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
THE PEACH ORCHARD

GETTYSBURG

A

AN APPEAL

WITH
SUPPLEMENT



EX LIBRIS


My

The "Lane" in the rear of the
Cemetery - having been named
"Hunt Ave", as Nicholson desired.

The Appeal

is now to have "N. S. Ave" renamed
"McGilvery Ave", whose Artillery fought
along and across it.


J. B.



To
Col. J. C. Mulliken,
From his old time friend,
John Bigelow.

July 26, 1913.

COMPLIMENTS OF
MAJOR JOHN BIGELOW
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.



THE PEACH ORCHARD

GETTYSBURG

JULY 2, 1863

*EXPLAINED BY OFFICIAL REPORTS
AND MAPS*

By MAJOR JOHN BIGELOW

Captain 9th Mass. Battery



AN APPEAL

TO HAVE TROSTLE LANE (A BATTLE AVENUE)
NOW NAMED "UNITED STATES AVENUE" RENAMED


HUNT AVENUE

FOR THE CREDIT OF THE ARTILLERY ARM
OF THE SERVICE, WHICH EXCLUSIVELY
FOUGHT ALONG IT, AND
IN HONOR OF

GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT

*Chief of Artillery
(1862-1865)*

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC



KIMBALL - STORER CO.
MINNEAPOLIS
1910

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THE PEACH ORCHARD

GETTYSBURG

JULY 2, 1863

The Peach Orchard is located at the junction of the Emmetsburg and the Wheatfield (or Millertown) roads, and is on a hill or high knoll, with Big and Little Round Tops about a mile on its left and rear.

Cemetery Hill is about two miles on its right and rear and two miles on the right of the Round Tops.

A low ridge, of gentle inclination on either side, extends over half the distance from Cemetery Hill toward the Round Tops. For the balance of the distance the ridge flattens out into rocky, wooded, low land and is commanded by the elevation at the Peach Orchard in its front.

The Peach Orchard Knoll is circled on its southerly and westerly sides by a wooded ridge (1600 yards distant on the south and 700 yards on the west), which was occupied by the Confederate artillery and infantry on July 2nd, 1863.

Map one (1) shows the position occupied by the 3rd Corps from the Round Tops to the front of the 2nd Corps on Cemetery Ridge, when the battle opened, and in detail, the regiments (Graham 1st Brig., 1st Div., 3rd Corps) and batteries (Seeley's, Randolph's, Ames', Thompson's, Hart's, Clarke's, Phillips', Bigelow's) at the Peach Orchard. Gen. Humphries' Division (2nd Div. 3rd Corps) connected on the right of Graham's Brigade and extended along the Emmetsburg road, towards Gettysburg.

There was an angle in the lines at the Peach Orchard, which placed the troops, defending it under great disadvantage, as it subjected them to the concentrated fire of sixteen encircling Confederate batteries and of a superior force of infantry. Graham's infantry and most of his batteries were Veterans of the army of the Potomac and had taken part in all of its great battles. Though comparatively few in numbers, they fought as determinedly and suffered as great proportional losses as their comrades on any other part of that hard fought field.

The struggle at the Peach Orchard was quite independent from that going on in front of the Round Tops and its adverse outcome was fraught with serious possibilities, because of the long gap it left in the line of battle, proper, of the army.

It is the purpose of this paper to explain how the wounding and capture of Gen. Graham affected his Brigade and how the individual efforts of Col. Freeman McGilvery (Comdg. 1st Vol. Brig. Arty. Res.) prevented the enemy from discovering the great opportunity for entering the lines of the army of the Potomac, offered to them.

*All quotations are from the Rebellion Record. Series I.
Vol. XXVII. Part 1. Gettysburg.*

Narrative

Early in the forenoon of July 2, the 3rd Corps was in position as Gen. Meade, Comdg. Army of Potomac, wished, viz.: between the Round Tops and left of the 2nd Corps. "On the rocky, wooded, low land," referred to, with the high commanding Peach Orchard Knoll in its front.

Gen. D. B. Birney, commanding 1st Div. 3rd Corps,

says (p. 483, *Reb. Rec.*): "At 12 M., believing from the constant fire of the enemy that a movement was being made to the left, I received permission from Maj. Gen. Sickles (commanding 3rd Corps) to send 100 Berdan Sharpshooters, with the 3rd Maine Reg. as a support, and feel the enemy's right. * * *"

"They advanced from the Peach Orchard out the Millerstown (now Wheatfield) road and entered the woods, in order to flank the enemy. The skirmishers of the enemy were driven in: but three columns of their forces were found marching to our left. The force sent by me was driven back, by overwhelming numbers, with the loss of about 60 killed and wounded. Communicating this important information to Major Gen. Sickles, I was ordered by that officer to change my front to meet the attack. I did this by advancing my left 500 yards and swinging round the right, so as to rest on the Emmetsburg road at the Peach Orchard."

"He also informed me that a division from the Second (Hancock) and one from the Fifth (Sykes) Corps, had been ordered to be in readiness to support me.

"My line was formed with Ward (2nd Brigade) on the left resting on the mountain (Little Round Top), DeTrobriand (3rd Brigade) in the center and Graham (1st Brigade) on my right, in the Peach Orchard, with his right on the Emmetsburg road.

"Smith's battery of rifle guns was placed so as to command the gorge at the base of Sugar Loaf (Little Round Top) mountain; Winslow's Battery on the right of Ward's Brigade and a battery from the Reserve Artillery; also Clarke's and Ames' batteries to the right, in rear of the Peach Orchard, supported by Graham's Brigade and the 3rd Michigan from 3rd Brigade and 3rd Maine from the 2nd Brigade. Randolph's, Seeley's and Turnbull's Batteries, were placed near the Emmetsburg road, on the front parallel with it." (Vide map 1.)

Gen. A. A. Humphreys, commanding 2nd Div., 3rd

MAP 1.
PEACH ORCHARD
Gettysburg

4:00 to 5:30 p. m., July 2, 1863


SHOWING

Location of Third Corps in front of the Round Tops — at Peach Orchard and along the Emmetsburg Road.

Opening in the lines between the Round Tops and left of Second Corps, occasioned by the Third Corps being advanced to the location shown.

General topography of the ground.

No. 1.



PEACH ORCHARD
GETTYSBURG
4.15 to 5 P.M. July 2, 1863
Showing OPERATIONS between
ROUND TOP and LEFT of R.C. CORPS.
Units ———— Confid. ————

HILLS
3 Corps

LONG STREETS
1 Corps

STICKLES
3 Corps

NEWTON
1 Corps

HANCOCK
1 Corps

EMMENDING ROAD

TANEYTOWN ROAD

GETTYSBURG

MAP 1

Corps (**Reb. Rec.**, p. 531), says: "July 2.—Shortly after mid-day I was ordered to form my division in line of battle, my left joining the right of the 1st Division, 3rd Corps, Major Gen. Birney, commanding, and my right resting opposite the left of Gen. Caldwell's division of the 2nd Corps. * * * The line I was directed to occupy was near the foot of the westerly slope of the ridge (Cemetery) I was on, from which foot slope the ground rose to the Emmetsburg road, which runs on the crest of a ridge nearly parallel to the Round Top (Cemetery) ridge. The second ridge declines again immediately west of the road, at a distance of 200 or 300 yards, from which the edge of the wood runs parallel to it. The wood was occupied by the enemy, whose pickets were exchanging shots from an early hour in the morning with our pickets thrown out beyond the road, on the westerly slope. (Vide Map 1.)

Gen. Birney. (Reb. Rec., p. 483.)

"I now opened (say at 3:30 p.m.) with Clarke's and Smith's batteries upon columns of the enemy moving toward our left, parallel with the Emmetsburg road.

"At 4 o'clock the enemy returned the artillery fire on my entire front and advanced their infantry *en masse*, covered by a cloud of skirmishers.

"Major Gen. Sykes (5th Corps) reached my left opportunely and protected that flank.

"As the fight was now furious and my thin line reached from Sugar Loaf (Little Round Top) Hill to the Emmetsburg road, fully a mile in length, I was obliged to send for more re-enforcements and received the 1st Div. 2nd Corps, Brig. Gen. J. C. Caldwell, commanding."

"My thin line swayed to and fro during the fight and my regiments were moved constantly, on the double quick, from one part of the line to the other to re-enforce assailed points."

General Birney's attention was fully occupied with the fast and furious fighting of his two Brigades (Ward and DeTrobriand's) and the 5th and 2nd Corps reinforcements, around Devil's Den, the Wheatfield and woods in front of the Round Tops: he was not in touch, personally, with Gen. Graham, nor could he see the desperate struggle at the Peach Orchard.

The **angle** at the Peach Orchard was most difficult to defend, circled as it was (on both sides) by commanding ridges, occupied by sixteen batteries of Confederate artillery, which concentrated their fire and enfiladed the two lines of the angle, with destructive effect. The Union infantry and artillery, holding that position, numbered about 2,700 men, and their losses in killed and wounded, 1,334 men, besides many horses (Phillip's and Bigelow's batteries alone lost 120 killed and wounded) tells how desperately they fought from 4 to 6 p. m., when they were obliged to retire to the rear.

Col. Tippin, 68th Pa. Infantry (**Reb. Record**, p. 499), says: "We remained in our position (rear of Clarke's battery) nearly two hours, suffering severely from the destructive fire of the enemy's batteries, posted on our left and front. I was then ordered to move my regiment forward into the Peach Orchard and fronting a road (Emmetsburg), running parallel with the enemy's front. We had been in position but a short time, when significant movements on the part of the enemy made it evident we were about to be attacked. Soon he advanced. I ordered the men to reserve their fire until reaching a certain point, when a destructive fire was opened, the enemy (two regiments Kershaw's Confederate Brigade) halting and dropping behind a fence. Receiving reinforcements and heavy masses of his infantry (Barksdale's Confederate Brigade) coming down on our right, I ordered my command to fall back to the position in the rear of the batteries, which was done in good order. Here I met Gen. Graham, who ordered me, at

once, to engage the enemy (Barksdale's Confederate Brigade) coming down on our right flank, which was promptly done, under his directions.

"Here, too, the gallant General was severely wounded and subsequently made prisoner. He declined any assistance and **directed me to take command and fight on.** I supposed him able to get to the rear, as, after dismounting, he walked with apparently little difficulty.

"We held the position as long as it was possible to hold it. The artillery having retired and the ranks very much decimated by the fire of the enemy, who were pushing forward in heavy masses, I ordered the command to retire in order, which was done."

It will be noticed that Gen. Graham turned his command over, after he was wounded, to Col. Tippin, but it does not appear that he (Col. Tippin) took active charge of the brigade at this critical time, when the enemy were closing in on the Peach Orchard.

None of the reports of the officers commanding the different regiments of the brigade, when they retired, nor of the batteries, make any reference to Col. Tippin, but each seems to have been left to their own resources. All fought finely and suffered severely; but they retired from the field, when each thought best. There was no commanding officer to collect them and form a second line; nor use them to cover the long gap in the lines, between the Round Tops and the left of the 2nd Corps, which they were leaving open (Map 2).

Reb. Record, p. 504.

Col. Madill, 141 Pa., after a graphic account of his struggle at the Peach Orchard, says:

"Being overpowered by the large number of the enemy, I was compelled to retire, which I reluctantly did."

This regiment lost 149 men, killed and wounded, out of 200 taken into the fight.

Reb. Record, p. 578.

Major Cooper, 7th N. J.,

The Colonel and Lieut. Col. having been wounded, says: "Soon the enemy appeared on the right flank and there being danger of being overwhelmed and captured, I ordered the regiment to fall back to the woods." (?)

Reb. Record, p. 498.

Major Danks, 63 Pa.:

"At 5:30 p. m. the regiment was relieved from the picket line, by a regiment of the 2nd Div. 3rd Corps, I then withdrew the regiment, our ammunition having been exhausted, fell back in good order, when I met the balance of the brigade and, after a few minutes rest, moved forward (back?) with the brigade to an open field, where we encamped for the night."

Reb. Record, p. 497.

Capt. Nelson, 57 Pa.:

"Being overpowered by a superior force, we were obliged to fall back, the 114 Pa. having done so already."

Reb. Record, p. 502.

Capt. Bowen, 114 Pa.,

After describing how his regiment was thrown into much confusion by a flank attack, says: "I succeeded, however, in rallying a number around the colors and brought them off, but, in doing so, got separated from the brigade, and, night coming on, I was unable to find them, although I used every effort to do so."

Reb. Record, p. 500.

Col. Calvin A. Craig, 105 Pa.,

After describing his struggle around the Sherfy house, located near the Peach Orchard, on the Emmetsburg road, says: "The regiment being so small and both

MAP 2
PEACH ORCHARD
Gettysburg


6:00 to 6:30 p. m., July 2, 1863

SHOWING

Changed Union and Confederate positions.

Where, at Trostle Angle, the 9th Mass. Battery was sacrificed *under orders* to hold enemy in check until Col. McGilvery established a line of artillery in its rear, covering the long gap between Round Tops and left of Second Corps.

The long gap in the Union Lines still unoccupied by troops.



MAP 2

flanks being entirely unprotected, I ordered the regiment to retire slowly and formed line again a short distance to the rear. * * * Soon after I saw Gen. Humphries and formed line with some of his troops.”

Strangely enough the Peach Orchard angle acted as a wedge and divided Longstreet's attack. After driving Graham from the Peach Orchard, Kershaw charged to his own right and front and took active part in the heavy fighting in front of the Round Tops: while Barksdale swung to his own left and assisted Anderson's Div. 3rd Confederate Corps, in driving Humphries' Division back from the Emmetsburg road (Maps 2, 3, 4).

Humphries could not fall directly back, thus attacked in front and on both flanks, but retired obliquely and to his right, until, with the remnants of his division, losing 2,545 out of 5,000 strong, he reached the front of the 2nd Corps, where he joined with some of Hancock's 2nd Corps, and drove the enemy, who had approached within 100 yards, from that part of the field, capturing many prisoners and retaking two pieces of artillery.

Fortunately, among the reinforcements sent to the Peach Orchard, about 4:30 p. m., was Col. Freeman McGilvery, commanding 1st Brig. Art'y. Res. with four batteries, Hart's 15th N. Y., Phillips' 5th Mass., Bigelow's 9th Mass., and Thompson's F. and C. Pennsylvania.

The batteries were placed in positions on the Wheatfield road (Map 1), Thompson's battery being at its junction with the Emmetsburg road.

The concentrated fire of the encircling Confederate batteries, already referred to, caused heavy loss of men.

horses and material, in all of the batteries. Thompson's battery was compelled to retire, leaving one piece. Hart's battery, also, was compelled to retire, at the same time with Clark's 3rd Corps battery, both having exhausted their ammunition.

Col. McGilvery came up at 5:45 p. m. to again visit his batteries, whose fire he had previously been directing. He learned that Capt. Randolph, who commanded the 3rd Corps artillery had been wounded and taken from the field; besides there was no one in charge of the infantry, which was falling back as each could, without any rallying point. He ordered Capt. Phillips, 5th Mass., to withdraw his battery. This was done under heavy infantry fire, one piece being drawn off by hand. Lastly, he ordered Capt. Bigelow, 9th Mass. Battery, to "limber up and get out." At this time, 6 p. m. (Map 2), there were *none* of our troops in or about the Peach Orchard, except the 9th Mass. battery. Instead, where our infantry had been a short time before, some 200 yards on the battery's right, was Barksdale's Confederate brigade, which had driven Graham's command from its position and was reorganizing for a further advance, with its line extending back as far as could be seen; while on its left front was a swarm of sharpshooters from Kershaw's Confederate brigade, two regiments of which had crossed its front but a few moments before (from the Peach Orchard contest), in order to join the balance of the brigade, then, hotly engaged before the Round Tops, and had received from the battery a damaging enfilading canister fire.

The danger from the sharp shooters was explained to Col. McGilvery and the request made for permission "By prolonge to retire firing." McGilvery consented. Prolonges or ropes were attached, one end to the pintles of the limbers, the other end to the gun trails, and the battery, alone on the field, was retired for some 400 yards, firing solid shot at Barksdale's line and keeping Kershaw's sharpshooters on its left front, back with canister,

until the angle of the stone wall was reached at the Trostle House (vide Map 2).

While under cover of a slight swell of the ground, the battery was preparing to make a rush for high ground in the rear; but Col. McGilvery again came to Capt. Bigelow and said: "Our lines are open between the Round Tops and the left of the 2nd Corps. You must remain here at all hazards, and check the enemy until I can form a *second line* in your rear."

The two left pieces, being so crowded among boulders that they could not be used, were sent to the rear, one being driven over the stone wall, the other through the gateway into Trostle's Lane, and, though overturned, was righted amid a shower of bullets and gotten safely to the rear. Thus the left of the battery was opened to Kershaw's sharpshooters.

The four remaining pieces were ordered to take their ammunition from the chests and place it near the guns, for rapid use; also to double shot with canister. Soon the enemy appeared breast high in front and heavy firing began and continued to the end.

At this time, about 6:30 p. m., Gen. Barksdale was hotly engaged with Humphries' division, which had swung back its left to meet the attack; Wilcox and Wright's brigades of Anderson's division, Hill's 3rd Confederate Corps, also, joined in the attack; while Alexander brought up to the Peach Orchard, six batteries, which poured in, at short range, a murderous fire on Humphries' devoted command. Before Humphries reached his final position in front of the 2nd Corps, notwithstanding the heavy losses his command was receiving from shot, shell and bullets, he rallied his men in the open field five or six times and repulsed the Confederate infantry, when they pressed him too closely.

Barksdale, however, detached the 21st Miss. Reg. to dispose of the 9th Mass. battery, which had been causing him great trouble from its steady fire, and was, then,

penned in the angle of the Stone Wall at Trostle's Lane. Its front attacks were steadily repulsed; but it was able to enter the battery on its undefended right flank, while Kershaw's skirmishers came in on the left flank, and men and horses were shot down. The enemy had, however, been delayed long enough to enable Col. McGilvery to gather and place in position, about 400 yards in the rear, on Trostle's Lane, near the Weirkert house, a *second* line of artillery (vide Map 3).

The sacrifice of the 9th Mass. Battery, thus, accomplished the purpose desired and was not in vain.

Reb. Record, p. 881.

Col. Freeman McGilvery, 1st Maine Artillery, commanding 1 Vol. Brig. Artillery Res., July 2:

"About 3:30 p. m. I received an order * * * to report to Gen. Sickles with one light 12-pounder and one rifled battery.

"The Fifth (5) Mass. Battery, Capt. Phillips, and Ninth (9) Mass. Battery, Capt. Bigelow, were marched immediately to a position occupied by Gen. Sickles, near a belt of woods, considerably in front of the prolongation of the natural line of defenses of our army, on the left center, in which Gen. Sickles' command was then engaged with the enemy. By Gen. Sickles' order I * * * placed the two Massachusetts batteries in a position that commanded most of the open country, between the woods held by our troops on the left center (front of Round Tops) and the high ground occupied by the enemy on their right (south and west of the Peach Orchard). A New Jersey (Clarke's) battery, immediately on the right of the two Massachusetts batteries was receiving the most of the fire of two or more rebel batteries. Hart's 15 N. Y. Battery reporting at that time, I placed it in position in a Peach Orchard on the right and a little in front of the New Jersey battery.

"The four batteries already mentioned presented a

front nearly at right angles with the position occupied by our troops on the Emmetsburg road, facing our left, the fire of which I concentrated on single rebel batteries and five or more were driven from their positions.

“Capt. Thompson’s (F. & C. 1st Pa. Art’y.) Battery of my brigade took position on the right of the 15th N. Y. Battery, two sections of the battery fronted and fired in the direction of those heretofore mentioned and the right section fronted to the right and opened fire on a section or more of rebel artillery, posted in the woods, at canister range, immediately on the right of the batteries under my command, the enfilade fire of which was inflicting serious damage through the whole line of my command.

“At about 5 o’clock a heavy column of rebel infantry made its appearance in a grain field, about 850 yards in front, moving at quick time toward the woods on our left, where the infantry fighting was then going on (front of the Round Tops). A well directed fire from all the batteries was brought to bear on them, which destroyed the order of their march and drove many back into the woods on their right, though the main portion of the column succeeded in reaching the point for which they started and sheltered themselves from the artillery fire.

“In a few minutes another and larger column appeared, at about 750 yards, presenting a slight left flank to our position. I immediately trained the entire line of guns upon them and opened fire with various kinds of ammunition. The column continued to move on at double quick until it had reached a barn and farm house immediately in front of my left battery (Bigelow’s) about 450 yards distant. When it came to a halt (a shot had killed its commanding officer) I gave them canister and solid shot with such good effect, that, I am sure, that several hundred were put hors du combat in a short space of time. The column was broken, part pushed on into the woods on our left, the remainder en-

deavored to shelter themselves in masses around the house (Rose) and barn.

"After the battle * * * I visited the house and barn, heretofore mentioned, and found 120 odd dead, belonging to three South Carolina regiments. * * *

"The asperities of the ground in front of my batteries were such as to enable the enemy's sharpshooters, in large numbers, to cover themselves within very short range.

"At about a quarter to 6 o'clock the enemy's infantry gained possession of the woods immediately on the left of my line of batteries and our infantry fell back, both on our right (Peach Orchard) and left. At this period of the action, all of the batteries were exposed to a warm infantry fire from both flanks and front. Whereupon I ordered them to retire 250 yards and renew their fire (the batteries were unable to do this, as the enemy came up too rapidly).

"The New Jersey (Clarke's) Battery before mentioned, being out of ammunition, retired to the rear. The 15th N. Y. (Hart's) Battery also retired from the field. Captains Bigelow and Phillips, who were under my observation about all of the time, evinced great coolness and skill in retiring their batteries. Capt. Phillips, Lieut. Scott and four men hauled one of his pieces off by hand, every horse in the limber having been shot down, at which work Lieut. Scott received a serious wound in the face, and it is a mystery to me that they were not all hit by the enemy's fire, as they were surrounded and fired upon from almost every direction. Capt Bigelow retired by prolonge, firing canister, which * * * effectually checked the enemy in his advance for a short time.

