principle of sin and death, and was only a *ὁμολῶμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, Rom. viii. 3. This expression refers simply to the sinlessness of his human nature. As being free from sin, he ought not to have died; yet he was subject to the necessity of death, not on his own account, but in virtue of his office, in which he took upon himself the sins of men. But how could he die? Though descended *κατὰ σάρκα* from the fathers of his nation and from Adam, yet he had in himself no element of death; the principle of his nature was the opposite of that of Adam's, was the life-giving spirit. The explanation of this is, that though flesh, sin, and death are inter-dependent, and proceed the one out of the other, yet the *σὰρξ* cannot be conceived but as essentially mortal. If the *σὰρξ* did not carry in itself the element of liability to death, it could not be considered that the death of Christ as one dying only in the *ὁμολῶμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας* was a true and actual death. Yet though he died truly and actually, he died only in the flesh; the life-giving spirit in him, the spiritual principle which constituted his true essence, could not be affected by death. How is it then that the apostle regards it as an act of God's omnipotence that Christ was not subdued by the death that had reigned since Adam, but rose again from the dead? Was this not a necessary consequence of his immortal,

spiritual, and heavenly nature? It cannot be asserted that his resurrection was only the resurrection of his body; for the resurrection is, in the apostle's view, the entrance into humanity of that principle of life which Christ procured for it, and by which the reign of death was broken. If Christ had not risen, this would not import merely that his body had not been revived, while the spiritual principle that was identical with his person still continued. It is only through his resurrection that he has become the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν* in which *πάντες ζωοποιηθήσονται*. How then can that be regarded as an operation of the divine omnipotence, and one extending only to Christ's body, which is simply the manifestation of his higher spiritual nature in its superiority to the mortality of the body? Here we see the apostle involved in the inconsistency which attaches unavoidably to every attempt to hold at the same time to a theory carried out logically to its ultimate consequences, and to the miracles of supernaturalism. The whole of Christianity depends in his estimation on the miracle of Christ's resurrection; yet, at the same time, we see him deducing his view of what Christianity is essentially, as the communication of a new life-principle, or as the stage at which man becomes conscious of the infiniteness of his nature, from purely historical and logical considerations. While holding its supernatural origin, he yet demonstrates how it springs naturally from the opposition of the psychical and the pneumatical, of the earthly and the heavenly, or of Adam and Christ, that is of man on the lower, and on the higher side of his nature, as these opposites form the successive momenta of a process which is developed in accordance with an immanent principle.

Christ is thus essentially man, the archetypal man in whom the higher principle of human nature appears. Did he begin to exist as such only when he was born as a human individual in the person of Jesus of Nazareth? The first is not the pneumatical, as the apostle says, 1 Cor. xv. 46, but the psychical, and the pneumatical follows it; at the same time, however, both of these are momenta of, and are included in, a unity. That the pneumatical



comes after the psychical is true, of course, only of the development in time. The pneumatical is not accounted for by indicating its origin in time. And if Christ represents in himself this higher principle of human nature, then this conception of what he is refers us back, beyond his merely individual existence, to the general out of which the individual proceeds. Thus we are not unprepared to find our apostle familiar with the idea of Christ's pre-existence. Besides the passages we have already discussed, Rom. i. 4 has been interpreted in this way, and it has been thought that the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* there spoken of is itself the element in which the higher pre-existent personality of Christ consists.<sup>1</sup> Before this can be admitted, however, we must ask how these two things consist with one another: firstly, that Christ is, as the apostle declares, essentially man; and secondly, that his personality is distinctively spirit: so that the spirit existed in him, antecedently to his human existence, in the form of a human personality. We are shut up to regard this as his conception when we remember how he calls Christ the spiritual, heavenly man, the Lord from heaven, 1 Cor. xv. 47, the Lord of glory, 1 Cor. ii. 8, the spirit, 2 Cor. iii. 17, and that not only in respect of his having been exalted and glorified through his resurrection, but without qualification, in respect of his whole being. Christ is, as the apostle says, 2 Cor. iii. 17, *το πνεῦμα*, the spirit itself; the substance of his being is spirit. Now the apostle appears to have conceived the essence of spirit to be an immaterial light-substance; in unfolding his conception of the spirit which the Lord is, he says that we all, who behold with unveiled face the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from one glory to another, as could not fail to be the case, since the Lord is the spirit. The essence of the spirit, and consequently the essence of Christ, is thus clearness, brilliancy, *δόξα*; it finds its analogy in the brilliant light of which the apostle speaks as shining from the face of Moses. In this spiritual brilliancy of Christ the eternal luminous essence of God himself is reflected. The apostle speaks, 2 Cor. iv. 6, of God, the creator of light, shining into our hearts

<sup>1</sup> Zeller, on the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*, Rom. i. 4. Theol. Jahrb. i. 486 sq.

πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, to make clear the knowledge of the glorious light reflected from the face of Christ as it was once reflected from the face of Moses. Christ is himself the image of God, and as the glory of God is reflected in him, so it is reflected again from him in the gospel (*εὐαγγέλιον τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ*), the knowledge of which produces a bright light in the man who receives it, 2 Cor. iv. 4. Thus we see distinctly that Christ is related as he is to God just because he is essentially spirit; it belongs to the spiritual light-nature of God to reflect itself in something outward, and thus, as Christ is τὸ πνεῦμα he is also κύριος τῆς δόξης, essentially spirit and light. And he is this not only in consequence of his exaltation, but essentially and originally. His exaltation brought about the full realization of what he was already, what had not been visible when he was crucified by the ἄρχοντες τοῦ κόσμου. But though thus the κύριος τῆς δόξης, he is also essentially man,—the pneumatical, heavenly man. The apostle thus appears to have conceived of Christ's pre-existent personality as the spiritual luminous figure of the archetypal man. And here a further question is suggested: what are the relations between this ideal first man and the historical first man, Adam? On one side they are far asunder; on another side they bear a relation to each other, which is analogous to the relation between God and Christ. The passage 1 Cor. xi. 3 may give us some insight into the apostle's peculiar ways of thinking here. It is said there that the head of the man is Christ, that the head of the woman is the man, that the head of Christ is God. The man is the εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα Θεοῦ, the woman is the δόξα, the luminous reflex, of the man. From this point of view it seems that the first man can be nothing but the reflex and the likeness of the archetypal man, of Christ. There is however this mighty difference between the two, that the one is merely earthly and psychical, while the other is heavenly and spiritual. The apostle does not indicate further how this contrast arose; we may be certain, however, that he did not conceive that Adam existed first in a state of perfection, and came to be what

he was afterwards ; he says of him, speaking of his essential nature, that he was merely a *ψυχὴ ζῶσα*, 1 Cor. xv. 45. The apostle considers it according to the universal order of nature that the psychical should be developed first in humanity, and then the spiritual ; and if this was the case, then of course what Christ was ideally, as the archetypal man, could not be realized in humanity till after the period of the earthly, psychical man. Not till then did God cause the archetypal man, the *κύριος δόξης*, to enter into humanity as his Son, his own Son, Gal. iv. 4, Rom. viii. 3, 32. He entered into humanity as one *ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, γενόμενος ἐκ γυναικὸς*,—predicates which agree very well with the conception of the person of Christ which we have arrived at above. It has been said, and with great justice, that the stress here laid upon the circumstances that the Son of God had a human body and was born of a woman, clearly shows the writer to have regarded his personality as not inseparable from a human body, as in the case of other men ; while it certainly shows at the same time that he considered Christ to have existed in such a body before his appearance in the world.<sup>1</sup> The apostle's view can scarcely have been any other than this, that Christ existed already subjectively for himself, and was invested with a *ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, at the time when he appeared as a man, and in order that he might so appear. The view would thus be the same as that expressed in the second Epistle of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians, chap. viii., with the simple words, *ὁ κύριος ὢν μὲν τὸ πρῶτον πνεῦμα, ἐγένετο σὰρξ*. This view is strictly consistent with the monotheism of Judaism, and differs radically from the Johannine view. The pre-existing subject is not the *λόγος, Θεός*, but the *πνεῦμα*, Christ, who, as the *κύριος δόξης*, is the *πνεῦμα*, 2 Cor. iii. 17. Now though Christ appeared only in a *ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, yet his appearance in the *σὰρξ* makes him really and perfectly a man. There is nothing to suggest a supernatural origin ; on the contrary, the apostle seems to exclude such an idea when he says that God sent his Son as one *γενόμενον ἐκ*

<sup>1</sup> Theol. Jahrb. 1842, p. 58.

γυναικὸς, Gal. iv. 4, or as one *γενόμενον ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα*, Rom. i. 3. How the apostle reconciled the sinlessness of Christ with his natural human generation we have no means of deciding. It is certainly unnecessary to assert that the two cannot possibly occur in one person; this is an inference from the doctrine of original sin, a doctrine of a later age and with which Paul was unacquainted. With the apostle it is only through actual sin that the *σὰρξ* becomes the seat of the *ἀμαρτία*.

Thus it is through his human birth that Christ enters into humanity as the Son of God. Over against the *γενέσθαι ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα*, however, the apostle places the *ὀρισθῆναι ὑπὸ Θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν*. What this *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* denotes is a further and somewhat obscure point in the Pauline Christology. As being *πνεῦμα*, it must, as we have already remarked, be that element in which the higher pre-existent personality of Christ consists. The peculiar expression, *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*, with which the *πνεῦμα* is further defined, can only be explained by an accurate examination of the passage Rom. i. 3, 4, where it is used. The apostle is seeking to express the fulness of his faith in the Messianic dignity of Christ at the outset of his Epistle by summing up all the momenta that enter into that conception. Christ is the Messiah in virtue of his being the son of David: to the Judæo-Christians at Rome, this was the first and principal criterion. But to the apostle a much more important criterion of his Messiahship is his resurrection from the dead. What Christ is physically as the son of David, he is spiritually through his resurrection; this is the spiritual credentials of his Messianic dignity, for this first of all supplied an actual proof that the spirit which alone could make him the Messiah was actually resident in him. And this is the proper meaning of the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*. Christians are *ἅγιος*, because Christ himself is *par excellence* the *ἅγιος*; and he is the *ἅγιος* because he has in himself absolutely the *πνεῦμα*, the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. The spirit is the principle in virtue of which Christ is the Messiah, it is the immanent principle of his Messianic

office ; and the apostle calls this spirit, which is essential to the Messiah, the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*. As being born of the seed of David he was the Messiah, the Son of God, according to the flesh ; but he has been attested to be the Son of God in a powerful manner (the apostle says *ἐν δυνάμει*, either to mark the resurrection as an act of the divine omnipotence, or to indicate that this alone was the true and real attestation of Christ's Messiahship), by the resurrection of the dead which took place in him in accordance with the Messianic spirit indwelling in him. The *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* is thus simply the Messianic spirit, and would not by itself be any proof of pre-existence. We have not, however, to regard it by itself, but in its connexion with the other momenta we have been discussing. The *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* presupposes the *πνεῦμα*, in which Christ's personality is broadly said to consist.

We have thus three momenta in which the personality of Christ is defined : 1. Christ is essentially and substantially spirit, *ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστίν*, 2 Cor. iii. 17, *i.e.* spirit absolutely, as God himself is essentially spirit. This spiritual nature of Christ necessarily implies the idea of pre-existence. 2. In Christ's appearance in humanity, *πνεῦμα*, the essential element of his personality, assumes the form of the Messianic spirit ; it is the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης*. 3. The resurrection proves Christ to be the Son of God in the highest sense ; at this point the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* asserts itself in its full power and significance as the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν*, 1 Cor. xv. 45. What the *πνεῦμα ἀγιοσύνης* is for Christ's own person, the *πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν* is for humanity ; it is the life-principle that works in humanity, makes an end of sin and death, and raises the mortal *σὰρξ* to the glorious image of the heavenly man. All that he is as *τὸ πνεῦμα*, as the *κύριος τῆς δόξης*, the *κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*, the *εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the *πνευματικὸς ἐπουράνιος ἄνθρωπος*, as the archetypal man in whom the image of God resides and is displayed, all this is introduced into humanity by his coming in the *ὁμοίωμα σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας*, to kill and to destroy the *σὰρξ*. And all this that he is, is accomplished and realized in humanity when the whole of humanity is formed after his image. For those who become the

children of God through the spirit of God or the spirit of Christ, them God προώρισε συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνος τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, Rom. viii. 29. It is an essential thought of the Pauline Christology that Christ is the image of God. This image of God, which he wears in his spiritual light-nature, prefigures the unity of God and man. Christ is essentially man ; but as the archetypal, spiritual, heavenly man, he is also the God-man, or the Son of God, the ἴδιος υἱὸς Θεοῦ. But the apostle never calls him simply God. This characteristic of the Pauline Christology shows us how strictly Jewish its conceptions are. The apostle has nowhere ignored the barrier which separates the Son of God from God, on the contrary, he holds fast to the position that Christ is essentially and substantially man. He is at the same time τὸ πνεῦμα, the spiritual man untainted by sin. Thus he is the ideal and archetypal man, and in this sense the κύριος τῆς δόξης.<sup>1</sup>

#### 4. The doctrine of angels and demons.

In the Epistles of which we take account in this inquiry, the apostle speaks very little of angels, and where he does speak of them it is not with any dogmatic intention, but only by way of illustration, and proverbially : Rom. viii. 38, 1 Cor. vi. 3, iv. 9, xiii. 1 ; Gal. i. 8, iv. 14 *sq.* We notice especially that he does not even mention the relation of the angels to Christ, as is the case in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where the higher dignity of Christ is defined by his relation to the angels. This lay outside of the apostle's sphere of vision ; Christ, though he be the κύριος τῆς δόξης, is yet with him too essentially a man to be thought of in such relations. The apostle's ideas about the angels are altogether vague ; to him they are certain superior superhuman beings standing between God and the world of human life. He even assumes, in accordance with the later and especially Alexandrine tradition, that the law was given through the angels ; but this merely proved to him that the Mosaic legislation was of a subordinate character.

<sup>1</sup> The Vorlesungen über neuest. Theologie, pp. 186-195, agree in the main with the above discussion.

It would hardly be worth while to make special mention of the apostle's angelology were it not for one passage in his Epistles, from which it might appear that he laid greater stress upon this doctrine than his other expressions on the subject would lead us to expect. I mean the passage 1 Cor. xi. 10. Here the apostle is admonishing the Corinthian women not to let themselves be seen with uncovered head, and for this he gives a reason: For this cause ought the woman to have a sign of the power (not of the power which she has, but of the power which her husband has over her; this is unquestionably the meaning of *ἐξουσία*) upon her head, because of the angels. Women are thus to wear a veil because of the angels; but why, what is the connexion between the one thing and the other? Different explanations have been advanced, but they are all alike unsatisfactory. An attentive consideration of the contents and connexion of the passage can lead us to but one conclusion: that as the words *διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους* cannot possibly have arisen out of anything in the apostle's own religious consciousness, they cannot be considered to be part of the original text. Observe how unconnected these words are here, and how they destroy the sense. The apostle's main proposition is this: the woman must wear a veil as a sign of her subjection to the man, for she is, as the apostle explains, *ἐξ ἀνδρός* and *διὰ τὸν ἄνδρα*. Therefore *ὀφείλει ἡ γυνὴ ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν*. It is clear that *διὰ τοῦτο* refers to what goes before; so far the argument is clear. But how is it interrupted and confused if *διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους* be added, as if a parallel to *διὰ τοῦτο*? The reason given before was quite sufficient; there is no place for this new and foreign reason, a thing to which not the slightest reference is made either in what precedes or in what follows. Our apostle is not such a writer as could destroy the logic of his argument with such an awkward interpolation. The sense most probably to be attributed to these detached and isolated words suggests to us that they were originally a gloss on the text. An early Christian, such a one as was much occupied with Jewish representations, might imagine, what the apostle Paul himself could never imagine, that the veiling of

women was advisable as a precaution against what had once happened to the angels before, Gen. vi. 1. Or he may have thought that the custom of women's wearing veils had been instituted as a memento of that occurrence, and for a standing admonition. The words *διὰ τοὺς ἀγγέλους* were added as a gloss to indicate this view, and were then taken up into the text without regard to their effect on the sense. The view we have indicated was actually current during the early centuries; we find it actually applied to impress upon women that their head-dress should be such as to give no occasion for unchaste desires. This appears most clearly from a passage in the Testament of the twelve patriarchs, in the Testament of Rubens, chap. v.: *προστάσσετε ταῖς γυναῖξιν ὑμῶν καὶ ταῖς θυγατράσιν, ἵνα μὴ κοσμῶνται τὰς κεφαλὰς καὶ τὰς ὄψεις αὐτῶν οὕτω γὰρ ἔθελεξαν τοὺς ἐγγρηγόρους* (the angels as guardian spirits) *πρὸ τοῦ κατακλισμοῦ.*<sup>1</sup> A Christian who was acquainted with these views would very naturally be led to think of them in connexion with this passage. To dispense with the veil he would think was to hold out one of the most dangerous of all temptations. Both of these considerations, then, the isolated position of the words, and the probability of their having originated in a gloss, make us hesitate to ascribe such a view to the apostle. He may have held a view like this, but never as a thing of such importance.

With regard to demons, the point we have to consider is how the apostle conceived them to be related to the heathen deities. The question arises in two passages: 1 Cor. viii. 4-6, and x. 19-21.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Tertullian, *De Velandis Virg.*, c. 7: *Si propter angelos scilicet quos legimus a Deo et coelo excidisse ob concupiscentiam feminarum, quis praesumere potest, tales angelos maculata jam corpora et humanae libidinis reliquia desiderasse, ut non ad virgines potius exarserint quarum flos etiam humanam libidinem excusat. Debet ergo adumbrari facies tam periculosa, quae etiam ad coelum scandala jaculata est, ut cum Deo adsistens, cui rea est angelorum exterminatorum, caeteris quoque angelis erubescat, et malam illam aliquando libertatem capitis sui comprimat, jam nec hominum oculis offerendam. C. 17: Nobis dominus etiam revelationibus velaminis spatia metatus est. Nam cuidam sorori nostri angelus in somnis cervicem, quasi applauderet verberans, elegantes, inquit cervicem, et merito nudaem. Bonum est usque ad lumbos a capite veleris, ne et tibi ista cervicem libertas non prosit.*



The first passage has greatly perplexed the interpreters. Rückert thinks it most likely that the apostle does not admit with regard to the idols of the heathen that they are truly gods, but does admit that there are many other beings of higher than human nature, and that these possess a certain power over men and over the inanimate world, in virtue of which power they may be called *κύριοι*, and even *θεοὶ*, though destitute of any proper title to be worshipped by men as *θεοὶ*. The apostle, Rückert thinks, actually assumed the existence of such beings as angels and demons. But he does not speak of angels and demons; he speaks of *θεοὶ* and *κύριοι*. And he denies that they have any objective existence—as the argument and the idea of the passage distinctly prove. His immediate object is to represent the eating of meat offered to idols as a thing entirely indifferent. There are no idols, he says; an *εἶδωλον* is a thing that has no reality in the world. Such gods as those of the heathens do not exist at all; there is only one God. For though there be so-called gods in heaven and on earth, as people talk of gods in the plural and believe in them, as in this sense there are many gods and many lords, yet for us, to our religious consciousness as Christians, there is only one God and only one Lord. There can be nothing clearer than that the apostle makes the existence of the heathen gods a matter of mere *λέγεσθαι*; allows their existence only in so far as they are represented and spoken of after the manner of polytheism as gods really existing. They are *θεοὶ* and *κύριοι* not really, but only to the imagination. We have to remark, however, on the other hand, that the reality and objective existence of the heathen gods is denied only in so far as it is claimed for them that they are *θεοὶ* and *κύριοι*, gods properly so called. This does not exclude the supposition that these beings who have no real existence as gods do yet exist actually and objectively not as gods but as demons. This is the apostle's position in the second passage. Here he takes up the other side of the question. His former assertion that an *εἶδωλον* is nothing, and that therefore neither is an *εἰδωλόθυτον* any true *εἰδωλόθυτον* (for nothing can be offered to an idol which has no existence), is not

recalled but modified and supplemented by a further statement. This is, that what the heathens offer they offer to demons and not to God, and that one cannot therefore partake in the heathen sacrificial feasts without coming into communion with demons. For it is from the nature of the case impossible—it is a contradiction—to drink the cup of the Lord and at the same time the cup of demons ; to partake of the Lord's table and at the same time of the table of demons ; to practise religious rites which connect us with beings of entirely opposite natures. Thus the apostle appears to have held the view which afterwards became so general, that heathenism was the empire of demons, and essentially demoniacal. With the apostle, however, the view has two sides : on the one side heathenism is demoniacal, on the other it does not deal with realities at all, it is a mere matter of imagination.<sup>1</sup> But the one element of heathenism cannot be separated from the other. The apostle regards the relation of heathenism to Christianity as one of absolute contradiction, not only in the subjective sense that one who has

<sup>1</sup> What Neander says (Planting and Training, i. 243 and 511) on the two passages under discussion is in part indefinite, and in part manifestly erroneous. In the passage viii. 5 he thinks the apostle is merely contrasting two different subjective standpoints, and that there is nothing said of the relations these bear to the objective. What is spoken of here, however, is not two subjective standpoints, but the subjective nature of polytheism, whose gods are merely imagined gods, and the objective nature of Christian monotheism. On the passage x. 20 Neander says, "verse 20 is to be interpreted in the light of the preceding verse. If we admitted that Paul described the heathen deities as evil spirits, then we should need to suppose that he wished to guard against that misunderstanding to which the previous comparison might have given rise, that he really acknowledged their divinities to be divine. But this is inconceivable. On the other hand, his words might be understood in such a way as if he considered these divinities to be real beings (though evil spirits), and hence ascribed objective importance to what was offered to them. To correct this mistake he says now, that he is speaking only of what the heathens believed subjectively from their own standpoint, which was the opposite of the Christian, that those beings to whom they sacrificed were *δαμόνια* in the Hellenic sense of the term." How misty, how mistaken ! What business have the *δαμόνια* in the Hellenic sense here ? The apostle means demons in the ordinary Jewish sense, and he says clearly enough that he holds them to be the beings to whom the heathens sacrifice. The matter becomes intelligible at once when we admit the light of the apostle's simple distinction. He denied the existence of the heathen gods as gods or idols (*εἰδωλον* is a supposititious god) : he had room, however, for the assumption that they were evil spirits.

become a Christian cannot be a heathen at the same time, but objectively. The two are related to each other as the false religion and the true. For what fellowship has righteousness with unrighteousness, or light with darkness, and what concord has Christ with Belial, etc. ? 2 Cor. vi. 14.

