


no. D 767.92A5 1946

pt. 13



GIVEN BY





# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

---

---

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

### S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

D767  
.92  
.A5  
1946  
Pt. 13

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

---

### PART 13

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8

---

Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

---

---

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

### JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

**S. Con. Res. 27**

(79th Congress)

D767  
192  
A5  
1946  
Pt. 13

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN  
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL  
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND  
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
RELATING THERETO

---

### PART 13

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8

---

Printed for the use of the  
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE  
WASHINGTON : 1946

\* D767  
. 92.  
. A5  
1946  
Pt. 13

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL  
HARBOR ATTACK

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois	BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representative from California
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine	FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina	

---

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, *General Counsel*  
GERHARD A. GESELL, *Chief Assistant Counsel*  
JULE M. HANNAFORD, *Assistant Counsel*  
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*

(After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, *General Counsel*  
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, *Associate General Counsel*  
JOHN E. MASTEN, *Assistant Counsel*  
EDWARD P. MORGAN, *Assistant Counsel*  
LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*



## HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

---

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.



## INDEX OF EXHIBITS

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
1	23 11-15-45	1	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.
2	24 11-15-45	254	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.
3	87 11-16-45	317	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.
4	142 11-16-45	318	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.
5	153 11-16-45	318	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielon as illustrating his narrative statement.
6	153 11-16-45	337	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.
7	172 11-17-45	391	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.
8	233 11-19-45	391	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
8-A	1792 12-18-45	413	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-B	1792 12-18-45	415	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
8-C	1792 12-18-45	424	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
8-D	2480 1-5-46	425	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
9	256 11-19-45	923	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
10	279 11-20-45	1000	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.
11	319 11-21-45	1006	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.
12	363 11-21-45	1013	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.
13	387 11-21-45	1019	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Force, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
14	397 11-21-45	1040	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10); enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).
15	401 11-23-45	1042	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.

16	401 11-23-45	1061	(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark; (b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941; (c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.
16-A	3839 2-6-46	1077	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
16-B	4341 2-13-46	1081	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.
17	402 11-23-45	1083	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.
18	402 11-23-45	1084	Documents relating to proposed " <i>Modus Vivendi</i> ," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).
19	402 11-23-45	1201	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.
20	402 11-23-45	1226	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.
21	402 11-23-45	1246	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.
22	458 11-23-45	1252	(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government; (b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 1669115; (c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.
22-A	1694 12-15-45 2065 12-31-45	1262	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 (c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
22-B	1783 12-18-45	1269	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.
22-C	1783 12-18-45	1275	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".
22-D	1783 12-18-45	1292	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.
23	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
24	476 11-24-45	1300	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.
25	574 11-26-45	1301	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.
26	634 11-27-45	1303	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).
27	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.
28	670 11-27-45	1315	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.
29	670 11-27-45	1315	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943), Department of State Publication 2008.
30	670 11-27-45	1315	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

31	737 11-28-45	Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese representatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.
32	778 11-29-45	Included are certain messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33	778 11-29-45	Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
33-A	2092 12-31-45	Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.
34	825 11-30-45	Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.
35	828 11-30-45	Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.
36	830 11-30-45	Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)
37	839 11-30-45	Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
38	841 11-30-45	Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.
39	928 12-4-45	Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secretary, General Staff.
40	954 12-4-45	Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (#97645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.
41	988 12-5-45	Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code destruction message).

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
42	990 12-5-45	1416	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".
43	997 12-5-45	1422	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.
44	1001 12-5-45	1423	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
45	1019 12-5-45	1471	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.
46	1027 12-5-45	1472	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.
47	1041 12-5-45	1476	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.
48	1044 12-5-45	1481	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.
48-A	2093 12-31-45	1484	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.
49	1053 12-6-45	1485	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).
50	1053 12-6-45	1551	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).



51	1053 12-6-45	1585	Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).
52	1053 12-6-45	1593	Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
53	1063 12-6-45	1600	Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
54	1067 12-6-45	1627	"Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).
55	1067 12-6-45	1628	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.
56	1076 12-6-45	1630	Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.
57	1077 12-6-45	1631	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.
58	1088 12-6-45	1632	List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
59	1092 12-6-45	1635	General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".
60	1094 12-6-45	1636	General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".
61	1112 12-7-45	1640	Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.
62	1284 12-10-45	1641	Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.
63	1345 12-11-45	1644	Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
64	1544 12-13-45	1645	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.
65	1541 12-13-45	1677	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.
66	1642 12-15-45	1680	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (#61255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.
67	1642 12-15-45	1682	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").
68	1675 12-15-45	1689	Log of U. S. S. <i>Boise</i> for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.
69	1677 12-15-45	1715	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.
70	1695 12-15-45	1716	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.
71	1696 12-15-45	1719	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.
72	1696 12-15-45	1721	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.
73	1700 12-15-45	1727	Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoze cabinet in Japan).

74	1703 12-15-45	Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.
74-A	2768 1-19-46	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.
75	1705 12-15-45	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.
76	1709 11-15-45	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsnoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.
77	1712 12-15-45	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.
78	1724 12-17-45	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
79	1724 12-17-45	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
80	1724 12-17-45	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.
81	1724 12-17-45	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.
82	1728 12-17-45	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).
83	1754 12-17-45	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (031850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.
84	1775 12-17-45	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	1799 12-18-45	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
86	1825 12-18-45	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	1889 12-19-45	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	1912 12-19-45	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	1938 12-20-45	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	2066 12-31-45	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 12-31-45	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grow, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12-31-45	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	2075 12-31-45	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	2078 12-31-45	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	2091 12-31-45	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

96	2091 12-31-45	1989	Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.
97	2091 12-31-45	2007	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.
98	2093 12-31-45	2014	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China".
99	2094 12-31-45	2015	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.
100	2095 12-31-45	2016	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".
101	2095 12-31-45	2023	Log of U. S. S. <i>Enterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.
102	2095 12-31-45	2107	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
103	2095 12-31-45	2118	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander. <i>Enterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.
104	2095 12-31-45	2122	"U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.
105	2096 12-31-45	2140	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.
106	2096 12-31-45	2144	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.
107	2349 1-4-46	2258	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gatch, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	2479 1-5-46	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	2476 1-5-46	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	2495 1-15-46	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	2496 1-15-46	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	2558 1-16-46	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces—Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

114	2558 1-16-46	2568	WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).
115	2558 1-16-46	2601	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
115-A	3449 1-31-46	2672	Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".
115-B	3450 1-31-46	2677	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.
116	2558 1-16-46	2700	Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.
117	2559 1-16-46	2707	Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.
117-A	5015 2-20-46	2713	Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.
118	2559 1-16-46	2714	Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".
119	2559 1-16-46	2716	Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
120	2559 1-16-46	2721	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.
121	2561 1-16-46	2727	Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.
122	2588 1-16-46	2735	Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and Gen. W. C. Short concerning aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department.

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
123	2588 1-16-46	2736	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.
123-A	5015 2-20-46	2743	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)
124	2674 1-17-46	2749	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.
125	2678 1-17-46	2801	Log of the <i>U. S. S. Wright</i> from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.
126	2767 1-19-46	2832	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.
127	2768 1-19-46	2867	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)
128	2768 1-19-46	2870	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.
129	2842 1-19-46	2875	Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPI-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.
130	2879 1-21-46	2941	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.
131	2892 1-21-46	2943	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.



132	2917 1-21-46	2943	Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941"; (c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."
132-A	5137 2-20-46	2946	Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.
133	2965 1-23-46	2953	Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
134	2965 1-23-46	3124	Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.
135	2965 1-23-46	3171	Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.
136	2966 1-23-46	3187	Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.
137	2966 1-23-46	3187	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.
138	2976 1-23-46	3195	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
139	3006 1-23-46	3196	Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.
140	3188 1-26-46	3203	Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.
141	3311 1-28-46	3254	File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".
142	3324 1-29-46	3302	Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
142-A	3324 1-29-46	3318	(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.
142-B	3674 2-4-46	3321	Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.
142-C	3741 2-5-46	3322	Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.
142-D	3780 2-5-46	3323	Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.
143	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)
144	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)
145	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)

146	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)
147	3929 2-7-47	3332	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)
148	3929 2-7-46	3332	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)
149	3929 2-7-46	3332	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)
150	4083 2-8-46	3333	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. F. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.
151	4421 2-13-46	3335	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
152	4794 2-18-46	3351	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.
153	5009 2-19-46	3353	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
154	5013 2-20-46	3430	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
155	5068 2-20-46	3435	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.
156	5122 2-20-46	3436	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".
157	5201 4-11-46	3441	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	5201 4-11-46	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
159	5201 4-11-46	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	5240 4-11-46	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	5241 4-11-46	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	5269 4-11-46	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A	5464 5-23-46	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	5292 4-11-46	3557	Log of the U. S. S. <i>Helena</i> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	5292 4-11-46	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	5292 4-11-46	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

167	5468 5-23-46	3652	(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.
168	5468 5-23-46	3666	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
169	5469 5-23-46	3696	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
170	5469 5-23-46	3789	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.
171	5469 5-23-46	3942	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
172	5469 5-23-46	3978	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.
173	5469 5-23-46	3985	Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.
174	5469 5-23-46	4030	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
175	5470 5-23-46	4115	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.
176	5470 5-23-46	4121	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
177	5470 5-23-46	4132	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date introduced	Exhibits page No.	Description
178	5470 5-23-46	4209	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President, and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
179	5470 5-23-46	4241	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.
180	5471 5-23-46	4551	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.
181	5520 5-23-46	4565	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.
182	5537 5-23-46	4702	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.
183	5468 5-23-46	4766	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.

**EXHIBIT NO. 7**

(Exhibit No. 7 is a map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the Opana radar detector station, 7 December 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 18 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

**EXHIBIT NO. 8****TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Exhibit No. 8:	Page
(1) Messages from MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo, dated 14 and 15 October 1945 to War Department-----	392
(2) Report dated 26 October 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with five inclosures-----	392
(3) Report dated 1 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with one inclosure-----	399
(4) Report dated 8 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with one inclosure-----	412
(5) Source Documents used by Navy in compiling the "Navy Summary of the Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor"-----	431
Exhibit No. 8-A Report dated 12 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with one inclosure-----	413
Exhibit No. 8-B Report dated 29 November 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with one inclosure-----	415
Exhibit No. 8-C Report dated 4 December 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with one inclosure-----	424
Exhibit No. 8-D Report dated 13 December 1945 from General MacArthur to War Department with three inclosures-----	425

## CONFIDENTIAL

## PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack.

Commander in Chief Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

## PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.

## GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

## SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB 26 OCTOBER 1945.  
 Subject: Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor  
 To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attn: A. C. of S., G-2)  
 1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage pos-



sible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Ass't Adjutant General.

5 Incls:

- Incl 1—Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45.
- Incl 2—Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45.
- Incl 3—Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.
- Incl 4—Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.
- Incl 5—Map, Routes of Jap Fleet.

(Incl. #1)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 108.

To: Colonel F. P. Munson, USA

G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. NAKAMURA,  
Rear Admiral, I. J. N.,  
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

*General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with Oral Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.*

1. Operational Orders

(A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

(1) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 1 December)

Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).

(a) (Issued 1 December)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

(3) Imperial Naval Order

(a) (Issued 2 December)

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

(4) Naval General Staff Instruction

(a) (Issued 2 December)

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

(B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

The subject matters are being investigated through members connected with the said forces of that period.

## II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources

- (1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)
- (2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.
- (3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of war.
- (4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

## III. Organization of Attacking Force

- First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga)
- Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu)
- Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku)
- Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei)
- Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma)
- First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division)
- Supply Force (8 Transports)
- Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

## IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

## V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy

- Sunk—2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma)
- 1 Destroyer
- 1 Transport
- Seriously Damaged—4 Battleships
- 4 Heavy Cruisers
- Aircraft shot down or burned—over 350

## VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

Failed to Return—27 aircrafts

N. B.—As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.

---

(Incl #2)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

10 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 123

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.

Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

## 1. Additional operational orders:

(a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofujima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B.—Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American

negotiations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

[2] 2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a certain restricted number of officers intimately concerned with the fleet operation.

3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. NAKAMURA,

*Rear Admiral, I. J. N.*

*Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.*

(Incl #3)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

11 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 130

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

"Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".

3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

[2] The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to 42° N 170° E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor:

The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

K. NAKAMURA,  
Rear Admiral, IJN.  
Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

(Incl #4)

[1]

QUESTIONNAIRE

17 OCTOBER 45.

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?  
(Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral ———, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)
2. When?  
(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922—any time such a proposal *first* was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion).
3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U. S.?
4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.  
(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)
5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.  
(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September 1941, Spring of 1941)
6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)
7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.
8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I. ?; Destroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what?)
- [2] Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? (e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) **NOTE:** When I say Plan, I differentiate between *plans* or staff studies and the actual *orders* issued to put the plan in effect.
  10. When did this work begin?
  11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?
  12. When was the plan finally approved?
  13. What persons and agencies knew about this plan? (e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at Honolulu, Military Attaches to ——— ——— ——— The Amassador at Washington, Kurusu, etc) **NOTE:** Names of individuals and agencies are both desired—for example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also: state persons who had partial knowledge, e. g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.
  14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions. (e. g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).
  15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?
  16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained? (e. g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).
  17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route?
  18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?
- [3] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor:
  20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss:
  - a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.
  - b. Partial decisions made and by whom.
  - c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both fleet units and air units) selected?
  - d. Why was the route you selected chosen?
  - e. What provision was made against discovery en route?
  - f. What action was to be taken if discovered?
  - g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?
  - h. What action was to be taken if the attack failed?
22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?
23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?
24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).
25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?
26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include:
  - Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?
  - Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?
  - Time each group was to strike its target.
  - Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?
27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.
 

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, and other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon.)
- [4] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e. g. If the U. S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U. S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)
29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:
  - a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.
  - b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.
  - c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.

NOTE: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)
30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?
31. Where did it assemble?
32. When did it move out on its mission?
33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.
34. Did everything go as planned?
35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why?
36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?
37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?
38. If so, what was done about them?
39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?
40. List your losses.
41. List estimated U. S. losses.
42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?
- [5] 43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack. (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)
44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e. g. "All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. ——— who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).")
45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?
47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area?
48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

100-100000

## GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

## SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov. 45)GB

1 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.  
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October (referred to above) and includes detailed information in answer to questions 1-13 inclusive, 21-28 inclusive, and 30-47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl. 1)

1032

## ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

## UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

## REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Doc. #1032

DRM/FMO/HDP

Pp. 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

Pp. 2 (Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.)

1. *Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack?*  
Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. *When was this done?*

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. *Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans?*

No.

4. *If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.*

(No statement.)

Pp. 3 (Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. *When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?*

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO.

6. *Who made the foregoing decision?*

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. *If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.*

It was not made in conference.

Pp. 4 (Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. *What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?*

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. *Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan?*

Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. *When was the above undertaking started?*

In the first part of September 1941.

11. *Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?*

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

Pp. 5. 12. *When was the final confirmation of this plan made?*

1 Dec. 41.

13. *Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?*

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

Chief of the Naval General Staff

Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff

Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff

The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff

members of the Combined Fleet Hq and 1 Air Fleet Hq

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff

Navy Minister

Navy Vice-Minister

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some

of their personnel

Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their

chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

Pp. 6



- (3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

Pp. 7 (Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Takkiechi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome.

(1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?

There were none.

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?

Pp. 9 Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers.

d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although

Pp. 10

it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHNSTON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery enroute?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.

Pp. 11

(3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken? The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken ?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INLAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

Pp. 12

22. *State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.*

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational standpoint and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

Pp. 13

23. *How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?*

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

PP 14 24. Explain in detail the organization of the Task Force (ships and air strength).

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuz, who was then commander of the AKAAGI Air Unit.)

(1) Ships.

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	DOUTY
Air Attack Force	Under direct commander	Six aircraft carriers AKAGI SUIKAIU KAGA HIRYU SORU SHOKAKU	Air attack
Screening Unit	Com Des Ron 1 Rear Adm ONOBI, Santaro	One light cruiser YAGARA Five destroyers URAKAZE ISOKAZE YASINAZA HAMAKAZE AKIOMO	Screen; cover
	CinC 1 Air		
Support Force	Fleet, Com Bat Div 3 Rear Adm MIKAWA, Gunichi Vice Adm MAGUMO.	Two battleships HIBI KIRISHIMA Two heavy cruisers TOBE CHIKUMA	Screen; support
Task Force			
Patrol Unit	Chaichi Com Sub Div 2 Capt IMAIZUMI, Kijiro	Three submarines I-19 I-21 I-23	Patrol ship lanes
Midway Neutralization Unit	Com Des Div 7 Capt KONISHI, Kename	Two destroyers AKEBONO USHIO	Attack air bases on Midway
1 Supply Unit	Captain of ETOKUFO (特務船) MARU (special) duty ship)	Captain of ETOKUFO MARU	
Supply Force		Five tankers EKIHO (特務) MARU ETOKUFO MARU YOKUHO (特務) MARU SINKOKU (特務) MARU AKEBONO MARU	
2 Supply Unit	Captain of TOBO (特務) MARU	Three tankers TOBO MARU TOEI (特務) MARU YIPPOH MARU	Supply

Pp. 15 (2) Air Strength.  
 (a) Reconnaissance Unit.

Type	Type of airplane	Number of airplanes	Ships on which based	Duty
Airplanes for reconnaissance just before the attack.	Type Zero Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	2	<i>Tone</i> (1)..... <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR and L A H A I N A Anchorage just before the attack.
Search-patrol planes..	Type 95 Reconnaissance Seaplanes.	4	<i>Hiei</i> (1)..... <i>Kirishima</i> (1) <i>Tone</i> (1) <i>Chikuma</i> (1)	Patrolling waters around OAHU.

pp 16 (b) Attack Unit

UNIT		COMMANDER	TYPE OF AIRPLANE	NUMBER OF AIRPLANES	TYPE OF ATTACK	ARMAMENT (EACH AIRPLANE)	TARGET
1st Group (BRUDAS)	1 Attack Unit	Comdr. FUJIKIDA		15	Horizontal bombing attack	One 800-kg armor piercing bomb	Battleships
		Lt Comdr. HASEGUCHI		15			
	2 Attack Unit		Type 97	50			
	3 Attack Unit	Lt ABE	97	10			
First Attack Unit	4 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. KUDOH	Carrier	10	Torpedo bombing attack	One 800-kg aerial torpedo	Aircraft carriers
	1 Special Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. MURATA	Bomber	12			
	2 Special Attack Unit	Comdr. FUJIKIDA		12			
	3 Special Attack Unit	Lt KITAJIMA		12			
2nd Group	4 Special Attack Unit	Lt NAGAI		8	Dive bombing attack	250-kg incendiary bomb	Air bases FUSO Island MAGLIER
	15 Attack Unit	Lt MATSUMURA	Type 99 Carrier	8			
	16 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. TAKAHASHI	Carrier	27			
		Lt SAKAMOTO	Bomber	27			
3rd Group	1 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt Comdr. ILLYA		9	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	1. Airborne airplanes 2. Strafing of grounded airplanes FUSO Island MAGLIER BARBERS POINT KAWIUM
	2 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHIGA	Type Zero Carrier	9			
	3 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SUGAYAMA	Carrier	9			
	4 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt OKAJIMA	Fighter	6			
4th Group	5 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SATO		6	Horizontal bombing attack	One 250-kg incendiary bomb Six 60-kg ordinary bombs	Air bases FUSO Island MAGLIER BARBERS POINT
	6 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt KANZOKU	Type 97 Carrier	6			
	6 Attack Unit	Lt Comdr. SHIMAZAKI	Carrier	27			
	5 Attack Unit	Lt ICHIHARA	Attack Plane	27			
Second Attack Unit	13 Attack Unit	Comdr. SHIMAZAKI	Lt Comdr. KUSUDA	16	Dive bombing attack	One 250-kg incendiary bomb	Aircraft carriers Cruisers
	14 Attack Unit	Lt KOBAYASHI	Type 99 Carrier	18			
	11 Attack Unit	Lt CHIBATA	Bomber	18			
	12 Attack Unit	Lt MAEHO		27			
7th Group	1 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHINDO	Type Zero Carrier	9	Air control and strafing attack	Two 20-mm MGs Two 7.7-mm MGs	1. Airborne airplanes 2. Strafing of grounded airplanes FUSO Island MAGLIER KAWIUM
	2 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt NIKAIKIDO	Carrier	9			
	3 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt IIDA	Fighter	9			
	4 Fighter Striking Unit	Lt HONO		9			


pp 17 (c) Combat Air Patrol

Patrol	Type of Airplane	Number of Airplanes	Ship on Which Based	Type of Patrol
Patrol 1	Type Zero	18	AGATA - 9	Direct air escort
			KAHA - 9	
Patrol 2	Carrier	18	SOFU - 9	Airplanes ready on flight deck
			HIRATO - 9	
Patrol 3	Fighter	18	ZUIKARU - 9	Airplanes ready on hangar deck (fueled and armed)
			SHOKAKU - 9	

Notes

- Direct air escort was carried out from an hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset.
- The patrols alternated every two hours.

(THE SKETCH OF MOVEMENTS OF AIR UNITS AFTER THEY CAME IN SIGHT OF OAHU.)



1. Second Attack Unit.
2. Ordered to deploy at 0410 hours.
3. Dive bombing unit
4. Attack run ordered at 0425 hours.
5. Horizontal Bombing Unit
6. **RICEDAN**
7. **RICEDAN**
8. **PCAO Island**
9. First Attack Unit.

10. Ordered to deploy at 0410 hours.
  11. Attack run ordered at 0430 hours.
  12. **MISLEB**
  13. **MISLEB**
  14. Horizontal Bombing Unit
  15. Horizontal Bombing Unit.
  16. **SABERS PINK**
  17. **SABERS PINK**
- Note: Some fighter groups in this sketch are operated as well after explosion.

Approved  
Specialist

- Pp. 18 25. *During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?*  
 (Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)  
 (1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.  
 (2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHŌKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHIKUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.
- Pp. 19 26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)  
 a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target.  
 (1) First Attack.  
 (a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).  
 Target: Battleships.  
 Reasoning:  
 (1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.
- Pp. 20 (2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.  
 (3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:  
 (a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.  
 (b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique.  
 (c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.  
 (b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).  
 Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.  
 Reasoning:  
 Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)  
 (c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).  
 Target: Air bases.  
 15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.  
 16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.  
 Reasoning:  
 (1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our
- Pp. 22

main attack units—the horizontal bombing and torpedo bombing units.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKMAN.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit—KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

(2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit—Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEHOE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

Reasoning:

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriers operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM.

4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and KANEHOE.

Reasoning:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

Pp. 26 The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit.

Dive Bombing Unit

WHEELER Field—0325 hours.

Torpedo Attack Unit

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage—0327 hours.



## Horizontal Bombing Unit

Same as above—0235 hours.

## Fighter Striking Unit

Began ground strafing—0330 hours.

## Second Attack Unit.

All three units—Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit—attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

Pp. 27 d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA\* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

Pp. 29 27. *How were midget submarines used?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

Pp. 30 The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HARBOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

Pp. 31 28. *Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(Replies by FUCHIDA:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

Pp. 32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30-38, are based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. *When did the Task Force begin to form?*

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. *Where was the rendezvous?*

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. *When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?*

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. *Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway? What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?*

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TANKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. *Did everything proceed according to plan?*

Yes.

Pp. 33 35. *If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?*

(No statement.)

36. *Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway?*

No.

37. *Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway?*

None.

38. *If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?*

(No statement.)

Pp. 34 39. *Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?*

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

Pp. 35 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

40. *What damage did the Japanese receive?*

In the First Attack:

Fighter planes.....	3
Dive bombers.....	1
Torpedo bombers.....	5
Total .....	<u>9</u>

In the Second Attack:

Fighter planes.....	6
Dive bombers.....	14
Total .....	<u>20</u>
Grand total.....	<u>29</u>

41. *What was the estimated damage to American forces?*

(1) Naval vessels:

Sunk: 4 battleships  
1 cruiser  
2 tankers

Pp. 36

Heavily damaged: 4 battleships  
Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

(2) Airplanes

Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes

Total: Approximately 250 airplanes.

It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. *How was the damage inflicted on the Americans determined?*

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.

(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

Pp. 37

43. *Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?*

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Cmdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

Pp. 38

(Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. *Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR?*

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. *If there were, where were these submarines based?*

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII.

b. *What were their operation orders?*

Pp. 39

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. *Were reports made during and after the attack?*

When the Task Force and the Midget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the 8 December.

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. *What damage was sustained by the submarines?*

Pp. 40

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

*47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters?*

The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

End

## GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

## SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45)GB

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945)GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945)GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ H. W. Allen  
H. W. ALLEN,  
Colonel, A.G.D.,  
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl 1)

Doc No. 1668

## ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

## UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

## PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

26 OCTOBER 1945

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein. NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.

## 14. Sources of intelligence?

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc.; were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:

1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.
3. American radio broadcasts (public).
4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.
5. General information.
15. Characteristics of intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in PEARL HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American air patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?

None.

19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.

Applicable facts not available.

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in "14".

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-A

### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (12 Nov 45) GB

12 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.  
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention: A. C. of S., G-2).

1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in compliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, an additional document is forwarded herewith.

2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 45-47 inclusive of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. Allen  
H. W. ALLEN,  
Colonel, A. G. D.,  
Asst Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Notes of Correspondent.

[A newspaper Article Published in the Yomiuri-Hochi, 30 October 1945]

[1]

THE EVE OF "PEARL HARBOR"

*An early chapter in the History of War Crimes.*

December 8, 1941. This is the fatal date when the American People as one resolved themselves to "Remember Pearl Harbor!" But long before this date Japan's submarine offensive on Pearl Harbor were going on and several eery periscopes were feeling out movements of American fleets from the rough sea. The former War Correspondent Hanakata has only now made public his notes taken at that time from direct narrations of the late Captain (then Lt Commander) Katsuji Watanabe of "I No. 69" and the late Rear Admiral (then Captain) Shinki Nakaoka of the 11th Detachment of the 3rd Submarine Fleet.

"The Japanese submarine detachment belonged to the Sixth Fleet, whose flagship was the light cruiser Katori. In early November orders for war preparation were given to this detachment, and on 11 November over ten submarines of the First and 3rd Detachments, including "I" Nos. 69, 74, 75 and others left Yokosuka Naval Base, with knowledge of the growing war fever in Washington and Tokyo.

"The submarine fleet followed a course due east in line ahead, stretching over 20 miles. They navigated at surface speeds of from 12 or 13 to 20 knots. But when they got near the Hawaiian waters they extended and followed their respective courses. The duties of the submarine fleet were known as (a) to feel the movements of American fleets around Pearl Harbor; (b) to disptach "special submarines" from their decks and to observe their war results; (c) to attack escaping American war vessels, if any; (d) to rescue operators of "special submarines", down fliers and others wherever possible.

"In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in the day time they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier *Lexington* but no trouble ensued.

"The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried on as had been scheduled. Before this, five large sized "I" type submarines belonging to the First Submarine Detachment had launched "special submarines" from their decks. That was the departure of the now well known Commander Iwasa and other members of "special attack parties".

"The submarines followed the upheaval in the harbor only through occasional land explosions coming through the deep water, and they confirmed the Harbor Battle at night when they emerged from the bottom of the sea. At 1631 (2101 Hawaiian time) Rear Commander Watanabe of "I No. 69" detected from the periscope a huge fiery column which marked the end of the USS *Arizona*.

[2] "Lt. Commander Watanabe's radio intercepted dispatches in relation to this were by the enemy and his "I No. 69" was pursued by enemy destroyers which dropped depth charges madly. Under this circumstance "I No. 69" dived 60 to 70 meters beneath the surface, though her ordinary diving capacity had been set at 30 meters. The submarine sustained damage here and there and finally was caught by submarine wires. She struggled hard and just managed to get away from the wires. Altogether this old submarine remained submerged about 39 hours. All hopes of rescuing fellow-fighters who had been shot down had been abandoned."

The notes from direct narration by Captain Watanabe and Rear Admiral Nakaoka end here. But Mr. Hanakata observes that most of the officers and crews of Japanese submarines, including those participating in the siege of Pearl Harbor, perished at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, the prey of American radio locators. For example, the said Captain Watanabe perished with his submarine in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands. Rear Admiral Nakaoka was promoted to be captain of the crack cruiser *Atago* but he also was killed in action by enemy bombs on the bridge of that vessel.

The Yomiuri-Hochi 30 October 1945.

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing notes represent a true report of the information given me by the late Captain Watanabe and the late Rear Admiral Nakaoka at the time of interview.

/s/ M. HANAKATA.

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-B

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (29 Nov 45) GB

29 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8 November 1945, same file number and subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese documents relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/sgd/ H. W. Allen  
H. W. ALLEN,  
Colonel, A. G. D.  
Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] Dec 1976

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-2.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

22 OCTOBER 1945.

Navy Ministry

The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein.

29. Copies of the following will be submitted:

1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack.
2. Operational research and other documents related to the attack.
3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions).

All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as a result no documents are available. The essential points in the orders relative to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men:

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff.

Section Orders and Directives

Real Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of Operation's Section, Naval General Staff).

Combined Fleet Orders

Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of Combined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).)

Task Force Orders

Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air Unit).

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials).

5 Nov 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials)

9 Nov 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations.

B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during these movements.

[3] C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth in the Separate Volume.

NOTE: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is recalled as follows:

"At the very beginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus. An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet"

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous areas.

B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet is authorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will immediately order the forces for the operation to return.

B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 5 is limited to the following cases:

1. If American English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japanese territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes.

[4] 2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach Japanese territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces.

3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials).

1 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and air forces in the ORIENT, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept and destroy them.

C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Commander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American,



English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect them.

D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations of the CHINA area fleet when necessary.

E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be given in a later order.

F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials).

1 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

The Combined Fleet operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume—"Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS".

[5] NOTE: As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate Volume was entirely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive of 5 November.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentials).

2 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9.

B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive.

2 Dec. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO).

It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement is reached in the negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of military power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special order to return.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN

7 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
CinC Combined Fleet

[6]

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take on supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure secrecy in movements.

NOTE: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order (giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also issued. Detailed information as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued later).

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN  
22 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the HAWAII area, maintaining the greatest secrecy as to its movements and a close watch against submarine or air attacks. At the opening of hostilities the Task Force will attack the main strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.

The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order).

At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdrawn immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks.

B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN.

NOTE: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued 25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now been corrected to 22 November.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN  
25 Nov. 41

[7]

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
CinC Combined Fleet

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long 170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as quickly as possible.

NOTE: In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order—(essentials).

Time of origin: Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41.

Text: X-Day will be 8 December.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN  
23 Nov 41

NAGUMO, Chuichi  
Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.

The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.

When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw. Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.

If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.

B. Chart (See next page.)

B. The allocation of strength will be shown in the table below.

UNIT	COMMAND	STRENGTH	DUTY
Air Force	Cinc 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet	Air Attack
Screening Unit	Com Des Ron 1	Flag of Des Ron 1; Des Div 17 Des Div 18; AKIGUMO	Screen; cover
Support Force	Com Bat Div 3	Bat Div, 3, - 2D (TN Presumably, less 2 elements.); Gru Div 8	Screen; support
Patrol Unit	Com Sub Div 2	Flag; I-19; I-21; I-23	Patrol ship lanes
Midway Neutralization Unit	Com Des Div 7	Des Div 7, - 2D (TN Presumably less 2 elements.)	Attack on MIDWAY Air Base
Supply Force	Captain of KYOKU- MURU (橘東) (Special duty ship)	KENYO (健洋) MARU; KYOKUO MARU; KOKUYO (國洋) MARU; SHINKOKU (神國) AKEBONO MARU	Supply
1 Supply Unit	Captain of TOHO (徳邦) MARU	TOHO MARU; TOBI (東愛) MARU; NIPPON MARU	
2 Supply Unit			

## [8] C. Movements of each force.

## 1. General:

The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITOKAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point (Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at every opportunity en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is designated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where contact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W).

Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplanes will be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100 hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and important air bases on OAHU.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations.

If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event, Car Div 5 and the two ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Force on the night of X-Day to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against MIDWAY.

If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS.

If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent back.

## 2. Patrol Unit:

The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit.

If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during landings and takeoffs.

After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy; if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available strength.

## 3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit:

The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw. After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA.

[9] The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship.

The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point where the enemy will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY.

D. In the event that the operation is cancelled while the Task Force is under way, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or MUTSU-KAIWAN.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN

23 Nov 41

Nagumo, CHUICHI

Task Force Commander

Task Force Order

The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows:

## A. Movements of Air Attack Force.

At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course.

At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z.

When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots.

It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between 0530 hours and 0600 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between 0645 hours and 0715 hours.

When the units return preparations will be made immediately for the next attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes.

If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a powerful enemy force is in route to attack, subsequent attacks will be directed against it.

#### B. Organization of air attack units.

As shown in Separate Tables.

#### C. Targets.

##### 1. First attack unit.

[10] 2. 1 Group (SHUDAN)

(1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers.

(2) Order of selection.

First battleships, then carriers.

##### B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated below

(1) 15 Attack Unit

FORD Island—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(2) 16 Attack Unit

WHEELER Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(3) Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

##### 2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as indicated below.

(1) 5 Attack Unit

KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT—hangars and Grounded planes.

(2) 6 Attack Unit

HICKHAM Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If there are an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and battleships will be attacked in that order.

##### c. Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

#### D. Outline of attack procedure.

##### 1. First Attack Unit.

2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing Unit will attack first; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2 Group last.

b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning come in over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main function will be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters.

If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the following strafing assignments against grounded airplanes.

(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units

Ford and HICKHAM

(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units

WHEELER and BARBERS POINT

(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units

KANEOHE

C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time interval between attacks.

(1) Fighter Striking Unit

(2) Ship Bombing Unit

(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit

(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit

##### 2. Second Attack Unit.

The entire unit will attack at about the same time.

The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is

encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows: 2. 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units.

- FORD AND HICKAM  
b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units.

WHEELER and KANEOHE

[11] 3. Outline for attack in case most of the carriers and battleships are anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR.

2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its use of torpedo planes.

b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fleet and then OAHU, maintaining its formation as a single group and striking under Air cover of the Fighter Striking units.

However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships.

4. Regrouping and returning:

a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from the western tip (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000m (if clouds are present at about that altitude the rendezvous will be made below them).

b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes. After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to their ships.

c. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack units and intercept any enemy pursuit.

#### E. Reconnaissance:

1. Reconnaissance before the attack.

No special reconnaissance will be made.

2. Reconnaissance just before the attack.

The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and CAHAINA anchorages, and report whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at these anchorages.

3. Scouting and search.

The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched about 0300. They will search over as wide an area as possible, between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-attacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc.

4. Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes (will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) will conduct a highspeed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and airplanes.

#### F. Air Patrol:

From 1 hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of attack, Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used.

## SEPARATE SQUADS

UNIT		COMMANDER		TYPE of AIRPLANE	NUMBER of AIRPLANES	TYPE of ATTACK	ARMAMENT (each plane)											
FIRST ATTACK	1 Group (SHUDAN)	1 Attack Unit	Comdr.	Comdr. FUCHIDA	TYPE	Horizontal	One No 80, Mark 5 Bomb											
		2 Attack Unit		Lt. Comdr. HANJICUOKI				15	bombing									
		3 Attack Unit		Lt. ANO				10	attack									
		4 Attack Unit		Lt. Comdr. KUDOMI				10										
	2 GROUP	1 Special Attack Unit		Lt. Comdr. MURARA	Carrier	97	12	Torpedo	One Type- 91 Aerial Torpedo									
		Attack Unit		Lt. KITAJIMA						BOMBER	12	Bombing						
		2 Special		Lt. KAGAI									8	Attack				
		3 Special Attack Unit		Lt. MATSUMURA											8			
	4 Special Attack Unit																	
	UNITE GROUP	2 GROUP		15 Attack Unit	FU-	Lt. Comdr. TAKARASHI	Type 99	27	Dive Bombing	One No. 25								
				16 Attack Unit		Lt. SAKAMOTO					Carrier Bomber	27	Attack	Land Bomb				
		Three (3) Group		1 Fighter Striking Unit		OHIDA	Lt. Comdr. ITAYA	Type	9	Air Control					and			
2 Fighter S.U.			Lt. SHIGA	9			and											
3 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. SUGIYAMA								9	and						
4 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. OKAWADA										6	Strafing				
5 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. SAFO													6	Attack	
6 Fighter Striking Unit			Lt. KANEKO															6
SECOND ATTACK		1 Group	6 Attack Unit			Lt.		Lt. Comdr. NEDAZAKI	Type 97	27					Horizontal Bombing			
			5 Attack Unit	Lt. YCHIRARA			Carrier	27										
		2 Group	13 Attack Unit	Comdr.					Lt. Comdr. NISHI	Type 99	18	Dive Bombing			One No 25, Ordinary			
			14 Attack Unit				Lt. KOBAYASHI	Carrier Bomber	18				Bombing					
	11 Attack Unit		Lt. OHINAYA		18		Attack											
	12 Attack Unit		Lt. MAKIYO											27		Attack		
	3 Group	8 Fighter Striking Unit	KAKI	Lt. SHIKO						Type	9	Air control			and			
		2 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. MIKAIKO				9	Carrier									
		3 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. IJIA	9		Fighter											
		4 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. NISHI									9	Strafing				
	UNITE	1 Fighter Striking Unit	KAKI	Lt. NISHI						Type	9	Air control			and			
		2 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. MIKAIKO				9	Carrier									
3 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. IJIA		9	Fighter													
4 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. NISHI				9	Attack											

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-C

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (4 Dec 45)GB

4 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.  
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistants  
Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this questionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October 1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945.

3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, which series collectively provide all data available from known Japanese sources on subjects listed in your radio WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945. However, should additional data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the war, same will be promptly forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ E. D. Law, Jr.  
E. D. LAW, Jr.  
Major, AGD,  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] 3543 B  
N. D. 406

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2.

17 NOVEMBER 1945.

To: Colonel F. P. MUNSON

From: Rear Admiral NAKAMURA

*Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel Munson dated 10 November 1945*

1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Ministry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN became more tense.

The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concentration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the considerable hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area, to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned.

(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomio who worked in the same department at that time.)

The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2] difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Ameri-



can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from Naval officers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms, and the like.

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a considerable length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely, and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were given, they would appear as follows:

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.

B. Signal intelligence.

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the training areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way.

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES

Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and other places, etc.

D. Observation submarines

With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually made smaller (It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December—American time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., were ascertained.

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.

II. The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commercial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some military matters included) of the country where the establishment or firm was located. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-D

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (13 Dec 45)BG

13 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor  
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2.)

1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl

Harbor on 7 December 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy and Civil Officers are forwarded herewith.

2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide further amplification of data previously forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander :

/s/ E. D. LAW, Jr.,  
E. D. LAW, Jr.  
Major, AGD, Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 Incls :

- Incl 1—Interrogation Capt. Genda.
- Incl 2—Interrogation Mr. Kase.
- Incl 3—Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi.

[1]

[Copy]

NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Date: 28 Nov. 1945.  
Interrogation No. 10

Place: FLTLOSCAP

Subject: Pearl Harbor Attack.

Personnel Interrogated: Captain Minoru Genda; Air Operations officer on staff of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the responsibility of planning the attack.

Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR.

Interpreter: Douglas Wada.

Summary :

The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a conversation with Admiral Omishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1, 1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further discussion Yamamoto directed Onishi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack. Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success.

About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith. The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan and who worked on it at the War College at this time; Admirals Yamamoto, Ugiki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima; Commanders Sasaki, Ono; following members of the Navy General staff: Admiral Fukudome, Captains Sanagi and Tonioka, Commander Miyo.

On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its mission at 0600 hours Nov 26th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, however, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions, anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or December 5th.

[2] The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamamoto from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NITA KAYAMA NOBORE" and means climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the message specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received, the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42.

In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanai, at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots.

The following was the composition of the striking force :

- 6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno.
- 2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima.
- 2 Heavy Cruisers; Tone and Chikuma.
- 9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship.
- 3 Submarines; I-19, I-21, and I-23.

Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack :

Fighters -----	81
Dive bombers -----	145
Horizontal bombers -----	104
Torpedo planes -----	40
Total -----	370

Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as intercepters, in case the U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai.

Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported that the Fleet was in.

Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attacked discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless.

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Nagumo felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments.

For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the south western sector from Oahu.

[3] The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23 knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface.

Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes.

[1] (Incl 2)

[Copy]

#### NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

##### Interrogation No. 9.

Subject: Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese Consul General in Honolulu.

Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Section of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Harbor. Undergrad work Amherst; graduate study at Harvard in international law, and relations 1928. Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e. U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post for about a year.

Where Interrogated: Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. (jg) S. E. SPRAGUE.

##### Summary :

Mr. Kase stated that he was personally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent

messages to the foreign office every few days informing it of the presence of units of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office received these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine. However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U. S. Fleet were not a matter of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington. The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollection of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority" on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General Kita.

[2] Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U. S. fleet or military installations in Hawaii?

A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him.

Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war concerning the U. S. Fleet. To whom were messages sent? Did you see them?

A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister.

Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U. S. Fleet; are any copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office?

A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of messages are there.

Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washington. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention.

Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams?

A. I suppose the Navy Minister.

Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available?

A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very short telegrams, usually, not even occupying a full page. These telegrams were not considered important at all from our point of view. Very likely they have been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel—we just had a look at them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of after-events, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance. But we did not know at the time.

Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron?

A. No. I don't recall him.

Q. Interrogator recounted l'affaire Kudo and its expose in newspapers.

A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done with knowledge of the Foreign Office.

Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo.

A. Oh?

Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is?

A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out.

[3] Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were sending despatches to Nomura?

A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work of the negotiations.

Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches?

A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department. Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations and their progress were sometimes discussed at joint conferences.

Q. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such instruction?

A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions.

Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions without your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible?

A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita through Foreign Office.

Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita. Do you know Mr. Morimura?

A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October 1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates.

Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did you take?

A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councillor of embassy at Bangkok.

(At some point about here, interrogator described Morimura's activities.)

Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura to Honolulu?

A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time.

Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister?


A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice-Minister. They assumed office in October 1941.

Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from Navy Department to give to Kita?

A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible.

Foreign Minister—Togo

Vice Foreign Minister—Nishi



## SOURCE DOCUMENTS USED BY NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

	Page
1. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #1-----	431
2. Japanese Combined Fleet Top Secret Operating Order #2-----	485
3. Japanese Submarine Operations (Pearl Harbor Attack)-----	487
4. Navy study "Time Table of Japanese Submarine Operations"-----	493
5. Translations of Captured Japanese Documents "Japanese Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experience off Hawaii"-----	497
6. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Patrol Operations of Japanese Submarine I-69 off Pearl Harbor"-----	503
7. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "The Southern Cross by Kuramoto, Iki"-----	512
8. Translation of Captured Japanese Documents (a) "Japanese Submarine School Notes Concerning Early War Experiences off Hawaii", (b) "Japanese Instructions to Yatsumaki Butai", (c) "Japanese Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands"-----	525
9. Translation of Captured Japanese Document "Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the Japanese Navy"-----	538
10. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War Captured from the Japanese Submarine I-1 which participated in Attack on Pearl Harbor-----	613
11. Interrogation of Japanese Prisoners of War who participated in attack on Pearl Harbor as member of crew of the (CV) Kaga-----	619
12. Navy Department Study of Japanese Espionage in Hawaiian Islands "Pre-War Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands, Report on Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet"-----	627
13. Navy Department Study "Sorties by Enemy Sub-Carried Planes and Sub-Carrier Identification"-----	649
14. Japanese Battle Lessons on Supply in the Greater East Asia War Supply Battle Lesson No. 1 (Translation)-----	653
15. Parallel translation of Source Document 14, supra-----	667
16. U. S. Navy Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 22, 8 December 1944-----	704
17. Photostatic copy of original Japanese document captured on Saipan consisting of notes on fueling at sea of Pearl Harbor Striking Force-----	767
18. Original Japanese document captured by U. S. Navy at Manila, the same being the original material for the translations appearing in Source Documents Nos. 1 and 2, supra-----	832

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

## SOURCE DOCUMENT #1

"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #1"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

**SECRET**Page  
2/1

COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO, SAKI BAY 5 Nov 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
Commander in Chief  
Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES,  
GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance  
with the Separate Volume.

## Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 1

## Separate Volume

Page 2/2 Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS

## CONTENTS

- I. Operations of the Combined Fleet in Case War with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS Begins during the CHINA Operations.
- A. Outline of operations
  - B. Preparations for war and the outbreak of war
    - 1. Preparations for the outbreak of war
    - 2. The outbreak of war and the use of arms theretofore
  - C. First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations
    - 1. Operation policy
    - 2. Outline of operations against A (TH American.) Fleet
    - 3. Outline of Southern Area operations
    - 4. Operation periods
    - 5. Allocation of forces
  - D. Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations
    - 1. Operation policy
    - 2. Important points which must be defended and advance bases in occupied territory
    - 3. Areas expected to be occupied or destroyed
    - 4. Allocation of forces
  - E. Protection of our sea traffic, destruction of enemy sea traffic, and mine warfare
    - 1. Operations to protect sea traffic
    - 2. Operations to destroy sea traffic
    - 3. Mine warfare
  - F. Communications
  - G. Supply
  - H. Operations other than those of the Combined Fleet
    - 1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations
    - 2. Operations of the CHINA Area Fleet
  - I. Joint Army-Navy Agreement (Separate Volume) (TH Missing.)
- II. Operations of the Combined Fleet in Case War with RUSSIA Begins during the War with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS and CHINA
- A. Operation policy
  - B. Allocation of forces



**SECRET**

## C. Operations other than those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations
2. Operations of the CHINA Area Fleet

## III. Miscellaneous Regulations

Page  
2/6

- A. Time to be Used
- B. Charts to be Used
- C. Identification of friendly and enemy forces

Page  
2/7

## I. COMBINED FLEET OPERATIONS IN CASE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS BEGINS DURING THE CHINA OPERATIONS

## A. Outline of Operations

1. In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut.
2. In the west British MALAYA will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT, as well as the BURMA Road, will be cut.
3. Enemy forces in the ORIENT will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.
4. Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

Page  
2/8

5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.
6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy will to fight.

## B. Preparations for War and the Outbreak of War

## 1. Preparations for the outbreak of war

a. The empire is expecting war to break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War". The various forces will act as follows:

Page  
2/9

(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organize and complete battle preparations in accordance with the allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations. When directed by the commanding officers of the various forces, they will proceed at the proper time to the pre-operation rendezvous and wait in readiness.

(2) All forces will be on strict lookout for unexpected attacks by the American, British and Netherlands forces.

SECRET

(3) The commanding officers of the various forces may carry out such secret reconnaissance as is especially necessary to the operation.

(4) Pursuant to defense plans, 4th Fleet will begin mining the NAMPO GUNTŌ.

Page  
2/10

b. When the advance forces necessary for carrying out the operation have been dispatched to the area of operations, the order "Second Preparations for War" will be issued, and each force will act in accordance with the following:

(1) Submarine forces attached to the Advance Expeditionary Force (SEMKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, Commerce Destructor Unit, Southern Area Force and South Seas Force, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed at the proper time to the area of operations.

(2) Remaining forces, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed so as to be in position for the outbreak of war.

c. After the required preparations for war have been made, if the situation changes significantly, specified forces may be returned from "Second Preparations for War" to "First Preparations for War".

Page  
2/11

2. The outbreak of war and the use of arms theretofore

a. The time for the outbreak of war (I Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order. The order will be given several days in advance. After 0000 hours, I Day, a state of war will exist. Each force will commence operations according to plan.

b. If a serious enemy attack is received before I Day, the following measures will be taken:

(1) Forces which are attacked will counterattack immediately. Before the I Day orders are issued, counterattacks by base air forces will depend on Imperial General Headquarters Orders.

Page  
2/12

(2) After the I Day order is issued, all forces will enter into a state of war and begin operations without waiting for special orders.

(3) Prior to the issuance of the I Day order, the outbreak of war will depend on Imperial General Headquarters orders.

c. After "Second Preparations for War" has been ordered, military force may be used in unavoidable cases such as the following:

(1) If American, British or Netherlands ships or airplanes approach the vicinity of our territorial waters and such action seems to create a danger.

(2) If our forces, while on the move outside our territorial waters, are involved in positive actions which appear to endanger them by forces of these countries.

**SECRET**Page  
2/5**6. First Phase (MAX DASH DASH) Operations****1. Operation policy**

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) (TN "6th Fleet" in pencil.), Striking Force (TN "1st Air Fleet" in blue pencil.), South Seas Force (TN "4th Fleet" in blue pencil.), Northern Force (TN "5th Fleet" in indelible pencil.) and Main Body (TN "Combined Fleet" in blue pencil.) will operate against the American fleet.

(TN Portion of page cut out and "Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) ...." and "Striking Force ...." inserted in blue pencil. Along with "South Seas Force" they are presumably subjects of the following sentence.) The South Seas Force will occupy and destroy important areas in the vicinity and will be ready for the enemy fleet in the AUSTRALIA Area. The Northern Area Force will be responsible for patrols against SOVIET RUSSIA.

Page  
2/4

b. While maintaining local superiority, the Southern Area Force (TN "2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleets and 11th Air Fleet" in indelible pencil.) will annihilate enemy fleets in the PHILIPPINES, British MALAYA and NETHERLANDS INDIES Area. At the same time it will co-operate with the Army as follows:

(1) The operations against British MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES will be commenced simultaneously, and the enemy air forces and fleets in these areas will be repeatedly battered by air attacks. Army advance expeditionary groups (SENKEN HEIDAN) will be landed in strategic areas of MALAYA, the PHILIPPINES and British BORNEO as quickly as possible. Air Forces will be sent to reinforce air operations.

Page  
2/15

(2) The results of the operations will be exploited, and the main body of Army invasion groups (HEIDAN) will be landed in the PHILIPPINES and then MALAYA in order to occupy their respective areas quickly.

(3) During the early stages of the operations the strategic areas of the CELEBES, DUTCH BORNEO and Southern SUMATRA will be occupied in the order named. The strategic areas of MOLUCCAS and TIMOR also will be occupied. Necessary air bases will be prepared in these areas.

Page  
2/16

(4) As these air bases are completed, air forces gradually will be sent forward, and enemy air strength in the JAVA Area will be crushed. When this is accomplished, the main body of the Army invasion group (HEIDAN) will be landed in JAVA to occupy it.

(5) After the fall of SINGAPORE the strategic areas of northern SUMATRA will be occupied. Operations against BURMA will be carried out at the appropriate time to cut off the enemy supply route to CHINA.

c. If the American fleet attacks, 3rd Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Fleet will carry out Southern Area operations temporarily. The bulk of combat strength will meet the attack.

d. An element (TN "2LS\*\*" written in blue pencil.) of the Combined Fleet will destroy enemy sea traffic in the PACIFIC and INDIAN Ocean Areas.

Page  
2/17

e. In order not to arouse the hostility of THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA, every effort will be made to secure their voluntary co-operation. But in the event of hostility, obstructions to our operations will be eliminated by force.

**SECRET****2. Outline of operations against the American fleet**

The classification of operations and the outline of operations are established in the following table. Each force will operate in accordance with the classification of operations indicated.

Page  
2/17  
2/18

SITUATION	CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS
At Outbreak of War	(TW This portion out out.)	
At Outbreak of War (Situation complicated by using task force for attack)	Method 2 for operations against American fleet	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will reconnoiter and make a surprise attack on the American fleet. If conditions warrant, air bases at HOWLAND, TUTUILA, FIJI, etc., will be attacked with appropriate forces.</li> <li>2. The Striking Force will prepare for the American fleet.</li> </ol>
In Case American Fleet Operates	Method 3 for operations against American fleet	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force and Northern Area Force will operate against the American task force.</li> <li>2. If necessary, the Main Body will give support.</li> <li>3. If conditions warrant, an element of 11th Air Fleet may be temporarily diverted to the east.</li> </ol>
In Case American Fleet Proceeds to Attack	Method 4 for operations against American fleet	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force, Northern Area Force and Main Body, deployed for interception, will operate against the American fleet. The decisive battle strength of Southern Area Force will join immediately to meet the attack.</li> <li>2. Southern Area operations will be continued by 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet and fighters of 11th Air Fleet.</li> </ol>

Page  
2/19**3. Outline of Southern Area Operations**

Southern Area Operations will be based on the operation policy and on the agreement between Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and Commander in Chief, Southern Area Army. The Southern Area Force Commander will direct the operations unless otherwise ordered.

**SECRET**

## 4. Operation periods

First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be classified as follows. Changes will be by special order.

a. First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations: This period will cover operations from the outbreak of war until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in the PHILIPPINES.

Page  
2/20

b. Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations: In general, operations from the First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in British MALAYA.

c. Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations: Operations from the end of the Second (DAI NI KI) Period Operations to the completion of the occupation of the NEHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

## 5. Allocation of forces

Allocation of forces during the First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations will be as follows.

a. Allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations - Separate Table 1

b. Allocation of forces for Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations - Separate Table 2

c. Allocation of forces for Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations - Separate Table 3

d. Allocation of forces for interception operations - Separate Table 4

Page  
2/21

## D. Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations

## 1. Operation policy

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will continue to make reconnaissance raids on the American and British fleets. These fleets will be attacked by base air forces, carrier air forces, etc. at opportune times.

b. American and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut in order to strengthen the defenses of strategic areas.

c. Enemy forces in the waters under our control and remnants of the enemy in occupied areas will be mopped up in order to secure resources and protect sea traffic.

Page  
2/22

d. If the American and British fleets attack, they will be destroyed individually by taking advantage of inner lines of defense.

e. Operations to destroy American and British sea traffic will be intensified.

## 2. Important points which must be defended and advance bases in occupied territory

a. Important points in occupied territory which must be defended are as follows:

MANILA, DAVAO, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, SOERABAJA, TARAKAN, BALIKPAPAN, MENADO, MAKASSAR, AMBOE, PENANG, RAHAUL. (IN DAVAO and MENADO emphasized by blue pencil circles.)

b. Advance bases in occupied territory are expected to be as follows:

MANILA, SINGAPORE, SOERABAJA

Page  
2/23

3. Areas expected to be occupied or destroyed

The following are areas expected to be occupied or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permit:

- a. Eastern NEW GUINEA, NEW BRITAIN, FIJI and SAMOA
- b. ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY
- c. ANDAMAN Islands
- d. Strategic points in the AUSTRALIA Area

4. Allocation of forces

The allocation of forces for Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations is established in Separate Table 5.

The allocation of forces for interception operations will be based on Separate Table 4.

SECRET

## B. Protection of Sea Traffic, Destruction of Enemy Sea Traffic and Mine Warfare.

## 1. Operations to protect sea traffic

Sea traffic will be protected as prescribed by force commanders, in accordance with the Plan for Protection of Maritime Commerce (1941), in addition to the following:

SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY		PRINCIPAL DUTIES
Philippines and Netherlands East Indies Force	West of Long 136°02'18" (TH Add "encompassing the defense area of 3 Base Force.>") South of Lat 20° South of a line passing through the northern edge of BRITISH BOMBED at an angle of 315°	1. Control of ship movements within assigned sectors 2. Matters related to escort of ships within assigned sectors 3. Gathering and disseminating information 4. Control of communications of ships navigating within assigned sectors 5. Issuing and cancelling alarms within assigned sectors
Malay Force	South of a line passing through the northern edge of BRITISH BOMBED at an angle of 315°	
South Seas Force	West of Long 136°02'18" (TH Add "plus defense area of 3 Base Force.>") Sea area south of Lat 24° <sup>00'</sup>	
Northern Force	Sea area north of Lat 24° <sup>00'</sup> Sea area south of Lat 29°	
Other Operational Forces	All sectors of operation	Co-operation in the following matters: 1. Destruction of enemy forces in all sectors of operations 2. Escort (Chiefly direct escort, depending on the situation or indirect escort) 3. Communications

<sup>1</sup> Editor's Note: Revised by "errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial, PRIT 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the HAGATO, SAKKI WAN.

**SECRET**

## 2. Operations to destroy sea traffic

## a. Policy

Page  
2/27

The immediate destruction of vital points in the sea traffic of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, combined with a checking of enemy forces, will aid our principal operations. We will endeavor to crush the enemy will to fight by gradually strengthening our efforts and by realizing our aims over a long period of time.

## b. Outline for execution

(1) Seizure of enemy ships at the outbreak of war: Enemy ships will be seized, provided that our principal operations are not thereby impaired. Close liaison will be maintained with Imperial General Headquarters and with homeland combat forces (NAISEN BUTAI). Sectors of responsibility for each unit, in observation and seizure of enemy ships, will correspond in general to sectors of responsibility in 1, "Operations to protect sea traffic".

Page  
2/28

(2) The Commerce Destruction Unit, as prescribed by its commanding officer and as opportunities arise in the South Seas Area after the outbreak of war, will operate between CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA and AUSTRALIA. Depending on the situation on the west coast of SOUTH AMERICA, one element will proceed to the INDIAN Ocean Area and will operate between AUSTRALIA and AFRICA.

(3) According to the progress of operations and to what is prescribed by the Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) commander, expeditionary forces not exceeding one submarine division will operate off the coasts of CENTRAL and NORTH AMERICA to the extent that the principal operations are not thereby hindered. The Hawaiian Area Force will endeavor to cut rear lines of supply at every opportunity.

Page  
2/29

(4) One element of DesRons 4, 5, 6, and 7 at the end of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations, will be assigned as directed by Southern Force Commander to destruction of sea traffic off the south coast of JAVA and at the western entrance to the MALACCA Straits. When southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations are completed, they will carry out a vigorous campaign of destruction of sea traffic in the INDIAN Ocean and AUSTRALIA Areas.

(5) In the pause after First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations or when opportunities arise during operations, forces for destroying sea traffic will be strengthened and will operate vigorously with surface ships and airplanes.

## 3. Mine warfare

Combined Fleet mine warfare will be directed by individual force commanders, in addition to conformance with the following:

Page  
2/30

## a. Southern area of operations

(1) Standard practices in offensive mine warfare - Appended Table 1

(2) (Standard) Summary of bases to be protected by mines and antisubmarine nets - Appended Table 2

(3) Summary of mine and antisubmarine supplies - Appended Table 3



**SECRET**

(4) Outline for establishing mine barriers at the end of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations - Appended Table 4

b. South Seas Area

The 4th Fleet defense plan will be followed and offensive mine warfare will be carried on as directed by the South Seas Force Commander.

Page  
-/31

c. When mines are laid or swept, the force commander in each case will report positions of mines, navigable sectors, etc., to the proper authorities.

d. Declarations concerning the laying of mines

Declarations will be issued by Imperial General Headquarters, after being routed through Combined Fleet Headquarters; they will be issued chiefly as a threat to the enemy.

Page  
2 of  
2/33

**SECRET**

Appended Table 1

STANDARD PRACTICES IN OFFENSIVE MINE WARFARE IN THE SOUTHERN AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI IKKI DAI) Operations.

SEA AREAS TO BE MINED	TYPE	FORCES TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	REMARKS
PHILIPPINES Area	Area outside MANILA Bay	X-1 - X-6 X-6 - X-6 (second stage)	One submarine from Subcom 6 (second stage)	To hinder passage of enemy vessels.
	BALABAC Straits	X-2 - X-10 X-6 - X-10	One submarine from Subcom 6 (first stage) One submarine from Subcom 6 (second stage)	To hinder passage of enemy vessels.
	SAN REMADEXO Straits	X-3 - X-6	See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	1. To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers, or submarines. 2. Mooring cables will be strengthened to withstand strong tidal currents.
	SUBICAO Straits	X-3 - X-6	See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines.
	SULU Sea	X-10	See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	Mines will be laid according to the enemy situation and as decided by Submarine Force Commander.
	SIFUY Straits	X-10	See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	Approximately 300
	PANLARAN Straits	X-10	See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	Approximately 300
	JINGAPORE Straits	X-1 - X-12 about X-12	Two submarines of Subcom 6 (first stage) One submarine of Subcom 6 (second stage)	Approximately 130
	MALAY Area	X-1 - X-10 about X-10	One mine layer of 9 Base Force	Approximately 600
	MALAYA Channel JESSELTON CUTIVAS	X-1 - X-11 about X-11	Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17	Approximately 650
BORNEO Area				To hinder passage of enemy cruisers, destroyers or submarines.

SECRET

Page  
273  
2/73

Appendix Table 1 (Continued)

STANDARD PRACTICES IN OFFENSIVE MINE WARFARE IN THE SOUTHERN  
AREA OF OPERATIONS

## b. Second Period (DAI XI LI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

SEA AREAS TO BE MINED	TIME	FORCES TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	REMARKS
North entrance to SONDARAJA	About X 425	Submarines from Subdon 6	Approximately 40	Aimed at light crafters and other vessels of similar and shallower draughts.
Entrance to SINGAPORE Straits and sea area south of MALAYA		One mine layer of 9 Base Force Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17	Approximately 500	1. To prevent enemy passage. 2. To intensify mine warfare of First Period (DAI ICHI) Operations.

## c. During and after Third Period (DAI ICHI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

SEA AREAS TO BE MINED	TIME	FORCES TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	REMARKS
PORT DARWIN	As quickly as possible	Mine Layers of Mine Layer Div 17	300	To hinder passage by the enemy.
Important points in AUSTRALIA	As soon as opportunities present themselves	One or two submarines from Subdon 6 One mine layer from Mine Layer Div 17	Suitable numbers	1. To hinder passage by the enemy. 2. Type 63 mines will be laid.
BALSOON COLOMBO CORDAI INDIAN OCEAN	As soon as possible after occupation of SINGAPORE	One or two submarines from Subdon 6	Suitable numbers	1. To hinder passage by the enemy. 2. Type 63 mines will be laid.

**SECRET**  
 2/26  
 2/27  
 2/28

Approved Page 1

(STANDARD) SUMMARY OF SITES TO BE PROTECTED BY MINES AND  
 ANTISUBMARINE NETS

AREAS TO BE MINED	OBJECT	TIME	FORCES TO BE USED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	ANTISUBMARINE NETS
LEGUATES OULP	To prevent entry by enemy submarines	At time of landing	2 Base Force	Approximately 900	As suitable
RAMOH OULP	"	"	1 Base Force	Approximately 300	"
DAVAO (DUMANGUILLAS Bay as conditions require)	"	As quickly as possible		Approximately 500	"
MANTILA Bay	"	"	One element of 2 Base Force	Approximately 900	"
GAMBANG Bay	"	To be completed before outbreak of war	9 Base Force	600	
ZARAKAN	"	Immediately after invasion	1 Base Force and See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	200	
BALICAPAN	"	"		300	
MAGASSAR	To prevent entry by enemy submarines	"		300	As suitable
SCORABAJA	"	"		1,000	
AMBON and KUPANG	"	"		300	
BASAVIA	"	"	2 Base Force	600	
SUTERA Straits	To hinder passage by the enemy	"	See 2 of Mine Layer Div 17	750	
Area outside SINGAPORE Bay	To prevent entry by enemy submarines	Immediately after landing	9 Base Force and Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17	900	As suitable
MALACCA Straits	To hinder passage by the enemy	"		400	

SECRET

Page  
2/38  
2/39

## Appended Table 1

## SUMMARY OF MINE AND ANTISUBMARINE SUPPLIES

SUPPLY BASES	SUPPLIES
MAKO	Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Type 88 Mines - approximately 220 (an additional 120 until about March 1942) Antisubmarine nets for 2 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set
PALAU	Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Antisubmarine nets for 1 Base Unit (KONKYOCHI) - one set

## Appended Table 2

## OUTLINE FOR ESTABLISHING MINE BARRIERS AT THE END OF SOUTHERN FIRST PHASE (ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS

When the southern First Phase (ICHI DAN) Operations end, mine barriers will be laid, as shown below. By making the SOUTH CHINA Sea safe, surface patrol will be facilitated. These operations will depend on special orders.

SEA AREAS TO BE MINED	NUMBER OF MINES TO BE LAID	FORCES TO BE USED	REMARKS
CARIMATA and CASPAR Straits	5,000	9 Base Force One element of Mine Layer Div 17	To prevent penetration by enemy submarines
SUNDA Straits	600	2 Base Force	To prevent penetration by enemy submarines First stage mine warfare will be intensified.
MALACCA Straits	1,000	9 Base Force	"

Page  
2/41

## F. Communications

**SECRET** Policy

Combined Fleet operational communications are based on Combined Fleet Wireless Communications Regulations and on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Communications in Southern Operations. In addition, they will conform to the following provisions.

## 2. Dispositions for communications

## a. Dispositions at the outbreak of war

Page  
2/42

Ship, submarine and airplane communications - Appended Table 1 (base) communications - Appended Table 2 (refer to appended chart)

These dispositions will be changed in the future to meet battle conditions. The respective force commanders will change the dispositions for submarine and airplane communications as needs arise.

b. Times for taking up assignments at the outbreak of war are as follows:

CLASSIFICATION	TIME	REMARKS
Communications Unit Communications	2400 hrs, I-8	After 2400 hrs, I-2 and until specially designated, 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet and Hainan Guard District will be in the ship communications system.
Ship Communications	2400 hrs,	
Submarine Communications	I-6	
Airplane Communications	2400 hrs, I-3	
Communications for Specially Designated Forces	By special orders	
Notes:		
1. For forces which must take up their assignments before the times set forth in this table, the respective force commanders will determine the time and report it to the proper authorities.		
2. In some cases, one element will take up its assignment at a time differing from that of the remainder of the force.		

## 3. Communications procedure

Page  
2/43

a. Broadcasting will be the principal means of communication within an operational force. Acknowledgment will be required when there is uncertainty concerning receipt of the message or when confirmation is required because the message is especially important.

Page  
2/44

b. Each force, at the direction of its commanding officer, will come into the short-range communications system of the nearest communications unit (TH Add "and into its broadcast communications system.")<sup>1</sup> (In cases of special necessity, it will come into the long-range communications system.) Communications dealing with transportation, supply, personnel and other communications not urgent from the standpoint of operations usually will come under this

<sup>1</sup>Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAKI WAN.

communications system. The Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces operating on special missions at great distances, when they set out from their rendezvous, will come under specially designated communications systems centered around the Tokyo Communications Unit (TOTSU).

Page  
2/45

c. All communications units will relay to the proper authorities communications of operational forces within their respective areas. Relay usually will be by broadcast, and acknowledgments will be required when confirmation of receipt is especially needed. Relays of messages classified urgent or higher will be broadcast immediately, other important messages at the times indicated in Paragraph d, below.

Page  
2/46

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	COMMUNICATIONS TO BE RELAYED
Tokyo Communications Unit	Communications of Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces under specially designated communications systems
Takao Communications Unit	Communications of submarine and airplanes under Southern Force
3rd Communications Unit	Communications of SubRon 5 and of airplanes based in PALAU within Southern Force
81st Communications Unit	Communications of airplanes and submarines operating in the SOUTH CHINA Sea Area
5th Communications Unit	Communications of submarines and airplanes under South Seas Force
6th Communications Unit	Communications of Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines
<b>Note:</b>	
Frequencies to be used in broadcasts will be as shown in d. When there is no danger of interfering with the operational communications of forces, frequencies of ships may be used.	

SECRET

4. All communications units will broadcast important dispatches dealing with operations in accordance with the following table. These assignments will use the broadcast facilities of this communication unit for communication with their respective areas. Such force will receive messages as prescribed by the force concerned.