"Capt. Thompson, having all his horses (six) belonging to the limber of one of his pieces killed while retiring, was compelled to leave the piece, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

"The crisis of the engagement had now arrived. I

gave Capt. Bigelow orders to hold his position (he had reached the angle of the stone wall at Trostle's house) as long as possible at all hazard, in order to give me time to form a new line of artillery, and justice demands that I should state Capt. Bigelow did hold his position and execute his firing with a deliberation and destructive effect upon the enemy in a manner such as only a brave and skillful officer could, until, one officer killed and the others wounded (one mortally), more than half of his men either killed or wounded, and his horses all shot down at the limbers he was forced to leave four guns (subsequently recovered) and retire. Two guns, under command of Lieut. Milton, were taken safely to the rear (before the enemy closed in on the open flanks).

"In the meantime I formed a new line of artillery about 400 yards to the rear (of Bigelow's position near the Trostle House), close under the woods and covering the opening which led into the Gettysburg and Taney town road, of the following batteries and parts of batteries:

"Battery I, 5 U. S. (Watson), and a volunteer Battery, which I have never been able to learn the name of; Dow's 6th Maine Battery; three guns of the 5th Mass. (Phillips) and two of Capt. Thompson's Pa. Battery, and commenced firing on the enemy's infantry (Wofford and Barksdale) and artillery (Alexander's), which had formed in the open field only about 700 or 800 yards in our front (Map 3).

"A brook, running through low bushes, parallel to our front midway between our's and the enemy's line, was occupied by rebel sharpshooters. As soon as the 6th Maine Battery reported * * * I ordered canister to be used, which compelled them to retire.

"About this time Pettit's N. Y. Battery reported and changed (took?) position on the right of the 6th Maine.

"At this time the enemy's artillery fire was very heavy and rapid. The unknown battery, heretofore men-

tioned, left the field; the guns of Battery I, 5 U. S., were abandoned (vide extract following). Capt. Thompson, being out of ammunition, was sent to the rear; Pettit's B, 1st N. Y. artillery, remained only a few minutes and left, while I was directing the fire of the 6th Maine and a section of the 5th Mass., Capt. Phillips.

"Lieut Dow, with the 6th Maine and one section of the 5th Mass., Capt. Phillips, remained in position and kept up a well-directed fire upon the enemy's line until they ceased firing, which was about 8 o'clock. I then placed Capt. Seeley's regular Battery (K, 4th U. S.), Lieut. James, in position near Dow's Battery, with instructions to watch the enemy closely and fire upon any advancing column or reply to any artillery that might be opened upon us. Here ended the engagement of July 2nd.

"During the engagement my horse was hit four times in the fore shoulder and breast by musketry, once on the fore leg by a shell and once on the hip by spent solid shot, of which wounds he soon after died."

Col. McGilvery's Aide, Capt. Irish, had been wounded in the thigh by a solid shot, early in the engagement. Consequently Col. McGilvery was left without assistance; but, by his individual effort, he collected parts of batteries, as they retired from the field, brought up Dow's 6th Maine Battery and established the line of artillery, which **covered and held the gap** in our lines, between the Round Tops and the left of the Second Corps (occasioned by the withdrawal of Graham's brigade) **for three-quarters of an hour** after Bigelow's Battery at the Trostle angle had been overcome, from 6:30 to 7:15 p. m., **before** any infantry was brought to his support.

After being badly crippled by the fire of Kershaw's skirmishers, Watson's Battery (I, 5th U. S.), on the left of McGilvery's new line, was charged by the 21st Miss. (Col. afterwards Gov. Humphries). Just as it was captured, and McGilvery's line was about to be attacked on the left flank, thus opened, the 39th N. Y. Reg't. was detached from Willard's 3rd Brig., 3rd Div., 2nd Corps, which came to the support of the artillery at 7:15 p. m. and drove the 21st Miss. back into its own line.

Reb. Record, p. 660.

2nd Lieut. MacConnell, commanding after Lieut. Watson was wounded, says:

"The battery was without support of any kind. The enemy appeared shortly, say twenty minutes after (our) taking position, nearly in front, at a distance of about 350 yards and the battery immediately opened on them with shell; as they approached nearer, the battery poured in canister, some twenty rounds, until men and horses were shot down or disabled to such an extent that the battery was abandoned."

Capt. A. P. Martin, commanding 5th Corps Artillery, to which Watson's Battery belonged, adds:

"It was, however, soon recaptured by the bravery and determination of 2nd Lieut. Samuel Peeples, 5th U. S. Artillery, who, having procured the services of the "Gari-baldi Guards" (39th N. Y., Willard's Brigade), took a musket and led the charge himself, driving the enemy from the guns and, retaking everything that was lost, conveyed it safely to the rear."

Reb. Record, p. 897.

Lieut. E. B. Dow, 6th Maine Battery (McGilvery's 2nd line):

"On going into position, my battery was under a heavy fire from two batteries of the enemy (Alexander's,

vide Map 3) situated some 1,000 yards in my front. I replied to them with solid shot and shell, until the enemy's line of skirmishers and sharpshooters came out of the woods to the left front of my position and poured a continual stream of bullets at us. I soon discovered a battle line of the enemy (Wofford's Confederate Brigade) coming through the woods, about 600 yards distant, evidently with the design to drive through and take possession of the road to Taneytown, directly in my rear. I immediately opened upon them with spherical case and canister, and, assisted by a section of Capt. Phillips' (5th Mass.) Battery, drove them back into the woods. Their artillery (Alexander's), to which we paid no attention, had gotten our exact range and gave us a warm greeting."

"It was evidently their intention * * * to have charged right through our lines to the Taney town road, isolating our left wing and dividing our army; but, owing to the prompt and skillful action of Col. Freeman McGilvery in forming his second line, as soon as he found the first line (Emmetsburg road) lost, their plan was foiled; for they no doubt thought the woods in our rear were filled with infantry, when the fact is we had no support at all."

Wofford's Confederate Brigade followed Barksdale's attack at the Peach Orchard and, while the latter was drawn to his left against Humphries, the former advanced directly to the front and towards the opening in our lines (Map 3); but, finding McGilvery's Artillery in position to cover the same and suffering from its fire, its direction was changed to the right, by which it was able to take our troops in flank, that were then hotly engaged in the Wheat field.

Capt. Randolph, commanding the 3rd Corps Artillery, at an early part of the engagement was seriously wound-

MAP 3
PEACH ORCHARD
Gettysburg

6:30 to 7:15 p. m., July 2, 1863

SHOWING

Changed Union and Confederate positions.


The Gap now occupied by McGilvery's artillery.

Humphries' Division being driven back toward the Second Corps, front.

Confederate advance in front of and towards the Round Tops.

Line of advance of Wofford, Confed. Brigade towards gap in Lines and its direction changed by the fire of McGilvery's artillery.

3.



MAP 3

ed and no one succeeded to his command. All of his batteries fought splendidly and suffered severely; but, when they were forced to retire, they had no rallying point and, except Seeley's, which joined McGilvery's second line, took no further part in the engagement of July 2nd.

Col. Tippin (68 Pa.), who succeeded Gen. Graham, only assembled the scattered regiments of his brigade far in the rear and after dusk, at which time he reported to Gen. Ward (then commanding the 1st Div., 3rd Corps); but, except portions of the 57 Pa. and 105 Pa., which strayed into Humphries' command, none of the regiments took further part (July 2) after leaving the Peach Orchard.

Losses

It should be stated that the Confederate regiments were kept recruited and were about 50 per cent larger in number than the Federal regiments; it being the rule in the North to enlist new regiments, instead of recruiting old ones, depleted by service, as was done by the Confederates.

The Confederate statements of losses are very untrustworthy. The following order will explain:

General Lee's Orders, No. 63.

Headquarters of Army of Northern Virginia.

May 14, 1863.

"The practice which prevails in the Army of including in the list of casualties those cases of slight injuries, which do not incapacitate the recipients for duty is calculated to mislead our friends and encourage our enemies by giving false impressions as to the extent of our losses." * * *

"The Commanding General deems it unnecessary to

do more than direct the attention of the officers to the impropriety of their furnishing the enemy with the means of computing our strength in order to insure the immediate suppression of this pernicious and useless custom."

By command of Gen. Lee.

W. H. TAYLOR, Asst. Adj. General.

*Wheat Field, Devil's Den and Woods
in Front of Round Tops*

Federals engaged:

3 Brigades, 3rd Corps (including Burling's).

5 Brigades, 5th Corps.

4 Brigades, 2nd Corps.

1 Brigade, 6th Corps.

With 3 Batteries.

Total losses, 4,133.

Confederates engaged:

6 Brigades, Longstreet's Corps.

With 4 Batteries.

Total losses, 2,822.

At Peach Orchard

Federals engaged:

1 Brigade (Graham's).

4 Regiments (3rd Mich., 3rd Maine, 2nd N. H.,
7th N. J.)

With 6 Batteries.

Total losses, 1,334.

Confederates engaged:

1 Brigade (Barksdale's).

2 Regiments (Kershaw's).

With 16 Batteries.

Total losses, 1,047.

At Emmetsburg Road

Which consisted in driving Humphries' Division, 3rd Corps, back to the 2nd Corps front.

Federals engaged:

Humphries' Division (Carr's and Brewster's Brigades.)

Harrow's Brigade, 2nd Corps (3 Regiments).

Willard's Brigade, 2nd Corps (4 Regiments).

With 3 Batteries.

Total losses, 2,545.

The losses were chiefly occasioned by the fire of Alexander's six batteries, which were brought on the field (Map 3) following Barksdale's success at the Peach Orchard.

Confederates engaged:

Barksdale's Brigade (3 Regiments).

Wilcox Brigade.

Perry Lang Brigade.

Wright's Brigade.

With 6 Batteries (Alexander's).

Total losses, 1,978.

It will thus be seen that the losses of Gen. Graham's Command, in the Peach Orchard contest, were much larger, in proportion to the number engaged, than in the hard fighting in the Wheatfield and before the Round Tops; while it was fully as great, in proportion, as that of Humphries' Division, in its masterly falling back to the front of the 2nd Corps, under terrible artillery fire.

The Confederate Artillery fire, concentrated on the Peach Orchard from sixteen batteries, was as severe and damaging as that on our lines, July 3.

Graham's Brigade, with the 3rd Maine, 3rd Mich., 2nd

N. H., and 7th N. J., well preserved their fine record as Veterans. Unhappily, however, when compelled to retire, owing to the wounding and capture of Gen. Graham and Col. Tippin not immediately assuming command, the troops were not held together to protect the long gap from the Round Tops to the left of the Second Corps, which they were leaving open.

Thus it was from 6 to 7:15 p. m., with Birney's 1st Div., 3rd Corps; Caldwell's 1st Div., 2nd Corps; Sykes' 5th Corps and Wheaton's Brigade, 6th Corps, hotly engaged before the Round Tops:

With Humphries' 2nd Div., 3rd Corps, assisted by Willard's and part of Harrow's Brigades, 2nd Corps, being driven to the right as far as the front of the 2nd Corps on Cemetery Ridge:

With Graham's Brigade at the Peach Orchard, disorganized and retired from the field and no commanding officer at the Peach Orchard danger point:

Col. Freeman McGilvery, alone, appreciated the critical conditions and, although he had no infantry supports, determined, if possible, to stay the advance of Barksdale and Wofford into the wide gap in our lines, thus occasioned. He found the 9th Mass. Battery in the angle of the Stone Wall at Trostle House (an impossible position for artillery without strong infantry support), yet, in order to gain time, he ordered it to remain and check the rebel advance, as long as possible and at all hazards. With its flanks open, on one side to the 21st Miss. Infantry and on the other side to Kershaw's skirmishers; after a loss of one officer killed, one mortally and a second seriously wounded; with six of seven sergeants killed or wounded and a total loss of 28 men and 80 out of 88 horses on the field; after firing over three tons of iron, including 92 rounds of canister, the latter at close quarters, the 9th Mass. Battery was finally overcome.

Meanwhile Col. McGilvery, without an Aide, succeed-

ed in gathering parts of batteries, which were retiring from the field, all, except the 6th Maine, in a badly crippled condition, and in forming a second line about 400 yards back of the Trostle House on Trostle Lane, around the Weikert house, just as the 9th Mass. Battery had been obliged to give up, at 6:30 p. m.

From 6:30 to 7:15 p. m., McGilvery's artillery in its new position, unsupported, checked every approach of the enemy. At 7:15 p. m. Willard's Brigade, 2nd Corps, came to his support. Later, other troops, including the 6th and 12th Corps (Map 4), were brought up and the line was made safe from the left of the 2nd Corps to and over both Round Tops, with Gen. L. A. Grant's Vermont Brigade, covering the extreme left flank, in the rear of Big Round Top.

Many histories have been written; but, in all, the fighting at the Peach Orchard, which barely escaped bringing disaster to the Army, has been hardly referred to, as of any importance. Gen. Sickles, strangely enough, never made any Official Report of the part taken by his Corps (3rd) in the battle. Gen. Graham, who commanded at the Peach Orchard, was wounded and captured at a critical time of the fighting of his Brigade and has made no report; Col. Tippin, who succeeded Gen. Graham as his line was breaking and who had been busy, up to that time, with the work of his own regiment, knew little about the brigade, which he only collected together, far in the rear and at dusk and says nothing of importance and

The reports of the Regiments and Batteries are brief and very conflicting as to the time of day, when events occurred.

Gen. Birney, to whose division, 3rd Corps, Gen. Graham's brigade (1st) belonged, has made an indefinite, misleading report of the Peach Orchard affair.

He says (**Reb. Record, p. 483**).

"Graham's Brigade was subjected, at the point of the

angle on the Emmetsburg road, to a fearful artillery fire, enfilading his lines; but his brigade, with the assistance of the 3rd Maine from the 2nd brigade, and the 3rd Michigan from the 3rd brigade of this division (he overlooks the 2nd New Hampshire and 7th New Jersey regiments), held the Peach Orchard until nearly dusk (instead it was six p. m.), when, finding the right unsupported, it fell back to the next ridge."

Gen. Birney, continuing, says:

"At 6 o'clock I found Major Gen. Sickles seriously wounded and, at his request, took command of the troops. I immediately visited Humphries' division" (whose lack of support on the right flank of Graham's brigade he has just given as an excuse for the falling back from the Peach Orchard of that brigade), "and, finding that the enemy, advancing through a gap in the line of my division, would take it in reverse, I ordered a change of front. Gen. Humphries accomplished this under a most effective artillery and musketry fire."

The gap referred to, was made by Graham's brigade, having been driven from the Peach Orchard; a fact Gen. Birney must have discovered before he ordered Gen. Humphries, who, at the time, was supporting Graham's right, to change his front.

Gen. Humphries retired his command from its advanced position on the Emmetsburg road, under the crushing fire of Alexander's six batteries and of four Confederate brigades. When pressed too closely, he made several stands in the open field, before his command reached the 2nd Corps front, and performed one of the most masterly manœuvres made in the battle.

It is said that Gen. Meade (commanding Army) was greatly worried when he learned, just as Longstreet began his attack, that the 3rd Corps had left the position

MAP 4
PEACH ORCHARD
Gettysburg

7:15 p. m. until dark, July 2, 1863

SHOWING

Changed Union and Confederate positions.

Union Lines back, as first established by Genl. Meade, but strengthened by the Sixth and Twelfth Corps, with the Round Tops occupied by the Fifth Corps.

Humphries' Division, Third Corps, in front of left of Second Corps.

The Confederates at the foot of the Round Tops and close to the Second Corps front, but, in front of McGilvery's Artillery held well back towards the Emmetsburg Road.


4.

PEACH ORCHARD

GETTYSBURG
7.15 and 8.45 a.m. 2. 1863.

Showing original Union and Confederate positions.

Scale.
100 yds
200 yds
300 yds
400 yds
500 yds



See p. 10 from Court House
GETTYSBURG

between the Round Tops and left of the 2nd Corps, where he had placed it and taken the advanced position at the Peach Orchard. It was too late, however, to re-establish the line as he wished, so he promised reinforcements from the 2nd and 5th Corps.

It is very doubtful whether the small 3rd Corps could have held Gen. Meade's line even until reinforcements arrived, as the ground close in its front was broken by large boulders and a wood, thus offering shelter for attacking infantry; while the Peach Orchard knoll, in its front, gave a commanding position for artillery.

After the war, the writer, sitting in a carriage at the Peach Orchard with Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, asked him if, with guns placed where we were, he could not have swept clean the low land, in our front, where Gen. Meade had intended the 3rd Corps line to have been. He replied: "I cannot afford to answer; but I will say, that, when this advanced position was lost, the opportunity passed away for acting on the offensive after the repulse of Pickett's charge, on July 3rd."

The small 3rd Corps could not possibly, in addition, have occupied the Big and Little Round Tops, which commanded its left flank and from which artillery could have enfiladed Meade's whole line to Cemetery Hill.

Finally the advanced position at the Peach Orchard, with the line running back to the Round Tops, seems to have misled Gen. Lee and caused him to insist, against Longstreet's advice to flank the Round Tops, that a direct attack on the supposed exposed flank of Meade's army should be made.

The communications between Gen. Lee and Gen. Longstreet caused delay; besides Longstreet wanted to learn, through his scouts, something of the character of the woods in front of the Round Tops, into which he was going to send his men.

The delay was of the greatest value to Gen. Meade,

for the 5th Corps (Sykes) only arrived on the field at 8 a. m., July 2, after a fatiguing four days' march from Frederick, Md., and was resting on the right of Meade's line, where Rock Creek crosses the Baltimore Pike.

Longstreet began his attack about 3:30 p. m., and the 5th Corps, then, was ordered to go to and hold the Round Tops. It arrived just in time to occupy Little Round Top with two brigades and prevent, after a hard struggle, the enemy from doing so. The balance of the Corps was sent to the support of the two brigades of Birney's division, which were being overpowered by superior numbers in the woods in front of the Round Tops. Gen. Caldwell, 1st Div., 2nd Corps, reported to Gen. Sykes, who seems to have taken charge of the fighting after his arrival on that part of the field.

From 3:30 to 8:00 p. m., July 2nd, the fighting on the left of Meade's battle line was fast and furious, and the losses great on both contending sides. At its close the Confederates had reached both the foot of the Round Tops and the 2nd Corps front on Cemetery Ridge (Map 4); **but** in front of McGilvery's artillery they were kept well back on the Emmetsburg road and prevented from discovering their great opportunity for success.

At 8:00 p. m. the 6th Corps, after a fatiguing march of 30 miles, arrived on the left of Meade's line, which **then** was established as originally intended, from the left of the 2nd Corps on Cemetery Ridge to and over both Little and Big Round Tops. (Map 4.)

The fighting of July 2nd at the Round Tops, Peach Orchard and Emmetsburg Road was **in front** of this line and thoroughly exhausted both sides. At its conclusion the Confederates had gained nothing of value.

An Appeal

Notwithstanding that Gettysburg was the greatest artillery battle of the Civil War and nearly fifty years have passed since the battle was fought, while the Battlefield Commission have had many fine avenues built over the field, which they have named after Infantry or Cavalry Officers, yet in no instance have they so honored the Artillery branch of the service.

Gen. Henry J. Hunt was Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula (1862) to Appomattox (1865). He took an active part, with his branch of the service, in every one of its great battles. At Gettysburg, July 3rd, his horse, having been shot under him, he advanced, on foot, revolver in hand, with the infantry, to the "clump of trees," and assisted in repelling Pickett's charge. Every veteran knows what reliance, both the Cavalry and Infantry Arms, placed on the assistance of the Artillery. It is but right that an avenue on the field of Gettysburg should be named after Gen. Hunt, to his own honor, for all time, and for the credit of the artillery branch of the service which he commanded.

Trostle's Lane, misnamed "United States Avenue," by the Commission, it is believed should be renamed.

HUNT AVENUE,

not because the artillery there performed other than its duty, the same as its comrades on every other part of the field, but because it is the only avenue on the field where the artillery exclusively fought, **without** the sup-

port of cavalry or infantry, and where no "Generals of Corps or Divisions" can set up claims for themselves. (Vide Nicholson Letter.) The **new avenue**, proposed by the Commission, should be named after Col. McGilvery, whose artillery, on July 2nd, alone occupied it and from it on July 3rd, with eight batteries, he swept the right of Pickett's attack with destructive effect.

Correspondence

To Col. John P. Nicholson,
Pres. Gettysburg Commission,
Gettysburg, Pa.

Dear Sir: Please inform me what steps it is proper for me to take to have the name of United States Avenue changed to either Hunt Avenue or McGilvery Avenue.

I find that many avenues bear the names of Infantry and Cavalry Officers but none of an Artillery Officer.

When General Graham was captured and Randolph was wounded at the Peach Orchard the way was open for Barksdale's Confederate Brigade, with Wofford's following, to enter, unopposed, our lines between Little Round Top and the left of the Second Corps.

Colonel McGilvery, of the Reserve Artillery, whose batteries had been sent to the assistance of the Third Corps, came up at this time and, discovering the existing condition, assumed control. He gave me my orders to check Barksdale's advance until he could form a line of Artillery in my rear to cover the gap in our lines. Without an aid, with his horse successively shot in six places, he rode over the field, gathered parts of Batteries retiring from the Peach Orchard and brought up Dow's Sixth Maine Battery, and with them effectually held Barksdale in check around the Trostle House for three-quarters of an hour after I had finished my half hour struggle, before Col. Willard came to his support. Col. Willard charged Barksdale to the right of, but not along Trostle's Lane, or as you have named the avenue, United States Avenue.

The fighting along the avenue was solely an artillery one, and I feel strongly that the avenue should be called after an

Artillery Officer—consequently I suggest the name of McGilvery, who, without assistance, did most effective service along the Trostle Lane, and, later, died from wounds received before Petersburg.

But I also feel that General Hunt was very badly treated after the war. While all other Corps Commanders were made Major Generals, he was retired either as Lieutenant Colonel of Colonel of Artillery. He was the finest Artillery Officer of the war, and commanded the love and respect of every member of his branch of the service.

I am the only surviving Light Battery Commander from Massachusetts who fought at Gettysburg, and my fighting was done along the Trostle Lane, consequently I am especially interested in having the avenue, which you have made of the Trostle Lane, properly named for the credit of the Artillery.

“Hunt Avenue” will give belated honor to the dear General, while “McGilvery Avenue” will give credit to a most deserving officer, whose assuming command when General Sickles and all the officers of the Third Corps had disappeared, and whose courage, energy and ability had a most important influence at a critical part of the battle field.

My first preference would be “Hunt Avenue,” which would honor the General and emphasize the fact that the fighting along its lines was by the Artillery.

My second preference would be “McGilvery Avenue,” for the reasons I have stated.

The name “United States Avenue” to my mind suggests, means and tells nothing.