5. The doctrine of the divine predestination.

With the apostle everything runs up into the absolute idea of God ; this is his favourite point of view for every subject he may be considering. And thus he deduces the salvation of man, from its first beginning to its final accomplishment, from a decree passed by God on the case of each individual. We know, he says, Rom. viii. 28, that all things work together for good to them that love God, to those who are called in accordance with a decree which he has passed. For those whom he foreknew (fixed in his consciousness as objects of knowledge), them he also predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren ; and those whom he predestinated, them he also called ; and whom he called, them he also justified ; and whom he justified, them he also glorified. Here the apostle makes it as clear as possible, that in the first beginning, which he places in the divine decree, the whole series of the subsequent stages was contained, which proceed by necessary sequence one out of the other. The first stage, the being foreknown, implies the last, the being glorified into the image of Christ, as its natural and necessary consequence. So soon as the divine decree has been arrived at, the process, the objective realization of the idea, moves forward by logical necessity. The subjective element in the realization is not, however, excluded, for as it was said before, it is only those who love God who can be the objects of his decree. In the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, on the other hand, we seem to find the idea of an absolute predestination. Here, however, everything depends, as we have already indicated, on a proper apprehension of the position which this chapter and the doctrine it contains occupy in regard to the whole system. The apostle is dealing with the different aspects in which the relation

of Israel to the kingdom of God, or the benefits of Christianity, is to be regarded. He goes back to the absolute will of God, and argues that no one can derive from his outward position any right to make definite claims on God, since in such things as depend on the absolute will of God there can be no such thing as injustice towards one party or another. This standpoint, where we are referred to the absolute will of God, is of course liable to be compared with another where the man complaining of injustice at God's hands is reminded of his own sins voluntarily committed. The apostle, however, makes no attempt to reconcile these two positions. Neither here nor anywhere else does he feel called upon to deal with speculative extremes. And in whatever way the question between freedom and predestination be adjusted in speculation, the two positions, that of absolute dependence and that of moral self-determination are both involved and rooted in the immediate Christian self-consciousness. Thus all that is hard, repellent, and one-sided in the argument of Rom. ix., is to be regarded merely as the extreme logical consequence of one of two positions. It is true, we must admit, but then there is the truth of the opposite position, which the apostle himself takes up afterwards, to be placed over against it. In making the practical application of his main proposition, verse 30, as he had developed it, verses 6-29, the apostle turns from the objective view of the matter to the subjective. The will of God being an absolute will, it is necessary to recognise it as such, and to remember our absolute dependence upon God. As the absolute will of God is not determined by anything human, so men's guilt is great if they refuse to recognise this dependence. With regard to the promises of God, the question is not whether a man belongs externally to the people of God, but whether he is himself elect of God, verses 6-9. It is of God's free choice to prefer one and to reject another, verses 10-13. Nor is this arbitrary choice to be regarded as an injustice on God's part, for man has no right to reclaim against him, the Lord of his fate, verses 14-21. And man is the less entitled to dispute God's absolute right of disposal when he considers that in those who are devoted to

destruction, God's longsuffering and retributive justice and omnipotence are manifested, and in the others the fulness of his grace, since he has called us as vessels of mercy from among both Jews and Gentiles, verses 22-29. The conclusion that is reached through all these considerations is that it does not depend on a man's willing and running; that the heathen obtained what they were not seeking, and the Jews did not obtain what they were seeking, namely, righteousness. And the reason of this was that righteousness is not to be obtained by seeking it through the law and the works of the law, but by faith alone. Thus the Jews brought their fate upon themselves; they did not obtain righteousness because they attached value to their own righteousness and did not submit themselves to the way of the divine appointment, through which righteousness may be obtained. For with Christ the life that is under the law has an end, and righteousness may now be obtained through faith by all, both Jews and Gentiles. Salvation is only to be had through faith. Though Moses teaches a righteousness that is to be achieved in the way of the law, yet it cannot be obtained, nor the salvation that proceeds from it, save by doing all that the law contains. But the righteousness that comes from faith is so near every man that he need not go far to seek it, either to heaven, as if Christ had to be brought down from above, or to the depths, as if he had to be brought up from the dead. It is offered freely and at once, and has only to be laid hold of. There can be no excuse for the want of a faith like this.

It is obvious that as in chapter ix. the apostle seems to argue for absolute predestination, so in chapter x. he takes up the opposite position. Here the cause of the rejection of Israel is found not in the will of God, but in their own wilful unbelief. This is no solution of the problem of predestination; the one position is simply set over against the other. In chapter xi., however, the apostle approaches the same question in a different way. From the subjective side he recurs again to the objective. Israel is undoubtedly the chosen people of God, the subject of his promises. And what God has promised must be fulfilled. God cannot have rejected

the people whom he foreknew (*προέγνω*, xi. 2, in the same sense as viii. 29). What then of the unbelief of the people? how can God's decree be accomplished in spite of their unbelief? To bring out this point the apostle enters on a teleological view of the world, from which it appears that everything must be subjected sooner or later to the absolute idea of God. The decree of the election of Israel is accomplished in the following momenta:—1. God has not cast away his people, since a part at least of them is accepted in virtue of his gracious choice, though the rest are hardened, xi. 1-10. 2. This hardening is certainly in contradiction with God's decree, yet it is not without its uses; it is not meant to lead to the final exclusion of the Jews, but only to provide an opportunity for the conversion of the Gentiles. 3. The hardening is only for a time, and will issue at last in the general conversion of Israel. This last point is reached by way of deduction from the other two. If the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more will their general entrance into the Messianic kingdom and blessedness bring about a great era of salvation? For if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world (of the Gentiles with God), what can the receiving of them be but the quickening of the dead, the last great catastrophe which we look for at the resurrection of the dead at the end of the world? If then the hardening of Israel be so full of blessing even for the heathen, it cannot but have blessed consequences for Israel also. The final and universal conversion of the Jews may also be inferred from the beginning which has already been made. For if the first fruit be holy, the lump is also holy, and if the root be holy, so are the branches. The hardening of a part of the Jews, then, can only last till all the heathens have entered in, and then all Israel will be saved. The apostle grounds this hope and confidence on the original election of Israel attested by the divine promises. For if in regard to the gospel they be hated of God for the sake of the Gentiles (inasmuch as the Gentiles believe—as it is God's will that the Gentiles should obtain salvation—through the unbelief of the Jews), yet as regards

the election they are beloved of God for the fathers' sake. For God cannot revoke his gifts and calling. As the Gentiles were once disobedient to God, but have now, through the disobedience of the Jews, become the objects of God's mercy, so have the Jews in their turn become disobedient, that in consequence of the mercy shown to the Gentiles they also might obtain mercy. For God has concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. And here the apostle sees the depth of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God; the unsearchableness of his judgments; the mystery and hiddenness of his ways; the absolute dependence of all on God, since from Him all things proceed, through Him all things come to pass, and to Him all things tend.

The apostle's main idea is the universality of the grace of God; no man can be excluded from it, it must extend at last to all, both Jews and Gentiles, in order to achieve the end it has in view. Grace being absolute, and it being impossible that what God has promised should remain unfulfilled, the apostle infers that the ends of grace must be realized universally. This universalism of grace, however, contains a decidedly particularist element. Grace may be universal in its operation, yet the peculiar object of the divine decree of the bestowal of grace and salvation (the *πρόθεσις κατ' ἐκλογὴν* Rom. ix. 11, the *ἐκλογὴ* xi. 28, *ἐκλογὴ χάριτος*, xi. 5) are the Jews as descendants of the patriarchs to whom God gave his promises. God's decree is therefore particular, inasmuch as it applies only to the Jews and not to the Gentiles. And it is also an absolute decree, for the election of the Jews precludes the possibility of their being cast away; it cannot be thought that the promise God has given to the Jews can remain unfulfilled. Now, how does it agree with this particularism and this absoluteness that the Gentiles have been brought into the kingdom of God, and that by far the greater part of the Jews is excluded from it? It is inconceivable except in this way, that each of these two events, the reception of the Gentiles and the exclusion of the Jews, is considered as itself constituting a momentum in the realization of the divine decree. The apostle does so regard the

reception of the Gentiles when he asserts that the Gentiles have been received only for the Jews' sake. The Jews have stumbled, he says, xi. 11, not to fall for ever; but rather through their fall salvation has come to the Gentiles, to provoke the Jews to emulation. Through their unbelief the Jews have been broken off as branches from the olive tree, and the Gentiles stand by faith as branches on the tree, verse 20. But blindness happened to a part of Israel, till the fulness of the Gentiles should have come in to the kingdom of God, verse 25. For the fact that the Jews did not receive the Gospel the apostle has no explanation but this: that what was wanting on the side of the Jews for the accomplishment of the divine decree was to take place on the other side, that of the Gentiles. The Jews did not submit themselves to the divine ordinance of justification by faith; and so, as justification could only be by faith, it had to be received by the Gentiles. Thus the unbelief of the Jews has provided, as it were, an opportunity for the Gentiles to obtain a part of that salvation, to which they had no claim in virtue of any election. They take part in it because in justification by faith God has opened up a way in which it is possible for them also to obtain it. But the position which they occupy in thus partaking of the gospel is in reality merely that of substitutes for the Jews. They receive the gospel in virtue of that election of which the Jews were the objects originally; they, the branches of a wild olive tree, are grafted into the good olive tree. Here the particularism of the election appears in a very strong light. Particularism is to lead to universalism at last, but the idea of the particular decree is not departed from. Now if the divine mercy has been extended to the Gentiles in this way, it is impossible that the Jews, on the basis of whose election the Gentiles have obtained mercy, should continue to be excluded from that mercy themselves, verse 31. Their blindness cannot shut out mercy from them for ever; their election cannot remain for ever unfulfilled. And though they be at present in a state of blindness, unbelief, and disobedience, that merely shows that their unbelief is a stage upon the road to the divine mercy.



For it is God's intention to carry out his decree of grace through disobedience and not otherwise. He has concluded all in disobedience, in order to have mercy upon all, says the apostle. Thus he does not hesitate to ascribe this disobedience not merely to a permission, but to an ordinance, of God; he regards the disobedience as a momentum through which the mercy is mediated, and which disappears in mercy as the end and consummation which it subserves and ushers in.

What grace is in the absolute conception of it must of necessity be realized, and as grace would not be absolute if it were not universal, it requires the universal mercy of God for its realization. Now how is this absoluteness and universality of grace, this objective character of grace, to be reconciled with freedom on the part of man? The apostle's whole doctrine of faith shows how important the subjective element is to him, and even in the discussion of chapter xi. everything turns on faith and unbelief, obedience and disobedience. But what importance can be ascribed to the subjective element of faith, if it be the case that grace is so absolute that it necessarily overcomes sooner or later every possible opposition, and gathers in all things to the embrace of universal mercy? All that we can say on this point is that the apostle does not by any means slur over the subjective side in favour of the objective; that he lets the two stand side by side without showing how they harmonize. On the one hand, all that grace must be in order to be absolute is to be developed and to become actual; and on the other hand, there is to be no compromise of the self-determination of the subject, the free and voluntary exercise of faith. How these two can be reconciled the apostle has nowhere shown. He is indeed thoroughly familiar with all the processes of subjective consciousness, and has the faculty of illuminating its inmost recesses; yet his interest is engrossed still more in the objective development which is determined by the absolute idea of God. Heathenism, Judaism, and Christianity, are to him great historical opposites, general forms of religious development; he regards not the individuals, but the masses, and in the

light of his well-assured Christian consciousness all the questions and riddles of the world find their solution in this one conception: that all things are to be subordinated at last to the absolute idea of Christianity, to be penetrated by it and received up into its unity. He takes a broad majestic sweep through the whole course of historical development, and traces it from stage to stage; but his Christian consciousness hurries him forward so fast towards the final issue that he passes over many considerations which must be essential momenta of the process, and which had a claim to be considered. Grace is glorified at last, issuing forth as universal mercy, but who are the objects of this mercy? The apostle says indeed that God has mercy upon all as he has concluded all in unbelief; but who are the πάντες on whom he takes mercy? are they the same individuals as were shut up to unbelief? are those who ἐν Χριστῷ ζωοποιηθήσονται the same individuals who died in Adam?—for the necessary condition of ζωοποιεῖσθαι is εἶναι ἐν Χριστῷ. The resurrection, the last world-catastrophe, is to be the general *théodicée*, but only for those who as Christians have been changed or have risen from the dead. Sin and grace, reprobation and mercy, are demonstrated on their objective side, but not on the subjective. The two should have been interwoven, but the one is merely placed after the other. There is a gap here in the apostle's system, which none of the materials in our hands enable us to supply.

6. The heavenly habitation, 2 Cor. v. 1 *sq.*

The view contained in this passage is noticed here merely because the apostle's meaning in it has frequently been misunderstood, and a belief attributed to him which he was far from holding.

For us, the apostle says, iv. 16-18, who look not to the things that are seen, but to the things which are not seen (for the things that are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal), there is an infinitely exalted glory. We shall take part in it, the death of the body is the porch to it. For we know that if this earthly house of our body were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not

made with hands, eternal in the heavens. For as long as we are in this body we groan, yearning to be clothed upon with our heavenly habitation. What follows, *εἶγε καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι*, etc. (read thus: not *ἐκδυσ.*), can only be taken as an explanation of *ἐπενδύσασθαι*. We shall not be without the covering of a body, for of course as soon as we are clothed upon in the way we expect we shall not be naked, not without a body to cover us. This is merely a repetition of *ἐπενδύσασθαι*, and is to say that in this *ἐνδύσασθαι* that which was most repugnant to the feeling acquired by the Christians from Judaism does not take place, namely, *γυμνοὶ εὐρεθῆναι*. And it is added that our longing in the present body is not to be understood to mean that we have any desire to be naked and without a body altogether. Being in the body we do indeed groan under the burden, but it is not to be concluded from this that we desire to be unclothed; we wish to be clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life. The apostle's utterances here amount to neither more nor less than the idea of the resurrection expressed in 1 Cor. xv. 53. In this passage it appears as a wish arising out of the pressure of the present body, and which the apostle takes care shall not be misunderstood. If man is not to be naked and without a body in the future, if he is to have another body consisting of better materials, then the future body must in one way or another be identical with the present one, must be built up on the same basis, and the change that is to take place must consist in being clothed upon. Thus the substance of the man's personality remains, even in its bodily features; what of it is earthly falls off from him, and it is thus transfigured and becomes heavenly. The man has even now an inward occult supersensuous ground-work for a bodily existence different from the present one, and that which he is essentially even in the present life emerges at his death into reality. This then is what is meant by the *οἰκοδομὴ ἐκ Θεοῦ*, the *οἰκία ἀχειροποίητος*, the *οἰκητήριον ἐξ οὐρανοῦ*. These phrases have been wrongly thought to indicate a heavenly body which true Christians were to receive immediately after death, and which was to be united at the resurrection with

that which rose out of the physical body. It is said that the connexion of verse 2 with verse 1 requires that the *οικητήριον* should be the same as the *οικοδομή*, that each of these is opposed to the *ἐπίγειος οἶκλα*, and must therefore signify a body, and that therefore verses 1 and 2 must both refer to a body which true Christians are to have at once at their death. Now, it is said, such a body can be no other than a heavenly body, quite different from the one we have, but to be united with it at the time of the resurrection. This curious imagination is quite inconsistent with the argument of our passage. The apostle is seeking to lift up his readers to the surpassing glory of the world to come, and he would not have served his object by speaking of an intermediate body. It is certainly true that this new body is represented as coming immediately after death. But this difficulty, as it is held to be, is not removed by supposing that the apostle hoped to receive the new body without the painful process of the soul's departure from her old tenement. It is said that what he desired was a painless change of his mortal body into an immortal, that to represent this change he passed from his former analogy of a house to the more convenient one of a garment, as if the new garment were put on over the old one, and the old one only then put off, or destroyed without pain, by the overpowering energy of the new one. This, however, is a mere expedient of interpretation, and is sufficiently disposed of by the fact that the apostle is not speaking only of himself, but of Christians generally. And supposing that the apostle overleaps here the middle stage between death and the resurrection, why should that be thought remarkable? Of course if the resurrection be conceived in the Jewish form, as the issue of a body from the grave, then there is a reason to inquire about a middle state. But the apostle does not entertain any such conception. In this passage he is not speaking of the resurrection at all, and what he says at 1 Cor. xv. 52 is that the dead will be raised *ἄφθαρτοι*. Now if they are raised *ἄφθαρτοι*, what part of the resurrection-body can come up out of the grave, for the grave contains nothing but the corruptible? In the apostle's view the

resurrection-body does not come out of the grave, but is a building of God, a house not made by men's hands, an eternal, heavenly habitation, following the earthly in accordance with the divine order which appoints the mortal and corruptible to be changed into the immortal and incorruptible. And if these two sides of the existence of man be of such a nature that they are intimately and immediately connected with each other, then neither can they be separated and held apart from each other in time. The Christian consciousness forbids us to think of a middle state as a stage of existence by itself; for that consciousness is so well assured (the *ἔχομεν*, verse 1, indicates this) that to it the mortal includes the immortal, and the incorruptible is present even in the corruptible. The corruptible is under the necessity of putting on the incorruptible, the mortal of being swallowed up of life. The apostle therefore adds, verse 5, we may with perfect confidence look forward to this state in which our earthly body will be transfigured into the heavenly, and our mortal nature into the immortal, and penetrated with the principle of life; for it is God who is to bring us to that state; the whole constitution which he, its creator, has given to our nature points to it, and the spirit that is given to us, which we have within us as the earnest of our destination in the future, vouches for it. The imaginations of Judaism were not without their part in the apostle's Christian faith; yet, as we see, his rational consciousness was able to assert itself against them.

## NINTH CHAPTER.

### ON CERTAIN FEATURES OF THE APOSTLE'S CHARACTER.

WE do not aim at a complete description of the apostle's character. Many data are wanting, without which it is not possible to make him stand before us as he was. What we propose is merely to take up a few noteworthy traits which appear prominently in his writings. And it is quite proper that this should follow at once on our discussion of the doctrine, for the apostle's doctrine is the immediate reflection of his spiritual individuality.