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	PERIOD OF BROADCAST	BROADCASTING FREQUENCIES	MESSAGE
Tokyo Communications Unit (TOYO)	Overhaul	9,175 Kc (SP-18) 8,750 Kc (SP-13) 14,700 Kc (SP-16)	Directed to all operating forces: 1. Important communications originating with the Flight-13 Force. 2. Important communications originating with the Central (SE) Force. 3. General All-Units. Presumably Central Communications Unit.
	0,100-1,600 Beginning at 30 minutes past each odd hour	1,700 Kc	Communications, as above, directed to advanced expeditionary (AMEMB) submarines
	0,600-1,800 Beginning at 30 minutes past each even hour		Communications, as above, directed to Subdiv 3 and Subdiv 5
Shanghai Communications Unit (SHANGHAI)	Overhaul	7,125 Kc (SP-17) 14,100 Kc (SP-16)	Important communications dealing with operations directed to Southern Force
	20 minute intervals beginning at 15 minutes past each hour	Frequencies used by Subdiv 5 and Subdiv 6	Important communications directed to submarine forces of Southern Force
Jin Communications Unit (JIN)	Beginning at 30 minutes past each hour	7,800 Kc (SP-13) 14,560 Kc (SP-16)	Important communications dealing with operations directed to Northern Area Force of Southern Force
Kait Communications Unit (KAIT)	Beginning at 15 minutes past each hour	7,325 Kc (SP-17) 14,650 Kc (SP-16)	Important communications dealing with operations directed to South C.C. Area Force
Jin Communications Unit (JIN)	20 minute intervals beginning at 15 minutes past each hour	Frequencies used by Subdiv 4	Important communications directed to submarines of Subdiv 4
Jin Communications Unit (JIN)	Beginning at 15 minutes past each hour	8,860 Kc (SP-16) 9,120 Kc (SP-18)	Important communications directed to South Seas Force and to forces operating in the SOUTH SEAS
San Communications Unit (SAN)	Beginning at 15 minutes past each hour	5,900 Kc (SP-13) 11,900 Kc (SP-12)	Important communications directed to South Seas Force and to Advanced Expeditionary Force (AMEMB 2021)

Notes:

1. All communications units will relay broadcast Tokyo Communications Unit shortwave broadcast communications.
2. After 1-2 broadcast communications will be given per minute numbers.
3. Acknowledgment will be sent in cases of special necessity. (In these cases, acknowledgments will be sent 15 minutes after transmission has been completed and by the method used for exchange of strategic information.)
4. Tokyo Communications Unit (TOYO) and Shanghai Communications Unit (SHANGHAI) will broadcast as prescribed frequencies. Other units will transmit on one frequency at night, and between 1000 and 1600 hours, depending on circumstances, they will make unclassified use of their surplus frequencies.
5. As the situation demands, times of broadcast may be changed in accordance with requests or as directed by the commanding officers of the forces operating in the respective areas.
6. Slight changes in broadcasting frequencies may be made by the communication units in accordance with needs. (In such cases the proper authorities will be notified in advance.)

Note: The symbol "L" indicates on exact SHANGHAI transmission of the original table.

TOP SECRET



Page  
2/49

e. When the Main Body is in the homeland area, transmission from the flagship of Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet will control the transmission facilities of the Tokyo and Kure Communications Units (TÔTSU, KURETSU), or the Tokyo Communications Unit (TÔTSU) will be assigned this work.

f. Communications outside the fleets

Except in cases of special urgency, communications will be effected by means of the communications system through the nearest communications unit.

Page  
2/50

4. Safeguarding communications

a. Safeguarding frequencies

Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 177, Standard Control of Frequencies Used During Operations, will be applied.

b. Safeguarding messages

(1) Code tables and call signs to be used are given as follows: Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 171, Use of Codes; Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 52, Table of Combined Fleet Special Wartime Call Signs; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 169, Abbreviated Call Signs for Exchange of Strategic Information; Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 179, Table of Symbols Indicating Emergency Classifications for Special Combined Fleet Communications.

Page  
2/51

(2) Methods of safeguarding and distinguishing deceptive dispatches: Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 49, Methods of Safeguarding and Distinguishing Deceptive Dispatches.

(3) Method of indicating dates: Combined Fleet Standing Order 51, Table of Combined Fleet Special Abbreviations for Dates.

TOP SECRET  
2/52  
2/53

(4) Methods for indicating place names are as follows:

ALPHABET SYSTEM	ALPHABETIC VALUES	KEY SYMBOLS	USE
Method 1 for indicating place names	CHINE* 1	NAVY Military Most Secret Serial 147, Abbreviated Code Table. This table will be used in accordance with what is prescribed in Abbreviated Code for Operational Communications and in Code Book 0.	Used for urgent ship and airplane communications
Method 2 for indicating place names	CHINE* 2	Those prescribed in ED and OFSU abbreviated codes for naval operational abbreviations and in Code Book 0.	
Method 3 for indicating place names	CHINE* 3		
Method 4 for indicating place names	CHINE* 4		
Method 5 for indicating place names	CHINE* 5	NAVY Military Top Secret Serial 585, Regulations for the Use of Pacific Ocean Military Place Maps; and Navy Military Top Secret Serial 347, Pacific Ocean Military Place Maps.	Used in general operations and in daily communications
Method 6 for indicating place names	CHINE* 6	NAVY Military Most Secret Serial 147, Abbreviated Code Table. (The use of code tables will be as shown in the notes.)	Used in airplane communications
Method 7 for indicating place names	CHINE* 7	In accordance with Naval General Staff Military Top Secret Serial 123, Regulations for the Use of Pacific Ocean Special Military Place Maps and Special Military Maps.	1. Used in Joint Army-Navy operations 2. Used in landward engagements
Method 8 for indicating place names	CHINE* 8	NAVY Military Most Secret Serial 165, Chart Indicating Protected Commerce Sector 9.	Used in protecting commerce
Method 9 for indicating place names	CHINE* 9	Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 175, Combined Fleet Emergency Maritime Method for Indicating Places.	Emergency use of CHINE* 9; used on special orders
Method 10 for indicating place names	CHINE* 10	Naval General Staff Military Most Secret Serial 144, Abbreviated Code Table for Specially Designated Places.	Used to indicate places in messages
Method 11 for indicating place names	CHINE* 11	Combined Fleet Abbreviated Code Table for Emergency Military Place Names.	Emergency use of CHINE* 10; used on special orders

Note: Use of Navy Military Most Secret Serial 167, Naval Aviation Military Place Code Tables

Derivates Used
A From the 1st to the 15th of odd-numbered months
B From the 16th to the end of odd-numbered months
C From the 1st to the 15th of even-numbered months
D From the 16th to the end of even-numbered months
E Reserves (Depending on special orders)

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

Page  
2/53 **SECRET**

## 5. Utilising and interfering with enemy communications

## a. Utilising enemy communications

(1) Intercept squads attached to each fleet will utilise enemy communications as directed by the commanders in chief of the respective fleets.

(2) Intercept squads attached to communications units will be assigned to utilisation of enemy communications in accordance with the following:

Page  
2/54  
2/55

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	OUTLINE
Tokyo Communications Unit	<p>The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of the American home fleet and airplanes; also on movements of Russian forces.</p> <p>Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit.</p>
Takao Communications Unit	<p>1. The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of American, British and Dutch fleets and airplanes in the FAR EAST.</p> <p>Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit.</p> <p>2. Depending on conditions, one element will come under the command of Commander in Chief, 11th Air Fleet.</p> <p>3. As the southern operations progress, it will proceed to occupied sectors whenever suitable.</p>
Other Communications Units	<p>Under direction of Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit, they will gather operational information.</p>

b. Interference with enemy communications will be directed by the force commanders, except in cases of special orders. Each force commander (Commanding officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit), whenever conditions are favorable, will direct communications units in the area (subordinate communications units) to obstruct enemy communications.

**SECRET**Appended Table 1Page  
2/57

## SHIP, AIRPLANE AND SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM	COMMUNICATIONS DISPOSITION	REMARKS
Ship Communications	<p>Strategic Communications 2 (2 SETSUHA*)</p> <p>Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN*)</p> <p>Communication Classification 2 (2 KUN*) (Fleet or force co-ordinated communications)</p>	<p>1. Flagship communications system frequencies used mainly by the flagship of the commander in chief of each fleet and by the flagship of specially established squadrons.</p> <p>2. Ordinary short wave is used by the flagship of the commanding officer of a squadron and when especially needed by ordinary vessels.</p> <p>3. Frequencies used in ship communications are mainly employed by Southern Force and those forces closely connected with it. Other forces use them for urgent communications. However, when the Combined Fleet is taking up interception (YŪGEKI) dispositions, their main use will no longer be restricted to the Southern Force.</p> <p>4. Southern Force communication classification is Classification 3.</p>
Airplane Communications	Frequency System 4 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (4 TEN*)	
Submarine Communications	Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN*)	The communications of Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines will be determined by the commanding officers of the Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI).
<p>Note:</p> <p>The use of day and night frequencies will conform with <u>Combined Fleet Wireless Regulations</u>, as well as with the following:</p> <p>In the main, night frequencies will be used. If reliability of communications cannot be expected of night frequencies only, day frequencies also will be used.</p>		

Page  
2/58

Note: The symbol \* indicated the exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

SECRET  
2/60  
2/61

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (BASE) COMMUNICATIONS

Appended Table 2

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM	ATTACHED SHIPS AND STATIONS	FREQUENCY COMMUNICATIONS FREQUENCY LOG			REMARKS
		ORDINARY	SUPPLEMENTARY	EXTRAORDINARY	
Communications System 1	Tokyo Communications Unit (TAKATSU) Tokyo Communications Unit (TOKYO)	5,590 (NA*4)	13,000 (NA*5)	7,480 (RE*7)	13,000 (NA*5) 15,180 (RE*7)
		3,010 (NA*3)	13,000 (NA*5) 7,590 (RE*5) 15,180 (RE*7)		
Communications System 2	2nd Communications Unit (TAKATSU) Tokyo Communications Unit (TOKYO)	5,760 (NA*3)	13,200 (NA*2)	7,760 (RE*7)	13,200 (NA*2) 15,200 (RE*7)
		13,200 (NA*2)	17,310 (NA*28) 7,155 (RE*7) 15,500 (RE*7)		
Communications System 3	3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU) 3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU) 3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU) 3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU)	4,745 (TO*17)	7,495 (NA*3)	7,495 (TO*17)	7,495 (TO*17) 8,510 (RE*8) 17,220 (RE*8)
		18,980 (TO*19)	7,315 (RE*7) 14,630 (RE*7)		
Communications System 4	3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU) 4th Communications Unit (TAKATSU) 5th Communications Unit (TAKATSU)	5,180 (NA*3)	7,920 (NA*2)	7,455 (NA*18)	7,455 (NA*18) 15,310 (NA*19)
		10,360 (NA*3)	17,880 (NA*3) 7,455 (NA*18) 15,310 (NA*19)		
Communications System 5	Hainan Communications Unit (HAINANSU) 3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU)	7,010 (RE*7)	6,260 (RE*6)	7,010 (RE*7)	6,260 (RE*6) 15,520 (RE*6)
		14,020 (RE*7)	12,520 (RE*6)		
Communications System 6	Choshi Film Communications Unit (CHOSHIFILM) 3rd Communications Unit (TAKATSU) Marous Island	5,725 (RE*14)	9,850 (RE*4)	5,725 (RE*14)	5,725 (RE*14) 11,450 (RE*15) 9,850 (RE*4)
		11,450 (RE*15)	9,850 (RE*4)		
Communications System 7	Daito Communications Unit (DAITOU) Tokyo Communications Unit (TOKYO) Tokosaka Communications Unit (TOKOSAKA) Tokosaka Communications Unit (TOKOSAKA) Chinal Communications Unit (CHINALSU)	5,925 (YO*17)	6,300 (TAN*23)	5,925 (YO*17)	6,300 (TAN*23) 12,600 (TAN*23) 11,850 (TO*18) 12,600 (TAN*23)
		11,850 (TO*18)	12,600 (TAN*23)		
Communications System 8	Daito Communications Unit (DAITOU) Tokyo Communications Unit (TOKYO) Matsushima Communications Unit (MATSUMISHIMA) Chinal Communications Unit (CHINALSU)	4,320 (NA*11)	6,695 (O*25)	6,695 (O*25)	6,695 (O*25) 13,390 (O*26)
		8,540 (NA*12)	13,390 (O*26)		
Communications System 9	Wakana Communications Unit (WAKANA) Daito Communications Unit (DAITOU) Tokyo Communications Unit (TOKYO) Hokkaido Communications Unit (HOKKAIDO) Matsushima Communications Unit (MATSUMISHIMA) Matsushima Communications Unit (MATSUMISHIMA)	4,175 (O*11)	4,717.5 (TAN*21)	4,175 (O*11)	4,717.5 (TAN*21) 9,435 (TAN*21)
		9,435 (TAN*21)	4,717.5 (TAN*21)		

Editor's Note: The frequencies for Communications System 5 have been corrected in accordance with above sheet No. 5, "Prints" issued by File, Secretary. Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Post 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the UJAGATO, SAKI WAN.

Editor's Note: Correction derived from same source.

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact RQNAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

These entries are established in accordance with special orders.

**SECRET**Appendix Table 2 (Continued)

## Notes:

1. The times of communications will be as usual unless specially determined.

2. When sending and receiving conditions between ships and stations in the same system are poor, an intermediate communications unit will be responsible for relay.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, Disposition 1 will be used. Subsequent alterations in dispositions or frequencies will be as prescribed by the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Communication Unit.

4. Communications unit (base) communications in occupied territories, except where specially determined, will be as prescribed by the commanding officer of each force.

## 5. Reserve frequencies

5,085 (TA\*14)  
 10,170 (TA\*15)  
 5,325 (TO\*23)  
 10,650 (TO\*24)  
 5,225 (SA\*25)  
 10,450 (SA\*26)  
 4,205 (HO\*71)  
 8,410 (HO\*72)  
 16,820 (HO\*73)  
 4,030 (RE\*11)  
 8,060 (RE\*12)  
 16,120 (RE\*13)  
 6,820 (TO\*51)  
 13,040 (TO\*48)  
 4,665 (SA\*14)  
 9,330 (SA\*15)  
 18,660 (SA\*16)  
 6,150 (TO\*43)  
 12,300 (TO\*44)


Page  
2/62

---

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJJ transliteration of the original KANA.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Approved: [ ]

CONNECTIONS BETWEEN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS (SARNS) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS



(X) Best tracking from the original document.)

(X) Translation of conventional signs and abbreviations.

<input type="checkbox"/> 41P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 1 Air Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 3 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> 41P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 11 Air Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 1 Fleet
<input type="checkbox"/> 5P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 5 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 5 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> 5P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 5 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 7 Fleet
<input type="checkbox"/> 3P	<input type="checkbox"/> Com Subzone	<input type="checkbox"/> Com Subzone	<input type="checkbox"/> 3P	<input type="checkbox"/> Com Subzone	<input type="checkbox"/> Com Subzone
<input type="checkbox"/> 5P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 2 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> 5P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet
<input type="checkbox"/> 4P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> 4P	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet	<input type="checkbox"/> CIAC 6 Fleet

**SECRET**Page  
2/65

## G. Supply

## 1. Supply policy

a. Generally, each ship will replenish its fuel when it falls below 60% of capacity. If battle is anticipated, however, every effort will be made to maintain capacity.

b. Ordnance, ammunition, bombs, rations and stores will be replenished to capacity at every opportunity.

## 2. Outline of supply

a. The allotment of bases of operations for the initial period of operations is established generally as follows:

4th Fleet, 5th Fleet, 6th Fleet - YOKOSUKA

Page  
2/66

1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, forces attached to Combined Fleet - KURE

11th Air Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 3rd Fleet - SASEBO

b. The allotment of bases of operations and supply points to the supply vessels attached to each force is established generally as follows:

Main Body, Striking Force, Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), South Seas Force - YOKOSUKA, KURE and vicinity

Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASEBO and vicinity

Northern Force - YOKOSUKA, OGINATO and vicinity

Commerce Destruction Unit - any suitable place

Page  
2/67

c. The allotment of supply bases is established generally as follows:

Northern Force - PARAMUSHIRO, AKKESHI, WAKKANAI, CHICHII JIMA, MARCUS Island

South Seas Force ) SAIPAN, ENAJALEIN,  
Advanced Expeditionary ) WOTJE, JALUIT,  
Force (SENKEN BUTAI) )  
TARQA, TRUK, PONAPE, PALAU (Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter)

Southern Force - PALAU (until First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations have ended), SAIGON, CAMBANG

The initial full allowance for supply bases and special supply points is as determined in Appended Table 1.

Page  
2/68

d. As the operation develops, special supply points (special stores department and special air depot) will be set up in occupied areas. They will be under the direction of the commanding officer of the forces in such areas. The following



locations have been chosen:

- (1) DAVAO
- (2) TARAKEM
- (3) BALIKPAPAN
- (4) MANILA
- (5) MAKASSAR
- (6) SOERABAJA
- (7) SINGAPORE
- (8) BATAVIA
- (9) PENANG

Page  
2/69

e. The various forces will be supplied by supply ships attached to them.

f. If possible, supply bases will not be used to supply other than airplanes and small vessels. In particular, except in unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to replenish stocks of supply ships.

g. Supplies and stores for forces which have advanced into captured areas will be unloaded and transported by base forces (KONKYOCHI) (IN "Base forces" changed to "special stores department.")<sup>1</sup> in cooperation with forces in the area.

Page  
2/70

h. When several forces are to be supplied at the same time, the senior commanding officer present will determine priority.

i. The assignment of supply ships is given in Appended Table 2.

j. The rendezvous and subsequent movements of supply ships attached to the Combined Fleet are given in Appended Table 3.

### 3. Important supply matters

a. As shown in Appended Table 5, the Combined Fleet Supply Dept will direct the over-all planning of supply for the Combined Fleet and will keep in contact with Imperial General Headquarters and each base of operations.

Page  
2/71

b. The organization of the supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will be determined by the respective force (or fleet) commander. The supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will supply the various forces (fleets) and will maintain contact with Combined Fleet Supply Dept, each base of operations and supply points.

c. When a force is supplied by a supply ship attached to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a report will be sent to the commanding officer of the force to which the ship is attached or to the commanding officer of the supply base.

d. When the commanding officer of the supply base furnishes considerable quantities and supplies to surface forces other than those for which he is responsible, he will submit a report on current stocks to Imperial General Headquarters, the commanding officer of the base of operations and Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

---

<sup>1</sup> Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI WAN.

**SECRET**Page  
2/72

e. When the force commander concerned finds it necessary to change the initial full allowance of the supply base or special supply point, he will make a report to Imperial General Headquarters and Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet and will notify the commanding officer of the base of operations. Each month reports and notices will be submitted in this manner concerning quantities necessary to replenish stocks.

f. Commanding officers of supply bases and officers in charge of special supply points will maintain a current inventory of stocks and requisition necessary items from the base of operations, taking into consideration stocks carried by the latter.

g. Force commanders (or commanders in chief of fleets) will indicate the quantities and types of military stores which must be carried on the supply ships. When supply ships are directed to a base of operations or to a supply point in order to restock, they will notify the commanding officer of the base (TM Add "or supply point.")<sup>1</sup> regarding time of arrival and quantities and types of material required.

Page  
2/73

h. When stores on supply ships have to be replenished or supplemented, the force commander (or fleet commander in chief) concerned will submit a report immediately to Imperial General Headquarters and to Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

i. Each force commander (or fleet commander in chief) will secure from the commanding officer of the base of operations the necessary information about the movements of and the types and quantities of material carried by supply ships which are dispatched as replacements or additions from the base of operations or supply base to the force (or fleet).

## 4. Replenishment of supply ships and supply bases

Page  
2/74

a. Supply will be carried out in such a manner that the various supply ships will not have to be restocked at one time. Supply ships will be restocked one at a time at a supply base or base of operations.

b. Supply bases and special supply points usually will be restocked by Imperial General Headquarters or the commanding officer of the base of operations.

Special orders will be issued to affect co-operation of supply ships of a force (or fleet).

The monthly replenishment allowances for supply bases and special supply points are given in Appended Table 4.

Page  
2/75

## 5. Protection of ships

When supply ships are to be dispatched, the force commander (fleet commander in chief) concerned will furnish suitable protection by forming a convoy, charting the course and providing escort. Supply ships attached to the base of operations will be protected in like manner.

<sup>1</sup>Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultra Secret Serial 1 Part 93, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAGATO, SABEI WAN.

Page

2/76

SECRET  
Appendix Table 3 (Substituted for previous page)

## INITIAL FUEL ALLOWANCES FOR SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

SUPPLY BASES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS	HEAVY OIL (METRIC TONS)		GALLONS OF AVIATION FUEL (GALILEAN TONS)	AVIATION FUEL (GALILEAN TONS)		ORDINARY BOMBS		LAND BOMBS		MACHETS AND AMMUNITION		PROVISIONS
	BOILER OIL	HEAVY OIL		79	87	80, 50'	25	6	80, 50'	25	6	
PERAMBURGO			300	250								
ARKISBEI	5,000	5,000	1,100	1,000								
WAKARAI	3,000	3,000	100	100								
CHICH JDA		300		100								
MARCS ISLAND				500								
SALPA	30,000	2,000	10,000	4,000	3,500	30	200	150	0	100	680	50,000
ENJALIN (RUOTOV*)			2,500	100	100	27	110	1,200	54	70	430	7,000
WOTZE			3,000	1,500	167	110	1,300	70	70	650		
JALIT (LIENTJ)		5,000		2,000	500	110	440	70	220			
TALCA			500	800								
TRUC		2,000	5,000	1,500	1,200		250	1,000		500	1,500	1,000,000
PONAYE		2,000	3,000	800	100							
PALAU	10,000	1,500	6,000	4,000	2,000	126	240	1,080	120	350	2,300	550,000
SAMA			1,000	2,000								
SALON on vicinity			6,000	4,000								
CAMPARI			1,000	1,000			200					
X (MANILA)				500	500							
X (ONWAO)				1,000	1,000							
X (TABAKAN)				1,000	1,000							
O MAKU	62,000	6,000	70,000	1,000	1,000							
O TALEAO	10,000	1,000	20,000	2,000	2,000							

3 months' supply of rations

Part of the necessary replacements for Southern Force air force

Necessary replacements for Southern Force

## Notes:

1. Ammunition and torpedoes are to be loaded on munition ships.
2. Mines will be handled as set for in Mining Operations, Appendix Table 3 (See Above.).
3. X indicates places where special supply points are to be established.
4. O indicates supply points whose capacity must be increased.
4. Explosive supplies like fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
5. As MAKU and TALEAO one month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be prepared (MAKU - air purifying material 18,000, oxygen 1,600; TALEAO - air purifying material 30,000, oxygen 3,600).

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

SECRET  
Approved 2/24/51

## INITIAL FY02 ALLOWANCES FOR SUPPLY BASEL AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

REFUEL BARRAGE AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS	HEAVY OIL (REFUEL POINT)	AVIATION FUEL (REFUEL POINT)	COAL (REFUEL POINT)	AMMUNITION (BARRELS)	FOODS (BARRELS)	SUPPLY POINTS	ITEMS	QUANTITIES FOR SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS
PARALLEL	ROLLIN OIL	HEAVY OIL	(TONS)	(TONS)	(BARRELS)			
ATKINS	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000				2,000
BARKLEY	3,000	3,000	500	2,000				2,000
CHICK JIMA	1,000	3,000	100	2,000				1,000
HANSON ISLAND			100					1,000
HALEPHE	10,000	2,000	3,000	5,000	\$ 6 1,000 \$ 25 100 \$ 50 50			5,000
HAJALKE (BOSTON)		2,000	1,500		2,000	AIR 100		5,000
WYCK		2,500	800		2,000			3,000
JAGREY (TERRAP)	5,000	2,000	1,500	5,000	1,000			3,000
PARA	80,000	1,000	300		500			1,000
THRE		1,000	2,500	1,000	3,000	AIR 100 MIS 30		8,000
PHOENIX	1,500	1,000	500	8,000	500			1,000
PARAD	10,000	2,000	2,500	10,000	5,000	AIR 30 MIS 50		10,000
PARA			8,000	2,000	1,000			3,000
SALON and vicinity			6,000	5,000	5,000			5,000
OSMAN and vicinity			1,000	2,000	3,000			5,000
X (MUTUAL)			1,000	1,000	1,000			5,000
X (MUTUAL)			3,000	3,000	3,000			5,000
X (MUTUAL)			3,000	3,000	3,000			5,000
X (MUTUAL)			3,000	3,000	3,000			5,000
O MARS	60,000	10,000	1,000	100,000	10,000	AIR 20 MIS 50		10,000
O MARS					1,000			10,000
O MARS					10,000	AIR 100 MIS 100		10,000
O MARS	10,000	1,000	3,000	80,000	5,000			180,000

Doc  
8/77  
8/78  
**SECRET**  
Approved Public (Continued)

Notes:

1. 50% of the ammunition will be 12.7-mm dual purpose gun shells. The rest will be shells for all types of medium and small caliber guns.
2. 35 of the bombs will be M6, 25% M6 25 and 75% M6 6. All EXHAUSTS approximately equal quantities of M6 60, M6 25 and M6 6 bombs will be held.
3. X indicates supply points for which supplies must be prepared beforehand so that they can be immediately forwarded to them.
4. O indicates supply points where initially prepared allowances must be increased.
5. All such base expendable supplies used for movement like fuel (heavy oil, coal, aviation fuel) will be prepared.
6. Air material will be replenished initially by reserve airplanes.
7. Substitute air purifying material will be prepared at CAMBANG (4,000) (SM Unit not stated.) and at EXHAUSTS (10,000). Enough up to 10% of these amounts will also be prepared.
8. 4,000 mines will be distributed in SOUTH BANG Area (will be carried by each ship).
9. M depth charges will be included in the land stores in the SOUTH BANG Area, but 1,000 can be furnished ashore.

---

Note: The symbol X indicates an exact EXHAUST transmission of the original EXHA.

**SECRET**  
Approved for Release by NSA on 05-08-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

Page 2/79  
2/80

DISPOSITION OF SUPPLY SHIPS FOR FIRST PERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIONS

FORCE	Striking Force	Advance Expeditionary Force (SHIMIZU TOTAL)	South Seas Force	Southern Force	Farther Force	Supply Force	TOTAL
NAVIGATION SHIPS	HIKICHO MARU	ARATAMA MARU [HITACHI MARU]	[YASUOYAKI MARU]	KOTO MARI OHRO MARU YASUKAKI MARU [HISSEN MARU]		KIHO MARU [HICHI MARU]	10
WATER TANKERS			TAKE YAMA MARU No 1 AMARUO MARU DUBOYAS MARU [MAYO MARU]	KOAE MARU OGOTO MARU [ASAYAMA MARU] [KISOGAWA MARU]			5
STORKS SHIPS	HOKO MARU	No 2 SHITO MARU	IGA MARU OHGOTO MARU OHITO MARU HOKKAI MARU HARUNA MARU	KOSHI MARU, SUMIYA MARU, KAKUMI MARU, KITAGAMI MARU, No 2 BANSHU MARU, No 2 BANSHU MARU, (OI MARU), [BANSHU MARU], (OI MARU), [HIRATO MARU], SENDAI MARU	CHOKO MARU	MANITA MARU No 3 BANSHU MARU	19
OTHERS	SHIRIYA MARU KIOGOTO MARU KINTO MARU SHIPPON MARU SHIKIGUO MARU IKIGUO MARU TORO MARU AKIBONO MARU No 2 KIHOI MARU	IFUO MARU TOA MARU [FUJISAN MARU]	SEIKO MARU KOTO MARU KALJO MARU KIHOI MARU	HAYATOMO ERIMO SABU CLARENCE MARU [SHITO MARU] [OHITO MARU] [HICHIKI MARU] [AMAGISAN MARU] [HANA MARU] [HICHIKOKI MARU] [TORO MARU] [No 5 HIHO MARU]		HARUTO YOSHIMI [HISHI MARU] No 2 HISHI MARU (including also No 2 HISHI MARU usually also carrying aviation gasoline.)	22
COLLECTOR OTHERS		SHIBUFUKU No 6 SHIRIKI MARU MARIANO MARU [HARIBO MARU] [MARIKAN MARU]	SHIBUFUKU No 6 SHIRIKI MARU MARIANO MARU [HARIBO MARU] [MARIKAN MARU]	KODOGAWA MARU AKAZI MARU [KOSHI MARU] [TORIYU MARU]	HIRASU MARU	KOTO MARU	11
MISCELLANEOUS AUXILIARIES		KINTO MARU YAMAGUCHI MARU	SHIRO MARU [YASUO MARU]	SHIRO MARU [YASUO MARU]	AKABITSAN MARU	OKITSU MARU	6
TOTAL	12	6	21	34	3	10	86

Note: # denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline. (The brackets were parentheses in original.)

SECRET

Page 2/61  
2/62  
Amended Exhibit 2, Part I

SECOND PERIOD (DAI NI KI) OPERATIONS AND THERIAFTERS

PODS	Striking Force	Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENKON BUTAI)	South Seas Force	Southern Force	Northern Force	Supply Force	TOTAL
MONITORING SHIPS	SHIGURO MARU	ARAYAMA MARU SHIRAGI MARU	ZAFUJIKI MARU	KOOTO MARU, ONOS MARU, YASUKAWA MARU FUJISAKI MARU		MIKI MARU FICHI MARU	10
BATER TANKERS			YASUTAMA MARU No 1, ANAKAWA MARU DAICHOAN MARU YATO MARU	KOAE MARU OKIYU MARU ARAYAMA MARU KIKOJIMA MARU			6
STORERS SHIPS	HOKKO MARU	No 2 HIRATO MARU	KOA MARU CHIKUBI MARU OKIYO MARU KOKIYAI MARU KAMURA MARU	KOKI MARU, SUKOOA MARU, KAKUREI MARU, KIRAJANI MARU, SHINDAI MARU, No 2 MARU, No 5, MARU MARU, OI MARU, HIRATO MARU	CHIKO MARU	NAMITA MARU No 3 MARU MARU	19
GENERALS	KYOGYO MARU HIRATO MARU HIPPON MARU No 2 KIYOI MARU	IRIYO MARU YOA MARU FUJISAKI MARU	SEIKIYO MARU MOTO MARU KAJJO MARU TOMO MARU MATSUMI MARU	KAYATONO, KIKINO, SAN CHUBETSU MARU, AOKI MARU, OKIYO MARU, FICHIKI MARU, KOKIYO MARU, FUKUJIMA MARU, SHIRAI MARU, FUJIKIYOKU MARU, No 5 HIRO MARU, KOKIYO MARU		NAKANO YASUDA SHIRATA SHIROKAWA MARU FUKI MARU MURAKAMI MARU No 2 HIRAI MARU	32 (including also 25) (28 Presumably also carrying aviation gasoline.)
COLLECTOR-OILERS			SEIENKOKU No 6 SEIKI MARU SARUKI MARU IRASHIRO MARU SARUKI MARU	YODOGAWA MARU AKIYAMA MARU KIKI MARU KOKIYO MARU	HIJIMA MARU	SOTO MARU	11
MISC. TANKERS ARTILLERY SHIPS			HIRATO MARU YAMAGATA MARU	SEIKO MARU KASOYA MARU	AKASHIRAN MARU	OKITSU MARU	6
TOTAL	6	6	22	36	3	13	66

Note: # denotes ships which transport aviation gasoline.





MEMORANDUM AND COMBINATION STATEMENTS OF SUPPLY SHIPS ATTACHED TO OCEANIC FLEET

**SECRET**  
Approved: 10/10/51

SHIP	FIRST DUTY		SECOND DUTY		NOTES	DESCRIPTION
	Supply	Body	Supply	Body		
REDELL MARU		Miscellaneous supply for Main Body	Miscellaneous supply for Southern Force			
ELIOS MARU		Miscellaneous supply for Main Body	Miscellaneous supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force		Second duty will be by special order	Western part of ILLAND Sea
MAKITA		Supplies supply for Main Body	Supplies supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force			
No. 9 BARRETT MARU						
MARUPO					Will leave KURE 17 Nov and load at ZALANT (load: heavy oil for boilers 5,000) - No. 1 Heavy Oil - 2,000). After filling tanks will sail at point Z (later course) from 2-day in Japan. After discharging supplies, will sail for KURE. After discharging supplies at KURE, will refuel and wait in readiness.	
TEIKOKU		Oil supply for Main Body	Oil supply for Southern Force, South Seas Force and Task Force		Will proceed to HAWAII and wait until 1 Dec (load: heavy oil for boilers - 5,000); No. 1 Heavy Oil - 1,000)	Western part of ILLAND Sea
ELIOS MARU					Will take on a full load of aviation oil gasoline at YOKOSUKA and arrive at ZALANT by 1 Dec. After discharging supplies, will refuel at YOKOSUKA and wait in readiness	
No. 2 BARRETT MARU					Will take on a full load of aviation oil gasoline and wait in readiness at KURE.	KURE
OKITSU MARU		Oil and coal supply for Main Body	Oil and coal supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force			
OKITSU MARU		Miscellaneous supplies - by Main Body	Miscellaneous supplies by Southern Force and South Seas Force		Second duty will be by special order	Western part of ILLAND Sea
SHIKITA MARU		Oil supply for Main Body (Special Period (10/10/51) Operations and Transport)	Oil supply for Southern Force (Special Period (10/10/51) Operations and Transport)			
SEIKEN MARU						
YUKI MARU						

Page  
2/87  
2/86  
~~SECRET~~  
Appendix

RENDEZVOUS AND SUBJECT MATTER END OF SUPPLY CHAINS ATTACHED TO COMBINED FLEET

SHIP	PRINCIPAL DUTY	DEPENDENT	RENDEZVOUS
NICHII MARU	Munitions supply for Main Body	Special orders	Western part of INLAND Sea
RIZU MARU	Reserve munitions supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force	"	"
MAMITA	Stores supply for Main Body. Reserve stores supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force.	"	"
No 3 BAKSHU MARU	Stores supply for Main Body. Reserve stores supply for Southern Force and South Seas Force	"	"
BARUTO	Reserve oiler for Iet Air Fleet until X plus 4. Afterward will be attached to Commerce Destruction Unit.	At the outbreak of hostilities will wait in readiness at the place designated by CINC Iet Air Fleet. After X plus 4 day will move as ordered by commanding officer of Commerce Destruction Unit.	South Seas Area; as directed by CINC Iet Air Fleet
TSUBOMI	Reserve oiler for Iet Air Fleet until X plus 4 Day. Subsequently reserve oiler in PALAU Area.	At the outbreak of war will wait in readiness at the point designated by CINC Iet Air Fleet. After X plus 4, will operate in the PALAU Area on special orders.	"
SHIRIYA (TN Subsequently deleted.)	Assigned to Midway Destruction Unit. Subsequently oiler for Main Body.	Will operate as directed by CINC Iet Air Fleet in First Period (DAI IXT) Operations. Thereafter, will operate in western part of INLAND Sea on special orders.	As directed by CINC Iet Air Fleet
HISHI MARU	Reserve oil supply (aviation gasoline) for South Seas Force	Special orders	YOKOSUKA
No 2 HISHI MARU	Reserve oil supply (aviation gasoline) for South Seas Force	"	SAGERO
SOTO MARU	Reserve oil and coal supply for Southern Force	"	"
KOYU MARU (TN Subsequently deleted.)	Reserve oil and coal supply for South Seas Force	"	Western part of INLAND Sea
OKITSU MARU	Reserve miscellaneous use by Southern Force	"	"

<sup>1</sup> Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the MAG-10, SA KI 454.

Page  
2/89

Second period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter will be the same as First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations, except for the following:

Striking Force	Oil Supply	KYOKUTO MARU KENYO MARU NIPPON MARU No. 2 KYUZEI MARU	Total 6
South Seas Force	"	Will add TOHO MARU	Total 22
Southern Force	"	Will add KUNOSHIO MARU KOKUYO MARU	Total 35 (TN Changed to 36) <sup>1</sup>
Supply Force	"	Will add SHINKOKU MARU, TOKI MARU (TN Insert SHIRIYA MARU.) <sup>1</sup>	Total 13 (TN Changed to 12.) <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard NAGATO, SABEL ATN.

## MONTHLY REPLACEMENT ALLOWANCES FOR SUPPLY BUSES AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINTS

TYPE (SUPPLY BASE AND SPECIAL SUPPLY POINT)	HEAVY OIL (GALVING TANK BOILER No 1 HEAVY OIL)	COAL (TONS)	AVIATION FUEL (KILOLITERS)	AMMUNITION (ROCKETS)	EXPLOSIVES (TRAMMERS)	MINES (TRAMMERS)	PREVIOUS MONTHS FOR . . . . . PERSONS PER MONTH
PARAMORONO			800				
AKESHI (18-sliding BIRMO and OUTTONG)	1,000		300				
MATEMAJ	1,000	300	100				
CEIGELJINA		300	200				
MAROUS (18-sliding)			300				
SAIPAS	2,000	500	Supply when needed				
EMJALIN (ROOTTO) *							
WOTTE		\$					
JALUIT (IMREPI) *	1,000	1,000	3,000	1,000	Supply amount used	Supply amount used	Supply amount used
TAROA							
TRUK	1,000						
FORMER	300		2,500	1,500	Supply amount used	Supply amount used	
FMALU	2,000	1,500	1,000	1,000	Supply amount used	Supply amount used	
SAICH (see vicinity OUTTONG)			Supply amount used				
X (MANILA)			Supply in part				
X (DAVAO)							
X (TABARAN)							
O MAIO	70,000	10,000	500	Amount Used by Southern Force	Amount Used by Southern Force	Amount Used by Southern Force	Amount Used by Southern Force
O TAILO	10,000	2,000	1,500	Amount Used by Southern Force	Amount Used by Southern Force	Amount Used by Southern Force	Amount Used by Southern Force

Note: One month's supply of air purifying material and oxygen will be sent to EMJALIN and MAIO.

\*Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact RO-11 transliteration of the original IDANA.

SECRET

Item No.	Item Name	Quantity	Unit Price	Total Price	Remarks	Remarks	Remarks
1	PARAFFIN	500					1,000
2	BITUMEN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
3	MAKABALI	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
4	MAKALITA	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
5	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
6	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
7	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
8	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
9	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
10	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
11	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
12	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
13	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
14	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
15	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
16	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
17	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
18	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
19	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
20	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
21	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
22	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
23	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
24	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
25	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
26	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
27	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
28	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
29	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
30	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
31	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
32	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
33	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
34	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
35	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
36	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
37	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
38	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
39	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
40	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
41	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
42	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
43	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
44	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
45	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
46	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
47	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
48	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
49	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000
50	MAKALAN	1,000	1,000	1,000			1,000

Notes:

- 50% of the commission will be 12.7 in each program etc.
- Unless the type of bomb is indicated, it will be the B-200.
- 0 indicates a supply point the quantity of which will be particularly increased.
- All supply points will be kept up to prescribed levels their supply of expendable materials such as fuel (heavy oil, emul, aviation fuel).
- Always material will be replenished at 100% in the South Sea area and at 100% in the Western area.
- Air purifying material for 2,000 (B-200) will be supplied by standard; 6,000 will be supplied to BAKALAN.
- In addition, oxygen, equal to 20% of the above amount, will be supplied.

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact BOMBI translation of the original BANA.


**SECRET**

Page 2/51

Appended Table 5

**ORGANIZATION OF SUPPLY FORCES OF COMBINED FLEET**

Editor's Note:  
This table included in portion of document comprising pages 2/125-151 inclusive which otherwise duplicates O. Supply. The duplicate pages are omitted.



**SECRET**Page  
2/96**H. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet****1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations**

a. These forces will strengthen the defense of strategic points, protect sea traffic and co-operate with the Combined Fleet or China Area Fleet in operations in the area in their charge.

b. Air forces and other necessary forces will be moved to the necessary places as conditions demand. They will be placed under the operational command of the commander in chief of the fleet concerned or of the commanding officer of the force at the naval station or auxiliary naval station in charge of the area concerned.

**2. Operations of CHINA Area Fleet**Page  
2/97

a. In general, the fleet will continue operations against CHINA with its present strength. It will annihilate land forces and wrest control from them.

b. At the outbreak of war the force of which 2ND CHINA Expeditionary Fleet is the nucleus will co-operate with the Army to occupy HONGKONG and annihilate enemy forces stationed there.

c. The defenses and security measures within the occupied areas will be strengthened and sea traffic along the CHINA coast will be protected. At the same time every effort will be made to deny the use of the CHINA coast to enemy ships and airplanes.

d. It will co-operate, as the occasion demands, with the Combined Fleet and Southern Army in escorting Army surface transports and in defending assembly points.

Page  
2/98**II. OPERATIONS OF THE COMBINED FLEET IN CASE WAR WITH RUSSIA BEGINS DURING THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS AND CHINA****A. Operation Policy**

1. The operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be modeled generally after the operation policy set forth in I.

2. The policy for operations against RUSSIA will be as follows:

a. In the event war breaks out during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

(1) For the most part, 5th Fleet and the homeland combat forces (NAISEN BUTAI) will be changed with defense. They will protect vital sea traffic along the coast of JAPAN and will protect strategic areas from air attack.

Page  
2/99

(2) Thereafter, as quickly as southern operations and operations against the American Fleet permit, elements of light forces and air forces will be diverted to operations against RUSSIA.

The operations described in the above paragraph thus will be strengthened.

**SECRET**Page  
2/99

b. In the event war breaks out after the completion of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.

The greater part of 5th Fleet and one element of the light forces will be shifted to operations against RUSSIA. The Russian fleet in the ORIENT will be immediately annihilated. Pressure will be brought to bear along the coast of Russian territory in the FAR EAST. In co-operation with the Army, these forces will destroy enemy air strength in the MARITIME Province and USSURI Province, and occupy VLADIVOSTOK and other strategic points in the FAR EAST.

Page  
2/100

B. Allocation of Forces.

Separate Table 6 (Will be sent later) (TN Missing.)

C. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations.

a. The naval stations at YOKOSUKA, KURE, SASEBO and MAIZURU and the auxiliary naval stations at OMINATO, CHINKAI and Port ARTHUR will strengthen security measures against Russian submarines and airplanes and will annihilate them if they appear in areas under their jurisdiction.

b. When the outer combat forces engage in active operations, air forces and other necessary forces will be transferred to the necessary points and will co-operate in these operations.

Page  
2/101

2. Operations of the China Area Fleet

The force which has I China Expeditionary Fleet and 3 China Expeditionary Fleet as its nucleus will cover the movements of the Army forces which will be diverted from central and northern CHINA. It will escort these forces during transport at sea and deploy suitably.

### III. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS

A. Time to be Used

Central standard time

B. Charts to be Used

Charts (charts of military places) to be used are as follows:

Page  
2/102

CHART (CHART OF MILITARY PLACES)	USE (ON SHIPS)
Navy Ultrasecret 347 Chart of Military Places in PACIFIC Ocean	For use in general operations (ships)
Special Chart of Military Places	1. For use in joint Army-Navy operations  2. For use in operations in narrow waters



**SECRET**Page  
2/102 Notes

Charts for general operations in the MALAY Area will be established separately. (TN This note subsequently has been deleted.)<sup>1</sup>

C. Identification of friendly and enemy forces

The identification of friendly and enemy forces will be based on Combined Fleet Doctrine and the following:

Identification between Navy ships and Japanese merchant shipping (including transports and ships attached to the Army) and between the various Army and Navy land installations (including forces) will be in accordance with Signal regulations for Identification of Japanese Ships in Warfare.

(TN Insert "but, in odd-numbered months method 1 will be followed, in even-numbered months method 2.")<sup>1</sup> (TN Add "Identification among airplanes will be based on the Joint Army-Navy Agreement Concerning Identification of Friendly Military Airplanes.")<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag secretary, Combined Fleet, as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, MAKI KAN.





SECRET

Appendix 1 (Continued)

## ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR FLEET PERIOD (DAI IKKI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS (From first preparations for war till the main army forces invading the PHILIPPINES have landed in the PHILIPPINES - 4 plus 20)

FORCES	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	DETAILS OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Northern Force	Cinc 5th Fleet	5th Fleet Kisarazu Airgroup CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit (TW Mine land attack planes from YOKO KD* added.) Three cargo ships	1. Will patrol and defend area in its charge. 2. Will patrol the route of the Striking Force and cover its withdrawal. 3. Will take security measures against HUBSIA.	1. Will operate in accordance with principal duty. 2. In Operation Method 1 against American Fleet, land attack planes from Kisarazu Airgroup will patrol the route of the Striking Force and cover its withdrawal. (Bases will be HOKKAIDO and MARCUS Island.)	As directed by commanding officer.
Supply Unit					
Commerce Destruction Unit	CO 24th Squadron (SERIAL)	24 One cargo ship	Will destroy sea traffic.	Will operate in accordance with the Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations.	NARUO GUYTO
Communications Force	CO 1 Combined Communications Unit	1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA) of 1 Combined Communications Unit	Operational communications. Communications intelligence.	Will operate according to F, "Communications."	The various pieces were stationed.
Attached Forces	Cinc 5th Fleet	Sec 2 of Gardiv 4 CHITODA SETTSU YAKAZE	Will be specially ordered.	Will be established separately.	Western part of INLAND SEA.
		11 transports (TW Changed to 11 transports.)	Will furnish supplies for operational forces.	Will operate according to G, "Supply."	

- Notes: 1. The assignment of supply ships will be based on Appended Table 2 of G, "Supply."  
 2. The patrol boundary line between Northern Force and South Seas Force will run east-west through MARCUS Island (which will be included in Northern Force area).  
 3. The operational boundary line between Southern Force and South Seas Force will be the boundary of BRITISH and DUTCH NEW GUINEA.  
 4. KI KD (TW Add "and" and land attack planes from YOKO KD.) will be under the operational command of Cinc Combined Fleet after I-Day.  
 5. The division of strength within the various forces may be changed appropriately.



SECRET  
2/104  
2/109

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PERIOD (DAI NI KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS  
(Up to about 100 when the landing of the main BRITISH MALT invasion force has been completed)

FORCE	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
		Destroyer 5 Submarine 4 One SubDiv of Submarine 6 AirFlot 22 36 attack planes ASAKI MURATO			
Supply Unit		35 train vessels			
Barbers Force	CinO 5 Fleet	5 Fleet KISARATSU Air Group CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit (CHICHIJIMA) Five train vessels			
Supply Unit		24 gpc One train vessel			
Commerce Destruction Unit	OO 24 Squadron (SEPPAI)				
Communications Force	OO 1 Combined Communication Unit	1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Commu- nications Unit) of 1 Combined Com- munications Unit	Continuation of First Period (DAI ICHI) Operations		
Attached Forces		See 2 of Cardiv 4 CHIYODA SEIYU (To inserted in inkr.) YAKAZE 13 transports			
Note			Same as for First Period (DAI ICHI) Operations		

Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

SECRET

SECRET

Page  
2/111  
2/112

Example Table 1

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD PERIOD (DAI SAN KE) OPERATIONS OF 71 ST FLEET (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS  
(Up to end of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

FORCE	COMMANDER OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Main Body		8th Div 1 Fleet (less 8th Div 3, CruDiv 6, Destroyer 1 except two Destroyers, Destroyer 3)			
Striking Force	6th Div 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet (less Car- Div 4) 8th Div 3 (less Sec 2) CruDiv 8, Destroyer 1 (less two Destroyers) Six train vessels	Continuation of Second Period (DAI NIKI) Operations		
Supply Unit					
Advanced Expeditionary Force	CINC 6 Fleet	6 Fleet Six transports			
Supply Unit					
South Seas Force	CINC 4 Fleet	4th Fleet CruDiv 6 JMSDF (23 Crossed etc.) 2 Units of 1 Combined Communications Unit 22 train vessels			
Supply Unit					
Southern Forces	CINC Combined Fleet	CruDiv 4 Two Destroyers of Des- Ron 4 CruDiv 4 (less Sec 2) 2 Reg of 8th Div 3 ASAFUEI ASAFI HANU Five battalions of special naval land- ing party Some fishing boats	1. Continuation of Second Period (DAI NIKI) Operations, exploiting battle successes 2. Covertly at sea and landing of the main Japs and Sumatra invasion forces 3. Disruption of traffic in the Straits of MALACCA and the area south of JAVA and SUMATRA		
Air Force		11 Air Fleet (less AirFleet 22 and 35 attack planes) Two battalions of special naval land- ing party			
Submarine Force		SubRon 4 SubRon 5 SubRon 6			
Netherlands Indies Force		3 Fleet (less one element) CruDiv 5 Destroyer 2 Destroyer 4 (less two destroyer divi- sions) AirFleet 11 Eight patrol craft			
Philippine Force		One element of 3 Fleet			
Malay Force		Southern Expeditionary CruDiv 7 Fleet Destroyer 3 AirFleet 22 36 attack planes ASAFI MUSAFU			
Supply Unit		35 train vessels			

SECRET

Page  
2/111  
2/112

## Separate Table 2 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD PERIOD (DAI SAN KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI ICHI DAN) OPERATIONS  
(Up to end of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

FORCE	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Northern Force	Cinc 5th Fleet	5th Fleet KISARATSU Air Group CHICHI JIMA Communi- cations Unit (CHI- CHITSU) Five transports			
		CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI)			
Commerce Destruction Unit	Cinc Combined Fleet	24 S** One train vessel		Continuation of Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations	
Communications Force		1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit.) of 1 Com- bined Communications Unit			
Attached Forces		Sec 2 of Cardiv 4 SETTSU CHITODA YAKAZE 13 train vessels			
Notes	Combined with First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations				

Note: The symbol \*\* after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

47



SECRET

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THE PHILIPPINE (TOZUKI)

Force Commander	Principal Unit	Allocation in Preparation for Decisive Action - 1 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)	Allocation in Preparation for Decisive Action - 2 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)	Allocation in Preparation for Decisive Action - 3 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)
Main Body	C1AF 5th Fleet	1. Support of the main body of the KALANAN and the entire operation supported. Depending on the situation, appropriate time. CHIVODA AIRFLIGHT 11	Strength 5th Fleet 1st Fleet (Less 5th Fleet) 5th Fleet CHIVODA AIRFLIGHT 11	Strength 5th Fleet 1st Fleet (Less 5th Fleet) 5th Fleet CHIVODA AIRFLIGHT 11
Minimum Force	C1AF 5th Fleet	1. Location and destroy- ing enemy (low- signal) force. 2. Decisive action.	2nd Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet	2nd Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet 5th Fleet
South Force	C1AF 5th Fleet	1. Detection and patrol of any ac- tions of the enemy in the area in its charge. 2. Location and destroy- ing enemy (low- signal) force. 3. Decisive action.	4th Fleet Subdiv 4 Subdiv 5	4th Fleet Subdiv 4 Subdiv 5
Northern Force	C1AF 5th Fleet	1. Defense and patrol of any ac- tions of the enemy in its charge. 2. Location and destroy- ing enemy (low- signal) force. 3. Decisive action.	5th Fleet (KALANAN) Air Group	5th Fleet (KALANAN) Air Group

Appendix Table 3 (Continued)

SECRET

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR INTERDICTION (THREAT)

FORCE	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR HOSTILE ACTION-1 (Detailed Allocation of Forces)	ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR HOSTILE ACTION-2 (Detailed Allocation of Forces)	ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR HOSTILE ACTION-3 (Detailed Allocation of Forces)
<p>1. Destroyer of and escort of carrier fleet</p> <p>2. Co-operation in base air force operations</p> <p>3. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>2. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>3. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. An element will observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. An element will observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>
<p>1. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>2. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>3. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>2. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>3. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. An element will observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>
<p>1. Patrol</p> <p>2. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>3. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>4. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. Patrol</p> <p>2. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>3. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>4. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. In addition to the preparation for the carrier fleet, the force will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>4. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. In addition to the preparation for the carrier fleet, the force will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>4. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. In addition to the preparation for the carrier fleet, the force will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>4. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>
<p>1. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>2. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>3. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. Support of South Sea Force or Northern Force</p> <p>2. Reserve of air superiority</p> <p>3. Decisive action</p>	<p>1. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. An element will be prepared to observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>	<p>1. An element will observe the enemy's movements and report to the command.</p> <p>2. An element will be prepared to intercept any enemy aircraft which may be sent to attack the carrier fleet.</p> <p>3. An element will be prepared to attack the enemy fleet and invasion force.</p>

Continuation of Southern Area operations

Continuation of Southern Area operations

Continuation of Southern Area operations

Continuation of Southern Area operations

Continuation of Southern Area operations

Continuation of Southern Area operations

Continuation of Southern Area operations

SECRET  
Navy Table 2 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR INTERCEPTION (TORREI)

FORCE	COMMANDER OFFICER	PRINCIPAL DUTY	ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-1 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)		ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-2 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)		ALLOCATION IN PREPARATION FOR DECISIVE ACTION-3 (Other matters will be as prescribed by doctrine.)	
			Strength	Outline of Operations	Strength	Outline of Operations	Strength	Outline of Operations
Commerce Destruction Unit	OO 24	Disruption of sea traffic	Eight patrol craft Element of 11 Air Fleet		Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet		Eight patrol craft One element of 11 Air Fleet	
Communications Force	OO 1 Combined Communications Unit	Operational communications and communications intelligence (FUSUIHA CHORO)	24 300	In accordance with Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations	24 300	Same as Allocation-1	24 300	Same as Allocation-2
Supply Force	Under Direct Command	Supply	1 Combined Communications Unit		1 Combined Communications Unit		1 Combined Communications Unit	Same as Allocation-2
			Troop		Troop		Troop	Same as Allocation-2

Notes

- When engaging in these allocations during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAS) Operations, the formation of the Striking Force will be revised by special order.
- Outline of deployment for the base air force:
  - Deployment areas as follows:
    - When the enemy is attacking in the MARSHALLS Area: the major element - the MARSHALLS Area; one element - MARIKUS Island, SAIPAN and ENBU Area.
    - When the enemy is attacking in the RABAU Area: the major element - SAIPAN Area; one element - ENBU and MARSHALLS Area.
    - When the enemy is attacking in waters east of JAPAN: the major element - TOKYO Area; one element - MARIKUS Island, SAIPAN and OMIKAWA Area.
  - Deployment depends on the swift shift of the MIZUKITAI. However aircraft carriers are used to shift fighter force units.
- The assignment of supply ships is the same as to the allocation of forces in First Phase (DAI ICHI DAS) Operations.
- Special orders will be issued for other forces not listed above.

Note: The symbol as set forth in conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

Page  
2/114

Separate Table 5

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SECOND PHASE (DAI SEI DAI) OPERATIONS  
(From the conclusion of southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations on)

FORCES	COMMANDING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OFFICER OF OPERATIONS	REMARKS
Main Body		BatDiv 1 1 Fleet (less BatDiv 3 and CruDiv 6)	Support of entire operations.		
Advance Force	CiaC 2 Fleet	2 Fleet BatDiv 3 CarDiv 4	1. Support of operations of Northern, South Seas and Southern Forces		
Carrier Air Force	CiaC 1 Air Fleet	1 Air Fleet (less CarDiv 4)	2. Destruction of enemy task force.		
Advanced Expeditionary Force	CiaC 5 Fleet	6 Fleet	Continuation of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations.		
Base Air Forces	CiaC 11 Air Fleet	11 Air Fleet (less one element) Two battalions of special naval landing party.	Patrol of necessary areas; base air combat.		
Southern Force	CiaC 3 Fleet	3 Fleet 1 Southern Expeditionary Fleet (7th entered in pencil.) 3 Southern Expeditionary Fleet SubRon 4 SubRon 5 AKAISHI ASAKI MARU Eight patrol planes Five battalions of special naval landing party ASAKI MOROTO One element of 11 Air Fleet	1. Hoopling up of enemy remnants in occupied key areas; checking of enemy penetration; defense and stabilization of key points. 2. Disruption of enemy sea traffic off northwest coast of AUSTRALIA and in INDIAN Ocean. 3. Depending on the situation, attacks on enemy air bases in northern AUSTRALIA.		
South Seas Force	CiaC 4 Fleet	4 Fleet CruDiv 6 AirFlot 11 2 Unit of 1 Combined Communications Unit	1. Patrolling and strengthening of defenses in South Seas Area; securing and garrisoning of occupied key points. 2. Attacks on key points in the Bismarck Archipelago and BRITISH NEW GUINEA.		
Northern Force	CiaC 5 Fleet	5 Fleet (KIKU) CHIGHI JIMA Communications Unit (ChICHITSU)	1. Patrolling and strengthening defenses in Northern Area. 2. Observation of and attacks on key points in ALASKAN Islands. 3. Security measures against RUSSIA.		
Commerce Destruction Unit	CO 24 Squadron (SENYAI)	24 or*	Same as First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations		
Communications Force	CO 1 Combined Communications Unit	1 Unit (less CHIGHI JI/A Communication Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit			
Attached Forces		CHIYODA SEITSU YAKATE			
Note	Assignment of supply ships will be determined separately.				

Note: The symbol \*\* after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact reproduction of that appearing in the original document.

AS  
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #2

ENTITLED

"JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

**SECRET**

Page  
2/152

COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 2

Flagship NAGATO, SAENI BAY, 7 Nov. 41

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
Commander in Chief,  
Combined Fleet

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

First preparations for war

Y Day will be 8 December

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #3  
(A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES)  
ENTITLED  
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRETJAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)

The operations of Japanese submarines, both midget and full-size, was one of the main factors in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, which contained the basic plans for the Pacific-wide attacks which launched the war, contained a paragraph referring to submarine operations at Pearl Harbor. The text of this paragraph, as recalled by a reliable Japanese Chief Yeoman who was attached to the staff of the late Admiral Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet, read as follows:

\* 7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the Inland Sea on X-20 Day to attack Pearl Harbor. Its entire strength will be so disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

The organizations participating in the Pearl Harbor attack, on the basis of POW and documentary evidence, included Subrons 1, 2, and 3 (Minus Subdiv 20). This is a total of 20 submarines, not including the 5 midgets carried on the decks of five of the large submarines. Sixteen of the twenty submarines have been definitely identified as having participated (I-1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,17,16,18,20,22,24, (1)68,(1)69,(1)74). The other four, which are assumed to have participated because they were part of the same Subdivs both before and after December 7th and are not known to have had other assignments, are the I-8,9,15, and (1)75. A fairly reliable POW has suggested that the I-10 was also present, but there is no other evidence to indicate that it was.

All of the submarines participating (with the exception of the 45-ton midgets) were of the I-type; i.e., over 1,000 tons. Sixteen of them were of the Long-Range Cruiser type—over 1900 tons, with a range of above 12,000 nautical miles at 14 knots. Of these, five (I-16,18,20,22,24) were equipped with midget submarines, the five midget submarines which attempted to get into



SECRET

Pearl Harbor. The remaining eleven Cruisers were plane-bearing submarines.

Four of the twenty were I (1)68 Class Submarines: 1400 tons, 6 torpedo tubes and a range of 8,000 miles at 16 knots.

The midget submarines used in the Pearl Harbor action (which subsequently were referred to as the "Pearl Harbor Type") were 41' in length, carried two 18" torpedoes, had a range of 175 miles at 5 knots and 13 miles at 20 knots.

When carried by the mother submarine, the midget sub is secured to the pressure hull with four heavy clamps and one auxiliary clamp. An access hatch, telephone and battery-charging leads connect the two submarines. The midget is launched by releasing the four main clamps from the parent ship and the auxiliary clamp from within the midget.

With regard to the anticipated results of the midget-submarines borne by the I-16 Class submarines, it is interesting to note that the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, in clarifying Secret OpOrder #1 is reported by the above-quoted Japanese Chief Yeoman as stating:

The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the <sup>Kure</sup> Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

PHASES OF THE ATTACK

Preliminary. According to the Secret OpOrder #1 schedule, most of the submarines in the attack force were supposed to leave the Inland Sea (presumably Kure, the major submarine base) on I-20 Day (November 18th, Honolulu time). Subron 2, composed of I-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is reported by a reliable POW to have left YOKOSUKA two days later. The Commander of the Sixth Fleet remained behind at Kure.

Apparently most of the submarines arrived in the Pearl Harbor area a day or two before the attack. The log of the I-1 reports that on December 5th (all dates Honolulu time) it was 600 miles from Pearl Harbor. According to POW's from the I-17, this sub arrive off OAHU on the 6th.

SECRET

Before the attack started, the submarines took up scouting positions. The area around Pearl Harbor had been divided into various sectors. Thus, the I-(1)69 cruiser submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, according to the captured report of its skipper. The I-17, according to POW's, took up a scouting position 1° North of Honolulu. There was also an E Inner Scouting Area: a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center.

One of the features of the submarine attack plan was to send at least two midgets into the harbor prior to the air attack in order to check on the ships present and their position. One midget was detected by the USCG CONDOR at 0350, four hours before the full aerial attack, as it was trailing the USS ANTARES, apparently hoping to slip through the net defenses following the ANTARES. This particular midget was apparently sunk by the USS WARD in 1200 feet of water. Another midget was sunk in the harbor, probably having slipped in through the net-gate which had been opened at 0458 to permit the passage of two minesweepers and not closed until 0840, three-quarters of an hour after the aerial attack. A navigation chart was recovered from a third midget which beached itself and the navigation track which was charted would have taken it all around Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. (See attached chart) The original chart was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub carried a simple code which would have enabled it to transmit its information to the main force awaiting outside.

The Attack: Prior to the full aerial attack which was launched about 0800, the main function of the submarines, both full-size and midget, was reconnaissance and surveillance. After the opening of the attack the full-size submarines were supposed to exploit the situation by torpedoing the ships which were trying to escape the confinement of the Harbor while the

SECRET

midgets were supposed to slip into the harbor during the confusion and contribute to the destruction caused by the carrier-borne aerial bombardment. Simultaneously they were supposed to report the damage inflicted by all Japanese efforts back to the Commander of the Striking Force. This information was gained not only by periscope observation, but also by the aerial reconnaissance of the observation planes carried by eleven of the participating submarines. One of the factors restricting the use of this type of observation was the heavy weather which made launching difficult.

Apparently all five of the midget subs launched were lost without causing any direct damage. The Japanese admitted the loss of five midgets and only five midget-bearing submarines (I-16,18,20,22,24) are known to have participated. There is no known damage by midget submarines and at least three are known to have been sunk before they could do any damage. In addition to the one sunk trying to follow the ANTARES into the Harbor, before the full attack, two were sunk in the harbor. One damaged itself on a reef to the right of the entrance channel, and north of Buoy #1. It was spotted there at 0817 by the USS HELM which opened fire. While being fired upon it clipped off the ledge and submerged. It was apparently this midget which beached itself at OAHU, because the apparatus of the latter had been put out of commission by reef damage.

The conning towers of two midget submarines were sighted in the North Channel, one by the CURTIS. This latter midget was sunk by the USS MCKENAHAN, the ready duty destroyer which rammed it and depth-charged it. The fifth midget was presumably sunk in one of several successful A/S attacks which were reported by the BLUE, the RAMSEY and the BREEZE. These attacks presumably accounted for the I-170 (which Japanese documents show as being unreported after December 8th) as well as the fifth midget.

Post-Attack Phase: It is clear that one of the principal functions of the submarine attack force was that of remaining in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor to pick off any damaged ships which might try to limp back to the mainland, or any other ships which might bring reinforcements to Pearl Harbor.

SECRET

We know that the I-1, which arrived on the eve of the attack did not leave the vicinity of Pearl Harbor until January 9th.

One of the most difficult situations experienced by the Japanese subs was that of the I-(1)69. At 1830 on December 7th it was ordered by the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces to shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area, a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center. On the way it was forced down before it could complete recharging its batteries and subsequently was caught in an anti-sub net 4.2 miles, 130° off Barber's Point. It was kept down on the bottom below its maximum safe diving depth for 38 hours, but escaped with minor damage.

After December 7th, submarine activity, at least on the part of those submarines which took part in the original attack, tapered off. About December 14th the I-17 left for the Oregon coast. On December 20th the I-174 left the Oahu area for Kwajalein. The I-1 which remained until January 9th, had an eventful cruise, but little success. On December 10th it sighted a CV but couldn't attack. On December 13th it sighted an AO but was prevented from attacking by A/S activity. On 20th of December it sighted an AK but was unable to attack. On December 25th it was depth-charged without damage. On December 30th it shelled the harbor at Hilo. On January 1st it was sighted and attacked twice by U.S. planes without damage.

Results: In summing up the part played by Japanese submarines in the attack on Pearl Harbor it is important to note that the Japanese lost one full-size submarine (the I-(1)70) and five midgets, while American forces suffered no known damage from submarines. Balanced against this is the fact that the submarines served an important scouting function and tied up American naval units.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #4  
( A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES )  
ENTITLED  
"TIME TABLE OF JAPANESE SUBMARINES OPERATIONS"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRET

Japanese  
TIMETABLE OF SUBMARINE  
OPERATIONS

18 Nov. '41 Submarines scheduled to leave Western part of Inland Sea for attack on Pearl acc. to Combined Fleet Secret OpOrd #1.

20 Nov. The I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7 left Yokosuka for Pearl.

25 Nov. Com. 6th Fleet was on Hashira Shima. (KURE)

5 Dec. OHATA, PO, says I-174 arrived off OAHU at this time with 15 or 16 others.

5 Dec. I-1 was 600 miles from Pearl.

6 Dec. I-17 arrived off OAHU, took scouting position 1° North of HONOLULU.

7 Dec. I-(1)69, Flag of Subdiv 12, took up surveillance position 17 miles SW of Pearl, before attack started.

7 Dec. 0350 USCG CONDOR sighted the periscope of submerged sub when conducting sweeping operations approx 1-3/4 miles SW of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy.

0357 CONDOR informed the USS WARD by visual signal. WARD, which was patrolling off Pearl Harbor instituted search.

0458 Net opened to permit the passage of two minesweepers. Not closed until 0840.

0633 Navy patrol plane dropped two smoke pots near midget following ANTARES.

0637 WARD sighted the periscope of unidentified sub apparently trailing the USS ANTARES then enroute to Pearl Harbor.

0640 WARD commenced attack, which is believed to have been successful.

0645 WARD reported to Commandant 14th Naval District, first time this had been reported.

0732 Patrol plane sank a hostile sub south of the entrance buoy, according to telephone call of Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO at 0740. This was later revealed to have been in cooperation with DD. Presumably this is the same action in which the WARD participated.

0751 The ready duty Destroyer, USS MONOCHAN, received orders to "proceed immediately and contact the WARD in defensive sea area" and also apparently to close the netgate. See above.

0755 Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned Cincpac: "Enemy air raid---not drill." Almost simultaneously Japanese torpedo planes attacked the battleships.

0817 The USS HELM spotted the conning tower of a submarine to the right of the entrance channel and northward of Buoy #1. Though immediately submerging, fire was opened when the submarine again surfaced temporarily, no hits were observed.