I feel that it is my privilege, indeed my duty, to call the attention of the Commission to this seeming injustice which has been done the Artillery branch of the service, and to ask, if they cannot grant my request themselves as I hope they may be able to do, for information as to who can.

An early reply will oblige.

Very truly yours,

JOHN BIGELOW.

October 18, 1909.

War Department,
Gettysburg National Park Commission,
Gettysburg, Pa.

November 1, 1909.

Major John Bigelow,

Dear Sir: Upon behalf of the Commission who acknowl-

edge the communication of October 18th, 1909, having in view the change of name of the connecting Avenue running from Hancock Avenue to Emmetsburg Road, we have to say that we do not see any valid reason to make the suggested change. There are on the Field an East Confederate Avenue, West Confederate Avenue and North Confederate Avenue, and it seemed eminently proper that the designation of a connecting Avenue in the Union Lines should be named "United States."

Thus far Avenues have only been named for Commanders of Corps and Divisions. When the connecting Avenues running north and south, and connecting from the Wheatfield Road upon which is now located the Artillery line, the proposition to name the Avenue after Commanders of Brigades will be considered in detail.

If the Commission were to undertake to change the names of Avenues and the location of organizations as named and placed before they came on to the Field, never a map would be completed.

We have had requests to name the Avenues all over the Field after a number of Officers, as for instance, Birney, Humphreys, Caldwell, Watson (Watson's Battery) and a number of others.

Very respectfully,
(Signed) JOHN P. NICHOLSON,
Chairman.

Col. John P. Nicholson, Chairman,
Gettysburg National Park Commission,
Gettysburg, Pa.

Dear Sir: Your suggestion, in your favor of November 1st, that, in my letter of October 18th stating historic facts, I did not suggest any valid reasons why "Trostle Lane," as it was known for years after the war but now is named by the Commission "United States Avenue," should be called "Hunt Avenue," requires me to be more specific.

First. The Civil War is over and the United States will not be troubled because avenues **within** the Confederate lines are called "Confederate." That is a proper name for them and conveys the information desired.

Second. The name "United States Avenue," on the contrary, as applied to "Trostles Lane," has no significance and conveys no information to an inquiring visitor; but, rather, belittles the fighting along its line, as of no importance, and, conse-

quently, does great injustice to the Artillery branch of the service.

A friend, who has just visited Gettysburg, tells me that he had a number of guides at the "Troastle Angle," on United States Avenue, who all thought my Battery was caught there; but had the support of other Batteries. It was a new story for them that it was alone and unsupported; that its sacrifice was intentional, if necessary, to check Barksdale's advance until McGilvery could collect and establish a new line of Artillery in its rear, and that the sacrifice accomplished the purpose desired. They were surprised, too, at the long stretch of our lines that was open from the Round Tops to the left of the Second Corps, for Barksdale and Wofford, from six to seven-fifteen P. M., July 2nd, except for what was done by McGilvery's Artillery.

Third. The name "United States Avenue" belongs more correctly to Pleasanton Avenue connecting Hancock Avenue and the Taneytown Road, centrally located within our lines, where there was no fighting and only a small body of Cavalry waiting orders.

There was no fighting along the "Confederate" avenues.

Fourth. The fighting along Troastle's Lane (United States Avenue) was done exclusively by the Artillery and, as the only avenue on the field so distinguished, it should, for the credit of the Artillery and the honor of its Corps Commander, be called "Hunt Avenue."

Fifth. The Artillery branch of the service took a sufficiently important part in the battle of Gettysburg to be entitled to some worthy recognition, on the field, at the hands of the Government.

Sixth. General Hunt, on the Peninsula, commanded the Reserve Artillery; after that, to the end of the war, was Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac. He did great service on July 2nd and 3rd at Gettysburg; not the least important being his stopping the Artillery fire of the Third, thereby saving its ammunition for Lee's final effort, "Pickett's Charge," when, his horse having been shot, he advanced on foot, revolver in hand, to the clump of trees, "the crucial point" of attack, with General Webb's men.

It will be remembered General Hancock insisted that his Corps (2) Artillery should continue firing in reply to the Confederate bombardment, with the result that many of his batteries were out of ammunition when most needed to repel "Pickett's assault" and had to be replaced, while it was in progress.

Besides many others, two guns of my Battery were ordered in on the Second Corps front, for that purpose.

Seventh. The rule adopted by the Commission, which overlooks one branch of the service in favor of another, is not in harmony with the great purpose which the National Government has in view at Gettysburg.

Excepting General Hunt, the Artillery had no Corps or Division Commanders, as had the Infantry and Cavalry, after whom avenues could, in compliance with the Commission's rule, be named.

Eighth. The intentions of the Commission with reference to avenues running North and South does not meet the issue with reference to "United States Avenue," which runs East and West; is a **battle** avenue, and its naming, in all fairness, belongs to the Artillery, which exclusively fought along it.

Ninth. Trostles Lane was not called "United States Avenue" "before they (the Commission) came on the field."

Probably, finding that the Infantry and Cavalry were not available and overlooking the Artillery, or not deeming what it did along the avenue of any importance comparable with the desirability of a counter balance to "Confederate Avenues" they, themselves, selected the name "United States."

Tenth. The very existence of the Commission, instead of a "Superintendent in Charge," shows that its work is not completed and, until such time, its maps will require many additions and corrections. In other words, the maps are not now complete, and they should be open to suggestions from those **most** interested.

The last blue print of the map does not have the familiar names of Cadori, Sherfy, Rose, etc., which have been so long used that they are landmarks for the student, although their dwellings are shown.

Eleventh. With reference to other requests for naming avenues, Birney and Humphries were outranked by General Sickles; Caldwell could hardly be selected to the prejudice of Crawford and others who fought in the Wheatfield; while Watson, I am sure, would gladly waive his claims, if any, in favor of his Corps Commander, General Hunt.

Dow's Sixth Maine Battery was in position on the evening of July 2nd, across Trostle's Lane (United States Avenue). I was carried into the Battery's front, while it was firing. Watson was well on Dow's left, facing more towards the Wheatfield, and. McGilvery's other parts of batteries were on Dow's right, as I well remember.

Twelfth. From the hearty endorsement, which my suggestion of the name of "Hunt Avenue" in the place of "United States" has received from military organizations and individuals to whom I have spoken, I feel that favorable action by the Commission, if they have the authority, will receive only commendation and popular approval. I find none favoring the name "United States" and none who regard as valid the reasons for its selection given by the Commission.

As one who received advice, instructions and orders from General Hunt, from the Peninsular to Petersburg; as one of the few Light Battery Commanders now living, who were present at Gettysburg (all of my comrades from Massachusetts, at least, have passed away), and as one especially interested, having been compelled to sacrifice my Battery, as already stated, at the "Trostle Angle," located on Trostle's Lane, now "United States Avenue," I feel, as stated in my letter of October 18th, that it is my privilege, indeed my duty, to respectfully call the attention of the Government's Commission to the unsatisfactory name they have selected for Trostle's Lane, and to use every effort to have the only **battle avenue** at Gettysburg, along which the Artillery exclusively fought, named for the credit of the Artillery and the honor of its Corps Commander, "Hunt Avenue."

Information of the final decision of the Commission is requested.

Very truly yours,

JOHN BIGELOW.

65 So. 11th St., Minneapolis, Minn.

REB. RECORD, P. 584.

Geo. E. Randolph, Capt. 1st R. I. Arty. and Chief of Art. Third
A. C.

"I was especially fortunate in having the advice and assistance of Brig. Gen. Hunt, Chief of Arty., Army of the Potomac, who examined the ground with me, and who, at the commencement and during the action, was present to contribute by his valuable advice to the efficiency of our artillery."

July 20, 1910.

The Gettysburg National Park Commission have neither acknowledged the receipt of nor replied to the communication of Nov. 10th, 1909. Consequently it is necessary to believe that they stand by their letter of Nov. 1st, 1909, and an Appeal becomes necessary.

JOHN BIGELOW.

Appeal

If, as Veterans, you believe that the injustice to the Artillery, referred to in the foregoing papers, should be rectified, please present the matter to your Loyal Legion Commandery or your Grand Army Post and get them to join with their comrades in requesting that Trostle's Lane, now misnamed United States Avenue, should be renamed,

HUNT AVENUE.

N. B.—Please send your resolutions to

- (1) The Gettysburg National Park Commission, Gettysburg, Pa. (Register this one.)
- (2) The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.
- (3) And a copy to John Bigelow, address "The Concord," No. 65 So. 11th St., Minneapolis, Minn.

Endorsements Already Received

Minnesota Commandery, Military Order Loyal of the United States.

Extract from the records of the meeting of the Minnesota Commandery, Military Order Loyal Legion of the United States, held May 10, 1910.

“Whereas, the attention of the Minnesota Commandery, Military Order Loyal Legion of the United States, has been called to the fact that the Artillery Arm of the service has not been recognized by the Government Commission in charge of the Battlefield of Gettysburg (as has been the Infantry and Cavalry), by naming any battle avenue after its Commanding Officer, and

“Whereas, the Commandery is familiar with the distinguished services rendered by the Artillery on that field, July 1, 2, 3, 4, 1863, and

“Whereas, the Commandery is informed that a battle avenue, along which the Artillery exclusively fought, has been named by the Commission “United States” Avenue, a name, as applied, which is misleading as to what was done along its line; **Now, therefore**,

“Resolved, that the commission in charge of the Gettysburg Battlefield be and are requested to change the name of “United States” avenue to “Hunt” avenue, for the credit of the Artillery and the honor of its distinguished Commander Gen. Henry J. Hunt.

“Resolved, that the said Commission be formally advised of the action taken by this Commandery.”

Advised of the action taken by this Commandery, May 15, 1910. A true copy.

DAVID L. KINGSBURY,
Recorder.

[Seal]

The following resolutions were favorably reported by the Committee on Resolutions and adopted by a unanimous vote at the 44th Annual Encampment of the Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, held at Minneapolis on June 14th-15th, A. D. 1910:

Whereas, The Grand Army of the Republic, Department of Minnesota, in Encampment assembled, recognizes the great liberality of the National Government towards its soldiers of the Civil War and its interest in preserving historic facts relating to battlefields of that War, particularly Gettysburg, and

Whereas, the attention of this Encampment has been called to the fact that The Gettysburg Battlefield Commission has named battle avenues on the Gettysburg field after officers of infantry and cavalry; but in no instance after those of the artillery arm of the service, and

Whereas, as Veterans, we have personal knowledge of the invaluable service rendered by the artillery on every battlefield of the War, and especially at Gettysburg, and

Whereas, its efficiency in the army of the Potomac, from the Peninsula to Appomatox, was in a great measure due to its Chief of Artillery, General Henry J. Hunt, and

Whereas, a battle avenue, along which the Artillery exclusively fought, has been named by the Commission "United States Avenue," a name, as applied, which we believe has no historic or other value,

Now Therefore, It Is Resolved, That the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission is requested to change the name of "United States Avenue" to "Hunt Avenue" for the credit of the artillery arm of the service and in honor of its distinguished Commander on that and many other battlefields, General Henry J. Hunt.

Resolved, That the said Gettysburg Battlefield Commission and the Secretary of War be formally advised of the action taken by this Encampment, by the Assistant Adjutant General.

I, Orton S. Clark, Assistant Adjutant General of the Department of Minnesota, G. A. R., do hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and correct copy of certain preamble and resolutions duly adopted by the Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, at its 44th Annual Encampment, held at the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, June 14-15, 1910.

[Seal]

ORTON S. CLARK,
Assistant Adjutant General,
Department of Minnesota.

At a regular meeting of John A. Rawlins Post No. 126, Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, held at the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, on Tuesday, July 19th, 1910, the committee theretofore appointed to consider the desirability of changing the name of "United State Avenue" on the Battlefield of Gettysburg to Hunt Avenue, submitted the following report and resolution, which report, on motion of Comrade Silas H. Towler, was received and filed and said resolutions were unanimously adopted.

To John A. Rawlins Post No. 126,
Department of Minnesota, G. A. R.

The undersigned, your committee appointed to consider the desirability of asking to have the name of "United States Avenue" on the Battlefield of Gettysburg, changed to Hunt Avenue, has carefully examined the government maps of the Battlefield, including the latest "blue print," issued by the Government Commission; has familiarized itself with the historic facts relating to the part of the field through which said United States Avenue passes; has considered certain correspondence, particularly a letter from Col. Nicholson, Chairman of the Gettys-

burg National Park Commission, dated November 1, 1909, and unanimously offers for your favorable consideration the accompanying resolutions.

Respectfully submitted,

ELL TORRANCE,
JOHN DAY SMITH,
C. E. FAULKNER,

Committee.

July 19, 1910.

Whereas, The John A. Rawlins Post, G. A. R., of Minneapolis, Minnesota, believes that the Artillery Arm of the service should receive proper recognition at the hands of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, and that such recognition, as they have already given to the Infantry and Cavalry, can be most fittingly made by naming a battle avenue after its commanding officer, General Henry J. Hunt.

Whereas, the said Commission has taken a battle avenue, along which the Artillery exclusively fought, and named it "United States Avenue;"

Whereas, the Semi-Centennial of the battle of Gettysburg is near at hand, and it is desired that the name of avenues on the Field shall on that occasion be approved by the surviving participants and not be a source of criticism and complaint against the Government Commission in charge; **Now therefore**,

Resolved, That the Gettysburg National Park Commission be and it is hereby respectfully requested to change the name of "United States Avenue" to Hunt Avenue.


Resolved, That the suggestions of its being desirable to balance the "Confederate" with a "United States" Avenue, and that it will make trouble to change a name on their maps, which have been made by the Chairman of the Commission, seem unimportant in view of the fact that the National Government, which is doing so


much to perpetuate the memories of the great Battle, can hardly be willing to have an injustice, occasioned by the mistaken judgment of its own servants, continue for all time to the prejudice of the Artillery Arm of its Military Service.

Resolved, That an official copy of this action by the John A. Rawlins Post be sent to the Secretary of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, Gettysburg, Pa., and also to the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Attest:

W. H. KELLER,
Adjutant.





Experiences of a Light Battery at Gettysburg

July 2,
1863

During the summer of 1863, the 9th Mass., Light Battery was attached to the 1st Volunteer Brigade, Col. McGilvery commanding, of the Reserve Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

On the afternoon of July 1st, it was in camp at Taneytown, Maryland, alongside of Army Headquarters. About sundown, word was brought that the Advance of the Army was facing Lee at Gettysburg, Pa.; there had been heavy fighting, and General Reynolds killed. Army Headquarters were moved during the night, and, at early dawn of July 2nd, the Reserve Artillery started on a 15 mile march to the scene of the impending battle. We moved rapidly over a road so rough and stony that a Battery ahead of us had a badly packed limber chest blown up and man killed. The Command arrived about eleven in the forenoon and was parked in the rear of Cemetery Hill, on the outskirts of Gettysburg.

Frequent puffs of smoke high in the air, from exploding shells, and an irregular, sputtering infantry fire, extending from the right at Culps Hill, around Cemetery Hill and to the left, near the Round Tops, indicated that the opposing lines were in close proximity, nervous and preparing for conflict. The day was very warm, 87 degrees in the shade,

and canvas covers were stretched, as shelter from the sun's rays. The gunners examined their chests; horses were fed and watered by detachments; officers, from Batteries parked around us, called, bringing news of latest happenings, and many of the men visited a barn, near by, already well filled with wounded.

About 3 o'clock P. M. heavy Infantry and Artillery fire was heard on the extreme right and left of our lines and soon an aid from Randolph, Chief of Artillery, 3rd Corps, rode up and asked for reinforcements; Colonel McGilvery gave us orders; "Assembly" was blown; drivers mounted and within five minutes we were off at a lively trot, following our leader to the left, where the firing was getting to be the heaviest. We were halted, in close order, near the Trostle House.

A spirited military spectacle lay before us; General Sickles was standing beneath a tree close by, staff officers and orderlies coming and going in all directions; at the famous "Peach Orchard" angle on rising ground, along the Emmetsburg Road, about 500 yards in our front, white smoke was curling up from the rapid and crashing volleys of Graham's 3rd Corps Infantry, and the deep-toned booming of Randolph's guns, as they tried to repel the furious assaults of Longstreet with Kershaw's and Barksdale's Brigades; while the enemy's shells were flying over or breaking around us.

Our halt was of short duration. We passed through the gateway in the Stone Wall, near Trostle's, and then started at full gallop for the crest of the ridge, 400 yards distant, extending from the Peach Orchard towards Little Round Top, nearly at right angles to the Emmetsburg Road.

We dropped our guns "in Battery" about 200 yards back of the "Peach Orchard" angle, under a heavy fire from sharpshooters and two Confederate batteries. One man was killed and several wounded before we could fire a single gun, but, the wind being light, we soon covered ourselves in a cloud of powder smoke, for our six Light Twelve guns

were rapidly served, as we engaged the enemy's batteries 1,400 yards away down the Emmetsburg Road, whose attention we were receiving. Our position was in the open and exposed. Besides the sharpshooting, the air seemed alive with bullets from the Peach Orchard struggle, just on our right, and they steadily required a wounded man to be sent to the rear, or a horse to be cut out; but we soon made the artillery fire so wild, that not one of their shot was conspicuously effective. It seemed but a short time, after we opened fire, before two of the enemy's limber chests were blown up and their fire silenced. Those who visited their position, afterwards, say it was covered with debris.

With the batteries disposed of, we immediately turned an effective fire on a large body of Confederate Infantry, Semme's Brigade, whom we saw forming around the Rose building, 600 yards in our front. As a swell of ground interfered with the new range of the left section, it was quickly moved around to the right flank of the Battery where the view was unobstructed. Our case shot and shell broke beautifully. One struck beneath the horse of the officer, who had apparently ridden out to give the order to advance—and brought down both horse and rider, causing sufficient delay to enable us, apparently, to break up their formation. After the war I met one of Semme's men, who told me that, if I would visit his Georgia home, he would show me enough graves and one-armed and one-legged men to satisfy me for my lifetime. General Humphries says of our fire: "One shell killed and disabled thirty men out of thirty-five in one company." General McLaws says, "The 50th Georgia lost one-third of its men from artillery fire, including its Commander." Colonel McGilvery, who visited the position after the battle, in his report says, he counted over 120 bodies, while J. Howard Wert, also an eye witness, in his book "Indications and Positions, Gettysburg Battlefield," says:

"On a rising knoll a short distance away are the Rose

buildings, while a small marshy stream flows between and pursues its way past the Spring House, into the woods below. July 2nd, 1863, this stream was clogged with the dead bodies of Confederates cut down by the fire of the infantry, whose monuments we are viewing, and the terrific missiles of Bigelow's Artillery. * * * Immediately after the battle were heavy rains, and in this valley so much was the stream obstructed, that great ponds were formed where the waters were dammed up by the swollen corpses of the Southern soldiery."

"In the garden of the Rose house nearly one hundred rebels were buried. All around the barn, even within the house yard, were, in numbers, the scantily covered followers of the Confederate Cause. Two hundred and seventy-five were buried behind the barn; a rebel Colonel was buried within a yard of the kitchen door. No pen can describe the awful picture of desolation, devastation and death that was presented here to the shuddering beholder, who traversed these localities July 4th, 5th and 6th, 1863."

Hardly had the enemy around the Rose buildings disappeared, before Kershaw's battle line, extending from the Rose buildings to the Peach Orchard, just on our right, leaped a stone wall along the Emmetsburg Road and in two lines, started across an open field in our front for a skirt of woods on our left, some 400 yards away. As thus far in the engagement, we had not seen any of our infantry, we, at first, hesitated to open fire on them, fearing they were Sickles' men; but their battle flags told the story, and the Battery immediately enfiladed them with a rapid fire of canister, which tore through their ranks and sprinkled the field with their dead and wounded, until they disappeared in the woods on our left, apparently a mob. Kershaw intended to have swept over the battery, but, in adjusting his right flank he says he ordered a company to move to the right, "a little." The word ran along his line to "charge to the right oblique," this caused his left flank to pass about 200 yards in our front and gave the battery an op-

portunity, which it improved to the limit. Kershaw, however, was not long in taking his revenge. As soon as the woods were reached, he sent a body of sharpshooters against us, who followed, until we were all shot down.

While the battery had thus been engaged, Hood had swung around beyond the Rose buildings and the contest was raging hot and fierce amid the boulders of Devils Den and the Round Tops on our left; while, with desperate fighting, the pendulum of battle had swung backward and forward four or five times through the Peach Orchard, 200 yards on our right, resulting in the capture of General Graham by the Confederates and the destruction or driving away of his infantry and artillery, much of the latter, owing to loss of horses, having been dragged off by hand.

Colonel McGilvery rode up, at this time, told me that "all of Sickles' men had withdrawn and I was alone on the field, without supports of any kind; limber up and get out." I replied that, "if I attempted to do so, the sharpshooters, on my left front, would shoot us all down." I must "retire by prolonge and firing," in order "to keep them off." He assented and rode away. (A prolonge is a rope one end of which can be attached to the limber and the other to the gun trail. It enables the latter to be dragged along on the ground, and firing can be continued, although the gun is moving. This is the only instance in the Civil War of its use on a battle field, without supporting infantry, and in the presence of an enemy advancing in force and so close at hand.)