That the apostle was converted from Judaism to Christianity, that he was transformed suddenly and decidedly from a bitter persecutor of Christ's followers to a faithful and devoted disciple of Christ, this great fact gives us a deeper insight into his spiritual organization than anything else we know of him. This was a step from one of two extreme opposites to the other, so that we see here a spirit involved in a great struggle, in the throes of a travail which cannot be accomplished save with labour and conflict and high spiritual energy. And if the two alternatives, than which he saw no other, and each of which displayed itself to him in all its significance and gravity, were great and very contrary alternatives, then this reveals to us one great feature of his character, that he could never stop half-way, but followed up the one line as much as the other to its last conclusions. Thus, if he was to persecute Christianity, it was a war of extermination that he waged against it, Gal. i. 13. Here we have a very determined nature, for which the consequences of the idea it has formed have all the power of necessity, which throws itself into everything that it takes up

with its whole energy, which is what it is entirely and absolutely. As a Christian, Paul would know nothing but Christ, and lived and moved entirely in him; just so he had formerly been with his whole soul a Jew, and the most zealous of all champions for the religion received by tradition from the fathers. *Προέκοπτον*, he says, Gal. i. 14, in describing his former *ἀναστροφή ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ, ὑπὲρ πολλοὺς συνηλικιώτας ἐν τῷ γένει μου περισσοτέρως ζηλώτης ὑπάρχων τῶν πατρικῶν μου παραδόσεων*. But the more consistently and energetically a tendency is worked out which is essentially one-sided and narrow, the more certain is it to suffer shipwreck on its own narrowness; it crumbles down by its own inward action, is overcome by the awaking consciousness of its own finitude, and thus necessarily undergoes a revulsion to the directly contrary tendency. It seems to be the thing itself which runs this course, and the subject in whom this takes place appears to be determined by something objective and external to himself, although the process is in reality his own spiritual act. And the vividness of the man's consciousness of this objective power determining him is a standard by which we may measure the depth of his nature as it withdraws into itself and works for itself through the universal process of spiritual life. It is this manifestly objective character that shows the apostle's act to have been a really great and wonderful event. It was an act such as only those natures are capable of whose movement is in the highest regions of the spiritual life. For we can detect no trace of any subjective interest or motive having influenced or helped this change; it was the immediate, purely objective impression of the spiritual power that had come over him, which changed Paul into that spiritual personality who appears before us as the apostle of Jesus Christ. It is of this characteristic of his spiritual nature, as manifested at the most important epoch of his life, that the apostle is thinking, when he calls himself with respect to his conversion to Christianity an *ἔκτρομα*, 1 Cor. xv. 8. This phrase suggests not a late birth, but a miscarriage; yet what he means is not that his unworthiness and unfitness for the apostolate were so great that he

had as little right to be an apostle as the fruit of a miscarriage to continue in the world. What he means by the expression is, that his birth into the world as a Christian was after a violent fashion, that it was as it were a miscarriage. Grotius very truly remarks : *hoc ideo dicit, quia non longa institutione ad christianismum perductus fuit, quo esset velut naturalis partio, sed vi subita, quomodo immaturi partus ejici solent.* This applies, however, not merely to the fact of his becoming a Christian, but to the whole of the sweeping revulsion that was brought about in his consciousness by the objective power of events and tendencies, without his being aware that he was doing anything to help or hinder it. What took place in him seemed to belie his nature: the absolute truth of Christianity was brought home to him and forced upon him against his will by Christ's appearing to him. He could do no other; little as he willed it for himself, he was constrained to yield the whole of thought and will to the obedience of Christ.<sup>1</sup>

He who has fought through such an inward conflict and in a personal spiritual process overcome the opposition which he there encountered, will, when the spiritual principle has worked its way through all and asserted itself in its own absolute superiority, know that he is himself the power that stands above the conflict. The principle which takes possession of his consciousness is now the immanent principle of his own self-consciousness; he knows

<sup>1</sup> It is said, and very truly, that the apostle's conversion discloses to us the inmost depths of his spiritual nature, and that the ultimate subjective basis of that nature is to be explained and comprehended in the light of this one characteristic fact. If this be so, the problem of the apostle's character may be viewed in the light of the question, why he not only became a Christian like others who were converted from Judaism to Christianity, but believed himself to be called to be an apostle. This followed, it may be said, from the call addressed to him by Christ; but what appeared to him objectively as the call of Christ was, subjectively considered, the inward impulse of his own spiritual nature. For it was the peculiarity of that nature that in every case it went straight to the results of its principles, and to the absolute. His spiritual nature thus carried him past a form of Christianity which was nothing but another form of Judaism; he was the first to declare the Christian principle in its integrity, in a way in which none of the older apostles had declared it, and so could scarcely avoid considering himself to be a new apostle.



himself free from everything by which he was formerly constrained ; he is conscious of his own independence and autonomy. The position which the apostle took up as the logical and necessary consequence of his conversion, involved of course that all those shackles of religious authority which he had recognised up to that time at once fell away. But it involved more : namely, that within Christianity the apostle recognised no other principle as having authority for him but his own immediate self-consciousness, rooted as it was in faith in Christ. One main feature of the apostle's individuality is this lively and powerful consciousness of freedom. He was quite alive to all that the principle of Christian freedom implied both for himself and for all Christians. It was in him, next to Christ, that this principle received its proper concrete contents ; it was in him that it first became subjective and individual. This consciousness of freedom is frequently, and variously, and energetically expressed in the apostle's letters. It is expressed most directly and openly in 1 Cor. ix. 1, where he says : Am I not free ? am I not an apostle ? have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord ? have I not you to point to as my work in the Lord ? These were the evidences which sustained his assured consciousness of freedom, independence, self-dependence as a Christian and an apostle. He calls himself free in the sense in which he spoke of Christian freedom in the eighth chapter (*ἐξουσία*, viii. 9), free, that is, as having an essential right to act in accordance with his own best convictions, without being bound by considerations regarding others, or being in the least degree subject to any superior authority.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The feeling of freedom is expressed most energetically where it meets with opposition. The opposition which the apostle had to encounter was the appeal made against him and in disparagement of him to the authority of the older apostles. Against them, then, he asserted his freedom in the fulness of its own native energy, and as not requiring any outward sanction, 1 Cor. ix. 4. They are to him only the *δοκούντες*. Their apparent dignity is no law to him ; for wherever the truth of the gospel is concerned, there can be no respect of persons. If it be the apostles themselves that he calls *οἱ ὑπερλίαν ἀπόστολοι*, and not merely the Judaizing teachers of the Corinthian Church who appealed to their authority, then this is a very distinct assertion that there can be no external

The true freedom, however, is not without limitation ; it realizes the conception of freedom by the limit which it sets itself and then again makes to disappear : and that which is the greatest freedom from narrowing and enslaving forms is, on the other hand, the highest capacity for entering subjectively into forms the most diverse. This mark and evidence of true freedom was not wanting with the apostle. Though free from everything, free from all dependence on man, says the apostle, 1 Cor. ix. 19, "I have yet made myself the servant of all, that in this way I might gain the more. To the Jews I have become a Jew, that I might gain the Jews ; to those who are under the law as one under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law ; to them that are without law, as one without law (not that I was without law in reference to God, but obeying the law of Christ), that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak I became weak, that I might gain the weak : I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some." Only he can become all things to all men who is so free and master of himself as to be able to put on every form of self-restraint. And what makes this self-restraint possible to him is that he is subject to an infinite power, his freedom being simply the outward form in which this subjection appears. The utmost freedom of self-consciousness is thus, when looked at from another side, the utmost subjection ; he is free, but his liberty consists in his consciousness being altogether determined by Christ, it is only in his union with Christ as an *έννομος Χριστού* that he knows himself free, and this his freedom consists in his subjection. It is with a view to this same freedom which consists in dependence on Christ that the apostle says, 1 Cor. vii. 23, "Ye are dearly bought ; be not ye the servants of men, do not be drawn into any spiritual dependence on men." In every event of life the

authority for him, by which he should consider himself bound. *Λογίζομαι γάρ μηδέν ύστερηκέμαι τών υπερλιάν άποστόλων*, 2 Cor. xi. 5, cf. xii. 11 *ούδέν γάρ ύστερήσα τών υπερλιάν άποστόλων, ει και ούδέν ειμι* (though I be nothing in myself apart from the grace of God supporting me). And the reason of this is the assurance he had gained through the knowledge of the truth, *ει δέ ιδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, άλλ' ού τῇ γνώσει.*

Christian has this inward spiritual freedom, without it his consciousness would not be a Christian consciousness at all. He is free inwardly though outwardly he be a slave. For in Christ freedom and bondage pass into each other, and neither of the two exists without the other. He who is called in the Lord being a slave, is yet free in relation to the Lord: and he who is called being free, is Christ's servant, 1 Cor. vii. 22. As there is no contradiction in a man's being dependent on Christ and yet free, nor in his being free and yet at the same time dependent, so bondage externally does not in the least preclude inward freedom. This inward freedom and independence of everything outward comes only to the man who has found in Christ the absolute principle of his spiritual life. The more he feels his dependence on Christ, the more independent is he of everything but Christ.

For a Jew who had been bound to the law from his childhood and felt the law's authority and control in every part and province of his life, to cut himself adrift from the law at once and altogether; to cast off its dictation, and with it to renounce all the natural and national ties which bound Jew and Jew together,—this must have been a step the gravity and far-reaching importance of which we can scarcely measure. This step our apostle took in his conversion; and in taking it he entered into a position of utter solitude; he was not attracted, though he became a Christian, to the older apostles; he was not drawn into fellowship with them, but remained alone. The boldness of this step may give us an idea of his spiritual energy. Now the shaking off of authority and the advance to autonomy is not admirable in itself: the moral and spiritual value of such a step consists in this, that it is not a capricious and arbitrary act, nor one brought about by merely outward circumstances, but a step taken from a full conviction that truth requires it. The autonomy which becomes the ruling principle must, in a word, be the autonomy of reason. And we must keep this in mind in considering the apostle's conversion; for it was a change from Judaism to Christianity, and Christianity, the absolute

religion, is also absolute reason. The apostle did, indeed, recognise in his conversion to Christianity a supernatural event, a miracle, a thing incomprehensible even to himself. Yet we see him labouring with all the power of his spirit to engraft this event which he had experienced, on his reason, to take it up into his thinking consciousness, thus to make it, what it could not otherwise be, his own spiritual act. In this fact more than anything else we have an explanation of the peculiar organization of his spiritual individuality; for it is this spiritual process that is worked out in the whole development of his doctrine, and in the discussions, personal and otherwise, which form the main contents of his Epistles. To speak of nothing else, let it be considered how he deals with the idea of the law, how he analyses it in its various elements, and seeks thus to resolve it into itself, in order to justify to the thinking consciousness that degradation of the law from its absolute authority, that depreciation of it to the position of a merely subordinate stage, which was necessary from the standpoint of Christianity. The development of the apostle's doctrine of justification with all the ideas which belong to it,—what is it but an analysis of the Christian consciousness according to the inward connexion of its momenta as they act and react upon each other, the nature of justification being thus explained from the inner necessity of the case? Here also we find the reason why the apostle's main developments of doctrine always grow in his hands into theories of religious history; since the course of history cannot be understood save by regarding one stage as contained by implication in the preceding stage, and regarding the whole in the light of the immanent idea which is the principle of the whole movement. The different determining periods of history, the contrasts into which it is divided, the contrast of sin with grace, of the law which requires works with faith which justifies without works, of death with life, of the first psychical with the second pneumatical Adam, these are simply so many momenta of the conception as it works forward by its own inward power. The great distinguishing characteristic which appears everywhere in the apostle's writings is the innate impulse, springing from the

very roots of his nature, towards rational speculative contemplation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is a deep conviction of the apostle, and comes repeatedly and in various ways to the surface in his writings, that Christianity is the truly rational, and that in matters of religion nothing can stand that cannot justify itself to rational contemplation. When he speaks, Rom. xii. 1, of a *λογικὴ λατρεία*, in which a man is to present himself a living sacrifice to God, he means a service which does not consist, like that of Judaism, merely in outward rites, but is spiritual in its nature and founded in the spirit itself, so that in everything it contains the worshipper must have the rational end and purpose of his act before his mind. And thus he adds an exhortation not to hold exclusively to that which is in accordance with the ruling tendency of the world and the time, but to be transformed in the renewing of the spirit (*τοῦ νόου*), i.e. to go back into one's self in thought, to consider and to prove in one's self what is the will of God, what is the good, and acceptable, and perfect. And here, I think, we find the explanation of that distinction which the apostle sometimes draws between that which he is in his *γνώμη*, and that which he is in pursuance of an *ἐπιταγή* of the Lord. It is not probable that this *ἐπιταγή* refers to an utterance of Jesus which he had received through tradition. A comparison of the various instructions which he gives on difficult questions of social duty will show us what the nature of the distinction is. Where he is conscious of a rational objective ground lying in the nature of the case, his instruction at once and of itself assumes in his consciousness the form of an immediate command of Christ. He speaks of a mere *γνώμη* in cases where he could not deny the subjective nature of his view. Cf. 1 Cor. vii. 6, 10, 12, 25, 40. As the objective truth could only declare itself in the form of the subjective consciousness, it is very natural that with the apostle the one constantly passes over into the other. Thus he says, verse 25, that he has no *ἐπιταγή* of the Lord in reference to virgins, but gives a *γνώμη*, *ὡς ἠλεημένος ὑπὸ Κυρίου πιστὸς εἶναι*, i.e. an opinion deserving of all consideration, as given quite in accordance with his apostolical consciousness. In the same way, verse 40, after the words *κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν γνώμην*, he adds, *δοκῶ δὲ κατὰ πνεῦμα Θεοῦ ἔχειν*. As his call was a fact of his consciousness, the self-assurance of his consciousness was his highest principle of knowledge. His self-assurance, however, is not called forth by himself, but rests on grounds of reason. The authority which he claims for himself as an apostle must not be said to be founded on the external fact of the appearance of Christ which he asserted he had had; it was founded rather upon two inner moments: 1. The truth of his gospel, a thing to him irrefragably true, Gal. i. 8; 2 Cor. xi. 4, and resting ultimately in the absolute satisfaction of man's need of salvation which it brought, in all that goes to make up faith in the Pauline sense. 2. The reality of the success of his work. He appeals to this as his strongest argument against his opponents. Those whom he had converted could not but bear witness that it was through him that they had become Christians, 1 Cor. ix. 1-3; 2 Cor. iii. 2, 3. But how could they have become Christians through him if he was not an apostle, and how could he have worked with such success as an apostle, 2 Cor. x. 13-18, if it were not God's will that he should so work, and how could this be God's will if it were not in accordance with the highest truth

If the first great characteristic of his personality be that he was as it were the receptive soil in which the principle of Christian consciousness should first take form and appear as a concrete consciousness, the second must be found in this, that that consciousness was expressed by him mainly in the way of thought. The apostle is conscious of the power of his thought; he declares to his opponents, 2 Cor. x. 2 *sq.*, how he intends to meet those who take him to be but a weak and ordinary man. For though, he says, I walk in the flesh, yet I do not war in a weak human way; for the weapons with which I fight are not humanly weak, but divinely strong to the pulling down of strongholds. I cast down arguments, and every work that is erected against the knowledge of God, and bring every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ. Far from being, as has been thought, the apostle's protest against the exercise of reason in things pertaining to faith, these words are an expression of the absolute confidence he reposed in his dialectical powers, that on the ground of reason he could never be defeated. The more we penetrate into the process of thought in the apostle's writings, the more minutely we analyse his mode of argument, the method of his development and representation, the more shall we be convinced that his is a thoroughly dialectical nature.<sup>1</sup> Here we may remind the reader of what was said, in our

and reason? What he says, Gal. ii. 8, in the pregnant words that God *ἐνήργησε ἔμοι εἰς τὰ ἔθνη* is an argument from effect to cause, an argument which would have no force were it not understood that nothing can really take up a position in the world but what is more or less true and rational. The success of his preaching to the heathen is in his eyes a proof that his gospel is true. This was the best credentials of his apostolic calling. It says a great deal for the apostle's sober good sense that he never appeals to the appearance of Christ to him as a purely outward fact, such as the Acts represent it. There was a good deal of the ecstatic in him, as the *ὄρασις* and *ἀποκαλύψεις Κυρίου*, 2 Cor. xii. 1, show us (the ecstasy described, verse 2, cannot, however, be identified with the act of his conversion; the fourteen years, 2 Cor. xii. 2, cannot coincide with the fourteen years of Gal. ii. 1); but this element was so thoroughly subordinate to his clear and rational self-consciousness that it could never make him a visionary.

<sup>1</sup> It belongs to the essence of the dialectical method, that it proceeds by negation, and in order to deny, accentuates the opposite, the contrast, and thus has naturally an element of irony. In the apostle's dialectic irony is not wanting; cf. 1 Cor. iv. 8; 2 Cor. xi. 18, 19; and Rückert's observations on the first of these

examination of the great Epistles, of their arrangement and the conception of thought from which it proceeds. We see everywhere in them the effort to place the subject treated of in the most general point of view it will admit of, to proceed from the general to the particular, and consider the main thought in all its aspects successively. What we have here is the true dialectical procedure ; namely that the thought is made to move through all its stages, and to arrive at the totality of its momenta, at which point its concrete determination coincides with and meets its abstract truth. Could the utter contemptibility of the sectarian squabbles at Corinth have been put more clearly than in the apostle's words : Is Christ divided ? Was Paul crucified for you ? Were you baptized in the name of Paul ? (1 Cor. i. 13.) Here a rapid turn of thought brings the question so entirely under the standpoint of an absolute contemplation, that we have nothing but an absolute Yes confronting an absolute No.<sup>1</sup> But the dialectical mediation follows at once. The apostle sees the source of the sectarianism of Corinth in the love of the Corinthians for worldly wisdom ; he therefore considers Christianity itself as wisdom. Wisdom is divided in his eyes into the wisdom of the world and the wisdom of God ; these are the two stages through which it moves ; through its negation in worldly wisdom it comes to affirm itself in the divine. At the opening of the Epistle to the Romans, in the same way, the apostle takes up the absolute standpoint of the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, the two momenta of which are the *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων* and the *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως*. Here also the development consists in the conception passing passages. The latter passage is a striking instance of his dialectic, as it fortifies itself with irony, and smites, overthrows, and crushes the opponent.

<sup>1</sup> Another notable instance of this is to be found in the passage 1 Cor. xi. 3. The question of women having their heads uncovered is at once put in this way : the head of the man is Christ, the head of the woman is the man : the head of Christ is God. The question whether the custom be a Christian one or no is placed under its absolute point of view : all that is asked is whether the custom be or be not consistent with the absolute dependence of Christ. Thus a question referring solely and simply to a case in practical life is identified with the very highest question, the relation to Christ. This rapid soaring up from the particular, the empirical, to the absolute, to the idea, to God, Christ, is a genuine Pauline trait.

through the stage of denial in order to affirm itself. The *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* passes through the negation of *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἔργων*, and becomes in *δικαιοσύνη ἐκ πίστεως* the true self-mediated *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*. It belongs to the dialectical method to take the object which is to be explicated dialectically, in its various stages, both negative and affirmative; since it is only in the consciousness of its mediation that the conception completes its dialectical movement. And our view that dialectical thought was the apostle's natural element is greatly confirmed by the fact that he never forgets the practical side of his discussion in the theoretical. What must be affirmed theoretically must often be denied practically; for love, the principle of practical conduct, is also an element, and has to be considered if the object is to be apprehended in the totality of its momenta. That Christian love was a conspicuous element in the apostle's character all that we know of his life and work leads us to believe. Here however we are more immediately concerned with such traits as are provided in his writings, and with the stamp of his essential spiritual character that is impressed upon them; and the place he has assigned to the element of love even in his dialectical thinking is noticed only as a proof how free he was in the whole attitude of his spirit from all onesidedness. Faith was nothing to him in itself, if it did not work through love; he could not rest satisfied with a merely abstract theoretical view of anything; his spirit urged him from the theoretical to the practical, from the abstract to the concrete, from the essential thought to the realities of life. The end which he thus kept in view was of course the communion of Christian life inspired with the principle of love. This is well illustrated by those two sections of the First Epistle to the Corinthians in which the apostle expresses his views on the subjects of eating the flesh of idolatrous sacrifices, and of speaking with tongues. The eating of the heathen sacrifices seems to have been in itself a thing of complete indifference to him; yet he regards it as very important that the fact that the practice was objectionable to many Christians should be recognised, and care taken not to wound them. This consideration must be taken into account in order to a proper



settlement of the question ; and as soon as the question is regarded from this point of view it ceases to be indifferent to religion ; it acquires an importance which it might not of itself possess. In the latter of the two sections we named, a place is even more distinctly and emphatically assigned to love, or the consideration due to others, to the common good, as a very important element in arriving at a decision. In this case we see very clearly how it is just in this practical side of the matter that the dialectical solution of the whole problem is sought and obtained. It is very obvious throughout that the apostle cares very little for the speaking with tongues. He does not however regard it as unchristian, he recognises it as one of the various forms in which the spirit which dwells in Christians finds expression. So he goes on to give it its definite position in the number of the Christian charisms, and to insist that each charism has an equal right to be considered, as making up along with the rest the unity of the whole. Thus though the *λαλεῖν γλώσσαις* be in itself a charism, yet its true, real value depends on its practical operation, on its being through love a means to the furtherance of the common Christian life. From this point of view the apostle pronounces a judgment on the *λαλεῖν γλώσσαις* which amounts to this : that from its small practical utility it ought to be as far as possible restricted. Thus we see how in every case it is the apostle's object to exhaust the subject he has in hand in all its logical bearings, and to bring his discussion to a stage where the confronting momenta are mediated dialectically in the unity of the conception. The apostle's whole representation, religious as it is, is filled to overflowing with the forms and elements of thought ; it is not only, what is commonly recognised as the great merit of the apostle's writings, that thought follows hard on thought : more than this, thoughts succeed each other as determinations and momenta of some one conception that is greater than all of them ; the thought unfolds itself, brings forth its own contents out of its own depths, and determines itself by taking up its own momenta. Hence the peculiar stamp of the apostle's language : it is distinguished on the one hand for pre-

cision and compression; on the other hand it is marked by a harshness and roughness which suggest that the thought is far too weighty for the language, and can scarcely find fit forms for the superabundant matter it would fain express.<sup>1</sup> Yet in one way the form actually used is not uncongenial to the contents; the language is Hellenistic Greek, an easy and flexible instrument, and well fitted for such a peculiar writer.