SECRET

This sub appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef and in line of breakers. While still being fired at, it slipped off ledge and submerged. ~~████████████████████~~

- 0830 The USS MONOGHAN, ready duty destroyer, which had been ordered to sea at 0751 but had been temporarily delayed by the initiation of the enemy action, got under way.
- 0836 The conning towers of two midget subs sighted in North Channel; one by CURTIS (AV4).
- 0837 The MONOGHAN, having observed an enemy submarine under fire of both the CURTIS and the TANGIER, proceeded at flank speed and at about 0843 rammed; thereafter dropped two depth charges. The fire of the CURTIS resulted in two direct hits on the conning tower. This submarine (midget) was later salvaged for inspection. Before the MONOGHAN dispatched it one midget fired a torp which was apparently aimed at the USS RALEIGH but passed under the bow of the DALE and exploded on Ford Island.
- 0840 Net closed. Had been opened at 0458 to permit passage of two minesweepers.
- 0915 USS BLUE dropped four and two DCs in two successive attacks on sound contact approximately four miles bearing 190° from DIAMOND Head Light.
- 0950 USS BLUE dropped 6 DCs on good sound contact; resulted in large oil slick and air bubbles over a length of 200 feet. 20° 11' 30" N 157° 49' 45" W.
- 1020 Two DCs dropped on sound contact by USS BLUE 6 miles, 200° from Diamond Head light.
- 1108 MTB reported a periscope to USS BREEZE, patrolling off Pearl Harbor.
- 1115 BREEZE dropped two DCs with no results: bearing Barber Point 297° T, Diamond Head 078 T, Hickham Tower 357° T.
- 1135 BREEZE picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity (see 1115); dropped DCs, which brought up oil and debris. A second attack a few minutes later with four keeper DCs brought no tangible results.
- 1204 GAMBLE on sound attack dropped 3 DCs 168 T from Diamond Head, 2.5 miles.
- 1830 Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces ordered I-(1)69 shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles SW of PEARL HARBOR to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center.)
- 2000 <sup>get sub</sup> I-(1)69 reports sighting five DDs "during night". Received close-range DC attack from them apparently no damage.
- 8 Dec. 0145 (HONOLULU LOCAL) I-(1)69 surfaced, on course of 300° for Barber's Point, hurriedly charged batteries, while at battle speed. Sighted 2 patrol vessels, about 3 miles away.

496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

- 0536 I-(1)69 is forced down by the DD; before it had completely recharged; DD attacked it with DCs without result.
- 0910 I-(1)69 Caught in anti-sub net. 4.2 miles off Barber's Point, at 130°
- 1205? A few minutes after noon RAMSEY DCed submarine on excellent sound contact 11 miles due west of Barber's Point, bringing up positive oil bubbles.
- 1225? Ramsey heard sub again and DCed, deepest about 250 ft. getting positive oil indications.
- 0 Dec. 1950 I-(1)69 surfaced after 38 hours submerged.
- 10 Dec. *Japan Sub* (US) I-1 sighted CV but couldn't attack.
- 13 Dec. *(US)* I-1 sighted AO but was counter-attacked and couldn't attack. About this time I-17, which had held scouting position 1° North of Oahu, left for the OREGON coast.
- 19 Dec. *Japan Sub* I-(1)74 left OAHU area for KWAJALEIN, acc. to POW PO OHATA.
- 20 Dec. *(US)* I-1 sighted AK but couldn't attack.
- 25 Dec. I-1 DCed without damage.
- 27 Dec. I-1 Departed Pearl Area for HILO.
- 30 Dec. I-1 attacked HILO harbor, shelling prob. DD.
- 31 Dec. *Japan Sub* I-3 reached deployment line; received report of CV and left line to shadow. *(US)*
- 1 Jan. I-1 sighted by US PLANES, attacked twice; no damage.
- 2 Jan. I-3 returned to deployment line.
- 4 Jan. I-1 proceeded to East of Oahu and resumed patrol.
- 6 Jan. I-1 made unsuccessful attack on US DD. I-3 sighted and attacked group of AKs, unknown result. *(US)*
- 9 Jan. I-1 headed for KWAJALEIN. *(US)* I-18 rushed to attack on hearing report of CV but no result.
- 11 Jan. *Japan Sub* *(US)* I-6 attacked CV Lexington Class; claimed sinking.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #5  
(TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS)  
ENTITLED  
"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES  
CONCERNING  
EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # \_\_\_\_\_, ICPOA Item # A72 Transl. by ICPOA Date 10 June 1943Title of Publication SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAREXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Initial Date \_\_\_\_\_

Final Date \_\_\_\_\_

Jan. 12, 1941Instructor Maeshima

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been no opportunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the 11th. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-68 recently, it has been decided to immediately mimeograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

(2) CONFIDENTIALNO. 1. TACTICS

## 1. Use of submarine carried planes. :

A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Niuhau, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.

B. When on picket station, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplane carrying submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

## 2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

A. Since America's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-14 (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)

B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge

(A) The I-68 primarily used sound listening patrol chōon shōkai 聴音哨戒

(2)

(3) CONFIDENTIAL

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following method was used and no uneasiness was felt because of the sound listening patrol.

### 3. Observation patrol.

- (1) Slowest speed used.
  - (2) Ventilation stopped.
  - (3) In steering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rest was all man power.
  - (4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the outer edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was possible to do so. Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.
- B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.

### 4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

- A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed patrol.
- B. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, he on guard.

## NO. 2. COMBAT DUTY

### 1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

- A. The method carried out by I-15 is as follows:
  - (1) Hoisted a "Breadth Four" Ensign at the tip of the periscope.
  - (2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Signal on the ladder to the bridge.
  - (3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc, its position and course one or two days previously to the home combat force [内戦部隊]

Then returning to an advanced base, [No] took the action of having the commandant of the advanced base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.

- B. There is an example of submarine I-63 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

(3)

(A)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

## 1. Onshore Current.

- A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.
- B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore.

NO. 4. MANEUVERING FOR ATTACK

## 1. Protracted submerged navigation.

- A. (1) In regard to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.
- (2) Although CO<sup>2</sup> reached 4.6%, O<sup>2</sup> reached 16% and the temperature reached 32°C., there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.
- (3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.
- B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.
- (2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "washing purifier" [洗淨式] type air purifying method.

## 2. Waves in the Hawaiian Area.

- A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times.
- Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.
- B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in sound detection patrol.
- Also, considering this, the periscope should be made as long as possible.

(A)

CONFIDENTIAL

(5)

NO. 5. COMMUNICATION

## 1. Underwater wireless reception ability.

A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sensitivity is 4 at a depth of 15 meters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area.

(Sending station USAMH)

NO. 6. (IS MISSING)NO. 7. HULL

## 1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.

A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged navigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.

## 2. Damages caused by depth charge attack.

A. While observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

- (1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were damaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).
- (2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).
- (3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.
- (4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.
- (5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.
- (6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.
- (7) Leakage in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increased.
- (8) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.
- (9) The accuracy of the (---?---) armeter decreased.
- (10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.
- (11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.

- B. (1) Disassemble the damaged depth indicator and remove the sea water between the #1 and #2 bocks [ OK ] - 7
- (2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #6

(TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT)

ENTITLED

"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

"PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR"

N. N. I. 96-1942

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial #47-43 Monograph Index Guide No. 9C7-4400  
 (Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40) (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-FE, ONI at Washington, D. C. Date April 22, 1943  
 (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference Op-16-FE Serial #41-43 of April 14, 1943.  
 (Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Evaluation  
 (As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—, (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)  
 identify when practicable, etc.)

Subject Japan Navy Submarines  
 (Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

CORRECTION

The reference report, a translation of a captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the Japanese submarine I-69 off Pearl Harbor, erroneously gives the date of these operations as December 8-10, 1942. This error occurs in the fourth line of the cover sheet, in the heading of the first page of the report, and in the fourth line of page 1. The date in all cases mentioned should read, "December 8-10, 1941".

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Distribution By Originator

Routing space below for use in O. N. I.		
Op-16	Gen'l Board	Op-10/11
Op-16-1	War College	Op-12
Op-16-1-F	MS (5)	Op-20 (5)
Archives	BuOrd (3)	NK Chungking (2)
Monograph	BuShips (3)	Com 11 (5)
Op-16-Fa-1 (8)	USMC	Naval Aide (2)
Op-16-F-1	Cominch (10)	MCJIC
Op-16-P-2	CincLant (9)	List I
		List II, less q
		List III, ff only
		Aust. Joint Staff
		N. Z. Joint Staff

Use this form for page 1 (original and copies). Use the 8 by 12 inches plain white paper as supplied for additional pages. Forward to ONI an original and a "Ditto Master" copy. Do not use carbon copies. If report only, submit copies of clippings, sketches, etc., where practical. If transmittal require sketches on "Ditto Master", or in a form suitable for black and white reproductions.

*copy made 4/21*



N. N. I. 96-1943

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial # 41-43 Monograph Index Guide No. 907-4400  
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40) (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate reports for each main title.)

From Op-16-FE, ONI at Washington, D.C. Date April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1944  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Captured Japanese Document Evaluation RELIABLE  
(As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with— Identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject Japan Navy Submarines  
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The attached report is an abridged translation of a Japanese captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the I-69 off Pearl Harbor, December 8-10, 1944, during which time the I-69 was believed to have been caught in an underwater obstruction.

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution By Originator \_\_\_\_\_

Marking space below for use in O. N. I.

- |                |              |              |                                    |
|----------------|--------------|--------------|------------------------------------|
| Op-16          | Gen'l Board  | Op-10/11     | List II, less q                    |
| Op-16-1        | War College  | Op-12        | List III, ff only                  |
| Op-16-1-F      | MIS (5)      | Op-20 (5)    | <del>Aust. Staff Mission (2)</del> |
| Archives       | BuOrd (3)    | NA Chungking | <del>Aust. Staff Mission (2)</del> |
| Monograph      | BuShips (3)  | Cem 11 (5)   | Aust. Joint Staff (2)              |
| Op-16-FA-1 (8) | USMC         | Naval Aide   | N. J. Joint Staff (2)              |
| Op-16-P-1      | Cominoh (10) | USJIC        |                                    |
| Op-16-P-2      | CinLant (9)  | List I       |                                    |

Use this form for page 1 (original and copies). Use the 4 by 11 inches plain white paper as supplied for additional pages. Forward to ONI as original and a "Ditto Master" copy. Officers preparing and those forwarding reports sign the last page of original and retained file copy of reports only. Submit copies of diplomas, sketches, etc., when practical. If practicable, prepare sketches on "Ditto Master," or in a form suitable for black and white reproduction.

# 506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

Report of I-69's Operations off Pearl Harbor, Dec. 8-10, 1941

The Japanese submarine I-69, (Flagship of Submarine Division 12), attached to the 3rd Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Force, was caught in an underwater obstruction while conducting surveillance of Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941 but finally freeing herself, was able to carry on with her specified task.

The following is an abridged translation of the report of the event, submitted with various pertinent conclusions by the Commander of Submarine Division 12, and officially distributed (Japanese 6th Fleet Secret Letter #2, Part 5, Jan. 10, 1942) as reference material of value for training. (Dates are in accordance with Japanese time).

## I. Circumstances Before the Event.

During daylight on December 8, the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of depth charges, I judged that the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.

At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were received, assigning the I-69 to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.

After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge attack. After that we heard enemy patrol boats continually, and could not surface. I judged that these patrol boats were disposed in all directions at intervals of 3 nautical miles. Just at this time, the waves were from 4 to 5 (sic), and . . . in proceeding wash there was difficulty in maintaining depth control without using standard speed, and battery discharge was comparatively high.

I felt keenly the need of recharging the batteries that night, judging that demands on battery power the next day would be great, and recharging difficult, because of the presence of enemy patrol boats. So, although it involved arriving at the designated patrol area somewhat behind schedule, I set course (300°) for the area southeast of Barker's Point, where I thought the enemy patrol might be comparatively lax. At 0015 on the 9th, we surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.

We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and port beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pearl Harbor shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn, and although we operated with the land as a background, an enemy patrol vessel discovered us and fired what looked like a green Very flare. The time was 0106 and our recharging was not yet finished (73% of used power had been replenished). In that condition we immediately submerged, and although we were depth-charged by the destroyer, the distance was great.

## II. Circumstances of Running Afoul of Underwater Obstacle and Measures Taken

At 0440 (December 9) we experienced a strange vibration of the ship, and the navigator ordered the engines stopped. At the time, our course was 80°, 4 motors were running together, and depth was 37 meters. I was in my cabin resting, and upon receiving the report went directly to the conning tower. Upon learning of conditions from the submarine's Commanding Officer, I decided that we had been caught in an anti-submarine net, and ordered the engines put into reverse in order to get clear. However, the needle of the speed-gauge did not move, as if the pit log tube were broken. It being difficult to determine our movement, I began to surface the ship, and increased the angle of trim.

CONFIDENTIAL

A slight tremor was felt in the ship, and I stopped headway. Again I backed at full speed, but the ship did not move. The ship's trim and depth were not normal. I ordered "Blow main tank", and "Regain negative buoyancy." During these operations we surfaced, or rose to a point at which we were awash, three times, according to the observations of the Commanding Officer of the Submarine, taken at the time of surfacing, within the limits of observation of the periscope (forward of the forward end of the gun platform) we were not caught in anything. Two enemy destroyers were about 5 kilometers dead ahead. As we had now reached a situation in which we could not continue either submerged or on the surface, I decided to lie submerged and to surface at sunset.

At 0454, I stopped the electric motors, but the ship began to sink. I ordered "Blow main tank". The reading of the depth-gauge in the tower reached the extreme limit (85 meters). (We actually reached 125 meters). Seeing this condition, I thought we must be free of the net, and ordered "head standard" at a depth of 40 meters, but as before there shortly occurred a slight tremor, headway was slowed, and I ordered "Stop". Again we began to sink. I ordered "Blow the main tank", but before we regained buoyancy control, the ship slowed to a stop, almost level, at a depth of 87 meters. It was 0506 when I realized we were resting on the bottom. Our estimated position was 4.2 nautical miles off Barber's Point at 130°.

### III. Situation and Measures Taken

#### After Reaching Bottom

Although the sea bottom was below safe submersible depth, (70 meters for the I-69), our resting on the bottom was an extremely good thing for us in our situation. As soon as we had bottomed we knew from sounds similar to those made by the destroyer we had previously sighted, that it was close by; and from other sounds we learned of the approach of other patrol vessels. The enemy would stop occasionally, and if we thought they were attempting sound-detection, we exercised rigid sound control. That is to say, the use of all pumps except the oil-pressure pump, and the movement of all rudders, electric fans, gyro-compass and ventilation blower were suspended. I decided to surface at sunset, but though many hours passed there were continual sounds of patrol vessels coming and going, and since our position six miles from the harbor entrance offered considerable chance of discovery and consequent battle to the death were I to surface at sundown, I decided to wait if possible till dusk of the following night, the 10th.

After bottoming, we recorded every hour the amount of bilge water, the inclination, the air pressure and the depth. The fact that the increase per hour of bilge water was about one and a fraction metric tons, and pressure in the air reservoir was 90 (kilos), convinced me that it would be possible to surface at dusk on the following day.

Anticipating that we would have to submerge after only a short time on the surface, I charged the air reservoir with high pressure air from our (6) reserve torpedoes, and was able to raise its pressure 25 kilograms. Although I thought it impossible to use the high-pressure air compressor, since, on account of our depth, we could not take in sea water for cooling, - the engineer suggested circulating the bilgewater as a cooling medium. After effecting sound control and recharging from the reserve torpedoes, I became concerned, as time passed, over the lowering of pressure in the air reservoir, and although I didn't use the high-pressure air compressor that day, I did use it on the 10th, raising the air reservoir pressure from 105 to 138 kilograms, and reducing the air-pressure inside the ship from 891 mm to 780 mm. The additional air thus obtained subsequently proved most efficacious.

Other measures consequent upon the length of time on the bottom were as follows:

#### A - Air purification:

To escape detection due to noise of ventilator motors, and to economize on electric power, we used air-purifying chemicals three times when we did not hear the enemy in the vicinity (the amount of air purifier used was 60 units) over a total period of about twelve hours; oxygen was released three times for a total of 45 minutes. At 0800 on the 10th there was a reading of 4.5% carbon dioxide, and just before surfacing we must have reached approximately 5.5%, and the crew had headaches. A state was reached where walking for even a slight distance, or any exertion, caused panting.

CONFIDENTIAL

## B - Stopping of bilgewater accumulation:

We tightened propeller-shaft packing by stuffing with waste and completely closed all valves to the outside.

## C - Meals:

To prevent rise of air temperature in the ship, and to economize on power, we used no heat for cooking, but ate biscuits, canned fruit, improvised rice cakes, etc.

## D - Rest:

To check increase of carbon-dioxide, we had everyone not specially employed sleep as much as possible. In anticipation of a battle to the death, and to incite the desire for a hard fight, we served sake to all hands at supper on the 9th, the first time since leaving base.

## E - Defecation:

In the absence of facilities for discharging excrement, we made use of empty oil cans.

IV. Situation and Measures  
Taken Prior to Surfacing

On the 10th we detected the presence of enemy patrol vessels, but not so frequently as on the previous day. Sunset on the 10th being at 1253 and moonrise at 1827, I decided to surface at 1500. My estimate of the situation was as follows:

A - It was possible that there might be no enemy patrol craft in the vicinity, since they knew that the I-69 was caught underwater; and in the event that we might be able to free the ship easily and escape to a place of comparative safety, I decided to withdraw from the area and ascertain by radio the current state of affairs, before continuing the task assigned.

B - In the event that freeing the ship might require some time, and that there might be considerable chance of discovery by the enemy, and a consequent battle to the death, I decided upon preparations to make utmost use of all weapons.

C - The possibilities were that we might be unable to move; that we might have to engage the enemy whether freed or not; that if freed, we might attempt to enter Pearl Harbor, or if unsuccessful in that, to block the channel.

The measures I took with the above estimate of the situation as my basis, were as follows:

## A - Preparations for battle:

Made preparations for gun, machine-gun and torpedo action.  
(Anticipating action against small ships, put 2-meter depth setting on torpedoes)

## B - Net Cutting Detail:

Arranged a detail of 3 officers, 2 petty officers and 14 men to take charge of appropriate stations, tools, etc.

## C - Preparations for Self-destruction:

Powder from 10 high-angle gun charges was collected and arranged in the magazine with 2 tins of kerosene. Self-destruction was to be carried out if the worst came to the worst, and would follow the broadcasting of the message: "We are unable to communicate."

## D - Preparations for Destruction of Secret Books:

Operational orders and special instructions for use of Codebook A

CONFIDENTIAL

(transl. note: K5, in Japanese), together with other papers of a highly secret character were cut up, and destroyed by being churned and pulped in a receptacle filled with sea water. Such things as secret charts and easily combustible documents were removed to the magazine for burning at the time of explosion. Things hard to burn, and which would have to be thrown into the sea were torn up and weighted, to avoid being picked up by the enemy. The time for throwing these away was to be specially designated before the explosion.

E - Disposal of Bilge Water:

Although we tried as much as possible to prevent accumulation of bilge water, the amount was very great in the motor room. Since a large change in trim was naturally to be expected at the time of surfacing, there was great concern lest the main electric motors be soaked with bilge water. Accordingly, the bilge water in the motor room was pumped into the after torpedo tube compartment, so that, even though the after torpedo tube compartment was flooded with bilge water above the deck plating before surfacing, the main electric engines would be perfectly safe at the time of surfacing and during subsequent dive, in spite of a great inclination. We estimated that, before surfacing, the amount of foul water in the ship totaled 50 metric tons, so prepared to pump it overboard immediately upon surfacing.

V. Circumstances and MeasuresTaken at time of Surfacing

Upon completion of all pre-surfacing preparations, I assembled all Warrant and higher officers, prayed for a good battle, and drank toasts with beer. We then went directly to our stations. The man in charge of listening gear reported all quiet in the vicinity. At 1457 we blew main tanks. Although the pressure in the air reservoir dropped from 138 to 85 metric tons (sic) the ship did not seem to be rising. The Senior Officer said, "We don't float". I then ordered "Cut in motors", "Port and starboard motors ahead standard", and immediately we saw that we were free of the bottom. However, the change of trim gradually increased, and although we stopped blowing the forward main tank, this inclination did not change. We then opened vents in the forward main tank, and gradually prevented further change in trim, with a maximum inclination of 25°. At 1520 we surfaced. Our period of submersion had been 38 hours.

As soon as the surfacing preparations had been completed, the net-cutting workers had been assembled, and I had instructed them not to be concerned with enemy fire, but rather to concentrate with calm certainty on cutting the net. As soon as we surfaced, the working party went directly out on deck. The lookout reported no enemy in the vicinity, and immediately the net-cutters reported no entanglement above the water line. Because the pit log tube had been damaged the previous day, it was pushed out through the bottom of the ship.

At this point, although I ordered stand-by on main engine, the oil in the engine room sump tank overflowed, as a result of the previous inclination, and for a short time it was impossible to use the engines. Both motors were ordered ahead standard, but the starboard motor didn't work. I wondered whether or not the starboard propeller were fouled in some obstruction, but when I saw the ship move forward I realized this was not so, and was greatly relieved, inasmuch as we could make out the light of an enemy attempting to challenge us. Our course was 270°. Drawing near to the coast (to starboard), I headed for other areas.

VI. Circumstances and Measures Taken After Surfacing

As the port engine had been made ready, I ordered port engine cut in, ahead standard, at 1519½. At 1533 we sighted an enemy destroyer on opposite course about 3 kilometers away at 30° to port, and quickly submerged. Immediately after surfacing we had started pumping bilge water and replenishing air, but about 25 metric tons of bilge water still remained. After diving, trim was unsteady, varying from a maximum of 55 degrees (sic) down by the head to a maximum of 35 degrees (sic) down by the stern. We reached a maximum depth of 75 meters. The pressure in the air reservoir fell to 35 kilograms and I realized it would be impossible to continue submerged. I ordered the ship to surface and fight it out, but after surfacing we did not sight the destroyer. The time was 1600.

CONFIDENTIAL

Again neither engine would run, because of the overflow of oil in the engine room sump tank. I ordered both motors ahead, and thenceforth proceeded on the basis that if we met the enemy we would fight a surface battle. Our course was generally northwest, with the coast for a background. At 1630, both engines were in shape, and were cut in. We went to ahead standard, ahead full, and finally flank speed. We were able to withdraw from the area without meeting any enemy.

On account of the inclination during the dive mentioned above, the inside of the ship was extremely dirty from bilge water, oil and excrement. In the after torpedo compartment, the torpedo tubes were inundated at time of submersion, then when we tilted back the forward bulkhead was covered with dirty water. Also, the battery fluid from the main storage battery had leaked out, producing a foul odor. Many hours were required for emergency repair measures. When our communications apparatus had been repaired, I radioed a report of our condition.

VII. Damage

Damage was chiefly to electrical equipment, from bilge water; and to outside optical and listening gear, from long submersion at great depth. We were not prevented from continuing our patrol, and were able to carry on our assigned task.

VIII. Views

A. I am profoundly convinced that the I-69's escape from danger was entirely due to Divine Providence, in that:

1) The depth at which we bottomed was such that a ship could remain there for a long time. Just before bottoming we had sunk to 125 meters, and although it might be only by chance that we touched bottom at an 87 meter spot, it is certainly unthinkable that we could have stayed submerged for so long a period at a greater depth.

2) There was no enemy nearby at the time of surfacing, and that we were already free of the underwater obstacle. Had we needed a long time to cut ourselves free, and had there been a very strict enemy patrol in the vicinity, we should certainly have been discovered and ended up with a fight to the death.

3) At the time we sighted the enemy destroyer at 1533, and submerged, we were not sighted by the enemy. We were unable to rig for noiseless running, and were in poor condition for submerged operation; in addition, our bow broke water.

B. More research into and improvement of stoppage of oil-leakage in submarines are needed. We know, from sound detection, that several enemy patrol vessels were directly above us. That we escaped being depth-charged is due entirely to prevention of oil-leakage.

C. Research and improvement in the field of noiseless running are needed. Although we were not depth-charged when bottomed, that was because of an entire absence of sound on our part. At many other times when we were running quiet we were depth-charged. This indicates both that the enemy's sound-detection is superior to ours, and that our being detected was because of the noise of our equipment.

D. The depth at which the overboard discharge pumps (main and auxiliary) and the electric power pump in the head can be used is too limited; it needs to be increased by about 60 meters.

E. There is immediate need of automatic depth-control gear. When entangled and unable to move, it is necessary, in order to remain below surface, to use discharge pumps a good part of the time. The sound of these pumps might easily lead to detection and attack by the enemy.

Furthermore, night-time charging of batteries is extremely difficult in patrol areas. At the outset we were barely able to do 73% of our re-charging. I consider the installation of automatic depth-control gear in

CONFIDENTIAL

submarines assigned to reconnaissance of enemy harbors an immediate and urgent necessity.

F. Submarines should be equipped with 4 pairs of net-cutting shears of proper design. The army wire-cutters lent to this ship by the Kure Military Supply Department would be practically useless in net-cutting.

G. There should be a supply of explosives for self-destruction. When we reached our crisis, I ordered preparations for blowing up the ship, but when I saw the crew panting in the foul air of the ship, and realized they would have to suffer further while waiting for the flames from the ignition-charge to explode the magazine, I felt that it was an unbearable situation.

H. Morale was excellent.

I. We threw overboard large quantities of waste, sandals, oil, etc., upon surfacing. I am not sure whether the enemy, seeing all this in the daytime, were made to accept it as proof of our sinking. I believe there will be many cases in which there will be difficulty in determining the effects of depth-charges or attacks after a submarine is caught in a net.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #7

(TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT  
TELLING THE EXPERIENCES OF A JAPANESE IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)  
ENTITLED

"THE SOUTHERN CROSS BY KURAMOTI, Iki"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)



CONFIDENTIALOp-16-FE  
Translation No. 290  
23 July 1945

## THE SOUTHERN CROSS

by

KURAMOTO, Iki

An account written in flowery language of the experiences of KURAMOTO, Iki in the attack on Pearl Harbor and in various other operations in the South Seas in 1942. The author has not been identified but was probably an enlisted man. Interspersed in the account will be found information of military interest from an historical point of view.

DISTRIBUTION

Op-16-A-3-h  
Op-16-W (2)  
Op-16-Z  
Op-13-2 (3)  
Op-20-3  
Cominch F-20  
Cominch F-4  
Cominch F-1  
JAD (4)  
JCS (7)  
NSA/C (3)  
PACLIPS (2)  
JIC NANY LSC (2)  
CINCPAC (2)  
CENTRAL FLEET  
CARIBBEAN FLEET  
COMSEVENTH FLEET (2)  
CINCPAC  
CNSL(Fletcher)  
via Op-16-PT  
DirC Adv. Intel.  
Center, CINCPAC Adv. Hdqtrs. (2)  
ComNav Forces, Navy #3256,  
c/o FPB, San Francisco

CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A LTHE SOUTHERN CROSS

## INTRODUCTION

When, in after years, one looks back on the events of the past, the recollection brings with it a mood of deep and poetic emotion. Even the most unhappy events of former years are touched with beauty by the light of the past, and their unpleasantness forgotten like a dream.

Just as the sun, sinking into the sea, paints the twilight sky with rosy clouds and impresses the eye of the beholder with its beauty as its majestic form sinks moment by moment below the horizon, so the mind of man, loving the beautiful and hating the ugly, instinctively transmutes everything into beauty.

When I look at the moon, I recall an evening in my native village when I watched it together with a tender companion, in an ecstasy of love.

When I look at the clouds, I think of a day in my childhood when, scolded by my mother, I flung myself down forlornly on the bank of a pool and watched the clouds drifting away into the distant sky, until finally my grief subsided to a vague sadness and in the twilight my mother led me home.

When I look at the stars, I remember fondly a night when, out of work and wandering aimlessly, I saw through my tears the weeping Pleiades twinkling in an alien sky.

With the passage of time, all these memories of the past become ever dearer to my heart.

Now, in the midst of this great world conflict of the Twentieth Century, I have taken up arms in the service of my beloved homeland, and have made the daring voyage to the South Seas, where shines the Southern Cross. My heart is joyful. I shall set down here for future years a record of these unforgettable days, so that their recollection may bring me a lifetime of delight.

## The Southern Cross!

Whether or not that name is a fitting title for this work, I do not know; but during my voyage to the South Seas that constellation impressed itself, I know not why, unforgettably upon my mind, and its name is indelibly written in my heart. Battles have followed battles, and I believe their dazzling number will remain recorded for posterity in this book, The Southern Cross.

KURANOTO, Iki<sup>(1)</sup>


---

(1) 倉元生

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

The Great East Asia War! Accursed conflict of nations!

The peoples of this world, seeking to enlarge their countries to gratify their boundless ambition, have rushed like a raging wave into a great war such as has never before been seen in the history of the world,

Epoch-making conflict of nations!

O tragic sight!

The weak become the victims of the strong. Those who have strength are victorious; those who have not strength are defeated. The victors use the natural resources and extensive territories taken from the enemy for the benefit of their own country; and, at the same time, expand their military preparations more and more in order to prevent the lies of enemy nations from ever again gaining a foothold. Like a great tree putting down roots deeply into the ground, they try to build a firm and enduring Paradise on earth.

The vanquished are driven from their country, and as an exiled race, gathered together into forlorn companies of the living dead, drift about aimlessly on a journey without end.

As long as there exist great numbers of people leading a crowded life on the limited surface of the earth, will not their innate passions of self-interest and ambition lead them to seek the means of living a more secure existence, and thus embroil them inevitably in war after war? A study of the past history of the world will immediately make this problem clear.

However, the wars of the past have been conflicts between two nations or at most a few nations only, in which only a part of the world has stood divided. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that they are mere trifling altercations in comparison to the Great East Asia War, which may be truly called a world revolution.

Now that we have been swept into this world conflagration, I shall attempt to set down in this book a record of my part in the Great East Asia War, and the impressions I have received from the many battles in which I have taken part. But first I must express my earnest hope that, by means of the supreme love for humanity which I take as my slogan, this horrible war may soon be ended in mutual understanding among nations, and that the peaceful days of before the war may again return to the earth.

When I write thus solemnly, those who may read this book in later days may think that I am glorifying the second coming of Christ, or such a great love as described in the poems of Goethe. However, as already stated in the beginning of this book, I am an ordinary mortal born in this twentieth century, and a soldier who has taken part in this tragic upheaval out of a fervent love for the land of his ancestors.

Ah! when one thinks of it, this is a century of endless change; he who in the morning is drunk with dreams of glory may, by evening, know the bitterness of affliction. The world is on the brink of a great transformation.

While generally praising the holiness of love and mourning the tumult of the world, I must yet take up arms for the land of my ancestors and fight to the last drop of my blood. Therein lies the bitterness of life.

What a contradiction!

Below I shall attempt to set down, just as I recollect at random, a record of my participation in the war.

CONFIDENTIAL

## HAWAII Operation (8 December)

At the time of year when green leaves turn suddenly to red in the cool winds of approaching autumn, and one begins to feel the piercing breath of the North Wind - that is to say, on 18 November 1941 - we left KURE harbor and sailed for the distant northern seas. The purpose of this operation was unknown to us.

We had taken on board warm clothing, materials for protecting the guns against the cold, and a great quantity of sea nets, but we understood nothing of this.

Day after day and night after night the ships carried out target practice.

In the newspapers that we had on board it was said that we were to attack DUTCH HARBOR, but we did not believe it.

Why did we not believe it? Consider the moderate course of Japanese diplomacy up to that time. It seemed unlikely that Japan meant at this time to lift up her hand against Britain and America. Indeed, was there not at that moment a conference in progress at Washington between America and Japan?

Our hopes were betrayed. We learned this when we went into port to refuel. Then we learnt for the first time how grave the situation was. Within the bay in that island of the bitterly cold North Pacific the air fleet was gathered. The crews, who every day were busy at conferences and discussions, were in an excited state of mind.

Finally the Navigation Officer, Lieut. Comdr. YAKO, told us we were to make a surprise attack on HAWAII. At last Japan could be at war with Britain and the U.S.A.!

An air attack on HAWAII! A dream come true. What will the people at home think when they hear the news? Won't they be excited! I can see them clapping their hands and shouting with joy. These were our feelings. We would teach the arrogant Anglo-Saxon scoundrels a lesson!

We must be inflexible in our course.... We could not expect to return alive.... Thinking that, for all we knew, we might now be eating and drinking for the last time, we gorged ourselves on wine and cakes from the canteen.

Finally, early in the morning of 26 November, our magnificent air fleet set out through the thick fog and stormy waves. Following a pre-arranged course it continued on its way toward PEARL HARBOR expecting to destroy the enemy's Pacific Fleet.

The weather grows worse, a gale blows, the seas rage, a dense fog descends. In this bitter weather, a show of actual force, a test by the gods, though tossed about in their struggle with the elements, the ships continue on their glorious way.

In the several days of danger when flags were blown away, and men washed overboard, throughout the storm, the target practice went on ceaselessly.

Every man was completely exhausted by continuous watches without sleep, and by the silent struggle with Nature; but our spirits were buoyed up by the thought that we were to strike the very first blow in this greatest of all wars.

Behind us there were a hundred million people, amongst them our own families, who had limitless faith in us. Imagine the joy of these people on the morning when we should successfully carry out this operation!

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Soon the fleet crossed the 180° date-line into the Eastern Hemisphere. About this time we received a report that a steamship was proceeding on the same course as ourselves, from SAN FRANCISCO to RUSSIA.

It was most important now to keep a good watch. There could be no doubt of our success, provided that this operation was not discovered by the enemy. Thereafter the whole crew kept watch for sight or sound of this ship; but fortunately even when near O point we had caught no sight of it. Considering the dense fog, we seemed to be under divine protection.

Finally, on the long-awaited X-Day, 8 December 1941, at 0130, we reached a point 300 miles to the north of HAWAII. Then the Imperial decree on the great battle was made public.

On this day there appeared in the clear sky a dense white cloud as if it were blessing our passage. Then from the decks of the aircraft carriers, plane after plane rose, flashing their silver wings in the sunlight, and soon there were a hundred and more aircraft in the sky.

Our Sea Eagles were now moving into a great formation. Our ten years and more of intensive training, during which we had endured many hardships in anticipation of this day -- would they now bear fruit? At this thought a thousand emotions filled our hearts as, close to tears, we watched this magnificent sight. One and all, in our hearts, we sent our pleas to the gods, and putting our hands together, we prayed.

Meanwhile our Sea Eagles, with the drone of their engines resounding across the heavens like a triumphal song, turned their course toward PEARL HARBOR on the island of OAHU and set forth on their splendid enterprise.

About thirty minutes later the fleet received the first report that the raid had been successful.

The second wave of the air attack force, in a large formation composed of some two hundred planes, took off in the same way an hour later.

Reports come in one after another: "Enemy anti-aircraft fire is becoming more and more intense -- we are now attacking against the main force of the enemy -- we are bombing enemy airfields, the damage is enormous--"

In this moment we are repaid for all our painstaking labors. The gods themselves will bear witness to the glory of our great enterprise!

The deck is now transformed into a whirlpool of excitement. As the glorious battle results are announced one after another by the pipes of the hurrying orderlies, shouts of joy are raised on all sides, and all gloom is completely swept away.

Meanwhile the fleet moves swiftly onward at a high speed of 26 knots.

About 0900 the welcome shapes of the returning raiders begin to appear through the clouds. One by one, like fledglings longing for their nest, they come to rest on the decks of the carriers.

Well done! But have they all come back? At this moment, my most earnest hope is that our losses may be small.

Within an hour, all the planes were brought aboard. We had lost only 29 planes. It was an incredibly small number when compared with our glorious battle results; nevertheless, when their heroic end was announced, the hearts of the crew were filled with sorrow for these men, and for the fate of our special submarines<sup>(1)</sup>

(1) TOKUSHU SENKOTEI 特殊潜行艇

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Suddenly the anti-aircraft defense signal was sounded. An enemy plane, above the clouds, was insolently following in the trail of our aircraft. Intending to shoot it down with one blast from our ship, we manned our battle stations, but in a moment the enemy got away.

It was also reported that the enemy fleet was on our trail; but this was only a false alarm, and all the ships withdrew towards O point.

Thus, having inflicted upon America a loss which cannot be wiped out in a lifetime, we finally set out upon our homeward journey.

On the way, the 2nd <sup>Casidy</sup> ~~Aviation~~ and the 8th <sup>Casidy</sup> ~~Aviation~~ were detached and headed for TAKE Island as an attack force.

On a morning near the end of the year -- 25 December -- we entered the harbor at KURE, which we had long been yearning to see again.

On thinking back, it was a long journey. The heroic men who took part in it, the public excitement at home of which we learned by radio, and the wild waves of the stormy North Pacific, are all etched upon my heart like a vivid dream.

Ah, memorable day - 8 December 1941!

(This concludes my recollections of the

HAWAII Operation)

## (NEW GUINEA) RABAU Operations

I had but a short while, but nevertheless I celebrated a victorious New Year's Day in the homeland and enjoyed to the fullest the taste of my native land. Leaving KURE behind, I set out on the long sea voyage to my second field of operations in the South Seas - to that southern land which I had longed for and dreamed of since my childhood. I stood at my lookout station watching white seas of dancing silver and gold waves and naked natives dancing in the shadow of coconut trees floated before my eyes. At length the fleet passed TAIWAN and entered the Tropical Zone. At TRUK, the land of eternal summer, we changed to our tropical uniforms.

The bright sun sent out blazing rays and it was steaming hot inside the ship. This completely dissipated my cherished illusions about the tropics. Even so, the squalls which occasionally assailed us, accompanied as they were with cool winds and rain, ameliorated the heat. Then at night the gentle evening breeze, blowing drowsily, gave delicious coolness to my hot body. Looking heavenward, stars like scattered gold and silver twinkled here and there in the evening sky. The Southern Cross, which I was seeing for the first time, glittered there among them.

The nights in the South Seas roused vague feelings of longing for home. Giving consolation for our inadequacies, the rippling waves broke against the side of the boat like sparkling scatterings of beautiful pure silver. The South Sea vegetation grew luxuriantly directly down to the beating waves and its beautiful contours were reflected on the surface of the sea. Adding the moon to this, the mid-day heat seemed a dream.

We stopped here for a certain number of days, then when the supplying was completed, finally turned toward the RABAU theater of operations and went forth to the attack. The gun shields were put up, and lookouts posted as usual.

CONFIDENTIAL

Since leaving KURE Harbor, how many times have I longed for a peaceful sleep in a hammock! Exhausted by work during the day, at night I lay among the machine guns on the upper deck, never closing my watchful eyes for an instant. Are the men on the homefront really aware of these hardships?

Finally, on 20 January, we launched our planes from a point 200 miles north of RABAU and NEW GUINEA. From that time until the 24th, when army units and landing forces carried out a bold landing in the face of the enemy, we sailed back and forth across the equator, moving northward during the day and southward at night. We bombed every day at dawn for about 10 times. Our beloved plane, the ABUKUMA<sup>(1)</sup> also took part in the bombing, receiving its baptism of fire. We did not see the enemy in this operation. Bitterly disappointed at this, we returned once again to TRUK.

## Part DARWIN Operations

On 1 February we received word of the appearance of an enemy striking force on the east end of the MARSHALL Islands. Our striking force, under orders to take and exterminate this enemy immediately, headed straight for the MARSHALL Islands.

However, the hour arrived and the enemy was nowhere about, so there was nothing to do but to sail for the next field of operations, namely PALAU, where we were to carry out joint operations with the Southern Force.

PALAU Island boasts of being the most civilized among the various South Sea Islands. The South Sea Islands Government Office is located here, and both the buildings and the inhabitants are civilized in comparison with TRUK and other islands.

With its stores, perks, shrines, APAI<sup>(2)</sup>, elementary schools, and in the military line the Air Group, Stores Department, etc., it reminded me of country towns at home.

Here I approached two native girls and in exchanging conversation with them on various subjects was amazed at their skill in Japanese, at their simplicity and naivety, and at the intelligence of their profiles.

On a certain day here we were sent out to destroy POINT DARWIN, an important port on the extreme northern tip of hostile AUSTRALIA. The planes took off as in the previous battle from a point 200 miles away, and inflicted tremendous damage on the port.

Our striking force next had to prepare for the JAVA Operations in the Indian Ocean. Giving chase to an enemy submarine, we sailed into STARING BAY in the Dutch-held CELEBES, which were now under occupation by our paratroop forces and landing forces.

## Indian Ocean (JAVA) Operations

England and America's ambitious 100-year-old dream of advancing into the South Seas and the Orient was finally shaken to its foundations as defeat followed defeat. In spite of the fact that they were taking their deathbed gasp; still stubborn, they despatched the

(1) ABUKUMA 阿武隈

(2) APAI 7/1/1 unidentified.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Combined British, Dutch and American Fleet, which now had no capital ships, and continued their throes in the JAVA area, their last defense. Our striking force, which was to help this enemy across its last river, acting in close cooperation with other South Sea forces, weighed anchor in STARING BAY on 25 February and was on its way to the salty Indian Ocean.

The fleet, keeping a strict anti-submarine patrol in the sea areas where enemy submarines navigate, advanced between the islands which intersperse the OMBAY Straits.

These waters, ripple-free as flowing oil, reminded me of the Inland Sea...(T.W. Remainder of sentence illegible)

Words at such a time fail to express what I feel. Wild ducks flying together, clouds floating majestically, a great school of dolphins -- the very picture of peace. Could it be that a bloody war was being fought on such a sea? It is not surprising that we felt a sense of wonder.

Finally the fleet made its splendid appearance in the Indian Ocean. A few hours later the 4th Cruiser Division<sup>(1)</sup> separated from the force as a detached force and left for an undisclosed destination. The remainder, 4 aircraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and several destroyers arrived in the vicinity of CHRISTMAS ISLAND to try to sink the enemy's fleet. We received reports from the Air Fleet 11 that one enemy carrier and one destroyer were trying to make port at CHRISTMAS ISLAND. We approached this island and sent up a reconnaissance plane, but it was not able finally to locate any trace of them. No doubt the swiftly retreating enemy had learned of our approach, and had escaped under cover of night.

Grumbling over our ill luck in being again eluded out of an engagement, we changed our course and formation and headed for a supply base. Suddenly the alarm was given to man our battle stations. Wondering what had happened, we leaped to our battle stations and saw to our right a cloud of black smoke rising on the distant horizon. The big guns of the TONE<sup>(2)</sup> opened fire, belching black smoke. The destroyers up ahead also began firing.

Soon the enemy merchant ship broke into flames, and in a few minutes sank to the depths of the Indian Ocean.

From this first bombardment by our striking force, I was able to realize something of the difficulties of artillery warfare; I was surprised to learn that we had fired several hundred shells at a single merchant vessel. Several hours later we were again ordered to man our battle stations. As we took up our posts, full of fighting spirit, the big guns of the TONE in the rear were already firing and shortly thereafter the HIEI<sup>(3)</sup> also opened fire.

Finally we sighted the two enemy cruisers which were following astern. They at once made a quick 180° turn and fled into the clouds and mist.

(1) 四戰隊

(2) 利根

(3) 比叻



C O N F I D E N T I A L

\* { Apparently it was considered too much trouble to finish them off with artillery fire; so our Sea Eagles rose with one flap of their wings from the decks of the carriers. In a few moments they sent the enemy to the bottom and came triumphantly back. In a short time the T.O.L. rescued members of the enemy crew from the same ship and returned to its group. In the meantime the destroyer AKIAKE (1) came back with 27 crewmen and other persons from the merchant ship which had previously been sunk.

We, who had not fired a single shot while we watched the artillery fight of the other ships, grieved with vexation beyond description, staring at the sky. In the meantime, off the coast of SOERABAJA and BATAVIA, our destroyer squadrons opened a day and night battle, and brilliant battle results followed in quick succession.

The enemy must have escaped somehow to Australia; not one of them was caught in our net. Finally, as a last resort, we carried out a great bombing attack on a large group of transports that were entering the harbor of BJILATJAP.

About that time the weather began to get worse, belying the reputation of the Indian Ocean as the most peaceful of the seven seas. The wind velocity increased to 20 meters per second, and the ships rolled with a 20-degree list to port and starboard. Finally we gave up taking on oil from alongside and began to take it stern on because of the heavy seas.

Afterwards in the midst of the rough weather, our force resumed its ceaseless reconnaissance, moving east and west in irregular movements in search of the enemy. At that time the statements of the survivors picked up by the TOME were made public.

These men knew nothing of the movements of their own fleet; they did not even know that HAWAII had been attacked. They seemed to believe that our fleet was concentrated only in the CELEBES. From this we could see how America was concealing her crushing defeats in a desperate attempt to prevent a decline in morale.

England and America, sacred countries of disguise, now your last time has come. Enemy of mankind, evil spirit of peace, the harsh blow of heaven has fallen against you.

Heaven will by no means forgive you, who for your own profit have planned an unscrupulous attack on Japan, the nation of righteousness, and on the Oriental people - you, who are trying to subjugate the world and to make the world a paradise for the white race!

Among the races who have been exploited up till now by the English and Americans are the Indians, the Malaysians, the Chinese, the Burmese, and countless other ignorant races whom civilization has bypassed. They have become the victims of the characteristic English-American policy of "squeeze and take", while the latter line their purses and nurture their overweening ambition.

They cause GANDHI to cry out for the independence of India and far away they carry on an opium war in the Republic of China.

---

(1) 有明

CONFIDENTIAL

All this is a cry from the heart of the splendid peoples of the Orient who are trying to escape the pressure which is being brought upon them by England and America.

However, now the blood of the Oriental peoples has returned to the original cherished desire of the Orientals and has been embraced by them. Their feelings are shown by the fact that they have pledged their mutual cooperation and assistance for the great undertaking of Japan, the leading power of the Orient.

Japan, who, as the leader of the Orient has opposed the powerful countries of England and America, really loves Asia and is laboring for the peace of mankind.

Our task group was now passing in the vicinity of ADMIRALTY BAY and on the eleventh we were scheduled to enter the port of KENDARI.

Although scarcely two months had passed since we left the homeland, it seemed like two years.

In the Indian Ocean, where once the German ship EMDEN played a spectacular part in the destruction of trade, there is now not a shadow of the enemy, and an uncanny silence pervades the surface of the sea where there is a faint reflection of the moon.

// Operations in the Indian Ocean (CEYLON)

With regard to the attack on CEYLON, which must grace the final pages of the history of our striking force, every possible preparation for battle had been completed during the 15 days when we lay at anchor in STARBUCK BAY. Actually it was at the very crack of dawn on 26 March 1942 when once again it sallied forth into the fleecy-capped waves of the Indian Ocean. We saw, just as we did in the Java operation, the porpoises playing near the ocean's surface, as if the quiet, gently-lapping waves of OMBAI Straits were lulling them to sleep.

There is a saying that the Indian Ocean has mountainous waves and that it is the ocean of the devil. But the Indian Ocean, shining before our eyes, was like an extremely quiet bay or a gently-rocking cradle.

Sailing around from place to place like this, a mundane feeling touched me. I was reminded of the days when I was a young bachelor with my pay envelope containing my monthly 50 ¥ converted into pure happiness, when I was swaggering through the street shops with an air of independence showing on my pimply face.

While I was writing, so tense with excitement was I that I might easily have sold my dearest possession at bargain prices. As the saying goes, my duties were like heavy weights on my shoulders.

We continued to sail swiftly and uneventfully, loading oil from time to time, standing watch, and keeping anti-submarine lookout. What strength there is in being with speedy airplanes!

At daybreak of the day before the attack, 4 April 1942, 400 miles from CEYLON, an enemy Consolidated Flying Boat met us. The bugle stirringly sounded "aerial attack" and the entire crew took up their posts.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Happy day! My blood ran fast and my flesh tingled as the enemy planes for which I had been waiting since the outbreak of the war appeared 30° off the port side. The shells were bursting in the air. It was more stirring than I had imagined it would be. The enemy tried to hide himself, using the white clouds as a smoke screen, but to no avail; our ships' fire sought him out, and after a few minutes of aerial warfare he came crashing down, trailing a long tail of smoke against the sky. Ah! They have exhausted all their secret methods! What feelings the enemy must have experienced during those few minutes! What a lamentable way to spend one's last few moments of life!

Early on 5 April, for which we had been waiting, our force reached a point 200 miles south of CEYLON. The weather was excellent for good aerial bombardment.

Before daybreak, a huge formation of planes set out for the enemy's last stronghold, COLOMBO in CEYLON. This attack was timed to take place just at the time of an Anglo-Indian conference. Piercing the morning haze like impetuous falcons, the planes soon disappeared from sight.

In less than an hour we received our first reports. According to those, we obtained brilliant results from aerial attacks on an enemy escorted convoy, on ground installations and airfields, and on an enemy plane on patrol duty. The planes returned to the ships safely.

Meanwhile, shipborne reconnaissance seaplanes went out to search for the enemy, looking to the west and to the south for ships and small craft. Presently, we received a wireless message from a plane of the 8th Cruiser Division to the effect that one carrier and one destroyer had been sighted. A carrier bomber unit was despatched instantly and sank them immediately. (Two enemy cruisers were mistaken for a carrier and destroyer).

The force, going outside its patrol radius, sailed north and then south in irregular movements.

Finally, after our supplying was completed, we turned to our next field of attack, TRINCOMALEE.

We launched the attack from a point 200 miles to the east at dawn on 9 April, in fine weather. Inasmuch as our large flying boats had been shooting down enemy craft for some time, we thought it likely that the enemy was expecting an attack on this occasion. However, our bold and intrepid fliers will turn the tables on the English by using their own strategy of crushing the enemy with a single blow. When we see the enemy, we will shoot him down without fail. The enemy faces the grim prospect of certain death.

The enemy's military installations at TRINCOMALEE were bombed until there were none remaining. Furthermore, our fleet dispatched its reserve forces and in the work of a moment sank the aircraft carrier HERMES and a destroyer which were cruising in neighboring waters. We seemed to be inspired with superhuman powers.

At this point, an enemy heavy bomber unit consisting of 9 planes audaciously attacked our force; but because the bombs fell from an altitude of 6000 meters, they did no more harm than startling the fish in the sea. Our 25 mm. machine guns pursued the planes above the ships and spurring fire in unison, brought down seven of them. This one battle certainly proved how weak the fighting capacity of enemy planes is.

CONFIDENTIAL

The face of the braggart Churchill who before the war disdained and scorned Japan, and the face of the miserable Churchill who now stumbles straight to defeat, would bear resemblance to the face of an actor who plays a double role of sorrow and glee.

The striking force in the BAY OF BENGAL and our force held each other; the BAY OF BENGAL force said it had been carrying on operations for five days and had obtained great results.

The English sun of military power in India, having finally lost its last vestige of defense, seemed on the point of setting.

The great British Empire has been shaken to its foundations, and its dream of world domination has been turned into a nightmare.

The passage of time has now fulfilled its purpose. Heaven has sent down its blessing upon the righteous, and crushed the wicked with an iron hand. Now this earth, which was made for the general benefit of all mankind, will be wholly transmuted into the paradise that has been the cherished hope of Eastern peoples. Japan, at the head, loudly sounds the knell of tyranny, and Japan, who leads the East to rebirth, is most fitted to bestow the blessing of the gods.

Back to our longed-for mother country! At long last we return to our home port. In frankness I admit that I shed a tear as we bade farewell to the skies of the Southern Seas. The ship, seeming to quiver with joy, passed through the beautiful MALACCA STRAITS on a northerly course.

We were on our way to our distant homeland, our hearts filled with emotion; loaded with honor, the best gift we could take to our native land was our glorious victory and our triumphal song.

Soon, as we were approaching the most northerly extremity of the PHILIPPINES, we received word by radio that an enemy task force had suddenly appeared at a point 750 miles south of Tokyo. Our force was ordered to destroy the enemy immediately. We sped to the attack at a high speed of 20 knots, intending to attack the enemy as long as our fuel held out. By an irony of fate, however, before we were able to reach this point, on the 18th of December several cities in the TOKOKU district of Japan suffered an air attack on a small scale.

We wept bitter tears and were filled with indignation; but although we continued the search for the enemy, we were unable to find him. However, it could not be helped and we followed the pre-arranged course that should have led us to the enemy, until, on the 23th, the whole fleet dispersed in home waters and we hastened to our longed-for home ports.

Friends and comrades of the striking force, for a long time we have suffered and been happy together; together we have rendered a great service to our country. Now the time has come for us to part; but, sooner or later, the day will come when we shall be together again. Until then, enjoy yourselves and be happy! While my heart is grieved at this sad parting, I shall try to write a few lines of feeble verse.

(P.S. The "few lines of feeble verse" (eight pages) have been omitted)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #8  
(TRANSLATION OF THREE CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS )  
ENTITLED

(A)

"JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES  
CONCERNING  
EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII"  
(same as SOURCE DOCUMENT #5, SUPRA)

(B)

"JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI"

(C)

"JAPANESE PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
 NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE TWO EIGHT)  
 c/o Fleet Post Office  
 San Francisco, California

FE

ML/jfm

CONFIDENTIAL

30 June 1943 Serial AS-300921

*Dofanore*

L11-1/BF37

From: Officer in Charge.  
 To: Distribution List Contained in Paragraph 2.  
 Subj: ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents,  
 Item No. 472 - "Submarine School Notes Concerning  
 Early War Experiences Off Hawaii."  
 ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents,  
 Item No. 473 - "Instructions to the Yatsunami Butai."  
 ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents,  
 Item No. 474 - "Places of Military Importance in the  
 Kurile Islands."

1. The enclosures forwarded herewith need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is required.

2. Distribution is as follows:

	<u>No. of Copies</u>
Cominch .....	2
VCNO (ONI) .....	5
VCNO (ONI) (For CinC Eastern Fleet) .....	1
CinCPac .....	1
CinClant .....	2
ComNorPac .....	5
ComSoPac .....	10
ComSoWesPac .....	5
ComSubPac .....	10
ComDesPac .....	10
ComAmphibForPac .....	3
NZNB .....	2

*M Legendre*  
 M. LEGENDRE  
 By direction

Encls:

1. Subject translations
2. Original Documents #472 and 473 (to ONI only)

*Copy return &  
 Capt the house*

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

## CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # \_\_\_\_\_, ICPOA Item # 472 Transl. by ICPOA Date 10 June 1943Title of Publication SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAR \_\_\_\_\_EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Initial Date \_\_\_\_\_ Final Date \_\_\_\_\_

Jan. 12, 1941Instructor Maeshima

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been no opportunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the 11th. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-68 recently, it has been decided to immediately mimeograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

(1)

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

NO. 1. TACTICS

## 1. Use of submarine carried planes.

- A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.
- B. When on packet station, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplanes carrying submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

## 2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

- A. Since America's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-16 (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)

- B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge

(A) The I-68 primarily used sound listening patrol chōon shōkai 聽音哨戒了

(2)



(3) CONFIDENTIAL

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following method was used and no uneasiness was felt because of the sound listening patrol.

## 3. Observation patrol.

A. (1) Slowest speed used.

(2) Ventilation stopped.

(3) In steering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rest was all man power.

(4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the outer edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was impossible to do so. Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.

B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.

## 4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed patrol.

B. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, he on guard.

NO. 2. COMBAT DUTY

## 1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

A. The method carried out by I-16 is as follows:

(1) Hoisted a "Breadth Four" Ensign at the tip of the periscope.

(2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Ensign on the ladder to the bridge.

(3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc, its position and course one or two days previously to the home combat force [丙 戰 部 隊]

When returning to an advanced base, [we] took the system of having the commandant of the advance base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.

B. There is an example of submarine I-63 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

(3)

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

## 1. Onshore Current.

- A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Point reef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.
- B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore.

NO. 4. MANEUVERING FOR ATTACK

## 1. Protracted submerged navigation.

- A. (1) In regard to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.
- (2) Although CO<sup>2</sup> reached 4.6%, O<sup>2</sup> reached 16% and the temperature reached 32°C., there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.
- (3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.
- B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.
- (2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "washing purifier" [洗淨式] type air purifying method.

## 2. Waves in the Hawaiian Area.

- A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times.
- Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.
- B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in sound detection patrol.
- Also, considering this, the periscope should be made as long as possible.

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

(5)

NO. 5. COMMUNICATION

## 1. Underwater wireless reception ability.

- A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sensitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 meters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area.

(Sending station USAMI)

NO. 6. (IS MISSING)NO. 7. HULL

## 1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.

- A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged navigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.

## 2. Damages caused by depth charge attack.

- A. While observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

- (1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were damaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).
- (2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).
- (3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.
- (4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.
- (5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.
- (6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.
- (7) Leakage in the Kingston valve of the negative buoyancy tank increased.
- (8) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.
- (9) The accuracy of the (---?---) ammeter decreased.
- (10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.
- (11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.

- B. (1) Disassemble the damaged depth indicator and remove the sea water

between the #1 and #2 beaks [  $\frac{1}{2}$  ] -7

- (2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

(5)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

## CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # \_\_\_\_\_, ICPOA Item # 473 Transl. by ICPOA Date 6 June 1943Title of Publication INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI

Originator \_\_\_\_\_

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Initial Date 14 October 1942 Final Date \_\_\_\_\_

The following translation was made from a document recovered from a two-man submarine raised May 7, 1943, by the salvage ship, USS ORTOLAN, under the Command of Lt. Commander A.A. Holland. The sub was located in Visale Bay, N.M. GUADALCANAL. The submarine was raised, but on account of a storm, broke loose and sank again.

October 14, 1942At SeaINSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI

1. On the evening of the 14th, after 2300 the midget subs will be launched west of Savo Island.
  2. Each unit will accomplish its mission according to the plan.
  3. In order to avoid confusion with the 8th Fleet and the Transport Group tonight, you will proceed submerged at a great depth until 0300 on the 15th.
  4. Midget submarines which have fired torpedoes and/or which have insufficient battery power remaining will proceed immediately to the shores of friendly places, if possible, to KAUAI.
  5. As there is at present no information for the evaluation of the true worth of the midget submarine, it is expected that each man will, both in the attack and the withdrawal, exert his every effort, and in this way (do his part) in supplying this information.
  6. Be confident in the August Virtue of His Majesty, in Providential Assistance, and in your ability which you have constantly developed.
- Go forth unchastened.
- "Heaven helps those who help themselves".

End.

Commanding Officer of the CHIYODA,  
HARADA, SATORU (AKIRA?).

## CONFIDENTIAL

## CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item # \_\_\_\_\_, ICPOA Item # 474 Transl. by ICPOA Date June 11, 43Title of Publication PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDSOriginator Technician of the Fisheries Experimental Station

IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE WRITER'S

Organization \_\_\_\_\_

Initial Date \_\_\_\_\_ Final Date \_\_\_\_\_

## TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

The following is a revised translation of a Japanese document captured in the recent ATTU operations. The original translation was made by the Advanced Intelligence Center, North Pacific Area. The ICPOA Revision includes the following points:

1. Addition of positions ( in latitude and longitude) of all geographical points mentioned in the original document.
2. The pronunciations for all geographical points in the following revised translation , are the pronunciations listed in Index of Japanese Place Names, Appearing in Japanese Hydrographic Publications, prepared by Intelligence Section, CinC Pacific Fleet, 1942.
3. Explanatory notes have been added.
4. Minor errors in the original translation have been corrected.

There is disagreement concerning the proper pronunciation of many place-names in the Kurile Islands, even in Japanese reference materials. For the sake of uniformity, and because it is thought to be the most accurate source, the CinPAC Index has been used to ascertain the correct pronunciation for the place names included in the following translation. The CinPAC Index contains every geographical point mentioned in the following translation with one exception. This exception is GYUKAKU, 47°09'N, 152°18'E., on SHIMUSHIRU Island. The translators have ascertained the position of GYUKAKU with the help of "Japanese Naval Air Chart," NO.11 ( War Department Map Collection Office reproduction). Any material in the following which is not a direct translation from the original document is indicated by brackets and the abbreviation "T.N.," meaning "translator's note."

CONFIDENTIAL

PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

Notes by a technician of the Fisheries Experimental Station

AKATSUKI 6174 Force

INFORMATION BULLETIN

1. This publication contains statements by a technician of the HOKKAIDO Government.

2. By Mr. \_\_\_\_\_

Time: 1935 - 1940

Season: June to August

Place: Kurile Islands [T.N. - Chishima Islands]

A general investigation of aquatic fauna has been made (salmon, salmon-trout, shark, shollfish).

The vessel used was a 26.76 ton, 60 HP, semi-diesel.

PROTECTED HARBORS IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

1. The Kuriles:

The Kurile Islands are divided into the Southern Kuriles, Central Kuriles, and Northern Kuriles.

A. Southern Kuriles: KUNISHIRI Island [T.N. KUNASHIRI Island 44°16' N, 146°00' E<sub>2</sub>], ETOROFU Island [T.N. 45°04' N., 147°48' E<sub>2</sub>]. (These are populated.)

B. Central Kuriles: URUPPU Island [T.N. 45°56' N., 150°00' E<sub>2</sub>], CHIRIHOI Islands [T.N. North CHIRIHOI, 46°32' N., 150°53' E.; South CHIRIHOI, 46°23' N., 150°49' E<sub>2</sub>], SHINCHI Island [T.N. SHIMUSHIRU Island, 46°58' N., 152°02' E<sub>2</sub>], KETOI Island [T.N. KETOI Island, 47°20' N., 152°30' E<sub>2</sub>], UGHISHIRU Island [T.N. 47°32' N, 152°49' E<sub>2</sub>], RASHO-A Island [T.N. RASHO-A Island, 47°45' N., 153°01' E<sub>2</sub>], KATSUNA Island [T.N. 48°05' N. 153°13' E<sub>2</sub>], SHASHIKOTAN Island [T.N. SHASUKOTAN Island 48°49' N., 154°06' E<sub>2</sub>], HARUNOKOTAN Island [T.N. 49°07' N., 154°31' E<sub>2</sub>], ONNEKOTAN Island [T.N. ONEKOTAN Island, 49°25' N., 154°45' E<sub>2</sub>].

C. Northern Kuriles: HOROLUSHIRO Island [T.N. PARALUSHIRU ISLAND, 50°20' N. 155°50' E<sub>2</sub>], GHURUSHU Island [T.N. GHILUSHU Island, 50°45' N., 156°20' E<sub>2</sub>], ARAITO Island, [T.N. ARAIDO Island, 50°52' N., 155°34' E<sub>2</sub>], (Populated during the summer for fishing.)

## (3) CONFIDENTIAL

## 2. Animals to be Found in the Kuriles

Walrus, sea-otters, and seals are native. Foxes are bred by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry only in the Central Kuriles. Near the shore, ABUAMI, SOHI [T.N. Translation for these fish unknown], salmon and salmon-trout (returning up the rivers) and BOTAN Shrimp are found. Cod and T.RABA Crabs are to be found off-shore.

## 3. Plants to be Found in the Kuriles:

There are forests as far north as URUPPU Island; but on the islands north of CHIRIHOI Island, only creeping pines and black alders, no taller than 6 feet, and weeds exist. There is a type of sea-weed known as KAIROPPA, about 15 meters in length, which has its leaf sections floating on the surface. Also there is sea-weed and sea-moss. [T.N. The Japanese term NORI has been translated as "sea-moss". NORI, or ASAKUSA NORI, is an edible red sea-weed. Its leaves are about 10 cm. wide and 20 cm. long. It grows best in winter. The weed is made into dried NORI, and is largely cultivated in estuaries where the water is brackish. It grows on sticks which are stuck into the sand at low tide. The mature leaves are dried. Yearly production of NORI is valued at 15,000,000 YEN, ranking next after sardines and herring as a fisheries product.]

## 4. Sea Routes from OTARU [T.N. Position of port is 43°12' N., 141°01' E.], HOKKAIDŌ to the Northern Kuriles.

A. OTARU to the SŌYA Straits [T.N. 45°45' N., 142°00' E.]; heading in a southerly direction along KITAMI Coast [T.N. The area known as the KITAMI Coast extends along the northern coast of HOKKAIDŌ from about 142°10' E. to 145°23' E.]; going from ADASHIRI [T.N. 44°01' N., 144°17' E.] toward IKABANOTSU Point [T.N. 45°26' N., 147°56' E.] on ETOROFU Island; heading in a northerly direction along the archipelago; passing through the ONEKOTAN Channel [T.N. 49°50' N., 155°05' E.]; and coming out on the Pacific side. Distance: 360 nautical miles.

B. OTARU to SŌYA Straits and direct to the Northern Kuriles. Distance: 800 nautical miles.

## 5. Protected Harbors.

Harbors suitable for small vessels ("\*" indicates harbors suitable for large vessels also).

## (1) ETOROFU Island:

\* SHANA area: [T.N. Position of port of SHANA is 45°14' N., 147°53' E.]

(4)

## CONFIDENTIAL

Offers good shelter even from north-westerly winds. There is a waterfall suitable for drinking water purposes. There is a salmon-trout canning factory. Practical Importance: It is a natural harbor; there are fishing establishments.

Remarks: On the Pacific shore, there is the harbor of HITOKAPFU [T.N.  $44^{\circ}58' N.$ ,  $147^{\circ}41' E.$ ] which is suitable for large vessels.

## (2) URUPPU Island:

FUTAGOSHIMA [T.N. Small island near S.W. tip of URUPPU, position of island is  $45^{\circ}38' N.$ ,  $149^{\circ}27' E.$ ]: There are shoals between FUTAGOSHIMA and URUPPU which reduce the force of the breakers. There is no water suitable for drinking.

\* MISHIMA Bay [T.N.  $46^{\circ}14' N.$ ,  $150^{\circ}20' E.$ ]; a sheltered harbor with a sandy bottom. Water from the KAIMEN River [T.N.  $46^{\circ}13' N.$ ,  $150^{\circ}20' E.$  (position of mouth)] is suitable for drinking. Salmon and Salmon-trout ascend the KAIMEN RIVER in the fall.

Remarks: KOBUNE Bay [T.N. Position of KOBUNE port is  $45^{\circ}56' N.$ ,  $150^{\circ}12' E.$ ] is on the Pacific side. Off the mouth of the Bay, is TOGARI INA, 28 meters high, which serves as a good landmark for entering the Bay. [T.N. TOGARI IWA is a pointed rock,  $45^{\circ}55' N.$ ,  $150^{\circ}12' E.$ ]. There is water suitable for drinking.

## (3) CHIRIHOI Islands:

\* SURA Bay [T.N.  $46^{\circ}32' N.$ ,  $150^{\circ}56' E.$ ] on Northern CHIRIHOI Island. Has sandy bottom. No drinking water.

## (4) SRIKISHIRU Island:

SHIMISHIRU Bay [T.N.  $46^{\circ}52' N.$ ,  $151^{\circ}51' E.$ ]: It is not a good harbor, but has a sandy bottom. Nearby is UMEURA [T.N. probably an inlet; position is  $46^{\circ}52' N.$ ,  $151^{\circ}48' E.$ ] where there is drinking water. BUROTON Bay [T.N.  $47^{\circ}09' N.$ ,  $152^{\circ}13' E.$ ]: A harbor suitable for small ships. Water has entered the crater; and the depth of the water and quality of the bottom is suitable for mooring in the area on the eastern side of a line running from the mouth of the bay to the Agriculture and Forestry Department's fox farm.

The mouth of the bay is narrow and shallow, and therefore it is easier to enter the harbor by having small boats indicate the shallowest areas, and having the ship pass in between them.

(4)



## (5) CONFIDENTIAL

\* GYUKAKU [T.N. Pronunciation not confirmed. Position is  $47^{\circ}09' N.$ ,  $152^{\circ}18' E.$ ; Do not confuse with GYUKAKU on PARAMUSHIRU Island]; Although the bottom is not good, it offers good shelter from N.W. winds. There is a road connecting with EUROTON Bay.

## (5) MATSUWA Island

There is shelter between YAMATO Bay [T.N.  $48^{\circ}05' N.$ ,  $153^{\circ}16' E.$ ] and BANJO Island [T.N.  $43^{\circ}05' N.$ ,  $153^{\circ}17' E.$ ]. Although the bottom is rocky, the area is bounded by the two islands, and the wind and waves can be avoided. Drinking water is available. There is a naval airfield.