Glancing towards the Peach Orchard on my right, I saw that the Confederates (Barksdale's Brigade) had come through and were forming a line 200 yards distant, extending back, parallel with the Emmetsburg Road, as far as I could see, and I must therefore move almost parallel with and in front of their line, in order to reach the exit of the stone wall at Trostle's house 400 yards away. No friendly supports, of any kind, were in sight; but Johnnie Rebs in great numbers. Bullets were coming into our midst from

many directions and a Confederate battery added to our difficulties. Still, prolonges were fixed and we withdrew—the left section keeping Kershaw's skirmishers back with canister, and the other two sections bowling solid shot towards Barksdale's men. We moved slowly, the recoil of the guns retiring them, while the prolonges enabled us to keep the alignment; but the loss in men and horses was severe. When we reached the angle of the stone wall at Trostle's house, a swell of ground, 50 yards on our right front, covered us from Barksdale's approaching line and we began to limber up, hoping to get out and back to our lines before they closed in on us; but McGilvery, again rode up, told me that back of me for nearly 1,500 yards, between Round Top and the left of the 2nd Corps, the lines were open; there were no reserves, and said, I must hold my position at all hazards until he could find some infantry, or could collect and place some batteries in position to cover the gap. The position, in which we were halted, was an impossible one for artillery. We were far in advance of our lines, without supports of any kind, for I had just been surprised and disappointed at seeing a regiment (118 Pa., Tilton's Brigade, 5th Corps) filing around a skirt of woods 100 yards on our left, and marching to the rear, leaving us to our fate; but it seems, during the few minutes they were exposed, they lost a Captain, two Lieutenants, a Sergeant and a number of men. Further, we were shut in by the angle of a stone wall, along one line of which, the left, Kershaw's sharpshooters were following us; while on its other line, in front and on our right, Barksdale's Brigade was advancing; nearly half our men and horses were lying killed and wounded at our first position, or on the field, between that and where we then were, for we had been steadily engaged since 4:30 P. M. (it was then 6 o'clock), and but a few rounds of ammunition were left in our chests. However, the orders were given to unlimber, take the ammunition from the chests, place it near the guns for rapid firing and load the guns to the muzzle. They were hardly

executed before the enemy appeared breast high above the swell of ground 50 yards in front, already referred to, and firing, on both sides, began. Notwithstanding repeated efforts, I don't think any of Barksdale's men came in on the front of the battery, weak as we were; but his lines extended far beyond our right flank, and the 21st Miss., Colonel, afterwards Governor, Humphries commanding, swung without opposition and came in from that direction, pouring in a heavy fire all the while. Just before they closed in, the left section, Lieut. Milton, could not be used, owing to some stone boulders, and was ordered to the rear. One piece went through the gateway of the stone wall, was upset, righted amid a shower of bullets and, Lieut. Milton assisting, was dragged to the rear, the other piece was driven directly over the stone wall and the stones lie today exactly as they were knocked by the wheels then, with a six or eight-inch tree grown up in front, as guardian of the spot.

I rode to the stone wall, hoping to stop some of Milton's cannoners and have them make a better opening, through which I might rush one or more of the remaining four guns, which were still firing. I sat on my horse calling the men, when my bugler, on my right, drew his horse back on his haunches, as he saw six sharpshooters on our left taking deliberate aim at us. I stopped two, and my horse two more of their bullets. My orderly was near by, and, dismounting he raised me from the ground.

I then saw the Confederates swarming in on our right flank, some standing on the limber chests and firing at the gunners, who were still serving their pieces; the horses were all down; overhead the air was alive with missiles from batteries, which the enemy had now placed on the Emmetsburg Road, and, glancing anxiously to the rear, I saw the longed for batteries just coming into position on high ground, 500 yards away. I then gave orders for the small remnant of the four gun detachments to fall back. My battery had delayed the enemy 30 precious minutes, from 6

to 6:30 o'clock P. M., and its sacrifice had not been in vain.

For three-quarters of an hour longer, until 7:15 P. M., McGilvery's artillery, made up of 6th Maine, and parts of five other batteries, which had been driven back badly crippled, from the Emmetsburg Road, and he had collected (21 guns in all) alone, covered the long gap in our lines, of which I have spoken. They used canister freely and repelled several efforts of the enemy to break through. Barksdale got no further than the Trostle buildings, but one of his regiments, the 21st Miss., which had come in on our right flank, moved farther to our left, and charging, captured one of McGilvery's picked up batteries (I. 5th U. S.). They were, however, shortly after, driven back by the 39th N. Y. of Willard's Brigade, 2nd Corps, which had been sent by Hancock to support McGilvery's line, and had arrived at 7:15 o'clock P. M.

Shortly after 7:15 o'clock P. M. Barksdale was attacked and driven back to the Emmetsburg Road by Willard's Brigade, sent, as I have said, by Hancock to support McGilvery's batteries. In this engagement, both Willard and Barksdale were killed.

So it is, that on July 2nd, 1863, while Longstreet reached and fought around the Round Tops, and Hill reached the 2nd Corps' front, the center of their attack was checked by the 9th Mass. Battery and held afterwards by McGilvery's Artillery, 1000 yards to the front of those points; never advanced beyond the Trostle buildings, and never discovered the gap in our lines, which might have proved a royal road to victory.

Let me add a few side lights, told by my men. Sergeant Baker, describing the situation at the time the 21st Miss. came in on our right flank, before the final shooting down, says: "The right gun, the fifth, horses all killed and left 50 yards up the slope; one driver killed, sergeant and gunner wounded and gone; two cannoneers wounded and one lying under the gun. The next gun, all but one horse killed; sergeant wounded twice; one cannoneer shot through the body,

lying in the enemy's lines; one other bruised in the back; the limber overturned near the gateway. The next two guns, one sergeant mortally wounded, the other hit in the foot; five men killed; two wounded; all the horses killed. The left section, one sergeant wounded and one man; gun teams had some wounded horses, but all went off the field."

Lieut. Erickson, who commanded the center section of the battery was shot through the lungs, early in the engagement, but refused to leave his guns. One of the men says:

"I saw Lieut. Erickson, as he passed near me, reeling in his saddle; he was frothing at the mouth, asked me for some water, drank nearly a canteen full. He afterwards saw the right piece some distance to the rear and in danger of capture; rode up to it, and was shot through the head, indeed, riddled with bullets; fell dead, his horse passing into the enemy's lines. The battery kept well aligned, in retiring, till near the rear of the field, when the right gun was left behind, losing all of its horses. Early in the action, at the right, I saw three wounded men lying on the ground and Gilson was lighting his pipe. He fell over, struggled a little and was still, shot through the neck. On the third gun, Murphy fell as he was about to fire. Fen took the lanyard and was shot; then Crossen stepped around to fire the gun and was shot. Smith stepped over and fired the gun. At last we were in the corner of Trostle's field and limbered up, with two rounds in our chest. We unlimbered, fired these with good effect; then, under orders, retired to the rear, crossing the stone wall."

Cole, driver of the 6th piece, says: "The lead and swing teams were shot and cut out. Finally my near horse was shot and cut out and, as we commenced to retire, I led the off horse and guided the pole. The limber chest saved me. The cover was open, in retiring, and there were thirteen holes in it besides some in the chest. There seemed to be a body of the enemy on our right front (Barksdale's Brigade) and at every discharge they were mowed down in swathes. In the evening I saw some prisoners, who said it

was the hardest artillery fire they ever stood against. One man had five of our canister in various parts of him, and another said, 'Never saw such men; you didn't know when you were whipped. We could have killed every one of you'ns; but we thought you had surrendered.' Still another Confederate said, 'we suffered awfully; but were bound to silence your d—n brass guns, anyway.'"

I fell from my horse within 50 feet of the stone wall. My bugler heard the officers of the 21st Miss., shouting to their men telling them not to fire at me again. Lieut. Whitaker, who had ably commanded the two right guns of the battery, though mortally wounded, rode up and gave me the strengthening benefit of his whiskey flask. I was lifted on my orderly's horse and taken back to the hospital by Bugler Reed at a walk. When about half way and directly in front of the 6th Maine Battery, which had been placed in position on the high ground in my rear—one of its officers rode forward and urged me to hasten my movements, as it was feared the enemy in front would take advantage of their silence to charge them. I replied, "My injuries make it impossible, go back and open fire at once." Well, in a few moments, Bedlam indeed broke loose. The ground all about us was swept with shot, shell, canister and bullets. Bugler Reed's nerve, however, did not fail him. He did not hasten his horse's movement, a single step, but he guided both horses with one hand, holding me on mine with the other, and we entered the face of the 6th Maine Battery, 300 yards away amid the cheers of its cannoneers, while it was hotly engaged with rebel batteries, in position on the Emmetsburg Road, and with the 21st Miss. firing from the stone wall. The enemy's shots followed us almost to the hospital on the Taneytown Road.

Bugler Reed has received a "Medal of Honor."

Corporal Adams says: "I noticed, as I came up, an abandoned gun, and, during the heat of the engagement, as the ammunition was giving out, Corporal Brown and myself brought eight rounds from that gun. It is said that

Ligal saved himself by braining a Confederate, with his rammer head." Another did so with a handspike.

Private Stowe says: "About the time we had orders to fix prolonges, I was shot through the body, I went to the rear about twenty yards and fell senseless. * * * I was left between the picket lines. There I was all night with none but the dead, save now and then a ghoul in gray searching the dead and stripping them of their clothing. If seen by our pickets they were fired on and driven away. The night was long and dark to me. I thought, if the boys could, they would come for me. Toward morning a man in gray came near me. He appeared to be looking about, but not trying to strip any bodies. He stood looking at me and I put out my hand and touched his foot. He jumped as if surprised; he probably thought me dead. On recovering, he stooped over, asked me where I was shot, if I was cold, and got a rubber blanket, placed it under me and covered me with two of woolen. He sat by me some time, talking, till it began to be light, then gave me his canteen of water, saying he must get back to his post."

The Battery was hotly engaged from 4:30 to 6:30 P. M., and, from the first was steadily depleted by the loss of men and horses. One officer was killed, one mortally and one seriously wounded, of four present; six out of seven sergeants were killed or wounded; the total loss of men was twenty-eight out of about sixty serving the guns, and sixty horses were killed, and twenty disabled out of eighty-eight on the field. Over three tons of ammunition were expended, including ninety-two rounds of canister out of ninety-six in the chests. The use of any canister indicates hot work, and usually a dozen rounds will easily break a charge.

Lockwood's Brigade, 12th Corps, of which I had by a strange coincidence, been acting Asst. Adjt. Gen., in the winter of '61 and '62, in a campaign on the eastern shore of Virginia—before the Army of the Potomac started, was brought over from the extreme right at Culps' Hill, at 7:30


P. M. and recaptured the four guns left in the angle. They were returned to the Battery the next day, and, though used on every battle field to Appomattox, never again left our possession. The two guns, withdrawn on the 2nd, were, the next day, July 3rd, under the able command of the surviving officer, Lieut. Milton, in position near the "bloody angle" and assisted in repelling Pickett's charge.


At the request of Gov. Andrews, I had taken command of the Battery only four months previous, in February, and found it within the earthworks of Washington, demoralized and unhappy because the men felt they were only playing soldiers, for which they had not enlisted. Gettysburg was their first battle; but on every field to Petersburg, they exhibited the same steadiness, and gave the same ready obedience to orders under most trying surroundings. Their camp life was equally a model of order and discipline; none of their number was ever court martialled. Without exception, they were soldiers only from the highest sense of duty and finely illustrated the patriotic spirit of the sixties.

I will conclude with the words used by Whitelaw Reid, then army correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette, who more briefly told this same story as an illustration of what was done by every other command on that field,

"Thus they fought along that fiery line at Gettysburg."







SUPPLEMENT
TO
PEACH ORCHARD
GETTYSBURG
—
AN APPEAL

FOR THE INFORMATION OF VETERANS

REPORT OF THE GETTYSBURG NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION
TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

REPLY OF RAWLINS POST NO. 126, DEPT. MINNESOTA, G. A. R.
CORRESPONDENCE:

LIEUT. ELL TORRANCE
LATE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC
CHAIRMAN NICHOLSON
GETTYSBURG NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION

LETTER OF GENERAL SICKLES

COMMENTS THEREON BY MAJOR BIGELOW

ENDORSEMENTS FROM MANY VETERAN ORGANIZATIONS OF
HUNT AVENUE

Showing the incorrect and misleading statements and foolish
reasons given by the Commission for retaining
the misapplied name of
United States Avenue
for
Trostle's Lane

(An Appreciation)
Colonel Freeman McGilvery of Maine





John A. Rawlins Post Resolves

(repeated for easy reference)

At a regular meeting of John A. Rawlins Post No. 126, Department of Minnesota, Grand Army of the Republic, held at the City of Minneapolis, Minnesota, on Tuesday, July 19th, 1910, the committee theretofore appointed to consider the desirability of changing the name of "United States Avenue" on the Battlefield of Gettysburg to Hunt Avenue, submitted the following report and resolution, which report, on motion was received and filed and said resolutions were unanimously adopted.

To John A. Rawlins Post No. 126

DEPARTMENT OF MINNESOTA, G. A. R.

The undersigned, your committee appointed to consider the desirability of asking to have the name of "United States Avenue" on the Battlefield of Gettysburg, changed to Hunt Avenue, has carefully examined the government maps of the Battlefield, including the latest "blue print," issued by the Government Commission; has familiarized itself with the historic facts relating to the part of the field through which said United States Avenue passes: has considered certain correspondence, particularly a letter from Col. Nicholson, Chairman of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, dated Nov. 1, 1909, and unanimously offers for your favorable consideration the accompanying resolutions.

Respectfully submitted,

July 19, 1910.

ELL TORRANCE,
JOHN DAY SMITH,
C. E. FAULKNER.

Whereas, The John A. Rawlins Post, G. A. R. Department of Minnesota, believes that the Artillery Arm of the service should receive proper recognition at the hands of the Gettysburg National Commission, and that such recognition, as they have already given to the Infantry and Cavalry, can be most fittingly made by naming a battle avenue after its commanding officer, General Henry J. Hunt.

Whereas, the said Commission has taken a battle avenue, along

which the Artillery exclusively fought, and named it "United States Avenue."

Whereas, the Semi-Centennial of the battle of Gettysburg is near at hand and it is desired that the name of avenues on the Field shall on that occasion be approved by the surviving participants and not be a source of criticism and complaint against the Government Commission in charge,

Now Therefore,

Resolved: That the Gettysburg National Park Commission be and it is hereby respectfully requested to change the name of "United States Avenue" to Hunt Avenue.

Resolved: That the suggestion of its being desirable to balance the "Confederate" with a "United States" Avenue and that it will make trouble to change a name on their maps, which have been made by the Chairman of the Commission, seem unimportant in view of the fact that the National Government, which is doing so much to perpetuate the memories of the great Battle, can hardly be willing to have an injustice, occasioned by the mistaken judgment of its own servants, continue for all time to the prejudice of the Artillery Arm of its Military Service.

Resolved: That an official copy of this action by the John A. Rawlins Post be sent to the Secretary of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, Gettysburg, Pa., and also to the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Attest:

W. H. KELLER, Adjutant.

W. D. 21914.

WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington,

September 21, 1910.

Sir:

On behalf of the Department, I beg to acknowledge receipt of the resolutions adopted at the regular meeting of John A. Rawlins Post No. 126, Department of Minnesota, G. A. R., held July 19, 1910, urging that the name of United States Avenue, upon the Gettysburg Battlefield be changed to Hunt Avenue, in honor of General Henry J. Hunt.

I now beg to invite your attention to the inclosed report of the Gettysburg National Park Commission and to the inclosures therein referred to, from which you will see that the existing name was chosen many years ago by the Commission and the

Secretary of War after due deliberation and that most excellent reasons existed for its selection. On the other hand, the Department concurs with the Commission that no good reason exists for changing the name to Hunt Avenue and that therefore the request of your organization must be denied.

Very Respectfully,
ROBERT SHAW OLIVER,
Acting Secretary of War.

MR. A. R. KELLER,
Adjutant, John A. Rawlins Post No. 126,
Department of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn.

(Inclosures: 3 to 8, inclusive, of 21914.)

INCLOSURES
WAR DEPARTMENT
GETTYSBURG NATIONAL PARK COMMISSION
GETTYSBURG, PA.

September 7, 1910.

To the Hon. Secretary of War

Sir:

The Commission have carefully considered the resolutions which are returned, and respectfully submit the following as a reply, and invite the attention of the Department to the documents bearing upon the subject, which accompanies this communication:

Journal of the Commission, November 4-5, 1893, Extract.

Letter to Major John Bigelow, November 1, 1909.

List of Commanding Officers of the Army of the Potomac.

The object of building the Avenue was to prevent the continuation of the Trolley R. R. Line from the Devil's Den north to the Angle.

The Trolley Co., having purchased a right of way over all the land except across the lane known as "Troastle's," which runs to the barn, and upon which had been improperly located the position of Watson's Battery.

If an individual by a statement to soldiers' organizations, who in the very nature of things can have no knowledge of the details, may change the work of the War Department, then there is no permanency, and the considered plan and scheme are at the mercy of those who presume they have a knowledge beyond the facts.

Almost every Avenue named by the Memorial Association has been the subject of attack during their occupancy of the Field.

Notably the effort to change Howard Avenue and Hancock Avenue, with other suggestions of similar character.

The Avenue named for the Government connects Hancock Avenue with the Emmitsburg Road, and will eventually connect with West Confederate for the purpose of placing a larger part of the Confederate Artillery of General Alexander's the positions being marked by him.

No good reason can be advanced to name the Avenue as first suggested "McGilvery" and now "Hunt."

There are but two small Markers on it relating to the Artillery, the Artillery line being along "Sickles Avenue," from the Emmitsburg Road eastward and a thousand feet south of "United States Avenue."

In naming the Avenues, the Commission have sought to employ the location of the Headquarters of the Officers designated, and there is no evidence that General Hunt ever was on the line of the Avenue suggested to be named for his, nor has injustice been done him, and the enclosed list shows other Officers quite as distinguished.

The purpose of the Commission is to build an Avenue greatly needed from the Baltimore Pike to General Meade's Headquarters on Meade Avenue, and to connect with Hancock Avenue. A part of the land for this Avenue has been procured, and the remainder in the near future. It has been agreed since 1904, that the Secretary of War was to be requested to name it "Hunt Avenue."

Very respectfully,

JNO. NICHOLSON,
C. A. RICHARDSON,
L. L. LOMAX,
Commissioners.

Journal of the Commission

EXTRACT

November 4, 1893.

At 11 A. M. Secretary of War Lamont arrived and made an inspection of the Field, with the Commission, Nicholson, Bachelder and Forney.

At 8 P. M. Secretary of War Lamont in the office until 11 o'clock and the details of the suggested line of work were gone over and in detail explained to him, also all the suggested condemnation proceedings, and the papers and maps required to show the case of the Government against the Trolley Co.

November 5, 1893.

At 9 A. M. the Secretary of War continued the examination of the details of the suggested work.

The question of connecting Hancock Avenue of the Memorial Association with the Government line to the West was discussed, and it was agreed that to make a connection to the Confederate line of battle, that the Trostle Lane should be opened to the Emmitsburg Road by purchase or condemnation.

After discussion as to the name of the avenue or road, Colonel Lamont suggested that as it was the first Avenue to be procured in the name of the United States, that it be so called.

Colonel Bachelder thought that as the proceedings were to be in the name of the "United States," and as no other avenue nor road would connect the lines of battle on the South Field, the suggestion was proper, and Colonel Lamont's recommendation was unanimously agreed to.

Colonel Nicholson instructed Colonel Cope to so make his drawings, and in view of the condemnation and submission to the Supreme Court U. S., adjourned at 1 P. M.

Colonel Lamont on the field in the afternoon, and left for Washington at 4:40 with Colonel Nicholson.

A True Copy,

JNO. NICHOLSON, Chairman.

N. B. The Act, making Gettysburg Battlefield a National Park was not approved until *Feb. 11, 1895*. Secretary Lamont had no authority over it Nov. 5, 1893.

The Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association on *May 22, 1895*, authorized conveyance of its properties to the National Government. J. B.

Report of Rawlins Post Committee
on the inaccurate and misleading
Report of Gettysburg Commission, made Sept. 7, 1910 to the
Honorable Secretary of War.

To John A. Rawlins Post No. 126
DEPARTMENT OF MINNESOTA, G. A. R.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Comrades:

Your committee, to whom was referred the communication of Ass't Sec'y of War, Robert Shaw Oliver, dated Sept. 21, 1910,

MAP NO. 6

RELIEF MAP
included in Report to Secretary of War
of
Gettysburg National Park Commission
Sept. 7, 1910.

SHOWING

Deep Black Line:

Proposed Hunt Avenue, located in the rear of Cemetery Hill, where *no* Batteries were "in position" and *far* from where the Reserve Artillery was parked.
(vide Commission's Report, Sept. 7, 1910.)

Dotted Line:

Granite School House Road along which the Reserve Artillery *was* parked.
General Tyler, Commanding Artillery Reserves had his Headquarters on the Taneytown Road, across from where the Granite School House Road enters it, vide Map 7.

Light Colored Line:

Trostle Lane an Exclusively Artillery *Battle* Avenue, now misnamed United States Avenue, which should be changed to *Hunt Avenue* in order to suitably honor the *Artillery Corps*.


The name of "McGilvery Avenue," instead of United States Avenue, is *only* waived to honor the *Artillery Corps* and its Chief, General Hunt.

Colonel McGilvery, by his Second Line of Artillery, between 6 and 7:15 P. M.

July 2, 1863,

without Infantry support, undoubtedly rendered great service in saving General Meade's line of battle

After
The Third Corps had left the field.



RELIEF MAP OF THE GETTYSBURG BATTLEFIELD
MADE BY THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION
COL. JOHN P. NICHOLSON CHAIRMAN
LT. COL. E. B. COPE ENGINEER

(with enclosures) refusing to grant the request, contained in your Resolves, unanimously approved at your meeting, July 19, 1910, in which you requested that the name of

United States Avenue, on Gettysburg Battlefield
be changed to
Hunt Avenue

have given the reply of Ass't Sec'y Oliver careful consideration and have to report:

The action of the Ass't Sec'y of War was based on a Report, which he called for from the Gettysburg National Park Commission, dated, Sept. 7, 1910.

The Report of said Commission is of such an extraordinary character, that, for your information, we shall consider it in detail.

Naming of Avenue.

Journal of Commission - - - Nov. 5, 1893.

(Extract)

"It was agreed that the Trostle Lane should be opened to the Emmitsburg Road by purchase or condemnation."

"After discussion as to the name of the avenue or road Col. Lamont suggested that as it was the first Avenue to be procured in the name of the United States, that it be so called."

Clearly, Col. Lamont's advisors, Nicholson and Bachelder (there could have been no Commission until the Act making the battlefield a National Park had been approved, which was done Feb. 11, 1895) gave no information to Sec'y Lamont, as to any historic facts connected with Trostle Lane, and the reasons given in the Journal for the selection of the name, "United States" are even more foreign to the purpose, for which the Gettysburg Battlefield was made a National Park, than that contained in the letter of

Chairman Nicholson to Major Bigelow, dated Nov. 1, 1909, viz: **"There are on the Field an East Confederate Avenue, West Confederate Avenue and North Confederate Avenue, and it seemed eminently proper that the designation of a connecting Avenue, in the Union Lines, should be named United States."**

It will be noticed that the name "United States" did not suggest to Chairman Nicholson the above, Journal of the Commission, reason for its being so called.