The traits we have dwelt on thus far give us as their result a mind naturally and perfectly adapted to take up into itself and to develop the free, universal, and absolute principle of Christianity. This, however, is only one side of his individuality; there is another which we must not disregard. It is a thing of course that even so eminent a mind as Paul's is subject to a certain limitation. It is nothing but what we had to expect that besides all the splendid gifts that distinguished him we should find also a certain onesidedness, a con-

<sup>1</sup> The apostle indicates, 2 Cor. xi. 6, that he is not unconscious of this. He says he is *εἰ καὶ ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ γνώσει*, a phrase which can refer to nothing but the struggle which it cost his thought to find expression. As for his language and style it has long been remarked, and very justly, that it bears a great resemblance to that of Thucydides. (We may mention the well-known work of Bauer, *Philologia Thucydideo-Paullina*, 1773, which, however, is merely a "notatio figurarum dictionis Paullinae cum Thucydidea comparatae," and deals chiefly with the outward expression.) As speech is the expression of inward thought, this similarity of modes of expression must be referred to a deeper similarity, namely of the mental idiosyncrasy of the two men. Such passages as 1 Cor. iv. 12, 13; vii. 29-31; ix. 20, 21; 2 Cor. vi. 9, 10 have the true ring of Thucydides, not only in expression, but in the style of thought. The genuine dialectical spirit appears in both in the love of antithesis and contrast, rising not unfrequently to paradox. Antithesis serves the dialectically thinking mind simply as a means to obtain a direct grasp of the conception in the whole of its bearings; it confronts the one with the other, negatives the one through the other, that the conception may thus determine itself through negation and affirmation. The analogy may be traced still further. Thucydides' critical method of dealing with history necessarily involved a breach with the great national consciousness which lived and had its being in the happy child-like Homeric-mythical theory of the world, proceeding to exhibit the conflict of Ionism and Dorism as a conflict within the larger whole, the nation. In the same way the apostle Paul could not take up the position of Christian universalism, in which the opposition of heathenism was done away, without renouncing the absolute importance of Judaism. With both these men the ties of national particularism give way before the generalizing tendency of their thought, and cosmopolitanism takes the place of nationalism.

sciousness in some way *borné*, a national particularism, which go to make up this definite individual character which we have before us. In our development of the Pauline doctrine the reader will remember how we came here and there on points in which it could not be denied that the thoughts and views of Judaism were still discernible, circumscribing his sphere of vision, directing his attention too exclusively to the future, and causing him to overleap momenta, which, from a freer and more universal standpoint, could not have been left unnoticed. Then his expectation of the *parousia*—here we see how his mind was influenced by the not very enlightened national expectations that were current at the time, insomuch that he expresses a firm belief that Christ's second coming would take place in a short time, and that he with his contemporaries would not need to pass through death and the resurrection, but would be changed without dying. We have already shown that this view is not to be pressed to the apostle's disadvantage to such an extent as some writers have done : and it is of importance in this regard not to attribute to him anything that cannot be shown from Epistles undoubtedly genuine to have been an element of his faith and thought. Yet this characteristic fact remains, that a view so manifestly peculiar and limited to the age in which it arose, and soon to be left behind as events and thoughts moved forward, had such influence as we see it had on the apostle's consciousness. In this case his view is narrowed by an idea peculiar to the nation and the time ; but his whole position with reference to the Old Testament is another such restriction. It was in opposition to the Old Testament that he became aware of the perfect freedom of his Christian position, and everything that formed in his eyes an element of Christian freedom was at the same time a liberation from the yoke of the law, and from the imperfection and limitation of the Old Testament dispensation. Yet, on the other hand, how much do we see him bound to the Old Testament, tied to the very letter of it ? He rests his demonstrations of the most important positions of his doctrine on inferences from passages of the Old Testament, and that not merely out of regard for those to whom the Old Testament was

the supreme authority, in order to make it easier for them to believe in the Christian doctrine, but because the Old Testament is to him the source of all objective truth, the ultimate authority on which the certainty of the Christian faith must rest. When he reminds his readers of the cardinal facts of Christianity, that Christ died for our sins, that he was buried and rose again on the third day, he does not omit to add that this happened according to the Scriptures, 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4. The more he wants to establish the truth of any doctrine and preclude all doubt of it, the more does he labour to prove it from passages of the Old Testament. Even that most important truth of all, in which the whole doctrine of salvation consists, that the true righteousness which avails before God is not to be attained by works of the law, but only by faith, even this doctrine is made to rest directly on the fact that even in the Old Testament Abraham believed God, and that this faith was imputed to him for righteousness, Rom. iv. 1 *sq.* If, the apostle argues, Gal. iii. 7, one can only be saved as a descendant of Abraham, then those are the sons of Abraham who are saved through faith; and as the promise was given to Abraham, that in him all nations should be blessed, this promise is now fulfilled in the fact that God justifies the heathen through faith. The promise was given to Abraham because the Scripture foresaw this event at the time when it was written. Christian faith is thus related to the Old Testament as the fulfilment to the promise: the former could not have taken place without the latter. And yet, as the apostle assures us in other passages, nothing can be more immediately certain than that which the Christian consciousness declares as its essential contents, or that which the divine spirit that is given to the Christian testifies to him.

The more the apostle enters into details in the inferences he draws from the Old Testament, the more striking does this dependence of the Christian consciousness on it appear. It is an authority lying outside of consciousness, and the deference paid to it arises simply from a personal subjective limitation. The most striking instances of this are to be found in two passages of the Epistle to the Galatians, in which, as is now acknowledged universally, the apostle deals with

the Old Testament passages from which he is reasoning in a quite arbitrary way, and gives them a sense which they never could have borne. With regard to the passage, Gen. xxii. 18, which he takes up, Gal. iii. 16, he simply adopts the interpretation which was usually given it by the Jews at the time. The seed of Abraham, in which all the nations of the earth are to be blessed, he does not take to be the posterity of Abraham generally, though this is obviously the meaning of the expression, but one person, an individual, Christ. He deals with the passages Gen. xvi. 15, xxi. 2 even more capriciously. His whole proof is nothing but a play of allegory, and has no force whatever to prove anything. The whole argument is erected on the distinction shown to have existed between Isaac and Ishmael, the two sons of Abraham, that the former was the son of a slave, while the other was born not only not a slave, but in consequence of a special divine promise. In virtue of this difference they are made to represent the two *διαθήκαι*. Ishmael, the slave by birth, stands for the law, because the law places men in a position of bondage before God. The apostle failed, however, to consider how little the subsequent history of the two sons of Abraham fits in with the allegorical interpretation he gives it. Ishmael is made to represent the law, but the Mosaic legislation never touched the sons of Ishmael. It was they who were free from the law, while those for whom the law was given were none but the posterity of Isaac, the type here of the *διαθήκη* of freedom; and the promise connected with the person of Isaac, in regard to which he was to be a type of Christians as *τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*, was only fulfilled by means of circumcision and the Mosaic law, and the whole theocratic dispensation connected with the law. Not only have the apostle's allegorical demonstrations out of the Old Testament no objective basis in the Old Testament itself,—they actually conflict with it.

There could be nothing more absurd than the efforts made by interpreters to show the apostle's argumentation to be objectively true. *Flatt*, for example, remarks on this passage: "The apostle received special divine instruction with a view to his expositions

of doctrine, and in that instruction the idea was communicated to him that Sarah and Hagar were types in the way he states. Thus he had a right to say that this history meant something else, had an inner meaning, that with regard to God's intention it was to be considered as a type, even though the author who wrote the history never thought of such a thing. The proposition,—This history has an inner meaning, is not, however, the same as the proposition,—When God caused the history in question to be narrated, he intended that it should be a prophecy in the form of a symbol: although we have a right to assume that in guiding the Old Testament writers God did not neglect to provide that the history should contain a certain amount of instruction for the future." What does all this mean? What a narrow petty theology is this! And what end does it serve? The apostle's subjective and capricious imagination, the mere play of his fancy, is to have its objective ground in the very spirit of God! And is the contradiction of historical truth which we find here removed by referring it back from the apostle to God himself? Luther had a healthier sense of truth, and judged: "The allegory of Sarah and Hagar will not hold water, for it is at variance with historical reason." This is the only true way of looking on the apostle's argument here; and thus the passage affords us a very curious proof of the position, both free and not free, which he occupied with regard to the Old Testament. In his view of the law that it places man altogether in the position of a bondman before God, a position of which the Christian consciousness knows nothing, he shows the greatest freedom of spirit, a self-assurance that has completely cast away all bonds of external authority. Here, on the other hand, we see him still confined to the old way of thinking about the Old Testament as if there were no other. For there cannot be a doubt that his allegory appeared to him to be the true sense of the Old Testament history, as an objective truth vouched for by the Old Testament. The Old Testament law is to be of force no longer, it has no power to constrain the religious consciousness; and yet the Old Testament stands before his mind with the undiminished weight of its divine

authority. A thing that is objectively certain to him, being the immediate utterance of his self-consciousness, must yet, after all, be recommended and proved to him out of the Old Testament. The Old Testament itself is made to furnish proof that the law, its most essential part, has no longer any authority. The apostle makes out his case by means of allegory ; allegory is to him, as to his contemporaries, the equivocal expedient by which, while making use of the Old Testament, he yet cuts himself off from it, and places himself above it. Allegory holds to the Old Testament as its necessary object, and rests all its proofs upon it ; yet it only plays with the Old Testament, since the allegorist has already placed himself above it, though not fully conscious that he has done so. Yet, freely as he uses the Old Testament in his allegorical interpretations of it, allegory is itself the strongest proof of his subjection to it ; for otherwise he never could endure the unnatural restraint that allegory imposes on him. It might be urged that the two examples we have mentioned of arbitrary allegorical interpretation occur in the Epistle to the Galatians, undoubtedly the oldest that the apostle wrote, and in which his view of the law is not so fully developed as in the later Epistles. We must, however, remind the reader of 1 Cor. x. 1 *sq.*, a passage which shows us as distinctly as the others how fully the apostle shared with his contemporaries the allegorical ideas current in his time.

These limitations of the apostle's individuality on its intellectual side are little more than the widest and most general limitations, those of time and country. It cannot be required of any man that he should not wear the character of his time. Yet the more a man is conscious of the boundaries he lives in, the freer will be his attitude towards them, and the more will he be inclined to remember the limits to which every human individuality is subject, and to show to others the fullest consideration. How the apostle's spiritual freedom appeared in his regard and indulgence for weaker fellow-Christians, we have already shown. Yet we must add that in his dealings with others the apostle did not invariably maintain this standpoint. He cannot be said to have always looked at

others from without, and to have been independent of his own subjective feelings. However convinced he was of the reality of his apostolical calling and of the absolute truth of his doctrine, still that cannot excuse his excesses in judging of his adversaries, and failing to distinguish involuntary from voluntary errors. Rückert remarks very justly on 2 Cor. ii. 17, that "Paul was apt to judge his opponents very harshly, and to impute motives for their conduct, which, in all probability, were not the true ones; since what he attributed to an unholy disposition might in many cases be the natural, and, considering the circumstances, must almost have been the necessary, outcome of honest prejudice (cf. Gal. i. 7, ii. 4, vi. 12). This harshness was part of his character as it was in the case of our own Reformer." He applies the same observation to the passage 2 Cor. xi. 12. What Rückert calls a harshness of character arises from inability to abstract from one's own subjective feelings, and transport one's-self into those of another. The apostle could not conceive the truth otherwise than as it appeared to him; and with regard to the different belief of another man he could not imagine that it had even a subjective foundation; what was asserted in their opinion being all the while nothing but that Judaism which was native to both them and him. With this influence which his idiosyncrasy exerted over his judgment of his opponents, we come down to the lower sphere of the peculiar bias and direction which he derived from character and temperament. We have already observed how this purely human side of the apostle appears chiefly in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. The passage 1 Cor. v. may also be compared. It can scarcely be denied that his character was marked by a certain excitableness or violence, which sometimes made him act precipitately, and rendered him liable to fitful and sudden changes of emotion. (This is particularly noticeable in 2 Cor. and in the Epistle to the Galatians.) We should obtain a deeper insight into the apostle's individuality, its psychical, and probably also its physical organization, if it were possible to form any clear ideas of the nature of the *ὀπτασίαι* and *ἀποκαλύψεις*, and the peculiar circumstances accom-



panying them, of which he speaks, 2 Cor. xii. But he gives us here only vague and distant hints on the subject, and it is impossible to fix any definite meaning on them, or to form any clear view of the subject from them.

But without this, what we have gathered while seeking for traits of his character is abundant confirmation of what he says of himself, 2 Cor. iv. 7, that he had a divine treasure in an earthen vessel.

## APPENDICES.

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## APPENDIX I.

### ON THE LITERATURE OF THE LEGEND OF PETER.

[See Part I. Chapter IX.]

THE first attack made on this legend proceeded chiefly from a general distrust of all such facts as were employed to provide a historical basis for the claims and encroachments of Rome. Such were the motives of those who either rejected the legend entirely or expressed grave doubts about it; first in the middle ages, when the assailants were parties in opposition, such as the Waldenses, or the declared enemies of the papacy, such as Marsilius of Padua, Michael of Casena and others; and then at the time of the Reformation and after it, when the assailants were Protestant historians, such as Matthias Flacius,<sup>1</sup> Claudius Salmasius,<sup>2</sup> and others.

<sup>1</sup> In his work published in the year 1554: *Historia certaminum inter Romanos Episcopos et sextam Carthaginiensem synodum Africanasque ecclesias, de primatu seu potestate Papae, bona fide ex authenticis monumentis collata*. Cf. p. 267, "Non constat plane, Petrum fuisse Romae. Nam quod Papistae scribunt, Petrum Romae 25 annos docuisse, cum usque ad 18 Ierosolymis docuerit, item in Ponto, ut aliqui tradunt, 5 annis fuerit, et Antiochiae 7, ad hoc etiam cum Babylone scripserit suam epistolam, propalam falsum est; inde enim efficeretur, ut longe ultra Neronis mortem vixisset, a quo tamen interfectus dicitur. Demonstratio item certa est, Petrum Romae non fuisse, quod Paulus Romam et Roma scribens, ac tam multos mediocres Christianos salutans et nominans, nusquam tamen vel unico verbo Petri tanti viri mentionem faciat." Flacius laid great stress on Gal. ii., p. 124: "Denique ego omnibus omnium mortalium historiis de Petro illam ad Galatas secundo a Paulo scriptam praefero. Ibi enim ille primum affirmat diserte Petro esse concreditum apostolatam seu episcopatum inter Judaeos, sibi vero inter gentes seu super gentiles. Deinde narrat, Petrum usque ad concilium Hierosolymitanum (quod circa 18 annos post ascensionem Christi, et septimo commenticii papatus Petri celebratum est) potissimum Judaeis praedicasse et de postero tempore sanctissimum datarum dexterarum foedus secum iniisse: quod

<sup>2</sup> *Librorum de primatu Papae*. P. I cum apparatu. Lugd. Bat. 1645.

By far the greater number of the Protestant divines, however, and especially those of the Reformed Church, who were much occupied with this field of historical research, considered the subject to be one calling for impartial treatment, and providing an opportunity to show their opponents how ready they were to respect the witness of history, when properly ascertained and resting upon fact.<sup>1</sup>

The first scholar who undertook a thorough historical investigation of the subject, and declared as the result of his researches that the common view was entirely destitute of historical reality, was Friedrich Spanheim. His *Dissertatio de ficta protectione*

*ipse quidem velit praedicare Judaeis, Paulus vero debeat concionari gentibus. Ubi habes brevissime et verissime comprehensam historiam Petri, quae indicat, ei et a Christo potissimum super et inter Judaeos apostolatam, episcopatum seu papatum concreditum mandatumque esse: et eum tum ante Hierosolymitanam synodum, tum postea potissimum Judaeos docuisse, eoque potissimum ibi sedisse vel stetisse, ubi plurimi Judaei fuerunt, id est in Syria et aliis orientalibus partibus. Nam Romae non ita multi fuerunt: quandoquidem et nondum fuerant sic dissipati, sicut postea in eversione Hierosolymae, et Claudius eos Roma penitus expulerat.*" The *Magdeburg Centuries* do not express any distinct doubt of the supposed fact.

<sup>1</sup> Compare the whole series of the Protestant divines who held this position on the subject. F. Spanheim enumerates them in the treatise to be named below, p. 336: Quinimo in Protestantium castris *ἐρέχοντες* non pauci, atque etiam largientes haud gravate plurimi, imo plerique, tantis auctoritatibus moti. Chamiero certe *non facile vellicandus videtur tantus consensus Patrum* sed neque Davidi Blondello, id perpetuo largienti, Romanam ecclesiam a Petro et Paulo fundatam atque instructam fuisse. Nec inficiati eam Petri inter Romanos praesentiam Th. Beza Annot. ad i. Petri v., Fr. Junius, Scaliger, Casaubonus, Petr. Molinaeus, Petitus, Usserius, Seldenus, Pearsonus, Fellius, Dodwellus, G. Cave, Bedelius ipse, et quotquot Ignatianis epistolis speciatim illi, quae est ad Romanos, patrocinantur, in qua Ignatius circa medium ad Romanorum coetum: *οὐχ ὡς Πέτρος καὶ Παῦλος διατάσσομαι ὑμῖν.* Quin Patricius Junius Notis ad Clementem, quod Petrus Romae vitam finierit martyrio dicit *potius* esse, quam ut in dubium vocetur. Similiter Hammondus vel his duobus testibus rem extra dubium poni, Caji scilicet et Dionysii Corinthiorum fide. Samuel Basnage at once followed Spanheim with a defence of the opposite view, in his *Exercitatio histor. crit. de rebus sacris vel ecclesiast.* Ultraj. 1692, p. 548. He declared: *Me quod attinet, hic tantum antiquitatis auctoritas apud me valet, ut adventum Petrium ad urbem orbis dominam in dubium adducere mihi sit religio, ita etenim, quae firmis cingunt historiam praesidiis, fama constans, testium vetustas atque fides incorrupta, pondus suffragiorum atque numerus, sub signis hujus narrationis militant ut historiae omni sit abroganda fides, si hac in re nutet.*

Petri apostoli in urbem Romam, deque non unius traditionis origine, appeared in 1679.<sup>1</sup> Spanheim brings forward first the negative grounds, which make the occurrence appear so improbable *a priori*: Luke's silence on the subject in the Acts, where there was every reason to speak of it; the silence of Paul himself both in his Epistle to the Romans, and in the Epistles of the Roman captivity; the agreement arrived at by the two apostles, Gal. ii. 9, that the one should consider the *ἔθνη* as his province, and the other the *περιτομή*, after which it was not likely that Peter should have left his work in countries so distant from Rome, and taken part in the foundation of a church which consisted almost entirely of Gentile Christians. Spanheim then takes up one by one the oldest and most important authorities for the fact, and impeaches their credibility chiefly by the general argument, supported of course by special proofs in each case, that writers who accepted with avidity so many and so manifestly fabulous traditions, are unworthy of credence in the case of this tradition. He finds the roots of the tradition partly in a mystical interpretation of the name Babylon in the First Epistle of Peter, v. 13, partly in the myth of the journey of Simon Magus to Rome, Peter having followed him to that city; and partly in the ambition of the Church of Rome which could be satisfied with nothing less than this: *ut Paulo in Romanae ecclesiae institutione, sed et in consummatione martyrii socius quoque Petrus adderetur, primus omnium apostolorum, πρῶτος in evangelio, πρωτόκλητος, προήγορος, ἀρχηγός*, qui primum lapidem in aedificanda ecclesia posuisset, obsignaturus quoque fidem in ecclesiarum omnium prima (p. 383). Thorough as Spanheim's investigation was, and pertinent as his arguments on many points undoubtedly are, his treatise failed to do much to shake the old tradition. The church historians who followed him continued to think that the authorities were too strong to be impugned; they went further, and asserted (as, for example, Schrökh)<sup>2</sup> that it would be difficult to find another event in the history of the early

<sup>1</sup> Opp. t. ii. (Lugd. Bat. 1703), pp. 331-388.

<sup>2</sup> Kirchengeschichte, vol. ii., 2d ed., p. 185.

church that was established so firmly and beyond all question as this one was by the unanimous testimony of the first Christian teachers. Of the later church historians and critics, Eichhorn<sup>1</sup> was the only one who ventured to assert the opposite, and this he did with all his wonted boldness. He said that the apostle Peter's residence at Rome, in company with Mark the Evangelist, was in all probability a fable. The foundation of Peter's reported residence at Rome was, that his first Epistle was dated from Babylon, (1 Peter v. 13); the early church interpreted this name figuratively, and said it stood for Rome; and this was the foundation on which everything was built, Peter's labours for the Roman church, his primacy and his martyrdom in that city, and all that has been fabled of him in the old and in the new Christian world. It might be asked with all confidence where any other piece of evidence was to be found? And was this absurd evidence to be respected by historical criticism? This startling attack was the chief means of inducing another Catholic theologian to undertake a new investigation of the subject, looking at it in an unprejudiced way, which is thoroughly deserving of respect. The results at which he arrived were these: that it is quite unquestionable on historical grounds that the apostle Peter came to Rome, that he taught and governed the Roman church, and suffered death at last on account of his faith; but that his residence at Rome cannot have extended to twenty nor to twenty-five years, but only at the outside to a few months over one year.<sup>2</sup> While the Catholic party thus admitted the necessity of setting bounds to the old tradition, and reducing it to a minimum, Protestant historians and critics displayed a wish to clear the controversy of polemical and party spirit, and met the Catholics with a confession that some of their former writers had gone too far. Neander and Gieseler were at one on this point. The former<sup>3</sup> declared it to be simply hypercriticism, to throw doubt

<sup>1</sup> Einl. in's N. T., vol. i. p. 554. Cf. vol. iii. p. 603 *sq.*

<sup>2</sup> In the *Essay on the apostle Peter's residence at Rome*, being also a contribution to the chronology of the early Church, in the *Theolog. Quarterly*, published by Drey, Herbst und Hirscher, Tüb. 1820, 4 H., p. 567 *sq.*

<sup>3</sup> *Church History*, vol. i. p. 296 (Bohn's Edition).

on the tradition that Peter had been at Rome, attested as it was by the consent of all the early authorities. This tradition was obviously to be referred to a period in which no one thought of exalting the church of Rome by the primacy of Peter. It was nothing but party and polemical spirit, Gieseler declared,<sup>1</sup> that led some Protestants to deny the reality of the event. Bertholdt,<sup>2</sup> Cölln,<sup>3</sup> Mynster,<sup>4</sup> and others, expressed themselves in the same way. Mynster for one thought that "what seduced the Protestant writers to throw doubt on a fact, attested as this was by the unwavering voice of all Christian antiquity, could have been nothing but polemical rancour, and that the writing in which these doubts had been collected, clearly betrayed by its title: Of the fictitious journey of Peter to Rome" (the essay of Spanheim), its true end and motive.