## (6) SHASUKOTAN Island:

OTOME Bay [T.N.  $48^{\circ}48' N.$ ,  $154^{\circ}04' E.$ ]. A semicircular bay with sandy bottom. It is not a good harbor because of the wide mouth. Drinking water is available.

## (7) ONEKOTAN Island:

REMO Bay [T.N.  $49^{\circ}37' N.$ ,  $154^{\circ}49' E.$ ]: It is not a good harbor, but is suitable as shelter from south-easterly winds. There is drinking water. In respect to the north-westerly winds, the Pacific side is of value.

KUROISHI Bay [T.N.  $49^{\circ}26' N.$ ,  $154^{\circ}49' E.$ ]: Since KUROISHI Bay is on the Pacific side, it is of value when prevailing winds are from the west.

## (8) PARAMUSHIRU Island:

KAKIMAEYTSU [T.N. Position of port is  $50^{\circ}22' N.$ ,  $155^{\circ}36' W.$ ]: There are harbor facilities and a fine broadwater.

PARAMUSHIRU Straits [T.N.  $50^{\circ}43' N.$ ,  $156^{\circ}10' E.$ ] are the straits between PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU Islands, and constitute the most valuable area in the Northern Kuriles. KATAOKA Bay [T.N.  $50^{\circ}44' N.$ ,  $156^{\circ}11' E.$ ], MURAKAMI Bay [T.N.  $50^{\circ}44' N.$ ,  $156^{\circ}09' E.$ ], KASHIWABARA Bay [T.N.  $50^{\circ}41' N.$ ,  $156^{\circ}09' E.$ ] and canning factories are located along the straits. There are turbot [T.N. flatfish] in KASHIWABARA Bay. The fishing industry flourishes on PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU during the summer, and fishery installations are located at various points along the seacoast.

KATAOKA Bay is a naval base and KASHIWABARA Bay is an army base.

[T.N. The original document was not classified]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #9

(TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT  
DEALING WITH EVENTS IN THE JAPANESE WAR  
COMMENCING THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR  
AND CONTINUING THROUGH MANY JAPANESE-UNITED STATES ACTIONS  
INCLUDING THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR,  
GUAM, WAKE ISLAND, THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS, RABAU, THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD SEA BATTLES OF THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS, THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN ATTU AND KISKA ISLANDS IN THE ALEUTIANS, ETC., TO 20 SEPTEMBER 1943)  
ENTITLED

"PROFESSIONAL NOTEBOOK OF AN ENSIGN IN THE JAPANESE NAVY"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPIILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE-TWO-EIGHT)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

RECEIVED ON:  
FOREIGN MAIL ROOM

WJ/vhj

CONFIDENTIAL

25 February 1944 - Serial ADM-250829

1 11 12 04

From: Officer-in-Charge.  
To : Distribution List.

Subj: Translation of Captured Japanese Document -  
JICPOA Item No. 4986 - Professional Notebook of an Ensign in the  
Japanese Navy.  
Source: Captured TARAWA 24 November 1943.

1. Subject translation, forwarded herewith, need not be reported and when no longer of value should be destroyed. No report of destruction is necessary.

*M. Legendre*  
M. LEGENDRE,  
By direction.

Encl:

1. Subject Item No. 4986.

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

	<u>No. Copies</u>
ARMY	
-ComGenCenPac, APO 958 .....	2
AC of S., A-2, 7th AAF, APO 953 .....	2
AC of S., G-2, Alaska Defense Command .....	1
AC of S., G-2, Western Defense Command .....	1
ComGen Hqs., USAFISPA, APO 502 .....	1
Chief Military Intelligence Service .....	6
Operations Division, War Department .....	6
Chief of Engrs., War Department .....	4
Dir. of Intell. Service, AAF, Arlington, Va. ....	2
Commandant, M.I.S.L. School, Camp Savage, Minn. ..	2
NAVY	
-Cominch .....	3
CNO .....	12
CNO (Eastern Fleet) .....	1
BuAero .....	3
CinCPac .....	3
CinCPac-2 .....	1
ComSerFor .....	3
ComBatPac .....	3
ComCruPac .....	12
ComDesPac .....	3
ComSubPac .....	3
ComSubTrainPac .....	1
ComAirPac .....	3
ComHawSeaFron .....	3
DIO, LAND - A-6 Sec. ....	1
FRUPAC .....	1
ComCenPac .....	3
ComFifthPhibFor .....	10
ComGroupTwoFifthPhibFor .....	5
ComGroupThreeFifthPhibFor .....	5
ComSoWosPac .....	10
Directorate of Intell., Hqs. Allied Air Forces, SoWosPac ..	3
Director Naval Intelligence, Royal Australian Navy .....	2
ComSoPac .....	5
AICNA .....	3
Dir. Advanced Base Office Pacific .....	5
U. S. Advanced Base Personnel Depot, San Bruno, Cal. ....	5
Acorn Training Detachment, Pt. Huoneme, Cal. ....	5
Advanced Base Depot, Pt. Huoneme, Cal. ....	5
O-in-C, Navy Unit, West Coast .....	1
Commandant, Army & Navy Staff College .....	1
Each Task Force Commander .....	1

(Continued Reverse Side)

25 February 1944 - Serial ADM-250829

DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued):

	<u>No. Copies</u>
MARINES-Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps .....	3
CG, First Marine Amphibious Corps .....	3
CG, Fifth Amphibious Corps .....	5
CG, Marine Corps Schools .....	1
CG, Marine Forces, I&ND .....	2

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT

Captured TARAWA 24 November 1943

Received JICPOA 6 December 1943

-----  
TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

JICPOA Items #4986 and #4986-A represent a complete translation of the professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio (中村 敏雄), IJN. Although the material in the notebook is of uneven value, it was felt that a complete translation would be of interest inasmuch as it represents the activities of an officer from the time he first boarded ship until shortly before the GILBERTS operation.

Part of the material in the book seems to have been examined by some higher ranking officer, and, in some cases, the notation "Not Permitted" accompanied by a series of blue pencil marks, is found over passages which were thought censorable. However, the notebook itself bears the classification "MILITARY - VERY-SECRET" (GUNGOKUHI) on the cover, which seemed protection enough to the writer of the book for including material of a highly confidential nature.

Nothing is known of the circumstances of capture of the notebook or of the fate of the writer. Since no torpedo boat unit was at TARAWA at the time of the American landing, it is entirely possible that the author escaped and is still alive.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFOA Item #4986

Page 3

CHRONOLOGY OF PERSONAL HISTORY

15 November 1941 Received commission as Passed Midshipman from the Navy Department.

15 November Received orders from the Navy Department assigning me to the KAKO (CA). Junior Division Officer, 2nd Division, and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.

1 December Received orders from Navy Department assigning me to the AOBA (CA). Staff Officer and Look-Out Officer.

1 April 1942 Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Look-Out Officer and appointing me to Navigation Department, and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division.

15 April Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties to Navigation Department and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division and appointing me Coding Officer and Junior Division Officer 6th Division.

25 April Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Coding Officer and appointing me Communications Officer.

1 June Commissioned Ensign by the Cabinet.

1 June Notified by the Navy Department of my assignment to the AOBA.

15 July Assignment to AOBA confirmed by Navy Department.

15 August Attached to the DesDiv 9 by the Navy Department.

5 September Notified by AOBA to leave the ship and to take up position on NOWAKI (DD).

9 September Assigned to the MIKUGUMO (DD) by the Com DesDiv 9.

23 September (?) Assigned to the ASAGUMO as Navigating Officer by the Com DesDiv 9.

DIARY

15 November 1941 Graduated from the Naval College at LTAJIMA. Made a midshipman in the Navy.

November Ordered aboard the KAKO (CA) at KURE as Junior Officer, 2nd Division and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.

19 November KAKO entered drydock #3 at KURE.

21 November Granted leave and returned home.

23 November Returned to my ship.

24 November KAKO left drydock.

25 November KAKO left KURE; anchored in HASHIRA SHIMA Channel.

26 November Paid our respects to the Commander-in-Chief, 6th Fleet, on HASHIRA SHIMA.

29 November Left HASHIRA SHIMA Channel. (DD)

2 December Anchored at HANA SHIMA.

4 December Ordered aboard the AOBA (CA) as lookout officer (MIHARISHI).

December Left HANA SHIMA (to assist the GUAM Occupation Force).

7 December Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: (rendered elsewhere).  
The Reply of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet: (rendered elsewhere).  
The Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, to the Combined Fleet, (rendered elsewhere).

8 December The Emperor has proclaimed war on the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND. Imperial rescripts sent to the Ministers of the Army and Navy. Our striking force has delivered a successful surprise attack on HAWAII.  
Results:

Sunk:  
1 CALIFORNIA Class BB  
1 MARYLAND Class BB  
1 ARIZONA Class BB  
1 UTAH Class BB  
1 Unidentified Ship  
2 Heavy Cruisers  
1 Oiler

Heavily Damaged:  
1 CALIFORNIA Class BB  
1 MARYLAND Class BB  
1 NEVADA Class BB  
1 Cruiser

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 4

8 December 1941  
(continued)Moderately Damaged:1 NEVADA Class BB  
4 CruisersOur Losses:9 Fighter Planes  
15 Bombers  
5 Reconnaissance PlanesShot Down:

450 planes

Landings were made by our southern forces at KOTA BHARU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and AMBOINA Bay; BASCO was occupied. Our troops entered the International Settlement at SHANGHAI. The British Gunboat, PENGUIN, was sunk there. A detachment of American Marines at PEKING laid down their arms. SINGAPORE, MIDWAY, WAKE, CLARK FIELD, GUAM, HONGKONG, DAVAO were bombed.

9 December  
10 December

The American sea-plane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (off DAVAO). The Emperor was overjoyed with the results of the HAWAII operation, sending another rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet.

Offensive and defensive alliance with THAILAND signed. WAKE attacked. The destroyers HAYATE and KISARAGI were sunk by shell-fire.

Landings effected at VIGAN. One sub-chaser sunk. GUAM, APARRI, MAKIN, TARAWA occupied.

Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River.

The 11th Air Fleet participated in a naval battle of the MALAY PENINSULA. PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE sunk.

11 December

Tripartite Pact signed. WAKE attacked. Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, the recipient of another imperial rescript declaring the Emperor's pleasure over the naval battle off the MALAY PENINSULA. GERMANY and ITALY declare war on the UNITED STATES. Landings effected at LEGASPI.

12 December

Our ship, the AOKA, anchored at TRUK.

13 December

Left TRUK.

December

The main naval force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA.

16 December

AOKA anchored at ROI.

17 December

SHINONOME (DD) wrecked 15 kms. north of BARAM Point while on patrol duty off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 and sank.

20 December

PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, GUATEMALA, CUBA and HAITI all declared war on our Empire.

21 December

AOKA left ROI (to assist the WAKE Occupation Force).

22 December

Landings effected at LINGAYEN.

23 December

Occupation of WAKE completed.

The (TW) HAWAII Striking Force has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA.

25 December

AOKA returned to ROI and anchored.

HONGKONG surrenders.

Landings effected at JOLO in a surprise attack.

Two enemy subs sunk off LINGAYEN Bay (by the destroyers ASAKAZE and SATSUKI).

26 December

KUCHING occupied. The SAGIRI (DD) sunk by an enemy torpedo.

Minesweeper #6 and the #2 UNYO Maru (ARS) were bombed and sunk. The MURASAME (DD) collided with Minesweeper #20 at TAKAO. MANILA bombed. One enemy destroyer, two subs, and ten merchantmen sunk. The ASAKAZE sank a sub off LINGAYEN.

27 December

The American Army commander in the PHILIPPINES declared MANILA an open city. MANILA was bombed and ten merchantmen sunk. The NOJIMA (AF) was torpedoed and ran aground.

29 December

The RO-60 ran aground south of ROI.

31 December

The YAMAGUMO (DD) hit a mine off LINGAYEN Bay.

An enemy sub sank off LAOAG.

1 January 1942

LABUAN and BRUNEI occupied.

3 January

MANILA surrendered.

4 January

The MYOKO (CA) was bombed off MALALAG in DAVAO Bay. Has returned to SASEBO, damaged and with casualties.

5 January

AOKA left ROI at 0000, returned at 1000. (A report had been received that an enemy carrier and two cruisers had left HAWAII for WAKE. We were ordered to leave at night on search and guard duty.)

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 5

- 6 January 1942 Left ROI at 0200, returned at 1030 on same mission.
- 7 January Left ROI for TRUK.
- 9 January The KANKO Maru (香興丸) was torpedoed and sunk in the DUTCH EAST INDIES.  
Two more enemy subs have been sunk.
- 10 January Anchored at TRUK.
- 12 January The LEXINGTON sunk by the I-6.  
TARAKAN surrendered.  
Minesweepers #13 and #14 sunk off LINKAS.  
The minelayer, PRINS VAN ORANJE, sunk.
- 13 January MENGACHU FORT on LINKAS Island captured.
- 18 January Left TRUK.  
The I-131 sank a 10,000 merchantman north of TIMOR.  
The BANSHU Maru (番守丸) hit a mine and sank.  
The ASO Maru (阿蘇丸) (AP-AK) was severely damaged.
- 20 January At 1800 crossed the equator at 148°37' E. Long. going south. (Fighter planes from the ZUIKAKU shot down an enemy flying boat that was approaching us. We spotted five of its crew floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.) One special duty ship and several of our merchantmen have been sunk at SINGAPORE.
- 21 January Our forces attacked an enemy force concentrating at CEBU and sank several merchantmen.  
The MANA Maru (摩那丸) (AP-AK) was sunk (in the south).  
The ASAGUMO (DD) collided with the OI Maru (大井丸).  
Landings effected at the mouth of the SAMUPARA River and the mouth of KENDARI Bay.  
One of our destroyers has damaged six enemy merchantmen in the INDIAN OCEAN.
- 22 January Have reached the southernmost point on our course (4°9' S., 150°55'30" E.)
- 23 January BANAKA (?) Airfield on GERIIN (?) Island occupied. As the result of an enemy torpedo attack, the TATSUKAMI Maru (辰竹丸) (AK), TSURUGA Maru (数賀丸) (AK), and the KURETAKE Maru (久米竹丸) were sunk; the SULLANOURA Maru (奥摩利浦丸) and Patrol Boat #37 were heavily damaged.  
RABAUL occupied.
- 24 January Crossed the equator at 150°E. going north at 0555. Recrossed it going south at 150°5' E. at 1240. The MYOKEN Maru (妙見丸) (AK) was sunk off CILI JANG. Landings effected at KENDARI and BALIKPAPAN.
- 25 January The TOMENAWA Maru (利根丸) was grounded.
- 26 January Reached the southernmost point on our course at 1430 (4°45' S., 149°52'E.).
- 27 January The British destroyer, THANET, was sunk.  
Landings made on PALMNGKAT. SANBASU (?) occupied.
- 30 January AOBA anchored in RABAUL Harbor at 0800.  
(Handed over our prisoners.) Left RABAUL at 1730.  
FUJIMI occupied.
- 31 January Anchored in YSA EL PASSAGE.  
Our forces have progressed towards SINGAPORE.  
Landings effected at JMBON, ROTIN, and PONTIANAK.
- 29 January MINKATAN (?) and PONTIANAK occupied.
- 1 February Left YSA EL PASSAGE. An enemy striking force appeared in the MARKHILLS Area and we have received reports that they are attacking there. We left immediately for KWAJALEIN.  
The enemy force is composed of 2 carriers, five heavy (?) cruisers, and five destroyers.
- 3 February The Submarine I-62 sank a 10,000 ton tanker off COLOMBO.
- 4 February J.V. SEA Battle.  
Enemy Losses:
- 1 Dutch Cruiser (Java Class) sunk.
  - 1 Dutch Cruiser (DE RUYTER Class) sunk.
  - 1 Dutch Cruiser (Java Class) medium damage.
  - 1 American Cruiser (MARBLEHEAD Class) medium damage.



CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 6

5 February 1942 The Submarine RO-34 sank a destroyer in the SUNDA STRAITS.  
 2 February 0116. Crossed the equator bearing north, 153°50' E.  
 4 February KWAJALEIN. Entered the Harbor at ROI.  
 5 February KWAJALEIN. Left ROI. Anchored at the main island at  
 KWAJALEIN.  
 6 February KWAJALEIN. Departed from the main island.  
 7 February The HOYO (空洋丸) Maru ran aground outside KEBIN Bay.  
 The Submarine I-124 had a gunnery engagement with an  
 English destroyer and was sunk.  
 8 February The NATSUSHIO (DD) was sunk by torpedoes.  
 9 February The KISOGAWA (木曾川丸) Maru was sunk off SAIGON by an  
 enemy submarine.  
 Successful landings were carried out at MAKASSAR, AENBATO-  
 BATO, SURUMI, and GAKMATA.  
 10 February TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK.  
 12 February The YAMATO (BB) became the flagship of the Combined Fleet.  
 15 February SINGAPORE fell.  
 16 February A message from the throne on the occasion of the fall of  
 SINGAPORE.  
 19 February The MYOKO (女高丸) Maru was sunk off NOMO SAKI by an  
 enemy submarine.  
 20 February TRUK. Departed from TRUK. An enemy task force composed  
 of 1 BB, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers has  
 appeared at a bearing of 75°46' off RABAUL and our force  
 has set out to capture or annihilate it. It seems that  
 the enemy is planning to carry out a surprise attack on  
 TRUK.  
 Successful landings were carried out at DEU and KOEPANG.  
 BALI Island has been occupied.  
 The Submarine I-60 was sunk, in a naval battle off BATAVI.  
 4 destroyers were sunk and 2 cruisers and 1 destroyer were  
 badly damaged. The MICHISHIO (DD) and OSHIO (DD) were  
 badly damaged.  
 23 February TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. RABATO (?) has been  
 occupied.  
 24 February 2 enemy cruisers and 2 destroyers have carried out an attack  
 in the vicinity of WAKE Island.  
 25 & 26 February A submarine shelled the American mainland. The submarine  
 RO-63 met with an accident in the vicinity of WAKE  
 Island.  
 27 February In a naval battle off SOERABAYA, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers  
 were sunk. Their force consisted of 5 cruisers and 9 des-  
 troyers.  
 28 February The Submarine I-58 sank a 15,000 ton fueling ship in the  
 SUNDA STRAITS. The Submarine I-4 sank a freighter south  
 of JAVA.  
 \*2 March TRUK. Departed at 1000. Engaging in the Fourth Campaign  
 (SR Operations).  
 4 March Crossed the equator at 0015 bearing southward, 150°54' E.  
 An enemy carrier attacked MARCUS Island. The enemy force  
 was composed of the ENTERPRISE, SALT LAKE CITY, NORTHAMPTON,  
 and a number of destroyers. The ERIMO (龍巻) (AO) was  
 sunk by torpedoes.  
 5 March At 0600 entered the harbor at RABAUL. Took on provisions.  
 Departed at 1700.  
 8 March Successful landing carried out in MENATEI Bay.  
 9 March Swept the sea around KUINKARORA (?) and anchored there.  
 10 March The SNLF has landed and are cleaning out the enemy along  
 the coast. Departed at 1615.  
 11 March Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled.  
 14 March Departed from RABAUL.  
 15 March Entered the harbor at KUINKARORA and stood by.  
 17 March Departed from KUINKARORA.  
 18 March Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL (メロエバレー).  
 26 March Departed from MELLE CHANNEL.  
 27 March Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 7

28 March 1942 Departed from RABAUL. Engaging in the Fifth Campaign.  
30 March Landing at SHORTLAND successful.  
1 April Entered harbor of RABAUL. Left the same day.  
2 April Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.  
7 April Departed from MELLE CHANNEL.  
8 April Crossed the equator bearing north, 148°13' E.  
10 April Entered the harbor at TRUK.  
30 April Departed from TRUK to engage in the Fifth Campaign.  
5 May Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.  
6 May Departed from SHORTLAND.  
7 May Attacked by enemy planes. The SHOHO (CV) was sunk at a bearing of 56°, 52 miles off DEBOYNE Island.  
9 May Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.  
Took on provisions and departed the same day.  
11 May The OKINOSHIMA (海防艦) (CM) was sunk by torpedoes.  
12 May Entered the harbor at KIETA. The SNLF landed. There was no sign of the enemy.  
13 May Anchored at SHORTLAND. Took on provisions and departed the same day bound for TRUK, our destroyer alone.  
16 May Entered the harbor at TRUK.  
17 May Departed from TRUK, bound for KURE.  
22 May Entered the harbor of KURE at 1300.  
25 May Entered No. 3 Dock at KURE.  
26-31 May Had leave. Returned to snip.  
29 May Left the Dock. Moored to land at A Anchorage.  
8 June Changed mooring to No. 18 Buoy.  
10 June Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the same day. Practiced avoiding torpedoes while cruising.  
Tested our speed over a measured course.  
16 June ? Departed at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor at NAGAHAMA.  
17 June Departed from NAGAHAMA at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor of KITSUKI.  
18 June Departed from KITSUKI bound for TRUK.  
23 June Entered the harbor at TRUK.  
30 June Departed from TRUK.  
2 July Crossed the equator (the 9th time) bearing south.  
Time - 0230. The HOYO (海洋丸) Maru drew alongside our port side and we refueled in tow.  
5 July Entered the harbor at KIETA.  
6 July Drew alongside the HOYO Maru (海洋丸) and refueled.  
When we had finished, we left the harbor.  
7 July Anchored in REKATA LAGOON.  
10 July 2 Destroyers dropped anchor.  
14 July Departed at 1200.  
16 July Entered MELLE Channel.  
18 July Set out for KUINKORORA.  
19 July Entered the harbor at KUINKARORA.  
21 July Departed from KUINKORORA bound for RABAUL (our destroyer alone). Refueled and left port the same day bound for YSABEL PASSAGE.  
22 July Anchored in YSABEL PASSAGE. There were 2 destroyers and we remained there until the 26th.  
26 July Departed from YSABEL PASSAGE and anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.  
1 August RABAUL. Departed from RABAUL. Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.  
7 August Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an enemy task force was attacking TULAGI, we made a forced run to RABAUL. The enemy had started to land at TULAGI. We joined the CHOKAI (CA).  
8 August We made a night attack on TULAGI.  
10 August The KAKO (CA) was struck by torpedoes from an enemy submarine and sank. (30,500 metres out from MARWIU Island at a bearing of 48°; at about 2°28' S., 152°11' E.)  
Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.  
17 August Left MELLE CHANNEL.  
19 August Anchored in REKATA BAY.  
20 August Left REKATA BAY.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 8

21 August 1942 Joined the CHOKAI (CA).  
 22 August Separated from the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's, anchoring at SHORTLAND for supplies. When finished here, left.  
 24 August Spotted a convoy. Rejoined the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's.  
 26 August Anchored at KIETA.  
 27 August Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND.  
 28 August Left SHORTLAND for the south.  
 4 September Anchored at KIETA.  
 5 September Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. Left ship after supper and reported on board the NOWAKI (DD) for duty.  
 6 September Left SHORTLAND. Headed for TRUK, escorting the TOA Maru (東亞丸) (XAO or AK?).  
 9 September Anchored in TRUK Harbor at 1400. Was transferred aboard the MINEGUMO (DD) after supper.  
 10 September Left TRUK for the south, escorting the KENYO Maru (健洋丸).  
 23 September Anchored at TRUK. Left the MINEGUMO and reported on board the ASAGUMO (DD) for duty.  
 26 September Left TRUK for SHORTLAND (Apart from being in DesDiv 9, the ASAGUMO had also been made a part of the SOUTH SEAS Force (NANYO BUTAI).  
 29 September Anchored at SHORTLAND.  
 2 October Took on board materiel to be landed at GUADALCANAL and left SHORTLAND. Began unloading at 2058, completed it successfully at 2230.  
 3 October Returned to SHORTLAND for supplies.  
 5 October Enemy carrier-based bombers attacked us (one bomb dropped very close: 200 metres on our port beam), but no damage. We repulsed them. Left SHORTLAND for the second time on the "ferry service" to GUADALCANAL. Were attacked by enemy planes. The NATSUGUMO (DD), MINEGUMO, and MURASAME turned back.

## (Reinforcement Butai)

26 September The DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) was attached to the Outer South Seas Force and set out from TRUK.  
 29 September Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.  
 2 October 0800 Departed from SHORTLAND on a southerly course. Our force was composed of the DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) and the DesDiv 2 (TN: dg) (minus the YUDACHI and the SAMIDARE). Had as passengers 250 soldiers who were to be put ashore; also carried provisions and 15 rear-cars which were to be put ashore.  
 2048 Arrived at KAMIMBO and commenced unloading operations.  
 2230 Work was completed.  
 2246 Departed from KAMIMBO, following a southerly course.  
 3 October 1036 Anchored at SHORTLAND.  
 5 October 0630 Departed from SHORTLAND, following a southerly course. Our force was composed of the DesDivs 9 and 2 (TN: dg). Carried as passengers 650 soldiers who were to be put ashore. As cargo carried 2 mountain guns, telegraph apparatus, and tools for laborers, which were to be put ashore.  
 1505 Were attacked by 10 enemy planes. The MINEGUMO (DD) was damaged by a near hit forward, sprang a leak and returned to SHORTLAND escorted by the NATSUGUMO (DD).  
 1552 Were attacked by nine enemy planes. Our ship was attacked by 3 carrier-based bombers. Bombs landed 100° to starboard, distance 50 meters, 50 meters off the bow, and 150° to starboard, distance 100 meters. Sustained no damage.  
 1705 The MURASAME (DD), having sprung a leak, because of a near hit by a bomb, returned to SHORTLAND.  
 1924 Enemy planes on patrol dropped flares.  
 2116 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced unloading operations.  
 2254 Unloading completed.  
 2257 Departed from TASSAFARONGA, following a central course.

## 548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 9

6 October 1019 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND, having entered the harbor through the North Channel.

8 October 0551 Set out from SHORTLAND, heading down the "Slot". (TN: CHUO-KORO 中央丸号). Our force was composed of the DesDiv 9 (minus the MINEGUMO) and the DesDiv 2 (minus the MURASAME and the SAMIDARE). Carried as passengers 560 men who were to be put ashore. As cargo, carried 18 trench mortars. Also carried a MAIZURU 4th Special Naval Landing Force Communications Unit and Work Unit.

1607 Were attacked by 11 enemy planes and our escort planes joined battle with them.

2056 Reached TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations.

2219 Operations concluded.

2224 Departed from TASSAFARONGA proceeding along the "Slot".

9 October 0453 Were attacked by 11 enemy carrier-based bombers and our escort planes joined battle with them.

0506 The enemy's carrier-based bombers attacked us and bombs landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard, distance 100 meters, and 80° to starboard, distance 50 meters. Shot down one of the enemy planes.

1120 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND.

11 October 0558 Departed from SHORTLAND. Our force was composed of the NISSHIN (CVS), CHITOSE (CVS), AKITSUKI (DD), the DesDiv 9 and the DesDiv 11 (TN: dg) (minus two destroyers). Carried as passengers 728 men who were to be put ashore. Also carried 4 15 cm. howitzers, 4 tractors, 2 field guns, 16 cases (?) of ammunition, 1 antisircraft gun, 1 fixed radio (HOTAI-MUSEN). The above materials were aboard the NISSHIN and CHITOSE. The ASAGUMO (DD) and the DesDiv 11 (minus 2 destroyers) carried 1 regimental gun, 2 battalion guns, 2 rapid-fire guns, 1 trench mortar, and ten tons of provisions.

2023 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations.

2123 Operations completed.

2130 Departed from TASSAFARONGA.

2135 Sighted our forces engaged in battle with the enemy a little north of SAVO Island. (The losses sustained by our 6th Fleet were: FURUTAKA (CA), sunk; AOKA (CA), badly damaged, and FUSUKI (DD), sunk).

2236 Returned to our anchorage. The NISSHIN and CHITOSE had not completed the disembarkation of the materials she carried.

2304 Operations were completed, and we changed our course to the south.

12 October 0655 Joined the SENDAI (CL).

0850 The MURAKUMO was hit by bombs from enemy planes and was unable to proceed and the DesDiv 9 went to her assistance.

1105 Arrived at our destination where we were assigned to patrol duty. Tried to tow the SHIRAYUKI (DD).

1258 Sighted 2 enemy carrier-based bombers.

1303 Sighted the two planes again.

1343 Attacked by 11 carrier-based bombers and 8 fighters.

1348 The NATSUGUMO was damaged by a bomb and was unable to proceed, and gradually began to list.

1415 The MURAKUMO was struck by a torpedo which exploded

1427 The NATSUGUMO sank but the crew was saved.

1445 Made our escape from this place.

1538 Joined the DesDiv 3 (sd).

1640 Proceeded to tow the MURAKUMO

1850 Arrived at this place.

1850 The SHIRAYUKI was disposed of with torpedoes. (RAIGEKI SHOBUNSU).

1909 Started back.

13 October 0630 Put in at SHORTLAND.

14 October 0353 Set out from SHORTLAND via the North Channel.

2021 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA where we changed our anchorage and established patrols.

2350 The CHOKAI (CA) and the KIUGASA shelled the airfield.

15 October 0400 A transport fleet (SENDAI (CL), YURA (CL), and TATSUTA (CL), ) completed disembarking operations.

CONFIDENTIALJICFOA Item #4986  
Page 10

15 October 1942  
(Continued) 0155 Started back, following a course north.  
1604 Put in at SHORTLAND.

17 October 0316 Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route..  
2029 Arrived at ESPERANCE where we commenced disembarking  
operations.  
2205 Finished the operations.  
2216 Departed from ESPERANCE going down the "Clot".

18 October 0446 The SENDAI was struck by a torpedo from an enemy submarine  
but sustained no damage. Three depth charges were dropped  
with unknown results.  
0930 Put in at SHORTLAND where we were attached to the main  
Fleet (?) (TN: SHUTAI 主隊).

24 October 1616 Departed from SHORTLAND in order to carry out an all-out  
attack against GUADALCANAL.

25 October Though we occupied one corner of the airfield on GUADAL-  
CANAL, we did not seize the airfield. Our forces stood  
by to the west.

26 October 1325 Put in at SHORTLAND.

30 October 0100 Enemy planes dropped bombs and 3 landed 50 meters off  
the bow.  
0123 Enemy planes dropped bombs and 6 landed 40° to port,  
distance, 30 meters. UCHIDA, Seaman, 3rd Class, was  
killed.

1 November 0800 The flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was run up  
on the ASAGUMO (DD).  
2230 Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.

2 November 2020 Left our companion ships and proceeded to the anchorage  
of a transport fleet. Maintained patrol outside (the  
anchorage).  
2330 Stopped disembarkation work and started back, following  
a course north.

3 November 1540 Put in at SHORTLAND.

4 November 2330 Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.  
2357 Enemy planes dropped some bombs 90° to port, distance,  
about 1000 meters.

5 November 2010 Parted ways with the transport fleet and continued on to  
the anchorage where we took up patrol.  
2101 The MURASAME sighted a torpedo-boat which it illuminated  
and shelled.  
2227 Disembarking operations were finished and we started back.  
The SHIGURE (DD) sighted a periscope (proceeding along a  
central course) and dropped depth charges.

6 November 0941 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND.

7 November 0800 The Command Flag was transferred to the TENRYŪ (CL) where  
it was run up.  
2300 Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.

8 November 1926 Separated and proceeded to our patrol station. Went to  
the anchorage of the transport fleet.

8 November 1937 The MOCHIZUKI (DD) sighted a torpedo-boat and illuminated  
it.  
2220 The SHIGURE, YUGURE (DD), and MOCHIZUKI went on ahead,  
starting back.  
2245 The transport fleet completed the disembarkation work  
and started back.

9 November 0554 Torpedoes were fired at us by an enemy submarine, which  
was proceeding along the "Slot". The SHIRATSUYU (DD) and  
YUDACHI proceeded to attack the submarine and sink it.  
0850 Put in at SHORTLAND.  
1500 The DesRon Flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was  
transferred to the ASAGUMO and run up.

11 November Returned to the DesRon 4, our original unit.

12 November 1520 Set out from SHORTLAND (departing by the North Channel).  
1330 Joined the DesRon 10 and 11 and set off for the south  
where a battle developed off LUNGA.

CONFIDENTIALJICFOA Item #4986  
Page 11

13 November 1942 0000 Torpedoes were fired from starboard but we continued on our way. We illuminated and shelled an enemy destroyer and inflicted great damage.  
0052 The YUDACHI was hit by a bomb and was unable to keep under way.  
0126 It withdrew.  
0906 Met up with the KIRISHIMA (BB).  
0935 Set out to do rescue work at the HILEI (BB).  
1414 Stopped rescue work and tried to join the Main Force.  
2010 Met up with the Advance Force.

14 November 0355 Were fueled by the HARUNA (BB).  
1435 Three torpedoes passed underneath our ship. We dropped depth charges. A battle broke out off SAVO Island.  
2200 Sighted 3 enemy battleships. A battle in which both torpedoes and guns were used broke out.  
2205 Launched a torpedo with unknown results. Our main batteries were very effective. The KIRISHIMA was hit with bombs and was unable to keep under way.  
2355 Put in alongside the KIRISHIMA. The entire crew abandoned ship (TW: the KIRISHIMA).

15 November 0123 The KIRISHIMA sank.  
0233 Ceased rescue operations and withdrew.  
1110 Joined the SENDAI (CL) and at 2100 joined the CruDiv 8 (8).

16 November 0600 Were supplied (with fuel) by the NICHIEI (海保丸) Maru (XAO).

18 November 0719 Put in at TRUK, entering by the North Channel.

21 November 1000 The Command Flag was transferred to the NAGARA (CL) and run up.

26 November 0800 Entered the dock.  
5 December 0730 Left the dock.  
6 December 0630 Left the harbor and carried out patrol to the north.  
7 December 1513 Entered the harbor.  
8 December 0600 Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol while the SIIGURE had firing practice.  
1540 Entered the harbor.

9 December 1706 Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol to the north.

13 December 1530 Departed by the north entrance and proceeded to escort the CHUYO (ACV).

15 December 1420 The CHUYO sighted the UZUKI (DD) off the bow.  
1445 Caught up with her. She turned around and we proceeded on to TRUK.

17 December 2335 Sighted a submarine on the surface and dropped 6 depth charges but were unable to determine results.

18 December 0627 Put in at TRUK by the North Channel.

20 December 1200 Departed from the harbor to carry out maneuvers.  
1908 Returned.

21 December 1015 Left the harbor, escorting the CHUYO and bound for YOKOSUKA.

26 December 0715 Sighted FUJIYAMA.  
1415 Entered the harbor where we were given leave.

27 December Went to TOKYO where I paid my respects to the Imperial Palace, and worshipped at the shrine of MEIJI, and YASUKUNI-JINJA.

2 January 1943 1545 Departed from YOKOSUKA bound for TRUK escorting the CHUYO.  
1700 Left TOKYO Bay.

8 January 0700 Arrived at TRUK via the North Channel.

11 January Were attached to the Southeast Area Fleet and were placed under the Cinc of the CarDiv 2.

15 January 1200 Departed from TRUK with a patrol unit for an air-craft carrier force, CarDiv 2 (minus the HIYO) in order to carry out "C" (HEI) transport operations.

17 January 1140 Proceeded to a place about 200 miles north of WEWAK. 25 fighters and 6 attack-bombers took off from the JUNYO. We headed for TRUK.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFOA Item #4986

Page 12

19 January 1943 0712 Put in at TRUK via the South Channel and our escort task was concluded. Set out to finish off an enemy submarine which a float reconnaissance plane from the TAKAO (CA) had sighted and attacked at a place 25 kilometres from the South Channel at a bearing of 155°.

20 January #6C (?) Convoy was attacked by a submarine 286 nautical miles (TN: " " " denotes a nautical mile) from TRUK at a bearing of 145°. The SURABAYA Maru (スラバヤ丸) was sunk and the MEIU Maru (明海丸) severely damaged.

21 January 2323 Proceeded to the rescue.  
1115 Arrived at our destination.  
1915 The MEIU Maru sank. Then turned back for TRUK. Picked up, however, 13 Army officers (warrant and above) and 419 enlisted men; 146 members from the crews of the two ships; and two Navy men.

22 January 0840 Returned to TRUK.

25 January The KUNIKAWA Maru (XCVS) had engine trouble and halted in her course 300 nautical miles from TRUK at a bearing of 132°.

0523 Left TRUK to stand by her.  
2130 Contact was made with the ship and we took charge of escorting her.

26 January 1200 The repairs on the KUNIKAWA Maru having been completed, proceeded to return.

27 January 1200 Arrived at TRUK.

31 January 0642 We left TRUK, as the screening unit for the advance force (AdB) and main force which were to assist in the "ke" (ケ) Campaign. (TN: "ke" Campaign seems to be a general Japanese term for an evacuation operation.) Our ship has been assigned to the Reinforcing Force (ZOB) of the Outer South Seas Force (SNB). Consequently, we detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB).

1 February 0700 Arrived at SHORTLAND.

4 February 1000 Left there (for our second transport duty at GUADALCANAL). Returned to SHORTLAND.

5 February Left SHORTLAND (for our third transport duty at GUADALCANAL).

7 February Returned to SHORTLAND. Campaign "ke" (ケ) is finished.

8 February Left SHORTLAND to escort the SENDAI (CL).

11 February 0130 Joined the SENDAI and returned to SHORTLAND. Left there for PALAU (with the SAMIDARE of Des'iv 10).

12 February 1814 Spotted an enemy submarine. Dropped depth charges but results were undetermined. Left the SAMIDARE and headed back to RABAUL to relieve our commander (SHITREI).

13 February 0900 Capt. KOMISHI relieved our commander and assumed his new duties.  
Capt. SATO left the ship.

14 February 1340 Left RABAUL for PALAU.  
1400 Arrived at PALAU.

17 February 0900 Left PALAU for WEWAK, escorting the KIYOSUMI Maru (清澄丸), the AIKOKU Maru (XCL), and the GOKOKU Maru (国国丸), engaged in Operation #81.

19 February 1800 Entered WEWAK anchorage. Kept a mobile guard.

22 February 0530 Unloading completed. Left the convoy and headed back to RABAUL.

23 February 1450 Arrived at RABAUL.

24 February 1250 Took on supplies (at KOKOPO) for the army.

27 February 2255 Left RABAUL (in a transport operation to LAE).  
28 February Came in contact with enemy planes in the evening.

1 March 0630 Fought several enemy planes (PBV's and B-17's). The KYOKUSEI Maru (旭盛丸) was so damaged by bombs that she sank. Rescued those aboard, however.

2 March 1420 Raided again by several B-17's. Together with the YUKIKAZE (DD) went on ahead to LAE. Supplies were unloaded for our troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFOA Item #4986

Page 13

3 March 1943 Rejoined the convoy.  
0700 Fought off a 100-odd enemy fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers, 10 or so of our own planes came to our defense. The convoy was destroyed. Rescued survivors, but discontinued this at 1300 and withdrew, changing our course southward and scouting. Able to detect nothing, however.

4 March 1640 Arrived at KAVIENG. Came alongside the SENDAI and got some supplies.  
2200 Left KAVIENG for RABAU.

5 March 0600 Arrived at RABAU.

7 March 1700 Left RABAU for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE, SHIKINAMI (DD), and URANAMI (DD)).

8 March 1043 Arrived at SHORTLAND.  
1700 Left there through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.  
We separated from the SHIKINAMI and URANAMI.

9 March 1642 Arrived at RABAU.

12 March 1700 Left RABAU for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE and MINATSUKI (DD)).

13 March 1700 Left SHORTLAND through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.

14 March 0600 Arrived at SHORTLAND. Moved supplies, then left again.  
1839 Arrived at RABAU.

30 March Left RABAU for SHORTLAND (with the SAMIDARE, YUGUMO (DD), KAZEGUMO (DD), and AKIGUMO (DD)).

31 March Arrived at SHORTLAND, then left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Were in continual contact with enemy planes, making it difficult to unload. Abandoned all thought of unloading finally and proceeded to return.

1 April 1700 Left again through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.

2 April Arrived SHORTLAND, leaving again for BUKA. Arrived at BUKA and picked up fuel.

3 April 0500 Left BUKA for SHORTLAND. Arrived there and found the KAZEGUMO and a merchantm damaged by a mine. (We suspect magnetic mines had been laid in the harbor.)

5 April 1700 Left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading and proceeded to return.

6 April Returned to SHORTLAND, leaving again for TRUK. One B-25 attacked us, but its bombs went wide of their mark.

9 April 0800 Arrived at TRUK.

10 April 0600 Left TRUK for YOKOSUKA.

13 April 1000 Arrived there, mooring to Buoy Y-17.

20 April Received a furlough and returned to my home at 1030 (until the 24th).

26 April 1130 Left for the (ATAMI) Health Resort.

28 April 1000 Returned (to: To YORUBI.) I was now to be stationed aboard the USUGUMO (DD).  
Left my old ship after lunch.

29 April 0954 Arrived at OMINATO (by train). Went aboard my new ship the USUGUMO.

12 May The situation in the northern area having changed suddenly, stopped our present work.  
2345 Left OMINATO for PARAMUSHIRO.

15 May 0415 Arrived at the PARAMUSHIRO Straits.

20 May 0725 Moving through the north entrance to PARAMUSHIRO, we went on patrol duty.

21 May 0520 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.

25 May 1630 Left PARAMUSHIRO for ATTU. (We were to attack the enemy fleet by surprise, transport urgently needed material, and pick up liaison men.)



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 14

30 May 1943 0240 Ceased our operations and proceeded to return.  
 31 May 0825 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.  
 2 June 0612 Left to clean out enemy subs operating south of  
 ARAIDO Island.  
 3 June 1100 Ceased this work and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.  
 5 June Today was the occasion of the national funeral of  
 YAMAMOTO, Admiral of the Fleet.  
 7 June 0700 Observed his passing with a half-mast ceremony.  
 The SHIRAKUMO (DD) collided with the NUMAKAZE (DD) 12  
 nautical miles off CAPE LOFATKA at a bearing of 122°.   
 0115 Headed in that direction to lend assistance.  
 0355 Joined the SHIRAKUMO.  
 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO, escorting her.  
 0950 Entered the harbor there.  
 19 June 1125 Left to determine the calibration of our direction  
 finder.  
 1455 Having done this, returned again.  
 23 June 0320 Left PARAMUSHIRO Harbor escorting the IKUSHIMA Maru ✓  
 (いしま丸).  
 1530 Ceased escorting and left the other ship.  
 2025 Joined the NITTEI Maru (日帝丸 ✓) and escorted it.  
 24 June 0648 Ceased escorting and entered the harbor (日帝丸  
 MUSHIRO ?)  
 1000 Came alongside the HAKKAI Maru (八海丸 ✓). Equipped  
 her with counter-radar (GYAKUTAN) and loaded landing  
 barges on her.  
 26 June 1155 Left the side of the HAKKAI Maru.  
 30 June 1700 Received warning to go on watch duty.  
 1950 Weighed anchor and left port (headed for a spot 23  
 nautical miles out of BETTOBU NUMA at a bearing of 350°  
 where a submarine attack had been reported).  
 1 July 0930 Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor.  
 5 July 1930 Left (to participate in the "ke" Campaign at KISKA).  
 10 July 0205 Planned to make a dash for KISKA, but the weather was  
 not favorable for it, so at 2030 we changed our course  
 and withdrew.  
 11 July 0550 Joined the NIPPON Maru (NAO) ✓ and received oil.  
 12 July 0735 Made a second attempt to dash into KISKA, but reversed  
 our course again at 1520 because of unfavorable condi-  
 tions.  
 13 July 0240 Made our third attempt.  
 1703 Gave up again.  
 2145 Made our fourth attempt.  
 14 July 0156 Gave up once more.  
 1500 Tried for the fifth time.  
 15 July 0430 Gave up again.  
 0820 Ceased our operations and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.  
 18 July 0830 Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor.  
 19 July 0630 Received an air raid warning for the northern KURILES.  
 0645 Five B-24's bombed us but there was no damage.  
 22 July 2000 Left for the second phase of our participation in the  
 "ke" Campaign.  
 26 July 1750 The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (due to  
 this, there was some confusion produced in the rear of  
 the formation, and the WAKABA (DD), HATSUSHIMO (DD), and  
 NAGANAMI (DD) also collided).  
 29 July 1105 Sighted the outline of an island.  
 1316 The ABUKUMA sighted the enemy and fired some torpedoes.  
 It developed that we had mistaken LITTLE KISKA for the  
 enemy.  
 1321 The SHIMAKAZE fired its guns.  
 1350 Dropped anchor in KISKA Harbor.  
 1405 Had finished taking aboard the men.  
 1420 The 2nd Transport Unit had finished.  
 1427 Departed.  
 31 July 0604 The weather cleared up.  
 1530 We entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 15

1 August 1943 1000 The 1st Transport Unit arrived.  
 3 August 1700 Departed from PARAMUSHIRO bound for OMINATO.  
 6 August 0600 Put in at OTARU.  
 7 August 0730 Went ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base.  
 8 August 1400 Arrived at YOKOSUKA having received orders to report to the Commandant of the Naval Torpedo School for duty. Started courses for torpedo-boat captain.  
 16 August Concluding my courses.  
 15 September Received orders assigning me to the YOKOSUKA Guard Unit (SHUBITAI) and placing me in command of the Number 10 Torpedo-Boat.  
 20 September

AN ACCOUNT OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

7 December 1941 Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet:  
 "We, by ordering this despatch, delegate you to have the responsibility of commanding the Combined Fleet. The responsibilities of the Combined Fleet will be extremely heavy and success or failure of the matter concerns the fate of the country. You have made progress by urging the achievements of Fleet-drill for many years, and you must be determined to meet our expectations by exalting our force and authority throughout the world by annihilating the enemy."  
 Reply to the Emperor by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet:  
 "I was overwhelmingly impressed by the gracious Imperial Rescript, at the outbreak of the war, and I shall carry out his great orders with reverence. The officers and men of the Combined Fleet have sworn to do their utmost and they will accomplish the aim of the despatch. They are determined to accept and carry out the Emperor's Commands."  
 Orders from the C-in-C to the Combined Fleet:  
 "The fate of our empire hangs on this war. Each man must do his utmost to fulfill his obligations."  
 8 December 1941 The Imperial Edict declaring war against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND was issued. Imperial Rescript to the Ministers of the Army and Navy was received. acceptance by the Minister of the Navy. Orders to the Minister of the Navy and his department in general. Success of the surprise attack on HAWAII by our striking force:

Surface Craft

Sunk:	4 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 1 Oiler
Seriously Damaged:	2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 2 DD's.
Moderately Damaged:	2 BB's, 4 Cruisers.

Aircraft

Seriously Damaged:	157 Planes
Razed:	(some) Hangars
Our Losses:	39 Planes

At this time our southern forces started to make landings. Successful ones were made at KOTA BHARU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and ALBONIA. The wireless station and airfield at BASCO in the BATAAN Islands north of LUZON were occupied. At SHANGHAI, the British gunboat PENGUIN was sunk. The International Settlement was entered. At PEKING, the American Marines laid down their arms. SINGAPORE was bombed. MIDWAY and WAKE Islands were bombed. CLARK Field and IBA on LUZON were attacked. We have taken over British and American rights and privileges in the southern islands. GUAM was bombed. HONGKONG and DAVAO were bombed.

CONFIDENTIALJICFOA Item #4986  
Page 16

- 9 December 1941 WAKE and GUAM were bombed. The American seaplane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (in DAVAO BAY). An enemy sub appeared off TAKAO Harbor.
- 10 December The results of our HAWAII Operation were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet. A THAI-JAPANESE offensive and defensive alliance has been signed. WAKE Island was attacked. The HAYATE (DD) and KISARAGI (DD) were shelled and sunk. Successful landings were made at VIGAN on LUZON; we suffered the loss of one sub-chaser. Occupation of GUAM completed. APARRI on LUZON also captured. MAKIN and TARAWA occupied. Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River on LUZON. An English fleet was attacked off the MALAY coast, and two of the latest British battleships, the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, were sunk.
- Imperial Rescript:  
"At the very outbreak of this war, our Combined Fleet has displayed a brilliant strategy and fought bravely. At HAWAII it has heavily crushed the enemy's fleet and air strength. We have received the report of this signal achievement ourselves. Moreover, we extend our deepest praise to our fighting forces, officers and men alike. If they should strive harder and harder, we foresee a magnificent future for our Empire."
- 11 December Establishment of the ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO Tri-partite Pact. Attack on WAKE. The results of the naval action off MALAYA were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the C-in-C, Combined Fleet.
- "The Air Force of the Combined Fleet has crushed the main force of the English Asiatic Fleet in the SOUTH CHINA SEA and has enhanced our power and prestige throughout the area. We are deeply pleased."  
Answer of C-in-C.  
Declaration of war against AMERICA by ITALY and GERMANY.  
Success of landing at LEGASPI.
- 15 December 1 Enemy Sub off TOKYO Bay  
1 Enemy Sub in the BUNGO CHANNEL  
3 Enemy Subs near CHICHIJIMA
- 16 December WAKE attacked.  
10 Enemy subs near CHICHIJIMA  
1 Enemy sub near TRUK  
3 Enemy subs at SHIO SAKI (汐崎)
- 17 December The SHINONOME was lost 15 km north of BARAM POINT while on patrol off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 twenty-five miles west of WAKE and sank instantly. The RO-62 suffered practically no damage.
- 19 December WAKE bombed. A Dutch submarine near PALAU.
- 20 December PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, CUBA, HAITI have declared war on JAPAN. MEXICO has broken off relations with JAPAN.  
Enemy Submarines:  
Near TOKYO Bay 2-4 BUNGO Channel 2-4  
" KII 2-4 BONIN Islands 3-4  
" MARCUS Islands 1-2 TAIWAN STRAIT 2-4  
" HAINAN Island 2 PALAU 4-5  
" MARIANA Islands 1-2
- 22 December Successfully landed at LINGAYEN.
- 23 December Complete occupation of WAKE. Striking Force arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA (near KURE).

CONFIDENTIALJICPCA Item #4986  
Page 17

25 December 1941 Surrender of HONG KONG.  
A successful surprise landing was made at JOLO on MINDANAO.

26 December The SAGIRI (DD) received a submarine torpedo attack north of KUCHING (SARAWAK) and sank. KUCHING occupied. The #6 Minesweeper and the UNYO #2 Haru (第二号潜水艇) were sunk by air bombing.

-- December The MURASAME (DD) collided with the #20 minesweeper at TAKAC. Air attack at MANILA.

27 December 1 DD, 2 SS, 10 merchant ships sunk. The ASAKAZE sank 1 SS at LINGAYEN. The C-in-C of the American Army of the PHILIPPINES declared MANILA an open city. MANILA was heavily bombed.

## DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUAM (GMITIAJIMA)

(12 December 1941)

## Installations:

There are facilities for 1 Naval Station.

There is one land air-base. There is also a seaplane base and dredging facilities. There is a PAA flying boat base which is used as a seaplane base. Submarine base facilities are being expanded. There are shore batteries.

Naval Personnel - about 500 men.

Army Personnel - about 1600 men.

## Supplies:

Coal - about 6,000 tons.

Heavy oil - there are 6 heavy oil tanks but their capacity is not known.

There are ammunition storerooms.

Fresh water and provisions - small quantities.

## Others:

APRA Harbor is suitable for protection from the wind all year around.

8 or 9 large warships can put in here. There are no suitable anchorages for other vessels.

## GUAM OCCUPATION FORCE BATTLE REPORT

The GUAM Island Occupation Forces protected the Southern Detachment (TN: NAN SHI TAI 南支隊) and began landing at 0500 on the tenth. While they continued mopping up activities and this force (TN: the GUAM Occupation Force) and the SNLF advanced to the important positions surrounding APRA Harbor (TN: 泐港) and occupied it completely. The enemy lost his fighting spirit because of the attacks of several days previous by our air forces.


## Results of the Battle:

- A. We took prisoner the governor and many government employees, and about 200 Marines, including their commander.
- B. There was fighting in the streets of AGANA (TN: 阿加納). 50 were killed.
- C. It was estimated that APRA harbor would be cleared of mines and ships able to anchor within ten days. One oil tank, the gun batteries and powder magazines had been blown up, however, the oil was still burning after 3 days.
- D. A 3,000 ton merchantman was seized. 100 kilolitres of airplane fuel was taken, as was much construction material (steel, bombs, too).
- E. The wireless and cable stations were both severely damaged and unfit for use.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4936  
Page 17-a

SKETCH MAP OF HAHA SHIMA - 2 December 1941



Eleven transports were in the harbor (part of the GUAN Occupation Force)


HASHIRA SHIMA → HAMA SHIMA

CHICHI SHIMA

HANA SHIMA



HAMA SHIMA → GUAN 800 miles



CONFIDENTIALJICFOA Item #4986  
Page 18My Opinions:

For about 6 months before it was attacked, construction was in progress on GUAM: plans had been made on a large scale to make the island a sub base. Looking at the condition of the project after our occupation, I would venture to say that by strengthening these installations, the enemy will be unable to avoid damage by our (TN: submarine) forces a few months later on.

I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's utterly deficient (defense), and then, too, the bold way in which we carried out our surprise attack. But I realize that, our next operation must, at all costs, be begun as soon as possible.

## SUMMARY OF WAKE ISLAND

27 December 1941

Military Installations

There is a base for the Pan-American Airways flying boats. Planes draw up alongside docks. As a base for flying boats, its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. There is a wireless station.

Supplies

There are some facilities. On PEALE Island are the facilities of the Pan-American Airways. There is an air-craft beacon, a powerplant, a hotel, and a wireless station. It is on the supply line which runs to MIDWAY and HAWAII and (going southwest) to GUAM.

Harbors

As a haven from wind and waves its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. Work had been proceeding on a channel which was to be 300 feet wide. At the entrance to the channel, the coral reef was to be cut to a depth of 35 feet and on the inner side, to a depth of 30 feet (TN: This refers to the channel under construction at the outbreak of the war. The outer channel was to be 35 feet deep, the turning basin 30 feet deep, and the width of the channel, 300 feet.)


There are no anchorages in the vicinity and vessels tie up to buoys.

## OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE WAKE ISLAND OCCUPATION

28 December 1941

1. Occupation scheduled for X / 4 day. (Occupation forces began operations after  $\frac{N}{X}$ .) (TN: Noon on X Day; X Day = December 23 ?).
2. Reconnaissance carried out 4 December ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) by 6 flying boats  $\checkmark$  (from 22nd squadron (CHUTAI) headquarters) and 12 land-based aircraft ( $\frac{1}{12} \times 12$ ).
3. 8 December 1000  
30 land-attack planes ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) carried out a bombing attack. (2 land planes ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) out of 9 were probably destroyed, one tank at the seaplane base ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) was destroyed by fire; 3 fighter planes ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) were sighted, but they did not engage our aircraft.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Petty Officer killed, several planes damaged by shell-fire.)
4. 9 December 0940  
A bombing attack was carried out by 26 land attack aircraft (TN: 10) (5 fighter planes were shot down, the north wing of the barracks was destroyed by fire, part of the airfield ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) was demolished, the seaplane base ( $\frac{1}{12}$ ) radio station was bombed. No flying boats (fd) were sighted. Radio communications were disrupted from 1005 to 2145.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Air Warrant Officer killed, 1 man slightly wounded, 14 planes damaged by shell fire.)
5. 10 December 2230  
A convoy of eleven merchant ships approached the south coast in a heavy swell. Landing operations were postponed, waiting for an improvement in weather conditions.

JICPO. Item #4986  
Page 18-a



MAP OF WAKE ISLAND  
25 Dec. 1941

RUOTTO → WAKE

- ⊕ - Long Range Field Gun in Position
- ⌚ - W/T Station
- P - Patrol Boat
- ⊗ - First Attack (⊗) Second Attack
- ⌚ - Flag 29 Desdiv
- ⌚ - LMG ?
- ⌚ - 3 Gun Emplacement ?

## 560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 19

6. 11 December 0645 The WAKE radio began transmitting to PEARL HARBOR (TN: "NPM").
7. 11 December Jap casualties: The HAYAKAZE (DD) exploded and sank at 0452.  
The KISARAGI (DD) exploded and sank at 0531.  
The KONGŌ Maru (XCL) was damaged by a hold fire. Rough weather still prevailed in the afternoon and (the landing force) decided to withdraw to KAWAJALEIN to make further plans. At 0715, 11 December, 17 land attack planes (TN: flo) attacked the PEALE Island shore batteries and MG positions, and were engaged by fighters for 30 minutes. One fighter was shot down. (Japanese losses: 2 land planes destroyed, 1 reserve 1st Lieutenant, 9 petty officers, and 5 enlisted men killed, 11 aircraft damaged by shell-fire, 1 man slightly wounded.)
8. 11 December 2330 The positions of two naval craft were fixed by RDF in the vicinity of WAKE Island (the ships were thought to be patrol craft, seaplane tenders or oilers).
9. 11 December 2050 On 27 has withdrawn from the WAKE (attack) force and is joining the submarine force. Most of the submarine force is engaged in patrolling WAKE.
10. 11 December 1100 The TSUGARU (CM) and the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF are standing by for the occupation of WAKE. At 0900 12 December (the attack group) secured from readiness and the SNLF units returned.
11. 12 December The HOYO Maru (XAO) returned to RUOTTO for supplies.
12. 12 December 1000 Cru Div 6 (TN: 63) is to return before 16 December to RUOTTO in order to aid in the operation of the area.
13. 12 December 0840 26 land planes (led by Lieut. Commander MATSUDA) bombed WAKE. (A warehouse and the western sector AA gun were demolished. Two fighter planes engaged the attack group.) (Japanese casualties: 1 plane exploded, 6 petty officers and 2 enlisted men killed, 4 planes damaged by shell-fire.)
14. An (American) naval vessel appearing at WAKE radioed COM 14th Naval District at 0552, 0721, and 0937, 12 December.
15. 12 December 1145 The position of the American naval vessel which was transmitting is --- nautical miles from WAKE at a bearing of 1150 60'.
16. 13 December 0530 The WAKE occupation force has arrived at RUOTTO.
17. 12 December 0100 Fifteen land planes bombed WAKE with undetermined results. Two 5 place flying boats (TN: ? rd x 2/5) bombed the airfield (A). There was an air battle. (Japanese casualties: 1 flying boat failed to return.)
18. 13 December 0130 COM Cru iv 6 requested of Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet to include the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF and the KIYOKAWA Maru (APV) in the WAKE occupation force.
19. 13 December 1010 A fighter-reconnaissance plane attached to Airflot 24 (at 5000 meters altitude) observing through a hole in the clouds (reported the following): One or two fighter planes in the revetments at the west side of the runway; no flying boats; one merchant ship carrying out unloading operations.
20. 13 December 1800 Cooperated with Striking Force (TN: KB).
21. 13 December 2320 The gunboat (TN: C) group has been disbanded. The WAKE (occupation) force has been reinforced (TENYO Maru (APV), KIYOKAWA Maru (APV), one company of the MAIZURU SNLF, 2 DD of Des iv 24.)
22. 14 December Three 10 place flying boats (TN: rd x 3/10) (under Lieut. Commander TASHIRO) at 0137 and 30 land-based planes at 0855 under Commander UCHINO bombed WAKE. (Direct hits were scored on the runway, revetments and one fighter plane set afire; the warehouse was set on fire. (Japanese casualties: 11 fighters damaged by shell-fire.)



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4980  
Page 20

23. 15 December 1610 8 flying boats (under the command of Lieut. Commander KOIZUMI) effectively bombed the barracks area in the northern part of the main island.
24. 16 December 32 land-attack planes (commanded by Lieut. MATANABE) and one fighter (at 7000 altitude) (reported the following): About 20 AA mobile guns, and a number of high-speed torpedo boats have appeared. (A heavy oil tank, an ammunition magazine and a warehouse were set on fire, and the base on PEALE Island effectively bombed.) (Jap. casualties: 3 land-attack planes were damaged by shell-fire.)
25. 17 December 1555 8 flying boats bombed the southeast section of PEALE Island. (Causing explosions at the AA gun, the hotel, and wireless station.)
26. 18 December 0940 Land-attack bombers (Type I) carried out reconnaissance. The southeast channel was blocked up.
27. 19 December 0845 27 land-based attack bombers bombed the airfield [X] on "ILKES Island. 1 fighter engaged them. The anti-aircraft guns on the airfield on "ILKES Island and one MG Unit were destroyed. (Japanese losses: One man killed aboard plane. 12 attack bombers (TN: here fld) were hit by shells.
28. 20 December 1330 A flight of enemy patrol planes arrived (TN: SHOKAIKI).

## CONDITION OF THE ENEMY

(Based upon aerial reconnaissance and sundry intelligence reports)

1. Marines — 300
2. Civilians employed by the Military — 1000
3. Dual purpose guns — 12 (part with mobile emplacements).
4. Coast defense batteries, machine gun positions — a great number.
5. Fighters — several
6. Submarines and torpedo-boats are lurking in the vicinity

## OUR FORCES

1. Air Forces of the South Seas Force are carrying out bombing attacks day after day.
2. A Submarine Force (RO-60, 61, 62) — is carrying out patrols around the island.
3. Reinforcement Butai (SORYU and HIRYU) on the 20th cooperated in landing operations by sending their planes in to attack.
4. Attacking Force — <sup>Seaborn</sup>  
(Flagship) YUBARI (CL), SubRon 6 (6SS).  
Landing Force — KONGO Maru, KINRYU Maru, Patrol Boats Nos. 32 and 33;  
Combined SNLF.  
SNLF Headquarters.  
1st Company (Company commanded by UCHIDA, MAIZURU SNLF)  
2nd Company (Company commanded by TAKANO, 6th Base Force)  
3rd Company (Company commanded by ITAYA, MAIZURU SNLF)
5. Covering Force —  
TENRYU (CL) and TATSUTA (CL).
6. Supporting Force —  
Cru iv 6 (6S).

## PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED SHOULD ENEMY (SHIP) BE ENCOUNTERED

1. The ships which sight the enemy shall expend every effort to conceal our force by laying smoke screens and by other means.
2. In the event that enemy surface naval vessels approach, in accordance with orders, the KINRYU Maru and the patrol boats shall avail themselves of every opportunity to retire from the disputed area.  
The SubRon 6 (6SS) and the Cru iv 18 (18S) are to annihilate the enemy.

<sup>Seaborn?</sup>

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Itcm #4986

Page 21

## MAINTENANCE OF SECRECY

1. Limited use of radio.
2. Light control
3. Localized use of lights for signalling at night and, as demanded by the situation, proper control of illuminating strength. May be used to determine bearing.
4. Throwing overboard things which will float in the water is strictly forbidden.
5. Disposal of bilge water which contains oily matter.

## OPERATIONS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCE

1. On the 21st at 0800 the Force will leave MELLU Channel. The landing force will carry out a landing at 0200 on the same day. The Force will proceed to a point about 50 miles to the east of WAKE Island and thereafter, shall act as the enemy situation may warrant.
  2. When the attack on WAKE gets under way, the Force shall proceed to a point about 50 miles to the southeast of the island and patrol in support (TN: of the attack).
- 23 December 1030 The occupation of WAKE Island has been completed.

## SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE

1. Enemy prisoners: Lt.-Colonel and his command --- 430  
Skilled laborers --- 1100  
In addition to this, many were killed and we acquired many installations, gun emplacements, and ammunition.
2. Our Losses:  
Killed --- UCHIDA Company --- 9  
Seriously Wounded --- 19 Men on Patrol Boat No. 32  
Slightly Wounded --- 34  
In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily damaged and 1 plane was shot down.

## LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE

1. When we think about the lessons that may be learned from a battle, we must view it with the eyes of a critic and to the end maintain the point of view of the other side.
2. Strive to the utmost to learn about the state of affairs of the enemy; though you may have exhausted every means to learn this, and you may believe that you know enough about it, you never know enough. However, after you have learned about the enemy and have made thorough preparations, there remains only the necessity for resolute action.
3. When it comes time to carry out the operation, look at the situation as the enemy does and try to discover his weak points.
4. Always take into account obstacles that may result from the weather (wind and waves, and range of vision).
5. Do not be defeated by a multiplicity of plans. Assemble similar plans into one whole.
6. In the light of the battle, it is foolish to refrain from delivering an all-out attack.
7. The distribution of military strength should be considered principally with regard to the main strategy. The decision as to the time of commencement of action must be made carefully.
8. It is essential in an operation that the various types of aircraft be brought together.
9. The fact that damage from accidental explosions (YUBAKU) of torpedoes and depth charges was very great should be borne in mind.
10. In war, the chances of success are three to seven. Out of 81 men 50 were killed. However, several hundred prisoners were taken and we captured the whole island. The side that fights well the last five minutes is the one that wins.
11. When battle is undertaken, the leadership of the commanding officers should be firm. By no means, may there be any faltering, or hesitation. When preparations have been made, action should follow.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 22

12. Though it is easy to throw away one's life by being impetuous, when once it is realized that death is pleasant, to live and do one's duty is difficult.
13. The idealist and the materialist are complimentary. The fallacy of AMERICA which worships materialism has been exposed.
14. Leadership in battle: Inform even the engine-room hands who cannot see the enemy of the situation. Exhaust all one's knowledge and ability when he is in a fatal position.
15. Acquisition of air supremacy is necessary. However, naval vessels still fulfill their peculiar purpose.
16. In glorious battle, the function of the supporting force is a thankless task.
17. Orders must be carefully considered. Once, however, they have been given, they should be carried out to the letter.
18. Inventiveness and originality. The most profitable use of new weapons is the responsibility of the strategist. (Believe earnestly in certain victory.)
19. Since the advancement of AA weapons is very slow we must fight planes with planes, and also we must destroy the base before the enemy can rise.
20. Importance of air bases (Bases for action). Planes must inevitably have bases.
21. The capture of the isolated island by occupation operations will be comparatively difficult as the whole island is a fortress; and, in addition to this, operating freely will be extremely difficult.
22. There are opportunities in battle. Seizing these opportunities wins victories; when one misses these opportunities he cannot win a victory no matter what he does.
23. Occupation operations and submarines. The enemy can only prove a threat by means of its submarines. It must be said that if the enemy were to conceal even one or two submarines in the vicinity of WAKE Island, they would be a great menace to our operations.
24. Operational Directions.
  - (A) Combined operations (KYODO SAKUSEN) are not feasible, as a rule. If there were a Naval Special Landing Force of 20,000 men, landing operations would be easy. In combined operations there are many occasions where opportunities are missed for striking at weak points with force. (JITSU MO MOTTE, KYO MO UTSU)
  - (B) Insufficient military strength causes unforeseen failure. It is said that the lion exhausts his entire strength even to catch one rabbit.
  - (C) A force without a central unit (SHUTAI) is not possible. There is a need for operational leaders to amass (information).

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 23

THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS  
28 January, 1942

## SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS:

## 1. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC):

Foreign: In our war with ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES we are bringing to bear, as might have been expected, economic pressure and we are dispatching against ENGLAND in the Orient armies of deliverance. We shall deliver a fatal blow against AUSTRALIA and shall carry out such attacks as will uproot the foundations of the British Colonial Empire which even now is in the process of disintegration.