Your Committee carefully considered the reasons given in Chairman Nicholson's letter, above quoted, and, finding them without merit, so reported to you, and, now, we have to say, that the reasons, given in the

Extract from Journal of Commission,
we regard of a similar character.

Further, we believe that, through the ignorance of the Commission or their failure to disclose the important historic facts, connected with Trostle Lane, Secretary Lamont was misled, else he would never have suggested the name "United States" and, today, knowing the historic facts, he would be among the first to have his mistake corrected, as you have desired.

The selection of the name, "United States," for Trostle's Lane, it seems from the "Journal of the Commission," was made on Nov. 5, 1893, (The Act making Gettysburg a National Park was only approved Feb. 11, 1895) but for many years afterward, was only known to the Commission and, only recently, to veterans most interested, as they are preparing for the Semi-Centennial of the Battle.

You will recall, that your Resolves asked simply for a change of name, "United States" to "Hunt" Ave., which would give suitable and proper recognition to the great **Artillery Corps of the Army of the Potomac**, commensurate with its importance, and, as the Infantry and Cavalry Corps of that Army have long been honored, viz: through its Commander, Gen. Hunt.

The Commission meets your very proper request, as follows:

**Report of Gettysburg National Park Commission to
Secretary of War, Sept. 7, 1910.**

After some preliminary statements, Commissioner Nicholson inserts this paragraph which cannot help but interest veterans.

Extract. "If an individual by a statement to soldiers' organizations, who in the very nature of things can have no knowledge of the details, may change the work of the War Department, then there is no permanency, and the considered plan and scheme are at the mercy of those who presume they have a knowledge beyond the facts."

Gettysburg Battlefield was consecrated by the members, past and present, of the Soldiers' Organizations, the intelligence of whose members Col. Nicholson regards so lightly and, while his ill advised reflections on their intelligence may furnish a gauge by which he himself may be judged, they in no wise affect their opinion of the treatment, which their reasonable request to the War Department should receive.

We repeat that the request is simply to change a misapplied name, United States, for one which will honor, through its Commander, General Hunt, the **Artillery Corps of the Army of the Potomac**, which at Gettysburg and on every hotly contested field of that Army, ever rendered willing and self sacrificing support to the co-ordinate Arms of the Service, the Infantry and the Cavalry.

It should be remembered that the Third Corps was driven from its advanced position at the Peach Orchard, at 6 P. M. after

two hours of the hardest fighting. It retired from the field for the day, leaving open General Meade's lines from the Round Tops to the left of the Second Corps, (¾ of a mile long.) and that Col. McGilvery, Commanding First Brigade Artillery Reserves, with no Third Corps Officers to assist nor advise, formed a Second Line of Artillery across Trostle Lane, near the Weikert House and, without Infantry support and the hardest fighting, stayed the Confederate Advance and prevented their discovering their great opportunity from 6 to 7:15 P. M., when Infantry was brought to his support and the Lines strengthened and established as Gen. Meade originally intended.

It will be remembered also that Gen. Meade greatly feared the danger to his lines, which General Sickles advanced position at the Peach Orchard threatened. The danger fully materialized at 6 P. M. but was finally averted by the independent action of Col. McGilvery's Artillery.

It is this independent Artillery contest, which, for the credit of the Artillery Corps it is desired to rename United States avenue with that of General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac.

Thus far knowledge of it has been minimized by the misleading name of United States.

Chairman Nicholson wrote General Sickles Oct. 17, 1910 and received a reply Nov. 11, 1910 to the effect

"The Avenues embracing my position are all properly named" which suggests that General Sickles prefers to have nothing done, to call attention to what was done *after his Corps left the field*, that would only confirm General Meade's contention and fears.

The next matter of any importance in the Report of the Commission, is:

Extract. "The Avenue named for the Government connects Hancock Avenue with the Emmitsburg Road and will eventually connect with West Confederate Avenue, for the purpose of placing a larger part of the Confederate Artillery of General Alexander's the position being marked by him."

Possibly this is one of the schemes to which Chairman Nicholson refers in the previous quotation.

There is no objection to General Alexander's position being properly marked, but the necessary Avenue should start from the Emmitsburg Road above or below, where the United States Avenue enters it, and, in this way, not prejudice the name of United States Avenue or its change to Hunt Avenue.

There is nothing of value in the foregoing suggestion of the Commission, nor any proper reason why it should be carried out.

The Millerstown Road, an extension of the Wheatfield Road, but a short distance from where the United States Avenue enters the Emmitsburg Road, runs direct to West Confederate Avenue. Further, this statement is at variance with a statement, previously made, that United States Avenue was to be a connecting link within the Union Lines. (vide letter of Major Bigelow Nov. 1, 1909.) L5

Again the Report of the Commission:

Extract. "No good reason can be advanced to name the Avenue, as first suggested "McGilvery" and now "Hunt."

The Commission are probably *still* ignorant of or indifferent to the historic facts relating to Trostle's Lane, especially as vividly explained by Major Bigelow in his book "The Peach Orchard, Gettysburg."

Again the Report of the Commission:

Extract. "There are but two small markers on it, relating to the Artillery, the Artillery line being along Sickles Avenue from the Emmitsburg Road eastward and a thousand feet south of United States Avenue."

This statement again shows the error of the Commission with reference to what was done by the Artillery along Trostle's Lane.

The first line of Artillery *was* along the Wheatfield Road (a short distance of which is now called Sickles Avenue) and the Emmitsburg Road: but when the line was broken at the Peach Orchard and the Third Corps, Infantry and Batteries, retired from the field for good, at 6 P. M., July 2, 1863, with General Graham Commanding at the Peach Orchard wounded and a prisoner, and with General Sickles wounded and taken from the field, Colonel McGilvery, Commanding First Volunteers Brigade Reserve Artillery, came on the field and, realizing the great disaster, which threatened, because General Meade's Lines from the foot of Little Round Top to the left of the Second Corps, a distance of three-fourths of a mile, were being left open, without assistance, formed a second line of Artillery (vide Map 7.) with such batteries and parts of batteries as he could collect, across the present United States Avenue, near the Weikert House, while the Ninth Massachusetts Battery was staying the approaching Confederates at the angle of the stone wall near Trostle's House some 400 yards in advance.

From 6 to 6:30 P. M. the Ninth Massachusetts Battery and from 6:30 to 7:15 P. M. McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery, without Infantry support, stayed the Confederate advance, and prevented their discovering the great opportunity to enter General Meade's Lines, which was before them. After 7:15 P. M., strong Infantry support from the First, Second and Twelfth Corps was brought up, and General Meade's Lines were made strong and safe.

At the time the Markers, to which the Commission refer were placed on the field, the land along Trostle's Lane was private property. Major Bigelow, with Mr. Trostle's consent, placed his marker, a limber chest, on a large stone boulder in the Stone Wall at Trostles, so as not to intrude on the property and Watson's Battery, where best they could, near the Weikert House. The other batteries found they would have to place theirs in the fields, where they would not be seen. So Capt. Dow, Sixth Maine Battery, by Batchelder's advice, marked his approximate position of July 3, on Hancock Avenue, which had, then, been laid out by the Memorial Association, and was all that was available to him. Captain Phillips, Fifth Massachusetts Battery, for similar reasons, placed his monument at his first position on the Wheatfield Road.

Further, it should be known that the Batteries had only sufficient money for their monuments and not for extra markers, placed where they thought they would not be seen.

Thus the statement of the Commission, with reference to the Markers, while apparently intended to impress the Secretary of War with the unimportance of Trostle Lane, is very misleading.

Again the report of the Commission:

Extract. "In naming the Avenues, the Commission have sought to employ the location of the Headquarters of the Officers designated."

Sickles Avenue properly marks the Third Corps position, July 2, 1863, and extends from the Round Tops to the Peach Orchard and well along the Emmitsburg Road, and is a mile and a half long.

Where, then, does it mark General Sickles' Headquarters? He moved his Corps out from the Taneytown Road in the morning and at night he was taken to some Hospital; while the Third Corps had fallen back to the approximate position, from which it had started in the morning.

The *Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association*, named the roads, which it laid out along the Union battle lines before the Government Commission took charge in 1895, after the Commanders of the Corps located along said roads and paid no attention to their "Headquarters" before, after, nor during the battle (at which time the Corps Commanders were where emergency called.)

The report continuing:

Extract. "And there is no evidence that General Hunt ever was on the line of the Avenue suggested to be named for him, nor has injustice been done to him and the enclosed list shows other officers, quite as distinguished."

Again Chairman Nicholson's statements are erroneous.

Reb. Rec. Vol. 1, Gettysburg P. 584.

Geo. F. Randolph, Capt. and Chief of Artillery, Third Army Corps.

"I was especially fortunate in having the advice and assistance of Brigadier General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, who examined the ground with me and who, at the Commencement and during the action was present to contribute by his valuable advice to the efficiency of our Artillery."

Whose knowledge of facts is the best?
See also, General Hunt's Report, Reb. Record Vol. 27. Part 1, Page 228, Gettysburg.

The list of Officers "quite as distinguished" whom the Commission furnished the Secretary of War "for whom no Avenues or Lines of Battle have been marked or named" is made up of Division Commanders, a few of whom succeeded disabled Corps Commanders, after whom avenues have already been named.

As a Sample:

Third Army Corps
Commanding
Major General David B. Birney
(Gen. Meade relieved Gen. Birney and placed Gen. Hancock in command)

he puts down

Artillery
Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt
notice he does not say,

Artillery Corps
Commanding
Brigadier General Henry J. Hunt,
which, while it would be the fact, would not serve his purpose in trying to prevent the name of United States Avenue being changed to Hunt.

The Artillery of the Army of the Potomac constituted a Corps, commanded by General Henry J. Hunt, and was not a Division. It ranked with the different Infantry and the Cavalry Corps. The guns, which have been placed at the different battery positions for *scenic effect*, scattered all over the field, emphasize the fact that there was an *Artillery Corps*. Its Batteries responded cheerfully to every emergency call. Their position in battle was where the fighting was hottest. They were always the favored marks of the opposing Batteries, Sharpshooters and Infantry and, yet, there is no record of a single Battery failing to perform its fullest duty. Its efficiency was due, in a large measure, to the watchful care of its Commander, Gen. Hunt, of whom every Batteryman was proud, and whom every veteran soldier in the Army, respected.

The Commission concludes its report with:
Extract. "The purpose of the Commission is to build an Avenue, greatly

needed, from the Baltimore Pike to General Meade's Headquarters on Meade Avenue and to connect with Hancock Avenue. A part of the land for this Avenue has been procured and the remainder in the near future. It has been agreed, since 1904, that the Secretary of War was to name it Hunt Avenue."

The Avenue, proposed to be built sometime, (it is now nearly 48 years since the Battle) as described by the Commission and shown on a Relief Map (vide Map 6) furnished by them, is located in the rear of Cemetery Hill, is far from the battle line, passes through a deep hollow, and is one, where no Batteries were "in position" and not even the Reserve Artillery was parked.

It would, in no way, worthily honor the

Artillery Corps, nor its Commander,

and your Committee believe, you should file a remonstrance with the Secretary of War, against the recognition, which the Commission proposes.

The Artillery Corps, through its Commander, is entitled to a prominent **Battle Avenue**, such as the unfortunately named United States Avenue, the name of which can be changed to Hunt Avenue without affecting the names of any avenues, now named after other Corps Commanders.

The Third Corps has its Sickles Avenue already built and named, not at Sickles' Headquarters; but along its battle line and would not be affected by the change. The fighting along Trostles Lane was independent of the Third Corps or any of its Officers and was done exclusively by McGilvery's Artillery between 6 and 7:15 P. M. **unsupported by any Infantry; after** the Batteries and Infantry at the Peach Orchard had retired from the field; **after** General Graham, their Commander, had been wounded and taken prisoner, **after** General Sickles had been wounded and taken to a hospital and **after** General Humphries' Division had been forced away from the Emmitsburg Road, thus uncovering Trostles Lane, and while it was gallantly falling back to the front of the left of the Second Corps. With General Meade's lines thus left open, from the foot of the Round Tops to the left of the Second Corps, **between 6 and 7:15 P. M., July 2, 1863 was one of the critical periods of the battle.** Colonel McGilvery, with his Artillery, alone, stayed the advancing enemy and prevented their discovery of the opportunity offered for success. This feat of arms, requiring the sacrifice of many lives and the wounding of many men, we believe should be recognized and honored.

Trostles Lane was indeed a battle avenue of the Artillery and with the important historic facts as they are, it is impossible to understand, why any one should oppose its recognition, as such.

There seems to have been a studied effort, by placing **no guns nor** markers to show McGilvery's Second Artillery Line and by the name "United States," to suppress the historic fact, that, after the disaster which came to the Third Corps in its advanced position at the Peach Orchard, the Army lines, between the Round Tops and left of the Second Corps, were saved by an independent contest, of the Artillery exclusively, between 6 and 7:15 o'clock P. M. July 2, and after 7:15 until 8 P. M. assisted by the active efforts of General Hancock and General Meade, (in which the latter had his horse "Baldy" wounded,) both personally leading troops of the Second and Twelfth Corps.

Conclusion.

Your Committee find no reason to consider the action on your request for Hunt Avenue, by the Assistant Secretary of War, as other than important, but in no way final.

They think the hostile attitude of the Chairman of the Commission towards Soldier Organizations, whose interests he is supposed to represent, should receive an expression of your disapproval and, advise, that your next step should be to ask the Honorable Secretary of War to personally reconsider, for the War Department, your request and that you should furnish him with historic data, supporting the same.

In pursuance of which suggestions the following Resolves have been prepared.

Whereas, The Report of the Gettysburg National Park Commission to the Secretary of War shows marked disregard for the Veterans, through whose efforts said Commission was authorized by Congress, and whom said Commission was intended to represent.

Whereas, Said Report contains many erroneous statements of fact and, apparently, is worded to prejudice the Secretary of War in his action on your request, that the name of United States Avenue, on the Battlefield of Gettysburg, should be changed to
Hunt Avenue.

Whereas, Said Commission suggests in said Report, that they intend **sometime** to build a connecting avenue within and far from the **Battle Lines**, on which no Batteries were stationed and not even the Reserve Artillery was parked and, further, they propose to ask the Secretary of War to name this back lane, Hunt Avenue, and so make recognition of the Artillery Corps of the Army of the Potomac.

Whereas, It is believed that, with a proper statement of historic facts and attention being called to the incorrect and misleading statements made to the Secretary of War by the Gettysburg National Park Commission, he will impartially reconsider your request for Hunt Avenue.

Therefore be it

Resolved, that the claim that the simple change of a name, to give equal recognition to the

Artillery Corps,

with that, which has already been given to the Infantry and Cavalry Corps, will, in any way, affect the permanency of any proper "plans or schemes" of the War Department, is wholly without merit.

Resolved, that the proposed avenue of the Commission, as shown by their map, is far from the battle lines and is within the Union lines, where there were no batteries "in position" and not even the Reserve Artillery was parked, and that it will in no way suitably honor the Artillery Corps, nor its Chief, General Hunt, and,
a formal remonstrance is hereby filed against such action being taken.

Resolved, that the Artillery Corps is entitled to have a prominent battle avenue named after its Chief, as has been done with the Infantry and Cavalry Corps, and not a single satisfactory reason has been submitted by the Gettysburg National Park Commission, why the name of "United States" Avenue should not be changed to Hunt Avenue.

Resolved, that the foregoing Report of the Committee, and action thereon with a copy of the book

"Peach Orchard, Gettysburg"

be forwarded to the Secretary of War and his reconsideration of the action of the Assistant Secretary, dated Sept. 21, 1910.

be and is hereby respectfully and earnestly requested

ELL TORRANCE

JOHN DAY SMITH

E. C. FAULKNER

Committee.

Dec. 20, 1910.

Regular Meeting John A. Rawlins Post, held December 20, 1910.

The Committee to whom was referred the communication of the Assistant Secretary of War, Robert Shaw Oliver, dated Sept. 21, 1910, refusing to grant the request of John A. Rawlins Post

unanimously approved at its meeting held July 19th, 1910, requesting that the name of "United States Avenue" on Gettysburg Battlefield be changed to "Hunt Avenue," submitted its report, reviewing in extenso the said decision of said Secretary, and specifying the errors into which said Secretary had fallen by reason of the incomplete and misleading report of the Gettysburg National Park Commission made to said Secretary under date of September 7th, 1910, and recommending that the entire matter be again referred to the Honorable Secretary of War for his reconsideration and favorable action, which report of the committee, with resolutions accompanying the same, was on motion of Comrade Torrance unanimously adopted.

A True Copy.

WM. H. KELLER
Post Adjutant.

Correspondence:

LIEUT. ELL TORRANCE

Late Commander in Chief, Grand Army of the Republic.

CHAIRMAN NICHOLSON

Gettysburg National Park Commission

Comments.

Apparently Chairman Nicholson does not wish to have the question of renaming of "United States" Avenue judged by veterans on its merits. He has widely circulated his own communications, but withheld those to which they were replies; even from the Honorable Secretary of War.

Believing that the request for Hunt Avenue is right and proper, and unwilling to have companions and comrades influenced by misleading and incorrect statements,

All of the papers, that have passed, are here printed for their impartial judgment.

JOHN BIGELOW.

February 4, 1911.

Minneapolis, Minn.
October 31st, 1910.

Col. John P. Nicholson,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Dear Companion and Comrade:—

I will address this letter to you personally and not as Chairman of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, although the

subject of the communication relates to a matter that has already come before you in an official capacity. I refer to the resolutions adopted by John A. Rawlins Post No. 126, Department of Minnesota, G. A. R., July 19, 1910, urging that the name United States Avenue upon the Gettysburg Battlefield be changed to "Hunt Avenue" in honor of General Henry J. Hunt.

Acting Secretary of War, Hon. Robert Shaw Oliver, under date of September 21st, 1910 acknowledged receipt of said resolutions and upon the report and recommendation of your Commission declined to grant the request of John A. Rawlins Post. Copies of the various papers, communications and records, upon which the action of the acting Secretary of War was based, were transmitted to said Post and have been placed in my hands for further consideration.

You are doubtless aware that, since the action taken by John A. Rawlins Post, similar action on the subject has been taken by the Department of Minnesota, G. A. R. and also by the Minnesota Commandery of the Loyal Legion. In both of these organizations are found many surviving soldiers who participated in the Battle of Gettysburg, some of them of national prominence, and the feeling is unanimous that the proposed change should be made.

At the National Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic, held at Atlantic City last September, resolutions of a similar import were adopted, first being heartily approved by the Committee on Resolutions, consisting of forty-five members, and then unanimously adopted by the Encampment. The expectation of the comrades generally is that the change will be made, as few are, at the present time, aware of the adverse action taken by your Commission. From my knowledge of the situation and of the very general opinion prevailing among the survivors of that great Battle, that the artillery branch of the service has been lamentably overlooked, I can assure you that the efforts to bring about the desired change will be redoubled, and will be continued without cessation until the request is granted. The Semi-Centennial of the Battle is in the early future and if the change is not made prior to that time it will provoke much criticism and increase the present dissatisfaction to such an extent as to mar the pleasure which should mark such an observance.

It seems to me, my dear Colonel, such a proper and reasonable request and the objections interposed by your Commission seem so unimportant compared with the reasons that can be given for the change, that I feel sure you will find it a difficult matter to maintain your position and it would be so much better to pay timely respect to the request of these different organizations, which has

assumed a character, dignity and importance that cannot and should not be ignored.

Referring to the statement in your report to the Secretary of War, that "it has been agreed since 1904 that the Secretary of War was to be requested to name it, "an avenue from the Baltimore Pike to General Meade's headquarters on Meade Avenue and to connect with Hancock Avenue' Hunt Avenue," I will say that such a recognition of the artillery would be altogether unsatisfactory for the reason that no batteries were placed there and it would in no way honor the artillery corps, or its Chief, General Hunt. A remonstrance should and doubtless will be filed against such action on the part of the War Department, when it is understood that such action is seriously contemplated.

My purpose in writing this letter is to urge your recession from the position already taken as a member of the Commission and although you may, upon a further and more full consideration of the whole matter feel justified in adhering to your original decision, I suggest that you yield your judgment to the earnest request and desire of so many of your surviving comrades who had a part in that great Battle.

Sincerely and fraternally yours,

Signed ELL TORRANCE

Philadelphia, Pa.

November 15th, 1910.

Lieut. Ell Torrance

Dear Sir:

Your letter of October 31, 1910, is acknowledged, in which you make the following statement:

"I (you) will address this letter to you personally and not as Chairman of the Gettysburg National Park Commission."

For that courtesy I thank you, and embrace the opportunity to reply.

It would appear to my mind to be presumptuous to offer any reasons or write a line regarding the issue after your threat,

"I can assure you that the efforts to bring about the desired change will be redoubled, and will be continued without cessation until the request is granted."

My views and position have nothing to do with the matter, other than loyalty to the War Department and to the Secretary of War.

1. You wish me to request the Department to change the action of a Secretary of War, who in aiding General Sickles, made the Park

possible, and preserved the integrity of the Field and enabled the Commission to erect the Memorials to the Artillery, which now have the commendation of soldiers over the world.

2. Secretary Lamont gave much thought to the halting of the trolley road, and he succeeded, and it is not surprising that the War Department is loyal to his memory and his work.

Of the resolution of the G. A. R. and your active interest, I am advised, and also of the fact that, without explanation, simply in the reading of the resolution in the closing hours, it was passed, as were many others.

This may have some weight, but the method makes a man, who tries to be fair, grieve.

Knowing that you had gone prepared to offer a resolution to have action taken, I sent documents that I hoped might be brought before the Committee, but they were not submitted, nor was an opportunity offered to show the objection to the contention in which you were engaged.

3. The statement in your letter "from my (your) knowledge of the situation and the very general opinion prevailing among the survivors of that Battle, that the Artillery branch of the service has been **"lamentably overlooked"** is inaccurate, and can only arise from ignorance of the work of the War Department.

4. As a matter of fact, of the 67 Union Batteries on the Field, the position of every Battery has been marked by not less than two guns, some with four and others with six, properly mounted upon special carriages built for the purpose, upon the model of 1861-65, with pyramids of shell and shot of the same calibre used by each Battery in the fight and **one-third of the locations have been duplicated in guns and carriages** for the Artillery operations of the first, second and third days of the Union Army.

Of the 69 Confederate Batteries on the Field, every Battery has been marked and located, with two or four guns in the same manner and under the same conditions.