My essay, which appeared in 1831, has led the two church historians, Neander and Gieseler, to at least modify their former view. They are unwilling to give up the supposed facts at the root of the legend, yet they cannot deny the weakness of the evidence. Neander allows the possibility of the legend having arisen out of the circumstances of the Roman church which I referred to,<sup>5</sup> but hesitates to agree in my result, considering that the argument which we mentioned must still be allowed some weight. Gieseler's chief point of late is,<sup>6</sup> that if the legend proceeded from the Judaizing Christians in Rome, and was meant to give Peter the preponderance over Paul, it is difficult to understand how it was not at once and strenuously contradicted by the Pauline party at Rome, and how the Pauline Cajus could be one of the chief author-

<sup>1</sup> *Lehrb. d. Kirchengesch.*, vol. i. 2d Ed. 1827, p. 189.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Krit. Einl. in das A. und N. T.*, Part V. p. 2690.

<sup>3</sup> *Encyclop. of Ersch and Gruber*, Part XVIII. p. 42.

<sup>4</sup> In the paper on the first residence of the apostle Peter at Rome in the *Kleine Theol. Schriften*, 1825, p. 143 *sq.* An arbitrary habit of wresting the statements of authorities from the context in which they occur, and allowing them just so much weight as suits the hypothesis to be established, is a prominent feature in Mynster's essay.

<sup>5</sup> *Planting and Training*, i. 379.

<sup>6</sup> *Lehrb. d. Kirchengesch.*, 4th Ed. 1844, p. 103.



ities in favour of it. This requires no further notice after what we have already said.<sup>1</sup> Mayerhoff<sup>2</sup> gives his decided adhesion to my view and to the arguments on which it is based, while Olshausen<sup>3</sup> as decidedly opposes it. Of those who have given the weight of their authority for or against the legend without having thoroughly investigated the question, I name here Schleiermacher<sup>4</sup> and De Wette,<sup>5</sup> who both take the negative side. In the Catholic church, Windischmann<sup>6</sup> and Ellendorf<sup>7</sup> may be mentioned as having lately expressed their views on a question of such importance for their Church. The former seems to be excited by Protestant contradiction, and does battle for the truth of the old tradition with all the fervour of Ultramontane partisanship. But as for the conflict of authorities he has nothing better to allege than that Peter resided in Rome more than once, first between 42 and 51, and then between 64 and 68. The latter of these two writers brings his historical critical investigation to this result: "Peter may have been at Rome; it is possible that he was there about the year 65 or 66. But it is nothing more than possible, and the opposite is equally likely, or even more likely. Nor can we take it ill of Protestants, if they follow the proofs offered by Holy Scripture, and by the earliest fathers, Clement and Justin, and hold Peter's residence at Rome, with all that is connected with it, to be a story drawn from the Apocrypha. Peter's residence at Rome can never be proved."

<sup>1</sup> Cf. vol. i. p. 252.

<sup>2</sup> *Hist. Krit. Einl. in die Petrin. Schriften*, 1835, p. 73 *sq.*

<sup>3</sup> Cf. vol. i. p. 247 *sq.*, where Olshausen's objections are met. On the assertions of Credner and Bleek, who are also defenders of the legend, compare my *Abh. über den Ursprung des Episcopats*, *Tüb. Zeitschr. für Theol.*, 1838, H. 3, p. 45 *sq.*

<sup>4</sup> *Vorlesungen über die Kirchengesch. (Sämmtliche Werke, zur Theol. Part II.)*, p. 69: "I am one of those who disbelieve the entire story of Peter's residence at Rome."

<sup>5</sup> *Einl. in das N. T.*, p. 314: "The alleged fact is essentially improbable. The legend seems to owe its existence to an effort made on the part of the Judæo-Christians of the influential church at Rome, to prove Peter to have had a share in the foundation of that church."

<sup>6</sup> *Vindiciæ Petrinæ*, Regensburg, 1836.

<sup>7</sup> *Ist Petrus in Rom und Bischof der römischen Kirche gewesen?* Darmstadt, 1841.

## APPENDIX II.

### COMPARISON OF THE PAULINE DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION

#### WITH THAT OF JAMES.

[Supplement to Part III. Chapter III.]

THE main doctrinal position of the Epistle of James : ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνου, ii. 24, is the direct opposite of the Pauline doctrine as it is stated, Rom. iii. 28, in the proposition, δικαιοῦται πίστει ἄνθρωπος, χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου. It cannot be denied that between these two doctrines there exists an essential difference, a direct contradiction. It may be urged that James says no more than οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνου, that he thus refers δικαιοῦσθαι not exclusively to ἔργα, but partly at least to πίστις also. But the Pauline proposition, on the other hand, distinctly excludes ἔργα and refers δικαιοῦσθαι to that very faith of which James says that without ἔργα it is nothing, forms no element of the religious life at all. Those works, then, which Paul altogether repudiates are with James the ground of δικαιοῦσθαι ; and that faith which with James has no religious value whatever apart from ἔργα, is with Paul the principle of δικαιοῦσθαι.

That the difference between Paul and James may not appear to be one of principle, it is generally assumed that they do not use the terms in question in the same sense : this is asserted either of δικαιοῦσθαι or of πίστις and ἔργα, and this difference in the use of terms is said to be quite consistent with agreement in thought on the main point at issue. One simple way of saving the harmony of the two apostles was to take the word δικαιοῦσθαι not in its Pauline sense of actual justification, but only of the manifestation of that which must flow from justification. Thus Calvin remarks on James ii. 24 : Certe Jacobus hic docere non

voluit ubi quiescere debeat salutis fiducia, in quo uno insistit Paulus. Ergo notanda est haec amphilogia, justificandi verbum Paulo esse gratuitam justitiae imputationem apud Dei tribunal, Jacobo autem esse demonstrationem justitiae ab effectis, idque apud homines. If the main difference is placed in the word *δικαιούσθαι*, then it is not necessary to take *πίστις* and *ἔργα* in different senses in the two writers. The prevailing view is, however, that the difference of the two is not to be sought merely in the word *δικαιούσθαι*, but rather in the meaning they attached to the words *πίστις* and *ἔργα*. It is said that *πίστις* means with Paul that faith in God which is founded upon Christ, and with James, merely religious knowledge as such; and that *ἔργα* are with Paul the works of the Mosaic law, and with James, moral and religious actions.<sup>1</sup> Neander adheres to this method of reconciling the two apostles, if, indeed, his wavering utterances on the subject yield any distinct view at all. He says, first, that Paul always regards *πίστις* alone as that through which a man becomes and continues to be a justified person before God, and from which all other elements of good are spontaneously, and by an inner necessity, evolved: and that Paul would never have said that faith and works must co-operate in order to justification. On the other side, however, the material difference disappears. For in this apostle's thought, works are the expression of faith, and of the *δικαιούσθαι* which faith procures, and are thus a necessary element of the Christian life, faith having to approve itself through the whole of life and conduct; and so the apostle comes to say that each man will receive his due according to the deeds done in the body, whether good or evil, 2 Cor. v. 10. Thus the Jacobean type of doctrine is represented in Paul.<sup>2</sup> If we are to regard these remarks as actually shedding light on the subject, the chief point in them must be this, that the *ἔργα* of James are different

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. Pott in his *Commentar zu Jak. ii.*: Alium alio sensu vocabula *πίστος* et *ἔργων* accepisse manifestum est—ita ut in tanta argumenti diversitate neuter neutri repugnare potuerit.

<sup>2</sup> *Planting and Training*, ii. 23 (Bohn).

from those of Paul, that he means such works as proceed from faith, and are the fruits of faith. But Paul does not distinguish two kinds of *ἔργα*; he says quite broadly that it is impossible to *δικαιῶσθαι* by them. This must apply to those that proceed from faith as well as to others; for if they proceed from faith, then faith is there already, and with faith justification: so that they cannot have been the means of justification.

Kern was thus perfectly justified in asserting that the difference between Paul and James is one of principle, and cannot be got rid of. James, he says, could never have made *δικαιῶσθαι* depend on *ἔργα*, had not his notion of justifying faith been limited to faith as it manifests itself in action. Kern brings the difference to a point in the following propositions: with Paul, faith, because it is the faith which justifies, is the source of good works, of morally good conduct; with James, faith, because it is the source of good works and proves in them its own vitality, is the faith that justifies. With Paul justification is conditioned by faith, or justification and faith are both present together in the man who is justified by faith, and in faith works proceed from justification. With James justification is conditioned by moral conduct; here we must not even use the expression "by faith and by the works which it brings forth;" for this would separate faith and conduct from each other, which from the Jacobean standpoint is an inadmissible distinction; justification proceeds from works, in which faith proves itself a living faith. With Paul faith is regarded in the light of its origin and essence as the attitude of soul in which man is occupied entirely with his relation to God in Christ, and refers himself entirely to God, sinking all reference to himself or to his neighbour. Faith, being such, was of course for Paul the only possible channel of justification. In one aspect he could connect justification with love; for the beginning of love is present in that movement of the heart towards God which springs from confidence in his grace and seeks to appropriate it. But even in this case what the apostle has in view is simply and exclusively man's relation to God. Love is not considered as the man's

principle of action, in his private or social relations ; it is spoken of merely because from the very nature of the moral life faith contains the germ of it. James, on the other hand, cannot conceive of faith but as issuing in that activity in which man brings forth what is in him both in reference to his neighbour, and to himself. To James, faith is nothing short of a principle of action, which man has acquired in order to act throughout the whole circle of his moral relations in a way that is in harmony with the will of God. Only when faith has thus proved itself sincere, and has reached its fulfilment, does man receive justification before God. According to this theory, then, active faith passes into consciousness of justification. With Paul, on the contrary, faith passes over from the consciousness of justification into that activity in which it proves itself a living faith by the influence it exerts in the man's private and social relations.<sup>1</sup>

This definition of the relation the two positions bear to each other is in the main accurate. Yet too large a concession is made to the unity of the two doctrines, when it is said that the *πίστις* of James is a principle,—a principle of action. We must go a step further in estimating the extent of the divergence, and assert that with James faith is not a principle of moral action at all. With Paul, faith evolves love out of itself, and shows itself active through love, and so faith is the principle of the practical ; it is the immediate unity of the theoretical and the practical ; there is no part of life that remains unaffected by it ; when it lays hold of a man it asserts its influence over every province of his spiritual nature. With James, faith has no practical element whatever ; it is never pointed out, as with Paul, that faith is the principle of *ἔργα*, of moral conduct. The faith of James is nothing higher than the faith of which Paul says, 1 Cor. xiii. 1 *sq.*, that the man who has it, and nothing more, is like a sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. It was not to this faith that Paul ascribed the power to justify ; he says of it *οὐδὲν ὠφελοῦμαι*. To this vain and empty faith Paul opposes the faith which justifies, as the only

<sup>1</sup> Der Brief Jakobi, Tüb. 1838, p. 43 *sq.*

true one, but the former is the only faith with which James seems to be acquainted. He says of faith indeed, that it *συνεργεῖ τοῖς ἔργοις*, ii. 22, so that *πίστις* seems to be an active principle which cooperates to justification; and he says that man is not justified by faith alone (*οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνου*, ii. 24); and justification by works is called the fulfilment of faith, *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τελειοῦται ἡ πίστις*, ii. 22. Notwithstanding all this, however, he does not seem to recognise any inner connexion between *πίστις* and *ἔργα*. Had he done so, then *πίστις* must have appeared as the operating principle of *ἔργα*, and *πίστις* would then be the main consideration; the *ἔργα* would be merely the form in which the inner *πίστις* becomes external. But how can James have conceived *πίστις* as standing in this relation to *ἔργα*, when he applies expressions to it which deny that it has in itself any life and activity, qualities which, had it been a principle, it must of necessity have had? That cannot have the rank or importance of a principle, which, as is said of faith in unmistakable terms, is dead for all further purposes, is devoid of strength or life, and must be likened to a body that is without spirit, without any principle of animation (ii. 20-26). And how could James have attributed *δικαιούσθαι* simply to *ἔργα*, if *ἔργα* were themselves to be referred to *πίστις* as their principle, so that their power to justify was derived from *πίστις*? It is evident that *ἔργα* and they alone are regarded as real and substantial; they are not merely a form in which a substance derived from something else that is greater is deposited; they are what they are immediately, of themselves and in virtue of their own nature, not merely the Outward of a different Inward, such as faith would be. It is true that James places *πίστις* by the side of *ἔργα* and even makes *πίστις* the presupposition of *ἔργα*, but what does this amount to? It amounts merely to this: that faith is present as well as works, but no more is asserted than that it is present. The *συνεργεῖν* of which he speaks signifies nothing more than this: that *πίστις*, mere theoretical knowledge, is a concomitant element of the religious consciousness, of which, however, works are the substantial form. The view implied rather than stated here is one

according to which the theoretical and the practical, knowledge on the one hand, and on the other the action which is in perfect harmony with will, do indeed stand side by side, but are quite unmediated with each other. Each exists for itself, and forms a sphere for itself beyond which it does not pass, and being thus unconnected with each other, they actually fall asunder. The unity is not reached in which the two sides are embraced and harmonized. It is by no means the case here, as with the Pauline conception of faith, that the theoretical and the practical are felt to form a unity, the latter being contained implicitly in the former, and being related to it as the outer to the inner. And if this interpenetration of the theoretical and the practical be wanting, and with it that unity of the spirit which the two ought to combine to form, if the two elements stand side by side without being mediated with each other, then, of course, the practical must appear to be the immediate and the independent, and the centre of gravity of the religious consciousness must fall on the side of the practical. This is plainly stated in the proposition that religion consists essentially in willing and in action, or that no *δικαίωσις* is possible, save what comes through *ἔργα*. Only *ἔργα* are reckoned to be real and objective, since they are what exists in the state of actuality. Now this amounts to saying that only what exists outwardly, empirically, to the senses, is true and actual. This outward existence, however, necessarily presupposes other existence in a different form, that is, in essence; and even the Jacobean view recognises that *ἔργα* come after and presuppose *πίστις*. But the characteristic feature of the position is that what is in essence is held to be the unreal, the empty, the shadow, which, existing as it does in essence is held unimportant, and scarcely worth considering. Thus with James the relation of *πίστις* to *ἔργα* is this, that *πίστις* has scarcely any real existence in itself at all, that it is only in *ἔργα* that it begins to exist truly and actually. The Pauline doctrine of justification takes us to the very opposite pole; here everything actual has reality only in virtue of that which it is in essence. *Πίστις* is what *ἔργα* pro-

ceed from and presuppose ; and the value of *ἔργα* consists entirely in *πίστις* ; this is the substantial element in them, this is the main point in question, and *ἔργα* are, as it were, a mere *accidens* of *πίστις*. Not that which exists externally, but that which is essentially, is true and real ; and only that which can be conceived as being in essence can truly exist, as with Paul *ἔργα* are true, actual *ἔργα* only inasmuch as they are operations of *πίστις*. Regarded from the one standpoint *ἔργα* have their absolute value in themselves ; they are for themselves the absolute, and the fact must be overlooked that as material phenomena they are and must be finite and imperfect. Regarded from the other standpoint, the *ἔργα* appear as the particular, and bear a negative and inadequate relation to their own essential conception. This negative character of the particular must be constantly corrected by a reference to the unity of the whole, namely to faith, the moral disposition which is the totality of the particular actions. The contrast of the Jacobean and the Pauline doctrine is thus not merely that of the Judæo-Christian and the opposite school of Christian thought : it is the contrast of the empirical and the speculative. Paul rises in his doctrine of faith from the empirical consciousness to the spiritual ; starting from the position that works as the particular can only be finite, inadequate, and negative, and that the consciousness of the absolute, if there be such a thing, cannot reside in works themselves but must be something beyond and above them, he rises to that which is essential, and which works presuppose. This is faith ; it is as a unity, as a totality, what works can only represent in a finite, inadequate and negative way. Looking at the doctrine of James from this point of view, we cannot but consider it a retrogression from that of Paul. When James puts *δικαιούσθαι ἐξ ἔργων* in place of the Pauline *δικαιούσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, he ascribes to works that absolute value which faith has with Paul. The reason why Paul denied *δικαιούσθαι* to *ἔργα* was that there was nothing absolute about them, and that they could only stand in an inadequate relation to *δικαιούσθαι*. Now what does James do but vindicate for works that absolute character which, according to



Paul, they cannot possibly have? They could not have this absolute character except in virtue of their unity with faith, and thus the absoluteness of works would not belong to works but to faith. This absoluteness of faith, however, is just what James denies. He must therefore place the absoluteness which works must have in their reference to *δικαιοῦσθαι* in the works themselves, regardless of the proof that has been given that works cannot as such have any absolute value. What is this but going back to a position which Paul had already overcome? The absolute standpoint of Christian consciousness which Paul took up in his doctrine of faith is degraded again to that of Judæo-Christi-*an*ity, at which a value is ascribed to works, which from their very nature they cannot possibly have. The spiritual consciousness of faith is made to retreat before the empirical consciousness of works.

But though the account here given of the relations the two doctrines bear to each other be accepted as satisfactory, the further question will remain, whether the Epistle of James is to be regarded as an intentional denial of the Pauline doctrine. This question is so important for the history of Paulinism that we feel bound to devote some attention to it. Schneckenburger<sup>1</sup> and Neander<sup>2</sup> have, as is well known, maintained that this is not the case. Neander asserts that the proposition of James, which most scholars seem constrained to regard as a denial of the Pauline doctrine of justification, belongs to quite a different province of religious life from that doctrine, and is aimed at a tendency of the Jewish mind, at the dead faith of Jewish religiosity. "It is mere imagination," Neander says, "to suppose that James alludes to the expressions and the illustrations of Paul. And is this allusion, if such it be, so very striking? Let it be remembered that the Pauline phraseology arose out of Judaism, from the Judæo-Hellenic use of terms,—it was by no means made up of new expressions, but often simply appropriated the old Jewish terms, employed them in new

<sup>1</sup> Annot. ad Epist. Jac. 1832, p. 126 *sq.*, Beiträge zur Einl. in's N. T., p. 196 *sq.*

<sup>2</sup> Planting and Training, i. 357 *sq.*

combinations, applied them to new contrasts, and animated them with a new spirit. Thus neither the term *δικαιοῦσθαι* in reference to God, nor the term *πίστις*, was entirely new; both of these ideas had long been familiar to the Jews. And the example of Abraham as a hero of faith must have been obvious to every Jew," etc. All this is very well known, and no one denies it; but what does it prove with regard to the position to be assigned to the Epistle in the history of the primitive Church? With regard to this, the only question we have to ask is, whether the onesided and perverted religious position which James denotes with the formula *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* can be regarded as a phenomenon which stands in any natural connexion with Judaism. And this question must undoubtedly be answered in the negative. Abstract notional faith, such as the term *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* may denote when used in a bad sense, was never one of the leading errors of the Jewish religion. It is true that faith is an important feature of the Jewish religion, faith, that is, in the One true God, or the *γνώσκων Θεόν*, by which Judaism is distinguished from heathenism. This faith, however, is an essentially practical thing; it is essential to it that the knowledge of God should always be accompanied by the worship of God through all the religious actions which are prescribed in the law. Judaism is no mere speculative monotheism: it is the religion of the one true God who has revealed himself in the law; and as the law demands, according to the very conception of its nature, to be observed and kept, so action in conformity with the law is the very essence and the distinctive characteristic of the Jewish religion. Thus except where confusion arose from the invasion of foreign elements, the main errors of the Jewish religion were not errors of theory, but of practice; the form of religious life was determined by the law in its various aspects and demands. Now it is certainly possible that the main error of a legal religion such as Judaism may consist in the mere knowledge of the law being regarded as the most important point. But the law being in its very essence a thing to be practised, knowledge thus divorced from action cannot be considered a peculiar development of the legal

religion, but must be considered as simply irreligion. The dead knowledge of the law and the empty learning of the Scribes which Neander cites is not a form of religion, but an utter want of the true religious life. Now, even though *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* were a mere one-sided development of Judaism, there must yet be something in it that might possibly become the principle of a definite direction of religious life. But no man could ever propound it as a principle to be seriously accepted and acted on, that mere knowledge is all that is wanted in order to satisfy the law. Where mere knowledge is made to take the place of action, it is not that a theory to this effect has been advanced or accepted; it is merely that there is a deficiency of practical conduct. In no case, however, could this mere knowledge, knowledge for its own sake and regardless of action, be rationally called *πιστεύειν*; knowledge and faith are not the same, and it would be hard to see what was meant by faith in such a connexion. The chief aberration of the religious life of Judaism is not to be sought on the side of the theoretical; but it is distinctly to be found on the side of the practical. The danger to which a religion that insists on legal obedience is most exposed is that action may be dissociated from disposition, that an action which is merely external and consists in the external performance of works may come to claim for itself a real religious value. In this regard there is no more notorious phenomenon in the whole history of religion than the legal formalism, the work-holiness, the *opus operatum* of the Jewish religion. Neander seeks, very naturally, to introduce the notion of the *opus operatum* as an element in this discussion. He finds the *opus operatum*, however, in such a faith in the one Jehovah and the Messiah as leaves the disposition unaffected; a notion entirely untenable, and, indeed, self-contradictory. An *opus operatum*, where such exists, cannot be an inward thing such as faith: it must be something outward, some work or performance. If then the *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, which James condemns, be a product of Judaism, it would more aptly be called *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων*. But there can be no doubt that the *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*