Domestic: In reading the history of the sea-girt Island Empire of JAPAN, as is natural, traces of those peerless men who ventured upon the seas and embarked upon adventures abroad are not lacking. Though it may be said that it was the WAKO (TN: A band of pirates who roamed the seas of CHINA and KOREA during the ASHIKAGA period) who revealed the spirit of the Japanese nation by hoisting the ancient flag inscribed "HACHIMAN, GREAT BODDHI-SATVA" (TN: HACHIMAN is the God of War in the Japanese pantology; BODDHI-SATVA is the BUDDHA-ELECT) and crossing the seas, the TOKUGAWA's closed the country for the long period of three hundred years (TN: 1638-1867) and the overseas expansion dissolved into nothingness like a dream. The delusion of national isolation was finally destroyed. Though it may be said that great strides forward were made during the period of MEIJI, it was a period of self-examination and development. During the TAISHO era we saw the nation carried away by the tide of international liberalism and effeminate ideals of peace. Retrenchment was a mistake.

The present invasion, however, will awaken a billion people. Our confidence is unshaken and we proceed with the conviction that we shall smash through the strong points of the enemy by this southern advance and that we shall bring the campaign to a most successful conclusion. We shall spare not the slightest effort.

## 2. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:

The resources of NEW GUINEA have not yet been exploited. The mining industry, especially in the production of gold, is well-known. There are fisheries. Being an intermediate trading place, its future possibilities as a relay base for transportation and communications are enormous.

## 3. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE:

- a. A stronghold from which aggressive offensives may be launched.

It cuts the most advantageous South Pacific line of the American offensive strategy against JAPAN—HAWAII, HOWLAND ISLAND, SAMOA, FIJI, SOLOMON ISLANDS, and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

- b. From the standpoint of defense, it is a buttress against invasion.

It presents a powerful defensive front against the south.

- c. A base from which to carry out blockade:

The sea routes which bind AUSTRALIA to ASIA will lie within bombing range of our planes. The shipping lanes, bays and ports which lie beyond bombing range may be threatened by our submarines based in the BISMARCK SEA.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4896

Page 24

## STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCES:

## 1. NAVY:

## a. Striking and Holding Fleet (TN: KAKUYO-KANTAI):

## Main Units:

MineDiv 19 (OKINOSHIMA Flagship, TSUGARU, TENYŪ MARU,  
MOGAIIGAWA MARU)✓

SubDiv 6 (YŪBARI Flagship);

DesDiv 29 (OITE Flagship, ASANAGI and YŪNAGI);

DesDiv 30 (MITSUKI Flagship, YAYOI and MOCHIZUKI);

KIYOKAWA (龍丸) , KONGŌ , 5th Gun-  
boat Squadron, 14th Minesweeper Squadron, and  
Submarine-chaser Div 56.

## Supporting Units:

CruDiv 18 (TEIRYŪ Flagship, TATSUTA);

DesDiv 23 (KIKUTSUKI Flagship, UZUKI and YUZUKI).

KINRYŪ (TN: 龍丸)

MAIZURU 2nd SMLF

HIROSHIMA Naval Landing Force, one company.

## b. Air Forces at TRUK:

YOKOHAMA Naval Air Group (14 flying boats);

CHITOSE Naval Air Group (9 fighters and 18 medium  
attack bombers).

## c. Indirect Guard Forces:

Supporting Force---6th Fleet;

TRUK Area Guard Force;

SAIPAN Area Guard Force;

## Cooperating Forces:

CarDiv 1

CarDiv 3 (half)

## 2. ARMY:

Commander-in-Chief of South Seas Detachment: Major-General  
HORII Tomitaro,

Infantry-----144th Regiment;

Cavalry-----3rd Company;

Mountain Gun Troops-----1st Battalion;

Engineers-----1st Company;

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 25

Commissary-----2nd Company;

Mobile Field AA---1st Company;

(The above all from the 55th Infantry Division).

(TN: In the original, this to "Navy and Army", is ruled through and marked "not permissible".)

## ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY IN THE BISMARCK AREA:

## 1. Surface Vessels:

## a. Australian Fleet;

2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, a few other ships.

Location not clearly known.

## b. Anglo-American Fleet;

5 battleships, 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, unknown number of  
destroyers. It is not known whether or not they will engage  
in battle (TN: RAIKŌ 萊攻 ).

## 2. Aircraft:

Several flying boats; several torpedo-bombers. Airfield.

Total planes, all types: about 50 (British and Australian).

Total flying boats: under 50 (American).

## 3. Submarines:

There is as yet no information concerning the situation of enemy  
submarines. There is a great possibility that American sub-  
marines have gradually made their way west. We assume, too,  
that British and Dutch submarines have made an appearance in  
the BISMARCK Sea Area.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 26

## IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT RABAUL

29 January 1942

I. MILITARY AFFAIRS:

1. Air Fields (TN:  ): RABAUL and VUNAKANAU
2. Defenses: Volunteer Defense Army (1 rifle company; 1 MG platoon), Roving Patrols (JUNKEITAI 巡警隊 ) about 172.  
Australian soldiers: About 500  
Batteries: Under construction at 3 places.
3. Security: 20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes. Outsiders forbidden to approach the air field and at night the movements of the Japanese are watched.

II. ESSENTIALS OF GOVERNMENT:

"Territory of NE GUINEA" Government Offices, Customs House, Law Courts  
Post Office, Wireless Station, Prison, Hospital.

III. POPULATION:

Urban Areas ----- about 4,000  
If nearby villeg.s are included: about 12,500

Of which are:

Natives	10,300 (majority MICRONESIAN)
"Whites"	1,000
Chinese	1,200
Japanese	25

IV. CONDITIONS OF THE HARBOR:

1. It is easy for a formation to enter the harbor.
2. The body of water which lies north of an east-west line drawn through DAWAPIA Rocks has a length of approximately 2 miles and a maximum breadth of 1.5 miles. Mud bottom. Depth of the water is from 84.1 -- 100 metres, but the northern half is 47 metres or less in depth. The anchorage for warships is, for the most part, between 10.9 and 31.5 metres in depth while the anchorage for merchant shipping is 36.5 metres deep.
3. Berthing capacity for the harbor is 5 CruDivs.
4. It affords excellent shelter.
5. Whenever there is a steady south-cast wind blowing strongly, the southern half is bound to be rough.
6. Sea-defense is easy.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFOA Item #4986

Page 27

## METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RABAU AREA

(31 January 1942)

1. GENERAL

Two periods are distinguished -- that of the northwest seasonal wind which extends from December to April and that of the southeast seasonal wind which extends from April to November.

In the winter, the northeast tradewinds of the northern hemisphere are constantly blowing, part of which cross the equator and penetrate into the southern hemisphere. When the northwest seasonal winds begin, the southeast seasonal wind gradually recedes with the fall of the southern hemispheric high pressure. It is believed that, about January, the area of variable winds at the ends of the north and south air fronts (IN: doldrum area) passes over the RABAU region. As a consequence, the weather in this area is generally uncertain.

2. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEATHER

- (a) Land and sea breezes are conspicuous. However, they rarely exceed an altitude of 500 metres and their area are generally restricted to about 10 miles including inland and sea.
- (b) Windless Nights.  
It is said that this phenomenon is more conspicuous during clear weather than during cloudy weather.
- (c) Daily change of atmospheric pressure.  
The atmospheric pressure, as in the case of the inner South Seas shows a regular daily change. Maximum highs are at 0900 and 2200 while maximum lows are at 0400 and 1600.
- (d) Amount of Rainfall.  
January has the heaviest rainfall of the year. An average amount of over 400 mm. of rain fall.
- (e) Wind.  
In January, southerly winds are slightly more numerous, 35% while northerly winds are somewhat fewer - 30%. However, in February, the southerly winds are reduced to 20% while northerly winds are increased to 40%. Judging from this in January, the winds alternate north and south with this area as the center of the doldrums region while in February the doldrums line has moved south.

3. WEATHER FORECASTING

Judging from various conditions:

- (a) In the case of a northwesterly wind, heavy rains accompanying sudden squalls. Weather generally bad and continuing for several days.
- (b) In the case of a southeasterly wind:  
Winds are generally light. Weather in this region probably good.
- (c) In the case of the doldrums line same as paragraph (a).  
Weather bad and uncertain.



CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 28

## RESULTS OF THE "R" CAMPAIGN

(At the beginning of the landings - 0000 on 23 January 1942)

- 0025 Succeeded in unloading at KAVIENG without mishap. Met no resistance.
- 0415 Occupied the airfield in the town. The city streets were razed by the fires the enemy had started. The telegraph office and all its installations were smashed. Completed sweeping the anchorage for mines.
- 1400 Occupied VANAKANAU; enemy resistance there. Captured 17 foreigners at NEW HANOVER; many heavy and light machine guns, rifles, ammunition and weapons were also confiscated. No defense installations at G. SMATA. The mopping up on CREDNER Island is finished.
- 0250 Town of RABAUL has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack by enemy planes. We have surrounded and are attacking the enemy in the MALAUR Sector. The inhabitants of (RABAUL) have all fled. Apparently all the Japanese residents there had been transported to SIDNEY on the 14th. 100 prisoners taken. 6000 bombs and 60 drums of plane fuel were also captured. Our losses were one carrier-based torpedo bomber and one carrier-based bomber; The Army lost 14 dead and 15 wounded.

## OUTLINE OF THE S.N.L.F. LANDING

31 January 1942

at YSAHEL Passage

Flag signals from the commander (SHIREIKAN);

Clean out the area along the shore near the anchorage.

## I. The objects of the operation.

- A. Hostile persons (deserters, recalcitrant white men, etc.)
- B. Enemy installations (wireless, gun, rifle installations, etc.)

## II. Area to be cleaned out.

The North shore of NEW HANOVER Island is to be covered from 150°20' E. Long. eastward to 150°28' E. Long. in sectors of two minutes longitude each. Our ships are to cover these sectors in reverse numerical order.

## III. The dispatched SNLF

Four platoons commanded by a company commander aboard each ship (1 WO or above, 10 rated and non-rated men in each platoon); one command platoon; total personnel, 60 or less.

## IV. Landing Boats (HAKENTEI)

They shall be armed, shall move along shore in pace with the progress of the SNLF, and shall stand ready to do signalling and any sudden mustering.

## V. Dress

The usual SNLF battle outfit will be worn.

## VI. Unless there are special orders to the contrary, the landing boats will leave their ships at 0700 on 1 February. They shall have returned by 1500.

# 570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 29

## CONDITION OF THE SHORES AND ANCHORAGES OF ISABEL PASSAGE

4 February 1942

From what we saw with our glasses, the entire island (NEW HANOVER) was one large, dense jungle, upon which no axe had made its mark since time began. Here and there along the shore, however, were human habitations. The mode of living was not altogether strange; indeed, the general aspect was Occidental. I was surprised at the blackness of the natives. Only a piece of cloth was wrapped about their loins. In general, they were resting in an absent-minded fashion, as if they didn't know the meaning of work. There was one man among them scratching his head just like a monkey. They would crawl about when changing their positions. Their behavior approached that of an animal.

At TSOI KOTO we spotted about twenty natives gathered together. Two or three persons stood in the center, surrounded by the others. They all seemed to be discussing something. Or else they were surprised at our anchoring and had called a meeting.

Living things were everywhere. We saw only drooping trees sreading out their leafy branches. If we could have penetrated to the depths of the jungle, we would surely have seen many strange things.

At TSOI KOTO an Australian managed a plantation. He had a western-style house.

The natives used a "canoe" in moving about on the water.

The water's depth at our anchorage was about 15 metres. There was a shallow spot 10 metres deep, however. The bottom was sandy.

The island had yet to be exploited at all; but with the coming of our countrymen in the future, I believe it will be greatly developed.

## SALAMOA-LAE OPERATIONS:

10 February 1942

### "LAE"

Although there is no place which can be called a natural harbor, buildings and air field installations have been set up; there are docks where sea-going vessels can tie up, and on calm days liners can put in there. Moreover, this harbor is equipped with 10-ton cranes and lighters with a capacity of 4000 tons and these transport and unload cargoes on ships which are bound for (TN: or are coming from) the SOLOMON Islands.

### "SALAMOA"

Because this harbor is the port of entry to MOROBE and "GOLDFIELD" (TN: ?) it is also called NEW GOLDFIELD HARBOR. As a result of the harbor construction of 1926 there is a good harbor which affords shelter of various depths of water. Ships anchor about 550 metres off-shore; although small-type vessels can approach the shore inside the harbor and drop anchor there is nothing of particular importance at present in the way of harbor facilities.

(TN: The next few lines were marked "Not Permitted" in original document.)

1. Forces occupying the CR Area:  
Flag DesRon 6; DesRon 6; Minesweeper Division 14; KIYOKAWA Maru (APW); TSUGARU (CM); TENYO Maru; KINRYU Maru (XCL); KONGO Maru (XCL); KOKAI Maru (黄海丸); 8th Base Force (TN: B<sub>6</sub>) SNLF.
2. Supporting Forces (SHIEN BUTAI)  
Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; CruDiv 18; DesRon 23; TŌHŌ Maru (XAO).

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986-  
Page 30

3. Submarine Forces  
Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7.
4. Land Based Air Forces  
Flag Airflot 24; Airflot 24; OBORO
5. Carrier-Based Air Forces  
Captain, SHOHŌ (CV); SHOHŌ (CV); HOKAZE (DD).

## Conditions of the Enemy:

1. The Volunteer Defence Forces of the enemy in this area consist of 2 rifle companies and 1 machine gun platoon.
2. The enemy air forces are based at LAE and SALAMCA and they are in close communication with PORT MORESBY and TOWNESVILLE while operating in the RABAUL Area (TN: "R" Area).  
There are less than 10 planes for each base and their activity is not very lively; they fly in mobile deployment in each place, however, and it will be difficult to wipe them out.
3. We doubt that the American striking force will restore its operations in the SOUTH SEAS Area and there is only a possibility that they will strike in this area.

PORT MORESBY (TN: MO)

Operations and Disposition of Strength 15 May 1942

(TN: In the original document the following lines were crossed out and labeled "Not Permissible".)

Central Unit (SHŪTAI)

Flag 4 Fleet KASHIMA (CL) TOKIWA (CM) YUNAGI (DD) SEISEN Maru (APV)

MORESBY Striking Force

Flag CruDiv 5 (TN: 5S) (Minus the NACHI) CarDiv 5 (Sf) DesDiv 27  
DesDiv 7 (dg) (minus 1 DD) TOHOMARU (XAO or APV)

MO Occupation Forces:

Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; DesRon 6 (minus the 1 DD of DesDiv 23); SHOHŌ;  
DesDiv 7 (only 1 DD); SubDiv 21; Minesweeper 20; CruDiv 18; TSUGARU  
(CM); KAMIKAWA Maru (XCVS); KIYOKAWA Air Group; KOEI Maru (高栄丸);  
AZUMASAN Maru (阿蘇山丸); GOYO Maru (五世丸); OSHIMA (OR) (石島);  
HOYO Maru (豊後丸); IRO (AO) (石原);

TULAGI Occupation Operations

Flag MinDiv 19; MinDiv 19 (TSUGARU) and TOKIWA (CM); DesDiv 23 1 DD;  
SHŌEI Maru (勝永丸).

Submarine Forces:

Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7 (minus SubDiv 21).  
Surface Escort Unit 2 (T.I).  
Flag Escort Unit 23 Surface Escort Unit (T.I) 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #1986

Page 31

Conditions of the Enemy:

1. American Air Forces in the Australian Area -- presumably 200 planes (1st line).
2. It appears that considerable strength is concentrated in the PORT DARWIN and TOWNSVILLE sectors.
3. There is no information about the American Striking Force since (TN: their arrival), but there is a great possibility that they are becoming stronger in this area.
4. Moreover it appears that the British Navy has dispatched a force composed of 2-3 cruisers and some destroyers with a battleship as main strength to the Australian area.
5. Although submarine activities have not been very lively, submarines still exist in the RABAU' area.
6. Transportation of materiel for AUSTRALIA. Transportation by plane is becoming gradually more active.
7. Since the activity of enemy reconnaissance planes has increased, it has become difficult to conceal our plans from them; security precautions are particularly important.
8. It has become necessary to take especially strict AA precautions.

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORAL SEA BATTLE

Outline of Battle of 4th Fleet.

On 4 May information concerning the enemy striking force (TN: KB) which had attacked TULLAGI was not very clear. On 6 May at 0830 a YOKOHAMA Air Group (TN: HAIKUKU) search plane discovered an enemy force composed of 1 CV, 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 5 DD at S15° 55' E158° 35' proceeding south. This was outside our radius of attack and about 0900 contact with the enemy was lost. As a result while the MORESBY (LO) Striking Force (KB) was preparing for enemy operations, the MORESBY (MO) Occupation force acted in accordance with established plans (A shipping group left RABAU' (RR) at 1600 on 4 May).

On 7 May at 0600 5 enemy carrier-based planes and at 0622 35 carrier-based planes, attacked in the area assigned to the MORESBY occupation force. Reconnaissance planes of the CruDiv 6 at 0640 sighted 1 BB, 1 CV, 2 cruisers and 7 DD proceeding north at a point S12° 15' E154° 30'. Later, at 0830 it was announced that there were 2 CV. At 0558 patrol-attack planes of the MORESBY Striking Force sighted a force which included a ship resembling an aircraft carrier at a point S15° 55' E157° 50'. The planes went to destroy the enemy force with its entire strength. However, a tanker was recognized to the right (this ship was bombed by part of the planes; heavily damaged and sunk). The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB) hurried toward the enemy in the west.

0700: The MORESBY Occupation Force (TN: "MO" - KORYAKU BUTAI) has withdrawn its shipping group (TN: SENDAI) to the northwest and it is continuing strict AA precautionary measures.

0920: 52 miles bearing 59° from DEBOYNE approximately 60 enemy carrier-based bombers and fighters attacked us. They concentrated a torpedo and bombing attack on the SHOHO (CV). CruDiv 6 (6S) mustered all available force and tried to protect the SHOHO but she had been hit by more than 3 torpedoes and 6 bombs. She fought bravely until the very last and at 0935 she sank.

The Occupation Forces prepared for a second attack by the enemy and withdrew to the north for a while. The main force (TN: SHUTAI) retired to the north to avoid an air attack.

1500: The SAZAKI (DD) while preparing for a counter attack at night picked up survivors of the SHOHO.

1244: Land-based attack-planes from the Base Air Force attacked the enemy Striking Force (TN: Enemy "KB"), sank 1 battleship, and heavily damaged 1 battleship.

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 32

The MORESBY Striking Force planned to attack at dusk and at 1420 15 carrier based attack and bombing planes were sent out, but we did not locate the enemy because of a sudden squall over the target area. While searching for the enemy in that vicinity we were attacked by enemy carrier-based fighters which came from the clouds and we engaged in an air battle with them. On the way back (TN: to the base) one group (ICHI BU) of carrier-based bombers discovered the enemy Striking Force (TN: "KB") in a squall at 13° South 154° 14' East at 1700, but it could not attack them on account of the squall and darkness. At 2010 the planes returned and landed. 7 planes failed to return. At about 1800 tracking planes lost contact with the enemy and the enemy's movements became unknown to us. The distance between us and the enemy was about 300 miles and the night battle stopped. At dawn on the 8th the attack was resumed and the day for the occupation of PORT MORESBY was postponed until X plus 2 days.

CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) and 2 DD (TN: 2 D) were added to the MORESBY Striking Forces.

On the 8th at 0622 reconnaissance planes from the SHOKAKU (CV) sighted an enemy striking force composed of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 6 destroyers at 14° 30' South 154° 40' East. The MORESBY Striking Force dispatched an attack unit at 0730. At this time CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) 100 nautical miles southwest of SHORTLAND Islands, was attempting to refuel from the IRO (AO) when patrol planes of the 11 Air Fleet (TN: 11 AF) reported that their and our striking forces were fighting. The ships stopped refuelling immediately and were ordered to join the CruDiv 18 and the DesRon 6 (TN: 6 Sd) and advance southward at full speed in order to cooperate with our striking force (TN: KB).

At 0930 we attacked the enemy carriers of the SARATOGA Class and YORKTOWN Class. We hit the SARATOGA Class ship with more than 9 torpedoes and 10 bombs and we hit the YORKTOWN Class ship with more than 3 torpedoes and 8 bombs. Definitely sunk. In addition we scored torpedo hits on 1 battleship.

From 0856 to 1020 more than 60 enemy carrier-based planes attacked the MORESBY Striking Unit 3 times. They scored 3 bomb hits on the SHOKAKU (CV) and 8 near misses. It was impossible to take off or land because fires broke out. It left the battle area.

At 0830 land-based search-attack planes sighted 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 4 DD of the enemy at 13° South and 149° East. Although we contacted them we could not dispatch an attack unit with the Base Air Force because of rain the the VUNAKANAU Area.

At this point we had to take into consideration the condition of the enemy surface forces and the difficulties of protecting transport groups with carriers against enemy land-based planes. We have postponed the occupation of PORT MORESBY. The group (TN: transport group) will return to RABAU.

Moreover, in consideration of the fuel situation, etc., the Striking Force was ordered at 1300 to stop the attack and to go north. The MORESBY main force (SHUTAI) also reversed its course and went to fuel. Thus, while the MORESBY operational force (SAKUSEN BUTAI) was preparing for the enemy striking force (KB) the order was issued to fall into position to help the occupation of the NAURU and OCEAN Areas. At 2045 the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet issued an order to strike to the utmost to annihilate remaining units of the enemy force.

The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB), the CruDiv 6, 1 DD, DesRon 6, and the sea-plane scouting squadron (SUITEITAI) were ordered to expedite fueling and to make attack preparations.

On the 9th most of the float reconnaissance planes from the DEBOYNE base, acting in concert with the Base Air Force in reconnoitering the enemy searched in the region to the south. The MORESBY Occupation Force also set out to search for and pursue the remaining enemy forces but was unable to follow the movements of the enemy.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 33

Results of the Engagement1. Enemy Strength

- (a) 2 BB, 2 cruisers, 4 DD
- (b) 1 BB, 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 6 DD
- (c) 1 AO, 1 DD

2. Sunk and Damaged

- 7 May: 1 large type tanker (about 20000 tons), 1 DD sunk almost certainly.
- 8 May: 1 CV, SARATOGA Class. Sinking confirmed.
- 1 CV, YORKTOWN Class. Sinking confirmed.
- 1 BB (Class not certain). Set afire and made to release heavy oil by a torpedo.
- 1 Cruiser (Class not certain). After receiving a torpedo from a carrier-based attack plane, exploded, caught afire and listed.

(The above results were obtained by CarDiv 5 and an air group (fg).)

- 7 May: 1 BB of CALIFORNIA Class sunk.
- 1 BB of WARSPITE Class. Heavily damaged.
- 1 CA of CANBERRA Class. Heavily damaged.

(The above results were obtained by the Base Air Force.)

3. Planes Shot Down (7 May - 8 May)

- Ship-board fighters - 58 planes
- Type unknown - 8
- Shipboard bombers and attack planes - 32
- TOTAL - 98 (10 not positive)

4. Remaining Strength

- (a) 1 BB (heavily damaged); 2 Cruisers (1 heavily damaged); 4 DD.
- (b) 1 BB (medium damage); 3 Cruisers (1 medium damage); 6 DD.

## COMBAT LESSONS FROM THE WAR FOR GREATER EAST ASIA

SECTION I - AN OUTLINE OF IMPORTANT BATTLES

## CHAPTER I. First Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

## 1. (A) Forces which participated:

- Flagship (TN: P): CHOMAI (CA); CarDiv 6
- (Flagship (TN: P): AOBA (CA), KAKO (CA), KINUGASA (CA), FURUTAKA (CA)
- Flagship (TN: P): TENRYU (CL), YUBARI (CL), YUKAZE (DD).

## (B) Enemy Forces:

- 9 CA; 1 CL (TN: CXL); 6 DD's.

## 2. Developments:

- (A) On the 7th at 0435 the TULAGI Communications Base reported that an enemy striking force accompanied by an occupation force had begun landing operations at TULAGI and at GUADALCANAL. Our forces have therefore decided to penetrate their anchorage and annihilate them.
- (B) On the 8th at 2100 a search-attack plane with flares took off from the ships.
- (C) 2120: Commanding Officer formed a single column with his ship at the head and moved to the attack.
- (D) At 2246 and at 2250: Sighted enemy destroyers sailing individual courses away from us but in order to conceal our plans we avoided being seen by the enemy and so passed them without action.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 34

- (E) 2331: "All forces, Attack", was ordered; Course 120°, Speed: 26 knots.
- (F) 2337: Sighted ACHILLES type enemy ship to the Northeast. CHOKAI fired torpedoes.
- (G) Thenceforth, each ship made a surprise torpedo attack on the enemy ships which were making a rendezvous. By 2350 we had blown up and sunk (or attacked and sunk) 3 cruisers (TN: CX 3) and 1 destroyer.
- (H) After the FURUTAKA torpedoed and sank a large type enemy destroyer at 2346 she was dangerously close to colliding with a large damaged enemy cruiser but she changed her course by porting her rudder and torpedoed and sank said large cruiser. She became separated from the ship next ahead and proceeded with the YUBARI and the TENRYU.
- (I) After we split to the east and west the CHOKAI (CA) and CruDiv 6 (minus the FURUTAKA), which made up the Eastern Unit, shelled and torpedoed the enemy 4 cruisers and 5 DD's newly sighted to the north. The FURUTAKA, TENRYU, and YUBARI, which made up the Western Unit, shelled the enemy. The two groups, cooperating, attacked from both sides and by 0012 they had completely destroyed the enemy.
- (J) YUNAGI (DD) torpedoed and sank an enemy cruiser at 2355. Considering the movements of the YUBARI she executed a turn at a very great angle. Because she was exceptionally far removed from the main force she reversed (TN: made a complete turn), and continuing to battle with one enemy destroyer, withdrew by herself.
- (K) On the 9th at 0200: In order to withdraw from the sphere of enemy bombing, the whole force received orders to withdraw.

## 3. Results of the Battle:

Blown up and sunk: 2 CA, 1 CL (TN: LCxl), 1 DD.  
 Attacked and sunk: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 CA (by torpedo and gunfire),  
 2 CA, 6 DD.  
 Damaged: 1 CA (by torpedo), 2 DD.

## CHAPTER II. 12 November. The Third (sic) Sea Battle of the SOLOMONS Islands.

## 1. Forces which participated:

1 BatDiv (TN: "11S") (Flagship (TN: 11S) HIEI (BB) and the KIRISHIMA (BB) bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL.  
 CruDiv 10 (TN: "10S") (TN: written a second time and crossed out) (Flagship (TN: P) NAGARA, DesDiv 61 (TN: 61 dg) (TERUTSUKI) DesDiv 16 (TN: 16 dg) Divisional Command (TN: P ?) YUKIKAZE and the MITSUKAZE  
 DesDiv 6 (TN: 6 dg) (AKATSUKI, IKAZUCHI and the INAZUMA) screened the firing units (SHAGEKITA).  
 DesRon 4 (TN: 4Sd) DesDiv 9 (TN: 9 dg) (Flagship: [TN: P] ASAGUMO)  
 DesDiv 2 (TN: 2dg) Divisional Command (TN: P ?) MURASAME, SAMIDARE, YUDACHI, HARUSAME.  
 Minesweeping and protection for the advance.  
 DesDiv 27 (TN: 27dg) (Division Command (TN: P) SHIGURE, SHIRATSUYU, and the YUGURE.) Protecting GUADALCANAL and the RUSSELL Islands.

## Enemy forces:

LUNGA Area: 4 CA  
 2 CL  
 7 DD  
 6 Torpedo Boats (TN: Tx6).  
 TULAGI Area: 3 CA  
 2 DD  
 1 Torpedo Boat (TN: GYORAITAI X 1)

## 2. Developments:

- (A) 0830. A B-17 flying from the south came in contact with BatDiv 11 but was driven off by fighters of CarDiv 2 (TN: fc).  
 2sf

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 35

- (B) At about sunset a Type Zero float reconnaissance plane from the HIEI (BB) sighted some 10 enemy vessels anchored at GUADALCANAL.
- (C) 2312: Unable to find the enemy even by taking a firing course of 130°.
- (D) 2343: The YUDACHI and the HIEI sighted the silhouettes of several enemy ships and charged with full force and began to battle.
- (E) The Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TAI) fired guns and torpedoes at the enemy from his west flank. The YUDACHI (DD) conformed with this and doubled the attack from the east and one after another we blew up and sank the enemy. On account of this the enemy gradually retreated to the north; part of the Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TAI) swept the enemy from the seas firing torpedoes and guns in succession.
- (F) The mopping-up unit, before going ahead, fell behind (KORAKU) when the main force had maneuvered to retire to the north of SAVO Island. It came up almost abreast with the main force but passed astern of the main force at the south side of SAVO Island and went to the north side of the island. It cooperated with the Screening Force and part of the Firing Force causing the annihilation of the enemy forces remaining.
- (G) From 2350 to 0034 we destroyed the major part of the enemy power in the area and we then withdrew to the North.

## 3. Results of the Battle:

Sunk (by torpedoes): 3 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 3)  
1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)

Sunk (by gunfire): 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)  
1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)  
3 Destroyers (TN: d x 3)

Severely Damaged: 2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)  
5 Destroyers (TN: d x 5) (sank later)  
1 Torpedo Boat (TN: t x 1) (sank later)

Medium Damage: 2 Destroyers (TN: d x 2) (sank later)  
1 Destroyer (TN: d x 1)

## CHAPTER III. 14 November. The Third Sea Battle of the SOLOMON ISLANDS.

## 1. Forces which participated:

CruDiv 4 (TN: 4S) (Flagship (TN: F<sup>1</sup>) ATAGO, TAKAO, KIRISHIMA; bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL.

CruDiv 10 (Flagship (TN: F<sup>2</sup>) NAGARA and the Squadron Command (?) (TN: F<sup>3</sup>) SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, SAMIDARE, INAZUMA.

DesRon 4 (Flagship and Squadron Command (TN: F<sup>4</sup> F<sup>5</sup>) the ASAGUMO.

DesDiv 6 $\frac{1}{2}$  (TN: 6l dg) (division command (TN: F<sup>6</sup>) TERUTSUKI, Protection (TN: screen) for the Firing Forces.

DesRon 3 (TN: 3 sd): (Flagship (TN: F<sup>7</sup>) SENDAI (CL))

DesDiv 19 (TN: 19 dg) Division Command (TN: F<sup>8</sup>) the URANAMI, the AYANAMI and the SHIKINAMI. Clearing the course for other ships.

Enemy Strength:

4 BB, 2 CA; and 4 DD.

## 2. Developments:

- (A) According to various intelligence reports from the planes of the SENYO Maru (XCVS) and other sources we expected to encounter a strong enemy force. At 1940 we withdrew our screen (CHOKUEI WO TESSURU) and moved it forward on the course ahead. At 2010 all forces were ordered to annihilate the enemy.



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 36

- (B) At 2010 the Mopping-up Unit sighted silhouettes of ships to the northeast of SAVO Island and gave chase. At about 2116 they engaged in battle. The AYANAMI was ordered to separate (from the main force) and to proceed to the LUNGA Point Area via the south side of SAVO Island. While proceeding there she blew up and sank one enemy cruiser which she met at the south side of SAVO Island.
- (C) The Mopping-up Unit (minus the ASAGUMO and the TERUTSUKI) went ahead of the main force at 2120 and sailed 6-7 kilometres astern of the AYANAMI. While proceeding, it met 1 enemy cruiser and 3 enemy destroyers. It destroyed those and then at 2145 it sighted 2 battleships northwest of ESPERANCE. While reporting this to the entire force it tried to attack them, but the destroyers did not have their guns loaded in time to fire (JIH.TSU SOTEN MANIAWAZU). After that the enemy withdrew to the south and we pursued them with all our effort. At about 2340 we overtook them and carried out our second attack on them.
- (D) Just before 2200 CruDiv 4 (TN: 4S), KIRISHIMA, ASAGUMO, TERUTSUKI sighted 4 Battleships in succession and attacked and sank 2 of them by torpedo and gunfire.
- (E) At 2325 the C-in-C of the Second Fleet (TN:  $\frac{F}{2F}$ ) took into consideration the present situation, their and our condition and the time of day and ordered our withdrawal to the north after carrying out an attack on enemy forces which had been contacted.

## 3. Results of the Battle:

2 BB's attacked and sunk; 1 BB considerably damaged; 2 CA's blown up and sunk.  
 1 DD blown up and sunk.  
 3 DD's attacked and sunk.

(End of Extracts)

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 37

## ACCOUNT OF THE NORTHERN CAMPAIGN (May-August 1943)

## I. CHRONOLOGICAL DIVISIONS

1. ATTU Campaign.  
From 25 May to 1 June; campaign ("ke" ) against ATTU.
2. KISKA Campaign.  
From 2 June to 26 June; first part of campaign ("ke" ) against KISKA (by submarine).  
From 27 June to 18 July; first phase in second part of campaign ("ke" ) against KISKA (by destroyer forces).  
From 19 July to 1 August; second phase in second part of campaign ("ke" ) against KISKA (by destroyer forces).

## II. SITUATION AT ATTU BEFORE THE ENEMY ATTACK

On 8 May the enemy issued an official communique on ANCHITKA (monitored by the radio of the 51st Communications Unit (Cg) ). In view of this intelligence, therefore, we were certain that the American army and navy had completed an air base and other installations there. On the 9th BICEYATTO Island in the MALOELAP Group was bombarded at 1615, PAPAN Island (in the MARIANAS) at 1910, and HOROBETSU Village, 15 kilometres northeast of MURORAN, at 2350. Were these bombardments meant to be made in concert with the TUNISIAN Campaign as propaganda for an aggressive American offensive in the PACIFIC? Or, they might have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the NORTH or SOUTH (PACIFIC) . Be that as it may, it should have been considered in connection with the recent prominence given to an enemy offensive in the PACIFIC, particularly in the ALEUTIANS; and our forces should have been very much on guard against an enemy counter-attack. Hence, at 2335 on the 10th, there was the following order from the (HQ), Combined Fleet (CF):-

- "(1) In view of communications intelligence (from 6th Communications Unit?) and the appearance of enemy submarines, there is suspicion of an operation by an enemy task force.
- (2) Maintain a vigilant watch for an enemy occupation (force) and air attack."

At this time the airfield installations on ATTU were expected to be almost finished by the end of May. But the air-raid trenches, fuel storehouses, shell and powder magazines, and other projects had yet to be started, while their completion had been scheduled for the first of June. Furthermore, DesRon 1 (CL KISO, DD SHIRARUMO, DD TAKABA) conveyed the KIMIKATA Maru (XCV) bringing float planes for ATTU. The ships left PARAMUSHIRO at 1200 on the 11th. Meanwhile, the KACHI (CA) and the HATSUCHIRO (DD) had left YOKOSUKA at 0014 on the 11th, bound for PARAMUSHIRO. Both groups were at sea then, when the American attack was made. Each of the Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 was engaged in transporting material for KISKA.

## III. SITUATION AT ATTU FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK

At 0449 on the 12th the 51st Communications Unit detected the call signal "BOU", making its first appearance on a frequency of 4385 K.C.; reception was extremely good. In the KISKA area, enemy planes delivered a hour-long attack at about 0700. Enemy reconnaissance planes were also very active. From 0200 until 0900 attacking enemy planes invaded the mists of ATTU, soaring over the island ceaselessly, relentlessly, as they strafed and bombed it. At this time absurd leaflets urging surrender were dropped in the CHICHAGOF Harbor sector. At 1000 the observation crew at HOLTZ Point spotted enemy boats headed for WEST ARM Point. The Shipping Engineers were sent out immediately to investigate from the sea. From them it was confirmed that the enemy was landing at WEST ARM Point and along the northwest coast. The forces in this sector at once entered upon Condition One as they determined to prevent the enemy landing even a part of his forces. At 1030 another enemy landing was announced in MASSACHE Bay. The enemy strength here was about 2000 men; but it seemed as if there were many more in reserve. In the meantime, enemy ships bombarded our forces with a threatening fire. At the report of an attack by a large enemy force, the ATTU Dispatched Force immediately set about burning all its documents save those in Cipher B (OTSU).

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFCA Item #4986

Page 38

The strength of the attacking forces remained unknown because of the poor visibility at the time. However, judging from the noise of the guns, it was thought that there was a support force composed of several cruisers and smaller ships, and having seen the attacks delivered by carrier-based planes, the presence of carriers in the vicinity was suspected. By 1520 the following was known about the strength of the enemy force: There were 29 ships in HOLTZ Bay and at WEST ARM Point, 27 in MASSACRE Bay, and 6 in WEST ARM Bay. Furthermore, more troops were continuing to land, and poor visibility prevented our forces from determining their number. According to communications intelligence at the time, a strong enemy force was operating in the southern ALEUTIANS.

#### IV. ORDERS OF THE 5TH FLEET AND STATE OF OUR FORCES FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK

- (1) Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 will cease their transport activities, and proceed at once to ATTU to attack the enemy transports.
- (2) The USUGUMO (DD) will cease its work and hasten to PARAMUSHIRO to supply our forces.
- (3) The commander of the escort force will attack enemy shipping in the MASSACRE Bay Area with planes from the KINIKAWA Maru.
- (4) The ASAKA Maru (浅香丸) will sail to AOMORI and pick up for transport to PARAMUSHIRO some army reinforcements.
- (5) The ATWATA Maru (粟田丸) will stand ready at YOKOSUKA (to transport naval reinforcements).

The Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Fleet, commanding the MAYA (CA), left PARAMUSHIRO to join the escort force.

At this time, the TAMA (CL) (at MAIZURU) also stopped its work and was able to leave on the 20th; the ASAGUMO (DD) (at YOKOSUKA) was able to leave on the 21st. The ABUKUMA (CL) (at GASEBO), however, was able to set out on the 16th.

Thus, the strength with which we could counterattack the enemy's assault was merely one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. Moreover, an air force was ordered to go to PARAMUSHIRO; but was delayed because of unfavorable weather.

#### Summary of the Operations of the Combined Fleet:

##### A. Northern Forces

1. Submarines concentrated in the ATTU Area to destroy enemy shipping.
2. Land-based air forces carried out patrols and attacks.
3. Surface units awaited a favorable opportunity to destroy enemy fleet units in the ATTU Area.
4. As it proceeded, our task force kept patrols on the enemy task force (by observation craft, fishing boats, submarines, and float reconnaissance planes).
5. An army of reinforcements was being transported to ATTU.

##### B. Task Force.

Proceeded from YOKOSUKA on the 22nd. Went through the waters east of the KUPILES during the last of the month. Its purpose was to crush enemy fleet units and task forces and to assist our Northern forces.

##### C. Combined Fleet.

Left TRUK on the 17th for YOKOSUKA.

#### V. EVENTS UNTIL THE FALL OF ATTU

The composition of the enemy fleet as seen from the land on the 13th was as follows:

In HOLTZ Bay - One CV (no bridge), one CHICAGO class cruiser, one OMAHA Class cruiser, three DD's.

In MASSACRE Bay - One BB, two cruisers, five DD's, ten transports.

About 1318 our submarines attacked the enemy fleet, causing the main body to withdraw eastward temporarily. About 1900 lights were lit on ships anchored in MASSACRE Bay, apparently for something important which had happened. A destroyer ran aground near shore.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 39

The enemy forces that had landed by 1300 on the 14th totalled not less than a division. Before long the enemy had put his carriers and battleships out to sea. However, the destroyers audaciously dropped anchor in the bay despite the attacks of our submarines, and observed us. (Thus, the enemy knew the weakness of our forces from previous reconnaissance.)

An enemy battleship was greatly damaged in an attack by our submarines on the 14th. In general, however, our ships were checked by the enemy destroyers. By the 24th they had only inflicted severe damage on a cruiser and some damage on two unidentified warships.

19 Medium bombers (CHUKO) made the first attack by our planes on the 14th. They returned because of unfavorable weather, however. Thereafter, on consecutive days, our planes were unable to attack due to unfavorable weather. Finally, on the 23rd, they attacked, destroying a cruiser and a destroyer, and setting fire to another ship. But on the following day, the enemy

(fleet) had generally withdrawn an hour before our attack force arrived. Hence, no results could be gained at sea, and our planes had to confine themselves to bombing land targets. At this time, the destroyer force which had at last completed the assembling of a force planned to evacuate our forces on ATTU Island, but though it put out from PARAMUSHIRO on the 25th, its efforts were of no avail because of continuous bad weather. In the meantime the Guard Unit on ATTU Island, although out-numbered, valiantly withstood the fierce attacks of the enemy, even at times carrying out night attacks on other operations which were doomed from the start. They waged bitter battle but, in the end, having received no reinforcements and having exhausted every last artifice (to the last man), they met their deaths calmly. Finally, on the 29th ATTU Island fell in honor.

#### VI. FIRST PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

KISKA, of course, was placed in a helpless position by the fall of ATTU. Therefore, it was decided to evacuate the island. We were entrusted with the task of evacuating the troops from the island by means of 10 submarines running back and forth. Since there were over 7000 men to evacuate and submarines have very limited capacity, it was not known how long it would take to finish the evacuation. In addition to this, the patrols around KISKA had finally become most strict and damage to our ship had increased. Finally, the I-7 was lost. No matter how enshrouded by the fog we would be, we would instant be bombarded, for the efficiency of the enemy's radar was far superior to what we had expected.

#### VII. FIRST PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

To meet this situation, as a last resort we carried out "ke" (TN:4) plan of operations by which we employed a force of destroyer forces (SUIRAIBUTAI). In order to do this we installed as quickly as possible, on the destroyers counter-radar equipment (TEKI-DENTAN NI TAISURU GYAKUTAN) and equipment to take aboard the landing barges to be used in the evacuation. On 6 July this work was, for the most part, completed. Because, however, there was uncertainty about the frequency of the enemy's radar there was some uneasiness about our counter-radar.

On 7 July at 1930 we set out from PARAMUSHIRO. Our force was composed of 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. At that time the state of affairs, as seen by the Grand Fleet (TN: GP), was as follows:

"Regarding the situation, it may be said that the possibility of the enemy attacking us in the vicinity of KISKA is great." But, on the other hand, it was felt that though the enemy had isolated KISKA he was hoping to starve out the garrison. Only patrols around the island were strictly maintained. It was felt that an aggressive offensive and landing were not to be expected. According to intelligence reports up to the 7th, about the 26th a fleet of transports had departed from the west coast of NORTH AMERICA and about the 3rd had reached the DUTCH HARBOR Area. Still more, we had received intelligence reports that transports had arrived at ATTU frequently during June. Furthermore, there was information that a powerful force had set out from DUTCH HARBOR on 1 July and had arrived at MOCHITKA on the 4th. The enemy's northern submarine force had been making preparations for battle since the 14th, or so, and having completed these preparations about the 30th, had assembled at DUTCH HARBOR.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 40

A squadron (TAI) of submarines, reinforcements for the submarine force, had reached DUTCH HARBOR from the American mainland about June 20th. Again there was intelligence that at the end of June, transports had arrived at ADAK and ATTU several times. On the 21st the air strength at AMCHITKA had been somewhat increased and the base for land planes at ATTU was nearing completion. Atmospheric conditions in the KISKA Area up to the time we set out were as follows:

On the 2nd and 3rd visibility was good, from 30 to 40 kilometres; on the 4th and 5th visibility was bad, from 2 to 3 kilometres. On the 6th it was about 30 kilometres.

In the meantime, a number of enemy planes -- B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, PBY's, and others, in formations, singly, or in pairs were carrying out day after day bombing and reconnaissance missions. Patrol about the island was maintained by a number of cruisers and destroyers.

On the 7th, the destroyer force (SUIRAI BUTAI) set out as scheduled. After they had set out, a thick fog rolled up and discovery and destruction by enemy submarines was rendered improbable. Thereafter, until we returned to PARAMUSHIRO the percentage of fog was constantly about 85. On the 7th, visibility around KISKA was about 7 kilometres. Enemy planes, (each time a reconnaissance plane), approached at 0350, 0724, and 0835, and at 1140. 6 cruisers and 4 destroyers bearing from the NW approached to a point 15 miles south of GERTRUDE COVE and shelled it. At 1455 3 enemy ships were sighted about 30 kilometres from SHIROZAKI (TN: 白崎).

The above ships, judging from shell splinters, duds, and shell holes, were PENSACOLA class, 1 ship, HONOLULU class, 2 ships, a new class, 1 ship, and 4 Destroyers. On the 8th, there was a thick fog from the morning on and during the day visibility was from 1 to 3 kilometres; in the evening about 6 kilometres. On this day no enemy planes came.

On the 9th, visibility to the SE was from 30 to 40 kilometres and from the afternoon on clouds covered the entire sky without a break. Though the clouds were 200 metres high and a thick fog hung upon the sea, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. One enemy warship was sighted at 0833 forty kilometres, 220°, from SOUTH HEAD. At 1057 a ship was sighted at 340° off TAKAZAKI (TN: 高崎). From 2050 to 2230 GERTRUDE COVE was shelled by destroyers on patrol with guns of about 12cm.

On the 10th at 0205 we speeded along our course and though we proceeded along our way until 2030, the fog was thin enough to allow airplane flights and since this was to our disadvantage, we turned back. The weather forecast from the Headquarters of the Division was as follows:

"On the 12th there will be fog rolling up from the SE at 8 metres per second with occasional breaks. On the 13th there will be prevailing east winds flowing from 8 to 12 metres per second and thick fog."

We prepared to make a dash for it on the 13th. Today (10th) there was fog around KISKA at the end of the day and visibility was from 1 to 2 kilometres. Enemy planes and also 2 single planes (TN: 単機 TANKI) came two or three times on reconnaissance flights.

11 July: About 0200 visibility was about 20 kilometres and though the sky was covered with clouds, the fog was light. Generally, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. At 2006 GERTRUDE COVE and at 2217 LITTLE KISKA were bombarded. Moreover, according to intelligence reports, the Army Air Base on ATTU and the airfield for Army heavy bombers at AMCHITKA and AGATTU were almost completed. Our observation boats (KANSHI-TEI) based at PARAMUSHIRO had discovered that patrols by the enemy to the west were becoming stricter and they were certain that along with the near completion of the land-plane base on ATTU patrols by the enemy carried out by aircraft, naval vessels, and submarines would be even stricter.

12 July: At 0735 we sped along our course but the fog was light and at 1520 we turned back. We expect to dash forward on the 14th. Today in the morning visibility around KISKA was from 6 to 8 kilometres, and though about noon it was 15 kilometres, the barometer fell. From 1800 on there was thick fog. Enemy planes, P-40's, B-25's, PBY's, all on reconnaissance missions came during the morning and about 1245 a small type naval vessel was sighted about 20 kilometres off TAKAZAKI at 330°.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 41

13 July: Having taken in consideration weather around KISKA, at 0240 we hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad weather at AMCHITKA and ATTU. No enemy planes were seen around the island. Only a small type naval vessel was carrying out patrol. However, because the visibility in the morning was from 8 to 10 kilometres we broke off our course and at 1703 turned back. Though we made the dash again at 2145, we turned back at 0156 on the 14th. The following is the weather forecast given out by headquarters on the 13th:

- "1. Tomorrow the weather around KISKA will not differ much from today' There will be a light fog and it is expected that visibility will be fair.
2. The high atmospheric pressure which prevails in these waters is slowly shifting to NE or ENE. Thus, should we proceed along our course, there is a possibility that the present state of weather and visibility will prevail as far as KISKA in the same general direction as the aforementioned high atmospheric pressure.
3. At the same time as this high atmospheric pressure progresses, the possibility of flights from ADAK is great.
4. We may conclude from the above that the possibility of success in our advance is extremely slight and that we shall have to turn back and wait. We may look forward to proceeding on our mission on the day after tomorrow."

(Insert)

According to the communications intelligence report of 13 July new call signals appeared on the 9th from the places we had presumed to be naval air bases; these were presumed to be at ATTU and the island neighboring. New call signals also appeared from the places we had presumed to be army air bases; we had figured two to be on ATTU and one in the neighboring islands. On the 11th, 6 army planes flew to ATTU. The total number of army and navy planes permanently based in the ALEUTIANS has grown rapidly since the 9th; 173 planes were in the ALEUTIANS by the 10th.

Enemy planes have been active on the 9th and 10th. Our patrols in the PARAMUSHIRO Area are vigilant.

And we have great numbers of powerful fleet units operating in the CENTRAL PACIFIC.

According to the communications intelligence report of 15 July, a powerful enemy force has been under radio silence for several days. The number of enemy ships operating around KISKA is very large. According to the communications intelligence report of 16 July, one part of the enemy fleet is apparently operating in the ALEUTIAN area. Liaison activities between AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay have been great. The enemy seems to be concentrating all his efforts in equipping and strengthening AMCHITKA.

14 July: In the morning the weather changed for the worse. The velocity of the wind was 14 metres per second; atmospheric pressure was 757mm.

Visibility was about 6 kilometres. In the afternoon conditions improved and the wind velocity was from 5 to 8 metres per second and visibility was 5 kilometres. Today 3 or 4 enemy naval vessels were patrolling around the island. At 1500 we started out but there was a statement from headquarters:

"The weather in the vicinity of KISKA and along the course we shall follow has had a change for the better. For the present, there is no prospect of meeting a favorable fog from the sea. We shall turn back now and return to PARAMUSHIRO where we shall plan a second operation."

15 July: At 0430 we turned back. Today visibility around KISKA was 10 kilometres and in the morning reconnaissance was carried out by a B-25, a P-38, and a PBY; and a formation of 7 B-24's and 5 B-25's bombed (KISKA). At 2202 enemy warships shelled GERTRUDE COVE.

16 July: Visibility -- 10 to 15 kilometres.

17 July: There was thick fog in the morning and visibility was 1.5 kilometres. In the afternoon it was 8 kilometres at times. Enemy planes were carrying out reconnaissance and naval vessels were maintaining patrols.

18 July: At 0830 we entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 42

## VIII. SECOND PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

At 2000 on the 22nd we entered upon the second phase.

On the 19th and 20th the visibility in the KISKA Area was 15 to 20 kilometres; on the 21st, it was 3 to 4 kilometres. To generalize the enemy's plans to the situation: There have been seven days out of 21 on which the enemy did not come over. Since the 9th enemy ships had bombarded KISKA five times.

Our sorties recently have been an hour later than planned because of the thick fog. Moreover, it has been difficult to maintain our formation. In our first change (of position) the relative positions were totally unknown. Communication by telephone is poor. On the 24th, while it was clear and only slightly misty, we looked about and adjusted our formation. The TAMA, NIPPON Maru (XAO), and KUNIJIRI (CM) were not to be seen. (The Commander-in-Chief 5th Fleet, was aboard the TAMA.)

At 0800 on the 24th, a patrol plane made a forced landing in Sector #10 on the ATTU patrol line, and dispatched a special urgent operational message. Indeed, there were several urgent messages to that effect. A dispatch from the 51st communications unit had arrived, saying that it was doubtful that the aviator had been located by the destroyer force. For 30 minutes after 0945 on the 23rd enemy ships bombarded from the northeast and south. And, as the skies were clear, formations of enemy planes strafed and bombed several times. The number of participating planes was over 96. The enemy employed delayed action bombs, incendiary bombs, and parachute bombs. The delayed action bombs were set at 30 minutes, one hour, 15 hours, 24 hours, etc.

On the 25th, it was clear, and formations of from three to nine P-40's raided KISKA seven times from AMCHITKA; all formations bombed only the landing field. The enemy bombers at AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay on ADAK, 51 all told, stood ready, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. The activity of enemy patrol planes at both bases was great.

About 1700 the KAZEGUMO (DD) detected an enemy submarine transmitting a message.

In view of our poor radio interception control, it is doubtful whether the sub was located.

About 1500 on the 26th we made contact with all the ships save the KUNIJIRI, and the locations to which our formation had been adjusted again were visible. Suddenly, at 1750 the KUNIJIRI collided into the starboard side of the ABUKUMA. Damage to both ships was slight, but because of the accident some confusion was produced in the rear units. The WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, and NAGANAMI (DD) collided, the latter receiving only slight damage. However, the WAKABA and NAGANAMI were now handicapped for operational cruising. The WAKABA returned to PARAMUSHIRO; the HATSUSHIMO entered the Naval Supply Unit.

On the 27th we set our course south and tried to pick up the lost trail of an enemy submarine.

We decided to make a dash for KISKA on the 28th. Conditions there had been (none too good) up to now.

The visibility had been excellent on the 26th and hence a handicap to our operating units; for a total of 46 planes raided KUKA that day. On the 25th a similar formation of P-40's had attacked seven times. Enemy bombers were generally in readiness at every base, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted.

Patrol planes were active, and a vigilant watch was kept in the north. Several enemy ships were operating in the waters south and west of KISKA. At 1925 there was a night bombing.

On the 27th, it was clear in the morning; visibility 20-30 kilometres, cloud ceiling at 3000 metres. But the fog appeared around 1800. On this day a total of 87 planes attacked. 8 B-24's bombed twice; afterwards, KISKA was subjected to reconnaissance for about three hours. At night single planes bombed three times; afterwards they dropped flares, which seemed strange and purposeless.

The barometer fell gradually during the morning of the 28th; the mist thickened, and the visibility was only 8-10 kilometres. Perhaps because the weather changed for the worse enemy planes did not fly over KISKA after 0340. By afternoon the fog had taken in the whole sky; the visibility was 6-8 kilometres.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 43

On the 29th, too, a heavy fog hung over our route. We pressed forward to KISKA, plotting our course from its radio waves. We only awaited the grace and aid of our gods. At 1105, while it cleared, for a bit, we recognized the outline of the island. Then the inevitable fog again. We sailed around to the north of KISKA, but saw no sign of enemy ships. At 1316 the ABUKUMA sighted an enemy vessel and launched several torpedoes, but it had mistaken LITTLE KISKA Island for the enemy.

Again, at 1321, the SHIMAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and opened fire with her guns. At 1325 we set our course to enter the harbor. Only within the bay, strangely enough, was the mist completely absent, and the visibility was extremely good. The clouds were at about 100 metres, and dense. We anchored at 1350. Immediately the landing barges which had been in readiness came alongside our ship and loaded the men aboard; in two trips, they had completed their work. The 500-odd men that came aboard did so in an orderly fashion and in fine spirits. By 1420 each of the ships in the 2nd Transport Unit (YUSOTAI) had completed its loading. We left then at once. The 1st Transport Unit left the harbor a little later. After that the mist gradually became thicker in the bay. Thereafter, the 2nd Transport Unit did not see anything whatsoever of the enemy. We left and went on ahead at a speed of 30 knots. The 1st Transport Unit, with the ABUKUMA, spotted a periscope, northeast of KISKA, but the submarine immediately disappeared beneath the waves and thereafter wasn't seen again.

At 0600 on the 31st the mist had completely cleared, and at 1530 we entered PEARL MUSHIRO Harbor. It seemed that the heavens were celebrating our success (in returning safely). At 1000 on the 1st of August the 1st Transport Unit entered the harbor; they had not lost a man. The evacuation of the defense force at KISKA, over 5,000 men, had been a success. The enemy apparently had not discovered the evacuation of our troops at all. Thereafter, for day after day, they bombed and bombarded KISKA, and on August 15, the landing of American and Canadian troops on the island was announced.

Truly the height of the ridiculous.



CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 44

## OFFICERS' REGISTER FOR THE KAKO (16 November 1941)

Commanding Officer:	Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yūji (高橋雄次)
Executive Officer:	Cmdr. TAMARA, Yasuedao (俵安岐夫)
First Lieutenant (UNYŌCHŌ) and 8th Division Officer:	Lt Cmdr AKUTAGAWA, Tadatarō (芥河唯太郎)
Gunnery Officer:	Lt Cmdr NISHIMURA, Haruyoshi (西村春芳)
Navigating Officer and 7th Division Officer:	Lt Cmdr YAMAGUCHI, Tokio (山口時男)
Torpedo Officer and 5th Division Officer:	Lt. YONEI, Tsuneo (米井恒雄)
Communications Officer and 6th Division Officer:	Lt. KONDO, Nobuichi (近藤信一)
Aviation Officer and 9th Division Officer:	Lt. SAITŌ, Yasukuni (斎藤安邦)
2nd Division Officer and Officer of the Guard:	Lt. KAGA, Makoto (加賀誠)
1st Division Officer:	S.D. Lt.(jg) MATSUNAGA, Isuke (松永爽助)
3rd and 4th Division Officer:	Lt. (jg) OCHIAI, Otoichi (落合乙市)
Deputy Gunnery Officer (SHŌHŌCHŌ):	S.D. Lt.(jg) MIZUNO, Tōru (水野亨)
Junior Officer, 1st Division:	S.D. Ens. ŌMURA, Sōtarō (大村惣太郎)
Assistant Navigating Officer (KŌKAISHI) and Junior Officer 4th Division:	Ens. KIKUCHI, Giichi (菊地義一)
Junior Officer, 2nd Division:	S.D. Ens. DATE, Jirō (伊達二郎)
Assistant Gunnery Officer and Junior Officer 3rd Division:	Ens. ŌMURA, Masao (大村正雄)
Assistant Communications Officer and Junior Officer, 6th Division:	Ens. ISHIKAWA, Takatoshi (石川孝壽)

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFOA Item #4986

Page 45

## FACTS ABOUT THE KAWO (17 November 1941)

## I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser.

Where built:	At the KAWASAKI Dockyard in KŌBE
Keel laid:	17 November 1922
Launched:	10 April 1925
Completed:	20 July 1926
Modification completed:	28 December 1937

## II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

A. Overall length:	185.2 metres
B. Length between perpendiculars:	176.8 metres
C. Maximum beam:	16.9 metres
D. Draft:	4.8 metres
E. Displacement:	7,100 tons
F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft:	23.3 tons
G. Moment required to change the trim 1 cm.:	246 metric tons
H. Shaft horsepower:	103,300 H.P.
I. Speed:	33 knots
J. Fuel carried:	1,842 tons
K. Fresh water carried:	156 tons
Drinking and all-purpose water:	66 tons
Water, in drums:	90 tons
L. Water evaporated in a day:	244 tons

## III. ARMAMENT:

- A. Guns:
- 6 20cm 50 cal. twin-mount guns, 3 year type, Model 2
  - 4 12cm 40 cal. dual-purpose guns, 10 year type
  - MG's: 4 13mm Hotchkiss MG's.  
2 7.7mm Lewis MG's  
8 25mm twin-mount MG's, Type 96
  - 179 Rifles, Type 38
  - 43 pistols, Army type
- B. Torpedoes:
- 2 mounts of Type 92 quadruple torpedo tubes each
  - 6 depth bombs
  - 1 set of paravanes
- C. Searchlights:
- 3 110cm searchlights, Type 92
  - 2 40cm searchlights, Type "SU"
- D. Range Finders:
- 2 6-metre range finders, Type 14  
2 貳 type 6-metre range finders  
2 貳 type 4.5-metre range finders for dual purpose guns  
2 貳 type 1.5-metre range finders  
2 貳 type 3.5-metre range finders (for torpedo work)
- E. Planes:  
Float reconnaissance planes: 1 in use (1 in reserve)
- F. Wireless Equipment:
- Transmitters:
    - 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 91 Mark 4 (Special) Modification 1
    - 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 92 Mark 4 Modification 1
    - 1 1000-watt short-wave transmitter, Type 95 Mark 3
    - 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 4
    - 1 350-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 5
  - Receivers:
    - 3 receivers, Type 91, Model 1
    - 3 short-wave receivers, Type 91
    - 16 special receivers, Type 92 Modification 3

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 46

- c. Wireless telephones:  
 1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 93  
 1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 2  
 1 ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 4  
 2 wireless telephone microphones, Mark 2, Modification 3
- d. Signal strength indicators (SOKUHAI) and Cathode-ray Tube Screens (KANGAKI)  
 1 Type 92 Electric Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I  
 1 Type 92 Short Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I  
 1 Type 92 Short Wave Signal Strength Indicator, Modification I  
 2 Type 15 No. 2 Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I
- e. Wireless:  
 1 Type TM Light Wireless, Modification I
- f. Radio Direction Finders:  
 1 Type 93 Mark I, Radio Direction Finder

## IV. ENGINES:

- (1) Main engines "BURANKACHIGU" Type Turbine - 4  
     (screw propellers - 4 )  
     (cog-wheel speed reduction gear installed)
- (2) R.P.M. of screw-propellers - (Maximum 360)
- (3) Boilers: Fleet Type - Mark "RO" crude-oil fired boilers exclusively - 0
- (4) Auxiliary Engine and Electric Engines
- (5) Lewis Type refrigeration machine -
- (6) SEGAR (S-O-T) double-effect (FUKKO) type carbonic acid gas type ice machine - 1
- (7) Type "MU" (TH: 風) 8 Watt Type Air Compressing Pump--3
- (8) 4 6-pole, compound-wound generators with interpole  
 4 compound-wound, D.C. electric motors with megapole and interpole:  
     2 300-K.W., 2 - 135 K.W.

## V. BOATS:

Type	Weight	Length	Beam	Draft	Men Carried
Motor Boats (2)	4.4 Tons	11 Metres	2.7 Metres	.6 Metres	30
Launch (1)	3. "	9 "	2.5 "	.6 "	35
Cutters (4)	1.5 "	9 "	2.45 "	.4 "	45
Dinghy (1)	.6 "	6 "	1.5 "	.2 "	10

## VI. LOCATION, TYPE, AND WEIGHT OF ANCHORS:

Bower anchors (2) Stockless bow; both sides each 4.8 tons  
 Stream anchor (1) With removable stock (?) stern; starboard 1.4 tons  
 Kedge anchor (1) Navy-type stern; port .5 ton

## VII. ANCHOR CABLES:

Bower anchor cables (2); 57mm. diameter; 15 shots on starboard side for 340.5 metres; 16 shots on port side for 351.4 metres; each cable shot is 22.7 metres  
 Stream anchor cable (1): 35mm. diameter; 162.9 metres long; of steel wire  
 Kedge anchor cable (1): 48 mm. diameter; 162.9 metres long; of Manila rope

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOa Item #4986

Page 47

## HEADQUARTERS STAFF, 6TH FLEET (1 December 1941)

Rear-Admiral GOTŌ, Zonchi (五 有 知 ); Commanding  
 Engineer Captain ŌMUKI, Jisaku (大 員 治 作 ); Fleet Engineering Officer  
 Commander KISHIMA, Kikutoku (黄 岛 掬 徳 ); Staff Officer  
 Lt. Comdr. MINAMI, Iwao (南 祝 ); Staff Officer  
 Lt. Comdr. SEKINO, Hideo (関 野 英 夫 ); Staff Officer  
 Eng. Lt. Comdr. ISHISAKA, Haruichi (石 坂 治 吉 ); Staff Officer  
 Warrant Officer IZUMI, Iwao (泉 岩 雄 ); Attached to Hdq. Staff

## OFFICERS OF THE AORA

Captain HISANUME, Yonejirō (久 宗 米 次 郎 ) Captain  
 Commander NAKAMURA, Kenji (中 村 謙 治 ) Executive Officer  
 Eng. Comdr. MINO, Kiroku (峯 毅 六 ) Engineering Officer  
 Lt. Comdr. NISHIKŌRI, Yūji (西 郡 雄 次 ) Navigator  
 Lt. Comdr. DOI, Yasumi (土 井 泰 三 ) Gunnery Officer  
 Lt. Comdr. (M.C.) MIURA, Ontarō (三 浦 温 太 郎 ) Medical Officer  
 Lt. Comdr. MIYAZAKI, Isamu (宫 崎 勇 ) Torpedo Officer  
 Lieutenant (sg) TAMURA, Hashi (今 村 端 ) Aviation Officer  
 Lieutenant (sg) IGETA, Hirokuni (出 田 博 国 ) 1st Lieutenant  
 Lieutenant (sg) TAKUBO, Tatsuo (田 久 保 龍 雄 ) 2nd Division Officer  
 Lieutenant (sg) HOSHINO, Seisaburō (星 野 清 三 郎 ) Communications Officer  
 Eng. Lt. SHIBATA, Yoshinori (柴 田 義 则 ) 10th Division Officer  
 Lt. (sg) (SC) MATSUNAGA, Seiryū (松 永 世 隆 ) Supply Officer  
 Special Duty Lt. (jg) KAJITA, Yoshisaburō (梶 田 芳 三 郎 ) 1st Division Officer  
 Special Duty Eng. Lt. (jg) IKEDA, Tadatsuna (池 田 忠 正 ) 12th Division Officer  
 Eng. Lt. (jg) NAKAJIMA, Riichi (中 岛 利 一 ) Division Officer  
 Lt. (jg) YOSHIMURA, Goro (吉 村 五 郎 ) Division Officer  
 Eng. Lt. (jg) HACASE, Takeshi (長 瀬 武 ) Division Officer  
 Lt. (jg) (M.C.) HOSOKI, Daisaburō (细 木 大 三 郎 ) Shio's Company  
 Lt. (jg) NOMODU, Sadasuke (野 々 部 定 祐 ) Ship's Company  
 Special Duty Ens. HASHICHA, Gihachi (梅 岡 儀 八 ) Ship's Company  
 Ens. (S.C.) KITAYA, Yoshikichi (北 谷 由 吉 ) Ship's Company  
 S.D. Ens. YAMABAYASHI, Tokuji (山 林 得 次 ) Ship's Company  
 Eng. Ens. HAMAYA, Haruo (浜 谷 春 雄 ) Ship's Company

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4936

Page 48

Ens. MAEGAWA, Shinichi (前川信一) Ship's Company  
 Res. Eng. Ens. OSHIMA, Magane (小島真全) Ship's Company  
 Ens. SATO, Tadashi (佐藤正) Ship's Company  
 Ens. ODERA, Shunsaburo (大寺俊三郎) Ship's Company  
 Eng. Ens. KOIZUMI, Yasutarō (小泉保太郎) Ship's Company  
 Ens. (S.C.) WADA, Isamu (和田勇) Ship's Company

## FACTS ABOUT THE AOBA

## I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser

Where built:	MITSUBISHI Dockyard at NAGASAKI
Keel laid:	4 February 1924
Launched:	25 September 1926
Completed:	20 September 1927
Modifications finished:	30 October 1940

## II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

A. Overall length:	181.36 metres
B. Maximum beam:	15.47 metres
C. Length between perpendiculars:	176.78 metres
D. Draft:	5.66 metres
E. Displacement:	11,660. tons (sic)
F. Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft:	23.6 kgs. (sic) (TW; tons?)
G. Moment required to change trim 1 cm:	246.2 kgs. (sic) (TW; tons?)
H. Shaft horsepower:	103,000. S.H.P.
I. Speed:	33. knots
J. Fuel oil carried:	20,400.
K. Fresh water carried:	
Drinking water:	31.04 tons
All-purpose water:	43.28 tons
Water in drums:	127. tons
Water evaporated in a day:	200. tons

## III. ARMAMENT, ETC. (same as the KAKO)

## FACTS ABOUT GOING ASHORE AT ROI (RUOTTO) (12-15-41)

Flag Signal for the AOBA.

1. While anchored at ROI and up until the 29th, all hands are permitted to go ashore and stroll about for three hours.
2. Extent of our liberty ashore; islands in the vicinity, swimming in the surf, and the wanton picking of fruit are prohibited.
3. For alarms, the AOBA will shoot two flares off in succession, in addition to its use of the regulation signals.
  - (1) Liberty ashore every day from 0600 to 0900, and from 1100 to 1400.
  - (2) Complement -- about 120.
  - (3) Small boats in use: 1 lighter holding 90-100 men  
1 cutter holding 25-30 men
  - (4) Place -- EDGIGEN Island (uninhabited island)

Warnings when going ashore.