Another fact, a very large percentage of the guns on the Field were in the fight, and stand on the exact locations from which they were fired, a consummation that has never before been attempted much less in so large a degree accomplished. This was brought about by years of inquiry and research, and in 1894-99, 4,712 letters were written on this subject alone, and it is not unusual to see Artillerymen feelingly touching the guns that they had served with, and yet you write that the Artillery has been "lamentably overlooked."

5. The Commission realized when they commenced work that the Artillery had not received its proper recognition, (nor is that surpris-

ing, there being only 6 guns mounted in the entire 25 square miles,) and proceeded to remedy that, which was to their mind, an injustice, and twice as much money has been spent, under the authority and approval of the Secretary of War, for the Artillery in purchasing land for their positions and for the proper marking, than for the Cavalry and Infantry combined, and upon the Battlefield of Gettysburg is concentrated a greater display of Field Artillery, (397 guns being mounted, in number to January 1, 1910,) than on the combined battlefields of the world, and it has excited the admiration of English, German and French Officers in their study of the battle in their visits, and to this we may add a number of those of the General Staff of the United States Army.

6. The **Regular Batteries** are in addition marked with bronze tablets, reciting the operations of each day, and in the locations where they did effective work.

At Antietam there does not seem to be a single gun mounted that locates the position of a Battery.

7. It is a matter of surprise to us in the appearance of the earnest advocacy of General Hunt's claims for recognition, that we do not recall your presence or interest at Washington, or at the White Sulphur at the time of the final report of the Committee on the re-organization and when General Hunt felt that after his Summerville, S. C. letter, 1878, and his Fort Adams letter, Jan. 20, 1875, to the House Committee on the re-organization of the Army that he needed friends, nor in the scores of letters to me from General Hunt regarding the Artillery at Gettysburg and Petersburg.

8. I fail to recall you or your client in the controversy between General Hancock, (representing the Second Corps and the command of the Artillery at Gettysburg) and General Hunt relative to the latter's services at Gettysburg.

9. In view of the many years of acquaintance with General Hunt through my cousin, Lieut.-Colonel Robert Nicholson Scott, Fifth United States Artillery, (every child in whose family bears the name of "Hunt,") it seems not only unjust but an outrage that I should be charged with neglect of General Hunt's reputation.

At the request of Colonel Scott, every reference in General Hunt's Summerville, S. C. letter, Feb. 11, 1878, was verified by me, and his letter in reply to General Hancock's, which appears in Senate Document, No. 14, 46th Congress, was read by me to the Committee of which General Bragg was Chairman of the House Committee and General Burnside of the Senate.

10. "Lamentably overlooked." This does not bear out the letters of Artillery Officers of the character and services of

of Graham, Seeley, Tidball, Atwell, Kinzie, Calef, Thompson, Fitzhugh, Cowan and scores of others whom it would be superfluous to mention. Nothing but gratitude for the recognition of their commands and the prominence given them has ever reached the Commission.

English Officers have made the prominence of the Artillery and the manner of its location and marking a subject of communication to their War Offices. One of the most distinguished Lieut.-Generals of the British Army, in comparing the fields of the old world, especially where the Artillery had won, in the Wars between France and Great Britain, of which Waterloo was one, chided his people for their lack of interest in that important arm of the service.

In the matter of the proposed Avenue for which a part was obtained in 1904, you write:

“Referring to the statement in your report to the Secretary of War, that ‘it has been agreed since 1904, that the Secretary of War was to be requested to name it, ‘an Avenue from the Baltimore Pike to General Meade’s Headquarters on Meade Avenue and to connect with Hancock Avenue’ Hunt Avenue.’ I will say, that such a recognition of the Artillery would be altogether unsatisfactory, for the reason that no batteries were placed there and it would in no way honor the artillery corps, or its Chief, General Hunt. A remonstrance should and doubtless will be filed against such action on the part of the War Department when it is understood that such action is seriously contemplated.”

11. **If your knowledge of the details was as complete as your statement,** there would be no necessity for my calling attention to the fact that over the fields through which the Avenue is to pass, almost all the reserve Artillery was drawn from during the Battle, and will, if made from the Baltimore Pike to Taneytown Road, be one of the most important Avenues to the Battlefield, for the Map shows that General Hunt’s Headquarters connecting with that of General Meade’s on the Taneytown Road is within 42 yards, actual measurement, of the line of the Avenue suggested to be named for him.

12. **The Commission has followed the well digested plan of the Memorial Association of marking the Avenues on the lines of battle. General Hunt was never on the line of the Avenue suggested to be named for him, on the contrary his Headquarters were one mile from the United States Avenue, nor did he ever make any claim for his presence there, not even in the Hancock controversy.**

We have appended a short list of suggestions that have been made as to the change of Avenues.

Respectfully

(signed) JOHN P. NICHOLSON.

Suggestions received by the Commission regarding the changing of "United States Avenue" since the agitation for a change was started.

"We think it should be named for Major-General Caldwell, of Second Corps up to the stone wall near the house east. He is the one surviving Corps Officer, and this would be a good time, if you change, to give his name a good place."

General Caldwell was no where near Trostle Lane, but front of the Round Tops.

"If a change is made of the Avenue called United States, why should it not be named for General Humphreys of the Third Corps; the left of our Division followed the line of this road to the Pike along where the Monuments of the First Massachusetts Regiment and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers are now."

General Humphries Division was along the Emmitsburg Road. It did no fighting on Trostle's Lane, and when withdrawn to the Second Corps front, simply uncovered the same.

"I hear that the Artillery want to take an Avenue along the line of Sickles Corps. Is this so? If I know the locations, and I think I do, any change should be for Humphrey's Division Second Corps, from the Trostle Barn to the Emmitsburg Pike. Call it after old General Humphreys."

Answered above, besides "Sickles" Avenue provides for the Third Corps battle line, and, so, its officers.

A representative "Of the 105th Pennsylvania (Wild Cat Regiment) asks that the Avenue be named, from Sickles Avenue east to the Emmitsburg Road, for General Charles K. Graham, commanding their Brigade, who was wounded and taken a prisoner in the Peach Orchard on the "Mill Road."

General Graham is worthy of the highest honors.

Trostles Lane is some distance from the "Mill Road."

Two of the Vermont Brigade suggest that "As changes are to be made in Roads, please have a part of Hancock from First Minnesota Regiments Monument near U. S. Artillery to Pleason-ton called for General Stannard."

No comments required.

"Will you allow the suggestion that if there is a change in name of an Avenue running from Hancock to the Emmitsburg that Hancock from the Douty Battery to the house at the corner, and then along the road now called United States to the stone wall or the bridge over the Plum Run, I think it is called to be named for Brig.-General Caldwell."

Answered previously.

"I read the Artillerymen are dissatisfied with the locations of the Batteries along Sickles Avenue. Why not take the opportunity to name the Wheatfield Road from Emmitsburg Road to the last Battery on it "Artillery Avenue?" How would this do? Please send a Map."

There is no objection to "Sickles Avenue" which was the battle line of the Third Corps: but to the name "United States" for Trostles Lane running at Right Angles to Sickles Avenue, along which the Artillery exclusively fought from 6 to 7:15 P. M. after the Third Corps had withdrawn from that part of the field.

"Why not change a part of United States Avenue from Sickles Avenue, east to the Trostle houses, and call it Excelsior Avenue, in recognition of the great service of the old Excelsior Brigade."

The Excelsior Brigade performed "great service," but not along Trostles Lane.

Explanation. (J. B.)

There was no Infantry fighting along Trostle's Lane.

Humphries' Division was in position along the Emmitsburg Road, when the Third Corps (Graham's Brigade) was forced to withdraw from the Peach Orchard. With its left flank, thus left open, the Division was compelled also to withdraw from its advanced position and did so under a heavy fire. It did not fall directly back, but retired obliquely, until it reached the left of the Second Corps front, thus uncovering Trostles Lane and leaving open that part of General Meade's line, from which, without his knowledge, it had advanced at mid-day. (vide Maps 1, 2, 3 and 4.)

General Caldwell was sent with his Division (Second Corps,) as a re-inforcement to the troops engaged in front of the Round Tops and reported to General Sykes, Commanding Fifth Corps, the ranking officer at that point.

The Third Corps withdrew from the Peach Orchard front at 6 P. M.

From 6 to 7:15 P. M. Colonel McGilvery of the Reserve Artillery, with such batteries as he could collect, formed a Second Line of Artillery about 1000 yards back of the Emmitsburg Road, across Trostles Lane, and near the Weikert House, with which he succeeded in staying Barksdale's and Wofford's advance, until at 7:15 P. M. Willard's Brigade Second Corps came to his support. At 7:45 P. M. Lockwood's Brigade, Twelfth Corps, came over from Culps Hill, and later the Twelfth and Sixth Corps. After 8 P. M. General Meade's original line, from the Second Corps to and over the Round Tops was made strong and safe.

November 30th, 1910.

Col. John P. Nicholson,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Dear Sir & Comrade:—

Your letter of the 15th inst. reached me in due course of mail and I regret that you misinterpreted the spirit in which my former letter to you was written. The alleged "threat" was simply a statement of facts as they had come under my observation and knowledge and, concerning which I felt you should be advised for I assumed you must have been ignorant of them, otherwise you would not have stated in your communication of September 7th, 1910 to the Secretary of War,

"If an individual by a statement to soldiers' organizations, who in the very nature of things can have no knowledge of the details, may change the work of the War Department, then there is no permanency and the considered plan and scheme are at the mercy of those who presume they have a knowledge beyond the facts."

If "an individual" only favored the proposed change, the request might be treated with slight consideration or summarily denied as in the case cited by you, but this is, as I endeavored to emphasize in my former letter to you, an entirely different proposition and is deemed so meritorious by its advocates, that it must eventually prevail. You are again in error when referring to the action taken on the subject by the National Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic, held at Atlantic City last September, you say

"Of the resolution of the G. A. R. and your active interest I am advised and also of the fact that without explanation, simply in the reading of the resolution in the closing hours, it was passed as were many others. This may have some weight but the method makes a man who tries to be fair, grieve. Knowing that you had gone prepared to offer a resolution to have action taken, I sent documents that I hoped might be brought before the committee, but they were not submitted nor was an opportunity offered to show the objection to the contention in which you were engaged."

The facts are that the Encampment was in session two days and the Committee on Resolutions, consisting of forty-five members, was in session six hours affording ample opportunity for you to present your side of the case, which would have been welcomed by every member of the Committee and by no one more heartily than myself, but not a word from you or from anyone representing you. When the matter came up in committee it was discussed and fully explained and, by a unanimous vote, recommended for adoption and duly reported to the Encampment and passed. Why this should make "a man who tries to be fair, grieve" is a Chinese puzzle to me. Would it not be more "fair" to treat with kindly considera-

tion those, who favor a change in the name of the Avenue? To discredit the motives prompting or to belittle the action taken by soldier organizations such as John A. Rawlins Post, the Department of Minnesota, G. A. R., the Minnesota Commandery of the Loyal Legion and the National Encampment of the Grand Army of the Republic does not seem to me to be "fair," and, unless you desire to place yourself in opposition to the wishes of nine-tenths of the survivors of the Battle of Gettysburg and to champion the memory of Secretary Lamont rather than that of General Hunt, I again earnestly urge you to hasten, rather than delay, conferring upon the Artillery arm of the service the recognition due it for its splendid services at the Battle of Gettysburg, which can only be adequately effected by naming the battle avenue in honor of its Corps Commander. No doubt the respective battery commanders are greatly pleased to have the guns, with which they fought, alongside their monuments, but was not this done largely for *scenic effect* and to give a more picturesque and realizing sense of the Battle to visitors, and while these same visitors on the field will find the battery positions as marked where the fighting was hottest, yet they will find no battle avenue named after and perpetuating the memory of their Corps Commander.

It should not surprise you that I am "actively interested" in this matter, for I am Chairman of the G. A. R. Committee on the observance of the Semi-Centennial Anniversary of the Battle, and Major Bigelow is also a member of the Committee, to represent the Artillery, and we are both naturally desirous to have the occasion one of pleasant remembrances and free from any cause for dissatisfaction. If you refer to Major Bigelow as "my client" you are again in error for he is far better able than I am to care for himself and to speak for the Artillery, which he so gallantly represented in that Battle.

In your letter you repeat the same statement, that you made in your report to the Secretary of War, that General Hunt was never on the line of the avenue proposed to be named for him. Must I reject what Captain Randolph, Chief of Artillery Third Corps (R. R. p. 584, Vol. 1 Gettysburg) says

"I was specially fortunate in having the advice and assistance of Brig. Gen. Hunt, Chief of Artillery Army of the Potomac, who examined the ground with me and who *at the commencement and during the action was present to contribute by his valuable advice to the efficiency of the Artillery.*"

There is just one question involved in this controversy and that is *the proper recognition of the Artillery Corps through its Commander, General Hunt, by a battle avenue.* Every artillerist took

pride not only in his own battery, but in the Artillery Corps and its Commander, General Henry J. Hunt and yet nearly fifty years have passed and there is nothing on that historic field to indicate that an *artillery corps* participated in said engagement, or that it had a commander, and for that reason I feel that I was justified in using the words "Lamentably overlooked," notwithstanding the recent statement made by your Commission, that it is proposed *some time* to build an avenue, far away from the battle line and name it after General Hunt.

But I have extended this letter far beyond the limit intended when I commenced. From what I have said you cannot fail to realize that there is a very earnest and strong movement on the part of the surviving veterans, who participated in the Battle of Gettysburg, to have the proposed change made, which can be readily accomplished unless opposed by your Commission, for the War Department can have no purpose or feeling in the matter, except to do justice to the Artillery and grant the reasonable request of the participants in that Battle, without regard to the branch of the service in which they served.

With full appreciation of the excellent work already done by your Commission and, trusting that it will reconsider its action and conclusions heretofore reported to the Honorable Secretary of War and grant the request of the comrades who have and will continue to petition for the change of the name United States Avenue to Hunt Avenue, I remain

Yours fraternally,

Signed: ELL TORRANCE

Comments by Major Bigelow.

1. "*Made the Park possible*" is an incorrect statement.

The Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, between 1864 and May 22, 1895, at which time it conveyed its properties to the National Government, expended over \$100,000; bought 600 Acres of land; marked the positions (313) of every Union Regiment and Battery; supervised the erection of 320 of their monuments and built 17 miles of roads *before* the National Government assumed control under *An Act*, approved February 11, 1895.

The interesting reference to General Sickles will receive attention in connection with his letter of Nov. 11, 1910.

2. The "Journal of the Commission" date, Nov. 5, 1893, apparently shows that Secretary Lamont changed the name of Trostles Lane to United States Avenue *without any authority*, which only came to him May 22, 1895.

There can be no disloyalty to the memory of Sec. Lamont, in changing the name of United States Avenue. Loyalty and respect can best be shown by correcting an error into which he had fallen.

Although Chairman Nicholson, who was not even a Director of the Memorial Association, says historic facts are *not* "valid reasons" for changing a misapplied name for one that will harmonize with the purpose for which Gettysburg battlefield has been made a National Park, it is believed that he would receive as little approval from Secretary Lamont, if he knew the real facts, as he does from many military organizations.

3. "Lamentably Overlooked," possibly "intentionally" would be better. The unreasonable and bitter opposition which Chairman Nicholson is making to a proper recognition of the *Artillery Corps of the Army of the Potomac* as a Corps, is not relieved by his placing guns at the positions of individual batteries, scattered all over the field; which has been done for *scenic effect*. The guns only emphasize the fact that the Army of the Potomac had an *Artillery Corps*. The positions of the Union Batteries were marked by the Memorial Association with monuments before Chairman Nicholson was made a commissioner, the same as are those of the Infantry and Cavalry, and all were satisfied.

It is simply absurd, then, to say "*the Commission realized, when they commenced work, that the Artillery had not received its proper recognition.*" If the Commission has any equivalent to the Artillery guns, why do they not use them for the Infantry and Cavalry? It is probable that the suggestion of the use of guns for "Scenic Effect" came from Col. Cope, Engineer in charge since 1876, to whom the real honor for the present appearance of the National Park is largely due.

4. The positions of all of the Union Batteries (except Regulars) were marked with Monuments, by the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, *before* the Government Commission was organized—and the calibre of each Battery could have easily been gotten from the War Department. Consequently the 4712 letters must have been to Confederates for information, which of course, it was desirable to have and have correct. In whose name were the letters written in 1894? The first appropriation for the National Park, apparently, was \$75,000 in 1895.

"*One-third of the locations (Union Batteries,) have been duplicated in guns and carriages, etc.*" and yet the position of McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery, which did such effective service after the Third Corps had left the field, has in *no way been recognized by gun or marker.*

The writer Oct. 18, 1909, gave to the Commission historic facts, connected with Trostles Lane, and simply suggested the change of a misapplied name, which would lead visitors to inquiry, and the story of the saving of General Meade's lines would be told. Nicholson's *curt* reply Nov. 1, 1909, that the facts stated were not "valid reasons," has raised the present issue. He has given much foolish talk about loyalty to a Secretary of War and the Department. As though either of them have any other purpose, than to carry out the objects for which Gettysburg Battlefield was made a National Park, and those reasons are, to preserve, impartially, historic facts connected with the *battle*; compared with which, a *latter day purchase of a road by the Government is of little importance.*

The only possible explanation, which suggests itself, for the extreme antagonism of this public officer to a very proper request from an active participant on McGilvery's Second Artillery Line and from many military organizations is the one to which attention will be called, when comments are made on General Sickles' letter of Nov. 11, 1910.

5. An English Officer, who, by advice of the writer, visited Gettysburg as early as 1887, returned, greatly impressed with what the *Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association* had accomplished in making the battlefield interesting for the military student. The Association had but limited means. Surely the Government Commission, during the sixteen years of its existence and with liberal funds, above the large amount required for their salaries, should have further developed the well arranged plans of the Association.

It is very wrong, however, for Chairman Nicholson to say that any injustice had been done to the Artillery by the Memorial Association, which had cared for the Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery impartially by securing land, building roads, and encouraging every Union organization, to erect monuments, as has been stated.

It is comparatively recently, that the War Department has replaced in the service the Civil War guns, with breech loaders, and the former became available for ornamenting the Gettysburg Battlefield. How much could Chairman Nicholson have had to do with the service changes. His claims for any praise are not deserved.

6. The Volunteer Batteries received money from their States for monuments. It was only proper that the Government should mark the positions of the Regulars.

7. Judge Torrance and the writer did their full duty during the War, on the battle lines. When the War ended, they engaged, gladly, in the battles of civil life and the writer has not had his

attention (since assisting the Memorial Association to mark Battery positions in the early eighties,) called to military matters. Now, both, find themselves, members of the Executive Committee of the G. A. R. for the celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, and their attention is called to conditions, as they exist there today. The writer visited Gettysburg in 1898, when he found Trostle's Lane unchanged and received no intimation of its being made United States Avenue.

8. "*You or your client.*" Nicholson should have a leather medal for the mental and official gymnastics, which he uses in his effort to support his unhappy position.

9. "Acts speak louder than words." A *back lane* is sufficient, according to Chairman Nicholson, for his good friend General Hunt; while an *exclusively Artillery Battle Avenue* should be named "United States," in opposition to the requests of many veterans and military organizations. Who selected the name "United States?" Three persons who had *no* authority over the field in 1898, who took *no* part in the battle and for the very stupid reason, that the road was the *first* purchased by the Government. It should be explained that Chairman Nicholson was a Lieutenant and Regimental Quartermaster during the War, and during the battle his wagons were probably parked at Westminster with the Army Trains.

10. Of course the Artillery Officers, named, are pleased to have guns by their monuments: but they would be more pleased to have the *Artillery Corps*, to which they are proud to have belonged, properly recognized through its Commander *General Hunt* by a *battle Avenue*, as requested.

11. "*If your knowledge of the details was as complete as your statement etc.*" Unhappily for Chairman Nicholson, as usual, *he is the one in error*. General Tyler, Commanding the Reserve Artillery, had his Headquarters between Hancock Avenue and the Taneytown Road, opposite where the Granite School House Road enters the latter, (vide 1876 Government Map. No. 7.) The Reserve Batteries were parked in the fields near to and along the said School House Road, and three-fourths of a mile or more from the proposed Hunt Avenue of the Commission. The writer was there, and at mid-day, July 2nd, saw shells breaking, where the proposed avenue is located.

12. "*The Commission has followed the well digested plan of the Memorial Association of marking the Avenues on the lines of battle. * * * * Gen. Hunt's Headquarters were one mile from United States avenue.*"

Chairman Nicholson is at fault again, the Association named

the Avenues after the Commanding Officers, whose troops were along them: but paid no attention to such Officer's Headquarters, for, during the battle, they were where emergency called. Sickles Avenue is nearly a mile long and includes the whole position of the Third Corps: but Gen. Sickles himself was at 4:30 P. M., well back from the fighting line and near the Trostle Barn, where he was wounded and taken from the field by 6 P. M.

The Artillery Corps had its batteries scattered all over the field, and it is entitled to have a battle avenue, named after its Commander, General Hunt: especially one, now misnamed United States Avenue, along which the Artillery exclusively fought and one which will in no way interfere with those already named after other Corps Commanders.

Chairman Nicholson asserts that,

"General Hunt was never on the line of the Avenue."

Reb. Record, Vol. XXVII, Part 1, p. 584, Gettysburg.

Capt. Randolph, Chief of Artillery Third Corps says

"Brigadier General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, examined the ground with me at the commencement and, during the action, was present to contribute by his valuable advice to the efficiency of our Artillery."

CONCLUSION.

The writer has reviewed Chairman Nicholson's letter of Nov. 15, 1910 to Judge Torrance, in detail, in order to show its incorrect statements and misleading character. It has been an unpleasant duty.

General Sickles' Letter.
Review of Same.

Quotation from
“Life of General George G. Meade,”
by Richard Meade Bache

Chairman Nicholson, of the Gettysburg National Park Commission has distributed copies of the following letter, which he obtained from Gen. Sickles.

*New York Monument Commission,
for the
Battlefields of Gettysburg and Chattanooga.
23 Fifth Ave., New York.*

November 11, 1910.

*Col. John P. Nicholson,
Philadelphia, Pa.*

My dear Col. Nicholson:

I have been a long time indebted to you for a reply to your favor of the 17th ultimo. I have been so much occupied lately in preparation for the dedication of an important monument, which we have erected for the State, on Lookout Mt., Tenn., near Chattanooga, that I have utterly neglected all other correspondence. I leave tomorrow for Chattanooga but, before embarking, I feel that I can no longer delay a reply to your esteemed favor.