which Paul condemns is an error chargeable to the Jewish cast of religion. Thus we should have the curious fact that the Jewish religion is charged with two opposite errors, *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* and *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων*, by two writers who, on the hypothesis, are at one on the nature of the Christian *δικαιοῦσθαι*. This is somewhat difficult to grasp; and it is equally difficult to see how, after James had denied *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, Paul on the other hand came to deny *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων*. To suppose that the denial of *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* preceded that of *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων* is manifestly a perversion of the natural and logical order of affairs. The element of the Jewish religion, which must have excited the most lively repugnance in the fully formed Christian consciousness, as it appeared for the first time in Paul, was undoubtedly its empty confidence in outward works. From this it was necessary to appeal to the inner disposition,—to faith. Then, when the inward, or faith, had come to be regarded as the most important point, the suspicion might very naturally arise, that too much importance was ascribed to this part, and that action and practice were in danger of being neglected. And it is obvious how naturally this suspicion would arise in the form of a reaction against the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith in the minds of men whose whole history and habits of thought disposed them to place the essence of religion in the practical, or in works, that is to say, in the Judæo-Christians who could scarcely be said to have left Judaism behind them. It is only in this way that Paul's denial of *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων*, and James's denial of *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως* can appear in that natural relation to each other, which they must have held in the course of the advance from Judaism to Christianity. Christian polemic on the subject of *δικαιοῦσθαι* can have found the object of its attacks nowhere but in Judaism, as Neander cannot but allow. Now if the first object of attack in this controversy were *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, then (not to mention that Neander's rendering of it as an element of Judaism is utterly capricious and unwarranted) we should have this curious and unnatural state of affairs before us: that James

calls the Jewish *δικαιοῦσθαι* a *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, while Paul uses this expression of the Christian way of justification ; and that James calls the Christian *δικαιοῦσθαι* a *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων*, the expression by which Paul denotes the Jewish. In this way the Jewish *δικαιοῦσθαι* would be the Christian, and the Christian the Jewish ; the two writers would be writing of the same thing, but in each of the two expressions that had to be employed on the subject, each writer would mean the opposite of what the other writer meant. The two expressions would thus exchange meanings, without a word of explanation being added, and although one of the two writers must have had the other before him. So unnatural a theory of the relation between James and Paul could only have been invented to serve some purpose. The reason why it was denied that the Epistle of James contained any reference to the Pauline doctrine of justification was that this was the evidence that had been used to prove its later origin or its spuriousness. Thus in this case also personal considerations were placed above considerations of fact and substance. One would have supposed that there was a sufficient contrast between the author of this Epistle, a writer so much at home in the Greek language and in Greek modes of thought, and a genuine Palestinian Judæo-Christian like James, as we know him especially from the description of Hegešippus ; and that this would have been enough, had there been no other evidence, to preclude the idea that the latter could have been the writer.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> As the Epistle undoubtedly presupposes the development of the Pauline doctrine, its date cannot be placed very early. The Pauline doctrine must have become generally known, and its opposition to Judæo-Christianity perceived, before this Epistle was written. But it is not only the doctrine of the apostle Paul that we see to have been in existence at the time ; we find allusions to his Epistles, which leave little room for doubt that the author was acquainted with them. Compare i. 2 with Rom. v. 3 *sq.* ; i. 18 with Rom. viii. 23 ; i. 21 with Rom. xiii. 12 ; i. 22 with Rom. ii. 13 ; ii. 21 with Gal. iii. 6, Rom. iv. 3 ; iv. 1 with Rom. vii. 23 ; iv. 4 with Rom. viii. 7 ; iv. 12 with Rom. ii. 1, xiv. 4. As for the use made of the example of Abraham, this, as De Wette remarks, *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1830, p. 349, cannot be held to prove that James was referring to Paul's Epistles to the Galatians and Romans. Paul and his followers may have used the argument frequently in their oral discourses. Yet in view of such a

The doctrine of this Epistle, then, must be considered as intended to correct that of Paul. But we should not do justice to the Epistle nor understand its doctrinal position if we judged that this correction of the Pauline doctrine was the chief end for which it was written. What is devoted to this subject is manifestly only a part of the contents of the Epistle, which are in general eminently practical, and consist chiefly of admonitions and instructions. The main characteristic of the Epistle is its practical tendency, and this can only be understood from the Judæo-Christian standpoint from which it is written. What we have here is no longer the original harsh and rigid opposition of Judaism to Christianity, as we meet it in the Epistles of our apostle; the opposition has softened down, the harsher demands of the law are now departed from. There is nothing here to remind us of the Judæo-Christianity of James, a man whom we know from Gal. ii.

series of analogous passages it becomes more probable that there was such a reference. A curious circumstance is the appeal made both in this Epistle and in that to the Hebrews to the example of Rahab; James ii. 25, Heb. xi. 31. De Wette observes very truly:—"It is very improbable that the idea of quoting Rahab as an instance of faith occurred to any other mind than that of the writer to the Hebrews; it is not faith that she is celebrated for in the Old Testament, and her character is not above suspicion. The peculiar train of thought, however, which that writer was pursuing led him to exalt her as a heroine of faith. It is therefore extremely probable that James made use of this Epistle, and this very obvious fact could scarcely be denied on the evidence that properly belongs to the subject. The reason for refusing to accept it must be drawn from some foreign motive, or must consist in mere prejudice. Let each man lay his hand upon his heart, and ask himself whether, if the deductions to be made from this fact were such as suited him, he could continue to deny it." Neander's reply to this consists in the question whether the allusions are so obvious after all. It is always possible to put such questions, but they do not conceal the underlying subjective interest and motive, which Neander indeed almost acknowledges, to make the Epistle of James earlier than Paul. Every unprejudiced person must see that an Epistle which contains references to that to the Hebrews must be post-Pauline. Compare De Wette's *Einl. in d. N. T.*, p. 310, where the true verdict on the subject is given:—"The signs of later composition which the Epistle itself contains are abundantly sufficient to prove that it was not written by James the brother of the Lord, but by a later author who assumed his name. The fiction of which he availed himself, and of which moreover the unepistolary form of address is an additional feature, was one not uncommon in antiquity. This view is not new to the church, and it is only narrowness and timidity that will be startled at it now-a-days."

to have been impregnated with all the obstinacy of traditionary Judaism, and to have been the uncompromising upholder of every Jewish institution, even of circumcision. Christianity is indeed regarded as a νόμος, but it is a νόμος which has cast off the yoke of ceremonial Judaism; all that the expression is meant to convey is the idea of religion as moral action, as practical conduct. It can never cease to be considered an essential element of religion that it is a practical thing and must go forth in moral and religious action or works: and this, the main substance of the religion of the Old Testament, is asserted to belong to Christianity as well. This suggests to us that though Christianity was at first identical with Judaism in the eyes of the Judaeo-Christians, it had by the time when this Epistle was written passed through a certain process of development, and had thus reached a stage much later in time than that of Gal. ii. And when the writer calls the law the νόμος τέλειος τῆς ἐλευθερίας, we see plainly enough the influence that Pauline Christianity had been exerting in this quarter. The Judaeo-Christian writer of the Epistle has come to entertain the idea of freedom, an idea which can have signified nothing but the liberation of the consciousness from everything which appeared from the Christian point of view to be the yoke of Jewish bondage: and it was the apostle Paul who first introduced this idea into Christian thought. This standpoint, belonging as it did to the more educated Christian consciousness, was one which James was far from having made his own, for we must not form our estimate of his position from the Paulinizing account of him given in the Acts. Nor can any one who has conceived even a tolerably rational view of the history possibly consent to regard that Judaeo-Christianity which had passed through the Pauline process of development, and the original Judaeo-Christianity which rejected the root-principle of Paulinism, as belonging to the same group or epoch, or to disregard the wide gulf that lies between the two. It is urged by Neander that the readers of the Epistle were none but Judaeo-Christians and as such neither inclined nor able to attach themselves to Paul or to assimilate the Pauline system. This may


be so ; yet they are not by any means unaffected by the Pauline view of the law : the great concession is an accomplished fact, that Judaism is to dispense with several of its most important institutions for the sake of the alliance with Christianity. The main point is now to maintain Judaism on its spiritual side, as the religion of practical conduct or moral action. Regarded in this way the Epistle of James presents to us that form of Christianity in which it was based upon Judaism indeed, but Judaism spiritualized and released from its positive forms, and was conceived as mainly a practical religiousness. Pauline Christianity devotes its energies to the discovery of, and engrossment in, what is deepest in the Christian consciousness ; it is aware of a certain tendency to speculation ; it seeks to become a comprehensive theory, and to grasp the contents of Christianity in the light of its absolute idea, as represented in the person of Christ. It is not content with a simple declaration of the forgiveness of sins as a Christian truth, it seeks to explain how the fact is possible, and by what ways and means it is brought home to the consciousness. It recognises and asserts that the true essence of Christianity is found only in the history and the person of Christ ; but it does not rest in this as a fact declared ; it seeks to apprehend the person of Christ in its highest, its absolute significance. The standpoint of the Epistle of James is an entirely different one. Here the peculiar Pauline ideas of the death of Christ and its atoning virtue, of the Holy Spirit as the principle of Christian consciousness, and the subjective appropriation of salvation, and of the person of Christ, are left out of sight, not merely because they do not happen to come in the writer's way (being however presupposed, as it is said), but because they lie entirely outside of his sphere of vision. The higher dignity of Christ is but barely hinted at in the expression *Χριστὸς τῆς δόξης*, ii. 1. This is the only passage in the Epistle where Christ is named, so different is it in this respect from those of Paul. *Νόμος* and *κύριος* are no more than mentioned, and the latter in so indefinite a way that *κύριος* may be understood of God as well as of Christ. We see here what an Old Testament and



deistical thing, so to speak, Christianity would have become, if this had been the only channel of its development. There is no living impulse here to develop organically the specific Christian element as it is contained in the idea of the person of Christ: what is specifically Christian fades away into general religion, of which the practical is the substantial element. Christianity is indeed the word of truth (i. 18); not however as the eternal Logos, in the absolute idea of whom the Christology of Paul finds its satisfaction, but as the principle of a new moral creation and regeneration, through which it is to operate practically in moral conduct and action. As then Pauline Christianity, following up its theoretical tendency and going back to the inner principle of Christian consciousness, reaches a point where it seems directly to conflict with this mainly practical interest, it is inevitable that these two tendencies, the Pauline and the Jacobean, starting as they do from opposite poles, should at this point come into collision. This point is reached in the doctrine of justification by faith, as Paul propounds it; the opposition lurking in the two tendencies from the beginning appears in all its force in the conflicting statements: *δικαιοῦνται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων*, and *δικαιοῦνται ἐκ πίστεως*.

Let it not be supposed, however, that this correction of the Pauline doctrine of justification was the writer's sole object in composing his Epistle. Had this been the case, the subject must have occupied a much more prominent position in the Epistle, and been distinctly marked as its principal topic. It is clearly its connexion with the rest of what he has to say that leads the writer to take up this point. It is not hard to discern that the task the writer proposed to himself was to give a systematic view of Christian life as it appeared from the peculiar standpoint which he occupied with his particular form of Judæo-Christianity; to show what form and aspect Christian life with all its parts assumed in the light of such views as he held. Now as this standpoint was a thoroughly practical one, for the character of the Jewish religion, with which Christianity is so intimately blended here, made this a thing of course, it is natural that the Epistle should be occupied

mainly with the principal elements of practical moral life, as it displays itself in Christian actions and endurance. The Christian is to be exhibited here—in the character he wears from this point of view, as an *ἀνὴρ τέλειος*; and the perfection of Christian life—which can be nothing but an *ἔργον τέλειον*. The whole contents of the Epistle may be very simply and naturally arranged in the light of this idea. But we do not enter further into these details, our object in making these remarks being simply to show the relation borne by the doctrine of the Epistle to that of Paul, and to restore the Epistle to its place in the history of the early development of Christianity, from which it has been removed by unfounded and arbitrary assumptions.



## APPENDIX III.

### THE TWO EPISTLES TO THE THESSALONIANS : THEIR GENUINENESS AND THEIR BEARING ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE PAROUSIA OF CHRIST.

[Supplement to Part II. Chapter VII.<sup>1</sup>]

DR. LIPSIVS has lately returned to the discussion of the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, and has referred to my criticism of it.<sup>2</sup> He is of opinion that it is possible to accept my account of the peculiar characteristics of the Epistle without being shut up to my conclusion with regard to its genuineness. All that is needed for this end, he thinks, is a correcter view of the object of the Epistle. "The marks of a controversy against Judaism, of which the Epistle contains a considerable number, have never yet been placed in the right light. The apostolical dignity of Paul has been impugned or threatened, and his object in celebrating as he does the praises of the Thessalonians is to draw attention to the success of his labours among them as the best evidence of his apostolical calling. The passage ii. 3 betrays a distinct personal interest of this nature. He had been charged, and this attack can only have come from the Jews, with *πλάνη, ἀκαθαρσία, δόλος*, and doubts had been raised as to the purity of his motives. The Epistle carries us back to the time when Paul had just founded the churches of Macedonia. His repeated appeals to the Thessalonians as to the effectiveness of his preaching and the divine origin of his doctrine, his eagerness to defend himself against the imputation of impure motives, the description of his unselfish con-

<sup>1</sup> From the *Theol. Jahrbücher* xiv. 1855, p. 141 *sqq.* Cf. above, p. 97.

<sup>2</sup> In the *Studien und Kritiken* 1854, p. 905 *sqq.* : Ueber Zweck und Veranlassung des ersten Thessalonicher briefs.

duct, by which he rebuts the charge, and the statement to which he recurs again and again, that he does not aim at the applause of men, all this reminds us of the closely analogous situation of the Corinthian Epistles, especially the second. But the chief interest of the First Thessalonian Epistle is derived from the fact that the opposition to the apostle is not yet so pronounced and definite as we find it in those to the Corinthians. The opposition party has not yet taken shape, but the elements of it are already discernible, and the apostle sees the storm brewing. In these circumstances he had to take measures as far as possible to fortify his own position against the libellous attacks of his enemies, and to secure the church he had founded from inward disorder and dismemberment."

The chief point that criticism has to consider in the case of the first of these Epistles is undoubtedly the striking resemblance which, as I have already shown, it bears in a number of passages to the Epistles to the Corinthians. Dr. Lipsius does not deny the fact of this resemblance; but he differs from me in holding this Epistle to be the original, while I hold it to be the copy. We have thus to inquire whether we can reasonably consider the circumstances spoken of in this Epistle to be the beginnings and elements of the similar, only more fully developed set of circumstances which we find in the church of Corinth, or whether there is anything to show that they have been adopted for literary purposes, such as a later author writing under the assumed name of the apostle might think himself justified in promoting in this way. I am decidedly of opinion that the latter is the case. Repeated investigations of the subject have confirmed my conviction that the passages in question in the Thessalonian Epistles give us nothing that is primary or fresh or self-evidencing; that they are the copy of an original, that the features of the original have lost much of their clearness in being reproduced for another circle of readers, and that only by going back to the original is it possible to infuse life and reality into these fainter outlines. I shall seek to prove this in detail.

The Epistle begins, after the Pauline greeting and benediction, with almost the same words as 1 Cor. i. 4: *εὐχαριστοῦμεν τῷ Θεῷ πάντοτε περὶ πάντων ὑμῶν*, and with a thanksgiving, as in the Corinthian Epistle, for all the blessings conveyed to the Thessalonians through the gospel that had been preached to and received by them. The contrast drawn, i. 5, between *λόγος* and *δύναμις* shows the author to be moving in the same circle of ideas as the apostle in the first chapters of First Corinthians, though he merely extracts the general drift of ideas which there appear in much greater detail. The words: *ὅτι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν δυνάμει* amounts precisely to what the apostle says in a connexion which gives the statements far greater force and meaning, 1 Cor. ii. 4: *καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως*, etc., and iv. 20, *οὐ γὰρ ἐν λόγῳ ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐν δυνάμει*. At 1 Cor. xi. 1 the apostle sums up his exhortations in the sentence: *μιμηταὶ μου γίνεσθε καθὼς ἐγὼ Χριστοῦ*; but, 1 Thess. i. 6, this imitation is spoken of and praised as a thing the Thessalonians had already practised. They are extolled for the pattern they had given and which had already attracted attention far and wide, 1 Thess. i. 7 sq.: *ἀφ' ὑμῶν γὰρ ἐξήχηται ὁ λόγος τοῦ κυρίου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ καὶ Αἰγαίᾳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν παντὶ τόπῳ ἢ πίστις ἢ πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐξελλήλυθεν*, just as the apostle says in praise of the Roman Christians, Rom. i. 8: *ὅτι ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν καταγγέλλεται ἐν παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ*. But what reminds us more than anything else of the peculiar tone of the Corinthian Epistles is the reference, introduced with such earnestness, to the manner of the apostle's first appearance among the Thessalonians, and to the evidence their own consciousness must furnish of the success of his labours. Compare 1 Cor. ii. 1, *κατὰ ἔλθων πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, ἦλθον οὐ*, etc., verse 3, *καὶ ἐγὼ—ἐγενόμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς*: iii. 1, *καὶ ἐγὼ, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν*, etc. This appears even more markedly in the Second Epistle, especially i. 12, *ἡ γὰρ καύχησις ἡμῶν αὕτη ἐστὶ, τὸ μαρτύριον τῆς συνειδήσεως ἡμῶν*,

etc., iii. 2, *sq.* etc. The passages analogous to these in 1 Thess. are i. 9: *αὐτοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ὅποιαν εἴσοδον ἔσχομεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς*; ii. 1, *αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε, ἀδελφοί, τὴν εἴσοδον ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅτι οὐ κενὴ γέγονεν*; verse 5, *καθὼς οἶδατε*, verse 9, *μνημονεύετε γὰρ*; verse 10, *ὑμεῖς μάρτυρες*; verse 11, *καθάπερ οἶδατε*, etc. As in the Corinthian Epistles, so here, the meaning and aim of all the passages of this kind is to be found in the apostle's defence of himself against the imputations of his opponents. In the Epistle to the Corinthians other more general topics are made to lead up to this apology in one way and another; it is intimately interwoven with the other contents of the Epistles, rather indirectly than directly. In the Epistle to the Thessalonians we have an abstraction from the concrete historical circumstances of the former case, and the apologetic aim comes to the front and is dwelt upon for its own sake. The imputations against which the apostle is made to defend himself are in part extremely general and vague, and partly of such a nature that the falsehood of the accusation is quite obvious and scarcely needs to be demonstrated. What is purposely kept to the end in the Epistles to the Corinthians is here taken up at the very outset. In 1 Thess. ii. 3-6, we find an echo of the last two chapters of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, where the apostle vindicates his personal honour against his Judaizing opponents, and asserts himself to be no teacher of false doctrine, no deceiver, no flatterer, and that his conduct has not been selfish or ambitious or overbearing. As we read 2 Cor. xii. 16 *sq.* of *δόλφ λαβεῖν, πλεονεκτεῖν, ἐπιβαρεῖν*, so also here. The peculiar expression *ἐν βάρει εἶναι* especially points unmistakably to 2 Cor. xii. 16: *ἐγὼ οὐ κατεβάρησα ὑμᾶς*, and xi. 9, *ἐν παντὶ ἀβαρῆ ὑμῖν ἐμαντὸν ἐτήρησα*, and can only be explained from these passages. When the apostle says, We have not sought honour from men, neither from others, nor from you, *δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι, ὡς Χριστοῦ ἀπόστολοι*, this can only mean, as it is generally interpreted, that he did not do this although he might quite well have assumed

authority and asserted his position as an apostle of Christ.<sup>1</sup> But why is this conveyed with the expression *ἐν βάρει εἶναι*, which occurs nowhere else in the New Testament in this sense? The expression clearly ought to convey in accordance with its proper sense, the sense which it bears in both the passages of 2 Cor., the idea of burdensomeness to others, by means of oppressive demands on them, especially such as are dictated by covetousness and love of money. How is it then that *πλεονεξία* is conjoined with it in this passage, 1 Thess. ii. 5, where the former expression is used in quite a different sense, and where the two expressions do not supplement nor explain each other as in 2 Corinthians. It is evident from what follows that *ἐν βάρει εἶναι* at once suggested to the author the *ἐπιβαρεῖν* of the Corinthian Epistle, verse 9; he makes the apostle ask his readers to think of his labour and trouble, how working night and day, that he might not be burdensome to any of them, he preached to them the gospel of God. And here again we detect an arbitrary misinterpretation of a thing, which, as it occurs in the Corinthian Epistle, is quite natural and intelligible. The apostle himself speaks of a *κόπος* and *μόχθος* (the only other passage where these two occur in this conjunction is the parallel 2 Thess. iii. 8), but not in the special sense of a manual *ἐργάζεσθαι*: and in regard to the *οὐκ ἐπιβαρεῖν*, what he there asserts that he did out of consideration for the peculiar circumstances of the Corinthian church is in the Epistle to the Thessalonians represented as his universal practice. The section 1 Thess. ii. 1 *sq.* presents other points of analogy with the Corinthian Epistles (cf. verse 2, *ἐπαρρησιασάμεθα* with 2 Cor. iii. 12, *πολλῇ παρρησίᾳ χρώμεθα*, and the affectionate expressions with which the apostle speaks of the church as a child which he had nursed and cherished, 1 Thess. ii. 7, 11, with 2 Cor. xii. 14, 15). Dr. Lipsius can neither ignore nor account for these

<sup>1</sup> The interpretation of Lipsius is quite unnatural and grammatically impossible. As apostles of Christ we have no need of honour from men; on the contrary we are able to be in burden and trouble, i.e. to endure persecutions and afflictions of all kinds with an even mind. *Δυνάμενοι* here, as *δυνάμενος* Gal. iii. 21, is the pure abstract *can*; what one might do but does not actually do.

analogies. In the Corinthian Epistles there is never any doubt who the antagonists are against whom the apostle is defending himself; his whole argument is aimed at the Judaizing party who counteracted his influence in the Corinthian church. But who are the opponents with whom he is confronted in the First Epistle to the Thessalonians? Dr. Lipsius infers from ii. 14-16 that they were Jews who had made a personal attack on the apostle on account of the gospel he preached, because he had taken up the position of apostle to the Gentiles. "Thus it was an opposition which sprang from the same grounds as the Judaizing opposition in other quarters. The only difference is that the opponents dealt with here appear to stand for the most part outside of Christianity; the antagonism to the apostle had not yet reached the dangerous stage to which it rose in Corinth about a year later, when an anti-Pauline party made its appearance in the bosom of the Christian church itself. It was still possible to point to the churches of Palestine as examples of patient endurance of Judaistic persecution. This could never have been the case if emissaries had already arrived from Judaea for the purpose of stirring up the Christians of Macedonia against the apostle. What Paul feared was the formation at Thessalonica of an opposition, a Judaistically-minded Christ-party; since the attacks which proceeded here from the unbelieving Jews had been aimed at him in Galatia by the Judaeo-Christian party," etc. All this is entirely destitute of foundation; it is entirely imaginary. The churches of Palestine were the head-quarters of Christian Judaism, and how can they ever have been exposed to Judaistic persecution? And it is a mere unwarranted assumption, when Jews and Judaizers are classed together in this way as if what is true of the one were true of the other also. Both were, of course, hostile to the apostle; but is it conceivable that Jews expressed their antipathy to him with no graver charge than that of *πλεονεξία*, etc. They either rejected the gospel altogether as a *σκάνδαλον*, or they hated the apostle for being an apostate and an enemy of the law. It is, on the other hand, a very curious circumstance that while the



opponents whom the apostle combats in his Epistles are Judaizers, and Judaizers only, the smaller Epistles which assumed his name are occupied with a controversy with the Jews, a controversy, however, the very vagueness and generality of which show it to be the product of reflection. Where shall we find a passage in the Epistles to the Galatians, Corinthians, or Romans, where the apostle reproaches the Jews, as he is made to do here, 1 Thess. ii. 15, with having killed Jesus and the prophets, and persecuted himself, with not pleasing God, and being contrary to all men? The adversaries with whom he comes in contact in his Epistles are of a different kind; but at a time when Paulinism had no longer any conflict with Judæo-Christianity, and was interested rather in finding means of accommodation with it, the apostle was made to write not against the Judaizers, but against the Jews. He could not be conceived without a contest of some kind on his hands, and the Jews could be made to receive all that he had to hurl against the enemies of the gospel. And this explains the reference to the churches of Judæa as a pattern for Gentile Christians, 1 Thess. ii. 14. For this also we shall in vain seek a parallel in the admittedly genuine Epistles.