1. This island is a breeding place for dengue fever, and the mosquitoes are extremely numerous here. When stripping or when you step into a thicket you must not be bitten by any mosquitoes.
2. You must not be naked at any time while ashore. Further, swimming is strictly prohibited.
3. The wanton picking of fruit is forbidden. Nor is it permissible to bring aboard ship fruit that is unnecessary.
4. You must be assembled on the beach 20 minutes before it is time to return to the ship.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item. #4986

Page 42-A

SKETCH of ANCHORAGES  
AT HONOLULU  
(12-17-41)



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 49

## 5. Concerning Alarms:

All hands will always be mindful of their ship, and must be able to assemble together when the alarm is sounded. Therefore, at an alarm two flares will be fired in succession three times or more times from our ship. You must take care so that in this eventuality the conduct of our defense is not imperiled.

#12

THE REEFS AT TRUK HARBOR (as observed from a motorboat)  
(TN: To accompany #11)

## I. Time and Place

12 December 1941, 1430 (one hour before sunset).  
Off the south shore of DUBLON Island in the TRUK Island Group.

## II. Weather; Sea Conditions.

Clear weather. South wind, velocity of approximately 6 meters (TN: per second).

## III. Summary of Activities.

We were unable to transport the official messenger to the Government Branch Office jetty, and the 15 Supply Department workers to the Munitions Section jetty at NEBERAL, but had accompany us the nine midshipmen on a hydrographic survey. We were familiar with the Government Branch Office jetty from our morning's experience. We were not familiar at all, however, with the location of the Munitions Section jetty. Even the charts we brought with us were not detailed. At the Branch Office jetty we asked people (for details, but without result), and although uneasy, we set out. We proceeded along, seeing marker posts A & B on our right. Then we passed two or three moored large flying boats. From point B we proceeded directly towards an object resembling a jetty. Because of our lack of self-confidence through this channel and of our uneasiness over the depths, we went along at slow speed. When we reached Point C, a rasping sound suddenly rent the air and our boat was jolted. The engine, of course, stopped at once. The boat, too, stopped, its bottom grating on the reef for a while. We felt that the boat was barely being supported near its center. This was 300 meters from the shore (to the right). The wind direction was on the starboard beam. The sun's angle of elevation was 15°.

## IV. Measures Taken.

As stated above in describing the position of the bottom of the boat, it was aground on the reef at the center of the boat and to the left, the water was rather deep and the bow of the boat was slowly being rocked to the right by the wind.

Accordingly, I ordered the passengers to draw back onto the stern as far as possible and had four men rock the starboard bow to the right, and, at the same time, the motor was placed in reverse. When they had rocked the boat two or three times, we easily drew away from the reef. After that, we continued in reverse and when we went some distance from the reef, we inspected the engine and gunwale and saw that no damage had been sustained. At that time we received a message by semaphore from the shore which said: "Do not go there!"


I immediately asked for the channel used by boats navigating in that area. When we were stranded on the reef and I thought about the impact I believed for sure that we must have sustained some damage. However, when I was told that there was no damage, in answer to my inquiry, we proceeded ahead.

## V. Causes and Lessons.

1. First of all, the foremost cause of this incident is the fact that we set out without knowing clearly our mission and without knowing where we were going.
2. The charts which we had taken along were not clear at all and should not have been used.
3. It will not suffice to guess at the depth of the water by advancing in the direction of the sun and, moreover, one must not fail to keep a sharp lookout at all moments and to pay attention to the large flying boats moored in the vicinity.
4. We did not take soundings.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICFOA Item: 7986  
Page 49-A



DETAILED MAP  
OF  
PEARL HARBOR



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 50

## VI. Measures Taken After Our Return to the Ship.

I reported to the Executive Officer and to the Officer of the Day. As it was sunset I had the launch hoisted aboard. Thus, I was present when the launch was hoisted aboard and when the bottom of the boat was inspected, aside from the fact that the keel plates had separated more or less, the boat was the same as ever. When the coxswain and I inspected the boat two or three times, we could discover no damage. Accordingly, I made a report to that effect to the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and to the Officer-in-Charge of the Division and thereby committed a grave error. By this I mean that when we inspected the boat the following morning there was a concavity of about 100 square centimeters in area on the star-board keel in the center and the bottom of the boat was full of water. The damage, however, had already been repaired with copper plates by the boat's crew. I immediately notified the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and the Division Officer.

## VII. Observations.

1. When in command of a boat, take full responsibility for matters affecting the boat, and do not listen to the opinions of others with regard to measures to be taken when stranded on a reef. I should have relied upon my own opinions.
2. Lookouts should have been most strictly posted.
3. When I did not know how deep the water was, I should have proceeded at a reduced speed.
4. The examination of the damaged place should have been done more thoroughly.  
"To caution add care".
5. I should have been quick to get in touch with this ship.

(End of narrative)

#10

## FACTS ABOUT TRUK (12-13-41)

## A. Waters Suitable for Anchorage.

On the west side of MOEN Island (and in the waters between the north side and RUAC).

In the vicinity of TRUK Harbor (i.e., in the waters south of UMAN Island and extending to OTTA Island and FANAN Island).

## B. Shelter from Wind and Waves.

Depending on the selection of an anchorage, shelter can be afforded, no matter which direction the wind may come from.

## C. Passes.

## Northeast Pass.

1. In the center of the pass are reefs 7.1 meters under water. They are floating, crimson, circular markers here.
2. When there is a strong northeasterly wind, there are great swells at the entrance to the pass.
3. Tidal current is 2 knots.

## North Pass.

1. Fair sailing with northeast winds.
2. The coconut grove to the northeast makes a good landmark.
3. Channel is sinuous.

## South Pass.

1. Navigable by large ships.
2. There is rather deep water at the end of the reefs on both sides of the pass. You cannot, however, distinguish the change in the color of the water.
3. Maintaining your distance abeam of FALEU Island, it is easy to pass through the narrows.

## EVERETT (EBARITTE) Pass.

1. Free of obstacles. Navigable by large ships.

## D. Supply.

Coal may be had at the naval coaling station on the south shore of DUBLON Island.

Fuel oil (JUYU) may also be had here.

Fresh water is to be had in containers of 260 and 160 tons (one each).


Daily water allowance is 200 tons.

Fresh provisions include egg-plants, small melons, sweet potatoes, taro, all kinds of fish, beef, and pork.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 50-A



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPCA Item #4986

Page 51

## VARIOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING SAILING AND ANCHORAGES IN THE MANDATES

I. INFORMATION FOR NAVIGATION

1. The use of charts showing swept and sounded areas (SĀHAI-SOLURŪCĀ-PAIZU). These island groups are mainly composed of coral atolls. Since the bottom of the sea is very undulating, sweeping and sounding must be carried out even when comparatively detailed sounding charts are available in order to avoid uncharted sunken reefs.
2. The carrying out of soundings.

When in the open sea and among several atolls, even though you may be carrying out to the best of your ability, sounding of the deep waters and soundings for hidden reefs, when you have not navigated throughout the entire area, it is necessary to continue sounding navigation (SOKUSHIKŌKŌ) most strictly.

3. Post strict look-outs.

A good part of the sea in these parts has not yet been sounded and in order to learn about changes in depths, it is necessary to post strict lookouts when navigating around these island groups.

(Note) Though recognition of shallow reefs depends, in the main, upon changes in the color of the water, great care is necessary since conditions of light, climate, and the nature of the sea bottom vary.

- |                             | Depth of Water   |
|-----------------------------|------------------|
| 1. Dark purple-indigo ..... | 70 metres & more |
| 2. Purple-indigo .....      | 40 to 70 metres  |
| 3. Purplish blue .....      | About 30 metres  |
| 4. Blue .....               | About 20 metres  |
| 5. Pale blue .....          | About 15 metres  |
| 6. Bluish green .....       | About 10 metres  |
| 7. Bluish yellow .....      | 2 to 5 metres    |
| 8. Brownish green .....     | Under 2 metres   |
4. The southern part of these island groups is the region of equatorial counter currents, generally from the east. However, around both the RALIK and RATAK chains the northern equatorial current (from the west) and the equatorial counter current (from the east) run longitudinally south and north. Hence, the tidal currents and the winds interact with an extreme complexity, and particular caution must be taken in navigation.

II. CAUTIONS WHEN ENTERING AND LEAVING THE PASSES TO LAGOONS

1. When there are large waves on the sea outside the lagoon, and when their direction coincides with that of the pass to the lagoon, the waves at the entrance to the pass will be remarkably high. But you must allow for a sufficient margin in your estimate of depths.
2. In general, the tidal currents running through the passes are strong. You may make it a general rule to head inward at flood tide and outward at ebb tide, but you should also maintain a careful watch in steering your ship, as the tides may be irregular, depending on the topography of the ocean floor.
3. When you are about to enter or leave a long and narrow pass, you must keep a sharp eye on the weather lest a squall, proceeding inward, engulf you. Furthermore, in the event you are beset by a squall, you must have a plan of action ready beforehand.
4. As the markers are, on the whole, inconspicuous, it is necessary that you do take soundings as you enter the pass, so that you may ascertain the positions of the marker and your ship with room to spare.
5. If you should use small scale charts, you must bear in mind that the notations on sweeping and depths have been omitted.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPCA Item #4986

Page 52

III. CAUTIONS IN DECIDING UPON AN ANCHORAGE

1. Throughout the year northeasterly to easterly winds prevail; the former are generally strong. Aside from the period July to October, when the winds are calmest, you should be careful in the selection of your anchorage.
2. Within an atoll there are several reef spots (TEI $\bar{S}$ HO). Hence, in determining upon an anchorage, you should seek a place with an even depth and conspicuous markers nearby. You should also drop your anchor to determine the depth.
3. In selecting an anchorage for fueling, especial consideration must be paid to wind, waves, and tides.

About 1315 on 21 January 1942, a large enemy flying boat was sighted closing in upon us at 2055' S. Lat., 149040' E. Long. Immediately we notified the task force by radio. Three Zero fighters left the task force in our direction, but they turned around at our instruction and headed for the enemy plane. Within a few minutes a trail of smoke was seen in the direction they had flown. Then we saw the three fighters circling at low altitude. It was certain now that the enemy plane had been shot down. We changed our course at once and proceeded in the direction of the fight. Shortly we saw the fighters flying toward us. We waved our caps in greeting, whereupon they returned our salute by dipping their wings. Then we reached the vicinity of the place where we supposed the plane to have been shot down, sure enough, there was a large oil slick on the sea. We also sighted five of the plane's crew drifting about; we took them aboard as prisoners. Three of the flying boat's regular complement of eight had perished. Of the five we rescued, two were officers and the others rated men.

## THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

(23 January 1942)

From Lt. HOSHIKO

## I. LAWS ON THE SUBJECT

- A. Regulations for the Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War
- B. Laws for Aerial Warfare (Clauses #36 to #38)
- C. Laws for Land Warfare
- D. Applicable Precedents

## II. WHO SHALL BE A PRISONER OF WAR

- A. Combatants, non-combatants (personnel in the Medical Corps are not considered POW's)
- B. Those in active service at the front (personnel with the Signal Corps in the field, etc.)
- C. Rulers (SHUKENSHA) and similar persons.
- D. Responsible government officials, diplomatic envoys, etc.
- E. Civilians employed by the military (GUNZOKU).
- F. Natives who shall have defended themselves against their captors.
- G. The sick and wounded in the military service.
- H. Crews of captured ships and aircraft.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 53

## III. TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

## A. A General Approach

It is of course essential that prisoners of war not be mistreated. The idea that aside from necessary restrictions, they should be treated as military men who have been taken prisoner, is widely accepted. Even though they are enemy officers and men, if it is considered that they were all doing necessary service, and that they were sacrificing their lives for their country, one must feel respect and sympathy for them.

Such springs from a common essence found in our so-called "BUSSHIDO" (TW: "The Way of the Warrior"). However the handling of prisoners of war during the first World War was quite harsh and there were many cases of it not being effected in accordance with previously existing rules.

Our "BUSSHIDO" has as its basis the principle "respect for honor", and the belief that giving a prisoner the opportunity to kill himself is noble treatment.

Respect for the enemy on the field of battle rises above the spirit of combat in response to the enemy's bravery. It is based on the belief that the warrior who views the battlefield as an exercise ground is pleased to have taken an enemy, regarding him as an opponent of exercise ground practice. In order to utilize this general conception concerning prisoners, it is basic that one's attitude should not embrace any individual admiration for the prisoner. It is thought that the differences in Western and Occidental schools of thought regarding "I have done my duty" (TW: In English in original) gives rise to dissimilarities in the concept of prisoners of war.

- B. Prisoners of war should be committed to the authority of the Government of the country which has taken them prisoner and they should be treated humanely. The prisoner may keep anything belonging to him other than implements of war, horses, or military documents. Therefore, the prisoner of war must be given suitable treatment by us. (It is necessary to act according to the various articles and provisions in question.)

Almost all confiscated documents and articles will be returned to these persons in view of the fact that they are personal articles.

## C. Excerpts from Measures for Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War

1. When you have captured a person who shall be a prisoner of war, immediately inspect the articles he carries with him.  
Confiscate weapons, ammunition, and other military articles (catalogue the articles). If he has any other possessions (it is necessary to catalogue the articles) they should be carried by this person if convenient.
2. Only when it is necessary to recognize the dignity of an officer prisoner, can the naval officer-in-charge wear his sword. (The circumstances and the officer's names are to be reported to the Minister of the Navy).
3. A daily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of belongings should be made concerning the prisoner, including the POW's age, social position, rank, residence, Naval District to which attached (SHOZOKU KANSENCHO).
4. Officer prisoners and non-combatant officer prisoners should be distinguished from petty officers and men and they should be treated in accordance with their social position and rank. Make exceptions for infringements of the law or insincerity in answering questions of name and rank.
5. When POW's are disobedient or have plans to escape, etc., the necessary measures for imprisonment or punishment can be carried out. There will be no objection to the use of armed force.
6. In connection with a POW's attempts to escape or misdemeanors apply the Naval Disciplinary Regulations. The disciplinary authority is a senior naval guard officer (GUREI) who actually takes in the prisoners.

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 54

7. The Naval officer in charge shall surrender the POW accompanied by his various documents and articles to the following:
    - (a) He shall surrender him to the Guard District of the Naval Base.
    - (b) In unavoidable circumstances he may surrender him to another Guard Officer (TN: GUNBEI)
    - (c) When he finds it advantageous he may confer with the Army or the Line of Communication (TK: HEITAN) Transportation and Communications Officer and he can surrender the prisoners of war to them. (In such instances, the officers, non-combatant officers (SOTOKAN 特別曹長), and men shall be segregated and their number reported quickly to the Minister.)
  8. When the POW's are picked up, a custodian will be appointed who shall look after the prisoners under the supervision of a naval officer.
  9. Telegrams and letters will be censored by the supervising officer. Only the harmless ones will be let through. The franking privilege shall apply. (You must consult the POW's last P.O. first, however.)
  10. A POW may be permitted to purchase daily necessities or other articles he may like with his own money, only when the supervising officer sees no reason why he should not.
  11. When a POW dies, a funeral service befitting his station and rank in life shall be held.
  12. The Last Will and Testament of a POW shall be handled as if it were from a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
- D. Extracts from the General Rules for the Treatment of POW's (as established in the Laws for Land Warfare).
1. POW's are obligated not to leave a certain area and may be detained in a fixed place. POW's may be imprisoned as long as it is necessary, as a measure to preserve the peace of the community, which must come first.
  2. The capturing nation may utilize the POW's as laborers, according to their rank and ability. Officers may not be employed. The POW's duties shall not be excessive. The labor shall have no relation whatsoever with the military strategy and actions of the capturing nation. (This is very inexplicit, so that in such matters the capturing nation enjoys a freedom of interpretation and may exercise its discretion.) If worked, the POW must be granted a remuneration commensurate with that given Army personnel of his rank in the capturing nation. They say that in this present war GERMANY grants its POW laborers a remuneration 60% of what they are entitled.
  3. The government of the capturing nation is obligated to feed and clothe every POW. When there is no special agreement between two warring nations, the capturing state shall treat matters of food, bedding, and clothing on an equal footing with its own troops.
  4. The POW shall submit to the rules in force. If he does not, the supervising officer may take stringent measures. If a POW shall escape and be caught again before he has reached his objective, he shall be punished. However, if he shall have reached his objective, but become a prisoner again at a later date, he shall not be punished in the least for the former escape.
  5. The capturing nation may permit a POW to take a prescribed oath and set him free; but it may not force the POW to take this oath. Moreover, the government of the capturing nation need not accede to the request of a POW to take the oath and be set free.
  6. At the commencement of hostilities between belligerents, a neutral country shall establish a Prisoner of War Information Bureau, to be in operation from the moment the first enemy nationals are rounded up on alien soil.
  7. POW mail shall be exempted from the local postage regulations; presents and relief society boxes addressed to POW's shall be free of import duties and railroad freight charges.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 55

8. Officer POW's shall receive the same pay that is granted officers of identical rank in the detaining country. This pay shall then be redeemed by the POW's government.
9. With the single stipulation that he shall abide by the rules governing order and discipline, as prescribed by the Army authorities, the POW is granted religious freedom.
10. After peace is restored, the POW shall be returned to his country as rapidly as possible.

## IV. MY OWN VIEWS (CONCERNING THE INTERROGATION OF POW'S)

Throughout the above stipulations, the freedom to interrogate POW's to further the operations of the capturing nation has not been granted. However, I believe that when there are POW's, as between any warring states, it should properly be the conventional thing to interrogate them for information on their fighting forces. Therefore, I conclude that there is no need to adhere to the rules of international law and to hesitate in conducting interrogations. However, if the POW's feelings are not given consideration, results either cannot be gained from the interrogation or will be meagre indeed.

That is to say:

- A. Insofar as possible, POW's should be picked up separately.
- B. Conversation and communication between POW's should be restricted.
- C. To help elicit testimony from POW's material recognized to be of value (documents, messages, etc.) should be gathered and arranged to the best of one's ability. The principal function of interrogation then, should be the further interpretation of this material.
- D. In interrogating, coercion should be the principle. Since in cases when the POW's native language differs from one's own, it is difficult to take advantage of any slip of his tongue, to practice detailed examination or to use indirect questioning (especially at times when one lacks confidence in one's vocabulary), it is easier (TN: for the interrogator) to adopt the formalities of a consultation. The feeling that the victor is superior, the loser inferior should pervade the interrogation. If necessary, you should demand that questions and answers be made in writing.
- E. Until the object of the interrogation has been attained, the POW should be made to feel anxious about his fate, should become haggard physically. Consideration should be given to the POW's quarters, sustenance, surveillance, etc.

## INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WARTIME

From Lt. HOSHINO

- I. The UNITED STATES declared MANILA an open city (TN: "undefended town" written in English). In answer, our imperial forces continued to bomb it. Finally, on 3 January they entered the city. How shall our action be explained in the light of international law?

We had to consider MANILA a defended city (TN: this term rendered in English), and hence our attacks were lawful.

(Reference Material:)

- A. The meaning of an "open city".

The question of what military installations and troops constitute a city's defense is one of a technical fact; (in practice, the question is whether or not the city is defended). However, there is no explicit authority on the subject.

In general, the following cities are recognized as "defended cities":

1. A city surrounded by fortifications.
2. A city in whose vicinity gun batteries and other positions have been erected.
3. A city in which troops are located and attempt to prevent the entrance of the enemy. (If there be a small number of troops, but recognized to have no "ability to resist", the city shall not be treated as a "defended city".)

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #1986  
Page 56

4. A city where the waters at the entrance to the harbor have been laid with (automatic) contact mines.
- B. What shall be selected as attack objectives?  
There is some difference of opinion because of the divergence of operational methods employed in naval, land, and air warfare.
1. Targets in a "defended city":  
There is no necessity to limit the objectives in this instance to fortifications and other defensive installations for troops.  
In air warfare (bombing) the objectives shall be the same as those listed, in the next section.
  2. Targets in an "open city":
    - a. Naval vessels (all ships used by the military services)
    - b. Troops (if there are many troops located in the city, it shall be considered a defended city).
    - c. Constructions with military possibilities:
      - (1) Airfields (those which are privately owned but may be given over to military use in the future must be included).
      - (2) Forts, trenches, obstructions.
    - d. Military, naval, (and airforce) installations (barracks, hangars, arsenals, etc.).
    - e. Storage points for arms and other material.
    - f. Factories and other installations that may be put to military use. (Privately owned plants which will be definitely turned over to the military are included. However, accessory and sub-contract factories are exceptions.)  
Railroads, wireless stations, harbor installations.  
In land warfare, armies must conduct their operations by entering cities which render their attack and bombardment impossible. In naval and air warfare, however, there are no obstacles to an attack.
  3. An "open city" not responding to levies on its populace (There are regulations to meet this situation in naval warfare only. However, the same rules should apply in land warfare. In air warfare, the application of such rules would be impossible.)
    - a. Should a naval force order a city to supply it with the necessary provisions and stores for its immediate needs in a formal demand and the city resist: (for details of the execution of a levy, consult levying orders and the "Regulations for Levying".)  
A levy should correspond to the resources of the place upon which it is made, and must have the approval of the commander of the naval force.  
Unrestricted levying by a SNLF., etc., and levying done by each ship is wrong.
    - b. Should the city officials fail to submit to our orders  
It is permissible to assess all people in the city a form of tax, but an "open city" cannot be bombarded because this levy has not been collected.
  4. When cities, towns, and villages may be bombed in air warfare as objectives (this included "open cities").
    - a. If a large force is in an area immediate to the operation of the opposing land force (including a SNLF) and is concentrating at the city, town, or village in question.
    - b. (Civilians may be in danger, but that cannot be avoided. However, in such instances all possible steps shall be taken to reduce the danger to them.)
    - c. (Bombing which has as its object the intimidation of civilians, the injury of non-combatants, and the destruction of non-military things is illegal.)  
However, there is no objection to destroying individual targets even if the city as a whole may not be made an objective.



CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 57

- C. Targets which may not be attacked (common to land, naval, and air warfare).
1. Religious buildings
  2. Buildings used in the learning of arts and crafts
  3. Buildings used by charity organizations
  4. Historical monuments
  5. Hospitals, collection stations for the sick and wounded, and hospital ships.

But if it had been assumed that these things would not be put to military use, and the enemy violated this assumption, there could not be the slightest objection to an attack. However in such an instance, the existence or non-existence of the breach must be made clear and attacks kept to the minimum necessitated.

- D. Is an attack without warning lawful? (a step taken at the outset of an attack).

In general, the city officials should be notified beforehand, regardless of whether the city is defended or not.

The method of notification is left to the discretion of the attacker. The scattering of leaflets advising evacuation is one way. Especially should an attack on objects within an "open city" be announced, giving its residents a considerable period of grace. (The length of this period will depend on circumstances.)

If the situation is urgent, it is not necessary to warn the city. It will suffice if as much consideration as possible is given to the reduction of inconvenience to the city's inhabitants.

When an assault, surprise attack, etc., is an unavoidable military necessity, an attack without warning is not unlawful. And in air attacks, too, it is not necessary to warn the city beforehand, be it defended or not.

However, an attack provoked by resistance to a levy must be preceded without fail by notification.

- E. Is it necessary that non-combatants be allowed to seek refuge outside the attack sectors when the city is being surrounded?

This may be readily refused, for favors based on pity need not be carried to excess.

- II. There is evidence that the PHILIPPINE Government employees withdrew from MANILA on a hospital ship. Was there anything to prevent us from subjecting this ship to a visit and search and seizing it?

As necessary, it is possible to take charge of a ship, conduct a visit and search, and then set it on an isolated course or detain it.

However, a hospital ship may not be molested as long as it does not commit an act against the enemy.

(Reference Material:)

- A. Definition of a hospital ship

1. A public vessel, private vessel, or ship of neutral registry which is employed with the single purpose of succouring the sick, wounded, and ship-wrecked.
2. Types and markings:

A flag bearing a red cross on a white field flown with the national flag is accepted identification.

- a. Naval hospital ships  
Painted white with a lateral green stripe of about one metre in width. Built and outfitted in the country using it.
- b. Privately owned hospital ships  
Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation, and operated under orders from the belligerent state.
- c. Hospital ships of neutral registry  
Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation in the neutral state, and must have the previous sanction of the government of registry and belligerent state.

In each case, the states in conflict with the said belligerent must be notified of the use of these ships in advance.

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 58

## B. The Rights and Obligations of a Hospital Ship:

1. No matter what nationality a ship may be, it may rescue from the sea the sick and wounded of belligerent powers.
2. Hospital ships may not be used for military purposes.
3. Hospital ships may not interfere with the transport of combatant troops.

Accordingly, the warships of belligerent powers may direct a hospital ship on an isolated course. If necessary, the warships can exercise the right of search and detention.

4. Hospital ships operate at their own risk:

If the symbol of the hospital ship is not recognized and it is attacked, the responsibility lies wholly with the hospital ship.

- C. In cases where a hospital ship engages in forbidden activities by taking advantage of its special rights as a hospital ship, such as engaging in the transportation of personnel other than the sick, wounded, and survivors of ship-wreck or when it makes available information or engages in any other such military function, it forfeits its special rights and may be considered subject to the treatment afforded ordinary ships. (According to British opinion, it is not permissible for a hospital ship to return to the functions of a merchantmen). When we consider, however, those rights which international law permits for the special handling of cases even in sick bays aboard warships we note that the hospital ship goes beyond its allotted powers when it takes aboard (from a warship) sick and wounded. Although it is permissible to open fire immediately upon it, except in absolutely unavoidable cases, it is allowed to get away.

## III. How would you, if you were Commander of the WAKE Island Occupation Force, have dealt with the bearer of a white flag?

Though the situation is handled according to the decisions of the Commander of the Occupation Force and according to the principles established for land warfare, those articles which treat of the situation in international law are given below:

## A. What is meant by the bearer of a flag (TN: in English):

1. He is acting under the orders of one of the belligerent parties (which indicates that he is representing one of the belligerent parties).  
His Duty: To negotiate on behalf of one of the belligerent parties.

His Identification: He bears a white flag.

2. The bearer of the flag and the interpreter, drummer, and bugler who accompany him possess certain inviolable rights.

## B. Treatment of the Flag Bearer:

1. The question of whether or not to acknowledge the flag bearer who has been sent out is left to the discretion of the Force Commander and he is not always obliged to receive him.

(However, in the above case, a declaration that the flag bearer will not be received is customary.)

2. If the flag bearer takes advantage of his position to determine the state of affairs on our side, the Force Commander in order to prevent this may use what ever means he finds necessary.
3. If the enemy has abused the privilege of sending a flag bearer, he can be detained for a while.

## C. Circumstances in Which the Flag Bearer Loses his Inviolable Rights:

1. When he incites treachery or when he takes advantage of his special right to further his own interests.  
When he does either of the above acts, he immediately forfeits his special rights (There should be no question about treating him as an enemy).
2. The flag bearer who has been denied reception shall immediately withdraw but because of this, he does not lose his special rights. That is to say, because reception has been denied it is not permissible to perform immediately a hostile act against the flag bearer.

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 59

## SPECIFICATIONS OF THE NO. 10 TYPE MTB

## 1. HULL:

Length Overall	32.400 metres
Length at Waterline (official)	31.770 metres
Beam	5.000 metres
Depth	2.800 metres
Displacement (official)	84.600 tons
"    (fully loaded)	89.381 tons
"    (light condition)	68.277 tons
Draft forward	1.104 metres
Draft aft	1.116 metres
Mean draft	1.111 metres
Fuel capacity	17.000 liters
Cruising Range (official)	Speed of 28 Knots for 410 Miles
"    "    (under special conditions)	Speed of 16 Knots for 1200 Miles
Maximum Speed	30 Knots

## 2. ARMAMENT:

Type 96 25mm dual-mount machine guns, Model 1, Modification 1	1
Provisionally termed 40 kilogram smoke laying gear (TN: HATSUEN-K <sup>7</sup> 發煙罐)	4
Type 99 7.7mm rifles	5
Pistols	5
Type 97 Gas Masks	18
Steel Helmets	15
Ammunition (25mm)	1200 rounds
"    (rifle)	1400 rounds
"    (pistol)	360 rounds

## 3. TORPEDO EQUIPMENT:

Torpedoes Type 44 (Type 97)	4
Side Dropping Gear, Model 2	4
Director, Type 14, Model 2	1
Type 95 Depth Charge (when torpedoes aboard, 10)	10
Depth Charge Hand Launches, Model 2	6
Air Reservoirs	2

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 60

4. NAVIGATING EQUIPMENT:		
Type 90 Magnetic Compass, Model 2, Modification 1		1
Compass for Small Boats, Model 2		1
5. OPTICAL EQUIPMENT:		
Manoueverable Range-Finder		1
7 Power Prism Binoculars (NOVA, Model 1)		4
Type 96 Sextant, Modification 1		1
6. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT:		
Primary Source of Power:		
Gasoline powered 6 KW 105 V DC Generators (for steering power and cooking use)		2
Secondary Source of Power:		
Storage Batteries, Model 3 (for use in starting and illumination)		1
Navigation Light		1
Illuminating Equipment (including 300W working lights)		1
Communication Apparatus		1
7. RADIO EQUIPMENT:		
Type 96 Mark 4 Air (TN: 空 ) Wireless, sending (and receiving)		1
Secondary Power Equipment		1
Hydrophones (furnished by special orders)		1
8. ENGINES:		
Main Engines - Mark 71 Model 6 internal combustion engines - 950 HP		
Gasoline Engines (VULCAN ( Vulcan ) speed reduction equipment installed)		4
Shafts and Screws		2
Auxiliary Engines, Steering Engines (BNS Model 2 Steering Equipment)		1
9. CREW:		
Officers and Warrant Officers		3
Enlisted Men		15

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #1,986  
Page 61

## 10. PRINCIPAL STORES:

Anchor	100 kilograms	1
Anchor cable - diameter 15mm		1
Hand-operated windlass		1
Fire extinguishing equipment, carbon dioxide type ventilators (electrically operated)		1
Training port (SENKAISŌ) (electrically operated)		3

## 11. RUDDER:

Balanced Rudder

## REFUELLING IN TOW

1 February 1942

1. ESSENTIALS:


To execute refuelling safely and swiftly at any time and place desired, maintaining the desired mobile strength and preparations for immediate response to the enemy.

2. PRECAUTIONS:

Since refuelling is an operation requiring cooperation between the fuelling and refuelling ships, careful preparation and investigation are necessary before the fact in order to insure close intercommunication. Arrangements made beforehand; unity of planning.


3. METHODS:

Refue ling alongside: mainly done with cruisers and destroyers; suited to a pitching motion; large-scale refue ling possible; simple to perform.  
Refue ling in tandem: possible for ships unsuited to refue ling alongside;  
Diagonal refue ling.



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986  
Page 61-A



CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4966


Page 62

5. REFUELING ALONGSIDE - DIAGRAM:

(See Enclosure)

6. REFUELING RECORD:

- A. Refueling method: alongside  
 B. Date: 24 January 1942, 0600  
 C. Place: (150° E. Long. on the equator)  
 D. Course: 0° Course intersection angle:  
 E. Shaft Speed: 8 knots (dangerous at 10-12 knots) Speed thru water: 6.6 knots.  
 F. Rudder compensation: 5° outboard  
 G. Wind direction: 340° Wind force: 3.5 metres per second  
 H. Roll: port 1.5°, starboard 2°  
 I. Barometric pressure: 758.4 mm Temperature: 25° C.  
 J. Distance between ships: 30 metres.  
 K. Pressure of oil pumped: 3 kilograms (TN: per sq. cm. ?)  
 L. Oil pumped: 240 tons per hour  
 M. Weights: 1.5 tons each Weight line: 24mm S.W. (steel wire)  
 N. Forward rope: 48mm S.W. Mooring Rope: 48 mm S.W.

7. HOW TO CALCULATE SHORT DISTANCES:

As is shown by the chart, puncture a piece of cardboard in two places with large match sticks and then hold the cardboard in a perpendicular position. Align the points where the sticks are visible so that the two points and the waterline of the fueling ship will be in the same plane. The bearing on which the distance being calculated lies in on the beam.

8. PROPER POSITIONS FOR THE SHIPS:

- Port to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart.  
 Fore and Aft - The number flag flying aboard the fueling ship should be slightly forward of the bridge on the refueling ship.  
 When the ships are out of line, the proper position for each will be shown by numbers indicated on the side of the fueling ship.

9. STANDARD SIGNALS:

- When the refueling ship hoists a white flag .... "The forward lines have been secured. No hindrance to putting out the weight."  
 When the refueling ship hoists a red flag .... "The inboard line has been secured. No hindrance to running out the weight."  
 When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag .... "The hoses have been connected. Begin to pump oil."  
 When the fueling ship hoists a blue flag .... "Have started to pump oil."  
 After the fueling ship has started to pump oil, when it hoists a blue flag .... "Have ceased pumping oil. Cast off the hose."  
 When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag .... "Flow of oil has ceased. Hoses cast off."

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 63

## Completion of the Operation:

When the fueling ship hoists a red flag ..... "Cast off inboard line."  
 When the fueling ship hoists a white flag ..... "Cast off forward line."

(For additional communication during the operation, write the message on a small black board and hold it up (so it may be seen).)

10. CAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED WHEN MANEUVERING THE SHIPS INTO POSITION:

- (1) There must be close coordination between the turn and the compass. When both ships draw near, there should be proper orientation of the magnetic compass. When the ships are maneuvering into position, changes in distances shall be made by the fueling ship and because of the deviations caused by prevalent currents, waves, and other elements, in the adjustment of positions, allowances shall be made for these variable influences.
- (2) When the angle of intersection of the courses of the ships is too great, since this has a direct relationship to the process of suction between the ships, it is dangerous for them to approach too rapidly.
- (3) When there is a variation in speed because of the displacement of the refueling ship, weather, and other reasons, this variation may be decreased when high speeds are involved by means of a standard rule:
  - Cruisers ..... Decrease from 0 - 1/4 knots.
  - Destroyers ..... Decrease from 1/4 - 1/3 knots. If the differences in speed are too great, great strain will be placed upon the forward line and upon the inboard line.
- (4) The angle of intersection of the course which the refueling ship should maintain with respect to the fueling ship should be fixed by considering the type of the ships, speed, weight, distance between the ships, influence of wind and waves, etc. Generally, 1° - 2° will be suitable. If the angle of intersection is great, there is open space between the ships and if there is not much strain upon the forward and inboard lines, there is a tendency for the ships to mutually draw together.

## DRY-DOCKING OF THE KAKO

(19 November 1941; KURE)


## I. THE SUBORDINATE WATCH OFFICER'S DUTIES

- A. Hereafter he shall manage the docking operations.
- B. We plan to dock at 1030. Stand easy until then.
- C. He shall supervise the deck crew in the changing of the anchor cables and wire-rope for hawsers fore and aft.
- D. He shall prepare to cast both anchors.
- E. Using a cutter, he shall change the wire-rope in the stern for a hawser. When finished, he shall supervise the hauling up of the bower cables.
- F. Afterwards, the cutter shall be sent ashore.
- G. He shall then supervise the securing of the gangway and boom by the division assigned to the task.
- H. Davits shall then be turned inboard.
- I. After the men from the Harbor Master's Office have come aboard, the starboard gangway shall be raised.
- J. After 0930 the use of the head is prohibited.
- K. After docking, he shall immediately put into effect the port fire bill. Each division shall make its preparations.
- L. Otherwise, he shall do such work as is prescribed in the port bill (SHUTSUNYUKO BUSHO).
- M. Attention! Carry on work at hand!



CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 64

II. (Enclosed a sketch). ....



## III. DOCKING ESSENTIALS

First, the wire rope a't shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. While paying this out, the wire-rope forward shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. Then haul in the anchor cable.

One (150 ton) tug-boat forward and one on each side amidships and aft. While paying out the forward hawser take in the ones aft and let go the one forward. The forward buoy will be changed to the starboard by the tug. When the tug turns at "A" (TN: see sketch) this ship will aid in turning about by steering of the ship and then proceed directly to the dock. Forward there are 2 clearly visible markers. The officers-in-charge of the work party are 1 Harbor Master on "top" (TN: see sketch) and 1 officer-in-charge forward on the forecstle.

There will be hand-flag communication between the forward and aft masts.

Just a little before (TN: reaching) the dock the tug-boat changes course by turning to starboard, and lines are passed from the shore to both sides of the ship. As the stern approaches the entrance the tugs let go and lines are passed to both sides of the stern. Then while the starboard and port lines are being hauled the bow is pointed toward the two markers and the ship proceeds only by this power. (TN: i.e. by hauling on lines).

When dry-docking is completed, close the rear gates and begin drainage.

(End)

## CONCERNING DRY-DOCKING

STANDARDS OF DRY-DOCKING (Regulations for Construction and Repair of Vessels, Item 61).

## Combined Fleet:

1. Battleships and Carriers (those officially designated as being over 30,000 tons displacement) and Special Duty Vessels --- Once a year.
2. Warships: (Battleships, Carriers (as above) excluded) --- Twice a year.  
Destroyers, Submarines  
Torpedo Boats and Mine-Sweepers
3. Special Duty Boats As necessary.

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 65

## DAILY ROUTINE WHILE DOCKED

0530	All hands turn to; calisthenics (outside the dock); swabbing outer decks.
0645	Breakfast
0730	Daily routine; Inspection
0845	Lay to duties
1130	Secure from duties
1145	Lunch
1305	Calisthenics
1315	Commence instruction
1600	Secure from instruction
1615	Begin leisure time
1700	End of leisure time
1715	Supper
1745	Fire detail secures

## INSTRUCTIONS WHILE IN DRY-DOCK

1. There must be no running about on board ship.
2. Beware of what lies under foot. Take care that you don't fall down onto the dock.
3. A WO or above should be present when any heavy things are being moved or transported.
4. The safety rope must be used without fail whenever work is being done on the sides of the ship.
5. Secrecy shall be maintained. Be especially careful of the movement of laborers.
6. Fires are strictly prohibited. Do any work on the reverse side of a piece of oil-cloth.
7. The fire bill in dock must be thoroughly carried out.
8. The ship shall be fumigated upon entering and leaving the dock.

## WHEN THE KAKO LEAVES DRY-DOCK

## Preparations for Leaving the Dock (25 November 1941)

1. Hereafter (the subordinate watch officer) shall conduct the preparations for leaving the dock.
2. We expect to leave the dock at 1315. Afterwards we shall moor to buoy #4.
3. The fore deck crew shall prepare to moor the forward part of the ship.
4. The anchor crew shall prepare to cast both anchors.
5. The division assigned shall prepare to get out both gangways, swinging booms and propeller booms.
6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions shall prepare to take aboard ammunition.
7. All small boats shall proceed to the mooring place.
8. All hands away from their ship shall return by 1300.
9. Men performing work away from their ship will make certain of their life net
10. Set about preparing to leave the dock.

CONFIDENTIALJICPOA Item #4986  
Page 67

Ships and shore stations spotting these signals shall indicate that they have received and understood them by hoisting the UNCLE flag or by transmitting the U (or cancel-U) code signal.

#3

## ADDRESS BY OUR CAPTAIN UPON MY BOARDING SHIP

by Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji (Captain, KAKO)

16 November 1941

"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And now I believe that as you stand here, at the battle front, your emotions have been heightened, as you sense impending action.

"When you reflect upon it, this is no training squadron; you have been assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his whole-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the present situation, and will not depend on others too heavily. You must undertake your duties assertively, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution, 'Always be at your station!'. It is extremely important that line officers always be on the upper deck, and that they observe everything. When they are on the upper deck, they are able to master anything that comes along.

In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of determination and effort."

## ADDRESS ON NEW YEAR'S DAY, 1942

by Capt. HISAMUNE, Yonejiro (Captain, AOBA)

"If we put aside our merriment and stop to consider, we find that we have greeted this New Year's Day, in the 2602nd year of our Empire on the scene of battle. First, however, we should offer congratulations on the long life of our Emperor and Supreme Commander. I feel that it is not only a great honor for military men to greet the New Year on the battlefield, but that we shall long remember partaking of 'ZONI' (TM: a traditional Japanese New Year's Day dish of rice cake boiled with vegetables and meat), clad in our hot-weather gear.

"However, our foe is of great strength, too. In particular, it has been judged that a large American force of cruisers, in conjunction with carriers, has designs on the SOUTH SEA Islands. This force, which is charged with the heavy duty of protecting the SOUTH SEAS, must not relax its vigilance for one second. We have whetted our swords ten years for this one battle. 1942 shall be the year in which we will exalt our military might before the world, and in which we will achieve the object of our sacred war. Let each man strive his hardest."

CONFIDENTIAL

JICPOA Item #4986

Page 68

## ADDRESS NO. 4 TO THE COMBINED FLEETS

(2003, 23 May 1943)

By the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets

On this occasion we pay our respects to the memory of a leader of the Combined Fleet, to a man whom we still remember. YAMAMOTO, the late Commander-in-Chief, died at the front. If we annihilate our stubborn enemy even at the cost of our lives, we will know that his spirit lives on.

During the past year and a half of this struggle, we have smashed the power of our great enemy and though we have, in the main, carried out our basic strategy, our enemy is striving for ultimate victory by expanding his preparations for offensive action and by devising plans for the strategic application of new weapons. Furthermore, taking advantage of the tide of the war in EUROPE, he is concentrating his main power in the GREAT EAST ASIA Area and is preparing to launch a counter-offensive. No matter how many times the enemy may advance against us, we shall always welcome combat with him and in exterminating him and securing for ourselves the ultimate victory, we shall by united effort and perseverance forge for ourselves a greater and greater military power. At the same time that we manifest a relentless spirit of attack, we shall be prepared to meet the changing conditions of warfare with new strategies and new weapons, always keeping one step ahead of the enemy.

The war is now at its peak. We defend what is ours and the task of meeting and striking the enemy must be the prerogative of the Imperial Navy. We shall defend ourselves to the last breath and shall totally destroy the enemy. Should we cross paths with the enemy upon the seas, that will be fine. We shall in our traditional way close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks. We look forward confidently to seeing our enemy vanquished.

If in accordance with this desire we devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the utter destruction of the enemy, being animated by the spirit of the late Commander-in-Chief YAMAMOTO, we shall be united, first of all, with the brave soul of the Admiral of the Fleet and then with those many others now in Heaven, and shall be able to look forward to the crushing of the enemy and the fulfillment of the great responsibility of the defense of our fatherland.

Let each and every one ponder well upon this task; let us all, by exerting our efforts look forward to the realization of the Imperial wishes by carrying to its conclusion this responsibility.

( END )

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #10

(INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR  
CAPTURED FROM THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-1  
WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)  
ENTITLED

"KUBOAKI, TAKEO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER PETTY OFFICER,  
INTERROGATION OF"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

A16-2(4)EF37

A8-2/EF37

AS/(25)

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE  
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER

HDH/rww

Serial" 0351

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 2 1943

From: The Commander South Pacific Area and  
South Pacific Force.

To: Distribution List.

Subject: KUBOAKI, TAKEO, Superior Class Engineer  
Petty Officer, interrogation of.


Enclosure: (A) Subject Interrogation.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information and use.

DISTRIBUTION

COMINCH - 1  
CINCPAC - 1  
VICEOPNAV (ONI) - 2  
CDT MARGORPS - 1  
COMSOWESPAC - 4  
ICPOA - 2  
COMAIRSOPAC - 2  
BUORD - 1  
EUSHIPS - 1  
EUPERS - 1  
COMAIRPAC - 1  
CTF 11 - 1  
CTF 16 - 1  
CTF 18 - 1  
CTF 62 - 1  
CTF 64 - 1  
CTF 67 - 1  
CTF 69 - 1  
COMAMPHIBFORPAC - 1  
COMAMPHIBFORSCUESPAC - 1  
COMGENSOPAC - 14  
COMGEN 1st MAG - 2  
NZNB - 1  
COMCARDIV 22 - 1  
DHI GHQ, New Delhi, India - 3

M. R. FRAWNING  
CHIEF OF STAFF.

  
H. D. MOULTON,  
Flag Secretary.

**COMBAT INTELLIGENCE CENTER  
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE**

CONFIDENTIAL

February 26, 1943.

IDENTIFICATION OF: KUBOAKI, TAKEO. SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER P. O.

(Interrogator: Lt. Col. H. D. Harris, U.S.M.C.)  
(Interpreter: Capt. J. R. Shively, U.S.E.C.R.)

Personal History:

POW was captured from the I-1 after having spent 24 hours in the water. He was suffering from shark bites on the right heel and left forearm. POW had completed 9 years service in Nip Navy; was 28 years old; and had attended high school. The POW had a course at the Mechanics School and then finished the submarine school and had returned to Mechanics School for an additional course. POW served aboard I-4 for 1 year. POW had been on the I-1 for 28 months; previously to that he was on the KATORI from November 1939 to October 1940. The POW was on duty with the diesel engines on both the KATORI and the I-1.

Identifications:

The POW said that the commander of the 6th Fleet was Vice Admiral KOMATSU. Vice Admiral SHIMIZU formerly commanded the 6th Fleet.

The POW gave the following names for the officers of the I-1:

Commanding Officer	-	SAKAMOTO, Lt. Comdr.
Engineer Officer	-	BUTO, Hisao, Lt.
Gunnery Officer	-	OKAWA, Ensign
Asst. Eng. Officer	-	FUJII, Warrant Officer
Electrical Officer	-	ITAI, Warrant Officer
Torpedo Officer	-	was a warrant officer - name unknown
Navigator	-	was a Lt. (jg) - name unknown

Operational Information:

Following represents a chronological record of I-1 operations obtained from POW:

1. December, 1941 - operated in Pearl Harbor area, firing several torpedoes at transport - no hits. I-1 was attacked on 2 or 3 occasions without effect.
2. January 13, 1942 - returned to Japan via Marshalls where I-1 refueled. Torpedo supply replenished in Japan.
3. February 2, 1942 - departed Japan and proceeded to Indian Ocean remaining there 2 months. One merchant ship was attacked and sunk (probably Australian). The I-1 developed engine trouble (broken shaft).

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL 33

4. April 2, 1942 - returned to Japan for overhaul, remaining there 3 months. The after gun was removed and ship rigged to carry one large motor landing craft (DAIEATSU). Ship's complement was supplemented by 3 additional men to man landing boat.

5. During July the I-1 was in Aleutian waters on a cruise which lasted about 50 days, during which no U.S. ships or planes were sighted.

6. September 10, 1942 - departed Japan for Rabaul, operating in Solomons area without incident until end of October.

7. November 1, 1942 - returned to Truk.

8. November 10, 1942 - departed for Japan.

9. November 20, 1942 - arrived Japan, remaining there until end of December.

10. January 3, 1943 - departed Yokosuka, Japan, for Truk in company with I-17. The MUSASHI and YAMATO were observed at Truk. The HAYATAKA left a day or two later.

11. January 10, 1943 - proceeded to Rabaul (ship repainted; engine trouble developed (clutch)). Proceeded to Guadalcanal.

12. January 29, 1943.- I-1 was attacked and destroyed January 29, 1943, while transporting stores and supplies to Guadalcanal.

Technical Information:

1. The I-1 carried 53 centimeter torpedoes - the speed of which was estimated to be 50 knots. Air pressure was 200 kg. per sq. cm.

2. The KATORI is powered with turbines, main engines, supplemented with diesel auxiliaries. Speed under diesel is 14 knots; diesel and turbines combined is 18 knots (carries one plane).

3. The I-17 is equipped with a monoplane (silver color) which when submerged is housed forward of conning tower.

4. Class "I" submarines carrying planes are the:

7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 (planes were recently removed as battle gear from the I-5 and I-6).



CONFIDENTIAL

5. "RO" subs, which are smaller than the "I" class, do not carry planes.

6. The "I" class submarines carrying midget submarines are:

16, 18, 20, 22, 24.

7. The MUSASHI and YAMATO (BBs) are apparently the same size with 3 turrets of 3 guns each believed to be very large.

8. The I-1 required about one minute and 30 seconds to submerge completely and did not change course while submerging.

Miscellaneous:

1. Submarine sinkings developed were on the approximate dates as follows:

I-63 - prior to December 7, 1941.  
 I-124 - January, 1942.  
 I-123 - September, 1942.  
 I-15 - October, 1942.  
 I-4 - about December 15, 1942.  
 I-3 - December 15, 1942.  
 I-28 - no date.  
 I-1 - January 29, 1943.

2. Temperature rises to 40° centigrade aboard larger subs.

3. The following submarine divisions (SENSUITAI) are reputed to be based at Yokosuka:

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

4. Four submarines are reported to be under construction at Yokosuka (interval of construction 3 to 4 months, output - 1 sub per month). No information on rate of production at other yards could be given by POW.

5. Air attack alarms used at Rabaul are:

- (a) Siren during day.
- (b) Red rockets at night.

CONFIDENTIAL

6. An airfield is known to be on Truk (Island of TAKESHIMA). Service personnel at Truk is principally navy (5,000), practically no army. Recreational facilities are provided.
7. There is a base hospital at Truk, possibly on NATSU ISLAND.
8. Following comments were also made by POW:
  - (a) While in Rabaul (January, 1943), he did not get ashore much. However, sake was to be had aboard.
  - (b) Believed sub sinkings in general principally caused by depth charges.
  - (c) Preference of duty is aboard "I" class of subs. However, has had no experience with "RO" class.
  - (d) Doesn't consider submarines are particularly good protection against enemy submarines (however, POW has never encountered enemy submarines).
9. POW had heard that HOSEO (CV) was sunk and saw the SHOKAKU under repair at Yokosuka in December.
10. Repair capacities at Rabaul are limited to the facilities carried on the one repair ship stationed there.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #11  
(INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR  
WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR  
AS A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF THE (CV) KAGA)  
ENTITLED  
"PRISONER OF WAR YOKOTA, SHIGEKI"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

CONFIDENTIAL - BRITISH SECRET

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION  
SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

SERIAL NO. 230

16 Aug '43

INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 145, YOKOTA, S.

1. Attached is a Report on information gained from Japanese PW YOKOTA, Shigeki.

2. All information contained in this Report has been extracted this PW source only. Its value should be assessed and its distribution restricted accordingly.

Examiner 7

CBS/ATR/SCW/1

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR,  
Colonel, S.C.,  
Co-ordinator.

<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>
AG GHI SWPA	15
COMD'S SEVENTH FLEET	20
DRI	5
ADV LHQ SWPA	34
AFB S/WPA	20
US MIL ATTACHE	1
OCG GHI SWPA	1
CG US FIFSA	3
NEFIS	1
US FFF	1
C S. AF HQ	1
CENTRAL BUREAU	1
ADV FOR ATIS	1
ATIS SWPA	14

Reference to HQ, JN (USC) 100037

DEMENTRATORIA

PW's Name: KIMURA, S. (phonetic)  
 Rank: 1st Lt. (phonetic)  
 Unit: 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Amphibious Brigade  
 Where Captured: On the beach at Iwo Jima  
 By Whom Captured: Marines  
 How Captured: Surrendered  
 When Captured: 23 Feb 54  
 Height: 5' 10"  
 Age: 23  
 Previous Address: 1000 1/2 St., Honolulu, Hawaii, 1953  
 Education: 8 yrs Primary, 2 yrs Higher Primary  
 Civil Occupation: Farmer

2. APPEARANCE

PW is a tall average intelligence and appears to have a very good memory, especially for names. He answers all questions readily and appears to have no idea of security. His knowledge is limited due to his small military experience.

3. IDENTIFICATIONS

1. Operations. Attack on PEARL HARBOR, Dec 7, 1941. (All dates given by PW are approximate). PW was in (CV) KAGA.

(1) Composition of Task Force

- (30) MIYAMA
- (12) KUROKI
- (CV) KAGA (Flagship)
- (CV) KAGA
- (CV) MIYAMA
- (CV) SOBU
- (2) ZUIKUN
- (CV) 5th Flotilla
- (1) 1st Fleet
- (1) 2nd Fleet
- (1) 3rd Fleet
- (1) 4th Fleet
- (1) 5th Fleet
- (1) 6th Fleet
- (1) 7th Fleet
- (1) 8th Fleet
- (1) 9th Fleet
- (1) 10th Fleet
- (1) 11th Fleet
- (1) 12th Fleet
- (1) 13th Fleet
- (1) 14th Fleet
- (1) 15th Fleet
- (1) 16th Fleet
- (1) 17th Fleet
- (1) 18th Fleet
- (1) 19th Fleet
- (1) 20th Fleet
- (1) 21st Fleet
- (1) 22nd Fleet
- (1) 23rd Fleet
- (1) 24th Fleet
- (1) 25th Fleet
- (1) 26th Fleet
- (1) 27th Fleet
- (1) 28th Fleet
- (1) 29th Fleet
- (1) 30th Fleet
- (1) 31st Fleet
- (1) 32nd Fleet
- (1) 33rd Fleet
- (1) 34th Fleet
- (1) 35th Fleet
- (1) 36th Fleet
- (1) 37th Fleet
- (1) 38th Fleet
- (1) 39th Fleet
- (1) 40th Fleet
- (1) 41st Fleet
- (1) 42nd Fleet
- (1) 43rd Fleet
- (1) 44th Fleet
- (1) 45th Fleet
- (1) 46th Fleet
- (1) 47th Fleet
- (1) 48th Fleet
- (1) 49th Fleet
- (1) 50th Fleet
- (1) 51st Fleet
- (1) 52nd Fleet
- (1) 53rd Fleet
- (1) 54th Fleet
- (1) 55th Fleet
- (1) 56th Fleet
- (1) 57th Fleet
- (1) 58th Fleet
- (1) 59th Fleet
- (1) 60th Fleet
- (1) 61st Fleet
- (1) 62nd Fleet
- (1) 63rd Fleet
- (1) 64th Fleet
- (1) 65th Fleet
- (1) 66th Fleet
- (1) 67th Fleet
- (1) 68th Fleet
- (1) 69th Fleet
- (1) 70th Fleet
- (1) 71st Fleet
- (1) 72nd Fleet
- (1) 73rd Fleet
- (1) 74th Fleet
- (1) 75th Fleet
- (1) 76th Fleet
- (1) 77th Fleet
- (1) 78th Fleet
- (1) 79th Fleet
- (1) 80th Fleet
- (1) 81st Fleet
- (1) 82nd Fleet
- (1) 83rd Fleet
- (1) 84th Fleet
- (1) 85th Fleet
- (1) 86th Fleet
- (1) 87th Fleet
- (1) 88th Fleet
- (1) 89th Fleet
- (1) 90th Fleet
- (1) 91st Fleet
- (1) 92nd Fleet
- (1) 93rd Fleet
- (1) 94th Fleet
- (1) 95th Fleet
- (1) 96th Fleet
- (1) 97th Fleet
- (1) 98th Fleet
- (1) 99th Fleet
- (1) 100th Fleet

(11) MEMBERS OF TASK FORCE. Task force assembled at TAWKAN (indicated by \* in MIYAKAWA'S REPORT) in SURIGAO, middle of May 1941, under command of MIYAMA (1st Lt.) ZUIKUN, Chitose.

(188c) WISKEY, KIRISHIMA, (CvE) AKAGE, HIRATO, 4 CR (including TORIE) and 2 DUs arrived TANKAN before 20 Nov '41.

(189) IGA left BASED 7 Nov '41, proceeded South of HIRATO, off East coast of JAPAN, arriving TANKAN 15 Nov '41.


Three SSs (OJLew) and 1 TB (Candy Strip) arrived 16 Nov '41.

(Cv) SUGITO arrived 16 Nov '41.

(CvE) ZUPICHI and SHIBATA arrived 17 Nov '41.

These SSs joined Task Force on leaving TANKAN 22 Nov '41.

Units involved as in following, tracing of sketch drawn by Ref-



(T.S. Area with W shown as red on original)  
 (T.S. Sketch tracing from the original document)

Tracing of Sketch Drawn by Ref., Showing Task Force Anchorage at TANKAN, Nov. 41.

(iii) Breaks at TANKAN. (For further particulars of TANKAN, see Sec 17).

PH saw no I/C or Patrol Vessels while at TANKAN, except 5 Torpedo Boats which anchored South-West of entrance for about one day.

Provisions were unobtainable in KAGA by Nov. PH thought she sailed, but was not certain.

Be-Store House was searched. An order was given, however, that no rubbish was to be thrown overboard, but was to be collected and burnt ashore by him near South-Western side of entrance. PH landed once, 20 Nov, for this duty. Officer in charge of working party gave orders that no one was to leave immediate vicinity of pier. PH saw, but did not speak to, about 3 fishermen who lived in 2 houses nearby; he saw no Army or Naval shore personnel, nor staff of W/Y station further inland.

(iv) Departure of Torpedo Force. Task Force sailed 11:00, 22 Nov '41, being joined by 3 SS on landing. Further movements and on passage was as follows:

SCHEIDT  
GRI/SHUKARD  
SHO/ZULIANGI  
SS

ARANT  
YACON  
RINON  
SS

(61)  
SS  
TONE  
Class

(The following information is based on original)

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

The following information is based on original and is being furnished to you for your information.

were not posted, this duty being carried out by A/A MC crews. Task force did not fuel while on return passage.

(vii) Rumours and prior knowledge of Operations. Before leaving SASEBO, 7 Nov '41, ship's company of KAGA were instructed to settle all their bills. (All important documents, photograph albums, musical instruments, and all other unnecessary items were put ashore, - MacDon Source). This gave them the impression that they were about to go on some operation.


After leaving SASEBO, the Executive Officer addressed them and informed them that they were going to an area South of TOKYO BAY. When they found they were proceeding further North, they were very surprised, and guessed they were going on a military operation, possibly against CHINA.

F1 did not admit that he had any idea of their real destination, stating that he was a very junior rating, knew very little and did not think much about the matter.

17. LOCATIONS

TAKAMA, TOROBU IS., JAPAN. F1 indicated on a map that TAKAMA was HITOKAPPU BAY on South coast of TOROBU IS. He knew no names of places in vicinity, but his general description agreed with that of HITOKAPPU BAY given in available publications. He stated that he did not know correct Chinese characters for TAKAMA, but thought they might be 塔馬. Task Force assembled at TAKAMA Nov '41 before leaving for attack on Pearl HARBOR (See Sec 5).

(1) General Description (See tracing of F1's sketch below).



The bay was surrounded by hills, the highest peak being 200 feet high. The bay was about 1/2 mile wide and 1/4 mile deep. The bay was very shallow and the water was very clear. The bay was very quiet and the only sound was the sound of the waves breaking on the shore.



scrub, not higher than 2 or 3 feet, and no trees could be seen. Ground was covered with snow, but there was no ice in bay or shore. PW saw no signs of lakes, rivers or swamps. The coastal area appeared to be uninhabited except by fishermen who lived in 3 houses near pier. It was, however, impossible to see details of centre or North-Eastern side of bay from KAG's, and view beyond pier was obscured by low hills and an embankment.

PW estimated width of bay to be 6,000 metres and distance between entrance and opposite shore to be 2,000 metres. He thought there was a large rock close inshore near centre of bay. Bay was "deeper than most harbours", but he did not know exact depth. There was deep water right up to foreshore.

Wind was from North-West.

(ii) Pier and Vicinity. There was only one pier, situated at South-Western side of bay. It was constructed of concrete and stones, about 15 metres long, 4 metres wide, 2 to 3 metres high, and had steps out at the end. Its height was difficult to estimate as waves were fairly high along side. There was no crane or structure on it. Depth of water at steps was about 5 metres. PW had landed at pier on one occasion to burn rubbish, but was not allowed to leave its immediate vicinity or to speak with any local fishermen. It was high tide when he landed.

Ground inshore of pier was stony with short grass showing above snow.

There were 3 fishermen's houses inshore and a little to South of pier. They were not visible from KAG's anchorage, but could be seen from pier. Behind houses earth embankment had been constructed, about 1 J3 (15 ft) high. Nothing could be seen beyond embankment except 3 W/T masts (See Sub-Sec (iv)). PW could not see whether there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no smoke or other signs of habitation.

Between houses and embankment there was a narrow and very rough road, which could perhaps be used by cars. PW did not know where road led. He saw no cars. There were no fishing boats to be seen.

(iii) Landing Places. Landing would be difficult between pier and South-Western side of entrance, as there were a number of rocks offshore, height above water about 2 ft. Fishing stakes were placed among these rocks. PW saw no sand or beach in this area.

PW considered that landing from MLC would be easy between pier and centre of bay. There were few rocks offshore, and height of foreshore above water did not exceed about 1 metre. Water appeared to be deep up to shore, but PW saw no beaches in immediate vicinity of pier.

From centre of bay to North-Eastern side of entrance landing would be impossible because of cliffs. PW saw no beaches in this area, but was unable to observe details from KAG's anchorage.

(iv) W/T Station. Situated behind embankment near pier, but no details of buildings were visible. Three W/T masts could be seen, but PW could not estimate height or arrangement as they were partly obscured by embankment. He saw none of its personnel, but thought it was a Naval W/T Station. He did not know any details of its organization, or number of personnel.

(v) Defences. PW saw no defences, guns, or torpedoes mounted ashore. There was no evidence of A/Sub nets or Boom Defence. There were no indications of minefields, either across entrance or outside, and no bouys which might mark channels. There were no buildings visible at either side of entrance.

He saw no A/C while at TINKLE, and did not know of existence of any airfields or S/P bases. He could not tell from KAGA's anchorage, or from pier, whether there were any suitable sites for airfields; ground near South-western side of entrance was, however, low lying.

(vi) General: There were no lighthouses or shore lights visible. He thought, but was uncertain, that Storm Signals were displayed in vicinity of W/T station.

008 EED 800.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

## SOURCE DOCUMENT #12

(A NAVY STUDY OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS  
CONSISTING OF

(A)

COM14 LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 0004 WITH ENCLOSURE 14ND SERIAL 234

(B)

CINCPAC-CINCPOA LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 000742

(C)

COMFIFTH FLEET LETTER TO COMINCH US PACFLEET SERIAL 000179

(D)

COMGEN HQ 5th PHIBCORPS LETTER TO COMFIFTH FLEET SERIAL 000374B

with

ENCLOSURE HQ 5th MARINE DIVISION 496 CIC DETACH, SASEBO, KYUSHU,

13 OCT 45, MEMO FOR THE AC OF S, G-2,

WITH ACCOMPANYING MAP AND SKETCH OF KAUAI AND OAHU ISLANDS

SHOWING THE LOCATIONS OF ATTACKING JAPANESE

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AIRPLANES AND SUBMARINES)

## ENTITLED

"PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS,  
REPORT ON PRE-WAR HONOLULU COMMERCIAL BROADCASTS CONTAINING  
CODED INFORMATION FOR THE JAPANESE FLEET"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

Serial: 0004

TOP SECRET

23
TOP SECRET
CONTROL
NO. 2559

14TH NAVAL DISTRICT  
OFFICE OF COMMANDANT  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

10 November, 1945.

3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps  
Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial  
000374B dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.  
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO LAND from Lt. R.H. Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

1. Forwarded.
2. Enclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two of second endorsement on basic letter.

*S. A. Taffinder*  
S.A. TAFFINDER.

Copy to:

- Com 5th Flt (3rd End. & Encl (A).
- ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd End. & Encl (A).
- CinCPac/POA (3rd End. & Encl (A).

23 Room 2055  
16 1945/EG/V  
A-82-109  
0068

**TOP SECRET**

Serial: 0004

TOP SECRET

10 November, 1945.

3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps  
 Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial  
 000374B dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.  
 To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO LAND from Lt. R.H.  
 Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject:  
 Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Contain-  
 ing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet;  
 Report of.

1. Forwarded.
2. Enclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two of second endorsement on basic letter.

S.A. TAFFINDER.

Copy to:

Com 5th Flt (3rd End. & Encl (A)).  
 ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd End. & Encl (A)).  
 CinCPac/POA (3rd End. & Encl (A)).

23 Room 2055

16 1945

# 10 (10) RE-5/2012

10 1945

**TOP SECRET**

District Intelligence Office  
 Fourth Fleet Naval District  
 5th Floor, Young Hotel,  
 Honolulu, Hawaii

14ND/AS-2  
 Serial 234

**TOP SECRET**

RFP/vps

**TOP SECRET**

7 November 1945

MEMO FOR: The District Intelligence Officer.

Subject : Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Reference: (a) HQ, Fifth Marine Division, 405th CIO Detachment TOP SECRET Memorandum for the AG of 5, G-2, dated 13 Oct. 1945, subject: Pre-War Espionage in the Hawaiian Islands.

1. Reference (a) discloses that Yoshio SHIGA, Lt. Comdr., IJN, aviator who participated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, made the following statements, in substance, on 9 October 1945 to Robert M. Tait, Special Agent, CIO, at Oosura, Kyushu, Japan:

- (a) That he believed quite strongly that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting station;
- (b) That, in his opinion, the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left Pearl Harbor, and that if, for another example, the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor;
- (c) That the (foregoing) information had been given to him by Lt. Comdr. Shigeharu MURATA, IJN, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan;
- (d) That the (foregoing) information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which (SHIGA stated) were at 0630, 1200, 1900;
- (e) That the time following the 1900 broadcast was probably used, since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information con-

**TOP SECRET**

14ND/AS-2  
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

-----

cerning a whole day's activities;

- (f) That, on the first Saturday the force was at sea, reports were received that there were only one or two carriers in Pearl Harbor;
- (g) That, on 6 December 1941, sometime between 2000 and 2100 (Hawaiian time) news came to him regarding numbers of ships in Pearl Harbor;  
other
- (h) That he could offer no leads concerning the espionage conducted for the attack than that of the Honolulu Broadcasting Station;
- (i) That, on 6 December 1941, the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, and that they then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message "Climb Mt. Niitaka", which was the signal for the attack.

2. On 30 October 1945, FBI-Honolulu and G-2(CID) Honolulu were furnished one copy each of reference (a) by the Acting District Intelligence Officer, 14ND. FBI-Honolulu, G-2(CID) Honolulu and DIO-14ND conducted checks of their respective files with negative results in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which had emanated from stations KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941.

3. On 31 October and 1 November, 1945, reporting officer interviewed J. Howard WORRAL, Manager of Station KGMB, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking the files and transcription library of KGMB:

There are no pre-war transcriptions, continuity scripts, or station logs for news, want-ads, or other local programs, including those which were given in the Japanese language, in our files or library. Transcriptions of the Japanese programs were made for many weeks prior to the war right up to 7 December 1941. All of these, with the exception of those for about 1 through 6 December, were cleaned out of our files and destroyed about two years ago following a discussion I had with either the Army Intelligence or the FBI. I recall that it was

14ND/A8-2  
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

-----

conceded, I think by the FBI, that there was no reason why we should continue to keep old material in our library when we needed the space so badly. All of that material which the Army wanted had been picked up, and the portion that was left, consisting of transcriptions of the Japanese programs, had been censored before it went out over the air. To my knowledge there was never any correspondence on the subject of cleaning out our files. We have kept no station logs over two years old; the FCC requires that we keep logs about two years before destroying them.

The transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 were turned over to Major Henry C. Putnam of Army Intelligence a short while after the war started. I recall that Hugh Lyttel (phonetic) and (fnu) Albright (phonetic) of Army Intelligence were frequently up here early in the war assisting or working with Major Putnam.

George FUJITA (George Masuzo FUJITA) was in charge of the Japanese programs and HAYASHIDA (Akiyoshi HAYASHIDA) went over the transcriptions prior to their being put on the air to make sure they contained nothing subversive or objectionable. HAYASHIDA was recommended to us by Mr. Shivers of FBI as being entirely responsible and trustworthy. Material gathered for the Japanese program as well as the Want-Ads program had no direct connection with newspaper ads; ads which went out over the radio could have appeared in the newspapers although radio time was bought separately from newspaper space.