Although sharing, no doubt, with yourself, very high admiration for Col. (Sic) Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, who should have been at least a Major-General in the army, and would have been a Lieutenant-General or a General in any European army, I cannot agree with Mr. Bigelow in his desire to change the name of United States Avenue to that of "Hunt Avenue." I would be glad, if practicable, to see an avenue on the battlefield of Gettysburg named after Hunt, but the position indicated by Bigelow is not the proper one, in my judgment. The avenues embracing my position are all properly named.

Appreciating your courtesies, and thanking you for your kindly regard, I remain, always,

Sincerely your friend,

*(Signed) D. E. SICKLES,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.*

The points in the letter of special interest are:

"I cannot agree with Mr. Bigelow in his desire to change the "name of United States Avenue to that of Hunt Avenue,"

also

"The avenues embracing my position are all properly named."

The Third Corps had left the field at 6 P. M., July 2, 1863.

Gen. Birney, Reb. Record, Gettysburg, Vol. 1, p. 483.

"At six o'clock I found Major Gen. Sickles seriously wounded, and at his request, took command of the troops. I immediately vis-

ited Humphreys' division, and finding that the enemy, advancing through a gap in the line of my division (occasioned by the withdrawal of Graham's Brigade at the Peach Orchard), would take it in reverse, I ordered a change of front. Gen. Humphreys accomplished this promptly under a most effective artillery and musketry fire."

**Gen. Humphreys Commanding Second Division, Third Corps,
Reb. Record, Gettysburg, Vol. 1, p. 533.**

"I was about to throw somewhat forward the left of my infantry and engage the enemy with it, when I received orders from General Birney (Gen. Sickles having been dangerously wounded and carried from the field), to throw back my left and form a line oblique to and in rear of the one I then held (along the Emmitsburg Road), and was informed that the First Division would complete the line to the Round Top ridge.

*"This I did under a heavy fire of artillery and infantry from the enemy, who advanced along my whole front." * * **

"My infantry now engaged the enemy's, but my left was in the air (although I extended it as far as possible with my Second Brigade) and, being the only troops on the field, the enemy's whole attention was directed to my division, which was forced back slowly, firing as they receded."

*"At this time I received orders through a staff officer from Gen. Birney to withdraw to Round Top Ridge—an order previously conveyed to Gen. Carr by Gen. Birney in person. This order I complied with, retiring very slowly, continuing the contest with the enemy, whose fire of artillery and infantry was destructive in the extreme." * * **

"Upon arriving at the crest of the ridge mentioned, the remnants of my division formed on the left of Gen. Hancock's troops."

Note the hour set by Gen. Birney, "6 o'clock," when he found Gen. Sickles "seriously wounded" and "at his request took command of the troops."

Further, "that the enemy, advancing through a gap in the line of my division would take it (Humphreys' Division), in reverse."

The gap was occasioned by the breaking of Graham's (1st Brig. Birney's Div. 3d Corps), Line at the Peach Orchard angle and its complete withdrawal from the field.

Turn now to Humphreys' Report.

*"I received orders from Gen. Birney (Gen. Sickles having been dangerously wounded and carried from the field), to throw back my left (vide Map 2), and form a line oblique to and in the rear of the one I then held (which was along the Emmitsburg Road) * * * "This I did." * * * "My left was in the air. * * * "At this time I received orders * * * to withdraw to Round Top Ridge."*

*"Upon arriving * * * the remnants of my Division formed on the left of General Hancock's troops.*

The time of day, 6 o'clock P. M. is also confirmed by the knowledge of the writer, whose command at that hour was alone on the Wheatfield Road and engaged with Kershaw's Infantry. He saw distinctly, 200 yards on his right and on the hither side of the Emmitsburg Road, Barksdale's Brigade, reforming for a further advance, after its severe contest in driving Graham's Brigade from the Peach Orchard Angle.

The *historic fact* then *is* (and it cannot, now, be changed by Chairman Nicholson, General Sickles, nor by the writer) that the Third Corps Lines at the Peach Orchard, located along the line of the present Sickles Avenue, ceased to exist after 6 P. M. July 2, 1863.

Humphrey's Division had swung away from the Emmitsburg Road, thus uncovering Trostle's Lane, and was retiring to the left of the Second Corps front. (vide Maps 2, 3, 4.) General Graham, commanding at the Peach Orchard, had been wounded and captured: his Brigade, badly shattered, had left the field for the day and General Sickles, wounded, had been taken to a Hospital.

This collapse of Sickles' Lines left unprotected General Meade's real line along Cemetery Ridge, from the foot of Little Round Top to the left of the Second Corps, and, the Confederates, under Barksdale followed by Wofford, were advancing to enter the Opening. (vide Maps 2 and 3.)

Trostle's Lane

An Independent Artillery Fight, from 6 to 7:15 P. M

Col. Freeman McGilvery, Commanding First Volunteer Brigade Artillery Reserve, whose Batteries had been sent at 4:30 P. M. to reinforce the Third Corps at the Peach Orchard, (reporting to Captain Randolph, Chief of Artillery, Third Corps, who later was taken from the field wounded) came on the field a little before 6 P. M. He discovered the demoralized conditions, which existed, and the great danger which threatened. He determined to sacrifice his Batteries, if necessary, in an effort to stay the enemy's advance into the opening in the Lines, occasioned by the withdrawal of the Third Corps from the field. He ordered Captains Phillips, Hart and Thompson to retire their Batteries a thousand yards, to a specified position at the Weikert House. He left the Ninth Massachusetts Battery, still hotly engaged on the Wheatfield Road with Kershaw's Infantry, until the last. When all the Infantry and other Artillery had withdrawn from the field, at 6 P. M., he gave it orders to retire, "by prolonge firing." At this time, Barksdale was 200 yards on the right of the Battery and in

the same field, with his line extending back as far as the writer could see, and was reorganizing his command, after its severe Peach Orchard struggle, for a further advance.

The Battery had slowly retired 400 yards, steadily firing to keep back Kershaw's Skirmishers who were following, and to delay Barksdale from advancing, and had reached the Angle of the stonewall at Trostle's House, when McGilvery again returned. He ordered the Battery to remain where it was, and "at all hazards" to check the Rebel advance, until he could form a line of Artillery in its rear, as *the Lines were open from the Round Tops to the Second Corps*. The Battery faithfully obeyed his orders, until, at at 6:30 P. M. with officers, men and horses all shot down, it could do no more.

Happily, Col. McGilvery had then succeeded, though his horse had been shot in six places while doing so, by his personal effort alone in establishing across Trostle Lane a second line of Artillery, 400 yards in the rear of Trostle's Angle, where the Ninth Massachusetts Battery had been sacrificed. With it, he saved Humphreys Division, already attacked in front and on the right flank, from an additional attack by Barksdale on the left flank, which was "in the air," and prevented the enemy from discovering his own lack of support and the open lines about him.

At 7:15 P. M. Willard's Brigade Second Corps, came in the nick of time to McGilvery's support; later other troops came up and General Meade's lines were made safe, through the personal efforts of General Meade and General Hancock. The outcome of the struggle was in doubt until 8 P. M. when it ceased on account of sheer exhaustion on the part of the enemy.

Between 6 and 8 P. M. as a study of the battle now shows, was *one of the critical and important periods of the battle*. McGilvery made his defense along and across Trostle's Lane, far in the rear of the Third Corps Line on the Emmitsburg Road and *after the Third Corps, General and all, had disappeared from that part of the field*.

The very reasonable desire to change the misapplied name "United States" to Hunt Avenuearises, then, from the two hours struggle to save the Lines with which General Sickles and the Third Corps had nothing to do. Consequently, his approval of the name "United States," and disapproval of "Hunt," and, statement that

"The avenues embracing my position are all properly named," should not receive any more consideration, than if he was trying to dictate the naming of an avenue on Culps Hill.

Possibly Chairman Nicholson thinks, that the name of "Hunt" Avenue for Trostles Lane would call attention to the fact,

that General Meade was fully justified in fearing disaster might follow, when he discovered, that General Sickles had moved his Corps from the position in which he expected to find "it" and had taken the faulty position at the Peach Orchard Angle.

With that matter I have nothing to do: except so far as General Sickles letter prejudices the proper recognition of what the Artillery did along Trostles Lane, towards saving General Meade's Lines, *after* the General and the Third Corps had left the field.

The writer was in the midst of that artillery struggle and knows too well its fearful character to be satisfied with General Sickles' unreasonable "dixit." He has a duty to his comrades to endeavor to have their gallant deed properly recognized and in accordance with the purpose for which Gettysburg Battlefield has been made a National Park.

Chairman Nicholson's methods and reasons for opposing the change of the name "United States," notwithstanding the historic facts relating to Trostle's Lane, which have been called to his attention, and the many requests from Soldier Organizations, which have been sent to the Commission, are so at variance with the duties of his position and so trivial, that, seemingly, the real reason lies deeper than he has disclosed.

Possibly I have found an explanation for his attitude, from the Commission Report to the Honorable Secretary of War (Sept. 7, 1910) and his own letters, which he has been circulating: but carefully keeping back the communications to which they were replies, thus endeavoring to prejudice his correspondents in his favor.

It will be recalled that,

Besides being Chairman of the Gettysburg Commission, with a liberal Salary, he is

Recorder, Commandery in Chief, Military Order Loyal Legion, U. S.

With Salary;

Recorder, Penn. Commandery Military Order Loyal Legion, U. S.

With Salary.

Thus honored by veterans, the reflections on the intelligence of members of Soldier Organizations, to be found in his Report to the Honorable Secretary of War, (Sept. 7, 1910) and in his letter to Judge Torrance, (Nov. 15, 1910,) are in very questionable taste, to say the least.

History:

The Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association.

Incorporated by Pennsylvania Legislature, April 30, 1864
Conveyed its properties to the National Government, May 22, 1895.

Between 1864 and 1895,

The Association received \$106,575.59: bought 600 Acres of land: built 17 miles of Avenues: induced and supervised the erection of 320 monuments and, with survivors of the battle, located the positions of every Union Regiment and Battery, except three from West Virginia.

Engineer in Charge, since 1876,

Lieut. Col. E. B. Cope.

All of this work was done by the Memorial Association *before* the National Government took charge, May 22, 1895, which it did under

An act

to establish a National Military Park at Gettysburg, Pa.

Approved Feb. 11, 1895.

The authority of the National Government over the Battlefield, then, began Feb. 11, or May 22, 1895, on which date the Memorial Association conveyed its properties to the Government. Yet, Chairman Nicholson sends with his Report to the Honorable Secretary of War, Sept. 7, 1910, an

Extract from "Journal of the Commission" dated Nov. 5, 1893 (note date)

"After discussion as to the name of the Avenue or road, Colonel Lamont suggested, that, as it was the first Avenue to be procured in the name of the United States, that it be so called."

The Journal could not be of the present National Park Commission, as neither Secretary Lamont, nor the Commission could, in 1893, have had any authority over the field, and apparently the first appropriation (\$75,000.) for the National Park, was only made in 1895.

But the Journal is interesting, as it tells the *True Reason* for the name "United States" being given to Trostle's Lane.

Is it in any way a worthy one to commemorate the two (2) hours struggle along and across it, between 6 and 8 P. M., July 2, 1863, on which, at one time, the safety of the Army depended?

Chairman Nicholson recognizes its absurdity and has tried to suggest others, that did not occur to the Secretary. Such as that "United States" should counterbalance "Confederate" on the Southern Side. He only makes matters worse, however, as he would use the revered name "United States" to offset not "Con-

federate States Avenue," but "Confederate" the name of the Southern Soldiery.

I find that Chairman Nicholson's statements with reference to "United States" Avenue are difficult to understand, when tested by facts.

For instance, in letter to Judge Torrance, Nov. 15, 1910, he says, "*You wish me to request the Department to change the action of a Secretary of War, who, in aiding General Sickles, made the Park possible.*"

I have already told what the Memorial Association had accomplished *before* the National Government assumed control.

The sentence, while very misleading as to the Park, is, however, enlightening in another direction. General Sickles was working with Secretary Lamont to have the National Government take up the work of the Memorial Association and, possibly, Nicholson has to thank him or them for his appointment on the Commission.

Apparently (vide Sickles' letter) on Oct. 17, 1910, Nicholson wrote General Sickles about "Hunt Ave."

Nov. 11, 1910, he received his reply, viz: condemning the change from "United States" to "Hunt" and saying "*The avenues embracing my position are all properly named.*"

Hence, naturally, comes a suggested reason for Nicholson's strenuous efforts to suppress proper recognition of the two (2) hours struggle of McGilvery's Artillery, along and across Trostle's Lane, and that of the Infantry, under General's Meade and Hancock on either side of said Lane, to save the lines, *after* General Sickles and the Third Corps had left that part of the field.

It surely is unfortunate, that a public officer, with his duties plain before him, should defy Justice and make any such unhappy inference possible.

Again, Chairman Nicholson artfully endeavors to secure popular favor for having placed guns at the monuments of the different Union and Confederate Batteries. The reply of the Rawlins Post Committee has set this claim in its proper light. "The change from muzzle to breech loading guns, made it possible to use those of the Civil War Period, thus made useless, for scenic effect." "A like honor (?) could not be extended to the Infantry and Cavalry, as they had no sufficiently distinctive weapons, that could be utilized."

He claims (Letter to Judge Torrance, Nov. 15, 1910) that guns have been placed at *all* of the positions of the Union and Confederate Batteries and, of the Union Batteries, "*one third of the locations have been duplicated with guns and carriages.*"

But, *he has not*, as a fact, placed a marker nor a gun to indicate the position of McGilvery's Second Line of artillery, around

the Weikert House, July 2, 1863, nor of McGilvery's massed battery of 39 guns of July 3, which were used with most destructive effect against Pickett's charge and its supports: yet he proposes to extend "United States" Avenue, in order to locate on it Alexander's Confederate Artillery. (vide Report to Secretary of War, Sept. 7, 1910.)

In the same report to the Honorable Secretary of War, he also gave him to understand that, "*the artillery Line was on Sickles avenue, from the Emmitsburg Road Eastward, and a thousand feet south of United States avenue*" and there was no other.

This statement shows either woeful ignorance or an unscrupulous effort to mislead the Honorable Secretary. The *first* line of Artillery was as he describes but, after the Third Corps was driven from the Peach Orchard, Col. McGilvery established a *second* line of Artillery, along and across Trostle's Lane, near the Weikert House and a thousand yards back of the position indicated by Nicholson, with which he materially assisted in saving the Army Lines from the disaster, threatened by the withdrawal from the field at 6 P. M. of the Third Corps, as already described.

Further, he said in his Report to the Secretary of War that, "*there are only two small markers on Trostle's Lane.*"

The Rawlins Post Report explains that the Statement is misleading: that the fields on either side of Trostle's Lane were private property, when the Memorial Association had the positions located by the survivors: that the property owners objected to markers on their land: that the markers would not be seen and that there was only money enough, possessed by most of the commands, for one monument.

Markers or no markers, however, Chairman Nicholson's seemingly avowed ignorance is not excusable. The position of McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery is clearly shown on

Map of the
Battlefield of Gettysburg "Second Day"
July 1, 2, 3, 1863.

Published by Authority of the Hon. Secretary of War
Office of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.
1876.

Survey ordered by
Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys
Chief of Engineers

Conducted by
Bv't. Maj. Gen. G. K. Warren
Major of Engineers

Position of Troops
compiled and added for the Government by John B. Bachelder.
(vide Map 7.)

I wish to say that Graham's Brigade, Third Corps, at the Peach Orchard, between 4 and 6 P. M. July 2, 1863, worthily sus-

tained their splendid reputation, earned in all the campaigns, beginning with the Peninsula; they withstood the heaviest concentrated fire of Artillery and Infantry of any troops on the field; their position, with both lines of the Peach Orchard Angle enfiladed, was faulty in the extreme; the loss of their Commander, General Graham, and the impossibility of his successor, Colonel Tippin, to assume command, when their line was being broken by superior numbers and their heavy losses, compelled their withdrawal from the field, for the day, for reorganization. In so doing, unfortunately, General Meade's Lines, were, for a long distance, left open, so far as the Third Corps was concerned, for the enemy to enter, and a further two (2) hours struggle was required, between 6 and 8 P. M. to save the lines.

The writer in his letter to Chairman Nicholson, Oct. 18, 1909, called attention to the historic facts relating to Trostle's Lane; to the misapplied name "United States" and suggested its change to "McGilvery," who did invaluable service along it with his Artillery, or to "Hunt," preferring the latter, as it would also honor the *Artillery Corps* with an exclusively *Artillery Battle Avenue*, the only one on the field so distinguished, and comply with a rule of the Commission (vide letter Nov. 1, 1909) that Avenues had only been named after Corps and Division Commanders.

To which Nicholson, replied Nov. 1, 1909, "*we do not see any valid reason to make the suggested change.*"

The fact, that many lives were sacrificed and many survivors have their bodies bullet scarred in a well nigh hopeless, but, fortunately successful, effort to save the Lines, which the retiring Third Corps left open to the advancing enemy, has no valid weight in this Commissioner's mind, compared with the other fact that the Government spent a few dollars to purchase Trostle's Lane, of which last fact the name "United States" offers no suggestion.

Then to discover, by Nicholson's letter, Nov. 15, 1910, (P. 1.) to Judge Torrance, that he probably secured his position on the Commission from Secretary Lamont, probably, too, felt he was under some obligation to General Sickles, and further, in reply to his letter of Oct. 17, 1910 to General Sickles, he was told by the General, Nov. 11, 1911

"The Avenues embracing my position are all properly named." which letter, he, Nicholson, has sent broadcast, foolishly thinking that it, in any way, justifies his bitter opposition to the requests made to the War Department by many soldier organizations, for the change of the name of "United States" to "Hunt" Avenue, surely places him in an unenviable light.

A few of the versatile methods and reasons which Chairman Nicholson has used to prevent the change of the name of
United States Avenue

to

Hunt Avenue

have now been explained. His methods have been extraordinary for a public officer: his reasons have little merit, as they are not in harmony with the duties of his Commission and the purposes for which Gettysburg Battlefield was made a National Park: are unjust, because they purpose to suppress important historic facts, connected with the battle: are misleading and often incorrect: and seemingly possess a personal equation not pleasant to consider.

When boiled down, the only residuum seems to be, a determination that, right or wrong,

“the change shall not be made.”

Companions and Comrades:

My appeal, *still*, is in behalf of the maimed and the dead of my own command, and those of McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery, who, in an extraordinary emergency, offered themselves a sacrifice at the *call of duty*. History shows that their efforts were invaluable at a critical period of the battle: but the name “United States,” unwisely given to Trostle's Lane, suppresses the facts and robs those heroes of the credit and honor, to which they are justly entitled.

The name

“Hunt Avenue”

however, will, during all time, lead visitors to make inquiries, “Why the name,” and the story will be told of *one* of the many heroic episodes of the battle, that will redound to the credit of the *whole*

Artillery Corps of the Army of the Potomac
and its Chief

General Henry J. Hunt.

Further will show the good judgment of General George G. Meade, with reference to the faulty Peach Orchard Angle and add to his honor, as a Leader in the midst of danger and as Commander of the Army of the Potomac.

JOHN BIGELOW.

How the Emergency, After 6 P. M. was met.

Facts which Nicholson seemingly desires to suppress
by the name “United States” Avenue and
by placing *no markers, nor guns* to indicate
the position of McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery,
From 6 to 8 P. M. July 2, 1863.

“Life of General George G. Meade”

(Extract)

By Richard Meade Bache

pages 334, 335.

“When Sickles was wounded at 6 P. M. and Birney succeeded him in Command of the Third Corps, General Meade superseded him in the command of it by Hancock. *No ordinary crisis had been reached at that point of time in the desperation of the struggle for victory.* Hancock turned over the Command of the Second Corps to Gibbon and, *personally* led (7:15 P. M.) Willard’s Brigade, of Hay’s division of the Second Corps to the relief of Birney (who was with Humphrey’s Division.) Troops were sent by Gibbon to fill in the open space between Humphrey’s right and the left of the Second Corps. General Meade, on the ground further to the left, *led* (7:45 P. M.) *into action* some of the re-inforcements arriving under his orders from Culps Hill, consisting of Lockwood’s Brigade of the Twelfth Corps and troops of the First. He advanced with the former, and rode at the head of the latter in their charge across the battlefield, scathless through all the turmoil, in which he was so near harm *that his faithful old horse, “Baldy” was shot under him,* the same horse that was wounded five or six times during the war, and yet lived to follow his master to the grave.

“The maintenance at one time of the terribly endangered lines on the left turned upon the establishment by *General Hunt*, Chief of Artillery, of a massed line of guns on the slight ridge along Plum Run, intermediate between the one on which the Emmitsburg Road runs and the lines of Cemetery Ridge, to the accomplishment of securing which position for the security of the lines still further in the rear, *deficient in Infantry*, the Ninth Massachusetts Battery lent itself with noble devotion. In the most dangerous crisis of the fight, when the Infantry of Humphreys and the Artillery, which had been advanced, were struggling against the incoming wave of the enemy rushing over the ground towards Cemetery Ridge, Bigelow, the Captain of the battery, which had been fighting with prolonges fixed, was ordered by his Chief, McGilvery, to hold to the last gasp his position near the Trostle House, in order to gain time for the other batteries, swarming in advance of the threatened point to take position along Plum Run Ridge. Sternly Bigelow fulfilled his trust, while the batteries in quick evolution fell into massed line (McGilvery’s second position) in his rear, until twenty-five pieces commanded and swept the ground to the relief of the disorganized troops and the retention of Artillery left standing on the field, finally bringing off his guns, after a hand to hand fight, many of his command killed, himself, with others, severely wounded, and with the loss of eighty horses. For a long while the ground within this hard-fought arena presented the

spectacle of lines of troops at various angles charging, retreating and recharging in determined *melee*, and no one would have dared, at the moment, to predict the issue of the conflict. At length the frantic efforts of the Enemy died out from sheer exhaustion."

N. B. All this occurred after 6 P. M. and after Gen. Sickles and the Third Corps had left the field in the vicinity of Trostles Lane.