An analogy becomes always more undeniable the further it can be traced through a number of detached particulars. And this holds good in this instance. The next section, ii. 17-20 and iii. 1 *sq.*, bears very clearly the impress of the Corinthian Epistles, especially the second of them. It is curious how the apostle is said, ii. 17, not merely to have wished more than once, but to have actually formed the intention once and again, an intention which only Satan had hindered, of returning to Thessalonica. How could this be the case so immediately after his departure from that city, and when Timothy, whom he had left there on that occasion, had just rejoined him? How could he possibly have come to propose such a journey in the earlier stage of his residence at Corinth, and amid the stress of the anxieties and labours with which he was occupied and engrossed in founding a new church? When we consider, however, how much there is in this Epistle

that is evidently drawn from the Epistle to the Corinthians, we are naturally led to think in this case also of the journeys and projects of travel which are so frequently referred to in those Epistles. The author adopted this as part of the plan of the Epistle he was writing, without noticing the improbability of it; he meant it to be simply an additional proof of the tender love and attachment which he makes his apostle express with so many phrases and ideas borrowed from the Corinthian Epistles. I have drawn attention to this already, but the argument may be greatly strengthened from what is said afterwards, iii. 1, about the sending of Timothy. The situation of the apostle which is described here is closely similar to that with which we are acquainted from 2 Cor. ii. 12, vii. 5 *sq.* According to those passages the apostle is in great anxiety and unrest on account of the state of the Corinthian church; he looks with restless solicitude for the news he is to receive from it, and in proportion to his anxiety is his delight when Titus comes and sets his doubts at rest with the assurances he brings of that church's continued attachment to him. We find all this repeated in 1 Thess. iii. 1 *sq.* The apostle cannot bear (verse 1, *μηκέτι στέγοντες*, cf. 2 Cor. ii. 13, *οὐκ ἔσχηκα ἄνεσιν τῷ πνεύματι μου*, vii. 5, *οὐδεμίαν ἔσχηκεν ἄνεσιν ἢ σὰρξ ἡμῶν*) his anxiety for the Thessalonians any longer; he must have information about them; he fears they may have been shaken by their afflictions. He therefore despatches Timothy to them; and when Timothy returns he is rejoiced and comforted with the tidings of their steadfastness in the faith and their undiminished love to him, just as in the other case by the coming of Titus (2 Cor. vii. 6, *παρεκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Θεὸς ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ Τίτου—ἀναγγέλλων ἡμῖν τὴν ὑμῶν ἐπιπόθησιν—ὥστε με μᾶλλον χαρῆναι*, 1 Thess. iii. 6: *ἄρτι δὲ ἐλθόντος Τιμοθέου πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀφ' ὑμῶν—καὶ εὐαγγελισαμένου ἡμῖν—καὶ ὅτι ἔχετε μνησιν ὑμῶν—ἐπιποθοῦντες ἡμᾶς ἰδεῖν—διὰ τοῦτο παρεκλήθημεν, ἀδελφοί, ἐφ' ὑμῖν—*

<sup>1</sup> Compare also 1 Thess. ii. 19, *τίς γὰρ στέφανος καυχῆσεως, ἢ οὐχὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς, καὶ ἡ χαρὰ*; iii. 7, *ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ θλίψει καὶ ἀνάγκῃ ὑμῶν*, with 2 Cor. vii. 4, *πολλὴ μοι καύχησις ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὑπερπερισσεύομαι τῇ χαρᾷ ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ θλίψει ὑμῶν.*

ἐπὶ πάσῃ τῇ χαρᾷ, ἣ χαίρομεν, etc.) The disagreement of our Epistle with the Acts in respect of Timothy is undoubtedly due to the wish to give a copy of the scene of the Corinthian Epistle. In the Acts, xvii. 14, Silas and Timothy stayed at Berea when Paul went from there to Athens, and rejoined him afterwards at Corinth. According to our Epistle, iii. 1, Timothy is with the apostle at Athens; it is from Athens that the apostle sends this ἀδελφὸς καὶ συνεργὸς (this latter predicate is given to Titus, 2 Cor. viii. 23) to Thessalonica, probably for no other reason than that in 2 Cor. the apostle is still on his journey, and his unrest and impatience on the journey give so eloquent and vivid a proof of his vehement desire for them. It is, of course, quite possible that these circumstances may have occurred more than once in the apostle's life; but when we find so many things repeated under the same circumstances, and the same occurrence narrated with the same words, we have a right to ask if the one account is not imitated from the other.

The hortatory part of the Epistle, which begins in chap. iv., does not contain such striking analogies; yet even here there are parallel sentences, the expressions of which are very similar to those of the corresponding sentences in the older Epistles. Compare 1 Thess. iv. 3, ἀπέχεσθε ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς πορνείας, with 1 Cor. vi. 18, φεύγετε τὴν πορνείαν. The exhortation 1 Thess. iv. 4: εἰδέναι ἕκαστον ὑμῶν etc., is quite analogous to that given by the apostle, 1 Cor. vii. 2 sq. in regard to the conduct of married people. The exhortation 1 Thess. iv. 6, μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ answers to the apostle's rebuke, 1 Cor. vi. 8, ὑμεῖς ἀδικεῖτε καὶ ὑποστερεῖτε καὶ ταῦτα ἀδελφούς, which refers to πρᾶγμα ἔχειν πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον of verse 1. The sentences 1 Thess. v. 19 sq: τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ σβέννυτε, προφητείας μὴ ἐξουθενεῖτε, πάντα δὲ δοκιμάζετε, τὸ καλὸν κατέχετε, are somewhat different in sound, but in scope and spirit they are just the same as the general concluding exhortation, 1 Cor. xiv. 39, 40, ζηλοῦτε τὸ προφητεύειν, καὶ τὸ λαλεῖν γλώσσαις μὴ κωλύετε, πάντα δὲ εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν γινέσθω.

Dr. Lipsius's attempt to defend the genuineness of the First Thessalonian Epistle would not of itself have induced me to return to the question regarding these two writings, had it not been that I thought myself in a position to give a further contribution to the settlement of it. The two Epistles are intimately related to each other by similarity of contents, certain passages proving that one of them must have been known to the writer of the other (cf. 1 Thess. ii. 9, and 2 Thess. iii. 8); and whatever verdict criticism may pass on one of them, will naturally determine our view of the other. The two simplest cases are that both are genuine or that both are spurious; there is another possible case, that the one is genuine and the other spurious, but this case can only be proved by such a careful comparison of the two as will show the spuriousness of the one to result from the genuineness of the other, or the genuineness of one from the spuriousness of the other. What has to be done first of all, however, is to find a point from which to determine the historical situation to which the Epistles belong. It is easy to deal in suppositions and probabilities, greater or less, with regard to such a monument of the primitive church; but what are they worth if there be no one fixed point for the hypothesis and combination to rest upon with some little solidity? The second of these Epistles is of greater value in the eyes of criticism than the first, its doctrine of Antichrist and of the Parousia being more definite and giving a better clew to the historical situation. Thus what we have first of all to examine is the eschatology of the chief passage of this Epistle. It has hitherto been considered, and I myself formerly held this view, that what we have in 2 Thess. ii. 1 *sq.* is the Christian view of Antichrist as it had arisen from a Jewish basis, chiefly in accordance with the prophecies of the book of Daniel; described in the chief features which it had assumed up to that time. This however gave too much room to suppose that the apostle Paul shared in the Jewish views of his contemporaries on the subject; and whatever trouble we may take to show his eschatology to be different from that of this Epistle, we shall always be met by the

assertion that the one as well as the other lies inside the Jewish circle of ideas on the subject. We must therefore ask more definitely whether in 2 Thess. ii. we do actually find ourselves entirely within the sphere of Jewish eschatology, such as the apostle also may have adopted; or whether we do not find a view of Antichrist which can only have arisen on Christian soil, and which presupposes events and experiences that belong to a later age than that of the apostles.

There can be no doubt, when we consider it, that the key to the chief passage of the Epistle, and therefore to the aim and character of the whole writing, is to be found in the Apocalypse. The Apocalypse is the earliest writing in which we find the concrete representation of a personal Antichrist; here the absolute enemy of Christianity is identified with the person of the Emperor Nero, and the picture of Antichrist is composed accordingly of features which are clearly enough borrowed from Nero's history and character. The same belief appears in the description of our Epistle. Antichrist is a definite person, an individual appearing in history at a certain fixed date; he is the man of sin, the son of perdition, the adversary who exalts himself above all that is called God, and is an object of worship, to such an extent that he places himself in the temple of God and asserts of himself that he is God. This description of Antichrist derives several of its expressions from the prophet Daniel (compare especially xi. 36), but it also coincides with the description of the Apocalypse. The Apocalypse does not make Antichrist declare that he is God, but the actions of the false prophet who stands beside the beast all serve to represent the beast or Antichrist, as an object of worship, such as is due to the supreme God alone. Cf. Apoc. xiii. 12, 14, 15, xix. 20. And *ἐπιδεικνύναι ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι ἐστὶ Θεὸς* does not refer, if accurately rendered, to what Antichrist says of himself in words, but rather to what he represents himself to be by his acts, in his whole Antichristian behaviour. The difference thus comes to be that what the Apocalypse sets before our eyes in a succession of scenes by means of narrative and description, the author of our Epistle com-

presses into a general notion, and expresses concisely by means of accurate definition. There is nothing to prevent us from taking the Antichrist of our Epistle to be the same individual who is described more at large in the Apocalypse. The expressions *ἀνομία* and *ἄνομος* on the one side, and *ναὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* on the other, may serve as an indication that we have to seek this individual in the circle of the heathen world. In what follows we recognise the views and images of the Apocalypse even more clearly.<sup>1</sup> Antichrist is the representative and organ of Satan, derives all power from him, and operates through false signs and wonders, through works of deceit, by which he plunges into destruction those who fall away from the truth and believe in him. Compare with *παρουσία κατ' ἐνέργειαν τοῦ σατανᾶ ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει*, Rev. xiii. 2, *ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ* (the beast or Antichrist) *ὁ δράκων τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν θρόνον αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξουσίαν μεγάλην* : with *σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα ψεύδους*, what the Revelation says of the false prophet, xiii. 13 sq., that he *ποιεῖ σημεῖα μεγάλα*, etc., cf. xix. 20 : *ὁ ποιήσας τὰ σημεῖα ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* ; with the *ἐνέργεια πλάνης*, through which men believe a lie, Rev. xiii. 14, *πλανᾷ τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς*, and xix. 20, *ἐν οἷς ἐπλάνησε τοὺς λαβόντας τὸ χάραγμα τοῦ θηρίου*, etc. The subjection of Antichrist is given differently in the Apocalypse, where the two organs of Satan, the beast and the false prophet, are at once hurled into the place of torment of the lower powers. The author of the Epistle represents Antichrist, whom he expressly describes as a man, as destroyed by the Lord through the breath of his mouth. This *πνεῦμα τοῦ στόματος*, however, is equivalent to the *ρόμφαία ὀξεῖα* which proceeds in the Revelation xix. 15, 21, *ἐκ τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ*, and by which all the remnant are killed. In all these particulars the Epistle to the Thessalonians and the Apocalypse are substantially agreed ; and there are some other points in the Epistle which appear inexplicable until the Apocalypse explains them. The most difficult problem in the

<sup>1</sup> Kern took it for granted in his discussion on 2 Thess. ii. 1-12, in the *Tübingen Zeitschrift für Theologie* 1839, H. 2, p. 200 sq., that the apocalyptic description of 2 Thess. is of a piece with the prophecy of the Revelation xiii. 3 sq., xvii. 10 sq., in which Nero returns in the character of Antichrist.

Epistle has hitherto been to find an interpretation for the *κατέχων* and the *μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας* which is already working. De Wette, for example, thinks that the mystery of iniquity should not be understood of any individual, but of the still uncollected and unformed mass of iniquity which was to assume form and personality in Antichrist, and of which the writer may have seen some manifestations in the opposition of fanatical Jews. But the expression *ἀνομία* prevents us from thinking of Jews: the reproach contained in the word was one for the Jews to bring against the apostle, not one to which they themselves were liable. The sense and substance of the passage are clear enough: that the beginnings and elements are already present of that which will make its appearance in full concrete reality in the person of Antichrist. But why is the word *μυστήριον* used to express this idea, and wherein does this *μυστήριον* consist, as Antichrist had not appeared at all, and what had appeared, the premonitory symptoms of his approach, was no secret, but manifest and visible? The only probable meaning seems to be this: that Antichrist was present in essence in the still scattered and isolated manifestations of *ἀνομία*. This presence of Antichrist in essence is, however, too abstract a notion; the statement is vague and shadowy; the power of evil that is working in the world is not fixed to any definite point, the person of Antichrist is not yet present at all, and his personal appearance is conceived merely as the concentration of all the various manifestations of the power of evil into a unity. Surely the writer must have meant something more than this. The difficulty is at once solved if we take the idea of Antichrist in this Epistle to be that of the Apocalypse. If it be the emperor Nero, then Antichrist is present as a person before he is fully revealed in the character of Antichrist. We have to think of the period in describing which the Apocalypse says of the beast, xvii. 8, *ὅτι ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ παρέσται*. Nero, as emperor, has retired from the scene and is reported to be dead; but he is still alive, and will come again as Antichrist. In this interval he is secretly and mysteriously active, and preparing to appear in the

full energy of Antichrist, as soon as his hour is come (*εἰς τὸ ἀποκαλυφθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ καιρῷ*, verse 6). This then is the meaning of the words: *τὸ γὰρ μυστήριον ἤδη ἐνεργεῖται τῆς ἀνομίας*. Antichrist is already come, but not openly, and is preparing in his retirement for the period when he is to appear. The word *μυστήριον* answers this interpretation perfectly. It is used in the same peculiar sense as in the Revelation xvii. 5, cf. verse 7. Here it is said of the woman that she has a name written on her forehead as *μυστήριον*, namely *Βαβυλὼν ἡ μεγάλη*; the meaning of which is that the name Babylon is given to her only in a figurative sense, that the reader is to think of something else that is merely hinted or suggested in this name; that is, that the name stands in reality for the city of Rome. In the same way the expression *μυστήριον ἀνομίας*, 2 Thess. ii. 7, is intended to indicate that *ἀνομία* or the worker of it, the *ἄνομος*, stand for something else not stated, which is to give the notion of Antichrist an actual body and contents. What the word *μυστήριον* conveys is the notion of a vague hint which has to be filled up and supplemented by being referred to something actually existing in history. If this be, as we think it is, an adequate solution of the *μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας*, then the *κατέχων*, or as the writer says more definitely *ὁ κατέχων*, no longer presents any difficulty. What can it refer to but the intermediate government, which the Apocalypse agrees with our Epistle in placing between the disappearance and the return of Nero: the Roman emperor who occupied the throne when the Epistle was written, not Galba (even the Apocalypse makes him the sixth, followed by a seventh), but one of the following emperors.<sup>1</sup> The further definition depends on other considerations which we have still to notice.

<sup>1</sup> The Apocalypse makes the sixth emperor to be followed by a seventh, who is to be immediately succeeded by the reappearing Nero. This limitation to the number seven is owing to the writer's view that the seven hills of Rome symbolize the number of her rulers; xvii. 9 *αἱ ἑπτὰ κεφαλαὶ ἑπτὰ ὄρη εἰσιν, ὅπου ἡ γυνὴ κάθηται ἐπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ βασιλεῖς ἑπτὰ εἰσιν*. Thus there can only be seven Roman emperors in all, and the seventh, the immediate predecessor of Antichrist, is the *κατέχων*; i.e. the last before him. The notion of the *κατέχων* can only have arisen



We must now inquire into the purpose and occasion of the Epistle. The writer's mind is engrossed and preoccupied with the Parousia of Christ, the judgment that is then to overtake the unbelieving world, and the glory which the faithful may anticipate as the reward and compensation of their sufferings. He thinks it necessary, however, to warn his readers against the assertion that the day of the Lord is already come. They are not to be shaken out of their composure, nor to give way to terror, not even—there can be no doubt that this is the meaning—though some one make the announcement with prophetic inspiration, or appeal in support of it to a pretended declaration or letter of the apostle himself. They are to let no man deceive them by any means, nor delude them into thinking that the day of the Parousia is coming now. This must evidently refer to some movement that had arisen among the Christians. The exhortation *εἰς τὸ μὴ ταχέως σαλευθῆναι* appears to indicate that something had been done already betraying a want of self-control and a readiness to be excited and led away. Let us seek for the traces of something of this kind in the history of the time. The Parousia is closely connected with Antichrist, and Antichrist with Nero, and thus we are naturally led to think of some of the pseudo-Neronian disturbances. Indeed it is surprising that none of the interpreters have sought the occasion of the Epistle in this quarter. A passage in Tacitus, which is often quoted for other purposes, approaches our Epistle even in its expressions and might well have been employed in this way. "Sub idem tempus," Tacitus says, Hist. ii. 8, of the period after the murder of Galba,

from the view of the Apocalypse. The apocalyptic elements of the Epistle have not been properly attended to. In the first chapter as well as in the second, we meet with the ideas and the spirit of the Apocalypse. The sufferings of the Christians are regarded throughout from the point of view of retributive justice. The result of these sufferings is to be, for the righteous, that they will be glorified and judged worthy of the kingdom of God; while the ungodly will be punished to avenge them. Compare 2 Thess. i. 5, and Rev. vi. 6 *sq.*, vii. 14, xi. 18.

The appearing of the Lord when he comes with his mighty angels is described in the same way as in Rev. xix. 11 *sq.* Compare the *ἐν πυρὶ φλογός* 2 Thess. i. 8, with the *φλόξ πυρός* of his eyes, Rev. xix. 12; and the *ἄγγελοι δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ*, 2 Thess. i. 7, with the *στρατεύματα τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ*, Rev. xix. 14.

when Otho and Vitellius, and even Vespasian were taking up arms for their several interests, "Achaia atque Asia falso exterritae, velut Nero adventaret; vario super exitu ejus rumore, eoque pluribus vivere eum fingentibus credentibusque. Inde late terror, multi ad celebritatem nominis erecti, rerum novarum cupidine et odio praesentium. Gliscentem in dies famam fors discussit."<sup>1</sup> Achaia, or Greece and Macedonia, and Asia Minor, were the chief seat of this disturbance, and Thessalonica was in these provinces. Even at that early date there were many Christians in these districts; and as the reappearance of Nero meant to them simply the coming of Antichrist, the terror occasioned by the report would affect them more powerfully than their neighbours, and may have caused them to behave in such a way as to aggravate the general alarm and confusion.<sup>2</sup> There can be no doubt that prophets arose who applied the signs of the times in their own manner, and perhaps appealed to the Johannine Apocalypse, which was already well known. Pauline Christians did not fail for their part to point to the utterances of Paul, verbal or epistolary, in which he was held to have foretold the catastrophe. At the time when our Epistle was written, the excitement was spoken of as *ταχέως σαλευθῆναι ἀπὸ τοῦ νόου*, and set down to some unscrupulous person who had imposed on the general credulity; the ludibrium falsi Neronis must thus have disappeared again, and the Epistle must have been written after the alarm was over. As we read of gliscentem in dies fama, the commotion may have continued for some time, but its collapse was so sudden and complete (fors discussit) that there

<sup>1</sup> We know of three pseudo-Neros. The first is that spoken of above; a second is mentioned by Zonaras (p. 578 c. cf. Reimarus on Dio Cassius, c. 64, 9). He appeared in A.U.C. 832 under Titus, gained a considerable following in Asia Minor and the regions of the Euphrates, and sought refuge at last with the Parthian king. The third is he, of whom Tacitus says, Hist. i. 2, that through him, mota prope Parthorum arma. According to Suetonius, vita Ner., c. 57, this was twenty years after Nero's death. The situation of our Epistle shuts us up to the first of these *falsi Neronis*.