Our librarian prior to and during the early part of the war was Alan LISSER, in my opinion entirely reliable, trustworthy and loyal. LISSER is presently working in San Francisco for station KFRG and would probably recall the details of what we had and didn't have in the library during that period.

As a rule, no transcriptions were made of local news or want-ads programs; such broadcasts were prepared in note or continuity form and given direct to the "mike" by the



14ND/AS-2  
Serial 234

T O P   S E C R E T

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

-----

announcer.

Our Hilo station, KHBC, was under a similar arrangement with respect to programs given in Japanese. A young woman, Miss Kazuho HIGUCHI, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, supervised and censored all such programs before they went out over the air; she was also recommended to us by Mr. Shivers.

4. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed M. A. MULLRONEY, Manager of Station KGU, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking his files:

I am sure that we do not have the continuity scripts or program outlines you are looking for. No transcriptions were made of programs given in Japanese during the pre-war period. We did make up continuity scripts for those programs during that period. Copies of these scripts were furnished to DIO-14ND, FBI-Honolulu, and Army Intelligence; the copies were translated and sent back, with comments, before the programs went on the air. As I recall, all of the scripts in our files were picked up shortly after the war started by Army Intelligence. I have the idea that some were sent to Washington; none were ever returned to KGU. I don't recall what person or persons picked up the scripts.

Up until several months before the war, FURUKAWA (Shigeo FURUKAWA) was in charge of the Japanese Sunday program; he was dishonest in his dealings with KGU. After he left this work, GOTO (Richard Hisashi GOTO) was in charge; Jack NAWATANI (Jack Iwasaburo NAWATANI) did the announcing on week days. Material gathered for the Japanese Sunday program came from subscribers contacted by FURUKAWA and GOTO; the material didn't come from the newspapers. Few, if any, of the programs originating locally, including news and Want-Ads, were transcribed before being put on the air. NAWATANI gathered material for the daily programs.

14ND/A8-2  
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

-----

6. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed L. R. DAMSON, Supervisor of Federal Communications Commission, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows:

FCC made no transcriptions of programs originating from Honolulu broadcasting stations prior to the war, except for the period of one week in July, 1941. At that time, local programs given in foreign languages over KGMB and KGU were transcribed at the specific request of FCC in Washington and were forwarded to Washington without being translated locally.

Commercial broadcasting stations are required to keep station logs for one year before destroying them.

Amateur radio stations continued operating right up to 7 December 1941. Except for specific cases which were checked by our monitors, there were no records or transcriptions made of amateurs' transmissions in T.H. Pre-war reports of specific cases checked by our monitors were forwarded long ago to FCC in Washington.

6. On 1 November 1945, reporting officer interviewed Lt.Col. Wilson GADDIS, AUS, Public Relations Office, G2, Fort Shafter, Oahu, who stated substantially as follows:

I worked very closely with Major Henry C. Putnam in the Public Relations Office, G2, in the early part of the war. I do not recall that Major Putnam ever picked up transcriptions of any Japanese programs from KGMB following the war. If he had, they would probably be in the files here or at G-2(CID) Honolulu. I feel certain that he has none of the transcriptions or continuity scripts with him at the present time.

After checking thoroughly in the files here, I can state that no such transcriptions or continuity scripts are here.

Major Putnam's present address is Mid-Pacific Liaison Officer, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. Major Putnam will be back at Fort Shafter, Oahu, about 1 December 1945.

14ND/AS-2  
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.  
-----

7. On 31 October, 2 and 3 November 1945, files of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, the Honolulu Advertiser, and the Archives of Hawaii were checked for information pertinent to code mentioned in reference (a). Nothing was found under Want-Ads and other sections in either newspaper for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 regarding the German attache losing one dog or the German attache wanting a cook or houseboy.

8. Files of the Archives of Hawaii, Honolulu, checked on 3 November 1945, disclosed the following information relative to times of news, want-ads, Japanese programs, and other programs immediately following on stations KOMB and KGU for 5, 6, and (scheduled for) 7 December 1941:

KOMB - Friday, 5 December 1941; this schedule representative of other week days:

0715 News  
0730 Wake Up and Live  
0830 News  
0836 Listen Ladiss  
0945 News and Want-Ads Program (Mrs. Nita BENEDICT)  
1000 Around the Town With Gene Sawyer  
1215 News  
1225 Stock Quotations  
1245 Japanese Program  
1415 Columbia's School of the Air (CBB)  
1500 News  
1505 Plantation Melodies  
1735 News  
1740 Show Parade  
1930 News  
1945 John Nesbit's Passing Parade  
2055 Streamlined Headlines  
2100 Amos 'n' Andy  
2125 News (CBS)  
2130 Here's Morgan  
2200 News  
2215 Swing Nocturne

14ND/AS-2  
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

-----

Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as  
the foregoing except for the following:

1415 Saturday News (following Japanese Program)  
1420 Football Game Broadcast  
1945 20th Century Serenade  
2130 South American Way

Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

0600 to 0830 - Japanese Program  
0930 News  
0945 Sports Reporter  
1900 News  
1915 Charioteers  
2200 News  
2215 Serenade in the Night

KGU - Friday, 5 December 1941; this schedule  
representative for other week days:

0600 Japanese Community Program  
0645 Easy Tunes and Topics  
0700 Shell Transradio News  
0710 Persian's Footwear Parade  
0900 Shoppers' Guide  
0810 Sunshine Program (E. Dropman & Co.)  
0815 Bulletin Board  
0830 Shoppe Serenade  
0845 Waikiki on the Air  
0950 Shell Transradio News  
1000 Music School  
1045 Japanese Program  
1130 We The Abbotts  
1215 Shell Transradio News  
1225 Oddities in the News  
1900 Shell Transradio News  
1915 Parker Family (NBC)  
2255 Shell Transradio News  
2300 Ending 6987th Day of Broadcast

14ND/A8-2  
Serial 234

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

**Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.**  
-----

Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as foregoing except for the following:

1000 Morning Matinee  
1225 Interlude  
1715 Beyond the News  
1730 Ranch House Roundup  
1915 Band Concert from A. & N. YMCA.

Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

1300-1430 Japanese Program  
1930 Shell Transradio News  
1945 Red Skelton & Company

9. There is no record of transcriptions or continuity scripts of Japanese and other programs broadcast by stations KHBC, Hilo, Hawaii, and KTOH, Lihue, Kauai, during the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 in the files of the three Honolulu investigative agencies or at stations KGMB and KGU.

10. While files of DIO-14ND do not contain transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs of broadcasts on KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941, there is considerable highly classified information in the files pertinent to this general subject, as follows in substance:

- (a) Japanese programs on stations KGMB and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to 8 December 1941 were monitored by Lt. Comdr. Yale Maxon, USNR, and Comdr. Denzel Carr, USNR, of DIO-14ND. The cryptic phrases listened for by these officers were never heard on KGMB or KGU. Monitoring was accomplished by listening direct to the broadcasts; no transcriptions were made of said broadcasts.
- (b) One of the cryptic phrases listened for did appear several times during the course of a Tokyo broadcast some hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor took place. The cryptic phrase in question came over

14ND/AS-2  
Serial 234

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

**Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.**  
-----

station JZI program (from Tokyo), at some time later than 1145 8 December 1941, Japan time, frequency 9835 kos.

- (c) For many months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, up through 6 December 1941, Nagao KITA, Japanese Consul-General, Honolulu, kept the Japanese Foreign Office supplied with detailed information concerning movements of U.S. Naval vessels by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraph channels. Of particular note is the message from KITA to Tokyo via R.C.A., under date of 6 December 1941, which gives disposition of ships, etc., in Pearl Harbor as of the evening of 5 December 1941.
- (d) Bernard Julius Otto KUEHN, with aliases, espionage agent, submitted a plan to the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, on or about 2 December 1941, involving use of a code on the KGMB Want-Ads morning program (0945), as follows:
- (1) A Chinese rug, etc., for sale- apply Post Office Box 1476; indicates 3 or 6
  - (2) A complete chicken farm for sale; indicates 4 or 7
  - (3) Beauty parlor operator wanted; indicates 5 or 8.

Under date of 3 December 1941 (Honolulu time), this simplified code system was transmitted by KITA to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo. A duplicate message was also addressed to Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff, signed FUJII. Under date of 3 December 1941 (Japan time), Foreign Minister TOGO telegraphed to KITA that he wanted KITA to hold onto the list of code words (presumably an older, complicated code system), including those intended for use on the radio broadcast, right up until the last minute; further, that when the "break" came, KITA

14ND/AS-8  
Serial 834

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Subject: Pre-war Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

-----

was to burn the code immediately and wire TOGO  
that he had done so.

- (e) FBI agents conducted an investigation to determine whether or not there had been any advertisements regarding the Chinese rug, beauty operator, or chicken farm, etc. over radio station KGMB Want-Ads program subsequent to 1 December 1941; newspaper ads were also checked for the same information. Records of the KGMB Want-Ads morning programs (0645) for the period of 24 November to 8 December 1941 were examined. No information was found, in the radio programs or newspapers, regarding the broadcast code system in question.

SUMMARY

11. Negative results were obtained in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which emanated from radio stations KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941; therefore it has not been possible to verify or refute statements of Yoshio SHIGA, Lt. Comdr., IJN, as contained in reference (a).

12. Japanese language programs on KGMB and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor were monitored by DIO-14ND. Although the purpose of this monitoring was to listen for certain phrases (which were not heard on KGMB or KGU), it does not appear likely that any phrases regarding the German attache would have been missed by the DIO-14ND monitors. There was a German Consul in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, but no attache; in the event, however, that the word "attache" were correctly used, the implication is that the commercial broadcast emanated from Japan.

13. The KGMB Want-Ads morning programs for 24 November to 8 December 1941 were checked by FBI-Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded phrases regarding a Chinese

14ND/AS-2  
Serial 234

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing  
Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.  
-----

rug, chicken farm, or beauty parlor operator. It appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attache, had they appeared on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by the agency conducting that investigation.

14. It is pointed out that the Japanese Consulate-General successfully furnished detailed military information to the Japanese Foreign Office up to and including the 6th of December 1941 by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraphic channels.

15. Inasmuch as SHIGA's information was reportedly given to him by another officer aboard the AKAGI following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.

16. The accuracy of the statement of J. Howard WORRELL, manager of KOMB, regarding transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 being turned over to Major Putnam, is doubted in view of Lt. Col. Gaddis' statement, his search of the files at Fort Shafter, and G-2(CID) Honolulu's search of their files.

R. H. PETERSON  
Lieutenant, USNR



Cinepac File

AB-6

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial: 000711

6 NOV 1945

2nd ENDORSEMENT on  
HQ VPhibCorps Top  
Secret Ltr. 091/130,  
Ser. 000374B dated  
14 October 1945.

**TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET

**From:** Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet  
and Pacific Ocean Areas.  
**To:** Chief of Naval Operations.  
**Via:** Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.  
**Subject:** Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

1. Forwarded.

2. Comment is requested from Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District concerning broadcasts related in basic correspondence and on other material considered pertinent.



C. H. McMORRIS  
Chief of Staff

Copy to:  
Com 5th Flt (2nd End only)  
ComGenVPhibCorps (2nd End only)

**TOP SECRET**

7329  
02931

A8-2(2)

COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET  
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000179

**TOP SECRET**

24 OCT 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to  
Hq. V PhibCorps Top  
Secret ltr. 091/130,  
ser. 000374B dated  
14 October 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet.  
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.  
1. Forwarded.

*D. C. Ramsey*  
D. C. RAMSEY  
Chief of Staff.

**TOP SECRET**

091/130  
Ser.000374B

HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS  
FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO


14 October, 1945.

TOP SECRET

From: The Commanding General. — ?  
To : The Commander, Fifth Fleet.  
Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.  
Enclosures: (A) 2 copies subject publication.

1. The attached progress report from the 496th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is forwarded in duplicate for your information.

2. Additional progress reports of the subject will be forwarded you as they become available to this Headquarters.

  
T. R. YANCEY  
By direction.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

HEADQUARTERS  
 FIFTH MARINE DIVISION  
 496th CIC DETACHMENT  
 c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

TOP SECRET

Sasebo, Kyushu  
 13 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AC OF S, C-2:

SUBJECT: PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

RE : Interview with Yoshio SHIGA,  
 Lt Cmdr, IJN

On 9 October 1945, this agent interviewed Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr, IJN, at the Minkiso Tea House, OMURA, Kyushu. Although difficult, this interview was conducted without an interpreter as SHIGA speaks some English. Informant is an aviator and participated in the Japanese attack on PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941. He lives at Itoyone, YAMAGUCHI CITY, Yamaguchi-Ken, Honshu. On about 15 October 1945, he is scheduled to fly a Japanese plane (escorted) from OMURA TO YOKITSUKA. Following this he plans to return to OMURA, by train, where he expects to be discharged from the Navy.

On about 1 April 1941, SHIGA said that he was directed to leave his assignment as instructor of pilots at OITA and report to SASEBO. Upon arrival he noted that the aircraft carrier "KAGA" was in port. Upon reporting at the base he was ordered, by Teigi YAMADA, Captain of the "KAGA", to go to YOKOSUKA with 23 other pilots and learn to fly "O's". From about 5 April until 19 April the group practiced flying these planes. On 20 April 1941 they went to SUZUYA, Honshu, and received new "O" planes.

The group practiced with these planes until the last of April when they were ordered to fly to KONOYE, Kyushu. En-route SHIGA noted that the carrier "KAGA" was anchored off KAGOSHIMA CITY. Following their arrival at KONOYE the group was ordered to practice landings aboard the "KAGA" as it steamed in and out of the bay. They did this until about 1 July 1941.

About 1 July, the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU arrived at SHIBUSHI BAY, a short distance from where the KAGA was anchored. All of the pilots from the carriers then went to KAGOSHIMA CITY. In practice the carriers alternated, three at SHIBUSHI BAY and one in KAGOSHIMA BAY. The fliers practiced carrier landings and dog-fighting. Team work was the essential of this training period. Two planes fought three planes, then three against six, and then six against nine. The objective of 9 against 18 was not reached, however.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

On about 8 August 1941, all of the carriers were ordered to YOKOSUKA. On about 10 August, the carriers SORYU and HIRYU were suddenly ordered to SAIGON, Indo-China. SHIGA, along with the rest of the pilots, was ordered aboard the HIRYU. The Japanese Army met no opposition at SAIGON. After the carriers were there for about a week they left for Japan and arrived at SASEBO about 5 September 1941.

After two or three days the two carriers were ordered to SAHEKI, Kyushu. Upon arrival SHIGA noted the carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU and the battleship YAMATO were in the harbor. He stated that he then became suspicious that "something big was going to happen". While there the pilots practiced navigation, dog-fighting, and carrier landings.

"On 5 October 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the AKAGI in SHIBUSHI BAY, by the Chief of Staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Ryunosuke KOSAKA. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on 8 December 1941 (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air force would strike the American Fleet at HAWAII. Grand Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoroku YAMAMOTO, also addressed the group saying that although Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to China and its oil embargo. The U. S. fleet, he said, was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at HAWAII it would be two or three months before it could maneuver. By that time occupation of BORNEO, the PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, JAVA, and SUMATRA would be complete. "

SHIGA stated that the consensus of the pilots following this startling news was, that to get to HAWAII secretly, was impossible. Hence it was a suicide attack. Also that it would be best for the Japanese Navy to fight the American Navy at sea without this attack. All of the carrier pilots were then granted a 7 day leave. On their return they went to SAHEKI and again practiced until 17 November 1941. On that date the KAGA, with 24 fighter planes, 36 torpedo planes, and 24 hell divers went to HITOKAPPU HARBOR.

Upon arrival at HITOKAPPU HARBOR, SHIGA noted the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, SHOGAKU, ZUIKAKU, battleships KONGO, HIEI, heavy cruisers KUMANO, MIKUMA, SUZUYA, plus one other, about 16 destroyers, and four or more large submarines were in that port. He believed that these submarines had midget submarines aboard. In the carrier force there were about 300 planes plus 9 seaplanes aboard the battleships and cruisers.

Prior to departure for HAWAII SHIGA said that they were briefed that PEARL HARBOR anchorages were: battleships on the east side of FORD ISLAND, carriers on the west side, destroyers were anchored in northeastern corner, and heavy cruisers on the HICKAM FIELD side. They were also told that the U. S.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

carriers were usually around LAHAINA ROADS, MAUI, during week days and entered PEARL HARBOR on Saturdays, where they stayed until Monday mornings. SHIGA said that Rear Admiral OKADA, Captain of the YAGI, visited the flagship AKAGI daily. Just ~~before~~ <sup>before</sup> departure OKADA told him that there were 6 carriers in Hawaiian waters, that the SARATOGA was on the U. S. west coast, and that the ENTERPRISE was two or three days out of Hawaiian waters, en-route from the PHILIPPINES.

Subject believes the force left HITCHIKU HARBOR between the 27 and 30 November and at cruising speed headed for HAWAII. They knew, he said, that U. S. air patrols went 800 miles south of DUTCH HARBOR and 800 miles north of MIDWAY. Their course was right between the patrolled areas during which time, he said, the weather was foggy. They were 800 miles due north of HAWAII on 6 December. They then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message, "CLIMB MT. NIITAKA". (This information corresponds with that received from a Japanese Navy Yeoman captured during the SAIKAN operation) This was the signal for the attack and at 24 knots they sped southward to within 250 miles of OAHU. There the planes took off.

*A Japanese source stated that...*  
 SHIGA stated that he believed quite strongly that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of PEARL HARBOR was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a HONOLULU Commercial Broadcasting Station. He was certain that there was a Hawaiian Nisei, who was a Japanese Naval Officer, aboard the flagship AKAGI, whose specific job was listening to these broadcasts and decoding them. SHIGA said that in his opinion the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a carrier left PEARL HARBOR. If the German attache wanted a cook or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or cruiser had entered the harbor. (1)

SHIGA said that this information was given to him by Lt Cmdr MURATA, Shigeharu, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan when SHIGA inquired of him "who was the hectic person responsible for letting the information concerning the ships in PEARL HARBOR".

*Source states...*  
 SHIGA believes that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 AM, 12 Noon, and 7 PM. He was prone to think that time following the 7 PM broadcast was used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opportunity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities. "

On the first Saturday when the force was at sea, (which means it had to leave prior to 29 November), SHIGA said that they received reports that there was only one or two carriers in PEARL HARBOR. Because of this the pilots were disappointed.

**TOP SECRET**TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

SHIGA said that on 6 December 1941, some time between about 8 and 9 PM (Hawaiian Time) news filtered to him that there were no carriers in PEARL HARBOR, but that 8 battleships, and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. No report was received concerning destroyers. There was no set way of his receiving news of this type so it was impossible to determine at what time the AKAGI might have relayed it to the Captain of the FACA.

At the briefing, prior to the operation, each pilot was furnished with a photograph of a map of PEARL HARBOR. The names of the ships in PEARL HARBOR were not known and each pilot just made rough entries of courses and anchorage areas or missions.

Since it was felt that more could be gained if a person versed in the technical phases of aviation interrogated SHIGA, he was turned over to Lt W. H. FERRICK, S-2, Marine Air Group 22, stationed at CMURA, to fully develop the attack phase. A copy of his report, however, will be forwarded to this headquarters.

The rough sketch map concerning the attack, accompanying this report, is preliminary, resulting from the first interview with SHIGA by this agent.

Concerning the espionage conducted for the attack, which is of great interest to the CIC, SHIGA could offer no other leads than that of the HONOLULU Broadcasting Station. He said that at no time, to his knowledge, were visual land signals used from HAWAII. M

The only person he could recall being alive from the AKAGI, who had participated in the PEARL HARBOR attack, was its commanding officer, Rear Admiral Rynosuke KOSAKA. He is presently Chief Liaison Officer at the KONOYE Naval Base.

This agent is presently under orders and awaiting transportation to KONOYE where he will interview KOSAKA in an effort to obtain additional information.

*Robert N. Tait*  
ROBERT N. TAIT  
Special Agent, CIC

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

*Tait, CIC, USA*

*Heard  
Hawaii*

(There is a map accompanying the above report of ROBERT N. TAIT, Special Agent, CIC, which portrays by rough sketch the islands of Oahu and Kauai and the Kauai Channel, and has noted thereon information obtained with reference to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations on 7 December 1941 as set forth in the report. This map is reproduced as Item No. 19 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #13

(A NAVY STUDY)

ENTITLED

"SORTIES BY ENEMY SUB-CARRIED PLANES

and

SUB CARRIER IDENTIFICATION"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"

(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

ENEMY ~~LISTS~~ SORTIES BY SUB-CARRIED PLANES (*Lists*)

New information on the enemy's use of submarine-borne aircraft for reconnaissance is furnished by a captured document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,212), which lists a series of sorties covering nearly a year in time and extending from ZANZIBAR east to OREGON.

During that period, the plane-carrying subs lost 24% of the aircraft which took off--most of them in landing and recovery accidents.

All sorties listed were flown from ten subs of the "I" class--the I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10, I-19, I-21, I-25, I-29, I-30 and I-31. A total of 38 sorties were flown between 30 November 1941, and 11 November 1942. This was the most active period for enemy sub-borne aircraft. (Hence, no mention is made of the Jap sub which reportedly reconnoitered PEARL HARBOR in October 1943.

Many of the subs employed have probably been lost during the past two years. The only identifiable loss among the group listed above, however, is the I-7, sunk at TWIN ROCKS, KISKA on 21 June 1943. This was confirmed by salvage operations.

The first listed flight, flown eight days before the attack on PEARL HARBOR, was a night sortie over SUVA BAY. The document states succinctly that the plane "did not return". Also noted are flights over PEARL HARBOR on 17 December 1941, 5 January 1942, and 24 February 1942, and over the OREGON coast on the nights of 9 and 29 August 1942.

## The complete list:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>Name of Sub</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Time</u>
30 Nov. '41	I-10	SUVA BAY	Night
17 Dec. '41	I-7	PEARL HARBOR	Dawn
5 Jan. '41	I-19	PEARL HARBOR	Night
7 Feb. '42	I-25	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 Feb. '42	I-9	PEARL HARBOR	Night
26 Feb. '42	I-25	MELBOURNE	Dawn
1 Mar. '42	I-25	HOBART	Day
8 Mar. '42	I-25	WELLINGTON	Pre-dawn
13 Mar. '42	I-25	AUCKLAND	Pre-dawn
19 Mar. '42	I-25	SUVA	Dawn
Not known	I-10	DABAN(Comment: There is a DABANU on WOODLARK or MURUA IS., between Eastern NEW GUINEA and NEW GEORGIA IS.)	
7 May. '42	I-30	ADEN	Dawn
8 May '42	I-30	JIBOUTI	Dawn
19 May '42	I-30	ZANZIBAR	Dawn
19 May '42	I-30	DAR-ES-SALAAM	Dawn
19 May '42	I-21	SUVA BAY	Dawn
23 May '42	I-29	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 May '42	I-21	AUCKLAND	Dawn
25 May '42	I-9	KISKA, AMCHI TKA	
26 May '42	I-9	KISKA	
27 May '42	I-19	"While making preparations for a night flight on the Northern side of BOGORLOF ISLAND (Comment: Probably BOGOSLOF IS. IN the ALEUTIANS) an enemy destroyed was recognized and we submerged, badly damaging our plane."	
27 May '42	I-25	KODIAK	Day
29 May '42	I-21	SYDNEY	Dawn
30 May '42	I-10	DIEGO SUAREZ	Night
31 May '42	I-10	DIEGO SUAREZ	
1 June '42	I-10	Plane search off coast of DIEGO SUAREZ	Night
9 Aug. '42)	I-25	OREGON (State)	Night
29 Aug. '42)			Night
19 Aug. '42	I-29	SEYCHELLES IS.(SEISERU SHOTO)	Day
30 Aug. '42	I-19	SUDEKO TO	
13 Oct. '42	I-7	ESPIRITU SANTO IS.	Dawn
19 Oct. '42	I-19	NOUMEA	
30 Oct. '42	I-9	NOUMEA	Dawn
2 Nov. '42	I-8	EPATE IS.	"Moonlight from 0000 0030"
4 Nov. '42	I-31	SUVA	0100
4 Nov. '42	I-9	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-7	VANIKORO IS.	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-21	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-9	ESPIRITU SANTO	Dusk

Comment: No mention was made in the document of the I-17. When sunk off NEW CALEDONIA in August 1943, prisoners from this sub claimed that it had reconnoitered west coast areas by plane in February 1942.

#### JAP CARRIER IDENTIFICATION

A recently captured order (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12, 253) presumed to have been issued by a Squadron CO of the 121st Air Group, describes identification markings which appear on flight decks of combatant carriers. The captured order indicates that markings are to consist of either the first two or the first and last Kana syllables of the ships' names. The Kana syllables "ZU HO" were already noted in a photograph of the CVL ZUIHO, sunk on 25 October (see "Weekly Intelligence, Vo. 1, No. 18).

The order states that large white Kana symbols are to appear on the starboard side toward the stern. The first Kana is to be eight meters (26½ feet) square, the second four meters square.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #14  
ENTITLED

"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR  
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

This is a translation parallel to the  
translation stated in Source Document  
#15 post of the same captured Japanese  
Document.

C-C TRAVEL &amp; INT. TRAVEL

#10,678

43

SUPPLY BASES AND FUELING FLEET UNITS AT SEA  
dated 10 June 1943, captured on SAIPAN.

-----

EDITOR'S NOTE

This document comprises extracts taken from an official study of problems relating to supply compiled 10 June 1943. Recommendations are included for the enlargement of supply bases and depots at BAKŌ, MIKAWA WAN and KURE. Examples are cited showing the difficulties experienced in fueling fleet units at sea during the first year and a half of the war; recommendations call for the installation of stern refueling gear on all ships, an increase in the rate of supply per hour, and the strengthening of hoses used in fueling. It is stated that the maintenance of supply lines calls for the construction of two naval storeships of the IRAKO type. It is possible that keels for IRAKO type ships were laid before their usefulness as contemplated in this document was ~~neutralized~~ neutralized by the Allied advance.

#10,678

Military - Very Secret (GUNGOKUHI)

Committee on Investigation of  
Battle Lessons, Supply Section  
(BUNKAKAI)

10 June 1943

## BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR

## SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON No. 1

Table of Contents

Page

- I. ~~Expansion~~ Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases
- II. ~~Problems~~  
Fueling of Fleet Units at Sea.
- III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships

CONFIDENTIAL 10,678

~~I. SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS FROM JAPAN~~

I. Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases  
 a. ~~Battle Lesson (Legend)~~

1. There has been a sudden increase in the operating efficiency of ~~customs-houses~~, piers, and government buildings being used by the YOKOSUKA Naval District in YOKOHAMA. (YOKOSUKA Civil Engr Dept).
2. Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 must be enlarged to permit the mooring of two or three 10,000 ton AKs. (3rd Fuel Depot).
3. Loading and supply facilities at BAKO must be expanded. The capacity to supply fuel oil must be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2nd Fleet).
4. Supply installations at MIKAWA WAN are insufficient and require enlargement. (1st Fleet).
5. The supply quay of the KURE Replacement Shop must be enlarged. It is frequently found <sup>to be</sup> too narrow for supply loading work and <sup>causes</sup> delay <sup>in</sup> results. (11th Air Depot).
6. Planes completed at the 11th Air Depot are operating on flights and as air transport after being transported by surface to the IMAKUNI Air Group; the loss in labor and time required for this is great. At least one runway of the KURE airfield must be lengthened and widened. (11th Air Depot).
7. There are <sup>many</sup> numerous instances <sup>where</sup> the capacities of local Stores Departments have been insufficient and <sup>are unable to</sup> ~~could not~~ meet the demands of operating forces. It is essential to ~~expand~~ <sup>expand</sup> installations and place experienced persons in charge so as to keep on hand large amounts of stores and insure a rapid supply. (All depts concerned with naval stores).



10, 6, 10

8. In order to expedite supply to the various forces in the farflung combat areas, and also in consideration of such things as air raids, it is necessary to establish branch offices of the local stores departments or branch supply depots with each front line force. (All Stores Depts).

9. Because of insufficient supply installations at local stores departments, heavy equipment such as DP guns and generators cannot be unloaded, and some things cannot be installed. The handling of torpedoes and mines is also very difficult. Not only is there a great possibility of damage to delicate equipment but there are many instances when it is not suited to rapid supply. The installation of piers, cranes, cranes on cargo lighters, and trucks is absolutely necessary. (All Stores Depts).

10. Acceleration in fitting out Specially Established Naval Stores Departments is earnestly desired. The 4th Naval Stores Department legally is tactically assigned to the 4th Fleet; however, it has a great deal of importance as a front line supply base even for ships of the Combined Fleet. Therefore it is necessary to attempt the speedy completion of installations as already planned and to equip them with an eye toward our persistent drive to the south. (2nd Fleet).

11. At RABAUL there is not a single sound pier installation, while great labor is being expended entirely on loading and unloading. No matter what other sacrifices are made, piers must be installed immediately. (108th Air Depot).

Conclusion ~~is that~~ In order that deficiency in supply installations will have no great effect on naval operations, it is necessary to determine at the central /activity/ the urgency of actual conditions in all areas and to formulate remedial measures.

10,678

~~II. FUELING OF BATTLE SHIPS AND OTHER MILITARY SHIPS~~

II. Fueling of Fl at Units at Sea.

As a Battle Lesson (Lesson)

There are many times in operational waters when fuel oil cannot be supplied unless refueling from astern is used.

The rate of oil received by ships per hour and the rate of supply to small ships from large ships is insufficient. (All Ships).

It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refueling to 300 metric tons per hour. (BatDiv 3).

The number of times refueled and results during the year since BatDiv 3 commenced operations:

	<u>KONGŌ</u>	<u>HARUNA</u>	<u>Average Amount</u>
From AO (2 hoses astern)	8 times	5 times	160 m tons per hr
from DD (from alongside)	17 times	22 times	110 m tons per hr

-----  
 The ZUIKAKU (CV) similarly loaded at 160 metric tons per hour, taking on 1942 m tons from the NICHITŌ MARU in 12 hours. An increase to 300 or 400 tons is necessary. (ZUIKAKU (CV)).

Conclusion (Opinion) It is urgently necessary from a military standpoint to put into effect the following measures for the supply of fuel oil at sea:

1. The installation of stern refueling gear on all ships.
2. A great increase in the rate of supply per hour in order to shorten the total time required.

10,678

VI. IMPROVEMENT OF NAVAL STORES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONSB. Battle Lesson (Lesson)

1. More than ten hoses broke during ~~maneuvers~~ on the HAWAII Operation; and during the INDIAN OCEAN Operation the hoses of an oil tanker were damaged and supply was greatly delayed. (CarDiv 2).

2. Losses from cutting and leakage during towing and refueling are likely to occur. Also, since the hoses stretch about 10%, the part which bends is likely to become constricted and greatly reduced the capacity for supplying oil. The number of times accidents happened to hoses from the beginning of the war up to the end of 1942 is shown below: (BatDiv 3).

	KONGŌ (BB)		HARUNA (BB)	
	Times Executed	Times Damaged	Times Executed	Times Damaged
Astern from AO	8	9 (TN: sic)	5	3
Alongside from DD	17	3	22	1

3. If the inner surface of the hose breaks, the filter is likely to get clogged up. (KENTŌ MARU, ZUIHŌ (CVL)).

4. If the weak points of the 12 meter cellophane (SEROFUAN) hose were improved upon, it would be suitable for use on naval vessels. Ten hoses might be made standard equipment for BBs, reducing the number of 4.5 meter hoses now in use <sup>by half</sup>.

Conclusion (Conclusion) Cellophane (SEROFUAN) hoses must be made tougher.

10,678

V. IMPROVEMENT OF SHIPS' HULLS, MACHINERY, FITTINGS AND EQUIPMENT  
FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

C. Battle Lesson (SASPA)

XXXXX

1. It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from astern.  
 (All ships).
2. In the case of tankers which supply from both sides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated. Improvements are necessary so that separate supplying can be carried out. (AKEBONO MARU, DesRon 4).
3. There are instances in which extraneous matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from tankers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in loading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with changeable filters. (ISE (BB))
4. In view of the many instances in which hoses are burst <sup>because of the</sup> ~~due to~~ extreme pressure caused by faulty operation of the intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cut-off valves. (TOHO MARU).
5. Oil intake funnels should be installed on all fuel tanks. (MYOKO (CA)).

Conditions on the MYOKO

No of funnels	No of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No of tank connection valves from each line	No of tanks
12	1	0	12
2	1	2	4
8	2	0	16
2	2	4	8
6	3	0	18
2	3	4	10
2	4	0	8
4	5	0	20

- 314 - 7

10, 618

6. The great length of the air outlet pipe on fuel tanks makes necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air.

Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, loading is impossible. (CHŌKAI (CA)†, MYŌKŌ (CA)).

7. From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity. (CHŌKAI (CA)).

8. It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations. (CHŌKAI (CA)),

9. When the YŪBARI (CL) is about half filled with oil, the upper tanks cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity fueling from astern is difficult, and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is necessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. Moreover, since funnel fueling of lower tanks requires time, it is necessary to convert to pressure fueling. (YŪBARI (CL)).

10. Often, large amounts of oil collect in the tanker's hoses at the time of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the hose (5 large buckets of oil have been collected from one hose (about 0.3 ton)). (HAMAKAZE (DD)).

11. By reason of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase from 40 tons to 80 tons the capacity of the seawater drainage ejector in the compensating oil tank. (MAKIGUMO (DD)).

12. It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipment throughout, in case of low temperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great. (BatDiv 3



10,678
--------

III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships

~~THE CAPACITY, PERFORMANCE, AND NUMBER OF SUPPLY SHIPS~~

~~6. A Battle Lesson (Kure)~~

Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Ammunition ships have been mistaken for storeships.

~~A Battle Lesson (Kure)~~

It is necessary to equip AKs with 40 ton derricks fore and aft to make possible the loading of lighters, large landing barges and other heavy objects. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

Conclusion ~~(Kure)~~ It is necessary to have a large number of AKs which are equipped with heavy derricks.

2. It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in southern areas. (MineLayerDiv 18, etc).

3. When accompanying a fleet, the present speed of 15 knots is difficult; a speed of 20 knots is necessary for fully loaded oil tanker. (KENYO MARU).

Conclusion ~~(Kure)~~ Good, fast ships must be chosen as supply ships to accompany the fleet.

~~B Battle Lesson (Kure)~~

1. Armament is weak; it must be strengthened. (MineLayerDiv 18).

2. Communications equipment is very deficient; it is inconvenient in directing maneuvers. (2nd Fleet).

3. It is necessary to add 2 MG. (Have at present one 7.7mm MG and 7 rifles). <sup>Two</sup> 2 pairs of 12cm binoculars are required. (Have at present 8cm). (KENYO MARU).

CONFIDENTIAL	10,673
--------------	--------

4. It is necessary to increase rifles by two DP guns and MG by ~~22~~ 12mm or 25mm MGs. (KURE Navy Yard).

5. Three 8cm binoculars, <sup>one</sup> twin mount 11 mm MG, and DP gun are required. Still another secondary frequency for radão transmission is required. (NICHIIYŌ MARU).

6. There are numerous instances when requisitioned ships are attacked from the side opposite the gun. In view of actual circumstances they should be equipped with one gun forward and one aft. Shells must be increased from 20 to over 50 rounds per gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

Conclusion ~~(Oath)~~

1. In view of the fact that there are many times when skill in lookout and evasive action determine the fate of a ship, it is profitable to develop these capabilities to the utmost.

2. Although AA, ASW, and communications equipment have been greatly increased, we believe that the present standard is inadequate.

← Battle Lesson ~~(Base)~~

In spite of the fact that there have been numerous opportunities for using converted airplane lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (11th Air Fleet).

Conclusion ~~(Oath)~~ Two converted airplane lighters must be assigned each air fleet and they must be equipped with 4 large landing barges.

← Battle Lesson ~~(Base)~~

1. Conditions are such that supply of fuel and lubricating oil in local

1



10, 678

areas is impossible and the torpedoes supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is gradually being taken care of by transferring small amounts from the supply of other ships. Since this is a great inconvenience, it must be made possible to get oil from ammunition ships or from oil tankers. (KINUGASA (CA))

2. The torpedoes supplied, once adjusted, go several months without examination and readjustment; there are many that are defective from having been in ~~xxx~~ storage a long time. If we were to participate in an operation ~~immediately~~ immediately after the delivery of these torpedoes, not only would we find them not completely ready for firing, but we would have some uneasiness regarding their accuracy. (KINUGASA (CA)).

Conclusion (~~Conclusion~~)

1. Fuel oil and lubricating oil must be included with torpedoes supplied from ammunition ships. (This has been done).

2. Torpedoes supplied must be inspected at suitable intervals and imperfect ones readjusted.

Battle Lesson (~~Lesson~~)

At present, conditions are such that with every possible use of the WAKIYA (AF), and the IRAKO (AF), supply is barely being carried ~~xxx~~ on.

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these, supply lines would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morale and on operations would be great. Two naval storeships of the IRAKO type must be constructed and put into operation immediately /in order to supply fresh provisions/ (2nd Fleet).

At least two ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> these ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> type ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> ships ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> this ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> type ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> must be attached to the Central Fleet. (2nd Fleet)

Conclusion. The number of naval storeships for fresh provisions must be increased.

CINC. G. I. C. O. A. Item #: 10,678

F. Battle Lessons (Revised)

1. Fuel oil is generally supplied every eight days; but fresh provisions are sometimes needed for as long as twenty days. (Deckton 2).

2. Oil tankers must be equipped with refrigerators and thus be enabled to supply fresh provisions at sea at the same time that they supply oil. (2nd Fleet).

Conclusion It would be well to plan for small craft such as EDe to be supplied with fresh provisions at the same time and place that they are supplied with fuel oil.

(End)

11.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #15  
ENTITLED

"JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR  
SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

This is a translation parallel to  
the translation stated in SOURCE  
DOCUMENT #14, supra of the same  
captured Japanese Document.

NAVY DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340  
NOV 10 1941

402  
7/10/41

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

1. [Illegible]

2. [Illegible]

3. [Illegible]

4. [Illegible]

5. [Illegible]

6. [Illegible]

7. [Illegible]

8. [Illegible]

9. [Illegible]

10. [Illegible]

Very truly yours,  
[Illegible Signature]


[Illegible Title]

These Article I issues are compiled from proposals forwarded from the beginning of the war to May 1945 by the subcommittee designated under "A", and from questions of supply personnel in the current period. The subcommittees designated "A" are at present handling material in their respective offices.

Rank of Subcommittees	Duties	Responsible Activity in General
⊙ General Affairs	1. Coordination and administration of proposals and proposals on CAGAI's program, 2. Review and control of publications of other subcommittees	Executive Council
⊙ #1	Matters concerning equipment related to the Technical Dept	TECHNICAL Dept. Plans Dept
△ #2	Matters concerning equipment related to Naval Air Sq	Naval Air Dept
⊙ #3	Matters concerning office stores, documents and records	TECHNICAL Stores Dept
△ #4	Matters concerning fuel, fresh water and drinking water in operations	TECHNICAL Stores Dept
△ #5	Matters concerning clothing, food, equipment supplies and other related goods and special projects	TECHNICAL Stores Dept
⊙ #6	Matters concerning medical stores	TECHNICAL Naval Hospital
△ #7	Matters concerning kitchen supplies	TECHNICAL Naval Hospital
△ #8	Matters concerning repair materials	C and E School
⊙ #9	Matters concerning construction materials	TECHNICAL Dept. Plans Dept (Construction)
⊙ #10	Matters relating to fuel and any equipment which may be used for the production of other materials including medical affairs equipment	TECHNICAL Stores Dept

Table of Contents

- I. General Report For (1/1/45)
- II. Supply of Personnel from 1945
- III. Supply of Personnel in the Current Period
- IV. Supply of Personnel in the Current Period - Division of Technical Dept



CINCINNATI, Ohio, June 10, 1918

1. **LOCAL TRANSPORTATION**

<p>1.</p>	<p>Local transport is generally a matter of local effort. The Government should have an office there, not the Office of Transportation which deals with general transportation. Consequently, work involving military supplies, and collection of them is especially difficult to handle.</p> <p>(All Post Dept. Military Service Offices)</p>	<p>Conclusion (General)</p> <p>It is necessary to have the greatest flexibility with regard to the machinery and methods of supply in local areas.</p>
<p>2.</p>	<p>There are numerous instances of material not being in supply and of shortages in communication because of inadequate knowledge of the nature and location of military needs. Transportation arrangements.</p> <p>(All Post Dept. Offices)</p>	<p>There is a need for research and observation in the military and logistics of supply. In addition, there is a need for increasing operational efficiency by applying experimental means to supply and communication problems in local areas.</p>
<p>3.</p>	<p>The existing situation is very poor as a result of the fact that local activities require control of local operations by the war part.</p> <p>(All Dept. Offices)</p> <p>a). It is recommended that a committee of officers should be organized, made of local military, naval or air military forces, civilian or military and civil in the War Department and War Department to study transportation and other matters which immediately affect the local transportation of supplies and other material.</p> <p>(All Post Dept. Offices)</p>	<p>Facilities must be improved in all areas in order to speed up existing and to increase the efficiency of transportation operations as much as possible.</p> <p>Advance the transportation machinery which actually affects forwarding military operations through management of cargo and the local facility of actual control.</p> <p>The loading of vessels must be perfectly executed, and</p>


[Illegible]	10678
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]
[Illegible]	[Illegible]



The image shows a document page with a table structure. The table has multiple columns and rows. The text within the table is extremely faded and illegible. The page is divided into columns by vertical lines, and there are horizontal lines suggesting rows of data. The overall appearance is that of a historical or official record that has been poorly preserved or scanned.







...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...

...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...

...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...

...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...

...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...

...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...  
...the ... of ...

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible due to heavy noise and low contrast in the scan. It appears to be a multi-column document, possibly a report or a set of minutes, with several columns of text separated by vertical lines. The text is mostly obscured by a dense pattern of black and white noise.]

II.

... (All States Dept)



12

Letter # 10678

It is necessary to eliminate the need for getting the Navy Minister's approval for the transfer of even one plane or one other ship, so that they can be done with the approval of the C-in-C.

(1st Air Fleet)

14

When spare parts are scarce as at present, we believe that if they are ordered <sup>under one head</sup> ~~separately~~ all as ~~with~~ <sup>one</sup> material or equipment, the ~~con-~~ <sup>sumption</sup> petition ~~through~~ the various depots will be eliminated. Moreover, if ~~as~~ <sup>they are</sup> ordered as material, it will not be necessary to transfer it through equipment (as such as ~~702~~ <sup>has been</sup> transferred to material); <sup>if it is found that</sup> matter can thus be expedited and receipt of goods facilitated.

(11th Air Depot)

~~eliminate transportation~~


Orders for aircraft <sup>the supply of</sup> ~~whose parts~~ must be centrally controlled.

15

It must be clearly indicated that ~~the~~ <sup>these</sup> Bantean goods necessary for all troop organizations in wartime are to be handled as ~~naval stores~~ <sup>ammunition</sup>. ~~However~~ <sup>Therefore</sup>, we believe that articles difficult to obtain or to ~~supply~~ <sup>handle</sup>, once lumped under one head, should be treated so that they may be delivered as battle supplies

(~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ARMY) (military stores) and, when necessary,


The handling of eastern goods ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~indispensable~~ <sup>indispensable</sup> to life in ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~area~~ <sup>area</sup> must be improved so that supply is always maintained and so that security is not endangered, and ~~best~~ <sup>best</sup> ~~practices~~ <sup>practices</sup> for a ~~loading~~ <sup>loading</sup> standard for ~~ships~~ <sup>ships</sup> must be established.






(Continued from page 680)  
 The Committee has also been informed  
 that the Government has been advised  
 by the Attorney General that the  
 Government is not bound by the  
 provisions of the Act in respect  
 of the disposal of the property  
 of a bankrupt after the  
 commencement of the proceedings  
 in bankruptcy. It is noted  
 that the provisions of the Act  
 in respect of the disposal of  
 the property of a bankrupt  
 after the commencement of  
 the proceedings in bankruptcy  
 are contained in section 101  
 of the Bankruptcy Act.

CHAS. A. BROWN







18

#10675

(b) Although it is necessary to increase material supplies from existing sources, it is considered essential to study the existing situation in the existing stocks of the various of the various types of this service material. Therefore, it is recommended that the following items be included in the material inventory of the hospital:

Such a wide material supply, in form of containers, and features, such time is required and available material every.

For your information, the summary of general repair jobs and the number of instances of a major nature of the Oklahoma Royal Hospital for the last year are as follows:

Number of general repair jobs for year 1944	
Number of instances of major nature	2741
General material	752
(a) Major items	
Sterilizer pump	731
Stethoscope	282
Hemiforce	75
Scales	187
(b) Replacement of consumables	26,000
(c) Major Hospital	

It is essential that hospitals in order to be equipped for repair of material used in medical treatment, that require be refilled quickly, and that supplies be adequate.

20  
19

#10678

III SUPPLY OF PROVISIONS IN LOCAL AREAS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE LOCAL OFFICE

Number	Battle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Opinion)
1	<p>Considerable efforts are being made toward local self-sufficiency in fresh provisions. However, the NISSAN Forestry and Agriculture (日産農林) and the SHIMIZU Fisheries (清水漁業) which are working to supply the Navy with fresh provisions at TAKAHARA, <sup>theater and operations of both organizations are Secret</sup> Futatabi <sup>only</sup> SHIMIZU, both have their bases and profiting areas in the former British area north of TARAU and have therefore run into difficulties.</p> <p>For example:</p> <p>In June of last year the SHIMIZU FISHING (清水漁業) (from the CHINARA Fishing Corp.) <sup>is a fishing vessel belonging to the SHIMIZU Fisheries, was prohibited from fishing in the former British possession (the north coast of SHIMIZU).</sup></p> <p>It is necessary to get permission to <sup>get</sup> fresh vegetables from the NISSAN <sup>at</sup> TAKAHARA and since even fresh provisions <sup>allotted</sup> <sup>supply is</sup> are bartered for, <sup>is</sup> <sup>difficult.</sup></p> <p>(101st Fuel Depot, TAKAHARA branch)</p>	<p>A central agreement between the Army and Navy regarding the policy of local self-sufficiency in fresh provisions must be made and the local authorities must be made to comply.</p>

Even if

2 ~~at TARAKAN~~ ~~at this place /TARAKAN/~~  
 were to attempt self-sufficiency,  
 there would not be enough fresh pro-  
 visions <sup>for the</sup> ~~in this area~~. Fresh meat and  
 green vegetables especially must be  
 supplied from some place like JAVA,  
 but at present a storeship makes  
 only one or two trips every two  
 months from the 102nd Naval Stores  
 Dept (SOERABAJA). The number of  
 storeships for local Stores Dept's  
 must be increased; at least two or  
 three trips a month must be made.

For your information, the amounts  
 needed here and the <sup>percentage</sup> ~~amount~~ of self-  
 supply are given in the following

table:

Type	Amount needed by all govt offices & forces here (kg per day)	Percentage self-sup- ply	Shortage	Remarks
Fresh fish	200,000	(5days refined) 68%	3,200	3 mo. average start- ing Nov 1943
Fresh meat	160,000	(10days refined) 3%	1,030	
Fresh vege- tables	600,000	54.8%	8,130	

(101st. Fuel Depot, TARAKAN Branch)

A greater number of storeships  
 is needed for the local supply of  
 locally raised provisions.

3 Supply for personnel of the <sup>Southern</sup> ~~Eastern~~  
~~Force~~ ~~in the South~~ (during the first phase  
 of the war totalling 100,000) is  
 insufficient with the storeships  
 used at present.

(2nd Fleet)

Machinery for the preservation of  
 local products must be established  
 in order to compensate for  
 and the shortage of storeships must  
 be ~~reduced~~

#10676

2

Because of imperfect packing a large amount of the sweets, tobacco, etc. supplied from JAPAN has been damaged in transit. The usual cause of this damage is moisture. The most effective method of packing goods on board ships from JAPAN and storing facilities at the fisha must be perfected. But since these articles are things which could be produced locally in sufficient quantities, manufacturers should be dispatched to inspect existing conditions and something should be done to study the different materials from JAPAN, and the usual sources of supply should be investigated as well as possible.

(Japan Mail Review, TOKYO, March report)

It is necessary to augment the sources of supply of canteen goods (sweets, tobacco, beer, soft drinks, soap, etc.) which can be produced locally.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF BUREAU OF SUPPLY AND STORES, U.S. NAVY

Subject	Supply Situation (General)	Conclusion (Continued)
1	<p>(1) There are many times in operations when oil cannot be supplied unless <del>refueling is used</del> <del>refueling is used</del>.</p> <p>(2) The rate of oil received by ships per hour and the rate of supply to small ships from large ships is insufficient. (all ships)</p> <p>It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refueling to 300 gallons per hour. (Bathir 3)</p> <p>The number of these refueling and <del>supply</del> <del>supply</del> during the year <del>is</del> <del>is</del></p>	<p>It is <del>it is</del> <del>it is</del> necessary from a military <del>standpoint</del> <del>standpoint</del> to put into effect the following measures for the supply of oil at sea:</p> <p>(1) the installation of <del>refueling</del> <del>refueling</del></p> <p>(2) A great increase in the rate of supply per hour in order to shorten the total time required.</p>





Number	Battle Lesson (Question)	Conclusion (Optima)
	<p><i>Storage</i>          (3) The movements of hospital ships are very limited; they rarely go into areas where small craft are operating.</p> <p><i>However, these ships (RUSHOKU) are usually made trips more or twice a month and therefore their medical officers must be made responsible for the supply of medical materials between ships. (SAMA, YOKOSUKI 5th OHP)</i></p>	<p><i>28</i> <i>13</i> <i>#10478</i></p>
2	<p>When ships are <i>preceding</i> they are <i>reasonably certain of obtaining the chance of getting supplies and goods</i> by transferring as much of their supplies as possible to <i>available</i> remaining behind, they <i>will</i> move as an aid in offsetting the <i>scarcity of</i> <i>space</i> <i>between</i> <i>ships</i>. (Nativ-3)</p>	<p>The transfer between ships of clothing, provisions, certain goods, navy relief goods, and special wartime life must be regulated at Fleet HQ in order to insure smoothness and efficiency.</p>
<p><b>CHAPTER XXXIII - THE CAPACITY, PERFORMANCE, AND NUMBER OF SUPPLY SHIPS AND TRANSPORTATION</b></p>		
Number	Battle Lesson (Question)	Conclusion (Optima)
1	<p>Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Identifying flags have been mistaken for starships, and thereby opportunities to load supplies have been lost. (Nativ 2)</p>	<p>Signal flags which indicate the type of supply ship should be <i>limited</i> issued at appropriate times.</p>
2	<p>(1) High-speed, medium type ships must be used in <i>multi-purpose</i> <i>(auxiliary)</i> <i>etc.</i></p> <p>(2) It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in <i>combat</i> <i>areas</i>. (<i>Minister of the Navy</i> <i>(Nativ 12, etc.)</i>)</p> <p>(3) <i>When accompanying a fleet</i> <i>the present speed of 15 knots is</i> <i>not sufficient</i>. <i>A</i></p>	<p>Such fast ships must be chosen as the supply ships to accompany the fleet.</p>

#10678

24

Daily loaded all tanks, (KANGO MARU)

2

- (1) Armaments crew, 70 men to be strengthened. (KANGO MARU)
- (2) Communications equipment is under discussion; it is dependent in

(1) In view of the fact that these operations were still in actual and creative progress throughout the life of a ship,

(If it is necessary to add 2 MG to the present 4 7.7mm MG and 7 rifles.)

2 rifles of 12cm binoculars are required (4 vs. at present 8cm.)

(KANGO MARU)

1000 lbs MG, 10 lbs of fuel, 100 lbs of other supplies from the transportation department.

(SHINYO MARU)

increased from 20 to more 50 rounds per gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6.

(YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept)

4

In spite of the fact that there have been numerous opportunities for using converted airplane lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (With Air Fleet)

Converted airplane lighters must be assigned with air fleet and they must be equipped with a large landing barge.

5

(1) Conditions are such that supply of fuel and lubricating oil is <sup>local</sup> impossible and torpedoes supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is gradually being made up of by transferring small amounts from the supply of

(1) Fuel oil and lubricating oil must be included with torpedoes supplied by submarines. (This has been done.)

(2) Torpedoes supplied must be inspected at suitable intervals

25 #10678

[Faint, mostly illegible text in the left column, possibly describing medical or logistical procedures.]

and lubricated areas readjusted.

[Faint, mostly illegible text in the left column, possibly describing hospital or medical facilities.]

(1) The number of hospital ships must be increased and the organization of the sick and wounded and the supply of medical materials facilitated.

[Faint, mostly illegible text in the left column, possibly describing medical or logistical procedures.]

(2) The capacity of hospital ships for applying medical materials must be increased.

[Faint, mostly illegible text in the left column, possibly describing medical or logistical procedures.]

(3) Cargo lighters to be used to transfer patients must be located aboard hospital ships.

[Faint, mostly illegible text in the left column, possibly describing medical or logistical procedures.]

#10678

At present conditions are such that with every possible use of the MILITARY (AF) and the MARINE (AF) supply is barely being serviced.

The number of... provisions and... (faint text)

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these supply lines, it would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morale and on operations would be grave. The vessel... the USMC must be constructed and put into operation immediately *for supply of...*

Operational maneuvers in remote areas for at least three months or more and the rapid supply of large quantities of strategic goods to forward areas is impossible. Moreover, storage facilities, the provisions at forward supply bases are poor and conditions are such that *over* forces stationed in these areas are heavily *only* supplied. Also because other equipment, ammunition, and miscellaneous goods have been loaded indiscriminately on supply ships of the Transportation Department system and the movements of these ships have not been under the direct supervision of the Combined Fleet, the status of transport from JAF has been such that the *of first* *the* *large-scale supply* *operational* *forward* *with their varying movements* is the possible.

Supply facilities for *forward* areas must be *maintained* and *the* *forward* *provisions* *maintain* *attached* to the Combined Fleet.

At least *the* *provisions* (including *containers* *and* *...*)

25  
27 #10676

airline supplies must be attached  
to the Fighting Fleet.  
(2nd Fleet)

✓ 9  
It would be well to plan for  
airline mail craft such as <sup>NO</sup> after  
to be supplied with fresh pro-  
visions at the same time and  
place that they are supplied with

(2) Aircrafters must be stationed  
with refrigerators and thus be enabled  
to supply fresh provisions at the same  
time that they supply air. (2nd Fleet)

It would be well to plan for  
airline mail craft such as <sup>NO</sup> after  
to be supplied with fresh pro-  
visions at the same time and  
place that they are supplied with

**COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT**

Initial Lesson (Lesson)

(1) Since it is believed to be very  
profitable both in the supply and transport  
of urgently needed spare parts, <sup>air</sup> transport  
planes should be detailed to all  
air depots for their exclusive use.

(11th Air Depot, 126th Air Depot)

(2) Fleets or Stores Depots in <sup>local</sup> ~~other~~  
strategic areas must be provided transport  
planes and every effort must be made to  
provide a rapid supply of highly expend-  
able light equipment.

Naval  
(MIDWAY NAVAL Stores Dept)

(3) In view of the great amount of medi-  
cal supplies requiring care in preservation,  
and urgent goods such as blood vaccines and  
X-ray film, it is necessary to meet the de-  
mand by increasing air facilities.

(USS Navy Yard, Submarine <sup>Base</sup> [U.S.])

(4) Since it is difficult to supply  
operational centers by surface, assistance

Conclusion (Opinion)

~~Further regulations and~~  
~~transportation in Air~~  
~~transportation in further~~  
~~required and attention of~~



Number	Subject/Issues (Demand)	Comments (Opinion)
1. (cont.)	equipment for lifts, reducing the number of 4.5 motor hoists now in use to half.	
2.	<p>Hoists and the lifts cannot be lifted normally, and it is necessary, at the time of manufacture, to supply hoists to be used in lifting heavy articles which can slipped as they are.</p> <p>There are many instances in which accessories have been damaged in transit.</p> <p>( 1954 Air Report )</p>	<p>Heavy goods should be fitted with metal attachments for extra weight in carrying and the weight of the goods should be plainly marked.</p>
3.	<p>Generally, the size and weight of the packages must be limited as much as possible. Mixing articles of varying sizes and weights in a large box simply increases the rate of damage.</p> <p>Furthermore, since packing boxes are stacked out of doors for a fairly long time in combat areas, it is important to make clear the necessity for care in handling and preserving the contents.</p> <p>( 1954 Air Report )</p>	<p>To prevent damage, it is essential to pack articles varying in weight and size in the same box. The weight and size of the box must suit the article /packed/.</p> <p>Precautions must be noted clearly on the outside of the box.</p>
4.	<p>Because of the weakness and inferior materials in bomb boxes now in use, there is not only damage to bombs, which damage costly, but the inconvenience in handling is heavily felt.</p> <p>( 11th Air Report, 1954 Air Report )</p>	<p>It is necessary to construct a framework for convenience in handling bomb containers and for putting in and taking out bombs.</p>
5.	<p>1). There are many examples of deterioration and decreased efficiency which occur with repetition of combat areas and because of conditions of temperature and climate which make special articles necessary.</p>	<p>In keeping with the expansion of combat areas, it is necessary to consider the temperature and climate in each area and to make studies concerning improvement</p>





No.	Subsidiary Issues (Details)	Conclusion (Opinion)
0	<p>1). Substitutive parts are frequently found in storage as being in good shape. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept.)</p>	<p>Equipment forwarded from to local areas and equipment transferred from Stores Dept for supply purposes</p>
6	<p>2). Many articles have been sent to an area immediately after being taken from storage. <del>Inspection</del> Inspection after arrival has revealed many defects. It is recognized that <sup>many times the</sup> <del>the</del> <sup>is in the</sup> <del>is in the</del> transportation. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept.)</p>	<p>should be sent only after re-inspection and adjustment.</p>
0	<p>It is desirable to use ships within the <del>limit</del> <sup>limit</sup> for the delivery of classified materials. In anticipation of difficulty due to <del>large</del> <sup>large</sup> movements, it is necessary to pack them in heavy paper or bind them with strips of cloth.</p>	<p>When classified material is sent, additional attention and study must be devoted to the packing.</p>
7	<p>Furthermore, in accordance with Military Affairs SECRET Order #830, Section 1, dealing with methods of disposal of the classified documents when no longer of use, the cover bearing the name of the document (in drawings, blue prints which bear the classification number and glass covers) must be returned for killing, thus preventing the spread of information and contributing to war security. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept.)</p>	
0	<p>Measures for the distribution of supply of spare parts used in a great variety of types of cars are being taken by area, such as KUREMA in "A" area and YOKOSUKA in "B" area. When units are transferred from one area to another, it is necessary to exchange the parts supplied in <sup>the original</sup> <del>the original</del> area so that a duplication of parts will not result. (YOKOSUKA Stores Dept.)</p>	<p>In order to simplify articles used spare parts for a great many types of cars, the subparts should be standardized as much as possible.</p>
8.		

UNCLASSIFIED 10/27

Page 2

Number	Facts Issues (Issues)	Proposed Solution
0 9	<p>When specially established Tugboat Squad for forward areas, facilities require the most space and parking, a great deal of labor, time and freight space is consumed in its transportation. It is usually damaged in transit and from the point of supply.</p> <p>(YOKOSUKA Station Dept.)</p>	<p>Change the location of the vessel to port or starboard as possible. In addition, allocate and coordinate the vessel's location.</p>

VIII. THE IMPROVEMENT OF SHIPS' HELMS, BACKING, FITTINGS AND EQUIPMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SERVICE OPERATIONS.

1). It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from astern. It is necessary to determine plans for the supply facilities of vessels on that supply system.

( ALL ships )

2). In the case of tankers which supply from both sides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated.

Improvements are necessary so that separate supplying can be carried out.

( AKISHIMO MARU, Port No. 4 )

3). There are instances in which serious matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from bow. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in loading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with stoppage filters.

( ISE(M) 209 )

4). In view of the many instances in which the hoses are burst due to fluctuation serious pressure caused by faulty operation

CINCPAC CINCPDA form # 10678

No.	Title/Location (Roman)	Condition/Detail																																				
	<p>of these intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cutoff valves.</p> <p>( 7000 (CA) )</p> <p>5). Oil intake funnels should be installed on all fuel tanks.</p> <p>( 7000 (CA) )</p> <p><u>Conditions on the 7000</u></p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>No. of funnels</th> <th>No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel</th> <th>No. of tank connection valves from each line</th> <th>No. of tanks</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>12</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>0</td> <td>16</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>2</td> <td>4</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>3</td> <td>0</td> <td>12</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>4</td> <td>10</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>4</td> <td>0</td> <td>8</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4</td> <td>5</td> <td>0</td> <td>20</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	No. of funnels	No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No. of tank connection valves from each line	No. of tanks	12	1	0	12	2	1	2	4	3	2	0	16	2	2	4	8	4	3	0	12	2	3	4	10	2	4	0	8	4	5	0	20	
No. of funnels	No. of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No. of tank connection valves from each line	No. of tanks																																			
12	1	0	12																																			
2	1	2	4																																			
3	2	0	16																																			
2	2	4	8																																			
4	3	0	12																																			
2	3	4	10																																			
2	4	0	8																																			
4	5	0	20																																			
	<p>6). The great length of the air inlet pipe on fuel tanks where necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air.</p> <p>Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, leading is impossible.</p> <p>( 7000 (CA), 7000 (CA) )</p> <p>7). From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity.</p> <p>( 7000 (CA) )</p> <p>8). It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations.</p> <p>( 7000 (CA) )</p>																																					

GWSAC-GINGOIA Item 2

10478

Page 24

No.	Description (Process)	Description (Process)
✓	<p>9). When the (MACHINE) is about half filled with oil, the upper tank cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity filling from bottom is difficult and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is necessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. However, when manual filling of lower tank requires this, it is necessary to resort to pressure filling.</p> <p>(MACHINE)</p>	
/	<p>10). Often, large amounts of oil collect in the boiler's lower at the time of refueling and the trouble in doing in the work of connecting the hose ( 2 large Lantry baskets of oil have been collected in one hour about 0.3 ton ).</p> <p>(MACHINE)</p>	
	<p>11). By reason of the hindrance to rapid filling occasioned by the length of time required to connect (0.3 hours), it is necessary to increase that of hose to 20 feet the capacity of the machine (MACHINE) in the accompanying oil tank.</p> <p>(MACHINE)</p>	
	<p>12). It is necessary to equip boilers with oil heating apparatus throughout. In case of low temperatures, the effect in the case of refueling is great.</p> <p>(MACHINE)</p>	

#10678

Page 35

Name (Last, First, Middle)	Qualification (if any)
<p>[Faint, illegible text]</p>	<p>[Faint, illegible text]</p>
<p>[Faint, illegible text]</p>	<p>[Faint, illegible text]</p>
<p>[Faint, illegible text]</p>	<p>[Faint, illegible text]</p>



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #16  
(U S NAVY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN  
VOLUME 1 No. 22, 8 DECEMBER 1944)

ENTITLED  
"UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,  
WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)



CONFIDENTIAL

Vol. 1 No. 22

8 DEC. 1941

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

WEEKLY

# INTELLIGENCE

U.S.S. NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

(see story of PEARL HARBOR on page 1)

CONFIDENTIAL

Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or without credit, so long as proper classification is observed.

"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key Navy, Marine and Army Commands. Any requests for additional distribution may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.

Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINC-PAC-CINCPAC "Weekly Intelligence" will be Monday rather than Friday. Therefore, Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December.

#### CONTENTS

PEARL HARBOR: The Planning Stage	Page 1 - 22
Sub Situation	23
Jap Ships Sunk in MANILA Harbor	24 - 25
MANILA Strike Results	26 - 27
Probable Conversion of Jap Hospital Ship	28
Increased AA Armament on Jap Freighter-Transport	29
MANILA, PHILIPPINE Islands	30 - 31
KUMA-NATORI Class CL	32 - 33
Long Delay Bomb Fuse	32
Floating Mines in JAPAN Sea	34 - 35
New Jap Rifle Grenade	34
GENYO Class Tanker Victim of PB&Y	36
Jap Aerial Anti-Sub Doctrine	37 - 43
Long-Shafted Engine Used on JACK	44 - 45
New Army Air Division	45
Jap Airfield Camouflage	46 - 47
Thumbnail Biography of HELEN	48
Provisional Sketch of GEORGE	49
Sidelight on Suicides	50
Japs Develop ENDO-CHINA	51 - 54
Jap Ordnance vs Allied Aircraft	55 - 56
Jap Anti-Sub Bomb	56
Weekly Photo Coverage	57 - 58
LUZON Airfields	59 - 62

Enclosures:

"Japanese Infantry Weapons"

Revised Drawing of YAMATO Class BB

CONFIDENTIAL

## PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U.S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pin-pointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Most remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got underway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Nippon, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Jap Naval officer, were made up

CONTINUED

PAGE 1

CONFIDENTIAL  
as follows:

UMPIRES

NAVAL GENERAL STAFF	RANK	OFFICIAL DUTIES
NAGANO, Osami	Admiral	
FUKUTOME, Shigeru	Rear Admiral	Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations).
UOZUMI, Jisaku	Captain	Member First Section.
YAMAMOTO, Chikao	Captain	Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
MAYUZUMI, Harue	Commander	Member " " " " "
TAMURA, Saburo	Commander	" " " " "
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi	Commander	" " " " "
UOZUMI, Yoriichi	Commander	" " " " "
NAVY MINISTRY		
TAKATA, Toshitane	Captain	Member of Military Affairs Bureau.
SHIKI, Tsuneko	Commander	" " " " "
TOIBATA, Kurie	Commander	" " Office of Military Supply
FUJII, Shigeru	Commander	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).

N-TEAM

## COMBINED FLEET

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku	Admiral	CinC Combined Fleet.
ITO, Seiichi	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
KUROJIMA, Kameto	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
GOTO, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Adjutant.
ISOBE, Taro	Commander	Staff Engineering Officer.
SUGI, Toma	Commander	Staff Gunnery Officer.
SASAKI, Akira	Commander	Staff Air Officer.
WADA, Yushiro	Commander	Staff Communication Officer.
NAGATA, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer.
WATANABE, Yasuji	Commander	Staff Operations and Plans Officer.
ARIMA, Takayasu	Commander	Staff Torpedo Officer.
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi	Commander	Staff Supply Officer.
OTA, Kanai	Commander	Meteorologist attached to Staff.

## 1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE)

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro	Rear Admiral	Commander.
ARISAWA, Naosada	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff.

E-TEAM

## SECOND FLEET

KONDO, Nobutake	Admiral	Commander.
-----------------	---------	------------

CONFIDENTIAL

YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke OISHI, Tamotsu	Captain Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff. Staff Navigation Officer.
FOURTH FLEET		
INOUE, Semi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
FIFTH FLEET		
HOSOGAYA, Boshiro	Vice Admiral	Commander.
ELEVENTH AIR FLEET		
TSUKAHARA, Nishizo KUSAKA, Jinichi	Vice Admiral Rear Admiral	Commander. Chief of Staff.

A-TEAM

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions)

TAKAHASHI, Ibo	Vice Admiral	Commander.
ISHIHARA, Hajime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.