An Appreciation:

COL. FREEMAN MCGILVERY
of Maine,

Commander First Volunteer Brigade, Artillery Reserve,
Army of the Potomac

was one of the real heroes of the battle of Gettysburg.

He died from wounds received at Fort Stedman, before Petersburg, Va.

At 6 P. M. July 2, 1863 he came to me at the Wheatfield Road, after *all* the other troops had withdrawn from the vicinity of the Peach Orchard, when the air was alive with bullets and breaking shells centered on my Battery and the ground was being swept with canister, in order to give me orders to withdraw.

Again, alone, in the midst of flying missiles, he came to me at the Trostle Angle. He hastily told me of the fearfully unprotected condition of the Lines between the Round Tops and the Second Corps, owing to the fact that the Third Corps, broken at the Peach Orchard, had left the field, and ordered me to remain and delay the enemy all I could, in order that he might have time to form a Line of Artillery in my rear.

With his horse shot four times in the breast and fore shoulder by musketry, once on the foreleg by a shell and once on the hip by a spent solid shot, (of which wounds the horse soon after died) Col. McGilvery succeeded in forming his Second Line of Artillery across Trostle's Lane, near the Weikert House and, though suffering greatly from Infantry and Artillery fire, checked the Confederate advance from 6:30 P. M. to 7:15 P. M. when Infantry was brought to his support and the Lines were made safe.

On July 3, 1863, in a slightly changed position from that at the Weikert House, from a massed Battery of 39 guns he poured a most destructive and effective fire into the right flank of Pickett's charging Columns; also drove back its flanking supports.

His Comrades and his State may well demand, that his services should receive some proper recognition.

JOHN BIGELOW.

Additional Endorsements
requesting that
United States Avenue
be renamed
Hunt Avenue

(A Few From Many)

1. New York Commandery, Military Order, Loyal Legion, N. S.
2. Annual Encampment Grand Army of the Republic
(Atlantic City, N. J., 1910)
3. U. S. Grant Post, No. 4, Department Massachusetts, G. A. R.
4. Geo. Washington Post, No. 105, Department New York, G. A. R.
5. Lafayette Post, No. 140, Department New York, G. A. R.
6. J. T. Benson Post, No. 527, Department of Indiana, G. A. R.

Passed at the Regular stated meeting of the Commandery of the State of New York Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States held December 7th, 1910.

Whereas, The Artillery arm of the military service in the Civil War was conspicuous for its effective work on many battlefields of that war, particularly so at Gettysburg, where its efficiency was so heroically displayed and where it contributed so largely to the triumphant success of the Union forces, and

Whereas, The work and achievements of the Artillery were measureably due to its Chief, General Henry J. Hunt, from the Peninsula Campaign to Appomattox, and

Whereas, General Hunt rendered splendid service at Gettysburg, especially on the second and third days, saving the ammunition of the artillery fire when it was most needed, until Lee's final effort,—“Pickett's Charge,”—when, his horse having been shot, he advanced on foot, revolver in hand, to the clump of trees, the “crucial point” of attack, and

Whereas, The attention of this Commandery is called to the fact that the Gettysburg Commission has named battle avenues on the field of Gettysburg after the officers of infantry and cavalry, but in no instance after those of the artillery arm of the service.

Now, Therefore, Resolved, That the Commission in charge of the Gettysburg Battlefield be and are hereby earnestly requested to change the name of “United States Avenue,” which has no real significance in the case, to “Hunt Avenue,” along which Avenue the artillery exclusively fought, for the credit of the artillery arm of the service and in honor of its distinguished Commander, General Henry J. Hunt.

Resolved, That the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission and the Secretary of War be formally advised of the action taken by this Commandery.

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC
Annual Encampment Atlantic City, N. J., September 23, 1910.

Preamble and Resolutions Offered by Past Junior Vice Commander in Chief Silas H. Towler.

Whereas, the National Government has for many years been represented by a Commission, which has had charge of the Battlefield of Gettysburg, with an able engineer Officer to assist them in

laying out and constructing Avenues to points of interest on that field; and

Whereas, the said Commission have named many Avenues after Commanding Officers of the Infantry and the Cavalry, but, in no instance, have so honored the Artillery Arm of the Service, which took an especially important part in that Battle; and

Whereas, the Commission have named an Avenue, along which the Artillery exclusively fought, "United States Avenue," and the Chairman of the Commission, in reply to a request, giving the historical reasons why the Avenue should be named "Hunt Avenue," in honor of General Hunt, Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac, said, "the historic facts were no valid reason for making the change, as against the desirability of having the name "United States" appear as a counterbalance to the "Confederate" Avenue which they have laid out." Now as said Confederate Avenue is some miles in length, and Trostle's Lane, now called United States Avenue, is only about one-half mile in length, and lies about perpendicular to the said road named Confederate Avenue, it is apparent to any one that, from a historical standpoint, to so name Trostle's Lane United States Avenue does not, in any way, counterbalance the magnificent and long Avenue named Confederate Avenue; and

Whereas, it is now near the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Battle, and the time is too short to try to convince a Commission, which neither acknowledges nor answers, except in a single instance, communications addressed to them by a Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, a Department Encampment, and also a Post of the Grand Army of the Republic; and

Whereas, said Commission is under the direction of and reports to the War Department, Washington, D. C.

Therefore Be It Resolved, That the Secretary of War be and is hereby requested to consider the inappropriate application of the name "United States" to a short *battle* Avenue by the Gettysburg National Park Commission.

Resolved, that the Secretary of War is respectfully requested to have the name of "United States" Avenue changed to

Hunt Avenue

for the credit of the Artillery and in honor of its Commander at Gettysburg,

GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT,
Chief of Artillery,
Army of the Potomac.

Unanimously Adopted.

To U. S. Grant Post, No. 4.,
Department of Massachusetts,
Grand Army of the Republic:

Your committee, appointed for the purpose of considering the advisability of taking some action in regard to the changing of name of *United States Avenue* on the Battlefield of Gettysburg to *Hunt Avenue*, have attended to that duty and report that it seems advisable to take such action by the adoption of the accompanying Resolves, and recommend the adoption of the same.

Respectfully submitted,
J. W. SPAULDING
L. J. LONGDYKE
T. J. MUNN

October 18, 1910.

Committee.

Whereas, it appears that in the naming of the different Avenues the members of the Gettysburg National Park Commission, who have exercised such excellent judgment in the giving names to the same, by adopting the very satisfactory plan of calling them after officers who performed distinguished services in the vicinity, have by accident, we believe, failed to recognize that important arm of the service which performed such gallant and meritorious services in that battle by naming no one of the Avenues after the officer who was the Chief of Artillery on that field.

And Whereas, there appears to us to be no reason for naming any particular Avenue on that field "*United States Avenue*," a name which would apply equally as well to every other Avenue on the Union Side. *Now Therefore*,

Resolved, that the Gettysburg National Park Commission be and it is hereby respectfully requested to change the name of the *United States Avenue* to *Hunt Avenue*.

Resolved, that an official copy of this action by U. S. Grant Post be sent to the Gettysburg National Park Commission, Gettysburg, Pa. and also to the Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

Report accepted and Resolutions adopted.

Attest:

CHAS. A. PATCH,
Adjutant.
Post 4, Massachusetts.

At a regular meeting of George Washington Post, held Thursday Evening, November 17th, 1910, the following was passed by unanimous vote.

Whereas, George Washington Post, No. 103, G. A. R., Department of New York, has had its attention called to the fact, that on the Battlefield of Gettysburg no adequate recognition has

been given to the Artillery Arm of the service by naming a battle avenue after a Commanding officer of Artillery, whose services were as distinguished as they were gallant, and

Whereas, What is known as Trostles Lane during the battle was a battle avenue where Artillery fought almost exclusively and has since been designated United States Avenue, and

Whereas, It seems eminently proper that the memory of the bloody struggle that took place upon this portion of the battlefield should receive the recognition it deserves by bearing the name of the officer who commanded the Artillery during this battle,
Therefore Be It

Resolved, That the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission be respectfully requested to take into consideration the advisability of changing the name of this Avenue from "United States" to "Hunt Avenue" so as to perpetuate the memory of General Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army and at the same time give to Artillery branch of the service, the credit and honor which is its just due.

Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions be sent to the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission and the Secretary of War.

LAFAYETTE POST, No. 140

Department of New York, G. A. R.

New York, Dec. 8, 1910.

Major John Bigelow,
65 South Eleventh Street,
Minneapolis, Minn.

Dear Sir:

The following Preambles and Resolutions were unanimously adopted at a regular Encampment of this Post on December 2, 1910, viz:

"Whereas, Lafayette Post, No. 140 G. A. R., Department of New York, has had its attention called to the fact, that on the Battlefield of Gettysburg no adequate recognition has been given to the Artillery Arm of the service by naming a battle avenue after a Commanding officer of Artillery whose services were as distinguished as they were gallant, and

Whereas, What is known as Trostles Lane during the battle was a battle avenue where Artillery fought almost exclusively and has since been designated 'United States Avenue,' and

Whereas, It seems eminently proper that the memory of the bloody struggle that took place upon this portion of the battlefield should receive the recognition it deserves by bearing the name of the officer who commanded the Artillery during the battle,
Therefore Be It

Resolved, That the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission be respectfully requested to take into consideration the advisability

of changing the name of this Avenue from 'United States' to 'Hunt Avenue' so as to perpetuate the memory of General Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, and at the same time give to Artillery branch of the service, the credit and honor which is its just due.

Resolved, that a copy of these resolutions be sent to the Gettysburg Battlefield Commission and the Secretary of War."

In compliance with your request I herewith transmit a copy of the above Resolutions for your information.

Yours in F. C. & L.,

FRANCIS B. STEDMAN,

Adjutant.

HEADQUARTERS J. T. BENSON POST 527,
Department of Indiana, G. A. R.

At our regular meeting Oct. 15, 1910, Comrade George H. Mader, the only member of our post, who served in the Army of the Potomac gave us a glowing account of that part of the Battle of Gettysburg in which Artillery, especially the Ninth Massachusetts Battery took conspicuous positions without almost or altogether any support of any kind, against overwhelming Confederate forces, with appalling loss and, in some instances, complete destruction of individual organizations; stating at the same time that it is the wish of those who served in this branch of the army that the avenue now called "United States" be renamed "Hunt" in honor of the Chief of Artillery of the same name whose illustrious service during the most trying hours of danger to our country's welfare stands most prominent upon the annals of the Civil War.

In pursuance of the foregoing and with a view of the fact, that the prominent leaders of the other branches of the U. S. Army have been honored by the appearance of their names upon different parts of the field of Gettysburg, and with the ardent desire of having the name of General Hunt given a place of perpetual renown, we have

Resolved: That the avenue "United States" should be changed and in future bear the name of "Hunt," and the members of Post 527, Department of Indiana, G. A. R. do hereby very respectfully solicit this important, much deserved and ardently wished for change.

G. G. SCHAFER,
Adjutant.

JAMES A. HARBESON,
Post Commander.

Contra

Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States
Commandery of the State of Pennsylvania.

MINUTES OF STATED MEETING OF THE COMMANDERY, FEBRUARY 15, 1911.

Extract:

Companion W. H. Lambert submitted the following:

Whereas, Action has been taken by Commanderies of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States indicating their belief that proper recognition has not been given by the United States Gettysburg Commission to the services of the Artillery and its immediate commander at the Battle of Gettysburg, and requesting the Commission to change the name of "United States Avenue" to "Hunt Avenue," in honor of that Commander;

And Whereas, The Commandery of the State of Pennsylvania is acquainted with the admirable work of the Gettysburg Commission, and particularly with its recognition of the services of the Artillery by locating guns—in batteries, or sections, or single pieces—to such extent that they are among the most conspicuous memorials on the field; and knowing that "United States Avenue" was so designated by the Secretary of War, Hon. Daniel S. Lamont, to whom in very large degree is due the provision made for the preservation of the battlefield, the Commandery believes it proper that that name should be retained, especially as the broad avenue marking the Rebel line is named "Confederate;" therefore, be it

Resolved, That in the judgment of the Commandery of the State of Pennsylvania the (1) Commission has appreciatively recognized the Artillery Service, (2) and the Commission may be safely entrusted to establish any further testimonial to the work of the Artillery and its Commander, General Hunt, that may be thought proper, without taking from the avenue the name so significantly appropriate to the (3) line along which the several arms of the service combined in defence of the United States.

The Preamble and Resolution were unanimously adopted.

Two hundred and ninety-seven Companions present.

(Signed) JOHN P. NICHOLSON

(Signed) E. A. LANDELL

Recorder

Commander

To the Honorable Board of Officers,
Pennsylvania Commandery,
Military Order Loyal Legion, U. S.

Sirs and Companions:—

In compliance with your suggestion, I enclose a check covering my annual dues for 1911.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Resolve, adopted by the Commandery, February 15th, 1911. I regret that the Commandery seems blindly to have accepted the inaccurate and

misleading statements, which the Gettysburg Commission has been circulating, to support the untenable position, which it has taken, with reference to United States Avenue and further that the "Home of General Meade," by ill considered action, should make itself appear as regardless of and antagonistic to a proper respect for the General's memory.

Since the circulating of General Sickles' letter, there is all the more reason for renaming United States Avenue, as "Hunt Avenue."

The Chairman of the Gettysburg Commission has tried to invent other, but equally stupid, reasons for the name, which Secretary Lamont, ill advised, gave to Trostle's Lane. He apparently recognizes the absurdity of the only true reason, vide Journal of the Commission, November 15, 1893. Which is "Because it (Trostle's Lane) was the first road procured by the Government."

The reason stated by the Commandery, is only one of the inventions, but will illustrate, viz:

"that a road 1000 yards long—and its name—should counter-balance the name 'Confederate'—applied to Avenues, miles long."

Does the Commandery realize that, besides the terrible two (2) hours battle of the Third Corps, in its faulty position at the Peach Orchard Angle, when it retired shattered and regardless of consequences, that another two (2) hours struggle was necessitated, by and around the Second Line of McGilvery's Artillery, wherein General Meade's and General Hancock's presence and utmost efforts were required to save the Army Lines, and further,

that it is the purpose to suppress—by the misapplied name "United States," vide Sickles' letter, all suggestion of this **Second Struggle?**

For all time, visitors inquiring, why the name "United States," will be told by guides—they do not know of any reason connected with the battle.—Contrast this, with

"Why the name "Hunt Avenue"—and they will be told:

1st—It was an exclusive battle avenue of the Artillery from 6 to 7:15 P. M. and named for its Chief — in honor of the **Whole** Artillery Corps of the Army of the Potomac—The same recognition as has been given to the Infantry and Cavalry Corps.

2nd—That, after 7:15, when Infantry came to the support of the Artillery, the emergency was so great, until 8 P. M. that General Hancock was with Willard's Brigade, on one side of McGilvery's Artillery,—and no less person than General Meade, himself, though commanding the Army, felt called upon to advance with troops from the Twelfth Corps, on the other side, in order to encourage them, and had his horse "Baldy" wounded.

3rd—That many men, at the call of duty, threw themselves

into the breach occasioned by the Third Corps and were killed and wounded.

It is surely unfortunate that the Chairman of the Gettysburg Commission—Should, as a Regimental Quarter Master, have been only an Army Non Combatant, during the War, and that his Associates on the Commission are reported as invalids.

Further that the papers, which he has been circulating should indicate that he probably was appointed on the Commission by Colonel Lamont—and in some way he was under obligations to General Sickles:

Further that he should write to General Sickles, apparently for his wishes about Hunt Avenue, (although the General had no more rights after 6 P. M. July 2nd, 1863 over the naming of Trostle's Lane than over an Avenue on Culp's Hill,) and he should receive a reply—condemning the name—and telling him.

"The Avenues embracing my lines are all properly named."

The methods and reasons, taken and urged for the retention of the name United States Avenue raise the question, (I find echoed by many,) as to whether the present Commission has not served its period of usefulness.

If it is possible, I wish my vote "No" to be placed on record—both against the Second Preamble, in which the credit given to Secretary Lamont ignores the greater work done by the Gettysburg Memorial Association: while the suggestion of balancing the name "Confederate" with the name "United States" is, I believe, undignified and unworthy of the Commandery.

The Southern Soldiers were called "Confederates" or "Rebs" and the Northern Soldiers, "Union Men," "Federal" or "Yankees." The name "Confederate Avenue" is consequently proper to distinguish General Lee's Lines: but

the Avenues should be called "Confederacy Avenue" or "Confederate States Avenue," with an excess of brotherly love, to justify the name "United States" on the Union Side, as a counter-balance.

And, also as to the Resolve, for the reason,

(1) that the placing of guns at the Monuments of the respective Batteries—was made possible by the change from muzzle loaders to breech loaders in the Regular Service—and was done Simply for **Scenic effect** and not as any special recognition of the several Batteries:

that their number, Scattered over the field, emphasizes the fact that the Army of the Potomac had an Artillery Corps, which, nearly fifty years after the battle, has not been recognized as a Corps by having a **Battle Avenue** named after its Commander, as has been done with the Infantry and Cavalry Corps;

(2) that the avowed purpose of the Commission, already opposed by many soldier organizations, to build a back Lane, as Hunt Avenue, far from the **Battle** lines, far from where the Reserve Artillery was parked and along which no batteries were "in position," the writer speaks from his own knowledge, shows that they are no longer to be trusted to make a proper recognition, on the field, of the Artillery Corps:

(3) that from 6 to 7:15 P. M. July 2nd, 1863, McGilvery's Artillery, exclusively, fought along and across the present "United States Avenue"—while, only after 7:15 P. M. until 8 P. M. was it supported by Infantry, that was engaged at a distance on either side, which facts make the final Statement of the Resolve, viz:

"the name so significantly appropriate to the line along which the several arms of the Service Combined in defence of the United States" too incorrect, historically, for the Commandery to assume its responsibility.

According to the line of reasoning adopted, Sickles Avenue, along which Infantry and Artillery **did** combine, should be called United States Avenue—rather than Trostle's Lane, where they **did not** Combine.

I will publish the Resolve of the Commandery, with other matter which the Commission has been sending broadcast, for both public record with Commanderies, Libraries, etc., and for the better information of Companions and Comrades. *I feel that the Commission is trifling with the memories of my dead and wounded Comrades.*

I will not follow the questionable example of the Gettysburg Commission and give Simply one Side of the question at issue: but I will tell the whole story, as I only desire the impartial judgment of my Companions and Comrades of the **battle** line, who at least, knowing the facts, will determine fairly

Whether the name "United States" worthily commemorates the many lives, that, with other officers and at the call of duty, I was compelled to sacrifice to save the Army line, **after** the Third Corps had left the field; and,

Whether the name "**Hunt Avenue**," for an exclusively Artillery Battle Avenue and the only one on the field so distinguished, will not best honor and recognize the Artillery Corps, the same as the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association had honored the Infantry and Cavalry Corps **before** the Government Commission took charge; and, to a visitor inquiring, "Why the Name," the story will be told of the terrible After Struggle, which General Sickles' unhappy movement necessitated—A story that will confirm the Good Military Judgment of General Meade, show his

bravery as a soldier and redound to his honor and credit as Commander of the Army of the Potomac.

If proper, I ask that this letter be read to the Commandery, coming as it does from an active participant with McGilvery's Artillery, one who writes from his own knowledge of facts and who is desirous that the Commandery shall not assume a false position, I am,

Fraternally and Respectfully,

(Signed) JOHN BIGELOW

"The Concord"

65 South 11th Street,

Minneapolis, Minnesota.

March 9, 1911.



MAP NO. 1

PEACH ORCHARD—GETTYBURG

4:00 to 5:00 P. M. July 2, 1863

SHOWING

Location of Third Corps, in front of the Round Tops — at Peach Orchard and along the Emmits-Road.

Opening in the lines between the Round Tops and left of the Second Corps, occasioned by the Third Corps being advanced to the location shown.

General Topography of the ground.



MAP 2

PEACH ORCHARD—GETTYSBURG

6:00 to 6:30 P. M., July 2, 1863

SHOWING

Changed Union and Confederate positions.

Where at Trostle Angle, the Ninth Massachusetts Battery was sacrificed *under orders* to hold the enemy in check until Col. McGilvery established a line of Artillery in its rear, covering the long gap between the Round Tops and left of Second Corps.

The long gap in the Union Lines still unoccupied by troops.

MAP 3

PEACH ORCHARD—GETTYSBURG

6:30 to 7:15 P. M., July 2, 1863


SHOWING

Changed Union and Confederate positions.
The gap now occupied by McGilvery's
Artillery.

Humphrey's Division being driven back
toward the Second Corps front.

Confederate advance in front of and to-
wards the Round Tops.

Line of advance of Wofford's Confederate
Brigade towards gap in Lines and its
direction changed by the fire of McGil-
very's Artillery.



MAP 4

PEACH ORCHARD—GETTYSBURG

7:15 P. M. until dark, July 2, 1863

SHOWING


Changed Union and Confederate positions.

Union Lines back, as first established by General Meade, but strengthened by the Sixth and Twelfth Corps, with the Round Tops occupied by the Fifth Corps.

Humphrey's Division, Third Corps in front of left of Second Corps.

The Confederates at the foot of the Round Tops and close to the Second Corps front, but in front of McGilvery's Artillery held well back towards the Emmitsburg Road.

MAI 4



4.

MAP NO. 7

SECOND DAY

Section of Official Map

1876

— Survey —


Ordered by
MAJ. GEN. A. A. HUMPHREYS
Chief of Engineers


Conducted under
BVT. MAJ. GEN. G. K. WAFREN
Major of Engineers


- Arrow No. 1. Position of Colonel McGilvery's First Line of Artillery, along Wheatfield Road, at Peach Orchard.
- Arrow No. 2. Position of Ninth Massachusetts Battery at Angle of stone wall on Trostle Lane—between 6 and 6:30 P. M. Map 2, is correct. Humphries Twenty-First Mississippi attacked from front and right and Kershaw's skirmishers from the left.
- Arrow No. 3. Position of McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery, front of Weikert House, after 6:30 P. M. and after the Third Corps had left the field.
- Arrow No. 4. Headquarters of General Tyler, Commanding Artillery Reserve, in field between Hancock Avenue and Taneytown Road, and opposite where the Granite School House Road enters the latter.
- Arrow No. 5. Park of Artillery Reserve, in the fields alongside of the Granite School House Road, far from the location of "Hunt Avenue," as proposed by the National Park Commission.
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
Note: The position of McGilvery's Second Line of Artillery was located on the Map, by John B. Bachelder.











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