<sup>2</sup> If the terror was so great and general as Tacitus describes, we are obliged to attribute it to the Christians more than others, for this among other reasons, that many of the Gentiles desired the return of Nero, and must have hailed the report of it. Cf. Theologische Jahrbücher, 1852, p. 332 sq.

could be no doubt of the utter groundlessness of the whole story, and it would naturally be spoken of as a thing of the past, just as we find in our Epistle. Yet we must not go too far beyond the date of the Neronian catastrophe; in spite of the experience gained from the appearance of the false Nero, our writer does not by any means relinquish the belief that Nero is to reappear; he knows that the *μυστήριον τῆς ἀνομίας ἤδη ἐνεργεῖται*, and that it is nothing but the existence of the *κατέχων*, the Emperor presently in possession of the throne, that causes his appearance to be delayed.<sup>1</sup>

It was important, therefore, to learn from the error that had been committed, and to deduce from it the principle on which the expectations of the future are to be formed. The newly made experience is vividly present to the writer's mind, and he derives from it the new criteria on which his new theory of the Parousia is based. The Parousia cannot take place until Antichrist has come, and Antichrist cannot come till after the falling away, and neither the falling away nor Antichrist can come until the *κατέχων* is taken out of the way. When, therefore, the ruling emperor has fallen, the catastrophe of the Parousia will begin. Now Galba had fallen already, so had also Otho and Vitellius, and notwithstanding this, the Nero of report had turned out to be a fictitious one. The several criteria here mentioned must therefore follow hard one on the other. With the fall of the present emperor comes Antichrist, with him must come the *ἀποστασία*, and this can be nothing but what the Apocalypse describes, xiii. 4, 8, 12, the idolatrous *προσ-*

<sup>1</sup> As the reigns of Otho and Vitellius were extremely short, the *κατέχων* is probably Vespasian, and the Epistle will then have been composed in the early years of his reign. It might be inferred from the *καθίσαι εἰς τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, 2 Thes. ii. 4, that the date is prior to the destruction of Jerusalem. Our only reason for doubting this is, that the Epistle shows the Apocalypse to have been already well known. The expression might be taken as a figurative one, formed after the prophet Daniel; or *ναὸς Θεοῦ* may be equivalent to *τόπος τοῦ ναοῦ*. Even though the temple was not standing, the place where it had stood was considered equally sacred, as we see from the setting up of the idol under Hadrian. Cf. the *krit. unters. über die kan. ev.*, p. 606 *sq.* The feeling of sanctity attached not so much to the temple as to the site on which the temple stood, as the temple itself is called *ἅγιος τόπος*; Acts vi. 13 *sq.*, xxi. 28.

*κυνεῖν*, namely, which is rendered to Antichrist at his appearance, when the whole unbelieving world hails him and espouses his cause. But this criterion is not enough ; it is not easy to be certain whether the following that a reputed Nero gets is sufficient in number and of such a character as to be a sure token of Antichrist. Antichrist must therefore reveal and declare himself to be what he is, the *ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας*, the *υἱὸς ἀπωλείας*, the *ἀντικείμενος καὶ ὑπεραιρόμενος ἐπὶ πάντα λεγόμενον Θεὸν ἢ σέβασμα, ὥστε αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν ναὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ καθίσει, ἀποδεικνύοντα ἑαυτὸν ὅτι ἐστὶ Θεός*. The main point, in a word, is the *ἀποκαλυφθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ καιρῷ*. Now what does all this amount to ? It is precisely the instruction and the warning that would be suggested by the experience just gained in the matter of the false Nero. That Christians were not to let themselves be imposed upon by any such ludibrium, nor led to think that the Parousia of Christ was to take place immediately ; that this belief would not be warranted until Antichrist had revealed himself so unmistakably with all his proper tokens, as to leave no doubt whatever of his actual presence. This is all intended, it is clear, to prevent the recurrence in the future of such commotions, as we see from the historical data that the affair of the false Nero had excited. The Christian is to consider it his duty to exercise caution and presence of mind, and to avoid all precipitation. With regard to the Parousia, he is to regulate his behaviour and his views strictly in accordance with the tangible evidence of facts.

The exhortations given in a later part of the Epistle are very appropriate to the historical situation we have traced. The belief in the Parousia could easily operate in a very demoralizing way. What was the use of caring for the future, or making orderly arrangements, if the Parousia might come at any moment and be the end of all ? This state of feeling could be more mischievous still. There were men to whom this state of things gave a welcome opportunity to indulge in their natural love of disorder. There were such men among the Christians : faith, *i.e.* the right Christian faith, was not a thing possessed by all, as is said, iii. 2 ; there

were not wanting *ἄστοποι καὶ πονηροὶ ἄνθρωποι*, who became a burden upon other people. The main part of the writer's exhortations is thus directed very naturally against disorderly life, against idleness and refusal to labour. The last was the chief evil; it arose from the view that all things were on the verge of dissolution. It was thought unnecessary to continue to work, men lounged about in idleness, and thought no shame to live at the expense of others, since those who had means would no longer be able, when the Parousia came, to make any use of them. It is those people who are spoken of in iii. 11 : *ἀκούομεν γὰρ τινὰς περιπατοῦντας ἐν ὑμῖν ἀτάκτως, μηδὲν ἐργαζομένους, ἀλλὰ περιεργαζομένους*. Hence the earnest admonition, not to go idle, but to work (*μετὰ ἡσυχίας ἐργάζεσθαι*, iii. 12), and the insistence upon the principle, that he who will not work, should get nothing to eat, iii. 10; which, however, is not to prejudice the exercise of the Christian duty of beneficence towards those who are in want, iii. 13. In this connexion, where the writer is recommending work for the purpose of self-support, and that Christians should beware of being burdensome to others, nothing could be happier than his appeal to the apostle's own example, and to the principles enunciated by him in his own Epistles. *Αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἶδατε, πῶς δεῖ μιμῆσθαι ἡμᾶς*, etc., verse 7 *sq.* The writer is obviously thinking of the passage 1 Cor. ix. 4 *sq.*; he very appropriately generalizes what the apostle says, 1 Cor. ix. 12, that he did for a special purpose, and imputes to him a wider motive : *ἵνα ἑαυτοὺς τόπον δώμεν ὑμῖν εἰς τὸ μιμῆσθαι ἡμᾶς*, v. 9. In the sentences, *μὴ συναναμίγνησθε, ἵνα ἐντραπή—ὁ κύριος τῆς εἰρήμης*, iii. 14, 16, we find further points of resemblance to the Corinthian Epistles. Cf. 1 Cor. v. 9, 11; 2 Cor. xiii. 2.

If this interpretation of the occasion and scope of the Epistle be accepted, it certainly cannot be charged with any want of colour or point, or historical character. The situation from which it is written is such that we fully appreciate the necessity that existed for issuing such a piece of Christian exhortation, and the desirability of investing it with the name of that apostle whom the Churches of those regions for whom it was mainly intended revered as their founder.

One very obvious result of the foregoing investigation, however, is that the apostle Paul cannot possibly have written this Epistle himself. He could know nothing of an Antichrist appearing in the person of the Emperor Nero; nor of a *κατέχων*, by whom the portentous catastrophe was in the meantime delayed, nor of the circumstances which called so urgently for exhortations like those to be addressed to the members of his Churches. Whom could the apostle possibly have meant with the *κατέχων*? It is said to be more than probable—De Wette shares this view—that he meant the Roman empire or the Roman emperor. There can be no doubt, it is said, that he had the book of Daniel before his mind, that the four monarchies of that book represented to him the whole course of the world's history down to the appearance of the Messianic kingdom, and that he unquestionably held the fourth to be the Roman empire, as did Josephus and the early fathers, so that this empire which still existed was the only obstacle in the way of the last catastrophe. He had before his eyes the condition of the world as it then was, and his vision carried him no further. He expected the speedy termination of the Roman empire, and after that the appearance of Antichrist, and finally, but still in his own lifetime, the second coming of Christ. All this, however, fails to explain how he formed this peculiar conception of a *κατέχων*. The Roman empire was the last; and Antichrist might come sooner or later during its existence. Now if the Roman empire, or the Roman emperor, was held to be the *κατέχων*, it must surely have had some characteristic features showing it to be so, and contained some definite symptoms of the impending catastrophe. But if, as is generally assumed, the Epistle was written in the year 53 A.D., what reason was there to deem the then reigning emperor Claudius to be the *κατέχων*, the power which alone stood in the way of the appearance of Antichrist? Or if the Epistle be placed at the very beginning of the reign of Nero, we know of nothing at that period that could lead any one to suppose that that Emperor would be the last. All that we find in this period is the general belief that the end of the world was near, but so long as this expectation derived

no special strength or colour from anything personal to the then reigning emperor, it is hard to see why he should be called the *κατέχων*. Nor is it easy to explain why, if the apostle thought it necessary at that time to give such a careful and circumstantial opinion on the Parousia, he never returned to the subject in any of his subsequent Epistles. In the later Epistles he entirely ignores, on this hypothesis, the vivid expectation of Antichrist which he had awakened, when he represented him as already working in secret, and about to appear in the immediate future. Was it not somewhat strange that having presented these ideas with such emphasis to the Christian consciousness, he should all at once drop the subject; that he should have nothing to say of the many prophecies he had uttered and which had remained unfulfilled, and pass at once to the announcement of the instant approach of the Parousia of Christ (1 Cor. xv. 51)? To explain all this, we are reminded of the narrow limits of time, which the apostle spoke of in his prophecy, and are even told that as the events which he expected from the immediate future did not take place, it was unreasonable to expect the fulfilment of the prophecy from a future more remote. It is better, we are told, to acknowledge that Paul made a mistake, that his characteristic impetuosity made him imagine that he knew things which it is not given to man to know, not even to an apostle though filled beyond all other men with the spirit of Christ. If this be all that can be said, the Epistle stands before us a riddle utterly unsolved. Would it not be far simpler to refer it to the time to which all its characteristic features obviously point, and to accept the conclusion that the apostle himself was not the writer? But, it may be objected, how could another writer make the apostle say these things if he could not possibly have said them himself? how could a later writer make him speak of Nero as Antichrist, when this theory could have had no evidence nor reason at the time when the Epistle was represented as having been written? The answer to this question is found in the precautions taken by the writer himself to meet it, if it should arise. In such a point we see very distinctly how the

character of such an Epistle is insensibly determined by the double personality of the writer. The writer is the apostle and yet at the same time another person; the form of the Epistle is from the pretended, the contents from the real, author, and these two have to be made to harmonize in some way. There are several things in the Epistle which give us a tolerably clear glimpse of an age lying beyond the apostle's time; and yet these are so managed as not to make its apostolic authorship too palpably impossible or improbable. The special concrete individual elements of the later history are as far as possible generalized, as we see in the conception of Antichrist. It is not till we take Nero to be the actual subject of the predicates with which Antichrist is characterized, that the picture appears before us as that of a real person; and yet it cannot be said that any of the traits of the picture is so specifically Neronian as to show the writer to have forgotten the part he was playing. He does not mention a *κατέχων* without speaking first of *τὸ κατέχον*, the abstract instead of the concrete, a phrase which suggests nothing more than some hindrance or other in the circumstances of the times. Again, we see the writer trying to engraft his own interests on the personal history of the apostle, and to keep up the fictitious personality, by asserting again and again that the apostle had told his readers by word of mouth, when he was present with him, what he was now writing, cf. ii. 5; iii. 10. Thus should there be anything in the Epistle that is not quite clear, they are to imagine what he said orally as the commentary to it, and to remember that the original readers had been already acquainted with the apostle's meaning. The pretended apostle, as author of the Epistle, is thus made to assure himself again and again of his identity with the true apostle; which simply shows that the writer felt this to be the weak point in his literary undertaking. In the same way the frequent allusions to passages of the authentic Epistles are meant to confirm us in the belief that we are altogether within the familiar circle of the Pauline ideas. But the more pains such a production takes to prove itself a Pauline Epistle (as notably in the conclusion, iii. 17, 18), the



more reason does there appear for holding its asserted origin to be doubtful.

We must now look back from the second Epistle to the first. If we have made up our minds about the second it will be less difficult to arrive at a definite opinion with regard to the first. As we saw that the genuineness of the first is doubtful, and as that of the second has even stronger evidence against it, we have now to inquire what, in this view of their origin, is the relation which they bear to each other.

The First Epistle deals in its exhortations with a wider range of subjects, and is at more pains than the second to explain by considerations personal to the apostle how the different topics it contains came to be taken up. Yet the question of the Parousia is evidently the foremost in the writer's mind, he thinks the time calls urgently for instruction and explanation on the subject. This point is kept prominently in view from the very beginning: even in the introduction, i. 3, the writer speaks of the *ὑπομονὴ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἡμῶν*, i. e. the hope of his return. He calls Jesus, i. 10, *τὸν ῥύόμενον ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης*, and God, ii. 12, *τὸν καλῶν ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βασιλείαν καὶ δόξαν*. He speaks repeatedly of the Parousia as the ultimate event which the efforts of Christians are to keep in view, ii. 19: *τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐλπίς—ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ—ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ*: iii. 13, *εἰς τὸ στηρίξαι ὑμῶν τὰς καρδίας—ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ μετὰ πάντων τῶν ἁγίων αὐτοῦ*. When he comes to speak of this subject specially, iv. 13, he makes the transition with the same formula with which the apostle generally introduces the more important passages of his Epistles: *οὐ θέλομεν δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν*. On comparing the sections in the two Epistles which deal with the Parousia, we are struck by the fact, that though there is said to be a very short interval of time between the two, the first contains no trace of what the second treats as a matter of the first importance. The first seeks to reassure its readers concerning those who have fallen asleep, and to instruct

them when the Parousia is to be expected; but there is not a word of Antichrist nor of the circumstances which are to herald his appearance. The interpreters have nothing to say on this point that bears the least semblance of probability. De Wette, for example, says that the strongly apocalyptic tendency of the apostle's preaching produced an extraordinary sensation at Thessalonica. The First Epistle did nothing to allay the excitement, but on the contrary insisted on the duty of being constantly on the watch for the immediate advent of Christ. The apostle felt it necessary afterwards to do something to cool down the fervour of the expectations the Thessalonians had formed. But this cannot surely have been necessary, for the picture of Antichrist that is drawn with such care must have been a fresh source of agitation. But why does Antichrist come on the scene at this point? According to 2 Thess. ii. 5, the apostle had spoken of Antichrist during his residence at Thessalonica, but even supposing the Second Epistle to be genuine, we cannot help asking why the First Epistle does not contain the least allusion to the subject. If the Second Epistle is to be fixed to the definite historical position we have indicated, it becomes impossible to frame any rational theory of the relation borne to it by the first, except on the assumption that the first was written after the second, and at a considerable interval after it. The expectation of Antichrist had died away of itself, since Antichrist had failed to appear at the time when everything in the Roman empire seemed to be ready for him. It was impossible to give up expecting the Parousia of Christ himself; but the longer it tarried, the more did doubts and questions arise on the subject, and these it was necessary to satisfy. This is what the First Epistle sets itself to do, and both the difficulty which it discusses, and the considerations it brings forward to meet them, belong to a later period. According to iv. 13, anxiety was felt on behalf of those Christians who had fallen asleep having waited in vain for the Parousia of Christ, and died before it came, lest, when it did arrive, they should be worse off than those who were living at the time. This might be (iv. 15) either by their

not rising again till later, or perhaps even by their continuing permanently in the comfortless condition of the under-world, which they had already endured since their death, so that there would be no difference between them and the heathens (verse 13). In view of these anxieties the writer appeals to the resurrection of Christ as the warrant for believing in a resurrection of the dead, and goes on to assure his readers that the resurrection of those Christians who had died would be the first thing to take place when the Lord should descend from heaven, after which those who were alive should be united to those who had risen, and be for ever with the Lord. It is very difficult to harmonize this description of the Parousia with the series of events connected with the coming of Antichrist, as the Second Epistle, following the Revelation, details them. But not to insist on this, we are forced to ask when Christians began to regard the case of those who had fallen asleep as a matter of such anxiety. If the Epistle be genuine and was written to the young church at Thessalonica only a few months after it was founded, how many *κεκοιμημένοι* could there be—members of the church who had died after their conversion to Christianity? The question of the prospects of their fellow-Christians who had died would naturally rise into prominence with the church when there came to be a considerable number who had died without seeing what all hoped that they would live to see, when a whole generation perhaps had departed from the midst of the Christian community. At a time when the Parousia and the end of the world were thought to be so close at hand, the idea that the Christian community consisted of the dead as well as of the living could only arise gradually, and could hardly become familiar till the continual replacement of the dead by the living had come to show that a new order of things was now prevailing.

The apostle had indicated a belief that he himself would live to see the Parousia, and an author writing after his death would still make him express that belief, iv. 15, 17. Though the apostle had been mistaken, yet what he had said was true of those who did live to

see the Parousia. But it marks a wide departure from the faith of the first Christians,—that they would be alive at the Parousia,—when instead of that expectation we find it urged that it did not make the least difference whether one became partaker of the blessings of that event in the ranks of the dead or of the living. The question whether the Parousia was to happen sooner or later was no longer one of paramount importance. The important thing was to cultivate that attitude of mind which the writer of the Epistle recommends to his readers, v. 1. The dogmatic significance of the question of the Parousia is here reduced to the practical exhortation that since the date of it was utterly uncertain it was necessary to be prepared for it every moment. This obviously implies, that a considerable time had passed since the Parousia began to be expected. *χρόνοι* and *καιροὶ* are spoken of, times and periods that have already passed without its coming, times and periods which may still have to pass before it comes, that is to say, simply the broad course of time, of which the *ἡμέρα Κυρίου* constitutes the closing scene. The only warning issued is against those who are seduced into too great security because the Parousia is so long delayed, and who forget that the day of the Lord comes suddenly and unexpectedly as a thief in the night, verse 2. Christians must thus be exhorted simply to be watchful and sober; an exhortation which shows that the Christian consciousness had now rejected the ecstatic and eccentric elements that entered into the primitive belief of the Parousia. If the Parousia be contemplated with composure, that means that it is beyond the immediate sphere of vision; and the further off it is conceived to be, the more room is there left for the circle of Christian life and duty. This sphere is filled up as much as possible by our author with moral instructions and exhortations to *περιπατεῖν ἀξίως τοῦ Θεοῦ*, ii. 12; cf. iv. 1, 2. In this department as well as in the other he has the Second Epistle before him, and borrows precepts which are much more natural and appropriate there than here; though they had not ceased to be necessary at the later period. Such are *νοθετεῖν τοὺς ἀτάκτους* verse 14, *φιλοτιμείσθαι ἡσυχάζειν, πράσσειν τὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι ταῖς χερσὶν*, iv. 11, and ii. 9; cf. 2 Thess.

iii. 7-12. The writer takes special care to let the reason and occasion of his moral precepts appear. For this purpose he avails himself largely of the apostolical framework of his Epistle. The apostle strives to stimulate his readers to be forward in the business of their Christian calling, partly by praising them for their good qualities, and partly by assuring them of his own love and attachment to them.

As for the passages which have commonly been held to show the dependence of the Second Epistle on the First, it is not difficult to convert them into proofs of the opposite relation. (In some cases they are obviously extensions and exaggerations of the parallels in the Second Epistle, as, *e.g.* iv. 15-17 is simply an explanation of the ἐπισυναγωγή, 2 Thess. ii. 1, and 1 Thess. v. 27, ὀρκίζω ὑμᾶς τὸν Κύριον, etc., is an assertion of the importance of the Epistle similar to that, 2 Thess. iii. 14, εἰ δέ τις οὐχ ὑπακούει, etc., only stronger.) And there seems to be no further consideration of any weight to be brought against the view we have sought to establish of the origin of the two Epistles, and their relation to each other. The First Epistle must accordingly have been written after the Second, and if we accept the most natural interpretation of the passage 1 Thess. ii. 16, we have the Epistle referring to the destruction of Jerusalem as an accomplished fact.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> If the Epistle be considered to be by Paul, we must say on this point that he regards a thing, of which he merely foresaw the accomplishment, as already to all intents accomplished. The grammar admits of this, but is it natural to speak of an event, such as the destruction of Jerusalem, before it came about, as if it had taken place already? The ordinary interpretation thus provides a new proof, that the author of an Epistle like this could not indeed forbear to speak of the time in which he himself was living, but took care to choose expressions which should not be out of place as coming from the mouth of the author whose name he was assuming.

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