SIXTH FLEET

SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.

FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet)

NAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff.

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE - Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U.S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as

CONTINUED

PAGE 3

CONFIDENTIAL

sunk.

On 6 and 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board - was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded - the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D.E.I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANY will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still War Minister - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NAGATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. OpOrders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder - i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.)

CONFIDENTIAL

The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

---

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN  
1 November 1941

## COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

## GENERAL SITUATION

## (a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

## (b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is siding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

## (c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

## (d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however,

CONTINUED

PAGE 5

CONFIDENTIAL

supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

OUR SITUATION

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU ), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

STRATEGY

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy



CONFIDENTIAL

of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

ANNEXED VOLUME

1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".
2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.
4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The fate of the Empire".

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".

"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack". - "Climb MT FUJI".

"The time to commence the attack is 0520". - "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".

"All forces attack". - "Climb MT NIITAKA!".

etc.  
CONTINUED

PAGE 7

CONFIDENTIAL

5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).
- (a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.
- (b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.
- (c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.
7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.
8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa-

CONFIDENTIAL

tion Force will probably be PALAU.

9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet.
10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It would be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

- 11 Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11th Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the bast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S., Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:)

- |          |                 |
|----------|-----------------|
| (1) GUAM | about X plus 2. |
| (2) WAKE | about X plus 7. |

CONTINUED

PAGE 9

CONFIDENTIAL

(3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAU and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

---

Herewith are two of the above referenced documents .

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.
2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.
3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be uses, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."
4. Supply Plans.  
  
Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.
5. Communications Plans.
6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

---

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK.

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October - and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku  
Commanding, Combined Fleet

CONFIDENTIAL

Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI WAN  
10 November 1941

## STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU Is. KURILES).
3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
4. Break-down of attack plane units.

The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit  
Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX  
1st Carrier Attack Unit  
Etc. (details not recalled by POW).

5. Fleet cruising formation  
(Including retiring formations)
6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO Chuichi  
Commanding  
Striking Force

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

CONTINUED

PAGE II

CONFIDENTIAL

3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (1)
4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.
7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months

CONFIDENTIAL

for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans.

(POW does not know about these; no details.)

Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and GMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

---

5 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #2

Y-Day will be 23 November.

---

10 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3

X-Day will be 8 December.

---

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHO); two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA; elements of DesRon 1; and about twenty subs.

CONTINUED

PAGE 13

CONFIDENTIAL

(Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible).


One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit PEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter ramméd and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.



Midget sub beached on OAHU.






CONFIDENTIAL

敵機沈没機報告用紙 A



敵機沈没機報告用紙 B



Photostat of a document from a crashed Jap plane after the PEARL HARBOR raid. Above, code designations are applied to ship anchorages near FORD ISLAND. Below, sectors from LAHAINA (on MAUI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS) are indicated in code. Codes were presumably to be used for either voice or radio transmission.

CONFIDENTIAL

局名	周波数	播送時刻	信号
KGMB (15.20)	590	1/10 以后连续放送	
KGU (15.20)	Y60	1/10 以后连续放送	5

Novel aid for Jap PEARL HARBOR raiders. Captured fragment above gives name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two chief HONOLULU radio stations.




Chart of torpedo runs, recovered from crashed Jap plane. Broken lines indicate aircraft from CV KAGA. Solid lines denote planes from other carriers.


CONFIDENTIAL



「ワシントン」海軍部より送られた写真

Captured Japanese photograph of FORD ISLAND under attack on 7 December 1941. A VAL has just scored a near miss.

CONFIDENTIAL



Above photograph is captioned in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".

CONTINUED

PAGE 2

CONFIDENTIAL




Photographs of the PEARL HARBOR raid were widely distributed among Jap personnel for morale purposes. Captured souvenir albums of Jap sailors often contain a set of these photos along with several equally dramatic shots of the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE sinking off SINGAPORE. Above photograph shows WHEELER FIELD during raid.

**SUBMARINE SITUATION**  
**NOV. 28 - DEC. 4**

CONFIDENTIAL

- ▲ - SIGHTING
- - SOUND CONTACT
- ⊗ - R D/F FIX



One enemy submarine was definitely sunk near the Empire on the 29th.

Absence of sighting and contact reports between HAWAII and the Mainland indicate the probable return of that sub to the Empire.

CONFIDENTIAL

## JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944



It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above estimate.

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANILA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA Class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.

The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.


Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.



MANILA Harbor photographed on 5 November by TICONDERAGA aircraft. Note concentration of destroyers.



CONFIDENTIAL




CONFIDENTIAL

## MANILA STRIKE RESULTS



Results of Third Fleet aircraft strike on MANILA Harbor 11-14, November 1944. Ship in foreground is a new type 6500 ton freighter, Sugar Baker (a), described in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21.




Two freighters on the bottom near the breakwater give testimony to the effectiveness of the strike.




CONFIDENTIAL



Burning ships and  
shore installations at  
MANILA Harbor.



Pier Seven and other in-  
stallations showing damage from  
Third Fleet bombs, 11-14 Nov-  
ember 1944.



CONFIDENTIAL

**PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP**

Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to the BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.


Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Japanese vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships - a disproportionate allotment in view of his general shipping situation.



PAGE 28

CONFIDENTIAL

## INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT



Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA - probably single-mount 25-mm - mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

CONFIDENTIAL

MANILA, PHILIP



This striking photograph of MANILA Harbor and environs was taken by planes from the USS HANCOCK on 25 November. Most of the ships seen, including a KUMA Class light cruiser, are resting on the bottom.

CONFIDENTIAL

## PINE ISLANDS



The white governmental buildings are seen in the right foreground. The largest pier (number Seven) has a sunken freighter alongside. The PASIG River winds through the city and enters the sea just outside the breakwater.

PAGE 31

CONFIDENTIAL

## KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL



Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warships has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

- Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament).
- Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armament.
- Four 25-mm single mount guns.
- Ten 25-mm in dual mounts
- Three 25-mm in a triple mount.
- Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is believed unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triple-mount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

### LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE

A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-lb. delay-type generally used against airfields.


Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U.S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.





535 (DA)



### KUMA - NATORI CL

#### ESTIMATE OF REVISED ARMAMENT

BASED ON PHOTOGRAPHS OF 26 OCTOBER 1944, SULO SEA,  
TAKEN BY 23rd & 31st BOMBING SQUADRONS OF 5th BOMBARDMENT GROUP

CINCPAC - CINCPAC  
RESTRICTED

CONFIDENTIAL

## FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,410). Although dated well over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU were very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VLADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U.S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.



## NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

A new type of Japanese high explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. This grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.

Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap ignites a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.


The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4, but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade.

PAGE 34



CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

## GENYO CLASS TANKER VICTIM OF PB4Y



On 31 October, a PB4Y of the 115th Bombing Squadron observed and photographed a 10,000-ton GENYO Class Jap tanker off KUDAT airdrome in MARUDU Bay (North BORNEO). The Allied plane attacked and apparently sank the AO with a single 250-pound GP hit, which ripped an eight-foot hole in the starboard bow. A 4-5-second delay fuse was used. Photo below shows the victim on the next day.

On 1 November another PB4Y observed the same ship lying on its side in this same location. On the following day it was observed on the bottom in 10-15 fathoms.



CONFIDENTIAL

## JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and its general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last summer and it is probable that other planes may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Patrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morale because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

### Aggressiveness is stressed.

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they immediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEYAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

### Patience and imagination are essential.

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained,

CONTINUED

PAGE 37

CONFIDENTIAL

we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

In regard to night operations.

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATEYAMA Air Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they attacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

Planes must be ready for instant operations.

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

Bad weather must be turned to account.

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return to base without loss of time."

U.S. submarine tactics.

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his

CONFIDENTIAL

present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied.

"Surfaced submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs change their appearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types.

#### Tactics for anti-sub patrol.

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable combat results.

"Patrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the surface."

#### Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).

#### Patrol altitudes and security.

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily the ease of carrying out bombing and/the possibility of/complications.

"(1). When primarily for visual contact.

"a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable.

"b. In darkness it is best to fly at/about 200 meters.

"c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters.

"(2). When using magnetic detector

"Daytime - under 80 meters is best.

CONTINUED

PAGE 39

CONFIDENTIAL

"Night time - 80-100 meters is best.

"When an important escorted convoy is passing it is necessary to report its movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

#### The lookout.

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lookout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious results will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surfaced enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

#### Principles of the attack.

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try.

When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain



CONFIDENTIAL

due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

#### Guiding other planes to the attack.

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. When the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"When two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.


#### Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.

To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vectoring bombless plane - but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual lookout. (Comment: sic!)

#### "Method of dropping target bombs.

Number next to circles indicate the order of dropping.

White are dropped according to detector signal.  
Green are dropped when the (X) area is reached.



CONTINUED

PAGE 41

## CONFIDENTIAL

"When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

Cooperation with surface craft.

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they are a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

Ordnance and equipment.

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, "Without a rifle, no infantry", so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow, and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time, rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be

CONFIDENTIAL

outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

Maintenance.

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of materiel, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required."

Confirmation evidence.

"The confirmation of combat results is extremely important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarines and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of deceptive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the enemy slip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

- "1. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.
  - "2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.
  - "3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."
- 
-

CONFIDENTIAL

## LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK


The smoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively small frontal area. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.18 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fan. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FW190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of its



Kasei 23 engine, used in JACK. Photo from captured document.

CONFIDENTIAL

14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.

---

## NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION


The existence of an 11th Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SAIPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the 11th Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOBE-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the 11th Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last March.

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The 11th Air Division therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

CONFIDENTIAL


## JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographs of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice, netting is not used.



LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas.

CONFIDENTIAL



Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and fuselage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

PAGE 47

CONFIDENTIAL

## THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT HELEN


(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft).

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h.p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h.p. Both models are similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h.p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.



Heavily camouflaged HELEN, under Allied strafing attacks. Photo from AAF, SWPA.



CONFIDENTIAL

## PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE


Reproduced below are provisional sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large epinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.



CONFIDENTIAL

## SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a "suicide" squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were "weak points". At the time he left MARALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U.S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvGas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAMIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAMIKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.

CONFIDENTIAL


## JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the PHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANH BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's sources of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing Force troops.

There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONG-HON GAY area, at TOURANE, CAM RANH BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine patrol.




CONTINUED

Page 51

CONFIDENTIAL

## CAT BAI AIRFIELD




CAT BAI A/F, located 3 miles SE of HAIPHONG, has two intersecting hard surfaced runways and is reported to be a first-class military installation. Included in the facilities are a radio station, repair shops and AA positions. Revetment areas are being extended and an attempt is being made to camouflage the taxiways.

Page 52

CONFIDENTIAL

## HON GAY




HON GAY - the chief coaling port of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, located on the north shore of the Gulf of TONKIN. Facilities include a coal treating plant with steam and electric loading devices, concrete piers and extensive railroad yards.

Page 53

CONFIDENTIAL

CAM RANH BAY



CAM RANH BAY - one of the finest fleet anchorages in the ORIENT. Affording complete typhoon protection, it was a staging point for Jap troops enroute for the conquest of MALAYA and NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.

Page 54

CONFIDENTIAL

## JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development - the use of implanted bombs - is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.

- a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C or dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
- b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.
- c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the wings. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.

CONTINUED

Page 55


CONFIDENTIAL

Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

---

## JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.





CONFIDENTIAL

**UNREELLY COVERAGE REPORT**

Photos received at CINCPAC-CINCPAC during period from 24 November 1944 to and including 1 December 1944

\* PRINTS ONLY RECEIVED  
\*\* SORTIES DISTRIBUTED

V/O	F. L.	All.	Sortie No.	Notes #	Date Taken
V	154.9 nm	32,500'	M10/28-21P	9225-41	10/31**
<b>ISLANDS:</b> Good vertical partial coverage of Saembo and Nagasaki.					
V	152.6 nm	20,000'	M7-14P1	9210-153	9/29
V	6"	35,600'	M13/6-21P (Amy A/D)	9210-222	1/23
V	24"	32,600'	M13/6-21P (Amy A/D)	9211-223	1/23
V	6"	25,450'	M11/6-21P (Amy Ia.)	9210-224	11/7
Split	24"	25,450'	M11/6-21P (Amy Ia.)	9213-225	11/7
Vert.	24"	25,450'	M11/6-21P (Amy Ia.)	9214-225	11/7
V	6"	29,300'	M7/2-49P-41 (Shanghai)	9237-226	7/12
Split	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Amy Vio. to S. of Chita)	9211-227	8/8**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Liaoping to Shaling)	9219-228	8/8**
Split	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Chikazuchi to Sasaki Vtc.)	9212-229	8/8**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Chikazuchi to Sasaki Vtc.)	9213-229	8/8**
Split	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Chongqing to S. of Phoula)	9215-230	8/8**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Chongqing to S. of Phoula)	9216-230	8/8**
Split	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Senaw to Amy Vtc.)	9219-231	8/8**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	AMA3-2428 (Senaw to Amy Vtc.)	9220-231	8/8**
V	24"	7,300'	21P8-48P21 (Sanichosen - Swilling Line Area)	9215-232	9/21**
V	24"	9,000'	21P8-48P21 (Tungabonien)	9216-233	9/21**
V	24"	14,000'	21P8-48P21 (Casting)	9217-234	9/21**
Spf	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (Senpa to S. of Phoula)	9314-235	7/27**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (Senpa to S. of Phoula)	9315-235	7/27**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (Tasika to Emuyating)	9316-236	7/27**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (Tasika to Emuyating)	9317-236	7/27**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9318-237	7/28**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9319-237	7/28**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9320-238	7/28**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9321-238	7/28**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9322-239	7/28**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9323-239	7/28**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9324-240	7/28**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9325-240	7/28**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9326-241	7/28**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9327-241	7/28**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9328-242	7/28**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A1 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9329-242	7/28**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Kiting to S. of Phoula)	9347-243	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Kiting to S. of Phoula)	9348-243	8/7**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9349-244	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (S. of Phoula to S. of Phoula)	9351-244	8/7**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Liaoping to Palakha)	9353-245	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Liaoping to Palakha)	9354-245	8/7**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Liaoping to Palakha)	9355-245	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Liaoping to Palakha)	9356-245	8/7**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (6 MI S. of Phoula to 10 MI S. of Phoula)	9357-246	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (6 MI S. of Phoula to 10 MI S. of Phoula)	9358-246	8/7**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (6 MI S. of Phoula to 10 MI S. of Phoula)	9359-247	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (6 MI S. of Phoula to 10 MI S. of Phoula)	9360-247	8/7**
Split	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Pangwei to Amy)	9361-248	8/7**
Vert.	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Pangwei to Amy)	9362-248	8/7**
V	24"	18,500'	2428-48A2 (Amy to Palakha)	9363-249	8/7**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A2 (14° 50' N, 117° 50' E to 20° 50' N, 117° 24' E)	9394-250	9/15**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A2 (14° 50' N, 117° 50' E to 20° 50' N, 117° 24' E)	9395-250	9/15**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A2 (14° 50' N, 117° 50' E to 20° 50' N, 117° 24' E)	9397-251	9/17**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A2 (14° 50' N, 117° 50' E to 20° 50' N, 117° 24' E)	9398-251	9/17**
Split	24"	20,000'	2428-48A2 (14° 50' N, 117° 50' E to 20° 50' N, 117° 24' E)	9399-252	9/17**
Vert.	24"	20,000'	2428-48A2 (14° 50' N, 117° 50' E to 20° 50' N, 117° 24' E)	9400-252	9/17**

V	24"	30,000'	21P8-48P21 (Canton, White Cloud & Tientsin Area)	9493-277	3/13**
V	24"	30,000'	21P8-48P21 (Hsinpo Docks)	9494-278	3/13**
V	24"	30,000'	21P8-48P21 (Sowloon & Hongkong)	9495-279	3/13**

**ISLAND GROUP - Senpa Shoto**

**Oblique film:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage.

V	24"	17,000'	C-810-2885-4-11-65	9401-184	11/25**
V	24"	17,000'	C-810-2885-4-11-65	9402-185	11/25**
V	12"	17,000'	A-002-2885-4-11-65	9403-186	11/25**
V	24"	18,500'	A-071-3885-4-11-65	9404-187	11/24**
V	24"	18,500'	B-073-3885-4-11-65	9405-188	11/24**
V	20"	19,450'	C-617-3885-4-11-65	9406-189	11/24**
O	6 3/8"	200'	A-882-4285	9407-190	11/27**
O	6 3/8"	200'	A-882-4285	9408-191	11/27**
O	6 3/8"	200'	C-327-4285	9409-192	11/27**
V	24"	18,900'	A-526-8198-4-11-64	9416-193	11/24**
V	24"	17,000'	A-071-8198-4-11-64	9416-194	11/24**
V	12"	17,000'	D-527-8198-4-11-64	9416-195	11/24**
V	24"	18,000'	A-873-9883-11-65-78C	9417-196	11/25**
V	12"	17,000'	B-876-9883-11-65-78C	9418-197	11/25**
V	24"	17,000'	C-911-9883-11-65-78C	9419-198	11/25**
O	12"	200'	A-016-43185-4-11-64	9420-200	11/25**
V	40"	20,000'	VD5-1A	9426-201	11/25**
V	40"	20,000'	VD5-1B	9427-202	11/25**
V	24"	20,000'	VD5-1E	9428-203	11/25**
V	24"	20,000'	VD5-1G	9429-204	11/25**
V	24"	20,000'	VD5-1H	9430-205	11/25**

**Oblique film:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage.

V	12"	11,700'	A-418-3885-4-11-65	9193-71	11/8**
V	12"	12,725'	A-491-3885-4-11-65	9194-72	11/8**
O	24"	12,750'	B-911-3885-78C	9195-73	11/8**
V	12"	13,000'	A-134-3188-4-11-64	9196-74	11/8**
O	6 3/8"	16,500'	A-641-8198-4-11-64	9197-75	11/6
O	6 3/8"	200'	No data	9198-76	11/25**
V	12"	200'	A-016-43185-4-11-64	9425-77	11/25**
V	24"	14,500'	B-223-43185-4-11-61	9426-78	11/25**
V	12"	11,400'	B-643-8198-4-11-64	9427-79	11/24**
V	12"	14,000'	A-016-43185-4-11-64	9428-80	11/25**
V	40"	20,000'	VD5-2A	9431-81	11/25**
V	24"	20,000'	VD5-2B	9432-82	11/25**

**Oblique film:** Distant oblique partial coverage.

O	6 3/8"	Var	VR10-18	9216-6	11/7**
---	--------	-----	---------	--------	--------

**ISLAND GROUP - Senpa Shoto**

**Inf. film:** Good vertical partial coverage of island in color.

V	24"	20,000'	YM-97	9218-261	11/29
V	24"	20,000'	YM-97	9219-262	11/29
V	24"	20,000'	YM-97	9221-263	11/29
V	24"	20,000'	YM-97	9222-264	11/29

**ISLANDS - Senpa Shoto - Good complete vertical coverage.**

V	24"	17,000'	A-880-4285	9199-36	11/7**
V	12"	13,300'	A-998-3928-4-11-64	9200-37	11/8**
V	24"	18,000'	A-846-9883-78C	9201-38	11/7

**ISLANDS IN ISLANDS**

**Oblique:** Good triastrogen partial coverage.

Tri	6"	13,500'	Essex-131 (F)	9213-83	9/13**
Net.	6"		Essex-131 (F)	9214-83	
			Essex-131 (F)	9215-83	

**ISLANDS:** Good triastrogen partial coverage.

Tri	6"	13,500'	Essex-131 (F)	9210-85	9/13**
Net.	6"		Essex-131 (F)	9211-85	
			Essex-131 (F)	9212-85	

**ISLANDS:** Good split-vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated.

Split	24"	Var	CV16-2652 (Maula)	9263-132	11/5**
Vert.	24"	Var	CV16-2653	9264-132	
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-5 (Maula)	9268-133	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-6 (Maula)	9269-134	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-7 (Maula)	9270-135	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-8 (Maula)	9271-136	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-9 (Maula)	9272-137	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-10 (Maula)	9273-138	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-11 (Maula)	9274-139	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-12 (Maula)	9275-140	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-14 (Maula)	9276-141	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	T100-15 (Maula)	9277-142	11/5**
O	8 1/4"	Var	T100-17 (Maula)	9278-143	11/5**
O	8 1/4"	Var	T100-17 (Maula)	9279-144	11/6**

## CONFIDENTIAL

O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-125 (North Tip)	928K-145	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-111 (North Tip)	921L-148	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-1 (North Tip)	9082-147	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-114 (North Tip)	924S-148	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-126 (North Tip)	924L-149	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-113 (North Tip)	928J-150	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-109 (North Tip)	928K-151	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-112 (North Tip)	927A-152	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	Frank-149 (Manila Bay)	928L-153	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV127-201 (Manila Bay)	928P-154	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV127-198 (Manila Bay)	928Q-155	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV127-198 (Manila Bay)	929I-156	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV127-202 (Manila Bay)	929J-157	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV127-197 (Manila Bay)	929K-158	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV127-199 (Manila Bay)	929L-159	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV16-544 (Manila Bay)	929P-160	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	CV16-2651 (Manila Bay)	929R-161	11/5**
O	6 3/8"	Var	BDGL-366	929V-162	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	BDGL-367	929W-163	10/18**
O	6 3/8"	Var	BDGL-368	929X-164	10/18**

**PERCSA:** Good split-vertical coverage of areas indicated.

Split Vert.	24"	30,000'	219K-AM163 (Takao A/D)	924J-179	9/12**
Split Vert.	24"	29,800'	219K-AM163 (Shikao A/D)	924S-340	9/12**
Split Vert.	24"	29,500'	219K-AM163 (Tateo A/D)	924T-341	9/12**

**MAIAI STATES:** Good vertical coverage of Singapore.

Y	24"	22,070'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC152)	934C-2	11/5**
Y	6"	21,500'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC175)	934I-3	11/5**
Y	12"	21,500'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC179)	934J-4	11/5**
Y	12"	21,000'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC111)	934S-5	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC184)	934G-6	11/5**
Y	24"	22,300'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC185)	934H-7	11/5**
Y	24"	22,300'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC189)	934I-8	11/5**
Y	24"	21,300'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC182)	934J-9	11/5**
Y	24"	21,300'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC181)	934K-10	11/5**

**PERMA:** Good vertical coverage of areas indicated.

Y	24"	24,000'	(Range) (442B)(AM14)(444-AC181)	936C-3	11/5**
Y	24"	24,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC182)	936D-4	11/5**
Y	24"	21,400'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC179)	936E-5	11/5**
Y	12"	23,500'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC182)	937C-7	11/5**
Y	24"	23,500'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC175)	938A-8	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC185)	937I-9	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC183)	937J-10	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC180)	937K-11	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC184)	937L-12	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC189)	937M-13	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC180)	937N-14	11/5**
Y	24"	22,000'	(442B)(AM14)(444-AC182)	937P-15	11/5**
Y	24"	21,000'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC152)	937Q-17	11/5**
Y	24"	21,400'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC184)	938B-18	11/5**
Y	12"	21,500'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC186)	938I-19	11/5**
Y	12"	21,700'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC189)	938J-20	11/5**
Y	12"	21,000'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC180)	938K-21	11/5**
Y	12"	20,500'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC182)	938L-22	11/5**
Y	12"	21,000'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC174)	938M-23	11/5**
Y	12"	20,600'	(142L)(AM14)(444-AC181)	938N-24	11/5**
Y	12"	16,500'	(Range) (442B)(AM14)(444-AC180)	938T-25	11/5**

**SUMABA:** Good vertical coverage of areas indicated.

Y	24"	21,300'	(442B)(AM15)(444-AC180)	938G-4	11/5**
---	-----	---------	-------------------------	--------	--------

**CAROLINE ISLANDS****Palau:** Good vertical and oblique coverage of areas indicated.

Y	24"	14,800'	289KAM97-1 (Sabelthup A/P)	942I-475	11/1
Y	40"	14,000'	289KAM98-1 (Sabelthup A/P)	942J-476	11/5
Y	40"	13,000'	289KAM98-2 (Sabelthup A/P)	942K-477	11/5
Y	24"	12,000'	289KAM98-1 (Central Harbor)	942L-478	11/1
Y	6"	2,500'	289KAM97-1 (Seregong Is)	942M-479	11/10
Y	40"	15,000'	289KAM98-1 (Drukthapel Is)	942N-480	11/9
Y	40"	14,000'	289KAM98-1 (Drukthapel Is)	942O-481	11/5
Y	40"	10,000'	289KAM98-1 (Drukthapel Is)	942P-482	11/5
O	12"	500'	289KAM97-2 (Seregong Is)	942Q-483	11/10
Y	40"	16,000'	289KAM99-1 (Borok Is)	942R-484	11/9
Y	40"	16,000'	289KAM98-1 (Borok Is)	942S-485	11/5
F	10"	15,000'	289KAM98-1 (Eymalik Is)	942T-486	11/10
O	12"	50'	289KAM98-1 (Ngapok Is)	942U-487	11/2
O	6 3/8"	Var	VB117	942V-488	11/17

**Palau:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

C	6 3/8"	1,700'	NA22-98F-221-8	931I-596	11/22
O	6 3/8"	1,100'	NA22-98F-221-8	931J-597	11/22
O	6 3/8"	15,000'	NA22-98F-113-8	931I-598	11/22
Y	20"	10,000'	NA22-7	944L-599	11/12

**Palau Area:** Good vertical partial coverage.

Y	40"	5,000'	289KAM97-1	923S-6	10/30
---	-----	--------	------------	--------	-------

**Somery:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

Y	40"	5,000'	289KAM97-1	923S-3	10/30**
O	12"	50'	289KAM97-3	923V-4	10/30**

**Truk:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage showing bomb damage in airfield areas.

Y	12"	19,300'	A-236-2782-AM30-70	945I-596	11/22
Y	12"	19,400'	E-151-2782-AM30-70	946A-597	11/22
Y	12"	18,000'	C-493-2782-AM30-70	947F-598	11/22
O	6 3/8"	18,000'	E-433-2782-AM30-70	948A-599	11/22
O	6 3/8"	17,000'	E-810-2782-AM30-70	949A-600	11/22
Y	24"	18,000'	A-423-2782-AM30-70	949A-601	11/22
Y	24"	18,200'	E-836-2782-AM30-70	949I-602	11/22
Y	12"	17,600'	C-348-2782-AM30-70	949K-603	11/22
O	6 3/8"	17,600'	C-348-2782-AM30-70	949L-604	11/22

**WAILANA****Wailana:** Good oblique partial coverage.

O	6 3/8"	Var	VB117-23	921B-30	11/15**
---	--------	-----	----------	---------	---------

**Wailana Is Medialia:** Good complete vertical coverage.

Y	24"	13,000'	E-832-2885	946B-6	11/17
---	-----	---------	------------	--------	-------

**Wailana:** Good complete vertical coverage.

Y	24"	10,000'	289KAM168-1	923J-6	11/14**
---	-----	---------	-------------	--------	---------

**Wailana:** Good oblique partial coverage.

O	6 3/8"	Var	VB117-22A	922T-23A	11/14
---	--------	-----	-----------	----------	-------

**Wailana:** Good vertical and oblique partial coverage.

Y	12"	3,000'	289KAM167-1	923K-185	11/14**
---	-----	--------	-------------	----------	---------

O	12"	50'	289KAM169-1	923L-186	11/14**
---	-----	-----	-------------	----------	---------

O	12"	75'	289KAM170-1	946A-187	11/14**
---	-----	-----	-------------	----------	---------

**Wailana:** Good oblique partial coverage.

O	6 3/8"	Var	VB117-22	922A-8	11/14
---	--------	-----	----------	--------	-------

**Wailana Is Palu:** Good oblique shot.

O	6 3/8"	Var	VB117-22B	922G-1	11/14
---	--------	-----	-----------	--------	-------

CONFIDENTIAL

**LUZON AIRFIELDS**

These photos, taken by carrier-based planes, are representative of the Jap-held airfields encountered by our aircraft on recent strikes against LUZON.



An example of the concentration of Jap fields in the vicinity of MANILA. Five of the six CLARK landing grounds are visible; the sixth is hidden by the cloud in upper right. Center - the four ANGELES airfields.

CONFIDENTIAL



GRACE PARK Airfield, located in the northern part of MANILA, is a fighter field. The new runway is concrete, however, the old runways outlined above are not paved and are believed unserviceable.

Page 60

CONFIDENTIAL



LEGASPI Airfield, situated  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles north of LEGASPI Town, is a medium bomber field with an improved runway. Note bomb crater, fallen trees and debris in foreground - the result of one of our recent strikes.

Page 61

CONFIDENTIAL




Fort STOTSENBURG, former American Army Headquarters, now believed to be a Japanese Garrison Headquarters at least partly responsible for the defense of the many airfields in this area.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #17  
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT  
CAPTURED BY U S MARINES  
AT SAIPAN DURING JUNE 1944  
CONTAINING  
MATERIAL PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR  
CONSISTING OF  
NOTES ON FUELING AT SEA  
FUELING AT SEA OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKING FORCE)  
ENTITLED  
"BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).  
  
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The pertinent material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 14 and 15 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."







警備府	吳、佐、舞、藏	橫須賀鎮守府	技術研究所	水陸部	海軍運輸本部	施設本部	航空本部	艦政本部	海軍省	軍令部
各一	各二	四	一	二	五	五	五	一〇	一〇	一〇
總務部	經理部	海軍病院	軍醫部	運輸部	港務部	燃料廠	航空廠	航空技術廠	工廠	防衛訓練
各一	各一	各二	各五	各一	各一	各二	各二	四	各五	各一
飛行訓練部	戰訓分科會	戰隊司令部	艦隊司令部	學校	特別根據地隊	根據地隊	潛水艦基地隊	海軍潛水艦部	航空隊	聯合航空總隊
各一	各一	各一	各一	各一	各一	各一	各一	各一	各一	二

記  
本  
先


CINCPAC-GINCPDA Form # 12672































五、電報...  
 六、空軍...  
 七、海軍...  
 八、陸軍...  
 九、...  
 十、...  
 十一、...  
 十二、...  
 十三、...  
 十四、...  
 十五、...  
 十六、...  
 十七、...  
 十八、...  
 十九、...  
 二十、...





















*[The page contains several columns of extremely faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the document. The text is too light to transcribe accurately.]*






























Vertical Japanese text, likely a title or chapter heading, possibly reading "Pearl Harbor" in kanji.

Small characters at the bottom left corner, possibly a page number or reference mark.








五  
補給性能補給能力復數及運航  
関念コト

	<p>1. 補給船の種別を明示せしめ標識の通符掲揚スルヲ便トス</p>	<p>一見上補給船の種別、別和標識、標識、是等付至ク莫ク給油船の給糧船ト誤リ搭載誤會ノ虞也 ルコトナリ (185)</p>
<p>2.</p>	<p>艦隊随伴ノ場合(向輪)補給船トシテハ力ヲ優速船トシテ橋ヲルノ要ナリ</p>	<p>航空基地移動用ノ高速中型船ヲ用フル要ナリ (2F) 一段、南方海面に於テハ小型優速艦ヲ利用價值極メ大ナリ (185 英、也) 艦隊ノ随伴ニ現狀ノ十五節ニ困難ナリ 給油船ノ突進滿載時二十節ヲ要ス (健洋丸) 兵裝糧食ヲ食前トシテ以テ強化スルヲ要ス (185) 通信装置運送ノ不備ニテ行動指示上不便ナリ (2F)</p>















航、結

論(并見)

我

(参考)

航空機は、この頃、まだ、飛べない。燃料も、まだ、ない。機体も、まだ、壊れていない。...


航空機は、この頃、まだ、飛べない。燃料も、まだ、ない。機体も、まだ、壊れていない。...

(参考)

(参考)

航空機は、この頃、まだ、飛べない。燃料も、まだ、ない。機体も、まだ、壊れていない。...

...













5

戰域、難水、應シ各地域、教道  
通夜其、他次流ヲ考慮シ、北  
通應不七需品等、改善選其方  
王色我防夜等、關シ研究ノ要  
(是次研究改善トシテ、下リ)

此地等、是等、  
應、  
相當、  
必、


熱帶、  
於、  
受、  
多、

乾、  
保、  
生、

此、  
此、  
(夜、








備修安在，見地骨之石沐我胡  
俄蒙之投投年，改其事項。





物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)


物 (理) 考 (五)


物 (理) 考 (五)

物 (理) 考 (五)


物 (理) 考 (五)















DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #18  
(PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT  
CAPTURED BY U S NAVY  
AT MANILA FROM THE JAPANESE CRUISER NACHI ON 1 APRIL 1945  
CONTAINING ON PAGES 2-1 THROUGH 2-152 ONLY  
MATERIAL PERTINENT (OTHER PAGES NOT BEING PERTINENT)  
TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR  
CONSISTING OF  
PLANS AND ORDERS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES  
ENTITLED  
"TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #1  
and  
TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #2"  
USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE  
"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR"  
(Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).  
(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8  
IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION  
OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 1 and 2 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."






TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

DOCUMENT

NO. 2

DOCUMENT  
NO. 2



聯合艦隊命令作第一號

145  
700

昭和十六年十月五日佐伯海軍監署

**軍機**

聯合艦隊司令長官山本五十六

聯合艦隊命令

對本  
列冊

英領戰艦三於之九聯合艦隊ノ作戰ニ依リ之ヲ實施ス

(1)

(終)

聯合艦隊命令作第一號別冊

對本英領戰艦三於之九聯合艦隊ノ作戰

目次

第一章 英及海軍中不國英國及蘭國ノ對戰ノ此場合ノ聯合艦隊ノ作戰

第二章 一戰要綱

第三章 海戰運用ノ要綱

第一節 海戰運用ノ要綱

第二節 海戰及海戰ノ武力行使

第三章 第一段作戰

2-2

第一節 作戰方針

第二節 對A艦隊作戰要領

第三節 南方作戰要領

第四節 作戰調別

第五節 兵力部署

第四章 第二段 作戰

第一節 作戰方針

第二節 占領地域中防備之重要地點  
及前進根據地

第三節 我占領及破壞預定地域

第四節 兵力部署

第五章 海上交通保護敵海上交通破壞及  
水雷戰

第一節 海上交通保護作戰

第二節 海上交通破壞作戰

第三節 水雷戰

第六章 通信

第七章 補給

第八章 聯合艦隊以外之作戰

第一節 各領守府軍港部隊之作戰

2-3

3-4

第三節 支那方面艦隊，作戰

第九章 海陸軍，協定（別冊）

第二編 對英法美日及戰時德國，開戰

總論，聯合艦隊作戰

第一章 作戰方針

第二章 兵力部署

第三章 聯合艦隊以外，作戰

第一節 支那守府要港部隊，作戰

第二節 支那方面艦隊，作戰

第三編 雜則

第一章 使用時機

第二章 使用海面

第三章 敵方識別

(終)

2-5

二

26

第一編 對支作戰下米國英國及蘭國下

開戦タル場合ノ聯合艦隊作戰

第一章 作戰要綱

- 一 東方ニ對シテ米國艦隊ヲ擊破シ且東洋ニ對スル米國ノ作戰線及補給線ヲ遮断ス
- 二 西方ニ對シテ英領馬來方面ヲ攻略シ英國ノ東洋ニ對スル作戰線、補給線及口ヲ止テ遮断ス
- 三 在東洋敵兵力ヲ擊滅シ其ノ作戰據點ヲ奪フト共ニ資源地ヲ獲得ス
- 四 要地ヲ攻略擴大防備ヲ強化シテ持久作戰

3-7

態勢ヲ確保ス

- 五 敵兵力ヲ速撃擊滅ス
- 六 戰果ヲ擴大シ敵ノ戰意ヲ奪フ

第二章 開戦準備及開戦

第一節 開戦準備

- 一 帝國ヲ米國英國及蘭國ニ對シ開戦ヲ豫期シ諸般ノ作戰準備ヲ完成スルニ決シタル場合ニ開戦概定期日ヲ定メ共ニ第一開戦準備ヲ下令ス各部隊ハ左ニ依リ行動ス
- (1) 各艦隊部隊ハ特令ナクシテ第一段作戰第一

1-7



一、作戦兵力部署ニ依リ編制トシテ戰備ヲ  
 整ヘ各戰隊指揮官訂定ニ依リ適時偵察開  
 始スルモ、時既に長シ連兵出動ス

二、各戰隊指揮官及之ニ關シテ、必要ノ兵隊  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

三、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

四、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

五、後方交通線ヲ確保シ、必要ノ兵隊及兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

六、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

七、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

八、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

九、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

十、各戰隊指揮官、自戰士等ニ必要ノ兵器ヲ  
 及兵器ヲ配付ス

2-9

2-10

第三節 開戦及開戦前之武力行使

- (一) 開戦時機之命令ニ依リ開戦日(×日)數日前迄令(奉命)ヲ以テ示ス
- ノ日(××××)以後開戦状態ニ入リ各部隊ノ隊之互ニ備戰ノ開始ス
- 二ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 三ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 四ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 五ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 六ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 七ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 八ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 九ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 十ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ

2-11

- (一) 日發令以前ニ於テ、大命ニ依リ開戦ス
- (二) 開戦状態ニ入リ作戰ノ開始ス
- (三) ×日發令以前ニ於テ、大命ニ依リ開戦ス
- 三ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 四ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 五ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 六ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 七ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 八ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 九ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ
- 十ノ日(××××)迄、自前日(××××)先制攻撃ヲ受ケ、(××××)迄之ニ至リ依リ

2-12

[Faint, illegible text, possibly a list or table of contents]

2-13

13-14 - see other side.

2-14

2-13

(四) 前項水攻ノ遂行ヲ待テ陸軍攻略兵團

ノ主力ヲ菲律賓次ニマニラニ上陸セシメ

速ニ菲律賓及英領志気ヲ攻略ス

(五) 作戰初期ニシテ是次ニマニラ南

部ニ攻メテ其要地ヲ占領シ見テモルカ諸

島ニシテ此島ノ要地ヲ占領シ所要ノ航空

基地ヲ整備ス

(六) 前項ノ航空基地整備次第逐次航空部隊

ヲ推進シテ爪哇方面敵航空兵力ヲ制圧

シ陸軍ヲ待テ陸軍攻略兵團ヲ遣フ

八

爪哇ニ上陸セシメ同島ヲ攻略ス

(七) 新嘉坡攻略後北部ニ攻メテ之ノ要地ヲ占

領シ又敵ノ對支補給路遮断ノ目的ヲ以

テ遮断線ニ對シ作戰ス

三 本國艦隊ニ依リ此場合ニ時南方作戰ノ第

三艦隊ヲ派遣シ艦隊ヲ以テ之ヲ攻略シ法戰

兵力ノ大半ハ暴擊戰ニ當リテ

四 聯合艦隊ノ活動ノ中心域ニ太平洋及印度洋

方面ニ於テ之ヲ敵海上交通ヲ破壊ス

五 泰國及佛領印度支那ニ對シテ極力彼ノ敵

2-15

2-16

意ヲ挑發セザル如クシ我作戰ニ隨意セシムルニ  
 努ムルモ其ノ敵對行動ヲ認メタル場合武力  
 ヲ以テ作戰ノ障害ヲ排除ス

第二節 對本國艦隊作戰要領

對本國艦隊作戰要領及作戰要領左ノ通定ム

各部隊、指示作戰種別ニ應ズル如ク作戰ス

戰況		
向	對本國艦隊	一先遣部隊及本國艦隊ヲ監視攻撃ス 情勢承リ機宜ノ兵力ヲ以テ之ヲ下ニ向
攻撃部隊	偵察隊	一「ゴ」ノ「シ」等ノ航空基地攻撃ス 二機動部隊及本國艦隊ニ向テ
本國艦隊	對本國艦隊	一先遣部隊機動部隊南方部隊北方部隊 本國艦隊對部隊對之攻撃ス 二主力部隊ノ所要應上之支援ス 三情勢依テ第一艦隊艦隊一部ヲ時來方 ニ利用スルコトアリ
進攻ノ場合	對本國艦隊	一先遣部隊第一先遣部隊機動部隊南 洋部隊主力部隊主力部隊及本國艦隊ニ 對テ作戰ス南方部隊中ノ決戦兵力ヲ選 選撃作戰ス 二南方作戰ス第三艦隊南遣艦隊第一艦 隊艦隊機關等ヲ以テ之ヲ續行ス

第三節 南方作戰要領

2-17

2-18

南方作戰ノ方針及聯合陸隊司令長官南方  
軍總司令官間協定ニ基キ特令スルモノヲ除ク  
ノ外南方部隊指揮官之ヲ實施ス

第四節 作戰期別

第一段作戰ヲ左ノ通區分シ其ノ變換ハ特令ス

一 第一期作戰

開戦ヨリ概テ菲律賓侵略陸軍主力上陸  
完了迄ノ作戰

二 第二期作戰

第一期作戰後ヨリ概テ英領馬來侵略陸

軍主力上陸完了迄ノ作戰

三 第三期作戰

第三期作戰後ヨリ蘭印侵略作戰ニ終結迄  
ノ作戰

第五節 兵力部署

第一段作戰中ノ兵力部署左ノ通定ム

一 第一期作戰兵力部署 別表第一

二 第二期作戰兵力部署 別表第二

三 第三期作戰兵力部署 別表第三

四 總撃作戰兵力部署 別表第四

1-17

2-20

第四章 第二段 作戰

第一節 作戰方針

一 米國及英國艦隊ニ對シ先遣部隊等ヲ以テ  
 監視監視、續行シ好機基地航空部隊母艦  
 航空部隊等ヲ以テ攻撃ス  
 二 米國及英國、東洋ニ對スル作戰線及補給  
 線ノ性質ニ邊断シ要地ノ防備ヲ強化ス  
 三 香港安南内線兵力及攻略要地ノ殘敵ヲ掃  
 滅シ新據ヲ確保シ海上交通ヲ保護ス  
 四 米國及英國艦隊及攻略内線ノ利ヲ占メ各

2-21

第二節 占領地域

一 對米國英國海上交通破壞作戰ヲ強化ス

第二節 占領地域中防備スベキ重要

地點及前進根據地

一 占領地域中防備スベキ重要地點左ノ通譯ス  
 馬尼刺「マニラ」新嘉坡「シンガポ」  
 「クワラ」  
 「アソシ」  
 「ベナン」  
 「ラバウル」  
 二 占領地域ニ於ケル前進根據地左ノ通譯ス  
 馬尼刺 新嘉坡 「シンガポ」

2-22



第三節 我人占領之破壞豫定地域

一戰情況許之限り連三占領又ハ破壞七ノ上ル  
地域五ノ如ク

一「青森」方面「三浦」方面「宇都」

「水戸」方面

二「宇都」方面「三浦」方面

三「宇都」方面「三浦」方面

四「宇都」方面要地

第四節 兵力部署

一、我人戦力部署別表第五通定ハ

上

二、我人戦力部署別表第六通定ハ

2-23

2-24



一、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 二、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 三、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 四、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育

一、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 二、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 三、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 四、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育

一、

一、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 二、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 三、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 四、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育

一、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 二、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 三、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 四、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育

一、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 二、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 三、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育  
 四、本會之宗旨，在於研究及推廣我國之教育

3-0

2-28

9

10

1. 關於珍珠港之襲擊，係由日本海軍所發動，其目的在於摧毀美國之海軍力量，並佔領太平洋之島嶼，以作為進攻美國之跳板。

2. 襲擊發生於十二月七日，即美國之獨立日。日本海軍在珍珠港內，以航空母艦為主要武器，投下大量之燃燒彈及高爆炸彈，造成重大之損失。

3. 襲擊發生後，美國海軍部隨即宣佈珍珠港為不設防之港口，並對日本宣戰。此舉使美國正式加入第二次世界大戰。

2-89

4. 襲擊發生後，美國政府隨即採取了一系列之緊急措施，包括封鎖日本領事館，並對日本實施經濟封鎖。

5. 此外，美國政府亦加強了對珍珠港之防禦，並對全國之空襲警報系統進行了改進。

— 14 —

11

6. 關於襲擊發生之原因，目前尚無定論。據一般之看法，日本海軍之所以發動襲擊，主要是因為其海軍力量在太平洋地區日益強大，而美國海軍力量則相對薄弱。

7. 此外，日本海軍亦認為，美國在太平洋地區之擴張，已威脅到其利益。因此，日本海軍決定採取果斷之行動，以維護其在太平洋地區之利益。

8. 然而，亦有部分人認為，襲擊發生之原因，主要是由於美國海軍在珍珠港內之防禦力量不足所致。

2-30

9. 總之，珍珠港之襲擊，是第二次世界大戰中一樞紐性之事件。其發生，使美國正式加入戰爭，並使戰爭之規模擴大到全球。

10. 此外，襲擊亦使美國人民對政府之防禦力量產生了懷疑，並促使政府採取了一系列之改革措施。

12

13

各部及機關，概當，投投，又，三，種，字，之  
 前，其，部，及，投，投，位，置，能，行，可，能，區，域，之，右，要，司，  
 報，告，直，接，  
 以，意，或，其，主，  
 之，以，各，部，及，其，主，管，之，職，之，任，之，各  
 部，及，其，主，管，之，人，事，之，任，之，各

2-31

附表一

自本行設方面之機械斷載者進給

一、本行設方面之機械斷載者進給

$\frac{1}{x^2} = x^{-2}$ $\frac{d}{dx} x^{-2} = -2x^{-3}$ $= -\frac{2}{x^3}$	$\frac{1}{x^3} = x^{-3}$ $\frac{d}{dx} x^{-3} = -3x^{-4}$ $= -\frac{3}{x^4}$	$\frac{1}{x^4} = x^{-4}$ $\frac{d}{dx} x^{-4} = -4x^{-5}$ $= -\frac{4}{x^5}$	$\frac{1}{x^5} = x^{-5}$ $\frac{d}{dx} x^{-5} = -5x^{-6}$ $= -\frac{5}{x^6}$
--	--	--	--

2-32



<p>1. 姓名</p> <p>2. 職稱</p> <p>3. 學歷</p> <p>4. 經歷</p> <p>5. 現任職務</p> <p>6. 其他</p>	<p>姓名</p> <p>職稱</p> <p>學歷</p> <p>經歷</p> <p>現任職務</p> <p>其他</p>
---	---

2-35

<p>姓名</p> <p>職稱</p> <p>學歷</p> <p>經歷</p> <p>現任職務</p> <p>其他</p>	<p>姓名</p> <p>職稱</p> <p>學歷</p> <p>經歷</p> <p>現任職務</p> <p>其他</p>
---	---

2-36

西	公	司	日	本	在	在	20	7/15	六	三	四	
日	公	司	日	本	在	在	207		六	三	四	
日	公	司	日	本	在	在	10	7/15	六	三	四	
日	公	司	日	本	在	在	10	7/15	六	三	四	

西	公	司	日	本	在	在	10	7/15	六	三	四	
日	公	司	日	本	在	在	10	7/15	六	三	四	

附本卷第三

移雷又修增同補冷子米

西	公	司	日	本	在	在	10	7/15	六	三	四	
日	公	司	日	本	在	在	10	7/15	六	三	四	

2-37

2-37



附表不日

南方作或改各機之機體區投區等類  
 南方作或改各區在機體區之投區之南是即各  
 之安全，其投區之南，必少，其投區  
 但此本丁或前之本。

教改安而	投各機	使用各方	由家	投各機
各之投	各之機	各之機	投各機	投各機
各之投	各之機	各之機	投各機	投各機
各之投	各之機	各之機	投各機	投各機

2-39

2-40





1. 關於珍珠港之襲擊，其目的在於使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，能與日本海軍力量，處於同等地位。

2. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於劣勢地位。

3. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於被動地位。

4. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於危險地位。

2-45

1. 關於珍珠港之襲擊，其目的在於使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，能與日本海軍力量，處於同等地位。	2. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於劣勢地位。
3. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於被動地位。	4. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於危險地位。

1. 關於珍珠港之襲擊，其目的在於使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，能與日本海軍力量，處於同等地位。	2. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於劣勢地位。
3. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於被動地位。	4. 襲擊珍珠港之結果，使美國之海軍力量，在太平洋中，處於危險地位。

2-46

[Faint, illegible text, possibly a table or list, with some markings and bleed-through visible.]

2-47

2-48

一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指

一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指

2-41

一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指

一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指

一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指

一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指  
 一、本州對付是應以警務方面作殊指彈指

2-50

(四) 偽造傳單罪之偽電區別法

其區別法係依其內容之字句及號碼 (即令其內容與原傳單無異)

(四) 聖旨表示法

其區別法係依其內容之字句及號碼 (即令其內容與原聖旨無異)

(四) 地點(名)表示法(左)通

時	詞	法	經	通	大	州	面	書	用	途
第一地點表示法	十一	一	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第二地點表示法	十二	二	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第三地點表示法	十三	三	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第四地點表示法	十四	四	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號

2-51

二六

第五地點表示法	十五	五	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第六地點表示法	十六	六	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第七地點表示法	十七	七	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第八地點表示法	十八	八	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號
第九地點表示法	十九	九	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號	陸軍省軍使收第一二七號

2-52





1. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 2. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 3. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 4. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 5. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 6. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 7. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 8. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 9. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 10. 凡在中華民國境內，

2-55

1. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 2. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 3. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 4. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 5. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 6. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 7. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 8. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 9. 凡在中華民國境內，  
 10. 凡在中華民國境內，

2-56

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly a list or report section]

2-57

[Faint, mostly illegible text, possibly a list or report section]

2-58

1. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額  
 2. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額  
 3. 1912年1月1日以前之負債額  
 4. 1912年1月1日以後之負債額  
 5. 1912年1月1日以前之資產額  
 6. 1912年1月1日以後之資產額  
 7. 1912年1月1日以前之淨資產額  
 8. 1912年1月1日以後之淨資產額  
 9. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與負債額之差額  
 10. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與負債額之差額  
 11. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與資產額之差額  
 12. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與資產額之差額  
 13. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與淨資產額之差額  
 14. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與淨資產額之差額  
 15. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與負債額之差額  
 16. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與負債額之差額  
 17. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與資產額之差額  
 18. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與資產額之差額  
 19. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與淨資產額之差額  
 20. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與淨資產額之差額


2-59

1. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額  
 2. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額  
 3. 1912年1月1日以前之負債額  
 4. 1912年1月1日以後之負債額  
 5. 1912年1月1日以前之資產額  
 6. 1912年1月1日以後之資產額  
 7. 1912年1月1日以前之淨資產額  
 8. 1912年1月1日以後之淨資產額  
 9. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與負債額之差額  
 10. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與負債額之差額  
 11. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與資產額之差額  
 12. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與資產額之差額  
 13. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與淨資產額之差額  
 14. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與淨資產額之差額  
 15. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與負債額之差額  
 16. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與負債額之差額  
 17. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與資產額之差額  
 18. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與資產額之差額  
 19. 1912年1月1日以前之營業額與淨資產額之差額  
 20. 1912年1月1日以後之營業額與淨資產額之差額

2-60

← 可也  
人 =





2-63

2-64

[Faint, illegible text, possibly a list or report fragment]

2-65

L

一、  
 二、  
 三、  
 四、  
 五、  
 六、  
 七、  
 八、  
 九、  
 十、

2-66

十一、  
 十二、  
 十三、  
 十四、  
 十五、  
 十六、  
 十七、  
 十八、  
 十九、  
 二十、

2-67

Faint, illegible text at the top of the page, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side.

Second block of faint, illegible text in the upper middle section.

Third block of faint, illegible text in the middle section.

Block of text in the lower middle section, containing several lines of faint, illegible characters.

Final block of faint, illegible text at the bottom of the page.

2-64

2-69



八、本會...

九、高...

十、...

十一、...

附表

第一節 行政

一、...

二、...

三、...

官之...

三

各部...

令...

二、...

三、...

令...

四、...

令...

令...

五、...

令...

2-70

2-71

一、各部隊長官之補缺  
 二、各部隊員之補缺  
 三、各部隊員之補缺  
 四、各部隊員之補缺  
 五、各部隊員之補缺  
 六、各部隊員之補缺  
 七、各部隊員之補缺  
 八、各部隊員之補缺  
 九、各部隊員之補缺  
 十、各部隊員之補缺

2-72

一、各部隊員之補缺  
 二、各部隊員之補缺  
 三、各部隊員之補缺  
 四、各部隊員之補缺  
 五、各部隊員之補缺  
 六、各部隊員之補缺  
 七、各部隊員之補缺  
 八、各部隊員之補缺  
 九、各部隊員之補缺  
 十、各部隊員之補缺

2-73

一、各部隊員之補缺  
 二、各部隊員之補缺  
 三、各部隊員之補缺  
 四、各部隊員之補缺  
 五、各部隊員之補缺  
 六、各部隊員之補缺  
 七、各部隊員之補缺  
 八、各部隊員之補缺  
 九、各部隊員之補缺  
 十、各部隊員之補缺

此項報告，係由該局人員，於一九二一年  
 一月間，由上海及北京，轉給該局，以  
 備查閱。  
 該局人員，於一九二一年，由上海及北京，  
 轉給該局，以備查閱。  
 如欲查閱，請向該局，索取。  
 一九二一年，一月間，由上海及北京，  
 轉給該局，以備查閱。

2-74

一九二一年 補給報告

本報告，係由該局人員，於一九二一年  
 一月間，由上海及北京，轉給該局，以  
 備查閱。  
 如欲查閱，請向該局，索取。  
 一九二一年，一月間，由上海及北京，  
 轉給該局，以備查閱。

2-75





1. 珍珠港事件發生後，美海軍部曾派員調查，其結果如何，請詳述之。  
 2. 美海軍部在珍珠港事件發生前，曾否接到任何關於日機襲擊之消息，如有，請詳述之。  
 3. 美海軍部在珍珠港事件發生前，曾否接到任何關於日艦襲擊之消息，如有，請詳述之。  
 4. 美海軍部在珍珠港事件發生前，曾否接到任何關於日機襲擊之消息，如有，請詳述之。  
 5. 美海軍部在珍珠港事件發生前，曾否接到任何關於日艦襲擊之消息，如有，請詳述之。

1-78







Handwritten notes at the top of the page:

1. 關於... (Regarding...)  
 2. 關於... (Regarding...)  
 3. 關於... (Regarding...)

...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...

4-2

...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page:

1. 關於... (Regarding...)  
 2. 關於... (Regarding...)  
 3. 關於... (Regarding...)

4-3









1941年12月7日

海軍省 航空隊 航空機 運用 記録

機名	機種	乗員	目的地	出発時刻	着陸時刻	備考
1	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
2	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
3	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
4	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
5	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
6	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
7	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
8	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
9	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
10	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
11	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
12	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
13	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
14	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
15	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
16	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
17	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
18	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
19	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
20	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	

2-92

機名	機種	乗員	目的地	出発時刻	着陸時刻	備考
21	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
22	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
23	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
24	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
25	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
26	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
27	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
28	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
29	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
30	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
31	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
32	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
33	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
34	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
35	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
36	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
37	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
38	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
39	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	
40	九九式	3	ハワイ	07:00	07:30	

2-93

海軍省 航空隊 航空機 運用 記録

昭和十六年十二月七日

航空機 運用 記録

機名 機種 乗員 目的地 出発時刻 着陸時刻 備考

1 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

2 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

3 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

4 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

5 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

6 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

7 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

8 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

9 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

10 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

11 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

12 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

13 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

14 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

15 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

16 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

17 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

18 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

19 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

20 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

21 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

22 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

23 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

24 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

25 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

26 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

27 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

28 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

29 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

30 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

31 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

32 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

33 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

34 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

35 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

36 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

37 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

38 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

39 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30

40 九九式 3 ハワイ 07:00 07:30



第八章 聯合艦隊以外，作戰

第一節 各鎮守府要港部部隊，作戰

一 各擔任區域內要港，防衛，嚴禁海上交通，保護  
二 各擔任區域方面，作戰，關於聯合艦隊及支那  
方面艦隊，協力云

二 航空部隊，其，應所要兵力，之情況，應之之，所要，  
地點，移動進出，之，同方面，作戰，關於艦隊，指  
揮官，之，官，該方面，擔任，鎮守府，及，要港，部，隊，指  
揮官，之，指揮，之，之，云

第二節 支那方面艦隊，作戰

一 四方

一 概不現態勢，以，支那，對，之，作戰，續行，之，上，并  
二 陸上兵力，之，揮，擊，滅，之，共，權，益，之，處理，之

二 關於初頭，第三，支，艦，隊，之，基，幹，之，部，隊，以，以，陸  
軍，之，協，同，之，承，應，之，以，陸，上，之，所，在，敵，兵，力，之，揮  
擊，滅，之

三 台，領，地，之，防，衛，之，嚴，之，支，那，沿，岸，之，海，上，交  
通，之，保，護，之，上，之，水，軍，亦，能，空，域，之，支，那，沿，岸  
利用，之，阻，之，之，之，云

四 陸，軍，之，上，陸，送，援，衛，及，集，合，點，之，防，衛，等，之，關，所，要  
應，之，聯合，艦，隊，及，南，方，軍，之，作戰，之，協力，之

2-96

2-97



一、凡我軍用之武器裝備，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

二、凡我軍用之經費，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

三、凡我軍用之糧食，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

四、凡我軍用之被服，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

五、凡我軍用之醫藥，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

四七

一、凡我軍用之武器裝備，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

二、凡我軍用之經費，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

三、凡我軍用之糧食，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

四、凡我軍用之被服，均應由國庫撥款

撥款，不得由地方撥款

五、凡我軍用之醫藥，均應由國庫撥款

2-98

2-99

第二章 兵力部署

別表第六 (發送)

第二章 聯合艦隊以外，作戰

第一節 鎮守府及司令部部隊，作戰

一 橫濱鎮守府 在 6 月 28 日，各鎮守府以 大 隊 艦 隊  
旅 隊，及 安 全 部 隊 隊，於 2 次 巡 邏 港 水 體 艦 隊 之 威  
對 之 威 威，於 2 艘 在 正 域 附近 之 水 體 艦 隊 之 擊  
破。

2-100

小 隊 艦 隊 艦 隊，及 之 實 施 之 巡 邏 令，此 艦 隊 以 兵  
艦 隊 來 方，有 甚 地 艦 隊 移 動 中 中 再 作 戰，防 方 之

第二章 又 兩 方 面 艦 隊，作戰

主 上 之 事 正 是 艦 隊 之 第 三 次 巡 邏 隊，及 奔 上 之 事 隊  
之 以 此 之 方 面，之 精 用 之 艦 隊 部 隊，艦 隊，之 檢 護 並  
其 之 檢 護 之 檢 護 之 上 之 機 宜 隊 隊，之 檢 護 之

第三節 海 軍

第一章 海 軍 部

中 大 艦 隊 的 一 次

第二章 使 用 之 圖

使 用 之 圖 (安 全 巡 邏 圖) 之 左 之 依 之

2-101

海軍艦船(公費艦隊圖) 陸軍艦船(陸軍艦隊圖) 商船(商船圖)	甲(甲種艦船) 乙(乙種艦船) 丙(丙種艦船)
---------------------------------------	-------------------------------

作為

馬來方面之使用之一般性甲種艦船之別定之

第三章 敵味方識別

敵味方識別之對人艦隊或乘所定之依外左之依

海軍艦船(日本艦船)輸送船及陸軍所屬船舶(含)

及陸軍艦船上之砲臺(共力)含之間、味方識別、戰

時田原船舶味方識別信標規程(依)

(終)

田九

2-102

2-103


















2-112

2-113



航艦母	隊部遺先	隊部方北	隊部洋
<p>一隊 二隊 三隊</p>	<p>一隊 二隊 三隊</p>	<p>一隊 二隊 三隊</p>	<p>一隊 二隊 三隊</p>
<p>IAF (-44)</p>	<p>IAF</p>	<p>IAF</p>	<p>IAF</p>
<p>通過時敵艦在前方方面通過 出敵外其航向其他各航 空母艦均可擊敵艦等此 空回部隊是舞前進</p>	<p>一部以敵艦隊監視 二部以敵艦隊監視 三部以敵艦隊監視</p>	<p>一部以敵艦隊監視 二部以敵艦隊監視 三部以敵艦隊監視</p>	<p>一部以敵艦隊監視 二部以敵艦隊監視 三部以敵艦隊監視</p>
<p>IAF (-44)</p>	<p>IAF</p>	<p>IAF</p>	<p>IAF</p>
<p>敵艦隊之威力圍外 機動之敵艦隊監視隊 機動之敵艦隊監視隊 機動之敵艦隊監視隊</p>	<p>一部以敵艦隊監視 二部以敵艦隊監視 三部以敵艦隊監視</p>	<p>一部以敵艦隊監視 二部以敵艦隊監視 三部以敵艦隊監視</p>	<p>一部以敵艦隊監視 二部以敵艦隊監視 三部以敵艦隊監視</p>

2-115







2-119



聯合艦隊司令部  
中華民國二十六年十月十七日  
聯合艦隊司令部

第一號九  
凡自交行中因急上...  
第二號九  
凡自交行中因急上...  
第三號九  
凡自交行中因急上...

2-120

聯合艦隊司令部  
中華民國二十六年十月十七日  
聯合艦隊司令部

第一號九  
凡自交行中因急上...  
第二號九  
凡自交行中因急上...  
第三號九  
凡自交行中因急上...

2-121

經

經

命令正誤表(二)


10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
4-220000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	10000000	10000000	64000000

2-122

10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000
10000000	64000000	10000000	64000000

2-115





2-125

1. 關於珍珠港之襲擊，其經過情形，已由  
 參謀長馬里亞諾將軍，於本月十日，在  
 參議院軍事委員會之聽證會中，作一詳盡  
 之報告。其報告之要點，可分述如下：

一、襲擊發生於本月七日，即星期日，上午  
 七時十五分。當時珍珠港內，共有美軍海軍  
 艦艇二十二艘，其中被擊沉者六艘，被擊傷者  
 十六艘。此外，尚有美軍飛機多架，亦被擊  
 毀。

2-126

理德萊



1. 1941年12月7日，珍珠港被炸(詳見前報)  
 2. 珍珠港被炸後，美海軍部即派巡洋艦「西多尼亞」號(西多尼亞號)前往調查  
 3. 該巡洋艦於12月11日抵達珍珠港  
 4. 該巡洋艦於12月12日離開珍珠港  
 5. 該巡洋艦於12月13日抵達檀香山  
 6. 該巡洋艦於12月14日離開檀香山  
 7. 該巡洋艦於12月15日抵達聖地牙哥  
 8. 該巡洋艦於12月16日離開聖地牙哥  
 9. 該巡洋艦於12月17日抵達聖多明各  
 10. 該巡洋艦於12月18日離開聖多明各  
 11. 該巡洋艦於12月19日抵達聖多明各  
 12. 該巡洋艦於12月20日離開聖多明各  
 13. 該巡洋艦於12月21日抵達聖多明各  
 14. 該巡洋艦於12月22日離開聖多明各  
 15. 該巡洋艦於12月23日抵達聖多明各  
 16. 該巡洋艦於12月24日離開聖多明各  
 17. 該巡洋艦於12月25日抵達聖多明各  
 18. 該巡洋艦於12月26日離開聖多明各  
 19. 該巡洋艦於12月27日抵達聖多明各  
 20. 該巡洋艦於12月28日離開聖多明各  
 21. 該巡洋艦於12月29日抵達聖多明各  
 22. 該巡洋艦於12月30日離開聖多明各  
 23. 該巡洋艦於12月31日抵達聖多明各

2-121

在珍珠港被炸後，美海軍部即派巡洋艦「西多尼亞」號前往調查。該巡洋艦於12月11日抵達珍珠港，於12月12日離開珍珠港，於12月13日抵達檀香山，於12月14日離開檀香山，於12月15日抵達聖地牙哥，於12月16日離開聖地牙哥，於12月17日抵達聖多明各，於12月18日離開聖多明各，於12月19日抵達聖多明各，於12月20日離開聖多明各，於12月21日抵達聖多明各，於12月22日離開聖多明各，於12月23日抵達聖多明各，於12月24日離開聖多明各，於12月25日抵達聖多明各，於12月26日離開聖多明各，於12月27日抵達聖多明各，於12月28日離開聖多明各，於12月29日抵達聖多明各，於12月30日離開聖多明各，於12月31日抵達聖多明各。

2-130



隊司令長官、報告之、及海軍總指揮官ニ通報ス

十日、海軍總司令部ニ報告ス

海軍總司令部ヨリ、海軍省ニ報告ス、長官、現在重  
要ナル、及、海軍省ニ報告ス、及、海軍省ニ報告ス

海軍省ニ報告ス、長官、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス

海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス

海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス

予已ニ海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス、海軍省ニ報告ス  
補填



一補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 如... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...

R-135

補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...  
 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給... 補給...

R-136

1. The following information was obtained from the records of the United States Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, on the subject of the attack on Pearl Harbor:

2. On December 7, 1941, the Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The attack resulted in the destruction of several United States Navy ships and aircraft, and the capture of others.

3. The attack was a major military and naval disaster for the United States. It resulted in the loss of 18 ships, including the battleships USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, and USS West Virginia. In addition, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers, and 3 destroyers were damaged.

4. The attack also resulted in the death of 2,335 United States military personnel and 68 civilians. The attack was a major turning point in the Pacific War, and it led to the United States' entry into the war.

5. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack, and it was a major military and naval disaster for the United States. It resulted in the loss of 18 ships, including the battleships USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, and USS West Virginia. In addition, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers, and 3 destroyers were damaged.

2 - 137

6. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack, and it was a major military and naval disaster for the United States. It resulted in the loss of 18 ships, including the battleships USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, and USS West Virginia. In addition, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers, and 3 destroyers were damaged.

7. The attack also resulted in the death of 2,335 United States military personnel and 68 civilians. The attack was a major turning point in the Pacific War, and it led to the United States' entry into the war.

8. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack, and it was a major military and naval disaster for the United States. It resulted in the loss of 18 ships, including the battleships USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, and USS West Virginia. In addition, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers, and 3 destroyers were damaged.

9. The attack also resulted in the death of 2,335 United States military personnel and 68 civilians. The attack was a major turning point in the Pacific War, and it led to the United States' entry into the war.

10. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise attack, and it was a major military and naval disaster for the United States. It resulted in the loss of 18 ships, including the battleships USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma, and USS West Virginia. In addition, 3 aircraft carriers, 3 destroyers, and 3 destroyers were damaged.

2 - 138

1. 關於... 之... 情形... 業經... 查明... 茲將... 情形... 列表... 如下...  
 2. ... 情形... 業經... 查明... 茲將... 情形... 列表... 如下...  
 3. ... 情形... 業經... 查明... 茲將... 情形... 列表... 如下...  
 4. ... 情形... 業經... 查明... 茲將... 情形... 列表... 如下...  
 5. ... 情形... 業經... 查明... 茲將... 情形... 列表... 如下...

139

-----

140

-----



<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>
<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>	<p>明</p>

2-143

2-144

1  
2  
3  
4

5  
6  
7  
8



1. The first part of the report is a general statement of the facts of the case, and is followed by a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is followed by a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

3. The third part of the report is a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is followed by a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.


4. The fourth part of the report is a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is followed by a detailed account of the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

2-150

2-150



前鋒隊聯合隊友表



2-157

機密聯合艦隊命令作第三號

600

昭和十五年十二月七日發自瀋陽飛艇長門

聯合艦隊司令長官山本五十六

軍機

聯合艦隊命令

第一開戰準備

Y日十二月八日

(S)

2-152

2-153



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY



3 9999 06314 026 1



